Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 22]
# TOP SECRETThe Concept of "Plausible Deniability"Non-attribution for U. S. Government covert operations was the original and principal purpose of the so-called doctrine of plausible denial.Evidence before the Committee clearly demonstrates that this concept, designed to protect the U. S. and its operatives from the consequences of disclosures, has been significantly expanded to: (1) mask not only Presidential decisions but those of his senior staffers; (2) support less than complete advice to such persons regarding these operations.The quest for "plausible denial" has shaped the processes of the U. S. Government for approving and evaluating covert actions. The 40 Committee and its predecessors can serve as "circuit breakers" for a President, placing the locus of consideration of covert action at several removes from the Oval office. One consequence of the doctrine of plausible denial is an incomplete documentary record.The quest for "plausible denial" has also led to the use of certain techniques, including euphemism and circumlocution. These techniques have had as their purpose the objective of allowing the President and other senior officials to deny knowledge of an operation should it be disclosed. In addition, the use of indirect reference to inform a President could be reversed--a President could communicate his desire to see a highly sensitive operation undertaken in a similar indirect, circumlocutious manner. Whether, at times circumlocution had the affect of failing to let Presidents or other officials accurately understand what was being said, was a question faced by the Committee.NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 23
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 23]
TOP SECRET"Plausible deniability" raises a number of other issues which theCommittee has had to confront. Differing interpretations of the practiceof plausible denial has affected the extent to which sensitive matterswere raised or considered. The evidence discussed below revealed thatvery serious problems of assessing and insuring accountability and con-trol can arise out of plausible deniability.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 24]
on August 29, 1975# TOP SECRETB. CubaWe have divided the facts with respect to Cuba into three broad sections.The first discusses the plots against Fidel Castro's life without attempting to confront the question of authorization.The second deals with the evidence concerning whether or not the successive Directors of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles and John McCone, authorized or knew about the various plots. (Although we have organizationally divided the evidence relating to the DCI's from the proof relating to other high administration officials, it is important to remember that the Director of Central Intelligence is the principal advisor to the President on intelligence matters, a member of major administrative policy-making councils as well as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.)The third section covers the evidence concerning whether or not other high officials--including the various. Presidents--authorized or knew about the plots. This section also considers the evidence relating to whether or not the CIA officials who were involved with the plots believed them to be consistent with the general policy objectives of the various administrations even if they had no personal knowledge as to whether the plots were or were not specifically authorized by higher authority.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 25]
# TOP SECRET21. The Assassination Plots ThemselvesWe have found concrete evidence of at least eight plots involving the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960 to 1965. Although some of the assassination plots did not advance beyond the stage of planning and preparation, one plot involving the use of underworld figures reportedly twice progressed to the point of sending poison pills to Cuba and dispatching teams to commit the deed. Another plot involved furnishing weapons and other assassination devices to a Cuban dissident. The assassination proposals ran-the gamut from high-powered rifles to poison pills, poison pens, deadly bacterial powders, and other devices which would strain the imagination.The most ironic of these plots took place on November 22, 1963--the very day that President Kennedy was shot in Dallas--when a CIA official in Paris offered a poison pen to a Cuban for use against Castro while at the same time an emissary from President Kennedy was meeting with Castro to explore the possibility of improved relations.The following narrative sets forth the facts of assassination plots against Castro as established before the Committee by witnesses and documentary evidence. The question of the level and degree of authorization of the plots is considered in the sections that follow.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 26]
# TOP SECRET3(a) Plots: Early 1960(1) Plots to Destroy Castro's Public ImageEfforts against Castro did not begin with assassination attempts.From March through August 1960, during the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA considered plans to undermine Castro's charismatic appeal by sabotaging his speeches. According to the Inspector General's Report, an official in the Technical Services Division (TSD) recalled discussing a scheme to spray Castro's broadcasting studio with a chemical which produced effects similar to LSD, but rejected the scheme because the chemical was not reliable. During this period, TSD impregnated a box of cigars with a chemical which produced temporary disorientation, hoping to induce Castro to smoke one of the cigars before delivering a speech. The Inspector General also reported a plan to destroy Castro's image as "The Beard" by dusting his shoes with thallium salts, a strong depilatory that would cause his beard to fall out. The chemical was to be administered during a trip outside of Cuba, in which it was anticipated Castro would leave his shoes outside the door of his hotel room to be shined. TSD procured the chemical and tested it on animals, but apparently abandoned the scheme because Castro cancelled his trip. (I.G., pp. 10-13.)(2) Proposal to Sabotage FlightThe first proposed action against the life of a Cuban leader sponsored by the CIA of which the Committee is aware took place in July 1960. On July 18, 1960, a Cuban airlineNW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 27![signature]
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 27]
# TOP SECRETpilot who had volunteered to assist the CIA in gathering intelli-gence informed his case officer in Havana that he would probablybe chosen to fly to Prague on July 21 to return Raul Castro toCuba (Memo to I.G., 1/17/75). On July 20 the pilot confirmed thathe would definitely fly the plane. CIA Headquarters and fieldstations along the route were requested to inform the Havana Stationof any intelligence needs that the pilot might fulfill. The caseofficer testified that he and the pilot contemplated only acquiringinformation about Czechoslovakia and Raul Castro, and that assas-sination was not considered.*The cable from the Havana Station was received at Head-quarters on the night of July 20. The duty officer, who was summonedto Headquarters from his home, contacted Tracy Barnes, Deputy toDDP Richard Bissell, and J.C. King, Chief of the Western HemisphereDivision.** Following their instructions, he sent a cable to theHavana Station early in the morning of July 21, stating: "Possibleremoval top three leaders is receiving serious consideration atHQS." The cable inquired whether the pilot was sufficientlymotivated to risk "arranging an accident during return trip" and* A cable to Headquarters requesting any intelligence needs  supports this account.** The duty officer testified that he must have spoken with Kingbecause he would not otherwise have signed the cable "by direction,J.S. King". (Duty Officer, p. 16) He also would "very definitely"have read the cable to Barnes before sending it, because "Barneswas the man to whom we went.  for our authority and for workconnected with the Cuban Project." (Duty Officer, pp. 4, 25) SinceKing at that time was giving only "nominal attention" to Cubanaffairs, the officer concluded that a proposal of the gravity of anassassination could only have "come from Mr. Barnes". (Duty Officer,p. 24)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 28]
# TOP SECRETadvised that the station could "at discretion contact subject to determine willingness to cooperate and his suggestions on details". Ten thousand dollars was authorized as payment "after successful completion", but no advance payment was permitted because of the possibility that the pilot was a double agent. According to the case officer, this cable represented "quite a departure from the conventional activities we'd been asked to handle". (Case Officer interview, 8/4/75, p. 2)*The case officer contacted the pilot and told him of the proposal while accompanying him to the airport for the flight. The case officer avoided the word "assassinate", but made it clear that the CIA contemplated an "accident to neutralize this leader's (Raul's) influence". (Case Officer interview, p. 2) After being assured that his sons would be given a college education in the event of his death, the pilot agreed to take a "calculated risk", limited to possibilities that might pass as accidental.** (Cable, Havana to Director, 7/22/70)Immediately after returning to the station the case officer was told that a cable had just arrived stating: "Do not5* The duty officer remembered the cable and some of the surrounding facts for precisely that reason: "[I]t was an unusual type of [cable], and I say this because I can remember it 15 years later." (Duty Officer, p. 14) The case officer recalled that when he saw the cable, he "swallowed hard". (Case Officer interview, p. 3)** The cable from Havana to Headquarters stated that the pilot was willing to risk: "A. Engine burnout on takeoff to delay or harrass trip: B. Vague possibility water ditching approximately three hours out from Cuba."
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 29]
TOP SECRETpursue ref. Would like to drop matter." (Cable, Director toHavana, 7/22/60; Memo to I.G., 1/17/75)* It was, of course, toolate to "drop the matter" since the plane had already departed.When the Cuban pilot returned, he told the case officer that hehad not had an opportunity to arrange an accident.(3) Poison CigarsA notation in the records of the Chief,Operations Div., Office of Medical Services indicates that onAugust 16, 1960, he was given a box of Castro's favorite cigarswith instructions to treat them with lethal poison (I.G., p.21). The cigars were contaminated with a botulinum toxin sopotent that a person would die after putting one in his mouth(I.G., p. 22). The Chief reported that the cigars were ready onOctober 7, 1960; TSD notes indicate that they were delivered toan unidentified person on February 13, 1961 (I.G., p. 22). Therecord does not disclose whether an attempt was made to pass thecigars to Castro.(b) Use of Underworld Figures--Phase I(1) The Initial PlanIn August 1960, the CIA took steps to enlistthe aid of members of the criminal underworld with gambling* This cable was signed by Tracy Barnes (Duty Officer, p. 28)  The duty officer recalled seeing this cable, and testified that he  had heard that Allen Dulles had countermanded the cable authorizing  the possible assassination attempt against Raul Castro. (Duty  Officer, pp. 29-30) The reasons for Dulles' action are discussed  infra at
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 30]
# TOP SECRETsyndicate contacts to assassinate Castro. The earliest evidenceof the operation is a conversation between Deputy Director ofPlans (DDP) Richard Bissell and Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Chiefof the Office of Security. Edwards recalled that Bissell askedhim to locate someone who could assassinate Castro (Edwards,pp. 2-3). Bissell confirmed that he requested Edwards to findsomeone to assassinate Castro, and believed that Edwards raisedthe idea of contacting members of a gambling syndicate operatingin Cuba* (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 71-73). Edwards assigned the missionto James P. O'Connell, Chief of the Operational Support Divisionof the CIA's Office of Security, explaining that he and Bissellwere looking for someone to "eliminate" or "assassinate" Castro(O'Connell, pp. 6-8, 95-96).Edwards and O'Connell decided to rely on Robert A.Maheu to recruit someone "tough enough" to handle the job(O'Connell, p. 8). Maheu was an ex-FBI agent who had entered intoa career as a private investigator in 1954. Robert Cunningham,a former FBI associate of Maheu's who was employed in the CIA'sOffice of Security, had arranged for the CIA to use Maheu in[^1][^1]: Although Castro closed the gambling casinos in Cuba whenhe first came to power, they were reopened for use by foreigntourists in late February 1959, and remained open until lateSeptember 1961.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 31]
# TOP SECRETseveral sensitive covert operations in which "he didn't want to have an Agency person or a government person get caught"* (O'Connell, p. 158). Maheu was initially paid a monthly retainer by the CIA of $500, which was terminated after his practice became more lucrative (O'Connell, pp. 13-14; 1.G., p. 15). O'Connell had served as Maheu's case officer since the Agency first began using Maheu's services, and by 1960 they had become close personal friends (Maheu, p. 6).Sometime in late August or early September 1960, O'Connell approached Maheu about the proposed operation (O'Connell, p. 9; Maheu, 7/29, p. 6). As Maheu recalls the conversation, O'Connell asked him to contact John Roselli, an underworld figure with possible gambling contacts in Las Vegas, to determine if he[^1][^1]: During 1954-1955, Maheu cooperated with the CIA in attempting to undermine Aristotle Onassis' contract with the Saudi Arabian government that would have given Onassis virtually complete control over shipping of oil from Saudi Arabia. Although he was employed by Onassis' competitor, Niarchos, Maheu worked closely with the CIA. He testified that he contracted for a listening device to be placed on Onassis' room in New York after first consulting with the Agency, and that he provided the impetus for the termination of the contract by publicizing its terms in a newspaper in Rome that he said he purchased with CIA funds. (Maheu, 7/30/75, pp. 14-25.)O'Connell testified that Maheu, at the CIA's request had also previously arranged for the production of a film in Hollywood depicting a foreign leader with a woman in the Soviet Union. The CIA planned to circulate the film, representing it to have been produced, but not released (O'Connell, pp. 159, 162-163). Maheu testified that he had located an actor resembling the leader and had arranged for the production of the film (Maheu, 7/30/75, pp. 39-42).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 32]
# TOP SECRETwould participate in a plan to "dispose" of Castro* (Maheu, 7/29,p. 8). Maheu had known Roselli since the late 1950's (Maheu, 7/29,pp. 58-60). Although Maheu claims not to have been aware of theextent of Roselli's underworld connections and activities, herecalled that"it was certainly evident to me that he was able toaccomplish things in Las Vegas when nobody else seemedto get the same kind of attention" (Maheu, 7/29, p. 60).O'Connell had previously met Roselli at Maheu's home (Maheu, 7/29,p. 8). O'Connell and Maheu each claimed that the other had raisedthe idea of using Roselli, and Maheu said O'Connell was aware thatRoselli had contacts with the gambling syndicate (Maheu, 7/29,p. 8; O'Connell, pp. 15-16).Maheu was at first reluctant to become involvedin the operation because it might interfere with his relationshipwith his new client, Howard Hughes. He finally agreed because hefelt that he owed the Agency a commitment (O'Connell, pp. 12-13,103). O'Connell recalled that Maheu was to approach Roselliusing a cover story that he represented business firms sufferingheavy financial losses caused by Castro's actions** (O'Connell,p. 16). O'Connell testified that Maheu was told to offer money,* Maheu testified that he was told that the plan to assassinate  Castro was one phase of a larger project to invade Cuba (Maheu,  pp. 7, 13, 47).** Roselli testified that the story was developed later andused as a mutual "cover" by O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli indealing with Cubans recruited for the project (Roselli, pp. 16-17).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 33]
probably $150,000, for Castro's assassination* (O'Connell, pp. 16, 111; Memorandum, Osborn to DCI, 6/24/66).(2) Contact With The SyndicateIn early September 1960, Maheu met Roselli at the Brown Derby in Beverly Hills, told him that "high government officials" needed his cooperation in getting rid of Castro, and asked him to help recurit Cubans to do the job (Roselli, p. 8). Maheu recalled that Roselli was at first reluctant to participate in the project and insisted on meeting with a representative of the government (Maheu, 7/29, pp. 10-11; Roselli, p. 9). A meeting with O'Connell was arranged in New York City at the Plaza Hotel during the week of September 14, 1960 (Roselli, pp. 10-11; I.G., p. 16). O'Connell testified that he was introduced to Roselli as a business associate of Maheu, and that Maheu told Roselli that he represented international business interests which were pooling money to pay for the assassination of Castro (O'Connell, p. 26). Roselli claimed that Maheu told him at that time that O'Connell was with the CIA** (Roselli, pp. 11, 85).* The I.G. Report places the amount at $150,000; O'Connell thought it might have been $100,000 (O'Connell, p. 16), Roselli recalled $250,000 (Roselli, p. 25) and Edwards confirmed the $150,000 figure (Edwards, p. 9). Maheu could recall no "price tag" for Castro's assassination (Maheu, p. 34).** The weight of the testimony indicates that Roselli realized the CIA was behind the assassination attempt at an early stage.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 34]
TOP SECRETIt was arranged that Roselli would go to Florida and recruit Cubans for the operation (Roselli, pp. 11-12).Edwards informed Bissell that contact had been made with the gambling syndicate (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 20-21; I.G., p. 17).During the week of September 24, 1960, O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli met in Miami to work out the details of the operation (O'Connell, pp. 25-26; Roselli, p. 12; I.G., p. 18). Roselli used the cover name of "John Rawlston" and represented himself to the Cuban contacts as an agent of "some business interests of Wall Street that had nickel interests and properties around in Cuba, and I was getting financial assistance from them" (Roselli, pp. 9, 17).Maheu handled the details of setting up the operation and keeping O'Connell informed of developments.After they had been in Miami for a short time, and certainly prior to October 18,* Roselli introduced Maheu to two indivi-Maheu substantially confirmed his account (Maheu, p. 111). O'Connell recalled that about three weeks after the New York meeting, Roselli told him, "I am not kidding, I know who you work for." (O'Connell, p. 26.)* Maheu recalls that he first met "Sam Gold" (Giancana) after November, 1960, when he was staying at the Fountainbleu Hotel (Maheu, p. 17). Other evidence indicates that the meeting took place earlier. When they first went to Miami, Maheu and Roselli stayed at the Kennilworth Hotel (Maheu, pp. 15-16); FBI records reveal that Maheu and Roselli (alias J. A. Rollins) were registered at the Kennilworth from October 11-30 (File R-505, FBI summary, p. 10). Giancana must have been involved in the operation during the October period at the Kennilworth because (1) the wiretap of Rowan's apartment, discussed infra, was made on October 30; (2) on October 18, the FBI sent a memorandum to Bissell stating that Giancana had been telling several people that he was involved in an assassination attempt against Castro (see infra, p. ).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 35]
# TOP SECRETduals on whom he intended to rely: "Sam Gold", who wouldserve as a "back-up man" (Roselli, p. 15), or "Key" man(Maheu, p. 17), and "Joe", whom "Gold" said would serve asa courier to Cuba and make arrangements there (I.G., p. 19).O'Connell, who was using the name "Jim Olds", met "Sam" and"Joe" only briefly (O'Connell, pp. 26-29).O'Connell testified that he learned the trueidentities of his associates one morning when Maheu called andasked him to examine the "Parade" supplement to the MiamiTimes.* An article on the Attorney General's ten-most-wantedcriminals list revealed that "Sam Gold" was Mom Salvatore Giancana,a Chicago-based gangster,** and "Joe" was Santos Trafficante,the Cosa Nostra chieftain in Cuba (O'Connell, pp. 28-30);I.G., p. 19). O'Connell reported his discovery to Edwards(O'Connell, pp. 31, 33) but did not know whether Edwardsreported this fact to his superiors (O'Connell, pp. 32, 41).O'Connell testified that this incident occurred after "wewere in this thing up to our ears", a month or so after[^1] A search of supplements to all Miami papers during thisperiod did not reveal the article described by O'Connell.[^2] Sam Giancana was murdered in his home on June 20, 1975.[^3] Trafficante made regular trips between Miami and Cuba ongambling syndicate business (I.G., pp. 19-20).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 36]
# TOP SECRETGiancana had been brought into the operation, but prior to giving the poison pills to Roselli (O'Connell, pp. 30, 44).Maheu recalled that it was Giancana's job to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the assassination (Maheu, p. 19), and that he met almost daily with Giancana over a substantial period of time (Maheu, p. 18). Although Maheu described Giancana as playing a "key role" (Maheu, p. 34), Roselli claimed that none of the Cubans eventually used in the operation were acquired through Giancana's contacts (Roselli, p. 15).### (3) Rowan Wiretap IncidentIn late October 1960, Maheu arranged for a Florida investigator, Edward DuBois, to place an electronic "bug" in comedian Dan Rowan's room in Las Vegas (Maheu, p. 36). DuBois' employee, Arthur J. Balletti, flew to Las Vegas and installed a tap on Rowan's phone (Maheu, p. 38). O'Connell characterized the ensuing events as a "Keystone comedy act" (O'Connell, p. 68). On October 31, 1960, Balletti, believing that Rowan would be out for the afternoon, left the wiretap equipment unattended. A maid discovered the equipment and notified the local sheriff, who arrested Balletti and brought* According to O'Connell and Roselli, DuBois had been requested to place a legal electronic bug against the wall from an adjacent apartment. Balletti instead installed an electronic tap on the phone (O'Connell, pp. 67-68; Maheu, pp. 36-37).