Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 384]
# BackgroundRafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Republic in 1930. For most of his tenure, the United States government supported him and he was regarded throughout much of the Caribbean and Latin America as a protege of the United States. Trujillo's rule, always harsh and dictatorial, became more arbitrary during the 1950's. As a result, the United States States' image was increasingly tarnished in the eyes of many Latin Americans.Increasing American awareness of Trujillo's brutality and fear that it would lead to a Castro-type revolution caused U.S. officials to consider various plans to hasten his abdication or downfall.As early as February 1960 the Eisenhower administration gave high level consideration to a program of covert aid to Dominican dissidents. (Special Group minutes, 2/10/60).In April 1960 President Eisenhower approved a contingency plan for the Dominican Republic which provided, in part, that if the situation deteriorated still further:"...the United States would immediately take political action to remove Trujillo from the Dominican Republic as soon as a suitable successor regime can be induced to take over with the assurance of U.S. political, economic, and -- if necessary -- military support." (Memo from Secretary of State Herter to the President, 4/14/60; Presidential approval indicated in Herter letter to Secretary of Defense Gates, 4/21/60.)Simultaneously, the United States was trying to organize hemispheric opposition to the Castro regime in Cuba. Latin
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 385]
American leaders, such as President Betancourt of Venezuela,pressed the United States to take affirmative action againstTrujillo to dispel criticism that the U.S. opposed dictator-ships of the left only. A belief that Castro's road to powerwas paved by the excesses of Batista led to concern that theDominican Republic might also eventually fall victim to aCastro-style Communist regime. (Rusk, pp. 8,9)## Initial Contact with Dissidents and Request for ArmsDuring the spring of 1960, the U.S. ambassador to theDominican Republic, Joseph Farland, made initial contact withdissidents who sought to free their country from Trujillo'sgrasp. They asked for sniper rifles. Although documentaryevidence indicates that a recommendation to provide theserifles was approved both within the State Department and theCIA, the rifles were never provided.### Dissident ContactsAmbassador Farland established contact with a group ofdissidents regarded as moderate, pro-U.S. and desirous ofestablishing a democratic form of government.* (Farlandaffidavit) Prior to his final departure from the DominicanRepublic in May 1960, the Ambassador introduced his Deputy-Chief-of-Mission, Henry Dearborn, to the dissident leaders, indicating that[^1] This loosely-organized group, with which contact was es-tablished, was referred to in cables, correspondence, andmemoranda as "the dissidents" and is so referenced herein.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 386]
-3-Dearborn could be trusted. Then on June 16, 1960, CIAHeadquarters* cabled a request that Dearborn become the "communications link" between the dissidents and CIA. The cable /stated/that Dearborn's role had the "unofficial approval of /AssistantSecretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Roy R.7 Rubottom"(Emphasis in original.) (HQS to Station cable 6/16/60).Dearborn agreed. He requested, however, that the CIAconfirm the arrangement with the dissidents as being that theU.S. would "clandestinely" assist the opposition to "developeffective force to accomplish Trujillo overthrow," but wouldnot "undertake any overt action itself against Trujillogovernment while it is in full control of Dominican Republic"(Station to HQS cable 6/17/60). CIA Headqaurters confirmedDearborn's understanding of the arrangement (HQS to Stationcable 6/19/60).## B. The Sniper RiflesDuring the course of a cocktail party in the DominicanRepublic, a leading dissident made a specific request to Ambas-sador Farland for a limited number of rifles with telescopicsights. The Ambassador promised to pass on the request (Farlandaffidavit) He apparently did so after returning to Washingtonin May 1960 (CIA memorandum for the record, 6/7/61).* As used herein "Headquarters" refers to Headquarters of the  Central Intelligency Agency; "Department" indicates the  Department of State.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 387]
-4-Documents indicate that consideration was given within the CIA to airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic. At a June 21, 1960, meeting with Ned Holman of the CIA Western Hemisphere Division, Ambassador Farland reportedly suggested possible sites for the drops. (CIA memo, 6/21/60)Documents also indicate that a meeting was held around the end of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom and Col. J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division. Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant Secretary's view regarding "To what extent will the U.S. government participate in the overthrow of Trujillo." A number of questions were raised by King, among them:"c. Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene?"King's handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom's response to that question was "yes" (CIA memo of 6/28/60; King affidavit)[^1]On July 1, 1960, a memorandum directed to General Cabell, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared for Colonel King's signature and, in his absence, signed by his principal deputy, Rudy Gomez (I.G. Report, p. 26). The memorandum stated that a principal leader of the anti-Trujillo opposition had asked Ambassador Farland for a limited number of arms to precipitate Trujillo's overthrow, and recognized that such arms[^1]: * Neither King nor Rubottom recalls such a meeting, nor does either recall any proposal for supplying sniper rifles. (Rubottom affidavit, King affidavit.)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 388]
"presumably would be used against key members of the Trujillo regime." The memorandum recommended that the arms be provided, since the fall of the Trujillo regime appeared inevitable, and therefore U.S. relations with the opposition should be as close as possible. "Providing the arms as requested would contribute significantly toward this end." (CIA memo, 7/1/60)Specifically, the recommendation was to deliver to dissidents in the Dominican Republic 12 sterile* rifles with telescopic sights, together with 500 rounds of ammunition.Paragraph 4 of the memorandum stated:"4. Approval for delivery of these arms has been given by Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, who requests that the arms be placed in hands of the opposition at the earliest possible moment." (Id.)Gomez's recommendation was concurred in by Richard Helms, as Acting DDP, and approved by General Cabell, (I.G. Report, p. 26).The kind of arms approved, sterile rifles with telescopic sights, together with the statement that they would be presumably used against key members of the Trujillo regime clearly indicated the "targeted use" for which the weapons were intended. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 77).On July 1, 1960, a cable was sent to Dearborn by CIA Headquarters informing him of the plan to airdrop 12 telescopically-sighted rifles into the Dominican Republic. The *"Sterile" rifles are "untraceable" rifles. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p.69)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 389]
-6-cable inquired whether the dissidents had the capability to realign the sights if thrown off by the drop. On July 14, 1960, Dearborn replied that the dissident leaders were against any further action in the Dominican Republic until after resolution by the OAS of a Venezuelan complaint then pending against Trujillo. The dissidents reportedly believed that sufficiently strong action by the OAS could bring Trujillo's downfall without further effort on their part. (Station to HQS cable, 7/14/60) The 12 sniper rifles were never furnished to the dissidents.On August 26, 1960, Dearborn cabled Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Lester Mallory reporting on a meeting between a dissident leader and John Barfield, the Consulate's political officer. The dissident leader was reported to have lost enthusiasm for an assassination attempt and was then speaking of an invasion from Venezuela. However, by September 1, 1960, dissidents were again speaking about the possible provision to them of arms. This time the request was for 200 rifles. For the next several months, consideration centered on providing 200 to 300 guns.II. Summer and Fall of 1960In August 1960, the United States severed diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic and recalled most of its personnel. Dearborn was left as Consul General and *de facto* CIA Chief of Station. Consideration was given both to providing
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 390]
arms and explosive devices and to the use of high level emissaries to persuade Trujillo to abdicate. By the end of the year, a broad plan of general support to anti-Trujillo forces, both within and without the country, was approved.## A. Diplomatic Development -- Withdrawal of U.S. PersonnelEvents occurring during the summer of 1960 further intensified hemispheric opposition to the Trujillo regime. In June agents of Trujillo tried to assassinate Venezuelan President Betancourt. As a result, the OAS censured the Trujillo government. At the same time, in August 1960, the United States broke interupted diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic and imposed economic sanctions.With the severance of diplomatic relations, the United States closed its Embassy. Most American personnel, including the CIA Chief of Station, left the Dominican Republic. With the departure of the CIA Chief of Station, Dearborn became *de facto* CIA Chief of Station and was recognized as such by both CIA and the State Department. Although on January 20, 1961, a new CIA Chief of Station came to the Dominican Republic, Dearborn continued to serve as a link to the dissidents.## B. Dearborn Reports Assassination May be Only Way to Overthrow Trujillo RegimeDearborn came to believe that no effort to overthrow the
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 391]
Trujillo government could be successful unless it involvedTrujillo's assassination.He communicated this opinion to both the State Department andthe CIA. In July 1960, he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottomthat the dissidents were"... in no way ready to carry on any type of revolutionaryactivity in the foreseeable future except theassassination of their principal enemy."(Dearborn to Rubottam letter, 7/14/60)It is uncertain what portion of the information providedby Dearborn to State was passed above the Assistant Secretarylevel. Through August of 1960, only Assistant Secretary Rubottom,his Deputy, Lester Mallory, and Staff Assistant Frank Devine,were, within the Latin American Division of the Department,aware of Dearborn's "current projects." (Devine to Dearbornletter, 8/15/60)*By September 1960, Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubottomas Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and FrankDevine had become a Special Assistant to Mr. Mann. Whileserving as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, Devinereportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating Stateactivities in Latin America. It was in this capacity thatDevine maintained almost daily communication with Ned Holmanand other officials of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division(Devine, p.7)*Dearborn's candid reporting to State during the summer of 1960raised concern with the Department and he was advised that certainspecific information should more appropriately come through "theother channel" (presumably, CIA communications). Dearborn wasadvised that his cables to State were distributed to at least 19different recipient offices. (Id.)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 392]
Mann solicited Dearborn's comments concerning plans -under discussion for forcing Trujillo from power. Dearbornreplied in a detailed letter which concluded:"One further point which I should probably not evenmake. From a purely practical standpoint, it willbe best for us, for the OAS, and for the DominicanRepublic if the Dominicans put an end to Trujillobefore he leaves this island. If he has his millionsand is a free agent, he will devote his life fromexile to preventing stable government in the D.R., tooverturning democratic governments and establishingdictatorships in the Caribbean, and to assassinatinghis enemies. If I were a Dominican, which thankheaven I am not, I would favor destroying Trujillo asbeing the first necessary step in the salvation ofmy country and I would regard this, in fact, as myChristian duty. If you recall Dracula, you willremember it was necessary to drive a stake throughhis heart to prevent a continuation of his crimes.I believe sudden death would be more humane thanthe solution of the Nuncio who once told me he thoughthe should pray that Trujillo would have a long andlingering illness." (Dearborn to Mann letter, 10/27/60)### Efforts to Convince Trujillo to AbdicateThroughout the fall of 1960, efforts were made on both thediplomatic and economic fronts aimed at pressuring Trujillointo relinquishing control, and ideally, leaving the DominicanRepublic. The use of high level emissaries, both from withinand without the ranks of government, was considered. (SpecialGroup Minutes, 9/8/60; Mann to Dearborn corres., 10/10/60)None of the efforts proved successful, and at the end of 1960Trujillo was still in absolute control.### CIA Plans of October 1960A CIA internal memorandum dated October 3, 1960 entitled
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 393]
"Plans of the Dominican Internal Opposition and DominicanDesk for Overthrow of the Trujillo Government" set forth planswhich "have been developed on a tentative basis which appearfeasible and which might be carried out.. covertly by CIA witha minimal risk of exposure." These plans provided, in part,for the following:"a. Delivery of approximately 300 rifles and pistols,together with ammunition and a supply of grenades, tosecure cache on the South shore of the island, about14 miles East of Ciudad Trujillo."b. Delivery to the same cache described above, of anelectronic detonating device with remote controlfeatures, which could be planted by the dissidents insuch manner as to eliminate certain key Trujillohenchmen. This might necessitate training and intro-ducing into the country by illegal entry, a trainedtechnician to set the bomb and detonator." (Emphasisadded) (CIA Memorandum, 10/3/60)E. December 1960 Special Group Plan of Covert ActionOn December 29, 1960, the Special Group considered andapproved a broad plan of covert support to anti-Trujillo forces.The plan, presented by Bissell, envisioned support to bothDominican exile groups and internal dissidents. Theexile groups were to be furnished money to organize and under-take anti-Trujillo propaganda efforts and to refurbish a yachtfor use in paramilitary activities. Bissell emphasized
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 394]
to the Special Group that "the proposed actions would not,of themselves, bring about the desired result in the nearfuture, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself."(Special Group Minutes, 12/29/60)IV. January 12, 1961 Special Group Approval of "LimitedSupplies of Small Arms and Other Material"On January 12, 1961, with all members present, * theSpecial Group met and, according to its Minutes, took thefollowing action with respect to the Dominican Republic:"Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Departmentof State that limited supplies of small arms and othermaterial should be made available for dissidents in-side the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that webelieve this can be managed securely by CIA, and thatthe plan would call for final transportation into thecountry being provided by the dissidents themselves.The Group approved the project." (Special Group Minutes, 1/12/61)A. Memoranda Underlying the Special Group ActionOn January 12, 1961, Thomas Mann sent a memorandum toUnder Secretary Livingston Merchant. The memorandum, sentthrough Joseph Scott, Merchant's Special Assistant, reportedon the disillusionment of Dominican dissidents with the UnitedStates for its failure to furnish them with any tangible orconcrete assistance. Further, it reported:Opposition elements have consistently asked us to supplythem with "hardware" of various types. This has includedquantities of conventional arms and also, rather persis-tently, they have asked for some of the more exotic itemsand devices which they associate with revolutationaryeffort. (Mann to Merchant memo of 1/12/61)* The members of the Special Group were at the time: Livingston  Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Gordon  Gray, Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs;  John N. Irwin, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Allen Dulles,  Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 395]
Mann suggested for Merchant's consideration and, if he approved, for discussion by the Special Group, the provision of token quantities of selected items desired by the dissidents. Mann specifically mentioned small explosive devices which would place some "sabotage potential" in the hands of dissident elements, but stated that there "would be no thought of toppling the GODR (Government of Dominican Republic) by any such minor measure." (Mann to Merchant memo, 1/12/61) This memorandum was drafted on January 11 by Mann's Special Assistant for CIA liaison, Frank Devine.A covering memorandum from Scott to Merchant, forwarding Mann's memo, was apparently taken by Merchant to the Special Group meeting. Merchant's handwritten notations indicate that the Special Group "agreed in terms of Tom Mann's memo" and that the Secretary of State was informed of that decision by late afternoon on January 12, 1961. (Scott to Merchant memo, 1/12/61)There is no evidence that any member of the Special Group, other than Allen Dulles, knew that the dissidents had clearly and repeatedly expressed a desire for arms and explosives to be used by them in assassination efforts.* While it is, of course, possible that such information was passed orally to some or all of the members of the Special Group, and perhaps even discussed by them on January 12, 1961, there is no[^1] Various CIA cables, including those dealing with the sniper rifles, indicate that copies were sent to the DCI, Allen Dulles.[^1]: *Various CIA cables, including those dealing with the sniper rifles, indicate that copies were sent to the DCI, Allen Dulles.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 396]
documentary evidence of which the Committee is aware whichwould establish this to be the case.On January 19, 1961, the last day of the Eisenhoweradministration, Consul General Dearborn was advised thatapproval had been given for supplying arms and other materialto the Dominican dissidents (HQS to Station cable, 1/19/61).Shortly thereafter, Dearborn informed Devine that thedissidents were "delighted" about the decision to deliver"exotic equipment." (Dearborn to Devine cable, 1/31/61)V. January 20, 1961 - April 17, 1961(the Kennedy Administration Through the Bay of Pigs)On January 20, 1961, the Kennedy administration tookoffice. Three of the four members of the Special Group (allexcept Allen Dulles) retired.Prior to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion on April17, 1961, a number of significant events occurred. Theseevents included meetings with Dominican dissidents inwhich specific assassination plans were discussed, re-quests by dissidents for explosive devices, the passage byU.S. officials of pistols and carbines to dissidents insidethe Dominican Republic, and the pouching to the DominicanRepublic of machine guns which had been requested by thedissidents for use in connection with an assassination attempt.[^1][^1]: *As indicated in the post-Bay of Pigs section, infra, permissionto pass those machine guns was denied and the guns were neverpassed.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 397]
-14-These events are discussed below under subheading A.Evidence reflecting the degree of knowledge of those events possessed by senior American officials is treated thereafter. As used herein, "senior American officials" means individuals in the White House or serving as members of the Special Group.A. Specific Events Indirectly Linking U.S. to Dissidents' Assassination Plans1. Assassination Discussions and Requests for ExplosivesAt meetings held with dissident leaders in New York City on February 10 and 15, 1961, CIA officials were told repeatedly by dissident leaders that "the key to the success of the plot [to overthrow the Trujillo regime] would be the assassination of Trujillo." (CIA memo for the record, 2/13/61) Among the requests made of the CIA by dissident leaders were the following:(a) Ex-FBI agents who would plan and execute the death of Trujillo.(b) Cameras and other items that could be used to fire projectiles.(c) A slow-working chemical that could be rubbed on the palm of one's hand and transferred to Trujillo in a handshake, causing delayed lethal results.(d) Silencers for rifles that could kill from a distance of several miles. (Id.)Other methods of assassinating Trujillo proposed by dissidents
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 398]
- 15 -at the February 10 or February 15 meetings included poisoningTrujillo's food or medicines, ambushing his automobile, andattacking him with firearms and grenades. (CIA memo for therecord, 2/13/61; 2/16/61)*The dissidents' "latest plot", as described in the FebruaryCIA memoranda, was said to involve the planting of a powerfulbomb, which could be detonated from a nearby electric device,along the route of Trujillo's evening walk. (Id.)On March 13, 1961, a dissident in the Dominican Republicasked for fragmentation grenades "for use during the next weekor so." This request was communicated to CIA Headquarterson March 14, 1961, and was followed the next day by an additionalrequest for 50 fragmentation grenades, 5 rapid-fire weapons,and 10 64 mm anti-tank rockets. This further request was alsopassed on to CIA Headquarters. (Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61)There is no evidence that any of these arms were supplied tothe dissidents.The documentary record makes clear that Frank Devine atthe State Department was also advised of related developmentsin a March 16, 1961, "picnic" letter from Dearborn who complainedthat his spirits were in the doldrums because:" . . the members of our club are now preparedin their minds to have a picnic but do not havethe ingredients for the salad. Lately they havedeveloped a plan for the picnic, which just mightwork if they could find the proper food. They* There is no record that the CIA responded affirmatively to  any of these requests and the CIA officer who drafted the  February 13 memorandum stated the view that some of the ques-  tions raised by the dissidents did not require an answer.