Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 368]
-6-Harvey testified that the "executive action" capability was intended to include assassinations (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 35). His cryptic handwritten notes of the January 25/26 meetings, preserved at the CIA, contain phrases which suggest a discussion of assassination--and Harvey confirmed this interpretation: "last resort beyond last resort and a confession of weakness", "the magic button", and "never mention word assassination". (Harvey, Ex. 1, 6/25/75).The Inspector General's Report did not mention these notes, or their dates. However, in describing Richard Bissell's initial assignment of the "executive action" project to Harvey, it referred to another set of Harvey's notes, which were destroyed after the preparation of the Report. The excerpt from these notes quoted Bissell as saying to Harvey, "The White House had twice urged me to create such a capability" (I.G., P. 37). Harvey also testified that this "urging" was mentioned in his initial discussion of "executive action" with Bissell (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37). However, the testimony from Bissell and White House aides in the Kennedy and Eisenhower Administrations is in conflict with Harvey's testimony as to whether such "urging" had in fact been given to Bissell.* Harvey's notes also contained a phrase which suggests his concern that any U.S. assassination attempts might breed retaliation from other governments: "dangers of RIS (Russian Intelligence Service) counter-action and monitor if they are blamed." (Harvey, Ex. 1, 6/25/75; Bissell, Ex. 1, 7/17/75).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 369]
The following testimony regarding the relationship between "the White House" and the executive action capability was obtained by the Committee:Harvey: Harvey testified that his missing notes indicated that Bissell mentioned White House urgings to develop an executive action capability (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37). Harvey said that he "particularly remember[ed]" that Bissell said that he received "more than one" urging from the White House (llarvey, 6/25/75, pp. 36-37; 7/11/75, p. 59). However, he had no direct evidence that Bissell actually had any such discussion with "the White House."No specific individual in the White House was named to Harvey (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 31). Moreover, he said that it would have been "improper" for him to have asked Bissell who he had talked to and "grossly improper" for Bissell to have volunteered that name (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37).Bissell: Bissell specifically recalled assigning Harvey to investigate the capability (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51). However, Bissell did not recall "a specific conversation with anybody in the White House as the origin" of his instruction to Harvey (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51).During the course of several appearances before the Committee, Bissell's testimony varied as to whether or not he had been urged by the White House to develop an executive action capability.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 370]
-8-In his initial appearances before the Committee on June 9 and 11, 1975, Bissell made statements that tended to indicate that White House authorization had been given. In response to the "twice urged" quotation of llarvey's notes in the Inspector General's Report, Bissell said, "I have no reason to believe that Harvey's quote is wrong." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51). Bissell accordingly said in his initial testimony that as far as he knew, it was true that he was asked by the White llouse to create a general stand-by assassination capability. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 49).Based again upon llarvey's missing notes ("White House urging") and his initial statement that he had no reason to challenge their accuracy, Bissell initially gave the opinion that McGeorge Bundy (Id., 6/9/75, p. 49), Special Assistant to President Kennedy for National Security Affairs, and Walt Rostow (Id., p. 51), Deputy Assistant to President Kennedy during 1961, were the two people from whom such a request was most likely to have come (Id., p. 53) because they were "the two members of the White House staff who were closest to CIA operations." (Id., p. 54).At another point in his initial testimony, Bissell said that the creation of the capability "may have been initiated within the Agency" (Id., p. 81). And still later he said: "there is little doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with Rostow and possibly Bundy" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 46).When Bissell returned to the Committee on July 17 and 22, his testimony, given in light of information gained since his earlier
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 371]
-9-appearances, was that there was no White House urging for the creationof the executive action project, although tacit approval for the"research" project was probably given by Bundy after it was established.First, he was shown the llarvey notes which had been preservedand which, without any mention of the White House, indicated llarveyhad received his assignment prior to January 25/26, 1961. Thosedates just 5 days after the change of administration madeBissell conclude that it was "very unlikely that that assignmentto [Harvey) was taken as a result of White llouse urging or consul-tation" (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10). Bissell said that Bundy didnot have any influence on the performance of his Agency duties beforethe Presidential inauguration (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 23). Bisselladded that he did not remember meeting with anyone in the new ad-ministration on matters prior to the inauguration (Bissell, 7/22/75,p. 23).Second, when he returned in July, Bissell also said he was con-vinced by telephone conversations with Rostow and Bundy that basedupon Rostow's duties which, in 1961, had nothing to do withcovert action he "never discussed" executive action with Rostow(Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10; 7/27/75, p. 22).As for Bundy, Bissell's final testimony (after telephone con-tact with Bundy) was that he believed that he had informed Bundyabout the capability after it had been created (Bissell, 7/17/75,pp. 10-11; 7/22/75, pp. 21-22). But Bissell confirmed his originaltestimony (6/9/75, pp. ____) that he did not brief Bundy on the
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 372]
-10-actual assassination plots against Castro already undertaken by the CIA (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47; 7/22/75, p. 31). Bissell was "quite certain" that he would not have expected Bundy to mention the executive action capability to the President. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35). Bissell testified:Q. Would you think the development of a capability to kill foreign leaders was a matter of sufficient importance to bring to the attention of the President?Bissell: In that context and at that time and given the limited scope of activities within that project, I would not." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35).Bissell said that he and Bundy spoke about an untargeted "capability" rather than the plan or approval for an assassination operation (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 11). Bissell said that although he does not have a specific recollection, he "might have" mentioned Castro, Lumumba, and Trujillo in the course of a discussion of executive action "because these were the sorts of individuals at that moment in history against whom such a capability might possibly have been employed." (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 50-51).Bissell said his impression was that Bundy, in addition to expressing no unfavorable reaction to the project, might have actually given a more affirmative reaction (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 25, 28).Bissell testified that he might have interpreted Bundy's reaction as approval for the executive action concept (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 30).Q: ... I think the testimony of this witness is going further in saying what you received from (Bundy) was, in your view, tantamount to approval?Bissell: I, at least, interpreted it as you can call it approval, or you could say no objection. He (Bundy)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 373]
-11-was briefed on something that was being done, as I now believe, on the initiative of the Agency. His (Bundy's) comment is that he made no objection to it. I suspect: that his reaction was somewhat more favorable than that, but this is a matter that probably someone listening to the conversation on which such a person could have had differing interpretations. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 33).Bissell's testimony on any conversation with Bundy regarding executive action was speculative reconstruction from first appearance to last because he had no "clear recollection" of the events (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 29, 36). But Bissell maintained that more "formal and specific and explicit approval would have been required" before any "actual overt steps in use of the capability." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 31)Bissell said that Harvey's notation about White llouse urgings to develop an executive action capability may have been a slightly confused account of a conversation subsequent to the initiation of the project in which Bissell relayed Bundy's reaction to Harvey (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 25).Bissell testified that the development of an executive action capability was "undoubtedly" initiated within the Agency (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 22). He had acknowledged on his first day of testimony that this would not have been unusual:it was the normal practice in the Agency and an important part of its mission to create various kinds of capability long before there was any reason to be certain whether those would be used or where or how or for what purpose. The whole ongoing job of a secret intelligence service of recruiting agents is of that character.... So it would not be particularly surprising to me. if theNW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 374
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 374]
-12-decision to create ... this capability had been taken without an outside request. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 67-68).*Bundy: McGeorge Bundy also testified that he had a conversation with Bissell, during which the executive action capability was discussed (Bundy, pp. 4-5). Bundy's testimony comports with Bissell's on the fact that they spoke about an untargeted capability, rather than an assassination operation (Bundy, pp. 4-5). But Bundy said that the capability included "killing the individual" (Bundy, p. 5). Bundy's impression was that the CIA was "testing my reaction," not "seeking authority" (Bundy, p. 15). Bundy summarized his testimony by saying:I am sure I gave no instruction. But it is only fair to add that I do not recall that I offered any impediment either. (Bundy, p. 10)Bundy said that he did not take steps to halt the development of the executive action capability or "pursue the matter at all" (Bundy, p. 19) because he was satisfied that this was not an operational activity, and would not become such without two conditions: first, that there be a desire or a request or a guidance that there should be planning against some specific individual; and second, that there should be a decision to move against the individual. (Bundy, p. 7).* For example, Bissell testified that on his own initiative, he had requested a CIA officer to go to the Congo to "make plans and develop the capability" for an assassination attempt against Lumumba, if ordered (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 55).** Bundy also testified that he had a vague recollection of hearing about poison in relation to Cuba, but he did not connect this to the conversation about executive action. (See footnote, p. 6, Kennedy Pre-Bay of Pigs section, supra.)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 375]
-13-Bundy testified that he believed that neither of these conditions had been fulfilled. (Bundy, p. 7).Bundy recalled the conversation as taking place "sometime in the early months of 1961." (Bundy, p. 4). When questioned about the dates in Harvey's notes, Bundy rated the chance that the conversation about executive action took place before January 25 -- when Harvey was already discussing the project at the CIA pursuant to Bissell's directive -- as "near zero" because the new Administration had been in office less than a week and he had been preoccupied with other problems, including the Berlin crisis and reorganizing the National Security staff (Bundy, p. 9).Bundy testified that he did not brief the President on the executive action project:Chairman: And you have testified that you did not take the matter to the President?Bundy: As far as I can recall, Mr. Chairman. (Bundy, p. 16)Bundy explained that the division of responsibility for national security affairs excluded Rostow from jurisdiction over covert operations, making it unlikely that Rostow would be briefed on a project like ZRRIFLE (Bundy, p. 11; Rostow, p. 11).Rostow: Rostow testified that he was "morally certain" that during his entire tenure in government, he never heard a reference to executive action or "such a capability or such an intention to act by the U.S." (Rostow, pp. 10, 13).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 376]
-14-Goodpaster and Gray: The responsibility for national security affairs during the latter part of the Eisenhower Administration was borne by Andrew Goodpaster and Gordon Gray. However, there was no evidence which raised the name of either man in connection with the development of an executive action capability. Both Goodpaster and Gray testified to having no knowledge of it. (Goodpaster, p. 11; Gray, p. 56.)(c) Authorization or Knowledge of Executive Action Project by DCIRichard Bissell said he was "quite certain" that Allen Dulles had full knowledge of the executive action project for two reasons: first, it "would have come to the DCI's attention" at the time of the transfer of William Harvey between components of the Agency to work on Cuban operations;[^1] and second, Bissell "would imagine" it was mentioned to Dulles at the initiation of the project (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35). Bissell and Harvey briefed Richard Helms on Project ZRRIFLE when he became DDP (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 53; Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 63). But Bissell did not recall briefing John McCone about the project when McCone took over as DCI (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 11). McCone testified that he had no knowledge of such a project (McCone, p. 43).William Harvey said it was assumed that the project was within the parameters permitted by the DCI. But Harvey testified that officially advising the DCI of the existence of the project[^1]: Harvey's transfer to Cuban operations was not completed until late in 1961.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 377]
-15-was "a bridge we did not cross" and would not have crossed until"there was either specific targeting or a specific operation or aspecific recruitment." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 59).(d) The Question of Whether Project ZRRIFLE was Connected to Any Actual Assassination PlotsThe Committee has sought to determine whether the CIA de-velopment of an executive action capability was related in any way to the actual assassination efforts. One question raised by this inquiry is whether the participants in the assassination operations might have perceived the executive action capability as in some way lending legitimacy to the actual assassination efforts.(i) Conversation Between Bissell and BundyIn his early testimony, Bissell said he did not have a recollection of whether he discussed the names of Castro, Lumumba, and Trujillo with anyone in the White House in the course of discussing the project to develop an executive action capability (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51). However, Bissell testified that it was "perfectly plausible that I would have used examples" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51). lle continued:in such a discussion of a capability, I might well have used the three names that I just gave, because these were the sorts of individuals at that moment in history against whom such a capability might possibly have been employed."(Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51).Bissell and Bundy both testified, however, that their discussion of the development of the capability for assassination did not involve any mention of actual assassination plans orNW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 378
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 378]
-16-attempts (see detailed treatment at Section (b), supra). Thereis no testimony to the contrary. The account of this conversa-tion raises a question as to whether Bissell acted properly inwithholding from Bundy the fact that assassination effortsagainst Castro had already been mounted and were moving forward.Bundy was responsible to a new President for national securityaffairs and Bissell was his principal source of information aboutcovert operations at the CIA.## (ii) Bissell's Instruction to Take Over Responsibility for Underworld Contact: November 1961Both Bissell and Harvey recall a meeting in November1961 in which Harvey was instructed to take over the contact withJohn Roselli (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19, 47; Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 86;and 6/11/75, p. 19)--which had been used for the initial poison pillplot as part of Project ZR/RIFLE. Harvey's notes placed the meetingon November 15, 1961 (I.G., p. 39), during the period in which Harveywas freed from his duties on another Agency staff to take overdirection of Task Force W, the locus of CIA activity against theCastro regime.According to Bissell and Harvey, the November meetinginvolved only the planning and research of a capability rather thana targeted operation against Castro (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 13;Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 60). But Bissell acknowledged that the purposeof the Roselli contact had been to assassinate Castro, and that "itis a fair inference that there would have been no reason to maintain
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 379]
-17-it [the contact] unless there was some possibility of reactivatingthat operation" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 19). Bissell stated thatbecause the assassination plot against Castro involving the syndicatehad been stood down after the Bay of Pigs . . . and therewas no authorization to pursue it actively . . . the re-sponsibility that was given to him [Harvey] was that oftaking over an inactive contact." (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 14)Bissell said that he had, in effect, asked Harvey to stand watch overthe contact in case any action should be required and further testi-fied that it was never required.The Inspector General's Report stated: "AfterHarvey took over the Castro operation, he ran it as one aspectof ZRRIFLE." (I.G., p. 40). Harvey recalled that during a dis-cussion with Bissell of the creation of an executive action capability,Bissell advised him of "a then going operation" involving the namesof Maheu and possibly Roselli and Giancana, "which was a part of theAgency's effort to develop . . . a capability for executive action."(Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 55, 61). Harvey said that at the time ofthis discussion, the operation had been "in train" for "approxi-mately two years or perhaps 18 months." (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54).Although his "net impression" was that both the"exploratory project" and the"specific operation" were "fullyauthorized and approved", Harvey said he could not testify that"specific White House authority for this given operation was impliedor stated". (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54.) Bissell does not recalltelling anyone in the White House that something had been done to
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 380]
-18-bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell,6/11/75, pp. 19-20). Harvey did not recall any mention of theWhite House or any higher authority than the DDP in his Novembermeeting with Bissell (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 60-61).Although Richard Helms was briefed and givenadministrative responsibility (as DDP) for Project ZR/RIFLE threemonths later, he did not recall that ZR/RIFLE was ever contemplatedas a capability to assassinate Castro (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 55).Asked whether the actual assassination efforts against Castro wererelated to ZR/RIFLE (executive action), Helms testified: "In mymind those lines never crossed" (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 52). However,Bissell's testimony leaves more ambiguity: "the contact with thesyndicate which had Castro as its target . . . folded into theZR/RIFLE project . . . and they became one" (Bissell, 6/11/75,p. 47). When asked by Senator Baker whether the executive action"capability . . for assassination" was "used against Castro",Bissell replied that it was "in the later phase". (Bissell, 6/11/75,p. 47). The instruction from Bissell to Harvey on November 15,1961, however, preceded the reactivation of the CIA-syndicate assas-ination operation against Castro by approximately five months.(iii) Use of Agent QJ/WIN in AfricaQJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal back-ground who had been recruited by the CIA for certain sensitiveprograms involving surreptitious entries which pre-dated Project
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 381]
-19-ZR/RIFLE. Harvey testified that QJ/WIN's function after the adventof Project ZR/RIFLE in 1961 was restricted to the "spotting" of.potential assets for "multi-purpose" covert use.However, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey wasassigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agentQJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by Arnold Silver, hissupervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey, as theChief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on which Silver worked,had ordered QJ/WIN's mission to the Congo (CIA Dispatch AUDW-147,11/2/60) and arranged the financial accounting for the missionafterward (Memorandum to Finance Division from William K. Harvey,1/11/61). [QJ/WIN's activities in the Congo are treated in detailin the discussion of the Lumumba case; see Section ______, *supra*.]There are two factors which may raise a question asto whether QJ/WIN was being used in an *ad hoc* capacity to developan assassination capability before ZR/RIFLE was formally initiated.First, there is a similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey,QJ/WIN, Silver, and Gottlieb were connected with the Lumumba matterand reappear in connection with the subsequent development ofZR/RIFLE. Second, Bissell informed Harvey that the development ofan assassination capability had already been discussed with Silverand Gottlieb before Harvey's assignment to ZR/RIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75,p. 52; I.G. Report, pp. 37-38).Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any firmevidence of a connection between QJ/WIN and the plot to assassinateLumumba.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 382]
FINAL DRAFT# TOP SECRETTRUJILLOR948Agreed to by drafting subcommittee on August 28, 1975*## SummaryRafael Trujillo was assassinated by a group of Dominican dissidents on May 30, 1961.Trujillo was a brutal dictator, and both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations encouraged the overthrow of his regime by Dominican dissidents. Toward that end the highest policy levels of both Administrations approved or condoned supplying arms to the dissidents. Although there is no evidence that the United States instigated any assassination activity, certain evidence tends to link United States officials to the assassination plans.Material support, consisting of three pistols and three carbines, was supplied to various dissidents. While United States' officials knew that the dissidents intended to overthrow Trujillo, probably by assassination, there is no direct evidence that the weapons which were passed were used in the assassination. The evidence is inconclusive as to how high in the two Administrations information about the dissidents' assassination plots had been passed prior to the spring of 1961.Beginning in March of 1961, the dissidents began asking United States officials for machine guns. By the time four M-3 machine guns were shipped to the CIA Station Chief in the Dominican capitol in April, it was well known that the dissidents wanted them for use in connection with the assassination. Thereafter, however, permission to deliver the machine guns to the dissidents was denied, and the guns were never passed. Two days before the assassination, President Kennedy personally authorized a cable to the U.S. Consul General[^1] The second paragraph under V.A.3.c. and the paragraph under VII.C. were drafted pursuant to the directions of the Subcommittee but have not been reviewed by the Subcommittee.NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 383
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 383]
-2-in the Dominican Republic stating that the United States government, as a matter of general principle, could not condone political assassinations, but at the same time indicating the United States continued to support the dissidents and stood ready to recognize them in the event they were successful in their endeavor to overthrow Trujillo.