Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 44]
# TOP SECRET42Mr. Baron. Prasumably, it is responding to the cable that we just looked at, and in this cable, Glen Fields says, "You are authorized have exploratory talks with Schotrofite to assess his attitude toward possible active agent or cut-out role."Would you assume that Glen Fields consulted you before sending this authorization to the Chief of Station?Mr. Tweedy. Not necessarily. I might have been out of town that day. As you will notice, all he says is, "You are authorizal have exploratory talks" and "Agree with you initial discussions should be on hypothetical basis." And, of course, at that point, we would expact a raport from the field on how it went.. He was taking it one step further. He might not have cleared that with me if I were away. He might also have perhaps cleared it with Mr. Bissall.Mr. Baron. As your Deputy, it would have been perfectly proper in your eyes for Glen Fields to have issued this cable without consulting you?Mr. Tweedy. Certainly. It is quite possible, too, that he ever told Mr. Bissell what he was planning to do. I cannot tell you specifically. This is all that this cable authoriz. I find it entirely within his delegated responsibilities.Mr. Baron. Would it have been standard procedura for Glen Fields, in your absence, to mention to Richard Bisselle the fact that such authorization to be sent to the Chief of Statio.:# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 45]
# TOP SECRET1 on an exceptional and sensitive mission like this one?2 Mr. Tweedy. Would you say that again?3 Mr. Baron. Would it have been standard procedure for4 Fields to check with Bissall in your absence before he sent such a cable?5 Mr. Tweady. No. Field's understanding of his authorities6 and his relationships with the DDP on such matters were exactly the same as mine. We would have seen eye to eye with him.7 If I had sent the cable, undoubtedly I would have let8 Mr. Bissall know that I was planning to carry this thing that much closer. The reason for that is that we were getting close to informing a third party that this was in the wind. Therefore before we actually took this step, I think something like this, a third party being Schotroff9 Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 8, we will introduce a cable on October 7th, 1967, from the Chief of Statlin to Jadwin, which is yourself.(The document referred to was marked TweedyExhibit No. 9 for identification.)# TOP SECRET![AGR]
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 46]
# TOP SECRET1 Mr. Baron. This cable begins with a reference to *Sidney*2 *Gottlieb*, and he: "Departed Leop for PBPRIME 5 October, view3 expiration date his materials. However, left certain items of4 continuing usefulness. Guthman plans continue try implement5 op."6 Do you have any independent recollection of receiving7 this cable?8 Mr. Tweedy. You know, it's terribly hard when you see9 something that clearly occurred, and to me I read, it's10 terribly hard at this stage to say, of course I remember. It all11 reads perfectly familiar to me now.. To say quite specifically12 I recall receiving the cable will perhaps go a little beyond13 my memory.14 Mr. Baron. Based upon having read this cable at that15 time, which you assume you did, is that correct?16 Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely.17 Mr. Baron. You would have known that *Sidney Gottlieb* had18 left the Congo on October 5th and that the Chief of Station19 planned to continue to try to implement the operation.20 Mr. Tweedy. Which means that he would continue his21 exploratory operational work to see if he could come to some22 solution..23 Mr. Baron. You would read that sentence still to apply24 to an exploratory phase, a phase in which the Chief of Station.25 was exploring the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba as# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 47]
# TOP SECRET1 opposed to moving to implementing?2 Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely. Under no circumstances anything alse.4 Mr. Dawson. Based upon this Exhibit and the previous one5 than, Mr. Tweedy, is it your opinion that in this case no agent6 was ever asked to assassinate Lumumba?7 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, indeed. That also coincides with my best recollection which is not all that damn good. It is9 perfectly obvious that Schotrofle was never requested to assassinate Lumumba, and I have no recollection of anybody having been asked to do this.11 Mr. Dawson. Whether the discussion was hypothetical, as outlined in the previous exhibit.13 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.15 Mr. Dawson. Why is it obvious that Schotroffe was rever asked to assassinate Lumumba in light of the sentence in this cable that reads, "Although did not pick up ball," -- referring to the fact that Schotrofle did not necessarily pick up the ball on assassinating Lumumba in his conversation with the Chief of Station, the Chief of Station nevertheless believed "he prepared take any role necessary within limits security accomplish objective."Does that not indicate that Schotroffe was at least Vie as Some01.e who was prepared to undertake an assassination ... if he should be tasked with it?# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 48]
TOP SECRET461 Mr. Tweedy. I did not say he was not. This at that time2 is the Chief of Station's best assessment of what the Schotroffereaction would be if the thing was formally put to him so5 bluntly that he understood entirely what it was all about. Ido not recall, I do not believe any of this residual traffic6 indicates that it ever got so far that we did that, and I think,7 my own belief is it is a 50-50 proposition on whether Schotroffe8 would agree to do it. I think probably in "limits security9 accomplish objective" is probably the controlling factor. I10 cannot really recall anymore.11 Mr. Dawson. Off the record.12 (Discussion off the record.)13 Mr. Baron. Back on the record.14 This report on October 7th by the Chief of Station refers15 back to the exploratory conversations that he mentioned he16 was --17 Mr. Tweedy. Implied to by Fields.18 Mr. Baron. -- authorized by Fields in the previous cableof the 30th.Mr. Tweedy. Right.Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 9, we will introduce a cable signe." by B. Tweedy to the Chief of Station in the YOPROr channel.(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 9 forTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 49]
TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-4000WARD & PAULNW Washing 20001123456789101112131415161718192021identification:)47TOP SECRET![tv screen]
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 50]
# TOP SECRET1 Mr. Baron. It begins, "Had good discussion your colleague2 7 October. Comments follow:"3 "A. Be *assured* did not expect YOPROP objectives4 be reached in short period and understand current situation5 fully warranted return your colleague."6 And then it continues to discuss the fact that you ware7 considering dispatching a third country national operator and8 a senior case officer from the CIA who would "run this op and9 outside agent full time under your direction."10 Doas this cable refer to the fact that you debriefed11 Sidney Gottlieb?12 Mr. Tweedy. I am sure it does. That is what it must be,13 yes.14 Mr. Baron. The first paragraph is meant to indicate that15 the Chief of Station should not feel that Headquarters would16 be disappointed in the fact that he did not pull off an17 assassination mission in such a short period of time?18 Mr. Tweedy. I want to be careful to how I reply to that.19 All I was saying to a very professional colleague was that we20 had no illusions about the fact that the planning operation21 of this would be very difficult, at hast, and would taks time22 and thoroughly agree with the fact that prospects, immediate23 prospects, were such that there was no alternative for Sidney24 Gottlieb to return. That is all I was saying.25 But to say what I was trying to express to him was the# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 51]
TOP SECRET491 fact that we were not overly disappointed that Lumumba was not2 assassinated at this point is just not the level of intercourse3 that I had with a very professional Chief of Station. That is4 all.5 Mr. Baron. Does not the paragraph A here indicate that6 the objective of the mission that was discussed in the YQPROP7 channel was to assassinate Lumumba in view or in light of the8 fact that Gottlieb had gone to the Congo with materials that9 were only going to be lethal for a short period of time?10 Mr. Tweedy. That is what it says.11 Mr. Baron. In other words, what I am trying to explore12 with you is your characterization of this entire stage of the13 operation as one of planning and exploration when we know that14 Gottlieb took materials to the Congo which would only be lethal15 for a short period of time and presumably was prepared to move16 from exploration to implementation?17 Mr. Tweedy. If, as a result of the Station focusing on18 the problem for the first time, as a result of Headquarters'19 request, they had come up with a plan that they thought was20 exceedingly solid and which Headquarters approved, it is not21 surprising, perhaps, that we wanted the materials there to take22 advantage of such, if you like, an unlikely event. But this23 would not change the normal sequence of events, which would be24 that the Station would explore, keep Headquarters informed!25 Headquarters would comment, it would then be a cresendo ofTOP SECRET![image]
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 52]
TOP SECRET1 agreement or no agreement at all resulting from either a final2 request for approval or either approval or no approval. Thiswould not have changed.4 Mr. Baron. Because *Gottlieb* took lethal materials to5 the Congo with him that had such a short period of lethality,6 ware you not contemplating at that time that the operation7 might wall move from the exploration phase to the implementation8 phase just as soon as *Gottlieb*and Hedgeman determined that it9 was feasible?10 Mr. Tweedy. I think I would put it quite differently.11 I think that I would say that we would have been remiss in not12 being in a position. to exploit, if we reached the point where13 we all agreed that the thing was possible.14 If they had merely gone over and said we think we can do15 it, by why do you not send the stuff from Headquarters, that16 would have been sort of nonsense, if you follow me.17 Mr. Baron. You would have expected the Chief of18 Station to cable back for confirmation, but it was certainly19 within your contemplation at the time that when *Gottlieb* went20 to the Cor.go, when the Chief of Station cabled for confirma-21 tion, you would probably give him a go ahead to assassinate22 Lumumba?23 Mr. Tweedy. I did not say that at all.24 Mr. Baro... If the operation were feasible?25 Mr. Tweedy. I did not say that at all. It would not havTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 53]
# TOP SECRET1 been my say-so. I do not know what the policy levels of myAgency, who in turn would have been reflected in the policylevels of the government, would have done if it had come to thepoint where somebody said, we can do it, do you want us to do5 it.6 Mr. Baron. You would have referred that to Bissell?7 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.8 Mr. Baron. lle would have referred it?9 Mr. Tweedy. He would have referred it according to hislights. That was not my business. He was his own laval ofauthority. He was as aware of his authority as I was at myleval. I only assume that this would have been discussed atthe highest level, certainly at the Agency. I assume that thedecision would have had to have been made by Allen Dulles andwho else he wished to consult in Washington.These are pure assumptions on my part. Under no circum-stances would I have given the go ahead.Mr. Dawson. That is interesting.Mr. Baron. I just have one more question on this line.I realize we are going very closely over this ground. We Wol:l!not be doing it if it weren't important in trying to get you toclarify for the record exactly what shade of meaning you waitto attach here.Would it be fair to say that when you dispatched [Gottlis']to the Corno you expected to hear back --# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 54]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Tweedy. I expected this would result in a dialogue2 between the Station and ourselves as to what might be feasible.3 Mr. Baron. You were hoping?4 Mr. Tweedy. Gottlieb assisting the Chief of Station in5 his explorations.6 Mr. Baron. In view of the entire policy of the Agency at7 that time, as indicated in the cables of Dulles and the cables8 from yourself and Bissell to the Congo, you were hoping that9 Gottlieb and the Chief of Station would find a feasible means10 of carrying out an assassination mission and then inform you of11 that.12 Mr. Tweedy. I am not going to comment on the hope. I do13 not know what my frame of mind was on that.14 The purpose of the exercise was to see whether this was15 possible. One thing was clear, that I was the instrument of16 policy in carrying out the exploration which was entirely a17 professional matter. If the exploration had reached a point18 where we felt that we could submit to higher authority a plan19 which we thought made some sense, at that point higher authority20 would have to take the ball and run with it and let us know21 what they concluded.22 Mr. Baron. By higher authority here, you mean any23 authority higher than yourself?24 Mr. Tweedy. It would start with me in my chain of command.25 I would not be concerned with the National Security AdvisorTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 55]
TOP SECRET531 to the President or anybody else, I was perfectly clear in my2 mind bacause of what had occurred and the way that these matters3 had been broached to the field by Mr. Dulles, that the thing4 was in the national arena and was just not in the Agency's5 alana.6 What Mr. Dulles would have done and what he felt his7 authorities ware from higher authority I cannot tell you.8 Mr. Dawson. That would have been a matter that would have9 bean between Mr. Bissell and Mr. Dulles, in that correct?10 Mr. Tweedy. In the first instance, it would have been11 Datwaan Mr. Dulles and the outside world, the Executive.12 Mr. Dawso::. The chain of command would have been, you13 would have talked to Bissell, you would not have been expecte'14 or would have asked what Mr. Dulles' view word?15 Mr. Tweedy. Mind you, we were also an Agency that was very flexible. I am not saying Mr. Dulles might not have talked16 to me about this, that was because Mr. Bissell was not immediately available, or something of this kind.17 What I am saying is at the working level, the operation level, the Divisional and the Station level, we had come un with a plan which made professional sense to us which we felt sound enough so that we would present it to our masters, we would have done 90 and the resultant instruction to the fie would have dapemled on their reaction as far as I was concerne within the Agency. As far as Mr. Dulles was concerned, I car:TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 56]
TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-6000541 tell you.In other words, the degree to which he thought he would have to refer further to Washington on, I have no idea.Mr. Baron. It was your job to find a feasible way to carry out an assassination; it was the job of Bissell and those above him to decide whether to go ahead, as far as you ware concerned?Mr. Tweedy. As far as I was concerned, that is the way it started.Mr. Dawson. You have no independent or specific recollection that you ever went to Mr. Bissell and said, we do not hev a shot at this, or we do, and we could do it this way, and him saying One thing or another? You have no recollection either way?Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Bissell read the same traffic I did.Mr. Dawson. I did not know that.Mr. Tweedy. He read these cables. When I say he read every single one of them word for word -- all I can say is he had full access to these cables and anything he had not read or had any reason to believe he had not read, I would have kent him generally briefed on the progress of the planning. Naturally, he would have been interested. He would not have followed it in detail.Mr. Dawson. Would Mr. Dulles have had any access to these cables?Mr. Tweedy. Not routinely. I think he would have expected.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 57]
TOP SECRET551 Mr. Bissell to keep him orally informed on a thing like this.2 He did not want any more paper floating around in those days.3 Mr. Dulles was in even another building. Now, we were all down4 at the Reflecting Pool at that point, were we not, and Mr.5 Dulles was on E Street. It doesn't make any difference. The6 number of papers on this YQPROP thing would have been restricted7 to the absolute minimum. I do not think Mr. Dulles would have8 expedted to be bothered with the operational details. What he9 would have expected from Mr. Bissell was progress on planning1 the elimination of Lumumba by whatever means.11 Mr. Dawson. Was the routine way that that information12 would have been given to Mr. Dulles -- for instance, what I'm13 thinking was, were there staff meetings at which you attended14 with Mr. Bissell in Mr. Dulles' prasa.ice concerning what was15 happening generally on a routine quarterly or weakly basis?16 Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Bissell would have seen Mr. Dulles by and17 large svery day.18 Mr. Dawson. They would not review meetings on a weekly orroutine basis?19 Mr. Tweedy. He had his own staff meating every morning,20 Mr. Dulles did. These were attended by his Deputy Directors, o21 which Mr. Bissell was ouz..22 I used to see Mr. Bissell -- he had a staff meating oncea week which all Chiefs of Division attended. Nothing likethis would be discussed at those. I had my own private meuti::TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 58]
# TOP SECRET1 with him on these matters whenever it seemed necessary by one2 or the other of us.Mr. Baron. Returning to the cable of October 7th, 1960, which you sent to the Chief of Station, the reference to a5 senior case officer who might be dispatched to the Congo, is that6 a reference to the fact that Bissell was considering dispatching7 Justin O'Donnall?Mr. Tweedy. No other candidate, no other. I assume that is who it is.Mr. Baron. O'Donnell's account that he was asked byBissell to go to the Congo to carry off the assassination of:: Lumumba would fit here?Mr. Tweedy. Sure.Mr. Baron. The third country national referred to in this cable and in other cables as someone you are considering dispatching to the Congo to help with the operation, would that be QJWIN or WIROGUB?Mr. Tweedy. As I told you before, definitely not WDROGUE.Iresumably this other fellow, whose identity and what he was is very, very unclear to me.Mr. Baror. The agent that was run by Arnold SilverMr. Tweedy. Yes. This would have been the ma: that wou!! have worked with Justin O'Donnell if it had all happened.Mr. Baron. That was QJWIN. I will represent to you that QJWIN was the agent who was supervised by Justin O'Donnell.# TOP SECRET![UGR]
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 59]
TOP SECRET571 Mr. Tweedy. We read that that time, which is my only2 recollection of it. That is the person I am sure.3 Mr. Baron. Let me correct myself here.4 I will represent to you that QJWIN was the agent that was5 recruited by Arnold Silver and sent by Silver to the Congo for6 use by O'Donnell and perhaps by the Chief of Station.7 Is that consistent with your recollection?8 Mr. Tweedy. No, it is not consistent with my recollection.9 It is certainly consistent with what I read the last time I saw10 you, which I have no reason to dispute. I just cannot remember11 the blighter at all.12 Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 10, let us introduce a cable of13 October 15th, 1960, which is not sent in the YOPROP channel.14 It is marked RIBATWEFLAT in the space whers sensitivity15 indicators are usually placed.(The document referredto was marked TweedyExhibit No. 10 foridentification.)TOP SECRET![logo of the company]
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 60]
# TOP SECRET1 Mr. Baron. This cable requests the views of the Chief of2 Station on suggestions A, B and C for various covert operations.3 In paragraph C, there is a reference to4 Mr. Tweedy, we have received the representation from the5 CIA that that was a cryptonym used to refer to Lumumba.6 Is that consistent with your intereptation of the cable?7 Mr. Baron. It is indeed.8 Mr. Tweedy. This paragraph C says in part: "Only direct9 action we can now stand behind is to support immobolizing or10 arresting , desirable as more definitiva action might be.11 Any action taken would have to be entirely Congolese."12 Now, you signed this cable, but it was not sent in the13 special sensitivity channel that dealt with Gottliab's mission to the Congo?14 Before we discuss this cable, let us also introduce into15 the record as Exhibit 1l another cable which you signed on16 October 15, 1960 which was sent in the YOPROP channel to the Chief of Station.(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 11 for identiticetic…)# TOP SECRET![photo of logo]
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 61]
TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-60001 Mr. Baron. This contains the following language: "You2 will note from cable through normal channel currently being3 transmitted" then it continues "on YQPROP suggestions. You4 will probably receive more along these lines as stumbling025 bloc WIROAK represents increasingly apparent all studying6 Congo situation closely and his disposition spontaneously7 becomes number one consideration."8 Mr. Tweedy. I think by that, I think it is perfectly God-9 awful English.10 Mr. Baron. The cable continues --11 Mr. Tweedy. Obviously that means that everyone one talked12 to said there is no solution to the Congo as long as Lumumba13 stays in a position of power or influence there. That is what14 that means.15 Mr. Baron. The cable continues: "Raise above so you not16 confused by any apparent duplication. This channel remains17 for specific purpose you discussed with colleague and also18 remains highest priority."19 Now, does this pair of cables indicate that at this point20 despite the indication in the first cable that we looked at that21 "direct action would be limited to entirely Congolese action"22 the actual position of yourself and others at Headquarters23 involved in this operation was that exploration of an assassina-24 tion mission remained the highest priority for the Chief of25 Station?TOP SECRET![signature]59
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 62]
# TOP SECRET1 Mr. Tweedy. I think that is accurate.2 We had come to the end of the road, at least-temporarily3 on the YQPROP aspect and for the time being we were in no4 position to approve anything but what was discussed in the5 FLAP cable. Nonetheless, as long as the threat to the Congo6 from Lumumba existed, there remained a high priority to search7 for means to take care of the YQPROP planning aspects.8 Mr. Baron. When the cable refers to the specific purpose9 you discussed with colleague --10 Mr. Tweedy. This is assassination with Gottlieb, I am11 sure.12 Mr. Baron. It then says: This purpose remains highest13 priority. Would that not indicate to the Chief of Station14 that he should proceed to find a way that Lumumba could be15 assassinated?16 Mr. Tweedy. What this would mean to the Chief of Station17 was that he should retain exploration of possible means of18 assassinating Lumumba as highest priority. He should continue19 to seek means to do this, not to do it.20 Mr. Baron. Again, you are maintaining you have just made21 yourself clear, as far as you were concerned, you were still22 asking him to explore and not implement at this point?23 Mr. Tweedy. Nothing else but.24 Mr. Baron. Who would have had access to or received25 distribution of the first cable we looked at which travelled in:# TOP SECRET