Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 41]
TOP SECRET39. 1 into these various timeframes. When you talk about, was there2 ever a discussion of assassination, you know, when people3 were coming out and being interviewed, yes, some Cuban refugee4 would say, by God, I would like to go back and shoot, you know,5 X, Y or Z. It might have been some commandante in his particu-6 lar area; it could have been Fidel Castro. This was just part7 of the fabric of the times.8 Mr. Baron. Can we turn now to the structure of the JMWAVE9 Station and explain that a bit? How large was the Station?10 What was the command structure within the Station?11 Mr. Halley. The Station started expanding in whatever12 timeframe it was, somewhere after the survey was completed. It13 must have started expanding sometime in March of 1962. You14 know, by the time that it was at its peak, which was probably15 somewhere just before the Cuban Missile Crisis, July, August16 of 1962, it was either the largest or the second largest -- my17 recollection was that it was the second largest station in18 existence at that time. I would not want to be pinned down on19 a particular number of people on any particular day.20 Mr. Baron. Could you give some idea as to the number of21 employees at the Station during its peak?22 Mr. Halley. I would say somewhere in the neighborhood of,23 you know, three hundred. You know, again, this means staff and24 contract employees.25 Mr. Baron. What do you cover with the term contractTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 42]
# TOP SECRET1 employees?2 Mr. Halley. These would be, for instance, maritime case3 officers. We hired people who had specialized skills, that is,4 that they could manage a series of vessels for us, but they5 were not longterm staff employees. These would be people who6 would be used, if you will, in a management organization, basic7 implementation of the program.8 Mr. Baron. Did you have other agents or operatives among9 the Cuban community or outside the Cuban community that were10 affiliated with the Station although not employed by it11 directly?12 Mr. Halley. I think we are going to have to define some13 terms.14 Mr. Baron. What I am trying to do now is simply get a15 picture of the scope of the Station's strength and its16 activities, how many people the Station had to call upon for17 its activities.18 Mr. Halley. Well, let me try to give you an answer, because19 I think we are going to get into a semantic problem here.20 When I talk about the Station, as such, I would say that21 is roughly in the neighborhood of three hundred people, and that22 was those people who would be involved in the management23 effort, the direction effort, the financial logistics, cover24 procedures, security, that kind of thing. All right? Flowing25 out from that were people whom we would call agents, that is,# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 43]
TOP SECRET411 people who were not knowledgeable necessarily of whom theyworked for or where the cover offices were located and so forth.Let us say, in the maritime part of the operation we might havehad at any one point in time, you know, up to five hundredpeople involved in maritime activities, you know?Again, if you pick a date, I am sure we can research it.The records are still available and you know how many peoplewe had, but let us take these five hundred. What am I talkingabout? These would be essentially Cubans who were the captainsof the vessles that were used in infiltration operations toput people on the shore of Cuba, and there were a variety oftechniques. In other words, you might start on with the mothership, which would be an LCI -- I am not sure how familiar youare with various kinds of vessels.Mr. Baron. What is an LCI?Mr. Halley. Landing craft kind of vessle, or a patrolcraft, a PC, 110-foot vessle, that would be a mother ship.This is the kind of ship that would take fuel supplies andwater, so that other smaller vessels could be serviced by it.So you might start with an operation of a mother ship towing asmaller boat, or having it on its decks and going down tofifteen or twenty miles from Cuba, putting the smaller boatover the side, which was a faster boat, lower silhouette, lesslikely to be picked up by Cuban coastal radar, and then thatwould take the team in close to the shore where we might finallyTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 44]
# TOP SECRET1 put them into rubber rafts, where they would paddle in or use2 a silent outboard motor if the surf was high.3 Mr. Baron. The people involved in manning those crafts4 would not necessarily be employees of the Station directly?5 They might be agents, even non-paid agents?6 Mr. Halley. No, they were not paid. For instance, they7 might work for a particular cover company. In other words, I8 am only using this as an example. Let us say we had the ABC9 Shipping Company. That shipping company was a subsidiary of10 the Station, if you will, and the ABC Shipping Company ran11 maybe one LCI and maybe two or three smaller boats which it12 could deck load and that company might have fifty or seventy-13 five employees, as an example, all Cubans, maybe some of them14 was Nicaraguans or Costa Ricans as most of these vessels -- I15 would have to go and look at each vessel.16 Does that give you a feel for the size of the problem?17 Mr. Baron. How many such companies would have been in18 existence at that time, companies operating as CIA proprietaries19 or companies in cover and supplying the JMWAVE Station with20 personnel or with equipment?21 Mr. Halley. We are talking about all of these companies,22 they probably went up into the hundreds. I distinguish between23 companies that were set up simply to provide cover as opposed24 to companies that were proprietaries. You know, these terms25 mean different things to me. The nature of the Agency's# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 45]
TOP SECRET1 involvement in each is different. I am having a little2 trouble --3 Mr. Baron. Could you explain what different categories of4 companies you were receiving help from at that point, and about5 how many of each there might have been?6 Mr. Halley. I do not think I could do that. We are7 talking about hundreds of companies that we used during that8 period of time. Some of them might simply have been a company9 set up and registered and run out of some attorney's10 office. It simply provided back stopping for the ownership of11 the small boat.12 Everything has to be owned by somebody, it has to have a13 Coast Guard registration, you know, things like that. Even if14 I had access to the files to answer your question, it would15 take me weeks to pull all that together to give you an answer.16 I don't think there is an overview statement.17 Mr. Baron. Would it be fair to say that you had coopera-18 tion on a grand scale from all kinds of people in private19 enterprise.in the Miami area, or in Southern Florida?20 Mr. Halley. I think it would be fair to say that we had21 extensive cooperation - I do not like your word "grand" -- that22 we had extensive cooperation from the civilian sector in23 Florida, in the state of Florida, to facilitate the conduct of24 this clandestine mission.25 Mr. Baron. Did you also have extensive cooperation fromTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 46]
TOP SECRET441 civic officials and law enforcement agencies in being allowed2 to operate free or the law? For instance, were you allowed to3 put vessels onto the water which were not properly registered,4 or which could be held immune for inspection by the Coast Guard5 or other maritime authorities, and were you allowed to send6 people through the streets of Southern Florida who may have7 bean armed or violating local law in some other way, who were8 held immune by arrangements that you had with law enforcement9 agencies?10 Mr. Halley. You have asked me, in essence, three11 questions.12 Mr. Baron. Right.13 Mr. Halley. Let me try to divide that and deal with each14 question separately.15 Let me first deal with the vessels. Every vessel that we16 had was appropriately registered. There were no short-cuts.17 insofar as the U.S. Coast Guard was concerned. That is, any18 vessel that was registered in the United States met appropriate19 safety standards and so forth, so we were not putting any20 vessels into the water that any citizen could not have put into21 the water. That is we are talking about ten, fifteen, twenty22 foot boats, thirty foot boats, thirty-five foot boats, things23 like that. These boats were owned in either a corporate name24 or by a private individual who had to register them with the25 Coast Guard and pass normal Coast Guard regulations.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 47]
TOP SECRET1 (Discussion off the record.)2 Mr. Baron. To continue with this, I understand that3 safety regulations would have been complied with, but was there4 some sort of immunity from inspection, say inspection for5 carrying armaments aboard a vessel that the CIA had arranged6 with maritime authorities, or local law enforcement authorities?7 Mr. Halley. When we had operations going, these were8 coordinated with the Coast Guard in terms of their knowing that,9 you know, at a particular date, time group, that there would be10 a rendezvous between two vessels which were our vessels, and11 this was coordinated with the Coast Guard.12 Mr. Baron. Would you return to the second part of that13 large question? Without reference to vessels, were CIA14 employees or agents on the streets of cities in Southern15 Florida immune from search or arrest by local law enforcement16 authorities?17 Mr. Halley. They were not immune.18 Let me ask to dispel one myth that I think has developed19 which is reflected in your question. We were meticulous to20 insure that no weapons were issued to anybody until the men21 were on the vessel outside of the immediate waters of south22 Florida, and we were meticulous to insure that when they came23 back from a mission that they were met at sea and all the24 weapons were taken away from them.25 So, when you talk about a group moving around in Florida,TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 48]
TOP SECRET1 we did work out through the entire state, and I did not want2 you to feel that I was being less than candid with you, and3 you keep saying south Florida, I want to say to you that we4 operated in the state of Florida, men moving around armed under5 our control in the state of Florida, is just not correct.6 This was all carefully controlled and they did not have their7 weapons when they came back, we took them before they landed,8 so they were not immune.9 Mr. Baron. You did have general arrangements or agreements10 with law enforcement agencies throughout Florida for the11 treatment of CIA operatives who were affiliated with the JMWAVE12 Station?13 Mr. Halley. We did have, through our Office of Security,14 a continuing dialogue with a number of law enforcement agencies15 in Florida. If a problem developed, we would then contact them16 and look at the issue within the context of what had transpired.17 Certainly there was no immunity. In other words, this has to be18 looked at on a case by case basis.19 For instance, you know, we had a training site in north20 Florida, as an example. If somebody came off of that site that21 was drunk and disorderly in town and could not speak English,22 the local authorities did have a number to call to raise this23 with us to see whether this was somebody that was of interest24 to us, and then we would have to go and settle that particular25 case.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 49]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Baron. Back to the structure of the relationships2 between yourself as Chief of Station at JMWAVE and any operatives3 or employees who worked underneath you at that Station, would4 it be fair to say that any activities run out of the Station5 ultimately were channeled out through you?6 Mr. Halley. They should have been, and they were -- you7 know this Station went through several mutations in organization8 during its existence. I guess the organizational structure that9 existed for the longest period of time was something like I am10 going to describe to you.11 There was a Chief of Station, which was myself. I had a12 Deputy Chief of Station for operations. That is the gentleman13 who is now retired, I think he is still alive, by the name of14 Moore, Robert Moore. I had a second Deputy Chief of Station and15 he was for Support Patterns. That is a gentleman who is also16 retired, a Mr. Corris.17 Then the rest of the Station was organized into a number of18 branches. Each branch was organized along functional lines.19 Let me give you an example. There was a Foreign Intelligence20 Branch. These were people in, what in my terminology would be21 classical foreign intelligence operations. That is, trying to22 recruit a Cuban diplomat abroad, as an example, dealing with,23 you know, a Uruguayan diplomat in the Uruguayan Embassy in24 Havana. They are working with resident agents in Cuba who might25 live in some city like Havana and have a legal job as a baker orTOP SECRET![photo of obscured image]
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 50]
TOP SECRET481 butcher or something but had a radio set in which they could2 communicate with us, through which they could communicate to us.3 Then there was the Paramilitary Branch. This was the4 group that ran the commando operations. This was the group that5 ran, and put people back into Cuba, into resistance groups, or6 established contact with resistance groups. This was a group7 that also worked in putting in caches that would supply people,8 either paramilitary forces in Cuba or agents that were being9 run by the Foreign Intelligence Group.10 All right. Then there was a Covert Action, people who11 dealt with exiled refugee groups that were involved in radio12 activities, publications, that kind of thing. Then there is a13 whole panoply of -- then there was Maritime, in terms of14 finance, and so on. Security was a branch. Obviously, under15 that kind of system, no executive, whether he is president of16 a corporation or a Station Chief, can see every single piece of17 paper that comes in or out, but clearly there was a review18 procedure whereby program reviews were conducted, individual19 operational reviews were conducted.20 Mr. Baron. By yourself?21 Mr. Halley. By myself. I do not want to leave you with22 the impression that I knew every single thing that was going23 on every minute and could account for the activities of three24 hundred employees on a daily basis.25 Mr. Baron. In talking about the personnel affiliatedTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 51]
TOP SECRET1 with the Station a moment ago, I think we may have created a::2 misimpression that the only people involved in CIA operations3 were people who were paid by the Agency. Isn't it also true4 that there were many members of Cuban exile groups in Florida5 who participated voluntarily from time to time in CIA sponsored6 operations?7 Mr. Halley. I think that you may have to sharpen that up8 for me. I am not sure what you really mean.9 If you are talking about foreign intelligence collections,10 you know, the people who were producing --11 Mr. Baron. I am talking now about the paramilitary12 operations.13 Mr. Halley. No. I do not know of any people that were14 involved in paramilitary operations that were not in some way15 paid.16 Mr. Baron. By the Agency?17 Mr. Halley. By the Agency.18 Let me make sure that we understand each other, because19 during this period of time there were a lot of independent20 Cuban groups who claimed that they had sponsorship from the21 Agency but did not, and were operating, and there was a period22 in time when these groups could not run their operations from23 Florida without running the risk of being picked up by Customs,24 Immigration, Coast Guard, the FBI, or if we had information on25 it, you know, we might pass the information to the Coast GuardTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 52]
TOP SECRET501 so that they could keep them from going.2 If that is what you are referring to, somebody like Alpha 663 or Commando L or somebody like that, they were not a part of4 the CIA apparatus.5 Mr. Baron. Although you might be aware of their activities?6 Mr. Halley. We would be aware of their activities,7 certainly.8 Mr. Baron. Can you explain if there is anything to add9 to what we have already said? The chain of command, apart from10 yourself as Chief of Station, to Task Force W and to the11 Directorate of Plans within the Agency?12 You would report directly to William Harvey?13 Mr. Halley. William Harvey was Chief of Task Force W,14 later FitzGerald. My chain of command was from me to them.15 You know, they had a subordinate staff who helped them monitor16 the Station's activity, so that it just was not the fact, you17 know, that Mr. Harvey and Mr. FitzGerald were totally dependent18 on what I told them. To have an appreciation of what was going19 on in Miami they had their own staff that was following20 individual operations.21 For instance, they had a paramilitary staff that would22 review our proposals for a paramilitary operation and might23 say we think that the Station has overextended itself this24 month, they want to run twenty-five operations given the25 weather during this particular month of October. We do notTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 53]
TOP SECRET1 think they could do it. We think they should be guided to run2 only twenty, fifteen, something like that. So they were not3 totally dependent on me.4 Mr. Baron. What was the nature of the split of responsi-5 bility between Task Force W and JMWAVE Station?6 In other words, were there certain operations that were7 run directly out of Task Force W?8 Mr. Halley. Also, you have to put this into a historical9 time. What period are you talking about.?10 Mr. Baron. During the period of your tenure. If there11 were changes during your tenure at JMWAVE, why do you not12 explain those?13 Mr. Halley. There were. Each one is different. Let me14 give you a couple of examples.15 Washington, Task Force W, essentially did not run16 any paramilitary operations where they took command and control17 for sending people to Cuba. For instance, if Task Force W in18 Washington wanted to plant a radio in Cuba which was to be picked19 up by foreign intelligence agents who could report, they would20 task us to implant that radio in a cache in a particular area21 in Cuba, for instance, Oriente province. We would know simply22 that it was a radio perhaps. We would then put it into23 Oriente province, write up the site, give them the rip cord.24 They would communicate to the agents in Cuba who would go25 recover the cache.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 54]
TOP SECRET521 So they had agents in Cuba that were reporting foreign2 intelligence to them so they had collection assets that were3 reporting to them along the same lines that we did. They did4 work at a downstream point when FitzGerald came in with a5 couple of groups -- in other words, they had contact with6 Artime. I had no contact with the Artime group as a general7 rule. They also had contact with Manolo Ray which I did not8 have contact with. So they were working with these kinds of9 larger exile groups.10 The Task Force also specialized in much more economic11 activity than I did. That is a question of looking at such12 things as England bus exports from Great Britain to Cuba. 13,1313 Mr. Baron. In terms of paramilitary operations, if an14 assassination operation had been run by Task Force W, would15 you have assumed as Chief of Station in Miami you would have16 been aware of such an operation?17 Mr. Halley. No, I do not assume that.18 Mr. Baron. Would it not have been sound managerial19 practice to let you know that there was an operation that might20 have been run through Florida into Cuba?21 Mr. Halley. No.22 You know, the Agency is a highly compartmented mechanism.23 You know, let us dispel one thing very promptly here. If you24 are asking me was I aware of all these contacts, you know, with25 the Mafia -- and I think I can tell you frankly at that time ITOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 55]
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000# TOP SECRET1 was not -- Harvey would come, you know, to Miami, to visit me2 to review the activities of the station, and while there would3 go off on his own and make his contact with whomever he was4 meeting. I knew he was meeting somebody, but it was not up to5 me to find out with whom he was meeting or why he was meeting6 them or what he was doing with them.7 Mr. Baron. My question really was, I think more innocent8 than that.9 Was it strictly one of involving what correct management10 techniques would be, or what kind of knowledge the Chief of11 Station of JMWAVE would have to have in order to do an effective12 job in dealing with the Cuban community and running operations13 into Cuba? You seem to be saying that it would not be ...14 necessary to run an effective job to have knowledge of every15 other operation that the CIA is running against Castro?16 Mr. Halley. I think what I am saying during that particu-17 lar time -- I do not want you to come to the conclusion that18 I was knowledgeable of everything that ran in from or through19 the state of Florida, because during that period of time, for20 instance, Mr. Harvey in particular was a very compartmented21 gentleman, and it would be keeping with his style to run an22 operation in which the locus of the operation might be Florida23 and I would not know about it.24 Now, that would be an unusual thing, but it is not precluded.25 Mr. Baron. Let us turn for a moment to following up on the# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 56]
TOP SECRET541 nature of your contacts with William Harvey in reference to any2 operations he may have in running unilaterally against Castro.3 Do you recall aiding Harvey in an operation that he was in charge4 of and that was not affiliated with JMWAVE?5 Mr. Halley. I do not recall anything, I do not recall6 anything specific. In other words, the pattern was in terms of7 command and control, I would come to Washington on a regular8 basis to review activity with Harvey after we submitted our9 paperwork. Harvey was also a frequent visitor to Florida.10 We would have operational discussions. He would talk to the11 Branch Chiefs, he talked to people. He also went out on his12 own, and he was meeting somebody, it was clear to me that he13 was meeting people. But it was frankly in the way that the14 Agency is run and managed, it was not a concern to me whom he15 was meeting.16 Mr. Baron. Would it have been proper of you to inquire17 of him whom he was meeting?18 Mr. Halley. No, it would not have been.19 Mr. Baron. Did you have suspicions or speculation about20 whom he might have been meeting or for what purpose that he21 was having these meetings?22 Mr. Halley. No, not for what purpose. There is a whole,23 you know, panoply of things going on at that time. You know,24 frankly I was a very busy guy, when Harvey was there, it occupied25 one hunk of a lot of my time. If he wanted to go off, you know,TOP SECRET