Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 260]
-15-### (a) Dulles Cables Again for "Elimination" of Lumumba,and a Messenger is Sent to Congo With a HighlySensitive AssignmentOn September 19, 1960, several days after Lumumba placed himself in the protective custody of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Leopoldville, Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed a cryptic cable to Leopoldville to arrange a clandestine meeting between the Chief of Station and "Sidney Braun," who was traveling to the Congo on an unspecified assignment:["SID"] SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX 27 SEPT. . . WILLANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS "SID FROM PARIS". . . ITURGENT YOU SHOULD SEE ("SID") SOONEST POSSIBLEAFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFYHIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO YOU.(CIA Cable, OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chiefof Station, 9/19/60.)The cable bore a highly unusual sensitivity indicator --"PROP" -- that restricted circulation at CIA headquarters to theChief of the Africa Division. ** In a letter of September 23, 1975, the Chief of the CIA Review Staff informed the Committee that "PROP" was normally used "to denote sensitive personnel matters" (Seymour R. Bolton to Frederick A. 0. Schwarz and Frederick D. Baron, 9/23/75. It appears that this sensitivity indicator, while created for other purposes, was utilized by Bissell, Tweedy, and the Chief of Station to restrict distribution of their communications about an assassination operation. The cable traffic cited in this report that was sent through the PROP channel did not touch upon personnel matters except in terms of recruiting additional CIA officers and agents for the assassination operation.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 261]
-16-The Bissell/Tweedy cable 'informed the Chief of Station thathe was to continue to use this indicator forALL [CABLE] TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOUINSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF.(CIA Cable, 9/19/60.)The Chief of Station -- referred to herein as "Hedgman"* --testified to a clear, independent recollection of receiving sucha cable. Hedgman stated that in September of 1960 he received a"most unusual" cable from CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 11,43). The cable advised, in his words, that:someone who I would have recognized wouldarrive with instructions for me.... Ibelieve the message was also marked for myeyes only ... and contained instructionsthat I was not to discuss the message withanyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 12-13.)Hedgman said that the cable did not specify the kind of instruc-tions he was to receive, and it "did not refer to Lumumba in anyway" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 12).Three days after the Bissell/Tweedy message that Hedgman wasto meet "Sid" in Leopoldville, Bronson Tweedy uses the same sensi-tivity indicator on a cable sent to Hedgman on an "Eyes Only"basis (CIA Cable, OUT 74837, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 9/22/60).* Due to fear of reprisal from Lumumba's followers, the Chief  of Station for the Congo from mid-summer 1960 through 1961 testi-  fied under the alias "Hedgman" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 2; 8/25/75,  p. 4).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 262]
-18-On September 24, Allen Dulles personally issued a cable to Leopoldville expressing in absolute terms his desire to "eliminate" Lumumba:WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT INELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITYRESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HEFAILS IN LEOP[OLDVILLE], SETTING HIMSELFIN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable,OUT 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)Dulles had expressed a similar view three days before in the presence of the President at an NSC meeting, stating:Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60)(b) Gottlieb Delivers Lethal Substances to the Chief of Station in the Congo for the Assassination of LumumbaThe Chief of Station reported through the PROP channel to Bronson Tweedy that he had made contact with the man dispatched to Leopoldville with a highly sensitive assignment on September 26. (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 9/27/60) This was the same week in which Dulles cabled about the "elimination" of Lumumba and made his statement to the NSC about the "grave danger" that existed as long as Lumumba was not "disposed of".Hedgman testified about the identity of "SID" -- the messenger referred to in the first cable through the PROP channel:Q: Who was the messenger who arrived?Hedgman: Mr. Sidney Gottlieb
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 263]
-17-Tweedy's cable indicated that a third country national would be required as an agent in the PROP operation:IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR PROP OBJECTIVES, BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SUCH BE PROVIDED THROUGH THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH [AMERICAN] ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED. (CIA Cable, 9/22/60.)Tweedy expressed reservations about two agents that the station was using for other operations and said "WE ARE CONSIDERING A THIRD NATIONAL CUTOUT CONTACT CANDIDATE AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT FILL BILL"* (CIA Cable, 9/22/60). Despite Tweedy's concern about the two existing station contacts, he indicated that the Chief of station and his "colleague" -- presumably the man identified as "Sid" who was to arrive in the Congo shortly to explain the PROP operation to Hedgman -- were to be afforded considerable latitude in exercising their judgment on the conduct of the operation:YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ OVER YOUR SHOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS OPPORTUNITIES. OUR PRIMARY CONCERN MUST BE CONCEALMENT (AMERICAN) ROLE, UNLESS OUT-STANDING OPPORTUNITY EMERGES WHICH MAKES CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET. READY ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE BASED OUR HIGH REGARD BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENTS. (CIA Cable, 9/22/60.)* This is probably a reference to agent QJWIN, who was later dispatched to the Congo. His mission is discussed in Sections ____, and ____, infra.
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- 19 -Q: And at that time, you knew who he was?Hedgman: I recognized him as an officer of the Agency. I believe he referred to the fact that I had received a message and that he was the person concerned. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 15-16)The message carried by Gottlieb, then Science Advisor to DDP Richard Bissell, was unmistakeably clear according to Hedgman:Hedgman: It is my recollection that he advised me, or my instructions were, to eliminate Lumumba.Q: By eliminate, do you mean assassinate?Hedgman: Yes. I would say that was my understanding of the primary means. I don't think it was probably limited to that, if there was some other way of doing it.Q: Of doing what?Hedgman: Of removing him from a position of political threat. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 17-18.)Hedgman said that he and Gottlieb also may have discussed non-lethal means of removing Lumumba as a "political threat", but he said, "I cannot recall with certainty on that" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 28).He clearly recalled the discussion of assassination, however:Q: And what did Mr. Gottlieb indicate with regard to the possibility of physically eliminating him?Hedgman: It was my understanding that that was probably expected of me. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 18.)And again:Q: I take it that once you started discussing these lethal agents, there was no doubt in your mind that the kind of elimination he was there particularly to discuss was killing Lumumba?
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 265]
Hedgman: There was no doubt in my mind that this was one of the way[s], and probably what they thought was the only way that would work (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 25).Hedgman explained Gottlieb provided him with poisons as a means of assassination:Q: And what did he tell you with regard to how that might be accomplished?Hedgman: ... He brought some biological agents. I assume that that's the correct word. But in any case, poisonous agent with him, which he passed to me....Q: These were lethal biological substances?Hedgman: Yes. That was my understanding as a non-expert. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 18-19.)Hedgman testified that he received "rubber gloves, a mask, and a syringe" along with the poisons and that Gottlieb instructed him in their use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 20-21). Hedgman indicated that this paraphernalia was for administering the poisons to Lumumba:Q: [W]hen he (Gottlieb) came to the Congo to give you lethal biological agents for the assassination of Lumumba, was it clear at that time that the means for administering those biological agents was to inject them into a substance that was to be ingested by Lumumba, whether it be food, or drink, or toothpaste or any other substance that was to be ingested?Hedgman: That's my recollection, yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 82; accord. p. 24.)Hedgman said that the means of assassination was not restricted to use of the poisons provided by Gottlieb:This was not a *sine qua non* that I employ this. If there were another method, another way, it would have been acceptable. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)
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-21-For example, Hedgman testified that he may have "suggested" shooting Lumumba to Gottlieb as an alternative to poisoning (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29).There was a firm requirement, however, that the means of assassination should not be traceable to the United States:The biological substance, or specimens, what have you, I think it was up to my judgment, and if there was a better way -- certainly. [T]he point I now recall was in no way, if I implemented these instructions, no way could it be traced back to the United States. It had to be a way which could not be traced back ... either to an American or the United States government. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)Hedgman said Gottlieb assured him that the poisons were produced to meet this requirement:I believe I raised the point that poisons left traces in the human body, which could be found on autopsy ... I believe that I was assured that these ... lethal agents would [leave] normal traces found in people that die of certain diseases. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 23.)Hedgman said that he had an "emotional reaction of great surprise" when it first became clear that Gottlieb was there to discuss an assassination plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 30). But the Chief of Station said that he did not give any indication that he would not carry out the instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46). Instead, he told Gottlieb he "would explore this" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46) and left him with the following impression:I think it would be a fair impression that he would take away the thought that I was going to look into it and try and figure if there was a way ... I believe I
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-22-stressed the difficulty of trying to carryout such an operation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,p. 47.)The cable that Hedgman sent to headquarters reporting hisinitial contact with Gottlieb was clearly an affirmative responseto the assignment. The Chief of Station said that he and Gottliebwere "ON SAME WAVELENGTH." (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville toTweedy, 9/27/60.) Hedgman was "afraid" that Mobutu's governmentwas "weakening under" foreign pressure to effect a reconciliationwith Lumumba, and said:HENCE BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENTWITH SECURITY INDICATED. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)(c) Hedgman Testified That Gottlieb Told Him ThatPresident Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assassinationof LumumbaHedgman testified that in the course of their meeting inLeopoldville, Dr. Gottlieb informed him that President Eisenhowerhad authorized the assassination of Lumumba:Q: Did you raise with him the question of authori-zation of such instructions to you?Hedgman: Yes, I did. That's my quite strongrecollection, that I did.Q: What do you recall in essence was what yousaid to him?Hedgman: In essence, I think I must have ... pointedout that this was not a common or usual Agency tactic,and I may have probably said that I never heard ofit being done, which I had not, never in my trainingor previous work in the Agency had I ever heard anyreferences to such, in my recollection at least, suchmethods. And it is my recollection I asked on whoseauthority these instructions were issued.Q: And what did Mr. Gottlieb reply?
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-23-Hedgman: It is my recollection that he identified the President, and I cannot -- the President of the United States -- and I cannot recall whether he said "the President," or whether he identified him by name. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 30-31.)Hedgman continued to explain that he was told "something to the effect that the President had instructed the Director" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 32, 34). Hedgman was clear that the ultimate source of authority for the assassination mission was the President:Q: Your understanding then was that these instructions were instructions coming to you from the office of the President?Hedgman: That's correct.Q: Or that he had instructed the Agency, and they were passed on to you?Hedgman: That's right.Q: You are not the least unclear whether or not you became aware with a very clear impression that the President's name had been invoked in some fashion?Hedgman: Yes. I came -- certainly that is my recollection.Q: You have no doubt about that?Q: At the time.Hedgman: At the time, I certainly felt that I was under instructions from the President, yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 32-33.)
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-24-Hedgman cautioned that he was recalling events long past:Hedgman: Gentlemen, after fifteen years, I cannot be 100 per cent certain, but I have always, since that date, had the impression in my mind that these orders had come from the President. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 34.)But he left no doubt about the strength of his "impression":Q: You have a very firm recollection that he [Gottlieb] represented to you that the President of the United States directed the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, is that correct?Hedgman: That's my recollection. Yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 102; accord, p. 34.)(d) Headquarters Makes the Assassination Plot "Highest Priority" and Authorizes Steps in Furtherance of ItOn the basis of his talks with "Sid," Hedgman listed a number of "possibilities" for covert action against Lumumba. At the top of the list was the suggestion that a particular agent be used in the following manner:HAVE HIM TAKE REFUGE WITH BIG BROTHER.WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BRUSH UPDETAILS TO RAZOR EDGE. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)Hedgman indicated that he would begin to follow this course by re- calling the agent to Leopoldville. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.) He in- formed headquarters: "PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY" (CIA Cable, 9/27/60).On September 30, the Chief of Station urged that headquarters authorize "exploratory conversations" with this agent so
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 270]
-25-that he could proceed with the plan that was his top priority:NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETSNOW AVAILABLE. MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELLINGOP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED RISKS OF VARYINGDEGREES.... [IN] VIEW NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, IF ATALL, URGE HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY CONVER-SATIONS TO DETERMINE IF [AGENT] WILLING TAKEROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP.(WOULD APPROACH ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS AND NOTREVEAL PLANS.) IF HE APPEARS WILLING ACCEPTROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL OBJEC-TIVE OP TO HIM.... REQUEST HQS REPLY [IMMEDIATELY]. (CIACable, IN 20857, Leopoldville to Tweedy,9/30/60.)Hedgman's cables -- sent for Tweedy's "Eyes Only" in the PROPchannel -- indicated that the assassination operation had beenmounted. They show that a specific operational plan had been setin motion to the extent that Hedgman thought that it would haveto be clearly "cancelled" by headquarters before he would stopproceeding with the plan. Hedgman's description of the meansof maintaining the security of the operation could be taken asa reference to a lethal biological agent which would be slow totake effect or which would leave no traces:ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC DETAILS[AGENT'S] PART IN OP, BELIEVE RISK MINI-MIZED IF HE LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OPARE APPARENT. (CIA Cable, IN 20857,Leopoldville to Tweedy.)
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-26-The same day, through the PROP channel, Hedgman received authorization from headquarters to proceed with his top priority plan:YOU ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKSWITH SCHOTROFFE TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDETOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUTOUT ROLE.... APPRECIATE MANNER YOUR APPROACH TOPROBLEM. (CIA Cable, OUT 75900, Fields toLeopoldville, 9/30/60.)In this cable, Glenn Fields, Assistant Chief of the Africa Division, expressed a "HOPE ... FOR MODERATE HASTE" (CIA Cable OUT 75900, Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60.)According to the report of the Chief of Station, Gottlieb left the Congo to return to headquarters on October 5 in view of the "EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS" (CIA Cable IN 24171, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60). The "expiration" of Gottlieb's "materials" probably refers to the date beyond which the substances would no longer have lethal strength. Although the relation of the "expiration date" to Gottlieb's departure is unclear from the cables, it probably signifies that some of the biological substances had lost their toxicity. Nonetheless, the Chief of Station indicated that Gottlieb left some biological substances that were still lethal and that he intended to proceed with the assassination operation:[SID] LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING USE-FULNESS. [CHIEF OF STATION] PLANS CONTINUETRY IMPLEMENT OP. (CIA Cable IN 24171,Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)
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-27-By this point, Hedgman had conducted his "exploratory con-versation" with the agent who was his best candidate for gaining access to Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60). Hedgman testified that the subject he "explored" was the agent's ability to find a means to inject poison into Lumumba's food or toothpaste. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60):I believe that I queried the agent who had access to Lumumba, and his entourage, in detail about just what that access, what access he actually had, as opposed to speak-ing to people. In other words, did he have access to the bathroom, did he have access to the kitchen, things of that sort.I have a recollection of having queried him on that without specifying why I wanted to know this. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 48.)On October 7, the Chief of Station reported to headquarters on this meeting:CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH [AGENT] ... AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES [AGENT] SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY HQS. ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP BALL, BELIEVE HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHIN LIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE.Hedgman testified that his exploratory steps left him with doubts about the wisdom or practicality of the assassination plot:[C]ertainly I looked on it as a pretty wild scheme professionally. I did not think that it ... was practical professionally. Certainly ... to keep the U.S. out of it....I explored it, but I doubt that I ever really expected to carry it out. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 111.)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 273]
-28-However, his cables indicate that he was planning to continue to implement the operation and sought the resources to do it successfully. He urged headquarters to send him an alternate operative for the assassination mission in the event that they found his first choice unacceptable:IF HQS BELIEVE [AGENT'S CIRCUMSTANCES]BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECESSITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRDCOUNTRY NATIONAL. (CIA Cable IN 24171,Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)Tweedy cabled the Chief of Station the same day that he "HAD GOOD DISCUSSION YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT" -- presumably referring to a de-briefing of Gottlieb upon his return to the United States. (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 10/7/60.) Tweedy indicated that he wasCONSIDERING DISPATCHING THIRD COUNTRYNATIONAL OPERATOR WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES,SHOULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVERPERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAYACTIVE OR CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS.(CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief ofStation, 10/7/60.)This expression of support for the operation was followed by an extraordinary pair of cables from headquarters on October 15, 1960. One of these cables was issued by a desk officer in CIA's Africa Division and released under Bronson Tweedy's signature, as Division Chief, and sent to Leopoldville through standard CIA channels, which would allow for distribution of the message to
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-29-appropriate personnel in the CIA station and the United States embassy. This cable generally discussed the possibility of covertly supplying certain Congolese leaders with funds and military aid (CIA Cable OUT 81476, Director to Leopoldville, 10/15/60). This cable also delimited the kind of action against Lumumba that would be authorized:ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW STAND BEHINDIS TO SUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING[LUMUMBA], DESIRABLE AS MORE DEFINITIVEACTION MIGHT BE. ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULDHAVE TO BE ENTIRELY CONGOLESE. (CIA CableOUT 81476, Director to Leopoldville,10/15/60.)On the same day that this message was dispatched, a second cable was sent to Leopoldville. This cable was issued personally by Bronson Tweedy and sent in the special PROP channel for Hedgman's "EYES ONLY" (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60).YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMALCHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A PARA [GRAPH]ON PROP TYPE SUGGESTIONS. YOU WILL PROBABLY RE-CEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING BLOC[LUMUMBA] REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALLSTUDYING CONGO SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DIS-POSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CON-SIDERATION.RAISE ABOVE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANYAPPARENT DUPLICATION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FORSPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE ANDALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. (CIA Cable OUT81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60).Thus, Tweedy resolved the apparent duplication of cables by indicating that communications about the assassination mission wereNW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 275
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-30-restricted to the PROP channel and that the assassination mission was to move forward. He went on to request Hedgman's reaction to the prospect of sending a senior CIA case officer to the Congo on a "DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT . . . TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY THIS ASPECT" (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60). This referred to CIA officer Justin O'Donnell, who testified that in late October he was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassinating Lumumba.*In the course of suggesting the assignment of an additional officer to the Congo, the cable provided insight into the reason that the assassination mission had not progressed more rapidly under the Chief of Station:SEEMS TO US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVY GIVE NECESSARY CONCENTRATION PROP. (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60.)Again, in contradiction of the limitations on anti-Lumumba activity outlined in the cable sent through normal channels, Tweedy's cable also proposed a plan to kidnap Lumumba:POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR ABDUCTION (LUMUMBA), EITHER VIA ASSAULT ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE PROBABLY, IF (LUMUMBA) ATTEMPTS ANOTHER BREAKOUT INTO TOWN . . . REQUEST YOUR VIEWS. (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60.)* For a full account of the meeting between Bissell and O'Donnell and O'Donnell's subsequent activities in the Congo, see Section 5(a), infra.