Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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-32-The next day, October 8, Headquarters cabled the Station in response to the Wimert-Lt. Colonel meeting. Headquarters took note of Schneider's resistance to coup plans and stated:> ...This would make it more important than> ever to remove him and to bring this new> state of events...anything we or Station> can do to effect removal of Schneider? We> Know this rhetorical question, but wish> inspire thought on both ends on this matter.> (Hqs. 628, 8 October)During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success looked unusually bleak. The Chile Task Force Log commented:> President Frei and the highest levels of the> armed forces unable to pull themselves together> to block Allende. The Chilean military's tradi-> tion of non-intervention, Frei's reluctance to> tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's> firm constitutional stand, and most importantly,> the lack of leadership within the government and> military are working against a military takeover.> (Task Force Log, 8 October)The following day the Station made reference to the "rapid(ly) waning chances for success." (Santiago 487, 9 October) This pessimism was not dispelled by their simultaneous judgment: "Station has arrived at Viaux solution by process of elimination." (Santiago 504, 10 October) Three days later the Task Force agreed: "We continue to focus our attention on General Viaux who now appears to be the only military leader willing to block Allende." (Task Force Log, 13 October)If Viaux was the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were bleak indeed. His own colleagues, Generals Huerta and Valenzuela described him as "a General without an army." (Santiago 495, 9 October) Yet in the first two weeks of October he came to be regarded as the best hope for carrying out the CIA's Track II mandate.
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-33-Although (Colonel Wimert) was instructed not to involve himself withViaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 461, 5 October), heserved initially as a contact to Viaux through [an Argentine] militaryAttache. The [Argentine] reported on October 5 that Viaux wanted severalhundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch a coup on October 9. (Santiago476, 6 October) Headquarters turned down the request, concluding thata "mini-coup at this juncture would be counterproductive" and Viauxshould postpone his plans, "while encouraging him in a suitable mannerto maintain his posture so that he may join larger movement later ifit materializes." (Headquarters 585, 6 October)The primary purpose of the "False Flag Base" was to contact Viaux,and it very rapidly relieved (Wimert and the [Argentine] Attache) of thattask. Viaux reiterated his demand for an air drop of weapons to the"False Flagger," and again the response was the same: reject the demandfor arms, but encourage him to keep planning. In essence the Agencywas buying time with Viaux: "We wish to encourage Viaux to expand andrefine his coup planning. Gain some influence over his actions."(Headquarters 689, 10 October) To achieve this latter purpose, Head-quarters authorized passing $20,000 in cash and a promise of $250,000in life insurance to Viaux and his associates, as a demonstration ofU.S. support. (Headquarters. 729, 13 October)On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over Schneiderby asking: "What is to keep Schneider from making statement in earlyhours which will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise joinViaux?" (Headquarters 729, 13 October) The Station's response later thatsame day was "Viaux intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats withinthe next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup." (Santiago 527,
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-34-(13 October) This Viaux kidnapping of Schneider was reported by the Station "as part of a coup that included Valenzuela." (Station 529, 13 October)At about this time the Station began to receive encouragement from its other contacts. On October 14, ten days before the Chilean Congress was to vote, the Task Force Log concluded:Now we are beginning to see signs of increasing coup activity from other military quarters, specifically an Army General (name deleted), Admiral Mirado the forces in Concepcion and Valdivis (and perhaps even Frei and (@ssa 06)(Task Force Log, 14 October)C. October 15 DecisionTo summarize, by October 15, General Viaux had advertised to his contact a desire to proceed with a coup, had indicated he would deal with the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once with Generals Huertavand Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans.*On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig at the White House to discuss the situation in Chile. According to the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessines "provided a run-down on Viaux, the canales meeting with hd, and, in some detail, the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint."(Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 15 October 1970) A decision was made at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily:"* The reason for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of a cable from Santiago to Headquarters:We discount Viaux's statement that he had called off his coup attempt because of False Flag Officer's impending visit. Other reporting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move this weekend. (Santiago 499, 10 October)There is also reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental in persuading Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile Task Force Log:Station reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela met with General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to attempt a coup." (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October)
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-35-It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence the message should state: "We have reviewed your plans and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities in the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support." (15 October Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig)The meeting concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr.Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply."*The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White House meeting to the Station in Santiago:2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup....We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource.3. After the most careful consideration it was determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out by him alone with the forces now at his disposal would fail. Thus it would be counterproductive to our Track Two objectives. It was decided that CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against precipitate action. (Headquarters 802, 16 October)The message was supplemented by orders to "continue to encourage him (Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with other coup planners." (Headquarters 802, 16 October) The message concluded: "There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Pirado Valenzuela *et al* and we wish them optimum good fortune." (Ibid.)* Secretary Kissinger's recollection of the October 15 meeting is not in accord with that of Mr. Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802) that was sent the following day to the Station in Santiago. This matter will be discussed in Part V of this report.
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# D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15The decision to "de-fuse" General Viaux was passed to Viaux's father-in-law on October 17. The in-law responded that it did not matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case. (Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final meeting of the CIA "False Flagger" and Viaux's father-in-law on October 18, the Agency was informed that the coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduction of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come."(Santiago 568, 19 October) An "emergency channel" of communication with Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, page 21)As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military contacts.*As a CIA overview statement in Track II stated:> Coup possibilities afforded by the active> duty military group led by General Valenzuela> and Admiral Tirado had always seemed more> promising than the capabilities of the Viaux> group. These military officers had the abil-> ity and resources to act providing they de-> cided to move and organized themselves ac-> cordingly.> (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from> the President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5)By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in this direction.On the evening of October 17, (Colonel Wimert) met with the Army and the Navy Captain They requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades,*Two coup plotters, Generals Canales and Garin, made one last attempt to persuade General Schneider to change his anti-coup position on October 15. The Station reported that the meeting turned out to be a "complete fiasco. Schneider refused to listen to General Canales eloquent presentation of Communist action in Chile...and adament in maintaining his non-involvement stance." (Santiago 548, 16 October)
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-37-'three 45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition. The Navy Captain said he had three machine guns himself "but can be identified by serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore unable to use them." (Santiago 562, 18 October) (Colonel Wimert and the Chief of Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine guns for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms were intended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of General Schneider.The fact that the weapons were provided the Lt. Colonel and the Navy Captain and that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killing suggests that the guns were not involved.The machine guns and ammunition were sent from Washington by diplomatic pouch on the morning of October 19, although Headquarters was puzzled about their purpose: "Will continue make effort provide them but find our credulity stretched by Navy Captain leading his troops with sterile guns. What is special purpose for these guns? We will try send them whether you can provide explanation or not." (Headquarters 854, 18 October) The first installment was delivered to the Army Lt Colonel and the Navy Captain late in the evening of October 18 and consisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally for Viaux.** As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in Chile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela, et. al.--rather than Viaux. An example of this shift in focus was the decision to provide the Army Lt. Colonel and the Army Captain the tear gas grenades originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the purpose of this action:Station plans give six tear gas grenades to(Colonel Wimert) for delivery to Armed Forcesofficers (deletion) instead of having (FalseFlag Officer) deliver them to Viaux group.Our reasoning is that (Wimert) dealing withactive duty officers. Also False Flagger)leaving evening 18 October, and will not bereplaced but(Wimert) will stay here. Henceimportant that(Wimert) credibility with ArmedForces officers be strengthened.(Santiago 562, 18 October)
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-38-That same day, General Valenzuela informed(Colonel Wimert) that he,General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General were preparedto sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of GeneralSchneider on the following evening, October 19, at a militarydinner being given for Schneider,*after which Schneider would be flownto Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, Admiral [Tirado] wouldhead the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to thekidnapping of Schneider, the cable reports:General Viaux knowledgeable of above operationbut not directly involved. He has been sent toVina to stay with prominent physician. Will beseen in public places during 19 and 20 Octoberto demonstrate fact that above operation not hisdoing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago atend of week. Military will not admit involve-ment in Schneider's abduction which is to beblamed on leftists. (Santiago 566, 19 October) *The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneiderleft in a private vehicle, rather than in his official car, and his police guardfailed to be withdrawn, but the Army [Colonel] assured [Colonel Wimert] that an-other attempt would be made on October 20. (Santiago 582, 20 October)[Colonel Wimert] was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 "which was the priceagreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors."* The "False Flag Officer" who was in contact with Viaux at the time  the Valenzuela plan was given to [Colonel Wimert] apparently understood  that Viaux was involved in the October 19 attempt. He stated:Q. Were you told any of the details of howthe (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out?Mr. Sarno. They indicated it was going to beat some sort of a banquet which the General(Schneider) would be attending.(Sarno testimony, p. 37)
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-39-but Wimert insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid the money. (Task Force Log, 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuela assured Colonel Wimert that the military was now prepared to move. (Task Force Log, 20 October) The second abduction attempt on the 20th also failed and the Task Force concludedSince Valenzuela's group is apparently having considerable difficulty executing even the first step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup succeeding or even occurring before 24 October now appears remote. (Task Force Log, 22 October)## E. The Killing of General SchneiderIn the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am), Colonel Wimert delivered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Army Lt. Colonel in an isolated section of Santiago.**Although (Colonel Wimert's testimony and the cable traffic do not clearly establish the identity of the group to which the Lt. Colonel was affiliated (see page 31) two CIA statements on Track II tie the weapons, and therefore the Lt. Colonel to the Valenzuela group:...The only assistance requested by Valenzuela to set the plan / of October 19/ into motion through Schneider's abduction was several sub-machine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus $50,000 for expenses (which was to be passed upon demand.(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, p. 22)...Three sub-machine guns, together with six gas cannisters and masks, were passed to the Valen-zuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason why they still wanted the weapons was because there were two days remaining before the Congress decided the Presidential election and the Valen-zuela group maintained some hope they could still carry out their plans.(CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," p. 7, July 15, 1975)
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At about 7 am that day the group that intended to kidnap GeneralSchneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to thefindings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneiderkilling, neither the Army *Lt. Colonel* nor the Navy *Captain* were there.Shortly after 8 am, General Schneider's car was intercepted, on hisway to work, by the abductorsand he was mortally wounded when he drewhis handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that handguns had been used to kill General Schneider, although it also foundthat one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing.The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said"Military Mission sources claim General Schneider machine gunned onway to work" (Santiago 587, 22 October) and "Assailants used greaseguns." (Santiago 589, 22 October) The submachine guns had previouslybeen described as "grease guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Stationwas that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons deliveredseveral hours earlier to the Army *Lt. Colonel*. Santiago then informedHeadquarters "Station has instructed (Col. Wimert) to hand over $50,000if Gen. Valenzuela requests " (Santiago 592, 22 October), thus indicatingthat the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valen-zuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled Headquarters:* The Military Court determined that those who participated in the  shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led  conspiracy. The Court also found that this same group had participated  in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts.In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the plotculminating in the death of General Schneider. He received a 20-yearprison sentence for being "author of the crime of kidnapping which re-sulted in serious injury to the victim," and a five-year exile for con-spiring to cause a military coup. Also convicted on the latter charge(were) Generals Valenzuela and *Girado*. They received sentences of threeyears in exile.
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-41-Station unaware if assassination was pre-meditated or whether it constituted bungledabduction attempt. In any case, it importantto bear in mind that move against Schneiderwas conceived by and executed at behest ofsenior Armed Forces officers. We know thatGeneral Valenzuela was involved. We alsonear certain that Admiral *firade*, Army (*Lt.Co.Colonell*) and Navy (*Captain*) witting and involved.We have reason for believeing that GeneralViaux and numerous associates fully clued in,but cannot prove or disprove that executionor attempt against Schneider was entrusted toelements linked with Viaux. Important factorto bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and notretired officers or extreme rightests, setSchneider up for execution or abduction....All we can say is that attempt against Schneideris affording Armed Forces one last opportunityto prevent Allende's election if they are willingto follow Valenzuela's scenario..(Santiago 598, 22 October)F. Post October 22 EventsThe shooting of General Schneider resulted immediately in a declara-tion of martial law, the appointment of General Prats to succeed Schneideras Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Valenzuela as chiefof Santiago province. These measures, and others taken, caused the ChileTask Force to make the following initial judgment:With only 24 hours remaining before the Congressionalrunoff, a coup climate exists in Chile.... The attackon General Schneider has produced developments whichclosely follow Valenzuela's plan....Consequently theplotters' positions have been enhanced.(Chile Task Force Log, 22 October)On October 23, Director Helms reviewed and discussed Track II:It was agreed...that a maximum effort has been achieved,and that now only the Chileans themselves can manage asuccessful coup. The Chileans have been guided to apoint where a military solution is at least open tothem. (Task Force Log,-24 October)
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A. SeptemberSeptember 18Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House. As Helms' notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18th, according to CIA records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in the Chilean situation...." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP, 18 September)The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject of concern during the last days of September. Apparently that pressure was viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit."September 21The 40 Committee met. The Select Committee has no confirmation that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' calendar confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee chairman, also attended, although the Committee has not been able to review his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting--and the meetings of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired--is that the meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity to meet privately and discuss Track II if they desired. In all these instances save the 40 Committee meeting on September 22, the Committee has no evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines meeting actually took place. That the CIA prepared a memorandum of conversation for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been able to find none for other meetings may provide some support for the argument that no other such private meetings occurred.September 22Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behind after a 40 Committee meeting called to discuss Track I. The two men discussed Track II actions, especially the contacts with then-Chilean-President Frei. According to
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# TOP SECRETKissinger told Karamessines that "our handling of the problem during the earlier meeting had been perfect and he added we were doing fine and keep it up." (Memorandum for the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines)B. OctoberOctober 5A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals (Prats, Valenzuela and Huerta)-named in a cable of September 30. (Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6. (Santiago 556, 5 October 1970) Karamessines presumed such a meeting had taken place, although he had no specific memory of it. (Karamessines testimony, pp. 69-70) His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 40 Committee meeting on Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger chaired the 40 Committee.October 6The Station reported that General Viaux was "ready to launch golpe evening 9 October, or morning 10 October." (Santiago 472, 6 October 1970) In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one "with scant chance of success which will vitiate any further more serious action." The Station was directed to try to "stop ill-considered action at this time." (Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970)Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux plan, supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see below) makes no mention of any previous plots. (Kissinger testimony, p. 24)