[178-10004-10056.pdf — page 28]
TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISHE WHITE HOUSE OFFICEtime and bureaucratic process that it reached the working levelonly in the form of SNIE 85-3, which held that establishment ofsuch a base was most improbable. (See, however, para 29)54. It is difficult to say whether information from ground    'sources would have been published had there not been a blanket    injunction against it. The analysts too were sensitive to the    potential political impact of the reports they were receiving;    this would not have influenced them against publication, but    would have made them want to be doubly sure, especially on a    subject with a history reaching back to *Our Man in Havana*. In    addition, rigid compartmentation was maintained between the    COMOP Special Gro) organization responsible for collection and    the intelligence components responsible for analysis. Few, if    any, CIA analysts working on the Cuban problem even had IDEALIST    clearances. As a result, they did not know that no overflights    of Pinar del Rio and Las Villas were included in the September    program, or that this program was seriously delayed. They had    no way of knowing that the photographic verification they had    requested would not be soon forthcoming, and they might well have    delayed publication from day to day in hopes of receiving it..55. Nevertheless, it can be established that if the injunc-    tion against publication had not existed there would have been    some reflection of the refugee reports in the *Cuban Daily Summary*,    which is not highly selective. In retrospect, it seems quite pos-    sible--but by no means certain--that they would then have been    picked up in the *Checklist*, but it is extremely doubtful if they    would have survived the coordination process for the *Central In-    telligence Bulletin*. Thus, at the most the President might have    learned that there was suspicious activity around San Cristobal    slightly more than a week before he apparently did.56. In sum the CIA analysts believed they had done their    duty by targeting the San Cristobal area for photographic cover-    age, but no word of their concern over activity in this area    had appeared in an intelligence publication. It appears highly    probable that the Special Group first heard of this concern at    its meeting on 9 October, when (see para. 63) it ordered a U-2    mission which covered the area.57. The gap of 7-10 days between the key analytic correla-    tion of reports and the Special Group meeting can probably be    attributed to the cumbersome processes of the administrative    structure supporting the Special Group. This machinery was de-    signed to provide elaborate justifications and back-up paper    work before each decision was made, procedures reaching back    into the early history of U-2 operations over the USSR. They    were intended for the control of deliberate strategic reconnais-    sance of the USSR, and not for a fast-moving situation such as    that in Cuba, which was rapidly becoming tactical. In fact,    after readout of the 14 October mission they were jettisoned.-28-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTPhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford Library