Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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It is clear from the record, moreover, that the defeat at the Bay of Pigs had been regarded as a humiliation for the President personally and for the CIA institutionally.By July the Special Group had agreed that the basic objective "is to provide support to a U. S. program to develop opposition to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable to the U. S." (Memo for the Record, July 21, 1961.) Occasional harrassment operations were mounted during the summer but there was neither over- all strategy nor much activity.2. National Security Action Memorandum 100 of October 5, 1961, and the CIA Intelligence EstimateThe documentary evidence and testimony indicate that in the fall of 1961 the question of the effect of Castro's removal from power and the prospects in that event, for U. S. military intervention were considered by the Kennedy Administration.Two studies were prepared in this connection. Pursuant to National Security Action Memorandum 100 ("NSAM 100"), the State Department was asked to assess the potential courses of action open to the U. S. should Castro be removed from the Cuban scene, and to prepare a contingency plan with the Department of Defense for military intervention in that event. The CIA, prepared an "Intelligence Estimate" on the "situation and prospects" in Cuba. As discussed below, the evidence indicates that the focus of these studies was on the possible courses of action open to the U. S. in a post-Castro Cuba, rather than on the means that might bring about Castro's removal. However, it also appears that assassination was not excluded from the potential means by which Castro might be removed.NSAM 100On October 5, 1961, Bundy issued National Security Action Memorandum No. 100 ("NSAM 100") (Bundy, Ex 3) entitled "Contingency Planning for Cuba", NSAM 100 was addressed to the Secretary of State stated in full: "In confirmation of
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oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward*, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency.Related documents indicate that the subject matter of the contingency referred to in HSAM 100 was the "possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene". (Dundy Ex 3A, Minutes of Special Group Meeting, October 6, 1961, p. 1.)The Minutes of the Special Group meeting on October 6, 1961, (the day after the issuance of NSAM 100) state that the Group was told that in addition to an overall plan for Cuban covert operations," a contingency plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene" was in preparation. (Bundy, Ex 3A, Memorandum for the Record of Special Group meeting, October 6, 1961, p. 1.)In addition, a Memorandum for the Record by Parrott on October 5, 1961, states that Parrott informed Assistant Secretary Woodward's Deputy that "what was wanted was a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene". (Bundy, Ex 3B, p. 1.) Parrott's memorandum further stated that in preparing the plan, "the presence and positions of Raul (Castro) and Che Guevara must be taken into account", and that General Taylor had told Parrott he preferred "the President's interest in the matter not be mentioned" toto Woodward. (Bundy, Ex 3B.) Parrott's memorandum also stated that "on the covert side, I talked to Tracy Barnes in CIA and asked that an up-to-date report be furnished as soon as possible on what is going on and what is being planned". (Bundy, Ex 3B, p. 1.)*Woodward at that time was Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs.
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Testimony of BundyBundy testified that the contingency referred to in NSAM 100 and the related documents was "what would we do if Castro were no longer there", but that "clearly one of the possibilities would be assassination". (Bundy, p. 77.) However, Bundy emphasized that NSAM 100 represented an effort to assess the effect should Castro be removed from power by any means (including assassina-tion) but "without going further with the notion (of assassination) itself".*(Bundy, p. 77.)*"If people were suggesting this to you and you were curious about whether it was worth exploring, one way of getting more light on it without going any fur-. ther with that notion itself would be to ask political people, not intelligence people, what they thought would happen if Castro were not there any longer." (Bundy, p. .)
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Bundy further contended that the President was not considering an assassination, but rather "what are things going to be like after Castro." (Bundy, p. 81.)[^1]## Taylor's TestimonyTaylor testified that he had no recollection of NSAM 100 of the events described in the related documents set out above. (Taylor, p. 18.) On the basis of his review of the documents, Taylor testified that "it sounds like purely a political consideration of the sequence of power in Cuba."[^2] Taylor emphasized, moreover, that"never at any time" did he raise the question of of assassination with Parrott, or with anybody else. (Taylor, p. 19)## Parrott's TestimonyParrott, the Special Group Secretary who transmitted the request for the NSAM 100 study to the State Department, testified that the request for a plan reflected in his memorandum of October 5, 1961, and the reference in that memorandum to the "contingency that Castro would in some way or another be removed from the Cuban scene" (described above, p. 18), reflected interest in a contingency study for Castro's removal, but by means "short of being killed." (Parrott, p. 83)[^1]: *Thus, with respect to the desire not to indicate the President's interest in the plan requested from the State Department, Bundy testified:> "...it was precisely to insulate the President from any false inference that what he was asking about was assassination. It is easy to confuse the question, what are things going to be like after. Castro, with the other question, and we were trying to focus attention on the information he obviously wanted, which is, what would happen if we did do this sort of thing, and not get one into the frame of mind of thinking that he was considering doing it."> (Bundy, p. 81)[^2]: Taylor said he was puzzled by the wording of NSAM 100 and the related documents and stated, "I just cannot tie in the language here with a plausible explanation." (Taylor, p. 18)
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# The CIA's Intelligence EstimateThe CIA study in connection with the consideration of Castro's removal was an intelligence estimate prepared by the CIA's Board of National Estimates (which was not part of the CIA's covert action directorate), entitled "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba"*.The CIA Estimate was pessimistic regarding the chances for success of a Cuban internal revolt, and further found that a Castro assassina- tion would likely strengthen the Communist position in Cuba.After a general review of the economic, military, and political situation in Cuba, the CIA estimate concluded that the Castro regime had sufficient popular and repressive capabilities to cope with any internal threat. The concluding paragraph of the estimate was entitled "If Castro were to Die". It noted that:"llis (Castro's) loss now, by assassination or by natural causes, would have an unsettling effect, but would almost certainly not prove fatal to the regime...(I)ts principal surviving leaders would probably rally together in the face of a common danger." (Estimate, p. 9.)The CIA study further predicted that should Castro die, "some sort of power struggle would almost certainly develop eventually," but that whatever the outcome of such a struggle, the Communist Party's influence would be "significantly" increased.(Estimate, p. 9.)*The IG Report apparently refers to an earlier draft of this intelligence estimate. (IG, p. 4.) The IG Report, in reporting that many CIA officers interviewed in the IG investigation stressed the point that "elimination of the dominant figures in a government...will not necessarily cause the downfall of the government," stated:"This point was stressed with respect to Castro and Cuba in an internal CIA draft paper of October 1961, which was initiated in response to General Maxwell Taylor's desire for a contingency plan. The paper took the position that the demise of Fidel Castro, from whatever cause, would offer little opportunity for the liberation of Cuba from Communist and Soviet Bloc control." (IG, p. 4.) The CIA was unable to locate the draft paper referred to in the IG Report.**A cover memorandum by Lansdale transmitting the CIA estimate to Robert Kennedy stated that the estimate "seems to be the major evidence to be used to oppose your program" (referring to the proposed overall Mongoose operation). Lansdale's memorandum criticized the estimate's assessment that "it is highly improbable that an extensive popular uprising could be fomented" against Castro as a "conclusion of fact quite outside the area of intelligence." (Lansdale Memorandum to Robert Kennedy, 11/62, p.1) As discussed in detail at pp. below, Lansdale's basic concept for the Mongoose program was to overthrow Castro through an internal revolt of the Cuban people.
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At the close of the meeting, Robert Kennedy asked Szulc to meet with President Kennedy the following day (Szulc, p. 25). On November 9, 1961, Szulc, accompanied only by Goodwin, met with President Kennedy for over an hour in the Oval Office.* (Szulc, 6/10, p. 25.) Szulc recalled that the President discussed "a number of his views on Cuba in the wake of the Bay of Pigs, asked me a number of questions concerning my conversations with Premier Castro, and...what the United States could /or/ might do in...either a hostile way or in establishing some kind of a dialogue..." (Szulc, 6/10, pp. 25-26).Szulc testified that after this general discussion, the President then asked "what would you think if I ordered Castro to be assassinated.*/*/(Szulc, 6/10, p. 26; Szulc Notes of conversation with President Kennedy, November 9, 1961). Szulc testified that he replied that an assassination would not necessarily cause a change in the Cuban system, and that it was Szulc's personal view that the United States should not be party to murders and political assassinations. (Szulc, 6/10, p. 26). Szulc testified that[^1] */Goodwin testified that President Kennedy met frequently with members of the press and others who were experts in their fields, but that it was "possible" that the meeting with Szulc may have been an occasion for the President to consider Szulc for a position in the Administration (Goodwin, p. 29-30).On November 2, 1961 Goodwin had addressed an "eyes only" memorandum to the President and the Attorney General outlining a suggested organization for what became the Mongoose operation. Goodwin proposed five "staff components," including "intelligence collection," "guerrilla and underground," and "propaganda." The memorandum stated: "As for propaganda, I thought we might ask Tad Szulc to take a leave of absence from the Times and work on this one--although we should check with /USIA Director/ Ed Murrow and Dick Bissell." (Goodwin Ex. 2, p. 1, 2).[^2] */*/ Szulc made notes of the conversation with President Kennedy as soon as he returned to his office, based on his memory of the meeting. President Kennedy's question regarding a Castro assassination appears in quotation marks in Szulc's notes, which were made the same day from "reasonably fresh" memory. (Szulc, 6/10, p.30).
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3. Testimony of Szulc on President Kennedy's November 9, 1961 Question   Regarding a Possible Castro AssassinationTad Szulc testified that in a private meeting he had with President Kennedy on Novebmer 9, 1961, the President asked"Szulc what would you think if I ordered Castro to be assassinated," and said "I agree with you completely" when Szulc answered that a Castro assassination should be ruled out on both practical and moral grounds. Szulc further testified that President Kennedy went on "to make the point how strongly he and his brother felt that the United States for moral reasons" must not be involved in assassinations. (Szulc, p.27).In early November 1961 Szulc was asked by Richard Goodwin, the Special Assistant to President Kennedy, to meet with Attorney General Robert Kennedy on November 8, 1961, to discuss the situation in Cuba. The meeting was an "off-the-record" one which Szulc attended as a friend of Goodwin's and not as a reporter. (Szulc, p. 24.) During the meeting with Robert Kennedy, the discussion centered on "the situation in Cuba following the (Bay of Pigs) invasion (and) the pros and cons of some different possible actions by the U. S. in that context" (Szulc, p. 25).The subject of assassination was not mentioned during this meeting. (Szulc, p. 31.)*In November 1961 Tad Szulc was employed as a reporter in the Washington Bureau of the New York Times (Szulc, p. 24). Szulc had visited Cuba in May-June 1961, following the Bay of Pigs invasion. (Szulc, p. 24) During the course of that trip, Szulc had a "series of very long conversations with Castro". (Szulc, p. 24.)
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thereupon the President said, "I agree with you completely." Szulc stated further:"He /President Kennedy/ then went on for a few minutes to make the point how strongly he and his brother felt that the United States for moral reasons should never be in a situation of having recourse to assassination." (Szulc, p.27).Szulc's notes of the meeting with the President state:"JFK then said he was testing me, that he felt the same way -- he added 'I'm glad you feel the same way' -- because indeed U.S. morally must not be part /sic/ to assassinations."Szulc's notes of the conversation further state:"JFK said he raised question because he was under terrific pressure from advisers (think he said intelligence people, but not positive) to okay a Castro murder. sed /sic/ he was resisting pressures." (Szulc note of conversation with President Kennedy, November 9, 1961).Szulc stated, relying on his memory, that it is "possible" and he "believed" that President Kennedy used such words as "someone in the intelligence business," as the source of the pressure for a Castro assassination. (Szulc, 6/10, p. 29). The President did not identify the person or persons. (Szulc, 6/19, p. 27).If anyone was in fact putting pressure on the President, there was no other evidence on this point adduced before the Committee. This was particularly troublesome since everyone questioned by the Committee, both within and without the CIA, denied ever having discussed assassination with the President, let alone having pressured him.Testimony of Goodwin.Goodwin attended the November 9, 1961 meeting between President Kennedy and Szulc. (Goodwin, p. 3). Goodwin testified that, after asking Szulc for his reaction to a suggestion that Castro be assassinated,President Kennedy said "well, that's the kind of thing I'm never going to do." (Goodwin, p. 3).
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11Goodwin testified further that several days after the meeting with Szulc, Goodwin referred to the mention of assassination to Szulc, and President Kennedy said only "we can't get into that kind of thing, or we would all be targets". (Goodwin, p. 4, 11.)4. The Rejection of Assassination in President Kennedy's November 16, 1961 SpeechA few days after the meeting with Szulc and Goodwin, and some six weeks after the issuance of NSAM 100, President Kennedy delivered a speech at the University of Washington. In that public address, President Kennedy stated:"We cannot, as a free nation, compete with our adversaries in tactics of terror, assassination, false promises, counterfeit mobs and crises." (Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 724)We discuss in the next section the nature of the program which was initiated against the Castro regime at the end of November 1961 pursuant to President Kennedy's instruction, and which continued to the Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962.![top secret]
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## D. Operation Mongoose1.  The Creation of Operation Mongoose. In November 1962 the proposal for a major covert program to overthrow Castro was developed. Richard Goodwin, a special assistant to President Kennedy, and Edward Lansdale, a military officer with experience in counter-insurgency operations, played major staff roles in the creation of Mongoose. Both Goodwin and Lansdale worked closely with Robert Kennedy, who took an active interest in this preparatory stage and in the later conduct of Mongoose. On November 1, 1961, Goodwin advised the President that Robert Kennedy "would be the most effective commander" of the proposed operation. (Memorandum to the President, November 1, 1961, p. ). Lansdale, in a memorandum to Robert Kennedy on November 15, 1961, outlining the Mongoose proposal, stated that a "picture of the situation has emerged clearly enough to indicate what needs to be done and to support your sense of urgency concerning Cuba". (Memorandum, November 15, 1961, p. )At the end of the month, on November 30, 1962, President Kennedy issued a memorandum recording his decision to begin the Mongoose project--to "use our available assets . . to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime". (Lansdale Ex. 17, Memorandum to the Secretary of State, Defense, et al., November 30, 1961).![TOP SECRET stamp]Important organizational changes were made in establishing Operation MONGOOSE.a. The Special Group Augmented. A new control group, the Special Group Augmented, was put in charge of Operation MONGOOSE. The SGA consisted of the regular Special Group (i.e., Bundy, Johnson of State,
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Gilpatric of Defense, McCone of CIA, and Gen. Lemnitzer of the JointChiefs) plus Robert Kennedy and General Taylor. Also, SecretariesRusk and McNamara more frequently attended its meetings than they didthose of the Special Group itself.b. General Lansdale as the Chief of Operations of MONGOOSE.General Edward Lansdale was named the Chief of Operations of the MONGOOSEactivities by President Kennedy. Lansdale had developed a reputation inthe Philippines and Vietnam for having an ability to deal with revolu-tionary insurgencies in less developed countries. In addition, as aresult of the Bay of Pigs failure, President Kennedy distrusted the CIAand believed he required someone from outside the Agency to overseemajor covert action programs. Rather than appoint Robert Kennedy tohead Mongoose as proposed by Goodwin, President Kennedy gave Lansdalethe task of coordinating the CIA's Mongoose operations with those of theDepartments of State and Defense, and made General Taylor the Chairmanof the Special Group Augmented. However, Robert Kennedy did play an activerole in the Mongoose structure, unrelated to his position as Attorney General.c. CIA Organization for Mongoose. In late 1961 or early 1962, WilliamHarvey was put in charge of the CIA's Task Force W, the CIA arm for MongooseOperations. Task Force W operated under the Special Group Augmented and em-ployed some 400 people at CIA headquarters and at the Miami Station. McConeand Harvey were thereafter the principal CIA participants in Operation Mongoose.Helms attended only some 7 of 40 Mongoose meetings and testified that itwas fair to state that McCone and Harvey, rather than Helms, were principallyconcerned with Mongoose. Helms was, however, substantially involved in Mongooseand testified that he "was as interested" in Mongoose as Harvey and McCone were.(Helms, 7/18, p. 10)
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## 2. Lansdale's Theory and Objective for MongooseIn the fall of 1961, Lansdale had been asked by President Kennedy to examine the Administration's Cuba policy and to make recommendations. Lansdale testified that, in reporting his recommendations to President Kennedy, he emphasized that "Castro ... had aroused considerable affection for himself personally with the Cuban population...." (Lansdale, p. 4), and that the U.S. "should take a very different course" from the "harassment" operations that had been directed against Castro up to that time. (Lansdale, p.3). These prior U.S. operations were conceived and led by Americans, Lansdale informed the President. (Lansdale, p. 5). In contrast, Lansdale proposed that the U.S. work with all exiles, particularly professionals who had opposed Batista and then became disillusioned by Castro. (Lansdale, pp. 4, 10-11). Lansdale's ultimate objective was to have "the people themselves overthrow the Castro regime rather than U.S. engineered efforts from outside Cuba." (Lansdale, p. 41).Hence, after his appointment as Chief of Operations, Lansdale's concept for the MONGOOSE project emphasized as a first step the development of leadership elements, and "a very necessary political basis" among the Cubans opposed to Castro, before any large actions began. (Lansdale, p. 11). At the same time, Lansdale sought to develop "means to infiltrate Cuba successfully" and to organize "cells and activities inside Cuba ... who could work secretly and safely." (Lansdale, p. 11) Lansdale's plan was designed so as not to "arouse premature actions, not to bring great reprisals on the people, and abort any eventual success." (Lansdale, p. 11).[^1] As Lansdale described his "concept of operation" for Mongoose in a memorandum to the President on January 18, 1962, it was to "help the Cubans from within Cuba" to overthrow the Castro regime through a "revolt of the Cuban people." (Lansdale Ex. 3, p. 2).[^1]:
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## 3. Bissell's Testimony Concerning Presidential Instructions to Act More Vigorously, But That Assassination Was Not Included.Sometime in the early fall of 1961, Bissell was apparently called to the White House and was said to have been"chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime."This description comes from the testimony of Samuel Halpern, a middle-level CIA covert action officer, who said Bissell told him about the meeting, and directed him to come up with some plans. (Halpern, pp. 8, 36-37). Bissell said he did not remember that precise meeting but that he had been, in essence, told to "get off your ass about Cuba."(Bissell, 7/25/75, pp. 37-38).Bissell was asked whether he considered such an instruction to constitute authority for proceeding to assassinate Castro. He said it would not, and that "formal and explicit approval" would be required for assassination action (Id., 38-39).Bissell also testified that there was in fact no assassination activity between the pre-Bay of Pigs/Roselli operation and his departure from the Agency in February 1962.In late 1961 Halpern became Harvey's Executive Assistant on Task Force W, the CIA action arm of Operation Mongoose. He testified that he never heard of the Roselli assassination operation (Halpern pp. 15-16).![TOP SECRET]
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4. The January 19, 1962 Meeting at Which the Attorney General Was Quoted As Saying Cuba Should Have the "Top Priority" in the United States Government.On January 19, 1962, a meeting attended by Lansdale, probably Helms, Helms' Executive Assistant George McManus, and other representatives of the agencies involved in Mongoose, took place in Attorney General Kennedy's office.* (McManus, p. 6).Notes taken at the meeting by McManus contain the following passages:"Conclusion Overthrow of Castro is Possible""... 'a solution to the Cuban problem today carried top priority in U.S. Gov/ernmen/t. No time, money, effort -- or manpower is to be spared.'""Yesterday ... the President had indicated to him' that final chapter had not been written -- its got to be done and will be done."(McManus Ex. 1, Memorandum, January 19, 1962, p. 2). McManus stated that the words "the top priority in the U.S. Gov/ernmen/t -- no time, money, effort or manpower is to be spared" had been spoken by the Attorney General (McManus, pp. 8-9).![TOP SECRET]*/ Others who attended the meeting were Brig. Gen. Craig, representing the Joint Chiefs, Don Wilson of USIA, Major Patchell of the Secretary of Defense's office, and Frank Hand of CIA.