Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 51]
TOP SECRET1 The Chairman. I think that since the point is impor-2 tant, that when the Committee Staff complete its review of the3 evidence it ought to be reminded to look closely at that Helms4 testimony and identify exactly what words Helms might have5 used to describe his relationship with Robert Kennedy.6 Senator Baker. And the time involved and what position7 Helms occupied at the time.8 The Chairman. I have another question.9 Mr. Bundy, we also have it from Mr. Bissell that at one10 time he called in an officer, a subordinate, O'Donnell, --11 that at one time Mr. Bissell called in a subordinate whose12 name was Mr. O'Donnell, and asked Mr. O'Donnell if he would13 be willing to undertake the assassination of Mr. Lumumba.14 Mr. O'Connell testifies that he said he would not be15 willing to undertake the assassination of Mr. Lumumba, because16 he had moral compunctions against killing.17 Mr. O'Donnell further testifies that he was then or18 thereafter dispatched to the Congo, where he was informed that19 some poison had been made available -- had come to the CIA20 headquarters in the Congo.21 Mr. Bundy. I am sorry, I missed that last.22 The Chairman. He was informed that some poison had23 arrived at the CIA headquarters in the Congo.24 When we asked Mr. Bissell on what authority he had asked25 O'Connell as to his willingness to undertake the assassinationTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 52]
TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-60001 of Lumumba, he could not provide us with that authority,2 except to say that he may have done it on his own initiative.3 Do you have any reaction to that?4 Mr. Bundy. Where is it in time?5 Senator Church. It was in the fall of 1960. It was6 not during the Kennedy Administration, it preceded the Kennedy7 Administration. But I asked you the question, because it8 strikes me as being a very disturbing piece of testimony, that9 any man so positioned, in the CIA could not identify higher10 authority for such an action, and would under oath say that it11 might have been on his own initiative.12 Mr. Bundy. I can't add to your comment on that, Mr.13 Chairman.14 The Chairman. Very well.15 Senator Morgan. Let me ask him a question or two, Mr.16 Chairman.17 The Chairman. Senator Morgan?18 Senator Morgan. Mr. Bundy, you recall very vividly19 talking with the President on many occasions about Cuba,20 is that right?21 Mr. Bundy. I recall vividly that I talked to him on many22 occasions, I am not very good on remembering specific dis-23 cussions.24 Senator Morgan. You told us a few minutes ago that he was25 constantly prodding, and why don't you do this, and why doesn'tTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 53]
TOP SECRET1 so and so work?2 Mr. Bundy. If I may correct that, I said he prodded me3 from time to time, not all the time.4 Senator Morgan. Quite frequently?5 Mr. Bundy. I wouldn't put it that often. It might have6 been three or four times.7 Senator Morgan. Mr. Bundy, you were head of the Security8 Council, you were his assistant?9 Mr. Bundy. I am trying to give an accurate picture of10 the number of times, Senator.11 Senator Morgan. You are trying to give such an accurate12 picture that you are not giving much of a picture at all.13 Are you telling this committee that throughout the time14 you assumed your duties, throughout the Cuban crisis, and all15 the MONGOOSE operations, that you might have talked to him two16 or three times about it?17 Mr. Bundy. No.18 Could I separate and try and clarify my answer?19 Senator Morgan. Yes.20 Mr. Bundy. I talked to the President, I suppose, many,21 many times in the context of the events that led up to and22 followed the Bay of Pigs. I talked to him dozens of times,23 maybe even hundreds of times, in the context of the events that24 led up to and followed the Cuban missile crisis. Those are the25 two great moments of Presidential concern over Cuba during theTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 54]
TOP SECRET521 time I was in Washington. I talked to him much less -- I can't2 give you a number-- on these intervening matters. And that is3 the distinction I am trying to make.4 Senator Morgan. You were something between himself and5 the National Security Council, were you not?6 Mr. Bundy. That isn't exactly the way it works.7 Senator Morgan. Just tell me what did you do.8 Mr. Bundy. I am trying to.9 Senator Morgan. I have been listening all morning, Mr.10 Bundy, and I just don't get it.11 Let me go to one other question. Was it true a while12 ago when you said that Robert Kennedy was constantly prodding13 people? Why can't we do more?14 Mr. Bundy. Yes, that is certainly true.15 Senator Morgan. I have no other questions.16 Senator Mondale. Could I ask one, Mr. Chairman?17 The Chairman. Senator Mondale.18 Senator Mondale. I don't like to ask this question,19 but I think it is important.20 Have you talked to others involved during this period21 when you may have been testifying before us and before the22 Rockefeller Commission, say, in the last five months about23 this testimony?24 Mr. Bundy. I answered that question. Yes, I have.25 Senator Mondale. Would you repeat it briefly for us?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 55]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Smothers. I was about to pursue that line,2 Senator Mondale.3 Senator Mondale. Go ahead.4 Mr. Smothers. I believe you indicated previously, Mr.5 Bundy, that you talked to Mr. Bissell, Mr. McNamara, Mr. McCone,6 Mr. Rostow, Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Schleinger, and others that may7 not be on that list. And you indicated that you had spoken to8 Mr. Bissell after his testimony regarding executive action.9 Mr. Bundy. That is right.10 Mr. Smothers. Had you spoken with him also before that11 testimony?12 Mr. Bundy. No.13 Mr. Smothers. Did he call you or did you call him?14 Mr. Bundy. I don't honestly recall. I think I said theother day that he had called me, but I think actually what16 happened that he called me, and my first words were, I needed17 to call you.18 Mr. Smothers. Can we go to your conversations with Mr.19 McNamara. When did you first talk with him about these matters20 being testified to?21 Mr. Bundy. I think pretty much as soon as it hit the papers.22 Mr. Smothers. Can you give the Committee the sense of23 your conversations with Mr. McNamara?24 Mr. Bundy. There have been a number of them. Mr.25 McNamara and I not only have been close friends, but are veryTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 56]
TOP SECRET541 closely associated now. So, I see him and talk with him fre-quently, both about substance of matters of internationaldevelopment, and about the business of the Ford Foundation.So, I have talked to him a number of times both on thetelephone and face to face. The essence of the conversationis the exploration of questions raised or doubts raised baboutthe conviction we both share, which is that no one in the KennedyAdministration, in the White House, or in the Capitol, evergave any authorization, approval, or instruction of any kindfor any effort to assassinate anyone by the CIA.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 57]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss with him, or did he raise2 with you specifically, the fact that he had received from3 Mr. McCone a memorandum from Mr. McCone in 196774 Mr. Bundy. Yes, he told me that.5 Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss the substance of that6 memorandum?7 Mr. Bundy. I discussed it initially with Mr. McCone.8 Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss it with Mr. McNamara?9 Mr. Bundy. He mentioned it to me. I don't recall much10 about it.11 Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss the meeting of August 1012 in Secretary Rusk's office?13 Mr. Bundy. That was the first discussed because the14 newspapers said that there had been a meeting of three, four15 or five of us, and the question was whether there had been16 such a meeting limited to three, four, or five. And we were able17 to satisfy ourselves that that was wrong.18 Mr. Smothers. That was wrong. What do you recall to19 have been Mr. McNamara's reaction of the August 10 meeting?20 Mr. Bundy. He didn't seem to have any that I can recall,21 at least I don't recall that he told me of any reaction of22 it.23 Mr. Smothers. Do you recall the substance of his24 comment regarding the 1967 McCone report?25 Mr. Bundy. No. I don't think he commented on it. HeTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 58]
TOP SECRET1 told me what it said.2 Mr. Smothers. With regard to your conversation with3 Mr. McCone, when did this occur, approximately?4 Mr. Bundy. That occurred earlieron.5 Mr. Smothers. Before the Rockefeller Commission inquiry?6 Mr. Bundy. I don't know exactly when it was. But it7 was within the context of the Rockefeller Commission8 inquiry and not this inquiry.9 Mr. Smothers. Are you talking about more than one10 conversation?11 Mr. Bundy. No, I think I talked to him on the phone12 and then I had a meeting with him.13 Mr. Smothers. In either the phone conversation or the14 meeting did you discuss Mr. McCone's 1967 report?15 Mr. Bundy. He told me that he had heard of it. I don't16 think he had then seen it.17 Mr. Smothers. You don't think he had then seen it?18 Mr. Bundy. He had then seen it as of 1975. He obviously19 saw it in 1967.20 Mr. Smothers. Can you give us a feeling for the approx-21 imate time when this conversation occurred?22 Mr. Bundy. I could probably work it out from my own23 calendar, but I don't have it in my head.24 Mr. Smothers. But at this time he had not seen the25 report?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 59]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Bundy. He had not seen the report in 1975. But2 since it is a report that as I understand it, it is a3 report that he made in 1967, and he had seen it then.4 Mr. Smothers. Did he indicate to you that he was.5 makinggan effort to get that report?6 Mr. Bundy. I think he told me that he had been in touch7 with the Agency and would be seeing the report, but I don't8 really recall.9 Mr. Smothers. To go into your conversation with Mr.10 Rostow, would you indicate to the Committee, please, the11 substance of that conversation?12 Mr. Bundy. Yes. I called him after my conversation13 with Mr. Bissell, because it seemed to me that he ought to14 be informed, and the two of them ought to talke with each15 other about that testimony.16 Mr. Smothers. At the time you called him it was your17 impression that Mr. Bissell had not talked with Mr. Rostow?18 Mr. Bundy. But was planning to.19 Mr. Smothers. And this was after Mr. Bissell's testi-20 mony?21 Mr. Bundy. That if right.22 Mr. Smothers. Did you and Mr. Rostow discuss the fact23 that both you and Mr. Rostow had been named as potential24 sources for the Exective Action authorization?25 Mr. Bundy. My emphasis in talking about Mr. Rostow wasTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 60]
TOP SECRET1 the fact that he had been mentioned, because it seemed to me2 that in my recollection that must be wrong, and he would be3 interested in getting it straightened out.4 Mr. Smothers. Can we go to your conversation with Mr.5 Goodwin. Did you call him or did he call you?6 Mr. Bundy. I called him.7 Mr. Smothers. And the nature of that conversation?8 Mr. Bundy. That conversation was about the Dominican9 Republic, because of my complete failure of recollection as10 to who or what the White House line of action, responsibility11 and concern was with respect to the Dominican Republic in12 1961. And I called him, and I called Dungan, and I called13 Schlesinger, because they were the the who had been very14 much involved in things like the Alliance for Progress, and15 new appointments to embassies in Latin America, and Latin16 American Policy generally, except for the Bay of Pigs. And17 I wanted to see if they had recollections about events in.18 that spring that were more extensive than mine. I didn't learn19 very much, but that was the purpose of the call.20 Mr. Smothers. And it it your testimony that your first21 exposure to the documentary evidence beyond these recollections22 was when either the Rockefeller Commission staff or this23 staff showed you documents pertaining to this inquiry.24 Mr. Bundy. I want to be precise about the Rockefeller25 Commission staff. They did not show me the documents, theTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 61]
TOP SECRET1 White House Staff showed me the documents.2 Mr. Smothers. The White House Staff showed you the3 documents?4 Mr. Bundy. Yes.5 Mr. Smothers. Under what circumstance did the White House6 Staff provide these documents to you? Was it at your request,7 or their request?8 Mr. Bundy. My request.9 Mr. Smothers. When did it occur?10 Mr. Bundy. At the time of the Rockefeller hearings.11 Mr. Smothers. At the time of the Rockefeller hearings?12 Mr. Bundy. Yes.13 Mr. Smothers. And prior to your testimony?14 Mr. Bundy. Yes.15 Mr. Smothers. Who provided these documents to you?16 Mr. Bundy. I never have testified on -- this is not a17 serious matter, because there is no secret about it. But I18 have always taken the position that White House decisions19 are for the White House to discuss, and I perfer to hold to20 that position now.21 Mr. Smothers. Are you saying that you do not feel at22 liberty --23 Mr. Bundy. No, I am not saying, I am saying that I would24 request the committee to address that question with the White25 House.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 62]
TOP SECRET1 The Chairman. What is the question?2 Mr. Smothers. The question is who in the White House provided Mr. Bundy with documents relevant to this investigation. And I believe his position is that he would prefer not to disclose that matter, or that that is a matter for the Committee's determination.7 Mr. Bundy. Let me explain, Mr. Chairman, because you were out of the room, that I have always taken the position that decisions of the White House are for the White House to discuss. I always asked permission to see documentation and permission was given. I looked at the document, but I would rather not discuss it, because I think it is for the White House to discuss it.13 The Chairman. What is the document?15 Mr. Bundy. I just described it, it is National Security Action Memorandum No. 1, we showed us the National Security Action file, which I believe your staff has.18 Mr. Schwarz. We have it here.19 Mr. Smothers. My question was, who had the request been made to, and showed him the document?21 Mr. Bundy. My point is that I have tried historically not to discuss this kind of question when it is something that concerns the White House, but to leave it to the White House to discuss it, and I would prefer to hold to that position.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 63]
TOP SECRET(Off the record.)Mr. Smothers. This quite frankly, Mr. Bundy, this related to an ancillary matter that is of concern to the Committee.You mentioned conversations with Mr. Schlesinger. Again, were those initiated by you?Mr. Bundy. The most recent one, he called me. And I think there were earlier ones, but I don't know. I can't be precise. I must say I don't know that I understand the line of questioning. These are very important matters, and people closely involved in them should be trying to get a clear sense of what each other remembers after this many years, it seems to me this would be entirely natural.Mr. Smothers. I don't question the fact that it is natural, Mr. Bundy. I think one of the difficult things for this Committee to do is to separate out, if you will, the independent recollections from the documentary evidence we have shown you, and from conversations with others --Mr. Bundy. You are quite right. And I have tried quite carefully to teil you my recollection.Mr. Smothers. We are merely trying now to establish those relationships so that when we get the point in the record there is some question regarding the nature of the recollection that might be of some assistance to us. That is not an attack on your veracity, it is not an attempt toTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 64]
TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-60001 see if there has been any effort at collusion or whatever,2 but merely to give us some guidelines in looking at the3 record.4 Do you recall, Mr. Bundy, from these conversations that5 we have just mentioned, any matters which have been raised6 by the participants that may be inconsistent with the7 documentary record as you have seen it? We know, of course,8 that Mr. McNamara's recollection appears to be inconsistent9 with the documentary evidence regarding the August 1010 meeting.11 Mr. Bundy. Well, so was mine. And I have no such12 recollection.13 Mr. Smothers. I am speaking. now of the recollection of14 others, if you will.15 Mr. Bundy. I can't really recite on that, because I16 haven't made the kind of comparison document by document17 and conversation by conversation that would allow me to make18 a clearcut and comprehensive answer. But I don't have any19 recollection of sharp divergency of that sort.20 The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz.21 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, I want to pick up on onething that you testified to that was left hanging and then22 come back through your involvement with Cuba and starting23 from the beginning. You testified that to your knowledge24 no authorization for an assassination was given. I want to25TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 65]
TOP SECRET1 come at the subject from another direction. Were you ever2 told at any time by anybody that assassination efforts were3 actually under way with respect to Mr. Castro?4 Mr. Bundy. Absolutely not.5 Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that the6 Central Intelligence Agency had hired the Mafia to assassinate7 Castro?8 Mr. Bundy. No.9 Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that during10 the MONGOOSE program Mr. Harvey was engaged in assassination11 efforts upon Fidel Castro?12 Mr. Bundy. No.13 Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that in the14 fall of 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency was passing15 assassination devices to a Cuban military officer?16 Mr. Bundy. No.17 Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that in the18 fall of 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency was engaged in19 an assassination effort with respect to Fidel Castro?20 Mr. Bundy. No.21 Mr. Schwarz. Now, after the Bay of Pigs, was there a22 reevaluation or reconsideration of what the policy toward Cuba23 should be? And would you turn in that connection to Tab B,24 of the Bundy Book 1 of 2 --25 Senator Tower. May I raise a purely technical point. ITOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 66]
TOP SECRET641 know it is not intentional, but I think we use the term, the2 Mafia was hired to assassinate Castro, I think that was3 inaccurate, because I don't think we have anything that4 indicates that we contacted the syndicate as such, and I think5 if we use, "individuals likely associated with the Mafia,"6 or something like that -- it is a little technical.7 Mr. Schwarz. Let me restate the question to make sure8 that there is not a problem with the scope of my question.9 And Senator Tower is correct.10 Were you ever told that the Agency had contacted a man11 called John Roselli?12 Mr. Bundy. No.13 Mr. Schwarz. A man called Sam Giancana?14 Mr. Bundy. No.15 Mr. Schwarz. A man called Santos Traficante?16 Mr. Bundy. No.17 Mr. Schwarz. Any person who was a criminal or allegedly18 a criminal for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Castro?19 Mr. Bundy. No.20 Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection whatsoever21 related to the subject we have been exploring in that group22 of questions?23 Mr. Bundy. No -- you are familiar with the fact that --24 refreshed my recollection of activities associated with the25 Mafia in a law enforcement context in Florida in 1964.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 67]
TOP SECRETcb 111 Mr. Schwarz. Since you raised it, let's just pin that2 down right now. What happened in 1964 with respect to the3 Mavia and Cuba, to the best or your recollection? And then4 we will just mark some documents.5 Mr. Bundy. Let me be clear that my recollection here is6 entirely refreshed. Perhaps you would rather come back to7 it?8 Mr. Schwarz. Let's put it in the record here, since we9 have raised the subject.10 Let's mark as Bundy Exhibit 1 the Helms memo to DCA11 on the Cuban exile plan dated June 10, 1964.12 (Document referred to is marked as13 Bundy Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)141516171819202122232425TOP SECRETWARD & PAULPhone (Area 202) 544-6000410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 68]
# TOP SECRETcb12Phone (Area 202) 544-600066Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy Exhibit 2A, the minutes of the meeting of the 303 Committee dated June 22, 1964.(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 2A for identification.)7600090000WARD & PAUL410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 69]
TOP SECRETcb 13Phone (Area 202) 544-600067Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy Exhibit 2B the minutes of the303 Committee of 18 June 1964.(Document referred to is marked asBundy Exhibit No. 2B foridentification.)75000030509WARD & PAUL410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 70]
TOP SECRETMr. Schwarz. And Bundy Exhibit 2C the minutes of the303 Committee of July 31, 1964.(Document referred to is marked asBundy Exhibit No. 2C foridentification.)TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 71]
TOP SECRETMr. Schwarz. And as Bundy Exhibit 2D the memorandum for the Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, "Status of FBI Investigation re Plans by Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Cuban Government Leaders," dated August 19, 1964.(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 2D for identification.)TOP SECRET![photo of 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003]
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 72]
TOP SECRETMr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, based upon your having had an opportunity prior to the testimony, and now again if you seek to do so, to refresh your recollection, will you recount for the Committee what happened in the summer of 1964 in connection with this matter?Mr. Bundy. Well, it is a relatively small matter in the context of what you are discussing, but what happened in the summer of 1964 was that it came to our attention that there were relations between Cuban refugees in Cuba and people apparently associated with the Mafia. And this did not seem to be a good idea. And this was in a period in which sentiment had been steadily growing for some time against activities by Cuban refugees that were wholly outside the control and not really in the interest of the U.S., and that they should be associated with a criminal group.And so when the matter came to the Special Group, the decision was made to refer it to the Department of Justice as a matter of internal American law enforcement. That was done.And the Department said that it was going after the matter, which it then did, and reported back.The reports don't give any conclusive picture of what really was going on, but they do show that the Bureau went to a number of people asking around about these matters, and as far as I know, it then faded away.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 73]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Schwarz. In the context of that discussion did2 anybody from the Central Intelligence Agency or anybody3 else inform you that in earlier years there had been4 a relationship with -- to use Senator Tower's caution --5 with persons alledgedly involved with the criminal syndicate6 in order to accomplish the assassination of Fidel Castor?7 Mr. Bundy. No.8 Mr. Schwarz. Now, going back to the post-Bay of Pigs9 period, would you put before the witness and mark as Exhibit10 2 the National Security minutes of a meeting held May 5, 1961.11 It is at Tab B of the Senator's Book 1 of 2. This reflects,12 am I correct, Mr. Bundy, a discussion of Cuba, held with the13 President and high officials of the government who are all14 listed on the front page?15 Mr. Bundy. Correct.16 Mr. Schwarz. And Cuba was discussed, and it was17 agreed, following the discussion that U.S. policy toward Cuba18 should aim at the downfall of Castro, and that since the19 measures agreed below are not likely to achieve this end,20 the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to21 further action?22 Mr. Bundy. Right.23 Mr. Schwarz. Now, can you describe the measures agreed24 to at that point?25 Mr. Bundy. My only way of doing that with any accuracyTOP SECRET