Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# TOP SECRET-55-The Committee does not have this new "marching order" in its possession.However, CIA officials from whom the Committee took testimony believed that there had been no such definitive end to Track II. It merely tapered off, to be replaced by a longer-term effort to effect a change of government in Chile. Karamessines' testimony was most explicit:Mr. Karamessines. I am sure that the seeds that were laid in that effort in 1970 had their impact in 1973. I do not have any question about that in my mind either. (Karamessines testimony, p. 26)***Q. Was Track II ever formally ended? Was there a specific order ending it?Mr. Karamessines. As far as I was concerned, Track II was really never ended. What we were told to do in effect was, well, Allende is now President. So Track II, which sought to prevent him from becoming President, was technically out, it was done. But what we were told to do was to continue our efforts. Stay alert, and to do what we could to contribute to the eventual achievement of the objectives and purposes of Track II. That being the case, I don't think it is proper to say that Track II was ended.(Ibid., pp. 128-129)When informed of Karamessines' testimony that Track II was never ended, Kissinger testified:The Chairman. Would you take issue with that, with the (Karamessines) testimony?Secretary Kissinger. Totally....It is clear that...after October 15th that there was no separate channel by the CIA to the White House and that all actions with respect to Chile were taken in the 40 Committee framework. There was no 40 Committee that authorized an approach to -or contact with military people, no plots which I am familiar with, and all the covert operations in Chile after Allende's election by the Congress were directed towards maintaining the democratic opposition for the 1976 election. And that was the exclusive thrust, and if there was any further unauthorized and this is the first that I have heard of it. (Kissinger testimony, pp. 75-77)
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(Draft--9/8/75)A. SummarySouth Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were assassinated during a coup by Vietnamese generals on November 2, 1963. Evidence before the Committee indicates that the United States Government offered encourage-. ment for the coup, but neither desired nor was involved in the assassinations. Rather, Diem's assassination appears to have been a spontaneous act by Vietnamese generals, engendered by anger at Diem for refusing to resign or put himself in the custody of the leaders of the coup.On one occasion, General Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh") out- lined to a CIA officer the possible assassination of Nhu and another brother, Ngo Dinh Can, as one of three methods being considered for changing the government in the near future. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Deputy Chief of Mission William Trueheart were informed of this possibility by the Saigon Chief of Station, who recommended that "we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a bloodbath in Saigon or a protracted struggle which would rip the Army and the country asunder" (CIA cable SAIG 1447, Saigon Station to DCI, 10/5/63). Upon being informed, Director McCone sent two cables. The first stated "[w]e cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination", and the second directed that the recommendation be withdrawn because "we cannot be in position actively condoning such course of action and thereby engagingNW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 133
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-2-our responsibility therefor" (CIA cable, DCI to Saigon 10/5/63);CIA cable DIR 73661, DCI to Saigon, 10/6/63).B. The Abortive Coup of August 1963On May 8, 1963, South Vietnamese troops in the City of Huefired on Buddhists protesting against the Diem Government, killingnine and wounding fourteen. This incident triggered a nationwideBuddhist protest and a sharp loss of popular confidence in theDiem regime.*On May 13, United States Ambassador Frederick E. Holtingmet with Diem and outlined steps which the United States desiredhim to take to redress the Buddhist grievances and recapturepublic confidence. These steps included admitting responsibilityfor the Hue incident, compensating the victims, and reaffirmingreligious equality in the country. (Pentagon Papers, p.208) OnJune 3, Madame Nhu, the wife of Diem's brother, Nhu, publiclyaccused the Buddhists of being infiltrated with Communist agents;Truehart protested her remarks to Diem and threatened to dis-associate the United States from any repressive measures againstthe Buddhists in the future (Pentagon Papers, p.308). Shortlythereafter, Madame Nhu commented on the self-immolation of Quang[^1][^1]: Senator Gravel Edition, *The Pentagon Papers, The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam*, pp. 207-208, Volume II, Beacon Press, Boston (hereinafter cited as Pentagon Papers). Former Public Affairs Officer of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, John Mecklin), in his book, *Mission in Torment, An Intimate Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam*, Doubleday and Company, 1965, (hereinafter cited as Mecklin, at pages 158-60 described the vulnerability of the Buddhists to Communist infiltration during this period noting that it" "offered a classic opportunity for a Communist sleeper ploy."
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Duc and other Buddhist monks by stating that she would like to furnish mustard for the monks' barbecue. On June 12, Trueheart told Diem that Quang Duc's suicide had shocked the world and again warned that the United States would break with his government if he did not solve the Buddhist problem. (Pentagon Papers, p. 208.)Lucien Conein, a CIA officer in Saigon,* testified that the Buddhist uprisings were the catalyst that ultimately brought down the Diem regime (Conein, pp. 42-44). These events led the United States to apply "direct, relentless, and tablehammering pressure on Diem such as the United States has seldom before attempted with a sovereign friendly government." (Mecklin, p. 169)By July 4, 1963, Generals Minh, Don, Kim, and Khiem had agreed on the necessity for a coup.**In his final meeting on August 14 with Ambassador Nolting, Diem agreed to make a public statement offering concessions to the Buddhists. This statement took the form of an interview[^1] Conein testified that he had known the Generals involved in the coup"for many years. Some of them I had known back even in World War II. Some of them were in powerful positions, and I was able to talk to them on a person to person basis, not as a government official." (Conein, p. 17.)[^2] Conein's After-Action Report stated that:"The majority of the officers, including General Minh, desired President Diem to have honorable retirement from the political scene in South Vietnam and exile. As to Ngo Dinh Nhu and .Ngo Dinh Can, there was never dissention. The attitude was that their deaths, along with Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, would be welcomed." (Conein After-Action Report, p. 10.)[^1]: * Conein testified that he had known the Generals involved in the coup[^2]: ** Conein's After-Action Report stated that:
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-4-with the columnist, Margurite Higgins, in which Diem asserted that his policy toward the Buddhists had always been conciliatory and asked for harmony and support of the government.Shortly after midnight on August 21, 1963, Nhu ordered forces loyal to him to attack pagodas throughout Vietnam, arresting monks and sacking the sacred buildings. Over thirty monks were injured and 1,400 arrested. The American Embassy was taken by surprise and viewed the attacks as a shattering repudiation of Diem's promises to Nolting. (Pentagon Papers, p.210)On August 24, 1963, the State Department sent a cable (Deptel 243) to the new ambassador in Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge. The telegram was prepared by Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman, and was approved by President Kennedy. (Pentagon Papers, p.235) Deptel 243 told Lodge to press Diem to take "prompt dramatic actions" to redress the grievances of the Buddhists."We must at same time also tell key military leaders that US would find it impossible to continue support GVN (Vietnamese Government) militarily and economically unless above steps are taken immediately which we recognize requires removal of the Nhu's from the scene. We wish give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove Nhu's but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem. You may also tell appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism . . . . Concurrently with above, Ambassador and country teams should urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how we might bring Diem's replacement if this should become necessary . . . . ."[^1][^1]: Conein testified that the raids might have been timed to occur when no American Ambassador was in Vietnam (Nolting had left a few days before and his replacement, Lodge, had not yet arrived) (Conein, p.21).
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-5-In a cable on August 25, CIA Chief of Station John Richardson reported the result of a conference among himself, Lodge, True- heart, General Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision from Washington and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions", (I.G., C, pp. 7-8) but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his brother from his position in the government.Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation that the United States contemplated suspending aid to the South Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers, p. 212).* Later on that same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officers Conein and Spera were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh, respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243, but to remind them that "we cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action, win or lose" (SAIG 0304, 8/26/63).A message from the White House on August 29 authorized Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding, but did not involve United States armed forces. Lodge was autho- rized to suspend United States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272, 8/29/63.) A cable from the President to Lodge on the same day stated:*In a cable to Harriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broadcast had "complicated our already difficult problem" by eliminating "the possibility of the generals' effort achieving surprise." Lodge further warned that. "the US must not appear publicly in the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends" (Cable, Lodge to Harriman, 8/26/63).
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-6-"I have approved all the messages you are receiving from others today, and I emphasize that everything in these messages has my full support. We will do all that we can to help you conclude this operations successfully . . . Until the very moment of the go signal for the operation by the Generals, I must reserve a contingent right to change course and reverse previous instructions. While fully aware of your assessment of the consequences of such a reversal, I know from experience that failure is more destructive than an appearance of indecision. I would, of course, accept full responsibility for any such change as I must also bear the full responsibility for this operation and its consequences." (Cable, 8/29/63).In a reply cable, Lodge stated:"1. I fully understand that you have the right and responsibility to change course at any time. Of course I will always respect that right.2. To be successful, this operation must be essentially a Vietnamese affair with a momentum of its own. Should this happen you may not be able to control it, i.e., the "go signal" may be given by the generals." (Cable, Lodge to President, 8/30/63)A cable from Saigon dated August 31, 1963, stated:"This particular coup is finished . . . Generals did not feel ready and did not have sufficient balance of forces . . . There is little doubt that GNV (South Vietnamese Government) aware US role and may have considerable detail . . ." (SAIG 0499, 8/31/63)Deptel 243 and the VOA broadcast set the tone for later relations between the United States representatives and the generals. Big Minh, who had initial doubts about the strength of American support, grew in confidence.C. The November 1963 CoupAmerican dissatisfaction with the Diem regime became increasingly apparent. On September 8, AID Director David Bell, in a television interview, stated that Congress might cut aid to South Vietnam if the Diem government did not change its course
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-7-(Pentagon Papers, p. 214). Lodge suggested a study to determine the most effective methods of cutting aid to topple the regime (Pentagon Papers, p. 214). On September 12, with White House approval, Senator Church introduced a resolution in the Senate condemning the South Vietnamese Government for its repressive handling of the Buddhist problem and calling for an end to United States aid unless the oppressive measures were curtailed (Pentagon Papers, pp. 214-215).In mid-September 1963, two proposals for dealing with Diem were considered by the Administration. The first contemplated increasingly severe pressure to bring Diem in line with American policy; the second involved acquiescing in Diem's actions, recognizing that Diem and Nhu were inseparable, and attempting to salvage as much as possible. It was decided to adopt the first proposal, and to send Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Taylor on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam. (Pentagon Papers, p. 215.)On October 2, McNamara and Taylor returned to Washington and presented their findings to the National Security Council. Their report confirmed that the military effort was progressing favorably, but warned of the dangers inherent in the political turmoil and recommended bringing pressure against Diem. This pressure would include announcing the withdrawal of 1,000 American troops by the end of the year; ending support for the forces responsible for the pagoda raids, and continuing Lodge's policy of remaining aloof from the regime. The report recommended
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-8-against a coup, but suggested that alternative leadership should be identified and cultivated. The recommendations were promptly approved by the President. (Pentagon Papers, pp.215-116)On October 3 Conein contacted Minh. Minh explained that a coup was being planned, and requested assurances of American support if it were successful. Minh outlined three courses of action, one of which was the assassination of Diem's brothers, Nhu and Can (Conein, p.25; cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).The Acting Chief of the CIA Station, David R. Smith, cabled on October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that "we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a protracted struggle" (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).A cable from the Director, CIA to Saigon responded that:"(w)e certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every such threat of which we might receive even partial knowledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of Diem. We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this matter opens door too easily for probes of our position re others, re support of regime, et cetera. Consequently believe best-approach is hands off. However, we naturally interested in intelligence on any such plan."* The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon by various military units and direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyalist units.** Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted this cable for McCone. Colby testified:"Q: So you were on notice as of that date that the Director personally opposed any involvement by the CIA in an assassination?"Colby: I certainly was." (Colby, p. 57)
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-9-McCone testified that he met privately with the President and the Attorney General, taking the position that "our role was to assemble all information on intelligence as to what was going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but to not attempt to direct it" (McCone, p. 62). He believed the United States should maintain a "hands off attitude" (McCone, p. 62). McCone testified:"I felt that the President agreed with my position, despite the fact that he had great reservations concerning Diem and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My precise words to the President, and I remember them very clearly, was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that, if Diem was removed we would have not one coup but we would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam and it might last several years and indeed it did." (McCone, pp. 62-63.)McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with the President, but rather "whether we should let the coup go or use our influences not to". He left the meeting believing that the President agreed with his "hands off" recommendation (McCone, pp. 62-63). McCone cabled Smith on October 6:"McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under McCone instructions, as we cannot be in position actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefore" (CIA to Saigon, DIR 73661, 10/6/63).In response, the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters:"Action taken as directed. In addition, since DCM Trueheart was also present when original recommendation was made, specific withdrawal of recommendation at McCone's instruction was also conveyed to Trueheart. Ambassador Lodge commented that he shares McCone's opinion." (Saigon to CIA, SAIG 1463, 10/7/63)
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-10-Conein, the CIA official who dealt directly with the Generals,*testified that he was first told of McCone's response to theassassination alternative by Ambassador Lodge around October 20(Conein, p. 35). Conein testified (but did not so indicate inhis detailed After-Action Report) that he then told General Donthat the United States opposed assassination, and that theGeneral responded, "alright, you don't like it, we won't talkabout it anymore" (Conein, p. 36).The United States increased pressure on Diem to mend hisways. On October 17, General Richard Stillwell (MACV J-3)informed Secretary Thuan that the United States was suspendingaid to the special forces units responsible for the pagodaraids until they were transferred to the field and placed underJoint General Staff (JGS) command (Pentagon Papers, p. 217).On October 27, Lodge traveled to Dalat with Diem, but didnot receive any commitment from Diem to comply with Americanrequests (Pentagon Papers, p. 219).On October 28, Conein met with-General Don, who hadreceived assurance from Lodge that Conein spoke for the UnitedStates. Don said that he would make the plans for the coup* Conein described his role as follows:"My job was to convey the orders from my Ambassador andthe instructions from my Ambassador to the people whowere planning the coup, to monitor those individuals whowere planning the coup, to get as much information sothat our government would not be caught with their pantsdown" (Conein, pp. 38-39).
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available to the Ambassador four hours before it took place, and suggested that Lodge not change his plans to go to the United States on October 31. (I.G., C, p. 37; Pentagon Papers, p. 219.)On October 30, Lodge reported to Washington that he was powerless to stop the coup, and that the matter was entirely in Vietnamese hands. General-Harkins disagreed and cabled his opposition to the coup to General Taylor (Pentagon Papers, p. 220). A cable from Bundy to Lodge dated October 30 expressed White House concern and stated that "[w]e cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup" (Cable, Bundy to Lodge, 10/30/63). A subsequent cable on that same day from Washington instructed Lodge to intercede with the Generals to call off the coup if he did not believe it would succeed. The instructions prescribed "strict noninvolvement and somewhat less strict neutrality". (Pentagon Papers, p. 220.)Late in the morning of November 1, the first units involved in the coup began to deploy around-Saigon. The Embassy was given only four minutes' warning before the coup began (MACV cable to Joint Chiefs of Staff 8512, 11/1/63).. An aide to Don told Conein to bring all available money to the Joint General Staff headquarters. Conein brought 3 million piasters (Approximately $42,000) to the headquarters, which was given to Don to procure food for his troops and to pay death benefits
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-12-to those killed in the coup (Conein, 6/20., p. 72).*Conein was at the Joint General Staff Headquarters during most of the coup (I.G., C, pp. 41-42). At 1:40 p.m., the Generals proposed that Diem resign immediately, and guaranteed him and. Nhu safe departure (Conein After-Action Report, p. 15). The palace was surrounded shortly afterwards, and at 4:30 p.m. the Generals announced the coup on the radio and demanded the resignation of Diem and Nhu. Diem called Lodge and inquired about the United States' position. Lodge responded that the United States did not yet have a view, and expressed concern for Diem's safety (Pentagon Papers, p. 221).According to Conein's report, Minh told Nhu that if he and Diem did not resign within five minutes, the palace would be bombed. Minh then phoned Diem. Diem refused to talk with him and Minh ordered the bombing of the palace. Troops moved in on the palace, but Diem still refused to capitulate. Minh offered Diem a second chance to surrender half an hour later, telling him that if he refused he would be "blasted off of the earth". Shortly before nightfall an air assault was launched on the Presidential Guard barracks. (Conein After-Action Report, pp. 17-18.)At 6:20 on the morning of November 2, Diem called General---[^2] CIA had apparently considered passing money to the coup leaders in early October (Colby, 6/20, p. 21) On October 29, Lodge calbed that a request for funds should be anticipated". (Lodge to State, No. 2040, 10/29/63; and 2063, 10/30/63). Conein received the money on October 24, and kept it in a safe in his house.