Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10011-10066.pdf — page 13]
SECRET/SENSITIVE- 9 -5. On two or three occasions between 1970 and 1972 the Washington Field Office loaned the MPD Morals Division a device to tap a touch-tone telephone. The request came from Inspectors R. L. Dollard and William L. Foran Ed Sayle of CIA was CIA's contact with Dollard, and Foran for equipment requests. Dollard or Foran would call Sayle, who in turn would direct Brewer to provide the equipment.6. On two or three occasions between 1970 and 1972, Sayle directed Brewer to provide receiving devices to MPD. Once Sgt. Brandaur of MPD personally contacted Brewer and requested a receiver. It was provided (ostensibly for training purposes).7. On several occasions covert miniature transmitters were furnished to MPD on an indefinite loan.8. The Washington Field Office also gave MPD personnel technical advice on use of double tape machines and advice on photography from time to time.MPD received no assistance from the Washington Field Office when they set up their Intelligence Division in 1967-68. No other assistance was ever rendered MPD concerning solving particular crime or interrogating a particular witness. Sometime after Director Schlessinger became DCI, the MPD was asked to return all equipment previously loaned to it by the CIA, and most was returned. Apparently a list of this equipment has been prepared. (The list may include other police departments as well).Montgomery County Police DepartmentIn about 1970, Mr. Brewer loaned some transmitters to Inspector Thrallkill (Ret.) and Lt. Glazom of the county police. They had already been loaned some receivers before Brewer came with the Washington Field Office.Fairfax County Police Department1. Years ago the county was given an old Ampex 601 recorder equipped to take a telephone tap off a dial phone.2. On one occasion Brewer accompanied a county police representative to U.S. Recording on S. Capitol Street to help him pick out a dial recorder for telephone taps.3. In 1969-70, Brewer loaned some photographic equipment to the county police forces intelligence unit. The equipment has never been returned.No personnel have ever been loaned to the county. No assistance has ever been given concerning a specific crime or witness.SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE- 10 -Other1.  In 1969 or 1970 metal detection demonstrations were given at CIA Headquarters to representatives of all Virginia and Maryland Police Departments.2.  Director Helms owned a beach house near Lewes, Delaware. On one occasion Brewer met with the chief of police there concerning the security of the beach house, as Helms had been receiving threats. Apparently Osborn gave the police chief a box of flares and other equipment (as a gift to the department) for the chief's assistance.At some point during the interview, Mr. Brewer indicated that he had not discussed his testimony with any representative of the Agency prior to the interview--except the General Counsel.IMPRESSIONSMr. Brewer was originally somewhat reluctant to be interviewed and at one point was considering whether he should retain a lawyer. However, as we went along he opened up considerably to the point where I now believe I have a pretty good understanding of the Office of Security's Washington Field Office. It would appear that the Washington Field Office did conduct much, if not most, of the physical and technical surveillance directed against American citizens subsequent to 1968. In every case the surveillance was directed by higher authority. It also appears that the Washington Field Office gave substantial assistance to local police departments in the Washington, D. C. area. Much of this assistance was obviously an appropriate exchange of information between two intelligence units. Most disturbing is the incident where CIA agents assisted MPD officers in a bona fide police surveillance (a law enforcement function), but this seems to have been an isolated case.JNR/vmrSECRET/SENSITIVENW 50955 DocId: 32203834 Page 15
[157-10011-10078.pdf — page 0]
157-10011-10078 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992Date:10/06/93Page:1JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10011-10078RECORDS SERIES :AGENCY FILE NUMBER :DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : UNKNOWNFROM :TO :TITLE :TESTIMONY OF OSBORN, HOWARD J.DATE: 02/17/75PAGES: 22SUBJECTS:MAJOR SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED IN TESTIMONY OF OSBORN, HOWARDDOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION : TRESTRICTIONS: REFERREDCURRENT STATUS: PDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS:SSCI Box 288, Folder 9![handwritten text, "Send to CIA 3/2/94 Classified Annex"][R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTEDNW 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 1
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SSCI Box 288, Folder 9288-9TOP SECRET (XGDS)Record Number 157-10011-10078MAJOR SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED IN THETESTIMONY OF HOWARD J. OSBORNFebruary 17, 1975Background of Mr. OsbornSee the written statement submitted to the Commission by Mr. Osborn dated February 11, 1975.Activities of the Office of Security Giving Rise to Questions1. Taping Systems in Certain CIA OfficesIn the offices of the DCI, the Deputy DCI, the Executive Director-Controller, the Deputy Director for Support (now Administration), the Director of Security, and the Deputy Director of Security, a system of telephone taps and microphones has existed. This system has made it possible to record covertly any telephone conversation or office conference taking place in those offices. All CIA officials in whose offices such equipment was installed were fully aware of its presence and its capability of being activated only by them. Portions of the system have been disconnected in recent years.2. Covert Uses of Listening Devices by the Office of SecurityIn each instance the installation of listening devices was expressly approved by the Director of Central Intelligence:a. A conversation which occurred in a motel between Victor Marchetti and Admiral Rufus Taylor, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, was covertly recorded. This was a meeting arranged by Admiral Taylor for the purpose of attempting to persuade Mr. Marchetti not to divulge sensitive information in a book which he was then writing;b. Interviews with defectors have been covertly recorded from time to time;c. With the approval of Attorney General Katzenbach, a telephone tap was placed on the telephone of a CIA employee who was alleged to be a spy of a foreign country;CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZED![signature]3 AUG 94![signature]TOP SECRET (XGDS 5B(2) EO 11652By Authority of:NW 50955 DocID: 303846 Page 2
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TOP SECRET- 2 -d. Polygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been routinely covertly recorded;e. The field offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert recording devices to record conversations of CIA employees with others where there was some reason to be concerned about the loyalty of such employees.3. Physical SurveillancePhysical surveillance of individuals in this country has been very rare as far as the Office of Security is concerned. Circumstances under which surveillance has been conducted have been limited to the following:a. CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classified information to unauthorized persons;b. *Victor Marchetti* to find out if he was getting information from current employees of the CIA;c. Jack Anderson, Les Whitten and another legman to determine their sources of classified information, and *Michael Gettner*, a staff writer for *the Washington Post*, for the same purpose;d. A female contact of the Latin American Division (and some of her associates) who reported to the CIA the existence of a plot to assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the Director of Central Intelligence.4. Watergate Contactsa. The McCord Lettersb. The Pennington Matterc. Assistance to E. Howard Hunt and White House re Ellsberg5. Covert Informers Employed by the Agencya. Within the Agency and Its ContractorsThe Office of Security employs a wide range of confidential informers from among the general roster of employees of the Agency. Included here are plumbers, chauffeurs, guards, telephone maintenance men, electricians, members of the char force, etc. TheseTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET- 3 -employees are paid additional compensation to act as infomers and to report to the Office of Security on any potential security problems which they observe among their fellow employees at the Agency.A few outside employees, i.e., non-employees of the Agency, are also retained for the same purpose. This would include employees of the telephone company and construction workers engaged in the construction of Agency buildings. In all instances, however, the purpose is to maintain security among CIA employees and those working for CIA contractors.Two proprietary companies, called Anderson Security Associates and General Personnel Investigations, have been used to do large- scale investigations of the personnel of companies who contract with the CIA.b. Outside the AgencyIn 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security arranged for Anderson Security Associates to have its employees attend meetings and other functions of various organizations thought to represent potential threats to CIA personnel or installations and to report on such threats. A list of organizations to be checked for indications of such threats was pro- vided to Anderson Security Associates, which in turn provided regular reports to the Office of Security on the activities of the organization monitored.There was also coordination between the Office of Security and local police departments to cover the same activity. An effort was made to determine the size of anticipated demonstrations and to anticipate what security forces would be necessary to cope with them.In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security directed the field offices to solicit or report information on anti-war and dissident elements. The CIA was concerned about the safety of its personnel, such as recruiters on college campuses, and its offices around the country. The field offices were directed at about that time to establish a clipping service on campus and other newspapers to report on organi- zations and individuals who might represent threats to CLA personnel or offices.As a result of the information fed into the Office of Security relating to organizations and individuals who may represent such threats, a substantial number of files were accumulated on individuals and or- ganizations.TOP SECRETNW 50955 DocId: 32203846 Page 4
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TOP SECRET- 4 -6. Mail Intercept Programs in New York and San Francisco7. Cover Operations Using Local Police CoverArrangements were made several years ago with Colonel Durrer of the Fairfax County, Va., Police Department for the issuance of badges and other police identification for use by CIA security personnel. This involved about 15 sets of identification.These badges and other identification were never used by the CIA. They were all returned to Colonel Durrer.Similar arrangements have been made with other police departments.Strict orders were issued that the use of identification as local police officers was to be limited strictly to situations involving actual cover for surveillance purposes.8. Training of State and Local Police and Other AssistanceAssistance was rendered to many local police departments, including those of the cities of New York and Chicago, and to the Maryland and Virginia state police during the period 1965 to 1972. He states that this program was vigorously and enthusiastically approved and supported by Mr. Helms.Assistance consisted of training of personnel, the loaning of equipment, and the declassification of materials and techniques in such areas as photo analysis, surveillance techniques, metals detection, explosives detection, locks and picks, hidden microphones, telephotography and covert photography, and the setting up, handling, and organization of intelligence operations.This program was terminated upon passage of an amendment to the Law Enforcement Assistance Act, which prohibited assistance to local and state police departments by the CIA.9. Break-Ins Without WarrantsMr. Osborn states that the only break-ins which have occurred to his knowledge by security personnel of the CIA have been those involving employees, former employees, or CIA contact agents who were under investigation for suspected disclosure or classified information.
[157-10011-10078.pdf — page 5]
TOP SECRET- 5 -10. Counter-Audio SweepsAt the request of other departments and agencies, including Congressional Committees, the Office of Security conducts "counter-audio sweeps" of their offices to protect against telephone taps, hidden microphones, and other intercepts of audible communications.TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10078.pdf — page 6]
TOP SECRET (XGDS)COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATESWashington, DC 20500Nelson A. Rockefeller,ChairmanJohn T. ConnorC. Douglas DillonErwin N. GriswoldLane KirklandLyman L. LemnitzerRonald ReaganEdgar F. Shannon, Jr.David W. Belin,Executive DirectorFebruary 13, 1975MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILEFROM:ROBERT OLSENSUBJECT:Summary of an Interview of Howard Osborn, conducted on February 10 and ll in the offices of the Commission by Mr. Robert B. OlsenPresent throughout the interview, which was conducted from 2:00 pm to approximately 5:30 pm on February 10 and from 12 noon until 2:45 pm and from 4:45 pm to approximately 8:00 pm on February 11, was the attorney for Mr. Osborn, Jack Debelius.Mr. Osborn appeared voluntarily at the request of the Commission staff. At the outset, Mr. Debelius raised a series of questions:1.  He asked us to supply an outline of the authority of the Commission. He was handed a copy of the Executive Order creating the Commission and spelling out its duties and powers.2.  He asked whether the Commission had subpoena powers, and he was advised that it did not.3.  He asked whether the Commission had power to grant immunity to witnesses, and he was advised that the Commission does not have such power.4.  He asked what liaison has been established, or will be established between the Commission and the various Senate and House Committees which will be investigating the CIA and other intelligence activities. He was told that the Commission expects to establish such liaison, but that none of the ground rules or arrangements have yet been agreed upon.5.  He asked whether Mr. Osborn would have an opportunity to review the transcript of any recorded testimony that he may give to the Commission or to the Commission staff. He was told that the Commission staff had agreed upon a policy of allowing any witness to examine the transcript of his own testimony.6.  He asked whether Mr. Olsen had been cleared for security and whether Mr. Osborn was free to reveal all levels of classified information in the course of the interview. He was advised that such a clearance had been obtained for Mr. Olsen and that Mr. Osborn was free to answer fully any questions put to him within the scope of the responsibilities of the Commission.TOP SECRET (XGDS-5B(2) EO 11652By Authority ofNW 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 7
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TOP SECRET- 2 -Mr. Debelius stated that he had carefully reviewed his own situation as a former employee of the Office of Security within the CIA and that he had concluded that there was no prospect that he would be called as a witness either by the Commission or by any Congressional or other committee. Hence, he did not feel that there would be any conflict in his representation of Mr. Osborn under the canons of ethics applicable to the legal profession.## Background of Mr. OsbornHoward Osborn graduated from the Virginia Polytechnic Institute in 1940 and shortly thereafter entered the military service. After World War II he was briefly with Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, and then joined the Central Intelligence Agency in late 1947. He served in various assignments within the United States and Europe prior to September 1963, including assignment as Assistant to the Inspector General and positions within the Directorate of Plans. In September 1963 he was named Deputy Director of Security. At that time the Director of Security was Rob Bannerman. On July 1, 1964, he was named Director of Security, and he continued in that position until early March 1974 when he applied for disability retirement and went on sick leave. He was retired on disability on December 31, 1974, having not returned to work since going on sick leave on March 8, 1974. He states that he had no involvement whatever with Agency activities after March 8, 1974.## Activities of the Office of SecurityThe Office of Security provides guards and security personnel to protect the physical facilities of the Agency. It has responsibility for overall security measures for all CIA installations, both in the United States and in foreign countries.## Counter-Audio SweepsAt the request of other departments and agencies of the United States Government it conducts "counter-audio sweeps" of their offices to protect against telephone taps, hidden microphones, and other intercepts of audible communications.In the case of Congressional committees and subcommittees, it conducts such sweeps of hearings rooms on the occasion of classified presentations by CIA personnel. Mr. Osborn further stated that there may have been other occasions when such sweeps were made of Congressional committee rooms, at the committee request, where classified presentations were to be made. Mr. Osborn does not, however, specifically recall such other occasions.It also seems to Mr. Osborn that the Office of Security has made similar counter-audio sweeps for one or more individual congressmen or senators of their offices in the Senate or House Office Buildings, but he again has no specific recollection. The Office of Security also makes such sweeps of the homes of officials of the CIA with their knowledge.TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET- 3 -He knows of no case in which the CIA has made a sweep of any other residences.It does make sweeps of private firms who have CIA contracts, but always with the knowledge and consent of the firm.He states that his Office has never used equipment for counter-audio sweeps for "positive intelligence."The sweeps conducted included physical inspection, checking all telephones for taps, checking desks, walls, ceilings and floors for listening devices or radio receivers, and may involve such sophisticated measures as counter-laser measures and the use of a Dodge mobile home equipped with sophisticated equipment capable of picking up a radio transmission from nearby premises.## Taping Systems in Certain CIA OfficesMr. Osborn stated that Mr. Helms had authorized for use in his office, in the office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, in the office of the Executive Director-Controller, in the office of the Deputy Director for Support (now Administration), in the office of the Director of Security, and in the office of the Deputy Director of Security a system of telephone taps and secret microphones which made it possible to record covertly any telephone con- versation or office conference taking place in those offices. The taping system could be activated with respect to telephones by depressing a button on the tele- phone in the office or on the telephone at the desk of the secretary in the adjacent office. The taping system to record office conversations would be acti- vated by depressing a button under the carpet in the vicinity of the desk of the person occupying that office. All CIA officials in whose offices such equipment was installed were fully aware of its presence and its capability of being acti- vated only by them.The recorded conversations from all of these offices, except those in the Office of Security, were recorded in a central bank of recorders located in the base- ment of the building. Those emanating from the Office of the Director of Security or Deputy Director of Security were recorded on twin recorders located down the hall from those offices.All recorded telephone and office conversations were transcribed. In some in- stances the tapes were retained, and in some instances they were erased. It is not known whether the Agency retains any copies of the typed transcripts. From time to time, particularly as an official has departed from the CIA, he has ondered tapes erased and transcripts destroyed.Mr. Osbom reports that Mr. Colby directed the removal of the recording and tele- phone taping equipment from his office when he became Executive Director- Controller of the Agency and again when he became Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Bannerman also had the equipment taken out of his office when he became Deputy Director for Support (Administration). Apparently all other officials in whose offices such equipment was installed used it from time to time.## Positive Uses of Counter-Audio EquipmentMr. Osborn stated that he wishes to clarify his previous testimony that counter audio had not been used in a positive sense. What he meant was that it had notTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET- 4 -been used in the positive sense under any of the circumstances referred to above. There were, however, several situations in which telephone tapes and covert recording devices were employed by the Office of Security:1. A conversation which occurred in a motel between *Victor Marchetti* and Admiral Rufus Taylor, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, was covertly recorded. This was a meeting arranged by Admiral Taylor for the purpose of attempting to persuade *Mr. Marchetti* not to divulge sensitive information in a book which he was then writing;2. Interviews with defectors have been covertly recorded from time to time;3. With the approval of Attorney General Katzenbach, a telephone tap was placed on the telephone of a CIA employee who was alleged to be a spy of a foreign country;4. Polygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been routinely covertly recorded;5. The field offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert recording devices to record conversations of CIA employees with others where there was some reason to be concerned about the loyalty of such employees. In each instance the installation of such listening devices was expressly approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Osborn recalls only three such instances:a. In 1972-73 such a device was installed in an effort to uncover details where an old defector was being forced to make kickbacks of his compensation from CIA to his CIA case officer;b. At a date which could not be recalled by Mr. Osborn a device had been installed to record activity of a female employee of the CIA who had become closely and intimately associated with persons believed to be dissidents;c. In about 1968 or 1969 at the request of Mr. Frank Bartamo of the Department of Defense the CIA planted listening devices at the apartment of a serviceman doing highly sensitive cryptographic work. This was done with the full knowledge of Mr. William Sullivan of the FBI. Mr. Osborn speculates that the CIA was called upon to accomplish this task for the Department of Defense because Mr. Sullivan believed that J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, would not approve.Mr. Osborn states that there may have been other instances where such listening devices were installed within the United States, but he does not recall any others. He is emphatic to the effect that after President Johnson issued an Executive Order prohibiting telephone taps without the authority of the Attorney General, the CIA never to his knowledge covertly tapped a telephone within the United States except in the one incidence authorized by Attorney General Katzenbach.TOP SECRET