Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 276]
This series of cables sent during, and after Gottlieb's visit to the Congo demonstrated a clear intent at CIA headquarters to authorize and support rapid progress on the assassination mission. The cables also show an intent to severely restrict knowledge of the assassination operation among officers in CIA's Africa Division and among United States personnel in the Congo, including those who were aware of and involved in other covert activities.(e) The Chief of Station Moves Forward With Assassination PlotThe testimony of the Chief of Station, taken fifteen years after the events in question and without benefit of review of the cables discussed above, was compatible with the picture derived from the cables of a fully authorized and tightly restricted assassination operation. Hedgman's testimony is at variance from the cables only with respect to the lack of vigor with which he claims to have pursued the assignment which he dealt with in an affirmative, aggressive manner in the cables.(i) The Chief of Station Testified That He Requested and Received Confirmation of the Assassination Plan from HeadquartersHedgman testified that, after receiving Gottlieb's instructions, he cabled CIA headquarters seeking confirmation that he was to carry out Gottlieb's instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 36). Hedgman did not recall whether he identified Gottlieb by name, and he doubted that he "would have" mentioned the President in such a cable (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 36, 43).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 277]
-32-Hedgman described the extraordinary security precautions he took cabling his request for confirmation of the assassination in- structions:There was some special channel ... becauseit was handled differently than any othernormal message. For example, it was not puton a regular cable form, which, you know,you have several copies for your various files.And it was my recollection that I personallycarried the message to the communicator toencrypt, and that was worded in a doublt-talkway that even the communicator would notnecessarily know what it was about."(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 42-43.)This description approximates the PROP channel that was used for all cables relating to the assassination mission.Hedgman testified that soon after cabling his request for con- firmation that he was to carry out the assassination assignment, he received an affirmative reply from headquarters:I believe I received a reply which I interpretedto mean yes, that he was the messenger and hisinstructions were ... duly authorized.(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 37-38.)Despite the cryptic nature of the cables, Hedgman said "I was con- vinced that yes, it was right." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 44, 50.)Hedgman did not recall receiving any indication, either from Gottlieb or by cable, that he was to await further authorization before using the poisons (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 38). Hedgman ex- pressed some uncertainty about whether he "had an absolute free hand" to proceed with an assassination attempt without receiving "final confirmation" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 38, 47, 53).
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-33-Hedgman summarized his testimony on this question in his second appearance:I probably had authority to act on my own but ... it was possible that I had to go back and get clearance for my action. (Hedgman, 8/25/75, p. 11; see also 8/21/75, p. 39.)Hedgman testified, however, that a "policy decision" had been made -- that assassination had been "approved" as "one means" of eliminating Lumumba as a political threat (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52).I thought the policy decision had been made in the White House, not in the Agency, and that the Agency had been selected as the Executive Agent, if you will, to carry out a political decision. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52.)Although Hedgman assumed that the President had not personally selected the means of assassination, he testified that he was under the impression that the President had authorized the CIA to do so and to proceed to take action:Hedgman: ... I doubt that I thought the President had said, you use this system. But my understanding is the President had made a decision that an act should take place, but then put that into the hands of the Agency to carry out his decision.Q: Whatever that act was to be, it was clearly to be assassination or the death of the foreign political leader?Hedgman: Yes.Q: Instigated by the CIA, initiated by the CIA?Hedgman: Certainly if those -- if Dr. Gottlieb's lethal agents were employed, that would have been the result, yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 104.)
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-34-Nonetheless, Hedgman said he had no "desire to carry out these instructions" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 106). Whether or not he felt there was authority to attempt an assassination without seeking final confirmation, he said that he would have checked with headquarters before taking action:I think probably that I would have gone back and advised that I intended to carry out and sought final approval before carrying it out had I been going to do it, had there been a way to do it. I did not see it as ... a matter which could be accomplished practically, certainly. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 51-52.)He proceeded to affirm that his reason for seeking a final approval would have been to receive assurances about the practicality of the specific mode of assassination that he planned to use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 53).(ii) The Chief of Station Took "Exploratory Steps" in Furtherance of the Assassination Plot and Testified That He Destroyed Cable Traffic Related to the PlotHedgman testified that after Gottlieb's visit, he locked the lethal substances in the bottom drawer of his safe, "probably" sealed in an envelope marked "Eyes Only" with his name on it (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 48-49). He said that his secretary was the only other person with access to the safe and that she would not have examined a package marked in this fashion (Iledgman, 8/21/75, p. 49).Hedgman testified that it was "possible" that he pre- served the poisons in his safe until after Lumumba's death; at any
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 280]
-35-rate, they were not disposed of before Lumumba was "successfully neutralized" by being captured and imprisoned by the Congolese government (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 85-86) at the beginning of December, 1960. Hedgman said that he does not recall taking the poisons out of his safe on any occasion other than when he disposed of them on the banks of the Congo River:I think that I took them out probably in a briefcase, or an air bag of some sort, and I believe that the things like the rubber gloves and the mask were thrown away in a bushy area or something where, you know, if they were found, it didn't matter that much. I believe I buried the other matters. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 84.)Hedgman testified, however, that in the intervening months, while the poisons were in his safe, he took "exploratory steps" in furtherance of the assassination plot (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60). He said that he sent several cables to CIA headquarters, after his request for confirmation of the assassination instructions, which "probably reflected further steps I had taken" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 59-60).Hedgman stated that his cables to headquarters on this matter were essentially "progress reports" on his attempts to find a means of access to Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 50). He also said that he "would bet on the fact that there was at least one or two more [cables] back" to him from CIA headquarters in response (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 50).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 281]
-36-The cable traffic conforms to Hedgman's recollection. For two months after Gottlieb's arrival in the Congo, a regular stream of messages flowed between the Leopoldville Chief of Station and headquarters through the PROP channel. In late September and early October the cables concerned the initiation of Hedgman's top priority plan -- recruiting the aid of a particular agent thought to have sufficient access to Lumumba's entourage to be able to poison Lumumba.* In mid-October, Tweedy notified the Chief of Station that the assassination mission remained "HIGHEST PRIORITY", and he suggested sending additional personnel to Leopoldville to in- tensify "CONCENTRATION" on this operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60).**These cables were followed by Hedgman's report to Tweedy on October 17 that the agent he had picked for the assassination mission* CIA Cable IN 18989, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/27/60; CIA Cable IN 20857, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable OUT 75900, Fields to Chief of Station, 9/30/60; CIA Cable IN 24171, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60. See Section ______, *supra*, for full treatment of these cables.** See Section ______, *supra*, for more complete text of this cable.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 282]
-37-HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE.THUS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPSINTEL NEEDED THIS JOB. (CIA CableIN 28936, Chief of Station to Tweedy,'10/17/60.)Hedgman testified that this operative left Leopoldville "sometimein October" which terminated their discussions about gaining accessto Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75,p. 61). The Chief of Station continued to communicate with head-quarters about finding a means to move forward with the assassina-tion operation and securing the necessary manpower to do so.Hedgman confirmed Tweedy's view that although the assassinationoperation was still his highest priority, he was overburdened withresponsibility for other operations so that he could not concentrateon the progress of the assassination mission:ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THISOP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME,VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. (CIA Cable,IN 28936, 10/17/60.)Due to his workload, the Chief of Station responded enthusiasticallyto Tweedy's suggestion of an additional case officer:BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICERHANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA ... IF CASEOFFICER AVAILABLE [CHIEF OF STATION] WOULDDEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTINGAND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS. (CIA CableIN 28936, 10/17/60.)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 283]
-33-The Chief of Station concluded this cable with the following cryptic recommendation, reminiscent of his testimony that he may have "suggested" shooting Lumumba to Gottlieb as an alternative to poisoning (liedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29):IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQSPOUCH SOONEST HIGH POWERED FOREIGN MAKERIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SCOPE AND SILENCER.HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGIIT.HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES NOW FORBIDDEN,WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENINGOF HUNTING SEASON. (CIA Cable IN 28936,10/17/60.)The first sentence of Hedgman's recommendation clearly refers to sending a sniper rifle to the Congo via diplomatic pouch. The rest of the message is probably an oblique reference to the possibility of shooting Lumumba at the "OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON" -- in other words, at the first opportunity to find Lumumba outside the residence where he remained in UN protective custody. This interpretation is bolstered by a report sent the next month by the Chief of Station through the PROP channel for Tweedy's "EYES ALONE." Iledgman's cable described the stalemate which prevailed from mid-September until Lumumba's departure for Stanleyville on November 27; Lumumba was virtually a prisoner in UN custody, but inaccessible to CIA agents and the Congolese:TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BUILDING IN SEVERALWEEKS. HOUSE GUARDED DAY AND NIGHT BYCONGOLESE AND UN TROOP CONGOLESETROOPS ARE THERE TO PREVENT TARGET'SESCAPE AND TO ARREST HIM IF HE ATTEMPTS.UN TROOPS THERE TO PREVENT STORMING OFPALACE BY CONGOLESE. CONCENTRIC RINGSOF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSER-VATION POST IMPOSSIBLE. ATTEMPTING GET
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 284]
COVERAGE OF ANY MOVEMENT INTO OR OUT OFHOUSE BY CONGOLESE... TARGET HAS DISMISSEDMOST OF SERVANTS SO ENTRY THIS MEANS SEEMSREMOTE. (CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief ofStation to Tweedy.)Hedgman testified that all of his cable traffic about theassassination question would have been sent with the sameextraordinarily stringent security precautions -- presumably re-ferring to the PROP channel -- which concerned Gottlieb's visitand the confirmation of authorization for his instructions:I would have sent in a special channelanything dealing with Lumumba, at leastthat would touch upon his removal in oneway or another. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 62.)The Chief of Station also testified that sometime beforeleaving the Station, he destroyed all cable traffic relating tothe assassination mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 89). Hedgman'sbest recollection was that he had received instructions to destroythose cables (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96). Hedgman said he had neverbefore in his tenure as Chief of Station in the Congo destroyedcable traffic because of its sensitivity (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 91).But he stated that the cables relating to assassination weredestroyed because of their extremely sensitive nature.* He said* It is possible that copies of cables dealing with such a  sensitive operation were also destroyed at CIA headquarters.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 285]
-40-that eventuallyI destroyed a great deal of traffic, because the Congo was a highly sensitive area in which -- at one period I recall we had all of our files in the burn barrels. I mean, when you wanted a file, you went over and dug it out of the burn barrell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 91.)At the conclusion of his testimony about the assassination plot, the Chief of Station was asked to give a general characteri- zation of the advisability of the plot and the tenor of the times in which it took place. His response indicated that although he was willing to carry out what he considered a duly authorized order, he was not convinced of the necessity of assassinating Lumumba:I looked upon the Agency as an executive arm of the Presidency.... Therefore, I suppose I thought that it was an order issued in due form from an authorized authority.On the other hand, I looked at it as a kind of operation that I could do without, that I thought that probably the Agency and the U.S. government could get along without. I didn't regard Lumumba as the kind of person who was going to bring on World War III or something.I might have had a somewhat different attitude if I thought that one man could bring on World War III and result in the deaths of millions of people or something, but I didn't see him in that light. I saw him as a danger to the political position of the United States in Africa, but nothing more than that. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 110-111.)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 286]
# -41-## (f) Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the Degree of Support for and Perpetration of the Assassination PlotThere is a great variance between the testimony of Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy and the picture of the assassination plot presented by the Chief of Station and the cable traffic from the period. While the weight of the evidence demonstrates that the assassination effort was the "highest priority" at CIA head- quarters among operations in the Congo, Bissell has no direct recollection of Gottlieb's mission to the Congo and Tweedy can recall nothing more than consideration of the feasibility of an assassination attempt.### (i) Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation To Poison LumumbaAs Chief of the Africa Division, Bronson Tweedy was the principal liaison at CIA headquarters with the Chief of Station in Leopoldville for all instructions, plans, and progress reports concerning the effort to assassinate Lumumba, which were communicated through the special PROP channel. Most of the reports and recommendations cabled to headquarters by the Chief of Station on the assassination operation were marked for Tweedy's "Eyes Only."Tweedy personally signed both the cable which initially informed the Chief of Station that "SID" would arrive in Leopoldville, with an assignment (CIA Cable OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief of
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-42-Station, 9/19/60) and the cable of October 7 indicating that hehad debriefed Gottlieb upon his return from the Congo (CIA CableOUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60). Tweedy was alsothe "Eyes Only" recipient of Hedgman's reports on Gottlieb'sarrival in the Congo (CIA Cable IN 18989, Chief of Station toTweedy, 9/27/60) and the subsequent communications about the planwhich emerged from the discussions between Gottlieb and Hedgmanas the top priority infiltration of an agent into Lumumba's en-tourage to administer a lethal poison to the Congolese leader (CIACable IN 20857, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable,Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60; CIA Cable, Chief of Stationto Tweedy, 10/17/60).Tweedy testified, however, without benefit of reviewing thesecables, that he had no knowledge of the plot to poison Lumumba :?. Do you have any knowledge of a messengerfrom CIA headquarters having to go to the Congoto provide the Chief of Station in the Congowith instructions to carry out the assassinationof Lumumba, if possible, and also provide himwith the tools to carry out such an assassination,namely, poisons and medical equipment for admin-istering them?Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not. (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 30-31)* See Sections 4(a) - 4(e) for full treatment of the cables sent  in the PROP channel between Tweedy and the Chief of Station in  Leopoldville.
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-43-When asked his opinion about the truth of the testimony received by the Committee that poisons were delivered to the Congo by Gottlieb, who carried instructions that they were to be used in the assassination of Lumumba, Tweedy replied:There is nothing in my experience with theAgency which would really bear on thatpoint whatsoever. (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 39-39)Tweedy added that if Gottlieb went to the Congo as a courier, "I will bet I knew it, but I don't recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 35).Tweedy testified that it was "perfectly possible" for lethal bio- logical substances to have been sent to the Congo, "but I don't recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 30).In response to a question about whether he knew about a cable from headquarters informing Hedgman that a messenger was to come to the Congo with instructions for him, Tweedy said that he would be "very surprised if I didn't [know], but I certainly have no recoll- ection of it whatsoever (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 31).Tweedy said that he "was not going to gainsay" the testimony of the Chief of Station that a cable was sent to headquarters through a special channel requesting confirmation that the instructions were to be carried out but he did not recall it (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32-33).Tweedy commented that rather than questioning the truth of the testimony of the Chief of Station,* the discrepancies in their* Tweedy expressed a high regard for the general credibility of the Chief of Station. Tweedy said that he never had occasion to doubt Hedgman's veracity or integrity, adding, "I would trust his memory and I certainly trust his integrity." (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)
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-44-testimony could be attributed to his own lack of recall:I 'really am having trouble with this. I had to be reminded of so many things. . .[T]he things that I recall the most vividly about all my African experiences were. . . the things I was basically concerned with all the time, which was putting this division together and the rest of it. When it comes to operational detail I start fuzzy and you would have thought with something like thinking about Mr. Lumumba in these terms, that I would have gone to bed and got up thinking about Lumumba, I can assure you this wasn't the case. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 34)Tweedy was firm, however, in his disbelief that "Gottlieb would have left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have empowered [him]. . . to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any further recourse or reference to headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32, 36). Tweedy said:In such a matter of this kind, headquarters would have wanted to have a last word up to the last minute. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)(ii) Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating Lumumba and He Cabled Hedgman About Gaining Access to Lumumba For the Purpose of AssassinationDespite Tweedy's lack of recollection about the actual plot to poison Lumumba, he did recall exploring the feasibility of an assassination attempt.Tweedy testified that he had discussed the subject of assassinating Lumumba "more than once" with Richard Bissell in the fall of 1960 (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 14-15). Tweedy stated that he did not know
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 290]
-45-whether Bissell had consulted with any "higher authority" aboutexploring the possibilities for assassinating Lumumba (Tweedy,9/9, p. 28). Generally, Tweedy said, when he received an instruc-tion from Bissell he would proceed to implement it on the assump -tion that it was fully authorized above the level of DDP:> I would proceed with it on the basis that he> was authorized to give me instructions and it> was up to him to bloody well know what he was> empowered to tell me to do. (Tweedy, 9/9, p.13)Tweedy characterized his discussions with Bissell about assass-inating Lumumba as "contingency planning" (Tweedy, 9/9/75, р. 28):> Tweedy. . . I think it came up in the sense that> Dick would have said we probably better be> thinking about whether it might ever be necessary> or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which case> we presumably should be in position to assess> whether we could do it or not successfully.Q. Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?> Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him> in any other sense but a planning exercise, . . .> never were we instructed to do anything of this> kind. We were instructed to ask whether such a> thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of> Station be thinking along those lines as well.> (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 15)Tweedy said that the planning that he undertook pursuant to his con-versation with Bissell included "a few" cables that he rememberssending to the Chief of Station asking himto keep in mind what sort of access one might everhave had to Lumumba. . [in] the eventuality thatwe might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally.(Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 19-21)
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-46-Tweedy did not recall inquiring about gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of abducting him from UN custody (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 24);rather he "supposed" that various means of assassination were being explored:Q. Would this be access to shoot him or would this be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?Tweedy. I suppose all those types of things might have been considered. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 23)Q. In your discussions with Bissell, about the feasibility of an assassination operation, did poisons come up as one means that was being considered and which the Chief of Station should explore?Tweedy. I am sure it must have. After all, there are not many ways of doing it. Shoot a man, poison him, of course you could, I suppose, stab him or something like that. But basically you are talking about a contingency plan which I assume has the best possibility of protecting the involvement of the U.S. Government and if you want to do it in a manner which would be as distant, if that is the right word, as possible, I think poison would then stand high on the list of possibilities.Tweedy did not "recall specifically" the response from the Chief of Station, but said he was "sure" that he received "a serious answer. . . a disciplined reply to an instruction from headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 23,27).Although Tweedy did not recall sending or receiving cables in a special channel concerning the "messenger" to the Congo or confirmation of his instructions, he acknowledged that the cables exploring access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassination would have been