Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 40]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:NGO DINH NHUCONEINDATES:July 11, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: CONEIN states that: "On July 11, 1963, NHU called the generals together forstaff meeting and shocked them by telling them that he knew of some coup planning going onthe generals. This scared the generals and other officers, needless to say, that NGO DINHNHU would be completely aware that there was some dissidence in the ranks." p. 20-21.SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinFILE:STAFF: R. DAWSONDATE: 30 June 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:Krulik, Major General Victor H.Kennedy, John F.Mendenhall, Joseph, StateNational Security CouncilDATES:8/63CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE:Higgins notes that Kennedy dispatched Krulik and Mendenhall to Viet Nam to make a tour ofthe country to determine the effect of the Buddhist crisis on the war against the VietCong. Returning to Washington, Krulik and Mendenhall each gave a different report on theeffect. Higgins notes that Kennedy asked wryly, "llave you two fellows been in the samecountry?" Higgins goes on to note that this was indeed indicative of the American reac-tion to Vietnam generally. Krulik, Higgins points out, visited the theatre of war by go-ing to all core areas as well as six divisional and some twenty-five regimental and bat-talion headquarters. But Mendenhall saw the theatre of the political intrigue, i.e.,Hue in Saigon. These latter two areas was the only Viet Nam that Americans knew duringthat time, and it was the slightly Effett, volital society which was the haven of VietNam's chronically critical and bickering intellectuals. Pages 104-105)SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins,Harper and RoweSTAFF: Dawson
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 41]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:NHƯ, NGO DINHCONEINDATES: CATEGORIES:August 1963 DIEMOCCURRENCE: The coup .... "aborted, because, one, they did not have necessary forces. I'm talking about the coup plotters, did not have the necessary forces to combat those loyal to the DIEM government, namely elements of the Marines, elements of the Rangers, presidential guard, and other units, and especially the Special Forces, which were the best armed troops available. Also, they announced in the press that the CIA was paying to have a coup. This was a very shrewd and calculating move on any man on the quality NGO DINH NH who was a shrewd politician and also master of psychological warfare." pp. 22-23SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinFILE:STAFF: R. DAWSONDATE: 20 June 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCESCOLBYDATES: CATEGORIES:August 1963 DIEMOCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that: "As part of the pressure on the government in the August period, in response to the fact that these SPECIAL FORCES with Vietnamese military and with Vietnamese police had conducted the raid on pagodas, CIA was directed to suspend its assistance to the SPECIAL FORCES. We did not suspend our assistance to the police or to the military who were involved in that, but CIA is an easy thing to turn off, turn on and off. The other programs are much more difficult to turn on and off. In a simple way, I think that has had a certain influence in what they did. I know it resulted in the transfer of several units outside of Saigon when we said we would continue to support them." p. 78-79SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ColbyFILE:STAFF: R. DAWSONDATE: 1 July 1975
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 42]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:MADAME NHUCONEINDATES:August 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:CONEIN states that: "Just before August 21, 1963, there were periods the bonzes burned themselves and that there had been local press releases made by MADAME NHU that were sometimes not too well received by the Americans, and also antagonized the population." p. 21![top secret watermark]SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinFILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAMDIEMCOLBY, WILLIAMNGO DINH NHU, CONEINDATES:August 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMSTAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:31 June 1975![top secret watermark]OCCURRENCE:COLBY stated that the United States sought to put pressure on President DIEM and the government, particularly to remove NGO DINH NHU from the country, to bring about certain changes of policy in August of 1963 that was thought necessary to improve the performance of the government of South Vietnam. Among these were the suspension of Public Law 480 aid the suspension of the commodity import program. And also through various contacts with dissident generals, the United States was requested whether it would stand aside if the generals ran their own coup, and they were given the response in general terms that, "Yes, we would stand aside, and yes, we would continue the aid program if a successor government took over and looked reasonably able to carry on the war. This can only be read as a green light to the generals. This message was passed through a CIA officer, but his credentials were checked by the generals receiving this kind of a message, with the Ambassador and with the Chief of the Military Aid group in Saigon so that there was no question about what U.S. policy was, nor that the CI officer was speaking for the Ambassador with his knowledge and consent."SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 10-11FILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:29 June 1975
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 43]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:DIEMCOLBY, WILLIAMNOLTINGLODGE, Henry CabotDATES:August 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: COLBY testified that during August, 1973 between the change of ambassadors from NOLTING to LODGE, that the government of South Vietnam took that period and raided Buddists pagodas and essentially sought to surpress the Buddihist dissidence. COLBY stated that DIEM went out and supressed this kind of active dissidence, justifying it in his mind and publicly as not accepting this kind of dissidence during a wartime situation, which that country was faced with. COLBY claimed that this suppression only served to adversely affect DIEM's image here in the United States and intensify the feeling of dissent within the educated class in Saigon and in the cities, weakened himself, rather than strengthen himself.![Top Secret Stamp]SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 8-9STAFF:R. DAWSONFILE:DATE:29 June 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:DIEMNOLTING, AMBASSADORRICHARDSON, JOHNDATES:Aug. 7, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: Higgins asked Diem in an interview on August 7, 1963 whether Diem thought the United States was plotting against him. Diem replied: "I do not think Ambassador Nolting is plotting against me. I do not think Richardson / of the CIA/ is plotting against me. I know there are American officials who are preparing the way in the event the decision is taken to try and get rid of me. I cannot forsee the future. And I cannot believe that America would turn against an ally under attack, engaged in a struggle for its very existence. But some people are crazy--and the world is crazy. Still, Miss Higgins, I hope that your government will take a realistic look at these young generals plotting to take my place. How much maturity or political understanding do they have--of their own country, let alone the world?" (169)![Top Secret Stamp]SOURCE:Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper andSTAFF:Dawson, R.
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 44]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:DIEM, LODGE, AMBASSADORDATES:Aug. 7, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMCard 1 of 2OCCURRENCE:During an interview by Higgins with DIEM on August 7, 1963 "...Diem sent an aide for document, which I later deduced to be a memorandum of a recent conversation with an American official.""Your ambassador, "Diem resumed, "comes and tells me that it enhances my posture of the liberal image to permit demonstrations in the street by the Buddhists and the political opposition...I cannot seem to convinvce the embassy that this is Viet Nam--not the United States of America. We have had good reason to ban street demonstrations in the middle of a war, and the reason is that the Viet Cong are everywhere...what would happen if the Viet Cong should infiltrate the demonstration here in Saigon, toss a bomb, kills dozens of persons, including some American press? What would 'liberal opinion' say of me then? Would they believe my government when it said that the Viet Cong were responsible for the killings because only the Communists could profit fromSOURCE:Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,STAFF:Dawson, R.1965DATE: July 2, 1975FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:DIEMCARD TWOCand 2 of 2OCCURRENCE:(continuation) such an event? Consider what happened at Hue. These plastic bombs were throw by the Viet Cong...but whom did the Americans blame? They blamed me--the President of Viet Nam-- and the Vietnamese Army. Would they be any more charitable next time? This is not child's play; I am not inventing Viet Cong terror. Yet when I try to protect the people of this country--including the Americans--by good police work, keeping control in the streets, I am accused of persecuting the Buddhists!" (167)SOURCE:Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,STAFF:Dawson, R.1965DATE: July 2, 1975FILE:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 45]
PERSONS/ENTITIES: Milting, Amb.Affair, Saigon EmbassyHilsman, Roger, Assistant Secretary of StateTrueheart, William Mechlin, Director, USIAViet NamDATES:8/14/63CATEGORIES:DiemCard 1 of 2CARD 1 OCCURRENCE: Higgins points out that on August 14, 1963, Hilsman, in a voice of America broadcast, declared that the Buddhist crisis was "beginning to affect the war effort." Higgins decided to check this story with the Saigon Embassy in approached Milting, who was at that time in conference with Trueheart and Mechlin. Milting told Higgins that "Our report shows that the Buddhist crisis is not having any impact at all--though, of course, it could if riots become severe enough to necessitate diverting front-line troups.""We have made a special check," the Ambassador continued, "of the rumor that Buddhist and Catholics are eating apart an Army messes. Nothing to it. I don't know what Hilsman based this statement on. But he isn't basing it on anything that went out of his Embassy, the military mission, or the CIA." Mechlin suggested to Milting that perhaps he should not publicly deny Hilsman's comment as Hilsman was, after all, Milting's boss." Higgins, returning to New York shortly thereafter, called Hilsman (Continued on Card 2)SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins, Harper and RoweSTAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: July 3, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:Card 2 of 2OCCURRENCE: Card 2to find out what was the basis for his broadcast. Hilsman conceded that in fact he had based his account upon the reports in the New York Times and other press dispatches out of Saigon. (page 124-125).SOURCE:STAFF:FILE:DATE:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 46]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:DiemDATES:14 August 1963CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE:TOP SECRETIn the Current Intelligence Memorandum (OCI 2339/63): "Coup Rumors in South Vietnam" the following quotation appeared: " . . . the coup reports and rumors which have arisen since the Buddhist crisis seem to reflect some serious coup plotting, we have no firm evidence of advanced planning by any group to attempt to overthrow the regime . . ." (2).SOURCE:1967 I.G. Report, part c, p. 2FILE:CageSTAFF:RDDATE:6/28/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:DIEMBall, Undersecretary of StateHelms, RichardColby, Wm.DATES:8/21/63CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE:TOP SECRETOn 21 August 1963, South Vietnamese troops and police attacked the occupied Buddhist pagodas throughout the country. DIEM imposed nationwide martial law. At a presidential meeting on Vietnam on this same date, the participants from the CIA, including the DCI, DDP, and Chief of Far Eastern Division, it was pointed out that on notes taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Division that "on the matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it was pointed out that there was no indication that DIEM was not in full control." (2)SOURCE:1967 I.G. Report, Part CFILE:CageSTAFF:RDDATE:6/28/75
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 47]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:DIEMDATES:8/21/63CATEGORIES:DiemTOP SECRETOCCURRENCE:On 21 August 1963, the current intelligence memorandum (OCI 2341/63):"Coup Rumors in South Vietnam" stated that "additional reports of plot-ting against the DIEM government have been received. While there is nohard evidence of imminent action, the Buddhist issue continues to make thesituation dangerous." (3)SOURCE:1967 I.G. Report, Part c, p.3FILE:CageSTAFF:RDDATE:6/28/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINDINHNGO DINH NHU, GENERAL DONDATES:21 August 1963 DIEMCATEGORIES:TOP SECRETOCCURRENCE:"During the period between 21 August and the lifting of marshall law on 16September, GENERAL DINH actually considered himself the hero of Vietnam and the savior ofthe DIEM regime. DINH, on approximately 31 August had the audacity to inform both PresidentDIEM and counsellor NHU that he was their savior and requested a ministerial post for himsellNHU's reaction was to order him to Dalat for a rest."During this period of time, DINHrealized that he had been played for a dupe by DIEM. The generals would recognize this factand GENERAL DON started playing on DINH's vanity by telling him that he was a real hero andthat, above all, should have been thanked by DIEM and NHU for saving the government.pp. 12-13SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975 , Exhibit 1, ConeinSTAFF:R. DAWSONDATE.
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 48]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:DiemDATES:August 21, 1963CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE: (card 1)Higgins characterizes the raids *anxakai* on the XaLoi and onAugust 21, 1963, as the turning point in American policy toward Viet Nam. She states that this crystalizes the feelings of a powerful action inside the Kennedy Administration that Diem had to be opposed." raised stories from Saigon scene that had all the inventiveness of an Oriental Ian Fleming. Soldiers in battle dress were wearing gasmasks "stormed" into shortly after midnight. A of bells, a blood-curdling scream shattered the spirits serenity. One eye witness professed to see two monks thrown twenty feet from a balcony. Extravagant rumors about the number of death and wounded spread like a wild malignancy."When the United Nations in Viet Nam investigated the rumors in charges(Gontinue to Card 2) 3 months later, he could find no evidence that anyone had been killed!SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite IligginsHarper and RoweThe investigators talked at length - who had beenSTAFF: DawsonDATE: July 2, 1975FILE: present during the entire affair Xa Loi and elsewhere. (180-81)PERSONS/ENTITIES:DIEMBall, Undersecretary of StateHelms, RichardColby, Wm.DATES:8/21/63CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE:On 21 August 1963, South Vietnamese troops and police attacked the occupied Buddhist pagodas throughout the country. DIEM imposed nationwide martial law. At a presidential meeting on Vietnam on this same date, the participants from the CIA, including the DCI, DDP, and Chief of Far Eastern Division, it was pointed out that on notes taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Division that "on the matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it was pointed out that there was no indication that DIEM was not in full control."(2)SOURCE:1967 I.G. Report, Part CSTAFF:RDFILE: CageDATE:6/28/75
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 49]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:21 AUG. thru16 SEPT.CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:During the period between 21 August and the lifting of martial law on 16 September, General Dinh actually considered himself the hero of Vietnam and the savior of the Diem Regime.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 12.STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:GENERAL DINHCATEGORIES:DIEMDATES:11/1/6321 AUG. thru16 SEPT. '63OCCURRENCE:Dinh's actions during this period as Military Governor did not endear him to the population or the other officers.SOURCE: Hearings, S. S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 12.STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 50]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:HILLSMAN, Roger (AssistantSecretary of State for FarEastern Affairs)CIADATES:8/22/63CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE:On August 22, 1963, in a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63334), the followingmessage appeared: "Ref dept. telegram in process. Reftel (which Hqs.not yet seen) states basic line to be taken and directs that it be pushedat all levels. Hilisman requested Hqs. send companion telegram to stationpointing out this is one technique to bring about surfacing of where andwho real power is. Pressing this line could maximize possibility of obtain-ing US objective. Even if it does not succeed, it can substantiallyassist in identification of alternate or successor leadership with necessarydrive, abilities and ambition, to incorporate in our overall contingencyplanning and serve as focus of build-up program. Hqs. will comment and inSOURCE:1967 I.G. Report, Part CSTAFF:RDDATE:6/28/75FILE:CagePERSONS/ENTITIES:HILLSMAN, Roger (AssistantSecretary of State for FarEastern Affairs)CIADATES:8/22/63CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE:CARD #2further detail after seeing message, if necessary, but passes above atHilisman's request." (3)SOURCE:1967 I.G. Report, part c, p.3STAFF:RDDATE:6/28/75FILE:Cage
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CIARICHARDSON, John (CIA station chief in Saigon)Saigon EmbassyDIEMDATES:8/22/63CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE:On August 22, 1963, in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0208) Chief of Station RICHARDSON forwarded his personal views concerning alternate leadership: "... Recent events have made us feel that hope for civilian government to replace DIEM administration is unrealistic. The solution seems even more improbable than ever before. Would appear that we should have either DIEM or military junta... View time factor have not coordinated this message with embassy but we have exchanged views fully on subject matter." (3-4)SOURCE:1967 I.G. Report, part c, pp 34STAFF:RDFILE:CageDATE:6/28/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:HILLSMAN, ROGERLODGE, HENRY CABOTCONEINDATES:22 or 23 August 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: LODGE arrived on 22 or 23 August. When he arrived he found that Saigon was armed camp. "During this period of these attacks on the pagodas, there had been many contacts made by a lot of people to anybody who would listen to them talking about doing something about doing away with the existing regime, I had talked with different generals and the one in August -- I don't recall if it was the 23rd or 24th, we received a cable which later been known as the famous ROGER HILLSMAN cable which practically gave us the go-ahead that this type of thing could not continue." pp. 21-22SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinSTAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 52]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINDATES:23 August 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:"There was a lot of talk of coups. We met with generals on different occasion. I met with them, other people had also. We had met with colonels and junior officers. And we anticipated that there would be some type of action taken in the latter part of August. p. 22."SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinFILE:# TOP SECRETSTAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:30 June 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:HARRIMAN, W. Averrel (Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs)HELMS (Deputy Director for Plans, (CIA))RUSK, Dean (Secretary of State)GILPATRICK Roswell (Deputy Sec. of Defense)OCCURRENCE:On August 24, 1963, in a telephone call from HARRIMAN to HELMS at 2000 hours, HARRIMAN outlined to HELMS the substance of what eventually turned out to be Deptel 243 to Saigon. In notes recorded by HELMS, in response to HELMS' query, "HARRIMAN confirmed that the thrust of the telegram contained an implicit pullout of American forces and support if the Nhus' were not ousted. HARRIMAN said the message had been cleared 'with Hyannisport'.) with the Secretary of State and with Mr. GILPATRICK."(4)DATES:8/24/63CATEGORIES:DiemSOURCE:1967 I.G. Report, part C, p.4STAFF:RDFILE:CageDATE:6/28/75
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 53]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:HILSMAN, Roger (Ass't. Sec. State for Far Eastern Aff -- FE)LODGE, Henry Cabot (Amb. to SVN)DATES:25 August 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOn August 25, 1963, in a cable from HILSMAN to LODGE (personal), sent via CIA channels (DIR 63854), there appeared the following message:"State cable sent separately represents agonizing at highest levels. Course outlined is dangerous but all agree that delaying clear cut US stand is even more dangerous. It won't be easy for you, but be assured we will back you all the way." (5)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 5STAFF: DawsonFILE: PART CDATE: 28.6.75PERSONS/ENTITIES:CIALODGE, Henry CabotDATES:25 Aug. 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63855), of August 25, 1963, the following message appeared:"FYI CIA not consulted re cable being sent separately, which however cleared at highest levels. In circumstances believe CIA must fully accept directives of policy makers and seek ways accomplish objectives they seek. While have not seen exact text, understand it invites LODGE final judgment. . . Danger in present course of action appears to be throwing away bird in hand before we adequately identified birds in bush, or songs they may sing. Thus suggest a real search for courses of action which might retain options in our hands at same time as taking positive stand rather than waiting for situation to clarify (at which point we probably unable to affect it.) This boils down to seeking some middle ground for at least interim period.. . ." (7)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 7STAFF: Dawson
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 54]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:HARDSON, Saigon Chief of StationKHANH, General (SVN)VERA, CIA officer in SaigonDATES:25 August 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMCIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0291), the following message appears on August 25, 1963:CHIEF OF STATION RICHARDSON reports that GENERAL KHANH requested an immediate meeting with VERA [an officer of the CIA Saigon Station]. At the meeting, KHANH requested assurances that the U.S. Government would support the VIETNAMESE ARMY if it should move against the DIEM REGIME." (7)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 7PART CFILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:CIADATES:26 August 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMSTAFF: DawsonDATE: 28.6.75OCCURRENCE:On August 26, 1963, in a CIA document entitled "ONE Staff Memorandum, No. 60-63, Internal ONE Working Paper, CIA Distribution Only," the following statement appears:"On balance, we believe the best hope for the preservation of US interests and attainment of US objectives in South Vietnam lies in the possibility of a coup d'etat by anti-Communist nationalists with sufficient military support to obviate prolonged civil war. Such a group might not prove able to salvage the situation and, indeed, might eventually prove no better than the present regime. Such a development would, however, enable the US and anti-Communist nationalist elements to make a fresh start unencumbered and unhampered by political errors of past years, months, and weeks. In such a fresh start, we believe, lies the only viable hope for the attainment of US interests and objectives in South Vietnam." (8)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 8FILE:STAFF: