Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# SECRETDCI officially advised?c. *Max.* security cable commo for *innocuous* cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth and no bashfulness re trips.d. *No* PA's (except for search) or intermediaries; *rigid* case-officering, from start to finish.e. *No* approach to officials of foreign governments.f. *No* use of any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Government agency.Training by opposition would ______.g. *Use of already* tested assets (e.g., Manuel in the search.h. Stand-by list of Rubarkers who can pass as foreigners.i. Pretext: Kutube/D search; this established (e.g., Rome).j. No discussions in Stations.k. No "team" until ready to go, *if* at all.4) Blackmail:a. *No* American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visa.b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.c. No meeting any candidate in house territory.d. Exclude organization criminals (e.g., Sicilians) those with record of arrests, those with instability of purpose as criminals.SECRETRECEIVED FROM:JUN 24 1975CIANW 50955 DocId:32423497 Page 16
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SECRETe. Staffers ________ -selection.5) Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs in case of blow.6) Should have phoney 201 in RI to backstop this, all documents therein forged and backdated. Should *look* like a CE file.7) Testing of moninees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.8) Former resistance personnel a possibility.9) Use nobody who has ever dealt with criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.10) Possible use of staffers for the action.11) Silverthorne.Keeping of files.SECRETRECEIVED FROMJUN 24 1975CIA
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SECRETFreedom to travelKhokhlov case.Legal, operational & ethical-morale problems.1) Maximum security & within Kubark only (e.g., how much does Siragusa now know?). Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering & deciphering. Gulse of Louvide objection. Siglen not secure enough.2) *One* focal point for search, control, *training*, case-officer & PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point *mandatory*. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-Station) commo.3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.4) Non-attributability: *No* American citizens or American residents for direct action; *possibly* for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officers who can pass as foreigners - and *limited* official reference.5) No *chain* of connections/permitting blackmail.6) Don't meet any selecter in house territory.7) Avoid discussion w/foreign officials until *all* possibility of search through private citizens (e.g., QJWIN) has been examined.8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. /4 above essential.9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.NW 50955 DocId:32423497 Page 18SECRET![received from CIA on JUN 24 1975]
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SECRET10) Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to Mafia.11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (OSS archives.)12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.13) All Kubark personnel involved should have some CE experience.14) Silverthorne & stable in Paris.15) What are limits on team or individuals selected? No "team" until ready to go.16) Danger of Standbys.SECRETRECEIVED FROMJUN 24 1975CIANW 50955 DocId: 32423497 Page 197
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SECRET8Scd G - 25/1 Exec Actions"The Magic Button"Narcotics Bureau"for a living" RIS 201 covercaution - Bankruptcy -- No star eyes - Jim A. Contradestinct from U-2Not a TSD problemApply brakesLast resort beyond last resort & a confession of weakness.--El Benefactor -- assumptionsExamples of 3 "wrong"Framework of Sid's job. LedfordEhut R&D - memo."Translating machines" - of E basic sounds project.pherious - (V with CB)comment - GearAnathesia26/1 -- AS -- Fanforn - DCI MatterNo fileNever mentions word assassination.1. Select proper oern to run --2. Place a cover3. Security Rules4. Guide leves5. Last Resort - Brakes -6. No other agencies7. No projects or papers except per cover.8. Principal agent - (Mankel) ?   AF - Project draft LCH tested 1500 - from NB.   Mask spat rqm. stall AF project - cler DbiekeMax as 2/3B - WKH - AS-Sid - Reserv.Substitute - What next![RECEIVED FROM JUN 24 1975 CIA]SECRETNW 50955 DocId: 32423497 Page 20
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SECRET9. Disposal10. Targets who & where -- Must know before we can spot --11. Case officering12. Cover file - create to provide RIS or xxxtobel it. - non Sov13. Note dangers of RIS counter action and monitor if they are blamed -Fd J list - *Remember*SECRET![RECEIVED FROM JUN 24 1975 CIA logo]
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystemIdentification FormDate: 7/7/2015Agency InformationAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10121RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-27Document InformationORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM:TO:TITLE:DATE: 03/09/1976PAGES: 147SUBJECTS: SSCSGO, METHODOLOGYCOMMITTEE BUSINESSDOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPTCLASSIFICATION: DeclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1CCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/22/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: CCBOX 324v9.1NW 50955 DocId:32423509 Page 1
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMDate: 08/07/95Page : 1AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10121RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-27DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIAFROM :TO :TITLE :DATE : 03/09/76PAGES : 147SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, METHODOLOGYCOMMITTEE BUSINESSDOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPTCLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRETRESTRICTIONS : REFERREDCURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULLDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS : CCBOX 324[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTEDNW 50955 DocId:32423509 Page 2
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TOP SECRETVol: 2 of 3NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATIONUnauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal SanctionsThe United States Senate R2784Report of ProceedingsHearing held beforeSenate SElect Committee to Study GovernmentalOperations with Respect to Intelligence ActivitiesTuesday, March 9, 1976Washington, D. C.(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)WARD & PAUL410 FIRST STREET, S. E.WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003(202) 544-6000TOP SECRETNW 50955 DocId: 32423509 Page 3
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# INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONForeign & Military Subcommittee MeetingTuesday, March 9, 1976United States Senate,Select Committee to Study GovernmentalOperations with Respect toIntelligence Activities.Washington, D. C.The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10.30 o'clock a.m. in Room S-407, the Capitol Senator Walter D. Huddleston (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.Present: Senators Huddleston, presiding. Hart of Colorado, and Mathias.Also present: William Miller, Staff Director: Joseph DiGenova, Charles Kirbow, Elliot Maxwell, Elizabeth Culbreth, Jan Orloff, William Bader, Lynn Davis, Al Quanbeck, Charles Lombard, Rick Inderfurth, Bob Kelley, Greg Treverton, Jim Johnston and Britt Snider, Professional Staff Members.TOP SECRET
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PROCEEDINGSSenator Huddleston. let's come to order.Mr. Aaron. The agenda today is to proceed with the DCI section and in addition we would like to get the Subcommittee's if you will substantive approval of the paper on the production of intelligence so that it might go to the Agency and we could go through the process of clearing its details.I don't know which of those you wish to take up first but -Mr. Kirbow. We should really take up the paper first because it already went out this morning.Mr. Aaron. Well.. they are reading it but we have not negotiated with them vet..Senator Huddleston. Any comment on that paper?Mr. Miller. Which paper?Senator Huddleston. The production of intelligence.Mr. Aaron. It is in the larger book.Mr. Kirbow. Senator, I have some comments but I defer to the Senators if they have some comments firstMr. Aaron. It's at Tab III. C6.Senator Huddleston. Charley, go ahead.Mr. Kirbow. Thank you.The concern that has been expressed by the senior witnesses from the and other parts of the community not only before this but as a matter of record forTOP SECRET
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The Senators. I'm sure that the big fight in the House last year was to avoid the excruciating details on budget figures and I think we had kind of discussed perhaps publishing 3 or 4 major features. I'd like to point out that in this particular document, such great detail as that portion of the CIA, the DDI which produces intelligence, we speak of an authorized project to $70.9 million with 2,269 employees, exact percentage of the Agency's budget and the exact percentage of the personnel. That one page of this document is probably the most classified single compilation.Senator Huddleston: What page is that?Mr. Kirbow. Page 3.Senator Huddleston. Of course it's out of the Agency.I would assume they would have some comment on it.Mr. Aaron. The point was not, the view was not to produce these precise numbers but A, to have them for the Subcommittee so that they could understand them and much as in the case of the DCI's original paper to expect that these things will be modified and to lay the basis for an appropriate discussion with them as to how one might modify it and yet capture the essence of the argument, and we'll just see how far that goes in trying to reach --Certainly we have intention of --Senator Huddleston: Could we say this Department represents a substantial expenditure with a large number of![TOP SECRET]
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employees?Mr. Kirbow. Wel! if I could tell you what my position on it is, in speaking to Beth Bloomfield last night I specificall asked her - well, she says that's to give them something out there to take out so that we'll have enough left in here that would be a worthwhile doorment at the end.And I think that if we are kidding ourselves that we have either the time or and we should not have the inclination in my opinion to waste the time of the people at the Agency or anything by "putting in things which will give Mr. Boldin something to gnaw on so he won't bother the rest of the thing,"I just didn't think that we were going to get into that kind of dealing with the Agency people. I thought we were going to be forthright in what we thought we should put in and what we would put in a document like this because the whole production of intelligence thing or the whole theme of the paper is this inadequate attention given to the analytical portion of production.And if we are doing this and sending it out there in this classified form full well knowing at the outset she says, well, that's not even material. If they want to take it out. just take it out.Well, if it's not material, I would hope that we're not wasting both our to read shout 10,000 were in the last month.> [Figure] Text: TOP SECRET
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Senator Huddleston. I think it's probably material to also to have a firmer grasp when we start discussing and defending the report maybe, even to the extent of having specific figures. I think it's highly unlikely that they will let that stay in there and we'll probably have to modify it. I see your point in a way that we might save ourselves time by scaling it down to begin with to what we think will be acceptable, but on the other hand. we may not guess right.Mr. Kirbow. Well, for the record then, Senator. I do have exception to this type writing where we deliberately beef it up with known classified information full well knowing that it's going to be taken out and not get to the point that we are trying to make. But I won't dwell on it any further.Senator Huddleston. Do you have any comment on that aspect, Senator Hart?Senator Hart. No.Senator Huddleston. All right, that one's ready to go.Mr. Aaron. Thank you.Now we left off yesterday on page 25. We had discussed two oral proposals by way of recommendations. The first was to set a tone for the DCI which was rejected and the second was to confirm the new community wide deputy for the DCI to have him subject to Senate confirmation to establish him as, in effect the first deputy of the DCI, the man who would succeed in his place.
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We also discussed briefly the recommendation number 16 and we agreed that we would make some change in the language relating to what in effect is the re-establishment of the board of national estimates to make clear that they weren't there just for the purpose of endorsing estimates but from the standpoint that they are there for the purpose of reviewing them.So the next recommendation is recommendation 17, and it is long and complicated. Essentially what the recommendation does is spell out more precisely what the DCI's responsibilities will be for the overall allocation of resources and coordination of the community's activities apart from the production of finished intelligence, which is the purpose of recommendation.Now what it does, the first paragraph summarizes the essential responsibilities along the lines of the President's Executive Order.Now it is slightly different from the Executive Order in the following sense. The Executive Order establishes an NSC Committee, gives the Committee the responsibility of preparing a national intelligence budget, makes the DCI the Chairman of that Committee. and gives the DCI in his person, if you will, the responsibility for presenting that budget to the PresidentHow we sort of cut through that somewhat complicated and not entirely clear allocation of authority to the DCI by simplyTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 9]
saving he is responsible for preparing the community's budget, and he has this Committee for this purpose in trying to place responsibility squarely on him to do that.Now this would not mean, however, that the Secretary of Defense be senior to him in the cabinet. I mean the National Security Council could not make a reclama and could not go over his head.That situation will till exist and this Committee is In fact a committee of the National Security Council. so there is another laver at which inter Agency disputes, if they continue beyond the level of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence,Now the first it also designates him as responsible for preparing the budget and providing quidance for operations programs in general terms and puts him in as chairman of the appropriate NSC committee, and then we reference the CFI and then authorize the following specific responsibilities.First of all, the establishment of national intelligence requirements for the entire community and it empowers him to draw upon representatives of the members of the intelligence community to help him in the task of establishing these requiremenNow this is an increase in his authority from his current postute. He has now the authority to issue addance in the preparation of remirements but he can't really say do this or do that. These are the things we want.
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Now as a practical matter, I think it's fair to say that he goes pretty far in getting his way at the present time, but on some of these requirements on a national basis, this would give him the clear authority to ask them to do things. Now his requirements, the level of detail and so forth, would obviously be something that would have to be negotiated out in the course of his work.Now that is the recommendation of the first paragraph and paragraph A.I might just say it also gives the DCI in connection with the requirements process, it refers here to the fact that he may determine the success of various Agencies in fulfilling and in fact what the paragraph sets up is a system whereby the DCI can establish requirements and then through the budget process and in the process of evaluating requirements make some estimate of how well the community is doing and either add to the budgets or take away in certain areas and so forth.This provides some of the real system as opposed to a paper system which he has had in the past.Laragraph B describes the preparation of the national intelligence budget and points-out that he should prepare this budget, present it to the President and to the Congress who would make some reference here to the language in the President's Executive Order in this regard.It makes the point that the definition of the
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elements to be included within a national intelligence budget -- in other words, what parts of the community would fit into that. where you draw the line between technical and national intelligence, between departmental and national intelligence.This definition would be established by the Congress in consultation with the Executive Branch.It further points out that he should be involved early in the process of preparing budgets in the budget cycle, and then it makes some hortatory kind of statements about how he should try to consider trade-offs between programs and between collection and production and so forth.Senator Huddleston. I would suggest there that we use another word besides trade-off. While it is common for us to use it up here in committee work. I don't think it conveys the best connotation to the public. What we're saying is that he balances out or apportions resources, whatever.Mr. Aaron. Now I think the final sentence is this important one, and the Senators should note this. The proposal and perhaps this ought to be made somewhat more clear than it is now as to who will do this, but the authority -- I'm sorry, it is clear. But the authority of the DCI to reprogram funds within the intelligence budget should be limited by statutes.The President. The Executive Order gives to the Committee on Foreign Intelligence not only the authority to approve the
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national intelligence budget, but to reprogram menevs within that budget.Now our estimate is that that budget would be on the order of $3, 4, perhaps up to $5 billion, depending on what is included in it, and I asked the White House, the NSC member of that Committee what the purpose of that particular provision was, and I asked him specifically did this mean that you would be able to, as in the case of Angola, reprogram money away from some. other part of the budget, NSA, NRO, some other major program, and put it into the covert military, para-military action program?And he said yes, that is the reason that he is given a sort of broad authority to reprogram money.Senator Huddleston. Well, they were doing some of that, weren't they?Mr. Aaron. To some extent I believe that's true, but I personally don't know what that extent was.Now to the extent we will see later that we place some or make some recommendations concerning limitations on the authority to draw upon different funds and to replenish certain funds for the purposes of covert action, this squares with that proposal by saving that there should be by statute certain limitations on the reprogramming of funds.We're not saying that those ought to be there really thinking that the oversight committee would have to work out.> [Figure: a `TOP SECRET` watermark]
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Now the next paragraph.Mr. Kirbow. Could we take these one at a time because these are rather critical?Mr. Chairman, one of the things that came before this Committee when I guess it was Mr. Colby testifying and at each meeting that Mr. Miller and the staff had with the people from the White House and the CIA when we were preparing the oversight bill, we heard many good reasons why we shou'd nct deprive the DCI of this ability to sign certifying out of certain funds and being able to expend them without a great big red tape machine to hinder that type of operation.If, as David says, his recommendation here is to prevent reprogramming, except within very narrowly defined statutory limits, is a first step toward restricting that further activity. I would like to except on this and have it discussed before the Full Committee, or in the absence of that, or connected with it, have the record that we have that shows us that we should restrict by legislation hereSenator Huddleston. What is the major thrust there?Is it to in fact limit or restrict or is it to actually have it defined and specified in the statute as to what circumstances might prevail?Mr. Aaron. The thrust here is as follows. The DCI can now reprogram money within his own agency to some extent. That budget, depending on the parts he can reprogram. I don't
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believe he can reprogram to within about $750 million of his own appropriation.Senator Huddleston. We can't take something out of the NSA now and put it over?Mr. Aaron. No. we can't do that. But in his new responsibilities as DCI for preparing the budget of the entire national intelligence program, he will now be in a position to reprogram the entire budget and therefore it's a much larger kind of flexibility.Now the thrust of this particular proposal is not really aimed, this particular one later one we do have one which does place some constraints and the purpose is to make it clear where the money comes from and where it's going to go to make it clear to the Congress at least. But this particular one simply says that because this is a much wider reprogramming flexibility, that it ought to be subject to certain kinds of definitions and consider the limitations so that the Congress knows what is happening to the moneys that it appropriates for particular purposes.Senator Huddleston. Well, for this particular paragraph, then. would define or specify, suffice the word limited, or not?Mr. Aaron. It should be defined. That's correct.Mr. Kirbo I do wish to point out, Mr. Chairman. that that is a departure from the standard reprogramming process that
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has been adopted in the Senate over the last 10 or 15 years,for instance, with the Committee on Armed Services.Senator Huddleston. For other departments?Mr. Kirbow. Where there is an authorizing and an appropriations type action in the Congress, as Senator Hart will know from his experience on that committee, if they wish to reprogram missile money over to aircraft, for instance, it has to be approved by all four of those committees, both Arms Services and both appropriations committees with the exact transfer of the amounts of money and the justifications given therefore.My concern is not that the Congress should not have a control of this or that you could make it so rigid by making recommendations that leave the oversight committee and the appropriations committee no flexibility to do this. And I would think that unless we have a very good record on this, we should recommend that this should be a matter that the oversight committee in its new role gives good consideration to.Mr. Miller. The oversight committees and the appropriatior committees would have flexibility. Every appropriations act is a statute, after all.Mr. Kirbow. They certainly would unless you restrict them by statute.Senator Huddleston. But we are suggesting a statute which the new oversight committee that has passed,![TOP SECRET]