Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 147]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:11/2/63DIEM1330 hoursNHUOCCURRENCE:> TOP SECRETLt. Colonel Thao and Lt. Hinh agreed that Diem and Nhu could have maintained telephone communications from the Cholon villa throughout the coup since lines ran from Gia Long Palace to Tan Son Nhut and from Thu Duc to the Cholon villa.SOURCE:STAFF:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One,Pages 24 - 25.DawsonDATE:FILE:6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:DIEMDON, GENERAL2 Nov 1963DIEMMINH, GENERALCONEINJGS headquartersOCCURRENCE:"According to one of CONEIN's reports, DIEM called GENERAL DON at 0650 hours 2 November and offered to surrender unconditionally. GENERAL MINH immediately ordered all telephones removed from rooms in their JGS command post area. This cut off all communication with the outside except for radios under MINH's control."> TOP SECRETSOURCE:STAFF:R. DAWSON
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 148]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:NHUDATES:Nov. 2, '631130 hoursCATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:1120 Lt. Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao said that he and his forcesseized Gia Long Palace during the early morning hours toreport Diem and Nhu to the JCS after their surrender.A search revealed they were not at the palace and had notbeen there during the coup. Thao reported back to the JGS.Villas in Saigon and Cholon known to be used by the NgoFamily were searched.SOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,Exhibit one, page 24.STAFF:DawsonDATE:6/30/75FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:IUDATES:11/2/631330 hoursCATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:Officer in J-2, JGS, reported that Diem and Nhu and anorderly were caught and killed by Quan's personnel at achurch in Cho Quan, Cholon. Captured with them wasCaptain Do Hai, a nephew of De Nhu, MRS Chief.SOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,page 25.STAFF:DawsonFILE:DATE:NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 149
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 149]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:AMBASSADOR LODGEDATES:11/2/631000 hoursCATEGORIES:DIEM> TOP SECRETAmbassador Lodge cheered envonte to the Chancery.SOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,Exhibit One, page 24.STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:GEN. MAI HUU XUANNHUDATES:11/2/631130 hoursCATEGORIES:DIEM> TOP SECRETE/General Mai Huu Xuan led the detail which located Diem and Nhu at a villa on Phung Hung street in Cholon. Xuan returned to the JGS with their bodies. Cause of death at this time is unknown.SOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,Exhibit one, page 24.STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 150]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:NHUDATES:11/2/631000 hoursCATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:> [Figure: "TOP SECRET" stamp.]1000 Dana and Dhu are reported as SOS. This is unconfirmed. There are also rumors that Diem and Nhu have escaped.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein Exhibit One, page 24.STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:NHUDATES:11/2/631000 hoursCATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:> [Figure: "TOP SECRET" stamp.]1000 Dana and Dhu are reported as SOS. This is unconfirmed. There are also rumors that Diem and Nhu have escaped.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein Exhibit One, page 24.STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 151
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 151]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:Vice President THODATES:11/2/630420 hoursCATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:TOP SECRETVice President Tho has accepted position as Prime Minister.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,Exhibit One, page 23.STAFF:DawsonDATE: 6/30/75FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:11/2/631000 hoursCATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:TOP SECRETSporadic small arms fire continue.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,STAFF: DawsonNW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 152
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 152]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:DONCONEINDATES:2 Nov 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: On 2 November 1963, GENERAL DON informed CONEIN that he needed money to paythe families of persons killed during the coup. CONEIN gave GENERAL DON an additional1,750,000 piasters. One bundle of 250,000 piasters was overlooked and was found later inCONEIN's safe. (The IG Report goes on to note as follows: "The passing of these funds isobviously a very sensitive matter.")> TOP SECRETSOURCE:CIA IG Report, 1967, pp. 40-41FILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE: 29 June 1975
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 153]
1964NW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 154
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 154]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:KHANHMAJOR DANG SYDATES:Jan. 1964CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:At the trial of Dang Sy by the Khanh regime that succeeded that of the coup leaders temporary or provisional government, Khanh's prosecutor insisted that the deaths had been caused by American-supplied grenades of the type known as MKIII whose use had been ordered by Dang Sy, and the conviction by the military court was that the 8 deaths were caused by these concussion grenades. Higgins argues in her book that this conviction is contrary to the Pentagon's assessment of the MKIII grenade which found that at worst the effects of such a grenade are non-fatal. Nor does such a grenade have sufficient force to decapitate or mutilate persons, let alone bring down the ceilings, doors, and windows that were adjacent to the veranda of the radio station. (95-96) Higgins also states that: "The conviction of Major Dang Sy certainly throws no light on the matter one way or another. The trial was clearly rigged from the start." (96-97)SOURCE:Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,STAPF:Dawson, R.1965DATE: July 2, 1975FILE:NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 155
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 155]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:Thich Tri QuangMcNamaraDiemDATES: CATEGORIES:Spring, 1965 DiemOCCURRENCE:Higgins, in her book, quotes McNamara as stating in Spring of 1965 that: "ThichTri Quang has made serious trouble for us before, and he will again. Perhaps thegreatest mistake we made_was_when we gave Thích Trí Quang at the U. S.Embassy." (from September through November 1963) Page 103![Top Secret stamp]SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins,Harper and RoweSTAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: July 3, 1975
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 156]
Colby, Wm. E. Pearson, D.BreckinridgeDAILS:CATEGORIES:3/67 DiemIX - C - 2 - bCastroOCCURRENCE:Breckinridge actually put together the I.G. Reports and he did so in response to a March 1967 Drew Pearson column to the effect that the agency was involved with criminal syndicates to assassinate Castro. As a result of discussions caused by the Pearson column, staff members in the I.G.'s office were directed to put together reports on CIA involvement in the assassination of Castro, Trujillo, and Diem (50).![TOP SECRET]SOURCE: STAFF:SSCI; testimony of Wm. E. Colby, 6/4/75 JFDFILE: DATE: 6/28/75CageNW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 157
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 157]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:IG REPORTCONEINSPERADON, GENERALDIEMDATES:31 May 1967CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: In concluding, the IG Report makes the following observations: "To recap:(a) CIA was not in favor of the decision to abandon the DIEM regime, but faithfully carried out instructions. (2) CIA officers CONEIN and SPERA were the contacts with the coup generals, but only as approved and under instructions. (c) A CIA officer, CONEIN, was at the generals' command post throughout the fighting. (d) CONEIN furnished GENERAL DON about $65,000 to buy off opposition military units while the coup was in progress. (e) CIA had no hand in the assassinations and had no foreknowledge of them."![TOP SECRET]SOURCE:CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 44FILE:STAFF: R. DAWSONDATE: 29 June 1975
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 158]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:COLBYDATES:1975CATEGORIES:DIEMTREND WEAKENEDOCCURRENCE: COLBY stated in response to the difficulty for the United States once it has sought to accomplish objectives through foreign nationalists to control the actions of the foreign nationalists, that "Certainly the foreigner makes his own decisions at various ti the degree to which he is going to do one thing or the other. The U.S. cannot control it. The U. S. can assist them, the U.S. can counsel him and advise him, perhaps influence him, but the control, that is....when you are dealing with essentially another soverign, why ti are limits to your degree of authority over them." p. 76SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ColbyFILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE: 1 July 1975NW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 159
[176-10011-10101.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992## JFK Assassination System### Identification FormDate: 5/5/2016## Agency InformationAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10011-10101RECORD SERIES: NSFAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 14## Document InformationORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE: EXTRACT FROM PAPER SENT GEN. LANSDALE 29 AUGUST '62DATE: 08/29/1962PAGES: 1SUBJECTS: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIESDOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION: SecretRESTRICTIONS: 1CCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/08/1998OPENING CRITERIA: UPON AGENCY REVIEWCOMMENTS: NSF:M&M:SPECIAL GROUP(AUGMENTED):8/62:BOX 319:PENDING NLK-90-50
[176-10011-10101.pdf — page 1]
# SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLYExtract from paper sent Gen. Lansdale 29 August 62SG Briefedch 30 Aug2. Through clandestine agent sources, we learned recently that a Western European merchant ship en route from Havana, Cuba, to Odessa, USSR, would be forced to dock at a Caribbean port and off-load temporarily part of its cargo in order to repair minor hull damage which resulted from an accidental grounding. It was ascertained that this vessel carried as cargo 80,000 two-hundred pound bags of Cuban raw sugar shipped to Odessa, USSR, for refining in the Soviet Union. In order to lighten the ship sufficiently to permit repairs, it was necessary to off-load and temporarily warehouse 14,000 of the two-hundred pound bags of sugar.3. Through a clandestine operation which was not detected and is not traceable, we were able to contaminate 800 of these bags of sugar with a chemical used in the process of denaturing alcohol while the bags were in the warehouse and before they were reloaded on the vessel.4. When this cargo of sugar is refined in the Soviet Union the contaminated bags will completely contaminate the entire shipment making the sugar unfit for human or animal consumption in any form. The contaminate we used will give the sugar an ineradicable, sickly bitter taste which no process will remove. The contaminate cannot be detected in the refining and although the contaminate is not in any sense dangerous to health, it is so strong to the taste that it ruins the taste of the consumer for any food or drink for a considerable time.5. This successful contamination will spoil the entire cargo the value of which to the USSR is estimated at $350,000 to $400,000.Additional InformationFor your further information in connection with this operation, it was completed on 24 August 1962 in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The vessel involved was the British merchant ship STREATHAM HILL. The operation was successfully conducted without compromise and none of the personnel connected with the vessel are aware of the operation.EYES ONLYSECRETSENSITIVE
[176-10011-10152.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystemIdentification Form## Agency InformationAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10011-10152RECORD SERIES: NSFAGENCY FILE NUMBER:## Document InformationORIGINATOR: WHFROM:TO: THE RECORDTITLE: MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDDATE: 06/08/1961PAGES: 4SUBJECTS: ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIESDOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION: SecretRESTRICTIONS: 1CCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/08/1998OPENING CRITERIA: UPON AGENCY REVIEWCOMMENTS: NSF:M&M:SPECIAL GROUP(CI) MEETINGS:6/61-10/62:BOX 319:PENDING NLK-92-104
[176-10011-10152.pdf — page 1]
# SECRET - EYES ONLY8 June 1961MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 6 June 1961PRESENT: Messrs. Bowles, Gilpatric, Bundy, Ralph Dungan, DullesMr. Dungan, Special Assistant to the President, participated in the Special Group meeting for the first time.## 1. CongoMessrs. Bowles and Gilpatric agreed with the plan for the Congo. Mr. Bowles conditioned his approval on the acceptance of the three provisions set forth in the State Department internal memorandum dated 6 June 1961 (copy attached). Mr. Dulles indicated that these conditions were accepted by the Agency but he pointed out that the condition which prescribed the inclusion of Gizenga or his representative in the Leopoldville Government involved the danger of bringing in a representative of Moscow who would attempt to subvert and control the government. Mr. Bundy felt that he could not approve this program without reference to higher authority.Note was made of the possibility that if Gizenga decided to participate in a new Leopoldville Government or Parliament, he had ample resources and a chance eventually to win control of the government.## 2. Review of Political Action ProjectsMr. Bundy stated that because of the special sensitivity of programs involving covert support to political parties and leaders in friendly countries, higher authority wished to review them. Mr. Bundy proposed Thursday or Friday, June 15th or 16th, for this purpose.Mr. Bowles suggested that we might ask to have a general policy enunciated regarding this subject. Other members of the Group-SECRET-EYES ONLY
[176-10011-10152.pdf — page 2]
# SECRET - EYES ONLYsuggested that a general policy statement might not be sufficiently flexible to take care of special situations which might arise.Mr. Dulles noted that the pertinent NSC paper authorized programs such as that under discussion, but emphasized that he would only undertake this type of activity if it was fully supported by the Department of State and higher authority. Ho stated that he fully appreciated the sensitivity of this type of activity. Mr. Dulles said, however, that he felt the Special Group should have come latitude to make decisions on these matters within the general policy which might be laid down by higher authority without referral of each specific case for approval.Mr. Bundy stated that he would like Mr. Dungan to work with our people in the preparation of the briefing to be given higher authority next week.## 3. Release Procedures - Francis Gary PowersBecause of the contingency nature of this proposal and because of the crowded agenda, discussion of this matter was deferred to the next meeting.## 4. STPOLLY Flight, VietnamThis flight was approved with Chinat personnel. There was some discussion as to the desirability of having South Vietnamese conduct these missions but it was pointed out that they did not have the competence.## 5. Covert Annex, VietnamThis annex was approved. It was noted that a progress report had just been received and it was suggested that this report be distributed to members of the Group.## 6. Covert Annex, KoreaMr. Bundy reiterated the decision that covert annexes should not be processed through the NSC machinery. Because of the interest of higher authority in political action operations in friendly areas (see Item 2) and since this annex was written in rather broad terms, he would like to check it further.2SECRET - EYES ONLY
[176-10011-10152.pdf — page 3]
SECRET - EYES ONLY## 7. TACKLEMr. Dollen stated thet while he wanted to open discussion ef this matter at this meeting, he did not expect a final decision to to made until the next meeting. Mr. Bandy noted the previous reserva- tions of the Date Department and the fact that this matter had been considered but not approved three times previously. Mr. Cilpatric supported the need for current Information which TACKLE would produce and suggested the possible use of U.S. personnel for the TACKLE mission. Mr. Dulles stated his opinion that the use of American personel would reise serious problems in the event of an accident. The use of well qualified Chinst crows, in his opinion, would mitigate the risko involved. It was agreed that the proposal would be resubmitted later.## 8. NicaraguaMr. Dalles cutlined the nature and value of the equipment romeining at Puerto Cabozao and of the need for negotiating with Samoza to effect its recovery. He indicated that some quid pro quo weald probably be involved in achtoving an agreement with Somers. Mr. Bandy stated that this was a mattor that should be negotiated between the Agency and the Department of State and need not be again referred to the Special Group.## 9. CubaMr. Dalles stated that he wanted to raise in a general way at this meeting the problem of the Agency's relations with the exile groups, the payment to dependente of the strike force and the publications which the Agency has been supporting. He emphasized that there involved a considerable amount of mocoy and that the mattor should be resolved at an early date. It was agreed that the Agency should discuss this mettor with Deputy Assistant Secretary Morales-Cervica and subælt a formal proposal to to early meeting of the Special Group.## 10. Minutes of Special Group MectingoMr. Bundy requested that copics of the minutes of Special Group meetings be forwarded to members of the Group for approval andSECRET - EVES ONLY
[176-10011-10152.pdf — page 4]
SECRET - EYES ONLretention. Mr. Gilpatric noted the very close relationship betweenhis office and the Agency and felt that bo could obtain all theinfermetion he needed without receiving a copy of the saloutes.Mr. Dulles suggested that because of the sensitivity of these recordsand because same of the references cantained therein involved theuse of pseudonyme, the need of the Group might be satisfied byhaving copies of the minutes of each meeting made available at thesubsequent meeting for approval. Mesars. Bundy and Dangan agreedto the submission of the minutes for approval at a subsequent meetingbut stated that they might have a need for a complete record immediatolyat hand to answer any questions put to thers by higher authority.THOMAS P. SCHREYERSECRET - EYES ONLY
[176-10030-10085.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992## JFK Assassination System Identification FormDate: 5/5/2016## Agency InformationAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10030-10085RECORD SERIES: ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWSAGENCY FILE NUMBER:## Document InformationORIGINATOR: CITIZENFROM:TO:TITLE: ORAL HISTORY WITH EDWARD LANSDALE BY DENNIS O'BRIENDATE: 07/11/1970PAGES: 123SUBJECTS: BAY OF PIGSDOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPTCLASSIFICATION: Not MarkedRESTRICTIONS: Open in FullCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 06/05/1998OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: Pages 3-21 and 28-34 talk about the Bay of Pigs. Pages 96 and 98 have been sanitized.
[176-10030-10085.pdf — page 1]
SANITIZED MK.99.41.12/00Oral History InterviewwithEDWARD G.Edwin D. LansdaleJuly 11, 1970Alexandria, VirginiaBy Dennis J. O'BrienFor the John F. Kennedy LibraryO'BRIEN: I think a logical place to begin in anything like this is just simply with the question, when did you first meet President Kennedy, or Senator Kennedy, if you met him before he was President?LANSDALE: I don't recall meeting him before he was Presidente. The first meeting was I believe, the first Saturday following the inauguration, whatever date that was. I was called into a meeting in the White House by [Robert S.] McNamara. It was a meeting, on, actually, on a report that I had written for [Dwight D.] Eisenhower. It was sort of a I'm not sure.
[176-10030-10085.pdf — page 2]
-2-that it was, NSC (National Security Council) meeting, but it was comparable to that with the personnel that were attending. There were several Secretaries: Defense, State, and his National Security people were there.O'Brien: Could we work with McNamara and [Roswell L],Gilpatric, members of the incoming administration, before they actually assumed office?LANSDALE: Just before, that is, a day or so before. I'd been in Vietnam for a brief visit and got back just before the inaugural, maybe two or three days, and at that time both McNamara and Gilpatric were in Defense getting briefed for their new jobs. I met them at that time. The outgoing Deputy Secretary of Defense asked me to start working with Gilpatric, and so I got Gilpatric rather than McNamaraO'BRIEN: This is Douglas.LANSDALE: Douglas, Jim Douglas (James H-Douglas)O'BRIEN: How is Douglas to work with, while you're with him? Is he a pretty sympathetic person?LANSDALE: Yes, very much so, very much so He was the one, actually, who wrote the orders and back-
[176-10030-10085.pdf — page 3]
-3-stopped my visit to Vietnam, and back- stopped it principally so that I could take a look at some of the political factors as well as economic, military, and psychological and everything else. This, frankly, took a consicanding on his part that because my views weren't always popular in other parts of the government I gathered that there was some opposition to my going out, and he insisted on it..O'BRIEN: I'd like to come back to that. I wonder if we could go on to talk about one of the major problems, which is Cuba. When is the first time that you hear about the Bay of Pigs invasion, not the Bay of Pigs, but the plans?LANSDALE: Sometime in the fall of sixty. I think that I heard of it about the first time that it was brought up to the inner-policy group of the Eisenhower administration. I was the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, at the time, for Special Operations and used to accompany the Deputy Secretary, who was a member of the inner policy group, to most of
[176-10030-10085.pdf — page 4]
-4-the meetings that thad. When Allen Dulles(Allen W.-Dulles) st raised the notion tothe Senate group I was present at the meeting as an Assista.O'BRIEN: What is the thinking about it at that time?What kind of operation is it basically a guerilla operation at this point?LANSDALE: Initially, it was. Initially, it was very different than the way it turned out. It was based on a premise that many people in Cuba were very unhappy with the Castro administration and the way it was turning away from the initial revolutionary objectives and the capture of the revolutionary movement by the Communist Party, which surprised many of the supporters of Castro as a guerilla and as a revolutionary action. So the thought was to back a number of Cubans who either had been supporters of Castro or were very unhappy, were still resident in Cuba, and to cause some overturn at the time.The change of plan towards the Bay of Pigs thing evolved fairly fragilely and apparently there was a planning group and CIA (Central*Context*?
[176-10030-10085.pdf — page 5]
-5-Intelligence Agency) who were working on thisinitial plan who started thinking in militaryinvasion terms. I suspect that they weredoing that because some of the Cuban militaryand military types, that is, very militant,kr s were coming out ofCuba as refugees, and they suddenly saw awindfall of man power and started thinking inother terms of use of them. But this changewas, the changed plan towards the Bay of Pigsthing, was well under way in the inner circlethinking of CIA by December of '60, very defi-nitely so.O'BRIEN: Who were some of the inner circle people atthis point, do you recall?LANSDALE: Let's see. Oh golly. Dick Bissell(Richard M. Bissell) was the overall chief ofthe group.O'BRIEN: Tracy Barnes, was he in it at that time?LANSDALE: Tracy was an assistant to him, but How far actually detailed of anything... Tracy, went in the actual planning, I have mydoubts that he was.O'BRIEN: How about Broe, William Broe?