Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10011-10010.pdf — page 11]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:MCCONE FITZGERALDBUNDY PAPICHJESSUP RFKSTEAKLEY JMWAVEJMWAVE VANCEDATES:HUGHES 8/19/64BOSCH JOSE 7/30/646/10/64CATEGORIES:SGAMONGOOSECASTROTOP SECRETOCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICHof the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director, (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000.--JOSE MARIO PEPINBOSCH, Preso of Bacardi Rum would contribute $50,000. BOSCH approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. goverment also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."SOURCE Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from Mecome to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants. "Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)FILE:IG REPORT 1967STAFFDATE:Baron, 7/1/75
[157-10011-10010.pdf — page 12]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:|                     |              |                   || ------------------- | ------------ | ----------------- || WAINWRIGHT, William | McNAMARA     | DATES:            || LASH, A. M.         | SPECIAL GRP. | August 10-11 1962 || TEPEDINO Carlos     | (AUGMENTED)  | CATEGORIES:       || McCONE              |              | CASTRO            |OCCURRENCE:CIA officer WAINWRIGHT and A.M. LASH-1 meet, along with CARLOS TEPEDINO (a Cuban exile jeweler in New York City), in Copenhagen (85). WAINWRIGHT reported that the term "assassinate" was used in the discussion of A.M. LASH's future role in Cuba and it visibly upset A.M. LASH, who preferred the term "eliminate." (85).DISCOVERY LEADS: Note: This discussion of assassination is taking place at the same time that DCI MCCONE lodges his objection, after the SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) meeting, to MCNAMARA's suggestion that the technique of assassination could be used against CASTRO.SOURCE:IG REPORT, 1967FILE:STAFF: BaronDATE: 7/2/75
[157-10011-10010.pdf — page 13]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:MCCONE FITZGERALD HUGHESBUNDY OPAPICH BOSCH JOSEJESSUP RFKSTEAKLEY JMWAVEJMWAVE VANCEDATES:8/19/647/30/646/10/64CATEGORIES:SGAMONGOOSECASTRO# TOP SECRETOCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICHof the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director,(116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs, Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000. JOSE MARIO PEPIN BOSCH, Preso of Bacardi Rum would contribute $50,000. BOSCH approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. goverment also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."SOURCE Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from Mccone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants. "Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)FILE:IG REPORT 1967DATE:Baron, 7/1/75
[157-10011-10010.pdf — page 14]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:HARVEY, WILLIAM COMINTMCCONEHELMSMATAHAMBRE COPPER MINESDATES:-11/14/6211/3/62CATEGORIES:MONGOOSESGAOCCURRENCE: Harvey states, "On 3 November, 1962, a fragmentary COMINT report was received, reflecting the arrests by the Cuban authorities in Panar del Rio, of the infiltrees. It was impossible to determine, definitely, whether this report referred to the two members of the Matahambre sabotage team."TOP SECRETSOURCE: 11/14/62, Memorandum of William Harvey, (00757)STAFF: PGWFILE:DATE: 6/30/75
[157-10011-10010.pdf — page 15]
NW 50955 DocId: 32203778 Page 16![photo description]PERSONS/ENTITIES:REKDATES:CATEGORIES:McGeorge BundyMr. ilcConeCol. Ledford (CIA)Mr. WilsonMr. ParrotOct 9, 1962Special Group (Augmented)Mr. JohnsonDr. Charyl:Mr. GilpatricDr. ScovillcGen. TaylorCol. Steakley*Mongoose*OCCURRENCE:SGA discussed various possibilities of accomplishing reconaissance of Cuba, ranging from very low level coverage by tactical aircraft to high performance aircraft and drones. Over- flights and peripheral flights were discussed.It was agreed that the first priority is one high performance mission in the western part of ✓ the island, to be accompanied by all out Elint support.: Depending on the results of this, a number of similar scarches may be mounted. First mission was later approved by higher authority, but the decision on the second proposition left open.The entire package was to be discussed at the USIB, and by Chiefs on Wednesday, October 10th.SOURCE:STAFF:Memorandum for the record, dated October 9, 1962, effecting a meeting ofFILE: Special Group Augmented and prepared by Thomas Parrot.(02021)DATE: POW6/29/75
[157-10011-10010.pdf — page 16]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:JOHNSONKILPATRICKMCCONE ✓DATES:Sept.16,1963CATEGORIES:MONGOOSESPECIAL GROUPOCCURRENCE:On September 16, 1963 a memorandum reported that "all members of the special group have approved project OARAGE (having to do with certain ELING activties in the area of Cuba.)"![TOP SECRET]SOURCE:Memorandum dated 16 September 1963 for members of the Special Group from Mr. ParrottSTAFF:KelleyFILE:DATE:6/28/75
[157-10011-10010.pdf — page 17]
NW 50955 DocId: 32203778 Page 18PERSONS/ENTITIES:BundyThompsonJean Baptiste georgesVanceMcConeDesmond FitzgeraldDATES:July 23, 1964CATEGORIES:DuvalierSpecial Group/303OCCURRENCE:On July 23, 1964 the 303 Committee met and discussed Haiti. "At the present time there is no U.S. involvement with the insurgency effort against the Duvalier regime." The Committee approved the passage of approximately $10,000 on a non-attributable basis to Father Jean Baptiste Georges in the Domincan Republic which "might serve a useful purpose. Ambassador Thompson noted that "The Dominican government had formerly requested U.S. assistance in getting Father Georges and his colleagues to move out of the Dominican Republic."SOURCE:Memorandum for the record, July 24, 1964, Minutes of 303 Committee meeting, July 23, 1964STAFF:KelleyDATE: June 30, 1975FILE:Cage
[157-10011-10010.pdf — page 18]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:WAINWRIGHT, WilliamLASH, A. M.TEPEDINO, CarlosMcCONEDATES:MCNAMARASPECIAL GRP.(AUGMENTED)August 10-111962CATEGORIES:CASTROOCCURRENCE:CIA officer WAINWRIGHT and A.M. LASH-1 meet, along with CARLOS TEPEDINO (a Cuban exile jeweler in New York City), in Copenhagen (85). WAINWRIGHT reported that the term "assassinate" was used in the discussion of A.M. LASH's future role in Cuba and it visibly upset A.M. LASH, who preferred the term "eliminate." (85).DISCOVERY LEADS: Note: This discussion of assassination is taking place at the same time that DCI MCCONE lodges his objection, after the SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) meeting, to MCNAMARA's objection that the technique of assassination could be used against CASTRO.SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967FILE:STAFF: BaronDATE: 7/2/75
[157-10011-10010.pdf — page 19]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:BISSELLDULLESGRAYMERCHANT✓CATEGORIES:MONGOOSESpecial GroupDATES:Aug. 12, 1960OCCURRENCE:On August 12, 1960 the Special Group heard a summary of the budget for Cuban operations from MR. BISSELL. Approximately 13¼ million dollars were required to finance Cuban operations for the fiscal year and a balance of 10-3/4 was necessary for the remainder of the fiscal year. Major subheadings in the budget were (1) political action, (2) propaganda, (3) paramilitary, (4) intelligence collection, (5) counterintelligence, (6) communications support, (7) support.It was agreed "This matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next 10 days. This was believed to be wise, not because any (continued)".SOURCE:Minutes of Special Group meeting August 12, 1960FILE:CageSTAFF:DATE: Robert KelleyJune 29, 1975![CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT]![CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED]
[157-10011-10010.pdf — page 20]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:MURPHY LYMANKILPATRICK CASTROFITZGERALD CASTRO'S SISTERDATES:4/23/63CATEGORIES:CUBASPECIAL GROUPOCCURRENCE: Murphy asked Fitzgerald whether Castro's immediate entourage had been penetrated. Fitzgerald replied that Castro's sister worked for us but that she didn't always have inside informationSOURCE: Memorandum, dated 4/23/63, prepared by Lyman and Kilpatrick.STAFF: WALLACHDATE: 7/2/75CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZED
[157-10011-10010.pdf — page 21]
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT6 Apr 94| PERSONS/ENTITIES:                                                                                | DATES:       | CATEGORIES:             || ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | ------------ | ----------------------- || SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER | July 5, 1962 | MONGOOSE                || Mateos, Lopez JFK                                                                                |              | Special Group Augmented |OCCURRENCE: President Kennedy's visit to Mexico greatly enhanced U.S. goodwill in Mexico. It fulfilled U.S. plans to impress upon Castro that Mexico is solidly with the United States and the West. State believes this should ease the way for future discussions about Cuba with the Mexicans. Re: Operation MONGOOSE, the joint communique issued by President Kennedy and President Lopez Mateos included a phrase which was 'They proposed to respect and maintain the principles of non intervention--whether this intervention may come from a continental or extracontinental state--and of self-determination of peoples." In response to a Lansdale query, the Department of State noted that "There were no developments resulting from the President's trip to Mexico including the text of the joint United States-Mexico communique which alter the basic guidelines which govern the Cuba Project." Lansdale noted that the CIA now had 45 Asians in Havana operating. In addition there are agents and teams in the provinces. "Voice of Cuba" broadcasts from the U.S. Navy submarine were successful. "It is noted that UPI carried this news item but spiced it up with added stories of Castro's use of militia against guerillas in Mantanzas.SOURCE: The 2 stories are being closely directed to fit in with other operations put together by have no relationship in reality. STAFF: broadcasts and to keep within Mongoose guidelines.and the Voice of Cubs Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented re:MONGOOSE progress from Lansdale, July 5, 1962 (00406-00408)FILE:di GenovaDATE: July 1, 1975
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PERSONS/ENTITIES:SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,TAYLOR, RFK, JOHNSON, MARTIN,GILPATRICK, LEMNITZER, MCCONE,PARROTT, LANSDALE, HURWITCH---DATES:July 19, 1962---CATEGORIES:Special Group AugmentedMONGOOSE---OCCURRENCE: McCone explained the situation which has resulted in a group led by *Senor Bosch* acquiring B-26's which are now in Costa Rica prepared to conduct a bombing raid on Cuba. The group discussed a draft State Department cable to various Latin American embassies related to this incident. It was agreed that the point should be made in the cable that any such contemplated raid would be premature at this time. Dis- association of the United States from any such endeavor was to be accomplished by leaking stories of the impending raid to the press.---SOURCE: Memorandum for the record, Minutes of meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 19 July, 1962 (00033)---STAFF:di GenovaDATE: July 2, 1975
[157-10011-10018.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10018RECORDS SERIES :AGENCY FILE NUMBER :DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIAFROM :TO :TITLE : SSCI TRANSCRIPT DATED JUNE 11, 1975, TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELLDATE : 06/11/75PAGES : 135SUBJECTS : TRANSCRIPT, TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELLDOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION : TRESTRICTIONS : REFERREDCURRENT STATUS : PDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS :SSCI Box 231, Folder 5, Testimony of Richard Bissell[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[157-10011-10018.pdf — page 1]
TOP SECRET53to reactivate the operation, to renew the attempt, untilafter I had left the Agency, which was in February 1962.Senator Mondale. Now, you say you discussed probablywith Bundy and Rostow the capability in developing morecapability of assassinations. And you may have discussedit in the context of various potential targets withoutdeciding on them. Once you decided on a target, or you weregoing to recommend a target, what was the process of gettingclearance?Mr. Bissell. I can't answer you that, simply becauseno specific target was ever recommended. And to the bestof my knowledge and belief, other than the case we have discussedat length of Castro, which in time preceded the SRRIFLE pro-ject. The issue of obtaining clearance never arose. Ican speculate on how that would have worked if you wish.Senator Mondale. No.The Chairman. Let's go ahead then with the questions.Mr. Schwarz. Senator Baker asked, did Helms succeed you?Mr. Bissell. That is correct.Mr. Schwarz. Did you turn over SRRIFLE to him anddid you tell him about it?Mr. Bissell. I believe I did. And I also believethat Mr. Harvey told him about it promptly after the turnover.Mr. Schwarz. Do you know a man called Justin O'Donnell?Mr. Bissell. Yes, I do.TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10018.pdf — page 2]
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000dn6TOP SECRET541 Mr. Schwarz. Did you ask him in words or substance to2 kill Mr. Lumumba?3 Mr. Bissell. I asked him to investigate the possibility4 and to make explanation for so doing.5 Mr. Schwarz. When did you do that?6 Mr. Bissell. I don't remember the date of that. I may7 have it on a chronology here, but I imagine that is a matter8 of record, or that he has testified to that date. I don't9 remember the date.10 Mr.Schwarz. Did you tell him this connection with11 making plans to go see the passer of the poison, Mr. Gottlieb?12 Mr. Bissell. I think I probably did.13 Mr. Schwarz. Did he tell you he wouldn't do it?14 Mr. Bissell. Later he told me that he didn't want to15 do it. But he also said that he thought it was an inappro-16 priate action, and that the desired object could be accom-17 plished better in other ways.18 Mr. Schwarz. Who authorized you to tell Mr. O'Donnell19 to take steps to move toward assassinating Mr. Lumumba?20 Mr. Bissell. Nobody.21 Mr. Schwarz. Did you inform the White House of that?22 Mr. Bissell. No.23 Mr. Schwarz. To the best of your knowledge, did anybody24 inform the White House of that?25 Mr. Bissell. To the best of my knowledge, no.TOP SECRET410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003NW 50955 DocId: 32203786 Page 3
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TOP SECRET55Mr. Schwarz. Why did you seek to assassinate Mr.Lumumba?Mr. Bissell. I didn't seek to assassinate him. Itold a member of the clandestine service to make plans anddevelop the capability so to do if it were approved andordered.Senator Goldwater. Approved by who?Mr. Bissell. It would have then had to have approvalat the highest level of government.The Chairman. Where did the idea come from?Mr. Bissell. I don't remember, Mr. Chairman. It couldpossibly have been mine.The Chairman. It could possibly have been yours?Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell Rostow that was your initiative?Mr. Bissell. I told him that the instruction as to O'Donnell was my initiative.Senator Baker. How many others did you plan on, just as a contingency?How many other people did you instruct to draw up plans to assassinate?Mr. Bissell. I don't believe there were any others which went to the point of instructing that a man be prepared.Senator Baker. How many were there that didn't go that far? How many murders did you contemplate?Mr. Bissell. Well, Senator --TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10018.pdf — page 4]
dnll# TOP SECRET591 quoting a cable concerning the asset WIROGUE, who was sent2 to the Congo in the fall of 1960.3 The Chairman. Mr. Bissell, the memorandum to which4 counsel has referred reads as follows:5 "In recommending the agent or asset ROGUE, the Chief6 of Station, Leopoldville, the Chief of the Agency's African7 Division, probably Bronson Tweedy, wrote in late 1960:8 'He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong,9 but if he is given an assignment, which may be morally wrong10 in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case offi-11 cer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he12 will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution13 without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize14 all actions".15 Is that fairly representative of the philosophy that16 applied to such matters at the time?17 Mr. Bissell. Well, it certainly applied within the18 range of matters that would have come under SRRIFLE.19 Could I say, Mr. Chairman, that I know of no way in20 which it is possible to operate a secret intelligence agency21 or a secret service unless it has at least a number of22 employees who are willing to and can be depended upon to23 carry out orders involving acts of this sort.24 The Chairman. That assumes, of course, that the25 United States ought to assassinate foreign leaders.# TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10018.pdf — page 5]
dn13TOP SECRET1 meant to suggest that that was entirely comparable?2 Mr. Bissell. It was not meant to suggest that it was3 entirely comparable, but the individual whom I have mentioned4 were all perceived in their time and place as menaces to5 their own countries and the U.S. interests.6 Senator Goldwater. Might I ask a question based on his7 experience?8 From my readings in trying to learn more about intelli-9 gence, I gathered the impression that the actions such as10 you have been describing up to and including assassination,11 are practiced by every intelligence organization that I have12 been studying, is that correct?13 Mr.Bissell. That is my impression likewise, Senator.14 Senator Goldwater. Including England?15 Mr. Bissell. I believe so. In fact, I think definitely16 it has been used by M16. I couldn't give you specific cases.17 Senator Goldwater. Certainly KGB.18 Mr. Bissell. Certainly the KGB -- although as, the Chair-19 man pointed out the other day, I at least cannot point to20 any case where the KGB has carried out the assassination of21 a chief of state.22 Senator Goldwater. Would you assume that in the cases23 of those other countries that this ruler would have knowledge24 of this in every case?25 TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10018.pdf — page 6]
TOP SECRETMr.Bissell. In the case specifically of the U.K., I would answer in the affirmative. I also believe, however, that the Chief of the Intelligence Service of any one of those countries would flatly deny that the chief of state had knowledge of such action.Senator Goldwater. Thank you.Senator Baker. Would you deny it?Mr. Bissell. In our case here?:Senator Baker. Yes, sir.Mr. Bissell. Yes, it would be appropriate to do so.Senator Baker. Have you done so?Mr. Bissell. I have not had occasion to, because I am unaware of any high level assassination that occurred by the U.S.Senator Baker. Doesn't that amount to a denial?Mr. Bissell. It is a denial that any has occurred, at least in the period that I am aware of.Mr. Schwarz. Was your answer to Senator Baker meant to indicate that you would perjure yourself on this matter?Mr. Bissell. It depends a little bit on the context.There are occasions when I would go a long way to protect the President of the United States from certain kinds of embarrassment.Senator Baker. The question was, very simply, would you try to protect the President in such a case as you des-TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10018.pdf — page 7]
dn15# TOP SECRET1 cribed, MI6 or otherwise?2 Mr.Bissell. I can conceive of so doing, Senator.3 Senator Tower. May I pursue that just a moment further?4 You might say one thing in sworn testimony before a5 committee like this, but say another thing publicly, is that6 what you mean?7 Mr. Bissell. That is exactly what I mean.8 The Chairman. Have you lied to this committee?9 Mr. Bissell. No, sir.10 The Chairman. Would you lie to this committee?11 Mr. Bissell. No, sir.12 Senator Tower. I think that distinction has to be made.13 I think I would have lied about the U-2 myself.14 The Chairman. Shall we proceed with the questions?15 Mr. Schwarz. The remaining topic I have is Trujillo.16 It is respectfully indicated, and involves a lot of documents.17 And we have some procedural matters that we need to take up.18 I know we can't finish Trujillo before 12:30, and I would19 suggest that we ask the witness and whatever Senators thatcan return to come back this afternoon on Trujillo.20 The Chairman. We have a Senate order that there will21 be no further committee meetings this afternoon.22 I doubt that we can obtain unanimous consent.23 ls2425# TOP SECRETNW 50955 DocId:32203786 Page 8
[157-10011-10018.pdf — page 8]
3TOP SECRET661 almost any kind of paramilitary operation, such as the2 Guatamalan operation, the Bay of Pigs itself is, the earlier3 operation that has been discussed in the press in Iran, and4 which resulted in the ouster of Mossedegwand the return of the5 Shah, there is an expectation that such operations will involve6 military or semimilitary action, and that some people will lose7 their lives in the process.8 Senator Baker. Yes, but I am speaking rather more9 precisely of a single person or a group of people who were10 targeted, or discussions were held about targeting them, for11 what would be an assassination were it not for the legal12 significance of the term.13 Mr. Bissell. I don't think I remember any cases in14 which that sort of matter was discussed or was the subject15 of planning, other than the ones which have already been16 mentioned in testimony.17 Senator Mathias. Could I interject a question at this18 point.19 But of course that contemplates what we have seen in20 the earlier testimony, that when you begin an operation --21 and I think this was the history of the Castro operation --22 to in some way incompacitate him politically, that it often23 moves to the extreme of incapacitating him physically, isn't24 that true?25 Mr. Bissell. That is correct, sir.TOP SECRET