Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 31]
TOP SECRET291 it and having shown it to President Kennedy, are you testifying2 that it was your understanding that the meaning of that3 sentence -- that that sentence was intended to convey to Mr.4 Dearborn a prohibition against involving the United States5 in an assassination attempt on the life of Mr. Trujillo?6 Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely. And in my first draft, I did it7 in terms of disclosure and changed that, struck that phrase8 about disclosure in order to make the point, and always at the9 President's instruction, to make absolutely clear to the Consul,10 because I used the very word disclosure, you can see here, and11 I crossed it out, in my handwriting.12 Mr. Schwarz. Could you read into the record how you13 changed it?14 Mr. Goodwin. Well, it's not very grammatical, it's15 embarrassing. Also, on the xerox -- I can't read the hand-16 writing on the xerox.17 "!lowever we also must not" -- something -- "permit any18 danger of disclosing any U.S. association with political19 assassination or intervention in the Dominican Republic,"20 it says or intervention. All that was struck.21 Senator Baker. That sounds like exactly what the Chairman22 asked you. It sounds like it might be interpreted as, please23 don't get caught.24 Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely, which is why I changed it.25 Senator, to read "llowever, we must not run risks of 11.S.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 32]
TOP SECRET1 association with political assassination since the U.S., as a2 matter of general policy, cannot condone assassination."3 Senator Baker. I've got to say, and I don't mean it to4 be critical of this witness, but on first reading of this5 document, which was some time ago, it sounded a lot to me like6 the Mission Impossible opening when they say, if you get caught7 the Secretary will disavow any knowledge of this undertaking.8 Mr. Goodwin. I wasn't familiar with the program at this9 time.10 Senator Baker. Nor was I, at that time.11 I need reassurance, and I think the record doas, that the12 coincidence of that this cable, this wire, going out, say two13 days before the assassination, after guns in fact had been14 dispatched, although not the guns they requested, and under15 the circumstances it might land itself to that interpretation.16 This witness says it does not. There is no evidence to17 the contrary that I'm aware of, and I don't know that we need18 to pursue the issue any further.19 Mr. Goodwin. If I may, Senator --20 Senator Baker. And it also, as Smothers points out, that21 there was another communication saying destroy anything you've22 got, all those communications except this cable.23 Mr. Aaron. That is standard practice. That is the standarn!24 practice for covert operations.25 Mr. Goodwin. My response, Senator, is that the carbinesTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 33]
TOP SECRET311 and pistols were transferred in late January, 1960, subsequent2 to an authorization of January 12th, prior to Kennedy's taking3 office. I'm not sure of the date of the transfer. I haven't4 seen any indication of the date of that transfer. I do know5 that the President was not aware of any transfer of guns,6 because he told me he was not aware of it, until we finally7 requested a review a couple of months, a few months later, of8 our complete covert operations in the Dominican Republic, at9 which point we became aware that this transfer had occurred.10 I still don't know the date of that transfer.11 And then it was the basis of that briefing paper, which12 obviously the Dominican Republic was not the first matter on13 President Kennedy's agenda when he came into office, on the14 basis of that briefing paper, he reviewed our policy and sent15 this telegram.16 The Chairman. And was the purpose of the telegram to call17 off any further involvement by the United States government in18 an assassination attempt against Mr. Trujillo.19 Mr. Goodwin. The purpose was to make sure the United20 States was not involved in any assassination. The purpose was to21 slow down that kind of over-zealousness. The President was22 not that anxious to see Trujillo thrown out.23 Senator Tower. That doesn't totally answer the question.24 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I'm sorry.25 The Chairman. Well, you see, we know, from your testimony,TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 34]
TOP SECRET1 that you had been advised in May that certain weapons had been2 transferred to certain dissident groups who at least had3 expressed an interest in assassinating Trujillo.4 Mr. Goodwin. Correct.5 The Chairman. So there was a connection, the connection6 being that the American government, through the CIA, furnished7 weapons to a group that had communicated its interest, if not8 its intention, to assassinate Trujillo.9 So then you send this message, and I'm asking you if the10 message was meant to call this off, this involvement. What11 exactly was meant? You weren't saying recover those arms.12 Mr. Goodwin. No, I wasn't. No.13 The Chairman. But at the same time, you were saying, don't14 transfer the machine guns, were you not?15 Mr. Goodwin. That's right. I think the President what16 we were saying is17 The Chairman. What exactly were you saying?18 Mr. Goodwin. We were saving that we didn't want to do19 anything that would involve us further, the United States20 further, in any effort to assassinatu Trujillo.21 The Chairman. I see. I see.22 Mr. Goodwin. Because we were not for assassination.23 Senator Baker. The distinction is24 Senator Tower. Well, it saya hare in number 3, it says,25 continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support of theirTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 35]
# TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-4000 331 position. So what, again the interpretation that can be drawn2 from this is that we don't want to be involved, but go ahead3 and have the other guys on, because their position would be to4 assassinate Trujillo, so what you are in effect doing is saying,5 let's don't be involved in it but let's indicate our support6 for what they are doing.7 Mr. Goodwin. We were indicating our support for what they8 were doing on the basis of the estimate in the contingency9 paper that Trujillo's days were numbered and whoever took office10 we wanted to be our man, that is correct. And so we were going11 to support and try to retain relations and say we would support,12 which is not a difficult thing to do, as you know, any group13 that might take office and be moderate and pro-United States.14 That was all we were interested in, was having a pro-American15 government.16 Senator Schweiker. Well, there are two other references17 here, Mr. Goodwin. Paragraph 3, "In case of assassination or18 overthrow" -- obviously you still had a reference there, whether19 initiated by a pro-U.S. group or not, was still part of the20 planning, and then back on page 3 you say, "In actual fact. We21 feel the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and22 expose the United States to great danger of ultimate disclosure23 in participation in an assassination attempt," and that is24 scratched out, and says "assassination attempt," meaning that25 there was -- to me -- some other plan afoot to assassinate# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 36]
# TOP SECRET1 since the ultimate would still be disclosed if you gave this.2 So what interpretation? I mean, this is rift here with assassination propositions, and the fact that you have "ultimate disclosure," fear of ultimate disclosure of participation,5 meant that certainly there was something already afoot, that ultimately would be disclosed if you went ahead with this pass through.8 Mr. Goodwin. I think what we were saying is if we did, it would be found out ultimately, which means not right away,.10 but later. In the case of assassination or overthrow, there ware many groups, a continual flow of groups, of information,12 that there were various groups planning to assassinate Trujillo.14 Senator Schweiker. Well, if that's what it meant, then why did you delete it?16 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I think --17 Senator Schweiker. If that was your interpretation, why in fact did you delete those four words, "ultimate disclosure of participation?"20 Mr. Goodwin. Could you tell me what page you're reading from?22 Senator Schwaiker. Page 3.23 The very words that you interpret one way were in fact deleted, which shows to mu that you meant them another way, or they wouldn't have been deleted, and you substitute two words# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 37]
TOP SECRET1 for it.2 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I mean --3 Senator Schweiker. So that you disguise that.4 Mr. Goodwin. Well, the words ware deleted because they5 ware words that were going to give exactly the impression you6 are talking about. By talking about ultimate disclosure, we7 were afraid of being found out and what we didn't want was any8 association with the assassination attempts, so the reference9 to disclosure was struck and the words association were10 inserted.11 Senator Schweiker. But you still call off -- you still12 left the language, in actual fact we feel the transfer of arms13 would serve very little purpose and expose the United States14 to great danger of association with assassination attempts.15 That still makes the point that you want to make, but you had16 other language, that says "ultimate disclosure of participation"17 which implies to me you were concerned about other things you18 were doing and things that had already been programmed and an19 operation that you were as much concerned about those being --20 or you wouldn't have changed the language to still say the same21 thing with that one distinction about something else being22 afoot. I don't --23 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I changed it, I believe, Senator -- I24 mean it's hard to be held responsible for language that was25 rajected because it was inaccurate. The problem was not oneTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 38]
TOP SECRET361 of disclosure, the problem was we did not want to be associated2 with assassination. That's why I struck it out.3 Senator Schweiker. You changed the language, but the first4 part of it remained exactly the same. In fact, we feel the5 transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose6 the United States. So while you changed the language, you had7 the same condition there that you were not going to supply those8 arms.9 Mr. Goodwin. We weren't, that's correct. We were not --10 Senator Schweiker. But why were you not concerned about11 the other language, because --12 Mr. Goodwin. Because the implication of the other lanquare13 was that, well, wa were worried about being found out, when in14 fact what the policy was was that we did not want to be15 involved. So I struck the implication.16 Mr. Smothers. Mr. Goodwin, why was the communication of17 our withdrawing to Dearborn? The only way Dearborn could have!18 been any closer to this plot would have been to become one of19 the dissident group. They told him everything they did, down20 to and including when the car was coming down the road. And21 we knew that, didn't we?22 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I haven't seen any communications to23 us that said that. I would not have -- I mean, one of his24 instructions was to keep in very close contact with these25 dissident groups. I wouldn't be surprised if they dropped hyTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 39]
TOP SECRET1 and if they told him everything they were planning to do. But2 it's a long jump between saying you're going out and kill3 Trujillo and pulling it off, as many people tried.4 But I was not aware, as I can remember, that he had any5 kind of detailed information.6 Mr. Smothers. His massages back to CIA, in fact, convey7 those details, don't they?8 Mr. Goodwin. Not that I saw after this, when these --9 none of them that --10 Mr. Schwarz. Well, did you know or did you not know that11 the dissidents intended to use the small arms, carbines and12 pistols, and other materials they had themselves, but intended13 to use the weapons we had supplied to assassinate Trujillo in14 precisely the way he was, in fact, assassinated? Did you know15 that before you wrote the telegram, or not?16 Mr. Goodwin. No, because what I'm responding to is a17 request that says we can't do it unless we have the machine18 guns, and that's to be used for the assassination. We are19 saying, don't give them machine guns.20 Later on they said to Dearborn, I mean he did tall me21 that afterwards, I don't know when they told him, well, we'll22 do it, whether or not we get the machine guns. I mean, that23 might also just bravado, or an effort to bluff us into saying,24 well, you might as well give it to them anyway since they're25 going to do it. I don't know why anyone would take onTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 40]
TOP SECRET1 Trujillo with a .38. I wouldn't have thought that, if I thought2 about it.3 President Kennedy went to Paris a week or two later. When4 the assassination actually occurred, we were all taken by5 surprise, so that Dearborn had detailed knowledge of when it6 was going to occur, we didn't. The Vice President -- he called7 an emergency meeting with the Vice President, a telegram was sent8 to Paris, and then the assassination ended up getting announced9 by Pierre Salinger.10 But this instruction, the President told me he wanted to11 make it absolutely clear we're not getting involved in12 assassinations.13 Senator Mondale. Mr. Goodwin, the record shows -- I think14 you've testified to this -- that toward the end of the Eisenhower15 Administration, they decided to supply arms to this dissident16 group and assist in the assassination of Mr. Trujillo. Then,17 as these documents show, at some point very near to the time18 that Mr. Trujillo was actually assassinated, a telegram was19 sent to our Consul saying, we don't want to be associated with20 this.21 Why didn't we also say stop it, tell these people not22 to proceed further, in light of the fact that they may have23 thought, because of previous history, that their efforts to24 assassinate Trujillo had our blessing? In other words, there25 is still a piece missing, in my opinion, that should haveTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 41]
TOP SECRET391 suggested --2 Senator Tower. Well, the next line says, "Continue to inform dissidents of U.S. support for their position."3 Senator Mondale. In other words, if I were one of those dissidents and I got that from the United States pursuant to this earlier agreement, I would feel encouraged to believe that I had the support of the United States in killing Trujillo, and that we weren't exactly neutral in that, at least, our government was not really neutral, that it encouraged them.4 It is true that they didn't get the machine guns, and it is true, apparently that what you understood was that they wanted the machine guns for assassination and they wanted the other weapons for personal defense, but there was still, it would seem to me, reason for them to believe that they had our support.5 Why didn't we say or communicate to them we want you to stop and we don't want this man assassinated, and we want you to know that we will have nothing to do with it?6 Why wasn't that final -- I just want to make one more point --7 There was a similar telegram sent just before Diem was assassinated -- now these are entirely different matters, and I appreciate that -- but it always seems to me that if we're worried about human life, if we're worried about correcting a policy that may have set a possible assassination in motion,TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 42]
# TOP SECRET1 the way to really disassociate it is to say stop, and that is2 really what I don't understand.3 Mr. Goodwin. Well, let me say, Senator, first of all,4 that the question of assassination now is paramount in people's5 minds. There is no doubt that we hoped that Trujillo would.he6 overthrown. Not only was their no doubt, but there was a7 unanimous vote of the Organization of American States that it8 be ostracized and sanctions imposed with the hope that it9 might happen. And that occurred aver before we took office and10 we were in full agreement with it.11 There are papers here which talk about the event of a coup12 of how you're going to get Trujillo some money to get him out13 of the country. Assassination was always a possibility, but14 a coup d'etat, a revolution or a civil war of some kind, a whole15 range of possibilities. And we did, in fact, believe that16 Trujillo was going to be overthrown one way or another and17 not necessarily, or even in paramount in our minds, by assassi-18 nation because -- in fact, it would seem at that time to be the19 most difficult thing of all to do. He was heavily guarded and20 protected, ordinarily. Thay knew more about it than we did.21 And when that happened, which we favored that happened,22 because we felt that the establishment of a democratic regime23 in the Dominican Republic was something not only beneficial to24 the United States and to our policias. I mean, when we're25 talking about Trujillo he was not -- I mean, about human life,# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 43]
# TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 546-60001 the man was not only a Fascist, but he was a murderer. He used2 to have a freezer room in the back of his house where he would3 take people and show them the bodies of enemies.But in any event, that's none of our concern, but our real5 concern was that this was regarded as an inevitability and we6 wanted to be associated with the new government.7 Senator Mondale. I understand, but the argument is made8 with respect to that last telegram that it was a fig leaf9 telegram designed to cover our tracks should assassination occur10 and you argue, and I think persuasively, that you intended much11 more than that, you intended to make it clear that we were not12 supporting the assassination, that machine guns were not going13 to be used.14 If that was our intent, and I take it that it was, why15 we didn't we go one step further and say please communicate to16 these dissidents who have every reason to believe from past17 history that we may be supporting the overthrow, including18 assassination, that we oppose the assassination of Mr. Trujillo.19 Wouldn't that make it very clear then that we were out of20 the business?21 Mr. Goodwin. I don't know. It would have made it, I22 suppose, clearer to them. On the other hand, I think, it's23 their country, and they could deal with Trujillo as they wanted24 to. It was not going to be us that dealt with him in this25 fashion.# TOP SECRET41760000617
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 44]
TOP SECRET421 Senator Mondale. Yeah, but soo, if we were completely2 neutral I'd agree with that. If they wanted to assassinate3 Trujillo that's their business。 I agree with it, that's none4 of our business.5 But I think we were already implicated. It's sort of like6 being in a criminal conspiracy and then pulling out the day7 before the job is done and not telling anybody. It seems to8 me you should say, boys, I'm out and I don't want you to do it.9 The Chairman. I've changed my mind.10 Senator Mondale. That's why I don't understand.11 Senator Baker. It's sort of like the situation that's12 been described to us where people were beyond control and you13 couldn't communicate with them after the forces had been sat14 in motion.15 Mr. Goodwin. Well, may I tell you, I don't know that there16 ever was any statement that those guns that were authorized on17 January 12th, either in the authorization or subsequent, for18 the purposes of assassination or otherwise.19 Mr. Schwarz. Well, there were scores of those;20 and whether they reached you or not is a separats and important21 question, but there are four or five examples of communication22 to the Agency, and I think passed on to the State Department,23 and that those guns were to be used for an assassination effort24 whether or not the machine guns were obtained.25 Senator Mondala. Well, you see, that could be important,TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 45]
TOP SECRET431 because if your understanding was as you have just described2 than the telegram makes more sense. But if in fact we were3 implicated, as I understood earlier in assassination attempts --4 The Chairman. Fritz, look at the way Dearborn is. I5 think it's very important to understand this matter, to look6 at the way Dearborn apparently understood the instruction. He7 was the one to whom it was given, and he wires back, having8 received the instruction, the following -- now this is at Tab9 J, book 2 of 2, the second J.10 It says - first of all, do you have that, Mr. Goodwin?11 Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I do.12 The Chairman. It says: "One, I believe we can hold pro-Unite13 States dissidents, although with some grumbling on the basis14 set forth." Now you're not likely to hold them if you tell15 them you're no longer connected with their scheme and Mr.16 Dearborn had not been instructed to tell them that.17 "Two, following our observations for Department and CAS18 considerations, A) if attempt is made by United States' friendsto assassinate Trujillo, there will be accusations against us19 and the best we can do is see there is no proof."2021 Senator Baker. To see there is no proof.22 The Chairman. "The greatest danger point is Thomas Stockard.23 He was given a small number of arms by dissident agents to hold24 several days and has told several persons dissidents obtained25 these items from Consulate. Stockard told me saying, I haveTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 46]
TOP SECRET                                         441 informed him this cannot be true or I would know and when he2 requested me supply arms through him for dissidents, I told3 him it was impossible. He is greater danger because of4 personal ambiterment against CAS, a matter of which CAS head-5 quarters is fully informed."6 Then he goes on to say that "since local CAS is now to7 engage mainly in intelligence collection and reporting, I8 recommend urgent transfer from the Dominican Republic of three9 CIA officers. If simmering assassination plot should materizlia10 they would be in danger and might be picked up for Trujillo-11 type questioning. This is easily avoidable by quick transfer12 now. These three have engaged in fully authorized activity13 which, if uncovered, could put the United States in bad public14 position. There is still considerable job in counterespionage15 and the collection and reporting and need to follow GODR,16 foster Leftist activities."17 Now there's a vote on.18 I read this because it suggests that Mr. Dearborn got a19 different message than the one you say you intended to send.(A brief recess was taken.)21 The Chairman. Let's go back on the record.22 Mr. Goodwin. Well, that paragraph, to me, Senator,23 Paragraph A -- I am not sure whether his interpretation of24 instructions, or at least in specifics, seems to be clear.25 He says that he has informed them that he cannot supply armsTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 47]
TOP SECRET451 to the dissidents, and that is what is what Kennedy, of course,2 had said in the telegram. And the request had been to know3 whether or not he could supply arms.4 So that I see from that point of view, I am not sure,5 quite clear, in what way he misinterpreted the telegram.6 The Chairman. Well, let's go down -- I don't think he7 has misinterpreted his instructions not to supply more arms.8 That's clear enough. But if you go down to B -- are you with9 me now?10 Mr. Goodwin. Yes.11 The Chairman. "Since local CAS -- I guess that should12 be Chief of Station -- "Since local Chief of Station, then" --13 and that would be CIA Chief of Station -- "Since local Chief14 of Station is now to engage mainly in intelligence collection15 and reporting, I recommend urgent transfer from Dominican16 Republic of three CIA officers. If simmering assassination plot17 should materialize" -- now that in itself, if I may digress a18 moment, suggests that in Dearborn's opinion assassination might19 be imminent. For he says "If simmering assassination plot20 should materialize, they would be in danger and might be picked21 up for Trujillo-type questioning. This is easily avoidable by22 quick transfer now." -- again the indication of his feeling23 that an assassination might be imminent, otherwise, why transfer24 them. "These three have engaged in fully authorized activities25 which, if uncovered, could put the United States in bad publicTOP SECRET