Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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SECRET171 activities conducted by the Special Activities Staff during2 your -- and subsequently the Cuban Operations Group during3 your 9-year tenure with those groups.4 A Well, there was -- it was an across-the-board5 intelligence operation consisting of collection of foreign6 positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary7 activities, covert action, economic activities. That is about8 the breadth of the thing.9 Q Now, these were all conducted through the DDO?10 A Right.11 Q Now, let's speak for a moment about the paramilitary12 operations. Were these operations run out of southern13 Florida?14 A Right.15 Q And in particular out of the Miami Station?16 A Yes.17 Q Were there any other CIA facilities in that area of18 the country that participated in these activities?19 A Not to my knowledge.20 Q Were there any southern harbors other than Miami21 that were used in these activities?22 A Well, we had activities down in the Keys also. As23 I said, we did have a Key West base.24 Q Were there any other bases in that area of the25 country that were utilized in these operations?SECRETPhotocopy fromGerald Ford Library
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SECKET181 A Well, not that I would call a base. We did have2 training facilities for the UDT teams.3 Q What is a UDT team?4 A Underwater demolition.5 Q Where were those bases located?6 A I frankly don't know. They were down along the Keys,7 along that long peninsula going down there. There were a8 number of sites. I really can't recall them.9 Q Were there any other sites within the United States10 in which paramilitary training was conducted, for people11 participating in these activities?12 A Not to my knowledge.13 Q Where were these people trained?14 A What do you mean?15 Q Well, Cubans who participated in these activities.16 A We trained them at these places we had in the Keys.17 Now, there also -- some of them were brought up here and trained18 at the Domestic Training Station.19 Q Where is that located?20 A That is down in Virginia.21 Q Were any CIA personnel actually involved in these22 raids?23 A Occasionally, I would think that -- you have got to24 understand at this time that we had a great many contract25 employees, independent contractors and this type of thing.
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SECRET1 Most of the paramilitary operations and the training was2 conducted by the Special Operations Group which is another3 entity of the --4 Q DDO?5 A DDO.6 Q Now, the facilities that we have been talking about,7 training facilities, were manned, then, by the Special8 Operations Group, or at least supervised by the Special9 Operations Group, is that correct?10 A Well, supervised, yes, and I would think that probably11 some of the training was given by their people. The Domestic12 Training Station is under the Office of Training and -- but I13 would think that in the paramilitary field that the SOG would14 probably staff the training facility with their people who have15 the expertise in paramilitary operations.16 Q Now, were the people that were being trained at17 these facilities basically Cuban refugees?18 A Yes.19 Q And at the outset I take it not many of those people20 were American citizens?21 A No.22 Q Or had become American citizens.23 A I would assume a great many have.24 Q By this time.25 A By this time, yes.Photocopy fromGerald Ford LibrarySECRET
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20Q At the present time, how large is that Cuban community in Miami? Do you have any idea?A Well, it is extremely large. I would think it is probably -- I was trying to think. I would say up towards a military people.Q You spoke about paramilitary operations and covert action. How do you distinguish between those two categories of activities?A Well, actually one can fall into the other. The paramilitary could fall into covert action but in those days we did distinguish somewhat. A lot of the covert action was media placement. We had a number of operations at -- legal- type operations, harassment operations. For instance, Fidel seized a great many art treasures and in particular he had a Napoleonic collection which was supposed to be the finest in the world that he sold to dealers in Europe. He had paintings that were immensely valuable that he tried to have auctioned in London and the London auctioneer would not accept them because he obviously didn't have clear title to them. He was forced to auction them in Toronto, Canada.We ran legal operations, got the owners and had them hire attorneys and bring them to court and this type of thing.He seized these race horses. He tried to peddle them in Europe and up in Canada. We ran opposition against that
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SECRET211 type of thing.2 Q These were what you considered to be covert operations?3 A Yes, covert action.4 Q Now, this is what you were referring to, legal-5 type operations?6 A Yes.7 Q You used legal process to harass Castro.8 A Yes.9 Q What other types of harassment activities did you10 run that would fall under this covert action category?11 A Well --12 Q Would economic warfare be --13 A That was sort of something separate unto itself.14 This was -- the economic warfare aspect of this thing was a15 decision of the Special Group to enforce an economic blockade.16 Q What special group is that?17 A It is now called the Forty Committee.18 Q Is that 302 Committee?19 A Well, it was a 302 at one time, too. First of all,20 it was called the Special Group, CI, Counterinsurgency. Then21 it went to the 302 and then it had another name in between22 there and now it is the Forty Committee.23 Q All right. We will return to that a little bit24 later, but what other types of harassment were you running25 against Castro --SECRETPhotocopy from Gerald Ford Library
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SECRETI221 A This is what I was trying to think of.2 Q -- that would be considered covert action?3 A Well, as I say, a lot of propaganda, press placement,4 media placement. It has been so long ago I really don't5 remember. I know we had a number of things going against him.6 We used suasion, moral suasion, otherwise. We did some7 extra-legal things. We tried to get to his sources of supply,8 particularly when they were countries that we had treaties9 with, NATO countries, Canada, this type of thing.10 Q Let's talk about each of those in turn. You said11 you used moral suasion. What kind of activities are you12 referring to?13 A Well, in the moral suasion field we -- actually, we14 were the catalyst in this whole thing and we had the legal15 activities, the legal -- well, I don't know how you would16 phrase it, but we operated under the Cuban access control17 regulations of the Treasury Department, the Trading with the18 Enemy Act, and we also used the facilities of the Department of19 Commerce, the Export Control people.20 I guess as you are aware, Cuban industry was totally21 U.S.-oriented. As parts began wearing out and this type of22 thing, Castro had his little people there running around trying23 to place orders with subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Where24 we would find this out through all-source intelligence, we25 or the Treasury people or the Commerce people would go to the
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SECRET                                                                                231   executives of these American companies and ask them to tell2   their foreign subsidiaries not to provide the spare parts3   and the other things that Castro might need. We had the4   Department of Commerce -- we identified 600 of the major U.S.5   companies that could provide spare parts for Cuban industry.6   We had the Department of Commerce send letters to those 6007   manufacturers and ask them to cooperate with them in denying8   any spare parts to the Cubans. This was a fairly concentrated9   effort to really isolate them.10  Q   All right. And that is what you were referring to11  as moral suasion?12  A   Yes.13  Q   Anything else in that category?14  A   Not really. None that I can think of.15  Q   Did you make the same kind of efforts with foreign16  companies?17  A   At one point we did but it was absolutely useless,18  the point in case being the Leyland buses. We pulled all stops19  to`stop that sale. The British Government turned us down20  flat.21  Q   Now, did you attempt to reach any other sources of22  supply?23  A   Well, we also had what we call a preemptive purchasing24  program. If there was a single source of supply for a25: particular item we would go in and buy it to deny the Cubans
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1 the market.2 Q Would that then be re-sold somewhere on the domestic3 A Yes.4 Q -- domestic market?5 A No. It would be re-sold abroad.6 Q In all cases?7 A The cases that I was associated with, it was all8 sold abroad.9 Q What kind of purchases were made?10 A Well, we purchased at one point -- we purchased11 some Bright Stock in Antwerp.12 Q What?13 A Bright Stock.14 Q What is that?15 A Heavy, heavy oil, and since Cuba -- 85 percent of16 her energy comes from oil, this was considered a critical17 commodity. Bright Stock can be -- oh, it is almost like tar,18 melted tar, and it can be cut into additives, lubricants, this19 type of thing, and this was critical to the Cuban economy. So20 we had an oil firm purchase this Bright Stock from a dealer for21 which we reimbursed the guy and the Bright Stock was eventually22 sold in Africa.23 Q Do you know of any sales of such materials that24 were made within the United States? Resales, I should say.25 A No.
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## SECKEIQ In addition to preemptive buying were there any other actions taken by this group with respect to sources of supply to Cuba?A Well, we did provide through third country agents who got orders for Cuban goods, in collusion with the Commerce Department, and I would assume the Special Group, we had replacement parts manufactured that were substandard.Q And you had them sold through foreign companies?A Well, we had our agents get the Cuban orders all over Europe. Then they would come back and, as a matter of fact, the former Secretary of Commerce, who is on your Committee, Des. and I met him and he gave us the go-ahead to do this.Q Mr. Dillon?A No. He was Secretary of the Treasury.Q But --A But you must remember that these American --Q Mr. Connors?A Yes. But you must remember these American manufacturers, well, their places were nationalized and they were only too happy to work with us. And actually, it was a cash deal, bona fide business. These things were transshipped through two or three countries, finally wound up in Havana.Q You referred to some extra-legal activities.A Yes. That is what I was trying to think of, what we did. I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of
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our activities but I just can't think -- I remember this wason one of our activities but I just can't remember what theextra-legal was. I just can't remember what it was. I knowit was one of the parts of the program.Q This was illegal activities? Is that what you arereferring to?A Well, I wouldn't say they were illegal, but theyweren't exactly legal, I don't think. Perhaps they were in agray area some place.Q Well, whose laws are we talking about, internationallaw, the laws of the United States?A I would have to go back and review the thing. Ireally can't remember this. I would have to go to the files.Q Where could we find that kind of thing in the files?A I would think probably down in the Records Center someplace.Q Would it be possible to obtain that material sometime during the lunch hour?A No. It is forty miles away.Q Well, is there some place in the building whereyou could refresh your memory?A Not to my knowledge. All that stuff has been shippedl.This is talking 11 years ago, 12 years ago. All that materialhas been retired.Q What category of activity would we be talking about> Photocopy from> Gerald Ford Library
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SECRET                                                                                                                                  271   Q   when we refer to extra-legal activities?2   A   This is what I was trying to think of and I can't think of what it was. I know extra-legal activities was one4   parts of the program that we were involved in.5   I might have a chart in my safe downstairs that might tell me what that is.7   Q   Well, let's make a note of that and we will have to8   come back to that.9   A   All right.10  Q   Who else would be knowledgeable about extra-legal activities that were run against Castro?12  A   Well, the people that would be knowledgeable are probably retired and I was running the program. So I ran the economic program.15  Q   Well, these are activities that were run in connection with the economic program?17  A   Yes.18  Q   We talked about media placement during this nine-year period. To what are you referring when you refer to20  media placement?21  A   Well, stories or news items that perhaps our propaganda people wrote. We had them placed in newspapers and magazines throughout the world.24  Q   Would this also include broadcasts over radio25  stations?SECRETPhotocopy from Gerald Ford Library
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SECRETA Oh, yes. Radio is a very big part of it.Q Now, were any of these newspapers or magazines published within the United States?A Not to my knowledge, no.Q These were essentially foreign publications?A Yes.Q Were any of them published in the Cuban community in Miami?A No. The intent was to get world opinion against Castro. You don't do that by publishing in the United States.Q What about the radio broadcasts? How were those handled?A Are you speaking of Radio Swan now?Q Well, I am unfamiliar with how many radio stations were involved. Was there more than one radio station?A No. We only had the one radio station but we did contract time with Florida stations, a station in New York.Q For broadcasts to what areas?A For broadcasts to Havana.Q And the station in New York, was that received also -- was that also broadcasting to various areas of the United States?A I have no idea. I don't know whether they used a particular frequency to get this out or whether they did it on short-wave or what they did.SECRETPhotocopy from Gerald Ford Library
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SECRET291 Q But the intention was to reach Cuba.2 A Reach Cuba.3 Q You referred to a station in New York, referred to4 as Swan. Were there others?5 A There were a couple in Miami that I recall. Not in6 Miami. I think there was one -- yes, there was one in Miami,7 I think, and one down in Key West that they used.8 Q Where was Radio Swan located?9 A On Swan Island.10 Q Where is Swan Island?11 A Swan Island is a little glob around Honduras.12 Q As far as you can recall, were there any other13 radio stations in the United States that were utilized to14 broadcast propaganda materials toward Cuba?15 A Well, there conceivably could have been, not that16 I recall right now..17 Q Do you recall any attempts by the Agency or groups18 affiliated with the Agency to raise money from the American19 public to support those propaganda activities?20 A No. As far as I know, Radio Swan and this type of21 thing was fully subsidized by the Agency.22 Q Do you recall the advertising campaigns that were23 run in connection with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?24 A Oh, yes.25 Q Was anything of that nature done in connection with
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1 Cuban propaganda?2 A Not to my knowledge.3 Q And that would include both the publications and the4 radio?5 A Right.6 Q Let's talk about economic warfare for a couple of7 moments. Could you describe for me briefly the type of8 economic activities that were conducted against Castro?9 A Well, first of all, we wanted to denigrate the10 regime, his credit worthiness, and this type of thing. We11 worked very closely with the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in12 the State Department and, well, for instance, in those days, I13 guess it was back in 1964, the price of sugar had jumped from14 about a penny a pound to 13 cents a pound, something like15 that, and we couldn't understand why. So we kept -- Fidel kept16 saying that he had such a poor crop and this type of thing and17 we just couldn't figure out why he had such a poor crop because18 some of our own island assets told us they were out there cutting19 this cane like mad and the mills were working 24 hours a day,20 this type of thing. So subsequently, we found out that he was21 lying and he was storing the raw cane in the schools, any22 place. He had no storage facilities and put it any place he23 could.24 So in cooperation with a couple of sugar brokers in25 New York, we surfaced this fact and the price of sugar took a
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SECRET1 real tumble and all of a sudden then Cuba started exporting.2 It was this type of thing that obviously he was trying to build up the world price because he didn't have any money, he was so short on his exchange, and obviously we didn't want him to get the exchange. So it was those types of activities.3 Q Was the assistance of any U.S. businessmen or U.S. companies enlisted in that effort?4 A Oh, yes.5 Q In what manner did you use U.S. companies and businessmen?6 A Well, we simply used them as the experts. A great many -- the sugar industry in Cuba was controlled by the American community, by American bankers, and obviously they lost everything when they had to pull out. Sugar is the lifeline of Cuba as far as any exchange, foreign exchange, this type of thing, and it was naturally our Number 1 target. So it was only natural that we would go to the American businessmen.7 Q What kind of assistance did you seek or obtain from these businessmen?8 A Well, we simply talked with them about why -- you know, the market conditions were, why the price was rising, if we could find out that Fidel has plenty of sugar, what would happen to the market price. This type of thing.9 Q They were used as consultants, basically.SECRETPhotocopy from Gerald Ford Library
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321 A They were used as consultants, basically, yes.2 Q We have spoken about the investment American business had in Cuba. Did it ever come to your attention that American organized crime5 A No.6 Q -- had considerable investment in Cuba?7 A No. Well, everybody knew that the Mafia was in Cuba. I mean, all the casinos and this type of thing.9 Q The casinos were run --10 A I knew that long before. When I was in the Air Force during the war, I used to fly into Havana on weekends and this type of thing.13 Q I understand that. It was fairly well known.14 A It was a criminal element.15 Q The Mafia was involved with the casinos in Havana.16 A Right.17 Q Do you know of any attempts by the Agency to enlist the support or assistance of any crime figures in any manner whatsoever in the Agency's efforts against the Cuban regime?20 A No.21 Q Have you ever heard of Mr. Roselli?22 A Oh, yes.23 Q When was the first time you heard of Mr. Roselli?24 A Well, I guess it was -- it seems to me it was either Drew Pearson or Jack Anderson had an article on him a number
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SECRET331 of years ago.2 Q Was that the first time you heard of the man's3 name?4 A Yes, as I recall.5 Q Is that also true of Sam Giancana?6 A No. I have heard that name but I don't know where.7 Q In connection with --8 A Not in connection with the Agency, no.9 Q In connection with the casinos or --10 A No.11 Q -- gambling interests in Cuba?12 A No.13 Q You know of no instance in which organized crime14 figures were used as consultants by the Agency?15 A Only what I read in the paper. I had no knowledge16 of that whatsoever.17 Q Do you know of any offers of assistance from figures18 of that type --19 A No.20 Q -- who were interested in getting back into cuba?21 A No.22 Q We were talking about economic warfare. We have23 talked about attempts to keep the price of sugar low. What other24 types of economic activities were conducted against Castro's25 Cuba?SECRETPhotocopy fromGerald Ford Library
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SECRET34A Well, we used all-source information to find out what his commercial dealings were. When we would see -- well, for instance, the Nicaro Nickel Mine which is a source owned by the General Services Administration, finally got back into production and nickel, of course, and still is -- was in short supply. We had a French firm, Societe le Nickel, who was buying almost the entire output of the Nicaro mines. And this French firm ex ported to the United States. So we went to the Treasury Department and to the Foreign Assets Control people and said, isn't there something we can do to stop these !le Nickel exports coming into the United States? So they looked into the thing and indeed they did.Q Who owned the mine?A The U.S. Government owned it when Castro took it over.Q I see.A General Services Administration. And it was leased out for operation. But the ownership rested with the Government.So the Treasury simply made the French provide a Certificate of Origin for the nickel that went in -- they export a lot of metal that contains nickel, silverware, knives and forks, this type of thing, and -- you know, stainless steel, and since nickel is used as a hardening agent we simply -- Treasury simply said you can't import any more into this
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# SECRET351 country until we have a Certificate of Origin. As a matter2 of fact, there was a boat that was pulling into the dock in3 New York and they wouldn't let it unload. They just turned it4 around. Eventually, over a period of months, le Nickel5 found other sources and export privileges to the United States6 were restored.7 You know, it is -- you just -- any time you raise8 or lower a tariff you have economic warfare. It is that9 simple.10 Q Were there any other instances that you can recall11 of economic warfare in which you enlisted the support of12 American business firms?13 A I know we were in touch with a great many American14 business firms. We enlisted everybody's support that we could.15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.16 (Discussion off the record.)17 BY MR. MANFREDI:18 Q When we broke for a moment we were discussing other19 instances where the Agency has enlisted the support of American20 business in economic warfare against Cuba. Can you think of21 any other such instances?22 A Oh, certainly. The Cubans were having an awful time23 with their Maritime fleet, such as it was. These boats were24 powered with Nordberg engines. We simply went to the Nordberg25 people and told them -- asked them to cooperate with us, which
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SECRET                                                                                361  they said they would. They notified their manufacturer's2  representatives around the world if they got any orders from3  the Cubans they were to be refused. This type of thing.4  We did the same thing with --5  Q   Let's just stop for a second. Now, was Nordberg6  compensated in any way for cooperation with the Agency?7  A   No.8  Q   Were they compensated for the loss of business9  involved in that activity?10 A   No. No.11 Q   I take it, you received similar cooperation from12 other companies.13 A   Oh, a great many other companies, yes.14 Q   Did any American companies refuse to cooperate in15 that manner?16 A   No. Not a one.17 Q   Were there any legal sanctions threatened against any18 companies?19 A   No. No.20 Q   Were there any sanctions that could have been brought21 to bear upon those companies had they chosen to trade with22 Cuba?23 A   Well, in the first place, they couldn't trade with.24 Cuba. They couldn't get export licenses from this country25 anyway. Then, under the Foreign Assets Control Act of theSECRET                                                                                     Photocopy fromGerald Ford Library