Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 74]
TOP SECRET1 is to in effect to quote from or summarize this document,2 Mr. Schwarz.3 Mr. Schwarz. The document speaks for itself, then. And4 you can add nothing to it?5 Mr. Bundy. No.6 Mr. Schwarz. But can you say that the measures did or7 did not include assassination?8 Mr. Bundy. There is nothing in my recollection and9 nothing in the document that seems to me to imply assassin-10 ation.11 Mr. Schwarz. Now, following this instruction, was12 Cuban policy reviewed again in the fall of 1961?13 Mr. Bundy. Yes.14 Mr. Schwarz. And ultimately out of the fall review15 in 1961 came the so-called MONGOOSE program; is that correct?16 Mr. Bundy. That is right.17 Mr. Schwarz. Now, prior to discussing upon the MONGOOSE18 program, did you consider a lot of other options?19 Mr. Bundy. I think we were -- and this is a hard20 question, but I think what we were doing was working toward21 an organization that would be able to take charge of the22 complicated, varied inter-departmental kinds of things involved23 in Cuba. We have been concentrating this morning on covert24 actions, but there were also propaganda problems, economic25 problems, and Cuban refugee problems in Miami, and a numberTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 75]
# TOP SECRET731 of others that did not all fall within one jurisdiction.2 Anytime you get that kind of problem you have an organization3 problem. And the solution of 1961, which took sometime to4 work out, as the passage of time suggests, was the creation5 of a Special Committee under the Chairmanship of General6 Taylor and with General Lansdale as its operating officer.7 Mr. Schwarz. Now, in the course of the review that did8 take place prior to the establishment of that Special Committee9 which then got called the MONGOOSE program, was one of the10 matters which was considered the assassination of Mr. Castro?11 Mr. Bundy. As I have already said, I can not tell you12 that this question never came up. But I recall no sustained13 discussion of that matter in that period.14 Mr. Schwarz. Whether you recall a sustained discussion15 or not --16 Mr. Bundy. I don't recall a discussion that I can pin-17 point anywhere, but over the period of 1961 to 1963 the18 subject was mentioned from time to time by different individ-19 uals, never to me that I can recall by the President. But20 it did come up'.21 Mr. Schwarz. And it may have come up in this period in22 the fall of 1961 as something to consider, is that correct?23 Mr. Bundy. As something to talk about rather than to24 consider, would be my answer.25 Mr. Schwarz. Would you put before the witness as Bundy# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 76]
TOP SECRET1 Exhibit 3 the National Security Action Memorandum No. 100,dated October 5, 1961, Tab C of the Senator's Bundy Book 1.2 And as Bundy Exhibit 3A the minutes of the Special Group3 meeting dated October 6, 1961, which is at Lansdale Tab 2.4 (Document referred to is marked as5 Bundy Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)6 (Document referred to is marked as7 Bundy Exhibit No. 3 for identification.)8 (Document referred to is marked as9 Bundy Exhibit No. 3A for identification.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 77]
TOP SECRETMr. Schwarz. Would you give a copy of the other document, the Parrott document, to all the Senators too?And finally, as Bundy Exhibit 3B a memorandum which we have retyped from an indistinct original dated October 5, 1961 For the Record, Subject: Cuba, signed by Mr. Parrott. And the indistinct original is attached.(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 3B for identification)TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 78]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, to summarize -- before I ask2 you the question -- in NSAM No. 100 you sent to the Secretary3 of State the following note: "In conformation of oral4 instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State5 Woodward, a plan is desired to the indicated contingency in6 Cuba". Do you have an independent recollection of what that7 indicated contingency was?8 Mr. Bundy. Before seeing this document?9 Mr. Schwarz. Before seeing the documents.10 Mr. Bundy. No.11 Mr. Schwarz. Having looked at not only Exhibit 3, but12 Exhibit 3A and 3B, do you agree that the contingency referred13 to in 3A and the contingency referred to in 3B are related14 to NSAM No. 100?15 Mr. Bundy. Yes, I do.16 Mr. Schwarz. Now, the contingency referred to in 3B,17 which is the earlier of the two following documents, is18 said by Mr. Parrott to be a plan against the contingency that19 Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban20 scent. And I am going to come to some of the other parts21 of that document with respect to the President's interest or22 not.23 And the contingency in 3A, which is the minutes of the24 Special Group, as characterized as follows: "Mr. Parrott also25 told the Group that two other exercises are in progress inTOP SECRET76
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 79]
TOP SECRET                                                                               771   connection with Cuba, the preparation of a contingency plan2   in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the3   Cuban scene, and an updating of the overall plan for4   covert operations".5   Now, after having reviewed those documents, and in the6   light of your testimony that it is possible that the7   consideration of the possibility of assassination which you8   say did occur at some point, occurred in the fall of 1961,9   do you agree that at that time the contingency under consider-10  ation here was the possibility of the assassination of Castro?11  Mr. Bundy. No, I would put it another way. The contin-12  gency here is, what would we do if Castro were no longer13  there. So that the question of how Castro ceased to be14  there is left out of this set of papers. Clearly one of15  the possibilities would be assassination, but only one of16  them. What we are talking about here, as I read the docu-17  ments, is a plan against the contingency that I am not reading18  from the Parrott memorandum, against the contingency that19  Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban20  scene. NSAM 100, whose language is indirect, nonetheless21  indicates, to me at least, rereading it, that the President22  wanted to know what was likely to happen if Castro were no23  longer there. He was, in other words, trying to get a picture24  of whether that would really change things, and if so, in25  what way.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 80]
TOP SECRET781 Mr. Schwarz. Just one detail that Mr. Smothers suggested2 to me. Is NSAM 100 what the White House showed you, or is3 it another document?4 Mr. Bundy. No, 181. But let me be precise. I asked5 to see the documents relating to -- from the National Security6 files relating to August 1962. And they gave me the NSAM7 file identified as the significant memorandum, NSAM 181.8 Mr. Schwarz. Now, the contingency to be examined,9 therefore, was what would happen -- would it help the U.S.,10 that is the question, if Castro were to disappear?11 Mr. Bundy. What would it be like if Castro were to12 disappear? The question is open ended.13 Mr. Schwarz. What was the conclusion?14 Mr. Bundy. I don't remember. My unaided sense of the15 matter is that intelligent political analysis would have16 suggested in 1961 or at any time later that the removal of a17 single individual in a revolution complex and general as this18 would have quite unpredictable and not necessarily helpful19 effects.20 Mr. Schwarz. You said that while you were clear the21 assassination was not in fact authorized, you believe that22 at some point it was examined, is that a fair characterization.23 Mr. Bundy. That isn't the word I used. Talk about.24 Mr. Schwarz. Talk about. And this exercise constitutes25 an analysis of what Cuba/the U.S. would be like if Castro wereTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 81]
TOP SECRET791 removed.2 Mr. Bundy. It constitutes a request for such an analysis.3 Mr. Schwarz. Was the analysis made?4 Mr. Bundy. I don't have any recollection.5 Mr. Schwarz. If one were exploring the possibility of6 assassination, I take it this kind of analysis is the sort7 of analysis one would wish to make if one was not simply8 ruling assassination out as a matter of principle in the first9 instance.10 Mr. Bundy. Let me put it another way. If people were11 suggesting this to you, and you were curious about whether12 it was worth exploring, one way of getting more light on it13 without going any further with that notion itself would be14 to ask political people, not intelligence people, what they15 thought would happen if Castro were not there any longer.16 You will notice that this National Security Action17 Memorandum is not addressed to the Central Intelligence18 Agency, less still to the covert part of the Agency, but19 rather to the Secretary of State. And specifically clearly20 the action of certain is Assistant Secretary Woodward.21 Mr. Schwarz. Now, document 3B indicates -- and you22 have had an opportunity to review this one before, I think --23 Mr. Bundy. Which one are we now talking about?24 Mr. Schwarz. 3B, Mr. Parrott's memo.25 Mr. Bundy. Yes. I have a clearer copy now than I hadTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 82]
TOP SECRETcb 26Phone (Area 202) 544-60001 yesterday, for which I am grateful.2 Mr. Schwarz. It indicates that there was a Presidential3 interest in the matter. And then General Taylor told Mr.4 Parrott that he prefered that the State Department, or Mr.5 Woodward in the State Department, not be told about the6 Presidential interest in the matter. First, was there a7 Presidential interest in the matter? You have no reason to8 doubt that there was, I take it.9 Mr. Bundy. I am sorry, I was reading a note, and I10 didn't hear the last part of the question.11 Mr. Schwarz. I asked really two questions, the first12 of which is a direct question, was there a Presidential13 interest in the matter?14 Mr. Bundy. There was a Presidential -- there was no15 doubt in my mind that when I write in a National Security16 Action Memorandum a plan as desired, that the desire is not17 mine.18 Mr. Schwarz. And the desire is in fact the Presidents?19 Mr. Bundy. Yes.20 Mr. Schwarz. Now, have you any other recollection of21 calling your attention to the fall of 1969?22 Mr. Bundy. Could I go back and comment on your earlier23 question.24 You correctly pointed out that there was concern to25 keep the President's name out of this process of request,TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 83]
TOP SECRET1 although you correctly point out that the President was the2 one who wanted to know.. My impression here is that whatever3 concern we have, General Taylor or I, in the frame of this4 language, it was precisely to insulate the President from5 any false inference that what he was asking about was6 assassination. It is easy to confuse the question. What7 are things going to be like after Castro, with the other8 question, and we were trying to focus attention on the9 information he obviously wanted, which is, what would happen10 if we did do this sort of thing, and not get one into the11 frame of mind of thinking that he was considering doing it.12 That is the distinction, I think.13 Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any further recollection of14 discussion of this matter in this fall of 1961? And by this15 matter I mean either the broader inquiry into what it would16 be like if Castro disappeared, or a scenario arising of the17 specific subject of assassination.18 Mr. Bundy. No, I don't.19 Mr. Schwarz. Had you ever heard before I asked you20 about the last night about a conversation, an alledged conver-21 sation, between the President and the Journalist Theodore22 Schwartz, and or Mr. Goodwin in this timeframe?23 Mr. Bundy? I saw that in the newspapers.24 Mr. Schwarz. Or in Esquire magazine?25 Mr. Bundy. Wherever I saw it, I saw it in print.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 84]
TOP SECRET821 Mr. Schwarz. But you have no independent recollectionof that or of the fact that Mr. Schultz met with the President?2 Mr. Bundy. No. But I will say this -- and it is a random3 observation -- if I were planning an action of great sensitivity4 I wouldn't discuss it with any journalist, I don't think.5 Mr. Schwarz. The record from Mr. Schwartz is that the6 President said he was opposed to assassination, but that he7 brought it up in a conversation with Mr. Schwartz, saying8 that he was being encouraged to order assassination.9 Now, you have said that you do recall that the subject10 was talked about, your words, at some point, and that it11 might have been in the fall of 1961.12 Mr. Bundy. I wouldn't want to say that it was only in13 any given period.14 Mr. Schwarz. But that one of the points in which it15 might have been discussed was the fall of 1961.16 Mr. Bundy. Certainly.17 Mr. Schwarz. We are going to come to another period18 which relates to you.19 Mr. Bundy. May I interrupt one second.20 Could we go off the record for a moment?21 The Chairman. Yes.22 (Discussion off the record.)23 The Chairman. Let's put that on the record.24 Would you restate what I have just stated?25 TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 85]
TOP SECRET83Mr. Bundy. Going back to your earlier, question, I have a message through the courtesy of the Committee from the White House that there is no objection to answering the question as to how the White House came to show me the NSC file. When I learned of some of the interests of the Rockefeller Commission, it seemed to me that it would be useful if I could refresh my recollection. I telephoned Dr. Kissinger, who it seemed to me would be the right person both in his capacity as Special Assistant and the capacity as Secretary of State, and he called me back to say that General Scocroft would show me the documents I needed, and he did not.Mr. Smothers. Just one question.This file contained what, now, other than the NSAM?Mr. Bundy. The only file that I had time to go through that I can recollect was the NSAM file, which is a relatively short one.Mr. Smothers. For which time period?Mr. Bundy. For the period surrounding August 1962.Mr. Smothers. It was given to us as an existing file, or matters that had been pulled, or organizedMr. Bundy. No, they gave me the whole file, they were all documents that I have been involved with, it was nothing new to me. But the ones I was looking for were the ones relating to this subject.Mr. Smothers. Were these only your documents?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 86]
TOP SECRETMr. Bundy. As far as I recollect.Mr. Smothers. And by your documents, I mean documents signed by you?Mr. Bundy. They wouldn't be all signed by me, not every NSMA was signed by me. But they would all be documents for which I had responsibility.Mr. Smothers. And the timeframe was --Mr. Bundy. Sufficiently before and after to give me a picture of the political context of August 1962 in relation to Cuba.Mr. Smothers. And do you recall when you saw this file?Mr. Bundy. Well, as I say, it was in the context of my appearance before the Rockeferrer Commission. And that would be early this year. I don't have the dates, and I don't want to make a mistake on it.Mr. Smothers. I am not trying to pin the date down. It would be helpful if you remember. But we can ask.Mr. Schwarz.Mr. Schwarz. I want to make sure that we have what we have done so for accurately summarized, and that you agree with it.Can I use discussion of an assassination, will you accept that?Mr. Bundy. It implies more seriousness and more sustained argument than I recollect.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 87]
TOP SECRETMr. Schwarz. So your records are, with respect topersons asking about---Mr. Bundy. Or talking about.Mr. Schwarz. -- or talking about assassination, thatdid occur, that it probably occurred on more than one occasion?Mr. Bundy. Yes.Mr. Schwarz. And that one of the occasions may havebeen in the fall of 1961?Mr. Bundy. What I recollect about the fall of 1961 isthis question, what would happen if he is not there?Mr. Schwarz. Which would be a relevant question to askif one was talking about assassination.Mr. Bundy. Yes. But I have no independent recollectionof talks about assassination, Mr. Schwarz, and I musn't leadyou by saying that I did.Mr. Schwarz. In any event, passing from talking about ordiscussions or contingencies, to authorizations for action,and specifically focusing on this concrete period, wasassassination authorized in the fall of 1961?Mr. Bundy. Absolutely not.Mr. Schwarz. In fact what was authorized in the fall of1961?Mr. Bundy. Well, we have a long document on that, Ithink.Mr. Schwarz. And that is the MONGOOSE program?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 88]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Bundy. And that is the MONGOOSE programs. 862 Mr. Schwarz. In connection with the MONGOOSE program,3 you had some dialogue about the Attorney General which was4 quite extensive. Let me ask you one additional question on5 that subject. What was the relationship personally and pro-6 fessionally between the Attorney General and General Maxwell7 Taylor?8 Mr. Bundy. It was very close. I think that they first9 met in a hardworking sense when they were -- I think they10 were both members of the committee to look into what happened11 after the Bay of Pigs, or if the Attorney General was not12 a member he was certainly closely interested.13 Mr. Schwarz. He was a member.14 Mr. Bundy. And I am sure the Attorney General was15 one of the people strongly favoring the appointment of General16 Taylor as the President's military advisor. They were both17 active and ardent tennis players, they liked each other, and18 they visited back and forth. One of the Kennedy children19 is named for General Taylor, I think. There was a relation of20 real trust and confidence between them. And the measure of21 its strength is that I think it easily survived later very22 shart differences over Vietnam.23 Mr. Schwarz. Now recognizing that, what I am asking for24 you is a matter of opinion and not a fact, given your under-25 standing of that relationship, will you give us your opinionTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 89]
TOP SECRETtb 331 the likelihood that Robert Kennedy, in the face of Maxwell2 Taylor's Chairmanship of the Special Group Augmented -- was3 Maxwell Taylor understood to be the Chairman of the Special4 Group Augmented?5 Mr. Bundy. It certainly is my understanding.6 Mr. Schwarz. Would Robert Kennedy in your opinion,7 in the fact of Maxwell Taylor's Chairmanship of the Special8 Group Augmented, have developed a bach-channel relationship9 with someone else for the purpose of assassinating Fidel10 Castro?11 Mr. Bundy. No.12 Mr. Schwarz. Now, in connection with MONGOOSE, you were13 a member of the Special Group Augmented, were you?14 Mr. Bundy. I was. I wasn't its most faithful attender,15 but I was a member.16 Mr. Schwarz. To the extent that you didattend, would17 you describe the nature of the meetings, what kind of items18 were brought before you, what was the process for decision19 making?20 Mr. Bundy. It is very difficult to do that without21 documentary reconstruction. But in the broadest sense, I22 think I can do it. The kinds of things would be Cuban exiles,23 training them, how united are they, whose the leader, and24 what kind of operations against the island are we able to25 mount, specific proposals, just because I have seen it inTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 90]
TOP SECRET1 the last two or three days -- I saw a sabotage program which2 involved, I think, oil facilities, transportation facilities,3 and a couple of other categories -- exfiltration was a4 frequent problem. I don't recall that we worried so much5 about getting the agents in, but there seems always to be6 a great problem about getting them out. And that sort of7 thing that I mentioned, propaganda, there was the one island8 enterprise -- was Florida doing much good, and how much9 does it cost and things of that sort.10 Mr. Schwarz. At any MONGOOSE meeting did Mr. Harvey11 state that he had taken steps to assassinate Fidel Castro?12 Mr. Bundy. I never heard anything from Mr. Harvey in13 any context in any meeting at any time on that subject.14 Mr. Schwarz. And it was clear that the President was15 the person basically in control, perhaps not of the details,16 but of the general program; is that right?17 Mr. Bundy. The President had worked it. The day to18 day operations where in the hands of different departments19 for different categories of programs. The coordinator was20 General Lansdale, and the Chairman of the Committee was General21 Taylor.22 Mr. Schwarz. Would you turn to Lansdale Tab 38, please?23 Where is the August 8 document that transmits the new24 guidelines for MONGOOSE?25 Mr. Kelley. That is Lansdale Tab 20.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 91]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Schwarz. The new guidelines, I mean the August2 guidelines.3 Mr. Kelley. 38.4 Mr. Schwarz. 38A.5 Was there a change in or about August between what was6 characterized as Phase I of Operation MONGOOSE and a step-up7 activities under the MONGOOSE?8 Mr. Bundy. It appeared to be so from the documents I have9 been reviewing. I couldn't give you an independent recollection10 on that point.11 Mr. Schwarz. You have got no reason to doubt that there12 was some step-up commencing in August?13 Mr. Bundy. I think that sounds reasonable. I just14 don't have any expertise other than as a reader many years15 later.16 Mr. Schwarz. Now, with respect to the August 10 meeting,17 you have previously testified - I am not sure you have --18 do you recall the subject of assassinations being brought up?19 Mr. Bundy. In the August 10 meeting? No.20 Mr. Schwarz. Specifically, do you recall Mr. McNamara21 ever bringing the subject of assassinations up?22 Mr. Bundy. No.23 Mr. Schwarz. We have shown you notes of Mr. Harvey on24 August 14, and General Lansdale's memorandum of August 1325 that refers to the liquidation of leaders and certain thingsTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 92]
TOP SECRET1 whited out. Do you remember seeing those?2 Mr. Bundy. Yes.3 Mr. Schwarz. Do they refresh your recollection?4 Mr. Bundy. No. They give me no -- they do not persuade me. I simply don't from that suddenly have any flash, so and5 so said that, not at all.6 Mr. Schwarz. But you don't have any reason to question7 them, you just don't have a recollection, is that fair?8 Mr. Bundy. I simply tell you that I was in a large meeting in which a great many subjects were discussed, and9 I have no recollection of that.10 Mr. Schwarz. I will pass around Mr. Bundy's notes from the meeting. If someone thinks they should be marked we can11 do that.12 Mr. Bundy. If the Committee is feeling charitable I hope they may not go into them.13 Mr. Schwarz. I don't think they will, but I thought we would pass them around in case they were.14 The Chairman. Let the Senators see them.15 Mr. Schwarz. We will make one observation, though. Both16 Mr. Rusk's calendar and Mr. Bundy's notes do not indicate17 Mr. Lansdale's being present at the meeting, although the minutes of the meeting do. And I take it you have no18 independent. recollection of whether or not he was not there.19 Mr. Bundy. I have no objection to entering anything inTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 93]
TOP SECRET1 anything that memorandum that the Committee thinks is2 relevant. It simply illustrates what the hand will do3 while the mind is elsewhere.4 The Chairman. Can you identify what you meant by the5 words, "Worms who were opposing".6 Mr. Bundy. "Worms" was a Cuban word, gusanos, and it7 was their own word for themselves, Cubans in opposition to8 Castor.9 (Discussion off the record.)10 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, would you mark with a B your11 notes of the August 10 meeting.12 And Mr. Reporter, will you mark that as Bundy Exhibit 4.13 (Document referred to was marked as14 Bundy Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)1516171819202122232425TOP SECRET