Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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in mid-September of 1960?Mr. Dillon. No, I was not aware of that.Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any CIA plan to snatchLumumba from UN protective custody and place him in the handsof the Congolese Army?Mr. Dillon. No, I wasn't aware of that.Mr. Dawson. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Baron has asked a lot ofquestions about some of the factual parts of this. And Iwould like to follow up on some of your statements aboutDirector Dulles' willingness to protect the President. Ithink you made a very interesting and forthright observation,that he was very interested in keeping the President protectedfrom things which may cause embarassment to him.Mr. Dillon. Not personally, but that he though wouldcause great embarrassment to the nation as well as to justthe Presidency, whereas if it was some individual, it is justbecause it is the terrible Mr. Dulles and the terrible CIA,it is not the nation. And the President is the nation. Sothat it was a fairly deep feeling which went beyondpersonality institutionally to the Presidency, which shouldnot be involved in this sort of thing.Mr. Dawson. Did you investigate what may have been thebasis for your feeling, which is your current feeling, thatthat was his way of operation?Mr. Dillon. I think that it was primarily -- I had known
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# TOP SECRET53him well over his eight years in the Foreign Service, and alsoin the State Department. But it was highlighted because thisexperience in the U-2, in the first few days of this I wasActing Secretary of State, and I had to bear the brunt of alot of that mix-up.Mr. Dawson. Was Mr. Dulles generally a responsibleindividual in whom the President placed great trust?Mr. Dillon. Very much so, great trust.Mr. Dawson. In his relationship with the President doyou believe that President Eisenhower was aware of Mr. Dulles'desire to protect him, President Eisenhower, from a greatembarrassment?Mr. Dillon. I would think so. Of course, the U-2 thingmade him aware of that, because it was not only Mr. Dulles'view, but it was also the view of the State Department thatthis was the correct procedure, that the President should takewhatever action was necessary either with Mr. Dulles or withsenior officials in the State Department, and blame them forboth, but not to accept the responsibility himself if nothinghappened. And he disregarded our strong feelings on that.Mr. Herter had just gotten back from a NATO meeting inTurkey, and he made a special trip out to Camp David to urgethis on him, to warn him before he did assume responsibilityhimself. But to no avail. Hagerty was very strong for thePresident taking responsibility, because I think he had a# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET54little different view of this. I think he had a view thatthe press looked on the President as someone who was not infull charge of the State Department at time, and he thoughtthis would contribute to that, which would be very bad forthe President. So we were thinking of it more from theinternational aspect. We had the contrary feeling.Mr. Baron. Did the President's trust in Allen Dullesdiminish significantly after the U-2 affair.Mr. Dillon. No, because there was nothing wrong with theU-2 affair, except that the President had authorized itspecifically, it was flying on the day after he authorized it.The only bolix that came was in the after events, where thissilly press release announcement was put out by NASA, I guessit was, that this plane had just been sort of flying around andgot lost, or something like that. And we really had a verydifficult time about that at the morning meeting where thenews came to us, which was out in the Virginia hills. ThePresident had a meeting of a restricted nature afterwards,including me and Allen Dulles, the Secretary of Defense, andColonel Goodpastor.And he put me in charge of handling the whole thing, andgave me the responsibility. And he wasn't fully briefed onall the cover stories or anything of this nature. And Iwent back to the State Department and was working diligentlyon this and talking to Mr. Dulles as to what we would say.TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET1 And the next thing we knew suddenly the President told2 Colonel Goodpastor to say that this was descended from the3 State Department.4 And the next thing we knew the statement came out from5 the US from NASA which made no sense at all.6 And of course what had happened was that Hagerty -- that7 had been the routine thing, and when it came up Hagerty was8 to refer the press to NASA, and NASA, if they were referred,9 had the cover story.10 And Goodpastor -- I never quite found out what happened11 in the White House, whether Goodpastor didn't get to Hagerty12 or Hagerty didn't pay any attention to them, either way was13 more likely, because Hagerty was way senior to Goodpastor14 at that time, and they had done this, and he didn't know, he15 had been at that little meeting with the President, he didn't16 know that it was supposed to be in the State Department. And17 that got everything off upside down. So we were trying to18 explain how the US Government had put out this silly statement19 which bore no relation to the facts, when we knew the facts.20 And of course at that time the Russians hadn't yet21 announced that they had the pilot or anything. But we knew22 that was likely, too. We knew that would happen. I think it23 followed electronically. And but it was because of this24 White House bolix that htis had happened.25 Mr. Dawson. The basis for Dulles' willingness throughout# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETthis period to protect the President was also -- I guess therewas some impact made upon his willingness after the U-2 crisisMr. Dillon. We still felt strongly that that had been amistake, because it put Khrushchev in a position where hefelt he had to break off the talks in Paris with the President,and so forth, which we felt would not have been the caseotherwise.So this didn't change Mr. Dulles at all, it made him evenstronger in wanting to protect the President, because he knewthe President was difficult to protect.Mr. Dawson. During the period following the U-2 crisisyou saw Director Dulles brief the Government on intelligenceoperations?Mr. Dillon. He did this at every National SecurityCouncil meeting. The format of the meetings were that themeeting would be called to order by the President, and thenhe would turn to Mr. Dulles for the intelligence briefing,which was the first item of business in all those meetings.Mr. Dawson. On those occasions did Mr. Dulles attempt totell the President enough where he would have some idea ofwhat was going on, but not tell him directly what washappening?Mr. Dillon. Most of the briefings were about intelligencewhat other people were doing and what was happening. And itTOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETwould only be exceptional when they would deal with what we were doing ourselves.Mr. Dawson. Dealing with the latter, when Mr. Dulles wanted Presidential approval to mount an operation, how did he go about achieving that or gaining that approval?Mr. Dillon. I don't really know. I do know in regard, to the U-2 flights, which had a very special procedure set up whereby a piece of paper had to be signed in each case by the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, or Acting Secretary of Defense, and then taken to the President and approved by him before the flight could take place. And that was handled by General Goodpastor rather than through Mr. Gray.Mr. Dawson. Did that change after the U-2 crisis?Mr. Dillon. No, that was the procedure.Mr. Dawson. He knew what he was approving very clearly?Mr. Dillon. He had been right up to this time and that was the case with the U-2. After the U-2 crisis there weren't any more U-2 flights, and that procedure came to a sudden end.Mr. Dawson. In other intelligence operations which you brought up which were required to be brought before the Special Group --Mr. Dillon. I don't recall that there were any. But if it was needed, I don't know who would do it, but it would be through the person who would know the most about it. And# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET                                                                           58that would be General Goodpastor, because he was very closeto the President, although he was a relatively junior officerat that time, he was a young colonel -- I think he may haveeven been a major when he started there in the White House.But he was sort of Staff Secretary to the President on allthose relations with the Pentagon and the CIA and the StateDepartment. If you wanted to see the President on somethingimportant, it was generally through General Goodpastor ratherthan through Gordon Gray. And Gordon Gray handled most ofthe detailed mechanics of setting up meetings, and that sortof thing. He was not as much a personal assistant to thePresident. And that job was held by General Goodpastor.Mr. Dawson. But in circumstances where the President wasgoing to be made aware of attempts to overthrow a government,in front of a number of people like the Special Group of theNational Security Council, were you privy to some of thoseoccurances?Mr. Dillon. I don't ever recall one.Mr. Dawson. You don't recall instances where an attemptor discussion to overthrow a government or anything moresinister than an assassination was brought up?Mr. Dillon. No, except the discussion of preparing acapacity to invade Cuba. That was considered. And we havethe minutes on that. That was considered a number of timesand reported a number of times.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET                                                                                                          59Mr. Dawson. After an intelligence operation blows, inthe sense that it is uncovered in connection with the Govern-ment of the US is found, are you aware that oftentimes aroutine order goes out to estand down intelligence, to takepositiveactions in that area, are you aware of that standardoperating procedure?Mr. Dillon. I don't quite understand what your questionis there.Mr. Dawson. After the U-2 crisis did we for a period oftime stop agressive intelligence actions against the SovietUnion?Mr. Dillon. Yes, I think that was natural.Mr. Dawson. That was my question. That is a routinematter?Mr. Dillon. That was a natural thing. Obviously westopped the U-2 flights because we knew they had the capacityto shoot them down, and so it was no use doing it again.And I would imagine we probably eased off on the electronicflights along the coasts of the Soviet Union, and kept themfurther away, or disconinued them for awhile.Mr. Dawson. Are you aware of a similar stand down orderhaving been issued after Lumumba was captured?Mr. Dillon. No.Mr. Baron. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned earlier that youmight have been away from Washington in August of 1960 whenTOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETthis Special Group meeting took place on August 25th, is that correct?Mr. Dillon. Yes, there is a possibility, because August was the month, if one was going to take any time off in the summer, it was likely to be in August.Mr. Dawson. It was best to take it off during August because of the miserable summers?Mr. Dillon. Yes. And my family had a summer place where I had gone since childhood in Maine, and it was easy to get to. I do have enough recollection to know I was there a couple of times when I had to get back for a Security Council meeting and there were certain weather problems from the Coast of Maine. I recall one time, it could have been this year, or it could have been a year earlier. But I know I was there those summers for a few days. And it could have been in August.Mr. Baron. In reference to the meeting at the Pentagon that was the subject of your affidavit, you mentioned to me before we began this testimony today that from what you have read recently, it is your impression that the remark of the CIA representative at that meeting which, as you have said, in effect turned off the suggestion of an assassination attempt against Lumumba, might have been made simply because the group was too large for such a discussion?Mr. Dillon. It might have been -- I said that because of what I have learned since, and I have learned more today --# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET                                                                                  611  but they did try to develop such a capacity versus Castro.2  But as I have thought about it since we talked, I think that3  is less likely. I think it is more likely that it might have4  been the beginning of this whole idea on the CIA's part that5  they should develop such a capacity. And maybe they didn't6  have it then and went to work to develop it beginning in7  August.8  Mr. Baron. So wittingly you have been present at the9  creation?10 Mr. Dillon. The early stages, yes.11 Mr. Baron. I have no further questions.12 I would simply like to say that the Committee is extremely13 appreciateive of your coming here today. This is obviously14 a difficult and unpleasant subject to discuss. And you have15 been tremendously informative on it. So thank you very much.16 Mr. Dillon. I wish I could be more so. But the details17 of what happened at that time, the day to day details, have18 really departed from my mind. It is only those few relatively19 unusual things that I still recall. And any way I can help20 I am glad to.21 Mr. Baron. There may be one way you can help right now.22 I know that before we started today Bill Miller, the Staff23 Director of the Committee, indicated that the Committee would24 be interested in hearing you out at great length on policy25 recommendations in the intelligence field gathered both fromTOP SECRET
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                                                                                                    62# TOP SECRET1   your experience in the State Department and the Treasury2   Department, and also your recent service on the Rockefeller3   Commission. But I wondered specifically, in reference to the4   assassination area, where we faced the need to tie up our5   investigations as soon as possible, and perhaps make some6   recommendations as soon as possible, do you have any specific7   suggestions?8   Mr. Dillon. No, I don't think so. I think that the record9   has shown that this is the type of thing that the US10  Government or any of its branches cannot and should not engage11  in. And I doubt very much that there will be any repitition12  of this sort of thing that took place in the early sixties,13  which I guess was predicated on the belief that something like14  that could be done in exceptional circumstances without its15  being surfaced and being connected with the US. And I think16  even those who believed that such action was morally proper17  and might have been in the best intersts of both the US and18  the world would think that the costs were too heavy if it was19  ever traced back to the US. And the record seems to show that20  it does get traced back. So I think that there will be a21  general agreement among those who are the type of people who22  would ordinarily think that such a thing should not be thought23  of as US Policy.24  Mr. Baron. Are there any institutional changes that you25  would suggest to prevent the use of assassination as a tool# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETof foreign policy?Mr. Dillon. The only thing is, -- I don't know just whatinstitutional changes are really necessary, but there shouldbe the clarification that the Special Group, or whatevername it is given for the Committee, would have to approve anyaction by the CIA, whether it is assassination or militaryaction or anything else, in writing. I think that would befine. I think it is naivete to have the idea that thePresident has to approve anything like that. I tend to agreewith Mr. Dulles that you should not get the Presidentpersonally involved in details of operations that might beon the edge of what is right. I am not judging just aboutassassinations, but in any covert operation. The law now isthat the President has to approve any covert operation. Ithink that the result now will be that there wouldn't beany. I think there may be times when we will need them, butnot violent ones. I have in mind such things as financialhelp and such things as that. But I don't think the Presidentought personally to sign the checks.Mr. Baron. Thank you again.(Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the Committee was adjourned,subject to the call of the Chair.)TOP SECRET
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AFFIDAVITUNITED STATES OF AMERICADISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SS:I, C. Douglas Dillon, being first duly sworn, do upon oath depose and state:From June 1959 until early January 1961, I served as Under Secretary of State. During approximately 35-40 percent of that time, I served as Acting Secretary of State because of Secretary Herter's absence from Washington.Secretary Herter, who preceded me as Under Secretary of State, had served as the State Department representative on the 54/12 Committee, a predecessor of the present Forty Committee. When I became Under Secretary, the President asked me to retain my earlier responsibilities for foreign economic policy. Accordingly, the Number 3 position in the Department of State was designated as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Robert Murphy was appointed to this position and took over the State Department's responsibilities on the 54/12 Committee.Because of the frequency of my service as Acting Secretary of State, I was kept regularly informed of important 54/12 Committee decisions. On occasion I met with the 54/12 Committee and participated in its deliberations.During this entire period I have no recollection of any discussions or decisions looking toward the assassination of either Generalissimo Trujillo or Prime Minister Castro.On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meeting in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was discussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended consideration of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassination attempts against anyone.Dated this 21 day of May, 1975.![Signature of C. Douglas Dillon]C. Douglas DillonSubscribed and sworn to before me this 21 day of May 1975.![Signature and stamp of Notary Public]Notary PubliDistrict of Columbia![Stamp of the White House]
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Dillon Exhibit 230 June 1960MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meetingm 30. June 1960PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Gen. Cabell3. CongoGen. Cabell mentioned briefly the fact of the election of Joseph Ileo to the Presidency of the Congo Senate, and the fact that we had assisted him financially. He indicated that we in no way intend to claim full credit for his election but, particularly in view of the very close contest, we might have had some effect; and in any case we may have secured some influence with this potentially useful individual.7. CubaIn an informal conversation after Gen. Cabell's departure, Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that the U.S. has taken publicly about all that it can afford to take from the Castro government; that public opinion both here and abroad is probably beginning to feel that there is no limit as to how far this country can be pushed around; that this may encourage other small countries to take a similar tack; and that the longer we delay with effective economic and other action the harder we may make it for ourselves.Mr. Merchant and Mr. Irwin agreed, with the stipulation that the United States should not take affirmative action until it is prepared to follow through on a substantial scale.
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to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or groupviews.Mr. Parrott also said that Mr. Macy had raised a relatedpoint which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and thatMr. Barnes had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be givenadequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was aconcern expressed as to planning for the support fiscal and otherwiseof a new Cuban government immediately after a successful overturnof the present one. Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with thenecessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in factdirected three weeks ago that State officials begin to draw them up.JapanettTHOMAS A. PARROTT5
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know enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente, particularly as to basic freedoms, their attitude toward restoration of seized American property, etc. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had pointed out that the Frente is composed of people who have broken with Castro, at least on the basic philosophies.)In an attempt to clarify the situation with respect to the first point, Mr. Parrott told the Group about last Monday's meeting with Mr. Macy, at which Mr. Barnes had covered in considerable detail all aspects of the Cuban project. He said that he was at a loss to understand how Macy could have received the impression that CIA is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer to Mr. Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated - and had developed at considerable length - the thesis that our view was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just why this is so; this explanation had included specific comments on the steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and to assess their apparent leaders. Mr. Parrott said further that the point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question for CIA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without the participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the country.On the second point, Mr. Dulles said that we do know a good deal about the basic political sympathies of Frente members, and cited as an example the position that had been taken as to the inclusion of certain ultra-conservative groups. He said that the Frente had issued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly as being to preserve the principles of the revolution. He said that as to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, etc., this was thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearance of being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans' point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do so. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future and would take that opportunity to discuss these matters further, as appropriate.Mr. Parrott said that there was no disagreement that the political ideas of these individuals must be constantly assessed and must be clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement of objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the FRD together, and that at this particular stage it would not be practical