Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 352]
-108-I have examined the memorandum (which I prepared) summarizing the discussion of the Congo at the September 21, 1960 meeting of the NSC. I recall the discussion and believe it is accurately and adequately summarized in the memorandum. I have no recollection of any discussion of a possible assassination of Lumumba at this meeting. With specific reference to the statement of the Director of Central Intelligence... I believe this is almost a literal rendering of what. Mr. Dulles said. My own interpretation of this statement was that Mr. Dulles was speaking in the context of efforts being made within the Congolese government to force Lumumba from power. I did not interpret it as referring to assassination* (Boggs affidavit 10/10/75, pp. 2-3.)Boggs was not, however, in a position to analyze Dulles' remark in light of the actual planning for covert operations that took place during this period because Boggs was not privy to most such discussions (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2).C. Douglas Dillon, who attended this NSC meeting as Acting Secretary of State, said that he did not recall the discussion (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 47). Dillon said that the minutes "could mean that" assassination would have been one acceptable means of "disposing of" Lumumba, although he felt that "getting him out [of the Congo] or locking him up" would have been a preferable disposition of Lumumba at that point since he was* NSC Executive Secretary James Lay, who was also present at the meeting of September 21, 1960, stated: "I cannot recall whether there was any discussion of assassinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings." (Lay affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1.)
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-109-already out of office (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 48).* When remindedof the fact that Lumumba's movement and communications werenot restricted by the UN force and that the Congolese armycontinued to seek his arrest long after the NSC meeting, Dillonacknowledged that during this period Lumumba continued to beviewed by the United States as a potential threat and a volatileforce in the Congo:He had this tremendous ability to stir upa crowd or a group. And if he could have gottenout and started to talk to a battalion of theCongolese Army, he probably would have had themin the palm of his hand in five minutes. (Dillon,.9/20/75, p. 49.)John N. Irwin II, who attended the NSC meeting as AssistantSecretary of Defense, stated that although he had no recollectionof the discussion, the language of the minutes was "broad enoughto cover a discussion of assassination" (Irwin affidavit,9/22/75, p. 2).Richard Bissell testified that, based upon his understandingof the policy of the NSC toward Lumumba even after Lumumba wasin UN custody, he would read the minutes of September 21 to indi-cate that assassination was contemplated "as one possible means"* See Section 3, supra, for discussion of CIA cable traffic  indicating that Lumumba continued to be regarded as capable  of taking over the government after he was deposed and that  pressure to "eliminate" him did not cease until his death.
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-110-of "disposing of" Lumumba. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 70.) Bissellwas not present at the NSC meeting (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60).Bissell's opinion stands in opposition to that of GordonGray, the President's National Security Advisor, who likewisetestified that he could not remember the NSC discussion in whichhe participated (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 57). When asked to interpretthe reference to "disposing of" Lumumba, Gray said he "put it inthe same category as 'get rid of', 'eliminate'" (Gray, 7/9/75,p. 57). Early in his testimony, Gray stated that "assassinationcould have been on the minds of some people when they usedthese words "'eliminate' or 'get rid of'" (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 17).Nonetheless, when asked to comment on the minutes of the NSCmeeting of September 21, he said: "It was not my impressionthat we had in mind the assassination of Lumumba" (Gray, 7/9/75,p. 57).** John Eisenhower, who attended the NSC meeting as Assistant  White House Staff Secretary, said that he had no "direct  recollection" of the discussion but he found the minutes of  the meeting consonant with his "recollection of the atmosphere"  at the time: "the U.S. position was very much anti-Lumumba"  (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 9). He said:I would not conjecture that the words "disposed of"meant an assassination, if for no other reason thanif I had something as nasty as this to plot, I wouldn'tdo it in front of 21 people . . . the number present[at] the meeting. (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 10.)
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-111-## (b) Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials That They Knew of No Presidential Consideration of AssassinationThe two members of President Eisenhower's staff who were responsible for national security affairs--Gordon Gray and Andrew Goodpaster--both made general disclaimers of any knowledge of Presidential consideration of assassination during their tenure.Gordon Gray served as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in which capacity he coordinated the National Security Council and represented the President at Special Group meetings. Gray testified that he did not recall President Eisenhower "ever saying anything that contemplated killing Lumumba" (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 28).When asked to interpret phrases from the minutes of particular NSC and Special Group meetings such as "getting rid of" or "disposing of" Lumumba, Gray stated:It is the intent of the user of the expression or the phrase that is controlling and there may well have been in the Central Intelligence Agency plans and/or discussions of assassinations, but . . . at the level of the Forty Committee [Special Group] or a higher level than that, the National Security Council, there was no active discussion in any way planning assassination.. . . I agree that assassination could have[^1][^1]: At the outset of his testimony on the subject, Gordon Gray acknowledged that he did not have a clear, independent recollection of Lumumba's role in the Congo (Gray, 7/9/75, pp. 25-26).
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-112-been on the minds of some people when they used these words 'eliminate' or 'get rid of'. I am just trying to say that it was not seriously considered as a program of action by the President or even the Forty (Special) Group. (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 17.)Andrew Goodpaster, the White House Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower, said that he and Gray were the "principal channels" between the President and the CIA, outside of NSC meetings (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, p. 4). Goodpaster was responsible for "handling with the President all matters of day-to-day operations in the general fields of international affairs and security affairs" (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, p. 3). He regularly attended NSC meetings and was listed among the participants at the NSC meetings of August 18, 1960 and September 21, 1960.When asked if he ever heard about any assassination effort during the Eisenhower Administration, Goodpaster replied unequivocally:... at no time and in no way did I ever know of or hear about any proposal, any mention of such an acitvity. [I]t is my belief that had such a thing been raised with the President other than in my presence, I would have known about it, and . . . it would have been a matter of such significance and sensitivity that I am confident that . . . I would have recalled it had such a thing happened. (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, p. 5.)John Eisenhower, the President's son who served under Goodpaster as Assistant White House Staff Secretary, stated that the use of assassination was contrary to the President's philos-
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-113-ophy that "no man is indispensable" (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 14.)*As a participant at NSC meetings who frequently attended dis-cussions in the Oval Office relating to national security affairs,John Eisenhower testified that nothing that came to his atten-tion in his experience at the White House "can be construed inmy mind in the remotest way to mean any Presidential knowledgeof or concurrence in any assassination plots or plans" (Eisenhower,7/18/75, p. 4).* Douglas Dillon testified that the subject of assassination  never arose in his "direct dealings with either President  Eisenhower or President Kennedy (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 22). He was  asked by a member of the Committee, however, to speculate upon  the general philosophical approach that Presidents Eisenhower  and Kennedy would have taken to decisionmaking on the question  of using assassination as a tool of foreign policy:Senator Hart (Colorado): I would invite your speculation atthis point as a sub-Cabinet officer under President Eisen-hower, and as a Cabinet Officer under President Kennedy, Ithink the Committee would be interested in your view as tothe attitude of each of them toward this subject, that isto say, the elimination, violent elimination of foreignleaders?Dillon: Well, that is a difficult thing to speculate onin a totally different atmosphere. But I think probablyboth of them would have approached it in a very pragmaticway, most likely, simply weighed the process and con-sequence rather than in a way that was primarily of amoral principle. That is what would probably have beentheir attitude in a few cases. Certainly the idea thatthis was going to be a policy of the U.S., generallyboth of them were very much opposed to it.. (Dillon,9/2/75, pp. 22-23.)Dillon served as Undersecretary of State in the EisenhowerAdministration and as Secretary of the Treasury under Kennedy.
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-114-Other Eisenhower Administration officials who were activein the Special Group in late 1960--Assistant Secretary ofDefense John N. Irwin II, Undersecretary of State for PoliticalAffairs Livingston Merchant, and Deputy Secretary of DefenseJames Douglas--stated that they did not recall any discussionabout assassinating Lumumba (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, pp. 1-2;Merchant affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1; Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75).(c) Richard Bissell Testified That, Despite His Lack ofa Specific Recollection, He "Strongly Inferred"That the Assassination Effort Against Lumumba WasAuthorized by President Eisenhower and Allen DullesRichard Bissell's testimony on the question of high-levelauthorization for the effort to assassinate Lumumba is prob-lematic. Bissell insisted that he had no direct recollectionof receiving such authorization and that all of his testimonyon this subject "has to be described as inference" (Bissell,9/10/75, p. 48). Bissell began his testimony on the subjectby asserting that it was on his own initiative that he instructedJustin O'Donnell to plan the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell,6/11/75, pp. 54-55). Nevertheless, Bissell's conclusion--basedon his inferences from the totality of circumstances relatingto the entire assassination effort against Lumumba--was that anassassination attempt had been authorized at the highest levelsof the government (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 32-33, 47-49, 60-62,65).
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-115-As discussed above, Bissell testified that the minutes of meetings of the Special Group on August 25, 1960 and the NSC on September 21, 1960 indicate that assassination was contemplated at the Presidential level as one acceptable means of "getting rid of Lumumba" (see Sections 5(a)(ii) and 5(a)(iii), *supra*).There was "no question", according to Bissell, that the cable from Allen Dulles to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville on August 26, which called for Lumumba's removal and authorized Hedgman to take action without consulting headquarters, was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting Dulles had attended the previous day (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 31-32). Bissell was "almost certain" that he had been informed about the Dulles cable shortly after its transmission (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 12).Bissell testified that he assumed that assassination was one of the means of removing Lumumba from the scene that is contemplated within the language of Dulles' cable (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 32):It is my belief on the basis of the cable drafted by Allen Dulles that he regarded the action of the Special Group as authorizing implementation [of an assassination] if favorable circumstances presented themselves, if it could be done covertly. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 64-65.)Dulles' cable signalled to Bissell that there was Presidential authorization for him to order action to assassinate Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62):
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-116-Q: Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President Eisenhower wanted Lumumba killed?Mr. Bissell: I am sure he didn't.Q: Did he ever tell you even circumlocutiously through this kind of cable?Mr. Bissell: Yes, I think his cable says it in effect. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 33.)As for discussions with Dulles about the source of authorization for an assassination effort against Lumumba, Bissell stated:I think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles would have said either the President or President Eisenhower even to me. I think he would have said, this is authorized in the highest quarters, and I would have known what he meant. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48.)When asked if he had sufficient authority to move beyond the consideration or planning of assassination to order implementation of a plan, Bissell said, "I probably did think I had [such] authority" (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62).When informed about the Chief of Station's testimony about the instructions he received from Gottlieb, Bissell said that despite his absence of a specific recollection:I would strongly infer in this case that such an authorization did pass through me, as it were, if Sid Gottlieb gave that firm instruction to the Station Chief. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40.)Bissell said that the DCI would have been the source of this authorization (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40).
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-117-Bissell did not recall being informed by Gottlieb that Gottlieb had represented to the Chief of Station that there was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 46). But Bissell said that assuming he had instructed Gottlieb to carry poison to the Congo, "there was no possibility" that he would have issued such an instruction without authorization from Dulles (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47). Likewise Bissell said he "probably did" tell Gottlieb that the mission had the approval of President Eisenhower (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47). This led to Bissell's conclusion that if, in fact, the testimony of the Chief of Station about Gottlieb's actions is accurate, then Gottlieb's actions were fully authorized:Q: In light of the entire atmosphere at the Agency and the policy at the Agency at the time, Mr. Gottlieb's representation to the Chief of Station that the President had instructed the DCI to carry out this mission would not have been beyond the pale of Mr. Gottlieb's authority at that point?Bissell: No, it would not. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 65).Bissell further stated:Knowing Mr. Gottlieb, it is literally inconceivable to me that he would have acted beyond his instructions. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 41.)With respect to his assignment to Justin O'Donnell to "plan and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 24) Bissell testified that "it was my own idea to give
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-118-O'Donnell this assignment" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50). But he said that this specific assignment was made in the context that an assassination mission against Lumumba already had authorization above the level of DDP (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50; see also pp. 32-33, 47-48, 60-62).
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 363]
# The "Executive Action" Capability.Along with the question of authorization for actual assassination attempts, the Committee considered the extent and nature of authorization for a CIA project which included, as one element, the development of an assassination capability.(a) IntroductionSometime in early 1961, Richard Bissell (Deputy Director of Plans) instructed William Harvey, who was at that time the Chief of one of CIA's Foreign Intelligence staffs, to establish an "executive action capability" which included research into a capability to assassinate foreign leaders. (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 51; Harvey 6/25/75, pp. 36-37.) At some time within the same period, Bissell and McGeorge Bundy (Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) had a conversation about the matter.Bissell, Harvey and Helms all agreed that the "generalized" capability was never used" (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 87; Harvey 6/25/75, p. 45; Helms 6/13/75, p. 52)."Executive action" is a CIA euphemism, defined by the testimony before the Committee as a project for research into developing means for overthrowing foreign political leaders, including a "capability to perform assassinations". (Harvey 6/25/75, p. 34.) Bissell indicated that executive action covered a "wide spectrum of actions" to "eliminate the effectiveness" of foreign leaders, with assassination as the "most extreme" action on the spectrum (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 32). The Inspector General's Report.
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-2-described executive action as a "general stand-by capability" to carry out assassination when required (I.G., p. 37). The project was given the code name ZR/RIFLE by the CIA.*A single agent ("asset"), given the cryptonym QJ/WIN, was placed under Harvey's supervision for the ZR/RIFLE project, but never used in connection with any actual assassination efforts.Richard Helms described QJ/WIN's "capability":"If you needed somebody to carry out murder, I guess you had a man who might be prepared to carry it out." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 53).Harvey did use agent QJ/WIN, however, to spot "individuals with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible multi-purpose use" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 50). For example, QJ/WIN reported that a potential asset in the Middle East was "the leader of a gambling syndicate" with "an available pool of assassins" (CIA file, ZR/RIFLE/Personality Sketches).However, Harvey testified that:"during the entire existence of the entire ZRRIFLE project no agent was recruited for the purpose of assassina- tion, and no even tentative targeting or target list was ever drawn." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 45.)Project ZR/RIFLE involved, generally, assessing the problems and requirements of assassination and developing a stand-* ZR/RIFLE was a cryptonym relating to two programs. One was the executive action assassination capability. The other was another program which is not part of the subject matter of this report. (William Harvey had been in charge of the CIA section with general responsibility for such programs.) This second program was genuine, but it was also to provide a cover for any executive action operation. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 49.)
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-3-by assassination capability; more specifically, it involved "spotting" potential agents and "researching" assassination techniques that might be used (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 11 and 6/9/75, p. 73; Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 37-A, 45). Bissell characterized Project ZR/RIFLE as "internal and purely preparatory" (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 32). The I.G. Report of 1967 found "no indication in the file that the Executive Action Capability of ZR/RIFLE-QJ/WIN was ever used", but said that "after Harvey took over the Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect of ZR/RIFLE". (I.G. pp. 40-41.)*(b) The Question of White House Initiation, Authorization, or Knowledge of the Executive Action ProjectThere is general agreement on one fact: at some point in early 1961 Bissell discussed the executive action capability with Bundy. The timing of that conversation and whether "the White House" urged that a capability be created were matters on which the evidence varied widely.Harvey testified that Bissell had told him that "the White House" had twice urged the creation of such a capability and the Inspector General's Report quoted notes of Harvey's (no longer in existence) to that effect. Bissell did not recall any specific conversation with the "White House". However, his initial testimony assumed the correctness of Harvey's notes, and stated* A discussion of whether ZR/RIFLE was related to the actual assassination efforts against Castro is found at Section (d), infra.
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that, while he could have created the capability on his own, anyurgings would have come from Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a laterappearance, however, Bissell said he merely informed Bundy ofthe capability and that the context was a briefing by him andnot urging by Bundy. Bundy said he received a briefing andgave no urging, though he raised no objections. Rostow said henever heard of the project.William Harvey testified that he was "almost certain"that on January 25 and 26, 1961, he met with CIA officials SidneyGottlieb, the new Chief of CIA's Technical Services Division, andArnold Silver, a CIA recruiting officer, to discuss the feasibilityof creating a capability within the Agency for "executive action"(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). After reviewing his notes of thosemeetings,* Harvey testified that they took place after his initial* As to the date of these notes, Harvey was asked whether his no-  tations "25/1-Sid G" and "26/1-AS" indicate that he spoke to Sidney  Gottlieb and Arnold Silver in 1961, as opposed to 1962. Harvey testi-  fied as follows:Q: And is it your judgment that that is January 26, 1961 andis about the subject of Executive Action?Harvey: Yes, it is.Q: And it followed your conversation with Mr. Bissell thatyou have recounted?Harvey: [W]ell, when I first looked at this, I thoughtthis, well, this has got to be '62, but I am almost certainnow that it is not. If this is true, this might place thefirst discussion that I had with Dick Bissell in earlyJanuary and this is difficult to pinpoint because there wereseveral such discussions in varying degrees of detail duringthe period in the spring, and very early in '61 to the fallof '61 period, but I did find out fairly early on that Silver
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-5-discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said, might have transpired in "early January". (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10).had -- or that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver, and this discussion, at the very least, had to take place after I know Bissell already had discussed the matter with Silver. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).Harvey had also testified that, after receiving Bissell's initial instructions to establish an executive action capability:the first thing I did . . . was discuss in theoretical terms with a few officers whom I trusted quite implicitly the whole subject of assassination, our possible assets, our posture, going back, if you will, even to the fundamental questions of A, is assassination a proper weapon of an American intelligence service, and B, even if you assume that it is, is it within our capability within the framework of this government to do it effectively and properly, securely and discreetly. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 37-A, 38).The Inspector General's Report connected Silver and Gottlieb to the early stages of the executive action project as follows:Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with Arnold Silver and with Sidney Gottlieb. Since Silver was already cut in, Harvey used him in developing the Executive Action Capability.... Harvey's mention of him [Gottlieb] in this connection may explain a notation by Dr. Gunn that Harvey instructed Gunn to discuss techniques with Gottlieb without associating the discussion with the Castro operation. (I.G. Report, pp. 37-38).It is evident from the testimony of Harvey and Bissell that the turn-over to Harvey of the Roselli contact in November 1961 was discussed as part of ZRRIFLE (see Section (d), infra). Thus, their initial discussion of executive action can, at the least, be dated before November 1961 and the "25/1" and "26/1" notations would have to refer to January 1961.