Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# TOP SECRETApril 7, 1964Memorandum for Discussion of Covert Program Against CubaU. S. covert operations against the Castro regime have recently been reviewed in the Special Group (54/12), and a number of issues are presented which require discussion and decision at a higher level.The present covert program is designed in support of a general policy of intense economic and political isolation of Castro, accompanied by methods short of war to get rid of the Castro regime. Parts of the program authorized in July 1963 have in fact been held up for various reasons, and it is now important to decide whether or not certain substantial and expensive activities should be (a) actively continued; (b) held in readiness; (c) reduced, or (d) abandoned.Covert programs against Cuba fall into the following categories:1.  Collection of intelligence, to include the infiltration and ex-filtration of agents and covert supply of agent operations.    Recommendation: It is unanimously recommended that this program be continued.2.  Covert propaganda aimed to encourage low-risk forms of active and passive resistance and to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.    Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be continued with regular review of their operational guidelines.3.  Cooperation with other agencies in economic denial by selective economic action with respect to products critical to the Cuban economy.    Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be continued:4.  Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential dissident elements near the power centers of the regime.    Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be continued.# TOP SECRETCopyLyndon B. Johnson Library
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# TOP SECRET- 2 -5. Indirect economic sabotage with a low level of visibility and detection. Programs of this sort involve possible overseas sabotage of Cuban ships and possible addition of contaminating elements to sensitive Cuban imports (not food).*Recommendation:* It is recommended that these programs be continued.6. CIA-controlled sabotage raiding apparatus in Florida which conducted five raids in the summer and fall of 1963, before authority for such raids was suspended for political reasons.*Recommendation:* Opinion is divided on this issue and it is recommended that higher authority hear the arguments of different parties.7. CIA-supported (but not directly controlled) autonomous Cuban exile groups operating from Central America. These groups will begin operations soon unless action is taken to try to stop them.*Recommendation:* Again opinion is divided and it is recommended that higher authority hear the arguments.> [Figure: A simple line drawing of a bird-like figure on the left and a profile of a person's head and neck on the right.]CopyNW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 142
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# TOP SECRET - EYES ONLYTHE WHITE HOUSEWASHINGTONMarch 4, 1965MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDYSUBJECT: Special Group Meeting - CubaHere is some miscellaneous information with regard to your Special Group meeting this afternoon on Cuba.1. Artime Cut-off - As you know, State is pressing to cut off Artime, largely because of his recent irresponsible activity. CIA opposes State on this one for the usual reasons. DOD, reportedly, will also take a somewhat reluctant line on cutting off Artime. Vance may express the view that a cutoff will drive Artime up the wall and that he will go off and do something that could cause us real trouble vis-a-vis our present conflict with the East. For example, he might go off and sink a Soviet ship. DOD would probably prefer that we phase him out slowly and keep a dialogue going over the course of the next few months. The advantage of this would be twofold - First, it would keep Artime quiet; second, his residual power to hurt us, when we finally do cut him off, will be reduced.On this one, I am inclined towards the DOD view.2. Pesticides - The CIA will probably propose a deal whereby we arrange to have diluted Cuban pesticides. State and DOD are both likely to oppose this one for such reasons as the following: First, it will mean going to the Dutch Government; it is questionable whether we want to bring up such a proposal with that government, especially if we think the odds are high that we will be turned down. Second, there is the moral issue of whether or not we should dilute pesticides which were given to the Cubans during the prisoner exchange. Third, it would be highly embarrassing if this one ever leaked out from one of the many bases that would have to be touched.I don't like this one either.3. Support to RECE - One question which will arise today is whether or not to start giving some low-risk support to RECE. While State and DOD, at the working levels, originally were in favor of it, they seem to have changed their position. One reason - some of the arguments which are spelled out in theTOP SECRET - EYES ONLYCopyLyndon B. Johnson Library
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TOP SECRET - EYES ONLYMr. Bundy -2- March 4, 1965attached memo on the subject. Another reason - State does not want to compromise its position on Artime (i. e., If you give aid to RECE, how can you stop aid to Artime?).State and DOD will probably propose that, in turning down RECE, we give them $17,000. The RECE people apparently had to tap a program fund of its small contributors to keep going administratively over the last couple months when Bosch cut them off; they want to return this money to the small contributors. Arguments in favor of giving them the money are: (a) it will lessen the shock of giving RECE a negative reply, (b) they will not look bad among the exiles (we don't want them to look bad because they are "good guys"), and (c) part of RECE's problem has not been their fault. We have not been able to give RECE as prompt an answer as we would have liked.I continue to be in favor of not getting involved with RECE; I agree that $17,000 is a small price to pay for a kiss-off.4. Keating Gimmick - Both DOD and State are cold to the idea of having Keating (I understand this now may be changed to Donovan) stir up trouble between the Soviets and the Cubans. DOD feels that such goings-on might be interpreted as some sort of Vietnam play. State feels that such a man wouldn't get received at a high level; also, there are other ways to do the job if it needs doing.While I admire CIA's ingenuity and I sincerely think we should keep them invention-minded, I must say that this one sounds like a Rube Goldberg contraption. I am against it.5. CIA's Paramilitary Capability - Both DOD and State will probably oppose CIA's proposal to drop its paramilitary capability. I agree with State and DOD that, with the present world situation as it stands, this is a good capability to keep on hand if we possibly can. I would agree to an abandonment of this capability only if it were demonstrated that we could crank it up again in a very short space of time.Gordon ChaseTOP SECRET - EYES ONLYCopyLyndon B. Johnson LibraryNW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 144
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE12 November 1964MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDYSUBJECT: Policy Toward CubaIn the attached paper the JCS recommended to the SecDef that he forward the Army study entitled, "Square Dance" to the Inter-departmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for appropriate interagency coordination as a basis for further consideration by the JCS.In the course of preparing a Chairman's position on "Square Dance," I pointed out that the covert operations proposed would involve serious injury to Cuban civilians, and probably should not be elected without very serious provocation -- perhaps greater than that required to justify invasion. In addition, even if consistent with US values on "just" international behavior, it is highly unlikely that we could undertake such operations without having our role discovered and resulting in serious international liabilities. Finally, even if "Square Dance" were successfully implemented, there would be no guarantee that the Cuban government would change its position. More likely, Soviet aid and control would be increased.As you are aware, Bill Smith participated in this study, though I understand he did not subscribe to all of its contents. I recommend, however, that the White House remain aloof from formal consideration of "Square Dance" at this stage. Then if the Coordinating Committee and the JCS should recommend action in accordance with study proposals, we can consider their recommendations without any precommitment.R. C. BOWMANTOP SECRET - SENSITIVECopyLyndon B. Johnson Library
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# TOP SECRET INFORMATICCOVER SHEETOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSETOP SECRET INFORMATION COVER SHEETCOPY NO. 2CONTROL NUMBER(S) DecNONURJCS 2304/241-1The attached TOP SECRET information contains data the security aspect of which is paramount, and unauthorized disclosure of which would cause EXCEPTIONAL GRAVE DANGER TO THE NATION. Special care in the handling, custody, and storage of the attached information must be exercised in accordance with the security regulations. This cover sheet is NOT A RECEIPT but a record of persons who have read all or any part of the document(s) identified by number shove.Each person receiving the attached TOP SECRET information shall sign and fill in the information required below:| NAME | DATE     | REMARKS                                                 || ---- | -------- | ------------------------------------------------------- ||      | RECEIVED | RELEASED  (Indicate portions and all of documents read) ||      |          |                                                         ||      |          |                                                         ||      |          |                                                         ||      |          |                                                         ||      |          |                                                         ||      |          |                                                         ||      |          |                                                         ||      |          |                                                         ||      |          |                                                         |SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:Destruction of this sheet is authorized one year fromdate of destruction of the document attached hereto.SD FGRM 194PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.JAN 54(When attachments are removed, this is unclassified)TOP SECRET INFORMATIONCOVER SHEET645993CopyLyndon B. Johnson LibraryNW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 14620
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVEJCS 2304/244-130 October 1964Pages 2 - 8, incl.TOP SECRETCOPY NO. 2DISTRIBUTION GREPORT BY THE J-5to theJOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFonSQUARE DANCE (U)Reference: JCS 2304/244DECISION1. At their meeting on 6 November 1964, after making amendments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 12 of this report.2. This Decision replaces page 2. Holders are requested to substitute the additional revised page 7, and revised white pages 3 and 5, incorporating the amendments, and to destroy the superseded pages in accordance with security regulations.3. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its Appendices A, B, and C, was forwarded as JCSM-942-64, dated: 9 November 1964, to the Secretary of Defense.4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c) applied and were followed.DISTRIBUTION:Gen. Wheeler (C/JCS) Gen. Burchinal (D/JS)Gen. Johnson (CSA) Gen. Manhart (VD/JS)Adm. McDonald (CNO) Adm. Davis (DD/JS)Gen. LeMay (CSAF) Adm. Mustin J-3)Gen. Greene (CMC) Gen. Emrick (J-5)Gen. Palmer (DC/S, OPS) Gen. Anthis (SACSA)NW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 147 19> [Figure: Logo of Lyndon B. Johnson Library]
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVESQUARE DANCE (U)THE PROBLEM1. To respond to a memorandum" by the Chief of Staff,   US Army, to consider a proposal that the Joint Chiefs of   Staff recommend to the President that the United States   covertly attack the Cuban sugar industry.FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM2. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in responding**5   to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba,   stated that the President would be advised of any new and   promising courses of action which could possibly bring pressure   upon the Cuban regime.3. On 1 September 1964, the Chief of Staff, US Army, sent   a memorandum*, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarding a   study on the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime   by covertly attacking the Cuban sugar industry. The Chief   of Staff, US Army, recommended that the Joint Staff accomplish   interagency coordination on the study proposals; and that   the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the study and forward it   by memorandum to the President, informing him that the Joint   Chiefs of Staff support the conclusions and recommendations   of the study and consider that the outline program therein   provides an adequate framework for the development of detailed   supporting programs and plans for participating agencies.4. On 2 October 1964, the Operations Deputies considered   the recommendations of the Chief of Staff, US Army, and agreed   to refer the matter to the Joint Staff for the preparation   of a report.* Attachment to JCS 2304/244** Enclosure to JCS 2304/218-3CopyLyndon B. Johnson LibraryTOP SECRET - SENSITIVEJ-5 2304/244-13TOP SECRET.
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVETOP SECRET5. On 5 October 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were   presented with a briefing on the study and discussed some   of the issues of the proposed actions.DISCUSSION6. For discussion, see Appendix A.CONCLUSIONS7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the   ultimate US objective toward Cuba must be to establish a   government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States.8. The proposal to covertly attack the Cuban sugar   industry is within existing or attainable capabilities and   merits consideration by other appropriate governmental   agencies as another option, in concert with other actions,   for causing the collapse of the Castro regime.9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that there are   possible political consequences which could result from   proof of US involvement in a program such as that proposed.10. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for    Cuban Affairs is the proper agency to accomplish the inter-    agency coordination.11. The study should be forwarded to the Secretary of    Defense for referral to the Interdepartmental Coordinating    Committee for Cuban Affairs for comment and recommendation    preliminary to submission to the President by the Joint    Chiefs of Staff.RECOMMENDATIONS12. It is recommended that:a. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with itsAppendices A, B, and C, which reflects the above conclu-sions be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.CopyLyndon B. Johnson LibraryTOP SECRET - SENSITIVEJCS 2304/244-1NW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 149TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVEb. This paper NOT be forwarded to the commanders of unified or specified commands.c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.Action Officer: Captain J. O. Sherman, USNJ-5, Extension 78926CopyLyndon B. Johnson LibraryTOP SECRET - SENSITIVEJCS 2304/244-1TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVEENCLOSUREDRAFTMEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSESubject: Cuban Actions (U)1. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in responding to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba, stated that the President would be advised of any new and promising courses of action which could possibly bring pressure upon the Castro regime.2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed a review of a study which examines world sugar economics and the vulnerabilities of Cuba's sugar industry. The study proposes an outline program which would undermine Castro's economy, deprive him of convertible currency, and cause political instability in Cuba through covert attacks against Cuba's sugar industry coupled with US stabilization actions on the world sugar market. Basically, the proposal envisions a three- to six-year program, beginning with a 30 per cent reduction of anticipated 1966 Cuban sugar production, by introducing aerially from off-shore, a sugar cane plant parasite, Bunga. Subsequently, the economic and political disturbances caused by this attack could be exacerbated and exploited by such measures as spreading hoof-and-mouth disease among draft animals, controlling rainfall by cloud seeding, mining canefields, burning cane, and directing other acts of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and transportation systems.> GROUP 1> EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC> DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION> Lyndon B. Johnson LibraryTOP SECRET - SENSITIVEJCS 2304/244-1NW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 151Enclosure
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the ultimate US objective toward Cuba must be to establish a government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States. The concept of attacking the Cuban sugar industry by covert means would furnish another option to the United States in bringing about the collapse of the Castro regime.4. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the possible political consequences from proof of the US involvement in such a program, they believe that proposals related to the expansion of US influence over the world sugar market, the stabilization of the free market, and the covert introduction of Bunga into Cuba, merit serious consideration. Other forms of attack proposed in the study might be taken subsequently to exploit resulting economic and political turbulence. Additional discussion is provided in Appendix A hereto.5. It is recommended that the attached draft memorandum (Appendix B) and study (Appendix C) be forwarded to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for appropriate interagency coordination and comment as a basis for consideration of further recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.CopyLyndon B. Johnson LibraryTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 7 EnclosureJCS 2304/244-1(Revised by Decision 9. November 1954)NW 50955 DocId:32423566 Page 152TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETAPPENDICES A, B, AND C(6 pages)CopyTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE Lyndon B. Johnson LibraryJCS 2304/244-1 8 Appendicés A, B, and CTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVEAPPENDIX ACONSIDERATIONS OF A PROPOSAL TO ATTACKCOVERTLY THE CUBAN SUGAR INDUSTRY1. The ultimate success of the proposed program would depend, in part, upon the effectiveness of the economic controls for the stabilization of world sugar prices. It would serve no purpose to reduce Cuba's total annual production of sugar if a subsequent rise in the price of sugar could net the Castro regime the same amount of convertible currency as it had before the program was undertaken. The arguments and rationale in favor of the economic proposals in the study appear to have validity. However, world economics is a most complex subject and involves many variable factors. The important points on economic controls should be coordinated with appropriate agencies in the government having responsibility for such matters.2. Assuming that success of the actions of the outline program can be achieved, it must be acknowledged that this would not assure the downfall of the Castro Government, or that if it did fall, a government friendly to the United States would be installed. Russia has too much at stake, politically, to allow an overthrow of a communist regime for economic reasons alone. Success of the proposed actions would, however, create serious difficulties for the Castro Government and would be an additional means of exerting pressure against that government.CopyLyndon B. Johnson LibraryTOP SECRET - SENSITIVEAppendix ATOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE3. There are disadvantages to the program proposed by the study. The approval for implementation of such a concept would introduce a new dimension into cold war methods and would require a major change in national policy. There is the possibility of retaliation in the event of discovery. There is also an obvious political risk associated with this proposal. Should any credible evidence of US involvement ever be obtained, the political loss to the United States would be great. Quite apart from the propaganda impact of such discovery, the influence of the United States in international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States would be impaired seriously.4. Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to keep the Secretary of Defense and the President apprised of the capabilities of the military establishment. The subject study presents measures which should be considered, and if found to be acceptable after coordination with appropriate government agencies it would represent another option for positive actions against the Castro regime.5. NSAM 213 dated 8 January 1963, established a committee to coordinate the management of all aspects of US policy toward Cuba. The President looks to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for the effective coordination of the execution of policy decisions and for timely recommendations on new courses of action. The subject study should be referred to this committee for the necessary coordination preliminary to reporting to the President.Copy* Enclosure to JCS 2304/Lyndon B. Johnson LibraryTOP SECRET - SENSITIVEAppendix A
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility to provide military advice to the Comnender in Chief and the Secretary of Defense. It is appropriate, therefore, that a matter such as the proposals under consideration, be sent to the Secretary of Defense with the recommendation that the study be forwarded to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for coordination and comment as a basis for consideration of further recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Steff.CopyLyndon B. Johnson LibraryTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE3Appendix A(Revised by Decision - 9 November 1954)NW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 156
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TOP SECRETTOP SECRET - SENSITIVEAPPENDIX BDRAFTMEMORANDUM FOR THE COORDINATOR, INTERDEPARTMENTALCOORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CUBAN AFFAIRSSubject: Cuban Actions (U)1. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the President that they would continue to review the problem of putting additional pressures on Castro and that the President would be advised if any new and promising courses of action were uncovered.2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have forwarded a study on the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime by attack- ing the Cuban sugar industry. The study examines the world sugar market and the vulnerabilities of Cuba's sugar industry, and proposes a phased interagency program which would:a. Initially reduce Cuban sugar production by approximately 30 per cent from the anticipated 1966 production level.b. Expand US influence in the world sugar market by assignment of quotas and other actions to insulate the free market from the effects of Cuban sugar losses.3. Apart from economic measures, the proposals made in the study are within existing or attainable military capabilities. Several actions are proposed. Key among these is the introduction into Cuba of Bunga, a plant parasite against sugar cane. It appears feasible to introduce gradually Bunga into Cuba and maintain a basis for plausibly disavowing US involvement.TOP SECRET - SENSITIVEGROUP 1 CopyEXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADINGLyndon B Johnson Library4Appendix BNW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 157