Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[176-10036-10137.pdf — page 1]
# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUNDUSE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEMCOUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/657,133SUBJECT SITUATION APPRAISAL AS OF 5 OCTOBER 1963 DATE DISTR. 8 OCTOBER 1963PRECEDENCE ROUTINEDATE OF INFO.PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (5 OCTOBER 1963) REFERENCES IN 33775APPRAISAL COMMENTARY FIELD REPORT NO.THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE STAFF OFFICERS OF THIS ORGANIZATION.1. THIS IS A FIELD APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. IT IS NOT AN OFFICIAL JUDGEMENT BY THIS AGENCY OR ANY COMPONENT. IT REPRESENTS THE OBSERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF STAFF OFFICERS BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THEM AT THE TIME OF ITS PREPARATION. PREPARED FOR INTERNAL USE AS A GUIDE TO THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, THIS COMMENTARY IS DISSEMINATED IN THE BELIEF THAT IT MAY BE USEFUL TO OTHER AGENCIES IN ASSESSING THE SITUATION FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES.2. THE MOST STRIKING FEATURE OF THE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FOR THE WEEK OF 29 SEPTEMBER-5 OCTOBER 1963 HAS BEEN A GREATER DEPTH OF REPORTING ON COUP PLOTTING, PROVIDING INFORMATION IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL AS TO THE PERSONALITIES INVOLVED AND THEIR ALLOTTED ROLES. STILL LACKING, HOWEVER, IS SOLID INFORMATION AS TO THE COHESIVENESS OF VARIOUS GROUPS REPORTED READY TO LAUNCH A COUP AND TOCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUNDUSE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEMSTATE/INF DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NICSTATE/DIATELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
[176-10036-10137.pdf — page 2]
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM TDCS DB-3/657,133 IN. 33775 PAGE TWOTHE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY ENJOY FIRM LEADERSHIP AT THE TOP OF THE ICEBERG OF WHICH WE ARE STILL GETTING ONLY TANGENTIAL GLIMPSES.3.  THE GENERALS MEANWHILE ARE NOW PRESSING PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM FOR A REPLY TO THE DEMANDS MADE SEVERAL WEEKS AGO DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE MARTIAL LAW PHASE. AS DESCRIBED BY GENERAL TRAN VAN DON, THE LIST OF DEMANDS ARE QUITE EXTENSIVE, INCLUDING THE ASSIGNMENT OF MILITARY MEN TO THE POSTS OF MINISTERS OF DEFENSE, INTERIOR, CIVIC ACTION AND EDUCATION. THEY ALSO ASKED FOR CONTROL OF THE SAIGON/CHOLON POLICE AND THE PLACEMENT OF THE CAPITAL REGION UNDER A PERMANENT MILITARY GOVERNORSHIP. DON SAYS THAT HE AND HIS FELLOW GENERAL OFFICERS DO NOT EXPECT DIEM TO ACCEDE TO THIS PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS, ACCEPTANCE OF WHICH WOULD INDEED AMOUNT TO A VIRTUAL SURRENDER ON THE PART OF DIEM AND NGO DINH NHU. THE LATTER WILL PROBABLY GO PART WAY, HOWEVER, IN MEETING THE DESIRES OF THE MILITARY IN AN EFFORT TO DETER THE LATTER FROM ATTEMPTING AN EARLY COUP. THEIR TACTIC IS LIKELY TO BE ONE OF SEEKING TO ENMESH THE GENERALS IN TIME-CONSUMING NEGOTIATIONS RELATED TO THE PROSPECTIVE REVAMPING OF THE GOVERNMENT WITH A VIEW TOWARD GAINING TIME IN WHICH TO MONITOR AND BREAK UP ANY COUP COMBINATION WHICH MAY BE DEVELOPING. THE OUTCOME OF MANEUVERING BETWEEN DIEM AND NHU AND THE MILITARY DURING THE COMING FEW WEEKS, OR POSSIBLY EVEN DAYS, IS LIKELY TO BE OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE TO FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.4.  DESPITE THE IMPRESSION OF THE RETURN TO NORMALITY THAT IS BEING FOSTERED BY THE REGIME, THE ATMOSPHERE IN SAIGON CONTINUES TO BE PERVADED TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE BY FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY. ARRESTS REPORTEDLY ARE CONTINUING, AS WELL ASC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/ CONTROLLED DISSEM
[176-10036-10137.pdf — page 3]
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED TDCSDB-3/657,133 IN 33775DISSEM PAGE THREESEARCHES OF PRIVATE HOMES BY THE SECURITY FORCES.5.  THERE ARE SCATTERED INDICATIONS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) IS    PLANNING TO SPRING SOME SURPRISES ON THE 26 OCTOBER NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS.    NHU, FOR EXAMPLE, IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD THE GENERALS THAT IN A FEW WEEKS HE    WOULD UNDERTAKE AN UNSPECIFIED ACTION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL NATURE WHICH NEITHER    "THE WEALTHY NOR THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE..". WE ALSO HAVE A REPORT THAT SWEEPING    CHANGES IN THE POLICE AND CIVIL INTELLIGENCE COMPLEX WILL OCCUR. MORE FRIVOLOUS    BUT PERHAPS SUGGESTIVE OF THE DESIRE BY THE REGIME TO EASE THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE    IN SAIGON ARE THE RUMORS THAT THE BAN ON DANCING WILL BE LIFTED. NATIONAL DAY    WOULD BE THE LOGICAL TIME FOR DIEM TO ANNOUNCE REVAMPING OF HIS GOVERNMENT, PROVIDEI    THIS DELICATE OPERATION CAN BE COMPLETED IN TIME.6.  A STRIKING THING ABOUT THE ELECTIONS WAS THE FACT THAT THEY WENT OFF    VIRTUALI.Y WITHOUT INCIDENT, EITHER IN SAIGON OR IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. THERE HAD    BEEN SEVERAL INDICATIONS THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) INTENDED DISRUPTION AS A COMPANION    TACTIC TO THEIR PROPAGANDA CALL FOR THE BOYCOTT OF THE ELECTIONS. NEITHER DURING    THE ELECTIONS, NOR DURING THE PRECEDING BUDDHIST CRISIS, DID THE COMMUNISTS SEEM    ABLE TO CAPITALIZE ON THEIR IMMEDIATE OPPORTUNITIES. ESPECIALLY LACKING WAS THE    EXERCISE OF THEIR MUCH VAUNTED CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM, RAISING SOME QUESTION    WAS    IN OUR MINDS AS TO WHETHER VC ABILITY TO USE TERRORISM IN CITIES/AS GREAT AS WE    HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE. IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO MEASURE THE SUCCESS OF    THE VC BOYCOTT APPEAL. SINCE THE GVN IN MANY AREAS MORE OR LESS FORCED THE ELECTORATE    TO VOTE AND IN AREAS WHERE ITS CONTROL WAS NOT THAT STRONG, THE REGIME ALMOST...    CERTAINLY FALSIFIED THE PERCENTAGES OF THE VOTE.C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM
[176-10036-10137.pdf — page 4]
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS.NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/ TDCS DB-3/657,133C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEMIN 33775PAGE FOUR7. ONE INDICATION OF THE REGIME'S INCREASED CONFIDENCE THAT IT HAS THE   SITUATION UNDER CONTROL IS THE FACT THAT COLONEL TUNG HAS RELEASED TWO COMPANIES   OF SPECIAL FORCES TROOPS FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC.8. ALTHOUGH MOMENTARILY QUIESCENT BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY GVN SECURITY CONTROLS,   THE STUDENTS CONTINUE THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND ARE DEVELOPING. PLANS FOR   FURTHER ACTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THERE APPEARS TO BE CONSIDERABLE DIVISION   OF OPINION AMONG THE VARIOUS STUDENT GROUPS, SOME OF WHICH EXISTED PRIOR TO THE   BUDDHIST CRISIS AND SOME HAVE SINCE EMERGED. REPORTING RECEIVED TO DATE WOULD   INDICATE THAT THE VC HAVE NOT YET MADE SIGNIFICANT INROADS INTO THE STUDENT MOVE-   MENT, ALTHOUGH THIS IS OF COURSE AN INCREASING POSSIBILITY IF RELATIONS BETWEEN   THE STUDENTS AND THE GVN LONG REMAIN IN THEIR PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY STATE. IN   PARTICULAR, WE HAVE LITTLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE THESIS THAT THE STUDENTS ARE   TO   FLEEING/THE COUNTRYSIDE TO JOIN THE VC ALTHOUGH SOME REPORTEDLY DID LEAVE SAIGON   AND HUE TO AVOID ARREST DURING THE PERIOD OF THE GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN.9. A REPORT FROM A VIETNAMESE TRADE UNION OFFICIAL PROVIDES ADDITIONAL   BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE NHU-MANELI MEETING IN EARLY SEPTEMBER AND ON THE   GENERAL SUBJECT OF POSSIBLE GVN-DRV RAPPROCHEMENT. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION   RECEIVED BY THE SOURCE FROM A FRENCH EMBASSY OFFICER, HO CHI MINH HAD AT ONE TIME   INDICATED TO A FORMER FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE IN NORTH VIETNAM HIS DISCOURAGEMENT   OVER CASUALTIES SUSTAINED IN THE WAR IN THE SOUTH, HIS DISTASTE FOR THE CHINESE   PRESENCE IN THE DRV, AND HIS RESTIVENESS OVER SOVIET "INTERFERENCE" OF AN   UNSPECIFIED NATURE. LALOUETTE. WAS REPORTED TO HAVE PASSED THIS ON TO NHƯ WHO,C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LCLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS:NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM
[176-10036-10137.pdf — page 5]
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD TDCS DB-3/657,133BACKGROUND. USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM IN 33775PAGE FIVEACCORDING TO THE FRENCH, LEAKED IT TO JOSEPH ALSOP, THUS BETRAYING THE CONFIDENTIALFRENCH CONVERSATION WITH HO. THE FRENCH ALLEGEDLY FEEL THIS PUT LALOUETTE IN ANUNTENABLE POSITION; HENCE, HIS FAILURE TO RETURN TO SAIGON. IT IS DIFFICULT TOBELIEVE THAT THE FRENCH REALLY CONSIDER NHU'S "INDISCRETION" AS SERIOUS, AS THEY LET:ON. SOURCE CLAIMS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT MANELI TOLD NHU PRRCTICALLY THE SAME STORYABOUT HO'S PREOCCUPATIONS.10. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR, DCM), USMACV (HARKINS), CINCPAC, PACFLT,    PACAF, ARPAC.END OF MESSAGEC-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM
[176-10036-10138.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM## IDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10138RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER:ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM: CIATO: DirnsaTITLE:DATE: 10/9/1963PAGES: 3SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE:CLASSIFICATION:RESTRICTIONS:CURRENT STATUS:DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam, 10/6/1963-10/14/63, CIA Reports. Box 2
[176-10036-10138.pdf — page 1]
SF1010 ..... 1963 OCT 9 15 3300 ESFDE ESI 09/1520Z OCTO 091448Z ZYHFM CIATO DIRNSASTATE RCI (HUGHES)JCSCNO (OP922Y1)AFSSO USAFDIA/CIICNICDFI/ACSIWHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOMZEMSECRET NOFORNSECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO SIDDEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLYCOUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAMSUBJECT PLANS OF GOVERNMENT TO ASSASSINATE AMBASSADOR: LODGE, OTHER HIGH EMBASSY OFFICIALS, AND THICHTRI QUANG, AND BURN THE CHANCERYDATE OF INFO. 8 OCTOBER 1963PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (8OCTOBER 1963)APPRISAL SEE BELOWREPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/657,149DATE DISTR. 9 OCTOBER 1963PRECEDENCE PRIORITYRIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9753THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE.APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE A MEDIUM LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (C) WITH EXTENSIVECONTACTS AMONG GOVERNMENT LEADERS.![list of names, Forrestal, Johnson, Klein, Komer, Parrott, Schlesinger, Press Office, File]
[176-10036-10138.pdf — page 2]
ITS REPRESENTATIVES. STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, EITHER GVN-SPONSOREDOR INDEPENDENTLY ORGANIZED, MAY TAKE PLACE. THE OTHER ASPECTSOF THIS REPORT ARE VIEWED WITH SKEPTICISM.1. SUMMARY. ON 8 OCTOBER 1963 NGUYEN DUY BACH, CHIEF OF THE   POLITICAL BUREAU, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES), SAID THAT   GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AUGHORITIES WERE PLANNING TO ALLOW A   STUDENT DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY CHANCERY   UNDER COVER OF WHICH ABOUT 100 GVN AGENTS WOULD ATTACK THE EMBASSY   AND ASSASSINATE AMBASSADOR HENRY CABOT LODGE AND OTHER HIGH-RANKING   EMBASSY OFFICIALS AFTER WHICH THE CHANCERY WOULD BE SET AFIRE.2. ON 8 OCTOBER 1963 BACH SAID THAT EARLIER ON THE SAME DAY   A DELEGATION OF STUDENTS HAD INFORMED HIM THAT THEY WERE ORGANIZING   A DEMONSTRATION WHICH THEY HOPED WOULD TAKE PLACE IN FRONT OF THE   AMERICAN EMBASSY CHANCERY WITHIN "THE NEXT FEW DAYS" DURING OFFICE   HOURS AND PROBABLY IN THE MORNING. THE STUDENTS PLANNED TO PRESENT   A STATEMENT TO AMBASSADOR LODGE PROTESTING THE REPRESSION OF   STUDENTS AND OTHER YOUNG PEOPLE BY THE GVN. (FIELD COMMENT.   FVS-9749, (NOT YET RECEIVED), FROM A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE,   REPORTED THE ARREST OF 130 SAIGON STUDENTS ON THE NIGHT OF 7 OCTOBER   BY SPECIAL POLICE.) THE STUDENTS ALSO TOLD BACK (AND BACH SAID   THAT HE HAD CONFIRMATION FROM OTHER UNIDENTIFIED SOURCES) THAT   NGO DINH NHU, MINISTER OF CIVIC ACTION NGO TRONG HIEU, AND COMMANDER
[176-10036-10138.pdf — page 3]
OF EMBASSY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS MELVIN L. MANFULL, AND SPECIALASSISTANTS MESSRS. FREDERICK W. FLOTT AND JOHN M. DUNN, AS WELLAS THICH TRI QUANG, BUDDHIST LEADER CURRENTLY LIVING IN THE CHANCERY.THE GVN AGENTSWOULD THEN BURN THE CHANCERY.3. BACH REMARKED THAT NORMALLY THE GUN PERMITTED NO DEMON-   STRATIONS BUT, BECAUSE OF THE PLANNED INFILTRATION OF GVN AGENTS,   THE. GUN WOULD ALLOW THIS PARTICULAR (PORTION GARBLED - BEING   SERVICED) (X) DEMONSTRATION BUT THEY WERE CONFIDENT THAT THEY COULD   CONTROL THE SITUATION.4. (FIELD COMMENT. AN UNTESTED SOURCE REPORTED ON 8 OCTOBER   THAT A NUMBER OF POLICE WERE GOING TO MASQUERADE AS STUDENTS   AND DEMONSTRATE IN FRONT OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE   BUILDING.)5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE), USMACV (GENERAL   HARKINS), CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.6. (X) HEADQUARTERS COMMENTAC MISSING PORTION WILL BE DIS-   SEMINATED ONLY IF IT MATERIALLY AFFECTS THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.SCP-15000> [Figure: A "SECRET NOFORN" stamp]NNNN> [Figure: A timestamp indicating the document was received on October 9, 1953, at 11:34.]
[176-10036-10139.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10139RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM :TO :TITLE: CIA Information ReportDATE: 10/15/1963PAGES: 2SUBJECTS :DOCUMENT TYPE :CLASSIFICATION :RESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam, 10/6/1963-10/14/63, CIAReports. Box 2
[176-10036-10139.pdf — page 1]
TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person in prohibited by law.CONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMCOUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM REPORT NO. TDCS-3/562,014SUBJECT RECOMMENDATION BY CABINET OFFICERS THAT DATE DISTR. 15 OCTOBER 1963NHU BE MADE PRIME MINISTERDATE OF EARLY OCTOBER 1963 PRECEDENCE ROUTINEINFO.PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (8 OCTOBER 1963) REFERENCES IN 39851DATE ACO.APPRAISAL SEE BELOW FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-9764SOURCE A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN VIETNAMESE POLITICAL CIRCLES, FROM CUONG.APPRAISAL: THE CABINET OFFICERS MAY HAVE MADE SUCH A RECOMMENDAT ION.1. SUMMARY. ON 8 OCTOBER 1963 NGUYEN HOANG CUONG, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, SAID THAT ON 5 OCTOBER VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN NGOC THO TOLD HIM THAT AT A MEETING OF CABINET OFFICERS IN EARLY OCTOBER IT WAS DECIDED TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT DIEM THAT NGO DINH NHU BE APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER. CUONG SAID THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD BE VOTED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.2. ON 5 OCTOBER VICE PRESIDENT THO TOLD CUONG THAT IN EARLY OCTOBER HE HAD CALLED A MEETING OF ALL CABINET MEMBERS TOCONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMSTATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR 00 EXOSTATE/DIRTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMFORM 1KA OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS,
[176-10036-10139.pdf — page 2]
CONFIDENTIALNO FOREIGN DISSEMTDCS-3/562,014IN 39851PAGE2DISCUSS THE STATUS OF NGO DINH NHU IN THE GOVERNMENT. THO SAID THAT THE CABINET DECIDED TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT DIEM THAT NHU BE APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER, REASONING THAT IF THE PRESIDENT DID NOT INTEND TO REDUCE NHU'S INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE LATTER'S APPOINTMENT TO AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT POST WOULD AT LEAST MAKE HIM ACCOUNTABLE FOR HIS ACTIONS.2. ON 8 OCTOBER CUONG SAID THAT IF THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTED THIS SUGGESTION, A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED BUT THAT THIS WOULD POSE NO PROBLEM AS THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD VOTE THE CHANGE WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.3: FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD STA 2ND AIR DIV. CINPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.END OF MESSAGECONFIDENTIALNO FOREIGN DISSEMCON NUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT
[176-10036-10142.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10142RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER:ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE: CIA Information ReportDATE: 9/24/1963PAGES: 4SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE:CLASSIFICATION:RESTRICTIONS:CURRENT STATUS:DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam, 9/22/63-10/6/63, CIA Reports. Box 2
[176-10036-10142.pdf — page 1]
# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS**SECRET**(When Filled In)COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAMNO FOREIGN DISSEMINO DISSEN ABROADBACKGROUND USE ONLYSUBJECT HUYNH VAN LANG COUP MOVE TIMINGREPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/656,830DATE DISTR. 24 SEPTEMBER 1963PRECEDENCE PRIORITYDATE OF 24 SEPTEMBER 1963REFERENCES IN 25834INFO.PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (24 SEPTEMBER 1963)DATE ACO.APPRAISAL SEE BELOWFIELD REPORT NO. Fvs-9691THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE A CLOSE ASSOCIATE (C) OF HUYNH VAN LANG, FROM LANG.APPRAISAL: THERE HAVE BEEN MANY REPORTS INDICATING THAT A COUP IS BEING PLANNED AND SOME OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN AGREES WITH THAT IN OTHER REPORTS. CLAIMS OF SUPPORT INDICATED HEREIN CANNOT BE ACCURATELY APPRAISED AT THIS TIME, NOR CAN THE ACTUAL TIMING OF THE COUP.1. SUMMARY. HUYNH VAN LANG, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AT SAIGON UNIVERSITY, SAID ON 24 AUGUST 1963 THAT HIS COUP GROUP WAS GOING TO LAUNCH A COUP BEFORE 5 OCTOBER AND PROBABLY ON 26 OR 28 SEPTEMBER BECAUSE TROOPS WILL BE IN SAIGON AT THAT TIME. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE NOW INCLUDES GENERALS TRAN THIEN KHIEM, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, NGUYEN KHANH, COMMANDING GENERAL OF 11 CORPS, AND DUONG VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT. EVERY EFFORT IS BEING TAKEN TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTENSIVE BLOODSHED. LANG CLAIMS TO HAVE. SIX DIVISIONS**SECRET**CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMINO DISSEN ABROADBACKGROUND USE ONLYSTATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NICSTATE/DIRAID USIA OC I ONE OCR ORR EXOTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMFORM 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.(15-20)
[176-10036-10142.pdf — page 2]
SECRET(When Filled In)CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSTDCS DB-3/656,830IN 25834PAGE 2PLUS AIRBORNE, MARINE, AND ARMOR ELEMENTS READY TO PARTICIPATE INTHE COUP. BRIGADIER GENERAL DO CAO TRI IS ALSO WORKING WITH THEGROUP.2. LANG MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE STATUS OF THE COUP:A. IT IS TO BE INITIATED BEFORE 5 OCTOBER, POSSIBLY ON 26OR 28 SEPTEMBER. TROOPS WILL BE BROUGHT INTO SAIGON ON 26 SEPTEMBERFOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION. MILITARY UNITS WILL REHEARSEON 28 SEPTEMBER FOR THE 26 OCTOBER NATIONAL DAY PARADE, AND THESETROOPS WILL REMAIN UNTIL 5 OCTOBER. GENERAL KHIEM WAS TRYING TOARRANGE THAT HE TROOPS BROUGHT TO SAIGON WOULD BE THOSE WHO WOULDSUPPORT A COUP.B. NO COUP HAS BEEN INITIATED AS YET BECAUSE EVERY EFFORTIS BEING TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT IT BE RELATIVELY BLOODLESS.LONE ATTEMPT WAS CANCELLED AT THE POINT OF EXECUTION BECAUSE ITWAS THOUGHT THAT FURTHER PREPARATION WOULD PREVENT BLOODSHED.C. A MAJOR PROBLEM IS THE LACK OF SUITABLE EXPLOSIVES TOBLAST A CONCRETE BUNKER WHERE PRESIDENT DIEM IS EXPECTED TO HIDE.THE ONLY OPENING TO THE BUNKER, OTHER THAN A HEAVY DOOR, IS THEVENTILATION SYSTEM AND THE COUP GROUP HESITATES TO USE FLAMETHROWERS OR POISON GAS BECAUSE THEY PREFER TO TAKE DIEM ALIVE.D. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE NOW INCLUDES LANG AND GENERALSKHIEM, KHANH, AND DUONG VAN MINH. GENERAL TRI HAS AGREED TO JOINCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSSECRET
[176-10036-10142.pdf — page 3]
SECRET(When Filled In)THE COUP ATTEMPT. COLONEL BUI DINH DAM, SEVENTH DIVISION COMMANDER,IS BELIEVED READY TO SUPPORT THE COUP BUT HAD NOT BEEN CONTACTED.COLONEL NGUYEN HUU HANH, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE IV CORPS, WHO IS ACOUR GROUP MEMBER, BELIEVES THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL HUYNH VANCAOIV CORPS COMMANDER, WOULD SUPPORT THE COUP SUT OTHER GROUPMEMBERS ARE NOT CONVINCED.E. GENERAL KHIEM WILL COMMAND THE COUP FORCES. MAJOR LAMTRANG THO, FORMER SECOND ARMOR SQUADRON COMMANDER AND NOW WITH THEJOINT GENERAL STAFF, WILL COMMAND ARMOR UNITS, INCLUDING SOME ELEMENTSOF 115 OLD SQUADRON PLUS THE FIRST TANK COMPANY AND THE FIFTHMECHANIZED RIFLE COMPANY OF THE FIRST ARMOR SQUADRON.F. THREE BATTALIONS OF THE AIRBORNE BRIGADE UNDER A MAJOR.WILL. JOIN ARMOR UNITS IN THE SHOCK FORCE.G. THE THIRD MARINE BATTALION UNDER CAPTAIN MAHVIET BANGWILL SERVE AS A BLOCKING FORCE TO PREVENT REINFORCEMENT OF THEPRESIDENTAL PALACE BY THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD.H. LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, STRATEGIC HAMLETINSPECTOR FOR 10 DINH NHU, WILL NOT COMMAND THE SHOCK TROOPS BUTWILL HAVE AN IM ORTANT MILITARY FUNCTION DURING THE COUP.I. LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN DINH PHAT, KIEN PHONG PROVINCECHIEF, WILL COME TO SAIGON AND ALSO HAVE AN IMPORTANTROLE.SECRET
[176-10036-10142.pdf — page 4]
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSSECRET(When Filled In)TDCSDB-3/656,830 IN 25834PAGE 4J. MAJOR NGUYEN VAN TU, COMMANDER OF THE EIGHTH REGIMENT, FIFTH DIVISION, WILL SUPPORT THE COUP WITH HIS FORCES. ALSO INVOLVED IS THE FIFTH RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY OF THE FIFTH DIVISION.K. GENERAL KHANH WILL COMMAND SIX DIVISIONS, ASSISTED BY GENERAL TRI. THESE DIVISIONS INCLUDE THE FIRST, SECOND, TWENTY-SECOND, TWENTY-FIFTH, TWENTY-THIRD, AND THE NINTH. ACCORDING TO KHANH, COLONEL BUI DZINH, NINTH DIVISION COMMANBER, IS NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH HIM BUT WILL SUPPORT HIM IN THE COUP.L. TIMING FOR THE COUP WILL PROBABLY BE 1000 HOURS, 1400 HOURS, OR Ø500 HOURS, SO THAT FAVORABLE UNITS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD WILL BE ON DUTY. THESE HOURS ALSO FALL BETWEEN THE NORMAL HOURS FOR CHANGING THE GUARD.M. ARRIVAL OF HIGH-LEVEL. UNITED STATES DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS DISCOURAGED THE COUP GROUP WHICH IS RELUCTANT TO PROCEED WITH THEM PRESENT IN SAIGON. THE GROUP HAS EVEN SPECULATED THE ARRIVAL OF THESE INDIVIDUALS MIGHT SIGNIFY THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARING A COUP OF ITS OWN; ARTICLES IN THE VIETNAM PRESS WERE CITED AS EVIDENCE OF THIS POSSIBILITY.3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.END OF MESSAGESECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[176-10036-10143.pdf — page 0]
176-10036-10143 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992## JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10143RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM :TO :TITLE: CIA Information ReportDATE: 9/24/1963PAGES : 4SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE :CLASSIFICATION :RESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/22/63-10/6/63, CIA Reports. Box 2