Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 196]
-47-(4) The theory that authority granted, or assumed to be granted, by one director or one administration could be presumed to continue without the necessity for reaffirming the authority with successor officials.(5) The creation of capabilities without careful review and authorization by policymakers, and the risk that such capabilities might be used without further authorization.(a) _The Danger Inherent in Overextending the Doctrine of Plausible Denial_The original concept of plausible denial envisioned implementing covert actions in a manner calculated to conceal American involvement if the actions were exposed. The doctrine was at times a delusion, and at times a snare. It was naive for policymakers to assume that sponsorship of actions as big as the Bay of Pigs invasion could be concealed. The Committee's inquiry into assassination and the public disclosures which preceded it demonstrate that when the United States resorted to cloak and dagger tactics, its hand was ultimately exposed. In addition, the likelihood of reckless action is substantially increased when policymakers believe that their decisions will never be revealed.Whatever can be said in defense of the original purpose of plausible denial--a purpose which intends to conceal U.S. involvement from the outside world--the extension of
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 197]
-48-# TOP SECRETthe doctrine to the internal decision-making process of the Government is absurd. Any theory which, as a matter of doctrine, places elected officials on the periphery of the decision-making process is an invitation to error, an abdication of responsibility, and a perversion of democratic government.## (b) The Dangers of Using "Circumlocution" and "Euphemism"According to Richard Bissell, the extension of plausible denial to internal decisionmaking required the use of cir- cumlocution and euphemism in speaking with Presidents and other senior officials.Explaining this concept only heightens its absurdity. On the one hand, it assumes that senior officials should be shielded from the truth to enable them to deny knowledge if the truth comes out. On the other hand, the concept assumes that senior officials must be told enough, by way of double talk, to grasp the subject. As a consequence, the theory fails to accomplish its objective and only increases the risk of misunderstanding. Subordinate officials should describe their proposals in clear, precise, and brutally frank language; busy superiors are entitled to and should demand no less.Euphemism may actually have been preferred--not becauseNW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 198
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 198]
-49-# TOP SECRETof plausible denial--but because the persons involvedcould not bring themselves to state in plain language whatthey intended to do and may have, in some instances, assumed,rightly or wrongly, that the listening superiors did notwant the issue squarely placed before them. Assassinate,murder and kill are words many people do not want to speakor hear. They describe acts which should not even be pro-posed, let alone plotted. Failing to call dirty businessby its rightful name may have increased the risk of dirtybusiness being done.## (c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions.Permitting specific acts to be taken on the basis ofgeneral approvals of broad strategies (e.g., keep Allendefrom assuming office, get rid of the Castro regime) blursresponsibility and accountability. Worse still, it increasesthe danger that subordinates may take steps which wouldhave been disapproved if the policymakers had been informed.A further danger is that policymakers might intentionallyuse loose general instructions to evade responsibility forembarrassing activities.In either event, we find that the gap between thegeneral policy objectives and the specific actions under-taken to achieve them was far too wide.It is important that policymakers review the manner inNW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 199
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 199]
which their directives are implemented, particularly whenthe activities are sensitive, secret, and immune frompublic scrutiny.(d) The Danger of "Floating Authorization"One justification advanced by Richard Helms and WilliamHarvey for not informing John McCone about the use of under-world figures to assassinate Fidel Castro was their assertionthat the project had already been approved by McCone'spredecessor, Allen Dulles, and that further authorization wasunnecessary, at least until the operation had reached a moreadvanced stage.Similarly, most of the actions taken in the Trujillocase during the early months of the Kennedy Administrationwere authorized by the Special Group on January 12, 1961,at the end of the Eisenhower Administration.The idea that authority might continue from one adminis-tration or director to the next and that there is no dutyto reaffirm authority with successors inhibits responsibledecisionmaking. Circumstances may change or judgments differ.New officials should be given the opportunity to reviewsignificant programs.(e) The Problems Connected with Creating New CovertCapabilitiesThe development of a new capability raises numerousproblems. Having a capability to engage in certain covert
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 200]
TOP SECRET-51-activity increases the probability that it will occur, since the capability represents a tool that is available for use. There is the further danger that authorizing a capability may be misunderstood as authorizing its use without need for obtaining explicit authorization.Of course, an assassination capability should never have been created in the first place.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 201]
Approved byDraftingSubcommittee10/8/75(with possible reservationas to language of statute)V. RECOMMENDATIONSDuring our long investigation of assassination, a number of vital issues came into sharp focus.Above all, stood the question of assassination. Our recommendations on other issues should await the completion of our continuing investigations and our final report. But we need no more information to convince us that a flat ban against assassination should be written into law.We condemn assassination and reject it as an instrument of American policy. Surprisingly, at present there is no statute making it a crime to assassinate a foreign official outside the United States. Hence, for the reasons set forth below, the Committee recommends the prompt enactment of a statute making it a Federal crime to commit or attempt an assassination, or to conspire to do so.A. General agreement that the United States must not engage in assassination. Our view that assassination has no place in America's arsenal is shared by the Administration.President Ford, in the same statement in which he asked this Committee to deal with the assassination issue, stated:I am opposed to political assassination. This administration has not and will not use such means as instruments of national policy. Presidential Press Conference, June 9, 1975, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. II, No. 24, p. 611.The witnesses we examined uniformly condemned assassination. They denounced it as immoral, described it as impractical, and reminded us that an open society, most of all, runs the risk of the assassination of its own leaders. As President Kennedy was reported to have said: "we can't get into that kind of thing, or we would all be targets." (Goodwin 7/18/75, p. 4)The current CIA Director and his two predecessors testified emphatically that assassination should be banned. Thus, Colby said:
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 202]
With respect to assassination, my position is clear. I just think it is wrong. And I have said so and made it very clear to my subordinates. (5/21/75, p. 89)Colby's predecessor, Helms, although himself involved in an earlier plot, said he had concluded assassination should be ruled out for both moral and practical reasons:As a result of my experiences through the years, when I became Director I had made up my mind that this option...of killing foreign leaders, was something that I did not want to happen on my watch. My reasons for this were these:There are not only moral reasons but there are also some other rather practical reasons.It is almost impossible in a democracy to keep anything like that secret... Somebody would go to a Congressman, his Senator, he might go to a newspaper man, whatever the case may be, but it just is not a practical alternative, it seems to me, in our society.Then there is another consideration...if you are going to try by this kind of means to remove a foreign leader, then who is going to take his place running that country, and are you essentially better off as a matter of practice when it is over than you were before? And I can give you I think a very solid example of this which happened in Vietnam when President Diem was eliminated from the scene. We then had a revolving door of prime ministers after that for quite some period of tiem, during which the Vietnamese Government at a time in its history when it should have been strong was nothing but a caretaker government.... In other words, that whole exercise turned out to the disadvantage of the United States....there is no sense in my sitting here with all the experience I have had and not sharing with the Committee my feelings this day. It isn't because I have lost my cool, or because I have lost my guts, it simply is because I don't think it is a viable option in the United States of America these days.Chairman Church. Doesn't it also follow, Mr. Helms -- I agree with what you have said fully -- but doesn't it also follow on the practical side, apart from the moral side, that since these secrets are bound to come out, when they do, they do very grave political damage to the United States in the world at large? I don't know to what extent the Russians
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 203]
- 3 -involved themselves in political assassinations, but under their system they at least have a better prospect of keeping it concealed. Since we do like a free society and since these secrets are going to come out in due course, the revelation will then do serious injury to the good name and reputation of the United States.Would you agree with that?Mr. Helms. Yes, I would..The Chairman. And finally, if we were to reserve to ourselves the prerogative to assassinate foreign leaders, we may invite réciprocal action from foreign governments who assume that if it's our prerogative to do so, it is their prerogative as well, and that is another danger that we at least invite with this kind of action, wouldn't you agree?Mr. Helms. Yes, sir. (6/13/75, pp. 76-78)Similarly, John McCone said he was opposed to assassinations because:I didn't think it was proper from the standpoint of the U.S. Government and the Central Intelligence Agency. (6/6/75, p. 15)B. CIA Directives Banning Assassination. In 1972 and 1973, Helms and then Colby issued internal CIA orders banning assassination. In his order, Helms said:It has recently again been alleged in the press that CIA engages in assassination. As you are well aware, this is not the case, and Agency policy has long been clear on this issue. To underline it, however, I direct that no such activity or operation be undertaken, assisted or suggested by any of our personnel.... (Memorandum, Helms to Deputy Directors; 3/6/72)Colby, in one of a series of orders in August 1973 arising out of the Agency's own review of prior "questionable activity," issued an order which stated:CIA will not engage in assassination nor induce, assist or suggest to others that assassination be employed. (Memorandum, Colby to Deputy Directors, 8/29/73)
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 204]
## C. The need for a statute.Commendable and welcome as they are, these CIA directives are not sufficient. Administrations change, CIA directors change, and someday in the future what was tried in the past may once again become a temptation. Assassination plots did happen. It would be irresponsible for us not to do all that we can do to prevent their happening again. Laws express our society's values; they deter those who might be tempted and stiffen the will of those who want to resist.The statute we recommend, which is printed as an appendix to this report, makes it a criminal offense for persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 1) to conspire, within or outside the United States, to assassinate a foreign official; 2) to attempt to assassinate a foreign official, or 3) to assassinate a foreign official.Present law makes it a crime to kill, or to conspire to kill, a foreign official or foreign official guest while such a person is in the United States. 18 U.S.C. 1116; 18 U.S.C. 1117. However, there is no law which makes it a crime to assassinate, or to conspire or attempt to assassinate, a foreign official while such official is outside the United States. Our proposed statute is thus designed to close this gap in the law.Subsection (a) of the proposed statute would punish conspiracies formed within the United States; subsection (b) punishes conspiracies outside of the United States. Subsection (b) is necessary to eliminate the loophole which would otherwise permit persons to simply leave the United States and conspire abroad. Subsections (c) and (d), respectively, make it an offense to attempt to kill or to kill a foreign official outside the United States.Subsections (a) through (d) specifically apply to any "officer or employee of the United States" to make clear that the statute punishes conduct by U.S.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 205]
- 5 -government personnel, as well as conduct by private citizens having no relation to the U.S. government. In addition, subsection (a), dealing with conspiracies within the United States, applies to "any other person," whether or not a United States citizen. Noncitizens who conspire within the United States to assassinate a foreign official clearly come within the jurisdiction of U.S. law. Subsections (b) through (d), which deal with conduct outside the United States, apply to U.S. citizens, and to officers or employees of the United States, whether or not they are citizens. Criminal liability for conduct outside the United States of persons who are not U.S. citizens or who do not hold a position as a officer or employee of the United States are matters for the law of the place where such conduct takes place.The term "foreign official" is defined in subjection (d) (2). The definition makes it clear that the offense may be committed even though the official belongs to an insurgent force, an unrecognized government, or a non-governmental political party. Our investigation -- as well as the reality of international politics -- has shown that officials in such organizations are potential targets for assassination.*/The offenses are limited to conduct aimed at such persons because of their official duties or status, or their political views, actions, or statements. Thus, for example, a conspiracy to kill or the killing of a foreign official, which is not politically motivated would not be punishable under this statute.The definition of official in section (d) (2) also provides that such person must be an official of a foreign government or movement "with which the United States is not at war or against which the United States Armed Forces have*/For example, Lumumba was not an official of the Congolese government at the time of the plots against his life, and Trujillo, though the dictator, held no official governmental position in the latter period of his regime.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 206]
- 6 -not been introduced into hostilities or situations pursuant to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution." This definition makes it clear that, absent a declaration of war or the introduction of United States Armed Forces pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, the killing of foreign officials is a criminal offense./insert discussion of paramilitary aspect/*****In the course of our hearings, some witnesses, while strongly condemning assassination, asked whether, as a matter of theory, assassination should absolutely be ruled out in a time of truly unusual national emergency. Adolf Hitler was cited as an example. Of course, the cases with which we were concerned were not of that character.[^1] In a grave emergency, the President has a limited power to act, not in violation of the law, but in accord with his own responsibilities under the Constitution to defend the Nation. As the Supreme Court has declared, the Constitution "is not a suicide pact." *Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez*, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).Abraham Lincoln, in an unprecedented emergency, claimed unprecedented power based on the need to preserve the nation:...my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best ofmy ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, byevery indispensable means, that government -- thatnation of which that Constitution was the organic law.Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve theConstitution? By general, law life and limb must be pro-tected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life;but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I feltthat measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might becomelawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation ofthe Constitution, through the preservation of the nation.... The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. X,pp. 65-66 (Nicolay and Hay, Eds. 1894).[^1]: Indeed, in the only situation of true national crisis -- the Cuban missile crisis -- assassination was not even considered.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 207]
- 7-Of course, whatever the extent of the President's own constitutional powers, it is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system that these powers are checked and limited by the Congress, including the Congress' power of impeachment. As a necessary corollary, any action taken by a President pursuant to his limited inherent powers and in apparent conflict with the law must be disclosed to the Congress. Only then may the Congress judge whether the action truly represented, in Lincoln's phrase, an "indispensable necessity" to the life of the Nation.As Lincoln explained in submitting his extraordinary actions to the Congress for ratification: "In full view of his great responsibility he has, so far, done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment, perform yours." (Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861).
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 208]
Appro by DraftingSubcommittee on 9/9/75.EPILOGUEWe do not believe that the acts which we have examined represent the real American character. They do not reflect the ideals which have given the people of this country and of the world hope for a better, fuller, fairer life. We regard the assassination plots as aberrations.We must not adopt the tactics of the enemy. Means are as important as ends. Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints that make men free. But each time we do so, each time the means we use are wrong, our inner strength, the strength which makes us free, is lessened.Despite our distaste for what we have seen, we have great faith in this country. The story is sad, but this country has the strength to hear it and to learn from it. We must remain a people who confront our mistakes and resolve not to repeat them. If we do not, we will decline; but, if we do, our future will be worthy of the best of our past.
[157-10014-10144.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystemIdentification FormDate: 7/7/2015Agency InformationAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10144RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-49Document InformationORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM:TO:TITLE:DATE: 00/00/1976PAGES: 263SUBJECTS: SSCSGO, REPORTDOCUMENT TYPE: REPORTCLASSIFICATION: SecretRESTRICTIONS: ConsultedCURRENT STATUS: WithholdDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 01/05/1999OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS:![page break]v9.1NW 50955 DocId:32423532 Page 1
[157-10014-10144.pdf — page 1]
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONDate : 08/07/95Page : 1AGENCY : SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10144RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-49DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIAFROM :TO :TITLE :DATE : 00/00/76PAGES : 263SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, REPORTDOCUMENT TYPE : REPORTCLASSIFICATION : SECRETRESTRICTIONS : REFERREDCURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULLDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS :[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[157-10014-10144.pdf — page 2]
# SECRET SENSITIVENW 50955 DocId:32423532 Page 3
[157-10014-10144.pdf — page 4]
V. The Disposal of Agency Proprietaries 59a. An Overview 59Entities Dissolved 63Entities Sold 68Entities "Otherwise Disposed Of" 71Description of Disposition of Entities Sold or Otherwise Disposed Of 74b. The Sale of SouthernAir Transport, Inc.: A Case Study In Disposal of a CIA Proprietary ...89-1Background ...89-1The Sale ...89-4Declassification of Relationship With CIA ...89-14Conflict Of Interest ..89-15Conclusion ...89-17VI. Project MHBOUND 90VII. Beyond "Doing Business": Peak Non-Government Security Investments by Proprietaries Active as of December 31, 1974 95VII. MHMUTUAL: The Insurance-Investment Complex 99a. A Brief History 99b. Current Status 106Stock Portfolio Performance Chart 108IX. The Air Proprietaries 113X. Issues Posed, Conclusions, and Recommendations 129
[157-10014-10144.pdf — page 5]
# I. INTRODUCTION AND PHILOSOPHY OF USEQuestions have arisen as to CIA's use of proprietary mechanisms to help carry out the Agency's missions. In particular, concerns have been expressed about the Agency's financial and management control over these entities and about the treatment of funds related to such entities. A careful review of these entities has revealed that CIA's proprietaries are appropriately limited and controlled with careful consideration given to their use within the spirit and letter of the law.Proprietaries fall into two main categories:1. Operating companies that actually do business as would any private firm; and2. Non-operating companies or entities that appear to do business under commercial guise.These entities may be legally constituted as corporations, partnerships, or sole proprietorships; or they may have no such legal standing, i.e., they may be "notional" entities which have bank accounts and backstopped addresses controlled by the Agency. Corporate proprietaries are incorporated in accordance with the statutory provisions of the jurisdiction of incorporation, are subject to the same review as any corporate entity within that jurisdiction, file applicable state and/or federal tax returns, and obtain the necessary licenses to conduct their normal business. The purposes served by them are two-fold: they provide cover, attribution for funding, and administrative assistance to agents