Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 511]
TOP SECRETAs Director Colby testified before the Committee, the death ofa foreign leader is a risk forseeable in any coup attempt. Inthe cases we have considered, the risk of death was known invarying degrees. It was widely known that the dissidents inthe Dominican Republic intended to assassinate Trujillo; thecontemplation of coup leaders to assassinate Nhu, PresidentDiem's brother, was communicated to the upper levels of theUnited States Government; while the CIA and perhaps the WhiteHouse knew that the coup leaders in Chile planned to kidnapGeneral Schneider, it was not anticipated that he would be killed,although the possibility of his death should have been recognizedas a.forseeable risk of his kidnapping.4. The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived   to be of Crisis ProportionsThe Committee fully appreciates the importance ofevaluating the assassination plots in the historical contextwithin which they occurred. In the preface to this report, wedescribed the perception, generally shared within the UnitedStates during the depths of the Cold War, that the countryfaced a monolithic enemy in Communism. That attitude helpsexplain the assassination plots which we have reviewed,although it does not justify them. Those involved neverthe-less appeared to believe they were advancing the best inter-ests of their country.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 512]
5. American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions AboutTheir Ability to Control the Actions of Coup LeadersRunning throughout the cases considered in this report was the expectation of American officials that they could control the actions of dissident groups which they were supporting in foreign countries. Events demonstrated that the United States had no such power. This point is graphically demonstrated by cables exchanged shortly before the coup in Vietnam. Ambassador Lodge cabled Washington on October 30, 1963, that he was unable to halt a coup; a cable from Bundy in response stated that "We cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup." The coup took place three days later.Shortly after the experience of the Bay of Pigs, CIA headquarters requested operatives in the Dominican Republic to tell the dissidents to "turn off" the assassination attempt, because the United States was not prepared to "cope with the aftermath." The dissidents replied that the assassination was their affair and that it could not be turned off to suit the convenience of the United States Government.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 513]
TOP SECRET- 5 -6. CIA Officials Made Use of Known Underworld Figures in Assassination EffortsOfficials of the CIA made use of persons associated with the criminal underworld in attempting to achieve the assassination of Fidel Castro. These underworld figures were relied upon because it was believed that they had expertise and contacts that were not available to law-abiding citizens.Foreign citizens with criminal backgrounds were also used by the CIA in two other cases that we have reviewed. In the development of the Executive Action capability, one foreign national with a criminal background was used to "spot" other members of the European underworld who might be used by the CIA for a variety of purposes, including assassination if the need should arise. In the Lumumba case, two men with criminal backgrounds were used as field operatives by CIA officers in a volatile political situation in the Congo.B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves1. The United States Should Not Engage in AssassinationWe cannot condone the use of assassination as a tool of foreign policy. Aside from pragmatic arguments against the use of assassination supplied to the Committee by witnesses with extensive experience in covert operations, we find that assassination violates moral precepts fundamental to our way of life.NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 514
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 514]
TOP SECRET- 6 -In addition to considerations, there were several practical reasons advanced for not assassinating foreign leaders. These reasons are discussed in the section of this report recommending a statute making assassination a crime:a. **Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations Instigated by the United States and Support for Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow Local Governments**Two of the five principal cases investigated by the Committee involved plots to kill foreign leaders (Lumumba and Castro) that were instigated by American officials. Three of the cases (Trujillo, Diem, Schneider) involved killings in the course of coup attempts by local dissidents. These latter cases differed in the degree to which assassination was contemplated by the leaders of the coups and the degree to which United States officials motivated the coups.The Committee concludes that targeted assassinations instigated by the United States must be prohibited.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 515]
TOP SECCET- 7 -Coups involve varying degrees of risk of assassination. The possibility of assassination in coup attempts raises questions concerning the propriety of United States involvement in coups, particularly in those where the assassination of a foreign leader is a likely prospect.This country was created by violent revolt against a regime believed to be tyrannous, and our founding fathers (the local dissidents of that era) received aid from foreign countries. Given that history, we should not today rule out support for dissident groups seeking to overthrow tyrants. But passing beyond that principle, there remain serious questions: for example, whether the national interest of the United States is genuinely involved; whether any such support should be overt rather than covert; what tactics should be used; and how such actions should be authorized and controlled by the coordinate branches of government.The Committee believes that its recommendation on the question of covert actions in support of coups must await the Committee's final report which will be issued after a full review of .. covert action in general.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 516]
- 8 -b. The Setting In Which the Assassination PlotsOccurred Explains, But Does Not Justify ThemThe Cold War setting in which the assassination plots took place does not change our view that assassination is unacceptable in our society. In addition to the moral and practical problems discussed elsewhere, we find two principal defects in any contention that the tenor of the period justified the assassination plots:First, the assassination plots were not necessitated by imminent danger to the United States. Among the cases studied, Castro alone posed a threat to the United States, but then only during the period of the Cuban missile crisis. assassination had been planned by the CIA long before that crisis, and was not advanced by policymakers as a possible course of action during the crisis.Second, we reject absolutely any notion that the United States should justify its actions by the standards of totalitarians. Our standards must be higher, and this difference is what the struggle is all about. Of course, we must defend our democracy. But in defending it, we must resist undermining the very virtues we are defending.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 517]
TOP SECRET- 9 -Two documents which have been supplied to the Committee graphically demonstrate attitudes which can lead to tactics that erode and could ultimately destroy the very ideals we must defend.The first was written in 1954 by a special committee formed to advise the President on covert activities. The United States may, it said, have to adopt tactics "more ruthless than [those] employed by the enemy" in order to meet the threat from hostile nations. The report concluded that "long standing American concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered."*Although those proposals did not involve assassinations, the attitudes underlying them were, as Director Colby testified, indicative of the setting within which the assassination plots were conceived. (Colby, 6/4/75, p. 117)* The full text of the passage is as follows:> another important requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political, and paramilitary organization far more effective, more unique, and, if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy. No one should be permitted to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient, and secure accomplishment of this mission.The second consideration, it is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the U. S. is to survive, long standing American concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered.NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 518
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 518]
# TOP SECRET- 10 -We do not think that traditional American notions of fair play need be abandoned when dealing with our adversaries. It may well be ourselves that we injure most if we adopt tactics "more ruthless than the enemy".A second document which represents an attitude which we find improper was sent to the Congo in the fall of 1960 when the assassination of Patrice Lumumba was being considered. The chief of CIA's Africa Division recommended a particular agent -- WIROGUE -- becauseHe is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize all actions. (Memo dated / /60; Bissell Tr., 6/11/75, p. )The Committee finds this philosophy is not in keeping with the ideals of our nation.2. The United States Should Not Make Use of UnderworldFigures for Their Criminal TalentsWe conclude that agencies of the United States must not use underworld figures for their criminal talents* in carrying out their operations. In addition to the corrosive effect[^1]Pending our investigation of the use of informants by the FBI and other agencies, we reserve judgment on the use of known criminals as informants. We are concerned here only with the use of persons known to be actively engaged in criminal pursuits for their expertise in carrying out criminal acts.[^1]: *Pending our investigation of the use of informants by the FBI and other agencies, we reserve judgment on the use of known criminals as informants. We are concerned here only with the use of persons known to be actively engaged in criminal pursuits for their expertise in carrying out criminal acts.NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 519
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 519]
- 11 -upon our government,* the use of underworld figures involves the following dangers:a. The use of underworld figures for "dirty business" gives them the power to blackmail the government and to avoid prosecution, for past or future crimes. For example, the figures involved in the Castro assassination operation used their involvement with the CIA to avoid prosecution. The CIA also contemplated attempting to quash criminal charges against QJWIN in a foreign tribunal.b. The use of persons experienced in criminal techniques and prone to criminal behavior increases the likelihood that criminal acts will occur. Agents in the field are necessarily given broad discretion. But the risk of improper activities is increased when persons of criminal background are used, particularly when they are selected precisely to take advantage of their criminal skills or contacts.*The corrosive effect of dealing with underworld figures is graphically demonstrated by the fact that Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who had devoted much of his professional life to fight-ing organized crime, did not issue an order against cooperating with such persons when he learned in May 1961 that the CIA had made use of Sam Giancana in a sensitive operation in Cuba.In May 1962, when the Attorney General learned that the operation had involved assassination, he did, according to a CIA witness, inform those briefing him that underworld figures should not be used before checking with him first, but failed to direct that they must never be so used.
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 520]
- 12 -c. There is the danger that the United States Government will become an unwitting accomplice to criminal acts and that criminal figures will take advantage of their association with the government to advance their own projects and interests.d. There is a fundamental impropriety in selecting persons because they are skilled at performing deeds which the laws of our society forbid.The use of underworld figures by the United States Government for their criminal skills raises moral problems comparable to those recognized by Justice Brandeis in a different context five decades ago:Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means -- to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of the private criminal -- would bring terrible retribution. Against this pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face. Olmstead v. U. S., 277 U.S. 439, 485 (1927)
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 521]
- 13 -C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to the Issues of Authori-zation and ControlIn the introduction to this report, we set forth in summary form our major conclusions concerning whether the assassination plots were authorized. The ensuing discussion elaborates and explains those conclusions.The Committee analyzed the question of authorization for the assassination activities from two perspectives. First, the Committee examined whether officials in policymaking positions authorized or were aware of the assassination activities. Second, the Committee inquired whether the officials responsible for the operational details of the plots perceived that assassination had the approval of their superiors, or at least was the type of activity that their superiors would not disapprove.No doubt, the CIA's general efforts against the regimes discussed in this report were authorized at the highest levels of the government. But the record leaves serious
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 522]
doubt concerning whether assassination was authorized bythe *Administrations*. Even if the plots were not expresslyauthorized, it does not follow that the Agency personnelbelieved they were acting improperly.1.  The Command and Control System for Assassina-    tions Was Such That the Plots Could Have    Been Undertaken Without Express AuthorizationAs emphasized throughout this report, we areunable to draw firm conclusions concerning responsibilityfor the assassination plots. Even after our long investiga-tion, it is unclear whether the conflicting and inconclusivestate of the evidence is due to the system of plausibledenial and its attendant doctrines, or whether there werein fact serious shortcomings in the system of authorizationwhich made it possible for assassination efforts to havebeen undertaken by agencies of the United States Governmentwithout express authority from officials outside of thoseagencies.Our preeminent finding is that assassination could havebeen undertaken by an agency of the United States Governmentwithout it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 523]
# TOP SECRET-15-explicit authorization from the highest level. The command and control system revealed by the record might have made it possible for the CIA to have engaged in assassination activities without express authorization by officials outside the Agency.The ambiguity and imprecision in the record illustrates the dangers of a "plausible denial" system in which the precise level of authorization may be difficult to ascertain. While there is no evidence that the "plausible denial" system has succeeded in shielding decision makers in the cases considered in this report, the possibility that a system exists which might permit those responsible for authorizing major operations to escape responsibility is disturbing. Responsible government requires that public officials be held accountable for their decisions.2. Findings Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Were Authorizeda. DiemWe find that neither the President nor any other official in the United States Government authorized the assassination of Diem and his brother Nhu. Both the DCI and top State Department officials did know, however, that the death of Nhu at least at one point had been contemplated by the coup leaders. To the contrary, when the possibility that the coup leaders were considering assassination was brought to the
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 524]
# TOP SECRET-16-attention of the DCI, he directed that the United States would have no part in such activity, and this information was relayed to the coup leaders.## b. SchneiderWe find that neither the President nor any other official in the United States Government authorized the assassination of General Rene Schneider. The CIA, and perhaps the White House, did know that coup leaders contemplated kidnapping, which, as it turned out, resulted in Schneider's death.The Presidents and other senior officials in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations sought the overthrow of Trujillo and approved general actions to obtain that end.The DCI and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs knew that the Dominican dissidents intended to assassinate Trujillo, but the date at which the dissidents' intent to assassinate was communicated to higher levels of the government responsible for formulating policy is less clear. The record does establish that in the Spring of 1961 senior American officials, including the President, learned that the dissidents intended to assassinate Trujillo and that they desired machine guns for that purpose. The Special Group disapproved passage of those weapons and the President himself, in a telegram, reaffirmed that decision, indicating that the
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 525]
TOP SECRETUnited States "as (a) matter of general policy cannot condone assassination", although he did state that if the coup succeeded, the United States would support the plotters.d. LumumbaThe chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the assassination plot was authorized by the President. It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot.The juxtaposition of discussions concerning "disposing of" Lumumba and taking "straightforward action" against him at NSC and Special Group meetings with Dulles' cable to the Congo, Bissell's representation to Gottlieb about "highest authority", and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support an inference that the President and the Special Group urged the assassination of Lumumba.Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does, as he said, offer a "clue" about Presidential authorization which, however, should be read in light of the uncertain record of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary testimony of others in attendance at the meetings, including the President's national security advisors. The fact that both the Chief of Station and Gottlieb were under the impression that there was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 526]
## TOP SECRET-17A-this impression was derived solely from Gottlieb's meetings with Bissell and Tweedy. Neither Gottlieb nor the Chief of Station had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements about Presidential authorization. Richard Bissell assumed that such authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles, but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event when this occurred.The evidence leads us to conclude that DDP Bissell and DCI Dulles knew about and authorized the plot to assassinate Lumumba. However, we are unable to make a finding that President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute certainty in the evidence.STD?NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 527
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 527]
TOP SECRET-18-e. CastroThere was no evidence from which the Committee could conclude that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson, their close advisors, or the Special Group authorized the assassination of Castro.We find that the effort against Castro was clearly authorized through the level of DDP. It is not certain whether Allen Dulles knew about the plots, although Bissell and Edwards were of the opinion that he did, and the credibility of their beliefs is buttressed by the fact that Dulles knew about the Lumumba assassination plot, which was planned and attempted at the time of the early Castro plots. We can find no evidence that McCone was aware of the plots which occurred during his tenure. His DDP, Richard Helms, testified that he never discussed the subject with McCone and was never expressly authorized by anyone to assassinate Castro.The only suggestion of express Presidential authorization for the plots against Castro was Richard Bissell's opinion that Dulles would have circumlocutiously informed Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy after the assassination had been planned and was underway. The assumptions underlying this opinion are too attenuated for the Committee to adopt it as a finding.NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 528
[157-10014-10151.pdf — page 528]
First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plots, a matter which is not certain. Second, it assumes that Dulles went privately to the two Presidents--a course of action which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than Bissell, testified was precisely what the doctrine of plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing. Third, it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand from a "circumlocutious" description that assassination was being discussed.The chain of assumptions is far too speculative for the Committee to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not able to speak for themselves. Moreover, it is inconsistent with Bissell's other testimony that "formal and explicit" approval would be required for assassination,* and contrary to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy.* If the evidence concerning President Eisenhower's order to assassinate Lumumba is correct, it should be weighed against Bissell's testimony concerning circumlocutious briefings of the Presidents in the Castro case. First, the Lumumba case would imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously. Second, the Lumumba example indicates that the President would discuss such matters openly in an appropriate forum, and would not need to be approached privately. Third, it can be inferred from Bissell's testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had told Dulles that he approved of the plot, Dulles would not have told anyone else of that fact. Yet Gottlieb's testimony in the Lumumba case states that he had been told of Presidential autho- rization for assassination by Bissell, who in turn assumed he was told by Dulles.