Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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## 14him to the jail. Balletti called Maheu in Miami, tying "Maheu into thisthing up to his ear" (O'Connell, pp. 71-72; File R-505, FBI memorandum).Balletti's bail was paid by Roselli (Roselli, p. 52).(i) Evidence Concerning CIA involvement in the Tap. TheCommittee received conflicting evidence on whether the agency was consultedprior to the installation of the tap. * O'Connell testified that hehad called Edwards and cleared the placement of an electronic "bug" inRowan's apartment prior to the installation of the tap (O'Connell,pp. 67-71). Maheu recalled that he had initially asked O'Connell ifthe CIA would handle the job, and that O'Connell had told him that"he would call Mr. Edwards and see if they would have thecapability of accomplishing this, . . and that subsequentlyhe informed me that Mr. Edwards had said that they would notdo it, but approved paying for it if we hired an independentprivate detective to put it on." (Maheu, 7/29, p. 37).On the other hand, Edwards, in a May 14, 1962 memorandum for theAttorney General (discussed at length, *infra*, p. ), stated that"At the time of the incident neither the Agency northe undersigned knew of the proposed technical installation."**Regardless of whether the CIA initially authorized the tap, it is apparentthat the CIA paid for the tap. DuBois told FBI agents that Maheu hadpaid him a retainer of $1,000 (File R-505, p. 14). O'Connell confirmedthat CIA "indirectly" paid for the tap because "we paid Maheu a certainamount of money, and he just paid it out of what we were giving him.""Q: But it was understood, or you understood, that out of the moneythe CIA made available to Maheu, Dubois would be paid for the tap?A: Yes.***Q: And Colonel Edwards. . . knew somebody was being employedin order to accomplish a tap?A: That is right." (O'Connell, p. 69.)** A memorandum by J. Edgar Hoover states that the Attorney General said he hadbeen told by Edwards that the "CIA admitted that they had assisted Maheuin making the installation" (Memo, Hoover, 4/10/62).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 38]
The Inspector General's Report accepted Edwards' assertion that "theAgency was first unwitting and then a reluctant accessory after the fact",but offered no further evidence to support that contention (I.G., p. 67).The Committee also received conflicting evidence concerningwhether the tap had been placed to keep Giancana in Miami or to checkon security leaks. O'Connell testified that during the early stages ofnegotiations with the gambling syndicate, Maheu informed O'Connell that agirl friend of Giancana was having an affair with Rowan. Giancana wantedMaheu to bug Rowan's room; otherwise, Giancana threatened to fly to LasVegas himself. Maheu was concerned that Giancana's departure woulddisrupt the negotiations, and secured O'Connell's permission to arrangefor a bug to ensure Giancana's continued presence and cooperation.(O'Connell, pp. 68-67.) Maheu substantially confirmed this account(Maheu, pp. 25-30).There is some evidence suggesting that the CIA itself may haveinstituted the tap to determine whether Giancana was leaking informationabout his involvement in an assassination attempt against Castro.Bissell was informed that Giancana had been talking about Giancana'sinvolvement in an assassination plot* (without indicating the CIA was* When Roselli talked with Giancana after the wiretap had been discovered,  Giancana "laughed. . . I remember his expression, smoking a cigar, he  almost swallowed it laughing about it" (Roselli, p. 52). Roselli  claims that he was "perturbed" because "It was blowing everything,  blowing every kind of cover that I had tried to arrange to keep quiet"  (Roselli, p. 52).Roselli said that he told Giancana that the CIA was involved in theoperation "in order to have him keep his mouth shut" (Roselli, p. 27).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 39]
16involved) by an October 18, 1960 memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, whichstated that "a source whose reliability has not been tested" reported:"(D)uring recent conversations with several friends,Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was to be doneaway with very shortly. When doubt was expressedregarding this statement, Giancana reportedly assuredthose present that Castro's assassination wouldoccur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicatedthat he had already met with the assassin-to-be onthree occasions. Giancana claimed that everything hasbeen perfected for the killing of Castro, andthat the 'assassin' had arranged with a girl, not furtherdescribed, to drop a 'pill' in some drink orfood of Castro's." (File R-505, memo from Hooverto DCI (Att: DDP), 10/19/60.)Roselli testified that Maheu had given him two explanations for the tapon different occasions: first, that Giancana was concerned about apossible affair between Rowan and his girl friend; and, second, that hehad arranged the tap to determine whether Giancana had told his girlfriend about the assassination plot, and whether she was spreading thestory (Roselli, pp. 47-48). Maheu gave the second explanation to theFBI when he was questioned about his involvement in the tap (FileR-505, FBI Summary), and Edwards wrote in the memorandum to theAttorney General:"Maheu stated that Sam Giancana thought that (Giancana'sgirl friend) might know of the proposed operation andmight pass on the information to one Dan Rowan, a friendof (Giancana's girl friend)". (Memorandum, Edwards toKennedy, 5/14/62.)(ii) Consequences of the tap. Edwards told Maheu that if hewas "approached by the FBI, he could refer them to me to be briefedthat he was engaged in an intelligence operation directed at Cuba"(Memo, Edwards to Kennedy, 5/14/62). FBI records indicate that on April 18,NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 40
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# TOP SECRET171961, Maheu informed the FBI that the tap involved the CIA, and suggested that Sheffield Edwards be contacted (File R-505, Memo, 4/20/61). Edwards subsequently informed the Bureau that the CIA would object to Maheu's prosecution because it might reveal sensitive information relating to the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion* (R-505, Summary of FBI file). In a memo dated April 24, 1962, Herbett J. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, advised the Attorney General that the "national interest" would preclude any prosecutions based upon the tap. Following a briefing of the Attorney General by the CIA, a decision was made not to prosecute.*** Details of the discussions between the CIA and FBI are described fully *infra* at pp.** Maheu subsequently drew on his involvement with the CIA to avoid testifying before Senator Edward Long's Committee investigating invasions of privacy in 1966. According to the Inspector General's Report, when Maheu learned that the Committee intended to call him, "he applied pressure on the Agency in a variety of ways--suggesting that publicity might expose his past sensitive work for the CIA" (I.G., p. 74). Lawrence Houston, General Counsel for the CIA, met with Maheu and his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, and informed Senator Long that Maheu had been involved in CIA operations (Houston, pp. 58-60). As a result, the Long Committee did not call Maheu to testify.
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(4) Poison Pills Are Prepared and DeliveredThe Inspector General's Report described conversations among Bissell, Edwards, and Cornelius Roosevelt, Chief of the Technical Services Division (TSD), concerning the most effective method of poisoning Castro (I.G., pp. 23-24). There is some evidence that Giancana or Roselli originated the idea of depositing a poison pill in Castro's drink to give the "asset" a chance to escape (I.G., p. 25). O'Connell recalled Roselli's request for something "nice and clean, without getting into any kind of out and out ambushing", preferably a poison that would disappear without a trace (O'Connell, p. 116).The Inspector General's Report cited O'Connell as stating that the Agency had first considered a "gangland-style killing" in which Castro would be gunned down. Giancana reportedly opposed the idea because it would be difficult to recruit someone for such a dangerous operation, and suggested instead the use of poison. (I.G., p. 25)Edwards rejected the first batch of pills prepared by TSD because they would not dissolve in water. A second batch, containing botulinum toxin, "did the job expected of them" when tested on monkeys. (I.G., pp. 25-26; O'Connell, p. 43) O'Connell received the pills from TSD, probably in February 1961, with reassurances that they were lethal, * and* Records of the TSD still extant in 1967 indicate that the pills were tested on February 10 and delivered to O'Connell sometime thereafter.
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TOP SECRETthen gave them to Roselli (O'Connell, p. 43).In late February or March 1961, Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered in Cuba to an official close to Castro who may have received kickbacks from the gambling interests (I.G., p. 23). The official kept the pills for a few weeks, then returned them. Roselli and O'Connell ascribed his failure to a case of "cold feet" (Roselli, p. 24; O'Connell, p. 44). The Inspector General noted that he had lost his position in the Prime Minister's office, and thus access to Castro, before he received the pills (I.G., p. 28).(5) A Second Delivery Is AttemptedFollowing this first failure, Roselli told O'Connell that Trafficante believed Tony Varona, a leading figure in the Cuban exile movement, might be able to accomplish the assassination (I.G., p. 29).* Dr. Manuel Antonio de Varona y Lorado headed the Democratic Revolutionary Front, a Cuban exile group supported by the CIA. The Inspector General's Report suggests that Varona may have been receiving funds from Trafficante and other racketeers interested in securing "gambling, prostitution, and dope monopolies" in* O'Connell testified that he met Varona only once, and that after the meeting Varona told Roselli:"Look, I don't know [sic] like the CIA and you can't tell me that this guy isn't a CIA man". O'Connell recalled, "I don't know whether I showed it or what, but he suspected that I wasn't what I was represented to be." (O'Connell, p. 22.)
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TOP SECRETCuba after the overthrow of Castro (I.G., p. 29). The Report speculated that Varona was interested in the assassination scheme as a means of financing the purchase of arms and communications equipment (I.G., p. 31).Varona claimed to have a contact inside a restaurant frequented by Castro (Roselli, p. 21). As a prerequisite to the deal, he demanded cash and $1,000 worth of communications equipment (I.G., pp. 31-32; 0O'Connell, p. 23). O'Connell recalls that Colonel J. C. King, head of the Western Hemisphere Division, gave him $50,000 in Bissell's office to pay Varona if he successfully assassinated Castro (O'Connell, pp. 17-21). O'Connell stated that Bissell also authorized him to give Varona the electronics equipment that he requested (O'Connell, pp. 20-24).Bissell testified that he did not doubt that some cash was given to O'Connell, and that he was aware that the poison pills had been prepared. He did not recall the meeting, and considered it unlikely that O'Connell would have been given the money in his office (Bissell, 6/11, p. 40). The Inspector General's Report, relying on an Office of Security memorandum to the DDCI dated June 24, 1966, as well as on an interview with the person who signed the voucher for the funds, placed the amount at $10,000 (I.G., pp. 31-32). If the Inspector General's conclusions were correct, the funds which Bissell allegedly authorized were probably the advance payment
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 44]
to Varona, and not the $150,000 that was to be paid to Varonaafter Castro's death.The record does clearly reflect, however,that communications equipment was delivered to Varona* andthat he was paid advance money to cover his expenses, probablyin the amount of $10,000 (I.G., p. 32). The money and pillswere delivered at a meeting between Maheu, Roselli, Trafficante,and Varona at the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami. As Rosellirecalled, Maheu"opened his briefcase and dumped a whole lot of moneyon his lap . . . and also came up with the capsulesand he explained how they were going to be used. Asfar as I remember, they couldn't be used in boilingsoups and things like that, but they could be used inwater or otherwise, but they couldn't last forever . . .It had to be done as quickly as possible. (Roselli,p. 21). **Varona had no better success than Orta.According to the Inspector General's Report, Edwards believedthe scheme failed because Castro stopped visiting the restau-rant where the "asset" was employed. Maheu suggested an* O'Connell testified that a man from the communications  office delivered the communications equipment that Varona had  requested to Miami (O'Connell, p. 20). Maheu recalled deliver-  ing an automobile which he had been told contained communica-  tions equipment to an empty lot (Maheu, p. 52).** Maheu denied that this dramatic event ever occurred, anddid not recall being present at a meeting at which the pillswere passed (Maheu, pp. 40-41). Maheu did recall that O'Connellshowed him the pills in an envelope and told him that the pillswould be given to a Cuban (Maheu, p. 40).
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# TOP SECRET210. alternative reason. He recalled being informed that after the pills had been delivered to Cuba, "the go signal still had to be received before in fact they were administered" (Maheu, p. 42). He testified that he was informed by O'Connell some- time after the operation that the Cubans had an opportunity to administer the pills to Fidel Castro and either Che Guevarra or Raul Castro, but that the "go signal" never came (Maheu, pp. 43-44, 60-61). He did not know who was responsible for giving the signal (Maheu, p. 44-45). Varona subsequently returned the cash and the pills (O'Connell, pp. 19-20; CIA Justice file R-153, Memorandum, Osborn to DCI, 6/24/66).The date of the Varona operation is unclear. The Inspector General's Report places it in March- April 1961, prior to the Bay of Pigs (I.G., p. 29). Bissell testified that the effort against Castro was called off after the Bay of Pigs (Bissell, 6/11, p. 52) and Maheu testified that he had no involvement in the operation after the Bay of Pigs (Maheu, p. 50). O'Connell, however, was certain that it occurred during early 1962 (O'Connell, pp. 47-48).(c) Use of Underworld Figures: Phase II(1) Change in LeadershipThe Inspector General's Report divides the gambling syndicate operation into Phase I, termina-
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 46]
TOP SECRETting with the Bay of Pigs, and Phase II, beginning withWilliam Harvey's involvement in late 1961. The distinctionbetween a clearly demarcated Phase I and Phase II may be anartificial one, as there is considerable evidence that theoperation was continuous, perhaps lying dormant for the periodimmediately following the Bay of Pigs.*In early 1961, Harvey** was assigned theresponsibility for establishing a general capability withinthe CIA for disabling foreign leaders, including assassinationas a "last resort" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 73; Harvey, 6/25, pp. 34-35).* Harvey said that he took over a "going operation" from  Edwards (I.G., p. 42; Harvey, 6/25, p. 67) and emphasized  that:"I would like to make as clear as I can that there wasno phase 1, phase 2 in this. This is an ongoing matterwhich I injected into . . . (Harvey, 6/25, p. 90).Continuity was provided by retaining O'Connell as the caseofficer for the project well into May 1962. During interviewsfor the Inspector General's Report, O'Connell recalled thatthere was "something going on" between the Bay of Pigs andHarvey's assumption of control, (I.G., p. 43). When testifyingbefore the Committee, O'Connell firmly recalled several tripsto Miami in the Fall of 1961, and "right up to the time Iturned it over to Harvey I was in and out of Miami" (O'Connell,pp. 89-90).** Harvey had a long background in clandestine activities.He had conceived and carried out the Berlin tunnel operation(Harvey, 6/25, pp. 8-9), and served as Chief of the division,which was responsible for the surreptitious acquisition of codeinformation (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 8-9).
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# TOP SECRETThe capability was called Executive Action and was later included under the cryptonym ZR/RIFLE. It and the evidence relating to (i) its connection to the "White House" and (ii) whether or not it involved action as well as "capability" is discussed extensively infra at ________.Harvey's notes reflect that Bissell asked him to take over the gambling syndicate operation from Edwards and discussed the "application of ZR/RIFLE to Cuba" on November 16, 1961 (I.G., p. 39). Bissell confirmed that the conversation took place and accepted the November date as accurate (Bissell, 7/17, pp. 12-13). He also testified that the operation"was not reactivated, in other words, no instructions went out to Roselli or to others . . . to renew the attempt, until after I had left the Agency" (Bissell, 6/11, p. 53).Harvey agreed that his conversation with Bissell was limited to exploring the feasibility of using the gambling syndicate against Castro (Harvey, 7/11, p. 60).Richard Helms replaced Bissell as DDP in February 1962. As such, he was Harvey's superior.Harvey testified that he kept Helms informed of the gambling
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syndicate operation at all stages* (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 65-66;7/11, p. 42; I.G., p. 41).## (2) The Operation is ReactivatedIn early April 1962, Harvey, who testi-fied that he was acting on "explicit orders" from Helms (Harvey,7/11, p. 18), requested Edwards to put him in touch with Roselli(CIA Justice File R-153; Edwards memorandum, 5/14/62). O'Connellfirst introduced Harvey to Roselli in Miami, where Harvey toldRoselli to maintain his Cuban contacts, but not to deal with Maheuor Giancana (O'Connell, p. 50; Roselli, pp. 27-30), whom he haddecided were "untrustworthy" and "surplus" (Harvey, 6/25, p. 65).O'Connell recalled that Roselli did not initially trust Harvey,*When interviewed for the Inspector General's Report, Harveystated that he briefed Helms on his first meeting with Roselli,and "thereafter he regularly briefed Helms on the status of theCastro operation" (I.G., p. 41).Helms' recollection was less certain. Helms did recall thathe was briefed by Harvey when Harvey first contacted Roselli inApril 1962. He remembered that he "reluctantly" had approved the operation,but that he had no confidence that it would succeed (Helms, 7/17,p. 23).When asked if he authorized sending the poison pills to Florida,Helms testified:"I believe they were poison pills, and I don't recallnecessarily approving them, but since Harvey alleges tohave them and says that he took them to Miami, I musthave, I must have authorized them in some fashion."(Helms, 6/13, p. 44).Helms confirmed that Harvey was "reporting quite regularly whatwas going on. Whether he reported everything or not, I do not know."It was Helms' expectation that Harvey would have reported to him amatter such as the pills. (Helms, 6/13, p. 105). However, Helms alsotestified:"You saw the I.G. Report says that I was kept currentlyinformed. Maybe I was and maybe I wasn't, and todayI don't remember it, as I have said. But I do notrecall ever having been convinced that any attempt wasreally made on Castro's life"(Helms, 7/18, p. 32).
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although they subsequently developed a close friendship.(O'Connell, p. 52).Harvey, O'Connell and Roselli met fora second time in New York on April 8-9, 1962 (I.G., p. 43). Anotation made during this time in the files of the Technical Ser-vices Division indicates that four poison pills were given to O'Connellon April 18, 1962 (I.G., pp. 46-47). The pills were passed to Harvey,who arrived in Miami on April 21, and found Roselli already in touchwith Varona (I.G., p. 47). He gave the pills to Roselli, explainingthat "these would work anywhere and at any time with anything" (Roselli,p. 31). Roselli testified that he told Harvey that the Cubans intendedto use the pills to assassinate Che Guevara as well as Fidel and RaulCastro. According to Roselli's testimony, Harvey approved of thetargets, stating "everything is all right, what they want to do"(Roselli, p. 34).Varona requested arms and equipment asa *quid pro quo* for carrying out the assassination operation (O'Connell,pp. 53-54). Harvey, with the help of the CIA's Miami station(JMWAVE), procured explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns,radios, and boat radar costing about $5,000 (I.G., p. 49). Harveyand the chief of the JMWAVE station rented a U-Haul truck underan assumed name and delivered the equipment to a parking lot(Harvey, 6/25, p. 63). The keys were given to Roselli, who watchedthe delivery from across the street with O'Connell (O'Connell, pp. 92-93).
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The truckload of equipment was finally picked up by either Varona or Roselli's agent, Maceo (I.G., pp. 49-50; Roselli, p. 40). Harvey testified that the arms "could" have been for use in the assassination attempt, but that they were not given to Varona solely for that purpose (Harvey, 7/11, p. 9). Roselli kept Harvey informed of the operation's progress. Sometime in May 1962, he reported that the pills and guns had arrived in Cuba (Harvey, 6/25, p. 64; Roselli, pp. 34, 42-43). On June 21, he told Harvey that Varona had dis- patched a three-man team to Cuba. The Inspector General's Report described the team's mission as "vague" and conjectured that the team would kill Castro or recruit others to do the job, using the poison pills if the opportunity arose (I.G., p. 51). Harvey met Roselli in Miami on September 7 and 11, 1962. Varona was reported to be preparing to send in another three-man team to penetrate Castro's bodyguard. Harvey was told that the pills, referred to as "the medicine," were still "safe" in Cuba (Harvey, 6/25, p. 103; I.G., p. 51). Harvey testified that by this time he had grave doubts about whether the operation would ever take place, and told Roselli that "there's not much likelihood that this is going anyplace, or that it should be continued" (Harvey, 6/25, р. 104). Varona's second team never left for Cuba, claiming that "conditions" in Cuba were not right (I.G., p. 51-52). During early January 1963, Harvey paid Roselli $2,700 to defray Varona's expenses (I.G., p. 52).
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Harvey terminated the operation in mid-February 1963. At a meeting with Roselli in Los Angeles, it was agreed that Roselli would taper off his communications with Varona (I.G., pp. 52-53). Roselli testified that he simply broke off contact with the Cubans. However, he never informed them that the offer of $150,000 for Castro's assassination had been withdrawn* (Roselli, p. 45).The agency personnel who dealt with Roselli attributed his motivation to patriotism** and testified that he was not paid for his services. According to O'Connell, Roselli"paid his way, he paid his own hotel fees, he paid his own travel.... And he never took a nickel, he said, no, as long as it is for the government of the United States, this is the least I can do, because I owe it a lot." (O'Connell, p. 27).Edwards agreed that Roselli was "never paid a cent" (Edwards, p. 16), and Maheu testified that "Giancana was paid nothing at all, not even for expenses, and that Mr. Roselli was given a pittance that did not even begin to cover his expenses (Maheu, 7/29, p. 68). It is clear, however, that the CIA did pay Roselli's* "Q: As far as those Cubans knew, then the offer which they understood from you to come from Wall Street was still outstanding?"A: I don't know if they still think so ... I didn't see them after that to tell them that" (Roselli, p. 45)."** Roselli claims that he was motivated by "honor and dedication" (Roselli, p. 59).In 1943, Roselli had been convicted of extorting money from motion picture producers to insure studios against labor strikes, and during the period of his contacts with the CIA, Roselli was deeply involved in hotel and gambling operations in Las Vegas (File R-505, Summary of FBI Documents). It is possible that he believed cooperating with the government in the assassination operation might serve him well in the future.