Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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-2-described executive action as a "general stand-by capability" to carry out assassination when required (I.G., p. 37). The project was given the code name ZR/RIFLE by the CIA.*A single agent ("asset"), given the cryptonym QJ/WIN, was placed under Harvey's supervision for the ZR/RIFLE project, but never used in connection with any actual assassination efforts. Richard Helms described QJ/WIN's "capability":"If you needed somebody to carry out murder, I guess you had a man who might be prepared to carry it out." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 53).Harvey did use agent QJ/WIN, however, to spot "individuals with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible multi-purpose use" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 50). For example, QJ/WIN reported that a potential asset in the Middle East was "the leader of a gambling syndicate" with "an available pool of assassins" (CIA file, ZR/RIFLE/Personality Sketches).However, Harvey testified that:"during the entire existence of the entire ZRRIFLE project no agent was recruited for the purpose of assassination, and no even tentative targeting or target list was ever drawn." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 45.)Project ZR/RIFLE involved, generally, assessing the problems and requirements of assassination and developing a stand-[^1] ZR/RIFLE was a cryptonym relating to two programs. One was the executive action assassination capability. The other was another program which is not part of the subject matter of this report: (William Harvey had been in charge of the CIA section with general responsibility for such programs.) This second program was genuine, but it was also to provide a cover for any executive action operation. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 49.)[^1]:
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-3-by assassination capability; more specifically, it involved "spotting" potential agents and "researching" assassination techniques that might be used (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 11 and 6/9/75, p. 73; Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 37-A, 45). Bissell characterized Project ZR/RIFLE as "internal and purely preparatory" (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 32). The I.G. Report of 1967 found "no indication in the file that the Executive Action Capability of ZR/RIFLE-QJ/WIN was ever used", but said that "after Harvey took over the Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect of ZR/RIFLE". (I.G. pp. 40-41.)*(b) The Question of White House Initiation, Authorization, or Knowledge of the Executive Action ProjectThere is general agreement on one fact: at some point in early 1961 Bissell discussed the executive action capability with Bundy. The timing of that conversation and whether "the White House" urged that a capability be created were matters on which the evidence varied widely.Harvey testified that Bissell had told him that "the White House" had twice urged the creation of such a capability and the Inspector General's Report quoted notes of Harvey's (no longer in existence) to that effect. Bissell did not recall any specific conversation with the "White House". However, his initial testimony assumed the correctness of Harvey's notes, and stated* A discussion of whether ZR/RIFLE was related to the actual assassination efforts against Castro is found at Section (d), infra.
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-4-that, while he could have created the capability on his own, anyurgings would have come from Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a laterappearance, however, Bissell said he merely informed Bundy ofthe capability and that the context was a briefing by him andnot urging by Bundy. Bundy said he received a briefing andgave no urging, though he raised no objections. Rostow said henever heard of the project.William Harvey testified that he was "almost certain"that on January 25 and 26, 1961, he met with CIA officials SidneyGottlieb, the new Chief of CIA's Technical Services Division, andArnold Silver, a CIA recruiting officer, to discuss the feasibilityof creating a capability within the Agency for "executive action"(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). After reviewing his notes of thosemeetings,* Harvey testified that they took place after his initial* As to the date of these notes, Harvey was asked whether his no-  tations "25/1-Sid G" and "26/1-AS" indicate that he spoke to Sidney  Gottlieb and Arnold Silver in 1961, as opposed to 1962. Harvey testi-  fied as follows:Q: And is it your judgment that that is January 26, 1961 andis about the subject of Executive Action?Harvey: Yes, it is.Q: And it followed your conversation with Mr. Bissell thatyou have recounted?Harvey: . . . [W]ell, when I first looked at this, I thoughtthis, well, this has got to be '62, but I am almost certainnow that it is not. If this is true, this might place thefirst discussion that I had with Dick Bissell in earlyJanuary and this is difficult to pinpoint because there wereseveral such discussions in varying degrees of detail duringthe period in the spring, and very early in '61 to the fallof '61 period, but I did find out fairly early on that SilverNW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 6
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-5-discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said, might have transpired in "early January" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10).had -- or that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver, and this discussion, at the very least, had to take place after I know Bissell already had discussed the matter with Silver. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).Harvey had also testified that, after receiving Bissell's initial instructions to establish an executive action capability:the first thing I did . . was discuss in theoretical terms with a few officers whom I trusted quite implicitly the whole subject of assassination, our possible assets; our posture, going back, if you will, even to the fundamental questions of A, is assassination a proper weapon of an American intelligence service, and B, even if you assume that it is, is it within our capability within the framework of this government to do it effectively and properly, securely and discreetly. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 37-A, 38).The Inspector General's Report connected Silver and Gottlieb to the early stages of the executive action project as follows:Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with Arnold Silver and with Sidney Gottlieb. Since Silver was already cut in, Harvey used him in developing the Executive Action Capability. Harvey's mention of him [Gottlieb] in this connection may explain a notation by Dr. Gunn that Harvey instructed Gunn to discuss techniques with Gottlieb without associating the discussion with the Castro operation. (I.G. Report, pp. 37-38).It is evident from the testimony of Harvey and Bissell that the turnover to Harvey of the Roselli contact in November 1961 was discussed as part of ZRRIFLE (see Section (d), infra). Thus, their initial discussion of executive action can, at the least, be dated before November 1961 and the "25/1" and "26/1" notations would have to refer to January 1961.
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-6-Harvey testified that the "executive action" capability was intended to include assassinations (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 35). His cryptic handwritten notes of the January 25/26 meetings, preserved at the CIA, contain phrases which suggest a discussion of assassination--and Harvey confirmed this interpretation: "last resort beyond last resort and a confession of weakness"; "the magic button", and "never mention word assassination". (Harvey, Ex. 1, 6/25/75).The Inspector General's Report did not mention these notes, or their dates. However, in describing Richard Bissell's initial assignment of the "executive action" project to Harvey, it referred to another set of Harvey's notes, which were destroyed after the preparation of the Report. The excerpt from these notes quoted Bissell as saying to Harvey, "The White House had twice urged me to create such a capability" (I.G., P. 37). Harvey also testified that this "urging" was mentioned in his initial discussion of "executive action" with Bissell (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37). However, the testimony from Bissell and White House aides in the Kennedy and Eisenhower Administrations is in conflict with Harvey's testimony as to whether such "urging" had in fact been given to Bissell.* Harvey's notes also contained a phrase which suggests his concern that any U.S. assassination attempts might breed retaliation from other governments: "dangers of RIS (Russian Intelligence Service) counter-action and monitor if they are blamed." (Harvey, Ex. 1, 6/25/75; Bissell, Ex. 1, 7/17/75).
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The following testimony regarding the relationship between "the White House" and the executive action capability was obtained by the Committee:Harvey: Harvey testified that his missing notes indicated that Bissell mentioned White House urgings to develop an executive action capability (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37). Harvey said that he "particularly remember(ed)" that Bissell said that he received "more than one" urging from the White House (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 36-37; 7/11/75, p. 59). However, he had no direct evidence that Bissell actually had any such discussion with "the White House."No specific individual in the White House was named to Harvey (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 31). Moreover, he said that it would have been "improper" for him to have asked Bissell who he had talked to and "grossly improper" for Bissell to have volunteered that name (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37).Bissell: Bissell specifically recalled assigning Harvey to investigate the capability (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51). However, Bissell did not recall "a specific conversation with anybody in the White House as the origin" of his instruction to Harvey (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51).During the course of several appearances before the Committee, Bissell's testimony varied as to whether or not he had been urged by the White House to develop an executive action capability.
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-8-In his initial appearances before the Committee on June 9 and 11, 1975, Bissell made statements that tended to indicate that White House authorization had been given. In response to the "twice urged" quotation of llarvey's notes in the Inspector General's Report, Bissell said, "I have no reason to believe that Harvey's quote is wrong." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51). Bissell accordingly said in his initial testimony that as far as he knew, it was true that he was asked by the White House to create a general stand-by assassination capability. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 49).Based again upon llarvey's missing notes ("White House urging") and his initial statement that he had no reason to challenge their accuracy, Bissell initially gave the opinion that McGeorge Bundy (_Id._, 6/9/75, p. 49), Special Assistant to President Kennedy for National Security Affairs, and Walt Rostow (_Id._, p. 51), Deputy Assistant to President Kennedy during 1961, were the two people from whom such a request was most likely to have come (_Id._, p. 53) because they were "the two members of the White House staff who were closest to CIA operations." (_Id._, p. 54).At another point in his initial testimony, Bissell said that the creation of the capability "may have been initiated within the Agency" (_Id._, p. 81). And still later he said: "there is little doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with Rostow and possibly Bundy" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 46).When Bissell returned to the Committee on July 17 and 22, his testimony, given in light of information gained since his earlier
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 10]
-9-appearances, was that there was no White House urging for the creation of the executive action project, although tacit approval for the "research" project was probably given by Bundy after it was established.First, he was shown the Harvey notes which had been preserved and which, without any mention of the White House, indicated Harvey had received his assignment prior to January 25/26, 1961. Those dates -- just 5 days after the change of administration -- made Bissell conclude that it was "very unlikely that that assignment to [Harvey] was taken as a result of White House urging or consultation" (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10). Bissell said that Bundy did not have any influence on the performance of his Agency duties before the Presidential inauguration (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 23). Bissell added that he did not remember meeting with anyone in the new administration on matters prior to the inauguration (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 23).Second, when he returned in July, Bissell also said he was convinced by telephone conversations with Kostow and Bundy that based upon Rostow's duties -- which, in 1961, had nothing to do with covert action -- he "never discussed"-executive action with Rostow (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10; 7/27/75, p. 22).As for Bundy, Bissell's final testimony (after telephone contact with Bundy) was that he believed that he had informed Bundy about the capability after it had been created (Bissell, 7/17/75, pp. 10-11; 7/22/75, pp. 21-22). But Bissell confirmed his original testimony (6/9/75, pp. ____) that he did not brief Bundy on the
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-10-actual assassination plots against Castro already undertaken by the CIA (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47; 7/22/75, p. 31). Bissell was "quite certain" that he would not have expected Bundy to mention the executive action capability to the President. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35). Bissell testified:Q. Would you think the development of a capability to kill foreign leaders was a matter of sufficient importance to bring to the attention of the President?Bissell: In that context and at that time and given the limited scope of activities within that project, I would not." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35).Bissell said that he and Bundy spoke about an untargeted "capability" rather than the plan or approval for an assassination operation (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 11). Bissell said that although he does not have a specific recollection, he "might have" mentioned Castro, Lumumba, and Trujillo in the course of a discussion of executive action "because these were the sorts of individuals at that moment in history against whom such a capability might possibly have been employed." (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 50-51).Bissell said his impression was that Bundy, in addition to expressing no unfavorable reaction to the project, might have actually given a more affirmative reaction (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 25, 28).Bissell testified that he might have interpreted Bundy's reaction as approval for the executive action concept (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 30).Q: ... I think the testimony of this witness is going further in saying what you received from (Bundy) was, in your view, tantamount to approval?Bissell: I, at least, interpreted it as you can call it approval, or you could say no objection. He (Bundy)
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-11-was briefed on something that was being done, as I now believe, on the initiative of the Agency. Ilis (Bundy's) comment is that he made no objection to it. I suspect that his reaction was somewhat more favorable than that, but this is a matter that probably someone listening to the conversation on which such a person could have had differing interpretations. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 33).Bissell's testimony on any conversation with Bundy regarding executive action was speculative reconstruction from first appearance to last because he had no "clear recollection" of the events (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 29, 36). But Bissell maintained that more "formal and specific and explicit approval would have been required" before any "actual overt steps in use of the capability." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 31).Bissell said that Harvey's notation about White llouse urgings to develop an executive action capability may have been a slightly confused account of a conversation subsequent to the initiation of the project in which Bissell relayed Bundy's reaction to Harvey (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 25).Bissell testified that the development of an executive action capability was "undoubtedly" initiated within the Agency (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 22). He had acknowledged on his first day of testimony that this would not have been unusual:it was the normal practice in the Agency and an impor- tant part of its mission to create various kinds of capability long before there was any reason to be certain whether those would be used or where or how or for what purpose. The whole ongoing job of ... a secret intelli- gence service of recruiting agents is of that character. So it would not be particularly surprising to me if the
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-12-decision to create ... this capability had been taken without an outside request. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 67-68).Bundy: McGeorge Bundy also testified that he had a conversation with Bissell, during which the executive action capability was discussed (Bundy, pp. 4-5). Bundy's testimony comports with Bissell's on the fact that they spoke about an untargeted capability, rather than an assassination operation (Bundy, pp. 4-5). But Bundy said that the capability included "killing the individual".(Bundy, p. 5). Bundy's impression was that the CIA was "testing my reaction," not "seeking authority" (Bundy, p. 15). Bundy summarized his testimony by saying:I am sure I gave no instruction. But it is only fair to add that I do not recall that I offered any impediment either. (Bundy, p. 10)Bundy said that he did not take steps to halt the development of the executive action capability or "pursue the matter at all" (Bundy, p. 19) because he was satisfiedthat this was not an operational activity, and would not become such without two conditions: first, that there be a desire or a request or a guidance that there should be planning against some specific individual; and second, that there should be a decision to move against the individual. (Bundy, p. 7).* For example, Bissell testified that on his own initiative, he had requested a CIA officer to go to the Congo to "make plans and develop the "capability" for an assassination attempt against Lumumba; if ordered (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 55).** Bundy also testified that he had a vague recollection of hearing about poison in relation to Cuba, but he did not connect this to the conversation about executive action. (See footnote, p. 6, Kennedy Pre-Bay of Pigs section, supra.)
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-13-Bundy testified that he believed that neither of these conditions had been fulfilled (Bundy, p. 7).Bundy recalled the conversation as taking place "sometime in the early months of 1961." (Bundy, p. 4). When questioned about the dates in Harvey's notes, Bundy rated the chance that the conversation about executive action took place before January 25 -- when Harvey was already discussing the project at the CIA pursuant to Bissell's directive -- as "near zero" because the new Administration had been in office less than a week and he had been preoccupied with other problems, including the Berlin crisis and reorganizing the National Security staff (Bundy, p. 9).Bundy testified that he did not brief the President on the executive action project:Chairman: And you have testified that you did not take the matter to the President?Bundy: As far as I can recall, Mr. Chairman.(Bundy, p. 16)Bundy explained that the division of responsibility for national security affairs excluded Rostow from jurisdiction over covert operations, making it unlikely that Rostow would be briefed on a project like ZRRIFLE (Bundy, p. 11; Rostow, p. 11).Rostow: Rostow testified that he was "morally certain" that during his entire tenure in government, he never heard a reference to executive action or "such a capability or such an intention to act by the U.S." (Rostow, pp. 10, 13).
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-14-Goodpaster and Gray: The responsibility for national securityaffairs during the latter part of the Eisenhower Administration wasborne by Andrew Goodpaster and Gordon Gray. However, there was noevidence which raised the name of either man in connection with thedevelopment of an executive action capability. Both Goodpaster andGray testified to having no knowledge of it. (Goodpaster, p. 11;Gray, p. 56.)(c) Authorization or Knowledge of Executive Action Projectby DCIRichard Bissell said he was "quite certain" that AllenDulles had full knowledge of the executive action project for tworeasons: first, it "would have come to the DCI's attention" at thetime of the transfer of William Harvey between components of theAgency to work on Cuban operations;* and second, Bissell "wouldimagine" it was mentioned to Dulles at the initiation of the project(Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35). Bissell and Harvey briefed Richard Helmson Project ZRRIFLE when he became DDP (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 53; Harvey,7/11/75, p. 63).. But Bissell did not recall briefing John McConeabout the project when McCone took over as DCI (Bissell, 7/17/75,p. 11). McCone testified that he had no knowledge of such a project.(McCone, p. 43).William Harvey said it was assumed that the project waswithin the parameters permitted by the DCI. But Harvey testifiedthat officially advising the DCI of the existence of the project[^1][^1]: * Harvey's transfer to Cuban operations was not completed until:late in 1961.
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-15-was "a bridge we did not cross" and would not have crossed until "there was either specific targeting or a specific operation or a specific recruitment." (liarvey, 6/25/75, p. 59).(d) The Question of Whether Project ZRRIFLE was Connected to Any Actual Assassination PlotsThe Committee has sought to determine whether the CIA development of an executive action capability was related in any way to the actual assassination efforts. One question raised by this inquiry is whether the participants in the assassination operations might have perceived the executive action capability as in some way lending legitimacy to the actual assassination efforts.(i) Conversation Between Bissell and BundyIn his early testimony, Bissell said he did not have a recollection of whether he discussed the names of Castro, Lumumba, and Trujillo with anyone in the White House in the course of discussing the project to develop an executive action capability (Bissell, 6/11/75, P. 51). However, Bissell testified that it was "perfectly plausible that I would have used examples" (Bissell; 6/11/75, p. 51). He continued:in such a discussion of a capability, I might well have used the three names that I just gave, because these were the sorts of individuals at that moment in history against whom such a capability might possibly have been employed." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51).Bissell and Bundy both testified, however, that their discussion of the development of the capability for assassination did not involve any mention of actual assassination plans or