Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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Helms stated that those words reflected the "kind of atmosphere" on which herelied for his perception that assassination was implicitly authorized. (Helms,7/17, p. 60-61.) McManus, who wrote the memorandum, agreed that Robert Kennedy"was very vehement in his speech" and "really wanted action" but McManus disagreedwith Helms perception, stating that "it never occurred to me" that the wordsquoted above from Robert Kennedy included permission to assassinate Castro. (McManus,p. 9.) Nor did the spirit of the meeting as a whole give McManus any idea thatassassination was either contemplated or authorized. (Tr., p. 9-10.)*5. General Lansdale's Mongoose Planning TasksOn January 18, 1962, Lansdale assigned 32 planning tasks to the agencies parti-cipating in Mongoose. (Lansdale Ex. 3, Program Review of the Cuba Project.) In amemorandum to the working group members, Lansdale emphasized that "it is our job to putthe American genius to work on this project, quickly and effectively. This demands achange from the business as usual and a hard facing of the fact that we are in a com-bat situation--where we have been given full command." (Lansdale memorandum, 1/20/62,p. 1.)The 32 tasks comprised a variety of activities, ranging from intelligence collec-tion to planning for "use of U. S. military force to support the Cuban popular*/ With respect to the question of priorities and emphasis in the KennedyAdministration, there was a great deal of proof showing that Cubaindeed had a high priority and the very existence of a high levelgroup like the Special Group Augmented further demonstrates itsimportance. MacNamara, for example, stated that. "we were hystericalabout Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter." (Inthe same context, MacNamara stated "I don't believe we contemplatedassassination.) (MacNamara, p. 93). Similarly, General Lansdale in-formed the members of his inter-agency committee that Mongoose "demandsa change from business-as-usual and a hard facing of the fact thatyou're in a combat situation where we have been given full command."Ex. , Memorandum, January 20, 1962, from Lansdale).On the other hand, Sorensen testified that "there were lots of toppriorities, and it was the job of some of /us/ to continually tellvarious agencies their particular subject was the top priority" andalthough Cuba was "important" it was "fairly well down on the list ofthe President's agenda." (Sorensen, p. 12). For example, when toldthat his first letter to Khruschev in the secret correspondence thatlasted two or three years would be "the single most important docu-ment you will write during your Presidency," President Kenndy said,"Yes, we get these every day over here." (Sorensen, p. 12).
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movement" and developing an "operational schedule for sabotage actions insideCuba." (Lansdale Ex. 3, p. 5, 7.)*In focusing on intelligence collection, propaganda and various sabotage actions,Lansdale's tasks were consistent with the underlying strategy of Mongoose to buildgradually towards an internal revolt of the Cuban people. (See p. above.)Lansdale transmitted a copy of the tasks to Robert Kennedy on January 18, 1962,with a handwritten note stating "my review does not include the sensitive work Ihave reported to you; I felt you preferred informing the President privately."Lansdale testified that this did not refer to assassinations and that he "never tookup assassination with either the Attorney General or the President."** Lansdaletestified that he could not precisely recall the nature of this "sensitive work"but that it might have involved a special trip he made under cover to meet Cubanleaders in Florida and to assess their political strengths. (Lansdale, p. 30.)[^1] There was testimony regarding one Lansdale plan that a witness thought was an exampleof Lansdale's "perspicacity" in planning operations. Parrott, the Secretary to theSpecial Group Augmented, testified:> "I'll give you one example of Lansdale's perspicacity. He> had a wonderful plan for getting rid of Castro. This plan> consisted of spreading the word that the Second Coming of> Christ was imminent and that Christ was against Castro (who)> was anti-Christ. And you would spread this word around Cuba,> and then on whatever date it was, that there would be a mani-> festation of this thing. And at that time--this is absolutely> true--and at that time there would be an American submarine> which would surface just over the horizon off of Cuba and send> up some starshells. And this would be the manifestation of the> Second Coming and Castro would be overthrown..."> "Well, some wag called this operation--by this time Lansdale was> something of a joke in many quarters--and somebody dubbed this> Elimination by Illumination.> (Parrott, p. .)[^2] Harvey testified that he never received any instructions from Lansdale to under-take assassinations, although as noted below (p. ), in August 1962, Lansdale askedHarvey to consider the feasibility of a plan for the "liquidation" of Cuban leaders.(Harvey, 7/ /75, p. .)
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- 19 -Lansdale also referred, in a memorandum to the Attorney General onJanuary 27, 1962, to his feeling that "we might uncork the touchdownplay" "independently of the institutional program we are spurring."(Lansdale Ex. 4, p.1). Lansdale testified that in this memorandum thephrase "touchdown play" was a "breezy way of referring to "a Cuban-revolt to overthrow the regime" rather than to a Castro assassination.(Lansdale, p.45).*/ The testimony was as follows:"The Chairman: What precisely did you mean by "uncork thetouchdown play independently of the institutional programswe are spurring?""General Lansdale: Well, I was holding almost daily meet-ings with my working group, and in tasking, and findinghow they were developing plans I was becoming more and moreconcerned that they kept going back to doing what I felt werepro forma American types of actions rather than actively ex-ploring how to get the Cubans into this, and to have themundertake actions."To me, the touchdown play was a Cuban revolt to over-throw the regime. I did not feel that we had gotten intothe real internal part of getting Cubans into the action,and I was concerned about that.""Senator Baker: In the same context, is it fair to say thatthe name of the game was to get rid of Castro or his regimeand that touchdown play was one of several methods thatmight have been used for that purpose?""General Lansdale: Yes.""Senator Baker: All right, now what was the touchdown playthat you had in mind here?""General Lansdale: Well, it was a revolt by the Cubansthemselves ... a revolution that would break down the policecontrols of the state and to drive the top people out ofpower and to do that, there needed to be political actionscells, psychological propaganda action cells, and eventuallywhen possible, guerilla forces developed in the country ina safe place for a new government to set up and direct therevolution that would eventually move into Havana and take over."(Lansdale, pp. 45-56).NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 155[^1]/
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- 20 -(e.g., "stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba," work through "ethnic language groups," "youth elements," or families through the Church") do not contain any indication of assassination. (Lansdale, Ex. 4, p. 1.)On January 19, 1962, Lansdale added an additional task to those assigned on January 18. This "Task 33" involved a plan to "incapacitate" Cuban sugar workers during the harvest by the use of chemical warfare means. (Lansdale, p. 29). Lansdale testified that the plan involved the use of non-lethal chemicals to sicken Cubans temporarily and keep them away from the fields for a 24-48 hour period "without ill effects." After initial approval for planning purposes (with the notation that it would require "policy determination" before final approval), the plan was ultimately cancelled after a study showed it was not feasible and before debate by the SGA. (Lansdale, p. 29, Special Group Minutes, 1/30/62, p. 1.)Lansdale's 33 tasks were approved for planning purposes by the Special Group on January 30, 1962 (Minutes of Special Group meeting, 1/30/62, p. 1). Thereafter, on February 20, 1962, Lansdale detailed a six phase schedule for Mongoose, designed to culminate in October, 1962, with an "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime." (Lansdale Ex. 11, Program Review of the Cuba Project, 2/20/62, p. 2). As one of the operations for the "Resistance" phase proposed for September, 1962, Lansdale listed "attack on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders." (Id., p. 151). Lansdale's plan stated:![top secret]*/ Lansdale's memorandum described the "touchdown plays!" as follows:"It may be a special effort which professional labor operators can launch to stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba. It may be through ethnic-language groups; Spain has an untapped action potential. It could be a warming-up of the always lively youth element in Latin America and Cuba, through some contacts specially used. It could be with the families through the Church, with families resisting the disciplined destruction of social justice by the Communists. It could be an imaginative defection project which cracks the top echelon of the Communist gang now running Cuba."
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- 21 -"This should be a 'Special Target' operation ...Gangster elements might provide the best recruit-ment potential for actions against police -- G2/intelligence/ officials." (Id., p. 151). */Lansdale testified that early in the Mongoose opera-tion he had suggested to the working level representatives of the Mongooseagencies that they get in touch with "criminal elements" to obtain intelli-gence and "possible actions against the police structure" in Cuba. (Lans-dale, p. 104). But Lansdale conceded that his proposal to recruitgangster elements for attacks on "key leaders" contemplated the targetedkilling of individuals, in addition to the casualties that might occur inthe course of the revolt itself. (Lansdale, p. 107).These 33 plans of Lansdale were, however, neverapproved for implementation by the Special Group Augmented. Asdiscussed below in greater detail (see p. ), the Special Group Augmentedtabled Lansdale's six phase plan altogether in February 1962, and directedLansdale to plan for and conduct an intelligence collection plan only.(Memo, 3/2/62; Minutes of Special Group Augmented Meeting, 3/5/62).a. Lansdale's Rejection of a Suggestion That a PropagandaCampaign, Including Rewards for Assassination, Be ExploredOn January 30, 1962, the representative of the Defense Department and theJoint Chiefs on the Mongoose Working Group forwarded for Lansdale's con-sideration "a concept for creating distrust and apprehension in the CubanCommunist Hierarchy" (Lansdale Ex. 1, Memorandum, 1/30/62, from Craigto Lansdale, p. 1). This concept, titled Operation Bounty, was described asa "system of financial rewards, commensurate with position and stature,for killing or delivering alive known Communists." (Id., p. 2) Under theconcept, leaflets would be dropped in Cuba listing rewards, which...*/An earlier reference to use of gangster-type elements had appearedin a CIA memorandum for the Special Group on January 24, 1962. Commentingon Task 5 of Lansdale's original 32 tasks (which called for planning for"defection of top Cuban government officials"), the CIA memorandum notedthat planning for the task will "necessarily be based upon an appeal madeinside the island by intermediaries" and listed "crime syndicates" alongwith other groups as possible intermediaries.
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were proposed as ranging from $5,000 for an "informer" to $100,000 for"government officials." A reward of "2¢" was listed for Castro nim-self. (Id., p. 3). Lansdale testified that price was designed "to deni-grate ... Castro in the eyes of the Cuban population." (Lansdale, Tr. 26).Lansdale testified that he "tabled" this concept when he received it, on the ground that "I did not think that it was something that should be seriously undertaken or supported further." (Lansdale, p. 26).Lansdale did not bring the proposal before the Special Group Augmented.## 6. The Control System for Mongoose Operations.In establishing the Mongoose Operation on November 30, 1961, President Kennedy had emphasized that the Special Group should be "kept closely informed" of 'Mongoose activities. (memorandum by the President, 11/30/62; Goodwin, p. ).In practice, as Samuel Halpern, Harvey's Executive Assistant on the CIA Mongoose Task Force W testified, this resulted in the submission of "specific detailed plans for every activity carried out by the task force." (Halpern, p. 16). Halpern testified that those plans were submitted "in nauseating detail:""It went down to such things as the gradients on the beach, and the composition of the sand on the beach in many cases. Every single solitary thing was in those plans, full details, times, events, weaponry, how it was going to happen, who was going to do what ... the full details of every single thing we did." (Halpern, p. 17).Harvey similarly characterized the control process (Harvey, 6/25, p. 123), as one which required the submission of "excruciating detail" and where it was understood that the Special Group Augmented was to be given
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an opportunity to debate and decide after weighing the strengths andweaknesses of any given proposed action. (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 114, 124).a. The Documentary EvidenceThe documentary evidence illustrates the tight control procedures set out for Mongoose by the Special Group Augmented. For example,as discussed above (p. ), Lansdale initially submitted 32 specific taskswith his 'basic concept" on January 18, 1962 for consideration bythe Special Group Augmented. (Lansdale Ex. 3) After considerationof Lansdale's concept and the 32 tasks in February, the Special GroupAugmented ordered Lansdale to cut back Iris plan to limit it to anintelligence collection program for the Harch-May 1962 period, ratherthan the five-stage plan to culminate in an October "popular revolution"as originally conceived by Lansdale. (Nemo 3/2/62, by Lansdale) Inapproving the intelligence collection program, the Special Group Aug-mented pointed out that:". . any actions which are not specifically spelledout in the plan but seem to be desirable as the pro-ject progresses, will be brought to the Special Groupfor resolution." (lielms: Ex. 1, 7/18, p.1)In addition, the Guidelines for the Mongoose programemphasized the Special Group Augmented's responsibility for control andprior approval of important operations:"The Special Group (5412 Augmented) is responsiblefor providing policy guidance to the (Mongoose) project,for approving important operations and for monitoringprogress. (Guidelines for Operation Mongoose, March 14,1962, p.2)"Further indication of the Mongoose control process is the request given
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- 24 -to llelms a month prior to llarvey's trip to meet Roselli in Miami. Pursuant to the discussion at the Special Group's mecting on March 5, Helms was asked to estimate "for each week as far into the next twelve months as possible . . the members and type of agents you will establish inside Cuba . . (and) brief descriptions . . of actions contemplated.'(Memo to llelms from Lansdale, March 5, 1962)Moreover, the approved plan for Operation Mongoose, as of the time of llarvey's meeting with Roselli in Miami required that any proposal to supply arms and equipment to particular resistance groups inside Cuba "be submitted to the Special Group for decision, ad hoc." (Lansdale Memo to __________, April 11, 1962, p. ). And the Guidelines for the Mongoose program emphasized that, after specific tasks were approved by the Special Group Augmented and given to participating agencies by Lansdale, normal command channels were to be observed. As the Guidelines stated:During this period, General Lansdale will continue as Chief of Operations, calling directly on the participating departments and agencies for support and implementation of agreed tasks. The heads of these departments and agencies are responsible for performance through normal command channels to higher authority.*[^1] (Guideline for Operation Mongoose, March 14, 1962, p.2)[^1]: * The initial draft of these. Guidelines had referred to the President but was later amended to read' "higher authority." (Draft Guidelines, March 5, 1962, p.2) The minutes of the consideration of these Guidelines were also amended with respect to the manner in which the Guidelines were approved. On March 16, 1962, a Memorandum for Record of "Discussion of Operation Mongoose with the President" of the Special Group (Augmented) stated:"In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented) the President was given a progress report on Operation MONGOOSE. The guidelines dated March 14, 1962 were circulated and were used as the basis of the discussion. After a prolonged consideration of the visibility, noise level and risks entailed, General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the guidelines.(footnote cont'd.)
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- 24a -In a Memorandum to McCone on April 10, 1962, Harvey recognized that theSpecial Group Augmented control process required advance approval of "majoroperations going beyond the collection of intelligence." But Harvey statedthat these "tight controls" were unduly "stultifying:""To permit requisite flexibility and professionalismfor a maximum operational effort against Cuba, theright controls exercised by the Special Group and thepresent time-consuming coordination and briefing pro-cedures should, if at all possible, be made lessrestrictive and less stultifying." (Memo, April 10, 1962,Harvey to McCone, p.4) *Even as the Cuban Missile Crisis approached, and the pressure toact against the Castro regime increased through a "stepped up" Mongooseplan, the Special Group continued to insist on prior approval of sensitiveoperations. Thus, when the Special Group Augmented on September 14,1962, approved in principle a proposed set of operations,(Footnote cont'd)However, a note at the bottom of this memorandum, dated March 22, 1962,stated:This minute was read to the Special Group(Augmented) today. The Group was unanimous in feelingthat no authorization, either tacit or otherwise, wasgiven by higher authority. The members of the Groupasked that the minute be amended to indicate that theGroup itself had decided to proceed in accordance withthe Guidelines.
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Bundy, speaking to the Group,"... made it clear that this did not constitute a blanket approval of every item in the paper and that sensitive ones such as sabotage, for example, will have to be presented in more detail on a case by case basis." (Memo of Special Group Augmented meeting, September 14, 1962, p. ).Helms and the members of the Special Group Augmented differed on whether or not these control requirements were consistent with Helms' perception that assassination was permissible without a direct order. We discuss that testimony below at7. The Pattern of Mongoose Action. The documentary evidence and the testimony reveal that the Kennedy Administration pressed the Mongoose operation with vigorous language and although the collection of intelligence information was the central objective of Mongoose up until August 1962 sabotage and para military actions were conducted. Thus, there was major sabotage operation aimed at a large Cuban coppermine, and other sabotage operations. As Lansdale described them in his testimony, the sabotage acts involved "blowing up bridges to stop communications and blowing up certain production plants" (Lansdale, p. 36). And during the Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962, sabotage was increasingly urged.[^1] In early March, 1962, the SGA recognized the need to begin "preliminary actions ... involving such things as spotting, assessing and training action-type agents" but the Group agreed that it must "keep its hand tightly" on these actions. The Group saw, however, that such control might not be completely effective and recognized "that many of the agents infiltrated would be of an all-purpose type; that is, they would be trained in paramilitary skills, as well as those of exclusively intelligence concern. It was noted that once the agents are within the country, they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.S., although every effort will be made to attempt such control." (Minutes of Special Group meeting, March 5, 1962).[^1]: /NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 162
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- 26 -At the same time, however, the record shows that the Special Group Aug-mented turned away from proposed sabotage and similar violent action throughout1962, including the period of the Missile Crisis. (See p. above.) Thus, Helmsnoted in a memorandum of a meeting on October 16, 1962, that Robert Kennedy in ex-pressing the "general dissatisfaction of the President" with Mongoose, "pointed outthat (Mongoose) had been underway for a year...that there had been no acts of sabo-tage and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice". (Memorandumby Helms, October 16, 1962, p. 1.) Similiarly a memorandum to Helms by his Execu-tive Assistant (who spent full time on Cuba matters), which reviewed the Mongooseprogram in the aftermath of the Missile Crisis, stated:"During the past year, while one of the options of theproject was to create internal dissension and resistanceleading to eventual U.S. intervention, a review showsthat policymakers not only shied away from the militaryintervention aspect but were generally apprehensive ofsabotage proposals. (McManus, Ex. 2, p. 1, McManus, p. 11).Harvey testified that this assessment of the Special Group Aug-mented's position was an accurate one. (Ilarvey, 6/25, р. ). This isalso borne out by the record of Mongoose activity. For example, afterLansdale's initial six phase plan to overthrow Castro by the fall of 1962,the single phase approved for January August 1962 was described by Lans-dale as "essentially an intelligence collection" effort. (Memorandum,April 11, 1962, by Lansdale). Indeed, the guidelines for Operation Mongoose,approved on March 5, 1962, stated that the acquisition of intelligencthe "immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts in the coming months."(Taylor Ex. 3, p. 2, Guidelines for Operation Mongoose, March 14, 1962).The Guidelines further stated that although other covert actions would beundertaken concurrently with intelligence collection, these were to be ona scale "short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt" in Cuba.(Id., p. 2). And the Special Group stipulated that Mongoose action beyondthe acquisition of intelligence "must be inconspicuous." (Memorandum,3/2/62, Lansdale, p. 3).