Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 144]
Don at the Joint General Staff headquarters and offered to surrender if he and Nhu were given safe conduct to an airport. Shortly afterwards, Diem offered to surrender unconditionally and ordered the Presidential Guard to cease firing. According to Conein, an escort for Diem appeared in front of the palace at 8:00 a.m., but Diem and Nhu were not present (Conein After-Action Report, p. 24).At 10:30 a.m. the bodies of Diem and Nhu were reported to be at the Joint General Chiefs' headquarters. Conein declined to view the bodies because he feared that doing so might damage United States interests (Conein, p. 57).The details of Diem's and Nhu's deaths are not known.** Conein specualted that Diem and Nhu escaped through a tunnel from the palace and fled to a Catholic Church in Chalon. He opined that an informant must have identified them and called the General Staff Headquarters (Conein After-Action Report, p. 23). Another CIA source states that Diem and Nhu had left the palace the previous evening with a Chinese businessman and arrived at the church at 8:00 on the morning of November 2. Ten minutes later they were picked up by soldiers and forced into an army vehicle (Cable, Saigon to State, No. 888). Minh originally told Conein that Diem and Nhu had committed suicide, but Conein doubted that Catholics would have taken their own lives in a church (Conein, p. 56). The Inspector General's Report states that on November 16, 1963, a field-grade officer of unknown reliability gave the CIA two photographs of the bodies of Diem and Nhu in which it appeared their hands were tied behind their backs (I.G., C, pp. 43-44). The source reported that Diem and Nhu had been shot and stabbed while being conveyed to the Joint General Staff headquarters.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 145]
-14-None of the informed sources give any indication of direct or indirect involvement of the United States.** It must be noted that on October 30, 1963, Ambassador Lodge notified Washington that there might be a request by ked leaders for evacuation, and suggested Saipan as a point for evacuation (Saigon Station Cable No. 2036, 10/30/63). Conein was charged with obraining the airplane. Between 6:00 and 7:00 on the morning of November 2, Minh and Don asked Conein to procure an aircraft. Conein relayed the request to David Smith, Acting Chief of Station at the Embassy, who replied that it would not be possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours, since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to a country that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in any other country. There were no aircraft immediately available that had sufficient range to reach a potential country of asylum (Conein, p. 54).
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 146]
# TABLE OF CONTENTSPageIV. Findings and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21. Officials of the United States Government Initiated Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22. No Foreign Leaders Were Killed As A Result of Assassination Plots Initiated by Officials of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33. American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy to Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Death of Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34. The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived to be of Crisis Proportions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3A5. American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions About Their Ability to Control the Actions of Coup Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46. CIA Officials Made Use of Known Under-world Figures in Assassination Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51. The United States Should Not Engage in Assassination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5a. Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations Instigated by the United States and Support for Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow Local Governments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6b. The Setting In Which the Assassination Plots Occurred Explains, But Does Not Justify Them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 147]
iii# TOP SECRETPage(a) Agency Officials Failed OnSeveral Occasions to RevealThe Plots To Their SuperiorsOr To Do So With SufficientDetail and Clarity27Castro27Trujillo34Schneider36(b) On Occasion, Administration OfficialsGave Vague Instructions to Sub-ordinates and Failed to Make SufficientlyClear That Assassination Should BeExcluded From Consideration.37Schneider38Lumumba38Castro396. Practices Current at the Time in Which   the Assassination Plots Occurred Were   Revealed by the Record to Create the   Risk of Confusion, Rashness, and   Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where   Clarity and Sober Judgment Was Most   Necessary   46(a) The Danger Inherent in Overextendingthe Doctrine of Plausible Denial47(b) The Dangers of Using "Circumlocution"and "Euphemism"48(c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions.49(d) The Danger of "Floating Authorization".50(e) The Problems Connected With CreatingNew Covert Capabilities50NW 50955 DocId: 32423525 Page 148
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 148]
## IV. Findings and ConclusionsIn evaluating the evidence and arriving at findings and conclusions, the Committee has been guided by the following standards. We believe these standards to be appropriate to the constitutional duty of a Congressional committee.1. The Committee is not a court. Its primary role is not to determine individual guilt or innocence, but rather to draw upon the experiences of the past to better propose guidance for the future.2. It is necessary to be cautious in reaching conclusions because of the amount of time that has passed since the events reviewed in this report, the inability of three Presidents and many other key figures to speak for themselves, the conflicting and ambiguous nature of much of the evidence, and the problems in assessing the weight to be given to particular documents and testimony.3. The Committee has tried to be fair to the persons involved in the events under examination while at the same time responding to a need to understand the facts in sufficient detail to lay a basis for informed recommendations.With these standards in mind, the Committee has arrived at the following findings and conclusions.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 149]
# TOP SLUNCTA. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves1. Officials of the United States Government Initiated Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice LumumbaThe Committee finds that officials of the United States Government initiated and participated in plots to assassinate Patrice Lumumba and Fidel Castro.The plot to kill Lumumba was conceived in the latter half of 1960 by officials of the United States Government, and quickly advanced to the point of sending poisons to the Congo to be used for the assassination.The effort to assassinate Castro began in 1960 and continued until 1965. The plans to assassinate Castro using poison cigars, exploding seashells, and a contaminated diving suit did not advance beyond the laboratory phase. The plot involving underworld figures reached the stage of producing poison pills, establishing the contacts necessary to send them into Cuba, procuring potential assassins within Cuba, and, according to one witness, delivering the pills to the island itself. In the 1960 plot involving a Cuban pilot and in the AM/LASH episode from 1963-1965, the CIA gave active support and encouragement to Cubans whose intent to assassinate Castro was known, and provided the means for carrying out the assassination.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 150]
-3-2. No Foreign Leaders Were Killed As a Result of Assassination Plots Initiated by Officials of the United StatesThe poisons intended for use against Patrice Lumumba were never administered to him, and there is no evidence that the United States was in any way involved in Lumumba's death at the hands of his Congolese enemies. The effort to assassinate Castro failed.3. American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy to Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Death of Trujillo, Diem, and SchneiderAmerican officials clearly desired the overthrow of Trujillo, offered both encouragement and guns to local dissidents attempting his overthrow, and supplied them with pistols and rifles.American officials offered encouragement to the Vietnamese generals who plotted Diem's overthrow, and a CIA official in Vietnam gave the generals money after the coup had begun. However, Diem's assassination was neither desired nor suggested by officials of the United States.The record reveals that the United States officials offered encouragement to the Chilean dissidents who plotted the kidnapping of General Rene Schneider, but did not desire or encourage his death. Certain high officials did know that the dissidents planned to kidnap General Schneider.NW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 151
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 151]
As Director Colby testified before the Committee, the death of a foreign leader is a risk forseeable in any coup attempt. In the cases we have considered, the risk of death was known in varying degrees. It was widely known that the dissidents in the Dominican Republic intended to assassinate Trujillo; the contemplation of coup leaders to assassinate Nhu, President Diem's brother, was communicated to the upper levels of the United States Government; while the CIA and perhaps the White House knew that the coup leaders in Chile planned to kidnap General Schneider, it was not anticipated that he would be killed, although the possibility of his death should have been recognized as a forseeable risk of his kidnapping.4.  The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived to be of Crisis ProportionsThe Committee fully appreciates the importance of evaluating the assassination plots in the historical context within which they occurred. In the preface to this report, we described the perception, generally shared within the United States during the depths of the Cold War, that the country faced a monolithic enemy in Communism. That attitude helps explain the assassination plots which we have reviewed, although it does not justify them. Those involved nevertheless appeared to believe they were advancing the best interests of their country.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 152]
## 5. American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions AboutTheir Ability to Control the Actions of Coup LeadersRunning throughout the cases considered in this report was the expectation of American officials that they could control the actions of dissident groups which they were supporting in foreign countries. Events demonstrated that the United States had no such power. This point is graphically demonstrated by cables exchanged shortly before the coup in Vietnam. Ambassador Lodge cabled Washington on October 30, 1963, that he was unable to halt a coup; a cable from Bundy in response stated that "We cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup." The coup took place three days later.Shortly after the experience of the Bay of Pigs, CIA headquarters requested operatives in the Dominican Republic to tell the dissidents to "turn off" the assassination attempt, because the United States was not prepared to "cope with the aftermath." The dissidents replied that the assassination was their affair and that it could not be turned off to suit the convenience of the United States Government.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 153]
6. CIA Officials Made Use of Known Underworld Figures   in Assassination EffortsOfficials of the CIA made use of persons associated with the criminal underworld in attempting to achieve the assassination of Fidel Castro. These underworld figures were relied upon because it was believed that they had expertise and contacts that were not available to law-abiding citizens.Foreign citizens with criminal backgrounds were also used by the CIA in two other cases that we have reviewed. In the development of the Executive Action capability, one foreign national with a criminal background was used to "spot" other members of the European underworld who might be used by the CIA for a variety of purposes, including assassination if the need should arise. In the Lumumba case, two men with criminal backgrounds were used as field operatives by CIA officers in a volatile political situation in the Congo.B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves1. The United States Should Not Engage in Assassination.We cannot condone the use of assassination as a tool of foreign policy. Aside from pragmatic arguments against the use of assassination supplied to the Committee by witnesses with extensive-experience in covert operations, we find that assassination violates moral precepts fundamental to our way of life.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 154]
# TOP SECRET- 6 -In addition to considerations, there were several practical reasons advanced for not assassinating foreign leaders. These reasons are discussed in the section of this report recommending a statute making assassination a crime.a. Distinction Between Targeted AssassinationsInstigated by the United States and Supportfor Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow LocalGovernmentsTwo of the five principal cases investigated by the Committee involved plots to kill foreign leaders (Lumumba and Castro) that were instigated by American officials. Three of the cases (Trujillo, Diem, Schneider) involved killings in the course of coup attempts by local dissidents. These latter cases differed in the degree to which assassination was contemplated by the leaders of the coups and the degree to which United States officials motivated the coups.The Committee concludes that targeted assassinations instigated by the United States must be prohibited.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 155]
- 7 -Coups involve varying degrees of risk of assassination. The possibility of assassination in coup attempts raises questions concerning the propriety of United States involvement in coups, particularly in those where the assassination of a foreign leader is a likely prospect.This country was created by violent revolt against a regime believed to be tyrannous, and our founding fathers (the local dissidents of that era) received aid from foreign countries. Given that history, we should not today rule out support for dissident groups seeking to overthrow tyrants.But passing beyond that principle, there remain serious questions: for example, whether the national interest of the United States is genuinely involved; whether any such support should be overt rather than covert; what tactics should be used; and how such actions should be authorized and controlled by the coordinate branches of government.The Committee believes that its recommendation on the question of covert actions in support of coups must await the Committee's final report which will be issued after a full review of covert action in general.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 156]
b. The Setting In Which the Assassination PlotsOccurred Explains, But Does Not Justify ThemThe Cold War setting in which the assassination plots took place does not change our view that assassination is unacceptable in our society. In addition to the moral and practical problems discussed elsewhere, we find two principal defects in any contention that the tenor of the period justified the assassination plots:First, the assassination plots were not necessitated by imminent danger to the United States. Among the cases studied, Castro alone posed a threat to the United States, but then only during the period of the Cuban missile crisis. Castro's assassination had been planned by the CIA long before that crisis, and was not advanced by policymakers as a possible course of action during the crisis.Second, we reject absolutely any notion that the United States should justify its actions by the standards of totalitarians. Our standards must be higher, and this difference is what the struggle is all about. Of course, we must defend our democracy. But in defending it, we must resist undermining the very virtues we are defending.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 157]
- 9 -Two documents which have been supplied to the Committee graphically demonstrate attitudes which can lead to tactics that erode and could ultimately destroy the very ideals we must defend.The first was written in 1954 by a special committee formed to advise the President on covert activities. The United States may, it said, have to adopt tactics "more ruthless than [those] employed by the enemy" in order to meet the threat from hostile nations. The report concluded that "long standing American concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered."*Although those proposals did not involve assassinations, the attitudes underlying them were, as Director Colby testified, indicative of the setting within which the assassination plots were conceived. (Colby, 6/4/75, p. 117)* The full text of the passage is as follows:another important requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political, and paramilitary organization far more effective, more unique, and, if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy. No one should be permitted to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient, and secure accomplishment of this mission.The second consideration, it is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the U. S. is to survive, long standing American concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 158]
# TOP SECRET- 10 -We do not think that traditional American notions of fair play need be abandoned when dealing with our adversaries. It may well be ourselves that we injure most if we adopt tactics "more ruthless than the enemy".A second document which represents an attitude which we find improper was sent to the Congo in the fall of 1960 when the assassination of Patrice Lumumba was being considered. The chief of CIA's Africa Division recommended a particular agent -- WIROGUE -- becauseHe is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize all actions. (Memo dated //60; Bissell Tr., 6/11/75, p. ).The Committee finds this philosophy is not in keeping with the ideals of our nation.2. The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld Figures for Their Criminal TalentsWe conclude that agencies of the United States must not use underworld figures for their criminal talents* in carrying out their operations. In addition to the corrosive effect*Pending our investigation of the use of informants by the FBI and other agencies, we reserve judgment on the use of known criminals as informants. We are concerned here only with the use of persons known to be actively engaged in criminal pursuits for their expertise in carrying out criminal acts.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 159]
- 11 -upon our government,* the use of underworld figures involvesthe following dangers:a. The use of underworld figures for "dirty business"gives them the power to blackmail the government and to avoidprosecution, for past or future crimes. For example, thefigures involved in the Castro assassination operation usedtheir involvement with the CIA to avoid prosecution. The CIAalso contemplated attempting to quash criminal charges againstQJWIN in a foreign tribunal.b. The use of persons experienced in criminal tech-niques and prone to criminal behavior increases the likelihoodthat criminal acts will occur. Agents in the field are neces-sarily given broad discretion. But the risk of improperactivities is increased when persons of criminal backgroundare used, particularly when they are selected precisely to takeadvantage of their criminal skills or contacts.*The corrosive effect of dealing with underworld figures isgraphically demonstrated by the fact that Attorney General RobertKennedy, who had devoted much of his professional life to fight-ing organized crime, did not issue an order against cooperatingwith such persons when he learned in May 1961 that the CIA hadmade use of Sam Giancana in a sensitive operation in Cuba.In May 1962, when the Attorney General learned that theoperation had involved assassination, he did, according toa CIA witness, inform those briefing him that underworldfigures should not be used before checking with him first,but failed to direct that they must never be so used.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 160]
TOP SECRET- 12 -c. There is the danger that the United States Government will become an unwitting accomplice to criminal acts and that criminal figures will take advantage of their association with the government to advance their own projects and interests.d. There is a fundamental impropriety in selecting persons because they are skilled at performing deeds which the laws of our society forbid.The use of underworld figures by the United States Government for their criminal skills raises moral problems comparable to those recognized by Justice Brandeis in a different context five decades ago:Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means -- to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of the private criminal -- would bring terrible retribution. Against this pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face. Olmstead v. U. S., 277 U.S. 439, 485 (1927)NW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 161
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 161]
# TOP SECRET- 13 -C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to the Issues of Authorization and ControlIn the introduction to this report, we set forth in summary form our major conclusions concerning whether the assassination plots were authorized. The ensuing discussion elaborates and explains those conclusions.The Committee analyzed the question of authorization for the assassination activities from two perspectives. First, the Committee examined whether officials in policymaking positions authorized or were aware of the assassination activities. Second, the Committee inquired whether the officials responsible for the operational details of the plots perceived that assassination had the approval of their superiors, or at least was the type of activity that their superiors would not disapprove.No doubt, the CIA's general efforts against the regimes discussed in this report were authorized at the highest levels of the government. But the record leaves serious