Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 127]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:COL. KHANGDATES:11/1/63CATEGORIES:DIEMCON'T ONNEXT CARDOCCURRENCE:Once the coup had started, Colonal Khang of the Marine Brignée and Colonel Lan of the Civil Guard decided to jois the coup. Colonel Lam at this time recorded instructions on a tope recorder which was to be later broadenst to all Civil Cored units ordering them to cooperate with the Generals' Revolutionary Committee. Lt. Colonel Chang, Coimander of the Marine Brigade telephoned his unit commanders not then participating in the cong and ordered then to support the coup. The commend of the Air Force was given to Colonel 20 Khao Mai vice Colonel Rien. The command of the 7th Divisica was given to Colocal Nguyen Van Co. Temporary comand of the IV CorpsSOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,page 12.STAFF:DawsonDATE:6/30/75FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:OCCURRENCE:CONTINUATION FROM LAST CARDwas given to Colocel Bui Huu Nhơn. Comroad of troops in Baigon was given to General Ton That Dinh. Vader Soueral Dinh's Overall commend were Saigon support troops, the Marine Brigade, the Airborne Brigade, 40 touks from the Armor Cowrand, the 5th and 7th Divisions, supported by the Air Force and the Thu Duc Officer's Training Base which joined the coup under the commend of Colonel Lam Son.SOURCE:Page 12, con't.STAFF:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 128]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:DINHMINHDONDATES:11/1/63CATEGORIES:![TOP SECRET stamp]OCCURRENCE:Then this did not materialize by early October, the coup principals realized that they had Dinh actively thinking against the regime. It is evident from statements during the series of meetings with General Ton and General Minh during the month of October that they still did not trust Dinh but felt they had compromised him sufficiently to use his troops and, if necessary, to eliminate Dinh if he showed any sign of compromising the generals. Dinh was surrounded by officers who surveilled him 24 hours a day including Colonel Co, his deputy, now IV Corps Commander and newly promoted to Brigadier General.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 13.STAFF: DawsonDATE: 6/30/75FILE:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 129]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:11/1/6310/21/63CATEGORIES:DIEM![Top Secret image]OCCURRENCE:In addition to the above maneuvering, Colonel Do Mau, (now Brigadier General), Chief of Military Security Service, played his role by issuing false military intelligence reports which went to President Diem. These reports started on or about 24 October and built up a picture of strong Viet Cong forces approaching Saigon for attack and permitted the Joint General Staff to issue appropriate orders, approved by the President, to move units favorable to the conspiracy to the outskirts of Saigon and also to move units, such as the Special Forces, away from Saigon.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, pages 13-14.STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:11/1/63CATEGORIES:DIEMNGO DINH NHUGEN. DONGEN. DINH![Top Secret image]OCCURRENCE:Ngo Dinh Nhu's reaction has to order him to Palat for a "rest". During this period of time, Nhu realized that he had been played for a dupe by Ngo Dinh Diem. The Generals recognized this fact and General Don started playing on General. Khanh's vanity by telling him that he was a real hero and that he, above all, should have been thanked by Diem and Nhu for saving the government.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 13.STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 130
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 130]
GEN. DONCONEINAMBASSADOR LODGEPERSONS/ENTITIES:OCCURRENCE:CONTINUED ON NEXT CARDDATES: Nov. 1, '63CATEGORIES: DIEMTOP SECRETGeneral Don stated to Conein that Bou had tried to alert Conein at the latter's residence since before dawn and to one andred. A later check revealed that Conein's telephone was out of order. Coppola was told that he was to keep a telephone line open to Ambassador Lodge; Don informed Conein that Colonels Le Cang Tung (ARVN Special Forces Commander Huynh. Huu Mien (Airforce Commander) and Colonel Cao Van Vien (Commander of the Airborne Brigade) were arrested; that Colonel Mong Ngoc Lim (Commander of the Civil Guard) and Lt. Colonel Le Nguyen KhangSOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,paga 9.STAFF: DawsonDATE: 6/30/75FILE:CONT FROM LAST CARDPERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:OCCURRENCE:TOP SECRET(Commander of the Marine Brigade) were under guard and not yet declared and considered neutral.Colonel Tung was brought in under armed guard and forced at gunpoint to order a cassette between the Special Forces, units adjacent to JCS headquarters and two platoons of the 5th Division. Once the cease fire had been declared between Special Forces and JGS, thirty-five armored personnel carriers loaded with troops in combat & ear started moving toward Saigon proper.SOURCE: p. 9, CONTSTAFF:NW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 131
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 131]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:NGO DINH NHUCOL. HUANGEN. DONDATES:11/1/63CATEGORIES:![TOP SECRET]OCCURRENCE: CON'T ON NEXT CARD ALSOQua thời he wonld peruoually upeck to the President on Dình'sbehalt and thus he would ask shat Dish be greated the Ministryof Interior vidie le, Don, would ask for the Ministry ofJaticunt Cafere, Righ believed that Doa had his ymscsalAnbarests at heart ică Dun riid, in fact, make such an appealΤο ΚΑΙ President to aluge his government bus gadu the proposalin such a way that it would have bom dugóssible Ser Dion orLaudlines were give,Dinh was auctured thatthe President world give him a adristerial pust. After thedeadlines bad ressed and Dinh bed not received what he thoughtSOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,page. 13.STAFF:DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:![TOP SECRET]OCCURRENCE:CONTINUATION FROM LAST CARD:ava bha apρον νοοορείtion, Gonaal Fon mal other offloors,Inladiez Colonel Tien, Commen-Ang Officer of the KittenryMendeay kit Dalat, continued to lend sympathy to Diaz, Stili.Mian van maiting for his ministerial postSOURCE:P., 13, Con't.STAFF:NW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 132
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:LansdaleDATES:Afternoon11/1/63CATEGORIES:DiemLodgeColbyOCCURRENCE:**TOP SECRET**Colby stated that although he did not have the copy there was a telegram which recounts a call made from Diem to Lodge on the afternoon of the coup. Diem said that he was having trouble "...an effort was being made against him by his Generals, and that he believed it essential to put this down. He urged that the U. S. consult General Lansdale and me (Colby) by name because we understood something about this situation. This was in the afternoon of the coup. The response, I believe, Ambassador Lodge did mention something about assistance in leaving the country." Pages 49-50.SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ColbySTAFF:DawsonFILE:DATE:7/1/75
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 133]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:HARKINS, LODGE, BUNDY, DON,DATES:30 Oct. 1963CATEGORIES:![Top Secret stamp]OCCURRENCE: On 30 October 1963, LODGE replied to BUNDY's cable (DIR 79109) of the same date by CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2063): "........do not think we have the power to delay or discourage a coup. DON has made it clear many times that this is a Vietnamese affair...... I believe we should continue our present position of keeping hands off but continue to monitor and press for more detailed information. CAS has been anaylzing forces for some time and it is their estimate that the generals have probably figured their chances pretty closely....... It does not seem sensible to have the military in charge of matter which is so profoundly political as a change of govern-ment.... As to requests from the generals, they may well have need of funds at the last moment with which to buy off potential opposition. To the extent that these funds can be passed discreetly, I believe we should furnish them.... If we were convinced that the coup was going to fail, we would of course do everything we could to stop it. HARKINS has readSOURCE: this and does not concur."CIA IG Report 1967, p. 39FILE:STAFF: R. DawsonDATE: 29 June 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:FELT, ADMIRAL CINCPAC CommanderCONEINDATES:31 October 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that on or about October 31, 1963, FELT came to Vietnam and landed and had an interview with DIEM in the morning. p. 48![Top Secret stamp]SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinFILE:STAFF: R. DAWSONDATE: July 1 1975
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 134]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGEBUNDYDATES:30 Oct 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: On October 30, 1963 in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2094) the followingcable from LODGE (in its entirety) occurred: "Thanks for your sagacious instruction. Willcarry out to best of my ability."![Top Secret stamp]SOURCE:CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 40FILE:STAFF: R. DAWSONDATE: 29 June 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGEBUNDY (?)DATES:30 Oct 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: On October 30, 1963, in a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 79407) the followingquotation appeared: "....We do not accept as a basis for U.S. policy that we have no powerto delay or discourage coup....We cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in yourmessage that only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention....U.S. authoritieswill reject appeals for direct intervention from either side.... " (the IG Report herestates without further showing the author of the above message that "the White House re-peats its instructions on command of the country team after LODGE leaves." The inferencecan probably be drawn that the message although looked upon as a CIA cable to Saigon, itwas undoubtedly emanating from the White House.)SOURCE:CIA IG Report, 1967 p. 39FILE:STAFF: R. DAWSONDATE: 29 June 1975NW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 135
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 135]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:SMITH, DAVID MCCONEHARKINS, GENERAL HELMSTRUEHARD, WILLIAM COLBYKENNEDY, ROBERTKENNEDY, JOHN F.DATES:Oct. 29, 1963.CATEGORIES:DIEMIn a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY in attendance. The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: it was suggested that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHART, and DAVID SMITH act as a committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that SMITH should not be involved in such a policy making function, although he would be in a position to provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy ev idence. The DCI stated his view that even a successful coup would create a period of interregmum, confusion which might only be solved by a second or third coup.SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38FILE:STAFF:DATE: Dawson6/27/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:HARKINS, DONMINH KENNEDY, JOHN F.LODGEBUNDYDATES:Oct 30, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMIn a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR79109) of OCT 30, 1963, BUNDY wrote to LODGE saying that "...chances of action with or without our approval now so significant that we should urgently consider our attitude and contingency plans. We believe our attitude to coup group can still have decisive effect on itsdecision. ... We must have assurance balance of forces clearly favorable...CONEIN should express to DON that we do not find presently reveal plans to give clear prospect of quick results...we badly need some corroborative evidence of men or others directly involved....highest authority desires it clearly understood that after your departure HARKINS should participate in all coup contacts supervision and the event coup begins he become head of country team..."SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 39STAFF:DawsonNW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 136
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 136]
LODGE, AMBASSADORDIEMNHUDATES:CATEGORIES:Oct. 29, 1963DIEMOCCURRENCE:In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG2040) of 29 October, sent through eyes only channels of CIA, LODGE gives his view on the seemingly imminent coup: "In summary, it would appear that a coup attempt by the generals group is imminent...and that no positiveaction by the USG can prevent a coup attempt short of informing DIEM and NHU...Althoughthere have no requests to date by the generals for materials or financial support, we must anticipate that such requests may be forthcoming..."SOURCE:STAFF:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38DawsonFILE:DATE:6/27/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:LODGE, AMBASSADORDIEMNHUOct. 29, 1963DIEMOCCURRENCE:In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG2040) of 29 October, sent through eyes only channels of CIA, LODGE gives his view on the seemingly imminent coup: "In summary, it would appear that a coup attempt by the generals group is imminent...and that no positiveaction by the USG can prevent a coup attempt short of informing DIEM and NHU...Althoughthere have no requests to date by the generals for materials or financial support, we must anticipate that such requests may be forthcoming..."SOURCE:STAFF:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38DawsonFILE.DATE:NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 137
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 137]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:GEN. DONAMBASSADOR LODGECONEINDATES:10/28/63CATEGORIES:DIEM![TOP SECRET]OCCURRENCE:General Don approached Ambassador Lodge at Dalat Airport on the occasion of the departure of President Diem and Ambassador Lodge for their return to Saigon and asked if Conein was speaking for the Ambassador; Ambassador Lodge replied in the affirmative; Don told the Ambassador the USG should not interfere or try to stimulate a coup; The Ambassador agreed, the USG wanted no satellites and the USG would not thwart an attempt.SOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 7-6STAFF:DawsonFILE:DATE:6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:SMITH, DAVID MCCONEHARKINS, GENERAL HELMSTRUEHARD, WILLIAM COLBYKENNEDY, ROBERTKENNEDY, JOHN F.DATES:Oct. 29, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEM![TOP SECRET]OCCURRENCE:In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY in attendance. The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: it was suggested that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHART, and DAVID SMITH act as a committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that SMITH should not be involved in such a policy making function, although he would be in a position to provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy evidence. The DCI stated his view that even a successful coup would create a period of interregnum, confusion which might only be solved by a second or third coup.SOURCE:STAFF:NW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 138
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 138]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:GEN. DONGEN. DO CAO TRINGUYEN KHANHOCCURRENCE:CON'T.NEXTCARDDATES:11/1/63CATEGORIES:# TOP SECRET625. Several days before the coup was to take place, General Don coordinated the final plan with Generals Do Cao Tri and Nguyen Khanh and with the Commanding Officer of the Military Academy at Dalat. The signal to start the coup was based on a previous decree issued by President Diem which stated that after 1 November there could be no siesta and there would be only a one-hour lunch period. By radio and telephone, the coup principals had issued instructions to coup participants that as of 1 November working hours would begin at 1330. Starting at 0730 hours 1 November the instructions were transcribed to units furthest away from Saigon, i.e., Hue, and in sufficient time so that the forces which were to attack SaigonSOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 11.STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75# TOP SECRET66OCCURRENCE: CONTINUATION OF LAST CARD, p. 11.would be in position at 1330 hours. One unit of the 7th Division received its instructions to move at 1330 hours but actually moved at 1315 hours. This also was one of the minor incidents which nearly upset the coup as there was fear that this would be detected by the forces loyal to Diem.SOURCE:STAFF:FILE:DATE:NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 139
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 139]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINGEN. DUONG VAN MINHGEN. TRAN VAN DONTRAN THIEN KHIEMTRAN VAN MINH CON'TYDATES:Nov. 1, 1963CATEGORIES:TOP SECRETOCCURRENCE:Conein vas contacted by Captain Foa, Alde de Cang to oneml 264, 26 1318 hours shuting that Conein was mated Asandiately at Cederal Start Headquarters. Slave this was not within previous benrity arrangements for the wart moeting, Coneia questicred Hon ho said be was only carrying out Mustanetions and stated that Consdn should come in uniform to 368 sind he then departed. While getting Lato woktorm, the dentist whose office hed bаsе мой for sontings appeared at Comela's home with con-fararthon of the message that Cracia was to procand imallatoly to J05 headquartors. He further stated that the coup me in progress. ss. Conula stertul CISCONTINUED ON NEXTCARDSOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,Pages 8-9.STAFF:DawsonFILE:DATE:6/30/75OCCURRENCE:Saigon via radio net using a pre-arranged voice code and proceeded to the War Room at JGS headquarters. Present were Generals Duong Van Minh, Tran Van Don, Phan Xuan Chien, Tran Thien Khiem, Tran Van Minh, Nguyen Ngoc Le, Mai Huu Xuan, Le Van Kía, Tran Tu Cai, Nguyen Van La, Nguyen Giac Ngo, Tran Ngoc Tam, Le Van Nghien; Colonels Do Hau, Nguyen Khuong, Duong Ngoc Lan; Majors Le Nguyed Khang, Do Khac Mai, and unddoentified junior officers.CONT. FROM LASTCARDSOURCE: p. 9.FILE:STAFF:DATE:NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 140
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 140]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:VICE PRESIDENT THODATES:11/2/630310 hoursCATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:TOP SECRETC310 Vice President Tho at JG3Palace is under heavy attackSOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,Exhibit One, Page 22.STAFF:DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75NW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 141
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 141]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:MΙΝΗNHUNGDATE:2 November 1963CATEGORIES:DIEM# TOP SECRETOCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that around 6:30 or 6:40 on November 2, 1963, DIEM talked to MINH for the first time. DIEM asked MINH for full honors and MINH replied that he could not guarantee full honors, if and during the time that Vietamese were still killing one another. DIEM stated that he would order the cease fire at the palace and CONEIN recalls that this took place at about 7:50, November 2, 1963. CONEIN stated as follows: "At this stage, there were four armored cars and 113's an escort of military police proceeded immediately from the joint general staff headquarters toward GAI LONG PALACE. BIG MINH with his aide, CAPTAIN NHUNG got into a sedan and with MTS Corps, went out the back road from the general staff headquarters toward the back of the golf course and took a different road from the armored cars that went down Cong Le." p. 52-53SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinSTAFF: R. DAWSONFILE:DATE: July 1, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:MINHDATE:11/2/632420 hours0020(?)CATEGORIES:DIEM# TOP-SECRETOCCURRENCE:0183. Increasingly heavy attack on the palace. Minh now ordered that the palace be taken at any cost. 16 armored vehicles are assembled from the Embassy roof. Approximately one company of foot soldiers moving up Pasteur toward the palace.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 23.STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 142]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:Don, GeneralConcinDATES:11/2/63CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE:Concin stated at the time they were going to bring the press in for the ceremony on the capitulation of Diem, Don said "get the hell out we are bringing in the press." Page 74.TOP SECRETSOURCE:Hearings, SSC Concin, June 20, 1975STAFF:DawsonFILE:DATE:7/1/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:LAM, DUONG NGỌCNHUXUANGENERAL MAI HUUDATES:"on/or/about, 10November 1963"November 2, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMTOP SECRETOCCURRENCE: XUAN and LAM receiving the message that DIEM and NHU had been spotted, took off with armored cars and went to the church. XUAN reported to the President, saluted, and told him to get into the armored car. NHU protested and asked for a sedan. DIEM and NHU were shoved into the car and were told by the commander of the column LAM, who was a little fat guy who wore a mustache and used to command the civil guard and not the individual who later became I-Corps commander, that the use of the armored car was for their physical protection. p. 59-60SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinSTAFF: R. DAWSON
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 143]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:ConcinLodge, H.C.DATES:11/2/63CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE:Concin stated he kept contact with the junta "until the day that the U. S. officially recognized the South Vietnamese government. There were several countries that recognized, and I was acting as the liaison officer for the ambassador to the junta during this period for approximately ten days or two weeks.**TOP SECRET**SOURCE: Hearings, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975STAFF: DawsonFILE: p. 61DATE: 7/1/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:Tuan ConeinNhuDATES:11/2/63CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE:Colby stated that another officer who had worked with Concin was apparently executed about that same time as Diem and Nhu were. Tuan had been head of the Special Forces and had worked very closely with Diem and Nhu and Concin and was executed by the Generals that morning. Page 27-28.**TOP SECRET**SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ColbySTAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 7/1/75NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 144
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 144]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:11/2/63CATEGORIES:DiemLinhNhu, Ngo DinhConeinOCCURRENCE:Conein explained that although it was baffling as to why Dien left the palace to go to the church in Cholon, and although he did not know exactly how they got out the general assumption was that there were secret tunnels in the palace which was the former Governor General's Palace called Gailong Palace. The tunnel took them under and through the palace and the half block to City Hall. Page 63-64.**TOP SECRET**SOURCE: Hearings, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 7/1/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:11/2-/63CATEGORIES:DiemBang, Major MinhPhen, Ngoc ConeinTau NhuOCCURRENCE:Bang was in the armored column and returned about an hour after Minh had left. Conein asked Bang(whom Conein had met in Hanoi in 1945) what his orders were. Bang stated the orders going through the palace was that we were not to fire unless we were fired upon and that they had not been found at that time. The expectation was and everybody assumed, that Minh and Nhu were at the palace.**TOP SECRET**SOURCE: Hearing, SSCI, Conein, 6/20/75STAFF: DawsonNW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 145
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 145]
PERSONS/ENTITIES: CON'T ON NEXTCARDKyDATES:11/2/630310 hoursCATEGORIES:CDIEMOCCURRENCE: All general officers except Generals Ly, Van Thanh Cao, Huynh Van Cao, Khai Quang Hoang.LIST OF OFFICERS Colonels: Lan Van ShatPARTICIPATING INTHE COUP:Do Mau, Chief of Military Security ServiceNguyen Huu CoNguyen Van Chuan, J.4. JGSNguyen Khuong, Chief of Staff for InfantryTran Vinh HuyenBại Huu Nhon, CO, 21st Infantry DivisionDuong Ngoc Lam, Director General, CivilGuard and Self Defense CorpsCON'T on NEXTCARDSOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,Exhibit One, page 22.STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75![TOP SECRET]PERSONS/ENTITIES:NGUYEN CAO KYOCCURRENCE:LAST CARD CONT.DATES:LIST OF OFFICERS PARTICIPATING IN THE COUP:Lt. Colonels: Le Nguyen Khang, Commander, MarineBrigadeDo Khac Lai, Chief of Staff, VietnameseAir ForceNguyen Cao Ky, CO, 1st Transport SudaVietnamese Air ForceCATEGORIES:DIEMSOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,STAFF:![TOP SECRET]NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 146
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 146]
DIEM# TOP SECRETOCCURRENCE: LIST OF OFFICERS PARTICIPATING IN THE COUP: CONTINUATION FROMLAST CARD: 10cMajors:SOURCE:FILE:STAFF:DATE:NW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 147