Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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in cables from Dearborn and Owen. (Station to HQS cables 4/25/61) On April 25, 1961, Owen advised Headquarters that Wimpy Berry had informed him that Antonio de la Maza was going to attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2. Owen also reported that this attempt would use the three carbines passed from the American Consulate, together with whatever else was available. (Id.)In response to the April 26 cable, Headquarters restated that there was no approval to pass any additional arms to the dissidents and requested Owen to advise the dissidents that the United States was simply not prepared at that time to cope with the aftermath of the assassination. (See C/S comments, Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61) The following day, April 27, 1961, Owen replied that, based upon further discussions with the dissidents, "We doubt statement U.S. government not now prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade them from attempt." (Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61)Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that an effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt and testified that efforts to carry out the instructions were unsuccessful. In effect, the dissidents informed him that this was their affair and it could not be turned off to suit the convenience of the U.S. government. (Dearborn, 7/29, p.52)
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On April 30, 1961, Dearborn advised Headquarters that the dissidents had reported to him the assassination attempt was going to take place during the first week of May. The action group was reported to have in its possession three carbines, four to six 12-gauge shotguns and other small arms. Although they reportedly still wanted the machine guns, Dearborn advised Headquarters that the group was going to go ahead with what they had, whether the U.S. wanted them to or not. (Station to HQS cable, 4/30/61)Dearborn's cable set forth the argument of the action group that, since the U.S. had already assisted the group to some extent and was therefore implicated, the additional assistance of releasing the machine guns would not change the basic relationship. The cable concluded:"Owing to far-reaching political implications involved in release or non release of requested items, Headquarters may wish discuss foregoing with State Department." (Id.)## B. Further Consideration of Passing Machine GunsIn reponse, a cable was drafted at CIA Headquarters authorizing passage of the machine guns. The cable which was sent to Allen Dulles, with Bissell's recommendation for its dispatch, provided:"Since it appears that opposition group has committed itself to action with or without
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- 33-additional support, coupled with fact ref.C items [the carbines) already made availableto them for personal defense; station authori-zed pass ref. A items [the machine guns] toopposition member for their additional pro-tection on their proposed endeavor." (Draft of HQSto Station cable, 5/2/61).The cable was never sent.In his testimony before the Committee, Bissell characteri-zed his reasoning for recommending release of the machine gunsas:" . . . having made already a considerableinvestment in this dissident group and itsplans that we might as well make the addi-tional investment." (Bissell, 7/22, p.127)The following day, May 3, 1961, Ray Herbert Deputy Chiefof the Western Hemisphere Division of CIA, who frequently actedas liaison with the State Department in matters concerningcovert operations in the Dominican Republic, met with AdolphBerle, Chairman of the State Department's Interagency Task Forceon Latin America.A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that Herbertinformed Berle that a local group in the Dominican Republicwished to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms for that purpose.The memorandum continued:"On cross examination it developed that thereal plan was to assassinate Trujillo and theywanted guns for that purpose. Herbert wantedto know what the policy should be."I told him I could not care less for Trujilloand that this was the general sentiment. Butwe did not wish to have any thing to do with anyassassination plots anywhere, any time. Herbertsaid he felt the same way. (Berle, Memo ofConversation, 5/3/61)
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Copies of Berle's memorandum were sent to Wymberly Coerr; the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and to Special Assistant Frank Devine.Both Herbert and Devine, who had been in almost daily contact with each other since August of 1960, had been advised of the assassination plans of the dissident group. In fact, Herbert, along with Bissell, had signed off on the proposed cable of May 2, releasing the machine guns for passage.C. Special Group Meetings of May 4 and May 18, 1961On the day following the Berle-Herbert meeting, the Special Group met and, according to the minutes:"The DCI referred to recent reports of a new anti-Trujillo plot. He said we never know if one of these is going to work or not, and asked what is the status of contingency planning should the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this point is covered in the Cuba paper which will be discussed at a high level in the very near future." (Special Group Minutes, 5/4/61)Once again, the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutes makes subsequent analysis as to the scope of matters discussed speculative. It is not known to what extent and in what detail Allen Dulles referred to "recent reports" of a new anti-Trujillo plot. Certainly, the most recent report of such a plot was Dearborn's April 30 cable -- disclosing an imminent assassination attempt potentially utilizing U.S.-supplied weapons.On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered the situation in the Dominican Republic and, according to the
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minutes:-35-"Cabell [Deputy DCI] noted that theinternal dissidents were pressing for therelease to them of certain small arms now inU.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. Heinquired whether the feeling of theGroup remained that these arms should not bepassed. The members showed no inclination totake a contrary position at this time."*(Emphasis supplied) (Special Group Minutes,5/18/61)"D. Final Requests by Dissidents for Machine GunsOn May 16, 1961, Dearborn cabled the State Department,attention Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr, with an urgentrequest from the dissidents for the machine guns. The cableadvised that the assassination attempt was scheduled for thenight of May 16 and that, while the chances of success were80 percent, provision of the machine guns would reduce thepossibility of failure. The dissidents reportedly stressedto Dearborn that if the effort failed, due to U.S. refusal tosupply the machine guns, the U.S. would be held responsibleand would never be forgiven. Dearborn reported that he hadinformed the dissidents that, based on his recent conversationsin Washington, he was reasonably certain that authorizationcould not be obtained for handing over machine guns. (Dearbornto State cable, 5/16/61)A return cable from the State Department to Dearborn, sentthe same day, confirmed Dearborn's judgment. It instructed him* There was no meeting of the Special Group at which the Domini-  can Republic was discussed between May 4 and May 18. The language  attributed to General Cabell as to whether the feeling of the  Group remained not to pass the arms, tends to suggest that the  question of passing these arms must have been raised prior to  the May 18 Group meeting, perhaps at the May 4, 1961 meeting.
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to continue to take the same line until he received contraryinstructions which clearly indicated they had been cleared inadvance by the State Department itself. This cable from State wasapproved by Under Secretary Bowles. (Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61)Ray Herbert referred to Dearborn's May 16 request in amemorandum he sent to Devine on the same date and asked to beadvised as to the Department's policy concerning passage ofthe machine guns. Herbert noted that when this request waslast taken to the Department, Berle made the decision that theweapons not be passed. (Memo to ARA from CIA, 5/16/61)Devine responded to Herbert's memorandum on the same day,advising Herbert that the Department's policy continued to benegative on the matter of passing the machine guns.[^1] Herbert'sattention was directed to the January 12, 1961 Special Grouplimitation concerning the passage of arms outside of theDominican Republic. A copy of Devine's memorandum to Herbertwas forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of State,to the attention of his personal assistant, Joseph Scott.(Devine to Herbert memo, 5/16/61)E. Dearborn in Washington for Consultation --Drafting of Contingency PlansAt a meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961,the question of U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic wasconsidered and it was:"Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba wouldprepare promptly both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communist interventionin the event of crises in Haiti or the[^1]: By May 27, 1961 Dearborn was advising the State Department that the roup was no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the fact that it must make do with what it had. (Dearborn to State Doc B1242356927 Page) 420
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- 37 -Dominican Republic. Noted the President's view that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multilateral." (Record of Actions by National Security Council, 5/5/61)(Approved by the President, 5/16/61)Although the precise dates are uncertain, Dearborn was recalled to Washington to participate in drafting of these contingency plans and recommendations. Dearborn was in Washington at least from May 10 through May 13, 1961.While in Washington, Dearborn met with State Department personnel and with Richard Goodwin and Arthur Schlesinger of the White House staff. When testifying before the Committee, he was unable to recall the substance of his discussions with Goodwin and Schlesinger, aside from his general assumption that the current situation in the Dominican Republic was discussed. He did not recall any discussion with Goodwin or Schlesinger concerning arms, either those which had been passed to the dissidents or those which were being sought.(Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 58-61) Dearborn left the meeting at the White House, however, with the firm impression that Goodwin had been reviewing cable traffic between Washington and the Dominican Republic and was very familiar with events as they then stood.(Dearborn, 7/29, p.62)
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TOP-CECRETOn May 11, 1961, Dearborn prepared a two-page draft document which set forth ways in which the U.S. could overtly aid and encourage the opposition to Trujillo. The draft noted that means of stepping up the covert program were considered in separate papers. (Dearborn draft document of May 11, 1961)This Dearborn draft of May 11, 1961, was apparently used as a basis for portions of the "Dominican Republic -- Contingency Paper" discussed below.Two documents entitled, "Program of Covert Action for the Dominican Republic" were provided to the Committee staff from State Department files. Each appears to be a draft of the covert activities paper described in Dearborn's May 11, 1961 memorandum. One draft recommended an expanded U.S. offer to deliver small explosive devices and arms. (Document indicating it was attached to "Dominican Republic -- Contingency," dated 5/12/61 and bearing Nos. 306-308). The other draft is very similar except that it concludes that delivery of arms within the Dominican Republic to members of the underground is not recommended. (Document from State Dept. files bearing No. 310).Attached to the second draft was a one-page document which Frank Devine believes he wrote. It listed eight numbered points including the following:"1. The USG should not lend itself to direct political assassination."2. US moral posture can ill afford further tarnishing in the eyes of the world.
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"3. We would be encouraging the action, supplying the weapons, effecting the delivery, and then turning over only the final execution to (unskilled) local triggermen.""4. So far we have seen no real evidence of action capability. Should we entrust ourselves and our reputation to this extent in the absence thereof?"7. Can we afford a precedent which may convince the world that our diplomatic pouches are used to deliver assassination weapons?" (Document from State Department files bearing No. 313)The other points raised in document No. 313 related to the likelihood that any such involvement by the U.S. would ultimately be revealed.On May 15, 1961, Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr sent to Under Secretary Bowles a document entitled "Covert Action Programs Authorized With Respect to the Dominican Republic". That document outlined the existing Special Group approvals for covert assistance to Dominican dissidents and, while making no recommendation as to further policy, suggested that the Special Group review the outstanding approvals and communicate to interested agencies the status of such authorizations. (State Dept. document from Coerr to Bowles, 5/15/61)During this period a document dated May 13, 1961, was
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prepared at the request of Richard Goodwin and was thereaftercirculated within the State Department.* This document,entitled "Program of Covert Action for the Dominican Republic"reported:"CIA has had in the direct custody of its Stationin Ciudad Trujillo, a very limited supply ofweapons and grenades. In response to the urgentrequests from the internal opposition leaders forpersonal defense weapons attendant to theirprojected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, three(3) 38 Cal revolvers and three (3) carbines withaccompanying ammunition have been passed by securemeans to the opposition. The recipients haverepeatedly requested additional armed support."This memorandum is the first direct evidence of disclosure toanyone on the White House staff of the fact that arms had beenpassed to dissidents in the Dominican Republic.The original ribbon copy of the memorandum has the abovequoted material circled in pencil and the word "neutralize"is underscored. Goodwin testified before the Committee thathe circled the above paragraph when first reading the memorandumbecause the information concerning passage of the arms was newto him and struck him as significant. (Goodwin 7/18, pp. 48,49)Under the heading of "Possible Covert Actions Which RequireAdditional Authorization," the memorandum to Goodwin indicatedthat the CIA had a supply of four 45 caliber machine guns anda small number of grenades currently in the direct custody ofthe Station in Ciudad Trujillo and that a secure means of passingthese weapons to the internal opposition "for their use in* See Scott to Bowles memorandum of May 19, 1961, enclosing copy  of Goodwin memorandum.
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personal defense attendant to their projected efforts to re-move Trujillo" could be developed by the Station. The memo-randum made no recommendation to approve or disapprove passageof these weapons. (Id.)On May 15, 1961, Bundy forwarded to Goodwin anothermemorandum. This one, entitled "The Current Situation in andContingency Plans for the Dominican Republic," had been receivedby Bundy from the State Department. Attached was an under-lying document which began:"Recent reports indicate that the internalDominican dissidents are becoming increasinglydetermined to oust Trunillo by any means, andtheir plans in this regard are well advanced."The May 15 memorandum stressed that it was highly desirablefor the U.S. to be identified with and to support the elementsseeking to overthrow Trujillo. The attachmentrecommended that Consul General Dearborn inform the dissidentsthat if they succeed "at their own initiative and on their ownresponsibility in forming an acceptable provisional governmentthey can be assured that any reasonable request for assistancefrom the U.S. will be promptly and favorably answered." (Documentsfrom State Dept. files bearing Nos. 279-286).F. Drafts Leading to and Final Cable of May 29, 1961A copy of Dearborn's cable of May 16, 1961, requestingurgent State Department guidance, was forwarded to RichardGoodwin. At the specific request of Goodwin,the State Department replied to Dearborn on May 17,
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-42-and advised him to keep in mind the President's view, as expressed at the May 5 National Security Council Meeting, that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before knowing what government would succeed him. (Department to Dearborn, 5/17/61)Dearborn responded on May 21, 1961, pointing out that for over a year State Department representatives in the Dominican Republic had been nurturing the effort to overthrow Trujillo and had assisted the dissidents in numerous ways, all of which were known to the Department. It was, Dearborn stated, "too late to consider whether United States will initiate overthrow of Trujillo." Dearborn invited further guidance from State.In response to Dearborn's request for guidance, the State Department drafted a reply on May 24. The draft discussed a conflict between two objectives:"(1) To be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive credit among DR dissidents and liberal elements throughout Latin America;"(2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican Republic and even more so from any political assassination which might occur."
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It was said to be the Department's considered opinion that"former objective cannot, repeat not, easily override latter."(State Dept. to Dearborn cable, 5/24/61 not sent)This State Department draft was forwarded to Under Secretary Bowles with the comment that Goodwin considered it "too negative" and that he would try his hand on a draft "for Bundy to present tomorrow morning." (Memo from Achilles to Bowles, 5/24/61)A May 26, 1961, memorandum from Bowles to Bundy begins:"Following up on our discussion of the Dominican Republic at yesterday's meeting of the Special Group, I am forwarding you a draft telegram which we would like to send to Henry Dearborn, our Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo, supplementing the guidance he will be receiving on the recently approved contingency plans."Minutes of the Special Group meeting on May 25, 1961 do not, however, reflect any discussion of the Dominican Republic.If, as Bowles' memorandum suggests, a discussion concerning the Dominican Republic did occur at the May 25 meeting, it is not known what the discussion involved or what decisions, if any, were made.Richard Goodwin personally prepared alternate drafts to the proposed State Department cable to Dearborn. Goodwin testified that it was his intent in revising the cable to communicate to Dearborn, President Kennedy's personal belief that the United States:" . . . didn't want to do anything that would involve us further, the United States further, in any effort to assassinate Trujillo."(Goodwin, 7/10, p.32)
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At the same time, Goodwin's draft raised the issue offurther covert action and transfer of arms to the dissidentsand advised Dearborn to hold out the arms as being availableto the dissidents pending their ability to receive them.It was the twofold intent of the cable as revised byGoodwin, (1) to express the desire to remain in the good gracesof the dissidents who, it was believed, would constitute thenew government following Trujillo's assassination, and (2)to avoid any action which might further involve the UnitedStates in the anticipated assassination. This dual purposeis clearly evident in the cable which advised:" . . . we must not run risk of U.S. associationwith political assassination, since U.S. as matterof general policy cannot condone assassination.This last principal is overriding and must prevailin doubtful situation." (Emphasis added)* * * * * * *"Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S.support for their position."According to Goodwin, the underscored material was inserted inthe cable at the specific direction of President Kennedy.(Goodwin, 7/10, pp. 22, 23).With respect to the four machine guns which were in theConsulate and which had been repeatedly requested by thedissidents, the cable advised Dearborn that the U.S. was unableto transfer these arms to the dissidents. Dearborn wasinstructed to:"Tell them that this is because of our suspicionthat method of transfer may be unsafe. In actual
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fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of association with assassination attempt."The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President Kennedy, was sent to Dearborn on May 29, 1961. (State Dept. to Dearborn cable, 5/29/61)VII. May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter:A. Trujillo AssassinatedLate in the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambushed and assassinated near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The assassination closely paralleled the plan disclosed by the action group to American representatives in the Dominican Republic and passed on to officials in Washington at both the CIA and the State Department. (Dearborn cable to State, 5/30/61) The assassination was conducted by members of the action group, to whom the American carbines had been passed, and such sketchy information as is available indicates that one or more of the carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when Trujillo was killed. (I. G. Report, pp. 60-61). This evidence indicate however, that the actual assassination was accomplished by handguns and shotguns. (I.G. Report, p.61)B. Cables to WashingtonAfter receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, both Consul General Dearborn and Station Chief Owen sent replies. According to Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable as a change in U.S. policy concerning support for assassinations. (Dearborn 7/29/75, p. 74).
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-46He interpreted the May 29 cable as saying:> "...we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate> Trujillo, that is all right. But we don't want> anything to pin this on us, because we aren't> doing it, it is the Dominicans who are doing> it:" (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 104)Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he said had always been his personal belief; that the U.S. should not be involved in an assassination and that if an assassination occurred it would be strictly a Dominican affair. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 100, 101)In contrast the CIA Station Chief, Owen, did regard the cable as manifesting a change in U.S. policy, particularly on the question of supplying arms. (Owen p. 120) He believed the May 29 cable was the final word in U.S. policy on this matter and consequently felt that the government had retreated from its prior position, of offering material support to the dissidents, and had adopted a new position of withholding such support.Owen's responsive cable to Headquarters stated:> "HQS aware extent to which U.S. government already> associated with assassination. If we are to at least> cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in> assassination preparation must be withdrawn."> (Station to HQS cable, 5/30/61)