Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 46]
TOP SECRET1 Lumumba was actually dead?2 Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall. You probably are much more knowledgeable on that than I am. I don't recall when in effect we no longer considered it or it no longer was a factor. I just don't remember.6 Mr. Baron. But, just now you were assuming that that would have the case?8 Mr. Tweedy. If it was still on, it was still on the agenda, inevitably we must have discussed it. If it was off the agenda then no, but I honestly don't remember.1: Mr. Baron. Let me show you now some cable traffic between the agency and Leopoldville which consists of a series of cables that begins shortly before Lumumba was placed into U.N. custody, then continues after he was placed in U.N. custody.16 In an attempt to refresh your recollection about the attitude at the Agency toward Lumumba after he was in U.N. custody --Mr. Tweedy. Okay.Mr. Baron. -- the first cable which we will mark Tweedy Exhibit 1 is dated August 26, 1960, from Leopoldville to the Director.(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 47]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Tweedy. That is the way all cables were addressed.2 I see he sent one specifically to DCI.Mr. Baron. Off the record.(Discussion off the record.)Mr. Baron. Onthe record.5 Let's turn back now.7 I believe while we were off the record and examining this cable closely you corrected me, Mr. Tweedy, on the fact that this cable was not sent from Leopoldville to the Director but rather it was sent from headquarters to Leopoldville, is that correct?Mr. Tweedy. Correct.Mr. Baron. And it appears to you from the designation "Allen W. Dulles", at the top of the telegram, that this was a personal message signed off by the DCI himself to the Chief of Station.Mr. Tweedy. Correct. As I said, he might not have drafted it but it certainly would have been his sign off.Mr. Baron. And let me direct your attention to the portion of the cable that says in high quarters here it is the clear-cut conclusion that if LLL continues to hold high office the inevitable result will at best he chaos and at worst pave the way to a Communist takeover of the Congo with disastrous consequences for the prestige of the U.N. and for the interests of the Free World generally.TOP SECRET45
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 48]
# TOP SECRET1 Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an2 urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditi:3 this should be a high priority of our covert action.4 Now, do you believe that LLL refers to Lumumba?5 Mr. Tweedy. I do,6 Mr. Baron. And why would three L's have been used in the cable?7 Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.8 Mr. Baron. Would that be a standard way of making sure9 that at least one of the L's was clear in transmission?10 Mr. Tweedy. I honestly don't know.11 Now, that isn't the normal way to do it at all. I honestly don't know how. His name was Patrice.13 Mr. Baron. But it is nonetheless your opinion that14 LLL does refer to Lumumba?15 Mr. Tweedy. I do indeed.16 Mr. Baron. Does this accord with your general sense17 of the policy toward Lumumba at that time at the Agency and State Department?18 Mr. Tweedy. It accords much more with my recollecti20 of our attitude toward the potentially disastrous situatio21 the Congo than it does on he personally, but he obviously22 was always in the background.23 Mr. Baron. Where the cable says we conclude that his24 removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that underTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 49]
# TOP SECRETexisting conditions this should be a high priority of out covert action, close quotes, -- is that consistent with the policy towards Lumumba as you recall it?In other words, that Lumumba's removal was a prime objective of the covert actions of the Agency.Mr. Tweedy. We would have given our eye teeth to have Lumumba not the head of the Congolese state, certainly I would agree with that.Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 2, let's turn to a cable dated September 16, 1960.(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)# TOP SECRET![image of a black banner]
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 50]
# TOP SECRETMr. Baron. This contains references to the fact that "the station ws flooded with reports re outcome Mobutu coup". And the cable goes on to discuss the fact that U.N. troops had interferred with Congolese troops and prevented them from arresting Lumumba.Now, this cable was sent to the CIA headquarters from Leopoldville one day after Lumumba sought protective custody from the United Nations and two days after the Mobutu coup where Mobutu took over the government.In the cable as it has been sanitized by the Agency it now reads:"Station advised two moderate Congolese politician try work with key Congolese contact in effort eliminate Lumumba. Fear U.N. protection will give Lumumba opportunity to organize counterattack. Only solution is remove him from scene soonest".WAs that the attitude of the Agency at this point, as far as you understood it, that the fact that Lumumba was in U.N. protective custody did not eliminate him as a threat in the Congo?Mr. Tweedy. I don't really recall but I think the chances are that we feared that U.N. protective custody might very well result in his early release or his ability stil to control matters. I should think that is very probable.Mr. Baron. And that is the reason why there would be# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 51]
# TOP SECRETthis fear of counterattack organized by Lumumba while he was protected by the U.N.Mr. Tweedy. Yes, that is probably true.Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 3 let's turn to a cable dated September 20, 1960, which is sent -- off the record.(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit 3 for identification.)(Discussion off the record.)# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 52]
# TOP SECRETMr. Baron. Back on the record.Although the top of this cable does not indicate where the cable was sent to and from, because we don't have the cover sheet for the cable, you have indicated to me by looking at the designations that this cable must have been sent from Leopoldville to headquarters, is that correct, Mr. Tweedy?Mr. Tweedy. That is correct.Mr. Baron. Let me direct your attention to paragraph 7 which says:"Station checking recurring reports of Kasavubu Lumumba reconciliation. Kasavubu denies Bolikango failed deny possibility of Lumumba entering new government, possibly as vice Premier. Believe some substance to rumor but will do best prevent if Lumumba allowed even minor role he most apt come out on top".Does that indicate to you that the Chief of Station in the Congo at this point continued to be extremely concerned that Lumumba should not be allowed even a minor role in the government of the Congo?Mr. Tweedy. That is what it says.Mr. Baron. Next, as Exhibit 4, we have a cable dated January 19, 1961.(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 53]
# TOP SECRETMr. Baron. This was sent from the Congo to --Mr. Tweedy. Sent from Elizabethville to Leopoldville info headquarters, information headquarters.Mr. Baron. So that headquarters would have received a copy of this cable sent by the base chief in Elizabethville to the Station Chief in Leopoldville?Mr. Tweedy. Right.Mr. Baron. And paragraph 1 of this cable says: "Thanks for Patrice. If we had known he was coming we would have baked a snake".Do you have an independent recollection of this cable?Mr. Tweedy. Yes, of course I do, for the simple reason of that phrase, which is another way of saying, a lighthearted way of saying, on the part of Elizabethville Lumumba arrived in Kutanga and he had no idea he was coming.Mr. Baron. So this cable does not indicate that there was any connection between the CIA and Lumumba's eventual death, the actual causes of his death in Kutanga?Mr. Tweedy. Will you say that again? I am not quite sure I understood that.Mr. Baron. Does that cable indicate in any way that the CI was knowledgeable of the actual causes of Lumumba's death at the point when it occurred?In other words, that they were connected to the people# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 54]
# TOP SECRETwho caused his death?Mr. Tweedy. I must say I have a hard time following the question. This means that Lumumba arrived under the Congo- lese auspices in Kutanga and that Elizabethville, the base at Elizabethville didn't know he was coming, our base, didn't know very much, didn't presumably know very much about what occurred, and reported very briefly on what they had heard.Mr. Baron. Let me put the question in context.On January 17, Lumumba had been flown to Kutanga?Mr. Tweedy. Yes.Mr. Baron. And later United Nations investigations concluded that it was the 17th or perhaps the 18th that Lumumba was actually killed in Kutanga.I was asking you before whether this cable would indicate that the United States would have been involved in bringing about the death of Lumumba?Mr. Tweedy. I would have thought that it merely indicates that this part of the Agency, i.e., Elizabethville had no idea he was coming, knew nothing about his fate except these few phrases that he put down here and would imply although it certainly doesn't say so, that he was adding a little information to what was perhaps an enormously ignorant Leopoldville which, of course, is the fact of the matter.We didn't know how all this was occurring and were not able to follow the event except after the event.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 55]
# TOP SECRETMr. Baron. Was the CIA connected in any way to the events that immediately led to Lumumba's death?Mr. Tweedy. None whatsoever.Mr. Baron. CIA was not involved in a plot to fly Lumumba from his previous place of imprisonment in Tysville out to Kutanga where the authorities were known to be so hostile to him that he would probably meet his death there?Mr. Tweedy. The fate of Lumumba in the end was purely an African event.Mr. Baron. At what point did you learn of Lumumba's death?Mr. Tweedy. I suspect probably about the time that the world did. No one had a beat on this.Mr. Baron. You had no advanced warning that Mobutu intended to fly Lumumba to Katanga?Mr. Tweedy. Not that I recall, and I am sure the cable traffic would reflect it if I had.Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, do you recall an asset who was sent from Europe, where he had been recruited by Arnold 05 Silver, to the Congo in the fall of 1960?Mr. Tweedy. I think Iwas reminded of this when I talked to you and Mr. Wides a couple or so months ago.Mr. Baron. This would be an asset who went by the cryptonym of QJWIN.Mr. Tweedy. So I was reminded then, which was a cryptonym# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 56]
# TOP SECRET54I didn't remember at all, whereas I do remember quite a number of cryptonyms when reminded of them.Mr. Baron. Aside from the cryptonym, do you recallthere was an asset who had been recruited by *Arnold Silver* in Europe and who was sent to the Congo to perform some mission in November and December of 1960?Mr. Tweedy. I was generally reminded of it by that conversation with you and Mr. Wides but I will confess that my recollection doesn't go any further than that.But unlike some of the things I have been reminded of, I think recalled that asset of *Arnold Silvers* had been involved. That is just as about as deep as my recollection goes.Mr. Baron. Let me see if I can refresh your recollection, first, by relating to you the testimony of *Justin O'Donnell* who said that he did make use of QJWIN in the Congo as a kind of "alter ego" of his, a general operative of his.Does that remind you at all of the nature of the mission that QJWIN had in the Congo?Mr. Tweedy. No, it doesn't.Mr. Baron. Have you heard the phrase executive action?Mr. Tweedy. In the newspapers.Mr. Baron. During your tenure as a CIA official you never heard the phrase executive action discussed as part of# TOP SECRET![image of text and number '2162' enclosed within a black rectangle]
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 57]
# TOP SECRET1 a CIA program or plan.2 Mr. Tweedy. No. Only in bureaucratic Washington terms of executive action.3 Mr. Baron. Meaning administrative action?4 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.5 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any project at CIA to develop the capability of carrying off an assassination of6 a foreign leader, if required?7 Mr. Tweedy. Will you repeat that?8 Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the CIA had a project which operated under the cryptonym ZRRIFLE to develop the mea:: pardon me, to develop the capability of carrying out assassin-ations if required?9 Mr. Tweedy. You mean just generically?10 Mr. Baron. Yes.11 Mr. Tweedy. No.12 Mr. Baron. Aside from the discussions that you had with Richard Bissell about the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba, did you participate in any other discussions at the Agency about assassination capabilities?13 Mr. Tweedy. Never.14 Mr. Baron. Did you bring anyone else connected with the Agency into the discussion of the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba, other than the Chief of Station in Congo?# TOP SECRET55
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 58]
TOP SECRETMr.Tweedy. The only other person who was aware of it was my deputy.Mr. Baron. That would be?Mr. Tweedy. Glenn Fields. He was aware of it in that sense.Mr. Baron. Did he take any action in realtion to that plan or consideration?Mr. Tweedy. No; just he was in matters of this kind he would have been my alterego but he was aware of it, that is all.Mr. Baron. Do you know William Harvey?Mr. Tweedy. Sure, I know Bill Harvey well. Haven't seen him in a long while.Mr. Baron. And were you aware that William Harvey was in contact with Arnold Silver to develop the standby capability for carrying out assassinations?Mr. Tweedy. I don't know anything about it whatsoever.Mr. Baron. Did you at any point talk with William Harvey about any CIA activity in the Congo?Mr. Tweedy. Not that I remember.Mr. Baron. Let me show you a document now that we will Mark Exhibit 5.(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 5 for identification.)TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 59]
# TOP SECRETMr. Baron! This is a dispatch from the Chief ofKUTUBE/D, which I believe is --Mr. Tweedy. That is Staff D.Mr. Baron. In the Foreign Intelligence Division, is that correct?Mr. Tweedy. Yes.Mr. Baron. Written to the Chief of Station in Dakar and Chief of Station in Luxemburg through Chief AF and Chief WE.Would Chief AF have been yourself, Chief of the African Division?Mr. Tweedy. What is the date?Mr. Baron. The date is November 2, 1960.Mr. Tweedy. I would have been.Mr. Baron. And William Harvey would hve been Chief of KU2D?Mr. Tweedy. I suppose he was then. He certainly was Chief of Staff D, in which case he could have, that is what he would have been then.Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, while we have been off the record you have had a chance to review this document and tell me some things about it I would like to repeat on the record.First of all, on this copy of the document there is typed the words Danuel M. Pressland, under the space forTOP SECRET![WBR logo]
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 60]
TOP SECRET581 officer's signature, and you said to me a moment ago that2 you are almost 100 percent sure that that is the pseudonymof William Harvey, is that right?4 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.5 Mr. Baron. And you were just pointing to --6 Mr. Tweedy. Chief of ID. You told me he was Chiefof ID at the time. He certainly was Chief of ID. You told7 me he was Chief of ID than, I put those two together8 and say I am pretty sure my recollection is Pressland was9 Harvey, I can't swear to it, but I am virtually sure.10 Mr. Baron. And do you have any independent recollec-12 tion of the subject matter that is discussed in this document?13 Mr. Tweedy. None at all. It doesn't ring a bellat all.14 Mr. Baron. Even after reviewing the document15 do you have any recollection of what QJWIN's mission in the16 Congo would be, would have been?17 Mr. Tweedy. No.18 Mr. Baron. You said that such a memo --20 Mr. Tweedy. You told me he was going out there to21 work with O'Donnell and whon O'Donnell went out there I22 guess he was going to look into a number of things for23 headquarters and the Station pertaining to Congolese matters.24 When I say I guess I am in effect asking you because I don't25 recollect by any emeans what the full auspices of O'Donnell'sTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 61]
# TOP SECRETvisit to the Congo were and you said that Mr. QJWIN was going out as sort of his caddy, if you like, he was going to work for him and act as his general assistant.Mr. Baron. That was the way Mr. O'Donnell described it, although in this lengthy memo which apparently precedes the dispatch of QJWIN to the Congo there is no mention of Mr. O'Donnell.Mr. Tweedy. This I don't think necessarily has anything to do with (O'Donnell)'s mission whatsoever. This, I think, is generic mission, seems to indicate that he is going to muck around with Corsicans. I don't recall Corsicans, I know O'Donnell in the Congo at all.Mr. Baron. Would this kind of dispatch have been written by the Chief of Staff D without consultation with the Chief of the African Division?Mr. Tweedy. He did consult, that is to say, he wrote the dispatch. I haven't read the whole thing but I gather from this -- you see there is also a reference here. I don't know what the reference is about. But I gather that Dakar is brought into this activity because they wanted to act in a support capacity to this headquarters activity.Mr. Baron. You don't have any recollection of a mission in Dakar Senegal about this time that headquarters was concerned with?Mr. Tweedy. No, I surely don't. On the contrary.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 62]
# TOP SECRETMr. Baron. Would it have been proper for the Chief of Staff D to arrange an operation in the Congo directly without going through the African Division although keeeping the African Chief informed?Mr. Tweedy. Well, the two are mutually exclusive. You can't have one without the other. To answer your first question, it would be quite improper and wouldn't have occurred that the Chief of Staff D was operating in an African Station without the African Division being informed. This, however, makes it amply clear that that was not the case, the African Division was informed. In what depth in terms of terms of headquarters purposes I don't know but it would have been sufficient for Harvey to have done what he did and coordinate this with the Division and if the Division had perceived any objection or saw any problems they would have raised it before the dispatch went out.Also I noticed Dakar is also invited to find problems with this, if it did, and say so.Mr. Baron. What kind of missions generally would Staff D have been carrying out in Africa at this time?Mr. Tweedy. Well, you know what the role of Staff D was.Mr. Baron. This would be obtaining codes by surreptitious entry.Mr. Tweedy. This is in effect the obtaining of signals# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 63]
# TOP SECRETintelligence by whatever means, yes, absolutely.Mr. Baron. Would it be surprising to you that QJWIN might have been used in some manner in connection with an assassination plot against Lumumba and have been directed or supervised by William Harvey without your knowledge?Mr. Tweedy. It would have surprised me exceedingly and would today. To put it differently, I am sure it didn't occur.Mr. Baron. After reading this memo, you told me a moment ago that you thought this might indicate that QJWIN was being recruited for ZRRIFLE activities.Mr. Tweedy. Well, you mentioned ZRRIFLE, which frankly I hadn't heard before. This sounds as if he was going to have some kind of generic assignment. I merely put those two together but I know nothing about it at all.Mr. Baron. The dispatch says, "In view of the extreme sensitivity of the objective for which we want him to perform his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do."Do you have any knowledge of what it was precisely that QJWIN was asked to do?Mr. Tweedy. I do not.Mr. Baron. Then, on page 3 of the dispatch it says: "The operation we have in mind is too sensitive to risk blowing it in this phase and the search for assets must be conducted with truly" -- which is underscored -- "minimum risk".# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 64]
# TOP SECRETWhat would these assets have been used for, what was the search for assets all about?Mr. Tweedy. I just do not know.Mr. Baron. Let's turn now to a document that we will mark Exhibit 6, dated January 11, 1961, which is a memo for the FN Division from William K. Harvey, Chief of FI Division D.In this memo I will direct your attention to the sentence that says in that cable COS Luxemburg was told to TA/A all QJWIN expenses to headquarters since QJWIN was being used for FI/D purposes."Do you know what FID purposes OJWIN was being used for?Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.Mr. Baron. The memo goes on to say that:"QJWIN was sent on this trip for a specifically sensitive operational purpose which has been completed".Were you informed by William Harvey that QJWIN'S mission was completed?Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that at all and don't recall any aspect of the mission or its completion.Mr. Baron. Okay.Did you know of an asset of the Chief of Station in the Congo known as WIROGUE, who was sent to the Congo after receiving plastic surgery so that he wouldn't be recognized by# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 65]
# TOP SECREThis fellow Europeans who might be traveling through the Congo?Mr. Tweedy. I do recollect that and you brought it to my attention, when you and Mr. Wides and I discussed this a couple of months ago. I do remember the cryptonym and remember generally the circumstances in which he was sent as a sort of general purpose agent to the Congo with the thought if we got involved in paramilitary activity he would be helpful and he was recruited on that rather general basis, and when you discussed with me a later alarming exchange of cables which indicated that he landed running and made some rather irresponsible remarks and we commented on them to the station.My best recollection is that in the long haul he stayed on in the Congo and I think became, I believe he became a somewhat useful intelligence source, but Hedgman would have a much better recollection of that. But I do remember quite well his dispatch. He had been seen by two or three members of my Division, including my deputy. I don't recall that I ever met him unless I met him in the Congo. If I did I just don't remember. But I remember he was assessed as it were, recruited in the United States and dispatched on a general purpose mission.Mr. Baron. So, he would be viewed as one of the major assets that Hedgman had in the Congo at that point?Mr. Tweedy. How major I don't know. He was an# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 66]
# TOP SECRET64asset. Only time would have told how major it would have been. He was thought qualified to perform one of a variety of things in the Congo by Hedgman.Mr. Baron. Would one of those things for which he was qualified have been an assassination mission against Lumumba?Mr. Tweedy. As I told you previously, told you and Mr. Wides previously, absolutely not, for the simple reason he was basically dispatched, assessed and dealt with by the balance of the Division, not by me personally, Glenn Fields personally, and he was in effect a station as set mounted by the Division.The Division knew nothing about the balance of this thing.Mr. Baron. You are saying that Division personnel outside of yourself and Glenn Fields would not have knownMr. Tweedy. To my knowledge.Mr. Baron -- would not have known that the assassination of Lumumba was being considered?Mr. Tweedy. Considered at all, that is correct.Mr. Baron. And --Mr. Tweedy. If they did learn of it I never knew that they learned of it and certainly never learned of it through me or Fields.Mr. Baron. The fact that you left the recruitment and training of this asset to other people in the Division than# TOP SECRET