Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 157]
TOP SECRET155381 1962?2 Mr. Bundy. I didn't say that. I said I had no independent3 recollection of them.4 Mr. Smothers. They did not come to your attention at that5 point?6 Mr. Bundy. I didn't say say that. I don't know that they7 did, but I don't know that they didn't.8 Mr. Smothers. But your recollection at this point is that9 they did not come to your attention?10 Mr. Bundy. That is not my recollection. I don't recall11 that one way or the other.12 Mr. Smothers. Okay.13 Let me ask you then about your knowledge of the Lansdale14 situation.15 Do you know General Lansdale?16 Mr. Bundy. Yes.17 Mr. Smothers. Do you know his reputation for truth and18 honesty?19 Mr. Bundy. I don't think I have any -- his reputation for20 truth and honesty, if you ask me the question as one asks it21 about, you know, all kinds of people, I have no reason to22 question it. I have doubts about some of the things I have23 seen attributed to him in recent weeks.24 Mr. Smothers. Well, let me put it this way. Would you25 believe General Lansdale under oath?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 158]
TOP SECRET1561 Mr. Bundy. It would depend on what he said.2 Mr. Smothers. It would depend upon what he said.3 Is your experience that General Lansdale is trustworthy4 only on a selective basis?5 Mr. Bundy. You are asking me questions about matters6 essentially in which his testimony, as I have seen it reported.7 Mr. Smothers. No, I am not asking you about his testimony.8 I am asking you if you would believe him under oath, based on9 your knowledge.10 Mr. Bundy. It would depend upon what he said, and if it11 was a matter on which I had my own knowledge.12 Mr. Smothers. Without regard to matters that General13 Lansdale has testified to before this Committee, based on your14 knowledge of him, your working relationship with him, your15 knowledge of what other people know of General Lansdale, his16 reputation in the community, if you will, would you believe him17 under oath?18 Mr. Bundy. I would currently have to say that I could not19 give you a definite affirmative answer to that question.20 Mr. Smothers. That's fine.21 Now, let's go back to the period of General Lansdale's22 appointment.23 General Lansdale was appointed as the coordinator of the24 Special Group, the Chief of Operations.25 After General Taylor's efforts had been under effort forTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 159]
TOP SECRET401 some time, six months, seven months, General Taylor comes in,2 I believe, in July after he completes his Bay of Pigs examina-3 tion, General Lansdale is appointed by the President at the end4 of November.5 Do you have any present recollection of the circumstances6 surrounding that appointment?7 Mr. Bundy. None that goes beyond what I discussed earlier.8 Mr. Smothers. To the best of your knowledge or recollection,9 did the appointment of this Chief of Staff or Chief of Operations10 reflect any lack of confidence in General Taylor on the part of11 either the Attorney General or the President?12 Mr. Bundy. No, the opposite. General Taylor had heavy13 responsibilities in his general responsibility as military14 representative of the President. He was made Chairman of the15 Committee to keep oversight on this. It was inappropriate16 entirely in terms of his rank and his other duties that he17 should be the day to day action officer.18 Mr. Smothers. Are you familiar with the degree of General19 Taylor's involvement with the development of the Special20 Group (Augmented) agendas? Was this done by General Taylor?21 Was it really General Lansdale's responsibility?22 Mr. Bundy. I don't have any knowledge of the details of23 the operations of the staff. It was clear to me, and I think24 to everyone else, that the man in charge of that operation, of25 that Committee, was General Taylor.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 160]
TOP SECRET411581 Mr. Smothers. Okay.2 Just one final series of questions.3 If we might, Mr. Bundy, go back to our conversations4 regarding your request to see documents prior to your testimony5 before the Rockefeller Commission, when you talked to Mr.6 Kissinger, precisely what did you request of him?7 Mr. Bundy. I said to him -- and again I cannot be precise --8 and I thought that there were going to be questions with respect9 to which it would be much easier for me to give helpful and more10 accurate answers if I could have access to appropriate documents11 since I have taken no documents of that character, no official12 documents of that character, from the White House. And he said13 he entirely agreed and he made the appropriate arrangements.14 Mr. Smothers. Did you ask for a timeframe for these15 documents?16 Mr. Bundy. I don't recall that I did, but when I came to17 look more closely at what I needed to see, as I told you18 earlier, it related specifically to the period around August19 1962.20 Mr. Smothers. Did the White House make the selection of21 documents for you?22 Mr. Bundy. No. The White House handed me a file of23 documents which covered the period.24 Mr. Smothers. They handed you a file of documents covering25 roughly the August 1962 period?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 161]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Bundy. That's right.2 Mr. Smothers. Had you made a request for documents3 covering this August '62 timeframe?4 Mr. Bundy. I must have told him the rough period with5 which I am concerned. Again, I don't understand the drift of6 your question.7 Mr. Smothers. Well, the drift of my question is, if indeed8 you selected the August 1962 documents, why did you select9 that?10 Mr. Bundy. Because Counsel to the Rockefeller Commission11 had directed my attention to the period.12 Mr. Smothers. To August 1962?13 Mr. Bundy. Yes.14 Mr. Smothers. In the file that centered roughly on this15 point in this timeframe, included NSA memo 181, was the file16 put together by the White House pursuant to this guidance?17 Mr. Bundy. The file that came into my hands, whether18 they put it together or whether it was a file drawn off the19 shelf, I can't tell you. You'll have to ask them.20 Mr. Smothers. Did it appear to you to be an off-the-shelf21 file?22 Mr. Bundy. I don't know what it was.23 The Chairman. What is the object of this series of24 questions, Curtis?25 Mr. Smothers. Well, I am trying to determine, Mr. Chairman',TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 162]
TOP SECRET431601 what Mr. Kissinger was requested to do and what actually2 happened.3 The Chairman. Don't we have that now in the record?4 It just seems to me like we're going over the same series of5 questions.6 Mr. Smothers. Well, since we don't know what was in the7 file --8 Mr. Bundy. Well, I thought I said the file was a file of9 National Security Action memoranda, a file which you already10 have here.11 Mr. Smothers. Relating to August, 1962?12 Mr. Bundy. Uh-huh.13 Mr. Smothers. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.14 Mr. Schwarz. On the Trujillo matter --15 Mr. Bundy. Sure.16 Mr. Schwarz. You know Mr. Trujillo was killed. Did you17 know or do you know that the persons who killed him had18 obtained some weapons from the United States?19 Mr. Bundy. I did not know, and do not now know, of my20 own knowledge that that was the case.21 I did know, or at least I believe I must have been on22 notice because of documents again that you have shown me, that23 weapons by a decision of the Special Group in early January24 had been or were being passed to Dominican dissidents.25 Mr. Schwarz. Were you involved in the sending of a telegramTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 163]
TOP SECRET44                                                                                                                                                            1611 to the Domincan Republic, either two or three days prior to the2 actual assassination of Mr. Trujillo?3 Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection of it, and when I saw4 those telegrams in discussions with your staff, they stirred no5 recollection on my part.6 Mr. Schwarz. Is it fair to state that Mr. Richard Goodwin7 is the best witness on those subjects from the White House for8 that period of time?9 Mr. Bundy. It appears that way to me, although that10 appears more from the fact that important. documents seem to11 have been addressed to him than because of my own recollection12 that he was interested in the matters and because of my phone13 conversation with him, he showed a considerable familiarity14 with events in the Domincan Republic, political events during15 that spring.16 Mr. Schwarz. Well, you got a memo from Mr. Bissell in17 February, 17th February '61. It is Tab R of the Trujillo18 Book 1 of 2, in which you were informed that the dissidents19 had been told by the United States that it was prepared to20 provide them with a limited supply of arms and equipment.21 When you got such information, did it trigger in your mind22 anything to the effect of, let's be concerned about how they're.24 going to use those weapons, or did you just accept the informa-24 tion and do nothing about it?25 Mr. Bundy. It is clear that the information was sent toTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 164]
TOP SECRET45 1621 me and it was clear, in that sense, that I had become responsi-2 ble for knowing what was in the document, but I have to say that3 as I reread it I have no recollection that I ever, in fact, did4 read it at the time. Whether that was because of the flow, the5 very heavy flow of other documents or because I passed it to6 someone else or because I just simply didn't get to it, I cannot7 tell you, but I have no recollection' that I saw it.8 Mr. Schwarz. You did make a request for a briefing paper?9 Mr. Bundy. It must have been done, and it was either done10 in my name or I did it.11 Mr. Schwarz. So you're not capable -- you don't remember12 it. Are you capable of making a comment on my question, which13 was having received information that arms had been supplied --14 Mr. Bundy. Having that information on my desk, anyway.15 Mr. Schwarz. Okay.16 In the light of hindsight, should persons in your position17 when they receive such information inquire into the purpose for18 which the arms are to be used?19 Mr. Bundy. Yes, I would -- and my own guess on this, and20 it's not much better than that, is that the decision which had21 been taken only a week before the new Administration came in,22 in the Special Group, was partly reviewed in some fashion, with23 the Special Group as reconstituted after the change in24 Administration. So I would have to say that I suppose I knew25 that weapons were being introduced into the Dominican RepublicTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 165]
TOP SECRET163461 and I would have to add that I did not, or I have no recollection2 and I think I would recollect it, if I had engaged in a careful3 inquiry to find out just what, who, when where and so on did4 not do that, and I think -- you ask in hindsight, I think it5 would clearly be important to have that kind of understanding,6 because as I understand the evidence that has now been developed,7 there was a level of communication and connection with the8 plotters in the Dominican Republic which exceeded what political9 authority appears to have expected or believed was going on.10 Mr. Schwarz. Would you agree with one further point,11 that it is very difficult for the United States to control12 events once it has made a decision to cooperate with dissident13 elements, and in particular once it's made a decision to14 cooperate with dissident elements by providing them with arms?15 Mr. Bundy. I think that -- one thing, I don't want to16 generalize here, but I think -- I would agree with the generali-17 zation, let me put it that way, if I could add that in the case18 of the Dominican Republic, I think one has also to recognize19 retrospectively that there was no way to have any communication20 with dissidents that would not involve recognition that, if you21 propose to be an effective dissident in that country under that22 ruler, you would probably be contemplating fairly violent23 action.24 Mr. Schwarz. I have nothing further on Trujillo.25 One question of Vietnam.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 166]
TOP SECRET1 You were involved in the question of the possible coup in Vietnam that actually took place?2 Mr. Bundyrz.Yes.3 Mr. Schwarz. And you were substantially involved in that as a matter of personal4 Mr. Bundy. I was working closely with the President and was probably the draftsman under his instruction of some of the cables that went out.5 Mr. Schwarz. Now, Diem was killed. It does not appear to me from the record that the United States wanted him killed.6 Is that fair?7 Mr. Bundy. That is correct.8 Mr. Schwarz. But the United States did want him deposed if a coup could be successful? Is that correct?9 Mr. Bundy. The United States, really had two views. Right up to the end, the United States hoped, hoped against hope, as it became more and more difficult to communicate with Diem, that he would see the, or come to share the kinds of argument, that were made to him, primarily by Ambassador Lodge, and that a change in his government and alslower, much lower, role for his brother and sister-in-law would assist him in recapturing public confidence. That was always the preferred solution.10 As prospects for that became more and more dim, the United States did come to take the view that there might be no alternative to a coup, and it certainly had the view that if thereTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 167]
TOP SECRET481 was going to be a coup, I believe the language somewhere in2 one of the cables is that it was in the interests of the UnitedStates 3 that it should succeed.4 Mr. Schwarz. Now, on the day of the coup, Ambassador5 Lodge told Mr.Diem that he would provide help to get him out6 of the country and do so by airplane, but he couldn't have the7 plane for twenty-four hours. Adid you know of the twenty-four8 hour point?9 Mr. Bundy. I don't remember that we did.10 Mr. Schwarz. B, don't you find it incomprehensible that11 the United States was not able to supply an airplane for12 twenty-four hours?13 Mr. Bundy. I don't really know because it depends on14 where the plane was going to go, what kind of plane. I don't15 think I'm competent to answer that question.16 What occurs to me is, there were lots of other ways of17 offering asylum for a twenty-four hour period, and I don't18 think I really find that a very significant point.19 The Chairman. Any further questions?20 If there are no further questions, I want to thank you21 for your testimony, it has been long, a very long morning, and22 it has been very helpful testimony. We appreciate it very23 much.24 Mr. Bundy. And I am thankful to you, Mr. Chairman25 Mr. Chairman, if it is not inappropriate and there is noTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 168]
TOP SECRET1 objection, I have a brief statement that I intend to make to 1662 the Press which will simply re-emphasize to them what I think3 I have said a number of times this morning about my view of4 the role of President Kennedy and Attorney General Kennedy.5 The Chairman: I leave that up to you. I certainly would6 not want to interpose any objection.7 Thank you very much.8 (Whereupon, at 12:42 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed.)TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM## IDENTIFICATION FORM---## AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10046RECORDS SERIES: HEARINGSAGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-H-04---## DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIAFROM : HALLEYTO :TITLE :DATE: 08/19/75PAGES: 159SUBJECTS : JMWAVECIAOPERATION MONGOOSECASTRO, FIDELDOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPTCLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIEDRESTRICTIONS : 1ACURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONSDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/31/98OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: Box 2---[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 1]
# TOP SECRETVol 3 of 3The Nuited States SenateReport of ProceedingsHearing held beforeSENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTALOPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIESTuesday, August 19, 1975Washington, D. C.(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned overto the Committee for destruction)WARD & PAUL410 FIRST STREET, S. E.WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003(202) 544-6000
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 2]
# TOP SECRET12(Witness: Halley)34EXHIBIT5No. 16No. 27No. 38No. 4910111213141516171819202122232425# TOP SECRETCONTENTSEXHIBITSFOR IDENTIFICATION26092110> [Figure] Phone (Area 202) 544-6000> [Figure] 410 First Street, S. E., Washington, D.C. 20003> [Figure] 767007 WARD
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 3]
# TOP SECRETSTAFF INTERVIEW:Tuesday, August 19, 1975United States SenateSelect Committee to Study GovernmentalOperations With Respect toIntelligence ActivitiesWashington, D.C.The Committes met, pursuant to notice, at 1:25 o'clock p.m. in Room 608, The Carroll Arms.Staff: Frederick Baron, Joseph diGenova, Professional Staff Members.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 4]
TOP SECRET1 2PROCEEDINGS2 Mr. Baron. Mr. Halley, is it true that you are here3 testifying today under alias, and that Halley is not actually4 your true identity?5 Mr. Halley. That is correct.6 Mr. Baron. Your true identity will be on file with the7 review staff of the CIA and available for verification by the8 Committee if that becomes necessary?9 Mr. Halley. That is my understanding.10 Mr. Baron. Let me show you a piece of paper marked11 "Statement Regarding Testimony and Alias" and let me ask you12 whether this is the statement you signed as we were beginning13 here today which indicates your true identity and which I have14 witnessed?15 Mr. Halley. Yes, that is the correct statement that I16 signed today. There is a blank there where we have not filled17 in the Senator's name.18 Mr. Baron. All right.19 For the moment, let us leave that blank and enter it into20 the record as is, as Exhibit 1.21 (The document referred to22 was marked Halley Exhibit23 No. 1 for identification.)2425TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 5]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Baron. It is your understanding, is it not, that we2 have worked out an arrangement with the review staff whereby3 the statement will be attached to your transcript as an Exhibit4 and in a sanitized form, leaving out either of the two references5 to your true identity which will only be available at this6 Agency.7 Mr. Halley. That is my understanding.8 Mr. Baron. Are you aware that you have the right to counsel9 before the Committee?10 Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.11 Mr. Baron. Are you appearing here, voluntarily here today12 without counsel?13 Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.14 Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that at any point you are15 entitled to cease answering any questions and consult with16 counsel if you wish?17 Mr. Halley. Yes, I am aware of that.18 Mr. Baron. Finally, are you aware that all your Constitu-19 tional rights are intact before the Committee here today,20 including your Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent?21 Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.22 Mr. Baron. I think we should put into the record the23 arrangement that we made before we began, and correct me if this24 is not your understanding of the arrangement, that we are25 testifying here today without placing you under oath becauseTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 6]
TOP SECRET1 there is no Senator available for that purpose, but both you and2 I are contemplating having a Senator swear you in and ask you if3 your transcript is true to the best of your knowledge at some4 point as soon as possible as it can be arranged after today's5 session.6 Mr. Halley. Yes. The statement that you have just made7 is my understanding of the agreement that we entered into prior8 to this conversation going on the record.9 Mr. Baron. Thank you.10 Let us begin then with some very broad questions11 about your background in the Agency. Can you tell me what you12 were doing in the Agency prior to your involvement with the13 JMWAVE station?14 Mr. Halley. I became involved with the Cuban affair in15 approximately February of 1962. At that time, I was in Head-16 quarters. I was Chief of Foreign Intelligence Activities for the17 Eastern European Division. I was asked to be released from those18 duties to conduct a survey of the opportunities for running19 intelligence operations against Cuba. I was released from those20 duties; I did engage in a survey of the possibilities for running21 intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary operations22 against Cuba.23 Mr. Baron. Your position as Chief of Foreign Intelligence24 for Eastern Europe did not involve Cuba in any way? That was25 your last position before you became involved in Cuban affairs,TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 7]
# TOP SECRET1 is that correct?2 Mr. Halley. That is correct.3 I want to qualify that. Undoubtedly, there were some4 actions that were being conducted in the Eastern European area5 that reflected on Cuba, but I was not involved in the Bay of Pigs6 operation. I was not fully focused on Cuban operations until7 approximately February of 1962.8 Mr. Baron. At what point did you join the Agency?9 Mr. Halley. I joined the Agency originally in 1951.10 Mr. Baron. In a very general way, can you describe the11 nature of your activities at the Agency prior to February of '62?12 Mr. Halley. When I was first assigned to the Agency, I was13 an Army officer on active duty. I went through the usual Agency14 training program. I was assigned to Eastern European activities15 where I originally was focused on Polish and German operations.16 I subsequently served from 1952 to 1959 in Germany. In the17 course of that service, I spent most of my time working on the18 Eastern European satellites, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,19 Romania, Bulgaria. In addition, I was involved on occasion in20 Soviet operations and East German operations.21 Mr. Baron. Did you have any involvement in Latin American22 affairs prior to February of '62?23 Mr. Halley. Yes. In the period 1960-62, I was responsible24 for setting up operational activity in Latin America that25 was targetted more explicitly on the Eastern European satellites.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 8]
TOP SECRET1 to some extent on the Soviet Union. This was in a period of time2 where the Eastern European satellites were expanding their3 presence in Latin America. In my duties in the Eastern EuropeanDivision, I was responsible for getting this program going in5 Latin America, so I did have an extensive exposure to Latin6 America: in the period '60 to '62, as I recall those dates.7 The accuracy of those dates can be checked from my official8 travel records, and so on.9 Mr. Baron. During that period of time you were actually10 in Latin America helping to set up this program?11 Mr. Halley. No, I was stationed in Washington, but I12 travelled to Latin America during this particular period of13 time.14 Mr. Baron. Did you travel to Cuba at any point during the15 course of that operation?16 Mr. Halley. Not specifically. I think I transitted Cuba17 on air stops being routed to various countries. I think I was18 at one or two Cuban airfields, but simply in transit.19 Mr. Baron. Not long enough even to talk to the people at20 the Station in Cuba?21 Mr. Halley. No, I had no contact at any time with the22 Havana Station.23 Mr. Baron. Did you pick up, during this period of time,24 a general sense of the attitude of Latin American governments25 toward the Castro government? Could you characterize thatTOP SECRET