Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 9]
TOP SECRET1 attitude, if you did?2 Mr. Halley. I certainly was aware, I think, of the broad3 political trend in the Hemisphere at that time, my interest was4 much more narrowly focused at that time on the Eastern European5 targets, and on the Soviet target, and I was not certainly6 specializing in Cuban affairs at that juncture.7 Mr. Baron. Cuba was not viewed at that juncture as part of8 the Soviet target, as a Soviet satellite?9 Mr. Halley. No, it was not.10 Mr. Baron. Coming then to February of '62, is that the11 point at which you joined the JMWAVE Station in Miami?12 Mr. Halley. No. When I first entered into this survey,13 it was to do this on a TDY basis, temporary duty assignment,14 to complete a report on my findings, to report those at that15 particular juncture to Mr. Harvey who was the head of the Task16 Force that was attempting to expand intelligence coverage of17 Cuba and I was not assigned to the station at that particular18 point in time.19 Mr. Baron. At what point did you join the JMWAVE Station?20 Mr. Halley. Shortly after having completed this survey.21 These dates are blurred now because the survey soon turned into22 a permanent assignment. I would have to check the exact dates23 from my service records, but after having completed the survey24 report, shortly thereafter I was asked to go to Miami to become25 permanently assigned to the station in Miami. I do not recallTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 10]
# TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-60001 the exact date at which that permanent change of station took2 place.3 Mr. Baron. Would you assume that that was sometime before4 the end of May of '62?5 Mr. Halley. Yes. It was probably before that, but as I6 say, there are a couple of weeks gap that we would have to look7 at my service record to get the exact dates, but certainly it8 could have been March, it could have been April: But I reserve,9 you know, the right to check my record if that is a critical10 point in terms of what you are trying to establish.11 Mr. Baron. Certainly.12 I should say generally at this point, if anything we cover13 today gives you that kind of problem it would be immensely14 helpful to us if you would check your answers against documents15 that might be available in the CIA.16 Mr. Halley. Yes, all right.17 Mr. Baron. In fact, let me ask you if you would check that18 one out, because it would be useful to know exactly when you19 joined the JMWAVE station.20 During the period of time before you joined JMWAVE, while21 you were conducting the survey, did you report to anyone other22 than William Harvey?23 Mr. Halley. In a formal sense, this TDY was conducted on24 behalf of the task force commander, who was Mr. Harvey. While25 I was in Miami conducting the survey, I obviously discussed# TOP SECRET410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 200038
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 11]
TOP SECRET91 matters pertaining to that survey to the team who was then in2 charge of the operational activity in Miami. That team was3 essentially headed by Mr. Al Cox, who has since died.4 Mr. Baron. Was that team the equivalent of JMWAVE station?5 Mr. Halley. Yes. Mr. Cox was the head, then, of what would6 be the equivalent of the JMWAVE Station.7 Mr. Baron. Was he the head of JMWAVE until the point when8 you replaced him, or until the point you became Chief of the9 JMWAVE Station?10 Mr. Halley. That is correct. He was the head of that11 unit until such time as I replaced him.12 Mr. Baron. Were you aware during this survey that you13 were conducting of any link between Task Force W and the so-called14 Special Group in the White House which was part of the National15 Security Council structure and used the project named MONGOOSE16 for anti-Cuban operations?17 Mr. Halley. My understanding at the time that I conducted18 this survey was that there was a three-man group in existence19 which was headed by Mr. Robert Kennedy that was conducting a20 survey to see what kind of activities could be conducted against21 Cuba. The other members of that particular group were General22 Lansdale and Mr. Helms.23 This three-man group had subordinate to it for all practical24 purposes the task force unit which was managed by Mr. Harvey.25 I am not familiar, however, with the other terminology that youTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 12]
# TOP SECRETPhone (Ares 202) 544-60001 used, that is Project MONGOOSE, or whatever you said. I do not2 know the exact words you used. I am not familiar with that3 terminology.4 Mr Baron. During the whole period of your involvement5 with JMWAVE, you were not made aware of Project MONGOOSE as6 such?7 Mr. Halley. I am not aware of Project MONGOOSE. I do not8 recall it as an acronym, cryptonym or anything else that was in9 common usage in my conversations.10 Also, you have to understand that during that particular11 time, Mr. Harvey was subordinate to the normal Agency chain of12 command. In other words, he had parallel lines, if you will.13 There was this three-man Task Force to whom he was reporting14 regularly. At the same time, as the Task Force Commander, he15 was reporting to the then-DDP who was Mr. Helms.16 Mr Baron. You began your survey just about the time that17 Mr. Helms replaced Mr. Bissell as DDP?18 Mr. Halley. That is right.19 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the command relationship20 between the three-man group that you have mentioned and William21 Harvey as head of Task Force W? Did that group task Harvey22 directly, or did Harvey's assignments have to come through Helms23 and through the DCI as opposed to this group that did not include24 the DCI?25 Mr. Halley. My understanding of it at the time was we were410 First Street, S. E., Washington, D.C. 20003# TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET1 really talking about parallel lines. In other words, this2 three-man group was meeting. Mr. Helms was both a member of3 that particular group and the DDP. Therefore, when he came back4 from one of these meetings and issued instructions to Mr. Harvey5 it was, you know, tantamount to these things coming through two6 channels simultaneously, one coming from this three-man task7 force and the other instruction simultaneously coming from Mr.8 Helms who was the DDP.9 Mr. Baron. As far as Mr. Harvey was concerned, an assign-10 ment or order from Richard Helms was an order to be taken at11 face value? Harvey did not have to question whether it had the12 stamp of approval from the DCI or not? Would that have been13 your operating understanding?14 Mr. Halley. That would have been my understanding, yes.15 Certainly an instruction received from Mr. Helms was a valid16 Agency instruction.17 Mr. Baron. The DCI at this point was John McCone.18 Mr. Halley. That is correct.19 Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of the relationship20 between this three-man group and John McCone at that point?21 Mr. Halley. Not on a day to day basis. Once I went to22 Miami, I came back on a regular basis to review operational23 plans and programs. On one occasion I accompanied Mr. McCone24 to the White House to give a presentation or sit in while the25 presentation was being made.# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 Mr. Baron. Where was this? What was the forum in which2 the presentation was made.3 Mr. Halley. This was a meeting with President Kennedy and4 other members of the then-Cabinet were present at that particular5 meeting.6 Mr. Baron. Was that a Cabinet meeting or was it a Special7 Group meeting as a sub-unit of the National Security Council?8 Mr. Halley. You know, that happened in 1962. This is9 1975. I do not recall then with precision as to whether it was10 a meeting of the Cabinet or whether it was a meeting of the11 National Security Council, or whether it was a meeting of the12 Special Group.13 Mr. Baron. That: is perfectly understandable. Do you recall14 which Cabinet members were present at that meeting?15 Mr. Halley. Yes. My recollection of that was that Mr.16 McNamara was present, Mr. Rusk was present, Mr. Kennedy, the17 Attorney General, was present. You know, I am just vague now18 at this particular point. Those are the ones that stick out in19 my memory as being present.20 Mr. Baron. Was the DCI present?21 Mr. Halley. Yes, the DCI was present, and he gave a22 portion of the presentation. As I recall, Mr. FitzGerald gave23 the other portion of the presentation.24 Mr. Baron. Who at that point replaced William Harvey as25 Chief of Task Force W?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 15]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Halley. Right. You know, the chronology of the Chiefs2 of our Task Force were that it was Harvey, then FitzGerald,3 then Screber, after that, Hart. I served with all four of those4 This was a very active period, you know, with precision, I cannot5 outline for you today the dates when Harvey left and FitzGerald6 took over, you know, when FitzGerald left and Screber took over7 and so forth. This is something that I would have to research8 to give you the precise dates.9 Mr. Baron. What was the substance of this meeting that10 they had in which the President was present?11 Mr. Halley. This was a general review of activities that12 were being conducted against Cuba.13 Mr. Baron. Was there any mention of any assassination14 effort at that meeting?15 Mr. Halley. No, there was not.16 Mr. Baron. You were attending at that point in connection17 with the survey you conducted?18 Mr. Halley. No. I was attending at that point as the19 Station Chief from Miami in order to make a contribution to the20 issues that were being discussed, to the fact that detailed,21 substantive back-up for whatever questions might be put to the22 Agency spokesmen. I made reference to that because you asked23 me if I knew the relationship between Mr. McCone and this24 three-man group. I said no, on a day-to-day basis I did not25 know the relationship, but that there were meetings that wereTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 16]
# TOP SECRET1 attended by me in which Mr. McCone was talking to individuals2 like Mr. Kennedy, the Attorney General, who was a member of that3 group.4 Mr. Baron. Were you aware that that group might have gone5 by any particular name or designation?6 Mr. Halley. No, I am not.7 Mr. Baron. You are not familiar with the term Special8 Group?9 Mr. Halley. Yes, I am aware of the term Special Group.10 I am aware that the chronology of the 303 Committee, Special11 Group, 40 Committee and so forth, but as I mentioned to you12 earlier, that particular time, I cannot distinguish between13 whether this was an ad hoc meeting or this was a Special Group14 meeting, or what it was.15 Mr. Baron. Did you assume at that time that the three-man16 group that you referred to, including the Attorney General,17 General Lansdale and Richard Helms, had a formal relationship18 to this larger Special Group? In other words, was that three-19 man group a kind of decision-making sub-unit of the Special20 Group, or do you think it operated entirely independent from21 the National Security Council structure.22 Mr. Halley. I do not think I can give you an authoritative23 answer to that. I would go back to what I previously told24 you. When I entered into this project in February of '62, the25 chain of command that I was familiar with was this three-man# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 17]
TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-60001 group in constant contact with Mr. Harvey. The second chain2 of command, paralleling that, was Mr. Harvey reporting to the3 DDP and the DDP subsequently reporting through his chain of4 command to the Director, and that would be the only way that5 I could characterize that with any accuracy.6 Mr. Baron. Did those two chains of command continue…7 as the channels of decision-making and tasking when you were…8 or during your tenure as Chief of Station at JMWAVE?9 Mr. Halley. That relationship changed, and again I do10 not have the date at my fingertips at what time that changed.11 I know that shortly thereafter I was in Miami, General12 Lansdale came down to visit me, to talk with me, about the13 progress that was being made in the operational program. At14 some point after that, this three-man group for all intents15 and purposes disappeared. General Lansdale was reassigned;16 the group broke up; subsequent reviews of the program were made17 at the Special Group level. As an example, we would have to18 submit every month the number of operations that we were going19 to run, such as infiltrations into Cuba through what would be20 paramilitary means, and these were approved by the Special21 Group. There was an approval procedure for setting those up,22 so subsequently the three-man group disappeared and the regular23 mechanism of the Special Group came into play.24 I am sorry, I cannot give you a precise date for that25 change, but I am sure it is in the record and I am sure you evenTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 have the date because the Agency has been researching all sorts2 of material for you. I feel that you would just have to get3 those dates for the record.4 Mr. Baron. We can do that.5 Would you say that every major operation that you undertook6 at JMWAVE would have been approved by the Special Group or at7 least they would have been put on notice of the nature of any8 major operation that you were planning?9 Mr. Halley. Why do you not define for me what you consider10 to be a major operation so we do not get into, you know, a11 problem? If you feel that you cannot do that.12 Mr. Baron. Perhaps we can turn it around and say, could13 you characterize the kinds of operations generally that you14 would refer to this three-man group initially, to the Special15 Group later, for their approval, or at least to put them on16 notice, the kinds that you might not refer and instead proceed17 unilaterally?18 Mr. Halley. Initially, the three-man group was seized19 with the problem of conducting the survey of what could be20 done against Cuba. As soon as that was more or less agreed21 upon, my understanding of this, as I told you, the three-man22 group was disbanded or atrophied or went on to other things23 and then the formal mechanism came in for approval, that is,24 the Special Group. As procedures became more formalized, we25 had to submit a monthly schedule of the kind of operations thatTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 19]
TOP SECRET1 would be conducted against Cuba in the paramilitary fields.2 In other words, if we were going to run an operation that3 was going to be a cache replacement in the Cuban mainland, that4 had to be put in, say in our October schedule, that October5 schedule had to be submitted to the Washington Headquarters so6 they could make it available to the *Special* Group sometime in7 September. So I would regard a cache, say the lowest kind of8 operation in terms of sensitivity, and then you could move up9 from team infiltrations that had to be approved in advance,10 resupply missions, paramilitary operations against fixed instal-11 lations would all be approved.12 Mr. Baron. If there had been any operation with the13 assassination of Fidel Castro, or other high Cuban government14 leaders as its objective, would such an operation have been15 referred to either the three-man group or later the Special16 Group.17 Mr. Halley. If such an operation had been proposed from18 Miami, it would have had to have gone through that particular19 process.20 Mr. Baron. Your answer seems to indicate that only21 operations that originated at the JMWAVE Station would be22 referred up for approval. Is that correct?23 Mr. Halley. That is the kind of activity that I have24 firsthand knowledge of. When I became the Station Chief, I told25 you my time at this was essentially February of 1962 throughTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 either June or July of '65. That was my stewardship. 182 my involvement in the Cuban operation.3 During that particular period of time, my firsthand knowledge4 of these events would be, if that kind of operation were to go5 forward it would have had to go through this approval mechanism,6 it would have had to have been some formal action taken. If it7 were something that certainly would -- for some reason might not8 be committed to paper, somebody may have wanted to discuss it9 orally from Miami, the chain of command would have been from me10 to whomever was the head of the Task Force in Washington, or11 later, when the Task Force became reintegrated into the Western12 Hemisphere Division, I would have had to talk to the Chief of13 the Western Hemisphere Division, who at one time was FitzGerald.14 Mr. Baron. But a plan that originated at the CIA above15 the level of the Chief of Station at JMWAVE would not necessarily16 have been referred to Special Group for approval, is that17 correct?18 Mr. Halley. I have no firsthand knowledge of that, thera-19 fore I am.trying to restrict myself to those things that I have20 Personal knowledge of. In other words, that is the kind of21 thing that I think you should talk to, you know, those who were22 involved directly, because I think you can talk to Mr. Harvey23 or Mr. Screber or others who would be able to give you a better24 perception of that.25 I want to make one point here, that once I went to Miami,TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 21]
TOP SECRET1 I was a regular visitor to Washington, but always for one or2 two days at a time when there was always a full agenda of events3 to be discussed that related to the Station in Miami. I did not4 carry here, I did not engage, you know, in idle conversation with5 my associates. Therefore, I was not aware of the firsthand6 situation of how they conducted business on a sustained basis7 on items that did not immediately impact on Miami.8 Mr. Baron. Do you have any personal knowledge of any9 operation run out of the JMWAVE Station that could be construed10 as an assassination effort?11 Mr. Halley. No, I do not.12 Mr. Baron. Do you have firsthand knowledge of any operation13 run out of Florida with CIA involvement that could be construed14 as an assassination effort?15 Mr. Halley. No, I do not have any firsthand knowledge.16 You also have to put this in a historical perspective. In17 other words, from what I have read in the Press since then,18 obviously I could put certain things together. You are asking19 me in this timeframe, 1962 to 1965, did I have any firsthand20 knowledge at that particular time?21 Mr. Baron. Exactly.22 Mr. Halley. The answer to that is no, I did not.23 You also have to put yourself in the historical context of24 that particular time. Thousands of refugees were coming out of25 Cuba, coming into Miami, Dade County up and down the FloridaTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 Keys. There was a regular mechanism to scraen these people.2 Any number of these people had plans or ideas for changing the3 situation in Cuba, among those ideas for changing the situation4 in Cuba were plans to assassinate any number of people in Cuba.5 This was something that was talked about, you could go down to6 any coffee house in downtown Miami and Cubans would be talking7 that kind of language.8 So I do not want to leave you with the impression that the9 word assassination never came across my radar screen, but we10 are talking about, and my answer was geared to a planned opera-11 tion by CIA.12 Mr. Baron. Or with CIA involvement of any sort?13 Mr. Halley. CIA involvement? I know of no operation that14 was a planned operational activity, you know, for the sole15 purpose of assassinating, you know, Mr. A, B or Mr. C..This was.16 the ällenteof the time. People were talking about these17 things in the refugee community, these kind of things were18 being discussed.19 Mr. Baron. Mr. A, B or C could have been Fidel Castro,20 Raul Castro?21 Mr. Halley. It could have been anyone. This was the mood22 of the Latin American revolutionary where a coup, you know, is23 a way of life, where restaurants and coffee houses abound with24 conversation about how to run a coup. In the running of a coup,25 one of the things that people talk about is how do you controlTOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET1 the leadership which then exists at that time.2 Mr. Baron. Are you saying that you are not aware of any3 operation, which could have had as one of its subsidiary objec-4 tives, whether the primary objective or not, the assassination5 of Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, or Che Guevara, which was run with6 CIA involvement?7 Mr. Hallay. I would like to phrase that question slightly8 differently, because I think, you know, you have several things9 tied together. I would like to answer your question this way.10 During my tenure in Miami, I did not put forth any proposals11 to mount an assassination operation. In other words, there12 was no formal plan, I did not put forth any operational proposals13 along this line.14 Secondly, I am not aware of any assassination plans being15 put forth, you know, by Mr. Harvey or by anyone else at that16 particular time. That is the way I would prefer to answer that.17 Mr. Baron. What kind of problem did you have with the18 question as it was asked?19 Mr. Halïey. Well, you lumped a number of things together. I am trying to separate these out. In other words, you put in20 there a secondary or tertiary consideration.21 Mr. Baron. Right, I am interested in that.22 Mr. Halley. That is what bothers me, because I did not23 put forth any plans. On the other hand, I do not want to be24 held responsible for such things as CIA being in touch with a25# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 paramilitary group in Cuba whose primary mission was the2 collection of intelligence, whose secondary mission might be to3 organize a resistance and, unbeknownst to me, might have had4 their own ideas which were never consulted with us, you know,5 never discussed with us, through the communications channels6 that we had, who may have been thinking, may have planned, and7 may have attempted, to implement assassination operations.8 I do not feel under the command and control mechanism that9 existed that I could exercise through the Station over such a10 situation that I could be held responsible for that. Therefore,11 I cannot accept your question on the secondary or tertiary12 situation because I have no knowledge of those. You may have13 some knowledge and you can confront me with some statement by14 some Cuban who said that this was part of his mission. I have15 to look at that at the time.16 Mr. Baron. We will go over some statements, but in trying17 to recover this ground one more time, I think it is important18 to distinguish an attempt to pin the responsibility on you,19 which I am not trying to do by my questioning --20 Mr. Halley. That is a complicated question.21 Mr. Baron. The attempt to simply -- undoubtedly, the22 attempt to simply bring out your knowledge and any awareness23 that you may have had of any kind of operation that had assassina-24 tion as one of its objectives, and also involved the CIA to25 any extent. That is what I am asking you for.TOP SECRET