Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10005-10228.pdf — page 59]
p 8.Jan 11 ---line 13 reached1514 5 - NONE15 6 - flashed24 l.10 at28 l.22 ease33 l.10 Jon43 17 20
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p.9. line by: Sub: "for" fr" with".line 15 - quotes.10 - J-K-Lp.19 line 15 - LEWISp.22 line 15 - POLLACH17 et. seg. = HARVEY25 l.21- The Special Group30 P.13- NAGU11345 l.4 - J or K1.5 - Bryanl. 8 Tracy
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Jandowide6.23 BAPON684 266? l. 5, 12, 15, 18, 2376 - l.11-y77 l. 5 - "COUNTERSP-1"78 l. 10,11 Y
[157-10005-10236.pdf — page 0]
157-10005-10236 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992Date: 10/04/93Page: 1JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10236RECORDS SERIES :AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R445DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIAFROM :TO :TITLE :REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS/TRANSCRIPTDATE : 07/08/75PAGES : 257SUBJECTS :TESTIMONY BY LANSDALE CONCERNING ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTSEXHIBITS ATTACHED IN THE FORM OF MEMOS/NEWS ARTICLESDOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT/EXHIBITSCLASSIFICATION : TRESTRICTIONS : REFERREDCURRENT STATUS : PDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/04/93.OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS:BOX 251-5[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTEDNW 50955 DocId: 32202426 Page 1
[157-10005-10236.pdf — page 1]
TOP SECRET110Mr. Schwarz. These are minutes of the Special Group whichyou attended, and it states: "Mr. Harvey gave a rundown onprogress to date with agent teams and in the general field ofintelligence, including the Opa-locka interrogation center andthe Madrid clandestine interrogation center. He outlinedvarious difficulties encountered and said that three agent teamshad been infiltrated."Now did Mr. Harvey, at that meeting, state anything -- doyou recollect Mr. Harvey making that report?General Lansdale. In general terms, yes.Mr. Schwarz. Did he state anything relating to thepassage of pills to persons to accomplish the assassination ofFidel Castro in the week prior to this meeting?General Lansdale. No. As a matter of fact, we were veryproud that he had gotten these teams in, that they had beeninfiltrated, and so forth, and collecting intelligence.Mr. Schwarz. Were they the first teams?General Lansdale. Yes.Mr. Schwarz. Did he say anything at that meeting thatyou recall about the subject of assassinations?General Lansdale. Nothing.Mr. Schwarz. Would you give the witness the May 7th '62memorandum of General Taylor, Subject, Report of Progress toHigher Authority?Now, Senators, that is supposedly slipped in your notebooksTOP SECRET
[157-10005-10236.pdf — page 2]
SENSITIVETOP SECRETSENSITIVEFILEN. B.Program Review byBrig. Gen. E. G. Lansdale,Chief of Operations18 January 1962THE CUBA PROJECTFILEN. B.CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZEDI. OBJECTIVEThe U.S. objective is to help the Cubans overthrow the Communistregime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which theUnited States can live in peace.II. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONBasically, the operation is to bring about the revolt of the Cubanpeople. The revolt will overthrow the Communist regime and institutea new government with which the United States can live in peace.The revolt requires a strongly motivated political action movementestablished within Cuba, to generate the revolt, to give it direction to-wards the objective, and to capitalize on the climactic moment. Thepolitical actions will be assisted by economic warfare to induce failureof the Communist regime to supply Cuba's economic needs, psychologicaloperations to turn the peoples' resentment increasingly against the regime,and military-type groups to give the popular movement an action arm forsabotage and armed resistance in support of political objectives.The failure of the U.S.-sponsored operation in April 1961 so shookthe faith of Cuban patriots in U.S. competence and intentions in support-ing a revolt against Castro that a new effort to generate a revolt againstthe regime in Cuba must have active support from key Latin Americancountries. Further, the *foreigness* (Soviet Union and Bloc) of the tyrannyimposed on the Cuban people must be made clear to the people of theWestern Hemisphere to the point of their deep anger and open actions todefend the Western Hemisphere against such foreign invasion. Such ananger will be generated, in part, by appeals from the popular movementwithin Cuba to other Latin Americans especially.The preparation phase must result in a political action organizationin being in key localities inside Cuba, with its own means for internalcommunications, its own voice for psychological operations, and its ownaction arm (small guerrilla bands, sabotage squads, etc.). It must havethe sympathetic support of the majority of the Cuban people, and make thisfact known to the outside world. (It is reported that the majority of Cubansare not for the present regime, but are growing apathetic towards whatappears to be a hopeless future or the futility of their status.)The climactic moment of revolt will come from an angry reaction ofthe people to a government action (sparked by an incident), or from afracturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both. (A majorgoal of the Project must be to bring this about.) The popular movemerExcluded from automaticregrading: DOD Dir.5200.10 does not apply.44-03-19-14DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE22 MAY 15 1962This document containsCopy Noofdocs.ATTORNEY GENERALSENSITIVETOP SECRET
[157-10005-10236.pdf — page 3]
# TOP SECRETSENSITIVEH. TV intrusionStatus: Equipment to enable TV intrusion of Havana TV broadcasts has been reactivated on a small vessel under CIA control. CIA plans to attempt intrusion on 22 January during Castro's forthcoming speech and parade demonstrations.I. Special sabotage supportStatus: State has explored, with negative results, the feasibility of pre-emptive action with respect to tanker charters (most Bloc ship- ments to Cuba are carried in Western bottoms). CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stoppage of some Cuban transport) is not expected until mid-1962. CIA is introducing "Lubzol" a corrosive additive, to Cuban locomotive diesel fuel oil through commercial suppliers in Belgium. It will be 4-5 months before the first locomotives break down. CIA expects to be able to have at least one agent recruited by 28 February to attempt introduc- tion of a corrosive additive to jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba.J. Military actionsStatus: Defense has been tasked with preparing a contingency plan for U.S. military action, in case the Cuban people request U.S. help when their revolt starts making headway. This contingency plan will permit obtaining a policy decision on the major point of U. S. intentions, and is looked upon as a positive political-psychological factor in a people's revolt, even more than as a possible military action. Defense also has been tasked with fully assisting State and CIA, as commitments of Defense men, money, and materiel are required.K. Major elements of the populationStatus: Both State and CIA are continuing to explore their capabilities (with results largely negative to date) for mounting special group operations inside Cuba focused upon dynamic elements of the population, particularly operations through the Church to reach the women and families, and through Labor contacts to reach the workers. Other elements include enlistment of the youth and professional groupings. Special consideration is to be given to doing this through Latin American operational contacts. This is vital to the success of our political action nucleus when CIA can put it into place.L. OutlookStatus: As reported to the Special Group last week, there has been a period of a realistic second look at CIA capabilities to mount the required clandestine operations against Cuba, and a subsequent start in "tooling up." After this second look, CIA has concluded that its realistic role should be to create at least the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overt action. This outlook, although arrived at thoughtfully within CIA, is far short of the Cuba project's goals. CIA must take yet another hard look at its potential capabilities, in the light of the following tasking, to determine if it cannot make the greater effort required.
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# TOP SECRETSENSITIVEV. TARGET SCHEDULEA. IntelligenceTask 1: NIE 85-62 on Cuba due 7 February (CIA).Task 2: By 15 February, Opa Locka Interrogation Center to be made an effective operation for collection and processing of intelligence (CIA with support of Defense, State, I&NS, FBI).Task 3: Intelligence collection from Cuban refugees elsewhere than Miami area. CIA to survey other refugee points (Puerto Rico, Venezuela, etc.) and on a priority basis to ensure maximum coverage of all such source points. 15 February target date.Task 4: CIA to continue its re-examination of intelligence assets, with priority on agents inside Cuba, and report on capability by 15 February. Also included is coverage of intelligence through third country sources, particularly those having diplomatic relations with Cuba.B. PoliticalTask 5: CIA to submit plan by 1 February for defection of top Cuban government officials, to fracture the regime from within. This effort must be imaginative and bold enough to consider a "name" defector to be worth at least a million U.S. dollars. This can be the key to our political action goal and must be mounted without delay as a major CIA project.Task 6: CIA to complete plans by 1 February for Cover and Deception actions, to help fracture the Communist regime in Cuba. Defense, State and FBI are to collaborate on this.Task 7: By 1 February, CIA to submit operations schedule for initiating popular movement within Cuba. This must include localities selected inside Cuba, assessment of selected Cubans, their infiltration, activity assignments, and political platform. One section must deal with the "underground," assess its true status and plans to use it.Task 8: State to follow up the OAS meeting by having U.S. Embassies in Latin America exploit all opportunities to enlist local sympathy for the Cuban people and to increase hostility towards the Communist regime in Cuba. State to submit report on results of this assignment by 13 February, so further planning can be programmed.Task 9: By 15 February, State to submit an inventory of operational assets in the Caribbean area, including capabilities of local governments or groups to mount operations on their own, to help achieve the Project's goals. Plans for early use of such capabilities are due by 19 February.Task 10: CIA to submit operational schedule for using assets in the Caribbean area to achieve the Project's political action goals. The objective of working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such as workers, farmers) is underscored. Due 19 February.
[157-10005-10236.pdf — page 5]
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEWASHINGTON 25, D. C.RECEIVEDJAN 29 1962MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERALFrom: Brig. Gen. LansdaleNoting that you will be away from the country most of the month of February, there are some matters vital to our Project for which we should provide. Certain proposals should have evidence of your support. Some strong decisions may have to be made if our Project is to win its goal -- and the bureaucratic machine has too many people captive to it, one way or another.It is my hope that you will make someone specifically responsible to speak for your determined course and have the role of being your "presence" as far as possible. This demands a personal conviction, freedom from bureaucratic instincts, and reasonably direct access to the President. Perhaps Dick Good-win could fulfill this role. Secretary McNamara is an alternate suggestion; he has so many irons in the fire that I hesitated mentioning him. You might be considering General Taylor, but I do not believe he can quite play this role; he is still too much a fine military bureaucrat at heart.As you know, I remain convinced that our goal can be won. Perhaps, if we can keep forcing U.S. agencies to work hard at it, the goal can be won through their efforts. Yet, their efforts haven't been impressive to date, and I still feel that we might uncork the touchdown play independently of the institutional program we are spurring.It may be a special effort which professional labor operators can launch to stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba. It may be through ethnic-language groups, Spain has an untapped action potential. It could be a warming-up of the always lively youth element in Latin America and Cuba, through some contacts specially used. It could be with the families through the Church, with familiesH4-08-190-14DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE22 JUN 6 1962RECORDS BRANCHThis document contains 2 pages..Copy 1 of 2 copies. Series ATOP SECRETNW 50955 DocId: 32202426 Page 6
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TOP SECRET SENSITIVEF. SABOTAGE SUPPORT PLAN## ACTIVITY1. Sabotage Cuban supply of nickel to Soviets.## PURPOSETo deny supply to Soviets and to hinder Cuba's ability to pay for Bloc imports.## CONSIDERATIONSThis can be an early sabotage action on the Nicaro Plant by a hit-and-run team based outside Cuba. Destruction of transformers, coolant pumps and towers seems more feasible than blocking the channel. Effect can be supported later by denial of Canadian spare parts.2. Sabotage fuel supply.To cripple transportation.Effects of CIA program of lubricating oil additive is expected on locomotive in June. Much more can be done with fuel contaminants, particularly on jet and diesel fuels. Crews aboard Western tankers offer real opportunity for more vigorous program.3. Sabotage communications.To dramatize and encourage the spirit of resistance.Prime targets for hit-and-run teams based outside Cuba are CMQ TV and the Czech radio transmitter (believed now used to jam U. S. broadcasts). Attacks mounted only when operationally feasible. The G-2 micro-wave net should be dealt with when there are sufficient assets inside to make sabotage coincide with a critical need, in August-September.4. Sabotage power supply.To increase strain on regime and bring daily business to a standstill, by dramatic action all people will note.This should be a concerted attack, as feasible in July-August, on power plants at Havana, Santiago, Cinfuegas, Vicente, Santa Clara, Cuatro Caminos, Matanzas. It is of a type requiring detailed planning and special equipment, and can be mounted from outside Cuba.CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZEDTOP SECRET SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET SENSITIVENW 50955 DocId:32202426 Page 8ACTIVITY4. * Caribbean Admission Center,     Opa-Locka, Florida, fully     activated by 15 March 1962.5. * Periodic intelligence esti-     mates, as required by progress     of operations.(1 - 15 March 1962 (cont)PURPOSETo collect intelligence required for theoperations, to identify and earmark in-telligence assets as refugees arrive,and to provide security against Com-munist agent operations.To up-date NIE 85-62, so that currentestimates can be considered at nationalpolicy levels.CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZEDCONSIDERATIONSThis operation, in response to early recommendationas essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving atutmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, witha new building completed and occupied, and with astaff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 Februaryand, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center.(CLA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice,State, USIA.)As the operations develop, there will be both increasedintelligence collection and a need for as current an In-telligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully.It is likely that a more informal method of producing anIntelligence Estimate for use at the national level (thannow governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to befollowed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence sum-maries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weeklyreport summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIAresponsibility, with support of others as required.)OTHER OPERATIONS6. * Continue negotiating for British help in contaminating     locomotive lubricants.     To cripple Cuba's rail transportation. British assistance is required to undertake a successful     sabotage of Cuban locomotives, through contaminating     lubricants. It is expected that a minimum of 3 months     is required before locomotives in Cuba start breaking     down, once the contaminant is introduced.INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS16 - 31 March 19627. * Two teams of agents dis- To collect intelligence. One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include     patched to Cuba. personnel who have had resistance training and some past     experience.* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
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ACTIVITY8. Establish 2 additional third-country resident agents in Cuba.9. By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained.10. * Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U. S.11. * Develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962.OTHER OPERATIONSNone.* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.TOP SECRET SENSITIVEPURPOSETo collect intelligence.To ready agent operations.To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now in the United States.To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U.S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.CONSIDERATIONSPossible future use in communications and support.Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. If the recruitment and training are for resistance activities, the task of recruitment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes only.There are "colonies" in Washington, D. C., and other U.S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this effort.)As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. A center is being activated in Spain. Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers, if possible, in Mexico City, Caracas, and Aruba, San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Santiago, Chile are being surveyed for possible centers. (CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.)
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# TOP SECRETOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEWASHINGTON 25, D. C.12 March 1962SENSITIVEMEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)From: Brig. Gen. LansdaleSubject: Policy Questions, Operation MongooseAs Operation Mongoose goes into the approved activities of Phase I,a number of policy questions have started to arise. Current problems,needing resolution, are listed below. It is requested that the SpecialGroup (Augmented) provide guidance, as a matter of some urgency.1. Use of U.S. military installations. CIA desires to train small   groups of Cuban nationals on the U.S. Air Force Bombing Range, Avon   Park, Florida, immediately. Defense reports that the proposed area   is adequate for this training, but that such training of covert agents   who will be introduced ultimately into Cuba represents a security problem   and a departure from past security procedures, due to the fact that U.S.   Government sponsorship will be apparent to trainees. Capture and   interrogation of any of these covert agents could result in exposure   (in international news media) of U.S. official involvement in efforts to   unseat the present Communist Cuban regime. A policy determination   is needed as to whether or not agents to be infiltrated into Cuba should   be trained on U.S. Government installations.There are other U.S. military installations and properties, inthe Southeastern U.S. and Caribbean areas, which CIA would like to usefor similar training and operational purposes in the future. The samepolicy determination could cover all uses of identifiable U.S. Governmentproperties for training and deployment of Cuban nationals for covertinfiltration into Cuba.2. Arming of Cuban guerrillas. CIA needs a policy determination on   the supplying of arms and equipment to deserving Cuban guerrillas, as   they are located, assessed, and request help. Such requests are starting   to surface, as the intelligence-collection effort is increased, and it isEXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATICREGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10DOES NOT APPLYThis document contains pages.Copy No. of 7 copies. SeriesPROPERTY OFTHE WHITE HOUSE OFFICESENSITIVETOP SECRETNW 50955 DocId:32202426 Page 10
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# MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) onProject Mongoose, 3 May 1962PRESENT: General Taylor; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric,General Decker, General Lansdale and General Craig;Mr. McCone, and Mr. Harvey1. General Lansdale gave an interim report on the progress   of stepping up recruitment of Cubans into the U. S. Army. He said   the consensus is that there are not more than a thousand suitable   individuals from whom additional recruits could be selected. The   Attorney General commented that the President wishes to have a large   number. General Lansdale said that various alternatives for training   of such Cubans are being looked into.It was agreed that such a cadre of Cubans would be an assetto the U.S., which might be used in a number of ways. GeneralLansdale, supported by General Taylor, pointed out that in thisconnection the matter of holding the individuals and giving themuseful employment after they are trained is an important and adifficult one.2. Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on progress to date with agent   teams and in the general field of intelligence, including the   Opa-locka interrogation center and the Madridiclandestine interroga-   tion center. He outlined various difficulties encountered, and said   that three agent teams have been infiltrated and that five W/T sets   are in place. Approximately 72 actual or potential reporting sources   are also in place. A significant development is that Major Duque has   refused to allow agents responsive to him to be dispatched on purely   intelligence-gathering missions. (This sort of attitude had been   forecast earlier as a possibility, but it now assumes particular im-   portance in view of Duque's stature.)3. Mr. Harvey also commented on the two attempts made to intrude   into Havana TV programs. The Group asked that a check be made, as   soon as possible; on how effective these operations were. They also   asked that a copy of the scripts used be made available. The Group   felt that it is worthwhile to check this capability out, as is now   being done, but questioned whether once proved effective it should not   perhaps be kept in reserve for a more meaningful time.cc: General Lansdale
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# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992Date: 10/05/93Page: 1## IDENTIFICATION FORM### AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10005-10250RECORDS SERIES:AGENCY FILE NUMBER: R654Rtd 3/16/94### DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM:TO:TITLE:TRANSCRIPT/RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS/EXHIBITSDATE: 06/25/75PAGES: 61SUBJECTS:PAGES 8-68 OF TESTIMONY BY SARNO, ALFRED J.DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPTCLASSIFICATION: TRESTRICTIONS: REFERREDCURRENT STATUS: PDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 10/05/93OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS:BOX 258-11[R] - ITEM IS RES