Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10011-10092.pdf — page 3]
TOP SECRET1 Soviet defectors and peoplw who claim to be and have subse-2 quently been found to be legitimate defectors.3 MR. MARCHETEI: You mean found to be illegitimate4 defectors?5 MR. OLSEN: No, found to be legitimate defectors6 well, either way.7 MR. MARCHETTI: Well, they would turn up from time to8 time. Usually I didn't have any direct dealings. They were9 handled by the Clandestine Services. But you would know the10 case. There is the famous case of Olenevski (?) who is this11 Polish intelligence officer who said that he was a KGB plantin12 the Polish service, and he is the one that many people on the13 extreme right like to point to as having identified all kinds14 of agents within the US Government. Eventually I got to the15 point where the was taking out ads in the newspapers to the16 effect that he is the tsaravitch, he had survived the shooting,17 and the legal claim and the throne.18 At this point you don't know if the guy was nuts all19 along, and I don't know what the official thinking about it20 at the Agency is.21 But there have been anumber of others over the years.22 There is Golonevski23 MR. OLSEN: How do you spell his name.24 MR. MARCHETTI: G-O-L-O-N-E25 These names are a matter of record. You will haveTOP SECRET
[157-10011-10092.pdf — page 4]
TOP SECRETdefecotrs which you believe to be questionable as to whetheror not it comes within the charter of the CIA?MR. MARCHETTI: No.. As I say, I have no first handknowledge on this subject.You remember the Minev-Rouse case?MR. OLSEN: Yes. You mentioned that in your book, Ibelieve, don't you?MR. MARCHETTI: I was in the Agency at the time thathappened, but I knew practically nothing about it in the AgencyFor one reason, I didn't pay any attention to it. I had noreason to. But it was after getting out of the Agency.This happened to be a case where Rouse, under Agencyorders, was directed to Miney as being a Soviet agent in theEstonian group, And Minev apparently to this day claimsabsolute innocence, and said that he was framed, and it wasdone for other reasons, because he didn't see eye to eye with theAgencyMR. OLSEN: You don't know the story behind that, Itake it?MR. MARCHETTI: No. But you could find out. I don'tknow what the Agency was doing. All I know is that Helmssubmitted some sort of affidavit which the judge accepted, andon the basis of that the case was resolved in favor of Rouse.He had to idneitify Rouse as being in the Agency's employ andacting under orders from the Agency. The reasons why, they areTOP SECRET
[157-10011-10092.pdf — page 5]
TOP SECRET69seem to work properly except in the US. And I am wondering whatkind of use in the US you might be aware of?MR. MARCHETTI: That wasn't what I meant by that.What I meant was, it worked good under laboratory conditions here, but when I would take it out to the field, it wouldn't work.MR. ROETHE: You weren't referring to any use of these beams here in the US?MR. MARCHETTI: No, I was not.But that is that system that people are talking about now, the laser people bugging system, where they can get a building across the street there and direct a beam here and pick it up. It has become quite popular in recent years, at least they talk about it.MR. OLSEN: You mean in the spy literature?MR. MARCHETTI: Yes.MR. ROETHE: At page 196 you refer to monitoring of embassy traffic from Maryland and Virginia. Were you referring to CIA's activity in monitoring, [or NSA?]MR. MARCHETTI: [NSA]MR. ROETHE: You are not aware of any CIA activity of this nature?MR. MARCHETTI: No, not here in this country. [ln]fact, the only case that I was aware of overseas that the CIA did it, if they did it at all, they did it because NSA, forTOP SECRET
[157-10011-10092.pdf — page 6]
TOP SECRETcertain-political reasons, the Government didn't want NSA in there, the military personnelMR. ROETHE: There is one reference to breaking into embassies at page 199. And there is no reference to any particular embassy. Are you aware of any activity where the CIA was actually implicated in breaking into an embassy? You have already talked about the Cilean Embassy.MR. MARCHETTI: This was based on information that was availabe in the Houston Plan, which by that time had become public. And also certain background information about the capabilities of the NSA in its technical field, and certain CIA clandestine abilities. And it was all rolled into one as a supposition.MR. ROETHE: On page 207 you indicate that many individuals at CIA were pressing for action against the KGB here in the US as the FBI was not doing a good enough job?MR. MARCHETTI: Yes.MR. ROETHE: Do you know of any actual operations that were ever taken by teh CIA, or do you have any evidence of such operations?MR. MARCHETTI: No, I do not.MR. ROETHE: On page 216 you refer to training of New and Chicago police. What kind of training are you referring to, or do you know?MR. MARCHETTI: That is just it. I am not exactly sureTOP SECRET
[157-10011-10093.pdf — page 0]
157-10011-10093 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992Date:10/06/93Page:1# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM## IDENTIFICATION FORM### AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10011-10093RECORDS SERIESAGENCY FILE NUMBER :### DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSIONFROM: ROETHE, JAMES, N.TO: FILETITLE :SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH PAPICH, SAM J.DATE: 03/05/75PAGES: 18SUBJECTS:PAPICH, SAM J. (INTERVIEW)DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION : SRESTRICTIONS: REFERREDCURRENT STATUS: PDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS:SSCI Box 294, Folder 15[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTEDNW 50955 DocId:32203861 Page 1
[157-10011-10093.pdf — page 1]
SECRET- 7 -During this period Papich developed a good relationship with Jim Angleton of Counterintelligence and found that he could work effectively with Angleton. In the early 1960's the relationship between the two agencies was probably the best that it ever got. While some flaps continued to occur, both agencies seemed to be making an effort to learn the responsibilities and jurisdiction of the other.Relationships Between 1965 and 1970During the Johnson Administration there was a deterioration or a cut in the number of projects directed towards the Soviets. Hoover's desire to become engaged in extensive counterintelligence work lessened. Many of the FBI's programs to identify illegal aliens attempting to penetrate the U. S. Government broke down. Hoover became extremely cautious and conservative in the area of counterintelligence, which greatly disturbed Papich, who felt strongly about the Soviet threat and who was convinced that strong counter-measures were necessary. For example, Papich tried to promote consideration for the recruitment of a top-level Soviet official as a CIA agent. This was to be a joint CIA-FBI operation, but it was slapped down by Hoover. Further, a proposed joint operation involving sensitive electronic coverage of suspected Soviet lactivities was ies was rejected,During 1967 and early 1968 Papich saw no signs from Hoover that the pro- grams and projects that Papich felt so necessary would be reinstituted. Papich was receiving the message that his relationship with Hoover was coming to an end. Papich was physically and mentally worn out trying to keep the two agencies working together. In 1968 Papich wrote a polite letter to Hoover expressing his concern with what was happening in the area of counterintelligence. He appealed to Hoover to reinitiate some of the effective programs aimed at Soviet penetration of the United States. While Hoover was extremely angry at Papich for writing such a letter, he did not fire him to the surprise of many. Further appeals by Papich to Hoover to reinstate programs were of no avail. From that point on, the relationship between Papich and Hoover chilled and any idea that Papich brought to Hoover from the CIA concerning joint counterintelligence efforts was generally rejected and accompanied by a critical remark.While Papich's 1968 letter had brought no change in Hoover's attitude, Hoover did keep Papich on as liaison. In the Fall of 1969 Papich con- fided to his wife that he was seriously considering retiring in the Spring of 1970. By the first of the year he realized that his career was effec- tively at an end and that he could no longer effectively accomplish his responsibilities as liaison between FBI and CIA. He decided to submit his letter of resignation, to be effective in early April of 1970.SECRET
[157-10011-10093.pdf — page 3]
SECRET- 12 -The following grey areas were delineated by Papich:1.  The question of whether the FBI should recruit agents in the United States for use by the CIA overseas or whether this should be left to the CIA.2.  Activities with respect to defectors and the debriefing of defectors in the United States. (At present the FBI generally lets CIA do the debriefing as long as the FBI is given access to the man within a reasonable time. On occasion the bone fides of defectors have been disputed by CIA and the FBI.)3.  The question of who is responsible for continued supervision over defectors once they have been resettled in the United States. FBI doesn't really have the manpower to monitor the many defectors presently in the United States. Papich feels that these individuals could go sour and should be watched by some one.4.  The question of who should provide cover in the United States for CIA operations overseas.5.  The handling of agents suspected by CIA to be Communist agents over- seas who travel to the United States.6.  Inadequate communication between the two agencies in resolving bona fides of defectors of interest to both agencies.7.  See the subheadings below.Papich believes that in fairness to the men in the field a more clear-cut delineation of jurisdiction is needed. He did state that from time to time documents were put forth by Hoover concerning the FBI's jurisdiction in particular areas. Generally such a guideline would be issued following a particular flap in an operation involving both the FBI and the CIA. Papich could not point to any specific document but suggested that we ask Kelley for this type of information.Papich did feel that there were some areas of jurisdiction that were clear- cut. For instance, CIA is not to investigate violations of the law in the United States. However, it is not Papich's opinion that the determining factor of jurisdiction is a strictly geographic one. (At least it shouldn't be.)Espionage MattersPapich felt strongly that the FBI had the responsibility to investigate any possible violations of the espionage laws. He could point to no case where the FBI refused to undertake this responsibility where reasonable evidence of espionage existed, even if the suspect was an employee of the CIA. In some instances, the CIA might come to the FBI with informationNW 50955 DocId:32203861 Page 4
[157-10011-10093.pdf — page 4]
SECRET- 15 -Ober's Operation: (continued)had the personnel, and the FBI would have become aware of such acti-vity on a massive scale. However, Papich did receive a continuingsupply of information from Ober. Most of this information relatedto the relationship between domestic and foreign groups. Inciden-tally, information pertinent to internal security may have beenpicked up and passed on to the CIA. Papich is also aware that someof Ober's recruits were gathering information in the United Statesas well as overseas on occasions when the student's travels endedand he or she returned to the States. This information was alsopassed on to Papich. Papich acknowledged that on occasion the FBIwould provide CIA with an introduction to a sympathetic student ina dissident group.2. Project MERRIMAC Office of Security) (S)Papich knows almost nothing of efforts to penetrate dissident groupsby the Office of Security. He feels that if such a project had beenextensive, the FBI would have become aware of it, as FBI had a largeWashington Field Office and was very interested in the dissidentgroups and constantly monitoring them. Papich could not recall anincident where a CIA asset working for Women's Strike for Peace wasturned over to the FBI. He did recall occasions when Ober's groupturned over assets to the FBI when the asset returned from overseasand no longer wished to work abroad. Papich believes that only asmall amount of information on dissidents was ever sent to the FBIfrom the Office of Security.Papich states that during this entire period of the dissidents, the atmos-phere was such that something had to be done by someone to learn what themore militant of these dissident groups were planning. Riots, bombings,and destruction of property were rampant. Citizens and newspapers werescreaming for action to bring this unrest to an end. It was a difficulttime for all Federal agencies.Criminal CasesPapich is not aware of any instances when the CIA has undertaken law en-forcement tasks in the United States. This does not mean that there wasnot some cooperation between the FBI and CIA in criminal cases. Forinstance, Angleton's overseas agents would frequently obtain informationconnecting Americans with criminal activities in the U.S. Angleton wouldcontact the FBI and together Papich and Angleton would develop the CIA'ssource of information to assist the FBI. A good example of this led tothe arrest and conviction of a New York City official during the LindsayAdministration.SECRETNW 50955 DocId:32203861 Page 5![scribbled text, possibly a signature or date] 5/20/75
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SECRET- 17 -Penetration of Embassies in the United StatesPapich has no knowledge of any CIA efforts to obtain positive intelli-gence by penetrating foreign embassies in the United States, although they did on occasion attempt to recruit Embassy personnel for activities overseas, pursuant to the the FBI/CIA Memorandum of Understanding of Feb. 7 1966 Papich believes that if the CIA attempted to gain positive in-telligence information through these embassies, this was an improper action which should have been performed by the FBI.Information Obtained From Tax ReturnsPapich is unaware of any instance where CIA has made use of tax returns to obtain information on Americans.PAPICH'S PHILOSOPHY AND MISCELLANEOUS ITEMSIt is Papich's belief that while the intelligence services of the United States presently obtain great amounts of information through new techno-logical developments, they are still unable to read the minds of the leaders of foreign countries. Consequently, they must attempt to pene-trate through clandestine efforts. The only way to successfully penetrate is to permit those conducting the operation to go about their business unburdened by numerous reporting requirements. Papich's philosophy is "If you want the job done right, give me X number of men and leave me alone." He questions whether this philosophy can be adopted in the United States in 1975, as faith in the leadership is an essential factor. He be-lieves that such operations can be controlled and overseen by the Director of the CIA, the Director of the FBI, and the President.Papich indicated that the differences between Hoover and Sullivan have nothing to do with CIA. Hoover was convinced that all dissident groups were directed by the Communist Party, whereas Sullivan disagreed. These differences affected the Hoover-Sullivan relationship only after Papich retired.Papich believes that the FBI lost stability when A. H. Belmont (the No. 3 man at the time) retired in 1967. He presently resides in Palo Alto, California. Belmont was loyal to Hoover, but he had excellent rapport with the agents and could put things in their proper perspective. In fact, Belmont was most useful in resolving differences between CIA and Hoover. Belmont's successors (DeLoach and Sullivan) could not measure up.JNR/vmrCC: D.Belin SECRETSenior CounselsNW 50955 DocId:32203861 Page 63/24/75
[157-10011-10121.pdf — page 0]
157-10011-10121 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992Date:10/07/93Page:1# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM## IDENTIFICATION FORM### AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10011-10121RECORDS SERIES :AGENCY FILE NUMBER :### DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : CIAFROM: DEMPSEY, JOHN P., CHIEF, RESEARCHTO: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF SECURITYTITLE :WILEY, CHARLES WILLIAMDATE: 04/01/74PAGES: 116SUBJECTS :SUMMARY REPORT BY VASALY, LOUIS W. RE WILEY, CHARLES W. [R]DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION : SRESTRICTIONS: REFERREDCURRENT STATUS: PDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS:SSCI Box 221, Folder 10[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTEDNW 50955 DocId: 32203889 Page 1
[157-10011-10121.pdf — page 1]
SECRETRecord Number 157-10011-101211 April 1974MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of SecuritySUBJECT : Charles William WileyAttached herewith for your information is a summary report covering Subject prepared by CIA Cover Employee Louis W. Vasaly and the undersigned. It is limited to and based upon existing documents in the Office of Security files on Charles William Wiley; overt file #343 589, covert file #127 958 and thirteen volumes of Security Research Staff operational files. The report's accuracy and authenticity are necessarily based upon file documents, since the writers did little or no interpretation of those documents and quoted documents in toto wherever possible.![signature of John P. Dempsey]John P. DempseyChief, Research BranchRECEIVED FROMSEP 30 1975CIANW 50955 DocId:32203889 Page 2SECRET062258
[157-10011-10121.pdf — page 2]
# SECRETCONTENTSBACKGROUND 1EVENTS LEADING TO RECRUITMENT 2SECURITY PROCESSING 8ACTIVITIES, MARCH 1956 - JUNE 1959 9CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP 13ACTIVITIES, JULY 1959 JANUARY 1974 15WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL, VIENNA 1959 15CUBA TRIP, ARREST AND DETENTION 1960 19AFRICA AND EAST EUROPEAN TRIP 1961 29OTHER ACTIVITY 1959-1964 34CLANDESTINE TRAINING 1961 40WORLD YOUTH FESTIVEL, HELSINKI 1962 41TAIWAN AND FAR EAST TRIP 1964 43WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL, ALGIERS 1965 44SOUTH AMER. TRIP, SUMMER 1965 47OTHER ACTIVITY 1965-1974 53VIETNAM TRIP 1967-1968 60EUROPEAN TRIP 1970 63WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL, EAST BERLIN 1973 64INVOLVEMENT IN CUDAN EXILE ACTIVITIES 55OVERSEAS TRAVEL 68UTILIZATION, CONTROL AND CASE OFFICERS 73COVER 101PERSONAL ACTIVITY 103TERMINATION 106CONTACTS AND RELATIONSHIP WITHJAMES MCCORD, LEE PENNINGTON,DONALD SWEANY and HOWARD HUNT 109
[157-10011-10121.pdf — page 3]
SECRETIBACKGROUNDCharles William Wiley, lecturer, photographer and free lance journalist, was born 17 November 1926 at Flushing, New York, of American-born parents. He married Katina Calamara, who was born on 18 March 1927 in New York City, on 11 February 1950. They had three children, a daughter, now age 23, and two sons, currently (1974) ages 15 and 13, respectively. Katina died by suicide in April 1973. He currently resides with his two sons in Parlin, New Jersey.The son of a professional actor, Wiley was, himself, a child actor on stage and radio from 1931-1941. In 1942 and 1943 he toured with U.S.O. shows and from 1943 through 1944, was an assistant stage manager in New York City. From 1933 to 1942, he attended the New York City Professional Children's School. He enlisted in the U. S. Navy and served honorably as a Seaman from November 1944 to July 1946. From 1946 to 1951, he held many part-time and temporary jobs in New York City and Miami, Florida, as a salesman, interviewer, bellhop and U. S. Postal Clerk. From 1949 through 1954 he attended night school at New York University and earned a B. S. degree in Journalism. Also, from 1951 to 1953, he was an underwriter for Guardian Life Insurance Company and from November 1953 to October 1954, an agent for Fidelity Life Insurance Company, both in New York City.
[157-10011-10121.pdf — page 4]
# EVENTS LEADING TO RECRUITMENTCharles W. Wiley first came to the official attention of the Office of Security (OS) on 9 September 1955, when Carl F. Heney (Executive Officer, OS) forwarded a letter written by Wiley to Ermal Geiss (Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS), who in turn directed the letter to James W. McCord [Security Research Staff of the Office of Security (SRS)]. How Heney obtained the Wiley letter is unknown, inasmuch as the name of the addressee was deleted in the letter. However, the letter was recorded in the Executive Registry under number 6-9881. The Wiley letter is dated 27 April 1955, gives Wiley's address and telephone number, and Wiley advised that he was working on an index of the *Daily Worker* for the years 1933-1945 "and thought that perhaps you might be interested in specific information that I am likely to find."On 10 September 1955, James W. McCord contacted Wiley in Flushing, New York. At that time, Wiley explained the nature of the index of the *Daily Worker* for the years 1934-1945, by stating that he was preparing the index under a grant from the American Legion Americanism Committee, headed by Lee Pennington (a former employee of the FBI). Wiley started the index in November 1954. Wiley stated he contacted the major government agencies in Washington to ascertain what information in the *Daily Worker* would be of most interest to them, and in addition, contacted a couple of Congressional Committees which McCord surmised were the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Senate Internal Security Committee. Wiley estimated it would take two and a half years to complete the index. At that time, Wiley was receiving part-time clerical assistance from the Women's Auxiliary of the American Legion Post in Flushing, New York. Wiley also indicated an interest in Agency employment after finishing the index.The results of McCord's interview with Wiley were brought to the attention of Robert Bannerman, Deputy Director of Security, by 21 November 1955, when Bannerman opined that "this may be valuable."> [Figure: RECEIVED FROM stamp]> A stamp says RECEIVED FROM, SEP 30 1975, CIA.
[157-10011-10121.pdf — page 5]
McCord met next with Wiley in Washington, D. C., for two days, ending on 1 December 1955. By that time, Wiley had indexed 150,000 names of the *Daily Worker* covering January 1934 through June 1936. Wiley stated that the FBI in New York City and the American Legion were already making "extensive use" of the index cards. Wiley stated that one of his purposes being in Washington was to secure financing for the index continuation. He stated that his $5000 a year grant from the American Legion Americanism Committee would expire at the end of December 1955, and if negotiations with that body were unsuccessful, he would attempt to secure financing from the Senate and House Investigating Committees. Wiley stated that the FBI has indicated the strongest desire that he continue the indexing but that in his discussion with Mr. DeLoach (Cartha DeLoach, an FBI senior official), no indication of forthcoming financial support from the Bureau for this work was indicated.In recording this contact with Wiley, McCord opined:> "I think it is obvious that the index which Wiley is working on would be of considerable value to the Security Ottice and to CIA, particularly since the Communist Party membership and activities during the 1934-40 period were for the most part very open and extensively advertised in the *Daily Worker*. An example of how open their activities were is indicated in the fact that Elizabeth Bentley's name was mentioned in a 1935 issue of the *Daily Worker* at a time prior to her going underground and acquiring a RIS (Russian Intelligence Service) mission. If the *Daily Worker* thus bears a record of (Communist) Party activities of an individual such as Bentley, who later became so prominent in RIS activities in the United States, then the possibility always exists that the names of persons later connected with OSS (Office of Strategic Services) and other governmental activity may also be mentioned in the 1934-40 *Daily Worker* issues, which have heretofore never been indexed by any government agency."