Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 157]
30El 17 de marzo de 1967, resultaron deteni- dos Félix Asencio Crespo, Wilfredo Martínez Díaz y Gustavo Areces Alvarez, al tratar de infiltrarse por la zona de Cayo Fragoso, procedentes de Estados Unidos.El objetivo principal que traían era reali zar un atentado contra nuestro Primer Mi- nistro y desatar una actividad sistemática de sabotajes con explosivos plásticos, todo ello complementado con ataques piratas,pa- ra dar la imagen en el exterior de activi- dades subversivas de grupos en distintas zonas y crear una situación que permitiera a las organizaciones contrarrevoluciona- rias radicadas en Estados Unidos, recabar ayuda oficial.Para llevar a cabo sus actividades en te- rritorio cubano, los mismos fueron entrena dos por la CIA, a través de las organiza- ciones "M-30-11", "RECE", "Los Pinos Nuevos", "Comandos L", "Alpha-66" y otras.Para esta misión se les facilitó todo el material bélico necesario.Félix Asencio Crespo, Wilfredo Martínez Díaz and Gustavo Areces Alvarez were arrested on March 17th, while they tried to infiltrate- by the Caye Fragoso zone, coming from the United States.The main objective they should carry out- was to assassinate our Prime Minister and launch a sistematic activity of sabotage with plastic explosives, all that supported with pirate attacks, in order to give abrcad an image of the existence of subversive activities in different areas and, thus, to create a situation which would permit the counterrrevolutionary organizations located in the United States to succeed in getting- official support.In order to carry out their activities in Cuban territory, they were trained by the CIA through the "M-30-11", "RECE", "Los Pinos Nuevos", "Comandos L", "Alpha-66" and others organizations. For this mission they were given all the neccessary warlike material.
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 158]
En 1971, con motivo del viaje del Comandante en Jefe a Chile, se fragua un atentado en ese país, para el cual se unen la CIA, fascista chilenos y contrarrevolucionarios-cubanos de la organización "Alpha-66".El principal encartado en este plan era Jesús Domínguez Benítez, conocido por "El Isleño", para quien (a través de contrarrevolucionarios cubanos radicados en Venezuela) se obtuvo documentación falsa que lo acreditaba como periodista venezolano, lo que le permitió cubrir la visita de nuestro Primer Ministro en dicho país.El plan se ejecutaría mediante una pistola-adaptada a una cámara de televisión, pero desistieron efectuarlo por considerar que no existían garantías para la conservación de sus vidas.Domínguez Benítez, perteneció a la organización terrorista "Poder Cubano", fue acusado por las autoridades norteamericanas de promover acciones terroristas en Estados Unidos y otros países como miembro de dicha organización, y arrestado por el FBI en 1968.On 1971, due to Commander in Chief's trip to Chile, a plot was elaborated in that country for which the CIA, the Chilean fascists and-Cubans counterrevolutionaries from "Alpha-66" organization came together.The major indicted in this plan was Jesús Domínguez Benítez, known as"The Islander". Through Cuban counterrevolutionaries settled down at Venezuela, he obtained false documents which identified him as a Venezuelan newspaper man, which permitted him to report our. Prime-Minister's visit in that country.The plan would be carried out using a gun camouflaged into a television camera, but they gave this up on considering there were no guarantees for the preservation of their lives.Domínguez Benítez, belonged to the "Poder Cubano" terrorist organization. He was accused by the American authorities of promoting terrorist actions inside the United States and other countries, as a member of that organization, and was arrested by the FBI in 1968!
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 159]
Sin embargo, en 1970 participa en el frustra- do intento de infiltración del "Alpha-66" por Oriente, refugiándose en la Base Naval, donde- nuevamente se le arrestó, esta vez, por in--- fringir las condiciones de una fianza sobre una condena de 18 meses por la causa anterior mente mencionada.No obstante, queda en libertad y sale sin difi cultades de Estados Unidos a Sudamérica para- participar en el atentado. Posteriormente re- gresa a Estados Unidos.However, in 1970 he participated in the "Alpha-66" unsuccessful attempt of infiltra tion through Criente Province, and sought refuge at the Naval Base, where he was arrested again, this time because he violated the conditions of a bond over an 18 months- condemn due to the trial just mentioned before.Nevertheless, he is set free and leaves United States without any difficulty, and - moves to South America in order to partici- pate in the plot. Afterwards, he returns to the United States.
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 160]
Consideramos que el análisis de las informaciones que aportamos, las públicamente- conocidas y las que las autoridades nor-- teamericanas poseen y no han sido publica das, permiten afirmar que la eliminación- física de dirigentes de la Revolución Cu- bana, principalmente del Primer Ministro- Fidel Castro Ruz, ha constituído una polí tica reiterada de los Estados Unidos a través de sus agencias subversivas, utili- zando para ello a contrarrevolucionarios- cubanos, ciudadanos norteamericanos y to- do tipo de elemento corrompido, tanto in-- terna como externamente, sin tomar en con sideración las víctimas que ocasionarían- estas acciones.Con este objetivo han sido facilitadas en grandes cantidades, armas, explosivos, me-- dios técnicos, de transporte y comunica-- ción a los participantes, para la realiza ción de sus planes.Estos son algunos hechos connotados y com probados de las numerosas actividades sub- versivas que ha realizado la CIA destina- das a la eliminación física de los diri-- gentes del Gobierno Revolucionario deWe consider that the analysis of the informa tions we offer, the publicly known, and the- ones that the American authorities possess -)and have not been published, allow us to affirm that the physical elimination of Cuban Revolutionary leaders, specially the Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz, has been a reiterat ed policy of the United States through its subversive agencies, making use of Cuban counterrevolutionaries, U.S. citizen and all- kind of corrupted individuals, inside the country as well as abroad, without taking into consideration the victims that would result from these actions.With this purpose, they have provided the participants with a great number of weapons, - explosives, technical means of transportation and communication for the accomplishment of their plans.These are some of the coonoted and proved facts of the numerous subversive activities that the CIA has carried out aimed to the assassination of the leaders of the Revolutio nary Government of Cuba.
[157-10014-10047.pdf — page 0]
157-10014-10047 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystonIdennlication ForaDate: 4/29/201Agency InformationAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10047RECORD SERIES: HEARINGSAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-H-05Document InformationORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM:TO:TITLE:DATE: 05/06/1976-PAGES: 80SUBJECTS:CASTRO, FIDELOPERATION MONGOOSEJMWAVECIADOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPTCLASSIFICATION: UnclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: ConsultedCURRENT STATUS: WithholdDATE OF LASTREVIEW: 02/26/1998OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: Box 2NW#:55510 DocId: 32423435
[157-10014-10047.pdf — page 1]
# TOP SECRETThe United States Senate R3014Report of ProceedingsHearing held beforeSenate Select Committee to Study GovernmentalOperations With Respect to Intelligence ActivitiesThursday, May 6, 1976Washington, D.C.(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)WARD & PAUL3007 WILSON BOULEVARDARLINGTON, VA 22301(703) 841-0800# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10047.pdf — page 2]
TOP SECRETCONTENTSTESTIMONY OF:Robert G. Halley--accompanied by--John Rigall andSeymour R. BoltenPAGE3TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10047.pdf — page 3]
# TOP SECRETEXECUTIVE SESSIONThursday, May 6, 1976United States Senate,Select Committee to Study GovernmentalOperations with Respect toIntelligence Activities,Washington, D. C.The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 o'clockp.m., in Room 608, the Carroll Arms Hotel, the HonorableRichard S. Schweiker presiding.Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).Also present: Jim Johnston and Paul Wallach, ProfessionalStaff Members.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10047.pdf — page 4]
## TOP SECRETPROCEEDING3 Senator Schweiker. I guess we will swear you in, so if4 you will stand up and raise your right hand, do you solemnly5 swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, thewhole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?6 Mr. Halley. Yes, I do7 Senator Schweiker. Be seated.8 Mr. Johnston. Would you state for the record your full9 name?10111213141516171819202122232425TOP SECRET![image] NWW.55510 Docid-32423435
[157-10014-10047.pdf — page 5]
# TOP SECRETTESTIMONY OF ROBERT G. HALLEYACCOMPANIED BY JOIN RIGALL AND SETMOUR R. BOLTENMr. Halley. My name is Robert G. Halley.Mr. Johnston. And I understand that is an alias and your true identity will be preserved by the Agency.Mr. Halley. That is correct.Mr. Johnston. Mr. Bolten, would you state your full name?Mr. Bolten. Seydour Boiten, Seymour R. Bolten.Mr. Johnston. And John, the alias you are testifying under?Mr. Riyall. John Rigall, R-i-g-a-1-1.Mr. Johnston. And Mr. Bolten and Mr. Rigal, would you state your capacity in this session today?Mr. Boiten. I am chief of the Review Staff of the CIA, and responsible for dealings with the Senate Select Committee.Mr. Rigall. I am Special Assistant to the DDO, sitting in here as an alternate monitor.Mr. Johnston. And the discussion that has taken place prior to going on the record today basically has resulted is a decision to have Mr. Bolten and Kr. Rigail attend as monitor to this session, and do you understand that, Mr. Halley?Mr. Halley. Yes, I doMr. Johnston. Mr. Halley, what was your capacity with Agency in November, 19639Mr. Halley. In November, 1963, 1 was the Chief of Sta# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10047.pdf — page 6]
TOP SECRETof the CIA operation that was based in Miami, Florida, targetedas its primarily responsibility for the Cuban operation.Mr. Johnston. Mr. Wallach has reminded me to remind you ofa procedural matter which, you understand you have the rightto counsel.Mr Halley. Yes, I do.Mr. Johnston. And you understand you have a right not toanswer questions if you don't wish to, or not to answer questionsuntil you consult with Counsel, is that correct?Mr. Halley. That is correct.Mr. Johnston. And you are appearing here voluntarilywithout counsel.Mr. Halley. That is corrent.Mr. Johnston. And going back to substantive questions..long đìd you remain as: Chief of Station?What were the dates of your service?Mr. Halley. Well, I arrived, or became involved in theCuban operations in the early 1962, and I stayed there unapproximately June of 1965.Senator Schweiker. What month again in '62?Mr. Halley. Early '62. I diản't give you the montti,Senator, because I originally came down to Florida to conducta sorvay of this operation to see what possibilities couldcarried out in terms of the collection of intelligence. Ilater filed a report on it, and I was later assigned down trTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10047.pdf — page 7]
TOP SECRETSenator Schweiker. And this was called JMWAVE, was it?Mr. Halley. That is the cryptonym that the Agency used for the Miami station.Senator Schweiker. And to whom in that chain of command at the CIA did you report when you were the operating head?Mr. Halley. There were different people at different times. When I first went to Miami, the task force commander was Mr. William Harvey. He reported then to the DDP, who reported to the Director of Central Intelligence. At a later point in the operation, Mr. Harvey moved on to other tasks, and Mr. Fitzgerald became the chief of that particular unit, and then after Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Hart was the head of that particular unit.And between Harvey and Fitzgerald, I think there was a short period of time when a fellow by the name of Bruce Cheeves was the acting chief of that particular unit, or the chief. I have forgotten the exact arrangement there.Senator Schweiker. Sometime during this period did it change its title from Task Force W to SAS, is that correct or not correct, or do I have it mixed up?Mr. Halley. My recollection of that chronology was that it was first called SAS and then became Task Force W, and then became integrated back into WH Division, which was the Western Hemisphere Division.Senator Schweiker. SAS preceded Task Force W?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10047.pdf — page 8]
TOP SECRETMr. Halley. Yes. That's off the top of my head. That's my recollection of it.Mr. Johnston. Just for the record, I think it was the other way around. Task Force was first and SAS was second.Senator Schweiker. But in sum and substance your duties were basically the same, whether it was Task Force W or SAS under Harvey and Fitzgerald, was that not true?Mr. Halley. Well, I think you have to break this period up into two phases, Senator. The early phase, 1962, was focused on coming up with an appraisal of what kind of an operation could be run against Cuba in the context which existed at that time, in other words, after the Bay of Pigs, after the post mortems had been conducted. The Administration at the time decided that they wanted to take another look at Cuba as an intelligence and national security problem. Therefore, an assessment was to be made in the early period of time as to what kind of an operation could be run in pursuit of U.S. policy objectives, which was to see if Fidel Castro's government could be removed. And when that assessment was conducted as to what kind of intelligence operations could be conducted, what kind of paramilitary or other operations could be run, that was an initial phase, and that phase was approved and put into effect, but as that operation was being put into effect the missile crisis came upon us, so that that was not really carried to its logical conclusion because the operationTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10047.pdf — page 9]
TOP SECRETthen shifted.Senator Schweiker. After October of '62Mr. Halley. No, prior to October of '62, because the Cuban crisis was in October of '62, but the buildup preceded it, and our operations which were collecting Intelligence in Cuba detected this buildup as it was unfolding. Therefore, the national priority became now how do you take action against Fidel Castro, but what is the nature of this Soviet buildup. And therefore the operation changed.Then after the Cuban missile crisis of October of 1962, the problem became one of monitoring the Soviet disengagement from Cuba, and then there was another phase after that when the Soviets were out, Castro was clearly recognized as the established power in Cuba, and the problem became one of looking at Cuba in the context of was there some other way to get a political change in Cuba other than by military action or by paramilitary action. In other words, the emphasis shifted to looking at the Castro military establishment to see if a coup could be pulled from within, to see if economic pressures could be put on the Castro regime.So the tasking of this particular unit did change, and change of nuances and degrees during this period, but in our professional sense it was focused on the Cuban targets. So in that sense you are correct, but it did go through various changes as events changed.TOP SECRET![NWB 55510 DocId: 32423435]
[157-10014-10047.pdf — page 10]
TOP SECRETSenator Schweiker. What was the relationship of your station and your assignment to General Lansdale? What role did he play?Mr. Halley. Well, in the early days, in the early period of 1962, General Lanadale was a member of a group that was looking at the basic problem of what could be done against the Cuban activity. This came up in one of my previous conversatio with Mr. Baron.Senator Schweiker. Are you talking about something we call Operation MONGOOSE, are we talking about Special Group Augmented, or what are we talking about?Mr. Halley. Well, when I first came into this activity In 1962, the principal peopleuthat seemed to be involved wit it at that time were Robert Kennedy, General Lansdale, Dick Helms, and William Harvey, and the group of Kennedy, Lansdale and llelms were providing, if you will, the guidance and the direction as to where this thing should go in the early days.Shortly after the operation was established and I was in Miami, Länsdale seems to have faded out of this particul picture, and I was not involved in the Washington nuances et this, so I am not clear as to exactly what was the reason for his departure from this particular scene.Senator Schweiker. And was that do you remember the скурсосут, Operation MONGOOSE?Ar. Halley. I've heard the cryptonym Operation MONGOOSETOP SECRET![photo of the bottom of the page with a white object in the middle]
[157-10014-10047.pdf — page 11]
but that didn't impact on my life at that particular time.Senator Schwelker. All right.Mr. Johnston. Moving to the time of the Kennedy assassination, were you Chief of Station and in Miami when the President was assassinated?Mr. Halley. Yes, I was the Chief of Station and I was in Miami.Mr. Johnston. You were physically in Miami on November 22nd.Mr. Halley. Yes, I was.Mr. Johnston. Did you receive any orders through CIA channels to conduct an investigation in any fashion into the assassination of the President?Mr.Halley. Well, my recollection of that was that we had requested for name traces at the time that Oswald was arrested, and that was our contribution to the investigation.Mr. Johnston. Did you receive any order in the form of a cable or any other fashion to conduct an InvestigationMr. Halley. I don't recall receiving one, but if you showed me a cable, I would have to comment on it. In other words this was in 1963. This is 1976, and as you know from record. I've been in an awful lot of high volume projects since that time, and I don't think it is likely that I would retain a specific cable, you know, on a particular day. I mean, I have been in Berlin, Laos, Vietnam. My life has been active.> [Figure] The text "TOP SECRET" is printed at the end of the page. There is also a faded rectangular image printed at the bottom of the page.
[157-10014-10047.pdf — page 12]
TOP SECRET1 therefore I do not recall a specific cable. If you've got a2 cable, I'd be glad to comment on it.3 Mr. Johnston. Well, I don't have one, and I'm asking you4 whether one would exist.5 Mr. Halley. I don't recall one.6 Mr. Johnston. And your judgment would be that there was7 not a cable ordering an investigation.8 Mr. Halley. I can't say that. I can only say that I9 don't recall one, but I do recall that at a later point, once10 Oswald was detained by the police and there was some investi-11 gative material emanating from that, we participated in12 name trace activity of whatever was sent to us at that time13 from Washington, because I do recall that at the time that14 the name traces were conducted, that one of the Cuban groups15 that we were in touch with at DRE, they did come up with a16 tape of a debate which had taken place between Oswald and some17 member of the DRE in New Orleans, and you know, that sort of18 sticks in my mind as an event of that particular time. And we19 commented on it, and as I recall, forwarded the tapes to20 Washington.21 Senator Schweiker. That was Bringuier's group, was it22 not?23 Mr. Halley. That was the DRE, the Direccion Revolucionaria24 Senators Schweiker. Wasn't Carlos Bringuier -- maybe25 I'm pronouncing it wrong, involved in that, and wasn't heTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10047.pdf — page 13]
TOP SECRET1.  associated with you folks at that time?2.  Mr. Halley. Well, I don't recall that specific name, Senator, at this time.3.  We did have a relationship with the DRE. We did deal with a number of their top leaders.4.  Mr. Johnston. Let me come back to that later.5.  Did you receive any orders not to investigate an area or not to conduct an investigation of any kind?6.  Mr. Halley. No, I don't recall receiving any such orders.7.  Mr. Johnston. At this time period, November 22nd, November 23rd, 1963, what was your capability in regard to conducting an investigation among Cuban exiles, and with Cuban sources?8.  Mr. Halley. Well, in relationship to Cubans living in the United States, I would say that our capability was quite good.9.  Now, if you are referring to our capability to conduct an investigation in Cuba, I would have to say it was limited.10. I have to know where specifically you are referring to. In other words, if you're talking in the area --11. Mr. Johnston. Please I'm talking domestically of Cuban exiles in the United States, and your answer is --12. Mr. Halley. That it would have been quite good.13. Mr. Johnston. Secondly, with regard to collecting intelligence as to possible Cuban involvement -TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10047.pdf — page 14]
# TOP SECRET1 Mr. Halley. From Cuba or in Cuba?2 Mr. Johnston. Any other source.3 Mr. Halley. Well, if you're talking about collecting4 information in Cuba --5 Mr. Johnston.. I see.6 Mr. Halley. It would then have to be focused specifically7 on different geographic areas. In other words, as an8 example, if you told me I want some information on a specific9 town in the province of Pinar del Rio, that probably was10 within our capability at that time because we had a rather11 extensive network in Pinar del Rio. If you had said to me,12 you know, in that same timeframe on this day, I want you to13 conduct a kind of an investigation in the province of Camaguey.14 I probably would have had to say, you know, we're not as well15 equipped, because our coverage varied from province to province.16 Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources -- and I mean specifically17 JMWAVE station, did JMWAVE station control sources in Cuban18 intelligence?19 Mr. Halley, I don't recall that we had any staff office20 in the Cuban intelligence service under our control. We may21 have been involved in some double agent operations at that time,22 but certainly we did not have a staff officer penetration of23 the Cuban services.24 Mr. Johnston. Did you ever receive any orders to contact25 whatever your contacts were in the Cuban intelligence, to# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10047.pdf — page 15]
TOP SECRET1 inquire about the assassination of President Kennedy?2 Mr. Halley. I don't recall receiving any auch instruction.3 Mr. Johnston. Did that ever about to you on your own?4 Mr. Halley. Well, I think as you probably see from some5 of the traffic, we did come up on our own with samplings of6 opinion, what was happening in the Cuban community. We were7 reporting what was coming out of Cuba in terms of information8 brought by, you know, refugees, material that was being made9 available through people corresponding and so forth, yes, we10 were sensitive to that particular problem.11 Mr. Johnston. But did you affirmatively go out and12 seek the informacion from sources in Cuba?13 Mr. Halley. well, to the extent that this was availabio14 to us, you know, we had lots of agents. If you're asking me15 did we send an Sw massage and task a specific agent to16 conduct an investigation, vor did we send them a radio message17 or senathing like that, I don't recall one.18 Mr. Johnston. Why didn't you do that?19 Mr. Halley. My recollection of this is that we felt20 that the nature of our capability was to simply respond to21 Witat we were able to obtain in the Miami area, and from bu22 sources in a passive way, because this was an investigation23 that was being conducted in the United States with the primar24 responsibility with agencies other than CIA,25 Mr. Johnston. I guess I don't quite understand the weTOP SECRET