Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 8]
TOP SECRETThe hearing record includes some pages of sworn testimony from witnesses*during hearing days as well as numerous staff interviews. The documents which the Committee obtained included raw files from the agencies and departments, from the White House, and from the Presidential libraries of the Administrations of former Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy Kennedy and Johnson.**We obtained evidence of two general types: *first*, evidence which related to the overall setting of events, the national policy of the time, and descriptions of normal operating procedures including channels of command and control; and *second*, evidence relating to specific events.A Senate Committee is not a court. It looks to the past, not to determine guilt or innocence, but in order to make recommendations for the future. Therefore, where we found the evidence to be ambiguous--as we did on some issues--we have set out both sides, in order that the evidence may speak for itself.Despite the number of witnesses and documents examined by the Committee, there were the following shortcomings in the evidence available to us:* The names of the witnesses are set forth in Appendix A.** The Committee served both general and specific document requests upon the Executive Branch and the Administration represented to the Committee that it did not know of any additional relevant documents, except, of course, for the possibility that the "Nixon papers" (which the Committee is attempting to obtain) may contain material relevant to the allegations relating to Chile.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 9]
OP SEGRET-5-Many of the events under consideration occurred as long as fifteen years ago. With one exception, they occurred during the administrations of Presidents now dead. Other high officials, whose testimony might have additional light upon the thorny issues of authorization and control, are also dead. Moreover, with the passage of time, the memories of those still alive have dimmed.The Committee often faced the difficult task of distinguishing refreshed recollection from speculation. In many instances, witnesses were unable to testify from independent recollection and had to rely on documents contemporaneous with the events to refresh their recollections. While informed speculation is of some assistance, it can only be assigned limited weight in judging specific events. Assassination is not a subject on which one would expect many records or documents to be made or retained.In fact, there were more relevant contemporaneous documents then we had expected, and the CIA in 1967 made internal study of the Castro, Trujillo and Diem assassination allegations. That study was quite useful, particularly in suggesting leads for uncovering the story of the actual assassination activity. Unfortunately, some material* Those studies were made at the direction of CIA Director Richard Helms to provide him with information to respond to questions put to him by President Johnson. The President's questions, as to Castro, were provoked by a Drew Pearson newspaper column of March (6), 1967, which had alleged CIA attempts on the life of Castro using the Mafia.The President asked Helms at the same time to provide information about Trujillo and Diem.NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 10
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 10]
-6-relating to that investigation was destroyed upon itscompletion.*A final deficiency in the evidence stems from thedoctrine that CIA covert operations should be concealedfrom the world and performed in such a way that if theywere discovered, the role of the United States could beplausibly denied. As an extension of this doctrine of"plausible deniability" communications between the Agencyand high Administration officials were often convolutedand imprecise.**The evidence contains sharp conflicts, Some of which relate tobasic facts. But the most important conflicts relate not so much to basicfacts as to differing perceptions and opinions based upon relatively undis-puted facts.With respect to both kinds of conflicts, the Committee hasattempted to set forth the evidence extensively so that it may speak foritself. In the findings and conclusions section, we suggest resolutionsof some of the conflicts. Remembering that the Committee's main job isto find lessons for the future, there are also occasions where we pointout that resolving conflicts in the evidence may be less important thanmaking certain that the system which produced the ambiguities is corrected.* This was done pursuant to the instructions of CIA Director Richard  Helms (Helms Ex. ; 6/13/75 Tr. _ ). In fairness to Director Helms it  should be added, however, that he was responsible for requesting the  preparation of the I.G. Reports and for preserving them.** For a full discussion of this doctrine see pages
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 11]
D. Summary of Findings and Conclusions1. The Questions PresentedThe Committee sought to answer four broad questions:ASSASSINATION PLOTS. Did U.S. officials instigate, attempt, aid and abet, or acquiesce in plots designed to assassinate foreign leaders?INVOLVEMENT IN OTHER KILLINGS. Did U.S. officials assist foreign dissidents in a way which significantly contributed to the killing of foreign leaders?AUTHORIZATION. Where there was involvement by U.S. officials in assassination plots or other killings, were such activities ordered and if so, at what levels of our Government?COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL. Even if not authorized, were the assassination activities perceived to be within the scope of agency authority, and was adequate control exercised over its activities.2. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the PlotsThe Seven Allegations. The Committee investigated alleged U.S. involvement in assassination plots in five foreign countries.* They were:| Country       | Individual Involved** || ------------- | --------------------- || Cuba          | Fidel Castro          || Congo (Zaire) | Patrice Lumumba       |* Insert Footnote on Sukarno and Duvalier.** Insert re Raul and Che and Ngo Dinh Nhu.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 12]
Country                                         Individual InvolvedDominican Republic                            Rafael TrujilloChile                                           General Rene SchneiderSouth Vietnam                                 Ngo Dinh DiemIn summary, the evidence with respect to each allegation disclosed the following.*Fidel Castro (Cuba). United States Government personnel plotted to kill Castro beginning in 1960. American underworld figures were used in these plots as well as Cubans hostile to the Castro regime. One of the later plots, which lasted until 1965, involved a Cuban dissident who was provided encouragement and material support by the United States.Patrice Lumumba (Congo/Zaire). In the Fall of 1960, two CIA officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba. Poisons were sent to the Congo and some exploratory steps were taken toward gaining access to Lumumba. Subsequently, in early 1961, Lumumba was killed by Congolese rivals. It does not appear from the evidence that the United States was involved in the actual killing.Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic). Trujillo was shot by Dominican dissidents on May 31, 1961. Commencing in 1960 and continuing to the time of the assassination, the U.S. Government generally supported these dissidents and some Government personnel were aware that they intended to kill Trujillo. Three pistols and three carbines were furnished by American officials, although a request for machine guns was later refused. There was conflicting evidence whether the weapons were knowingly supplied for use in the assassination and whether any were present at the scene.* See Section III for a detailed treatment of the evidence.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 13]
General Rene Schneider (Chile). On October 25, 1970, General Schneider died of gunshot wounds inflicted while resisting a kidnap attempt three days earlier. Schneider, as Commander in Chief of the Army and a constitutionalist opposed to military coups, was considered an obstacle to efforts to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the office of President of Chile. The United States Government supported, and sought to instigate, a military coup to block Allende. U.S. officials supplied financial aid, machine guns and other equipment to various military figures who opposed Allende. There was conflicting evidence on whether the United States had previously severed relations with the group that kidnapped and killed Schneider and on whether any of the equipment supplied was actually used in the kidnapping.Ngo Dinh Diem (South Vietnam). Diem and his brother, Nhu, were killed on November 2, 1963, in the course of a South Vietnamese Generals' coup. Although the United States Government supported the coup, there was no evidence that American officials favored the assassination. Indeed, it appeared that the assassination of Diem was not part of the Generals' pre-coup planning but was instead a spontaneous act which occurred during the coup and with which there was no American connection.In addition to these five cases the Committee received evidence that ranking government officials discussed, and may have authorized, the establishment within the CIA of a generalized capability to assassinate.Similarities and Differences Among the Plots. The plots all involved Third World countries, most of which were relatively small and none of which possessed great political or military strength. Apart from that similarity, there were significant differences among the plots. The following distinctions are pertinent:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 14]
-10-(1) Whether United States officials initiated the plot or were responding to requests of local dissidents for aid.(2) Whether the plot was specifically intended to kill a foreign leader, or whether the leader's death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of an attempt to overthrow the government.The Castro case is an example of a plot conceived by United States officials to kill a foreign leader. The Lumumba plot falls into the same category.In the case of Trujillo, although the U. S. Government certainly opposed his regime, it did not initiate the plot. Rather, United States officials responded to requests for aid from local dissidents whose aim clearly was to assassinate Trujillo. By aiding them this country was implicated, whether the specific weaponry actually supplied was meant to kill Trujillo or was only intended as a symbol of U.S. support for the dissidents.The Schneider case is different from that of both Castro and Trujillo. The United States Government sought a coup and provided support to local dissidents, knowing they believed that General Schneider was an obstacle to their plans. However, even though the support included deadly weapons, it appears that the intention of both the dissidents and the United States officials was to abduct, not to kill, General Schneider. Similarly, in the Diem case, United States officials did want a change in Government, but there is no evidence that the United States sought the death of Diem himself.3. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Issues of Authority and Control.To put the inquiry into assassination allegations in context, two
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 15]
points must be made clear. First, there is no doubt that the United StatesGovernment opposed the various leaders in question. U.S. officialsat the highest levels objected to the Castro and Trujillo regimes, believedthe accession of Allende to power in Chile would be harmful to American in-terests, and thought of Lumumba as a dangerous force in the heart of Africa.Second, the evidence on assassinations has to be viewed in the context of other,more massive activities directed against the regimes in question. Forexample, the plots directed against Fidel Castro personally, cannot be under-stood without considering the fully authorized, comprehensive, assaults uponhis regine, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 and Operation Mongoose in1962.However, the issue of Governmental authorization of assassinationis of independent importance. There is a significant difference between acoldblooded, targeted, intentional killing of an individual foreign leader andother forms of intervention in the affairs of foreign nations. Therefore,the Committee endeavored to explore as fully as possible the question ofhow and why the plots happened, whether they were authorized, and if so, fromwhat level the authorization came.We discovered a murky picture. It is not clear whether this isdue to the system of deniability and the consequent state of the evidencewhich even after our long investigation remains conflicting and inconclusive,or whether there were in fact serious shortcomings in the system of authori-zation so that activities such as assassinations could have been undertaken byan agency of the United States Government without express authority.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 16]
-12-# TOP SECRETBased upon the record of our investigation, the Committee's single most important finding is that the system was such that assassination activity could have been undertaken by an agency of the United State's Government without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was explicit authorization from the highest level.Along with that paramount conclusion, the Committee makes four other major findings.* The first relates to the lack of *direct* evidence of authorization of the assassination plots by Presidents or other persons above the Governmental agency or agencies involved. The second explains why certain officials may have, nonetheless, perceived that, according to their judgment and experience, assassination was an acceptable course of action. The third criticizes agency officials for failing on several occasions to reveal their plans and activities to superior authorities, or for failing to do so with sufficient detail and clarity. The fourth criticizes Administration officials for, on occasion, giving vague and indirect instructions to subordinates, and for not making sufficiently clear that assassination should be excluded from consideration.There is admittedly a tension within the four findings. The first and third points tend to suggest a lack of authority while the second and fourth points explain why agency officials could nonetheless have perceived that their actions were proper. This tension reflects a basic conflict in the evidence. While there are some conflicts over facts, it is more important that there may often have been two differing perceptions of the same facts. This distinction may be the result of the differing backgrounds and experience of those persons experienced in covert operations as distinquished* The Committee's findings are elaborated in Section, infra.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 17]
-13-TOP SECRETfrom those who were not. Words of urgency which to the former may have meantkilling, to the latter may have meant nothing of the sort.While we are critical of certain individual actions, the Committeeis mindful of the inherent problems in a system which relies upon secrecy,compartmentation, circumlocution, and the avoidance of clear responsibility.This sytem creates the risk of confusion and rashness in the very areas whereclarity and sober judgment are most necessary. llence, before turning to anextensive review of the evidence relating to the cases, we briefly deal withthe general subject of covert action during the relevant period.
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# TOP SECRETAgreed to by Drafting SubcommitteeAugust 28, 1975II. COVERT ACTION AS VEHICLE FOR FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATIONSimply stated, covert action may be defined as activity which supports the sponsoring nation's foreign policy objectives but is concealed under circumstances permitting that nation to plausibly deny its actions.The National Security Act of 1947 did not specifically include authority for covert operations. However, it granted to the National Security Council, then created as an instrument of the President, the authority to direct the CIA to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." Thereafter, at its first meeting in December 1947, the National Security Council issued a top secret directive granting the CIA the authority to conduct covert operations. From 1955 to 1970, the basic authority for these operations was National Security Council 5412/2.*This directive framed the purposes of covert operations entirely in terms of opposition to "International Communism,"** directing the CIA to counter, reduce and discredit "International Communism" throughout the world in a manner consistent with U. S. foreign and military policies. It also directed the CIA to undertake covert operations to achieve this end, and defined covert operations as any covert activities related to* Today the basic authority for CIA covert action operations is National Security Decision Memorandum 40, which superceded NSC 5412/2 on February 17, 1970.** By contrast, NSAM 40 of 1970 described covert actions as those secret activities designed to further official U. S. programs and policies abroad. It made no reference to communism.NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 19
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# TOP SECRETpropaganda, economic warfare, political action (including sabotage, demolition and assistance to resistance movements) and all activities *compatible with the directive* (emphasis supplied). In 1962, the CIA's General Counsel rendered the opinion that the Agency's activities are "not inhibited by any limitations other than those broadly set forth in NSC 5412/2." (CIA General Counsel Memorandum 4/6/62)POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND APPROVAL MECHANISMThe evidence dealt with in Part III is concerned with what actually happened as far as obtaining, or not obtaining, authorization for the activities under review by the Committee. With respect to what was meant to happen in regard to covert action generally, the CIA's General Counsel stated in 1962:CIA must necessarily be responsible for planning. Occasionally suggestions for action will come from outside sources but, to depend entirely on such requirements would be an evasion of the Agency's responsibilities. Also, the average person, both in government and outside, is thinking along normal lines and to develop clandestine cold war activities properly, persons knowing both the capabilities and limitations of clandestine action must be studying and devising how such actions can be undertaken effectively.With respect to policy approval, the General Counsel went on to say:Both in developing ideas or plans for action it is incumbent upon the Agency to obtain necessary policy approval, and for this purpose these matters should be explored with proper officials in other departments and agencies, particularly in the Departments of State and Defense, so the determination can be made as to whether any one proposal should go to the Special Group or higher for policy determination.The General Counsel's 1962 memorandum made it clear that the CIA considered itself responsible for developing proposals and plans to
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 20]
# TOP SECRETimplement the specific objectives of NSC 5412/2 at the same time, however, the memorandum stated that even in the development of ideas or plans for action, it was incumbent upon the Agency not only to coordinate with other executive departments and agencies, but also to "obtain necessary policy approval" (emphasis added). The issue which faced the Committee, of course, was whether such approval was, in fact, sought and obtained for assassination plans, and whether CIA officials thought it was "necessary" to obtain *express approval for these activities.*Beginning in 1955, the responsibility for authorizing CIA covert action operations rested in the Special Group, a sub-Cabinet level sub-committee of the National Security Council composed of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Today this group is known as the 40 Committee, and its membership now includes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs. In addition, during 1962 another subcommittee of the NSC was established to oversee covert operations relating to Cuba. It was known as the Special Group (Augmented) and was composed of the members of the Special Group, the Attorney General and certain other high officials.The overriding purpose of the Special Group and its successors has been to exercise control over covert operations abroad. The Special Group was charged with the responsibility of considering the objectives of any proposed activity, whether or not it would accomplish these aims. how likely it would be to succeed, and in general whether or not it would be "proper" and in the American interest. The Special Group Chairman usually was responsible for determining which projects required Presidential consideration, as well as keeping him abreast of progress or changes.NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 21
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 21]
# TOP SECRETThe foregoing should not be taken to imply that the procedures always have been clear and tidy, nor that they have always been followed. Prior to 1955, formal procedures barely existed at all. In 1955 the Special Group procedures were made more formal. Nevertheless, the procedures that were followed during the period of 1959-63 were characterized by an internal CIA memorandum as "somewhat cloudy and thus can probably be described as having been based on value judgments by the DCI." (Memorandum for the Record, C/CA/PEG, "Policy Coordination of CIA's Covert Action Operations," 21 February 1967)In addition to the "somewhat cloudy" nature of the formal procedures themselves, there are other options available to any Chief Executive. The Committee recognizes that an agency charter to plan covert action could not preempt Presidential authority to develop and mandate foreign policy. Similarly, it is equally clear that what may be represented as the "desire" of a President is often communicated by intermediary officials whose perceptions may or may not accurately reflect the true Presidential purpose. Obviously, formal procedures can be disregarded from above or below. In at least one case, for example, a President instructed CIA officials not to consult with the Special Group or other departments. In at least one other case, Agency officials decided not to bring matters to the attention of the Special Group. It should also be noted that all of the above procedures apply to activities labeled "covert action" whereas some of the activities considered in this report were treated as "counter-intelligence" actions. Such actions are not normally subject to 40 Committee-type interdepartmental authorization and review.> [Figure: handwritten text with the word "what"]NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 22