Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 86]
### PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGE, HENRY CABOTKENNEDY, JOHN F.KENNEDY, ROBERT F.DIEM, MC CONE, JOHN### DATES:5 or 6 Oct. 1963### CATEGORIES:![DIEMS TOP SECRET stamp]### OCCURRENCE:MC CONE recalled a meeting with President KENNEDY and Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY had with him on or about October 5 or 6, 1963. The Attorney General was rather non-committal in the meeting. He and I walked downstairs together, and he said, "John, are you sure you are right?" And I said, "I think I am" and he said "I'm rather surprised at the position you took." And I said, "well, you didn't disagree with it..." (T) This discussion had nothing to do with assassinations. This was whether we should let the coup go or use our influences not to. Then interestingly enough, the President sent a series of messages to CABOT LODGE urging that he'd do all that he could to get DIEM to change his ways. CABOT LODGE's first attempt failed and then he was called -- CABOT LODGE was called by DIEM's office and DIEM said, "you tell the President to tell me what he wants me to do and I'll do it." Unfortunately, the forces were surrounding the palace at that very moment and the coup was on. It was a kind of a dramatic little part of the history of that tragedy."### SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 6, 1975, McCone, pp. 63-64### STAFF:R. DAWSON### FILE:### DATE:29 June 1975### PERSONS/ENTITIES:KAHN, CONEIN, LODGE, TRUHART, WM.NGO DINH KAHNSMITH, DAVIDCOLBY, WILLIAM, MC CONE, JOHN### DATES:5-7 Oct. 1963### CATEGORIES:![DIEMS TOP SECRET stamp]### OCCURRENCE:COLBY testified as to the events surrounding the cable from Saigon of 5 October 1963 which reads as follows: "We do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon, or a protracted struggle which could rip the army and the country asunder." And the response on 6 October 1963 which COLBY wrote for MC CONE as follows: "MC CONE directs that you withdraw recommendation to Ambassador concerning assassination plan under MC CONE instructions as we cannot be in a position to actively condone such course of action thereby endangering our responsibility, therefore COLBY explained that this second message he drafted was to eliminate assassination as an alternative. COLBY stated that the assassination of DIEM's other brothers NHU and KAHN, NGO DINH KAHN, were to continue. A reply was sent on October 7 from Saigon in response to the MC CONE cable saying that action was taken as directed, meaning that the Ambassador had been so informed to withdraw the recommendation."### SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 12-17### STAFF:R. DAWSON### FILE:### DATE:29 June 1975
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 87]
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:MCCONE Oct 6, 1963 DIEMLODGESMITHOCCURRENCE:In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR73661of 6 Oct) the following appears: "... MCCONE directs that you withdraw recommendations from Ambassador (concerning assassignation plan) under MCCONE instructions as we can not be inposition actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefore."SOURCE: STAFF:IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 28 DawsonFILE: DATE:6/27/75PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:TRUEHART Oct 7, 1963 DIEMLODGEMCCONESMITHOCCURRENCE:In a response to the CIA cable of Oct. 6, 1963, to Saigon, the station in Saigon responded (SAIG1463 7 Oct): "Action taken as directed." In addition since DCM TRUEHART was also present when original recommendation was made, specific withdrawal recommendation at MCCONE's instruction was also conveyed to TRUEHART. Ambassador LODGE commented that he shares MCCONE'S opinion."SOURCE: STAFF:IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 29 DawsonFILE: DATE:6/27/75
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 88]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:BUNDYCOLBYJOHNSONKILPATRICKMCCONEDATES:10/8/63CATEGORIES:DIEMSPECIAL GROUPOCCURRENCE:On October 8, 1963 at a special group meeting the DCI expressed concern that there was a lack of intelligence coverage during the period when "the U.S. was maintaining a posture of almost no official contact at top levels." They refer to the fact that NHU and DIEM are not being contacted by Americans. Mr. MCCONE also referred to "theorientation of (Saigon) station functions." Mr. BUNDY pointed out that"for Americans to resume top level contacts at this time would appear to represent a political rapprochement. Ambassador LODGE might feel that this was running counter to his policy." The Group gave its approval to the basis realignment of station functions. (The nature of such functions are not outlined.)SOURCE:Minutes of Special Group Meeting Oct.17, 1963FILE:STAFF: KelleyDATE: 6/28/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:Tung, Col.   Smith, DavidPhillips, Rusus, AID Acting Chief of StationColby, William Sizgon after 10/5/63Richardson, John "Jocko"Aid to Diem RegimeDATES:Oct 8, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:On 8 September 1963, the CIA IG report reflects in a comment that the U.S. government publicly confirmed on Oct. 8, 1963 that aid had already been cut quitely and over a period of some months. Bill Colby, Jock Anderson and Dave Smith told us that the public announcement of the aid reduction was a signal to the general and that the reduction was planned with that in mind. It may be that the cut in aid was deliberately planned to spur the generals on, but if so, that intention did not find its way into the record. The nearest thing to it is in the record of a presidential meeting of 10 September 1963. The President asked Rufus Phillips of AID what specific actions Phillips recommended and he suggested "cutting aid to Colonel Tung which would be viewed by the generals with much enthusiasm as an indication of virgouous of American position." In general, ald cuts were discussed in terms of bring pressure on Diem to make needed changes in his regime. However planned, or however looked upon by the U. S. administration, it is clear that the Vietnamese considered the official confirmation of aid cut as a clear token of their support of coup planning.DTIC. IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 17-18STAFF: DawsonDATE:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 89]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:KENNEDY, JOHN F.RICHARDSON, JOHN6/27/75DATES:Oct. 9, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:On October 9, 1963 Presidential newsconference the President stated that "I know that the transfer of JOHN RICHARDSON, who is a very dedicated public servant, has led to surmises but I can assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out independent activities, but has operated under closecontrol of the Director of Central Intelligence operating under -- with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under my instructions."SOURCE:FILE: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32STAFF:DawsonDATE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGE, HENRY CABOTCOLBY, WILLIAMKENNEDY, JOHN F.DATES:Oct 9, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:In a CIA cable to Saigon of October 9, 1963, marked eyes only for Ambassador (DIR74228) which was originaed by WILLIAM COLBY thefollowing appears:"... while we do not wish to stimulate coup, we also do not wish to leave theimpression that U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regime and if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, insuring popular support to win war and improving working relationships with U.S." The cable urges that the contact with MINH press for "detail information clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success." The text states that these "additional general thoughts" have been discussed with the President and that the cable had been cleared with high officials at White House, State and Defense."SOURCE:STAFF:Dawson
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 90]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:KENNEDY, JOHN F.RICHARDSON, JOHNDATES:Oct. 9, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:On October 9, 1963 Presidential newsconference the President stated that "I know that the transfer of JOHN RICHARDSON, who is a very dedicated public servant, has led to surmises but I can assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out independent activities, but has operated under closecontrol of the Director of Central Intelligence operating under -- with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under my instructions."SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32STAFF:DawsonFILE:DATE:6/27/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGE, HENRY CABOT KENNEDY, JOHN F.MINH, GENERALDON, GENERALCOLBY, WILLIAMDATES:Oct 10, 1963Oct. 9,1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success. While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness in military effort...."SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32-33STAFF:DAWSON
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 91]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGE, HENRY CAPOTCOLBY, WILLIAMKENNEDY, JOHN F.DATES:Oct 9, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:In a CIA cable to Saigon of October 9, 1963, marked eyes only for Ambassador (DIR74228) which was originaed by WILLIAM COLBY thefollowing appears: "... while we do not wish to stimulate coup, we also do not wish to leave theimpression that U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regime and if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, insuring popular support to win war and improving working relationships with U.S." The cable urges that the contact with MINH press for "detail information clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success." The text states that these "additional general thoughts" have been discussed with the President and that the cable had been cleared with high officials at White House, State and Defense."SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32FILE:STAFF:DawsonDATE:6/27/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGE, HENRY CABOTKENNEDY, JOHN F.MINH, GENERALDON, GENERALCOLBY, WILLIAMDATES:Oct 10, 1963Oct. 9,1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success. While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness in military effort...."SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33STAFF:DAWSON
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 92]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:AMBASSADOR LODGEGEN. MINHGEN. DONOCCURRENCE:Ambassador Lodge instructs it to initiate contact with General Minh or General Don, but if the Generals initiate contact, such contacts were authorized; in the course of meetings with Don or Minh, assurances were to be given that the CIA will not thwart a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regime if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, assuring popular support to win the war, and improving working relations with the United States.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One, page 5.FILE:STAFF: DawsonDATE: 6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGE, HENRY CABOT KENNEDY, JOHN F.MINH, GENERALDON, GENERALCOLBY, WILLIAMOCCURRENCE:In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success. " While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness in military effort...."SOURCE: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33FILE:STAFF: DAWSONDATE: 6/27/75
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 93]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:Senate Foreign Relations CommitteeMCCONEOCCURRENCE:A briefing by MCCONE to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was noted that "we have not seen a successor government in the wings that we could say positively would be an improvement over DIEM. Therefore it has been our counsel to proceed cautionsly, otherwise the situation might flare up which might result in something of a civil war, and the Communists would come out the victor merely by sitting on the sidelines."SOURCE:IG Reprot 1967 (CIA) p. 33FILE:STAFF:DawsonDATE:6/27/75---PERSONS/ENTITIES:Senate Foreign Relations CommitteeMCCONEOCCURRENCE:A briefing by MCCONE to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was noted that "we have not seen a successor government in the wings that we could say positively would be an improvement over DIEM. Therefore it has been our counsel to proceed cautionsly, otherwise the situation might flare up which might result in something of a civil war, and the Communists would come out the victor merely by sitting on the sidelines."SOURCE:IG Reprot 1967 (CIA) p. 33FILE:STAFF:DawsonDATE:6/27/75---DATES:Oct 10,1963CATEGORIES:DIEMDATES:Oct 10,1963CATEGORIES:DIEM
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 94]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINGENERAL DONDIR/4228LODGE, HENRY CABOTDATES:Oct 23,1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:In a October 23, 1963 entry into the Saigon stations, "History of the Vietnamese Generals Coup", it was noted that a meeting with CONEIN requested by General DON, DON said the Generals had decided to try to stage a coup within a week following 26 October. CONEIN under instructions passed the substance of DIR74228 to DON. DON promised he would seek permission of the coup committee to give CONEIN their political plan for the Ambassador's eyes only.SOURCE:IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 33FILE:STAFF:DawsonDATE:6/27/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:Lt. Col. PHAM NGỌC THAODATES:Oct. 24, '63CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:![Top Secret stamp]A report was received at approximately 1230 hours that Lt. Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao was planning a coup scheduled for 1300 hours; the coup failed to materialize. Later, Thao admitted that the coup faltered because they lacked transportation, otherwise the coup would have begun as reported.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., June 20, 1975, Conein, Exhibit 1,page 7.STAFF:DawsonFILE:DATE:
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINAMBASSADOR LODGEONDATES:10/23/63CATEGORIES:DIEMCoasia anked why the groovals had not spoken to Ambasador Lodge at the 13 October receptios; Don stated that security sould nut permit na approach to the Ambresador since other washers of the OVH were present; Don promised he would awek permission of the coup compittee to give Cracin their political plan for the Ambassador's syos only and requested a aceting in downtown Saigon on 24 October.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 6.STAFF: DawsonDATE: 6/30/75FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:ONEIN'NERAL DONR74228DGE, HENRY CABOTDATES:Oct 23,1963CATEGORIES:DIEMa October 23, 1963 entry into the Saigon stations, "History of the Vietnamese Generals up", it was noted that a meeting with CONEIN requested by General DON, DON said the nerals had decided to try to stage a coup within a week following 26 October. CONEIN der instructions passed the substance of DIR74228 to DON. DON promised he would seek rmission of the coup committee to give CONEIN their political plan for the Ambassador's es only.SOURCE:STAFF:
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 96]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:DONConeinDATES:Oct. 23, '63CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:General Don requested Conein to meet him at JGSHeadquarters; Don stated the general officerscoup committee had decided to attempt to takeadvantage of the 26 October National Day in orderto stage a coup within a week; a member of GeneralDon's staff, Colonel Nguyen Khoung, had leaked toU.S. authorities that a coup was to occur on orabout 27 October; Khuong's overtures to the Americanshad reached the palace and as a result PresidentNhu had ordered the 5th and 7th Divisions, whichwere key elements in the Saigon area for the coupto go on extended operations outside Saigon;SOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, p. 6.STAFF:DawsonFILE:DATE:6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINR. HUANDATES:Oct. 23, '63CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:Doneluded to know the answers to previous questionswith respect to the USG attitude toward a coup;Conein, under instructions, told Don that the USGwould not thwart a change of government or denyassuring popular rapport to winthe war and improvingworking relations withContact Conein through Mr. Huan;SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, p. 6.STAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE:6/30/75
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PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:GEN. MINH 10/18/63 DIEMDONGEN. HARKINSCONEINOCCURRENCE:TOP SECRETFoth Generals Minh and Don promet interceptiongdion by General Harkins as well as sent otherARVN generals; though Ambassador talked with allgenerals, none mentioned Conein.SOURCE: STAFF:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, Dawsonpage 6.DATE: 6/30/75FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:11/1/6310/21/63TOP SECRETOCCURRENCE:In addition to the above maneuvering, Colonel Do Mau, former Brigadier General, Chief of Military Security Service, played an role by turning false military intelligence reports which went to President Diem. These reports started on or about 24 October and built up a picture of strong Viet Cong forces approaching Saigon for attack and permitted the Joint General Staff to issue appropriate orders, approved by the President, to move units favorable to the conspiracy to the outskirts of Saigon and also to move units, such as the Special Forces, away from Saigon.SOURCE: STAFF:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, Dawsonpages 13-14.FILE: DATE: 6/30/75
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 98]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:ConeinHuanGen. HarkinsAmbassador LodgeDATES:Oct. 17, '63CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: Conain and Huan held meeting which Huan conflrurd the fact that he attempting to contact and had a message from the generals. At a reception to be given 12 October by General Harkins for Ambassador Lodge, one of the generals would approach the Ambassador and ask the latter to vouch for Conein; if the Ambassador confirms that Conein is speaking with the Ambassador's authority, he should be prepared for a future meeting outside Saigon; Huan was only passing a message and did not elaborate further.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One, page 5-6.STAFF: DawsonDATE: 6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:LAM NGOC HUANAMBASSADOR LODGEDATES:Oct. 16, '63CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: Mr. Lam Ngoc Huan, Manager of Caravelle Hotel and former ARVN officer who was retired due to suspicions of involvement in November 1960 coup plot, approached an Embassy officer after a social event and stated he was trying to establish contact with a military officer designated by Ambassador Lodge to take part in confidential discussions. Huan claimed he was representing some Vietnamese generals and other officers who wanted to talk to an American military officer about the situation in South Vietnam.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One, Page 5.STAFF: Dawson
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 99]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINMC NAMARANGU YEN QUANGPHAM NGOC THAODATES:12 October 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: When CONEIN was asked to explain the reference to Secretary MC NAMARA at p. 5, Exhibit 1, he stated that there were different elements contacting the same group, i.e., NGU YEN and THAO. But did not explain the reference to MC NAMARA. p. 29TOP SECRETSOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinFILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:July 1, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:JAMBASSADOR LODGESECRETARY MACNAMARADATES:Oct. 12, '63CATEGORIES:DIEMTOP SECRETOCCURRENCE:Captain Nguyen Cang Nguyen, Chief of Operations, Armor Command, stated he was contacted by two different coup groups during the week of 5-12 October; the second group was headed by Lt. ColonelSOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One,STAFF:Dawson
[157-10014-10227.pdf — page 100]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINDONDATES:Oct. 24, '63CATEGORIES:DIEMTOP SECRETOCCURRENCE:Conein and Don met at 1230 hours; (a) Don did not receive permission from the coup committee to turn over the political plan; (b) Don had been authorized to outline the political thinking of the coup committee. (1) the succeeding-government would be civilian and no member of the coup committee would hold a senior position in the new government; (2) the new government would, as soon as possible, free non-communist political prisoners, hold free elections, and permit operation of opposition political parties except for the Viet Cong; (3) there will be complete freedom of religion andCON'T ON NEXTCARDSOURCE:Hearings, S.S.C.I., June 20, 1975, Conein,Exhibit One, page 7.STAFF: DawsonDATE: 6/30/75FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:Oct. 24, '63CATEGORIES:TOP SECRETOCCURRENCE:CONTINUATION OFLAST CARD:no favoritism or discrimination shown toward any creed; (a) the new government would be pro-West but not a pawn of the USG; (b) the new government would carry the war against the Viet Cong to a successful conclusion with Western, particularly USG, help; (c) Don said that Conein would be in close contact with coup headquarters to insure a close line of communication between the coup headquarters and the Ambassador; (d) Don stated that once the coup started, it would do no good for the USG to attempt to stop it; (e) Don was aware of coup plotting on the part of Lt. Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao; (f) the coup committee was in contactCON'T ON NEXTCARDSOURCE:STAFF:
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OCCURRENCE:TOP SECRETCONTINUATION OF LAST TWO CARDS:with Thao, but Thao does not have the necessary force to carry out his plan; (g) The generals' coup committee had come to the conclusion that the entire Ngo family had to be eliminated from the political scene in South Vietnam; (h) A new meeting was scheduled for 28 October.SOURCE: P. 7, cont'FILE:STAFF:DATE:
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:DONCONEINGEN. HARKINSDATES:10/24/63CATEGORIES:DIEMTOP SECRETOCCURRENCE: General Don's aide requested Conein to be at the VIP lounge at Saigon airport at 0615 hours; General Don told Conein that he had seen General Harkins the evening of 23 October and General Harkins informed him that the U.S. military would not thwart any plans of the generals; Don informed Conein that all plans were complete and had been checked and rechecked. The necessary military units were available and willing to join the coup; the 207935 would occur within the next week and in no case later than 2 November; Don requested a meeting that evening at a dentist's office in downtown Saigon.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., June 20, 1975, Conein, Exhibit oneSTAFF: DawsonFILE:DATE: 6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGE, HENRY CABOTHARKINSBUNDY, MC GEORGEGENERAL DONCONEINDATES:October 24, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: In a cable marked "eyes only" to LODGE and HARKINS from BUNDY dated October 24, CONEIN characterized this telegram as activating the disengagement between the U.S. government and DIEM. The text of that cable is as follows: "There may be danger. NHU attempting entrapment DON's approaches to CONEIN. Feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKINS can stand back from any non-essential involvement. It seems wise to maintain close control over meetings between DON and CONEIN." p. 33TOP SECRETSOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinSTAFF:R. DAWSON