Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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-78-WIROGUE only as a CIA officer would "normally do ... when youspeak in a derogatory manner of an asset." (Hedgman, 8/21/75,p. 101)The Chief of Station maintained that WIROGUE's propositionto QJWIN to join an "execution squad" could be attributed toWIROGUE's "freewheeling" nature. Hedgman said:I had difficulty controlling him in that hewas not a professional intelligence officeras such. He seemed to act on his own withoutseeking guidance or authority ... I foundhe was rather an unguided missile ... thekind of man that could get you in trouble be-fore you knew you were in trouble....(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 96-97).But Hedgman did not disavow all responsibility for WIROGUE's actions:[I]f you give a man an order and he carries itout and causes a problem for the Station, whythen as Chief of Station, well, you acceptresponsibility. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)In sum, the Chief of Station testified that despite the factthat the CIA was interested in the assassination of Lumumba duringthis period, agent WIROGUE's attempt to form an "execution squad"was an unauthorized, maverick action, unconnected to the CIA assassi-nation plan.Nonetheless, the fact that WIROGUE was to be trained in "medicalimmunization" (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75) raises the possibilitythat he was connected to the plot to assassinate Lumumba by meansof lethal biological substances. The 1975 report on WIROGUE's case
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-79-by the Inspector General's office leaves this question open. Thereport concludes with the statement that "WIROGUE/1 spent most ofhis time trying to develop contacts and was not directly involvedin any particular operation." (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) But,when the report was circulated in the Inspector General's office,the following comment was handwritten by Scott Breckinridge, oneof the principal authors of the 1967 report on CIA involvement inassassination attempts: "ROGUE's pitch is too clear to be dis-carded out of hand as 'exceeding instructions.'" (I.G. Memorandum,3/14/75)6. The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing   About Lumumba's Death in KatangaThere is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bring-ing about Lumumba's death in Katanga. The CIA officers most closelyconnected to the plot to poison Lumumba testified uniformly thatthey knew of no CIA involvement in Lumumba's death.(a) Lumumba's Escape from UN Custody, Capture byCongolese Army, and Imprisonment at Thysville:November 27-December 3, 1960The strongest hint that the CIA may have been involvedin the capture of Lumumba by Mobutu's troops after his departurefrom UN custody on November 27, was contained in a PROP cable fromthe Chief of Station to Tweedy on November 14 (CIA Cable IN 42478,Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60). In the cable, Hedgman re-ported that an agent of his had learned that Lumumba'sPOLITICAL FOLLOWERS IN STANLEYVILLE DESIRE THATHE BREAK OUT OF HIS CONFINEMENT AND PROCEED TOTHAT CITY BY CAR TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY.(CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)
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The Chief of Station was confident that he would have foreknowledgeof Lumumba's departure and that action plans were prepared for thateventuality:DECISION ON BREAKOUT WILL PROBABLY BE MADESHORTLY. STATION EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY[AGENT] OF DECISION WHEN MADE.... STATIONHAS SEVERAL POSSIBLE ASSETS TO USE IN EVENTOF BREAKOUT AND STUDYING SEVERAL PLANS OFACTION. (CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)There is no other evidence, however, that the CIA actuallygained prior knowledge of Lumumba's plan to depart for Stanleyville.In fact, a cable from Leopoldville on the day after Lumumba'sescape betrays the station's complete ignorance about the circum-stances of Lumumba's departure (CIA Cable IN 48484, Leopoldvilleto Director, 11/28/60).But the same cable raises at least a question as to whetherthe CIA was involved in the capture of Lumumba enroute by Congolesetroops:[STATION] WORKING WITH [CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT]TO GET ROADS BLOCKED AND TROOPS ALERTED[BLOCK] POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTE. (CIA Cable,11/28/60.).A cable of December 2 reporting Lumumba's capture militatesagainst CIA involvement, however, because it portrays the Congoleseforces as the source of the station's information (CIA Cable IN 10643,Leopoldville to Director, 12/3/60).The Chief of Station testified that he was "quite certain thatthere was no Agency involvement in any way" in Lumumba's departure
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-81-from Uil custody and that he had no foreknowledge of Lumumba'splan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 63-64). He stated that he consultedwith Congolese officers about the possible routes Lumumba mighttake to Stanleyville, but he was "not a major assistance" in track-ing down Lumumba prior to his capture (Hedgman, 3/21/75, p. 65).Despite the fact that O'Donnell had planned to draw Lumumbaout of UN custody and turn him over to Congolese authorities, heinsisted that Lumumba escaped by his own devices and was not trickedby the CIA (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 22).(b) Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Where He Was Killed:January 17, 1960The contemporaneous cable traffic shows that the CIA waskept informed of Lumumba's condition and movements in January of1961 by the Congolese and that the CIA still considered Lumumbaa serious political threat. But there is no direct evidence ofCIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba's death in Katanga.* Excerpts from cable traffic of January 1961 and from the  testimony of CIA officers Hedgman, Tweedy, O'Donnell, and Helms  (investigative report) should be inserted.
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-82-SECTION 7: Rewritten perSubcommittee Instructions,10/20/75 (FDB)*7. The Question of the Level at which the Assassination Plot Was AuthorizedThe chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the assassination plot was authorized by the President. It is clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot.At the least, the chronological relationship between strong Presidential or other White House expressions of hostility to Lumumba and CIA steps toward the assassination of Lumumba is close enough to make it appear that Dulles thought he was acting in response to pressure from above in approving assassination as one means of removing Lumumba from the political scene.Nevertheless, there is enough countervailing testimony by Eisenhower Administration officials and enough ambiguity in the records of high-level policy meetings to raise a doubt as to whether President Eisenhower intended an assassination effort against Lumumba.The chain of significant events in the Lumumba case begins with the testimony that President Eisenhower made a statement at a meeting of the National Security Council in the Summer or early Fall of 1960 that came across to one staff member in attendance as an order for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. The next link is a memorandum of the Special Group meeting of August 25, 1960, which indicated that when the President's "extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action" were conveyed, the SpecialNW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 328
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-83-Group agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. (Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960)The next day CIA Director Allen Dulles, who had attended the Special Group meeting, personally cabled to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE . . . A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION" (CIA Cable OUT 62966, Dulles to Leopoldville, 8/26/60). Dulles added: "YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE."Although the Dulles cable does not explicitly mention assassination, Richard Bissell -- the CIA official under whose aegis the assassination effort against Lumumba took place -- testified that, in his opinion, this cable was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting and signaled to him that the President had authorized assassination as one means of removing Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33-34, 61-62; see Section 7(c), *infra*). Bronson Tweedy, who bore the primary administrative responsibility for activities against Lumumba, testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy that no measure, including assassination, was to be overlooked in the attempt to remove Lumumba from a position of influence (Tweedy, 10/9/75, pp. 4-5).On September 19, 1960, Bissell and Tweedy cabled the Chief of Station to expect a messenger from CIA headquarters. Two days later, in the presence of the President at a meeting of the National Security
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-84-Council, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "would remain a gravedanger as long as he was not yet disposed of" (Memorandum, 460thNSC Meeting, 9/21/60). Five days after this meeting, a CIA scien-tist arrived in Leopoldville and provided the Chief of Stationwith lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinateLumumba, and informed him that the President had authorized thisoperation.Two mitigating factors weaken this chain just enough so thatit will not support an absolute finding of Presidential authoriza-tion for the assassination effort against Lumumba.First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration re-sponsible to the President for national security affairs testifiedthat they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledge of, anassassination plot.Second, the minutes of discussions at meetings of the NationalSecurity Council and its Special Group do not record an explicitPresidential order for the assassination of Lumumba. The Secretaryof the Special Group maintained that his memoranda reflect the ac-tual language used at the meetings without omission or euphemismfor extremely sensitive statements (Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 18-19).NSC staff executives stated, however, that there was a strong pos-sibility that a statement as sensitive as an assassination orderwould have been omitted from the record or handled by means of euphe-mism. Several high Government officials involved in policy-making
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-85-and planning for covert operations testified that the language in these minutes clearly indicated that assassination was contemplated at the NSC as one means of eliminating Lumumba as a political threat; other officials testified to the contrary.(a) High-Level Meetings at which "Getting Rid of Lumumba" Was Discussed(i) Dillon Testified that the Question of Assassination Was Raised at Pentagon Meeting: Summer 1960In late July 1960, Patrice Lumumba visited the United States and met with Secretary of State Christian Herter and Under-secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon. While Lumumba was in Washington, D.C., Secretary Herter pledged aid to the newly formed Government of the Congo (*New York Times*, 7/28/60, p. ).According to Dillon, the impression that Lumumba left with the Government officials was that of an irrational, almost psychotic personality:> When he was in the State Department meeting, either with> me or with the Secretary in my presence . . . he would> never look you in the eye. He looked up at the sky. And> a tremendous flow of words came out. He spoke in French,> and he spoke it very fluently. And his words didn't ever> have any relation to the particular things that we wanted> to discuss . . . You had a feeling that he was a per-> son that was gripped by this fervor that I can only char-> acterize as messianic . . . [H]e was just not a rational> being. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 24.)Dillon said that the willingness of the United States Government to work with Lumumba vanished after these meetings:
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[T]he impression that was left was . . . very bad, that this was an individual whom it was impossible to deal with. And the feelings of the Government as a result of this sharpened very considerably at that time . . . We [had] hoped to see him and see what we could do to come to better understanding with him. (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 23-24.)Dillon testified that shortly after Lumumba's visit to Washing- ton, in late July or August, he attended a meeting at the Pentagon where representatives of the State Department, Defense Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA were present (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 17-20, 25-26).According to Dillon, "a question regarding the possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised" at the meeting (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 15; *see also* 17, 25). Dillon did not recall anything about the language used in raising the question (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 30). Dillon assumed that when the subject of Lumumba's assassination was raised, "it was turned off by the CIA" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 30). Dillon said that "the CIA people, whoever they were, were negative to any such action" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 18). This opposition "wasn't moral," according to Dillon, but rather an objection on the grounds that it was "not a possible thing" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 18). Dillon said the CIA reaction "might have been" made out of the feeling that the group was too large for such a sensitive* Dillon was unable to recall the precise date of this meeting (Dil- lon, 9/2/75, pp. 25-26).
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-87-discussion (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 60).Dillon was clear about the fact that "top level" CIA people were in attendance, although he did not remember who lodged the negative reaction to the assassination question (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 22, 25). He said it "would have to have been either Allen Dulles, or possibly [General] Cabell . . most likely Cabell" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 25). He added that it was "very likely" that Richard Bissell was in attendance (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 21).Dillon stated that this discussion could not have served as authorization for an actual assassination effort against Lumumba (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 31). But he believed that the expression of concern typified a prevalent attitude toward Lumumba that might have justified the CIA's development of a capability to assassinate him:> I think they could have decided they wanted to develop the capability . . just by knowing the concern that everyone had about Lumumba. . . They wouldn't have had to tell anyone about that. That is just developing their own internal capability, and then they would have to come and get permission. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 30)Dillon testified that he had never heard any mention of the plot to poison Lumumba; nor, by implication, had he heard even a hint that the CIA asked permission to mount such an operation (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 50). But after being informed of the poison plot, Dillon made the following comment about the Pentagon meeting he attended:
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-88-I think it is . . . likely that it might have been the beginning of this whole idea on the CIA's part that they should develop such a capacity. And maybe they didn't have it then and went to work to develop it beginning in August. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 61)Dillon said that it was unlikely that formal notes were taken at the meeting or preserved because it was a small "ad hoc" group rather than an official body (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 18). Such interdepartmental meetings were "not unusual," according to Dillon (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 20).The only officials Dillon named as probable participants other than the CIA representatives were Deputy Secretary of Defense James Douglas and Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 19, 21). Douglas stated that it was possible that he attended such a meeting at the Pentagon, but he does not recall it (Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75). Nor does he recall the question of Lumumba's assassination ever being raised in his presence (Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75). Likewise, Irwin stated that it was "likely" that he attended the meeting to which Dillon referred; but he did not remember whether he was present "at any meeting at the Pentagon where the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised" (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, p. 3).(ii) Robert Johnson Testified That He Heard the President Order Lumumba's Assassination at an NSC MeetingRobert H. Johnson, a member of the National Security
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-89-Council staff from 1951 to January 1962, offered what he termed a "clue" to the extent of Presidential involvement in the decision to assassinate Lumumba (Johnson, 6/18/75, pp. 4-5).* Johnson recounted the following occurrence at an NSC meeting in the Summer of 1960 which began with a briefing on world developments by the Director of Central Intelligence:* Robert Johnson introduced his testimony with the following statement:I would like to preface my remarks by pointing out that my decision to offer testimony to this committee has involved for me a profound personal, moral dilemma. In my role as a member of the NSC Staff for ten and one-half years, I was privy to a great deal of information that involved relationships of confidentiality with high officials of the United States government. I have always taken very seriously the responsibilities implied in such relationships.These responsibilities extend, in my view, far beyond questions of security classification or other legal or foreign policy concerns. They relate to the very basis of human society and government -- to the relationships of trust without which no free society can long survive and no government can operate.I have been forced by recent developments, however, to weigh against these considerable responsibilities my broader responsibilities as a citizen on an issue that involves major questions of public morality, as well as questions of sound policy. Having done so, I have concluded, not without a great deal of reluctance, to come to your committee with information bearing upon your inquiry into government decisions relating to the assassination of foreign leaders. (Johnson, 6/18/75, pp. 4-5)After his tenure on the staff of the National Security Council, Robert Johnson served from 1962 to 1967 on the Policy Planning Council at the Department of State.
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At some time during that discussion, President Eisenhower said something -- I can no longer remember his words -- that came across to me as an order for the assassination of Lumumba who was then at the center of political conflict and controversy in the Congo. There was no discussion; the meeting simply moved on. I remember my sense of that moment quite clearly because the President's statement came as a great shock to me. I cannot, however, reconstruct the moment more specifically.Although I was convinced at the time -- and remained convinced when I thought about it later -- that the President's statement was intended as an order for the assassination of Lumumba, I must confess that in thinking about the incident more recently I have had some doubts. As is well known, it was quite uncharacteristic of President Eisenhower to make or announce policy decisions in NSC meetings. Certainly, it was strange if he departed from that normal pattern on a subject so sensitive as this. Moreover, it was not long after this, I believe, that Lumumba was dismissed as premier by Kasavubu in an action that was a quasi-coup. I have come to wonder whether what I really heard was only an order for some such political action. All I can tell you with any certainty at the present moment is my sense of that moment in the Cabinet Room of the White House. (Johnson, 6/18/75, pp. 6-7)Johnson "presumed" that the President made his statement while "looking toward the Director of Central Intelligence" (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 11). He was unable to recall with any greater specificity the words used by the President (Johnson 9/13/75, p. 10).When asked about the strength of the possibility that he had heard only a general directive for the political overthrow of Lumumba, Johnson testified that it was his clear impression at the time of the meeting, and has remained so for the fifteen years since, that he had heard an assassination order:Q: . . Would it be fair to say that although you allow for the possibility that a coup or some more general
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-91-political action was being discussed, it is your clearimpression that you had heard an order for the assassi-nation of Lumumba?Johnson: It was my clear impression at the time.Q: And it remains your impression now?Johnson: It remains my impression now. I have reflect-ed on this other kind of possibility, but that is thesense . . . that persists. (Johnson, 9/13/75, pp. 24-25)Johnson explained that his allowance for the possibility that he hadheard an order for a coup did not disturb his recollection of hear-ing an assassination order:It was a retrospective reflection on what I had heard,and since this coup did occur, it occurred to me thatit was possible that that is what I heard, but thatwould not change my sense of the moment when I heardthe President speak, which I felt then, and I continueto feel, was a statement designed to direct the dispos-al, assassination, of Lumumba. (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 12)Johnson stated that the incident provoked a strong reactionfrom him:I was surprised . . . that I would ever hear a Presidentsay anything like this in my presence or the presence ofa group of people. I was startled. (Johnson, 6/18/75,p. 13)A succinct summary of Johnson's testimony was elicited by SenatorMathias in the following exchange:Mathias: What comes across is that you do have amemory, if not of exact words, but of your own reactionreally to a Presidential order which you considered tobe an order for an assassination.Johnson: That is correct.Mathias: And that although precise words have escapedNW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 337
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you in the passage of fifteen years, that sense of shock remains?Johnson: Right. Yes, sir. (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 8)After the meeting, Johnson, who was responsible for writing the memorandum of the discussion, consulted with a senior official on the NSC staff to determine how to handle the President's statement in the memorandum and in the debriefing of the NSC Planning Board that followed each meeting:I suspect -- but no longer have an exact recollection that I omitted it from the debriefing. I also do not re- call how I handled the subject in the memo of the meet- ing, though I suspect that some kind of reference to the President's statement was made. (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 7).In his second appearance, Johnson reiterated that it was "quite like- ly that it was handled through some kind of euphemism or may have been omitted altogether" (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 21).[^1][^1]: In 1960, Johnson was Director of the Planning Board Secretariat third in command on the NSC staff. He attended NSC meetings to take notes on the discussions whenever one of the two senior NSC officials was absent.Johnson testified that the person with whom he consulted about the manner of recording the President's statement in the minutes was one of the two top NSC staff officials at that time: NSC Executive Secre- tary James Lay or Deputy Executive Secretary Marion Boggs (Johnson, 9/13/75, pp. 12-13). Johnson could not recall which of the two offi- cials he had consulted, but he "inferred" that it must have been the "top career NSC staff person present" at the meeting where he heard the President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 12). At both of the NSC meetings where the President and Johnson were present for a dis- cussion of Lumumba August 18 and September 7 -- James Lay was ab- sent and Marion Boggs served as Acting Executive Secretary.Marion Bogg's statement about his method of handling the situation described by Johnson is in accord with Johnson's testimony: