Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10008-10246.pdf — page 3]
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY                                        Page 2 of 2# TOP SECRETFILE:-- Prepared a daily briefing for the White House on Cuban intelligence.-- Preparing review of books such as "The Invisible Government" and damage reports (i.e., reports setting forth what sensitive information exposed by book).P.D. stressed that he was "out of touch with the day-to-day operations of Task Force W". However, he believes that Harvey kept Helms fully briefed.Harvey, in P.D.'s own words, was "not an ordinary man", . . . "egocentric", "bombastic", "one of the strongest proponents of compartmentalization and need to know". In addition, Harvey had a law degree and a successful FBI stint prior to joining the Agency.Harvey had a thyroid problem. As one of the "CIA's most interesting characters", Harvey was often talked about; P.D. has difficulty separating personal experience from rumors. Describing Harvey as a "four martini man at lunch" . . . which, coupled with Harvey's thyroid medicine, caused Harvey to be sleepy, etc., after lunch. In fact, P.D. told us that this was the "last straw" in McCone's eyes; i.e., apparently when McCone called Harvey in to "discuss" the Kennedys' complaints about Harvey's utterings, it was immediately after lunch and Harvey either fell asleep or failed to pay attention. ("McCone did not have an audience.") P.D. added that there was general "bad chemistry" between McCone and Harvey.P.D. noted Harvey's intense loyalty to "his people" (including Helms and Starkey[^3]). However, P.D. is sure that even with these people, Harvey was likely to have been extremely close-mouthed.[^3]:
[157-10008-10253.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystemIdentification FormDate: 2/23/201Agency Info mationAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10008-10253RECORD SERIES: MEMORANDUMAGENCY FILE NUMBER:Document In formationORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM:TO:TITLE: RELATING TO "BOOK V" OF CHURCH COMMITTEEDATE: 00/00/1976PAGES: 12SUBJECTS:CASTROCUBANOTES RE: BOOK V OF CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORTDOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMEN ΓCLASSIFICATION: UnclassifiedRESTRICTIONS:CURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/15/1994OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: BOX 441
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Book V. p. 79 In mid-1965 the CIA interrogated Tepedino, New York jeweler who had been involved with the AMLASH operation from the beginning. The report concluded that the subject was deceptive during the interrogation and withheld pertinent information in one or more relevant areas. Tepedino lied in response to questions dealing with AMLASH's and his ties to Cuban intelligence. Tepedino stated chat AMLASH had no plan to overthrow Castro. Tepedino stated AMLASH had strong connections with Cuban intelligence and was probably cooperating with it in various ways. Although AMLASH never mentioned these connections to his CIA case officers, Teledino stated chat AMLASH had mentioned them to him and almost everyone else he had met.
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Book V, p. 25 Helms cirected Karamessinis and Angleton to fully cooperate with the desk officer, John Whitten, charged with investigating the assassination. On November 24, Mexico City cabled the names of known contacts of Soviet personnel in Mexico City and AMLASH's name (Rolando Cubela) was included on that list. Nonetheless neither Fitzgerald, Helms, Tom Kor Angleton advised the desk officer of significance of this name.
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157-10011-10000 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 Date:08/15/92Page:1JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10000RECORDS SERIES :INDEX CARDSAGENCY FILE NUMBER :DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIAFROM :TO :TITLE :[R]DATE: 07/01/75PAGES: 494SUBJECTS :OPERATION MONGOOSE[R]DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION : TRESTRICTIONS: REFERREDCURRENT STATUS: PDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/28/93OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS:Box 132, Book 1 of 5,Index Cards dated June-July 1975[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTEDNW 50955 DocId:32203768 Page 1
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Reviewed by NSAOn 1/10/94Release in PartPERSONS/ENTITIES:SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZERDATES:July 11, 1962CATEGORIES:Special Group AugmentedMONGOOSEOCCURRENCE: Notice to Special Group that operational representatives are preparing assessments of Operation MONGOOSE. These will cover among other things "factors worth considering in deciding on a future course of action (We have a working definition of four possible future courses of action)." Memo quotes NSA summary on intelligence problems which notes that "Intelligence has been obtained of Soviet participation in-Cuban tacticalair training, Cuban-air_defense_performance, and-the-presence of Soviet-type-air-defenseequipments."Sec6(1)(b)SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmentedfrom Lansdale re: Progress OPERATION MONGOOSE 11 July 1962(00428-00430)FILE:STAFF:DATE: di GenovaJuly 2, 1975
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# UNCLASSIFIEDCIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZED![Signature] 4 Feb 14K10/8/98| PERSONS/ENTITIES:                                                  | DATES:       | CATEGORIES:             || ------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------ | ----------------------- || HELMS PRESIDENT KENNEDY MCCONE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD | July 25,1962 | SPECIAL GROUP LMONGOOSE |OCCURRENCE: Helms notes that McCone briefed the panel of the President's foreign intelligence advisory board on political action projects. He pointed out that "each project must have his approval to the circulation to the members of the Special Group". For example, reconnasiance overflights are now approved. Helms noted covert financial support in Peruvian, Greek, Finnish, Italian, and Brazilian elections Helms "read to the panel a paper on the operation Mongoose which theDirector had used earlier in the day for giving a briefing to the President."SOURCE: Memorandum for the record, re meeting on CA matters with the panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board of Helms, dated July 25, 1962 (00870)STAFF:diGenovaDATE:7/3/75![CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT]
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NW 50955 DocId: 32203768 Page 4PERSONS/ENTITIES:Father PeytonPeter GraceNO OBJECTIONNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILDATES:Dec. 5, 1960CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZEDCATEGORIES:MongooseSpecial Group2 Feb 94(1) (A)(1)(B)2 8/10/98OCCURRENCE:The Special Group discussed (1) the possibility of providing sixty thousand dollars from the Cuba budget to sponsor the religious activity of Father Peyton in Cuba; (2) a proposal to survey the possibility of establishing a strike base in Nicaragua; (3) the necessity for the Defense Department to supply 38 military men to CIA. "Mr. Douglas questioned whether the present concept of 600 or 700 Cubans is any longer practicable. He said that it had been his understanding that -the-current-thinking-contemplated_figures_more_on_the_order_of 3,000." Mr. Barnes replied that the CIA believes what is required is enough individuals to serve as a rallying point for the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and thus 600 is as useful as 3,000. The CIA justified the request for 38 military men because it now believed it was necessary to train the Cubans in infantry tactics involved in a defense, in addition to the guerrilla warfare training previously contemplated.SOURCE:Special Group meeting minutes Dec. 5, 1960STAFF:Bob KelleyFILE:DATE:June 29, 1975
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NW 50955 DocId: 32203768 Page 5PERSONS/ENTITIES:SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTEDMONGOOSE, TAYLOR, RFK) JOHNSON,GILPATRICK, (MCCONE, CARTER,LEMNITZER, CLANSDALE CLINE, PARROTTOCCURRENCE:No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for CIA deletions, (1)(c) 2/8/94CATEGORIES: 28/10/98DATES:July 12, 1962 Special Group AugmentedJuly 20,-1962 MONGOOSEApril 9, 1963 (CARD ONE OF TWO )CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED 4 Feb. 94 (1)(c). (2p)Lansdale briefed the group on numbers of agents in Cuba. Air resupply proposal submitted by CIA "should be deferred pending broader review of the entire situation." Taylor noted if urgent need for air supply proposal could be made to the Special Group Augmented at any time. "Mr. McCone emphasized that no high-level penetra- tions of the Cuban government have yet been attained." "The Attorney General inquired about the status of popular support for Castro, and also the possibility of a revolt -against-him."_ Lansdale_replied, "There is no rallying point for active opposition."The AG and Johnson emphasize need to obtain hard intelligence on subversive activities by Castro in the hemisphere. A complete review of MONGOOSE was set toward the end of July. Taylor emphasized need for summaries of results "and a statement of future al- ternatives open to the U.S. should be developed." Looking into proposal to subsidize *Japanese* purchases of Dominican sugars so that the *Japanese* could divert these purchases from Cuba. McCone said that his experts had informed him that from a legal point of view, CIA could use unvouchered funds to support an operation of this kind. He cautioned,SOURCE: Memo for the record, Minutes of the Special STAFF: (continued) Group (Augmented) meeting 12 July 1962 re: Operation MONGOOSE, (00031-00032)FILE:DATE: di Genova July 2, 1975
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:MCCONE, HARVEY, RUZde Cornbal, Virgen vaOCCURRENCE: Efforts were made to establish contact with Juana Castro Rug, half sister of Fidel and Raul Castro Ruz, because she opposed the strong Communist nature of the Cuban regime. According to Mrs. Virginia Leitao de Cunha, she contacted Ruz and obtained Ruz agreement to provide intelligence on the Cuban political leadership and to work against the Cuban Communist regime, "short of engaging in activity which might result in direct personal charmstor her brothers Raul and Ridel." Arrangements were being made for direct recruitment of Ruz in Mexico.DATES:July 10, 1962June, 11, 1962July 1, 1962May 1962CATEGORIES:MONGOOSESOURCE: Memorandum for McCone from William Harvey re:Juana Castro Ruz, 10 July 1962 (02561)FILE:STAFF:di GenovaDATE: July 1, 1975.
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NW 50955 DocId: 32203768 Page 7PERSONS/ENTITIES:PRES. KENNEDY, HARVEY, TAYLORDATES:MAY 7, 1962CATEGORIES:MONGOOSE, SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTEDOCCURRENCE: Memo: "I reported to higher authority the substance of Mr. HARVEY'S briefing of the SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED on 3 MAY 1962, pointing out the very limited progress which has been made and the uncertainty of the ultimate effectiveness of our program. I mentioned the DUQUE incident as indicative of the morale problem. It was agreed we would continue along the present lines-until the terminal-date-of-the-present-phase in August."TOP SECRETSOURCE: MEMO FOR RECORD, REPORT OF PROGRESS TO HIGHER AUTHORITY, MAY 7, 1962, MAXWELL D. TAYLOR (00024)STAFF: DiGenovaFILE:DATE: 7/2/75CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZED4 Feb-94(1)(A)8/10/98
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:MR. GRAYMR. GEHLENDATES:Oct 6, 1960CATEGORIES:Special GroupMONGOOSEPresidential AuthorizationCard 2 of 3OCCURRENCE:On October 6, 1960 the Special Group discussed relating to CUBA:(1) Explanation by MR. DULLES of the "abortive supply drop to resistance elements" in Cuba.(2) MR. DULLES' proposal for_U-2_coverage_of_CUBA _"All_the_members_of_the_group_said that they were in favor of proceeding with the coverage." Mr. Gray asked to have the memorandums on which Mr. Dulles had based his presentation forwarded to him for use in getting the required decision.Mr. Dulles' proposal for use of American volunteers and foreign nationals in the Cuban operation. The group agreed Mr. Dulles could begin screening lists of potential candidates. Dulles added that there might be a possibility ofSOURCE:Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960STAFF:Bob KelleyFILE:CageDATE: June 29, 1975
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:Oct. 6, 1960CATEGORIES:Special GroupMONGOOSEPresidential AuthorizationCard 3 of 3OCCURRENCE: (cont.)including some Germans in this group and that we would talk informally to General Gehlen about it. He emphasized that he was asking for no Special Group approval at this time in this specific connection."![Top Secret Stamp]SOURCE:Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960FILE: CageSTAFF:DATE: Bob KelleyJune 29, 1975
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NW 50955 DocId: 32203768 Page 10CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZED![signature] 1 FEB 94(1)(c)28/10/98PERSONS/ENTITIES:MCCONECanadaDATES:![TOP SECRET stamp]CATEGORIES:MONGOOSEOCCURRENCE:McCone testified that he recalled that activity to sabotage the shipment of spare parts from Canada to Cuba. He did not recall whether it was Vickers spare parts. (23).SOURCE:McCone, Testimony, 6/6/75STAFF:RheaFILE:DATE:6/27/75
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NO OBJECTION as evinceNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL2/23/94CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZED大8/10/98No DoD objection to public disclosurepursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for2/8/94CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZED2 Fol 94(1)(c)| PERSONS/ENTITIES: | DATES:       | CATEGORIES:   || ----------------- | ------------ | ------------- || LANSDALE,         | Mar 2, 1962  | Special Group ||                   | Nov 30, 1961 | Mongoose      |OCCURRENCE: Lansdale traces the history of the project from its inception on Nov. 30, 1961 through March 1, 1962. Under the latter date, he notes, "The Chief of Operations /Lansdale/is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412 Augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress." (00181) Lansdale also submitted an intelligence plan for basic intelligence collection upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro. The plan itself at pages 00183 through 00187, included establishing intelligence agents inside Cuba; collecting intelligence from Cubans inside the United States; counterfeiting ration cards and currency inside of Cuba; geographical surveys of air fields, military installations, communications centers; attempts to place trained agents inside the government organizations or to defect officials "in place"; and gotiating for British help in taminating lubricants and fuels to cripple Cuban, transportation at The British want to know, how serious are you?, before risking their assets to help the U.S.". (00180-00187)SOURCE: Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962 on the Cuba Project (00180-00187)STAFF:di GenovaFILE:DATE: June 30, 1975
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:HELMS, LANSDALE,No DoD objection to public disclosurepursuant to P.L. 102-526, except forNSA deletion, (1)(B) & (c)DATES:Feb. 1, 1962CATEGORIES:Special Group AugmentedMONGOOSEOCCURRENCE: Memo for Richard Helms from Gen. Lansdale concerning *NSA* cover. The memoalludes to a conversation on the previous day, Jan. 31, 1962, about *NSA* cover for theCuba Project. It indicates that Cuba cover is top priority. It indicated that this was notpossibly known to the members of the United States Intelligence Board. The problem seemed tobe to be able to decide how much of (*NSA* (National Security Agency)'s) assets were needed toprovide cover for the Cuban project.# TOP SECRETSOURCE: Memorandum for Richard Helms from Brig. Gen. Lans-dale, dated Feb. 1, 1962 (00122)STAFF:di GenovaFILE:DATE: June 29, 1975
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:LANSDALE,CATEGORIES:Special GroupMongooseDATES:Mar 2, 1962Nov 30, 1961OCCURRENCE: Lansdale traces the history of the project from its inception on Nov. 30,1961 through March 1, 1962. Under the latter date, he notes, "The Chief of Operations/Lansdale/is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412 Augmentedby the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible forproviding policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress."(00181) Lansdale also submitted an intelligence plan for basic intelligence collectionupon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro.The plan itself at pages 00183 through 00187 included establishing intelligence agentsinside Cuba; collecting intelligence from Cubans inside the United States; counterfeitingration cards and currency inside of Cuba; geographical surveys of air fields, militaryinstallations, communications centers; attempts to place trained agents inside the governmentorganizations or to defect officials "in place"; and negotiating for British help incontaminating lubricants and fuels to cripple Cuban transportation. The British want toknow, how serious are you?, before risking their assets to help the U.S. (00180-00187)SOURCE: Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962on the Cuba Project (00180-00187)STAFF:di GenovaFILE:DATE: June 30. 1975![CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED]
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:Helms, RichardLeyland BUS Co.DATES:1962CATEGORIES:CastroMongoose ✓OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that the aim of the Cuban operations was "to get rid of Castro or the Castro regime in Cuba; lets put it that way, and no limitations were placed on the means. In fact, I never recall having been told by anybody do not do this, do not do that, do not do the other thing." (26) (The above statements refer to Mongoose.) Helms testified that "the pressure was very intense and I remember vividly it was very intense." The pressure led to several "very nutty schemes." (26) Helms testified the pressure built up to the Bay of Pigs and then lay dormant for awhile and intensified again toward the end of 1961 and 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis itself was the period of greatest intensity. Afterwards interest tapered off, although Helms recalled efforts in 1963 involving "economic warfare" such as turning off oil deliveries and stopping bus deliveries including an attempt to stop the sale by the Leyland Bus Company in Spain of buses to Cuba. (27)SOURCE:Helms 6/13/75FILE:STAFF:RheaDATE:6/28/75
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:(continuation)DATES:CATEGORIES:OCCURRENCE: CARD 2Card 2 of 4meeting of foreign ministers which opened January 22, 1962. The object was to get wideWestern Hemisphere support for OAS resolutions condemning Cuba and isolating it from therest of the hemisphere. "The OAS meeting is to be supported by public demonstrations inLatin America, generated by CIA and a psychological campaign assisted by USIA." The majortask_of_the_diplomatic_capability_was_to encourage Latin American leaders to developindependent operations similar to the instant project seeking an internal revolt of theCuban people against the Communist regime. In the economic warfare area an embargo onCuban trade was to be considered after the OAS meeting. The CIA was unable to undertakethe action to sabotage the sugar harvest which commences about January 15 and upon whichCuba's one-crop economy depended. Sabotage of transport, mills, sugar sacking in canefields was explored, according to Lansdale's review. Special sabotage support was noted.→SOURCE:STAFF:FILE:TOP SECRETDATE:
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:(continuation)DATES:CATEGORIES:Card 3 of 4.OCCURRENCE: CARD 3"CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stoppage of some Cuban transports) is not expected until mid-1962. CIA is introducing "*Lubzol*", a corrosive additive to Cuban locomotive diesel fuel oil through commercial suppliers in Belgium. A similar project was noted for jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba. Lansdale noted that the CIA had concluded that its realistic role should be to at least create the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create-a-climate-which-will-permit-provocative actions in support of a shift to overaction. Lansdale wanted them to reevaluate to see whether or not they could make a greater effort. An outline of what the 33 tasks are for each of the entities involved then follows in Lansdale's memo. The memorandum notes that the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the project through the appropriate organizations and departments of the government. In this regard the memo notes "Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popularSOURCE:STAFF:FILE:TOP SECRETDATE:
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:CARD 3DATES:CATEGORIES:Card 3 of 3OCCURRENCE: (continued from Memo for the Special Group re: Cuba Project, Jan. 24, 1962 detectives and foreign police officials." (00106)In regard to Task #7 of General Lansdale's review this memo notes, "Moreover, the development of a resisitence movement will not remain controllable, so that operational time tables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions." (00107)The memorandum notes that six men to form the initial nucleus for work for_inside_Cuba_ have-been-assessed-in-depth. Fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers for resistence. It was also noted that in support of State's efforts, CIA has conducted pro- paganda operations_including a number of mass demonstrations in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.SOURCE:FILE:**TOP SECRET**STAFF:DATE:
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# NW 50955 DocId: 32203768 Page 18NO OBJECTION servicNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL2/23/94PERSONS/ENTITIES:LANSDALE,No DoD objection to public disclosurepursuant to P.L. 102-526, except forCIA deletions. (1)(C)2/8194DATES:Mar 13, 1962Y,CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZED2 Feb 94(1)(c)CATEGORIES:Special Group AugmentedMONGOOSE ✓CUBA(2 pp)K8/10/98Card 1of2.OCCURRENCE: The planning for Operation MONGOOSE was prepared on a format of separate planning for each department and agency involved. Revised planning along that line was submitted with this memorandum. Activities already approved were marked with an asterisk. Approved were dispatching one intelligence agent operation to a key area selected by the CIA, ("Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills -as-well-as-intelligence-collection,... However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.") (00207), Carribbean Admissions Center cpa-Locka, Florida. Periodic intelligence estimates, continued negotiating for British help in contaminating locamotive lubricants, two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba approved for March 16-31, 1962, develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S., develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962 in South America andSOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmentedfrom Lansdale re: Institutional Planning, Operation MONGOOSE,13 March 1962 (00206-00213)FILE:STAFFILTDANE di GenovaDATE 1, 1975Jal