Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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so far would have legislativo.cuthority over. So we're reallyjust recommending here that in this statute they provide theframework under which these kinds of reproguamming can bedone in view of the fact that we are extending the DCI from hisown little bailiwick to the entire intelligence community.Mr. Kirbow. If that's the intent of the committee, Ihave no reservations about it.Senator Huddleston, I don't think the military peoplewould obiect to that kind of language, They'd like to havesome definite framework for a man to reach into his budget.Mr. Kirbow. I think all the various agencies would liketo have that kind of protection.Senator Huddleston. Okay.Mr. Davis. Number C. the DCI should have responsibilityto review all intelligence activities and intelligence resourceallocations, including tactical military intelligence in orderto carry out his more general responsibilities.We've used the word "review" very carefully here. Thisis not a responsibility to direct those onerations but simplyto be able to look at the whole in order to sort of balance itout.We're not saving that he's taking over responsibilityfrom the military commanders. If you read the Executive Orderthe language is different and it says that the theDCI will not have resonsibility for tactical militareTOP SECRET
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intelligence. But then it uses the word guidance. That is that the DCI will provide guidance on the relationship between the two and that is ambiguous to us and so we wanted to make sure that the DCI would be able to look at the whole but not have responsibility for directing the tactical military intelligence programs.Mr. diGenova. The original drafting of that Section C, I think it's actually clearer than the way it's drafted now. The original draft says, while the DCI shall not have responsibil for directing tactical military operations, the DCI shall have responsibility to review all intelligence activities, et cetera.I think the original one is better because it makes it clearer what you are trying to say.Mr. Kirbow. If you're going to use that for Senate. you have to say tactical military intelligence operations.Mr. diGenova. Yes. There's a word missing from the original formulation.Mr. Davis. The reason it was taken out is because it was a negative and there was the thought that this is saying what he does do and leaving what he doesn't do not to be said. It's un to the Committee how you want to --Mr. diGenova. But you don't want to do the same thing the President did and leave the thing ambiguous.Mr. Davis. I have no problem making that first statement.Senator Huddleston. If you want to be positive you can
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say while the responsibility for directing tactical militaryoperations resides with whoever it is, the DCI still shall havethe review.Mr. Davis. Well, review is, I think, the right wordbecause he's going to try to look at the whole.Senator Huddleston. I think Joe makes a point therebecause that could lead to some misinterpretation.Mr. Davis. Section does on to ask the Director ofCentral Intelligence to establish a staff to support him inthese responsibilities and to draw a staff as widely and fromthe best talent that he can.Senator Hart. Is this another staff or is this thestaff that is in being?Mr. Davis. This is the staff in being. He has alwayshad people to help him in this role.Senator Hart. Why do we have to authorize him to dosomething he's already doing?Mr. Davis. We don't want him not to do that. I meanwe want him to have a special staff to carry out theseresponsibilities.Senator Huddleston. This is about the second or thirdtime we've referred to him having the staff.Senator Mathias. Why don't you say maintain instead ofestablish?Senator Hart. The if he doesn't want the staff?
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Mr. Davis. He's authorized. He doesn't have to.Mr. Kirbow. He's authorized to have a staff under the President's executive order or in any other normal course of business.This appears to be direing down below the kind of statutory authority position that you have and telling them how to structure all of the organizations underneath.That's my objection to that particular aspect of the recommendation. I kind of side with Senator Hart. He has the authority to do his business and I don't think anyone in their wildest imagination would think that the Congressional record or history in this would establish that he's supposed to do it by himself.Senator Hart. You took the words right out of my mouth.Mr. Kirbow. And I once more say this is one of the recommendations that we recommend be taken out.Senator Hart. Who's we?Mr. Kirbow. The staff had had discussions at the staff level where several recommendations that things like this be taken out for that very reason be considered. and I think it is inadvertent that they are back in the redraft.Senator Huddleston You have no strong feeling about that?Let's omit that paragraph.Senator Hart. To that correction and I hate to do this but I'd like to back up because David sailed right by this
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18page 24, recommendation 16. The Director also would be empowered to establish a board of senior advisors.Now who is that? Who is that board?Mr. Davis. This would be something similar to the board of national estimates.Senator Hart. Is he empowered to do that now?Mr. Aaron. He is not empowered to do that now because it was abolished on him.Mr. Davis. But he could do it.Mr. Aaron. I don't think that's correct.Mr. Maxwell. He abolished it. It was not abolished on him.Senator Hart. Could Mr. Bush reconstitute it if he wants?Mr. Bader. Senator, this is in a way a call to the DCI. It is based, I think, on really extensive testimony we have taken here about the utility of the board of national estimates.Senator Huddleston. It may be more a recommendation than an authorization.Mr. Davis. At the same time we didn't want to tell him he had to because it is more or less up to him because if he doesn't want to run his show that way --Senator Hart. Who are these people?Mr. Davis. In that they have been former seniorTOP SECRET
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officials and academics who could serve to review the estimates and comment on them for the director.Senator Hart. Do they perform any function? Have they in the past?Mr. Miller. Oh, yes. Llewelyn Thompson, for example.There are senior diplomats. senior military men from the outside, people of distinction, people who have seen a lot and have something to contribute.Senator Hart. Have they had something to contribute?Mr. Miller. Yes.Mr. Aaron. There are two functions they can perform. More or less. they can bring their wisdom to bear on the product.Senator Hart. I want to know what they have done in the past.Mr. Miller. Soviet matters. Llewelyn Thompson's roles, for example.Mr. Aaron. And the second thing they have done was to provide some senior support for the DCI and the judgements he is making.Now the extent to which that support has been translated into borsepower is unclear, except it was sufficiently strong that it was of concern to the previous administration and was one of the reasons that the board and others was dis-established.- Senator Hart. Hare they preyented any problems in the east that we know 05?
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Mr. Inderfurth. I think that's in relation to helping to insulate the DCI from pressures to modify him, In the past, the board of national estimates insulated the DCI from pressures.-Senator Hart. Chile, Angola, all these cases where the DCI comes in and says we don't really want to do that but the President made us, does he bring in the senior advisor to the President and say, Llewelve Thompson doesn't want us to, either.Mr. Lombard. I think part of the problem here. Senator, is that the office of estimates was created under the Eisenhower Administration and fitted very well into the formalistic way in which foreign policy was evolved during that administration. Perhaps as a matter of fact it's been criticized as being overly formalistic and the board of estimates was viewed as being somewhat too long-range and somewhat other world and not geared to what the President perceived as being his day to day needs on estimates.Now I don't know where the equities lie in this thing, but it seems as though these institutions have changed according to individual Presidents.So really, beginning with the Kennedy administration, you had the decline of the office of national estimates because it no longer seemed to fit the fabric.Mr. Aaron. I'm not sure that's really a fair picture of the history of the board. Perhaps you could tell us since
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Mr. Kirbow. I want to talk about the testimony that was given before the committee on this from two of the former DCIs. Mr. Colby, at both the breakfast briefings he gave and in testimony, favored the use of individual intelligence offices around in these various agencies, originating estimates and everything else: whereas Mr. Helms, when he testified here, says I really don't know how that system is working right now. I didn't favor it when Mr. Colby established it, and I had the other system and it worked well for me.So I think here again you are talking about a man's staffing requirements as they suit the particular times and the individual as to how he wants to run the intelligence community and what apparently suited Mr. Helms fine didn't suit Mr. Colby and he used a different system which he says works great. And I say that that is, again, a step down thing. Unless you want to encourage him to do it in a recommendation and not mandate that he do it, it kind of makes him run his business the way you want it run and to no apparent abuse problems or anything like that.Senator Hart. Well, my only thought here is that some future oversight committee or select committee is going to be trying to pinpoint responsibility, and there are so many boards and committees and rocks to hide behind that a DCI has or a President or anybody has that
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So again, my intent here is not to be a know-nothing. It: just to keep the structure as clean as possible to identify responsibility. That's all. And if this is important to do, let's do it.Mr. Bader. The record, Senator, and I can only speak from personal experience with the board of national estimates -- I certainly know of at least four estimates with which I had a part of which the board's role was very important in shielding both the PCI and indeed the analyst from the ravages in two cases of the military who felt very strongly that the continuation of our bases in the Azores was much more important than say some hard political realities about the future of Portugese Africa.And I could cite other cases where this kind of insulating function was enormously important. It had a great deal to do with the experience. the background and the very presence of some of these board members.They also play a role as the chairman of the coordinating sessions of these national estimates. There's not just an advisory board that sits quite far from the process. Each national intelligence estimate one of these board members becomes the chairman.So they do play a very active role in the preparation.Mr. Aaron. I might mention that in this connection your concern about the accountability problem. which I think is a
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fair one, we have testing that Helms' disposition on this was very clear. When he ioned the estimate it was his estimate and it really wasn't the board's estimate.Mr. Maxwell. Perhaps it might be useful because I think it is clear that he is empowered to do it. Two, if the committee desires to make clear that as a recommendation, on the basis of the committee's examination of their record that this is a desirable thing rather than saving that it would be empowered by statute, because he does have that nower.Mr. Kirhow. Is it the desire of the Committee though, to change the current system which the present director has not seen fit to change vet, which he has full authority to change if he wishes to do so and which the previous DCI established and developed into a working mechanism?Mr. Miller. The records show that the function of the board had been official results. Then it seems to me we should so state that it is a desirable structure.Mr. Kirbow. I had one difference with Bill. I don't know that it is desirable to insulate the DCI from the opinions of the respective military departments if they have a vested interest in the outcome of the decision being rendered.Mr. Miller. The heard has distinguished members from the militerv.Mr. Kirbow. I don't know how it can be used to isolate.
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Mr. Miller. Insulate the political pressure. That's the point. Not the point of view of opinion.Senator Hart. Mr. Chairman, I move that this paragraph stay in. that we move on.Senator Huddleston. Yes. I think we discussed that thoroughly yesterday, as a matter of fact.Mr. Aaron. On E, this is the clause which, in effect, makes clear that there is a definite limit to the DCI's authority and the limit being the conduct of warfare, at which time there should be a clear system and process whereby these activities of the intelligence community over which he has responsibility in some general sense here for budget and so forth, that these basic activities come under the Secretary of Defense. It's simply recognizing the fact that we really have two problems.On the one hand. the conduct of intelligence in what is essential: peacetime and the conduct of intelligence in wartime.Mr. Inderfurth. David. could we get some examples of what high tension means?Mr. Kirbow. We recommended that that come out. Everyone had agreed on that and I think it was put back in. It's something that you can't define. The Secretary of Defense may feel there's very high tension but the not may not be willing to give up his control at that time and you wind up with a wrestling match.Senator Hart. ut there's a phrase of archer national
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1 emergency maybe?..2 Mr. Aaron. Well, I think the way we came on it was to simply say if you have the process for a time of war, the President may exercise it. and he may exercise it if he feels it's a crisis.6 The point was just to have a process and have it understood what happens.8 Mr. diGenova. Is it good to have a system that is operating, all right in peacetime and then when you come to the time you really need, you give it to someone else to run?11 Mr. Aaron. Well, the requirements change in time of12 war.13 Mr. Quanbeck. The collection would become almost completely operational. The sites would be dedicated to opeational purposes and there'd be no purpose to have direction from the DCI.17 In that case it would be a supporting military operation.18 Similarly. the new satellite systems would be used to support ongoing operations.20 Mr. diGenova. In other words, you're saving there wouldn't be very many national intelligence needs.22 Mr. Quanbeck. Well. economic intelligence would be relatively unimportant. Verification of arms control agreements would not be a matter of concern.25 Mr. diGenova. You're talking about the use of hardware.
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Mr. Quanbeck. YoMr. Kirbow. There's no difference of opinion between the former DCI's -- I don't know Mr. Bush's position -- or the former Secretaries of Defense. Everyone concedes that the control of intelligence should go for Defense's purposes in time of war, the principal control.Mr. Davis. The point is, too, the argument in the past has been the Secretary of Defense needs the control he has had in order to prepare for war and now you're saying the DCI's going to do more but you don't want to upset the military commanders. And this is a way of saying that we understand that in wartime it is going to go back. It is more symbolic.Mr. Kirbow. One of the recommendations in the military area we'll come to later is on this same subject with the bulk of the work I guess on the subject being done by that group.Mr. Davis. This also happens with the clandestine service today. In war the clandestine service comes under the military commander in the field.Mr. Aaron. There are some arrangements of this character because of the expanded authority of the DCI that is granted both in the order and our proposed statute.. particularly in the area of requirements.It's important to have this caveat, if you will.Now recommendation 1 really suggests that the oversight
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committee look at carrving the budget process a step further and instead of appropriating: or authorizing the appropriation funds to the different departments for intelligence purposes, that in fact they are authorized to the DCI who would then parcel them out, and it doesn't come down hard to say that this ought to be done but that this is the next logical step in this process and it is something for the oversight committee's agenda.Now rumber 19 --Mr. Kirbow. I would like to except on that until such time as the whole subject of the budget and release of the figures and everything else is considered. the whole budyęt aspect at the same time.Senator Hart. I don't understand this exception procedure. How does that work?Mr. Kirbow. Senator Tower has asked the Chairman that if there was anything that had not been in agreement among the staff, that it could be brought before that it would certainly come to the subcommittee.Senator Hart. Well, the Subcommittee can go ahead and vote on something, can't they?Mr. Kirbow. Yes.Senator Hart. I think every member of the Full Committee reserves his riches when ons netter comes before the Full Committee. I don't think there reed to be exceptions filed.![image of text that says TOP SECRET]
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It's all de novo when it acts up to the Full Committee anyway.Mr. Kirbow. I simply indicated to the Chairman earlier that I didn't want to have a reservation like that and not point it out to him because I didn't want the absent member to appear to be sandbagging the subcommittee.Senator Huddleston. He's putting us on notice.Mr. Aaron. Option 19, this option steps up to the question of whether the DCI in his new capacity as the overall manager of the community, and by manager I don't mean down in the nuts and bolts but having the general management responsibility of interpreting the budget in terms of requirements, in terms of general guidance for the management of some of these activities. whether that function should be separated from that of running the CIA as an agency.Now we have heard some testimony about the inconsistency between those two responsibilities. I think the arguments, if I can set them on the two sides, would be as follows. And by the way, there's a difference of opinion in the staff as to which of these is the right one to follow The argument in favor of going ahead now to separate them is that these are inconsistent, that one could have, you remove the DCI from a conflict of interest situation in which he is both running one of the principal agency responsible for not only clandestine activities but for a small segment of signals intelligence, the development of certain research and development programs that are![TOP SECRET]
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29of great interest to the community, and you take him out of the position of having to judue other people's research and development, programs and other people's SIGINT programs, and other activities when he is the overall director of Central Intelligence, and that therefore this separation, his removal from that, would be a good idea.The second argument is that you really want to place the authority squarely on the bow director of this agency who's going to be responsible for clandestine activities. If he still has a boss above him who is kind of responsible but who in fact because of his increased responsibilities won't be able to give the day to day attention to clandestine activities that he might, if he didn't have these greater responsibilities, one should make the lines of authority clear and place the responsibility for the head of this agency on that agency and leave it there.Now the argument against that is that -- well, there are two kinds of arguments against. One is that the situation now is justified and that this is a good thing and we don't need to make any change and there are good reasons to believe that.The second argument might follow in the middle and says, well, there is some inconsistency potentially. There might be some advantages to reparsting them as well as some costs, but we have now ist instituted this new system whereby you have broader responsibilities for the ICI. Let's see how it works fcr![image of the words TOP SECRET and WARD & PAUL at the bottom of the document]NW 50955 DocId: 32423509 Page 32
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auhile before stepping to the question of whether he can really adequately perform and wear both hats.Those are essentially. I think, the arguments. If there are others that ought to be offered in explanation of the choice.Mr. Bader. I would just underline that, Mr. Chairman, the second point that David has made about recommending the situation to stay the way it is today. That is, that the two hats would stay together.I think some of us feel that the period in front of us will be a period of experimentation and testing where there are new responsibilities that will flow to the DCI. We'll see how they work, we'll see where his authority takes us. We'll see whether he really will in fact establish himself as the responsible director of, in a DCI sense, and we argued here that the oversight committee should be attentive to this to see how it works out and that if sometime in the future after we've had a chance to see how these expanded responsibilities work in practice, that will be a time to see whether the DCI and the Director of CIA function should be separated.Mr. Aaron. I think that to argue the first case a little more strongly, if I could, there are two additional points to be made about it.One is that in fact having the second half running the agency will be an impediment to him effectively running the overall community.
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31So it isn't really just a question. I would argue,of seeing where the current system takes us. It's a matter oflooking at what we have learned as a result of our inquiryand saying, in fact, this is going to be an impediment and itis my personal opinion and I think supported at least by sometestimony that that would be the case.The second argument. I think, is a somewhat broader one,and I guess I'm not prepared to make it. But we've had aninquiry into the CIA, some of its problems, some of itsaccountability problems, some of its management problems, andas a result of this inquiry there is, at least it strikes meas being some inconsistency to be argued between having thisbroad inquiry and ending up with a much stronger, larger, andmore powerful Central Intelligence Agency in every respectwith greater authority over other elements of the intelligencecommunity.Now you can only carry that so far but it seems to methat there is a serious question here as to, and it is seen inpart by other elements of the intelligence community who reallyare concerned that by wearing the two hats', the DCI will stillreally be representing the Agency vis a vis their particularagencies like NSA and the others.That's the choice!Mr. Igeno a. Mr. Chairman, if I could just note forthe record that of the witnesses who testified before theTOP SECRET