Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[178-10004-10056.pdf — page 9]
# TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTE. Hard Intelligence on the Build-Up (Defensive Phase)18. During the last week in August, CIA continued to follow the progress of the Soviet build-up, using shipping information, communications intelligence, and agent and refugee sources. The Checklist of 29 August reported that:"There is no sign of a let-up in the movement of Soviet equipment and personnel into Cuba."By latest count, there have during the past six weeks been some 80 voyages to Cuban ports by Bloc vessels and 20-35 by ships under Communist charter."We note that deliveries of industrial equipment, foodstuffs, and other nonmilitary items are being made largely on chartered Western ships, probably because so many Soviet ships are involved in hauling military gear."19. The first hard evidence on what the Soviets were up to in Cuba was provided by photography of the 29 August mission. The President was told, in the Checklist of 31 August that:"Preliminary information from the 30 /sic7 August U-2 mission shows at least seven SA-2 sites on the western half of the island. Manning of this many sites would require some 1500-2000. Bloc troops. We are able to report on the basis of what is known so far that construction of the sites appears to be fairly advanced and that there are canvas-covered missiles in the vicinity of some sites. The existence of additional sites can probably be assumed."The same source reveals seven or eight Soviet missile-equipped torpedo boats and an undetermined number of Soviet tanks. The Cubans have had Soviet tanks for some time, but this is our first indica- tion that they now have boats of this type. They appear to be KOMAR-class converted PT-boats, mounting two surface-to-surface missiles with an estimated range of 35 nautical miles."After further analysis this information appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 6 September. On the 4th and 5th, General Carter briefed a number of congressional leaders, including the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. In a White House statement, also of 4 September, the President publicly confirmed the presence of SA-2s and KOMAR-class boats.-9-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST> Photocopy> from> Garald R. Ford Library
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# TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST20. The 29 August mission had confirmed the establishment of a missile defense of Western Cuba. The first mission for September (of the two which had been authorized as a routine matter by the Special Group on 19 July; see para 10) was flown on schedule on 5 September and revealed similar defenses in Las Villas Province. In retrospect, it can be seen that the two groups of SA-2 sites surrounded the areas in which MRBM and IRBM site construction was planned. Photography of these areas in the 29 August and 5 September missions, however, gave no recognizable evidence that any such construction was then under way (although re-examination showed a few vehicles and some construction material at Guanajay Site 1 on 29 August). In fact, there was probably no ballistic missile equipment in Cuba at the time (see discussion in paras. 36-39).21. More detailed readout of the 29 August mission had, by about 6 September, led CIA analysts to suspect the presence of another kind of missile site--possibly surface-to-surface--at Banes, on the northeastern coast. General Carter so informed the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense on 6 September. No equivalent of such a weapon had been identified in the USSR in earlier U-2 photography. Lacking such background, further information and study were necessary to determine the characteristics and range of the missiles. Programs for both were set in motion.22. COMOR, at the request of the Secretary of State, on 9 September reviewed the vehicles available for reconnaissance of Banes. The next day, General Carter in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense requested "necessary actions, (including Special Group approval) to provide for the employment, when directed by higher authority, of tactical-type reconnaissance" against the cruise-missile site at Banes. At the Special Group meeting of 14 September, a JCS representative briefed on capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba; however, the Secretary of Defense was recorded as not wanting the operation considered further until results of further U-2 reconnaissance of these targets were available, i.e., General Carter's proposal had been overtaken by the decision on U-2 coverage taken on 10 September (see paras 24-25). Meanwhile, further analysis of the 5 September photography had resulted in a CIA study dated 14 September which concluded definitively that the Banes site was intended for a short-range coastal defense missile. A fully checked-out item appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 18 September.-10-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST> Photocopy from Garsid R. Ford Library
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST PROPERTY OFTHE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE23. One additional item was picked up by the 5 September mission, the presence of an assembled MIG-21 at Santa Clara airfield, along with several others still in crates. This was not reported by CIA in the Checklist, but was reported in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 8 September. Actually, these MIG-21 crates (readily identifiable from photographs) had arrived in Cuba about 1 September aboard a Soviet ship which had been photographed en route, but the photographs were not received in Washington for several weeks. Upon the arrival of these and photographs of other ships carrying MIG-21 crates, an item was published in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 27 September--with DIA withholding concurrence (see para. 6) --that between 22 and 30 MIG-21s had been delivered to Cuba. This information was also reported in the Checklist of 27 September.-11-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTPhotocopyfromGarald R. Ford Library
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTF. The New Overflight Program24. The results of the 29 August and 5 September missions, in particular the confirmation of SA-2 sites, led to a full review of the overflight program for Cuba. This took place in the White House on 10 September. Among those present were Mr. Rusk, Mr. Robert Kennedy, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, General Carter, and General Lansdale. The decisions of this meeting are crucial to the record, and some discussion of the atmosphere in which they were taken is required. There were three major factors:a. On 30 August, a SAC U-2 had overflown Sakhalin Island. The USSR had protested on 4 September, the US had acknowledged the overflight, and the incident has received major play in the world press. This had been followed on 8 September by the loss of Mission GRC-127 over Communist China, accompanied by even greater publicity. As a result, most of the participants were--to varying degrees--reluctant to chance another U-2 incident at this time. This meant that they were naturally hesitant to authorize any flights over areas where SA-2s might be operational.b. Second, there is no record that the MRBM problem was discussed. The hard intelligence gathered so far on the Soviet build-up (the Banes problem was still up in the air), was not such as to produce a sense of alarm or a feeling that urgent action was required. The establishment of SA-2s and other advanced defensive systems had been foreseen in the NIE of 1 August and their probable arrival had been fully reported during the intervening period. Hence confirmation came not as a shock, but as a problem to be dealt with deliberately. (It may even have served to relax the sense of urgency generated by the President's decisions of 23 August, the known usually being less alarming than the unknown.) The participants therefore felt that the next step was to provide systematic coverage of the rest of Cuba, from which the full story of what the USSR had put into the island could be developed. They felt no immediate need for re-coverage of the areas covered by the two previous missions.c. Finally, the participants were operating in the atmosphere of the time. The Cubans had been claiming that U.S. invasion was imminent. The Soviet diplomatic and propaganda apparatus was attempting to focus attention-12-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTPhotocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
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# TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTon Berlin and hinting at a confrontation late in the year,thus creating the impression that a Berlin crisis would notcome until after the US election. In fact, the USSR in itsstatement of the following day (11 September) on Cuba statedthis explicitly. There were vague hints of Khrushchev's in-tent to attend the UNGA in New York. Khrushchev appears nowto have been throwing up a diplomatic smoke-screen behindwhich to carry out the deployment of strategic forces intoCuba, but those present at the meeting of 10 September didnot have the benefit of this hindsight. Furthermore, theymust all have been acutely aware that Cuba was potentiallythe campaign issue that could most seriously damage the Admin-istration in the election campaign then beginning.25. At the meeting, the Secretary of State objected to    the CIA proposal for two extended overflights covering the    remainder of the island not covered in the 29 August and 5    September missions. He insisted, instead, that coverage of    the rest of Cuba should be designed so that peripheral flights    over international waters would not be combined with over-    flights of Cuban territory. To meet his wishes, the program    was divided into four flights, two overflights and two peri-    pheral. One overflight was to be over the Isle of Pines and    the other over the part of Cuba east of 77° West to cover    Guantanamo and Banes. One peripheral flight was to cover    the north coast of eastern Cuba, the other the south coast.    The overflights would be quick "in-and-out" operations, while    all four were to be designed for maximum safety. (There    is apparently no written record that a decision was made not    to fly over known SA-2 sites, but in obtaining approval for    the tracks it was necessary to provide assurance that they    did not do so.) Later the DCI negotiated with the Depart-    ment of State permission to extend the Isle of Pines mis-    sion over the Bay of Pigs area of Cuba proper. The Presi-    dent approved this program, authorizing three flights in    September in addition to the one remaining of the normal    September allocation (Special Group action of 19 July).    Thus, the record shows that the President authorized every-    thing the Special Group requested.-13-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST> Photocopy> from> Gerald R. Ford Library
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTG. SNIE 85-3-6226. The lack of urgency expressed in these decisions was also reflected in the deliberations over and the content of SNIE 85-3-62, The Military Build-up in Cuba, passed by USIB on 19 September. This estimate, which was generated by the issuance of NSAM 181, must be viewed as a symptom of the state of mind in the Intelligence Community and in Washington generally during the first half of September. There were no dissents and no major disagreements in preparation of the final draft. Its key findings are as follows:a. "We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it and consequently that the main purpose of the military build-up in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose."b. "The Soviets themselves are probably still uncertain about their future military program for Cuba. Indeed they probably intend to test US and Latin American reactions as they go along."c. "As the build-up continues, the USSR may be tempted to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defensive in purpose but of a more 'offensive' character: e.g., light bombers, submarines, and additional types of short-range surface-to-surface missiles...."d. "However, they are well aware that the question of offensive as opposed to defensive weapons in Cuba has become a major political issue."e. "The establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear striking forces which would be used against the US would be incompatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far...However, Soviet military planners have almost certainly considered the contribution which Cuban bases might make to the-14-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST
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# TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTSoviet strategic posture and, in that connection, the feasibility and utility of deploying nuclear delivery systems to Cuba. Therefore, this contingency must be examined carefully, even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy.f. "Soviet planners might see some utility in deploying MRBMS and IRBMS to Cuba in order to supplement the limited number of ICBMS now believed to be operational in the USSR and to reach targets beyond the range of submarine-launched missiles."g. "The establishment on Cuban soil of a significant strike capability with such weapons would represent a sharp departure from Soviet practice, since such weapons have so far not been installed even in Satellite territory... The Soviets might think that the political effect of defying the US by stationing Soviet nuclear striking power in so menacing a position would be worth a good deal if they could get away with it. However, they would almost certainly estimate that this could not be done without provoking a dangerous US reaction."h. "Although the Soviets may see some military advantages in Cuba as a strategic strike base, the risks would be great and the political implications would run counter to the kind of policy they are actually pursuing in Latin America. They do not propose to win the region for communism by military conquest. They count instead on a process of political action...."27. In commenting on these statements it must first be recognized that the judgment on the degree of risk which the USSR was willing to accept was gravely in error. It should also be recognized that the community was virtually unanimous in support of this judgment; deployment of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons outside the USSR was without precedent. Further, while the first ballistic missiles had probably arrived in Cuba in the period 7-15 September, (see para. 37) the first reports from ground observers who had seen them had not arrived in Washington by 19 September; there was no evidence available that MRBMS were on the way. What the estimate failed to do, however, was to give adequate weight to the pace at which Soviet operations were moving and to the great probability that the new installations were manned by Soviet personnel. The community was still thinking in terms of the rather deliberately-paced Soviet military aid programs for the UAR, Iraq, and Indonesia (and indeed for Cuba in the 1960-62 period) when there was already good evidence that the Cuban program had departed from this pattern.28. Moreover, the Indonesian program too had broken the pattern only a month before, when the USSR showed itself willing to accept a substantially increased degree of risk for the-15-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST> Photocopy> from> Gerald R. Ford Library
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTsake of a political gain something less than vital to Sovietinterests. The original contracts for Indonesia had beenroughly similar to those for the UAR and Iraq. They included14 SA-2 sites, 12 KOMARS, 26 TU-16s (12 equipped with air-to-surface missiles) and 12 submarines, all to be manned by In-donesians and to be delivered at a pace consonant with the re-quired training of personnel. However, as the crisis overWest New Guinea approached its climax of. August, Soviet eager-ness to embroil the Indonesians in open warfare with the Dutchled them to accelerate delivery schedules and to permit theuse of Soviet personnel to operate some of the weapons beingprovided. Six submarines manned by Soviet crews actually con-ducted war patrols under nominal Indonesian command. Thus bymid-August the USSR had shown itself willing to take some riskof military engagement with an ally of the United States, al-beit the degree of risk involved was far less than in the Cu-ban venture.29. For the record, there is no evidence that the ex-    istence of SNIE 85-3 had any inhibiting influence on later de-    cisions. It was not, for instance, cited to support an argu-    ment against continuing overflights. Nor did it affect current    intelligence reporting; this is conducted independently of the    estimative process and provides a check on the continuing val-    idity of standing estimates.-16-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST> Photocopy> from> Gerald R. Ford Library
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTH. Views of the DCI30. The only available record of dissent from the judgments made in Washington during the first half of September, both estimative and operational, is that of the DCI himself, who, although vacationing on the Riviera, was kept informed by CIA cable. On 7 September, he cabled General Carter urging frequent repeat reconnaissance missions and stating that "my hunch is we might face prospect of Soviet short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable types in Cuba which could command important targets in Southeast US and possibly Caribbean areas." On 10 September, the DCI again cabled "Difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly defenses being established in Cuba...appears to me quite possible measures now being taken are for purpose of ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBMS to be installed by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from overflights. Suggest Board of National Estimates study motives...." (The Board's response is in effect contained in SNIE 85-3.)31. On 13 September and again on 16 September the DCI repeated these premonitions. In the latter cable he added "Do not wish to be overly alarming this matter but believe CIA and community must keep Government informed of danger of a surprise and also that detection of preparatory steps possibly beyond our capability once Cuba defense system operative." Finally, on 20 September, the DCI expressed reservations on the conclusions of SNIE 85-3, which had been cabled to him, saying "as an alternative I can see that an offensive Soviet base in Cuba will provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position in connection with all other critical areas and hence they might take unexpected risks in order to establish such a position." These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates.32. As a result of the DCI's pressure there was a renewed examination of other methods of reconnaissance of Cuba. (It should be noted here that this discussion was in terms of what might be necessary after the establishment of a complete SA-2 defense had made use of the U-2 impossible, with the implicit thought that only at this point would the Soviets risk the introduction of such weapons as MRBMS.) On 19 September, at USIB, General Carter stated his desire to use RF-101s over Cuba. He also said he thought use of the FIREFLY drone over Cuba could be justified to the Special-17-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTPhotocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
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# TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTPROPERTY OFTHE WHITE HOUSEGroup, adding that "we cannot put a stop to collection in Cuba; otherwise the President would never know when the point of decision was reached." The Special Group at its next meeting approved consideration of the use of FIREFLY and COMOR forwarded to USIB on 27 September a program for its use. (NO FIREFLY missions have yet been attempted.)33. Another attempt during this period to get additional coverage was the programming of KEYHOLE Mission 9045 (29 September - 2 October) to photograph Cuba. The results were unsatisfactory, largely because of cloud cover.-18-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST> Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
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# TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTI. CIA Reporting during September34. The progressive uncovering of the Soviet program in Cuba was reported in detail by CIA current intelligence. Pertinent samples from the Checklist are:a. "The number of confirmed SAM sites remains at 12, but the likelihood that others are under con- struction grows, with the latest evidence pointing to the Isle of Pines as one of the additional locations." (14 September)b. "A message intercepted yesterday on a net serving Soviet forces in Germany called for 'volunteers for the protection of Cuba.' We are not sure of the weight to be placed on this and another intercept. referring to the isolation of 'volunteers.' If valid, they would suggest that the influx of Soviet military personnel to Cuba is not finished. We are investigating further." (15 September)c. "We have spotted two more Soviet passenger vessels en route to Cuba. Their arrival will raise our estimate of technicians on the scene to about 4,200. We are beginning to see some tenuous evidence foreshadowing the appearance of SAM sites in Camaguey Province." (18 September)d. "The interception on 15 September of a signal from a missile-associated radar, probably coming from the surface-to-air missile site at Mariel, suggests that the site is or soon will be operational. "The message asking for volunteers for service in Cuba, which we reported Saturday, has now cropped up on enough Soviet military radio nets to reveal that a fairly general recruiting campaign is going on. There is no indication yet of the numbers involved." (19 September)e. "Evidence is still coming in on Moscow's canvass of its military forces for volunteers to serve in Cuba. This activity is puzzling; we have never seen anything like it before. "The move may be purely administrative: to replace personnel who had been suddenly ordered there with others prepared to stay for some time. On the other hand, it could mean another sizable increment to Soviet personnel in Cuba or a belief in Moscow that its people are likely to be engaged in combat. We are trying to get a better answer." (21 September)-19-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST> Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTf. "Our running account of the number of Soviet dry-cargo vessels making the voyage to Cuba since mid-July is now over 100. About 85 of these probably were carrying military hardware."The Cuban Foreign Office on Tuesday ordered Western correspondents to put in for new credentials by today, telling them that all of Cuba beyond Havana's city limits is out of bounds except by special permission." (27 September)35. During this period General Carter, at the President's instructions, briefed General Eisenhower on the Cuban situation on 10 September. On 12 September he briefed the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees. Although out of time sequence, it should also be noted here, because the information presented was essentially more of the same, that the DCI again briefed General Eisenhower on 3 October and Congressman Cannon on 9 October.-20-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST![Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library]