Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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for this paragraph, that be review and that he advise the President and the committee if in his oninion any of these practices violate the Constitutional rights of American citizens or any other laws.Mr. Kirbow. I would feel much better about this since it hasr't been an apparent abuse but to see that go in the Teneral recommendation that all of the activities of the intelligence community herviewed by him or be examined in whatever yay you think it should be done for that purpose.But it would seem that it cuts then to a general preventive tune mechanism instead of being here kind of put in against the FRD. which as we say apparently has been doing it properly all along and not in violation of the law.We don't appear to be accusing them of it here, although the language may not be quite so specific.Mr. Aaron. I might just say that there is a further recommendation that involves the Attorney General on page 40, which is number 27 dealing with the same committee, a different aspect of it.What this does is it elaborates with the recommendation mugher 17. which establishes the counter intelligence committee and it deals with the two sides of these activities. On the one hand it's going to reuis orcoram for positiva foreign intelligence collection clandestine within the United States. and on the other hand is going to review the counter intelli Inc
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programs of the CIA and that are conducted inside theUnited States both from the standpoint of their legality.Now I think it's possible to consolidale those recommenda-tions so that we don't say it twice, and I also think it'spossible to take out any impliction that these programs werenot necessarily conducted properly in the past.But I would hate to sort of just have, and my rersonalfeeling is that I would hat to have a general kind of thingthat the Attorney General ought to do this because he oughtto do this already. And what we're trying to do is make somerecommendations that are more specifically targeted on the,subiect matter that we have reviewed and give him. in effect,specific charge.Senator Huddleston. Well, we are giving him thespecific charge of reviewing it, which apparently he didn'thave before. Now before when something came to his attentionhe certainly had the responsibility to move on it if in hisopinion it was contrary to Constitutional rights.Mr. Aaron. So I see you're discussing the last sentencestill, is that right, not the review noint?Mr. Kirbow. ile rightfully assumes, as the common lawdoos, that all government officials in an official positionare performing their duties properly.Senator Huddleston. To sant te do bayond that though.He want him to know what they're doinTOP SECRET![WARD PAUL]NW 50955 DocId: 32423509 Page 90
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Mr. Firbow. And then you may he should review it in kind of a general recommendation, then you talk about all of the intelligence functions having any possibility of affecting the laws of the United States.I really would like to see that kind of requirement placed on the Attorney General as a general requirement instead of trying to just pick out little specifics unless we have an abuse connected with it.Now in the domestic task force they have specific abuses and they make specific recommendations of corrective action, but that doesn't appear to be the case in either of these here, either the true covert operationsMr. Aaron. I might make a suggestion along those lines just in terms of simplifying some of this. It might be possible to take the first part of the review section here, follow it with the recommendation on the top of 27 saving the domestic counter-intelligence activities of the CIA would be subject to this review and then follow that with a third recommendation that the Attorney General would be required to advise the President and the oversight committee if he found any irregular-ities in either one of these programs.Senator Mathias. I think that's more reasonable and it does what you want to do which is to force the Attorney General's attention to it.Mr. Aaron. All right. Could we turn for a moment to![image of top secret stamp]
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wmber 27 because it has bracketed portion that we might considerably do away with.That's page 40.The bracketed portion says that the NSC would approve all counter intelligence activities of the CIA in the United States and it spells out a kind of procedure there.Now the net effect of this kind of procedure really is to establish that the FBI 1 without question, I mean the practical effect is that the PRI is without question the counter-intelligence agency and you've got to get the President to approve anything that the CIA is going to do in this Field. And that is really it inside the United States. That's the net effect of this paragraph.Now my own personal view of this paragraph is that it's probably not necessary. We have the NSC committee. It is supposed to resolve the question of where the FBI lets off and the CIA begins and it is an NSC committe that can report to the President if they have a disagreement.I'm not sure I feel strongly about it.Mr. digenova. I would only add that I spoke to John Elliff about this paragraph and he also feels that it's unnecessary to do this. We thinks that this consolidation would be bad, first of all od it's unnecessary second of all.Mr. Miller.  الحركة golication?TOP SECRET
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Mr. diGenova. Aren't you talking about the consolidation?Mr. Aaron. No, we're talking about the paragraph that just precedes it. I'm sorry, this is the bracketed portion. I'll read it out."The CIA should receive NSC approval of all counter-intelligence activities within the United States. This approval should be given by the President and be supported by the recommendation of the NSC counter-intelligence committee, Attorney General and the Director of the FBI. All such projects should be reported annually to the oversight committee."Mr. Maxwell. I would move that we just strike that as unnecessary.Senator Huddleston. That's a vote. We'll be right back.(A brief recess was taken)Senator Huddleston. Well, it's 3.30. Let's see if we can resolve anything.Mr. Aaron. Now the next recommendation, which is number 21 goes to the establishment of a special committee of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, which would review human intelligence collection problems.This is an area where there has been some effort institutionally to try to get a handle on it but it is essentially split about as widely in the government as you can do it. You have a State Department that produces at least> [Figure: TOP SECRET]
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in volume the most material and according to CIA analysts most of that information. a Jarge proportion of that is keved to their report and yet obviously a great deal of clandestine collection is carried out by the CIA itself and the military services account for a significant amount of collection, some of which is extremely important in countries with military governments.The issue then becomes whether there shouldn't be a particular mechanism to deal with it and the proposal here is to create a subcommittee of the CFL for that purpose, or a special committee of the CFI. And the reason for that is to put in the chair the Department of State or the Secretary of State's designee and representatives of the Secretary of State and it would e a committes essentially of the CỦA. the Department of State and the Department of Defense trying to bring some focus into those programs and making some choices and so forth.I might have Bill Bader speak to it. I think the recommendation originates with him.Mr. Båder. This recommendation is part of two basic recommendations that deal with the question of human intelligence collection.First is the question of the approval mechanism. As you'l see when we get into the latter part of the paner, one of these very strong recommendattens that we have as the committee, or is being offered to the committee as a possible recommendation
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is that human collection projects would go to the operations advisory group for approval. That is. for operational approval.As you know from our testimony these kinds of projects do not go to the 40 Committee tyre organizations where they deal with covert action projects.So on the one hand we're hoping to deal with the question of operational approval. In this particular subcommittee we go to the question of overall management and direction of tasking, what should we be doing, what should the United States be doing in the human collection field? Where should we be in x number of years? What should the principal objectives of human collection be?And in this way we hope to bring the diversity that now exists in the community from the CIA to the military services and bring it together under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State who would help provide this kind of overall direction and management quidance.It is not an important elaboration of the committee on foreign intelligence. It should be there in any event because it's a management problem. This gives it focus, this gives the Secretary of State the chairmanship of a committee and I think properly so. that deals with this larger problem of whither human intelligence collection.Mr. Maxwell. It's unclear here whether it's chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State and the DCI and
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92Secretary of Defense are expected to attend or whether they're all supposed to be designers.I don't know what the protocol is but is it likely that the Secretary of Defense would attend if it were a designee of the Secretary of State?Mr. Miller. Sometimes. sure.Mr. Bader. They certainly did on these other committees.But what would you propose?Mr. diGenova. The language is a little unclear.Mr. Bader. Perhaps it should say that the Secretary of State is chairman and he presumably then could designate whomever he pleased.Mr. Kirbow. As a matter of practicality. if the Secretary of State doesn't show up and the Secretary of Defense is there. who's going to chair the meeting?Mr. Aaron. As a matter of practicality if the Secretary of State doesn't show up, the Secretary of Defense won't be there.Mr. Kirbow. And you digress down because he's never going to go to this kind of meeting where he takes up the day to day operations.Aren't you really talking here. don't you leave the language so vague that you fail to imply that what you want is a review of the policies and act the day to day, we need one more agent in Amsterdam and two more in Brussels?![TOP SECRET]
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Mr. Aaron. That's not what we want to convey and soyou are correct.Mr. Kirbow. They should review the rolicies and goals and requirements, really.Mr. digenova. How about policy at the end of the first sentence?Mr. Aaron. Human intelligence collection policy.Senator Huddleston. and eliminate the part about size.Mr. Bader. Revier and rake recommendations with regard to policies and priorities, and then there's a misnrint here.We don't need American .S. clandestine.Mr. Kirbew. Down through the word, the two words, human collection before the last sentence, you get inte kind of a great deal of detail about what they're supposed to consider. whereas if you said they cliculd consider the policies of human intelligence, human collection and the trade-offs between covert and overt collection and the sorts of things you have brought to a committee a consideration of this problem which they have never taken before.Mr. Bader. I think we could add the word policy here and policies and we will underline that.Recommend the cataltichront of a special committee of the CET to review all forstom buman intelligene collectionrolicies: Το κουλτοl make recommendations with regard to the priorities ar! ام وماء.S. glandastins howan colltic> [Figure: TOP SECRET]
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operations and choices bebice vert and clandestine humancollection.Mr. Kirbow. And Mr. Chairman, without going back and belaboring one of the other recommendations, I think that the staff should do that in each instance where we may have given a task to a committee to da a areat deal more detail because even on this domestic counter intelligence activities my earlier recommendation was bat by statute the policies governing domestic counter-intelligence should be considered.You don't want them to consider the day to day operationI don't believe.Mr. Aaron. But I do think that we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that we are interested particularly in the latter case and. I think in this case that you're interested in the program.I mean you just don't want to say it will be the policy of the U.S. to do some or it would be the policy I mean you really want to have an opportunity in a management sense to look at the overall program is the program achieving what it's supposed to achieve, is the scale of the program here as opposed to there in the right balance to reflect our priorities?In other words. I think that.--Mr. Miller It's not a rubber stamp, you're caring.Mr. Aaron. That's right and it isn't just al with> [Figure: TOP SECRET stamp]
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words on paper. It tries to get at the problem of what are the programs and are they doing their job?Mr. diGenova. Who do they make the recommendations to?The CFI?Mr. Aaron. Yes, or the President.Mr. Maxwell. One remark in connection with --Mr. diGenova. Let's make that clear. It just says make recommendations.Mr. Maxwell. In Bill's fix. to specify. I think it was intended that it's all human intelligence collection abroad.Mr. Aaron. Yes, that's right.All right. perhaps we can go on to the next recommendation.Now this is bracketed. I think it might be better first before we take up the bracket let's take up what is not bracketed and just indicate that this is in effect hortatory, if you will.It urges the oversight committee to examine the question of clandestine collection to ensure that it's really focused on things that need clandestine collection that are of high priority, not only the highest, but certainly deserve that kind of risk and effort and areas in which clandestine collection are the only means available so as to emphasize something of the extraordinary nature of espionage.Now beyond that there's the recommendation that the clandestine services like the military services and the foreign service, be subject to a manpower ceiling.![TOP SECRET]
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I think this would not suggest that that ceiling be a public figure but that the Congress establish a manpower ceiling for that, just as it has these other services that serve in the field of national security.Now I know Charley has some reservations about that.Mr. Kirbow. Yes. But to put it in the proper context and I didn't bring it up at that point, nor did Elliot,if you look at the bottom of page 32, ve in car findings section discuss a point on the fact that we don't now whether the size of the clandestine service is the right size.We also indicate that over the past decade the size has heen reduced significantly, particularly in the field.Then we core over here and recommend that there be a manpower ceiling for the clandestine services only of the CIA. Today there is a budget ceiling on the number of people in the CIA that is governed by the amount of money that they det and the amount of money that they put forward to support that kind complement.I objected to kind of the dipoing down process of going into a serment of an agency and limiting its manpower because if we had a crystal ball, we could do that very carefully and properly, I think. But I can't see into the future and two years from now we may need the largest clandestin service we've ever bad because of the problems that would confront the nation and I think that since it is carefully controlled by the Congress
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through its budget levels and manpower levels, let's let theagency decide how many people it takes to run a segment of itsown organization.Mr. Inderfurth. A very special segment. though.Mr. Kirbow. Well, special only because we have concernedourselves with the abuse aspects of it under the assassinationtype thing. Of more concern to us should be the fact that theanalytical section out there probably needs strengtheninginstead of, worrying about regulating the size of the clandestine.service.Mr. Inderfurth. Well, that comes up later as well.Mr. Kirbow. Do you think that size in any way contributdato the plot against Castro or some of these other people?Mr. Inderfurth. I think it has in covert action throughoutLatin America.Mr. Bader. Mr. Chairman. I would support Mr. Kirbow onthis one..My own view is unless you're going to go to the fullextent of addressing the question of establishing mannowerceilings throughout the Central Intelligence Agency, to singleout one directorate at this point doesn't really make muchsense to me. though I understand the principle behind it.Senator Huddleston. Well. I do too. I think we can makea flat statement that you could get too big. that there maybe a point somewhere up there beyond which is a very dangerous![TOP SECRET]
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situation. But I don't think we have determined that anyspecific size has yet been shown to be so detrimental and wecould say that there ought to be a specific level.I think the rest of that paragraph certainly ought tobe continuously examined.Mr. diGenova. The second part of that paragraph reallyassumes that that kind of review would go on and if necessary,the committee could make a recommendation at the appropriatetime.Mr. Aaron. It proposes that kind of a review. Thepurpose of having a manpower ceiling as it exists, as I sayin other agencies where one could argue that you would have thesame problem. the military might have an emergency nextweek which would require an enormous expansion of militaryservices.Now the point of it is to give really simply to give orsuggest that the oversight committee put in its arsenal ofcontrols over the clandestine activities that the CIA: somehandle on the clandestine services number because it makes adifference. I mean they could put their money elsewhere.Senator Mathias. lhow about saying establish and annuallyadiust, or from time to time adiust?Mr. Aaron. The point is not just to set higher limibut rather to say, to have this tool, and even ask the Agencyto tell us what that ceiling you know, they mint well be
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under their authorized strength.Mr. Inderfurth. Another alternative is to say should consider establishing a manpower ceiling.Mr. Kirbow. Could I make the point that oversight of any agency necessarily entails looking at the number of people it has every year because you have to determine how much money they've got to support and they have to come tell you that.If we're going to have an oversight committee, that is one of the functions that it performs. We do it with our military services. but we don't tell them that we can't put them all over in. that they can't put all the Navy people in destroyers..Senator Huddleston. That's right, but I don't think you can exactly equate clandestine operation with other types of agency operations.I think there's a difference here in the potential impact. It's a secret operation.Mr. Aaron. Should consider establishing?Senator Huddleston, I think that It ought to follow the paragraph. Leave the parngrach as it was and say the committee should also consider the advisability of establishing a manpower ceiling.Senator Meblas. Adjustable ceiling.Mr. Kirbow. I won't really know what such rommendation
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docs for this committee recommend to another committee thatmaybe they ought to do something but I guess it's all right.Mr. Aaron. I'm afraid we do that quite a bit.Mr. Miller. We're just laying out the agenda.Mr. Kirbow. Which is not binding on them.Mr. Miller. In the Government Operations Committee one of the provisions of the bill, as you know, is an agenda, and many of the items that are in that agenda are subsumed in this.Mr. Kirbow. Doesn't it go to the make-up of the individual divisions? Overall size of the intelligence community is the way they recommended it, and I think that's a reasonable approach.Mr. Aaron. Turning to the question of the Agency itself.Number 23, this again is not in the category of statutory proposals but in the category of urging the Agency to ensure that the skills of intelligence collection are the primary criteria for advancement within the clandestine services.Senator Mathias. Versus management?Mr. Aaron. Versus covert operations.Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman. on this one I can conceive of nothing that would do more harm to either side of this question than to say to a man who wants to devote his life and take a career in the clandestine service that you can't get promoted on being good at what you're supposed to be doing.You get promoted on being good at this other aspect of it. and**TOP SECRET**![WARD/SAUL]
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think it's just totally cut of keeping with what you want. If you want a good clandestine coeration, you want the best you can find. and I think that he should get the same amount of credit for being good at whatever he's assigned to as being in this other intelligence business.Mr. Aaron. The intelligence business, of course, is their primary mission.Mr. Kirbow. Notif Le's a clandestine operator. That's his primary business and he doesn't have any choice over whether or not he gets assigned when he aces in out there as a junior executive to the clandestine side of the day to day operation.Senator Widdleston. That does this address?Mr. Aaron. This addresses the problem of the clandestine service which goes to the several things. Primarily it collects intelligence. But it is in the nature of, or at least the past history of the Agency, which Bill can speak more directly to than I. that the covert operations people get the better advancement. It's in part built into the system in that you can measure the effect of the covert action operation easier than this endless effort to recruit a good agent many times which will fall through through no fault of the agent himself.Furthermore concre action operatives siroly come to higher level attention caster thar somebody who's a gond agent: