Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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handler but who is really operating off in a very secure and remote environment.So in an effort to try to suggest that they make a real effort to compensate for what we have found in this area, this particular thing is designed to urge them to do their best to try to overcome that problem.Now we wanted to put it in a way that was not pejorative and that did not exclude the advancement of good covert operators. If you want to keep covert operations. I agree with Charley, you have to have good ones and you've got to reward them.I don't think that this particular recommendation which is to the Agency and not to statute does what perhaps Charley fears it would do. It simply urges that they give the proper weight to what for the clandestine services is their primary mission.Mr. Bader. The problem of it is we're not after this really and perhaps it's a language problem. We're not trying to suggest here that the intelligence collectors in the career matters should be favored over the operator. What we were after really was that we have noticed over the years and in the record that the intelligence operator has tended to move along much faster.What he has done. His projects are very quickly visible while intelligence collection can be something that runs over years and it's hard in the trenches. And I think the> [Figure: TOP SECRET]Mr. Kirbow. I'm sorry. I don't believe that that's the case. What I'm really saying is this. Over the years from about 1947 on through the '60s clandestine operations were a way of life in the CIA. Whether it is in favor today or not is probably on the side of no. it's not in favor at the CIA because there are only 165 versus some 500 or 600.Senator Huddleston. I really don't see that as being relevant.As I see this it's not a question of whether we like clandestine operations or not. It's seems to me the question is whether or not those individuals who serve are getting undue> [Figure: TOP SECRET]
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preferential treatment and advancement within the Agency.Is that what we're trying to get to here?Mr. Kirbow. They say it's within the clandestine services, that the covert operator gets more advancement within the clandestine services side of the house then the other people, and I don't think our record supports that.It may be that you have found more of the directors being from the covert side of the house but that is not what the attack is here.Senator Huddleston. Can't we say that within the clandestine services our inauiry indicates that those in the covert section have advanced in areat r numbers more rapidly?Mr. Rader. Yes. I think the record is clear on that within the clandestine services.Sanctor Huddleston. And the Committee believes that the Agency ought to ensure that all employees, whatever side, be given the opportunity based on their actual skills.Mr. Aaron. That's the thrust of what we're trying to express here.Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman. I would like to reserve for Senator Tower on this one because I don't think the record of the Committee supports that.Mr. diGenova, Hop about if we said this the Central Intelligence should ensure that the skills of intelligence collection are given cual considration as a criterion for
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advancement within the clandestine services.Ms. Culbreth. Then you get back in to what we struck out from the original, which was as opposed to covert action operations. We deleted that from the earlier thing to try to avoid --Mr. diGenova. I'm trying to just paraphrase what the Senator just said, what they said was the thrust, which was that intelligence collection capabilities are put on an equal footing with operations.Mr. Aaron. What I think is a better way to put the point, and it's along that same line, might be to simply say, to urge that the Agency ensure that the skills of intelligence collection are given importance in advancement within the clandestine services of that mission for the clandestine services, if you will.In other words, the great bulk of the people in the clandestine services, as Charley pointed out, are in fact intelligence collectors. They are case officers for trying to acquire information and I think that what we're trying to arrive at here is that it should be given an importance, that this skill should be given an importance and significance in proportion to the significance that the Agency accords to that particular task.Senator Mathias. That all are we trying to get at here? Are we getting at the fact that you get some stare who, because.> TOP SECRET> > NW 50955 DocId: 32423509 Page 108
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of their clandestine skills on all the available promotions. most of them, that they get ahead and I think that that is a problem. You see it in the armed services all the time.I remember Commander Buckley who, because he was a big PT boat man, and he just happened to be called on to take MacArthur off Corrigedor, ended up an Admiral, and I won't comment further.Now I think there is such a human response to courage and daring and unusual skill that it's going to be very hard to deflect that from having its natural outlet in recognition..Mr. Faron. As I say, a lot of the problem is in the nature of things and the recommendation goes to an effort to put us on record as trying to compensate for what I think you rightly say.Covert action draws attention to the operator. Clandestine collection, you do not draw attention to yourself.Mr. Kirbow. There is a more basic problem to this at the Agency. I did spend some considerable time in this business.The excellent people, the people who turn out to be excellent in the Agency and get the quick promotions are not necessarily promoted because they are covert operators alone.Most of the very fine people that they have or that they had in the early years wanted to be in that business because that's what being a spy was, and they will end up with a majority of the good people.Why shouldn't they be promoted? That's exactly theTOP SECRET
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decision.Senator Huddleston Well, there are too many elements here involved in who ought to be promoted. There are too many human elements and somebody has to make a decision.I just don't know how we can advice them on that. I think I would strike that. I would favor taking it out.Mr. Aaron. Okay. Number 24 goes to the question of the relationship between the domestic contac' division and the directorate of operations or what is otherwise known as the clandestine services.In 1972. I believe it was, when Mr. Schlesinger went to the CIA, this directorate whose primary responsibility is for collecting overt intelligence but which has a support function for the clandestine collection or the clandestine recruitment of agents within the United States was then moved into the directorate of operations.The Committee's own bearings and testimony on the subject indicated that a reasonably large portion of their activity and their contacts are used for the initial stages of trying to spot, assess, and get people close to foreign intelligence agent recruitment targets.Now there are one concern about that is that unlike the foreign resources division whose mission is 'learly clandestir the domestic contact division approaches their people on an over basis, it save, 'I'm not a spy. I'm not doing anyTOP SECRET
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I am an overt person. I belong to the CIA. I would like you to tell me about your travels or advise us on some subject or what have you on an open basis, and that this relationship is completely above board in every way. And you don't have to worry that this relationship is going to be used for any overt purpose. However, it turns out that some of those relationships are or do or are brought to evolve into support for clandestine activities in which information is gathered on people who might be helpful in all the ways and I think we had a pretty good attendance at that session when this was discussed.So the question comes down to this -- this blurring of the line between an organization as to whether its mission really is overt or not in every respect, should this be a concern to the Committee? And if it is of concern to the Committee, should we take some steps to try to reinforce its overt character and separate it out from the clandestine services where it is now located and where at least a few of the people in the DCD have expressed some concern that they will now become populated with real clandestine operators and that they will really sort of become another arm of that organization.Now Bill Bader would like to talk to this point. It formerly was part of the directorate of intelligence which is the more overt arm of the Agency to begin with and collected that information.
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In other governments this same function is done. for example, in Britain it's done by the board of trade because a lot of the information is technical, economic, or scientific in nature, which is also true for the DCD. as a matter of Fact.And so the question that is presented to the Committee is do we want to leave the DCD where it is in the Director of Clandestine Operations? Do we want to have the clandestine service, if you will. have a quasi-overt arm within the United States widely spread out throughout the United States? Would we want to confine the clandestine activities to the clandestine service and the overt activities to some overt organization, be that back in the directorate of intelligence in the Agency or moved out to the State Department or some other organization which does operate openly an a matter of course?Mr. Inderfurth. What would that mean in terms of numbers? How large is the DCD?Mr. Aaron. I believe it is about 150 or 200.Mr. Bader. There are 38 offices.Mr. Aaron. And they are about two or three man offices.A lot of the personnel in the DCD are in fact succunded from the military services or PRDA. You know there are different areas of the country that have different kinds.. you know, or agriculture, for example if they're interested in agriculturel intelligence a lot of these people come out of
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agriculture. I mean it's a funny kind of mixture of people. The CIA sort of does this in part as a service of common concern to the intelligence community and in part at least heretofore it does the overt collection function as a service to its own analysts. This was particularly in the early days when we had less access to information in the denied areas of the world. It was a very rich source of information for us. It still is quite a good and important and economical source, and it's a good program. The question is how much it should be involved in clandestine support and if you want to find a way to encourage it, to. if you will. emphasize its overt mission over its covert mission or do you want to put it back into some overt side of the Agency or the government?Mr. Maxwell. I have some very mixed feelings about this recommendation and the problem might be described better by looking at the flow of information from the end point. The FRD now is involved in the recruitment of agents for foreign intelligence gathering within the United States. A number of times they need, and I think they have indicated to the Committee that they need some help in determining whether they should go to an individual and say, can you introduce me to this potential agent of influence in a country. can you introduce me to the student without that blowing up in their faces?
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The question then is how can they be provided with the information that they need to allow them to make a recruitment that the Committee may find is valuable.If it is from the DCD, it has all the problems that David articulated, and I appreciate those problems. The question the Committee has to face is where they are going to get that information, whether it should be for the DCD, whether it's located in DDO, from the DoD, whether it's located in the DOI or from the DCD, or located in the State Department or under State Department control.My own sense of that is that the decision that was made by Director Schlesinger in moving it from the DDI to the DDO did raise the potential of compromising the overt character, but it also made the liaison which we find important more efficient and easier to manage and potentially easier to control if both elements are under the same set of guidelines and regulations which would govern the DDO as a whole as to who may be apporoached, who may be used operationally.If it's put in another directorate or outside, I think there's a difficulty in that kind of control and I think it's also, it obviously raises the question of whether the FRD was going to get the information that it needed for a valuable function of recruiting foretoners while they're in the United States.I think the Committee can do any number of ways but I> [Figure: A "TOP SECRET" watermark in big, bold black letters. Below the watermark are the initials "WPAUL"]
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Think that the end product has to be looked at in the recruitment of spies, and secondly we have to look at what kinds of assurances could be made in any branch of the government if overt collection is being done as to whether that information could be used by another branch of the government.If DCD were entirely overt and a promise were made to Mr. Bader that this would never be used for an operational purpose or you would never be asked as a consenting adult to aid in an operational purpose, then the end production might well be that the FRD is going to be sending people out covertly within the United States to covertly obtain information to determine if they are going to make a covert approach to a foreign spy, and I think that I have real hesitation about, rather than the information being available from consenting individuals on an open basis.Mr. Aaron. If I could add to that. I agree, I think the question is if you're going to allow the conduct of recruitments to take place and you're going to allow information to be collected on these people. somebody has to do it and so you're not going to avoid any of those questions by this.The issue goes in part to whether the people who will initially begin developing that information will be people with every incentive to keep it within certain bounds or whether there will be incentives that work at cross purposes to that.I think that, if we have a situation in which the> [Figure: TOP SECRET classification]NW 50955 DocId: 32423509 Page 115
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nco could legitimately have contact with academies and largenumbers of people who otherwise, if our other recommendationsin here are accepted and even some of the internal regulationsof the CIA are written into law, people would be kind of offbounds for operational use.Now the DCD, however, because it is overt, is allowedto deal with these people, and the question is, well, theincentives to be scrupulous in their activities, keeping themovert and not trying to use people sort of for operationalsupport and so forth, the question is would those incentivesbe better outside the DDO or inside the DDO or would it makea difference.The second point is, and this is a somewhat differentpoint the DCD is having an increasing problem, quite frankly,and we have had testimony from Mr. Nelson and others, he'shaving a problem because it is associated with the CIA.Now people are reluctant to cooperate with them becauseof concern about being associated with the CIA. The fact thatthey actually do engage in operational support doesn't helpthat very much.And so the question is if you really want the fullestexploitation of the foreign intelligence, open foreignintelligence potential of the American people who are willingto cooperate openly, shouldn't that be done by some organizationwhich does not have this aura of clandestine activity.> [Figure: TOP SECRET stamp]> ![TOP SECRET stamp]
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associated with it?That is somewhat separate but relevant.Mr. Kirbow! Mr. Chairman, apparently they're not talking about doing it with any fewer people or any different neople, but you're talking about calling it something else.In discussing this with Mr. Nelson, under whom it comes now. and with Mr. Proctor, under whom it previously came, they do not distinguish any of the problems, that they are having any problems in maintaining contact with over 100,000 American citizens who are kind of returning travellers and that they are getting the tree of information that these t loyal citizens are willing to give to them.These neorle advertize their address and probably nut their telephone number in the public telephones in each of these 38 offices and all you have to do is look it up and say that's a CIA function there.It is probably as overt as anything they do except testify on the Hill, which has become very overt in the past year or two. But just to talk about moving it back into a place where they just moved it out of on the lack of some kind of record that is not working properly row or more properly there. I don't think we're in a position to decide that. To decide that you want to move it out of the CIA and into the Department of State. I think the record is totally weid on that subject.> TOP SECRET> > ![text: WARD PAUL]
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I just hate to see us recommend taking away from one place and putting it some place else without a record.Senator Hart. Can't we recommend that we put it back in intelligence and the oversight committee consider that after it's created and so on.Senator Huddleston. Why was it taken out of intelligence?Mr. Bader. It was a question of consolidation of collection in one directorato.You see while the domestic contract service was under the DDI, it was a collection service. It was in an analytical branch and Schlesinger, as I understand it, felt that it was the tidy thing to do to put all collectors under the same tSenator Huddleston. Overt and covert?Mr. Bader. Yes. And I think the issues here have been very well articulated.I had very little to add to them. I think it is an issue. I have a personal concern that we have not taken the responsible officials at any Length on the record on this question of the relative advantages or disadvantages.My own personal view with some experience is that it seems to me it would make a great deal of sense for this function to be under the DDI to emphasize and underline its overtness and that the individuals who are in this particular service or office then would flow naturally from the analytical side and it would be very different kinds of people as they tended
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to be before 1971, 1972.Senator Huddleston. Is there any chance that anybody would be denied the product of this investigation if we changed it?Mr. Bader. One of the things we should bear in mind,Mr. Chairman, is that if you go down the road and talk about these various reforms or changes in the intelligence structure, that moving the DCI function and enhancing his powers and then perhaps eventually separating the Director of CIA from the DCI. that at this point it would seem logical for an overt collection side of an intelligence agency to be with the DCI.But that is down the road as well and perhaps what we want to do with something like this is - you don't understand that point?Mr. Maxwell. No. I don't.Mr. Kirbow. What he's really saying is that if you move all of this overt side out of the DCI. you leave the covert side out there without any of the support function. which this group furnishes to them.Mr. Bader. Down the road when you have a DCIMr. Maxwell. If you assume that the DCI is going to take the entire DDI ---Senator Huddleston. Could we have a situation where an agent might be both covert and overt?
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Mr. Kirbow. These people out there are not agents. These are employees. And most of them, by the way, are former employees. They are retired CIA officers.Senator Huddleston. They are not mixing the assignments?Mr. Kirbow. No. They, for example. I don't mind putting this on the record.We had a large international organization in the company I was with before I returnel to the Senate. Before we departed we could get a briefing on the place where we were going to kind of safeguard against making defense mistakes, and when we came back, they came and had lunch with you and asked you to kind of reveal or when you were dealing with the director; of whatever it was in Singapore, what was the situation? What was the atmosphere? What's going out there because you were in a business atmosphere and rubbed elbows and they came and met with you and did this. or occasionally you would stop by the San Francisco office and you'd do this.That's the business these people are in, principally. Isn't that correct?Senator Huddleston. Hac do you have any thoughts on this?Senator Mathias. i don't think anyone has discussed option number 2 while I've been sitting here, and I haven't bean sitting here consistently. But is there any value to cutting it out and star Lo State?TOP SECRET![TOP SECRET]
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Just to be the do advocate, one of the values that occurs to me is to bring the State Department in touch with reality.Mr. Kirbow. Well you'll never get me to tell a member of the Department of State personal business that I was conductin for my company in Singapore because I don't think that it would be.I'll put it personaliz. I don't think that I would have trusted them with the secrets of what my company's operations were versus an intelligence organization, Not an onen organization like the Department of State.Mr. Aaron. The information collected by the DCD is fully available to every agency of the government. It's not considered classified or secret or anything else.Mr. Kirbow. They ask you a lot of questions.Senator Hart. The orincipal argument, Mac, is that there's no record on this and for us just to haphazardly make this recommendation without our record--The compromise I suggested was a recommended option 1 and that the new committes Look at option 2 when it is in existence and has made a record.Senator Huddleston L'e ipclired to do with cution 1.I have a question i save the Committee recomende permanent oversight committHow is this modea to work?![image of text saying TOP SECRET]
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Mr. Aaron. I just think that in drafting the charter -- actually you can just say you recommend by statute or you could say that the Committee recommends that it be removed or moved back. and you can leave it to the DCI to do it.Senator Huddleston. Just recommend that it be done.Mr. Kirbow. May I respectfully reserve on that?Mr. Aaron. All right. Now 25. we're going to get some testimony tomorrow morning on 25 and 26 as to what they actually do and we will have that on the record.And 27 will be moved up, as we have talked about it earlier. And 28, then, was the order of business, and that is the proposal that in fact we ought to consider a model rather like the British, which is that counter intelligence by the CIA and by -- I'm sorry the author of this is not be -- by the counter intelligence, by the CIA, and the FBI, be consolidated into one organization along the lines of MI 5 or 6.I can never keep them straight.Mr. Inderfurth. Fine. This would --Senator Huddleston. Where would that agency be in the structure?Mr. digenova. This is the point I was getting at before that the domestic task force and John Flliff has some problems with these recommendations, that I'm just spotlighting this now. He doesn't understand the advisability of this. He doesn't see the value in a good reason.