Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 55]
TOP SECRETFrom the counter-intelligence staff standpoint, in particular what I was concerned with was an attempt to make sure that there was a full integration. You see, under the operating procedures and the responsibilities, the military services are required to advise the CIA of its activities, counter-intelligence and so forth abroad. In turn, they advise the FBI of their counter-intelligence activities and so forth here in the United States.So you have, when an activity here in the United States, the individual involved, the double agant, the controlled foreign asset transfers abroad, then there is a transfer of coordination and vice versa.Mr. Angleton. I'd like to inject this. There is concurrent jurisdiction since the double is usually an American citizen. So regardless of where he is, we would always persuade the Army or whoever it is, to notify the Bureau through their own channel because you're dealing with Americans, so geography is not really the important element.Mr. Miler. From a counter-intelligence standpoint, it has had, there have been some problems as a result of that in terms of the regular CIA representation abroad. There is a means of working together with the military services and so forth in terms of notifying each of the services, each of the agencies of the potential for deception feeding and so forth.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 56]
TOP SECRET53sh 5Phone (Area 202) 544-60001 Mr. Johnson. Does the CIA have veto powers over military2 proposed double-agents?3 Mr. Miler. No, not the veto power.4 Mr. Angleton. Well, it never really comes up to a veto.5 But if we took a stand against it and supplied reasoning that6 made sense, they would go along the way that we wanted. We've7 never had a head-on collision.8 Mr. Miler. There would oftentimes be differences in the9 field, that would be presented through the proper channels,10 say from the Army back to the ACST from our field station11 to headquarters. And then there would be a discussion and a12 resolution at the Washington level.13 Now obviously, in any kind of a situation like that,14 there have been instances where, you know, there was bad15 feelings and misunderstandings and so forth. But I think that16 overall, at least in my experience in the way we try to17 conduct the business was that it was mutually beneficial.18 Now the military services have complained to me because19 I represented and a couple of my people represented the20 Agency on double agents to the military services and so forth,21 that we were not as forthcoming in providing them information22 about our possible assets and so forth as they were.23 Their system was different. They had a clearinghouse24 system where this was available and so forth. Our position25 on it was that if we had a requirement, we would perhaps findTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 57]
TOP SECRETgsha 161 a source or an asset in which to fulfill the requirement.2 But for security and compartmentation reasons, not exclusively3 due to the counter-intelligence concerns but also to the4 general security and operations procedures of the Agency as5 a whole, there was a reluctance to put this information forward except when and as needed.End Tape 4gBegin 4B7 Mr. Angleton. And there's another point that has to be8 raised here. That is when you get into the field of deception9 you are bound by certain charters. Those charters have not10 been approved at the highest policy level. So there's been11 a great deal of tactical military cover and deception.12 Our interest is more on the strategic deception, and13 that paper has been resting with Dr. Kissinger for soте 2 1/214 years or more for approval.15 Mr. Miler. Three.16 Mr. Angleton. Three years.17 So that is bogged down a great deal of the whole overall18 deception program.19 Mr. Maxwell. The paper that is in front of Dr. Kissinger now makes what deceptions?20 Mr. Angleton. It was a paper that was pulled together21 by the Joint Chiefs, ourselves, and the FBI.22 Mr. Maxwell. And it proposes what?23 Mr. Angleton. It outlines procedures for strategic24 deceptions, political deception and other deception.25TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 58]
# TOP SECRET55Mr. Johnson. Could you give a brief example of the CIA role in strategic deception, a specific example?Mr. Angleton. No, I can't. I mean I could get into cases but it's too vague. It's always been something that has been arrived at ad hoc and it served the purpose, but I wouldn't call it strategic.Mr. Miler. No program, in other words.Mr. Angleton. In other words, the proper strategic deception would be the President calls in the Director and says, no one knows that in three months I'm going on the following trip. I will have meetings with the following people. I'm not going to announce it until a week before I leave.So it gives you a time span of two months to use all of your sources to put across disinformation or information, a letter in the mailbox to the proper addressee that, you know, favor his role or favor his mission and helps him out. And that's what we are trying to seek and have been trying to seek for a long time. But there has to be a way of knowing what are some of the intentions of the government in order to advance it through disinformation or deception.Mr. Miler. With respect to the military, if I may return to that, I think that one of the -- probably the greatest difference and failure with respect to CIA counter-intelligence relationships with the military was with respect to the situation in Vietnam because CIA did not perform a counter-# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 59]
## TOP SECRETintelligence function of any responsibility or significance in Vietnam. That was a tragic failure on the part of CIA and it goes back to the basic problem of the present management, to answer your earlier question, the present management because the present management of the CIA was involved in the decisions which prohibited a good counter-intelligence effort in Vietnam.Mr. Shea. In that paper that is before Dr. Kissinger, are there any proposed control mechanisms that would act as a filter so that the misinformation in a sense could not flow back into the policy circles within the United States?Mr. Angleton. Well, there wouldn't be. The kind of channels used, there wouldn't be any of that happening. This would be information given to an agent who was reporting, say to the KGB back, say it would never hit the light of day.Mr. Shea. So the process of misinformation as it normally relates to the intelligence field is totally separate in terms of the active process of misinformation as it goes on in counter-intelligence?Mr. Angleton. We are not dealing in overt. There may be some overt things put out that support a document that was given to a double who would pass it to KGB. But if the man is regarded to be an agent of the KGB, the KGB is not going to publicize that document without having blown the alleged agent.Mr. Shea. But they could work on it in their process of disinformation to come back, and you would be caught..## TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 60]
TOP SECRET57gsh 191 Mr. Miler. No. To be successful you would have to have2 a means of monitoring. You would have to have your penetration3 of, you would have to have your own litmus to see where it4 is played back or what reflections or what requirements are5 put on other double agents on the basis of the information from6 this agent.7 That requires a centralized screening and control of8 double agents.9 Mr. Angleton. If you sent the information through Agent N10 to KGB headquarters in Moscow, part of your testing would be to see11 whether your other double agents received questionnaires12 which you knew related to that document.13 Mr. Shea. But it seems like in order to make strategic14 misinformation functional, you would have to have the same15 requirements that you had when you were talking about having16 a double agent: namely, somebody in a superior point of17 information penetrated into that organization to make sure18 that they are getting that information you're sending out19 is misinformation.20 Mr. Miler. Not necessarily.21 Mr. Angleton. It's not quite the same.22 Mr. Miler. It's not quite that simple because you could23 see reflections of it perhaps in other areas in political24 actions, in failure to act.25 Mr. Angleton. There are other ways of doing it. YouTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 61]
TOP SECRET581 can go to a diplomat who has a weak cipher system and you2 yourself can tell that diplomat in great confidence a whole3 series of things. You know the Soviets are going to break the4 code and read that message.5 That would be one way of doing it. There are other ways6 of having, telling a friendly foreign service whom you7 know is penetrated.8 I mean it's all case by case. But once you are given the9 task, that's when you begin to look at all of your assets and10 you begin to do the creative side of running a double, or how11 are you going to put this across. And there are many ways of12 doing it without bringing many people in.13 Mr. diGenova. I'd like to change the subject matter just14 briefly. Part of the responsibility of the CI research personnel15 is to produce reports on various subjects which include current16 analyses on proprietary companies used by foreign intelligence17 services.18 I would like to know whether or not either of you could19 shed any light on the question of whether or not we have any20 evidence that foreign intelligence services have established21 and used proprietary companies in the United States?22 Mr. Angleton. Well, there's one case that comes to mind.23 I can't remember the details but I think that as a result of24 it, one of our deputy directors had a big project with this25 company and they dropped it because the Foreign IntelligenceTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 62]
TOP SECRET59gsh 21Phone (Area 202) 544-60001 Service had quite a penetration into it.2 Mr. diGenova. Would that be the only instance of which3 you are familiar that there was in fact knowledge of an operating4 proprietary company run by a foreign intelligence service5 within the continental United States?6 Mr. Angleton. Offhand I can't say because the Office of7 Security would be working with the Bureau, usually. I mean to8 say that S&T are the most likely people to have contracts with9 a number of contractors and companies. It would be Office10 of Security's job.11 Mr. diGenova. Maybe I'm not making my point clear. I12 just thought that maybe in the course of your counter-intelligence13 function you may have discovered by whatever means that there14 was in fact such a company operating in the United States15 which was being used, not to contract with the Agency but to16 contract or just do anything, whether it was a bookkeeping17 firm or a law firm or anything, and was in fact engaged in18 espionage.19 Mr. Miler. Well, we've had a number in the past. We've20 had a number of leads which were to the effect that Soviet21 intelligence money was in such and such a company, or something22 such as that. That was turned over to the FRI. And whether23 or not we ever heard anything back or did anything further on24 it, no.25 In other words, unless there was an investigative angleTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 63]
TOP SECRET60Phone (Area 202) 544-60001 which we could pursue abroad or something, I'm a little bit2 confused by the question because it's outside -- the investigation3 of such a thing is outside the purview of the CIA unless it is4 abroad, unless it would be funded through Switzerland or Luxem-5 bourg or unless there was a Messagerie Maritime connection where6 Soviet money was being put in and they had representation here.7 Mr. diGenova. Well, the staff has been given information8 that these analyses are done by CI research personnel or9 proprietary companies of foreign intelligence services, and10 either that information is wrong or we just do not understand11 each other.12 Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean it's true that there have13 been analyses done. But the one that comes to mind is the14 one I mentioned, was the one where in this case it was French,15 had a heavy penetration of a company and that company was16 contracting with our STT people and therefore, our question17 was rather a project for large sums of money of using this18 company would proceed, and the decision based on our counter-19 intelligence analyses was to drop the project.20 Mr. diGenova. I'd like to ask the question.21 We've been told that one of the benefits which occurs22 to U.S. counter-intelligence when it focuses on bloc countries23 is the fact that these totalitarian regimes have a habit of24 acquiring great amounts of information about their citizenry25 and storing it, and that this is, on occasion, accessible to usTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 64]
# TOP SECRET61gsh 231 and makes them somewhat vulnerable as a result of that.2 Turning the coin around a little bit and looking at our-3 selves, are the computerized systems which we now have in our4 country which put in a central location large amounts of5 information about individual citizens and large groups of6 citizens, making us vulnerable to penetration in terms of7 information, more vulnerable in terms of penetration by8 foreign counter-intelligence services?9 Mr. Angleton. Vulnerable in what sense?10 Mr. diGenova. Getting information about us, period,11 which I understand is one of the key goals of counter-intelligence,12 finding out what the other side is doing.13 Mr. Angleton. You mean surreptitiously getting it from14 us or officially getting it from us?15 Mr. diGenova. Both. The fact of the matter is the16 information exists and it's vulnerable for them to have it,17 is it vulnerable for us to have it?18 Mr. Angleton. Well, I wouldn't put it down as vulnerable19 because when anyone makes a request on you for information,20 the first question is why. So the burden is on them to justif21 that they have a counter-espionage reason for asking for that22 information. And in the bulk of the cases you'll find that the23 are doing your work for you.24 In other words, they've come across a telephone tap of25 some American who's arrived, he's made a call to the Bulgaria::# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 65]
TOP SECRET1 embassy and it looks as though:there's a meeting being set up,2 so immediately you get a flash. And they ask that service for3 traces on the individual and you come back with the why, i.4 and they tell you about the entire Bulgarian business. And5 so we start an investigation as to Bulgarian antecedents or6 anything dealing with Bulgaria, et cetera. And if it's7 justified, we give them the information.8 Mr. diGenova. Well, I don't think, Mr. Angleton, that's9 not what I'm getting at.10 We as a country are amassing properly, quote, unquote,11 large amounts of information about ourselves through the use12 of computer systems.13 Mr. Angleton. That's right.14 Mr. diCenova. The CIA tells us that that is one of the15 things they like so much about foreign countries, because the16 totalitarian regimes have the tendency to amass large amounts17 of information about their citizenry and when we penetrate18 and get that information, that helps us.19 My question is when we do that, when we centralize the20 information by using our own computer systems, no matter where21 it is, do we help them?22 And in this regard I would note that in 1970 the Inspector23 General's report on the question of cover noted that the fact24 that credit bureaus in this country were amassing so much25 information about people, including CIA personnel, that itTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 66]
TOP SECRETgsh 25Phone (Area 202) 544-6000631 posed a major threat to maintain cover, both in the United2 States and abroad for CIA agents.3 Now the question I raise is are we cutting off our nose4 to spite our face by using computers to really marshall together5 large amounts of evidence which can be made accessible to6 foreign powers either by surreptitiously or by simply openly7 getting it?8 Mr. Miler. Yes, the answer is yes.9 Mr. diGenova. Good.10 Mr. Miler. Because it's very easy to get this information.11 And, for example, the Soviets have had, you can confirm this12 from the Bureau, have had a systematic system of purchasing13 from the State of Maryland, the District of Columbia, the14 State of Virginia, the business directories, residence15 directories, license directories for less than $350 apiece.16 Mr. Johnson. If we're going to keep on our schedule,17 we've got a witness who's supposed to be here at 3:30, so18 is there a final question?19 Mr. Kirbow. I have two questions. secause of the20 vast years of experience, Mr. Chairman, that we should ask21 then to comment on, and either one of you all should answer.22 What do you all consider today to be the major threats23 to this country? And the second question is, what has been24 the major foreign covert action program directed against this25 country in your lifetime and experience in the Agency?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 67]
TOP SECRET641 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think, no question, it's the2 Soviet bloc services that represent the major threat because3 they are really a small, they are directly subordinated to the4 central committee and to the basic objectives, as I've seen them!5 all my life to the change and balance of military power.6 Further, that practically all intelligence operations more7 and more have political objectives, and I think it is the fact8 that since '59 they have elevated the Cuban intelligence and9 all of the other bloc services to a very high degree of10 efficiency, that they are coordinated and they work as equals.11 And I think that is the major threat, that is the12 inability of the FBI by lack of personnel and manpower to be13 able to cover these people. There isn't the minimal coverage.14 The people they cover are people who have been "identified,"15 and I defy anyone to have a list of identified agents in this16 country.17 Now that is the legal side of it. Now the larger part18 of it is the illegal, where there's been little or no success.19 The only one that has really come out is the Abel case, which20 we handled through *Hayharen Hahannan*. And then there was one or two21 minor ones.22 But that is a whole program of bloc activity, and23 according to one of the best sources we had, his view was that24 the illegals would be placed primarily in airports, docks,25 factories, and they give a whole listing. And these are theTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 68]
TOP SECRET651 areas where you have sabotage, you have explosions you can't2 identify, et cetera.3 Now the illegal directorate represents a very major part4 of Soviet intelligence and bloc intelligence and we just --5 there are not successes. It's just happenstance.6 Mr. Epstein. It's disruption of our defense effort?7 Is that what you're speaking of now? Their goal being8 disruption of this country's defense effort?9 Mr. Angleton. Well, they have many assignments. But10 the point is they have also the sabotage-assassination part,11 which is totally apart from the body politic of the KGB, and12 it raises questions in everybody's mind when there is sabotage13 and all other kinds of activities and you cannot find the14 culprits.15 One defector stated that he believed that the computer16 fire they had in the Pentagon several years ago was KGB. He17 was KGB. But he stated in effect that he thought that was18 one of their operations.19 Scotty?20 Mr. Miler. The major threat to the U.S., I think, is21 based on the fact, as we referred to earlier, as this should22 affect counter-intelligence, the national counter-intelligence23 effort, is to have your national counter-intelligence focuse!24 on the fact that the Soviets and the Soviet blocs, since "Ma25 of 1959 have rededicated themselves to the principles ofTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 69]
TOP SECRET1 Leninism. They have rededicated themselves to the shift in2 the military balance of power. They have reinstituted, in3 effect, what was the policy of the NEP period, the New Economic4 Policy, the attraction of Western business, the attraction of5 Western capital into the Soviet Union to bolster the Soviet6 Union, the disruption of the economies of other nations, which7 would have an adverse effect on the economy of this nation --8 all of this centrally controlled and directed, used through9 such countries as Romania, where we have for several years now10 deluded ourselves that Romania is independent, through Bulgaria,11 through Hungary, through Poland, all the rest of it.12 This is the major threat to the United States. Counter-13 intelligence is probably, in my view, at least, one of the14 major ways that you're going to be able to counter this and15 at least get the information brought to the attention of the16 people who are making the decisions and making the policy17 for this country.18 Mr. Epstein. Has our penetration effort been good enough19 to establish whether or not the Soviet Union has been involved20 in direct covert action against the United States, such as21 to undermine our economy, not using other countries but22 directly?23 Mr. Angleton. There's been a tremendous amount of24 information on this. I mean, for example today the second25 head of the Chamber of Commerce in Moscow is General Pitovranov.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 70]
TOP SECRET671 Prior, he was Deputy Chief of the NKVD. He was the resident.2 KGB resident in Peking. He's the one who with Mao set up the3 underground that took over China. He was the head of Karlshorst,4 the largest KGB in Germany. He operated people like George5 Blake. lle organized the kidnapping of Otto John, the head6 of Security, West Germany.7 Ile has now been placed as the Deputy Chief, or Deputy8 Chairman, of the Moscow Chamber of Commerce, the same role that*DZHERZHINSIY*9 Lenin had *Derjensky* in the NEP. That is the role to he10 able to deal with Western capitalists with the view of abroad11 recruitments and with the view of using them as agents of12 influence.13 Now there's a tremendous amount of data. Now this is14 what I'm trying to say, that counter-intelligence has always15 been kept at a very low level as far as its ability to submit16 such studies or whatnot to the National Security Council or to17 a forum where they are debated. But they happen to be the18 only hard intelligence because they are coming from men who19 were 16 years in this one case, a part of that mechanism and20 who read all the files.21 Mr. Epstein. What happens to all that?22 Mr. Angleton. Well, that's been used by directors in23 briefings but there's never yet been a forum where you can24 actually have a confrontation with people who hold contrary25 views.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 71]
TOP SECRET68Mr. Miler. In other words, how significant is the fact then, how significant would it be if our Congress, our Executive and our business people knew that as of 1974 the last figures I have of 187 Soviets identified with the USSR all union chamber of commerce, the people that are doing all of the business with our businessmen who are coming here to the United States, work them and so forth, when 47 of those were appointed to that from the KGB.I mean, what significance does this have to the United States?Senator Schweiker. 47 out of how many?Mr. Miler. About 182.Mr. Angleton. Let's go to the scientific side on this.The scientific side, in May of 1969 the central committee ordered that there be added 2,000 staff officers to KGB from the Academy of Sciences in order to exploit the opening to the West and the scientific levels.Mr. Epstein. And how would that exploitation be accomplished?Mr. Angleton. For recruitment and exploitation of contacts in the West in the scientific exchanges.Mr. Epstein. The goal being espionage or something else?Mr. Angleton. Espionage.Mr. Miler. Espionage and influence. How many KGB officers?TOP SECRET