Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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Committee. I believe the record reflects that Mr. Schlesinger was the only former DCI whe was in favor of separating the Agency from the Director and all those who were still alive to testify who were former directors favored it, most notably Mr. McCone and also Mr. Helms, Hr. Helms characterizing the director as ending up with a disembodied spirit if he were deprived of this analytical vehicle.So I think as far as the racord goes. I think the record is against divesting the director of the Agency, although there is certainly evidence from those who felt that he should be.Mr. Aaron. Let me see if I can clarify that record a little more.First of all, the proposal is not to divest him from the analytical and production function. That we clearly provide for and Ithat would not take place.The second point is that I believe the record goes to the question of sorting out or separating the director as he has to this time existed in the sort of general kind of overseer and the kind of jawbone authority that he has had. And the questions that have been put to the witnesses generally have been put in the context ofwhat was, up until recently, his authority in that capacity, and I might sav personally I would agree with that.I think if von vere to divorce the director who essentially only had jawbone authority from an agency and the specific![TOP SECRET]
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RE 331 gravity that that gave him then he would be a disembodied2 spirit. But we're talking about a somewhat different situation3 now where he has real authority over the budget.4 Mr. Kirbow. But also presupposes. Mr. Chairman, that you5 have decided already that you're going to separate the analytical6 side of the house up there from the clandestine side of the7 house and put them into separate agencies.8 I don't believe the committee has decided that. The9 staff may.have.10 Mr. Treverton. It doesn't necessarily presuppose that.11 Mr. Kirbow. If he's going to put the analytical side12 of the house over there with the DCI13 Mr. Treverton. Well, in any situation we would leave14 the DCI with his responsibility for estimates and a staff to15 do that.16 I grant that the argument for separating the DCI from17 the CIA is stronger.18 Senator Huddleston. Well, he wouldn't be without authority19 over the Central Intelligence Agency. He recommends the budget20 and tasks them. He gives them the responsibility and apportions21 the resources.22 Mr. Lombard. I wonder if I could ask a question.23 We have had previous DCI's who have testified that you24 should not have the dividing of the DCI from the agency but25 that was based upon the organization as they then knew it.
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Now my question is this. Assuming that we were to achieve all of the measures in the recommendations that we have here for the DCI budget and all the rest, it seems to me that that is an awful lot of work without having to be concerned with the day to day operations of the CIA.I don't know. I irst raise the question.Senator Huddleston. I think that's a good point.Mr. Lombard. He first of all has to present the budget to the President. He has to defend the budget up on the hill, and that's in at least four committees. And then he's got to have an analytical base, and presumably the national estimate function and on top of that, worrying about the day to day operations of the Agency.I don't know if that is more than one may should be asked to do.Senator Huddleston. Well, when we talk about major reorganization and re-assignment of functions, almost, and we're probably confusing that by continuing to call the man who is going to supervise all of the intelligence the OCI.Mr. Bader. Senator, what we are entering into here is a period of transition for the DCI where he has new responsibilities which are not certain at this point how they will be implemented.Part of our problem with this decision is, as has been stated and noted. most of the testimony of former people is against the background of the present situation. The rest of
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it is not really relevant to the question of what the OCI will be doing if, and I underline the word if, these new responsibilities that are being thrust on him by both the Executive and by the Congress, are in fact implemented.The argument I would make here is that the oversight committee should take some time and consider this, certainly in light of how these reforms, if they are reforms, are carried out.Senator Huddleston. So that's option one.Mr. Davis. The Executive Order is an attempt to look at the problem and to make one step which says there will be two deputies, and therefore the OCI will have someone who is managing his operations and takes some of the burden off and that's why they did it. And in a sense they recognized the conflict of interest and this was a step in that direction which we are accepting.And when you say who prepares the budget, you have to be a little careful as to what that means. I mean the money is still authorized to the departments. They will still have their own budgetary process, and how exactly he gets control over that at this point is unclear. We're giving him language about how it's going to happen, and I think that's the argument for waiting a short time to see whether or not he actually does get control.Mr. Aaron. I might just say that we have to look at> [Figure] Image of a text saying TOP SECRET
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this recommendation as well, not simply in the context of thePresident's own proposals and own measures that he has taken butin terms of the measures which we propose bo Laken in statute.which of course the oversight committee or whatever responsiblelegislative committee will have the power to dispose of theseproposals or recommendations.But in that context it's very clear that we do zivevery unambiguous authority, very strong authorit - I think I'venoted a for other points where we actually strengthened the,thrust of the Executive Order. And so when we look at thequestion of whether he should or should not, whether we shouldor should not recommend that in the context of this kind ofauthority there will also be development of a statute thatwould separate these functions, it has to be seen against whatwe propose and not what the President just proposed.Senator Huddleston. The fact is that if everythingwe have recommended so far should come to pass and the DCIshould have the expanded responsibility and authority, hewould be a more powerful wan if he was separated from theoperation of the Agency. He would be a more powerful man thenthan he is now as running the Agency and being the so-calledcoordinator, would he not?.Mr. Davis. That's correct, that's the rurpose.Senator Mathias, Me. Chairman, do us have que testimonyfrom other agency heads, how they would view this question?**TOP SECRET**
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Mr. Lombard. We have come from the DIA.Senator Huddleston. The DIA would favor separating the two.Mr. Miller. General Allen has also said that.Mr. Kirbow. General Allen at the meeting when this was discussed, he indicated that this has not created any problem for him, that he didn't see any favoritism being displayed on the part of Mr. Colby and the people he dealt with.Mr. Maxwell. I think that's part of the reason why a number of us had favored option number one, was that a great deal of the trouble with the President's Executive Order and our recommendations was to give the DCI more authority. But for the period of time in which that has not been sorted out and we don't have a record for to take away or recommend taking away essentially the troops that the DCI had used, which in the future hopefully he would not need if recommendations on both sides come into being would be to weaken him at a crucial time as people try to fill in the vacuum that is created.Senator Huddleston. I think the question then is whether or not what we are recommending actually comes to pass. If it does come to pass. then this is an issue that needs to be addressed.Now the other question is should we remain silent on it in the report or should as option one indicates here, leave it as it is until such times it has been determined that itTOP SECRET
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would be advantageous to seperate them.Is that what we're saying there?Mr. Aaron. Yes. I think there are really three options.One is to leave the stuff out, and my own personal preference would be to leave it out entirely if the committee did not feel that, if it didn't want to recommend that. It's kind of a half-hearted --Senator Hart. Has the Administration already taken a step in this direction with the reorganization?Mr. Aaron. It has by charging the new deputy out there and saving he's going to have more authority.Senator Hart. How does one register disagreement with that? Vote for option one?Mr. Aaron. If you thought that was inadequate, you would vote for number one.Senator Hart. I don't think it's inadequate, I think it's wrong. I vote for option one.Mr. Inderfurth. This also comes up under part 5(d), this whole discussion of options separating out.Mr. Aaron. That's a separable question, the question of the structure of the Agency itself.Mr. Davis. Under the Executive Order this new deputy for the intelligence community is physically moving out of Langley and coming downtown. That's supposed to be symbolic as well of the separation of the two roles.
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Senator Huddleston. Could we solve it by just having a narrative statement at the and of all of these recommendations relating to the DCI to say that the foregoing, preceding recommendations would, if carried out, substantially strengthen the role of the DCI or they are intended to do that?And this brings up the question as to whether or not in this expanded role he should also at the same time be essentially responsible for the operation of one of the agencies and that this matter, as his duties are excanded, this matter needs to be considered further and a determination made whether or not it's appropriate that he continue to hold that responsibility.That's not a recommendation. It's just a commentary on what we have done.Mr. Kirbow. It highlights the problem and passes it to the oversight committee, which would have time to conduct hearings on it after some history had been established on the new role.Senator Mathias. Could Senator Hart elaborate on his brief statement of position?Senator llart. I think the division out there that apparently the President has worked out is a bad one and I for one would like to go en record somewhere or another as opposing it.Mr.Miller. De vor mean, Cenator, that![TOP SECRET]
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40Senator Hart. I don't think this little dotted line means a damned thing, frankly. I've never seen an organization like that work in my life.This is the --Ms. Culbreth. That's ours.Mr. Kirbow. At the present time. Senator, the Executive Order leaves the DCI as head of the CIA with a strong kind of executive deputy out there that does the day to day running of that.Senator Hart. Well, I like that equally less well. That's the same thing.Mr. Aaron. Senator, do you have -- is there another solution that we haven't considered?Senator Hart. Yes. Leave it the way it is now.Mr. Aaron. Make him run it but give him other responsibilities in other areas?Senator Hart. Well, I don't want to name any names but some of the sort of nameless, faceless people that have been out there running operations in effect with some vague responsibility to report upward.Senator Huddleston. Well, we say that in practice when these other, if indeed those other recommendations go into effect and he does assume this additional authority over the total community, once that happened then it ought to be reviewed to see whether or not that additional authority still ought to
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operating head.You know, that can be a dissipation of his accountability.You have a man that is so involved in so many other things that some nameless person is under him calling the shots. But if we were to move him away from that, then that nameless person becomes the man that we're looking to as far as the operation of the CIA is concerned.Mr. Kirbow. At that time too wouldn' you expect that that person would be named as the Director of the CIA. would he nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate?Mr. Miller. What's wrong with having the DCI in charge of the community as long as the deput is under his direct control?Senator Huddleston. Well, you have the community of the USA. You don't call the director out there the director of the DCI.We should be consistent.Mr. Aaron. Option 2-- we'd have a clear deputy, we'd know who he was. He'd be confirmed by the Senate.. He'd be a man of stature and he wouldn't be anybody's deputy. We would be responsible.Mr. Kirbow. He wouldn't be a deputy at all. He'd be the director of CIA.Senator Huddleston. He'd just elevate the deputy for operations to be the director.
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Senator Mathias. Isn't that in effect today except for the titles?Mr. Aaron. Not exactly because he still reports to the DCI. Maybe part of your question goes to who that person ought to be and what kind of requirements there ought to be on that, whether you want to describe the kind of person you want out there.Senator Mathias. Action 2 is really the President's order except for the semantics.Mr. Bader. Not really, Senator.Mr. Quanbeck. Option 2 actually separates. The DCI would be different from the Director of CIA.Mr. Aaron. The guy you would hold responsible under the current system still has to be the DCI. Under option 2 the guy you would hold responsible would be the head of that agency and not Mr. Bush, in effect.Senator Huddleston. If we go to my narrativeparagraph ---Senator Hart. Can we have that written up and brought back?Senator Mathias. I think this could be a critical recommendation.Senator Huddleston. I was going to say we might add a line in there that a reason to review it and possibly to change it would be to give a better fix on responsibility for the actual operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.
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That would be the main reason that I would think that you would move the DCI away from that.Senator Mathias. But it does not appear to me that you exonerate your national intelligence officer, whatever you call him. just because you have someone else you can also point to.I think you'd get two fish on the same hook if something goes wrong.Mr. Aaron. I think that would be in part true depending upon what the particular problem was.Senator Mathias. Well, sure, if their checkwriter is out of wack and they haven't called in the repairman, they might confine the responsibility to --Senator Huddleston. Actually, you don't exonerate him.As I see it for the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency you have added to him the responsibility for the operations of the other intelligence agencies, too, and he has to review authority and be in fact would be the focal point of any misdeed or wrong deed that may occur, whether it's in NSA or CIA or whatever.Mr. Aaron. It would really be very similar to the role he would now have under the Executive Order to the NSA. It's much closer to that.We'll on that paragraph and present it either this afternoon or at meeting.
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44Now the next section refers to the Central Intelligence Agency in general. Now because so much of our inquiry is focused on the Central Intelligence Agency, we have a rather long series of recommendations regarding it.Now the sections are briefly these -- those dealing with the charter for the Agency for its conduct of espionage, counter-intelligence and covert action, and the question of covert action itself, how it might be conducted and what limitations might specifically, or rules and regulations might apply to it.The production of intelligence, which is on its way, but it's not in here, there is another section. Then the impact on the domestic world of these activities both intelligence collection and covert action and I believe you had a good discussion of that longer paper prepared by Mr. Bader the other day.And then finally, some discussions of the inspection system, the general counsel, the inspector general and so forth. and some recommendations in regard to that.Those are the central parts of it. It included of course, such matters as proprietarion, cover and so forth.Now if we could turn to the first set of recommendations, let me just make sure that there are not disagreements in the book that need to be brought to your attention.Mr. Hazwell. I think there are. There are things thatTOP SECRETNW 50955 DocId: 32423509 Page 47
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15ere agreed upon at the taff level that were left out.Mr. Aaron. I have one here.Mr. Kirbow. Well, just for your information, there appears to be several things which were not just an occasional one but several things that were agreed on at the staff level that subsequently found their way back here in the exact original language.But I won't dwell or that now.Mr. Aaron. I'd be happy to take that out to see what we can do about it.Now the first bracket that I find is on page 36. there are any others before that that people have, we can take that up.Mr. Maxwell. There's one on 32. It's not a bracket but it was a statement that would have been included as to the committee's findings as to internal controls on espionage activities by the Central Intelligence Agency.Mr. Aaron Yes. I recall that one.Mr. Maxwell. Also on that page there's no effective machinery to make sure that those outside the clandestine service. I think that was addressed to the CIA because unless a finding is made at the CIA that the DCI at this point, the Director --Mr. Aaron. I don't understand.![TOP SECRET]
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16Mr. Maxwell. The second full paragraph on 33 the way it reads, it assumes that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who is outside the clandestine service is not able to ensure.Mr. Aaron. I understand. You're right. Okay, if these are agreed things and they have been dropped out, then let's just get them back in. I don't know that we have to take the subcommittee's time to do.But if we missed some that were disagreed and need to be brought to the subcommittee. I'd like to make sure we get them out.Senator Huddleston. At the bottom of the page on 33, maybe it's just not coming through to me but the CIA engages in both overt and clandestine activity within the United States for the purpose of foreign intelligence collection by overt means from American citizens.Mr. Aaron. I'm sorry. I think that foreign intelligence collection. period, and then the rest of that sentence comes out.And then it says the domestic collection does the overt, and the foreign resources does the covert.Okay, my first bracket is on page 36 and it is that the Committee questions the practice of recruiting for foreign espionage purpose immigrants desiring American citizenship.The point was made that there have in the past beenTOP SECRET
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instances in which those ho were immigrants to the United States who wished to have citizchin were then approached by the intelligence agencies and either sent back as legal travellers and what have you and the question being the point of concern being that their vulnerable status of wanting to have permanent citizenship in the country made them more susceptible to either actual or implied or even imagined threats or imagined coercion.Mr. diGenova. Can I ask a question about that? I'm totally unfamiliar with the subject and I'd like to know what the evidence was on the record.Mr. Aaron. It came us in two cases that I recall and I'd like for Bill to speak to one of them. One case involved the Chinese in which the Chinese were approached and used for this purpose. I am not aware of any testimony that there was in fact coercion involved. The question was the practice and whather it has within it elements of coercion or at least the potential for it.Now the second case. I think you can speak to.Mr. Bader. We have received testimony from a professor from a university in the Southwest that said that he had acted or was the middleman in an operation of recruitment of Tewish Fussian imigrants who came to the United States the in particular were interested fu move of the Pussion Jovich immigrants whe were quite sound in beta Hob presumably after roer ment they!![TOP SECRET]
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1 Would return to the United States. I mean the Soviet Union.2 We did not take that testimony any further than receiving his3 testimony. That is, we have not taken it to the point of4 asking the agency whether in fact they have such a program5 in the Southwest. So the testimony was limited to that one6 charge which I personally gave some real credibility to.7 Ms. Culbreth. Can you explain just what the charge is8 here? What is the wrong that has been done?9 Mr, Kirbow. What's wrong with that? That's the question10 I had in the original suggestion at the staff level.11 The only human collection we are getting from behind12 the Iron Curtain in Russia today is principally either through13 our cooperation with the Israeli intelligence community using14 just this sort of individual and sending them back, or sending15 this type of individual from the United States back inside.16 We're not getting the other human intelligence.17 Mr. Bader. I was only responding to the question of18 what the testimony was.19 To go on to the further issue which I think is going20 to be addressed by the Committee. it's not the question of21 whether we should, the Central Intelligence Agency should be22 recruiting foreigners in this country for intelligence purposes,23 people who may return to their country of origin.24 The question is whether the individual who is in the25 process of seeking American citizenship are in quotes "vulnerable![TOP SECRET VARD A PAUL]NW 50955 DocId: 32423509 Page 51
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1 to exploitation for such purposes and whether in that shading2 the Committee would want to take a position about recruitment3 of that particular group.4 Mr. diGenova. My position is this, Bill. The first5 time I heard about this was when I read it in these findings6 and corclusions. I never saw a hearing on it, I never saw a7 document about it; I never had a chance to comment on it as8 a designee, and I never had a chance to bring it up with my9 Senator.10 I'm not sure that we want to say this, ask the Senators11 to say this, without having something in a report about what12 the practice is, how it's been conducted, who has objected to13 it. what's the extent of it. before we start making a14 recommendation.15 We're saying we question the practice of recruiting.16 I have no objection to the Committee ultimately making17 a statement like this. I just don't know what the record is.18 This is the first time I've ever seen this.19 Mr. Bader. That's why I wanted it bracketed so it could20 be so discussed.21 Senator Hart. What if we said we urge the permanent22 oversight committee to look into this question?23 Mr. Aaron. I think it would make some sense to have24 gotten the Agency on the record that in fact this is practice25 or something that happens.