Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 162]
doubt concerning whether assassination was authorized by the Administrations. Even if the plots were not expressly authorized, it does not follow that the Agency personnel believed they were acting improperly.1. The Command and Control System for Assassinations Was Such That the Plots Could Have Been Undertaken Without Express AuthorizationAs emphasized throughout this report, we are unable to draw firm conclusions concerning responsibility for the assassination plots. Even after our long investigation, it is unclear whether the conflicting and inconclusive state of the evidence is due to the system of plausible denial and its attendant doctrines, or whether there were in fact serious shortcomings in the system of authorization which made it possible for assassination efforts to have been undertaken by agencies of the United States Government without express authority from officials outside of those agencies.Our preeminent finding is that assassination could have been undertaken by an agency of the United States Government without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 163]
-15-explicit authorization from the highest level. The commandand control system revealed by the record made it possible forthe CIA to have engaged in assassination activities withoutexpress authorization by officials outside the Agency.The ambiguity and imprecision in the record illustratesthe dangers of a "plausible denial" system in which the preciselevel of authorization may be difficult to ascertain. Whilethere is no evidence that the "plausible denial" system hassucceeded in shielding decision makers in the cases consideredin this report, the possibility that a system exists whichmight permit those responsible for authorizing major operationsto escape responsibility is disturbing. Responsible governmentrequires that public officials be held accountable for theirdecisions.2. Findings Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Were   Authorizeda. DiemWe find that neither the President nor any otherofficial in the United States Government authorized the assas-sination of Diem and his brother Nhu. Both the DCI and topState Department officials did know, however, that the deathof Nhu at least at one point had been contemplated by the coupleaders. To the contrary, when the possibility that the coupleaders were considering assassination was brought to the
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 164]
TOP SECRET-16-attention of the DCI, he directed that the United States would have no part in such activity, and this information was relayed to the coup leaders.b. SchneiderWe find that neither the President nor any other official in the United States Government authorized the assassination of General Rene Schneider. The CIA, and perhaps the White House, did know that coup leaders contemplated kidnap- ping, which, as it turned out, resulted in Schneider's death.c. TrujilloThe Presidents and other senior officials in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations sought the overthrow of Trujillo and approved general actions to obtain that end. The DCI and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter- American Affairs knew that the Dominican dissidents intended to assassinate Trujillo, but the date at which the dissidents' intent to assassinate was communicated to higher levels of the government responsible for formulating policy is less clear. The record does establish that in the Spring of 1961 senior American officials, including the President, learned that the dissidents intended to assassinate Trujillo and that they desired machine guns for that purpose. The Special Group disapproved passage of those weapons and the President himself, in a telegram, reaffirmed that decision, indicating that the
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 165]
TOP SECRETUnited States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone assassination", although he did state that if the coup succeeded, the United States would support the plotters.d. LumumbaThe chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the assassination plot was authorized by the President. It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot.The juxtaposition of discussions concerning "disposing of" Lumumba and taking "straightforward action" against him at NSC and Special Group meetings with Dulles' cable to the Congo, Bissell's representation to Gottlieb about "highest authority", and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support an inference that the President and the Special Group urged the assassination of Lumumba.Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does, as he said, offer a "clue" about Presidential authorization which, however, should be read in light of the uncertain record of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary testimony of others in attendance at the meetings, including the President's national security advisors. The fact that both the Chief of Station and Gottlieb were under the impression that there was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization becauseNW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 166
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 166]
this impression was derived solely from Gottlieb's meetings with Bissell and Tweedy. Neither Gottlieb nor the Chief of Station had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements about Presidential authorization. Richard Bissell assumed that such authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles, but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event when this occurred.The evidence leads us to conclude that DDP Bissell and DCI Dulles knew about and authorized the plot to assassinate Lumumba. However, we are unable to make a finding that President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute certainty in the evidence.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 167]
## e. CastroThere was no evidence from which the Committee could conclude that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson, their close advisors, or the Special Group authorized the assassination of Castro.We find that the effort against Castro was clearly authorized through the level of DDP. It is not certain whether Allen Dulles knew about the plots, although Bissell and Edwards were of the opinion that he did, and the credibility of their beliefs is buttressed by the fact that Dulles knew about the Lumumba assassination plot, which was planned and attempted at the time of the early Castro plots. We can find no evidence that McCone was aware of the plots which occurred during his tenure. His DDP, Richard Helms, testified that he never discussed the subject with McCone and was never expressly authorized by anyone to assassinate Castro.The only suggestion of express Presidential authorization for the plots against Castro was Richard Bissell's opinion that Dulles would have circumlocutiously informed Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy after the assassination had been planned and was underway. The assumptions underlying this opinion are too attenuated for the Committee to adopt it as a finding.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 168]
First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plots, a matter which is not certain. Second, it assumes that Dulles went privately to the two Presidents--a course of action which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than Bissell, testified was precisely what the doctrine of plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing. Third, it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand from a "circumlocutious" description that assassination was being discussed.The chain of assumptions is far too speculative for the Committee to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not able to speak for themselves. Moreover, it is inconsistent with Bissell's other testimony that "formal and explicit" approval would be required for assassination,* and contrary to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy.* If the evidence concerning President Eisenhower's order to assassinate Lumumba is correct, it should be weighed against Bissell's testimony concerning circumlocutious briefings of the Presidents in the Castro case. First, the Lumumba case would imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously. Second, the Lumumba example indicates that the President would discuss such matters openly in an appropriate forum, and would not need to be approached privately. Third, it can be inferred from Bissell's testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had told Dulles that he approved of the plot, Dulles would not have told anyone else of that fact. Yet Gottlieb's testimony in the Lumumba case states that he had been told of Presidential authorization for assassination by Bissell, who in turn assumed he was told by Dulles.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 169]
# TOP SECRET-20-Helms and McCone testified that the Presidents under which they served never asked them to consider assassination.There was no evidence whatsoever that President Johnson knew about or authorized any assassination activity during his Presidency.3. CIA Officials Involved in the Assassination Operations Perceived Assassination To Have Been A Permissible Course of ActionThe CIA officials involved in the targeted assassination attempts testified that they had believed that their activities had been fully authorized.*In the case of the Lumumba assassination operation, Richard Bissell testified that he had no direct recollection of authorization, but after having reviewed the cables and Special Group minutes, testified that authority must have flowed from Dulles through him to the subordinate levels in the Agency.In the case of the assassination effort against Castro, Bissell and Sheffield Edwards testified they believed the operation involving underworld figures had been authorized by Dulles when they briefed him shortly after the plot had been initiated. William Harvey testified he believed that the* The lower level operatives, such as O'Connell and the AM/LASH case officers, are not discussed in this section, since they had clear orders from their immediate superiors.NW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 170
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 170]
TOP SECRET-21-plots "were completely authorized at every appropriate level within and beyond the Agency", although he had "no personal knowledge whatever of the individuals' identities, times, exact words, or channels through which such authority may have passed". Harvey stated that he had been told by Richard Bissell that the effort against Castro had been authorized "from the highest level", and that Harvey had discussed the plots with Richard Helms, his immediate superior. Helms testified that although he had never discussed assassination with his superiors, he believed:"... that in these actions we were taking against Cuba and against Fidel Castro's government in Cuba,... that they were what we had been asked to do. ... In other words we had been asked to get rid of Castroand ... there were no limitations put on the means, and we felt we were acting well within the guidelines that we understood to be in play at this particular time."The evidence points to a disturbing situation. Agency officials perceived the effort to assassinate Castro to have been within the parameters of permissible action, but Adminis- tration officials (including McCone) responsible for formulat- ing policy were not aware of the effort and did not authorize it. The explanation may lie in the fact that orders concerning overthrowing the Castro regime were stated in broad terms that were subject to differing interpretations by those responsible for carrying out those orders.The various Presidents and their senior advisorsNW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 171
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 171]
# TOP SECRET-22-strongly opposed the regimes of Castro and Trujillo, theaccession to power of Allende, and the potential influenceof Patrice Lumumba. Orders concerning action against thoseforeign leaders were given in vigorous language. For example,President Nixon's orders to prevent Allende from assumingpower left Helms feeling that "if I ever carried a marshall'sbaton in my knapsack out of the oval office, it was that day."Similarly, General Lansdale described the Mongoose effortagainst Cuba as "a combat situation", and Attorney GeneralKennedy emphasized that "a solution to the Cuban problemtoday carries top priority". Helms testified that thepressure to "get rid of [Castro and the Castro regime]" wasintense, and Bissell testified that he had been ordered to"get off your ass about Cuba".It is possible that there was a failure of communica-tion between policymakers and the agency personnel who wereexperienced in 'secret, and often violent, action. Althoughpolicymakers testified that assassination was not intendedby such words as "get rid of Castro", some of their sub-ordinates in the Agency testified that they perceived thatassassination was desired and that they should proceed with-out troubling their superiors.The 1967 Inspector General's Report on assassinationsappropriately observed:.NW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 172
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 172]
The point is that of frequent resort to synechdoche -- the mention of a part when the whole is to be understood, or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated references to phrases such as "disposing of Castro" which may be read in the narrow, literal sense of assassinating him, when it is intended that it be read in the broader, figurative sense of dislodging the Castro regime. Reversing the coin, we find people speaking vaguely of "doing something about Castro" when it is clear that what they have specifically in mind is killing him. In a situation wherein those speaking may not have actually meant what they seemed to say or may not have said what they actually meant, they should not be surprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted differently than was intended.Differing perceptions between superiors and their subordinates were graphically illustrated in the Castro context.[^1]McCone, in a memorandum dated April 14, 1967, reflected as follows:Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms such as "dispose of Castro", "remove Castro", "knock off Castro", etc., and this meant the overthrow of the Communist government in Cuba and the replacing of it with a democratic regime. Terms such as the above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as stated, all refer to a change in the Cuban government.[^1]: * "Senator Mathias: Let me draw an example from history. When Thomas A'Beckett was proving to be an annoyance, as Castro, the King said, 'who will rid me of this turbulent priest?'. He didn't say, go out and murder him'. He said, 'who will rid me of this man', and let it go at that."Mr. Helms: That is a warming reference to the problem."Senator Mathias: You feel that spans the generations and the centuries?"Mr. Helms: I think it does, sir."Senator Mathias: And that is typical of the kind of thing which might be said, which might be taken by the
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 173]
-24-Helms, who had considerable experience as a covert operator, gave precisely the opposite meaning to the same words, interpreting them as conveying authority for assassination.Helms repeatedly testified that he felt that explicit authorization was unnecessary for the assassination of Castro in the early 1960's, but he said he did not construe the intense pressure from President Nixon in 1970 as providing authority to assassinate anyone. As Helms testified, the difference was not that the pressure to prevent Allende from assuming office was any less than the pressure to remove the Castro regime, but rather that "I had already made up my mind that we weren't going to have any of that business when I was Director."Certain CIA contemporaries of Helms who were subjected to similar pressures in the Castro case rejected the thesis that implicit authority to assassinate Castro derived from the strong language of the policymakers. Bissell testified that he had believed that "formal and explicit approval" would be required for assassination, and McManus testified director or by anybody else as presidential authorization to go forward?"Mr. Helms: That is right. But in answer to that, I realize that one sort of grows up in tradition of the time and I think that any of us would have found it very difficult to discuss assassinations with a President of the U.S. I just think we all had the feeling that we were hired out to keep those things out of the oval office."
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 174]
-25-that "it never occurred to me" that the vigorous words of the Attorney General could be taken as authorizing assassination. The differing perceptions may have resulted from their different backgrounds and training. Neither Bissell (an academician whose Agency career for the six years before he became DDP had been in the field of technology) nor McManus (who had concentrated on intelligence and staff work) were experienced in covert operations.*The perception of certain Agency officials that assassination was within the range of permissible activity was reinforced by the continuing approval of violent covert actions against Cuba that were sanctioned at the Presidential level and by the failure of the successive administrations to make clear that assassination was not permissible. This point is one of the subjects considered in the next section.* Of course, this analysis cannot be carried too far. In the Lumumba case, for example, Johnson and Dillon, who were Administration officials with no covert operation experience, construed remarks as urging or permitting assassination, while other persons who were not in the Agency did not so interpret them.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 175]
4. The Failure In Communication Between Agency Officials In Charge Of The Assassination Operations And Their Superiors In The Agency And In The Administration Was Due To:(a) The Failure of Subordinates To Disclose The Operations To Their Superiors; and(b) The Failure of Superiors to Give Precise Orders Regarding the Nature of Permissable Operations and to Make Clear That Assassination Was Precluded in the Climate of Violence Engendered by the Aggressive Covert Actions Sanctioned by the Administrations.While we cannot find that officials responsible for making policy decisions knew about or authorized the assassination attempts (with the possible exception of the Lumumba case), Agency operatives at least through the level of DDP nevertheless perceived assassination to have been permissible. This failure in communication was inexcusable in light of the gravity of assassination. The Committee finds that the failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors was reprehensible, and that the reasons that they offered for having neglected to inform their superiors are unacceptable. The Committee further finds that Administration officials failed to be sufficiently precise in their directions to the Agency and that their attitude toward the possibility of assassination was ambiguous in the context of the violence of other activities that they did authorize.
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 176]
# SECRET-27-(a) Agency Officials Failed On Several Occasions To RevealThe Plots To Their Superiors, Or To Do So With SufficientDetail and ClaritySeveral of the cases considered in this report raisequestions concerning whether officials of the CIA sufficientlyinformed their superiors in the Agency or officials outside theAgency about their activities.CastroThe failure of Agency officials to inform their superiorsof the assassination efforts against Castro is particularlytroubling.Richard Bissell testified that he and Sheffield Edwardstold Allen Dulles only "circumlocutiously" and only afterthe project had begun about the operation which used membersof the underworld. Both Bissell and his successor as DDP,Richard Helms, testified that they never discussed the opera-tion with John McCone or any officials outside the CIA. Thetwo officials directly responsible for the operation--Edwardsand William Harvey--testified that they never discussed theoperation with McCone or any Government official above thelevel of DDP. McCone testified that he was never consulted aboutthe operation, and that Dulles never briefed him on itsexistence. On the basis of the testimony and documentaryevidence before the Committee, it is uncertain whether DullesNW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 177
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 177]
# TOP SECRET-28-was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld operation, and virtually certain that it continued into McCone's term without his or the Administration's knowledge or approval.On the occasions when Richard Bissell had the opportunity to inform his superiors about the assassination effort against Castro, he either failed to inform them or misled them.Bissell testified that he and Edwards told Dulles and Cabell about the assassination operation using underworld figures, but that they did so "circumlocutiously", and then only after contact had been made with the underworld and a price had been offered for Castro's death.Bissell further testified that he never raised the issue of assassination with officials of either the Eisenhower or Kennedy Administration. His reason was that since he was under Dulles in the chain of command, he would normally have had no duty to discuss the matter with the Presidents or other Administration officials, and that he assumed that Dulles would have circumlocutiously spoken with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy about the operation. These reasons are insufficient. It was inexcusable to withhold such information from those responsible for formulating policy on the unverified assumption that they might have been circumlocutiously informed by Dulles, whoNW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 178
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 178]
# TOP SECRET-29-himself had not been straight-forwardly told about the operation.*The failure to either inform those officials or to make certain that they had been informed by Dulles was particularly reprehensible in light of the fact that there were many occasions on which Bissell should have informed them, and his failure to do so was misleading. In the first weeks of the Kennedy Adminis- tration, Bissell met with Bundy and discussed the development of an assassination capability within CIA--executive action.But Bissell did not mention that an actual assassination attempt was underway. Bissell appeared before the Taylor-Kennedy Board of Inquiry which was formed to report to the President on the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban situation, but testified that he did not inform the Commission of the assassination operation. As chief of the CIA directorate concerned with clandestine operations and the Bay of Pigs, Bissell frequently met with officials in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations to discuss Cuban operations, and his advice was frequently sought. He did not tell them that the CIA had undertaken an effort to assassinate Castro, and did not ask if they favored proceeding with the* Even assuming that Bissell correctly perceived that Dulles understood the nature of the operation, it was inexcusable for Bissell not to have briefed Dulles in plain language. Further, even if one accepts Bissell's assumption that Dulles told the Presidents, they would have been told too late, because Bissell "guessed" they would have been told that the operation "had been planned and was being attempted".