Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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-16-attempts (see detailed treatment at Section (b), *supra*). There is no testimony to the contrary. The account of this conversation raises a question as to whether Bissell acted properly in withholding from Bundy the fact that assassination efforts against Castro had already been mounted and were moving forward. Bundy was responsible to a new President for national security affairs and Bissell was his principal source of information about covert operations at the CIA.## (ii) Bissell's Instruction to Take Over Responsibility for Underworld Contact: November 1961Both Bissell and Harvey recall a meeting in November 1961 in which Harvey was instructed to take over the contact with John Roselli (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19, 47; Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 86; and 6/11/75, p. 19)--which had been used for the initial poison pili plot as part of Project ZR/RIFLE. Harvey's notes placed the meeting on November 15, 1961 (I.G., p. 39), during the period in which Harvey was freed from his duties on another Agency staff to take over direction of Task Force W, the locus of CIA activity against the Castro regime.According to Bissell and Harvey, the November meeting involved only the planning and research of a capability rather than a targeted operation against Castro (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 13; Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 60). But Bissell acknowledged that the purpose of the Roselli contact had been to assassinate Castro, and that "it is a fair inference that there would have been no reason to maintainNW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 18
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-17-it [the contact) unless there was some possibility of reactivating that operation" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 19). Bissell stated that because the assassination plot against Castro involving the syndicate had been stood down after the Bay of Pigs . . . and there was no authorization to pursue it actively . . . the responsibility that was given to him [Harvey] was that of taking over an inactive contact." (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 14)Bissell said that he had, in effect, asked Harvey to stand watch over the contact in case any action should be required and further testified that it was never required.The Inspector General's Report stated: "After Harvey took over the Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect of ZRRIFLE." (I.G., p. 40). Harvey recalled that during a discussion with Bissell of the creation of an executive action capability, Bissell advised him of "a then going operation" involving the names of Maheu and possibly Roselli and Giancana, "which was a part of the Agency's effort to develop . . . a capability for executive action." (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 55, 61). Harvey said that at the time of this discussion, the operation had been "in train" for "approximately two years or perhaps 18 months." (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54).Although his "net impression" was that both the "exploratory project" and the "specific operation" were "fully authorized and approved", Harvey said he could not testify that "specific White llouse authority for this given operation was implied or stated". (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54.) Bissell does not recall telling anyone in the White House that something had been done to
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 19]
-18-bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell,6/11/75, pp. 19-20). Harvey did not recall any mention of theWhite House or any higher authority than the DDP in his Novembermeeting with Bissell (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 60-61).Although Richard Helms was briefed and givenadministrative responsibility (as DDP) for Project ZR/RIFLE threemonths later, he did not recall that ZR/RIFLE was ever contemplatedas a capability to assassinate Castro (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 55).Asked whether the actual assassination efforts against Castro wererelated to ZR/RIFLE (executive action), Helms testified: "In mymind those lines never crossed" (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 52). However,Bissell's testimony leaves more ambiguity: "the contact with thesyndicate which had Castro as its target . . . folded into theZR/RIFLE project . . . and they became one" (Bissell, 6/11/75,p. 47). When asked by Senator Baker whether the executive action"capability . . for assassination" was "used against Castro",Bissell replied that it was "in the later phase". (Bissell, 6/11/75,p. 47). The instruction from Bissell to Harvey on November 15,-1961, however, preceded the reactivation of the CIA-syndicate assas-ination operation against Castro by approximately five months.### Use of Agent QJ/WIN in AfricaQJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal back-ground who had been recruited by the CIA for certain sensitiveprograms involving surreptitious entries which pre-dated Project
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-19-ZR/RIFLE. Harvey testified that QJ/WIN's function after the adventof Project ZR/RIFLE in 1961 was restricted to the "spotting" ofpotential assets for "multi-purpose" covert use.However, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey wasassigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent-QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by Arnold Silver, hissupervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey, as theChief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on which Silver: worked,had ordered QJ/WIN's mission to the Congo (CIA Dispatch AUDW-147,11/2/60) and arranged the financial accounting for the missionafterward (Memorandum to Finance Division from William K. Harvey,1/11/61). [QJ/WIN's activities in the Congo are treated in detailin the discussion of the Lumumba case; see Section ____, supra.]There are two factors which may raise a question as to whether QJ/WIN was being used in an *ad hoc* capacity to developan assassination capability before ZR/RIFLE was formally initiated.First, there is a similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey,QJ/WIN, Silver, and Gottlieb were connected with the Lumumba matterand reappear in connection with the subsequent development of"ZR/RIFLE. Second, Bissell informed Harvey that the development ofan assassination capability had already been discussed with Silverand Gottlieb before Harvey's assignment to ZR/RIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75,p. 52; I.G. Report, pp. 37-38).Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any firmevidence of a connection between QJ/WIN and the plot to assassinateLumumba.
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FINAL DRAFTTOP SECRETTRUJILLOR948Agreed to by drafting subcommittee on August 28, 1975*SummaryRafael Trujillo was assassinated by a group of Dominican dissidents on May 30, 1961.Trujillo was a brutal dictator, and both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations encouraged the overthrow of his regime by Dominican dissidents. Toward that end the highest policy levels of both Administrations approved or condoned supplying aims to the dissidents. Although there is no evidence that the United States instigated any assassination activity, certain evidence tends to link United States officials to the assassination plans.Material support, consisting of three pistols and three carbines, was supplied to various dissidents. While United States' officials knew that the dissidents intended to overthrow Trujillo, probably by assassination, there is no direct evidence that the weapons which were passed were used in the assassination. The evidence is inconclusive as to how high in the two Administrations information about the dissidents' assassination plots had been passed prior to the spring of 1961.Beginning in March of 1961, the dissidents began asking United States officials for machine guns. By the time four M-3 machine guns were shipped to the CIA Station Chief in the Dominican capitol in April, it was well known that the dissidents wanted them for use in connection with the assassination. Thereafter, however, permission to deliver the machine guns to the dissidents was denied, and the guns were never passed. Two days before the assassination, President Kennedy personally authorized a cable to the U.S. Consul General.* The second paragraph under V.A.3.c. and the paragraph under VII.C. were drafted pursuant to the directions of the Subcommittee but have not been reviewed by the Subcommittee.
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-2-in the Dominican Republic stating that the United States government, as a matter of general principle, could not condone political assassinations, but at the same time indicating the United States continued to support the dissidents and stood ready to recognize them in the event they were successful in their endeavor to overthrow Trujillo.
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# BackgroundRafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Republic in 1930. For most of his tenure, the United States government supported him and he was regarded throughout much of the Caribbean and Latin America as a protege of the United States.Trujillo's rule, always harsh and dictatorial, became more arbitrary during the 1950's. As a result, the United States States' image was increasingly tarnished in the eyes of many Latin Americans.Increasing American awareness of Trujillo's brutality and fear that it would lead to a Castro-type revolution caused U.S. officials to consider various plans to hasten his abdication or downfall.As early as February 1960 the Eisenhower administration gave high level consideration to a program of covert aid to Dominican dissidents. (Special Group minutes, 2/10/60).In April 1960 President Eisenhower approved a contingency plan for the Dominican Republic which provided, in part, that if the situation deteriorated still further:"...the United States would immediately take political action to remove Trujillo from the Dominican Republic as soon as a suitable successor regime can be induced to take over with the assurance of U.S. political, economic, and if necessary military support." (Memo from Secretary of State Herter to the President, 4/14/60; Presidential approval indicated in Herter letter to Secretary of Defense Gates, 4/21/60.)Simultaneously, the United States was trying to organize hemispheric opposition to the Castro regime in Cuba.
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American leaders, such as President Betancourt of Venezuela, pressed the United States to take affirmative action against Trujillo to dispel criticism that the U.S. opposed dictator- ships of the left only. A belief that Castro's road to power was paved by the excesses of Batista led to concern that the Dominican Republic might also eventually fall victim to a Castro-style Communist regime. (Rusk, pp. 8,9)## II. Initial Contact with Dissidents and Request for ArmsDuring the spring of 1960, the U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Joseph Farland, made initial contact with dissidents who sought to free their country from Trujillo's grasp. They asked for sniper rifles. Although documentary evidence indicates that a recommendation to provide these rifles was approved both within the State Department and the CIA, the rifles were never provided.### A. Dissident ContactsAmbassador Farland established contact with a group of dissidents regarded as moderate, pro-U.S. and desirous of establishing a democratic form of government.* (Farland affidavit) Prior to his final departure from the Dominican Republic in May 1960, the Ambassador introduced his Deputy-Chief- of-Mission, Henry Dearborn, to the dissident leaders, indicating that[^1][^1]: This loosely-organized group, with which contact was established, was referred to in cables, correspondence, and memoranda as "the dissidents" and is so referenced herein.
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-3-Dearborn could be trusted. Then on June 16, 1960, CIAHeadquarters* cabled a request that Dearborn become the "communications link" between the dissidents and CIA. The cable /stated/that Dearborn's role had the "unofficial approval of /AssistantSecretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Roy R.7 Rubottom"(Emphasis in original.) (HQS to Station cable 6/16/60).Dearborn agreed. He requested, however, that the CIAconfirm the arrangement with the dissidents as being that theU.S. would "clandestinely" assist the opposition to "developeffective force to accomplish Trujillo overthrow," but wouldnot "undertake any overt action itself against Trujillogovernment while it is in full control of Dominican Republic"(Station to HQS cable 6/17/60). CIA Headqaurters confirmedDearborn's understanding of the arrangement (HQS to Stationcable 6/19/60)B. The Sniper RiflesDuring the course of a cocktail party in the DominicanRepublic, a leading dissident made a specific request to Ambas-sador Farland for a limited number of rifles with telescopicsights. The Ambassador promised to pass on the request (Farlandaffidavit) He apparently did so after returning to Washingtonin May 1960 (CIA memorandum for the record, 6/7/61).* As used herein "Headquarters" refers to Headquarters of the  Central Intelligency Agency; "Department" indicates the  Department of State.
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-4-Documents indicate that consideration was given within the CIA to airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic. At a June 21, 1960, meeting with Ned Holman of the CIA Western Hemisphere Division, Ambassador Farland reportedly suggested possible sites for the drops.(CIA memo, 6/21/60)Documents also indicate that a meeting was held around the end of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom and Col. J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division. Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant Secretary's view regarding "To what extent will the U.S. government participate in the overthrow of Trujillo." A number of questions were raised by King, among them:"c. Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene?"King's handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom's response to that question was "yes" (CIA memo of 6/28/60; King affidavit)*On July 1, 1960, a memorandum directed to General Cabell, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared for Colonel King's signature and, in his absence, signed by his principal deputy, Rudy Gomez (I.G. Report, p. 26). The memorandum stated that a principal leader of the anti-Trujillo opposition had asked Ambassador Farland for a limited number of arms to precipitate Trujillo's overthrow, and recognized that such arms* Neither King nor Rubottom recalls such a meeting, nor does either recall any proposal for supplying sniper rifles.  (Rubottom affidavit, King affidavit.)  NW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 27
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"presumably would be used against key members of the Trujillo regime." The memorandum recommended that the arms be provided, since the fall of the Trujillo regime appeared inevitable, and therefore U.S. relations with the opposition should be as close as possible. "Providing the arms as requested would contribute significantly toward this end." (CIA memo, 7/1/60)Specifically, the recommendation was to deliver to dissidents in the Dominican Republic 12 sterile* rifles with telescopic sights, together with 500 rounds of ammunition.Paragraph 4 of the memorandum stated:"4. Approval for delivery of these arms has been given by Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, who requests that the arms be placed in hands of the opposition at the earliest possible moment." (Id.)Gomez's recommendation was concurred in by Richard Helms, as Acting DDP, and approved by General Cabell,(I.G. Report, p. 26).The kind of arms approved, sterile rifles with telescopic sights, together with the statement that they would be presumably used against key members of the Trujillo regime clearly indicated the "targeted use" for which the weapons were intended. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 77).On July 1, 1960, a cable was sent to Dearborn by CIA Headquarters informing him of the plan to airdrop 12 telescopically-sighted rifles into the Dominican Republic. The*"Sterile" rifles are "untraceable" rifles. (Bissell, 7/22/75,p.69)
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-6-cable inquired whether the dissidents had the capability torealign the sights if thrown off by the drop. On July 14,1960, Dearborn replied that the dissident leaders were againstany further action in the Dominican Republic until after re-solution by the OAS of a Venezuelan complaint then pendingagainst Trujillo. The dissidents reportedly believed thatsufficiently strong action by the OAS could bring Trujillo'sdownfall without further effort on their part. (Station toHQS cable, 7/14/60) The 12 sniper rifles were never furnishedto the dissidents.On August 26, 1960, Dearborn cabled Deputy AssistantSecretary of State Lester Mallory reporting on a meeting betweena dissident leader and John Barfield, the Consulate's politicalofficer. The dissident leader was reported to have lostenthusiasm for an assassination attempt and was then speakingof an invasion from Venezuela. However, by September 1, 1960,dissidents were again speaking about the possible provision tothem of arms. This time the request was for 200 rifles. Forthe next several months, consideration centered on providing200 to 300 guns.II. Summer and Fall of 1960In August 1960, the United States severed diplomaticrelations with the Dominican Republic and recalled most of itspersonnel. Dearborn was left as Consul General and de factoCIA Chief of Station. Consideration was given both to providing
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arms and explosive devices and to the use of high levelemissaries to persuade Trujillo to abdicate. By the end ofthe year, a broad plan of general support to anti-Trujilloforces, both within and without the country, was approved.A. Diplomatic Development --Withdrawal of U.S. PersonnelEvents occurring during the summer of 1960 further in-tensified hemispheric opposition to the Trujillo regime. InJune agents of Trujillo tried to assassinate Venezuelan Presi-dent Betancourt. As a result, the OAS censured the Trujillogovernment. At the same time, in August 1960, the UnitedStates broke interupted diplomatic relations with the DominicanRepublic and imposed economic sanctions.With the severance of diplomatic relations, the UnitedStates closed its Embassy. Most American personnel, includingthe CIA Chief of Station, left the Dominican Republic. Withthe departure of the CIA Chief of Station, Dearborn became*de facto* CIA Chief of Station and was recognized as such byboth CIA and the State Department. Although on January 20,1961, a new CIA Chief of Station came to the Dominican Republic,Dearborn continued to serve as a link to the dissidents.B. Dearborn Reports Assassination May be OnlyWay to Overthrow Trujillo RegimeDearborn came to believe that no effort to overthrow the
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Trujillo government could be successful unless it involved Trujillo's assassination.He communicated this opinion to both the State Department and the CIA. In July 1960, he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottom that the dissidents were"...in nc way ready to carry on any type of revolutionary activity in the foreseeable future except the assassination of their principal enemy."(Dearborn to Rubottam letter, 7/14/60)It is uncertain what portion of the information provided by Dearborn to State was passed above the Assistant Secretary level. Through August of 1960, only Assistant Secretary Rubottom, his Deputy, Lester Mallory, and Staff Assistant Frank Devine, were, within the Latin American Division of the Department, aware of Dearborn's "current projects." (Devine to Dearborn letter, 8/15/60)*By September 1960, Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubottom as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and Frank Devine had become a Special Assistant to Mr. Mann. While serving as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, Devine reportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating State activities in Latin America. It was in this capacity that Devine maintained almost daily communication with Ned Holman and other officials of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division(Devine, p.7)*Dearborn's candid reporting to State during the summer of 1960 raised concern with the Department and he was advised that certain specific information should more appropriately come through "the other channel" (presumably, CIA communications). Dearborn was advised that his cables to State were distributed to at least 19 different recipient offices. (Id.)
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Mann solicited Dearborn's comments concerning plans-under discussion for forcing Trujillo from power. Dearbornreplied in a detailed letter which concluded:"One further point which I should probably not evenmake. From a purely practical standpoint, it willbe best for us, for the OAS, and for the DominicanRepublic if the Dominicans put an end to Trujillobefore he leaves this island. If he has his millionsand is a free agent, he will devote his life fromexile to preventing stable government in the D.R., tooverturning democratic governments and establishingdictatorships in the Caribbean, and to assassinatinghis enemies. If I were a Dominican, which thankheaven I am not, I would favor destroying Trujillo asbeing the first necessary step in the salvation ofmy country and I would regard this, in fact, as myChristian duty. If you recall Dracula, you willremember it was necessary to drive a stake throughhis heart to prevent a continuation of his crimes.I believe sudden death would be more humane thanthe solution of the Nuncio who once told me he thoughthe should pray that Trujillo would have a long andlingering illness."(Dearborn to Mann letter, 10/27/60)C. Efforts to Convince Trujillo to AbdicateThroughout the fall of 1960, efforts were made on both thediplomatic and economic fronts aimed at pressuring Trujillointo relinquishing control, and ideally, leaving the DominicanRepublic. The use of high level emissaries, both from withinand without the ranks of government, was considered. (SpecialGroup Minutes, 9/8/60; Mann to Dearborn corres., 10/10/60)None of the efforts proved successful, and at the end of 1960Trujillo was still in absolute controlD. CIA Plans of October 1960A CIA internal memorandum dated October 3, 1960 entitled
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"Plans of the Dominican Internal Opposition and DominicanDesk for Overthrow of the Trujillo Government" set forth planswhich "have been developed on a tentative basis which appearfeasible and which might be carried out.. covertly by CIA witha minimal risk of exposure." These plans provided, in part,for the following:"a. Delivery of approximately 300 rifles and pistols,together with ammunition and a supply of grenades, tosecure cache on the South shore of the island, about14 miles East of Ciudad Trujillo."b. Delivery to the same cache described above, of anelectronic detonating device with remote controlfeatures, which could be planted by the dissidents insuch manner as to eliminate certain key Trujillohenchmen. This might necessitate training and intro-ducing into the country by illegal entry, a trainedtechnician to set the bomb and detonator." (Emphasisadded) (CIA Memorandum, 10/3/60)E. December 1960 Special Group Plan of Covert ActionOn December 29, 1960, the Special Group considered andapproved a broad plan of covert support to anti-Trujillo forces.The plan, presented by Bissell, envisioned support to bothDominican exile groups and internal dissidents. Theexile groups were to be furnished money to organize and under-take anti-Trujillo propaganda efforts and to refurbish a yachtfor use in paramilitary activities. Bissell emphasized