Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 443]
- 10a -bility of meaningful military intervention in political situation."He concluded by stating: "What we are saying in this 'cold-blooded assessment' is that opportunities for further significant USG action with the Chilean military are nonexistent." (Memorandum/Ambassador's Response to Request for Analysis of Military Option in Present Chilean Situation, 12 September 1970)The CIA's response was in the same vein. Viron Vaky, Kissinger's assistant for Latin American affairs on the NSC staff, summarized the CIA's "cold-blooded assessment" in a memo to his boss: "Military action is impossible; the military is incapable and unwilling to seize power. We have no capability to motivate or instigate a coup." (Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger/Chile--40 Committee Meeting, Monday--September 14, September 14, Viron P. Vaky)On September 14, the 40 Committee met to discuss these reports and what action was to be taken:Particular attention was devoted to a CIA prepared review of political and military options in the Chilean electoral situation based on the Embassy and Station's "cold-blooded assessment." The Committee focused on the so-called "Rube Goldberg" gambit which would see Alessandri elected by the Congress on October 24th, resigning thereafter to leave Frei constitutionally free to run in a second election for the presidency.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 444]
-11-Ambassador Korry was asked to go directly to President Frei to see if he would be willing to commit himself to this line of action. A contingency of $250,000 was approved for "covert support of projects which Frei or his trusted team deem important." It was further agreed that a propaganda campaign be undertaken by. the Agency to focus on the damage of an Allende takeover....(CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970)Following the September 14 Forty Committee meeting and President Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CIA, U.S. Government efforts to prevent Allende from assuming office proceeded on two tracks. Track I comprised all covert activities approved by the 40 Committee, including the $250,000 contingency fund to bribe Chilean congressmen as well as propaganda and economic activities. These activities were designed to induce the opponents to Allende in Chile to prevent his assumption of power, either through political or military means. Track*The terms Track I and Track II were known only to CIA and White House officials who were knowledgeable about the President's September 15 order to the CIA. The Committee sent letters to various senior officials inquiring if they were, in fact, not knowledgeable of the Track II activities. Those letters were sent to Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Under-secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer, NSC Staff Member for Latin America Viron P. Vaky, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research Ray S. Cline, and the Deputy Chief of Mission in Santiago Harry W. Shlaudeman. Thus far the Committee.has received written responses from Messrs. Moorer, Johnson, Vaky, Shlaudeman and Cline. All except Cline have indicated that they had no knowledge of the Track II activity at the time; Cline indicated he heard of the activities in a general way, from his subordinate who handled 40 Committee work and from former associates at the CIA. In oral communications with Committee staff members, Secretaries Rogers and Laird have indicated they were unaware of Track II.NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 445
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 445]
-12-II activities in Chile were undertaken in response to President Nixon'sSeptember 15 order and were directed towards actively promoting andencouraging the Chilean military to move against Allende. In his testimonybefore the Committee, Kissinger stressed the links between TracksI and II:...There was work by all of the agencies to try toprevent Allende from being seated, and there waswork by all of the agencies on the so-called TrackI to encourage the military to move against Allende...the difference between the September 15th meet-ing and what was being done in general within thegovernment was that President Nixon was encouraginga more direct role for the CIA in actually organiz-ing such a coup. (Kissinger testimony, p. 13)Tracks I and II did, in fact, move together in the month afterSeptember 15. The authorization to Ambassador Korry, who was formallyexcluded from Track II, to encourage a military coup became broader andbroader. In the 40 Committee meeting on September 14, he and other"appropriate members of the Embassy Mission" were authorized to inten-sify their contacts with Chilean military officers to assess theirwillingness to support the "Frei gambit"--a voluntary turn-over ofpower to the military by Frei, who would then have been eligible torun for President in new elections. (Memorandum/Policy Decisions Relatedto Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presiden-tial Election, 9 October 1970)In a situation report to Dr. Kissinger and Assistant SecretaryCharles Meyer on September 21, Ambassador Korry indicated that in orderto make the Frei gambit work, "if necessary, General Schneider would
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 446]
-13-have to be neutralized, by displacement if necessary."* (Korry toMeyer and Kissinger/Situation Report, 21 September 1970) In testifying,Kissinger felt the Korry report indicated "the degree to which TrackI and Track II were merging, that is to say, that individuals on TrackI were working on exactly the same problem as the CIA was working onTrack II." (Kissinger testimony, p. 21)Ambassador Korry's activites in Chile between September 4 andOctober 24 support Kissinger's view that the line separating Track Iand Track II often became blurred. For example, the Ambassador wasauthorized to make his contacts in the Chilean military aware that ifAllende were seated, the military could expect no further militaryassistance (MAP) from the United States. Later, in response to his ownrecommendation, Korry was authorized to inform the Chilean military that.all MAP and military sales were being held in abeyance pending the outcomeof the Congressional election on October 24. On October 7, AmbassadorKorry received the following cable from Kissinger and Under Secretary*In this same situation report, Ambassador Korry related a message thathe had sent to President Frei through his Defense Minister indicatingthe economic pressures that would be brought to bear on Chile shouldAllende assume office.Frei should know that not a nut or bolt will beallowed to reach Chile under Allende. OnceAllende comes to power we shall do all withinour power to condemn Chile and the Chileans toutmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designedfor a long time to come to accelerate the hardfeatures of a Communist society in Chile. Hence,for Frei to believe that there will be much ofan alternative to utter misery, such as seeingChile muddle through, would be strictly illusory.The use of economic instruments as levers on Frei and the Chileanmilitary was a persistent subject of White House/CIA discussionsand of instructions to the field. Helms' notes from the September15 meeting with the President and Kissinger included the notation"make the economy scream." Economic leverage was the primarytopic of a September 18 White House meeting involving Kissinger,Helms and Karamessines.NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 447
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 447]
-14-of State U. Alexis Johnson:2. ...you are now authorized to inform discreetly   the Chilean military through the channels available   to you that if a successful effort is made to block   Allende from taking office, we would reconsider the   cuts we have thus far been forced to make in Chilean   MAP and otherwise increase our presently programmed   MAP for the Chilean Armed Forces.... If any steps   the military should take should result in civil dis-   order, we would also be prepared promptly to deliver   support and material that might be immediately re-   quired. (Hqs. to Stn. 075517, 7 October 1970)The essential difference between Tracks I and II, as evidenced byinstructions to Ambassador Korry during this period, was not that TrackII was coup-oriented and Track I was not. Both had this objective inmind. The difference between the two tracks was, simply, that the CIA'sdirect contacts with the Chilean military, and its active promotion andsupport for a coup, were to be known only to a small group of individualsin the White House and the CIA. Kissinger testified that Track IImatters were to be reported directly to the White House "for reasonsof security." (Kissinger testimony, p. 14) Thomas Karamessines, theCIA's Deputy Director for Plans at the time and the principal CIAcontact with the White House on Track II matters, testified on hisunderstanding of why State, Defense, the 40 Committee and AmbassadorKorry were excluded from Track II:That was not a decision that we made. But thebest I can do is suggest that there was concernabout two things. Number one, that there mightbe serious objections lodged, for example, bythe State Department particularly if Track 2were to be laid out at a Forty Committee meeting.And the only other thing I can contribute to thatis that it was felt that the security of theactivity would be better protected if knowledgeof it were limited. (Karamessines testimony, p. 122)
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-15-C. CIA Views of Difficulty of ProjectOn one point the testimony of CIA officials who were involved in Track II is unanimous: they all said they thought Track II was unlikely to succeed. That view ran from the working levels of the Agency to the top. They all said they felt they were being asked to do the impossible, that the risks and potential costs of the project were too great. At the same time, they felt they had been given an explicit Presidential order, and they tried to execute that order.A few excerpts from the testimony follow:Richard Helms, CIA Director -...my heart sank over this meeting, because...the possibility of bringing off something like this seemed to me at that time to be just as remote as anything could be. In practical terms, the Army was constitutionalist....And when you look here at the time frame in which the man was suddenly asking you to accomplish something, it seemed really almost inconceivable....What I came away from the meeting with the distinct impression that we were being asked to do almost the impossible and trying to indicate this was going to be pretty tough.... (Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, pp. 6-7)David Phillips, Chief, Chile Task Force -...it is my feeling that the odds are unacceptable, it is something that is not going to work, and we are going to be burned if we get into it ...what are the chances of pulling off a coup successfully, or in any way stopping Allende from assuming the presidency?...we never even got to two chances out of 20. (Phillips testimony, p. 16)...I assure you that those people that I was in touch with at the Agency just about universally said, my God, why are we given this assignment?. (Phillips testimony, p. 53)James Flannery, Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division -There was just no question that we had to make this effort, no matter what the odds were. And I think that most people felt that the odds were just pretty long. (Flannery testimony, p. 20)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 449]
-16-Further, CIA officials believed their judgment of the endeavor'sdifficulty was known to the White House. Helms commented on the Septem-ber 15th meeting: "So realizing all of these things, I'm relativelycertain that day that I pointed out this is going to be awfully tough."(Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, p. 16) Karamessines recalled pointingout to the President that "the Chilean military seemed to be disorganizedand unwilling to do anything. And without their wanting to do something,there did not seem to be much hope." (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 450]
III. CIA'S Implementation of Track IIA. Evolution of CIA StrategyThe President's instruction to the CIA on September 15 to prevent Allende's assumption of power was given in the context of a broad U.S. Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 instruction to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military circles, there was little indication that it would actually take place without active U.S. encouragement and support.There was much talk among Chilean officers about the possibility of some kind of coup...but this was not the kind of talk that was being backed by, you know, serious organizational planning. (Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 32)1. The "Constitutional Coup" ApproachAlthough efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende victory continued simultaneous with Track II, the Agency premised its activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end.On September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago:Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assump-tion of power. Paramilitary legerdemain has beendiscarded. Military solution is objective.(Hqs. 236, Sept. 21, 1970, para. 3)The initial strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promoting a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency decided to promise "help in any election which was an outgrowth of a successful military takeover." (Nov. 18, 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger)Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve the Congress, and proclaim a new election. A private U.S. citizen who had been a conduit for CIA funds to Frei's 1964 campaign was sent to see him
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-18-with this message on September 24. (Task Force Log, September 23)Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, testified:So this was in a sense not Track II, but in a sense another aspect of a quiet and hopefully non-violent military coup....This was abandoned when the military were reluctant to push Frei publicly...and, number two, Frei was reluctant to leave on his own in the absence of pressure from the military....There was left as the only chance of success a straight military coup.(Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1975, p. 6)At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported:Strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor Schneider will act. For that reason any scenario in which either has to play an active role now appears utterly unrealistic. Overtures to lower echelon officers (e.g., Valenzuela) can of course be made. This involves promoting Army split.(Stn. to Hqs. 424, September 23, 1970)2. Military SolutionPresident Frei's failure even to attempt to persuade his own party convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende ended all hope of using him to prevent an Allende presidency. (November 18 memo, Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October, it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leader-ship of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneider, constituted a stumbling block. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970; Santiago 439, September 30, 1970) The Agency's task was to cause a coup in a highly unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented by Frei's inaction, Schneider's strong constitutionalism, and the absence of organization and enthusiasm among those officers who were interested in a coup.A three-fold program was set into motion:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 452]
-19-a. Collect intelligence on coup-minded officers;b. Create a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation, and terrorist activities intended to provoke the left to give a pretext for a coup;* (Hqs. 611, October 7, 1970)c. Inform those coup-minded officers that the U.S. Government would give them full support in a coup short of direct U.S. military intervention. (Hqs. 762, October 14, 1970)B. The Chile Task ForceBecause of the highly sensitive nature of the operation, a special task force was created in the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division to manage it.The task force was placed under the daily direction of the Deputy Director for Plans, Thomas Karamessines, and a group of the Agency's most experienced and skilled operators were detailed to the task force.*A cable sent from CIA Headquarters to Santiago on October 19 focused on creating an appropriate justification for a coup. The cable stated:1. It still appears that Ref A coup has no pretext or justification that it can offer to make it acceptable in Chile or Latin America. It therefore would seem necessary to create one to bolster what will probably be their claim to a coup to save Chile from communism... You may wish include variety of themes in justification of coup to military for their use. These could include but are not limited to: A) Firm intel. that Cubans planned to reorganize all intelligence services along Soviet/Cuban mold thus creating structure for police state.... B) Economic situation collapsing.... C) By quick recognition of Cuba and Communist countries Allende assumed U.S. would cut off material assistance to Armed Forces thus weakening them as constitutional barriers. Would then empty armories to Communist Peoples Militia with task to run campaign of terror based on alleged labor and economic sabotage (Use some quotes from Allende on this.)2. Station has written some excellent prop guidances. Using themes at hand and which best known to you we are now asking you to prepare intel report based on some well known facts and some fiction to justify coup, split opposition, and gain adherents for military group. With appropriate military contact can determine how to "discover" intel report which could even be planted during raids planned by Carabineros.3. We urge you to get this idea and some concrete suggestions to plotters as soon as you can. Coup should have a justification to prosper. (Headquarters 882, 19 October 1970)
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David A. Phillips, Chief of Station in Rio de Janeiro, was summoned back to Washington to head the operation. With the exception of the Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy James Flannery and the head of the Chile Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware of the task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had responsibility for Chile. The task force had a special communications channel to Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic about Track II. (November 18, 1970, Helms to Kissinger memo, page 3) Most of the significant operational decisions were made by Phillips, Broe and Karamessines, who met on a daily basis.It should be noted that all those involved with the task force described the pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed, Karamessines has said that Kissinger "left no doubt in my mind that he was under the heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was placing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished." (Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, page 7) The Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, James Flannery, testified that pressure was "as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme." (Flannery testimony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just constant, constant....Just continual pressure....It was coming from the White House." (Broe testimony, August 4, 1975, page 55)C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency RelationsThe CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the Chilean military to carry out its task. However, the U.S. Army At- &tache in Santiago, Colonel Paul Wimert, knew the Chilean military
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 454]
very well due to his five years of service there and his broad personal contacts among the Chilean officers. Following a proposal by the Chief of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting intelligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military, the senior military which we had not maintained and did not have, but which we felt confident that our military representative in Chile had....And we got the approval of the DIA to enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to procure intelligence.(Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested message for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28, 1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized transmission of a message directing the Army Attache:...to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence, his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal military figures who might play a decisive role in any move which might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense Attache of this message, or give them any indication of its portent. In the course of your routine activities, act in accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously, I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion with the CAS chief.* General Bennett returned to the United States on the evening of October 10, 1970. General Philpott was Acting Director in Bennett's absence.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 455]
very well due to his five years of service there and his broad personal contacts among the Chilean officers. Following a proposal by the Chief of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting intelligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military, the senior military which we had not maintained and did not have, but which we felt confident that our military representative in Chile had.... And we got the approval of the DIA to enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to procure intelligence.(Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested message for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28, 1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized transmission of a message directing the Army Attache:...to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence, his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal military figures who might play a decisive role in any move which might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense Attache of this message, or give them any indication of its portent. In the course of your routine activities, act in accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously, I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion with the CAS chief.* General Bennett returned to the United States on the evening of October 10, 1970. General Philpott was Acting Director in Bennett's absence.