Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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-77-Moreover, in his testimony as to the conversation with Lansdale on May 30, 1975 that was the basis for his report, Martin said he did not specifically ask Lansdale if he had acted on orders with regard to an assassination plan, nor did Lansdale say he acted on orders. Rather, Martin asked Lansdale "who were you working for?"*/ When Martin did specifically ask Lansdale in a subsequent conversation on June 4, 1975 if he had acted on orders, Martin testified that Lansdale stated that he had not. In this subsequent conversation on June 4, 1975, Martin said he asked Lansdale specifically, "were you ever ordered by President Kennedy or any other Kennedy to draw up plans to assassinate Castro?" (Martin, p. 21). Martin testified that Lansdale replied "no" and that his orders were "very broad." (Martin, p. 21). Martin further testified that in this June 4 conversation he asked Lansdale whether "any assassination planning you did was done on your own initiative," and that Lansdale replied "yes." (Martin, p. 21). Martin stated that it was his belief that his June 4 conversation was at variance with Lansdale's statements to him on May 30, 1975. (Martin, p. 21). It may also be the case, based on Martin's testimony as to the differences between the questions he posed to Lansdale on May 30 and on June 4, 1975, that he and Lansdale may have misunderstood each other.*/ Martin testified that his conversation with Lansdale on May 30, 1975 involved two subjects: 1) "what were you (Lansdale) doing in August 1962" (Martin, p. 16), and 2) "who were you working for." (Martin, p. 17). Martin stated that in the first portion of the conversation dealing with Lansdale's activities in August 1962, Lansdale stated, according to Martin, "I just wanted to see if the U.S. had any such capabilities" and that this included "assassination" as well as other means of disposing of Castro. As to the second portion of the conversation, Martin stated he asked Lansdale "who were you working for" and Lansdale replied "on that project I was working for the highest authority in the land." (Martin, p. 18).
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(2) The O'Leary ReportO'Leary's news report read as follows in its lead paragraphs:"Retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale has namedRobert F. Kennedy as the administration officialwho ordered him in 1962 to launch a CIA projectto work out all feasible plans for "getting ridof" Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro."Lansdale, in an interview with the WashingtonStar, never used the word "assassination" andsaid it was not used by Kennedy, then the attor-ney general.But he said there could be no doubt that "the.project for disposing of Castro envisioned thewhole spectrum of plans from overthrowing theCuban leader to assassinating him."O'Leary's report also stated that "Lansdale said he was contactedby Robert Kennedy in mid-summer of 1962...." In his appearance before theCommittee, O'Leary pointed out that this reference to the mid-summer of1962 modified the reference in the lead paragraph of his report. (O'Leary,p. 13).In his testimony, Lansdale said he submitted a statement to theWashington Star stating that this report was "a distortion of myremarks." (Lansdale, p.61). Lansdale testified that he stated tothe Washington Star that "perhaps someplace in the planning thereis something about what to do with a leader who would threaten the
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lives of millions of Americans (with Soviet Missiles... but I cansay I never did receive any order from President Kennedy or fromRobert Kennedy about taking action against Castro personally."(Lansdale, pp.61-62). Lansdale further testified that he toldO'Leary that he did take orders from Robert Kennedy, but made clearthat "it was on a very wide-ranging type of thing." (Lansdale, p.62).Lansdale testified as follows concerning his statement to the Starfollowing the O'Leary report:"After the story appeared, the... Washington Starasked me what wide-ranging things were you talkingabout?"I said there were economic matters and militarymatters and military things and they were verywide-ranging things. I said perhaps all O'Learywas thinking of was assassination. I wasthinking of far wider than that." (Lansdale, pp.62-63)O'Leary's report makes clear that Lansdale did not state thatRobert Kennedy instructed Lansdale to develop an assassinationplan. The O'Leary report states:"Lansdale said he is certain Robert Kennedy'sinstructions to him did not include the word"assassination." He said the attorney general,as best he could recall, spoke in more generalterms of exploring all feasible means andpracticalities of doing something "to get ridof" Castro.In view of the above, it appears that although he may have beenimprecise in his conversations with O'Leary and Martin, Lansdale never-theless did not tell them that he was ordered to develop an assassinationplan by Robert Kennedy or the President. As discussed above (see p. ).Lansdale testified that he never discussed a Castro assassination withPresident Kennedy or with Robert Kennedy. Lansdale's reported statementsthat he was ordered to plan to "get rid of Castro by all feasible meansis also consistent with Lansdale's testimony, as well as that of the otherwitnesses, with respect to the objective of the Mongoose operation. As
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-20-discussed above in section _______, however, it was the testimony of allwitnesses except Helms that such statements did not include assassination.Lansdale's statements to O'Leary and Martin appear consistent with hissworn testimony that it was his own idea to request an assassination planfrom Harvey and that he did not discuss this idea with anyone except Harvey.(see p. _______ above). With respect to this latter point, however, it isa fact that Lansdale's request for an assassination plan followed almostimmediately after the August 10 meeting, where the question of a Castroassassination was raised. Hence, it is not unreasonable to conclude thatthe raising of the question of a Castro assassination at the August 10meeting prompted Lansdale to request an assassination plan (although itwas the finding of the IG Report as well as the testimony of Harvey thatthe August 10 meeting had no relation to the question of authorization forthe 1962 assassination plot).
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H. The Question of Authorization for the 1963 Assassination Plot1. The 1963 Assassination PlotThis section discusses the specific question of authorization above the Agency for the delivery of the poison pen to AM/LASH on November 22, 1963, and reviews certain policies of the Kennedy Administration during 1963 which are relevant to that question.*/ (The facts relating to the poison pen plot are set out at pp. _______ above).2. The Issue of AuthorityMuch of the testimony of Helms and the Kennedy Administration members discussed in the preceding section (see pp. _______ to _______) is relevant to the question of authorization for the 1963 assassination activity. Once again there was no evidence that anyone above the Agency was informed about or specifically authorized the plot.As in the case of the 1962 assassination plot, however, Helms testified that he believed the 1963 assassination activity was permissible in view of his perception of continuing pressure exerted by the Administration to overthrow Castro /and his perception that there were no limits placed on the means that could be used to achieve Castro's downfall. (Helms, 9/11/75, pp. 11-13).The testimony of Helms and the Kennedy Administration members on the issue of whether the pressure to overthrow Castro made assassination permissible without a direct order is discussed in detail in the preceding section and is not repeated here. Before turning to Helms' specific testimony relating to AM/LASH (including his view that AM/LAsh was not seen as a potential assassin) we discuss below the Kennedy Administration Cuba policy in 1963. In*/The evidence showed that the "science-fiction" devices of an exploding sea shell and a poison diving suit were abandoned at the laboratory stage within the CIA and that no authorization was sought for their development or eventual use. dence, the focus in this section is on the activity involving the delivery of the poison pen to AM/LASH.
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general, the 1963 covert action program and pressure was less intense than it had been in 1962.3. The Kennedy Administration's Policy Towards Cuba in 1963(a) OrganizationThe Mongoose Operation was disbanded following the Cuban Missile Crisis. An interagency "Cuban Coordinating Committee" was established within the State Department with responsibility for developing covert action proposals. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 148.) The review and approval function was taken from the Special Group Augmented (which passed out of existence) and was placed under the Special Group, chaired by Bundy. (Bundy, 7/11/75, р. 148.)U.S. policy towards Cuba in 1963 was also treated in the National Security Council's Standing Group, the successor to the Executive Committee which had dealt with the Missile Crisis. Members of the Standing Group included Robert Kennedy, McNamara, McCone, Bundy and Sorensen.We discuss below four aspects of the Kennedy Administration's 1963 Cuba policy. These are: (1) the Standing Group's discussion of possible developments in the event of Castro's death; (2) the Standing Group's discussion of policy options; (3) the covert action program approved by the Special Group; and (4) the diplomatic effort to explore the possibility of reestablishing relations with Castro. The first three of these took place in the Spring or early Summer of 1963; the fourth aspect -- the effort to communicate with Castro -- took place at the same time as the 1963 assassination activity.
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- 3 -## (b) The Discussion of the Contingency of Castro's DeathIn the Spring of 1963, the Standing Group discussed contingency planning in the event of Castro's death. The documentary evidence and testimony indicated that Castro's death was discussed as a contingency which might occur independent of U.S. action. The Group found that the possibilities for favorable developments to the United States should Castro die were "singularly unpromising". (Summary Record of Standing Group Meeting, May 28, 1963, p. 1).The discussion stemmed from a memorandum by Bundy which discussed "possible new directions" for U.S. Cuban policy. (Bundy Memorandum to the Standing Group, April 21, 1963). The memorandum distinguished between (i) events which might occur independently of U.S. action and (ii) steps the U.S. might "initiate". (Bundy memorandum, p. 2.)When the Standing Group discussed the Bundy memorandum, Robert Kennedy proposed a study of the "measures we would take following contingencies such as the death of Castro or the shooting down of a U-2." (Bundy Ex. 6E, Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting, April 23, 1963, p. 2). The downing of a U-2 had been listed in the Bundy memorandum as a subject for contingency planning under the category of steps for which the U.S. must "await events" as distinguished from "initiate actions".Bundy's follow-up memorandum, an agenda for a further Standing Group discussion of Cuban policy, listed the subject of a
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Castro death contingency under a category comprising subjects not involving U.S. initiatives, *e.g.*, "occurrence of revolt or repression in the manner of Hungary", attributable interference by Castro in other countries", and "the reintroduction of offensive weapons". (Bundy Ex. 6-G, 4/29/63).After the meeting of April 23, 1963, the Standing Group assigned to CIA's Office of National Estimates[^1] the task of estimating possible developments if Castro should die. (Bundy Ex. 6-H, Memorandum for Members of the Standing Group, May 2, 1963).The resulting paper analyzed the various forces which would come into play in Cuba after Castro's death, including the likely behavior of Castro's top aides, Raul Castro and Che Guevara, as well as possible Soviet reaction. (Bundy Ex. 6-I, Draft Memorandum by Office of National Estimates titled "Developments in Cuba and Possible U.S. Actions in the Event of Castro's Death", pp. 2-5, hereafter called the "ONE paper"). The ONE Paper concluded that "the odds are that upon Castro's death, his brother Raul or some other figure in the regime would, with Soviet backing and help, take over control".[^2][^1]: */The Office of National Estimates is the research division of the CIA responsible for analyzing foreign intelligence. The Office is not part of the CIA's covert operations organization.[^2]: **/The ONE Paper also saw little chance that a government disposed towards the United States would be able to come to power without extensive U.S. military support: "Anti-Moscow Cuban nationalists would require extensive U.S. help in order to win, and probably U.S. military intervention." (Bundy Ex. 6-1, p. ii).
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In addition, the ONE Paper warned that the United States would most likely be blamed if Castro should die by another's hand. "If Castro were to die by other than natural causes the U.S. would be widely charged with complicity, even though it is widely known that Castro has many enemies". (Bundy Ex. 6-I, p. 4.)The ONE Paper also identified a number of possible U.S. actions in the event of Castro's death, ranging along a spectrum that included no U.S. initiatives, action to support a government in exile, quarantine and blockade, and outright invasion. (Bundy Ex. 6-I, pp. 7-12.)On May 28, 1963, the Standing Group discussed the ONE Paper. The Standing Group found that "all of the courses of action [open to the U.S. should Castro die] were singularly unpromising". (Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting No. 7/63, May 28, 1963, p. 1).Bundy agreed that the Standing Group "certainly posed the question" in the Spring of 1963 as to what would happen if Castro died or were killed. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 130.) But he testified that he had no recollection of a Castro assassination being on the minds of Standing Group members when they discussed this contingency. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 14.)[^1][^1]: */As indicated above p. ), Bundy did recall that over the period 1961 and 1963 "the subject of a Castro assassination was mentioned from time to time by different individuals", but said that he was not aware of "much discussion in the Spring of 1963 on that subject". (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 140.)
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Bundy testified, however, that one reason for getting an estimate of this kind was to get it on record that we should not be "fussing" with questions of assassination and that it was not a sound policy. (Bundy, 7/11/75, р. 142.)Bundy further testified that it was not unusual to assess the implications of a foreign leader's possible death, giving the cases of Stalin and DeGaulle as examples. In the case of Castro, Bundy said he felt it was only prudent to attempt to assess the question of a post-Castro Cuba since Castro was such a "dominant figure". (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 145.)(c) The Standing Group's Discussion of U.S. Policy Towards CubaThe Standing Group's documents indicate it continued to assume the desirability of harassment, but recognized there were few practical measures the U.S. could take that were likely to achieve Castro's overthrow.In his April 21, 1963 memorandum on "Cuban Alternatives" Bundy identified three possible new alternatives: (1) forcing "a non-Communist solution in Cuba by all necessary means", (2) insisting on "major but limited ends", or (3) moving "in the direction of a gradual development of some form of accommodation with Castro". (Bundy Memorandum to the Standing Group, April 21, 1963, p. 3.) These alternatives were discussed at Standing Group meetings on April 23 and May 28, 1963.
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- 7 -Sorensen, who participated in these meetings, testifiedthat the "widest possible range of alternatives" were dis-cussed, but that "assassination was not even on the list".(Sorensen, 7/21/75, p. 4.) He said that consideration ofpossible options such as forcing "a non-Communist solutionin Cuba by all necessary means" did not encompass assassina-tion:"[this] could not have included or implied assassina-tion. Instead, it expressly referred to 'the develop-ment of pressures' and 'gradual escalation of the con-frontation in Cuba' to produce an overthrow of theregime, including 'a willingness to use military forceto invade Cuba'. Such a course was obviously notadopted by the President, and in any event expressedan approach far different from assassination". (Soren-sen affidavit, 7/25/75, p. 4).*/The record of the first Standing Group discussion of Bundy'smemorandum shows that a number of alternatives were discussed (noneof which involved assassination) but no conclusions were reached.On May 28, 1963, the Standing Group met again. McCone arguedfor steps to "increase economic hardship" in Cuba, supplementedby sabotage to "create a situation in Cuba in which it would bepossible to subvert military leaders to the point of their acting*/ The Bundy memorandum also used the phrase "all necessary measures"to describe the steps the U.S. was willing to take to "prevent" a di-rect military threat to the U.S. or to the Western Hemisphere from Cuba.Sorensen explained the meaning of this phrase in the context of theApril 23 discussion of Kennedy Administration policy."[this phrase) could not by any stretch of semanticsor logic have included assassination or any otherinitiative. It reflected the purely defensive postureimplemented six months earlier when long-range missilesand other offensive weapons were placed in Cuba."
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- 8 -to overthrow Castro". (Summary Record of NSC Standing GroupMeeting No. 7/63, May 28, 1963, p. 1.) McNamara said thatsabotage would not be "conclusive" and suggested study of"economic pressures which could upset Castro." Robert Kennedysaid "the U.S. must do something against Castro, even thoughwe do not believe our actions would bring him down". (Id.,p. 2) In conclusion, Bundy summarized by stating that the taskwas "to decide now what actions we would take against Castro,acknowledging that the measures practical for us to take willnot result in his overthrow". (Id., p. 2.)(d) The Special Group's Authorization of a Sabotage Pro-gram Against CubaDuring the first six months of 1963, little, if any,sabotage activity against Cuba was undertaken.[^1] However, onJune 19, 1963, following the Standing Group's discussion of Cubapolicy in the Spring, President Kennedy approved a Cuba sabotageprogram.[^2] (Memorandum for the Special Group, 6/19/63, p. 1.)[^1]: */ At an April 3, 1963 meeting on Cuba, Bundy stated that nosabotage operations were then underway because the Special Group "haddecided . . that such activity is not worth the effort expended onit." (Memorandum of Meeting on Cuba, 4/3/63, p. 1).[^2]: **/ The sabotage program approved on June 19, 1963 was directed at"four major segments of the Cuban economy", (1) electric power; (2)petroleum refineries and storage facilities; (3) railroad and high-way transportation and (4) production and manufacturing. (Memoran-dum for the Special Group, June 19, 1963, p. 1) Operations under thisprogram were to be conducted by CIA-controlled Cuban agents from aU.S. island off Florida and it was to complement a similar effort de-signed to "develop internal resistance elements which could carry outsabotage." (Id., p. 2.)
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In contrast to the Mongoose program, which sought to build toward an eventual internal revolt, the 1963 covert action program had a more limited objective, i.e., "to nourish a spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defections and other byproducts of unrest". (Id., p. 2.)After the initial approval, particular intelligence and sabotage operations were submitted to the Special Group for specific prior authorization. On October 3, 1963, the Special Group approved nine operations in Cuba, including several sabotage operations. And on October 24, 1963, thirteen major sabotage operations were approved to be undertaken in the period November 1963 through January 1964, including the sabotage of an electric power plant, an oil refinery, and a sugar mill. (Memorandum, July 11, 1975, CIA Review Staff to Select Committee, on "Approved CIA Covert Operations into Cuba.").(e) The Diplomatic Effort to Explore an Accommodation With CastroAs early as January 4, 1963, Bundy proposed to President Kennedy that the possibility of communicating with Castro be explored. (Bundy Ex. 6, Memorandum to the President, January 4, 1963, p. 3.) Bundy's memorandum on "Cuba Alternatives" to the Standing Group on April 23, 1963, also listed the "gradual development of some form of accommodation with Castro" among policy alternatives. (Bundy memorandum, p. 3.)
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And, at a meeting on June 3, 1963, the Special Group agreed it would be a "useful endeavor" to explore "various possibili- ties of establishing channels of communication to Castro". (Memorandum of Special Group meeting, June 6, 1963, p. 2).In the Fall of 1963, William Atwood was a Special Advisor to the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations with the rank of Ambassador. (Atwood, 7/10/75, p. 3.) Atwood testified that during the period of September-November, 1963, he held a series of talks with the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations to discuss opening negotiations on an accommodation between Castro and the United States. (Atwood, pp. 5-9.)Atwood testified that at the outset he informed Robert Kennedy, who told him that the effort "was worth pursuing". (Atwood,p.6).Atwood said he regularly reported on the talks to the White House and to his superior at the United Nations, Adlai Steven- son. (Atwood pp. 6-7.) Atwood further stated that he was told by Bundy that President Kennedy was in favor of "pushing towards an opening toward Cuba" to take Castro "out of the Soviet fold and perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back into normal". (Atwood, p.7-8.)Atwood stated that he believed the only people who knew of his contacts with the Cubans were the President, Harriman, Steven- son, Robert Kennedy, Bundy, Bundy's assistant, and journalist Lisa Howard. (Howard had initially placed Atwood in contact with the Cuban Ambassador after reporting to Atwood that during a trip to Cuba she had learned Castro was anxious to establish
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communications with the United States. Thereafter Howard served as an intermediary in arranging Atwood's meetings with the Cubans. (Atwood, pp. 4, 18)).Atwood also testified that he arranged for a French journalist, Jean Daniel, to visit the White House prior to Daniel's scheduled trip to see Castro. (Atwood, p. 19.) (According to an article by Daniel in December, 1963, Daniel met with President Kennedy on October 24, 1963. They discussed the prospects for reestablishing U.S.-Cuba relations and President Kennedy asked Daniel to report back to him after seeing Castro.)[^1]Atwood's efforts reached their high point on November 18, 1963, when Atwood spoke by telephone with a member of Castro's staff in Cuba. (Atwood, p. 8). Pursuant to White House instructions, Atwood informed Castro's staff member that the U.S. favored preliminary negotiations at the U.N. (rather than in Cuba as proposed by the Cubans), and that the U.S. desired to work out an agenda for these talks. (Atwood, pp. 8-9). After receiving Atwood's report on this conversation, Bundy told Atwood that after the Cuban agenda was received, President Kennedy wanted to see Atwood to "decide what to say and[^1]: */ Daniel, Unofficial Envoy: A Historic Report from Two Capitals, (New Republic, December 14, 1963). Daniel was with Castro when Castro received the report of President Kennedy's assassination. Daniel, When Castro Heard the News, (New Republic, December 7, 1963).