Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 157]
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE4. Mindful of the risks attending such actions, the Joint   Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the proposals of the study and   believe that they offer an option for exerting new pressures   against Castro. They believe that proposals related to the   expansion of US influence over the world sugar market, the   stabilization of the free market, and the covert introduction   of Bunga into Cube, merit serious consideration. Other forms   of attack proposed in the study might be taken subsequently   to exploit resulting economic and political turbulence.5. The study is forwarded herewith with a request that   the concept and actions proposed in the outline program of   the study be coordinated by your committee with other govern-   mental departments and agencies. Upon completion of your   review and coordination, it is further requested that your   comments be made available to the Secretary of Defense and   the Joint Chiefs of Staff.TOP SECRET - SENSITIVECopyLyndon B. Johnson Library(Revised by Decision November 1954)
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 158]
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVEAPPENDIX CArmy Report onSQUARE DANCE (U)(See Attachment to JCS 2304/244,beginning on page 6 of the white attachment)CopyLyndon B. Johnson LibraryTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE6Appendix CNW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 1597TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE5 November 1964TOP SECRETCOPY NO. ____________DISTRIBUTION GNOTE BY THE SECRETARIESto theHOLDERS OF JCS 2304/244-1A Report by the J-5onSQUARE DANCE (U)FIRST CORRIGENDUMAt the request of the originator, holders are requested to substitute the attached revised page 7, and destroy the superseded page in accordance with security regulations.R. C. FORBESJ. E. MANSFIELDJoint SecretariatUNCLASSIFIED Without AttachmentTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE1st Coorig to JCS 2304/244-16TOP SECRETNW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 160
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TOP SECRET - SENSTIVE ix-e-2-h21 July 1975INVENTORIED:ON: 3/31/77BY: BCMEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR STAFFSUBJECT: Inspection of Classified Documents at LBJ Library Related to Covert Actions Against CubaFROM: Loch JohnsonAmong the many documents which I examined at the Johnson Library in Texas this past week is one that I find particularly alarming. I wish to draw it to your attention.The document in question is from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, dated 30 October 1964. The subject is a proposed covert action against Cùba, with the code name SQUARE DANCE.On 21 March 1964, the JCS responded to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba by advising the White House that any new promising courses of action to undermine the Castro regime would be brought to the President's attention. Apparently their first bright new idea was SQUARE DANCE, outlined in the 30 October document (attached). The proposal envisioned the destruction of the Cuban economy by intro- ducing aerially from off-shore a sugar cane plant parasite called Bunga. The program would begin with a 30 per cent reduction of antici- pated Cuban sugar production (see page 6) and within three-to-six years the ruination of the sugar industry would be achieved. "The economic and political disturbances caused by this attack could be exacerbated and exploited," continues the JCS memo, "by such measures as spreading hoof-and-mouth disease among draft animals, controlling rainfall by cloud seeding, mining canefields, burning cane, and direct- ing other acts of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and transportation systems" (6, emphasis added). In sum, SQUARE DANCE "would furnish another option to the United States in bringing about the collapse of the Castro regime" (7).In Appendix A of the SQUARE DANCE proposal, the memo notes that the approval for implementation of the program "would introduce a new dimension into cold war methods and would require a major change in national policy." Indeed it would-or at least one hopes we have not used such methods before! The proposal is nothing less than a variant of germ warfare which would have had serious consequences for the civilian population.At this point we do not know what happened to the SQUARE DANCE concept. It may never have been implemented at all, even partially. (The covering memo written by Bowman, an NSC staffer, to Bundy suggests that the White House was skeptical toward the idea.) To me, though,NW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 161
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the mere writing of this kind of proposal is a reprehensible first step toward the worst kind of foreign policy mischief. I find it even more repugnant than contingency plans for assassination. These are not the kinds of recommendations which should filter up to the White House from the intelligence community. The agencies must have a better sense of what is acceptable policy, legally and morally. As in the Huston Plan, the White House was confronted here with a series of illegal and un- ethical options. The result of SQUARE DANCE would have been parasitic death for the major plant and animal life in Cuba. The feeble efforts of the CIA to direct assassination attempts against Castro pale by comparison with this Army proposal. for covert action.I believe SQUARE DANCE deserves our attention. If assassination is unacceptable, surely too is the widespread destruction of plant and animal life through covert germ warfare. Somehow (probably through hearings and restrictive legislation) the Congress must drive home the point that there are legal and moral limits to American foreign policy. These limits may not be easy to define, but we must try.Note: On the third page of the second attachment (a "Memorandum for Discussion of Covert Program Against Cuba" written by Bundy) reference is made to "possible addition of contaminating elements to sensitive Cuban imports (not food)." The cover memo from Gordon Chase (NSC staffer) indicates that this proposal received Presidential backing.
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 162]
# ASSASSINATION ALLEGATIONS: CastroNewspaper accounts report that prior to the April 17, 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA either directly or through Robert Maheu inlisted the aid of Sam Giancana and Johnny Roselli in organizing assassination attempts against Castro. The first attempt on Castro's life was on or about 3/13/61. The first attempt used poison and it was hoped that with Castro dead, the invasion planned and executed 3/17/61 would have a greater chance for success. There were five more attempts made on Castro's life after 3/17/61. The last was in late February or early March of 1963.Allegations (from Newspaper sources):1) The CIA either directly or through Robert Maheu enlisted Sam Giancana who enlisted Johnny Roselli to organize an assassination team directed at Fidel Castro.2) Johnny Roselli headed several missions against Castro from late March or April 1961 / late February or March 1963.3) That RFK learned of this CIA-Mafia plan and aborted it.4) Roselli received poison capsules from the CIA which he gave to Cubans assigned the task of poisoning Castro
[157-10014-10178.pdf — page 163]
(2)[4, con't.]before the Bay of Pigs. One of the Cubans was related to one of Castro's cooks.5) The assassination was intended to take place before invasion the planned Bay of Pigs/in order to insure that CIA operation's success.6) The CIA has extended services to Giancana which included a break-in of Comedian Dan Rowan's Las Vegas apartment.7) Roselli worked under the direct supervision of CIA agents William Harvey and James O'Connell.8) Individuals allegedly involved directly or indirectly with Cuban Refugees:1. Roselli2. Maheu3. Hunt4. Liddy5. Giancana6. James O'Connel7. William HarveyQuestions:1) Who was COS of JMV wave in Miami from 1960-1963?2) Was there any positive effort among Cuban nationals to determine if there were any Castro intelligence agent information?
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(3)3) Did any contacts or agents within the Cuban refugees ever speak of or sequest an attempt to be made on Castro's life? If so, how was the situation handled?4) In preparation for the Bay of Pigs was the assassination or neutralization of Castro seen as a desirable and positive step towards the success of the invasion?5) Were any private raids against Cuba conducted by Cuban nationals?6) Was the CIA aware passively or were such matters made known to the agency by the Cuban nationals in advance?7) Did the CIA clear such actions?8) Was the CIA aware of Roselli's actions?9) Did the CIA through whatever means enlist the aid of Johnny Roselli?10) At any time has the CIA been associated with Sam Giancana?
[157-10014-10185.pdf — page 0]
157-10014-10185 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination System Date: 7/7/2015Identification FormAgency InformationAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10185RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-90Document InformationORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM:TO:TITLE: THE CONGODATE: 08/22/1975PAGES: 5SUBJECTS:CIAMOBUTULUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATIONDOCUMENT TYPE: SUMMARYCLASSIFICATION: UnclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1CCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/31/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS:v9.1NW 50955 DocId: 32423573 Page 11
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMDate: 08/07/95Page: 1AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10185RECORDS SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-90DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM:TO:TITLE: THE CONGODATE: 08/22/75PAGES: 5SUBJECTS: LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATIONCIAMOBUTUDOCUMENT TYPE: SUMMARYCLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIEDRESTRICTIONS: REFERREDCURRENT STATUS: POSTPONED IN FULLDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 01/19/99OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS:[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTEDNW 50955 DocId:32423573 Page 2
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# INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARYINTERVIEW WITH: "Victor Hedgeman"REGARDING: The CongoDATE-TIME-LOCATION: August 22, 1975, S201, a.m./p.m.PRESENT: Bill BaderHAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:FOLLOW UP REQUIRED: SEE PAGE 5 - POSSIBLE INTERVIEWEESMATERIALS SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S):EXECUTIVE SESSION: X NO
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# INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARYPage 1 of ______Interview and Meeting Summary - "Victor Hedgeman"w/Bill Bader, August 22, 1975, S201FILE:After an extended tour with the United States Army and some education at San Diego State, Hedgeman went to Harvard where he studied in the Department of International Relations, working to a degree in political science. He didn't finish his degree but went after being recruited at Harvard into the OPC. He then became an NOC in Europe and for a number of years worked in Belgium, Luxembourg and France. His primary responsibility in Belgium was that of surveillance of Soviet operators in Europe. While in Brussels in 1959 he came to meet a good percentage of the Congolese who would be important in the Congo after independence: Ileo, Mobutu, and Adoula. In January of 1960 he became the first Chief of Station in the Congo; prior to that time the Agency had merely a liaison service. In late July of 1960 Hedgeman returned to the United States with Ambassador Timberlake to press for a U.S. policy of political action in the Congo. Hedgeman's position was that the Soviets were moving large amounts of equipment and manpower into the Congo and that something had to be done to head it off. At the time he first went to the Congo he was the only man in the Station. A year later there were five or six and eventually the Station would reach upwards of twenty. Hedgeman mentioned that the relationships and staff that he built in the Congo persisted, and that when the Laotian operation started the group would move almost intact to Laos. Hedgeman believed that the Congo was vitally important to American interests,NW 50955 DocId:32423573 Page 4
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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY                                            Page 2 of ______despite some criticism of that point from the State Department. He felt that the economic wealth of the Congo was important to the United States' future, and that it was equally important that the Congo remain a viable unit. He said that there was very strong resistance at the State level for political action involvement in the Congo. Fortunately the Congo operation became one of Allen Dulles' projects. At the beginning, with the approval of the Special Group, it was agreed that the CIA would begin to provide financial support for moderate Congolese politicians. By August of 1960, however, Hedgeman and Timberlake were pushing for instructions that would allow them to pursue a course that would lead to a change in government. Hedgeman said that those close to Lumumba at that time were Soviet agents. The way that it was initially pursued was to the building of personnel assets investing in labor unions to help them with their propaganda, a lobbying campaign, direct payments to politicians.FILE:The first major effort to rid the Congo of Lumumba came with a plan developed by Hedgeman to bribe enough members of the Senate in order to induce them to vote Lumumba out.. This plan was to have taken place on the 7th of September, 1960. Hedgeman had arranged that the radio would be denied Lumumba after his defeat so that he would not be able to go on the radio to try to change the decision of the Senate. Unfortunately and for reasons Hedgeman does not know to this day, Mobutu jumped the gun and threw Lumumba out. Lumumba in turn wentNW 50955 DocId: 32423573 Page 5
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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY                                                                                    Page 3. ofto the Assembly and harangued them and got the vote and also got the vote in the Senate by bringing troops out and surrounding the Senate building. Hedgeman said that up to this point he had been thinking largely in parliamentary terms; that the way to rid the country of Lumumba was through the paramilitary method. After this experience of the 5th through the 7th, he decided more drastic and direct methods had to be employed.Hedgeman contends that the *coup* of Mobutu seized control was arranged and supported, and indeed, managed, by the Central Intelligence Agency. During the course of the interview Hedgeman spoke glowingly of Mobutu, who he feels is a man with good political judgment, a sense of history, and the capacity to be a Pan African leader. Mobutu was only twenty-nine at the time. Hedgeman says his most difficult time with Mobutu came in February of 1961 when the Kennedy administration decided that a federalized government, including all political factions was the only hope of averting civil war. Hedgeman was charged with going to Mobutu and telling him that the United States had decided to withdraw all support from him and that he would have to resign. He said Mobutu was utterly shocked by this and could not possibly believe the United States could believe that the Congo was ready for parliamentary government. He said Mobutu was so upset that he drew his gun and waved it in the direction of Hedgeman and said "If this happens, I will die," and, looking at Hedgeman, "so will others." Hedgeman said Mobutu only put his gun away when Hedgeman told him that he did not personally agree with the decision, that he was just carrying out orders like a good soldier.FILE:NW 50955 DocId: 32423573 Page 6
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# INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARYPage 4. of ______FILE:Hedgeman stressed that in this period, 1960-1961, the Congo was fraught with utter confusion; he sais that what they were running was a Scotch tape and baling-wire operation. As for paramilitary operations, Hedgeman said they began seriously in the end of 1962 with the arrival of a number of T-6's that he and Ed Gullion had asked for. He said that these aircraft were not intended to be used in combat, but only to reassure the Congolese that the United States was with them and provide them with a bit of black magic. Hedgeman professed that the paramilitary combat missions of 1963, in support of anti-rebel activities, were really quite minor affairs.Some specifics. Hedgeman contended that he had no knowledge of the approval of funding of South African mercenaries and tribal leaders capable of resistance as approved by the 303 Committee. He also said, though, that he had important contact with Mike Hoare mercenaries, they gave no direct or indirect support to them. He also said there was ne, repeat no, complicity or support on the part of the CIA in the ouster of Kasavubu by Mobutu in November of 1965.Throughout the conversation, Hedgeman interspersed the most hair-raising tales of his and his daughter's brushes with death in their dealings with unruly mutinous Congolese, ranging from being placed before two different firing squads during one day and his evening as the selected victim of a hit contract given by the Union Miniere.As for CIA employees who might testify well, should the Committee handle the Congo issue in executive session, Hedgeman recommended Edward Korn-Patterson, Bronson Tweedy, and Glen Fields.
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystemIdentification FormDate: 7/7/2015Agency InformationAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10227RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-132Document InformationORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM: DAWSON, R.TO:TITLE: DIEMDATE: 06/00/1975PAGES: 157SUBJECTS: CIACOLBY, WILLIAMVIETNAMKENNEDY, JOHNDIEM, ASSASSINATIONDOCUMENT TYPE: SUMMARYCLASSIFICATION: DeclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1CCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/05/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: CC Box 133
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 1]
Date: 08/08/95Page : 1# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM## AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10227RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-132## DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIAFROM : DAWSON, R.TO :TITLE : DIEMDATE : 06/00/75PAGES : 157SUBJECTS : VIETNAMDIEM, ASSASSINATIONCOLBY, WILLIAMCIAKENNEDY, JOHNDOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARYCLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRETRESTRICTIONS : REFERREDCURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULLDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/20/99OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS : CC Box 133[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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DIEMNW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 3![photo of writing says Page 33]
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# PERSONS/ENTITIES:McCone NhuColoy HillsmanKennedy, John F. TungMcNamarra DiemLodge# DATES:11 Sept 63# CATEGORIES:DIEM# OCCURRENCE:In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA participants being McCone and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNamarra pointed out that Lodge has little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCone commented that he believed that we should move cautiusly, that we should talk seriously to Diem and that Lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic view of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McCone also suggested that another approach be made to Nhu to seek his cooperation ina departure. The President asked whether we had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid (as proposed in a paper prepared by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studies. The President asked DOD and CIA to analyze the Hillsman paper. He also asked that a telegram be sent to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some real contact with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the President should be well informed of any steps taken in this context such as the instance involving CIA payment to Col Tung last week.IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 21-22FILE:DATE: Dawson6/27/75
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 4]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:KENNEDY, JOHN F.KENNEDY, ROBERT F.MC CONE, JOHNDIEMDATES:5 Oct 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMTOP SECRETOCCURRENCE: On or about October 5, 1963 when the telegram of October 5 and 6 were sent to Saigon, MC CONE was called over by PRESIDENT KENNEDY and met privately with PRESIDENT KENNEDY and the Attorney General, ROBERT F. KENNEDY, and took the position that the CIA should take a hands off position as far as the assassination of DIEM was concerned. MC CONE "felt that the President agreed with my position, despite the fact that he had great reservations concerning DIEM and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we could on DIEM to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My precise words to the President, and I remember them very clearly, was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that, if DIEM was removed we would have not one coup, but we would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam, and it might last several years as indeed it did. So it was for that reason that I felt there would beSOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, Friday, June 6, 1975, McCone, Vol. 1, 2 of 5FILE:pp. 62-32STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:29 June 1975---PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:Card 2 of 2OCCURRENCE: more stability if DIEM could be persuaded to change his ways than remove him and hope that some group of generals could run the country better."TOP SECRETSOURCE:FTIF.STAFF:DATE.
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 5]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:MC CONE, JOHNDIEMDATES:5 Oct 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: On October 5, 1963, MC CONE sent, to some locations, including SAIGON the following message: "Believe assassination discussions most careful handling. In general best line is no line so that it is clear that we are sticking to position of having no responsibility for actions of any of various contending Vietnamese groups. We certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every such threat of which we might receive even partial knowledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of DIEM. We believe in gaging ourselves by taking position on this matter opens door too easily for probes of our position re others, re support of regime, etc. Consequently, believe best approach is hands off. However, we naturally interested in intelligence on any such plan. This message has been cleared with State Department."SOURCE:Hearing held before Senate Select Committee Intelligence, June 6, 1975, McCone, p. 60.FILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE: 29 June 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:MINH, GENERALCONEINNGO DINH CANNGO DINH NHUDATES:October 3-41963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: On October 3-4, 1963, CONEIN was asked to contact BIG MINH and did so by himsel at MINH's headquarters. "At that time, BIG MINH explained to me that they had had, that there was going to be a coup d'etat, that they didn't want this to be an American sponsored coup d'etat, they wanted to be assured of American backing, specifically in the part where it comes to military and economic aid after the coup had been successful." p. 24 "What the GENERAL meant, he actually did not want U.S. participation in the coup d'etat. He did not want the U.S. government to start the coup d'etat. He also outlined three general ideas, this was the first time that a leader had mentioned the possibility of assassination. This assassination was not of DIEM. This was if they could not do anything, it would be the elimination of NGO DINH CAN, who was the war lord in central Vietnam and NGO DINH NHU. At that time GENERAL MINH did say that one of the alternative means was to eliminate CAN and NHU and keep DIEM." That was one of the alternatives. p. 25SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinSTAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:CIA - Saigon StationVIETNAMESE GENERALSDATES:31 Aug. 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:In an August 31, 1963, CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0499), the following message appears:""This particular coup is finished....GENERALS did not feel ready and did not have sufficient balance of forces....There is little doubt that GVN aware US role and may have considerable detail...."" (15)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 15STAFF: DawsonDATE: 28.6.75FILE: