Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 55]
## PERSONS/ENTITIES:HELMS, Richard LODGE, Henry CabotCARTER, Gen. Marshall KENNEDY, John F.NHU CIADIEM DEPTEL 243FELT, ADM. Harry D. (CINCPAC)## DATES:26 August 1963## CATEGORIES:DIEM> [Figure: TOP SECRET stamp]## OCCURRENCE:On August 26, 1963, HELMS' record of a Presidential Meeting on Vietnam, is below. The other CIA participant was GENERAL MARSHALL CARTER, DDCI."The question was raised as to whether there had been such a significant change in the Vietnam situation that it really appeared desirable to dump the NHU's and possibly DIEM himself. Principal points discussed were: ADMIRAL FELT's concern over the dangers inherent in the current US action in South Vietnam; the fact that LODGE had not seen DIEM to discuss the future role of the NHU's; the meaning of the phrase 'give direct support to military commanders' in DEPTEL 243; the question of succession; and what would happen if the action taken over the weekend failed. The PRESIDENT asked for another session on August 27 with participants to present biographic data on key SVN personalities and a contingency plan for the succession." (8-9)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 8-9STAFF: DawsonDATE: 28.6.75FILE:## PERSONS/ENTITIES:RICHARDSON, John KHIEMCONEIN MINHSPERAKHANH## DATES:26 Aug. 1963## CATEGORIES:DIEM> [Figure: TOP SECRET stamp]## OCCURRENCE:In a CIA cable from Saigon on August 26, 1963 (SAIG 0330),"RICHARDSON reports the results of the CONEIN/SPERA approaches to the generals. In essence, KHANH said he was not yet ready, and KHIEM said he would have to check with MINH." (9)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 9STAFF: DawsonFILE:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 56]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:KENNEDY, John F. HARKINS (MAC/V)HELMS (DD/P) CIACOLBY, William DEPTEL 243CARTERLODGE, Henry CabotDATES:27 Aug. 1963CATEGORIES:![Diem and TOP SECRET mark]OCCURRENCE:On August 27, 1963, there was a Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. The record was taken by HELMS or by COLBY for the CIA, and the other CIA participants were CARTER and HELMS:"The PRESIDENT stated that a coup should not be attempted unless it would be successful and asked whether we could turn back at this point. The PRESIDENT asked that the judgment of LODGE and HARKINS be sought on the prospects for victory or defeat of a coup. A cable was drafted asking if they still agreed with their concurrences to DEPTEL 243." (9-10)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 9-10STAFF: DawsonDATE: 28.6.75FILE:DEPTEL 243 DEPTEL 256KENNEDY, John F.LODGE, Henry CabotHARKINS, John (Commander, MAC/V)DATES:27 Aug. 1963CATEGORIES:DIEM![TOP SECRET mark]OCCURRENCE:In a State telegram to Saigon (DEPTEL 256), on August 27, 1963, the following message appeared:"Examination of reports to date gives considerable hope but leaves unanswered questions. Proceeding from the concept outlined in DEPTEL 243 as modified, now desire your prompt interim appraisal of present prospects. . . . Highest authority asks whether you and HARKINS, in light of developing situation, presently favor operation as currently planned by generals. We wish to give you all possible support in best available course but not to insist on any decision that developing evidence makes it wise to modify." (10)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 10STAFF: DawsonFILE:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 57]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:GEN. DINHCOUNSELLER NHUDATES:31 August '6311/1/63CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:Dinh, on approximately 31 August, had the audacity to inform both President Diem and Counseller Nhu that he was their savior and requested a ministerial post for himself.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,pages 12-13.FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:RICHARDSON, JohnSTAFF: DawsonDATE: 6/30/75DATES:28 Aug. 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:August 28, 1963, RICHARDSON reports in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0363) that:Situation here has reached point of no return.... Unless the generals are neutralized before being able to launch their operations, we believe they will act and that they have a good chance to win.... We all understand that the effort must succeed and that whatever needs to done on our part must be done...." (10)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 10FILE:STAFF: DawsonDATE:
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## PERSONS/ENTITIES:NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEEHELMS, RichardHARKINSCIAKENNEDY, John F.## DATES:29 Aug. 1963## CATEGORIES:DIEM> TOP SECRET## OCCURRENCE:At a NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE meeting on Vietnam on August 29, 1963, with a record taken by DD/P HELMS, shows thatThe consensus was that HARKINS should confirm to the generals that the approaches from CIA were bona fide and represented the views of the US government. There was agreement that better information was needed on what the generals were in fact planning to do and whether it was militarily feasible. A telegram giving the sense of the meeting was drafted for "PRESIDENTIAL approval." (12)(Other CIA participants were not identified.) (12)## SOURCE:I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 12## FILE:## STAFF:Dawson## DATE:28.6.75---## PERSONS/ENTITIES:KENNEDY, JOHN F. BUNDY, McGeorgeRUSK, Dean NSC Exec. Com.MCNAMARA, Robert LODGE, Henry CabotTAYLOR, Maxwell HARKINS, John## DATES:28 Aug. 1963## CATEGORIES:DIEM> TOP SECRET## OCCURRENCE:On August 28, 1963, the PRESIDENT met privately with RUSK, MCNAMARA, TAYLOR, and McGEORGE BUNDY. He reported to the rest of the NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE merely that three telegrams were being sent to Saigon: a personal message to LODGE from the PRESIDENT, a general message from the DEPARTMENT to the AMBASSADOR, and a telegram from TAYLOR to HARKINS. (11)(This is reflected in notes taken by HELMS (DD/P) of the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE meeting on Vietnam. Other CIA participants are not identified.) (11)## SOURCE:I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 11## FILE:## STAFF:Dawson## DATE:28.6.75
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 59]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:JOHNSON, Lyndon B. RUSKCARTER McNAMARACOLBY BUNDYDATES:30 Aug. 1963CATEGORIES:DIEM![Top Secret marking]OCCURRENCE:August 30, 1963, there was a VICE PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, with HELMS, CARTER, and COLBY participating. The record is provided by C/FE COLBY which shows that:"RUSK referred to recent cable traffic and said that he was not even sure whom we were dealing with or what they were planning. McNAMARA pointed out that there was some question whether the generals ever did have a plan. BUNDY said he had re-read the earlier traffic and noted that they never said they did. GEN. CARTER said he believed that the general's coup was not likely at this stage and that in another week we will be approximately where we were before the attack on the Buddhist temples. BUNDY suggested we consider additional contingencies before the GROUP and whether the assumption that NHU is impossible is well founded." (13)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 13FILE:STAFF: DawsonDATE: 28.6.75PERSONS/ENTITIES:JOHNSON, Lyndon B. HARKINSCOLBY CARTERRUSK HELMSMCNAMARALODGEDATES:31 Aug. 1963CATEGORIES:DIEM![Top Secret Marking]OCCURRENCE:At a VICE PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on August 31, 1963, a record by C/FE COLBY reflects that:"RUSK suggested we look at precisely what in the Vietnam situation made us think of a coup and what might be done to improve conditions in Vietnam. McNAMARA suggested the first requirement was reestablishment of communication between LODGE and HARKINS. RUSK directed that a telegram be prepared for Saigon making suggestions as to what we might ask the GVN to do." (14)(DDCI CARTER and DD/P HELMS also participated.)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 14STAFF: Dawson
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 60]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:ARKINSHIEMMINHLODGEDATES: 31 Aug. 1963CATEGORIES: DIEMTOP SECRETAugust 31, 1963, in the Saigon Station's chronology of August 1963 coup activities, the following report appears:GENERAL HARKINS was authorized to meet with KHIEM to give KHIEM assurances of USG backing. KHIEM showed a reluctance to talk and suggested that HARKINS meet with GENERAL MINH. KHIEM commented that MINH had called off the planning and was working on other methods which KHIEM would not describe. KHIEM further stated that the generals were not ready as they did not have enough forces under their control. HARKINS decided not to give KHIEM assurances which he had been authorized to impart. LODGE approved HARKINS' decision on 31 August after HARKINS reported." (13)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 13STAFF: DawsonDATE: 28.6.75PERSONS/ENTITIES:State DepartmentDefense DepartmentMcConeDATES: Fall 1963CATEGORIES: DiemOCCURRENCE:Colby stated that the "...in this situation we were having almost daily meetings with senior officials in the CIA, State Department, Defense Department and so forth, in the basement of the White House and there was no question that this was national policy and hammered out. ...at these meetings, these were the meetings at which Mr. McCone and I argued very strongly that we should not move against the Diem government we should continue to work with it." Page 36TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 61]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINDATES:Fall 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:CONEIN stated that; there was dissidence within the coup group, the people who were going to pull the coup and one general didn't like the other general. The best way I can describe it, if you had three Vietnamese generals sitting and talking to you, one general would talk, walk out of the room to go to the "john", two would tell you, don't trust that one, and finally the one who had out-waited the other two, there would be one left, and he would say, don't trust those two. p. 31TOP SECRETSOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinFILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:July 1, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:COLBYLODGE, HENRY CABOTNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILSTATE DEPARTMENTDATES:Fall 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that "I would say that the embassy's position, the political section and the ambassador, was much more sympathetic to the proposition that the war could not successfully be conducted with President DIEM still in power without a major change in his style of operation. However, there is an additional factor, this which was the public pressure on the policy levels of our government in Washington, and the United States, and think this public pressure was felt particular by the people in the NATIONAL SECURITY COUN and by the people in the STATE DEPARTMENT." p. 61TOP SECRETSOURCE:STAFF:R. DAWSON
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 62]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:COLBY General HARKINSLODGE, H.C.NSCDATES:Fall 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: Mr. COLBY stated that: "The Defense Department was almost totally in a position that the wars in the countryside, that the countryside seems to be going along reasonably well, that this (DIEM's continuance in office) is an urban problem, urban political problem which should not interfere with the main things going on. This was true of the Secretary and General HARKINS out there and the Joint Chiefs here and so forth". p. 62SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ColbyFILE:STAFF: R. DawsonDATE: 1 July 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:NHULODGE, H.C.COLBYDATES:Fall 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: COLBY stated in response to a question as to whether there was any serious attempt to persuade DIEM to leave office voluntarily that: "There had certainly been discussions to have NHU leave Vietnam at various times". But, "there was almost no direct contact between our ambassador LODGE and President DIEM, very little contact." P. 66
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 63]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:COLBYDATES:Fall 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMNSCSTATE DEPARTMENTOCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that the public pressure that was brought upon or was felt by the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL and by the people in the STATE DEPARTMENT was "one of distast for President DIEM." p. 61SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ColbySTAFF: R. DAWSONDATE: 1 July 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:COLBYPRESIDENT KENNEDYGENERAL KRULAKMR. MENDELHAYDATES:Fall 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that: "The most dramatic way in which this was posed, this has been described publicly a number of times, was that at one time, particularly with the frustrating period the President (Kennedy) faced with these two strong positions, he sent two officers, one a General Krulak, who was an assistant to Secretary McNamara and a Mr. Mendelhay, who had formerly been the political counsellor in Saigon, to Saigon for about five days to make an assessment on the spot and they came back to the camera room, and one sat on one end of the room and one sat on the other and General Krulak first said he had been to 20 provinces and talked to 20 provinces and 30 military chiefs and all that sort of thing and the war business (was) going on basically and there were some problems, but the thing was that they seemed to have a strategy and they seemed to be moving along on it, then Mendelhay said he went to three cities and talked to lots of civil servants and political people, and all the rest of it and there was a general feeling that the cause hopeless because there was so much distaste for President DIEM and so much opposition, and the general feeling that the war could not be won. And the President, of course, looked at them andSOURCE: said, did you two fellows go to the same country? And theanswer is they did.Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ColbyThey looked at two differentSTAFF:R. DAWSONDATE.
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:Nh, TonthatHữu, Ngo DinhDATES:9/65CATEGORIES:Diem> [Figure: "TOP SECRET" stamp]OCCURRENCE:Conein stated that Diem and Nhu did not understand Dinh's role as a double agent. Diem or Nhu had planned to have a Bravo I and a Bravo II that Diem and Nhu would have their own coup and go down to Vongtau as if they were escaping and there would immediately be a counter-coup to bring Diem--all instigated by Nhu back to power by popular acclamation. So on November 1 at 1 p.m. in the afternoon when troops were moving it was assumed by Diem and Nhu that this was part of Diem's plan to have a counter-coup. Page 66-68.SOURCE: Hearings, SSC, Conein, June 20, 1975STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 7/1/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINDINHGENERAL DONDATES:September 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMHUAN, Commanding Officer, Military Academy at DelatOCCURRENCE: DON promised DINH that he would personally speak to the President on DINH's behalf and that he would ask that DINH be granted the Ministry of Interior, while he, DON, would ask for the Ministry of National Defense. DINH believed that DON had his personal interest at heart and DON did in fact make such an appeal to the President to enlarge his government, but made the proposal in such a way that it would have been impossible for DIEM or NHU to accept. Deadlines were given. DINH was informed that the President would give him the ministerial post. After the deadlines had passed and DINH had not received what he thought was his proper recognition, GENERAL DON and other officers including HUAN continued to lend sympathy to DINH while DINH was still waiting for his ministerial post. p. 13> [Figure: "TOP SECRET" stamp]SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, ConeinSTAFF: DawsonDATE: June 30 1975
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 65]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:GENERAL ΜΙΝΗKHIEMLODGE, Henry CABOTDON, GENERALCONEINDATES:September 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: "During the month of September, there was still more talk of coups, and at the time, the month of September, I had been told by Ambassador LODGE that I was to monitor coups planning only.... That I was to convey any messages. I had conveyed messages to BIG MINH on two occasions, GENERAL KHIEM on one occasion. I had met with GENERAL KHIEM and BIG MINH on another occasion. On several occasions, I had met with GENERAL DON and other military leaders." p. 23SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinFILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:20 June 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:RICHARDSON, JohnDIEMNHUCIACOL. TUNGDATE:2 Sept. 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: on September 2, 1963,In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0523),/the I.G. REPORT provides the following summary:"RICHARDSON cabled a damage assessment. He concluded that DIEM and the NHU's are fully aware that the USG encouraged the GENERALS to attempt a coup and that CIA was the instrumentality of this encouragement. He judged there was an even possibility that all major programs could go forward as in the past. He listed as a major dilemma the Stations future relationships with COL. TUNG. He noted his dissatisfaction with TUNG as a GVN liaison vehicle through which to conduct PM programs, but noted that the GVN had offered no alternative. Unless we were willing to discontinue our NVN, Laos border, and cross-border programs, we must continue to work with TUNG. [NOTE: PM programs = paramilitary programs]"The Times of Vietnam published charges that the CIA was plotting and financing a coup and was giving asylum to the chief anti-DIEM Buddhist leader. The story was picked up and widely played by the New York Daily News, the Chicago Tribune, Baltimore Sun, and other prominent newspapers." (15-16)SOURCE:STAFF:Dawson
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 66]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:KENNEDY, John F. DIEMHELMS NHUCOLBY BUNDYRUSK MADAME NHULODGEDATES:6 Sept. 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:At a PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on September 6, 1963, HELMS and COLBY provide the following summary:RUSK stressed the immediate need for direct contact between LODGE and DIEM. BUNDY pointed out the necessity of advising LODGE not to have a real show-down with DIEM over NHU at this forth- coming meeting, as one of LODGE's cables indicated he was headed very much in this direction. RUSK agreed to do this. The PRESIDENT agreed with the desirability of silencing, MADAME NHU but expressed some doubt that NHU's participation was as fatal as STATE seemed to say it was. RUSK commented that the COUNTRY TEAM had stated its feeling that NHU must go, to which the PRESIDENT replied that they may have been operating under directives received from here." (16)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 16FILE:STAFF: DawsonDATE: 28.6.75
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 67]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:EWNEDY, John F. DIEMOMS NHUCLBY BUNDYUSK MADAME NHUGEDATES:6 Sept. 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:In a PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on September 6, 1963, HELMS and COLBY provide the fol-lowing summary:FOSK stressed the immediate need for direct contact between LODGE and DIEM. BUNDY pointed out he necessity of advising LODGE not to have a real show-down with DIEM over NHU at this forth-oming meeting, as one of LODGE's cables indicated he was headed very much in this direction. USK agreed to do this. The PRESIDENT agreed with the desirability of silencing MADAME NHU but expressed some doubt that NHU's participation was as fatal as STATE seemed to say it was. RUSK mented that the COUNTRY TEAM had stated its feeling that NHU must go, to which the PRESIDENT eplied that they may have been operating under directives received from here." (16)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 16FILE:STAFF: DawsonDATE: 28.6.75PERSONS/ENTITIES:Special Forces CIA paymentsCIATung, Col.Bell, DavidDATES:8 Sept. 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:On 8 September 1963 wire services in prominent newspapers carried a story that the Special Forces troops who raided the pagodas on the 21 August were still being paid secretly by CIA. This story was attributed to a highly reliable source in Washington and gave details of support to Col. Tung in the amount of $3,000,000 annually, and of payment of $250,000 on 3 September. The story was datelined in Washington and in Manila. David Bell warned in a television interview that the U.S. Congress might cut pack aid to Vietnam unless the Diam government changed its policy.SOURCE: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 17STAFF: DawsonDATE:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 68]
# PERSONS/ENTITIES:KrulgkCrewlack, Victor Gen., Mendenhall, Jos. A.Counterinsurgency SpecialistsJoint Chiefs of StaffRusk, Dean Sec. of StateMcCone Jobp DN# DATES:10 Sept. 1963# CATEGORIES:DIEM# OCCURRENCE:Richardson, JohnUN AdvisorBureau Far EasternAffairsKennedy, JbbnF.At a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with Carter and Colby in attendance, the following record by Colby is provided of the meeting of September 10, 1963.General GroTeck reported his findings in Vietnam. His conclusions were that the war was going ahead at an impressive pace and that the Vietcong war could be won if current U.S. military and socological, programs are continued. Mendenhall, the Ştate representative who accompanied Celack, expressed the view that there was complete breakdown of the Siagon civilian government in the security situations in the provinces had deteriorated. The President asked where the two gentlemen had been insame country. Rusk suggested that the focus be on what happened in July and August that reversed the optimistic judgments in May and June. Mr. McCone talked from a personal telegram which he had received Richardson recommending against any cut in aid.# SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19# STAFF:Dawson# FILE:# DATE:6/27/75# PERSONS/ENTITIES:DiemRichardson, Chief of Station CIA Siagon# DATES:10 Sept 1963# CATEGORIES:DIEM# OCCURRENCE:On 10 September 1963 in a cable from the CIA station in Siagon (SAIG0760) to Washington, the following quotation appears: "Am inclined to feel general officers will seek evolutionary accomodation with Diem, (if he permits them to do so) unless overall situation clearly deteriorates, thereis breakdown of civil order or of governmental machinery, or unless war effort begins to go backward seriously (despite damages suffered since 8 May and 21 August am inclined to believe we should be able to resume successful prosecution of war in military and civil sections) do not align myself with the view that USG should suspend aid ".# SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19# STAFF:Dawson
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 69]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:Kennedy, John F. PresidentCIAOCCURRENCE:On 10 September 1963, in an interview by Huntley and Brinkley, the President denied the charge that the CIA makes its own policy.SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19FILE:STAFF:DawsonDATE:6/27/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:Bundy,ColbyMcConeMcNamarraKennedy, PresidentDATES:10 Sept. 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: At a National Security Council executive meeting on Vietnam, with Carter and Colby participating for the CIA, Colby provided the following record: Bundy stressed the need to unify U.S. government posture, to coordinate press guidance and to control outgoing messages to Saigon. He emphasized the importance of following the President's guidance on this delicate problem, in spite of intensly differing views of what should be done and how, the risk, minimum objectives, and facts. McNamarra stated that his position was virouously against throwing out this government without seeing an alternative and that none appeared to exist. Mr. McCone commented that the problem was not so much the existance of an alternative as to how to put one into power. Bundy summarized the President's position as one in which we must express our reservations as to mistakes and misdeeds of Diem but not be a position where we can not deal with him further.SOURCE:STAFF:Dawson