Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 4]
TOP SECRETFOREIGN AND MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGThursday, January 22, 1976United States Senate,Select Committee to Study GovernmentalOperations with Respect toIntelligence Activities,Washington, D. C.The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 o'clock p.m., in Room S-407, the Capitol, the Honorable Gary Hart presiding.Present: Senators Hart of Colorado (presiding), and Schweiker.Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; and Joseph diGenova, Charles Kirbow, Jim Johnston, Britt Snider, Loch Johnson, Elliot Maxwell, Elizabeth Culbreath, Bob Kelley, Michael Epstein, Rick Inderfurth, Charles Lombard, and Pat Shea, Professional Staff Members.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETPROCEEDINGS1 Senator Hart of Colorado. Gentlemen, let's go ahead and2 be sworn and get under way if you don't mind.3 Do you swear the testimony you're about to give will be4 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help5 you God?6 Mr. Angleton. I do.7 Mr. Miler. I do.8 Senator Hart of Colorado. Thank you very much.9 Mr. Angleton at least has been before us before, and10 routinely we remind all witnesses that they preserve all of11 their constitutional rights, including the right to counsel,12 the right to remain silent and so forth and so on, and to have13 a member of the Committee present during all of the testimony.14 It is my understanding we have no prepared statements to15 start with, so I think I'll just open it up to staff questions16 and interject some of my own, and I understand that the general17 subject matter to be discussed here today -- and we are interested18 in your expertise regarding the question of counterintelligence!19 So, we'll just have the staff members start.202122232425TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETTESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETONACCOMPANIED BY SCOTTY MILERMr. Johnson. I wonder if we could begin by having bothof your gentlemen give us some information on your backgrounds, beginning with Mr. Angleton.Mr. Angleton. I entered the OSS in 1943 from the Army, went into training in Washington and environs and then to London, and then eventually to Italy, and I took over as Chief, Counterintelligence in Italy, and eventually took over as Chief, OSS.I returned in about '47, '48, and various jobs in both espionage and counterintelligence. At one time Chief of Operations and eventually Chief of Counterintelligence, and that was from about 1954 until 1974.Mr. Johnson. Mr. Miler?Mr. Miler. I entered OSS in 1946. I was sent to China.I was in China until 1949, transferred to Japan, became involved in intelligence aspects of the Korean War. I served in Thailand, the Philippines, as I said, China, Japan, Ethiopia. I traveled extensively, was a station chief abroad, and for the last ten years I have been in Counterintelligence, first in the Special Investigations, and subsequently as Chief of Operations! for Mr. Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff.And when I left the Agency in December of '74, that was my position.# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 Mr. Johnson. So both of you left the CIA in December, 19742 Since that time we understand there have been some changes3 in how counterintelligence is conducted at the CIA.4 Could you give us some understanding of those changes?5 Mr. Angleton. I would like to defer to Mr. Miler on this,6 if I may?7 Mr. Miler. Yes.8 My understanding is there have been some rather fundamental9 and substantive changes which are a continuation, actually,10 of changes that were made first in 1973, in July of 197311 when many of the centralized counterintelligence functions were12 decentralized and reallocated to different components of the13 Directorate of Operations. Such things as agent approvals and14 security, operational security reviews for intelligence15 collection and covert action operations, the oversight on16 intelligence operations, and oversight on counterintelligence17 operations in the field were decentralized. Research and18 Analysis has been curtailed, and the emphasis on it has changed19 There have been changes in the record procedures.20 Mr. Johnson. Could you be more specific on these changes,21 for example, in research?22 Mr. Miler. In research, the research is now, as I under-23 stand it, pretty much on a case by case basis, not in an24 overall perception of worldwide or national counterintelligence25 problems. There is no -- the application of historical cases,TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 historical problems is not being applied, as I understand it,2 to current operational efforts or investigative needs. There is3 an entirely different philosophy being applied as to what may4 be required in terms of understanding the counterintelligence5 threat to this nation. There is very little emphasis, if any, or6 concern with such things as deception and disinformation. Therd7 is little application of analytical and assessment work to the8 overall role of foreign intelligence and security services in9 political action.10 There have been some fundamental changes in operational11 philosophies stemming from an application of what is termed12 management by objectives as it is being applied in the CIA to13 operations, and there is a -- has been a distinct change in14 some of the attention which has been previously placed on the15 problem of penetration from foreign and particularly hostile16 intelligence services into the American community.17 And there has been a very, very substantive change in18 the perception and the conduct of counterintelligence in that19 there has been what is in my view a very serious erosion20 of security and compartmentation of operations, and leakage21 of information which has not been to the best interests of22 a national counterintelligence effort.23 Mr. Johnson. So, from going from a rather centralized24 apparatus to a decentralized situation, the dangers of penetration25 have increased.TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETMr. Miler. The dangers of penetration have increased significantly, and this extends also to the methods by which relations with foreign intelligence services are conducted.Mr. Johnson. But how do you respond to the criticism that during your tenure and Mr. Angleton's tenure, too tight a rein was kept on counterintelligence information, and individuals in the field at the station level failed to get the information they needed to conduct their counterintelligence operation?Mr. Miler. I would have to respond to that, Mr. Johnson, and I could only respond to it in the context of specifics. To my knowledge, and as practiced from my position as Chief of Operations, whenever there was information which was judged to be of significance, importance to a field station, that field station was advised, unless there was some overriding security source protection or other considerations, and the decision then not to advise them was made at the Deputy Director for Operations, as it is now called, or the Director level.There was, certainly, a very tight security, a very tight compartmentation of counterintelligence information and activities, which in my view was essential, and still is essential, and will be even more essential in the future if we are to regain a counterintelligence initiative and to do our job in the future. And I think this is the fundamental question that the management of the CIA and the Senate and the# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 10]
TOP SECRET1 Executive have to decide, is do we want a counterintelligence2 effort, and if so, then we have to get to it, and we have to3 put our best minds to it.4 Mr. Johnson. Were there instances during your period in5 counterintelligence where the Counterintelligence Staff would6 conduct its own counterespionage activities, without the knowledge7 of the various geographic division chiefs?8 Mr. Miler. There were very few of them, with the chiefs.9 There may have been some.10 Mr. Johnson. In those cases where there were such11 operations, were they cleared with the DDO?12 Mr. Miler. Every single one of them was cleared with the13 DDO and/or the Director and/or the Deputy Director.14 Mr. Johnson. On important counterespionage operations,15 could you tell us in more detail what the approval and clearance16 process is?17 We know that for covert action the 40 Committee frequently18 becomes involved. What about for important counterespionage19 operations?20 Mr. Miler. Well, Mr. Angleton might want to qualify my21 response, because obviously he was involved more in this22 than I was, but there would be the two primary considerations.23 One was a strictly CIA, counterintelligence or counterespionage24 activity. The derivation of the authority for this came from25 the statutes which set up the CIA and from National SecurityTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET5/3 5/5Council directives 53, 55 and so forth. The authority rested in there. The approval would go to the then DDP, now Deputy Director for Operations, the Deputy Director and/or the Director.The authorities, if it were a significant counterintelligence or counterespionage case, the authorities, as I understood it then, might require the Director to go outside the Agency to the White House or the Attorney General and so forth.Alternatively, we in the CI Staff might be directed to coordinate this with the FBI. We would go to the FBI, explain the case and so forth. The FBI would then go to the Attorney the Department of Justice and get authorities, whatever authorities they would require in order to pursue the investigations, conduct the case, and do it according to whatever stipulations that the Department of Justice would put on it in order to either neutralize the suspected spy or agent, and/or conclude the case by prosecution.And I am talking now of primarily in terms of a serious counterespionage case involving an American citizen.Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, do you know of any instances where the CI Staff or higher authority within the CIA went outside the Agency for approval for important counterespionage operations?Mr. Angleton. I know of cases, yes.Mr. Johnson. And what would the approval system be?TOP SECRET
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## TOP SECRET1 Mr. Angleton. Well, it would be an ad hoc discussion2 between the Director and the Secretary, and probably others,3 the Attorney General.4 Mr. Johnson. Does this happen frequently? Is this a typical5 procedure for a major counter operation?6 Mr. Angleton. If it's a major matter, it's on the basis7 of need to know.8 You have another kind of case where a foreigner came to9 me and stated his government had a defector from the Bloc, an10 excellent agent, and they would be prepared to give us the agent11 if we would take it over lock, stock and barrel, handle it12 in such a fashion that there would be no exposure, because of13 the political consequences to their government.14 I would go to the Director and the Deputy Director, spell15 out the matter, and come to a determination with them whether16 we wanted to take the case on. This particular case involved17 not only a person who had been in the intelligence service of18 the opposition a long time, but he had access to codes, and alsd19 a great deal of deciphered material. So it was kicked back20 and forth, and there was a determination made that we would21 take it over, the staff would take it over in its entirety.22 And therefore, it meant that I called in Scotty and we23 pulled together our team, we sent them abroad. We handled the24 man in the field for a long time, and then eventually brought25 him back here.## TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 In a case of that sort, the instruction was agreed upon2 by all concerned, and the Director's instruction was that the3 Division was not to be informed, the Division where this4 individual came from, the Bloc area, should not be informed;5 that the Bureau, only two or three people in the Bureau, by6 name, should be informed, and that we would run the operation7 and bury the individual at the end.8 Now, it went along --9 Mr. Johnson. Did you say "bury the individual"?10 Mr. Angleton. I'm not using it in your Committee terms.11 Mr. Kirbow. You'd better clear that up for the record.12 Mr. Miler. We would integrate him in to the American13 society in such a way that he would be non-identifiable.14 Mr. Angleton. He would be buried.15 Mr. Miler. May I just add here also that the authorities,16 the approval are very specific in terms of the agents' and the17 CIA's responsibility to advise and get the approval of the18 Attorney General in bringing someone like this into the19 United States.20 The Director got this approval. It was a formal letter21 to the Attorney General, a formal reply. There was a formal22 but very limited advice to the Immigration. All of the legal23 requirements required by the Attorney General, Immigration,24 all other agencies, were done. However, in this instance, they25 were done on a very narrow, select basis, directly to AttorneyTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET111 General and so forth, rather than to go through the normal2 bureaucratic chain of command out of the CIA and its various3 components.4 Mr. Angleton. With the added fact that we did not disclose5 all of the facts, nor identity.6 Now, this is important, because the individual was of7 such prominence that the country concerned would be placed in8 jeopardy diplomatically, the place where he was residing on9 tour. There would be intensive investigations by his head-10 quarters, and therefore we had to have covers. And so we11 laid on in such a fashion that another service received infor-12 mation regarding the target country that would induce them to13 take certain observable actions, and then to spread the word14 that the fellow had actually defected to another country, so15 that their entire investigative thrust would be directed toward16 that country.17 Senator Hart of Colorado. So far we've talked about18 process, and I think we'll keep going on it, and return to19 it, but I would like to quantify some of this if I can.20 First of all, by terms of definition, is the phrase or21 the term "counterintelligence" interchangeable with counter-22 espionage?23 Mr. Angleton. It can be. I think technically counter-24 intelligence is regarded to be all forms of investigative25 activity, travel control, your data files, your dossiers, allTOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET1 of the systems that go into counterintelligence as such.2 Out of that emerges a product, and one of the products is3 counterespionage.4 Senator llart of Colorado. I see.5 How big was the Counterintelligence Staff?6 Mr. Angleton. When? Well, when it was in its prime it7 was around, it was 200 some odd people. After this decentraliza-8 tion took place, when we lost international Communism, which in9 no service in the world has it ever been divorced from10 counterintelligence; we lost our police division where we11 train police from throughout the world; we lost operation12 approval, which is approval of agents; we lost our controls13 over the Technical Services Division; we lost the geographic14 representation; we lost liaison, which was the liaison was with15 the FBI and 26 other government agencies who do investigations.16 Mr. Miler. They took counterintelligence and liaison17 away from the counterintelligence component, if you can imagine18 such a situation.19 Mr. Angleton. So that reduced us to less than 80 people,20 and this comes to, Senator, if I can just point to one of the21 most important things in the legislation or in whatever the22 Executive does, is that you cannot have in my view a Director23 of the FBI and a Director of CIA who are independent of one24 another. You have to have some higher authority to whom you25 can make an appeal when decisions of this sort are made so that# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 it is aired, and it is not done without the knowledge of anyone,2 and then breaks, as it did, in the New York Times and what not.3 Mr. Johnson. Yesterday we had the Bureau representatives4 telling us that there was really no problem or conflict when5 it came to questions of this, and that there was no problem6 with higher authority. Apparently you wouldse you7 disagree with that.8 Mr. Angleton. I disagree in total with that. I'm saying the9 decline in the Bureau over 20 years from when they had very high10 grade counterintelligence until today when there has probably11 been -- well, it is least effective.12 Senator Hart of Colorado. Why is that?13 Mr. Angleton. Well, I think it has to do with the number14 of diversions it had in the days of the Vietnam war, when15 internal security lost a tremendous number of men to other16 assignments and duties.17 Second, I don't think that counterintelligence or the18 real thrust of Soviet Bloc intelligence has ever been brought!19 up to policy level, and, more important, anything that involves20 penetration has always been swept under the rug. In other21 words, the question of penetration in this government or22 penetration in any agency has never been brought to a responsible23 level of finding out how it happened and what has gone wrong.24 And let's take one defector who said -- in this case he25 spent 16 years in the Soviet Union in the KGB. He gave usTOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET1 over 180 leads of penetration in France, and it occasioned my2 drafting a letter for Mr. McCone to give to President Kennedy3 to give to DeGaul. DeGaul secretly sent to this country one4 of his highest trusted military men. He was here incognito. He5 met with the defector for three days.6 The French original reaction to President Kennedy's letter7 was, it was Soviet provocation, because this was at the stage8 when France was making certain very sensitive agreements in the9 atomic field and otherwise with the United States, and therefore10 these allegations of penetration had a very direct bearing on11 those negotiations. And so the General who came over was12 totally prepared to believe this was provocation, but after13 three days with the defector, in a meeting with Helms and14 myself, he stated without any question that this man was 10015 percent bona fide, because he could ask him those questions16 right on the nerve of their secrets, and he got the responses.17 Now, this defector also gave considerable data on the18 status of penetration in the U.S. Government, documents which19 he had seen in Moscow, cryptonyms of operating agents, documents.20 which could only have been prepared by our organization, and21 many other cases going back into the early '50s, going almost22 to Cabinet level. So all of this information was made available23 to the Bureau. But in due course Mr. Hoover regarded or made24 the pronouncement -- and I won't say when he makes a pronouncement25 that it is one that has been recommended to him from higher# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 level -- that the defector in question was probably a provoca-2 tion, and the Bureau ceased contact with that individual, and3 I would say they have not had any contact with him since 1965.4 Senator Hart of Colorado. Why did Hoover make that5 decision?6 Mr. Angleton. Well, among other things, this defector7 wanted to have access to ongoing and to past cases with the8 view that he had a tremendous amount of data that he could not9 relate to anything, but if he could see things that were going10 on, then it would be meaningful to him in terms of what he had11 to contribute. And I can take the example that, with another12 allied service; immediately we brought them into it and he had13 seen certain naval documents that dealt with infrastructure and14 budget. This happened to be British.15 In time they found the documents, and when they presented16 them to him, he could identify those he had seen and those he17 had not seen. This led to the apprehension of Vassil, who18 was in the admiralty. And this was the quality of his19 information.20 All through the west agents were apprehended on the basis21 of his information. But there is a tremendous bulk of it which22 is made up of fragments, made up of documents he's seen where23 we have not been able to identify the document; a great number24 of cryptonyms of reporting sources. where we cannot find the25 body to fit the cryptonym. So this is the reality. And he isTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 being contacted perhaps by nine different intelligence services.2 Now, there is no one who has supported the question of3 his mala fides. In other words, everyone, to a man, has4 stated that he is bona fide, that they have never been able to5 disprove a statement of fact that he has given as a statement of6 fact, although they do not necessarily agree with his hypotheses.7 That is the official statement.8 Mr. Miler. May I just add two things on this?9 First, Mr. Johnson, it goes back to the business of10 compartmentation and not advising stations. In the case Mr.11 Angleton cited, the Paris station of the CIA was not told12 anything about the information, and I think this is a very good13 example of why you would not.14 The second point I would like to follow up on is with15 respect to this defector's information, there were five leads16 which were passed to the FBI about penetration which involved17 the CIA, for action. And one case was solved, but it was18 solved only after the FBI officially sent us a letter saying19 that they concluded that there was no substance to this20 information.21 They had to reopen the investigation --22 Mr. Angleton. And they also said: send it to the Army.23 Mr. Miler. Yes, send it to the Army.24 Now, they had to reopen the investigation when their25 surveillance spotted a man coming out of the Soviet embassy, andTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 it was subsequently proved that he was a Soviet spy.2 Mr. Angleton. Now, that individual had performed four3 separate missions for Soviet intelligence since about 1938 or4 '39. One, he had been dropped in by the Soviets into Germany5 on a mission with the WT set, to be captured in order to be6 played back and to penetrate the German intelligence.7 Second, he had moved from that into the penetration ofVIASOV8 the Vassilov movement, which were the captured Russians in theVLASOV9 German--in the Vassilov Army.10 Third, he had penetrated the anti-Soviet forces in Germany11 and then he was taken on by us in 1948 or '51 is when they12 sent to renew his inks.13 So he was with us from '51 to around '60.14 Well, when the defection occurred, it was '62.15 Mr. Johnson. And Mr. Angleton, you used a term that is16 unfamiliar to us: his inks.17 Mr. Miler. Secret inks.18 Mr. Angleton. Secret inks. In other words, the Germans19 had captured a Soviet agent who had the same kind of20 inks, and so therefore the inks were compromised, so they laid21 on a large operation in Berlin and trained him in highly22 sophisticated inks. And he is now residing not too far23 distant from us.24 But I might add that it is very important to note that while25 we maintained that he is a Soviet agent, and the Bureau disagreedTOP SECRET