Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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-63-My feeling definitely is that it was for aspecific purpose, and was just not an all-purpose capability there begin held for tar-gets of opportunity, unspecified targets.(O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 49.)At several points, O'Donnell stated that he did not think thatLumumba was the target specified for the use of the virus (O'Donnell,6/9/75, p. 17; 9/11/75, p. 48). But he allowed for that possibility:I supposed it was for a lethal operation, verypossibly Lumumba, but very possibly in connec-tion with other people. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75,p. 24; accord. 6/9/75, p. 17.)His final word on the subject was that he assumed that the "specificpurpose" of the virus was the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell,9/11/75, p. 50).O'Donnell said that the Chief of Station never indicated thatO'Donnell was to employ the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 52). Infact, O'Donnell testified that Hedgman "never discussed his assassi-nation effort, he never even indicated that this was one." (O'Donnell,9/11/75, p. 54.)While Hedgman has no direct recollection of discussing hisassassination operation with O'Donnell, he "assumed" that he hadat least discussed with O'Donnell the problem of gaining access toLumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75,pp. 55, 60). O'Donnell testified, however, that because he was"morally opposed to assassination" he would "absolutely not" have
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 309]
-64-explored the means by which such access could be gained, nor wouldhe have undertaken a mission to the Congo if it involved assess-ment of the situation for an assassination operation by someoneelse (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 26).O'Donnell was "sure" that he "related everything" to Hedgmanabout his conversations with Bissell concerning the assassinationof Lumumba (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 46). Hedgman, however, had norecollection of learning this from O'Donnell (Hedgman, 8/21/75,p. 56).Beyond this, O'Donnell said that his discussions of assassi-nation with Hedgman were general and philosophical, dealing with"the morality of assassinations" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 46, 54):From my point of view I told him I hadmoral objections to it, not just qualms,but objections. I didn't think it wasthe right thing to do. (O'Donnell,9/11/75, p. 9).When asked to characterize Hedgman's attitude toward assassinationbased on those discussions, O'Donnell said:I will answer your question just as fairlyand as scrupulously as I can. I have agreat deal of respect for Hedgman. And ifhe said something, I would believe him tobe speaking the truth as he knew it withoutshading it. The best I could say, Ithink, would be this, that he would not havebeen opposed in principle to assassination inthe interests of national security. Iknow that he is a man of great moral per-ception and decency and honor, and so forth.And that it would disturb him to be engaged insomething like that. But I think I wouldhave to say that in our conversations, mymemory of those, at no time would he rule itout as being a possibility. (O'Donnell,9/11/75, p. 18.)NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 310
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(v) O'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize" Lumumba by TurningHim Over to Congolese Authorities and Requested theAssignment of Agent QJWIN to Leopoldville as HisAlter EgoAfter Justin O'Donnell arrived in the Congo, he formu-lated a plan for "neutralizing" Lumumba by drawing him away fromthe custody of the UN force which was guarding his residence:O'Donnell: [W]hat I wanted to do was toget him out, to trick him out, if I could,and then turn him over . . . to the legalauthorities and let him stand trial. Be-cause he had atrocity attributed to him forwhich he could very well stand trial.Q: And for which he could very well havereceived capital punishment?O'Donnell: Yes. And I am not opposed tocapital punishment. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,pp. 20-21.)*To implement his plan, O'Donnell made arrangements to rent "an ob-servation post over the palace in which Lumumba was safely ensconced"* According to an earlier report from the Chief of Station, it  was the view of the Special Representative of the Secretary General  of the United Nations that arrest by Congolese authorities was "JUST  A TRICK TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA" (CIA Cable Leop  Chief  of Station to Director, 10/11/60). The Chief of Station proceeded  to recommend Lumumba's arrest in the same cable:STATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED [CONGOLESE] LEADERSARREST LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CONTINUE BETHREAT TO STABILITY CONGO UNTIL REMOVED FROMSCENE (CIA Cable, 10/11/60).
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-66-(O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 20).* O'Donnell also "spotted" a memberof the UN guard and made his acquaintance to recruit him for anattempt to lure Lumumba outside UN protective custody (O'Donnell,6/9/75, p. 20; 9/11/75, p. 21).O'Donnell said that he cabled progress reports on his plan toCIA headquarters (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 26) He also said thathe informed the Chief of Station about his plan (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,p. 56).In connection with his effort to draw Lumumba out of UN cus-tody, O'Donnell arranged for a CIA agent, whose code name wasQJWIN, to come to the Congo to work with him (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,p. 19):What I wanted to use him for was ...counter-espionage [...]. I had to screenthe U.S. participation in this ... byusing a foreign national whom we knew,trusted, and had worked with ... theidea was for me to use him as an alterego. (O'Donnell Tr., pp. 19-20.)In mid-November, two cables from Leopoldville urged CIA head-quarters to send QJWIN as soon as possible (CIA Cable IN 41261,Leopoldville to Director, 11/11/60) with this message:LOCAL OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIREIMMEDIATE EXPEDITION OF QJWIN TRAVEL TOLEOPOLDVILLE. (CIA Cable IN 41556,Leopoldville to Director, 11/13/60.)* A cable from the Chief of Station to Tweedy in mid-November  reported that the double guard of United Nations and Congolese  troops around Lumumba's residence thwarted this plan: "CONCENTRIC  RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POST IMPOSSIBLE"  (CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60).
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The cables contained no exploration of this sense of urgency aboutthe "operational circumstances."(b) Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November-December 1960QJWIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background, recruited in Europe (Memorandum to CIA Finance Division, Re: Payments to QJWIN, 1/31/61), and supervised by CIA officer Arnold Silver. In November 1960, at O'Donnell's request (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 19), agent QJWIN was dispatched to the Congo by Silver, to undertake a mission that "might involve a large element of personal risk." (CIA Cable IN 36814, 11/2/60.)*.A dispatch from the CIA headquarters on his pending trip to Africa made clear the high degree of sensitivity accorded to his mission:In view of the extreme sensitivity of the objective for which we want him to perform his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do... Instead, he was told ... that we would like to have him spot, assess, and recommend some dependable, quick-witted persons for our use..... It was thought best to withhold our true, specific requirements pending the final decision to use [him]. (CIA Dispatch, AUDW-147, 11/2/60.)* Part of the purpose in dispatching QJWIN to Africa was to send him from the Congo to another African country for an unspecified mission. QJWIN's mission to this country is not explained in the cable traffic between CIA headquarters and the various stations that dealt with him.There is no indication in CIA files as to whether QJWIN completed this mission. O'Donnell said he had no knowledge of any mission that would have taken QJWIN to this country (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 32-33).
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This message itself was deemed too sensitive to be retained at the station: "this dispatch should be reduced to cryptic necessary notes and destroyed after the first reading." (CIA Dispatch, AUDW-147, 11/2/60.)QJWIN arrived in Leopoldville on November 21, 1960 (CIA Cable IN 49486, 11/29/60) and returned to Europe in late December 1960 (CIA Cable OUT 54710, Director to Leopoldville, 12/9/60).The CIA Inspector General's Report said that QJWIN had been recruited earlier by Arnold Silver for use in a special operation in the Congo [the assassination of Patrice Lumumba] to be run by Justin O'Donnell. (I.G. Report, p. 38.)However, both O'Donnell and Bissell testified that O'Donnell refused to be associated with an assassination operation.[^1] Instead, O'Donnell said he went to the Congo to attempt to snatch Lumumba from the protective custody of the U.N. guard and place him in the hands of the Congolese army. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 13-14, 37.)According to O'Donnell, QJWIN was a man who was capable of undertaking an assassination mission:O'Donnell: ... I would say that he would not be a man of many scruples.Q: So he was a man capable of doing anything?O'Donnell: I would think so, yes.Q: And that would include assassination?O'Donnell: I would think so.(O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 35-36.)[^1]: See Sections 5(a) (ii) and 5(a) (iii) above.
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-69-But O'Donnell had no knowledge that QJWIN was ever used for an assassination mission (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 36, 42).O'Donnell said that, as far as he knew, he was the only CIA officer with supervisory responsibility for QJWIN and QJWIN did not report independently to anyone else (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 28).When asked if it was possible that QJWIN had a mission independent of that he was performing for O'Donnell, he said:O'Donnell: Yes, that is possible orit could have been that somebody contactedhim after he got down there, that theywanted him to do something along the linesof assassination. I don't know. (O'Donnell,9/11/75, p. 29.)But he discounted this possibility as "highly unlikely" because it would be a departure from standard CIA practice -- placing an agent in a position of knowledge superior to that of his supervising officer (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 29).Despite O'Donnell's doubt that QJWIN had an independent line of responsibility to the Chief of Station, a cable of November 29 shows that Hedgman was aware of WIN's activities.In that cable, the Chief of Station reported through the PROP channel to Tweedy that QJWIN had begun implementation of a plan to "PIERCE BOTH CONGOLESE AND UN GUARDS" to enter Lumumba's residence and "PROVIDE ESCORT OUT OF RESIDENCE" (CIA Cable IN 49486, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/29/60). O'Donnell said that he had directed QJWIN to make the acquaintanceship of the member of the UN force whose help he sought for the plan to snatch Lumumba from UN custody
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-70-(O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 21). But Lumumba had left UN custody at this point to travel toward his stronghold at Stanleyville. This did not deter QJWIN:VIEW CHANGE IN LOCATION TARGET, QJWINANXIOUS GO STANLEYVILLE AND EXPRESSEDDESIRE EXECUTE PLAN BY HIMSELF WITHOUTUSING ANY APPARAT (CIA Cable, 11/29/60).It is unclear whether this latter "plan" contemplated assassination as well as abduction. An affirmative reply from headquarters came through the PROP channel the next day which was also susceptible of interpretation as an assassination order:CONCUR QJWIN GO STANLEYVILLE... WE AREPREPARED CONSIDER DIRECT ACTION BY OJWINBUT WOULD LIKE YOUR READING ON SECURITYFACTORS. HOW CLOSE WOULD THIS PLACE [UNITEDSTATES] TO THE ACTION? (CIA Cable OUT 98314,Chief of Africa Division to Chief of Station,11/30/60.)O'Donnell said that agent QJWIN's stay in the Congo was "co-extensive with my own, allowing for the fact that he came after I did." (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 19.) O'Donnell said he left the Congo around the time of Lumumba's death in Katanga at the hands of Congolese authorities. (O'Donnell, p. 20.) QJWIN left in December shortly after Lumumba was captured by the Congolese army.In a memorandum to arrange the accounting for QJWIN's activities in the Congo, William K. Harvey -- under whom O'Donnell had worked before being detached for assignment to the Congo -- noted the success of QJWIN's mission: "QJWIN was sent on this trip for a
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-71-specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been completed" (Memorandum for Finance Division from William K. Harvey, 1/11/61). O'Donnell explained Harvey's reference to the fact that QJWIN's mission had been "completed" by saying that once Lumumba was in the hands of the Congolese authorities "the reason for the mounting of the project ... had become moot" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 35). When asked if he and QJWIN were responsible for Lumumba's departure from UN custody and subsequent capture, O'Donnell said: "Absolutely not" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 35). Harvey did not recall the meaning of the memorandum, but he assumed that O'Donnell's return from the Congo constituted the "completion" of QJWIN's mission (Harvey, affidavit, p. ).Despite the indication in the Inspector General's Report that QJWIN may have been recruited initially for an assassination mission and the suggestive language of the cables at the end of November, there is no clear evidence that QJWIN was actually involved in any assassination plan or attempt. The CIA officers who were involved in or knowledgeable of an assassination plot against Lumumba gave no testimony that tended to show that QJWIN was related to that plot.The Chief of Station had a "vague recollection" that QJWIN was in the Congo working for Justin O'Donnell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) But Hedgman did not recall why QJWIN was in the Congo. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) QJWIN was not a major operative of Hedgman's. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy did not recall anything about QJWIN's mission in the Congo
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-72-(Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 54-57; Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 54, 61).William Harvey, from whose division QJWIN was on loan for his Congo assignment, had no specific knowledge of WIN's activities in the Congo:I was kept informed of the arrangements for QJWIN's trip to the Congo and, subsequently, of his presence in the Congo. I do not know specifically what QJWIN did in the Congo. I do not think that I ever had such knowledge.... If QJWIN were to be used on an assassination mission, it would have been cleared with me. I was never informed that he was to be used for such a mission. (Harvey affidavit, p. )He stated that Arnold Silver probably wrote the memoranda concerning QJWIN and submitted them for HARVEY's signature (Ilarvey affidavit, p. ).(c) QJWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIFLEAfter leaving the Congo in early 1961, QJWIN was used by CIA officer William Harvey as the principal asset in Project ZRRIFLE, a project which included research into a capability to assassinate foreign leaders.* QJWIN's role in Project ZRRIFLE was to "SPOT" figures of the European underworld who could be utilized as agents by the CIA if required. Harvey stated that before the formation of Project ZRRIFLE:* For a full treatment of Project ZRRIFLE, see Section infra, on the "Executive Action Capability."
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Arnold Silver had not previously usedQJWIN as an assassination capability oreven viewed him as such. (Harvey affi-davit, p. )Although Harvey also had discussions with Sidney Gottlieb in connec-tion with Project ZRRIFLE, he believed that Gottlieb never mentionedto him either QJWIN's activities in the Congo or Gottlieb's owntrip to Leopoldville (Harvey affidavit, p. ). Harvey had con-sulted with Arnold Silver about the initiation of Project ZRRIFLE(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).The Chief of Station in Leopoldville testified that he hadnever heard of Project ZRRIFLE, nor was he aware of any CIA projectto develop the capability of assassinating foreign leaders.(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 93.) Furthermore, Hedgman said that he was"quite certain" that he never discussed assassination capabilitiesor assets with Harvey at any time. (Hedgman, 3/21/75, p. 95.)Hedgman testified that Arnold Silver came to the Congo on a counter-intelligence mission during his tenure, but they did not discussthe plan to assassinate Lumumba. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 92.)An interesting note on the value accorded QJWIN by the CIAand the inherent predicament for an intelligence agency that employshoodlums is found in a cable from CIA headquarters to Arnold Silverin 1962. The CIA had learned that QJWIN was about to go on trialin Europe on smuggling charges. The cable suggested:IF . . . INFOR TRUE WE MAY WISH ATTEMPT QUASII.CHARGES OR ARRANGE SOMEHOW SALVAGE QJWIN FOROUR PURPOSES. (CIA Cable OUT 73943, 4/18/62.)
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(d) Agent QJWIN Was Asked By Hedgman's Operative WIROGUE to Join an "Execution Squad": December 1960.The one incident where there is an explicit reference to assassination in connection with QJWIN involved his contact with WIROGUE, another asset of the Congo station.WIROGUE was an "essentially stateless" European who was "a forger and former bank robber" and had fought with the French Foreign Legion. (Inspector General Memorandum, 3/14/75.) He was sent to the Congo after being given plastic surgery and a toupee by the CIA so that he would not be recognized by Europeans traveling through the Congo. (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) WIROGUE was assessed by the CIA as a man who "LEARNS QUICKLY AND CARRIES OUT ANY ASSIGNMENT WITHOUT REGARD FOR DANGER" (CIA Cable OUT 86554, Africa Division to Leopoldville, 10/27/60).The Chief of Station described WIROGE as "a man with a rather unsavory reputation, who would try anything once, at least." (Hedgman, 3/21/75, p. 96.) Hedgman used him as "a general utility agent" because "I felt we needed surveillance capability, developing new contacts, various things." (Hedgman, 3/21/75, p. 96.) Hedgman supervised WIROGUE directly and did not put WIROGUE in touch with Justin O'Donnell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)A report on agent WIROGUE, prepared for the CIA Inspector General's office in 1975, described the training and tasking he received:
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-75-On 19 September 1960 two members of Africa Division met with him to discuss "an opera- tional assignment in Africa Division." In connection with this assignment, WIROGUE/1 was to be trained in demolitions, small arms, and medical immunization... In October 1960 a cable to Leopoldville stated that ... Headquarters [had] ... intent to use him as utility agent in order to "(a) organize and conduct a surveillance team; (b) intercept packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (d) execute other assignments requiring positive action. His utilization is not to be restricted to Leopoldville." (I.G. Memorandu, 3/14/75.).WIROGUE made his initial contact with Hedgman in Leopoldville on December 2, 1960 (CIA Cable IN 13739, 12/17/60). He was given two instructions by Hedgman: (1) to "build cover during initial period;" and (2) to "spot persons for [a] surveillance team" of intelligence assets in the province where Lumumba's support was strongest. (CIA Cable IN 18739, 12/17/60.)Soon after receiving these instructions, agent WIROGUE approached QJWIN and asked him to join an "execution squad." This incident is described by Leopoldville Chief of Station Hedgman in a cable to CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 99):QJWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WIROGUE REPORTED LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, JAPAN, SOUTH AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROPE. QJWIN SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUSINESS. STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE. 14 DEC QJWIN REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE MEMBER "EXECUTION SQUAD." WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT INTERESTED, WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS. UNDER QJWIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER SAID HE WORK- INF FOR [AMERICAN) SERVICE.IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS, WIROGUE MENTIONED QJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM. THEN [CHIEF OF STATION) TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE HAD MADE APPROACH LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN NO. STEPS. [CHIEF OF STATION) WAS UNABLE CONTRADICT, AS DID NOT WISH REVEAL QJWIN CONNECTION [CIA]. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director, 12/17, 60.)
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The cable also expressed Hedgman's concern about WIROGUE's actions:... LEOP CONCERNED BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELINGAND LACK SECURITY. STATION HAS ENOUGH HEAD-ACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO NOTABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND WHO NOT WILLINGFOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. IF HQS DESIRES, WILLINGKEEP HIM ON PROBATION, BUT IF CONTINUE HAVEDIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE WIROGUE RECALL BESTSOLUTION. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director,12/17/60.)WIROGUE's attempt to recruit QJWIN for an execution squad is explained by Hedgman as a mistake and by the actions of QJWIN as an unauthorized, unexpected contact which he did not initiate.The Chief of Station testified that he had not instructed WIROGUE to make this kind of proposition to QJWIN or anyone else. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.) He added:I would like to stress that I don't know what WIROGUE was talking about as a[n] "execution squad," and I am sure he was never tasked to go out and execute anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.)Hedgman suggested that WIROGUE may have concocted the idea of an execution squad:His idea of what an intelligence operative should do, I think, had been gathered by reading a few novels or something of the sort. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.)Justin O'Donnell had no knowledge of an attempt by anyone connected to the CIA to recruit an execution squad and no recollec-
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-77-tion of WIROGUE (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 39-42). O'Donnell men-tioned that agent QJWIN was considered for use on a "strong armsquad," but said that this was for purposes more general thanassassinations:surveillance teams where you have to gointo crime areas ... where you need afellow that if he gets in a box can fighthis way out of it. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75,p. 36).Richard Bissell recalled nothing of the WIROUGE approach toQJWIN (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 71). Bronson Tweedy did recall thatWIROGUE was "dispatched on a general purpose mission" to the Congo(Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 63). But Tweedy testified that WIROGUE would"absolutely not" have been used on an assassination mission againstLumumba because "he was basically dispatched, assessed and dealtwith by the balance of the Division" rather than by the two peoplein the Africa Division -- Tweedy himself and his deputy, GlennFields -- who would have known that the assassination of Lumumbawas being considered (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 64-65).The Chief of Station said that if the WIROGUE incident wasconnected to an actual assassination plan, he would have transmitteda message in a more narrowly restricted channel than that in whichthis cable was sent. His cable on WIROGUE's approach to QJWIN wassent to headquarters with a security designation that allowed muchwider distribution than the PROP cables that he sent and receivedconcerning the Gottlieb assassination assignment. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,p. 102.) In contrast, he limited distribution of the cable about