Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 112]
Out of these March 1960 meetings of the NSC and Special Group came the general covert action plan against Cuba.*Against this background of general discussions of Cuba, we considered certain remarks appearing in the records of a March 10, 1960 National Security Council meeting and a March 14, 1960 Special Group meeting.The record of the NSC meeting of March 10, 1960 (at which President Eisenhower was present) states that Admiral Arleigh Burke, in commenting on Allen Dulles' statement that the Cuba covert action plan was in preparation, "suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package deal, since many of the Cuban leaders around Castro were even worse than Castro." (Gray Ex. 2, p. 9). And, according to the minutes of a Special Group meeting on March 14, 1960 (which President Eisenhower did not attend) "there was a general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously." (Gray Ex. 3, p. 2).Admiral Burke, who served as Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 to 1961, stated in an affidavit** that although he did not have a specific recollection of the March 10, 1960 meeting of the National Security Council, he had a clear recollection of the discussions of Cuba policy that took place in the spring of 1960. (Burke affidavit, p. 1). Burke stated that the reference to the suggestion by him at the March 10, 1960 meeting "clearly refers to the* As Gray testified, this plan covered four areas: sabotage, economic sanctions, propaganda, and training of a Cuban exile force for a possible invasion. Gray stated that this plan had nothing to do with assassination. (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 17).** Admiral Burke was unable to testify in person before the Committee because he was in the hospital.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 113]
# TOP SECRETgeneral covert action plan reported by Allen Dulles at that meeting and tothe general consideration given at that time in the U. S. Government toidentify Cuban groups with which the U.S. might work to overthrow the Castroregime." (Burke affidavit, p. 1). Burke stated:"In this connection, it was my view that the U.S. must supportthose Cuban groups who would have a sufficient power base amongthe Cuban people, not merely to overthrow Castro, but to beable to cope with and dismantle his organization as well. Itwas my firm belief at the time that many people in Castro'sorganization were Communist and that Castro was probably aCommunist. I therefore advocated that any effort to supportgroups so as to achieve Castro's overthrow must focus, notmerely on the leaders at the top of the Castro regime, but onthe very strong organization that had been the key to Castro'srise to power, and was the basis for his power." (Burke affidavit,p. 1-2).*Burke stated further:"The question of a Castro assassination never arose at the March 10,1960 NSC meeting or at any other meeting or discussion that Iattended or in which I participated. It is my firm convictionbased on five years of close association with President Eisenhowerduring my service as Chief of Naval Operations, that PresidentEisenhower would never have tolerated such a discussion,or have permitted anyone to propose assassination, nor would hehave ever authorized, condoned, or permitted an assassinationattempt." (Burke affidavit, p. 2).Gray testified that the discussion at the March 10 and March 14,1960 meetings dealt with plans to overthrow the Castro government, rather thanto assassinate Castro himself. He said that Admiral Burke's recorded commentat the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting was part of a lengthy and general discussionof the problem of Cuba. At the outset of that discussion, it was Under Secretaryof State Douglas Dillon who pointed out that "the result of Castro's disappearancemight be a Communist takeover." (Gray Ex. 2, p. 7; Gray, p. 11). And
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 114]
# TOP SECRETAdmiral Burke's reference to a "package deal" for the removal of Cuban leaders was in direct response to a comment by Allen Dulles recorded in the minutes that "a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being worked on." (Gray Ex. 2, p. 9; Gray pp. 13-14). Gray said he believed that Mr. Dulles "was certainly referring to" the Eisenhower Administration's plan to train Cuban exiles for an invasion, rather than a targeted attempt on Castro's life.*/ (Gray pp. 14, 45). Gray testified that viewing Admiral Burke's remarks in context, he believed it was clear that "Admiral15[^1] A CIA memorandum of an internal CIA meeting (Memorandum of First Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force, March 9, 1960), shows that the first meeting of the CIA task force established to plan the training of a Cuban exile force was held on March 9, 1960, the day before the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting. (Memorandum of First Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force, March 9, 1960). At that March 9, 1960, CIA meeting, the CIA task force discussed "an operation directed at the overthrow of the Castro regime" and described that operation as one in which a Cuban exile force would be trained for "6-7 months." In the discussion of this operation, it was noted that a principal problem was the weakness of the Cuban exile groups which "had no real leader and are divided into many parts," but it was hoped that during the long training period the "opposition groups will have been merged and will have formed a government-in-exile to which all trained elements could be attached." (Id., p. 2).According to the memorandum of the meeting, J. C. King, chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere division had stated, "unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could be eliminated in onepackage - which is highly unlikely - this operation can be a long, drawn-out affair and the present government will only be overthrown by the use of force." (Id., p. 1).NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 115TOP SECRET[^1]: */
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TOP SECRETBurke was expressing his opinion that if you have any plan for theoverthrow of Castro/ it ought to take these factors into consideration, thatyou might end up with a Communist government." (Gray, p. 45).With respect to the March 14, 1960 Special Group meeting, AdmiralBurke stated that the "general discussion" referred to in the record of thatmeeting "clearly did not involve a discussion of assassination of Cuban leaders,but to the possible effects should only those leaders be overthrown by a groupnot powerful enough to also master the organization those leaders had establishedin Cuba." (Burke affidavit, p. 2) Burke stated further:"Thus, it was consistent with my views then that I should havebeen recorded in the record of the March 14 meeting as warningin this discussion that the Communists might move into controleven if these three top leaders should be overthrown. As statedabove, I strongly believed that a strong, organized group mustbe in the forefront of any effort to overthrow the Castrogovernment." (Burke affidavit, p. 2).In any event, when a question "whether any real planning had beendone for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara"was subsequently asked at a Special Group meeting on November 3, 1960, theDeputy Director of the CIA, General Cabell, according to the record of thatmeeting, pointed out"that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highlydangerous in conception and execution, because the instrumentsmust be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of thenecessity for simultaneous action, it would have to be concludedthat (such action) is beyond our capabilities." (Gray Ex. 1, p. 3).[^1] The record of the March 14 meeting states: "Admiral Burke said that theonly organized group within Cuba today were the Communists and there was thereforethe danger they might move into control." (Gray Ex. 3, p. 2)TOP SECRETNW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 116[^1]: *
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TOP SECRETThe reference to "direct positive action" is ambiguous and can be subject to a number of different interpretations, including a question suggesting exploration of assassination.*However, it is clear that at most a question was being asked. Moreover, assuming that "direct positive action" meant killing, it is significant that shortly after assassination plots were begun, the CIA Deputy Director told the Special Group that such action was "beyond our capabilities."* Testimony varied as to the meaning of the phrase "direct positive action" and General Cabell's response in the November 3, 1960 memorandum.Gray testified that the phrase "direct positive action" could be taken to include assassination, but he did not know whether Mr. Merchant intended to refer to assassination or not. (Gray, 7/9, p. 9).Parrott, the author of the memorandum, testified that, although he had no recollection of the November 3, 1960 meeting, it was his opinion, based on the context of weekly Special Group meetings and discussion in the Fall of 1960, that this discussion centered on the possibility of a palace coup, as opposed to a paramilitary operation mounted from outside Cuba; General Cabell was indicating that "we simply do not have agents inside of Cuba to carry out this kind" of a coup. (Parrott, pp. 19-21) Parrott also testified that the phrase "direct positive action" was not a euphemism, and that he did not employ euphemisms in Special Group records, except for references to the President. (Parrott, pp. 19-21). We discuss in greater detail at pp. ______, and ______ other ambiguous phrases in minutes and memoranda drafted by Parrott.Bissell testified that he found it "difficult to understand" that General Cabell would have told the Special Group that it was beyond the CIA's capabilities to take "direct positive action" (if that referred to assassination) in light of Bissell's assumption that General Cabell was informed of the CIA/ underworld assassination effort. (Bissell, 7/17, pp. 15-18).Mr. Merchant was unable to testify because of ill health and orders of his physician.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 117]
TABLE OF CONTENTSc. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION(i) PRE-BAY OF PIGS ASSASSINATION PLOTS 1a. BISSELL WAS OF THE OPINION THAT DULLES HAD INFORMEDPRESIDENT KENNEDY THAT THE ASSASSINATION OPERATION HADBEEN PLANNED AND WAS BEING ATTEMPTED 1b. BISSELL TESTIFIED HE DID NOT INFORM THE PRESIDENT ORWHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS OF THE ONGOING ASSASSINATIONPLOTS 1c. KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DENTED KNOWLEDGE OFASSASSINATION EFFORTS AND GAVE OPINION THAT PRESIDENTKENNEDY WAS NOT INFORMED 6d. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ASSASSINATION EFFORTS WEREDISCLOSED IN VARIOUS BRIEFINGS OF ADMINISTRATIONOFFICIALS 10(i) BRIEFING OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 10(ii) DISCUSSION WITH BUNDY ON "EXECUTIVE ACTIONCAPABILITY" 11(iii) TAYLOR/KENNEDY BAY OF PIGS INQUIRY 12(iv) MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 13e. CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY ANDGEORGE SMATHERS 16
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 118]
TOP SECRET -- FOR INTERNAL COMMITTEE USE ONLY (DRAFTING SUBCOMMITTEE) 8/29/75c. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATIONThe evidence on the issue of whether or not assassination plots were authorized during the Kennedy Administration is divided herein into two broad sections. The first primarily relates to the assassination operation involving underworld figures and occurring prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion of April, 1961. The second section deals with the Post-Bay of Pigs period, including the Roselli operation in the spring of 1962, Operation Mongoose, the laboratory schemes in early 1963, and the AM/LASH plot in the fall of 1963.(i) PRE-BAY OF PIGS ASSASSINATION PLOTSThe pattern of testimony for this period was essentially the same as for the Eisenhower Administration. Bissell, once again, said he assumed and believed that Dulles had met with President Kennedy and informed him, in a circumlocutious fashion, that the operation had been planned and was being attempted. Bissell also testified that he (Bissell) did not inform the President about the assassination efforts or any of the other non-CIA persons with whom he was working on covert Cuban operations. The Kennedy Administration officials all testified that they did not know about or authorize the plots. Furthermore, they said they did not believe the President did or would authorize an assassination plot.There were for this period no significant contemporaneous documents.a. BISSELL WAS OF THE OPINION THAT DULLES HAD INFORMED PRESIDENT KENNEDY THAT THE ASSASSINATION OPERATION HAD BEEN PLANNED AND WAS BEING ATTEMPTEDWhen John F. Kennedy became President in January, 1961, Richard Bissell was still Deputy Director for Plans and the principal agency official responsible for the ongoing efforts against the Castro regime, including both the Bay of Pigs operation and the assassination plots. Bissell is the only sur-
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 119]
Page 2viving CIA policy maker with first hand knowledge of high-level decision-making in the early phases of the Castro assassination efforts. Bisselltestified that he believed Allen Dulles had informed the President (althoughDulles did not so inform him) and that accordingly the plots had been approvedby the highest authority. Bissell was questioned about how he felt the Pres-ident would have been made aware of the plots:"Senator Baker: ... You have no reason to thinkthat he [Dulles] didn't or he did [brief PresidentKennedy]. But the question I put was whether ornot in the ordinary course of the operations ofthe CIA as you know it under their traditions,their rules and regulations, their policies asyou knew them what in your opinion -- [w]as thePresident, President-elect briefed or was he inthe light of all these circumstances?Bissell: I believe at some stage the Presidentand the President-elect both were advised that suchan operation had been planned and was being attempted.Senator Baker: By whom?Bissell: I would guess through some channel byAllen Dulles.The Chairman: But you're guessing, aren't you?Mr. Bissell: I am, Mr. Chairman, and I have said thatI cannot recollect the giving of such briefing atthe meeting with the President-elect in November orin any meeting with President Eisenhower." (6/9/75,pp. 38-39).Bissell's testimony varied with respect to the force with which he statedhis belief that the President had been informed. Once he referred to it as"a pure personal opinion" (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 60-1); on another occasion hetestified as follows:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 120]
"Senator Morgan: Mr. Bissell, it's a serious matter to attribute knowledge of this sort to the President of the U.S., especially one who cannot speak for himself. Is it fair to assume that out of an abundance of caution you are simply telling us that you have no knowledge unless you are absolutely certain?... I gather that you think ...it [assassination plot information] came out but because of the seriousness of the accusation you are just being extremely cautious...is that a fair assumption to make?Bissell: That is very close to a fair assumption, sir. It's just that I have no direct knowledge, first-hand knowledge of his [President Kennedy's] being advised, but my belief is that he knew of it. [assassination plans)." (Bissell, 6/9, p. 56).When asked why he had not himself informed White House officials or the President of the assassination plots, Bissell said since Dulles was the DCI, he "left the question of advising senior officials of the government and obtaining clearances in Allen Dulles' hands" (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 29, 33).As with President Eisenhower, Bissell said that, based upon his testimony that Dulles knew about the assassination plot, he "assumed" that Dulles"had at least intimated [to President Kennedy] that some such thing was underway." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 33).** The Presidential logs from the Kennedy Administration indicate only one meeting before the Bay of Pigs invasion at which the President and Allen Dulles may have met privately. This meeting took place on March 25, 1961. (There is no record of the meeting. We feel compelled to state that the fact of this meeting, on the evidence available, is of little, if any significance or relevance.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 121]
Page 4Again as part of his "pure personal opinion" (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 60) that this was done, Bissell speculated that Dulles would have engaged in a "circumlocutious" sort of conversation. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 6), using "rather general terms."Bissell repeatedly coupled Eisenhower and Kennedy together when he speculated about the manner in which he felt the Presidents would have been advised to maintain "plausible deniability." (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 38, 57; 6/11/75, pp. 5-6):"In the case of an operation of high sensitivity of the sort that we are discussing, there was a further objective that would have been pursued at various levels, and that was specifically with respect to the President, to protect the President. And, therefore, the way in which I believe that Allen Dulles would have attempted to do that was to have indicated to the two successive Presidents the general objective of the operation that was contemplated, to make that sufficiently clear so that the President either President Eisenhower or President Kennedy could have ordered the termination of the operation, but to give the President just as little information about it as possible beyond an understanding of its general purpose. Such an approach to the President would have had as its purpose to leave him in the position to deny knowledge of the operation if it should surface."My belief a belief based, as I have said, only to me knowledge of command relationship of Allen Dulles as an individual, and of his mode of operations -- is that authorization was obtained by him in the manner that I have indicated. I used the word on Monday "circumlocutious," and it was to this approach that I referred."Assuming for the moment that I am correct, since the effort would have been to minimize the possibility of embarrassment to the President, it is, I think, understandable that neither I nor anyone else in the Agency would have discussed this operation on our own initiative with, for instance, members of the White House staff.NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 122
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The effort would have been to hold to the absolute minimum the number of people who knew that the President had been consulted, had been notified and had given, perhaps only tacitly, his authorization." (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 5-6).However, Bissell testified that Dulles never told him he had briefed President Kennedy and he did not recall asking Dulles. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 34; 6/11/75, p. xx; 7/17/75, p. 27). In contrast, Bissell testified that on certain other occasions, Dulles had mentioned that a "circumlocutious" approach had been used to brief President Eisenhower on sensitive subjects (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 10-14). Bissell also said that he never asked to what degree Dulles had advised McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, of the assassination plot. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 34).b. BISSELL TESTIFIED HE DID NOT INFORM THE PRESIDENT OR WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS OF THE ONGOING ASSASSINATION PLOTS.When asked if he had informed anyone outside the CIA that an effort to assassinate Fidel Castro was underway, Bissell stated, "not to my recollection."He added that he was not told that any Administration official had been made aware of such efforts. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 28-30).After the change of Administration, McGeorge Bundy was the White House official who was the liaison with Bissell concerning Cuba and in general was the principal White House official responsible for CIA matters (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 16). Bundy was a former student of Bissell's at Yale and they were personal friends (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 28). Bissell testified that he did not tell Bundy about the ongoing Castro assassination plots (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 28-29; 7/22, p. 31), and Bundy confirmed this (Bundy, p. 41).
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Page 6Cuban affairs during this period leading up to the Bay of Pigs received active high-level attention. Bissell said that, in a continuation of the kind of intense weekly scrutiny the Eisenhower Administration had given the invasion plans (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 13)."...almost from the beginning of the Kennedy Administration, the President himslef and a number of Cabinet members and other senior officials took a very active interest in the operation(s) concerning Cuba." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 16).Bissell "almost invariably" was present at meetings in which the President and other senior officials took an "active interest" in Cuba (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 17). Bissell testified that he did not inform any of them of the assassination plot. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 39).c. KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF ASSASSINATION EFFORTS AND GAVE OPINION THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS NOT INFORMEDTestimony was taken by the Committee from all living officials high in the Kennedy Administration who dealt with Cuban affairs.* The theme of their testimony -- which is set forth in detail below -- was that they had no knowledge of any assassination plan or attempt by the U.S. government before or after the Bay of Pigs invasion.As with the Eisenhower Administration officials, members of the Kennedy Administration also said they did not believe the President's character or style of operating would be consistent with approval of such a matter. (McNamara, p. 4; Bundy, p. 98; Taylor, pp. 45,51).* Most of the testimony from officials high in the Kennedy Administration dealt with the period after the Bay of Pigs invasion, involving Operation Mongoose and related activities. (See Section ,infra.) It was during this period that most of the high officials in the White House, State Department, Defense Department, and the CIA were drawn into the detailed planning of Cuban operations. During this period, an *extraordinary* amount of decision making memoranda and other documents were generated in response to the Cuban situation.
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Secretary of State Dean Rusk testified:"I never had any reason to believe that anyone that I ever talked to knew about had any active planning of assassination underway." (Rusk, pp. 65,49).Likewise, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated that he had "no knowledge or information about...plans or preparations for a possible assassination attempt against Premier Castro." (McNamara, pp. 7,4). [The question of whether McNamara once raised the issue of assassinating Castro is discussed at Section ,infra.]Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense under McNamara, said that killing Castro was not within the mandate of the Special Group which he construed to be the weakening and undermining of "the Cuban system." (Gilpatric, p. 28).This was supported by General Maxwell Taylor, who chaired Special Group meetings on Operation Mongoose. Taylor stated that he had "never heard" of the assassination effort against Castro (Taylor, pp. 72, 7-8). Taylor stated that he never raised the question of assassination with anyone. (Taylor, p. 19). Moreover, Taylor testified that he was not aware of a directive for an assassination effort from the President or the Attorney General, nor was he aware of a proposal for the assassination of a foreign leader in any form by anyone to the Special Group (Taylor, pp. 41,45,62).McGeorge Bundy stated that it was his "conviction" that "no one in the Kennedy Administration, in the White House, or in the Capitol, ever gave any authorization, approval, or instruction of any kind for any effort to assassinate anyone by the CIA." (Bundy, p. 54)