Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10005-10297RECORDS SERIES :AGENCY FILE NUMBER:CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF CIA INFORMATIONIN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZEDDOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIAFROM :TO :TITLE :SELECT COMMITTEE - ASSASSINATION REPORT (UPDATED OCT 16, 1975)DATE : 09/01/75PAGES : 678SUBJECTS :SELECT COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORT (CLASSIFIED) TABS A-JTAB A: PROLOGUETAB B: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARYTAB C: COVERT ACTIONTAB D: CUBATAB E: CONGOTAB F: EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITYTAB G: DOMINICAN REPUBLICTAB H: CHILETAB I: SOUTH VIETNAMTAB J: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONSTAB K: RECOMMENDATIONSTAB L: EPILOGUEDOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION : TRESTRICTIONS: REFERREDCURRENT STATUS : PDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 10/05/93OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS:COMMITTEE'S DRAFT REPORT:(UPDATED OCTOBER 16, 1975)[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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Date:10/05/93Page:2JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORM-------------------------------------------------------------------- [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTEDNW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 2
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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE - ASSASSINATION REPORT(update)October 16, 1975TABLE OF CONTENTSTAB A: PrologueTAB B: Introduction and SummaryTAB C: Covert Action as Vehicle for Foreign Policy ImplementationTAB D: Cuba1. Introduction2. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Authorized or Known About Within the CIA3. The Question of Authorization Outside the Central Intelligence Agency in the Eisenhower Administration4. The Question of Authorization During the Kennedy Administration, Pre-Bay of Pigs5. The Question of Authorization During the Kennedy Administration, Post-Bay of Pigs6. The Question of Authorization for the 1963 Assass. Plot7. The Question of Authorization in the Johnson Administratio:TAB E: CongoTAB F: Executive Action CapabilityTAB G: Dominican RepublicTAB H: ChileTAB I: South VietnamTAB J: Findings and ConclusionsTAB K: RecommendationsTAB L: Epilogue
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taken during the Bay of Pigs operation) present Castro with a contaminated diving suit* (Colby, 5/21, pp. 38-39).The Inspector General's Report dates this operation in January 1963, when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as Chief of Task Force W, although it is unclear whether Harvey or Fitzgerald conceived of the plan (I.G., p. 75). It is likely that the activity took place earlier, since Donovan had completed his negotiations by the middle of January 1963. Helms characterized the plan as "cockeyed" (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).TSD bought a diving suit, dusted the inside with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease (Madura foot), and contaminated the breathing apparatus with a tubercule bacillus (I.G., p. 75). The Inspector General's Report states that the plan was abandoned because Donovan gave Castro a different diving suit on his own initiative (I.G., p. 75). Helms testified that the diving suit never left the laboratory (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).(e) AMLASH(1) Origin of the ProjectIn March 1961, an officer of the Mexico City CIA station met with a highly-placed Cuban official to determine if he would cooperate in efforts against the Castro regime (I.G., p. 78). The Cuban, referred to by the cryptonym AMLASH-1, had been*Donovan was not aware of the plan.
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39TOP SECRETA CIA cable dated February 2, 1965, statedthat B-1 had given AMLASH-1 a silencer and that AMLASH-1 had"small, highly concentrated explosives." On February 11, 1965 the Madrid Station cabled that AMLASH-1 would soon receive "onepistol with silencer and one FAL rifle with a silencer from B-l'ssecretary" (I.G., p. 103). A subsequent cable reported that"B-1 had three packages of special items made up by his technicalpeople and delivered to AMLASH-1 in Madrid" (I.G., , p. 103In June 1965, CIA terminated all contact withAMLASH-1 and his associates because of reports that his activitieswere widely known (I.G., pp. 104-105)."4. B-l is to be in Cuba one week before the eliminationof Fidel, but no one, including AM/LASH-1 will knowB-l's location."5. B-l is to arrange for recongition by at least five LatinAmerican countries as soon as Fidel is neutralized anda junta is formed. This junta will be established eventhough Raul Castro and Che Guevara may still be aliveand may still be in control of the part of the country.This is the reason AM/LASH-1 requested that B-l be ableto establish some control over one of the provinces sothat the junta can be formed in that location."6. One month to the day before the neutralization of Fidel,B-l will increase the number of commando attacks to amaximum in order to raise the spirit and morale of thepeople inside Cuba. In all communiques, in all radiomessages, in all propaganda put out by B-1 he must relatethat the raid was possible thanks to the informationreceived from clandestine sources inside Cuba and fromthe clandestine underground apparatus directed by "P".This will be AM/LASH-l's war name."NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 5
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TABLE OF CONTENTSD. CONGO                                                                              Page1. Introduction                                                                               12. Dulles Cablei Leopoldville That "Removal"   of Lumumba is an Urgent Objective in "High   Quarters"                                                                                33. CIA Encouraged Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate"   Lumumba, Who Was Viewed as a "Grave Danger" Even   After Being Deposed and Placed in U.N. Protective   Custody                                                                                  84. The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba                                                          14   (a) Dulles Cabled Again for "Elimination"   of Lumumba, and a Messenger Was Sent to   Congo With a Highly Sensitive   Assignment                                                                        15   (b) Gottlieb Delivered Lethal Substance to   Hedgman in the Congo for the Assassi-   nation of Lumumba: September 1960                                               18   (c) Hedgman Testified That Gottlieb Told   Him That President Eisenhower Had   Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba                                              22   (d) Headquarters Makes the Assassination   Plot "Highest Priority" and Authorizes   Steps in Furtherance of It                                                            24   (e) The Chief of Station Moves Forward   With Assassination Plot                                                               31   (i) The Chief of Station Testified   That He Requested and Received   Confirmation of the Assassination   Plan from Headquarters                                                             31   (ii) The Chief of Station Took "Explora-   tory Steps" in Furtherance of the   Assassination Plot and Testified   That He Destroyed Cable Traffic   Related to the Plot                                                                   34
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-ii-(f) Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About theDegree of Support for and Perpetration of theAssassination Plot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41(i) Tweedy Had No Recollection of the OperationTo Poison Lumumba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41(ii) Tweedy Testified That He Discussed WithBissell the Feasibility of AssassinatingLumumba and IIe Cabled Hedgman About GainingAccess to Lumumba for the Purpose ofAssassination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44(iii) Bissell Testified That Ile Did Not RecallWhether the Assassination Operation HadMoved from Planning to ImplementationBut it Was Not Against Agency Policy toSend Poisons to the Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 485. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination   Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives   in the Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52(a) (O'Donnell's) Operations in the Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53(i) Tweedy and the (Chief of) Station Agreed Thata Senior Case Officer Should be Sent tothe Congo to Concentrate on the Assassi-nation Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53(ii) Bissell Discussed Assassination ofLumumba With (O'Donnell) and Sent Himto Congo: October-November 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54(iii) Bissell Testified That He Asked (O'Donnell)to Plan and Prepare for an AssassinationOperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59(iv) (O'Donnell) Arrived in the Congo andLearned That a Virus Was in theStation Safe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60(v) (O'Donnell) Planned to "Neutralize"Lumumba by Turning Him Over toCongolese Authorities and Requestedthe Assignment of Agent QJWIN toLeopoldville as His Alter Ego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65(b) Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November-December 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
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DRAFT: OCTOBER 6, 1975Frederick D. BaronTOP SECRETFor Internal CommitteeUse OnlyD. CONGO1. IntroductionThe Committee has received solid evidence of a CIA plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. The plot proceeded to the point where lethal substances and instruments specifically intended for use in an assassination were placed in the hands of the CIA Chief of Station in Leopoldville by an Agency scientist.Although these instruments of assassination were never used, a number of questions are presented by the Lumumba case which reflect general issues that run throughout the Committee's assassination inquiry. First, did CIA officers and operatives in the Congo take steps to attempt the assassination of Lumumba?Second, how high in the United States government was the source of authorization for the CIA assassination plot? Finally, was the CIA connected in any way to the events that actually led to the death of Lumumba while in Congolese custody?A thread of historical background is necessary to weave these broad questions together with the documents and testimony received by the Committee.
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-3-Stanleyville, and he was imprisoned. The central government of the Congo transferred Lumumba on January 17, 1961 to the custody of authorities in the province of Katanga, which was asserting its own independence at that time. Several weeks later, the Katangese authorities announced Lumumba's death.There are various accounts of the circumstances and timing of Lumumba's death. The United Nations investigation of the incident concluded that Lumumba was killed on January 17.*2. Dulles Cables Leopoldville That "Removal" of Lumumba is an Urgent Objective in "High Quarters"Shortly after the Congolese declaration of independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960, the CIA assigned a new Chief of Station to the Congo. The Chief of Station said that the briefings he received at CIA headquarters in preparation for his departure contained no discussion of the possibility of assassinating Patrice Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 8). On his brief return to headquarters in connection with Lumumba's visit to Washington in late July, the Chief of Station again heard no discussion of assassinating Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 9).During August, great concern about Lumumba's political strength in the Congo was growing among the foreign policy-makers of the Eisenhower Administration.** This concern was nurtured* Report of the Commission of Investigation, 11/61, UN Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for October, November, and December.** See Section 5, infra, for full discussion of the prevailing anti-Lumumba attitude in the United States government as shown by minutes of the National Security Council and Special Group and the testimony of high Administration officials.
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by intelligence reports such as that cabled to CIA headquartersby the new Chief of Station:EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCINGCLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT.MANY FORCES AT WORK HERE: SOVIETS ... COMMUNISTPARTY, ETC. ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT DETERMINE MAJORINFLUENCING FACTORS TO PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLEFOR POWER, DECISIVE PERIOD NOT FAR OFF. WHETHEROR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYINGCOMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI-WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO ANDTHERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TAKE ACTIONTO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA.... (CIA Cable (IN 39706),Leopoldville to Director, 8/18/60.)This cable also stated the Chief of Station's operational "OBJECTIVE[OF] REPLACING LUMUMBA WITH PRO WESTERN GROUP" (CIA Cable, 8/18/60).Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the Africa Division of CIA's clan-destine services, replied the same day that he was seeking StateDepartment approval for the proposed operation based upon "OURBELIEF LUMUMBA MUST BE REMOVED IF POSSIBLE" (CIA Cable (Out 59741),Tweedy to Leopoldville, 8/18/60). On August 19, Richard Bissell,Director of CIA's covert operations branch, signed a follow-upcable to Leopoldville: "YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PROCEED WITH OPERATION"(CIA Cable OUT 59959, Director to Leopoldville, 8/19/60).Several days later, the Chief of Station reported that a planto assassinate Lumumba had been proposed to President Kasavubu byCongolese leaders:ANTI-LUMUMBA LEADERS APPROACHED KASAVUBUWITH PLAN ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA ... KASAVUBUREFUSED AGREE SAYING HE RELUCTANT RESORTVIOLENCE AND NO OTHER LEADER SUFFICIENTSTATURE REPLACE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable (IN 42761),Leopoldville to Director, 8/24/60.)
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-6-The next day, Allen Dulles personally signed a cable* to the Leopoldville Chief of Station which stressed the urgency of "removing" Lumumba:IN HIGH QUARTERS** HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL [LUMUMBA] CONTINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE THE INEVITABLE RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PRESTIGE OF THE UN AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE THAT UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION. (CIA Cable, OUT 62966), Director to Leopoldville, 8/26/60.)Dulles cabled that the Chief of Station was to be given "WIDER AUTHORITY" -- along the lines of the previously authorized operation to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group -- "INCLUDING EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). "WE REALIZE THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY PRESENT THEMSELVES TO YOU," the cable continued (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).* Cables issued under the personal signature of the DCI are a relative rarity in CIA communitations and call attention to the importance and sensitivity of the matter discussed.** As discussed in Section 5(c), infra, Richard Bisell testified that Allen Dulles would have used the phrase "higher quarters" to refer to the President (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48).
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-7-Dulles also authorized the expenditure of up to $100,000 "TOCARRY OUT ANY CRASII PROGRAMS ON WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE THE OPPOR-TUNITY TO CONSULT HQS" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). He assured the [Chief of] Station that the message had been "SEEN AND APPROVED ATCOMPETENT LEVEL" in the State Department (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).But the Director of Central Intelligence made a special pointof assuring the [Chief of] Station that he was authorized to actunilaterally in a case where the United States Ambassador to theCongo would prefer to remain uninformed:TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRETO BE CONSULTED, YOU SHOULD SEEK HIS CON-CURRENCE. IF IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE, HEDOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACTON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOTPERMIT REFERRAL HERE (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).This mandate raises a question as to whether the DCI was contem-plating a particular form of action against Lumumba which theAmbassador would want to be in a position to "plausibly deny"United States involvement. DDP Richard Bissell testified that hewas "almost certain" that he was informed about the Dulles cableshortly after its transmission and that it was his "belief" thatthe cable was a circumlocutious means of indicating that thePresident wanted Lumumba to be killed (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33,64-65).* See Section 5(c), infra, for additional testimony by Bissell  on the question of authorization for the assassination effort  against Lumumba.
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-9-to a remark by the Chief of Station that implied that he mightassassinate Lumumba:TO COS COMMENT THAT LUMUMBA IN OPPOSITION ISALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN OFFICE, [THECONGOLESE POLITICIAN) INDICATED UNDERSTOODAND IMPLIED MIGHT PHYSICALLY ELIMINATELUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, (IN 49679) Leopoldvilleto Director, 9/7/60.)The cable continued to report that the Chief of Station had offeredto assist this politician "IN PREPARATION NEW GOVERNMENT PROGRAM"and assured him that the United States would supply technicians(CIA Cable, 9/7/60).As the chaotic struggle for power raged, the Chief ofthe Africa Division succinctly summarized the prevalent U. S.apprehension about Lumumba's ability to influence events in theCongo by virtue of personality, irrespective of his officialposition:LUMUMBA TALENTS AND DYNAMISM APPEAR OVER-RIDING FACTOR IN REESTABLISHING HIS POSITIONEACH TIME IT SEEMS HALF LOST. IN OTHER WORDSEACH TIME LUMUMBA HAS OPPORTUNITY HAVE LASTWORD HE CAN SWAY EVENTS TO HIS ADVANTAGE.(CIA Cable, (OUT 69233,) Director to Leopoldville,9/13/60).The day after Mobutu's coup, the Chief of Station reportedthat he was serving as an advisor to a Congolese effort to "elimi-nate" Lumumba due to his "fear" that Lumumba might, in fact, havebeen strengthened by placing himself in UN custody, which affordeda safe base of operations:
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-10-STILL DIFFICULT DETERMINE WHETHER MOBUTU HASSUFFICIENT CONTROL ARMY TO ENFORCE DECISIONSANNOUNCED NIGHT 14 SEPTEMBER. STATION ADVISED[TWO MODERATE CONGOLESE POLITICIANS] TRY WORKWITH [KEY CONGOLESE CONTACT] IN EFFORT ELIMI-NATE LUMUMBA. FEAR UN PROTECTION WILL GIVELUMUMBA OPPORTUNITY ORGANIZE COUNTER ATTACK.ONLY SOLUTION IS REMOVE HIM FROM SCENE SOONEST.(CIA Cable, (IN 13374,) Leopoldville to Director,9/15/60.)On September 17, another CIA operative in the Congo metwith a leading Congolese senator. At this meeting, the senatorrequested a clandestine supply of small arms to equip someCongolese Army troops. The cable to CIA headquarters concerningthe meeting reported:[CONGOLESE SENATOR] REQUESTED CLANDESTINESUPPLY SMALL ARMS TO EQUIP ... TROOPSRECENTLY ARRIVED LEOP[OLDVILLE] AREA ...[THE SENATOR] SAYS THIS WOULD PROVIDE COREARMED MEN WILLING AND ABLE TAKE DIRECTACTION ... [SENATOR] RELUCTANTLY AGREESLUMUMBA MUST GO PERMANENTLY. DISTRUSTS[ANOTHER CONGOLESE LEADER] BUT WILLING MAKEPEACE WITH HIM FOR PURPOSES ELIMINATIONLUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, IN 14228,) Leopoldville.to Director, 9/17/60.)The CIA operative told the Congolese senator that "HE WOULD EXPLOREPOSSIBILITY OBTAINING ARMS" and recommended to CIA headquartersthat they shouldHAVE [ARMS] SUPPLIES READY TO GO ATNEAREST BASE PENDING [UNITED STATES]DECISION THAT SUPPLY WARRANTED AND NECES-SARY (CIA Cable, 9/17/60).[^1] This recommendation proved to be in line with large scaleplanning at CIA headquarters for clandestine paramilitary supportto anti-Lumumba elements. On October 6, 1960, Richard Bissell andBronson Tweedy signed a cable concerning plans which the Chief ofStation was instructed not to discuss with State Department repre-sentatives or operational contacts:[^1]: (footnote continued on next page)
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-11-Several days later, while warning a key Congolese leader about coup plots led by Lumumba and two of his supporters, the Chief of StationURGED ARREST OR OTHER MORE PERMANENT DISPOSAL OF LUMUMBA, GIZENGA, AND MULELE (CIA Cable,(IN 15643) Leopoldville to Director, 9/20/61).Gizenga and Mulele were Lumumba's lieutenants who were leading his supporters while Lumumba was in UN custody.(Footnote continued from previous page)[IN]VIEW UNCERTAIN OUTCOME CURRENT DEVELOP- MENTS [CIA] CONDUCTING CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CONGO AT REQUEST POLICY ECHELONS. THIS PLANNING DESIGNED TO PREPARE FOR SITUATION IN WAY [UNITED STATES] WOULD PROVIDE CLANDESTINE SUPPORT TO ELEMENTS IN ARMED OPPOSITION TO LUMUMBA.CONTEMPLATED ACTION INCLUDES PROVISION ARMS, SUPPLIES AND PERHAPS SOME TRAINING TO ANTI- LUMUMBA RESISTANCE GROUPS.(CIA Cable(OUT 04697,) Director to Leopoldville, 10/6/60.)
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4.  The Plot to Assassinate LumumbaIn the fall of 1960, a scientist from CIA headquarters delivered to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville lethal bio- logical substances to be used to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. The Chief of Station testified that after requesting and receiving confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to carry out the scientist's instructions, he proceeded to take "exploratory steps" in furtherance of the assassination plot. The Chief of Station testified that in the course of his discussion with the CIA scientist, Sidney Gottlieb, he was informed that President Eisenhower had ordered the assassination mission against Patrice Lumumba. Gottlieb's mission to the Congo was both preceded and followed by general cables urging the "elimination" of Lumumba sent from CIA headquarters in an extraordinarily restricted "Eves Only" channel -- including two messages under the personal signature of Allen Dulles.The lethal substances were never used by the Chief of Station. But despite the fact that Lumumba had placed himself in the protective custody of the UN peace-keeping force shortly before the poisons were delivered to the Chief of Station, there is no clear evidence that the assassination operation was terminated before Lumumba's death. There is, however, no direct evidence of a connection between the CIA assassination plot and the events which actually led to Lumumba's death.** See Section 6, infra, for a discussion of the evidence about the circumstances that led to Lumumba's death in Katanga.