Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10125.pdf — page 66]
# TOP SECRETMr. Aaron. Let me try another fix here because I'm not too sure.The oversight committee shall require the fiscal impact of proprietaries in the CIA's budget be made clear in the Director's authorization presentation, or what phrase is that? In the Director's what?Mr. Kirbow. The DCI's annual report to the appropriate oversight committee.Senator Huddleston. The DCI's annual report.Mr. Kirbow. The Agency would not report separately. They should make their presentation a part of the DCI's report to the appropriate oversight committee.Mr. Maxwell. While we are on that, could I, on No. 6, we have already, I thought, by statute prevented any covert action being funded other than by (a) appropriation to a covert action budget, or (b) the contingency reserve.Mr. diGenova. That's right.Mr. Maxwell. Does that make No. 6 redundant?Mr. Kirbow. Yes.Senator Huddleston. The only comment I would make is that the other is not an accomplished fact yet. This might be accepted and that might not.Mr. Maxwell. Well, the reason I say that is that the way this reads, I would have or would be opposed to it because it provides an exception with the approval of the versight
[157-10014-10125.pdf — page 67]
# TOP SECRET651 committees, when we want, I think, to be able to go to the2 Congress and say, we recommend most strenuously that only these3 two methods be used for funding, rather than providing a third4 method and someone says, well, maybe we should have a fourth5 method, and I would like to go with the strongest possible6 recommendation in regard to the earlier statutory requirement7 that it only be by specific appropriation to covert action and8 the contingency reserve fund.9 Mr. Kirbow. Otherwise, Mr. Chairman, we will stand a10 chance of getting the other amended, to allow the oversight11 committee. to allow it.12 Mr. diGenova. Why don't we say this by statute, and then13 have the rest of the sentence an addendum which would just14 allude to the fact that funding is to be accomplished to the15 method we set out if you want to eliminate it.16 Well, this was the problem that was raised, or an issue17 that was raised during the study, and this is set in here18 for that reason. It can easily be removed if it is inconsistent19 with another recommendation of the Committee.20 Mr. Aaron. Well, we have two or three different earlier21 provisions that relate to this. The first is that re-22 programming authority, defining reprogramming authority, the23 possibility that something used for a program covert action X24 which involves a proprietary that generates a certain amount25 of money, can be used for program Y.
[157-10014-10125.pdf — page 68]
# TOP SECRET66The second issue is we have proposed that covert actions be funded either by line item or by the contingency reserve.The third thing we proposed is that the contingency reserve be replenished, if I am correct, only by appropriation, concurrence of the oversight Committee.Now, what this in effect does, I think the question that he's driving at is, what do you do with the profits of a proprietary organization? Can you put it in the contingency reserve?If so, our other recommendation would pick up the notion that it can only be done with the concurrence of the Committee.Is there some other purpose, direct transfer? Well,presumably one of the limitations on reprogramming -- and this would be a fair point to make here, as part of its definition of limitations on reprogramming, it is recommended that the oversight committee proscribe the allocation of profits from any proprietary to a covert operation without their express consent. And this is really kind of -- if it doesn't go through the contingency reserve, it really goes to the question of reprogramming.Now, I realize that we have said that our other recommendation by implication would prohibit this, but it is only by implication, I would think.Mr. Maxwell. My sense is that by providing this --Mr. Aaron. You kind of create a channel.
[157-10014-10125.pdf — page 69]
TOP SECRET67Mr. Maxwell. It's not that you create a channel, but you aid the, increase the temptation for the proprietaries to try to generate funds, and secondly, I think it is the easiest way for the oversight committee to have a handle on covert action, and particularly its funding, is to say there are two ways you can do it. You can do it either by the regular appropriation process, or you can do it through the contingency reserve fund. But if you start to build in the ways that the contingency reserve fund can be replenished, I think people -- I think there may be a loss of control.Mr. Aaron. Well, this is a way it can be replenished, and this is not prohibited by anything we have recommended yet.Mr. Maxwell. I understand that, but I guess I was trying to clean up the organizational structure.Mr. Kirbow. I think this is the problem with recommending the legislation piecemeal, is that the insurance company out there is a covert operation. It is a secret operation at the agency conducted in that manner, and if you allow only covert operation to be funded only from the contingency reserve, whatever monies they generate will have to go back into the general treasury because they cannot be used to either replenish the contingency reserve or to operate a covert or to perform a covert function or operation.So they are not even -- they can't not only use the profits
[157-10014-10125.pdf — page 70]
TOP SECRET681 to do that, they cannot use the general monies that they2 generate from that to conduct. They will have to fund that3 insurance program in the contingency reserve.4 Mr. diGenova. No, not at all, because it is not a covert5 operation. That is not being use to fund a covert operation.6 It has been used to pay pensions and annuities to foreign7 agents. It's not a covert operation.8 Senator Huddleston. Agents are covert. If you restrict9 it to use of funds, if it is not already done, no funds10 derived from the operations of proprietaries shall be used for11 any other purpose except the operation of the proprietary and12 any profits shall be returned to the general treasury.13 It precludes it, doesn't it?14 Mr. Aaron. That would solve the problem, yes.15 Mr. Kirbow. And that's what they are doing today by16 regulation.17 Senator Huddleston. Can we say that?18 Mr. Aaron. I don't see why not.19 Mr. diGenova. Well, we say that in our recommendation No. 4.20 Mr. Aaron. Well, this says --21 Mr. diGenova. That deals with terminations and liqui-22 dations.23 Mr. Aaron. This is liquidations, and terminations. This24 is not just operations.25 Mr. Maxwell. There is one problem, a slight problem. That
[157-10014-10125.pdf — page 71]
TOP SECRET 691 is that some of the profits are reinvested. It is not that they2 take everything over or break even.3 Senator Huddleston. Well, I didn't say that. I said all4 funds not needed in the operation.5 Mr. Bader. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, you could amend No. 46 to all returns of funds or profits not needed for the operation.7 Mr. diGenova. There you go, whether from liquidations,8 terminations or profits exceed for the needs of the operation9 of the individual proprietaries should be remitted to the U.S.10 Treasury.11 Senator Huddleston. You can work that out so that it would12 be understood that there is a need to keep a certain reserve13 back.14 Mr. diGenova. We will unite 4 and 6.15 Senator Huddleston. That's all but 5.16 Mr. diGenova. 5 is only about the Department of Justice17 being notified as to the disposition.18 Mr. Aaron. Now, we have two recommendations with respect19 to cover. The first is just to recommend that the Department of20 State stop publishing data which makes it possible to identify21 people under cover.22 Mr. Kirbow. Well, just a minute. On No. 5 I do have23 a question here.24 The Agency doesn't sign off on any other disposal of25 United States properties and military bases or major edifices or
[157-10014-10125.pdf — page 72]
TOP SECRET                                                                               701 anything like that..2 Mr. diGenova. And the reason for that is every other3 government agency is subject to the rules and statutes of the4 Federal Disposal of Property Act, and the CIA isn't.5 Mr. Kirbow. Do you see this could be an abuse area?6 Mr. diGenova. I could see the Attorney General, if he7 knew that Admiral Raborn or some other Director is putting8 pressure on the CIA to dispose of a piece of property, would9 want to know about that, since they are not subject to the10 Federal Disposal of Property Act like every other government11 agency is.12 I don't think -- I think the record clearly shows, and13 the General Counsel indicated that he was not opposed to having14 outside review of their disposals, provided it was classified15 or done in a classified way since they have never had any16 problem.17 Mr. Kirbow. What you are doing here, approving the final18 disposition of disposal, if you are intending that he review19 the disposal process or participate in it, he wouldn't have known20 about Raborn. He wouldn't have known about Raborn at all21 because he didn't dispose of it to his client, and this would22 not pick up that kind of abuse that you have discussed here.23 Mr. diGenova. Suppose it had been disposed of to Admiral24 Raborn, and they knew about it, and the AG said, why is this25 being done? It would raise a red flag which would not otherwise
[157-10014-10125.pdf — page 73]
TOP SECRET711 be raised since the Federal Disposal of Property Act would not2 have applied which would have flagged that legally to any other3 agency.4 Mr. Aaron. It would also strengthen the Agency's hand to5 resist those purposes, to just simply say, hey, this has to be6 signed out by the Attorney General. This isn't going to work.7 It seems to me that what we do need here --8 Mr. Kirbow. If what we are trying to do is get his9 participation, just having him approve it doesn't get his10 participation, I think we ought to put that in if that's what11 we want to do.12 Mr. diGenova. I think the word "approve" is wrong. It13 should be "participate." The sale or disposition of any CIA14 proprietary --15 Senator Huddleston. How are you going to make it "partici-16 pate?"17 Mr. diGenova. I think the word we want is "consultation."18 Senator Huddleston. I think what we are trying to do is19 replace what other agencies have to do in an overt way and20 under a specific law, which this agency is not under, so it will21 have some assurance that it is being done in a proper way.22 Mr. Kirbow. I don't disagree with the AG being in on the23 act, but this one gets you participation on disposition.24 Senator Huddleston. Well, figure a way to get it done.25 Mr. Aaron. Well, what I wanted to say was I would like to
[157-10014-10125.pdf — page 74]
# TOP SECRET72note that back on page 67 where we have struck out the referenceto Mr. Raborn and intend to expand on the pressures havingbeen brought to bear, part of that expansion should includea statement that there is no -- or that the Federal Disposalof Property Act does not apply to the CIA, which is a crucialaspect.Mr. Kirbow. They are exempt, and then bring in therequirement for CIA, or for the AG participation.Mr. Aaron. And that includes that.Mr. diGenova. So we will rewrite 5 to make it consultation.Ms. Culbreath. David, on cover, may I just say, didn'twe decide to delete the opening paragraph?Mr. Aaron. You're right, you're right.: Ms. Culbreath. We were just going to list the recommen-dations.Mr. diGenova. Yeah, we already said that.Mr. Aaron. NOW, we have a recommendation that theCIA should make an effort to place a greater proportion of itsofficers abroad under nonofficial cover, and that recommendationis in brackets. Recommendation (a), that the CIA make agreater effort to place a greater proportion of its officersabroad, "under nonofficial cover" is in brackets.Senator Huddleston. That relates to the Welch discussion.Mr. Aaron. It relates to the Welch discussion and itrelates to the difficulties and problems of official cover.TOD REEDET
[157-10014-10125.pdf — page 75]
# TOP SECRET1 Mr. Bader. How do you feel about this, Joe?2 Mr. diGenova. This is a problem because just like the man says, cover is a relative thing. I don't think there is anything wrong with saying that the CIA, that they should make an effort to put -- really not much of a recommendation -- should make an effort to place a greater proportion of its officers abroad under nonofficial cover, and the Agency does not see that in this form, wouldn't view that as a bad thing. They thin cover is, if it is deep and effective, is okay. They just say well, their answer this way, well, you know, you don't do much work under deep, nonofficial cover, and one of the prices you pay is you don't have a lot of operational freedom. You have to work hard at your regular job and you don't do a whole heck of a lot.3 The recommendation, the way it is phrased, is sort of a push to them to see if they can find better ways. It also probably tells them that maybe they should use proprietaries abroad a little more, which are very, very efficient, according to Eric, according to both things, operations and cover.4 Mr. Aaron. I think we have got to be careful on this point. I mean, we ought to wait until the staff director returns because I think he has a particular interest in this suggestion, but we are talking about moving more people into unofficial cover. I would like to express my own persional reservations about that in terms of its relationship to a
[157-10014-10125.pdf — page 76]
# TOP SECRET1 number of things that the Committee has already decided to do.2 Senator Huddleston. We are eliminating a lot of cover.3 Mr. Aaron. That's the first thing.4 Now, the second thing -- and these are nonoffocial cover5 categories. The second thing that we are doing is trying to6 place somewhat greater authority in the hands of the ambassador7 and the missions overseas to know what is going on. That is8 something that they can do when it is in their house. It is9 something that's extremely difficult for them to do when it is10 off in the forest someplace.11 So it is -- and as Joe just said, it looks like a recommen-12 dation to use more proprietaries, in part because it is in the13 same section, but in reality because that is one of the ways14 they might do it, and I just wonder how much we have thought15 through for ourselves where the balance of our recommendations16 lie, particularly since most of the stuff is derived basically17 from operational experience anyway.18 There was a period, toward the end of Mr. Bissell's19 career in the Agency, or maybe shortly thereafter, when they20 began to try to put more people in unofficial cover, and it21 wasn't a very good experience for them.22 Mr. Kirbow. David, how does the ambassador lose control,23 whether it is official or unofficial, except that he has got24 them in his compound? It is an official government function25 over which he has absolute control.
[157-10014-10125.pdf — page 77]
TOP SECRET                                                                                              751 Senator Huddleston. But if they keep coming to the2 embassy to check with him, they blow their cover, unless they do3 it by telephone.4 Mr. Kirbow. Well, I don't think they should go to the5 embassy at all. I think their contact should become covert.6 Mr. diGenova. Well, we're sort of caught between a rock7 and a hard place because we know the official cover is we cover8 it best.9 Senator Huddleston. Well, maybe we could approach in10 that one way is to improve official covert11 Mr. Aaron. That is the one recommendation we make here,12 but the limits on that are very -- they are just structural,13 like..14 Senator Huddleston. It seems to me like we are in an15 area that we know a lot less about than the people who are16 in the business.17 Mr. Aaron.. That is sort of my feeling.18 Mr. Kirbow. We are asking them to proscribe against19 anything that they can convince an oversight committee in the20 future is essential in the trend of that time.21 Senator Huddleston. Shouldn't we say that the time has22 come for a whole review of cover to see whether or not they23 can find some better ways?24 Mr. Maxwell. We might say that the first large scale25 study in '48 and '49 of the Agency, done by Mr. Dulles, among
[157-10014-10125.pdf — page 78]
TOP SECRET                                                                        761 others, recommended very strongly that there be more unofficial2 cover..3 I think the Agency has been under considerable pressure4 throughout its existence to do that, and as Joe pointed out5 there are certain limits to what it has been able to do.6 Senator Huddleston. Well, I think rather than suggest7 what ought to be more or less official or unofficial cover, the8 whole matter ought to be studied immediately by the Agency, and9 see if they can find some new ways consistent with all the10 restraints and prohibitions that the Committee has placed upon11 them.12 (General laughter.)13 Senator Huddleston. All right, where does that leave us14 here today as we close out today's session?15 Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that in keeping16 with an earlier discussion today, that because it is a summary17 of findings as well as an introduction, that perhaps while18 we are nice and fresh, tomorrow we might take up the intro-19 ductory section prepared by the Staff Director, so that if we20 change it much, we either make the rest of our --21 Senator Huddleston. Have any of the other members seen it22 at all, Bill?23 Mr. Miller. Just Senator Mathias.24 Senator Huddleston. All right, do you want to meet at25 10:00 o'clock in the morning?NW 50955 DocId: 32423513 Page 79TOD READET
[157-10014-10125.pdf — page 79]
TOP SECRET                                                                                       771   Mr. Aaron. Are we going to terminate now?.2   Senator Huddleston. They've got a vote going and it's 5:10.3   I think we'd better.4   (Whereupon, at 5:10 o'clock p.m., the Subcommittee5   recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)678910111213141516171819202122232425TOP SECRETNW 50955 DocId: 32423513 Page 80
[157-10014-10133.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992## JFK Assassination System### Identification FormDate: 7/7/2015## Agency InformationAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10133RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-39## Document InformationORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM:TO:TITLE:DATE: 03/25/1976PAGES: 40SUBJECTS: SSCSGO, METHODOLOGYCOMMITTEE BUSINESSDOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPTCLASSIFICATION: DeclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: 1B; ICCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 03/22/2000OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: CCBOX 324
[157-10014-10133.pdf — page 1]
Date: 08/07/95Page : 1JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10133RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-39DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIAFROM :TO :TITLE :DATE : 03/25/76PAGES : 40SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, METHODOLOGYCOMMITTEE BUSINESSDOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPTCLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRETRESTRICTIONS : REFERREDCURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULLDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS : CCBOX 324[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTEDNW 50955 DocId: 32423521 Page 2
[157-10014-10133.pdf — page 2]
TOP SECRETVol. 2 OF 3NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATIONUnauthorized Disclosure Subjectto Criminal SanctionsThe United States Senate R2873Report of ProceedingsHearing held beforeSenate Select Committee to Study GovernmentalOperations With Respect to Intelligence ActivitiesThursday, March 25, 1976Washington, D. C.(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned overto the Committee for destruction)WARD & PAUL410 FIRST STREET, S. E.WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003(202) 544-6000NW 50955 DocId:32423521 Page 3TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10133.pdf — page 3]
TOP SECRETCOMMITTEE MEETINGThursday, March 25, 1976United States Senate,Select Committee to Study GovernmentalOperations with Respect toIntelligence Activities,Washington, D. C.The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:43 o'clock p.m., in Room S-407, the Capitol, the Honorable Frank Church (Chairman) presiding.Present: Senators Church (presiding), Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Michigan, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Mathias, Baker and Schweiker.Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A. O. Scwharz, Jr., Chief Counsel; and Charles Kirbow, Elizabeth Culbreath, Michael Madican, Charles Lombard, William Bader, Ted Rolson, Burt Wides, Walter Ricks, Rick Inderfurth, John Bayly, David Aaron, Elliot Maxwell, Joseph Dennin, Margaret Carpenter, Martha Talley, Paul Wallach and Jim Johnston, Professional Staff Members.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10133.pdf — page 4]
# TOP SECRET2PROCEEDINGSThe Chairman. We will soon have a quorum. Why don't we begin with the Recommendation No. 43 on page 77, having to do with academics.My understanding is that this recommendation has been redrafted along the lines of the Committee's recommendations, and as it now stands it calls for the CIA academics and the institution to be informed, and for any student being recruited to be so informed.There is a choice in the latter case in informing him before he is paid or informing him before he leaves the U.S. Will you explain that to me, please?Mr. Aaron. In the course of our discussion about the recruitment of students off campuses, there were two categories of concern. One was for the integrity of the institutions themselves, and the second was, in turn, for the students that might be involved.To take the second one first, the Committee received testimony that some foreign students recruited as agents for the CIA were brought into kind of a holding status at a certain point in which they were working for, if you will, CIA proprietaries or CIA front organizations where they might conduct some operational activity, provide some information, under the impression that they were not working for the CIA but for a company or, I think as one put it, I think, a group# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10133.pdf — page 5]
# TOP SECRET31 of investors.2 Concern was expressed by the Committee in considering3 this testimony that this might be rather severe for the student4 once he discovered the fact he had been working for the CIA,5 or should his government find that out, so that it was an6 element of coercion to hire somebody under, if you will, false7 pretenses.8 That second proviso, then, in effect says that we may9 pitch and recruit a student as an agent, but you must, when you10 do that, when you really bring him into an operational relation-11 ship with the Agency, he should be so informed and not brought12 into this sort of --13 The Chairman. Let's go off the record.14 (Discussion off the record.)15 The Chairman. The question that I have on this recommen-16 dation is why shouldn't the foreign student being recruited17 by the CIA be informed of his relationship with the CIA18 at the time that that relationship is established?19 Why do you condition it upon payment or leaving the20 country?21 Senator Huddleston. Well, I was going to say there are22 many, many initial contacts that do not advance maybe much23 further than that, and for the CIA to have to be exposed maybe24 on each of those might not be reasonable. What we have tried25 to do is to make the wittingness be known about the time that# TOP SECRET