Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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- 47a -# TOP SECRETIt seems to me, although the records don't reflect it, that there was a meeting in September, a very brief one, in which I must have been told that there was a specific program going underway. That probably would have been by Henry (Kissinger) and perhaps with Karamessines there. I am not sure. (Haig testimony, p. 12)October 10Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with General Haig. He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from all."(Memorandum/FUBELT, by William Broe, 10 October 1970)Haig recalled the telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 10th.His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation.I do know, and I know that from looking at the record this morning, that Karamessines made a telephone call to me in which he gave a progress report. I recall that. It was in effect a negative progress report, that they were just not coming up with it. (Haig testimony, p. 12)# TOP SECRET
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-49-meeting on the 15th (see below) to have discussed the results of the October 14th message. But the CIA record makes no mention of any such discussion. (Kissinger testimony, p. 53)October 14The 40 Committee met to discuss, among other topics, Chile. In addition to the 40 Committee principals (Kissinger, John Mitchell, David Packard, Alexis Johnson, Admiral Moorer), the meeting was attended by. Karamessines, William Broe and General Robert Cushman of the CIA, Charles Meyer from State, Viron Vaky, and Ambassador Korry, who had returned to Washington from Santiago for a short period of consultation.According to the minutes of that meeting, Kissinger asked Karamessines to give a rundown on the latest developments and present situation in Chile. Karamessines pointed out that "a coup climate does not presently exist." He noted that "the unpredictable General Viaux is the only individual seemingly ready to attempt a coup and...his chances of mounting a successful one were slight." Ambassador Korry agreed with Karamessines' assessment and stated that "as of now it seemed almost certain that Allende would be voted into office on October 24th." Kissinger then observed that "there presently appeared to be little the U.S. can do to influence the Chilean situation.one way or another." Other participants at the meeting concurred. (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 14 October 1970, 16 October 1970)![top secret]
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# October 15Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to discuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines gave a run-down on Viaux, Canales and Tirado and "the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux did not have more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less--to launch a successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:5. It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence our message was to state: "We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support."6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instruc- ted Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and securely to maintain the capability for Agency operations against Allende in the future.8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply. (Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15 October 1970)
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Kissinger, in his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat more detailed than he would have remembered. (Kissinger testimony, p. 52) He believed the Agency had been told to "stand down and preserve your assets."Kissinger believed that the gist of the October 15th meeting as recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA issued to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based on the October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum of the meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a "high incentive to preserve the maximum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp. 55-56) The October 16th order indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous day, and stated:2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date....4. There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Tirado, Canales, Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune. (Headquarters 802, 16 October 1970)Kissinger recalled the October 15th conversation as "turning off the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do them." (Kissinger testimony, p. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony.The conclusions of that meeting were that we had better not do anything rather than something that was not going to succeed.... My general feeling was, I left that meeting with the impression that there was nothing authorized."(Haig testimony, p. 13)
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# -51-## October 10-October 22 (approximate)Karamessines and one or two others went with Kissinger to speak with the President, after a larger meeting. Karamessines believed this meeting took place between October 10 and 24. (Karamessines testimony, p. 89)According to Karamessines, the "President went out of his way to impress all of those there with his conviction that it was absolutely essential that the election of Mr. Allende to the presidency be thwarted."* As they were leaving the Oval Office, the President took Karamessines aside to reiterate the message. (Karamessines testimony, p. 8)## October 19Station cabled Headquarters early in the morning, advising that the tear gas had been passed and outlining the Valenzuela coup plan, beginning with the kidnap of Schneider. In testimony before the Committee, Karamessines indicated he certainly would have reported the Valenzuela plan to Kissinger "very promptly, if for no other reason than that we didn't have all that much promising news to report to the White House..." (Karamessines testimony, p. 72)And as I say, if for no other reason we would have wanted to get this kind of hopeful report to the White House as soon as possible, and it would be my best estimate now that that is precisely what we did. (p. 72)In the afternoon of the 19th, Karamessines met with General Haig for an hour at the White House. (Karamessines calendar) By then, Karamessines would have had in hand the cable outlining the Valenzuela* If the meeting with the President occurred after October 15, that would lend credence to the testimony of CIA officials that they were not directed to end their coup efforts in the October 15th meeting. Unfortunately, the Committee has not had access to the daily calendars of President Nixon or Secretary Kissinger, which might pinpoint the date of the President's conversation with Karamessines. Those calendars, along with other White House documents bearing on Track II, have been subpoenaed.
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-32-plan, since the cable had arrived that morning. However, General Haighad no recollection of the meeting with Karamessines on the 19th. Nordid he believe he had been informed of the Valenzuela plan. "Thisis all very new to me. I hadn't seen any of this, and I was not familiarwith this particular plan...or $50,000, or any of the characters thatare described in here." (Haig testimony, pp. 38-39)Similarly, Kissinger testified that he had not been informed ofthe Valenzuela plan. He said he "was informed of nothing after October15th...." (Kissinger testimony, p. 65) He indicated that, accordingto his daily calendar, he had no conversation with either Karamessinesor Helms between the 15th and the 19th. (Ibid., p. 53) He indicatedthat he never knew that the CIA was in the process of passing guns andtear gas to Chilean military conspirators. He said "...there was nofurther meeting on that subject. In anybody's record, mine or theirs(the CIA's), none of the information from the 16th on was familiar to me."(Ibid., p. 62)Kissinger further testified he did not know that the United Stateswas dealing with Chilean officers who plotted a coup which involvedthe abduction of General Schneider:Senator Hart of Colorado. I am not sure thatthe record clearly shows you answer to the directquestion of whether you knew or did not know thatwe were negotiating with military officers withregard to a plot that did involve the abductionof General Schneider.Secretary Kissinger. I said I did not know.(Kissinger testimony, p. 86)Nor did General Haig believe he had been informed of any abductionplans before the fact.
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Q. Were you aware during that period of timeof the plans to kidnap General Schneider?General Haig. I was aware after the fact....Q. But you were never informed prior to hisattempted abduction?General Haig. I don't believe I was at all.October 20A cable to the Station indicated that "while awaiting word on whateverevents may have occurred 19 October, please let us know what you can oninterim basis....Headquarters must respond during morning 20 October toqueries from high levels." (Headquarters 883, 20 October 1970) Karamessinestestified that the references to "high levels" in the cable of the 20thmeant White House officials, probably Kissinger. He felt quite certainthat Kissinger would have been briefed in advance about Valenzuela's planfor the 19th and so would have been expected to ask what happened on themorning of the 20th. (Karamessines testimony, p. 73) In contrast, Kissingerinterpreted that cable in precisely the opposite light. He felt it indicatedthat he had not been informed of the Valenzuela plan in advance. Whennews of the Schneider kidnap reached the White House, Kissinger believedhe would have had "somebody pick up a telephone and say, 'What is thisall about?'" (Kissinger transcript, p. 68)October 22Karamessines met with Haig at the White House. (Karamessines calendar)General Haig remembered that word of the shooting of Schneider came as"a great shock" to him, and he believed that Karamessines had told himabout it in their meeting on the 22nd. He thought that Kissinger eitherwas present at the meeting or that he, Haig, had gone immediately in toKissinger's office to relate what Karamessines had told him. (Haig testi-mony, p. 36)
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C. DecemberDecember 2A memorandum, dated December 2, 1970, from Helms to Kissinger stated that Helms had given a recapitulation on Track II to Attorney General Mitchell, who would deliver it personally to Kissinger. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: "sent to Kissinger via DCI (Helms)."(Helms memorandum for Kissinger, 2 December 1970) The report, which was dated November 18, 1970, contained a full account of CIA activities during Track II, including the several plans to kidnap Schneider and the passage of weapons to the Chilean conspirators. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, 18 November 1970)In his testimony to the Committee, Kissinger did not recall receiving the report, although he doubted that he would have read such an "after action" report in any case. He testified that he could not find it in his files, in contrast to his finding a CIA report on Track I, dated November 19, 1970. Kissinger was puzzled by a number of aspects of the memorandum and report: why there were two reports, why the report of the 18th apparently was only called to his attention on the 2nd of December, and why it was to be delivered through Mitchell. (Kissinger testimony, pp. 71, 74)D. Did Track II End?The Committee also received conflicting testimony about whether or not Track II ever ended, formally or in fact. As noted above, Kissinger indicated that Track II was supposed to have ended, as far as he was concerned, on October 15. It was formally terminated, according to Kissinger, by a new Presidential marching order issued prior to the October 24 vote of the Chilean Congress.
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-55-The Committee does not have this new "marching order" in its possession.However, CIA officials from whom the Committee took testimony believed that there had been no such definitive end to Track II. It merely tapered off, to be replaced by a longer-term effort to effect a change of government in Chile. Karamessines' testimony was most explicit:Mr. Karamessines. I am sure that the seeds that were laid in that effort in 1970 had their impact in 1973. I do not have any question about that in my mind either. (Karamessines testimony, p. 26)***Q. Was Track II ever formally ended? Was there a specific order ending it?Mr. Karamessines. As far as I was concerned, Track II was really never ended. What we were told to do in effect was, well, Allende is now President. So Track II, which sought to prevent him from becoming President, was technically out, it was done. But what we were told to do was to continue our efforts. Stay alert, and to do what we could to contribute to the eventual achievement of the objectives and purposes of Track II. That being the case, I don't think it is proper to say that Track II was ended.(Ibid., pp. 128-129)When informed of Karamessines' testimony that Track II was never ended, Kissinger testified:The Chairman. Would you take issue with that, with the (Karamessines) testimony?Secretary Kissinger. Totally.... It is clear that...after October 15th that there was no separate channel by the CIA to the White House and that all actions with respect to Chile were taken in the 40 Committee framework. There was no 40 Committee that authorized an approach to or contact with military people, no plots which I am familiar with, and all the covert operations in Chile after Allende's election by the Congress were directed towards maintaining the democratic opposition for the 1976 election. And that was the exclusive thrust, and if there was any further contact with military plotting, it was totally unauthorized and this is the first that I have heard of it. (Kissinger testimony, pp. 75-77)
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# SummarySouth Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were assassinated during a coup by Vietnamese generals on November 2, 1963. Evidence before the Committee indicates that the United States Government offered encouragement for the coup, but neither desired nor was involved in the assassinations. Rather, Diem's assassination appears to have been a spontaneous act by Vietnamese generals, engendered by anger at Diem for refusing to resign or put himself in the custody of the leaders of the coup.On one occasion, General Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh") outlined to a CIA officer the possible assassination of Nhu and another brother, Ngo Dinh Can, as one of three methods being considered for changing the government in the near future. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Deputy Chief of Mission William Trueheart were informed of this possibility by the Saigon Chief of Station, who recommended that "we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a bloodbath in Saigon or a protracted struggle which would rip the Army and the country asunder" (CIA cable SAIG 1447, Saigon Station to DCI, 10/5/63). Upon being informed, Director McCone sent two cables. The first stated "[w]e cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination", and the second directed that the recommendation be withdrawn because "we cannot be in position actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging
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-2-our responsibility therefor" (CIA cable, DCI to Saigon 10/5/63);CIA cable DIR 73661, DCI to Saigon, 10/6/63).B. The Abortive Coup of August 1963On May 8, 1963, South Vietnamese troops in the City of Huefired on Buddhists protesting against the Diem Government, killingnine and wounding fourteen. This incident triggered a nationwideBuddhist protest and a sharp loss of popular confidence in theDiem regime.*On May 18, United States Ambassador Frederick E. Holtingmet with Diem and outlined steps which the United States desiredhim to take to redress the Buddhist grievances and recapturepublic confidence. These steps included admitting responsibilityfor the fue incident, compensating the victims, and reaffirmingreligious equality in the country. (Pentagon Papers, p.208) OnJune 3, Madame ilhu, the wife of Diem's brother, Nhu, publiclyaccused the Buddhists of being infiltrated with Communist agents;Truehart protested her remarks to Diem and threatened to dis-associate the United States from any repressive measures againstthe Buddhists in the future (Pentagon Papers, p.308). Shortlythereafter, Hadame Thu commented on the self-immolation of Quang* Senator Gravel Edition, *The Pentagon Papers, The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam*, pp. 207-  208, Volume II, Beacon Press, Boston (hereinafter cited as Pentagon  Papers). Former Public Affairs Officer of the U.S. Embassy in  Saigon, John Mecklin), in his book, *Mission in Torment, An Intimate  Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam*, Doubleday and Company, 1965,  (hereinafter cited as Mecklin, at pages 158-60 described the vul-  nerability of the Buddhists to Communist infiltration during this  period noting that it "offered a classic opportunity for a Communist  sleeper ploy."
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Duc and other Buddhist monks by stating that she would like to furnish mustard for the monks' barbecue. On June 12, Trueheart told Diem that Quang Duc's suicide had shocked the world and again warned that the United States would break with his government if he did not solve the Buddhist problem. (Pentagon Papers, p. 208.)Lucien Conein, a CIA officer in Saigon,* testified that the Buddhist uprisings were the catalyst that ultimately brought down the Diem regime (Conein, pp. 42-44). These events led the United States to apply "direct, relentless, and tablehammering pressure on Diem such as the United States has seldom before attempted with a sovereign friendly government." (Mecklin, p. 169)By July 4, 1963, Generals Minh, Don, Kim, and Khiem had agreed on the necessity for a coup.**In his final meeting on August 14 with Ambassador Nolting, Diem agreed to make a public statement offering concessions to the Buddhists. This statement took the form of an interview* Conein testified that he had known the Generals involved in the coup"for many years. Some of them I had known back even in World War II. Some of them were in powerful positions, and I was able to talk to them on a person to person basis, not as a government official." (Conein, p. 17.)** Conein's After-Action Report stated that:"The majority of the officers, including General Minh, desired President Diem to have honorable retirement from the political scene in South Vietnam and exile. As to Ngo Dinh Nhu and .Ngo Dinh Can, there was never dissention. The attitude was that their deaths, along with Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, would be welcomed." (Conein After-Action Report, p. 10.)
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with the columnist, Margurite Higgins, in which Diem asserted that his policy toward the Buddhists had always been conciliatory and asked for harmony and support of the government.Shortly after midnight on August 21, 1963, Nhu ordered forces loyal to him to attack pagodas throughout Vietnam, arresting monks and sacking the sacred buildings. Over thirty monks were injured and 1,400 arrested. The American Embassy was taken by surprise and viewed the attacks as a shattering repudiation of Diem's promises to Nolting. (Pentagon Papers, p.210)On August 24, 1963, the State Department sent a cable (Deptel 243) to the new ambassador in Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge. The telegram was prepared by Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman, and was approved by President Kennedy. (Pentagon Papers, p.235) Deptel 243 told Lodge to press Diem to take "prompt dramatic actions" to redress the grievances of the Buddhists."We must at same time also tell key military leaders that US would find it impossible to continue support GVN (Vietnamese Government) militarily and economically unless above steps are taken immediately which we recognize requires removal of the Nhu's from the scene. We wish give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove Nhu's but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem. You may also tell appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism . . . Currently with above, Ambassador and country teams should urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how we might bring Diem's replacement if this should become necessary . . ."[^1] Conein testified that the raids might have been timed to occur when no American Ambassador was in Vietnam (Nolting had left a few days before and his replacement, Lodge, had not yet arrived) (Conein, p.21).[^1]:NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 495
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In a cable on August 25, CIA Chief of Station John Richardson reported the result of a conference among himself, Lodge, True- heart, General Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision from Washington and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions", (I.G., C, pp. 7-8) but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his brother from his position in the government.Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation that the United States contemplated suspending aid to the South Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers, p. 212).* Later on that same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officers Conein and Spera were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh, respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243, but to remind them that "we cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action, win or lose" (SAIG 0304, 8/26/63).A message from the White House on August 29 authorized Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding, but did not involve United States armed forces. Lodge was authorized to suspend United States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272, 8/29/63.) A cable from the President to Lodge on the same day stated:*In a cable to Harriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broadcast had "complicated our already difficult problem" by eliminating "the possibility of the generals' effort achieving surprise." Lodge further warned that "the US must not appear publicly in the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends" (Cable, Lodge to Harriman, 8/26/63).