Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# TOP SECRET-30-effort. He was present at the meeting with Dulles and President Kennedy at which the new President was briefed on covert action in Cuba, but neither Dulles nor Bissell mentioned the assassination operation that was underway.The failures to make forthright disclosures to policy-makers continued during the time that Richard Helms was DDP. Helms' failure to inform McCone about the underworld operation when it was reactivated under Harvey and poison pills were sent to Cuba was a grave error in judgment, and Helms' excuses are unpersuasive. In May of 1962, the Attorney General was told that the CIA's involvement in an assassination plot had terminated with the Bay of Pigs. Not only did Edwards, who had briefed the Attorney General, know that the operation had not been terminated, but Helms did not inform the Attorney General that the operation was still active when he learned that the Attorney General had been misled. Helms did not inform McCone of the plot until August 1962, and did so then in a manner which indicated that the plot had been terminated before McCone became Director. Helms' denial that AM/LASH had been involved in an assassination attempt in response to Secretary of State Rusk's inquiries was, as Helms testified, "not truthful".When Helms briefed President Johnson on the Castro plots, he apparently described the activities that had occurred during prior administrations but did not describe the AM/LASH opera-NW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 180
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TOP SECRET-31-tion which had continued until 1965. Helms also failed toinform the Warren Commission of the plots because the precisequestion was not asked.Helms told the Committee that he had never raised theassassination operation with McCone or Kennedy Administrationofficials because he had assumed that the project had beenpreviously authorized, and that the aggressive character ofthe Kennedy Administration's program against the Castro regimemade assassination permissible even in the absence of anexpress instruction. He added that he had never been convincedthat the operation would succeed, and that he would have toldMcCone about it if he had ever believed that it would "goanyplace".Helms' reasons for not having told his superiors aboutthe assassination effort are unacceptable; indeed, many of themwere reasons why he should have sought express authority..As Helms himself testified, assassination was of a high orderof sensitivity. Administration policymakers, supported byintelligence estimates furnished by the Agency, had emphasizedon several occasions that successors to Castro might be worsethan Castro himself. In addition, the Special Group Augmentedrequired that plans for covert actions against Cuba be sub-mitted in detail for its approval. Although the Administrationwas exerting intense pressure on the CIA to do something aboutCastro and the Castro regime, it was a serious error to haveNW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 181
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TOP SECRET-32-undertaken so drastic an operation without obtaining full and equivocal permission.William Harvey, the officer in charge of the CIA's attempt using underworld figures to assassinate Castro, testified that he never discussed the plot with McCone or officials of the Kennedy Administration because he believed that it had been fully authorized by the previous Director, because he was uncertain whether it had a chance of succeeding, and because he believed that it was Helms', not his, duty to inform higher authorities.Nonetheless, the Committee believes there were occasions on which it was incumbent on Harvey to have disclosed the assassination operation. As head of Task Force W, the branch of the CIA responsible for covert operations in Cuba, Harvey reported directly to General Lansdale and the Special Group Augmented. The Special Group Augmented had made known that covert operations in Cuba should be first approved by it, both by explicit instruction and by its practice that particular operations be submitted in "nauseating detail". Yet HarveyNW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 182
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-33-did not inform either General Lansdale or the Special GroupAugmented of the assassination operation, either when he wasexplicitly requested to report to McCone, General Taylor,and the Special Group on his activities in Miami in April1962, or when the subject of assassination was raised in theAugust 1962 meeting and McCone voiced his disapproval.The Committee finds that the reasons advanced for nothaving informed those responsible for formulating policyabout the assassination operation were inadequate, misleading,and inconsistent. Some officials viewed assassination astoo important and sensitive to discuss with superiors, whileothers considered it not sufficiently important. Harveytestified that it was premature to tell McCone about theunderworld opération in April 1962, because it was notsufficiently advanced, but too late to tell him about it inAugust 1962, since by that time he had decided to terminateit. On other occasions, officials thought disclosure wassomeone else's responsibility; Bissell said he thought it wasup to Dulles, Harvey believed it was up to Helms, but Helmsremarked that Harvey "kept Phase II pretty much in his backpocket".
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TOP SECRET-34-The Committee concludes that the failure clearly to inform policymakers of the assassination effort against Castro was grossly improper. The Committee believes that it should be incumbent upon the DDP to report such a sensitive operation to his superior, the DCI, no matter how grave his doubts might be about the possible outcome of the operation. It follows that the DCI has the same duty to accurately inform his superiors.## TrujilloIn the Trujillo case there were several instances in which it appears that policymakers were not given sufficient information, or were not informed in a timely fashion.At a meeting on December 29, 1960, Bissell presented a plan to the Special Group for supporting Dominican exile groups and local dissidents, and stated that the plan would not bring down the regime without "some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself". At a meeting on January 12, 1961, the Special Group authorized the passage of "limited supplies of small arms and other material" to Dominican dissidents under certain conditions. At this time, the fact that the dissidents had been contemplating the assassination of Trujillo had been known in the State Department at the level of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and by senior officials of the CIA, including the DCI. Yet the memorandum supplied to Under Secretary Merchant, whichNW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 184
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# TOP SECRET-35-was said to have been the basis upon which the Special Group agreed to the "limited supply" of small arms, did not mention assassination. To the contrary, it spoke of "sabotage potential" and stated that there "would be no thought of toppling the [government] by any such minor measure [as the supplying of small arms]."On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a memorandum on the Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy. Bissell knew that the dissidents planned to assassinate Trujillo, but his memorandum did not mention assassination. It indicated that the dissidents' "plan of action" included arms for 300 men. Those involved agreed that support of this nature suggested a non-targeted paramilitary plan, not an assassination.The passage of the carbines was approved by CIA headquarters on March 31, 1961. The State Department was apparently unaware of this passage for several weeks. The pouching of the machine guns was not disclosed outside the CIA.The State Department official from whom the CIA sought permission to pass the machine guns stated that on "cross examination" the CIA official conceded that the purpose was assassination. The CIA official then agreed the United States should have nothing to do with assassination plots "anywhere, anytime", even though the previous day he and Bissell had signed a draft cable permitting the passage of the machine guns for use in connection with a planned assassination.
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TOP SECRET-36-SchneiderThe issue here is not whether the objectives of the CIA were contrary to those of the Administration. It is clear that President-Nixon desired to prevent Allende from assuming office, even if that required fomenting and supporting a coup in Chile. Nor did White House officials suggest that tactics employed (including as a first step to kidnapping General Schneider) would have been unacceptable as a matter principle. Rather, the issue posed is whether White House officials were consulted, and thus given an opportunity to weigh such matters as risk and likelihood of success, and to apply policy-making judgments to particular tactics. The record indicates that up to October 15 they were; after October 15 there is some doubt.The documentary record with respect to the disputed post-October 15 period gives rise to conflicting inferences. On the one hand, Karamessines' calendar shows existence of at least one White House contact in the critical period prior to the kidnapping of General Schneider on October 22. However, the absence of any substantive memoranda in CIA files--when contrasted with several such memoranda describing contacts with the White House between September 15 and October 15--may suggest a lack of significant communication on the part of the CIA as well as a lack of careful supervision on the part of the White House.NW 50955 DocId: 32423525 Page 186
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TOP SECRET-37-The standards applied within the CIA itself suggest a view that action which the Committee believes called for top-level policy discussion and decision was thought of as permissible, without any further consultation, on the basis of the initial instruction to prevent Allende from assuming power. Machine guns were sent to Chile and delivered to military figures there on the authority of junior CIA officers without consultation even with the CIA officer in charge of the program. We find no suggestion of bad faith in the action of the junior officers. But it necessarily establishes that there was no advance permission from outside the CIA for the passage of machine guns. And it also suggests an attitude within the CIA toward consultation which was unduly lax. Further, this case demonstrated the problems inherent in giving an agency a "blank check" to engage in covert operations without specifying which actions are and are not permissible, and without adequately supervising and monitoring these activities once begun.(b) On Occasion, Administration Officials Gave Vague Instructions to Subordinates and Failed to Make Sufficiently Clear That Assassination Should Be Excluded From Consideration.While-we cannot find that high Administration officials expressly approved of the assassination attempts, we have noted that certain agency officials nevertheless perceivedNW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 187
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-38-assassination to have been authorized. Although those officials were remiss in not seeking express authorization for their activities, their superiors were also at fault for giving vague instructions and for not explicitly ruling out assassination. No written order prohibiting assassination was issued until 1972, and that order was an internal CIA directive issued by Director Helms.SchneiderAs explained above, there is no evidence that assassination was ever proposed as a method of carrying out the Presidential order to prevent Allende from assuming office. The Committee believes, however, that the granting of carte blanche authority to the CIA by the Executive in this case may have contributed to the tragic and unintended death of General Schneider. This was also partially due to impositing an impractical task to be accomplished within an unreasonably short time. Apart from the question of whether any intervention was justified under the circumstances of this case, the committee believes that the Executive in any event should have defined the limits of permissible action.LumumbaWe are unable to make a finding that President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute certainty in the evidence. However, it appears that theNW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 188
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TOP SECRET-39-strong language used in discussions at the Special Group and NSC, as reflected in minutes of relevant meetings,led Dulles to believe that assassination was desired. The minutes contain language concerning the need to "dispose of" Lumumba, an "extremely strong feeling about the necessity for straight forward action", and a refusal to rule out any activity that might contribute to "getting rid of" Lumumba.CastroThe effort to assassinate Fidel Castro took place in an atmosphere of extreme pressure by Eisenhower and Kennedy Administration officials to discredit and overthrow the Castro regime. Richard Helms recalled that:"I remember vividly [that the pressure] was very intense. And therefore, when you go into the record, you find a lot of nutty schemes there and those nutty schemes were borne of the intensity of the pressure. And we were quite frustrated."Bissell recalled that:"During that entire period, the administration was extremely sensitive about the defeat that had been afflicted, as they felt, on the U.S. at the Bay of Pigs, and were pursuing every possible means of getting rid of Castro."Another witness, Samuel Halpern, stated that sometime in the Fall of 1961 Bissell was"chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro Regime."General Lansdale informed the agencies cooperating in Operation
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TOP SECRET-40-Mongoose that "you're in a combat situation where we have been given full command". Secretary of Defense McNamara confirmed that "we were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter"..Many of the plans that were discussed and often approved contemplated violent action against Cuba. The operation which resulted in the Bay of Pigs was a major paramilitary onslaught that had the approval of the highest government officials, including the two Presidents. Thereafter, Attorney General Kennedy vehemently exhorted the Special Group Aug-mented that "a solution to the Cuban problem today carried top priority . . no time, money, effort--or manpower is to be spared."* Subsequently, Operation Mongoose involved propaganda and sabotage operations aimed toward spurring a revolt of the Cuban people against Castro. Measures that were considered by the top policymakers included incapacitating sugar workers during harvest season by the use of chemicals; blowing up bridges and production plants; sabotaging merchandise in third countries--even those allied with the United States--prior to its delivery to Cuba; and arming insurgents on the island. Programs undertaken at the urging* The Attorney General himself took a personal interest in the recruitment and development of assets within Cuba, on occasion recommending Cubans to the CIA as possible recruits and meeting in Washington and Florida with Cuban exiles active in the covert war against the Castro government.
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# TOP SECRET-41-of the Administration included intensive efforts to recruitand arm dissidents within Cuba and raids on plants, mines,and harbors.Discussions at the Special Group and NSC meetings mightwell have contributed to the perception of some CIA officialsthat assassination was a permissible tool in the effort tooverthrow the Castro regime. At a Special Group meeting inNovember 1960, Under Secretary Merchant inquired whetherany planning had been undertaken for "direct, positive action"against Che Guevarra, Raul and Fidel Castro. Cabell repliedthat such a capability did not exist, but might well haveleft the meeting with the impression that assassination wasnot out of bounds. One phase of Lansdale's plans, whichwas submitted to the Special Group in January 1962, aimedat inducing "open revolt and overthrow of the Communistregime", and included in the final phase an "attack on thecadre of the regime, including key leaders". The proposalstated that "this should be a 'Special Target" operation.Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potentialagainst police. ." Several minutes from Special Groupmeetings contain language such as "possible removal ofCastro from the Cuban scene". Although Lansdale's proposalwas shelved, the type of aggressive action contemplated wasnot ruled out.On several occasions, the subject of assassination was -NW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 191
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TOP SECRET-42-discussed in the presence of senior Administration officials. While those officials never consented to actual assassina- tion efforts, they also failed to indicate that assassination was impermissible as a matter of principle.In early 1961, McGeorge Bundy was informed of a CIA project described as the development of a capability to assassinate.* Bundy raised no objection and, according to Bissell, may have been more affirmative. Although Bissell stated that he did not infer authorization from Bundy's remarks for the underworld plot against Castro that was then underway, the fact that he believed that the development of an assassination capability had been approved by the White House (which he subsequently told to Harvey) may well have contributed to the general perception that assassination was not prohibited.Documents indicate that in May 1962, Attorney General Kennedy was told that the CIA had sought to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs. According to the CIA officials present at the briefing, the Attorney General[^1][^1]: Bundy, who was National Security Advisor to the President, had an obligation to tell the President of such a grave matter, even though it was only a discussion of a capability to assassinate. His failure to do so was a serious error.
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TOP SECRET-43-indicated his displeasure about the lack of consultation on the impropriety of the attempt itself.* There is no evidence that the Attorney General told the CIA that it must not engage in assassination plots.At a meeting of the Special Group Augmented in August 1962, well after the assassination efforts were underway, Robert McNamara is said to have raised the question of whether the assassination of Cuban leaders should be explored, and General Lansdale issued an action memorandum assigning the CIA the task of preparing contingency plans for the assassination of Cuban leaders. While McCone testified that he had immediately made it clear that assassination was not to be discussed or condoned, Harvey's testimony and documents which he wrote after the event indicate that Harvey may have been confused over whether McCone had objected to the use of assassination, or whether he was only concerned that the subject not be put in writing. In any* Documents show that the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, learned in May of 1961 that the CIA had used underworld figures in an operation against Cuba. The documentary record further reflects that the Attorney General was not told that the operation had involved assassination efforts until May of 1962, and that the operation was then described to him as having-been terminated in May 1961. There is no evidence that the Attorney General suspected the true nature of the operation until that briefing, or that he learned that it had not in fact been terminated. While it is curious that the Attorney General would not have inquired further into the nature of the operation when he discovered that Sam Giancana had been involved in it, there is no evidence that he did.
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TOP SECRET-44-event, McCone went no further. He issued no general order banning consideration of assassination within the Agency.One of the programs forwarded to General Lansdale by the Defense Department in the Mongoose program was entitled "Operation Bounty" and envisioned dropping leaflets in Cuba offering rewards for the assassination of Government leaders. Although the plan was vetoed by Lansdale, it indicates that persons in agencies other than the CIA perceived that assassination might be permissible.While the ambivalence of Administration officials does not excuse the misleading conduct by Agency officials or justify their failure to seek explicit permission, it displayed an insufficient concern about assassination which may have contributed to the perception that assassination was an acceptable tactic in accomplishing the Government's general objectives.With the exception of the tight guidelines issued by the Special Group Augmented concerning Operation Mongoose, precise limitations were never imposed on the CIA requiring prior permission for the details of other proposed covert operations against Cuba. No general policy banning assassination was promulgated until Helms' intra-agency order in 1972. In light of the number of times in which the subject of assassination arose, Administration officials were remiss in not explicitly forbidding such activity.NW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 194
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TOP SECRET* * * * *-45-The Committee notes that many of the occasions on which CIA officials should have informed their superiors of the assassination efforts but failed to do so, or did so in a misleading manner, were also occasions on which Administration officials paradoxically may have reinforced the perception that assassination was permissible.For example, when Bissell spoke with Bundy about an executive action capability, Bissell failed to indicate that an actual assassination operation was underway, but Bundy failed to rule out assassination as a tactic.In May of 1962 the Attorney General was misleadingly told about the effort to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs, but not about the operation that was then going on. The Attorney General, however, did not state that assassination was improper.When a senior administration official raised the question of whether assassination should be explored at a Special Group meeting, the assassination operation should have been revealed, but a firm written order against engaging in assassination should also have been issued by McCone if, as he testified, he had exhibited strong aversion to assassination.
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# TOP SECRET-46-6. Practices Current at the Time in Which the Assassination Plots Occurred Were Revealed by the Record to Create the Risk of Confusion, Rashness, and Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where Clarity and Sober Judgment Was Most Necessary.Various witnesses described elements of the system within which the assassination plots were conceived. The Committee is disturbed by the custom that permitted the most sensitive matters to be presented to the highest levels of Government with the least clarity. We find this disturbing, and view the following concepts as particularly dangerous:(1) The extension of the doctrine of "plausible denial" beyond its intended purpose of hiding the involvement of the United States from other countries to an effort to shield higher officials from knowledge, and hence, responsibility for certain operations.(2) The use of circumlocution or euphemism to describe serious matters--such as assassination--when precise meanings ought to be made clear.(3) The theory that general approval of broad covert action programs is sufficient to justify specific actions such as assassination or the passage of weapons.