Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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√4. CubaThe DCI summarized the progress we have made in establishing contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its capabilities (after this action had been cleared with the Special Group).He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of approximately 500 people ready to operate by November. In answer to Mr. Irwin's question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating the tactical combat phase.Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The latter had told Mr. Gray that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had two reservations that he would like Gray to look into.One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his discussion with CIA representatives in connection with the latest withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received "no evidence" that any effective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had answered that in the formal presentation last week, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups.)The second point had to do with a feeling that we might not3
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outstanding intelligence, ability or drive, but that he is obviously well motivated. Mr. Irwin asked whether there might be other individuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature in the church hierarchy who could be useful.Mr. Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black Africa is not a very substantial force. Mr. Dulles concurred in this, but added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate.
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SEONET-EYES ONLY Pllon Exhibit 3(a)E-325 August 1960MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles1. CongoMr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. Dulles later described them "2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included: operations through the chief advisor of the Christian Trade Unions; the planned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange a vote of no confidence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact with an alieged leader of certain independent labor groups. Fie emphasized that the latter had just come up and that we are now in the process of assessing the bona fides and capabilities of the individual.The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much. in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.Mr. Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have given thought to the possibility of using high officials of the Catholic Church in Africa to promote the general objectives of the West. In this connection, he cited a preliminary assessment which had been made of the Negro Cardinal recently appointed by the Pope - the assessment being that the individual in question is a man of notPROPERTYTHE WHITE HOUSE OFPOCHSECRET-FYES CALYTHIS 200ISA SOURCE CEFAFER 1.3. 220-DO NOT DESTROYNW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 126
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# 4. Dominican RepublicMr. Dulles inquired whether Mr. Merchant wanted to discuss the proposal to dispatch a letter to Trujillo suggesting that the latter retire from office. At Mr. Merchant's request, the DCI stated his opinion, which was to the effect that he had considerable reservation as to the efficacy or wisdom of such a letter. He said that it seemed to him much more useful to make a personal approach, which not only stood a chance of being more effective, but also could be denied. He pointed out that a personal approach had been attempted some time ago, but that the individual in question had not been able to carry it off. He suggested that the approach might best be made by an unofficial American, and that Mr. Pawley would be a better bet than the previous individual.Mr. Merchant said that he realized his own name had been suggested, and that he was far from enthusiastic about the idea. He said further that he has a visceral feeling against asking a Chief of State to get out of office either through the medium of a letter or personal contact - particularly when we do not know who might succeed him. Mr. Merchant conceded with good humor the validity of Mr. Gray's wry comment that Mr. Merchant's ethics and his pragmatism might be somewhat intertwined.Mr. Gray said that he was entirely opposed to having any U.S. official sign such a letter. He thought that an unofficial letter might be a different matter.The conclusion of the Group was that it would be worth the effort to get Mr. Pawley to attempt a direct approach to the Benefactor; it was noted that the chances of success are perhaps less than even, but that no great harm could result.# 5. CongoThere was a brief discussion of developments in the Congo and the possibilities of effective action there. Mr. Gray said that he hoped that Agency people in the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss.
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Mr. Dulles said he believed a warrant had been issued for the arrest of Lumumba. Aside from Lumumba, Mobutu appears to be the only man in the Congo able to act with firmness. A recent attempt to assassinate Mobutu had failed. Mr. Dulles then reported that we had attempted to provide Mobutu with funds but that the guards protecting Mobutu had relieved our messenger of the funds. We cannot get funds to Mobutu because he does not have complete control over his guards. A new development has been Mobutu's creation of a council of advisers, most of whom are graduate students. The old ministers have been turned out of office and their offices have been taken over for the council, which is intended to carry on for a temporary period. Mr. Dulles reported that the USSR had suffered a severe blow to its prestige in the Congo. However, he had been surprised at the ease with which the Soviets were forced out of the Congo. He believed that the Soviet diplomats, after departing from the Congo, went to Accra but he did not know whether they had moved on toward the USSR. Mr. Gray asked whether the Soviets were really quitting the Congo. Secretary Dillon said the Soviet press has not yet admitted that the Soviets have quit the Congo. Mr. Dulles said the Soviet diplomats indicated to the press before leaving that they would be back. Secretary Dillon believed it was clear that the Soviets had not given up in the Congo. Mr. Dulles reported that the Soviet diplomats left the Congo so hurriedly that the Soviet markings which they painted over the Congo markings on their planes were still wet when they left. Mr. Dulles said the Soviet ships off the African coast were apparently awaiting a clarification of the situation. Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of.Mr. Dulles observed that the situation in Laos was still confusing and that little progress had been made toward the settlement of the crisis during the past week. The threatening situation in Sam Neua Province, however, had been quieted as a result of the dispatch of Laotian parachute troops to that area. The situation remains troublesome because Pathet Lao and Viet Minh forces could intervene at any time. The problem of the conflicting governments in Laos is no nearer a settlement. The King has requested that General Ouane and General Phoumi call upon him. A skirmish between Phoumi's forces and Vientiane forces has been reported at Fak Sane, but little bloodshed resulted. Apparently, Phoumi has adopted tactics of carrying on a war of nerves against Vientiane. There has been firing across the Mekong River into the city and Phoumi apparently intends to starve out the government. Meanwhile,
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kept under continuing scrutiny by all interested departments and agencies to ensure that it serves the purposes of retarding the growth of the war potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and reducing its unity. Noted that, with respect to paragraph 1l of NSC 5704/3, U.S. export controls over such materials, equipment, technology and services as can be unilater- ally controlled by the United States may be imposed not only to achieve a worthwhile adverse impact on the war potential of the European Soviet Bloc, but also to serve other U.S. policy objectives, especially with regard to technology and services.NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all holders of NSC 5704/3.5. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITYMr. Dulles said he would first summarize developments in the Congo. Several African states were making frantic efforts to save Lumumba. An intercepted message between Egypt and Ghana indicates that Nasser is urging the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea to concentrate their forces in Leopoldville and bring pressure to bear for the maintenance of Lumumba as Prime Minister. Mr. Dulles remerked that the bulk of the UAR forces now in the Congo had been placed advisedly in north Equateur Province, while the Guinea forces were in the northern part of Leopoldville Province. Intercepted messages also indicated that Nasser had asked that a council be formed in Leopoldville consisting of the diplomatic representatives of the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea in that city. The UAR Ambassador to the Congo had been directed, in concert with the Ambassadors of Ghana, Guinea and Morocco to attempt to per- suade Kasavubu to effect a reconciliation with Lumumba. On Sep- tember 20 Kasavubu had announced that he had reached no agreement with Lumumba but the latter had later displayed a piece of paper purporting to be an agreement with Kasavubu.Secretary Dillon reported that Lumumba had requested a visa for travel to New York as the representative of the Congo to the UN and had also requested a visa as an official of the Govern- ment of the Congo. We had denied both requests for visas. How- ever, if Lunumba asked for a visa to visit the U.S. as a private citizen, we would have difficulty in turning him down.Mr.Dillon added that the Congo Government declares it will arrest Lumumba if he attempts to leave the country.
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SECRET-EYES ONLYDillon Exhibit 48 September 1960AWD/GneMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 September 1960PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles1. Supply Drop to Cuban DissidentsMr. Parrott outlined the proposed supply drop to Cuban dissidents in the Escambray. After brief discussion, the Group approved the project as presented. Mr. Parrott asked whether approval could be granted at this time for continuing missions of a similar nature to this group or other bodies of dissidents. The Special Group agreed to this, with Mr. Dulles stating that the other members could be notified by telephone, without the necessity of convening a meeting.SECRET-EVES ONLYPROPERTY DETHE WHITE HOOOL VIFIOLNW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 130
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# VI. 9 Jul 75--2-2-4-GICUBAFIDEL CASTRO INTERVIEVED BY DAGENS NYHETהזStockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Jul 75 pp 1, 12 LD(Mats Holmberg interview with Cuban Prime Minister Castro: "The United States Ho Longer Wants To Assassinate Me"](Excerpts] Havana, 2 July--For a man who has for many years been on the CIA death list, Cuba's leader Fidel Castro looked remarkably unconcerned. He sat on a sofa in the Swedish Embassy a few hours before Olof Palme's departure from Cuba and when he was questioned about the CIA's repeated attempts to assassinate him, he raised both hands to the ceiling in a gesture of resignation:"Good Lord," he said. "We have known all that for a long time. It seems a little ridiculous," Fidel said, "to hear today of disclosures of new assassination plans when here in Cuba we already knew of them.""Yet what is now being disclosed in the United States is only a small part," he said. "We could describe a dozen similar assassination plans and we will also do so when the U.S. investigations are over."But he did not believe that he ran the risk of being assassinated by the CIA any longer."If there are such plans today, we at least, do not know of then," he said. "I believe that the United States is no longer so interested in assassinating me--and I believe that it has accepted the Cuban revolution as a fact and that sooner or later it must come to an agreement with us.""But no one can be absolutely certain," he said.Raised EyebrowsWhat Fidel Castro sald while seated on the Swedish Embassy sofa will cause some eyebrows to be raised in many countries which Cuba has accepted as international allies.One of the key phrases of Olof Palme's Latin American trip has been "a new economic world order." It is a term which embraces small countries' rights to control their natural resources, and in both the oil power, Venezuela, and the potential oil power, Mexico, Olof Palme's hosts have adopted the concept with enthusiasm.When Fidel Castro explained his own skepticism concerning talk of "a new economic world order" after dinner at the Swedish Embassy, he did so in a violent attack on the world's oil-producing countries.He believed that a new world order could not be created by the introduction of new privileges for a new group of countries.The Poor Are AffectedInsufficient to demand that all countries have control over their own raw materials," he said. "All privileges are created at another's expense, and today it is not the industrialized countries which are affected by the oil countries' profits but the poor countries which do not have oil.
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VI. 9 Jul 15Q 2JUL 14 1975CIACUBA"How can you compare cocoa and oil?" he asked. "What benefit is it to countries like Sri Lanka and Tanzania that all countries control their raw materials when all this means to them is that they must pay more for both oil and industrial goods?"I am not speaking for myself," he explained. "We receive oil from the USSR on favorable terms. But if the oil countries demand solidarity from the Third World, they must concern themselves with the problems of the Third World. They are, as yet, reluctant to do this.""Where has the oil revenue gone?" he asked, and he answered the question."It has been deposited in the economies of the industrial world and has been used for arms purchases. The industrialized countries will emerge from the economic crisis stronger than ever. It will be the developing countries which will be affected."They Do Not DareFidel Castro fell silent and he looked at the Swedish journalists with an expression of genuine alarm."Do you think I am speaking too severely?" he asked worriedly. "But you must understand that someone must talk about this. There is no one else who dares, since all are hoping for loans from the oil countries."And he gave those who sat next to him a comforting slap on the back.In various Latin American countries Latin America is described today as a changing continent, and in both Mexico and Venezuela Olof Palme listened to the revolutionary and anti-imperialist diatribes which are increasingly part of both these countries' official language.Fidel Castro did not appear especially impressed by this change. He did not mention Mexico and Venezuela at all when he was asked about the prospects for social revolution in South America--but he did mention the military governments of Peru and Panama.Better Than Nothing"No path toward revolution can be ruled out," he said, "and we are watching the progressive regimes in Peru and Panama with great interest. It is meaningless to discuss whether an armed struggle is necessary for revolution--all that can be aaid is that a revolution must be based on real force, whether it be in Chile or Cuba."lio smiled sadly when asked for his opinion of the governments in Venezuela and Mexico, which, by their own assurances, are revolutionary, and he thought for a long time before answering: "It is better than nothing."Someone asked if it is true that Cuba is receiving economic ald from the USSR in conflict with its own ideology and that it has its "stomach in Moscow and its head in Peking."Fidel Castro was obviously upset by the question."It was not they who contrived the Cuban revolution," he said, "it was us. But the USSR helped us when no one else would, and we cannot forget that. We have not compromised with either the USSR or anyone else, and who else could have helped us? The United States?"NW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 13243
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THE EVENING STAR (Washington), Monday, S September 1963, Four Star Edition, page B 4, Columns 4 - 5"Goldwater's Toughness Challenged by Castro"by Daniel Harker, AP Staff Writer".... Bitterly denouncing what he called recent U.S. prompted raids on Cuban territory, Mr. Castro said:'We are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. U.S. leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe.'The U.S. is always ready to negotiate and make promises which later it will not honor. This has happened to promises made during the October crisis. They have been broken as can be seen with new attacks.'But I warn this is leading to a very dangerous situation that could lead to a worse crisis than October's....'"[From an impromptu interview given by Castro at a Brazilian Embassy reception this week.]
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TIME-PICAYUNE, New Orleans, Monday, 9 September 1963, page 7,Columns 5 - 7"Castro Blasts Raids on Cuba. Says U.S. LeadersImperiled by Aid to Rebels."This item was introduced by an editor's notereferring to the fact that Castro had turnedup at a Brazilian Embassy reception Saturdaynight (7 September) where he had submitted toan impromptu interview. Harker's account ofthe interview reached New York Sunday after-noon."Havana (AP) - Prime Minister Fidel Castrosaid Saturday night: 'U.S. leaders would bein danger if they helped in any attempt to doaway with leaders of Cuba.'""Bitterly denouncing what he calledrecent U.S. prompted raids on Cuban territory,Castro said: 'We are prepared to fight themand answer in kind. U.S. leaders should thinkthat if they are aiding terrorist plans toeliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves willnot be safe.'""...World affairs ... seemed to beentering a more peaceful climate a few daysago, but now this trend has changed withattacks."""The U.S. is always ready to negotiateand make promises which later it will not honor.This has happened to promises made during theOctober crisis. They have been broken as canbe seen with new attacks.'But I warn this is leading to a verydangerous situation that could lead to a worsecrisis than October's....'"RECEIVED FROMJUL 14 1975CIANW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 134
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4(24) In 1971, a plan was prepared to assassinate Castro on a visit to Chile. The main protagonist was Jesus Dominquez Benitez, known as "The Islander," who had been arrested by the FBI in 1968 for promoting terrorist actions inside the United States. In 1970 he had participated in an unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate Cuba through Oriente Province and had sought refuge at Guantanamo, where he was arrested for bond violation. Nonetheless, he was free in 1971, to participate with the CIA, Chilean fascists, and Cuban counterrevolutionaries in a scheme to assassinate Castro using a gun concealed in a television camera. He obtained Venezuelan press credentials from Cuban exiles in that country. The plan was aborted. Those involved in the plot feared for their lives because the plan did not insure their escape.###
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# CLOSING STATEMENT FROM CUBA DOCUMENTWe consider that the analysis of the informations we offer, the publicly known, and the ones that the American authorities possess and have not been published, allows us to affirm that the physical elimination of Cuban Revolutionary leaders, especially the Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz, has been a reiterated policy of the United States through its subversive agencies, making use of Cuban counterrevolutionaries, U.S. citizen and all kind of corrupted individuals, inside the country as well as abroad, without taking into consideration the victims that would result from these actions.With this purpose, they have provided the participants with a great number of weapons, explosives, technical means of transportation and communication for the accomplishment of their plans.These are some of the connoted and proved facts of the numerous subversive activities that the CIA has carried out aimed to the assassination of the leaders of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba.
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# THE WHITE HOUSETOP SECRET-SENSITIVEEYES ONLYWASHINGTONNovember 12, 1964MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDYSUBJECT: Shipments of Contaminating Elements to Cuba1.  I refer to your interest in hearing more about the Fitzgerald operation which involves the current shipment of contaminating elements to Cuba and which is aimed at bringing about a breakdown of a substantial amount of Cuban machinery.2.  Attached is a copy of a memo which I believe you drafted for a meeting with the President on April 7, 1964. Item 5 would appear to cover the type of operation which Fitzgerald is now conducting.I have not come across any minutes of the April 7 meeting. (As I recall it, you intentionally kept the attendance restricted and were the sole attendee from the NSC staff.) While. I do not recognize the handwriting or the doodles on the attached memo, they indicate that Item 5 was approved. My own strong recollection of the meeting was that Items 1 through 5 were O.K. and that the only serious problems concerned Items 6 and 7.3.  I assume that you still want to hear a status report on the Fitzgerald operation at the Special Group meeting today and I will pass this word to both Des and Peter Jessup.I think this operation is probably too far down the road to stop, if indeed we do want to stop it. In any event, you will be able to find this out, by some gentle questioning, when Des gives his status report.GCGordon ChaseTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY.NW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 140CopyLunden R Johnson Library