Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains Information affecting the National Defense: of the United States, within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law..CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROLSECRET(When Filled In)COUNTRY BRAZIL CHINA CUBAREPORT NO. TDCS -3/485,732SUBJECT OFFER OF SUPPLIES AND MEN TO THE GOVERNOR OF RIO GRANDE DO SUL BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA AND CUBADATE DISTR. 3 SEPTEMBER 1961PRECEDENCE PRIORITYDATE OF INFO. WEEKCOF 27 AUGUST 1961REFERENCES IN 23204PLACE & DATE ACQ. BRAZIL, RIO DE JANEIRO (2 SEPTEMBER 1961)APPRAISAL 3FIELD REPORT NO. HBR 2529THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS: ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE A BRAZILIAN PROFESSOR (C) WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG COMMUNIST STUDENT LEADERS.1. DURING THE WEEK OF 27 AUGUST PARTY CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG OF COMMUNIST CHINA AND PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO OF CUBA BOTH OFFERED MATERIAL SUPPORT, INCLUDING QUOTE VOLUNTEERS UNQUOTE, TO LEONEL BRIZOLA, GOVERNOR OF RIO GRANDE DO SUL, WHO WAS LEADING THE STRUGGLE IN BRAZIL TO ASSURE THE SUCCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY OF VICE PRESIDENT JOAO GOULART UPON THE RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT JANIO QUADROS.BRIZOLA DID NOT ACCEPT THE OFFER, ALTHOUGH HE APPRECIATED THE MORAL SUPPORT, BECAUSE HE DID NOT WISH TO QUOTE CREATE AN INTERNAT-IONAL AFFAIR UNQUOTE OF BRAZIL'S POLITICAL CRISIS. (FIELD COMMENT:BRIZOLA OBVIOUSLY WAS AFRAID THAT IF THE OFFERS WERE ACCEPTED: THE UNITED STATES MIGHT INTERVENE. THE OFFER OF AID BY CASTRO LEAKEDSECRETNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROLSTATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC: USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO EXO FBI I&NS TREASURYTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
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CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSS-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL TDCS-3/485,732IN 23204PAGE 2TO THE PRESS; THAT OF MAO DID NOT)。2.  FIELD DISSEM: STATE, FBI, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCARIB. CINCLANTEND OF MESSAGECLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSS-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL
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176-10037-10452 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992## JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10037-10452RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER:ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE: Information Report Re: ViewsDATE: 8/1/1962PAGES: 4SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE:CLASSIFICATION:RESTRICTIONS:CURRENT STATUS:DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 196: Countries, Vietnam, General 8/1/62-8/14/62. Box 6.
[176-10037-10452.pdf — page 1]
# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains Information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage laws, Title 18; U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794; the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSS-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLYCOUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM REPORT NO.: TDCS DB-3/650,938SUBJECT: WARNING TO PRESIDENT DIEM OF A POSSIBLE DATE DISTR.: 1 AUGUST 1962COUP D'ETAT ON NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962PRECEDENCE: PRIORITY DUNGANKAYSENDATE OF 1 AUGUST 1962 REFERENCES: KILDUFFINFO: VIETNAM, SAIGON (1 AUGUST 1962) PETERSENPLACE & SCHLESINGERDATE ACQ: BELKAPPRAISAL: SEE BELOW FIELD REPORT NO:THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION: SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE: APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE: PARA: 2-4: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER: FROM LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN CHAPANSONPARA: 5-8: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER: FROM MAJOR LONGPARA: 9: AN OFFICER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (C), WHO IS KOMERBELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS GOVERNMENT RASKINSAUNDERSCOMMENT. ALTHOUGH THE COUP D'ETAT DESCRIBED IN THISHEADQUARTERS:REPORT DID NOT OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962, THIS REPORT IS BEINGDISSEMINATED SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED MIGHT EVOLVEHE DID NOT EXHYUYIN THE BASIS OF HIS CONCLUSIONS. SEE FIELD APPRAISALA PLAN FOR A FUTURE COUP AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME.PARAS 10 THROUGH 14.ON 1 AUGUST 1962 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN CHAU, CHIEF OF THEARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SERVICE, STATEDAT APPROXIMATELY 2100 HOURS THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT NGO DINHDIEM HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT OCCURING ON THE NIGHTOF 1-2 AUGUST 1962. (SOURCE COMMENT: CHAU DID NOT NAME THE INDIVIDUAL FROMCLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSS-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLYSTATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC OCI ONE DIA CIBVIEF EXO# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
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CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSS-E-C-R-E-TNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USEONLY/NO DISSEM ABROADIN-TDCS DB-3/650;938PAGE TWOWHOM HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION.3. -CHAU-ADDED-THAT-THE-COUP-WAS-ALLEGEDLY-BEING-PLANNED-BY-A-GROUP-OF-   SENIOR ARVN OFFICERS LED BY ARVN CHIEF OF FIELD COMMAND MAJOR GENERAL DUONG   VAN MINH. CHAU ALSO STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL MAI HUU   XUAN, CHIEF OF THE QUANG TRUNG TRAINING CENTER, MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED. CHAU   INDICATED THAT XUAN'S INVOLVEMENT WAS INFERENTIAL AND NOT EXPLICIT.4. CHAU COMMENTED WITHOUT FURTHER EXPLANATION THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT ALSO   BE INVOLVED. CHAU CONJECTURED THAT NOT MORE THAN TWO ARVN BATTALIONS WERE   INVOLVED. HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF HIS CONJECTURE.5. AT APPROXIMATELY 2200 HOURS ON 1 AUGUST, MAJOR LONG, CHIEF OF THE   CAPITAL REGION MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS) STATED THAT A CENTRAL TELE-   COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER OF THE GIA DINH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HAD INTERCEPTEDON 1 AUGUST A VIETNAMESE, COMMUNIST (VC) RADIO MESSAGE, IN PLAIN TEXT ADDRESSED ADENSTO THE VC SAIGON/CHOLON ZONE COMMITTEE INSTRUCTING ALL VC MILITARY UNITS TO BEPREPARED-FOR-AN-UPRISING-AT-MIDNIGHT-ON-1-AUGUST-(SOURCE-COMMENT MAJORLONG DID NOT IDENTIFY THE ORIGINATOR OF THE MESSAGE.) (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT 'KIMEO TDCS-3/518,127 REPORTED THAT ON 23 JULY 1962 THE VC IN THE SAIGON AREA WEREORDERED TO CEASE ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT.6. MAJOR LONG ADDED THAT GENERAL XUAN HAD INFORMED THE VIETNAMESE   -GOVERNMENT-ON-25-JULY-1962-THAT-HIS-INTELLIGENCE-SECTION-HAD-INTERCEPTED-A   VC DOCUMENT INSTRUCTING VC PERSONNEL TO BE READY FOR AN UPRISING IN ABOUT ONECLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSS-E-C-R-E-TNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
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# WEEKP-2-C-R-E-TS-E-C-R-E-TCLASSIFICATION = DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEMABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLYTDCS DB-3/650,938PAGE -THREE-(SOURCE COMMENT. MAJOR LONG DID NOT KNOW THE ORIGINATOR OR THE ADDRESSEE OF THE *INTERCEPTED DOCUMENT*, NOR DID HE STATE TO WHICH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCY GENERAL XUAN HAD REPORTED IN EVER TO REFLE83. MAJOR LONG ALSO REVEALED THAT AN MSS AGENT PENETRATION OF THE VC OF UNTESTED RELIABILITY HAD REPORTED ON 1 AUGUST THAT HIS VC SUPERIOR IN CHAU HIEP (THIRTY KILOMETERS WEST OF SAIGON) HAD INSTRUCTED HIM ON 31 JULY TO BE ALERTED FOR A COUP, AND TO MEET HIS VC SUPERIOR IN SAIGON FOUR HOURS AFTER THE COUP BEGAN.85. MAJOR LONG ALSO STATED THAT A HAND GRENADE HAD EXPLODED IN THE GOV'EAL VAP AREA OF SAIGON ON THE NIGHT OF 1 AUGUST INJURING SEVEN VIETNAMESE WOMEN AND CHILDREN (SOURCE COMMENT THE RELEVANCE OF THE EXPLOSION TO A COUP ATTEMPT IS NOT CLEAR BUT MAJOR LONG BELIEVED THAT THE EVENTS MIGHT BE VTRO CONNECTED 7-5.ПИШЕТЕ THЕ PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES) INTERCEPTED CODED RADIO MESSAGES ON 12 AUGUST ON FUNUSUAL FREQUENCIES THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGES WHEN DECODED WERE IN VIETNAMESE AND FRENCH AND STATED THAT A COUP WOULD OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST. ARVN UNITS HAVE BEEN ALERTED IN THE SAIGON AREA.ICMG FOR FIELD COMMENT: CHAU IS CONSIDERED TO BE A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT OF ALL THE ARVN OFFICERS, GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH, WAS THE MOST LIKELY TO LEAD A COUP ATTEMPT. GENERAL MINH HAS BEEN A VOCAL CRITIC OF THE DIEM REGIME INSOFAR AS DIEM'S EFFICACY AGAINST THE VC IS CONCERNED.GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, FREQUENTLY RUMORED TO BE A MEMBER OF VARIOUS COUP GROUPS.2-E-S-E-R-E-TCLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
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S-E-C-R-E-TCLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEMABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLYTDCSDB-3/650,938PAGE FOURIS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DISSATISFIED WITH HIS PRESENT ASSIGNMENT AND TO HAVEHARBORED RESENTMENTS AGAINST DIEM FOR ALLEGED SLIGHTS, DESPITE THE FACT THATDIEM PROMOTED HIM FROM 'COLONEL TO BRIGADIER GENERAL SEVERAL YEARS AGO. MAJORLONG HAS EXHIBITED PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE "IN HIS PRESENT POSITION."11. FIELD COMMENT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ALL OF THE INFORMATION PROCEEDED    FROM A SINGLE SOURCE OR FROM TWO SOURCES AND THE VARIATION IN DETAIL WAS IN THE    ORAL ACCOUNTS OF DIFFERENT SOURCES. THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) CENTRAL    INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) WAS UNAWARE OF ANY POSSIBLE COUP SHORTLY AFTER    MIDNIGHT ON 1-2 AUGUST. HOWEVER, AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME, THE NORMAL    PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAD ALREADY BEEN REINFORCED AND POLICE CHECK POINTS ALSO    SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REINFORCED. GIVEN THE ADVANCE ALERT BY THE GVN MILITARY    AND SECURITY ELEMENTS, IT IS PROBABLE THAT ANY INTENDED COUP WOULD BE ABORTIVE.    FIELD COMMENT.12. AT10200 ON 2 AUGUST, SAIGON WAS QUIET AND THERE WERE NO SIGNS APPARENT    OF ANY COUP ATTEMPT, EXCEPT FOR THE ALERT OF SOME OF THE GVN ELEMENTS STATED IN    PARAY 1105. VID IO WEEL ETE AC 20L6SIOS IN AVIGON LOME ACCES VIEEN JEE COII.    (JATB13.VIFIELD COMMENT. THE INTERCEPT OF A PLAIN TEXT VC RADIO MESSAGE REFERRED    TOLIN PARA FIVE IS NOT CONVINCING AND RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE VC MIGHT    BE ENGAGED IN A CONFUSION MANEUVER. ISEPES CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT AND DECODE A    MESSAGE IN THE SAME DAY, AS REPORTED IN PARA. NINE, IS QUESTIONABLE.C. LETTLFIELD DISSEM ESTATE CINCPAC CARPAC PACARE PAPET.(Source CONSELL MYLO FONG DID HOL KMCN LAS OFICIRVICE OY JEE WOOKERAEREND OF MESSAGES-E-C-R-E-TWEBOVDEVCREDO CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSFOLUTNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
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# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10037-10453RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR : CIAFROM:TO :TITLE: Information Report Re: ViewsDATE: 8/14/1962PAGES: 5SUBJECTS :DOCUMENT TYPE :CLASSIFICATION :RESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 196: Countries, Vietnam, General 8/1/62-8/14/62. Box 6.
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# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY_Vietnam_This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18 U.S.C. Sections 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.CLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSS-E-C-R-E-T TO THE CNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE ONLY RETAIN OR DESCOUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/651;039SUBJECT: VIEWS OF BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, H.A.F. HOHLER, ON A NEUTRALIST SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAMDATE DISTR. 14 AUGUST 1962INFO:DUNGANPRECEDENCE ROUTINE KAYSENKILDUFFDATE OF INFO. EARLY AUGUST 1962 REFERENCES 43629 ERSENSCHLESINGPLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (7 AUGUST-1962)TAYLORDATE ACQ.BELKAPPRAISAL: SEE BELOW FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-7782FORRESTATHIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE AN INDEPENDENT VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS; FROM ANOTHER VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST.APPRAISAL: ALTHOUGH IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE STATEMENTS SET FORTH IN THE REPORT WERE MADE AS INDICATED, IT IS CONSIDERED DOUBTFUL THAT AMBASSADOR HOHLER ACTUALLY HOLDS THE VIEWS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM.THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, H.A.F. HOHLER, TOLD A VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST ON 2 AUGUST 1962 THAT HE HAD BEEN READING SOME OF THE JOURNALIST'S ARTICLESAND WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN A LATE JUNE ARTICLE ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE VICHINESE COMMUNISTS AND THE SOVIETS OVER NORTH VIETNAM. AFTER DISCUSSING THESE DIFFERENCES AT LENGTH THE AMBASSADOR STATED HIS BELIEF THAT, A THIRD FORCE IN VIETNAM VIS NOT ONLY POSSIBLE, BUT ACTUALLY EXISTS; AND THAT SUCH A THIRD FORCE IN NORTH VIETNAM, COMBINED WITH NEUTRALIST ELEMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, IS THE ONLY HOPE FOR VIETNAM.HOHLER EMPHASIZED THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM VISA NEUTRALIST COALITIONSIMILAR TO OFFICER AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN SAIGON WHERE5. THE CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE AT THE HOME OF BELEN BODERACLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSS-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE ONLYSTATE ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC USIA OCI ONE OCR AID DIA EXTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMRECBEL
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# SECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNOFORN/CONTINUED-CONTROL/BACKGROUND USETDCS DB-3/651,039IN 43629PAGE 2THAT WORKED OUT FOR LAOS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE AMERICANSARE NOT TRAINED IN GUERILLA WARFARE AND CAN NOT WIN THE WAR AGAINSTTHE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VG) IN SOUTH VIETNAM.2. THE CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE AT THE HOME OF PETER ROBERTSINFORMATION OFFICER AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN SAIGON, WHEREJOURNALISTROBERTS ARRANGED A MEETING BETWEEN THE/AND AMBASSADOR HOHLERJOURNALISTTHE HAS KNOWN ROBERTS FOR SOMETIME THROUGH PRESS CONFERENCESAND SOCIAL AFFAIRS AMONG JOURNALISTS. THE WAS SURPRISED TO LEARNOSETHAT ROBERTS THAD ARRANGED THEY MEETING AT THE REQUEST OF THE ONCE DA ATRIAMBASSADOR WHO HADO EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO TALK WITH HIM:JOURNALISTVIZ VENETHER THE INOR ROBERTS HADI MUCH OPPORTUNITY TO STATEJOURNALISTTHE IRVIEWS DURING THE CONVERSATION THE ASSURED THE AMBASSADORTHAT, IF ARE FROM BEING NEUTRALISTE MINDED, HE FEARS NEUTRALISM FOR AERESOUTH VIETNAM MORE THAN ANY OTHER SOLUTION. SINCE HE BELIEVESNEUTRALISM TOIBE: NO MORE THAN A MAJORISTEPATOWARD ULTIMATE TAKEOVERAND CONTROL BY THE COMMUNISTS ROBERTS POINTEDLY DISAGREED IKON VIETKOSDAWITH AMBASSADOR HOHLER'S STATEMENT THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE OFWINNING THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM, INDICATING THAT IT IS MUCH TOOEARLY TO MAKE SUCH A BLUNT STATEMENT, ALLUDING TO THE HUGE EFFORTUNDER WAY AND THE GAINS DALREADY APPARENT. ROBERTS DID SAYHOWEVER THAT THE SURFACING OF THE OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAMNGHE AN AND HOA BINH SHOULD DEMONSTRATE TO THEOFAMERICANS AND TO THE GOVERNMENT/VIETNAM THE FUTILITY OF SUCH OPERATIONSCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSSECRET. NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
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# SECRETROBERTS ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE WAS SURPRISED AT THE FAILURE OF THE VC TO REACT EARLIER IN THE PROPAGANDA FIELD TO OBVIOUSLYEXPLOITABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM AND THE AMERICANS.JOURNALIST(SOURCE COMMENT) SAID THAT HE THINKS THE ARTICLE THAT CAUGHT THE INTEREST OF AMBASSADOR HOHLER/ ONE DATELINED SAIGON, 29 JUNE 1962,APPEARING IN AN EARLY JULY ISSUE OF THE PHILIPPINE HERALD, ENTITLED "INTRA-PARTY RIFT IN RED NORTH VIETNAM - MOSCOW HAS AN EDGE ON PEIPING?".JOURNALIST/SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD READ OUT OF THE CONTEXT AND MISINTERPRETED VARIOUS STATEMENTS IN THE ARTICLE TO WHICH HE REFERRED,JOURNALISTWHICH LED HIM TO CONSIDER THE/A NEUTRALIST. THE STATEMENTS BELIEVED INVOLVED, WHICH APPEAR IN LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE ARTICLE, ARE AS FOLLOWS: "STUDENTS OF COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAM HERE WERE OF AGREEMENT THAT THE REPORTED GAINS - AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING, THAT THE PRO-SOVIET GROUP WILL EXERT A TEMPERATE INFLUENCE ON THE COURSE OF EVENTS, UNLESS THE 'SCALES' ARE TURNED BY PEIPING IN FAVOR OF ITS PUPPETS AND IF THE FREE WORLD KNOWS HOW TO CASH IN ON THE 'RED' DISPUTE, THE CHANCES WERE NOT DISMISSED OF A LONGER TRUCE IN WEELSOLUTION TO EMBATTLED VIETNAM.(FIELD COMMENT) IN A LATE JULY CONVERSATION WITH AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, THE COUNSELLOR OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN SAIGON CONT BURROWS, ATTACKED THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, STATING-THAT-
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# SECRETCLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS: NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE ONLYTDCS DB-3/651,039 PAGE 4THERE COULD BE 'NO HOPE' OF PROGRESS AGAINST THE VC UNLESS DIEM WERE REMOVED, IN CRITICIZING THE ILLIBERALITY OF THE DIEM REGIME', BURROWS APPLIED STANDARDS OF CRITICISM THAT EVEN THE MOST ADVANCED WESTERN DEMOCRACY WOULD FAIL TO MEET. DURING THE SAME CONVERSATION, COLONEL HENRY LEE, MILITARY ATTACHE TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY, EXPRESSED HIS OPINION THAT THE WAR AGAINST THE VC WAS NOT PROCEEDING FAVORABLY FROM THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW. HE APPEARED CRITICAL OF DIEM AND SEEMED INCLINED TOWARD A MILITARY JUNTA, POSSIBLY UNDER INFLUENCE OF MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH.6. (FIELD COMMENT: US AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, FREDERICK E. NOLTING, COMMENTED ON 8 AUGUST THAT AMBASSADOR HOHLER HAS NEVER GIVEN THE SLIGHTEST INDICATION THAT HE HOLDS THE VIEWS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM IN THIS REPORT. ON 8 AUGUST, AMBASSADOR HOHLER TOOK A COMPLETELY CONTRARY LINE IN A DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR NOLTING, EXPRESSING OPTIMISM REGARDING THE PROSPECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM. AMBASSADOR NOLTING SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE INFORMATION SHOULD BE TREATED WITH GREAT RESERVE AND WITH THE POSSIBILITY IN MIND THAT IT MAY REPRESENT A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO CREATE MISTRUST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN.)7. (FIELD COMMENT: NGO DINH NHU, BROTHER AND POLITICAL ADVISOR OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM, TOLD AN AMERICAN OBSERVERSECRETCLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLS: NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
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SECRET(When Filled In)CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE. ONLYTDCSDB-3/651,039IN 43629PAGE 5ON 8 AUGUST THAT, WHILE HE CONSIDERS FRENCH POLICY BOTH IN PARIS AND IN SAIGON TO HAVE AS ITS. OBJECTIVE THE NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, HE FEELS THAT THE BRITISH HAVE A CONTRARY POLICY MORE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE US. NHU SAID THAT HE HAS HAD NO INDICATIONS THAT CAUSE HIM CONCERN WITH RESPECT TO THE BRITISH ROLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND INITIATED THE COMMENT THAT AMBASSADOR HOHLER HAD SAID TO HIM RECENTLY THAT AN INTER-NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOUTH VIETNAM OR THE NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM WAS "UNTHINKABLE."8. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR ONLY), CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.END OF MESSAGESECRETCLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION, CONTROLSNOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
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176-10037-10454 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM## IDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10037-10454RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER:ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE: Information ReportDATE: 9/25/1962PAGES: 2SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE:CLASSIFICATION:RESTRICTIONS:CURRENT STATUS:DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 196: Countries, Vietnam, General 9/22/62- 9/27/62. Box 6.
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# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains information affecting The National Dofense of the United States within the meaning Espionage Laws, Title 18. U.SC Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited**CONFIDENTIAL**(When Filled In)COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM CHINA (TAIWAN) LAOS REPORT NO. TDCS-3/523,453SUBJECT PROPOSED JOINT CHINESE NATIONALIST-SOUTH VIETNAMESE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONSIN LAOS DATE DISTR. 25 SEPTEMBER 1962DATE OFINFO. MID SEPTEMBER 1962PLACE & VIETNAM, SAIGON (21 SEPTEMBER 1962)DATE ACO.APPRAISAL 2 FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 7977-BELKSOURCE THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVEA HIGH-LEVEL MEMBER (B) OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST DIPLOMATIC MISSION-JINISTEON,WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR APPROVAL OF HIS GOVERNMENT.i. IN MID-SEPTEMBER 1962, TRAN KIM TUYEN, CHIEF, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE, PROPOSED TO HUANG TIEN-MAI, CHIEF OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU INTELLIGENCE STATION IN SAIGON, THAT SOUTH VIETNAM AND NATIONALIST CHINA CONDUCT JOINT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN LAOS. TUYEN CLAIMED THAT THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN LAOS, AND THE STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WOULD BREAK RELATIONS WITH LAOS, NECESSITATED IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION OF SUCH A PROPOSAL. TUYEN TOLD HUANG THAT HE ENVISIONED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STATIONS ON THE BORDER BETWEEN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM, AS WELL AS IN LAOS, TO SUPPORT JOINT VIETNAMESE/ NATIONALIST CHINESE AGENT OPERATIONS.**CONFIDENTIAL**STATE INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OC.I ONE OCR ORR OB! 00 EXOTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMFORM5-62 1 Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
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CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLS# CONFIDENTIALNO FORE IGN DISSEMTDCS-3/523,453 IN 28327(When Filled In). PAGE 22. HUANG CONCURRED IN PRINCIPLE, BUT ADVISED TUYEN THAT HE   HAD TO OBTAIN THE APPROVAL OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT   BEFORE ENTERING INTO DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS. ON 19 SEPTEMBER HUANG   TELEGRAPHED HIS HEADQUARTERS IN TAIPEI, OUTLINING TUYEN'S PROPOSAL,   AND REQUESTING EARLY APPROVAL.3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACE USOM MAAG   CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION.![text that is unreadable]# CONFIDENTIALEND OF MESSAGECLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROL'SNO FORE IGN DISSEM
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176-10037-10460 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY : NARARECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10460RECORD SERIES : National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR : CIAFROM :TO :TITLE : Task Force Status ReportDATE : 0/00/1963PAGES : 1SUBJECTS :DOCUMENT TYPE :CLASSIFICATION :RESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 332 R & S, Southeast Asia Task ForceReports 4/11-6/13/63. Box 6.
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# SECRETCOPY 1 OF 10# STATUS REPORTOF THETASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIACOVERT ANNEX - HIGHLIGHTS## CAMBODIAA CIA source in the Chinese Nationalist diplomatic mission in Saigon has reported GRC plans to assist dissident Cambodian leader Son Ngoc Thanh in a political action campaign against the Sihanouk government. The GRC is also exploring Thanh's capability for penetrating the Cambodian government and the feasibility of assassinating Sihanouk.## NORTH VIETNAMOver 700,000 CIA-designed leaflets were dropped into the Haiphong/Lay Kay areas in April. The objective of this operation, in addition to familiarizing the DRV population with the anti-communism symbol on the leaflets, is to create a diversion within North Vietnam proper which may dissipate DRV security strengths in response to psywar and deception activities, and thus lessen DRV capability for action in South Vietnam.## SOUTH VIETNAMA two-month Civic Action Ministry training course for 229 montagnard cadres was completed in April. The first priority of these graduates, in direct satisfaction of requirements levied by General Rosson during his visit, is formation of fixed teams for use at Special Forces camps. Included in the course were 45 Vietnamese civic action cadre, all tribal dialect speakers, who will serve as team chiefs.
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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10037-10491RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER:ORIGINATOR: CIAFROM:TO:TITLE: Information Report Re: Appeal to President KennedyDATE: 1/24/1962PAGES: 2SUBJECTS:DOCUMENT TYPE:CLASSIFICATION:RESTRICTIONS:CURRENT STATUS:DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 195: Countries, Vietnam, General11/13/61-11/31/61. Box 6.