Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# TOP SECRETV. CIA/White House Communication During Track IIThe testimony given to the Committee by Henry Kissinger and General Haig conflicts with that given by CIA officials.Kissinger and Haig testified that on October 15, 1970, the White House stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile. Both testified that after that date they were neither informed of, nor authorized, CIA Track II activities, including the kidnap plans of General Schneider and the passage of weapons to the military plotters.By contrast, CIA officials testified that they operated before and after October 15 with the knowledge and approval of the White House.The conflict pertains directly to the period after October 15, but it bears on the degree of communication between the White House and the CIA in the earlier period as well. For instance, Henry Kissinger testified that he was informed of *no coup plan* which began with the abduction of General Schneider. He was aware of General Viaux's plan--which he and Karamessines decided on October 15 to try to forestall--but did not know that it was to begin with Schneider's abduction.CIA officials, especially Thomas Karamessines, stated that there was close consultation throughout Track II between the Agency and the White House. Karamessines testified that he met with Kissinger some six to ten times during the five weeks of Track II (Karamessines testimony, page 66); and that he kept Kissinger generally informed of developments. (Ibid., page 56) The Committee has records of two meetings between Karamessines and Kissinger and of one telephone conversation between Karamessines and Kissinger's deputy, General Alexander Haig. Karamessines' daily calendar indicates that three other meetings with General Haig took place--but does not establish with certainty that the topic was
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Track II. If The calendar also suggests that Karamessines and Kissingermet on three other occasions and so might have had the opportunity todiscuss Track II.Henry Kissinger's testimony before the Committee differsfrom Karamessines in two respects: He believed Track II was "turned off"on October 15; and, after that date, he was informed neither of the coupplans of the Chilean conspirators nor of the passage of weapons to them.He said that Track II wasin the nature of a probe and not in the nature ofa plan,...no plan for a coup was ever submitted tothe White House. So my recollection of events,this was a request by President Nixon for Track IIwhich led to two or three meetings which then on.October 15th led to being turned off by the WhiteHouse, after which Track II was dead as far as myoffice was concerned, and we never received anotherreport on the subject. (Kissinger testimony, p. 15)***In my mind Track II was finished on October 15thand I never received any further CIA informationafter October 15th on the basis of any records thatI have been able to find. (Ibid., p. 59).General Haig's testimony generally coincided with Kissinger'srecollection:I left (the October 15th meeting) with the distinctimpression that there was nothing that could bedone in this covert area that offered promise orhope for success. I had the distinct impressionthat was Dr. Kissinger's conclusion, and that ineffect these things--and I wasn't even reallyfamiliar with what these two groups were to do andhow they were to do it, but they were to cease anddesist. (Haig testimony, pp. 26-27)***My recollection would be that we had no hope for aviable, covert plan of action. That is the impres-sion I got. (Ibid., p. 29)The following pages present the Committee's record of communicationbetween the White House and the CIA from September 18 through December 2:
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# A. September## September 18Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House. As Helms' notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18th, according to CIA records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in the Chilean situation...." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP, 18 September)The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject of concern during the last days of September. Apparently that pressure was viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit."## September 21The 40 Committee met. The Select Committee has no confirmation that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' calendar confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee chairman, also attended, although the Committee has not been able to review his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting--and the meetings of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired--is that the meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity to meet privately and discuss Track II if they desired. In all these instances save the 40 Committee meeting on September 22, the Committee has no evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines meeting actually took place. That the CIA prepared a memorandum of conversation for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been able to find none for other meetings may provide some support for the argument that no other such private meetings occurred.## September 22Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behind after a 40 Committee meeting called to discuss Track I. The two men discussed Track II actions, especially the contacts with then-Chilean-President Frei. According to
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# TOP SECRETKissinger told Karamessines that "our handling of the problem during the earlier meeting had been perfect and he added we were doing fine and keep it up." (Memorandum for the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines)B. OctoberOctober 5A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals --Prats, Valenzuela and Huerta--named in a cable of September 30. (Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6. (Santiago 556, 5 October 1970) Karamessines presumed such a meeting had taken place, although he had no specific memory of it. (Karamessines testimony, pp. 69-70) His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 40 Committee meeting on Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger chaired the 40 Committee.October 6The Station reported that General Viaux was "ready to launch golpe evening 9 October, or morning 10 October." (Santiago 472, 6 October 1970) In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one "with scant chance of success which will vitiate any further more serious action." The Station was directed to try to "stop ill-considered action at this time." (Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970)Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux plan, supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see below) makes no mention of any previous plots. (Kişsinger testimony, p. 24)
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-47-Similarly, Kissinger did not remember having been informed that the CIA had called off a coup it regarded as premature. He stated:My perception at that period was that if they had a coup they would come...back to us before triggering it...at no time during the period did they, in fact, tell us...that they had a coup that might be ready to go. And, indeed, they generally told us the opposite.(Kissinger testimony, pp. 25-26)As Karamessines' calendar indicated, there was a 40 Committee meeting on October 6. He attended this meeting, along with Richard Helms: and William Broe of the CIA. According to the minutes of that meeting, CIA efforts to promote a military coup in Chile were not discussed.However, in an exchange with Charles Meyer, who was then the State Department's Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Dr. Kissinger stressed the desire of "higher authority" (President Nixon) to prevent Allende's assumption of office. According to the minutes:Mr. Meyer pointed to the need to determine a post-Allende position such as proposed in NSSM 97. It was agreed that an early NSC meeting was desirable on that subject. Mr. Kissinger said this presumed total acceptance of a fait accompli and higher authority had no intention of conceding before the 24th; on the contrary, he wanted no stone left unturned. (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 6 October 1970, 7 October 1970).October 8Karamessines met for lunch with General Haig. (Karamessines calendar)In his testimony, Haig recalled being aware that the CIA was in touch with two differenct groups of military plotters. He believed there must have been another meeting in which the CIA informed him of its on-going contacts.
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- 47a -# TOP SECRETIt seems to me, although the records don't reflect it, that there was a meeting in September, a very brief one, in which I must have been told that there was a specific program going underway. That probably would have been by Henry (Kissinger) and perhaps with Karamessines there. I am not sure. (Haig testimony, p. 12)October 10Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with General Haig. He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from all."(Memorandum/FUBELT, by William Broe, 10 October 1970)Haig recalled the telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 10th.His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation.I do know, and I know that from looking at the record this morning, that Karamessines made a telephone call to me in which he gave a progress report. I recall that. It was in effect a negative progress report, that they were just not coming up with it. (Haig testimony, p. 12)# TOP SECRETNW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 123
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-48-Haig indicated to the Committee that he would have passed along thesubstance of that conversation to Kissinger, and that in general hisrole at the time was one of a conduit to Kissinger:I am quite confident that, given my own concep-tion of my role at that time, that I would haveconveyed that information to Henry,...(Haig testimony, p. 13)***October 14Q. If Mr. Karamessines was unable to see Dr.Kissinger, and talked to you, what degree oflatitude did you have concerning what you wouldpass on to Dr. Kissinger?General Haig. At that time I would consider Ihad no degree of latitude, other than to conveyto him what had been given to me. (Ibid., p. 15)A cable to Santiago for Colonel Wimert, ostensibly from GeneralBennett, authorized Wimert to select two Chilean general officers andconvey to them the following message: "High authority in Washingtonhas authorized you to offer material support short of armed interven-tion to Chilean Armed Forces in any endeavors they may undertake toprevent the election of Allende on October 24...." (Headquarters toStation cable 762, October 14, 1970) Karamessines testified that inthis case "high authority" would have been Kissinger or the President,for no one else could have given Wimert such broad authorization.Karamessines presumed that the message had been drafted in, or atleast cleared with, the White House. (Karamessines testimony, p. 91)However, Kissinger did not recall having authorized the October 14thcable. He found the sequence of events puzzling: having been told onthe 10th that little was happening, he would have expected in the
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-49-meeting on the 15th (see below) to have discussed the results of the October 14th message. But the CIA record makes no mention of any such discussion. (Kissinger testimony, p. 53)October 14The 40 Committee met to discuss, among other topics, Chile. In addition to the 40 Committee principals (Kissinger, John Mitchell, David Packard, Alexis Johnson, Admiral Moorer), the meeting was attended by Karamessines, William Broe and General Robert Cushman of the CIA, Charles Meyer from State, Viron Vaky, and Ambassador Korry, who had returned to Washington from Santiago for a short period of consultation.According to the minutes of that meeting, Kissinger asked Karamessines to give a rundown on the latest developments and present situation in Chile.. Karamessines pointed out that "a coup climate does not presently exist."He noted that "the unpredictable General Viaux is the only individual seemingly ready to attempt a coup and...his chances of mounting a successful one were slight." Ambassador Korry agreed with Karamessines' assessment and stated that "as of now it seemed almost certain that Allende would be voted into office on October 24th." Kissinger then observed that "there presently appeared to be little the U.S. can do to influence the Chilean situation one way or another." Other participants at the meeting concurred. (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 14 October 1970, 16 October 1970)![image of TOP SECRET stamp]NW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 125
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October 15Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to discuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines gave a run-down on Viaux, Canales and Tirado and "the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux did not have more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less--to launch a successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:5. It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence our message was to state: "We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. We will continue to have our support."6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instructed Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and securely to maintain the capability for Agency operations against Allende in the future.8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply.   (Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15 October 1970)
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-50-Kissinger, sin his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat more detailed than he would have remembered. (Kissinger testimony, p. 52) He believed the Agency had been told to "stand down and preserve your assets."Kissinger believed that the gist of the October 15th meeting as recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA issued to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based on the October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum of the meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a "high incentive to preserve the maximum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp. 55-56) The October 16th order indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous day, and stated:2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date....4. There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Tirado, Canales, Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune. (Headquarters 802, 16 October 1970)Kissinger recalled the October 15th conversation as "turning off the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do them." (Kissinger testimony, p. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony.The conclusions of that meeting were that we had better not do anything rather than something that was not going to succeed.... My general feeling was, I left that meeting with the impression that there was nothing authorized."(Haig testimony, p. 13)NW 50955 DocId: 32423525 Page 127
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-51-October 10-October 22 (approximate)Karamessines and one or two others went with Kissinger to speak with the President, after a larger meeting. Karamessines believed this meeting took place between October 10 and 24. (Karamessines testimony, p. 89)According to Karamessines, the "President went out of his way to impress all of those there with his conviction that it was absolutely essential that the election of Mr. Allende to the presidency be thwarted."* As they were leaving the Oval Office, the President took Karamessines aside to reiterate the message. (Karamessines testimony, p. 8)October 19Station cabled Headquarters early in the morning, advising that the tear gas had been passed and outlining the Valenzuela coup plan, beginning with the kidnap of Schneider. In testimony before the Committee, Karamessines indicated he certainly would have reported the Valenzuela plan to Kissinger "very promptly, if for no other reason than that we didn't have all that much promising news to report to the White House...." (Karamessines testimony, p. 72)And as I say, if for no other reason we would havewanted to get this kind of hopeful report to theWhite House as soon as possible, and it would be mybest estimate now that that is precisely what wedid. (p. 72)In the afternoon of the 19th, Karamessines met with General Haig for an hour at the White House. (Karamessines calendar) By then, Karamessines would have had in hand the cable outlining the Valenzuela* If the meeting with the President occurred after October 15, that would lend credence to the testimony of CIA officials that they were not directed to end their coup efforts in the October 15th meeting. Unfortunately, the Committee has not had access to the daily calendars of President Nixon or Secretary Kissinger, which might pinpoint the date of the President's conversation with Karamessines. Those calendars, along with other White House documents bearing on Track II, have been subpoenaed.
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-52-plan, since the cable had arrived that morning. However, General Haighad no recollection of the meeting with Karamessines on the 19th. Nordid he believe he had been informed of the Valenzuela plan. "Thisis all very new to me. I hadn't seen any of this, and I was not familiarwith this particular plan...or $50,000, or any of the characters thatare described in here." (Haig testimony, pp. 38-39)Similarly, Kissinger testified that he had not been informed ofthe Valenzuela plan. He said he "was informed of nothing after October15th...." (Kissinger testimony, p. 65) He indicated that, accordingto his daily calendar, he had no conversation with either Karamessinesor Helms between the 15th and the 19th. (Ibid., p. 53) He indicatedthat he never knew that the CIA was in the process of passing guns andtear gas to Chilean military conspirators. He said "...there was nofurther meeting on that subject. In anybody's record, mine or theirs(the CIA's), none of the information from the 16th on was familiar to me."(Ibid., p. 62)Kissinger further testified he did not know that the United Stateswas dealing with Chilean officers who plotted a coup which involvedthe abduction of General Schneider:Senator Hart of Colorado. I am not sure thatthe record clearly shows you answer to the directquestion of whether you knew or did not know thatwe were negotiating with military officers withregard to a plot that did involve the abductionof General Schneider.Secretary Kissinger. I said I did not know.(Kissinger testimony, p. 86)Nor did General Haig believe he had been informed of any abductionplans before the fact.
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-53-Q: Were you aware during that period of time of the plans to kidnap General Schneider?General Haig. I was aware after the fact....Q. But you were never informed prior to his attempted abduction?General Haig. I don't believe I was at all.October 20A cable to the Station indicated that "while awaiting word on whatever events may have occurred 19 October, please let us know what you can on interim basis....Headquarters must respond during morning 20 October to queries from high levels." (Headquarters 883, 20 October 1970) Karamessines testified that the references to "high levels" in the cable of the 20th meant White House officials, probably Kissinger. He felt quite certain that Kissinger would have been briefed in advance about Valenzuela's plan for the 19th and so would have been expected to ask what happened on the morning of the 20th. (Karamessines testimony, p. 73) In contrast, Kissinger interpreted that cable in precisely the opposite light. He felt it indicated that he had *not* been informed of the Valenzuela plan in advance. When news of the Schneider kidnap reached the White House, Kissinger believed he would have had "somebody pick up a telephone and say, 'What is this all about?'" (Kissinger transcript, p. 68)October 22Karamessines met with Haig at the White House. (Karamessines calendar)General Haig remembered that word of the shooting of Schneider came as "a great shock" to him, and he believed that Karamessines had told him about it in their meeting on the 22nd. He thought that Kissinger either was present at the meeting or that he, Haig, had gone immediately in to Kissinger's office to relate what Karamessines had told him. (Haig testimony, p. 36)
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C. DecemberDecember 2A memorandum, dated December 2, 1970, from Helms to Kissinger stated that Helms had given a recapitulation on Track II to Attorney General Mitchell, who would deliver it personally to Kissinger. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: "sent to Kissinger via DCI (Helms)."(Helms memorandum for Kissinger, 2 December 1970) The report, which was dated November 18, 1970, contained a full account of CIA activities during Track II, including the several plans to kidnap Schneider and the passage of weapons to the Chilean conspirators. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, 18 November 1970)In his testimony to the Committee, Kissinger did not recall receiv- ing the report, although he doubted that he would have read such an "after action" report in any case. He testified that he could not find it in his files, in contrast to his finding a CIA report on Track I, dated November 19, 1970. Kissinger was puzzled by a number of aspects of the memorandum and report: why there were two reports, why the report of the 18th apparently was only called to his attention on the 2nd of December, and why it was to be delivered through Mitchell. (Kissinger testimony, pp. 71, 74)D. Did Track II End?The Committee also received conflicting testimony about whether or not Track II ever ended, formally or in fact. As noted above, Kissinger indi- cated that Track II was supposed to have ended, as far as he was concerned, on October 15. It was formally terminated, according to Kissinger, by a new Presi- dential marching order issued prior to the October 24 vote of the Chilean Congress.