Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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crisis for them to have authorized a Castro assassination. (Bundy, p. 95, 97-98).Bundy further stated that he was never told by anyone that assassination efforts were underway against Castro, that underworld figures were hired by the CIA in this regard, or that Harvey was engaged in Castro assassination activity. (Bundy, p. 63.)Bundy testified that he heard about the concept of "executive action""Some time in the early months of 1961". (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 4.) But since this was presented to him as an untargeted capability only he did not "discourage or dissuade" the person who briefed him on this. (Bundy, p. 4, 7, 10.)When asked if he had any recollection of any specific covert plans that involved poisons in conjunction with activities against Cuba, Bundy stated"I have no recollection of any specific plan. I do have a very vague, essentially refreshed recollection that I heard the word poison at some point in connection with a possibility of action in Cuba. But that is as far as I have been able to take it in my own memory. (Bundy, p. 42).Bundy stated further that this recollection relating to poison involved a proposal that seemed "impractical" because it was going to kill a large group of people in a headquarters mess, or something of that sort." (Bundy, p.42-43).[^1] Bundy stated:"... the most important point I want to make is that I find the notion that they separately, privately encouraged, ordered, arranged efforts at assassination totally inconsistent with what I knew of both of them. And, as an example, I would cite -- and one among very many -- the role played by the Attorney General in the Missile Crisis, because it was he who, most emphatically, argued against a so-called surgical air strike or any other action that would bring death upon many, in favor of the more careful approach which was eventually adopted by the President in the form of a quarantine or a blockade." (Bundy, p. 98).[^1]: */
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With respect to the possibility that Robert Kennedymay have authorized assassination outside of Special Group Augmentedchannels, Bundy stated that although Robert Kennedy did spur peopleto greater effort during Mongoose, "he never took away from theexisting channel of authority its authority or responsibility."(Bundy, pp. 47-48). Bundy further testified that there existed be-tween Robert Kennedy and Maxwell Taylor (the Special Group AugmentedChairman) "a relation of real trust and confidence." In view of thisrelation, Bundy stated it was his opinion that Robert Kennedy wouldnot have by-passed Taylor to develop a "back-channel" relationshipwith someone else to assassinate Castro. (Bundy, p. 87).e. Testimony of MacNamaraMacNamara, served as Secretary of Defense throughoutthe Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. In that capacity, he represented the Department of Defense as a member of the Special Group andthe Special Group Augmented during the Mongoose Operations.
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McNamara stated that he had no knowledge or information of any proposalfor the assassination of Premier Castro coming from President Kennedy orRobert Kennedy. (McNamara, 7/11/75, p. 4.) He did note that "we were hysteri-cal about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter, and that therewas pressure from (President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy) to do something aboutCastro. But I don't believe we contemplated assassination. We did, however,contemplate overthrow." (cNamara, p. 93.)There occurred during McNamara's testimony an exchange which is appropriateto set out in full because of the manner in which it captures the dilemma posedby the evidence on the question of authority:> "The Chairman. We also have received evidence from> your senior associates that they never participated in> the authorization of an assassination attempt against.> Castro nor ever directed the CIA to undertake such> attempts.We have much testimony establishing the chain ofcommand where covert action was concerned, and all ofit has been to the effect that the Special Group orthe Special Group Augmented had full charge of covertoperations, and that in that chain of command any proposalof this character or any other proposal having to dowith covert operations being directed against theCastro regime, or against Castro personally, were tobe laid before the Special Group Augmented and were notto be undertaken except with the authority of thatgroup and at the direction of that group.Now, at the same time we know from the evidencethat the CIA was in fact engaged during the periodin a series of attempts to assassinate Castro.Now, you see what we are faced with is this dilemma.Either the CIA was a rogue elephant rampaging out ofcontrol, over which no effective direction was beinggiven in this matter of assassination, or there was
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some secret channel circumventing the whole structureof command by which the CIA and certain officials inthe CIA were authorized to proceed with assassinationplots and assassination attempts against Castro. Or thethird and final point that I can think of is thatsomehow these officials of the CIA who were so engagedmisunderstood or misinterpreted their scope of authority.Now it is terribly important, if there is any way that wecan find out which of these three points represented whatactually happened. That is the nature, that is thequandary.Now, is there anything that you can tell us that wouldassist us in finding an answer to this central question?Mr. McNamara. I can only tell you what will further youruneasiness. Because I have stated before and I believetoday that the CIA was a highly disciplined organization,fully under the control of senior officials of the govern-ment, so much so that I feel as a senior official of thegovernment I must assume responsibility for the actionsof the two, putting assassination aside just for themoment. But I know of no major action taken by CIA duringthe time I was in the government that was not properlyauthorized by senior officials. And when I say that Iwant to emphasize also that I believe with hindsight weauthorized actions that were contrary to the interest of theRepublic but I don't want it on the record that the CIAwas uncontrolled, was operating with its own authorityand we can be absolved of responsibility for what CIAdid, again with exception of assassination, again whichI say I never heard of.The second point you say that you have, you know thatCIA was engaged in a series of attempts of assassination.I think to use your words. I don't know that. I acceptthe fact that you do and that you have information I wasnot aware of. I find that impossible to reconcile. I justcan't understand how it could have happened and I don'taccept the third point, that they operated on the basisof minunderstanding, because it seems to me that theMcCone position that he was opposed to it, his clearrecollection and his written memo of 1967 that I was stronglyopposed to it, his statement that Murrow opposed all shouldeliminate any point of misunderstanding. Sofrankly can'treconcile. (TR. 38-41)McNamara further stated that "I find it almost inconceivable thatassassination attempts were carried on during the Konnedy Administra
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-54-days without the senior members know it, and I understand the contradiction thatthis carries with respect to the face." (McNamara, p. 4.) He further emphasizedthat for the President or Robert: Kennedy to have approved a Castro assassinationwas "totally inconsistent with everything I know about the two men." (McNamarap. 90.)f. Testimony of GilpatricGilpatric served as Deputy Secretary of Defense throughout the Kennedy Admini-stration. (Gilpatric, p. 5; Gilpatric Ex. 1, p. 5.) In that capacity, Gilpatricrepresented the Department of Defense as a member of the Special Group and theSpecial Group Augmented during the Mongoose operation. (Gilpatric, p. 5.)Gilpatric testified that he understood the mandate ofthe Special Group during Mongoose was not to kill Castro, but to "so under-mine, so disrupt the Cuban system under Castro that it could not beeffective."* (Gilpatric, p. 28). Gilpatric emphasized that "it was thesystem we had to deal with" and words such as "get rid of Castro" weresaid "in the context of the system, of the .... government, he had installedand was presiding over, but of which /Castro/ was only one part ..." (Gil-patric, p. 29).* Initially in his first appearances before the Committee Mr. Gilpatric  was unable to recall any of the events or characters involved in Operation  Mongoose. He failed to recall that General Lansdale was the Chief of  Operations for the project, or Lansdale's involvement in the Special  Group Augmented even though Gilpatric recommended Lansdale for pro-  motion to Brigadier General. Gilpatric testified that the lapse of time,  approximately fifteen years, had impaired his memory on these events.  (Gilpatric, pp. 6-9.) (Insert possible proposed additional language by  Smothers.)
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Gilpatric said that he knew of no express restriction that would have barred the killing of Castro. But Gilpatic testified that he understood "There were limits on the use of power" and that these pre-cluded the use of assassination. (Gilpatric, p. 31). Thus, while Gil-patric said that it was "perfectly possible" that one might reasonably have inferred assassination was authorized, nevertheless, the limits on action set down by the Special Group Augmented would have required that specific efforts be made by one receiving general instructions to clarify whether those instructions authorized assassination.*/ He added that "within our charter, so to speak, the one thing that was off limits was military invasion." (Id. p. 45). In this context of the longoose charter, Gilpatric, when asked whether the "killing of Castro by a para-military group (would) have been within bounds." he responded, "I know of no restriction that would have barred it." (Id.) In response to a ques-tion as to whether there was any concern for the limits on the activities of personnel involved in these raids and infiltration efforts, Gilpatric said: "No, to the contrary. The complaint that the Attorney General had, if we assume he was reflecting the President's views on it, was that the steps taken by the CIA up to that point, and their plans were too petty, were too minor, they weren't massive enough, they weren't going to be ef-fective enough." (Id., p. 47.) However, as discussed above at p., on March 5, 1962, the Special Group Augmented had agreed, with respect to "action-type" agents, that it "must keep its hand tightly on these agents' activities, and although once such agents were inside Cuba, they could not be "effectively controlled," the Group would make "every effort...to attempt such control."*/ In Gilpatric's testimony, there was the following exchange:"Senator Huddleston:... It's on the basis of these words that everybody admits were used, like replace or get rid of, on the basis of these kinds of conversation alone that /Helms/ was firmly convinced and that apparently went right down through the whole rank of command, firmly convinced that he had the authority to move against the life of a head of state.(Footnote continued on next page.)
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Gilpatric testified that "it was not unusual" for President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy to deal directly with people at various levels in the Executive Branch. (Gilpatric, p. 58). With respect to Mongoose, Gilpatric said that Robert Kennedy was the "moving spirit" (Gilpatric, p. 11). But Gilpatric stated that Robert Kennedy's role was "principally to spur us on, to get going, get cracking." (Gilpatric, p. 47). Thus, although Robert Kennedy frequently complained that the plans of the CIA and Mongoose weren't "massive enough" and that "we should get in there and do more," Gilpatric pointed out that Robert Kennedy was not making specific proposals in these urgings, and the result he desired was a general one "to limit the Castro regime's effectiveness," rather than any specific measure. (Gilpatric, p. 47).g. Testimony of RuskDean Rusk served as Secretary of State throughout the Kennedy Administration. Rusk participated in a number of Special Group Augmented meetings during the Mongoose operation. (Rusk, p. ).(Footnote continued from previous page.)Now this disturbs me, and I don't know whether our councils of government operate that way in all areas or not, but if they do then it seems to me it would raise a very serious question as to whether or not the troops are getting the right orders.""Mr. Gilpatric....I thought there were limits on the use of power and that was one of them.""Senator Huddleston. And going beyond that would require that somebody make a specific effort to make sure he understood precisely wrat they were talking about, would that be your interpretation?""Mr. Gilpatric. It would." (Gilpatric, p. 31).
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Rusk testified that he had never been informed of anyCastro assassination plans or undertakings and had no knowledge of anysuch activity. (Rusk, p. 52).Rusk further testified that he found it "very hard tobelieve" that President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy would have, in the courseof urging action against Castro, sanctioned the use of any measure againstCastro.*/ Rusk said that, while it was "possible" that a person, in goodfaith, might have thought specific courses of action were authorized fromthe emphasis given to taking action against Castro, nevertheless Rusk testi-fied that with respect to a Castro assassintion,"It would have been an abuse of the President and theAttorney General if somebody had thought they weregetting that without confirming that this was, in fact,an official, firm policy decision. (Rusk, pp. 98-99).With respect to whether President Kennedy or RobertKennedy might have communicated directly with Helms or Harvey on a Castroassassination effort, Rusk testified that, based on his experience and themanner in which foreign affairs matters were handled, I don't see how it couldhave happened." (Rusk, p. 99).**/*/ "Senator Huddleston... (Do) your contacts with Robert Kennedy or Presi-dent Kennedy, indicate to you that they were agitated to such an extentabout Cuba and Mongoose progress that in a conversation with someoneurging them to get off their rear-end and get something done that theymight convey the message that they meant anything, go to any length todo something about the Castro regime?"Mr. Rusk. I find it very hard to believe that Robert Kennedy standingalone, or particularly Robert Kennedy alleging to speak for PresidentKennedy, would have gone down that trail..."**/"Senator Mondale...We asked General Taylor yesterday whether he thoughtsomething of informal, subterranean, whatever kinds of communicationsfrom the highest level to Helms would have been possible without his(Footnote continued on following page.)
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h. Testimony of SorensenSorensen served as a Special Assistant to President Kennedy during the entire Kennedy Administration. Sorensen was a member of the National Security Council Executive Committee that dealt with the Missile Crisis, although he was not involved with Mongoose.Sorensen testified that in his daily personal meetings with the President and at all the National Security Council meetings he attended, there was "not at any time any mention -- much less approval by him -- of any U.S.-sponsored plan to assassinate any foreign leaders" (Sorensen, p. 4). Based upon his close contact with President Kennedy, Sorensen stated that it was his opinion that:"such an act (as assassination) was totally foreign to his character and conscience, foreign to his fundamental reverence for human life and his respect for his adversaries, foreign to his insistence upon a moral dimension in U.S. foreign policy and his concern for his country's reputation abroad, and foreign to his pragmatic recognition that so horrendous but inevitably counter-productive a precedent committed by a country whose own chief of state was inevitably vulnerable." (Sorensen, p. 5).(Footnote continued from previous page.)knowledge, and he said he felt that was incredible, he didn't think it was possible.Do you think that it would be likely that an informal order around channels, say to Helms or to Harvey--The Chairman. Over a three-year period.Senator Mondale. Over a three-year period would have been possible without your being informed?Mr. Rusk. Theoretically, Senator, one would have to say it is possible.Senator Mondale. But based on your experience?Mr. Rusk. In terms of practicality, probability and so forth, I don't see how it could have happened.You know those things, in these circles we were moving in could not be limited in that way. You know the echoes would come back."
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# F. The August 10, 1962 MeetingAs indicated above (see p. ), the question of a Castro assassination was raised at a meeting of the Special Group Augmented on August 10, 1962. Thereafter, on August 13, 1962, Lansdale directed Harvey to include in a proposed plan for Phase II of Mongoose a plan for the "liquidation of leaders" as an option. We took considerable testimony and examined the documents relating to the August 10 meeting, the nature of the discussion of a Castro assassination, and Lansdale's subsequent request for a contingency plan.At the outset, it should be noted that the documents and testimony showed that discussion of a Castro assassination at the Agust 10, 1962 meeting had no connection to the assassination activity undertaken by Harvey and Roselli, or any other Castro assassination plans or efforts. As the CIA Inspector General found:> "The subject (of a Castro assassination) was raised> at a meeting at State on 10 August 1962, but it is> unrelated to any actual attempts at assassination.> It did result in a MONGOOSE action memorandum by> Lansdale assigning to CIA action for planning> liquidation of leaders. (IG, p. 118).The finding of the Inspector General is supported both by the chronology of the Castro assassination efforts and the testimony of Harvey. The chronology shows that it was three months prior to the August 10, 1962 meeting that Harvey gave Roselli the poison pills for use against Castro, and that shortly thereafter (and well before August 10, 1962) Harvey was informed that the pills were inside Cuba. (see p. above). Moreover, after the August 10, 1962 meeting there was no Castro assassination activity during the remainder of 1962. (see p. above).In addition, Harvey (who attended the August 10, 1962 meeting and
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recalled that the question of a Castro assassination was raised) declared that the discussion was not related to his assassination activity with Roselli. (Harvey, 7/11, pp. 48-50). Harvey further testified that he did not view the August 10, 1962, discussion of a Castro assassination as authorization for the Roselli operation because "the authority, as I understood it, for this particular operation went back long before the formation" of the Special Group Augmented. (Harvey, 7/11, p. 49).1. The Contemporaneous Documentsa. Lansdale's August 13, 1962 MemorandumFollowing the August 10, 1962 meeting, Lansdale sent a memorandum on August 13, 1962, to Harvey and the other members of Lansdale's interagency working group.[^1] (Lansdale Ex. 15, Memorandum from Lansdale, August 13, 1962).The Memorandum began by stating: "In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the August 10 policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission." (Lansdale Ex. 15, p. 1).Lansdale further set out his concept of what was required: "I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the heading of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military." (Lansdale Ex. 15, p. 1).[^1]: * In addition to Harvey, copies of Lansdale's August 13, 1962, memorandum were sent to Robert Hurwitch (State Dept), Gen. Benjamin Harris (Defense Dept) and Don Wilson (U.S. Information Agency). (Lansdale Ex. 15.)In his testimony, Gen Harris identified a document drafted by the Mongoose Working Group in the Defense Dept shortly before the August 10 meeting. The document listed a number of steps that could be taken in the event of an intensified Mongoose program that might involve U. S. military intervention. One such step was "assassinate Castro and his handful of top men." (Harris Ex. 4.) Gen. Harris stated that this was "not out of the ordinary in terms of contingency planning... it's one of the things you look at. (Harris, p. 37.) There was no evidence that this document was distributed outside the Defense Dept's Mongoose working group.
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Lansdale's memorandum then assigned to Harvey papers on the followingsubjects by the means of the following passage, which contained a deletedphrase:"Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political, /words deleted/,Economic, (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary."(Lansdale, Ex. 15, p. 1).According to a memorandum by Harvey to Helms the following day, August14, 1962, the words deleted from the above-quoted passage were "includingliquidation of leaders." (Lansdale Ex. 16, Memorandum by Harvey, August 4,1962, to Helms).b. Harvey's August 14, 1962 MemorandumWhen Harvey received Lansdale's August 13 memorandum, Harvey wrotea memorandum to Helms attaching a copy of Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum, andnoting that Harvey had excised the words "including liquidation of leaders."(Lansdale Ex. 16, Memorandum, August 14, 1962, from Harvey to Helms). Har-vey's Memorandum stated:"The question of assassination, particularly ofFidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamaraat the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) inSecretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was theobvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to acomment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a sub-ject which has been made a matter of officialrecord. I took careful notes on the comments atthis meeting on this point, and the Special Group(Augmented) is not expecting any written commentsor study on this point. (Lansdale Ex. 16).Harvey's memorandum further stated that, on receipt of Lansdale'smemorandum, Harvey had called Lansdale's office and pointed out "the inad-missibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such
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a document," and that the CIA "would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it." (Lansdale Ex. 16, p. 1).c. The Minutes of the August 10, 1962 MeetingThe minutes of the August 10 meeting contain no reference to the subject of a Castro assassination. (Memorandum for Record, Special Group Augmented Meeting, August 10, 1962, by Parrott, hereafter referred to as the "August 10 Minutes"). Parrott, the author of the August 10 Minutes, testified that he did not recall a discussion of assassination at that meeting, but the fact that the minutes do not reflect such a discussion is not an indication that the matter did not come up. (Parrott, p. 34). Parrott pointed out that his minutes "were not intended to be a verbatim transcript of everything that was said," since the purpose of his minutes was "to interpret what the decisions were and to record those and to use them as a useful action document." (Parrott, 34-35). Parrott testified:> "we had 15 or 16 people (at the August 10, 1962 meeting)...all of them well informed, all of them highly articulate."> > This meeting, as I recall, went on for several hours...Now I'm sure that particularly in a group like this that there were a great many proposals made that were just shot down immediately." (Parrott, p. 34-35).Parrott further testified that he did not record proposals that were quickly rejected at the August 10 meeting. (Parrott, p. 35). Parrott stated that, although he had no recollection of a discussion of Castro's assassination at the August 10 meeting, he would infer from the related