Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 21]
TOP SECRET1 and told us to send this off, we had a development occur which2 it is not necessary for me to go into, it's still a relatively3 live case, in which proof positive came that he was a Soviet4 agent, and it was in the face of that proof positive that the5 Bureau moved in and interrogated him. And that is what prompted6 him to go to the Soviet embassy.7 And after some hours there he came out, he was asked why8 did you go to the Soviet embassy, and he said I went there to9 get my personal history and particulars regarding my family10 since those are the questions you have been asking me. In11 other words, instead of -- in this case the man had a wife12 who was having an affair off and on with a Japanese military13 person here -- instead of recruiting the Japanese and the wife14 to work in to him, because what we wanted was a confession,15 because the point I want to stress here is in a case of this16 sort, a penetration there, he is not there as a solo person.17 He is there as a spotter. He is a person used for entrapment18 abroad. He is a person who can originate an operation,19 induce you to go into the operation and bring in a weak20 element, and put them in a position for further recruitment.21 And I can stretch this on and on.22 And the classic example is the Philby case. Philby23 would have been Chief of British Intelligence. He was also24 identified positively in the end by this defector. When the25 defector first knew about it, it was called the Ring of FiveTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 22]
TOP SECRET1 in the Soviet intelligence, five people, Philby being one.2 But from the time he knew about it, in actual fact it3 was a ring that went into the twenties, because the purpose4 of the penetration is simply not to be a passive figure; it is5 to be an aggressive figure who creates situations for recruit-ment. And that case has never been prosecuted. The man has6 never confessed. He's never been broken. And yet it was in7 the heart of our SB, Soviet Division activities.8 Senator Hart of Colorado. Could you give us, back to the9 quantification, could you give us some figures for numbers of10 counterintelligence cases handled per year?11 Mr. Angleton. Scotty, you can.12 Senator Hart of Colorado. Just so we can have an idea13 of the magnitude of volume.14 Mr. Miler. Well, for example, one program that we had15 going was an attempt to record penetration recruitment attempts16 of U.S., American officials abroad, strictly abroad. And over17 a ten year period the number of attempts to recruit and18 penetrate hit close to 1200. So we were running around 250 or19 so a year, just in that one small area of counterintelligence20 concern.21 The number of cases that we had would vary, but I would22 say that from defectors in the last ten year, from Soviet23 and Soviet Bloc defectors, we averaged around 150 cases a24 year. At one time -- I do know that at one time we had over25 TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 23]
# TOP SECRET1 500 active cases which required investigation.2 We were concerned with approximately 140 to 160 double3 agent operations a year. We had investigations which would4 probably have a range, 25 to 30, significant investigations5 that were going on, in addition to which we would have a6 number of investigations, leads and operations with cooperative7 foreign intelligence and security services which would probably8 hit an average of about 50, if you would.9 There were other operations which were generated from other10 investigations and so forth, leads from the FBI, leads from11 the military services, which would perhaps hit 30 or 4012 a year.13 Senator Hart of Colorado. What about the number of cases14 involving penetration, successful or otherwise, of the Agency15 itself?16 Mr. Angleton. Well, the basic responsibility would be17 the Office of Security. In other words, we would work with18 them, but it tends to be a one way street, as it should be,19 namely, they are responsible for personnel and for installations.20 But from the one defector alone, I would say there were five21 hard leads.22 Senator Hart of Colorado. Over what period of time?23 Mr. Angleton. Of this one defector who came out in24 December of '61. But his leads were going back to '51, 1951.25 Mr. diGenova. Is this the same defector with whom the# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 24]
TOP SECRET1 FBI has had no contact since 1965?2 Mr. Angleton. That's correct.3 Mr. diGenova. Has the Agency had any contact with him since 1965?4 Mr. Angleton. Yes, we've had it, but we've had our ups and downs.5 Mr. diGenova. And what have those ups and downs been attributable to?6 Mr. Angleton. Well, they are basic -- well, first, there are two different attitudes in the American intelligence community regarding defectors. One of them is to give them the harsh treatment and to treat them as second class citizens, and we actually have taken on more salvage cases in the Counterintelligence Staff and rehabilitated these people. In fact, we came into that case basically because the fellow had gone sour. And --7 Mr. Kirbow. Meaning he had failed to continue cooperating or was not giving you the right information?8 Mr. Angleton. That's right. Well, no, it was simply that he refused to cooperate any further, because one didn't appreciate the ideological reasons for his defection.9 So these ups and downs would go on -- I mean, we would have to change case officers because they would simply have a breakdown in communication.10 Mr. diGenova. Did the failure of the FBI to utilize thisTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 25]
TOP SECRET1 asset inhibit you in any way from using the asset or the Agency2 from utilizing it?3 Mr. Angleton. Absolutely, because so much of the infor-4 mation that we wanted to take up with him was also related to5 FBI information.6 Mr. diGenova. In other words, you needed access to7 information the FBI had, and you couldn't get it?8 Mr. Angleton. We could get it but they wouldn't give9 permission that their information would be submitted to him.10 Mr. diGenova. In other words, you had a third agency11 rule blocking you?12 Mr. Angleton. A third agency, also in the attitude.13 For instance, in one session in which I participated, the14 Bureau asked him to give the name of a source. He refused to15 give it on the grounds that the man was in the KGB, was a16 friend of his, and he didn't want that man's name ever to17 get back to the KGB because it would mean the man's life.18 And therefore he had a direct confrontation, refusing to give19 it, very understandable.20 Mr. diGenova. Was this lack of cooperation directly21 attributable to Mr. Hoover, to your knowledge?22 Mr. Angleton. no.23 Mr. diGenova. Was this problem ever brought to the24 attention of the President of the United States at any time?25 Mr. Angleton. No, but he raised it with the AttorneyTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 26]
TOP SECRET1 General Mr. Kennedy, he had a direct meeting with him.2 Mr. diGenova. And what, if anything, happened?3 Mr. Angleton. Only encouragement.4 Mr. diGenova. Could you amplify on that?5 Mr. Angleton. Well, the Attorney General handled him6 very well indeed, but nothing further came out of it.7 Mr. diGenova. But there was no commitment on the part of8 the Attorney General to see if he could budge: Mr. Hoover to9 assist the Agency?10 Mr. Angleton. Well, the issue didn't come up in that11 fashion, just the general, the general agreement that he was12 prepared to work for the United States at the highest level,13 because the intelligence he had went far beyond simply KGB.14 It went into Soviet policy. It went into Soviet reorientation.15 It went into Soviet Bloc. It went into Soviet defense matters.16 It went into some of the major secrets. And therefore it wasn't17 simply counterintelligence. It had to do with policy or18 political action.19 He knew, for example, the identity of a Prime Minister20 who was a Soviet agent, who at that time was trying to get us21 to go into several political arrangements, and he knew22 exactly how he was recruited and how he was being used as an23 agent of influence.24 So these were matters that went beyond simply intelligence25 scope.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 27]
TOP SECRET241 Mr. Kirbow. How long is a man like that good for, Mr.2 Angleton? I mean, by this time, or a decade from now, a lotof that information is of no longer any value to you.4 Mr. Angleton. So, that's not so. It is a fact that the5 man has a computer mind. In other words, if you took all of6 his interrogation reports, they ran to some 20 filing cabinets.7 You try to have anyone retain in their mind, to apply that8 same data against a new problem that comes up, it requires an9 individual who lived that to be able to look at a case that10 has arisen, and he knows the case officer on the Soviet side,11 and he can give an analysis that this fellow was on the Scandi-12 navian desk and that he was promoted to this, and that his13 background is ciphers. He had not told you that he was ciphers14 before because it wasn't relevant. So it's a new, added15 factor.16 And then you find that someone is known17 as a code clerk, and therefore the pieces begin to fit18 together, that the man who was sent to the field by the Soviets19 to handle some unknown American is a cipher expert, and thereforeyou look among who are the code clerks.21 Mr. diGenova. I'd like to --22 Mr. Miller. Could I interrupt just a moment?23 You spoke in this instance of 20 file cabinets from the24 interrogation of one defector.25 Mr. Angleton. Yes.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 28]
TOP SECRETMr. Miller. What kind of volume did you put together in your years in this activity? If this is the product of one interrogation, what kind of volume did you put together to make a workable capability?Mr. Angleton. Well, the first thing was to computerize everything, and the second was to break it out case by case, British cases, Australian cases, New Zealand cases, Dutch cases, Finnish cases, French cases, Italian cases, all the way on across the board, American cases; and then to take all of the data, all of the voluminous stuff that was pertinent to each of the leads, including the unknowns, in other words, Unknown 1, Unknown 2, Unknown 3, etc.So you had the ability to pick out a file on X subject or X individual, and there would be the direct quotation from the interrogation, and then whatever traces there were of follow-ups, action taken, dissemination, etc.Mr. Miller. Just to press that -- yes.Mr. Miler. I think your question is the total volume of the files that were available to the Counterintelligence?Mr. Miller. Yes. I was impressed by the fact that one interrogation yielded 20 file cabinets, and was wondering the total volume.Mr. Miler. What were the figures on the cases to read?Mr. Angleton. Well, I think I've already presented that once, but when we were dealing with the new management and itTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 29]
TOP SECRET1 was all this business of objectives and management by objectives,2 and the idea of changing Counterintelligence personnel every3 two years and new faces and open it all up and the rest of it,4 we ran a basic job on how many, if you took 20 cases that were5 imperative for a Counterintelligence officer to read, what the6 statistical side would be. Those 20 cases would run into enough7 linear footage, which according to the mathematicians in the8 Agency would take 22 man years to read, or if they were 1009 percent incorrect, 11 years to read. Those would be the 2010 basic counterintelligence cases.11 And the purpose of it was simply to show that it was a12 profession, and that there had to be longevity to build up13 Counterintelligence officers.14 Mr. Johnson. Generally speaking, within the counterintelli-15 gence organizations, it seems to you perform four activities:16 liaison, research, operations and security.17 Could you give us an idea of your own priorities in18 terms of distributing manpower across those four activities?19 Can you break it out that way?20 Mr. Angleton. Well, it is difficult to break out, but21 the primary thing of all is the question of penetration in the22 U.S. Government, and then in allied governments. That would he23 my priority. In other words, when we had a defector from the24 Cuban service who had information of an agreement made between25 the KGB and the DGI in Cuba to work against the U.S. and howTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 30]
TOP SECRET1 they would differentiate the priorities, and areas where the2 KGB was oversurveilled, the DGI would take over the surveillance3 of our personnel and so on.4 The moment this defector arrived in the United States, I5 sent Scotty to the airport immediately to see him because that's6 the number one priority. Here was an individual whose job7 was to work on Americans and who allegedly had seen information8 from one of our embassies. Now, that is the highest priority,9 and particularly because information of a counterintelligence10 nature is perishable. Some is and some isn't.11 The moment there is a defector, the opposition runs a12 damage report. So you know certain information will be known13 to them immediately that is compromised, and they will take14 action to correct it. But there are certain secrets that the15 man knows that their damage report will not turn up. Those16 you put on the back burner. But the ones you reach for first17 are those that are perishable, and this is -- the priority is18 established by the fact that here is a live, highly valuableforce, and we only have so much time to extract the cream off19 of him and determine those things that would disappear.20 Mr. Miler. But the whole thrust of all of our operations,21 research, analysis, everything, was toward that goal. And much!22 of the reason for the security of the compartmentation for23 the CI activity was to protect that concern.24 Mr. Lombard. I wonder if I could ask a question concerningTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 31]
TOP SECRET1 the Bureau.2 Would it help today if there was a separate Bureau under3 the Attorney General for counterintelligence, separate from the4 FBI?5 Mr. Angleton. You are posing the same problem that the6 RCMP in Canada had. In other words, they set up, I might add7 because of us, because we brought them into counterintelligence8 in a way they had never been brought into it, we brought them9 down when this first defector, this major defector came out,10 and the cases that were revealed to them, cryptonyms, telegrams11 that were taken from them, an ambassador who was recruited,12 one of their ambassadors and all this, led in time to the13 Canadian Prime Minister desiring to set up a special counter-14 intelligence. And so they had this problem of how you take15 a law enforcement force and what do you do about it. And16 their ultimate decision was that you had to keep it within the17 RCMP. You created the separate office, and you created sort18 of a director general of it, but the cadre, your people came19 from the regular force, even though they are separated from20 the rest of the RCMP, and they are independent of the Commissioner21 of the RCMP. I mean, they are there for rations and quarters.22 Mr. Lombard. I guess what I had in mind was more the23 British model of the Yard having --24 Mr. Angleton. Well, the British model is the most25 overexaggerated model in the world. I think I can quiteTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 32]
TOP SECRET1 honestly state that since World War II the British have nevercaught an agent where the lead didn't come from us or somebodyelse. It was never self-generated.Now, in the last year or so maybe they caught an agent,but up until that time they have never caught an agent.Mr. Lombard. So your answer, in effect, would be thatthe counterintelligence function should stay within the Bureau.Mr. Angleton. That is correct. I mean, not that it'sideal, but in terms of the realities, in terms of the realitiesit should be kept within the Bureau. It should, be greatlyenlarged, and the head of that should be, in my view, a DeputyDirector of the Bureau.Mr. Lombard. All right.Now, let me ask you this. In your experience were thereproblems where the law enforcement impded the running ofcounterintelligence or counterespionage operations domestically?In other words, were there times when you would have liked tohave run an agent domestically for a longer period of timein order to get the rest of the guys, but they said no, we'vegot to take this fellow to court now?Mr. Angleton. That used to be prevalent back in the '50s.Today I don't think they've got many cases. I mean, I don'tthink that the job is being done, not in the last ten years.Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, when I asked you earlierwhat your priorities were, you mentioned making sure thatTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 33]
TOP SECRET1 we were not penetrated in conducting investigations to see if2 in fact we were, which seems to give the impression that we3 are defensively oriented, and that was your main priority.4 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that how could you have it5 any other way?6 If you've got a cryptonym of telegrams disappearing and7 are in possession of the opposition --8 Mr. Johnson. But isn't the aggressive dimension even9 more important and trying to penetrate the hostile service?10 Mr. Angleton. Those are all kind of theoretical arguments11 to my way of thinking.12 Mr. Miler. You have to know what you're penetrating first.13 Mr. Angleton. I mean, this idea of running operations is14 not really understood.15 To run a double agent operation requires a tremendous16 amount of manpower. It is a commitment that very few people17 understand. If you are going to run a double, I mean, to start18 from the beginning, you've got to be able to keep a diary.19 Now, one is the real life is the real life of the agent and20 the other is his double life, because you can have a question21 from his headquarters that says, that agent you had three22 years ago, would you please go back to him. You've got to23 be able to read into a diary of the fictional life in order24 to answer that question.25 Now, this takes manpower. You've got to have meetings.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 34]
TOP SECRET1 You've got to be able to satisfy the questionnaires, and you2 can go all the way on down the line. This ties up thousands of3 man-hours.4 Mr. Johnson. Could you explain that "satisfy the5 questionnaires?"6 What does that phrase mean, "satisfy the questionnaires?"7 Mr. Angleton. The opposition wants to know, find out8 from your sources the following questions.9 Mr. Miler. In other words, the requirements they put10 on the agent.11 Mr. Angleton. Now, that agent is allegedly in the CIA12 and there is a penetration, then you are just going through13 games, and they will play such an operation. They could have14 a very senior penetration into the Agency and play along on15 a double in order to lead you to believe that they do not have16 a penetration. And they can tie up your manpower and put17 doubles underneath him and another agent, and they can give18 him a radio set, and with the radio set they can give him19 crystals, and he needs other crystals, and it involves more20 and more of your own personnel and manpower. And you can21 tie up NSA monitoring all the links.22 And so this idea that has all of a sudden been novel and23 newly discovered in the Agency that Counterintelligence must24 be aggressive is in my view a joke. It's a joke.25 Mr. Miler. You have to know what you're dealing with.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 35]
TOP SECRET321 You have to understand the enemy intelligence service before2 you're going to penetrate it, and you have to be secure from3 penetration yourself, and you then have to run that penetration4 very securely and on a very compartmented basis.5 Mr. Angleton. And there is one added proviso, then, that6 you can only run a first rate double agent if you have a7 source superior to him that he is unaware of. In the war,8 when we broke the German code, it was no problem to run German9 double agents because we could read their messages back to10 their headquarters, re-enciphered, and the headquarters messages11 back to the control, back to our double. So questions of12 danger signals, questions of alerting him that he was under13 control and so on was taken care of because of communications14 intelligence.15 When you don't have communications intelligence, then16 the only other source that is superior is penetration, that is,17 somebody who can read back from their headquarters how they are,18 in fact, absorbing the thrust of that double agent. And those19 conditions do not exist for the Bureau or for ourselves.20 Mr. Miler. Or for the military services, to run a lot21 of double agents.22 Mr. Angleton. I mean, they do not have the superior23 source of control over double agents.24 Senator Hart of Colorado. Why is that?25 Mr. Angleton. Because they are one, not breaking codes, orTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 36]
TOP SECRET1 they don't have the penetrations in the opposition against whomyou run the double.2 Senator Hart of Colorado. But what is the prescription?3 Does that mean we can't do that or we aren't, or what?4 Mr. Angleton. Well, we haven't succeeded. I mean, we5 have had Popov and Penkosky, and both of them are dead. Theywere shot.6 Mr. Johnson. It must be easier to penetrate the so-called7 Third World than it is the so-called Soviet Bloc.8 Mr. Angleton. Absolutely.9 Mr. Miler. But that's not getting you exactly what you10 want or need either. And you can divert an awful lot of time,11 effort and manpower to running what in essence would eventually12 boil down in a year or two years to operations for operations'sake. It will look good in statistics. It will justify your13 budget request to the OMB. It will justify your counterintelligence effort in terms of management objectives, because you've14 increased from 22 double agent operations to 46 last year, but15 what is the net result, and how much time, effort and so forthare you actually using, and where are you losing focus on16 what the real problems are facing the country in terms ofpenetration and in terms of knowledge and in counterintelligence:17 Mr. diGenova. The picture which both you and Mr. Angleton18 paint this new face of counterintelligence from your point of19 view is a rather gloomy one because your comments seem toTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 37]
TOP SECRET1 indicate that you believe that this decentralization, lack of2 compartmentation and in general, spreading the counterintelligence3 function around is eventually going to lead to a breakdown in4 the end product. We're not going to be getting what we should5 be getting. You may be getting bigger statistics, and on the6 face it may look like we're getting more, but in fact we're7 not.8 Mr. Miler. You're not going to get substance.9 Mr. diGenova. Why was that decision made? That seems to10 be so fundamentally apparent by the way you explain it? Surely11 the Director must have made that decision for a reason?12 Do you know why?13 Mr. Angleton. Mr. Miler has known him more than -- longer14 than I have. Would you?15 Mr. Miler. Yes, I'll offer my opinion on it.16 Mr. diGenova. We would like to have it.17 Mr. Miler. The basic reason is that neither the current18 director nor the incumbent DDO understand or perceive of what19 counterintelligence actually is and what function it has, and20 what the CIA's responsibility is for counterintelligence to21 the nation. That is my personal opinion. They do not -- they22 have not had experience in counterintelligence. They've never23 worked in counterintelligence. And quite frankly, they do not24 understand the problems involved in counterintelligence.25 Counterintelligence, as articulated previously by theTOP SECRET