Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10047.pdf — page 16]
TOP SECRETbecause the CIA did have responsibility and certainly the capability to collect information from foreign countries.Mr. Halley. Well, we had no reason at the particular time to feel that there was any kind of a case, hard information, that the Cubans were behind the assassination.In other words, you know, at that particular period in time there were a large number of rumors, gossip, in the Cuban Community. Those that came to our attention were raported, and we tried to put them in some perspective, that is, who was the individual, what access did he have to this data and so forth.But we had no persuasion that this was being mounted by the Cubans at that particular time.Mr. Wallach. I would like to ask a couple of questions by way of background and let Jim yo right back to his line of questioning.Taking the period as exemplary, October of 1963 --Mr. Halley. October of '63, okay.Mr. Wallach. Which I take it would be fairly indicative of what was going on in May, June, July and August of the same year, I want to pick a fairly standard month for that period.Mr. Halley. Uh-huh.Mr. Wallach. Before the assassination.It's my understanding that in addition to getting posicTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 Intelligence from refugees, etc., coming to this country,2 that your station did operate agents and did have sources,3 whatever terms you want to use, inside Cuba, is that correct?4 Mr. Halley. Yes, we did have sources inside Cuba.5 Mr. Wallach. Gould you briefly for the record --6 (Pause)7 Mr. Wallach. What I'd like to do very briefly for the8 record, as you know, I think you had an interview with Mr.9 Baron and went into it with you, but very briefly describe10 generally the type of operations that your station was conductiby11 vis-a-vis Cuba.12 Mr. Halley. Well, in the first instance, we were engaged13 in foreign intelligence collection activities, that is, tro14 to establish information which related to the plans, intenci15 and capabilities of the Cuban government. We were also16 involved in counterintelligence operations, that is, tryin17 to figure out what the Cubans were doing in terms of their18 Intelligence operations in the United States, or through th19 United States into Central and Latin America. We were a20 involved in propaganda operations against Cuba, and covert21 action in the sense of trying to establish contact wi22 dissident military personalities in Cuba.23 Mr. Wallach. Without naming names, did you in the ri24 period I've been talking about, October of 1963, have ett25 sources or agents fairly highly placed within the CubanTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 government?2 Mr. Halley. I don't think -- there I'd have to get a3 better definition from you of what is highly placed. If you4 are talking about Fidel Castro and his immediate encourage --5 Mr. Wallach. People who could possibly have been in6 meetings or dinner with Castro, or meetings with Castro. 17 don't know enough about how Castro operated.8 Mr. Halley. I would say if you are talking about somebody9 who was a member of his immediate entourage and who was dealing10 with him in a governmental sense, then the answer is no, but11 we did have people who were on the periphery of this. That12 is, they wouldn't have been major participants, but they13 would have been in social contact with Castro or members of14 his entourage.15 Mr. Wallach. How about persons within the DGI, whatever16 the correct name for Cuban intelligence is.17 Mr. Halley. Well, again as I mentioned earlier, we had18 no staff officer penetration of the Cuban intelligence service.19 We had some reporting on people who were in touch with20 various leaders in the Cuban intelligence, and it was all the21 social or family or other context that these people were22 reporting on.23 Mr. Wallach. Do you recall at any time in 1962 or 196324 the fact being brought to your attention that certain Cuban25 agents out of New York City were actually beginning to runTOP SECRETNW#:55510 DocId:32423435
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TOP SECRET1 assassination plots against Cuban exile leaders down in2 Miami?3 Mr. Halley. Out of New York? No, I don't recall that.4 One thing, just before we leave this, so we don't have an5 incomplete record, you asked me the other kinds of operations6 that we were running. We were running a full scope of para-7 military operations against Cuba. That is, we were putting8 people back into Cuba who may have come from a particular9 province, and who then went into the bush and lived in the10 bush, and we kept them supplied with food, arms, basic11 equipment. We did have radio contact with them. We were12 involved in raids against the Cuban coast, we were involvedputting caches into the Cuban coast.13 Senator Schweiker. Does that finish your point?14 Mr. Halley. Yes, sir, that's roughly it.15 Senator Schweiker. Following up this other question,16 was any one part of your job plugging intelligence leaks at17 this given time?18 Was there any concern during your timeframe that you were19 involved in Cuban operations of Intelligence Leaks from our20 country to theirs through the Cuban Intelligence system?21 Was this ever a consideration or priority of you as22 Station Chief?23 Mr. Halley. Yes, in terms of -- well, yes, the answer24 to that is yes. Now, let me elaborate on it.25TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET1 We had a jurisdictional problem. For instance, a Cuban2 agent detected in the United States or being suspected of being3 a Cuban agent would have been a case that we would have had4 to have coordinated with the FBI, and essentially the FBI took5 primary action on this.6 I recall one case where we detected a Cuban agent in the7 United States, and the case was transferred to the Bureau and8 it involved a fundamental jurisdictional issue, which was9 clearly the Bureau's right to take that particular case over.10 So in that sense, the primary responsibility in the Miami11 area in the counterintelligence sense that you are discussing,12 Senator, would have rested with the Bureau.13 Senator Schweiker. Did you ever attempt to find a leak14 by placing one of our agents into the system to plug a leak?15 I mean, was it ever that magnitude of concern attached?16 Mr. Halley. No, I don't recall that kind of a case. In17 other words, I do recall cases where people came out of Cuba,18 gave us a story that we did not necessarily believe, where19 we would turn them back and send them back to Cuba, so that20 over a longer period of time we could determine what it is that21 they were really after, what they were trying to do. In other22 words, were they trying to come into the United States to23 penetrate and immigrate, were they trying to get in touch with24 American intelligence, and if so, why. But it was all done25 back into the Cuban context.# TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET1 Senator Schweiker. This is a tough question to answer,2 but at that period of time, how successful in your opinion was3 the Cuban intelligence system in doing some of that penetrating,4 and I realize that we had a lot of Cuban exiles here, and it is5 pretty hard to tell the players from the scorecard we are in.6 It is a tough relevant question, but I wonder how you would7 analyze it.8 Mr. Halley. Well, I think it would be fair to say that9 given the Cuban propensity to talk - in other words, you have10 to start off with a fundamental point of departure that if you11 get two Cubans that have got a secret, it is not going to be12 a secret, because they do talk, and therefore they all constantly13 talk.14 Our biggest problem in maintaining security of our own15 operations, such as an infiltration operation into Cuba to16 put in a cache or run a commando raid or put a person back17 in was to maintain security. The only way we could do it would18 be to take all participants of that operation and take them19 out of the Cuban community and in fact isolate them for a week20 of ten days or more prior to the mounting of the operation so21 that they wouldn't talk, and we could know where they would22 be constantly, 24 hours a day. And within that milieu, I think23 it is safe to say that the Cuban intelligence service did have24 some agents and could be expected to have a general feel for25 the pulse of the community at that time.# TOP SECRET![image of a microphone]NNN: 55510 DocId: 32423455
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TOP SECRETSenator Schweiker. During that same time frame, or during the time frame that you were Station Chief, what are some other Cuban groups that you worked with that come to mind? I have mentioned DRE. I realize there were several different ones?Any others particularly that were helpful and worked with you like the DRE?Mr. Halley. Well, the DRE was the main group because what had happened is after the -- or prior to the Bay of Pigs there was a great collaboration between CIA and a number of these groups. After the Bay of Pigs, the dialogue with these groups sort of dried up, and during my tenure, the main group that we worked with in that sense as an organizational entity was the DRE because they had a lot of active, imaginative young student leaders who had contacts throughout the Western Hemisphere who were equally interested in using them in the propaganda and covert action sense in Central and Latin America as we were actually using them against Cuba itself.Senator Schweiker. Where did Alpha 66 fit or not fit into that?Mr. Halley. We did not have an organizational relationship with Alpha 66. Alpha 66 was in being. We monitored their activities so that we would know when they were going to in raids against Cuba. We may have had people who at one time or another were in our paramilitary teams who left us forTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETone reason of another and may have ended up in Alpha 66.Senator Schweiker. We realize that one of the otherintelligence agencies might have had a liaison or workingoperation with Alpha 66, not the CIA, is that correct?Mr. Halley. Yes, I think -- you know, in the back ofmy memory I believe that one of the military services --Senator Schweiker. Might it have been the ArmyIntelligence?Mr. Halley. My recollection, it was probably a militaryservice, and it probably was the Army, but I would have tocheck the record.Senator Schweiker. We also were informed, and I justwondered if this was your recollection, that at some pointsome of the operations got a little bit overlapping andduplicating, and that the boats would -- I'm simplifying itof course, but that the boats weren't coordinated too well,and at one point it got to be a problem with whoever elsewas involved, and that finally an agreement was worked outwith Army intelligence that all the boats would be suppliedby CIA instead of having them sort of fly-by-nighting andpossibly mess up some things because of duplication or conflict.Do you recall any of that at all?Mr. Halley. Well, I think there were periods when theU.S. Government was putting a clamp-down on refugee groupsgoing out, and the whole apparatus of government, Coast Guard.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETCustoms, Inmigration and Naturalization, FBI, CIA, were workingtogether to try to keep these operations from going to Cuba.In that context, the military did have some problems, butmy recollection of that. Senator, is that we put them into thecoordination mechanism that we had for getting boats our. Idon't recall our taking their people --Senator Schweiker. I might have stated it wrong.What do you mean by a coordination mechanism?Mr. Halley. Well, for instando, we had, let's say, forthe month of October 1963, we would draw up an operationalplan in September. In the course of that operational plan amigeared to the đạnk of the moon, we would have a number of..Infiltration missions scheduled to put in coches. We'd havsammaber of missions scheduled to put in toans or to takepeople out of Cuba. We'd have a number of missionsscheduled to conduce comando raids against fixed installatioبليSo we would draw up the schedule and coordinato thoschedule with the appropriate agencies like Coast Guard orCustoms so that we could nove our boats is and out and notcause the U.S. Covetriment to expand manhours and money ipursuing our boats.Senator: Seneiker. think that is what I had in mHr. Halley, And therefore, on this schedule, when weworked this out, we therefore would tack on thoperations and work this out so that there was a centralTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 clearinghouse, and the U. S. government had a grip on what it2 was doing in this clandestine field.3 Senator Schweiker. To your recollection, besides Army4 intelligence, were there any other intelligence services that5 were involved to any extent with that general picture?6 Mr. Halley. Well, with the mutation of that, as I recall.7 the Navy had some activities in and out of Guantanamo, and there8 were some discussions at various times on how their pepple9 In Guantanamo could be supported, and the people were going10 in and out of Guantanamo.11 Senator Schweiker. Were the Armmy operations very extensiv12 or not compared to yours?13 Mr. Halley. No. Compared to ours, they were infinit14 Senator Schwelker. And Navy?15 Mr. Balley. Navy, as I think all of this was limited to16 the perimeter all around Guantanamo, and Guantanamo.17 Senator Schweiker. All right.18 Mr. Wallach. I just want to ask you a couple of wore19 questions as. I was going to before.20 I realize this question is going to your expertise, and21 if you have any trouble with definitional terms, let's get22 chom straight.23 Mr. Halley. Right.24 Mes Wallach. DIU JHWAVE itself as an entity have ene25 capability to conduct an investigation to determine whether ciTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 not there had been Cuban involvement in the assassination of2 President Kennedy in 1963?3 Mr. Halley. I don't think there would have been a real4 world capability. I mean, if you're talking in my terms of5 conducing an investigation of this type in Cuba, which would6 have been professionally sound, that people could have put7 confidence in. I think the answer to that is probably no. I'm8 giving you an opinion on. That is my opinion.9 Mr. Wallach. Let's go back to terms, then. I'm not talking10 about an investigation where you could obviously have the11 freedom to go up and interview anyone you wanted to interview.12 Mr. Halley. No. We are talking about through clandestine13 resources. In other words, to conduct this kind of investigation,14 you know, in my view, you would have had to have had15 a penetration of one or more of the Cuban intelligence service16 once serving. The penetration would have had to have been in the 26th of July17 Movement, and had enough rapport with the top leadership that18 it could have moved freely in and out of a specific circle.19 would probably had to have been at the level of a Commandant.20 We did not have that kind of resource in depth to conduct21 that kind of investigation.22 Mr. Wallach. Were there ever any discussions at that, at that23 that you remember between yourself, Fitzgerald, Helms,24 anyone, as to whether or not the CIA did have the capability25 to conduct such an investigation?TOP SECRETNW#55510 DocId:32425455
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TOP SECRETMr. Halley. I don't recall such a discussion, but again, the reason for it was, it was essentially felt at that time, as name traces were done, the whole mood and the whole atmosphere was that this was a case that was being investigated by the FBL. It was their jurisdictional problem.Mr. Wallach. Did the FBI, to your knowledge, have the capacity to investigate or to conduct any sort of investigation inside Cuba?Mr. Halley. Inside Cuba? No, I don't think they did.Mr. Wallach. Did you have direct contact with anyone from the Bureau on a continuing basis from the FBI?Mr. Johnston. Let's restructure that whole area.What was the liaison relationship between JMWAVE, the Bureau and Florida?Mr. Halley. There was a direct liaison on a daily working basis, if this was required, between JMWAVE and the Miami Field Office, I think it was called, as a separate field office.Mr. Johnston. At what level was this liaison conducted directly with you?Mr. Halley. No. This was conducted at at least three levels that I can recall: periodically the Chief of the Field office and I would meet to review problems, if we had any particular problems, or frankly, just to get together just to make sure that we did not have any problems. There wasTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 direct liaison on a working level between the people in the2 Counterintelligence shop of the Station and what I think the3 Bureau used to call the Tamale Squad, which were former4 Bureau agents who had been down in Havana, who had left when5 Fidel came into power, and were still working in Miami. And the6 third liaison was essentially with people who were working7 specific cases, where the name trace mechanism between ourselves8 and the Bureau would show some mutuality of interest in a9 particular case.10 For instance, as an example, the Bureau might call up and11 say, look, what do you know about Juan Jose Gonzalez of the12 Second Front of the Escambrai. We'll say, okay, we'll take13 the question, we'll do a trace, prepare the answer, and somebody14 would go down and talk to them. So it was close. I would15 say it was close.16 Mr. Johnston. Did you ever do the reverse? Did you ever17 ask the Bureau for information?18 Mr. Halley. Yes. We traced specific people with the19 Bureau.20 Mr. Johnston. In November, after the assassination of21 President Kennedy, did you personally meet with anybody from22 the FBI regarding the investigation?23 Mr. Halley. I don't recall meeting on that specific24 subject.25 Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether anyone in INWAVE metTOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETwith the FBI in regard to the FBI investigation in Florida?Mr. Halley. My recollection is that this name traco procedure was working, whatever they were working in relationsh to their investigation, was being run through us. In other words, how many traces, who was being traced, I coulda't answer that.Mr. Johnston. Well, name traces are one thing. I guess I am talking one step above that. Did anyone in JMWAVE to your knowledge discuss with anyone in FBI in Florida the CIA's capability to assist the FEI investigation?Mr. Halley. I have no way of answering that. I don't recall that, I don't recall that kind of thing. You know, this is you know, we're talking about 1963. This is 13 years ago, and I keep telling you, you know, I've had a busy active life.Senator Schweiker. You are doing so far very well..Mr. Halley. I feel you are pressing ma on something th io: almost unreasonable, I bean, I don't recall tach anë every conversation. I mean, I had a 300 man station..Mr. Johnston. I agree with you on that, but you are describing have traces, which you to seem to recall, but i saying was there anything beyond naso traces that you reciMas there any assistance given beyond nazo braces?Senator seawelker, was there any higher level invest that you can repali?# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETMr. Halley. The reason this name trace thing sticks in my mind, frankly, is because of the name traces that were conducted on Oswald when we got the hit, and I recall, the hit was made on the fact that there was the discussion and debate between Oswald and the DRE fellow, and we were tracing a lot of names at that time, and in conjunction with this particular event, once people were arrested and detained and there was some reason to expect that there was what I called an investigative follow-up, you know, you've got to start from some fact. What was the fact? You had a name, an address, a telephone number, that kind of tracing was going on. That is what impacts on me, what is this, you know, 13 years later.Senator Schweiker. In connection with that, the group, the DRE group, there was some allegation that Oswald, I guess part of it is reality for sure, that he tried to penetrate the group himself by coming in when he was in New Orleans and infiltrate it on his own, which I guess is known, and what is in doubt, there was an allegation that while he was doing that, that he possibly talked of assassinating Kennedy or had paid money to assassinate Kennedy.Does any of that conversation strike any bells or recollection with regard to DRE?Mr. Halley. No. It doesn't, Senator, and I think I've got to explain this to you as to what was the nature of our relationship with the DRE. In other words, we had aTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 relationship with the DRE where we gave them a monthly2 subsidy. In other words, this would make them in our category3 like independent contractors. In return for this particular4 subsidy, they were to collect intelligence for us on the island5 of Cuba where they still had people. They were to be a symbol6 of a certain amount of resistance therefore they had to engage7 in certain activities, propaganda, radio broadcasts, correspon-8 dence to their friends and associates on the inside to show9 that there was a spark on the outside, around which people could10 rally.11 They also wanted to have a boat to move people inside12 and out of Cuba, and the money, the subsidy that we gave them13 helped them do all of these things. And we got an accounting14 from them. But we did not control each and every action that15 they took, so that if they chose, you know, not to report16 something to us, we wouldn't necessarily know it, and not17 every little detail of their organization did we know. If18 they met somebody19 Senator Schweiker. Well, I can understand that because20 there were a lot of groups like that, I'm sure.21 Mr. Halley. But that particular one was one with which22 we had a subsidy relationship.23 Senator Schweiker. Do you recall who your control24 relationship was with that particular group? I assume there25 was a CIA control relationship.TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET1 Mr. Halley. Yes, there was a particular man that was in2 Liaison with that group, and there were several during that poriod3 of time.4 Senator Schweiker. Might it have been Carlos Bringuier,5 the name we mentioned before?6 Mr. Halley. You mentioned the name, and to be honest, the7 name doesn't ring a bell. But is he also known as Fatty?8 Senator Schweiker. Well, you've got me now.9 Mr. Haliny. Well, every Cuban has an alias, like, they10 call him El Gordo or something like that.11 Senator Schweiker. Well, it might be. He fits it.12 Mr. Halley. Well, you might be able to answer this. Was13 he the fellow that was on the DRE boat that raided Havana?14 I have trouble matching up some of these names, and frankly,15 that name doesn't ring a bell, but I might have known him as16 El Gordo, and he was on the boat, and we dealt with different17 people.18 (Discussion off the record.)19 Mr. Johnston. Let me show you WAVE cable 8049, dated20 21 November '63, which is your report on this DRE matter,21 that cable basically indicates that you got information from22 DRE about Oswald.23 Is that correct?24 Mr. Halley. Yes. The wording of this particular cable25 shows that we did get from the DRD files this information.# TOP SECRET