Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 496]
"I have approved all the messages you are receiving from others today, and I emphasize that everything in these messages has my full support. We will do all that we can to help you conclude this operations successfully . . . Until the very moment of the go signal for the operation by the Generals, I must reserve a contingent right to change course and reverse previous instructions. While fully aware of your assessment of the consequences of such a reversal, I know from experience that failure is more destructive than an appearance of indecision. I would, of course, accept full responsibility for any such change as I must also bear the full responsibility for this operation and its consequences." (Cable, 8/29/63).In a reply cable, Lodge stated:"1. I fully understand that you have the right and responsibility to change course at any time. Of course I will always respect that right.2. To be successful, this operation must be essentially a Vietnamese affair with a momentum of its own. Should this happen you may not be able to control it, i.e., the "go signal" may be given by the generals." (Cable, Lodge to President, 8/30/63)A cable from Saigon dated August 31, 1963, stated:"This particular coup is finished . . . Generals did not feel ready and did not have sufficient balance of forces . . . There is little doubt that GNV (South Vietnamese Government) aware US role and may have considerable detail . . ." (SAIG 0499, 8/31/63)Deptel 243 and the VOA broadcast set the tone for later relations between the United States representatives and the generals. Big Minh, who had initial doubts about the strength of American support, grew in confidence.### C. The November 1963 CoupAmerican dissatisfaction with the Diem regime became increasingly apparent. On September 8, AID Director David Bell,in a television interview, stated that Congress might cut aid to South Vietnam if the Diem government did not change its course
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 497]
-7-(Pentagon Papers, p. 214). Lodge suggested a study to deter-mine the most effective methods of cutting aid to topple theregime (Pentagon Papers, p. 214). On September 12, with WhiteHouse approval, Senator Church introduced a resolution in theSenate condemning the South Vietnamese Government for itsrepressive handling of the Buddhist problem and calling for anend to United States aid unless the oppressive measures werecurtailed (Pentagon Papers, pp. 214-215).In mid-September 1963, two proposals for dealing with Diemwere considered by the Administration. The first contemplatedincreasingly severe pressure to bring Diem in line with Americanpolicy; the second involved acquiescing in Diem's actions,recognizing that Diem and Nhu were inseparable, and attemptingto salvage as much as possible. It was decided to adopt thefirst proposal, and to send Secretary of Defense McNamara andGeneral Taylor on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam. (PentagonPapers, p. 215.)On October 2, McNamara and Taylor returned to Washingtonand presented their findings to the National Security Council.Their report confirmed that the military effort was progressingfavorably, but warned of the dangers inherent in the politicalturmoil and recommended bringing pressure against Diem. Thispressure would include announcing the withdrawal of 1,000American troops by the end of the year, ending support for theforces responsible for the pagoda raids, and continuing Lodge'spolicy of remaining aloof from the regime. The report recommended
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 498]
-8-against a coup, but suggested that alternative leadership should be identified and cultivated. The recommendations were promptly approved by the President. (Pentagon Papers, pp.215-716)On October 3 Conein contacted Minh. Minh explained that a coup was being planned, and requested assurances of American support if it were successful. Minh outlined three courses of action, one of which was the assassination of Dien's brothers, Nhu and Can (Conein, p.25; cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).The Acting Chief of the CIA Station, David R. Smith, cabled on October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that "we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a protracted struggle" (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).A cable from the Director, CIA to Saigon responded that:"(w)e certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every such threat of which we might receive even partial knowledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of Diem. We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this matter opens door too easily for probes of our position re others, re support of regime, et cetera. Consequently believe best approach is hands off. However, we naturally interested in intelligence on any such plan."* The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon by various military units and direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyalist units.** Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted this cable for McCone. Colby testified:"Q: So you were on notice as of that date that the Director personally opposed any involvement by the CIA in an assassination?"Colby: I certainly was." (Colby, p. 57)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 499]
-9-McCone testified that he met privately with the President and the Attorney General, taking the position that "our role was to assemble all information on intelligence as to what was going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but to not attempt to direct it" (McCone, p. 62). He believed the United States should maintain a "hands off attitude" (McCone, p. 62). McCone testified:"I felt that the President agreed with my position, despite the fact that he had great reservations concerning Diem and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My precise words to the President, and I remember them very clearly, was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that, if Diem was removed we would have not one coup but we would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam and it might last several years and indeed it did." (McCone, pp. 62-63.)McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with the President, but rather "whether we should let the coup go or use our influences not to". He left the meeting believing that the President agreed with his "hands off" recommendation (McCone, pp. 62-63). McCone cabled Smith on October 6:"McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under McCone instructions, as we cannot be in position actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefore" (CIA to Saigon, DIR 73661, 10/6/63).In response, the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters:"Action taken as directed. In addition, since DCM Trueheart was also present when original recommendation was made, specific withdrawal of recommendation at McCone's Instruction was also conveyed to Trueheart. Ambassador Lodge commented that he shares McCone's opinion." (Saigon to CIA, SAIG 1463, 10/7/63)
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-10-Conein, the CIA official who dealt directly with the Generals,*testified that he was first told of McCone's response to theassassination alternative by Ambassador Lodge around October 20(Conein, p. 35). Conein testified (but did not so indicate inhis detailed After-Action Report) that he then told General Donthat the United States opposed assassination, and that theGeneral responded, "alright, you don't like it, we won't talkabout it anymore" (Conein, p. 36).The United States increased pressure on Diem to mend hisways. On October 17, General Richard Stillwell (MACV J-3)informed Secretary Thuan that the United States was suspendingaid to the special forces units responsible for the pagodaraids until they were transferred to the field and placed underJoint General Staff (JGS) command (Pentagon Papers, p. 217).On October 27, Lodge traveled to Dalat with Diem, but didnot receive any commitment from Diem to comply with Americanrequests (Pentagon Papers, p. 219).On October 28, Conein met with General Don, who hadreceived assurance from Lodge that Conein spoke for the UnitedStates. Don said that he would make the plans for the coup* Conein described his role as follows:"My job was to convey the orders from my Ambassador andthe instructions from my Ambassador to the people whowere planning the coup, to monitor those individuals whowere planning the coup, to get as much information sothat our government would not be caught with their pantsdown" (Conein, pp. 38-39).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 501]
-11-available to the Ambassador four hours before it took place, and suggested that Lodge not change his plans to go to the United States on October 31. (I.G., C, p. 37; Pentagon Papers, p. 219.)On October 30, Lodge reported to Washington that he was powerless to stop the coup, and that the matter was entirely in Vietnamese hands. General-Harkins disagreed and cabled his opposition to the coup to General Taylor (Pentagon Papers, p. 220). A cable from Bundy to Lodge dated October 30 expressed White House concern and stated that "[w]e cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup" (Cable, Bundy to Lodge, 10/30/63). A subsequent cable on that same day from Washington instructed Lodge to intercede with the Generals to call off the coup if he did not believe it would succeed. The instructions prescribed "strict noninvolvement and somewhat less strict neutrality". (Pentagon Papers, p. 220.)Late in the morning of November 1, the first units involved in the coup began to deploy around Saigon. The Embassy was given only four minutes' warning before the coup began (MACV cable to Joint Chiefs of Staff 8512, 11/1/63). An aide to Don told Conein to bring all available money to the Joint General Staff headquarters. Conein brought 3 million piasters (Approximately $42,000) to the headquarters, which was given to Don to procure food for his troops and to pay death benefits
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-12-to those killed in the coup (Conein, 6/20, p. 72).*Conein was at the Joint General Staff Headquarters during most of the coup (I.G., C, pp. 41-42). At 1:40 p.m., the Generals proposed that Diem resign immediately, and guaranteed him and Nhu safe departure (Conein After-Action Report, p. 15). The palace was surrounded shortly afterwards, and at 4:30 p.m. the Generals announced the coup on the radio and demanded the resignation of Diem and Nhu. Diem called Lodge and inquired about the United States' position. Lodge responded that the United States did not yet have a view, and expressed concern for Diem's safety (Pentagon Papers, p. 221).According to Conein's report, Minh told Nhu that if he and Diem did not resign within five minutes, the palace would be bombed. Minh then phoned Diem. Diem refused to talk with him and Minh ordered the bombing of the palace. Troops moved in on the palace, but Diem still refused to capitulate. Minh offered Diem a second chance to surrender half an hour later, telling him that if he refused he would be "blasted off of the earth". Shortly before nightfall an air assault was launched on the Presidential Guard barracks. (Conein After-Action Report, pp. 17-18.)At 6:20 on the morning of November 2, Diem called General* CIA had apparently considered passing money to the coup leaders in early October (Colby, 6/20, p. 21). On October 29, Lodge calbed that a request for funds should be anticipated (Lodge to State, No. 2040, 10/29/63; and 2063, 10/30/63). Conein received the money on October 24, and kept it in a safe in his house.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 503]
Don at the Joint General Staff headquarters and offered to surrender if he and Nhu were given safe conduct to an airport. Shortly afterwards, Diem offered to surrender unconditionally and ordered the Presidential Guard to cease firing. According to Conein, an escort for Diem appeared in front of the palace at 8:00 a.m., but Diem and Nhu were not present (Conein After-Action Report, p. 24).At 10:30 a.m. the bodies of Diem and Nhu were reported to be at the Joint General Chiefs' headquarters. Conein declined to view the bodies because he feared that doing so might damage United States interests (Conein, p. 57).The details of Diem's and Nhu's deaths are not known.** Conein specualted that Diem and Nhu escaped through a tunnel from the palace and fled to a Catholic Church in Chalon. He opined that an informant must have identified them and called the General Staff Headquarters (Conein After-Action Report, p. 23). Another CIA source states that Diem and Nhu had left the palace the previous evening with a Chinese businessman and arrived at the church at 8:00 on the morning of November 2. Ten minutes later they were picked up by soldiers and forced into an army vehicle (Cable, Saigon to State, No. 888). Minh originally told Conein that Diem and Nhu had committed suicide, but Conein doubted that Catholics would have taken their own lives in a church (Conein, p. 56). The Inspector General's Report states that on November 16, 1963, a field-grade officer of unknown reliability gave the CIA two photographs of the bodies of Diem and Nhu in which it appeared their hands were tied behind their backs (I.G., C, pp. 43-44). The source reported that Diem and Nhu had been shot and stabbed while being conveyed to the Joint General Staff headquarters.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 504]
-14-None of the informed sources give any indication of direct or indirect involvement of the United States.** It must be noted that on October 30, 1963, Ambassador Lodge notified Washington that there might be a request by ked leaders for evacuation, and suggested Saipan an as a point for evacuation (Saigon Station Cable No. 2036, 10/30/63). Conein was charged with obraining the airplane. Between 6:00 and 7:00 on the morning of November 2, Minh and Don asked Conein to procure an aircraft. Conein relayed the request to David Smith, Acting Chief of Station at the Embassy, who replied that it would not be possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours, since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to a country that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in any other country. There were no aircraft immediately available that had sufficient range to reach a potential country of asylum (Conein, p. 54).
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# TABLE OF CONTENTSPageIV. Findings and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21. Officials of the United States Government Initiated Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22. No Foreign Leaders Were Killed As A Result of Assassination Plots Initiated by Officials of the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33. American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy to Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Death of Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34. The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived to be of Crisis Proportions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3A5. American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions About Their Ability to Control the Actions of Coup Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46. CIA Officials Made Use of Known Under- world Figures in Assassination Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51. The United States Should Not Engage in Assassination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5a. Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations Instigated by the United States and Support for Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow Local Governments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6b. The Setting In Which the Assas- sination Plots Occurred Explains, But Does Not Justify Them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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# TOP SECRETPage 112. The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld Figures for Their Criminal Talents 10C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to the Issues of Authorization and Control 131. The Command and Control System for Assassinations Was Such That the Plots Could Have Been Undertaken Without Express Authorization 142. Findings Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Were Authorized 15a. Diem 15b. Schneider 16c. Trujillo 16d. Lumumba 17e. Castro 183. CIA Officials Involved in the Assassination Operations Perceived Assassination To Have Been A Permissible Course of Action 204. The Failure In Communication Between Agency Officials In Charge Of The Assassination Operations And Their Superiors In The Agency And In The Administration Was Due To: 26(a) The Failure of Subordinates To Disclose The Operations to Their Superiors; and 26(b) The Failure of Superiors To Give Precise Orders Regarding The Nature of Permissible Operations and to Make Clear That Assassination Was Precluded in the Climate of Violence Engendered by the Aggressive Covert Actions Sanctioned by the Administrations 26NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 507
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(a) Agency Officials Failed OnSeveral Occasions to RevealThe Plots To Their SuperiorsOr To Do So With SufficientDetail and Clarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Castro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Trujillo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34Schneider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36(b) On Occasion, Administration OfficialsGave Vague Instructions to Sub-ordinates and Failed to Make SufficientlyClear That Assassination Should BeExcluded From Consideration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Schneider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Lumumba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Castro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396. Practices Current at the Time in Which   the Assassination Plots Occurred Were   Revealed by the Record to Create the   Risk of Confusion, Rashness, and   Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where   Clarity and Sober Judgment Was Most   Necessary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46(a) The Danger Inherent in Overextendingthe Doctrine of Plausible Denial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47(b) The Dangers of Using "Circumlocution"and "Euphemism" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48(c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions. . . . . . . . . . . . . 49(d) The Danger of "Floating Authorization". . . . . . . . . . . . . 50(e) The Problems Connected With CreatingNew Covert Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
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IV. Findings and ConclusionsIn evaluating the evidence and arriving at findings and conclusions, the Committee has been guided by the following standards. We believe these standards to be appropriate to the constitutional duty of a Congressional committee.1. The Committee is not a court. Its primary role is not to determine individual guilt or innocence, but rather to draw upon the experiences of the past to better propose guidance for the future.2. It is necessary to be cautious in reaching conclusions because of the amount of time that has passed since the events reviewed in this report, the inability of three Presidents and many other key figures to speak for themselves, the conflicting and ambiguous nature of much of the evidence, and the problems in assessing the weight to be given to particular documents and testimony.3. The Committee has tried to be fair to the persons involved in the events under examination while at the same time responding to a need to understand the facts in sufficient detail to lay a basis for informed recommendations.With these standards in mind, the Committee has arrived at the following findings and conclusions.
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# TOP SECRET- 2 -A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves1. Officials of the United States Government Initiated Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice LumumbaThe Committee finds that officials of the United States Government initiated and participated in plots to assassinate Patrice Lumumba and Fidel Castro.The plot to kill Lumumba was conceived in the latter half of 1960 by officials of the United States Government, and quickly advanced to the point of sending poisons to the Congo to be used for the assassination.The effort to assassinate Castro began in 1960 and continued until 1965. The plans to assassinate Castro using poison cigars, exploding seashells, and a contaminated diving suit did not advance beyond the laboratory phase. The plot involving underworld figures reached the stage of producing poison pills, establishing the contacts necessary to send them into Cuba, procuring potential assassins within Cuba, and, according to one witness, delivering the pills to the island itself. In the 1960 plot involving a Cuban pilot and in the AM/LASH episode from 1963-1965, the CIA gave active support and encouragement to Cubans whose intent to assassinate Castro was known, and provided the means for carrying out the assassination.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 510]
-3-2. No Foreign Leaders Were Killed As a Result of Assassination Plots Initiated by Officials of the United StatesThe poisons intended for use against Patrice Lumumba were never administered to him, and there is no evidence that the United States was in any way involved in Lumumba's death at the hands of his Congolese enemies. The effort to assassinate Castro failed.3. American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy to Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Death of Trujillo, Diem, and SchneiderAmerican officials clearly desired the overthrow of Trujillo, offered both encouragement and guns to local dissidents attempting his overthrow, and supplied them with pistols and rifles.American officials offered encouragement to the Vietnamese generals who plotted Diem's overthrow, and a CIA official in Vietnam gave the generals money after the coup had begun. However, Diem's assassination was neither desired nor suggested by officials of the United States.The record reveals that the United States officials offered encouragement to the Chilean dissidents who plotted the kidnapping of General Rene Schneider, but did not desire or encourage his death. Certain high officials did know that the dissidents planned to kidnap General Schneider.