Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10011-10018.pdf — page 9]
SHELBURNE: ms1TOP SECRET81Phone (Area 202) 544-60001AFTERNOON SESSION2:173TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL (CON'D)4The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.5Mr. Schwarz will commence the questioning.6It will be understood that the oath still continues to7apply.8Mr. Schwarz. Before we turn to Trujillo, two quick9questions. On the subject of Sukarno, were you involved in10the making of the movie in which an actor was made up to look11like Sukarno, and he engaged in sexual activity, with the12proposal, the plan, being that that movie would be released13in Indonesia?14Mr. Bissell. I have no recollection of that.15Mr. Schwarz. And if I took out any of the details and16broke it apart you would have no recollection?17Mr. Bissell. I am afraid not.18Mr. Schwarz. And the second thing, to pin down on Mr.Helms, did yon brief him about the Mafia matter?19Mr. Bissell. I am reasonably clear that I did not brief20him in the early stages, that is to say, in 1960. And my21impression is that he may very well not have been briefed on it22until I was about to leave the Agency in early 1962.23Mr. Schwarz. But at that point you did brief him??24Mr. Bissell. I don't remember whether I personally25TOP SECRETNW 50955 DocId:32203786 Page 10
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# TOP SECRET1 they might eventually be so used.2 Mr. Schwarz. Is that a supposition, or is it based upon3 any recollection?4 Mr. Bissell. I would say it is a faint recollection.5 But I find it very difficult in this case to distinguish6 between an element of supposition and a dim recollection.7 Let me come to what I seem to remember about this matter.8 There was, as you have already indicated, several discussions9 in the Special Group, and one or more at least in other very10 small groups with representation from State, the White House11 and the Agency. And I am clear -- I do recollect that the12 plans at that time contemplated the arming of obviously a13 relatively small group inside the Dominican Republic, that is,14 the provision of arms perhaps for a dozen or so people, but15 not for something like a Bay of Pigs invasion or a major16 geurilla activity.17 Now, in discussing that kind of an operation, I am18 perfectly certain that everyone that participated in the19 discussion was clear that weapons so supplied might very well20 be used against Trujillo or other senior supporters of his.21 Mr. Schwarz. For how many countries in your experience22 at the CIA has the US Government supplied arms to dissident23 groups within the country?24 Mr. Bissell. Well, we have talked about two cases;25 Indonesia is another case during the time I was in the Agency,# TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10018.pdf — page 11]
TOP SECRET                                                                                                      901 or before I was DDP. Off hand I can't remember other cases,2 but there may have been some. Well, earlier before I was ever3 in the Agency, there was the *case of Iran*. And there was the4 reasonably well publicized case *of Guatamala*.5 Mr. Schwarz. And the Iron Curtain countries?6 Mr. Bissell. I think we have.7 Mr. Schwarz. But what I am driving at, it is fairly8 common to supply arms to dissident elements in countries all9 over the world?10 Mr. Bissell. Yes, that is correct.11 Mr. Schwarz. Does taht also imply that there is an12 assassination contemplated or not?13 Mr. Bissell. I would say definitely not, in most cases14 not. In a large scale operation like *Guatamala* there was15 no intention of any assassination. I think you would include16 it under that term.17 The same is true *in Iran* of course -- the possibility18 that a chief of state would be killed.19 The Chairman. But you would distinguish this matter from20 just supplying of arms to dissidents? In other words, there21 was an element of knowledge here that the arms were supplied22 for a purpose, and that that purpose might well be the assassi-23 nation of Trujillo or other highly placed people in this24 Government, correct?25 Mr. Bissell. The way I would prefer to state it, Senator,TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10018.pdf — page 12]
# TOP SECRET91I think is basically consistent with what you said. I would say that in the planning of this operation, and in the approval process, those involved would probably have given a higher probability to such use being made of the weapons than they would in some of the other operations that I have referred to.Mr. Schwarz. However, just focusing on the Special Group as of the 12th of January, you can't tell from the minutes which state of mind existed, but you have a faint recollection that the more targeted state of mind existed as of the 12th of January?Mr. Bissell. My impression is that as of that time, as I mentioned at the end of the testimony this morning, the reason that the State Department, and probably the Agency's representatives in the Special Group, favored this group was a pragmatic reason. It was to maintain and strengthen political ties with the dissidents.Mr. Schwarz. The next matter of record that we should focus on is a memorandum of January 25, 1961, apparently reflecting a discussion of Project EMDEED. Was EMDEED the code for the overthrow of Trujillo?Mr. Bissell. I suspect it was the code name for the project of support to the dissidents.Mr. Schwarz. Do you remember the name EMSLEW?I show you the memorandum of January 24, 1961 headed "Discussion of Project_EMDEED." Does it appear to be a# TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10018.pdf — page 13]
TOP SECRET107and this record, which is a record we have obtained from the Agency, may be unfair to you. But do you not agree that on this record it appears that on the item of the pass- ing of the weapons which were the weapons that were in fact used, it appears that the AGency elected to keep the State Department uninformed on that item?Mr. Bissell. No, sir, it does not quite appear that way.It appears -- if I put these two together --Mr. Schwarz. By these two you mean your cable of March 24 and the cable of May 1 relating to certain matters is not to be discussed with the State Department?Mr. Bissell. Yes. The earlier cable of those refers to machine guns.Mr. Schwarz. And to the pouching of revolvers?Mr. Bissell. And the pouching of revolvers. And I believe that what eventually passed to the dissidents were three rifles, not the revolvers. And, therefore, neither of these cables in fact refers to the passage to the dissidents out of UK's control.This cable states the conditional willingness at some time in the future to pass machine guns. That permission was never granted and they were never passed.It refers to pouching revolvers. And I don't know whether there was a record that those were ever passed, or even intended to be passed, to the dissidents. And it wouldTOP SECRET
[157-10011-10024.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992## JFK Assassination System Identification Form Date: 7/30/201## Agency InformationAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10011-10024RECORD SERIES: TRANSCRIPTAGENCY FILE NUMBER:## Document InformationORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM: COLBY, WILLIAM E.TO:TITLE: SSCI TRANSCRIPT, TESTIMONY OF DCI WILLIAM COLBYDATE: 05/21/1975PAGES: 113SUBJECTS: CASTROSSCI TRANSCRIPT, TESTIMONY OF DCI WILLIAM COLBYOPERATION MONGOOSECUBADOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT.CLASSIFICATION: UnclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: Consulted; 1B; Donor RestrictedCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/04/1994OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: SSCI Box 239, Folder 14v9.1NW 50955 DocId:32203792 Page 1
[157-10011-10024.pdf — page 1]
157-1001110024NW 50955 DocId:32203792 Page 2
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TOP SECRETVol. 1 Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal SanctionsThe United States Senate R 119CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED![signature] Report of ProceedingsHearing held beforeSelect Committee to Study Governmental Operationswith Respect to Intelligence ActivitiesRecord Number 157-10011-10024COMMITTEE HEARINGSSCI Box 239, Folder 14Wednesday, May 21, 1975Washington, D. C.(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)WARD & PAUL410 FIRST STREET, S. E.WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003(202) 544-6000TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10024.pdf — page 3]
TOP SECRET301 the first man contacted by Mr. Maheu, worked through a2 Cuban exile leader. And he offered -- and he said that he3 could do something of this nature provided he got some funds4 and the assistance. And he was supported in this regard.5 And I think again we have some doubts as to the accuracy of6 his reporting.7 Mr. Schwarz. In November 1961 did Mr. Bissell indstruct8 a William Harvey to take charge of the gambling syndicate9 operation designed to kill Fidel Castro? Page 3 of Mr. Greer's10 report, which is at the beginning of your report.11 Mr. Colby. I believe so, yes.12 Yes. That is what our evidence says, the summary13 sais, "of the evidence available". And this is the evidence14 available in 1963. And there have been some minor changes in15 some of the details of this summary, very minor changes.16 But the essence of this report is still roughly accurate, I believe.17 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Harvey -- was Mr. Harvey the man that18 had hired an agent in order to kill Lmumba?19 Mr. Colby. Mr. Harvey was the head of Staff D, Staff D20 of the Operations directorate2122232425TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10024.pdf — page 4]
# 1(B)codes and ciphers, and in the process, you obviously work up some people who are able to do this kind of work, which is quite different from the normal life style of most of us.Mr. Harvey had been a very venturesome officer in the past. He was responsible for the Berlin tunnel. And he was sent down to take this job. And he assumed as part of it the capability of he was given by Mr. Bissel this chore of carrying on this particular operation as well.Mr. Schwarz. Had he been the person who had, in connection with the abortive effort to kill Mr. Lmumba, hired an agent for that purpose?Mr. Colby. I have forgotten whether he hired him. He 1(B) hired a foreigner. And this foreigner's job our records indicate that this foreigner's job was tied up with the penetration of code rooms and the safe cracking and things of this nature for that purpose. And there are some very obscure references that an additional assignment was to look into the possible assassination of Mr. Lmumba. The evidence is that he went down to what is now Kinshasa, Elizabethville in 1960, stayed there a few weeks, and left in October, I believe. And then Mr. Lmumba was killed thereafter in a totally separate set of circumstances in which we had nothing to do.There is some indication that a CIA officer who was asked to have something to do with this particular job said he did not want to do it.TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10024.pdf — page 5]
was not advised of the assassination activities. Quite likelyI cannot say that for sure, but I know the compartmentation system was such.Chairman Church. What was the name of the CIA agent who was given the responsibility for liaison between the CIA and the Warren Commission?Mr. Colby. To my knowledge it is Mr. Raymond Rocca.Chairman Church. Where is it now?Mr. Colby. He retired at the end of December of last year. He remained working for us for a few months. I think he is retired. I believe he is still in the Washington area.Mr. Knoche. Yes, he is still working with us.Mr. Colby. Still working with us to help on the transition of the whole counter intelligence program.Chairman Church. Why did he retire?Mr. Colby. That was the Angleton case, Mr. Chairman, and the facts of that case were that I had had some professional differences in the organization with Mr. Angleton as to the way the counterintelligence business was run and the way the Israeli account was handled. I believed that it required a higher degree of coordination of the other elements of the Directorate and of the Agency. We had debated this on various occasions in the past. I did reorganize that staff in 1973 and took a number of functions away from it. The liaison with the
[157-10011-10024.pdf — page 6]
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000FBi for instance, and a couple of other things. I gradually endeavored to open up the Israeli account to a better gelation-Iship with our other Year Eastern activities. We debated this over many months and on several occasions. We could never really agree to it because he insisted on the importance of retaining it where it was. 1(b)Mr Angleton had done a very good job of establishing that liaison years ago and knew a lot of the semmor Israeili whe were involved in it.I believed there was inadequate coordination in the Arab areas. 1(b)Also, I believed that there was a undue degree of compartmentation of that staff, that it needed more interchange with our other divisions. We debated this and discussed it and I set as my time limit for this discussion the end of December because there were some very substantial retirement benefits that people would loose if they stayed after that point. Then unfortunately the Seymour Hirsh article of December 22nd came to our attention before it was actually published, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to make two basic decisions. I was going to move the Israeli account from This control and I was going to put some sucessor leadership into the Head of the Counterintelligence Staff. I said I would offer him a post of tying together some counterintelligence doctrine, he could stay working with us. He did not have toTOP SECRETNW 50955 DocId: 32203792 Page 7
[157-10011-10024.pdf — page 7]
Chinese Communists subsequently blamed the Chinese Nationalistsand the US for sabotaging the aircraft. The aircraft employeehad fled to Taiwan. We had nothing to do with that incidentand frankly heard about it after it occurred.In the fall of 1956, a senior Chinese Nationalist officialinformed an officer of CIA that a Chinese National planned toassassinate Chou En Lai during his visit to Cambodia inNovember '56 and had been thwarted by the Cambodian arrest ofthe Chinese Nationalist officer sent to Phnom Penh to supervisethe attempt. We learned of this after it had happened and wehad nothing to do with it.We had a relationship with the Chinese NationalistsIntelligence Service over the years and they clearly have donethings without our knowledge or involvement, and in a numberof areas, but we have also worked together on some areas.These are two that were separate.Also I was asked to look at the photographs of Howard Huntand Sturgis that appeared in Newsweek some years ago. Weobtained this photograph from the FBI last night about 5 o'clock.We had not had it before. We had a copy of the Newsweekedition..These are photographs of Howard Hunt in 1949, 1950 and1961. This is the only photograph we have of Mr. Sturgis.It is taken out of the Newsweek.We have had no connection with Mr. Sturgis and so we haveTOP SECRET
[157-10011-10024.pdf — page 8]
individuals in it.Senator Schweiker. Did you get the other photograph, the supposed Oswald photograph leaving the Embassy?Mr. Colby. I don't have that with me. It is in the Warren Commission published report. It is in there.Senator Schweiker. It is in there?Mr. Colby. Yes. It was cropped slightly in order to conceal where it was taken but it was --Senator Schweiker. It is in the Warren Commission?Mr. Colby. Yes, it is in the Warren Commission.Just one additional matter.Chairman Church. Just one thing I would like to say to you, Mr. Colby, before I forget it. You have made reference to the Israeli account and the special way that it had been handled under Mr. Angleton. Before we finish our review with you of covert operations we would like to have a more detailed statement of that matter.Mr. Colby. Right.Chairman Church. And I think you should prepare to discuss it with us and we will have further questions to ask you in connection with it.I just wanted to give you notice.Mr. Colby. Right. In our lexicon it doesn't count as a covert action but that is all right, no problem, I will cover it.
[157-10011-10024.pdf — page 9]
# TOP SECRETMr. Harvey was given the responsibility of this by Mr. Bissel and originally it continued as a separate action from the Castro operation, but Mr. Harvey was also given that responsibility, and for all intents and purposes they became wedded.Mr. Helms was the person who formally approved ZR Rifle as a project. ZR Rifle had a dual purpose that has not been clarified by our inquiry. It apparently was in fact used for the stated purposes, as far as organizational activities went along, which was to steal codes, and Mr. Helms, when he approved the project, authorized accounting on certification, which meant that rather than the usual vouchers supporting expenditures, that the officer involved would simply certify that the money had been spent and this would be accepted. It had a project amount of some dollars, $7500 - $10,000, some of it to include the salary of an agent, some to include operating expenses.So Mr. Helms' main appearance in the approval of ZR Rifle does not necessarily equate with the date when he became familiar with the Castro operation.Mr. Schwarz. Because of the dual purpose of Rifle, Rifle means both, rifle files and used rifles?Mr. Breckinridge. It may mean either or both.Mr. Colby. It is supposed to disassociate but sometimes# TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10024.pdf — page 10]
# TOP SECRET1 Mr. Schwarz. November 1961?2 Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is probably correct. It was in the fall of 1961 that Mr. Harvey was given this assignment3 by Mr. Eissel. I think Mr. Bissel left in 1962. I am not sure of the dates, So Mr. Bissel would have known at that time.4 But I am not sure after that.5 Chairman Church. Helms succeeded Mr. Bissel as chief of operations?6 Mr. Colby. Deputy Director of Plans.7 Chairman Church. Deputy Director for Plans.8 Your record shows that Helms had knowledge of the ZR Rifle operation, which, among other things, was to develop an executive9 capability -- whatever that means. Presumably that means a capability to conduct an assassination if and when authorized by proper authority?10 Mr. Breckinridge. That is my understanding.11 Chairman Church. Is that your understanding?12 Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir.13 Chairman Church. Do your records show that, or is that based upon what has been revealed through your interrogation?14 Mr. Breckinridge. First, let me go back and clarify, then I will answer this question, if I may.15 Mr. Helms approved ZR Rifle, which the record showshas the16 responsibility of stealing codes, essentially. 1(b)17 My understanding, from my interviews, is that ZR Rifle had# TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10024.pdf — page 11]
TOP SECRET                                                                                                90Chairman Church. Senator Hart.Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Colby, in connection withZR Rifle, I think you testified or your associate said this wasa multi-purpose operation, *including stealing codes,* and the1(B)development of the capability of what euphemistically is calledexecutive action.In your professional judgment, and with your history ofyour background in the Agency, does it make any sense to you thata major operation, a major intelligence gathering operation of"the sort of stealing codes, which I assume means from other 1(3)governments," would be mounted under the direction of a manabout whom all I know is that Mr. Harvey has a background ofsomething like a soldier of fortune, and funded at the level,I should say, of $7500 to $10,000?Does it not suggest to you that *stealing codes* was in 1(B)fact an internal cover for what was explicitly an assassinationoperation with unlimited, non-voucher financial capability?Mr. Colby. No, not that it is purely a cover.In the first place, Mr. Harvey had a very successful tourin Berlin where he ran the Berlin tunnel operation, which wasone of our major successful intelligence operations.Mr. Harvey was a very colorful figure who had his lifestyle,which is different than some others, but he had been veryeffective at that, *and very adventuresome in that category of* 1(3)*signals intelligence* and a very venturesome idea of that nature.TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10024.pdf — page 12]
smn 2                                                                                                                                              91# TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-60001 He was in the assignment of Chief of the FI Division staff.2 That Staff's major function is to conduct the Signals intelligence3 work which must be done in the clandestine service. 1(B)4 It handles our efforts today to penetrate into foreign5 code rooms abroad, and things of that nature, and it involves6 the breaking into of safes and things, all that complicated7 material. 1(B)8 Now, the thing that puts it together with this "capability"9 executive action, is the high degree of compartmentation of10 this material, that kind of a project. In other words, a11 code-breaking, a stealing operation, obviously that is to be12 kept very, very secret. If you get caught in it, it has all13 sorts of very bad diplomatic implications, and so forth. 1(B)14 Therefore, there is a system of very sharp compartmentation of15 the work of that particular group.16 You also are dealing with some very venturesome people17 who are willing to crawl into somebody else's code room and 1(B)18 take the chance of getting caught.19 So, given you have a man who had some good technical20 experience, who is a venturesome type himself and is running a21 program which is not too far off the requirements of high22 compartmentation, and a very high risk kind of operation, and23 therefore, for Mr. Bissel to have selected Harvey to carry out24 this project seems to me that it is compatible that be could25 be running code-breaking projects, or code stealing projects.# TOP SECRETNW 50955 DocId:32203792 Page 13WARD & PAUL410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
[157-10011-10024.pdf — page 13]
smn 3                                                                                                                                         TOP SECRET                                                                                                                                                 92Phone (Area 202) 544-6000WARD & PAUL.410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003as well as this other activity.Now, in the lifestyle at the time, not mentioning the second one, this gets back into the recordkeeping that we have been discussing. It was not to be put on the record although to be done. That is a perfectly proper hypothesis, it seems to me, but to say that *the code stealing* was only a cover I think isprobably an unwarranted conclusion.Senator Hart of Colorado. What about the level of funding of $7,500 to $10,000?Mr. Colby. That is not very much money for that kind of an operation.Senator Hart of Colorado. Precisely. I think it is too little.Mr. Colby. No. For a capability of that nature, it is largely a staff operation. In other words, you use your own staff officers. You may hire an agent or something, but I don't think you can draw much conclusion from the actual number on the figure one way or the other.This might not have been the only such project. You know, an assassination project would cost you more money than that, too.Senator Hart of Colorado. Absolutely.Mr. Colby. I find it hard to say that that is the only amount of money involved. I think you get into a situation where additional money would be put into either of those kindsNW 50955 DocId:32203792 Page 14                                                                                                                                TOP SECRET