Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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to the Special Group that "the proposed actions would not,of themselves, bring about the desired result in the nearfuture, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself."(Special Group Minutes, 12/29/60)IV. January 12, 1961 Special Group Approval of "LimitedSupplies of Small Arms and Other Material"On January 12, 1961, with all members present, * theSpecial Group met and, according to its Minutes, took thefollowing action with respect to the Dominican Republic:"Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Departmentof State that limited supplies of small arms and othermaterial should be made available for dissidents in-side the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that webelieve this can be managed securely by CIA, and thatthe plan would call for final transportation into thecountry being provided by the dissidents themselves.The Group approved the project." (Special Group Minutes, 1/12/61)A. Memoranda Underlying the Special Group ActionOn January 12, 1961, Thomas Mann sent a memorandum toUnder Secretary Livingston Merchant. The memorandum, sentthrough Joseph Scott, Merchant's Special Assistant, reportedon the disillusionment of Dominican dissidents with the UnitedStates for its failure to furnish them with any tangible orconcrete assistance. Further, it reported:Opposition elements have consistently asked us to supplythem with *hardware* of various types. This has includedquantities of conventional arms and also, rather persis-tently, they have asked for some of the more exotic itemsand devices which they associate with revolutationaryeffort. (Mann to Merchant memo of 1/12/61)* The members of the Special Group were at the time: Livingston  Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Gordon  Gray, Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs;  John N. Irwin, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Allen Dulles,  Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
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Mann suggested for Merchant's consideration and, if heapproved, for discussion by the Special Group, the provisionof token quantities of selected items desired by the dissidents.Mann specifically mentioned small explosive devices which wouldplace some "sabotage potential" in the hands of dissidentelements, but stated that there "would be no thought oftoppling the GODR (Government of Dominican Republic)by any such minor measure." (Mann to Merchant memo, 1/12/61)This memorandum was drafted on January 11 by Mann's SpecialAssistant for CIA liaison, Frank Devine.A covering memorandum from Scott to Merchant, forwardingMann's memo, was apparently taken by Merchant to the SpecialGroup meeting. Merchant's handwritten notations indicate thatthe Special Group "agreed in terms of Tom Mann's memo"and that the Secretary of State was informed of thatdecision by late afternoon on January 12, 1961. (Scottto Merchant memo, 1/12/61)There is no evidence that any member of the Special Group,other than Allen Dulles, knew that the dissidents had clearly.and repeatedly expressed a desire for arms and explosives tobe used by them in assassination efforts.[^1] While it is, ofcourse, possible that such information was passed orally tosome or all of the members of the Special Group, and perhapseven discussed by them on January 12, 1961, there is no[^1]: Various CIA cables, including those dealing with the sniper rifles, indicate that copies were sent to the DCI, Allen Dulles.
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documentary evidence of which the Committee is aware which would establish this to be the case.On January 19, 1961, the last day of the Eisenhower administration, Consul General Dearborn was advised that approval had been given for supplying arms and other material to the Dominican dissidents (HQS to Station cable, 1/19/61). Shortly thereafter, Dearborn informed Devine that the dissidents were "delighted" about the decision to deliver "exotic equipment." (Dearborn to Devine cable, 1/31/61)V. January 20, 1961 - April 17, 1961 (the Kennedy Administration Through the Bay of Pigs)On January 20, 1961, the Kennedy administration took office. Three of the four members of the Special Group (all except Allen Dulles) retired.Prior to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961, a number of significant events occurred. These events included meetings with Dominican dissidents in which specific assassination plans were discussed, requests by dissidents for explosive devices, the passage by U.S. officials of pistols and carbines to dissidents inside the Dominican Republic, and the pouching to the Dominican Republic of machine guns which had been requested by the dissidents for use in connection with an assassination attempt.[^1][^1]: *As indicated in the post-Bay of Pigs section, infra, permission to pass those machine guns was denied and the guns were never passed.
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-14-These events are discussed below under subheading A.Evidence reflecting the degree of knowledge of those events possessed by senior American officials is treated thereafter. As used herein, "senior American officials" means individuals in the White House or serving as members of the Special Group.A. Specific Events Indirectly Linking U.S. to Dissidents' Assassination Plans1.  Assassination Discussions and Requests for ExplosivesAt meetings held with dissident leaders in New York City on February 10 and 15, 1961, CIA officials were told repeatedly by dissident leaders that "the key to the success of the plot [to overthrow the Trujillo regime] would be the assassination of Trujillo." (CIA memo for the record, 2/13/61) Among the requests made of the CIA by dissident leaders were the following:(a) Ex-FBI agents who would plan and execute the death of Trujillo.(b) Cameras and other items that could be used to fire projectiles.(c) A slow-working chemical that could be rubbed on the palm of one's hand and transferred to Trujillo in a handshake, causing delayed lethal results.(d) Silencers for rifles that could kill from a distance of several miles. (Id.)Other methods of assassinating Trujillo proposed by dissidents
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- 15 -at the February 10 or February 15 meetings included poisoningTrujillo's food or medicines, ambushing his automobile, andattacking him with firearms and grenades. (CIA memo for therecord, 2/13/61; 2/16/61)*The dissidents' "latest plot", as described in the FebruaryCIA memoranda, was said to involve the planting of a powerfulbomb, which could be detonated from a nearby electric device,along the route of Trujillo's evening walk. (Id.)On March 13, 1961, a dissident in the Dominican Republicasked for fragmentation grenades "for use during the next weekor so." This request was communicated to CIA Headquarterson March 14, 1961, and was followed the next day by an additionalrequest for 50 fragmentation grenades, 5 rapid-fire weapons,and 10 64 mm anti-tank rockets. This further request was alsopassed on to CIA Headquarters. (Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61)There is no evidence that any of these arms were supplied tothe dissidents.The documentary record makes clear that Frank. Devine atthe State Department was also advised of related developmentsin a March 16, 1961, "picnic" letter from Dearborn who complainedthat his spirits were in the doldrums because:" . . . the members of our club are now preparedin their minds to have a picnic but do not havethe ingredients for the salad. Lately they havedeveloped a plan for the picnic, which just mightwork if they could find the proper food. They* There is no record that the CIA responded affirmatively to  any of these requests and the CIA officer who drafted the  February 13 memorandum stated the view that some of the ques-  tions raised by the dissidents did not require an answer.
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have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardlymore, and we are not prepared to make themavailable. Last week we were asked to furnishthree or four pineapples for a party in thenear future, but I could remember nothing in my in-structions that would have allowed me to contri-bute this ingredient. Don't think I wasn'ttempted. I have rather specific guidelinesto the effect that salad ingredients will bedelivered outside the picnic grounds and willbe brought to the area by another club.(Dearborn letter to Devine, 3/16/61)After reviewing his "picnic" letter, together with the requestsin the March 14 and 15 cables discussed above, Dearborn con-cluded during his testimony before the Committee that the"pineapples" were probably the requested fragmentationgrenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredientsoutside of the picnic grounds was, almost certainly, meant torefer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Grouporder that arms be delivered outside the Dominican Republic.(Dearborn 7/29, pp. 25-27).## The Passage of Pistols### Pouching to the Dominican RepublicIn a March 1-5, 1961 cable, Chief of Station Owen reportedthat Dearborn had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issueto several dissidents. In reply, Headquarters cabled: "Regretno authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations againstshipment of arms" and indicated that their reply had been coor-dinated with State. (HQS to Station cable, 3/17/61) TheStation Chief then asked Headquarters to seek the necessaryauthorization and noted that at his last two posts, he hadreceived pistols via the pouch for "worthy purposes" and,
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therefore, he knew it could be done. (Station to Hqs cable, 3/21/61) Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols and ammunition were being pouched. However, the Station Chief was instructed not to advise Dearborn. (Hqs. to Station cable, 3/24/61)*b. Reason for the CIA Instruction Not to Tell DearbornOwen testified that he believed the "don't tell Dear- born the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that the sending of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not something to be unnecessarily discussed. (Owen, pp. 78,79)Dearborn said he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew Owen had no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 33)c. Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single pistol for purposes completely unrelated to any assassination con- sideration. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 29-31) He said he had been approached by a Dominican contact-who lived in a remote area and was concerned for the safety of his family in the event of political reprisals. Dearborn testified that he had believed* The Inspector General's Report, issued in connection with a review of these events, concludes that:"There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files that the pistols were actually pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a sub- sequent request for submachine guns." (I.G. Report, p. 60)This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March 24, 1961, Headquarters to Station cable; which provides:"C. Pouchingi revolvers and ammo requested TRUJ 0462 (in 20040) on 28 March. Do not advise (name Dearborn deleted) this material being pouched. Explanation follows."
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the man's fears were well-founded and had promised to seek a pistol.*Although there is no direct evidence linking any of these pistols to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 1961, CIA memorandum, unsigned and with no attribution as to source, states that two of the three pistols were passed by Owen to Lorenzo "Wimpy" Berry, a United States citizen who was in direct contact with the action element of the dissident group. It should also be noted that the assassination was apparently conducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether one or more of these .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols eventually came into the hands of the assassins and, if so, whether they were used in connection with the assassination, remain open questions.Both Dearborn and Owen testified that they regarded the pistols as weapons for self-defense purposes and they never considered them in any way connected with the then-current assassination plans. (Dearborn 7/29, p.70; Owen, pp.38,73)However, none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the purpose for which the handguns were sought and Owen's cable stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents. (Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24, 1961,*Dearborn is clear in his recollection that he asked Owen to request only one pistol. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp.30,31) Owen, on the other hand, testified that if his cables requested three pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must have asked for three pistols. (Owen, p.72)The pistols were, however, apparently sent in one package (HQS to Station cables, 3/27/61 and 3/24/61) and Dearborn testified that, what he believed to be the one gun, came "wrapped up" and that he passed it. (Dearborn, -7/29,p.30)
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cable advising that the pistols were being pouched is the very cable which was sent in response to a request by the dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination effort which had been previously described to Headquarters. As with the carbines discussed below, it appears that little, if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over passing these weapons to would-be assassins.## 3. Passing of the Carbines### a. Request by Owen and Dearborn and Approval by CIAIn a March 26, 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters, Owen asked for permission to pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber Ml carbines. The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by Navy personnel after the U.S. broke formal diplomatic relations in August 1960. Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred in the proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 42,43) On March 31, 1961 CIA Headquarters cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines. (Hqs to Station cable, 3/31/61)### b. Were the Carbines Related to Assassination?The carbines were passed to the action group contact, Wimpy Berry, on April 7, 1961. (Station to HQS cable, 4/8/61) Eventually, they found their way into the hands of one of the assassins, Antonio de la Maza. (Station to HQS cable, 4/26/61; I.G. Report pp. 46, 49) Both Dearborn and Owen testified that the carbines were at all times viewed as strictly a token show
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of support, indicating U.S. support of the dissidents' effortsto overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 46-48; Owen p. 39)c. Failure to Disclose to State DepartmentOfficials in WashingtonThere is no indication that the request or the passageof the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials inWashington until several weeks after the passage. In fact, onApril 5, Ileadquarters requested its Station to ask Dearbornnot to comment in correspondence with State that the carbinesand ammunition were being passed to the dissidents. This cablewas sent while Owen was in Washington, and it indicated thatupon his return to the Dominican Republic, he would explainthe request. The Station replied that Dearborn had not com-mented on the carbines and ammunition in his correspondencewith State and he realized the necessity not to do so. (Stationto HQS cable, 4/6/61)Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at thetime of his April-6 cable, that someone in the State De-partment had been consulted in advance and had approved thepassage of the carbines (Dearborn 7/29, p. 44)
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3. Requests For and Pouching of the Machine Gunsa. Owen Requests Machine Guns for Use in AssassinationThe Station Chief suggested that Headquarters consider pouching an M3 machine gun on February 10, 1961 (Owen, pp. 63,64; Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61). The request was raised again in March but no action was taken. On March 20, 1961, Owen cabled a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns specifying their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic pouch or similar means. The dissidents were said to feel that delivery by air drop or transfer at sea would overly-tax their resources. (Station to HQS cable, 3/20/61)The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly identified, in Owen's cable, as being sought for use in connection with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to kill Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress and, according to Owen's cable:"4. To do they need five M3 or comparable machine- guns. and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job." (Id.)In essence, CIA's response was that the timing for an assassination was wrong. Owen was told that precipitious or uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of a leftist, Castro-type regime and the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create more problems than solutions." It was Headquarters' position that:"...we should attempt to avoid precipitous action by the internal dissidents until opposition group and HQS are better prepared to support /assassination/*, effect a change in the regime, and cope with the aftermath." (HQS to Station cable, 3/24/61)* Word supplied by CIA in previously sanitized cable.
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-22-The cable also stated that Headquarters was prepared to deliver machine guns and ammunition to the dissidents when they developed a capability to received them, but that security considerations precluded use of U.S. facilities as a carrier.*Soon, thereafter, on April 6, 1961, while Owen was in Washington for consultation with Headquarters, he reported on events in the Dominican Republic and> "especially on the insistence of the EMOTH [dissident] leaders that they be provided with a limited number of small arms for their own protection (specifically, five M3 caliber .45 SMG's)." (CIA memo for the record, 4/11/61)b. Pouching the Machine Guns is Approved by BissellAccordingly, on April 7, 1961, a Pouch Restriction Waiver Request and Certification was submitted seeking permission to pouch "four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used for self protection." (Pouch Restriction Waiver Request 4/7/61)The request, submitted on behalf of the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, further provided:> "B. A determination has been made that the issuance of this equipment to the action group is desirable if for no other reason than to assure this important group's continued cooperation with and confidence in this Agency's determination to live up to its earlier commitments to the group. These commitments took* This same cable of March 24, 1961, is the one which advised that the revolvers and ammunition were being pouched.![TOP SECRET]
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# TOP SECRETthe form of advising the group in January 1961 that we would provide limited arms and assistance to them provided they develop the capability to receive it. Operational circumstances have prevented this group from developing the assets capable of receiving the above equipment through normal clandestine channels such as air drops or sea infiltration."The Waiver Request was approved by Richard Bissell, as Deputy Director (Plans), on April 10, 1961. (Id.)The machine guns were pouched to the Dominican Republic and were received by the station on April 19, 1961.* (I.G. Report, p. 42; Station to Headquarters cable, 4/19/61).On April 10, Walter Elder, Assistant to the Director, had issued a memorandum which stated:"Mr. Dulles wants no action on drops of leaflets or arms in the Dominican Republic taken without his approval." (Elder memorandum of 4/10/61).The Elder memorandum suggests that Dulles did not know that an air drop of arms was regarded as unfeasible and that pouching had been approved.## B. Knowledge of Senior American Officials (pre-Bay of Pigs)On February 14, 1961, prior to the passage of weapons, but a month after the generalized approval of the passage of arms by the prior administration, a meeting of the Special Group was held with Messrs. McNamara, Gilpatric, Bowles, Bundy, Dulles, Bissell, and General Cabell in attendance.* Permission to pass the machine guns was never obtained and the guns never passed into the hands of the dissidents. The matter is discussed in detail beginning at page ;** Elder testified that this note, sent the weekend before the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, was intended to make sure that there were no unusual planes shot down or any unnecessary noise in the Dominican Republic" prior to the Cuba invasion. (Elder, p. 51)
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The minutes state that:"Mr. Dulles, assisted by Mr. Bissell, then summarized for the benefit of the new members of the Special Group the specific actions taken by the predecessor group during the past year, and also a list of significant projects which antedate the beginning of 1960 and which it is planned to continue." (Special Group Minutes of 2/14/61)In the course of the discussion, the following point, among others, was made:"(a) Dominican Republic -- Mr. Bundy asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government to Trujillo." (Id.)The request attributed to Bundy suggests that the Dominican Republic had been one of the matters on which Dulles and Bissell briefed the new members.What is unclear from the February 14 minutes (just as it is unclear from the January 12 minutes) is the degree to which the Special Group was informed concerning the means by which the dissidents planned to accomplish the overthrow of the Trujillo regime. Specifically, it is not known if the new members of the Special Group were told that the dissident group had expressed the desire to assassinate Trujillo. Nor is it known if the Special Group was
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advised that the State Department representative in theDominican Republic had made the assessment that the Dominicangovernment could not be overthrown without the assassinationof Trujillo.Bissell testified that he had no clear recollectionof the details of the February 14 briefing and he was unableto say whether or not the method of overthrow to be attemptedby the dissidents was discussed. (Bissell, 7/22, pp. 101, 102)Robert McNamara, one of the new members of the Special Groupin attendance for the briefing, has no recollection as to thespecificity in which the Dominican Republic was discussed at theFebruary 14 meeting. He does not recall any mention by eitherDulles or Bissell of dissident plans to assassinate Trujillo.(McNamara affidavit).February MemorandaThe Secretary of State sent the President a memorandumon February 15, 1961, in response to a request concerning pro-gress to assure an orderly takeover "should Trujillo fall."The memorandum advised that:"Our representatives in the Dominican Republichave, at considerable risk to those involved,established contacts with numerous leaders of theunderground opposition . . . /and/ . . . the CIAhas recently been authorized to arrange for deliveryto them outside the Dominican Republic of small armsand sabotage equipment."This reference to recent authorization for delivery ofarms indicates that Secretary Rusk had received some briefingconcerning events in the Dominican Republic and the January 1961