Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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(13 October) This Viaux kidnapping of Schneider was reported by the Sta-tion "as part of a coup that included Valenzuela." (Station 529, 13 October)At about this time the Station began to receive encouragement from itsother contacts. On October 14, ten days before the Chilean Congress wasto vote, the Task Force Log concluded:Now we are beginning to see signs of increasingcoup activity from other military quarters,specifically, an Army General (name deleted),Admiral Tirado, the forces in Concepcion andValdivis and perhaps even Frei and Ossa.(Task Force Log, 14 October)C. October 15 DecisionTo summarize, by October 15, General Viaux had advertised to his con-tact a desire to proceed with a coup, had indicated he would deal withthe Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once with Gen-erals Huerta and Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans.[^1]On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met Henry Kissinger and AlexanderHaig at the White House to discuss the situation in Chile. Accordingto the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessines "provided a run-down on Viaux, the Canales meeting with Tirado, and, in some detail,the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint."(Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 15 October1970) A decision was made at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot,at least temporarily:"[^1]: The reason for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of a cablefrom Santiago to Headquarters:We discount Viaux's statement that he had called off his coup at-tempt because of False Flag Officer's impending visit. Other re-porting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move thisweekend. (Santiago 499, 10 October)There is also reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumentalin persuading Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile Task Force Log:Station reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela metwith General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to at-tempt a coup." (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October)
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-35-It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence the message should state: "We have reviewed your plans and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities in the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support." (15 October Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig)The meeting concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr.Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply."*The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White House meeting to the Station in Santiago:2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup....We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource.3. After the most careful consideration it was determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out by him alone with the forces now at his disposal would fail. Thus it would be counterproductive to our Track Two objectives. It was decided that CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against precipitate action. (Headquarters 802, 16 October)The message was supplemented by orders to "continue to encourage him (Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with other coup planners." (Headquarters 802, 16 October) The message concluded: "There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Tirado, Canales, Valenzuela *et al* and we wish them optimum good fortune." (Ibid.)* Secretary Kissinger's recollection of the October 15 meeting is not in accord with that of Mr. Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802) that was sent the following day to the Station in Santiago. This matter will be discussed in Part V of this report.
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# D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15The decision to "de-fuse" General Viaux was passed to Viaux's father-in-law on October 17. The in-law responded that it did not matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case. (Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final meeting of the CIA "False Flagger" and Viaux's father-in-law on October 18, the Agency was informed that the coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduction of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come." (Santiago 568, 19 October) An "emergency channel" of communication with Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, page 21)As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military contacts.As a CIA overview statement in Track II stated:Coup possibilities afforded by the activeduty military group led by General Valenzuelaand Admiral Tirado had always seemed morepromising than the capabilities of the Viauxgroup. These military officers had the abil-ity and resources to act providing they de-cided to move and organized themselves ac-cordingly.(CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate fromthe President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5)By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in this direction.On the evening of October 17, Colonel Wimert met with the Army Lt. Colonel and the Navy Captain. They requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades,[^1][^1]: Two coup plotters, Generals Canales and Garin, made one last attempt to persuade General Schneider to change his anti-coup'position on October 15. The Station reported that the meeting turned out to be a "complete fiasco. Schneider refused to listen to General Canales' eloquent presentation of Communist action in Chile...and adament in maintaining his non-involvement stance." (Santiago 548, 16 October)
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three 45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition. The NavyCaptain said he had three machine guns himself "but can be identifiedby serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore unable touse them." (Santiago 562, 18 October) Colonel Wimert and the Chiefof Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine gunsfor self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms wereintended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of General Schneider.The fact that the weapons were provided the Lt. Colonel and the NavyCaptain and that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killingsuggests that the guns were not involved.The machine guns and ammunition were sent from Washington by diplo-matic pouch on the morning of October 19, although Headquarters waspuzzled about their purpose: "Will continue make effort provide thembut find our credulity stretched by Navy Captain leading his troopswith sterile guns. What is special purpose for these guns? We willtry send them whether you can provide explanation or not." (Headquarters854, 18 October) The first installment was delivered to the Army Lt.Colonel and the Navy Captain late in the evening of October 18 and con-sisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally for Viaux.[^1][^1]: As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup inChile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela, et. al.--rather than Viaux. An example of this shift in focus was the decision toprovide the Army Lt. Colonel and the Army Captain the tear gas grenadesoriginally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the purpose ofthis action:Station plans give six tear gas grenades toColonel Wimert for delivery to Armed Forcesofficers (deletion) instead of having FalseFlag Officer deliver them to Viaux group.Our reasoning is that Wimert dealing withactive duty officers. Also False Flaggerleaving evening 18 October, and will not bereplaced but Wimert will stay here. Henceimportant that Wimert credibility with ArmedForces officers be strengthened.(Santiago 562, 18 October)
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-38-That same day, General Valenzuela informed Colonel Wimert that he, General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General were prepared to sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of General Schneider on the following evening, October 19, at a military dinner being given for Schneider,* after which Schneider would be flown to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, Admiral Tirado would head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to the kidnapping of Schneider, the cable reports:General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation but not directly involved. He has been sent to Vina to stay with prominent physician. Will be seen in public places during 19 and 20 October to demonstrate fact that above operation not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of week. Military will not admit involve- ment in Schneider's abduction which is to be blamed on leftists. (Santiago 566, 19 October)The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneider left in a private vehicle, rather than in his official car, and his police guard failed to be withdrawn, but the Army Lt. Colonel assured Colonel Wimert that another attempt would be made on October 20. (Santiago 582, 20 October)Colonel Wimert was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 "which was the price agreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors."* The "False Flag Officer" who was in contact with Viaux at the time the Valenzuela plan was given to Colonel Wimert apparently understood that Viaux was involved in the October 19 attempt. He stated:Q. Were you told any of the details of how the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out?Mr. Sarno. They indicated it was going to be at some sort of a banquet which the General (Schneider) would be attending. (Sarno testimony, p. 37)
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but Wimert insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid the money. (Task Force Log, 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuela assured Colonel Wimert that the military was now prepared to move. (Task Force Log, 20 October) The second abduction attempt on the 20th also failed and the Task Force concludedSince Valenzuela's group is apparently having considerable difficulty executing even the first step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup succeeding or even occurring before 24 October now appears remote. (Task Force Log, 22 October)E. ## The Killing of General SchneiderIn the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am), Colonel Wimert delivered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Army Lt. Colonel in an isolated section of Santiago.**Although Colonel Wimert's testimony and the cable traffic do not clearly establish the identity of the group to which the Lt. Colonel was affiliated (see page 31) two CIA statements on Track II tie the weapons, and therefore the Lt. Colonel, to the Valenzuela group:...The only assistance requested by Valenzuela to set the plan /of October 19/ into motion through Schneider's abduction was several sub-machine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus $50,000 for expenses (which was to be passed upon demand.(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, p. 22)...Three sub-machine guns, together with six gas cannisters and masks, were passed to the Valenzuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason why they still wanted the weapons was because there were two days remaining before the Congress decided the Presidential election and the Valenzuela group maintained some hope they could still carry out their plans.(CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," p. 7, July 15, 1975)
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At about 7 am that day the group that intended to kidnap General Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider killing, neither the Army Lt. Colonel nor the Navy Captain were there. Shortly after 8 am, General Schneider's car was intercepted, on his way to work, by the abductorsand he was mortally wounded when he drew his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that hand guns had been used to kill General Schneider, although it also found that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing.[^1]The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said "Military Mission sources claim General Schneider machine gunned on way to work" (Santiago 587, 22 October) and "Assailants used grease guns." (Santiago 589, 22 October). The submachine guns had previously been described as "grease guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Station was that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered several hours earlier to the Army Lt. Colonel. Santiago then informed Headquarters "Station has instructed Col. Wimert to hand over $50,000 if Gen. Valenzuela requests " (Santiago 592, 22 October), thus indicating that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valen- zuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled Headquarters:[^1]: * The Military Court determined that those who participated in the shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led conspiracy. The Court also found that this same group had participated in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts.In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the plot culminating in the death of General Schneider. He received a 20-year prison sentence for being "author of the crime of kidnapping which re- sulted in serious injury to the victim," and a five-year exile for con- spiring to cause a military coup. Also convicted on the latter charge were Generals Valenzuela and Tirado. They received sentences of three years in exile.
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-41-Station unaware if assassination was premeditated or whether it constituted bungled abduction attempt. In any case, it important to bear in mind that move against Schneider was conceived by and executed at behest of senior Armed Forces officers. We know that General Valenzuela was involved. We also near certain that Admiral Tirado, Army Lt. Colonel and Navy Captain witting and involved. We have reason for believeing that General Viaux and numerous associates fully clued in, but cannot prove or disprove that execution or attempt against Schneider was entrusted to elements linked with Viaux. Important factor to bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and not retired officers or extreme rightests, set Schneider up for execution or abduction.... All we can say is that attempt against Schneid is affording Armed Forces one last opportunity to prevent Allende's election if they are will to follow Valenzuela's scenario..(Santiago 598, 22 October)Although itprediction of (an abduction atconstitutional:Dr. Allende wa:died the next (F. Post October 22 EventsThe shooting of General Schneider resulted immediate]tion of martial law, the appointment of General Prats toas Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Val uelof Santiago province. These measures, and others taken,Task Force to make the following initial judgment:With only 24 hours remaining before the Congre runoff, a coup climate exists in Chile....The on General Schneider has produced developments closely follow Valenzuela's plan....Consequent plotters' positions have been enhanced.(Chile Task Force Log, 22 OctobOn October 23, Director Helms reviewed and discussedIt was agreed...that a maximum effort has beer and that now only the Chileans themselves can successful coup. The Chileans have been guide point where a military solution is at least of them.(Task Force Log, 24 Octob
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-42-Although it was not immediately clear to CIA observers, the Station's prediction of October 9 that the shooting of Schneider (as a result of an abduction attempt) would "rally the Army firmly behind the flag of constitutionalism" was correct. (Santiago 495, 9 October) On October 24 Dr. Allende was confirmed by the Chilean Congress. General Schneider died the next day.
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V. CIA/White House Communication During Track IIThe testimony given to the Committee by Henry Kissinger and General Haig conflicts with that given by CIA officials.Kissinger and Haig testified that on October 15, 1970, the White House stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile. Both testified that after that date they were neither informed of, nor authorized, CIA Track II activities, including the kidnap plans of General Schneider and the passage of weapons to the military plotters.By contrast, CIA officials testified that they operated before and after October 15 with the knowledge and approval of the White House.The conflict pertains directly to the period after October 15, but it bears on the degree of communication between the White House and the CIA in the earlier period as well. For instance, Henry Kissinger testified that he was informed of *no coup plan* which began with the abduction of General Schneider. He was aware of General Viaux's plan--which he and Karamessines decided on October 15 to try to forestall--but did not know that it was to begin with Schneider's abduction.CIA officials, especially Thomas Karamessines, stated that there was close consultation throughout Track II between the Agency and the White House. Karamessines testified that he met with Kissinger some six to ten times during the five weeks of Track II (Karamessines testimony, page 66); and that he kept Kissinger generally informed of developments. (Ibid., page 56) The Committee has records of two meetings between Karamessines and Kissinger and of one telephone conversation between Karamessines and Kissinger's deputy, General Alexander Haig. Karamessines' daily calendar indicates that three other meetings with General Haig took place--but does not establish with certainty that the topic was
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# A. September## September 18Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House. As Helms' notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18th, according to CIA records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in the Chilean situation...." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP, 18 September)The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject of concern during the last days of September. Apparently that pressure was viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit."## September 21The 40 Committee met. The Select Committee has no confirmation that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' calendar confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee chairman, also attended, although the Committee has not been able to review his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting--and the meetings of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired--is that the meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity to meet privately and discuss Track II if they desired. In all these instances save the 40 Committee meeting on September 22, the Committee has no evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines meeting actually took place. That the CIA prepared a memorandum of conversation for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been able to find none for other meetings may provide some support for the argument that no other such private meetings occurred.## September 22Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behind after a 40 Committee meeting called to discuss Track I. The two men discussed Track II actions, especially the contacts with then-Chilean-President Frei. According to
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# TOP SECRETKissinger told Karamessines that "our handling of the problem during the earlier meeting had been perfect and he added we were doing fine and keep it up." (Memorandum for the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines)## B. October### October 5A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals --Prats, Valenzuela and Huerta--named in a cable of September 30. (Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6. (Santiago 556, 5 October 1970) Karamessines presumed such a meeting had taken place, although he had no specific memory of it. (Karamessines testimony, pp. 69-70) His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 40 Committee meeting on Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger chaired the 40 Committee.### October 6The Station reported that General Viaux was "ready to launch *golpe* evening 9 October, or morning 10 October." (Santiago 472, 6 October 1970) In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one "with scant chance of success which will vitiate any further more serious action." The Station was directed to try to "stop ill-considered action at this time." (Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970)Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux plan, supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see below) makes no mention of any previous plots. (Kişsinger testimony, p. 24)
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Similarly, Kissinger did not remember having been informed that the CIA had called off a coup it regarded as premature. He stated:My perception at that period was that if they had a coup they would come...back to us before triggering it...at no time during the period did they, in fact, tell us...that they had a coup that might be ready to go. And, indeed, they generally told us the opposite. (Kissinger testimony, pp. 25-26)As Karamessines' calendar indicated, there was a 40 Committee meeting on October 6. He attended this meeting, along with Richard Helms and William Broe of the CIA. According to the minutes of that meeting, CIA efforts to promote a military coup in Chile were not discussed.However, in an exchange with Charles Meyer, who was then the State Department's Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Dr. Kissinger stressed the desire of "higher authority" (President Nixon) to prevent Allende's assumption of office. According to the minutes:Mr. Meyer pointed to the need to determine a post-Allende position such as proposed in NSSM 97. It was agreed that an early NSC meeting was desirable on that subject. Mr. Kissinger said this presumed total acceptance of a fait accompli and higher authority had no intention of conceding before the 24th; on the contrary, he wanted no stone left unturned. (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 6 October 1970, 7 October 1970)October 8Karamessines met for lunch with General Haig. (Karamessines calendar)In his testimony, Haig recalled being aware that the CIA was in touch with two differenct groups of military plotters. He believed there must have been another meeting in which the CIA informed him of its on-going contacts.