Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 48]
TOP SECRET461 position."2 Now I would read those words as meaning that Mr. Dearborn3 anticipated at least the real possibility of assassination4 attempts in the immediate future and that he was recommending5 that those CIA officers that had been connected with having6 supplied weapons should be taken out of the Dominican Republic7 right away.8 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I would agree with a good part of that,9 Senator, although I think that there were assassination plots10 simmering in the Dominican Republic and now, and of course this11 in fact took place. And I think he was concerned that the12 assassination would be unsuccessful, that Trujillo would pick13 up the Americans and find out not simply about the transfer of14 guns but the whole range of covert activities that they had15 been engaged in, torture them and perhaps kill them.16 And he thought the safest thing to do, with this thing in17 the air, was to get them out of the country. There was nothing18 I think, in the telegram that was sent to him that denies the19 possibility that Trujillo might be assassinated or that there20 might be an attempted assassination, which is the purport of21 Dearborn's, because if the assassination was successful, there22 was no need to get the CIA out.23 The Chairman. But there is something more, really. If24 the possibility of assassination was a long continuing thing,25 always on the mind of Dearhorn, why does he respond to thisTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 49]
# TOP SECRET471 instruction by saying, get these man out now?2 Mr. Goodwin. Well I think obviously these people had3 relayed to him that they're going to try to make the attempt4 anyway, with or without the machine guns. He thought the attempt5 might be abortive, and if so, he thought that all Americans or6 people that worked for him or with him would be in danger.7 The Chairman. Then you would have to agree with me,8 wouldn't you, that in his opinion, Dearborn's opinion, he had9 evidence that suggested to him that an assassination attempt10 was imminent.11 Mr. Goodwin. I think that's clear. Yes, I think it was.12 The Chairman. And he took this sufficiently serious to13 recommend getting the three CIA agents out without further14 delay?15 Mr. Goodwin. I think that's right. That's absolutely16 true, because I think he believed that there was a serious17 attempt in the offing, as indeed there was, and he was absolutely18 right and he was doing his job well.19 I would like to say, if I might go back, that in terms of20 the telegram, is that I sat in the office with President21 Kennedy who instructed me to draft a telegram to say that he22 wanted nothing to do with political assassinations, which I23 did, so it's not a matter of interpretation, because he cannot24 testify to that matter, so it's not a question of reading the25 text so much as deciding whether or not I'm telling the truth# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 50]
TOP SECRET1 about that instruction.2 Mr. Schwarz. Assuming that you are telling the truth --3 Mr. Goodwin. Thank you.4 Mr. Schwarz. We have to explore whether something went5 wrong in the communication process, and I want to put some6 information in front of you and then see if you can help us7 explain what, if anything, went wrong.8 Would you show him Exhibit 2-A.9 Now Exhibit 2-A is a cable dated March 20th from the Agency10 in the Dominican Republic to the Agency in Washington. And11 reading in Paragraph 3, it describes the way in which -- it12 describes a plot.13 In Paragraph 4, it says the following: "To do, they need14 five M-3's or comparable machine guns and 1500 rounds15 ammunition for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use16 quiet weapons for basic job." Now the basic job is apparently17 the assassination.18 Now again, ware you told -- now, in Exhibit 1, you were19 told in the briefing on covert action by the CIA that the20 carbines and the pistols had been passed for personal defense21 weapons and not to do the basic job, as this telegram indicates.22 Mr. Goodwin. That's correct. That's what it says.23 Mr. Schwarz. Right. I understand that.24 Now, what I am trying to understand is, in telling you that25 the weapons had been passed for personal defense purposes, doTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 51]
# TOP SECRET49you think that is consistant, is candid, in light of the fact that the Agency had been told that other weapons were going to be used for the basic job, that is the assassination.Mr. Goodwin. Well, there are several communications regarding the weapon details of the plan and they are obviously inconsistent.Mr. Schwarz. They are.Mr. Goodwin. The telegrams say it, but on the other hand, a carbine or pistol is hardly a quiet weapon. I mean, I would regard that as saying I am going to strangle him. And if you're going to have a fire fight with machine guns, I mean in other words, it seems to me that somebody is interpretting what they say, or they might have had five or six different plans.The request that came to the White House, finally, was very specific, and this is too, that additional weapons are needed in order to carry out an assassination plot. I mean, however you read this, they do say they need additional weapons to carry off an assassination. And that is what the President at that point had in mind on May 13th, around May 13th, about the original transfer, which was not pursuant to any policy that;he had established or any directions that he had given, immediately said, you know, make it clear to Dearborn that we're not getting involved in assassinations. They can do what they want, but we are not going to get involved.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 52]
# TOP SECRET1 Senator Mondale. In other words, the President was2 advised by you that there was an assassination plot in which we3 were implicated and he told you that we don't want any part of4 it and you are to send a message on his authority saying that,5 and that is what you thought you had done?6 Mr. Goodwin. I would phrase it a little bit differently,7 Senator, which is to say I would say there were people who8 wanted to assassinate Trujillo to whom we had given some guns9 and his response was probably like, you mean some idiot gave10 them guns? I said, yes. He said -- this is a paraphrase --11 you know, if you knew Senator Kennedy, or President Kennedy,12 I mean, he said, well, let's make it clear. And if you compars13 my draft with the State Department draft, I was overriding, as14 they point out, bacause their draft says, we're trying to get15 this message through but we're blocked by Mr. Goodwin and have16 to send his message instead. They would rather blame me, of17 course, than the President.18 It is clear that the stress is changed to make it clear19 that the President wants nothing to do and cannot condone20 assassination. It does not say cannot condone being caught at21 assassination, it says cannot condone assassination. And I did that because he told me to do that.22 The Chairman. And you have characterized the Kennedy23 policy as one of getting the government no further involve!24 because there had been a past involvement? lle knew that an!# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 53]
# TOP SECRET51you knew that, to the extent that weapons had been furnished dissident groups who had expressed an interest in assassinating Trujillo. And your intention here in sending this telegram was to convey to Mr. Dearborn that the Kennedy Administration wanted no further involvement in this --Mr. Goodwin. That's right. We found -- the President found out on May 13th that pursuant to the authorization that preceeded his coming into office that a couple of carbines and pistols had been transferred in order to mount a major assault on a government that had lasted for thirty years, and it seemeri at that point like a formidable threat to Trujillo.He wanted to make it absolutely clear when he found out that anybody who wanted to assassinata Trujillo in the Dominican Republic that they were going to do it on their own, the United States would have nothing to do with it and we give out no more weapons and this is why he said we do not want to condone assassination or he associated with it. And that's why I wrote the telegram that I drafted that's in my handwriting.Senator Towar. Well, may I ask you, then, what you interpretted the meaning of the first sentence in number 3, "Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for their position?"Mr. Goodwin. They were -- their position was that, what they regarded as that Trujillo should be overthrown and replaced by a moderate government. We supported that position, as did# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 54]
TOP SECRET521 the other members of the Organization of American States, and2 we wanted to make it very clear that we did support that3 position, and we wished them well in their efforts to establish4 that position and if they did we would recognize their govern-5 ment and send them assistance, which we did.6 As a matter of fact, we took much greater efforts to7 get rid of Ramfes Trujillo in the six months that followed the8 assassination than anything that preceeded it, including bringing9 the American fleet practically into the harbor at Cuidad10 Trujillo at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. Instead11 of carbines and pistols, we brought in destroyers, aircraft12 carriers and Marine battalions so that they would know what13 the consequences might be if they didn't get out when they got14 out.15 If I might make one more point, Senator, if I may, is that16 the countries of South America are full of guns sent there17 by the American government to be used to kill thousands of18 people over the last several decades, and with the lone19 exception of both revolutionaries from underneath and armies20 from on top -- of course you're well-acquainted with that --21 sent knowing that they would be used to kill people in internal22 struggles. The only distinction in this case is that Trujillo23 happened to be the head of State, which is a practical24 distinction, but you could hardly make a moral one.25 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question inTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 55]
TOP SECRET1 that respect?2 The Chairman. Well, I am not sure I agree with that;3 although that is a philosophical argument.4 Senator Baker. Are you telling us, Mr. Goodwin, that5 assassination, not of heads of state, but assassination of6 lesser figures was a common, ordinary occurrence in South7 America at the behest of America or with American support?8 Mr. Goodwin. No, I am talking about that we supply arms9 to revolutionary groups or to armed groups which we did in10 say Bolivia, or sometimes to the government itself, or in Chile11 we gave assistance of various kinds to dissident groups with12 the knowledge that our assistance would he used in internal13 struggles.14 I don't have to use the word assassinations.15 Senator Baker. But how about for internal struggles, then,16 as opposed to assassination?17 Mr. Goodwin. Well, this is an internal struggle in the18 Dominican Republic.19 The Chairman. I think you recognize the distinction,20 because it is well-defined in our criminal laws. There is21 a difference between first degree murder and manslaughter.22 There is supposed to connote a certain difference in moral23 connotations, and undertaking deliberate action that is24 targetted against a particular person with the intention of25 murdering that person is normally regarded under our criminalTOP SECRET![photo of document page with text and seal]
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 56]
TOP SECRET541 laws as the most reprehensible kind of homicide and therefore2 definted as murder in the first degree。 So there mást be some3 gradation there.4 Mr. Goodwin. Well, there are gradations, although I do5 think that many of the activities against, say, someone like6 Allende or others are equally targetted in Latin American7 countries and not just general conflict or the killing of8 particular ­ Mexicans, of course, traditionally go out and9 shoot down leaders of new guerrilla groups or insurgents, but10 not necessarily with our guns.11 The Chairman. But in any event you're not testifying hare12 to your certain knowledge the United States government participa13 ted in an assassination attempt or assisting in an assassina-14 tion attempt' --15 Mr. Goodwin. No, I don't have any deep knowledge of that16 subject, what was the natural end consequence of our acts.17 In any event, I do want to return to this.18 This was -- clearly President Kennedy was much closer to19 yours.20 Mr. Schwarz. After the Trujillo assassination took place,21 President Kennedy was in Paris and as one of the documents we22 looked at indicatas, there was a meeting at which Vice President23 Johnson was interested in finding out what had happened and you24 had a review of this, and discussed in that review that the25 weapons had been passed, the small arms and the machine gunsTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 57]
TOP SECRET551 hadn't been passed and the assassination occurred.2 Now, after that review, were any steps taken to make, as3 a matter of more general, governmental policy, the policy which4 is expressed in the telegram you drafted at President Kennedy'-5 instruction?6 Mr. Goodwin. Not to my knowledge.7 (A brief recess was taken.)8 The Chairman. Do you have any more questions?9 Mr. Schwarz. I don't have any more questions.10 The Chairman. Do you have any other matters that you11 can tell us about the Trujillo assassination for our enlighten-12 ment?13 Mr. Goodwin. On the assassination?14 The Chairman. On the assassination.15 Mr. Goodwin. I don't think so, but let me read through16 all of this, and when I come back the next time, I might have17 something else, if I can find anything else in there -- I do18 think this is pretty complete.19 The Chairman. We will expect to hear you again early next20 week, on the Cuban phase of your testimony.21 Mr. Goodwin. And Duvallier.22 The Chairman. Mr. Dennin, they've been up all night,23 would like to ask two questions.24 Mr. Dennin. Well, when you said there were no more25 questions, I just raised the possibility and you discussed itTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 58]
TOP SECRET561 about meetings held after the assassination back in Washington2 when Mr. Dearborn came back as well as those meetings held3 after the assassination before he came back, at which the4 whole matter was discussed, initially with Vice President5 Johnson presiding and ultimately, the last one, with President6 Kennedy.7 Mr. Goodwin. That's right. We had, of course, a series8 of emergencies. We had an emergency meeting, and cabled the9 President who was in Paris, and the first matter on our mind10 was how to keep Ramfes Trujillo, who was the son of Trujillo,11 from taking over, and we didn't know where he was, at first,12 it took us awhile to find out that he was in Paris, which at13 least indicated, Senator, that if they were planning it, it14 wasn't done in a very comprehensive fashion, and we found he15 was in Paris and we wanted to stop him from returning, to16 detain him, but it was too late. By the time we found out, he17 had already chartered an Air France jet and was on his way to18 Cuidad Trujillo, and I believe there was some effort made to19 bluff him off by sending messages to the plane in flight,20 diverting it to some American airport, but he didn't do that.21 and he landed and took over. And I think the principal aim of22 our policy from that point on was how to get him and his uncle.23 Hector -- and I forget the other fellow's name -- out of there24 so that the kind of moderate government that we wanted could25 be installed.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 59]
TOP SECRET571 And John Martin was sent down to talk to him and to make2 various inducements like he could take his money out, it was3 discussed that if he would leave peaceably, but what finally4 happened was when McNamara moved the fleet in over the horizon5 and an Air Force General bombed the palace, that was the end,6 he got on his boat and left.7 The Chairman. Air Force General?8 Mr. Goodwin. A Dominican Air Force General.9 Ile decided that was an easier target than the American10 fleet.11 The Chairman. Was the bombing done at our instruction?12 Mr. Goodwin. No, I don't believe so. I was trying to13 remember that, but I don't believe it was. As I remember,14 it was quite a surprise to us that this fellow had taken the15 initiative. The moving of the fleet was intended as sort of16 a threat that if they didn't get out we might come in and get17 them. There was no, however, no, at that point, no country18 attempted to do that, just to scare them. And the fleet was19 actually cheered in the Dominican Republic, a very rare20 occasion.21 But this Air Force General did, and then he tried to make22 himself dictator and two of his own officers arrested him. They23 all had been trained in American military schools.24 Mr. Schwarz. To complete the record on the response to25 the telegram We had Dearborn's reaction. Wa will read intoTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 60]
TOP SECRET581 the record the cable back from the CIA Chief of Station in2 response to the telegram Mr. Goodwin drafted.3 Assume -- reference B, that's the telegram. "Final word4 on present policy in which KUBARK" -- that's CIA -- "work here5 must be based. Para 2 and Para 5, that reference, are for6 practical purposes retreat from previous policy. However,7 Headquarters aware extent to which ODYOKE" that is, the United8 States --"already associated with EMSLFW -- that in the9 assassination of Trujillo. -- "if we are to at least try 'cover10 up tracks' KUBARK personnel directly involved in EMSLFW11 preparations must be withdrawn now."12 I don't know if that merits comment or not. It just13 happens to be how it was interpretted by CIA.14 Mr. Goodwin. I think it's accurate and it also reflects15 Dearborn's own disappointment that --16 Mr. Schwarz. CIA.17 Mr. Goodwin. CIA's disappointment, which is understandable.18 The Chairman. Any further questions?19 Senator Tower?20 Mr. Smothers?21 Mr. Smothers. Mr. Chairman, I'd rather wait till the return22 of the witness.23 The Chairman. Yes.24 Let's make certain that Mr. Goodwin has an opportunity to25 meet with the staff so that the pertinent documents that willTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 61]
TOP SECRET591 up in connection with our interrogation on Castro will be2 reviewed. We're not interested in any kind of entrapment. We3 want you to be fully aware of whatever documentation we have4 so you can help enlighten us of your understanding of the5 policy at the time.6 Mr. Goodwin. And whatever I bring I can give to you and7 then duplicate it.8 Mr. Schwarz. Well, shall we plan, for safety, on the9 staff seeing you on Wednesday morning and having your testimony10 Wednesday afternoon, or could you be here by Tuesday?11 Mr. Goodwin. Well, since I'm going to Rumford, Maine and12 getting the things out, I think it will be safer Wednesday, if13 that's not too inconvenient.14 The Chairman. Wednesday?15 All right. Thank you very much.16 (Whereupon, at 6:35 o'clock p.m., the hearing was recessed,17 to reconvene at .8:30 o'clock a.m., Friday, July 11, 1975.)TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 0]
157-10014-10089 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992Date : 08/06/95Page : 1# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM## IDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10089RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGSAGENCY FILE NUMBER : 11-H-08DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIAFROM : TWEEDY, BRONSONTO :TITLE :DATE : 10/09/75PAGES : 92SUBJECTS : CIAASSASSINATION, LUMUMBA, PATRICEDOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPTCLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIEDRESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, 1CCURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONSDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS :NW 50955 DocId:32423477 Page 1 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 1]
# TOP SECRETThe United States Senate R1572Report of Proceedings3/19/22BYEGHearing held beforeSenate Select Committee to Study GovernmentalOperations With Respect to Intelligence ActivitiesThursday, October 9, 1975Washington, D. C.(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned overto the Committee for destruct:..)WARD & PAUL410 FIRST STREET, S. E.WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003(202) 544-6000TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETCONTENTSAPAGE4amt12 WITNESSBronson TweedyEXHIBITS5 EXHIBIT FOR IDENTIFICATION6 No. 1 37 No. 2 118 No. 3 289 No. 4 3210 No. 5 3511 No. 6 3912 No. 7 4113 No. 8 4314 No. 9 4615 No. 10 5716 No. 11 5817 No. 12 63TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 3]
# TOP SECRETEXECUTIVE SESSION-- -- --Thursday, October 10, 1975-- -- --United States Senate,Select Committee to Study GovernmentalOperations With Respect toIntelligence Activities,Washington, D. C.The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:25 o'clocka.m. in Room 407, The Capitol, the Honorable Richard Schweikerpresiding.Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).Also present: Frederick Baron and Rhett Dawson, Profes-sional Staff Members.-- -- --# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 4]
# TOP SECRET## PROCEEDINGSSenator Schweiker. Would you'raise your right hand?Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?Mr. Tweedy. I do.Senator Schweiker. It has been nice meeting you.Mr. Tweedy. Thank you very much.(Whereupon, Senator Schweiker left the hearing room.)(Discussion off the record.)Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, you have just received the oath from Senator Schweiker, who has now left the room, and you are under no obligation to continue to testify in his absence, but obviously the Committee would appreciate it greatly if you would continue to testify.Are you willing to continue to testify in the Senator's absence?Mr. Tweedy. I plan to testify fully.Mr. Baron. You are willing to testify to the truth as best as you can do it?Mr. Tweedy. I will indeed.Mr. Baron. Are you aware that you have the right to counsel?Mr. Tweedy. I am.Mr. Baron. You are appearing here voluntarily without# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 5]
TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-60001 counsel?2 Mr. Tweedy. I am.3 Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that you may cease answering questions at any point if you wish to consult with counsel?5 Mr. Tweedy. I am.6 Mr. Baron. Finally, are you aware that all of your Consti- tutional rights are intact, including your Fifth Amandment rights to remain silent?9 Mr. Tweedy. I am.10 Mr. Baron. All right, then.Let us proceed to review a set of documents which were not available to us in your first examination. The attempt here today is not to go over a lot of old ground that we covered in your first examination but to focus our concerns on a few main events in the alleged story of an assassination plot against Lumumba, and to refresh your recollection by review of these documents.: Let me introduce as Exhibit 1 a cable from Allen Dulles to the Leopoldville Station, marked for Robert Guthman on October 26th, 1960.(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)TOP SECRET![the top secret logo]