Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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SECRET321 A They were used as consultants, basically, yes.2 Q We have spoken about the investment American businesshad in Cuba. Did it ever come to your attention that Americanorganized crime --5 A No.6 Q -- had considerable investment in Cuba?7 A No. Well, everybody knew that the Mafia was in8 Cuba. I mean, all the casinos and this type of thing.9 Q The casinos were run --10 A I knew that long before. When I was in the Air Force11 during the war, I used to fly into Havana on weekends and this12 type of thing.13 Q I understand that. It was fairly well known.14 A It was a criminal element.15 Q The Mafia was involved with the casinos in Havana.16 A Right.17 Q Do you know of any attempts by the Agency to enlist18 the support or assistance of any crime figures in any manner19 whatsoever in the Agency's efforts against the Cuban regime?20 A No.21 Q Have you ever heard of Mr.Roselli?22 A Oh, yes.23 Q When was the first time you heard of Mr. Roselli?24 A Well, I guess it was -- it seems to me it was either25 Drew Pearson or Jack Anderson had an article on him a number
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SECRETof years ago.Q Was that the first time you heard of the man's name?A Yes, as I recall.Q Is that also true of Sam Giancana?A No. I have heard that name but I don't know where.Q In connection with --A Not in connection with the Agency, no.Q In connection with the casinos or --A No.Q -- gambling interests in Cuba?A No.Q You know of no instance in which organized crime figures were used as consultants by the Agency?A Only what I read in the paper. I had no knowledge of that whatsoever.Q Do you know of any offers of assistance from figures of that type --A No.Q -- who were interested in getting back into cuba?A No.Q We were talking about economic warfare. We have talked about attempts to keep the price of sugar low. What other types of economic activities were conducted against Castro's Cuba?
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SECRET                                                             34A  Well, we used all-source information to find out what!his commercial dealings were. When we would see -- well, forinstance, the Nicaro Nickel Mine which is a source ownedby the General Services Administration, finally got back intoproduction and nickel, of course, and still is -- was in shortsupply. We had a *French* firm, *Societe le Nickel*, who wasbuying *almost the entire* output of the Nicaro mines. And this*French* firm exported to the United States. So we went tothe Treasury Department and to the Foreign Assets Controlpeople and said, isn't there something we can do to stop these*le Nickel* exports coming into the United States? So they lookedinto the thing and indeed they did.Q  Who owned the mine?A  The U.S. Government owned it when Castro took itover.Q  I see.A  General Services Administration. And it was leasedout for operation. But the ownership rested with theGovernment.So the Treasury simply made the *French* provide aCertificate of Origin for the nickel that went in -- theyexport a lot of metal that contains nickel, silverware, knivesand forks, this type of thing, and -- you know, stainlesssteel, and since nickel is used as a hardening agent we simplyTreasury simply said you can't import any more into this
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SECRETcountry until we have a Certificate of Origin. As a matter of fact, there was a boat that was pulling into the dock in New York and they wouldn't let it unload. They just turned it around. Eventually, over a period of months, le Nickel found other sources and export privileges to the United States were restored.You know, it is -- you just -- any time you raise or lower a tariff you have economic warfare. It is that simple.Q Were there any other instances that you can recall of economic warfare in which you enlisted the support of American business firms?A I know we were in touch with a great many American business firms. We enlisted everybody's support that we could.MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.(Discussion off the record.)BY MR. MANFREDI:Q When we broke for a moment we were discussing other instances where the Agency has enlisted the support of American business in economic warfare against Cuba. Can you think of any other such instances?A Oh, certainly. The Cubans were having an awful time with their Maritime fleet, such as it was. These boats were powered with Nordberg engines. We simply went to the Nordberg people and told them -- asked them to cooperate with us, which
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SECRETthey said they would. They notified their manufacturer's representatives around the world if they got any orders from the Cubans they were to be refused. This type of thing.We did the same thing with --Q Let's just stop for a second. Now, was Nordberg compensated in any way for cooperation with the Agency?A No.Q Were they compensated for the loss of business involved in that activity?A No. No.Q I take it, you received similar cooperation from other companies.A Oh, a great many other companies, yes.Q Did any American companies refuse to cooperate in that manner?A No. Not a one.Q Were there any legal sanctions threatened against companies?A No. No.Q Were there any sanctions that could have been brought to bear upon those companies had they chosen to trade with Cuba?A Well, in the first place, they couldn't trade with Cuba. They couldn't get export licenses from this country anyway. Then, under the Foreign Assets Control Act of the
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SECRET                                                                        37Treasury Department you have the extra-territorialty clause in there where a subsidiary of an American company cannot -- foreign subsidiary of an American company cannot trade with the country that is designated and Cuba was a designated country. And all the businessmen were well aware of this. Nobody tried to twist their arm.Q   Other than insuring that these companies refused to accept orders from Cuba, which I take it you feel they were legally constrained from doing, what other types of support did you receive from American business?A   Well, if American business -- sometimes they would receive correspondence, particularly, say, from -- well, they received it from Cuba asking for publications and this type of thing. They would normally forward all this type of thing to the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department, or in some instances they might call me and I would just give them a Post Office box to send the correspondence to.Q   Any other types of support solicited or received by the Agency from American business?A   No. Not that I can recall. There just wasn't one firm we approached, and God knows we approached I don't know how many, that wasn't extremely cooperative. As a matter of fact, a lot of them, you know, thought we weren't doing enough, that we ought to do a little more than we were doing, the government wasn't really pushing Cuba the way it should, butSECRET
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SECREToutside of that, nothing. There wasn't any problem of coopera-tion. There wasn't any arm-twisting. It was all voluntary.Q Did you identify yourself as CIA --A Yes.Q -- in dealings with these companies?A Indeed, I do and we went to the top level, eventhe Board Chairman or the president. No problem at all.Q Let's talk about paramilitary operations. We startedbut didn't really discuss that in any depth.Q What kind of paramilitary operations were runagainst Cuba by the CIA?A Maritime operations.Q Is that the extent of it?A That is the extent of it.Q Were there any aerial operations?A Not to my knowledge.Q Leaflet drops?A No.Q Bombing?A No. Of course, you had the over-flights. As far asI am concerned that is the only aerial activity.Q That was run by another directorate, wasn't it?A Yes.Q Aerial photography, and so forth.A Yes. They run a flight when you ask them. It has to
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SECRETbe requested and that is about it.QAnd those were run out of the United States?AOh, yes.QCan you think of anything, any other type of para-military activity other than maritime operations.ANo. I really can't, no.QAm I correct that those operations were mannedby CIA contract employees?ARight.QWhich would include Cuban refugees.ARight.QAnd some CIA officers?ARight.QAny other branches of the services, Armed Services,involved? This, of course, is posted Bay of Pigs.AYes. No, not to my knowledge. You have got to rememberthat probably down at our Domestic Training Station we probably have people on detail from other from the militarybranches in the Government, but other than that I don't thinkthat of course, during the Bay of Pigs operation we alsohad people detailed into the Agency.QNow, the training of persons involved in maritimeoperations, I take it, was conducted in part within theUnited States and in part outside of the United States. Isthat correct?
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SECRETA I would think probably the major portion of it was conducted within the United States.Q The Keys would be considered within the United States.A Oh, yes.Q Or were there any locations where it was conducted outside the United States?A Following the Bay of Pigs, I don't think so. Not to my knowledge. I just don't know, I just don't recall but I don't think that -- I think all the training was done domestically.Q Now, what kinds of operations are included within this category of maritime operations?A Well, the infiltration operations, infiltrating agents into Cuba, exfiltrating agents, hit and run sabotage raids. That is about the extent of it.Q Now, when did these operations commence? Was it shortly after the Bay of Pigs?A I would -- I think these operations were probably at their height during the period about 1963 through, say, 1967. The program was terminated in 1968, I think in December 1968, something like that.Q Why was the program terminated?A First of all, it was too expensive. It wasn't providing enough intelligence and it simply wasn't -- economically.
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SECRET                                                                           41Phone (Area 202) 544-60001 it wasn't feasible to continue these things. The agents were2 getting wrapped up. We were -- we just felt that the return3 wasn't sufficient for what the investment was.4 Q You say the agents were getting wrapped up.5 A Yes.6 Q What do you mean by that?7 A When we infiltrated an agent, Cubans would identify8 him and capture him.9 Q These various types of paramilitary operations that10 were conducted by the Agency I trust were approved by the11 Forty Committee?12 A Every operation received a specific approval from13 the Forty Committee.14 Q In advance?15 A In advance.16 Q Now, what was the procedure for submitting - for17 initiating such an operation?18 A Well, normally in the case of an infil or an exfil.19 or perhaps we wanted to lay down the cache.20 Q You are referring to a cache of arms.21 A A cache of anything, replay of radio, batteries,22 whatever they might need. If we decided that we should have23 one of these operations and the request would go from here24 over to the, I guess to the White House and then the Forty25 Committee at its weekly meeting -- they used to meet very
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SECRET                                                                   421 frequently -- they would either approve the operation or say2 no. These operations had to be planned well in advance because3 the tides had to be right, the moon had to be in the proper4 phase for communications and this type of thing. And these5 things, all these were coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of6 Staff, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the FBI. If we were7 exiltrating people, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.8 Every Government agency or enforcement agency or military9 agency that had any involvement whatsoever, and the entire10 thing was coordinated.11 Q   Do you know of any such paramilitary operations12 that were run unbeknownst to the Forty Committee?13 A   No.14 Q   What kind of volume of operations are we talking15 about?.16 A   You are not talking about a very big volume of1.  operations because of the planning that had to go into these2.  things. I would say that probably at the height of the thing3.  they may be running three or four a month. No more than that.20 Q   You have heard Eugenio Martinez refer to having21 run 300 operations.22 A   I have seen that.23 Q   Is that inaccurate?24 A   Well, it all depends on what is in his mind. He25 may have considered some of the training exercises as opera-
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SECRET                                                  43tions. Obviously, these guys trained. In order to run oneof these operations, you know, you would have to have a mothership in place and rubber boats and the UDT people to go in tosee if there were mines and this type of thing on the shorebefore you go. So he may have considered that all these train-ing exercises were operations but no way did he ever partici-pate in any three or 400 active operations into Cuba.Q Now, from what specific locations were theseoperations launched?A They were mostly launched from the keys.Q Any other locations?A Not to my knowledge.Q Now, would you describe for me the kind of hit andrun sabotage operations that were conducted?A Well, we conducted one hit and run sabotage againstthe Texaco refinery.Q What used to be the Texaco refinery?A What used to be the Texaco refinery.MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.(Discussion off the record.)THE WITNESS: These things, a great amount of planningwent into these things. We did have a model of the refinery.We agonized over the best approach to the refinery and thistype of thing to do the most effective damage. This was run. Itwas successful, as I recall, not totally successful but it was
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# SECRET1 a successful operation. By that, I mean they didn't do as2 much damage as they wanted to because they had to get out3 because the Cuban defense came after them. It was that type4 of operation that we did.5 As I recall, another time we took a team in to burn6 some cane fields. Really, the classical operations that we7 did in the maritime activities were the infiltrations and8 exfiltrations.9 Q Were any CIA operations run out of Guantanamo?10 A Not to my knowledge.11 Q Was it impractical to use the base there for --12 A Well, the base is so surrounded and has been that13 I think if a guy went through that fence you would carry him14 back. He wouldn't walk.15 MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.16 (Discussion off the record.)17 MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.18 BY MR. MANFREDI:19 Q Are there any other categories of sabotage run outof the Keys other than what you have just described?21 A Well, we did lay down a cache, if you will, sabotage22 kits to be used by our own island agents. They contained23 sugar to dump into gas tanks and metal fragments to put down24 crank cases. Things of this nature.25 One of our main objects was to, of course, sabotage
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SECRET45all the oil. We did that with a big operation. We made ourown oil, substandard. Additives, I should say, not oil. Wecontracted with an American firm for that. And we shippedit in through third countries in Europe. It did hit the target.The thing we wanted to get at was the oil and theautomotive machinery on the island. We knew it was breakingdown and if we could get a complete breakdown we would haveeverything at a standstill because in those days the automotivGequipment wasn't coming in that rapidly from Europe becauseCastro didn't hve the money to buy it and they weren't going textend the credit.The railroad system was in total disaster. TheSoviets had such a long logistics line, supply line, plusthe fact that the Cubans didn't like the Soviet equipmentbecause they were used to good American equipment. And thesewere principal targets that we were trying to get to.Q In your experience at the Agency can you think ofany other analogus or similar paramilitary operations runfrom a base in the United States?A No.Q I know there has been some paramilitary trainingin the United States.A Oh, yes..Q In connection with other operations.A Oh, sure.SECRET
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SECRET                                                                       46Q   But do you know of any paramilitary operations thatwere actually run out of the United States?A   No.Q   As far as you know, then, this is a totally uniquesituation.A   As far as I am concerned, it is, yes.Q   Now, how large a Navy was actually organized inMiami? On a previous occasion you described this to me asthe third largest Navy in the Caribbean.A   That is right.Q   What kind of equipment did these people have?A   Well, we had -- honestly, everything from a canoeup to three to 500 foot mother ship. We had Boston whalers,rubber boats. We had a number of craft in, say, the 27 to45 foot length. And they looked like real tubs. They werepainted and they looked like they wouldn't even float butthey had the fastest engines in them. They could outrun any-thing. They were extremely well armed. We had our under-water demolition teams. We had a pretty good Navy.Q   Did these craft operate under non-official-coverin the Miami area?A   Yes.Q   Were there a variety of covers or was there onefirm?A   No. Variety.
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SECRETQ Fishing companies?A Well, fishing companies, Geodetic Survey, marine supply. In all, I think during the period that the station and these other entities were under commercial cover, or non-official cover, I think we had 100 so cover companies.Q Did any of these companies actually engage in any legitimate commercial activities?A Not to my knowledge, no.Q None of them -- were any of them in competition with firms in that area?A These are probably what we would call devised facilities. They were probably registered with the State of Florida and they paid taxes and this type of thing, but if one was blown or became known, we just crossed that out of existence and started up a new one.Q What did Eugenio Martinez do when he wasn't running these operations?A Well, he was down -- this is one of the reasons, as I told you before, we brought him back and put him under that contract, that retainer, because of the years that he spent under such strict operational discipline down in the Keys. Obviously, he didn't stay down there all the time. He came back -- he might come back once a month, or something like that, to see his family, perhaps once every two weeks if he got some time off.
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SECRETQ I see. So some of these boats and personnel were actually stationed full-time *in the Keys*?A Oh, yes. Oh, sure.Q Were there any operations run out of the United States which involved destruction of crops or poisoning of sugar or anything of that sort?A What did you have in mind specifically? You mean the Puerto Rican thing?A Well, that is one of the things I had in mind.Would you describe that for me?A Well, this is, I guess you could term it a target of opportunity. This was where a vessel was carrying Cuban sugar to the Soviet Union and I forget exactly now what happened to it but I know that it got a hole below the waterline, or something, and had to put into Puerto Rico for repairs.In order to repair it, I guess, and get it in the drydock or wherever it was, they had to remove the sugar and put it in the warehouse and at that time I guess somebody came up with a plan to try to widen the rift between -- there was a rift at that time between the Soviets and Cubans and to put a harmless substance into the sugar that would make it acid, sour tasting, and it wouldn't harm the sugar or the individual, and some of this was done. And then when it leaked, of course, we had to get rid of it and we had a sugar firm buy it back from the Soviets.
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SECRETQ Bought it back from the Soviets?A Yes.MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.(Discussion off the record.)MR.MANFREDI: Back on the record.BY MR. MANFREDI:Q Are there any other operations in which crops were -- were there attempts to destroy crops in Cuba?A No. No.Q Place foreign substances in Cuban products?A In Cuban products?Q Yes.A No. Not that I recall. You see, Cuba really -- in those days the only thing, Cuba was exporting sugar and nickel. The agriculture sector of the economy was in absolutely total chaos. God, they didn't have any citrus, they didn't have anything, and the poor people in Cuba were literally starving. There just wasn't anything to eat. And Fidel was going around with this big plan -- of course, there were a number of experimental cattle ranches in Cuba. King Ranch had one there. I forget -- several other European and American companies that had experimental cattle ranches there and they were experiment-ing with the, you know, cross-breeding and this type of thing. Fidel was preoccupied with this. He went up to Canada and paid $100,000 for a bull and -- so he just put it
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SECRETon an old Cuban Airways airplane. The damn airplane few toohigh and the bull became sterile by the time he landed inCuba. No thought given to, you know, pressurizing the cabinand keeping the temperature at a certain point and this typeof thing. So he was helping us all along the line andthis here again, we generate propaganda, incompetence and thistype of thing.But as far as sabotaging any Cuban product, no, wedidn't go into that. Our object was to enforce the blockadeand cut off his sources of supply.Q When was the Miami Station established?A As a station?Q Yes.A I think in September 1961.Q And that was several years before you became involvedin Cuban matters?A Yes.Q Do you know of any other facilities of that naturewithin the United States, Agency facilities?A You mean, targeted against the opposition?Q Yes.A A station as such?Q Yes.A No. You have some communications facilities thatyou really call stations because here again, they are not
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# SECRETdirected towards any domestic activity. They are in support of overseas communications.Q Of course, we have FR bases and DCD offices and Office of Security officers, and so forth.A Right.Q But I am talking about actual stations.A Operating stations, no.Q This is the only such station in the United States as far as you know, is that correct?A Right.Q And was this station established to deal primarily with Cuban activities?A Yes.Q Cuban-related matters?A With Cuba, period.Q Did it have, when it was established, any other responsibilities with respect to Western Hemisphere activ. 105.A Not to my knowledge.Q Entirely limited, then, to Cuban activities?A Yes, and in support of Cuban activity and other countries in the Hemisphere.Q When you joined the group dealing with Cuban activities, what was the size or the number of personnel attached to that Station?A To that Station? Well, the Station had probably a
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SECRET                                                                                   52couple hundred staffers there, full-time employees of the Agency, plus I don't know how many contract employees, independent contractors, probably another 200 minimum. It was obviously the largest installation we had. I think at its height it had over 500 people in it.Q   Full-time Agency people?A   No, no.Q   Combination of contract and --A   And full-time, yes. A regular employee we call a star employee.Q   Now, would Martinez have been one of those contract people?A   Yes.Q   Even though he was located down in the Keys?A   Oh, yes.Q   And what kind of facilities did the Station have in Miami? Physical facilities.A   Well, they were located on the south campus off the University of Florida, I mean, the University of Miami, at the old Richmond Naval Air Station. It was a self-contained unit. It was pretty well off the beaten path, in fact, damn well off the beaten path. It was about four miles from the Dixie Highway inland. We had our own guard force.Q   Official cover?A   No. Non-official