Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[178-10004-10087.pdf — page 14]
SECRETAfter finding the shellfish toxin in the vault, a complete inventory was taken. A large number of dangerous chemicals or drugs of various types were found. These materials relate to a number of past programs of TSD, including the drug project, the development of harassment materials for crowd control or meeting disruption, crop contamination programs, etc. Small amounts of several other lethal preparations were found. Two of these are known to have been obtained by the Agency for testing at Fort Detrick. Nothing is known about three others. Also found were a number of L-Pills issued to agents, and formerly to U-2 pilots, for suicide purposes in the event of capture.Boston contended that he had no recollection of the shellfish toxin having been obtained from Fort Detrick and stored in the laboratory. On 30 June, discussions were held with Dr. Gordon in an interview at which Boston was also presen Gordon stated that the toxin had in fact been called back from Fort Detrick and stored in the laboratory on the basis of his own decision which resulted from conversations with Boston. It was their belief that the cost and difficulty of isolating the shellfish toxin were so great that it simply made no sense to have it destroyed. Apparently no one, including the Chief of TSD, was told of this decision or the fact that the material had been delivered by Fort Detrick. As Gordon recalled, this took place prior to his being told by the Chief of TSD to inform Fort Detrick that destruction of the material on the inventory list should take place. Boston who was present during this discussion took no issue with Gordon's account. Neither could recall precisely how the material was delivered to OTS, but the DOD investigation indicates that it was delivered to Boston by someone from Fort Detrick.
[178-10004-10087.pdf — page 15]
SECRETGordon was certain that the shellfish toxin in storage in OTS is the same toxin as that listed on the inventory. There is, however, a discrepancy between the amount in storage as calculated from the labels and the amount shown on the inventory. Since the material in storage is in several different forms and complete reliance is placed upon labeling, however, no real discrepancy may actually exist.Discussions with Karamessines have established that he and Helms were aware of the disposition question and that a clear decision had been made that the Agency stockpile should be destroyed by the Army and that, in accordance with Presidential Directives, the CIA should get completely out of the BW business.The explanation given by Gordon as to how the shellfish toxin came to be in Agency storage is fully consistent with other available information. He stated that the material was always handled with extreme care. Undoubtedly it was simply transferred from one freezer to another and in his view was continually under adequate control. He is certain that nothing was done with it subsequent to its delivery and prior to his departure from the Agency in 1972. Boston has given assurance that it was untouched subsequent to that.After the discovery of the material, OTS was told to investigate ways in which they could safely dispose of it with full documentation. Edgewood Arsenal was contacted and arrangements were made to deliver the material to Edgewood for disposal on 11 June 1975. The disposal was to be witnessed by a representative from the IG's office. On the day prior to the scheduled delivery, these arrangements were cancelled, however, because the DD/S&T wished to consider further ways of insuring that the destruction of the material could not be later.13. SECRETPhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford LibraryNW 50955 DocId:32112749 Page 16
[178-10004-10087.pdf — page 16]
SECRETmisinterpreted. Upon informing Edgewood Arsenal of this decision, Bostonwas told that while Edgewood would dispose of chemical material for the CIA,it would not do so in the case of biological materials since that was not con-sistent with the mission of the arsenal. No further efforts toward the disposalof the material have taken place, and it remains under guard in the OTS vault.## Operational Uses of MKNAOMI Material.There is no record associating the project with actual operations. Discussions with those involved in the project indicate that hand-launchers withdarts loaded with dog incapacitant may have been delivered for use inS.E. Asia. They also indicate that some of the material or crop spoilants mayhave been employed. While no direct connections to assassination planning havebeen found, there are some disturbing similarities between the agents beinginvestigated at Fort Detrick and some of the reported schemes for incapacitatingor assassinating Castro. For example, botulinum pills were reportedly providedin February 1961 and again in April 1962 for use against Castro. Such pillswere made for the Agency at Fort Detrick and the record shows the delivery ofsome in the same time period as the 1962 attempt. Another scheme in 1960involved the treatment of cigars with botulinum toxin; the comparable treatmentof cigarettes is reported in MKNAOMI files. Consideration was given to theadministration of shellfish toxin with a pin device in late 1960. Both thetoxin and pin delivery devices were developed at Fort Detrick. The divingsuit scheme in 1963 involved dusting the inside of the suit with a funguswhich would produce madura foot, a serious, non-specific, skin disease. Work14SECRETPhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford LibraryNW 50955 DocId:32112749 Page 17
[178-10004-10087.pdf — page 17]
SECRETon fungal agents generally compatible with such an approach was underway at Fort Detrick shortly before this scheme was hatched and the agent was prepared at Agency direction in a form suitable for application to clothing, pillow cases, and so on. Tuberculosis germs with which the breathing apparatus of the suit were to be contaminated were available at Fort Detrick though not included in Agency stocks. Finally, the general presence of BW agents or toxins in all of these plans suggests the strong influence of work carried on at Fort Detrick.None of the interviews undertaken in the course of this investigation provide information about specific support to operations which may have involved assassination. Roosevelt, who was Chief of TSD from 1960-1962, believed that discussions involving assassination took place but claimed to know few of the details and was skeptical as to the seriousness of such discussions. Treichler, Chief of the Biology Branch during this period, denied ever having received requests for such support or providing it, but these assertions appear incompatible with information he earlier provided to the IG's office during its investigation of assassination attempts. Treichler may constitute a connection between the MKNAOMI project and the assassination plots involving Castro. He was the officer responsible for MKNAOMI during this period. The records show his giving direction in specific terms to the preparation of materials at Fort Detrick matching those mentioned in the assassination schemes. Finally, the IG's report indicates that he delivered such material to other elements of the Agency. Beyond the Castro schemes, no suggestion can be found that any of these materials or devices was ever considered for use for lethal purposes.NW 50955 DocId:32112749 Page 18SECRETPhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford Library
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination System Date: 8/27/201Identification FormAgency InformationAGENCY: CHENEYRECORD NUMBER: 178-10004-10115RECORD SERIES: GENERAL SUBJECT FILEAGENCY FILE NUMBER: INTELLIGENCE--REPORT BY JAMES J. ANGLETONDocument InformationORIGINATOR: CIAFROM: ANGLETON, JAMESTO: ROCKEFELLER COMMISSIONTITLE: REPORT TO PRES. COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE U.S.DATE: 00/00/1975PAGES: 37SUBJECTS: ANGLETON, JAMESCONSPIRACY THEORIES, USSRNOSENKO, YURIOSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIODROCKEFELLER COMMISSIONDOCUMENT TYPE: REPORTCLASSIFICATION: SecretRESTRICTIONS: 1B; 4CURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/09/1993OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: See pages 5-7. Does not include attachments.
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 1]
SECRET SENSITIVE178-10004-10115REPORT TO THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ONCIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATESMr. Vice President and Members of the Commission:In accordance with the Commission's request, myformer colleagues and myself submit herewith a critiqueof the counterintelligence function in the Agency. Wewelcome the Commission's interest in this matter becauseit will be the first review of U.S. counterintelligenceat such a responsible level in Government. In anyevent, it is urged that authoritative attention, beyondthe life of the Commission, be given to the scope androle of counterintelligence in the Intelligence Community.This action is imperative because the current leadership isalmost totally uninformed and inexperienced in the specialtyof counterintelligence, and its authority for changes is beingpermitted to go unchallenged. The result is reflected in thefailure to maintain continuity in this function. We believe> Photocopy> from> Gerald R. Ford Library![stamp of classified document]CLASSIFIED BY 054519EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATIONSCHEDULE OFE 0 11952, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:§ 5(1), ((2)) (3) or (4) fcircle one or more)AUTOMATICALLY DECLASIFIED ONDate Impossible to Determine(unless impossible, insert fate or eventiNW 50955 DocId:32112721 Page 2
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 2]
SECRET SENSITIVEthat unless there are some enforceable guidelines set forth by a higher authority, the conduct of effective counterintelligence by the Government will be lost for years to come. Counterintelligence is traditionally a vital plate in the shield of national security. It also protects the security and well-being of our Allies who have access to our sensitive intelligence by virtue of identity of interests or because of formal arrangements and pacts such as NATO. There are also useful confidential interservice agreements whereby certain foreign intelligence services conduct unilateral or joint operations with our field stations, and the standard of their security is of continuing concern. In lower key, it is also in the interest of CIA to aid the security services of the remaining non-Communist countries where any friendly elements exist.Although we have been charged primarily with our view on CIA counterintelligence as such, we have included, as perspective requires, the security and counterintelligence interrelationship of other agencies and departments. Unlike the collection and evaluation of positive intelligence, there has not been organized in Government, and particularly in the Intelligence Community, any machinery to produce an end-product which might be described to be *national* as distinguished from *departmental* counterintelligence. Very little is logical regarding this subject, unless one views the historical framework of the function, in terms of the special,NW 50955 DocId:32112721 Page 32SECRET SENSITIVEPhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford Library
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 3]
# SECRET SENSITIVEif not privileged, position of the FBI who had dominated the Intelligence Community as it relates to counterintelligence. Director Hoover refused to submit his views or policies to the scrutiny of the Intelligence Community where any problem remotely impinged on the interests and/or jurisdiction of the FBI. This unassailable stance estopped any and all attempts to bring the Bureau to account in any interagency board of equals charged with counterintelligence oversight, including the very effective President's Foreign Intelligence Board (PFIAB) who were thoroughly apprised of the facts, given their continuity and authority within the Community. What emerged was a loose *ad hoc* liaison of third parties, but never a meeting of chiefs with Mr. Hoover to hammer out basic issues relating to internal security and counterintelligence. This was the state of affairs until the appointment of Mr. Gray; counterintelligence as a function of Government - with few exceptions - was frozen by Mr. Hoover. Mr. Gray's tenure was marred by the turbulence of Watergate, and it was only with the appointment of Mr. Kelley that a new era opened up. Unfortunately, nothing of consequence has been tabled with Mr. Kelley on the outstanding issues.Unlike the producers of positive intelligence, those engaged in counterintelligence are the primary consumers of their own product, and the counterintelligence product is less perishable than that of positive intelligence. We have attempted to remedy this omission over the years on an *ad hoc* basis by distilling intelligence from counterintelligence operations.![SECRET SENSITIVE watermark]![Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library]
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 4]
# SECRET SENSITIVEand we have concluded that *ad hoc* arrangements are inadequate for satisfying those who have a need for the counterintelligence end-product. As to the recipients, they should include selected officials who are involved in the estimating process as well as policy makers up to the Cabinet level. This has not been the case in the past, and as a result of this void, there has existed a conflict of views at both the policy and estimating levels regarding intentions, capabilities and the peculiar political dynamics of the Soviet Bloc. Experience would indicate that the basis differences in interpretation and evaluation are seemingly unbridgeable. What is required as soon as possible is an authoritative forum with access to all-source information in which differences may be joined and adjudicated.We believe that the result would give the guidelines and targets for political action follow-up and would have a significant impact on interdepartmental policies which are not unrelated to the Soviet Bloc realities which we have uncovered in counterintelligence.Specifically, reference is made to cases which involve a determination regarding the *bona fides* of Soviet defectors and Bloc sources whose positive information is given the broadest dissemination even though the source is suspect. From the beginning it has been defectors who have given us the most vivid appreciation of the clandestine activities of the Soviet Bloc. It is through defectors that one gainsSECRET SENSITIVEPhotocopy from Gerald R. Ford LibraryNW 50955 DocId:32112721 Page 5
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 5]
SECRET SENSITIVEknowledge regarding the identities and use of penetration agents and agents of influence who are, in turn, the kingpins of Soviet strategic deception.An example of recent vintage which illustrates the range of confusion is Mr. McCone's response on television to a question that certain information was not turned over to the Warren Commission because the source was the KGB defector, Nosenko, whose *bona fides* at the time were not fully established. After having asserted that much effort always is devoted to the problems of *bona fides*, Mr. McCone related that he had been informed that the Agency's position now regarding Nosenko, as a result of a painstaking examination, was that he is *bonafide*. Astounded by this statement, the undersigned called the Agency officer who was the former executive assistant to Mr. McCone for clarification. He opined that Mr. McCone could not remember everything but that he would look into the matter. As of this writing there has been complete silence as to the identity of the Agency's spokesman.To understand the significance of this anonymous bestowal of *bona fides* requires some further explanation of the Nosenko case. Several thousand man-hours have been expended in interviewing Nosenko and analyzing his information. While there were those somewhat removed from the case who accepted his *bona fides*, a contrary view was registered by the following: the Chief of the Soviet Division (who is now the Director's National Intelligence Officer for Soviet Production); the thenSECRET SENSITIVEPhotocopy from Gerald R. Ford LibraryNW 50955 DocId:32112721 Page 6
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 6]
# SECRET SENSITIVEDeputy Chief of the Soviet Division, even though he was the first contact of Nosenko's in the field; and his chief associates in the Division. In favor of Nosenko's *bona fides* have been the Office of Security and certain other members of the Soviet Division. The most persuasive detractor of Nosenko has been the KGB defector, Golitsyn. He is regarded to be the most knowledgeable KGB defector to come our way. After a lengthy analysis, he concluded that Nosenko was a dispatched agent *provocateur*. His views are also shared independently by another Soviet Intelligence Officer who defected to the Agency. The Counterintelligence Staff arrived at the same conclusion. The question of *bona fides* is unresolved. It has been permitted to fester without any authoritative conclusion because it is an interagency problem affecting other Soviet Bloc cases which are controlled elsewhere in the Community. Nosenko's information revolves around the following subject matters:1. President Kennedy's Assassination:Nosenko's story is that while he was in the KGB's internal intelligence, he read the case file on Oswald. Given the timing of his defection, shortly after the assassination, his account - *not* borne out by the initial polygraph - may be viewed as exonerating the Soviets of any complicity with Oswald, thus![photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library]
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 7]
SECRET SENSITIVEsupporting the flimsy documentation onOswald handed over to the U.S. Governmentby the USSR. This would also tend to disa-vow any relationship between the USSR andCuba in clandestine activity.2. Penetrations: With one or more   exceptions, he stated that there were no   penetrations of the U.S. Government. This   assertion flew in the face of the overview   which Golitsyn gave to us regarding Soviet   Bloc penetration of Western services and   strategic deception.3. Order of Battle of the KGB at Home   and Abroad: There are many instances where   Nosenko's information contradicts Golitsyn's.   We have concluded on the basis of present evidence that   Nosenko was dispatched to the West to mutilate the counter-   intelligence leads which had been revealed by Golitsyn.   As to his observations regarding Oswald, it was the Soviets   who have pushed the deception theme to the effect that   Oswald was an instrument of the military - industrial com-   plex of the eastern United States. This thought was first   raised by Khrushchev in Cairo in an unusual interview which   he had with an American journalist. It has since been pur-   sued by the Soviets through various channels, mainly KGB,-   and it is now common currency in Soviet newspapers and other   media.
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 8]
# SECRET SENSITIVEThe Nosenko case goes to the quick of the counterintelligence problem facing not only the FBI and the Agency but all Western Intelligence and Security Services, many of whom have received information derived from Nosenko.It is evident that as presently organized, the Intelligence Community is incapable of correlating intelligence production with the product and analysis of counterintelligence information.Given the inability of the Intelligence Community to come to grips with the problems raised by counterintelligence, it is suggested that the only solution to the very unsatisfactory situation today would be the appointment of an ombundsman who would be authorized to act directly on behalf of the National Security Council on serious interagency problems which have a direct bearing on the plans and capabilities of the Communist Bloc and involve the more sensitive operations of counterintelligence. Alternatively, consideration could be given to the responsibilities of the Chairman of PFIAB, which might be enlarged to satisfy this need.As Attachment A, I submit a letter and attachment which was submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 31 January 1975. Given the march of events and the uncertainties involved, in addition to the responsibilities of his high office, it is understandable, perhaps, that the Secretary has not wished to become entangled in disputations on this subject matter as long as the Agency and its various Directors are being subjected to investigation. Nevertheless, in our view, the![SECRET BONITO]PhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford LibraryNW 50955 DocId:32112721 Page 9
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 9]
SECRET SENSITIVEissues involving Soviet strategic disinformation and our defense posture go to the heart of national security insofar as they relate to estimates affecting the world balance of power. Additionally, we believe it to be most misleading for one to assume that estimates derived from technical collection alone justify the negotiation of finite disarmament and other treaties with the Soviet Bloc governments unless there is corresponding high-level covert intelligence production which supplements and confirms the findings of technical collection.This view argues against the philosophy now being aired with Olympian aplomb that technical coverage alone is a substitute for clandestine sources or that it gives a reliable data base which justifies a super power to bargain away its strength. (Attachment B sets forth the views of Mr. Paul Nitze and his first-hand impression of the SALT talks. Of particular interest is his description of the atmospherics: [a] the peculiar role of the KGB among Soviet negotiators, and [b] how an uninformed U.S. representation learned from the Soviet delegation of changes in the U.S. negotiating positions arrived at in Washington. The KGB attempted similar ploys during the Johnson Administration with a former high official of President Kennedy's on the Vietnam issue.)If there be validity to the information derived from Golitsyn, then it would follow that detente and estimatesSECRET SENSITIVEPhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford LibraryNW 50955 DocId:32112721 Page 10
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 10]
SECRET SENSITIVEderived therefrom are misleading with regard to the eventsin Portugal, Vietnam and other areas where we are in com-petition with the Soviets and the Bloc. A more accuratepicture could be obtained if the structure of theIntelligence Community, in its processing of information,were less concerned with public or overt data regardingthe Soviet Bloc intentions, such as the reporting ofAmbassadors and other representatives, and instead givefull faith and credit to secret information from bona fidesources who are or were within the Soviet Bloc system andwhose warnings regarding disinformation have been uni-versally ignored. To repeat, it is the opinion of thesesources that the bulk of information available to theWest through Soviet Bloc contacts, regarding the strategyand aims of the Eastern Bloc, is, on the whole, spuriousand represents little more than coordinated handouts whichadvance the interests of Soviet Bloc strategic disinformationat many levels of communications.The remainder of this report represents the status, asof March 1975, of U.S. counterintelligence, primarily withinthe CIA, but also, as the perspective requires, at the na-tional level. The discussion consists of four parts;The authority under which CIA conductscounterintelligence activities.The nature of those activities.NW 50955 DocId:32112721 Page 11![Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library]