Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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-93-As Johnson stated, his testimony standing alone is "a clue, rather than precise evidence of Presidential involvement in decision-making with respect to assassinations" (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 5). To determine the significance of this "clue," it must be placed in the context of the records of the NSC meetings attended by Johnson, testimony about those meetings, and the series of events that preceded the dispatch of poisons to the Congo for Lumumba's assassination.In the Summer of 1960, there were four NSC meetings where developments in the Congo were discussed at which Robert Johnson was present. The President was not in attendance at two of those occasions -- July 15 and July 21 (NSC Minutes, 7/15/60; NSC Minutes,I have no independent recollection of being consulted by Mr. Johnson about how to handle in the memorandum of discussion any sensitive statement regarding Lumumba. I am not saying I was not consulted; merely that I do not remember such an incident. If I had been consulted, I would almost certainly have directed Mr. Johnson to omit the matter from the memorandum of discussion. (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2)James Lay, who attended other NSC meetings where Lumumba was discussed (e.g., September 21, 1960), also confirmed the fact that NSC minutes would not be likely to record a statement as sensitive as a Presidential order for an assassination, if such an order were given:If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC meeting, it was sometimes the practice that the official NSC minutes would record only the general subject discussed without identifying the specially sensitive subject as the discussion. In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be made in the NSC minutes. (Lay affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 2)
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7/21/60). Nonetheless, the attitude toward Lumumba even at theseearly meetings was vehement:Mr. Dulles said that in Lumumba we were faced with aperson who was a Castro or worse . . . Mr. Dulles wenton to describe Mr. Lumumba's background which he de-scribed as "harrowing" . . . It is safe to go on theassumption that Lumumba has been bought by the Commun-ists; this also, however, fits with his own orienta-tion. (NSC Minutes, 7/21/60)The President presided over the other two NSC meetings. After look-ing at the records of those meetings, Johnson was unable to deter-mine with certainty which one was the meeting at which he heard thePresident's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 16).However, the chronology of meetings, cables, and events in theCongo during this period makes it most likely that Johnson's testi-mony refers to the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960.The meeting of August 18 took place at the beginning of a seriesof events that preceded the dispatch of a CIA scientist to Leopold-ville with poisons for the assassination of Lumumba.*The Septem-ber 7 meeting took place in the midst of this series of events.* The major events in the series, each of which is discussed in de-  tail in other sections of the report, may be summarized as follows:  The week following the NSC meeting of August 18, the Special Group  was informed of the President's "extremely strong feelings about the  necessity for very straightforward action" and the Group agreed to  consider "any particular kind of activity which might contribute to  getting rid of Lumumba" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). At this  meeting, DCI Allen Dulles commented that "he had taken the comments  referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vig-  orously as the situation permits" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60;  see Section 7(a)(iii), *infra*) The next day, Dulles sent an "Eyes  Only" cable under his personal signature to the Chief of Station in
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-95-*The NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, was held three weeks beforethe "quasi-coup" in the Congo -- the dismissal of Lumumba by Kasavubu-- which Johnson remembers as taking place "not long after" he heardthe President's statement. The only other meeting at which Johnsoncould have heard the statement by the President was held on Septem-ber 7, two days after this event.Robert Johnson's memorandum of the meeting of August 18, 1960,indicates that Acting Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon* introduced* Leopoldville, indicating that it had been concluded in "HIGH QUAR-  TERS" that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE  AND THAT .. THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION"  (CIA Cable OUT 62966, Dulles to Chief of Station, 8/26/60). The Dul-  les cable added:WE WISH GIVE YOU WIDER AUTHORITY . . INCLUDING EVEN MOREAGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT . . YOU CANACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT RE-FERRAL HERE. (CIA Cable, 8/26/60) (See Section 2, supra,for more complete treatment of this cable.)On September 19, a CIA scientist was dispatched from headquartersto the Congo on an extraordinarily sensitive assignment (CIA CableOUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief of Station, 9/19/60; see Section4(a), supra) On September 21, in the presence of the President atan NSC meeting, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "remained a gravedanger as long as he was not disposed of" (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60; seeSection 7(a)(iv), infra) Finally, on September 26, the CIA scien-tist arrived in the Congo, provided the Chief of Station with lethalbiological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and in-formed him that the President had ordered the DCI to undertake an as-sassination effort (see Sections 4(a)-4(c), supra) The Chief ofStation stated that he received confirmation from CIA headquartersthat he was to follow the instructions he had been given (see Section4(e)(i), supra).** In 1960, Dillon served as Undersecretary of State, the "number twoposition in the State Department," the name of which subsequentlychanged to Deputy Secretary of State. In this position, he frequently(Continued)
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-96-The discussion of U.S. policy toward the Congo. In the course of his remarks, Dillon maintained that the presence of United Nations troops in the Congo was necessary to prevent Soviet intervention at Lumumba's request:If . . Lumumba carried out his threat to force the UN out, he might then offer to accept help from anyone.The elimination of the UN would be a disaster which, Secretary Dillon stated, we should do everything we could to prevent. If the UN were forced out, we might be faced by a situation where the Soviets intervened by invitation of the Congo. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60)The discussion then continued to raise the spectre of an alliance between Lumumba and the Soviet Union:Secretary Dillon said that he [Lumumba] was working to serve the purposes of the Soviets and Mr. Dulles pointed out that Lumumba was in Soviet pay. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60)In this context, the following exchange between President Eisenhower and Secretary Dillon was recorded:The President said that the possibility that the UN would be forced out was simply inconceivable. We should keep the UN in the Congo even if we had to ask for European troops to do it. We should do so even if such action was used by the Soviets as the basis for starting a fight. Mr. Dillon indicated that this was State's feeling but that the Secretary General and Mr. Lodge doubted whether, if the Congo put up really determined opposition to the UN, the UN could stay in. In response, the President stated that Mr. Lodge was wrong to this extent -- we were talking of one man forcing us out of the Congo; of Lumumba supported by the Soviets. There was no indication, theserved as Acting Secretary of State and either attended or was kept informed about NSC and Special Group meetings. Dillon later served as Secretary of the Treasury under President Kennedy.(Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 2-4.)
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-97-President stated, that the Congolese did not want UN support and the maintenance of order. Secretary Dillon reiterated that this was State's feeling about the matter. The situation that would be created by a UN withdrawal was altogether too ghastly to contemplate. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60)This is the only statement about Lumumba which the memorandum of the meeting attributed to the President.As reported, it clearly does not contain an order for the assassination of Lumumba. But the statement does indicate extreme Presidential concern focused on Lumumba: The President was so disturbed by the situation in the Congo that he was willing to risk a fight with the Soviet Union and he felt that Lumumba was the "one man" who was responsible for this situation, a man who did not represent the sentiments of the Congolese people in the President's estimation.After reviewing NSC documents and being informed of Robert Johnson's testimony, Douglas Dillon stated his "opinion that it is most likely that the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960 is the meeting referred to by Mr. Johnson." (Dillon affidavit, 9/15/75.) However, Dillon testified that he did not "remember such a thing" as an explicit Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 32). Dillon explained how he thought the President may have expressed himself about Lumumba:Dillon: . . It could have been in view of this feeling of everybody that Lumumba was [a] very difficult if not impossible person to deal with, and was dangerous to the peace and safety of the world,NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 343
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-98-that the President expressed himself, we will have to do whatever is necessary to get rid of him. I don't know that I would have taken that as a clearcut order as Mr. Johnson apparently did. And I think perhaps others present may have interpreted it other ways. (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 32-33.)Q: Did you ever hear the President make such a remark about Lumumba, let's get rid of him, or let's take action right away on this?Dillon: I don't remember that. But certainly this was the general feeling of Government at that time, and it wouldn't have been if the President hadn't agreed with it. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 33.)Dillon said that he would have thought that such a statement "was not a direct order to have an assassination" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 33). But he testified that it was "perfectly possible" that Allen Dulles would have translated such strong Presidential language about "getting rid of" Lumumba into authorization for an assassination effort (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 34-35):I think that Allen Dulles would have been quite responsive to what he considered implicit authorization, because he felt very strongly that we should not involve the President directly in things of this nature. And he was perfectly willing to take the responsibility personally that maybe some of his successors wouldn't have been. And so I think that this is a perfectly plausible thing, knowing Allen Dulles. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 34.)Marion Boggs, who attended the meeting of August 18, as Acting Executive Secretary of the NSC, stated after reviewing the Memorandum of Discussion at that meeting:
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-99-I recall the discussion at that meeting, but have no independent recollection of any statements or discussion not summarized in the memorandum. Specifically, I have no recollection of any statement, order or reference by the President (or anyone else present at the meeting) which could be interpreted as favoring action by the United States to bring about the assassination of Lumumba.* (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, pp. 1-2.)The Memorandum of Discussion at the NSC meeting of September 7, 1960--the only other meeting at which Johnson could have heard the President's statement--records only a brief, general discussion of developments in the Congo (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60). As part of Allen Dulles' introductory intelligence briefing on world events, the Memorandum related his remarks on the situation in the Congo following Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba from his position in the government (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, p. 4). Neither the length nor the substance of the record of this discussion indicates that Lumumba's role in the Congo received the same intense kind of consideration as the NSC had given it on August 18.** There is no record of any statement by the President* Boggs added:"Based on my whole experience with the NSC, I would have considered it highly unusual if a matter of this nature had been referred to in a Council meeting where a number of persons with no 'need to know' were present." (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2.)** The NSC minutes of the meeting of September 7, deal with the discussion of the Congo in two pages (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, pp. 4-5). By comparison, the August 18 meeting required an
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-100-during this discussion (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, pp. 4-5).Nevertheless, in the course of his briefing Dulles expressed his continuing concern over the amount of personnel and equipment that was being sent to the Congo by the Soviet Union, primarily to aid Lumumba (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, p. 5).Dulles concluded this part of his briefing with an observation that demonstrated that Lumumba's dismissal from the government had not lessened the extent to which he was regarded at the NSC as a potent political threat in any power struggle in the Congo:Mr. Dulles stated that Lumumba always seemed to come out on top in each of these struggles. (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, p. 5.)The day after this NSC meeting, Gordon Gray made a pointed reminder of the President's concern about the Congo to Allen Dulles at a meeting of the Special Group:Mr. Gray said that he hoped that Agency people in the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss. (Special Group Minutes, 9/8/60.)There are three possible interpretations of the failure of NSC records to reveal whether the President ordered the assassination of Lumumba at one of these meetings. First, an extraordinarily lengthy (fifteen pages) summary of discussion on the Congo and related policy problems in Africa, indicating that this topic was the focal point of the meeting (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60, pp. 1-15).
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-101-assassination order could have been issued but omitted fromthe records. Robert Johnson testified that it was "verylikely" that the Presidential statement he heard would havebeen handled by means of a euphemistic reference or bycomplete omission "rather than given as [a] . . . direct quo-tation" in the Memorandum of Discussion (Johnson, 9/13/75,p. 14). Second, as illustrated by Douglas Dillon's testimony,the President could have made a general statement about "gettingrid of" Lumumba with the intent to convey to Allen Dulles thatthere was implicit authorization for an assassination effort.Third, despite general discussions about removing Lumumba, thePresident may not have intended to order the assassination ofLumumba even though Allen Dulles may have thought an assassina-tion effort had been authorized. The three White House staffmembers responsible to the President for national security.affairs testified that there was no such order. Gordon Gray,Andrew Goodpaster, and John Eisenhower were all in attendanceat the NSC meetings of August 18 and September 7.*(iii) The President's "Extremely Strong Feelings" LedThe Special Group to Consider Anything That MightGet Rid of Lumumba: August 25, 1960On August 25, 1960 five men** attended a meeting of the* See Section 7(b), *infra*, for a general treatment of the  testimony of Gray, Goodpaster and Eisenhower.** There were four standing members of the Special Group atthis time: Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence; Gordon
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-102-Special Group, the subcommittee of the National Security Council responsible for planning covert operations. Thomas Parrott, a CIA officer who served as Secretary to the Group, began the meeting by outlining the CIA operations that had been undertaken in "mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). This campaign involved covert operations through certain labor groups and "the planned attempt . . . to arrange a vote of no confidence in Lumumba" in the Congolese Senate (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60).The outline of this campaign evoked the following dialogue:> The Group agreed that the action contemplated is> very much in order. Mr. Gray commented, however,> that his associates had expressed extremely strong> feelings on the necessity for very straightforward> action in this situation, and he wondered whether the> plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this.> Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments> referred to seriously and had every intention of pro-> ceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or> requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself> in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind> within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was> finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not> necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular> kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid> of Lumumba. (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60, p. 1.)Both Gordon Gray and Thomas Parrott testified that reference to Mr. Gray's "associates" was a euphemism for PresidentGray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Livingston Merchant, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs; and John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secretary of Defense. Also in regular attendance was Thomas A. Parrott, Secretary to the Special Group.
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-104-Eisenhower which was employed to preserve "plausible deniabil- ity" by the President of discussion of covert operations memorialized in Special Group Minutes (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 27; Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 8-9).The four living participants at the meeting have all stated that they do not recall any discussion of or planning for the assassination of Lumumba (Merchant affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1; Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, pp. 1-2; Gray, 7/9/75, pp. 27, 32; Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 25-26). Gray said that he did not consider the President's desire for "very straightforward action" to include "any thought in his mind of assassination" (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 32). Parrott testified to the same effect, maintaining that he would have recorded a discussion of assassination in explicit terms in the Special Group Minutes if such a discussion had taken place (Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 26-27).John N. Irwin II acknowledged, however, that while he did not have "any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting", the reference in the minutes to the planning for "getting rid of Lumumba" was "broad enough to cover a discussion of assassination" (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, p. 2).Irwin's interpretation is shared by Douglas Dillon and Richard Bissell--two high government officials who were not participants at this Special Group meeting but who were involved in the planning and policymaking for covert operations in the Congo during this period.
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-105-As a participant in National Security Council meetings of this period, Dillon said that he would read the Special Group minutes of August 25, 1960, to indicate that assassination was within the bounds of the kind of activity that might be used to "get rid of" Lumumba (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 42).Dillon noted that the reference in the minutes to the fact that Allen Dulles stated that he "had taken the comments referred to seriously" probably pointed to the President's statement at the previous NSC meeting at which Robert Johnson took notes (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp.39-40).When asked whether the CIA would have the authority to mount an assassination effort against Lumumba on the basis of the discussion at the Special Group, Dillon said:They would certainly have the authority to plan. It is a close question whether this would be enough to actually go ahead with it. But certainly the way this thing worked, as far as I know, they didn't do anything just on their own. I think they would have checked back at least with the senior people in the State Department or the Defense Department. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 43.)Dillon said that if the CIA checked with the State Department, it might have been done in such a way that it would not appear on any record (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 43). Dillon added that "to protect the President as the public representative of the U.S. from any bad publicity in connection with this", Allen Dulles "wouldn't return to the President" to seek further
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-106-approval if an assassination operation were mounted (Dillon, 9/2/60, pp. 42-43).Richard Bissell stated that in his opinion the language of the Special Group Minutes of August 25, 1960 indicated that the assassination of Lumumba was part of a general strategy at the NSC and within the CIA for removing Lumumba from the political scene (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 29, 32).Bissell added:The Agency had put a top priority, probably, on a range of different methods of getting rid of Lumumba in the sense of either destroying him physically, incapacitating him, or eliminating his political influence. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 29.)Bissell pointed to the Special Group Minutes of August 25, 1960 as a "prime example" of the circumlocutious manner in which a topic like assassination would be discussed by high government officials:Bissell: When you use the language that no particu-lar means were ruled out, that is obviously what it meant, and it meant that to everybody in the room. Meant that if it had to be assassination, that that was a permissible means.You don't use language of that kind except to mean in effect, the Director is being told, get rid of the guy, and if you have to use extreme means up to and including assassination, go ahead. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 32-33.)Bissell added that this message was, "in effect", being given to Dulles by the President through his representative Gordon Gray (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 33).(iv) NSC Meeting of September 21, 1960: Dulles SaidLumumba Would Remain a Grave Danger Until"Disposed Of"In the course of his intelligence briefing to the NSC.
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-107-on September 21, 1960, Allen Dulles stressed the danger ofSoviet influence in the Congo. Despite the fact that Lumumbahad been deposed from his position as Premier and was in UNcustody, Dulles continued to regard him as a threat, especiallyin light of reports of an impending reconciliation betweenLumumba and the post-coup Congolese government:Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in theCongo for the monent but Lumumba was not yetdisposed of and remained a grave danger as longas he was not disposed of. (NSC Minutes,9/21/60.)Three days after this NSC meeting, Allen Dulles sent apersonal cable to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville whichincluded the following message:WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATINGLUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTALPOSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP [OLDVILLE), SETTINGHIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable,OUT 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)On September 26, Sidney Gottlieb, under assignment fromCIA headquarters, arrived in Leopoldville (CIA Cable IN 18989,Leopoldville to Director, 9/27/60), provided the Chief ofStation with poisons, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba;and assured him that there was Presidential authorization forthis mission (see Sections 4(b)-4(c), *supra*).Marion Boggs, NSC Deputy Executive Secretary, who wrotethe memorandum of the discussion of September 21, did notinterpret Dulles' remark as referring to assassination: