Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 430]
-47-Immediately following the assassination, all CIApersonnel in the Dominican Republic were removed from thecountry and within a few days Consul General Dearborn wasback in Washington. The State Department cabled the CIA stationin the Dominican Republic to destroy all records concerningcontacts with dissidents and any related matters, except not todestroy the contingency plans or the May 29, 1961 cable to Dear-born. (HQS to Station cable, 5/31/61.## C. Immediate Post-Assassination PeriodThe U.S. Consulate in the Dominican Republic was quickto dispatch its early reports that Trujillo had been assassinated,and the U.S. communications network transmitted the report toPresident Kennedy in Paris. The President's Press Secretary,Pierre Salinger, made the first public announcement of theassassination, preceeding by several hours release of the newsin the Dominican Republic. Secretary of State Rusk testifiedthat when he learned of Salinger's announcement he was most con-cerned. Rusk said that Trujillo's son Ramfis was also in Parisand he was afraid that Ramfis, upon first learning of hisfather's death from the press secretary to the President of theU.S., might try to retaliate against President Kennedy. (Rusk,32, 33.)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 431]
# TOP CLOPSCHNEIDER REPORT|      |                                                            | Page || ---- | ---------------------------------------------------------- | ---- || I.   | Summary                                                    | 1    || II.  | The President's Initial General Instruction and Background | 6    || A.   | September 15 White House Meeting                           | 6    || B.   | Background: Tracks I and II                                | 8    || C.   | CIA Views of Difficulty of Project                         | 15   || III. | CIA's Implementation of Track II                           | 17   || A.   | Evolution of CIA Strategy                                  | 17   || 1.   | The "Constitutional Coup" Approach                         | 17   || 2.   | Military Solution                                          | 18   || B.   | The Chile Task Force                                       | 19   || C.   | The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency Relations      | 20   || D.   | The False Flag Base                                        | 26   || E.   | Chief of Station                                           | 27   || IV.  | CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup                              | 29   || A.   | The Chilean Conspirators                                   | 29   || B.   | Contacts Prior to October 15                               | 30   || C.   | October 15 Decision                                        | 34   || D.   | Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15                | 36   || E.   | The Killing of General Schneider                           | 39   || F.   | Post October 22 Events                                     | 41   || V.   | CIA/White House Communication During Track II              | 43   || A.   | September                                                  | 45   || B.   | October                                                    | 46   || C.   | December                                                   | 54   || D.   | Did Track II End?                                          | 54   |
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 432]
# SCHNEIDER REPORTI. SummaryOn September 4, 1970, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens won a plurality in Chile's Presidential election.* Since no candidate had received a majority of the popular vote, the Chilean constitution required that a joint session of its Congress decide between the first and second place finishers. This constitutional requirement had, in the past, been pro- forma. The Congress had always selected the candidate who received highest popular vote. The date set for the Congressional joint session was October 24, 1970.On September 15, 1970, President Richard Nixon informed CIA Director Richard Helms that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable to the United States. The CIA was instructed by President Nixon to play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to the presidency. The Agency was to take this action without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and without informing the U.S. Ambassador in Chile. While coup possibilities in general and other means of seeking to prevent Allende's accession to power were explored by the 40 Committee throughout this period, the 40 Committee was never informed of this direct CIA role. Nor did it ever approve that role. The only institution to which the Agency was to re- port, both for informational and approval purposes, was the White House.*Dr. Allende, a long-time Senator and founder of the Socialist Party in Chile, was a candidate of Popular Unity Coalition. The Coalition was made up of Communists, Socialists, Social Democrats, Radicals, and dissident Christian Democrats. Allende was a self-proclaimed Marxist and was making his fourth try for the presidency. His opponents were Radomire Tomic Romero, candidate of the ruling Christian Democratic Party, and Jorge. Alessandri Rodriquez, candidate of the right-wing National Party. Dr. Allende won 36.3% of the popular vote; Alessandri was second with 35.3% of the vote. Dr. Allende's margin of victory was 39,000 votes out of a total of 3 million votes cast in the election. The incumbent President, Eduardo Frei Montalvo, a Christian Democrat, was ineligible for re-election. Chilean law prohibits Presidents from succeeding themselves.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 433]
-2-In practice, this meant that the CIA was to keep the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, informed of its activities.Between October 5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero (police) officials in Chile. Those Chileans who were inclined to stage a coup were given assurances of strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, both before and after a coup.One of the major obstacles faced by all the military conspirators in Chile was the strong opposition to a coup by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Rene Schneider, who insisted the constitutional process be followed. As a result of his strong constitutional stand, the removal of General Schneider became a necessary ingredient in the coup plans of all the Chilean conspirators. Unable to have General Schneider retired or reassigned, the conspirators decided to kidnap him. An unsuccessful abduction attempt was made on October 19, 1970, by a group of Chilean military officers whom the CIA was actively supporting. A second kidnap attempt was made the following day, again unsuccessfully. In the early morning hours of October 22, 1970, machine guns and ammunition were passed by the CIA to the group that had failed on October 19. That same day General Schneider was mortally wounded in an attempted kidnap on his way to work. The attempted kidnap and the shooting was apparently conducted by conspirators other than those to whom the CIA had provided weapons earlier in the day.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 434]
# -3-A Chilean military court found that high-ranking military officers, both active and retired, conspired to bring about a military coup and to kidnap General Schneider. Several of the officers whom the CIA had contacted and encouraged in their coup conspiracy were convicted of conspiring to kidnap General Schneider. Those convicted of carrying out the actual kidnap attempt and the killing of General Schneider were associates of retired General Roberto Viaux, who had initially been thought by the CIA to be the best hope. However, later the CIA discouraged General Viaux because the Agency felt other officers, such as General Camilo Valenzuela, were not sufficiently involved. General Viaux was convicted by the military court and received a twenty-year prison sentence for being the "intellectal author" of the Schneider kidnap attempt. General Valenzuela was sentenced by the military court to three years in exile for taking part in the conspiracy to prevent Allende's assumption of office. The military court found that the two Generals had been in contact throughout the coup plotting.The principal facts leading up to the death of General Schneider (all of which are discussed in more detail below) are as follows:1.  By the end of September 1970, it appeared that the only feasible way for the CIA to implement the Presidential order to prevent Allende from coming to power was to foment a coup d'etat.2.  All of the known coup plots developed within the Chilean military entailed the removal of General Schneider by one means or another.3.  United States officials continued to encourage and support Chilean plans for a coup after it became known that the first step would be to kidnap General Schneider.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 435]
4. Two unsuccessful kidnap attempts were made, one on October 19, the other on October 20. Following these attempts, and with knowledge of their failure, the CIA passed three submachine guns and ammunition to Chilean officers who still planned to kidnap General Schneider.5. In a third kidnap attempt on October 22, apparently conducted by Chileans other than those to whom weapons had been supplied, General Schneider was shot and subsequently died. The guns used in the abortive kidnapping of General Schneider were, in all probability, not those supplied by the CIA to the conspirators. The Chilean military court which investigated the Schneider killing determined that Schneider had been murdered by handguns, although one machine gun was at the scene of the killing.[^1]6. While there is no question that the CIA received a direct instruction from the President on September 15th to attempt to foment a coup, the Committee received sharply conflicting testimony about whether the White House was kept informed of, and authorized, the coup efforts in Chile after October 15. On one side of the conflict is the testimony of Henry Kissinger and General Alexander Haig; on the other, that of CIA officials. Kissinger testified that the White House stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile on October 15, 1970. After that date, Kissinger testified--and Haig agreed--that the White House neither knew of, nor specifically approved, CIA coup activities in Chile. CIA officials, on the other hand, have testified that their activities in Chile after October 15 were known to and[^1]: The Committee has not been able to determine whether or not the machine gun at the scene of the Schneider killing was one of the three supplied by the CIA.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 436]
*thus authorized by the White House.*[^1]This conflict in testimony, which the Committee has been unable to resolve through its hearings or the documentary record, leaves unanswered the most serious question of whether the CIA was acting pursuant to higher authority (the CIA's view) or was pursuing coup activities in Chile without sufficient communication (the Kissinger/Haig view).[^1] The basic issue is whether or not the CIA informed the White House of its activities. In context, informing was tantamount to being authorized. No one who testified believed that the CIA was required to seek step-by-step authorization for its activities; rather the burden was on the White House to object if a line of activity being pursued by the CIA seemed unwise. Both Kissinger and Haig agreed that if the CIA had proposed a persuasive plan to them, it almost certainly would have been approved. The CIA did not believe it needed specific White House authorization to transfer weapons to the Chileans; in fact, CIA. Deputy Director (Plans) Thomas Karamessines testified that he did not formally approve the transfer, but rather that in the context of the project it was clear that the Agency had the authority to transfer weapons and that it was clear to Karamessines' subordinates that he would approve their decision to do so. He believed he probably was informed before the weapons actually were sent.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 437]
## II. The President's Initial General Instruction and Background### A. September 15 White House MeetingOn September 15, 1970, President Nixon met with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell at the White House. The topic was Chile. Handwritten notes taken by Director Helms at that meeting reflect both its tenor and the President's instructions:1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!worth spendingnot concerned risks involvedno involvement of Embassy$10,000,000 available, more if necessaryfull-time job--best men we havegame planmake the economy scream48 hours for plan of actionIn his testimony before the Select Committee, Director Helms recalled coming away from the meeting on September 15 with:...(the) impression...that the President came down very hard that he wanted something done, and he didn't much care how and that he was prepared to make money available.... This was a pretty all-inclusive order.... If I ever carried a marshall's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that day. * (Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 6,10,11)* Director Helms also testified that the September 15th meeting with President Nixon may have been triggered by the presence of Augustin Edwards, the publisher of the Santiago daily *El Mercurio*, in Washington. That morning, at the request of Donald Kendall, President of Pepsi Cola, Henry Kissinger and John Mitchell had met for breakfast with Kendall and Edwards. (Mitchell calendar) The topic of conversation was the political situation in Chile and the plight of *El Mercurio* and other anti-Allende forces. According to Mr. Helms:I recall that prior to this meeting (with the President) the editor of *El Mercurio* had come to Washington and I had been asked to go and talk to him at one of the hotels here, this having been arranged through Don Kendall, the head of the Pepsi Cola Company....I have this impression that the President called this meeting where I have my handwritten notes because of Edwards' presence in Washington and what he heard from Kendall about what Edwards was saying about conditions in Chile and what was happening there.(Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 4-5)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 438]
However, none of the CIA officers believed that assassination was within the guidelines Helms had been given.Senator Hart of Colorado. ...did the kind of carte blanche mandate you carried, the marshall's baton that you carried out in a knapsack, to stop Allende from assuming office, include physical elimination?Mr. Helms. Well, not in my mind, because when I became Director, I had already made up my mind that we weren't going to have any of that business when I was Director, and I had made that clear to my fellows, and I think they will tell you this.The following day, September 16, Director Helms called a meeting at the CIA to discuss the Chilean situation. At this meeting, he related to his colleagues his understanding of the President's instructions:2. The Director told the group that President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile was unacceptable to the United States. The President asked the Agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him. The President authorized $10,000,000 for this purpose, if needed. Further, the Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Departments of State cr Defense.   (Memorandum/Genesis of the Project, 16 Sept. 1970)Henry Kissinger's recollection of the September 15 meeting with President Nixon is in accord with that of Richard Helms.[^1] Although Dr. Kissinger did not recall the President's instructions to be as precise as those related by Director Helms, he did testify that:....the primary thrust of the September 15th meeting was to urge Helms to do whatever he could to prevent Allende from being seated. (Kissinger testimony, p. 13)***[^1]: The documents, and the officials from whom the Committee has heard testimony, are in substantial agreement about what President Nixon authorized on September 15, namely CIA involvement in promoting a military coup d'etat in Chile. There is not, however, agreement about what was communicated between the CIA and the White House--and hence what was authorized by the latter--in the week between October 15 and the death of General Schneider, October 22. This matter will be discussed in Part V of this report on the Schneider killing.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 439]
It is clear that President Nixon wanted him (Helms) to encourage the Chilean military to cooperate or to take the initiative in preventing Allende from taking office. (Kissinger testimony, p. 12)Operationally, the CIA set the President's instructions into motion on September 21. On that day two cables were sent from CIA Headquarters to Santiago informing the CIA Chief of Station (COS) of his new directive:3. Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power. Parliamentary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective. (Hqs. to Stn. 236, 21 September 1970)***B. (Track Two)--This is authority granted to CIA only, to work toward a military solution to problem. As part of authority we were explicitly told that 40 Committee, State, Ambassador and Embassy were not to be told of this Track Two nor involved in any matter. (Hqs. to Stn. 240, 21 September 1970).B. Background: Tracks I and IIUnited States Government concern over an Allende regime in Chile did not begin with President Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CIA. * For more than a year, Chile had been on the 40 Committee's agenda.At an April 15, 1969, meeting of the 303 Committee (the predecessor of the 40 Committee) the question arose as to whether anything should be done with regard to the September 1970 Presidential election in Chile.At that time, Director Helms pointed out that "an election operation will* Covert U.S. Government involvement in large-scale political action programs in Chile began with the 1964 Presidential election. As in 1970, this was in response to the perceived threat of Salvadore Allende. Over $3 million was spent by the CIA in the 1964 effort. (Colby testimony, July 14, 1975, n. 5)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 440]
-9-not be effective unless an early enough start is made. On March 25, 1970, the 40 Committee approved a joint Embassy/CIA proposal recommending that "spoiling" operations--propaganda and other activities--be undertaken by the CIA in an effort to prevent an election victory by Allende's Popular Unity (UP) Coalition. A total of $135,000 was authorized by the 40 Committee for this anti-Allende activity. On June 18, 1970, the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, submitted a two-phase proposal to the Department of State and the CIA for review.The first phase involved an increase in support to the anti-Allende campaign. The second was a contingency plan to make "a $500,000 effort in Congress to persuade certain shifts in voting on 24 October 1970." Phase II was, stated simply, a proposal to bribe Chilean Congressmen to vote against Allende should he win a plurality in the September 4 election. On June 27, 1970, the 40 Committee increased funding for the anti-Allende "spoiling" operation to $390,000. A decision on Ambassador Korry's bribe proposal was deferred pending the results of the September 4 election.The 40 Committee met twice between the time Allende received a plurality of the popular vote on September 4 and President Nixon issued his instruction to Director Helms on September 15.** At both these meetings the question of U.S. involvement in a military coup against Allende was raised. Kissinger stressed the importance of these meetings when he testified before the Select Committee:*This and other references to 40 Committee discussions and actions regarding Chile are contained in a memorandum provided to the Committee by the CIA entitled "Policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election," dated October 9, 1970. On August 25, 1975, we subpoenaed all White House/National Security Council documents and records relating to the effort by the United States Government to prevent Salvadore Allende from assuming office. On September 4, the Committee received 46 documents from the White House relating to Chile covering the period September 5 to October, 14, 1970.**See Page 9a.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 441]
TOP SEGRET- 9a -**Following the September 4 election, the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence circulated an intelligence community assessment of the impact of an Allende government on U.S. national interests. That assessment, dated September 7, 1970, stated:Regarding threats to U.S. interests, we conclude that:1.  The U.S. has no vital national interests within Chile. There would, however, be tangible economic losses.2.  The world military balance of power would not be significantly altered by an Allende government.3.  An Allende victory would, however, create considerable political and psychological costs:    a. Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened by the challenge that an Allende government would pose to the OAS, and by the reactions that it would create in other countries. We do not see, however, any likely threat to the peace of the region.    b. An Allende victory would represent a definite psychological set-back to the U.S. and a definite psychological advance for the Marxist idea. (Intelligence Memorandum/"Situation Following the Chilean Presidential Election," CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, 7. September 1970)TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 442]
-10-I think the meeting of September 15th has to be seen in the context of two previous meetings of the 40 Committee on September 8th and September 14th in which the 40 Committee was asked to look at the pros and cons and the problems and prospects of a Chilean military coup to be organized with United States assistance.(Kissinger testimony, p. 5)According to the summary of the 40 Committee meeting on September 8, the following was discussed:...all concerned realized that previous plans for a Phase II would have to be drastically redrawn.... The DCI made the point, however, that congressional action against Allende was not likely to succeed and that once Allende was in office the Chilean opposition to him would disintegrate and collapse rapidly. While not advocating a specific course of action, the Director further observed that a military golpe against Allende would have very little chance of success unless undertaken soon. Both the Chairman and the Attorney General supported this view.... At the close of the...meeting the Chairman directed the Embassy to prepare a "cold-blooded assessment" of:1) the pros and cons and problems and prospects involved should a Chilean military coup be organized now with U.S. assistance, and2) the pros and cons and problems and prospects involved in organizing an effective future Chilean opposition to Allende.(CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970)Ambassador Korry responded to the 40 Committee's request for a "cold-blooded assessment" on September 12. He stated that "We /the Embassy/ believe it now clear that Chilean military will not, repeat not, move to prevent Allende's accession, barring unlikely situation of national chaos and widespread violence." The Ambassador went on to say that "Our own military people /are/ unanimous in rejecting possi-![TOP SECRET]