Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10011-10078.pdf — page 10]
# TOP SECRET- 5 -## Physical SurveillanceMr. Osborn states that physical surveillance of individuals in this country has been very rare as far as the Office of Security is concerned. He doubts that it has exceeded ten times during his tenure in the Office of Security.He describes those circumstances under which surveillance has been conducted as being limited to the following:1.  CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classified information to unauthorized persons;2.  Victor Marchetti to find out if he was getting information from current employees of the CIA;3.  Jack Anderson, Les Whitten and another legman to determine their sources of classified information, and Michael Getler, a staff writer for the Washington Post, for the same purpose;4.  A female agent of the Latin American Division who reported to the CIA the existence of a plot to assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the Director of Central Intelligence. This surveillance was conducted under the supervision of Mr. Ober, of the Directorate of Operations, with the full knowledge of the FBI.Also included in this surveillance was some of the contacts of this agent in Detroit, Miami, and New York City. The agent involved here was Thelma King, and the surveillance took place in 1971. (Mr. Osborn reports that a conversation between Miss King and her case officer in a New York hotel was also covertly recorded.)Mr. Osborn is emphatic to the fact that every instance of physical surveillance in his experience was authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence except that Mr. Brownman, the Deputy Director for Administration, may have been the official to authorize the surveillance of employees, but it is possible that these also were approved by Mr. Colby as DCI. Mr. Osborn is also emphatic to the effect that no member of Congress has ever been placed under physical surveillance, has ever had his telephone tapped, has ever been covertly monitored with respect to any conversations or communications, or has ever had a security check performed on him by the CIA.## Watergate Contacts1.  The McCord Letters: Mr. Osborn states that a letter directed to Mr. Helms in late June 1972 was referred to his office as a part of the "crank mail" received that day. He recognized the signature on the letter as being that of a former employee of the Office of Security, Mr. James McCord. Mr. McCord had shortly before that been arrested in connection with the breakin at the Democratic National Headquarters on June 16, 1972. Mr. Osborn states that he immediately brought this letter to the attention of Richard Helms, the DCI.TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10078.pdf — page 11]
TOP SECRET- 6 -McCord Letters (continued)Mr. Helms directed that the letter should be retained in the file, but that nothing further should be done about it and that he would take care of it. Thereafter a series of letters were received from Mr. McCord by Paul Gaynor, then the Chief of Security Research Staff within the Office of Security. These letters were received by Mr. Gaynor at his home. Each letter was promptly brought to the attention of Mr. Helms. The thrust of these letters was that the Committee to Re-elect the President and high officials within the Nixon Administration were planning to blame the CIA for the Watergate break-in. Mr. Helms directed that these letters not be referred to the Justice Department and that he would take care of them. Mr. Osborn recalls being present when the matter was discussed with the General Counsel of the CIA, Mr. Houston, who advised that the CIA was not obligated to reveal these letters to the Justice Department.At a much later date, Mr. Osborn gave full testimony with respect to these McCord letters and the actions regarding them to the Nedzi Subcommittee of House Appropriations Committee and to the counterpart Senate Subcommittee.2. The Pennington Matter: For many vears a man named Lee Pennington, a former FBI agent, has been retained by the CIA as a confidential informant. His compensation from the CIA has been $250 per month. Mr. Osborn stated that he has no idea what kind of information has ever been supplied to the Agency by Mr. Pennington in exchange for the compensation paid him.In August 1972 Mr. Osborn was on vacation during the time his deputy, Ermal Geiss, was in charge of the Office of Security. (The Office of Security had been designated by the DCI as the liaison with all other governmental agencies and departments relating to Watergate matters.)While Mr. Osborn was on vacation anFBI agent named Arnold Parham contacted the Office of Security and requested information on a man simply named "Pennington". The request was directed to Steve Kuhn of the Office of Security. Mr. Kuhn's Reputy, Hollis Whitaker, took the request of agent Parham to Ermal Geiss and asked whether the FBI should be given the names of both Penningtons or just one of them. Mr. Geiss instructed Whitaker that Parham should be supplied only with the name of Cecil Pennington, a retired employee of the CIA, who was not related in any way to Lee Pennington. Geiss instructed Whitaker that Lee Pennington's name should not be given to Parham.Mr. Geiss would have known that James McCord while he was employed in the Office of Security had acted as the case officer for Lee Pennington, that McCord was involved with the Watergate break-in, and that the FBI was really interested in Lee Pennington.Mr. Osborn states that all of the above information came to his attention in February 1974 and that he had no knowledge of it until that time.TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10078.pdf — page 12]
TOP SECRET-7-Pennington Matter (continued)Lee Pennington and a man named Charles Wylie were the only two confidential informants who Osborn can think of who were emploveed as such by the Office of Security during his tenure with that office. (This is in addition to CIA emplovees and the employees of propriety investigating companies who have been used as informants.) Mr. Wylie was a journalist and writer who was paid $10,000 per year, plus certain travel expenses, by the CIA to act as an informant, but Mr. Osborn has no idea what kind of information he provided to the Agency in recent years. He does recall that many years ago Wylie provided information regarding the Vienna, Austria, Youth Festival and also some information gathered on the trip he made to Japan. Mr. Osborn states that he has never met Lee Pennington or Charles Wylie, nor has he ever talked with either of them in person or by telephone.(Mr. Pennington was apparently terminated as a CIA informant on December 31, 1973.) Mr. Osborn states that he "started action" to terminate Wylie in about January or February 1974. He thought that Wvlie had never provided anything to the Office of Security and that it was "no time to have a domestic informant."Both Pennington and Wylie had been informants for the Office of Security for many years. They had been retained in that capacity even before Mr. Osborn became Deputy Director of Security in 1963.In February 1974 in connection with a search of files in the Office of Security some indication was turned up that Mr. Osborn had been informed in January 1973 about the fact that Lee Pennington had entered the home and the office of James McCord at the request of Mrs. McCord on January 22, 1972, to locate and destroy records which would have revealed a "link" between Mr. McCord and the CIA. Mr. Osborn denies that he received any such information. The informa-tion was allegedly given to him by Paul Gaynor, Chief of Security Research, in the Office of Security.Mr. Gaynor retired in 1973 at the request of Mr. Osborn, who had been directed to cut a GS-16 from his staff in a personnel reduction move. He states that Mr. Gaynor accepted this request gracefully and retired.Osborn and Gaynor have never discussed with each other the subject of Lee Pennington or the deception practiced on the FBI in August 1972. Osbom does not think that Gavnor opened up the subject, but he does believe that Gaynor has testified before either one of the Congressional committees investigating Watergate or the Special Prosecutor's Office.After Mr. Gaynor retired, Lou Vasaly of the Office of Security has handled contacts with Wylie and Pennington.In January or February 1974 Mr. Osborn sent Sidney Steinbridge of the Office of Security to New York to terminate Mr. Wylie.Lee Pennington died in the fall of 1974 of natural causes. He was in his middle 70's.TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10078.pdf — page 13]
# TOP SECRETWatergate Contacts (continued)3. Assistance to E. Howard Hunt re Ellsberg Break-InMr. Osborn states that the Office of Security had no involvement whatever with the assistance rendered by the CIA to Mr. Hunt in connection with the break-in of the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist and that he had no knowledge of that matter prior to the break-in. He is now acquainted with the White House request made to General Cushman for assistance to Mr.Hunt in 1971. He is also now familiar with the fact that the CIA provided to Mr. Hunt disguise equipment, false identification papers, and a camera, in response to the White House request. He also now knows that Mr. Hunt arranged for the development of the photographs which he had apparently taken on the occasion of the break-in at the office of Mr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist.In 1971 Mr. Osborn received a request from Mr. Young at the White House for the psychological profile on Daniel Ellsberg. He says that Mr. Young stated that the White House had been very pleased with the profile which had been developed by the CIA on Fidel Castro and would like the same kind of profile on Ellsberg.Osborn stated that he responded to Young that the CIA personnel had a great deal of biographical material on Ellsberg. Young assured Osborn that the White House would provide material on Ellsberg. Osborn responded that such a request would have to be approved by the DCI, Mr. Helms.Osborn then took the matter to Mr. Helms, who approved the project and told him to provide the requested assistance to Young.Young thereafter sent materials from time to time to Osborn relating to Ellsberg. It was Osborn's impression that these materials were very fragamentary and would not be sufficient to provide a meaningful psychological profile. Nonetheless, the request and the materials were turned over to the doctors at CIA and a draft of a profile was ultimately worked up. Mr. Young did not appear to be very well pleased with the draft.Mr. Osborn surmises that the break-in at the offices of Dr. Fielding (Ellsberg's psychiatrist) was accomplished for the purpose of gathering more information with which to develop a better psychological profile.TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10078.pdf — page 15]
# TOP SECRET-10-## Surveillance of Dissident Groups and ActivityIt has been mentioned above that Mr. Osborn informed us of the activity of the Anderson Security Associates in maintaining in the Washington, D.C. area a check on individuals and organizations who would represent potential threats to CIA personnel or organizations.There was also coordination between the Office of Security and local police departments to cover the same activity. An effort was made to determine the size of anticipated demonstrations and to anticipate what security forces would be necessary to cope with them.In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security directed the field offices to solicit or report information on anti-war and dissident elements. The CIA was concerned about the safety of its personnel, such as recruiters on college campuses and its offices around the country. Its recruiting office in Ann Arbor, Michigan, had been bombed at about that time. Mr. Osborn also believes that the field offices were directed at about that time to establish a clipping service on campuses and other newspapers to report on organizations and individuals who might represent threats to CIA personnel or offices.As a result of the information fed into the Office of Security relating to organizations and individuals who may represent such threats, a substantial number of files were accumulated on individuals and organizations.## Mail InterceptsMr. Osborn reports that a mail intercept program in New York City began in about 1952 and ended in 1973. He learned of this program when he became Director of the Soviet-Russian Division in the Operations Directorate. He states that the program involved the identification of parties within the United States sending and receiving mail with persons in the Soviet bloc countries and the identification of the persons in the Soviet bloc sending and receiving such mail. Selected items of mail were also opened and photographed, and then resealed and forwarded. Mr.Osborn states that he cannot recall any specific use made by the CIA of the information so obtained. The primary purpose of the program as he understood it was to provide information to the FBI. He recalls several conferences regarding the program. It was his position that the three personnel from the Office of Security who worked on the program were not performing any useful service for the Office of Security, that it was a drain on the budget of his office, and that the CIA had no business tampering with the mail in the first place. Mr. Colby, when he was Executive Director-Controller of the Agency, supported Mr. Osborn's position on the matter. It was opposed by Mr. Angleton of the Directorate of Operations, who argued primarily that the information derived from the project was vitally necessary to the FBI. Mr. Helms elected to have the program continue. It was finally terminated by Mr. Colby during the time that Mr. Schlesinger was DCI in 1973.TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10078.pdf — page 16]
TOP SECRET- 11-Mr. Osborn also thought that continuation of the program was too risky in the light of public and Congressional attitude toward the CIA. He thinks that the program originated while Allen Dulles was DCI and that it was undertaken with the knowledge and consent of the Postmaster General. However, this is hearsay, according to Mr. Osbom.Mr. Osborn is also acquainted with the fact that from 1969 to 1971 the project of mail surveillance occurred from time to time in San Francisco. The Office of Security ade the arrangements with the Post Office Department for this program, but it was carried out by the Far East Division and the Technical Services of the Directorate of Operations. The Technical Services Division at that time was headed by Rod M. Kenner, who is now retired and living in Florida.The arrangements with the Post Office Department were made by Jack Turton of the Office of Security. Mr. Osborn has only the vaguest knowledge of the purpose of this project and could offer no further light than that it involved some checking on the stamping and postmarking of mail from the Peoples Republic of China. The project was orally okayed by Mr. Helms. Mr. Osborn has no knowledge of any other mail undercover projects in New Orleans or elsewhere.Cover Operations Using Local Police CoverMr. Osborn stated that arrangements were made several years ago with Collonel Durer of the Fairfax County, Virginia, Police Department for the issuance of badges and other police identification for use by CIA security personnel. It is Mr. Osborn's recollection that this involved about 15 sets of identification.These badges and other identification were never used by the CIA. They were all returned to Colonel Ducrer.This arrangement was inspired by difficulties which had been encountered by security personnel in conducting a physical surveillance of Victor Marchetti. It seems that Marchetti lived in a residential community and his home was situation on a cul-de-sac. This made it extremely difficult to cruise by his home or station a security car anywhere near his home without attracting the attention of other residents in the neighborhood. Security personnel who may have been sitting in a car within several blocks of the Marchetti residence would have attracted the curiosity of the residents and the operation would be threatened if such residents approached the car and asked what the occupants were doing there and if they were given straight-forward answers. According to Mr. Osborn, it was highly desirable that the security personnel be able to respond to such inquiries by saying that they were police performing official duties. Most citizens, he savs, would accept that as sufficient, whereas their curiosity would be even further aroused if the security personnel identified themselves as being with the CIA.M. Osborn states that he had issued strict orders that the use of identification local police officers was to be limited strictly to situations involving actual over for surveillance purposes.TOP SECRETNW 50955 DocId: 32203846 Page 17
[157-10011-10078.pdf — page 17]
TOP SECRET-12-Mr. Osborn seems to recall that the Office of Security had similar arrangements with the Washington, D. C. Metropolitan Police Department, and he thinks that there were instances in which such cover was actually used, but he does not recall specific cases. He also states that it is possible that CIA field offices would have used similar cover of local police departments, but he has no knowledge of such instances.## Wire TapsMr. Osborn states that he has no acquaintance with the wire taps made of the office and home phones of two syndicated columists in Washington in 1962 and 1963, which wire taps are revealed in the file as having been authorized bv Attorney General Robert Kennedy. (The file reveals continuation of activity with respect to the surveillance of these columnists into the period of when Mr. Osborn was in the Office of Security as its Deputy Director. The file does not, however, show any indication of actual awareness on the part of Mr. Osborn that telephone tapping was involved. On the contrary, there are indications in the file that these telephone taps were discontinued immediately prior to Mr. Bannerman becoming the Director of Security in 1963, at which time Mr.Osborn also became the Deputy Director of Security.)## Training of State and Local Police and Other AssistanceMr. Osborn states that assistance was rendered to many local police departments, including those of the cities of New York and Chicago, and to the Maryland and Virginia state police during the period 1955 to 1972. He states that this program was vigorously and enthusiastically approved and supported by Mr. Helms.Assistance consisted of training of personnel, the loaning of equipment, and the declassification of materials and techniques in such areas as photo analysis, surveillance techniques, metals detection, explosives detection, locks and picks, hidden microphones, telephotography and covert photography, and the setting up, handling, and organization of intelligence operations.This program was terminated upon passage of an amendment to the Law Enforcement Assistance Act, which prohibited assistance to local and state police departments by the CIA.Mr. Osborn feels verv strongly that the program of cooperating with and assisting police departments in improving their capability to fight crime was proper and that its termination is a serious disservice to the American people. Referring to the prohibition on CIA "police and law enforcement functions" in the National Security Act of 1947, Mr. Osborn is of the coinion that the CIA in sharing its information and technical developments with state and local police departments was not exercising any police or law enforcement function.NW 50955 DocId:32203846 Page 18TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10078.pdf — page 18]
# TOP SECRETThe Huston PlanMr. Osborn states emphatically that the Office of Security had no knowledge whatever in developing or assisting in the so-called "Huston Plan," relating to domestic security operations. He states that he had never heard of it until it hit the papers at the time of the Watergate investigation. All relation-ships with the Inter-Agency Domestic Intelligence unit was handled for the CIA by Mr. Helms and Mr. Ober.## The Nosenko AffairNosenko was a KGB agent who defected to the United States in Switzerland in the early 1960's. His interrogation was handled under the supervision of the SR Division of the Directorate of Operations, especially by David Murphy and Peter Bagley of the SR Division.Mr. Osborn states that he repeatedly protested the treatment of Nosenko. After more than two years of solitairy confinement in a special facility for which the Office of Security provided all security measures, Mr. Bruce Solie of the Security Office finally arranged for the release of Nosenko and gradually increased his privileges and freedom.Mr. Osborn states that Nosenko has proved to be the most valuable defector in the entire history of the CIA. He has been responsible for identifying nine Soviet agents, including a major in the Pentagon.## Surveillance of Justice DouglasMr. Osborn has no knowledge of the alleged surveillance of Justice Douglas (referred to in an article in *The Washington Post* on February 3, 1975, page D-11).## Contact with The White HouseMr. Osborn states that he was not involved and has no information regarding any request from the White House for files relating to the coup in which Premier Diem was overthrown in Vietnam, or regarding the Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba. The CIA personnel who would have been involved in such matters were William Nelson, Deputy Director of Operations, on the Bay of Pigs matter; and George Carver, then Special Assistant to the DCI for Vietnam affairs, with respect to the Diem coup.The only other contact of any nature with the White House recalled by Mr. Osborn was one which he seems to remember occurring in about 1963 when the Office of Security was consulted by the Secret Service with respect to counter-audio measures to protect against bugging and wire taps in the White House. He thinks this occurred during the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson.## Unauthorized Break-InsMr. Osborn states that the only break-ins which have occurred to his knowledge by security personnel of the CIA have been those involving employees, former employees, or CIA contact agents who were under investigation for suspected disclosure of classified information. (Details are in the files provided to the Commission.)TOP SECRET
[157-10011-10078.pdf — page 19]
# TOP SECRET## GeneralMr. Osborn states categorically that the Office of Security has never to his knowledge:*   conducted any audio surveillance, telephone taps, physical surveillance or personal investigation of any member of Congress or public official;*   maintained any file for political or other improper purpose of any such congressmen or public official;*   pulled any file for examination for purpose of checking up on any such member of Conress or public official.Mr. Osborn states that he does not recall any instance during his career with the CIA to which any particular activity of the Agency was examined in the specific light of Section 403 of the National Security Act of 1947; i.e., he does not recall any assessment of a proposed or ongoing activity from the standpoint of whether it was improper as a "police", "law enforcement", or "internal security" function.## ImpressionMr. Osborn impresses the interviewer as being honest, intelligent, and dedicated to the interests of the United States and its people. His memory appeared to be in error in some details, but considering the wide range of the interview and the time period involved, coupled with the wide breadth on responsibilities and the number of personnel under his supervision in the Office of Security, this is to be expected.There is one area in which the interviewer was doubtful concerning the complete candor of Mr. Osborn. That was the area of his knowledge concerning the Pennington matter.# TOP SECRET