Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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documents (the Lansdale and Harvey Memoranda of August 13 and 14) that thesubject was raised but "it never got off the ground.... Therefore, I did notrecord it." (Parrott, p. 35).The documents and testimony of Parrott suggest several possible in-ferences with respect to the nature of the discussion of a Castro assassinationat the August 10 meeting. First, as indicated by the Lansdale and Harveymemorandum, it is possible that a contingency plan was requested but that itwas decided not to make this "a matter of official record." (LansdaleEx. 16, p. 1). However, if it had been decided to commission a writtencontingency plan, as Lansdale requested Harvey prepare, it is difficult tosee how this request could have been reconciled with a decision to make towritten record.Second, it is possible that, as Parrott's testimony indicated, thesubject was raised but quickly rejected. This inference is apparently con-sistent with the fact that the subject did not appear in Parrott's minutes,and perhaps, although less so, with Harvey's August 14 Memorandum. Harvey'sMemorandum states that the Special Group Augmented "is not expecting anywritten comments or study on this point." (Lansdale Ex. 16, p. 1).Before turning to the testimony on these questions, we discuss thecontext of the August 10 discussion of a Castro assassination as reflectedin the minutes of the August 10 Meeting.d. The August 10 MeetingThe August 10 Meeting was held to decide upon a further course of actionto succeed the intelligence collection phase of Mongoose which was scheduledto conclude in August. (McCone, p. 34). As a policy meeting, there were in
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attendance a larger number of officials than usually participated in SpecialGroup Augmented meetings. The Meeting was chaired by Secretary of StateRusk (and held in his office), and attended by a total of 15 officials,including the principals of the agencies taking part in Mongoose, *i.e.*,Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, CIA Director McCone, and USIA DirectorMurrow.At the August 10 meeting, General Lansdale proposed that a "stepped-upCourse B" be adopted for Mongoose, (August 10 Minutes, p. ). This planinvolved operations to "exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychologi-cal, and other overt pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, withoutovert employment of U.S. military." (Memorandum for Special Group Augmented,August 8, 1962, p. 1).However, the Special Group Augmented decided against consideration ofthe "stepped-up Course B". In the discussion of Lansdale's Course B proposal,Rusk "emphasized the desirability of attempting to create a split betweenCastro and old-line Communists". (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). In addition,McNamara questioned whether the practice of building up agents in Cuba wouldnot lead to actions that "would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion".(August 10 Minutes, p. 2) (A remark which seems inconsistent with McNamaraat the same Meeting raising the question of assassination in any sense ofadvocacy). The Minutes state that McNamara's concern "led to the suggestionby General Taylor that we should consider changing the overall objective/of Mongoose/ from one of overthrowing the Castro regime" to one of causingits failure. (August 10 Minutes, p. 2).Hence, in lieu of Lansdale's "stepped-up Course B", the Special Group
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Augmented chose a plan advanced by McCone that assumed Castro's continuance in power and had the more limited objective of splitting off Castro from "old-line Communists".* (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). The decision and "action" of the Special Group Augmented at the August 10 meeting was stated as follows:"The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split."(August Memorandum, p. 2).***"Action to be taken:CIA to prepare a new version of ies variant plan, in accordance with the above-summarized discussion. This should be ready by Wednesday, August 15."(August 10 Memorandum, p. 3).It was therefore in this context that Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum to Harvey stated that "in compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the August 10 policies meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B. "Indeed, pursuant to the August 10 decision to adopt McCone's proposal for a more limited plan that assumed Castro's continuation in power, Lansdale's memorandum stated that a CIA paper titled "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort) will be used as the starting basis."(Lansdale Ex. 15, p. 1).[^1] The August 10 Minutes show that McCone pointed out that the stepped-up Course B "will risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a Hungary type blood bath if unsupported". (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). McCone "emphasized that the stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless the U.S. is prepared to accept attributability for the necessary actions, including the eventual use of military force". (August 10 Minutes). The August 10 Minutes further stated that, in McCone's view, the CIA variant "would avoid all of these dangers because it would not invite an uprising". (August 10 Minutes, p. 2).[^1]: */
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In view of the issues raised by these documents we took testimonyfrom the principal participants in that meeting. In particular, we discussbelow the testimony as to whether Lansdale's request for an assassinationplan reflected the desire of the SGA or was contemplated by the SGA's decisionto proceed with a plan of "reduced effort" that posited Castro's continuancein power.## 2. The TestimonyAs set out below, Harvey, McCone, and Goodwin recall the question ofa Castro assassination was raised at the August 10 meeting.* We discussthat testimony, first with respect to the August 10 meeting itself, and,second, with regard to the action that followed that meeting.### a. Testimony as to the August 10 Meeting#### (1) Testimony of McConeMcCone testified that the question of a "liquidation" or removal ofCastro and other Cuban leaders arose at the August 10 meeting in the contextof "exploring the alternatives that were available" for the next phase ofMongoose. (McCone, p. 33). McCone testified that he did not recall whomade this suggestion, but that he and Mr. Murrow took "strong exception"to the suggestion. A memorandum of McCone's recollection of the August 10Meeting, written in 1967,**/states:[^1] Other participants (Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, and Gilpatric) did not recallthe August 10 discussion.[^2] On April 14, 1967, after McCone left the CIA, he dictated a memorandumof his recollection regarding the August 10, 1962 meeting. The memoran-dum was prompted by a telephone call from the newspaper columnist, JackAnderson, who at that time was preparing a column on Castro assassination(Continued on the following page.)
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"I took immediate exception to this suggestion, stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USG (U.S. Government) and CIA were concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should it appear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on moral or ethical grounds." (McCone Ex. 4).McCone testified that there was no decision at the August 10 meeting that assassination should not be part of any program, but that "the subject was just dropped" after his objection. (McCone, p. ). McCone's 1967 memorandum stated that"At no time did the suggestion receive serious consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) nor by any individual responsible for policy." (McCone, Ex. 4).(2) Testimony of HarveyHarvey's testimony that the August 10 discussion was unrelated to any actual Castro assassination activity is discussed above (see p. ). With respect to that discussion itself, Harvey testified that it was his recollection that the question of a Castro assassination was raised by Secretary McNamara.(Harvey, p. 30). Harvey said it was his impression that McNamara raised the question as one of "shouldn't we consider the elimination or assassination" of Castro. (Harvey, p. 30).With respect to the reaction of the Special Group Augmented to this.(Footnote continued from the previous page.)attempts, implicating President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy. After talking with Anderson on the telephone, at Robert Kennedy's request, McCone dictated the April 14, 1967 memorandum, which stated that at one of several Mongoose meetings on August 8, 9 or 10, 1962, "I recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro." (McCone, Ex. 4, p. 1).
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suggestion, Harvey testified:"I think the consensus of the Group was to sweepthat particular proposal or suggestion or questionor consideration off the record and under the rugas rapidly as possible. There was no extensivediscussion of it, no discussion, no back and forthas the whys and wherefores and possibilities andso on."(Harvey, p. 30).(3) Testimony of CoodwinGoodwin testified that he had a recollection of "limited certainty"that the subject of a Castro assassination was raised at the August 10meeting.[^1]Goodwin testified that "I am unable to say with any certainty who itwas" who raised the subject of a Castro assassination at the August 10meeting. (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 8)[^2][^1]: In a staff interview prior to his testimony, Goodwin recalled the date of the meeting at which a Castro assassination was raised as falling in early 1961, after the Bay of Pigs. (Memorandum of Staff Interview with Goodwin, May 27, 1975, p. 2). After reviewing the Minutes of the August 10, 1962 meeting and the Lansdale and Harvey memoranda of August 13 and 14, respectively, Goodwin testified that he had "misplaced the date of the meeting in my own memory." (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 7). In placing the incident on August 10, 1962, Goodwin stated"Now, of course, you know, it may not be. That's the best recollection I now have. It's a little better than the earlier one, but it's not certain." (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 8).[^2]: In a magazine article in June 1975, Goodwin was quoted as stating that at one of the meetings of a White House task force on Cuba it was McNamara who "said that Castro's assassination was the only productive way of dealing with Cuba." (Branch and Crile, "The Kennedy Vendetta," Harpers, July, 1975, p. 61). In his testimony on July 18, 1975, Goodwin stated: "that's not an exact quote" in the article, and explained further:(Footnote continued on following page.)
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(4) Testimony of McNamaraMcNamara testified that, although he had no recollection of the question of a Castro assassination being raised at the August 10 meeting, he did express opposition to any assassination attempt or plan when he spoke with McCone several days after the August 10 meeting. (McNamara, p. 7,8).McNamara's testimony with respect to his conversation with McCone is discussed below with the testimony as to actions after the August 10 meeting.b. Testimony as to Actions After the August 10, 1962 Meeting(1) Testimony of McConeMcCone testified that he called McNamara after he received Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum and,"insisted that that Memorandum be withdrawn because no decision was made on this subject, and since no decision was made, then Lansdale was quite out of order in tasking the Central Intelligence Agency to consider the matter."*/(Footnote continued from the previous page.)"I didn't tell (the author of the magazine article) that it was definitely McNamara, that very possibly it was McNamara. He asked me about McNamara's role, and I said it very well could have been McNamara." (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 33).If Goodwin's recollection was as uncertain as he swore it was in his testimony, it is difficult to understand how he could have spoken in the terms he testified he did to the author of the magazine article, particularly in view of Goodwin's statement that "it's not a light matter to perhaps destroy a man's career on the basis of a fifteen year old memory of a single sentence that he might have said at a meeting without substantial certainty in your own mind /and/ I do not have that." (Goodwin, pp. 34-35).*/ McCone's 1967 Memorandum stated:"Immediately after the meeting, I called on Secretary McNamara personally and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily agreed. I did this because Operation Mongoose--an interdepartmental affair--was under the operational control of (the Defense Department)...(McCone Ex. 4).
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McCone also testified that McNamara agreed that the Lansdale Memorandumshould be withdrawn for the same reason expressed by McCone, i.e. because thetopic of a Castro assassination had not been given consideration by the SpecialGroup Augmented. (McCone, p. 39).## (2) Testimony of HarveyAs discussed above (see p. ______) Harvey's Memorandum of August 14, 1962states that upon receiving Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum, Harvey demandedthat Lansdale excise the words referring to "liquidation of leaders." Har-vey's Memorandum further stated that "the Special Group (Augmented) is notexpecting any written comments or study on this point." This latter passageraises the issue whether Harvey meant to state that the Special Group Aug-mented authorized a Castro assassination plan or activity but that no writtenrecord should be made. In his testimony, Harvey clarified this point bystating that the Special Group did not express a desire to proceed with thesuggestion of a Castro assassination:> "Senator Schweiker:...was it understood in an> *unwritten way* that (assassination) was to pro-> ceed?"> > "Mr. Harvey: Not to my knowledge, no.....> If there was any *unwritten understanding* on> the part of the members of the Special Group> concerning this, other than what was said at the> meeting, I do not know of it..."> (Harvey, pp. 30-31).Harvey further testified that shortly after the August 10 meeting,McCone told Harvey that he had called McNamara to state that assassiantionshould not be discussed and that he had told McNamara that if he was involvedin such matters, he might be excommunicated from his church. (Harvey, p. 25).
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(3) Testimony of McNamaraMcNamara testified that he did not recall any discussion of a Castro assassination at the August 10 meeting, but that he did express opposition to any assasssination attempt when McCone telephone him after Lansdale's August 13 memorandum was brought to McCone's attention. (McNamara, P. 7,8).McNamara stated that"I agreed with Mr. McCone that no such planning should be undertaken." (McNamara, p. 8).McNamara stated further that"I have no knowledge or information about any other plans or preparations for a Castro assassination." (McNamara, p. 7).(4) Testimony of ElderElder, a career CIA officer, served as McCone's Executive Assistant from May 1962 until McCone's departure from the Agency in April 1965. Elder testified that he was present when McCone telephone McNamara after the August 10 meeting.Elder stated that McCone told McNamara"the subject you just brought up, I think it is highly improper. I do not think it should be discussed. It is not an action that should ever be condoned. It is not proper for us to discuss, and I intend to have it expunged from the record." (Elder, p. 23).Elder testified that this was the essence of the conversation but that he remembered "several exact phrases, like 'would not be condoned' and 'im- proper'". (Elder, pp. 23, 24).[^1][^1]: Elder, who stated he heard both McCone and McNamara's pact of the telephone conversation via a speaker phone, said that McNamara "just more or less accepted what Mr. McCone said without comment or rejoinder." (Elder, p. 24).
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When Harvey later received Lansdale's August 13 memorandum, McConespoke to Harvey in Elder's presence, and "McCone made his views quite clearin the same language and tone...that he used with Mr. McNamara." (Elder,p. 25). Elder testified that Harvey did not tell McCone that Harvey wasengage in the Castro assassination effort at that time. (Elder, p. 25).Elder also described a meeting he had with Helms in Elder's officeshortly after the August 10 meeting to convey to Helms McCone's views re-garding the subject of assassinations. Elder stated:"I told Mr. Helms that Mr. McCone had expressedhis feeling to Mr. McNamara and Mr. Harvey thatassassination could not be condoned and would not beapproved. Furthermore, I conveyed Mr. McCone'sstatement that it would be unthinkable to recordin writing any consideration of assassinationbecause it left the impression that the subjecthad received serious consideration by governmen-tal policymakers, which it had not. Mr. Helmsresponded, 'I understand.' The point is thatI made Mr. Helms aware of the strength of Mr.McCone's opposition to assasination. I know that Mr.Helms could not have been under any misapprehensionabout Mr. McCone's feelings after this conversation."(Elder Affidavit, 8/ /75, p. ).(5) Testimony of LansdaleLansdale testified that he recalled that the subject of Castro'sassassination surfaced at the August 10 meeting, but that the "consensus was...hell no on this and there was a very violent reaction." (Lansdale, p. 20).With respect to why he asked Harvey on August 13 for a Castro assasinationplan, Lansdale testified:"Senator Baker: Why did you, three days laterif they all said, hell no, /go/ ahead with it?"
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"General Lansdale:...the meeting at which they said that was still on a development of my original task, which was a revolt and an overthrow of a regime. At the same time, we were getting intelligence accumulating very quickly of something very different taking place in Cuba than we had expected, which was the Soviet technicians starting to come in and the possibilities of Soviet missiles being placed there... At that time, I thought it would be a possibility someplace down the road in which there would be some possible need to take action such as /assassination/."*/ (Lansdale, p. 21).Lansdale stated that he had only one brief conversation with Harvey after the August 13 memorandum in which Harvey stated "he would look into it...see about developing some plans" but that was the last Lansdale ever heard of the matter. (Lansdale, p. 124). Lansdale stated that with the develop- ment of the Missile Crisis, Mongoose "was being rapidly shifted out of consideration" and thus "I wasn't pressing for answers... it was very obvious that another situation was developing that would be handled quite differently in Cuba." (Lansdale, P. 124).Lansdale testified that he was "very certain" that a discussion of a Castro assassination plan or proposal never came up in his discussions with Robert Kennedy or with President Kennedy, and that he had originated the request to Harvey for plan without discussing the matter with anyone:*/"Q:...Why, if it is true that assassination idea was turned down on August 10, you sent out your memo of August 13?""General Lansdale:...I don't recall that thoroughly, I don't remember the reasons why I would.""Q: Is it your testimony that the August 10 meeting turned down assassinations as a subject to look into, and that you nevertheless asked Mr. Harvey to look into it?""General Lansdale: I guess it is, yes. The way you put it to me now has me baffled about why I did it. I don't know." (Lansdale, pp. 123-124.
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"Senator Baker:...did you originate this idea oflaying on the CIA a requirement to report on thefeasibility of the assassination of Castro or didsomeone else suggest that?""General Lansdale: I did, as far as I recall.""Senator Baker: Who did you discuss it with beforeyou laid on that requirement?""General Lansdale: I don't believe I discussed it withanyone.""Senator Baker: Only with Harvey?""General Lansdale: Only with Harvey.""Senator Baker: Did you ever discuss it with Helms?""General Lansdale: I might have, and I don't believethat I did. I think it was just with Harvey.""Senator Baker: Did you ever discuss it with RobertKennedy?""General Lansdale: No, not that I recall.""Senator Baker: With the President?""General Lansdale: No."(Lansdale, pp. 19-20).
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c. Testimony of News Reporters as to Lansdale's Comments on the August 10 MeetingDuring the Committee's investigation, news reports concerning the August 10 meeting and Lansdale's request for a Castro assassination plan appeared in the press. Two of these reports were based on statements made by Lansdale to David Martin of the Associated Press and Jeremiah O'Leary of the Washington Star-News. In view of the apparent conflict between Lansdale's testimony to the Committee and what Lansdale was reported to have said to Martin and O'Leary, the Committee invited these reporters to testify as to Lansdale's statements to them. Martin testified under a subpoena issued by the Committee pursuant to Senate Resolution 21. O'Leary appeared voluntarily but stated the policy of his newspaper with regard to disclosing news sources precluded him from any comment going beyond that contained in a prepared statement he read under oath. O'Leary's statement declared that his news report "represents accurately my understanding of the relevant in- formation I obtained from news sources." (O'Leary, page 5).We discuss below Martin's testimony and the news reports as they compare to Lansdale's testimony.(1) The Martin News ReportMartin's news report stated, in its lead paragraph:"Retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdalesaid Friday that acting on orders fromPresident John F. Kennedy deliveredthrough an intermediary, he developedplans for removing Cuban Premier FidelCastro by any means including assassination."(Ex. 2 to Martin Affidavit)Martin testified that this lead paragraph was accurate and that it was a conclusion which he drew based upon the totality of his interview on May 30, 1975 with Lansdale. (Martin, pp. 19-20) In contrast, Lansdale
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testified that, after reading Martin's report in the press, he told Martin "your first sentence is not only completely untrue, but there is not a single thing in your story that says it is true." (Lansdale, p. 65)As discussed above (see p. ), Lansdale testified that on his own initiative he had originated the request to Harvey without discussing the matter with anyone and that a Castro assassination plan never came up in his discussions with Robert Kennedy (or with President Kennedy).In view of Martin's testimony that the lead paragraph of his report was a conclusion based on the totality of his interview with Lansdale, it should be noted that the remainder of Martin's story does not state that Lansdale was ordered by President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy to develop plans for a Castro assassination. The report quotes Lansdale as stating "I was working for the highest authority in the land...the President" and goes on to state that Lansdale said he did not deal directly with the President but 'worked through" an intermediary more intimate to the President than Bundy.[^1] It can be noted that the phrases "working for" and "working through" are not the same as the lead paragraph's conclusion that Lansdale was "acting on orders" to develop a Castro assassination plan.In addition, subsequent paragraphs in the Martin report indicate that Lansdale said the decision to include assassination in his planning was Lansdale's own, as he testified it was to the Committee. Thus, the Martin report states Lansdale said that assassination was "one of the means he /Lansdale/ considered," that it was Lansdale's belief that assassination would not have been "incompatible" with his assignment, and that Lansdale said "I just wanted to see if the U.S. had any such capabilities."[^1]: The Martin report states that Lansdale refused to provide this intermediary's name for the record. In respecting the confidentiality of news sources, the Committee didnot seek to ask Martin what was said off the record to him in the course of his newsgathering efforts. (Martin, p. ).