Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 563]
- 3 -involved themselves in political assassinations, but undertheir system they at least have a better prospect of keep-ing it concealed. Since we do like a free society andsince these secrets are going to come out in due course, therevelation will then do serious injury to the good name andreputation of the United States.Would you agree with that?Mr. Helms. Yes, I would.The Chairman. And finally, if we were to reserve to our-selves the prerogative to assassinate foreign leaders, we may in-vite reciprocal action from foreign governments who assumethat if it's our prerogative to do so, it is their prero-gative as well, and that is another danger that we at leastinvite with this kind of action, wouldn't you agree?Mr. Helms. Yes, sir. (6/13/75, pp. 76-78)Similarly, John McCone said he was opposed to assassinationsbecause:I didn't think it was proper from the standpoint of the U.S.Government and the Central Intelligence Agency. (6/6/75, p. 15)B. CIA Directives Banning Assassination. In 1972 and 1973, Helms andthen Colby issued internal CIA orders banning assassination. In his order, Helmssaid:It has recently again been alleged in the press that CIAengages in assassination. As you are well aware, this is notthe case, and Agency policy has long been clear on this issue.To underline it, however, I direct that no such activity oroperation be undertaken, assisted or suggested by any of ourpersonnel.... (Memorandum, Helms to Deputy Directors, 3/6/72)Colby, in one of a series of orders in August 1973 arising out of the Agency'sown review of prior "questionable activity," issued an order which stated:CIA will not engage in assassination nor induce, assist orsuggest to others that assassination be employed. (Memorandum, Colbyto Deputy Directors, 8/29/73)
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## C. The need for a statute. Commendable and welcome as they are, theseCIA directives are not sufficient. Administrations change, CIA directors change,and someday in the future what was tried in the past may once again become a tempt-ation. Assassination plots did happen. It would be irresponsible for us not to doall that we can do to prevent their happening again. Laws express our society'svalues; they deter those who might be tempted and stiffen the will of those whowant to resist.The statute we recommend, which is printed as an appendix to this report,makes it a criminal offense for persons subject to the jurisdiction of the UnitedStates 1) to conspire, within or outside the United States, to assassinate aforeign official; 2) to attempt to assassinate a foreign official, or 3) to assas-sinate a foreign official.Present law makes it a crime to kill, or to conspire to kill, a foreignofficial or foreign official guest while such a person is in the United States.18 U.S.C. 1116; 18 U.S.C. 1117. However, there is no law which makes it a crimeto assassinate, or to conspire or attempt to assassinate, a foreign officialwhile such official is outside the United States. Our proposed statute is thusdesigned to close this gap in the law.Subsection (a) of the proposed statute would punish conspiracies formedwithin the United States; subsection (b) punishes conspiracies outside of theUnited States. Subsection (b) is) necessary to eliminate the loophole which wouldotherwise permit persons to simply leave the United States and conspire abroad.Subsections (c) and (d), respectively, make it an offense to attempt to kill orto kill a foreign official outside the United States.Subsections (a) through (d) specifically apply to any "officer or employeeof the United States" to make clear that the statute punishes conduct by U.S.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 565]
- 5 -government personnel, as well as conduct by private citizens having no relationto the U.S. government. In addition, subsection (a), dealing with conspiracieswithin the United States, applies to "any other person," whether or not a UnitedStates citizen. Noncitizens who conspire within the United States to assassi-nate a foreign official clearly come within the jurisdiction of U.S. law. Sub-sections (b) through (d), which deal with conduct outside the United States, applyto U.S. citizens, and to officers or employees of the United States, whether ornot they are citizens. Criminal liability for conduct outside the United Statesof persons who are not U.S. citizens or who do not hold a position as a officeror employee of the United States are matters for the law of the place where suchconduct takes place.The term "foreign official" is defined in subjection (d) (2). The defini-tion makes it clear that the offense may be committed even though the officialbelongs to an insurgent force, an unrecognized government, or a non-governmentalpolitical party. Our investigation -- as well as the reality of internationalpolitics -- has shown that officials in such organizations are potential targetsfor assassination.*/The offenses are limited to conduct aimed at such persons because of theirofficial duties or status, or their political views, actions, or statements. Thus,for example, a conspiracy to kill or the killing of a foreign official, which isnot politically motivated would not be punishable under this statute.The definition of official in section (d) (2) also provides that such per-son must be an official of a foreign government or movement "with which theUnited States is not at war or against which the United States Armed Forces have*/For example, Lumumba was not an official of the Congolese government at thetime of the plots against his life, and Trujillo, though the dictator, held noofficial governmental position in the latter period of his regime.
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- 6 -not been introduced into hostilities or situations pursuant to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution." This definition makes it clear that, absent a declaration of war or the introduction of United States Armed Forces pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, the killing of foreign officials is a criminal offense./insert discussion of paramilitary aspect/In the course of our hearings, some witnesses, while strongly condemning assassination, asked whether, as a matter of theory, assassination should absolutely be ruled out in a time of truly unusual national emergency. Adolf Hitler was cited as an example. Of course, the cases with which we were concerned were not of that character.[^1] In a grave emergency, the President has a limited power to act, not in violation of the law, but in accord with his own responsibilities under the Constitution to defend the Nation. As the Supreme Court has declared, the Constitution "is not a suicide pact." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).Abraham Lincoln, in an unprecedented emergency, claimed unprecedented power based on the need to preserve the nation:> ...my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government -- that nation -- of which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law life and limb must be protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution, through the preservation of the nation ....> The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. X, pp. 65-66 (Nicolay and Hay, Eds. 1894).[^1]: Indeed, in the only situation of true national crisis -- the Cuban missile crisis -- assassination was not even considered.
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- 7 -Of course, whatever the extent of the President's own constitutional powers," it is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system that these powers are checked and limited by the Congress, including the Congress' power of impeachment. As a necessary corollary, any action taken by a President pursuant to his limited inherent powers and in apparent conflict with the law must be disclosed to the Congress. Only then may the Congress judge whether the action truly represented, in Lincoln's phrase, an "indispensable necessity" to the life of the Nation.As Lincoln explained in submitting his extraordinary actions to the Congress for ratification: "In full view of his great responsibility he has, so far, done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment, perform yours." (Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 568]
Approved by DraftingSubcommittee on 9/9/75EPILOGUEWe do not believe that the acts which we have examined represent the real American character. They do not reflect the ideals which have given the people of this country and of the world hope for a better, fuller, fairer life. We regard the assassination plots as aberrations.We must not adopt the tactics of the enemy. Means are as important as ends. Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints that make men free. But each time we do so, each time the means we use are wrong, our inner strength, the strength which makes us free, is lessened.Despite our distaste for what we have seen, we have great faith in this country. The story is sad, but this country has the strength to hear it and to learn from it. We must remain a people who confront our mistakes and resolve not to repeat them. If we do not, we will decline; but, if we do, our future will be worthy of the best of our past.NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 569
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992## JFK Assassination System## Identification FormDate: 7/7/2015## Agency InformationAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10178RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-83## Document InformationORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM:TO:TITLE:DATE: 00/00/1975PAGES: 161SUBJECTS: CASTRO, FIDELLUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATIONCIADOCUMENT TYPE: REPORTCLASSIFICATION: DeclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: IB; ICCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/31/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: CC Box 73v9.1NW. 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 1
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONDate : 08/07/95Page : 1AGENCY : SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10178RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-83DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIAFROM :TO :TITLE :DATE : 00/00/75PAGES : 161SUBJECTS : LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATIONCIACASTRO, FIDELDOCUMENT TYPE : REPORTCLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRETRESTRICTIONS : REFERREDCURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULLDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/19/99OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS : CC Box 73[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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# INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARYINTERVIEW WITH: Congo Chief of StationREGARDING: Lumumba Assassination Plan and Related Events in the Congo.DATE-TIME-LOCATION: August 20, 1975 - 12:30-3:30 p.m. Room 608, Carroll ArmsPRESENT: Burton Wides, Rhett Dawson, Frederick BaronHAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:FOLLOW UP REQUIRED:MATERIALS SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S):EXECUTIVE SESSION: YES X NO
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MEMORANDUMTO:FilesFROM:Frederick BaronDATE:August 20, 1975SUBJECT: Interview with Congo Chief of Station: Lumumba AssassinationPlan and Related Events in the CongoStaff Members Present: Burton Wides, Rhett Dawson,Frederick BaronThe following is a summary of the contents of an interview conducted with a former CIA officer concerning a period (1960-1961) in which he was Chief of Station in the Congo. The interview was conducted from 12:30 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. today in Room 608 of the Carroll Arms Hotel.At the request of the Chief of Station (COS), we agreed to take his testimony under alias. He will be referred to hereinafter as "COS".COS GOES TO CONGO AND RECEIVES MESSENGER FROM HEADQUARTERSCOS said that he arrived in the Congo as Chief of Station in early July (probably the 10th or 11th) 1960. COS said that before he left Headquarters for the Congo he did not talk with either Richard Bissell (DDP) or Bronson Tweedy (Chief, Africa Division) about the prospect of assassinating Patrice Lumumba. Soon after arriving in the Congo, COS was asked to return to Headquarters in late July for briefings. He said there was no talk of assassination at those meetings, either.
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-2-After his return to the Congo, probably in early September, COS received a cable from Headquarters that said, in his words, "someone I would recognize would appear to give me instructions for a mission I would carry out." Soon thereafter Sidney Gottlieb arrived in the Congo to meet with COS. COS recognized Gottlieb from the Technical Services Division at the CIA, and it was made clear that Gottlieb was the messenger referred to in the cable.Gottlieb and COS met in COS's new apartment. COS dated this meeting by the fact that he had moved into this apartment in early September, 1960 . COS said that Gottlieb informed him that lethal biological agents had been developed for the assassination of Lumumba. COS believes that Gottlieb brought a poison virus and probably two other lethal biological agents with him in his bag. But COS said it was possible that the biological weapons arrived shortly thereafter. COS said that Gottlieb also provided rubber gloves, a gauze mask, and probably a hypodermic syringe -- equipment for administering the poisonous substances. The poisonous substances were to be injected into food, drink, toothpaste, or anything else that Lumumba might ingest. COS did not remember the appearance of the biological agents themselves, but he did recall that there were approximately three different types of lethal substances provided to him.COS said that he was "taken aback" by Gottlieb's assignment to him of the assassination of Lumumba. COS said that he was a junior Chief of Station, and he wanted to make sure to "pin down" the chain of authority for this assignment because "I had neverNW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 5
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-3-heard of anything like this." COS's best recollection was that hehad the following interchange with Sidney Gottlieb:COS: Where did this brilliant idea come from?Gottlieb: The top.COS: Who at the top?Gottlieb: The Director has instructions from PresidentEisenhower.COS said that he could not recall the exact language of theinterchange, although this was his best recollection. He saidGottlieb made it clear that the President wanted to find a way toremove Lumumba from the scene. He said that when Gottlieb explainedthe source of authorization for the assassination plot, he made itclear that the President was the source. COS said it was possiblethat Gottlieb used a euphemism, but it was more likely that hementioned either "President Eisenhower" or "the President." Inresponse to a question from the staff to paraphrase again the importof Gottlieb's instruction to him, COS said that Gottlieb told himsomething to the effect that "I am giving you instructions on highestauthority to assassinate Lumumba any way you can." COS said thatGottlieb did not insist that the assassination had to take place bymeans of the biological agents he was supplying.COS said that this was not an exploration of the possibilityof assassination or the establishment of a mere capability for assassi-nation. "They were serious about it . . . it was clear that thepolicy decision to assassinate Lumumba had been made." COS said
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 6]
-4-he was not awaiting any further "go signal" in order to proceed with the assassination operation.COS said that Gottlieb told him that there was to be no connection with the United States if the biological agents were to be employed. COS had an asset in the Congo that he considered for use as an intermediary in this project, although he never moved forward to make the asset knowledgeable of the project. COS said that, whether or not he used an intermediary to accomplish the assassination, Gottlieb made it clear that "I was to do it or find a way to do it."COS asked Gottlieb when the lethal biological agents would lose their potency. Gottlieb said this would happen over a long period of time. COS said that he did not remember exactly what the substances looked like, nor whether Gottlieb brought it in his bag, and this would not be surprising because "in those days there were no customs checks in the Congo."COS locked the virus in a safe at the Station to which only he had access. He remembers taking the virus from the safe sometime later -- probably after the arrest or death of Lumumba -- to dispose of it by burying it near the Congo River. COS said that he had no training in chemistry and felt ill-equipped to deal with poisons. COS asked Gottlieb if the poison left traces. Gottlieb told him that it left the traces of a normal disease.COS said he was never subjected to great pressure to use the poison. COS added that, when he spoke with Gottlieb, "I don't
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 7]
think I agreed to use it." Although he also said that he did not tell Gottlieb that he would refuse to use it.COS said that even though Gottlieb had told him that clearance for the assassination of Lumumba had come from the President and the DCI, he wanted verification from Headquarters of an assignment of such magnitude. COS said: "I responded to Headquarters with a double-talk message, saying that I had met the messenger and requesting confirmation. I then received a cable containing double-talk confirmation, something like 'your assumption confirmed.'"COS said "I never knew who was sending me these cables. They also said 'Director' and I sent my cables with a special slug. My cables were probably marked to 'Director' which is never actually seen by the DCI. COS thought that he destroyed his copy of cables on this subject on instructions contained in those cables. He said that only a single copy of the cables had existed at the Congo Station. COS said that he was instructed by Gottlieb that he was not to discuss this assassination mission even with his own deputy. COS said that he did not discuss the operation with Glenn Fields. He also said that he would not have discussed the operation with Dr. Lester Houck because Houck was removed as Branch Chief in early fall due to dissatisfaction with his performance.COS said that he thought an assassination effort was "a bad idea, both morally and practically." However, COS said that he may not have expressed his grave concern to Gottlieb because he was so taken aback at receiving the assignment. COS thought that he told Gottlieb that he did not have a good means of access to Lumumba.
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-6-COS recalls raising the subject of assassination withGottlieb on subsequent occasions outside the Congo only in thecontext of his (COS's) feeling: "Thank God I never had to use it."COS did not remember if Gottlieb mentioned Richard Bissell asa source of authority or approval for the assassination operation.COS does not recall that anyone other than the President and theDCI were indicated as the source of authority for the assassinationoperation.O'DONNELL IS DISPATCHED FROM HEADQUARTERS TO THE CONGOCOS recalled the fact that Justin O'Donnell arrived in theCongo from CIA Headquarters approximately in October of 1960. COSsaid that O'Donnell "came to eliminate Lumumba." COS did not re-call whether O'Donnell recalled a conversation with Richard Bissell.COS said that, in anticipating O'Donnell's arrival, he hadthe impression that O'Donnell was coming to aid in the removal ofLumumba. COS said, "I wondered if Headquarters thought I was drag-ging my feet and that I might be relieved."COS said he did not remember discussing his meeting withSidney Gottlieb with O'Donnell but he simply does not have aspecific recollection. COS said he would not dispute O'Donnell'stestimony that COS had made O'Donnell aware that a poison viruswas in his safe. COS said that assassination was "not excluded"as one of the means of removing Lumumba that O'Donnell might use.But COS said that he was not certain that assassination was includedas one of O'Donnell's tools. COS said that he may have discussedNW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 9
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-7-with O'Donnell a plan to snatch Lumumba from "protective custody." But he does not specifically remember this.COS said that "O'Donnell did not seem to do anything most of the time, and I didn't take him very seriously. He spent a lot of time drinking." COS said that he was not aware of any action O'Donnell took to carry out an assassination or a "snatch" of Lumumba.COS said that the assassination plan had struck him from the beginning as a bad idea, so he moved slowly on it. "I showed some action to Headquarters by sending cables, but never pushed it."COS said that he asked O'Donnell to clear with him any major actions he was contemplating in the Congo. COS believes that O'Donnell was in the Congo from September until approximately Christmas.LUMUMBA'S ESCAPECOS said that Lumumba's escape from "protective custody" was a surprise to him. He said that the CIA Station had nothing to do with it, although they investigated the incident.COS said "I was in touch with many official Congolese about where Lumumba was and how he got out. But I did not get much good information. It was assumed that Lumumba was going to Stanleyville. The Congolese flew troops to points that he would have to pass on this route. I remember reviewing maps of these routes with the Congolese."COS added, "I left the Congo for Rome because of the prospect that Lumumba might start an uprising against 'white devils.' ButNW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 10
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-8-when I arrived in Rome I read that Lumumba was captured. I learned from Mobutu and Casavubu that Lumumba would be imprisoned in Thysville.COS MEETS WITH BISSELL, TWEEDY, AND KARAMESSINES IN ROMEIn November 1960, while Lumumba was at large, COS flew to Rome to meet with Richard Bissell, Bronson Tweedy and Thomas Karamessines (then Chief of Station in Rome) for a briefing session on events in the Congo. The meeting took place at Karamessines' house. COS remembers a general discussion of events surrounding Lumumba's escape and of the situation in the Congo, but he does not recall any specific discussion of assassination. He said, "Perhaps we did discuss assassination, I simply don't recall. I was tired. I had flown all day. And I wasn't in favor of assassination."BRONSON TWEEDYCOS assumed that Tweedy was knowledgeable of the assassination plan. However, he does not recall specifically discussing the plan with Tweedy prior to the delivery of the poison or while he was in possession of the poison. COS said, "I did talk with Bronson Tweedy much later about it to the effect that 'thank God nothing was ever done.'"COS did not remember whether Tweedy came to the Congo before Lumumba's death. COS thought that he must have come later. COS said, however, that if Tweedy had come earlier he probably would have asked Tweedy about the assassination mission.