Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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Special Group decision to provide arms to anti-Trujilloelements. Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,Thomas Mann; Deputy Assistant Secretary William Coerr; andSpecial Assistant Frank Devine continued in their respectivepositions throughout the transition period. The Committee hasbeen furnished no documents indicating that Secretary Rusk orUnder Secretary Bowles were specifically advised as to theintentions of the Dominican dissidents to kill Trujillo; intentionsof which the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs certainlyhad knowledge. Indeed, Secretary Rusk testified that he was notpersonally so advised. (Rusk, 7/10, pp. 41,42)On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a briefing paperon the Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy'sNational Security Advisor. The paper made note of the out-standing Special Group approval for the provision of arms andequipment to Dominican dissidents and stated that the dissidentshad been informed that the U.S. was prepared to provide sucharms and equipment as soon as they developed the capability toreceive them.The briefing paper also indicated that dissident leadershad informed CIA of "their plan of action which they felt couldbe implemented if they were provided with arms for 300 men,explosives, and remote control detonation devices." Variouswitnesses have testified, however, that supplying arms for 300men would, standing alone, indicate a "non-targeted" use for the
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arms (i.e., a paramilitary or revolutionary implementation asopposed to a specifically targeted assassination use). (Bissell,7/29, p.80),Concerning the briefing paper, Bissell testified that:"... it is perfectly clear that I was aware at thetime of the memorandum to Mr. Bundy that thesedissident groups were, and had for a long time,been hoping they could accomplish the assassinationof Trujillo. As a matter of fact, the requests sincesome seven or eight months earlier was a perfectlyclear indication of that, so that fact was not newknowledge." (Bissell 7/22, p.102)When asked why the memorandum did not include the fact thatthe dissidents intended the assassination of Trujillo, Bissellreplied:"I cannot tell you, Mr. Chairman. I do notremember what considerations moved me. I don'tknow whether it was because this was commonknowledge and it seemed to me unnecessary toinclude it, or as you are implying, there wasan element of concealment here. I would be verysurprised if it were the latter, in this case."(Bissell, 7/22, p.101)In response to questions concerning the lack of informationin the February 17, 1961 briefing paper concerning the uses towhich the requested arms might likely be put by the dissidents,Bissell stated:"... I would say that the Agency's failure,if there be a failure here was [not] (sic) to 'statein writing that the plans of the dissidentswould include assassination attempts."(Bissell, 7/22, p.99)Bissell's briefing paper for Bundy concluded with theassessment that a violent clash might soon occur between Trujillo
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and the internal opposition, "which will end either with theliquidation of Trujillo and his cohorts or with a completeroll up of the internal opposition." In this regard, the fearwas expressed that existing schedules for the delivery ofweapons to the internal opposition might not be sufficientlvtimely, and it was therefore recommended that consideration begiven to caching the requested arms and other materials.(Bissell to Bundy memo, 2/17/61)Thus, by the middle of February 1961, the seniormembers of the new administration, and in view of the "forhigher authority" nature of Bundy's request, presumablyPresident Kennedy himself, were aware of the outstanding SpecialGroup approval for the passage of arms and other materials toopposition elements within the Dominican Republic. There wasno modification or recision of the "inherited" Special Groupapproval and it would seem fair, therefore, to regard theapproval as having been at least acquiesced in by the newadministration..During March and early April 1961, operational levelswithin both the CIA and the State Department learned of in-creasingly detailed plans by the dissidents to assassinateTrujillo. There is no evidence that this information waspassed to the White House or to any member of the Special Group,
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# TOP SECRETexcept Allen Dulles. * Similarly, there is no evidence that the passage of the pistols or the carbines or the pouching of the machine guns to the Dominican Republic was disclosed to anyone outside of the CIA during this period. **VI. April 17, 1961 - May 31, 1961(Bay of Pigs Through Trujillo Assassination)Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, attempts were made by State and CIA representatives in the Dominican Republic to dissuade the dissidents from a precipitous assassination attempt. These efforts to halt the assassination of Trujillo were the result of instructions from CIA Headquarters and were prompted by concern over filling the power vacuum which would result from Trujillo's death.The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic but permission to pass them to the dissidents was never given and the guns never left the Consulate.Dearborn returned to Washington for consultation and a contingency plan for the Dominican Republic was drafted.Two days before Trujillo's assassination, Dearborn received a cable of instructions and guidance from President Kennedy. The cable advised that the U.S. must not run the risk of association with political assassination, since the U.S., as a matter of general policy, could not condone assassination. The cable* Copies of CIA cables, including the March 20, 1961 cable describing the plan to assassinate Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress were apparently sent to the office of the Director of Central Intelligence.** Although a copy of the CIA cable advising that the pistols were being pouched was sent to the Director's office, Dulles apparently did not receive copies of the cables approving passage of the carbines or pouching of the machine guns.
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further advised Dearborn to continue to hold open offers of material assistance to the dissidents and to advise them of U.S. support for them if they were successful in overthrowing the Trujillo government. The cable also reconfirmed the decision not to pass the machine guns.A. Decision Not to Pass the Machine Guns and Unsuccessful U.S. Attempt to Stop Assassination EffortBy April 17, 1961, the Bay of Pigs invasion had /operation was a failed/. As a result, there developed a general realization that precipitous action should be avoided in the Dominican Republic until Washington was able to give further consideration to the consequences of a Trujillo overthrow and the power vacuum which would be created. (Bissell, 6/11, p.113) A cable from Headquarters to the Station, on April 17, 1961, advised that it was most important that the machine guns not be passed without additional Headquarters approval.The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic on April 19, 1961, and Headquarters was so advised. The earlier admonition that the machine guns should be held in Station custody until further notice was repeated in a second cable from Headquarters, sent April 20, 1961. This decision was said to have been "based on judgment that filling a vacuum created by assassination now bigger question than ever view unsettled conditions in Caribbean area." (HQs. to Station cable, 4/20/61)The dissidents continued to press for the release of the machine guns and their requests were passed on to Headquarters
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in cables from Dearborn and Owen. (Station to HQS cables 4/25/61) On April 25, 1961, Owen advised Ileadquarters thatWimpy Berry had informed him that Antonio de la Maza wasgoing to attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2.Owen also reported that this attempt would use the threecarbines passed from the American Consulate, together withwhatever else was available. (Id.)In response to the April 26 cable, Headquarters restatedthat there was no approval to pass any additional arms to thedissidents and requested Owen to advise the dissidents that theUnited States was simply not prepared at that time to cope withthe aftermath of the assassination. (See C/S comments,Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61) The following day, April 27,1961, Owen replied that, based upon further discussions withthe dissidents, "We doubt statement U.S. government not nowprepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade them fromattempt." (Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61)Dearborn recalls receiving instructions thatan effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt andtestified that efforts. to carry out the instructions wereunsuccessful. In effect, the dissidents informed him thatthis was their affair and it could not be turned off to suitthe convenience of the U.S. government.(Dearborn, 7/29, p.52)
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- 32 -On April 30, 1961, Dearborn advised Headquarters that the dissidents had reported to him the assassination attempt was going to take place during the first week of May. The action group was reported to have in its possession three carbines, four to six 12-gauge shotguns and other small arms. Although they reportedly still wanted the machine guns, Dearborn advised Headquarters that the group was going to go ahead with what they had, whether the U.S. wanted them to or not. (Station to HQS cable, 4/30/61)Dearborn's cable set forth the argument of the action group that, since the U.S. had already assisted the group to some extent and was therefore implicated, the additional assistance of releasing the machine guns would not change the basic relationship. The cable concluded:"Owing to far-reaching political implications involved in release or non release of requested items, Headquarters may wish discuss foregoing with State Department." (Id.)B. Further Consideration of Passing Machine GunsIn reponse, a cable was drafted at CIA Headquarters authorizing passage of the machine guns. The cable which was sent to Allen Dulles, with Bissell's recommendation for its dispatch, provided:"Since it appears that opposition group has committed itself to action with or without
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- 33 -additional support, coupled with fact ref.C items [the carbines) already made availableto them for personal defense; station authori-zed pass ref. A items [the machine guns] toopposition member for their additional pro-tection on their proposed endeavor." (Draft of HQSto Station cable, 5/2/61).The cable was never sent.In his testimony before the Committee, Bissell characteri-zed his reasoning for recommending release of the machine gunsas:" . . having made already a considerableinvestment in this dissident group and itsplans that we might as well make the addi-tional investment." (Bissell, 7/22, p.127)The following day, May 3, 1961, Ray Herbert, Deputy Chiefof the Western Hemisphere Division of CIA, who frequently actedas liaison with the State Department in matters concerningcovert operations in the Dominican Republic, met with AdolphBerle, Chairman of the State Department's Interagency Task Forceon Latin America.A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that Herbertinformed Berle that a local group in the Dominican Republicwished to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms for that purpose.The memorandum continued:"On cross examination it developed that thereal plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they-wanted guns for that purpose. flerbert wantedto know what the policy should be."I told him I could not care less for Trujilloand that this was the general sentiment. Butwe did not wish to have any thing to do with anyassassination plots anywhere, any time. Herbertsaid he felt the same way. (Berle, Meno ofConversation, 5/3/61)
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Copies of Berle's memorandum were sent to Wymberly Coerr;the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,and to Special Assistant Frank Devine.Both Herbert and Devine, who had been in almost dailycontact with each other since August of 1960, had been advisedof the assassination plans of the dissident group. In fact,Herbert, along with Bissell, had signed off on the proposedcable of May 2, releasing the machine guns for passage.## Special Group Meetings of May 4 and May 18, 1961On the day following the Berle-llerbert meeting, theSpecial Group met and, according to the minutes:> "The DCI referred to recent reports of a new> anti-Trujillo plot. He said we never know if> one of these is going to work or not, and asked> what is the status of contingency planning should> the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this point> is covered in the Cuba paper which will be discussed> at a high level in the very near future." (Special> Group Minutes, 5/4/61)Once again, the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutesmakes subsequent analysis as to the scope of matters discussedspeculative. It is not known to what extent and in what detailAllen Dulles referred to "recent reports" of a new anti-Trujilloplot. Certainly, the most recent report of such a plot wasDearborn's April 30 cable -- disclosing an imminent assassinationattempt potentially utilizing U.S.-supplied weapons.On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered thesituation in the Dominican Republic and, according to the
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minutes:-35-"Cabell [Deputy DCI] noted that the internal dissidents were pressing for the release to them of certain small arms now in U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. He inquired whether the feeling of the Group remained that these arms should not be passed. The members showed no inclination to take a contrary position at this time." (Emphasis supplied). (Special Group Minutes, 5/18/61)D. Final Requests by Dissidents for Machine GunsOn May 16, 1961, Dearborn cabled the State Department, attention Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr, with an urgent request from the dissidents for the machine guns. The cable advised that the assassination attempt was scheduled for the night of May 16 and that, while the chances of success were 80 percent, provision of the machine guns would reduce the possibility of failure. The dissidents reportedly stressed to Dearborn that if the effort failed, due to U.S. refusal to supply the machine guns, the U.S. would be held responsible and would never be forgiven. Dearborn reported that he had informed the dissidents that, based on his recent conversations in Washington, he was reasonably certain that authorization could not be obtained for handing over machine guns. (Dearborn to State cable, 5/16/61)A return cable from the State Department to Dearborn, sent the same day, confirmed Dearborn's judgment. It instructed him[^1] There was no meeting of the Special Group at which the Dominican Republic was discussed between May 4 and May 18. The language attributed to General Cabell as to whether the feeling of the Group remained not to pass the arms, tends to suggest that the question of passing these arms must have been raised prior to the May 18 Group meeting, perhaps at the May 4, 1961 meeting.[^1]: * There was no meeting of the Special Group at which the Domini-can Republic was discussed between May 4 and May 18. The language attributed to General Cabell as to whether the feeling of the Group remained not to pass the arms, tends to suggest that the question of passing these arms must have been raised prior to the May 18 Group meeting, perhaps at the May 4, 1961 meeting.
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to continue to take the same line until he received contraryinstructions which clearly indicated they had been cleared inadvance by the State Department itself. This cable from State wasapproved by Under Secretary Bowles. (Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61)Ray Herbert referred to Dearborn's May 16 request in amemorandum he sent to Devine on the same date and asked to beadvised as to the Department's policy concerning passage ofthe machine guns. Herbert noted that when this request waslast taken to the Department, Berle made the decision that theweapons not be passed. (Memo to ARA from CIA, 5/16/61)Devine responded to Herbert's memorandum on the same day,advising Herbert that the Department's policy continued to benegative on the matter of passing the machine guns. Herbert'sattention was directed to the January 12, 1961 Special Grouplimitation concerning the passage of arms outside of theDominican Republic. A copy of Devine's memorandum to Herbertwas forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of State,to the attention of his personal assistant, Joseph Scott.(Devine to Herbert memo, 5/16/61)E. Dearborn in Washington for Consultation --Drafting of Contingency PlansAt a meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961,the question of U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic wasconsidered and it was:"Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba wouldprepare promptly both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communist interventionin the event of crises in Haiti or theBy May 27, 1961 Dearborn was advising the State Department thatthe roup was no longer requesting the arms and had accepted thefact that it must make do with what it had. (Dearborn to Statecable, 5/27/61)
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Dominican Republic. Noted the President'sview that the United States should notinitiate the overthrow of Trujillo beforewe knew what government would succeed him,and that any action against Trujillo shouldbe multilateral." (Record of Actions byNational Security Council, 5/5/61)(Approved by the President, 5/16/61)Although the precise dates are uncertain, Dearborn wasrecalled to Washington to participate in drafting of thesecontingency plans and recommendations. Dearborn was in Washing-ton at least from May 10 through May 13, 1961.While in Washington, Dearborn met with StateDepartment personnel and with Richard Goodwin and ArthurSchlesinger of the White House staff. When testifying beforethe Committee, he was unable to recall the substance ofhis discussions with Goodwin and Schlesinger, aside from hisgeneral assumption that the current situation in the DominicanRepublic was discussed. He did not recall any discussion withGoodwin or Schlesinger concerning arms, either those which hadbeen passed to the dissidents or those which were being sought.(Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 58-61) Dearborn left the meeting at theWhite House, however, with the firm impression that Goodwin had beenreviewing cable traffic between Washington and the DominicanRepublic and was very familiar with events as they then stood.(Dearborn, 7/29, p.62)
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On May 11, 1961, Dearborn prepared a two-page draft document which set forth ways in which the U.S. could overtly aid and encourage the opposition to Trujillo. The draft noted that means of stepping up the covert program were considered in separate papers. (Dearborn draft document of May 11, 1961) This Dearborn draft of May 11, 1961, was apparently used as a basis for portions of the "Dominican Republic -- Contingency Paper" discussed below.Two documents entitled, "Program of Covert Action for the Dominican Republic" were provided to the Committee staff from State Department files. Each appears to be a draft of the covert activities paper described in Dearborn's May 11, 1961 memorandum. One draft recommended an expanded U.S. offer to deliver small explosive devices and arms. (Document indicating it was attached to "Dominican Republic -- Contingency," dated 5/12/61 and bearing Nos. 306-308). The other draft is very similar except that it concludes that delivery of arms within the Dominican Republic to members of the underground is not recommended. (Document from State Dept. files bearing No. 310).Attached to the second draft was a one-page document which Frank Devine believes he wrote. It listed eight numbered points including the following:"1. The USG should not lend itself to direct political assassination."2. US moral posture can ill afford further tarnishing in the eyes of the world.
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"3. We would be encouraging the action, supplying the weapons, effecting the delivery, and then turning over only the final execution to (unskilled) local triggermen."4. So far we have seen no real evidence of action capability. Should we entrust ourselves and our reputation to this extent in the absence thereof?"7. Can we afford a precedent which may convince the world that our diplomatic pouches are used to deliver assassination weapons?" (Document from State Department files bearing No. 313)The other points raised in document No. 313 related to the likelihood that any such involvement by the U.S. would ultimately be revealed.On May 15, 1961, Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr sent to Under Secretary Bowles a document entitled "Covert Action Programs Authorized With Respect to the Dominican Republic". That document outlined the existing Special Group approvals for covert assistance to Dominican dissidents and, while making no recommendation as to further policy, suggested that the Special Group review the outstanding approvals and communicate to interested agencies the status of such authorizations. (State Dept. document from Coerr to Bowles, 5/15/61)During this period a document dated May 13, 1961, was
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prepared at the request of Richard Goodwin and was thereaftercirculated within the State Department. * This document,entitled "Program of Covert Action for the Dominican Republic"reported:"CIA has had in the direct custody of its Stationin Ciudad Trujillo, a very limited supply ofweapons and grenades. In response to the urgentrequests from the internal opposition leaders forpersonal defense weapons attendant to theirprojected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, three(3) 38 Cal revolvers and three (3) carbines withaccompanying ammunition have been passed by securemeans to the opposition. The recipients haverepeatedly requested additional armed support."This memorandum is the first direct evidence of disclosure toanyone on the White House staff of the fact that arms had beenpassed to dissidents in the Dominican Republic.The original ribbon copy of the memorandum has the abovequoted material circled in pencil and the word "neutralize"is underscored. Goodwin testified before the Committee thathe circled the above paragraph when first reading the memorandumbecause the information concerning passage of the arms was newto him and struck him as significant. (Goodwin 7/18, pp. 48,49)Under the heading of "Possible Covert Actions Which RequireAdditional Authorization," the memorandum to Goodwin indicatedthat the CIA had a supply of four 45 caliber machine guns anda small number of grenades currently in the direct custody ofthe Station in Ciudad Trujillo and that a secure means of passingthese weapons to the internal opposition "for their use in -* See Scott to Bowles memorandum of May 19, 1961, enclosing copy  of Goodwin memorandum.