Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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PAGE TWOTYPE WEAPONS INVOLVED. POSSIBLE METHODS DELIVERY ARE FORNICLAM PLANE TO TRANSPORT FROM ADJACENT TERRITORY, OR POSSIBLYFROM MATADI BY PLANE OR TRUCK. ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE GIVEMONEY TO LAT 5 TO GIVE TO LAT 7 FOR HIM TO PURCHASEDIRECT AND HAND OVER TO LATC. WIROAK - IN VIEW OUR DISTRUST SUBJECT REF A EXPLORE NICLAM.KNOWLEDGE OF AND ACCESS TO FETICHEUR TO DETERMINE WHETHERBUYING OFF FETICHEUR AS WIROAK SPIRITUAL SUPPORT MIGHT BE SERIOUSBLOW TO HIM. ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW STAND BEHIND IS TOSUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING WIROAK, DESIRABLE AS MORE.DEFINITIVE ACTION MIGHT BE. ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULD HAVE TO BEENTIRELY CONGOLESE. HOWEVER, WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS FOROUR REVIEW ON ANY WAY THIS COULD POSSIBLY BE ACCOMPLISHED.END OF MESSAGESECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
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51:15 October 19h0(PRITY) LIOPRTAAT ZOPROPEYES ONLY GUTHHAN1. YOU WILL NOΤΣ ΓΛΟM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL CHANNEL CURRENTLY DEING TRANSMITTED A PARA ON Y PROP TYPE SUGGESTION. YOU WILL PROBABLY RECEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBL BLOCROAK REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL STUDYING SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY 32CONEN ONE CONSIDERATION. FOR EXAMPLE WE HAD SOME AFRICAN TALKS WE TREICH SERVICET HIS WEEK AND RE CONGO THEY CAME UP WITH THIS IMMEDIATELY. (NO INDICATION AT ALL FRENCH SERVICE DOING ANT FO SPECIFIC ABOUT IT.;2. RAIS ALOYE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANT APPARENT DU FION THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUS COLLEAGUE AND ALSO ΑΣΜΑΙΝΣ ΠΙIGHEST PRIORITY. REDAR 1302 YOUR REACTION TO POSSIBLE DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE...SECRETBABR
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SECRETDIRECTORRECD FROMSEP 22 1965CIAPAGE TWOCITE DIR 06200SOONEST TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY THIS ASPECT. WE STILL WORKING ON THIRD NATIONAL MENTIONED THAT REF, BUT WONDER WHETHER YOU THINK EARLY ARRIVAL CASE OFFICER WOULD MAKE SENSE. SEEMS TO US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVY GIVE NECESSARY CONCENTRAT. YQPROP. ADVISE.1. HAVE DISCUSSED NICLAM WITH BETTELHEIM AND POSSIBILITY OF COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR ABDUCTION WIROAK, EITHER VIA ASSAULT ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE PROBABLY, IS WIROAKATTEMPTS ANOTHER BREAKOUT INTO TOWN AS RECENTLY. PICKED GROUP OF WIPLAT PCNA TROOPS MIGHT ALSO BE CONSIDERED. REQUEST YOUR VIEWS.END OF MESSAGE![signature of releasing officer]![coordinating officers]![authenticating officers logo]
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# DIRECTORLEOPOLOVILLEC/AFDCP, S/C 2Oct 17 23 4818REC'D CABLE SECT.PRIORITYIN 25935DIRCITELEOP 814EYES ONLY JAZWIN FROM GUTHMANRYBAT YSPROPREF: A. DIR 96862 (OUT 78336 )B. DIR 96253 (OUT 81396 ).1. HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE. THIS HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS INTEL NEEDED THIS WG.2. BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER HANDLE FOR OPS EXCELLENT IDEA. ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THIS OP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME, VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. SITUATION WILL BE EVEN MORE COMPLICATED WHEN WHAT GCCS ELIZ 13 OCTOBER. IF CASE OFFICER AVAILABLE, GUTHMAN WOULD DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING AND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS.3. SERIOUSLY DOUBT POSSIBILITY ASSAULT HOUSE, VIEW STRONG, ARE CONCUR UP FEASIBLE IF SUBJECT GOES OUT INTO TOWN BUT VIEW ONE WATCHING HOUSE, DOUBT HE WILL TRY THIS. IN NEAR FUTURE. BELIEVE POSSIBLE TO MOUNT COMMANDO, PER REF B, BUT ASSUME HQS WOULD WANT THIS DONE BY THIRD NATIONAL ASSET.4. IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HIS POUCH SOONEST HIGH.SECRET
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PAGE 2 SEP 22 1915CIAPRIORITIIN 2593;LEOP BICITEPOWERED FOREIGN MAKE RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SIGHT AND SILENCERHUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT. HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLENOW FORBIDOEN, WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING OFHUNTING SEASON.END OF MESSAGEC/S COMMENT: REQUESTED STA VIEWS RE POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUPABDUCTION (SUBJ).SECRET
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystemIdentification FormDate: 7/7/2015## Agency InformationAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10100RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-M-06## Document InformationORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM: SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR.TO:TITLE: NOTES ON GORDON GRAYDATE: 07/04/1975PAGES: 72SUBJECTS:ASSASSINATIONSCIATRUJILLOLUMUMBA, PATRICEGRAY, GORDONDOCUMENT TYPE: REPORTCLASSIFICATION: DeclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: 1B; ICCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/05/2000OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: CCBOX 450
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONDate : 08/06/95Page : 1AGENCY : SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10100RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEEAGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-06DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIAFROM : SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR.TO :TITLE : NOTES ON GORDON GRAYDATE : 07/04/75PAGES : 72SUBJECTS : GRAY, GORDONASSASSINATIONSTRUJILLOLUMUMBA, PATRICECIADOCUMENT TYPE : REPORTCLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRETRESTRICTIONS : REFERREDCURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULLDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS : CCBOX 450[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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# GORDON GRAY# Box 458# 430-2![photo of a document folder cover.]
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ToLaR Ruk FilesFrom: Frederick BatRe: Notes onDate: 7/4/75GORDON GRAYROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONYPage Subject2262 Biographical background2268 Opinions on PFIAB generally2272 Never heard of Executive Action'2273 "I know of no plan, plot, operational organization that ever came to President Eisenhower with respect to any assassinations, "XKM (2272-3)2273 In 1960, Eisenhower "approved a four point program, xaxax sabotage, stepped up economic sanctions, propaganda, and the ke training of Cuban refugees"2274 There was one WE "well known individual" on PFIAB who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you considered trying to bump off some of the leaders in North Vietnam". Them&hamamińxyxwx Gray says that "Agency policy was against assassination on the ground that it didn't accomplish anything".2275 "I know of no (assassination) plan or operational capability that has ever been authorized at any high level of government"2276 Rmesiden At a meeting with Gray and a representative of the CIA in 1958, "the President told me that he wanted the 54/12 group to pass upon all activities of this government which impinged upon the sovereignty or the people of some other nation.... President Eisenhower was very sensitive to the necessity of having the top people in government from the appropriate agencies pass upon the widdom, and in some cases, feasibility of those kinds of operations."2278-9 Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint Congression al Koversight committee because of danger of leake2281 Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence officer" (either the DCI or a Special Assist. to the Pres. for Int.)2292 & TRUJILЬО: Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's report in May, 1960 that dissidents in the Rom. Rep. wanted high powered rifles with telescopic scopesx and subsequentl received authorization to provide them by the Assist. Secy of State through the DCI.2293 Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at end of Eisenhower Admin. (11/29/60; 1/12/61) at which it was agreed to furnish arms to dissidents in the Dom. Rep..--"I would think our concern was, if we had that kind of concern, was with being of assistance to the dissidents, and not assasssination, or that kind of activity."NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 5.
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ToLan Ruk FilesFrom: Frederick BalRe: Notes onDate: 7/4/75                                                                  GORDON GRAYROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONYPage            Subject2262            Biographical backgroundAMKNX2268            Opinions on PFIAB generally2272            Never heard of Executive Action2273            "I know of no plan, plot, operational organization thatever came to President Eisenhower with respect to anyassassinations, "KИ (2272-3)2273            In 1960, Eisenhower "approved a four point program, sakuxsabotage, stepped up economic sanctions, propaganda,and the ke training of Cuban refugees"2274            There was one wE "well known individual" on PFIABwho would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have youconsidered trying to bump off some of the leaders in NorthVietnam". Them@hamaniкухня Gray says that "Agency policywas against assassination on the ground that it didn'taccomplish anything".2275            "I know of no (assassination) plan or operationalcapability that has ever been authorized at any highlevel of government!"2276            Rmesiden At a meeting with Gray and a representativeof the CIA in 1958, "the President told me that he wantedthe 54/12 gropp to pass upon all activities of thisgovernment which impinged upon the sovereignty or thepeople of some other nation.... President Eisenhower wasvery sensitive to the necessity of having the top peoplein government from the appropriate agencies pass uponthe widdom, and in some cases, feasibility of thosekinds of operations."2278-9          Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint Congressional Koversight committee because of danger of leake2281            Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence officer"(either the DCI or a Special Assist. to the Pres. for Int.)2292            & TRUJIЬЬО: Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland'sreport in May, 1960 that dissidents in the Rom. Rep. wantedhigh powered rifles with telescopic scopesx and subsequentlreceived authorization to provide them by the Assist. Secyof State through the DCI.2293            Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at end of Eisen-hower Admin. (11/29/60; 1/12/61) at which it was agreed tofurnish arms to dissidents in the Dom.Rep.--"I would think our concern was, if we had that kind ofconcern, was with being of assistance to the dissidents,and not assasssination, or that kind of activity."NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 6
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These documents were pulled from aSpecial Group file by John Bayly.They should be replaced after wexerox those minutes we intend touse as exhibits for the Gray testimony.Attached on top is copyof a CIA memo to be usedas an exhibit.NW 50955 DocId 32423488 Page 7
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GORDON GRAYChronology and IssuesBARONJuly 8, 1975TOP SECRETIssues and QuestionsBiographical Background1942-1947 U.S. Army (Private to Captain)1949-1950 Department of Army (ultimately Secretary of the Army)1950-1951 Special Assistant to President TRUMAN1951 Organized for TRUMAN the Psychological Strategy Board, which involved close contact with intelligence community1951-1955 President, University of North Carolina1955 Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA)1958 Director, Office of Defense Mobilization1958-1961 SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT (EISENHOWER) FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (Head of NSC)1961-1975 Member, PFIAB (President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) appointed by JFKChronology of Events1959November 4 Special Group discusses Allen DULLES' "Cuba Propaganda Project" for use of radio transmitters. GRAY said "he was sure (the project would meet with high level approval" provided it was acceptable to the President of Mexico.GRAY represents President EISENHOWER at Special Group meetings.
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# TOP SECRET1960 (Cont'd)February 12A "special" NSC meeting was held on this day. The only record of this meeting in the NSC minutes states: "On instructions from the Executive Secretary no memorandum was written." (NSC Minutes)February 17Special Group approves evaluation of agents for Cuban sugar mill sabotage. GRAY "discussed *this matter with his associate*" (Eisenhower) and reported two tactical objections. (SG Minutes)March 9GRAY tells Special Group that any covert action like sugar mill sabotage should be undertaken only after overall consideration of "whether and how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO." (SG Minutes)March 14At an NSC meeting, Allen DULLES "reported that a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being worked on. Admiral BURKE suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package deal, since many of the leaders around CASTRO were even worse than CASTRO." (NSC Minutes)At a Special Group meeting, after a paper titled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba" was read, there was "a general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if FIDEL and RAUL CASTRO and CHE GUEVARA should disappear simultaneously." (SG Minutes)April 7"GRAY asked the (Special) Group's views on what happens after TRUJILLO, specifically how CASTRO can be kept out of the Dominican Republic." Acting DCI CABELL recommends U.S. military intervention after TRUJILLO departs. (SG Minutes)Issues and QuestionsWhy were no minutes written?Does context show that phrase "his associate" refers to President EISENHOWER?Did such consideration involve assassination plotting?Was this "package deal" the simultaneous triple assassination plot that was mentioned on November 3, 1960?Does this simultaneous disappearance plan refer to assassination planning?Is there a connection between this Special Group discussion and the NSC discussion on March 14, 1960, re a plan to remove Cuban leaders?Did U.S. support TRUJILLO'S opponents out of a desire to keep CASTRO out of the Dominican Republic?NW 50955 DocId:32423488 Page 92
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1960 (cont'd)# TOP SECRETIssues and QuestionsApril 14At an NSC meeting presided over by Vice President NIXON, Allen DULLES reported "TRUJILLO'S position continued to weaken and was now quite precarious. [he] thought further attempts will be made to kill or oust TRUJILLO." Under Secretary of State DILLON said "if TRUJILLO could be removed from power in the Dominican Republic while pro-CASTRO elements were prevented from seizing power in that country, our anti-CASTRO campaign throughout Latin America would receive a great boost. The Vice President agreed that getting rid of TRUJILLO would be a favorable development for us." (NSC Minutes)Were these U.S. attempts to kill TRUJILLO?DILLON'S comment indicates that the U.S. had an active interest in removing TRUJILLOWhat did NIXON mean by "getting TRUJILLO"?April 14Allen DULLES predicted at an NSC meeting, that one possible outcome with respect to CASTRO was an assassination that would make CASTRO a martyr. (NSC Minutes)Does this show that assassination was not a favored alternative because it would produce martyrdom?June 30GRAY says "the U.S. has taken publicly about all that it can afford to take from the CASTRO government." (SG Minutes)General atmosphere of vehement opposition to CASTRO.July 1Memo from the Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI recommending delivery of high-powered rifles with telescopic scopes to the opponents of TRUJILLO. The memo said: "approval for delivery of these arms has been given by ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ROY RUBOTTOM."Was the Special Group aware of this actionWas the President aware of the plan?Purpose of weapons?July 5.President EISENHOWER met with Secretary of State HERTER and others to discuss the Dominican Republic. "The President thought we should knock out of any documents on file any reference to starting a revolution." (Conference Memorandum)
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1960 (cont'd)# TOP SECRETIssues and QuestionsJuly 7Allen DULLES reported to the NSC that the Venezuelan government wants the United States to lead the way in breaking relations with TRUJILLO. DULLES stated: The Venezuelan government was engaged in an all-out effort, through the OAS and otherwise, to isolate, condemn and cause the downfall of TRUJILLO. [Because] they have convincing evidence that TRUJILLO was responsible for the assassination attempt on BETANCOURT [President of Venezuela] . . . BETANCOURT believes another attempt will be made momentarily and therefore it [his government] wants a showdown without delay." (NSC Minutes)"Mr. DULLES stated that he believes, and the intelligence community agrees, that the problem of TRUJILLO must be settled before the problem of CASTRO can be dealt with, even though CASTRO is the greater threat." (NSC Minutes)The NSC Minutes further state that BETANCOURT was told that the U.S. cannot act without ascertaining TRUJILLO'S successor. The U.S. will work with BETANCOURT and FIGUERES of Costa Rica on suggestions for a successor to TRUJILLO. President EISENHOWER suggested that a government in exile should be ready to go into the Dominican Republic in the event of TRUJILLO'S downfall. (NSC Minutes)July 21GRAY said "his associates" would favor the development of sabotage operations in CUBA. (SG Minutes)The U.S. was under pressure to move against TRUJILLO.Did TRUJILLO'S attempt against BETANCOURT make him "fair game" for assassination in the eyes of OAS nations including the U.S.Did the U.S. determine a successor?Did the U.S. "act"?."Associate" is the euphemism for Eisenhower.Does sabotage imply the further steps of assassination?NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 11
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1960 (cont'd)# TOP SECRETIssues and QuestionsJuly 28President EISENHOWER stated at an NSC meeting: "Until TRUJILLO is *eliminated*, we cannot get our Latin American friends to reach a proper level of indignation in dealing with CASTRO." In this regard, "the President said if we attempted to take any action with respect to Cuba before settling the TRUJILLO situation, we would be the loser." (NSC Minutes)Does "elimination" mean "assassination"?August 12BISSELL outlines 13.3 million dollar budget for Cuban operations which was to be laid before "higher authorities" for decision. (SG Minutes)August 16Dr. Edward GUNN (CIA Office of Medical Services) receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated with lethal poison for use against CASTRO. (IG REPORT p. 21)Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, or DCI DULLES aware of this?August 25After the Special Group approved anti-LUMUMBA operations in the Congo, "GRAY commented, however, that his associates had expressed *extremely strong feelings* on the necessity for *very straightforward* action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined would be sufficient to accomplish this . . . It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which *might contribute to getting rid of LUMUMBA.*" (SG Minutes; emphasis added)Is this circumlocutious order for assassination from the President? An indication that at the least, assassination was within the range of acceptable means for "getting rid of LUMUMBA"?At the NSC meeting, Mr. STANS suggested that the U.S. might "throw out LUMUMBA by peaceful means." (NSC Minutes)August (approx)BISSELL asks EDWARDS to find underworld contacts with Cuba to aid in an assassination operationWere EISENHOWER, GRAY, or Allen DULLES aware of this? Was it authorized by
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1960 (cont'dTOP SECRETIssues and QuestionsSeptember 8 During brief discussion of CONGO developments,"GRAY said that he hoped that Agency people inthe field are fully aware of the top-levelfeeling in Washington that vigorous action wouldnot be amiss." (SG Minutes; emphasis added)September 21 Allen DULLES stated at an NSC meeting that"LUMUMBA was not disposed of and remained agreat danger as long as he was not disposedof." (NSC Minutes)Against LUMUMBA personally?Did the NSC contemplate "disposing of"LUMUMBA by assassination?October 24 At an NSC meeting, Allen DULLES reportedthat "five Congolese soldiers had attemptedto assassinate MOBUTO on the 15th ofOctober. The U.S. had prior informationof this attempt and had warned MOBUTO . . .(NSC Minutes)November 3 At a Special Group meeting, Mr. MERCHANT"asked whether any real planning has been donein taking direct positive action against FIDEL,RAUL and CHE GUEVARA. He said that withoutthese three the Cuban government would beleaderless and probably brainless. He concededthat it would be necessary to act against allthree simultaneously."The minutes further state: "General CABELLpointed out that action of this kind isuncertain of results and highly dangerousin conception and execution, because theinstruments must be Cuban. He felt that,particularly because of the necessity ofsimultaneous action, it would have to beconcluded that Mr. MERCHANT'S suggestion isbeyond our capabilities." (SG Minutes)Did. this information prompt the U.S.to plot the assassination of LUMUMBAin retaliation or to protect MOBUTO?Was MERCHANT referring to an assassina-tion of Cuban leaders?Shortly before this, CIA had made theassassination contract with the Mafia.Was General CABELL unaware of this CIAcontract? Was General CABELL expressinga traditional CIA objection to assassina-tion proposals? If so, on what otheroccasion did Mr. GRAY hear the CIAobjection?NW 50955 DocId 32423488 Page 136
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# TOP SECRET1960 (cont'd)December 29At a Special Group meeting, Mr. BISSELL gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covent activities directed against the TRUJILLO regime, but "he also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against TRUJILLO himself." (SG Minutes) (Source: Minutes, December 29, 1960, by T. Parrott, of Special Group Meeting, December 29, 1960, 02752)Issues and QuestionsTRUJILLO was assassinated on May 30, 1961.Did Mr. BISSELL or the Special Group propose to approve aiding Dominicans who might assassinate TRUJILLO to effect such a "decisive stroke"?1961. January 12Special Group approves the State Department proposal explained by MERCHANT "that limited supplies of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents inside the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC." (SG Minutes; emphasis added)Were these assassination-type weapons?If not, was this Special Group action used as implicit authority for sub- sequent provision of weapons for the assassination of TRUJILLO?Late Jan.-Early Feb.DDP BISSELL asks William HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. HARVEY'S notes are quoted as saying that BISSELL said he had been "twice urged by the White House" to establish such a capability, including the capability to assassinate political leaders.Was the EXECUTIVE ACTION project initiated or authorized during the EISENHOWER Adminis tration?