Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10100.pdf — page 69]
-6-After the BAY OF PIGS, Gray called President EISENHOWER and offered to show him all of the memos that Gray had prepared on Presidential meetings on Cuba. Gray said that JOHN EISENHOWER obtained the memos and brought them to Gettysburg. Gray and President EISENHOWER reviewed the memos. Gray said that the President objected to the word "planning" in reference to a Cuban invasion, on the basis that there was no actual military planning. EISENHOWER suggested that the page should be retyped to change the word "planning". Gray said they did retype the page.Gray said that although in his mind and EISENHOWER's, there was no military "planning", definitely EISENHOWER knew that Cuban exiles were being trained for an amphibious landing in Cuba.President EISENHOWER went so far in contingency planning, said Gray, as to advocate to Allen DULLES the formation of a government in exile among the Cuban community. But, Gray said, the Cubans could never settle among themselves who would constitute the leadership of such a government.Referring to the minutes of Special Group meeting of August 12, 1960, Gray remembers the presentation by Richard BISSELL of a budget for Cuban operations over 13 million dollars, with a heavy emphasis on paramilitary operations. Gray said that the reference at the end of the memo to laying this budget before "higher authorities" for approval clearly referred to President EISENHOWER.Referring to the minutes of the Special Group meeting of November 3, 1960, at which MERCHANT asked a question about whether there had been planning "for taking direct positive action against FIDEL, RAUL, and CHE GUEVARA," Gray said![TOP SECRET]
[157-10014-10100.pdf — page 70]
-7-that he did not remember the meeting. Gray acknowledged, however, that the phrase "direct positive action" in this context "could have included assassination." Gray said that the reaction by General CABELL that such action would be beyond CIA capabilities, was the "usual DCI reaction".Referring to the Special Group minutes of December 28, 1960, Gray said that "the special meeting" mentioned therein is clearly a meeting with the President. Gray though that this must have been the last meeting on Cuba with the President, the purpose of which would have been to clean up the Cuba project for the new administration. Gray said that there must have been dozens of meetings on Cuba (all of which will be reflected in the Gray memos in Abilene).CASTRO/GAMBLING SYNDICATE OPERATION, PHASE IGray said that he was *completely unaware* of any conversation between Richard BISSELL and Sheffield EDWARDS about establishing underworld contacts for the purpose of an assassination attempt on CASTRO. Gray also said that he was unaware of any development, within the Technical Services Division of the CIA, of assassination devices to be used against CASTRO such as lethal cigars. Likewise, he was unaware of the development of any devices designed for the disorientation or embarrassment of CASTRO.Gray said that he knew *BISSELL well*, but not EDWARDS.Gray said that, if such operations were in progress, the DCI should have known about them. Gray said that if the DCI knew about such operations, "he would have raised it at the Special Group or with me. He didn't. I think I would have known if Allen DULLES had discussed such subjects with the President."Gray said that it was possible that BISSELL was acting unilaterally on this![image of top secret watermark]
[157-10014-10100.pdf — page 71]
-8-matter. Gray said that he'd talked to Andrew GOODPASTER about the recentnews stories which indicate that there was assassination planning againstCASTRO during this period of time, and GOODPASTER said that he'd neverheard about such things.EXECUTIVE ACTION"I never heard of EXECUTIVE ACTION until David BELIN mentioned it tome."ASSASSINATIONS GENERALLYGray said that he remembered two mentions of assassination: (1) WhenNASSAR was riding high, someone at the planning board said "we ought to bumphim off". But Gray said this was not a serious discussion. Assassination wasnot an option that went to the President. (2) At the PFIAB meetings, onemember consistently would ask the CIA "about bumping off the leadership inHanoi". Gray did not think this was a serious suggestion. Gray said themember who suggested this is "well-known" and he was reluctant to provide thename to us."I followed closely any covert operations I was interested in." Gray saidthat "if I had known of any assassination attempt, I probably would have called"the responsible official to stay abreast. He said he didn't know of any suchattempts.> ![TOP SECRET]
[157-10014-10100.pdf — page 72]
# Interview Questions For Gordon GrayTRUJILLO1. MEMO of July 1, 1960 from J.C. King, (Chief, WHD) to Acting DCI Raheit recommending the delivery of arms (high-powered rifles with telescopic scopes) to the opposition of TRUJILLO. The Memo says that "APPROVAL FOR DELIVERY OF THESE ARMS HAS BEEN GIVEN BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ROY RUBOTTOM".-Aneminem Were there any proceedings of the Special Group at this time which authorized delivery of arms? (We don't have record of any authorization until January 12, 1961 S.G. Minutes)-If not, did the DCI and Assistant Secretary of State exceed their authority?-Generally, what was the procedure in the Eisenhower administratior for handling the approval of such a project?-Could the DCI approve it under his own authority?-Did the Assistant Secretary of State exceed his authority by not requesting receiving approval foom the Secy of Stat-Shouldn't the Special Group have been consulted?[^1]2. SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES of 12 JANUARY 1962. GRAY was present. The Group approves shipment of arms to "dissidents inside the Dominican Republic".-Do you Em remember this event? Are the minutes accurarte?-What was the policy behind the approval?-Weren't the weapons intended for use in assassination?[^1]: 1
[157-10014-10100.pdf — page 73]
To: FilesFrom: FDBRe: NOTES ON TESTIMONY OF ROBERT H. JOHNSON (6/18/75)Date: 7/5/75Biographical Background1951-62 National Security Council staff member1962-67 State Department, member of Policy Planning CouncilChronology of EventsSummer, 1960 Johnson attended a meeting of the NSC to discuss developments in the CONGO. "At some time during that discussion, President EISENHOWER said something -- I can no longer remember his words -- that came across to me as an order for the assassination of LUMUMBA...There was no discussion; the meeting simply moved on."--Johnson said he might have omitted the statement from his de-briefing memo due to its sensitivity.-- J. said probably Allen DULLES and Gordon GRAY were present at the meeting (in the Cabinet Room).--The formal record of decision by the NSC is unlikely to contain infommation on this subject, he said.--The memos which Johnson did on the meetings would be with President Eisenhower's papers. (10)"I was surprised ...that I would ever hear a President say anything like this in my presence or the presence of a group of people. I was startled."
[157-10014-10109.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystemIdentification FormDate: 7/8/2015Agency InformationAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10109RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-15Document InformationORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM:TO:TITLE:DATE: 06/25/1975PAGES: 19SUBJECTS: HARVEY, WILLIAMZRRIFLEOPERATION MONGOOSEDOCUMENT TYPE: REPORTCLASSIFICATION: DeclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: IB; ICCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/08/2000OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: CCBOX 418
[157-10014-10109.pdf — page 1]
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMDate: 08/06/95Page : 1AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10109RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-15DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIAFROM :TO :TITLE :DATE : 06/25/75PAGES : 19SUBJECTS : HARVEY, WILLIAMOPERATION MONGOOSEZRRIFLEDOCUMENT TYPE : REPORTCLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRETRESTRICTIONS : REFERREDCURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULLDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS : CCBOX 418[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[157-10014-10109.pdf — page 2]
# TDPBOX 418MEETING 25 JUNE 75
[157-10014-10109.pdf — page 3]
# AGENDATWENTY-FOURTH MEETING OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES10:00 A.M. ON JUNE 25, 1975 IN 457 RUSSELL BUILDINGTestimony by Mr. William Harvey![inventory record]NW. 50955 DocId: 32423497 Page 4
[157-10014-10109.pdf — page 4]
TOP SECRETWILLIAM HARVEYShort Chronology*Biographical1940-47 Counterespionage work as FBI agent1947 Joined CIA as head of Soviet Intelligence Branch1948 Deputy Assistant Director, Office of SpecialOperations (which became DDP)1952 Chief of Station, Berlin (Berlin Tunnel operation)1959 Became Chief of Foreign Intelligence staff DivisionD (FI/D) which handles communications intelligenceand sensitive methods of obtaining it (*e.g.*,surreptitious entries)1960August 16 DR. EDWARD GUNN (Office of Medical Services)receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated withlethal poison. (21)1961Late January EDWARDS and O'CONNELL ask for development of(approx.) POISON PILLS. (24)February BISSELL (DDP) asks HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE(approx.) ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. Harvey'snotes are quoted as saying that Bissell said hehad been "twice urged by the White House" toestablish such a capability. (37) Harvey isbriefed, probably by both BISSELL and EDWARDS, onthe Phase I assassination plot run by SheffieldEDWARDS and James O'CONNELL (Office of Security)which involved criminal syndicate connections. (37)HARVEY uses agent QJWIN (recruited earlier byARNOLD SILVER for use in an assassination operationagainst LUMUMBA) as the principle asset for ZRRIFLE.(38)Edwards has the POISON PILLS tested. (25)* Page references in parentheses are from the 1967 Report of the Inspector  General of the CIA.
[157-10014-10109.pdf — page 5]
TOP SECRET                                                                            21961 (cont'd)Early Feb.             According to Dr. GUNN, HARVEY asked about thepills he tested. Gunn briefed Harvey, who toldhim to brief SIDNEY GOTTLIEB about techniquesbut not targets. (27)Late Feb.              Pills given to ROSELLI by O'CONNELL are passedto TRAFFICANTE. (27) ROSELLI reports to O'CONNELLthat pills reached ORTA in Cuba. ORTA returnspills in couple weeks. (27)March-Early April       O'CONNELL gives pills and money to ROSELLI whopasses them to VARONA. (32)Mid-April              Bay of Pigs invasion fails; JFK appoints TaylorCommittee.November 15            Beginning of PHASE II: BISSELL instructs HARVEY toapply the ZRRIFLE assassination capability toCastro. (39) Harvey takes over the criminal syndicatecontacts developed in Phase I. (39) HARVEY is toldby HELMS that he is to take over the CIA Cubatask force. (39)November 29            MC CONE replaces Allen Dulles as DCI1962February               EDWARDS briefs HARVEY on Castro operation. (40)February 7             EDWARDS meets with FBI to ask them not to prosecutethe Rowan wiretap case because of CIA concern. (60)February 19            HELMS (DDP nominee) authorizes HARVEY to handleZRRIFLE project with unvouchered funds. (38)April 8-9              HARVEY, ROSELLI, O'CONNELL, and perhaps MAHEU meetin New York to plan Phase II. (43) (Harvey disputesO'Connell's recollection that Maheu was there andknowledgeable of Phase II.) Both Edwards andHarvey check with HELMS before the meeting isarranged and HARVEY obtains Helm's approval not tobrief MC CONE (41). Harvey thereafter beginsregular reporting to Helms on Phase II. (41)April 14               HARVEY, ROSELLI, and O'CONNELL meet in Miami. (46)April 18-19            Pills are delivered to Harvey in Washington. (46)NW 50955 DocId:32423497 Page 6
[157-10014-10109.pdf — page 6]
TOP SECRET1962 (cont'd)April 21 HARVEY passes the pills to ROSELLI in Florida. (47)Roselli was to give the pills to Varona, who had anasset in Cuba with access to Castro's restaurant.At this point Roselli is using Tony VARONA and"MACEO" as contacts with Cuba rather than Trafficante.(47-8)Late April HARVEY, with help of Ted SHACKLEY (Chief of JMWAVEstation in Miami), loaded arms and equipment in aU-Haul truck which was left in a parking lot forRoselli, who delivered it to a Cuban contact. (49-50)Throughout May Intense contact between HARVEY and ROSELLI. Rosellireports that pills are in Cuba at the restaurantfrequented by Castro awaiting the opportunity touse them. (50)May 7 EDWARDS and HOUSTON brief ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F.KENNEDY on PHASE I of the assassination operation. (62a)*May 14 Edwards tells HARVEY of the briefing of RFK. (65)Harvey says that he briefed HELMS about this andadvised against briefing McCone (DCI) or Carter(DDCI); Helms agreed. (65)HARVEY is told by EDWARDS that the "tacit approval"of the DCI should be obtained if Roselli was to beused any further. (65) Harvey told Edwards thatRoselli would not be used any more. (According toEdwards' memorandum of 5/14/62.) (42)June 21 ROSELLI tells HARVEY that VARONA has sent three mento Cuba to recruit others for the pill plot. (51)August 10 Special Group (Augmented) meets on OPERATION MONGOOSE.HARVEY and MC CONE said that MCNAMARA raised thesubject of assassinations at this meeting in regardto new plans.August 13 General LANSDALE'S memorandum assigns to HARVEY thedrafting of an outline of intelligence, political,economic, and paramilitary activities for theimplementation of MONGOOSE. The task includesplanning for "splitting the regime, including liquida-tion of leaders".* RFK asks to be told before the CIA works with the Mafia again. (62a)
[157-10014-10109.pdf — page 7]
TOP SECRET1962 (cont'd)August 14HARVEY writes a memorandum to DDP HELMS saying that he advised Lansdale's aide FRANK HAND to excise the words "including liquidation of leaders" from the LANSDALE memo because of "the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document". Harvey also tells Helms that he has "careful notes" on MC NAMARA'S discussion of assassination at the Special Group meeting of August 10.SeptemberPills still in place; HARVEY learns that VARONA is ready to send another team to Cuba. (51)OctoberCUBAN MISSILE CRISIS1963FebruaryHARVEY and ROSELLI agree in Los Angeles to call off the operation, although not to break precipitously with VARONA. (52)JuneHARVEY and ROSELLI have last dinner in Washington and are observed by SAM PAPICH of the FBI, who has ROSELLI under intensive surveillance. Harvey asks Papich to let him know if HOOVER is going to call MC CONE. (53-4) Harvey briefs Helms and Helms agrees not to brief McCone unless it appears that McCone will receive a call from Hoover. (54)August 16Spurred by a Chicago newspaper story of the same day, HELMS sends MC CONE the Edwards memo of 5/14/62 of the RFK briefing. (69)
[157-10014-10109.pdf — page 8]
SEGRETEYES ONLY14 May 1962MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:SUBJECT: John RosselliINVENTORIED:ON MAR 2 1977BY1. In early April Mr. William Harvey asked me to arrange a contact with Subject. The meeting in New York City was arranged for 9 April. I explained to Mr. Harvey that the undersigned would take no part in future operations proposed for Subject.2. In the interim I have kept Mr. Harvey fully informed reference to my briefing of The Attorney General on the former project and cautioned him that I felt that any future projects of this nature should have the tacit approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.3 On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that he was dropping any plans for the use of Subject for the future.![signature of Sheffield Edwards]Sheffield EdwardsDirector of SecurityIVES CALYSEGRETNW 50955 DocId: 32423497 Page 9
[157-10014-10109.pdf — page 9]
# OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEWASHINGTON 25, D.C.13 August 1962MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIAROBERT HURWITCH, STATEGEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSEDON WILSON, USIAFrom: Brig. Gen. Lansdale EdSubject: Alternate Course BIn compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course E for submission. The CIA paper "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)" will be used as the starting basis.Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the outline paper for submission. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of Crane.Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, deception), and Paramilitary. Economic (sabotage, limited). Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.SEC DEF CONTR No. X-1530 EXCLUDED FROM GDSNW 50955 DocId:32423497 Page 10
[157-10014-10109.pdf — page 10]
SECRETSENSITIVEEVES ONLYHELMIS EX2.6/13/7514 August 1962MAR 21 1977MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)SUBJECT : Operation MONGOOSE1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information.2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were "including liquidation of leaders."3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so.NW 50955 DocId: 32423497 Page 11SECRET EVES ONLYSENSITIVE
[157-10014-10109.pdf — page 11]
5. For your information also, in your absence and since the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above.![Signature]WILLIAM K. HARVEYChief, Task Force WAttachmentMemo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62
[157-10014-10109.pdf — page 12]
# SECRETProject ZRRIFLE1.  Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use agent assets for Division D operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.2.  Objectives: The objective of this project is the procurement of code and cipher materials, and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services, primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.3.  Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely![NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions]![RECEIVED FROM SECRET JUN 24 1975 CIA Classified by 007789 Exempt from ceneral declassification schedule of E.O. 11252 exemption schedule 53 (1), (2), (3) Automatically declassified on Date Impossible to Determine]NW 50955 DocId:32423497 Page 13
[157-10014-10109.pdf — page 13]
control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which isin closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct theactivity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justifyremoving from the OOA category.4. Operational Assets:(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principalagent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJWIN was firstcontacted in 1958 through the Chief of the Luxembourg I. S. by the Chief ofStation, Luxembourg, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation intothe United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contactedsporadically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Marcotics.Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJWIN. InOctober 1960,
[157-10014-10109.pdf — page 14]
SEGRET                                                                                                      3QJWIN annual salary:                                                                                             $7,200Travel & ops expenses for QJWIN &other agents & agent condidates:                                                                           2,000Fees for services by and standby of agentsand agent candidates:                                                                                             2,000Travel of staff employees engaged inARRIFLE activity:                                                                                                2,500Hire of safehouses, automobiles and otheroperational expenses:                                                                                               1,000$14,700Pay for agents on completion of jobs?1) Legal, ethical-morale, operational problems; political: non-attributability.2) Our own experience (Bangkok) (and effect on DDP) and experiences with   KGB (Crossup, Bandera groups, Khokhlov) - require most professional,   proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, *CE-experienced* ops   officers (few available), able to conduct patient search and with guts to   pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, and w/known high   regard for operational security. Assessments are all-important.3) Maximum security:a. Kubark only (e.g., what does Siragusa now know?); no approachto other Government agencies.b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control, search, *training*case officering, etc. DDP authority in this focal point mandatory                                                                                                     RECEIVED FROM                                                                                                           JUN 24 1975SEGRET                                                                                                             CIANW 50955 DocId:32423497 Page 15