Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 79]
-8-It is clear that President Nixon wanted him (Helms) to encourage the Chilean military to cooperate or to take the initiative in preventing Allende from taking office. (Kissinger testimony, p. 12)Operationally, the CIA set the President's instructions into motion on September 21. On that day two cables were sent from CIA Headquarters to Santiago informing the CIA Chief of Station (COS) of his new directive:3. Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende as- sumption of power. Parliamentary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective.   (Hqs. to Stn. 236, 21 September 1970)***B. (Track Two)--This is authority granted to CIA only, to work toward a military solution to problem. As part of authority we were explicitly told that 40 Committee, State, Ambassador and Embassy were not to be told of this Track Two nor involved in any matter. (Hqs. to Stn. 240, 21 September 1970).B. Background: Tracks I and IIUnited States Government concern over an Allende regime in Chile did not begin with President Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CIA.* For more than a year, Chile had been on the 40 Committee's agenda.At an April 15, 1969, meeting of the 303 Committee (the predecessor of the 40 Committee) the question arose as to whether anything should be done with regard to the September 1970 Presidential election in Chile.At that time, Director Helms pointed out that "an election operation will* Covert U.S. Government involvement in large-scale political action programs in Chile began with the 1964 Presidential election. As in 1970, this was in response to the perceived threat of Salvadore Allende. Over $3 million was spent by the CIA in the 1964 effort. (Colby testimony, July 14, 1975, p. 5)
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 80]
-y-not be effective unless an early enough start is made.* On March 25, 1970, the 40 Committee approved a joint Embassy/CIA proposal recommending that "spoiling" operations--propaganda and other activities--be undertaken by the CIA in an effort to prevent an election victory by Allende's Popular Unity (UP) Coalition. A total of $135,000 was authorized by the 40 Committee for this anti-Allende activity. On June 18, 1970, the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, submitted a two-phase proposal to the Department of State and the CIA for review. The first phase involved an increase in support to the anti-Allende campaign. The second was a contingency plan to make "a $500,000 effort in Congress to persuade certain shifts in voting on 24 October 1970." Phase II was, stated simply, a proposal to bribe Chilean Congressmen to vote against Allende should he win a plurality in the September 4 election. On June 27, 1970, the 40 Committee increased funding for the anti-Allende "spoiling" operation to $390,000. A decision on Ambassador Korry's bribe proposal was deferred pending the results of the September 4 election.The 40 Committee met twice between the time Allende received a plurality of the popular vote on September 4 and President Nixon issued his instruction to Director Helms on September 15.** At both these meetings the question of U.S. involvement in a military coup against Allende was raised. Kissinger stressed the importance of these meetings when he testified before the Select Committee:*This and other references to 40 Committee discussions and actions regarding Chile are contained in a memorandum provided to the Committee by the CIA entitled "Policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election," dated October 9, 1970. On August 25, 1975, we subpoenaed all White House/National Security Council documents and records relating to the effort by the United States Government to prevent Salvadore Allende from assuming office. On September 4, the Committee received 46 documents from the White House relating to Chile covering the period September 5 to October 14, 1970.**See Page 9a.
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TOP SEGRET- 9a -**Following the September 4 election, the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence circulated an intelligence community assessment of the impact of an Allende government on U.S. national interests. That assessment, dated September 7, 1970, stated:Regarding threats to U.S. interests, we conclude that:1.  The U.S. has no vital national interests within Chile. There would, however, be tangible economic losses.2.  The world military balance of power would not be significantly altered by an Allende government.3.  An Allende victory would, however, create considerable political and psychological costs:    a. Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened by the challenge that an Allende government would pose to the OAS, and by the reactions that it would create in other countries. We do not see, however, any likely threat to the peace of the region.    b. An Allende victory would represent a definite psychological set-back to the U.S. and a definite psychological advance for the Marxist idea. (Intelligence Memorandum/ "Situation Following the Chilean Presidential Election," CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, 7 September 1970)TOP SECRETNW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 82
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I think the meeting of September 15th has to be seen in the context of two previous meetings of the 40 Committee on September 8th and September 14th in which the 40 Committee was asked to look at the pros and cons and the problems and prospects of a Chilean military coup to be organized with United States assistance.(Kissinger testimony, p. 5)According to the summary of the 40 Committee meeting on September 8, the following was discussed:...all concerned realized that previous plans for a Phase II would have to be drastically redrawn.... The DCI made the point, however, that congressional action against Allende was not likely to succeed and that once Allende was in office the Chilean opposition to him would disintegrate and collapse rapidly. While not advocating a specific course of action, the Director further observed that a military golpe against Allende would have very little chance of success unless undertaken soon. Both the Chairman and the Attorney General supported this view.... At the close of the...meeting the Chairman directed the Embassy to prepare a "cold-blooded assessment" of:1) the pros and cons and problems and prospects involved should a Chilean military coup be organized now with U.S. assistance, and2) the pros and cons and problems and prospects involved in organizing an effective future Chilean opposition to Allende.(CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970)Ambassador Korry responded to the 40 Committee's request for a "cold-blooded assessment" on September 12. He stated that "We /the Embassy/ believe it now clear that Chilean military will not, repeat not, move to prevent Allende's accession, barring unlikely situation of national chaos and widespread violence." The Ambassador went on to say that "Our own military people /are/ unanimous in rejecting possi-![image of top secret stamp]
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 83]
- 10a -bility of meaningful military intervention in political situation."He concluded by stating: "What we are saying in this 'cold-blooded assessment' is that opportunities for further significant USG action with the Chilean military are nonexistent." (Memorandum/Ambassador's Response to Request for Analysis of Military Option in Present Chilean Situation, 12 September 1970)The CIA's response was in the same vein. Viron Vaky, Kissinger's assistant for Latin American affairs on the NSC staff, summarized the CIA's "cold-blooded assessment" in a memo to his boss: "Military action is impossible; the military is incapable and unwilling to seize power. We have no capability to motivate or instigate a coup." (Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger/Chile--40 Committee Meeting, Monday--September 14,September 14, Viron P. Vaky)On September 14, the 40 Committee met to discuss these reports and what action was to be taken:Particular attention was devoted to a CIA prepared review of political and military options in the Chilean electoral situation based on the Embassy' and Station's "cold-blooded assessment." The Committee focused on the so-called "Rube Goldberg" gambit which would see Alessandri elected by the Congress on October 24th, resigning thereafter to leave Frei constitutionally free to run in a second election for the presidency.TOP SECRETNW 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 84
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# -11-Ambassador Korry was asked to go directly to President Frei to see if he would be willing to commit himself to this line of action. A contingency of $250,000 was approved for "covert support of projects which Frei or his trusted team deem important." It was further agreed that a propaganda campaign be undertaken by the Agency to focus on the damage of an Allende takeover....(CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970)Following the September 14 Forty Committee meeting and President Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CIA, U.S. Government efforts to prevent Allende from assuming office proceeded on two tracks. Track I comprised all covert activities approved by the 40 Committee, including the $250,000 contingency fund to bribe Chilean congressmen as well as propaganda and economic activities. These activities were designed to induce the opponents to Allende in Chile to prevent his assumption of power, either through political or military means. Track[^1][^1]: The terms Track I and Track II were known only to CIA and White House officials who were knowledgeable about the President's September 15 order to the CIA. The Committee sent letters to various senior officials inquiring if they were, in fact, not knowledgeable of the Track II activities. Those letters were sent to Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Under-secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer, NSC Staff Member for Latin America Viron P. Vaky, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research Ray S. Cline, and the Deputy Chief of Mission in Santiago Harry W. Shlaudeman. Thus far the Committee has received written responses from Messrs. Moorer, Johnson, Vaky, Shlaudeman and Cline. All except Cline have indicated that they had no knowledge of the Track II activity at the time; Cline indicated he heard of the activities in a general way, from his subordinate who handled 40 Committee work and from former associates at the CIA. In oral communications with Committee staff members, Secretaries Rogers and Laird have indicated they were unaware of Track II.
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-12-II activities in Chile were undertaken in response to President Nixon'sSeptember 15 order and were directed towards actively promoting andencouraging the Chilean military to move against Allende. In his testimonybefore the Committee, Kissinger stressed the links between TracksI and II:...There was work by all of the agencies to try toprevent Allende from being seated, and there waswork by all of the agencies on the so-called TrackI to encourage the military to move against Allende...the difference between the September 15th meet-ing and what was being done in general within thegovernment was that President Nixon was encouraginga more direct role for the CIA in actually organiz-ing such a coup. (Kissinger testimony, p. 13)Tracks I and II did, in fact, move together in the month afterSeptember 15. The authorization to Ambassador Korry, who was formallyexcluded from Track II, to encourage a military coup became broader andbroader. In the 40 Committee meeting on September 14, he and other"appropriate members of the Embassy Mission" were authorized to inten-sify their contacts with Chilean military officers to assess theirwillingness to support the "Frei gambit"--a voluntary turn-over ofpower to the military by Frei, who would then have been eligible torun for President in new elections. (Memorandum/Policy Decisions Relatedto Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presiden-tial Election, 9 October 1970)In a situation report to Dr. Kissinger and Assistant SecretaryCharles Meyer on September 21, Ambassador Korry indicated that in orderto make the Frei gambit work, "if necessary, General Schneider would
[157-10014-10137.pdf — page 86]
-13-have to be neutralized, by displacement if necessary."* (Korry toMeyer and Kissinger/Situation Report, 21 September 1970) In testifying,Kissinger felt the Korry report indicated "the degree to which TrackI and Track II were merging, that is to say, that individuals on TrackI were working on exactly the same problem as the CIA was working onTrack II." (Kissinger testimony, p. 21)Ambassador Korry's activites in Chile between September 4 andOctober 24 support Kissinger's view that the line separating Track Iand Track II often became blurred. For example, the Ambassador wasauthorized to make his contacts in the Chilean military aware that ifAllende were seated, the military could expect no further militaryassistance (MAP) from the United States. Later, in response to his ownrecommendation, Korry was authorized to inform the Chilean military thatall MAP and military sales were being held in abeyance pending the outcomeof the Congressional election on October 24. On October 7, AmbassadorKorry received the following cable from Kissinger and Under Secretary* In this same situation report, Ambassador Korry related a message that  he had sent to President Frei through his Defense Minister indicating  the economic pressures that would be brought to bear on Chile should  Allende assume office.Frei should know that not a nut or bolt will beallowed to reach Chile under Allende. OnceAllende comes to power we shall do all withinour power to condemn Chile and the Chileans toutmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designedfor a long time to come to accelerate the hardfeatures of a Communist society in Chile. Hence,for Frei to believe that there will be much ofan alternative to utter misery, such as seeingChile muddle through, would be strictly illusory.The use of economic instruments as levers on Frei and the Chileanmilitary was a persistent subject of White House/CIA discussionsand of instructions to the field. Helms' notes from the September15 meeting with the President and Kissinger included the notation"make the economy scream." Economic leverage was the primarytopic of a September 18 White House meeting involving Kissinger,Helms and Karamessines.
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-14-of State U.Alexis Johnson:2. ...you are now authorized to inform discreetly the Chilean military through the channels available to you that if a successful effort is made to block Allende from taking office, we would reconsider the cuts we have thus far been forced to make in Chilean MAP and otherwise increase our presently programmed MAP for the Chilean Armed Forces.... If any steps the military should take should result in civil disorder, we would also be prepared promptly to deliver support and material that might be immediately required. (Hqs. to Stn. 075517, 7 October 1970)The essential difference between Tracks I and II, as evidenced by instructions to Ambassador Korry during this period, was not that Track II was coup-oriented and Track I was not. Both had this objective in mind. The difference between the two tracks was, simply, that the CIA's direct contacts with the Chilean military, and its active promotion and support for a coup, were to be known only to a small group of individuals in the White House and the CIA. Kissinger testified that Track II matters were to be reported directly to the White House "for reasons of security." (Kissinger testimony, p. 14) Thomas Karamessines, the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans at the time and the principal CIA contact with the White House on Track II matters, testified on his understanding of why State, Defense, the 40 Committee and Ambassador Korry were excluded from Track II:That was not a decision that we made. But the best I can do is suggest that there was concern about two things. Number one, that there might be serious objections lodged, for example, by the State Department particularly if Track 2 were to be laid out at a Forty Committee meeting. "And the only other thing I can contribute to that is that it was felt that the security of the activity would be better protected if knowledge of it were limited. (Karamessines testimony, p. 122)
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C. CIA Views of Difficulty of ProjectOn one point the testimony of CIA officials who were involved inTrack II is unanimous: they all said they thought Track II was unlikely to succeed. That view ran from the working levels of the Agency to the top. They all said they felt they were being asked to do the impossible, that the risks and potential costs of the project were too great. At the same time, they felt they had been given an explicit Presidential order, and they tried to execute that order.A few excerpts from the testimony follow:Richard Helms, CIA Director...my heart sank over this meeting, because...the possibility of bringing off something like this seemed to me at that time to be just as remote as anything could be. In practical terms, the Army was constitutionalist....And when you look here at the time frame in which the man was suddenly asking you to accomplish something, it seemed really almost inconceivable....What I came away from the meeting with the distinct impression that we were being asked to do almost the impossible and trying to indicate this was going to be pretty tough.... (Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, pp. 6-7)David Phillips, Chief, Chile Task Force...it is my feeling that the odds are unacceptable, it is something that is not going to work, and we are going to be burned if we get into it ...what are the chances of pulling off a coup successfully, or in any way stopping Allende from assuming the presidency?...we never even got to two chances out of 20. (Phillips testimony, p. 16)...I assure you that those people that I was in touch with at the Agency just about universally said, my God, why are we given this assignment? (Phillips testimony, p. 53).James Flannery, Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere DivisionThere was just no question that we had to make this effort, no matter what the odds were. And I think that most people felt that the odds were just pretty long. (Flannery testimony, p. 20)
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-16-Further, CIA officials believed their judgment of the endeavor's difficulty was known to the White House. Helms commented on the September 15th meeting: "So realizing all of these things, I'm relatively certain that day that I pointed out this is going to be awfully tough." (Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, p. 16) Karamessines recalled pointing out to the President that "the Chilean military seemed to be disorganized and unwilling to do anything. And without their wanting to do something, there did not seem to be much hope." (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)
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III. CIA's Implementation of Track IIA. Evolution of CIA StrategyThe President's instruction to the CIA on September 15 to prevent Allende's assumption of power was given in the context of a broad U.S. Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 instruction to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military circles, there was little indication that it would actually take place without active U.S. encouragement and support.There was much talk among Chilean officers about the possibility of some kind of coup...but this was not the kind of talk that was being backed by, you know, serious organizational planning.(Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 32)1. The "Constitutional Coup" ApproachAlthough efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende victory continued simultaneous with Track II, the Agency premised its activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end.On September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago:Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power. Paramilitary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective.(Hqs. 236, Sept. 21, 1970, para. 3)The initial strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promoting a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency decided to promise "help in any election which was an outgrowth of a successful military takeover." (Nov. 18, 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger)Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve the Congress, and proclaim a new election. A private U.S. citizen who had been a conduit for CIA funds to Frei's 1964 campaign was sent to see him
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with this message on September 24. (Task Force Log, September 23)Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, testified:So this was in a sense not Track II, but in a sense another aspect of a quiet and hopefully non-violent military coup.... This was abandoned when the military were reluctant to push Frei publicly...and, number two, Frei was reluctant to leave on his own in the absence of pressure from the military.... There was left as the only chance of success a straight military coup. (Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1975, p. 6)At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported:Strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor Schneider will act. For that reason any scenario in which either has to play an active role now appears utterly unrealistic. Overtures to lower echelon officers (e.g., Valenzuela) can of course be made. This involves promoting Army split. (Stn. to Hqs. 424, September 23, 1970)2. Military SolutionPresident Frei's failure even to attempt to persuade his own party convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende ended all hope of using him to prevent an Allende presidency. (November 18 memo, Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October, it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leader- ship of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneider, constituted a stumbling block. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970; Santiago 439, September 30, 1970) The Agency's task was to cause a coup in a highly unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented by Frei's inaction, Schneider's strong constitutionalism, and the absence of organization and enthusiasm among those officers who were interested in a coup.A three-fold program was set into motion: