Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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Trujillo government could be successful unless it involved Trujillo's assassination.He communicated this opinion to both the State Department and the CIA. In July 1960, he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottom that the dissidents were"... in no way ready to carry on any type of revolutionary activity in the foreseeable future except the assassination of their principal enemy." (Dearborn to Rubottom letter, 7/14/60)It is uncertain what portion of the information provided by Dearborn to State was passed above the Assistant Secretary level. Through August of 1960, only Assistant Secretary Rubottom, his Deputy, Lester Mallory, and Staff Assistant [Frank Devine], were, within the Latin American Division of the Department, aware of Dearborn's "current projects." ([Devine] to Dearborn letter, 8/15/60)*By September 1960, Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubottom as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and [Frank Devine] had become a Special Assistant to Mr. Mann. While serving as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, [Devine] reportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating State activities in Latin America. It was in this capacity that Devine maintained almost daily communication with [Ned Holman] and other officials of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division(Devine, p.7)*Dearborn's candid reporting to State during the summer of 1960 raised concern with the Department and he was advised that certain specific information should more appropriately come through "the other channel" (presumably, CIA communications). Dearborn was advised that his cables to State were distributed to at least 19 different recipient offices. (Id.)
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have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardlymore, and we are not prepared to make themavailable. Last week we were asked to furnishthree or four pineapples for a party in thenear future, but I could remember nothing in my in-structions that would have allowed me to contri-bute this ingredient. Don't think I wasn'ttempted. I have rather specific guidelinesto the effect that salad ingredients will bedelivered outside the picnic grounds and willbe brought to the area by another club.(Dearborn letter to Devine, 3/16/61)After reviewing his "picnic" letter, together with the requestsin the March 14 and 15 cables discussed above, Dearborn con-cluded during his testimony before the Committee that the"pineapples" were probably the requested fragmentationgrenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredientsoutside of the picnic grounds was, almost certainly, meant torefer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Grouporder that arms be delivered outside the Dominican Republic.(Dearborn 7/29, pp. 25-27)## The Passage of Pistolsa. Pouching to the Dominican RepublicIn a March 15, 1961 cable, [Chief of Station Owen] reported that Dearborn had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issue to several dissidents. In reply, Headquarters cabled: "Regret no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against shipment of arms" and indicated that their reply had been coordinated with State. (HQS to Station cable, 3/17/61) The Station Chief then asked Headquarters to seek the necessary authorization and noted that at his last two posts, he had received pistols via the pouch for "worthy purposes" and,
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therefore, he knew it could be done. (Station to Hqs cable, 3/21/61) Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols and ammunition were being pouched. However, the Station Chief was instructed not to advise Dearborn. (Hqs. to Station cable, 3/24/61)*b. Reason for the CIA Instruction Not to Tell DearbornOwen testified that he believed the "don't tell Dearborn the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that the sending of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not something to be unnecessarily discussed. (Owen, pp. 78,79)Dearborn said he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew Owen had no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 33)c. Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single pistol for purposes completely unrelated to any assassination consideration. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 29-31) He said he had been approached by a Dominican contact who lived in a remote area and was concerned for the safety of his family in the event of political reprisals. Dearborn testified that he had believed* The Inspector General's Report, issued in connection with a review of these events, concludes that:"There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files that the pistols were actually pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a subsequent request for submachine guns." (I.G. Report, p. 60)This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March 24, 1961, Headquarters to Station cable, which provides:"C. Pouching revolvers and ammo requested TRUJ 0462 (in 20040) on 28 March. Do not advise (name Dearborn deleted) babeing pouched. Explanation follows."
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the man's fears were well-founded and had promised to seek a pistol.*Although there is no direct evidence linking any of these pistols to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 1961, CIA memorandum, unsigned and with no attribution as to source, states that two of the three pistols were passed by [Owen] to Lorenzo "Winpy" Borry, a United States citizen who was in direct contact with the action element of the dissident group. It should also be noted that the assassination was apparently conducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether one or more of these .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols eventually came into the hands of the assassins and, if so, whether they were used in connection with the assassination, remain open questions.Both Dearborn and [Owen] testified that they regarded the pistols as weapons for self-defense purposes and they never considered them in any way connected with the then-current assassination plans. (Dearborn 7/29, p.70; [Owen] pp.38,73)However, none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the purpose for which the handguns were sought and [Owen]'s cable stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents. (Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24, 1961,*Dearborn is clear in his recollection that he asked [Owen] to request only one pistol. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp.30,31) [Owen] on the other hand, testified that if his cables requested three pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must have asked for three pistols. [Owen] p.72)The pistols were, however, apparently sent in one package (HQS to Station cables, 3/27/61 and 3/24/61) and Dearborn testified that, what he believed to be the one gun, came "wrapped up" and that he passed it. (Dearborn, --7/29,p.30)
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cable advising that the pistols were being pouched is the very cable which was sent in response to a request by the dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination effort which had been previously described to Headquarters. As with the carbines discussed below, it appears that little, if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over passing these weapons to would-be assassins.3. Passing of the Carbinesa. Request by Owen and Dearborn and Approval by CIAIn a March 26, 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters, Owen asked for permission to pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber M1 carbines. The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by Navy personnel after the U.S. broke formal diplomatic relations in August 1960. Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred in the proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 42,43) On March 31, 1961 CIA Headquarters cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines. (Hqs to Station cable, 3/31/61)b. Were the Carbines Related to Assassination?The carbines were passed to the action group contact Mirpo Berny on April 7, 1961. (Station to HQS cable, 4/8/61) Eventually, they found their way into the hands of one of the assassins, Antonio de la Maza. (Station to HQS cable, 4/26/61; I.G. Report pp. 46, 49) Both Dearborn and Owen testified that the carbines were at all times viewed as strictly a token show
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of support, indicating U.S. support of the dissidents' efforts to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 46-48; Owen p. 39)c. Failure to Disclose to State Department Officials in WashingtonThere is no indication that the request or the passage of the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials in Washington until several weeks after the passage. In fact, on April 5, Headquarters requested its Station to ask Dearborn not to comment in correspondence with State that the carbines and ammunition were being passed to the dissidents. This cable was sent while Owen was in Washington, and it indicated that upon his return to the Dominican Republic, he would explain the request. The Station replied that Dearborn had not commented on the carbines and ammunition in his correspondence with State and he realized the necessity not to do so. (Station to HQS cable, 4/6/61)Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the time of his April 6 cable, that someone in the State Department had been consulted in advance and had approved the passage of the carbines (Dearborn 7/29, p. 44)
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3. Requests For and Pouching of the Machine Gunsa. OwenRequests Machine Guns (for Use in Assassination)The Station (Chief) suggested that Headquarters consider pouching an M3 machine gun on February 10, 1961 (Owen, pp. 63,64;Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61). The request was raised again in March but no action was taken. On March 20, 1961, Owen cabled a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns specifying their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic pouch or similar means. The dissidents were said to feel that delivery by air drop or transfer at sea would overly-tax their resources. (Station to HQS cable, 3/20/61)The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly identified, in Owen's cable, as being sought for use in connection with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to kill Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress and, according to Owen's cable:"4. To do they need five M3 or comparable machine- guns. and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job." (Id.)In essence, CIA's response was that the timing for an assassination was wrong. Owen was told that precipitious or uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of a leftist, Castro-type regime and the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create more problems than solutions." It was Headquarters' position that:"...we should attempt to avoid precipitous action by the internal dissidents until opposition group and HQS are better prepared to support /assassination/*, effect a change in the regime, and cope with the aftermath." (HQS to Station cable, 3/24/61)* Word supplied by CIA in previously sanitized cable.
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-22-The cable also stated that Headquarters was prepared to deliver machine guns and ammunition to the dissidents when they developed a capability to received them, but that security considerations precluded use of U.S. facilities as a carrier.*Soon, thereafter, on April 6, 1961, while Owen was in Washington for consultation with Headquarters, he reported on events in the Dominican Republic and"especially on the insistence of the EMOTH [dissident] leaders that they be provided with a limited number of small arms for their own protection (specifically, five M3 caliber .45 SMG's)." (CIA memo for the record, 4/11/61)b. Pouching the Machine Guns is Approved by BissellAccordingly, on April 7, 1961, a Pouch Restriction Waiver Request and Certification was submitted seeking permission to pouch "four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used for self protection." (Pouch Restriction Waiver Request 4/7/61)The request, submitted on behalf of the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, further provided:"B. A determination has been made that the issuance of this equipment to the action group is desirable if for no other reason than to assure this important group's continued cooperation with and confidence in this Agency's determination to live up to its earlier commitments to the group. These commitments took* This same cable of March 24, 1961, is the one which advised that the revolvers and ammunition were being pouched.
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in cables from Dearborn and Owen. (Station to HQS cables 4/25/61) On April 25, 1961, Owen advised Headquarters that Wimpy Berry had informed him that Antonio de la Maza was yoing to attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2. Owen also reported that this attempt would use the three carbines passed from the American Consulate, together with whatever else was available. (Id.)In response to the April 26 cable, Headquarters restated that there was no approval to pass any additional arms to the dissidents and requested Owen to advise the dissidents that the United States was simply not prepared at that time to cope with the aftermath of the assassination. (See C/S comments, Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61) The following day, April 27, 1961, Owen replied that, based upon further discussions with the dissidents, "We doubt statement U.S. government not now prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade them from attempt." (Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61)Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that an effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt and testified that efforts to carry out the instructions were unsuccessful. In effect, the dissidents informed him that this was their affair and it could not be turned off to suit the convenience of the U.S. government.(Dearborn, 7/29, p.52)
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- 33-additional support, coupled with fact ref.C items (the carbines) already made availableto them for personal defense; station authori-zed pass ref. A items (the machine guns) toopposition member for their additional pro-tection on their proposed endeavor." (Draft of HOSto Station cable, 5/2/61).The cable was never sent.In his testimony before the Committee, Bissell characteri-zed his reasoning for recommending release of the machine gunsas:" . . . having made already a considerableinvestment in this dissident group and itsplans that we might as well make the addi-tional investment." (Bissell, 7/22, p.127)The following day, May 3, 1961, Ray Herbert[^1], Deputy Chiefof the Western Hemisphere Division of CIA, who frequently actedas liaison with the State Department in matters concerningcovert operations in the Dominican Republic, met with AdolphBerle, Chairman of the State Department's Interagency Task Forceon Latin America.A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that Herbertinformed Berle that a local group in the Dominican Republicwished to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms for that purpose.The memorandum continued:"On cross examination it developed that thereal plan was to assassinate Trujillo and theywanted guns for that purpose. Herbert wantedto know what the policy should be."I told him I could not care less for Trujilloand that this was the general sentiment. Butwe did not wish to have any thing to do with anyassassination plots anywhere, any time. Herbertsaid he felt the same way." (Berle, Memo ofConversation, 5/3/61)[^1]:NW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 105
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```- 34 -```Copies of Berle's memorandum were sent to Wymberly Coerr;the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,and to Special Assistant Frank Devine.Both Herbert and Devine, who had been in almost dailycontact with each other since August of 1960, had been advisedof the assassination plans of the dissident group. In fact,Herbert, along with Bissell, had signed off on the proposedcable of May 2, releasing the machine guns for passage.C. Special Group Meetings of May 4 and May 18, 1961On the day following the Berle-Herbert meeting, theSpecial Group met and, according to the minutes:"The DCI referred to recent reports of a newanti-Trujillo plot. He said we never know ifone of these is going to work or not, and askedwhat is the status of contingency planning shouldthe plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this pointis covered in the Cuba paper which will be discussedat a high level in the very near future." (SpecialGroup Minutes, 5/4/61)Once again, the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutesmakes subsequent analysis as to the scope of matters discussedspeculative. It is not known to what extent and in what detailAllen Dulles referred to "recent reports" of a new anti-Trujilloplot. Certainly, the most recent report of such a plot wasDearborn's April 30 cable -- disclosing an imminent assassinationattempt potentially utilizing U.S.-supplied weapons.On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered thesituation in the Dominican Republic and, according to the
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to continue to take the same line until he received contrary instructions which clearly indicated they had been cleared in advance by the State Department itself. This cable from State was approved by Under Secretary Bowles. (Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61)[Ray Herbert] referred to Dearborn's May 16 request in a memorandum he sent to [Devine] on the same date and asked to be advised as to the Department's policy concerning passage of the machine guns. [Herbert] noted that when this request was last taken to the Department, Berle made the decision that the weapons not be passed. (Memo to ARA from CIA, 5/16/61)Devine responded to [Herbert's] memorandum on the same day, advising [Herbert] that the Department's policy continued to be negative on the matter of passing the machine guns. * [Herbert's] attention was directed to the January 12, 1961 Special Group limitation concerning the passage of arms outside of the Dominican Republic. A copy of [Devine's] memorandum to [Herbert] was forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of State, to the attention of his personal assistant, Joseph Scott. ([Devine to Herbert] memo, 5/16/61)E. Dearborn in Washington for Consultation -- Drafting of Contingency PlansAt a meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961, the question of U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic was considered and it was:"Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emergency and long- range plans for anti-communist intervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the---By May 27, 1961 Dearborn was advising the State Department that the roup was no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the fact that it must make do with what it had. (Dearborn to State---[^1] By May 27, 1961 Dearborn was advising the State Department that the roup was no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the fact that it must make do with what it had. (Dearborn to State
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-45.-fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of association with assassination attempt."The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President Kennedy, was sent to Dearborn on May 29, 1961. (State Dept. to Dearborn cable, 5/29/61)VII. May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter:A. Trujillo AssassinatedLate in the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambushed and assassinated near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The assassination closely paralleled the plan disclosed by the action group to American representatives in the Dominican Republic and passed on to officials in Washington at both the CIA and the State Department. (Dearborn cable to State, 5/30/61) The assassination was conducted by members of the action group, to whom the American carbines had been passed, and such sketchy information as is available indicates that one or more of the carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when Trujillo was killed. (I. G. Report, pp. 60-61). This evidence indicates however, that the actual assassination was accomplished by handguns and shotguns. (I.G. Report, p.61)B. Cables to WashingtonAfter receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, both Consul General Dearborn and Station Chief Owen sent replies. According to Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable as a change in U.S. policy concerning support for assassinations. (Dearborn 7/29/75, p. 74).
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-46He interpreted the May 29 cable as saying:> "...we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate> Trujillo, that is all right. But we don't want> anything to pin this on us, because we aren't> doing it, it is the Dominicans who are doing> it." (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 104)Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he said had always been his personal belief; that the U.S. should not be involved in an assassination and that if an assassination occurred it would be strictly a Dominican affair. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 100, 101)In contrast the CIA Station Chief, Owen did regard the cable as manifesting a change in U.S. policy, particularly on the questionof supplying arms. (Owen p. 120) He believed the May 29 cable was the final word in U.S. policy on this matter and consequently felt that the government had retreated from its prior position, of offering material support to the dissidents, and had adopted a new position of withholding such support.Owen's responsive cable to Headquarters stated:"HQS aware extent to which U.S. government already associated with assassination. If we are to at least cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in assassination preparation must be withdrawn."(Station to HQS cable, 5/30/61)
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# SCHNEIDER REPORTI. Summary Page 1II. The President's Initial General Instruction and Background 6A. September 15 White House Meeting 6B. Background: Tracks I and II 8C. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project 15III. CIA's Implementation of Track II 17A. Evolution of CIA Strategy 171. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach 172. Military Solution 18B. The Chile Task Force 19C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency Relations 20D. The (False Flag) Base 26E. Chief of Station 27IV. CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup 29A. The Chilean Conspirators 29B. Contacts Prior to October 15 30C. October 15 Decision 34D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15 36E. The Killing of General Schneider 39F. Post October 22 Events 41V. CIA/White House Communication During Track II 43A. September 45B. October 46C. December 54D. Did Track II End? 54
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III. CIA's Implementation of Track IIA. Evolution of CIA StrategyThe President's instruction to the CIA on September 15 to prevent Allende's assumption of power was given in the context of a broad U.S. Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 instruction to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military circles, there was little indication that it would actually take place without active U.S. encouragement and support.There was much talk among Chilean officers about the possibility of some kind of coup...but this was not the kind of talk that was being backed by, you know, serious organizational planning.(Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 32)1. The "Constitutional Coup" ApproachAlthough efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende victory continued simultaneous with Track II, the Agency premised its activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end.On September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago:Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assump-tion of power. Paramilitary legerdemain has beendiscarded. Military solution is objective.(Hqs. 236, Sept. 21, 1970, para. 3)The initial strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promoting a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency decided to promise "help in any election which was an outgrowth of a successful military takeover." (Nov. 18, 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger)Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve the Congress, and proclaim a new election. (A private U.S. citizen who had been a conduit for CIA funds to Frei's 1964 campaign was sent to see him)