Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 7]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:RICHARDSON TAYLORSPERA HARKINSCONEIN TRUEHEARTMINH WEEDE, Gen. Richard G.KHIEM (Chief of Staff, MAC/V)OCCURRENCE:On August 29, 1963, the following report was listed within the Saigon Station's chronology of August 1963 coup activities as follows:"At 0745 hours, RICHARDSON, SPERA and CONEIN, latter two of whom were scheduled to contact GENERALS MINH and KHIEM at 0815 same morning, were shown a message from GENERAL TAYLOR to GENERAL HARKINS stating aspects of Vietnam situation being reviewed at WHITE HOUSE and commenting that second thoughts were beginning in Washington. Faced with this information and given strictly limited time factors, RICHARDSON decided that the meeting with GENERALS MINH and KHIEM should not be postponed but that contacting officers would make this meeting a fact-finding mission without encouraging or discouraging GENERAL MINH."When SPERA and CONEIN returned from their meeting with KHIEM and MINH, (con't.)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 12FILE:STAFF: DawsonDATE: 28.6.75PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:OCCURRENCE:we proceeded to TRUEHEART's office to make our report. The AMBASSADOR came in and RICHARDSON advised him of our meeting with GENERAL WEEDE, of TAYLOR's cable, and of the decisions which RICHARDSON had made as a result of the TAYLOR cable. LODGE was angry and expressed the view that RICHARDSON's decision had destroyed the possibilities of carrying out a coup. RICHARDSON expressed a firm dissenting opinion." (12)SOURCE:FILE:STAFF:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 8]
# ENTITIES:TAYLOR, MaxwellDEPTEL 243HARKINS, JohnDEFENSE DEPARTMENT ParticipationJOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF# DATES:28 Aug. 1963# CATEGORIES:DIEM![top secret stamp]# OCCURRENCE:The following telegram was sent from TAYLOR to HARKINS (JCS 3368-63) on August 28, 1963:"Important WHITE HOUSE meeting on subject scheduled for 1200 28 August EDT, your views urgently needed on overall feasibility of operation contemplated....FYI State to Saigon 243 was prepared without DOD or JCS participation. Authorities are now having second thoughts." (11)# SOURCE:I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 11# FILE:# STAFF:Dawson# DATE:28.6.75
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGE, Henry CabotDIEMDATES:26 August 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:On August 26, 1963, AMBASSADOR LODGE presented his credentials to SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM. (8)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 8STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 28.6.75PERSONS/ENTITIES:RICHARDSON, JohnLODGE, Henry CabotCONEIN, CIA officer in SaigonKHIEMSPERA, CIA officer in SaigonKHANHDEPTEL 243DATES:26 Aug. 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:On August 26, 1963, in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0304),"RICHARDSON reports that the AMBASSADOR decided that the American official hand should not show in the operation. It was agreed that CONEIN would see KHIEM and that SPERA would see KHANH. CONEIN and SPERA were directed to convey the substance of DEPTEL 243, plus this comment: 'We cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action, win or lose.'" (9)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 9STAFF: Dawson
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## PERSONS/ENTITIES:RICHARDSON, JohnLODGE, Henry Cabot DIEMTRUEHART, William CIAHARKINS, Gen. Paul D. (Commander, MAC/V)WEEDE, Gen.## DATES:25 August 1963## CATEGORIES:DIEM## OCCURRENCE:On August 25, 1963, the following/cable from Saigon (SAIG 0296) had the message below:"RICHARDSON reports the results of a conference among AMBASSADOR LODGE, DCM TRUEHART, GENERAL HARKINS, GENERAL WEEDE, and RICHARDSON. The group agreed that giving DIEM an option had no chance of success. They accepted DEPTEL 243 (of 24 August) as a basic decision from Washingto and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions. RICHARDSON gives headquarters his views on possible successor regimes." (7-8)## SOURCE:I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 7-8FILE: Part CSTAFF: DawsonDATE: 28.6.75
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:HARRIMAN, Averell KENNEDY, John F.HILSMAN, Roger TAYLOR, MaxwellMcCONE, John (Mil. ass't toMCNAMARA, Robert Pres.)RUSK, Dean GILPATRIC, RoswellDATES:24-25 August1963CATEGORIES:DIEMTOP SECRET(CARD 1 of 4)OCCURRENCE:The I.G. REPORT of 1967 (CIA) contains the following description of the events of August 25, 1963, from a book by MARGUERITE HIGGINS: "The crucial act, with its overtones of Greek tragedy, opened with a cable. It was dispatched to Saigon late in the evening of August 24, 1963, a date made more significant because it was a Saturday. Washington usually empties on summer weekends or lapses into a somnolent mood as officials desperately seek relaxation.""The telegram contained spectacular new instructions for the U.S. EMBASSY in SAIGON. It was drawn up at a meeting called by Under-secretary of State AVERELL HARRIMAN and ROGER HILSMAN, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and head of the Vietnam task force. The President's senior advisers were, for the most part, out of town. CIA DIRECTOR JOHN McCONE was in California. DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT MCNAMARA was on vacation. (con't)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 5-6PART CSTAFF: DawsonDATE: 28.6.75FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:(cont)HELMS, RichardDIEMNHUDATES:CATEGORIES:DIEMTOP SECRET(CARD 2 of 4)OCCURRENCE:SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK was attending a baseball game in New York. PRESIDENT KENNEDY was at Hyannis Port. GENERAL TAYLOR says he knew nothing of the meeting until it was over and the telegram long on its way."... the cable proved historic. For the first time it gave the signal to 'unleash' the Vietnamese military, flashed a green light for the coup against DIEM of which the generals had been talking for so many years.""... the cable of August 24 was a radical revision of the previous philosophy of one war at a time. It envisaged the generals' making war on their own government, and with the implicit blessing of the United States.""The substance of the cable was that the U.S. EMBASSY was to make an effort (con't.)NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 12
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:Diem(CARD 3 of 4)OCCURRENCE:to persuade DIEM to fire his brother, release the Buddhist rebels, end press censorship, and restore other democratic liberties suspended under martial law. And if, as the cable anticipated, DIEM would not do these things, then the EMBASSY was to contact the VIETNAMESE GENERALS and tell them that the United States would no longer stand in the way of a revolt."... the controversial August 24 cable was dispatched from Washington Saturday evening after being cryptically summarized to PRESIDENT KENNEDY at the summer White House at Iyannis Port.""The ACTING SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ROSWELL GILPATRIC . . . had the cable described to him over the telephone. MR. GILPATRIC says he was frankly surprised that such an (con't.)PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE:Important set of instructions should be rushed out on a weekend. But he did not feel that he ought to veto the telegram since . . . it had the 'approval of the PRESIDENT.'"In McCONE's absence, the cable was described, again cryptically, to RICHARD HELMS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR of the CIA, who also did not feel disposed to veto something 'approved by the PRESIDENT.'" (5-6)CARD 4 of 4NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 13
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGE, Henry Cabot (Amb. to SVN)NHUDIEMDEPTEL 243OCCURRENCE:In a State telegram to Saigon (DEPTEL 243), on August 24, 1963, the following message appeared:"The DEPARTMENT informs the AMBASSADOR that the U.S. Government cannot tolerate a situation in which power lies in NHU's hands. If DIEM is unwilling to rid himself of NHU, then DIEM himself may have to go. The AMBASSADOR is authorized: (1) to inform the GVN that actions against BUDDHISTS must be redressed; (2) to tell key military leaders that the USG cannot support a DIEM regime that includes the NHU's and that 'we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism;' (3) to make statements in Saigon removing the military taint on the pagoda raids.""The telegram includes the following statement: 'The AMBASSADOR and COUNTRY TEAM should urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how (con't.)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 4-5FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:OCCURRENCE: (con't from card 1)we might bring about DIEM's replacement if this should become necessary. You will understand that we cannot from Washington give you detailed instructions as to how this operation should proceed, but you will also know we will back you to the hilt on actions you take to achieve our objectives.'" (4-5)DATES:24 August 1963CATEGORIES:DiemSTAFF: DawsonDATE: 28.6.75DATES:CATEGORIES:
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:Thich Tri QuangDiemDATES:Aug. 21, 1963CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE:> [Figure: "TOP SECRET" stamp partially obscuring the text]Higgins states that the Xa Loi pagoda, based on her own experiences, was more a political command post than a holy place. It was the headquarters from which the militant Thich Tri Quang and others had run their political war against the Diem regime. According to Higgins, Thich Tri Quang told an Austrian journalist by the name of Denis Warner early in August that he hoped in the process "they would kill one or two of us."Higgins goes on to note that the State Department regarded the actions against a dozen pagodas a betrayal of Diem's promise to reconciliate the Buddhists. (Page 181)SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins,Harper and RoweFILE:STAFF: DawsonDATE: July 3, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:GENERAL TON THAT DINH, MILITARYGOVERNOR OF SAIGON, COMMANDER 3RDCORPSCONEINNGO DINH NHUAMBASSADOR NOLTINGDATES:21 August 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMLodije, Henry C.OCCURRENCE: "On the night of the 21st of August, GENERAL TON THAT DINH, as military governor of Saigon and Commander of the 3rd Corps, has established a curfew. If I recall correctly, the curfew was to start about 7:00 or 8:00 o'clock at night. Anybody seen after that time would be shot. And that night, elements later on, we didn't know at that time, later on proving to be elements of the special forces, which was praetorian guard of NGO DINH NHU and the police dressed in military uniforms attacked the pagodas in Saigon. What was very bad about this, Ambassador NOLTING had already been relieved and Ambassador LODGE was on his way to take over". p. 21SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein> [Figure: "TOP SECRET" stamp partially obscuring the text]STAFF: R. DAWSONNW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 15
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:Milting, AmbassadorLodge, AmbassadorDiemThich Tri QuangDATES:Aug. 21, 1963CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE:Higgins claims that "...the raids by the Vietnamese Army and the pagodas took place five days after the departure of Ambassador Milting from Saigon, and a week before Henry Cabot Lodge was expected to arrive on his first tour of duty in Viet Nam." Higgins goes on to explain that Diem claimed that the reason that the raids were performed at this time was because: "It had become clear that Thich Tri Quang of Buddhist was that no intention of coming to any agreement with the government, irrespective of how many consessions were made. Since the raids would create an anti-Diem propaganda explosion, it would be less embarrassingto the United States if they took place when the new Ambassador was *not President* of Vietnam. For the same reason, great care was taken not to inform the United States of the pagoda plans. The reasoning was that Washington could be blamed for something about which if knew nothing." (page 183)SOURCE:STAFF:DATE:FILE:---PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:CONEIN, CIA officer (Saigon)DON, General8/21/63DiemDIEMOCCURRENCE:On August 21, 1963, at a meeting between CONEIN [an officer of the CIASaigon station] and General DON, the latter asked for US governmentassurances of support assurances of support for moves against the DIEMregime." (3)SOURCE:STAFF:1967 I.G. Report, Part C, p3.RDFILE:DATE:NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 16
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:GENERAL DONAMBASSADOR NOLTINGCONEINDATES:July 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: On July 4, 1963, CONEIN received a message from DON, Commander of I Corps at the time, to meet with him in the Caravelle Hotel for a public meeting and the hotel was jammed packed. CONEIN states that: "It was at that time on the 4th of July that I had the first indication that something serious was being comtemplated, when GENERAL DON told me that if the Buddhist situation does not get settled, that the military are planning. I reported this fact, and I believe it was around the 8th or 9th of July, that more indications...." p. 20.SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinFILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:30 June 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:EN. DUONG VAN MINHEN. TRAN VAN DONAJ. GEN. LE VAN KIMEN. TRAN THIEN KHIEMDATES:7/63CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: The initial conscious decision and agreement among the coup principals occurred before General Duong Van Minh has been the indubitable leader of the coup principals from the outset. General Tran Van Don has been General Minh's deputy and principal officer to coordinate civilian officers and unit commanders. Major General Le Van Kim, probably the most intelligent of the conspirators, has been responsible for aligning nationalist opposition parties and for developing political planning. General Tran Thien Khiem's role was to issue necessary orders and to act as Chief of Staff to General Minh during the plotting of the coup and the actual coup.SOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 10.STAFF:DawsonDATE:6/30/75FILE:
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:DIEMGEN. MINHNGO DINH NHUDATES:7/63CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:> TOP SECRETOne of the main factors that affected the coup was the decision to eliminate or keep President Diem. The majority of the officers, including General Minh, desired President Diem to have honorable retirement from the political scene in South Vietnam and exile. As to Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, there was never dissension. The attitude was that their deaths, along with Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, would be welcomed.SOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page ten.STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75---PERSONS/ENTITIES:DiemDATES:10 July 1963CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE:> TOP SECRETIn SNIE, 53-2-63, on 10 July "the situation in South Vietnam" the following quotation appeared: "if -- as is likely -- Diem fails to carry out truly and promptly the commitment he has made to the Buddhists, disorders will probably flare again and the *chances* of coup or assassination attempts against him become even better... We do not think the Communists would necessarily profit if he were overthrown by some combination of his non-Communist opponents. A non-Communist successor regime might be initially less effective against the Viet Cong, but, given continued support from the U. S., could provide reasonably effective leadership for the government and the war effort." (1-2)SOURCE:1967 I.G Report, part C, vol. 1-2STAFF:
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:DIEMTHICH TRI QUANGDATES:May 6, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: Diem on May 6, 1963 revived a regulation banning the public display of any religious flag--either the Buddhist or Catholic-- having any precedence over the National Vietnamese flag in public places or in public view. Higgins does not doubt that the Vietnamese government's decision to revive these flag regulations on May 6, 1963 made possible the Hue tragedy. Ironically, action by Diem has been generally viewed as anti- Buddhist. His May 6 circular had been provoked a few days earlier in Da Nang by the excessive use by Catholics of the flag of the vatican with the National Vietnamese flag on view being sometimes tattered and torn and few in number. (91)SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row1965STAFF:Dawson, R.DATE: July 2, 1975FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINMADAME NHUDATES:1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that the catalyst that brought down the DIEM regime was their antagonism of the Buddhists. He explained that 80% of the Vietnamese people claimed to be Buddhists. And that DIEM led a Catholic regime and that this drove people, particularly in light of MADAME NHU's statements to the effect that she'd like to furnish some mustard at a bonzes barbecue, or something to that effect. This made people want to identify themselve:: against the regime and so they would go back to the pagodas. CONEIN did not know whether or not this became the principal reason for the United States wanting to get rid of the regime. pp. 42-44.SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinSTAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:FILE:
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:TRUEHEART, WILLIAMMECKLIN, JOHN (Dir. USIA)NOLTING, AMBASSADORDATES:June 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMCard 1 of 2OCCURRENCE: Mecklin stated that the American position following the incident at Hue was to "urge Diem to repair all Buddhist grievances forthwith, to accept responsibility for the May 8 killings, and to indemnify the victims and apologize, perhaps by visiting Hue himself to do so." (Ambassador Nolting was on a Meditterranean vaction at the time.)"According to Mecklin, William Trueheart, the Charge d'Affaires, applied on orders from Washington, 'direct, relentless, tablehammering pressure on Diem such as the United States had seldom before attempted with a sovereign friendly government...' In despair Trueheart in June resorted to a formal warning to Diem that if he continued repressive measures (police effort to prevent and disperse illegal demonstrations), the United States would be forced to disassociate itself publicly from such actions, as indeed we did two months later. The warning was a momentous step. It amounted to a direct official command from (continued next card).SOURCE:Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper tand Row, 1965STAFF:Dawson, R.DATE: July 2, 1975FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:CARD TWODATES:CATEGORIES:DIEMCard 2 of 2OCCURRENCE: (continuation) the United States. Public disassociation could have disasterous results, encouraging the Buddhists, heartening the Viet Cong, strengthening the regimes foreign critics..." perhaps even stimulating the Vietnamese Army to try another coup'"(100)![TOP SECRET]SOURCE:Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and RowSTAFF:NW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 20
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINNHU, NGO DINHMADAME NHUCAN, NGO DINHDATES:"Summer 1963"CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that the attacks in May in Hue followed up by an attack in Augus on the pagodas in Saigon consolidated the three or four different sects of the Buddhists by making them become a political entity which they had never been before. CONEIN stated that it had become obvious to people in the State Department, USAID and JUSPAU, as well as persons within the CIA and the country team generally, that the true power of the government at that time was not DIEM but rather NHU and CAN, as well as MADAME NHU, the chief of the womens' solidarity movement. DIEM was felt to be out of touch with reality and not getting the true facts as everything was being channeled through his brother, NHU. pp. 44-45SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinFILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:July 1, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINDATES:"middle May1963"CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: CONEIN said that the DIEM government started the Buddhist antagonism but could not understand their doing so. He gave his personal opinion as that "they had a chance to get out of it and get out of it very gracefully within the first two weeks after the 8th of May incident in HUE by meeting the demands of paying off the families of those people who were killed when the military attacked the pagodas in Hue. If this would have been done, I think that we would have been much better off....This was a turning point of the political situation....". pp. 41-42SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinSTAFF:R. DAWSON
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:DIEMMAJOR GEN. TRAN VAN DON (sp.?)DATES:May 8, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:"Immediately after May 8, President Diem ordered a formal investigation of the Hue affairs. For this purpose he appointed a 3-man technical commission led by Major General Tran Van Don, the acting head of the army (General Don was considered a man of integrity by the Americans.)" The commission also included the Surgeon General of the Vietnamese Army and its Chief of Ordinance. After extensive interrogation of witnesses General Don's mission cited plastic charges as the cause of the deaths on May 8."At the time, nonetheless, Diem's regime claimed that plastic bombs caused the deaths was widely ridiculed.""Unfortunately, no American officials were witness to the incidence. The American consul had been out of town but he tended to disbelieve the government's efforts to place (continued) the blame on Viet Cong plastics. He felt that the American supplied grenades were responsible for the killings." (96)SOURCE:Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, 1965STAFF:Dawson, R.DATE: July 2, 1975FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:THICH TRI QUANGNGUTEN VAN BANG (Province Chief)MAJOR DANG SY (ASST. PROV. CHIEF)DATES:May 8, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:Nguyen Van Bang later at the trial of Major Dang Sy said that "While we were inside, two loud explosions suddenly reverberated on the veranda. Then came the sounds of broken glass, gunshots, and exploding hand grenades." In the confusion Major Dang Sy heard the explosions also and in attempting to signal what he feared may be a Viet Cong attack fired three shots in the air. Unfortunately this was the prearranged signal authorizing his troops to use grenades to disperse the crowds. At least 15 of these grenades were throw and the explosions caused at least 8 dead at the radio station. (95) This statement though, appears to be in conflict with later medical evidence coming from the Interior Minister which found that none of the bodies of the dead had metal splinters in their organs, but rather the weapons expert said that the bombs were probably made of plastic and that "plastic is the arm of the Viet Cong guerilla." (95-96)"SOURCE:Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, 1965STAFF:Dawson, R.DATE: July 2, 1975FILE:
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:THICH TRI QUANGNGUYEN VAN BANG (Province Chief)MAJOR DANG SY (Asst. Province Chief)DATES: May 8, 1963CATEGORIES: DIEMOCCURRENCE: According to Higgins on May 8, 1963 on the Buddhist birthday Thich Tri Quang, in the middle of a religious ceremony, began to give a vitriolic anti-government speech on the subject of the non-existent ban on Buddhist flags. About 8 pm Thich Tri Quang arrived at the radio station carrying in his hands a tape recording which he then made the demand upon the director of the station to play. He was refused. Thich Tri Quang proceeded to encourage an already active angry crowd which in the middle of this oration began to shout and press forward. The director of the station called up Nguyen Van Bang who soon arrived and attempted to appease Thich Tri Quang, but the latter would not listen. Nguyen Van Bang then asked for armored cars in hopes that this would fighten the crowd and prevent any violence to the radio station. Major Dang Sy then arrived with some armored cars and got some general orders to disperse the crowd. Police arrived and attempted to turn fire hoses on the crowd. (93-94)SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and RowSTAFF: Dawson, R.FILE:DATE: July 2, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:Trich Tri QuangDiemDATES: May 8, 1963CATEGORIES: DiemOCCURRENCE: "No evidence can be adduced showing that before the Hue incident of May 8, 1963, there was a religious issue in Vietnam. If there had been, assuredly the critics of Diem's leadership would have trumpeted it to the world. Complaints of alleged religious repression made by Thich Tri Quant and his accomplices in a campaign of letters to the United Nations and prominent foreigners, had begun, but they represented no more than the early activity of determined propagandists.Most hostile criticism toward Diem centered not on what he did but on his methods and techniques of governing."