Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardlymore, and we are not prepared to make themavailable. Last week we were asked to furnishthree or four pineapples for a party in thenear future, but I could remember nothing in my in-structions that would have allowed me to contri-bute this ingredient. Don't think I wasn'ttempted. I have rather specific guidelinesto the effect that salad ingredients will bedelivered outside the picnic grounds and willbe brought to the area by another club.(Dearborn letter to Devine, 3/16/61)After reviewing his "picnic" letter, together with the requestsin the March 14 and 15 cables discussed above, Dearborn con-cluded during his testimony before the Committee that the"pineapples" were probably the requested fragmentationgrenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredientsoutside of the picnic grounds was, almost certainly, meant torefer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Grouporder that arms be delivered outside the Dominican Republic.(Dearborn 7/29, pp. 25-27)2. The Passage of Pistolsa. Pouching to the Dominican RepublicIn a March 15, 1961 cable, Chief of Station Owen reportedthat Dearborn had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issueto several dissidents. In reply, Headquarters cabled: "Regretno authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations againstshipment of arms" and indicated that their reply had been coor-dinated with State. (HQS to Station cable, 3/17/61) TheStation Chief then asked Headquarters to seek the necessaryauthorization and noted that at his last two posts, he hadreceived pistols via the pouch for "worthy purposes" and,
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therefore, he knew it could be done. (Station to Hqs cable, 3/21/61) Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols and ammunition were being pouched. However, the Station Chief was instructed *not* to advise Dearborn. (Hqs. to Station cable, 3/24/61)*b. Reason for the CIA Instruction Not to Tell DearbornOwen testified that he believed the "don't tell Dearborn the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that the sending of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not something to be unnecessarily discussed. (Owen, pp. 78,79)Dearborn said he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew Owen had no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 33)c. Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single pistol for purposes completely unrelated to any assassination consideration. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 29-31) He said he had been approached by a Dominican contact who lived in a remote area and was concerned for the safety of his family in the event of political reprisals. Dearborn testified that he had believed* The Inspector General's Report, issued in connection with a review of these events, concludes that:> "There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files that the pistols were actually pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a subsequent request for submachine guns." (I.G. Report, p. 60)This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March 24, 1961, Headquarters to Station cable, which provides:"C. Pouching revolvers and ammo requested TRUJ 0462 (in 20040) on 28 March. Do not advise (name Dearborn deleted) material being pouched. Explanation follows."
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the man's fears were well-founded and had promised to seek a pistol.*Although there is no direct evidence linking any of these pistols to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 1961, CIA memorandum, unsigned and with no attribution as to source, states that two of the three pistols were passed by Owen to Lorenzo "Wimpy" Berry, a United States citizen who was in direct contact with the action element of the dissident group. It should also be noted that the assassination was apparently conducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether one or more of these .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols eventually came into the hands of the assassins and, if so, whether they were used in connection with the assassination, remain open questions.Both Dearborn and Owen testified that they regarded the pistols as weapons for self-defense purposes and they never considered them in any way connected with the then-current assassination plans. (Dearborn 7/29, p.70; Owen, pp.38,73)However, none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the purpose for which the handguns were sought and Owen's cable stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents. (Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24, 1961,*Dearborn is clear in his recollection that he asked Owen to request only one pistol. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp.30,31) Owen, on the other hand, testified that if his cables requested three pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must have asked for three pistols. (Owen, p.72)The pistols were, however, apparently sent in one package (HQS to Station cables, 3/27/61 and 3/24/61) and Dearborn testified that, what he believed to be the one gun, came "wrapped up" and that he passed it. (Dearborn, 7/29,p.30)
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cable advising that the pistols were being pouched is the very cable which was sent in response to a request by the dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination effort which had been previously described to Headquarters. As with the carbines discussed below, it appears that little, if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over passing these weapons to would-be assassins.3. Passing of the Carbinesa. Request by Owen and Dearborn and Approval by CIAIn a March 26, 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters, Owen asked for permission to pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber Ml carbines. The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by Navy personnel after the U.S. broke formal diplomatic relations in August 1960. Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred in the proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 42,43) On March 31, 1961 CIA Headquarters cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines. (Hqs to Station cable, 3/31/61)b. Were the Carbines Related to Assassination?The carbines were passed to the action group contact, Wimpy Berry, on April 7, 1961. (Station to HQS cable, 4/8/61) Eventually, they found their way into the hands of one of the assassins, Antonio de la Maza. (Station to HQS cable, 4/26/61; I.G. Report pp. 46, 49) Both Dearborn and Owen testified that the carbines were at all times viewed as strictly a token show
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of support, indicating U.S. support of the dissidents' efforts to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 46-48; Owen p. 39)c. Failure to Disclose to State Department Officials in WashingtonThere is no indication that the request or the passage of the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials in Washington until several weeks after the passage. In fact, on April 5, Headquarters requested its Station to ask Dearborn not to comment in correspondence with State that the carbines and ammunition were being passed to the dissidents. This cable was sent while Owen was in Washington, and it indicated that upon his return to the Dominican Republic, he would explain the request. The Station replied that Dearborn had not commented on the carbines and ammunition in his correspondence with State and he realized the necessity not to do so. (Station to HQS cable, 4/6/61)Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the time of his April 6 cable, that someone in the State Department had been consulted in advance and had approved the passage of the carbines (Dearborn 7/29, p. 44)
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3. Requests For and Pouching of the Machine Gunsa. Owen Requests Machine Guns for Use in AssassinationThe Station Chief suggested that Headquarters consider pouching an M3 machine gun on February 10, 1961 (Owen, pp. 63,64; Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61). The request was raised again in March but no action was taken. On March 20, 1961, Owen cabled a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns specifying their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic pouch or similar means. The dissidents were said to feel that delivery by air drop or transfer at sea would overly-tax their resources. (Station to HQS cable, 3/20/61)The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly identified, in Owen's cable, as being sought for use in connection with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to kill Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress and, according to Owen's cable:"4. To do they need five M3 or comparable machine- guns. and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job." (Id.)In essence, CIA's response was that the timing for an assassination was wrong. Owen was told that precipitous or uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of a leftist, Castro-type regime and the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create more problems than solutions." It was Headquarters' position that:"...we should attempt to avoid precipitous action by the internal dissidents until opposition group and HQS are better prepared to support /assassination/*, effect a change in the regime, and cope with the aftermath." (HQS to Station cable, 3/24/61)* Word supplied by CIA in previously sanitized cable.
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-22-The cable also stated that Headquarters was prepared to deliver machine guns and ammunition to the dissidents when they developed a capability to received them, but that security considerations precluded use of U.S. facilities as a carrier.*Soon, thereafter, on April 6, 1961, while Owen was in Washington for consultation with Headquarters, he reported on events in the Dominican Republic and"especially on the insistence of the EMOTH [dissident] leaders that they be provided with a limited number of small arms for their own protection (specifically, five M3 caliber .45 SMG's)." (CIA memo for the record, 4/11/61)b. Pouching the Machine Guns is Approved by BissellAccordingly, on April 7, 1961, a Pouch Restriction Waiver Request and Certification was submitted seeking permission to pouch "four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used for self protection." (Pouch Restriction Waiver Request 4/7/61)The request, submitted on behalf of the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, further provided:"B. A determination has been made that the issuance of this equipment to the action group is desirable if for no other reason than to assure this important group's continued cooperation with and confidence in this Agency's determination to live up to its earlier commitments to the group. These commitments took* This same cable of March 24, 1961, is the one which advised that the revolvers and ammunition were being pouched.
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# TOP SECRETthe form of advising the group in January 1961 that we would provide limited arms and assistance to them provided they develop the capability to receive it. Operational circumstances have prevented this group from developing the assets capable of receiving the above equipment through normal clandestine channels such as air drops or sea infiltration."The Waiver Request was approved by Richard Bissell, as Deputy Director (Plans), on April 10, 1961. (Id.)The machine guns were pouched to the Dominican Republic and were received by the station on April 19, 1961.* (I.G. Report, p. 42; Station to Headquarters cable, 4/19/61).On April 10, Walter Elder, Assistant to the Director, had issued a memorandum which stated:"Mr. Dulles wants no action on drops of leaflets or arms in the Dominican Republic taken without his approval." (Elder memorandum of 4/10/61).**The Elder memorandum suggests that Dulles did not know that an air drop of arms was regarded as unfeasible and that pouching had been approved.## B. Knowledge of Senior American Officials (pre-Bay of Pigs)On February 14, 1961, prior to the passage of weapons, but a month after the generalized approval of the passage of arms by the prior administration, a meeting of the Special Group was held with Messrs. McNamara, Gilpatric, Bowles, Bundy, Dulles, Bissell, and General Cabell in attendance.* Permission to pass the machine guns was never obtained and the guns never passed into the hands of the dissidents. The matter is discussed in detail beginning at page ;** Elder testified that this note, sent the weekend before the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, was intended to make sure that there were no unusual planes shot down or any unnecessary noise in the Dominican Republic" prior to the Cuba invasion. (Elder, p. 51)
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## TOP SECRETThe minutes state that:"Mr. Dulles, assisted by Mr. Bissell, then summarized for the benefit of the new members of the Special Group the specific actions taken by the predecessor group during the past year, and also a list of significant projects which antedate the beginning of 1960 and which it is planned to continue." (Special Group Minutes of 2/14/61)In the course of the discussion, the following point, among others, was made:"(a) Dominican Republic -- Mr. Bundy asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government to Trujillo." (Id.)The request attributed to Bundy suggests that the Dominican Republic had been one of the matters on which Dulles and Bissell briefed the new members.What is unclear from the February 14 minutes (just as it is unclear from the January 12 minutes) is the degree to which the Special Group was informed concerning the means by which the dissidents planned to accomplish the overthrow of the Trujillo regime. Specifically, it is not known if the new members of the Special Group were told that the dissident group had expressed the desire to assassinate Trujillo. Nor is it known if the Special Group was![scribbled text]NW 50955 DocId: 32423539 Page 408
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advised that the State Department representative in theDominican Republic had made the assessment that the Dominicangovernment could not be overthrown without the assassinationof Trujillo.Bissell testified that he had no clear recollectionof the details of the February 14 briefing and he was unableto say whether or not the method of overthrow to be attemptedby the dissidents was discussed. (Bissell, 7/22, pp. 101, 102)Robert McNamara, one of the new members of the Special Groupin attendance for the briefing, has no recollection as to thespecificity in which the Dominican Republic was discussed at theFebruary 14 meeting. He does not recall any mention by eitherDulles or Bissell of dissident plans to assassinate Trujillo.(McNamara affidavit).February MemorandaThe Secretary of State sent the President a memorandumon February 15, 1961, in response to a request concerning pro-gress to assure an orderly takeover "should Trujillo fall."The memorandum advised that:"Our representatives in the Dominican Republichave, at considerable risk to those involved,established contacts with numerous leaders of theunderground opposition . . . /and/ . . . the CIAhas recently been authorized to arrange for deliveryto them outside the Dominican Republic of small armsand sabotage equipment."This reference to recent authorization for delivery ofarms indicates that Secretary Rusk had received some briefingconcerning events in the Dominican Republic and the January 1961
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Special Group decision to provide arms to anti-Trujilloelements. Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,Thomas Mann; Deputy Assistant Secretary William Coerr; andSpecial Assistant Frank Devine continued in their respectivepositions throughout the transition period. The Committee hasbeen furnished no documents indicating that Secretary Rusk orUnder Secretary Bowles were specifically advised as to theintentions of the Dominican dissidents to kill Trujillo; intentionsof which the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs certainlyhad knowledge. Indeed, Secretary Rusk testified that he was notpersonally so advised. (Rusk, 7/10, pp. 41,42)On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a briefing paperon the Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy'sNational Security Advisor. The paper made note of the out-standing Special Group approval for the provision of arms andequipment to Dominican dissidents and stated that the dissidentshad been informed that the U.S. was prepared to provide sucharms and equipment as soon as they developed the capability toreceive them.The briefing paper also indicated that dissident leaders had informed CIA of "their plan of action/which they felt could be implemented if they were provided with arms for 300 men,explosives, and remote control detonation devices." Variouswitnesses have testified, however, that supplying arms for 300men would, standing alone, indicate a "non-targeted" use for the
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arms (i.e., a paramilitary or revolutionary implementation asopposed to a specifically targeted assassination use). (Bissell,7/29, p.80),Concerning the briefing paper, Bissell testified that:"... it is perfectly clear that I was aware at thetime of the memorandum to Mr. Bundy that thesedissident groups were, and had for a long time,been hoping they could accomplish the assassinationof Trujillo. As a matter of fact, the requests sincesome seven or eight months earlier was a perfectlyclear indication of that, so that fact was not newknowledge." (Bissell 7/22, p.102)When asked why the memorandum did not include the fact thatthe dissidents intended the assassination of Trujillo, Bissellreplied:"I cannot tell you, Mr. Chairman. I do notremember what considerations moved me. I don'tknow whether it was because this was commonknowledge and it seemed to me unnecessary toinclude it, or as you are implying, there wasan element of concealment here. I would be verysurprised if it were the latter, in this case."(Bissell, 7/22, p.101)In response to questions concerning the lack of informationin the February 17, 1961 briefing paper concerning the uses towhich the requested arms might likely be put by the dissidents,Bissell stated:"... I would say that the Agency's failure,if there be a failure here was [not] (sic) to statein writing that the plans of the dissidentswould include assassination attempts."(Bissell, 7/22, p.99)Bissell's briefing paper for Bundy concluded with theassessment that a violent clash might soon occur between Trujillo
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and the internal opposition, "which will end either with theliquidation of Trujillo and his cohorts or with a completeroll up of the internal opposition." In this regard, the fearwas expressed that existing schedules for the delivery ofweapons to the internal opposition might not be sufficientlvtimely, and it was therefore recommended that consideration begiven to caching the requested arms and other materials.(Bissell to Bundy memo, 2/17/61)Thus, by the middle of February 1961, the seniormembers of the new administration, and in view of the "forhigher authority" nature of Bundy's request, presumablyPresident Kennedy himself, were aware of the outstanding SpecialGroup approval for the passage of arms and other materials toopposition elements within the Dominican Republic. There wasno modification or recision of the "inherited" Special Groupapproval and it would seem fair, therefore, to regard theapproval as having been at least acquiesced in by the newadministration.During March and early April 1961, operational levelswithin both the CIA and the State Department learned of in-creasingly detailed plans by the dissidents to assassinateTrujillo. There is no evidence that this information waspassed to the White House or to any member of the Special Group,
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# TOP SECRETexcept Allen Dulles. * Similarly, there is no evidence that the passage of the pistols or the carbines or the pouching of the machine guns to the Dominican Republic was disclosed to anyone outside of the CIA during this period.**VI. April 17, 1961 - May 31, 1961(Bay of Pigs Through Trujillo Assassination)Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, attempts were made by State and CIA representatives in the Dominican Republic to dissuade the dissidents from a precipitous assassination attempt. These efforts to halt the assassination of Trujillo were the result of instructions from CIA Headquarters and were prompted by concern over filling the power vacuum which would result from Trujillo's death.The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic but permission to pass them to the dissidents was never given and the guns never left the Consulate.Dearborn returned to Washington for consultation and a contingency plan for the Dominican Republic was drafted.Two days before Trujillo's assassination, Dearborn received a cable of instructions and guidance from President Kennedy.The cable advised that the U.S. must not run the risk of association with political assassination, since the U.S., as a matter of general policy, could not condone assassination. The cable* Copies of CIA cables, including the March 20, 1961 cable describing the plan to assassinate Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress were apparently sent to the office of the Director of Central Intelligence.** Although a copy of the CIA cable advising that the pistols were being pouched was sent to the Director's office, Dulles apparently did not receive copies of the cables approving passage of the carbines or pouching of the machine guns.
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further advised Dearborn to continue to hold open offers of material assistance to the dissidents and to advise them of U.S. support for them if they were successful in overthrowing the Trujillo government. The cable also reconfirmed the decision not to pass the machine guns.A. Decision Not to Pass the Machine Guns and Unsuccessful U.S. Attempt to Stop Assassination EffortBy April 17, 1961, the Bay of Pigs invasion had /operation was a failed/. As a result, there developed a general realization that precipitous action should be avoided in the Dominican Republic until Washington was able to give further consideration to the consequences of a Trujillo overthrow and the power vacuum which would be created. (Bissell, 6/11, p.113) A cable from Headquarters to the Station, on April 17, 1961, advised that it was most important that the machine guns not be passed without additional Headquarters approval.The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic on April 19, 1961, and Headquarters was so advised. The earlier admonition that the machine guns should be held in Station custody until further notice was repeated in a second cable from Ilead-quarters, sent April 20, 1961. This decision was said to have been "based on judgment that filling a vacuum created by assassination now bigger question than ever view unsettled conditions in Caribbean area." (HQs. to Station cable, 4/20/61)The dissidents continued to press for the release of the machine guns and their requests were passed on to Headquarters