Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 38]
TOP SECRET1 current DDO, was station security and liaison.2 Mr. Kirbow. Can you see this getting any better with3 your new selectee who is coming from the outside world?4 Probably knows the term counterintelligence, but knows nothing5 about the intelligence community basically?6 Mr. Miler. I don't -- quite frankly, I couldn't comment7 on Mr. Bush at all, but if Mr. Bush is going to have to rely8 on the current management and the current management of counter-9 intelligence in the CIA, it is my view that he will get10 completely erroneous information and not have the advantage11 of understanding counterintelligence, and would be forced to12 make decisions which ultimately will be tragic to this13 country as far as counterintelligence is concerned, from14 ignorance.15 Senator Hart of Colorado. What kind of erroneous16 information?17 Mr. Miler. What counterintelligence is, how it should18 be organized, what the threat to the nation is that can be19 hopefully countered by an effective counterintelligence organi-20 zation which is integrated between the CIA, the FBI, the21 military services, the Department of State, and all other22 agencies concerned.23 You are going to have to have a perception of the real24 problems and what is involved in counterintelligence in order25 to organize or reorganize the CIA's counterintelligence efforts,TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 39]
# TOP SECRET1 to promote the best kind of a national program.2 Senator Hart of Colorado. Assume something about, Mr.3 Angleton mentioned earlier, about the tendency to sweep penetrations under the rug in this country.4 Has there been a pattern in the past that still prevails5 of reluctance on the part of professional intelligence6 officials as well as administration officials to admit that7 we are susceptible to that?8 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think there is no question that9 there has been a tremendous dishonesty in facing up to hard10 facts an intelligence.11 I'll take the Yom Kippur war as an example. As you know,12 it was a complete failure in terms of prediction. As I main-13 tained in my testimony, if you cannot make a proper estimate14 in a primitive area, then God help you when you come into the15 Bloc area, and I still hold by that conviction.16 But in that case, a few days prior to the Yom Kippur war,17 the FBI disseminated a report to the President, the Secretary18 of State, Defense and the Director of CIA which purported to19 be a discussion between Gromyko and a very senior source20 to the effect that they had given up on the Arabs, that they21 would no longer support the Arags, they would no longer give22 them arms, that they were going to recognize Israel, and in23 fact they had the draft notes ready for the recognition of24 Israel.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 40]
TOP SECRET1 Now, I have never seen the post mortem of the whole project2 on the estimation, but I would assume that any estimator who3 received information by letter or memorandum, hand-carried,4 quoting Gromyko, would tend to discount the fact that the Arabs5 were about to attack Israel where they would have to depend on6 Soviet arms, and therefore the question of the Yom Kippur war7 would be out of the question. In other words, that one report,8 I give it as an example.9 Now, independently a study group of the Joint Chiefs came10 up with the whole question of Soviet disinformation, strategic11 disinformation to put us off balance on our estimating process.12 Now, in our own Agency we were heavily frowned upon for13 raising these questions, that there was a strong element of14 Soviet deception and disinformation that had been injected into.15 the intelligence collecting program.16 Mr. Miler. Prior to the Yom Kippur war.17 Mr. Angleton. Prior to that. But the important thing18 is that that source who provided the Bureau with that infor-19 mation has been providing information over a number of years,20 but no one has made a study of information in hindsight in21 order to evaluate that source.22 And I could go into many more sensitive cases of where23 again intention has come through a highly questionable source,24 and yet there has been no re-examination. There has been no25 grouping or forum in which there can be any disputation. EachTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 41]
TOP SECRET                                                       38endPhone (Ares 202) 114-60007600011223WARD & PAUL410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 200031 party goes along on his own.2345678910111213141516171819202122232425TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 42]
WARDIGSHAngleton1/22/76Tape 4TOP SECRET1 Senator Hart of Colorado. It seems to me that you're2 suggesting at the very least a..naivete on the part of our3 government and at the worst, I don't know what.394 Mr. Angleton. Well, I do suggest that there is a naivete.5 There is no counter-disinformation group. There's no one who ever6 studies -- most of the information today that goes into much7 of -- it's mainly scientific. The human part of it is small.8 Now most of it is from overt sources.9 Mr. Johnson. What about the Inner-agency Committee on10 Defectors? Doesn't that review?11 Mr. Angleton. It has nothing to do with it.12 Mr. Johnson. What does that do?13 Mr. Angleton. That only allocates or handles the mechanics14 of who talks to the defector and what are the priorities and15 questionnaires and whatnot.16 Mr. diGenova. The order of interrogation.17 Mr. Miler. It is a clearing house to get the information disseminated.18 Mr. diGenova. Mr. Angleton, I'm interested in going19 back to one part of your most recent response about the fact20 of your or the CI staff's concerns about the Israeli problem21 which you alluded to was frowned upon within the Agency.22 What form did that take? I'd be interested to know that.23 Mr. Angleton. Well, it took this form, that a person24 working with Scotty who takes his military duty over there,25TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 43]
TOP SECRET1 two weeks every year and whatnot, and who is very high on S&T2 intelligence, arranged for these Joint Chiefs and this group3 to come over and to address an audience of hand-picked people.4 So this covered both the overt side of the House5 Mr. Miler. The three directorates, intelligence,6 operations, and S&T.7 Mr. Angleton. And they laid out their entire thesis,8 and we added to that to the FBI report to which I referred.9 Afterwards I was severely criticized for having wasted everybody's10 time on that matter and told that if they realized it was11 going to be that type of thing, we would never have permitted12 it to have taken place, et cetera, et cetera.13 Mr. Kirbow. Was this by the three directorates?14 Mr. Miler. No, that was from the directorate of15 operations. The directorate of S&T, Scientific and Technical16 was impressed by the presentation and subsequently said that17 there was very great need for thought in this. And I think18 also, Jim, that concurrently in the operations I had an officer19 who was working on discernible or apparent deception as reflected20 in CIA reporting from the field of Soviet disinformation21 concerning the situation in the Middle East.22 And we did a tremendous study on this and which was23 completely discounted and thrown out and it wasn't even24 considered.25 Mr. Miller. Well, in the Yom Kippur War, if I'm notTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 44]
TOP SECRETmistaken, there was a SIGINT alert. The NSA collection systemswere of such nature their analysts said it looks like there'sgoing to be a war within 24 hours. They predicted the time.They sent it over. It was immediately said, go back to bed.Is that correct?Mr. Angleton. All I know about it is the alleged partof that. I remember the Pike Report that caused a great dealof comment. I thought that the four magic words were thatNSA was not able to make a contribution because the Egyptianshad gone into a high SIGINT alert.In other words, that through SIGINT they couldn't learnthe intention. I don't know this fact that you are tabelling.Mr. Miller. I think Mr. Miler is --Mr. Miler. The point that we're trying to make in thisconnection is part and parcel of Soviet espionage, Sovietintelligence service activity and Soviet bloc intelligenceservice activity is in the political field. It involvesdeception and disinformation. A properly coordinated and runcounter-intelligence effort will bring research and analyticalwork to bear which would give an analysis and an assessmentof the situation, which should be of value to policy-makersin the government, to the intelligence directorate of the CI.to the Director of the CIA, and that what has happened in theCIA since mid-1973 is that there has been erosion of thisfacility which cannot be divorced from counter-intelligenceTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 45]
TOP SECRET42gsh 4Phone (Area 202)384-60001 because as you focus and even as you focus on what the current2 popular term, aggressive counter-intelligence operations, you3 have to have some knowledge of this in order to be able to4 equate, assess and evaluate your so-called penetration of5 a Soviet or Soviet bloc intelligence service to see if it is6 real. You have to have.a litmus paper to judge your penetration.7 And without that litmus, you are completely at the mercy of8 a system which is orchestrated and which is essentially9 directed and controlled.10 Mr. Miller. So what you're saying is from mid-1973 on11 the country, or at least the CIA has lost a valuable asset.12 What happened in '73? What was the decision?13 Mr. Angleton. That's the decentralization, when all14 of these components were taken away from us, including the15 liaison and whatnot, including international communist parties.16 So this completely viscerated the counter-intelligence17 as we have built it up since 1954.18 We were, I would say without question in the Western19 world, we gave the leadership. We created all of the inter-20 governmental committees. We brought services from tiny21 fragmented units up into major components of their government,22 the five major countries, which meant we reoriented their23 services along priorities that met our requirements, and I24 don't think there was any question that we were the acknowle25 leaders in the Western world.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 46]
TOP SECRET1 By the same token, it induced people to bring their cases2 to us for analysis. They came to see us many times to see3 the defectors, the stable of defectors that we had for4 interrogation.5 So that alone was a tremendous acquisition of counter-6 intelligence data which would not have otherwise have been7 available to this country.8 Mr. Kirbow. And it's not available today because of this9 spreading of the --10 Mr. Angleton. Well, that's what they say. I mean I've11 had one or more chief of intelligence who have surreptitiously12 seen me since my departure. And they will naturally work13 as far as they can with the agency.14 Mr. Miller. When you say us, who do you mean?15 Mr. Angleton. How did I use it?16 Mr. Miller. You were referring to your capability prior17 to 1973.18 Mr. Miler. The CI staff.19 Mr. Angleton. The CI staff.20 Mr. Miller. The CI staff. Well, what were the numbers,21 what was the capability that you had translated into people,22 into files?23 Mr. Angleton. Well, at the highest point we had a little24 over 200 people. That was clerical and officers.25 Mr. Miller. That seems a fairly small group.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 47]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Angleton. Well, they were a hardworking group. We2 were understaffed. There were many things we could have3 taken on and I'll give you one example because it is still4 pending, and it gets down to the question of penetration.5 But when Philby was stationed in Washington, he was6 given communications intelligence clearance so if NSA broke7 into the Bulgarian traffic, he could go to his Soviet control8 and tell them that we were reading Bulgarian traffic. A secret9 of that sort permits them to make use of the Bulgarian10 traffic as a deception channel the moment they know you are11 reading it. That becomes a powerful instrument in their12 hands to deceive.13 Now my point is this: No one has made an analysis from14 the day that he was briefed on that particular traffic of why15 the traffic continued for two more years and then gradually16 petered out of what was put into that traffic which, if you17 took that and identified an item of deception that came from18 the opposition, you then look at your own agent reports and19 find what agents at the same time were fortifying that lie20 or that piece of deception. And it would point a finger on21 agents who, in fact, were under control.22 How this is just one small exercise. NSA has preserved23 every single piece of paper. In other words, there's literally24 hundreds of thousands of pages of available material for such25 aa analysis, and I worked very closely with Lou Tordella.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 48]
TOP SECRET1 In fact, one of our effort or common efforts was I brought him2 into counter-intelligence. I brought him in with all these3 foreign chiefs and whatnot in order to enlarge the scope of4 NSA, since they can study and frame these patterns, they5 can get into illegal traffics and get into many facets.6 It's one of the best outfits, as far as I know, in the7 U.S. government, but they had always been denied these facts8 that I just stated, such as Philby's access, the clearances,9 the various espionage cases that have happened in the west,10 the people that have had communications intelligence clearance.11 Senator llart of Colorado. Could we have a Philby level12 penetration of our intelligence community?13 Mr. Angleton. I'm not stating that there is one, but I14 have probably done more recruitment of higher level people in15 my youth in the business and I have never been any respector16 of rank. I've dealt with prime ministers, and I've dealt with17 them at all levels.18 And therefore, my point is it is conceivable, it's19 conceivable if you've got enough information, spotting inform20 tion, and you can put a person into a certain kind of situatiom21 regardless of his rank, you will find that he is recruitable.22 It is a process of a fingernail, finger, hand, arm and body.23 Senator Hart of Colorado. But all of the grills that24 new people of the Agency have to go through, lie detector רה25 so on, you're saying that they can get through that.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 49]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Angleton. I don't think anyone regards the lie2 detector to be anything more than just another investigative3 instrument. It does help in the sense that there are certain4 people susceptible. They will in turn roveal something of their5 past which they should have revealed, which, if you had6 discovered independently, would have given you grounds to believe7 they were penetration, but once the machine begins to find that8 they're goggling on something, then they come out and9 say, well there's a story I haven't told you when I was in10 Turkey, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, and wipes the slate11 clean.12 So it serves a useful purpose. But it's not -- I13 wouldn't give it 20 percent credibility. Now the Office of14 Security probably gives it 70 or maybe higher.15 Mr. diGenova. Mr. Angleton, the point you made of the16 lack of study of traffic which followed the deception in the17 cable traffic, as I understand it, you're saying that there's18 been no analysis that you're aware of since that time done of19 of everything since then.20 'Mr. Angleton. There's never been any analysis ever.21 Mr. diGenova. Is the current research set-up which CI22 staff now has which is oriented toward instant studies, quote23 unquote, to provide data for ongoing operations inconsistent24 with wanting to achieve that sort of goal, like analyzing that25 data?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 50]
# TOP SECRET471 Mr. Angleton. Well, I don't know what that really means,2 instant analysis. I mean we've always done instant analysis.3 Mr. diGenova. I know that but it's our understanding,4 we've learned from the Agency that there has been a movement5 away from in-depth historical research toward more current6 sort of analyses.7 What you're suggesting to me by saying that there's8 been no analysis done of those cables is that we've lost a9 valuable CI tool since that study hasn't been done, and I'd10 like to know if your assessment of the current trend toward11 research is a bad one?12 Mr. Angleton. I think it makes no sense whatsoever.13 Mr. Miler. It's disastrous. It will lead to complete14 chaos within a very short time because you're trying to analyse15 an individual case without having the ability to relate 4016 other cases to that case.17 Mr. diGenova. There's no integration in other words.18 Mr. Miler. That's right and you cannot operate in a19 vacuum.20 Mr. Angleton. We have learned from one defector, the21 one of December '61 a complete new understanding of whathappened from the days of Lenin.22 That is not in the public record. A complete new23 picture of the growth of the OGPU and of the Cheka. And in24 the roorientation of KGB part of the deStalinization in May25 TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 51]
# TOP SECRETof 1959, it was a return to the modus operandi of the Cheka.And this is from an individual, fully, who had seen all of the documents, fully versed in it so that this plunged us back into it and we began then to find leads. And I give one example.Goneral Orlov, who died not long ago in the United States, was the most senior NKVD KGB officer ever to defect, and he died last year. The Bureau had interrogated him in 1953 after the death of Stalin with little or no success. ile knew the code name of Philby. The Agency tried to contact him in '58 and had a very unhappy handling problem. We went back into it shortly thereafter and we were able to go through his book with him and he gave us the true identities of 34 agents in France.His uncle had been one of the senior men under Lenin, head of NKVD in the Ukrain[^2] but with tremendous operations. He himself was a senior NKVD man in Spain during the civil war. So we spent up until his death, Mr. Rocco[^2], who was my deputy, would travel to the Midwest and spend several weekends with him of dredging out and recreating the operations and penetrations in British intelligence and the British navy and whatnot, eventually getting down, by recreating and reconstructing, down to the identity. Now this is research, and these are cases where the Soviets had every reason to believe that those agents were safe and secure because nothing had happened.And when you make that type of identification unbeknownst# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 52]
# TOP SECRET491 to them, then it gives you tremendous leverage of how you want2 to play it, whether you move in to take him on as a double3 or whether you move in to arrest him.4 Mr. diGenova. And that isn't being done today.5 Mr. Angleton. Well, they can't do it because they don't have6 Mr. Rocco and they have fired most of the personnel. One of7 the best men we had was from the Library of Congress and8 knowing where to find every piece of information. inthet govern-9 ment has just been transferred to, or he's been released or10 hired back on contract, and when they are putting him in the11 Freedom of Information section as a contract agent.12 And he has handled Ukrain, he's run agents, he speaks13 Russian.14 Mr. Johnson. We are going down with a representa-15 of military intelligence later on this afternoon. Could you16 tell us about the coordination between military CI and CIA17 CI especially in the area of double agentry.18 Mr. Angleton. Then I will just say one thing and then19 Scotty will speak authoritatively to it.20 We all came out of the war and therefore we are very21 strongly in favor of a very strong military counter-intelligence..22 And therefore, we've always given them highest priority of our23 time. We've done the original training of the OSI people.24 We trained teachers who went out, who in turn trained25 other people. That was a three months course, if I recall.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 53]
TOP SECRET501 We rean a seminar using the highest talent that we had and2 revealing as much information as we could conceivably reveal.3 And so our whole mental attitude was that counter-intelli-4 gence, one of its highest priorities is the defense of its5 own forces. And I'm not going to justify the mail program at6 this time, but some day I'll justify it in print or otherwise7 because it represents only .001 percent of Americans -- a8 small coterie of Americans who wrote to the Soviets when we9 had troops in the field on two occasions, and our primary10 duty was the support of those troops.11 So that background Scotty can tell you but the relationships12 we've had with the military.13 Mr. Miler. Well, the relationships with the counter-14 intelligence with the military have varied. I would say that15 for the most part it has been reasonably good, it has been16 perhaps better in Washington than it has been in the field.17 With few exceptions CIA field representatives have not been18 terribly concerned with conducting counter-intelligence. They19 have not cooperated to the extent that the military commanders20 in the field have wanted.21 Some of this has to do with priorities that are imposed22 on the CIA representatives from Washington. Some of it has23 to do with lack of manpower. Some of it has to do with the24 fact that in the opinion of many of the CIA operatives, the25 Ariny in particular, to a lesser extent the other services,TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 54]
TOP SECRETgsh 131 have not undertaken counter-intelligence activities which are2 of a high enough level to justify the time and attention,3 particularly of senior CIA representatives abroad.4 It is, I think, also a bit of a problem because the5 priorities of military counter-intelligence in many instances6 do not parallel or support CIA's priorities. They have the7 responsibility for the protection of their installations and8 there have also been imposed on the military the requirement9 to build assets, what we term double agents which the military10 term controlled foreign assets, as a contingency for possible11 deception use.12 Traditionally, also, the CIA, and in recent years this13 has been quite true, the CIA field operatives have wanted to14 exploit military counter-intelligence assets for what is15 termod aggressive positive intelligence or recruitment attempts16 of the enemy agent or officer who was controlling the double17 agent of the controlled foreign asset.18 There has been traditionally a problem of coordination19 between the military services, the CIA, and the FBI on double20 agent operations.21 I think overall this has worked reasonably well, given22 the fact that -- in particular, for example, the system of23 chain of command in the Army is a very confused one and is not24 easy to put your finger on. There are various echelons and25 reporting procedures and so forth.TOP SECRET