Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[176-10030-10168.pdf — page 122]
O'BRIEN: Well, when you get back, you talk to President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy and John McCone, as I understand, in a rather private meeting. What happened here?LANSDALE: Well, this was when I came back, I met the President. I went in with Taylor and Rostow-- all of us did who were out on the mission--and he thanked us all very much and as we were leaving he asked me to stay behind and talk to him, and that was when he asked me to perform this other service for him, which was initially to think about it, and if I came up with some ideas, why to put them down, briefly on paper and give them to him. [^1] And I said, "Well, do you want me to forget about Vietnam for the time being, because I haven't written my report yet about Vietnam." He said, "Yes, this other takes priority over it so I didn't even finish writing my reports on what I had seen in Vietnam at the time. I went immediately into this other work."O'BRIEN: Well, about that time, there's at least some thinking in terms of memos that are going to the President about the only way to save Vietnam[^1]: 9
[176-10030-10168.pdf — page 123]
-121-is with a rather substantial commitment ofU.S. troops. Is that. . .LANSDALE: Yes, there was some. Now where. . . Hmm,there was some, and I can't remember justwhere it was coming from. This was one ofthe things, that Diem asked me when I saw him.He asked me if he should ask for U.S. troops,and I said, "Do you need them?" He said, "Iasked you a question," and I said, "Well, I'masking you a very legitimate question on thisthing, and I said, "Are you ready to admit thatyou have so lost control of your situationthat you can't cope with it here?" And I said,"You'd have to do that before you ever turnaround and ask for American troops in here."And he said, "No, we can still handle things,"and you've answered my question, so apparentlyhe didn't ask. There have been some conversations, going on - I'm sure with some ofthe Americans before that would be my guesson this thing because he didn't say, "Whatdo you think of "or "should I ask?" which was sort of like somebodyhad recommended this at some point, and I
[176-10030-10168.pdf — page 124]
-122-don't think it would have been completely inthe Vietnamese context.O'BRIEN: Yeah, do you get any of this thinking when you get back? Any contingency planning or thinking about the building of troop levels to a more substantial level-maybe linked with the settling of the Laotian question first?LANSDALE: There might have been, and I might have known some of it. I can't recall now of any, it's someplace in the back of my head, there were some things like that going on. I turned around, just took time off completely from other things and concentrated on this other problem for a time afterwards. Actually, through December of that year, I was sort of holed up and working on some things. My staff would get in and out of some of these other things, and I used to shove them in to take my place in meetings and so on and I can only then just get very quick briefings on them, but they were essentially supporting whatever McNamara and Gilpatric were doing so I'd just have them go in and report directly and work with them directly.
[176-10030-10168.pdf — page 125]
-123-O'BRIEN: Yesh. Who were the people on your staff at that point?LANSDALE: Well, let's see? One of them was Sam Wilson, whose now a brigadier general in the ArmyJack Bowles was a Navy Captain who went down to serve with the JCS afterwards and is now with Standard Oil and working out of Singapore.And I had five or six people like that, but those were my two principle ones.O'BRIEN: Well, this is about ready to run out, and we've covered quite a bit
[176-10030-10422.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM## IDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10030-10422RECORD SERIES: Sorensen PapersAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR :FROM: Schlesinger, Jr.TO: President KennedyTITLE: Memo to President CIA ReorganizationDATE: 6/30/1961PAGES: 15SUBJECTS: CIADOCUMENT TYPE: MemorandaCLASSIFICATION: UnclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: 1CCURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 8/21/1998OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: Sorensen Papers: Classified Subject Files 1961-64 Box 47, CIA, Document 1a.
[176-10030-10422.pdf — page 1]
SECRETJune 30, 1961MEMORANDUM FC. THE PRESIDENTSUBJECT: CLA ReorganizationSEE SANITIZEDVERSIONNLK-84-149ARRB/C.C. 9/02I submit the following views as one who worked in CSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since.Un balance, CIA's record has probably been very good. In the nature of clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence agency are unknown; all the public hears about (or should hear about) are its errors. Put, again in the nature of the case, an ayency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned isw visible errors. The important thing to recognise today. Ia my judgment, is that the CIA, as at present named and constituted, has about used up its quota, ks margin for future error is practically non-existent. One more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably in US policy, at home as well as abroad. And, until CIA is visibly reorganised, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely blamed for developments of which it is wholly innocent.The argument of this memorandum is that CIA's trouble can be traced to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate; and that this autonoray is due to three main causes: (1) an inadequate doctrine of clandestine operations; (2) an inadequate conception of the relationship between operations and policy; (3) an InadequateOr should be -- a gross and repeated CIA falling has been its occasional readiness to succumb to the temptations of faverable publicity. The Guatemalan and Iranian operations were almost nullified by the flood of self-congratulatory publicity which followed them (a. g., the articles by Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 30, Ν. 13,1954).SECRET
[176-10030-10422.pdf — page 2]
SECRET2. conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum also suggests ways in which some of these problems can perhaps be alleviated.1. CIA AutonomyCIA conducts three main forms of secret work: clandestine intelligence collection; covert political operations; and paramilitary activities. It carries out these functions with relative autonomy. The reasons for the autonomy are historical.When CIA began, the State Department, still thinking too much in terms of its traditional missions in foreign affairs, looked on this new venture with suspicion and renounced the opportunity to seize firm control of CIA operations. It did not, for example, try to establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities; and some ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA was up to in their countries. After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers further confirmed CIA's independence from supervision by State Department desks.In the meantime, CIA grew in size and power. During the fifties it began in some areas to outstrip the State Department in the quality of its personnel. Partly because CIA paid higher salaries and even more perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his people courageous protection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able to attract and hold a large number of able and independent-minded men. The more it added brilliant activists to its staff, the more momentum its operations developed, and the greater role it played in the initiation of policy.By the time that State had begun to be fully aware of the problems created by an active and autonomous CIA, it had long since missed the chance to establish its own ultimate authority. While State retained a nominal supervision over covert political operations, this was to some degree offset by CIA's tendency to present a proposed operation almost as a *fait accompli*; State never had title to central overt clandestine intelligence collection; and it had lost ground in such areas as overt political reporting and even in the maintenance of overt diplomatic contacts.
[176-10030-10422.pdf — page 3]
SECRET:For its part. CIA had developed a whole series of functions paral- leling already existing functions of the State Department, and of the Defense Departrant as well. Today it has its own political desks and military #afis; it has in effect its own foreign service; it has (or bes had) the own combat forces; it even has its own sir force. As annual budget is about times that of the State Depart- iment. The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristics of a state within a stato.II. DoctrineThough CLA's autonomy developed for historical reasons, it has been able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our conduct of clandestine operatione. The problem of doctrine for CIA is the extent to which its various clandestine missions are compatible with a free and open society.It is idle to argue that, because the Communists can do such-and-sech, we are free to do it too. Communism is a creed murtured in con. spiracy: and the whole point of Communist social and political organi sation is to make conspiracy effective. If 'fighting fire with fire' means contracting the frecioms traditionally enjoyed by Americans in order to give more freedom to CIA, no ane seriously wishes to do that. Yet I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits which the maintenance of an open society places on secret activity. Until this is done, CIA's role will not be clearly defined and under- stood. The problem which must be faced is: what sort of secret activity is consistent with the preservation of a free social order?We must begin, I believe, by accepting the fact that the United States will continue to be a nation in which politicians will ask questions and make speeches, reportere will dig out stories, newspapers will pub- lish editorials, individuals, driven by promptings of conscience, will blurt out things harmful to the state, and so on. We do not wish to change these things and could not do so without violating the essence of our society. These things make up the framework in which CIA must operate. In abort, they constitute the problem; and, as General Marshall used to say, "There's no point in fighting the problem."
[176-10030-10422.pdf — page 4]
# SECRETThere follows from this, I would think, the conclusion that secret activities are permissible so long as they do not corrupt the principles and practices of our society, and that they cease to be permissible when their effect is to corrupt these principles and practices.Each form of secre: activity presents its own problem. Clandestine intelligence collection has been a traditional function of the national state. ks rules and usages are fairly well established in the main, espionage, if conducted with discretion, should present no great problem. However, when conducted with an open checkbook and a broad mandate evan espionage can begin to push against the limits of secret activity in an open society. I consider later, for example, the question of the Controlled American Source (CAS) and whether the overdoing of CAS is not beginning to harm other ar of the government.Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions arise when it is necessary to subsidise newspapers, politicians and organisations in other countries. But corruption of the political life of another nation is not a responsibility to be lightly assumed. I wonder whether CIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it. Paramilitary activities create an even more difficult problem, if only because the problems of concealment are so much more difficult.In general, I would suggest that any secret operation whose success is dependent on the suppression of news, on lying to Congressmen and journalists and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken only when the crisis is so considerable that the gains really seem to outweigh the disadvantages. This suggests that the sise of the pro- posed operation may be of crucial importance. Small operations can be done with a minimum of accompanying corruption. The greater. the visibility of the operation, the more its success depends on thwarting the impulses and denying the values of an open society, the riskier it becomes, and the more urgent it is that an overwhelming casa be made for its necessity.In short, when confronted with a proposed operation, we must not only ask whether the operation is technically feasible in its own terms; we must ask whether its eaccess requires our open seristy to be in an serious way false to its own principles.
[176-10030-10422.pdf — page 5]
SECRET5. la### III. Operations and olicyClandestine activitie should be assessed not only in the context of their relationship o an open society but also in the context of thei: relationship to United States foreign policy.CIA operations have at boon held effectively subordinate to U. S. foreign policy.1.  Clandestins intelligence collection is, by charter, free from State Depertment control. This fact exposes American foreign policy to a multituds of embarrassments when CIA is discovered recruiting agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent Singapore case, when CIA, without notice to the Consul General, tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore Police provides an instructive example. After complications of ludicrous complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit had long since informed his superiors of the CIA approach and was leading CIA into a trap which, when sprung, produced considerable embarrassment to relations between the US and the Singapore government. There have been troubles of a comparable sort in Pakistan and in Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals were smuggled into Sasebo to work in a CIA-NSA operation).CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Department in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation. In short, no one knows how many potential problema fer US foreign policy -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are being created at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations. Surely there is an argument for permitting Stats to decide whether the advantage to be gained by the operation (s. g., the information derivatis from an agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) outweighs the risk (o. g., exasperating the local government and shaking its confidence both in our purposes and in our sonse), Clandestine intelligence operations should plainly be cleared bath with the Department of State and (save for exceptional instances and on agreement of the Secretary of State) with the local U.S.Ambassador.SECLEC
[176-10030-10422.pdf — page 6]
SECRET2. Covert political operations technically require State Department clearance In practice, however, CIA has often been able to seize the initiative in ways which reduce State's role almost to that of a rubber stamp.This has been partly the consequence of the superior drive and activism of CIA personnel, especially as compared with the diffidence of State Department personnel. For example, when men come to CIA with the assignment of developing covert political campaigns or organising coups or preparing for paramilitary warfare, these men naturally fall to work with ingenuity and zeal; they probably feel that they are not earning their pay unless, say, they organise as many coups as possible. The concept of 'contingency planning' has legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations still presumably in a hypothetical stage; people did not at first notice that 'contingency planning,' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training of personnel, creates a vested interest which often transforms contingencies into apparent necessities. Thus, if a group is assembled and revved up on a contingency basis, then the failure to carry the project through (it is argued) will invite the disappointment and alienation of the group; so the pressure increases to follow through on what had started as a pure speculation. This was a central factor, of course, in the Cuban decision -- the fact that disbandment of the Cuban force in Guatemala just seemed to create too many problems and embarrassments. Having entered into relations with personalities in foreign lands, CIA has sometimes seemed to feel that we must thereafter do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security or even go over to the Communists. This approach has made us on occasion the prisoners of our own agents.We become prisoners of our agents in another sense too. The Cuban episode leaves the strong impression that CIA is not able to control its own low-level operatives. While the CIA people in Washington are men of exceptionally high quality, the men attracted to field jobs are sometimes tough and even vicious people motivated by drives of their own and not necessarily in political or even moral sympathy with the purpose of the operation. Such actions as locking up the Revelationary Council; such enterprises as Operation 40 in Miami where CIA agents reportedly trained Cubans in methods of torture, such episodes as the detention and third degree reportedly administered to Dr. Rodolfo Nodal Tarara and 16 other democratic Cubans this February -- all these suggest that things go on under CIA sponsorship with which CIA in Washington is only dimly acquainted.
[176-10030-10422.pdf — page 7]
7. laIt has meant too the the State Department, often apprised of an operation only in its ater stages, is under great pressure to endorse the operatic. as already mounted because of the alleged evil consequences a exercising a veto. I well remember Tom Mann's remark the way the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba:"I would never have isvored initiating this operation; but, since it has gone as far as it has, I do not think we can risk calling it off. " Moreover, at a time when there is increasing premium on activism, State, when it questions CLA operations or initiatives, casts itself in a prissy, sissy, negative rods. The advocate of clandestine activities seems 'tough' and realistics the opponent has to invoke such intangibles as the reputation of the United States, world public opinion, "What do we say in the United Nations?", etc., and seems hopelessly idealistic, legalistic and 'soft.'The result of CIA's adtiative in covert political operations has been to create situations chich have forced policy on the State Departament. This was not the orignal idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote in his 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee,"The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy.Yet, in the years siace, CIA has, in effect, 'made' policy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even tren targets of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not a state of mind calculated to stiniulate friendly feelings toward the United States. Indonesia, of course, is a prime example.This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifica State of a projected covert operation is inadequate to protect US Interests. There must be some means by which State can be inforzad of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will continue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reasonable control.3. The Controlled American Source (CAS) represents a particula aspect of CLA's encroachment on policy-making functione. CIA today has nearly as many people under official cover overseas as State -- 3900 to 3700. About 1500 of these are under State Department cover
[176-10030-10422.pdf — page 8]
8:(the other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover). Originally the use of State Department cover for CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. The Dulles-Correa-Jackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problems, but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in this way and through increased efficiency of its overseas personnel, find a way to temper its demands upon the State Department." Nonetheless CIA has steadily increased its requisitions for official cover.There are several reasons why CIA has abandoned its original intention of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange cover through State; it is less expensive; it is quicker; it facilitates the security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a pleasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.In some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumbers regular State Department personnel. In the American Embassy in Vienna, out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List as being in the Political Section, 16 are CAS personnel; of the 31 officers listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Of the 13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile, 11 are CAS. On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration 47 percent of the political officers serving in United States Embassies were CAS. Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, has more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) than the Ambassador. Often he has direct access to the local Prime Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period in Laos) he pursues a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is generally well known locally as the CIA representative.In the Paris Embassy today, there are 128 CIA people. CIA in Paris has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally occupied by State. The CIA men doing overt internal political reporting outnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10-2. CIA has even sought to monopolize contact with certain French political personalities, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA occupies the top floor of the Paris Embassy, a fact well known locally, and on.