Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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3 November 1960MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell, Gen. Lansdale1. CubaMr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant said he would check into the progress of the State Department group which has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas, supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that perhaps things have now progressed to a point where covert activities of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be effective. Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mr. Gray cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the population in ways which the Communists have developed so well. The latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of exiles under CIA control. Now the same people are beginning to feel more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic deprivations being experienced by the middle and upper classes, time is actually working on Castro's side. Mr. Merchant said that he foresaw that there would occur a point in time beyond which covert intervention would not do the job.Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to "clean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force. He suggested the possibility of using the CIA-backed exiles to mount a simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt
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intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusionof which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, butthat should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamothis would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray said that he had hadthe subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday inorder to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point.He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completelyunderstood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act wouldbe met with a previously-agreed-on response.Mr. Merchant stated that, apart from any attack on Guantanamo,he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meetingwas faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meantthat it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossibleand yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean upthe mess." He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that anuprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. wouldbe met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situationlike Algeria.Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabelloutlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with thereasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically thepossibility of U. N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scopeof the program, which has been brought about by the increased strengthof the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed seriousdoubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure. Mr.Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent afinal conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposalembodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice shouldrest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil orpreparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention.Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to hisassociates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr. Merchant agreedthat this is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not preparedto move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibilitiesof keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed.In this connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of usinga refugee organization - either an existing one or a contrived one - tobackstop the operations.
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Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific locations that would be suitable.Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is bevond our capabilities.
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4. Supply Drops - CubaGen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had not taken place because of the absence of specified communication from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed that the Group had no objections. The members so signified.5. U-2, CubaGen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued that we are analyzing the exact results on a priority basis and that some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of this kind before the middle of next week." The other members appeared to have the same reaction.6. Policy Consideration Re Cuban ExilesMr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however, that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take; that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups other than those under the direction of CIA.The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make arrangements for this.7. Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis Cape CanaveralMr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum
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on this subject, which had been discussed with the rest of the Groupon 20 October 1960.
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# SECRETEYES ONLY15 aug 6012 August 1960MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting - 11 August 1960PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Dulles, and Bissell2. Budget for Cuban Operations: Mr. Bissell summarized the budget which had been prepared as a basis for seeking a release from the Reserve to finance Cuban operations for the balance of the fiscal year. The budget for the year totals approximately thirteen and a quarter million dollars, not including provision for the replacement of material with an estimated value of 1.6 million dollars to be withdrawn from Agency inventory. Since 2.5 million dollars of budgeted and Reserve funds have been made available for this program by an earlier action, the balance required is about ten and three-quarters million dollars. Mr. Dulles stated that a release of ten million would be requested at this time since there is inevitably a wide margin of uncertainty as to what the actual costs will turn out to be. Mr. Bissell stated the amounts required by major sub-headings as follows:Political Action $ 960,000.00Propaganda 2,152,120,00Paramilitary 8,055,753.00Intelligence Collection 833,200.00Counter Intelligence 325,400.00Communications Support 229,420.00Support 731,718.00$ 13,287,611.00 TotalPROPERTY OFTHE WHITE HOUSE OFFICEEYES ONLYSECRETNW 50955 DocId:32423488 Page 36THIS DOCUMENT ISA SOURCE DOCUMENTIN CS H. TICALPAPER NO. 230
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SECRETEYES ONLY-2-It was agreed that the operations in question must go forward and that the amount did not seem unreasonable for activities of this scope and scale but it was understood that Messrs. Merchant and Gray could not state that they had reviewed in any detail the manner in which the estimates had been arrived at. Following further discussion, it was agreed that this matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial expenditures which should not be undertaken without reasonable assurance that the operation was to go forward.![Signature of Richard M. Bissell, Jr.]RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.Deputy Director(Plans)EYES ONLYSECRET
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SECRET - EYES ONLY25 August 1960MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles1. CongoMr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. Dulles later described them "2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included: operations through the chief advisor of the Christian Trade Unions; the planned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange a vote of no confidence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact with an alleged leader of certain independent labor groups. He emphasized that the latter had just come up and that we are now in the process of assessing the bona fides and capabilities of the individual.The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.Mr. Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have given thought to the possibility of using high officials of the Catholic Church in Africa to promote the general objectives of the West. In this connection, he cited a preliminary assessment which had been made of the Negro Cardinal recently appointed by the Pope - the assessment being that the individual in question is a man of notPROPERTY OFTHE WHITE HOUSE OFFICESECRET - EYES ONLY
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outstanding intelligence, ability or drive, but that he is obviously well motivated. Mr. Irwin asked whether there might be other individuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature in the church hierarchy who could be useful.Mr. Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black Africa is not a very substantial force. Mr. Dulles concurred in this, but added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate.
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# √4. CubaThe DCI summarized the progress we have made in establishing contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its capabilities (after this action had been cleared with the Special Group).He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of approximately 500 people ready to operate by November. In answer to Mr. Irwin's question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating the tactical combat phase.Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The latter had told Mr. Gray that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had two reservations that he would like Gray to look into.One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his discussion with CIA representatives in connection with the latest withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received "no evidence" that any effective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had answered that in the formal presentation last week, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups.)The second point had to do with a feeling that we might not
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know enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente,particularly as to basic freedoms, their attitude toward restorationof seized American property, etc. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray hadpointed out that the Frente is composed of people who have brokenwith Castro, at least on the basic philosophies.)In an attempt to clarify the situation with respect to the firstpoint, Mr. Parrott told the Group about last Monday's meeting withMr. Macy, at which Mr. Barnes had covered in considerable detailall aspects of the Cuban project. He said that he was at a loss tounderstand how Macy could have received the impression that CIAis not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answerto Mr. Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated -and had developed at considerable length - the thesis that our viewwas one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail justwhy this is so; this explanation had included specific comments on thesteps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups andto assess their apparent leaders. Mr. Parrott said further that thepoint had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the questionfor CIA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without theparticipation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within thecountry.On the second point, Mr. Dulles said that we do know a gooddeal about the basic political sympathies of Frente members, andcited as an example the position that had been taken as to the inclusionof certain ultra-conservative groups. He said that the Frente hadissued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadlyas being to preserve the principles of the revolution. He said that asto specific stands on restoration of U. S. property rights, etc., thiswas thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearanceof being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans'point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly doso. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near futureand would take that opportunity to discuss these matters further, asappropriate.Mr. Parrott said that there was no disagreement that the politicalideas of these individuals must be constantly assessed and must beclearly established before the operation actually comes off. Headded, however, that it should be borne in mind that once thesepolitically-screened individuals had issued their general statementof objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the FRDtogether, and that at this particular stage it would not be practical
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to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or groupviews.Mr. Parrott also said that Mr. Macy had raised a relatedpoint which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and thatMr. Barnes had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be givenadequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was aconcern expressed as to planning for the support fiscal and otherwiseof a new Cuban government immediately after a successful overturnof the present one. Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with thenecessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in factdirected three weeks ago that State officials begin to draw them up.JapanettTHOMAS A. PARROTT5SECRET - EVES CHILYPROPLOYTHE WHITE HOLNW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 42
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# SECRET - EYES ONLYWhile agreeing that the Government could not take an official stand, Mr. Merchant expressed his personal opinion that if the companies should suspend operations, this would give the Soviets a great opportunity, given the fact that the Cuban economy is so dependent on oil. He pointed out that no alternative leader to Castro has yet emerged, and that the United States would be held liable for any economic crisis that might be precipitated in this way.Mr. Gray related the consideration of this sort of action to the sugar project discussed three weeks ago by the Group. He emphasized that in his opinion these are isolated actions and that any moves of this kind should be made only after an over-all consideration of whether and how the United States wishes to move against Castro. Mr. Irwin took some exception to this, indicating that he thought it wa's possible and perhaps desirable to take such actions as those contemplated in the sugar proposal, apart from any concerted across-the-board program. Mr. Dulles emphasized that in any case we will have to decide before long whether covert action should be taken in Cuba.It was then agreed that a special meeting of the Group should be held on Monday, March 14th, to consider what might and should be done in Cuba. It was agreed that in addition to the regular members, Mr. Rubottom, Admiral Burke, Mr. Bissell, Mr. King and perhaps Colonel Lansdale should attend.There was then a brief discussion of Admiral Burke's letter to Mr. Merchant. It developed that the attachment to this letter has now been given the status of a JCS document but that it has not been forwarded to the NSC as the JCS had desired. (Mr. Irwin said that he had held up this action because of the informal nature of the letter.) Mr. Merchant said the Department is preparing comments and that he hoped the JCS paper would not be considered apart from State's comments.Mr. Dulles said that we would require a policy decision on whether a black radio could be established on U.S. territory, probably in the Florida Keys. It was agreed that this proposal should be staffed through the Scott office.SECRET - EYES ONLY
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7 April 1960MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 7 April 1960PRESENT: Mr. Merchant, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Gray, Gen. Cabell3. Dominican RepublicMr. Gray asked the Acting DCI whether he had anything to add on the situation in the Dominican Republic to what had been covered by himself and the Secretary of State that morning at the NSC meeting. General Cabell replied that he would only like to add the comment that it appears evident that Trujillo will not consider making any arrangements for an orderly succession to himself, but that he will either hang on to the bitter end or flee the country on short notice, à la Batista.Mr. Gray asked the Group's views on what happens after Trujillo, specifically how Castro can be kept out of the Dominican Republic. General Cabell commented that so far no worthwhile opposition to the Benefactor has been identified, and that in his opinion it might well become necessary to dispatch U.S. forces, openly identified as such, to the country in the immediate aftermath of the demise or flight of Trujillo. Mr. Merchant said that his preliminary thoughts were that there would probably be a good chance to get OAS support for a move of this kind to forestall Castro; on the other hand, we might expect some internal revulsion at the arrival of U.S. forces because of the memory of the Marine occupation.Mr. Merchant added that Mr. Rubottom was thinking seriously of a plan to seal off the land approaches to the Dominican Republic via Haiti, thereby requiring any sizeable Castro effort to be an amphibious one. He said that this plan has not yet been formally4. CubaMr. Gray expressed satisfaction with the organizational arrangements for interagency groups considering the continuing development of the Cuban situation. In this connection he expressed some concern that USIA and CIA might be working on parallel or conflicting lines with respect to radio. General Cabell assured him that the top people in USIA are aware of CIA plans and there should be no crossing of wires.
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28 April 1960MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 28 April 1960PRESENT: Messrs. Hare, Gray, DullesMr. Joseph Scott of the Department of State sat in as an observer.8. CubaMr. Gray said that he had discussed with his associates the organizational entities within the U.S. Government which have been established to deal with the Cuban situation. He noted that a number of different groups and committees, with varying interests and objectives, are concerning themselves with this situation and that there seemed to him to be no "chief of staff" to whom all could look as a central point.He said that the opinion had been expressed to him that Mr. Dillon should assume this function, but that in Dillon's absence, Mr. Hare should take on the responsibility and should inform himself of the general outlines of what has been going on in the Government. Mr. Gray said that it had been felt essential to have such an official available over the coming weekend, because of the expected May Day troubles, and that since this official should be of such a stature as to permit access to the highest levels, Mr. Hare had been decided upon, pending Mr. Dillon's availability.In this connection it was agreed that Mr. Dillon should be brought up to date at an appropriate time on the status of covert operations with respect to Cuba.Inter alia, Mr. Gray expressed concern and some surprise at statements and actions by UAR officials with regard to Cuba. Mr. Hare explained at some length his conviction that Deputy Foreign Minister Sabri (older brother of Ali Sabri) is largely responsible for this kind of thing, and that it does not represent the feelings of Nasser or Ali Sabri. He traced the brother's background and described him as a "twisted personality."
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SECRET-EYES ONLY19 November 1960MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 19 November 1960PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant and Mann; Douglas and Gen. Lansdale; Gray; Dulles and Bissell/2. CubaMr. Merchant began by stating that in his opinion we are putting more burden on the Guatemalan government with our training base than that government can support for very long. He noted that Mr. Mann believes the solution is to move our training activities to the U.S., but Mr. Merchant does not think we can get away with this, particularly if an increase in numbers is contemplated: Therefore, the only solution would seem to be to move to another base or bases in other countries; this would involve the same burden on the other countries as now exists with respect to Guatemala. Although he has not discussed this point with Secretary Herter, Mr. Merchant believes that it is time to take another look at Cuba and if the U.S. attitude toward Castro remains unchanged then we should consider shifting our entire posture. This would involve a break in diplomatic relations, the support of a government in exile, and other activities mostly overt, including some training in the U.S.