Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 176]
- 36 -"Mr. Helms: "...killing was not part of the CIA's policy. It was not part of the CIA's armory...but in this Castro operation... I have testified as best I could about the atmosphere of the time, what I understood was desired (and) that this was getting rid of Castro, if he had been gotten rid of by this means that this would have been acceptable to certain individuals... I was just doing my best to do what I thought I was supposed to do." (Helms, 6/13. pp.87-88).When asked why he did not seek clarification from the Special Group, its members, or Robert Kennedy whether it was "in fact, the policy of the U.S. Government to actually kill Fidel Castro," Helms answered "I don't know...""...There is something about the whole chain of episodes in conncection with this Roselli business that I am simply not able to bring back in a coherent fashion. And there was something about the ineffectuality of all this, or the lack of conviction that anything ever happened, that I believe in the end made this thing simply collapse, disappear. And I don't recall what I was briefed on at the time. Maybe I was kept currently informed and maybe I wasn't, and today I don't remember it... But I do not recall ever having been convinced that any attempt was really made on Castro's life. And since I didn't believe any attempt had been made on Castro's life, I saw no reason to pursue the matter further." (Helms, 7/18, pp.31-32).f. Helms' Perception of the Relevance of Special Group Controls to Assassination ActivityThe evidence concerning the control system established by the Special Group for the Mongoose Operation is discussed above (see p. ).Helms stated, however, that the control system established by the Special Group for Mongoose was not intended to apply to assassination activity. (Helms, 7/18, p.21). Thus, with respect to the Special GroupAugmented's decision on March 5, 1962 that major operations going beyond the collection of intelligence must receive advance approval, Helms stated that this referred to "rather specific items that the Special Group had on its agenda" from the outset of Mongoose. (Helms, 7/18, p.21). Since assassination was not among such items, Helms stated![image of top secret stamp]
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- 37 -that the Special Group would not have expected assassinationactivity to come under this particular policy. (Helms, 7/18,p.21). And with respect to the Special Group Augmented's desireto "keep its hands tightly on preliminary actions" leadingtowards sabotage and other actions beyond intelligence collection,Helms stated that was the kind of injunction "that appears in allkinds of governmental minutes of meetings." (Helms, 7/18, p.17).Helms said he regarded these as "general injunctions: rather thanan "all inclusive injunction" to keep the Group informed of all matters.(Helms, 7/18, -.17).Helms said he recognized, however, that there were limits onpermissible activity during Mongoose.*/ (Helms, 7/18,p.9). Thus,Helms stated that although there were "no limitations" on actionsto remove Castro during Mongoose, there were restraints on sabotageoperations and he did not understand the absence of specific limitationsto authorize more drastic actions, such as committing the U.S. militaryto an invasion of Cuba. (Helms, 7/18, p.9).In addition, Helms testified that he saw no need to inform theSpecial Group of the Harvey-Roselli operation because that operation wascharacterized by "ineffectuality" and a "lack of conviction that anythingever happened." (Helms, 7/18, p.32). Helms stated he did not believeany attempt had been made on Castro's life by virtue of Harvey meetingsin Miami with Roselli. (Helms, 7/18, p.32).*/ Helms testified, that although loss of life was implicit in theMongoose operations,"I think there was an effort made not to take tacksthat would recklessly kill a lot of people and notachieve very much. I think there was an effort, if youhad a sabotage operation, not to throw a lot of handgrenades into a city, but rather take out the power.plant which would actually damage the economy of thecountry. There was an effort made to find devices thatwould seem to have a useful end. (Helms, 7/17, p.63-64).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 178]
## 2. Harvey's Testimony Concerning Authority### a. Harvey's Perception of AuthorityHarvey stressed that at all times he was acting as a line officer reporting to his immediate superior within the Agency, the Deputy Director for covert actions (first Bissell, then Helms.)* (Harvey, 6/25, p. 83).Similarly, Harvey also pointed out that his information with respect to authorization from outside the agency came from the Deputy Director:"(a)t no time during this entire period...did I ever personally believe or have any feeling that I was either free-wheeling or end-running or engaging in any activity that was not in response to a considered, decided U. S. policy, properly approved, admittedly, perhaps, or through channels and at levels I personally had no involvement in, or first-hand acquaintance with, and did not consider it at that point my province to, if you will, cross-examine either the Deputy Director or the Director concering it." (Harvey 6/25, p. 83.)
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39Thus, Harvey relied upon his superiors within the Agency for authority. Indeed, Harvey indicated that his perception of the authorization for the 1962 assassination activity may have come from the period when Allen Dullės was DCI. As Harvey stated:"But I had every right to believe organizationally, humanly, whatever way you want to put it, that nothing that was being told to me by Bissell had not in fact come to him from /Allen Dulles7."But Harvey made clear that this did not imply that McCone knew of or authorized the assassination activity:"The Chairman: 'That doesn't necessarily mean that because the previous director had knowledge that Mr. McCone had knowledge. It is not like a Covenant that runs in the land.'"'Mr. Harvey: 'No, of course not, and they don't always brief their successors.'" (Harvey, 6/25, p. 85.)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 180]
b. Harvey and the Special Group AugmentedHarvey testified that he never informed the Special Group Augmented, or any of its members individually, of the ongoing assassination plots. As we described earlier, the Special Group Augmented and its Mongoose program began its Cuba activities in late 1961 through 1962. Harvey attended.many of the Special Group Augmented meetings as the CIA's representative. He testified that at no time was assassination discussed at any of the meetings, except for the August 10, 1962 meeting.*We took substantial testimony covering the April/May 1962 period when the underworld contact was reactivated, the pills were passed to Roselli and delivered to Cuba. Harvey had been appointed several months earlier as head of the CIA's Task Force W, which operated under the Special Group Augmented as the CIA's action arm for Mongoose activities.In the latter part of April, Harvey went to Miami where the CIA had its large (at least 200 persons) JM/WAVE Station. As Harvey testified, in addition to his meeting with Roselli and the delivery of the poison pills, Harvey's trip had other totally unrelated (in Harvey's view) purposes as well:> "...this was one of a number of periodic trips for the> purpose of reviewing in toto...the actual and potential> operations at the Miami base...and this covered the whole> gamut from personnel administration, operational support> in the way of small craft [and] so on.."(Harvey., 7/11,> pp. 15-16).The Special Group Augmented expected to receive a report from Harvey on his April trip to Miami. On April 19, 1962, while Harvey was in Miami, Lansdale told the Special Group Augmented that:"Upon the return of Mr. Harvey from his current field visit,more specific information on the status of agent trainingand operations should be made available." (Memorandum for* This meeting and the testimony concerning it is treated in depth in the section, infra, pp.
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the Special Group, April 19, 1962, from Lansdale, p.). On April 26, 1962, the Special Group Augmented was informed by Lansdale that Harvey was in Florida "initiating a new series of agent infiltrations" and would return to Washington on April 30. (Memorandum for the Special Group /Augmented/, April 26, 1962, from Lansdale.) At the Special Group meeting on the same day General Taylor requested that Harvey "attend the next meet-ing and report on agent activities." (Memorandum for the Record, April 26, 1962, by McCone.) The next day, April 26, 1962, Harvey was sent a memorandum informing him of General Taylor's request as well as the fact that McCone wanted to meet with Harvey and Lansdale "immediately on your return to dis-cuss the Task Force activities," (Memorandum for Action, Elder to Harvey, April 27, 1962.)Harvey did report to the Special Group upon his return but did not mention his meeting with Roselli or the delivery of the pills and the weapons.Harvey testified that when he reported to the Special Group Augmented, on his trip to Miami, he did not inform them or, indeed any individual outside the Agency, that he had given the pills to Roselli. (Harvey, 7/11, p. 16.)* And when McCone asked Harvey to brief him on what Harvey had done in Miami, Harvey did not tell McCone of the pills. As indicated above,Harvey did not believe it was necessary to do so. (Harvey, 7/11, p. 17.)** Harvey testified with respect to why he did not brief the Special Group Augmented, in the following exchange:"Q.: '...Did you believe that the White House did not want the Special Group to know?''""A.: 'Well, I would have had no basis for that belief, but I would have felt that if the White House (tasked) this (operation to the CIA) and wanted the Special Group to know about it, it was up to the White House to brief the Special Group and not up to me to brief-them, and I would have considered that I would have been very far out of line and would have been subject to severe censure.'"* (Harvey Tr. 7/11, p. 77).
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-42-The minutes of the May 3, 1962, Special Group Augmented meeting make no mention of Harvey's above-related plot activities. The minutes of that meeting show that on his return from Miami, Harvey gave a progress report to the Special Group Augmented on "agent teams" and the "general field of intelligence". (Harvey, Ex. 3, Memorandum of Special Group Augmented Meeting, May 1962, p. 1.) Harvey reported that three agent teams had been infiltrated and that 72 actual or potential reporting sources were also in place. (Harvey Ex. 3, p. 1.)Shortly after the May 3 meeting, General Taylor went to see the President to give him what he called a "routine briefing" (Taylor Tr. ________, p. ________).General Taylor's memorandum of his briefing of the President similarly makes no reference to Harvey's contacts with Roselli or the delivery of pills and guns. (Memorandum for Record May 7, 1962, by General Taylor.) Taylor testified that he had never heard of Harvey delivering pills to poison Castro, or of any assassination attempts. (Taylor Tr. ________, p. 42.)
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3. Testimony of Kennedy Administration OfficialsIn addition to examining the actual nature of the Mongoose operation (discussed above at p. ), we took considerable testimony from Kennedy Administration officials on the question of authority for a Castro assassination in the Mongoose period. Set out in the section below is the testimony of the Kennedy Administration officials principally involved in the Mongoose operation and the Special Group Augmented, all of whom testified the assassination plots were not authorized. These were McCone, the Director of CIA and a member of the Special Group Augmented; General Taylor, Chairman of the Special Group Augmented; General Lansdale, Chief of Operations for Mongoose; Special Group Augmented members Bundy and Gilpatric; Secretary of State Rusk; and Secretary of Defense McNamara. Their testimony focused on the principal issues raised by Helms, including: (1) whether any authority for a Castro assassination existed; and (2) whether they had knowledge of any Castro assassination activity.*In the succeeding section we discuss the August 10, 1962, meeting where the subject of a Castro assassination was raised.a. Testimony of McConeMcCone testified that at no time during his service in the Kennedy Administration as DCI (1961-1963), did President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy or any member of the Cabinet or White House staff discuss with him any Castro assassination plans or operations. (McCone, p. 44.)As discussed above in greater detail, McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence and Helms immediate superior, testified he did not authorize and was not informed about, the assassination activity. (McCone, p. 3.)*In addition, the Committee questioned the Kennedy Administration members as to the likelihood that an assassination order might have been given to Helms by Robert Kennedy through a "back channel", outside the normal chain of command; however, Helms subsequently appeared and testified that no such order was ever given by Robert Kennedy. (See p. above.)
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McCone pointed out that although the Cuban problem was discussea in terms of "dispose of Castro," or "knock off Castro", these terms were meant to refer to "the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba" and not a Castro assassination. (McCone, p. 44; McCone Ex. 4, memorandum April 14, 1967, to Helms.)McCone further stated that "it is very hard for me to believe" that Robert Kennedy would have initiated a Castro assassination activity without consulting with the Special Group Augmented. (McCone, p. 52).b. Testimony of TaylorTaylor served as Chairman of the Special Group Augmented during the Mongoose Operation (Taylor, 7/9, p. ). In addition, Taylor also served as President Kennedy's Military Representative and Intelligence Advisor after the Bay of Pigs until his appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1962 (Taylor, 7/9, p. ; Bundy, 7/11, p. 25).Taylor testified that a Castro assassination plan was "never" submitted to the Special Group Augmented, either orally or in writing. (Taylor, p. 41). Taylor further testified that he and the Special Group Augmented were never told of the passage of the poison pills to Roselli in April 1962, and that the passage of these pills without the knowledge of the Special Group Augmented was "entirely, completely out of the context and character of the way the /Special Group Augmented/ operated or the way it would accept" that an operation was properly authorized. (Taylor, p. 43). And Taylor testified that although the Special Group Augmented was "certainly anxious for the downfall of Castro" an "assassination never came up" in the meetings and discussions of the Special Group Augmented. (Taylor, p. 62).With respect to whether President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy or Robert Kennedy might have bypassed the Special Group Augmented to deal directly with Helms or CIA officers to assassinate
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Castro, Taylor testified that this would have been "entirely con-tradictory to every method of operation I ever saw on the part of the President and his brother." (Taylor, p. 45). Taylor stated "the President and the Attorney General would never have gone around" the Special Group Augmented. (Taylor, p. 49).Although Taylor acknowledged that Robert Kennedy frequently pushed for more direct action during Mongoose, Taylor stated that "there was no suggestion /of/ assassination" in these urgings. (Taylor, p. 67). Taylor testified that Robert Kennedy dealt directly with Lansdale outside Special Group Augmented channels "only for the purpose of imparting his own sense of urgency" but "never" would Robert Kennedy have done so on substantive issues:"Senator Hart of Colorado: But on substantive issues, he wouldn't, in effect, been dealing behind your back?""General Taylor: Never. Never. That was not his way."(Taylor, p. 53). [^1]c. Testimony of LansdaleLansdale testified that he "was very certain" that he never discussed a Castro assassination with either President Kennedy[^1]: The evidence showed, however, that there were occasions when the Attorney General dealt with those concered with Mongoose without consulting General Taylor. For example, as discussed in greater detail (in the section on Mongoose operations) on January 18, 1962, General Lansdale sent a copy of his program review to Robert Kennedy attached to which was a cover memorandum indicating that other "sensitive work" not in the review was to be dealt with only between the President, the Attorney General, and Lansdale. The nature of that work (which Lansdale testified involved political contacts in the Cuba exile community) is discussed at p. above.![might hav]
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or Robert Kennedy:"The Chairman: You do not recall ever having discussed with the Attorney General a plan or a proposal to assassinate Fidel Castro?""General Lansdale: No. And I am very certain Senator, that such a discussion never came up...neither with the Attorney General or the President." (Lansdale, p. 18.)*Lansdale further testified that the plausible deniability concept had no part in the fact that he never discussed a Castro assassination with President Kennedy or the Attorney General.** Lansdale testified that he "had doubts" that assassination was a "useful action, and one which I had never employed in the past, and during work in copying with revolutions and I had considerable doubts as to its utility and I was trying to be very pragmatic." (Lansdale, p. 31.) When asked if he thought the President was not aware of efforts to depose Castro and his government by any means including assassination, Lansdale answered "I am certain he was aware of efforts to dispose of the Castro regime. I am really not one to guess what he knew of assassinations, because I don't know." (Id., p. 32.)With regard to the Castro assassination attempts, Lansdale testified that Harvey "never" told him that Harvey was attempting to assassinate Castro. (Lansdale, p. 24.) Lansdale stated:"I had no knowledge of such a thing. I know of no order or permission for such a thing and I was given no information at all that such a thing was going on by people who I have now learned were involved with it."(Lansdale, p. 58). */*/ Thus, when Lansdale was questioned about the "touchdown plays" (discussed in detail above at p. ), there was this testimony:"Senator Baker: Now do you completely rule out the possibility that the touchdown play had to do with the possible assassination efforts against Fidel Castro?""General Lansdale: Yes ... I never discussed, nor conceived, nor received orders about an assassination of Castro with my dealings with either the Attorney General or the President."**/ "Senator Baker: Is that the reason you didn't, because of the principle of deniability?""General Lansdale: No, it wasn't. The subject never came up, and I had no reason to bring it up with him."
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47As discussed below in detail at pp, after the subjectof a Castro assassination was raised at the August 10, 1962 meeting of theSpecial Group Augmented, Lansdale directed Harvey to prepare a plan for the"liquidation" of Cuban leaders. However, no such plan was ever prepared and,as the IG Report concluded, the August 10 meeting was "unrelated to any actualattempts at assassination." (IG, p. 113).With respect to the possibility that Robert Kennedymight have by-passed the SGA and Lansdale to deal directly with Agencyofficials on a Castro assassination, Lansdale testified:"I never knew of a direct line of communicationbetween the President or the Attorney General and Harveyapart from me on this...."During the course of the Committee's investigationinto these allegations of assassination efforts by the U.S. government,however, General Lansdale spoke with several reporters concerning thesubject of a Castro assassination plan in 1962. Lansdale's comments tothe reporters are dealt with below in connection with the August 10,1962, meeting of the Special Group.*/ "Senator Huddleston: You never had any reason to believe thatthe Attorney General had dealt directly with Mr. Harvey?""General Lansdale: I hadn't known about that at all, no....""Senator Huddleston: ...You have no reason to believe that hemight have broached (a Castro assassination) with the AttorneyGeneral?""General Lansdale: I wouldn't know that -- I certainly didn'tknow it.""Senator Huddleston: You had no reason to believe that therewas any kind of activity going on in relation to Cuba outsideof what you were proposing or what was coming before the SpecialGroup?""General Lansdale: No, I was supposed to know it all, and Ihad no indication that I did not know it all (except for oneoperation by Harvey unrelated to assassinations)."NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 188
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- 48 -d. Testimony of BundyBundy served as President Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs throughout the Kennedy Administration. (Bundy, p. 2). In addition, Bundy participated in the planning that led to the creation of Operation Mongoose and was a member of the Special Group Augmented. (Bundy, pp. 34, 87).Bundy testified that the matter of a Castro assassination was "mentioned from time to time" over the period 1961-1963 but "never to me that I can recall by the President." (Bundy, p. 73). Bundy emphasized that the question came up "as something to talk about rather than to consider." (Bundy, p. 73.)Bundy testified that it was his conviction that "no one in the Kennedy Administration, in the White House ... ever gave any authorization, approval, or instruction of any kind for any effort to assassinate anyone by the CIA." (Bundy, p. 54). Bundy testified that he knew and worked on an intimate basis with both President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy during the entire Kennedy Administration, and testified that it was "incredible" that they would have authorized a Castro![Top Secret stamp]
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assassination, either explicitly or implicitly as a result of pressure they exerted in the anti-Castro effort:"The Chairman: Based upon that acquaintanceship, do you believe, under any of the circumstances that occurred during that whole period, either one of them would have authorized the assassination of Fidel Castro?""Mr. Bundy: I most emphatically do not ... If you have heard testimony that there was pressure to do something about Cuba, there was. There was an effort, both from the President in his style and from the Attorney General in his style to keep the government active in looking for ways to weaken the Cuban regime. There was. But if you, as I understand it, and not even those who pressed the matter most closely as having essentially been inspired by the White House can tell you that anyone ever said to them, go and kill anyone.Let me say one other thing about these two men, and that is that there was something that they really wanted done, they did not leave people in doubt, so that on the one hand, I would say about their character, their purposes, and their nature and the way they confronted international affairs that I find it incredible that they would have ordered or authorized explicitly or implicitly an assassination of Castro. I also feel that if, contrary to everything that I know about their character, they had had such a decision and such a purpose, people would not have been in any doubt about it." (Tr. 98-99).Bundy was asked "have you any way to explain to the Committee, as to why Mr. Helms would testify that he...had no doubts, that the Agency was fully authorized to proceed to not only develop schemes, but to engage in active attempts to assassinate Castro?"Bundy replied: "I have no explanation of that." (Bundy, pp. 99-100)Bundy further testified that despite the extreme sense of urgency that arose during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro's assassination was never discussed, and it was "totally inconsistent" with the policies and actions taken by the President and Robert Kennedy in that![Image of TOP SECRET]