Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 28]
SECRET SENSITIVEdirect access to the Minister of Defense,. and some service chiefs have also had the benefit of immediate access to the president of the republic. Through its liaision with the SID the CIA greatly augments its own resources at scant cost. The same pattern obtains, in varying degrees, in all of the countries (more than one hundred) and most of the services (more than three hundred) with which CIA maintains liaison relationships.Counterintelligence liaison requires close and expert attention. It is built upon mutual interest; but through training, persuasion and other means the skillful liaison officer expands the shared basis and thus directs or redirects the enormous counterintelligence resources of the non-Communist world against targets of primary importance to the U.S.In return for this vast strengthening of our defense, our Allies look to us for several advantages: for example, a buttres- sing of their frequently meager capabilities in research and analysis. They must also be confident that we can give a full measure of![photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library]
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 29]
# SECRET SENSITIVEprotection to secrets shared with us. And they look to us for leadership. At times we have disappointed them.An instance of this occurred in September 1971, when the British expelled ninety to 105 Soviet intelligence officers from their country in a single action. They had noted a relentless buildup of the Soviet clandestine force in their midst. MI 5, the British counterintelligence service, found that the fifteen intelligence officers whom it had identified in the U.K. in 1950 had grown by 1970 to more than 120. The PNG action was carried out despite some qualms. The Soviets made only a token retaliation. The Belgians followed the British lead, though on a smaller scale and without publicity. A number of liaison services expected the U.S. to make a similar move, and the FBI and CIA joined in recommending such action here. But no initiative was undertaken.Now the fabric of our counterintelligence liaison relationships shows some fraying because of clamor in the American press and a consequent change of atmosphere. Our partners are no longer sure that we can act decisively> [Figure] Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 30]
SECRET SENSITIVEin concert with them or even keep theirsecrets. To weather the crisis, CIA needsa strengthened counterintelligence cadre inits Headquarters, one able to give fullsupport and judicious guidance to liaisonofficers abroad.- A mounting inability to cope with  the growing menace of hostile clandestine  activity. The sudden reduction in CIA's  central counterintelligence capacity took  place at a time when the intelligence  services of the Soviet Bloc, about twenty-  five in all, have increased immeasureably  their total presence abroad and their op-  erational initiatives, particularly in  respect to strategic deception and pene-  tration. The Soviet capability in economic  and industrial espionage has always been a  very real danger to the U.S. and remains so.  For this reason I included a summary of the  Armand J. Hammer case in my earlier report,  and I resubmit it with this paper  (Attachment C). A second illustration is the  case of General Yevgenni Petrovich  Pitrovanov, also attached (Attachment D).  Our estimate of total Soviet intelligence> [Figure: Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library]NW 50955 DocId: 32112721 Page 31
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 31]
SECRET SENSITIVEstrength abroad in January 1975 wasca. 3,900, of whom 332 were stationed inthe U.S. Soviet official presence in theU.S. and other countries has grown morerapidly in recent years than has thecorresponding number of identified opera-tives, although we feel confident that theratio of about 40 per cent has not changed,or not at least to the advantage of theWest.As my previous report stated,Director Kelley has warned of a growingimbalance between our adversaries and theforces at his disposal. We believe thatthere has been a severe decline in the ef-fectiveness of U.S. counterintelligence bothdomestically and abroad. Something of theaggressiveness of the hostile services isshown in their persistent attempts to recruitAmericans abroad for such clandestine purposesas penetration. During the period 1965 throughmid - 1972, there was a total of 2,150 suchincidents (an incident being an outright at-tempt to recruit or an overture clearly intendedto lead to recruitment). Thus, in an averageyear, 287 Americans overseas are approached by![photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library]
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 32]
SECRET SENSITIVEadversary services with intent to harm. It would be unrealistic not to expect the KGB and other clandestine Communist services to recognize that the present is a time of disarray in U.S. counterintelligence and to seek to exploit this advantage to the hilt.- Inadequate information about the intelligence and security services of China, Cuba and Eastern Europe, especially the latter.We have a large body of counterintelligence about the USSR, and it has been entered into computer programs. Our machines programs about the services of Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia are, in contrast, non-existent or moribund. They have been allowed to slide because of the pressures of keeping up with services as large and virulent as the KGB and the GRU. The USSR itself has not made this mistake. It orchestrates large-scale clandestine operations against the West, assigning roles to the apparatuses of the Warsaw Pact states and to Cuba in accordance with their capabilities. These Soviet allies are extensions of the Soviet capacity to wage underground warfare, and therefore we need to know![Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library]
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 33]
them intimately and to keep our knowledgecurrent. Our performance falls too short.- A lack of communication and inter-  action between the Director of Central In-  telligence and CIA's counterintelligence unit.The present Director lacks counterintelligenceexperience. He has asked for, and received, onlyone two-hour briefing on the subject. Most of hispredecessors, in contrast, were vitally concerned.Through briefings and through operational parti-cipation they acquired a real familiarity withthe wide spectrum of counterintelligence and theproblems that it inevitably engenders. The pres-ent Director of Central Intelligence, on theother hand, has managed CIA's affairs withoutconsulting me or other highly experiencedcounterintelligence officers about Agency opera-tions, programs or priorities. Those now desig-nated to succeed us cannot, with the best will inthe world, make a sudden leap that will carrythem across decades of intensive, daily experi-ence acquired by those who already have left theAgency and those who are unquestionably leavingin the not-too-distant future. Thus counter-intelligence is left with a growing threat, un-diminished responsibilities, a sharp reductionin capabilities and no effective access to theAgency's top managerial level on substantiveissues.
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 34]
# IV. RECOMMENDATIONSThe following recommendations are presented for the consideration of the Commission with the sole intent of revitalizing national counterintelligence and enabling it to discharge its assigned responsibilities in furtherance of national security. To this end we propose the following changes:1.  That the Operational Directorate of CIA assign not less than one-tenth of its component to counterintelligence.2.  That of this total about half be assigned to a central counterintelligence unit in Headquarters and that the remaining half be divided among the various Area Divisions and branches in Headquarters and selected Agency stations abroad.3.  That CIA provide this cadre with counterintelligence training in depth.4.  That selected counterintelligence personnel be rotated through Headquarters and field assisgnments of growing responsibility in accordance with career plans that afford them opportunities for advancement which equal those of their Agency colleagues.
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 35]
SECRET SENSITIVE5. That counterintelligence designees   abroad work under the nominal command of   Chiefs of Stations but that they engage in   counterintelligence work full time and that   they have privacy channels of communications   with the Headquarters counterintelligence   unit which will ensure that access to their   sensitive information remains on a compart-   mented, need-to-know basis.6. That close operational liaison   between the FBI and the counterintelligence   unit be fostered, and that direct, operational,   domestic liaison with other U.S. departments   and agencies by the counterintelligence unit   be maintained to whatever extent the national   interest requires.7. That the U.S. establish a single   central organ to formulate policy for national   strategic deception and to deal with adversary   deception, specifically including disinforma-   tion. Further, that this body have the neces-   sary access to policy-creating levels of the   U.S. Government and that it have the necessary   measure of jurisdiction over Governmental   components engaged in deception and counter-   deception.![Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library.]NW 50955 DocId:32112721 Page 36
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 36]
8. That CIA counterintelligence liaison   abroad be improved through a judicious aug-   mentation of exchange of counterintelligence   information, including penetration leads, by   augmentation of U.S. capacity for leadership   in dealing with the common adversary, and   the expansion of the cadre of counterintelli-   gence liaison officers abroad.9. That CIA undertake a more vigorous   program to obtain further data about the   intelligence and counterintelligence services   of China, Cuba and Eastern Europe, so that   our knowledge of them becomes fully compara-   ble with our knowledge of the Soviet serv-   ices, and that these increased holdings be   placed in machine records as rapidly as their   size warrants.10. That the U.S., and especially the    FBI and the CIA, intensify counteringelligence    work against Soviet and other illegals.11. That within the expanded counterintel-    ligence unit in CIA headquarters a defector    section be created and that this section be    responsible for supervising the operational    handling and continuing debriefing of desig-    nated defectors, both abroad and in the U.S.
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 37]
SECRET SENSITIVEthe latter responsibility to be assigned in agreement with the FBI and other affected departments and agencies.12. That the chief of the counterintelligence unit have direct and frequent access to the Director of Central Intelligence and other Deputy Directors and members of the Intelligence Community engaged in security and counterintelligence to ensure that counterintelligence considerations are given due weight in the formulation of policy and that counterintelligence capabilities are fully utilized in defending CIA and other U.S. departments and agencies against clandestine activity, including penetration operations, carried out by our adversaries.Attachments: as statedJames AngletonNW 50955 DocId:32112721 Page 3837Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
[178-10004-10148.pdf — page 0]
178-10004-101482025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystemIdentification FormDate: 8/27/201Agency InformationAGENCY: DAVISRECORD NUMBER: 178-10004-10148RECORD SERIES: GENERAL SUBJECT FILEAGENCY FILE NUMBER: INTEL. INVESTIGATIONS--MISC. B, OCT.1975 (3)Document InformationORIGINATOR: WHFROM: RATLIFF, ROB ROYTO: SCOWCROFT, BRENTTITLE: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REQUEST FOR MAIL INFORMATIONDATE: 10/14/1975PAGES: 3SUBJECTS: OPERATION MONGOOSEDOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUMCLASSIFICATION: SecretRESTRICTIONS: 1CCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/09/1993OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: No attachments.
[178-10004-10148.pdf — page 1]
MEMORANDUMEYES OTHE WHITE HOUSEOUTSIDE SYSTEMINFORMATIONWASHINGTONTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE Attachments14 October 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFTFROM: ROB ROY RATLIFFSUBJECT: Justice Department Request for Mail InformationJeanne Davis transmitted to me a request from the Department of Justice to survey 40 Committee and predecessor group files to determine any information of a list of subjects focused on operations involving mail. She asked that I transmit my findings directly to you.I assume that Justice is interested in *illegal* use of the mails. As I understand CIA's admitted activity in this field, it was an *intelligence collection operation* and therefore would not be subject to review by the 40 Committee or its predecessors. We find no record that mail intercept operations were discussed by the 40 Committee or predecessors; however, there are references to mail operations in Committee records.Jeanne Davis said Justice wanted material on "any use of mail techniques." These are representative items:TAB A--Reports which indicate general mailings of propaganda and related material. There is nothing sinister in this--you put a book or pamphlet in an envelope, address it, put on postage and drop it in the mail.TAB B--Letters were test mailed inside a denied area to see if they come out, or individuals mailed spontaneous letters to CIA-supported enterprises. Again, there is nothing unusual about this--regular use of the mail system.TAB C--Special covert operations which make use of the mails, including:C-1--A forged letter mailed in Prague to a Czech leader.C-2--Mailing of black letters, primarily from third countries. However (see page 5 of 9 May 1972 item), some of these letters may have been inserted into the mail system ostensibly as having originated in the denied area.TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE Attachments![Signature]EYES O![PHOTO COPY FROM GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY]
[178-10004-10148.pdf — page 2]
EYES ONLYTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE Attachments -2-C-3--Some covert operations using the mail may have been designed to represent that the item was originally mailed in a denied area. In other words, you want the recipient to believe that his letter came from the Chinese Communists so you make it appear as if it had been mailed from China. Note that the last item in this group (17 and 10 January 1972) refers to "letter-insert mechanisms." I can find no elaboration of what this means, but it might represent intercept of the mail, surreptitious opening of a letter and the insert of some additional material.C-4--National Intelligence Estimates and other reports of intelligence may refer to information, some part of which was gleaned from mail intercepts. On the basis of protecting sources and methods these would not normally be identified in a document. However if the question were asked at a meeting, the source might be orally identified as a mail intercept (or SIGINT or whatever).C-5--This category represents probable entry into the international mail system to support a covert operation. The first item shows DOD sending letters ostensibly from groups in North Vietnam to other countries. The second shows CIA fabricating and mailing 700 letters "ostensibly from Peking." The third shows CIA fabricating Democratic Republic of Vietnam greeting cards and mailing them.In each of the C-5 cases, operational information was probably gleaned from a mail intercept operation which would enable one to fabricate the paper, envelopes, writing and addressing styles, even counterfeit postage stamps and cachets, all with the aim of giving the appearance that the letter originated from a denied area. The material might then be inserted into the international mail system (e.g., you know that mail from Communist China transits Panama for onward distribution to Latin America; through liaison or independent contacts you insert your bundles in the sack from Peking and then it is given routine onward distribution through the regular mail system).C-6--Here are two cases where the Committee was informed that mail *intercepts* were the source of information used in support of covert operations.With regard to MONGOOSE files--which Mrs. Davis said Justice also wanted us to check--I find only the references at TAB D which suggest the possibility that mail intercept operations were a part of the response to intense pressures for more "hard" information on what was going on in Cuba.TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE AttachmentsEYES ONLY> PHOTO COPY> FROM> GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY
[178-10004-10148.pdf — page 3]
CLONETEYES ONLY# TOP SECRET 'SENSITIVE Attachments -3-Mrs. Davis also said that Justice made reference to Walt Rostow's recollection of a general survey of all "intelligence programs country by country" made by the 303 Committee. I assume he means the general beginning-of-a-new- President's-term roundup (similar to the ones given Mr. Nixon and Mr. Ford). We find references to covert action reviews, but these appear to have been oral and we find nothing in writing, and no references to mail operations.In summary, we have made a review of our files, with special reference to the general index of minutes and the country files deemed most likely to include references to "any use of mail techniques." Representative findings are cited above. We find no record of "illegal" mail operations being a subject of discussion or consideration within the 40 Committee and predecessor organizations (December 1958 to the present). However, there is evidence that the Committee was informed that mail intercept operations were conducted (TAB C-6).Please advise if any additional material or presentation is desired.AttachmentsTABS A-DTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE AttachmentsEYES ONLY> ![photo copy from gerald r. ford library]NW 50955 DocId:32105870 Page 4
[178-10004-10396.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystemIdentification FormDate: 8/31/201Agency InformationAGENCY: ROCKCOMRECORD NUMBER: 178-10004-10396RECORD SERIES: BAKER-WEIDNER FILESAGENCY FILE NUMBER: B-W VII-KDocument InformationORIGINATOR: ROCKFROM: WEIDNER, JOHNTO: FILETITLE: INTERVIEW WITH JOHN STEINDATE: 03/18/1975PAGES: 8SUBJECTS: CIANOSENKO, YURISTEIN, JOHNSECRET SERVICEOSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIODDOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION: SecretRESTRICTIONS: 1B; ICCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 02/13/2001OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: Includes "Advice and Waiver" statement.
[178-10004-10396.pdf — page 1]
# COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATESWashington, DC 20500March 18, 1975Nelson A. Rockefeller,ChairmanJohn T. ConnorC. Douglas DillonErwin N. GriswoldLane KirklandLyman L. LemnitzerRonald ReaganEdgar F. Shannon, Jr.SECRET - SENSITIVEDavid W. Belin,Executive Director178-10004-10396MEMORANDUM FOR: FileFROM:James B. WeidnerSUBJECT: Interview with John SteinI interviewed Mr. Stein in his office at the CIA Headquarters, Langley, Virginia on March 18, 1975. The interview commenced at 11:10 a. m. and continued until approximately 1:20 p.m. No one else was present. At the outset of the interview, Mr. Stein signed an Advice and Waiver which is annexed hereto.Mr. Stein, along with several other Deputies, were assigned to an Ad Hoc Committee to review various alleged domestic activities of the CIA. Stein's particular area was the counter-intelligence staff, except for the activities of that staff relating to the CI/SO project and to the mail intercept project.Stein said that, after his review, he concluded that the job of the CI staff was essentially to "horse" the FBI into doing something. In fact, according to Stein, once you eliminate CI/SO and the mail intercept project from the CI staff, their activities were benign insofar as the scope of this Commission's scope of inquiry was concerned. He said that, unless you conclude that keeping records relating to Americans, per se, is improper, the CI staff files contained little of interest.(a) Action-oriented MattersI asked Stein whether he had found any evidence of domestic breaking and entering directed by the CI staff. Stein said that he had found no such activities, with one possible exception. Stein stated that, if such activities seemed appropriate, the CI staff would inform the BureauNW 50955 DocId:32105622 Page 2> Photocopy from> Gerald R. Ford Library
[178-10004-10396.pdf — page 2]
SECRET - SENSITIVEwhich would accomplish the activities. This was because, if anythingwere discovered by virtue of the action which would lead to a prosecution,the action should be taken by the FBI, since the Department of Justicewould have responsibility for the prosecution.The only possible exception to the absence of any "breaking and entering"by the CI staff was the Tofti case. Tofti was a long term employee ofthe Agency, who put his house up for rent. Coincidently, another Agencyemployee went to look at the house for possible rental. In the course of sodoing, the second employee found that there were quite a number ofclassified documents on the third floor of the house. The employee thenreported what he found to the Agency, which sent personnel over to recoverthe documents. (The documents related to world-wide proprietaries ofthe Agency with which Tofti had been involved. Ultimately, Tofti explainedthat he intended to write a book about these matters and that was why therecords were in his home.) The Agency undoubtedly did not have timeto advise the Bureau much in advance (if at all) of the Agency's effort torecover the subject documents. Stein also noted that this incident did not,in fact, involve "breaking and entering" since the house was already openedto allow prospective renters to examine it.Stein said that he had found no instances of physical surveillance done bythe CI staff, although the staff would probably have been aware of surveillanceaccomplished by other agency components or by the Bureau. Stein citedas an example an instance where a female Agency employee was found tobe living with a man who could well have been working for a foreignGovernment. The Office of Security, therefore, put a surveillance on her housfor approximately three weeks. Discussions were also had with an informantwithin the Agency concerning this employee. (Files on this case would bemaintained by the Office of Security).Stein found no evidence of any electronic surveillance or telephone tapsaccomplished domestically by the CI staff. The staff had no personnelwho could actually take any action. The staff, in this regard, wouldhave had an advisory capacity, if it part icipated at all. The CI staffwould simply advise the Bureau or other components of the Agency suchas the Office of Security or the Office of Technical Services. In suchinstances the CI staff would not hold the file, except perhaps a memorandumrelating to the particular case, but Stein found no such memoranda.SECRET - SENSITIVE