Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 42]
TOP SECRETget back to it. After the Six-Day War the Soviets sent outa barrage of propaganda in Arabic fto the Middle East fromAndio Moscow that the CIA -- and then mentioned Bill Harvey,who was working for us, and whom I had put in touch with theIsraelis during the Cuban business -- had met on a ship withMorris, the Chief of the British Intelligence, who had a back-ground in the war with the Israelis, and had met there and pre-pared and carried out all the strategic part of the Six-DayWar. And this is all PFIS. And there was a tremendous pikeof Soviet materials -- they never got much into our media, be-cause it is directed to the Middle East in Arabic, and whichobviously they knew.They used Harveys' name instead of my name, because pro-fessionally we were very close and more important,I had introduced Harvey as the only officer to the Israeli op-erational people on the Cuban business. And, therefore,it showed they had knowledge of Harvey's, and so on.The query then raised was whether the penetration washere or was it in Israel.Mr. Kirbow. Did you express any concern to Mr.Szulc about the use of Dr. Mann's name in this article?Mr. Angleton. Not Dr. Mann's name. My expression wasthat if you -- I said that article, false as it is, with themany things injected in it -- I will be very frank with you,I became scared of the thought, because, one, the story ofTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETthese two journalists was so implausable, and I looked overto Ben a few times -- and I know him well -- and he hadabsolutely a stoney expression, no expression on his face.And this was something very, very queer, and the whole thingwas initiated by him. And that was why I asked Mr. Szulc,did he come to you or did you come to him.Senator Baker. Did he come to you?Mr. Schwarz. He came to us.Senator Tower. Let me ask you one specific question,yes or no.Did you confirm to Szulc that during the late fiftiessubsequent to the Suez War that the CIA made available to theIsraeli Government technical assistance and the availabilityof one or more distinguished nuclear scientists or physicistsfor the purpose of developing atomic weapons?Mr. Angleton. That is completely false.Mr. Aaron Mr. Angleton, did you confirm or deny thatto Mr. Szulc?Mr. Angleton. I am stating that I never made any suchstatement And I stayed off of the nuclear businessMr. Aaron. So you didn't confirm and you didn't deny,is that correct?Mr. Angleton. It is very difficult for me to respondto that, because after all, this was a fast-moving discussioncovering an awful lot of subject. And furthermore, in theTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETback of my mind was the fact that we had problems withthe Israelis in the nuclear field.Mr. Aaron. What problems were those?Mr. Angleton. They were very sensitive problems. And I don't think that they really shed any light on things that you are talking about here.Mr. Aaron. Do you recall a conversation with me and Mr. Schwarz in which, in discussing this same matter, you said you felt under no obligation to either confirm or deny this story with Mr. Szulc?Mr. Angleton. Yes, I know I used that phrase. There was a denial. And I think that Wells would second the fact that there was a denial. But when I got down to a lot of the other questioning, my thinking was to try to lead him around back into the meeting with Hersh, and lead him back to this source that had to do with Sidney Gottlieb, and so on.Senator Tower. Are you saying in effect, then, that any questions he raised with you about the transfer of visual material or deeper technology, or manpower, for that matter, to the Israeli Government, was couched in circumlocutry terms of some kind?Mr. Angleton. I will put it this way.Senator Tower. That you got no direct questions of that sort?Mr. Angleton. I would say this to you, Senator. WhenTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 45]
TOP SECRETI left there -- and I think this is a very important point -- first, I will have to explain we went to the restaurant, he invited us to the restaurant, he was insistent on it. And we went there. And here in the restaurant the entire discussion was a recapitulation by him, in a restaurant that was fairly full of people. Hersh was a person who had requested a secret meeting in Wells' house, and then proceeded in a restaurant to regurgitate this entire matter.Senator Tower. Which restaurant was it?Mr. Angleton. It was the Sea Catch.Senator Baker. Did you ever have any impression that it might be recorded, is that what you are driving at?Mr. Angleton. I don't know. The thought crossed my mind. I looked at him, and he sort of -- he could hide a lot of things.And so we got back to Wells' house. And it was very late. And he tried to get me to come back to his place. And I told him I just wouldn't do it. And that is how the thing broke up.Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Angleton, in your long relationship and position with the Agency, did you ever express your concern to anyone out there that you thought this might have been a setup by a foreign source, or from internally?Mr. Angleton. What might be a setup?Mr. Kirbow. That this whole Szulc interview, story andTOP SECRET
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NBRTOP SECRET1 everything else.2 Mr. Angleton. I never discussed this with anybody3 in the Agency until we had this lunch.4 Senator Baker. Do you suspect that now?5 Mr. Angleton. I do not -- I don't know what to suspect,6 because I don't have access to files. And I think one has7 to review a lot of material. I think one has to review8 Szulc's files.9 Mr. Miller. You spoke of that earlier, you described10 it as a dossier.11 Mr. Angleton. Well I think there is a file on it, a12 security file. I think he was one of the journalists, the13 first one, who made a reputation for blowing the whole Bay of14 Pigs, and so on. And I think the fact that he is foreign-15 born, and the allegations and so on And so the Bureau has16 a similar file And many of these files are created -- and17 they get to be accredited to the Pentagon, and therefore a18 routine security check is made.19 Mr. Schwarz. Are you aware of any surveillance of20 Mr. Szulc?21 Mr. Angleton. No.22 Mr. Schwarz. Past surveillance?23 Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I am not aware of it.24 As I say, I don't think I have ever seen his file for five or25 ten years.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETMr. Kirbow. In your official capacity in the CIA you never had any occasion to cross Mr. Szulc's trail or consider him as a person --Mr. Angleton. I separated him once in a fight with a friend of mine.Mr. Kirbow. But nothing in an official capacity?Mr. Angleton. No.Mr. Miller. Let me ask another question on this file matter.You said that to your knowledge there were files on Mr. Szulc. Were there files on other newspapermen?Mr. Angleton. Yes, there are files on other newspaper men.Mr. Miller. And other Americans?Mr. Angleton. A lot of them.Senator Baker. Hersh wrote a story about -- what did he say -- 7,000 files. Was that right or wrong?Mr. Angleton. I think it would be many more. I have never counted them.Senator Baker. How many? A hundred thousand a million?Mr. Angleton. Well, when you consider all visa checks -- and we do 500,000 visa checks on foreigners -- and the question of American sponsors and so on -- this thing on all of this is a question of the gradual deterioration of our efficiency, because our staff was cut in half, and we had the problemsTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 of the Watergate, and we had all of these things. And so a2 great deal of this stuff was there, but it wasn't being pro-3 Fessionally worked upon.4 Senator Baker. You have mentioned the Watergate twice,5 Mr. Angleton.6 Can you shed any light on that period in the Agency's7 life, the impact that the Watergate investigation had or any8 involvement of the Agency in any of the so-called9 Watergate affairs?10 Mr. Angleton. Of the Agency itself?11 Senator Baker. Or anybody connected with it.12 Mr. Angleton. I am sorry, sir, that is a debatable13 question there, and I want get it accurate.14 What was that again?15 Senator Baker I don't want to narrow it. I want to make16 it broad.17 Mr. Angleton. I want to make sure I understand you.18 Senator Baker. There are two parts of the question.19 One, do you know of any Agency involvement of those who were20 working in the working with the AGency in the Watergate,21 in your break-in or the preparation for the cover up or the22 attempted cover-up?23 Mr. Angelton. My answer on that is, I do not. And24/9by that I am separating the midnight channel 26 things and the25 newspapers. I know Jim McCord extremely well.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETSenator Baker. Are you aware of the letters that McCord wrote to the DCI after the Watergate suggesting how you could avoid having this blamed on the Agency?Mr. Angleton. I am aware of what was in the press.And Paul Nabami recently died who wrote those letters, and it made great sense to me, and I had personal relationships beyond an official relationship.Senator Baker. He wrote two to Gaynor and three to Helms.Mr. Angleton. I didn't know.Senator Baker. I believe so.Mr. Angleton. In any event, I can say that Gaynor's connection, because he had great trust in Gaynor -- and he was a very stubborn man and he left the AGency on conviction, I assume, or troubles in the Office of Security.Senator Baker. In connection with Watergate?Mr. Angleton. He left much earlier.Mr. Miller. He being McCord?Mr. Angleton. Yes.Mr. Miller. Why did he leave?Mr. Angleton. I don't know. And I was really surprised that he didn't come by and say goodbye.Senator Baker. Was he a prominent official at the Agency?Mr. Angleton. He was not.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 50]
TOP SECRETSenator Baker. Did he have a prominent responsibility?Mr. Angleton. He was a man that had a very difficult case abroad, which meant that it had to be buried, no leakages. And Rused him twice, and one was a pretty lengthy use of him. And he followed instructions to the letter. He strayed on the one. And it is not important. It is just something that he did something that wasn't very wise.Senator Baker. Doyou know why he went into the Watergate Complex?Mr. Angleton. I can't understand it, because I would say it was ideological with him. There wasn't any difficulty in understanding his views on a given subject.Senator Baker. The equipment that was used, I am told, was a fairly primitive sort for that sort of operation.Does that agree with your appraisal of him?Mr. Angleton. That is what I read. And that surprised me also, because as a rule -- let me put it this way, what I am saying is, it was the Soviets who made an allegation that in a certain country very close to us they were using a laser beam on a window of the Minister of Defense, and acquiring everything.So, instead of using anybody in the clandestine side. I took McCord and the group and sent them to that country for six or seven weeks to work on it. So, McCord has great knowledge of the -- he knows the counter electronics. AndTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETto know that you have got to know the other.Senator Baker. He was familiar with the most exotic source of intelligence gathering?Mr. Angleton. Precisely.And that is why I can't understand -- I mean, if the papers are correct in what they have stated, although many of the sources were people who also sell electronic equipment.Senator Baker. I don't want to lead you too far away from the original subject. But I would be interested in knowing what if any information you can give us about the Oswald situation.For instance, does the Agency keep a file, or does it have a file on Lee Harvey Oswald?Mr. Angleton. They have a file. They have, I think, more than one. I think they have a subject file, and in that they have all the documentation that went to the Warren Commission through Mr. Raymond Rocca, who is my deputy.And then there is a lot of undigested material that was brought out after the Warren Commission.Senator Baker. Was there ever any inquiry? Or do you have any opinion as to whether Oswald was a Soviet Agent?Mr. Angleton. Yes, I have a very strong opinion. I know the time factor, I will try to shorten this.But I tried to prevail on Mr. Dulles that there should not be -- that there should be a statement to the effect that the Commission, in the life of the Commission -- that these areTOP SECRET
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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000TOP SECRET1 the conclusions on the available evidence. But given the fact2 that the Soviet Government has a Department 13, which is under3 the Central Committee, who is taxed with the assassination of4 Western Leaders, that the door is open, and that is for future5 generations to speculate. So that it would not be closing the6 door, that it would really mean the investigation would be7 pursued.8 Senator Baker. John McCone, as I remember, was9 queried once on whether we could establish the bona fides of10 certain people, including Oswald.11 Mr. Angleton. And Nosenko.12 Senator Baker. Was there any advice by you at that13 time to McCone or other wise that the bona fides of that14 Soviet person or of Oswald ought not to be stated in cate-15 gorical terms?16 Mr. Angleton. During the period of the Warren Commission17 we prevented as far as we could any information from Nosenko18 going under the record, on a question of bona fides.19 Senator Baker. Why?20 Mr. Angleton. Because we didn't regard him as bona fides.21 Senator Baker. What did you regard him as?22 Mr. Angleton. We thought he was a dispatch agent who23 was sent to mutilated the leads of very high grade Soviets24 whom we had acquired prior to that.25 Senator Baker. To mutilate leads relating to the KennedyTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 assassination?2 Mr Angleton. Relating to assassination, KGB agents,3 Vassily, the British agents, and many agents in France, a4 alleged penetration in the U.S., et cetera.5 Senator Baker. And did McCone accept your advice?6 Mr. Angleton. He did, except that I understood that7 a lot of it has been declassified. And when he gave this8 interview recently with Shor, I called his executive officer9 Elder and I asked him, and he said, who in the Agency ever10 alleged to McCone that we now had re-established the bona fides?11 And I said, he is an old man and doesn't think too12 well, et cetera, and don't give me that stuff.13 And he said, well, I will give it to you.14 And I never heard from him since. But McCone was a man15 whowould not have made this statement. He has total recall.16 Senator Baker. I am sure he does.17 Do you have an opinion as to whether or not Oswald was18 infact a Soviet agent?19 Mr. Angleton. Well, let me put it this way.20 I don't think that the Oswald case is dead. There are too21 many leads that were never followed up. There's too much in-22 formation that has been developed later.23 For example, in 1966, in a Soviet book on Cuba there is24 a photograph of Khrushchev, a photograph of Castro, a photograph25 of a man called Alexiev, real name Shettov, KGB, with the firstTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 Soviet Ambassador to Havana, and a man named Leontov, who was the Soviet KGB operational man in Mexico. When the Mexican2 police arrested Castro as a student, they found in his note-3 books the name of Leontov, KGB, Mexico.4 Now, photographs 61, and so on, are in a KGB journal for5 Soviet citizens abroad. It is a bible, 75 percent KGB staff.6 Photograph of Brezhnev, Castro, Alexiev, Leontov.7 Now, we had a double agent after the assassination,8 who made a number of allegations that he acquired from the9 Chief of KGB, Mexico, Yatskov and he was a superior of Leontov.10 Now, after the assassination Khrushchev was in Cairo on a state visit. And he pulled an American journllist aside, and totally11 out of context, expressed the view that there was a con-12 spiracy, and it involved the Right Wing of the U.S.13 The thingwas totally out of context. And he planted this bug in this fellow's ear.14 WE had double agents who stated that the KGB put all of15 their personnel for six months on working on the assassina-tion, and had concluded that an American Right Wing business under Johnson was to succeed in power. And I am not talking about petty informants. I am talking about men whowere ascertained members of the KGB and part of the Soviet elite.16 And I can multiply that. Those cases, those leads have never been followed up. One is because of lack of manpower.17 Two, the general problem in Washington and the governmentTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 that there is no forum which can adjudicate issues in the2 intelligence community of a counter-intelligence nature.3 I may have allegations, very firm, that relate to somebody in4 high office. But there isn't anyone, ombudsman or somebody, to5 whom you can go with the information and talk to the Soviets and6 pull the bureau and ourselves and everybody together.7 Senator Baker. Could you give us at your leisure a memor-8 andum of your recommendations in that respect, how that might9 be constituded?10 Mr. Angleton. It would not be a pleasant one. I have11 submitted -- and I don't think it is breaking any confidence12 such a memorandum to the Commission. And I have submitted13 a personal letter to the Vice Prsident. And my whole plea14 was that my days were numbered, but regardless, that in and15 beyond the life of that Commission, that in his position as16 Vice President he had a rare opportunity the first time these17 matters were ever aired, and that the disaster of Hoover's death,18 and Gray, and the Watergate and so forth, has destroyed the19 counter-intelligence forces.20 And this added thing of Hersh has about dealt the final21 blow.22 Senator Baker I hate to interrupt you, and I also hate23 to ask you this question, but can you make an evaluation of24 the effectiveness of the Agency in particularly its counter-25 intelligence activities at this time?TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETMr. Angleton. Very, very poor.I have put in there, and I think it is very conservative, that it has put us back 20 years. But I think in the eyes of every intelligence service in the Western World, where we have had the leadership and we pulled everything together, and where they have looked to us for guidance and for traces and for understanding, that we have lost all of our prestige.Senator Baker. Two more quick questions, and I will yield my turn.Do you know of or have any substantial information about Russian KGB. activities in the U.S. *such as the infiltration* of Congressional offices?Mr. Angleton. There isa whole history of information that relates to the past and to modus operandi and to targets, and so on. And that is inclusive of all the American life, and in particularly visits to the Soviet Union, and so on. Thereare communications intelligence more sensitive which was broken during and after the war, KGB communications, New York to Moscow, and Washington to Moscow, et cetera. And there were cryptnyms given. And it runs into hundreds of thousands of messages, of which a small percentage have been broken.And they relate to Hiss and many things. And most of those cases will not be subject to prosecution, because they would not be admissible. And there are a lot of problems there. We have worked on it, and we brought the British, the# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 57]
TOP SECRETCanadians, and New Zealanders and Australians, because we have this common denominator of the military and other agreements where they do share common information. And there are many unresolved cases.Senator Baker. Do you know of any cases though, dealing with penetration of a Congressional office?Mr. Angleton. No. But my statement doesn't mean anything because I can assure you that it is the last thing I have been concerned with in some months. But I have seen these allegations in the paper, I wouldn't be surprised. And this is the second time in my life, or the third time, I have ever been here. To come here and see how this whole set up is is quite a shock.Senator Baker. What about communications intercept, Congressional conversations, are you aware of any methodical effort by the Russians or the KGB vis-a-vis Congressional telephone conversations?Mr. Angleton. Absolutely. I think -- I am assuming now that the people in NSR are correct, they usually are, that the telephone, the formal telephone company traffic apparently, without the knowledge of the caller, is quickly shifted to microwave. That runs into hundreds of thousands of telephone callsNow, I used to be quite deeply involved in the penetration of embassies, and so forth, in my youth. And itTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 is a fingernail, arm and body affair. It takes an awfulllong time before you finally get into a code room and aplace where you can do something securely.What I am trying to say is that if you get enoughdepth on any target or any installation you begin to know muchmore about that installation than anybody who occupies it.Senator Baker. If I were trying to confirm the rumorthat the KGB had the capability and did in fact record as manyas 30 or 40 thousand simultaneous telephone conversations,mostly related to governmental officials, and transmitted themto the Soviet Union, and kept individual files on them, wouldyou confirm that for me?Mr. Angleton. I would state that that is absolutely inmy view correct. And I would say that the man who technicallycould respond to that would be Dr Lou Tordello, a retiredChief of NSA who is now, I think, still a consultant there.And he is probably amore sophisticated person to relate the pro-ducts of NSA to the realities of the question you asked.And I think the other point I would make is simply thatwhat their KGB has, which we never will have, is manpower.In other words, we have to narrow the size of the target someday the way the British did, and expel that 105,Our State Department says that what happened inEngland has no relevancy here, because we have had a differentsetup, because among those expelled men who served in Washington,TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETand who weren't in the U.K., were those who were on the Anglo-American Desk, which meant that there was an American whom they had handled in Washington who had been transferred to London where the case officer follows the agent. And that statement, official statement, was put out without any consultation with the Bureau or ourselves. So, we are living in a dream world here in terms of Soviets, and time is short, it is detente, and it is all the *fallacious* kind of discussions and arguments one hears on the subject. We have come to detente for information through operations and our understanding of it, not wishful thinking.And our views are shared by professionals all through the Western World. And they laugh at the U.S. in terms of what detente has done. But what it has done to the intelligence services, or to the FBI, the FBI is only a shadow of what it once was. And so there isn't any real internal security protection.The Bureau's problems -- and I had the case of a KGB officer threatening one of the people we are dealing with in the Mid-west, he was from the United Nations a young KGB fellow. And I asked the Bureau, was he a ?And they said, we put him to bed.They didn't put him to bed, he was where he wasn't supposed to be. And I tried to get the department to go in with him. And I am still up there.TOP SECRET