Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 11]
TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 546-400091 tried and most of them, they were all dead. It was a very2 risky business. It's not the kind of thing they would want to3 try with a .38.4 And I think also, I mean nobody, I think as I say, we5 had no particular anticipation that this or any other group6 would be successful in something that nobody had been able to7 do for thirty years, but at any rate, those were the backstops.8 Mr. Schwarz. Did you know how the arms were passed into9 the Dominican Republic, as opposed to passed to the dissidents?10 Mr. Goodwin. No, I only know what Dearborn later told me11 in conversation. I only have this fifteen year old mamory12 on my part that he gave them to them in the consulate. I may13 have known at one time how he got them. There were a lot of14 guns in the Dominican Republic.15 Mr. Schwarz. Did you know that arms were passed through16 the diplomatic pouch?17 Mr. Goodwin. I did not know that, but I wouldn't be18 surprised, weapons of that size.19 Mr. Schwarz. Now again, when were the arms passed, as20 far as you know?21 Mr. Goodwin. Well I don't know. I don't have the exact22 the message is in here. I think it was after President23 Kennedy took office.24 My knowledge of it was on the basis of the message25 The Chairman. Is there someone that can help Mr. GoodwinTOP SECRET410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 200037600061736
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 12]
TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 566-40007600061733410 West Street, S.F. Washington, D.C. 200031 with the documents?2 Mr. Schwarz. Let's mark that as Goodwin Exhibit No. 1,3 a document consisting -- dated May 13, 1961 and headed4 Subject, CIA Covert Activities, Dominican Republic, stating:5 "Attached is the special briefing paper of CIA covert activities6 directed against the Dominican Republic which is requested by7 Mr. Richard Goodwin at the White House," and attaching a8 several page document with that heading and that date.9 Mr. Goodwin. This is the paper that they sent me and10 that's where, I guess, I found out about it.11 (The document referred12 to was marked Goodwin13 Exhibit No. 1 for14 identification.)1516171819202122232425TOP SECRET10
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 13]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Schwarz. Now that indicates, does it not, that the2 weapons were passed sometime after late January, you can tell3 that?4 Mr. Goodwin. Yeah.5 Mr. Schwarz. All right.6 You can tell that by looking at the heading 2 which7 indicates when the request for the passage of the arms was8 made.9 Mr. Goodwin. Yes, it says in late January. Of course10 they weren't authorized until the 12th.11 Mr. Schwarz. But they were passed, in any event, after12 the Kennedy Administration took office.13 Mr. Goodwin. Yes.14 Mr. Schwarz. Now you told President Johnson, Vice15 President Johnson,- we will mark this Goodwin Exhibit 2,16 a memorandum which, Senators, is at Tab II, the book which is17 marked book 2 of 2 and dated June 1, 1961.18 (The document referred to19 was marked Goodwin20 Exhibit No. 2 for21 identification.)22232425TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 14]
TOP SECRET12Mr. Schwars. Would you read into the record, Mr. Goodwin,this is a memorandum for the files dated June 1, 1961, subjectReport of Point Raised at meeting with Vice President.Would you read into the record the second paragraph?Mr. Goodwin. "At one point during the meeting, the VicePresident asked about the three carbines which the Agency hadturned over to the dissidents, specifically asked about thedate of delivery. Mr. Goodwin made a statement to the effactthat this was done under the previous Administration, i.e.,prior to January 20, 1961, pursuant to a decision of theSpecial Group."Can you tell me if this his memo I'm reading? I'd like to know.Mr. Schwarz. Well, there are some initials at the bottomof the page, do they help you decide whose memo it is?Mr. Dennin. I believe we were told by Secretary of StateRusk that it's Under Secretary of State Johnson. That's whatthe U stands for.Mr. Schwarz. Did you make that statement, Mr. Goodwin?Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember making it. It is aninaccurate statement, and there was a clear record that itwould be inaccurate in documents that I had already seen.I thought that I wouldn't have made it. I had no purpose inmaking it. And this is --The Chairman. What is the inaccuracy of this?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 15]
# TOP SECRET1 Mr. Goodwin. The delivery of the arms was not made prior2 to January 20th. The authorization, Senator, was prior to3 January 20th.4 Senator Schweiker. Was when, again? Was what date?5 Mr. Goodwin. The authorization was the 12th of January.6 Senator Schweiker. What year?7 Mr. Goodwin. 1961.8 Senator Schweiker. And delivery was when?9 Mr. Schwarz. Sometime subsequent to January 20th.10 Mr. Goodwin. Wall, now that I look at this, all it says11 was late January.12 The Chairman. This is June 1st, this is dated June 1st,13 and you are reported to have said, "At one point during the14 meeting the Vice President asked about the three carbines15 which the Agency had turned over to the dissidents and16 specifically asked about the date of delivery. Mr. Goodwin17 made the statement to the effect that this was done under18 the previous Administration, i.e., prior to January 20th,19 1961, pursuant to a decision of the Special Group."20 Actually the delivery took place after January 20th 1961.21 Mr. Goodwin. Well that was my first impression on reading22 that, but I notice that all it says was late January, Senator,23 so I suppose the 20th of the 19th in somebody's mind could be24 late January. I mean, I don't really remember.25 Mr. Schwarz. But Mr. Goodwin, you know, independent of# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 16]
# TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 944-4000141 the document which we marked as Exhibit 1, in fact the arms2 were delivered after January 20th.3 Mr. Goodwin. I may have known. All I -- my first4 knowledge was this document, the timetable that I requested5 which simply informed me that the delivery of carbines had been6 made in late January. I don't know any more than that.7 Mr. Schwarz. All right.8 Mr. Goodwin. This is my source of knowledge. I may have9 learned more subsequent to it if Dearborn pinpointed it.10 Mr. Schwarz. In addition with dealing with Dearborn, were11 you dealing with anybody from the CIA on this?12 Mr. Goodwin. Well, they were always at the meetings.13 Mr. Schwarz. Who do you remember from the CIA?14 Mr. Goodwin. Tracy Barnes -- I can't be sure who all was15 there. At the meeting with the Vice President, I'm sure some-16 body like Bissell, at least, would have been there. But I'm17 sure you must have a list.18 Mr. Schwarz. Now I would like you to testify in answer to19 a series of questions as to what you were or were not told.20 Now, were you told that the arms which had been delivered21 had been delivered to persons who said at times that they22 wanted to use them for personal defense, but who said more often that they wanted to use them for assassination purposes?23 Mr. Goodwin. I was given to understand and told24 specifically and it's reflected in the documents, that they# TOP SECRET410 First Street, S.E. Washington, D.C. 200037600011711
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 17]
TOP SECRET1 wanted -- in order to carry out an assassination, they thought2 they needed transfer of additional weapons, of submachine guns.3 I don't remember any indication that anyone thought that a4 carbine or a .38 was adequate to mount an effort of that kind5 against Trujillo. But they, of course, were interested in6 assassinating Trujillo, involved as they were in a very life7 and death struggle, their families were being slaughtered --8 Mr. Schwarz. The record demonstrates that the Agency was9 informed in April, prior to the memorandum that went to you10 which we marked as Exhibit 1, that the dissidents intended to11 undertake the assassination effort and to do so within the12 means that they eventually actually did, by blockading the13 road and shooting Mr. Trujillo as he was visiting his mistress.14 And that they intended to do it whether or not they received15 the machine guns, but they would like the machine guns, just16 to help.17 Now, were you informed by the Agency or by anyone else18 that the dissidents intended to accomplish the assassination19 with the small arms whether or not they got the machines?20 Mr. Goodwin. I was informed that both this and other21 groups intended and wanted to assassinate Trujillo. We got22 reports of assassinations about to occur almost every two or23 three weeks in the White House. There is a long gap between24 wanting to kill Trujillo and being able to do it, and -- but25 at all times, continually, up into May, there was the veryTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 18]
# TOP SECRET161 insistent request for additional arms that would make the2 plot feasible and at the specific request of President Kennedy,3 those arms were denied and --4 Mr. Schwarz. I'm going to come to that. I want to know5 what you were informed about the intentions of the dissidents.6 You didn't answer my question. You said you were fraquently7 informed about assassination plots all over the world, but8 specifically with respect to the Dominican Republic, were you9 or ware you not informed that the Agency had been told by the10 dissidents that they intended to accomplish the assassination11 of Fidel Castro -- excuse me, of Trujillo -- whether or not12 they received the machine guns?13 Mr. Goodwin. I was told that afterwards by Dearborn. 114 wasn't told that particularly at the time, although that15 wouldn't surprise me if they said that. By the Agency, you16 mean Dearborn, or --17 Mr. Schwarz. I mean the Central Intelligence Agency.18 Mr. Goodwin. They communicated directly with the Agency19 in this instance?20 Mr. Schwarz. There were Agency people in the Republic.21 Did you know there were Agency people in the Republic?22 Mr. Goodwin. I knew they were in and out.23 Mr. Schwarz. In and out?24 Mr. Goodwin. They ran some guns in at one time, as I25 remember, and they also were engaged in the collection of# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 19]
# TOP SECRET1 intelligence about dissident groups. 172 Mr. Schwarz. Was it your impression that Dearborn was3 in charge of the Dominican Republic, or the Agency personnel4 was in charge of the Dominican Republic?5 Mr. Goodwin. My impression at the time was that the6 instructions given to Dearborn were carried out, and all7 instructions from the President went to Dearborn.8 Mr. Schwarz. Apart from instructions from the President,9 was it your impression that the Agency was in charge of the10 Dominican Republic or that Dearborn was in charge of the11 Dominican Republic.12 Mr. Goodwin. My impression was that Dearborn was in charge13 of the Dominican Republic, subject to very close supervision14 from Washington.15 The Chairman. Dearborn was the --16 Mr. Goodwin. He was the Consul. We had no formal17 relations.18 The Chairman. He was the Consul?19 Mr. Goodwin. Right.20 Wasn't that true?21 Mr. Schwarz. The paper record makes it look quite likely22 that the Agency, at least from their point of view, thought23 that they were in charge.24 Mr. Goodwin. They should have told the President. We25 sent all of our messages to Dearborn.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 20]
TOP SECRET18Mr. Schwarz. What was your understanding of the location of the machine guns that the dissidents wanted?Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember, but it's in here somewhere in the paper.(Pause)Mr. Schwarz. Well, let me cut through the question.Did you know that the machine guns were sent to the Dominican Republic (through the diplomatic pouch?Mr. Goodwin. I know now.Mr. Schwarz. Did you know about it?Mr. Goodwin. Now I knew, when the issue arose in May that we had -- we had brought in machine guns, but the precise mathod by which they were brought in I never asked about.The Chairman. I am having a little difficulty following.We began with your heing told that it was the policy of the previous Administration to ancourage dissident groups and do whatever possible to isolate or to undermine and bring down the Trujillo regime. Then, following the Inauguration of President Kennedy, certain weapons are passed to these dissidents in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of assassinating -- of their use in the assassinating President Trujillo.Now when did you learn that weapons had been in fact passed to dissident groups, that obviously had occurred after President Kennedy had been inaugurated. When did you firstTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 21]
TOP SECRET191 learn?2 Mr. Goodwin. On the 13th of May when we requested from3 the White House a briefing paper on all covert activities in4 tha Dominican Republic, that had been conducted in the5 Dominican Republic.6 Mr. Schwarz. Now that briefing paper was requested from7 whom?8 Mr. Goodwin. Well, it would have been requested by me for9 the President.10 Mr. Schwarz. From the CIA?11 Mr. Goodwin. From the CIA.12 The Chairman. From the CIA, and that briefing paper has13 been identified for the record?14 Mr. Goodwin. That is correct.15 The Chairman. All right.16 When you found out that these weapons had been transferred17 in January to certain dissident groups for the purpose of18 assassinating Trujillo, what did you do?19 Was it then your understanding that this was President20 Kennedy's policy?21 Mr. Goodwin. No.22 The Chairman. Then what did you do when you received23 that information?24 Mr. Goodwin. If I may go back for a moment, Senator,25 and that is the briefing paper involved a very clear distinctionTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 22]
TOP SECRET201 between these weapons which were to be used for purposes of2 personal type side-arms, the salf-defense attendant to any3 project and the desire for assassination weapons which would4 have consisted of machine guns.Our response to this briefing paper was immediately to6 try to review our entire policy toward the Dominican Republic7 and prepare, which we did over the next couple of weeks,8 instructions to the Consul about the nature of future relations9 with dissidents, because the President felt that things10 might be getting out of hand, with what was happening in the11 Dominican Republic.12 So we did prepare that paper. The President had, as I13 said, two great concerns. He didn't want anybody trying to14 push Trujillo over unless he knew what was going to happen15 next, because he would much rather have Trujillo in there than16 a Communist leader. And secondly, that the United States17 not be associated with any kind of violent overthrow. And in18 the telegram that was --19 The Chairman. All right.Now when the President told you that those were his21 two concerns, what action was then taken to implement the22 President's policy?23 Mr. Goodwin. The action that was then taken was to taka24 and set aside the original instructions from the State25 Department and at the President's instructions, I typed up theTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 23]
TOP SECRET1 telegram which is here in my handwriting, which was to go and2 did go, slightly revised to --3 Mr. Schwarz. All right. Let me mark the one in your4 hand as Exhibit 3.5 (The document referred to6 was marked as Goodwin7 Exhibit No. 3-A for8 identification.)910111213141516171819202122232425TOP SECRET![photo of telephone number and adress information]
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 24]
TOP SECRET221 Mr. Schwarz. Well, let's mark them, Mr. Goodwin -- you2 know how to do this as well as I do. Make them 3-A, 3-D and3 3-C.4 Mr. Goodwin. In which I personally added in the course5 of rewriting6 The Chairman. Can you identify in the Senators' books7 where these documents appear?8 Mr. Schwarz. Where is 3-179 Mr. Goodwin. This is 233 at the bottom.10 (Pause)11 This xerox of my raw, personally typewritten draft appears12 on page 237. That's my very bad typing and handwriting.13 And then paqe 256 is the final. And the same page, 242,14 page 237 and 242.15 The Chairman. Is 242 the final version of the message16 that want out?17 Mr. Goodwin. Yes.18 The Chairman. This is for Dearborn from State?19 Mr. Goodwin. That's correct.20 The Chairman. And by whom was the messages signed?21 Mr. Goodwin. Probably the Secretary, I guess, but they22 are both my drafts. I received a draft from the State Depart-23 ment, discussed it with the President, and at his instruction24 prepared this redraft. I never would have overridden the State25 Department on my own, and adding to it two major points asideTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 25]
## TOP SECRETfrom rewording it. The first one is on a different matter, andthe second one was to say in the final version, "However, wemust not run the risk of U.S. association with politicalassassinations, since the United States as a matter of generalpolicy cannot condone assassinations. This last principle isoverriding and most prevail in doubtful situations."That was inserted at the instruction of the President,a much stronger statement of that than occurs in the StateDepartment draft, and it finishes again with -- it says,"Clearly, at the present time we are unable to transfer armsto dissidents. We feel that the transfer of arms would servevery little purpose."(The document referred towas marked GoodwinExhibit No. 3-B foridentification.)## TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 26]
TOP SECRET24Phone (Area 202) 544-60081 The Chairman. Now you saw this telegram and approved it2 before it was sent by State?3 Mr. Goodwin. I wrote it.4 The Chairman. But you said that the State Department5 changed the language.6 Mr. Goodwin. No. They had prepared an original draft7 which I changed and redrafted. Now that is here too, including8 a note from them saying that I wasn't satisfied with their9 draft.10 The Chairman. So this was your own message, then, that11 you believed accurately reflected President Kennedy's policy?12 Mr. Goodwin. It was prepared at the specific instruction13 of the President. It was shown to him before transmission.14 The Chairman. It was shown to the President?15 Mr. Goodwin. Oh, yes.16 The Chairman. Very well.17 Then, reading the first paragraph, "The President has now18 approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here19 with one major exception. You are not to request a pre-20 signed request for help from Dominican dissident groups."21 Mr. Goodwin. I can explain that, Senator.22 There was a proposal made in the State Department version23 that has been discussed that the dissident groups, that in case24 they managed to take over the government and there was some25 kind of fighting that they should request help from Venezuela,TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 27]
# TOP SECRET251 Columbia, a few of our allies and therefore we ought to prepare2 them in advance for such a request. The President thought that3 putting such a document in their hands would amount to a4 declaration of war and wanted it struck.5 The Chairman. All right.6 Then the second paragraph, "We consider it essential that7 you continue to work" -- wall, before we go on with the second8 paragraph, in the first paragraph you say, "The President has9 now approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here10 with one major exception."11 Now, what were those contingency plans that had been12 discussed?13 Mr. Goodwin. They have them here, I believe.. I think --14 this is a very thick document, where you have a series of15 contingency plans, it discusses here. "The paramount interest16 of the United States is to assure that Castro-Communist17 elements not take over." It says Trujillo is weak, and then it18 is an analysis of the dissidents and their intention, the19 weakness of the Trujillo regime, and it goes into the covert20 activities, which, I think probably -- is that your principal21 interest at this time?22 The Chairman. Yes.23 Mr. Goodwin. There's an Appendix that sets forth all the24 covert activities. Recommendation A of the United States,25 not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo, that we inform prod.s.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 28]
26TOP SECRET1 dissidents that if they succeed on their own and form an2 acceptable government we will be glad to come in and help them3 and then the rest talks about here; ways of recognizing --4 The Chairman. There is nothing in that contingency5 plan that contemplated the assassination of Trujillo himself?6 Mr. Goodwin. It contemplated only the possibility that7 he might be assassinated, not that we would assassinate him.8 The Chairman. But if he were assassinated, it would have9 presumably been the result of an action by a dissident group10 to overthrow his regime?11 Mr. Goodwin. Yes.12 The Chairman. All right.13 Moving to Paragraph 2 in your message -- the President's14 message to Mr. Dearborn, "We consider it essential that you15 continue to work to strengthen pro-U.S. sentiment among dissi-16 dent groups. Your work along this line has been invaluable.17 However, we must not run the risk of U.S. association with18 political assassination, since the U.S., as a matter of general19 policy cannot condone assassination. This last principle is20 overriding and must prevail in doubtful situations."21 Now that language, it has been suggested by some members22 of the Committee that your concern here had to do with avoiding23 any relationship that might lead to a disclosure that the24 United States had indeed an interest in or was somehow involved25 in a plot to assassinate Trujillo. Because you say, "howeverTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 29]
# TOP SECRET1 we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political2 assassination, since the U.S. as a matter of general policy3 cannot condone assassination. This last principle is over-4 riding and must prevail in doubtful situations."5 Now don't those words at least convey or lend themselves6 to the interpretation that your primary concern was that the7 United States should not get caught?8 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I don't believe so, Senator, because9 I think, to me, the plain meaning of the words and as I10 understood it was that we must not run the risk of U.S.11 association with political assassination. That means not12 be associated with the process of political assassination inany form.13 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman?14 In that same vein, if I could interrupt for just a second,15 is it true -- and would Counsel prompt me -- that the guns had16 already been dispatched?17 Mr. Schwarz. Certain guns.18 Senator Baker. I'm not talking about how many, Fritz.19 Guns had been dispatched.20 Mr. Schwarz. But this telegram refuses the passage of21 four machine guns.22 Senator Baker. I'm not going to argue with you. I am23 just saying that guns had been dispatched.24 Senator Schweiker. What's the date of this telegram?25 TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 30]
# TOP SECRET1 Senator Baker. This was just before the assassination,2 two days before the assassination.3 Mr. Smothers. Carbines and pistols had been dispatched.4 Machine guns were in the country but had not been turned over5 to the dissidents.6 Senator Baker. And now, in retrospect, we're not quite7 sure -- or there's no indication that the guns were actually8 used in the assassination, although they may have been in the9 back seat. Is that about the way it stacks up?10 The Chairman. And the dissidents had requested machine11 guns.12 Senator Baker. And the witness, or another witness, has13 said we thought the signals for assassination efforts for14 machine guns, when in fact it would appear that they went ahead15 with the material in hand.16 Mr. Goodwin. I believe they had additional guns of their17 own. You wouldn't try it with a .38.18 Senator Tower. I think the type of guns is important,19 because carbines or pistols wouldn't be used in an assassination20 against a heavily armed --21 Mr. Goodwin. Trujillo travelled with bodyguards in a22 heavily armed car.23 Also, if I might add, Senator --24 The Chairman. Just to understand what you have said,25 as the author of this instruction and having conferred about.# TOP SECRET