Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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TOP SECRETCONTENTSTestimony of:C. Douglas DillonPage2ExhibitsExhibit No. 1Exhibit No. 235Exhibit No. 337Exhibit No. 444Exhibit No. 5TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETEXECUTIVE SESSIONTuesday, September 2, 1975United States Senate,Select Committee to Study GovernmentalOperations with Respect toIntelligence Activities,Washington, D.C.The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:00 o'clock p.m., in Room 608, Capitol Hill Hotel, Senator Gary W. Hart presiding.Present: Senator Hart of Colorado (presiding).Also present: Frederick Baron and Rhett Dawson, Professional Staff Members.Mr. Baron. Would you state your name and address for the record, please?Mr. Dillon. My name is C. Douglas Dillon. And my address is Far Hills, New Jersey.Mr. Baron. Mr. Dillon, we have a few formalities that we must go through with every witness.I want to know first of all if you are aware that you have the right to counsel here today?Mr. Dillon. Yes, I am aware.TOP SECRET
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# TESTIMONY OF C. DOUGLAS DILLONTOP SECRETMr. Baron. And are you aware that you may cease answering questions at any point to seek advice of counsel?Mr. Dillon. I am glad you have so notified me.Mr. Baron. And are you vuluntarily appearing here today without counsel?Mr. Dillon. Yes, I am.Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that you have all of your constitutional rights intact here before the Committee, including your Fifth Amentment rights?Mr. Dillon. I am glad to know that.Mr. Baron. Mr. Dillon, could you please give the Committee a general idea of your position in the Government from, say, late 1959 until March of 1961?Mr. Dillon. In late 1959 I was Under Secretary of State, which was the number two position in the State Department. And I continued in that position until 1961.My duties as such were two-fold. One was the position as the First Deputy to the Secretary of State, and Acting Secretary in his absence from time to time, in which capacity I had to be fully aware at all times of moreorless everything that was in the ken of the State Department, so I could fill in for the Secretary of State as necessary. And in those days the Secretary was absent a good deal of the time, because there were travels abroad, and various reasons. I think I mentioned in my affidavit that I think I served as Acting Secretary at least a third of the time during that period.TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETMy other duty, which was a more particular duty, was to be in charge of the economic side of our foreign policy, which included economic areas of the State Department, and also included oversight and general direction of the ICA, which was the name at that time of the Foreign Aid Agency. And I had the responsibility for Congressional relations of the Foreign Aid Program, and for getting the legislation passed each year, for not the detailed operation, there was a director of the ICA but I had the general oversight of it. And also a military program, which was not under the ICA, but which was run through the Defense Department, and I was the senior State Department official involved in that area.So I had those two different functions. And for that reason the setup in this area of working with the CIA and on intelligence matters was somewhat different than it had been prior to that. Prior to my advent as Under Secretary the Under Secretary had always ahndled that. Mr. Herter, who was my immediate predecessor, handled it, and Mr. Hoover before. When I became Under Secretary I became so under a new law that had been passed in 1953, at which time I was promoted to Deputy Under Secretary to the new position, which was called Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, which was the number three job in the Department. That legislation provided that this third Under Secretary could either be an Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, as I was, or an Under Secretary# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETfor Political Affairs, the implication being that he would be the Under Secretary for Political Affairs if the Under Secretary, the number two fellow, handled the eocnomic area, which Mr. Herter did, not when I was first appointed as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, but then when I became Under Secretary I took with me the economic responsibilities.So The number three fellow was named Under Secretary for Political Affairs. It was Mr. Murphy first, and then Mr. Merchant. And they handled in each case all the details of the Special Group.Mr. Barron. And the liaison with the CIA?Mr. Dillon. And the liaison with the CIA. That was not handled at the Assistant Secretary level, a great deal of it was done at the Assistant Secretary level, but when it got above that, it went to the Under Secretary of Political Affairs. On the other hand, when things were really important, I was notified, because I had to know about them if an emergency came up whilte the Secretary was out of town. But that was not my particular problem.Mr. Barron. So you would be kept notified of major developments in the Special Group by Mr. Murphy or Mr. Merchant?Mr. Dillon. Yes, major developments.And I do remember over that year of sitting in occasionally on meetings that I presume were on that. But they all dealtTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETwith economic assistance to the various political groups in different countries when they needed help.Mr. Barron. Did you attend National Security meetings regularly?Mr. Dillon. I attended National Security meetings quite regularly whenever I was in town, eith in --(Off the record discussion)Senator Hart. Mr. Dillon, do you swear that the testimony you are giving is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?Mr. Dillon. I do.Senator Hart. Just for the record, you also understand that all of the testimony you have given will be covered by the oath?Mr. Dillon. That is correct.Senator Hart. I am sure the Staff has advised you of your constitutional rights?Mr. Dillon. They have.Mr. Barron. Would you read back the witness' last answer?(The witness' last answer was read.)Mr. Dillon. Either in the capacity as Acting Secretary of State if the Secretary was out of town, or as one of the Assistants when he was in town because of the fact that I had overall supervision of the Foreign Aid, both military and economic programs, at that time, and therefore, it wasTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETimportant that I be fully aware of everything that went on at National Security meetings. And they took place as you know, at that time on a regular basis every Thursday, I think it was morning.Mr. Baron. And where did they take place?Mr. Dillon. In the Capitol Room at the White House.Mr. Baron. Were you in a position as Under Secretary of State to be aware of every major CIA operation against a foreign leader or a foreign government?Mr. Dillon. I think if there were any such things I would assume that I would have been aware of them.Mr. Baron. Would you have also have been aware of any communications or orders running from the President to the Director of Central Intelligence?Mr. Dillon. Only if they had been given in my presence and I had heard of them. I wouldn't necessarily be aware of them otherwise. If the President had wanted the State Department to be aware of it, -- and they usually did, there was pretty good coordination there, Gordon Gray was his Special Assistant and would keep everybody notified. But that wouldn't necessarily mean that we knew of every particular thing.Mr. Baron. In what manner were you made aware of major CIA covert activities?Mr. Dillon. I think if they were major they were allTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 discussed at one time or another in the National Security2 Council, or they at least knew about them at that time, because3 the major activity that was just getting underway at that time4 was very much aware of the development of the capability to5 move against Cuba.6 Mr. Baron. And what was the nature of your awareness of7 that development?8 Mr. Dillon. We discussed it quite frequently. And it was9 the setting up of camps in Central America that trained Cuban10 exiles, and the development of plans for their use. They were11 rather general in nature, but of which I was aware of in some12 detail. But at that time we all knew that those plans would13 not be ready and the capability wouldn't be ready until14 sometime next year. So if a decision was to be made to use15 them, it would have come in the following Administration.16 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the development of any CIA17 plans or efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro?18 Mr. Dillon. No, not at all.19 Mr. Baron. Did you hear any discussion of that subject?20 Mr. Dillon. None whatsoever.21 Mr. Baron. So although you were aware of CIA covertly22 activities against the Cuban regime, you were completely23 unaware of any assassination effort against Castro?24 Mr. Dillon. The major activity was the building up of25 this capacity among the Cuban exiles, or supposed capacity,TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETto invade Cuba and cause a change in regime.Mr. Baron. Turning back to your position in the Government, isn't it true that shortly before the change of Administrations you resigned from the State Department in contemplation of resuming Government service in the Kennedy Administration as Secretary of the Treasury?Mr. Dillon. Yes.I might as well explain that in some detail, because it was an unusual situation.That fall, I think it was in October, just prior to the election in early October, due to some mishap in London, the Bank of England failed to support the price of gold at a given moment, and it shot up from the support price of $35 an aounce to maybe $49 or $50. And there was great perturbation in the financial markets over this, the first time that it had happened since the thirties when the price had been set. And there began to be an outflow of gold from the US at the rate of over a $100 million a week, which seemed very big in those days. And it was very disturbing.That continued through the election. And if anything, it intendsified after the election.During the election, of course, as a member of the Republic Administration while the State Department was not involved in the election campaign, it was specifically exempt from having anything to do with it -- I was obviously aTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET                                                                                                        9supporter of Vice President Nixon, who was seeking election atthat time. Nevertheless, about two or three weeks after theelection, about three weeks after the election, I received atelephone call one day in my office from Pierre Salinger, whomI did not know. And he told me on the telephon that SenatorKennedy -- whom I knew slightly, because he was on the ForeignRelations Committee -- would like to come and see me thatnight.And I said, that was very foolish. I am at his disposal,I will go see him.He said, that is not what the Senator said. He wants tocome to see you.And I said, very good. I will be home all night.So Senator Kennedy did show up at 9 o'clock. And he toldme that he was very concerned about this loss of gold and thelack of confidence in the financial stability of the US andthe world. And he wanted to rectify this. And nobody trustedhim because the campaign had been made on the basis that hewas going to disrupt everything, and didn't have anythingabout finances.And so what he wanted was to appoint someone whom hethought would carry weight around the world, and yet who wassympathetic to his idea of keeping the economy moving. Andhe had read some speeches I had made at one time or anotherin my economic capacity with the State Department whichTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETpretty much paralleled his thinking. And I had been quite contrary to Vice President Nixon's campaign on that issue where he talked about growthmanship and the path to push our growh. And I mentioned, I believe, in the Rockefeller Report that at that time that we had to grow at five percent a year if we wanted to produce and not have unemployment, and so forth.And I had seen Kennedy's economic speech which he made in Philadelphia at the end of October, and I thought it was just great, there was nothing I could find wrong with it. Of course, nobody had read it and nobody paid any attention to it. And I don't think he had ever given it, but it had been released, he had been there and made a speech and said some of it. And it was very carefully prepared, and was quite dull an dry as a result. It was written largely or suggested largely, I found out later, by Professor Samuels, who was the Dean of all economists at that time. And I couldn't find anything wrong with that.And he said he could not make any offer of this, and wasn't doing that, but he wanted me to think about this because he thought it was absolutely essential to safegard the currency and all that.Well, this came as a great surprise to me. I had made all my plans to go back home.To make a long story short, I talked to various people,TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETincluding Bob Anderson, who was then Secretary of the Treasury. And quite a few people did.And he said I should do this.And also the President-elect was good enough to say if I did do this he would work with me, and I would be his top economic advisor, and if there were any differences in economic advice that he would side with the Treasury unless the thing was serious enought to lead to a parting of the ways. And one commitment that he wanted from me was that if there was that it would not be a silent parting of the ways. And that was a very easy thing for me to agree to.And on or after I had come back from a final meeting of the OACD in Paris at which the Convention was signed, at which I had been a leading negotiator, early in December I had a call from him when I got back that morning saying that he wanted me to come over to his place, that he wanted to do this if I would agree.So I went to President Eisenhower and told him of my meeting abroad and told him I was going to see Senator Kennedy -- which he didn't like very much. And I saw him.And we talked about certain financial things that might be a problem, which I told him about, which they turned out not to be.And he then right away, that morning, much to my surprise, went out on the front stoop of the house in Georgetown and took me out there with Robert Kennedy, whom I had never met before# TOP SECRET
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Dillon Exhibit 5                                 September 21, 1960MEMORANDUMSUBJECT:     Discussion at the 460th Meetingof the National Security Council,Wednesday, September 21, 1960Present at the 460th NSC Meeting were the President of theUnited States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State (Dillon);the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office ofCivil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also present at theMeeting and participating in the Council Actions below were theSecretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget;the Attorney General (Items 1 and 2); the Secretary of Commerce(Items 1, 2 and 3); the Acting Secretary of the Interior (Bennett)(Items 1 and 2); Mr. Tom Killefer for the President, Export-ImportBank of Washington (Items 1 and 2); and the Chairman, Council onForeign Economic Policy (Item 3). Also attending the Meeting werethe Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intel-ligence; the Special Assistents to the President for National Secu-rity Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; AssistantSecretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; Mr. Robert Packard for theDepartment of State; Mr. Knight McMahan, Central Intelligence Agency;the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House StaffSecretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy ExecutiveSecretary, NSC.There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meetingand the main points taken.1. WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENDENCE ON MIDDLE EAST PETROLEUM   (NSC Action No. 2080; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary,   same subject, dated March 26, 1959, and June 28, 1960; NSC   6011; Memos for NSC, same subject, dated August 9 and 29, and   September 19, 1960)Mr. Gray introduced the subject to the Council. (A copy ofMr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meetingand another copy is attached to this Memorandum).At the conclusion of Mr. Gray's presentation, the Presidentsaid he had received the most glowing reports on the prospectsfor petroleum production in Libya. He had been told that theLibyan reserves exceeded even the Sahara reserves. He askedNW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 66TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETuntile that day, and announced both of us at once. So I was announced as of the middle of December as the future Secretary of the Treasury.That rather limited my capacity in the State Department. But I did continue for two or three more weeks to wind things up and make a proper turnover.And then I resigned from the State Department in January and continued that preparation for the new job.And that is how that happened.Mr. Baron. So you left the State Department -- you said earlier to me on January 2nd or 3rd?Mr. Dillon. Ori 4thoor 5th sometime in the first fouri or five or six days. And after that one thing I ought to make clear is that President Kennedy had a great interest in the authority of the Presidency in foreign policy. And I think he was under the impression that Secretary Dulles had probably dominated President Eisenhower in some asptects, which I don't think was an accuare description of what happened at all, but it was a generally held one at that time. So he wanted to take over this very much himself. And so he put in some new people there.And we came to be very close, and worked very well together. And I had the greatest admiration for him.He never at that time or later ever asked me anything about my experience at the State Department or any foreign policyTOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETthing, I was not used in any transitional sense at all.Mr. Dawson. To include the Bay of Pigs plan?Mr. Dillon. Totally. That was rather a surprise to me. And I think I might have been of some help to him if he had, because I had been aware of it right up through January, and in particular I was aware, at least that is my understanding at the time, that there was always an ultimate background in the use of our naval air if those people got in trouble. And I don't think that was ever made clear to President Kennedy. And that was too bad. And when it was made clear to him he reacted violently against it, and I rather doubt if he would have allowed the thing to be unleashed if he had known this much about it.Senator Hart. Aside from the regular 54-12 meetings, did you have contact with the CIA in any other capacity on a routine basis?Mr. Dillon. No, not on a routine basis.Senator Hart. Occasional basis?Mr. Dillon. Yes. Because, for instance, I went back when we were flying earlier, when we were flying US missions, for instance, they had to be cleared by the State Department, or the Defense Department, or by the CIA, and finally by the President. And that was all handled through Goodpastor, he was then a colonel, at the White House. So I did in that capacity a couple of times, as Acting Secretary, have to clear# TOP SECRET
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                                                                                                     14# TOP SECRET1   those things and talk with Allen Dulles about them. And so2   from time to time there were those moreorless informal3   contacts. But they were not routine and regular. They were4   generally on this basis of when I was Acting Secretary and5   they needed something from the State Department.6   Senator Hart. I don't want to interrupt the flow of7   questions by the Staff on this sequence, but we may want to8   get some questions on your experience during the US situation9   on the Doctrine of "Plausible Deniability".10  Mr. Dillon. That is something I feel I have a good deal11  to say about.12  Senator Hart. You can proceed here sequentially.13  Mr. Baron. Just one other question before we turn to your14  affidavit. And that is, you were indicating that when you15  joined the Kennedy Administration you were not consulted for16  advice on your State Department experience.17  Mr. Dillon. Until the time of the missile crisis, when18  they got together a new, what we called an EXCOM, Executive19  Committee. At that time, whether it was the result of the Bay20  of Pigs thing, or just the fact that the President knew me21  better, and we had been working together for a longer time, he22  called me in right at the beginning, and I had a very activerole in this period.23  Mr. Baron. But at the beginning of the Kennedy Admini-24  stration I take it you were not asked for advice on Congo# TOP SECRET
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15# TOP SECRETaffairs nor kept abreast of developments in the Congo?Mr. Dillon. No, nor any other foreign policy, except as it fell under the monetary area, with one exception. And this was economic entirely. That is, the President, because of my past experience in the handling of this matter, asked me, moreorless as a favor, because he didn't believe the Treasury should really handle this, but he asked me if I would head the US effort or set up the Alliance for Progress. And there was going to be a meeting down in Uruguay, Puntal del Este. And so I did do thta. And that was the only foreign policy job I did. And that was economic in nature.Mr. Baron. Let me show you now a copy of your affidavit to the Rockefeller Commission which concerns among other things a meeting that was held in the Pentagon where the Congo was discussed. First, let me ask you if that is a true copy of your affidavit?Mr. Dillon. It so appears.Mr. Baron. Do you recall this meeting where, as you have affirmed: "On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meeting in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was discussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the possibility of assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET16operation. This ended consideration of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassina- tion attempts against anyone."Do you recall this meeting now?Mr. Dillon. Yes, I recall just what I said there. And I think probably should expand on that a little bit, because in looking at it it is not as clear as I would like it to be.When I mentioned the assassination attempt it was not necessarily limited to -- or it might have been CIA personnel. It also included encouraging one of the many factions that might not like him there to take action on their own, with CIA encouragement.Senator Hart. What kind of encouragement, material support, financial support?Mr. Dillon. That, or moral support, if they did the US would recognize them if they became the head, and would help them.Senator Hart. Was there any discussion that you can recall of the passage o- weapons?Mr. Dillon. No, no detail like that. This was very brief, very general, and just turned off by the CIA people at that time.Mr. Baron. So this mention of assassination could have included a CIA sponsored assassination attempt?Mr. Dillon. It could have, yes.TOP SECRET