Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# TOP SECRET-37-The standards applied within the CIA itself suggest a view that action which the Committee believes called for top-level policy discussion and decision was thought of as permissible, without any further consultation, on the basis of the initial instruction to prevent Allende from assuming power. Machine guns were sent to Chile and delivered to military figures there on the authority of junior CIA officers without consultation even with the CIA officer in charge of the program. We find no suggestion of bad faith in the action of the junior officers. But it necessarily establishes that there was no advance permission from outside the CIA for the passage of machine guns. And it also suggests an attitude within the CIA toward consultation which was unduly lax. Further, this case demonstrated the problems inherent in giving an agency a "blank check" to engage in covert operations without specifying which actions are and are not permissible, and without adequately supervising and monitoring these activities once begun.(b) On Occasion, Administration Officials Gave Vague Instructions to Subordinates and Failed to Make Sufficiently Clear That Assassination Should Be Excluded From Consideration.While we cannot find that high Administration officials expressly approved of the assassination attempts, we have noted that certain agency officials nevertheless perceivedNW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 547
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-38-assassination to have been authorized. Although those officialswere remiss in not seeking express authorization for theiractivities, their superiors were also at fault for givingvague instructions and for not explicitly ruling out assassina-tion. No written order prohibiting assassination was issueduntil 1972, and that order was an internal CIA directive issuedby Director Helms.SchneiderAs explained above, there is no evidence that assassina-tion was ever proposed as a method of carrying out the Presi-dential order to prevent Allende from assuming office. TheCommittee believes, however, that the granting of carteblanche authority to the CIA by the Executive in this casemay have contributed to the tragic and unintended death ofGeneral Schneider. This was also partially due to impositingan impractical task to be accomplished within an unreasonablyshort time. Apart from the question of whether any inter-vention was justified under the circumstances of this case,the committee believes that the Executive in any event shouldhave defined the limits of permissible action.LumumbaWe are unable to make a finding that PresidentEisenhower intentionally authorized an assassinationeffort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolutecertainty in the evidence. However, it appears that the
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# TOP SECRET-39-strong language used in discussions at the Special Group andNSC, as reflected in minutes of relevant meetings,led Dulles to believe that assassination was desired. Theminutes contain language concerning the need to "dispose of"Lumumba, an "extremely strong feeling about the necessityfor straight forward action", and a refusal to rule out anyactivity that might contribute to "getting rid of" Lumumba.## CastroThe effort to assassinate Fidel Castro took place in anatmosphere of extreme pressure by Eisenhower and KennedyAdministration officials to discredit and overthrow the Castroregime. Richard Helms recalled that:"I remember vividly [that the pressure] was veryintense. And therefore, when you go into the record,you find a lot of nutty schemes there and those nuttyschemes were borne of the intensity of the pressure.And we were quite frustrated."Bissell recalled that:"During that entire period, the administration wasextremely sensitive about the defeat that had beenafflicted, as they felt, on the U.S. at the Bay ofPigs, and were pursuing every possible means ofgetting rid of Castro."Another witness, Samuel Halpern, stated that sometime inthe Fall of 1961 Bissell was"chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House byboth the President and the Attorney General for, as heput it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything aboutgetting rid of Castro and the Castro Regime."General Lansdale informed the agencies cooperating in OperationNW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 549
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# TOP SECRET-40-Mongoose that "you're in a combat situation where we have been given full command". Secretary of Defense McNamara confirmed that "we were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter".Many of the plans that were discussed and often approved contemplated violent action against Cuba. The operation which resulted in the Bay of Pigs was a major paramilitary onslaught that had the approval of the highest government officials, including the two Presidents. Thereafter, Attorney General Kennedy vehemently exhorted the Special Group Aug-mented that "a solution to the Cuban problem today carried top priority . . no time, money, effort--or manpower is to be spared."[^1] Subsequently, Operation Mongoose involved propaganda and sabotage operations aimed toward spurring a revolt of the Cuban people against Castro. Measures that were considered by the top policymakers included incapacitating sugar workers during harvest season by the use of chemicals; blowing up bridges and production plants; sabotaging merchandise in third countries--even those allied with the United States--prior to its delivery to Cuba; and arming insurgents on the island. Programs undertaken at the urging[^1]: * The Attorney General himself took a personal interest in the recruitment and development of assets within Cuba, on occasion recommending Cubans to the CIA as possible recruits and meeting in Washington and Florida with Cuban exiles active in the covert war against the Castro government.
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TOP SECRET-41-of the Administration included intensive efforts to recruitand arm dissidents within Cuba and raids on plants, mines,and harbors.Discussions at the Special Group and NSC meetings mightwell have contributed to the perception of some CIA officialsthat assassination was a permissible tool in the effort tooverthrow the Castro regime. At a Special Group meeting inNovember 1960, Under Secretary Merchant inquired whetherany planning had been undertaken for "direct, positive action"against Che Guevarra, Raul and Fidel Castro. Cabell repliedthat such a capability did not exist, but might well haveleft the meeting with the impression that assassination wasnot out of bounds. One phase of Lansdale's plans, whichwas submitted to the Special Group in January 1962, aimedat inducing "open revolt and overthrow of the Communistregime", and included in the final phase an "attack on thecadre of the regime, including key leaders". The proposalstated that "this should be a 'Special Target" operation . . .Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potentialagainst police. ." Several minutes from Special Groupmeetings contain language such as "possible removal ofCastro from the Cuban scene". Although Lansdale's proposalwas shelved, the type of aggressive action contemplated wasnot ruled out.On several occasions, the subject of assassination wasNW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 551
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TOP SECRET-42-discussed in the presence of senior Administration officials. While those officials never consented to actual assassination efforts, they also failed to indicate that assassination was impermissible as a matter of principle.In early 1961, McGeorge Bundy was informed of a CIA project described as the development of a capability to assassinate.* Bundy raised no objection and, according to Bissell, may have been more affirmative. Although Bissell stated that he did not infer authorization from Bundy's remarks for the underworld plot against Castro that was then underway, the fact that he believed that the development of an assassination capability had been approved by the White House (which he subsequently told to Harvey) may well have contributed to the general perception that assassination was not prohibited.Documents indicate that in May 1962, Attorney General Kennedy was told that the CIA had sought to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs. According to the CIA officials present at the briefing, the Attorney. General* Bundy, who was National Security Advisor to the President, had an obligation to tell the President of such a grave matter, even though it was only a discussion of a capability to assassinate. His failure to do so was a serious error.NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 552
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TOP SECRET-43-indicated his displeasure about the lack of consultationon the impropriety of the attempt itself.* There is noevidence that the Attorney General told the CIA that it mustnot engage in assassination plots.At a meeting of the Special Group Augmented in August1962, well after the assassination efforts were underway,Robert McNamara is said to have raised the question ofwhether the assassination of Cuban leaders should be explored,and General Lansdale issued an action memorandum assigningthe CIA the task of preparing contingency plans for theassassination of Cuban leaders. While McCone testifiedthat he had immediately made it clear that assassinationwas not to be discussed or condoned, Harvey's testimonyand documents which he wrote after the event indicate thatHarvey may have been confused over whether McCone hadobjected to the use of assassination, or whether he was onlyconcerned that the subject not be put in writing. In any* Documents show that the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy,  learned in May of 1961 that the CIA had used underworld  figures in an operation against Cuba. The documentary record  further reflects that the Attorney General was not told that  the operation had involved assassination efforts until May  of 1962, and that the operation was then described to him  as having been terminated in May 1961. There is no evidence  that the Attorney General suspected the true nature of the  operation until that briefing, or that he learned that it  had not in fact been terminated. While it is curious that  the Attorney General would not have inquired further into  the nature of the operation when he discovered that Sam  Giancana had been involved in it, there is no evidence that  he did.
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TOP SECRET-44-event, McCone went no further. He issued no general orderbanning consideration of assassination within the Agency.One of the programs forwarded to General Lansdale bythe Defense Department in the Mongoose program was entitled"Operation Bounty" and envisioned dropping leaflets in Cubaoffering rewards for the assassination of Government leaders.Although the plan was vetoed by Lansdale, it indicates thatpersons in agencies other than the CIA perceived that assas-sination might be permissible.While the ambivalence of Administration officials doesnot excuse the misleading conduct by Agency officials orjustify their failure to seek explicit permission, it dis-played an insufficient concern about assassination whichmay have contributed to the perception that assassinationwas an acceptable tactic in accomplishing the Government'sgeneral objectives.With the exception of the tight guidelines issued bythe Special Group Augmented concerning Operation Mongoose,precise limitations were never imposed on the CIA requiringprior permission for the details of other proposed covertoperations against Cuba. No general policy banning assas-sination was promulgated until Helms' intra-agency orderin 1972. In light of the number of times in which thesubject of assassination arose, Administration officialswere remiss in not explicitly forbidding such activity.
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TOP SECRET* * * * * *The Committee notes that many of the occasions on which CIA officials should have informed their superiors of the assassination efforts but failed to do so, or did so in a misleading manner, were also occasions on which Administration officials paradoxically may have reinforced the perception that assassination was permissible.For example, when Bissell spoke with Bundy about an executive action capability, Bissell failed to indicate that an actual assassination operation was underway, but Bundy failed to rule out assassination as a tactic.In May of 1962 the Attorney General was misleadingly told about the effort to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs, but not about the operation that was then going on. The Attorney General, however, did not state that assassination was improper.When a senior administration official raised the question of whether assassination should be explored at a Special Group meeting, the assassination operation should have been revealed, but a firm written order against engaging in assassination should also have been issued by McCone if, as he testified, he had exhibited strong aversion to assassination.
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TOP SECRET-46-6. Practices Current at the Time in Which the Assassination Plots Occurred Were Revealed by the Record to Create the Risk of Confusion, Rashness, and Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where Clarity and Sober Judgment Was Most Necessary.Various witnesses described elements of the system within which the assassination plots were conceived. The Committee is disturbed by the custom that permitted the most sensitive matters to be presented to the highest levels of Government with the least clarity. We find this disturbing, and view the following concepts as particularly dangerous:(1) The extension of the doctrine of "plausible denial" beyond its intended purpose of hiding the involvement of the United States from other countries to an effort to shield higher officials from knowledge, and hence, responsibility for certain operations.(2) The use of circumlocution or euphemism to describe serious matters--such as assassination--when precise meanings ought to be made clear.(3) The theory that general approval of broad covert action programs is sufficient to justify specific actions such as assassination or the passage of weapons.NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 556
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(4) The theory that authority granted, or assumed to be granted, by one director or one administration could be presumed to continue without the necessity for reaffirming the authority with successor officials.(5) The creation of capabilities without careful review and authorization by policymakers, and the risk that such capabilities might be used without further authorization.(a) The Danger Inherent in Overextending the Doctrine of Plausible DenialThe original concept of plausible denial envisioned implementing covert actions in a manner calculated to conceal American involvement if the actions were exposed. The doctrine was *at times a delusion and at times a snare*. It was naive for policymakers to assume that sponsorship of actions as big as the Bay of Pigs invasion could be concealed. The Committee's inquiry into assassination and the public disclosures which preceded it demonstrate that when the *United States resorted to cloak and dagger tactics, its hand was ultimately exposed*. In addition, the likelihood of reckless action is substantially increased when policymakers believe that their decisions will never be revealed.Whatever can be said in defense of the original purpose of plausible denial--a purpose which intends to conceal U.S. involvement from the outside world--the extension of
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-48-# TOP SECRETthe doctrine to the internal decision-making process of the Government is absurd. Any theory which, as a matter of doctrine, places elected officials on the periphery of the decision-making process is an invitation to error, an abdication of responsibility, and a perversion of democratic government.## (b) The Dangers of Using "Circumlocution" and "Euphemism"According to Richard Bissell, the extension of plausible denial to internal decisionmaking required the use of circumlocution and euphemism in speaking with Presidents and other senior officials.Explaining this concept only heightens its absurdity. On the one hand, it assumes that senior officials should be shielded from the truth to enable them to deny knowledge if the truth comes out. On the other hand, the concept assumes that senior officials must be told enough, by way of double talk, to grasp the subject. As a consequence, the theory fails to accomplish its objective and only increases the risk of misunderstanding. Subordinate officials should describe their proposals in clear, precise, and brutally frank language; busy superiors are entitled to and should demand no less.Euphemism may actually have been preferred--not because
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TOP SECRETof plausible denial--but because the persons involved could not bring themselves to state in plain language what they intended to do and may have, in some instances, assumed, rightly or wrongly, that the listening superiors did not want the issue squarely placed before them. Assassinate, murder and kill are words many people do not want to speak or hear. They describe acts which should not even be proposed, let alone plotted. Failing to call dirty business by its rightful name may have increased the risk of dirty business being done.(c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions.Permitting specific acts to be taken on the basis of general approvals of broad strategies (e.g., keep Allende from assuming office, get rid of the Castro regime) blurs responsibility and accountability. Worse still, it increases the danger that subordinates may take steps which would have been disapproved if the policymakers had been informed. A further danger is that policymakers might intentionally use loose general instructions to evade responsibility for embarrassing activities.In either event, we find that the gap between the general policy objectives and the specific actions undertaken to achieve them was far too wide.It is important that policymakers review the manner in
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TOP SECRET-50-which their directives are implemented, particularly when the activities are sensitive, secret, and immune from public scrutiny.(d) The Danger of "Floating Authorization"One justification advanced by Richard Helms and William Harvey for not informing John McCone about the use of under-world figures to assassinate Fidel Castro was their assertion that the project had already been approved by McCone's predecessor, Allen Dulles, and that further authorization was unnecessary, at least until the operation had reached a more advanced stage.Similarly, most of the actions taken in the Trujillo case during the early months of the Kennedy Administration were authorized by the Special Group on January 12, 1961, at the end of the Eisenhower Administration.The idea that authority might continue from one administration or director to the next and that there is no duty to reaffirm authority with successors inhibits responsible decisionmaking. Circumstances may change or judgments differ. New officials should be given the opportunity to review significant programs.(e) The Problems Connected with Creating New Covert CapabilitiesThe development of a new capability raises numerous problems. Having a capability to engage in certain covert
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TOP SECRET-51-activity increases the probability that it will occur, since the capability represents a tool that is available for use. There is the further danger that authorizing a capability may be misunderstood as authorizing its use without need for obtaining explicit authorization.Of course, an assassination capability should never have been created in the first place.
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# V. RECOMMENDATIONSApproved byDraftingSubcommittee10/8/75(with possible reservationas to language of statute)During our long investigation of assassination, a number of vital issues came into sharp focus.Above all, stood the question of assassination. Our recommendations on other issues should await the completion of our continuing investigations and our final report. But we need no more information to convince us that a flat ban against assassination should be written into law.We condemn assassination and reject it as an instrument of American policy. Surprisingly, at present there is no statute making it a crime to assassinate a foreign official outside the United States. Hence, for the reasons set forth below, the Committee recommends the prompt enactment of a statute making it a Federal crime to commit or attempt an assassination, or to conspire to do so.A. General agreement that the United States must not engage in assassination. Our view that assassination has no place in America's arsenal is shared by the Administration.President Ford, in the same statement in which he asked this Committee to deal with the assassination issue, stated:> I am opposed to political assassination. This administration> has not and will not use such means as instruments of national> policy. Presidential Press Conference, June 9, 1975, *Weekly> Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. II, No. 24, p. 611.The witnesses we examined uniformly condemned assassination. They denounced it as immoral, described it as impractical, and reminded us that an open society, most of all, runs the risk of the assassination of its own leaders. As President Kennedy was reported to have said: "we can't get into that kind of thing, or we would all be targets." (Goodwin 7/18/75, p. 4)The current CIA Director and his two predecessors testified emphatically that assassination should be banned. Thus, Colby said:
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With respect to assassination, my position is clear. I just think it is wrong. And I have said so and made it very clear to my subordinates. (5/21/75, p. 89)Colby's predecessor, Helms, although himself involved in an earlier plot, said he had concluded assassination should be ruled out for both moral and practical reasons:As a result of my experiences through the years, when I became Director I had made up my mind that this option...of killing foreign leaders, was something that I did not want to happen on my watch. My reasons for this were these:There are not only moral reasons but there are also some other rather practical reasons.It is almost impossible in a democracy to keep anything like that secret.... Somebody would go to a Congressman, his Senator, he might go to a newspaper man, whatever the case may be, but it just is not a practical alternative, it seems to me, in our society.Then there is another consideration...if you are going to try by this kind of means to remove a foreign leader, then who is going to take his place running that country, and are you essentially better off as a matter of practice when it is over than you were before? And I can give you I think a very solid example of this which happened in Vietnam when President Diem was eliminated from the scene. We then had a revolving door of prime ministers after that for quite some period of tiem, during which the Vietnamese Government at a time in its history when it should have been strong was nothing but a caretaker government.... In other words, that whole exercise turned out to the disadvantage of the United States....there is no sense in my sitting here with all the experience I have had and not sharing with the Committee my feelings this day. It isn't because I have lost my cool, or because I have lost my guts, it simply is because I don't think it is a viable option in the United States of America these days.Chairman Church. Doesn't it also follow, Mr. Helms I agree with what you have said fully -- but doesn't it also follow on the practical side, apart from the moral side, that since these secrets are bound to come out, when they do, they do very grave political damage to the United States in the world at large? I don't know to what extent the Russians