Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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a. Collect intelligence on coup-minded officers;b. Create a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation, and terrorist activities intended to provoke the left to give a pretext for a coup; *(Hqs. 611, October 7, 1970)c. Inform those coup-minded officers that the U.S. Government would give them full support in a coup short of direct U.S. military intervention. (Hqs. 762, October 14, 1970)## B. The Chile Task ForceBecause of the highly sensitive nature of the operation, a special task force was created in the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division to manage it. The task force was placed under the daily direction of the Deputy Director for Plans, Thomas Karamessines, and a group of the Agency's most experienced and skilled operators were detailed to the task force.*A cable sent from CIA Headquarters to Santiago on October 19 focused on creating an appropriate justification for a coup. The cable stated:1. It still appears that Ref A coup has no pretext or justification that it can offer to make it acceptable in Chile or Latin America. It therefore would seem necessary to create one to bolster what will probably be their claim to a coup to save Chile from communism... You may wish include variety of themes in justification of coup to military for their use. These could include but are not limited to: A) Firm intel. that Cubans planned to reorganize all intelligence services along Soviet/Cuban mold thus creating structure for police state.... B) Economic situation collapsing.... C) By quick recognition of Cuba and Communist countries Allende assumed U.S. would cut off material assistance to Armed Forces thus weakening them as constitutional barriers. Would then empty armories to Communist Peoples Militia with task to run campaign of terror based on alleged labor and economic sabotage (Use some quotes from Allende on this.)2. Station has written some excellent prop guidances. Using themes at hand and which best known to you we are now asking you to prepare intel report based on some well known facts and some fiction to justify coup, split opposition, and gain adherents for military group. With appropriate military contact can determine how to "discover" intel report which could even be planted during raids planned by Carabineros.3. We urge you to get this idea and some concrete suggestions to plotters as soon as you can. Coup should have a justification to prosper. (Headquarters 882, 19 October 1970).
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David A. Phillips, Chief of Station in Rio de Janeiro, was summoned back to Washington to head the operation. With the exception of the Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy James Flannery and the head of the Chile Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware of the task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had responsibility for Chile. The task force had a special communications channel to Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic about Track II. (November 18, 1970, Helms to Kissinger memo, page 3) Most of the significant operational decisions were made by Phillips, Broe and Karamessines, who met on a daily basis.It should be noted that all those involved with the task force described the pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed, Karamessines has said that Kissinger "left no doubt in my mind that he was under the heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was placing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished." (Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, page 7) The Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, James Flannery, testified that pressure was "as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme." (Flannery testimony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just constant, constant.... Just continual pressure.... It was coming from the White House." (Broe testimony, August 4, 1975, page 55)C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency RelationsThe CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the Chilean military to carry out its task. However, the U.S. Army Attache in Santiago, Colonel Paul Wimert, knew the Chilean military
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Every well due to his five years of service there and his broad personal contacts among the Chilean officers. Following a proposal by the Chief of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting intelligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military, the senior military which we had not maintained and did not have, but which we felt confident that our military representative in Chile had.... And we got the approval of the DIA to enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to procure intelligence.(Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested message for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28, 1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized transmission of a message directing the Army Attache:...to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence, his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal military figures who might play a decisive role in any move which might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense Attache of this message, or give them any indication of its portent. In the course of your routine activities, act in accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously, I wish and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion with the CAS chief.[^1] General Bennett returned to the United States on the evening of October 10, 1970. General Philpott was Acting Director in Bennett's absence.[^1]: General Bennett returned to the United States on the evening of October 10, 1970. General Philpott was Acting Director in Bennett's absence.
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-22-This message is for your eyes only, and should not be discussed with any person other than those CAS officers who will be knowledgeable. CAS will identify them. (Headquarters 380 to Santiago)For this and all subsequent messages intended for the Army Attache, the secret CIA communications channel was used.Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that initially the Army Attache would be used only to "obtain or procure" intelligence on Chilean military officers.* (Philpott, p. 11; Karamessines, p. 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the Army Attache, however, did in fact trigger his deep involvement in the coup attempt. According to the Attache's testimony, he received day-to-day instructions from the Chief of Station, and on occasion, the COS would show him messages ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him to take certain actions. The COS also transmitted messages from the Army Attache to these Generals.General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track II and that he never received any communication relating thereto, nor did he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the Army Attache.General Philpott also testified that he had no recollection of anything connected with Track II after his initial meeting with General Cushman on September 28. (Philpott, p. 16)U. S. Army Colonel Robert C. Roth, who in September and October 1970 was the Chief of the Human Resources Division, Director of Collection, DIA,* In this connection it should be noted that when questioned about this letter, General Philpott testified that he recalled signing an authorization such as that contained in the first paragraph of Headquarters 380 but that he did not recall the authorizations and instructions in paragraphs two and three.
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testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott on "a priority requirement to identify Chilean personalities who might be helpful in preventing the election of Allende as President of Chile." (Roth, Vol. I, p. 6) Though Roth recalls no mention of Track II as such, the goal of this mission is identical to that described in the message of September 28 bearing Philpott's signature.Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activities connected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meeting on October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic material on Chilean generals which focused on their willingness to participate in a military coup. Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representative attended.The chronology also shows that on October 21, Roth delivered a message to Mr. Broe to be sent by CIA channels.* A message was sent to Col. Wimert that same day, ostensibly from General Bennett, which authorized:FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has been rescinded. This action does not repeat not.imply change in our estimate of situation. On the contrary, it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situation develops as we anticipate. Request up date on situation. (Santiago 4463; Ref: Headquarters 762) (Headquarters 934, 21 October 1970)Roth testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when he followed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information on Chilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA. Philpott also instructed him that* Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this message and also pressed him on several occasions to seek a response from Broe to an earlier message to Colonel Wimert. (Roth, Vol. II, p. )
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23a"any further action on the subject would henceforth be the responsibilityof the CIA and that DIA would perform normal support functions." (Roth,p. 8)*Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities describedby Roth were routine DIA activities. However, Colonel Roth testified:I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, isthat I was informed that there was concern at the highestU.S. Governmental level over the possible election of Allende,that DIA then had a priority responsibility of coming up withthe identities of key Chilean personalities that would be help-ful, and so forth. I have nothing specific as to the nature ofthe instructions or the channels through which they came.Q. It was your sense at the time that you were working on aproject that if it had not been initiated by, at least hadthe attention of or concern of, the highest level?* Roth's chronology also indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe  be queried on two or three occasions regarding a report from Wimert  and that Philpott instructed that only he (Philpott) would communi-  cate with Cushman if the need arose. (Roth, p. 11) Roth also testi  fied that Philpott advised him that communications with Wimert would  be by CIA channels. (Roth, p. 41)![TOP SECRET stamp]
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Colonel Roth. That was my impression at the time.Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department that the highest level of government usually indicated the President of the United States?Colonel Roth. I would assume that.The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify Generals Bennett and Philpott as either the sender or recipient. Among these documents is a message relating to Track II which bears Philpott's purported signature. (Undated message. ca. 14 October 1970) General Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted that it was and he could not recall signing it, or having seen it. (Philpott, p. ) CIA also produced messages of October 14 (Headquarters 762) and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying instructions from General Bennett to the Army Attache. General Bennett testified he did not authorize these messages:It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military assistance area. It goes beyond the responsibility which I had in terms that I would have to get the authority or the approval of the Secretary through the Chairman for covert action of this magnitude. This message would not have been signed by me. (Bennett testimony, p. 21)According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testimony, p. 84)The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents bearing on the issue of Wimert's Track II instructions or responses. A DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel 0. Graham, the present Director of DIA, produced no copies of communication documents for the September-October 1970 period. (Graham, p. 6) However, Roth testified that detailed memoranda for the record which he prepared on his activities are missing from the files. (Roth, Vol. II, p.)
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CIA officials maintain that they acted faithfully in transmitting messages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending a message without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was particularly forceful in this regard:> ...I can recall no instance in my experience at the Central Intelligence Agency in which a message was received for an individual, an officer of the government anywhere, in whatever department, which was not faithfully, directly, promptly and fully and accurately delivered to that officer, or to his duly authorized representative.> (Karamessines testimony, p. 79)We may have played tricks overseas, but it stopped at the water's edge, and we didn't play tricks among ourselves or among our colleagues within the Agency or in other agencies.(Karamessines testimony, p. 79)We could not remain in business for a day... if this had been the practice of the Agency. It would have been no time at all before we would have been found out, a single instance of the kind of thing you are suggesting might have taken place would have put us out of business.(Karamessines testimony, p. 80)Dr. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the Army Attache's role or that he authorized any messages to be sent to the Army Attache.(Kissinger testimony, p. 22)The investigation to date has not resolved the conflict between the statements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials. There are four possibilities that could explain the conflict. First, Generals Bennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track II and communicated their general instructions to the Army Attache. This possibility would be contrary to their sworn testimony. Second, General Bennett was not aware of Track II but General Philpott was and communicated general instructions to the Army Attache. This possibility is supported by Roth's testimony but would be contrary to Philpott's sworn testimony and his duty to keep General Bennett informed. Third, the CIA acted on its own and, after receiving initial authority from General Philpott, co-opted and ordered
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the Army Attache without further informing any member of the Departmentof Defense of the White House. This possibility would be contrary tothe sworn testimony of David Phillips, William Broe, Thomas Karamessines,and William Colby. Fourth, members of the White House staff authorizedthe CIA to convey orders to the Army Attache on the basis of high orhighest government authority. Further, that the White House staffdirected that the Army Attache's superiors in the Pentagon not be in-formed. This possibility would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr.Kissinger and General Alexander Haig.## D. The False Flag BaseIn order to minimize the risks of making contact with the dissidentChilean officers, the task force decided in late September to set up a"False Flag Base," i.e., to send four staff officers to Chile posing asnationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert's contactswith Chilean military officers.[^1] Given the limitations of the Station'sresources and Colonel Wimert's visibility, Headquarters felt the use of"False Flag Officers" was necessary because "We don't want to miss achance." One of these officers posed as a Brazilian intelligence officerso that "any flap would be a Brazilian one." (Headquarters 363,September 27, 1970)[^1]: *The use of, "False Flag Officers" is not, according to David Phillips,"an unusual practice," either by the CIA or foreign intelligenceservices. (Phillips testimony, pp. 47-48)
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-27-The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and reportedseparately on their contacts to a "deep cover" CIA officer in Santiagowho in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of theChief of Station, they received their instructions from Washington andnot from him. (Chief of Station testimony (Felix), August 1, 1975, p. 27)E. Chief of StationAlthough most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know ofTrack II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable andthe Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean officers.The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic:I had left no doubt in the minds of my colleaguesand superiors that I did not consider any kind ofintervention in those constitutional processesdesirable....And one of the reasons certainly for mylast recall. (to Washington) was to be read the riotact--which was done in a very pleasant, but veryintelligible manner. Specifically, I was told atthat time that the Agency was not too interested incontinuously being told by me that certain proposalswhich had been made could not be executed, or wouldbe counterproductive. (Chief of Station (Felix)testimony, August 1, 1975, p. 10)The Chief of Station's objection to Track II did not go unnoticed.The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Reportshould not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report onaction taken." (Headquarters 612, 7 October) Very simply, Headquarterswanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency itself.
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Three examples of the Chief of Station's reporting bear out hisclaim to have dissented:Bear in mind that parameter of action is exceed-ingly narrow and available options are quitelimited and relatively simple.(Santiago 424, September 23, 1970)Feel necessary to caution against any false optimism.It is essential that we not become victims of ourown propaganda. (Santiago 441, October 1, 1970)Urge you do not convey impression that Station hassure-fire method of halting, let alone triggeringcoup attempts. (Santiago 477, October 7, 1970, p.2)
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# IV. CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup## A. The Chilean ConspiratorsAnti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key individuals. One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before. Following the "Taenazo" revolt, and his dismissal from the Army, Viaux retained the support of many non-commissioned and junior officers as well as being the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups. (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July 15, 1975)Another individual around which plotting centered was General Camilo Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago Garrison. General Valenzuela was in league with several other active duty officers, including Admiral Hugo Tirado, Navy Commander in Chief; General Vicente Huerta, Director General of the Carabinero (police) Corps; General Canales, Director of the Military Academy; and General Joaquin Garcia, second in command, Air Force. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, November 18, 1970) All of these officers, with the possible exception of Canales, were in contact with Viaux as well.[^1] This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of dramatizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as an abortive coup.[^2] The record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military officers is incomplete. The record does show, however, that Viaux met with General Huerta around October 7. (Chile Task Force Log, October 7). On October 12 Viaux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October). One cable from Santiago indicates that Admiral Tirado may have been a member of Viaux's inner circle of conspirators. (Station 545, 16 October 1970) At the very least, Tirado was in contact with Viaux.Although a distinction can be made between the Viaux and Valenzuela groups, as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony before the Committee, the principal distinction between the two was that the latter was led by active duty military officers. The two groups were in contact with each other. The record also indicates that they worked together in at least two of the three Schneider kidnap attempts.[^1]: *This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of drama- tizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as an abortive coup.[^2]: **The record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military officers is incomplete. The record does show, however, that Viaux met with General Huerta around October 7. (Chile Task Force Log, October 7). On October 12 Viaux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October). One cable from Santiago indicates that Admiral Tirado may have been a member of Viaux's inner circle of conspirators. (Station 545, 16 October 1970) At the very least, Tirado was in contact with Viaux.
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There was considerable communication among the various plotting elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified:...I might add here that it seemed that a good dozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean senior officers were privy to what was going on in addition to President Frei and they were all talking to one another exchanging views and trying to see how best to mount the kind of coup that they wanted to see take place. (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)## B. Contacts Prior to October 15The CIA's initial task in Chile was to assess the potential within the Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly that anti- Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police), but were immobilized by "the tradition of military respect for the Constitution" and "the public and private stance of General Schneider, Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict adherence to the Constitution." (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to overcome "the apolitical, constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military." (Ibid, p. 2)Since the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by General Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the U.S. Government would support a coup both before and after it took place. (Headquarters to Station 611, 7 October 1970) This effort began in earnest on October 5 when Colonel Wimert informed both an Army General ("Station's priority contact") an an Air Force General of the pro-coup*The military officers were told, for example, that should Allende be prevented from taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostracized, but rather can continue to count on us for MAP support and maintenance of our close relationship." (Hqs. 075517, 7 October 1970)