Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[178-10004-10054.pdf — page 8]
TOP SECRETfact take one step back and two steps forward, and hold on to the Cuba real estate as a propaganda and insurgency base, as a means of keeping Castro 'ur der control, or in order to retain a capability for quickestoration of a Soviet offensive capability. The kind of concerted intelligence action which the DCI had in mind would include (1) penetration of the Castro government regime, (2) the placement of additional agent teams in Cuba, (3) the continuation of efforts to obtain the assistance of British, French and German representatives in Cuba, (4) the possible obtaining of useful ir telligence from the attorney, Donovan, who is negotiating prisoner releases, and (5) possibly the obtaining of useful information from the captain of the "African Pilot" who had a 3-hour talk with Castro and who yesterday asked to see a U. S. intelligence officer.Mr. Pace asked whether Mr. McCone would favor the use of Guantanamo Naval Base as a base for launching intelligence and related operations against Cuba. Mr. McCone said that he would not be in favor of this because if we were caught using Guantanamo for intelligence operations Castro would obtain UN and other support for Cuba's demands for U.S. evacuation of the Naval Base.Answering General: Doolittle 's question, the DCI stated that U-2 overflights of Cuba were going at the rate of two a day, resulting in coverage of all targets once a week and in coverage of some important targets' (e.g., harbors) more often. Mr. Mic Cone said that COMOR and USIB list the targets and that he then establishes flight schedules.Going back to the subject of Guantanamo, Mr. Pace asked whether the DCI had made a study of the expected intelligence return that would be obtained if intelligence operations were conducted from the Base Mr. Pace adding that he thought such a study should be made before a final policy dec:sion was reached. Mr. McCone said that he had not made such a study. He added that in August the "operators" in CIA had proposed to the MONGOOSE Group that Guan-tanamo Base be so used, but this was opposed at the policy level. Mr. McCone said that he would not be opposed to a restudy of the proposal at this time. In answer to Dr. Killian's inquiry, Mr McCone confirmed that we are conducting SIGINT Operations at Guantanamo, and Mr. Kirkpatrick noted that NSA had only recently added two more positions thereHandle Via COMINT TALENT KEYHOLEChannels OnlyHandle via BYEMANControl SystemTOP SECRET
[178-10004-10054.pdf — page 9]
TOP SECRETMr. Murphy asked the DCI to 'state the meaning of "MONGOOSE B PLUS". Mr. McCone explained that in the MONGOOSE Group it was originally conceived that Phase I would be one of gathering intelligence on the possibilities for the organization and supply of resistance groups within Cuba, but this effort was "only fairly successful" because Castro has some 100,000 informers in place in Cuba and exercises internal security controls through a system of ration cards, and therefore, CIA did not get as many teams into Cuba as had been hoped. On August 10, Phase II was reached with: MONGOOSE planning for (a) violent actions (b) a relatively high level of actions, or "B-PLUS", and lesser actions, or "B MINUS". Mr. McCone said that he had not been prepared to endorse proposed "B PLUS" actions in the absence of plans for military backing, because of his own speculation that the U.S. would be faced with MRBMs in Cuba. In any case, the MONGOOSE effort became diverted by considerations of Soviet activities in Cuba, Mr. McCone stated.In answer to a question from Mr. Murphy as to who chairs the MONGOOSE Group at this time, Mr. McCone said that he did not know whether Mr. Bundy or the Attorney General was now serving as Chairman.With reference to the absence of photographic evidence of Soviet offensive missile deployment prior to October 14 photography, Mr. McCone said that if one looks at photography of Cuba obtained on September 5 it is possible to spot evidence of activity at the San Cristobal MRBM site, but this activity could have been that of agricultural workers and the evidence did not then point to missile activity. Dr. Killian noted the Board's concern that Soviet camouflage operations may be deceiving us. Mr. McCone expressed his own great concern that the Soviets are deceiving us by camouflage methods. Acknowledging that our intelligence estimates leave a certain margin for error, Mr. McCone noted that it is nevertheless impossible for us to say that we know all that is going on in the USSR with respect to missile activity. In response to Dr. Killian's comment that public discussion seem to indicate that U. S. missile capabilities are superior to those of the USSR, the DCI considered that any such conclusion is erroneous and dangerous and could lead to a complacency which might well result in curtailment of the U. S. missile program by an economy-minded Congress. Mr. McCone added that in his presentations to select Committees of the Congress he always expresses reservations concerning U. S. missile superiority.Dr. Killian wondered whether the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress understand the danger of conclusions that "nothing is there because it can't be seen". Mr. McCone said that undoubtedly there is a tendency toward heavy dependence upon photographic intelligence.Handle Via COMINT TALENT KEYHOLE Channels TOP SECRET Handle via BYLIAN Control System
[178-10004-10056.pdf — page 0]
178-10004-10056 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination System Date: 8/27/201Identification FormAgency InformationAGENCY: ROCKCOMRECORD NUMBER: 178-10004-10056RECORD SERIES : ASSASSINATION FILESAGENCY FILE NUMBER: MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (9)Document InformationORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO: DIRECTOR, CIATITLE: [Restricted]DATE: 11/14/1962PAGES: 33SUBJECTS: CUBAN MISSILE CRISISCUBACIAANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIESDOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUMCLASSIFICATION: Top SecretRESTRICTIONS: 1B; ICCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/04/1993OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS:v9.1 39
[178-10004-10056.pdf — page 1]
IMONGOOSC - PARAS S, 15-17TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST 19178-10004-10056 14 November 1962SCIPROPERTY OFTHE WHITE HOUSE OFFICEMEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceSUBJECT : CIA Handling of the Soviet Build-upin Cuba, 1 July - 16 October 1962A. The Background1.  The USSR's decision to develop Cuba as a military base must have been made by the spring of 1962, and preparations within the USSR must have been under way from that time on. There also must have been planning activities in Cuba, particularly reconnaissance and survey work. The only indication of these operations which has so far been found is a single intercepted personal message on 11 April to a Russian in Cuba who had previously been at the Kapustin Yar missile test range. This fragment was not judged solid or important enough to warrant inclusion by itself in current intelligence publications.2.  Thus, until the first evidence of the deployment began to come in late in July, Washington had no warning of the USSR's intention. Intelligence officers dealing with Cuba were focussing during July on the direction Soviet-Cuban relations would take following Soviet acquiescence in Castro's assertion of his leadership of Cuban Communism in the "Escalante affair." This attitude was reflected in reporting on the visit of Raul Castro to Moscow early in the month. The President's Intelligence Checklist, which will normally be used in this memorandum as the record of CIA reporting to the President, Secretaries of State and Defense, General Taylor, and McGeorge Bundy, reported on 4 July that Raul was "probably seeking more Soviet military aid and, specifically, more advanced equipment such as the MIG-21s and surface-to-air missiles which the USSR is already providing to Indonesia, Egypt, and Iraq." The Checklist of 19 July, however, noted that Raul had left Moscow without the usual publicity and communiqué, and surmised that this was "a pretty good sign that the visit was unproductive." (The Central Intelligence Bulletin, whenever coordination permitted, carried material generally similar to the content of the Checklist.)SCI TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTPhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford Library
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST3. The Intelligence Community view of the Cuban problem in this period was crystallized in NIE 85-2-62, The Situation and Prospects in Cuba, passed by USIB on 1 August 1962, as the intelligence foundation.for MONGOOSE. This estimate stated that:a. "By force of circumstances, the USSR is becoming ever more deeply committed to preserve and strengthen the Castro regime. The USSR, however, has avoided any formal commitment to protect and defend the regime in all contingencies."b. "We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate."c. "The Soviets...would almost certainly never intend to hazard their own safety for Cuba's sake," but "have sought to create the impression that Cuba was under the protection of their missile power..."d. "We believe that the Bloc will continue to limit its military assistance to Cuba to defensive weapons7. Such a policy would not preclude the provision of more advanced jet fighters, surface-to-air missiles, and modern radars, or even the provision of a token number of IL-28 jet light bombers..."-2-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIPhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford Library
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# TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTB. The Soviet Operation Begins4. During the last two weeks of July, Soviet ships 'carrying equipment and personnel for the build-up made their first voyages to Cuban ports, the first arriving in the period 26-29 July. Knowledge of some of these movements reached CIA through routine intelligence coverage of Soviet shipping before the ships reached Cuba. No particular significance is normally attached to such voyages. However, evidence gradually accumulated that the "behavior pattern" of these ships was similar to that of Soviet ships carrying arms to other countries, that even greater security measures than usual were in effect, that a number of the ships were coming from Baltic rather than Black Sea ports, that some of these were passenger ships, and finally that there was a general movement of Bloc shipping toward Cuba: on an unprecedented scale.5. Apparently, the first recognition of unusual activity in any intelligence publication was a note in a daily review of economic intelligence for CIA internal use. Commenting on an NSA report that certain Soviet ships were en route to Cuba which had declared for other destinations, this paper stated on 1 August that "at lease some, if not all, of the ships involved probably are carrying additional military equipment to Cuba." This statement was in direct contradiction to NSA's comment on the same information, i.e., that it tended to corroborate a report by the Brazilian Ambassador in Havana (earlier intercepted by NSA) that Raul Castro had asked the USSR to take back excess war materiel.6. CIA was also in disagreement with DIA over interpretation of intelligence on the movement of shipping to Cuba throughout the month of August. The resulting difficulties in coordination of the Central Intelligence Bulletin held up publication from 3 August to 9 August of the first item on the Cuban build-up in that publication. As late as 29 August, DIA in its own daily Intelligence Summary said that "The high volume of shipping probably reflects planned increases in trade between the USSR and Cuba..." There were further difficulties resulting from CIA-DIA differences in the interpretation of photography of aircraft crates deck-loaded on Soviet ships; the record shows that CIA was-3-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST.PhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford Library
[178-10004-10056.pdf — page 4]
# TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTright. Finally, it should be noted that there is a long history of CIA efforts to obtain better photography on deck cargoes and faster service in returning these pictures to Washington.7. The Checklist reported the accumulating information fully to the President. On 4 August, it stated that "Eleven Soviet ships are on their way to Havana and we strongly suspect they are carrying arms. Such a delivery would not be far short of the total amount of arms delivered in the first half of 1962." On 9 August, it said "Soviet shipments to Cuba have been arriving on an unprecedented scale since mid-July. Some 32 vessels are involved; at least half of these we believe to be carrying arms. Five passenger ships with a total capacity of about 3,000 persons have already arrived. Some of the personnel are said to be Soviet technicians, and we have no reason to doubt this. We do not believe there are any combat troops among them."8. The DCI on 8 August briefed the Republican Policy Committee, emphasizing the arrival of Soviet military equipment and technicians. Two days later, at a MONGOOSE meeting, he again stressed the importance of this intelligence and raised questions as to what purpose was behind the sudden movement of men and materiel. He said that the United States must face the possibility of the USSR locating MRBMS in Cuba as a step that it could justify because of US missile bases in places like Italy and Turkey.9. Soviet operations in August involved primarily the establishment of surface-to-air missile and coast defense missile positions. By the middle of August CIA was receiving a large volume of agent and refugee reporting which, while understandably garbled and fragmentary, enabled analysts to pinpoint areas of construction and identify some of the equipment coming in. On 18 August, the Checklist reported "There are grounds for thinking that the large influx of Soviet military equipment and technicians into Cuba lately could be connected with the beginning of construction of surface-to-air missile sites. What we know so far is that the shipments have included quantities of electronic, transportation and construction equipment, some of it similar to Soviet equipment which showed up in Indonesia for the building of SAM installations, and that many of the arriving Soviets are construction personnel..." There were further Checklist items along the same line on 23 and 28 August.-4-PhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford Library
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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTC. The July Overflight Program10. On 10 July, General Taylor, motivated primarily by the extensive use of aerial reconnaissance in following Chinese Communist military activities in Fukien, had asked the DCI for a comprehensive review of aerial photography activities. The end-product of this exercise was a series of memoranda dated approximately 16 July from the DD/I to the DCI. The one on Cuba recommended that U-2 flights over Cuba be continued at their current level of two a month. It cited inter alia in justification that earlier missions over Cuba had provided "conclusive evidence that recurring reports of submarines and missile bases in Cuba have been false," and that "our most important need is for any evidence of the deployment of SA-2 missiles and/or MIG-21s in Cuba." This proposal was approved by the Special Group on 19 July and later by the President.11. The first of the two Cuban U-2 missions authorized for. August was flown on 5 August, probably just too soon to detect significant reflections of the Soviet equipment entering the island at that time. The second mission was originally scheduled for 8 August but cancelled because of weather. The next day the Special Group gave the DCI discretion to fly the second August mission "whenever the immediate situation with regard to Soviet materiel justified it." COMOR reaffirmed its requirement for the second mission on 13 August. The mission was again scheduled for the period beginning on the 19th,. held up for 9 days by weather and eventually flown on 29 August. (See Para 19)-5-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTPhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford Library
[178-10004-10056.pdf — page 6]
# TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTD. Promulgation of NSAM 181 and the Response12. On 21 August the DCI attended a meeting in Secretary Rusk's office at which were also present Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Johnson, the Attorney General, Generals Taylor and Lemnitzer, and McGeorge Bundy. He told this group that information available since 10 August indicated the extent of Soviet aid was much greater than previously thought, and that this probably included highly-sophisticated electronic installations or missile sites, probably ground-to-air. The DCI again raised the possibility that the Soviets would locate MRBMS in Cuba, and there developed a discussion of possible US courses of action in case they did so. It was agreed that the DCI would fully brief the President the next day (which he did) and that Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and the DCI would discuss the situation with the President on 23 August.13. At the meeting of the 23rd, a number of actions were decided upon to deal with what was agreed to be a critical problem for the United States. These actions were formalized in NSAM 181. (In addition, the President asked for a continuing analysis of the number and types of Bloc personnel and equipment in Cuba). Thus, by 23 August CIA had alerted the highest levels of the government to a rapidly unfolding Soviet military development in Cuba, including the probable establishment of surface-to-air missile sites, and the danger of surface-to-surface missiles. Furthermore the President had taken action on the intelligence received. There was at this time no evidence of any sort that surface-to-surface weapons were being installed--in fact, the MRBM units had scarcely started en route from the USSR--but the possibility had been discussed by the President and his advisors.14. The paragraphs of NSAM 181 applicable to CIA dealt with: a) release of information, b) MONGOOSE, and c) "An analysis /which should be prepared of the probable military, political and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba of either surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles which could reach the US." The first two subjects are outside the scope of this memorandum; the third exists as a memorandum dated 31 August prepared largely by McGeorge Bundy and the DD/I. This paper, which had the benefit of preliminary results of the 29 August U-2 mission, concluded that the introduction of surface-to-air missiles was the "most probable present Soviet missile activity," and that such missiles would be a serious threat to aerial reconnaissance, but not to "determined US attack." It stated that "surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads would constitute a very significant military-6-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST> Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
[178-10004-10056.pdf — page 7]
TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICEthreat to the continental US." The memorandum concluded that introduction of any missiles "will have a substantial political and psychological impact, while surface-to-surface missiles would create a condition of great alarm."15. In a memorandum of 27 August, General Carter reported to Mr. Bundy what actions CIA was taking in response to NSAM 181. He named the officers responsible for the three items mentioned above and listed the following additional measures:a. Task Force W was to look into the possibility of removing restrictions on mounting clandestine operations out of Guantanamo.b. The Board of National Estimates was to establish a procedure to ensure continuing analysis of the numbers and types of Communist Bloc personnel entering Cuba, quantity and types of Bloc equipment and its probable use, and all construction, particularly missile sites.c. The Board was also to assess the physical and psychological dangers to the US and Latin America of missile installations in Cuba. (The two Board actions, which were later synthesized in the paper which eventually appeared on 19 September as SNIE 85-3, had already been set in motion by the DD/I, in a memo to the AD/NE of 24 August).d. CIA was to begin immediately publishing a daily paper on Cuba, including current intelligence, estimative assessments and coverage of the press, to be distributed to the President, Bundy, McNamara, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, Rusk, Taylor, and Robert Kennedy. (This paper, the Cuban Highlights memorandum, was issued by CIA beginning 27 August, using a philosophy and format similar to the Checklist. A few additional officials were later added to its distribution. It was discontinued on 19 September, because General Carter and the DD/I concluded that sufficient emphasis was by then being given to Cuban reporting in regular intelligence publications).e. CIA would arrange intelligence collection over-flights "as frequently as the situation demands." (The results of this action make up the central theme of this paper.)f. Task Force W was to prepare a plan of operations for MONGOOSE B Plus.16. The minutes of USIB show that at its next meeting, 29 August, Mr. Hilsman requested an SNIE on the military build-up in Cuba, to be submitted to USIB at its next regular meeting.-7-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST> Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
[178-10004-10056.pdf — page 8]
# TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALISTPresumably Mr. Hilsman was also acting in response to NSAM 181. In any case, the paper he requested and the Board memorandum already requested by the DD/I were combined. Successive drafts of such a paper, prepared by the ONE staff, were quickly overtaken by the photography which became available after 29 August. At the USIB meeting of 7 September, further attempts to write it were deferred until the new information could be digested. This estimate, SNIE 85-3-62, was in fact passed by USIB on 19 September. Its substance will be discussed later. (See Paras. 26-29)17. Also at the 29 August USIB meeting, two other pertinent subjects were discussed. First, General Carter and Mr. Cline raised the question of more rapid delivery from Turkey and Denmark of Navy photography of outbound Soviet ships (see para. 6). Second, General Carter informed the Board that he had two days earlier asked General Lemnitzer about the possibility of low-level photography using RF-101 or F8U aircraft and that Lemnitzer had replied that something "could be dug up." The conversation with Lemnitzer was the result of an instruction telephoned from out of town by the DCI, who was concerned over the long delay of the 29 August mission by weather. (The DCI departed Washington on leave on 23 August, went first to the West Coast, left the country on 30 August for the Riviera, and returned to Washington on 23 September.) On 30 August Lemnitzer told the Special Group of this discussion with General Carter. The Group agreed to take cognizance of the matter and reopen it "when specific targets and information needs could be identified."-8-TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST![Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library]