Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10008-10238.pdf — page 3]
# CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZEDMEMORANDUMTO:FROM:DATE: July 2, 1975SUBJECT: List of Documents Referred to in Special Group Minutes 1960-1964 (Less 1962) which the Committee May Wish to ObtainTheTilas nt of Sinte has no objection to the release or de fication of this document in fullRUNGSIDE RETTEy of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)1. The document reflecting a project discussed at the Special Group meeting on February 17, 1960, with respect to "a project providing for covert spotting and assessment of potential agents for eventual sabotage of sugar mills." (Source: Special Group Minutes dated February 17, 1960)2. Paper entitled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba" which was read at the Special Group meeting on March 14, 1960. (Source: Special Group Minutes dated March 15, 1960, para. 1. Note that in para. 12 it is stated "Mr. Gray said he would like to submit later this week to his associate the paper entitled 'General Covert Action Plan for Cuba' but modified on the basis of this morning's discussion. Mr. Dulles promised a revised paper this week.")3. Any paper which relates to the briefing by Mr. Dulles "on certain confidential aspects of the situation in the Dominican Republic" to the Special Group meeting on March 30, 1960. (Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting March 30, 1960. Note the Minutes do not indicate the nature of this briefing.)4. Special Group Minutes dated October 27, 1960, state: "The paper outlining a proposal to aid Col. Mobutu 'in working toward the eventual formation of a moderate government was read by the Group." The Minutes indicate that "the Group approved the proposal." (Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting dated October 27, 1960.)5. Any backup papers or documents relating to a reference in the minutes of the Special Group meeting on November 3, 1960, where it is stated: "Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been done for taking direct, positive action against Fidel, Raul, and Che Guevara."6. The Minutes of November 10, 1960, Special Group meeting state: "Mr. Bissell mentioned briefly that we are making certain contingency plans for the Congo against the possibility of a pro-Soviet Lumumba government...."7. The document containing the plan which was presented to the Special Group meeting on December 29, 1960, by Mr. Bissell. The Minutes for that meeting state: "Mr. Bissell gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the Trujillo regime...he also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself."
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8. Any paper or document used by Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell in the briefing they gave to new members of the Special Group at the meeting on 14 February 1961. The Minutes state: "Mr. Dulles, assisted by Mr. Bissell, then summarized for the benefit of the new members of the Special Group the specific actions taken by the predecessor group during the past year, and also a list of significant projects which antedate the beginning of 1960 and which it is planned to continue."9. The memorandum which was requested by Mr. Bundy at the Special Group meeting on February 14, 1961. The minutes state: "Mr. Bundy asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government to Trujillo."10. The reports referred to by the DCI at the Special Group meeting on May 4, 1961. The Minutes state: "The DCI referred to recent reports of a new anti-Trujillo plot."11. The "Cuba Paper" mentioned in the Special Group Minutes of May 4, 1961. The Minutes state: "Mr. Bundy said that this point (anti-Trujillo plot planning) is covered in the Cuba Paper which will be discussed at a high level in the very near future."12. Any Action Memoranda or other documents which would clarify the action taken by the Special Group at the meeting on May 18, 1961. At that meeting, Gen. Cabal noted that internal dissidents in the Dominican Republic were pressing for the release to them of certain small arms, "now in U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. He inquired whether the feeling of the group remained that these arms should not be passed. The members showed no inclination to take a contrary position at this time." (It is not clear whether a contrary position signified contrary to the desire of the internal dissidents or contrary to Gen. Cabal's suggestion that these arms not be passed.) (Source: 'Special Group Minutes 18 May 1961,02769)13. A paper on Covert Programs for Cuba was presented by the DCI at the Julý 20, 1961, Special Group meeting. The paper appeared to be a basic position paper: Its para. 2a read: "The basic objective is to provide support to a U.S. program to develop opposition to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable to the U.S." (Source: Minutes dated July 21, 1961, 02778)14. On July 27, 1961, the Special Group discussed a CIA paper titled: "Internal Action Operations Against Cuba" dated July 25, 1961. The Group discussed its relevance to the "basic paper discussed last week." (Source: Special Group Minutes July 27, 1961, 02781)15. On August 3, 1961, the Special Group reviewed "a condensed set of recom- mendations summing up the proposed Cuban program." This paper was approved for consideration by higher authority. (Source: Special Group Minutes August 3, 1961, 02782)
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16. On October 6, 1961, Mr. Parrott told the Special Group that there was    in preparation "a contingency plan in connection with the possible    removal of Castro from the Cuban scene." (We should obtain this plan    as it may relate to an assassination plot.) (Source: Special Group    Minutes October 6, 1961, 02783)17. On December 8, 1961, Gen. Lansdale presented "the outline of a program    designed to overthrow the Castro government." (Source: Special Group    Minutes December 8, 1961, 02795)18. The March 26 Special Group Minutes referred to a "Shipping Sabotage    Paper of 19 March. The proposal reflected in the paper was remanded    for Group consideration by the Cottrell Committee." (Source: Special    Group Minutes March 26, 1963, 02839)19. On April 4, 1963, the Special Group approved three papers which were    subsequently approved by "higher authority" on April 9. The papers    were titled "Sabotage of Shipping," "Russian Language Broadcasts,"    and "Propaganda Inciting Cubans within Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops."    (Source: Special Group Minutes April 4, 1963, 02844 and Memo for    Members of the Special Group April 9, 1963, 02845)20. The Minutes of April 11, 1963, Special Group meeting referred to    "Three papers being considered at today's meeting." One of these papers    may deal with sabotage in Cuba as there was a "lengthy discussion" of    the entire question of sabotage at the meeting. Also, the Minutes state:    "The comments from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated 11 April on    the three papers being considered at today's meeting (were requested by    the group to) be withdrawn and destroyed for security reasons."    Note: We should perhaps make a request for such comments, to determine    whether they were in fact destroyed. (Source: Minutes dated 11 April    1963, 02846)21. The Minutes of 18 April 1963 indicate the Special Group "turned to dis-    cussion of the papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated April    16, 17, and 18." There is no indication of the subject matter of these    papers. The Minutes state that it was agreed these papers should be    "staffed and sharpened up for presentation at next week's meeting."    Note that the Minutes indicate the title of the paper dated April 17,    as "Maximum Covert Action Program" which consists basically of "sabotage    and harrassment, plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who    may be responsive to our advice but not certainly to our command."    Note further that the Minutes state Mr. Bundy and McCone expressed doubts    as to whether "we are in a position to decide major problems of this    type (presumably reflected in the three papers) until we have a clearer    picture of what the overall policy toward Cuba is likely to be...."    Note also that Mr. Bundy stated he was not sure whether "it would be    possible to embark on the activities proposed in the Coordinator's    papers, without a drastic change in U.S. policy." (Source: Minutes    dated 18 April 1963, 02848-49)
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-4-22. A memorandum for the Special Group dated April 26, 1963, (02853) which discusses a paper on "new covert policy and programs toward Cuba" states that decisions have been made regarding certain of the item numbers in that paper.23. The Minutes of the Special Group meeting on April 25 (02855) refer to a paper on a "proposed new policy and program toward Cuba."24. A memorandum for the Special Group dated June 19, 1963, subject: "Sabotage Program, Cuba" discusses a meeting with higher authority on that subject at which a "proposed program was approved dealing with 'external sabotage' directed at four major segments of the Cuban economy: (1) electric power; (2) petroleum refineries and storage facilities; (3) railroad and highway transportation; and (4) production and manufacturing." (Source: Memorandum June 19, 1963, 02871)25. The Minutes of Special Group meeting on 18 July 1963 state that higher authority had no objection to a program recommending a new "political action" plan for Haiti. Col. King told the Special Group that "everyone concerned with the project agrees that Duvalier must be removed in some manner or other." King went on to say that the existing plan is unworkable and thus it is "best to switch to a different kind of operation. This would include training of exiles in cross-border operations with a long-range objective of establishing a clandestine organization and building an effective opposition in Haiti." (Source: Minutes 18 July 1963, 02878)26. Minutes of Special Group meeting 15 August 1963 (02880) indicate the Special Group approved a "Operational Proposal"dated 12 August 1963, relating to "a non-violent program to inhibit free world and neutral trade with Cuba."27. The Minutes of Special Group meeting on August 29, 1963 (02883) state the Group considered a paper from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated August 12, 1963, titled "Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups."28. The Minutes of the Special Group meeting on 5 September 1963 refer to a paper from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated August 13 on the "subject of Commandos L." Mr. Fitzgerald referred to the fact that "it would be feasible to take off from a point in the northern Bahamas, rather than from one of the keys very near Cuba." Note that the August 29 Minutes (02883) refer to the project for support of Commandos L as "useful, but not essential" and that the "economic damage which this group might inflict would be comparatively minor" but there might be "some psychological advantages...and such operations would serve to keep the Cuban security forces busy." Note further that the Minutes of October 3, 1963, state that higher authority (President Kennedy) had reviewed the proposed Commandos L operation and felt it might be "a worthwhile mission to undertake" provided certain conditions were met. The Special Group on August 3 agreed to review the project onceNW 50955 DocId:32203746 Page 7
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-5-more if it still appears desirable in light of the comments at that meeting and by higher authority. Also note that the Minutes of October 24, 1963 (02898) state that "CIA is dropping its earlier proposal to support Commandos L, due to the crackdown on exile raids by various U.S. and British Government agencies."29. The Minutes of November 12, 1963 (02905-08) indicate Mr. Fitzgerald reported on Cuban operations under six main headings. Given the length of this report, there may have been some formal paper from which Fitzgerald spoke, although the minutes do not refer to any particular piece of paper.30. A number of particular "operations" designated by number and purpose are mentioned in the minutes of Special Group meetings on 14 November, 5 December, 6 December, 19 December, 20 December, 1963 and January 2 and January 9, 1964. If desired, we might request the backup papers for these operations. Typical operations were described as "the exfiltration of two members of an existing resistance net," the"infiltra- tion of a five-man team for the purpose of sabotaging a railway bridge."31. The Minutes of a Special Group meeting on February 13, 1964, state the Special Group discuss "a specific Department of Defense paper" which dealt with, among others, the following topics: "Harrassment of Free World Shipping to Cuba," "Covert Economic Activities," "Encouraging Dissidents Among Factions," "Actions Against Cuban Subversion in Latin America." Source: Minutes dated 14 February 1964 (02919)32. The Minutes of April 3, 1964 (02924) refer to a paper entitled "Status of Sabotage and Raiding Capability Against Cuba." The Minutes also state that "three separate papers" were submitted to all members of the Group and the Group concluded to approve five infiltration/exfiltration operations and five caching operations, but table the five sabotage proposals.33. A memorandum for Mr. Bundy dated 18 June 1964 (02931) refers to a "Helms Memo to DCI entitled Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Leaders, June 10, 1964."34. The Minutes of a meeting on June 18, 1964, (02932) state that: "A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involved the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders." No other identification of this paper is given, it may refer to the Helms memo immediately above.35. The Minutes of July 9, 1964, (02937) indicate that Mr. Bundy read a draft NSAM "dealing with the establishment of a new working group to examine the problem of Cuba."36. A memorandum by John McCone to McGeorge Bundy dated August 19, 1965, summarizes seven reports regarding the status of an FBI investigation re "Plans by Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Cuban Government Leaders." The reports apparently were of interviews by FBI agents of various individuals allegedly involved in the plans. (Source: 02943-44)
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-6-37. A memo dated September 3, 1964, refers to a paper titled "Request by Revolutionary Student Directorate for Permission to Move Personnel to the Dominican Republic for Purpose of Engaging in Hit and Run Activities Against Cuba." (Source: Memo for the Record, 02947)38. A memo for the record dated 11 September 1964 (02948) states that "basic reports of the Cuban Study Group established by NSAM 311 of 10 July 1964 were nearing their final stages and that certain gaps were being closed between the SNIE findings and those of the Critical Collection Committee."
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992Date:10/07/93Page:1## JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM### IDENTIFICATION FORM### AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10008-10241RECORDS SERIES :AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R602CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF CIA INFORMATIONIN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED### DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIAFROM :TO :TITLE :INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARYDATE : 07/24/75PAGES : 7SUBJECTS :INTERVIEW WITH BRUCE CHEEVERASSASSINATION INQUIRYDOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION : TRESTRICTIONS : REFERREDCURRENT STATUS : PDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/93OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS :BOX 438-3![signature]
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438-3 R602INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY TOP SECRETINTERVIEW WITH: Bruce CheeverREGARDING: Assassination Inquiry SSCI CO 438-3SSCI BOX " 438-3DATE-TIME-LOCATION: July 24, 1975 10241PRESENT: Paul WALLACH and Joe DiGenovaHAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:FOLLOW UP REQUIRED:MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S):EXECUTIVE SESSION: _ YES _ NoNW 50955 DocId: 32203749 Page 2
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# INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARYPage 1 of 6TOP SECRETThis morning Joe DiGenova and I interviewed Bruce Cheever at the Carroll Arms. We focused on Cheever's tenure as deputy director of Task Force W.Background:1938-43 Marine Corps1943-44 OSS Parachute School1944-46 Marine Corps1950-53 Office Police Coordination; headed Plans Section for Western European Division1953-56 Chief of Station: Sweden1956-60 Deputy Chief, European Division1960-3/62 Headquarters, U. S. European Command (U. S. representative)3/62-65 Deputy Director: Task Force W1965-71 Chief of Station: South America1971 Retired from Agency3/64-2/65 Deputy Chief, Special Operations Branch (developing paramilitary capabilities for Agency)Apparently selected for Task Force W because of extensive paramilitary background. Not sure whether slotted by Harvey or Helms.Prior to his Task Force W assignment, Harvey was known to Cheever by reputation only. He described Harvey as one of the finest operatives the Agency ever had, citing Harvey's Berlin tunnel.Cheever understood that Task Force W was Mongoose's instrument to get rid of the Castro regime; that the Cuban operations had White House backing; and that the Agency had been given an operational carte blanche, with the caveat that each operation had to receive explicit SGA approval prior to getting off the drawing board.Cheever told us: "You don't pull in fast-rising men like [Ted) Schakley unless you have solid backing." Cheever believes that Lansdale was RFK's representative and that Task Force W would not suggest aggressive covert action to the SGA without Lansdale's approval.![CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUME AS SANITIZED, 14 Jul 94 (1)(B), (1) (c).]DocId: 32203749 Page 3
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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY                                                                   Page 2 of 6Cheever confirmed what we knew about Harvey.Although Cheever worked closely with Harvey, hetold us that Harvey was a loner and most surelywould not inform him of operations unless he hada "must need to know". In Cheever's opinion,Harvey was one of the great believers in compart-mentalization; Cheever "complained that Harveyturned him into his staff man" (as compared to anoperational extension). Cheever also told us thatHarvey was a two martini man at lunch with thyroidproblems; this often "led to problems for Harveyat early afternoon meetings".Cheever believes he attended at least ten SGAmeetings. However he does not recall RFK, onlyrecalls briefing Bundy. (Maybe Cheever attendedother than SGA meetings -- the minutes do not re-flect his attendance.)Cheever met weekly with designees of the SGAprincipals in Lansdale's office (Messrs. Califano,Haig, Hurwitch, Craig, and Johnson). Cheever wouldbrief these designees on proposed operationalplans; discussion of the details would ensue.Subsequent to the staff meetings, the principalswould meet and decide whether or not the particularplan would be approved. Cheever did state that theGroup often rejected proposals. In one instance,Max Taylor vetoed the maritime infiltration of asmall team. Taylor felt that the chances of successwere small and attributability great. (Cheeveragreed with Taylor -- "but it was one of Lansdale'sbrain childs.")Cheever told us that "around the Task Force Wshop it was known that the Kennedys wanted to getrid of the Castro regime." In order to get thisdone, "the Kennedys built a fire under the Agency'stail and installed Lansdale as Chief of Operations".According to Cheever, Lansdale and the SGA were"geared to keeping the Kennedys informed as to whatwas happening".However, after the Cuban missile crisis, Cubanoperations were not pursued with the same sense ofurgency.
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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10008-10246RECORDS SERIES :AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R560ACIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF CIA INFORMATIONIN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED6/12/98DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM :TO :TITLE :INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARYDATE: 07/25/75PAGES: 3SUBJECTS:INTERVIEW WITH DAVID, PAUL (ALIAS)SUBJ: ASSASSINATION INQUIRYDOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION: TRESTRICTIONS: REFERREDCURRENT STATUS: PDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 10/07/93OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS:BOX 438-12[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUR RYINTERVIEW WITH: Paul David (alias)SSCI 438-1210246REGARDING: Assassination InquiryDATE-TIME-LOCATION: July 25, 1975; 608 Carroll ArmsPRESENT: Messrs. WALLACH and DiGenovaHAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:FOLLOW UP REQUIRED:MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S);EXECUTIVE SESSION: ☑ YES ☐ NoNW 50955 DocId: 32203754 Page 2
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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARYTOP SECRETThis morning, Joe and I met with Paul David ("P.D.") at the Carroll Arms for approximately two hours. George Clarke from the CIA's General Counsel's staff was present for the last fifteen minutes of the interview.Page 1 of 2FILE:Background:1948-51 - Assistant to the Chief of Station - *Rumania*1951-54 - Chief Rumanian Desk1954-58 - Chief of Operations Against Communist Areas (Eastern Bloc) - (Operations from *(Greek Base)* stationed in Greece)1958-61 - Channel Chief Station1961-62 - Special Assistant to Helms1962-63 - National War College (June 1962 - July 1963)1963-64 - Helms' Special Assistant1965-66 - Chief Station (Holland/Hague)1966-69 - Chief of Station (Ethiopia)1969-73 - Chief of Operational Services - Chief of Staff in DDP. (Director Clandestine Services)1973 - Chief Career Management Personnel1973-74 - Chief Plans & Programs for DirectorateInterview Summary:Bissell "out of the blue" asked P.D. to read and comment upon Zoogby's Cuban operations paper. P.D. told Bissell that the paper/proposals "stunk" ( . . "much like another Bay of Pigs"). Apparently, Helms also read and liked P.D.'s comments. After Bissell "left", Helms requested that P.D. come on board as his staff assistant.P.D. stressed that he was not in the operational line of command -- "I provided an interface for intelligence information." A typical day in P.D.'s life:-- Screening cable traffic (7 - 9 a.m.). Primarily cables relating to positive intelligence, to prepare Helms for his daily 9 a.m. hour-long meeting with DCI McCone.CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED![signature](1)(A)(1)(B)(1)(C)![unidentifiable logo] 55 DocId: 32203754 Page 3