Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 25]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Halley. Right, and I will stand by my answer, that is,2 I put forth no plans, I know of no plans put forth, you know,3 during my tenure in Miami in which assassination was part of4 the operational rationale. You know, the only way we can clarify5 this perhaps to your satisfaction is to discuss some specifics.6 If you are prepared to talk about specifics, maybe I can deal7 with those within the framework of that general statement that8 I made, you know. I know how Cubans talk. I know the rumors9 that have existed over the years. I simply do not want to be10 identified with any action conducted by some group over which11 I had no knowledge or control. That is my key point.12 Mr. Baron. I think that answers it for now, and we will13 cover some specifics later.14 One more question on this dual chain of command: on the15 one hand, the Agency chain of command from the DDP to Harvey16 to you at JMWAVE, and on the other hand, the three-man decision17 making group consisting of the Attorney General, Lansdale and18 Helms. Would you say in the early days that this three-man19 group appeared to you to be in control of the decision making20 before the Special Group stepped in, that decisions were made21 in a less formal way than they were later under the Special22 Group?23 Mr. Halley. I really could not address myself to that.24 In other words, I never sat in on a meeting of the three-man25 group. In other words --TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 26]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Baron. What about the kind of reporting that wasrequired of you by the three-man group as opposed to the SpecialGroup?4 Mr. Halley. My requirements for reporting really stemmedin the early days from Harvey. If there were any specialrequirements, he was taking them from the three-man group andtranslating them and, in fact, much of the system of reportingin those early days was generated by me and what I thought....was required to keep Mr. Harvey as a Task Force Commanderfully informed. I think that you undoubtedly know from therecord that I worked for Mr. Harvey prior to 1962 and thereforeI was familiar, you know, with his style of operation and thoughI had a clear understanding of what he needed in an informationalsense. So when I went to Miami, I organized much of thereporting flow upward, if you will, from the field unit toHeadquarters.17 Mr. Baron. Had you worked for Mr. Harvey in Germany?18 Mr. Halley. Yes, I had.19 Mr. Baron. In Berlin?20 Mr. Halley. Yes, sir.21 Mr. Baron. This was on the famous and successful tunneloperation?23 Mr. Halley. No, I do not deserve any credit for the tunneloperation. That is Mr. Harvey's activity. He kept that verytightly compartmented and in the days when that was going on, ITOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 27]
# TOP SECRET1 was involved primarily with Eastern European activities.2 Mr. Baron. You were aware of Mr. Harvey's style of3 operating?4 Mr. Halley. Yes. I worked with him -- I think the date is5 somewhere in June or July of '54 to somewhere in '59. I would6 have to look that up in the record, the exact date.7 Mr. Baron. But you say you not only had a close working8 relationship with Mr. Harvey, but you came to be a personal9 friend of his?10 Mr. Halley. Yes, I would like to say I am a personal friend11 of Mr. Harvey.12 Mr. Baron. Returning to your statements about the chain13 of command, you seem to be saying that Mr. Harvey served as the14 funnel for both of these chains of command; as far as you were15 concerned, you received directives from him, whatever the source16 may have been originally, is that correct?17 Mr. Halley. Correct.18 I want to make a point. Insofar as the three-man group was19 concerned, I would see Helms in his role as the DDP in the three-20 man group. I would see Lansdale -- as I told you, Lansdale came21 down to visit me in Miami on one occasion. He came as part of22 that three-man group. But my chain of command, during my23 visit was still from me to Harvey. Lansdale was down there,24 I was to be, you know, straightforward, candid, discuss plans,25 programs, problems. But I received my orders and instructions# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 28]
TOP SECRET1 the control of money and so forth was vested in the Task Force2 Commander, Mr. Harvey.3 Therefore, I never dealt with this three-man group as a4 body. I dealt with the individuals, you know, and various5 mutations.6 Mr. Baron. Would you say that the three-man group had a7 less formal, more free-wheeling style of decision making,8 there was a real change in the rigor with which you were required9 to report after the Special Group took over?10 Mr. Halley. I would have to say that the total reporting11 became more formalized the longer we stayed in business. I12 cannot ascribe this to the difference of style of the three-man13 group as opposed to the Agency chain of command or subsequent14 with the requirements of the Special Group. This evolved from15 a body of experience that was gained as the operation was16 established and got some experience.17 So I would not want to characterize that as being a result18 of the groups.19 Mr. Baron. You did not have any problem with the propriety20 of the three-man group in the early stages?21 Mr. Halley. No, I had no reason to believe that it was22 not a duly constituted body. In other words, the.. officers that23 I reported to, in that particular case, Mr. Harvey, Mr. Helms,24 were my chain of command at that particular point, were the25 ones who briefed me on the existence of this three-man bodyTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 29]
TOP SECRET1 and I felt that that was a perfectly legitimate function of2 that body.3 Mr. Baron. Who briefed you on the existence of the body?4 Mr. Halley. My recollection of the initial briefing was5 from Mr. Harvey.6 Mr. Baron. Do you recall how he described that three-man7 group and the responsibilities?8 Mr. Halley. No. This was 1962, and this is 1975. As9 you know from my records, these intervening years have been10 very active for me, therefore, I do not remember with precision11 that conversation in all of its details. I do recall my first12 briefing on the existence of this three-man group being from13 Harvey.14 Mr. Baron. You mentioned that General Lansdale might15 occasionally meet with you personally. This is in Miami, at16 JMWAVE Station?17 Mr. Halley. I can only recall at this point one specific18 meeting where he came down to Florida in Miami to visit.19 Mr. Baron. What was the substance of that meeting?20 Mr. Halley. He was given some briefings by my staff on21 their areas of specialization, whether it was foreign intelli-22 gence collection, whether it was maritime activities, or whether23 it was paramilitary activities. I spent a lot of time with him.24 personally, talking about where we stood, where we were making25 progress in the collection of intelligence, where we were havingTOP SECRET27
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 30]
TOP SECRET281 problems, and so on. It was a substantive management operation,2 problem-oriented type of conversation.3 Mr. Baronv. What period of time would you place this in?4 Mr. Halley. Probably sometime in the summer of '62,5 because my family was already in Miami at that point, and when6 I first went to Miami my family was not with me. I think my7 wife joined me in Miami sometime in the summer of '62, you know,8 I would have to research that. It is obviously available from9 the records as to when my family moved and a permanent change10 of station.11 Mr. Baron. Was there any discussion whether direct or12 indirect of assassination of Cuban leaders during your meetings13 with General Lansdale?14 Mr. Halley. I do not recall any such conversations. You15 know, I think that from my point of view, we are off a little16 bit on this perspective I would like to try to focus on the17 perspective for you in the historical setting.18 Mr. Baron. Please do.19 Mr. Halley. I think by your questions and your interest,20 you are narrowly focused on this assassination thing, but let21 me turn that around a bit, and let me put it in my context at22 the time which may help you understand my answers.23 Mr. Baron. Before you do, can I stop you for one moment?24 I would like to get back on the track that we originally25 started on of asking you about the JMWAVE Station in generalTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 31]
# TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-6000291 and the context at that time. Could I ask just a couple of2 specific questions before we do that, about the three-man group3 that you raised, and then give you a full opportunity to pull put4 out of what we have said so far and everything that will follow5 into context.6 Did you have any individual meetings with Robert Kennedy,7 who was then-Attorney General?8 Mr. Halley. You mean individual, one on one?9 Are you saying did I have a meeting, “a personal, private10 meeting with the Attorney General?11 Mr. Baron. Yes.12 Mr. Halley. The answer to that is no.13 Mr. Baron. Did you have any meetings with the Attorney14 General of any sort during this period of time?15 Mr. Halley. I mentioned to you earlier that at this meeting16 that I went to with Director McCone, the Attorney General, Mr.17 Robert Kennedy, was present at that White House briefing. He18 did ask some questions, which I do not remember what the19 questions were at this particular point in time. I answered20 some of those questions that were put during the course of that21 particular presentation. Throughout that whole period of time,22 that was the only, if you will, direct contact with him that23 I can remember. You know, unless you can show me something.24 Mr. Baron. During the entire period that you were25 involved with JMWAVE?# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 32]
# TOP SECRET301 Mr. Halley. That is right.2 Mr. Baron. At that meeting -- again, I realize what we3 are doing is an isolation, out of context -- at that meeting that4 you attended, with the Cabinet members and the President, was5 there any discussion either directly or indirectly or by means6 of any circumlocutions of the subject of assassination?7 Mr. Halley. Not that I can recall.8 You know, my recollection of that meeting is, we went to it9 en masse, the first -- you know, Director McCone, myself,10 Bruce *Che* Server, several other people who went. We went in11 several cars. We went to the meeting, the Cuban issue was the12 first item on the agenda. As I recall the thing, the Cuban13 thing was over after this period of time. We, the technocrats14 left, the Director John McCone stayed on. You know, during my15 presence at the meeting there was nothing discussed about16 assassinations.17 Mr. Baron. Was there any such discussion between yourself18 and John McCone or Richard Helms at any point?19 Mr. Halley. I never recall discussing assassinations with20 John McCone. Now, in terms of discussions with Richard Helms,21 these were conversations in which atmospherics in Miami and22 problems like that would be discussed, and I am sure somewhere23 in some of these conversations the mood of the community, the24 subject of assassinations undoubtedly came up. This was part25 of the life of that particular period.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 33]
# TOP SECRET1 I cannot remember a specific date, you know, some time at2 which that was discussed, and you know I never received any3 instruction from Helms to mount an assassination operation.4 Mr. Baron. Again, I am not trying to unfairly pull these5 kinds of conversations out of their historical context. Before6 we flesh out the historical context, do you have any recollection7 of the manner in which assassination might have come up between8 yourself and Helms?9 Mr. Halley. Again, I put it in this overall context of10 the times. We were running Foreign Intelligence collection11 operations against Cuba with classical agent means. We were running12 collection against Cuba through paramilitary teams. We were13 involved in paramilitary operations that could be described as14 commando raids. Those were the kinds of activities.15 We were dealing with exile groups, we were debriefing16 refugees and in all of this conversations of assassination,17 the Cuban penchant for it had to come up. I cannot pinpoint --18 Mr. Baron. You do not recall any reference of means to19 be used or people to be involved?20 Mr. Halley. No. Even such things as discussions of21 various kinds of weapons, you know, people, as you probably22 know from this experience, every individual who deals with23 weapons has a different view on what is the ideal weapon. If24 you took a squad of ten men and gave them the free choice, I25 am sure all ten of them would come up with a different weapon.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 34]
TOP SECRET321 Therefore, when we were standardizing weapons to our2 paramilitary teams, things like that, weapons would be discussed3 in terms of, you know, muzzle velocity, rate of fire, weight -4 of the weapon for the Cuban to carry, because many of them were5 quite small. In this context, people would discuss what is6 the range, can a guy use it to shoot somebody at a particular7 range? Is this an assassination weapon? Is this a good weapon8 for close combat?9 Therefore the term assassination was just a part of the life,10 of the fabric at that time. That is what I am trying to get11 across. I just cannot articulate any more eloquently than12 that.13 Mr. Baron. I think you are being quite eloquent and14 extremely informative. You mentioned that the phrase assassina-15 tion would be used in the discussions about the kinds of weapons16 that would be used for commando raids or equipping your17 operatives.18 Mr. Halley. Paramilitary teams, right.19 Mr. Baron. Was the capacity of a weapon to be used as20 an assassination weapon among other uses a desirable capacity?21 In other words, was that phrase used positively?22 Mr. Halley. No, it was not. It is the kind of thing23 that weaves itself into, you know, a conversation.24 For instance, if you are planning a commando raid against25 something like an oil refinery, you have to think about how areTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 35]
TOP SECRET1 you going to get across the guard force that is around a2 refinery's One of the questions you have, of course, is if you3 bypass them, you are successful to get in without a trail or any4 kind of a struggle, that is great. But what happens if you are5 implanting your target and the guard stumbles on you, you know,6 the guard force then becomes an immediate: risk to your operation7 and usually there is a fire fight. Therefore, this becomes a8 question of weapons. In other words, what weapon is going to9 give the highest muzzle velocity and make the largest amount of10 noise. Therefore, if you have two weapons of co-equal cyclic11 rate of fire and one made less rate of noise than the other12 for that job you would pick the weapon with the lowest noise.13 You might even silence it. You may make a silenced submachine14 gune out of it.15 These are the kinds of things that go into these discussions16 of weapons.17 Mr. Baron. The technology of assassination and targetted18 shooting, are you referring to when you say assassination19 weapon -- to a weapon generally capable of targetted shooting?20 Mr. Halley. In this particular context, I think most21 people felt that the Cuban penchant for assassination, for22 discussing assassination, was the kind that would have to be23 done from a long range.24 You know, I think that it is generally an accepted thesis25 that a group of dedicated men who are prepared to give their livesTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 36]
TOP SECRET1 can in time assassinate almost anybody. Now, the Cuban was not2 that kind of a person. That was not his psychological make-up.3 He tends to want to live, to enjoy life, to talk about his4 accomplishment. Therefore, while they were brave and dedicated,5 they were the kind of people who would probably engage in6 something like this in the context of using the sniper weapon7 as a vehicle for assassination, long distance.8 Therefore, in this context you are talking about range, you9 know, one of the key factors becomes what is the accurate range10 of a weapon if fired by an expert marksman. Therefore, that is11 the kind of thing that would go into, you know, discussions of12 weapons.13 Mr. Baron. When you were discussing weapons with high14 range and low muzzle velocity, was this ever discussed in the15 context of shooting Fidel Castro or other key Cuban leaders as16 opposed to targetted shooting on a commando raid.17 Mr. Halley. I can recall, you know, no conversation in18 which it was narrowly focused on the question of Fidel Castro.19 Mr. Baron. Let us go back, then, to putting this all20 into historical context. I am going to ask you if you can21 explain more about the structure of the JMWAVE Station, both22 the channels upward. from you to the Agency and the Special23 Group and the channels downward from you to your operatives,24 if in the course of explaining the structure, you would like to25 make some comments about the historical context, that would beTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 37]
# TOP SECRET1 appreciated.2 Mr. Halley. I think what I would like to do is to try to3 put this into some perspective.4 The perspective really starts with the failure of the Bay5 of Pigs Operation. After the failure of the Bay of Pigs, the6 Kennedy Administration wanted another look taken at the problem7 of Cuba. In order to get that other look started, the Kennedy8 Administration created this three-man task force or this three-9 man group and wanted to see what else could be done against10 Cuba, and that is when I came into this problem in February of11 '62.12 Mr. Baron. Is it possible that the three-man group that13 you are referring to is actually the Robert Kennedy-Maxwell14 Taylor Board of Inquiry into the reasons for the failure of the15 Bay of Pigs operation?16 Mr. Halley. This three-man group stemmed out of that17 inquiry. What its relationship was to the inquiry, I do not know,18 because I was not involved and I never had an opportunity once19 I plunged into this job, to go back and read those historical20 documents. You know, I am sure there is a Maxwell Taylor Report, and so forth, but I have never read it.22 All right.23 Therefore, my first task when I became involved in this24 was the task of coming up with an operational plan to see what25 kinds of intelligence could be collected in Cuba, so that by# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 38]
TOP SECRET361 collecting this intelligence, an assessment could be made based2 on hard facts as to what could be done against Castro. In other3 words, the difference here was that people thought that the Bay4 of Pigs operation was not soundly grounded in intelligence.5 Therefore, this was an attempt to start the collection of6 intelligence to see what could be done.7 In order to collect intelligence at that particular time,8 it was believed that all avenues of approach should be used,9 so that meant classical foreign intelligence operations,10 counterintelligence operations, the debriefing of refugees, and11 the use of paramilitary means to put teams into Cuba to collect12 intelligence on that part of the island that could not be13 covered by what you would call the more classical means of14 foreign intelligence collection.15 As the program was started essentially by me or accelerated16 by me, we in fact got caught up with the Cuban Missile Crisis17 that is, the advent of the Soviet intervention into Cuba -- and18 our whole effort shifted to covering that Soviet build-up in19 Cuba, and this was an integral part to our having detected the20 Soviet build-up and the United States government taking the21 actions which they did, that is, to verify this.22 There was a great problem for a while when we were all23 talking about hard intelligence, the President, John Kennedy,24 was telling us, give us hard intelligence. We thought we were25 giving him hard intelligence. What he meant, in his definitionTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 39]
TOP SECRET1 of hard intelligence, as it turned out to be, was a U-22 photograph. Ile never articulated that to us in those terms.3 Then we got caught up into the eyeball to eyeball confron-4 tation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. When that was over, we5 got caught up with the problem of monitoring the disengagement6 of the Soviet presence in Cuba. That took us up through sometime7 into early '63.8 Then we took a look again, because we knew an awful lot9 more about them than we had when we started in February of '62,10 to see what could be done against Cuba, and it was clear at11 that point that no external invasion was going to be possible,12 because that was something that was excluded by the Khruschev-13 Kennedy agreement and then it was not feasible. In any event,14 therefore it was a question of what could be done. So we were15 collecting intelligence to continue to stay on top of the16 situation. We were attempting to establish contacts with the17 military establishment in Cuba to see if there was any force18 that was opposed to Castro within the military establishment19 that would be used to alter the situation and continue to see20 whether there were any economic pressures that could be brought21 on Cuba that would accelerate the whole problem of creating22 an environment in which a resistance could be created on an23 island.24 Mr. Baron. Were those the two primary tactics used at25 that point when Castro had consolidated his strength and
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 40]
TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-60tape 31 when the United States and Russia reached an agreement that no2 external invasion of Cuba would take place, did you turn3 primarily to the ways and means of finding a dissident group4 within Cuba that might be capable of overthrowing Castro,5 number one, and number two, of finding means of undermining6 the economic strength of the Castro government.7 Mr. Halley. In addition, we were continuing to support8 certain elements of resistance, you know, that were still there9 that were not in the Army.10 Mr. Baron. What kinds of elements were those?11 Mr. Halley. These were paramilitary forces that were in12 Cuba, that we had put in or established contact with, or people13 who were already in the bush who we had already established14 contact with or they had established contact with us, and we15 were providing them with food, weapons and so forth so that they16 could survive. So that it was a multifaceted approach at that17 particular time.18 That went on from the middle of '63 until the middle of19 '65, and these are two distinct phases of this operation. In20 effect, one, a survey, and two, the Missile Crisis and its21 post-mortem, and then the next phase was the continuation of22 intelligence collection, the working or taking the sounding with23 military dissidents, economic pressure, and working with24 natural dissident elements that were still on the island.25 I think you know that all of your questions have to be putTOP SECRET