Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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SECRET27when we refer to extra-legal activities?A This is what I was trying to think of and I can't think of what it was. I know extra-legal activities was one parts of the program that we were involved in.I might have a chart in my safe downstairs that might tell me what that is.Q Well, let's make a note of that and we will have to come back to that.A All right.Q Who else would be knowledgeable about extra-legal activities that were run against Castro?A Well, the people that would be knowledgeable are probably retired and I was running the program. So I ran the economic program.Q Well, these are activities that were run in connection with the economic program?A Yes.Q We talked about media placement during this nine-year period.. To what are you referring when you refer to media placement?A Well, stories or news items that perhaps our propaganda people wrote. We had them placed in newspapers and magazines throughout the world.Q Would this also include broadcasts over radio stations?SECRETPhotocopy from Gerald Ford Library![photo of WARD & PAUL Phone (Area 202) 544-6000 and 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 and NW 50955 DocId:32275454 Page 29]
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SECREIA Oh, yes. Radio is a very big part of it.Q Now, were any of these newspapers or magazines published within the United States?A Not to my knowledge, no.Q These were essentially foreign publications?A Yes.Q Were any of them published in the Cuban community in Miami?A No. The intent was to get world opinion against Castro. You don't do that by publishing in the United States.Q What about the radio broadcasts? How were those handled?A Are you speaking of Radio Swan now?Q Well, I am unfamiliar with how many radio stations were involved. Was there more than one radio station?A No. We only had the one radio station but we did contract time with Florida stations, a station in New York.Q For broadcasts to what areas?A For broadcasts to Havana.Q And the station in New York, was that received also -- was that also broadcasting to various areas of the United States?A I have no idea. I don't know whether they used a particular frequency to get this out or whether they did it on short-wave or what they did.SECRET
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SECRET 291 Q But the intention was to reach Cuba.2 A Reach Cuba.3 Q You referred to a station in New York, referred to4 as Swan. Were there others?5 A There were a couple in Miami that I recall. Not in6 Miami. I think there was one -- yes, there was one in Miami,7 I think, and one down in Key West that they used.8 Q Where was Radio Swan located?9 A On Swan Island.10 Q Where is Swan Island?11 A Swan Island is a little glob around Honduras.12 Q As far as you can recall, were there any other13 radio stations in the United States that were utilized to14 broadcast propaganda materials toward Cuba?15 A Well, there conceivably could have been, not that16 I recall right now..17 Q Do you recall any attempts by the Agency or groups18 affiliated with the Agency to raise money from the American19 public to support those propaganda activities?20 A No. As far as I know, Radio Swan and this type of21 thing was fully subsidized by the Agency.22 Q Do you recall the advertising campaigns that were23 run in connection with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?24 A Oh, yes.25 Q Was anything of that nature done in connection with
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SECKET1 Cuban propaganda?2 A Not to my knowledge.3 Q And that would include both the publications and the4 radio?5 A Right.6 Q Let's talk about economic warfare for a couple of7 moments. Could you describe for me briefly the type of8 economic activities that were conducted against Castro?9 A Well, first of all, we wanted to denigrate the10 regime, his credit worthiness, and this type of thing. We11 worked very closely with the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in12 the State Department and, well, for instance, in those days, I13 guess it was back in 1964, the price of sugar had jumped from14 about a penny a pound to 13 cents a pound, something like15 that, and we couldn't understand why. So we kept Fidel kept16 saying that he had such a poor crop and this type of thing and17 we just couldn't figure out why he had such a poor crop because18 some of our own island assets told us they were out there cutting19 this cane like mad and the mills were working 24 hours a day,20 this type of thing. So subsequently, we found out that he was21 lying and he was storing the raw cane in the schools, any22 place. He had no storage facilities and put it any place he23 could.24 So in cooperation with a couple of sugar brokers in25 New York, we surfaced this fact and the price of sugar took aSECRETPhotocopy fromGerald Ford Library
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SECRET1 real tumble and all of a sudden then Cuba started exporting.2 It was this type of thing that obviously he was3 trying to build up the world price because he didn't have any4 money, he was so short on his exchange, and obviously we didn't5 want him to get the exchange. So it was those types of6 activities.7 Q Was the assistance of any U.S. businessmen or U.S.8 companies enlisted in that effort?9 A Oh, yes.10 Q In what manner did you use U.S. companies and11 businessmen?12 A Well, we simply used them as the experts. A great13 many -- the sugar industry in Cuba was controlled by the14 American community, by American bankers, and obviously they15 lost everything when they had to pull out. Sugar is the16 lifeline of Cuba as far as any exchange, foreign exchange, this17 type of thing, and it was naturally our Number 1 target. So it18 was only natural that we would go to the American businessmen.19 Q What kind of assistance did you seek or obtain from20 these businessmen?21 A Well, we simply talked with them about why -- you22 know, the market conditions were, why the price was rising, if23 we could find out that Fidel has plenty of sugar, what would24 happen to the market price. This type of thing.25 Q They were used as consultants, basically.
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32A They were used as consultants, basically, yes.Q We have spoken about the investment American businesshad in Cuba. Did it ever come to your attention that American organized crime --A No.Q -- had considerable investment in Cuba?A No. Well, everybody knew that the Mafia was in Cuba. I mean, all the casinos and this type of thing.Q The casinos were run --A I knew that long before. When I was in the Air Force during the war, I used to fly into Havana on weekends and this type of thing.Q I understand that. It was fairly well known.A It was a criminal element.Q The Mafia was involved with the casinos in Havana.A Right.Q Do you know of any attempts by the Agency to enlist the support or assistance of any crime figures in any manner whatsoever in the Agency's efforts against the Cuban regime?A No.Q Have you ever heard of Mr.Roselli?A Oh, yes.Q When was the first time you heard of Mr. Roselli?A Well, I guess it was -- it seems to me it was either Drew Pearson or Jack Anderson had an article on him a number
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SECRET                                                                                                            331  of years ago.2 Q Was that the first time you heard of the man's3 name?4 A Yes, as I recall.5 Q Is that also true of Sam Giancana?6 A No. I have heard that name but I don't know where..7 Q In connection with --8 A Not in connection with the Agency, no.9 Q In connection with the casinos or --10 A No.11 Q -- gambling interests in Cuba?12 A No.13 Q You know of no instance in which organized crime14 figures were used as consultants by the Agency?15 A Only what I read in the paper. I had no knowledge16 of that whatsoever.17 Q Do you know of any offers of assistance from figures18 of that type --19 A No.20 Q -- who were interested in getting back into cuba?21 A No.22 Q We were talking about economic warfare. We have23 talked about attempts to keep the price of sugar low. What other24 types of economic activities were conducted against Castro's25 Cuba?SECRETPhotocopy fromGerald Ford Library
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SECRET 341 A Well, we used all-source information to find out what2 his commercial dealings were. When we would see -- well, for3 instance, the Nicaro Nickel Mine which is a source owned4 by the General Services Administration, finally got back into5 production and nickel, of course, and still is -- was in short6 supply. We had a French firm, Societe le Nickel, who was7 buying almost the entire output of the Nicaro mines. And this8 French firm ex ported to the United States. So we went to9 the Treasury Department and to the Foreign Assets Control10 people and said, isn't there something we can do to stop these11 le Nickel exports coming into the United States? So they looked12 into the thing and indeed they did.13 Q Who owned the mine?14 A The U.S. Government owned it when Castro took it15 over.16 Q I see.17 A General Services Administration. And it was leased18 out for operation. But the ownership rested with the19 Government.20 So the Treasury simply made the French provide a21 Certificate of Origin for the nickel that went in -- they22 export a lot of metal that contains nickel, silverware, knives23 and forks, this type of thing, and -- you know, stainless24 steel, and since nickel is used as a hardening agent we simply25 -- Treasury simply said you can't import any more into this
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SECRET                                                                        351 country until we have a Certificate of Origin. As a matter2 of fact, there was a boat that was pulling into the dock in3 New York and they wouldn't let it unload. They just turned it4 around. Eventually, over a period of months, le Nickel5 found other sources and export privileges to the United States6 were restored.7 You know, it is -- you just -- any time you raise8 or lower a tariff you have economic warfare. It is that9 simple.10 Q Were there any other instances that you can recall11 of economic warfare in which you enlisted the support of12 American business firms?13 A I know we were in touch with a great many American14 business firms. We enlisted everybody's support that we could.15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.16 (Discussion off the record.)17 BY MR. MANFREDI:18 Q When we broke for a moment we were discussing other19 instances where the Agency has enlisted the support of American20 business in economic warfare against Cuba. Can you think of21 any other such instances?22 A Oh, certainly. The Cubans were having an awful time23 with their Maritime fleet, such as it was. These boats were24 powered with Nordberg engines. We simply went to the Nordberg25 people and told them -- asked them to cooperate with us, which
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SECRET                                                                                                           361 they said they would. They notified their manufacturer's2 representatives around the world if they got any orders from3 the Cubans they were to be refused. This type of thing.4 We did the same thing with --5 Q Let's just stop for a second. Now, was Nordberg6 compensated in any way for cooperation with the Agency?7 A No.8 Q Were they compensated for the loss of business9 involved in that activity?10 A No. No.11 Q I take it, you received similar cooperation from12 other companies.13 A Oh, a great many other companies, yes.14 Q Did any American companies refuse to cooperate in15 that manner?16 A No. Not a one.17 Q Were there any legal sanctions threatened against any18 companies?19 A No. No.20 Q Were there any sanctions that could have been brought21 to bear upon those companies had they chosen to trade with22 Cuba?23 A Well, in the first place, they couldn't trade with24 Cuba. They couldn't get export licenses from this country25 anyway. Then, under the Foreign Assets Control Act of theSECRET
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# SECRET1 Treasury Department you have the extra-territorialty clause2 in there where a subsidiary of an American company cannot --3 foreign subsidiary of an American company cannot trade with4 the country that is designated and Cuba was a designated country.5 And all the businessmen were well aware of this. Nobody tried6 to twist their arm.7 Q Other than insuring that these companies refused8 to accept orders from Cuba, which I take it you feel they were9 legally constrained from doing, what other types of support did10 you receive from American business?11 A Well, if American business -- sometimes they would12 receive correspondence, particularly, say, from -- well, they13 received it from Cuba asking for publications and this type14 of thing. They would normally forward all this type of thing15 to the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department, or in16 some instances they might call me and I would just give them17 a Post Office box to send the correspondence to.18 Q Any other types of support solicited or received by19 the Agency from American business?20 A No. Not that I can recall. There just wasn't one21 firm we approached, and God knows we approached I don't know22 how many, that wasn't extremely cooperative. As a matter of23 fact, a lot of them, you know, thought we weren't doing enough,24 that we ought to do a little more than we were doing, the25 government wasn't really pushing Cuba the way it should, but# SECRETPhotocopy from Gerald Ford Library![logo of Gerald Ford Library]
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SECRET                                                                                                        381  outside of that, nothing. There wasn't any problem of coopera-2  tion. There wasn't any arm-twisting. It was all voluntary.3  Q   Did you identify yourself as CIA --4  A   Yes.5  Q   -- in dealings with these companies?6  A   Indeed, I do and we went to the top level, even7  the Board Chairman or the president. No problem at all.8  Q   Let's talk about paramilitary operations. We started9  but didn't really discuss that in any depth.10  What kind of paramilitary operations were run11  against Cuba by the CIA?12  A   Maritime operations.13  Q   Is that the extent of it?14  A   That is the extent of it.15  Q   Were there any aerial operations?16  A   Not to my knowledge.17  Q   Leaflet drops?18  A   No.19  Q   Bombing?20  A   No. Of course, you had the over-flights. As far as21  I am concerned that is the only aerial activity.22  Q   That was run by another directorate, wasn't it?23  A   Yes.24  Q   Aerial photography, and so forth.25  A   Yes. They run a flight when you ask them. It has toSECRET Photocopy fromGerald Ford Library
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SECRET391 be requested and that is about it.2 Q And those were run out of the United States?3 A Oh, yes.4 Q Can you think of anything, any other type of para-5 military activity other than maritime operations.6 A No. I really can't, no.7 Q Am I correct that those operations were manned8 by CIA contract employees?9 A Right.10 Q Which would include Cuban refugees.11 A Right.12 Q. And some CIA officers?13 A Right.14 Q Any other branches of the services, Armed Services,15 involved? This, of course, is posted Bay of Pigs.16 A Yes. No, not to my knowledge. You have got to remember17 that probably down at our Domestic Training Station we18 probably have people on detail from other -- from the military19 branches in the Government, but other than that I don't think20 that -- of course, during the Bay of Pigs operation we also21 had people detailed into the Agency.22 Q Now, the training of persons involved in maritime23 operations, I take it, was conducted in part within the24 United States and in part outside of the United States. Is25 that correct?Photocopy fromGerald Ford LibrarySECRET
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SECRET1 A I would think probably the major portion of it was2 conducted within the United States.3 Q The Keys would be considered within the United4 States.5 A Oh, yes.6 Q Or were there any locations where it was conducted7 outside the United States?8 A Following the Bay of Pigs, I don't think so. Not9 to my knowledge. I just don't know, I just don't recall10 but I don't think that -- I think all the training was done11 domestically.12 Q Now, what kinds of operations are included within13 this category of maritime operations?14 A Well, the infiltration operations, infiltrating15 agents into Cuba, exfiltrating agents, hit and run sabotage16 raids. That is about the extent of it.17 Q Now, when did these operations commence? Was it18 shortly after the Bay of Pigs?19 A I would -- I think these operations were probably20 at their height during the period about 1963 through, say,21 1967. The program was terminated in 1968, I think in December22 1968, something like that.23 Q Why was the program terminated?24 A First of all, it was too expensive. It wasn't provid-25 ing enough intelligence and it simply wasn't -- economically.SECRETPhotocopy fromGerald Ford Library
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# SECRET1 it wasn't feasible to continue these things. The agents were2 getting wrapped up. We were -- we just felt that the return3 wasn't sufficient for what the investment was.4 Q You say the agents were getting wrapped up.5 A Yes.6 Q What do you mean by that?7 A When we infiltrated an agent, Cubans would identify8 him and capture him.9 Q These various types of paramilitary operations that10 were conducted by the Agency I trust were approved by the11 Forty Committee?12 A Every operation received a specific approval from13 the Forty Committee.14 Q In advance?15 A In advance.16 Q Now, what was the procedure for submitting -- for17 initiating such an operation?18 A Well, normally in the case of an infil or an exfil.19 or perhaps we wanted to lay down the cache.20 Q You are referring to a cache of arms.21 A A cache of anything, replay of radio, batteries,22 whatever they might need. If we decided that we should have23 one of these operations and the request would go from here24 over to the, I guess to the White House and then the Forty25 Committee at its weekly meeting -- they used to meet verySECRETPhotocopy fromGerald Ford Library
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SECRET                                                                          421 frequently -- they would either approve the operation or say2 no. These operations had to be planned well in advance because3 the tides had to be right, the moon had to be in the proper4 phase for communications and this type of thing. And these5 things, all these were coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of6 Staff, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the FBI. If we were7 exiltrating people, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.8 Every Government agency or enforcement agency or military9 agency that had any involvement whatsoever, and the entire10 thing was coordinated.11 Q Do you know of any such paramilitary operations12 that were run unbeknownst to the Forty Committee?13 A No.14 Q What kind of volume of operations are we talking15 about?16 A You are not talking about a very big volume of17 operations because of the planning that had to go into these18 things. I would say that probably at the height of the thing19 they may be running three or four a month. No more than that.20 Q You have heard Eugenio Martinez refer to having21 run 300 operations.22 A I have seen that.23 Q Is that inaccurate?24 A Well, it all depends on what is in his mind. He25 may have considered some of the training exercises as opera-
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# SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-600043tions. Obviously, these guys trained. In order to run oneof these operations, you know, you would have to have a mothership in place and rubber boats and the UDT people to go in tosee if there were mines and this type of thing on the shorebefore you go. So he may have considered that all these train-ing exercises were operations but no way did he ever partici-pate in any three or 400 active operations into Cuba.Q Now, from what specific locations were theseoperations launched?A They were mostly launched from the Keys.Q Any other locations?A Not to my knowledge.Q Now, would you describe for me the kind of hit andrun sabotage operations that were conducted?A Well, we conducted one hit and run sabotage againstthe Texaco refinery.Q What used to be the Texaco refinery?A What used to be the Texaco refinery.MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.(Discussion off the record.)THE WITNESS: These things, a great amount of planningwent into these things. We did have a model of the refinery.We agonized over the best approach to the refinery and thistype of thing to do the most effective damage. This was run. Itwas successful, as I recall, not totally successful but it was410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003NW 50955 DocId:32275454 Page 45# SECRETPhotocopy fromGerald Ford Library
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SECRET1 a successful operation. By that, I mean they didn't do as2 much damage as they wanted to because they had to get out3 because the Cuban defense came after them. It was that type4 of operation that we did.5 As I recall, another time we took a team in to burn6 some cane fields. Really, the classical operations that we7 did in the maritime activities were the infiltrations and8 exfiltrations.9 Q Were any CIA operations run out of Guantanamo?10 A Not to my knowledge.11 Q Was it impractical to use the base there for --12 A Well, the base is so surrounded and has been that13 I think if a guy went through that fence you would carry him14 back. He wouldn't walk.15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.16 (Discussion off the record.)17 MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.18 BY MR. MANFREDI:19 Q Are there any other categories of sabotage run out20 of the Keys other than what you have just described?21 A Well, we did lay down a cache, if you will, sabotage22 kits to be used by our own island agents. They contained23 sugar to dump into gas tanks and metal fragments to put down24 crank cases. Things of this nature.25 One of our main objects was to, of course, sabotageSECRETPhotocopy from Gerald Ford Library
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# SECRETall the oil. We did that with a big operation. We made ourown oil, substandard. Additives, I should say, not oil. Wecontracted with an American firm for that. And we shippedit in through third countries in Europe. It did hit the target.The thing we wanted to get at was the oil and theautomotive machinery on the island. We knew it was breakingdown and if we could get a complete breakdown we would haveeverything at a standstill because in those days the automotiveequipment wasn't coming in that rapidly from Europe becauseCastro didn't hve the money to buy it and they weren't going toextend the credit.The railroad system was in total disaster. TheSoviets had such a long logistics line, supply line, plusthe fact that the Cubans didn't like the Soviet equipmentbecause they were used to good American equipment. And thesewere principal targets that we were trying to get to.Q In your experience at the Agency can you think ofany other analogus or similar paramilitary operations runfrom a base in the United States?A No.Q I know there has been some paramilitary trainingin the United States.A Oh, yes.Q In connection with other operations.A Oh, sure.# SECRETPhotocopy fromGerald Ford Library