Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[176-10036-10058.pdf — page 3]
# SECRET10. The ring takes great precautions to prevent tracing of the addressees. One of the important links is a woman whose Paris home has entrances on two different streets. She and her husband use the principal street address for their normal lives; but the back street address for the receipt of clandestine correspondence.11. In this Cuban-sponsored subversive operation, routes of travel are planned to escape easy detection of the fact that a person has left his home, been trained, and, has, returned to his country. Most of the travel has been by way of Mexico and thence to Cuba, since it was possible to escape detection of the travel. The Cubans issued loose leaf inserts for the travelers' passports, rather than stamping a record of the travel in the document itself. The Mexican Government has recently begun measures to control this travel, but a large number have managed to enter and leave Cuba for Mexico without detection. Some of the travel to Cuba is by way of the Dutch and British West Indies.12. Many of the returning trainees go through Paris and Prague. From Paris, the travelers fan out to a number of different Latin American countries, from which they attempt clandestine re-entry into Peru. Ecuador, Colombia and Brazil have been used extensively as Latin American entry points as the travelers leave Paris.13. The agent reports that money for this extensive travel program has been deposited in Swiss banks by the Chinese Communists, via Cuba. MIR trainees were told not to ask for aid from the Soviets to avoid straining relations with China, "since it is backing them". Our asset was responsible for the safekeeping of approximately $15,000 when he arrived in Paris. The money had been parceled out among a number of trainees during the trip, and they handed it to the Paris coordinator there. Our asset was given $1,000 when he left Paris, which he was to use for documentation when he was ready to re-enter Peru. He reported that the cost of the travel of his group from Peru to Cuba was approximately $25,000, and that this money was brought to a local leader from Paris by courier before the trip.14. The MIR plans to establish a cover importing company representing a French firm which exports cheap agricultural equipment. The branch in Peru will serve as a cover for activities involving the travel of MIR members and the transfer of funds. It will also be a clearing house for information and instructions. When the current group of trainees is back in Peru, another group will be sent out, and funded through the cover firm. The agent reports that# SECRET
[176-10036-10058.pdf — page 4]
SECRETthe next group will number approximately 100 men and that they will receive instructions in Algeria, North Vietnam, Laos, and China. The top leader of the Peruvian group has told his lieutenants that ho will soon go to Algeria to start arrangements for this training.15. The MIR has planned four fronts in Peru in its proposed revolution. One is in the south with headquarters in Cusco, another is in the central region in the Sierra, a third is in Lima, and the fourth is in northern Peru. The agent has named the leaders in charge of each of the four fronte..16. Our asset makes frequent reference to internal disputes in the MIR between the old line Communists and those referred to as Trotskyites. The MIR leaders in Ouba felt that some of their own groupe had joined with the Trotskyites and they discussed this problem with Fidel Castro. Castro promised not to let the so-called Trotaky- ites return to Peru until the others were already in place and in command of the several fronts. Some of the avowed Trotskyites were among the first to be sent back, however, and the MIR leaders are highly incensed. The leaders fear that the Trotskyites will endangor the movement, and they have been especially disturbed to find that two Cuban officers, who are known to be frotskyites, had accompanied them from Cuba.17. The Agency asset sset had first estimated that it would take at least two months for all of the Peruvians to return. The re-entry program had fallen approximately a month behind schedule because of unexpected problems of transferring funds and obtaining documents. Moreover, a Communist group in one of the neighboring countries which was to help them began to charge exorbitant amounts for its assistance The Peruvians were obliged to wait until additional money was brought to them by courier.18. The agent also, estimated that at least another month or two would be required to complete plans for the revolution after all of the trainees were back. The leaders of the trainees complained that the MIR had not made adequate plans to receive the groups and had not doveloped its revolutionary plans soundly.19. Recently, however, the operation has been increasing in tempo. The leaders of the HIR have been putting additional pressures. on our asset and on others in the chain to speed up re-entry. A number of the trainees have spread out to mall neighboring toms ready to cross the border into Peru olandestinely. False documenta- tion of these nearby countries is also being procured to assist others to croes into Peru "legally".SECRET
[176-10036-10065.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10065RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER:ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE: Draft Briefing Notes: FundingDATE: 2/18/1963PAGES: 5SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE:CLASSIFICATION:RESTRICTIONS:CURRENT STATUS:DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 59: Cuba Subjects, Cuban Subversion, 2/18/1963. Box 1
[176-10036-10065.pdf — page 1]
SECRETDRAFT BRIEFING NOTES 18 February 1963FUNDINGI. Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin America is easy to ascertain and hard to document. Our evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers carrying cash.A. A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several witnesses to have large quantities of US currency stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suitcase. There is no law against bringing currency into Venezuela, so that authorities could not even determine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was captured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.B. A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Portocarrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in September, 1961, when weather forced the plane to overfly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was found to be carrying $3,600 in cash from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.C. Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla training camp in the mountains west of Quito andSECRET
[176-10036-10065.pdf — page 2]
SECRETarrested some 48 members of the URJE (Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth) The leaders of the group admitted having received guerrilla training in Cuba, but there was no other evidence at the time of any Cuban involvement. The URJE, however, was a Communist-front group whose leaders had thrown off the discipline of the regular Communist party, and this January the Communists managed to have a URJE convention, run by Young Communists, expel the leaders. They were accused, according to published accounts, of having wasted $44,000 supplied by Cuba for guerrilla activities. One of our reliable sources in the Communist Party ((a regional Communist leader in contact with the Cuban chargé in Chile, and a member of the PCE inquiry commission)) has informed us that the next-to-last Cuban chargé in Quito blamed the fiasco on the fact that his successor had passed the money to the URJE without coordinating with the regular Communist party.D. A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected last November has given us a specific account of procedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weapons which were then smuggled into Guate-mala.-2-SECRET
[176-10036-10065.pdf — page 3]
SECRETE. We also have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers by which Cuban money eventually reaches Latin American front groups to pay for political and propaganda activity. In some countries where the Cubans still have diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats showing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front- group propaganda.F. Just last month, one of the first Brazilians to receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying to some of those same guerrilla training camps exposed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. Interestingly enough, the Brazilians believe that the money Cuba had been providing for the camps actually came from Communist China. Since the exposure of the Varig documents--and probably since the guerrillas first reached the Cuban embassy in Rio with their complaints about mismanagement, confusion, and corruption--the Cubans have apparently stopped financing this operation, but the evidence shows it is still limping along. The man with' the suitcase full of ammunition said that a woman attorney in Rio had given him the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla camp. We know-3-SECRET
[176-10036-10065.pdf — page 4]
SECRETII. The principle that guerrillas must be self-sustaining has obviously been applied to finances as well. Communists have staged waves of bank robberies in Venezuela, Peru, and Argentina.A. The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima suburb last year which netted almost $100,000. Some of the participants have been caught and are being tried in the mass trials of more than 200 Communists just starting in Peru. We know that the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guerrillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo Blanco in the Cuzco Valley.B. Just last week a bank in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000 by men wearing FALN armbands.C. Argentine police last July raided a Buenos Aires warehouse and found evidence that it had been the headquarters for a gang of terrorists--apparently working with both the Peronists and the
[176-10036-10065.pdf — page 5]
SECRETCommunists--responsible for a wave of hold-ups,burglaries, and attacks on police posts designedto obtain funds, weapons, and explosives.-5-SECRET
[176-10036-10073.pdf — page 0]
176-10036-10073 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM## IDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10073RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR :FROM: JohnsonTO: RostowTITLE: Meeting of Vietnam Task Force June 19 1961DATE: 6/20/1961PAGES: 5SUBJECTS :DOCUMENT TYPE:CLASSIFICATION :RESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 193: Vietnam General 6/19/1961-6/30/1961. Box 1
[176-10036-10073.pdf — page 1]
2 SECRETJune 20, 1961 SanitizedNLK-75-26NLX 02-310, 1/03MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOWSUBJECT: Meeting of the Task Force on Viet Nam on June 19, 1961## Intelligence BriefingAmong the interesting items reported in the intelligence briefing was a response from Embassy Saigon on the Cambodian border problem. Embassy Saigon did not agree with the view of Embassy Phnom Penh that this is an insignificant problem. At present, Saigon reports, Cambodia is used primarily as a safe haven by guerrillas in Viet Nam rather than as an area from which operations are mounted. The Embassy provided specific information on VC activity in Cambodia which, it suggested, should be shown to Sihanouk. There was also a report that the Indian member of the ICC has stated in the ICC that that body should investigate subversion. This was said to have caused the Polish member to ask for a recess of the ICC in order to permit him to prepare a reply. (This report, if confirmed, is in line with an earlier TDCS indicating that instructions along these lines had gone to the Indian member of the ICC.).It was also reported that on Friday there may have been a clash between Pathet Lao and South Vietnamese forces just inside Laos on the highway connecting Laos and South Viet Nam. (South Vietnamese forces have been in this area for some time.) The following table on operations for May was also presented.|           | Killed | Captured | Surrendered | Deserted || --------- | ------ | -------- | ----------- | -------- || Viet Cong | 824    | 30       | 37          | none     || GVN       | 240    | 158      | none        | 41       |## The Local Currency: Costs ProblemMr. Cottrell reported on the current status of the problem of meeting the local currency costs of the 20,000 man increase. A message has been sent to Saigon requesting the Embassy to undertake negotiations with the GVN and offering three alternatives in descending order of preference:a. The U. S. would commit $5.1 million equivalent in piasters, provided the GVN proceeds without delay with mobilization and meets the balance of the local currency costs from its own resources.- 1 -SECRET
[176-10036-10073.pdf — page 2]
SECRETb. If the proposal under a above is not adequate to obtain GVN agreement, we would offer an additional $4.85 million in piasters. This is estimated to be sufficient to cover local currency costs in 1961 of the call-up of the additional 20,000 men.c. If neither of the above proposals proves acceptable, the U. S. would offer an additional $4.55 million in assistance in 1961 which, if the GVN would accept a dollar/piaster rate of 73, would be sufficient to meet the piaster cost for 1961.As of yesterday afternoon, no reaction had been obtained from Saigon. In a long conversation with Ben Wood, the Deputy Director of the Task Force, Thuan was told before he left the U. S. of our offer under a above. On the basis of this offer, he indicated that he would send instructions to Saigon to initiate the call-up of the 20,000 men, even in the absence of a final agreement. This problem, therefore, seems on its way toward solution.## The Situation in Laos in Relationship to South Viet NamA large part of the meeting was devoted to discussion of a draft memorandum that Cottrell read to the Task Force containing his ideas with respect to the situation in Laos and what should be done about it. You are generally familiar with his ideas as a result of your conversation yesterday with him. I did not attempt to take detailed notes on the memorandum, but his proposal runs along the following lines.Cottrell does not believe that any arrangement to create a neutral Laos will be viable. He does not believe that we should withdraw in favor of the French in Laos. The French cannot be depended upon to do a good job and the reestablishment of their presence will be deeply resented throughout the former Indo-Chinese states. The military situation in Laos is alarming. The Pathet Lao are now posing a serious threat in southern Laos. Cottrell proposes that we seize upon some plausible excuse to break off the Geneva Conference. The failure of the ICC to stabilize the situation would provide such an excuse. He would then introduce Thai special forces and "hunter-killer" forces now being trained in South Viet Nam into southern Laos in an effort to clean out the Pathet Lao "infection" there. In the discussion of his proposal, the question was raised as to whether the introduction of U. S. forces would not be necessary. Cottrell acknowledged that this was a real possibility and emphasized the importance of our not letting our friends in Southeast Asia down by refusing to use force if that should prove necessary.- 2 -SECRET
[176-10036-10073.pdf — page 3]
Members of the Task Force were asked for their reactions to the paper. There was a rather surprising degree of agreement that something along this line must be done or it will be virtually impossible to deal with the situation in South Viet Nam. (There was no State Department representative present at the time except Cottrell himself.) The ICA member and the representative of Jack Bell's office did raise questions as to whether political and economic action by the Diem regime was not a more important precondition to solution in Viet Nam than military action in Laos.I made the following points about the proposal: First, I observed that this would seem to me to raise important questions of policy which had been considered and decided in the past at the highest levels of government. I indicated that I would be unable to take a personal stand on the issues raised. I expressed some surprise about the apparent unanimity of view that, unless we undertake military action in Laos, it would be virtually impossible to deal effectively with the situation in Viet Nam. I said that, while I could see no objection to the Viet Nam Task Force raising these questions, it seemed to me that they should be raised much more clearly in the context of the Viet Nam problem. That is, the proposed memorandum should make clear why the present situation in Laos will make it difficult, if not impossible, to carry out an effective program against the Viet Cong in Viet Nam. Cottrell agréed to take account of this suggestion (with which there seemed to be some agreement in the Task Force).I understand some of the feeling of frustration which has prompted Cottrell to produce his memorandum. I specifically share his doubts with respect to getting the French back into Laos. (I had thought that this proposal had been dropped as a result of adverse reaction from various sectors.) The Cottrell proposals, however, raise very directly the question of U. S. military intervention in Laos. It seems to me inconceivable that his objective could be achieved without such intervention. The proposals also would have the effect, it seems to me, of merging the war in Laos with the war in Viet Nam. I do not think that this would be a good idea.I think that there is a serious question as to whether the situation in Laos is not deteriorating so seriously that any likely political solution will not leave it as a serious source of infiltration into both Viet Nam and Thailand. But I wonder whether this question cannot be better reviewed in the context of contingency planning for Laos itself. In this connection, I do feel that the military contingency plan that we have seen for Laos is based upon too narrow a contingency -- i.e., a clear failure to achieve a cease fire or the breaking of a cease fire by the Communists. We need to plan against the- 3 -
[176-10036-10073.pdf — page 4]
# SECRET2SECRETPossibility that the Geneva Conference will be prolonged in- definitely and that meanwhile the PL will take over Southern Laos piece by piece and bit by bit as it appears to be doing. I wonder whether you want to check again with Alexis Johnson on the status of contingency planning? I wonder whether it isn't about time to have the NSC and the President review the Laos situation?Other MattersI raised the question as to the next step in consideration of Diem's proposal for a 100,000 man increase in GVN forces. I was told that the matter was being studied in Defense. It was the view of the DoD representative that the possibility of such an increase was academic until some time in 1963 because it would take until then to raise the 20,000 men already authorized and the 30,000 currently under consideration. (The 30,000 would be a part of the 100,000 since Diem was using a 170,000 man base.).I also raised the question of whether food supplies were being cut off by the. Viet Cong (as suggested to you by a Vietnamese.) I was told that the only evidence of Viet Cong action in this area was the recent seizure of seven barges carrying sugar. However, it was also stated that the GVN has given this fear as an explanation for reduction in rice ex- ports. That is, the GVN has withheld rice from international markets because of a fear that the rice may be needed in Viet Nam if the VC should begin to cut food supply lines. Thus it may be related to the argument about GVN foreign exchange revenuesreserves.There seemed to be no great concern in the Task Force with this as a current real problem. Following the meeting I talked to the ICA representative about whether it would be de- sirable to build up Vietnamese rice stocks to relieve them of their fear that rice supplies may be cut off and thus to per- mit them to sell more of their rice abroad. He indicated that politically it was very difficult to justify export of rice to Viet Nam which was itself a rice exporter.(Today I talked with Jack King of CIA (ONE) about this question. He had not made a specific study of it, of course. It was his impression that, while there was some VC interference with rice movements, the problem was not one of independently serious proportions. That is, it was a reflection of the general VC problem which was serious, but not in itself a сaнне for alarm. It was also his impression that GVN exports of rice had been surprisingly well maintained.)-4SECRET
[176-10036-10073.pdf — page 5]
# SECRETFinally, I raised the question of what planning was being done to internationalize the border problem. In response Cottrell simply referred to his plan for dealing with the situation in Laos. Today I talked with Bob Cleveland in State about the same point. He referred to the arrangements that are being made for a meeting of MAAG and USOM Chiefs of countries in the area sometime in July at which the border problem, among others, will be discussed. He also referred to the fact that Ben Wood is currently working on a counter insurgency plan to cover all of Southeast Asia. Defense had earlier been asked to prepare such a plan but had failed to do so. (I find a great inertia, apparently rooted in a basic lack of sympathy, whenever I attempt to raise the question of finding some means to involve the international community in the border question. Neither Cottrell nor the State Department representatives seem very much. interested. Have you ever discussed this question with Alexis Johnson? I think it might be useful to do so.)Following the meeting I followed up with Cottrell on the conversation you had had with him in the morning, asking him whether he didn't think it would be desirable to send General Taylor to South Viet Nam to consider the request for a 100,000 man increase and also to make sure that our military activities in South Viet Nam were really being reoriented. He reacted negatively to this proposal, taking the view that it was un-desirable to continue sending missions out to inspect the work of people in the field. In a later conversation with someone else in State I got a much more favorable reaction to this idea. The more I think about it the more I am convinced that it would be highly desirable. I very much share your uneasy feeling about the situation.![signature of Robert H. Johnson]Robert H. Johnson- 5 -SECRET
[176-10036-10078.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10078RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER:ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE: Opposition in Khanh Hoa ProvinceDATE: 9/13/1962PAGES: 2SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE:CLASSIFICATION:RESTRICTIONS:CURRENT STATUS:DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 9/62. Box 2