Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 71]
TOP SECRETMr. Baron. And it was a more general reference --Mr. Dillon. It was a very general way of getting some- where. In one of those other papers something was said about getting rid of Lumumba. That was really moreorless the objective, not necessarily to have him leave the earth, but just to get him out of the Congo and away.Mr. Baron. Your clear impression that the suggestion contemplated assassination as one means of getting rid of Lumumba?Mr. Dillon. As a possibility.Mr. Baron. And let's fill in some of the context of the meeting. Do you recall where this meeting took place?Mr. Dillon. I think it took place in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.I may say that after you spoke on the telephone the other day I called Mr. Gates, who was Secretary of Defense at that time, and who was a friend of mine then, and has continued to be, and asked him if he had any recollection of this particular meeting. And he says he did not. But I do think it took place in his office. And I don't recall whether he was there or not. It could be that he wasn't even there. But I think it was in his own office that it took place.Mr. Baron. When we spoke before you said that you thought he probably was in attendance. Is that still your feeling?Mr. Dillon. Well, because it was in his office. I don'tTOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETremember him being there or saying anything. All I remember is the location, and the fact that the subject came up, and the fact that there were a number of people there -- I don't remember who they were -- and the fact that the CIA people, whoever: they were, were negative to any such action.Mr. Baron. About how many people were in attendance?Mr. Dillon. I would say five or six, because I saw them sitting around the desk, I would say five or six, or it could have been seven or eight, no more.Mr. Baron. Was this the meeting of any official body?Mr. Dillon. No, I don't think so. It was not a note-taking type of meeting. It was not sitting around the table with somebody as the Chairman.Senator Hart. It was ad hoc, in other words?Mr. Dillon. It was ad hoc.Senator Hart. Would you be able to characterize the nature of the CIA opposition? Was it vehement, violent, casual?Mr. Dillon. No. It was just more orless silent, and "there is nothing we can do." It wasn't moral.Senator Hart. There was no policy objection?Mr. Dillon. It wasn't stated in that way. It was just saying, no, it is not a possible thing.Mr. Baron. You mentioned on the phone to me that rather than amoral objection, as you have just said, it might have# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET19been an objection on the grounds that the CIA did not have thecapability to perform such an operation?Mr. Dillon. It could have been, it may have been justsomething that they couldn't do, and therefore there is nouse talking about it.Mr. Dawson. The subject matter of the meeting was probablysomething which the Secretary of Defense had a leading rolein designing a policy for, right?Mr. Dillon. I don't recall the details of what wasahppening at that time in the Congo. But I do have a basicrecollection that over this period of time it was a prettydifficult situation, with UN forces in there, and all sortsof troubles down in the southeastern part where the coppermines were, and trying to get people out so they wouldn't getkilled. There was always contingency planning, whether wewould have to use any of our forces for another evacuationor something else. So it was a very mixed up and sort of ahot situation at that time.So certainly various people in the Defense Departmen wouldbe interested. Mr. Gates, when I spoke to him, said that hepersonally had not given primary attention at any time to theCongo. He said it might have been Jim Douglas, who, as Imentioned to you there, was listed as attending one of thosemeetings. And I don't recall exactly what his title was atthat time, but he had been, I think, Secretary of the AirTOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETForce, and maybe still was at that time.Mr. Baron. Was it a regular occurance to convene such meetings at the Pentagon?Mr. Dillon. We had a very close relationship between the State Department and the Pentagon at that time. And it was not unusual, because of the fact that generally there would be a representative of the Joint Chiefs present, and they were both over there, and if for any reason it seemed reasonable, we would do that. Now, usually I think the man who was responsible would be this number three person in the State Department, he would go to the Pentagon for many of the meetings, the briefings and things like that which would be in the area of the Joint Chiefs, and so forth. He was there a great deal. I wasn't there in my capacity.Mr. Baron. Do you have any idea why you were in attendance at this particular meeting?Mr. Dillon. It might also have had something to do with the thing that I was talking with them about all the time, a totally different subject, which was military aid. That could well have been.Mr. Baron. Do you recall any of the other participants at the meeting?Mr. Dillon. Not by name.On the telephone you asked me about Bissell, whether he might have been there. And I answered, in all probability he might have, because I knew him, in fact I have known him for# TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETmany years, all my life. But when I was down here at that timeI knew he had a high position in the CIA, and was in chargeof all this sort of stuff, and he was at a number of meetingsthere, morteven at the White House. He was an advisor to Mr.Dulles. So I say that is very likely.Mr. Baron. By this sort of stuff would you mean covertactions?Mr. Dillon. Covert actions or anything that was importantenough in that general field to involve Mr. Dulles, The CIA,the President. He was a person there, one of the people thatwas talked to about it. There were three people. There werereally at that time Allen Dulles, General Cabell, and Bissell.Mr. Baron. Was it your general impression that this wasa high level meeting - a sufficiently high level meeting sothat Allen Dulles might have been in attendance?Mr. Dillon. He could have been.Mr. Baron. And are there any other people who would havebeen likely candidates to have been in attendance at themeeting?Mr. Dillon. I imagine there must have been some represen-tative of the military there. But I don't know who it wouldhave been. But there must have been someone else if theSecretary of Defense was there. Now, Erwin, since he didn'tallow these things, he might have been there. That is justsupposition.# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET22Mr. Baron. And I believe you had said to me before that despite your absence of a clear recolleciton as to which CIA people were there, it was clear to you that some top level CIA people were there?Mr. Dillon. Top enough, so that something like this could be raised and moreorless disposed of without even thinking of it any further.Senator Hart. Let me insert a question, if I might. This is a philosophical question.First of all, factually, in any of the dealings, formal or informal, that you ever had with President Eisenhower or President Kennedy, did the subject of assassination ever arise?Mr. Dillon. As far as I know, as I recall, in dealing directly with either of them, no.Senator Hart. I would invite your speculation at this point as a sub-Cabinet officer under President Eisenhower, and as a Cabinet Officer under President Kennedy, I think the Committee would be interested in your view as to the attitude of each of them toward this subject, that is to say, the elimination, violent elimination of foreign leaders?Mr. Dillon. Well, that is a difficult thing to speculate on in a totally different atmosphere. But I think probably both of them would have approached it in a very pragmatic way, most likely, simply weighed the process and consequenceTOP SECRET
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23TOP SECRETrather than in a way that was primarily of a moral principle.That is what would probably have been their attitude in a fewcases. Certainly the idea that this was going to be a policyof the US, generally both of them were very much opposed toit.Senator Hart. Off the record just a second.(Off the record discussion)Mr. Baron. To return to the setting at the meeting at thePentagon, I wonder if you could fill in the nature of thediscussion that was taking place on the Congo before thisprospect of assassination was raised at the meeting?Mr. Dillon. I don't recally recall it, except that itwas bemoaning the general presence of Lumumba and thedifficulty of working anything out with him, or the impossi-bility of working anything out with him, and the explorationof other possibilities.Mr. Baron. Did you date this meeting by any particularevent which took place?Mr. Dillon. Yes. I dated it only because it must havetaken place after, and presumably shortly after, Lumumba'svisit to Washington, because the impression that was left wasthat it was very bad, that this was an individual whom it wasimpossible to deal with. And the feelings of the Governmentas a result of this sharpened very considerably at that time.I don't think it would have possibly have occurred before heTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET                                                                             241 came. We hoped to see him and see what we could do to come to2 better understanding with him.3 Mr. Baron. Why did he strike you as being impossible to.4 deal with in any way?5 Mr. Dillon. Well, what I really recall was the impression6 he made rather than the individual things he said. When he was7 in the State Department meeting, either with me or with the8 Secretary in my presence, he spoke in a mannter that seemed9 almost messianic in quality. And he would never look you in10 the eye. He looked up at the sky. And a tremendous flow of11 words came out. He spoke in French, and he spoke it very12 fluently. And his words didn't ever have any relation to the13 particular things that we wanted to discuss. And it was just14 like ships passing in the night. You had a feeling that he15 was a person that was gripped by this fervor that I can only16 characterize as messianic. And he was just not a rational17 being.18 Mr. Baron. When we talked earlier I believe you19 charaterized his personal power almost as psychotic, is that20 right?21 Mr. Dillon. That is right.22 Mr. Baron. So that after he departed from the US you23 and others at a high level in the State Department were,24 extremely concerned about this man continuing in a position25 in the Congo?TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET25Mr. Dillon. That is right.Mr. Baron. Do you recall who raised the question or the prospect of assassination of Lumumba at this meeting?Mr. Dillon. I don't. It very likely could have come from somewhere, either from the State Department or possibly from the Defense Department in the international affairs areas, someone just throwing out this question. Now, I said the State Department. There was probably someone there besides myself. Because it wasn't usual to just be alone talking about this.Mr. Baron. Do you recall whether this was raised as a question or as a suggestion?Mr. Dillon. No, as a question.Mr. Baron. And who was the CIA representative that you mentioned in your affidavit that responded as indicated that this was not within the capability of the CIA?Mr. Dillon. That I don't recall. But I imagine it would have to have been either Allen Dulles, or possibly Cabell, but I think most likely Cabell.Mr. Baron. We have a record of the fact that Lumumba met with Secretary Herter in Washington on the 27th of June 1960. Does that accord with your memory as to the probable date of this conversation? It would be shortly after Lumumba's visit.Mr. Dillon. Shortly after his visit. And that must have been it. And the record that you had must have been the# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET26record of the meeting that I attended that I referred toearlier. The dates that were given in this affidavit weresupplied to me on the basis that it was shortly after hisvisit. So they looked up when his visit was, and that is whythey put this in. All I recall of the place and date is thatwhen I saw him off at the airport it was very hot. So it musthave been the summer, July or August.Mr. Baron. Let me fill you in on a few other events thatwere happening from mid to late July, and ask you if thisrefreshes your recollection as to the sense of urgency thatmight have existed at a meeting such as the one you attendedin reference to getting rid of Lumumba. It appears that onthe 12th of July the US had sent a carrier, the Wasp, to theCongo, although we had refrained from sending troops to theCongo. Then on the 20th of July Ambassador Lodge indicatedthat it was the US position that the UN would be urged to doeverything possible to keep Soviet troops out of the Congo.Then on the 22nd of July Lumumba signed a 50-yearcontract with CINCO, a large American resources company. Butthat contract was disavowed by the finance minister of theCongo the following day, on the 26th of July I am sorry, itwas disavowed on the 26th of July, which wasn't the followingday. And it was in that setting that Lumumba then came toWashington.While he was in Washington apparently Secretary Herterpledged aid to the Congo. And Mr. Detweiler, who was theTOP SECRET
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27TOP SECRET1 Head of the CIMCO Company that had this huge contract in the2 Congo, met with people at the State Department to discuss the3 situation as to whether the contract was going to be performed4 or not in the Congo.5 Do you recall any of that background? And does that6 refresh your recollection about the urgency of the situation7 at that time?8 Mr. Dillon. No. The only thing I recall is that there9 were -- which I think I mentioned maybe earlier in our informal10 conversations -- that there were talks at the time about the11 possibility of using US military force in one way or another12 -- I think the fact that the Wasp was ordered there fits right13 in with that sort of general recollection, that it was14 something that we were very worried about. And I don't15 remember this particular contract with this company. In fact,16 I don't think I have ever heard of CIMCO.17 Mr. Baron. Did you have an independent recollection of18 the ordering of the Wasp to the Congo -- or to the shores of19 Africa?20 Mr. Dillon. Not of that one particular thing. But I do21 remember that there was consideration of the use of military22 -- I think there was some talk about airlift capacities and23 things of that nature, too, at that time.24 Mr. Baron. Again to refresh your recollection, I believe25 CIMCO, C-I-M-C-O, stands for the Congo InternationalTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET281 Management Corporation, which was a US corporation. And they2 had signed a resources development contract in the Congo.3 Mr. Dillon. It must have been a company that was just4 formed for that purpose or soemthing, it sounds like.5 Mr. Baron. Do you recall a visit from Ambassador6 Timberlake, who was at that time the US Ambassador to the7 Congo, to Washington shortly before your meeting at the8 Pentagon?9 Mr. Dillon. No. But it think it would have been normal,10 with Lumumba, who was then Prime Minister, coming here, and11 our concern about the situation, for the Ambassador to come12 back prior to Lumumba's visit or simultaneous with it, to13 brief the Department on the latest developments there. That14 was sort of standard operating practice. When the head of a15 government comes usually the Ambassador comes with him to do16 that.17 Mr. Baron. Would it fit with your memory that the CIA18 Chief of Station and the US Ambassador had come back to19 Washington shortly before Lumumba's visit in preparation for20 his visit to report upon events in the Congo?21 Mr. Dillon. It is not my memory, because I don't22 remember that. But what I can say is that that would have23 been standard practice, and I would have been surprised if24 they hadn't.25 Mr. Baron. What kind of reports would you have beenTOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET29Phone (Area 202) 544-60001 getting at that time from the CIA Chief of Station and the US2 Ambassador?3 Mr. Dillon. Well, we would have been getting whatever4 reports the US Ambassador sent, the reports from the Chief of5 Station would go to the CIA, and we would not get those except6 in the edited form that the CIA would give them to us.7 Mr. Baron. Did you receive urgings from the US Ambassador8 from the CIA as a result of their briefings from the Chief of9 Station in the Congo to undertake political action in the10 Congo toward removing Lumumba from a position of power due to11 reports that Lumumba was heavily influenced by the Soviets?12 Mr. Dillon. I do know that he was supposedly influenced13 by the Soviets. But my impression of seeing him was that he14 certainly wasn't controlled by them or anyone else, he was15 so far gone himself that nobody could rely on him as an16 individual. I don't recall any paticular urgins from the17 Ambassador, although I think they would have been natural,18 because this was a very difficult situation, and he was there,19 and if he had been not warning against something, that would20 have been very unusual.21 Mr. Baron. Aside from the recent visit of Lumumba and22 the personal impression that he had made upon yourself and23 the Secretary of State, there were other reasons, were there24 not, to have a sense of urgency about removing him?25 Mr. Dillon. There were all sorts of difficulties that INW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 84# TOP SECRET
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30# TOP SECRETdon't recall. But there were those problems down around thecopper mines, and Katanga, there was a revolution down thereof sorts, And there were many difficulties in the Congo atthat time.Mr. Baron. Do you recall anything else about the languagethat was used in raising the question of assassination at themeeting?Mr. Dillon. No, I am sorry, I don't recall really anythingbut what is in the affidavit, but just the subject came upgenerally as a question, and it was turned off by the CIA.Mr. Baron. Would the manner in which the question ofassassinating Lumumba was raised at that meeting have servedas sufficient authorization for the CIA to proceed to developthe capability to assassinate Lumumba after that meeting?Mr. Dillon. Well, I don't think they really needed anyauthorization to develop the capabilities if they didn't usethem. And certainly it would not have been enough authoriza-tion by a long shot for them to start doing that. But I thinkthey could have decided they wanted to develop the capabilityin this area irrespective of this, just by knowing the concernthat everyone had about Lumumba in the area. That they couldhave done. They wouldn't have to tell anyone about that.That is just developing their own internal capability, andthen they would have to come and get permission.Mr. Baron. Would the same thing hold true for the# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET                                                 31Phone (Area 202) 544-60001 development of a generalized assassination capability at the2 CIA -- that such a capability could be developed without3 specific authorization from authority outside the CIA?4 Mr. Dillon. Yes, I would think so.5 Mr. Baron. But it is clear to you that the discussion at6 the meeting at the Pentagon that you attended would not in7 itself have served as an authorization for an actual assassi-8 nation effort against Lumumba?9 Mr. Dillon. Not at all.10 Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear the phrase "Executive Action"11 during your entire tenure in Government?12 Mr. Dillon. No. The first time I ever heard it, I was13 on the Rockefeller Commission.14 Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the CIA undertook a project15 which was run under the crytonum ZR RIFLE to develop the means16 for carrying off an assassination if required?17 Mr. Dillon. No, I didn't.18 Mr. Baron. And your first knowledge of any such project19 was during your service on the Rockefeller Commission?20 Mr. Dillon. That is right.21 Mr. Baron. Earlier today we discussed Robert Johnson,22 who was a member of the NSC Staff in the late fifties and23 serving until early 1962. Do you recall whether Robert24 Johnson participated in this meetingat the Pentagon?25 Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall. I wouldn't think so,TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETbecause I wouldn't think there was necessarily anyone from the National Security Staff. And as I said also earlier, I don't personally remember Mr. Johnson myself at all.Mr. Baron. As I represented to you earlier, Mr. Johnson, in testimony before the Committee, indicated that he was present at a NSC meeting in his capacity as a notetaker, at which the President made a remark that clearly indicated to Mr. Johnson that he had ordered the assassination of Lumumba. And Mr. Johnson said there was a silence -- Mr. Johnson himself was shocked, but no one at the meeting reacted explicityly, and the meeting simply proceeded. He places this meeting in the summer of 1960, and said that it happened at some point before the coup in which Mobutu took power on Septemb er 14th of 1960. Were you present at such a meeting?Mr. Dillon. If you mean was I present at a meeting where I recall the President ordering the assassination of Lumumba, I don't remember such a thing. But I think that I was probably present at most of the Security Council meetings at that time. It being in August I might have been away for a week possibly for a vacation, and I might have missed one. But otherwise I would have been there. It could have been in view of this feeling of everybody that Lumumba was very difficult if not impossible person to deal with, and was dangerous to the peace and safety of the world, that the President expressed himself, we will have to do whatever is necessary to get rid of him.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET                                                                              331  I don't know that I would have taken that as a clearcut order2  as Mr. Johnson apparently did. And I think perhaps others3  present may have interpreted it other ways. But I am pretty4  sure that if the President had said you go and get rid of him,5  shoot him or something -- I just can't conceive of him6  doing that. But I can conceive of him saying, let's take7  action and get this situation rectified, which is moreorless8  along the lines of the various memoranda you have shown me.9  Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear the President make such a10 remark about Lumumba, let's get rid of him, or let's take11 action right away on this?12 Mr. Dillon. I don't remember that. But certainly this13 was the general feeling of Government at that time, and it14 wouldn't have been if the President hadn't agreed with it.15 Mr. Baron. So although you have no recollection of being16 present at the meeting that Robert Johnson recounts, you17 would find his testimony at least plausible?18 Mr. Dillon. It is possible. But I would think anything19 like this was not a direct order to have an assassination,20 but let's take some action to get rid of Lumumba, get him21 out of office.22 Mr. Dawson. Would that be adequate, implicity authoriza-23 tion?24 Mr. Dillon. It would have been up to the CIA as to what25 they thought. And they could have well thought that. ThatTOP SECRET