Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[176-10030-10422.pdf — page 9]
9. the night of the Generals' revolt in Algeria, passers-by noted with amusement the the top floor was ablase with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Cavin was able to secure entrance that night to the CIA off: es only with difficulty.)CLA is apparently Dos firmly committed to the CAS approach as a permanent solution or its problems. It is pressing to have CIA people given the ran's of Counselor. Before State loses control of more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before CAS becomes permanentiy integrated into the Foreign Service, it would seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.4. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quarteru as a purely technical matter, easily detachabis from policy and therefore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yet there is almost no CIA function mors peculiarly dependent on the political context than paramilitary warfare.There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a paramilitary operation is in its nature a large and attributable operation and therety. as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the training of, say, the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics or to the support of already existing guerrilla activitisa,) For ansther, the moral and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for us. Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are doing what the world expects from them; when we do it, we appear to betray our own professed principles and therefore cannot afford to compound delinquency by defeat. Moreover, as the recent Algerian episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And, as the recent tractors-for-prisoners episode showed, when we do sead men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them of and close the books. The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about liquidating a losing show.
[176-10030-10422.pdf — page 10]
SECRET10. laMoreover, guerrilla warfare is fought, much more than military men ordinarily realize, in an ideological context. The guerrilla succeeds when his program enlists grassroots support: and it is very difficult indeed to beat him when the countryside is with him. Van Mook told General Marshall in 1946 not to worry about the guerrillas in Indonesia: "we are sanding 50,000 men out there and will clean the situation up in the three months." Marshall, who had had experience fighting guerrillas in the Philippines, replied, "It won't be so easy. You will find that they will bleed you to death." Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of overcoming guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force.Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times since the end of the Second World var: in Greece, because Tite's defection closed the northern border; in the Philippines; and in Malaya. In the last two cases the guerrilla resistance ended because of the combination of political and military countermeasures. The struggle In Malaya, as Field Marshal Templer understood (and said), was for the minds and hearts of the people; it therefore involved not only paramilitary operations but a vast educational program, organization of trade unions, political reform and an offer of national independence. If the guerrilla's power lies in his revolutionary program, the answer lies in part in meeting the needs which enable the guerrilla to rouse the countryside. "Without a political goal," wrote Mao Tse-tung, "guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and if their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained," He added, "Do we want the support of the masses? If we do, we must go among the masses; arouse them to activity; concern ourselves with their weal and woe."For these reasons, paramilitary warfare cannot be considered as primarily a military weapon. It is primarily a political weapon and must therefore be subjected to close and careful political oversight. It probably should be retained in a reconstituted CIA rather than transferred to Defense.
[176-10030-10422.pdf — page 11]
11. la5. How to Establish Policy Control? Here I wonder whether the British experience right not be of value. The notable feature of the British intelligence system is the determination to keep clandestine activity under strict Foreign Office control. This control is achieved in a number of ways:a) Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) itself operates under the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a Foreign Office chairman (until recently Sir Patrick Dean, who is now the British representative at the UN) and which includes the Service Intelligence directors and representatives of the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office as well as the Chief of SIS.b) basic political warfare directives are originated, not by SIS, but by the Information Research Department in the Foreign Office, often in consultation with an interdepartmental Working Group on International Communist Fronts, and under the ultimate control of the Superintending Under-Secretary of the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department in the Foreign Office.c) SIS covert political action campaigns must not only conform to Foreign Office directives but must be cleared with the appropriate Foreign Office geographical desks.d) working groups under IRD chairmanship govern operations in special areas, such as, for example, Sino-Soviet relations or the World Youth Festival.e) a Foreign Office Staff Liaison Officer sits next to the SIS Chief, and Foreign Office officials serve tours of duty in SIS sections.All these devices might be adapted for use by the State Department. Organizationally, this would mean that the intelligence agency would retain operational autonomy but that its operations would be at all points subject to State Department clearance -- a clearance to be
[176-10030-10422.pdf — page 12]
SECRET12. enforced by directives, by State Department chairmanship of working groups, azad by the infiltration of State Department personnel into the felligence agency.Cbviously this set would not succeed, however, unless the State Departraeat itself were prepared to overcome its inbred hatite of diffusion, egativism and delay and to take a firm and purposeful grip on the situation.IV. Cperations and intelligenceThe relationship between operations and intelligence raises partien- larly perplexing questions. 'Intelligence' includes two separable activities: clandestine cellection; and research, analysis and evaluation. The first deals with that small portion of raw intelli- gence procured by secret means (Mr. Dulles estimated in 1947 that "a proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by...overt, normal, and aboveboard means would supply us with over 60 percent, I should estirante, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy"); the second involves the colistion and interpretatior of all forms of intelligence, however obtained and the production of estimates.Under the British system, clandestine collection is entrusted to the Secret Intelligence Service. The research, analysis and estimating function is located in the Foreign Office Research Department.Under the American system, CIA has responsibility for beth clandestine collection and research and analysis. The State Depart ment's Bureau of Intelligence and Research aise has ressarch and analysis responsibilities, but, in practice, CIA hee established control over the machinery for producing antional estimates in such a way as to reduce State's contribution to subraitting its views to CLA for acceptance or rejection, in other words, where in Great Britain the Foreign Office plays the coordinating role in the intelligence fiabi in the United States that role has been assumed by CIA.
[176-10030-10422.pdf — page 13]
SECRETThe argument agains: incorporating the research and estimate function in State was made by Dulles in 1947: "For the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that information should processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facts, and to araw conclusions from these facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper proudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, havis-g once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty."Precisely the same argument can be used with equal effect against the incorporation of the research and estimate function in CIA 1.e.. if intelligence is too closely connected with operations, then those committed to particular operation will tend to select out the intelligence which validates the operation.Obviously both argments conclude in a case for the establishmeat ef a fairly independent esearch and estimate group. But, if the R group is too independent, one runs into the opposite danger: that is, that neither policy or operations will be subjected to adequate intelligence checks.The trouble with the Cuban operation, for example, was not that intelligence and operations were combined, but precisely that the Cuban operation evaded systematic intelligence judgment. The in- telligence branch (DDD) of CIA was never Informed of the existence of the Cuban operation. The Office of National Estimates was never asked to comment on the assumption, for example, that discontent had reached the point in Cuba where a successful landing operation. would provoke uprisings behind the lines and defections from the Militia, In December and February, the Office of National Estimates produced general appraisals of the Cuban situsties, but these were wholly independent of the Cuban operation. I gather that, if its opinion had been invited, DDI would have given quite a differe estimate of the state of opinion in Cube from that on which the pers tion was based, There existed, in short, the ridiculous situstion
[176-10030-10422.pdf — page 14]
SEUNCI14. that knowledge of the Cuben operation, flaunted in Miami bare by aay cumber of ice-level agents in the operations branch of CIA, was denied to even see top officials of the intelligence branch. The Eureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State know even less about the Cuban operation.The problem, then, is to have an R&E group sufficiently independeri of both policy and cuerations to resist the pressure to make the case for vested ideas ane interests -- yet sufficiently close to be able to subject projected operations or policies to the most intense and searching scrutiny.Where could this group be located? If the CIA were to become subordinate to State. as Mi-e is to the Foreign Office, then the F... function might be vested in a coordinate subagency, somewhat inde- pendent of both Stats and CLA, yet closely connected with both in d to-day operations. The R&F. subagency would receive intelligence from CIA and from State, as well as from the services and, of course, from public sources. It would represent, in effect, a fusion of CIA/C and State/Intelligence and Research. I might niso take over certai of the service functions now confided to CIA -- photographic interpre- tation, biographical data, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt collec- tion, maps, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Ecara with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with a State Department or White House chairmanV. Conclusion.The argument of this memorandum implies a fairly drastic rearrange rment of our present intelligence set-up. t also implies the capacity of the State Department to assume command of the situation and to co so in an effective and purposeful way. If the State Department as at present staffed is not capable of assuming effective command, this to not. in my judgment, an argument against a rational reorganisationa intelligence. It is an argument for a drastic overhaul of the State Department.
[176-10030-10422.pdf — page 15]
SECRET15. The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this memorandum would e as follows:1) The Star Department would be granted general ciearance authuaty over all clandestine activity. This raight be effectuated on the British model by the appointment of a Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence, who would act for t! Secretary in these matters and who might serve as chairrea of a Joint Intelligence Ecard.2) The Jour. Intelligence Board would include representatives from ail elemente in the intelligence community and ales from te white House.3) The operuting branches of the present CIA would be reconstituted under some blameless titie (the National Information Servico). This new agency would be charged with responsibility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations and for paramilitary activities. It would submit projects to the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance.. In general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relation. ship to State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA presently do.4) A second senii-independent agency would be set up, again bearing a blameless title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordinate with the operations agency. This agency would be charged with responsibility for cellation and interpretation. It would include CLA/DDL the Eureau of Intelligence and Research in State, and the various service functions now carried on by CIA (photographic interpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcast inonitoring, scientific intelligence, maps, overt collection, etc.). It might well be located in the CIA building in McLean,cc: The Attorney GeneralMr. BundyMr. DunganArthur Schlesinger, jr.
[176-10033-10145.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM## IDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY : NARARECORD NUMBER : 176-10033-10145RECORD SERIES : Church CommitteeAGENCY FILE NUMBER :ORIGINATOR : WHFROM : Schlessinger, Jr.TO : Kennedy, John FTITLE : CIA ReorganizationDATE : 6/30/1961PAGES : 15SUBJECTS :DOCUMENT TYPE : Paper, TextualCLASSIFICATION : DeclassifiedRESTRICTIONS :CURRENT STATUS :DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 2/14/2001.OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS :
[176-10033-10145.pdf — page 1]
# SECRETJune 30, 1961MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENTSUBJECT: CIA ReorganizationI submit the following views as one who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since.On balance, CIA's record has probably been very good. In the nature of clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence agency are unknown; all the public hears about (or should hear about) are its errors. But, again in the nature of the case, an agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned few visible errors. The important thing to recognize today, in my judgment, is that the CIA, as at present named and constituted, has about used up its quota. Its margin for future error is practically non-existent. One more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably in US policy, at home as well as abroad. And, until CIA is visibly reorganized, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely blamed for developments of which it is wholly innocent.The argument of this memorandum is that CIA's trouble can be traced to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate; and that this autonomy is due to three main causes: (1) an inadequate doctrine of clandestine operations; (2) an inadequate conception of the relationship between operations and policy; (3) an inadequate*Or should be -- a gross and repeated CIA failing has been its occasional readiness to succumb to the temptations of favorable publicity. The Guatemalan and Iranian operations were almost nullified by the flood of self-congratulatory publicity which followed them (e. g., the articles by Richard and Gladye Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," *Saturday Evening Post*, Oct. 30, NN. 6, 13, 1954).SECRET
[176-10033-10145.pdf — page 2]
SECRET6. 2. conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum also suggests ways in which some of these problems can perhaps be alleviated.1. CIA AutonomyCIA conducts three main forms of secret work: clandestine intelligence collection; covert political operations; and paramilitary activities. It carries on these functions with relative autonomy. The reasons for the autonomy are historical.When CIA began, the State Department, still thinking too much in terms of its traditional missions in foreign affairs, looked on this new venture with suspicion and renounced the opportunity to seize firm control of CIA operations. It did not, for example, try to establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities; and some ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA was up to in their countries. After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers further confirmed CIA's independence from supervision by State Department desks.In the meantime, CIA grew in size and power. During the fifties it began in some areas to outstrip the State Department in the quality of its personnel. Partly because CIA paid higher salaries and even more perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his people courageous protection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able to attract and hold a large number of able and independent-minded men. The more it added brilliant activists to its staff, the more momentum its operations developed, and the greater role it played in the initiation of policy.By the time that State had begun to be fully aware of the problems created by an active and autonomous CIA, it had long since missed the chance to establish its own ultimate authority. While State retained a nominal supervision over covert political operations, this was to some degree offset by CIA's tendency to present a proposed operation almost as a *fait accompli*: State never had title to control overt clandestine intelligence collection; and it had lost ground in such areas as overt political reporting and even in the maintenance of overt diplomatic contacts.SECRET
[176-10033-10145.pdf — page 3]
SECRET3. For its part, CIA had developed a whole series of functions paral- leling already existing functions of the State Department, and of the Defense Department as well. Today it has its own political desks and military staffe; it has in effect its own foreign service; it has (or has had) its own combat forces; it even has its own air force. Its annual budget is about_times that of the State Depart- ment. The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristics of a state within a state.II. DoctrineThough GIA's autonomy developed for historical reasons, it has been able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our donduct of clandestine operations. The problem of doctrine for CIA to the extent to which its various clandestine missions are compatible with a free and open society.It is idle to argue that, because the Communists can do such-and-such, we are free to do it too. Communiom is a creed nurtured in con- spiracy, and the whole point of Communist social and political organi- zation is to make conspiracy effective. If 'fighting fire with fire' means contracting the freedoms traditionally enjoyed by Americans in order to give more freedom to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that. Yet I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits which the maintenance of an open cociety places on secret activity. Until this te done, CIA's role will not be clearly defined and under- stood. The problem which must be faced is what sort of secret activity is consistent with the preservation of a free social order?We must begin, I believe, by accepting the fact that the United States will continue to be a nation in which politiciane will ask questions and make speeches, reporters will dig out stories, newspapera will pub- lish editorials, individuels, driven by promptinge of conscience, will blurt out things harmful to the state, and so on. We do not wish to change these things and could not do so without violating the essence of our society. These things make up the framework to which CIA must operate, In short, they constitute the problems and, ae General Marshall used to say, "There's no point in fighting the problem."SECRET6
[176-10033-10145.pdf — page 4]
# SECRETThere follows from this, I would think, the conclusion that secret activities are permissible so long as they do not corrupt the principles and practices of our society, and that they cease to be permissible when their effect is to corrupt these principles and practices.Each form of secret activity presents ite own problem. Clandestine intelligence collection has been a traditional function of the national state. Es rules and usages are fairly well established. In the main, espionage, if conducted with discretion, should present no great problem. However, when conducted with an open checkbook end a broad mandate, even espionage can begin to push against the limits of secret activity in an open society. I consider later, for example, the question of the Controlled American Source (CAS) and whether the overdoing of CAS to not beginning to barm other activities of the government.Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions arise when it is necessary to subsidico newspapers, politicians and organizations in other countries. But corruption of the political life of another nation is not a responsibility to be lightly assumed. I wonder whether CIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it Paramilitary activities creato an even more difficult problem, if only because the problems of concealment are so much more difficult.In general. I would suggest that any secret operation whose success to dependent on the suppression of newe, on lying to Congressmen and journalists and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken only when the criste to so considerable that the gains really seem to outweigh the disadvantages. This suggests that the ging of the proposed operation may be of crucial importance. Small operations can be done with a minimum of accompanying corruption. The greater the visibility of the operation, the more its success depends on thwarting the impulses and denying the values of an open society. the riskier it becomes, and the more urgent it to that an overwhelming case be mede for ite neceealty.In short, when confronted with a proposed operation, we must not only ask whether the operation to technically fenattie in its own termet we must ask whether ite succese requires our open society to be in any serious way false to its own principled.# SECRET