Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 292]
-47-sent in a channel that was even more closely restricted than the normal CIA cable traffic (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 22, 32-33). Tweedy said destruction of such cable traffic would have been left to the discretion of the Chief of Station and he did not know whether Hedgman destroyed the Station's copies (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 22).Tweedy said "I would be surprised if I didn't" have a conversation with Sidney Gottlieb about "anything in his inventory that could possibly be used, including lethal biological substances (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 68-69). Tweedy "suspected" that "the first conversation along these lines would undoubtedly have been held between Dick Bissell and Sidney Gottlieb," which Tweedy then would have "followed-up" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 69).Tweedy maintained that the period in which he explored the means of access for assassinating Lumumba remained "a planning interval and at no point can I recall that I ever felt it was imminent that somebody would say 'go'" (Tweedy, 9/9. pp. 18-19):Tweedy. It was always my assumption that at the time anything like this should occur there would have been some kind of real focus on the problem at probably a very considerable policy level within the Agency. . . and it never occurred to me that I would get a call or Bissell would ask me to come down to his office and sya go to it. Nor were we ever in a position where he said that I would merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got that far.Q. You didn't have any action plans for the assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or were aware of?NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 293
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 293]
-48-Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing thatever got anywhere. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 19)It is difficult to reconcile the cable traffic with Tweedy'stestimony that no action plans were launched and that no authoriz-ation for implementing the assassination operation, authorizationfor Hedgman's approach to his agent to explore access to Lumumba'sentourage is in accord with Tweedy's description of his inquiriesabout gaining access to Lumumba.However, the fact that Tweedy was personnaly informed that theChief of Station "PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP" (CIA Cable IN24171, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60) is harder to reconcilewith his statements that a "go ahead" on the operation was neverimminent, especially in light of Tweedy's PROP cable the next weekwhich told the Chief of Station that Lumumba'sDISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE.CONSIDERATION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FORSPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUEAND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY (CIA CableOUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60)(iii) Bissell Testified That He Did Not RecallWhether The Assassination Operation HadMoved From Planning To ImplementationBut It Was Not Against Agency Policy toSend Poisons to The CongoRichard Bissell testified that he did not remember discussingthe feasibility of assassinating Lumumba with Bronson Tweedy, but itseemed "entirely probable" to him that such discussions took place(Bissell, 9/10, pp. 3-4).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 294]
-49-Bissell said he "may have" given Tweedy specific instructions about steps he was to take to further an assassination plan, but he did not remember to do so (Bissell, 9/10, p.4). Bissell said that exploring access to Lumumba --"almost certainly" seeking information from the Chief of Station about access for poisoning -- would have been a "key part" of his "planning and preparatory activity" but he had no specific recollection of cable communications on this subject (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 6-8). Bissell remembered that he was aware that the Chief of Station had an agent thought to have direct access to Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10, p. 80).Bissell testified that he "most certainly" approved any cables that Tweedy sent to the Chief of Station seeking information about gaining access to Lumumba but it was so sensitive a matter (Bissell, 9/10, p. 8) Bissell added:I think Mr. Tweedy, on the basis of an oral author-ization from me, would have had the authority tosend such a cable without my signing off on it.(Bissell, 9/10, p. 8)Bissell believed that Tweedy would have known of Gottlieb's trip to the Congo, although it was possible that Tweedy was "cut out of knowledge of the specific operation" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 21).Bissell's lack of recollection of discussing his assignment to Justin O'Donnell*with Tweedy was the reason for his speculation that* Bissell's assignment to O'Donnell is discussed in Sections 5(a)(i) and 5(a)(ii), infra.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 295]
-50-Tweedy might have been unaware of the true purpose of Gottlieb's visit (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 20-22).Bissell did not recall cables concerning the dispatch of a messenger and subsequently confirming that his instructions were to be followed, but he said "This sounds highly likely. I would expect, given the background, that the confirmation would have been forthcoming" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 43).It was "very probable," according to Bissell, that he discussed the assassination of Lumumba with Sidney Gottlieb, who was then his Science Advisor (Bissell, 9/10, p. 14). Bissell said that on a number of occasions he discussed with Gottlieb "the availability of means of incapacitation, including assassination" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 60).Although he had no "specific recollection," Bissell assumed that, if Gottlieb went to the Congo, he had approved the mission, (which "might very well" have dealt with the assassination of Lumumba) (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 18, 20, 44).. Despite his absence of specific recollection of these events, Bissell said, "There is nothing in mind that I remember that would be in conflict" with the testimony of the Chief of Station that Gottlieb carried poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).Bissell testified that it would not have been against CIA policy in the fall of 1960 to send poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 296
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 296]
-51-He classified "the act of taking the kit to the Congo. . . as still in the planning stage" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 49). Bissell acknowledged, however, that the dispatch of poisons and paraphernalia with which to administer them was an extraordinary event:It would indeed have been rather unusual to send such materials -- a specific kit. . . of this sort-- out to a relatively small station, unless planning for their use were quite far along. (Bissell, 9/10, p. 37).Nonetheless, Bissell said that he "probably believed" that he had sufficient authority at that point to direct CIA officers to move from the stage of planning to implementation (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 60-61). In light of his absence of a specific recollection of these events, he stated that "if it be taken as established that Mr. Gottlieb took specific instructions 'to implement,' " Gottlieb would not have been acting beyond the mandate given to him by Bissell and it would show that the assassination plot "had then passed into an implementation phase" and that "authorization was given" (Bissell, 9/10/ pp. 39, 41, 49).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 297]
## 5. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives in the CongoJustin O'Donnell, a senior CIA officer in the clandestine operations division in 1960, testified that during this period he had been asked by DDP Richard Bissell to go to the Congo to carry out the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12).O'Donnell said that he refused to participate in an assassination operation, but proceeded to the Congo to attempt to draw Lumumba away from the protective custody of the UN guard and place him in the hands of Congolese authorities (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 13-14).Shortly after O'Donnell's arrival in the Congo he was joined by a CIA agent with a criminal background who was used the following year by the CIA as part of a program to develop a stand-by assassination capability. Late in 1960, one of the operatives of the Chief of Station in Leopoldville approached this agent of O'Donnell's with a proposition to join an "execution squad" (CIA Cable IN 18739, Leopoldville to Director, 12/7/60).Despite the fact that O'Donnell was initially approached to be part of the plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba, it is unlikely that O'Donnell was actually involved in the implementation of that plot by the Chief of Station. Whether there is any connection between the assassination plot and either of the two operatives -- QJWIN and WIROGUE -- is less clear.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 298]
(a) O'Donnell's Operations in the Congo(i) Tweedy and the Chief of Station Agreed That a Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to the Congo to Concentrate on the Assassination OperationIn early October, 1960, several cables sent in the specially restricted PROP channel dealt with a plan to send a "senior case officer" to the Congo to aid the Chief of Station with the assassination operation.* On October 7, Bronson Tweedy informed Hedgman that he "WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH TDY [TEMPORARY DUTY] SENIOR CASE OFFICER RUN THIS OP" by supervising a third country national operative (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60). On October 15, Tweedy requested Hedgman's reaction to the suggestion of dispatching the senior case officer as soon as possible to concentrate on the assassination operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60). Two days later, the Chief of Station replied affirmatively:BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICERHANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA. (CIA CableIN 28936, Chief of Station to Tweedy).The Chief of Station advised that his responsibilities for "MULTIPLE OPS" had restricted the amount of time he was able to devote to the assassination operation (CIA Cable, 10/17/60).* See Section 4(e), _supra_, for full treatment of these cables.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 299]
(ii) Bissell Discussed Assassination of Lumumba WithO'Donnell and Sent Him to Congo: October-November 1960Probably shortly after the Chief of Station's cable of October 17 requesting the assignment of a senior case officer to concentrate on the assassination operation, Richard Bissell broached the subject with CIA officer Justin O'Donnell.At that time, O'Donnell was the Deputy Chief of a component of the Directorate of Plans -- the CIA's covert action arm O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 8).Justin O'Donnell testified that in October of 1960, he was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassinating Patrice Lumumba (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12; 9/11/75, pp. 19, 43):O'Donnell: He called me in and he told me he wanted to go down to the Belgian Congo, the former Belgian Congo, and to eliminate Lumumba .Q: What did you understand him to mean by eliminate?O'Donnell: To kill him and thereby eliminate his influence.Q: What was the basis for your interpreting his remarks, whatever his precise language, as meaning that he was talking about assassination rather than merely neutralizing him through some other means?O'Donnell: It was not neutralization . . .Clearly the context of our talk was to kill him. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12.)O'Donnell reacted strongly to Dissell's instruction:I told him that I would absolutely not have any part of killing Lurmumba. He said, I want you to go over and talk to Sidney Gottlieb. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 12.)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 300]
Gottlieb was a CIA scientist who was at that time the ScienceAdvisor to Bissell (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 14).O'Donnell said it was "inconceivable that Bissell would directsuch a mission without the personal permission of Allen Dulles"(O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 44). But the question of authorizationwas never raised by Bissell:I assumed that he had authority from Mr. Dullesin such an important issue, but it was not dis-cussed, nor did he purport to have higherauthority to do it. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 15.)O'Donnell promptly met with Gottlieb and testified that he was"sure that Mr. Bissell had called Gottlieb and told him I was comingover" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13; 9/11/75, p. 7). O'Donnell saidthat Gottlieb told him "that there were four or five ... lethalmeans of disposing of Lumumba" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13). O'Donnellrecalled that "one of the methods was a virus and the others in-cluded poison" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 12; 9/11/75, p. 7). O'Donnellsaid that Gottlieb "didn't even hint ... that he had been in theCongo and that he had transported any lethal agent to the Congo"(O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 7-A).After speaking with Gottlieb, O'Donnell said:I then left his office, and I went back toMr. Bissell's office and I told him in noway would I have any part in the assassina-tion of Lumumba ... and reasserted inabsolute terms that I would not be involvedin a murder attempt. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 43.)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 301]
-56-O'Donnell said that in one of his two conversations with Bissell about Lumumba, he raised the prospect "that conspiracy to commit murder being done in the District of Columbia might be in violation of federal law" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14). He said that Bissell "airily dismissed" this prospect (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14).Despite his refusal to participate in assassination, O'Donnell agreed to go to the Congo on a general mission to "neutralize" Lumumba "as a political factor" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 43-44):I said I would go down and I would have nocompunction about operating to draw Lumumbaout [of UN custody], to run an operation toneutralize his operations which were againstWestern interests, against, I thought,American interests. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13.)O'Donnell added that his objective was to:neutralize Lumumba's influence ... and hisactivities against [a Congolese leader],whom at that time you might say was our closeinstrument, he was the man we had put ourchips on. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 20.)Bissell also recalled that, after their discussions about assassi- nation, O'Donnell went to the Congo "with the assignment ... of looking at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 53).Although O'Donnell did not formulate a precise plan until he reached the Congo, he discussed a general strategy with Bissell:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 302]
-57-Mr. O'Donnell: I told Mr. Bissell that I would be willing to go down to neutralize his activities and operations and try to bring him out [of UN custody) and turn him over to the Congolese authorities, that is correct.Senator Mondale: Was it discussed then that his life might be taken by the Congolese authorities?Mr. O'Donnell: It was, I think, considered in the -- not to have him killed, but then it would have been a Congolese being judged by Congolese for Congolese crimes. Yes, I think it was discussed. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 38.)There was a "very, very high probability" that Lumumba would receive capital punishment at the hands of the Congolese authorities, according to O'Donnell (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 24). But O'Donnell "had no compunction about bringing him out and then having him tried by a jury of his peers" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, р. 14).Although O'Donnell had expressed his aversion to assassination to Bissell and had undertaken a more general mission to "neutralize" Lumumba's influence, it was clear to him that Bissell was still interested in the assassination of Lumumba:in leaving at the conclusion of our second discussion ... he said, well, I wouldn't rule out that possibility -- meaning the possibility of the elimination or the killing of Lumumba -- I wouldn't rule it. In other words., even though you have said this, don't rule it out.... There is no question about it, he said, I wouldn't rule this other out, meaning the elimination or the assassination (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 45).O'Donnell had a distinctive recollection that after his second discussion of Lumumba with Bissell, he met with Richard Helms in order
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 303]
to make his opposition to assassinating Lumumba a matter ofrecord (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 44-45):[I]n the Agency, since you don't havedocuments, you have to be awfully cannyand you have to get things on record, andI went into Mr. Helms' office, and Isaid, Dick, here is what Mr. Bissellproposed to me, and I told him that Iwould under no conditions do it, and Helmssaid you're absolutely right. (O'Donnell,6/9/75, pp. 15-16).Richard Helms testified that it was "likely" that he had such aconversation with O'Donnell and he assumed that O'Donnell's versionof their conversation was correct (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 22-23).[^1]William Harvey testified that O'Donnell had informed himabout the conversations with Bissell:Mr. O'Donnell came to me and said that hehad been approached by Richard Bissell ...to undertake an operation in the Congo, oneof the objectives of which was the elimina-tion of Patrice Lumumba. He also told methat he had declined to undertake thisassignment. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9.)Harvey said that in a later conversation with Bissell, Bissell toldhim that he had asked O'Donnell to undertake such an operation(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9).O'Donnell said that within forty-eight hours of his second dis-cussion with Bissell, he departed for the Congo (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,pp. 45-46).[^1]: * Helms testified that he did not follow-up on this conversa- tion in any way. He did not recall why O'Donnell had gone to the Congo or what his mission was (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 32-33).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 304]
### Bissell Testified That he Asked O'Donnell to Plan and Prepare for an Assassination OperationBissell remembered "very clearly" that he and O'Donnell discussed the assassination of Lumumba in the fall of 1960 (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 75) and that O'Donnell reacted negatively (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 18). According to Bissell, O'Donnell said that he thought that assassination "was an inappropriate action and that the desired object could be accomplished better in other ways" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54).Bissell also confirmed the fact that he had asked O'Donnell to see Sidney Gottlieb (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 44).Bissell differs with O'Donnell's account on only one important point -- the degree to which Bissell's initial assignment to O'Donnell contemplated the mounting of an operation as opposed to contingency planning. O'Donnell flatly testified that Bissell requested him to attempt to kill Lumumba. In his first testimony on the subject, Bissell said that he asked O'Donnell "to investigate the possibility of killing Lumumba" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54; see also pp. 55, 75). In a later appearance, however, Bissell stated that O'Donnell "had been asked to plan and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 24).Bissell said that after his conversations with O'Donnell, he felt that it would be necessary to "postpone" the assassination operation because, "given O'Donnell's reaction, there was a risk
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 305]
-60-that the planning of such an operation would be blown" (Bissell,9/10/75, p. 25). Despite his impression that he might have de-activated assassination operations against Lumumba at that time,Bissell could not preclude the possibility that the Hedgman/Gobblieb poison plot continued to move foward:[T]his had been in my mind a very sensitive with theassignment to him, limited knowledge of it limited very narrowly evenwithin the Agency. And it is difficult to separate recollection from inference onoccasion. But I seem to recollect that after this conversation with him, I wantedthis put very much on the back burner and inactivated for quite some time. Now thatdoesn't rule out the possibility that some action through completely different channelsmight have gone forward. But the best of my recollection is, I viewed this not onlyas terminating the assignment for him, but also as reason for at least postponing any-thing further along that line. (Bissell,9/10/75, pp. 25-26).In Tweedy's mind, O'Donnell's eventual mission to the Congo waslinked to assessing the possibility for assassinating Lumumbarather than to a general plan to draw Lumumba out of UN custody(Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 26).(iv) O'Donnell Arrived in the Congo and Learned Thata Virus Was in the Station SafeOn October 29, the Chief of Station was informed throughthe PROP channel that Justin O'Donnell was soon to arrive in Leo-poldville "IN FURTHERANCE THIS PROJECT" (CIA Cable OUT 86798, Fieldsto Chief of Station, 10/29/60). On November 3, O'Donnell arrived
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 306]
-61-in Leopoldville (CIA Cable IN 38052, Leopoldville to Director,11/4/60). Chief of Station Hedgman testified that he had beenmade aware by cable that O'Donnell was coming to the Congo(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 40). Hedgman said it was "very possible"that as a new Chief of Station he took the dispatch to the Congoof a senior officer like O'Donnell as a signal that CIA headquarterswas "dissatisfied with my handling" of Gottlieb's instructions.(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 42).Hedgman had a general picture of O'Donnell's mission:I understood it to be that -- similar tomine, that is, the removal or neutrali-zation of Lumumba ... I have no clearrecollection of his discussing the assassi-nation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 54.).Hedgman said that he had no recollection of O'Donnell indicatingone way or the other whether he was considering assassination asa means of "neutralizing" Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55).Hedgman said, "in view of my instructions, I may have assumed thathe was" considering assassination (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). Gen-erally, however, Hedgman perceived O'Donnell as being unenthusiasticabout his mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 56, 88-89).When O'Donnell arrived in the Congo, he met with the Chief ofStation, who informed him that there was "a virus in the safe"(O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 7-A; 6/9/75, p. 16). O'Donnell said heassumed it was a "lethal agent" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 37), althoughHedgman was not explicit:I knew it wasn't for somebody to get his polioshot up to date. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 16.)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 307]
He added that if the virus was to be used for medical purposes,"it would have been in the custody of the State Department"personnel, not the CIA station (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 36).O'Donnell said that he did not recall that Hedgman mentionedthe source of the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 8).[^1] But O'Donnellassumed that it had come from Sidney Gottlieb's office:It would have had to have come from Washington,in my estimation, and I would think, since ithad been discussed with Gottlieb that itprobably would have emanated from his office.(O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 28.)Hedgman did not recall discussing Gottlieb's trip to the Congowith O'Donnell, but "assumed" that he did so (Hedgman, 8/21/75,pp. 60-61).O'Donnell was "certain" that the virus had arrived before hedid (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 24). He was surprised to learn thatsuch a virus was being held at the Leopoldville station becausehe had refused an assassination mission before departing for theCongo (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 17).O'Donnell stated that he knew of no other instance where alethal biological substance was in the possession of a CIA station(O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 50). He assumed that its purpose wasassassination:[^1]: When O'Donnell was informed about Hedgman's testimony onthe visit of Gottlieb to the Congo and the plot to poison Lumumba,he said, "I believe absolutely in its credibility" (O'Donnell,9/11/75, p. 53). O'Donnell found nothing in the facts as he knewthem, nor in Hedgman's character to raise a question about thattestimony. O'Donnell regarded Hedgman as "an honest and a decentman" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 19) "a totally truthful man"(O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 56).