Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 52]
hotel bill during his stay in Miami in October 1960.* The CIA's involvement with Roselli caused the Agency some difficulty during Roselli's subsequent prosecutions for fraudulent gambling activities and living in the country under an assumed name.**(d) Plans in Early 1963Two plans to assassinate Castro were explored by Task Force W, the section concerned with covert Cuban operations, in early 1963. Desmond Fitzgerald (now deceased), Chief of the Task Force, asked Samuel Halpern to determine whether an exotic seashell, rigged to explode, could be deposited in an area where Castro commonly went skin diving (Halpern, p. 28). The idea was explored by the Technical Division and discarded as impractical (Helms, 6/13, p. 135; I.G., p.77)A second plan involved having James Donovan (who was negotiating with Castro for the release of prisoners* FBI reports reveal that Roselli's expenses at the Kennilworth llotel, where he was registered from October 11 30, 1960 under the name of J.A. Rollins, were paid by Mabeu (File R-505, FBI file summary, p.10). Maheu's expenses were reimbursed by the CIA.** In May 1966, the FBI threatened to deport Roselli for living in the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia. (Roselli, whose true name is Filippo Saco, was born in Italy and allegedly brought illegally into the United States while still a child.) Roselli contacted Edwards, who informed the FBI that Roselli wanted to "keep square with the Bureau," but was afraid that gangsters might kill him for "talking" (CIA Justice File R-153, Memorandum, Osborn to FBI, 5/27/66). After Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling activities at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills in 1967, he requested Harvey, who had left the Agency, 'to represent him (CIA Justice File R-153, Memorandum for Record by Osborn, 12/11/67). Harvey contacted the Agency and suggested that it prevent the prosecution (Osborn Memorandum, supra). Roselli was subsequently convicted of violating United States interstate gambling laws. In 1971, the CIA approached the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, to "forestall public disclosure of Roselli's past operational activity with CIA "that might occur if deportation proceedings were brought. (CIA to Select Committee, 7/21/75). It was agreed that CIA would be kept informed of developments in that case. The deportation order is presently being litigated in the courts.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 53]
taken during the Bay of Pigs operation) present Castro with a contaminated diving suit* (Colby, 5/21, pp. 38-39).The Inspector General's Report dates this operation in January 1963, when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as Chief of Task Force W, although it is unclear whether Harvey or Fitzgerald conceived of the plan (I.G., p. 75). It is likely that the activity took place earlier, since Donovan had completed his negotiations by the middle of January 1963. Helms characterized the plan as "cockeyed" (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).TSD bought a diving suit, dusted the inside with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease (Madura foot), and contaminated the breathing apparatus with a tubercule bacillus (I.G., p. 75). The Inspector General's Report states that the plan was abandoned because Donovan gave Castro a different diving suit on his own initiative (I.G., p. 75). Helms testified that the diving suit never left the laboratory (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).(e) AMLASH(1) Origin of the ProjectIn March 1961, an officer of the Mexico City CIA station met with a highly-placed Cuban official to determine if he would cooperate in efforts against the Castro regime (I.G., p. 78). The Cuban, referred to by the cryptonym AMLASH-1, had been*Donovan was not aware of the plan.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 54]
involved with an anti-Batista faction that only grudgingly accepted Castro's rule (Case Officer 2, p. 9, 39).* The meeting was inconclusive, but lead to subsequent meetings at which AM/LASH-1 agreed to cooperate with the CIA.AM/LASH-1 was viewed as an important "asset" inside Cuba. As a high-ranking military leader who enjoyed the confidence of Fidel Castro, he could keep the CIA informed of the internal workings of the regime (Case Officer 2, pp. 23, 40). It was also believed that he might playa part in fomenting a coup within Cuba (Case Officer 2, p. 43).**From the first contact with AM/LASH-1, until the latter part of 1963, it was uncertain whether he would defect or remain in Cuba. His initial requests to the CIA and FBI for aid in defecting were rebuffed (I.G., pp. 80, 82-83). When Case Officer 1 joined the AM/LASH-1 operation in June 1967, his assign-* The Committee has taken the testimoy of the two case officers involved in the AM/LASH project. Case officer 1 dealt with AM/LASH-1 through September 1963; Case Officer 2 continued until mid-1965 (Case Officer 2, p. ). The Committee has agreed not to divulge their names as they are still in active service with the Agency.** AM/LASH-1 was the major "asset" in the AM/LASH operation. During this period the CIA also sponsored a separate operation to "penetrate the Cuban military to encourage either defections or an attempt to produce information from dissidents, or perhaps even to forming a group which would be capable of replacing the then present government in Cuba" (Case Officer 1, pp. 18, 22).The case officers for AM/LASH were also involved in this second related program.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 55]
TOP SECRET31ment was to "stay in place and report to us" (Case Officer 1, p. 38).At a meeting in August 1962 in a foreign capital, AM/LASH-1 stated that he would remain in Cuba if he "could do something really signifi- cant for the creation of a new Cuba", and expressed a desire to plan the execution of Fidel Castro (Case Officer 1 Contact Report, August 1 meeting). The subject of assassinating Castro was again discussed at a meeting on August 10, 1962, between AM/LASH-1 and his case officer. The case officer's contact report states that assassination was raised in discussing AM/LASH-1's role in Cuba, and that AM/LASH-1 was visibly upset. "It was not the act that he objected to, but merely the choice of the word used to describe it. 'Eliminate' was acceptable." (Case Officer 1, Contact Report, August 7-10, meetings).The case officers who testified before the Committee said that AM/LASH-1 was not directly requested to assassinate Castro. The record clearly reveals, however, that the agency personnel dealin gwith AM/LASH-1 were aware of his desire to take such action. A cable to headquarters reporting an August 15, 1963 meeting with AM/LASH-1 stated:"Have no intention give AMLASH-1 physical elim-ination mission as requirement but recognizethis something he could or might try to carryout on his own initiative."** Case Officer 1 testified that AM/LASH-1 discussed "eliminating' Castro, although he attributed such remarks to AMLASH-1's "mercurial" nature, and stated that no specific plans for assassinations were ever discussed (Case Officer 1, pp. 39-41, 62). The case officer who took over the AMLASH project in September 1963 recalled being briefed by Case Officer 1 on AMLASH's belief that Castro's assassination was a necessary first step in a coup. (Case Officer 2, p. 28).The second AMLASH case officer described the context in which AMLASH-1 generally raised the topic of assassination:"You also must recognize that AMLASH was a rather temperamental man whose temperament was of a mercurial nature and whereas he may have said something like this in one fit of pique, he would settle down and talk about organizing a regular military coup in the next breath." (Case Officer 2, p.29)NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 56
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 56]
# TOP SECRETAt a meeting on October 3, 1963, AMLASH-1 again raised the possibility of defecting, but indicated that he would be willing to continue working against the Castro regime if he received firm assurances of American support (Case Officer 2, pp. 48-49). According to Case Officer 2, AMLASH-1 asked for military supplies, a device with which to protect himself if his plots against Castro were discovered, and a meeting with Attorney General Robert Kennedy (Case Officer 2, pp. 48-49).Desmond Fitzgerald (now deceased), who was then Chief, SAS * agreed to meet AMLASH-1 and give him the assurances he sought. The Inspector General's Report states that Fitzgerald consulted with the DDP, Helms, who agreed that Fitzgerald should hold himself out as a personal representative of Attorney General Kennedy (I.G., p.89).**Helms testified that he did not recall the conversation, and speculated that the Attorney General might not have been consulted because"this was so central to the whole theme of what we had been trying to do . . .(find someone inside Cuba who might head a government and have a group to replace Castro). This is obviously what we had been pushing, what everybody had been pushing for us to try to do, and it is that context that I would have made some remark like this."(Helms, 6/13, p. 117)* SAS (Special Affairs Staff) was the name given to Task Force W in early 1963 when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as head of the covert Cuban operations. The AMLASH Case Officers reported directly to Fitzgerald.** The contact plan for the proposed meeting stated:"Fitzgerald will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to (foreign capital) for specific purpose meeting AMLASH-1 and giving him assurances of full support with a change of the present government in Cuba."
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 57]
33Helms recalled that he told Fitzgerald to"go ahead and say that from the standpoint of politicalsupport, the United States government will be behind you ifyou are successful. This had nothing to do with killings..This had only to do with the political action part of it".(Helms, 6/13, p. 131.)Fitzgerald met AM/LASH-1 on October 29, 1963,in a foreign capital, and promised that the United States wouldsupport a coup against Castro* (Case Officer 2, p. 60). Whenlater interviewed for the Inspector General's Report, Fitzgeraldrecalled that AM/LASH-l repeatedly requested an assassinationweapon, particularly a "high powered rifle with telescopic sightsthat could be used to kill Castro from a distance" (I.G., p. 90).Fitzgerald stated that he told AM/LASH-1 that the United Stateswould have "no part of an attempt on Castro's life" (I.G., p. 90).Case Officer 2 recalled that AM/LASH-1 raised the prospect ofassassinating Castro, but did not propose an explicit plan (CaseOfficer 2, pp. 62, 85). AM/LASH-1, was, however, "convinced thatCastro had to be removed from power before a coup could be under-* Case Officer 2 did not recall whether Robert Kennedy's name  was used (Case Officer 2, p. 60).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 58]
taken in Cuba" (Case Officer 2, p. 61).AMLASH-1 also requested high-powered rifles and grenades (Case Officer 2, p. 77). A memorandum by Case Officer 2, dated November 18, 1963, states:"C/SAS (Fitzgerald) approved telling AMLASH-1 he would be given a cache inside Cuba. Cache could, if he requested it, include . . . high powered rifles with scopes . . . "AMLASH-1 was told on November 22, 1963, that the cache would be dropped in Cuba (Case Officer 2, p. 92).## (2) The Poison Pen DeviceOn November 22, 1963, Case Officer 2 met with AMLASH-1 in a foreign capital, offered him a ball-point pen rigged with a hypodermic needle, and suggested that Blackleaf 40 would be an effective poison to use in the device. (Case Officer 2, p. 110)The needle was designed to be so fine that the victim would not notice its insertion (Case Officer 2, p. 103).The Inspector General's Report states that Case Officer 2, when he was interviewed in 1967, stated that AMLASH-1 had requested the Agency to"devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try." (I.G., p. 92)The Report concluded that:"although none of the participants so stated, it may be inferred that they were seeking a means of assassination of a sort that AMLASH-1 might reasonably have been expected to have devised himself." (I.G., p. 92)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 59]
# TOP SECRET35Halpern, Fitzgerald's assistant, told theCommittee that the pen was intended to show "bona fides" and"The orders were to do something to get rid of Castro . . .and we thought this other method might work whereas a riflewouldn't." (Halpern, p. 26)Helms confirmed that the pen was manufactured"to take care of a request from him that he have some devicefor getting rid of Castro, for killing him, murdering him,whatever the case may be." (Helms, 6/13, p. 113)". . . (t)his was a temporizing gesture." (Helms, 6/11, p. 133)*On November 22, 1963, Fitzgerald and the caseofficer met with AMLASH-1 in a European capital and offered himthe poison pen, recommending that he use Blackleaf-40, a deadly poisonwhich is commercially available. (Case Officer 2, p. 112) The Inspect-or General's Report noted that"it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy wasshot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Parisand giving him an assassination device for use againstCastro." (I.G., p. 94)* In his testimony before the Committee, Case Officer 2 offered a con-  flicting story. He said that the purpose of the pen was"to provide AMLASH with a device which would serve him toprotect himself in case he was confronted with and chargedwith being involved in a military coup against Castro."(Case Officer 2, p. 107)According to the case officer, AMLASH-1 had requested an "esoteric devicewhich could easily be concealed and which he could use in self-defense(Case Officer 2, po. 98-99). The device was not intended for offensiveuse against any person, but was rather"a kind of psychological crutch . . .to help him think thatwe were interested in his own protection, his own security"(Case Officer 2, pp. 104-105).This version is wholly inconsistent with documents in the CIA files, someof which were written by the AMLASH case officer, which establish thatAMLASH-1 intended to kill Castro, and that the CIA knew his desire andendeavored to supply the means that he needed.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 60]
36The case officer later recalled that AMLASH-1 did not "think muchof the device," and complained that CIA could surely "come up withsomething more sophisticated than that" (I.G., p. 93a).The case officer recalled offering the pento AMLASH-1, but could not remember whether AMLASH-1 threw it awaythen or took it with him (Case Officer 2, pp. 105, 110). He didrecall that AMLASH-1 said he would not take the pen back to Cuba,but did not know what AMLASH-1 in fact did with the pen (Case Offi-cer 2, pp. 110-111).An entry in the CIA files on AMLASH datedMarch 29, 1965, states:"Although Fitzgerald and the case officer assured AMLASH-1on November 22, 1963, that CIA would give him everythinghe needed (telescopic sight, silencer, all the money hewanted) the situation changed when the case officer andFitzgerald left the meeting to discover that PresidentKennedy had been assassinated. Because of this fact,plans with AMLASH-1 changed and it was decided that wecould have no part in the assassination of a governmentleader (including Castro) and would not aid AMLASH-1 inthis attempt. AMLASH-1 was not informed of (this de-cision) until he was seen by the case officer in Novem-ber, 1964."
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 61]
## (3) Providing AMLASH-1 with ArmsCIA cables indicate that one cache of arms for AMLASH-1 was delivered in Cuba in March 1964 and another in June. An entry in the AMLASH file for May 5, 1964, states that the case officer requested the Technical Services Division to produce, on a "crash basis," a silencer which would fit an FAL rifle. The contact report of a meeting between the case officer and a confidant of ANLASH states that AMLASH was subsequently informed that it was not feasible to make a silencer for an FAL.Toward the latter part of 1964, AMLASH-1 became more insistent on the fact that the assassination of the Cuban leadership was a necessary initial step in a successful coup. (Case Officer 2, pp. 129-133). In a memorandum dated December 10, 1964, the case officer wrote:"AMLASH-1 was told and fully understands that the United States Government cannot become involved to any degree in the 'first step' of his plan. If he needs support, he realizes he will have to get it elsewhere. FYI: This is where B-1 could fit in nicely in giving any support he would request."Documents in the AMLASH file establish that in early 1965, the CIA put AMLASH in contact with B-l, the leader of an anti-Castro group. As the case officer explained to the Inspector General:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 62]
# TOP SECRET" . . . what had happened was that SAS had contrived to put B-l and AMLASH together in such a way that neither of them knew that the contact had been engineered by CIA. The thought was that B-l needed a man inside and AMLASH wanted a silenced weapon, which CIA was unwilling to furnish to him directly. By putting the two together, B-l might get its man inside Cuba and AMLASH might get his silenced weapon -- from B-1."(I.G., p. 101)A report of a meeting between a case officer andB-1 states that B-l, in his initial contacts with AMLASH-1, discussed plans for assassinating Castro. AMLASH-1 suggested that guerrilla raids against Cuba should be stepped up one month before the "attempt on Fidel Castro" to "prepare the public and raise the morale and resistance spirit of the people." B-l reported that AMLASH-1 believed that the only solution to the problems in Cuba would be"to get rid of Fidel Castro. He is able either to shoot him with a silencer or place a bomb in some place where Fidel will be. He might use, for example, a small bomb that he can carry and place, or with his group attack, the residence where Fidel lives . . . B-l is going to provide AMLASH-1 with escape routes and places where B-1 is able to pick him up. He will memorize these points and escape routes. Next, B-l is to provide AMLASH-1 either a silencer for a FAL or a rifle with a silencer.** A CIA document dated January 3, 1965, states that B-1 told a case officer that he and AM/LASH-1 had reached an agreement on the following points:"1. B-l is to provide AM/LASH-1 with a silencer for the FAL; if this is impossible, B-l is to cache in a designated location a rifle with a scope and silencer plus several bombs concealed either in a suitcase, a lamp or some other concealment device which he would be able to carry and place next to Fidel Castro."2. B-l is to provide AM/LASH-1 with escape routes controlled by B-l and not by the Americans. The lack of confidence built up by the Bay of Pigs looms large:"3. B-l is to prepare one of the western provinces, either Pinar del Rio or Havana, with arms caches and a clandestine underground mechanism. This would be a fall back position and a safe area where men and weapons are available to the group.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 63]
39# TOP SECRETA CIA cable dated February 2, 1965, stated that B-l had given AMLASH-1 a silencer and that AMLASH-1 had "small, highly concentrated explosives." On February 11, 1965 the Madrid Station cabled that AMLASH-1 would soon receive "one pistol with silencer and one FAL rifle with a silencer from B-l's secretary" (I.G., p. 103). A subsequent cable reported that "B-l had three packages of special items made up by his technical people and delivered to AMLASH-1 in Madrid" (I.G., p. 103In June 1965, CIA terminated all contact with AMLASH-1 and his associates because of reports that his activities were widely known (I.G., pp. 104-105)."4. B-l is to be in Cuba one week before the elimination of Fidel, but no one, including AM/LASH-1 will know B-l's location."5. B-l is to arrange for recongition by at least five Latin American countries as soon as Fidel is neutralized and a junta is formed. This junta will be established even though Raul Castro and Che Guevara may still be alive and may still be in control of the part of the country. This is the reason AM/LASH-1 requested that B-l be able to establish some control over one of the provinces so that the junta can be formed in that location."6. One month to the day before the neutralization of Fidel, B-l will increase the number of commando attacks to a maximum in order to raise the spirit and morale of the people inside Cuba. In all communiques, in all radio messages, in all propaganda put out by B-1 he must relate that the raid was possible thanks to the information received from clandestine sources inside Cuba and from the clandestine underground apparatus directed by "P". This will be AM/LASH-1's war name."
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 64]
Approved by DraftingSubcommiteee 9/5/752. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Authorized or   Known About Within the Central Intelligence Agency?(a) The Question Presented. As we have seen, firstRichard Bissell and then Richard Helms, each as Deputy Director ofPlans (DDP), were aware of plots to assassinate Fidel Castro. Theevidence set forth herein relates to whether their superiors inthe Agency, in particular Allen Dulles and John McCone, authorizedor were aware of the assassination plots.Dulles served as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)from 1953 to November 1961. McCone served as DCI from November 1961to 1965.* The Committee took considerable testimony on whether Dul-les and McCone (or their Deputy DCI's, General Cabell and GeneralCarter, respectively) knew about or authorized the plots againstFidel Castro's life.In summary, the evidence is as follows:(i) Dulles: Bissell and Edwards bothexpressed the belief that Dulles (and his Deputy, General Cabell)authorized the initial phase of the assassination plot involvingunderworld figures. They acknowledged, however, that Dulles (andhis Deputy) were not told about the plot until after the under-world figures had been contacted. The words said to have beenused to brief them--"an intelligence operation"--do not convey on[^1] Bissell served as DDP from January 1, 1959, to February 17, 1962. (President Kennedy decided to replace Dulles and Bissell because of the failure of the Bay of Pigs (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 6-8).) Helms, who had been Bissell's Deputy, succeeded Bissell in February 1962 as DDP. He was appointed DDCI in April 1965, and DCI in June 1966.[^1]: * Bissell served as DDP from January 1, 1959, to February 17,1962. (President Kennedy decided to replace Dulles and Bissellbecause of the failure of the Bay of Pigs (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 6-8).)Helms, who had been Bissell's Deputy, succeeded Bissell inFebruary 1962 as DDP. He was appointed DDCI in April 1965, andDCI in June 1966.NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 65