Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[176-10037-10491.pdf — page 1]
# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Esplonage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794; the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSCOUNTRY: CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAMREPORT NO. TDCS -3/499,631SUBJECT: APPEAL TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE REBEL OFFICERS IN PHNOM PENHDATE DISTR. 24 JANUARY 1962DATE OF INFO: 20 JANUARY 1962PRECEDENCE ROUTINEPLACE & DATE ACQ: CAMBODIA, PHNOM PENH (20 JANUARY 1962)REFERENCES IN -15274APPRAISAL 2FIELD REPORT NO. FDP 1560THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE: APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B); FROM MAJOR PHAM VAN LIEU.1. ON 20 JANUARY 1962 MAJOR PHAM VAN LIEU FORMER COMMANDER OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) MARINE CORPS AND MEMBER OF A GROUP OF SVN REBEL OFFICERS IN PROTECTIVE CUSTORY BY THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT, PRESENTED A PROPOSAL FROM HIS GROUP TO THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN PHNOM PENH ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY WITH A COVER LETTER TO AMBASSADOR TRIMBLE. THIS PROPOSAL SIGNED BY THEIR LEADER COLONEL NGUYEN CHẢNH THAI AND OTHER OFFICERS IN THE GROUP, CONTAINED A LIST OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE DIEM GOVERNMENT'S CORRUPT AND INEFFICIENT METHODS OF OPPOSING THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC). IT SUGGESTED THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY REAPPRAISE THE US POLICY TOWARD THE DIEM GOVERNMENT AND UNSEAT AND REPLACE IT WITH A GOVERNMENT TRULY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SVN PEOPLE. THE PROPOSAL WAS PRESENTED IN TWO COPIES, EACH ONE HAVING ONE ENGLISH, FRENCH AND A VIETNAMESECLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS[C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L] NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROLSTATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO AID DI/ EXOTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
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CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSCONFIDENTIALNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROLTDCS-3/499,631IN 15274PAGE 2LANGUAGE VERSION.2. MAJOR LIEU TOLD AN EMBASSY OFFICER THAT "COMPETENT CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES" WERE PLANNING TO RELEASE HIS GROUP FROM CUSTODY BY THE END OF JANUARY. HE SAID PRINCE SIHANOUK HAD APPROVED, AND THAT A CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT SECURITY SERVICE WAS OBTAINING DOCUMENTATION FOR THE GROUP. WHEN ASKED WHAT THEIR PLANS WERE AFTER THEY WERE RELEASED, MAJOR LIEU SAID THAT THEY WERE STILL HOPING FOR ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD AT LEAST LIKE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH US EMBASSY OFFICERS.3 SINCE NOTHING COULD BE DONE TO REMEDY THE SITUATION IN SVN UNTIL DIEM WAS ELIMINATED, THEY WOULD FIGHT DIEM FIRST AND THE VC SECOND.HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. SEE CS-3/486,609 AND FDP 1168/TDCS-3/473,682 IN WHICH MAJOR LIEU SAID THAT HIS GROUP WAS CONSIDERING JOINING THE SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.5 FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCPAC, PACFLT, ARPAC, PACAFEND OF MESSAGECLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSCONFIDENTIAL-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10037-10493RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM :TO:TITLE: Information Report Re: CommentsDATE: 1/28/1962PAGES: 3SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE :CLASSIFICATION :RESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 195: Countries, Vietnam, General11/13/61-11/31/61. Box 6.
[176-10037-10493.pdf — page 1]
# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains Information, affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws Title 18, U.S.C. Sect. 793. and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.CONFIDENTIAL(When Filled In)CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROLREPORT NO. TDCS-3/500,097COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAMSUBJECT COMMENTS OF TRAN. VAN LY ON THE DESIRABILITY DATE DISTR. 28 JANUARY 1962PROBLEMS AND CONSEQUENCES OF A COUP D'ETATDATE OFINFO. 25 JANUARY 1962PRECEDENCE ROUTINEPLACE &DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (26 JANUARY 1962TAYLORKAYSENR. JOHNSONREFERENCESRETAIN OR DESTROYAPPRAISALFIELD REPORT NO: PF-VS-7006THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVESOURCE AOVIETNAMESE NATIONAL ARMY OFFICER WORKING AT THE GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS, FROM TRAN VAN LY.ON 25 JANUARY 1962 TRAN VAN LY, OPPOSITION LEADER IMPRISONED FROM NOVEMBER 1960 TO FEBRUARY 1961 FOLLOWING STHECATTEMPTED COUP OF 1960, SAID THAT CERTAIN GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE CONSULTED WITH HIM ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTEMPTING A COUP D'ETAT (FIELD COMMENT. (TDCS-3/500,042) FVS-6999/BY THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED HIM AS POEHTINGAL ADVISOR TO GENERAL INGHIEME) ESUCHEA COUP WOULD BE TO PREVENT THE COUNTRY FROM FATEING TINTO THE HANDS OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTSA(VC) MIME. EYESAID THAT HE WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH THESED GENERALS IN PRINCIPLE ON THE NECESSITY FOR A COUP DIETAN, BUTEWAS WORRIED BOTH ABOUT THE METHOD TO BE EMPLOYED HAND THE CONSEQUENCESTO LY WASL AWARE THAT CUERPAIN POENT POLLAND RELIGICOSTGROUPS IWISHEDATOTISUUNTO THECONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROLSTATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO DIA EXOVTFTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
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# CONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROLTDCS-3/500,097 IN 18750PAGE 2A COUP WITH THE SUPPORT OF MILITARY ELEMENTS. HOWEVER THESE GROUPS WERE TOO DIVIDED TO BE SUCCESSFULLY BELIEVED THE ONLY SUCCESSFUL COUP WOULD BE ONE MOUNTED BY THE ARMY ITSELF. (FIELD COMMENT)TRAN VAN LY WAS A MEMBER OF THE "CARAVELLE" OPPOSITION GROUP. (cs-3/474,755)ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE OF FVS-59087 HE WAS MOVING TOWARD A NEUTRALIST POSITION IN 1960 AND WAS DISAPPOINTED OVER CONTINUED SUPPORT TO DIÊM BY THE U.S. A BRITISH OFFICIAL SERVICE REPORTEDTHAT WHEN HE WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON ON 8 FEBRUARY 1961, HE WAS FORCED TO SIGN A DECLARATION OF LOYALTY TO/DIÊM. SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENTSPEAKING IN GENERAL TERMS LY SAID THAT IN SETTING UP SUCH A COUP TWO THINGS WERE IMPORTANT: TO AVOID BLOODSHED AND TO ORGANIZE AS SMALL A FORCE AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER NOT TO ALLOW THEPLAN OF ACTION TO BE EXPLOITED BY THE VC. LY'S SOLUTION WOULD BE TO HAVE THE GENERAL OFFICERS DECLARE THE WHOLE OF SOUTH VIETNAMTO BE IN A STATE OF SETGE. THE TROOPS WOULD THEN BE FORBIDDEN TO MOVE WITHOUT AN EXPRESS ORDER FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND ALL ROADS LEADING TO SAIGON WOULD BE RESGUARDED.IN CASE THE COUP WERE SUCCESSFUL CREVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE OF THREE GENERAL OFFICERS WOULD DIRECT EVERYDAY GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS WITH THE HELP OF TECHNICAL ADVISORS AND ESPECIALLY THE SECRETARIES OF STATE WHO WOULD HAVE REMAINED AT THEIR POSTS DURING THIS PERIODTHE PEOPLE WOULD BE ABLE TO CHOOSE THE HEAD-OF-THE-STATE.# CONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
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CONFIDENTIALNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL                                        TDCS -3/500,097                                           IN 18750PAGE 35. (FIELD COMMENT. LY TALKED TO SOURCE IN GENERAL TERMS. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THIS WAS BECAUSE OF RETICENCE ON LY'S PART IN RESPECT TO SOURCE, OR WHETHER LY IS NOT IN FACT INVOLVED IN THE ALLEGED PLANNING OF GENERAL NGHIEM.)6. FIELD DISEM. STATE MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAFCONFIDENTIAL                                                     END OF MESSAGE                                                 NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
[176-10037-10494.pdf — page 0]
176-10037-10494 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992## JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10037-10494RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER:ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE: Information Report Re: Strategic HamletsDATE: 2/20/1962PAGES: 5SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE:CLASSIFICATION:RESTRICTIONS:CURRENT STATUS:DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: NSF: Countries: Vietnam, General, 2/62, Box 195. Box 8.
[176-10037-10494.pdf — page 1]
# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains Information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited be law.CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROLCOUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAMREPORT NO. TDCS-3/502,553SUBJECT STRATEGIC HAMLETSDATE DISTR. 20 FEBRUARY 1962DATE OF INFO. MID-FEBRUARY 1962PRECEDENCE ROUTINEFILEPLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 FEBRUARY 1962)FIELD NO. FVS-7075 IN 30145RETAIN OR DESTROYAPPRAISAL IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT NHU'S VIEWS ARE AS EXPRESSED, AND THAT LUONG CORRECTLY REPEATED NHU'S STATEMENTSSOURCE THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B), WITH PARAS. 1-3 FROM NGO DINH NHU, AND PARA. 4 FROM BUI VAN LUONG.1. NGO DINH NHU, BROTHER AND POLITICAL ADVISOR OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM, STATED ON 14 FEBRUARY 1962 THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' PROGRAM WOULD BE MORE THAN A METHOD OF AFFORDING DEFENSE FOR THE POPULATION OF VIETNAM, IT WOULD BE A BASIC STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIETNAM. HE STATED THAT A COMMON COMPLAINT IN VIETNAM WAS THE WEAKNESS OF ITS CADRES, WHO FAILED TO TURN THE GOVERNMENT'S REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM INTO REALITY. HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE COMPLAINT WAS ONLY PARTIALLY TRUE, AS THE OTHER ASPECT HAD BEEN THE INABILITY OF THE CADRE TO OPERATE IN THE CONDITION OF INSECURITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO 80 ORGANIZE THE SITUATION THAT THE CADRE COULD HE PLACED IN THE AREA OF HIS WORK AND AFFORDED THE NECESSARY PROTECTION AND FACILITIES FOR THE WORK. THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' PROGRAM WOULD PROVIDE BOTH OF THESE.CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROLSTATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR 00 AID DIAADDED: EXOTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM![photo of list of names]
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CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL TDCS-3/502,553 IN 30145PAGE TWO2. THE PROGRAM AS PLANNED BY NHU HAD THREE MAIN ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD MAKE   IT PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE FOR VIETNAM.A. IT WAS FIRST OF ALL TRADITIONAL, RESTING UPON THE BASIC UNIT OFVIETNAMESE SOCIETY. THUS IT CAPITALIZED UPON THE INGRAINED HABITS OF THEPOPULATION.B. THE SECOND ASPECT WAS THAT IT WOULD AFFORD THE MEANS TO MODERNIZEVIETNAMESE LIFE. NHU STATED THAT IT WAS LESS A PROBLEM OF RAISING THE STANDARDOF LIVING THAN OF CHANGING THE MODE OF LIVING. HE SAID THAT IF ATTENTION WASGIVEN TO INSERTING NEW MODES OF LIFE INTO THE ORDINARY PEASANT'S EXISTENCE, ITWOULD INEVITABLY BRING SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN HIS ORIENTATION. NHU COMPAREDTHE RESULT OF THE INSERTION OF SMALL AUTOMOBILES, WASHING MACHINES, ETC., INTOTHE LIFE OF THE EUROPEAN WORKING CLASS WHICH HE CLAIMED HAD DISRUPTED COMMUNISTINFLUENCE OVER THIS CLASS. AS A RESULT, NHU SAID, MOST EUROPEAN COMMUNISTPARTIES OPPOSED MODERNIZATION. HE STATED THAT THE ASIAN COMMUNIST PARTIESWERE LESS INTELLIGENT IN THEIR APPROACH, AS THEY ADVOCATED MODERNIZATION OFASIAN LIFE WITHOUT REALIZING THAT IT WOULD INEVITABLY REDUCE THEIR OWN ORGAN-IZATIONAL POWER. NHU STATED THAT A STUDY OF STEPS APPROPRIATE FOR VIETNAM ALONGTHIS LINE SHOULD BE MADE AND A CONSCIOUS EFFORT DEVOTED TO INSERTING THESE NEWMODES OF LIFE INTO VIETNAM. AS AN EXAMPLE, HE CITED THE EFFECT OF DISTRIBUTINGBICYCLES WITH MICROMOTORS, THUS MAKING THE PEASANT MOBILE AND CHANGING HIS MODEOF LIFE. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET, HE REITERATED, WOULD AFFORD THE NECESSARYPROTECTION AND ECONOMIC BASE FOR SUCH A MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
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CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL TDCS-3/502, 553 IN 30145 PAGE THREEC. THE THIRD ELEMENT, NHU SAID, WOULD BE DEMOCRATIZATION. HEDEFINED IT AS THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND ORDER TO RURAL LIFE. HE STATED THATAT PRESENT THE PEASANTS WERE EXPOSED TO ILLEGALITY BY THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTSAND BY GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) ELEMENTS, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVIL. THIS WASIN PART A RESULT OF THE DISPERSION OF THE POPULATION AND ITS INABILITY TO ASSUMEITS OWN GOVERNANCE. AS AN INDUCEMENT TO FORM A STRATEGIC HAMLET, NHU SAID THEPOPULATION SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT THE HAMLET WOULD BE GUARANTEED THE FULLAPPLICATION OF LAW BY ITS OWN AUTHORITIES, THUS MOVING IT TOWARD A SYSTEM OFDEMOCRATIZATION APPROPRIATE TO THE COMMUNITY. HOWEVER, IT WOULD HAVE LITTLE ORNOTHING TO DO WITH CHANGES OF THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON. NHU STATED THAT HE HADBROUGHT OUT IN A RECENT TALK TO GVN OFFICIALS THAT ONE COULD CHANGE THEGOVERNMENT IN SAIGON 35 TIMES WITH NO EFFECT UPON THE REAL SITUATION IN THECOUNTRYSIDE, BUT THAT THE APPLICATION OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' SYSTEM WOULDDEFINITELY AFFECT THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE COUNTRYSIDE IN A WAY WHICH TOUCHEDTHE POPULATION ITSELF. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET WOULD ALSO, ACCORDING TO NHU, AFFORDA BASIS FOR THE BUILDING OF INSTITUTIONS IN VIETNAM TO GIVE ADDITIONAL STABILITY,E.G., COOPERATIVES, MEDICAL SERVICES, EDUCATION, WOMENS' MOVEMENTS, YOUTHMOVEMENTS, ETC.3. NHU STATED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' CONCEPTS WITH   A GROUP OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS RECENTLY, AND HAD MADE ONE VERY STRONG ADDITIONAL   POINT TO THEM. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS-7034, TDCS-3/501,110 GAVE AN ACCOUNT, FROM   A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, OF NHU'S REMARKS AT THE MEETING.) HE STATED THAT HECLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
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CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL TDCS-3/502,553IN 30145PAGE FOURWAS AWARE THAT THERE WAS MUCH DISCONTENT AMONG THE VARIOUS LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH, HE SAID, STEMMED FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO THE JOB. ANY LOCAL OFFICIAL WHO FACED A PROBLEM MADE A REQUEST TO HIS NEXT HIGHER AUTHORITY FOR ASSISTANCE AND WAS DISCONTENTED IF THE ASSISTANCE WAS INADEQUATE. THE NEXT LEVEL REQUESTED THE CHIEF OF PROVINCE, WHO REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM THE MINISTRY, AND HAD THE SAME REACTION. THE MINISTER MADE THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT AND WAS DISCONTENTED AT INADEQUATE SUPPORT. THEORETICALLY, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD MAKE REQUESTS OF THE AMERICANS AND BE DISCONTENTED WITH THE AMERICANS FOR LACK OF ADEQUATE SUPPORT. NHU STATED THAT THE ENTIRE PROCESS WAS INFANTILE, AND A CHILDISH WAY OF DEPENDENCE UPON A SUPERIOR TO SOLVE ONE'S PROBLEMS. HE STATED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP A MATURITY IN THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE SO THAT THEY WOULD TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOLVING THEIR OWN PROBLEMS, UTILIZING SUCH ASSISTANCE AS WAS GIVEN THEM, BUT NOT ATTEMPTING TO SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. HE STATED THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLET WAS THE WAY TO INTRODUCE THE PROCESS OF BEGINNING MATURITY TO THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT. NHU SAID THAT THE OFFICIALS WERE MUCH AMUSED AT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE DISCONTENT AND FOUND MUCH VALIDITY IN HIS STATEMENT OF HOW TO OVERCOME IT. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO KEEP REPEATING THE LESSON, AS OTHERWISE THE OLD HABITS OF DEPENDENCE UPON POWERS ABOVE WOULD RETURN AND THE WHOLE VICIOUS CYCLE OF DISCONTENT WOULD START AGAIN.CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
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CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL TDCS-3/502,553 IN 30145PAGE FIVE4. MINISTER OF INTERIOR BUI VAN LUONG, IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION ON 13   FEBRUARY, STATED THAT NHU HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS'   PROGRAM BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE FULL CONTROL OF THE NEW INTERMINISTERIAL   COMMISSION. HE SAID THAT NHU HAD SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT DID   NOT WISH A REPETITION OF THE ERRORS MADE IN THE INITIATION OF THE AGROVILLE   PROGRAM. NHU EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF EXPLAINING TO THE POPULATION WHAT   IT WAS BEING ASKED TO DO AND OF FOLLOWING VERY STRICT RULES, FOR INSTANCE,   THAT THE POPULATION BE ASKED TO ASSIST ONLY IN ITS OWN LOCALITY AND NOT BE   REQUIRED TO WORK ON DISTANT AREAS. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE PROVINCE CHIEFS   WERE INSTRUCTED NOT TO LAUNCH OFF IN ALL DIRECTIONS, CREATING STRATEGIC HAMLETS   ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN IDEAS, BUT TO FOLLOW THE PROGRAM AND PATTERN TO BE   ESTABLISHED BY THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' COMMITTEE.5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR MAAG AID CINCPAC PACFLT   ARPAC PACAF.END OF MESSAGECLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
[176-10038-10032.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER : 176-10038-10032RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR: DOSFROM :TO :TITLE: Embtel 660 (Saigon) Re: Task Force on VietnamDATE: 11/16/1961PAGES: 3SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE :CLASSIFICATION :RESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: NSF: Countries: Vietnam, General, 11/16/61-11/17/61, box 195. Box 8
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# INCOMING TELEGRAM## Department of StateSANITIZED VERSIONLX-75-92 3SECRETControl: 9439Rec'd: NOV. 16, 1961 3:50 a.m. 01943 ActionFE FROM: SAIGONInfo TO: Secretary of StateSS NO: 660, NOVEMBER 16, 11 AMGSPLHSO ACTION DEPARTMENT: 660, INFORMATION CINCPAC POLAD 2683EURAIDPX LIMIT DISTRIBUTIONIOPINR TASK FORCE VNCIA REF: EMBTEL 062725 0128T DECOOSDARMY 1. OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPLOITATION OF NEW MANAGEMENT OF NATIONALAIR POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICEE (COLONEL NGUYEN VAN Y VICE GENERALNAVY NGUYEN VAN ELA) E FALBAINTOCTWO GENERAL FIELDS, INTELLIGENCE ANDA NATIONAL POLICE BOTH CAS CAND USOM HAVE FOR CONSIDERABLE TIMEDC BEEN STYMIED BUT WITH CHANGE BELIEVE REAL PROGRESS CAN BEMADE. THIS WILL REQUIRE WORKING OUT OF DETAILED PROGRAMS FORADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE TRAINING, ETC., AND ADDITIONAL U.S.RMR PERSONNEL FOR NECESSARY ELAISON AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT.2. CAS HAS ALREADY PROPOSED TO ITS HEADQUARTERS DEVELOPMENT OF   NATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTY. PENETRATION SERVICE TO SERVE AS   "SPECIAL BRANCH" OF SURETE WHOSE CHARTER AT PRESENT COVERS   BOTH SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AND ORDINARY INVESTIGATIONS.   THIS "SPEC EAL BRANCH" WOULD HAVE REPRESENTATIVES AT PROVINCE   LEVELS AND BE MANAGED THROUGH REGIONAL DIRECTORATES. AT EACH   REGIONAL DIRECTORATE, CAS WOULD PROPOSE ASSIGN AT LEAST ONE   CAS OFFICER TO MAINTAIN CLOSE LIAISON AND COLLABORATION.   CONCERT WOULD BE FULL INTEGRATION HIS EFFORT INTO   VIETNAMESE EFFORT. THIS WOULD REQUIRE FOLLOWING CAS COMMITMENT:A. CAS OFFICERS FOR DIRECTORATES AT HUE, NHA TRANG, BAN METHUỘT, BIEN HOA, SAIGON/CHOLON, AND CAN THO, AS WELL AS ALREADYSECRETREPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY ISPROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
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SECRET3. -2-660, NOVEMBER 16, 11 AM, FROM SAIGONEXISTING PERSONNEL FOR LIAISON AT NATIONAL LEVEL. PERSONNELWOULD BE SUPPORTED BY NECESSARY INTERPRETERS, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.B. PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNIST PARTY PENETRATIONTRAINING TO VIETNAMESE OFFICER PERSONNEL OF NEW SPECIAL BRANCH,TAKEN FROM EXPERIENCED SURETE OFFICERSC. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO GIVE PROVINCIAL SPECIAL BRANCHOFFICERS FUNDS TO OPERATE AGENT NETWORKS IN PROVINCES.EXACT SUM NOT YET DETERMINED BUT WILL BE SEEN TO BE SUBSTANTIALBY MULTIPLYING NUMBER OF PROVINCES (38) BY REASONABLE MONTHLYSUM: FOR EACH PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ENABLE HIM-HIREAGENTS AND PAY OTHER OPERATIONAL EXPENSES3. USOM EQUALLY DETERMINED PROSECUTE POTENTIAL FOR GREATER   COLLABORATION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICE STRUCTURE WITH   REGULAR INVESTIGATORY FUNCTIONS OF SURE TE, TO PROVIDELICE VID   ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMPON EFFECTIVE NATIONAL BASIS TO BOLSTER BY   GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT COUNTRY, AND THUS CONTRIBUTE   TO CONTRBUTION CRIME DISORDER, OVERT COMMUNIST ACTION, ETC.   THIS: WOULD COMPRISE OVER-ALL DEVELOPMENT USOM POLICE, SURETE AND   RELATED INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES TO INCLUDE:A CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL POLICE FUNCTIONS UNDER THE SECRETARYOF STATE FOR: INTERIOR.B. A: DELINEATION OF FUNCTIONS AS THEY PERTAIN TO THE SEPARATEELEMENTS OF PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICES.C. THE ADOPTION OF A REALISTIC TRAINING PROGRAM, GEAREDTO AN APPROPRIATE PROGRAM OF COMMODITY PROCUREMENT.D. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICE.USOM ENVISIONS DEVELOPMENT BASED UPON MUTUAL AGREEMENT ANDUPON RECIPIENTS'S ABILITY TO ABSORB INTRODUCTION OF NEWCONCEPTS.4. THIS BEING MADE TASK FORCE MATTER DUE MY CONVICTION IT IS   SUBSTANTIAL WE MOVE FORWARD IN-BOTH--ABOVE-F-I E-LDS TO MAX-I MUM   DEGREE POSSIBLE, TAKING FULL ADVANTAGE OF WHAT APPARENTLYSECRET
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SECRET-3- 660, NOVEMBER 16, 11 AM, FROM SAI GONIS REAL NEW BREAK IN SITUATION. URGE FULLEST SUPPORT FROM TASKFORCE LEVEL AND ABOVE OF THESE SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTIVITY BYCAS AND USOM, AND SUPPORT IN WASHINGTON FOR NECESSARY PERSONNELAND BUDGET ADDITIONS WHICH MAY BE INVOLVED.NOLTINGMMSECRET
[177-10001-10060.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992## JFK Assassination System Identification FormDate: 8/26/201Agency InformationAGENCY: LBJRECORD NUMBER: 177-10001-10060RECORD SERIES: NSF, COUNTRY FILE, CUBA, TDCS, VOL. I, BOX 32AGENCY FILE NUMBER:Document InformationORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE:DATE: 12/18/1963PAGES: 2SUBJECTS: CUBADOCUMENT TYPE: REPORTCLASSIFICATION: UnclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: 1BCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 10/02/1998OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: DOC. #158
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# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSSECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLYCOUNTRY CUBAREPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/658, 582SUBJECT CUBAN GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S ADMINISTRATIONDATE DISTR. 18 DECEMBER 1963DATE OF INFO. LATE NOVEMBER 1963PRECEDENCE ROUTINEPLACE & DATE ACO. 16 DECEMBER 1963REFERENCES IN 82930APPRAISAL THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.FIELD REPORT NO.SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL CUBAN DIPLOMAT IN WESTERN EUROPE WHO HAS BEEN A FAIRLY RELIABLE REPORTER OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INFORMATION.1. FIDEL CASTRO WAS VERY UPSET OVER THE CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION.THE TOP CUBAN LEADERSHIP WAS SURE PRESIDENT KENNEDY WOULD NOT INVADE CUBA AND THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT THE POLICY OF HIS ADMINISTRATION FOR ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AND INTERNAL SUBVERSION AGAINST CUBA WOULD NOT OVERTHROW THE RÉGIME.2. THE PRESENT POLICY OF THE CUBAN GOVT., ON ORDERS FROM CASTRO, IS NOT TO ATTACK PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN PUBLIC OR DO ANYTHING TO IRRITATE HIM. ACCORDING TO CUBAN GOVT. LEADERS, CASTRO WANTS TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON SAYS AND DOES ABOUT CUBA,CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSSECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLYSTATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXX OCI ONE OCR ORR BMX XXBISTATE/DIR REPCINCLANT I&NS TREASURYTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMFORM 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.NW 50955 DocId:32282900 Page 2(15-20)
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CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSSECRET/ NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/(When Filled In) NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLYTDCS DB-3/658,582 IN 82930PAGE 2AND GIVE HIM. AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE, IF HE FEELS. SO INCLINED,RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT.(END OF MESSAGE)CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSSECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLYNW 50955 DocId: 32282900 Page 3