Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[176-10036-10094.pdf — page 4]
CONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMTDCS -3/544,531IN 21850PAGE 47. APPRAISAL: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT NHU MADE THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3 AND THAT INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 2. IT IS POSSIBLY TRUE THAT NHU MADE THE STATEMENTS IN PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 CONCERNING THE UNITED STATES USING AID TO PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT HE TOLD GVN OFFICIALS TO PREPARE FOR A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN AID. THE REACTION OF THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE OFFICERS TO HIEN'S VERSION OF NHU'S STATEMENTS IS PROBABLY TRUE.END OF MESSAGECONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM
[176-10036-10095.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10095RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER:ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE: Central Intelligence Agency Information ReportDATE: 4/22/1963PAGES: 2SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE:CLASSIFICATION:RESTRICTIONS:CURRENT STATUS:DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2
[176-10036-10095.pdf — page 1]
# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Titia 13, U.S.C Socs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized orized person, is Is prohibited by law.SECRET(When Filled In)COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAMCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/NO DISSEM ABOADREPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/654,285DATE DISTR. 22 APRIL 1963PRECEDENCE ROUTINESUBJECT INDICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAMPLAN TO REQUEST REDUCTION OF AMERICANPERSONNEL IN VIETNAMREFERENCES IN 22329DATE OFINFO. MID-APRIL 1963PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (18 APRIL 1963)DATE ACQ.APPRAISAL SEE BELOWTHIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE.: APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE A VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (F), WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS AT THE PRESIDENCY.APPR IT IS POSSIBLY TRUE THAT BOTH DIEM AND NHU HAVE BECOME AT LEAST PARTIALLY UPSETOVER CERTAIN AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND OVER THE LARGE NUMBER OFAMERICAN PERSONNEL CURRENTLY IN SOUTH VIETNAM.1. BY MID-APRIL 1963 A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF TENSION HAD   DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT   OVER OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. BOTH DIEM AND NGO DINH NHU WERE   CONCERNED OVER RECENT "INFRINGEMENTS" OF VIETNAMESE SOVEREIGNTY.   MAAG WAS CITED AS A VIOLATOR IN THIS CONNECTION, BUT THE U.S.   SPECIAL FORCES WERE SINGLED OUT AS THE MAIN IRRITANT. DIEM IS   ALLOWING ADDITIONAL TIME FOR FURTHER BLUNDERS AND, AFTER BUILDING   UP A STRONG CASE, HE PLANS TO CONFRONT AMBASSADOR NOLTING AND   USMACV CHIEF GENERAL HARKINS WITH FRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE OF U.S.   RESPONSIBILITY, DEMANDING A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF U.S.SECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/NO DISSEM ABROADSTATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXX XXXX OC ONE OCRTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMFORM 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.SANITIZED MK.01.197.6.6.3 1/15
[176-10036-10095.pdf — page 2]
SECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/NO DISSEM ABROADTDCS DB-3/654,28522329PAGE: 2PERSONNEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM ON THE BASIS THAT THE FORCE IS TOOLARGE AND UNMANAGEABLE..2. SOME VIETNAMESE INVOLVED IN CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS   WITH AMERICANS WERE BEING QUESTIONED IN DETAIL BY PRESIDENCY   STAFF MEMBERS AS TO U.S. ACTIVITIES. SOME OF THE INDIVIDUALS   QUESTIONED HAD INDICATED TO THE PRESIDENCY THAT THE U.S. MILITARY,   AND PARTICULARLY THE U.S. SPECIAL FORCES, ALTHOUGH GENERALLY   WELL. MOTIVATED, DID NOT SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THE NECESSITY FOR   COORDINATING THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH APPROPRIATE VIETNAMESE   AUTHORITIES.3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR NOLTING), USMACV   (GENERAL HARKINS), MAAG (GENERAL TIMMES), CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC   PACAF.END OF MESSAGESECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/NO DISSEM ABROAD
[176-10036-10097.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10097RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER:ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE: Central Intelligence Agency Information ReportDATE: 4/25/1963PAGES: 2SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE:CLASSIFICATION:RESTRICTIONS:CURRENT STATUS:DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000΄OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2
[176-10036-10097.pdf — page 1]
# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYS. VietnamThis material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Lows, Title 18. U.S.C Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEMCOUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM REPORT NO. TDCS-3/544,961SUBJECT VIET CONG CONCENTRATION ON DATE DISTR. 25 APRIL 1963TERRORIST AND MILITARYSUBVERSION ACTIVITY IN THECAPITAL AREADATE OF EARLY APRIL 1963 PRECEDENCE ROUTINEINFO.PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (8 APRIL 1963) REFERENCES INDATE ACO.APPRAISAL 3 FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-8792THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM INTELLIGENCE SERVICE; FROM SOURCES DESCRIBED AS VIET CONG PENETRATIONS.1. IN EARLY APRIL 1963, WARD-LEVEL OFFICIALS IN THE VIET CONG (VC) SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH SPECIAL ZONE WERE INFORMED THAT TERRORIST AND MILITARY SUBVERSION ACTIVITY WOULD BE INCREASED. THE AREA TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WOULD OPERATE UNDER DISTRICT ORGANIZATIONS, WHEREAS PREVIOUSLY IT HAD BEEN DIRECTLY AND SOLELY RESPONSIBLE TO THE SPECIAL ZONE COMMITTEE. EVERY DISTRICT MUST DEVELOP ONE OR TWO TERRORIST GROUPS CONSISTING OF THREE CELLS EACH. OPERATIONS OF THESE GROUPS WOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO THEIR OWN DISTRICTS BUT COULD BE EXPANDED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE ZONE, AS OPPORTUNITIES AROSE. AMERICANS. WERE TO BE THE PRIMARY TARGETS OF ALL OPERATIONS.CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEMSTATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA. NIC A.ID USIA OC I ONE OCR ORR 081 00STATE/DIRTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMFORM 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.SANITIZED MK. 01.197.6.8.1 1/15(15-20)
[176-10036-10097.pdf — page 2]
CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLSINTDCS-3/544,961PAGE TWOC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM2. VC COUNTERPROPAGANDA PERSONNEL OF THE SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH   SPECIAL ZONE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO SUSPEND ALL ACTIVITY AND AWAIT   TRANSFER ORDERS. THEY UNDERSTAND THAT MANY WOULD BE TRANSFERRED INTO   MILITARY SUBVERSION ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AREA.3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV AID MAAG   USIA CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR   DIVISION.END OF MESSAGECLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[176-10036-10098.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10098RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER:ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE: Central Intelligence Agency Information ReportDATE: 5/18/1963PAGES: 3SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE:CLASSIFICATION:RESTRICTIONS:CURRENT STATUS:DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2
[176-10036-10098.pdf — page 1]
# NLK-81-327 TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains Information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.**CONFIDENTIAL**CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS**NO FOREIGN DISSEM**(When Filled In)COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAMREPORT NO. TDCS-3/547,672SUBJECT PLANS FOR A COUP D'ETAT IN CENTRAL VIETNAM BY THE REFORMED VNQDDDATE DISTR. 18 MAY 1963DATE OF INFO. EARLY MAY 1963PRECEDENCE ROUTINEPLACE & DATE ACO. VIETNAM, SAIGON (13 MAY 1963)REFERENCES IN 41761FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 8959THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE A VIETNAMESE NEWSPAPERMAN (c) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS IN PRESS AND POLITICAL CIRCLES.APPRAISAL: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE VNQDD IS BEING REFORMED; ITS CAPABILITIES IN CENTRAL VIETNAM CANNOT BE JUDGED.1. SHORTLY AFTER THE 8 MAY 1963 INCIDENT IN HUE, NGUYEN VAN LUC RECEIVED A PLAN FOR A COUP D'ETAT IN CENTRAL VIETNAM FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL VIETNAM THOẠT XAC PHONG TRAO (TXPT), (SOURCE COMMENT.. TXPT DOES NOT TRANSLATE MEANINGFULLY INTO ENGLISH. THOẠT HAS THE CONNOTATION OF GOING OUT IN MIND AND SPIRIT; XAC MEANS BODY, I.E., PHYSICALLY; PHONG TRAO MEANS MOVEMENT THUS, THE MOVEMENT OF MIND, SPIRIT, AND BODY MIGHT BE ONE TRANSLATION; A BETTER ONE WOULD BE VNQDD.) THE TXPT HAS BEEN DEVELOPING SINCE VIETNAM QUOC DAN DANG (VNQDD) VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST PARTY) 1958 FROM THE PARTICULARLY THOSE ELEMENTS IN CENTRAL VIETNAM,**CONFIDENTIAL**CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS**NO FOREIGN DISSEM**![GROUP I Excluded fram sulematt dawngrading and deetassification]STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCB SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR OAR OBI OO EXOSTATE/DIRTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMFORM 1Kg OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.SANITIZED MK.01.197.6.10.2
[176-10036-10098.pdf — page 2]
CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLSCONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM TDCS-3/547,672 IN 41761 PAGE 2THE VNQDD STRONGHOLD. THE TXPT, ALTHOUGH COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF FORMER VNQDD MEMBERS, WAS ESTABLISHED ESSENTIALLY AS A BUDDHIST ASSOCIATION AND HAS BEEN LEGALLY ENGAGED IN CIVIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES SINCE ITS FORMATION. CLANDESTINE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION HAS PROCEEDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEVELOPING NEW, YOUNGER LEADERS, AND OF DENYING THE OLDER PASSIVE TENETS OF BUDDHISM AS WELL AS THE OLDER LEADERS OF THE VNQDD, THE ULTIMATE INTENT BEING A REVITALIZED REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT. (FIELD COMMENT. LUC IS THE FATHER AND ACCOMPLICE OF NGUYEN VAN CU, ONE OF THE TWO PILOTS WHO BOMBED THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE ON 27 FEBRUARY 1962.)2. THE TXPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE REMINDED LUC THAT THE ORGANI- ZATION WAS IN A POSITION TO HANDLE A COUP ACTION IN CENTRAL VIETNAM EFFECTIVELY, POINTING OUT THAT THOSE MILITARY UNITS NOT CONTROLLED COULD BE NEUTRALIZED AND THAT THE AIR BASE AT DA NANG COULD BE CONTROLLED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE. THE COMMITTEE STATED THAT, AFTER THE ANTI-BUDDHIST ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE PEOPLE WERE READY FOR AN UPRISING. BY TAKING NGO DINH CAN AND ARCHBISHOP NGO DINH THUC INTO CUSTODY AND BY GAINING MILITARY CONTROL OVER THUA THIEN AND QUANG NAM PROVINCES, SUCCESS COULD BE ASSURED IN CENTRAL VIETNAM. THIS WOULD PLACE THE TXPT IN A POSITION OF USING PRESIDENT DIEM'S TACTICS OF NEGOTIATIONS AGAINST HIM, I.E., HAVING GAINED CONTROL OVER CENTRAL VIIETNAM , THEY WOULD OFFER TO NEGOTIATE WITH DIEMCONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[176-10036-10098.pdf — page 3]
CLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLSCONFIDENTIALFOREIGN DISSEMTDCS-3/547,672IN 41761PAGE 3AND , AT THE SAME TIME, THEY WOULD BE MOUNTING A COUP AGAINST THEREGIME IN SAIGON, WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE NO LATER THAN THREE DAYSAFTER THE ONE IN CENTRAL VIETNAM.3. LUC SENT A TRUSTED FOLLOWER, ONE VIET, TO SAIGON TO DISCUSS   THE PLAN WITH AN OPPOSITIONIST SYMPATHIZER AND GET HIS VIEWPOINT.   VIET WAS ADVISED TO TELL LUC THAT ANY SUCH ACTION WAS PRECIPITATE   AND DANGEROUS. ALTHOUGH IT WAS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE FORMER VNQDD   MEMBERS IN CENTRAL VIETNAM HAD THE POWER CLAIMED, A COUP THERE,   WITHOUT SIMULTANEOUS ACTION IN SAIGON, WOULD LEAVE A VACUUM WHICH   THE VIET CONG (VC) COULD IMMEDIATELY USE TO THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE.   VC REACTION PROBABLY WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF GAINING CONTROL OF ALL   AREAS NOT EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED BY THE COUP GROUP, WITH THE   ULTIMATE POSSIBILITY OF PARTITIONING CENTRAL VIETNAM, OF BEING IN A   POSITION TO FORM A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, AND FINALLY, OF BEING   ABLE TO CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES. ACCORDING TO VIET, THIS   FOLLOWED LUC'S THINKING, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE HIS FOLLOWERS WERE NOT   IN A POSITION TO ACT IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. VIET   THOUGHT THAT LUC WOULD INSTRUCT THE TXPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN   CENTRAL VIETNAM TO TAKE NO ACTION AT THIS TIME, AND THAT LUC'S   ADVICE WOULD BE ACCEPTED.4. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV USOM MAAG USIS   CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.   END OF MESSAGECONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM
[176-10036-10099.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10099RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM :TO :TITLE: Central Intelligence Agency Information ReportDATE: 5/18/1963PAGES: 5SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE :CLASSIFICATION :RESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2
[176-10036-10099.pdf — page 1]
# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY*S. Vietnam*This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.SECRET(When Filled In)CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMCOUNTRY VIETNAMREPORT NO. TDCS-3/547,646SUBJECT APPREHENSIONS OF VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL IN SINGAPORE REGARDING RECENT EVENTS IN VIETNAMDATE DISTR. 18 MAY 1963PRECEDENCE ROUTINEREFERENCES IN 41548DATE OF 17 MAY 1963INFO.PLACE & SINGAPORE (17 MAY 1963)DATE ACQ.FIELD REPORT NO. FSS 12881APPRAISAL SEE BELOWTHIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B) FROM VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL TRAN KIM PHUONG.APPR: CONSUL GENERAL PHUONG HAS BEEN AN ARDENT AND DEVOTED SUPPORTER OF THE PRESIDENTAND OF NGO DINH NHUNS CAN LAO PARTY. HETSTA CATHOLIC AND A FRIEND AND SUPPORTER OF DR. TUYEN. THIS REPORT IS BELIEVED TO REFLECT ACCURATELY HIS VIEWS WHICH ARE FELT TO BE REASONABLY OBJECTIVE AS WELL AS SINCERE.1. SUMMARY. VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL TRAN KIM PHUONG CONSIDERS THAT THE COMBINATION OF THREE UNWISE POLITICAL ACTS IN THE PAST MONTH MAY ULTIMATELY PROVE FATAL TO THE REGIME OF PRESIDENT NGU DINH DIEM DESPITE ITS GAINS IN THE MILITARY STRUGGLE AGAINST THE VIET COMMUNISTS (VC). THESE THREE ACTS WERE: DISMISSAL OF HUYNH VAN LANG OF THE OFFICE OF EXCHANGES FROM HIS POSITION OF POWER IN THE SOUTHERN FACTION OF THE CAN LAO (REVOLUTIONARY WORKER'S) PARTY; THE DENIGRATION AND REMOVAL FROM POWER AND AUTHORITY OF DR. TRAN KIM TUYÊN, DIRECTOR OF SEPES;; AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE HUE INCIDENT ON BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY 8 MAY IN WHICH BUDDHIST PARADERSSECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMSTATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR 081 00 EXOSTATE/DIRTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
[176-10036-10099.pdf — page 2]
SECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMTDCS -3/547,646IN 41548PAGE 2WERE KILLED BY THE CIVIL GUARD. EACH OF THESE SEPARATE ACTS HASSERVED TO WEAKEN THE MOTIVATION OF DIFFERENT SEGMENTS OF VIETNAMESEAND TO FURTHER NARROW, POSSIBLY TO A FATAL DEGREE, THE BASE OFSUPPORT FOR THE REGIME.2. CONSUL GENERAL PHUONG FEARED THAT TUYEN'S DISMISSAL IN   PARTICULAR WOULD CAUSE CONSIDERABLE INSECURITY AMONG LOYAL SUPPORTERS   AND PUBLIC SERVANTS OF THE REGIME WHO KNOW DR. TUYEN'S RECORD OF   LOYAL SERVICE TO THE PRESIDENT AND ESPECIALLY TO HIS BROTHER, PRESI-   DENTIAL COUNSELOR NGÔ DINH NHU. THESE OFFICIALS CAN CERTAINLY   QUESTION WHETHER ANYONE'S POSITION IN THE REGIME IS SAFE IF TUYEN   COULD FALL FROM FAVOR. PHUONG STATED THAT SEVERAL FRIENDS OF HIS   WITH LONG RECORDS OF SERVICE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (G.VN)   AND TO THE PRESIDENTIAL FAMILY HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN TO HIM DESPONDENT-   LY ALONG THESE LINES. TUYEN HAD A BAD REPUTATION WITH MANY   OFFICERS IN THE VIETNAMESE ARMY AND BUREAUCRACY AS THE HATCHETMAN   AND TROUBLESHOOTER FOR NGO DINH NHU BUT NO ONE DOUBTED HIS   DEVOTION TO NHU. YET NHU HAS STRIPPED HIM OF ALL REAL AUTHORITY   SUPPOSEDLY BECAUSE OF A SILLY WOMEN'S TIFF BETWEEN   MADAME NHU AND MADAME TUYEN. ANY OBJECTIVE GVN OFFICIAL MIGHT   QUESTION THE FRIVOLITY, INGRATITUDE AND LACK OF PERSPECTIVE OF A REGIME   THAT ACTS THUS.3. FURTHERMORE TUYEN WAS ONE OF THE FEW REMAINING GVN OFFICIALS   IN HIGH POSITION RESPECTED BY OPPOSITION LEADERS AND VIETNAMESESECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM
[176-10036-10099.pdf — page 3]
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSSECRET(When Filled In)NO FOREIGN DISSEMTDCS-3/547,646IN 41548PAGE3INTELLECTUALS PARTICULARLY THOSE FROM NORTH VIETNAM. THOSE WHODID NOT LIKE HIM AT LEAST TRUSTED HIS FAIRNESS AND BASIC EMPATHYWHEREAS THEY NEITHER TRUSTED NOR LIKED NHU EVEN THOUGH NHU HIMSELFWAS AN INTELLECTUAL.4. WITHIN THE CAN LAO PARTY, WHICH IS STILL ONE OF THE SECRET   MAINSPRINGS OF SUPPORT IN VIETNAM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE NGO   FAMILY, THE PARALLEL REMOVAL FROM AUTHORITY OF HUYNH VAN LANG HAS   OCCASIONED SIMILAR DOUBTS AMONG THE PARTY'S RANK -AND-FILE. AS IN   TUYEN'S CASE, CAN LAO MEMBERS CAN QUESTION WHAT VALUE IS LOYALTY   AND SERVICE IF A MAN LIKE LANG CAN LOSE HIS. POST.5. THE EVEN MORE SERIOUS MISTAKE WHICH MAY NARROW THE BASE OF   SUPPORT FOR THE GVN TO A FATAL DEGREE WAS THE SHOOTING OF BUDDHIST   PARADERS AT HUE ON THE OCCASION OF BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY. THE HUE   REGIME OF CENTRAL VIETNAM COUNSELOR NGO DINH CAN HAS ALWAYS OPERATED   LIKE AN AUTONOMOUS POLICE STATE AND HAS BEEN NOTORIOUS FOR ITS   FAVORITISM TOWARD CATHOLICS, BELYING PRESIDENT DIEM'S   EARLIER REPUTATION FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE. MANY VIETNAMESE   CATHOLICS FEAR THAT THE GVN'S INCREASING PRO-CATHOLIC BENT WILL BE   HARMFUL TO THE CHURCH AS WELL AS TO THE REGIME. CERTAINLY THE   STUPID SUPPRESSION OF BUDDHIST RELIGIOUS FLAGS AT HUE ON 8 MAY (ON   PRETEXT THAT THEY MIGHT BE CONSTRUED AS CONNECTED TO VC COMMEMORATION   OF THE DIEN BIEN PHU VICTORY)   AND CONSEQUENT. FATALITIES WILL AROUSE THE ANTAGONISM OF PREDOMINANTLY,CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSSECRETNO FOREIGN DISSEM
[176-10036-10099.pdf — page 4]
SECRETCLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMTDCS-3/547,646IN 41548PAGE 4BUDDHIST VIETNAM AGAINST BOTH THE REGIME AND THE CATHOLICS.6. FROM REPORTS REACHING HIM PHUONG FOUND IT PARTICULARLY   SIGNIFICANT THAT WHEN CENTRAL VIETNAM AUTHORITIES ORDERED POLICE   TO EXECUTE THE DIRECTIVE BANNING FLAGS, INITIALY THE POLICE MERELY   RESTATED THE ORDER BUT WOULD NOT RIP DOWN ANY BUDDHIST FLAGS.   FINALLY SEVERAL CATHOLIC POLICE DID SO, BUT SOME BUDDHIST POLICE-   MEN REFUSED, SAYING THAT BUDDHIST FLAGS SHOULD BE PERMITTED JUST   AS CATHOLIC FLAGS ARE FLOWN ON SAINTS DAYS. SUCH DEFIANCE OF ORDERS[^1]   AT HUE IS QUITE RARE, PHUONG SAID.7. THE CROWNING INSULT TO BUDDHISTS WHICH WILL FURTHER ENFLAME THEM   AND ALSO REVIVE THE OUTCRY AGAINST NGO FAMILY RULE WAS   THE NEWS OF HUE ARCHBISHOP NGO DINH THUC'S PLAN THAT THE PRESIDENT   ASK BUDDHIST ASSOCIATIONS ELSEWHERE IN VIETNAM TO CONDEMN THE   CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DISORDER OF THE HUE BUDDHISTS. ARCHBISHOP   THUC REPORTEDLY WENT TO SAIGON TO DEMAND. THIS. THE VC COULD NOT   HAVE A BETTER PROPAGANDA WEAPON IF THEY HAD LAUNCHED THE IN-   CIDENT AND DIRECTED THUC'S REACTION THEMSELVES.8. BY SUCH ACTS THE REGIME IS DESTROYING CONFIDENCE AND LOYAL   MOTIVATION OF PUBLIC SERVANTS, INTELLECTUALS, PARTY SUPPORTERS, AND   THE MASS OF NON-CATHOLIC PEASANTRY IN ITS MOST CRUCIAL TIME.   IF THIS CONTINUES ONLY SYCOPHANTS AND XENOPHOBES WILL   PREDOMINATE IN THE GVN AND ITS RELATIONS WITH ITS PEOPLE, BUREAU-SECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM[^1]: 1
[176-10036-10099.pdf — page 5]
SECRET(When Filled In)CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMTDCS-3/547,646IN 41548PAGE 5CRACY, ARMY AND FRIENDLY ALLIES WILL DETERIORATE IN A WELTER OFPETTY JEALOUSIES, FEUDS, AND PREJUDICES.9. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (CONGEN ONLY) CINCPAC PACAF PACFLT ARPAC.END OF MESSAGESECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM
[176-10036-10102.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10102RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER:ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE: CIA Information TelegramDATE: 3/19/1963PAGES: 3SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE:CLASSIFICATION:RESTRICTIONS:CURRENT STATUS:DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 2/63-3/63. Box 2
[176-10036-10102.pdf — page 1]
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY - VietnamThis material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEMCOUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM/CHINA (TAIWAN) REPORT NO. TDCS-3/540,863SUBJECT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT DIEM AND DATE DISTR. 19 MARCH 1963VICE PRESIDENT CHEN CHENG OF NATIONALIST FILECHINADATE OF 4-9 MARCH 1963 PRECEDENCE ROUTINEINFO. REFERENCES IN 89258PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (5-12 MARCH 1963)DATE ACQ.APPRAISAL SEE BELOW FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-8661THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL MEMBER (B) OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT INSAIGON WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS GOVERNMENT, ACHINESE BUSINESSMAN (F) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS IN THE CHINESE COMMUNITY, AND AMEMBER (F) OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT IN SAIGON.APPR. IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS OCCURRED BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS ANDPOSSIBLY TRUE THAT THE SUBJECTS INDICATED WERE COVERED.1. DURING THE VISIT OF NATIONALIST CHINA'S (CHINAT) VICE PRESIDENT CHEN CHENGTO SOUTH VIETNAM FROM 4 TO 9 MARCH 1963, HE AND PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM CONVERSEDIN EXCESS OF TWENTY HOURS, CHIEFLY IN PRIVATE WITH ONLY AN INTERPRETER PRESENT.THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE CONVERSATIONS WAS EVIDENCED BY THE EXPRESSIONS ON THEFACES OF THE TWO MEN FOLLOWING THEIR VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS. THE CONTENTS OF THECONVERSATIONS DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE ADVISORS OF EITHERPARTICIPANT.2. CHEN DELAYED HIS SCHEDULED DEPARTURE FROM SAIGON FOR 24 HOURS TO PERMITHIM TO TRAVEL WITH DIEM TO DALAT, WHERE, EXCEPT FOR A BRIEFCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEMSTATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OB 00STATE/DIRTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMFORM 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.(15-20)