Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 11]
# SECRET SENSITIVEA summary of critical developments in the history of U.S. counterintelligence from 1945 to 1975.Recommendations which we respectfully urge the Commission to submit to the President for his consideration.I. THE AUTHORITYThe current version of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5, U.S. Espionage and Counter- intelligence Activities Abroad, effective 17 February 1972, is the charter for the conduct of foreign clandestine activities by CIA and by the other members of the U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence community. NSCID/5 defines counterintelligence as "... that intelligence activity, with its resultant product, devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and undertaken to protect the security of the nation and its personnel, information and installations against espionage, sabotage and subversion. Counterintelligence includes the process of procuring, developing, recording and disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine activity and of penetrating, manipulating or repressing individuals groups or organizations conducting such activity."As defined, counterintelligence consists of two parts, security and counterespionage. *Security* is essentially the> Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford LibraryNW 50955 DocId:32112721 Page 12
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 12]
# SECRET SENSITIVEstatic defenses erected against the clandestine activities of adversaries of the U.S., whereas *counterespionage* is aggressive activity of engaging the adversary clandestinely.NSCID/5 stipulates that the Director of Central Intelligence shall undertake specified actions in order to ensure centralized direction of all clandestine activities within the scope of the Directive. It also charges CIA with primary responsibility for U.S. clandestine activities abroad and permits other departments and agencies to conduct such foreign clandestine activities as are supplementary or are necessary to their security. Departmental counterintelligence is brought together through two Director of Central Intelligence Directives, one which requires coordination in advance with CIA on clandestine counterintelligence operations abroad, and the other which stipulates that CIA shall serve as a central repository of foreign counterintelligence data to the Intelligence Community.The flow of authority is from the National Security Council to the Director of Central Intelligence to the Deputy Director for Operations to the central counterintelligence unit of CIA or to an area division to provide whatever assistance the Director may require to discharge his obligations under NSCID/5 and its assignment to him of responsibility for the protection of methods and sources or under other laws, orders and directives. The immediate mandate of the counterintelligence component, however, is derived fromNW 50955 DocId:32112721 Page 13> [Figure: a seal]Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 13]
SECRET SENSITIVEthose responsibilities assigned directly to CIA (and thuschiefly from paragraphs lb, 3b, 3c, 3d and 9 of NSCID/5, thechief provisos of which have been noted above).In our view the DCI is not exercising under NSCID/5responsible centralized direction of counterintelligenceclandestine activity. As indicated to the Commission inverbal testimony, the current Director has spent less thanfour to five hours with the Counterintelligence Staff fromthe moment he became the Deputy Director for Operationsuntil the present. His knowledge of the activity during theperiod when he was Chief of the Far East Division was one offailure and is reflected in an Inspector General's report ofthe period. This and some of his communications to the fieldare a matter of record in the FE Division. Instead of exer-cising leadership in resolving the serious problems of pene-tration and disinformation, which are of prime importance tothe security of the country, under his aegis there has been adecentralization and mutilation within the Agency and, there-fore, within the Community of high-level counterintelligenceactivity. We believe that substantial changes are neededand that these changes should be effected with and throughan understanding of our counterintelligence mission, capa-bilities and needs. In setting forth our collective views onthese matters, we do so, drawing on our professional experi-ence as to what needs to be set right and how it may be done.The primary cause of the present vulnerability of our na-tional security is the inadequate attention and serious lackof understanding of the counterintelligence function.SECRET SENSITIVENW 50955 DocId:32112721 Page 14PhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford Library
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 14]
## II. THE NATURE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIESThe counterintelligence unit of the CIA bears a direct responsibility for the security of all Agency espionage and counterintelligence operations conducted abroad. It is also directly responsible for identifying and containing or controlling hostile clandestine activity through such operations as the following:- The identification of adversary personnel, regardless of citizenship or location abroad.- The penetration of foreign services.- The handling and utilization of certain intelligence and counterintelligence defectors from foreign services.- The management of double agent operations.- The detection, analysis and nullification of hostile deception operations, including disinformation.- Counterintelligence analysis and operations directed against adversary propaganda, defamation, forgeries and other covert activities.- The exploitation of communications intelligence in furtherance of counterintelligence objectives.
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 15]
SECRET SENSITIVE- The conduct of liaison abroad with foreign counterintelligence and security services and with foreign services generally about counterintelligence matters.- The conduct of domestic counterintelligence liaison to ensure the necessary sharing of information and coordination of action..- The maintenance of its own records and the managerial supervision of CIA's central repository of records to ensure that the foreign counterintelligence in these holdings is collated, analyzed and made available to others in the Intelligence Community on a need-to-know basis.III. A SUMMARY OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HISTORY OF CIAAfter the Second World War, except for a few stations abroad, centralized U.S. counterintelligence practically disappeared. By October 1945, when O.S.S. was liquidated, its counterintelligence branch, X-2, had become a wide-spread net of overseas stations staffed by some 650 counterintelligence specialists. Starting nearly from scratch, X-2 had created and developed a thoroughly professional U.S. counterintelligence capability in a very short time because it served a leadership that understood and respected
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 16]
the counterintelligence function and conferred upon it the necessary measure of authority, autonomy and the essential secrecy required for the conduct of this activity. To better understand the need for reform, it is believed that a short historical presentation is essential. What is here submitted is based on voluminous files and documentation which record the shaky progress of counterintelligence as practiced by the U.S. Government following World War II until the present.After October 1945 the concept of counterintelligence as a separate and equal function withered away. On 17 October of that year Brigadier General John A. Magruder, then the director of the Strategic Services Unit (a short-lived inheritor of O.S.S.), stated in a memorandum to Mr. John J. McCloy that the valuable O.S.S. liaison relationships abroad were deteriorating because foreign services were uncertain as to whether the United States would have a central intelligence service. General Magruder was an honorable and conscientious custodian of O.S.S.Although CIA was established in 1947, and although the first version of NSCID/5, promulgated in December 1947, charged the Director of Central Intelligence with the conduct of all organized federal counterespionage operations overseas, the new Agency did not have a central counterintelligence unit of mechanism through which it could meet its counterintelligence responsibilities.NW 50955 DocId: 32112721 Page 17> [Figure] Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 17]
# SECRET SENSITIVEOn 1 January 1949 a report was submitted to the National Security Council at its request by men whom it had appointed to a Survey Group: Messrs. Allen W. Dulles (chairman), William H. Jackson and Mathias F. Correa. As one who had played a key role in the Office of Strategic Services, Mr. Dulles was familiar with the wartime role and performance of X-2. He understood its record and mission which were succinctly stated in the War Report: *Office of Strategic Services*. [^1] The opening paragraph of this official account of X-2 reads as follows: "Counterespionage is a distinct and independent intelligence function. It embraces not only the protection of the intelligence interests of the government it serves, but, by control and manipulation of the intelligence operations of other nations, it performs a dynamic function in discerning their plans and intentions, as well as in deceiving them. An effective counterespionage organization is therefore an intelligence instrument of vital importance to national security."[^2]The Dulles Committee made recommendations designed to strengthen CIA and its counterintelligence capability. The[^1]: Vol. I, Washington Organization, History Project, Strategic Services Unit, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, War Department, Washington, D. C., July 1949.[^2]: Ibid., p. 189.17> Photocopy> from> Gerald R. Ford LibraryNW 50955 DocId:32112721 Page 18
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 18]
# SECRET SENSITIVE1949 report is infused with an understanding of problems and principles that have remained much the same for the past quarter of a century. The following two brief quotations are illustrative: "... We ... propose that the branches of the Central Intelligence Agency which are directly engaged in clandestine actitivities, such as secret intelligence [espionage), counterintelligence, secret operations and the like, be given a great measure of autonomy as to internal administration, the control of their operations and the selection of personnel." The report also stated, "It seems apparent that the present counterespionage staff of the Office of Special Operations should be materially strengthened and more intensive counterespionage work promoted."Until the end of 1954, however, counterintelligence remained structurally and in other respects subordinate to the collection of positive intelligence. In August 1950 there was a counterintelligence sub-unit called Staff C, but it had a total strength of twenty-three. The Soviet Intelligence Branch of Staff C consisted of three people. The result was a dispersion of the counterintelligence function among the area branches and a degradation of the work to such lowest common denominators as name tracing, maintenance of counterintelligence files and the like.A notice of 20 December 1954 announced the formation of a new, senior counterintelligence element, the Counterintel-ligence Staff. For the first time CIA had elevated the![Photocopy from Gerald R. Fond Library]NW 50955 DocId:32112721 Page 19
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 19]
SECRET SENSITIVEcounterintelligence function, as a Staff function, to fullparity with espionage and covert activities. One of thefirst undertakings of the Counterintelligence Staff wasto determine who was doing counterintelligence work, whatthey were doing and under what circumstances. This surveywas launched in 1955 and completed in 1956. It establishedthat except for the Counterintelligence Staff itself, theOperational Directorate had only 133 full-time counterin-telligence officers, about 6 per cent of its total non-clerical strength. The average grade of these officers wasGS-09, and their average Agency experience was five years.Only one in four had had either basic or advanced trainingin counterintelligence.From the end of 1954 until April 1973, the apex of itsdevelopment, the Counterintelligence Staff grew in numbers,skills and responsibilities. By the latter date its per-sonnel strength, as I noted in my earlier report to theCommission, consisted of 130 officers and seventy-two assist-ants and clerical personnel. This total of 202 still con-stituted only 3.7 per cent of the total Directorate ofOperations strength of 5,662. As a result CIA could notmeet its counterintelligence responsibilities adequatelyeven at this peak of on-board counterintelligence strength.It is our view that the Operations Directorate ought todevote no less than 10 per cent of its manpower tocounterintelligence and that no less than half of its![page number 19]![Photocopy from Gerald R. FordLibrary]NW 50955 DocId: 32112721 Page 20
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 20]
SECRET SENSITIVEcounterintelligence personnel should be allocated to the counterintelligence unit in Headquarters. This 10 per cent, comprising 566 officer and clerical employees, would still fall considerably short of our counterintelligence strength in the fall of 1945 when O.S.S. was dissolved.The Counterintelligence Staff was nevertheless able to work effectively against its major targets. The scope of this paper prohibits an adequate resume, but there is an indication of the results achieved in the fact that during the years 1961 through 1963 eight major Soviet penetrations of American and foreign liaison intelligence services were uncovered and that six of the eight exposures resulted directly from CIA's counterintelligence work. Fifteen Soviet agents were arrested, as well as more than twenty others who were working clandestinely for one or another of the East European services.In August 1973 as a result of the change in leadership in the Agency, there was put in motion a series of baffling administrative and functional changes which ignored the state of the art; the need for resolving many inter-Agency problems in counterintelligence, and, particularly, the need to work out with the FBI in depth a number of conflicts concerning the *bona fides* of sources; the handling of defectors; and authoritative research and analysis pertinent to these differences.20PhotocopyfromGerald R. Ford LibraryNW 50955 DocId: 32112721 Page 21
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 21]
SECRET SENSITIVEThe strength of CIA's counterintelligence unit was cut almost in half - to eighty-nine; and by December 1974 the on-board strength of our counterintelligence personnel, officer and clerical, was down to seventy-seven, a total comprising 1.7 per cent of Operations Directorate strength. This abrupt reduction in force was accompanied by the transfer of four interlocking staff elements (International Communism, Operational Approvals, Police and Counterintelligence Liaison) to other jurisdictions. I do not know of any reasons concerning the performance of the Counterintelligence Staff or the scope of hostile clandestine intelligence action against the U.S. which would justify this drastic reduction and weakening.With regard to the FBI it is a fact that for some years prior to the death of Mr. Hoover, there were sharp differences between the FBI and the Counterintelligence Staff regarding the *bona fides* of Soviet intelligence personnel who represented perhaps the prime sources of information in relation to Soviet Bloc activity in the U.S., penetration in the Government and the order of battle of the Soviet presence.CIA was fortunate to acquire a KGB defector in December 1961 who had spent many years at a very high level of Soviet security acquiring the most sensitive information in the full knowledge that when the time was propitious, he would defect to the West and impart his information. By way of simplification, it should be noted that this individual> [Figure: Document page with a stamp indicating it is a photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library.]
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 22]
SECRET SENSITIVEwas responsible for the breaking of many espionage cases in the West, but equally important he divulged Soviet plans, strategy and organization effected in 1959 by the KGB under the auspices of the Central Committee which in turn mapped out in partnership with other services of the Bloc a program of action whose principal targets were the isolation of the U.S. as the "Main Enemy" and the ultimate change in the balance of military power in favor of the Soviet Bloc.During the later tenure of Mr. Hoover, which was fraught with difficulties between the FBI and members of the Senate, and included other changes hampering or limiting the FBI's ability to conduct internal security operations, the hard issues of disagreement were never dealt with on an agency-to-agency basis. To the contrary, as the Commission is well aware, there was eventually a break-down in liaison across the board between departments and agencies of the Government with the FBI (with the exception of the White House). Further, the internal disputes within the Bureau challenging Mr. Hoover's leadership were extremely detrimental to any objective consideration concerning the national security, and consequently years were lost in pursuing the national counterintelligence objective.During this period, in our view, national estimates and evaluations were formulated in concrete establishment of detentist philosophy which marked the real state of Soviet Bloc subversion in the secret war.![Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library]
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 23]
# SECRET SENSITIVEBy way of explanation, we can illustrate the ineffectual coordination with a case involving a long-term Soviet penetration in the Agency. A very important staff agent was unmasked by virtue of information supplied by the aforementioned defector, but in the process the FBI officially took the position that the candidate who was submitted by the Agency was not the Soviet agent in question, and by memorandum they proposed that we submit all of the data to the Department of Defense on grounds that the penetration agent was more likely a past or present asset of the military. Subsequently, a high-level source confirmed our original identification, which in turn was accepted by the FBI. The case is illustrative of the inability within this Government to resolve interagency differences in all of those sensitive fields affecting penetration.The result of the 1973 changes was a decentralization of counterintelligence, a retrogression to the inadequacies of the period 1949 to 1955. Now, as then, counterintelligence in CIA lacks the necessary specialists and the requisite interaction at the Agency's highest levels. Some of the present grave problems are not new, but the recent changes have greatly magnified them. Among our present weaknesses are the following:- An almost total failure against Soviet illegals (intelligence officers under deep, non-official cover). At> [Figure] Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 24]
# SECRET SENSITIVEpresent CIA is not conducting a single operation against a Soviet illegal.- An incapacity to pursue unresolved outstanding leads. We estimate that there are some fifteen hard-core leads to known or probable penetrations by adversary services into U.S. or Allied services; that there are about one hundred leads meriting immediate study, analysis, investigation and exploitation; and that there are no less than one thousand that merit pursuit. All of them are now dormant.- An inability to deal effectively with the twin problems of devising and carrying out strategic U.S. deception operations and of nullifying adversary deception. This serious weakness is not imbedded in CIA alone, and it did not result from the restructuring of Agency counterintelligence. The U.S. lacks a single, duly mandated, centralized authority for dealing with deception. Those few individuals and groups in the U.S. Government, chiefly in the military services, who are concerned with strategic> [Figure: In the bottom right corner, there is a label that reads 'Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library'. Centered at the bottom, there is a number '24' surrounded by illegible text.]NW 50955 DocId: 32112721 Page 25
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 25]
SECRET SENSITIVEdeception lack ready or frequent access to the policy level. They attempt to frame deception plans in ignorance of new policies, and they can obtain top-level review of their plans only on an *ad hoc* basis. The remedy is not to abandon deception and counter-deception but to elevate these functions. Should the Government do so, however, CIA would now lack the required expertise.- A dwindling cadre. A substantial core of experienced counterintelligence specialists is the first prerequisite for an effective counterintelligence program. Only a few are left today. The problem results not solely from the drastic reduction in force in 1973 but also from a philosophy and system that have made it almost impossible to replace either the numbers of the skills of those lost through attrition. In the Operational Directorate it is the Area Divisions that are linked by a command line to top CIA management in Headquarters and to all 147 Agency stations overseas. The Divisions select25> [Figure: Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library]NW 50955 DocId:32112721 Page 26
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 26]
SECRET SENSITIVEyoung intelligence officers soon after the completion of their initial training, at the outset of their careers. They send many of them abroad, direct their work through Chiefs of Stations and Bases and bring them back in accordance with the personnel needs of Headquarters and the Field. The result is a system of rotation that benefits both the Agency and the employee. In contrast, the counterintelligence unit in Headquarters has no representative of its own overseas. To secure competent replacements, it must try to intervene in the normal progress of careers, to persuade officers and Divisions that higher interests require a change of their plans and to convince the officers that they should choose careers in counterintelligence even though their career advancement is in fact likely to be impeded by this choice.In brief, CIA has no system for developing counterintelligence career officers; sending them abroad on a rotational basis to acquire, through a series of tours, the necessary experience as specialists; and providing them with the same incentives and career prospects as those of their peers in the Area Divisions.
[178-10004-10115.pdf — page 27]
# SECRET SENSITIVEAn accelerating decline in the quality of our counterintelligence liaison relationships abroad. Here too there is a parallel with the problems that beset us in the past and that gave cause to General Magruder to express his concern in 1945.Most of CIA's liaison overseas is carried out with counterintelligence and security services because only a minority of nations maintain foreign espionage organizations, whereas nearly all have internal security services. Italy is typical. It has a few intelligence officers overseas, but 99 per cent of its strength is at home. The major Italian intelligence service is the Defense Intelligence Agency (SID). The SID draws its counterintelligence from the Carabinieri (a semi-military organization with a network of posts spread throughout the country) and from all of the military services. The service has a vast array of domestic sources that number in the high thousands and range from the portieri who tend apartments throughout Italy to high dignitaries of the church and state. The chief of the SID hasBLONEP7SENSITIVE> [Figure] Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford LibraryNW 50955 DocId:32112721 Page 28