Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 70]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:Richardson, JohnWeede, GeneralCIA Station SiagonDATES:11 Sept 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: In a September 11, 1963 CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG0797) Richardson reported that the country team attempted to agree on a six page summary cable to answer a cable from the department requesting views. The team was unable to agree even on the first three pages of the summary. Weed and Richardson dissented on the basis of the draft summary was too sweeping and too negative including definitively about the country on an inadequate basis of data. He said: "in some ways we seem to have reached the point in the official American community, where if you think we can win with the present government, you are simply not running in the right direction with the majority."SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 20STAFF:DawsonFILE:DATE:6/27/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:McConeColbyRuskBundyLodgeNhuDATES:11 Sept 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: In a September 11, 1963 meeting of the National Security Council Executive Committee meeting on Vietnam, the record taken by Colby (with McCone also being present for the CIA) the following appears: "Rusk said he believed that we were not likely to achieve an independent Vietnam unless we could eliminte Nhu. At the same time he was not willing to say that Diem should go, he saw no alternative. Rusk commented that we should work with Lodge on Diem to take over the real leadership and become the real President. McCone suggested also the desirability of negotiating with Diem. Bundy read off a CIA suggestion for a process of negotiating with Nhu."SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA), p.STAFF:DawsonFILE:DATE:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 71]
# PERSONS/ENTITIES:Lodge, Ambassador Henry Cabot# DATES:11 Sept 1963# CATEGORIES:DIEM# OCCURRENCE:In a state telegram from Saigon (SAIG478) Lodge provided the following reflection on the situation: "My best estimate of the current situation in Vietnam is (a) that it is worsening rapidly; (b) the time has arrived for the U. S. to use what effective sanctions it has to bring about the fall of the existing government and the installation of another; and (c) that intensive study should be given by the best brains of the government to all the details, procedures and variants in conncection with suspension of aid."# SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 21# STAFF:Dawson# FILE:# DATE:6/27/75# PERSONS/ENTITIES:McConeHillsmanColoyTungKennedy, John F.Di.emMcNamarraLodge# DATES:1.  1 Sept 63# CATEGORIES:DIEM# OCCURRENCE:In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA participants being MeCone and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNamarra pointed out that Lodge has little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCone commented that he believed that we should move cautiosly, that we should talk seriously to Diem and that Lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic view of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McCone also suggested that another approach be made to Nhu to seek his cooperation ina departure. The President asked whether we had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid. (as proposed in a paper prepared by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studies. The President asked DOD and CIA to analyze the Hillsıran paper. He also asked that a telegram be sent to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some real contact with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the PresidesDURE Bould be well informed of any steps taken in this contextTAFFsuch as the instance involving CIA navment to Col Tung last week.
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 72]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:Shellman, HuntingtonTruehart, William, DCNLodge, Henry CabotDon, GeneralOCCURRENCE:In a CIA cable from Saigon on 13 September 1963 (SAIG0890) Hungtington Shellman who visited Saigon reported his views of the situation in Vietnam. He included as part of his report the substance of a discussion with D Truehart: "The Ambassador is considering charging McVey with making the approach to SV military. He mentioned Gen. Don, to attempt to stimulate early coup action with appropriate U.S. assurances. I inquired had Ambassador made such a proposal to Washington and was told this was within Lodge's authority."SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 22FILE:DATES:13 Sept 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMSTAFF:DAWSONDATE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:Halberstan, DavidMcCone, John, DCIOCCURRENCE:On 15 September 1963, Halberstam stated that the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency favors all out support for the present regime but that almost all other members of his staff are embittered over the raids in the pagodas. They also feel their chief close association with Nhu while necessary, has severely damaged intelligence gathering.SOURCE:DATES:15 Sept. 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMSTAFF:Dawson
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 73]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:Halberstan, David.McCone, John, DCISaigon StationDATES:15 Sept. 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:On 15 September 1963, Halberstam stated that the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency favors all out support for the present regime but that almost all other members of his staff are embittered over the raids in the pagodas. They also feel their chief close association with Nhu while necessary, has severely damaged intelligence gathering.SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 23FILE:STAFF:DATE: 6/27/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:Richardson, JohnDiemDATES:16 Sept 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG0922) of 16 September 1963 Richardson replied to Washington's requestfor his judgment on the desirability and feasibility of certain ideas, as Washington was then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. He cabled: "We must go on trying to win the war with current administration for as long as it persists in power (we should not attempt publicly to achieve objectives with respect to GVN with probability of attainment is virtually nil) we cannot covertly tinker with or engineer coup unless general situation is reasonably perpitious and if we are unable to establish necessary working contact with Vietnamese leaders willing and able to do the job with necessary means. (Agree we should carefully explore and perhaps carefully experiment with graduated measures designed to pressure Diem, within context of persuading him to take steps needed. These measures would be more effeftive if they are limited to practical and acheivable objectives.)"SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24STAFF:Dawson
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 74]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:Richardson, JohnDiemNW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 75DATES:16 Sept 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG0922) of 16 September 1963 Richardson replied to Washington's requestfor his judgment on the desirability and feasibility of certain ideas, as Washington was then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. He cabled: "We must go on trying to win the war with current administration for as long as it persists in power (we should not attempt publicly to achieve objectives with respect to GVN with probability of attainment is virtually nil) we cannot covertly tinker with or engineer coup unless general situation is reasonably perpitious and if we are unable to establish necessary working contact with Vietnamese leaders willing and able to do the job with necessary means. (Agree we should carefully explore and perhaps carefully experiment with graduated measures designed to pressure Diem, within context of persuading him to take steps needed. These measures would be more effeftive if they are limited to practical and acheivable objectives.)"SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24FILE:STAFF:DawsonDATE:6/27/7PERSONS/ENTITIES:Smith, David R.CIA Acting Chief after 5 Oct 1963Richardson, JohnLodgeDunn, MikeOCCURRENCE:In a memoranda for the record prepared by Helms on September 17, 1963, he reported "Smith (discuss with me) reports that Lodge wanted to get rid of Mr. John Richardson (Mike Dunn) had told Conein that Lodge was 'to get rid of Richardson'. (On one occasion Dunn asked Conein, 'do you think that Dave Smith can run the stations for a temporary period while a new station chief is being sent out here?' "SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24FILE:STAFF:DawsonDATE:6/27/75DATES:Sept 17, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEM
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 75]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:Smith, David R.CIA Acting Chief after 5 Oct 1963Richardson, John LodgeDunn, Mike Saigon StationDATES:Sept 17, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:In a memoranda for the record prepared by Helms on September 17, 1963, he reported "Smith (discuss with me) reports that Lodge wanted to get rid of Mr. John Richardson (Mike Dunn) had told Conein that Lodge was 'to get rid of Richardson'. (On one occasion Dunn asked Conein, 'do you think that Dave Smith can run the stations for a temporary period while a new station chief is being sent out here?'"SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24FILE:STAFF:DawsonDATE:6/27/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:Lansdale, Major General Rusk, DeanMcCone, JohnLodge, Henry CabotRichardson, JohnDATES:Sept 19, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEM![TOP SECRET]OCCURRENCE:In a personal letter from McCone to Lodge it was stated that: "I was told by Dean Rusk that you proposed that Gen. Lansdale (replace Richardson as Chief of Station). I wish to emphasize the agency will reorient the Saigon station any practical way to meet your desires. Personnel, including the station chief can be replaced ... Lansdale would not be acceptable to the organization or to me personally... if the decision is to abandon all hope of working with the regime then Richardson probably should be replaced .... We have no current intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which could lead us to conclude that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a replacement regime which would be better. This is not however to say that a coup may occur even before you receive this letter....."SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25STAFF:Dawson
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 76]
# PERSONS/ENTITIES:Lodge, Henry CabotKennedy, John F.# DATES:Sept. 19, 1963# CATEGORIES:DIEMOn September 19, 1963 in a state telegram from Saigon (544) Lodge stated to the President that "I agree that no good opportunity for action to remove the prosent government in the immediate future is apparent and that we should, therefore, do whatever we can as an interim measure pending such eventuality. Frankly, I see no opportunity at all for substantative changes."# SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24-25# STAFF:Dawson# DATE:6/25/75# PERSONS/ENTITIES:Lansdale, Major General Rusk, DeanMcCone, John Saigon StationLodge, Henry CabotRichardson, John# DATES:Sept 19, 1963# CATEGORIES:DIEMIn a personal letter from McCone to Lodge it was stated that: "I was told by Dean Rusk that you proposed that Gen. Lansdale (replace Richardson as Chief of Station). I wish to emphasize the agency will reorient the Saigon station any practical way to meet your desires. Personnel, including the station chief can be replaced ... Lansdale would not be acceptable to the organization or to me personally... if the decision is to abandon all hope of working with the regime then Richardson probably should be replaced.... We have no current intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which could lead us to conclude that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a replacement regime which would be better. This is not however to say that a coup may occur even before you receive this letter....."# SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25# STAFF:Dawson
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 77]
# PERSONS/ENTITIES:McConeCIA Subcommittee on House Armed Services# DATES:Sept. 23, 1963# CATEGORIES:DIEM# OCCURRENCE:On September 23, 1963, the McCone briefed the CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services. He told them that the agency was urging a slow cautious approach to the problem of ousting the Diem regime and that there appeared to be no replacement for the then current regime that was capable of running the government.# SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25# STAFF:Dawson# FILE:# DATE:6/25/75---# PERSONS/ENTITIES:NHUDINHCOLONEL TUNGCONEIN# DATES:October 1963# CATEGORIES:DIEM# OCCURRENCE:DINH's desire to become a Minister was greater than his allegiance to President DIEM. He became the actual key to the success of the coup. His facile, and at times brilliant mind, was used to the general's advantage in that GENERAL DINH convinced President DIEM that he, General DINH, along with COLONEL TUNG, should be given blanket orders to be a counter-coup force. "DINH also convinced TUNG to move four of his principal airborne companies on a bootless operation outside of Saigon on 29 and 30 October, so that these troops would not be present on 1 November. DINH is the Minister of Security in the provisional government. p. 13> [Image: top secret stamp]# SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, Conein# STAFF:R. DAWSON# DATE:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 78]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINDATES:October 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that he looked upon his job as conveying orders from his am-bassador to the people that were planning the coup and to monitor those people who wereplanning the coup, and to get as much information so that our government would not be caughtwith their pants down. He did agree not to thwart the coup and in fact, to supply economicand military assistance if the coup succeeded, but did not conceive his objective the en-couragement or the promotion of the coup, nor did he ever discuss the possibility of dis-couraging the coup. CONEIN stated that if the United States had now shown any interest orremained neutral in opposing DIEM, there would have been a coup anyway. pp. 38-41![Image of TOP SECRET stamp]SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinFILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:July 1, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:DINHMINHDONCOLONEL CO, Dinh's DeputyDATES:Early October1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: When the ministerial post for DINH did not materialize by early October, thecoup principals realized that they had DINH actively thinking against the regime. It isevident from statements during the series of meetings with GENERAL DON and GENERAL MINH dur-ing the month of October that they still did not trust DINH, but felt they had compromisedhim sufficiently with his troops, and, if necessary to eliminate DINH if he showed any signof compromising the generals. DINH was surrounded by officers who surveilled him 24 hours aday including CO, his deputy. p. 13![Image of TOP SECRET stamp]SOURCE:STAFF:R. DAWSON
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 79]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINCOLBY, WILLIAMDATES:October, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that "The CIA officer (CONEIN) received a call on October 30 (1963) to come over and join the general staff and come to the meeting and essentially sat with them as they continued the operation from thereon. They didn't move to the decision to run the coup and he sat in the headquarters during most of the time. He went home at one point, etc."![TOP SECRET stamp]SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 11-12STAFF: R. DAWSONDATE: 29 June 1975FILE:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 80]
# PERSONS/ENTITIES:ConeinGen. DonGen. Duong Van MinhGen. Ton That DinhNgo Dinh Nhu# DATES:Oct. 2, 1963# CATEGORIES:DIEM# OCCURRENCE:Conein/General Don meeting at Nha Trang with the following significant points: (a) General Duong Van Minh desired a private conversation with Conein; (b) General Ton That Dinh (Commanding General, III Corps) realized he had been duped by Diem Government during his tenure as Military Governor of Saigon between 21 August and 26 September 1963; (c) Generals, during the month of September 1963, submitted a request to President Diem to accord them positions in different ministries which they did not expect Diem to honor; (d) Don stated thatSOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One. p. 4FILE:CONTINUED ON NEXT CARDSTAFF: DawsonDATE: 6/30/75# PERSONS/ENTITIES:# DATES:# CATEGORIES:# OCCURRENCE: CONTINUED FROM LAST CARD:The Generals now have a plan; (e) prior to General Dinh's press conference of 29 August, an unidentified Vietnamese civilian told Counsellor Ngo Dinh Nhu that the Americans were contacting various Vietnamese in order to encourage a coup - Don was called by Nhu and shown a list prepared by Nhu naming Americans engaged in coup plotting; Conein's name was not on the list.SOURCE:STAFF:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 81]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:AMBASSADOR LODGECONEINGEN. DUONG VAN MINHOCCURRENCE:DATES:10/3/63CATEGORIES:DIEMAmbassador Lodge approved Conein's meeting with General Duong Van MinhSOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One, p.4.STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:McNamarraLodgeMcConeRichardsonSmithOCCURRENCE:On October 3, Lodge wrote a personal letter to McCone stating that "I... agree with what I understand McNamarra said to you. The time has come for a new face, but I also think of Richardson as a devoted and a patriotic American..." On October 4, 1963 in a CIA cable from Saigon, (SAIG1397) the following report appeared: "...it is clear that Lodge wants a change in chief of station....departing Saigon 18 - 20 hours...". In a comment in the IG report it is noted that Richardson's departure was based on a headquarters request that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon as possible. Upon Richardson's departure his deputy David R. Smith, became acting chief of station."SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 26STAFF: DawsonDATE:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 82]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGEDept. of StateMCNAMARRATAYLORDATES:5 Oct 1963CATEGORIES:DIEM> [Figure: Image of the words 'TOP SECRET' stamped diagonally across the page.]OCCURRENCE:On 5 October 1963 in a states cable to Saigon (DEPTEL534) it was stated as a fourthinstruction that the Ambassador should continue his policy of "cool correctness"towardGPN.SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA p. 30STAFF:DATE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:McNamarraLodgeMcConeRichardsonSmithDATES:Oct 3 - 4,1963CATEGORIES:DIEM> [Figure: Image of the words 'LIMITED OFFICIAL USE' stamped diagonally across the page.]OCCURRENCE:On October 3, Lodge wrote a personal letter to McCone stating that "I... agree with whatI understand McNamarra said to you. The time has come for a new face, but I also thinkof Richardson as a devoted and a patriotic American..." On October 4, 1963 in a CIAcable from Saigon, (SAIG1397) the following report appeared: "....it is clear thatLodge wants a change in chief of station....departing Saigon 18 - 20 hours...". In acomment in the IG report it is noted that Richardson's departure was based on a head-quarters request that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon as possible. UponRichardson's departure his deputy David R. Smith, became acting chief of station."SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 26STAFF:DawsonDATE:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 83]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGEDept. of StateMCNAMARRATAYLORDATES:5 Oct 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:On 5 October 1963 in a states cable to Saigon (DEPTEL534) it was stated as a fourth instruction that the Ambassador should continue his policy of "cool correctness"toward GPN.SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA p. 30FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:KENNEDY, JOHN F.LODGE, HENRY CABOTWHITEHOUSESTAFF:DATE:DATES:October 5, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:In a White House cable to Saigon (CAP63560) of 5 Oct 1963, the following message appears: "...Presdient today approved recommendation that no initiative should be taken to give any active, covert encouragement to a coup. It should be urgent covert effort with closest security under broad guidance of Ambassador to identify and build contacts with possible alternative leadership as it appears...."SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 30STAFF:Dawson
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 84]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:KENNEDY, JOHN F.LODGE, HENRY CABOTDATES:October 5, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:In a White House cable to Saigon (CAP63560) of 5 Oct 1963, the following message appears:"...Presdient today approved recommendation that no initiative should be taken to give any active, covert encouragement to a coup. It should be urgent covert effort with closest security under broad guidance of Ambassador to identify and build contacts with possible alternative leadership as it appears...."SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 30STAFF:DawsonPERSONS/ENTITIES:Kennedy, John F.Colby, WilliamCommodity Jeport ProgramMcConeDATES:Oct. 5, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:On 5 October there was a Presidential meeting on Vietnam. The only CIA participant was McCone. He provided the following record. The meeting was held to discuss matters that became the subject of DEPTEL 5/34 (See later entry of 5 October.) DCI said it was the opinion of CIA with the exception of Colby, Chief Fareast Division, that fiddling with the commodity import program as a political lever would be much more likely to create an economic crisis undermining the war effort than to scare Diem and Nhu into a more cocperative attitude, because it would seriously affect the confidence and planning of the Vietnamese business community and quickly engender inflationary measures at large of a more serious nature. It was the concensus of the meeting that some meaningful political movements had to be made but exactly what they should be was not determined.SOURCE:TO Report 1967 (CIA) р. 27STAFF:Dawton
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 85]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:SMITH, DAVIDCONEINLOIDGEΜΙΝΗOCCURRENCE:In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG1447) of 5 October 1963, DAVE SMITH, the Acting Chief of Station cabled that he had discussed this latest CONEIN/MINH meeting with Ambassador LODGE and DCN TRUEHART. SMITH reported that he had recomended to Ambassador LODGE that: "we do not set ourselves errovacably against the assassignation plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or protracted struggle which can rip the Army and the country asunder."SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA), p.28FILE:STAFF:DawsonDATE:6/27/75DATES:Oct 5, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEM---PERSONS/ENTITIES:Nhu, Ngo Dinh ConeinCân, Ngo Dinh LodgeDiemMinh, GeneralOCCURRENCE:On October 5, 1963 in a CIA Cable from Saigon (SAIG1445) it was stated that the meeting with Conein (approved by Ambassador in October) General Minh requested a statement of the U.S. Position with respect to a change in the GVN in the near future. He said he did not expect U.S.G. support of a coup effort but did need USG assurances that USG would not try to thwart his plans. He outlined three possible plans for the accomplishment of the change of government: (a) assassinationof Ngo Din Nhu and Ngo Dinh Cin, keeping President Diem in office; (b) encirclement of Saigon by various military units; and (c) direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyalist military units.SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 27-28FILE:STAFF:DawsonDATE:DATES:Oct 5, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEM