Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 121]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:COLBYLODGE, H.C.DATES:November 1, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: When DIEM called LODGE directly preceding his death, COLBY states that the message that he saw of the summary of the conversation was that DIEM, "....said that he was going to require his officers to have filled their oaths of loyalty to the constitution, th Vietnamese constitution, in his office as president. He was very stiff about his position President." p. 67SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ColbyFILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:1 July 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINDON, GENERALSTATION (SAIGON)JGS headquartersDATES:1 Nov 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: On November 1, 1963, "CONEIN went to JGS headquarters and remained at the command post throughout the struggle. Before leaving his home, CONEIN alerted the STATION by radio. Upon arriving at JGS headquarters, CONEIN was told by GENERAL DON that DON had tried unsuccessfully to reach CONEIN earlier by telephone. A later check revealed that CONEIN's telephone was out of order. CONEIN was told that he was to keep a telephone line open to the Ambassador. Because there was a CIA officer on the scene and in intimate contact with the coup principals, the STATION was able to report almost minute-by-minute progress of the coup."SOURCE:CIA IG Report, 1967, pp. 41-42FILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE: 29 June 1975
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINCOLBY, WILLIAMDIEMMIHN, GENERALDATES:1 November 1963CATEGORIES:![DIEM TOP SECRET stamp]OCCURRENCE:COLBY states that "When CONEIN was told by the generals, GENERAL MINH, that the NHU brothers, DIEM and NHU, had committed suicide, CONEIN thought it incredible on its face. This was because both brothers were very strong Catholics and CONEIN doubted that they would have done such a thing. According to COLBY, CONEIN was offered a chance to look at the bodies but turned it down. In trying to reconstruct the period of the assassination on November 1, COLBY reports that there was a telephone conversation between President DIEM and the generals. In fact there were several of them. President DIEM was very strongly rejecting the generals, calling them to discipline, and so forth, in the early stages. At a later stage, in the early morning of November 1, he called and indicated that he would surrender if he would be properly handled. The generals then sent somebody down to receive that surrender and found that President DIEM was not there. He'd actually gotten out through the back door of the palace and had gone down to another section of the city. SOURCE: CONEIN was not in attendance."Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 17-19.FILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE: 29 June 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINCRITICJGS headquartersSTATIONDATES:1 Nov 1963CATEGORIES:![TOP SECRET stamp]OCCURRENCE:The IG Report makes the following statement: "The fact that CONEIN was at JGS headquarters is well known in official circles", and bolsters that notoriety by the following statement: "The first cable (on the coup) was received at headquarters at 0117 hours, (November 1, 1963,) Washington time, and was filed on the CRITIC network at 0159. At 0256 hours, following receipt of the sixth non-CRITIC cable, headquarters instructed the STATION to put the coup reporting on the CRITIC network at the STATION. Sometime during the day of 1 November (the confirmation copy of the cable lacks a date/time stamp) headquarters cabled a warning to the STATION against including the names of CIA personnel in its CRITIC cables. CONEIN is identified by and as being at JGS headquarters in eleven CRITIC messages, seven of which were put into the CRITIC channel, without the name being deleted, here at headquarters."SOURCE:CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 42FILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:29 June 1975NW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 123
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CONEIN1 November 1963 DIEMOCCURRENCE: When the generals took over the PTT which controlled the communications, they left only the embassy lines open. The telephone terminals had been taken out prior to the coup and instead of leaving CONEIN's telephone into his home open, it had been disconnected P. 51> TOP SECRETSOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinFILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:July 1, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:COLBY, WILLIAMNhu1 November 1963 DIEMOCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that "The CIA had nothing to do with the assassination of President DIEM and Mr. NHU. The actual assassination was a shock and surprise to everyone in the United States government and when it was announced it was a matter of grave concern. In retrospect, one must realize that there was, however, considerable debate about encouraging and supporting the generals in an overthrow of the DIEM regime, and that the record is very clear that the United States through its overall policy was in support of that overthrow and, of course, I think it is fair to say that in launching a violent overthrow of a regime involved such as this, people are going to get hurt, and in this case, the leaders we killed in the process." pp. 19-20SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 19-20> TOP SECRETSTAFF:R. DAWSONNW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 124
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:GENERAL DINHDATES:11/1/6321 AUG. thru16 SEPT. '63CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:> TOP SECRETDinh'sMilitary Governor did not endear him to the population or the other officers.SOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 12.STAFF: DawsonDATE: 6/30/75FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINDATES:1 November 1903CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that on several occasions, he warned the embassy that certain shellings were going to take place, or bombings by aircraft were going to take place at a certain time in order to alert American personnel who might be living around the area to watch out or stay under cover, because they would find 105's in the center of the city. There were no American casualities during this coup. The Vietnamese suffered about 100 dead. p. 51-52> TOP SECRETSOURCE:STAFF: R. DAWSONNW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 125
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:OCCURRENCE:0. There has a leak to the President prior to the actual coup being launched. Eecimse of this, the President ordered the 41st Ranger Fattalion to move into Saigon and to take the PTT and to surround the palace. This caused another stumbling block in the generals' plan. They were completely taken by surprise by this saneuver and had to negotiate with the commeader of the battalion to withdraw his unit.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 11.FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:GEN. DINHCOUNSELLER NHUOCCURRENCE:Dinh, on approximately 31 August, had the audacity to inform both President Diem and Counseller Nhu that he was their savior and requested a ministerial post for himself.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, pages 12-13.FILE:DATES:11/1/63TOP SECRETSTAFF: DawsonDATE: 6/30/75DATES:31 August '6311/1/63TOP SECRETSTAFF: DawsonDATE: 6/30/75CATEGORIES:DIEMCATEGORIES:DIEMNW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 126
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GEN. MINH# TOP SECRETOCCURRENCE The method used by the generals to neutralize opposi-CON'T. ONNEXT CARD tice elements or doubtful officers was to hold a luncheon meeting for all general officers in the Saigon area (with the exceptica of General Ton That Diah) and ail commanders of separate units. Once every one of these officers bad appetred at Osascol Staff Headquarters and were seated (with the daception of Captata quyen ho had besu killed), General Fish auptunced that be and a group of sfricars were going to ovnebhosa the government by force. At this bice, a section of KtDway Policy avned with submachine guas came into the room. Super Itch sakod for those officers who were villing to go Torg 17th the coup to stand up. De told then they would beSOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, pages 11-12.STAFF: DawsonFILE: DATE: 6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:# TOP SECRETSrce to more around General Staff Headquarters but were not to leave the command post. Those who did not join the coup vere incedletoly placed under arrzat and put unfor armed guard. Once the not-coup slabors ind heen taken away, General dinh ordered & τόμοι coordev brought to the coneond post at thich time he read the proclamation and objectives of the comp plotters whichWMS recorded. He then asked each officer who had agreed to participate in the coup to speak his name into the tape recorder,CONT.OCCURRENCE Several tapes were made from the original and distributed in different parts of the city in pire-arranged hiding pinces so that in the ovent the coup failed, no officer could claim that he and not voluntarily participated in the coup.SOURCE: P. 12, LAST CARD CONTINUEDSTAFF: DawsonFILE: DATE: 6/30/75