Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 72]
TOP SECRET691 Mr. Angleton. In 1961, 1000 of those had been pulled2 together. There was a briefing given by the general staff to3 high KGB people regarding the field of military electronics,4 and during that briefing it was pointed out that they were 145 years behind us, but they would overcome and surpass us through6 three means: Number one was the Central Committee adding the7 2,000 staff officers for espionage; Second would be disinfor-8 mation leading our scientific efforts in the wrong directions;9 And third was to enter into those kind of treaties which would10 bind our own scientific progress in military fields.11 When I left the Agency, I read a report by a man who12 knew nothing of this lecture, and this was a group of American13 electronic experts who had made a very sensitive, Top Secret14 study which stated that in this field the Soviets were four15 years behind us.16 This was in 1974.17 Mr. Epstein. A final question. In the last 10 or 1518 years have you experienced any situations where any hostile19 powers were involved in covert action against the election20 process in this country?21 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think there's no question that22 influence has been brought to hear.23 Mr. Inderfurth. llow?24 Mr. Epstein. Meaning what?25 Mr. Angleton. Propaganda, among other things.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 73]
# TOP SECRET701 For example, one of the most famous of the disinformation2 agents, I mean they had established contact at political levels3 in this country.4 Mr. Epstein. How about campaign financing?5 Mr. Angleton. I don't think it figures unless it would6 be the CP.7 But just to add one last point to this question of the8 threat, it is my view, seeing Angola and seeing the unwilling-9 ness of this country to resist or to define its purpose, or10 to deal fairly with its allies, that within a period of four11 years there will be a form of confrontation on an unpopular12 issue between the Soviet bloc and the United States in which13 we will back down. We will then go into our supreme isolation,14 because in December of '61, when this Soviet defected and he15 had read the political action programs, he spelled out in16 detail that one of the primary purposes of the reorientations17 was that all intelligence operations or political objectives,18 and the main political objective was to reaffirm the United19 States as the main enemy, to achieve its isolation and to achieve20 political hegemony over most of Africa and Latin America.21 He pointed out that the two largest and newest divisions22 created in KGB were Africa and Latin America.23 How this was not speculative. This was reading actual24 documents of a Top Secret nature in which you had to have a25 communications intelligence clearance to even have access to# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 74]
TOP SECRET1 them, and I think what he has spelled out, and I might add that2 when I took him to many: countries we talked on higher levels3 than we could talk in the United States. And I took him to4 some countries that we could talk to Prime Ministers. I have5 seen Prime Ministers and have been able to expose this. But6 the machinery here is not of such a nature that you can get7 into these matters.8 Mr. Epstein. Are they disseminated?9 Mr. Angleton. We're not going to disseminate. These10 are matters that should go to the Secretary of State. They11 shouldn't he going up, through people because many of the12 secrets are within that.13 Mr. Epstein. Do they go to the Secretary of State?14 Mr. Angleton. No.15 Mr. Epstein. Why not?16 Mr. Angleton. I don't think the Secretary of State has17 ever been much interested in asking for opinions. On Romania18 we sent something to the President prior to our trip.19 Mr. Epstein. But the documents you're talking about,20 the Top Secret documents --21 Mr. Angleton. We don't have the document. I'm stating22 he read those documents in Moscow.23 Mr. Epstein. But the report that he read, was that24 disseminated?25 Mr. Angleton. I don't know. It went to the Director andTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 75]
TOP SECRET721 it went to many other people. But whether it actually got to2 the Secretary of State, I do not know.3 Mr. Miler. I think one important point here that I4 would like to make is that what has happened, in my opinion5 what has happened in counter-intelligence in the Agency and6 the so-called aggressive operations, the increase in double7 agent operations and so forth and the dispersal of the centralized8 counter-intelligence is not going to produce a counter-9 intelligence program within the CIA which is going to focus10 on attempting to provide the government, policy-makers and11 so forth, with the kind of information and analytical product12 that is necessary if we're going to have a successful counter-13 intelligence.14 Mr. Johnson. I would like to thank the witnesses, and15 unless Senator Schweiker has any questions, we will adjourn16 for five minutes.17 Is that acceptable?18 Thank you very much.19 Senator Schweiker. Thank you very much.20 (Thereupon, at 4:10 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the21 above-mentioned matter was concluded.)TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 0]
157-10014-10018 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992Date: 08/04/95Page : 1# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM## AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10018RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGSAGENCY FILE NUMBER : 05-H-02## DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCSGOFROM : BUNDY, MCGEORGETO :TITLE :DATE : 07/11/75PAGES : 168SUBJECTS : BUNDY, MCGEORGEROSTOW, WALTCASTRO, FIDELCIAOPERATION MONGOOSEDOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPTCLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIEDRESTRICTIONS : 1BCURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONSDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/12/98OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS : Box 2[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTEDNW 50955 DocId:32423406 Page 1
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 1]
# TOP SECRETBundiORIGINALNATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATIONUnauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal SanctionsVol. 1 OF 3R496The Nuited States SenateReport of ProceedingsINVENTORIED:ON 2/14/77BY BCHearing held beforeSenate Select Committee to Study GovernmentalOperations With Respect to Intelligence Activities76000030141Friday, July 11, 1975Washington, D. C.(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned overto the Committee for destruction)WARD & PAUL410 FIRST STREET, S. E.WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003(202) 544-6000TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 2]
TOP SECRETCONTENTS12 TESTIMONY OFPAGE3 McGeorge Bundy24EXHIBITS5Bundy No. 1656 Bundy No. 2A667 Bundy No. 2B678 Bundy No. 2C689 Bundy No. 2D699 Bundy No. 27410 Bundy No. 37411 Bundy No. 3A7512 Bundy No. 3B9113 Bundy No. 49314 Bundy No. 513015 Bundy No. 613116 Bundy No. 6-A13217 Bundy No. 6-B13318 Bundy No. 6-C13419 Bundy No. 6-D13520 Bundy No. 6-E13621 Bundy No. 6-F13722 Bundy No. 6-G13823 Bundy No. 6-H13924 Bundy No. 6-I14425 Bundy No. 7TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 3]
# TOP SECRETCOMMITTEE MEETINGFriday, July 11, 1975United States Senate,Select Committee to Study GovernmentalOperations with Respect toIntelligence Activities,Washington, D. C.The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:40 a.m., in Room S-407, The Capitol, Senator Frank Church (Chairman) presiding.Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan, Mondale, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Baker, Mathias and Schweiker.Also present: Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Charles Lombard, Patrick Shea, David Aaron, Robert Kelley, Frederick Baron and Michael Madigan, Professional Staff Members.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 4]
TOP SECRET1 The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.2 Mr. Bundy, would you please stand and take the oath.3 Do you swear that the testimony you will give in this4 hearing will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but5 the truth, so help you God?6 Mr. Bundy. I do.7 The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz.8 TESTIMONY OF MCGEORGE BUNDY9 Mr. Schwarz. Would you state your full name and address10 for the record, please?11 Mr. Bundy. My name is McGeorge Bundy. I live in New12 York. My home address is 1040 Fifth Avenue.13 Mr. Schwarz. And you are currently the Chairman or the14 President of the Ford Foundation?15 Mr. Bundy. The President of the Ford Foundation.16 Mr. Schwarz. In the Kennedy Administration what position17 did you hold?18 Mr. Bundy. I was Special Assistant for National Secur-19 ity Affairs.20 Mr. Schwarz. And you held that all the way through the21 Kennedy Administration and for how many years in the Johnson22 Administration?23 Mr. Bundy. I held that office from the beginning of the24 Kennedy Administration to the end of February 1966.25 Mr. Schwarz. Prior to commencing work with the KennedyTOP SECRET2
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 5]
TOP SECRET1 Administration, had you had anything to do with the Central2 Intelligence Agency?3 Mr. Bundy. I had a brother who worked for many years in4 the Central Intelligence Agency. I occasionally talked with5 members of the Agency during the forties and the fifties, both6 about substantive questions of what one thought about the7 conditions in the Soviet Union, and occasionally also about8 efforts that they were then making to recruit talented9 graduates of colleges.10 Mr. Schwarz. You mentioned your brother. To put some-11 thing of a different kind in the record than we have gotten12 recently, would you recount the position taken by Allan Dulles13 in connection with the problem that your brother had in the14 1950's.15 Mr. Bundy. Well, my brother came under attack from16 Senator Joseph McCarthy. And the ground was, as I recall17 it, in general that he had been a friend and supporter of18 Alger lliss and was therefore not to be trusted in a place19 as sensitive as the Central Intelligence Agency.20 Allan Dulles -- and my impression is that this was21 quite characteristic of him -- took an extremely firm stand22 on this matter, and stood by his estimate that my brother was23 in fact in no sense a security risk, rather, to the con-24 trary. And the defense was successful, and my brother25 continued in the Central Intelligence Agency until the KennedyTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 6]
TOP SECRETPhone (Ares 202) 544-60001 Administration came in, at which time he moved over to the2 Defense Department.3 Mr. Schwarz. We have indicated to you that we are going4 to discuss the countries of Cuba, the Dominican Republic and5 Vietnam, although not much on Vietnam. And the majority and6 minority staff have shown you some documents of that period,7 some 15 years ago. Before I get to those three countries,8 I would like to ask you some questions about a subject9 called Executive Action. Have you ever heard of the subject10 called Executive Action?11 Mr. Bundy. Yes, I have.12 Mr. Schwarz. When did you first hear of it?13 Mr. Bundy. Well, as I have told your staff, that is a real14 difficulty for me, because I cannot pinpoint the time at15 which I heard of it. My impression was that it was some time16 in the early months of 1961.17 Mr. Schwarz. And do you have a recollection as to the18 context in which you heard about it, the person from whom you19 heard about it, and will you provide to the Committee your20 full recolection of the subject of Executive Action in the21 early 1961?22 Mr. Bundy. Would it help if I try to describe in a23 general way what I now understand of this matter, the24 part which is recollection and the part which is clarified25 by discussions with the staff and what I now think about it?410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 7]
# TOP SECRET51 Mr. Schwarz. Would you distinguish, though, the part2 that is recollection and the part that is based upon other3 matters?4 Mr. Bundy. That is exactly what I would like to do.5 The part that is recollection is very vague. And I6 would say that I have no recollection of more than one conver-7 sation on this subject. And the impression that sticks in8 my mind is that I was told about it in a general way. And9 it was described to me as an effort to study through the10 possibilities by which one might act against an individual11 in a context other than that of espionage and counter-espionage,12 a context more political.13 Mr. Schwarz. When you say "act against an individual",14 act in what fashion?15 Mr. Bundy. Act in a variety of fashions, as I recollect16 it, but up to and including killing the individual.17 The two things that I think are clear in my recollection18 about that -- three -- one, that it was a concept presented19 or described to me -- I was in effect being briefed on it.20 Two, that it was entirely an untargetted -- that it21 was in no sense a plan to do anything to anyone.22 And third, and I think quite important, that it was23 not anoperation which had any specific target.24 Mr. Schwarz. You said you were in effect briefed on it.25 By whom?# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 8]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Bundy. That is what I don't know. I cannot2 recollect who it was. And I think it inapproprate to guess3 when I have no recollection.4 Mr. Schwarz. What time? I don't mean what time of day,5 but what time?6 Mr. Bundy. As I say, sometime I think in the early7 months of 1961. And searching memory is an uncertain busi-8 ness, but it sticks in my mind that I heard about it in the9 rooms of the Executive Office Building. And that10 would place it in time, because I moved from the Executive11 Office Building to the West Basement of the White House sometime12 after the Bay of Pigs, perhaps in May.13 Mr. Schwarz. So based on that fact you place it in14 time sometime prior to the Bay of Pigs and sometime after--15 Mr. Bundy. After my arrival in Washington.16 Mr. Schwarz. And when did you arrive in Washington?17 Mr. Bundy. About the 10th of January. I would place18 it more closely, because I think it was after I was in the19 Office of the Special Assistant, which, of course, was occupied20 until the 20th of January by others.21 Mr. Schwarz. So you place it after the 20th of January,22 but before the Bay of Pigs, which was April 14 or 17?23 Mr. Bundy. That is right.24 Mr. Schwarz. Did it come up in a context where you25 urged that such a capacity be created?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 9]
# TOP SECRET1 Mr. Bundy. No.2 Mr. Schwarz. What context did it come up in?3 Mr. Bundy. It came up in a context in which it was being described to me by someone else. And that is really about as far as I can take it with precision.5 Mr. Schwarz. WAs it described to you by someone else as a capacity in being?8 Mr. Bundy. As a capacity -- and this is not something I want to be too certain about, Mr. Schwarz, but my recollection would be that it was a capacity coming into being.11 Mr. Schwarz. Now, receiving that information, did you take any steps to discourage or dissuade the person, whoever it was, who was describing to you the capacity coming into being?15 Mr. Bundy. What I recollect is that I was satisfied with the description I received on two points.17 First, that this was not an operational activity, and would not become such without two conditions: first, that there be a desire or a request or a guidance that there should be planning against some specific individual; and second, that there should be a decision to move against an individual.23 Being satisfied that these two things were not happen-ing -- and I am now giving you a reconstruction rather than a precise recollection -- I am confident that what I did was# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 10]
TOP SECRET1 to place this notion in the category of hypotheticals, of2 things with no current urgency to them, and in that sense3 not a question that cried for attention in the sense that4 so many others did. If I may make a straightforward compari-5 son, we were, I think, even before the inauguration, but6 certainly very quickly thereafter, very heavily engaged in7 a real question of choice, which was the question of choices8 around what would you do with the Cuban brigade which led9 eventually to the Bay of Pigs. And that occupied a very10 large amount of time and attention, as did the crisis in Berlin11 and the crisis in Laos.12 In the same period there were briefings on contingency13 plans for the uses of nuclear weapons, other weapons, and a14 whole swarm of, sort of, and here were reports that came15 naturally to the Special Assistant's office, which was also16 being reorganized.17 So, I think that what I did was simply to put this one18 aside. I cannot claim to have thought about it seriously,19 because it was in the flow of business that would come to the20 Special Assistant's office.21 Mr. Schwarz. I want to see if we can be more precise22 on dates to check on what other evidence we have. We have23 other evidence that discussions of this matter were going24 on in the Central Intelligence Agency on the 25th and 26th25 of January 1961.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 11]
TOP SECRET1 Now, are you able to testify with respect to the likeli-2 hood of the conversation you have recounted taking place3 prior to the 25th or the 26th of January 1961.4 Mr. Bundy. I would rate it very, very unlikely.5 This is a matter I have thought about since you did mention6 those dates to me. And I would say that the chance that7 within the first four days after being sworn in I would have8 been drawn to consider this question is, from my side, as9 near zero as I can put it. I had been teaching international10 relations over a period of ten years. I was deeply interested11 in many of the immediate problems, most notably the problem of12 the crisis in Berlin and the concomitant question of relations13 with the Soviet Union. And I was preoccupied with all of14 the things that happened when you moved to Washington from15 helping the Secretary to buy a house, and working out a16 staff, and I was under instruction from the President to17 reorganize the White House National Security staff. This18 subject was far out of my mind, and I would not have brought19 it up. I doubt that anyone wouldhave brought it to20 me in those early days.21 The Chairman. May I interrupt for a moment.22 As I understand your testimony, Mr. Bundy, you were23 briefed on the concept of Executive capability sometime early24 in 1961, and you can't remember now who it was who briefed you.25 Do you recall whether or not you instructed anyone atTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 12]
# TOP SECRET1 the CIA to develop such a capability?2 Mr. Bundy. I am sure I gave no instruction. But it is3 only fair to add that I do not recall that I offered any4 impediment after I was briefed.5 The Chairman. But your best recollection is that some-6 body toldyou that such a capability was being developed?7 Mr. Bundy. I don't want to be too firm on that, but that8 would be my best recollection.9 The Chairman. We received testimony from Mr. Bissell.10 Are you acquainted with Mr. Bissell?11 Mr. Bundy. Yes, sir. I have known him a long time, and12 he has been a great friend of mine.13 The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz, since you are very familiar14 with the record, are you going to take Mr. Bundy through the15 record of Mr. Bissell's testimony?16 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissell testified --17 The Chairman. And we have the transcript. If it would18 be helpful for Mr. Bundy to look directly at the transcript.19 I think he should have it.20 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissell's testimony was, first, that21 in the first instance he said he did not recall any specific22 conversation. Then, however, he said, after having reviewed23 certain notes by Mr. Harvey, he concluded that if Mr. Harvey's24 note indicated, as they did, that he, Bissell, told Harvey25 in 1961 that he had been twice urged by the White House to set# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 13]
TOP SECRET111 up an Executive Action capability, then he had no reason to2 doubt that testimony. And then he went on through a series3 of comments to end up saying that he would have been given4 that urging by either Rostow or Bundy, more likely Rostow.5 First, let's focus on Rostow. Was Rostow involved in6 the briefing?7 Mr. Bundy. No -- now, that I can't tell you out of my8 recollection, but only out of my knowledge of the way the9 office was organized. The first things we did, Walt Rostow10 and I, was to work out an informal but nevertheless reasonably11 clear-cut division of labor. And the whole business of12 what I thought of as special group business, namely, matters13 that related to covert action, and would, if they came for14 division, come through the special group, fell on my side15 of that division. I don't recall that Mr. Rostow was ever16 involved in any matter of this sort.17 The Chairman. It is fair to say that this was Mr. Rostow's18 testimony.19 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissel is, as you say, a friend of20 yours of long standing, and still is a friend of yours?21 Mr. Bundy. Yes, he is.22 Mr. Schwarz. Wehave his testimony which, while it did23 have gradations within it, ended up saying that24 he believed either you or Mr. Rostow urged him to set up the25 Executive Action capability. And you have testified that theTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 14]
TOP SECRET121 fact is that you were given a briefing, and you didn't urge it,2 but on the other hand you didn't say it should stop.3 How can you explain, if you can, the testimony of your4 friend Mr. Bissell, and the contrast between that and5 your testimony?6 Mr. Bundy. Well, as I understand Mr. Bissell's testi-7 mony -- and I should add, so that there will be no misunder-8 standing, that I have not only the advantage of discussions with9 you, but I have talked with him about it -- as I understand10 that testimony from that conversation, he was trying to ex-11 plain a situation in which he had no reason to question an Agency12 history to the effect that he first gave instructions on this13 matter in February 1961. And in that context -- and he had14 no reason to question the report that he had received15 White House encouragement -- it is in that context that his16 speculations about Mr. Rostow and about me seem to fall.17 I would be surprised, if his memory were refreshed18 with respect to the dates of January which you have des-19 cribed to me, if he were to believe that any initiative in20 this enterprise would come in the first instance from the21 Kennedy Administration.22 The Chairman. Mr. Bundy, our transcript of the23 Bissell testimony makes it clear that Mr. Bissell himself24 does not dispute the documented record. He said in effect,25 if Harvey says that I told him that I had been twice instructedTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 15]
TOP SECRET1 by the White House to develop an Executive capability, Ihave no basis on which to dispute that record.Then when we asked him, very well, who in the WhiteHouse told you, and when were you told, he replied, itmust have been early in 1960, and I don't recall who told me,but it must have been either Rostow or Bundy.He then recounts that he had numerous conversationswith both of you during the period, and concludes that theinstruction must have come either from you or from Mr. Rostow.Now, Mr. Rostow tells us he never gave such an instruc-tion, and in fact has no memory of every having discussedsuch an instruction.Mr. Bundy. He would have in fact have had no authorityto give such an instruction.The Chairman. That is right.And he pointed that out.Mr. Bundy. And in fact I wouldn't have the authorityto give any such instruction, and I would have been onlythe channel to give such instruction.Senator Baker. Who would have had the authority?Mr. Bundy. If the authority were required outside theAGency it would have to have been the President himself.The Chairman. What I would like to ask you --Mr. Bundy. Could I continue with Senator Baker'squestion for one second.TOP SECRET