Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[178-10002-10215.pdf — page 38]
SECRET37Treasury Department you have the extra-territorialty clausein there where a subsidiary of an American company cannot --foreign subsidiary of an American company cannot trade withthe country that is designated and Cuba was a designated country.And all the businessmen were well aware of this. Nobody triedto twist their arm.Q Other than insuring that these companies refusedto accept orders from Cuba, which I take it you feel they werelegally constrained from doing, what other types of support didyou receive from American business?A Well, if American business -- sometimes they wouldreceive correspondence, particularly, say, from -- well, theyreceived it from Cuba asking for..publications and this typeof thing. They would normally forward all this type of thingto the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department, or insome instances they might call me and I would just give thema Post Office box to send the correspondence to.Q Any other types of support solicited or received bythe Agency from American business?A No. Not that I can recall. There just wasn't onefirm we approached, and God knows we approached I don't knowhow many, that wasn't extremely cooperative. As a matter offact, a lot of them, you know, thought we weren't doing enough,that we ought to do a little more than we were doing, thegovernment wasn't really pushing Cuba the way it should, butSECRETPhotocopy fromGerald Ford Library
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# SECRET1 outside of that, nothing. There wasn't any problem of coopera-2 tion. There wasn't any arm-twisting. It was all voluntary.3 Q Did you identify yourself as CIA4 A Yes.5 Q -- in dealings with these companies?6 A Indeed, I do and we went to the top level, even7 the Board Chairman or the president. No problem at all.8 Q Let's talk about paramilitary operations. We started9 but didn't really discuss that in any depth.10 What kind of paramilitary operations were run11 against Cuba by the CIA?12 A Maritime operations.13 Q Is that the extent of it?14 A That is the extent of it.15 Q Were there any aerial operations?16 A Not to my knowledge.17 Q Leaflet drops?18 A No.19 Q Bombing?20 A No. Of course, you had the over-flights. As far as21 I am concerned that is the only aerial activity.22 Q That was run by another directorate, wasn't it?23 A Yes.24 Q Aerial photography, and so forth.25 A Yes. They run a flight when you ask them. It has toSECRETPhotocopy fromGerald Ford Library
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SECRET391 be requested and that is about it.2 Q And those were run out of the United States?3 A Oh, yes.4 Q Can you think of anything, any other type of para-5 military activity other than maritime operations.6 A No. I really can't, no.7 Q Am I correct that those operations were manned8 by CIA contract employees?9 A Right.10 Q Which would include Cuban refugees.11 A Right.12 Q. And some CIA officers?13 A Right.14 Q Any other branches of the services, Armed Services,15 involved? This, of course, is posted Bay of Pigs.16 A Yes. No, not to my knowledge. You have got to remember17 that probably down at our Domestic Training Station we18 probably have people on detail from other -- from the military19 branches in the Government, but other than that I don't think20 that -- of course, during the Bay of Pigs operation we also21 had people detailed into the Agency.22 Q Now, the training of persons involved in maritime23 operations, I take it, was conducted in part within the24 United States and in part outside of the United States. Is25 that correct?Photocopy fromGerald Ford LibrarySECRET
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SECRET1 A I would think probably the major portion of it was conducted within the United States.2 Q The Keys would be considered within the United States.5 A Oh, yes.6 Q Or were there any locations where it was conducted outside the United States?8 A Following the Bay of Pigs, I don't think so. Not to my knowledge. I just don't know, I just don't recall but I don't think that -- I think all the training was done domestically.12 Q Now, what kinds of operations are included within this category of maritime operations?14 A Well, the infiltration operations, infiltrating agents into Cuba, exfiltrating agents, hit and run sabotage raids. That is about the extent of it.17 Q Now, when did these operations commence? Was it shortly after the Bay of Pigs?.19 A I would -- I think these operations were probably at their height during the period about 1963 through, say, 1967. The program was terminated in 1968, I think in December 1968, something like that.23 Q Why was the program terminated?24 A First of all, it was too expensive. It wasn't providing enough intelligence and it simply wasn't -- economically,SECRETPhotocopy fromGerald Ford Library
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# SECRET1 it wasn't feasible to continue these things. The agents were2 getting wrapped up. We were -- we just felt that the return3 wasn't sufficient for what the investment was.4 Q You say the agents were getting wrapped up.5 A Yes.6 Q What do you mean by that?7 A When we infiltrated an agent, Cubans would identify8 him and capture him.9 Q These various types of paramilitary operations that10 were conducted by the Agency I trust were approved by the11 Forty Committee?12 A Every operation received a specific approval from13 the Forty Committee.14 Q In advance?15 A In advance.16 Q Now, what was the procedure for submitting -- for17 initiating such an operation?18 A Well, normally in the case of an infil or an exfil.19 or perhaps we wanted to lay down the cache.20 Q You are referring to a cache of arms.21 A A cache of anything, replay of radio, batteries,22 whatever they might need. If we decided that we should have23 one of these operations and the request would go from here24 over to the, I guess to the White House and then the Forty25 Committee at its weekly meeting -- they used to meet very# SECRETPhotocopy fromGerald Ford Library
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SECRET                                                                                               421 frequently -- they would either approve the operation or say2 no. These operations had to be planned well in advance because3 the tides had to be right, the moon had to be in the proper4 phase for communications and this type of thing. And these5 things, all these were coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of6 Staff, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the FBI. If we were7 exiltrating people, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.8 Every Government agency or enforcement agency or military9 agency that had any involvement whatsoever, and the entire10 thing was coordinated.11 Q Do you know of any such paramilitary operations12 that were run unbeknownst to the Forty Committee?13 A No.14 Q What kind of volume of operations are we talking15 about?16 A You are not talking about a very big volume of17 operations because of the planning that had to go into these18 things. I would say that probably at the height of the thing19 they may be running three or four a month. No more than that.20 Q You have heard Eugenio Martinez refer to having21 run 300 operations.22 A I have seen that.23 Q Is that inaccurate?24 A Well, it all depends on what is in his mind. He25 may have considered some of the training exercises as opera-
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# SECRET431 tions. Obviously, these guys trained. In order to run one2 of these operations, you know, you would have to have a mother3 ship in place and rubber boats and the UDT people to go in to4 see if there were mines and this type of thing on the shore5 before you go. So he may have considered that all these train-6 ing exercises were operations but no way did he ever partici-7 pate in any three or 400 active operations into Cuba.8 Q Now, from what specific locations were these9 operations launched?10 A They were mostly launched from the Keys.11 Q Any other locations?12 A Not to my knowledge.13 Q Now, would you describe for me the kind of hit and14 run sabotage operations that were conducted?15 A Well, we conducted one hit and run sabotage against16 the Texaco refinery.17 Q What used to be the Texaco refinery?18 A What used to be the Texaco refinery.19 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.20 (Discussion off the record.)21 THE WITNESS: These things, a great amount of planning22 went into these things. We did have a model of the refinery.23 We agonized over the best approach to the refinery and this24 type of thing to do the most effective damage. This was run. It25 was successful, as I recall, not totally successful but it was# SECRETPhotocopy fromGerald Ford Library
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# SECRETa successful operation. By that, I mean they didn't do as much damage as they wanted to because they had to get out because the Cuban defense came after them. It was that type of operation that we did.As I recall, another time we took a team in to burn some cane fields. Really, the classical operations that we did in the maritime activities were the infiltrations and exfiltrations.Q Were any CIA operations run out of Guantanamo?A Not to my knowledge.Q Was it impractical to use the base there for --A Well, the base is so surrounded and has been that I think if a guy went through that fence you would carry him back. He wouldn't walk.MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.(Discussion off the record.)MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.BY MR. MANFREDI:Q Are there any other categories of sabotage run out of the Keys other than what you have just described?A Well, we did lay down a cache, if you will, sabotage kits to be used by our own island agents. They contained sugar to dump into gas tanks and metal fragments to put down crank cases. Things of this nature.One of our main objects was to, of course, sabotage# SECRETPhotocopy fromGerald Ford Library
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SECRET45all the oil. We did that with a big operation. We made our own oil, substandard. Additives, I should say, not oil. We contracted with an American firm for that. And we shipped it in through third countries in Europe. It did hit the target.The thing we wanted to get at was the oil and the automotive machinery on the island. We knew it was breaking down and if we could get a complete breakdown we would have everything at a standstill because in those days the automotive equipment wasn't coming in that rapidly from Europe because Castro didn't hve the money to buy it and they weren't going to extend the credit.The railroad system was in total disaster. The Soviets had such a long logistics line, supply line, plus the fact that the Cubans didn't like the Soviet equipment because they were used to good American equipment. And these were principal targets that we were trying to get to.Q In your experience at the Agency can you think of any other analogus or similar paramilitary operations run from a base in the United States?A No.Q I know there has been some paramilitary training in the United States.A Oh, yes.Q In connection with other operations.A Oh, sure.SECRETPhotocopy fromGerald Ford Library
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SECRET1 Q But do you know of any paramilitary operations that2 were actually run out of the United States?3 A No.4 Q As far as you know, then, this is a totally unique5 situation.6 A As far as I am concerned, it is, yes.7 Q Now, how large a Navy was actually organized in8 Miami? On a previous occasion you described this to me as9 the third largest Navy in the Caribbean.10 A That is right.11 Q What kind of equipment did these people have?12 A Well, we had -- honestly, everything from a canoe13 up to three to 500 foot mother ship. We had Boston whalers,14 rubber boats. We had a number of craft in, say, the 27 to15 45 foot length. And they looked like real tubs. They were16 painted and they looked like they wouldn't even float but17 they had the fastest engines in them. They could outrun any-18 thing. They were extremely well armed. We had our under-19 water demolition teams. We had a pretty good.Navy.20 Q Did these craft operate under non-official cover21 in the Miami area?22 A Yes.23 Q Were there a variety of covers or was there one24 firm?25 A No. Variety.SECRET
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SECRET471 Q Fishing companies?2 A Well, fishing companies, Geodetic Survey, marine3 supply. In all, I think during the period that the station4 and these other entities were under commercial cover, or non-5 official cover, I think we had 100 so cover companies.6 Q Did any of these companies actually engage in any7 legitimate commercial activities?8 A Not to my knowledge, no.9 Q None of them -- were any of them in competition with10 firms in that area?11 A These are probably what we would call devised12 facilities. They were probably registered with the State of13 Florida and they paid taxes and this type of thing, but if one14 was blown or became known, we just crossed that out of15 existence and started up a new one.16 Q What did Eugenio Martinez do when he wasn't running17 these operations?18 A Well, he was down -- this is one of the reasons, as19 I told you before, we brought him back and put him under that20 contract, that retainer, because of the years that he spent21 under such strict operational discipline down in the Keys.22 Obviously, he didn't stay down there all the time. He23 came back -- he might come back once a month, or something24 like that, to see his family, perhaps once every two weeks25 if he got some time off.SECRETPhotocopy fromGerald Ford Library
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SECRET1 Q I see. So some of these boats and personnel were2 actually stationed full-time in the Keys.3 A Oh, yes. Oh, sure.4 Q Were there any operations run out of the United5 States which involved destruction of crops or poisoning of6 sugar or anything of that sort?7 A What did you have in mind specifically? You mean the8 Puerto Rican thing?9 A Well, that is one of the things I had in mind.10 Would you describe that for me?11 A Well, this is, I guess you could term it a target of12 opportunity. This was where a vessel was carrying Cuban sugar13 to the Soviet Union and I forget exactly now what happened to14 it but I know that it got a hole below the waterline, or15 something, and had to put into Puerto Rico for repairs.16 In order to repair it, I guess, and get it in the17 drydock or wherever it was, they had to remove the sugar and18 put it in the warehouse and at that time I guess somebody came19 up with a plan to try to widen the rift between -- there was20 a rift at that time between the Soviets and Cubans and to21 put a harmless substance into the sugar that would make it22 acid, sour tasting, and it wouldn't harm the sugar or the23 individual, and some of this was done. And then when it24 leaked, of course, we had to get rid of it and we had a sugar25 firm buy it back from the Soviets.SECRET
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# SECRET1 Q Bought it back from the Soviets?2 A Yes.3 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.4 (Discussion off the record.)5 MR.MANFREDI: Back on the record.6 BY MR. MANFREDI:7 Q Are there any other operations in which crops were8 -- were there attempts to destroy crops in Cuba?9 A No. No.10 Q Place foreign substances in Cuban products?11 A In Cuban products?12 Q Yes.13 A No. Not that I recall. You see, Cuba really -- in14 those days the only thing, Cuba was exporting sugar and nickel.15 The agriculture sector of the economy was in absolutely totalchaos. God, they didn't have any citrus, they didn't have17 anything, and the poor people in Cuba were literally starving.18 There just wasn't anything to eat. And Fidel was going around19 with this big plan -- of course, there were a number of20 experimental cattle ranches in Cuba. King Ranch had one there.21 I forget -- several other European and American companies that22 had experimental cattle ranches there and they were experiment-23 ing with the, you know, cross-breeding and this type of thing.24 Fidel was preoccupied with this. He went up to25 Canada and paid $100,000 for a bull and -- so he just put it# SECRET![Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library]
[178-10002-10215.pdf — page 51]
SECRET                                                                              501 on an old Cuban Airways airplane. The damn airplane few too2 high and the bull became sterile by the time he landed in3 Cuba. No thought given to, you know, pressurizing the cabin4 and keeping the temperature at a certain point and this type5 of thing. So he was helping us all along the line and6 this here again, we generate propaganda, incompetence and this7 type of thing.8 But as far as sabotaging any Cuban product, no, we9 didn't go into that. Our object was to enforce the blockade10 and cut off his sources of supply.11 Q     When was the Miami Station established?12 A     As a station?13 Q     Yes.14 A     I think in September 1961.15 Q     And that was several years before you became involved16 in Cuban matters?17 A     Yes.18 Q     Do you know of any other facilities of that nature19 within the United States, Agency facilities?20 A     You mean, targeted against the opposition?21 Q     Yes.22 A     A station as such?23 Q     Yes.24 A     No. You have some communications facilities that25 you really call stations because here again, they are notSECRET                                                                                Photocopy fromGerald Ford Library
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## SECRET1 directed towards any domestic activity. They are in support of2 overseas communications.3 Q Of course, we have FR bases and DCD offices and4 Office of Security officers, and so forth.5 A Right.6 Q But I am talking about actual stations.7 A Operating stations, no.8 Q This is the only such station in the United States9 as far as you know, is that correct?10 A Right.11 Q And was this station established to deal primarily12 with Cuban activities?13 A Yes.14 Q Cuban-related matters?15 A With Cuba, period.16 Q Did it have, when it was established, any other17 responsibilities with respect to Western Hemisphere activities?18 A Not to my knowledge.19 Q Entirely limited, then, to Cuban activities?20 A Yes, and in support of Cuban activity and other21 countries in the Hemisphere.22 Q When you joined the group dealing with Cuban23 activities, what was the size or the number of personnel24 attached to that Station?25 A To that Station? Well, the Station had probably acouple
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SECRET1 couple hundred staffers there, full-time employees of the2 Agency, plus I don't know how many contract employees,3 independent contractors, probably another 200 minimum. It was4 obviously the largest installation we had. I think at its5 height it had over 500 people in it.6 Q Full-time Agency people?7 A No, no.8 Q Combination of contract and --9 A And full-time, yes. A regular employee we call a staff10 employee.11 Q Now, would Martinez have been one of those contract12 people?13 A Yes.14 Q Even though he was located down in the Keys?15 A Oh, yes.16 Q And what kind of facilities did the Station have in17 Miami? Physical facilities.18 A Well, they were located on the south campus of the19 University of Florida, I mean, the University of Miami, at20 the old Richmond Naval Air Station. It was a self-contained21 unit. It was pretty well off the beaten path, in fact, damn22 well off the beaten path. It was about four miles from the23 Dixie Highway inland. We had our own guard force.24 Q Official cover?25 A No. Non-official.Photocopy fromGerald Ford LibrarySECRET
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## SECRETQ Non-official cover. What was the cover?A It was a commercial cover. It was called -- the first one was called Zenith Corporation and it was set up with a President and Vice President, normal corporate setup.Q Engaging in any business?A No.Q Now, in a community of that type, Cuban community, how long could a non-official cover last?A Well, obviously it didn't, but it was research activities. Funded -- it is a giant mechanism when you put one of these things in for the funding and this type of thing, for your ostensible customers, establishing bank accounts.Q Yes, I understand.A So it was a research activity and the only people that ever paid any attention to the place were the newspapers. You know, somebody would make an inquiry, you know, we can't accept any work, we are loaded with Government contracts and this type of thing, and it held up reasonably well. And out of this one thing, of course, then we were running these innumerable other covers with different activities. The guard force, of course, were like -- well, they wore uniforms, similar to the Pinkerton people and this type of thing. And I think that there was -- in the later days at that site I think the Department of Agriculture had offices in there and some other Government agencies, in other buildings, of course.SECRET
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SECRETQ And this particular Station, then, was under the supervision of the group we have been discussing?A Yes. They were staffed within the Cuban Operations.Q When did the Western Hemisphere Division resume responsibilities for the Miami Station?A Well, when Des. Fitzgerald left as Chief of the Special Activities Staff and became Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, he brought it back into the Division.Q Is there presently a Miami Station?A Oh, yes.Q And how large is it at the present time?A Well, since we -- I think when we closed down the Cuban Operations, I don't know how large it is at the present time because we are in one of these periods where we are reassigning people, but I think by the end of this fiscal year there are going to be between 11 and 14 people.Q When you joined the group in 1963, what functions were being performed by the Miami Station?A Well, all the classical intelligence functions. I think I have lined them out at one time -- collection of positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary, this type of thing. Covert action.Q This is the list of things you gave me earlier in the deposition?A Yes.Photocopy from Gerald Ford LibrarySECRET
[178-10002-10215.pdf — page 56]
SECRETQ Which of these activities, if any of them were actually being conducted within the Cuban community in Miami?A Well, the collection of foreign positive and probably counterintelligence.Q So the Agency was conducting counterintelligence activities in the Miami area?A Yes, sir.Q Can you give me an example of the kinds of counterintelligence activities that the Agency would be conducting in that area or was conducting in the area at that time?A Well, we had a number of joint operations, as I recall, with the Bureau. We had identified a Castro agent that came in by small boat and when she was -- she came in with a number of other people. When she hit the -- they had a reception center up in Opa Loca that was really a HEW operation. The Domestic Contact Division office had people out there and we did, too. Our people from the DDO were under Immigration and Naturalization Service cover. When the HEW people did the preliminary interrogation of these people they had to fill out forms, where were you born, this type of thing, biographic type thing. These forms would be passed to our people who would look at the forms and based on previous experience or what they might have been doing, and they felt that perhaps they might have some information of intelligence value, they would reinterrogate them.SECRETPhotocopy from Gerald Ford Library![photo of 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003]