Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 5]
TOP SECRET1 end of December.2 Mr. Schwarz. 1974?3 Mr. Angleton. 1974.4 Mr. Schwarz. And were you the Chief of Counterintelligence at the CIA for that period?5 Mr. Angleton. I was.6 Mr. Schwarz. For that entire period of time?7 Mr. Angleton. No, from 1954.8 Mr. Schwarz. Were you also responsible for relations with Israeli intelligence agencies?9 Mr. Angleton. That is correct.10 Mr. Schwarz. Can you briefly state the connection, if any, between your counter intelligence work and the Israeli work, or put even more generally, how did you happen to have both those jobs?11 Mr. Angleton. Well, if I could ask you some clarifica- tion, are we addressing ourselves here in terms of this meeting to the Szulc business, or are we trying to take up everything?12 Mr. Schwarz. No, we are not going to try to take up everything. We may try to take up a few things beyond the Szulc business. What we are trying to do --13 Mr. Angleton. I can direct my answers to you better if I know more where we are going.14 Mr. Schwarz. We are going to the Szulc business, but itTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 6]
TOP SECRET2 it would be helpful to have a few background first,3 Senator Baker. If I may say so, so that Mr. Angleton4 will not be taken by surprise, there are one or two things thatI would like to discuss. The nature of that material would be5 similar to what you have already discussed with Rockefeller,6 having to do with the Oswald situation and other things.7 Mr. Angleton. Well, to begin with, I went into OSS in8 1943, in 1943 from the infantry: And then Iwas assigned to an9 embryonic counter intelligence unit under General10 Donovan. My immediate chief was James R. Murphy, who had been11 a protegee and obtained his law degree in General Donovan's12 office. And he is a practicing attorney here in Washington.13 And he was Chief of X-2, which was the counter intelligence.14 And during that time a number of us were put together who15 had never had any experience in the subject. And that included16 people such as Jonnie Oaks, who was the head of the editorial17 page of the New York Times, and Ben Wells and a tremendous18 cross-section of American life.19 And there was a training intensive in this country, and20 I was sent to London. And the purpose of that was to ab-21 sorb the British experience, and more important the breaking22 of German codes.23 The breaking of the German codes, which is relevant to24 our activity, was really done in England. And by way25 digression, the Germans were using a receiver machine calledTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 7]
TOP SECRETEnigma, the blue prints of which were originally obtained by a Frenchman. And I might add that the Frenchman never received credit for it. And yet that perhaps was the most single important breakthrough of the entire war. And he had obtained it about eitht to nine or ten years prior to the out-break of war, when it was non-operative. And he had the prescience to know that the systems could only be one thing, that it would be operative in a time of war.I give this digression simply to point out that the fruits of that breakthrough would first go to the military and the military operations. And the counter intelligence use of it would be the bottom of the list of priorities, in one sense.But it would mean that a compromise of the material in any fashion to the Germans would destroy the military uses. And during the war or when the Germans went into the war, they brought it up from 10 percent recovery to about 100 percentAnd I believe it was in the neighborhood of some 22,000 operational messages from the German high command. I know the Battle of Tobruk was fought on six intercepts.So our job was to make use of the counter intelligence for the purpose of playing back German agents to their high command. And this was an elaborate deception. And when the war ended I would say that 99 percent of all reporting agentsTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 that the Germans had were under our control. And in fact2 when many of the German hierarchy tried to escape to the3 west under aliases, their only point of contact for most4 documentation and money was to our agent under control.5 And it was called the Safe Haven program.6 So London was in a sense a staging area with full access7 to British, or the fruits of British activity, going back8 through their entire history. And it was the advance head-9 quarters for General Donovan, and Mr. Murphy.10 I was then sent to Italy in 1943. And I took over the11 counter intelligence for Italy the OSS, AFIHO, Allied Forces12 Ileadquarters.13 Subsequently I became the Chief of OSS Italy. And14 I want to say that my work then became more broad in terms of15 espionage and all the other branches of OSS. And I re-established the counter/intelligence services. And I brought the17 French back into existence, particularly the man who18 originally acquired the code, and who worked on it for many19 years. And by this time it was shifted to the Saudi bloc.20 I left Italy in 1947 or 1948 and came back, and was21 discharged and went into the Agency immediately. And during22 the period I was in the Agency, of course, I had both agent23 operations, long distance operations, and counter intelligence,24 and some sabotage, black propaganda, infiltration.25 And probably the first overnight operation that there wasTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 9]
TOP SECRETwhich was known as Plan Hope, which is simply putting theItalians in an airplane and having them fly over to theRoumanian border and make very primitive photographs of thewhole region.And I was sent back to the Air Force. And then I hadcode operations, embassy penetrations, and so on.So, in a sense the resuscitation of the Italian service,Army and Navy, Air Force, and the Minister of the Interior,was American rehabilitation. And I am not going to go intothe details of the political situation. There was thecivil war in Greece, and the revival of the internationalBrigade and in fact the Soviets had built up, when they werenot fighting the war, in the post-war period, assassinations,and instability.And throughout this we had very close supervision fromMr. Murphy, and General Donovan. And we had special interestin the Vatican, and what was happening in Berlin behind theCurtain.And the then acting Secretary of State for the Vatican,Montini who is the present Pope. And so there was muchto do through our channels, and General Donovan, with Montini,the Pope, who is now the Pope, one of the basic problems wasthe cold war. We did not buy the cold war, it came to usand we worked with the Germans, and as we broke down theopposition, we began to find that we were not getting theTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 10]
TOP SECRETGermans, we were getting the Soviets.But the penetrations and the operations which we ran during the military phase began to take on a character of their own in the civilian phase in the very long term Soviet objectives against the U.S. in particular, and against the alliesAnd then I got into all fields of labor, subversion, illegal immigrants, and then revolution. I was in Greece.And our penetrations at that period were fairly high level and sophisticated, because of the reaction to Stalin.And as the Soviet troops occupied new territories, it was faced with these ambiguities, the defectors coming over to us at very high levels.And in the course of this, of course, was the Israeli immigration. Technically we were still a part of AFHQ, which was a combined and Allied Headquarters. And the British desires were that our activities be directed in supporting their responsibilities in the Middle East, and, therefore, to prevent the immigration.And I think the only policy cable that was ever received during that period was one we sent to Mr. Murphy, and through General Donovan to the President. That was where we exercised our influences on the Italians to prevent immigration. And they addressed themselves to this issue, and they came back with an ambiguity, but it leanedTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETtoward the general proposition that we should not discourage the British nor hurt the British directly, but we should not interfere with the Italians to support the British position.And so my dealings were with Admiral Maugeria, who had been Chief of the Italian Naval Intelligence, but was then the Commanding Admiral of the Turanian Fleet generally south, where all these illegal immigrants collected and were sent down.And then they blew up the Irgum, and blew up the British embassy in Rome, who were my opposite numbers. And the man with whom we had set up as the Italian intelligence through the rest of the Israelis -- we had the members of the group, and then we had the dilemma again as to whether we turned them over to the British authorities, and so on.And we were in a position to make decisions one way or the other. And eventually we came down on the side of releasing them.And there is so much more of it. I am trying to keep the thread of it.Mr. schwarz. So you developed some kind of a relation-ship, perhaps a friendly relationship, with persons connected with the new State of Israel or the hoped-for state of Israeli back in the 1940's?Mr. Angleton. That is right.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETMr. Schwarz. And was there any other significant reason why you kept the Israeli account, if that is the right ex- pression?Mr. Angleton. There wasn't one after I left there, nor was there one here in Washington.But the other side of the Israeli problem was that you had thousands coming from the Soviet Union. And you had the Soviets making use of the immigration for the purpose of sending illegal agents into the West and breaking down all the travel control, identifications and so on.And so there was both a security problem and a political problem. And one of my men married, I might say, the head of the Zionist movement in Italy, the underground. So I had a connection to this man. He was very important.So, coming back to Washington, I was Special Assistant to Colonal Donald/H? Galloway, who was head of the clandestine side and covered the world, on all sides of clandestine activity.And subsequently I was Chief of Operations for Es- pionageAnd in 1954 I had a special operational unit, and was made head of the counter intelligence.Mr. Schwarz. In the period beginning in 1954 and lasting until 1974, when you left the Agency, did you have any relationship -- is the Israeli account the wrong way to say it?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 13]
TOP SECRETMr. Angleton. It is all right. It is as good as nyMr. Schwarz. Did you have any relationship with the Israeli account?Mr. Angleton. No. That began in 1951. There was no relationship between the Agency and the Israeli intelligence.Mr. Schwarz. You mean at all, or prior to 1951.Mr. Angleton. There wasn't any from 1947 -- 1946 on.Mr. Schwarz. Then it began in 1951. And allI am trying to establish, and not spend a lot of time with it, is, do you have any relationship with Israel, Israeli intelligence, or the Israeli account on behalf of the Agency between 1951 and 1974.Mr. Angleton. It was reconstituted in 1951. And I was the negotiator of the arrangement. The Mayor of Jerusalem, Pete Kollek, was at the other end of the negotiation. He was stationed in Washington. But during the Jewish Agency period he was head of the intelligence in Turkey, during the war and prior.Mr. Miller. How was that agreement negotiated?Mr. Angleton. It was negotiated by finding waat dis we have in common. It was reviewed by Admiral Hillenkoetter, who was then Director. And he was to be succeeded by General Walter Bedell Smith. And the decision was made during the war that Bedell Smith was to take over, and Allen Dulles returned.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 14]
TOP SECRETto this activity, that we would go ahead and re-establish a relationship. And after a lot of bureaucratic problems, they gave me the account.Mr. Miller. What ws the nature of the arrangement that was agreed upon between the two services?Mr. Angleton. In most simplistic terms, they were in- formed that we would not work with them against the Arabs, that we would work with them on Soviet intelligence and Soviet bloc intelligence and communism, where it existed.Mr. Schwarz. Did that agreement -- which I take it was more flexible that but did it remain in effect throughout the period of your service with the Agency?Mr. Angleton. More or less.Mr. Miller. Was this agreement in the form of a paper?Mr. Angleton. Paper and operations, discussion.Mr. Miller. And under whose authority was the agreement made?Mr. Angleton. Under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Prime Minister of Israel on the other side.Mr. Miller. And this involved the exchange of resources of both countries?Mr. Angleton. The term "resources" is not quite correct. Everything except their own people. It was givingTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETup papers and signals, communications intelligence, and allthe other products of intelligence action.Mr. Miller. So the Director of Central Intelligence wasaware of the agreement. Was the President?Mr. Angleton. The President was aware of it. And theSecretary of State was the brother of the Deputy Chief of theCIA, and eventually was very much involved.Mr. Miller. Where is a record of this agreement kept,as an instrument of the U.S.?Mr. Angleton. The internal papers would be in the Agency.The letters, copies of the letters from Ben Gurion to thePresident or to the Secretary of State I assume are still inthe Agency. I dealt with other departments in connectionwith Africa, and so on, underdeveloped areas.If you are speaking as to whether there was a representa-tive treaty which was cleared -- and people wanted thesethings cleared -- I don't think there were any clearancesobtained from the Hill.Mr. Miller. Was it regarded as an obligation or acommitment/from the U.S. to Israel on certain matters?Mr. Angleton. When you use the word U.S. while youmay use it as contracting officers and all that, there wasvery little reduced to writing. And it is a custom ofIntelligence that intelligence supersedes writing. Andthere have been very few directors to my knowledge that wouldTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETput their pen to hand to sign an agreement to some understanding. It is based on a fiduciary relationship and common understanding.So, these were all understandings that were generated by events. WE had the arrest of the nine doctors, and the pogrom in Russia. And obviously you didn't go through a lot of bureaucracy, it was there for everyone to see. And it had a direct impact on the question of immigration of agents, and everything else that goes along with it. And I think that characterizes any good operation.Mr. Miller. How was it possible for succeeding directors of the intelligence agency to understand what the agreements were between in this case the Israeli intelligence service and the U.S. Intelligence Service?Mr. Angleton, Very simple. They saw the production to begin with. And they met with directors or the head of Israeli intelligence. And they met with Ambassadors and prime ministers. And they were very much involved.Mr Schwarz. Just one more background question and then we will turn to the principle subject.Following through on the subject of Israel up to your departure in 1974, is there any connection between your departure and handling of Israel? And if there is, what is the connection?Mr. Angleton. Well, I think I have said it all to theTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 commission -- I don't know how wisely. You can always get different information from different people. But Colby told them, so I would like to give him the benefit of the23 doubt on it. But over a period of time Colby who is not my cup of tea professionally or in any other way, and in my4 view is on the negative side of life and Dr. Schlesinger,5 before he went to Defense, said that Colby was the only other6 person on Watergate. So you have got certain persons who7 were prominent. And there was the negative aspect of self-inspection, and inferiors reporting on superiors, until8 they came through the snake pit.9 And in the course of all of this there was time when he assumed the authority, and in total contrast to Schlesinger,10 he began to regard the Israeli account as some- thing where we had to open the windows and let the air in. And he used phrases such as, we must help out Henry and a few other things.11 Any/position was that it was a political relationship, and that we were not bound, or should not be bound to using12 the Agency on tactical ventures when we had relationships which had strategic implications.13 But one must rembmer that there are still three million Jews in the Soviet Union. And the relationship is the14 only place where you do it with high level agencies who work for ideology and do not work for money. So it is unique.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETAnd my second point was that everything should be run on the grounds of need-to-know, and should not go into the Arab Division until there was peace in the area. There was no identity of interest or fundamental interest between Israelis and an example is 500 Polish intelligence officers who were Jewish who immigrated to Israel. They knew more about Polish intelligence than the Poles. And the Soviets had worked with the Poles in the West, and trained them in Moscow, where you had the cohesion of 27 bloc services working together through their own congress party apparatus into a collective with Moscow.And most important, our job was to preserve the integrity of the immigration from the bloc, because the problem of escape to Israel is a religious problem, it is not a political problem. There could not be a prime minister who would survive the day if he did not go along with the idea of the return.And, therefore, there is a certain kind of parallelism, you might say, between handling the communications intelligence during the war and where a low priority makes use of it and endangers the whole with the question of immigration, where the fruits of that immigration come to this government.(Recess.)Senator Tower. Will you go ahead and resume the questioning?TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETMr. Schwarz. You were in the middle of an answer, believe.Mr. Angleton. What I am trying to say is that immigration is a source of very high level information, and it is very comparable with its problems as communications intelligence during the war when the lives of men were involved in troop movements.And, therefore, the idea of opening up the doors and things, and so on, to me seemed absolutely contrary to the spirit, and what had been going on for 22 years.And during that time we had obtained, for example, by way of production, Khrushchev's secret speech which practically created revolutions in Hungary and Poland.I was just simply reiterating the problem of the immigration. This idea of opening the doors and letting the light in, and breaking down compartmentation, and breaking down the need to know, would inevitably put in jeopardy, the immigration, if the Soviets should learn the extent of the activities.Now, the production ran from everything, such as the secret speech of Khrushchev's against Stalin, it ran into the first hard information on nuclear explosives, and it ran into practically the whole gamut. And I think in a certain period of time it resulted in over 22,000 reports dealing with the Soviet bloc which were unique. And much of thisTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 came from, say, an engineer that had a factory, or what not,in other words, it had a very direct bearing on our ownR&D and our own defense budget.Now, our own way of handling it was to gives falseattribution, reports, so that if the report was ever compro-mised, it would not compromise the operations, for the immi-gration. And, therefore, that was one of the issues.On the other issue was that to politicize the Agency,as I stated, on the tactical problems, which are going tobe with us for a long time.And to break down the fiduciary relationship-- which isafter all a personal business-- all the men I have had, weremen who stayed in it and came back to headquarters and went backto Tel Aviv, they went to the National Security Council, andwent back to Tal Aviv, et cetera, a small group of men. Itwas probably the most economical operation that has ever beendevised in the US. Government. I don't think there was morethan 10 people that were hired in the same process.I started from the south side with two Jewish men whoworked with me during the war. He sent them over as ordinarypeople under cover to establish the working hours of things,and I brought over six others and put them through some monthsof training, outside of the structure.And one of them rose to be Deputy Chief of the Service.But it is a part of the whole fiduciary business.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETFor example, we had certain political overtones wherewe were used in an affirmative way under President Eisenhower.He wanted to make a real attempt to see if there could everbe a peace in the Middle East. And with Alan Dulles, hisbrothers, and myself, and Kermit Roosevelt, we put up a planto bringing in Robert B. Anderson, who had been AssistantSecretary of the Defense.And he was accredited as special emissary from thePresident. And I handled his base to Israel, which was secret,black, as we call them to see Ben Gurion -- and Shaffetz wasthe Foreign Minister -- and Kollek, who was in the Prime Minis-ter's office, and later MayorAnd we took him back to Rome. And Kermit Rooseveltwould take him over to see Nasser, And this went on backand forth on many trips, until the conclusions were reachedthat there could not be any peace.But those types of initiatives could be done withoutpublicizing or without destroying it.Mr. Schwarz. In any event, some dispute in connectionwith these Israeli matters underlay your dispute with Mr.Colby, which underlay your leaving the Agency?Mr. Angleton. Yes. He offered me jobs or what not.But these are matters of principle, as far as I am concerned.Mr. Miller. Mr. Angleton, you described the fiduciaryrelationship. Were there points along the way where the U.STOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETinterests and the interests of Israel were in conflict?Mr. Angleton. We never got into that. Of course, you only had to read the paper every day to see that.Mr. Miller. But how did they come up ? You say they didn't come up at all?Mr. Angleton. Of course, they came up. There wasn't anything secret about it.Mr. Miller. But what examples can you give?Mr Angleton. The recent/visit of Rabun is a classic case. The so-called reassessment of the Middle East. The Times has better accounts of it than the Agency has.Mr. Miller. I mean at your level.Mr. Angleton. I don't quite get the thrust of your question.Mr. Miller. What I am saying is that you had an unusually close relationship --Mr. Angleton. It was not unusual. I have had it with many chiefs of services in 80 different countries, so it is not any more unusual than a lot of others. The French-man who got the code is closer to me than the Israelis are.Mr. Miller. Similar to the relationship.Mr. Angleton. I don't like the word unusual because to me it is usual.Mr. Miller. Delete that. If your working relationshipTOP SECRET