Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 71]
1 Monday or Tuesday, even his hope is that during the courseof the next week the Full Committee will finish that.3 In the meantime, of course, we can still be working on4 these reports looking toward hopefully, if we could have those5 by the end of next week, too, then the Full Committee would6 be in a position of at least having the material available to7 them if we decided to release everything at one time or if8 we needed a few more days to refine the reports themselves.9 That's about as much as we can hope for.10 Mr. Aaron. Okay. I think that to be realistic about the11 longer material, it is a lot longer and I think to be at 1112 proud of the material we will want to be sure that we have13 gone through it.14 So therefore I think the end of next week is probably15 not realistic of having it in shape for the Full Committee to16 bless it.17 On the other hand, I think that before the end of the18 month it would be possible to have a product, unless we run19 into some enormous snag.20 Senator Mathias. But that does not contemplate the21 executive review.22 Mr. Aaron. No, I'm sorry, that is including executive23 review.24 Mr. Miller But it does not contemplate printing.25 Mr. Aaron. That correct.> [Figure: Image of the words "TOP SECRET" stamped on the document.]NW 50955 DocId:32423509 Page 72
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 72]
Mr. diGenova. Yesterday. Mr. Bolton indicated to me when I was there that there was no way that they could complete sources and methods review by the 15th of March, and I said I didn't see how they could either, since they had just really begun having access a week or so ago or whatever it was. And they seem to think that the end of the month is probably, considering the rewrites and a chance to look at the rewrites--Senator Mathias. I have been independently advised of the same thing, that the end of the month is maybe a little optimistic.Mr. Miller. Senator Church just talked to Director Bush and I talked to Mitch Regovin just prior and worked out an arrangement on the question of clearances of sensitive material and the Chairman told Mr. Bush that he will take whatever time is required, he asked for expeditious effort on their part.Mr. Bush said that he would urge his troops onward, and he recognized that there had been snags and difficulties. The Chairman said that he was not going to press beyond the capability of either side. He wants to do the proper job and whatever time is required.He said that he hoped that we could cooperate and work it out so that we could finish by the end of the month. AndMr. Bush said that he would make every effort to do that.So that seems amicable between the Chairman and the Director.
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 73]
TOP SECRETThen the question arose about the deadline on the 15th and the Chairman is going to ask that this deadline be set aside because of the problems of not being able to finish security and those other matters.So he is taking steps to do that now.Senator Huddleston. But I think it's still encumbent on us to make a special effort to move as fast as we can, and we plan to go ahead tonight.Okay, now we get back.Mr. Aaron. We're on page 37 and the procedure we're trying to follow to expedite things is to look particularly at the recommendations and at the bracketed language.Now recommendation 20 --Senator Huddleston. Before we get to 20, there's a problem in wording. "The last paragraph before 20, the Committee also found that there's no established inter-Agency mechanisms for establishing the bona fides of defectors."You've used established twice there.Mr. Aaron. I think we can take the first one out.Ms. Culbreth. We might say, David, that the staff hopes to take a real editorial shot at this before it gets published, anyway, and maybe even before it gets to everybody next week, and we would hope that we can get a lot of these things,But certainly, and that you see that you want us to be sure that we get to point out.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 74]
Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, on that particular thing, at the staff level I had bracketed that entire paragraph because I'm not sure what we're trying to accomplish by what you say there.This is probably the most difficult task that faces a counter-intelligence organization any place in the world is to establish whether or not a defector that you have just picked up is a double agent or not.I listened to the man who has done this all his adult life at the Agency, Mr. Angleton, and he never made it clear just how you ever are sure that you have a bona fide.And then his follow-on said basically the same thing. What do we intend to do with this finding? Do we intend then to legislate something? What are we going to do with it?Mr. Aaron. The finding goes to the recommendation later that there be essentially for other purposes. But a subcommittee of the National Security Council on the subject of counter-intelligence which would look at other matters and we will get to that in a moment, but among its tasks is that it would be a forum in which differences of opinion as to the bona fides of a defector could be discussed and potentially reconciled.Mr. Angleton testified and spoke at length in other forums with us about the fact that when -- that at present there really is no way that there's a difference between the FBI and
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 75]
CIA as to the bona fides of a defector and there's no way for the government to come to a decision about it.And this really makes that point and leads to the further point that we believe there ought to be some mechanism whereby some decision can be reached. Now people may still have reservations, as they do about this particular individual we refer to here. But in the end one has to make a decision and simply keeping him in a jail some place is probably not a useful way, to proceed, and in fact, this is the kind of recommendation that comes from Mr. Angleton and seems to be supported by other people, even his successor at the Agency.Mr. Kirbow. Do we have any place in our findings that discusses the so-called, this single case of some sort here?Is there some evidence?Mr. Aaron. Yes.Mr. Kirbow. It's going to be in the report when somebody else reads this? They'll be able to go some place else and see what you're talking about?Mr. Aaron. That's correct. It will be in, I believe it's in the paper on counter intelligence. It's also addressed in the Rockefeller Commission report.Now as the first recommendation. I think that we have agreed at the staff level to take out the brackets and put a footnote which would make it clear that while the primary mission of the CIA would be to collect denied or protected foreign> [Figure] TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 76]
intelligence information, that this would not, you know. that at the same time the Agency could be directed to perform such other collection tasks as directed by the NSC.In other words, the point is that certainly they do some overt collection. For example, foreign broadcast information service is done by them as a service and so forth. But at the same time the point of alving the CIA a charter is to give it a charter for its primary mission and as set forth NSCID 5, for example, that mission is to conduct espionage.Senator Mathias. What about the role of statistical analysis? That kind of analysis that can be deduced from study of voluminous quantity of economic information much of which is public?I'll go back to the ball bearings. the ball bearing factory.Mr. Aaron. Well, this goes to the point really of the organization of this section. There's a separate section on the production of intelligence which would authorize the CIA to produce national Intelligence. That kind of thing. The Central Intelligence Agency as the producer of national intelligence must be the recipient of all intelligence flowing into our overall national intelligence effort, and that intelligence includes overt intelligence as collected from the Treasury Department from Commerce from Labor attaches abroad, the full score of information collecting, most of which> TOP SECRET> ![image of top secret label]
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 77]
is not secret or clandestina and is available to the CIA and it would be their job to compile it.And that does not exclude other functions. For example, the analytical function is not mentioned here. This is simply to give it the collection function and that is because the paper is simply organized in that fashion. It doesn't try to step up to the whole charter, every aspect of it. We just try to break it down.Mr.. Maxwell. Should there be a kind of overt foreign intelligence which the NSC with the mechanism for allocating priorities within the intelligence community should be done by the CIA?It could under the formulation now do that.Mr. Aaron. That's why for example there's one thing that they do that's overt. Even their clandestine people abroad do an overt collection job and that is biographic information and that, while it was once in the State Department, was transferred to the CIA because they have a lot of clandestine biographic information and as a matter of centralizing and efficiency the decision was made to move it over there.That kind of thing would not be precluded and would still exist.Now it goes on to state that in doing this we would also recommend authorizing the CIA to carry out the recruitment of agents within the United States for this purpose. And it goes
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 78]
further to say that there would be an annual review of thisactivity by the Senate oversight committee and by thecounter-intelligence committee which we proposed be establishedand has been agreed here as a recommendation of the NationalSecurity Council.Now the further sentence that is in brackets calls uponthe Attorney General to certify to the President and tothe oversight committee that these actions are being taken ina manner that does not violate the Constitutional rights ofAmerican citizens or any other provision of law.Trying to keep track of the domestic intelligencerecommendations is a little bit like painting a moving train,but this tends to coincide with their recommendation, and thepurpose of this is obviously to place a little tighterrestriction and more authority in the hands of the AttorneyGeneral to ensure that these domestic espionage-related actionsthat are conducted on a covert or clandestine basis are infact not infringing on Constitutional rights or attempting tobreak the law in any way.Mr. Kirbow. You're really talking about recruitmentsnow. You're not talking about other clandestine and covertactivities and operations?Mr. Aaron. That's correct. It's not, for example, ifyou were to establish a base in Florida for the purposes ofharassing Cuban shipping. That would not come up here.
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 79]
Mr. Kirbow. And the bracketed information, Mr. Chairman, was that I didn't feel at the time we considered this and I asked that it be bracketed, that the Attorney General who is never going to operate in this area alone, he is not going to make these decisions without staff support of some description, and if he's going to do that with people in the Department of Justice, which is where he gets the staff, the concern of the people in the Agency about broadening even within their own agency those people that know about the agent procurements and where they are and whom they are is of vital concern. It's probably one of the most carefully guarded secrets. Even to the extent that Mr. Colby testified before this Committee unde oath. he said, I don't want to know the names of the agents because someone may want to decide some day to wrassle it out of me.I don't know what the Attorney General certifying here does for you if on the saine subcommittee you have the DCI, who is the President's principal man, you have the secretaries of state and all these other people apparently at the beck and call in intelligence matters to put the Attorney General and his staff into the agent procurement business.Senator Hart. Not in the agent procurement business..Mr. Kirbow. I mean with knowledge of agent procurement.Senator Hart. Well, the Attorney General is in the business of upholding and defending the laws of this country
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 80]
and he can't do that if he doesn't know when one of the agencies of the Federal government might be breaking them.It's a chicken and egg situation.Mr. Kirbow. You think he should approve the policies or the actual procurement of the agent.Senator Hart. The procedures. Nothing in here, I mean we have argued this thing for 13 months, there's nothing here that requires the Agency to turn over names of their sources or anything like that.The Attorney General doesn't need to know the names even more than Bill Colby does, or less. Just to find out that the procedures of violating the laws of this country, that's all.Ms. Culbreth. Could I raise another point, Mr. Chairman?It seems to me that one of the concerns that you have with having the Attorney General certify in this specific case to the President and also to the oversight committee is a consistent problem that I think runs throughout our recommendations.On the one hand, we are describing for accountability within the Executive Branch of the proper people, and on the other hand we are afraid that if we make him accountable, we're giving him so much power that they are going to disregard the Constitutional obligations.
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 81]
In this specific situation, for example, we've already got the Attorney General being involved with the oversight responsibilities. When he takes office he already has the obligation to see that all the laws and activities of agencies are carried out as they're supposed to be.And in addition to that, we are proposing in another part of our recommendations that the general counsel and the inspector general of the CIA be subject to Senate confirmation so that there are lots of other kinds of checks, and I would just hope that as the Senators consider additional proposals like this, that we don't get to the point that the Congress is hamstringing them inside the agencies on how they carry out the responsibilities.Each one of these standing by itself may look like, well, this is a good idea and we should have this additional certification or this addition chain of reporting and making sure you get it authorized.But I have a fear after having looked through a good bit of this, that we are getting too many layers in there, and I would just urge a caution if there are situations where we maybe have it pretty well covered until we get some opportunity to see how this new set-up is going to work, whether we're going to have the kind of abuses we had before. Maybe we don't need each of these details of Congress going down into the agencies and saving how they go about their day to day business.
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 82]
Mr. di.Genova. Mr. Chairman, I would add in that regard that with regard to the specific recommendation, this is not going down into the Agency. This is talking about the Attorney General who is the head of an agency, first of all, and the history has shown that other Attorneys General who took the same oath that this man did didn't do their jobs and one of the reasons was that they didn't know about certain things.And the purpose of this provision is to make them aware of what is going on, to make legal judgements and to advise the President about the legality of procedures attending the recruitment of agents and other activities within the confines of the United States.The provision for confirming the inspector general and general counsel is a wholly unrelated thing to this although it doesn't go to the problem of reaching down into the Agency.I don't see how that does that because he's going to be dealing with the DCI.Senator Huddleston. Contrary to many of the things that we do, we provide ways to correct abuses once they've happened and it seems to me this is a principal way of trying to avoid abuses to start with.If I were on the oversight committee I would certainly, and if were getting the information that we contemplate the committee would get, then that is we would know about these things> [Figure] A "TOP SECRET" watermark is stamped across the bottom of the document.
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 83]
I would certainly want to know whether or not the chieflaw enforcement officer of the country thought they werelegal or illegal, or if there was a question about it.Senator Mathias. I have a real question if I wereAttorney General whether I would sign what we would call forhere.Senator Huddleston. The certification bothers me alittle bit.Senator Mathias. How could I as Attorney General saythat I certify that all the actions in this area do not violateConstitutional rights of American citizens or any other provisionof law?I have worked in a state law department and had tosign some certifications much simpler than this, and I agonizedover them. And this is so far beyond the personal knowledgeof the Attorney General for him to make any kind of certification,I think we should get him involved but I question whether itshould be a certifying.Senator Huddleston. What's the step just under actuallycertifying?He could review. He could certainly raise a red flag.His oath would require that he do something.Senator Mathias. If you force him to certify. I thinkyou're going to get such a wishy-washy thing that to hisknowledge and he was not advised to the contrary and stuff like
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 84]
# TOP SECRET1 that.2 Mr. Aaron. I think that's a fair point. The question,3 I guess, the case at which the certification would run most would4 add to what already is in the sentence preceeding it which5 is review by the Committee which the Attorney General is6 to chair, would be the case in which the Attorney General is7 aware of a particular activity, is aware that it is illegal8 but just doesn't do anything about it on the theory that it9 is somebody else's business. And he doesn't really, he doesn't10 have an obligation in this category of matters to render11 a judgment and bring it to the attention of the President or12 the Congress.13 Senator Mathias. Why don't we say this, that the14 Attorney General be required to advise the President and the15 oversight committee that he is familiar with the procedures16 established to accomplish this purpose and that he is not17 aware of any violation of the Constitution or other law in18 the execution of the action..19 I think you can lay that kind of a burden on the Attorney20 General .21 Mr. Aaron. Would it be possible to just make it sort22 of a reporting function in which he said, and this is in the23 same direction, the Attorney General will be required to24 advise the President and the oversight committee if he finds25 that these options are being taken in a manner that violates?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 85]
Senator Huddleston. Yes. First he must review them.Mr. Aaron. And if he finds a violation, evidence of violation, then he must report to the President and the oversight committee. Just place the responsibility there.Senator Huddleston. If in his opinion.Senator Mathias. I wouldn't have any trouble with that.Mr. Maxwell. I have one other point on that paragraph and that is it provides for annual review by the counter- intelligence committee of the National Security Council.I had understood we were dealing with the recruitment of agents for the United States foreign intelligence purposes, and the question is whether the counter intelligence committee which was to focus on resolving issues involving the bona fides of defectors, issues between the FBI and CIA, would be the body which would have the appropriate knowledge in the positive intelligence value, or whether it should be assigned to a counter-intelligence function.It's simply a question of where the responsibility should be allocated for reviewing those within the National Security Council structure, and I wasn't clear whether the counter-intelligence committee was the appropriate one.Mr. Aaron. Well, on that point, the purpose of setting up the counter-intelligence committee is essentially to look at the domestic impact of our intelligence activities, the primary ones being in the counter intelligence field but also
[157-10014-10121.pdf — page 86]
in the positive intellige me field.In fact, the resolution of the bona fides problem is a much smaller aspect of those two problems but the existence of the committee with some knowledge of the problem of counter-intelligence makes it possible to have a forum at the National Security Council level to address it.Mr. Kirbow. What abuse that has been brought up in the nast either in the press or accusations about a committee is this aimeri at?Has there been abuses that we have documented or reported that indicate that this has violated the Constituţional rights of anybody. includiut these forsioners for this purpose?We must be aiming this at something other than just kind of pulling it out of the air?Mr. Aaron. I think it really comes more in the category of questionable practices and I wish I had the domestic fellow here but it's really a question of, for example, when you're in the process of trying to recruit foreign assets or even Americans to perform foreign intelligence missions where you may begin collecting information on Americans for the purposes of assessing whether they are helpful to vou in approaching the particular person or whether the would be a dood access adept or who ומי might conduct some other kinds of surveillance more of a safeguard. I think.NW 50955 DocId: 32423509 Page 87> TOP SECRET> > FAIL.
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I don't think we're reall necessarily closing the barn door to some enormous abuse.Mr. Kirbow. I had never heard of one in that area.Mr. Aaron. I think by and large the FRD's quite clear.In other words, when we went through the CHAOS and some of these other programs that vere questionable, there were some cases in which some of the reporting that took place as a result of the foreign resources diuision got into the CHAOS net.But the forcion resources division managed to stay clear of in general and resisted in fact the effort on the part of the CHAOS team to do out and actively recruit in this area on a clandestine basis.This is really sort of more in the category of A. insuring that that doesn't take place and B.giving them help that they can say no, giving them a place to go if pressures such as the Huston Plan type pressures are brought to bear.Senator Huddleston. Well, there are several places in our report findings, several cases indicated in the testimony we've taken that the Attorney General ought to review and recommend.And I'm wondering whether or not rather than just spotting it at these various places, whether we couldn't make a general recommendation. We've already got the Attorney Teneral on the Committee and that he resicu if not all practiccant at least whatever practices, the same lange we were just talking abo