Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[176-10033-10151.pdf — page 1]
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR UNDYPer your request.RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR17 February 1961(DATE)SANITIZED MK. 98.84 5/04
[176-10033-10151.pdf — page 2]
# SECRETBRIEFING PAPER ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC## I. SituationFollowing the break in diplomatic relations in August 1960 U.S./Dominican relations have worsened steadily, and the anti-U. S. sentiment of the GODR was brought sharply into focus by the appearance of pickets outside our consulate on 5 January in protest against the OAS vote to extend trade sanctions against the Dominican Republic. The pickets bore signs condemning the interventionist policy of the U. S. and calling for the expulsion of Consul General Dearborn, whom they labeled a spy. The Dominican radio and press continued to censure President Eisenhower as being responsible for the present state of affairs, while maintaining a reserve concerning President Kennedy, apparently adopting a "wait and see" attitude, although it has previously expressed some reservations regarding the President's choice of advisers on Latin America.On 26 January the GODR ordered the expulsion of U. S. Vice Consul James A. McNamara on the ground that he was making derogatory remarks about the country; however, it is probable that this expulsion was in retaliation and anger over the belief that the U. S. had provided information to Venezuela on Trujillo's efforts to overthrow or assassinate President Batencourt.It is thought by some informed observers that the outcome of the sugar legislation which comes up for renewal in the U. S. Congress in March 1961 will be all-important to the future of U. S./Dominican relations. Some say that the Trujillo government cannot last another six months if they do not get their share of the Cuban windfall sugar; and rumors are circulating in Ciudad Trujillo that if they are deprived of the windfall the GODR plans to expropriate American properties and terminate U. S. consular relations.## II Operational Summary### A. GeneralIt will be recalled that on 24 January 1961 the Special Group authorized the Agency to provide dissident exiled Dominican groups with limited arms and equipment provided their delivery to elements within the Dominican Republic was effected by Dominicans. Immediately following this decision we indicated to witting leaders of the VRD (BETANCOURT - FIGUERES - ORNES Group) and the FCR (Internal Dissident Group withwhom DEARBORN is in touch) that we were prepared to provide them a limited supply of arms and equipment provided they developed the capability to introduce same into the Dominican Republic.On 27 January Station Caracas was authorized to inform President BETANCOURT the U. S. is now providing financial support and technical guidance to VRD activities directed by Horacio ORNES,# SECRET
[176-10033-10151.pdf — page 3]
SECRET-2-specifically for ship repairs, recruiting and training crews, locatingsites and facilities for future PM activities, strengthening the politicalorganization of the VRD and propaganda. On 30 January Station Caracaswas authorized to inform BETANCOURT that Headquarters was preparedto consider providing arms and equipment to any bona fide resistance elementwith whom adequate contact can be established. BETANCOURT was to beencouraged to recommend any new individuals or groups he considered usefulto further objectives of the project. Station Caracas reported that PresidentBETANCOURT was gratified to receive the above information.In Headquarters contact with FCR exiled leaders, they disclosedtheir plan of action which they felt could be implemented if they wereprovided with arms for 300 men, explosives, and remote control detonationdevices. They also claimed to have a small boat infil-exfil capability.On the other hand the VRD, while claiming no internal organization, claimeda sea and air capability and are the chosen instruments of PresidentBETANCOURT and Jose FIGUERES.B. Frente Civica Revolucionaria (FCR)(1) We have recently been in touch with key exiled leaders ofthe FCR and they have expressed a willingness to assemble a small cadrein Puerto Rico. It is contemplated that they will develop maritimecapability, be in touch with their internal counterparts throughW/T facilities, and develop plans for implementing the internal group'splan of action. In view of their reluctance to deal directly with theORNES Group (VRD) and in the interests of security we plan to keepthem compartmented for the time being.(2) Through our Station in Ciudad Trujillo we are attemptingto ascertain the details of the FCR's plan of action and develop a stay-behind communication capability.C. Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana (VRD)(1) We are actively supporting the VRD (the ORNES group) inrepairing and outfitting their yacht so as to develop an arms deliverycapability. It is estimated that it will take from 45 to 60 days to completethis work. Additional time may be needed to recruit and train a crew.(2) Support is also being given to the VRD's propaganda andorganizational activities. A program is being developed with the hope thatthe VRD can develop their own contacts and sources of information withinthe Dominican Republic.D. Possibility of Developing a Boycott Capability(1) During the summer of 1960 WH Division made use of FernandoMUNIZ Silva, Dominican exile in Puerto Rico and at the time head of theSECRET2a
[176-10033-10151.pdf — page 4]
SECRET-3-Syndicate of Free Dominican Labor in Exile (SLTDE), to organize picketing activities in San Juan against Ships carrying cargo to or from the Dominican Republic. The picketing had some success and showed promise of becoming a threat to the Dominican economy, but was finally broken up by the International Longshoremens Association (ILA), at least one officer of which was reportedly in the pay of Trujillo.(2) Inasmuch as the ILA has recently abrogated its contract with the Dominican unions under pressure from George Meany it is felt that now would be a good time to consider resumption of picketing activities in San Juan, in the hope that such action might spark similar activities in other ports. Trujillo has demonstrated an awareness of the importance of smooth labor relations in foreign ports and it is felt that a blow at this time from international labor would do much to bring the dictator to his knees.(3) It should be noted that the Department of State last summer disapproved any approach to U. S. unions on this subject. WHD feels that perhaps this announced policy should now be reviewed in the light of more recent developments and an attempt be made, through covert channels if necessary, to build up an international shipping boycott against the GODR.III Conclusions(1) In many respects initial talks with FCR and VRD leaders reveal that they over-estimate their own capabilities. Neither has an immediate capability to introduce arms into the area or a firm plan of action.(2) That we have indicated to both organizations our willingness to help has been a boost to their morale and has also precipitated a noticeable withdrawal from earlier claims of "all we need is arms and a little help and we can do the job".(3) Recent reports on internal conditions in the Dominican Republic clearly point out that the country is rapidly approaching a stage of complete economic paralysis, a situation that has created feelings of tension and desperation, not only among the opposition elements but within the ranks of the Trujillo clique itself. While sources within the middle class express fears of eventual liquidation of that class by the dictator and his son Ramfis, it is not likely that Trujillo will move until he lears of the outcome in late March 1961 of congressional action on the windfall sugar quota. If such action is favorable to Trujillo, it is probable that he will continue to rule uneasily for an indefinite period unless material outside pressure is brought to bearSECRET
[176-10033-10151.pdf — page 5]
SEGRET-4-against him. If, however, his windfall is taken from him, it is thefirm opinion of this Division that a violent reaction on his part willshortly thereafter be felt which will end either with the liquidation ofTrujillo and his cohorts or with a complete roll-up of the internal opposition.While the organization of delivery capabilities described elsewhere in thismemorandum is proceeding according to schedule, it is now feared thatthese capabilities will not be ready for use until the appropriate time,i.e., prior to 1 April, has passed and until there may no longer existinternal assets with which to deal. WH Division, therefore, recommendsthat consideration: be given to the immediate use of sea capabilitiesnow employed by WH/4 to cache the requested arms and other materialon land areas contiguous to the Dominican coast from whence, as informedFCR elements claim they can do, infiltration of the arms can be carriedcut by members of the internal FCR by the use of fishing vessels.SECRET
[176-10036-10023.pdf — page 0]
176-10036-10023 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY : NARARECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10023RECORD SERIES : National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR : CIAFROM :TO :TITLE : Withdrawal of United Nations TroopsDATE : 8/00/1963PAGES : 1SUBJECTS :DOCUMENT TYPE :CLASSIFICATION :RESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS : Congo Cables; restriction information innacurate/missing; box 1
[176-10036-10023.pdf — page 1]
# SECRETCIA INFORMATION REPORTNO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLYCOUNTRY UNITED NATIONS/CONGOSUBJECT WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED NATIONS TROOPS FROM THE CONGODOI AUGUST 1963PADA NEW YORK, 7 AUGUST 1963APPR 3SOURCE MEDIUM LEVEL LATIN AMERICAN OFFICIAL /F/ WITH CLOSE CONTACTS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIATSECRET UTF-1470DEFINITE PLANS ARE BEING MADE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED NATIONS TROOPS IN THE CONGO AT THE END OF 1963 DESPITE CONGOLESE PREMIER CYRILLE ADOULA,S PLEAS TO THE CONTRARY. THE ONLY WAY OF COUNTERACTING THE WITH- DRAWAL WOULD BE TO FIND A NEW METHOD OF FINANCING THE CONGO OPERATION. UNDER SUCH A PLAN, THE IDEAL WOULD BE THE MAINTENANCE OF 40-50 PERCENT STRENGTH. ALTHOUGH THERE IS TALK IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT OF FUNDING METHODS, THE ABILITY OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO ACCEPT SUCH OUTSIDE FUNDS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DEBATE.FIELD DISSEM U.S. MISSIONUTF-1470 8 AUGUST 1963NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
[176-10036-10027.pdf — page 0]
176-10036-10027 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORM
[176-10036-10027.pdf — page 1]
AGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10027RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER:
[176-10036-10051.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY : NARARECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10051RECORD SERIES : National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR : CIAFROM :TO :TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information ReportDATE : 8/10/1963PAGES : 3SUBJECTS :DOCUMENT TYPE :CLASSIFICATION :RESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 48: Cuban Subjects: Exiles information report. Box 1
[176-10036-10051.pdf — page 1]
# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains information affecting the National Defense of the. United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMSECRETCOUNTRY CUBA NICARAGUASUBJECT POSSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CUBAN EXILE BASE IN NICARAGUAREPORT NO. TDCS -3/556, 052DATE DISTR. 10 AUGUST. 1963PRECEDENCE ROUTINEDATE OF INFO. 24 JULY 1963PLACE & DATE ACO. ENGLAND, LONDON (9 AUGUST 1963)REFERENCES TDCS-3/555,529IN 97132FIELD REPORT NO. OEL 35,970APPRAISAL 3THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.SOURCE OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS "WELL-KNOWN AND EXPERIENCED IN REPORTING, PROBABLY RELIABLE, QUOTING ROMANI."1. IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION/24 JULY 63, SALVADOR ROMANI, REPRESENTATIVE IN VENEZUELA OF CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION COMANDO UNIFICADO DE LA LIBERACION EN CUBA (UNITED COMMAND OF CUBAN LIBERATION - CULC), CLAIMED THAT A SMALL NUMBER CUBAN EXILES HAD ALREADY MOVED FROM MIAMI TO NICARAGUA. IN EXILE CIRCLES IT IS BELIEVED THIS ACTION REFLECTS A PREVIOUS AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRESIDENT SOMOZA OF NICARAGUA AND MANUEL ARTIME, SECRETARY GENERAL OF EXILE GROUP MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACIÓN REVOLUCIONARIA (MOVEMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY - MR.R). ROMANI DID NOT KNOW DETAILS OF AGREEMENT. IF IT ENTAILS ESTABLISHMENT OF A LARGE-SCALE EXILE MILITARY BASE IN NICARAGUA,SECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
[176-10036-10051.pdf — page 2]
55SECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMTDCS -3/556,052IN 97132PAGE 2OTHER EXILE GROUPS WILL AWAIT REACTION OF UNITED STATES BEFOREDECIDING THEIR OWN COURSE OF ACTION.2. NUCLEUS/SUCH A BASE WOULD BE DRAWN FROM THREE TO FOUR THOUSAND   EXILES WHO, ACCORDING TO ROMANI, HAVE PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED MILATARY   TRAINING FROM MEMBERS/U.S. ARMED FORCES. ROMANI CLAIMED U.S.   POLICY IS TO FERMENT INTERNAL RESISTANCE IN CUBA AND/STRENGTHEN THE   RESISTANCE BY INFILTRATION OF TRAINED COMMANDO GROUPS OF EXILES.   FOR THIS REASON THE U.S. CONTINUES/GIVE TACIT SUPPORT FOR TRAINING   OF EXILE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.3. ROMANI MADE FOLLOWING REVIEW OF POLICIES OF PRINCIPAL EXILE   PARTIES:(A) CULC IS CONCENTRATING ON DISSEMINATION/ANTI-CASTROPROPAGANDA IN CUBA TO PREPARE GROUND FOR INSURRECTION. IT FAVORSINFILTRATION/SMALL MILITARY GROUPS BUT REJECTS A GENERAL INVASION.(B) JURE (JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIA), LED BY MANUEL RAY, CONSIDERS THEPRINCIPLE REQUIREMENT IS TO SECURE SUPPORT OF DISCONTENTED ELEMENTSIN CUBAN MILITIA AND ARMED FORCES.(C) ALLIANCE OF MRP (MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO POPULAR),SECOND FRONT OF ESCAMBRAY AND ALPHA 66, SUPPORTS CONTINUATION OF HIT-AND-RUN RAIDS ON CUBAN MAINLAND IN ORDER/MAINTAIN MORALE OF RESISTANCEFORCES IN CUBA.CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSSECRETNO FOREIGN DISSEM
[176-10036-10051.pdf — page 3]
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMTDCS -3/556,052 IN 97132PAGE 3(D) SEVERAL GROUPS, INCLUDING UMC (UNIDADES MILITARES CUBANAS), CLC (COMANDOS LIBRES DE CUBA) AND A SECTION OF MRR CONSIDER THAT ONLY A GENERAL INVASION WILL OVERTHROW THE CUBAN REGIME.(E) FUR (FRENTE UNIDO REVOLUCIONARIO), LED BY AURELIANO SANCHEZ ARANGO, IS WORKING PRIMARILY TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT/LATIN AMERICAN GOVTS FOR COORDINATED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON CUBAFIELD DISSEM: STATE, CINCLANT CINCSO.END OF MESSAGECLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM
[176-10036-10052.pdf — page 0]
176-10036-10052 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY: NARARECORD NUMBER: 176-10036-10052RECORD SERIES: National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR : CIAFROM :TO :TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information ReportDATE : 6/28/1963PAGES : 2SUBJECTS :DOCUMENT TYPE :CLASSIFICATION :RESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: National Security Files, Box 48: Cuban Subjects: Exiles information report. Box 1)-
[176-10036-10052.pdf — page 1]
# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMThis material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage to Bee, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSSECRET(When Filled In)NO FOREIGN DISSEMCOUNTRY CUBASUBJECT CUBAN EXILE PLANSDATE OF INFO.: MID-JUNE 1963PLACE & DATE ACO. ENGLAND, LONDON (27 JUNE 1963)APPRAISAL 3REPORT NO. TDCS-3/551,800RRESTALDATE DISTR. 28 JUNE 19630HNSONPRECEDENCE ROUTINEREFERENCESKAYSENKILDUFF_KLEINKOMER_ SAUNDERSSCHLESINGERFIELD REPORT NO. OEL 3566SMITHTHIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENTIENTIVE.SOURCE AN OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS "WELL KNOWN AND EXPERIENCED IN REPORTING, PROBABLY RELIABLE, QUOTING THE PERSONS MENTIONED".1. AMAURY FRAGINALS ALONSO, ONE OF THE LEADERS IN THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO POPULAR (POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT - MRP), THE SECOND FRONT OF ESCAMBRAY AND ALPHA 66, CLAIMED IN CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSION DURING A VISIT TO VENEZUELA IN MID JUNE 63 THAT THE ALLIANCE WILL CONTINUE TO ATTACK THE CUBAN MAINLAND.AT THE SAME TIME, PLANS ARE GOING AHEAD TO LAUNCH PLAN OMEGA.FRAGINALS SAID THAT PLAN OMEGA HAS THREE STAGES: (A) REORGANIZATION AND ARMING OF GUERRILLA GROUPS THROUGHOUT CUBA WHICH WILL BE LED BY LOCAL MEN WHO KNOW THEIR AREA;(B) INCESSANT GUERRILLA ATTACKS AGAINST RUSSIAN BASES, THE CUBANSECRETCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEMSTATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID. USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OBI 00 EXTATE/DIR FBI I&NS TREASURYTELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMORM. 1K OBSOLETE FREVIOUS EDITIONS.
[176-10036-10052.pdf — page 2]
CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSSECRET(When Filled In)NO FOREIGN DISSEMTDCS-3/551,866IN 69083PAGE 2ARMY AND THE MILITIA. THE PURPOSE OF THESE WILL BE TO CAUSE MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES, UNDERMINE THEIR MORALE AND RAISE THE MORALE OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN PREPARATION FOR AN INSURRECTION; (C) COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF A GENERAL INSURRECTION.2. FRAGINALS REMARKED THAT THE REORGANIZATION OF GUERRILLA GROUPS IS PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY BUT THAT THERE IS AN INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS. HE REVEALED THAT THE ALLIANCE IS RECEIVING BLUE-PRINTS, FROM INSIDE CUBA, OF MAJOR PLANTS. THEY INCLUDE INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR FUNCTIONS, SHIFTS, AS WELL AS THE NUMBER AND DEPLOYMENT OF GUARDS. THE BLUE PRINTS ARE TRANSMITTED BY COURIER OR LETTER AND WILL BE USED FOR PLAN OMEGA.3. FRAGINALS DESCRIBED THE LATEST ADHERENT TO THE ALLIANCE, THE FRENTE ANTI-COMMUNISTA DE LIBERACION (ANTI-COMMUNIST LIBERATION FRONT - FAL), AS A CLANDESTINE GROUP WITHIN THE CUBAN ARMY. HE REFUSED TO GIVE FIGURES BUT ALLEGED THAT THE GROUP WAS EXPANDING AND WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE "FORTHCOMING WAR" IN CUBA. HE CONFIRMED THE ALLIANCE'S DETERMINATION TO WAGE WAR ON FIDEL CASTRO'S REGIME, EVEN AT THE RISK OF PRECIPITATING A NUCLEAR CONFLICT4. FIELD DISSEMI STATE, CINCLANT, CINCSO.![list of names]END OF MESSAGECLASSIFICATION DISSEMINATION CONTROLSNO FOREIGN DISSEM
[176-10036-10058.pdf — page 0]
176-10036-10058 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY : NARARECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10058RECORD SERIES : National Security FilesAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR : CIAFROM :TO : Director, CIATITLE : Activities of Cuban Trained Peruvian GuerrillasDATE : 4/11/1963PAGES : 5SUBJECTS :DOCUMENT TYPE :CLASSIFICATION :RESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 51: Cuba, Subjects intelligence material6/63-7/63. Box 1
[176-10036-10058.pdf — page 1]
# SECRETCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYWASHINGTON 25, D. C.EYES ONLY11 April 1963MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central IntelligenceSUBJECT: Activities of Cuban-Trained Peruvian Guerrillas1. The information in this memorandum comes from an extremely sensitive source who is currently a member of a group of Cuban-trained Peruvian guerrillas. No other dissemination has been made of the reports he has provided, in order to protect him and to insure that a channel is kept open to him. The information is being forwarded in this restricted manner at this time to furnish an insight into the extent of Cuban efforts to assist Latin American revolutionary movements. The Agency directed asset is working inside a network which is now assisting Cuban-trained Latin Americans to re-enter their own countries illegally, and to join with leftist revolutionary groups to overthrow the established goverments.2. The Agency esset vas a momber of a group of more than 70 Peruvians trained in Cuba from June until December 1962. His contingent traveled in small groups by way of Mexico. Ho received his first special assignment when he was appointed to stay behind in Mexico tamporarily and to act as a olandestine contact with a Cuban Embassy official there. The Cuban gave him instructions and funds, and be directed the later groups which transited Hexic3. The Peruvian group was ostensibly in Cuba only to attend the July celebrations. According to our agent, come of the members themselves did not know in advance they were to be given training. The Cubans set the Peruvians up as self-contained unite in secret training sites in Habana, where they were given political indoctrination and weapons. Later they were moved to rural hill areas for guerrilla training. The agent has described in detail these secret training sites, giving address of the houses and the locations of the guerrilla areas4. The agent was removed from his group for several weeks to undergo special training in secret communications techniques, in preparetion for his current assignment.5. At present, the agent acts as coordinator, helping the Peruvians to return illegally to Peru. He is in correspondence withSECRET
[176-10036-10058.pdf — page 2]
SECRET-2-persons in numerous points of entry in Latin America and with contacts in several European capitals who assist the group on their clandestine return. Although many left Peru openly on valid papers, they are coming back illegally. Some have false documentation from other countries, primarily from Colombia; some have Peruvian passports issued in the names of persons now deceased; some are crossing the borders from neighboring countries clandestinely without showing any papers; and some go by small boats to isolated areas.6. The agent is a member of the Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR) of Peru which now plans to join with other leftist revolutionary groups to bring about a coup before the elections scheduled for June 1963. The agent knows of come 200 Peruvians who have received Cuban training, only a small percentage of whom are actually Communist Party members.7. Approximately 300 persons have been named by the agent as being connected with the ring helping the Peruvians to reinfiltrate secretly. Attempts are being made to learn whether some of these, particularly those used as "Co-ordinators" or "Correspondence points" in Europe and the United States, are also connected with the illegal return of Cuban-trained guerrillas to other countries.8. Paris has emerged as the center of the network. Groups of ten arrive weekly from Cuba to be sent on to various Latin American countries for eventual re-entry into Peru. The man in charge of the Peruvians is headquartered in Paris. From there, he has been directing the travel, sending instructions to his scattered subordinates, and receiving reports and information from contacts throughout the world, and handling funds.9. Correspondence between members of the group is by cable and by letter. The security of communications is protected by several alternate systems of code and secret writing. Each of the trainees has been assigned a number; and letter and number designations are given to hotels and pensione. In cable correspondence, the ring uses these numbers to indicate which persons are traveling and where they may be reached. The content of the messages appears to relate to business matters, covering shipment dates and invoice numbers for example. Letter correspondence contains secret writing with relatively sophiscated systems, interspaced between lines of innocuous friendly or business letters. A dictionary is used for coded messages in either cables or letters, with page and word number referring to clandestine key words.SECRET