Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 456]
-22-This message is for your eyes only, and should not be dis- cussed with any person other than those CAS officers who will be knowledgeable. CAS will identify them. (Headquarters 380 to Santiago)For this and all subsequent messages intended for the Army Attache, the secret CIA communications channel was used.Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that ini- tially the Army Attache would be used only to "obtain or procure" in- telligence on Chilean military officers.*(Philpott, p. 11; Karamessines, p. 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the Army Attache, however, did in fact trigger his deep involvement in the coup attempt. According to the Attache's testimony, he received day-to-day instructions from the Chief of Station, and on occasion, the COS would show him messages ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him to take certain actions. The COS also transmitted messages from the Army Attache to these Generals.General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track II and that he never received any communication relating thereto, nor did he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the Army Attache. General Philpott also testified that he had no recollection of anything connected with Track II after his initial meeting with General Cushman on September 28. (Philpott, p. 16)U. S. Army Colonel Robert C. Roth, who in September and October 1970 was the Chief of the Human Resources Division, Director of Collection, DIA,* In this connection it should be noted that when questioned about this letter, General Philpott testified that he recalled signing an authorization such as that contained in the first paragraph of Headquarters 380 but that he did not recall the authorizations and instructions in paragraphs two and three.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 457]
testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott on:"a priority requirement to identify Chilean personalities who might behelpful in preventing the election of Allende as President of Chile."(Roth, Vol. I, p. 6) Though Roth recalls no mention of Track II as such,the goal of this mission is identical to that described in the messageof September 28 bearing Philpott's signature.Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activitiesconnected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meetingon October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic material on Chileangenerals which focused on their willingness to participate in a militarycoup. Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representative attended.The chronology also shows that on October 21, Roth delivered a message toMr. Broe to be sent by CIA channels.* A message was sent to Col. Wimertthat same day, ostensibly from General Bennett, which authorized:FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS hasbeen rescinded. This action does not repeat not implychange in our estimate of situation. On the contrary,it is intended to place us in a posture in which we canformally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situa-tion develops as we anticipate. Request up date on situa-tion. (Santiago 446; Ref: Headquarters 762) (Headquarters934, 21 October 1970)Roth testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when hefollowed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information onChilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA. Philpott also instructed him that* Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this  message and also pressed him on several occasions to seek a re-  sponse from Broe to an earlier message to Colonel Wimert. (Roth,  Vol. II, p. )
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- 23a -"any further action on the subject would henceforth be the responsibility of the CIA and that DIA would perform normal support functions." (Roth, p. 8)*Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities described by Roth were routine DIA activities. However, Colonel Roth testified:I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, is that I was informed that there was concern at the highest U.S. Governmental level over the possible election of Allende, that DIA then had a priority responsibility of coming up with the identities of key Chilean personalities that would be helpful, and so forth. I have nothing specific as to the nature of the instructions or the channels through which they came.Q. It was your sense at the time that you were working on a project that if it had not been initiated by, at least had the attention of or concern of, the highest level?* Roth's chronology also indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe be queried on two or three occasions regarding a report from Wimert and that Philpott instructed that only he (Philpott) would communicate with Cushman if the need arose. (Roth, p. 11) Roth also testified that Philpott advised him that communications with Wimert would be by CIA channels. (Roth, p. 41)![TOP SECRET]
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Colonel Roth. That was my impression at the time.Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department that the highest level of government usually indicated the President of the United States?Colonel Roth. I would assume that.The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify Generals Bennett and Philpott as either the sender or recipient. Among these documents is a message relating to Track II which bears Philpott's purported signature. (Undated message. ca. 14 October 1970) General Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted that it was and he could not recall signing it, or having seen it. (Philpott, p. ) CIA also produced messages of October 14 (Headquarters 762) and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying instructions from General Bennett to the Army Attache. General Bennett testified he did not authorize these messages:It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military assistance area. It goes beyond the responsibility which I had in terms that I would have to get the authority or the approval of the Secretary through the Chairman for covert action of this magnitude. This message would not have been signed by me. (Bennett testimony, p. 21)According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testimony, p. 84)The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents bearing on the issue of Wimert's Track II instructions or responses. A DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel O. Graham, the present Director of DIA, produced no copies of communication documents for the September-October 1970 period. (Graham, p. 6) However, Roth testified that detailed memoranda for the record which he prepared on his activities are missing from the files. (Roth, Vol. II, p. )
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CIA officials maintain that they acted faithfully in transmittingmessages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending amessage without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was particularlyforceful in this regard:...I can recall no instance in my experience at the CentralIntelligence Agency in which a message was received for anindividual, an officer of the government anywhere, in what-ever department, which was not faithfully, directly, promptlyand fully and accurately delivered to that officer, or to hisduly authorized representative.(Karamessines testimony, p. 79)We may have played tricks overseas, but it stopped at thewater's edge, and we didn't play tricks among ourselves oramong our colleagues within the Agency or in other agencies.(Karamessines testimony, p. 79)We could not remain in business for a day... if this had beenthe practice of the Agency. It would have been no time atall before we would have been found out, a single instanceof the kind of thing you are suggesting might have takenplace would have put us out of business.(Karamessines testimony, p. 80)Dr. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the Army Attache'srole or that he authorized any messages to be sent to the Army Attache.(Kissinger testimony, p. 22)The investigation to date has not resolved the conflict between thestatements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials. There arefour possibilities that could explain the conflict. First, GeneralsBennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track II and communicated theirgeneral instructions to the Army Attache. This possibility would becontrary to their sworn testimony. Second, General Bennett was not awareof Track II but General Philpott was and communicated general instructions tothe Army Attache. This possibility is supported by Roth's testimony.but would be contrary to Philpott's sworn testimony and his duty tokeep General Bennett informed. Third, the CIA acted on its own , and,after receiving initial authority from General Philpott, co-opted and ordered
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the Army Attache without further informing any member of the Departmentof Defense of the White House. This possibility would be contrary tothe sworn testimony of David Phillips, William Broe, Thomas Karamessines,and William Colby. Fourth, members of the White House staff authorizedthe CIA to convey orders to the Army Attache on the basis of high orhighest government authority. Further, that the White House staffdirected that the Army Attache's superiors in the Pentagon not be in-formed. This possibility would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr.Kissinger and General Alexander Haig.D. The False Flag BaseIn order to minimize the risks of making contact with the dissidentChilean officers, the task force decided in late September to set up a"False Flag Base," i.e., to send four staff officers to Chile posing asnationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert's contactswith Chilean military officers. * Given the limitations of the Station'sresources and Colonel Wimert's visibility, Headquarters felt the use of"False Flag Officers" was necessary because "We don't want to miss achance." One of these officers posed as a Brazilian intelligence officerso that "any flap would be a Brazilian one." (Headquarters 363,September 27, 1970)*The use of "False Flag Officers" is not, according to David Phillips,"an unusual practice," either by the CIA or foreign intelligenceservices. (Phillips testimony, pp. 47-48)
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-27-The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and reportedseparately on their contacts to a "deep cover" CIA officer in Santiagowho in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of theChief of Station, they received their instructions from Washington andnot from him. (Chief of Station testimony (Felix), August 1, 1975, p. 27)## Chief of StationAlthough most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know ofTrack II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable andthe Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean officers.The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic:I had left no doubt in the minds of my colleaguesand superiors that I did not consider any kind ofintervention in those constitutional processesdesirable.... And one of the reasons certainly for mylast recall (to Washington) was to be read the riotact--which was done in a very pleasant, but veryintelligible manner. Specifically, I was told atthat time that the Agency was not too interested incontinuously being told by me that certain proposalswhich had been made could not be executed, or wouldbe counterproductive. (Chief of Station (Felix)testimony, August 1, 1975, p. 10)The Chief of Station's objection to Track II did not go unnoticed.The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Reportshould not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report onaction taken." (Headquarters 612, 7 October) Very simply, Headquarterswanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency itself.
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Three examples of the Chief of Station's reporting bear out his claim to have dissented:Bear in mind that parameter of action is exceedingly narrow and available options are quite limited and relatively simple. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970)Feel necessary to caution against any false optimism. It is essential that we not become victims of our own propaganda. (Santiago 441, October 1, 1970)Urge you do not convey impression that Station has sure-fire method of halting, let alone triggering coup attempts. (Santiago 477, October 7, 1970, p.2)
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IV. CIA Efforts to Promote a CoupA. The Chilean ConspiratorsAnti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key individuals. One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before. * Following the "Tacnazo" revolt, and his dismissal from the Army, Viaux retained the support of many non-commissioned and junior officers as well as being the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups. (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July 15, 1975)Another individual around which plotting centered was General Camilo Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago Garrison. General Valenzuela was in league with several other active duty officers, including Admiral Hugo Tirado, Navy Commander in Chief; General Vicente Huerta, Director General of the Carabinero (police) Corps; General Canales, Director of the Military Academy; and General Joaquin Garcia, second in command, Air Force. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, November 18, 1970) All of these officers, with the possible exception of Canales, were in contact with Viaux as well.**[^1] This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of dramatizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as an abortive coup.[^2] The record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military officers is incomplete. The record does show, however, that Viaux met with General Huerta around October 7. (Chile Task Force Log, October 7). On October 12 Viaux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October). One cable from Santiago indicates that Admiral Tirado may have been a member of Viaux's inner circle of conspirators. (Station 545, 16 October 1970) At the very least, Tirado was in contact with Viaux.Although a distinction can be made between the Viaux and Valenzuela groups, as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony before the Committee, the principal distinction between the two was that the latter was led by active duty military officers. The two groups were in contact with each other. The record also indicates that they worked together in at least two of the three Schneider kidnap attempts.[^1]: *This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of drama-tizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted asan abortive coup.[^2]: **The record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military officersis incomplete. The record does show, however, that Viaux met with GeneralHuerta around October 7. (Chile Task Force Log, October 7). On October 12Viaux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October). Onecable from Santiago indicates that Admiral Tirado may have been a memberof Viaux's inner circle of conspirators. (Station 545, 16 October 1970)At the very least, Tirado was in contact with Viaux.
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There was considerable communication among the various plottingelements. As Thomas Karamessines testified:...I might add here that it seemed that a gooddozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean senior officerswere privy to what was going on in addition toPresident Frei and they were all talking to oneanother exchanging views and trying to see howbest to mount the kind of coup that they wantedto see take place. (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)## Contacts Prior to October 15The CIA's initial task in Chile was to assess the potential withinthe Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly that anti-Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police),but were immobilized by "the tradition of military respect for theConstitution" and "the public and private stance of General Schneider,Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict adherence to theConstitution." (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 Novem-ber 1970, p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to overcome "the apolitical,constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military." (Ibid, p. 2)Since the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by GeneralSchneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to theidea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to thesecond level of general officers. They were to be informed that the U.S.Government would support a coup both before and after it took place.*(Headquarters to Station 611, 7 October 1970) This effort began inearnest on October 5 when Colonel Wimert informed both an Army General("Station's priority contact") an an Air Force General of the pro-coup---*The military officers were told, for example, that should Allende beprevented from taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostra-cized, but rather can continue to count on us for MAP support and main-tenance of our close relationship." (Hqs. 075517, 7 October 1970)
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*U.S. policy. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6) [^1]Three days later the Chief of Station told General Huerta, Commander of the Carabineros that "the U.S. Government favors a military solution and is willing to support it in any manner short of outright military intervention." (Task Force Log, 9 October) General Huerta informed the COS that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean Army high command. (Task Force Log, 10 October)On October 7, Colonel Wimert approached members of the War Academy in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons. This was Colonel Wimert's first contact with the Army Lt. Colonel to whom he would ultimately pass three submachine guns on October 22. At this meeting, the Lt. Colonel told Colonel Wimert that he and his colleagues were trying to exert force on Frei to eliminate Gen. Schneider to either replace him, send him out of the country. They had even studied plans to kidnap him. Schneider is the main barrier to all plans for the military to take over the government to prevent an Allende presidency. (Santiago 483, 8 October)[^1]: According to the CIA's wrap-up report on Track II, between October 5 and October 20, the CIA Station and the Army Attache--for the most part the latter--made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero officials. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 8 November 1970)[^2]: In his testimony, Colonel Wimert indicated that the Lt. Colonel was affiliated with General Canales. (Wimert testimony, p. 52) In a cable sent to Headquarters on October 18, in which the Lt. Colonel's request for three submachine guns was made, the Station indicated that Wimert believed the Army officer, and his companion, a Navy Captain, were in league with Admiral Tirado. (Station 562, October 18) At another point in his testimony, Wimert stated, "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy Captain and the Army Lt. Colonel and the Air Force General over here." (Wimert testimony, p. 107) The Committee has been unable to determine the exact affiliation of the Army Lt. Colonel. However, as previously stated, both General Canales and Admiral Tirado were affiliated with General Valenzuela and Admiral Tirado was in contact with General Viaux.
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The next day, October 8, Headquarters cabled the Station in response to the Wimert-Lt. Colonel meeting. Headquarters took note of Schneider's resistance to coup plans and stated:...This would make it more important than ever to remove him and to bring this new state of events...anything we or Station can do to effect removal of Schneider? We know this rhetorical question, but wish inspire thought on both ends on this matter. (Hqs. 628, 8 October)During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success looked unusually bleak. The Chile Task Force Log commented:President Frei and the highest levels of the armed forces unable to pull themselves together to block Allende. The Chilean military's tradition of non-intervention, Frei's reluctance to tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's firm constitutional stand, and most importantly, the lack of leadership within the government and military are working against a military takeover. (Task Force Log, 8 October)The following day the Station made reference to the "rapid(ly) waning chances for success." (Santiago 487, 9 October). This pessimism was not dispelled by their simultaneous judgment: "Station has arrived at Viaux solution by process of elimination." (Santiago 504, 10 October) Three days later the Task Force agreed: "We continue to focus our attention on General Viaux who now appears to be the only military leader willing to block Allende." (Task Force Log, 13 October)If Viaux was the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were bleak indeed. His own colleagues, Generals Huerta and Valenzuela described him as "a General without an army." (Santiago 495, 9 October) Yet in the first two weeks of October he came to be regarded as the best hope for carrying out the CIA's Track II mandate.
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Although Colonel Wimert was instructed not to involve himself with Viaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 461, 5 October), he served initially as a contact to Viaux through an Argentine military Attache. The Argentine reported on October 5 that Viaux wanted several hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch a coup on October 9. (Santiago 476, 6 October) Headquarters turned down the request, concluding that a "mini-coup at this juncture would be counterproductive" and Viaux should postpone his plans, "while encouraging him in a suitable manner to maintain his posture so that he may join larger movement later if it materializes." (Headquarters 585, 6 October)The primary purpose of the "False Flag Base" was to contact Viaux, and it very rapidly relieved Wimert and the Argentine Attache of that task. Viaux reiterated his demand for an air drop of weapons to the "False Flagger," and again the response was the same: reject the demand for arms, but encourage him to keep planning. In essence the Agency was buying time with Viaux: "We wish to encourage Viaux to expand and refine his coup planning. Gain some influence over his actions." (Headquarters 689, 10 October) To achieve this latter purpose, Headquarters authorized passing $20,000 in cash and a promise of $250,000 in life insurance to Viaux and his associates, as a demonstration of U.S. support. (Headquarters 729, 13 October)On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over Schneider by asking: "What is to keep Schneider from making statement in early hours which will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise join Viaux?" (Headquarters 729, 13 October) The Station's response later that same day was "Viaux intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats within the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup." (Santiago 527,