Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 103]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:BUNDY CONEINJOHNSONKILPATRICKMCCONEOCCURRENCE:On October 24, 1963 Mr. MCCONE had a special group meeting "expressed his fear that the top U.S. diplomatic and military officials in Saigon are becoming too involved in conversations between General DON and COEIN. Such involvement could destroy CONEIN usefullness and involve Ambassador LODGE and General HARKINS in operation difficult to deny." The Special Group authorized a message to LODGE and to HARKINS emphasizing a secure system of contacts with Genral DON and Vietnamese military and an assessment of DON's status and his future plans and the tightening of control over the DON/CONEIN meetings. The group agreed to firm up policy thinking re Vietnam before LODGE returns to Washington and hear Mr. LODGE's views on what courses of action should be taken.SOURCE:Minutes of Special Group Meeting Oct. 24, 1963FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:ODGEBUNDYON, GENERALΟΝΕΙΝOCCURRENCE:In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG1964) from LODGE to BUNDY it was noted that: "CAS has been punctilious in carrying out my instructions. I have personally approved each meeting between GENERAL DON AND CONEIN who has carried out my orders in each instance explicitly..."SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35FILE:DATES:Oct. 24, 1963STAFF:KelleyDATE:6/28/75DATES:Oct. 24, 1963STAFF:DAWSONDATE:6/27/75CATEGORIES:DIEMSPECIAL GROUPCATEGORIES:DIEM
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 104]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGEHARKINSBUNDYCONEINNHUDATES:Oct 24, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:In an eyes only cable from CIA to Saigon for LODGE and HARKENS, from BUNDY the following message appears: "...there may be danger NHU attempting entrapment through DON's approaches to CONEIN...feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKINS should stand back from any nonessential involvement...it seems wise to maintain close control over meetings between DON and CONEIN."SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35FILE:STAFF:DAWSONDATE:6/27/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:BRENTCONEIN.CRITICJGS headquartersDATES:24 Oct 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: The IG Report notes that, "The fact that CONEIN was at JGS headquarters is well known in official circles. On 24 October, headquarters had cabled the STATION: 'In future do not repeat not put message re coup plots or rumors in CRITIC channel. Rather you should slug them IMMEDIATE ATTENTION FOR BRENT.' As a consequence, the firse cabled reports from the STATION came in as regular CIA cables and were put onto the CRITIC network here at headquarters."SOURCE:CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 42STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 105]
## PERSONS/ENTITIES:HANSEN, BUREAU OF BUDGETEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF CIALODGERICHARDSON## DATES:Oct 24, 1963## CATEGORIES:DIEM## OCCURRENCE:On October 24, 1963, there was a meeting between the executive director of CIA and KENNETH HANSEN, Bureau of the Budget, wherein HANSEN detailed charges made by LODGE at his initial meeting with LODGE. The memorandum for the record prepared by the Executive Director, details the following charges made by LODGE: 1. CIA was improperly dealing with NHU; 2. CIA was reluctant to turn over to the military its operation among the hill tribes; 3. CIA had inadequate penetrations of the GVN and the Buddist and was caught by surprise; 4. RICHARDSON had a palatial mansion and entertained government officials there; 5. the CIA station was too large and too visible; 6. CIA acted on its own initiative without coordination and without control either at the Ambassador or Washington. HANSEN said he later reported to LODGE that he thought LODGE's charges were erroneous. He said he was convinced that everything the CIA had ddone in Vietnam had been approved in Washington, coordinated with and carried out under the directions of the Ambassador, and had been carried out with good judgment and with a high quality of performRCEHANSEN noted that at the time of his first meeting withSIDE, LODGE hadnot yet had a full breifing on what the Agency was doing. This took place a few days later. (This appears to be a record by the CIA of a source which it had in the Bureau of the Budget for finding out what Lodges thinking was at this time.)IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 34## PERSONS/ENTITIES:DON, GENERALHARKINS, GENERALCONEIN,## DATES:Oct. 24, 1963## CATEGORIES:DIEM## OCCURRENCE:In an entry of October 24, 1963 the Saigon's station "History of the Vietnamese Generals Coup", it is noted that CONEIN held two meetings with General DON of 24 October. DON reported he had been informed by Goharal HARKENS that the U. S. military would not thwart any coup plans. DON said the coup plans were complete; the necessary military units were available; and that the coup would occur no later than 2 November. The second meeting DON said the coup committee refused to turn over the political plan but authorized DON to outline its substance, which he did.## SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 35## STAFF:Dawson## FILE:## DATE:6/27/75
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 106]
# PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGEHARKINSBUNDYCONEINNHU# DATES:Oct 24, 1963# CATEGORIES:DIEM> [Figure: "TOP SECRET" stamp.]# OCCURRENCE:In an eyes only cable from CIA to Saigon for LODGE and HARKENS, from BUNDY the following message appears: "...there may be danger NHU attempting entrapment through DON'S approaches to CONEIN... feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKINS should stand back from any nonessential involvement...it seems wise to maintain close control over meetings between DON and CONEIN."# SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35# STAFF:DAWSON# FILE:# DATE:6/27/75# PERSONS/ENTITIES:HANSEN, BUREAU OF BUDGETEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF CIALODGERICHARDSON# DATES:Oct 24, 1963# CATEGORIES:DIEM> [Figure: "TOP SECRET" stamp.]# OCCURRENCE:On October 24, 1963, there was a meeting between the executive director of CIA and KENNETH HANSEN, Bureau of the Budget, wherein HANSEN detailed charges made by LODGE at his initial meeting with LODGE. The memorandum for the record prepared by the Executive Director, details the following charges made by LODGE:1. CIA was improperly dealing with NHU;2. CIA was reluctant to turn over to the military its operation among the hill tribes;3. CIA had inadequate penetrations of the GVN and the Buddist and was caught by surprise;4. RICHARDSON had a palatial mansion and entertained government officials there;5. the CIA station was too large and too visible;6. CIA acted on its own initiative without coordination and without control either at the Ambassador or Washington. HANSEN said he later reported to LODGE that he thought LODGE's charges were erroneous. He said he was convinced that everything the CIA had done in Vietnam had been approved in Washington, coordinated with and carried out under the directions of the Ambassador, and had been carried out with good judgment and with a high quality of performance. HANSEN noted that at the time of his first meeting with LODGE, LODGE had not yet had a full briefing on what the Agency was doing. This took place a few days later.
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 107]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:DON, GENERALHARKINS, GENERALCONEIN,OCCURRENCE:In an entry of October 24, 1963 the Saigon's station "History of the Vietnamese Generals Coup", it is noted that CONEIN held two meetings with General DON of 24 October. DON reported he had been informed by Geberal HARKENS that the U. S. military would not thwart any coup plans. DON said the coup plans were complete; the necessary military units were available; and that the coup would occur no later than 2 November. The second meeting DON said the coup committee refused to turn over the political plan but authorized DON to outline its substance, which he did.SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 35FILE:STAFF:DawsonDATE:6/27/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGEBUNDYDON, GENERALCONEINOCCURRENCE:In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG1964) from LODGE to BUNDY it was noted that: "CAS has been punctilious in carrying out my instructions. I have personally approved each meeting between GENERAL DON AND CONEIN who has carried out my orders in each instance explicitly..."SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35STAFF:DAWSON
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## PERSONS/ENTITIES:MCCONE NHUKENNEDY, JOHN F.LODGEDIEM## DATES:Oct.25, 1963## CATEGORIES:DIEM## OCCURRENCE:In an October 25, 1963 Presidential meeting on Vietnam, with the only participant from CIA being MCCONE, MCCONE's notes show that the President stated that the purpose of the meeting was to consider: (1) recent actions in South Vietnam with respect to coup planning and qualifications of the individuals reporting, and (2) our policy in Sout Vietnam as he wished to be assured there was unanimity within the government prior to the return of LODGE for consultations. MCCONE stated his views in detail. In sessance, he held: (1) DON might be managed by NHU; (2) CIA has not control and therefore could assume little responsibility; (3) DON could have a coup in the making and could pull it off; (4) we are handling a delicate situation in a non-professional manner; (5) successful coup would lead to confusion because generals would provide weak leadership; (6) one coup would be followed by another and the war might be lost during periods of political confusion; (7) civilians capable of running South Vietnam could not be injected into the government and exercise effective control; (8) cannot discuss important political issues with DIEM because of the policy of "cool correct attitude; (9) we either have to work with DIEM and NHU or we have to take aggresive steps to remove them and it is not clear that the succeeding government would be much better.IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36## PERSONS/ENTITIES:MCCONE NHUKENNEDY, JOHN F.LODGEDIEM## DATES:Oct.25, 1963## CATEGORIES:DIEM## OCCURRENCE:In an October 25, 1963 Presidential meeting on Vietnam, with the only participant from CIA being MCCONE, MCCONE's notes show that the President stated that the purpose of the meeting was to consider: (1) recent actions in South Vietnam with respect to coup planning and qualifications of the individuals reporting, and (2) our policy in Sout Vietnam as he wished to be assured there was unanimity within the government prior to the return of LODGE for consultations. IICCONE stated his views in detail. In sessance, he held: (1) DON might be managed by NHU; (2) CIA has not control and therefore could assume little responsibility; (3) DON could have a coup in the making and could pull it off; (4) we are handling a delicate situation in a non-professional manner; (5) successful coup would lead to confusion because generals would provide weak leadership; (6) one coup would be followed by another and the war might be lost during period stitical confusion; (7) civilians capable of running South Vietnam could not be injected into the government and exercise effective control; (8) cannot discuss important political issues with DIEM because of the policy of "cool correct attitude; (9) we either have to work with DIEM and NHU or we have to take aggresive steps to remove them
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 109]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:DON, GENERALLODGE, AMBASSADORCONEINDATES:Oct. 28, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:The October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon stations "History of the Vietnamese Generals Coup" notes that: General DON asked LODGE if CONEIN was speaking for the Ambassador. LODGE replied in the affirmative. DON told the Ambassador that the U.S. government should not interfer with or try to stimulate a coup. The Ambassador agreed with DON.SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36-37FILE:STAFF:DAWSONDATE:6/27/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:DON, GENERALLODGE, HENRY CABOTCONEINDATES:28 October 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: CONEIN said "in the latter part of October, he was informed by DON to convey to LODGE that they were ready to have a coup and that CONEIN was to stay home and await further orders, and that the coup would be accomplished before November 2, 1963. LODGE, who was preparing to return home on the 31st of October, was requested through CONEIN by DON that LODGE not change his_plans as it might be a signal to DIEM and NHU that something was going on. p. 48.SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinFILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:STILWELL, GENERAL RICHARDCONEINGENERAL DONLODGE, HENRY CABOTDATES:Latter part ofOctober 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: In the latter part of October, CONEIN stated, the people in Washington figured that CONEIN was being set up as "patsy" and that this would be highly embarrassing for the U.S. government in case he was found out to have been set up. Therefore, the people in Washington made recommendations that somebody more senior to him and with extensive military background should take over from him. When Washington then sent a message to Ambassador LODGE and recommended that a capable officer and a personal friend of CONEIN'S, GENERAL STILWELL take over, GENERAL DON and the coup members said, no, we trust CONEIN, we don't want anybody else. pp. 31-32# TOP SECRETSOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinSTAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:July 1, 1975FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:DON, GENERALLODGE, AMBASSADORCONEINDATES:Oct. 28, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:The October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon stations "History of the Vietnamese Generals Coup" notes that: General DON asked LODGE if CONEIN was speaking for the Ambassador. LODGE replied in the affirmative. DON told the Ambassador that the U.S. government should not interfer with or try to stimulate a coup. The Ambassador agreed with DON.SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36-37STAFF:DAWSON
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BON, GENERALCONEINODGE, HENRY CABOTDATES:CATEGORIES:Oct 28, 1963DIEMOCCURRENCE:In an October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon station "History of the Vietnames Generals Coup" it is noted that: CONEIN met with Genral DON for the last time before the coup was launched. DON confirmed he had talked with the Ambassador who had vouched for CONEIN. DON stated that he was leaving on 29 October to coordinate final plans. DON requested CONEIN to remain at home until 30 October -- until further notice. DON repeated that the Ambassador would have the plans before the coup began, but when pressed on his previous commitment to make them available, 48 hours in advance, DON said that possiblythe hours would only be made available 4 hours in advance. DON said that nothing would be happening within the next 48 hours and that, if there was a good reason for the ambassador to change his planned 31 October departure, the Ambassador would be informed in time to make his own decision.SOURCE:STAFF:IG Report 1967 (CIA) P. 37DAWSONFILE:DATE:6/27/75
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONFIN GEN. DO CAO TRIGEN. NGUYEN KHANHGEN. DONAMBAS. LODGEDATES:Oct. 28, '63CATEGORIES:DIEMTOP SECRETOCCURRENCE.Chapin and General Don met at a dentist's office in downtown Saigon at 1045 hours. (a) Don confirmed that he had talked to Ambassador Lodge who had vouched for Connin; (b) Don insisted that the generals' committee wished to avoid Americans' involvement in the coup and requested that other U.S. personnel stop talking to colonels and majors about any coup action; (c) Don was informed that Ambassador Lodge was scheduled to depart Saigon on or about 31 October; (d) Don was interested in the exact time the Ambassador intended to depart on 31 October, stating that he hoped the Ambassador would not change his schedule as a change might beCON'T ON NEXTCARDSOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., June 20, 1975, Conein, Exhibit one,STAFF: DawsonFILE: page 8.DATE: 6/30/75---PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:TOP SECRETOCCURRENCE: suspected by the GVN; (f) Don stated that he was leaving on 30 October to coordinate final plans with Generals Cao Dai and Nguyen Khanh; (g) Don requested Connin to remain at home from 30 October onward until further notice; (h) Connin questioned Don regarding General Ton That Dinh's participation in coup planning; Don stated that Dinh was not participating in the planning and that the coup committee sympathizers had General Dinh continuously surrounded and had instructions to eliminate Dinh if he showed any signs of compromising the coup; (i) Don, although admitting that he was notCON'T FROM LASTCARDSOURCE: p. 8, con't.STAFF:![photo of document page]
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:TOP SECRETOCCURRENCE:CONT. FROM LASTCARDparticipating in the actual planning of the units that would participate in the coup, stated that from the meetings of the coup committee he knew of the following units: One-half of the Airborne Brigade, 3 Battalions of Marines, all of the Air Force with the exception of Colonel Huynh Huu Hien, the entire 5th, 7th, and 21st Divisions, half of the 503rd Division, and elements of the 9th Division. (j) the Command Post for the coup would be Joint General Staff Headquarters.SOURCE: p. 8, con't.STAFF:DATE:FILE:
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:TinhChung, CAPT ConcinThu, Ngo DinhLam, ColDATES:11/2/63CATEGORIES:Diem> **TOP SECRET**Ham was returning with Diem and Nhu and an aide of Diem to the headquarters in an armored personnel carrier when Minh in a separate column in radio communications with Lam's colurin found out that Diem and Nhu had been taken. Concin states that linh with his aide, crossed the column, halted it and Thung stepped into the armored car and upon orders from Hinh khong Lilled enem. The bodies were then taken directly to the General Staff leadquarters and later on in the afternoon they were later removed from the General Staff Headquarters to Clinique St. Paul.SOURCE: Hearings, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE:7/1/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGE, HENRY CABOTCONEINDATES:1 November 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: On or about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon on November 1, 1963, there were communications between LODGE and DIEM. CONEIN was in both radio and telephonic contact with the Embassy, keeping them posted of the units, the personalities and what was transpiring. CONEIN was to convey, one of the first messages from the generals that the genera did not want any U.S. military officer or advisor with any of the attacking units. They d not want any American participation within the coup. p. 50> **TOP SECRET**
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:   DATES: CATEGORIES:RAN THIEN KHIEMINH   2400 hours DIEMTRAN VAN DON   Nov. 1, '63OCCURRENCE:Urea Dien khiza is acting as Minh's Chief of Staff for Operations, but Tran Van Don is definitely the No. 2 in the generals' group. General Chieu is assisting General Khien and is following military operations closely, assisted by several competent colonels and majors.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,Exhibit One, page 21.FILE:   STAFF: DawsonDATE: 6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:   DATES: CATEGORIES:Nov. 1, '63 DIEM2400 hoursOCCURRENCE:Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho also has not been located.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,Exhibit One, page 21.FILE:   STAFF: DawsonDATE: 6/30/75
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:11/1/632140 hoursCATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:TOP SECRETTroops moving to the palace area and covering the Zoo to insure that Diem and Nhu do not attempt to escape through a sewer tunnel exit in the Zoo area.SOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,Exhibit One, page 19.STAFF:DawsonFILE:DATE:6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:11/1/632400 hoursCATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:TOP SECRETLt. Colonel Thao heading group designated to blow up the palace. 24 tanks from the Tulin Navy Guard which had joined the coup, and some of the armored vehicles from My Tho are moving into three columns. They will move in on the palace after the blast. The tanks are commanded by Major Lien, former Chief of Darlac Province.SOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,Exhibit One, page 21.STAFF:DawsonFILE:DATE:
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:MINHAMBASSADOR LODGEDATES:11/1/631925 hoursCATEGORIES:DIEM> TOP SECRET1925 Minh istormed that Aubasindor Lodge will receive the gonevale after the coup in OVON.SOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 18.STAFF: DAWSONDATE:6/30/76FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:11/1/632140 hoursCATEGORIES:DIEM> TOP SECRETPresideistal Crawi olercats in the guica contings Tigo EngSOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, Page 19.STAFF:DawsonNW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 118
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 118]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:Vice President NGUYEN NGỌC THODATES:11/1/631545CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:# TOP SECRET1M5 Pro-western civilian politicians at 309 with gunemis; will host new civil government. No military permanent is Lev government which should be established murder civil control in two to three days. It is later revealed that Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho and fat het lender Stu Imy Quat are the only ones time for a cluster for the new government.SOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 16.STAFF:DawsonDATE:6/30/75FILE:NHUPERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:11/1/631645CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:# TOP SECRET2045 General at palace, talk with Coombs.mentioned above talked with M. in clitics at -2, 3/GreenCron 14 Cat, Poylar; E/General Hauyan one ego, Assistant to Chief, Joint General Staff for Pueutili; is forced at one point to announce 110 Nora. Force Commander Hien did not speak; have been slindested,SOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,STAFF:Dawson
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 119]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:DUONG VAN MINHTRAN VAN MINHTRAN THIEN KHIEMDATES:11/1/631545 hoursCATEGORIES:DIEM> TOP SECRETusdio VEIE is under comp controls taped broadcast icedybut coe rolay point had been blova.The following gezerals are at JGS:M/General Duong Van Minh, Militery Advisor toThe PresidentM/General Tyan Van Minh, Dermanen's SecretsaryConsral, MND.B/General Tran Thien Khlen, Chief of Staff,Joint Coneral Staff.B/Generai Le Van Kin, KNDM/Geoom! Nguyen Ngoc Le, Inspector, Self DefenseCerpe/Ctv12 GuardBy Geteral Dhen Xuan Chieu.SOURCE! Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit 1 STAFF: DawsonFILE:page 16.DATE: 6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:GEN. NGUYEN KHANHDATES:11/1/631545 hoursCATEGORIES:DIEM> TOP SECRETOCCURRENCE:The follvring era claimed also to be supporting the coup:B/Cacoral Ngayon DThanh, Cosmariing Conerek, 23CorpsI/General to 020 Yrd. Compzdar, lap uiviudonBien Hoa and My Tho under woup control.Joint Crisant Staff preparing heavy air brubairdoen's forthe palace.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit onepage 16.STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 120
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OCCURRENCE:DATES:Nov. 1, '631330 hoursCATEGORIES:DIEMTOP SECRET1330 Marines pour into Saigon from the direction of Bien Hoa;Inter indicated to be from Quang Trung Training Center.SOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 14.STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:COL. Le QUANG TUNGDATES:11/1/631400 hoursCATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:TOP SECRETColonel Le Quang Tung captured; directed to order Vietnamese Special Forces to cease fire; firing ceased at Vinh HQ.Fighting at palace; about 200 troops observed.35 armored cars moving toward the palace.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 14.STAFF: DiemFILE:DATE: 6/30/75NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 121