Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[178-10003-10453.pdf — page 19]
10. All correspondence, memoranda or other documents prepared within or received by CIA in connection with the 1965 order of President Johnson barring wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping by federal personnel.11. Appointment calendars of Richard Helms and Robert Cushman 1969-1973.12. Reports by Jack Bauman December 1971-January 1972 on meetings with Howard Hunt.
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II. CIA PERSONNEL TO BE INTERVIEWED OR DEPOSEDThe following list indicates the CIA personnel the Committee has thus far decided to interview, or depose.* Where known, specific persons are identified. In all other cases, the position or program responsibility and pertinent years are provided so that CIA can identify the appropriate persons; if the person is no longer with the Agency, the Agency should provide the last known addresses.A. Directorate of Operations1. DDO AREAWilliam Nelson, Tom Karamessines, David Blee, Cord MeyerExecutive Assistant to DDO (1966-1972)Director of Missions and Program Staff (inception - 1972)2. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STAFFDonovan Pratt, Jane Ronan, Newton Miller, John Hodden, Brick O'NealExecutive Assistant to CH/CI (1966-1972)Chief, Police Group (1967-1972)Special Operations Group:Richard Ober, Jason HornDeputy Chief (1967-1973)Secretary to Chief and Deputy ChiefBranch Operations OfficerAll "Case Officers"* Individuals are listed under the office in which they worked during the period in question. Organizational entities are identified as they existed in those periods.
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CI Personnel handling Projects:SRPOINTERHTLINGUALSRWESTPOINTERMKSOURDOUGH3. OPERATIONS STAFFSeymour Bolten4. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE STAFFChief and Deputy Chief/FI (1967-1973)Division (of Staff) D:Carelton Swift, Warren L. Dean, Frederick Griffin,Robert Halverson, Gerald Fallon, Frank Hoose.Chief and Deputy Chief/D; Deputy for Plans andPolicy/D (1967-1973)5. CENTRAL COVER STAFFEric EisenstadtChief and Deputy Chief (1965-1975)Chief, Corporate Cover Branch (1965-1975)6. COVERT ACTION STAFFChief and Deputy Chief (1965-1973)7. FAR EAST DIVISIONChief (1968)Domestic Operations Branch (1967-1973)Branch Chiefs and Project Officers for:(a) MPLODESTAR (and MPCHAUVINISM and MPTROIKA,if separate project officers);(b) "PROJECT 1" as described by the RockefellerCommission Report (p. 137);(c) Mail opening involving Far East correspondence(1967-1973)8. WESTERN EUROPE DIVISIONOfficers involved in queries of stations on Robert Vescoand IOS matters and in communications to Swiss authoritiesregarding Vesco's detentionPrincipal liaison officer with CI/SOG (1967-1973)
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9. AFRICAN DIVISIONPrincipal liaison officer with CI/SOG (1967-1973)10. DOMESTIC OPERATIONS DIVISION (now FOREIGN RESOURCES DIVISION)Gordon Jorgenson, John Shaffer, Seymour Russell, Walter O'Brien,Stanley Gaines, Robert T. Cassidy, Joseph Bulik, Maurice Sovern,John Markham, Lydia KenneyChief (1964-1973)Deputy Chief, Chief Intelligence Operations Group;Chiefs Branch I and Branch II; Chief Special ProjectsStaff (1967-1973)Chief Commercial Management; Chief Commercial Operations(1964-1971)Base Chiefs New York, Miami, Chicago San Francisco, Boston,Los Angeles, and Washington (1964-1973)All supervisory personnel, New York Base (1968-1973)11. WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISIONWilliam Broe, J. D. Esterline, Bruce Cheever,Ted Shackley, Lawrence Sternfeld, Paul HolliwellChief and Deputy Chief/WH (1965-1973)Chief, Cuban Operations (1965-1973)Chief, Cuban Operations Group, Miami Operations BranchChief, Miami Station (JMWAVE) (1963-1973)Chile Desk Officer, Headquarters (1971-1972)12. SOVIET BLOC DIVISIONChief, U. S. Operations Branch (1967-1973)Project Officer and Branch Chief on SRPOINTER, HTLINGUAL13. TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION (now OFFICE OF TECHNICAL    SERVICES, DDS&TCarl Duckett, John McMahon, Everett. O'Neal, Paul Kater,Norm Jackson, John Ward, Bruce O DellChief, Deputy Chief and Deputy Chief for Operations/TSD(1965-1973)Chief Audio Branch; CH/Training Branch; and CH/SpecialDevices Branch (1967-1973)
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TSD Officers in charge of training and in charge of technical assistance for:(a) Penetration of locks and other security barriers in connection with surreptitious entry;(b) Electronic, other technical, or photographic surveillance (1967-1973)B. Directorate of Management and Services1. OFFICE OF SECURITYCharles Kane, Edward Sayle, Louis Vasaly, Cecil Tighe, Arthur Sheridan, Victor White, John B. Cryer, Jack Bauman, William Curtin, Walter Richardson, Frank Favorini, James McCabe, Edmund Kilppa, Joseph Langea, J. K. Hutchinson, Ralph Orcutt, John J. Sullivan, Frederick Evans, Lawrence Howe, Robert Robinson, David Hanlon, Wallace Geiman, Meredith Flook, Jack Turton, George R. Brewer, George SwegmanProject Officer in Office of Security and Project Officer at Anderson Associates for PROJECT MERRIMAC:Office representatives involved in proposal of "PROJECT 1" referred to in the Rockefeller Commission Report (p. 137);Project Officer for PROJECT RESISTANCE.2. OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONSRichard Scott, Lloyd Harnage, Florend Kindell, Daniel Wakeman, James Fisher, F. G. Israelson, John Coffey, Arthur Reinhardt, Paul Rinaldo3. OFFICE OF FINANCEWarren D. Magnuson, Thomas YaleDirector (1965-1975)Director, Monetary Division (1965-1975)Director, Proprietary Systems and Accounts Division (1965-1975)C. Directorate of Intelligence1. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCHOfficers tasking other CIA offices for queries on Robert Vesco and IOS
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2. DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICEVernon SandoDCS Director;Chief of New York Office, DCS (1967-1973)D. Directorate of Science and TechnologyRobert Chapman, Sayre Stevens, James Kirsch, John McMahonE. DCI Area1. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSELJohn WarnerJohn K. Greaney2. OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSELJohn MauryGeorge Carey3. INSPECTOR GENERAL AND REVIEW STAFFDonald Chamberlain, Scott Breckenridge, William Broe4. OTHERSeymour BoltenJohn Clarke
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## III.The following staff members along with the senior staff of the Committee are presently working on this aspect of the Select Committee's inquiry:Burton WidesMichael MadiganElliot MaxwellHoward LiebengoodPaul WallachJoseph diGenovaJohn PetersonIf other persons begin to work in this area, appropriate notification will take place.
[178-10004-10053.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992## JFK Assassination System Identification FormDate: 8/27/201## Agency InformationAGENCY: ROCKCOMRECORD NUMBER: 178-10004-10053RECORD SERIES: ASSASSINATION FILEAGENCY FILE NUMBER: MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (3)## Document InformationORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE: DCI PRESENTATION TO THE PFIAB, 7 DECEMBER 1962DATE: 12/10/1962PAGES: 3SUBJECTS: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIESPFIABOPERATION MONGOOSEMC CONE, JOHNCLANDESTINE OPERATIONSDOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUMCLASSIFICATION: Top SecretRESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1CCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 08/03/1993OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS:
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# TOP SECRET178-10004-1005310 December 1962MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD..SUBJECT: DCI Presentation to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 7 December 19621. After concluding the discussion on Cuba, the Director told the Board that he wanted to report on the status of OXCART. He noted that we were on schedule with the aircraft, and that five would be completed by the end of December. He said that one had reached MACH 2. 16 at 60, 000 feet. There had been some trouble with the J-58 engines, but all problems were soluble. He said the progress on the aircraft was running ahead of that on the engines, and noted that we had had 75 hours in the air with 18 hours on the J-58 engine. He said he had been in direct contact with Mr. Horner to insure that the project was receiving top priority. Dr. Killian asked if Pratt and Whitney had their first team in and the DCI said yes, but one of the problems was that Hamilton Standard didn't have access to everything in Pratt and Whitney unless Horner paved the way.2. Dr. Baker asked if there had been a solution to the fuel pump problem and the DCI commented that he believed a solution was being reached. Dr. Killian noted that Bendix was working on an alternative fuel pump. The DCI concluded by saying that while the radar cross section was not as small as we had hoped for, it was being worked on.Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
[178-10004-10053.pdf — page 2]
3. Mr. McCone then turned to the budget and noted that some difficulties had arisen in this connection and in the over all field of coordination. He reminded the Board that they had wanted him to review the budgets of the whole intelligence community, and noted that the military intelligence budget was 90% of the over all effort. He said that he had discussed this with Secretary McNamara. Dr. Killian reiterated that he thought the DCI should review the whole intelligence budget. The DCI noted that intelligence in Defense was going through a transitional period with the development of DIA and other changes. General Doolittle expressed surprise that CIA was only 10% of the intelligence budget. The DCI pointed out that Defense was spending $3,844,000,000 on intelligence and CIA only $363,000,000. This was an increase from $2,250,000,000 in the past, but Defense had put all reconnaissance of the Navy and Air Force into its intelligence budget. He said he did not believe this was correct, and thought it should be deleted.4. Turning to the CIA budget, the Director said he had instructed the Agency to keep at the level of last year--this was about $50,000,000 less than what had been asked for by the various departments. He said he thought the Agency had worked hard to keep the budget down, and noted that there had to be additional funds for operations against Cuba. There was an increase in NPIC, and as a result the budget was $425,000,000 versus $405,000,000. The Bureau of the Budget had cut this to $381,000,000 and taken $20,000,000 for Cuban operations to charge to the Reserve. The DCI said he found this unacceptable, and thought the contingency should be pure. At this point
[178-10004-10053.pdf — page 3]
Mr. Clifford said he had run across the phrase, MONGOOSE, on severaloccasions, and asked what this involved. The DCI then explained briefly theMONGOOSE project and how it was set up. He said that after his discussionwith the President and Attorney General last fall, it had been decided toutilize all resources to unseat Castro. He went on to mention some of theactivities of the project. Mr. McCone then said he did not favor continuingsabotage and guerilla operations. He noted that he was very disturbed aboutthe future and felt that there might be a confrontation within the next few days,and that the Russians might light up the SAM's. He said he had no way ofexplaining why the SAM sites were being left there. Dr. Langer asked if itmight not be for fear of an invasion; the Director said he did not think sobecause our military forces could eliminate the SAM sites without muchtrouble.5. Mr. McCone then said he wanted to discuss the NRO agreement.   He said that it had not worked, and the Director of NRO feels that he must   have fiscal control over CIA projects and review programs progressively   week by week and month by month. The DCI said this was wrong because the   appropriation was to CIA and was approved by a different committee of   Congress to whom we were responsible. He noted that CIA could handle the   project more clandestinely. He had discussed this matter with the Secretary   of Defense but had reached no agreement. Defense is withholding   $140,000,000 and asking CIA to fill out certain forms before they will advance   the money. The Director said that such a decision cannot be made retro-
[178-10004-10054.pdf — page 0]
178-10004-10054 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination systemIdentification FormDate: 4/17/201Agency Informat onAGENCY: ROCKCOMRECORD NUMBER: 178-10004-10054RECORD SERIES: ASSASSINATION FILESAGENCY FILE NUMBER: MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (3)Document InformationORIGINATOR: PFIABFROM: KIRKPATRICK, LYMANTO: RECORDTITLE: MEETING OF THE DCI WITH PBIAB, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 0930 Α.Μ.DATE: 12/28/1962PAGES: 10SUBJECTS:ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIESCLANDESTINE OPERATIONSPFIABMC CONE, JOHNOPERATION MONGOOSECUBAN EXILESDOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUMCLASSIFICATION: Top SecretRESTRICTIONS: 1BCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/09/2016OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS:NW 52879 DocId:32112782 Page 1
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(December 20th - Continued)CONFIDENTIAL| ITEM | TIME       | SUBJECT                                                                                                    || ---- | ---------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- || 11.  | 1:00-2:30  | Lunch - Room 21, Executive Office Building                                                                 ||      | (3:15)     | _J. Engel, Security_ & _Tom Parrott_                                                                       || 12.  | 2:30-3:30  | Status of Implementation of Prior-Board Recommendations                                                    || 13.  | 3:30 - END | Resume Discussion of Report on the Cuban Arms Buildup and Complete Preparation of Report to the President. |CONFIDENTIAL
[178-10004-10054.pdf — page 4]
THE WHITE HOUSEWASH NGTONTOP SECRThis forment sestalia famationIDEALIST, CORONAOXCARTMEMORANDUM FOR THE FILESUBJECT: Board Meeting of December 27 - 28, 1962The Eoard convened at 9:00 a.m. on December 27.* Those present were Dr. Killian, Chairman, Board members Langer, Murphy, Gray, Doolittle, Pace and Clifford and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.Dr. Killian suggested that Board members read the draft report which had been furnished to the Board on the preceding day by Mr. McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence, setting forth the results of the all-source review which the Board hai requested concerning U. S. intelligence community activities with respect to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba during the 6-months preceding October 22, 1962. The Chairman asked that Board members make note of any comments and questions they might wish to raise for discussion during this twc-day meeting. Dr. Killian said that he was not sure the DCI's repcrt had the approval of the intelligence community at this point, for he understood that Mr. McCone was at that moment reviewing the draft report in Seattle, and it was possible that some of the conclusions and factual details migint not have yet received final approval by the agencies which contributed to the preparatior of the report (CIA, DIA, State and NSA). Accordingly, the Chairman noted the importance of the discussions which the Board would have on the following day with heads of the intelligence agencies. The Chairman also thought that the Board should aim for the preparation of a Board report to the President at the close of this 2-day meeting.Dr. Killian said that he had very recently talked to Mr. McGeorge Bundy who hopes that the Board will take the time it needs to produce a solid report on the handling given by U. S. intelligence agencies to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. Mr. Bundy assured that the President will understand that the Board is going into the subject deeply and objectively. About 10 days ago, the Chairman related, he had received a telephone call from Mr. Bundy who said that he had seen an early draft of the DCI's report (from a confidential source) and was concerned because the report did not get to the basic issues, and Mr. Bundy expressed an intention to talk to Mr. McCone about this. Dr. Killian stated that he had an appointment to see Mr. Bundy later in the morning at which time he would ask Mr. Bundy to meet with the Board during the course of this meeting.* Board members Baker and Land were unable to attend.Handle Via COMINT TALENT - KEYHOLEChannels OnlyHar dle via BYEMANCor trol SystemTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET24-day stay in Cuba, and our Government is equally in the dark about Soviet and Cuban plans for further activities involving other countries in this Hemisphere. Also we are lacking-intelligence on Cuba/Communist China discussions. Mr. Murphy reiterated his concern that our lack of information on such matters as these indicates the absence of an adequate intelligence capability to keep our Government informed about developments in Cuba at the present time and in the future.Dr. Killian at this point reported to the Board on the conversation which he had just had with Mr. Bundy. According to Mr. Bundy, the President is fully aware that the Board is conducting its review of the Cuba situation. The President wants an objective report from a group of citizens who have no axe to grind, and he is placing great store on this effort of the Board. The Chairman said that Mr. Bundy was obviously concerned about the prospect that the Congress will make inquiries into the Cube matter. However, Mr. Bundy feels there is a bare possibility that Congressional investigators will be more hesitant to raise hypothetical questions if they learn of the existence of a study having been made by a group such as the Board. It is Mr. Bundy's hope that the Board will carefully consider the preparation of a sanitized version of the report, but if the Board and the President feel that this cannot be done then the Board should try to prepare 'a report which could be used in executive session of a Committee of the Congress.Dr. Killian went on to report other matters which had been covered in his discussion with Mr. Bundy. He said that Mr. Bundy had expressed concern over the failure of the DCI to accept the suggestion that there be submitted a more adequate report than the one which the DCI forwarded to the Board on December 26. Mr. Bundy noted in this connection that the DCI's report assigns to policy makers prime responsibility for any failures with respect to intelligence handling..On the question of availability of Special Group records for purposes of the Board's study, Mr. Bundy informed the Chairman that certainly the Board should examine such records and that they could be obtained from. Mr. Parrott (Mr. Bundy commented that the Board is the only group which can have this kind.of.access)Handle, Via COMINT-TALFJIT KEYHOLE Channels C Handle, via BYEMAN Control SystemTOP SECRET
[178-10004-10054.pdf — page 6]
TOP SECRETAs to the Board's study, Mr. Bundy told Dr. Killian that the Board should include in its review discussions with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- Mr. Bundy indicating that the Secretary of Defense has particular reservations about the DCI's report.Another matter mentioned by Mr. Bundy was his belief that the morale of the intelligence community as a whole stands to suffer in the absence of a carefully done review and report which is being expected from the Board.With regard to the interim report which the Board has under way, Mr. Bundy informed the Chairman that the report could be delivered to him or it could be presented to the President directly, and Mr. Bundy thought it important that the Board present it to the President in person. One fother matter discussed was the Board's concern about any intelligence let-down in the wake of the Cuba crisis, it being Mr. Bundy's belief that no such let-down is in prospect if present directives and discussions on the subject have any effect in Government.(At the conclusion of the Chairman's account of his discussion with Mr. Bundy, the Board recessed for lunch.)At 2:30 p.m., the Board was briefed on the world situation by Mr. Thomas Lawlor, senior intelligence officer in CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy DCI/Intelligence was on vacation leave and not available to be present at this Board meeting). Mr. Lawlor explained that his own responsibilities included the handling of current intelligence matters, the selection and write-up of current intelligence items (e.g., in the CIB and in memoranda for the White House), and the preparation of internal intelligence notes for use at the CIA working level. Mr. Lawlor pointed out that his duties were in the areas of analysis and production, not the collection, of intelligence. His briefing of the Board included the following subject matters:USSR/Chicom relations: Recriminations between the USSR and Communist China are the greatest in the history of their dispute and an open break in party relations is most likely near.USSR/Cuba: The USSR is presently reappraising its foreign policy positions in the light of the Cuba crisis aftermath.USSR/Berlin: The USSR is at a diplomatic standstill in Berlin, and this is traceable to the USSR/Chicom riftHandle Via COMINTALENT KEYHOLEChannels onlyHandle via BYEMANControlTOP SECRET
[178-10004-10054.pdf — page 7]
TOP SECRET20The Chairman asked the DCI whether the MONGOOSE-activity presented any particular intelligence problem in the Cuba situation. Mr. McCone said what it had not. He said that in the MONGOOSE activity the Special Group and the Attorney General had given a great deal of consideration to the need for intelligence collection with respect to Cuba, but he intelligence needed was primarily for covert action rather than other purposes. Nevertheless, the MONGOOSE activity contributed to the over-all : ntelligence collection effort on Cuba. Mr. McCone recalled that there was a hiatus in the collection of intelligence on Cuba after the Bay of Pigs in- vasion, and when he took office in November 1961 Mr. McCone was surprised to learn that no interrogation of Cuban refugees was aking place. Thereafter, following discussions with the President and the Attorney General they got the refugee interrogations under way.Mr. Murphy wondered why there had been a let-down in intelligence gathering after the Bay of Pigs incident. Mr. McCone said that this took place before his time, but he assumed that the reasons had to do with discouragement and other psychological factors. In response to Dr. Killian's question as to whether another intelligence let-down was in store in the wake of the Cubs crisis, Mr. McCone said that there was in fact a great danger of such a development following what some officials consider was an "intelligence victory" for the United States. Mr.licCone, noting that the Soviet SA-2's remain in Cuba, said he had brought this up forcefully, a week ago at an NSC Executive Committee meeting, and the President had agreed to get word to the USSR that any inter- ference with our aerial reconnaissance of Cuba would be considered as being most grave and Messrs. MicCloy and Stevenson have passed this word to Kuznetsov. Mr. McCone added that while low-level reconnaissance flights have been suspended, should any ominous development occur,it will be necessary to obtain Presidential: approval of the resumption of low-level 'flightsMr. Pace inquired as as to whether there were any prohibitions on the conduct of intelligende operations with regard to Cuba. Mr. McCone said yes, it is desired to follow a more aggressive pattern of agent infiltration into. Cuba. He would like to see a 3. or 4 month effort directed toward the obtaining of straight intelligence on Cuba (in lieu of political warfare, for example) to determine the trend of Solet plans in Cuba. The DCI noted that the Soviets may quietly get out of Cuba, or they may inHandle Via COMINT TALENT-KEYHOLEChanne's OnlyHandlexvia BYEMANtrol SystemTOP SECRET