Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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With the scheduled conclusion of that intelligence collection phase in August 1962, the Special Group Augmented considered whether to adopt a "stepped-up Course B plus," which, in contrast to Phase I, was designed to inspire a revolt against the Castro regime. (Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented, 8/8/62, from Lansdale, p. 1). Initially, the Special Group Augmented decided against this course and in favor of a "CIA variant," at a meeting of Special Group Augmented principals on August 10, 1962. (Minutes of Special Group Augmented meeting, August 10, 1962). The "CIA variant," which was proposed by McCone on August 10, posited more limited actions to avoid inciting a revolt and sought not Castro's overthrow, but a split between Castro and "old-line Communists." (*Id.*, p. 2). The onset of the Missile Crisis caused an initial reversion to the stepped-up Course B plan, but ultimately, however, an order was issued on October 30, 1962 to halt all sabotage operations. (Lansdale, Ex.8, Memo by Lansdale, 10/30/62)Thus, on August 20, Taylor told the President that the Special Group Augmented perceived no likelihood of an overthrow of the Castro government by internal means without direct U.S. military intervention, and that the Special Group Augmented favored a more agressive Mongoose program. (Memo from Taylor to President.) Shortly thereafter, on August 23, McGeorge Bundy issued NSC Memo Number 181 to Lansdale and Taylor stating that, at the President's directive, "the line of activity projected for Operation MONGOOSE Plan B plus should be developed with all possible speed." One week later, on August 30, the CIA was instructed by the Special Group Augmented to submit a list of possible sabotage targets they might propose and it was noted that this list could serve as the limit for action on the Agency's own initiative: "The Group, by reacting to this list, could define the limits within which the Agency could operate on its own initiative." Special Group Augmented Minutes of August 30, 1962.)
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-28-Thus, at a Special Group Augmented meeting on October 4, 1962, Robert Kennedy stated that the President "is concerned about progress on the Mongoose program and feels that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage operations". And Robert Kennedy urged that "massive activity" be undertaken within the Mongoose framework. In line with this proposal, the Special Group Augmented decided that "considerably more sabotage" should be undertaken, and that "all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches with the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime". (Minutes of Special Group Augmented meeting, October 4, 1962, p. )*. On October 30, 1962, however, the order to stop all sabotage operations was issued (Lansdale, Ex. 8).*** The SGA also decided on October 4, 1962, that Robert Kennedy would chair the Group's meetings "for the time being." (Id., p. ). Subsequently, at a meeting on October 16, 1962, Robert Kennedy stated that he was going to give Mongoose "more personal attention" in view of the lack of progress and would hold daily meetings with the working group representatives, i.e., Lansdale, Harvey, and the other Agency members. (Harvey, Ex. 12, Memorandum of Meeting, October 16, 1962, by Helms, p. 1). Helms testified that he did not recall any such daily meetings with the Attorney General, but he had the impression there may have been several at first, but then they ceased. (Helms, 7/17/ pp. 54-55).**Harvey testified that he had a "confrontation" with Robert Kennedy at the height of the Missile Crisis concerning Harvey's order that agent teams be sent into Cuba to support any conventional U.S. military operation that might occur. Harvey stated that Robert Kennedy "took a great deal of exception" to this order and as a result McCone, ordered Harvey to stop the agent operations. (Harvey, 7/11, p. 30-81.) Elder, McCone's assistant at the time, similarly described this incident and stated that, although Harvey had attempted to get guidance from top officials during the Missile Crisis, Harvey "earned another black mark as not being fully under control". (Elder, p. 34-35.)
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-28a-As Sorensen (a member of the Executive Committee established to deal with the Missile Crisis) testified, even though Cuba was the "No. 1 priority" during the Missile Crisis, and "all alternatives, plans, possibilities were exhaustively surveyed" during that time, the subject of assassination was never raised in the high-level National Security Council Executive Committee (of which Helms was not a member) that was formed to deal with the Missile Crisis.(Sorensen, 7/21, p. 11.)****** There are references in the Special Group Augmented records to attacks on Soviet personnel in Cuba. The record of the SGA meeting on September 9, 1962, states:> "It was suggested that the matter of attacking and> harassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be> considered." (SGA Minutes, 9/9/62, p. ).Earlier, on August 31, 1962, Lansdale had included a task "to provoke incidents between Cubans and Bloc personnel to exacerbate tensions," in a proposed projection of actions for Phase II of Mongoose. (Memorandum to SGA, 8/31/62, from Lansdale, Action No. 47). The Special Group thereafter decided, as a means of "emphasizing such activity" to replace that task with one to "cause actions by Cubans against Bloc personnel," and to note that "consideration will be given to provoking and conducting physical attacks on Bloc personnel." (Memorandum to Taylor, Rusk, and MacNamara, 9/12/62, from Lansdale, pp. 1-2).
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E. ## The Issue of Authority Outside the AgencyThis section discusses the evidence as to whether there was authorization from outside the Agency for the assassination activity that took place during the Mongoose operation.TR. 7/17, p.4)As discussed below in detail, both Helms and the Kennedy Administration officials agreed that no direct order was ever given for Castro's assassination and that no one outside the Agency (including McCone) was informed about the assassination activity. Helms testified, however, that he believed the assassination activity was permissible and that it was within the scope of the authority given to the Agency. McGone and the other Kennedy Administration officials disagreed, testifying that assassination was not permissible without a direct order and that a Castro assassination was not within the authorized bounds of the Mongoose operation.In April 1962, when the poison pills were given to Roselli in Miami, Helms was the CIA Deputy Director in charge of covert operations and reported to McCone, the CIA Director. Helms had succeeded Bissell in this job, following Bissell's retirement in February, 1962, as a consequence of the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Helms testified that, after the Bay of Pigs, "Those of us who were still (in the Agency) were enormously anxious to try and be successful at what we were being asked to do by what was then a relatively new Administration. We wanted to earn our spurs with the President and with other officers of the Kennedy Administration." (Helms1. ### Helms' Testimony Concerning AuthorityAs set forth below, Helms testified that while he doubted whether he was initially informed that Harvey gave poison pills to Roselli and did not recall having authorized a Castro assassination in that form, nevertheless, Helms had authorized the 1962 assassination plot because "we felt that we
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were operating as we were supposed to operate, that these things ifnot specifically authorized, at least were authorized in general terms."(Helms, 6/13, p.61)a. His Perception of AuthorityHelms testified that based upon the "intense" pressure exerted by theKennedy Administration to overthrow Castro it was his perception that the CIAwas at all times acting within the scope of its authority with respect to theassassination activity.* But, Helms testified that there was no direct order toassassinate Castro from anyone, including the President of the Attorney General.(Helms, 6/14, p. 83.) (This point is discussed in detail infra p. .)(Helms, 6/13, p. 137: Helms, 7/17, p. 62, 7/17 p. 4-5.) Helms testified thatthis authority, as he perceived it, was implicit in the U. S. policy and attitudetowards Castro. (Helms, 6/13, p. 165.) As Helms testified:"I believe it was the policy at the time to get rid of Castroand if killing him was one of the things that was to be donein this connection, that was within what was expected."(Helms, 6/13, p. 137.)*The extent to which pressure in fact existed "to do something about Castro" isdiscussed in detail in the section immediately above dealing with Operation Mon-goose, its strategy of causing an internal revolt of the Cuban people againstCastro, the strict control system established by the Special Group Augmented, andthe pattern of intelligence collection and sabotage activity actually authorizedand undertaken.
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Helms testified that "I remember vividly (the pressure to overthrow Castro) was very intense." (Helms, 6/13, p. 26.) Helms stated that this pressure intensified during the period of Operation Mongoose during late 1961 and throughout 1962, and then continued on through much of 1963. (Helms, 6/13, p. 27.)As these pressures rose, "obviously the extent of the means that one thought were available, obvious increased too." (Helms, 6/13, p. 26.)Helms stated that during the Mongoose Operations period "it was made abundantly clear...to everybody involved in the operation that the desire was to get rid of the Castro regime and to get rid of Castro... the point was that no limitations were put on this injunction." (Helms, 7/17, p. 16-17). In Helms' testimony, the following exchange occurred:"Senator Mathias: 'Let me draw an example from history. When Thomas A. Beckett was proving to be an annoyance, as Castro, the King said who will rid me of this man. He didn't say to somebody go out and murder him. He said who will rid me of this man, and let it go at that."Mr. Helms: 'That is a warming reference to the problem.'"Senator Mathias: 'You feel that spans the generations and the centuries?!'"Mr. Helms: 'I think it does, sir.'"Senator Mathias: 'And that is typical of the kind of thing which might be said, which might be taken by the director or by anybody else as presidential authorization to go forward?'"Mr. Helms: 'That is right. But in answer to that, I realize that one sort of grows up in [the] tradition of the time and I think that any of us would have found it very difficult to discuss assassinations with a President of the U.S. I just think we all had the feeling that we're hired out to keep those things out of the oval office.'"Senator Mathias: 'Yet at the same time you felt that some spark had been transmitted, that that was within the permissible limits?'"Mr. Helms: 'Yes, and if he had disappeared from the scene they would not have been unhappy.'" (Helms Tr. 6/13, pp. 72-73)
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llelms said that although he never was told by his superiors to kill Castro (ilelms, 7/17, p. 15), there was at the same time never any injunction laid down by the Kennedy Administration that proscribed a Castro assassination: "No member of the Kennedy Administration...ever told me that (assassination) was proscribed, (or) ever referred to it in that fashion..." (Helms, 7/71, p. 18.) "Nobody ever said that (assassination) was ruled out..."*/(Helms 7/17, p. 43.)llelms stated that during the Mongoose period, the delivery of prison pills for assassination of Castro, "with all the other things that were going on at that time...seemed to be within the permissible part of this effort." (Helms, 6/13, p. 99.) "In the perceptions of the time and the things we were trying to do this was one human life against many other human lives that were being lost." (IIelms, 6/13, p. 64.)**/*As Helms declared: "In my 25 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, I always thought I was working within authorization, that I was doing what I had been asked to do by proper authority and when I was operating on my own I was doing what I believed to be the legitimate business of the Agency as it would have been expected of me." (Helms, 6/13, p. 30-31.)**As set out above (p. ), Helms stated: "...people were losing their lives in raids, a lot of people had lost their life at the Bay of Pigs, agents were being arrested left and right and put before the wall and shot." (Helms, 6/13, p. 64.)
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## Helms' Testimony That He Had No Direct Order to Assassinate Castro and Did Not Inform the President or the Special Group of the Assassination ActivityHelms testified that there was no direct order to assassinate Castro.He said that his perceptions of authority did not reach the point where he could testify that he had specific instructions to kill Castro. As he put it:"I have testified as best I could about the atmosphere of the time, what I understood was desired, and I don't want to take refuge in saying that I was instructed to specifically murder Castro. . ." (Helms, 6/13, p.88).On the question of whether the President was informed of any assassination plots, Helms pointed out that "nobody wants to embarrass a President of the United States (by) discussing the assassination of foreign leaders in his presence" (6/13, p. 29), and that the Special Group was "the mechanism that was set up. . .to use as a circuit breaker so that these things did not explode in the President's face and that he was not held responsible for them." (6/13, p. 29). However, Helms also testified that he had "no knowledge that a Castro assassination was ever authorized by the Special Group (Augmented)" (6/13, pp.28-29).In addition, Helms said he never informed the Special Group Augmented or any member of that Group that Harvey had given the pills to Roselli in Miami "because I am not even sure I knew about it at the time." (Helms, 7/18, p.18).[^1] Helms also stated he never told Robert Kennedy about any assassination activity and my "presumption is he wasn't informed" (Helms, 6/13, p.58), and that "Harvey kept (the Roselli pill plot) pretty much in his back pocket." (Helms, 6/13,pp.57-58).Helms further testified that although Robert Kennedy was "constantly in touch" with him in 1962 and 1963, Robert Kennedy never instructed Helms[^1]: ![Footnote mark]
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- 31a -to assassinate Castro:"The Chairman. 'Since he was on the phone to yourepeatedly did he ever tell you to kill Castro?'"Mr. Helms. 'No.'"The Chairman: 'He did not?'"Mr. Helms: 'Not in those words, no.'" (Helms,7/17, p.13)*/Any tefttoNOT to do ITPreticularlywher learn on psoutTERMINATON plot* Helms immediately reiterated after this exchange that his perception of authority for a Castro assassination rested on the pressure exerted by the Administration against Castro. The exchange between the Chairman and Helms continued as follows:"The Chairman: 'Well, did he ever tell you in other wordsthat clearly conveyed to you the message that he wantedto kill Castro?'"Helms: 'Sir, the last time I was (before the Committee), Idid the best I could about what I believed to be the parametersunder which we were working, and that was to get rid of Castro.And I don't, I am sorry to say . . . see how one would haveexpected that a thing like killing or murdering or assassinatingwould become part of a large group of people sitting around atable in the United States Government. I can't imagine anyCabinet officer wanting to sign off on something like that. Ican't imagine anybody wanting something in writing saying Ihave just charged Mr. Jones to go out and shoot Mr. Smith.'"(Helms, 7/17, pp. 13-14)NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 172
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## c. Helms Testimony that he Doubted Whether he had Authorized a Specific Assassination Attempt or was Informed of the Passage of the PillsThere is some doubt whether Helms ever authorized a specific attempt at Castro's assassination, or was informed of the passage of the pioson pills to Roselli in April, 1962. Although Helms testified that Harvey regularly reported to Helms on Harvey's Mongoose work (Helms, 6/13, p.95), and Helms "would have thought" that Harvey would have reported to Helms the transfer of the pills into Cuba (Helms, 6/13, p.105), Helms does not recall Harvey ever telling him that the pills were delivered to Roselli. (Helms, 7/17, p.22).Thus, as indicated above, Helms testified he never informed the Special Group Augmented or any member of that Group that Harvey had given the pills to Roselli in Miami "because I am not even sure I knew about it at the time." (Helms, 7/18, p. 18.)* And with respect to the pills, Helms testified that, although he agreed to the Harvey-Roselli operation (and believed there was implicit authorization for assassination activity), he testified "I never recall having okayed the killing of Castro myself in that form." (Helms, 7/17, p. 9.)## d. Helms' Perception of Robert Kennedy's Position on a Castro AssassinationIn testifying as to his perception of authority, Helms emphasized the particular role played by Robert Kennedy in pressing for progress and results*/ Helms' testimony that he may not have been informed that the pills were delivered is corroborated by Harvey's testimony. Harvey testified that when he returned from Miami he reported to Helms on his contacts with Roselli. But Harvey said that he only "briefed Helms generally", on the subjects of Harvey's takeover of the Roselli operation, the prospects of the operation, and the fact that Harvey had dropped Maheu and Giancana from the operation. (Harvey, 6/25, p.65).
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Robert Kennedy often talked directly with Helms and other CIA officials working on the Mongoose program, outside of the Special Group Augmented channels. (Helms, 7/17, p.13; 7/18, pp.60-61). As Helms stated:"I can say absolutely fairly we are constantly in touch with each other in these matters. The Attorney General was on the phone to me, he was on the phone to Mr. Harvey, to Mr. Fitzgerald, his successor. He was on the phone even to people on Harvey's staff, as I recall it." (Helms, 7/17, p.13).Helms said that although he did not know whether a Castro assassination would have been morally acceptable to Robert Kennedy,Helms believed that Robert Kennedy "would not (have been) unhappy if (Castro) had disappeared off the scene by whatever means." (Helms, 7/17. p.17-18). And Helms stated that Robert Kennedy never told him that a Castro assassination was ruled out. (Helms, 7/17, p.21).llowever, Helms further testified that although Robert. Kennedy was "constantly in touch" with Helms and their exchanges were marked by de- tailed, factual, and highly specific discussions on anti-Castro operations. Robert Kennedy never raised the subject of a Castro assassination and never instructed Helms to assassinate Castro.** Helms further testified that he had no knowledge that Robert Kennedy "was ever asked to specifically approve an assassination plot." (Helms, 6/13, p. 57.).[^1] Q: "So it was your impression that he was sort of setting the tone for the group's action or activity."A: "Oh, yes...there wasn't any doubt about that. He was very much interested in this and spent a great deal of time on it.(Helms, 6/13, p. 22.)**The telephone records of the Attorney General's office indicate frequent contact between the Attorney General and Helms and Helms stated that his conversations with Robert Kennedy were "candid" and that "he and I used to deal in facts most of the time." (Helms, 6/13, p.63.) Helms testified as to the level of detail in his talks with Robert Kennedy:"For example, we had projects to land sabotage teams.[^1] Well, (the Attorney General would ask) have you got the team organized, did the team go? Well, no, we've been delayed a week because the weather is bad or the boats don't run, or something of this kind. It even got down to that degree of specificity." (Helms, 7/17, p.40)[^1]: So it was your impression that he was sort of setting the tone for the group's action or activity.
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And, as stated above, llelms also testified that "llarvey kept Phase 2 (the Roselli pill operation) pretty much in his back pocket" and that although Helms stated "I do not know this for sure," he testified it was his "presumption" that Robert Kennedy was not informed of the Pllase 2 operation.* (Helms, 6/13, p. 57-58.)e. Helms' Testimony as to Why He Did Not Obtain a Direct OrderHelms testified that assassination "was not part of the CIA's policy" or a part of CIA's "armory". (Helms, 6/13, p. 37-88) And, in his own view, Helms said that he "never liked assassination". (And, in fact, banned its use _______ years after he became CIA Director.) (Helms, _______.)Moreover, Helms testified that he had serious reservations regarding the CIA working with underworld figures. (Helms, 7/18 p.31). When Harvey propsed to contact Roselli to see if gangsten links to Cuba could be developed, Helms "had very grave doubts about the wisdom to dealing with underworld figures. (Helms, 6/13, p.33; 7/18, p.31).Despite these reservations, Helms did not seek approval for the assassination activity because he said assassination was not a subject that he felt should be aired with higher authority. (Helms, 7/18, 0C/;pp.31-32). With respect to the question of obtaining express authority* Helms based this presumption on a review of relevant documents at the time of his testimony. (Helms, 6/13, p.58).
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from the Special Group or Special Group Augmented, Helms stated: "...I didn't see how one would have expected that a thing like killing or murdering or assassination would become a part of a large group of people sitting around a table in the United States Government." (Helms, 7/17, p. 14). And with regard to informing the President or obtaining explicit authority from him, Helms stated that "nobody wants to embarrass a President of the United States (by) discussing the assassination of foreign leaders in his presence." (Helms, 6/13, p. 29).Thus, in the following exchange Helms stated that it "wouldn't have occurred to me to ask" for clarification or express authority for assassination activity from Robert Kennedy or the Special Group:"Senator Huddleston: "...it did not occur to you to inquire of the Attorney General or of the Special Group or of anyone that when they kept pushing and asking for action...to clarify that question of whether you should actually be trying to assassinate?""Mr. Helms: "I don't know whether it was in training experience, tradition or exactly what one points to, but I think to go up to a Cabinet officer and say, am I right in assuming that you want me to assassinate Castro or to try to assassinate Castro, is a question it wouldn't have occurred to me to ask."***"Senator Huddleston: "...(because assassination has such serious consequences) seems to fortify the thought that I would want to be dead certain, I would want to hear it from the horse's mouth in plain, simple English language before I would want to undertake that kind of activity." (Helms, 7/17, pp.51-52).Helms also pointed out his reason for not seeking express authority in the following exchange:![top secret]"Senator Morgan: "In light of your previous statement that this is a Christian country and that this Committee has to face up to the prime moral issue of whether or not killing is...acceptable...don't you think it would have taken affirmative permission or authority to kill, rather than just saying it was not eliminated from the authority or you were not restricted...?"