Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[177-10001-10305.pdf — page 41]
# SECRET27 March 1963VENEZUELA1. We have no acceptable figure on Venezuelan travel to Cuba. Liaison services maintain no records, and have no such capability.2. Reports from travel control points show 128 Venezuelan nationals traveling to Cuba, but only 48 returning. The names of most of those returning do not appear on the lists of those who went to Cuba. In the few cases where round-trip travel can be established, the stay was generally short. We must conclude that Venezuelans who went to Cuba for training traveled at least one way, and in some known instances both, clandestinely.3. On the basis of usually reliable agent reports, we believe that more than 200 Venezuelans received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba in 1962. Castro has made it plain that he assigns the first priority for revolution to Venezuela.4. At present there are probably about 100 men involved in the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) paramilitary command attempting to terrorize the Federal District of Caracas. Sources in both the PCV and the Government of Venezuela estimate there are another 300 guerrillas in the field, although we know of no more than 150, in small units of about 20 men, who are under coordinated PCV command. Including terrorist groups of university students and paramilitary party formations in Maracaibo and other large cities, the total number involved in violence probably does not exceed 600. Only seven known to be engaged in these operational are known to have been in Cuba long enough for training.5. The PCV, however, in the first months of 1963 has proven itself capable of implementing the terrorist and sabotage operations which last October it could only plan. Organization and coordination have improved, and sabotage has reached a level of sophistication in technique and materials which implies either the presence of outside experts or else a highly advanced stage of training.-38-SECRET
[177-10001-10305.pdf — page 42]
# SECRET6. The guerrillas committed themselves to field operations prematurely in 1962 and, denied support or sympathy by the peasantry who are strongly pro-Betancourt, were rounded up or dispersed. A total of 139 were tried by special military courts last fall following the Puerto Cabello and Carupano revolts. More than 110 were given substantial prison sentences. Four at the most are believed to have been in Cuba long enough to receive training.7. Altogether there have been an estimated 1,000 to 1,500 arrests since the beginning of 1962, but there have been no trials or jail sentences other than those of the guerrillas mentioned above. All others were held for varying lengths of time, most of them for less than 90 days. Most of those arrested have been released either for lack of evidence, or by civil judges who are generally either inefficient or open to corruption. Possibly 50 of those arrested may have received some training in Cuba, but government interrogators have so far been unable to obtain any admission of Cuban training, and no travel records are maintained which would give leads for such interrogation.8. The number of incidents leading to arrests are estimated at 250. The principal incidents have been the uprisings of the Puerto Cabello and Carupano garrisons; the October/November sabotage of the Lake Maracaibo oilfields; the hijacking of the freighter Anzoategui in February and the earlier theft of five French paintings from the Museum of Fine Arts; burning of the Sears-Roebuck warehouse and dynamiting of highway bridges in February; pipeline sabotage in March; the recent capture of two PCV paramilitary groups; a bank robbery in February by men wearing the armband of the Communist "Armed Forces of National Liberation" (FALN); and the indiscriminate shooting in Caracas in January and February in the wave of terrorism designed to deter Betancourt's visit to Washington.9. The majority of the Communist-directed incidents have been carried out by members of the PCV paramilitary groups who in general have not themselves had Cuban training, but are trained and directed by instructors who have in turn been trained in Cuba and in some cases in Communist China.
[177-10001-10305.pdf — page 43]
SECRET10. Voice radio transmitters in Caracas    and in outlying cities have been heard in conversa-    tion with a voice transmitter in Cuba.11. Principal personalities known or believed    to have received training in Cuba include:Members of the PCV central committee:Guillermo Garcia Ponce, Rafael E. Martinez, RadamesLarrazabal, Alonso Ojeda Olaechea, Douglas Bravo,German Lairet, and Joaquin Araujo Ortega.Other political leaders: Simon SaiezMerida, Americo Martin, Romulo Henriquez, Jr., andDomingo Alberto Rangel of the extremist Movement ofthe Revolutionary Left (MIR); Fabricio Ojeda, JoseVincente Rangel, and Victor Jose Ochoa of the URD.Labor leaders: Cesar Millan, HoracioScott Power, Hector Marcano Coello, Laureno Torrealba,Helo Cruz Villegas, and Vicente Pinate.Student leaders: Alfredo Maneiro, FreddyMunoz, Jose Rafael Tenorio, Alcides Villalba, JoseLinares, Hector Rodriguez Bauz, and Julio Escalona.Educators: Hector Mujica, Fruto Vivas,Humberto Cuenca, and Jose Vincente Scorza.-40-SECRET
[177-10001-10305.pdf — page 44]
SECRET27 March 1963OTHERS1. There have been about 40 legal travelers from British Guiana to Cuba. Some Latin American travelers could be carried without much chance of detection on Cuban freighters hauling rice. Local papers and opposition parties have charged that some of the students sent to Cuba did not have proper academic qualifications for their studies, implying their travel, was for other purposes. There are no reliable reports, however, that any Guianese have received subversive training in Cuba. Any Cuban training for British Guianese would presumably be designed to support rather than subvert the government of Premier Cheddi Jagan. There have been no arrests for subversive activity, and no incidents of terrorism, sabotage, or subversion. There have been riots, but not Cuban-connnected.2. Jamaica sent 593 legal travelers to Cuba in 1962, probably accounted for largely by the 20-25,000 Jamaicans resident in Cuba. There is no evidence of guerrilla training for any Jamaicans, and there have been no arrests for guerrilla, sabotage, or terrorist activity. Subversion is confined largely to public oratory defying the Jamaican authorities. A British Guianese Communist studying in Jamaica, who is believed to have received training in Cuba, instigated a demonstration in front of the U.S. Embassy in October, 1962, by six members of the "Friends of Cuba Committee;" one Communist was arrested, fined, and released as a result for "obstructing traffic." Two university instructors and two other teachers are believed to have received indoctrination in Cuba.3. Surinam and Trinidad report no subversive incidents, no arrests, and no evidence of Cuban subversive training for any of their nationals. Trinidad listed two legal travelers in Cuba in 1962.-41-SECRET
[177-10001-10445.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystemIdentification FormDate: 8/26/201Agency InformationAGENCY: LBJRECORD NUMBER: 177-10001-10445RECORD SERIES: NSF, JOHN MCCONE MEMORANDA, MTGS. 6 JAN. 64-2 APR. 64, BOX 1AGENCY FILE NUMBER:Document InformationORIGINATOR: CIAFROM: MCCONE, JOHNTO:TITLE:DATE: 02/21/1964PAGES: 2SUBJECTS: NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNEDDOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDCLASSIFICATION: SecretRESTRICTIONS:CURRENT STATUS: WithholdDATE OF LAST REVIEW:OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: DOC. #12v9.1NW 50955 DocId:32283348 Page 119
[177-10001-10445.pdf — page 1]
SECRET-EYES ONLY20 February 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting with the President - 20 February 1964 - Alone1. I advised the President of my willingness to go with him and to meet early in the day with General Eisenhower if he thought this would be constructive. He said he felt General Eisenhower might feel he was being high-pressured and that he intended merely to advise him of the plan to surface the OXCART and exchange formalities. He would then tell him hé was ordering me to go out and brief him in the next week or two and I should make my own arrangements.2. I told the President we had a very sensitive effective operation working in Mexico City jointly with President Mateos which involved telephone surveillance and was being done in a most careful manner with his knowledge and with the assistance of a few of his trusted officials. This had resulted in a very intimate relationship between our station chief, Mr. Win Scott and the President. Ambassador Mann knew of this from Scott, as did certain selected people in State Department. However President Mateos did not know of Mann's knowledge of the operation and looked upon the operation as an intimate arrangement between himself and the CIA station. I mentioned that Mateos had been best man at Win Scott's recent wedding. I said the President should not mention this but I wanted him to know about it if it was raised by President Mateos.3. I told President Johnson that we continued our interrogation of Nosenko; our counterintelligence people were inclined to feel he was a plant but had not made up their minds. President said he thought he was probably legitimate and would give us some good information. I said I hoped this was true that we certainly were taking advantage of everything that he did give us; that we were working closely with the FBI, however we could only conclude at the moment that the Soviet's performance and action were so different from any other defector case that our suspicions had been aroused. The President asked to be kept informed.4. The President then raised the question of Spain, suggesting I might return to Spain to talk again to Franco. He said he was in a very difficult situation because of announcement of the cut-off of aid to Britain, France and Yugoslavia which he did not know about until he read it in the paper, and that he was beside himself because he wanted to give aid of $31 million to Spain but had the greatest difficulty in the justification.SECRET-EYES ONLY
[177-10001-10445.pdf — page 2]
SECRET-EYES ONLYI told the President it was my impression from information gained from clandestine sources that Franco had made some moves to curtail trade with Cuba after my visit with him but that the Spanish companies were endeavoring to circumvent his orders by various surreptitious methods. The President asked that I study the matter carefully and speak to him about it next week.ACTION: I have asked Mr. O'Ryan to contact Noel and I am asking Mr. Ball to contact Ambassador Woodward to determine whether the Spanish had taken any actions which they have announced or might communicate to us which would indicate an intention on their part to curtail or restrict shipping or trade with Cuba.5. The President then said he wanted to do everything possible to get me out of the cloak and dagger business. That he was tired of a situation that had been built up that every time my name or CIA's name was mentioned, it was associated with a dirty trick. He asked if our economic studies had stood up and I said yes, they had, and that they were reconfirmed and supported by an exhaustive article in TIME Magazine. The President seemed pleased at this, expressed satisfaction in CIA's operations but was most emphatic in his feelings that we should get away from the cloak and dagger image and expressed a determination to bring this about by statements he would make from time to time.JAM/mfbNW 50955 DocId:32283348 Page 3SECRET-EYES ONLY
[177-10002-10012.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystemIdentification FormDate: 8/26/201Agency InformationAGENCY: LBJRECORD NUMBER: 177-10002-10012RECORD SERIES: NSF, UNARRANGED FILES, LA/CUBAN SUBVERSION, BOX 5AGENCY FILE NUMBER:Document InformationORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE:DATE: 02/18/1963PAGES: 7SUBJECTS: NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNEDDOCUMENT TYPE: DRAFT BRIEFING NOTESCLASSIFICATION: UnclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: 1ACURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW:OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS:
[177-10002-10012.pdf — page 1]
SECRETDRAFT BRIEFING NOTES18 February 1963# CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICAI. Introductory StatementThe public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the daily record of events in Latin America, and reports from our intelligence sources within Communist and other left-extremist elements throughout this hemisphere all agree on one salient conclusion: that Fidel Castro is encouraging and supporting the efforts of Communists to overthrow and seize control of the governments in Latin America.A. Analysis indicates that the immediate threat stems less from the subversive efforts of traditional Communist movements than from Cuban support of any and all active revolutionary and terrorist movements.B. These distinctions are not precise. In some countries, Castro's original success has spurred the established Communist movement to action, and he supports it. In others, the old-time Communists may even oppose radical action at this time, and Castro works with more active and more militant revolutionists.SECRET
[177-10002-10012.pdf — page 2]
# SECRETC. In any event, we know of only two coun--tries--Mexico and Uruguay--where Castroappears inclined for the time being toforego inciting violence, and this only !because he wants a favorable climate forhis operations into other countries.II. Even before the October missile crisis--andwith increasing rancor since then--Cuban leadershave been exhorting revolutionary movements toviolence and terrorism, and supporting theiractivities.A. Cuban support takes many different forms.We have occasional evidence of directparticipation by Cuban nationals, as inthe La Oroya disorders in Peru in December.We know that some funds move, generally incash by courier, from Cuba to the revolu-tionaries in other countries. While we havenot been able to come up with the kind ofairtight proof a court would require thatweapons move directly from Cuba to thesesame groups, we do know that Cuba furnishesmoney to buy weapons, and that some guer-rilla forces in Peru, for instance, areequipped with Czech weapons which mostlogically would come from Cuba.-2-# SECRET
[177-10002-10012.pdf — page 3]
SECRETB. But by and large, our evidence shows thatCuba is not now attempting a large programof physical support for Latin American rev-olutionaries. It is, rather, concentratingon supplying the inspiration, the guidance,the training, and the communications andtechnical assistance they require.C. In essence, Castro tells would-be revolu-tionaries from other Latin American coun-tries: "Come to Cuba; we will pay yourway, we will train you in underground or-ganization techniques, in guerrilla warfare,in sabotage and in terrorism. We will seeto it that you get back to your homeland.Once you are there, we will keep in touchwith you, give you propaganda support, sendyou propaganda materials for your movement,training aids to expand your guerrilla forces,secret communications methods, and perhapsfunds and specialized demolition equipment."Castro is not, as far as we know, promisingthese other Latin Americans any Cuban weaponsor Cuban personnel--either leaders, ad-visers, or cadres. But he probably doestell them: "If you succeed in establishing-3-SECRET
[177-10002-10012.pdf — page 4]
# SECRETsomething effective by way of a revolu-tionary movement in your homeland, if yourguerrillas come down out of the hillsand confront regular armed forces, then wemay consider more concrete forms of assist-ance."D. So far, it should be noted, none of themovements in South America has reached thisfinal stage--and in fact even Castro'sSierra Maestra guerrillas never had to fighta pitched battle with regular militaryformations which might have required moreadvanced weapons than small arms, grenades,mines, and machineguns. In many ways, Cubaunder Castro is the Latin version of the oldComintern, inciting, abetting, and sustain-ing revolution wherever it will flourish.III. Before going into more detailed evidence of Cubansubversion in Latin America, I should note thatVenezuela is apparently number one on Cuba'spriority list for revolution.A. Fidel Castro said so to the recent meetingof Communist front organizations for LatinAmerican women.1. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both empha-   sized the outlook for revolution.in   Venezuela in speeches in January.
[177-10002-10012.pdf — page 5]
# SECRET2. One of our established sources of proven reliability, high in the ranks of the Venezuelan Communist Party ((a veteran party member and leader of the FALN)), says the Central Committee agreed in January that a "peaceful solution to the present situation in Venezuela is out of the question."B. This same source reported that Communist guerrilla and terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed under a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates activities with the other militant extremist group in Venezuela, the MIR, The result has been the creation of the FALN,, or Armed Forces of National Liberation.1. The FALN is currently trying to publicize its existence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate shootings. These have also been designed to dissuade President Betancourt from his trip to Washington.2. I do not wish to minimize the violence in Venezuela. The sabotage is the work of-5-SECRET
[177-10002-10012.pdf — page 6]
# SECRETexperts, and is being done with advancedtypes of explosives. The shooting hasreached the point in Caracas where it isnot safe to go out after ten at night insome sections of the capital. But it isthe opinion of both our people and the em-bassy that this is not a threat to govern-ment control. It is one thing for a groupof young men to race down a dark streetfiring a machinegun from a speeding car.It is quite a different matter to standup to the armed forces, or seize and holdgovernment buildings.3. We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla   training to more nationals from Venezuela   than from any other country. I shall ex-   plain in more detail later how we arrive   at our figures on guerrilla trainees. Our   best estimate now is that more than 200   Venezuelans received such training in 1962.a. Many of these are engaged in terror-ism in the cities, and others wererounded up and given long prisonsentences when they committed themselves
[177-10002-10012.pdf — page 7]
SECRETprematurely last spring in a country-side where the rural population stronglysupports the Betancourt administration.b. One of our best penetrations of the Com-munist Party in Venezuela tells us thatat present the unified command has lessthan 150 guerrillas in the field, inwidely separated groups of 15 to 25 meneach.-7-SECRET
[177-10002-10016.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992## JFK Assassination System### Identification FormDate: 8/26/201Agency InformationAGENCY: LBJRECORD NUMBER: 177-10002-10016RECORD SERIES : NSF, UNARRANGED FILES, LA/CUBAN SUBVERSION, BOX 5AGENCY FILE NUMBER:Document InformationORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE:DATE: 02/18/1963PAGES: 5SUBJECTS: NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNEDDOCUMENT TYPE: DRAFT BRIEFING NOTESCLASSIFICATION: UnclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: 1ACURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 04/21/1998OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS:
[177-10002-10016.pdf — page 1]
# SECRETDRAFT BRIEFING NOTES 18 February 1963FUNDINGI. Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin America is easy to ascertain and hard to document. Our evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers carrying cash.A. A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several witnesses to have large quantities of US currency stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suitcase. There is no law against bringing currency into Venezuela, so that authorities could not even determine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was captured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.B. A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Porto-carrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in September, 1961, when weather forced the plane to overfly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was found to be carrying $3,600 in cash from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.C. Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla training camp in the mountains west of Quito andSECRET
[177-10002-10016.pdf — page 2]
# SECRETarrested some 48 members of the URJE (Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth). The leaders of the group admitted having received guerrilla training in Cuba, but there was no other evidence at the time of any Cuban involvement. The URJE, however, was a Communist-front group whose leaders had thrown off the discipline of the regular Communist party, and this January the Communists managed to have a URJE convention, run by Young Communists, expel the leaders. They were accused, according to published accounts, of having wasted $44,000 supplied by Cuba for guerrilla activities. One of our reliable sources in the Communist Party ((a regional Communist leader in contact with the Cuban chargé in Chile, and a member of the PCE inquiry commission)) has informed us that the next-to-last Cuban chargé in Quito blamed the fiasco on the fact that his successor had passed the money to the URJE without coordinating with the regular Communist party.D. A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected last November has given us a specific account of procedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weapons which were then smuggled into Guate- mala.-2-SECRET
[177-10002-10016.pdf — page 3]
# SECRETE. We also have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers by which Cuban money eventually reaches Latin American front groups to pay for political and propaganda activity. In some countries where the Cubans still have diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats showing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front-group propaganda.F. Just last month, one of the first Brazilians to receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying to some of those same guerrilla training camps exposed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. Interestingly enough, the Brazilians believe that the money Cuba had been providing for the camps actually came from Communist China. Since the exposure of the Varig documents--and probably since the guerrillas first reached the Cuban embassy in Rio with their complaints about mismanagement, confusion, and corruption--the Cubans have apparently stopped financing this operation, but the evidence shows it is still limping along. The man with the suitcase full of ammunition said that a woman attorney in Rio had given him the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla camp. We know-3-SECRET
[177-10002-10016.pdf — page 4]
# SECRETII. that this woman is a cut-out in the communications between the pro-Communist Peasant Leagues, which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy. The principle that guerrillas must be self-sustaining has obviously been applied to finances as well. Communists have staged waves of bank robberies in Venezuela, Peru, and Argentina.A. The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima suburb last year which netted almost $100,000. Some of the participants have been caught and are being tried in the mass trials of more than 200 Communists just starting in Peru. We know that the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guerrillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo Blanco in the Cuzco Valley.B. Just last week a bank in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000 by men wearing FALN armbands.C. Argentine police last July raided a Buenos Aires warehouse and found evidence that it had been the headquarters for a gang of terrorists--apparently working with both the Peronists and the
[177-10002-10016.pdf — page 5]
SECRETCommunists--responsible for a wave of hold-ups,burglaries, and attacks on police posts designedto obtain funds, weapons, and explosives.-5-SECRETNW 50955 DocId:32205165 Page 6