Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:Colby Ngo, Dinh CanConeinHhuDATES:10/63CATEGORIES:DiemTOP SECRETOCCURRENCE:Colby explained that a couple of weeks before the assassination the thought of assassination was not aimed at Dien but at Nhu and Can, Dien's two brothers who were considered the evil influence of the government. "The idea of removing Nhu From Vietnam was one that was discussed in great detail and a great deal of pressure was put on Diem to send his brother out of the country." "At one point I made a suggestion that perhaps I could convince him of the desirability of leaving the country for the benefit of is own, of the country itself. That I could go over and argue him into.(t) That I think is the separable thing from the actual decision to shoot Diem. I think the decision to shoot Diem was a conscience decision taken by the Generals which came as a very new development during the coup, bat let's face it is something you have to anticipato may taken an overthrow of a government." Pages 33-34SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ColbySTAFF:DawsonFILE:DATE:7/1/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:am, Ngo DinhoneinnhDATES:11/2/63CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE:Conein stated that at no point in the climatic days leading up to the assassination was there a discussion of the killing of Diem. Further, there had never been any discussion at any time about Diem himself being killed by anybody. In fact, the generals and many people wanted Diem to be around but they could not stand Nhu and Madame Nhu, Diem's wife. Page 64-66.TOP SECRETSOURCE:Hearings, SSC, Conein, June 20, 1975STAFF:DawsonNW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 24
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:COLBY, WILLIAMMINH GENERALNHUNGCONEINDATES:1 November 1963CATEGORIES:DIEM## NhưOCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that "Apparently the decision by several of the generals, theones that were present, that he (DIEM) would be executed when they got him. They sent anofficer, a small armored unit to pick him up after they found out where he was down in theother part of town. He and his brother were put in an armored personnel carrier with anofficer, a young Vietnamese who was an aide to GENERAL MINH, head of the coup group, andthey went into the armored personnel carrier and when the carrier arrived back at head-quarters, the two were dead and had been shot several times. That officer, incidentally,and a rather bizarre aspect of this, was himself apparently when this junta of generalswas overthrown about two months later. Somebody took that occasion to shoot him."pp. 18-19.SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 18-19STAFF: R. DAWSONDATE: 29 June 1975FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:DIEMTHICH TRI QUANGDATES:May 7, 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:The Diem circular to ban all religious flags reached Hue on May 7, 1963.Since the city was already bedecked with flags the Vietnamese Minister of Interior,Vui Van Long, arriving in Hue on the same date as the circular arrived went to the Bud-dhist leaders and explained that the flag regulation would not be enforced. "The leadersof the monks were very pleased," said Minister Long. "They listened to me and told methat I had given complete satisfaction to their desires Quang was present during thisexchange and joined in expressing satisfaction with the arrangement not to enforcethe regulation. Some police in Hue did take down flags before the Province Chief couldreverse the order to enforce the regulation. But the precipitating factor, accordingto Higgins was that Kuang sent a few monks around to tell the people to haul down theflags, even though he knew this was no longer required, thanks to the Interior Ministersactions. "The monks were told to tell the population that this was being done as aresult of Diem's order to ban the Buddhist flag. (91-92)SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,STAFF: Dawson, R.1965DATE: July 2, 1975FILE:NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 25
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:McConeDiemNhuKahnDATES:CATEGORIES:DIEMIn responce to a question as to whether McCone was aware of a suggestion to assassinate Mr. Diem and had sent a telegram in conjunction that suggestion, McCone testified that he did not think it was Mr. Diem He testified that "there was a prop osal, one of a number of proposals, in connection with the difficult political situation that existed in South Vietnam, to dispose by assassination Mr. Nhu and General Kanh.... when that was brought to my attention I ordered a telegram sent out to stand that down" (4) McCone testified that "The situation in Vietnam was unlike other situations. We were really at war there. My opposition was more on the basis of considered judgement that the action recommended by the station wouldn't in final an alysis solve any problem." (5).SOURCE: McCone, June 6, 1975STAFF: Gordon RheaFILE:DATE: 6/27/75
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NW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 271960-62
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:LANSDALEALAN DULLESDATES:Mar 16, 1960CATEGORIES:MONGOOSESPECIAL GROUPDIEMOCCURRENCE:On March 16, 1960 at the Special Group Meeting there was discussion of stepped up plans to use the base radio at Guentameo Bay to expand the stations listening audience. VIETNAM Mr. DULLES Referred to the worsening security situation in South Vietnam... and commented that this appears to be a situation where S. F. training might be in order. DULLES asked whether it would be "politically feasible for Col. LANSDALE to visit the area to assess the situation on the spot." DULLES also discussed briefly "the possibility of assisting the South Vietnam government to mount guerrila operationsin the north."SOURCE:Minutes of Special Group Meeting, March 16, 1960.STAFF:KELLEYFILE:DATE:6/27/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:LansdaleDullesHareIrwinDATES:May 12, 1960CATEGORIES:DiemSpecial GroupOCCURRENCE:On May 12, 1960, the Special Group discussed the subject of the invitation from President Diem for General Lansdale to visit Viet Nam. Mr. Hare said "that he assumed that the way in which Diem would like to use General Lansdale would not be acceptable to the U. S., but that some adjustments could no doubt be made. Mr. Dulles said that "Lansdale could be counted on to carry out whatever instructions he had in a manner least calculated to upset Diem."SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group meeting May 12, 1960STAFF: Bob KelleyFILE:DATE: June 29, 1975
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAMNGO DINH NHUMINISTER OF THE INTERIOR-GOVERNMENTOF VIETNAM, COLBY, HARKINSWESTMORELAND, GENERALDATES:1962CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that: "In 1962 COLBY assigned him to work with the MINISTERTHE INTERIOR OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM to be responsible for liaison between CIA and thMINISTER on a program called THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM. The idea for this program wasthat of NHU, the President's brother and counsellor, which was to establish security withihamlets and villages in order the people could deny access of food and taxes to theVIET CONG. In this position, CONEIN was able to travel quite extensively under the auspicof the MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, and to talk to the unit commanders down to and includingsmall sections." p. 17. CONEIN. "This was done with the permission of GENERAL HARKINS anit was known to GENERAL WESTMORELAND when WESTMORELAND took over." p. 18.SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinFILE:JFKPERSONS/ENTITIES:Maxwell TaylorDATES:27 Sept 62CATEGORIES:Special Group Aug-mentedMOONGOOSEDiem/OCCURRENCE:Taylor states that the Special Group and the Sencial Group Augmented considered a proposal byCIA for covert activities designed to harass the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This hadbeen prepared in response to a request by the Sec.'s of State and Defense.Taylor added that the Special Group asked that a more detailed operation plan be prepared.It was agreed that Defense make certain equipment and personnel available to CIA in supportof this program. An elint flight designed to identify the North Vietnamese radar order ofbattle, so as to permit planning over flight routes was authorized. This will be flown outof Saigon, using the specially equipped aircraft available on Taiwan, but with the ChineseAir Force markings removed, and employing Chinese Nationalists pilots documented South Vietnam-se citizens.SOURCE:Maxwell Taylor's memorandum for the President, datedSept 27, 1962.STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:30 June 1975STAFF:PGWFILE:DAM6/29/75NW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 29
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## PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEIN## DATES:February 1962## CATEGORIES:DIEM## OCCURRENCE:CONEIN stated: "In February of 1962, two air force pilots, Vietnamese Air Force pilots, attacked the presidential palace of NGO DINH DIEM. This was not the first indication there was something wrong, because if you will recall, in November of 1960, there was another attempted coup. At that time, in February, I was asked if I would go to the different military leaders which I knew and had known in the past, to find out what was the political pressure, what was the temperature, was there really some dissidence within the military ranks, was there really a basis for an uprising against NGO DINH DIEM? I was unable, at this time, to determine this fact. There was an isolated dissidence within the military structure. This was reported in February and March of 1962." pp. 16-17.## SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein## STAFF:R. DAWSON## DATE:30 June 1975## FILE:![DocId: 32423615 Page 30]
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINDATES:February 1962CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated: "In February of 1962, two air force pilots, Vietnamese Air Force pilots, attacked the presidential palace of NGO DINH DIEM. This was not the first indication there was something wrong, because if you will recall, in November of 1960, there was another attempted coup. At that time, in February, I was asked if I would go to the different military leaders which I knew and had known in the past, to find out what was the political pressure, what was the temperature, was there really some dissidence within the military ranks, was there really a basis for an uprising against NGO DINH DIEM? I was unable, at this time, to determine this fact. There was an isolated dissidence within the military structure. This was reported in February and March of 1962." pp. 16-17.SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinFILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:30 June 1975
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NW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 32
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:DIEMDATES:1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: "Most manifestations of political oppostion," wrote Henderson, "were vigorously suppressed. Civil liberties remained an unfulfilled ideal. Elections were far from free and many of the devices used to stimulate popular support for the regime bore the the familiar stamp of modern totalitarian practice. No doubt these moves could be justified, at least to some extent, in terms of the overwhelming problems confronting Diem during his first few years in office and also the inexperience of Free Viet Nam's people with the forms and substance of democracy, but...Diem had still to prove that his professed devotion to the democratic cause represented anything more than a facade to disguise increasingly plain reality of stern dictatorship." (164-165)SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper andRow, 1965STAFF: Dawson, R.DATE: July 2, 1975FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:NGO DINH CANMINISTER OF INTERIORCONCINDATES:1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that: "On May 7, 1963,.... "The MINISTER OF INTERIOR, myself and his entourage flew to Hue in central Vietnam. While in Hue, it was on my aircraft that I assigned to me for that day - while in Hue, they had a very large meeting of different military authorities and at that time I did not realize what was going on. They had met with the President's brother, NGO DINH CAN who was considered the war lord, in a way, and some decisions were made, of which I was not aware of (sic). We returned quite late the night of the 7th; though I wanted to stay, the MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR told me it would be impossible. I wanted to see the celebration of the birthday of Budda. I wanted to see burnt boats with the candles lit going down the perfumed river, but it was not to be. The next day there was an attack by the military forces on the Buddhists. At that time, the Buddhists as an entity was not a political force and therefore thought of being, and when the attack on the Buddhist came about, this was, in my estimation, one of the turning points in what was happening in.SOURCE: Vietnam." p. 19STAFF: R. DAWSONHearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:LODGE, Henry CABOTCONEINDATES:1963CATEGORIES:DEIMOCCURRENCE: "....I worked for Ambassador LODGE. I reported to Ambassador LODGE and I received my instructions from Ambassador LODGE. They were cable instructions, he had a very good habit of not reading something. He would fold a piece of paper and what pertained to you for instructions, he would let you read that and that alone so that you didn't know who was sending it or where it came from. He just read that and he said those are the instructions, do you understand them? Yes, sir; allright, we'll carry them out." p. 23![top secret logo]SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinFILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:20 June 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINDATES:1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: "I had never, and even right up to the very end, I had never been asked for any resources whatsoever to help or to aid in the elimination of any individual." p. 25![top secret logo]SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ConeinFILE:STAFF:R. DAWSONDATE:June 30 1975
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:DawsonNational Security CouncilState DeptOCCURRENCE:DATES:1963CATEGORIES:DiemTOP SECRETColby stated that the policy of the chain of command wanted a determination whether it be by the Security Council or by other authority is made to carry out that policy is normally transferred from the National Security Council to the ambassador. "The ambassador is the President's representative and has overall authority of all agencies in that country, and therefore, an important question like this (the Diem coup) would be passed to the ambassador tohandle. "Now, the other agencies in town would be informed of the policy directive that we might have additional communication as to the details as to how to implement them, which in this case (the Diem coup) were done through directive to our Station Chief to make sure he operated very directly and in-mediately under the control of the ambassador." Page 35.SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ColbySTAFF:DawsonFILE:DATE:7/1/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:Special ForcesColbyDATES:1963CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE:Colby stated that "the Special Forces first arrived in Vietname working for CIA in this country program of developing villages for their own defense. When it got to be as I remember 750 of them the question arose as to whether they should be transferred out of CIA into military control, and this was done during 1963; military took over responsibility for that program and I will have some more words to say about that at another time." Page 28-29.TOP SECRETSOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20,1975, ColbySTAFF:DawsonDATE.NW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 35
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:BUNDY, MC GEORGE, TAYLOR, MAXWELLBALL, GEORGEFORRESTAL, MICHAELHILLSMAN, ROGER; AMBASSADOR NOLTINGMC CONE, JOHN, MC NAMARA, ROBERTGILPATRIC ROSWELLDATES:1963CATEGORIES:DIEM> [Figure: "TOP SECRET" stamp]OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that the persons typically in attendance in the conferenceroom or situation room to discuss matters in Vietnam during 1963, MESSRS. BUNDY, BALL,FORRESTAL, HILLSMAN, MC CONE, MC NAMARA GILPATRIC, TAYLOR. p. 70 COLBY also stated thatgenerally the Attorney General was generally not in attendance. If the meeting was to bewith the President, then it would have been in the Cabinet room and then the AttorneyGeneral would have been there. pp. 70-71, The chairman of the meetings downstairs whichPresident never attended would have been Mr. BUNDY. pp. 71-72 Mr. HARRIMAN would come sotimes, COLBY recalled, and Vice President JOHNSON would always attend the ones upstairs inthe Cabinet room, but did not take a particularly active part. pp. 72 Ambassador NOLTINGwhen he returned, after his replacement in Vietnam took a very active role opposing actionagainst President DIEM to the extent that he was invited to participate. And his advice wanot accepted. p. 73SOURCE:Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, ColbyFILE:STAFF: R. DAWSONDATE: 1 July 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:CONEINDATES:Summer andFall 1963CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE: "There were (sic) not one coup plan. There were several. The problem that wafacing the people that were making assessments of this was which one had the most likelychance of succeeding? We were at the point of no return. There was no chance of going backbecause there was going to be a coup. The best thing to do was to monitor and keep the U.S.government advised of who the principal players were, what their intentions were then and inthe future. It was an impossible situation, and also during this time, it was getting downto the critical element. In October, the generals had to have assurances that I was speakinfor the Ambassador. Several attempts were made to get these assurances, and it was practi-cally impossible because of the security around the generals, who were already suspect...."p. 28> [Figure: "TOP SECRET" stamp]NW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 36
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:DiemDATES:Summer 1963CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE:"....Diem was not conforming to Western standards of democracy. And this was really the heart of the case against him. Implicit in their criticism was the assumption that Occidental style democracy was, in fact, the answer to Oriental Vietnam's problems. It was an assumption with which Ngo Dinh Diem disagreed on both practical and philosophical grounds."SOURCE:"Our Vietnam Nightmare", Marguerite Higgins,Harper & Row, 1965, p. 165FILE:STAFF: DawsonDATE: July 2, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:Thich Tri QuangMcNamaraDiemDATES:Summer, 1963CATEGORIES:DiemOCCURRENCE: Card=1Higgins states in her book that, "Washington generated pressure on Diem for conciliation was based on the assumption that Thich Tri Quang's grievances concerning flags and such were what motivated his Budist protest movement. But it was evident that what Thich Tri Quang wanted was a pretext to see. His objective was not a solution, but nonetheless than Diem's head."Perhaps Diem might have had a better image in the United States if he had personnally shown immediate public concern for the victims of the Hue tragedy. He then instantly order generous indemnification of the families who suffered losses, but this was never publicized. Perhaps he was tooSo inwardly assured of his innocence was Diem that he did not of going through the trouble of proving it. He would certainly(Continued on Card-2) have pleased Madison Ave. boys of the Embassy visiting a one or twobut such strategy would scarcely have appeased Thich Tri Quang, whose trouble was not Diem's image.SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins,Harper and RoweSTAFF: DawsonDATE: July 3, 1975
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:GEN. HUYUH7/63DIEMOCCURRENCE:> TOP SECRETGeneral Huynh Van Cao, Commanding General of IV Corps was never taken into the confidence of the coup principals. The participants preferred to work with Colonel Bui Huu Than, Commander of the 21st Division. With the 7th Division and the 9th Division, the conspirators dealt with regimental commanders and bypassed the division commanders. This tactic applied also to the Marine Brigade and the Airborne Brigade and, to a lesser extent, to the Armor Command.SOURCE:STAFF:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page ten.DawsonDATE:6/30/75FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:GEN. DO CAO TRI7/63DIEMGEN. NGUYEN KHANHGEN. TON THAT DINHGEN. DONOCCURRENCE:> TOP SECRETOther general officers such as Do Cao Tri and Nguyen Khanh were informed of the coup planning but did not actively participate in any of the actual planning. General Ton That Dinh, Commanding General of III Corps, was handled completely differently than any other officer. Division Commanders were contacted by General Don directly or were requested to appear at the Joint General Staff then their military situation permitted or when visiting Saigon.SOURCE:STAFF:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 10.DawsonDATE:6/30/75NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 38
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES: CATEGORIES:7/63 DIEM ✓OCCURRENCE:CONTINUED ON ANOTHER CARD:TOP SECRET 5aeloments of the Fresidential Guard had boen contactedand then e vare early defections duing the fighting. The RangerCourund Tos cot contneted stage Paeger Units were assigned toZollvidual corps and divisions. Those anoigned to coup mitswere sotmed to be loyal to that unit. The Air Force WAS300 para me with the coup plottom with the exceptionSOURCE: STAFF:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, Dawsonpage ten.FILE: DATE: 6/30/75PERSONS/ENTITIES:OCCURRENCE:CONTINUED FROM FIRST CARD:DATES: CATEGORIES:TOP SECRET 5bof its organding officer, Colonel Ikuynh Ram Ein, Dhe medicalservdeo.com-coatacourt azw, mas vàth the cond platters.The nary, alzuys considered faithful to President pien, vno toBull 12vw the ectegory of the Vietaciose Bpactal Focoes withAis qui ser insuing the necessary, pedeps nuder AdvBH,SOURCE: STAFF:Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, Dawsonpage 11.FILE: DATE: 6/30/75NW 50955 DocId:32423615 Page 39
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OCCURRENCE:7/63CATEGORIES:DIEM> TOP SECRETUnfortunately, the officer, a Major (2nd) Thien (phonetic), who had the mission to escort Captain Ho Tan Quyen, Commanding Officer of the Naval Forces, killed the Captain prior to 1200 hours. This nearly upset the timing of the plan. Fortunately, he was driven directly to the Military Hospital and no one knew of his death except the coup principals and the contour loyal to them.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, Page 11.STAFF: DawsonDATE: 6/30/75FILE:PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATE:7/63CATEGORIES:DIEMOCCURRENCE:> TOP SECRETThe Saigon Garrison troops, including support troops such as quartermaster, signal, engineers, etc., were contacted through individual commanders. Vietnamese Special Forces, because of its dubious role as the executive arm of the secret police, was never contacted but was always considered by the Generals as being completely loyal to President Diem.SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 10-11.STAFF: DawsonDATE: 6/30/7FILE:NW 50955 DocId: 32423615 Page 40