Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 529]
Helms and McCone testified that the Presidents underwhich they served never asked them to consider assassination.There was no evidence whatsoever that President Johnsonknew about or authorized any assassination activity during hisPresidency.3. CIA Officials Involved in the Assassination Opera-   tions Perceived Assassination To Have Been A Permis-   sible Course of ActionThe CIA officials involved in the targeted assassinationattempts testified that they had believed that their activitieshad been fully authorized.*In the case of the Lumumba assassination operation,Richard Bissell testified that he had no direct recollectionof authorization, but after having reviewed the cables andSpecial Group minutes, testified that authority must haveflowed from Dulles through him to the subordinate levels inthe Agency.In the case of the assassination effort against Castro,Bissell and Sheffield Edwards testified they believed theoperation involving underworld figures had been authorizedby Dulles when they briefed him shortly after the plot had beeninitiated. William Harvey testified he believed that the* The lower level operatives, such as O'Connell and the  AM/LASH case officers, are not discussed in this section, since  they had clear orders from their immediate superiors.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 530]
TOP SECRET-21-plots "were completely authorized at every appropriate level within and beyond the Agency", although he had "no personal knowledge whatever of the individuals' identities, times, exact words, or channels through which such authority may have passed". Harvey stated that he had been told by Richard Bissell that the effort against Castro had been authorized "from the highest level", and that Harvey had discussed the plots with Richard Helms, his immediate superior.. Helms testified that although he had never discussed assassination with his superiors, he believed:". . . that in these actions we were taking against Cuba and against Fidel Castro's government in Cuba, that they were what we had been asked to do. . . . In other words we had been asked to get rid of Castro and . . . there were no limitations put on the means, and we felt we were acting well within the guidelines that we understood to be in play at this particular time."The evidence points to a disturbing situation. Agency officials perceived the effort to assassinate Castro to have been within the parameters of permissible action, but Administration officials (including McCone) responsible for formulating policy were not aware of the effort and did not authorize it. The explanation may lie in the fact that orders concerning overthrowing the Castro regime were stated in broad terms that were subject to differing interpretations by those responsible for carrying out those orders.The various Presidents and their senior advisorsNW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 531
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TOP SECRET-22-strongly opposed the regimes of Castro and Trujillo, theaccession to power of Allende, and the potential influenceof Patrice Lumumba. Orders concerning action against thoseforeign leaders were given in vigorous language. For example,President Nixon's orders to prevent Allende from assumingpower left Helms feeling that "if I ever carried a marshall'sbaton in my knapsack out of the oval office, it was that day."Similarly, General Lansdale described the Mongoose effortagainst Cuba as "a combat situation", and Attorney GeneralKennedy emphasized that "a solution to the Cuban problemtoday carries top priority". Helms testified that thepressure to "get rid of [Castro and the Castro regime]" wasintense, and Bissell testified that he had been ordered to"get off your ass about Cuba".It is possible that there was a failure of communica-tion between policymakers and the agency personnel who wereexperienced in secret, and often violent, action. Althoughpolicymakers testified that assassination was not intendedby such words as "get rid of Castro", some of their sub-ordinates in the Agency testified that they perceived thatassassination was desired and that they should proceed with-out troubling their superiors.The 1967 Inspector General's Report on assassinationsappropriately observed:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 532]
TOP SECRET-23-The point is that of frequent resort to. synechdoche -- the mention of a part when the whole is to be understood, or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated references to phrases such as "disposing of Castro", which may be read in the narrow, literal sense of assassinating him, when it is intended that it be read in the broader, figurative sense of dislodging the Castro regime. Reversing the coin, we find people speaking vaguely of "doing something about Castro" when it is clear that what they have specifically in mind is killing him. In a situation wherein those speaking may not have actually meant what they seemed to say or may not have said what they actually meant, they should not be surprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted differently than was intended.Differing perceptions between superiors and their sub-ordinates were graphically illustrated in the Castro context.[^1]McCone, in a memorandum dated April 14, 1967, reflected as follows:Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms such as "dispose of Castro", "remove Castro", "knock off Castro", etc., and this meant the overthrow of the Communist government in Cuba and the replacing of it with a democratic regime. Terms such as the above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as stated, all refer to a change in the Cuban government.[^1]: * "Senator Mathias: Let me draw an example from history. When Thomas A'Beckett was proving to be an annoyance, as Castro, the King said, 'who will rid me of this turbulent priest?'. He didn't say, 'go out and murder him' He said, 'who will rid me of this man', and let it go at that."Mr. Helms: That is a warming reference to the problem."Senator Mathias: You feel that spans the generations and the centuries?"Mr. Helms: I think it does, sir."Senator Mathias: And that is typical of the kind of thing which might be said, which might be taken by theNW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 533
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# TOP SECRET-24-Helms, who had considerable experience as a covert operator, gave precisely the opposite meaning to the same words, interpreting them as conveying authority for assassination.Helms repeatedly testified that he felt that explicit authorization was unnecessary for the assassination of Castro in the early 1960's, but he said he did not construe the intense pressure from President Nixon in 1970 as providing authority to assassinate anyone. As Helms testified, the difference was not that the pressure to prevent Allende from assuming office was any less than the pressure to remove the Castro regime, but rather that "I had already made up my mind that we weren't going to have any of that business when I was Director."Certain CIA contemporaries of Helms who were subjected to similar pressures in the Castro case rejected the thesis that implicit authority to assassinate Castro derived from the strong language of the policymakers. Bissell testified that he had believed that "formal and explicit approval" would be required for assassination, and McManus testifieddirector or by anybody else as presidential authorization to go forward?"Mr. Helms: That is right. But in answer to that, I realize that one sort of grows up in tradition of the time and I think that any of us would have found it very difficult to discuss assassinations with a President of the U.S. I just think we all had the feeling that we were hired out to keep those things out of the oval office."NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 534
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-25-that "it never occurred to me" that the vigorous words of the Attorney General could be taken as authorizing assassination. The differing perceptions may have resulted from their different backgrounds and training. Neither Bissell (an academician whose Agency career for the six years before he became DDP had been in the field of technology) nor McManus (who had concentrated on intelligence and staff work) were experienced in covert operations.*The perception of certain Agency officials that assassination was within the range of permissible activity was reinforced by the continuing approval of violent covert actions against Cuba that were sanctioned at the Presidential level and by the failure of the successive administrations to make clear that assassination was not permissible. This point is one of the subjects considered in the next section.* Of course, this analysis cannot be carried too far. In the Lumumba case, for example, Johnson and Dillon, who were Administration officials with no covert operation experience, construed remarks as urging or permitting assassination, while other persons who were not in the Agency did not so interpret them.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 535]
4. The Failure In Communication Between Agency Officials In Charge Of The Assassination Operations And Their Superiors In The Agency And In The Administration Was Due To:(a) The Failure of Subordinates To Disclose The Operations To Their Superiors; and(b) The Failure of Superiors to Give Precise Orders Regarding the Nature of Permissable Operations and to Make Clear That Assassination Was Precluded in the Climate of Violence Engendered by the Aggressive Covert Actions Sanctioned by the Administrations.While we cannot find that officials responsible for making policy decisions knew about or authorized the assassination attempts (with the possible exception of the Lumumba case), Agency operatives at least through the level of DDP nevertheless perceived assassination to have been permissible. This failure in communication was inexcusable in light of the gravity of assassination. The Committee finds that the failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors was reprehensible, and that the reasons that they offered for having neglected to inform their superiors are unacceptable. The Committee further finds that Administration officials failed to be sufficiently precise in their directions to the Agency and that their attitude toward the possibility of assassination was ambiguous in the context of the violence of other activities that they did authorize.
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# TOP SECRET-27-(a) Agency Officials Failed On Several Occasions To RevealThe Plots To Their Superiors, Or To Do So With SufficientDetail and ClaritySeveral of the cases considered in this report raise questions concerning whether officials of the CIA sufficiently informed their superiors in the Agency or officials outside the Agency about their activities.CastroThe failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors of the assassination efforts against Castro is particularly troubling.Richard Bissell testified that he and Sheffield Edwards told Allen Dulles only "circumlocutiously" and only after the project had begun about the operation which used members of the underworld. Both Bissell and his successor as DDP, Richard Helms, testified that they never discussed the operation with John McCone or any officials outside the CIA. The two officials directly responsible for the operation--Edwards and William Harvey--testified that they never discussed the operation with McCone or any Government official above the level of DDP. McCone testified that he was never consulted about the operation, and that Dulles never briefed him on its existence. On the basis of the testimony and documentary evidence before the Committee, it is uncertain whether Dulles![photo of handwriting that says shoule Harvey have told]NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 537
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TOP SECRET-28-was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworldoperation, and virtually certain that it continued intoMcCone's term without his or the Administration's knowledgeor approval.On the occasions when Richard Bissell had the opportunityto inform his superiors about the assassination effort againstCastro, he either failed to inform them or misled them.Bissell testified that he and Edwards told Dulles andCabell about the assassination operation using underworldfigures, but that they did so "circumlocutiously", and thenonly after contact had been made with the underworld and aprice had been offered for Castro's death.Bissell further testified that he never raised the issueof assassination with officials of either the Eisenhower orKennedy Administration. His reason was that since he was underDulles in the chain of command, he would normally have had noduty to discuss the matter with the Presidents or other Adminis-tration officials, and that he assumed that Dulles would havecircumlocutiously spoken with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedyabout the operation. These reasons are insufficient. It wasinexcusable to withhold such information from those responsiblefor formulating policy on the unverified assumption that theymight have been circumlocutiously informed by Dulles, whoNW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 538
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-29-himself had not been straight-forwardly told about the operation.*The failure to either inform those officials or to makecertain that they had been informed by Dulles was particularlyreprehensible in light of the fact that there were many occasionson which Bissell should have informed them, and his failure todo so was misleading. In the first weeks of the Kennedy Adminis-tration, Bissell met with Bundy and discussed the developmentof an assassination capability within CIA--executive action.But Bissell did not mention that an actual assassination attemptwas underway. Bissell appeared before the Taylor-Kennedy Boardof Inquiry which was formed to report to the President on theBay of Pigs and the Cuban situation, but testified that he didnot inform the Commission of the assassination operation. Aschief of the CIA directorate concerned with clandestine operationsand the Bay of Pigs, Bissell frequently met with officials inthe Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations to discuss Cubanoperations, and his advice was frequently sought. He did nottell them that the CIA had undertaken an effort to assassinateCastro, and did not ask if they favored proceeding with the* Even assuming that Bissell correctly perceived that Dulles  understood the nature of the operation, it was inexcusable for  Bissell not to have briefed Dulles in plain language. Further,  even if one accepts Bissell's assumption that Dulles told the  Presidents, they would have been told too late, because Bissell  "guessed" they would have been told that the operation "had  been planned and was being attempted".
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TOP SECRET-30-effort. He was present at the meeting with Dulles and President Kennedy at which the new President was briefed on covert action in Cuba, but neither Dulles nor Bissell mentioned the assassination operation that was underway.The failures to make forthright disclosures to policymakers continued during the time that Richard Helms was DDP. Helms' failure to inform McCone about the underworld operation when it was reactivated under Harvey and poison pills were sent to Cuba was a grave error in judgment, and Helms' excuses are unpersuasive. In May of 1962, the Attorney General was told that the CIA's involvement in an assassination plot had terminated with the Bay of Pigs. Not only did Edwards, who had briefed the Attorney General, know that the operation had not been terminated, but Helms did not inform the Attorney General that the operation was still active when he learned that the Attorney General had been misled. Helms did not inform McCone of the plot until August 1962, and did so then in a manner which indicated that the plot had been terminated before McCone became Director. Helms' denial that AM/LASH had been involved in an assassination attempt in response to Secretary of State Rusk's inquiries was, as Helms testified, "not truthful".When Helms briefed President Johnson on the Castro plots, he apparently described the activities that had occurred during prior administrations but did not describe the AM/LASH opera-NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 540
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TOP SECRETtion which had continued until 1965. Helms also failed toinform the Warren Commission of the plots because the precisequestion was not asked.Helms told the Committee that he had never raised theassassination operation with McCone or Kennedy Administrationofficials because he had assumed that the project had beenpreviously authorized, and that the aggressive character ofthe Kennedy Administration's program against the Castro regimemade assassination permissible even in the absence of anexpress instruction. He added that he had never been convincedthat the operation would succeed, and that he would have toldMcCone about it if he had ever believed that it would "goanyplace".Helms' reasons for not having told his superiors aboutthe assassination effort are unacceptable; indeed, many of themwere reasons why he should have sought express authority.As Helms himself testified, assassination was of a high orderof sensitivity. Administration policymakers, supported byintelligence estimates furnished by the Agency, had emphasizedon several occasions that successors to Castro might be worsethan Castro himself. In addition, the Special Group Augmentedrequired that plans for covert actions against Cuba be sub-mitted in detail for its approval. Although the Administrationwas exerting intense pressure on the CIA to do something aboutCastro and the Castro regime, it was a serious error to haveMC CONE/DULLES re ASAP
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-32-undertaken so drastic an operation without obtaining full andequivocal permission.William Harvey, the officer in charge of the CIA's attemptusing underworld figures to assassinate Castro, testified thathe never discussed the plot with McCone or officials of theKennedy Administration because he believed that it had beenfully authorized by the previous Director, because he wasuncertain whether it had a chance of succeeding, and becausehe believed that it was Helms', not his, duty to inform higherauthorities.Nonetheless, the Committee believes there were occasionson which it was incumbent on Harvey to have disclosed theassassination operation. As head of Task Force W, the branchof the CIA responsible for covert operations in Cuba, Harveyreported directly to General Lansdale and the Special GroupAugmented. The Special Group Augmented had made known thatcovert operations in Cuba should be first approved by it, bothby explicit instruction and by its practice that particularoperations be submitted in "nauseating detail". Yet Harvey.
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-33-did not inform either General Lansdale or the Special GroupAugmented of the assassination operation, either when he wasexplicitly requested to report to McCone, General Taylor,and the Special Group on his activities in Miami in April1962, or when the subject of assassination was raised in theAugust 1962 meeting and McCone voiced his disapproval.The Committee finds that the reasons advanced for nothaving informed those responsible for formulating policyabout the assassination operation were inadequate, misleading,and inconsistent. Some officials viewed assassination astoo important and sensitive to discuss with superiors, whileothers considered it not sufficiently important. Harveytestified that it was premature to tell McCone about theunderworld operation in April 1962, because it was notsufficiently advanced, but too late to tell him about it inAugust 1962, since by that time he had decided to terminateit. On other occasions, officials thought disclosure wassomeone else's responsibility; Bissell said he thought it wasup to Dulles, Harvey believed it was up to Helms, but Helmsremarked that Harvey "kept Phase II pretty much in his backpocket".relationshipNW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 543
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-34-The Committee concludes that the failure clearly to inform policymakers of the assassination effort against Castro was grossly improper. The Committee believes that it should be incumbent upon the DDP to report such a sensitive operation to his superior, the DCI, no matter how grave his doubts might be about the possible outcome of the operation. It follows that the DCI has the same duty to accurately inform his superiors.Trujillo.In the Trujillo case there were several instances in which it appears that policymakers were not given sufficient information, or were not informed in a timely fashion.At a meeting on December 29, 1960, Bissell presented a plan to the Special Group for supporting Dominican exile groups and local dissidents, and stated that the plan would not bring down the regime without "some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself". At a meeting on January 12, 1961, the Special Group authorized the passage of "limited supplies of small arms and other material" to Dominican dissidents under certain conditions. At this time, the fact that the dissidents had been contemplating the assassination of Trujillo had been known in the State Department at the level of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and by senior officials of the CIA, including the DCI. Yet the memorandum supplied to Under Secretary Merchant, which
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TOP SECRET-35-was said to have been the basis upon which the Special Groupagreed to the "limited supply" of small arms, did not mentionassassination. To the contrary, it spoke of "sabotage potential"and stated that there "would be no thought of toppling the[government] by any such minor measure [as the supplying ofsmall arms]."On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a memorandumon the Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy. Bissell knewthat the dissidents planned to assassinate Trujillo, but hismemorandum did not mention assassination. It indicated thatthe dissidents' "plan of action" included arms for 300 men.Those involved agreed that support of this nature suggested anon-targeted paramilitary plan, not an assassination.The passage of the carbines was approved by CIA head-quarters on March 31, 1961. The State Department was apparentlyunaware of this passage for several weeks. The pouching of themachine guns was not disclosed outside the CIA.The State Department official from whom the CIA soughtpermission to pass the machine guns stated that on "crossexamination" the CIA official conceded that the purpose wasassassination. The CIA official then agreed the United Statesshould have nothing to do with assassination plots "anywhere,anytime", even though the previous day he and Bissell had signeda draft cable permitting the passage of the machine guns foruse in connection with a planned assassination.NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 545
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# TOP SECRET## Schneider-36-The issue here is not whether the objectives of the CIA were contrary to those of the Administration. It is clear that President Nixon desired to prevent Allende from assuming office, even if that required fomenting and supporting a coup in Chile. Nor did White House officials suggest that tactics employed (including as a first step to kidnapping General Schneider) would have been unacceptable as a matter principle. Rather, the issue posed is whether White House officials were consulted, and thus given an opportunity to weigh such matters as risk and likelihood of success, and to apply policy-making judgments to particular tactics.The record indicates that up to October 15 they were; after October 15 there is some doubt.The documentary record with respect to the disputed post-October 15 period gives rise to conflicting inferences. On the one hand, Karamessines' calendar shows existence of at least one White House contact in the critical period prior to the kidnapping of General Schneider on October 22. However, the absence of any substantive memoranda in CIA files--when contrasted with several such memoranda describing contacts with the White House between September 15 and October 15--may suggest a lack of significant communication on the part of the CIA as well as a lack of careful supervision on the part of the White House.