Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[176-10036-10102.pdf — page 2]
CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM TDCS-3/540,863 IN 89258 PAGE 2VISIT TO THE MILITARY SCHOOL, THE ENTIRE TIME WAS. DEVOTED TO PRIVATE TALKS. MEMBERS OF THE CHEN ENTOURAGE WERE NOT NOTIFIED UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT OF THE REVISED SCHEDULE NOR WERE THEY GIVEN ANY INDICATION AS TO THE CONTENT OF THE DISCUSSIONS.3. MEMBERS OF THE CHINAT DELEGATION AND OF THE CHINAT DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY SPECULATED THAT THE TWO MAIN TOPICS OF CONVERSATION WERE. GREATLY INCREASED CHINAT MILITARY SUPPORT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM, AND THE USE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AS A BASE FOR CHINAT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE CHINA MAINLAND. CHEN IS BELIEVED TO HAVE OFFERED DIEM UNRESTRICTED MILITARY TRAINING. AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT, PLUS UP TO ONE DIVISION OF COMBAT TROOPS TO FIGHT IN VIETNAMESE ARMY UNIFORMS. CHEN IS ALSO THOUGHT TO HAVE ASKED DIEM TO CEASE DRAFTING OVERSEAS CHINESE IN VIETNAM, WHICH IS CAUSING THE CHINATS EMBARASSMENT, I.E., DEMONSTRATIONS BY THESE LOCAL CHINESE AGAINST THE CHINAT EMBASSY IN SAIGON AND APPEALS TO THE CHINAT AMBASSADOR. CHEN PROBABLY ASKED DIEM TO PUBLICLY SUPPORT THE CHINAT MAINLAND COUNTERATTACK THEME AND TO GRANT AIR-FIELD AND COASTAL BASES FOR CHINAT MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN PORTIONS OF CHINA.OTHER LIKELY TOPICS OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE TWO MEN WERE THE CONDUCTING OF JOINT OPERATIONS INTO NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS, THE MATTER OF THAILAND'S MOVEMENT TOWARDS NEUTRALITY, AND JOINT EFFORTS TO UNSEAT CAMBODIA'S SIHANOUK, WHOM THE CHINATS FEEL ISA LACKEY OFCONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM
[176-10036-10102.pdf — page 3]
CONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION – DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMTDCS-3/540,863IN 89258PAGE 3PEIPING. CONCENSUS AMONG THE CHINAT COMMUNITY AND CHEN'S DELEGATIONWAS THAT SOME ACCORD WAS REACHED BY THE TWO LEADERS, AS CHEN WAS INEXCELLENT SPIRITS AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS VISIT.4. -ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT SLOW IN GETTING STARTED, THE VISIT DID   RESULT IN BRINGING THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CLOSER TOGETHER, PARTICULARLY   THE COUNTERPARTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE VISIT ALSO SERVED A   USEFUL PURPOSE IN EFFECTIVELY IMPRESSING THE LOCAL CHINESE POPULATION,   WHICH TURNED OUT MORE OR LESS SPONTANEOUSLY IN AN ESTIMATED ONE HUNDRED   THE   THOUSAND ALONG THE ROUTE TO/AIRPORT TO CHEER CHEN WHEN HE   DEPARTED. THE APPARENTLY GENUINE ENTHUSIASM OF THE USUALLY APATHETIC   VIETNAMESE CHINESE CAME AS A SURPRISE EVEN TO THE LOCAL CHINAT   DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY.5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID USIA   CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.END OF MESSAGECONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM
[176-10036-10103.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10103RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER:ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE: CIA Information TelegramDATE: 3/20/1963PAGES: 3SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE:CLASSIFICATION:RESTRICTIONS:CURRENT STATUS:DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 2/63-3/63. Box 2
[176-10036-10103.pdf — page 1]
# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains information affecting the National Defense of the. United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18. U.S.C Sect 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LCOUNTRYSOUTH VIETNAMREPORT NO. TDCS -3/541,020SUBJECTTHE SEEKING OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FORTHE OVERTHROW OF THE DIEM REGIMEDATE DISTR. 20 MARCH 1963DATE OFINFO.MID-MARCH 1963PRECEDENCEROUTINEPLACE &DATE ACO.VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 MARCH 1963)REFERENCESIN 89614APPRAISALSEE BELOWFIELD REPORT NO.FVS-8662THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (C), WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AT THE PRESIDENCY.APPR THIS REPORT IS TYPICAL OF VIEWS HELD BY CERTAIN OPPOSITIONISTS, INCLUDING THOSEIN THE FELLOW-TRAVELLING CATEGORY. COMMENTS OF THIS NATURE HAVE ALSO BEEN MADEBY GOVERNMENT PROVOKERS SEEKING TO PROVOKE AMERICAN REACTION. THE LINE THATDIEM IS ACCEPTABLE, BUT THAT HIS FAMILY, ADMINISTRATION, AND PROGRAMS ARE NOT,IS ALSO CHARACTERISTIC OF VARIOUS OPPOSITION ELEMENTS AS WELL AS SOME SEGMENTSOF THE LEFT. THE ESTIMATE CONTAINED HEREIN ON A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS, INCLUDINGTHE APPRAISAL THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS TO THEGOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM OR TO AMERICAN OBJECTIVES, IS NOT ACCEPTED.1. AMERICAN AID IS ESSENTIAL TO AN OVERTHROW OF THE DIEM REGIME,ACCORDING TO THE STATEMENTS MADE BY TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF A COMMITTEE OFNATIONALIST ANTI-COMMUNIST POLITICAL OPPOSITIONISTS IN MID-MARCH 1963, INTHE PRESENCE OF AN OFFICIAL OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES),WHO MAY ALSO BE A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE. THE COMMITTEE IS ENGAGED IN ASTUDY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND MAKING PLANS FOR ITSIMPROVEMENT. ALTHOUGH SEPES' CHIEF TRAN KIM TUYEN IS NOT A MEMBER OF THECOMMITTEE, BECAUSE OF HIS POSITION, HE HAS PROVIDED CERTAIN SUPPORT FROM TIME TO TIME.CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMSTATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OBI 00 EXOSTATE/DIRTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMSANITIZED M2K.01.197.5.7.3
[176-10036-10103.pdf — page 2]
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSCONFIDENTIALNO FOREIGN DISSEM TDCS -3/541,020IN 89614PAS TWO,THE TWO REPRESENTATIVES INDICATED THAT, IF AMERICAN AID IS NOT FORTHCOMING, OTHER SOURCES WILL BE CONTACTED. IF THE AMERICANS HELP THE NATIONALIST CAUSE OF THE OPPOSITIONISTS, THEY WILL HAVE SOME MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER THE RESULTS; OTHERWISE, THEY WILL HAVE NONE. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS 8654, TDCS-3/540,447, REPORTED AN EARLIER DISCUSSION BY THESE INDIVIDUALS.)2. ACCORDING TO THESE OPPOSITIONISTS, THE COUNTRY HAS REACHED A COMPLETE IMPASSE AND SOMETHING MUST HAPPEN SOON. IF DIEM SHOULD DIE SUDDENLY, THE RESULT WOULD BE CHAOS, OUT OF WHICH THE COMMUNISTS WOULD EMERGE AS THE ONLY BENEFICIARIES. DIEM REMAINS IN POWER ONLY AS THE RESULT OF AMERICAN MILITARY SUPPORT, WITHOUT WHICH HE WOULD BE COMPLETELY LOST. THE DIEM GOVERNMENT IS WORSE THAN IMPOSSIBLE. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY, SUCH AS THE HOA HAO AND THE CAO DAI, THAT ARE COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO COMMUNISM BUT CANNOT POSSIBLY SUPPORT THE PRESENT REGIME, WHEREAS THEY COULD SUPPORT SOME OTHER NATIONALIST TYPE OF GOVERNMENT. PRESIDENT DIEM :.IS PERSONALLY A DECENT AND HONORABLE MAN, BUT NGO DINH NHU AND HIS WIFE MUST BE ELIMINATED; WITHOUT THEM, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RE-ORIENT DIEM...3. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM ARE EITHERCONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM6
[176-10036-10103.pdf — page 3]
CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSCONFIDENTIALNO FOREIGN DISSEM TDCS -3/541,020 IN 89614 PAGE THREEUNAWARE OF OR UNWILLING TO FACE IT, THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS AREHEAVILY INFILTRATED WITH VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC), WHOSEPRESENCE WILL MAKE ITSELF KNOWN IN DUE COURSE. THE REPUBLICANYOUTH MOVEMENT IS ONLY A LONG SERIES OF MEETINGS AND ISCOMPLETELY LACKING IN DEPTH AS AN ORGANIZATION; IT IS ASUPERFICIAL VENEER, GOING THROUGH VARIOUS FRUITLESS MOTIONS.THE PRINCIPAL CRITERION FOR SELECTION OF PROVINCIAL ANDDISTRICT LEADERS IS PERSONAL OBEDIENCE TO THE REGIME; COMPETENCEIS ONLY AN AFTERTHOUGHT.4. IF THE SITUATION CONTINUES IN ITS PRESENT VEIN, THERE   WILL BE A RENEWED VC OFFENSIVE ON A LARGER SCALE SOON AFTER   THE ONSET OF THE RAINY SEASON, WHEN BAD WEATHER REDUCES THE   EFFECTIVENESS OF HELICOPTERS AND AIR CAPABILITY IN GENERAL.   THIS WILL BEGIN NEAR THE SAIGON AREA, AND, AT THE SAME TIME   THE VC WITHIN THE *STRATEGIC HAMLETS* WILL GO INTO ACTION.5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACY MAAG AID   USIA CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.END OF MESSAGECONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM
[176-10036-10104.pdf — page 0]
176-10036-10104 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10104RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM :TO :TITLE: CIA Information ReportDATE: 6/19/1963PAGES: 2SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE :CLASSIFICATION :RESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 6/63. Box 2
[176-10036-10104.pdf — page 1]
# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Sect 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.CONFIDENTIAL(When Filled In)CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMCOUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAMREPORT NO. TDCS - 3/550,953SUBJECT GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WHITE PAPER ON THE BUDDHIST ISSUE AND AMERICAN PRESENCE AND POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAMDATE DISTR. 19 JUNE 1963PRECEDENCE PRIORITYDATE OF INFO. 12-17 JUNE 1963REFERENCES IN 62883PLACE & DATE ACO. VIETNAM, SAIGON (17 JUNE 1963)FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9171APPRAISAL 3THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) WITH CONTACTS IN PRESS AND POLITICAL CIRCLES.1. ON 17 JUNE 1963 GENE GREGORY OF THE TIMES OF VIETNAM SAID THAT HE HAD JUST RETUNED FROM DALAT WHERE HE HAD SPENT FIVE DAYS WORKING ON A WHITE PAPER SETTING FORTH THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM POSITON NOT ONLY ON THE BUDDHIST ISSUE BUT ALSO ON THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF AMERICAN PRESENCE AND POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAM. GREGORY SAID THAT MADAME NGO DINH NHU HAD ASKED HIM TO PREPARE THE PAPER AND, IN FACT, HE LIVED IN THE NHU VILLA IN DALAT WHILE HE WORKED ON IT.2. GREGORY SAID THAT ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL POINTS WHICH MADAMECONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMGROUP IExcluded from automatic downgrading and declassificationSTATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR 081 00STATE/DIRTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMSANITIZED MK. a.197.7.2.6FORM 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
[176-10036-10104.pdf — page 2]
CONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMTDCS - 3/550,953IN 62883PAGE 2NHU SUGGESTED BE INCLUDED IN THE PAPER WAS A COMPARISON OF SOUTH VIETNAM WITH THE UNITED STATES WHERE GANGSTERISM AND RACE RIOTS EXISTED, THE CONCLUSION BEING THAT THE DIEM REGIME WAS NOT REALLY TOO BAD AFTER ALL.3. GREGORY STATED THAT THE WHITE PAPER CONSISTED OF OVER TWENTY PAGES, WAS NOT FOR LOCAL CONSUMPTION, BUT WILL BE DISTRIBUTED INTERNATIONALLY, DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT THE UNITED STATES BUT POSSIBLY ALSO FRANCE AND ENGLAND.4. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD. STA. 2ND AIR DIV. CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.END OF MESSAGECONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMCONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT
[176-10036-10113.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM## IDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10113RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER:ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE: CIA Information TelegramDATE: 7/12/1963PAGES: 4SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE:CLASSIFICATION:RESTRICTIONS:CURRENT STATUS:DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 198: Vietnam, 7/1/1963-7/20/63. Box 2
[176-10036-10113.pdf — page 1]
# S. Vietman 50TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYSEE SANITIZED VERSIONNLK-81-269; NLK-89-15+DOWNGRADEDThis material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sect. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.SECRETCLASSIFICATIONNO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM CONTROLSNO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLYCOUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAMREPORT NO.: TDCS DB-3/655,517SUBJECT: COUP D'ETAT PLAN OF NGO DINH NHUDATE DISTR.: 12 JULY 1963DATE OF INFO.: 11-12 JULY 1963REFERENCES BE CITED IN 78592PLACE & DATE ACQ.: VIETNAM, SAIGON (12 JULY 1963)FIELD REPORT NO.: FVS 9305APPRAISAL: SEE BELOWTHIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE: A GENERAL OFFICER (B) WHO EITHER ATTENDED THE MEETING OR WHO ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION FROM AN OFFICER WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING.APPRAISAL: NGO DINH NHU IS PROBABLY PLANNING A COUP. HOWEVER, THE TIMING OF THE COUP ATTEMPT AND THE GENERALS WHO ARE SPECIFICALLY INVOLVED ARE UNKNOWN.SUMMARY: NGO DINH NHU PROPOSED TO ARMY (GENERAL) OFFICERSON 11 JULY 1963 THAT THEY STAGE A COUP D'ETAT AS SOON AS WEDPOSSIBLE THIS COUP MUST BE STAGED OVERNIGHT AND THE ARMY SHOULD TURN OVER CONTROL TO CIVILIANS ON THE NEXT DAY.ON 12 JULY 1963 NGO DINH NHU TOLD A GROUP OF GENERAL OFFICERS THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING NO PROGRESS IN THE WAR AGAINST THE VIET CONG OR IN OTHER PROGRAMS AND THAT THE GENERAL OFFICERS MUST PROVIDE THE ACTION REQUIRED. THAT THE GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE BEEN CONTINUALLY HUMILIATED IN THE EYES OF THE PEOPLE AND IN ORDER TO REGAIN POPULAR RESPECT, THEY MUST ENGINEER A COUP D'ETAT.CONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATIONNO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM CONTROLSNO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLYGROUP 1: Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassificationSTATE/INR: INDIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR UCS SECDEF INSA NICSTATE/DIR:TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMOPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO: DIRNSA (PROD. NO.)AFSSO WHITE HOUSESTATE (RCI) (FOR HUGHES)DIA/CTIC SIT ROOMUCSNICCNO (OP. 922 Y1)DFI/ACSIFORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
[176-10036-10113.pdf — page 2]
SECRETCLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION-CONTROLSIN 78592TDCSDB-3/655,517PAGE 2(When Pilled In)NO-DISSEM ABROAD/BACKEROUND USE ONLYNHU SAID THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT THE COUP IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY.NHU SAID THAT THE GENERAL OFFICERS MUST SUPPORT HIM.HAB BENHU SAID THAT HE WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE PRESIDENTHO OR WITH THE ADMINISTRATION IN GENERAL: ALTHOUGH MANY PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN HANDED TO HIM, HE HAS HAD NO REAL POWER TO FORCESTHE PRESIDENT OR OTHERS TO MAKE DECISIONS OR TO TAKE NECESSARY ACTION ONLY WITHIN THE PAST YEAR, CINFACT, CHASCHE HAD I ANY OFFICIAL POSITION AS DIRECTOR OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET I PROGRAM.beat: GrNHU SAID THAT THE ARRIVAL COF A NEW U.S. VAMBASSADOR WOULD BRING ABOUT CHANGES LAND THAT FAST ACTION WAS INECESSARY; IMMEDIATE DECISIONS MUST BE REACHED. WANTHE CGOURDIS. OTO LOGOURME KTHIS WAS ETHE ONLY CHANCE FOR SUCCESS. THE ARMY MUST SEIZE THE TROUBLE MAKERS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE BUDDHIST MOVEMENTS MUST IILBER:QUELLED SIC NHUN QUALIFIEDUNION VI OFE TREK AND VILENGED THE HE HEELINGTHIS STATEMENT BY ADDING THAT DOING ANTHAT HE DID NOT MEAN THE BUDDHISTS PER SEBUT T-THE FIVE RINGLEADERS-WHO-WE-RE-TO-BLAME BECAUSE THEY HAD AUSED SVTHEIR RELIGION TO FURTHER THEIR OWN AMBITIONS AND DESIGNS.05. NHU CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT THE COUP MUST BE STAGED OVERNIGHT; IT MUST BE LIGHTNING FAST AND PROBABLY ALL ICT THAT WOULD BE NEEDED WOULD BE A SHOW OF FORCE ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, THE GENERAL OFFICERS, MUST TURN THE GOVERNMENT OVERTOS CIVILIAN.CONTROL IN RESPONSE TO A STATEMENT FROM MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LE CHIEF-OF-VETERANS AFFAIRS THAT SUCH AN ACTION REQUIREDCLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSSECRETNO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKEROUND USE ONLY
[176-10036-10113.pdf — page 3]
SECRETCLASSIFICATION-DISSEMINATION CONTROLSIN 78592PAGE 3MAJOR DECISIONS AND A PLAN, NHU SAID THAT HE AND HIS WIFE AND THE GENERAL OFFICERS WOULD HAVE THE REQUIRED PLAN. NHU COMMENTED THAT HE REALIZED THAT HIS WIFE WAS NOT LIKED BY MANY PEOPLE BUT THAT SHE HAD TRIED TO HELP IN THE FIGHT FOR VIETNAM AND THAT SHE HERSELF REALIZED THAT SHE HAD MANY SHORTCOMINGS.6. GENERAL LE THEN SAID TO NHU: "YOU SAY THAT YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH THE GOVERNMENT BUT THE PEOPLE SAY THAT YOU ARE CONCERNED WITH ALL DECISIONS MADE". NHU REPEATED HIS COMMENTS ON LACK OF POWER, FAILURE TO HAVE HIS ADVICE ACCEPTED, AND HIS LACK OF OFFICIAL POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT.7. GENERAL LE COMMENTED ON 12 JULY THAT ALTHOUGH NHU MIGHT BE WILLING TO OVERTHROW THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, LE THOUGHT THAT THEY SHOULD PROCEED WITHOUT NHU, ADDING THAT ALL THAT THE ONHUS WANTED TO DO WAS TO SAVE THEMSELVES. (SOURCE COMMENT.) CHILDREN HAVE BEEN BROUGHT INTO SAIGON AND WERE UNDER HEAVY GUARD. THE NHUS ALSO HAVE AN ESCAPE PLAN.)8. BRIGADIER GENERAL PHAM XUÂN CHIẾU SAID ON 12 JULY THAT ANY COUP D'ETAT ACTION MUST BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AND THAT GENERAL OFFICERS SHOULD COOPERATE.9. COLONEL LE QUAN VIEN SAID ON 12 JULY THAT HE HAD NOT ATTENDED THE 11 JULY MEETING BUT WAS AWARE THAT SOMETHING WAS GOING ON, ADDING THAT NHU AGREED WITH DIEM THAT SOME CHANGES SHOULD BE MADSECRETNO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
[176-10036-10113.pdf — page 4]
# SECRET(13)50TDCS DB-3/655,517 IN 78592PAGE -4-FLIENDED THE H YO MEETING. BE MADE BEFORE AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE LODGE ARRIVED; NHU; HOWEVER, WANTED TO GO FURTHER AND HAVE A COUP D'ETAT WITHOUT DELAY.VIEN SAID THAT THE FOLLOWING GENERAL OFFICERS WERE LEADERS IN THE COUP PLANNING GROUP: BRIGADIER GENERAL TON THAT DINH, COMMANDING GENERAL, 111 CORPS; COLONEL HUYNH VAN CAO, COMMANDER, IV CORPS;BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN VAN LA, COMMANDER, CAPITAL AREA; AND BRIGADIER GENERAL: NGUYEN KHANH, COMMANDING GENERAL; 111 CORPS.VIEN MENTIONED ANOTHER GROUP THAT WOULD SUPPORT A COUP PLACING VICE PRESIDENT THO IN TEMPORARY CONTROL AS INCLUDING MAJOR-GENERAL WLED.DUONG, VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT; BRIGADIERHEAGENERAL TRAN VAN DON, COMMANDER OF THE ARMY; AND TWO OTHERS.10. FIELD DISSEM STATE (AMBASSADOR), USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS), CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACELT.> [Figure: a blurry text showing a list of actions and responses]END OF MESSAGE
[176-10036-10115.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10115RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER:ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE: CIA Information TelegramDATE: 7/16/1963PAGES: 2SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE:CLASSIFICATION:RESTRICTIONS:CURRENT STATUS:DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 198: Vietnam, 7/1/1963-7/20/63. Box 2
[176-10036-10115.pdf — page 1]
# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.CONFIDENTIALSECRETCLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS(When Filled In)NO FOREIGN DISSEM BACKGROUND USE ONLYCOUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAMREPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/655,558SUBJECT STATUS OF COUP D'ETAT PLANS OF TRAN KIM TUYEN'S GROUPDATE DISTR. 16 JULY 1963PRECEDENCE ROUTINEDATE OF INFO. 15 JULY 1963REFERENCES IN. 80366PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (15 JULY 1963)FIELD REPORT NO. EVS 9309APPRAISAL 3THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AMONG GOVERNMENT LEADERS.> > 1. ON 15 JULY 1963 AN INDIVIDUAL ASSOCIATED WITH THE COUP D'ETAT>    GROUP HEADED BY DR. TRAN KIM TUYEN, CURRENTLY AN ADVISOR AT THE PRES->    IDENCY, SAID THAT THEIR NATIONALIST, ANTI-COMMUNIST COUP WOULD OCCUR>    "SOON." HOWEVER, AS THE VIET CONG WERE REPORTEDLY PLANNING TO INTEN->    SIFY THEIR ACTIVITIES DURING THE WEEK PRIOR TO THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE>    GENEVA ACCORDS n20 JULY, THE COUP WOULD NOT BE STAGED UNTIL AFTER THAT>    DATE. THE COUP WOULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST PRESIDENT DIEM AS WELL AS>    THE NGÔ ĐÌNH NHUS AND THE GROUP PLANNED TO ESTABLISH A CONSTITUTIONALCONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSSECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM BACKGROUND USE ONLYSTATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY/L AIR/JCS SECDEF NSA IL UST/A OCI CONESTATE/O/IRTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM2ECBELNO LOOSE INFOFORM 10-62 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS:SANITIZED MK.89.15![GROUP Excluded from: automatic downgrading and declasufica]
[176-10036-10115.pdf — page 2]
# SECRETCLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMBACKGROUND USE ONLY57IN 80366TDCSDB-3/655,558PAGE 2REGIME BEHIND VICE PRESIDENT: NGUYEN NGOC THO.*, (FIELD COMMENT. FVS-9286 (DCSDB-3/655,471 ), FROM ANOTHER SOURCE, REPORTED DETAILS OF TUYEN'SPLAN AND THAT HE WANTED TO MOVE BEFORE THE END OF JULY;)2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS)CINCPAC PACFLT ARPACO PACARAPE Cons nonго не ве ядуOCO JE VLIED DIWAО КОРОМЕИ YO SHE TEL CONG NEDE УЕБОЧДЕОГА УГУВЧИС 10 ТИЩЕН1819 2389 ЭНТ ТΑ ΣΟΣΙΝΟΑ ΝΑ ΥΥСТИЛИ ИЗУUT MIX MART CUORE:1 он 12 ЭЛГА 1923 M INDIAID MILH THE CONG DELVI> [Figure] A high resolution chart with many words illegible due to light contrast. The title is cut off but seems to mention something about the source of the image being from 'DAESANENI'.SECRETVELESENCSEBKECEDENCE SCALIKEFESORE KO LOOP09-2222228CENDROF MESSAGE ONUD MEL JAГACLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS.NO FOREIGN DISSEM BACKGROUND, USE ONLY
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10116RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR : CIAFROM :TO :TITLE: CIA Information TelegramDATE: 7/17/1963PAGES: 2SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE :CLASSIFICATION :RESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 198: Vietnam, 7/1/1963-7/20/63. Box 2
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# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Sect 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation, of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LNO FOREIGN DISSEMCOUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAMREPORT NO. TDCS -3/553,724SUBJECT: POSSIBLE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM FOREIGN POLICY IN LIGHT OF APPOINTMENT OF AMBASSADOR LODGEDATE DISTR. 17 JULY 1963DATE OF INFO.: MID-JULY 1963PRECEDENCE: ROUTINEPLACE & DATE ACQ.: VIETNAM, SAIGON (15 JULY 1963)REFERENCES: IN 80437APPRAISAL: SEE BELOWFIELD REPORT NO. FVS-9314THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE: A HIGH-LEVEL VIETNAMESE SECURITY OFFICIAL (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AMONG GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.APPR: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM HAS RECALLED SOME OF ITS FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES; HOWEVER, WHETHER THE REASON IS TO DEFINE A NEW FOREIGN POLICY IN LIGHT OF AMBASSADOR LODGE'S APPOINTMENT IS UNKNOWN. SEE HEADQUARTERS COMMENT, PARAGRAPH 2MID-JULY 1963 PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM WAS CONSIDERABLY DISTURBED OVER THE DESIGNATION OF HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR. AS AMBASSADOR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN): THE APPOINTMENT SUGGESTED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT THE UNITED STATES PLANNED TO WIELD A "BIG STICK," AND THE GVN RECALLED A NUMBER OF ITS DIPLOMATS FOR CONSULTATION. AMONG THEM WERE THE REPRESENTATIVES IN KUALA LUMPUR AND SINGAPORE, NEW DELHI, DJAKARTA, TOKYO, RANGOON, AND SENEGAL AND SEVERAL OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS. THE REPRESENTATIVES WERE RECALLED OSTENSIBLY SO THAT THEY COULD ATTEND A SEMINAR ON THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO EXPLAIN THE PROGRAM ABROAD; HOWEVER, THE GVN ACTUALLYCLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LNO FOREIGN DISSEMSTATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORRSTATE/DIRTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMOBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONSNO FOREIGN DISSEM