Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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personal defense attendant to their projected efforts to re-move Trujillo" could be developed by the Station. The memo-randum made no recommendation to approve or disapprove passageof these weapons. (Id.).On May 15, 1961, Bundy forwarded to Goodwin anothermemorandum. This one, entitled "The Current Situation in andContingency Plans for the Dominican Republic," had been receivedby Bundy from the State Department. Attached was an under-lying document which began:"Recent reports indicate that the internalDominican dissidents are becoming increasinglydetermined to oust Trunillo by any means, andtheir plans in this regard are well advanced."The May 15 memorandum stressed that it was highly desirablefor the U.S. to be identified with and to support the elementsseeking to overthrow Trujillo. The attachmentrecommended that Consul General Dearborn inform the dissidentsthat if they succeed "at their own initiative and on their ownresponsibility in forming an acceptable provisional governmentthey can be assured that any reasonable request for assistancefrom the U.S. will be promptly and favorably answered." (Documentsfrom State Dept. files bearing Nos. 279-286).F. Drafts Leading to and Final Cable of May 29, 1961A copy of Dearborn's cable of May 16, 1961, requestingurgent State Department guidance, was forwarded to RichardGoodwin. At the specific request of Goodwin,the State Department replied to Dearborn on May 17,
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-42-and advised him to keep in mind the President's view, as expressed at the May 5 National Security Council Meeting, that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before knowing what government would succeed him. (Department to Dearborn, 5/17/61)Dearborn responded on May 21, 1961, pointing out that for over a year State Department representatives in the Dominican Republic had been nurturing the effortto overthrow Trujillo and had assisted the dissidents in numerous ways, all of which were known to the Department. It was, Dearborn stated, "too late to consider whether United States will initiate overthrow of Trujillo." Dearborn invited further guidance from State.In response to Dearborn's request for guidance, the State Department drafted a reply on May 24. The draft discussed a conflict between two objectives:"(1) To be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive credit among DR dissidents and liberal elements throughout Latin America;"(2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican Republic and even more so from any political assassination which might occur."![TOP SECRET]
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It was said to be the Department's considered opinion that "former objective cannot, repeat not, easily override latter." (State Dept. to Dearborn cable, 5/24/61 not sent)This State Department draft was forwarded to Under Secretary Bowles with the comment that Goodwin considered it "too negative" and that he would try his hand on a draft "for Bundy to present tomorrow morning." (Memo from Achilles to Bowles, 5/24/61)A May 26, 1961, memorandum from Bowles to Bundy begins:"Following up on our discussion of the Dominican Republic at yesterday's meeting of the Special Group, I am forwarding you a draft telegram which we would like to send to Henry Dearborn, our Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo, supplementing the guidance he will be receiving on the recently approved contingency plans."Minutes of the Special Group meeting on May 25, 1961 do not, however, reflect any discussion of the Dominican Republic.If, as Bowles' memorandum suggests, a discussion concerning the Dominican Republic did occur at the May 25 meeting, it is not known what the discussion involved or what decisions, if any, were made.Richard Goodwin personally prepared alternate drafts to the proposed State Department cable to Dearborn. Goodwin testified that it was his intent in revising the cable to communicate to Dearborn, President Kennedy's personal belief that the United States:"... didn't want to do anything that would involve us further, the United States further, in any effort to assassinate Trujillo." (Goodwin, 7/10, p.32)
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At the same time, Goodwin's draft raised the issue of further covert action and transfer of arms to the dissidents and advised Dearborn to hold out the arms as being available to the dissidents pending their ability to receive them. It was the twofold intent of the cable as revised by Goodwin, (1) to express the desire to remain in the good graces of the dissidents who, it was believed, would constitute the new government following Trujillo's assassination, and (2) to avoid any action which might further involve the United States in the anticipated assassination. This dual purpose is clearly evident in the cable which advised:" . . . we must not run risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S. as matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principal is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation." (Emphasis added)* * * * * *"Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for their position."According to Goodwin, the underscored material was inserted in the cable at the specific direction of President Kennedy.(Goodwin, 7/10, pp. 22, 23).With respect to the four machine guns which were in the Consulate and which had been repeatedly requested by the dissidents, the cable advised Dearborn that the U.S. was unable to transfer these arms to the dissidents. Dearborn was instructed to:"Tell them that this is because of our suspicion that method of transfer may be unsafe. In actual
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fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of association with assassination attempt."The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President Kennedy, was sent to Dearborn on May 29, 1961. (State Dept. to Dearborn cable, 5/29/61)VII. May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter:A. Trujillo AssassinatedLate in the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambushed and assassinated near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The assassination closely paralleled the plan disclosed by the action group to American representatives in the Dominican Republic and passed on to officials in Washington at both the CIA and the State Department. (Dearborn cable to State, 5/30/61) The assassination was conducted by members of the action group, to whom the American carbines had been passed, and such sketchy information as is available indicates that one or more of the carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when Trujillo was killed. (I. G. Report, pp. 60-61). This evidence indicate however, that the actual assassination was accomplished by handguns and shotguns. (I.G. Report, p.61)B. Cables to WashingtonAfter receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, both Consul General Dearborn and Station Chief Owen sent replies. According to Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable as a change in U.S. policy concerning support for assassinations. (Dearborn 7/29/75, p. 74).
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-46He interpreted the May 29 cable as saying:> "...we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate> Trujillo, that is all right. But we don't want> anything to pin this on us, because we aren't> doing it, it is the Dominicans who are doing> it." (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 104)Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he said had always been his personal belief; that the U.S. should not be involved in an assassination and that if an assassination occurred it would be strictly a Dominican affair. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 100, 101)In contrast the CIA Station Chief, Owen, did regard the cable as manifesting a change in U.S. policy, particularly on the question of supplying arms. (Owen p. 120) He believed the May 29 cable was the final word in U.S. policy on this matter and consequently felt that the government had retreated from its prior position, of offering material support to the dissidents, and had adopted a new position of withholding such support.Owen's responsive cable to Headquarters stated:> "HQS aware extent to which U.S. government already> associated with assassination. If we are to at least> cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in> assassination preparation must be withdrawn."> (Station to HQS cable, 5/30/61)
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-47-Immediately following the assassination, all CIA personnel in the Dominican Republic were removed from the country and within a few days Consul General Dearborn was back in Washington. The State Department cabled the CIA station in the Dominican Republic to destroy all records concerning contacts with dissidents and any related matters, except not to destroy the contingency plans or the May 29, 1961 cable to Dearborn. (IIQS to Station cable, 5/31/61.C. Immediate Post-Assassination PeriodThe U.S. Consulate in the Dominican Republic was quick to dispatch its early reports that Trujillo had been assassinated, and the U.S. communications network transmitted the report to President Kennedy in Paris. The President's Press Secretary, Pierre Salinger, made the first public announcement of the assassination, preceeding by several hours release of the news in the Dominican Republic. Secretary of State Rusk testified that when he learned of Salinger's announcement he was most concerned. Rusk said that Trujillo's son Ramfis was also in Paris and he was afraid that Ramfis, upon first learning of his father's death from the press secretary to the President of the U.S., might try to retaliate against President Kennedy. (Rusk, 32, 33.)
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SCHNEIDER REPORTReviewed and Agreed to byDrafting Subcommittee onAugust 27, 1975
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# SCHNEIDER REPORTPageI. Summary 1II. The President's Initial General Instructionand Background 6A. September 15 White House Meeting 6B. Background: Tracks I and II 8C. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project 15III. CIA's Implementation of Track II 17A. Evolution of CIA Strategy 171. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach 172. Military Solution 18B. The Chile Task Force 19C. The Use of the Army Attache and InteragencyRelations 20D. The False Flag Base 26E. Chief of Station 27IV. CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup 29A. The Chilean Conspirators 29B. Contacts Prior to October 15 30C. October 15 Decision 34D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15 36E. The Killing of General Schneider 39F. Post October 22 Events 41V. CIA/White House Communication During Track II 43A. September 45B. October 46C. December 54D. Did Track II End? 54
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# I. SummaryOn September 4, 1970, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens won a plurality in Chile's Presidential election.* Since no candidate had received a majority of the popular vote, the Chilean constitution required that a joint session of its Congress decide between the first and second place finishers. This constitutional requirement had, in the past, been pro- forma. The Congress had always selected the candidate who received highest popular vote. The date set for the Congressional joint session was October 24, 1970.On September 15, 1970, President Richard Nixon informed CIA Director Richard Helms that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable to the United States. The CIA was instructed by President Nixon to play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to the presidency. The Agency was to take this action without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and without informing the U.S. Ambassador in Chile. While coup possibilities in general and other means of seeking to prevent Allende's accession to power were explored by the 40 Committee throughout this period, the 40 Committee was never informed of this direct CIA role. Nor did it ever approve that role. The only institution to which the Agency was to re- port, both for informational and approval purposes, was the White House.*Dr. Allende, a long-time Senator and founder of the Socialist Party in Chile, was a candidate of Popular Unity Coalition. The Coalition was made up of Communists, Socialists, Social Democrats, Radicals, and dissident Christian Democrats. Allende was a self-proclaimed Marxist and was making his fourth try for the presidency. His opponents were Radomire Tomic Romero, candidate of the ruling Christian Democratic Party, and Jorge Alessandri Rodriquez, candidate of the right-wing National Party. Dr. Allende won 36.3% of the popular_vote; Alessandri was second with 35.3% of the vote. Dr. Allende's margin of victory was 39,000 votes out of a total of 3 mil- lion votes cast in the election. The incumbent President, Eduardo Frei Montalvo, a Christian Democrat, was ineligible for re-election. Chilean law prohibits Presidents from succeeding themselves.
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-2-In practice, this meant that the CIA was to keep the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, informed of its activities.Between October 5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero (police) officials in Chile. Those Chileans who were inclined to stage a coup were given assurances of strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, both before and after a coup.One of the major obstacles faced by all the military conspirators in Chile was the strong opposition to a coup by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Rene Schneider, who insisted the constitutional process be followed. As a result of his strong constitutional stand, the removal of General Schneider became a necessary ingredient in the coup plans of all the Chilean conspirators. Unable to have General Schneider retired or reassigned, the conspirators decided to kidnap him. An unsuccessful abduction attempt was made on October 19, 1970, by a group of Chilean military officers whom the CIA was actively supporting. A second kidnap attempt was made the following day, again unsuccessfully. In the early morning hours of October 22, 1970, machine guns and ammunition were passed by the CIA to the group that had failed on October 19. That same day General Schneider was mortally wounded in an attempted kidnap on his way to work. The attempted kidnap and the shooting was apparently conducted by conspirators other than those to whom the CIA had provided weapons earlier in the day.
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-3-A Chilean military court found that high-ranking military officers, both active and retired, conspired to bring about a military coup and to kidnap General Schneider. Several of the officers whom the CIA had contacted and encouraged in their coup conspiracy were convicted of conspiring to kidnap General Schneider. Those convicted of carrying out the actual kidnap attempt and the killing of General Schneider were associates of retired General Roberto Viaux, who had initially been thought by the CIA to be the best hope. However, later the CIA discouraged General Viaux because the Agency felt other officers, such as General Camilo Valenzuela, were not sufficiently involved. General Viaux was convicted by the military court and received a twenty-year prison sentence for being the "intellectal author" of the Schneider kidnap attempt. General Valenzuela was sentenced by the military court to three years in exile for taking part in the conspiracy to prevent Allende's assumption of office. The military court found that the two Generals had been in contact throughout the coup plotting.The principal facts leading up to the death of General Schneider (all of which are discussed in more detail below) are as follows:1.  By the end of September 1970, it appeared that the only feasible way for the CIA to implement the Presidential order to prevent Allende from coming to power was to foment a coup d'etat.2.  All of the known coup plots developed within the Chilean military entailed the removal of General Schneider by one means or another.3.  United States officials continued to encourage and support Chilean plans for a coup after it became known that the first step would be to kidnap General Schneider.
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4. Two unsuccessful kidnap attempts were made, one on October 19, the other on October 20. Following these attempts, and with knowledge of their failure, the CIA passed three submachine guns and ammunition to Chilean officers who still planned to kidnap General Schneider.5. In a third kidnap attempt on October 22, apparently conducted by Chileans other than those to whom weapons had been supplied, General Schneider was shot and subsequently died. The guns used in the abortive kidnapping of General Schneider were, in all probability, not those supplied by the CIA to the conspirators. The Chilean military court which investigated the Schneider killing determined that Schneider had been murdered by handguns, although one machine gun was at the scene of the killing.[^1]6. While there is no question that the CIA received a direct instruction from the President on September 15th to attempt to foment a coup, the Committee received sharply conflicting testimony about whether the White House was kept informed of, and authorized, the coup efforts in Chile after October 15. On one side of the conflict is the testimony of Henry Kissinger and General Alexander Haig; on the other, that of CIA officials. Kissinger testified that the White House stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile on October 15, 1970. After that date, Kissinger testified--and Haig agreed--that the White House neither knew of, nor specifically approved, CIA coup activities in Chile. CIA officials, on the other hand, have testified that their activities in Chile after October 15 were known to and[^1]: The Committee has not been able to determine whether or not the machine gun at the scene of the Schneider killing was one of the three supplied by the CIA.
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*thus authorized by the White House.This conflict in testimony, which the Committee has been unable to resolve through its hearings or the documentary record, leaves unanswered the most serious question of whether the CIA was acting pursuant to higher authority (the CIA's view) or was pursuing coup activities in Chile without sufficient communication (the Kissinger/Haig view).*The basic issue is whether or not the CIA informed the White House of its activities. In context, informing was tantamount to being authorized. No one who testified believed that the CIA was required to seek step-by-step authorization for its activities; rather the burden was on the White House to object if a line of activity being pursued by the CIA seemed unwise. Both Kissinger and Haig agreed that if the CIA had proposed a persuasive plan to them, it almost certainly would have been approved. The CIA did not believe it needed specific White House authorization to transfer weapons to the Chileans; in fact, CIA Deputy Director (Plans) Thomas Karamessines testified that he did not formally approve the transfer, but rather that in the context of the project it was clear that the Agency had the authority to transfer weapons and that it was clear to Karamessines' subordinates that he would approve their decision to do so. He believed he probably was informed before the weapons actually were sent.
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II. The President's Initial General Instruction and BackgroundA. September 15 White House MeetingOn September 15, 1970, President Nixon met with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell at the White House. The topic was Chile. Handwritten notes taken by Director Helms at that meeting reflect both its tenor and the President's instructions:1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!worth spendingnot concerned risks involvedno involvement of Embassy$10,000,000 available, more if necessaryfull-time job--best men we havegame planmake the economy scream48 hours for plan of actionIn his testimony before the Select Committee, Director Helms recalled coming away from the meeting on September 15 with:...(the) impression...that the President came down very hard that he wanted something done, and he didn't much care how and that he was prepared to make money available.... This was a pretty all-inclusive order.... If I ever carried a marshall's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that day. * (Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 6,10,11)*Director Helms also testified that the September 15th meeting with President Nixon may have been triggered by the presence of Augustin Edwards, the publisher of the Santiago daily *El Mercurio*, in Washington. That morning, at the request of Donald Kendall, President of Pepsi Cola, Henry Kissinger and John Mitchell had met for breakfast with Kendall and Edwards. (Mitchell calendar) The topic of conversation was the political situation in Chile and the plight of *El Mercurio* and other anti-Allende forces. According to Mr. Helms:- Recall that prior to this meeting (with the President) the editor of *El Mercurio* had come to Washington and I had been asked to go and talk to him at one of the hotels here, this having been arranged through Don Kendall, the head of the Pepsi Cola Company....I have this impression that the President called this meeting where I have my handwritten notes because of Edwards' presence in Washington and what he heard from Kendall about what Edwards was saying about conditions in Chile and what was happening there.(Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 4-5)
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However, none of the CIA officers believed that assassination was within the guidelines Helms had been given.Senator Hart of Colorado. ...did the kind of carte blanche mandate you carried, the marshall's baton that you carried out in a knapsack, to stop Allende from assuming office, include physical elimination?Mr. Helms. Well, not in my mind, because when I became Director, I had already made up my mind that we weren't going to have any of that business when I was Director, and I had made that clear to my fellows, and I think they will tell you this.The following day, September 16, Director Helms called a meeting at the CIA to discuss the Chilean situation. At this meeting, he related to his colleagues his understanding of the President's instructions:2. The Director told the group that President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile was unacceptable to the United States. The President asked the Agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him. The President authorized $10,000,000 for this purpose, if needed. Further, the Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense. (Memorandum/Genesis of the Project, 16 Sept. 1970)Henry Kissinger's recollection of the September 15 meeting with President Nixon is in accord with that of Richard Helms.[^1] AlthoughDr. Kissinger did not recall the President's instructions to be as precise as those related by Director Helms, he did testify that:...the primary thrust of the September 15th meeting was to urge Helms to do whatever he could to prevent Allende from being seated. (Kissinger testimony, p. 13)***[^1]: The documents, and the officials from whom the Committee has heard testimony, are in substantial agreement about what President Nixon authorized on September 15, namely CIA involvement in promoting a military coup d'etat in Chile. There is not, however, agreement about what was communicated between the CIA and the White House--and hence what was authorized by the latter--in the week, between October 15 and the death of General Schneider, October 22. This matter will be discussed in Part V of this report on the Schneider killing.