Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[176-10036-10143.pdf — page 1]
# TELEGRAM IN.ORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains information: affecting the National Defanse of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title. 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an una uthorized person is prohibited by law.CONFIDENTIALCOUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAMREPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/656,842SUBJECT:1. NGO DINH NHU INTENTION TO DEAL WITH VC2. ATTEMPTS OF PHẠM NGỌC THẠO TO TARRANGEYKECHE AIR FORCE SUPPORT FOR A COUP D'ETATDATE DISTR. 24 SEPTEMBER 1963PRECEDENCE ROUT INEDATE OF 9-20 SEPTEMBER 1963REFERENCES IN 26062PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (22 SEPTEMBER 1963)FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9684APPRAISAL SEE BELOWSOURCE A FIELD GRADE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE OFFICER (F).THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THAO HAS PLANNED A COUP AND HAS SOUGHT VNAF SUPPORT AS REPORTED THE SUBSTANCE LOG THẠO S TALKS WITH DIEM AND NHU CONCERNING NHUS CONTACTS WITH THE VIET CONG AND NHU'S PLANS FOR MAJOR CHANGES IN THE SOUTHVIETNAMESE ECONOMY) CANNOT BE ACCURATELY JUDGEDOLITI IS DOUBTFUL THẤT NHƯ WOULD MAKE A DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS ALTHOUGH THAO IS APPARENTLY CONVINCED THAT NHU IS CONSIDERING SUCH ACTION.SUMMARY: ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1963 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGỌC THAO, ASSIGNED TO THE PRESIDENCY AS AN INSPECTOR FOR THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM, SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED SEPARATELY WITH PRESIDENT DIEM AND NGO DINH NHƯ ABOUT NHU'S CONTACTS WITH THE VIET CONG (VC) AND THẬT NHU HAD ADMITTED THAT HE WAS "CONSIDERING DEALING WITH THE COMMUNISTS."THAO CLAIMED THAT NHU WAS PLANNING MAJOR CHANGES TO MAKE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY MORE SIMILAR TO THE ECONOMIES OF COMMUNIST NATIONS. THAO HAS SOLICITED VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF) SUPPORT FOR A COUP D'ETAT AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME.CONFIDENTIALTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
[176-10036-10143.pdf — page 2]
CONFIDENTIAL# THAO SAID THAT NHU'S PLANS TO DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS MUST BE FORESTALLED.## 2. THAO-SAID THAT DURING THE WEEK. 9-15 SEPTEMBER-PRESIDENT DIEM SUMMONED HIM AND ASKED HIM HOW HE, DIEM, WAS REGARDED BY THE PEOPLE. THAO REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS STILL PERSONALLY POPULAR BUT THAT THE PEOPLE DISLIKED NHU BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THAT NHU WAS IN CONTACT WITH THE VC. THAO SAID THAT DIEM WAS ANGERED AND DEMANDED TO KNOW WHO HAD TOLD THAO THIS INFORMATION. THAO REPLIED THAT THIS OPINION WAS COMMONLY HELD BY CIVIL SERVANTS, THE GENERAL PUBLIC, AND THE AMERICANS.## 3. ON 16 SEPTEMBER NHU SUMMONED THAO AND ASKED HIM WHY HE HAD TOLD THE PRESIDENT OF NHU'S CONTACTS WITH THE VC. THAO BELIEVED THAT NHU HIMSELF HAD TOLD AMERICAN AMBASSADOR LODGE AND THAT LODGE HAD SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED THAO. NHU CALMED DOWN AND LATER IN THE INTERVIEW ADMITTED THAT HE HAD BEEN "CONSIDERING DEALING WITH THE COMMUNISTS." THAO CLAIMED THAT HE TOLD NHU THAT NHU DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE COMMUNISTS AND THAT HE WOULD BE PLAYING A DANGEROUS GAME IN DEALING WITH THEM. (FIELD COMMENT. AMBASSADOR LODGE HAS NEVER MET THAO.)## 4. THAO SAID THAT NHU PLANNED TO MAKE MAJOR CHANGES DURING THE COMING MONTHS, INCLUDING THE NATIONALIZATION OF BANKS AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES, WHICH THAO SAID, WOULD MAKE SOUTH VIETNAM'S ECONOMY MORE SIMILAR TO ECONOMIES OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. (FIELD
[176-10036-10143.pdf — page 3]
CONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSTDCS DB-3/656,842IN. 26062PAGE 3FO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLYCOMMENT. THẠO DID NOT STATE THE SOURCE OF HIS INFORMATION CONCERNING NHU'S PLANS.) ACCORDING TO THAO, NHUIS CONTACT WITH THE COMMUNISTS WAS VIA THE POLISH DELEGATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION. THAO SAID THAT NHU'S PLAN TO DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS MUST BE FORESTALLED.5. ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1963 THAO SPOKE TO A RANKING VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF) OFFICER CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE VNAF SUPPORTING A COUP D'ETAT AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. THAO SAID THAT:A. THE VNAF WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN ANY FIGHTING BECAUSE RESISTANCE BY GOVERNMENT FORCES WOULD BE OVERCOME IN THREE. HOURS.B. THE COUP LEADERS WANTED THE VNAF TO HINDER OR STOP THE FORCES OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HUYNH VAN CAO, IV. CORPS COMMANDER FROM ASSISTING FORCES LOYAL TO THE DIEM REGIME.6. THAO WANTED VNAF SUPPORT TO STOP CAO ALTHOUGH HE BELIEVED THAT CAO MIGHT NOT NOW SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT AS STRONGLY, AS IN THE PAST. HE GAVE THE FOLLOWING REASONS FOR THIS JUDGEMENT:A. CAO DID NOT ESTABLISH MARTIAL LAW IN THE IV CORPS AFTER THE PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHING MARTIAL LAW IN THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY ON 21 AUGUST.B. RECENTLY, CAO HAS KEPT HIS TROOPS HEAVILY COMMITTED IN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VCC. CAO APPEARED TO BE REMAINING ALOOF FROM EVENTS. IN, SAIGON.D. CAO HAS MADE "REPEATED" REQUESTS TO THAO TO VISIT HIM ANDCONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLYCONTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REPORT.
[176-10036-10143.pdf — page 4]
# 5CONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION-CONTROLS(WHEN FILLED-IN) NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLYTDCS DB-3/656,842IN 26062PAGE 4HAS OFFERED HIS PRIVATE AIRCRAFT TO THAO FOR SUCH A VISIT.7. THE VNAF OFFICER WHOM THAO APPROACHED REPLIED THAT COLONEL   HUYNH HUU HIEN, VNAF COMMANDER, WAS COMPLETELY LOYAL TO THE REGIME   AND, PARTICULARLY, TO NGO DINH NHU. HE ALSO TOLD THAO THAT IT   WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WHAT ACTION VNAF OFFICERS WOULD TAKE   IN THE EVENT OF A COUP. THAO REPLIED THAT IF HIEN, FAILED TO   COOPERATE, HE COULD EASILY BE KILLED.8. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL   HARKINS) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC, PACAF.END OF MESSAGECONFIDENTIALCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS TDCZ 50-312915NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLYNTINUATION OF TDCS INFORMATION REP
[176-10036-10149.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10149RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR : CIAFROM :TO :TITLE: CIA Information ReportDATE: 10/2/1963PAGES : 6SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE :CLASSIFICATION :RESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/22/63-10/6/63, CIAReports. Box 2
[176-10036-10149.pdf — page 1]
# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Sect.. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any mannor to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.SECRET(When Filled In) KS [FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD]BACKGROUND USE ONLYCOUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAMREPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/657,031SUBJECT FURTHER PLANNING OF LANG COUP GROUPDATE DISTR. 2 OCTOBER 1963DATE OF 26-30 SEPTEMBER 1963INFO.PRECEDENCE PRIORITYREFERENCES IN 31379PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (30 SEPTEMBER 1963)DATE ACO.APPRAISAL SEE BELOWFIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9725THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE A CLOSE ASSOCIATE (C) OF LANG, FROM LANG.APPR: LANG MAY BE MAKING COUP. PLANS AS REPORTEDBUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH OTHER IN-DIVIDUALS NAMED MAY BE INVOLVED CANNOT BE JUDGED. GENERAL TY PROBABLY HAS SUPPORTED THEGENERALS DEMANDS ON PRESIDENT DIEM. THE MEETING OF DIEM WITH THE TROOP COMMANDERS POS-SIBLY TOOK PLACE AS REPORTED. LANG PROBABLY HOLDS THE VIEWS CITED.1. SUMMARY. ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1963 HUYNH VAN LANG, PROFESSOR   OF ECONOMICS AT SAIGON UNIVERSITY SAID THAT LIEUTENANT GENERAL   L'E VAN TY CHIEE, JOINT GENERAL STAFF (JGS), HAD REINFORCED THE   GENERALS DEMANDSFFOR GOVERNMENTAL REFORMS BUT THAT SOME   GENERALS WERE CONVINCED THAT THE COUP SHOULD TAKE PLACE   REGARDLESS OF WHETHER DIEM INITIATES REFORMS BRIGADIER GENERAL   TRAN THIEN KHIEM, CHIEF OF STAFF, JGS, WASCOONCERNED ABOUT   VIET CONG MILITARY ACTIVITY NEAR SAIGON. HE AND OTHER GENERALS   WANTED TO BE ASSURED OF UNITED STATES SUPPORT IN THE EVENT THAT   A COUP SUCCEEDED. COLONEL DO MAU, CHIEF, MILITARY SECURITYCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSSECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY CIBGROUP 1Excluded from automatic downgrading, and declassificationSTATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC XXXXXXXXXX OCI ONE OCR XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX EXOSTATE/DIRTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMFORM10-62 1K: OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
[176-10036-10149.pdf — page 2]
# SECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSTDCS DB-3/657,031                                                                                                                                                                  IN 31375NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD                                                                                                                                         BACKGROUND USE ONLY                                                                                                                                PAGE 2SERVICE, HAS ATTEMPTED TO INFLUENCE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF) OFFICERS TO ATTACK GIA LONG PALACE. THE COUP PLOTTERS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT PRESIDENT DIEM'S MEETINGS WITH ARMY OFFICERS DURING WHICH THE LATTER RECEIVED GIFTS OF MONEY. LANG'S PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING THE COUP HAS BEEN ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND HE HAS STARTED SELECTING MEMBERS OF A SHADOW GOVERNMENT. LANG HAS ADVISED POSTPONING THE COUP UNTIL HIS GOVERNMENTAL PLANNING HAS BEEN COMPLETED.2. LANG MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ABOUT MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:A. LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE VAN TY, RECENTLY RETURNED FROM THE UNITED STATES, MET WITH OTHER GENERALS ON 26 OR 27 SEPTEMBER AND THEN SAW PRESIDENT DIEM TO URGE GOVERNMENTAL REFORMS, INCLUDING THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERALS TO THE MINISTRIES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INTERIOR.B. GENERAL KHIEM AND OTHER GENERALS WERE BECOMING CONVINCED THAT REFORMS ALONE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT AND THAT THE ENTIRE NGO FAMILY HAD TO BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE.C. KHIEM WAS CONCERNED ABOUT INCREASED VIET CONG (VC) MILITARY ACTIVITY NEAR SAIGON AND THE COUP PLOTTERS FEARED POSSIBLE VC EXPLOITATION OF AN ATTEMPTED COUP D'ETAT.SECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD                                                                                                                                         BACKGROUND USE ONLY
[176-10036-10149.pdf — page 3]
SECRETD. KHIEM AND OTHER GENERALS DID NOT WISH TO ATTEMPT ACOUP, UNTIL IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULDSUPPORT THEM IF THEIR COUP SUCCEEDED.E. COLONEL DO MAU, WORKING THROUGH LIEUTENANT COLONELSNGUYEN CAO KY, 1ST TRANSPORT GROUP COMMANDER AND DO KHAC MAI,VNAF CHIEF OF STAFF, HAS INDEPENDENTLY ATTEMPTED TO INFLUENCEVNAF OFFICERS TO MOUNT A COUP AND ATTACK GIA LONG PALACE.LANG'S GROUP BELIEVED THAT MAU WAS TOO INDISCREET BUT PLANNEDTO CAPITALIZE ON THE SITUATION IF THE VNAF DID BEGIN A COUP.(FIELD COMMENT. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT MAI AND MAU WEREDISAPPOINTED THAT NO ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THE REGIME.)F. GENERAL KHIEM CLAIMED THAT HELICOPTER UNITS WEREINCLUDED IN THE LANG COUP GROUP.G. PRESIDENT DIEM RECENTLY SUMMONED MILITARY OFFICERS,WITH THE RANK OF CAPTAIN AND ABOVE, WHO COMMANDED TROOP UNITS INAND NEAR SAIGON AND GAVE THEM SUMS OF MONEY RANGING FROM30,000 TO 100,000 PIASTERS. THE MONEY OSTENSIBLY WAS SEIZEDFROM THE VC. COLONEL NGUYEN VAN THIEN, VIETNAMESE ARMOR COMMANDER,RECEIVED 100,000 PIASTERS, WHICH APPARENTLY HAS CAUSED HIM TORENEW HIS ALLEGIANCE TO DIEM. SOME JUNIOR OFFICERS COUNTED ONTO SUPPORT THE COUP HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THEIR MEETING WITH THEPRESIDENT, BUT OTHERS WERE NOT AND HAVE JOINED THE COUP GROUP.SECRET
[176-10036-10149.pdf — page 4]
# SECRET(When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY TDCS DB-3/657,031 IN 313 PAGE 4(FIELD COMMENT. SEE FVS 9712 (TPCS-3/560,375 ) FOR THAO'S STATEMENT TTHAT NHU HAD GIVEN LARGE SUMS OF MONEY TO MILITARY OFFICRS.)H. DIEM HAS GIVEN LARGE SUMS OF MONEY TO COLONEL HUYNHHUU HIEN, VNAF COMMANDER. ACCORIDNG TO GENERAL KHIEM, DIEM HASGIVEN HIEN ORDERS TO USE THE VNAF FOR COUNTERCOUP ACTION ANDFOR EVACUATION OF THE PRESIDENT IF NECESSARY.1. DIEM OFFERED LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO,   INSPECTOR OF STRATEGIC HAMLETS, THE POSITION OF DIRECTOR   GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE WHILE NHU OFFERED HIM COMMAND OF THE   SPECIAL FORCES. THAO, HOWEVER, HAS NOT WAVERED IN HIS SUPPORT   OF THE COUP.3. LANG SAID THAT HE HAS URGED DELAY IN MOUNTING THE   COUP UNTIL HE HAS COMPLETED HIS PLANS FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT   SO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO VOID FOR THE VC TO EXPLOIT. HE   SAID THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE HAS ACCEPTED IN   PRINCIPLE HIS IDEAS CONCERNING ORGANIZATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT.(FIELD COMMENT: IN LANG'S PROPOSED GOVERNMENT THE REVOLUT I ONARYCOMMITTEE WOULD REPLACE PRESIDENT DIEM. THE TERM MINISTER WOULDBE USED INSTEAD OF COORDINATING SECRETARY OF STATE ANDMINISTER OF SECURITY AND MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS WOULDBE ADDED TO THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, WHICH WOULD NOTDIFFER DRASTICALLY FROM THE PRESENT ONE.) LANG HAS SELECTED# SECRET CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEMINO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY
[176-10036-10149.pdf — page 5]
SECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS:BACKGROUND USE ONLYTDCSDB-3/657,031IN 31379PAGE 5(When Filled In) NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROADTHE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS AS MEMBERS OF A SHADOW CABINET:A. GENERAL KHIEM, MINISTER OF SECURITYB. VO VAN HIEN, CURRENTLY A SAIGON LAWYER, MINISTER OF JUSTICE.C. LANG, EITHER MINISTER OF ECONOMY OR DEPUTY MINISTER OF ECONOMY FOR FINANCE.D. NGUYEN TON HOAN, PROMIENT OPPOSITION LEADER IN EXILE, MINISTER OF CULTURAL AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS.E. NGUYEN THAI, OPPOSITION LEADER IN THE UNITED STATES, EITHER MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS OR DEPUTY MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS FOR CIVIC ACTION.F. MAJOR GENERAL TRAN VAN MINH, DEPUTY MINISTER OF SECURITY FOR DEFENSE.G. NGUYEN HUY NGHIA, GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AMBASSADOR TO TOKYO, DEPUTY MINISTER OF SECURITY FOR INTERIOR.H. NGUYEN HUU CHAU, FORMER MINISTER OF INTERIOR UNDER DIEM CURRENTLY IN EXILE, DEPUTY MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.I. AU TRUONG THANH, PROFESSIONAL ECONOMIST, DEPUTY MINISTER OF ECONOMY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS.J. LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE.SECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROADBACKGROUND USE ONLY
[176-10036-10149.pdf — page 6]
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSTDCS DB-3/657,031BACKGROUND USE ONLY.SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD(When Filled In)IN 31379PAGE 6LANG. HAS CONTACTED ALL OF THE ABOVE EXCEPT NGHIA, CHAU AND HOA,HE HAS SENT A CATHOLIC PRIEST TO PARIS TO CONTACT CHAU ANDWAS PLANNING TO CONTACT THE OTHERS EVENTUALLY.4. LANG SAID THAT HE WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE   INCLUSION OF TRAN KIM TUYEN, RECENTLY ASSIGNED AS GVN CONSUL   GENERAL TO CAIRO, IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THAO   HAS ASSURED TUYEN'S SUPPORTERS IN SAIGON THAT TUYEN WILL BE A   MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE IN ORDER TO ASSURE   THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE COUP.5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL   HARKINS) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.END OF MESSAGECLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSBACKGROUND USE ONLYSECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
[176-10036-10173.pdf — page 0]
# 176-10036-10173 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10173RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER :.ORIGINATOR : WHFROM: BundyTO: LodgeTITLE :DATE: 10/30/1963PAGES : 4SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE :CLASSIFICATION :RESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 201: Vietnam, 10/29/63-10/31/63, CIAReports. Box 2
[176-10036-10173.pdf — page 1]
CAS. 79407.October 30, 1963TOP SECRETEYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGEFROM McG. Bundy, White House1. Our reading your thoughtful 2063 leads us to believe a significant difference of shading may exist on one crucial point (see next para) and on one or two lesser matters easily clarified.2. We do not accept as a basis for U. S. policy that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup. In your paragraph 12 you say that if you were convinced that the coup was going to fail you would of course do everything you could to stop it. We believe that on this same basis you should take action to persuade coup leaders to stop or delay any operation which, in your best judgment, does not clearly give high prospect of success. We have never considered any betrayal of generals to Diem, and our 79109 explicitly rejected that course. We recognize the danger of appearing hostile to generals, but we believe that our own position should be on as firm ground as possible, hence we cannot limit ourselves to proposition that only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention. We believe that your standard for intervention should be that stated above.3. Therefore, if you should conclude that there is not clearly a high prospect of success, you should communicate this doubt to generals in a way calculated to persuade them to desist at least until chances areTOP SECRET EYES ONLY
[176-10036-10173.pdf — page 2]
TOP-SECRET EYES ONLY - 2 -better. In such a communication you should use the weight of U. S. best advice and explicitly reject any implication that we oppose the effort of the generals because of preference for present regime. We recognize need to bear in mind generals' interpretation of U. S. role in 1960 coup attempt, and your agent should maintain clear distinction between strong and honest advice given as a friend and any opposition to their objectives.4. With respect to money for coup-group you are authorized to make such clandestine disbursements as you consider secure and effective from available GAS piasters4. We continue to be deeply interested in up-to-the-minute assessment of prospects and are sending this before reply to our CAS 79126. We want continuous exchange latest assessments on this topic.5. To clarify our intent, paragraph 7 of our 79109 is rescinded and we restate our desires as follows:a. While you are in Saigon you will be chief of country team in all circumstances and our only instruction is that we are sure it will help to have Harkins fully informed at all stages and to use advice from both him and Smith in framing guidance for coup contacts and assessment. We continue to be concerned that neither Conein nor any other reporting source is getting the clarity we would like with respect to alignment of forces and level of determination among generals.b. When you leave Saigon and before there is a coup, Truehart will be chief of the country tem. Our only modification of existing procedures is that in this circumstance we wish
[176-10036-10173.pdf — page 3]
TOP SECRET EYES ONLY -3- 10/30/63all instruction to Conein to be conducted in immediate consultation with Harkins and Smith so that all three know what is said to Conein. Any disagreement among the three on such instructions should be reported to Washington and held for our resolution when time permits.c. If you have left and a coup occurs, we believe that emergency situation requires, pending your return, that direction of country team be vested in most senior officer with experience of military decisions, and that officer in our view is Harkins. We do not repeat not intend that this switch in final responsibility should be publicized in any way, and Harkins will of course be guided in basic posture by our instructions, which follow in paragraph 7. Thus we do not believe that this switch will have the effect suggested in your paragraph 8.6. This paragraph contains our present standing instructions for U. S. posture in the event of a coup.a. U. S. authorities will reject appeals for direct intervention from either side, and U.S.-controlled aircraft and other resources will not be committed between the battle lines or in support of either side, without authorization from Washington.b. In event of indecisive contest, U. S. authorities may in their discretion agree to perform any acts agreeable to both sides,TOP SECRET EYES ONLY
[176-10036-10173.pdf — page 4]
TOP-SECRET EYES ONLY -4- 10/30/63such as removal of key personalities or relay of information.In such actions, however, U. S. authorities will strenuously avoid appearance of pressure on either side. It is not in the interest of USG to be or appear to be either instrument of existing government or instrument of coup.c. In the event of imminent or actual failure of coup, U. S. authorities may afford asylum in their discretion to those to whom there is any express or implied obligation of this sort. We believe however that in such a case it would be in our interest and probably in interest of those seeking asylum that they seek protection of other Embassies in addition to our own. This point should be made strongly if need arises.d. But once a coup under responsible leadership has begun, and within these restrictions, it is in the interest of the U. S. Government that it should succeed.70. We have your message about return to Washington and all public comment!    announcement has not already been made, we suggest that it be kept as low-key and quiet as possible, and we also urge that if possible you keep open the exact time of your departure. We are strongly sensitive to great disadvantage of having you out of Saigon if this should turn out to be a week of decision, and if it can be avoided we would prefer not to see you pinned to a fixed hour of departure now.#####TOP SECRET EYES ONLY
[176-10036-10179.pdf — page 0]
176-10036-10179 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992## JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10179RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR: DOSFROM :TO :TITLE: Status Report on Southeast AsiaDATE: 7/11/1962PAGES: 10SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE :CLASSIFICATION :RESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 203: Vietnam Status 7/11/63. Box 1
[176-10036-10179.pdf — page 1]
SEE SANITIZED VERSION NUK-81-235upted via dae 2/SECRETSTATUS REPORTONSOUTHEAST ASIAJULY 11, 1962PREPARED BY:TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIADEPARTMENT OF STATESECRET