Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 105]
* U.Si policy. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6)*Three days later the Chief of Station told General Huerta, Commander of the Carabineros that "the U.S. Government favors a military solution and is willing to support it in any manner short of outright military intervention." (Task Force Log, 9 October) General Huerta informed the COS that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean Army high command. (Task Force Log, 10 October)On October 7, Colonel Wimert approached members of the War Academy in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons. This was Colonel Wimert's first contact with the Army Lt. Colonel to whom he would ultimately pass three submachine guns on October 22. At this meeting, the Lt. Colonel told Colonel Wimert that he and his colleagues were trying to exert force on Frei to eliminate Gen. Schneider to either replace him, send him out of the country. They had even studied plans to kidnap him. Schneider is the main barrier to all plans for the military to take over the government to prevent an Allende presidency. (Santiago 483, 8 October)*According to the CIA's wrap-up report on Track II, between October 5 and October 20, the CIA Station and the Army Attache--for the most part the latter--made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero officials. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 8 November 1970)**In his testimony, Colonel Wimert indicated that the Lt. Colonel was affiliated with General Canales. (Wimert testimony, p. 52) In a cable sent to Headquarters on October 18, in which the Lt. Colonel's request for three submachine guns was made, the Station indicated that Wimert believed the Army officer, and his companion, a Navy Captain, were in league with Admiral Tirado. (Station 562, October 18) At another point in his testimony, Wimert stated, "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy Captain and the Army Lt. Colonel and the Air Force General over here." (Wimert testimony, p. 107) The Committee has been unable to determine the exact affiliation of the Army Lt. Colonel. However, as previously stated, both General Canales and Admiral Tirado were affiliated with General Valenzuela and Admiral Tirado was in contact with General Viaux.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 106]
The next day, October 8, Headquarters cabled the Station in response to the Wimert-Lt. Colonel meeting. Headquarters took note of Schneider's resistance to coup plans and stated:...This would make it more important than ever to remove him and to bring this new state of events...anything we or Station can do to effect removal of Schneider? We know this rhetorical question, but wish inspire thought on both ends on this matter.(Hqs. 628, 8 October)During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success looked unusually bleak. The Chile Task Force Log commented:President Frei and the highest levels of the armed forces unable to pull themselves together to block Allende. The Chilean military's tradition of non-intervention, Frei's reluctance to tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's firm constitutional stand, and most importantly, the lack of leadership within the government and military are working against a military takeover.(Task Force Log, 8 October)The following day the Station made reference to the "rapid(ly) waning chances for success." (Santiago 487, 9 October) This pessimism was not dispelled by their simultaneous judgment: "Station has arrived at Viaux solution by process of elimination." (Santiago 504, 10 October) Three days later the Task Force agreed: "We continue to focus our attention on General Viaux who now appears to be the only military leader willing to block Allende." (Task Force Log, 13 October)If Viaux was the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were bleak indeed. His own colleagues, Generals Huerta and Valenzuela described him as "a General without an army." (Santiago 495, 9 October) Yet in the first two weeks of October he came to be regarded as the best hope for carrying out the CIA's Track II mandate.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 107]
Although Colonel Wimert was instructed not to involve himself with Viaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 461, 5 October), he served initially as a contact to Viaux through an Argentine military Attache. The Argentine reported on October 5 that Viaux wanted several hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch a coup on October 9. (Santiago 476; 6-October) Headquarters turned down the request, concluding that a "mini-coup at this juncture would be counterproductive" and Viaux should postpone his plans, "while encouraging him in a suitable manner to maintain his posture so that he may join larger movement later if it materializes." (Headquarters 585, 6 October)The primary purpose of the "False Flag Base" was to contact Viaux, and it very rapidly relieved Wimert and the Argentine Attache of that task. Viaux reiterated his demand for an air drop of weapons to the "False Flagger," and again the response was the same: reject the demand for arms, but encourage him to keep planning. In essence the Agency was buying time with Viaux: "We wish to encourage Viaux to expand and refine his coup planning. Gain some influence over his actions." (Headquarters 689, 10 October) To achieve this latter purpose, Headquarters authorized passing $20,000 in cash and a promise of $250,000 in life insurance to Viaux and his associates, as a demonstration of U.S. support. (Headquarters 729, 13 October)On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over Schneider by asking: "What is to keep Schneider from making statement in early hours which will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise join Viaux?" (Headquarters 729, 13 October) The Station's response later that same day was "Viaux intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats within the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup." (Santiago 527,
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 108]
(13 October)* This Viaux kidnapping of Schneider was reported by the Station "as part of a coup that included Valenzuela." (Station 529, 13 October)'At about this time the Station began to receive encouragement from its other contacts. On October 14, ten days before the Chilean Congress was to vote, the Task Force Log concluded:Now we are beginning to see signs of increasingcoup activity from other military quarters,specifically, an Army General (name deleted),Admiral Tirado, the forces in Concepcion andValdivis and perhaps even Frei and Ossa.(Task Force Log, 14 October)C. October 15 DecisionTo summarize, by October 15, General Viaux had advertised to his contact a desire to proceed with a coup, had indicated he would deal with the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once with Generals Huerta and Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans.*On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig at the White House to discuss the situation in Chile. According to the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessines "provided a run-down on Viaux, the Canales meeting with Tirado, and, in some detail, the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint."(Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 15 October 1970) A decision was made at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily:"* The reason for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of a cable from Santiago to Headquarters:We discount Viaux's statement that he had called off his coup attempt because of False Flag Officer's impending visit. Other reporting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move this weekend. (Santiago 499, 10 October)There is also reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental in persuading Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile, Task Force Log:Station reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela met with General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to attempt a coup." (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October)
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 109]
-35-It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence the message should state: "We have reviewed your plans and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities in the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support." (15 October Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig)The meeting concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr.Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressureon every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October,after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marchingorders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply."*The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the WhiteHouse meeting to the Station in Santiago:2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup....We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource.3. After the most careful consideration it was determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out by him alone with the forces now at his disposal would fail. Thus it would be counterproductive to our Track Two objectives. It was decided that CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against precipitate action. (Headquarters 802, 16 October)The message was supplemented by orders to "continue to encourage him(Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with othercoup planners." (Headquarters 802, 16 October) The message concluded:"There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Tirado,.Canales, Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune." (Ibid.)* Secretary Kissinger's recollection of the October 15 meeting is not in accord with that of Mr. Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802) that was sent the following day to the Station in Santiago. This matter will be discussed in Part V of this report.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 110]
D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15The decision to "de-fuse" General Viaux was passed to Viaux's father-in-law on October 17. The in-law responded that it did not matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case. (Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final meeting of the CIA "False Flagger" and Viaux's father-in-law on October 18, the Agency was informed that the coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduction of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come." (Santiago 568, 19 October) An "emergency channel" of communication with Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, page 21)As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military contacts.As a CIA overview statement in Track II stated:Coup possibilities afforded by the active duty military group led by General Valenzuela and Admiral Tirado had always seemed more promising than the capabilities of the Viaux group. These military officers had the ability and resources to act providing they decided to move and organized themselves accordingly.(CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5)By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in this direction.On the evening of October 17, Colonel Wimert met with the Army Lt. Colonel and the Navy Captain. They requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades,[^1][^1]: *Two coup plotters, Generals Canales and Garin, made one last attempt to persuade General Schneider to change his anti-coup position on October 15. The Station reported that the meeting turned out to be a "complete fiasco. Schneider refused to listen to General Canales' eloquent presentation of Communist action in Chile...and adament in maintaining his non-involvement stance." (Santiago 548, 16 October)
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 111]
-37-three 45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition. The NavyCaptain said he had three machine guns himself "but can be identifiedby serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore unable touse them." (Santiago 562, 18 October) Colonel Wimert and the Chiefof Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine gunsfor self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms wereintended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of General Schneider.The fact that the weapons were provided the Lt. Colonel and the NavyCaptain and that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killingsuggests that the guns were not involved.The machine guns and ammunition were seat from Washington by diplo-matic pouch on the morning of October 19, although Headquarters waspuzzled about their purpose: "Will continue make effort provide thembut find our credulity stretched by Navy Captain leading his troopswith sterile guns. What is special purpose for these guns? We willtry send them whether you can provide explanation or not." (Headquarters854, 18 October) The first installment was delivered to the Army Lt.Colonel and the Navy Captain late in the evening of October 18 and con-sisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally for Viaux.*[^1] As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup inChile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela, et. al.--rather than Viaux. An example of this shift in focus was the decision toprovide the Army Lt. Colonel and the Army Captain the tear gas grenadesoriginally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the purpose ofthis action:> Station plans give six tear gas grenades to> Colonel Wimert for delivery to Armed Forces> officers (deletion) instead of having False> Flag Officer deliver them to Viaux group.> Our reasoning is that Wimert dealing with> active duty officers. Also False Flagger> leaving evening 18 October, and will not be> replaced but Wimert will stay here. Hence> important that Wimert credibility with Armed> Forces officers be strengthened.> (Santiago 562, 18 October)[^1]: * As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in Chile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela, et. al.-- rather than Viaux. An example of this shift in focus was the decision to provide the Army Lt. Colonel and the Army Captain the tear gas grenades originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the purpose of this action:
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 112]
-38-That same day, General Valenzuela informed Colonel Wimert that he,General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General were preparedto sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of GeneralSchneider on the following evening, October 19, at a militarydinner being given for Schneider,*after which Schneider would be flownto Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, Admiral Tirado wouldhead the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to thekidnapping of Schneider, the cable reports:General Viaux knowledgeable of above operationbut not directly involved. He has been sent toVina to stay with prominent physician. Will beseen in public places during 19 and 20 Octoberto demonstrate fact that above operation not hisdoing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago atend of week. Military will not admit involve-ment in Schneider's abduction which is to beblamed on leftists. (Santiago 566, 19 October)The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneiderleft in a private vehicle, rather than in his official car, and his police guardfailed to be withdrawn, but the Army Lt.Colonel assured Colonel Wimert that an-other attempt would be made on October 20. (Santiago 582, 20 October)Colonel Wimert was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 "which was the priceagreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors."* The "False Flag Officer" who was in contact with Viaux at the time  the Valenzuela plan was given to Colonel Wimert apparently understood  that Viaux was involved in the October 19 attempt. He stated:Q. Were you told any of the details of howthe (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out?Mr. Sarno. They indicated it was going to beat some sort of a banquet which the General(Schneider) would be attending.(Sarno testimony, p. 37)
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 113]
-39-but Wimert insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid themoney. (Task Force Log, 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuelaassured Colonel Wimert that the military was now prepared to move. (TaskForce Log, 20 October) The second abduction attempt on the 20th alsofailed and the Task Force concludedE. The Killing of General SchneiderIn the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am), Colonel Wimertdelivered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Army Lt.Colonel in an isolated section of Santiago.[^1][^1]: Although Colonel Wimert's testimony and the cable traffic do notclearly establish the identity of the group to which the Lt. Colonelwas affiliated (see page 31) two CIA statements on Track II tie theweapons, and therefore the Lt. Colonel, to the Valenzuela group:...The only assistance requested by Valenzuelato set the plan /of October 19/ into motionthrough Schneider's abduction was several sub-machine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenadesand gas masks (all of which were provided) plus$50,000 for expenses (which was_to be passed upondemand.(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities,18 November 1970, p. 22)...Three sub-machine guns, together with six gascannisters and masks, were passed to the Valen-zuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason--why they still wanted the weapons was becausethere were two days remaining before the Congressdecided the Presidential election and the Valen-zuela group maintained some hope they could stillcarry out their plans.(CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from thePresident on Chile," p. 7, July 15, 1975)
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```-40-```At about 7 am that day the group that intended to kidnap General Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider killing, neither the Army Lt. Colonel nor the Navy Captain were there. Shortly after 8 am, General Schneider's car was intercepted, on his way to work, by the abductorsand he was mortally wounded when he drew his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that hand guns had been used to kill General Schneider, although it also found that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing.* The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said "Military Mission sources claim General Schneider machine gunned on way to work" (Santiago 587, 22 October) and "Assailants used grease guns." (Santiago 589, 22 October) The submachine guns had previously been described as "grease guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Station was that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered several hours earlier to the Army Lt. Colonel. Santiago then informed Headquarters "Station has instructed Col. Wimert to hand over $50,000 if Gen. Valenzuela requests " (Santiago 592, 22 October), thus indicating that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valen- zuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled Headquarters:[^1] The Military Court determined that those who participated in the shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led conspiracy. The Court also found that this same group had participated in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts.In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the plot culminating in the death of General Schneider. He received a 20-year prison sentence for being "author of the crime of kidnapping which re- sulted in serious injury to the victim," and a five-year exile for con- spiring to cause a military coup. Also convicted on the latter charge werė Generals Valenzuela and Tirado. They received sentences of three years in exile.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 115]
-41-Station unaware if assassination was pré-meditated or whether it constituted bungledabduction attempt. In any case, it importantto bear in mind that move against Schneiderwas conceived by and executed at behest ofsenior Armed Forces officers. We know thatGeneral Valenzuela was involved. We alsonear certain that Admiral Tirado, Army Lt.Colonel and Navy Captain witting and involved.We have reason for believeing that GeneralViaux and numerous associates fully clued in,but cannot prove or disprove that executionor attempt against Schneider was entrusted toelements linked with Viaux. Important factorto bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and notretired officers or extreme rightests, setSchneider up for execution or abduction....All we can say is that attempt against Schneideris affording Armed Forces one last opportunityto prevent Allende's election if they are willingto follow Valenzuela's scenario..(Santiago 598, 22 October)F. Post October 22 EventsThe shooting of General Schneider resulted immediately in a declara-tion of martial law, the appointment of General Prats to succeed Schneideras Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Valenzuela as chiefof Santiago province. These measures, and others taken, caused the ChileTask Force to make the following initial judgment:With only 24 hours remaining before the Congressionalrunoff, a coup climate exists in Chile.... The attackon General Schneider has produced developments whichclosely follow Valenzuela's plan.... Consequently theplotters' positions have been, enhanced.(Chile Task Force Log, 22 October)On October 23, Director Helms reviewed and discussed Track II:It was agreed...that a maximum effort has been achieved,and that now only the Chileans themselves can manage asuccessful coup. The Chileans have been guided to apoint where a military solution is at least open tothem.(Task Force Log, 24 October)NW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 116
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-42-Although it was not immediately clear to CIA observers, the Station's prediction of October 9 that the shooting of Schneider (as a result of an abduction attempt) would "rally the Army firmly behind the flag of constitutionalism" was correct. (Santiago 495, 9 October) On October 24 Dr. Allende was confirmed by the Chilean Congress. General Schneider died the next day.