Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[178-10004-10396.pdf — page 3]
SECRET - SENSITIVEAs a digression, Stein commented that, to the extent that CI staff mayhave gotten into "gray" areas, this may well have been as a result ofan effort to restrict knowledge of a particular incident to the smallestpossible number of people. Thus, rather than going to the Bureau, wherecontrol over the dissimilation of the subject information would not bepossible, the staff might go to another Agency component such as theOffice of Security. Similarly, where an investigation proved fruitless, conti-nued maintenance of relevant files by the CI staff, rather than by the Agencyor the Bureau generally, constituted part of an effort to avoid prejudicingthe particular subject of the investigation.Another general area mentioned by Stein was that involving the use byCI staff of people having an historical relationship with the staff. Thesepersons would be used against clearly foreign targets in the United States.As an example, Stein said that such persons might be used to obtain accessto codes or the like in this country.Stein mentioned the allegations relating to the reported breaking and enteringinto the Chilian Embassy. I told him that we had already reviewed thisinstance, and, therefore, there was no need for him to review it any detail.(b) Files on Americans.The major source of files on Americans maintained by CI staff (was the"American Targets Program" (ATP). This program involved informa-tion received by CI staff from Agency sources, from the State Department,and from the Military. Information might also be received from the FBI. Thepurpose of ATP was to collate all contacts between any American and anyforeign intelligence officers, particularly those from the USSR. The conceptof the program was that all such contacts would be reported to CI staff,which would index them for future reference.Stein noted that, although the State Department actually had a formal regu-lation requiring that all contacts with Soviets be reported, it was extremelydifficult to convince State officers so to report. Stein spent a substantialamount of time overseas under State cover. He said that, as a result ofthat experience, he knows that State officers are reluctant to report this kindof information. (A State officer probably will not achieve promotion by hiscontact with Soviet personnel.) As a result of this reluctance, the informa -tion obtained by the CI staff generally originated with the State Department'sOffice of Security.SECRET - SENSITIVE3PhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford LibraryNW 50955 DocId:32105622 Page 4
[178-10004-10396.pdf — page 4]
SECRET - SENSITIVEThe ATP program for filing was simply that when a name was reportedto CI staff, it was mechanically processed by personnel who exercisedno judgment in recording the name. The names of both the Soviet and theAmerican people involved in the contact would be recorded. As a result of thisprocess, the ATP file index was able to develop a great deal of informationon Soviet contacts with Americans. If, as a result of information obtained,CI staff had reason to believe that a aprticular person had been recruitedby the Soviets, that information would be forwarded to the Office of Securityfor the Agency, if any Agency officer were involved, or to FBI, if an Americaroutside the Agency was involved.Stein explained that this program was conducted by CI staff instead of bythe FBI or State, because the program might well contain informationwhich would be relevant to CIA purposes, but not relevant to the purposesof the other Agencies. Thus, the files might well contain informationconcerning known KGB Agents. That information, in turn could havederived from a sensitive source, the identity of which CIA would not wantto have revealed. Accordingly, the information was stored by the Agencyrather than the other possible Governmental components. Informationrelevant to those components, however, was made available to them fromthe ATP project.The information utilized by ATP could have been derived, as noted, fromreports of other Governmental components or from information providedby any American. This would be information provided voluntarily, eitherby a person actually having a contact with a foreign intelligence officeror by persons with knowledge that someone else had had such a contact.The information could be particularly useful, not only to the CIA, but toother Governmental components. For example, the State Department'sOffice of Security might report that a State officer had had a contact overa long period with a Soviet. The CI staff could check all its informationon that Soviet and confirm whether they had reason to believe that theSoviet was in fact an agent.Another source of files on Americans held by CI staff might be the productof code-breaking by NSA. Thus, in reading codes, names of Americansmay appear. Some of these may be innocuous, and some may be spies.In any event, all these names are also indexed, although the index isseparate from ATP, because of the sensitivity of the NSA program as wellas the information derived therefrom.SECRET SENSITIVTY4NW 50955 DocId:32105622 Page 5![photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library]
[178-10004-10396.pdf — page 5]
SECRET - SENSITIVEThe information plugged into the indexing system will not become an actual file until there is some reason for opening a file on a particular person. At that point (for example, a file search requested by another Agency) all information relating to a particular person will be collated in one place. This, in turn will be developed into a separate file (a personality file). If the information on a particular person is requested by a CIA field office, the collation process would occur and the field would be told how the particular person had come to the attention of the Agency in the first instance and would also be told any derogatory information which the field station would want to know.Other CI files derived from on-going cases. Part of these files emanate from information provided to the Agency by defectors. For example, one element of this information is designated "Soviet leads." This is because the CI staff learned from a defector that all Soviet women employed in the United States Embassy in the USSR during a certain period were Soviet agents. Some of these women, in turn, married Americans, and, as a result, now live in the United States. The FBI is advised of the identity of all these women. The CI staff, under official cover, occasionally goes out to interview these women, in an effort to convince them to reveal what they know about KGB operations. The effort was first to determine whether the women continue to be KGB agents, and, if not, to gather information from them. The general modus operandi would be to tell the women that we know that at one time they were KGB agents and, while we did not intend to take any action against them, to request them to reveal information that they may have learned at that time concerning KGB operations. Generally, the women would agree to do so. If they did not, the contract would, at least temporarily, be dropped. These women are/*used* as "defectors who did not defect".Other examples of going cases are: a journalist who had private contact with George Blake, a former KGB agent in England; an American who was tied into the Able case (in this instance, the actions are taken by the Bureau, but guidance given by CI staff); and a journalist who the KGB, on three occasions, attempted unsuccessfully to recruit. *Other files may relate to actions begun because of some kind of counter-intelligence implication in a particular situation. In these instances CI would maintain the files because of the particular sensitivity of the matter, even though action may be taken by another Agency component.*Stein noted that the decision as to whether to utilize someone as a double agent is made by the CIA. If the decision is affirmative, the double agent would be handled by Agency (if he is abroad) or by the FBI (if he is in this country). The only exceptions to this pattern would be where the double Agent is in the United States for only a brief time or where he has a special relationship with a particular CIA officer.NW 50955 DocId:32105622 Page 6PhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford Library
[178-10004-10396.pdf — page 6]
SECRET - SENSITIVEOther files are maintained concerning the Soviet Embassy. CIA's position on this matter is that this is a State case which the Agency is running on behalf of State.There is also a file on Vesco held by the CI Staff. The Agency became involved in this situation because John Dean of the White House called and stated that President Nixon's brother had obtained a job with IOS. He wanted to know what IOS was all about. CIA, in fact, had a file on IOS, because it was known that the Soviets had been attempting to penetrate that institution as a vehicle for getting agents into this country or at least allowing them to learn of economic matters relating to the United States. Stein said that, at one point, Vesco's lawyer called to say that he wanted to have an account of everything which had been said about Vescolover South American radio channels. The Agency refused this request, stating that it was beyond its charter.(c) DefectorsThere are four sorts of defectors handled by the CI Staff. The first group are those under low level cover which are being used to scan Soviet publications and to extract anything relating to Soviet intelligence which they, in light of their expertise, may recognize. The second group of defectors are those with "talents". This group are former KGB agents who, as a result, have special knowledge. They may be used from time to time to go and talk with (either in the United States or abroad) USSR citizens. Another sort of defector is one from Czechoslovakia. This particular person is highly knowledgable in Maxist-Leninist matters. Accordingly, he is used to write propaganda which is disseminated abroad. The last category of defectors are those who are no longer in regular contact with the agent. These particular persons are seen from time to time for some particular reason which could simply be an administrative matter concerning their pensions, etc.The CI Staff also maintains a file on defectors from America to some other country (such as the Soviet Union, Cuba and others). These names are recorded because the persons involved may eventually end up in the United States once again or in some country other than the Soviet Bloc. This would not necessarily mean that that person is a spy, but it does mean that he would be of counter-intelligence interest, At approximately the time of the Kennedy assassination the Secret Service and the FBI became particularly interested in potential defectors from
[178-10004-10396.pdf — page 7]
SECRET - SENSITIVEthe United States. (Recall that Oswald had had connections with Russia). This was an operation which the CIA did not particularly want to undertake. Nonetheless the Agency did trace the names which the Bureau and Secret Service provided in this regard. The number of these names was perhaps 2,000 including crackpots who may have as an off hand comment, suggested that they intended to defect to, for example, Russia. The CIA attempted to turn the program over to the Secret Service for the Bureau, but th would not take it. The CIA ultimately stopped the project and cleared all the files out. This would have been approximately three years ago. Stein noted that although the files had been eliminated, it was possible that some of the names provided to the Agency had made it into the Central Agency files, and would not have been eliminated therefrom.I briefly discussed the NOSENKO Case with Stein. Nosenko had defected to the United States and was admitted to this country as a "parolee". That is, the Immigration and Naturalization Bureau have a quota of persons which the Agency can bring into the country without regular immigration papers. These persons are the responsibility of the Agency. There was some initial doubt, as to whether, in fact, Nosenko had been sent to the United States by the KGB. Information obtained from another defector tended to confirm this suspicion. The question then was what to do with Nosenko. It was decided for a variety of reasons, that it would be unwise to attempt to deport him; as a result, he was kept in the United States in isolation. After several years it was determined that Nosenko was, in fact, not an attempted double agent. He was thereafter rehabilitated and now lives happily in the United States. Although the CI had an interest in this case, it was actually run by the Office of Security.As one aspect of the Agency's duty to help in services of common concern to all Governmental agencies, the CIA recorded in computer form at the request of the FAA, all information relating to hijackers, Stein thinks that this was probably because the CIA had the only equipment which could handle the needed material in the proper fashion. The information so provided would, for example, include names of all those who were on board hijacked planes. Approximately two years ago the CIA tried to give this program to the FAA. That Agency, however, would not accept the program, and, therefore it was terminated by CIA.SECRET - SENSITIVE
[178-10004-10396.pdf — page 8]
## ADVICE AND WAIVERPlace Rangley VaDate 3/15/74Time 11:00 AMBefore you make any statement to, or answer any questions from, the Commission or its investigators, you should understand that you have the right to remain silent. If you choose to answer, anything you say can be used against you in court.You may consult a lawyer for advice before any questions are put, and you may have a lawyer with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions without a lawyer present, you still have the right to stop answering at any time; or you may defer your answer until you talk to a lawyer.## WAIVERI have read and understand the foregoing advice. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions / *with* / *without* / a lawyer at this time. No promises or threats have been made to me, and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.SignedWitness:Witness:Witness:> [Figure: Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library]NW 50955 DocId:32105622 Page 9
[178-10004-10416.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystemIdentification FormDate: 8/27/201Agency InformationAGENCY: ROCKCOMRECORD NUMBER: 178-10004-10416RECORD SERIES : TESTIMONY SERIESAGENCY FILE NUMBER: COLBY STATEMENT--APPENDICESDocument InformationORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE: THE MIAMI STATIONDATE: 01/13/1975PAGES: 7SUBJECTS: BAY OF PIGSANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIESCIAPERIODICAL, RAMPARTSMIAMI, FLCUBAN EXILESDOCUMENT TYPE: REPORTCLASSIFICATION: UnclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: ConsultedCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 11/06/1995OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: Appendix J to Statement of William Colby to Rockefeller Commission, 13 January 1975.
[178-10004-10416.pdf — page 1]
178-10004-10416SecretAppendix J# THE MIAMI STATIONIn March 1960, President Eisenhower approved the project later to become known as the Bay of Pigs. In April 1960 a Western Hemisphere Division Forward Operations Base (FOB) was established in South Miami, Florida, for the purpose of coordinating all support, training, and preparatory activities for operations against Cuba. The FOB simultaneously supported our busy Havana Station which was operating under difficult circumstances, including inhibiting surveillance of our officers by Castro security services. After the Station was closed in Havana when US diplomatic relations were broken with Castro's government in January 1961, it was envisioned that selected personnel assigned to the Miami Base would, upon the overthrow of the Castro government, become a nucleus to reopen the Havana Station. During the Bay of Pigs landing, the FOB provided support for the operation.In September 1961, the Miami Station was established at a new location, replacing the FOB. About 300 persons were assigned to the Station at one time; Headquarters responsibility was in an autonomous group until 1965, when the Western Hemisphere Division resumed charge.Utilizing former Cuban assets in Havana who had fled to the United States, indigenous Cuban organizations were formed to continue the overt struggle against the Castro government. In addition, a Cuban Intelligence Organization in exile was formed to collect information on the activities of militant autonomous Cuban exile groups in the United States who were not affiliated with the US Government effort against the Cuban regime. The Cuban intelligence organization in exile participated in a number of activities including the issuance of anti-Castro publications, maintaining relations with anti-Castro governments and groups in the Caribbean and Latin American countries, and debriefing Cuban exiles arriving in the United States for positive foreign intelligence and counterintelligence to identify Cuban agents being infiltrated into the United States via the Cuban Freedom Flights and small boats. Allied with this effort was an electronic intercept capability directed at Cuban government communications which was manned by indigenous Cuban exiles. Close working relations were maintained with US Government agencies in the Miami area such as the FBI, INS, Coast Guard, Customs, Navy, Air Force, etc., to coordinate activities. A small support base was established in Key West.SecretPhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford Library
[178-10004-10416.pdf — page 2]
SecretDuring the period 1962-66 the Miami Station engaged in classical intelligence operations directed against the Cuban regime. Radio Americas was established and broadcast daily from Swan Island in the Caribbean. Psychological, economic, and political activities were undertaken in an effort to undermine confidence in the Castro government and underscore the Soviet presence and total Cuban dependence on the USSR. Maritime operations were also undertaken. Among other missions, Cubans who desired to escape from the Cuban mainland were assisted.In late 1966 a substantial cutback in the pace of operations began and a reorganization of the Station was undertaken as a result of a review by higher authority (303 Committee). Many cover entities were terminated and personnel reassigned. Increased emphasis on the collection of intelligence and counterintelligence through operations in other foreign areas, limitation on maritime activities, and consolidation of written and radio output achieved considerable savings in money and manpower.In early 1968 it became apparent that as a result of sustained operational activity in the Miami area over a period of years the cover of the Miami Station had eroded to a point that the security of our operations was increasingly jeopardized. This erosion was more significant following the *Ramparts* exposure of CIA operations and the possibility that the location of our Station on property leased from the University of Miami might be especially embarrassing to the University. At the same time, it became apparent that activities would have to be reduced drastically for policy, budgetary, and operational reasons. It was decided to deactivate the Miami Station and replace it with a smaller Station which would be better able to respond to current needs. Security had deteriorated seriously at the large Station (then 150 persons) which was under commercial cover near Homestead; the new Station of about 50 persons had good official cover on a government-controlled area in a run-down part of Miami Beach. It was felt, also, that the new Station could facilitate adjustments in the objectives and targets of Miami-based operations and enable the new Station to reduce our dependence on those Cuban exiles who were no longer in tune with current or future needs.In August 1968 the new, smaller Miami Station was activated, and during the ensuing months the maritime activities were terminated; a new and much smaller media operation was activated, and intelligence collection was expanded to include the Bahamas and Lesser Antillies. Increased emphasis was given to third-country Cuban operations (agent recruitment and technical operations against Cuban Embassies abroad) under the guidance of the new Station. The Cuban emigre organizations supported by the Station were drastically reduced and activities were2SecretNW 50955 DocId: 32105602 Page 3PhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford Library
[178-10004-10416.pdf — page 3]
Secretphased down. In 1974, responsibility for the residue Cuban operations was transferred to Headquarters and the remaining Cuban emigre organizations were terminated.Currently, some 20 staff personnel in the Miami Station are engaged in collecting foreign positive intelligence and counterintelligence in those areas of the Caribbean that are of strategic importance to US policymakers and in which unfriendly overt or covert actions would be inimical to US interests. (For Support Activities in the Miami area, see the attachment.)
[178-10004-10416.pdf — page 4]
SecretSupport Activitiesin the Miami AreaCommunicationsPrior to 1968.From the late 1950s through 1968, CIA communications activities in the Miami area supported DDO covert action against the Cuban government. The CIA radio station transmitted and received enciphered messages to and from agents at sea or in Cuba.A radio intercept facility also monitored Cuban and other selected foreign radio signals. Apart from Cuban operations, some high frequency Morse and teletype messages were exchanged between the Miami radio base station and selected CIA field stations in Latin America. In 1964 the CIA Latin American area electronic equipment repair facility was relocated from Panama to the Richmond Naval Air Station.Miami-based CIA communications personnel were responsible to the DDO for training staff and agent personnel and for equipping teams and boats with the means of maintaining communications during operations directed against Cuba.Liaison was conducted with the FCC, the FBI, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense.Other non-communications liaison existed between the Miami communications facilities and various organizations: the Miami Beach Police, the University of Miami, and the Coast Guard/GSA.From 1968 to Present.The focus was on communicating with CIA agents in-place on the island of Cuba or in Latin America. Communications links were established with foreign police authorities in several countries during this period.