Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 88]
TOP SECRET                                                                         34is an imponderable which runs through all of this, whether itis Lumumba or Castro. And you won't be able in the Castroarea, or particularly in this area, to run it down, becausethe people aren't here anymore. But the person who really madethat decision for the CIA was Allen Dulles.Mr. Dawson. I guess I was asking for your expert opinionon the command and control structure as to what adequate,implicit authorization would have been?Mr. Dillon. I think that Allen Dulles would have beenquite responsive to what he considered implicit authorization,because he felt very strongly that we should not involved thePresident directly in things of this nature. And he wasperfectly willing to take the responsibility personally thatmaybe some of his successors wouldn't have been. And so Ithink that this is a perfectly plausible thing, knowing AllenDulles.Mr. Dawson. And you were aware that that was the way thesystem worked at that time?Mr. Dillon. It was the way he worked; because he had avery strong feeling of protecting the President from gettingtoo closely involved with anything that was unpleasant andof this nature.Mr. Baron. So from your knowledge of Allen Dulles it isconceivable that he would have taken Presidential languagesuch as, get rid of Lumumba, and translate it into anTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 89]
TOP SECRETauthorization for an assassination within the CIA?Mr. Dillon. It is possible. And the same thing with Castro, when that came along the following year. That is perfectly possible.Mr. Baron. Mr. Secretary, I would like to show you a series of minutes from the Special Group and ask you if those refresh your recollection as to the attitude of the US toward the Congo in the summer and fall of 1960. The first, which we will call Exhibit 2, is dated 30 June 1960.(The above referred to document was marked Dillon Exhibit No. 2, for identification.)TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 90]
36# TOP SECRETMr. Baron. And this document refers to the election of Joseph Ileo to the Presidency of the Senate of the Congo, and recounts a report by General Cabell that the US assisted Ileo financially and "may have secured some influence with this potentially useful individual."Did you ever see these minutes at the time they were made?Mr. Dillon. No, I don't think I ever did.Mr. Baron. Do you recall having a report of this meeting from Mr. Merchant who would have been State Department representative at the meeting?Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall. I don't think I would have, because this wouldn't have seemed to me to be important enough to necessarily have been brought to my attention.Mr. Baron. Were you aware that Joseph Ileo was a significant figure in Congo politics?Mr. Dillon. I don't recall him at all now.Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you, to refresh your recollection, that in September of 1960, after Lumumba was taken out of power by Kasavubu and Mobutu, he was replaced as Prime Minister of the Congo by Joseph Ileo.Mr. Dillón. I didn't realize that.Mr. Baron. Do you have any refreshed recollection now of the relationship between the US and Joseph Ileo?Mr. Dillon. No.Mr. Baron. Generally speaking, would you have been# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 91]
TOP SECRET                                                                                         371 notified by Mr. Merchant or Gordon Gray about what transpired2 at a Special Group meeting?3 Mr. Dillon. Not by Gordon Gray. That wasn't his job.4 But it would be by Mr. Merchant if it was considered to be5 something that was of enough importance that it might be6 something that I would have to act on or know about in my7 capacity as Acting Secretary of State, whenever that arose.8 Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the US was supplying9 financial support or other kinds of support to "Moderate"10 polititions within the Congo who would be opponents of Lumumba?11 Mr. Dillon. Not in detail, but certainly the general12 fact that we would be doing that, yes.13 Mr. Baron. Let me show you now minutes from a Special14 Group meeting of 25 August 1960. Which we will marke Exhibit15 3.16 (The above referred to document17 was marked Exhibit No. 3 foridentification.)1819202122232425TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 92]
# TOP SECRETMr. Baron. For the record, these minutes refer to areport by Thomas Parrott, who was the Secretary of the SpecialGroup on CIA activity in relation to the Congo. Mr. Parrottoutlines three CIA operations in the Congo which make use oftrade unions in the Congo and include the prospect that avote of no confidence in Lumumba would be arranged.Following that report by Mr. Parrott there is a paragraphwhich describes the action of the Group as follows: "TheGroup agreed that the action contemplated is very much inorder. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associate hadexpressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for verystraightforward action in this situation, and wondered whetherthe plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this.Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referredto seriously and had every intention of proceeding asvigorously as the situation permits or requires, but addedthat he must necessarily put himself in a position of inter-preting instructions of this kind within the bounds ofnecessity and capability. It was finally agreed thatplanning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out'consideration' of any particular kind of activity whichmight contribute to getting rid of Lumumba."Do you recall receiving a report of that meeting?Mr. Dillon. No, I don't, that particular meeting. Butyou would have to ask Mr. Gray about that. I don't know whothey wearned# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 93]
TOP SECRETthey referred to as his associate, that is the key point. He worked for the President.Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that we have testimony from Thomas Parrott, who took the minutes for this meeting and other Special Group meetings, that when he used the phrase "Mr. Gray's associate or Mr. Gray's friend," he was referring euphemistically to the President.Mr. Dillon. That is what I would moreorless have assumed. But as long as you have that testimony, my assumption is probably correct. And it follows the same way, that Mr. Dulles said he would take any comments referred to seriously. And then he talks about those as instructions and the same thing. And it would seem to be that. And that must refer to the same meeting that your friend Mr. Johnson testified to, which I presume took place before this. They are talking about something that happened before this day, where he had said his associate had expressed strong feelings about the matter, and Mr. Dulles said he would take the comments referred to seriously.Mr. Baron. So it is your impression that Mr. Dulles had heard comments by the President previous to this meeting?Mr. Dillon. Certainly.Mr. Baron. Comments which called for "very straight- forward action?"Mr. Dillion. Yes, I think that is certainly what thisTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 94]
# TOP SECRETsaid. So I think that whatever records there are of NSCmeetings before that, that they may not have kept such recordsin detail. And that meeting -- if you can find any meetingthat Mr. Johnson took the notes of just prior to that, thatis probably the meeting.Mr. Baron. So you would assume that the language usedby the President, heard by Mr. Johnson, which indicated toMr. Johnson that an assassination was at the least acceptablemeans of getting rid of Lumumba, is probably the languagereferred to here by Mr. Dulles?Mr. Dillon. It would sound so, seems so.Mr. Baron. And would you also assume, from your knowledgeof Special Group meetings and the way the minutes were writtenup, that very straightforward action could be a euphemism forassassination?Mr. Dillon. No, I wouldn't necessarily think that. Itwould just mean strong action to do something to get rid ofLumumba, it could be a revolution, it could be anything. Ithink it comes here that they would not necessarily rule outconsideration of any particular activity. I would think, ifthey were really going to mount something, they probably wouldhave come back to the Group. But they might not have. Andagain, getting back to Mr. Dulles, I do not think he wouldhave gone back to the President and said, now, I have got thecapability to assassinate Lumumba, and I am going to do it# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 95]
# TOP SECRETnext week if I have your permission, sir. He wouldn't havedone that. Because where I particularly remember this, orget the feeling particularly strong, is dating back tosomething that Senator Hart mentioned, the U-2 incident.Allen Dulles' strong desire was to take the whole responsi-bility for that, and resign, and be fired in disgrace,publically, in order to protect the President. But thePresident totally refused to accept any such way of handlingit.Mr. Baron. So that says something not only about thecharacter of Allen Dulles, but the character of the President?Mr. Dillon. Of both, yes.Mr. Baron. That the President would be inerested intaking responsibility for the orders that he had given?Mr. Dillon. Yes. He was very strong that way. And Mr.Dulles was so strong in wanting to protect the President thathe was willing to go out in disgrace, public disgrace afterten years or more of service to the Government, just to pro-tect the President, although there was nothing that he hadresponsibility for, primary responsibility.Mr. Baron. From your knowledge of Special Group meetingsand minutes, it is your reading of this sentence that "itwas finally agreed that planning for the Congo would notnecessarily rule out consideration of any particular kindof activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba"# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 96]
# TOP SECRET421 -- you would read that sentence to indicate that an assassina-2 tion was within the bounds of the kind of activity that might3 be used to get rid of Lumumba?4 Mr. Dillon. Yes, I would.5 Mr. Baron. And you were commenting before that Mr. Dulles6 might be expected by, say, some members of the Special Group,7 to return to the Special Group if an assassination were being8 mounted?9 Mr. Dillon. Not only that, but anything being mounted,10 I mean whatever action to get rid of Lumumba, I think he would11 probably come back and say what we are doing.12 Mr. Baron. But it is also your statement that, due to13 the mode of operating of Allen Dulles, and his character,14 it is quite conceivable that he wouldn't have returned to the15 Special Group with such an operation?16 Mr. Dillon. That might be, although it is more likely17 that what he really said was that he wouldn't return to the18 President.19 Mr. Baron. In order to protect the President?20 Mr. Dillon. In order to protect the President. I think21 he had looked on other officials in the Government as quite22 different from the President, all of the, in other words, as23 expendable, and he probably would be less likely to go and24 do things totally on his own. And his whole idea was to25 protect the President as the public representative of the US# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 97]
# TOP SECRETfrom any bad publicity in connection with this or any othersimilar thing.Mr. Baron. But based on the discussion at this meetingyou would assume that the CIA would have the authority toproceed to mount an assassination effort against Lumumba?Mr. Dillon. No, I said that they would certainly have theauthority to plan. It is a close question whether this wouldbe enough to actually go ahead with it. But certainly the waythis thing worked, as far as I know, they didn't do anythingjust on their own. I think they would have checked back atleast with the senior people in the State Department or theDefense Department.Mr. Dawson. Would they have done that in such a way thatit would be available to appear on the public record at anytime?Mr. Dillon. Maybe not. It might have just been a callfrom the Secretary of State, Mr. Herter, or possibly theSecretary of Defense.Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection --Mr. Dillon. -- and Gordon Gray. I think they would havekept him notified, because he was sort of central in thisthing, they wouldn't do anything without his at least knowingabout it.Mr. Baron. Did you have any independent recollection ofbeing made aware of this Special Group meeting that we have# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 98]
TOP SECRETbeen discussing before you saw the minutes today?Mr. Dillon. No, I did not.Mr. Baron. Let me show you now what we will marke as Exhibit 4, which is minutes of the Special Group of September 8, 1960, and point you toward the passage on the second page that refers to the Congo where Gordon Gray indicates that "there is top level feeling that vigorous action would not be a mistake."(The above referred to document was marked Dillon Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 99]
TOP SECRET45Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recolleciton of being made aware of this meeting?Mr. Dillon. No, I do not.Mr. Baron. Is this consonant with your understanding of the policy at the highest levels of the American Government toward Lumumba at this time?Mr. Dillon. It fits inis with what I understood was the general policy that we were very concerned with.Mr. Baron. Do you recall that at this period of time, in early September, Lumumba had just been deposed, and there was a struggle going on between Lumumba and Kasavubu for power which culminated in a coup on September 14th by Mobutu and on the 13th of September Lumumba entered the protective custody of the United Nations forces in Leopoldville, do you recall that chain of events?Mr. Dillon. No. I knew that at some point there was a change in government. I don't recall the detail of it at this time.Mr. Baron. Are you aware that in early September Soviet planes and Soviet trucks had gone to Stanleyville?Mr. Dillon. If you tell me that is the case, I think it does refresh my memory, because I do know -- I do remember that we were very concerned about that sort of action by the Soviets.Mr. Baron. And were you aware that Stanleyville was theTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 100]
# TOP SECRETstronghold of Lumumba and his supporters?Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall that.Mr. Baron. Dut you do recall that at that point there was concern at higher levels in the State Department over the connection between Lumumba and the Soviets?Mr. Dillon. Yes, very much so.Mr. Baron. Let me show you Exhibit 5, which is "minutes of the National Security Council meeting of September 21, 1960."(The above referred to document was marked Dillon Exhibit No. 5 for identification.)
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 101]
TOP SECRET47Phone (Area 202) 544-6000Mr. Dillon. Yes, I see now that I attended this as Acting Secretary of State, this particular meeting.Mr. Baron. And do you recall the discussion reported in those minutes of affairs in the Congo, that there was the fear of Egyptian influence on the Congo situation on the part of Lumumba, and that there was some pressure being brought to reconcile Kasavutu and Lumumba?Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall any of the details of this meeting. I don't recall the meeting itslef. But it fits right in with the general feeling about the problem, the way you looked at the Congo problems.Mr. Baron. The minutes refer to a visa application for Lumumba. Would that have been in connection with Lumumba's desire to come to the US to be recognized as the legitimate representative of the Congo Government before the United Nations?Mr. Dillon. It would certainly refer to his desire to come to the United Nations to get out of the Congo, where he had been deposed. Whether he cared much whether we recognized him as the legitimate representative or not I would doubt. I don't think he had much interest in what we recognized. But I think it does show that he wanted to get out. And this was a way of getting out. And he also probably wanted to go to the UN and make a big complaint there.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 102]
# TOP SECRETMr. Baron. The last paragraph of those minutes quoteMr. Dulles as saying: "The Soviet ships off the African Coast were apparently awaiting a clarification of the situation."Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment, but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of."Did Mr. Dulles make those remarks?Mr. Dillon. I don't recall those particular remarks. But he could have. But again, there my own interpretation, "disposed of" wouldn't necessarily only be assassinated, it would be gotten out of the Congo to some place where he was neutralized and couldn't come back in, and you could be sure he was done with.Mr. Baron. But assassination would have been one of the means of disposing of Lumumba, that would have been acceptable?Mr. Dillon. I guess the word "disposed" could mean that. But that strikes me as rather surprising, because I would think once he was out of office, our concern would have been deescalated to some extent, it would have been more to find some way, which should have been perfectly possible, of getting him out, or locking him up, or anything.Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that the report of the United Nations investigation of the circumstances surrounding Lumumba's death, which was not reported until February of 1961, indicated that at this time, in late# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 103]
# TOP SECRETSeptember of 1960, Lumumba was in the custody of the United Nations troops, who were actually protecting him at his residence in Leopoldville, not restraining him from leaving, but there was a Congolese guard surrounding the UN troops who were prepared to arrest Lumumba if he did leave his residence.Mr. Dillon. I think I recall that now, because it is rather unusual circumstances.Mr. Baron. And then apparently in the middle of October the UN had refused to surrender Lumumba to the Congolese Army, who had come with an arrest warrant for Lumumba. Is it your understanding that during this period of time, even after Lumumba was in the protective custody of the United Nations, he was still considered a potential threat and volatile force in the Congo by the US?Mr. Dillon. I would imagine so. And I would not be at all surprised if the then rulers or officials of the Congolese Government that succeeded Lumumba were concerned about it, because he had this tremendous ability to stir up a crowd or a group. And if he could have gotten out and started to talk to the battalion of the Congolese Army, he probably would have had them in the palm of his hand in five minutes.Mr. Baron. We had testimony from a CIA officer, who said he had been dispatched to the Congo by CIA Headquarters for the purpose of trying to secure Lumumba's escape from UN# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 104]
# TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-600050custody, and place him in the hands of the Congolese Army, where the CIA officer's expectation was that Lumumba would receive a trial, and probably capital punishment at the hands of the Congolese Army. Does this mission of the CIA officer seem to conform to your own idea of US policy at that time toward Lumumba?Mr. Dillon. Yes, I think very much so.Mr. Baron. Now, we also have testimony that the CIA Chief of Station in the Congo was visited by a representative from CIA Headquarters who supplied him with lethal biological agents and the equipment with which to administer these substances for the purpose of assassinating Lumumba, and that he, the Chief of Station, was charged with such a mission, which obviously he never carried out successfully. Have you ever heard any mention or even a hint of such an operation?Mr. Dillon. No, I never have.Mr. Baron. Would such an operation seem consonant with the kinds of discussions that had been recounted in those Special Group meetings?Mr. Dillon. Well, to the extent particularly that one document you have showed me --Mr. Baron. The August 23rd meeting?Mr. Dillon. Yes -- if assassination is a real possibility as that indicates, this would be a way to do it. But I never heard of it at the time, and I didn't realize that there wasWARD & PAUL410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003NW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 105# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 105]
TOP SECRET                                                                                                                    51Phone (Area 202) 544-60001 any such capacity for the use of biological things. I read2 about that and heard about it in the Rockefeller Commission3 with Castro, but not about this.4 Mr. Dawson. Would you expect to be told about the5 operational detail?6 Mr. Dillon. Not in detail. But I am rather surprised7 that it went this far and in my position I didn't know some-8 thing about it. It may be that they felt that it was so tight9 that there was no need to tell anyone except the Secretary of10 State. I assume Secretary Herter would have known about it.11 Mr. Baron. Would it be possible that the CIA would feel12 that the "plausible deniability" would have covered someoneWARD & PAUL13 in your position?14 Mr. Dillon. It could have, if they felt that they had a15 clearcut --16 Mr. Baron. -- mandate to proceed with an assassination17 operation?18 Mr. Dillon. It is possible. That is just supposition,19 but it is possible. It may not really have been Mr. Dulles'410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 2000320 decision.21 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any connection between the22 CIA and the actual death of Patrice Lumumba?23 Mr. Dillon. No.24 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any CIA sponsorship for the25 coup which brought Mobutu into firm control of the GovernmentNW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 106                                                                                              TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 106]
TOP SECRETin mid-September of 1960?Mr. Dillon. No, I was not aware of that.Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any CIA plan to snatchLumumba from UN protective custody and place him in the handsof the Congolese Army?Mr. Dillon. No, I wasn't aware of that.Mr. Dawson. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Baron has asked a lot ofquestions about some of the factual parts of this. And Iwould like to follow up on some of your statements aboutDirector Dulles' willingness to protect the President. Ithink you made a very interesting and forthright observation,that he was very interested in keeping the President protectedfrom things which may cause embarassment to him.Mr. Dillon. Not personally, but that he though wouldcause great embarrassment to the nation as well as to justthe Presidency, whereas if it was some individual, it is justbecause it is the terrible Mr. Dulles and the terrible CIA,it is not the nation. And the President is the nation. Sothat it was a fairly deep feeling which went beyond sonalpersonality institutionally to the Presidency, which shouldnot be involved in this sort of thing.Mr. Dawson. Did you investigate what may have been thebasis for your feeling, which is your current feeling, thatthat was his way of operation?Mr. Dillon. I think that it was primarily -- I had knownTOP SECRET