Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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Furthermore, Bundy testified that he was never told by anyone at any time that assassination efforts were being conducted against Castro (Bundy, p. 63). Bundy said that Richard Bissell never informed him about CIA involvement in assassination attempts against any foreign leader (Bundy, p. 41). Bundy acknowledged, however, that he had once been briefed by Richard Bissell on the development of an "executive action capability" at the CIA (see Section infra).*Walt Rostow, who shared national security duties with Bundy before moving to the Department of State, testified that during his entire tenure in government he "never heard a reference" to an intention to undertake an assassination effort (Rostow, pp. 10, 12-13, 38).Asked if he had ever been told anything about CIA efforts to assassinate Castro, Richard Goodwin, Assistant Special Counsel to the President, replied, '''No, I never heard of such a thing." (Goodwin, p. 13).*** As indicated further below, Bundy also said (i) that the matter of a Castro assassination was "mentioned from time to time ... as something to talk about rather than to consider." (Bundy, p. 73); and (ii) he had a "very vague, essentially refreshed recollection" that at some time he had heard about "poison" in connection with a "possibility of action in Cuba" -- what stuck in his mind was that it seemed "totally impractical because it was going to kill a large number of people in a headquarters mess or something like that." (Bundy, pp. 42-43). Bundy stated flatly, however, that no assassination plot was approved and that he was never informed about the various plots. (Bundy, pp. 54, 63-64).** As indicated below, Goodwin did on two occasions hear questions raised about assassination. One involved the President, who said he was opposed (see p. ); the other involved the meeting of August 10, 1962 (see pp. to ).
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Presidential Assistant Theodore Sorensen said that his "first-hand knowledge" of Cuban affairs was limited to the post-Bay of Pigs period (Sorensen, p. 4). Sorensen stated, however, that his general opinion based upon his close contact with President Kennedy, was that"such an act [as assassination) was totally foreign to his character and conscience, foreign to his fundamental reverence for human life and his respect for his adversaries, foreign to his insistence upon a moral dimension in U.S. foreign policy to his pragmatic recognition that so horrendous but inevitably counterproductive a precedent committed by a country whose own chief of state was inevitably vulnerable could only provoke reprisals and inflame hostility." (Sorensen, p. 5).Sorensen also said that President Kennedy "would not make major foreign policy decisions alone without the knowledge or participation of one or more of those senior foreign policy officials in whose judgment and discretion he had confidence." (Sorensen, pp. 5-6).Sorensen concluded his testimony by providing the Committee his judgment on the following question:"Q: Would you think it would be possible that ... the Agency, the CIA could somehow have been under the impression that they had a tacit authorization for assassination due to a circumspect discussion that might have taken place in any of these meetings?Sorensen: It is possible, indeed, I think the President on more than one occasion felt that Mr. Dulles, by making rather vague and sweeping references to particular countries was seeking tacit approval without ever asking for it, and the President was rather concerned that he was not being asked for explicit direction and was not being given explicit information, so it is possible. But on something of this kind, assassination, I would doubt it very much. Either you are for it or you are not for it, and he was not for it. (Sorensen, 7/21/75, pp. 32-33.)"
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Page 10d. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ASSASSINATION EFFORTS WERE DISCLOSEDIN VARIOUS BRIEFINGS OF ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS.(i) BRIEFING OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT.After the election, in the latter part of November, 1960, Dullesand Bissell jointly briefed President-elect Kennedy on "the most importantdetails with respect to the operation which became the Bay of Pigs." (Bissell,6/9/75, p. 34). Bissell testified that he did not believe the ongoing assass-ination efforts were mentioned to the President-elect, and that to the best ofhis recollection they were not. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 27, 35-36). Bissellsurmised that the reasons he and Dulles did not tell Kennedy at that initialmeeting were: (a) "apparently" they had not thought it was an importantmatter*; and (b) they would have thought that that was a matter of which heshould be advised upon assuming office rather than in advance." (Bissell,6/9/75, p. 35). The latter comment led to the following exchange:"The Chairman: Isn't it a strange distinctionthat you draw that on the one hand (as) a Presi-dential designate, as President-elect, he shouldhave all of the details concerning a planned in-vasion of Cuba, but that he should not be toldabout an ongoing attempt to assassinate FidelCastro?Mr. Bissell: I think that in hindsight it couldbe regarded as peculiar, yes."The Chairman: ...(I)t just seems too strangethat if you were charged with briefing the man who* This was subsequently repeated by Bissell in response to examination of  his assumption that Dulles probably told President Eisenhower about the assass-  ination operation:"...the Mafia operation was not regarded as ofenormous importance and there were much moreimportant matters to talk about with thePresident." (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 25).
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# Page 11was to become President of the U.S. on matters so important as a planned invasion of a neighboring country, and that if you knew at the time in addition to the planned invasion there was an ongoing attempt to assassinate the leader of that country, that you would tell Mr. Kennedy about one matter and not the other.'"Mr. Bissell: Well, Mr. Chairman, it is quite possible that Mr. Dulles did say something about an attempt to or the possibility of making use of syndicate characters for this purpose. I do not remember his doing so at that briefing. My belief is that had he done so, he probably would have done so in rather general terms and that neither of us was in a position to go into detail on the matter. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 35).However, Bissell also testified generally that pursuant to the doctrine of plausible denial, efforts were made to keep matters that might be "embarrassing" away from Presidents (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 5-6).## (ii) DISCUSSION WITH BUNDY ON "EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY"As explained in the next section, sometime during the early period of the Kennedy Administration, Bissell discussed with Bundy the subject of a "capability" for "executive action" a term said by Bissell to include various means of "eliminating the effectiveness" of foreign leaders up to and including assassinations (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 32).There is some dispute concerning when this occurred and who initiated it, and this subject is discussed at length at Section , infra.Bissell and Bundy both testified, however, that Bissell did not tell Bundy in the course of discussing the executive action capability or at any other time of the actual assassination plots against Castro (Bissell, 7/22, p. 31; Bundy, p. 41). (However, there was some testimony that the names of Castro, Trujillo, and Lumumba might have been mentioned in connection
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Page 12with the discussion of "research" into the capability. (Bissell, 6/11/75,pp. 50-51)).(iii) TAYLOR/KENNEDY BAY OF PIGS INQUIRYFollowing the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedyconvened a "board of inquiry" which reviewed "the causes of... [the] failure"of the operation (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 42,45). The members of the board wereRobert Kennedy, General Maxwell Taylor, Allen Dulles and Admiral Arleigh Burke.The panel examined the Bay of Pigs failure for several weeks and issued itsreport on June 13, 1961. The "Taylor Report" does not mention the assassinationplots.Bissell was questioned extensively and appeared to General Taylor to havebeen the principal person involved in the operation and much more knowledgeablethan Dulles who had deliberately kept himself out of the planning and delegatedresponsibility to Bissell. (Taylor, p. 73).Bissell testified that he did not disclose to the Taylor/Kennedy Committeethat there had been an assassination effort against Castro (Bissell, 6/9/75,p. 42). He put forward several reasons for not having done so. First, "thequestion was never asked." Second, he claimed Dulles already knew about theoperation. Third, Bissell said "by that time the assassination attempt had beencalled off." Fourth, he contended that the assassination effort was "not germane"because it did not contribute to the failure of the Bay of Pigs. (Bissell,6/9/75, pp. 44-46; 6/11/75, p. 39).Bissell hastened to add that he had no reason to believe" that Allen Dulles,himself a board member, did not discuss the plots with one or more members(Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 46).
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Page 13However, both General Taylor and Admiral Burke stated that neither Bissell nor Dulles informed them of the assassination plots (Taylor, pp. 72-73; Burke affidavit, 8/25/75, p. 3).When asked if Richard Bissell ever informed him that underworld figures had been offered a large sum to assassinate Castro, General Taylor responded, "No, I never heard that, and it amazes me" (Taylor, p. 72). Taylor said that during his review of the Bay of Pigs operation no mention was made of an assassination effort against Castro (Taylor, p. 72). Despite the fact that Dulles met with Taylor on the Board of Inquiry thirty or forty times, Taylor testified that Dulles never told him about the plot (Taylor, p. 73).(iv) MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERALBissell's testimony that he had not disclosed assassination plots to the Kennedy/Taylor "court of inquiry" was consistent with his statement that"I have no knowledge that Robert Kennedy was advised of this (the plot to kill Mr. Castro)."(Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 41).The Committee tested this statement against other parts of Bissell's testimony. An attachment to the May 22, 1961 FBI memorandum (regarding the Las Vegas tap) which Director Hoover had sent to the Attorney General* had quoted Edwards as saying that Bissell in "recent briefings" of Taylor and Kennedy,"told the Attorney General that some of the associated planning included the use of Giancana and the underworld against Castro."(Bissell, 7/17/75, Ex. 3).When first shown this document, Bissell said,* A handwritten note from the Attorney General to his assistant on the face of the memorandum indicates that he had actually seen the document. This memorandum is discussed in detail at Section, infra.NW 50955 DocId:32423539 Page 131
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Page 14"I have no recollection of briefing those two gentlemen except as members of the Board of Inquiry that I have described, of which Allen Dulles himself was a member." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 27).As mentioned above (Section (e), supra), Bissell testified that his briefings to the Board of Inquiry did not deal with assassination efforts. (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 45-46).Discussing the document in a subsequent appearance before the Committee, Bissell again said that he had no recollection of any such conversation (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 56) but he was sure that it did not take place in front of the Kennedy/Taylor board of inquiry (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 64).However, Bissell speculated, the report quoted language which "I might very well have used, that is, the use of the underworld against Castro." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 21).The examination of Bissell on whether he had had any such discussion and, if so, why he used such obscure and indirect language, elicited the following testimony:"Q: Did you, sometime in May of 1961 communicate the state of your awareness to the Attorney General in your briefing to him?Bissell: Well, there is a report which I was shown, I think it was last week, I believe it also came from the FBI, but I could be wrong about that, or indicating that I did, at that time in May, brief the Attorney General, and I think General Taylor to the effect that the Agency had been using -- I don't know whether Giancana was mentioned by name, but in effect, the Underworld against the Castro regime.Q: Did you tell them -- them being the Attorney General and General Taylor -- that this use included actual attempts to assassinate Mr. Castro?"
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Page 15"Bissell: I have no idea whether I did [.] I have no idea of the wording. I think it might quite possibly have been left in the more general terms of using the underworld against the Castro regime, or the leadership of the Castro regime.Q. Mr. Bissell, given the state of your knowledge at that time, wouldn't that have been deliberately misleading information?Bissell: I don't think it would have been. We were indeed doing precisely that. We were trying to use elements of the underworld against Castro and the Cuban leadership.Q. But you had information, didn't you, that you were, in fact, trying to kill him?Bissell: I think that is a way of using these people against him.Q. That's incredible. You're saying that in briefing the Attorney General you are telling him you are using the underworld against Castro, and you intended that to mean, Mr. Attorney General, we are trying to kill him?Bissell: I thought it signalled just exactly that to the Attorney General, I'm sure.Q. Then it's your belief that you communicated to the Attorney General that you were, in fact, trying to kill Castro?Bissell: I think it is best to rest on that report we do have, which is from a source over which I had no influence and it does use the phrase I have quoted here. Now you can surmise and I can surmise as to just whattthe Attorney General would have read into that phrase." (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 53-54).Bissell then testified:
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"Q. Was it your intent to circumlocutiously or otherwise, to advise the Attorney General that you were in the process of trying to kill Castro?Mr. Bissell: (U)nless I remembered the conversation at the time, which I don't, I don't have any recollection as to whether that was my intent or not." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 56).Bissell proceeded to speculate that a "proper" briefing might not have included any reference to the assassination plot. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 59). He gave two reasons for this speculation: (i) even if he had "thoroughly briefed" the Attorney General he would have chosen "circumlocutious" language to tell him about the activity involving Giancana. (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 53-56); and (ii) the assassination effort had been "stood down by then." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 59). Bissell concluded by reiterating that he had "no knowledge" that the Attorney General was "specifically advised" of the assassination plot against Castro (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 62).*e. CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND GEORGE SMATHERSGeorge Smathers, former U.S. Senator from Florida, testified that the subject of the possible assassination of Castro arose in a conversation between Smathers and President Kennedy on the White House lawn in 1961.** Smathers* If the FBI quotation of Edwards is to be accorded significant weight, then it is important to note that another section of it contradicts Bissell's assumption that Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy had been circumlocutiously advised by Dulles of the assassination plot. Edwards told the FBI that "Allen Dulles was completely unaware of Edwards' contact with Maheu" in connection with Cuban operations.Bissell's explanation for Edwards' statement was that Edwards was being "protective" of the DCI. (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 20). But this testimony must be reconciled with Bissell's previous testimony that Dulles knew of the operation and probably would have told the President about it.** Smathers' testimony about this conversation referred to the transcript of an Oral History interview, conducted on March 31, 1964, in which his testimony was based gives an indication that the conversation transpired in 1961, before the Bay of Pigs invasion in mid-April.It appears from the White House logs of Presidential meetings that there were only two occasions in 1961 when Senator Smathers met with the President alone for as much as twenty minutes. Both of those meetings took place in March. (Supra, p. ).
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rage 17said he discussed the general Cuban situation with the President many times(Smathers, p. 6). Smathers had many Cuban constituents, was familiar withLatin American affairs, and was a long-time friend of the President (Smathers,p. 6).Smathers had the "impression" that the President raised the subject ofassassination with him because someone "had apparently discussed this andother possibilities with respect to Cuba" with the President (Smathers, pp.16, 25). Smathers had no direct knowledge of any such discussion, nor did heknow who might have been involved (Smathers, pp. 18-19, 25). The Presidentdid not indicate directly that assassination had been proposed to him (Smathers,p. 18).According to Smathers:"... [President Kennedy] asked me what reactionI thought there would be throughout SouthAmerica were Fidel Castro to be assassinated...I told the President that even as much as I dis-liked Fidel Castro that I did not think it wouldbe a good idea for there to be even consideredan assassination of Fidel Castro, and the Pres-ident of the United States completely agreed withme, that it would be a very unwise thing to do,the reason obviously being that no matter who didit and no matter how it was done and no matterwhat, that the United States would receive fullcredit for it, and the President receive fullcredit for it, and it would work to his greatdisadvantage with all of the other countries inCentral and South America... I disapproved of it,and he completely disapproved of the idea."(Smathers, p. 22).Smathers further testified that he had said the reason it would work to "greatdisadvantage" with the nations of Central and South America was because they wouldblame the United States for any assassination of Castro (Smathers, p. 6).
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Page 18Smathers said that on a later occasion he tried to raise the subject of "Cuba and what could be done" with President Kennedy (Smathers, p. 22). The President made it clear to Smathers that he should not raise the subject with him again.*Senator Smathers concluded his testimony by indicating that on Cuban affairs in general, he felt he was "taking a tougher stance than was the President" (Smathers, p. 24). But Smathers said that he disapproved of even thinking about assassinating Castro and said he was "positive" that Kennedy also opposed it (Smathers, p. 16).* One night at dinner with Senator Smathers, the President emphasized his point by cracking his plate at the mention of Cuba. (Smathers, p. 22).
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# Kennedy Administration -- The Question of Authorization Outside the Agency During the Post Bay of Pigs, Mongoose, and 1963 PeriodsThis section discusses the question of authorization outside the Agency for the assassination plots during 1962 and 1963 -- the period of Operation Mongoose (the 1962 Kennedy Administration program aimed at overthrowing Castro by an internal revolt), the Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962, and the subsequent program in 1963 which saw a more limited covert action program directed against Cuba.## Recap of the Assassination Activity After the Bay of PigsDuring 1962 and 1963 there were three principal assassination plots.1. In the spring of 1962, William Harvey reactivated the contact with John Roselli and in April provided lethal pills and guns to Roselli and Cuban associates in Miami. In May it was reported that the pills reached Cuba.2. In early 1963, the *science fiction schemes* -- exploding sea shell and poisoned diving suit -- were contrived and then abandoned.3. In November 1963 the dissident Cuban who was code-named AMLASH was given a poison pen device.## The Issue of AuthorityThe fundamental issue dealt with in this section is whether the above assassination plots were authorized outside the Agency. The issue arises from *the differing perceptions* of Helms and his subordinates, on the one hand, and members of the Kennedy Administration, including the Director of the CIA, on the other hand.While Helms stated that he never received a direct order to assassinate Castro, Helms testified that he fully believed that the CIA was at all times acting within the scope of its authority and that he believed a Castro assassination came within the bounds of the Kennedy Administration's effort to overthrow Castro and his regime. Helms stated that he never informed McCone or any officials of the Kennedy
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Administration of the assassination plots. On the other hand, McCone and the sur-viving members of the Kennedy Administration testified that they did not believe a Castro assassination was permissible without a direct order, that assassination was not within the parameters of the Administration's anti-Castro program, and testified that to their knowledge no such direct order was given to Helms.Before setting out the testimony in detail, we discuss below the Kennedy Administration's 1962 covert action program, Operation Mongoose (as well as the events in 1961 leading to that program) which was designed to overthrow the Castro regime. An understanding of that program is essential to an evaluation of the testimony on the issue of authorization.C. Events From the Bay of Pigs to the Establishment of Mongoose1. The Taylor ReviewOn April 22, 1961, following the Bay of Pigs failure, the President requested General Maxwell Taylor to conduct a re-evaluation of "our practices and pro-grams in the areas of military and paramilitary, guerilla and anti-guerilla activity which fall short of outright war." The President hoped that Taylor would give special attention to Cuba. (Letter to Maxwell Taylor, April 22, 1961) Robert Kennedy was to be Taylor's principal colleague in this effort.The resulting review of the U.S. policy in this area concluded:"We have been struck with the general feeling that there can be no long-term living with Castro as a neighbor. His continued presence within the hemispheric community as a dangerously effective exponent of Communism and Anti-Americanism constitutes a real menace capable of eventually overthrowing the elected governments in any one or more of weak Latin American republics."***"It is recommended that the Cuban situation be reappraised in the light of all presently known factors and new guidance be provided for political, military, economic and propaganda action against Castro." (Report to the President, June 13, 1961, memorandum No. 4, p. 8)