Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 92]
# TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-60001 run by William Harvey?2 Mr. Halley. To develop the capability to carry on the3 assassination?4 Mr. Baron. Yes.5 Mr. Halley. No. I have no knowledge of Harvey being6 focused on a project or given the capability of carrying one7 out.8 Mr. Baron. Harvey has testified, as has Richard Bissell,9 I will represent to you, that instruction was given by Bissell10 to Harvey to set up, to develop such a capability in early 196111 and that Harvey took steps to develop such a capability in12 coordination with an asset in New York named OJWIN and I think13 that period of greatest activity was in 1962 and WIN was14 involved in spotting potential assets among the criminal under-15 world in Europe and might be used for any number of dirty16 deeds.17 Mr. diGenova. It should be emphasized that the Executive18 Action Plan that you are referring to has had as its goal the19 incapacitation of foreign leaders, one possibility of20 incapacitation being the ultimate weapon, assassination. It was just not assassination. It was a spectrum of activities21 that could be used to incapacitate a foreign leader anywhere22 from illness, chemical warfare, and then including death.23 Correct me if I am wrong, but it was not just assassination.24 Mr. Baron. Does that ring any bells?25# TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET921 Mr. Halley. No, it does not.2 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection that the ZRRIFLE3 Project involving the development of an Executive Action"4 capability would have been tied in in any way to an operation5 against Cuba?6 Mr. Halley. No, that does not ring any bells, none what-7 soever.8 Mr. Baron. I would like to introduce as Halley Exhibit9 3 an article from Harper's Magazine entitled "The Kennedy10 Vendetta," subtitled "How the CIA Waged a Silent War Against11 Cuba," written by Taylor Branch and George Crile III.12 Let me show you this article and let me ask you whether13 you have read it?14 Mr. Halley. Yes, I have read the article.15 (The document referred16 to was marked Halley17 Exhibit No. 3 for18 identification.)19202122232425# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 94]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Baron. Let us pick out some spacifics and discuss2 them briefly here.3 Near the beginning of this article, it mentions that JMWAVE4 Station operated within an annual budget of well in excess of5 $50 million.6 Would that be accurate to you?7 Mr. Halley. I do not recall whether that is an accurate8 figure. We would have to go back to the records. You know, as9 I explained to you earlier, the start of the operation taking10 place in March and escalated up to a high point and then11 dropped off. In the budgetary cycle, we are dealing with a12 mass of figures, and I would not want to give you an inaccurate13 answer. That is something that could be researched -- we have14 the files -- rather than speculate for you on the buildup and15 reduction in the operation. I do not feel that is useful.16 Mr. Baron. As a ballpark figure, would you be able to17 place the annual budget of the Station in the neighborhood18 of tens of millions of dollars?19 Mr. Halley. No, I would not, because of this transition,20 you know, period, the costs were very high in the beginning to21 get a start-up operation, brought to a certain peak, and then22 tapered off and starting to be peeled back. I would not want23 to draw a figure of --24 Mr. diGenova. What would the start-up cost?25 Mr. Halley. In terms of what they involved or dollars?TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET1 Mr. diGenova. Dollars.2 Mr. Halley. I have no recollection of the dollars.3 Mr. Baron. Would you say that $50 million would be in the4 right ballpark for your activities at the peak?5 Mr. Halley. I just have no recollection of the dollar6 figure. You might want to get that figure when you can retrieve7 it in the files. It is available.8 Mr. Baron. Were the operations of JMWAVE coordinated with9 other Latin American CIA Station's, as the article indicates10 here?11 Mr. Halley. I think my recollection of that phase is that12 Cuban activities with other Latin American stations were13 coordinated with JMWAVE.14 Mr. Baron. Coordinated with JMWAVE?15 Mr. Halley. With JMWAVE.16 Mr. Baron. Who had the central coordinating responsibility?17 Mr. Halley. Washington.18 Mr. Baron. Was that delegated by Washington to you?19 Mr. Halley. No. Essentially Washington had the overall20 coordinating responsibility, but that needs some elaboration.21 Let me say that we would become aware in our activities in22 Miami that a number of interesting people had come in on a23 flight to Mexico City. We would send a cable down to Mexico24 City with an information copy to Washington outlining who we25 were interested in, and I would probably send somebody down to# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 96]
TOP SECRET951 Mexico to look at the particular Cuban or the operational2 opportunity in conjunction with the Station Chief in Mexico3 City. So we were in some cases a clearinghouse.4 The final coordination authority rested in Washington. I5 will say that if Miami wanted to do something and for local6 political reasons in Mexico the Mexican Station Chief did not7 want to do it, that would be adjudicated, not by Miami, but by8 Washington.9 Mr. Baron. Let me quote you a passage here and see if it10 comports with our discussions earlier of special arrangements11 you may have, the JMWAVE Station may have had, with law enforce-12 ment authorities in Florida.13 The article says: "All the boat missions to Cuba were tech-14 nically illegal under the Neutrality Act, the Maritime Laws,15 and Immigtation statutes, so that the Station had to work out16 special arrangements with Customs, Immigration and the Coast17 Guard."18 Is that generally accurate?19 Mr. Halley. I think, as I described to you before, there20 was coordination with the Coast Guard in terms of vessel21 departures. The other is Immigration?22 Mr. Baron. Customs, Immigration and Coast Guard.23 Mr. Halley. Immigration, there would not have been24 coordination on a particular, you know, boat dispatch. On the25 other hand, let's say if a mission aborted for some reason andTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 97]
TOP SECRET961 a small boat could not recover its position and get back to the2 mother ship to be picked up and it was adrift or came in to one3 of the islands or came in to the Florida coast anywhere and was4 picked up and picked up by Immigration inspectors, then they5 would ask to have their case referred to a particular individual6 It may have been a code number, a color code, it may have been7 phrase. But then Immigration would get in touch with us and say8 we have this group, here is what they say, what is your interest9 in this particular group, and then that would be adjudicated10 at that point.11 Now the third group was Customs. Customs did have a12 number of patrols and at times when boat loadings were conducted13 off the Florida Keys in particular, those ware coordinated with14 the Coast Guard so they would not be expending their manpower15 to run down groups that were extricating with us, in fact the16 Agency was doing.17 Mr. Baron. The article continues to say: "It was illegal18 for agents to travel around with machine guns and plastic19 explosives in the cars, as they often did. The Station had to20 establish liaison with seventeen police jurisdictions along21 the Florida coast and into the Keys. The result was that22 any agent who was arrested for anything from drunken driving to23 illegal possession of firearms would be quickly released."24 Is that accurate?25 Mr. Halley. I commented on that before, and we are on theTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 98]
TOP SECRET1 record on that as saying that we did not drive around, there2 were no vehicles moving, manned by these Cubans with arms and3 weapons on them.4 In other words, you are coming back to the same point,5 because as I explained to you, the weapons were only given to6 them on the vessel and taken back from them when they came back7 from a mission, so that the statement is not actually correct.8 Mr. Baron. What about the end of that passage where they9 say that the result, and I understand that you would disagree10 as to whether it was a result of this kind of a practice which11 you say was not carried on at all.--12 Mr. Halley. It was not.13 Mr. Baron. Did a situation exist where any agent who was14 arrested for anything from drunken driving to illegal possession15 of firearms would be quickly released.16 Mr. Halley. I have to go back and divide your question17 into two parts. There were no firearms --18 Mr. Baron. I am not saying firearms supplied to them by19 the CIA for a CIA mission or any agent travelling down the20 street in Miami who happened to have a Saturday Night Special21 in his car or who happened to be drunk while driving. Would22 such a person be released right away or once the CIA connection23 surfaced?24 Mr. Halley. My answer to that is no. In other words, if25 he had a Saturday Night Special and was picked up by the policeTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 99]
TOP SECRET1 and detained, and if he then asked to be in contact with us,2 the case would be looked at at that particular point and if he3 had a Saturday Night Special, you know, there would not be any4 intervention on his behalf because it had nothing to do with5 his task on the behalf of CIA.6 I did mention to you earlier we had training camps in various7 parts of the State. If somebody came out of the training camp8 and did get drunk and was picked up and did not speak English9 or something and the police jurisdictions did have a way of10 getting in touch with us and we might intervene on a case of11 disorderly conduct.12 Mr. diGenova. How was that established, the relationship of13 liaison with these jurisdictions. Had it been set up with14 JMWAVE directly through Washington and down through the FBI?15 How had that been done?16 Mr. Halley. It varied. When we started expanding the17 operation, you know, there had already been a Station there18 and there also were two security units in the greater Miami19 area. In some cases the existing contacts at the Station were20 expanded, the same with Dade County. In other cases, the21 security of personnel who had established contact with other22 jurisdictions were used to effect the introduction. In some23 cases, we had our security people who were on my staff go out24 to these jurisdictions and identify themselves simply with a25 badge and a name and discuss the kinds of things that they wereTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 100]
TOP SECRET                                                                                                   991  interested in so that there would not be a cross of problems2  with these jurisdictions and therefore a liaison was opened on3  that basis, a multiplicity of approaches.4  Mr. Baron. The article discusses the fact that regular5  commando raids were run out of JMWAVE Station to the shore of6  Cuba, and that those commandos were equipped with all kinds of7  explosives and armaments.8  Is that generally a fair statement, that we were running on9  a regular basis commando raids to Cuba?10 Mr. Halley. Yes. There were a series of commando raids11 run from the Miami Station against targets in Cuba.12 Mr. Baron. Were assassination weapons, that is, high-powered13 rifles with low muzzle velocity and telescopic sights, supplied14 to those commando teams as a matter of course?15 Mr. Halley. No, they were not. For most of those16 commando teams, you were looking for a different kind of a17 weapon. You are looking for a weapon with a high range of fire18 power over a short distance to deal with an emergency situation19 rather than the kind of, you know, weapon that we are talking20 about.21 In other words, you would find that type of a group armed22 with a submachine gun, as for example.23 Mr. Baron. If an assassination weapon as we have24 described it was supplied to a commando team, they would have25 to have a specific purpose in mind for its use?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 101]
# TOP SECRET1 Mr. Halley. Yes.1002 Also, again, all of these weapons were controlled, the3 weapons that were issued at the time of the mission on the4 mother ship and picked up on the team's return to the mother5 ship, so there was accountability for the weapons.6. Mr. Baron. Would it have been unusual to supply what we7 have called an assassination weapon to a commando team?8 Mr. Halley. Well, that depends on the mission. For9 instance, let me use an example.10 Most of the missions that were run were run against targets11 that were in fairly close proximity to the shore. If you are12 going to put a party to attack your objectives, let us say the13 objective was a petroleum storage tank, if you were going to do14 this by putting charges up against the petroleum storage tank15 that meant that you had to have a group infiltrate close16 enough to put the charges on the tank. Some distance away17 from them you would give them a second element of the commando18 team which would be providing covering fire for this group in19 case they got into trouble and cannot handle it on the ground.20 This covering fire group might have had a light machine gun,21 a Belgian weapon. They could have these kinds of weapons and22 they did have these kinds of weapons which in the definition you23 are using could be used as a sniper weapon or whatever, but the24 basic reason for having that weapon was to provide fire support25 for the other members of the commando team. And therefore when# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 102]
TOP SECRET101Phone (Area 202) 544-60001 this mission was over and they returned, those weapons were2 taken back from them and accounted for. They were shaken down3 so that we did not have weapons disappearing out of our4 control.5 Mr. Baron. Such weapons, high-powered rifles with telescopic6 scopes, conceivably with silencers, were supplied with some7 regularity, but they were kept under tight control?8 Mr. Halley. We had high-powered rifles. I cannot think now9 of a case where there was a sniper scope attached to the rifle.10 I can think of no case where there was a silencer attached to11 a rifle in any of these commando raids. There were a number of12 raids conducted, some of them involved teams of fifteen or13 twenty men. I am not prepared to say that no man ever had one,14 but I do not recall one. You know, if you gave me an inventory15 which are in the files, for each of the operations and say here16 is the operation plan, does this list of equipment fifteen years17 later look reasonable to you, I would be able to tell you yesor no. But off the top of my head, I do not recall a sniper19 scope or a silenced rifle.20 Mr. Baron. Do you know a man by the name of Rolando21 Martinez?22 Mr. Halley. Of Watergate involvement?23 Mr. Baron. Yes.24 Mr. Halley. Yes, I know of him. I have never met him25 personally. I know of him. Ile was a member of our boatTOP SECRET
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## TOP SECRET1 infiltration team. He was a UDT man.2 Mr. Baron. In the Harper's article, it says that Martinez3 indicated that "More than once he was given personal charge of4 weapons drops in which special rifles with silencers and tele-5 scopic sights were left in designated inland spots."6 Do you know of a factual basis for that statement?7 Mr. Halley. Martinez is undoubtedly factually correct when8 he says he put caches on the coast of Cuba that contained weapons9 I do not know how he would be able to tell what kind of weapons10 were in the cache. The reason I say that is that when one of11 these missions were planned, the cache was put together and12 packed by our logistics group and once the cache was put13 together it was brought on board the vessel and the cache was14 then turned over to the team for infiltration so he would never15 have seen the contents of the cache, he would not have opened16 it up because it was always in a sealed container.17 It is conceivable that in the pre-mission briefing that18 he got before he went down that he was told that we are putting19 in a cache containing a radio or putting in a cache containing20 weapons because that would influence what he selected as a21 cache type. In other words, if it were a radio, we would want22 it higher and drier than we would a can containing weapons that23 were wraped in cosmolene and so forth. He might know that they24 were weapons, but he wouldn't know that they were silenced25 and they had a scope. I must honestly say to you I doubt that.## TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 104]
# TOP SECRET103Mr. Baron. Did you know of any weapons drops that were made for the purpose of supplying someone inside Cuba with a weapon for the assassination of Fidel Castro?Mr. Halley. No, not for that clearly stated purpose. As I told you, we put a lot of weapons caches in. The weapons were multi-purpose weapons, could be used. I know of no cache that went in specifically for the task of playing a contributory role to assassinating Fidel Castro.Mr. Baron. It would not have been contrary to the policy directives under which you were operating at the time to supply such a weapon to someone inside Cuba who might have access to Castro?Mr. Halley. No, it would not have been. For instance, I can remember several resistance groups that we had that had two or three hundred men that we were supplying on a regular basis.Mr. diGenova. Inside Cuba?Mr. Halley. Inside Cuba, that were essentially living in the bush to a large extent, whom we did supply weapons to and got ammunition to them and so forth. And that was why I was very careful when you mentioned this linkage before to saying that I could not be a guarantor as to what these men would do with these weapons once they got their hands on them. They were free agents.Mr. diGenova. This is an interesting point. This has come up before. We are aware of our reading of the record that# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 105]
TOP SECRET1 what you have said is a concern of not only yourself in terms ofrealizing that it was a possibility but of people like Dean3 Rusk and Mr. McCone, who also said, you have to realize then4 once these agents are in another country and are supplied that5 there is little if anything we can do to control those weapons6 after they receive them. It would be safe to say that that, of7 course, was understood that there was a lack of control, and8 to the extent that it was a problem, it existed and had to be9 tolerated because of the nature of the operation, would that10 be correct?11 Mr. Halley. I do not know whether I want to phrase it12 exactly as you have in terms of this lack of control. Our13 mission in dealing with these groups was to first, to put them14 in areas where we did not have other intelligence covers. Their15 first task was to collect intelligence.16 The: second task was to organize a resistance which would17 take armed action if we ever got a total package put together18 that gave us an opportunity -- that was the first and secondary19 missions. Once we issued the weapons to the team leader, if20 you will, he had freedom to recruit from among the peasants21 anybody he wanted to. If he gave the peasant a weapon, there22 was no guarantee either by the team leader or by us that that23 peasant would not do something that we did not want him to do.24 To even shoot a militiaman, you could have an argument, you25 know, over a woman. Any number of things.TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET105Mr. diGenova. Were there any restrictions, once, for example, those weapons caches were delivered either by land or air -- and we have spoken to Mr. Murray who was in the Havana Station, for example, for awhile and Arthur Avignon who was head of the Havana Station for awhile who indicated that they were aware of the weapons drops and, were intimately familiar with where they would be.Mr. Halley. That was all before my time. I have no knowledge of that. During my time, we made no drops by air.Mr. diGenova. Were there any limitations that were placed of how the weapons would be used that were delivered into Cuba to these internal resistance groups?Mr. Halley. I cannot speak to this period that you are addressing.Mr. diGenova. During your period.Mr. Halley. During my period, the weapons were issued essentially as self-protection for the people who were living in the bush. Secondly, to be used in a military operation at such time as we got the whole package together. Thirdly, they were to be used for self-protection if they conducted raids, ambushes, sabotage operations.Mr. Baron. There is one further quote from Martinez in this article that I would like to ask you to comment on.He is quoted as saying: "I took a lot of weapons to Cuba, some of them were very special weapons for special purposes. They# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 107]
TOP SECRET1061 were powerful rifles with sophisticated scopes, Springfields2 with bolt action, rifles only used by snipers. They were not3 sent to shoot pigeons or to kill rabbits. Everyone in the4 Underground was plotting to kill Castro and the CIA was helping5 the Underground. I was with the Underground as well as the CIA,6 so you can see I was involved in the plots too, but that is7 also obvious."8 You commented before that there was a lot of talk in the9 air about assassinating Castro. Martinez seems to be taking10 that a few steps further, saying that there were actual plots11 underway in the Cuban Underground to assassinate Castro and12 that people who worked with the CIA were aware of those plots13 and were aiding them in effect by the weapons they were14 supplying.15 Is that an accurate statement?16 Mr. Halley. No, I do not think I can go along with that17 statement. Martinez' role as I described it to you, he is18 accurate when he says that weapons were put in and that19 he participated in putting them in. I again question how he20 would know what was in each cache. I just do not see that, and21 I would have to accept that as a sort of secondhand statement22 by him because of the way that the caches were put together.23 I just do not see his knowing that.24 Now I don't want to exclude, however, that any particular25 kind of weapon did not go to Cuba. Maybe bolt-actionTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET                                                                                                                                      1071 Springfields did go in.2 Mr. diGenova. Could he have found out about this after3 the fact from people that he knew in Cuba, members of the4 resistance in Cuba that he knew of who would have told him the5 nature of the items that they would have received in a cache6 delivery? Would that be one way that he could have found out?7 Was he that intimately involved, to your knowledge?8 Mr. Halley. He was not at the time. This is the period9 that I am familiar with, '62-'65. I do not know. Maybe some10 of these people have come out since then, and maybe he has11 talked to people who have come out in '68, '69, things like that.12 I cannot exclude that.13 At the time, I do not think, however, he would have had14 that kind of firsthand knowledge, and therefore I have trouble15 with that statement and I cannot identify with it.16 Mr. Baron. The Harper's article says: "By the end of17 1961, several men affiliated with the CIA had already been18 foiled in attempts to kill him" -- meaning Castro -- "among19 them, Luis Toroella, executed; Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, still in20 prison; William Morgan, executed; and Antonio Veciana, escaped21 to the United States. Had these men succeeded, their efforts22 would have been tied to the U.S. only indirectly, if at all."23 Let me show you the passage I am reading from and ask24 you whether you have any knowledge of the connection of any of25 those men named to the CIA.TOP SECRET