Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 65]
-2-their face that the plot involved assassination, although Bisselland Edwards insist the real meaning must have been understood.There is some other evidence which can be said both to suggestthat Dulles and Cabell did know and to suggest that they did notknow. (See Section (b) below.)(ii) McCone: McCone testified that he did notknow about or authorize the plots. Helms and Bissell both statedthat McCone was not told by them of the earlier assassination ef-forts when McCone assumed the position of DCI in November 1961.The I.G. Report states that Harvey received Helms' approval notto brief McCone when the actual efforts were resumed in 1962.Harvey testified this accorded with his recollection. Thereafter,Helms and Harvey did not tell McCone about assassination activityon several occasions. Helms did not recall any agreement not tobrief McCone, but did not call into question the position taken byHarvey or the I.G. Report on this matter. Helms did say that Mc-Cone never told him not to assassinate Castro, but added that hewas not claiming that he told McCone about the plots. (These mat-ters, as well as the various reasons put forward by Harvey andHelms for not briefing McCone, are set forth in Section (c) below.)(b) Did Allen Dulles Know of or Authorize the InitialPlots Against Castro?Both Allen Dulles and his Deputy (DDCI),* This testimony relates to the "airplane" incident in July 1960  and what the I.G. Report referred to as the initial phase of the  assassination effort involving the underworld. With respect to  the "schemes" prior to that operation, the I.G. Report concluded  they could "find no evidence that any of the schemes were approved  at any level higher than division, if that". (I.G., p. 10.)
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- 3 -General Cabell, are deceased. Since we were unable to take any testimony from either, the Committee's investigation centered around the documents available and the testimony of those still alive who served under Dulles and Cabell.**The Inspector General questioned neither Dulles nor Cabell in preparing his Report in 1967.
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(i) Dulles' January 1960 Statement to the SpecialGroup Suggesting Contingency Plans for the Overthrow of theCasto Government, but Ruling Out "Elimination" of Castro.January 13, 1960, Allen Dulles, in what was apparently the first Special Group discussion of a covert program to overthrow Castro, emphasized that "a quick elimination of Castro" was not contemplated by the CIA (minutes of Special Group meeting, 1/13/60). According to the minutes of the meeting, Dulles first "noted the possibility that over the long run the U.S. will not be able to tolerate the Castro regime in Cuba, and suggested that covert contingency planning to accomplish the fall of the Castro government might be in order." Then, in response to the State Department representative's comment that "timing was very important so as to permit a solidly based opposition to take over," Dulles"emphasized that we do not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro, but rather actions designed to enable responsible opposition leaders to get a foothold."(ii) Dulles' Alleged Recission of the July 1960Airplane Assassination Plan Upon Learning of It.As discussed in greater detail above (see p. ___________), in July, 1960, Tracy Barnes, Bissell's assistant, approved the sending of, in July, 1960, a cable to the Havana station stating that "possible removal of top three leaders (was) receiving serious consideration," and instructions were given to carry out a plan to kill Raul Castro. That plan was, however, abandoned shortly after it had been approved.
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- 5 -The Executive Officer to the Chief of the Cubacourt action project, who had sent the cables testified thathe had "heard" that Dulles had countermanded Barnes' plan andhad indicated that "assassination was not to be considered."(Duty Officer, p. 29).*The officer added, however, that hehad no personal knowledge of the reason for calling off the plan,or even if Dulles had been the one who called it off, he furthertestified that"assassination had not been part of the Cubacovert action project in 1960 and that Dulles'action in this incident conformed with CIApolicy against the use of assassination." (DutyOfficer, p.* The countermanding cable to the Havana station, which was  "Operational Immediate," was sent the morning after the cable  of the previous night. The officer who sent that cable testified:"...I saw the cable and was told that, to thebest of my knowledge, my memory is that theDirector [Dulles), not the Deputy Director[Bissell] ... had countermanded the cable andhad directed that -- had indicated that ...assassination was not to be considered."(Duty Officer, p. 29).The officer stated that he did not talk to either Dulles orBissell about the countermanding cable, but that he did see thecable and in all likelihood heard of the reason for Dulles' re-action in discussions the same morning with his superior, theChief of the Cuba project. (Duty Officer, pp. 30-32).** The officer testified:"...we were schooled that although other countries[used assassination] we do not, and I had alwaysunderstood this as a basic rule." (Duty Officer, p 14)."Question: So was it your understanding after thiscable, and in view of your knowledge of the Agencygeneral practice with respect to assassination in whichyou had been schooled that it was not done, that assass-ination was not part of the Cuba Project, as far as youknew?"
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- 6 -"Officer: That's correct."***"Question: And would it be accuaate to say that your recollections concerning what you now view as what Mr. Dulles' attitudes were ... are based on your general training about what had always been said ... [and] that after this incident, what you were told ... fortified that previous belief [in] that Dulles had nullified at least this particular cable?""Officer: Correct.""Question: Do you have anything in your recollection or as a result of your informed opinion or experience that would indicate to the contrary; that is, that Mr. Dulles did have assassination in his arsenal, so to speak?""Officer: I have no basis for any such speculation."(Duty Officer, pp. 31, ______).
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- 7 -### (iii) Dulles Briefing on Use of Underworld Figures in September 1960.1. Bissell and Edwards Said Dulles Was Told About An "Intelligence Operation" With No "Bad Words" Used, But That Dulles (and his Deputy) Understood That to Mean Assassination.Bissell recalled that "in the latter part of September" there was "a meeting in which Col. Edwards and I briefed Mr. Dulles and General Cabell" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 20).Bissell testified that "Colonel Edwards outlined in somewhat circumlocutious terms the plan that he had discussed with syndicate representatives" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 22). He stated that Edwards had said:"that contact had been made with [the underworld], that a plan had been prepared for their use, and I think he either said in as many words or strongly inferred that the plan would be put into effect unless at that time or subsequently he was told by Mr. Dulles that it should not be". (Bissell, 6/9, p. 22.)*The CIA's 1967 I.G. Report, based upon interviews with Edwards and Bissell, said Dulles and Cabell were briefed as follows:"The discussion was circumspect. Edwards deliberately avoided the use of any 'bad words'. The descriptive term used was 'an intelligence operation'. Edwards is quite sure that the DCI and the DDCI clearly understood the nature of the operation he was discussing. He* Bissell testified that he was relying on the dating provided in the Inspector General's Report, but that his state- ments concerning what was said at the meeting we're of his personal knowledge (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 20-22).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 71]
- 8 -recalls describing the channel as being 'from A to B toC'. As he then envisioned it, A was Maheu, B΄wasRoselli, and C was the principal in Cuba. Edwardsrecalls that Mr. Dulles merely nodded, presumably inunderstanding and approval. Certainly there was noopposition. Edwards states that, while there was noformal approval as such, he felt that he clearly hadtacit approval to use his own judgement." (I.G.,pp. 17-18.)Bissell testified that the description sounded "highly plausible".(Bissell Tr. 6/9/75 at 24.) Edwards said it was "accurate"(Edwards Tr. at 11).In light of the manner in which Bissell and Edwardsdescribed briefing Dulles, the question arises as to whetherDulles in fact would have understood that the operation involvedassassination. The Inspector General, in attempting to "con-jecture as to just what the Director did approve", decided"It is safe to conclude, given the men participating andthe general subject of the meeting, that there was littlelikelihood of misunderstanding--even though the detailswere deliberately blurred and the specific intendedresult was never stated to unmistakable language. It isalso reasonable to conclude that the pointed avoidance of'bad words' emphasized to the participants the extremesensitivity of the operation." (I.G., p.18).Bissell testified that"I can only say that I am quite sure I came away fromthat meeting--and there was, I think, subsequentoccasions when this came up between Mr. Dulles andmyself, and I am quite convinced that he knew the natureof the operation.* * *"Q.: What were the subsequent conversations you hadwith Mr. Dulles in which you concluded that he knewthat this was an assassination effort?"Bissell.: . . it's really a guess on my part that
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- 9 -such conversations occurred . . . I do believe they did occur is that during the entire autumn I suppose I must have spoken to Mr. Dulles practically daily about some aspect of the whole Cuban operation and I am virtually certain that he would in one or another of those conversations and probably more than once have asked if there was anything to report about the Sheffield Edwards' operation. He also may have been in direct contact with Edwards at that time." (Bissell Tr. 6/9/75, pp. 24-26)When asked by the Chairman why, in this context, persons within the Agency talked "in riddles to one another", Bissell replied that:" . . . I think there was a reluctance to spread even on an oral record some aspects of this operation.""Chairman: Did the reluctance spring from the fact that it simply grated against your conscience to have to speak more explicitly?"Bissell: I don't think it grated against my conscience. I think it may have been a feeling that the Director [Dullesl preferred the use of the sort of language that is described in the I.G. Report."Bissell, in a subsequent appearance before the Committee, again addressed the issue of whether he and Edwards had made it clear to Dulles that what was involved was an assassination operation:"I thought I made clear that it was my impression--and I believe the impression incidentally that I thought was confirmed in the [I.G. Report)--that in discussing this with Dulles and Cabell . . . the objective of the operation was made unmistakably clear to them. The terms 'an intelligence operation', I think someone said, was that not a cover designation? But we would not under any circumstances have told Allen Dulles that this was an intelligence collection operation. If I said that on Monday, I must have given a wrong impression." (Bissell Tr. 6/11, p. 24.)On the other hand, Scott Breckenridge, the only author of the Inspector General's Report still with the CIA, testified that in his opinion a "pointed avoidance of 'bad
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- 10 -words'" would have made it less likely that an "intelligenceoperation" would have been understood as an assassinationattempt, and that "it was open to question how clearly thiswas stated to Mr. Dulles and whether or not Mr. Dulles under-stood" (Colby/Breckenridge, 5/, p. .)Sheffield Edwards was quite infirm when examined bythe Committee and has since died.[^1] Edwards testified beforethe Committee as follows:". [T]his possible project was approved by Allen B.Dulles, Director of CIA, and by General Cabell, theDeputy Director. They are both dead."The Chairman: How do you know, Colonel, that theproject had been approved by these two gentlemen?"Edwards: I personally briefed Allen Dulles . . andCabell." (Edwards, 5/30/75, pp. 5-6)In his interview with the Rockefeller Commission,Edwards testified (Edwards interview, p. 5):"Q.: Now, who inside the Agency besides Bissell didyou have any contact with on the top echelon?"A.: Very important. The plan was approved by Allen W.Dulles and General Cabell."[^1]: As the investigation proceeded, members of the Committeerequested that Edwards be recalled. Edwards passed awaybefore this could be accomplished. As a result of Edwards'infirmity and subsequent death, the Committee was unable toexamine him effectively concerning his conflicting priorstatements concerning Dulles' knowledge of the plots.
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James O'Connell, who was the case officer for the operation involving underworld figures, testified that when he and Edwards discussed the matter in 1975, prior to giving evidence to the Rockefeller Commission, he was sure that Edwards had told him Dulles had approved the plot (0'Connell Tr. 5/30, pp. 58-59). He added that he was "reasonably sure" or "knew" in the "back of my mind" that either Edwards or Bissell had also told him of Dulles' knowledge when the plot was underway in 1960-62 (O'Connell Tr. 5/30, pp. 33-34; 36; 60).*A review of Dulles' calendar for August through December 1960 showed no meeting involving Dulles, Cabell, Bissell and Edwards.** Of course, such a meeting could have occurred without having been recorded.2.. Whatever Was Said to Dulles, He Was Not Briefed Until After Contact With the Underworld Figures Had Been Made.Bissell and the Inspector General's Report (which* In June 1966, Howard J. Osborn, Edwards' successor as Director of Security, wrote a memorandum for Helms on Maheu stating that "the DCI was briefed and gave his approval". When questioned about this memorandum, Osborn stated that he had no firsthand knowledge of the briefing, and that he had most likely obtained this statement from Edwards or O'Connell.** The calendar also reflects no meetings during that period between Dulles, Edwards and Bissell, or between Dulles and Edwards.
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- 12 -relied on Edwards) placed the briefing of Dulles in "the latterpart of September 1960".Bissell did not have a clear independent recollectionof the dates involved, but recalled that discussions concerningthe possible use of syndicate members against Castro began "inthe Autumn of 1960".* He recalled initial discussions amonghimself, Edwards, and Colonel J. C. King, Chief of the WesternHemisphere Division, which he said occurred before Dulles andCabell were approached about assassinating Castro. Accordingto Bissell,"those conversations, the subject matter was a capabilityto eliminate Castro if such action should be decidedupon.""It is, therefore, accurate to say that my bestrecollection of those conversations (with Edwards andKing) is that they addressed themselves to the existenceor non-existence of the capability and to the possibilityof developing a capability. They were not conclusive ordecisive conversations . . . nor would they have revealeda prior decision to implement such a plan by anybody."(Bissell, 6/9, p. 19.)* "Q.: When did you first become aware of any plan or  effort to assassinate Mr. Castro?"Bissell: Well, I became aware of planning a contingencybasis for such an operation. My recollection isAugust . . . ."Q.: August of 1960?"Bissell: '60, correct . . . but without reading [theI.G. Report], I would have remembered initial conversationsearly in the autumn of 1960." (Bissell Tr. 6/9, pp. 17-18.)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 76]
O'Connell contacted Roselli in early September 1960. During the week of September 25, O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli met with Giancana and Trafficante in Miami. Bissell testified as follows concerning the sequence of those events:"Q.: Well, before we come to the meeting [with Dullesl, you had been informed, prior to that, had you not, that contact had been made with the Mafia?"Mr. Bissell.: I had."Q.: Now were you informed that the Mafia had been given the go ahead to proceed with actual efforts to assassinate Castro?"Bissell: Not that early, to my best recollection. I cannot date that at all well. I would suppose that it was within the next two or three weeks." (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 20-21.)On the other hand, Roselli's testimony suggests that Maheu had indicated prior to the "latter part of September" 1960 that a large sum of money would be paid for Castro's death (Roselli, p. 17), and Edwards' May 14, 1962 memorandum indicated the briefing of "senior officials" took place after the money had been offered.It is clear, then, that even if Dulles was informed about the use of underworld figures to assassinate Castro, subordinate agency officials had previously decided to take steps toward arranging for the killing of Castro, including discussing it with organized crime leaders.
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-14-(iv) Questions Raised by Edwards' Communications to the Justice Department in 1961 and 1962.As fully described *supra*, pp. ____, the FBI discovered in the late 1960's that Maheu had been involved in an illegal wiretap in Las Vegas. In April 1961, Maheu told the FBI that the tap had been placed in connection with a CIA operation, and suggested that the FBI contact Edwards to verify this fact.An FBI report of a May 3, 1961 interview with Edwards (in which Edwards vaguely described the use of Giancana as relating to "clandestine efforts against the Castro Government" with no mention of assassination, and a copy of which was given to the Attorney General) stated:"Col. Edwards advised that only Mr. Bissell (Director of Plans, CIA) and two others in CIA were aware of the Giancana-Maheu activity in behalf of CIA's program and Allen Dulles was completely unaware of Edwards' contact with Maheu in this connection. He added that Mr. Bissell, in his recent briefings of Gen. Taylor and the Attorney General in connection with their inquiries into CIA relating to the Cuban situation, told the Attorney General that some of the associated planning included the use of Giancana and the underworld against Castro." (FBI memorandum entitled "Arthur James Balletti et al.", May 22, 1961, p. 2.) (Emphasis added)
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- 15 -Bissell said he was certain, however, that the statement regarding Dulles' knowledge about the operation was wrong, and testified that "it is just flatly contrary to my recollection that Allen Dulles was unaware of these contacts, as I have testified several times" (Bissell, 6/11, p. 27).When asked to speculate on why Edwards would have told the FBI that Dulles was unaware of Edwards' contact with Maheu, Bissell replied:"I can only surmise that he believed he could secure the cooperation of the Justice Department that he required without in any way involving his superior, Mr. Dulles, and simply did this in a protective fashion." (Bissell, 7/17/, p. 20).A year later, on May 7, 1962, Edwards and CIA's General Counsel met with Attorney General Robert Kennedy. (That meeting, is discussed extensively below at p. _____). Edwards' memorandum of the meeting indicated that he had said that after Roselli and Giancana had been offered $150,000, Edwards had "then briefed the proper senior officials of [the]* Now, it (the FBI memorandum) is just flatly contrary to my recollection that Allen Dulles was unaware of these contacts, as I have testified several times. Also, I submit it is quite implausible that I would have briefed Gen. Taylor and the Attorney General--and incidentally, I have no recollection of briefing those two gentle men except as members of the Board of Inquiry that I have described, of which Allen Dulles himself was a member--it is quite implausible that I would have briefed them on a matter which had been going on for some months, and some which the Director, Mr. Dulles himself, had never been informed."
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- 16 -Agency" (without specifying whom) and they had "duly orally approved."* It further states that "knowledge" of the project had been "kept to a total of six persons."**Dulles had left the Agency between the time of Edwards' two statements.(v) Remarks Made to the Special Group by General Cabell in November 1960.Bissell and Edwards testified that Cabell was aware of the Castro plots (Bissell Tr. 6/9, p. 22; Edwards Tr. 5/30/75, pp. 5-6).**** On the same day as writing that memorandum for the Attorney General, Edwards wrote another memorandum for his own files indicating that after putting Harvey in contact with Roselli in early April, he had:"cautioned him [Harvey] that I felt that any future projects of this nature should have the tacit approval of the Director of Central Intelligence." (5/14/62, Memorandum for the Record.)This memorandum, which contained other information which Harvey and Edwards had agreed to include to "falsify" the record, is discussed *infra*, p. ______.** The 1967 Inspector General's Report surmised that thirteen people knew of the plot, including Dulles, based upon Bissell's and Edwards' account of the Dulles briefing. (See discussion, *supra*. at ______.)*** The Inspector General's Report stated:"With Bissell present, Edwards briefed the Director (Dulles) and the DDCI (Cabell) on the existence of a plan involving members of the syndicate. . . Edwards is quite sure that the DCI and the DDCI clearly understood the nature of the operation he was discussing." (IG Report, p. 17.)O'Connell testified that prior to O'Connell's testifying before the Rockefeller Commission, Edwards told O'Connell that Cabell had been aware of and authorized the project.
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-17-The testimony indicates that the meeting between Dulles,Bissell, Edwards, and Cabell occurred sometime "in the autumn"of 1960, probably around September. The minutes of a meeting ofthe Special Group, the high-level governmental body for consider-ing covert action, on November 3, 1960, reflect the followingremarks:"Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planninghad been done for taking direct positive action againstFidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without thesethree the Cuban Government would be leaderless andprobably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessaryto act against all three simultaneously. General Cabellpointed out that action of this kind is uncertain ofresults and highly dangerous in conception and execu-tion, because the instruments must be Cubans. Hefelt that, particularly because of the necessity ofsimultaneous action, it would have to be concludedthat Mr. Merchant's suggestion is beyond our capabilities."(11/3/60 Special Group Minutes, P. 3).Exactly what the term "direct positive action" meant to thespeaker or those listening is uncertain. Neither was able tooffer any interpretive help to the Committee. However, otherparticipants at this meeting have testified that the referencecould mean or include assassination.**[^1][^1]: "Q: Do you read. . . direct, positive action. . .as meaning killing (Fidel Castro, Raul Castro and CheGuevara)?""A: I would read it that way, yes." (LansdaleTr. 7/8/75, p. 103.)"Q: . . .would you agree that the words 'directpositive action' appear to question whether there's been anyplanning in connection with assassinating (the Castros andGuevara)?""A: I think the phrase 'positive action' could includeassassinations, but. . . I'm not sure what was in Mr. Merchant'smind." (Gray Tr. 7/9/75, p. 9.)
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- 18 -Bissell was also asked about the minutes of the November 3 meeting. After reading the reference to "direct positive action," Bissell said "I find it difficult to understand" (Bissell Tr. 7/17, p. 18). He was then asked"Q: Do you, in light of the November 3 minutes) remain firm that Cabell was knowledgeable (of the assassination plots)?""A: It casts some doubt on that in my mind."When asked if it cast "some significant doubt in light of (Cabell's) character", Bissell answered "yes" (Bissell, 7/17, pp. 22-23).