Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10144.pdf — page 255]
SECRETDOMESTIC REAL PROPERTY LISTING| Location                      | Street Address                     | Personnel | Purpose                                         || ----------------------------- | ---------------------------------- | --------- | ----------------------------------------------- || Texas                         |                                    |           |                                                 || C. Safehouses                 |                                    | N.A.      | Covert meetings                                 || 1 Location                    |                                    |           |                                                 || Utah                          |                                    |           |                                                 || A. Övert & Nominal Properties |                                    |           |                                                 || Salt Lake, Ut                 | Fed. Bldg., 125 S. State St. (EOP) | 2         | U.S. resident contact                           || Virginia                      |                                    |           |                                                 || A. Overt & Nominal Properties |                                    |           |                                                 || Richmond, Va                  | Fed. Bldg., 400 N. 8th St. (EUP)   | 3         | U.S. resident contact                           || B. Official Cover Properties  |                                    |           |                                                 || 1 Installation (4 Stations)   |                                    | 286       | Records Center, Training, R&D, Commo Facilities || 1 Installation                |                                    | 76        | Field Training Site                             || 1 Location                    |                                    | 72        | Technical R&D                                   || 1 Installation                |                                    | 3         | R&D project                                     || 1 Location                    |                                    | 0         | Minor ordnance storage                          || Washington                    |                                    |           |                                                 || A. Overt & Nominal Properties |                                    |           |                                                 || Seattle, Wa                   | Courthouse, 1010 Fifth Ave. (EOP)  | 5         | U.S. resident contact                           || B. Official Cover Properties  |                                    |           |                                                 || 1 Location                    |                                    | 24        | Foreign equipment analysis                      |SECRETE2 CL By 029557NW 50955 DocId: 32423532 Page 256
[157-10014-10144.pdf — page 256]
SECRETDOMESTIC REAL PROPERTY LISTING| Location                      | Street Address                          | Personnel | Purpose               || ----------------------------- | --------------------------------------- | --------- | --------------------- || Washington                    |                                         |           |                       || C. Safehouses                 |                                         | N.A.      | Covert meetings       || 1 Location                    |                                         |           |                       || D. Non-Official Properties    |                                         | 3         | Contractor liaison    || 1 Location                    |                                         |           |                       || Wisconsin                     |                                         |           |                       || A. Overt & Nominal Properties |                                         |           |                       || Milwaukee, Wi                 | Courthouse, 517 E. Wisconsin Ave. (EOP) | 2         | U.S. resident contact |
[157-10014-10144.pdf — page 257]
SECRETAttachment 2CIA Domestic Real Property Summary Sheet| Location                      | Overt & Nominal | Official | Safehouses | Non-Official | TOTAL || ----------------------------- | --------------- | -------- | ---------- | ------------ | ----- || Washington, D. C. and Suburbs | 17              | 13       | 37         | 16           | 83    || Arizona                       | 4               | 10       | 12         | 1            | 1     || California                    |                 |          |            | 9            | 35    || Colorado                      | 2               |          |            |              | 2     || Connecticut                   | 1               |          |            |              | 1     || Florida                       | 2               | 4        | 2          | 4            | 12    || Georgia                       | 1               | 1        |            |              | 2     || Hawaii                        | 1               | 2        |            |              | 3     || Illinois                      | 2               | 2        | 2          |              | 6     || Indiana                       | 1               |          |            |              | 1     || Louisiana                     | 1               |          |            |              | 1     || Maryland                      | 2               | 3        | 1          |              | 6     || Massachusetts                 | 2               | 2        | 2          |              | 6     || Minnesota                     | 3               |          |            |              | 2     || Missouri                      |                 |          |            |              | 3     || Nevada                        | 1               |          |            |              | 1     || New York                      | 5               | 3        | 23         | 9            | 40    || North Carolina                |                 | 1        |            |              | 1     || Ohio.                         | 2               | 1        |            |              | 3     || Oklahoma                      | 1               | 1        |            |              | 1     || Oregon                        | 4               |          |            |              | 4     || Pennsylvania                  |                 |          |            |              | 1     || Tennessee                     | 1               |          |            | 1            | 6     || Texas                         | 4               |          | 1          |              | 1     || Utah                          | 1               | 1        |            |              | 9     || Virginia                      | 1               | 8        |            |              | 4     || Washington                    | 1               | 1        | 1          | 1            | 1     || Wisconsin                     | 1               |          |            |              |       || TOTALS                        | 62              | 53       | 81         | 41           | 237   |SECRET
[157-10014-10144.pdf — page 258]
29 AUG 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and TechnologyDeputy Director for IntelligenceDeputy Director for Management and ServicesDeputy Director for OperationsINFO : Inspector GeneralSUBJECT : Questionable Activities1. As an aspect of the allegations of improper CIA activity in connection with the Watergate and associated matters, the Inspector General was directed to assemble all information available in the Agency on any such activities. Certain specific matters were provided to him, and the Director by memorandum of 9 May 1973 directed all employees to report any activities, current or past, "which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency." This information was assembled and consolidated by the Inspector General in a memorandum of 21 May 1973 and certain individual memoranda thereafter supplementing it. This material was used in a detailed, page-by-page review of all such information with Senator Symington and Congressman Nedzi, as Chairmen of the Senate and the House Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittees, respectively. In addition, I undertook very specific commitments in my confirmation hearings to ensure that the Agency will remain within its legislative charter. I am arranging for the published transcripts of those hearings to be circulated throughout the Agency for compliance, and at that time will reaffirm the specific direction made by Dr. Schlesinger in his memorandum of 9 May 1973. This will also be incorporated into appropriate regulations.2. With respect to the specific questionable activities which vere reported as a result of the search made throughout the Agency, however, I believe it essential to take specific action in order that these not seem to be condoned or overlooked. I have therefore developed specific instructions on each reported activity. These are included in the attachments to this memorandum, and have the force of specific direction to you to pass on to appropriate subordinates the instructions outlined. Separate packages of such Instructions are being developed for each Directorate in order to respect the sensitivity of some of the activities discussed, including those which are deemed quite appropriate within CIA's charter.SECRET-EYES ONLY![ELIMPDET]FROMJUN 25 1975![ELIMPDET CC BY]NW 50955 DocId: 32423532 Page 259220
[157-10014-10144.pdf — page 259]
Similarly, each activity is placed on a separate page so that the Deputy Director concerned may most easily forward it to the office or offices directly concerned without distributing it more broadly.3. In the event that these instructions raise substantial difficulties of implementation or compliance, I would appreciate your raising such cases with me directly, with whatever recommendations you may have for modification to carry out the spirit of the action undertaken here but to avoid undue disruption of legitimate activities. In the absence of such notice, I will expect full compliance with the instructions outlined herein.4. Each addressee Deputy. Director is instructed to recommend to the DDM&S modification or addition to Agency regulations of appropriate language to reflect the direction included in this memorandum and attachments addressed to him. DDM&S will be responsible for consolidating such recommendations and making an overall report to the Director through the IG, coordinating with General Counsel.![signature of W. E. Colby]W. E. ColbyAttachmentsC:ydc (27 August 1973)Distribution:Original - IG1 - Mr. Colby1 - DDS&T1 - DDI1 - DDM&S1 - DDO1 - OGC - w/o atts1 - OLC - w/o atts1 ER (w/o atts - being held in IG file)- 2 -SECRET-EYES ONLYRECEIVED FROMJUN 25 1975CIA
[157-10014-10144.pdf — page 260]
MEMORANDUMSUBJECT: Domestic Proprietary CompaniesCorporate cover, as managed by the Cover and Commercial Staff, is an appropriate support for pur overseas operations. To the degree that domestic proprietary or cover companies are required, a clear justification will be developed as to the relationship of their support of our overseas operations.SECRET-EVES ONLYNW 5055 DocId:32423532 Page 261RECEIVED FROMJUN 25 1975CIA
[157-10014-10144.pdf — page 261]
MEMORANDUMSUBJECT: Project MHMUTUALProject MHMUTUAL will be operated in conformance with appropriate legal restrictions. Arrangements are being made for the briefing of the appropriate Congressional committees. Particular attention will be given to avoiding any possible conflict of interest situations with firms with which the Agency has contracts. Particular concern will also be exhibited over possible improper influence on the stock market or stock dealings through the investments involved in MHMUTUAL.SECRET-EYES CULYNW 50955 DocId: 32423532 Page 262RECEIVED FROMJUN 25 1975,CIA3
[157-10014-10144.pdf — page 262]
SECRETEVES ONLYMEMORANDUMSUBJECT: Domestic Proprietary CompaniesCorporate cover, as managed by the Cover and Commercial Staff, is an appropriate support for our overseas operations. To the degree that domestic proprietary or cover companies are required, a clear justification will be developed as to the relationship of their support of our overseas operations.Suggested addition:Corporate cover, including notional companies, as managed by the Cover and Commercial Staff, is an appropriate support for our overseas operations. To the degree that domestic proprietary or cover companies are required, a clear justification will be developed as to the relationship of their support of our overseas operations.NW 0955 DocId: 32423532 Page 263.SECRETEVES ONLYRECEIVED FROMJAN 25 1975CIA
[157-10014-10144.pdf — page 263]
SECRETEVES ONLYMEMORANDUMSUBJECT: Project MHMUTUALProject MHMUTUAL will be operated in conformance with appropriate legal restrictions. Arrangements are being made for the briefing of the appropriate Congressional committees. Particular attention will be given to avoiding any possible conflict of interest situations with firms with which the Agency has contracts. Particular concern will also be exhibited over possible improper influence on the stock market or stock dealings through the investments involved in MHMUTUAL.The DDO has no problem with this as written.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystemIdentification FormDate: 7/7/2015AGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10151Agency InformationRECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-56Document InformationORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM:TO:TITLE: SELECT COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORTDATE: 09/01/1975PAGES: 560SUBJECTS: SSCSGO, REPORTDOCUMENT TYPE: REPORTCLASSIFICATION: DeclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: IB; ICCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/21/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS:v9.1NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 1
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 1]
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMDate : 08/07/95Page : 1AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10151RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMIITTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-56DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIAFROM :TO :TITLE : SELECT COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORTDATE : 09/01/75PAGES : 560SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, REPORTDOCUMENT TYPE : REPORTCLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRETRESTRICTIONS : REFERREDCURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULLDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/08/99OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS :[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 2]
SELECT COMMITTEE - ASSASSINATION REPORTSeptember 1, 1975Tab A: PROLOGUETab B: Part I: Introduction and SummaryTab C: Part II: Covert Action as Vehicle for Foreign Policy ImplementationTab D: Part III/CubaTab E: Part III/Dominican RepublicTab F: Part III/ChileTab G: Part III/CongoTab H: Part III/South VietnamTab I: Part IV: Findings and ConclusionsTab J: Part V: RecommendationsNW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 3
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 3]
Agreed to by SubcommitteeOctober 8, 1975PROLOGUEThe events discussed in this Interim Report must be viewed in the context of United States policy and actions designed to counter the threat of spreading Communism. Following the end of World War II, many nations in eastern Europe and elsewhere fell under Communist influence or control. The defeat of the Axis powers was accompanied by the rapid disintegration of the Western colonial empires. The Second World War no sooner ended than a new struggle began. The Communist threat, emanating from what was then called the "Sino-Soviet bloc," produced a policy of containment intended to prevent further encroachment by Communism into the "free world."United States strategy for conducting the Cold War called for the establishment of interlocking treaty arrangements and military bases throughout the world. Our concern over the expansion of an aggressive Communist monolith led the United States to fight two major wars in Asia. In addition, it was considered necessary to wage a relentless cold war against Communist expansion wherever it appeared in the "back alleys of the world." This called for a full range of clandestine activities in response to the operations of Communist clandestine services.The fear of expanding Communism was particularly acute when Fidel Castro emerged as the leader of Cuba in the late 1950's. His takeover was seen as the first significant penetration by the Communists into the Western Hemisphere. U.S. leaders, including
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 4]
- 2 -most Members of Congress, called for vigorous action to stem the Communist infection in this hemisphere. These policies rested on widespread popular support and encouragement.Throughout this period, the U.S. felt impelled to respond to threats which were, or seemed to be, skirmishes in a global Cold War against Communism. Castro's Cuba raised the spectre of a Soviet outpost at America's doorstep. Events in the Dominican Republic appeared to offer more such opportunities for the Russians and their allies. The Congo, freed from Belgian rule, occupied the strategic center of the African continent, and the prospect of Communist pene- tration there was viewed as a threat to American interests in emerging Africa. Americans are well aware of the powerful reactions set off in the United States in the 1960's by the domino theory in Indochina. And, even the election in 1970 of a Marxist president in Chile was seen by some as a threat similar to that of Castro's takeover in Cuba.The Committee regards the unfortunate events dealt with in this Interim Report as an aberration, explainable at least in part, but not justified, by the pressure of events at the time. The Committee believes that it is still in the national interest of the United States to do what it can to help nations resist Communist domination, but it is clear that this cannot justify in the future the kind of abuses covered in this report. Indeed, the Committee has resolved that steps must be taken to prevent them from happening again.> do what they> can FOR SELF-> DETERMINATIONNW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 5
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 5]
Agreed to by Drafting Subcommittee on August 27, 1975*# 1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARYThis interim report covers allegations of United States involvement in assassination plots against foreign political leaders. Of equal significance in this report are certain other cases where foreign political leaders in fact were killed, where the United States was in some manner involved in activity leading up to the killing, but where it would be incorrect to say that the purpose of United States involvement had been to encourage assassination.The evidence establishes that the United States was implicated in several assassination plots. The Committee believes that the use of assassination as a tool of foreign policy is incompatible with American principles, international order, and morality. It should be rejected.Our inquiry also revealed serious problems with respect to United States involvement in coups directed against foreign governments. Some of these problems are addressed here on the basis of our investigation to date; others we raise as questions to be answered after our investigation into covert action has been completed.We stress the interim nature of this report. In the course of the Committee's continuing work, other alleged assassination plots may surface, and new evidence concerning the cases covered herein may come to light. However, it is the Committee's view that the cases covered herein have been developed in sufficient detail to clarify the issues which are at the heart of the Committee's mandate to recommend legislative and other reforms relating to the vital matters discussed below.* The Vice Chairman reserved as to the first sentence in the discussion of the similarities and differences among the plots. (See p.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 6]
In depth treatment of the assassination question has lengthenedthe Committee's schedule but has greatly increased the Committee's awarenessof the hard issues it must face in the months ahead. The Committee intends,nevertheless, to complete, by February 1976, its main job of undertaking thefirst comprehensive review of the intelligence community.## A. The Committee's MandateUnder Senate Resolution 21, the Committee was instructed to in-vestigate the full range of governmental intelligence activities and theextent, if any, to which such activities were "illegal, improper or un-ethical". In addition to that very broad general mandate, the Committeewas required by the Senate to investigate, study and make recommendationsconcerning various specific matters, several of which relate to the assassi-nation issue.[^1]Although the Rockefeller Commission conducted an inquiry intoreported assassination plots, the Commission declared it was unable, fora variety of reasons, to complete its inquiry. At the direction of the Presi-dent, the. Executive Branch turned over to the Select Committee the workthe Commission had done, along with other documents relating to assassina-tions.[^1]: For example, S. Res. 21 requires the Committee to study and investigate the following:*   the extent and necessity of . . . covert intelligence activities . abroad";*   "[the] nature and extent of executive branch oversight of all United States intelligence activities";*   "the need for improved, strengthened, or consolidated oversight of United States intelligence activities by the Congress"; and the need for new legislation.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 7]
-3-## B. Committee Decision To Make This Report PublicThis report raises important questions of national policy. We believe that the public is entitled to know what certain instrumentalities of their Government have done. Further, our recommendations can only be judged in light of the factual record. Therefore, this interim report should be made public.Because of our faith in the democratic system, and the paramount importance of strengthening the institutions of this country, the Committee believes the truth about the assassination allegations should be told.Democracy depends upon a well-informed electorate. Truth underlies both justice and freedom.We reject any contention that the facts disclosed herein should be kept secret because they are embarrassing to the United States. Despite the possible injury to our national reputation, the Committee believes that foreign peoples will, upon sober reflection, respect the United States more for keeping faith with its democratic ideal than they will condemn us for the misconduct itself.The fact that portions of the story have already been publicly disclosed only accentuates the need for full disclosure. Innuendo and misleading partial disclosures are neither fair to the individuals involved, nor a responsible way to lay the groundwork for informed public policy judgments.## C. The Scope of the Committee's InvestigationThe investigation of the assassination issue has been an unpleasant duty, but one that the Select Committee had to meet. The Committee has compiled a massive record in the months that the inquiry has been underway.