Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 82]
- 19 -### (c) Did John McCone Know of or Authorize Assassination Plots During His Tenure as DCIThe CIA considered several assassination plots against Castro during McCone's tenure as Director. Harvey initiated his contact with Roselli in April 1962, and the operation involving underworld figures continued into early 1963. In early 1963 the CIA looked into the possibility of assassinating Castro with an exploding seashell and contaminated diving suit. AM/LASH was offered a poison pen device in November 1963, and caches of arms were delivered to Cuba for his use in the following year.### (i) McCone Testified That He Did Not Authorize or Know About the Castro Plots and That He Would Have Disapproved the Plots Had He Been AskedMcCone testified that he was not aware of the plots to assassinate Castro which took place during the years in which he was DCI, and that he did not authorize those plots.* (McCone, 6/6/75, pp. 33, 44-45) He testified that he was not briefed about the assassination plots by Dulles, Bissell, Helms, or anyone else when he succeeded Dulles as Director in November 1961 (McCone, 6/6/75, pp. 6-7, 17), and that if he had ever been asked about the plots, he would have disapproved. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 47) McCone testified:* McCone testified that he first learned of the Roselli operation in August, 1963, long after it had been terminated. See discussion, p.
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- 20 -I had no knowledge of any authorized plan orplanning that might lead to a request forauthorization. Of course, during those daysit was almost common for one person or anotherto say, we ought to dispose of Castro[b]ut at no time did anyone come to me, orcome to other authorities to my knowledge,with a plan for the actual undertaking of anassassination.* * * * *Senator Hart of Colorado: . . . Did youever discuss the subject of assassinationswith your predecessor, Mr. Dulles?McCone: No, I did not.(ii) Helms, Bissell, and Other Subordinate AgencyEmployees Testified That They Did Not Ask McCone to Approvethe Plots or Know If He Had Knowledge Of Them.Richard Bissell was DDP under McCone for three months,from November 1961 until February 1962. Richard Helms assumedthe duties of DDP from Bissell.Bissell testified about McCone's knowledge as follows:Q.: Your testimony is that you never discussedassassinations with Mr. McCone?Α.: That is correct.Q.: . . .[D]id you tell McCone anything aboutthat conversation with Mr. Harvey in whichyou at least told him (Harvey) to takeover the relationship with the criminalsyndicate?Α.: I don't remember so doing.
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- 21 -Helms testified that he did not recall ever having dis-*cussed the assassination plots with McCone while the plotswere continuing. When asked whether McCone was aware of theassassination plots against Castro, Helms testified:No, it isn't my impression that I told him,at least I don't have any impression, unfor-tunately. Mr. McCone is an honorableman. He has done his own testifying, and allI can say is that I do not know specificallywhether he was aware or not. (Helms, 6/13/75,pp. 90, 101-102)Helms further testified:Q.: I believe Mr. McCone testified that henever heard of any of these attempts when hewas Director. Would you have any reason todisagree with his testimony?Helms: Sir, I have always liked McCone andI don't want to get into an altercation withhim. He had access to Harvey and everybodyelse just the way I had and he had regularaccess to the Attorney General.* * * * *Q.: If you were a member of this Committeewouldn't you assume that Mr. McCone was un-aware of the assassination attempts whilethey were underway?Helms: I don't know how to answer that,Senator Mondale. He was involved in this upto his scuppers just the way everybody else*Helms testified that he first told McCone about the plotusing underworld figures in August 1963. See discussion *supra*at p.
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-22-was that was in it, and I just don't know.I have no reason to impugn his integrity.On the other hand, I don't understand howit was he didn't hear about some of thesethings that he claims that he didn't.(Helms, 7/13/75, pp. 32-33)* * * * *I honestly didn't recall that Mr. McConewas not informed and when I was told thatthere was evidence that he wasn't informed,I was trying to scratch my head as to why Ididn't tell him at the time and my surmisesare the best I can come up with. I am reallysurprised I did not discuss it with him atthe time. My relations with him were good,and so my surmises are just the best I amable to do in 1975 over an episode that tookplace that many years ago. (Helms, 6/13/75,p. 90)Several other Agency officials who were aware of theassassination plots testified that they had not told McConeof the plots. William Harvey testified that he never spokewith McCone about the operation involving underworld figuresor assassination and that, to the best of his knowledge,McCone had not been told about the project. (Harvey, 6/25/75,p. 66)Sheffield Edwards, when asked whether he had informedMcCone about the plot, replied:Edwards: No, I did not inform Mr. McCone.Q.: Was there a reason for why you did notinform Mr. McCone?
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- 23 -Edwards: Well, I did not want to dragMr. McCone into this thing that in myopinion had petered out, and I did notwant to involve him. (Edwards, p. 18)James O'Connell, who was the case officer for the opera-tion under Edwards, testified that he recalled that Edwards hadtold him during a discussion about the plots in 1965 thatEdwards had not briefed McCone on the operation.As a matter of fact, I don't think he everknew about it. From later conversations withColonel Edwards, not recently, we talked aboutit, and he said that he was convinced thatMr. McCone never knew about it, it wasn't onhis watch, so to speak, and he didn't want toget him involved. (O'Connell, pp. 37, 39)George McManus, Helms' Special Assistant for Cuba duringthe relevant period, testified that he was not told about theassassination activities, and gave his opinion that if McConehad been asked to approve an assassination, he "would havereacted violently immediately".**McManus advanced two reasons for this opinion:1.  McCone had a great love for the President of    the United States and he sort of looked at him    as an older son or a brother, a very protective    sense he had about the President, President    Kennedy, and McCone would have immediately said    Jesus, this is a no win ball game.2.  Secondly, as an individual, he would have found    it morally reprehensible. (McManus, p. 33)(Continued)
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- 24 -Walter Elder, McCone's Executive Assistant, testified that he had not known of the underworld operation until August 1963, and that in his opinion McCone did not learn of the operation prior to that time.* (Elder, p. 15)(iii) Helms and Harvey Did Not Brief McCone About the Assassination PlotsMcCone assumed the position of DCI in November 1961. It was also in November 1961 that Bissell asked Harvey to assume operational control over the Castro plot involving underworld figures.** Richard Helms replaced Bissell in February of 1962 and was subsequently briefed by Harvey on(Continued)McManus also testified:I always assumed that Mr. Helms would keep the Director fully informed of any activity that he thought was sensitive. Under most circumstances, and indeed under all circumstances you can imagine, Helms would have told McCone, with the exception of a situation in which Helms had been told by higher authority not to tell him. (McManus, pp. 32-34)*In August 1963 Helms gave McCone a copy of Edwards' May 14, 1962, memorandum to the Attorney General. See discussion infra at p. ______.With respect to the Cuban assassination matters, where Colby's knowledge was only second-hand, Colby said: "Mr. McCone did not know of it." (Colby, 5/21/75, p. 101)**See earlier discussion supra.
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 - 25 -the existence of the assassination plots. Helms was Harvey'simmediate superior and the person to whom he reported aboutthe Castro plot activities.Harvey testified that in the spring of1962, when he was preparing to contact Roselli, he briefedHelms on the assassination plot. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 65)Harvey said:. . . I briefed Helms generally on the take-      over of Roselli, on the doubts about the      operation, on the possible . . . future of      it, and to the extent it had then been possible,      the assessment of Roselli and the cutting out      of various individuals.*Harvey testified that when he briefed Helms on the assassina-tion plot operation, they decided that it would not be appro-priate at that point to brief John McCone.There was a fairly detailed discussion be-tween myself and Helms as to whether or notthe Director should at that time be briefedconcerning this. For a variety of reasons*Harvey testified that when he took over the Roselli opera-tion, he had "cut out" both Maheu and Giancana because "regard-less of what I may have thought of their trustworthiness, . . .they were surplus" to the operation. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 65)
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which were tossed back and forth, we agreed that it was not necessary or advisable to brief him at that time.I then said, as I recall, to Mr. Helms, if you decide in the future that he should be briefed, I would like to know about it in advance to which, to my best recollection, he agreed. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 66)Harvey then offered the following explanation for why he and Helms had decided not to discuss the matter with McCone at that time:There were several reasons for this. One, this operation at that stage had not been assessed. It was obviously questionable on several grounds. It obviously involved knowledge by too many people. We were not even sure at that point it had any remote possibility or rather any real possibility for success. It had arisen with full authority insofar as either of us knew long before I knew anything about it, and before the then-Director became Director of the Agency.I saw no reason at that time to charge him with knowledge of this, at least until we reached the point where it appeared it might come to fruitation or had had a chance to assess the individuals involved and determine exactly the problem we faced, including the possible problem -- and it was a very, or it appeared to be, and in my opinion was, at that time, a very real possibility of this government being blackmailed either by Cubans for political purposes or by figures in organized crime for their own self-protection or aggrandizement, which, as it turned out, did not happen, but at that time was a very pregnant possibility. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 67-68)* * * * *
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- 27 -I am definitely not saying that there was any effort to hide or conceal any information from the Director. There was not. This was a discussion as to whether or not it was even necessary or appropriate at this point to take details of this particular operation in an unassessed form to the then-Director at that time. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 69)Harvey stated that he did not have any reason to believe that the assassination activities would have been "disapproved by the Director" had he been advised of the project (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 69) and stated that he had thought the plots "were completely authorized at every appropriate level within and beyond the Agency". (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 66) When asked why McCone had not been given an opportunity to consider the plot, Harvey replied:One of the things that I don't know from my own . . . knowledge . . . is who was briefed in exactly what terms at the time of the so-called Las Vegas flop that involved attempts to place a technical surveillance . . . in Dan Rowan's hotel room. (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 46)
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- 28 -Harvey was queried on whether the reasons he had given for not briefing McCone were actually "reasons why he should [have been] briefed forthwith". Harvey replied:Well, Senator Huddleston, it will be quite easy in looking at it now to say, well, I can see your argument.All I can say to you in answer is at that time I didn't feel that it was necessary or advisable. I did not make this decision except in consultation, and had I been disagreed with, that would have been it. And I am not off-loading this on Richard Helms or attempting to at all. It isn't all that easy for me to go back this many years and sort of recast all of the reasoning and be sure I am accurate. And I don't also want to evade it by saying, well, it seemed like a good idea at the time. But actually it did.In other words, this was not something that either Helms or myself felt that at that stage there was any point in attempting to brief the Director on it until, at least, we had a somewhat better handle on it.* * * * *And I might also add, if I may, . . . but as far as either one of us knew at that point he might have been or should have been briefed, if you want it that way, by either Allen Dulles or Richard Bissell. (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 67-71)The 1967 Report prepared by the Inspector General for Helms states that Harvey said: "When he briefed Helms on Roselli, he obtained Helms' approval not to brief the Director." (I.G., p. 41)
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- 29 -Helms testified that he did not recall this conversation,but that he had no reason to doubt the accuracy of Hårvey'stestimony and the Inspector General's Report. (Helms, 6/13/75,pp. 32, 106).Helms, when asked about Harvey's testimony that he andHarvey had agreed not to brief McCone, stated "I frankly don'trecall having agreed to this."My recollection is that I had very gravedoubts about the wisdom of this. And asI recall it, we had so few assets inside Cubaat that time that I was willing to try almostanything. But the thing did not loom large inmy mind at that time. I was enormously busywith a lot of other things, taking over a newjob [as DDP]. Mr. McCone was realtively new inthe Agency and I guess I must have thought tomyself, well this is going to look peculiar tohim and I doubt very much this is going to goanyplace, but if it does, then that is timeenough to bring him into the picture. (Helms,6/13/75, p. 33)Helms also stated:It was a Mafia connection and Mr. McCone wasrelatively new to the organization and this was,you know, not a very savory effort. (Helms,6/13/75, p. 92)Helms later testified that he did not "recall ever having beenconvinced that any attempt was really made on Castro's life."I am having a very difficult time justifyingbefore this Committee, because there is some-thing in here that doesn't come together, evenfor me, I am sorry to say. Because if this wasall that clear, as everybody seems to think it
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- 30 -was, that there were those pills in that restaurant in Cuba and Castro was about to die, I certainly would have talked to McCone about it. And this never was that clear, I am sorry to say, but it never was, not at that time. (Helms, 7/17/75, p. 34)On May 7, 1962, Edwards and the CIA's General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, briefed Attorney General Robert Kennedy on the operation involving underworld figures, describing it as terminated.*Harvey told the Inspector General that:. . . on 14 May he briefed Helms on the meeting with the Attorney General, as told to him by Edwards. Harvey, too, advised against briefing Mr. McCone and General Carter and states that Helms concurred in this. (I.G., p. 65)Harvey testified that what he had probably told Helms was that:Any briefing of the Director on the discussion with the Attorney General concerning this should come from Colonel Edwards and Larry Houston, the General Counsel, and not from the DDP unless we are asked. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 99)Helms testified that he did not recall this conversation and remarked:It seems odd to me only because, if the Attorney General had been briefed on something it would seem very logical that it would be very important to brief the Director at that time on the same thing. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 107).*The briefing is exhaustively described *supra* at p. ____.According to the Inspector General's Report, Harvey and Roselli had a farewell dinner before Harvey went on an assignment to Rome in June 1963. The meeting was observed by the FBI, and Sam Papich, the FBI liaison with the CIA, notified HarveyNW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 94
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-31-Harvey supplied poison pills and weapons to Roselli and his Cuban associates during a trip to Miami in April, 1962.*At a Special Group meeting on April 26, General Taylor requested that Harvey "attend the next meeting and report on agent activities" (Memo, McCone, 4/26/62). On April 26, Harvey was sent a memorandum informing him of General Taylor's request and McCone's wish to meet with Harvey and Lansdale "immediately on your return to discuss the Task Force Activities." (Memorandum, Elder to Harvey, 4/27/62).Harvey testified that upon his return, he reported to the Special Group on the "status of the active and potential sources inside Cuba..."Q.: "Did you report on the passage of the pills to Roselli?Harvey: No, I did not.Q.: Which you had just accomplished in Miami. . .for the purpose of assassinating Fidel Castro.Harvey: No.Q.: And did you report that to Mr. McCone when he asked you to tell him what you had done in Miami?Harvey: No, I did not." (Harvey, 7/11, pp. 16-17.)that Hoover would be informed. Harvey asked Papich to call him if he felt that Hoover would inform the Director about the incident."Harvey said that he then told Mr. Helms of the incident and that Helms agreed that there was no need to brief McCone unless a call from Hoover was expected. (I.G., p. 54.)* Harvey described the trip to Miami as "one of a number of periodic trips for the purpose of reviewing in toto. . .the actual and potential operations at the Miami base. . .and this covered the whole gamut from personnel administration, operational support in the way of small craft (and) so on. . ." (Harvey, 7/11, pp. 15-16).
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-32-Harvey stated that he did not tell McCone or the Special Group about the operation at that time because:"I did not consider either, A, that this should be in any sense in this amorphous stage, surfaced to the Special Group, nor, as I have attempted to explain before that it should be briefed to John McCone at that point in the state that it was in with as little as we knew about it, and with all of the attendant. background which at that point, and I was not personally cognizant of all of this, had been going on for approximately, as I recall, two to two-and-a-half years." (Harvey, 7/11, p. 18.)Harvey attended an August 10, 1962 meeting of the Special Group Augmented.* He testified that a person [Robert McNamara] at that meeting suggested that the Special Group "consider the elimination or assassination of Fidel" (Harvey, 7/11, p. 30).Harvey then testified that on the day following this Special Group meeting (Harvey, 6/25, p. 71):"in connection with a morning briefing of John McCone, the question again came up and I expressed some opinion as to the inappropriateness of this having been raised in this form and at that forum (Special Group meeting), at which point Mr. McCone stated in substance that he agreed and also that he had felt so strongly that he had, I believe, the preceding afternoon or evening, personally called the gentleman who made the proposal or suggestion and had stated similar views as to the inappropriateness and that he [McCone] said in addition . . . if I got myself involved in something like this, I might end up getting myself ex-communicated."Harvey stated that he did not tell McCone on that occasion about the actual assassination operation involving Roselli. He said (Harvey, 6/25, p. 73):*This meeting and the raising of the suggestion of assassination is discussed in depth in part ________, infra.
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-33-"I would like to recast the time that this took place. This was August of '62. This was at the start of the so-called Missile Crisis.""A tentative decision had been made at that point that the only sensible thing to do with [the Roselli operation] was to terminate it as rapidly and cleanly as it could be done . . . I am sure that I had discussed with Roselli, at least on a tentative basis, by August, the probable necessity of terminating this . . . "According to the Inspector General's Report, the "medicine" was reported to be still in Cuba at this time. (I.G., pp. 51-52)Harvey testified that the Report was referring to the pills (Harvey, 6/25, p. 105).*In relation to the August 10 meeting, Helms was asked whether he believed McCone would have stopped an assassination attempt if he had known that one was underway. Helms stated:Mr. Helms: "The reason I say I don't know . . . is that elsewhere Mr. McCone states that he went to see Mr. McNamara in connection with this August 1962 affair and told Mr. McNamara that he wouldn't have anything to do with this, that I have no recollection that I don't believe he ever said anything to me about his not wanting to have anything to do with it."Q.: "And you were close to Mr. McCone in that period? You are his Deputy for Plans?Mr. Helms: "I saw him almost daily."Q.: "And is it your belief that if he had made any such statement to Mr. McNamara that he would have come to you and told you about it at some point?"Mr. Helms: "I just don't know why he didn't but I don't recall any such statement. As I said, and I would like to repeat it, Mr. McCone had given me my job, he had promoted me, I felt close to him, I felt loyal to him, and I would not have violated an instruction he gave me if I could have possibly helped it."*Harvey said:"I may have deferred for a period of a few weeks giving an actual order to terminate this as soon as possible, . . . "(Harvey, 6/25, p. 74).NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 97
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-34-0.: "But in any event, it is your judgment that he did not indicate that he was opposed to assassinations?Mr. Helms: "Not to me."Walter Elder, who served as McCone's Executive Assistant, testified, however, that he had personally told Helms of McCone's opposition to assassination after the August 10 meeting.*(iv) The August 1963 Briefing of McConeAn August 16, 1963, Chicago Sun Times article claimed that the CIA had had a connection with Giancana.** McCone asked Helms for a report about the article. McCone testified that when Helms came to see him, he brought the following memorandum:"1. Attached is the only copy in the Agency of a memorandum on subject, the ribbon copy of which was sent to the Attorney General in May of 1962. I was vaguely aware of the existence of such a memorandum since I was informed that it had been written as a result of a briefing given by Colonel Edwards and Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General in May of last year."2. I spoke with Colonel Edwards on the telephone last evening, and, in the absence of Mr. Bannerman on leave, I was with Colo- nel Edwards' assistance able to locate this copy. As far as I*Elder told the Committee:"I told Mr. Helms that Mr. McCone had expressed his feeling that assassination could not be condoned and would not be approved. Furthermore, I conveyed Mr. McCone's statement that it would be unthinkable to record in writing any consid- eration of assassination because it left the impression that the subject had received serious consideration by governmental policy makers, which it had not. Mr. Helms responded, 'I un- derstand'. The point is that I made Mr. Helms aware of the strength of Mr. McCone's opposition to assassination. I know that Mr. Helms could not have been under any misapprehension about Mr. McCone's feelings after this conversation." (Elder Affidavit.)**The 8/16/63 Chicago Sun Times article states that "Justice Department sources" believed that Giancana never did any spying for the CIA, but pretended to go along with the Agency "in the hopes that the Justice Department's drive to put him behind bars might be slowed - or at least affected - by his ruse of coopera- tion with another government agency."