Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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-iii-(c) QJWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIFLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 72(d) Agent QJWIN Was Asked By Hedgman's Operative WIROGUE to Join an "Execution Squad": December 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 746. The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing About Lumumba's Death in Katanga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79(a) Lumumba's Escape from UN Custody, Capture by Congolese Army, and Imprisonment at Thysville: November 27-December 3, 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79(b) Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Where He Was Killed: January 17, 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 817. The Question of the Level at Which the Assassination Plot Was Authorized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82(a) High-Level Meetings at Which "Getting Rid of Lumumba" is Discussed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84(i) Dillon Testified That the Question of Assassination Was Raised at Pentagon Meeting: Summer 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84(ii) Robert Johnson Testified That He Heard the President Order Lumumba's Assassi-: nation at an NSC Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88.(iii) The President's "Extremely Strong Feelings" Lead the Special Group to Consider Anything That Might Get Rid of Lumumba and Dulles Cables for Lumumba's Removal: August 25-26, 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101(iv) NSC Meeting of September 21, 1960: Dulles Said Lumumba Would Remain a Grave Danger Until "Disposed Of" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106(b) Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials That They Knew of No Presidential Consideration of Assassination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110(c) Richard Bissell Testified That He "Strongly Inferred" That the Assassination Effort Against Lumumba Was Authorized By President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
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DRAFT: OCTOBER 6, 1975Frederick D. BaronTOP SECRETFor Internal CommitteeUse OnlyD. CONGO## 1. IntroductionThe Committee has received solid evidence of a CIA plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. The plot proceeded to the point where lethal substances and instruments specifically intended for use in an assassination were placed in the hands of the CIA Chief of Station in Leopoldville by an Agency scientist.Although these instruments of assassination were never used, a number of questions are presented by the Lumumba case which reflect general issues that run throughout the Committee's assassination inquiry. First, did CIA officers and operatives in the Congo take steps to attempt the assassination of Lumumba?Second, how high in the United States government was the source of authorization for the CIA assassination plot? Finally, was the CIA connected in any way to the events that actually led to the death of Lumumba while in Congolese custody?A thread of historical background is necessary to weave these broad questions together with the documents and testimony received by the Committee.
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-2-In the summer of 1960, there was a great deal of concern at the highest levels in the United States government about the role of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo.* Lumumba, who served briefly as Premier of the newly independent nation, was viewed with alarm by United States foreign policymakers because of what they perceived as his magnetic public appeal and his leanings toward the Soviet Union.Under the leadership of Lumumba and the new President, Joseph Kasavubu, the Congo declared its independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960. In the turbulent month that followed, Lumumba threatened to invite Soviet troops to hasten the withdrawal of Belgian armed forces. The United Nations Security Council requested a Belgian withdrawal and dispatched a neutral force to the Congo to preserve order. In late July, Lumumba visited Washington and received pledges of economic aid from Secretary of State Christian Herter. At the beginning of September, Soviet airplanes, trucks, and technicians were arriving in the province where Lumumba's support was strongest.By mid-September, Lumumba sought protection from the UN guard in Leopoldville after losing a struggle over the leadership of the government with Kasavubu and Joseph Mobutu, Chief of Staff of the Congolese armed forces. In early December, Mobutu's troops captured Lumumba while he was traveling toward his stronghold at* Since the period in which the events under examination occurred, the names of many geographical units and governmental institutions have changed. For instance, the nation formerly known as the Republic of the Congo is now the Republic of Zaire and the present capital city, Kinshasa, was known then as Leopoldville. For the sake of clarity in dealing with many of the documents involved in this section, the names used in this report are those which applied in the early 1960's, contemporaneously with the events under consideration.
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-3-Stanleyville, and he was imprisoned. The central government of the Congo transferred Lumumba on January 17, 1961 to the custody of authorities in the province of Katanga, which was asserting its own independence at that time. Several weeks later, the Katangese authorities announced Lumumba's death.There are various accounts of the circumstances and timing of Lumumba's death. The United Nations investigation of the incident concluded that Lumumba was killed on January 17.[^1]2. Dulles Cables Leopoldville That "Removal" of Lumumba is an Urgent Objective in "High Quarters"Shortly after the Congolese declaration of independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960, the CIA assigned a new Chief of Station to the Congo. The Chief of Station said that the briefings he received at CIA headquarters in preparation for his departure contained no discussion of the possibility of assassinating Patrice Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 8). On his brief return to headquarters in connection with Lumumba's visit to Washington in late July, the Chief of Station again heard no discussion of assassinating Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 9).During August, great concern about Lumumba's political strength in the Congo was growing among the foreign policy-makers of the Eisenhower Administration.[^2] This concern was nurtured[^1]: Report of the Commission of Investigation, 11/61, UN Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for October, November, and December.[^2]: See Section 5, infra, for full discussion of the prevailing anti-Lumumba attitude in the United States government as shown by minutes of the National Security Council and Special Group and the testimony of high Administration officials.
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by intelligence reports such as that cabled to CIA headquarters by the new Chief of Station:EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT. MANY FORCES AT WORK HERE: SOVIETS COMMUNIST PARTY, ETC. ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT DETERMINE MAJOR INFLUENCING FACTORS TO PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE FOR POWER, DECISIVE PERIOD NOT FAR OFF. WHETHER OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI-WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TAKE ACTION TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA.... (CIA Cable IN 39706, Leopoldville to Director, 8/18/60.)This cable also stated the Chief of Station's operational "OBJECTIVE [OF] REPLACING LUMUMBA WITH PRO WESTERN GROUP" (CIA Cable, 8/18/60).Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the Africa Division of CIA's clandestine services, replied the same day that he was seeking State Department approval for the proposed operation based upon "OUR BELIEF LUMUMBA MUST BE REMOVED IF POSSIBLE" (CIA Cable Out 59741, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 8/18/60). On August 19, Richard Bissell, Director of CIA's covert operations branch, signed a follow-up cable to Leopoldville: "YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PROCEED WITH OPERATION" (CIA Cable OUT 59959, Director to Leopoldville, 8/19/60).Several days later, the Chief of Station reported that a plan to assassinate Lumumba had been proposed to President Kasavubu by Congolese leaders:ANTI-LUMUMBA LEADERS APPROACHED KASAVUBUWITH PLAN ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA ... KASAVUBU REFUSED AGREE SAYING HE RELUCTANT RESORTVIOLENCE AND NO OTHER LEADER SUFFICIENTSTATURE REPLACE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable IN 42761, Leopoldville to Director, 8/24/60.)
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-5-This incident indicates that the CIA was aware that there was some Congolese support for the assassination of Lumumba, but that the moderate President of the Congo still respected Lumumba and refused to consider assassination.On August 25, 1960, Allen Dulles attended a meeting of the Special Group -- the National Security Council subcommittee responsible for the planning of covert operations.* In response to the outline of some CIA plans for political actions against Lumumba, such as arranging a vote of no confidence by the Congolese Parliament, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs reported that the President had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60.)After this discussion, the Special Group finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60.)* This Special Group meeting and the testimony about its significance on the issue of authorization is discussed in detail in Section 5 (iii), infra.
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-6-The next day, Allen Dulles personally signed a cable* to the Leopoldville Chief of Station which stressed the urgency of "removing" Lumumba:IN HIGH QUARTERS** HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL [LUMUMBA] CONTINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PRESTIGE OF THE UN AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE THAT UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION. (CIA Cable, OUT 62966, Director to Leopoldville, 8/26/60.)Dulles cabled that the Chief of Station was to be given "WIDER AUTHORITY" -- along the lines of the previously authorized operation to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group -- "INCLUDING EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). "WE REALIZE THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY PRESENT THEMSELVES TO YOU," the cable continued (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).* Cables issued under the personal signature of the DCI are a relative rarity in CIA communitations and call attention to the importance and sensitivity of the matter discussed.** As discussed in Section 5(c), infra, Richard Bisell testified that Allen Dulles would have used the phrase "higher quarters" to refer to the President (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48).
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-7-Dulles also authorized the expenditure of up to $100,000 "ΤΟCARRY OUT ANY CRASII PROGRAMS ON WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE THE OPPOR-TUNITY TO CONSULT HQS" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). He assured theChief of Station that the message had been "SEEN AND APPROVED ATCOMPETENT LEVEL" in the State Department (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).But the Director of Central Intelligence made a special pointof assuring the Chief of Station that he was authorized to actunilaterally in a case where the United States Ambassador to theCongo would prefer to remain uninformed:TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRETO BE CONSULTED, YOU SHOULD SEEK HIS CON-CURRENCE. IF IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE, НЕDOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACTON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOTPERMIT REFERRAL HERE (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).This mandate raises a question as to whether the DCI was contem-plating a particular form of action against Lumumba which theAmbassador would want to be in a position to "plausibly deny"United States involvement. DDP Richard Bissell testified that hewas "almost certain" that he was informed about the Dulles cableshortly after its transmission and that it was his "belief" thatthe cable was a circumlocutious means of indicating that thePresident wanted Lumumba to be killed (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33,64-65).** See Section 5(c), infra, for additional testimony by Bissell  on the question of authorization for the assassination effort  against Lumumba.
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3. CIA Encourages Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate" Lumumba, Who is Viewed as a "Grave Danger" Even After Being Deposed and Placed in UN Protective CustodyOn September 5, 1960, President Kasavubu dismissed Premier Lumumba from the government despite the strong support for Lumumba that existed in the Congolese Parliament. After losing the ensuing power struggle with Kasavubu and Mobutu, who seized the government by a military coup on September 14, Lumumba sought protection from the United Nations peace-keeping force. The evidence indicates that the ouster of Lumumba from the government did not alleviate the concern about him in the United States government.Rather, the CIA and high Eisenhower Administration officials* continued to view him as a threat, at least until early December when he was captured by Mobutu's troops and imprisoned. During this period, CIA officers in the Congo advised and aided Congolese contacts known to have any intent to kill Lumumba. They also opposed the resumption of the democratic process after the coup -- by reopening the Parliament -- because of the likelihood that this would return Lumumba to power.The day after Lumumba was deposed by Kasavubu, two CIA officers met with a high level Congolese politician who had a close relationship to the Leopoldville Station. The Station reported to CIA headquarters that the politician had made a response* A detailed treatment of the expressions of continued concern over Lumumba at the National Security Council level is set forth in Section _____, infra.
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-9-to a remark by the Chief of Station that implied that he mightassassinate Lumumba:TO COS COMMENT THAT LUMUMBA IN OPPOSITION ISALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN OFFICE, [THECONGOLESE POLITICIAN] INDICATED UNDERSTOODAND IMPLIED MIGHT PHYSICALLY ELIMINATELUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, IN 49679, Leopoldvilleto Director, 9/7/60.)The cable continued to report that the Chief of Station had offeredto assist this politician "IN PREPARATION NEW GOVERNMENT PROGRAM"and assured him that the United States would supply technicians(CIA Cable, 9/7/60).As the chaotic struggle for power raged, the Chief ofthe Africa Division succinctly summarized the prevalent U. S.apprehension about Lumumba's ability to influence events in theCongo by virtue of personality, irrespective of his officialposition:LUMUMBA TALENTS AND DYNAMISM APPEAR OVER-RIDING FACTOR IN REESTABLISHING HIS POSITIONEACH TIME IT SEEMS HALF LOST. IN OTHER WORDSEACH TIME LUMUMBA HAS OPPORTUNITY HAVE LASTWORD HE CAN SWAY EVENTS TO HIS ADVANTAGE.(CIA Cable, OUT 69233, Director to Leopoldville,9/13/60).The day after Mobutu's coup, the Chief of Station reportedthat he was serving as an advisor to a Congolese effort to "elimi-nate" Lumumba due to his "fear" that Lumumba might, in fact, havebeen strengthened by placing himself in UN custody, which affordeda safe base of operations:
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-10-STILL DIFFICULT DETERMINE WHETHER MOBUTU HASSUFFICIENT CONTROL ARMY TO ENFORCE DECISIONSANNOUNCED NIGHT 14 SEPTEMBER. STATION ADVISED[TWO MODERATE CONGOLESE POLITICIANS] TRY WORKWITH [KEY CONGOLESE CONTACT] IN EFFORT ELIMI-NATE LUMUMBA. FEAR UN PROTECTION WILL GIVELUMUMBA OPPORTUNITY ORGANIZE COUNTER ATTACK.ONLY SOLUTION IS REMOVE HIM FROM SCENE SOONEST.(CIA Cable, IN 13374, Leopoldville to Director,9/15/60.)On September 17, another CIA operative in the Congo metwith a leading Congolese senator. At this meeting, the senatorrequested a clandestine supply of small arms to equip someCongolese Army troops. The cable to CIA headquarters concerningthe meeting reported:[CONGOLESE SENATOR] REQUESTED CLANDESTINESUPPLY SMALL ARMS TO EQUIP ... TROOPSRECENTLY ARRIVED LEOP[OLDVILLE] AREA...[THE SENATOR] SAYS THIS WOULD PROVIDE COREARMED MEN WILLING AND ABLE TAKE DIRECTACTION...[SENATOR] RELUCTANTLY AGREESLUMUMBA MUST GO PERMANENTLY. DISTRUSTS[ANOTHER CONGOLESE LEADER] BUT WILLING MAKEPEACE WITH HIM FOR PURPOSES ELIMINATIONLUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, IN 14228, Leopoldvilleto Director, 9/17/60.)The CIA operative told the Congolese senator that "HE WOULD EXPLOREPOSSIBILITY OBTAINING ARMS" and recommended to CIA headquartersthat they shouldHAVE [ARMS] SUPPLIES READY TO GO ATNEAREST BASE PENDING [UNITED STATES]DECISION THAT SUPPLY WARRANTED AND NECES-SARY (CIA Cable, 9/17/60.)*[^1] This recommendation proved to be in line with large scaleplanning at CIA headquarters for clandestine paramilitary supportto anti-Lumumba elements. On October 6, 1960, Richard Bissell andBronson Tweedy signed a cable concerning plans which the Chief ofStation was instructed not to discuss with State Department repre-sentatives or operational contacts:(footnote continued on next page)[^1]: This recommendation proved to be in line with large scaleplanning at CIA headquarters for clandestine paramilitary supportto anti-Lumumba elements. On October 6, 1960, Richard Bissell andBronson Tweedy signed a cable concerning plans which the Chief ofStation was instructed not to discuss with State Department repre-sentatives or operational contacts:(footnote continued on next page)
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-11-Several days later, while warning a key Congolese leader about coup plots led by Lumumba and two of his supporters, the Chief of StationURGED ARREST OR OTHER MORE PERMANENT DISPOSALOF LUMUMBA, GIZENGA, AND MULELE (CIA Cable,IN 15643, Leopoldville to Director, 9/20/61).Gizenga and Mulele were Lumumba's lieutenants who were leading his supporters while Lumumba was in UN custody.(Footnote continued from previous page)[IN]VIEW UNCERTAIN OUTCOME CURRENT DEVELOP-MENTS [CIA] CONDUCTING CONTINGENCY PLANNINGFOR CONGO AT REQUEST POLICY ECHELONS. THISPLANNING DESIGNED TO PREPARE FOR SITUATIONIN WAY [UNITED STATES] WOULD PROVIDE CLAN-DESTINE SUPPORT TO ELEMENTS IN ARMEDOPPOSITION TO LUMUMBA.CONTEMPLATED ACTION INCLUDES PROVISION ARMS,SUPPLIES AND PERHAPS SOME TRAINING TO ANTI-LUMUMBA RESISTANCE GROUPS.(CIA Cable OUT 04697, Director to Leopoldville,10/6/60.)
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-12-Throughout the fall of 1960, the CIA continued to view Lumumba as a serious political threat while he remained in UN protective custody.* One concern was that if the Parliament which had been closed by the coup -- were re-opened and the moderates* Both Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the CIA Africa Division, confirmed that the CIA continued to view Lumumba as a threat even after he placed himself in UN custody (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. ; Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. ). Both Bissell and Tweedy referred to two factors to substantiate this view: first, Lumumba was a spellbinding orator with the ability to stir masses of people to action; and second, the UN forces did not restrain Lumumba's freedom of movement and the Congolese army surrounding them were often lax in maintaining their vigil.[Quote/Cite from transcripts.]
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-13-failed to obtain a majority vote, the "PRESSURES FOR [LUMUMBA'S]RETURN WILL BE ALMOST IRRESISTABLE" (CIA Cable, IN 33499,Leopoldville to Director, 10/26/60).*   Another general concern at CIA headquarters was that foreign powers would intervene in the Congo and bring Lumumba to power (CIA Cable, OUT 81720, Director to Leopoldville, 10/17/60). Similarly, throughout this period Lumumba was viewed by CIA officials and the Eisenhower Adminis- tration** as a stalking horse for "what appeared to be a Soviet.effort to take over the Congo" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 10, 45).During this period, the Leopoldville station continued to maintain close operational relationships with, and offer aid to, Congolese contacts who expressed a desire to assassinate Lumumba*** although there is no direct evidence that aid was provided for the specific purpose of assassination.* A CIA Cable (IN 37289) from Leopoldville to the Director on November 3, 1960 returns to this theme: the opening of the Congolese Parliament by the United Nations is opposed because it "WOULD PROBABLY RETURN LUMUMBA TO POWER."** See Section _ infra, on such analysis at high-level policy meetings.*** A Congolese security officer in liaison with the CIA on an attempt to tap Lumumba's phones "IMPLIED HE TRYING HAVE [LUMUMBA] KILLED BUT ADDED THIS MOST DIFFICULT AS JOB WOULD HAVE BE DONE BY AFRICAN WITH NO APPARENT INVOLVEMENT WHITE MAN. (CIA Cable, IN 34867, Leopoldville to Director, 10/28/60.)
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## 4. The Plot to Assassinate LumumbaIn the fall of 1960, a scientist from CIA headquarters delivered to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville lethal bio- logical substances to be used to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. The Chief of Station testified that after requesting and receiving confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to carry out the scientist's instructions, he proceeded to take "exploratory steps" in furtherance of the assassination plot. The Chief of Station testified that in the course of his discussion with the CIA scientist, Sidney Gottlieb, he was informed that President Eisenhower had ordered the assassination mission against Patrice Lumumba. Gottlieb's mission to the Congo was both preceded and followed by general cables urging the "elimination" of Lumumba sent from CIA headquarters in an extraordinarily restricted "Eves Only" channel including two messages under the personal signature of Allen Dulles.The lethal substances were never used by the Chief of Station. But despite the fact that Lumumba had placed himself in the protective custody of the UN peace-keeping force shortly before the poisons were delivered to the Chief of Station, there is no clear evidence that the assassination operation was termi- nated before Lumumba's death. There is, however, no direct evidence of a connection between the CIA assassination plot and the events which actually led to Lumumba's death.** See Section 6, infra, for a discussion of the evidence about the circumstances that led to Lumumba's death in Katanga.