Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 33]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Bundy. I don't think the President ever acted Ian2 Fleming.3 Senator Baker. I think that is right. But I think it...4 is important for us, Mr. Bundy, to try to establish, as the5 Chairman said, the range of available information or evi-6 dence that sheds some light on the three alternative possi-7 bilities, and the type of things that the President interested8 himself in is terribly important in that respect.9 I believe that you said you had no information or no10 recollection of what particular situation, or what other11 deals that were made he was interested in.12 Mr. Bundy. I will put it more concretely than that.13 The President said, can't we do something more about Cuba?14 Why don't you get ahold of these people who are dealing with15 this and see if they can't do better, and pass the word16 that I am interested, that kind of thing.17 Senator Baker. Do I understand that to mean that he never18 spoke of a particular practice?19 Mr. Bundy. I can't tell you that, because I know, the20 record indeed reminds me, that particular actions that are21 related to Cuba that came up through the group of ten22 went to him, and some were approved and some were not.23 So, he clearly looked at them.24 I would have to have the documents there in order to25 be precise, and I don't have them with me.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 34]
# TOP SECRET1 Senator Baker. Which documents?2 Mr. Bundy. Documents which the Committee staff3 has provided.4 Mr. Schwarz. We have them.5 Senator Baker. Tell me what they are.6 Mr. Schwarz. November 30, 1961, Tab -- is that Tab H7 or Tab 4 about the November 30, 1961, which authorizes8 MONGOOSE?9 Mr. Kelley. Tab 4.10 Mr. Schwarz. May 5, '62, Lansdale Tab 21.11 Senator Baker. Let's stop there, if I may.12 Do you have a copy of this memorandum, Mr. Bundy?13 Mr. Kelley. He will have it in a moment.14 Mr. Bundy. One place these documents did not go is15 into the memorabilia of former members.16 Mr. Kelley. We are talking about Tab 4.17 Senator Baker. Mine says, see Lansdale Tab 4.18 Mr. Kelley. Yes. November 30, 1961.19 Senator Baker. I would really prefer if someone gave20 Mr. Bundy a copy of the same material I am working on.21 Mr. Kelley. All right, that is the chronology.22 Mr. Bundy. November 30, 1961?23 Senator Baker. Yes, sir. It is on page 3, the third24 item.25 Mr. Bundy. I have it.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 35]
TOP SECRET1 Senator Baker. President Kennedy's decision to begin2 MONGOOSE. Is it clear, Mr. Bundy, that President Kennedy made3 the decision to initiate the MONGOOSE program?4 Mr. Bundy. No question.5 Senator Baker. I notice in the staff interpretation6 under the column "Issues and Questions" that they alleged7 that you recall probably writing this memorandum.8 Mr. Bundy. That is really a logical inference. The9 President would not himself have written a long memorandum of10 instructions of this kind. It is possible that General11 Taylor wrote it. But I think it is more likely that I did.12 But in any event, whichever of us did so was doing it as a13 staff officer for the Prsident's convenience in recording14 his decision.15 Senator Baker. So at least to this extent there is16 no question about the chain of command, or the chance to17 control it, the President authorized it?18 Mr. Bundy. Just to underline that point, as I recall19 the paper which was shown to me, it is one from Mrs. Lincoln20 to General Taylor saying, the President wants you to have21 this as a description of the decisions.22 Senator Baker. Would you repeat that?23 Mr. Bundy. I think the covering memorandum on that24 document is from Mrs. Lincoln to General Taylor, and it says,25 the President wants you to have this as a record of hisTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 36]
TOP SECRET1 decisions.2 Senator Baker. Thank you, sir..3 Do you have an independent recollection of the meeting4 or the encounter with President Kennedy in connection with5 MONGOOSE?6 Mr. Bundy. Not a specific meeting, but of the process7 which led to this decision, yes.8 Senator Baker. Describe for me, if you will, what9 MONGOOSE was intended to be?10 Mr. Bundy. Well, MONGOOSE in a general way was the11 whole set of things to be concerned with mostly, but not only,12 covert activities against the Communist regime in Cuba.13 Senator Baker. The chronology also quotes the memo as14 saying, one, we will use our available assets to go ahead15 with the discussed project in order to help Cuba overthrow16 the Communist regime.17 Can you elaborate on that?18 Mr. Bundy. Not without documentary assistance beyond19 what I have just said. It was to be a fairly wide ranging20 program. I believe that what that really sort of implies21 to me is that all departments are to cooperate, that the22 Committee is to review possibilities, proposals, to seek23 them out, and that the thing is to be coordinated by the24 Committee, whose chairman will be -- this summary doesn't25 say so, but my recollection is that the chairman was to beTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 37]
# TOP SECRET1 General Taylor, and it does say that General Lansdale2 was to be the Chief of Operations.3 The Chairman. I have some questions at this point, please.4 Item 4 of this memorandum reads: "The NSC 54/12 Group5 will be kept closely informed of activities, and will be6 available for advice and recommendation".7 Does this suggest to you that the regular channel was8 supposed to operate with respect to MONGOOSE, that is to say,9 a central role was to be played by the Special Group in10 connection with its activities?11 Mr. Bundy. It is a puzzling sentence to me as I read12 it now. And I can't give you a precise answer on that. I13 think the general answer has to be that the 54/12 Group continus:14 through this period. General Taylor was the chairman of15 both. The overlapping of membership was extensive. And16 I think you would get a more precise answer as to the exact17 relation from General Taylor than I am in a position to give18 you.19 The Chairman. I have a very clear memory of General20 Taylor's testimony. And his testimony was that the Special21 Group Augmented was the group that had charge of operation22 MONGOOSE. It was further his testimony that all plans, all23 operations, were to be brought to the Special Group Aug-24 mented for its approval. And the approval of that Group25 was necessary before any such plans were actually implemented.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 38]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Bundy. I would certainly be clear on that, Mr.2 Chairman. I thought you were asking whether there was a3 further requirement that it go from the Special Group4 Augmented to the Special Group. And I have no precise view5 on that.6 The Chairman. I see.7 Now, when you refer to the NSC 54/12 Group --8 Mr. Bundy. That is what I think of as the Special Group.9 The Chairman. That is what you think of as the Special10 Group.11 I asked the question because the language is a little12 fuzzy.13 Mr. Bundy. It is.14 The Chairman. This language might suggest that there is15 an independent line of authority, and that the Special Group16 Augmented or the Special Group was simply to be kept informed,17 and its advice and recommendations would be taken under advise-18 ment.19 Mr. Bundy. I think myself, Mr. Chairman, that20 we don't have a very serious problem here, because I would21 agree with General Taylor's recollection that the Special22 Group Augmented was the Cuba group.23 Now, the Special Group is simply the same people less24 two or three. And the only real operational value of this25 paragraph is that perhaps the staff officer who serviced theTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 39]
TOP SECRET1 54/12 would be available in a decision to the staff officer2 servicing the Special Group Augmented. But the decision-making3 persons are simply a smaller number of the very people4 that both General Taylor and I recollect as having the main5 responsibility.6 The Chairman. So according to your best remembrance,7 you would agree with the testimony we have received from8 General Taylor?9 Mr. Bundy. Yes, I would.10 The Chairman. Mr. Smothers?11 Mr. Smothers. Mr. Bundy, perhaps we could get some help12 in how the recollections come together here. I might pursue13 for just a moment some of the background regarding other14 sources of information you may have had regarding the subject15 matter of his testimony.16 You indicated earlier that you had talked with Mr.17 Bissell about his testimony.18 Did you talk with persons other than Mr. Bissell?19 Mr. Bundy. Oh, yes.20 Mr. Smothers. Did you talk with Mr. McNamara?21 Mr. Bundy. Yes, indeed.22 Mr. Smothers. Regarding these events?23 Mr. Bundy. Yes.24 Mr. Smothers. Have you spoken with Mr. Gilpatric?25 Mr. Bundy. NO, I don't think I have.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 40]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Smothers. Mr. Rusk?2 Mr. Bundy. Yes.3 Mr. Smothers. Mr. McCone?4 Mr. Bundy. Yes.5 Mr. Smothers. Are there others?6 Mr. Bundy. I am sure there are. Mr. Rostow. Mr.7 Goodwin. There may well be others, Mr. Schlesinger and Mr.8 Dungam -- who has very little to do with it, but I talked9 to them because of my own absence of recollection about the10 Dominican Republic.11 Mr. Smothers. Let me just raise a few questions regard-12 ing those discussions, and perhaps it will be somewhat helpful13 to us in trying to piece this together.14 Has any documentary evidence passed between you and15 the persons previously mentioned regarding the subject16 matter of these hearings?17 Mr. Bundy. Not that I know of.18 Mr. Smothers. Did Mr. McCone provide you any documentary19 evidence?20 Mr. Bundy. No.21 Mr. Smother. Did you receive any documentary evidence22 from any source other than the staff?23 Mr. Bundy. No -- I beg your pardon. When I testified24 before the Rockefeller Commission I asked through that25 Commission whether I could look at NCS files particularly inTOP SECRET38
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 41]
TOP SECRET1 order to clarify my recollection of the 6th of August 1962.2 And I was allowed to look at the NSAM files. And my memory was refreshed by NSAM-1, which I believe the committee has.3 Mr. Smothers. Have you made a similar request to4 persons now within the Agency for on the White House staff?5 Mr. Bundy. No.6 Mr. Smothers. Could we go back into your conversation7 with Mr. Bissell? Could you describe for the Committee, please,8 your reaction when Mr. Bissell indicated to you that he had in9 testimony before this Committee told the Committee that10 either you or Mr. Rostow had asked him to establish an Execu-11 tive Action Capability?12 Mr. Bundy. He didn't report it that way to me. He13 reported it to me that the testimony that had been given by14 others placed this event in February 1961. Testimony by15 others indicated that he had said to them that he had been16 encouraged to do this by the White House, and that in casting17 around as to who might have encouraged, he had given the18 names of Rostow and Bundy. I think this is roughly what19 he said to me.20 The Chairman. That was the character of his testimony?21 Mr. Bundy. I told him that I thought he must22 be wrong about Rostow, because that wasn't the way it worked,23 and that my own recollection was not that we had encouraged24 him, but that I had at some stage been informed about it.25 TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 42]
TOP SECRET1 We then went on to a discussion of what it was. And2 we agreed that whatever else it was, it was not an operation3 plan, and it was not targeted against anyone.4 Mr. Smothers. What was his reaction to your comment5 that he had been informed as opposed to initiating?6 Mr. Bundy. I don't recall that we had a very extended7 discussion on it. I don't recall his reaction, and I don't8 recall exactly how I put the point.9 The Chairman. Let me just ask at that point, the way you10 have characterized Bissell's testimony correspnds with my11 memory of it. It is hard for me, however, to understand12 how Mr. Bissell -- why Mr. Bissell would have directed Mr.13 Harvey to develop such a capability, and apparently represented,14 if the documents are to be believed, to Mr. Harvey that he had15 been twice instructed to do this by the White House, if he16 had not in fact received such authority.17 Do you think that Mr. Bissell would have undertaken18 on his own initiative to develop such a capability and19 simply represented to his subordinate that he was doing so on20 instructions from the White House?21 Mr. Bundy. I think there is a prior question, Mr.22 Chairman, which is the credibility of the witness from whom he23 is taking this recollection.24 The Chairman. That is fair.25 Though Mr. Bissell himself did not seem disposed --TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 43]
TOP SECRETMr. Bundy. Mr. Bissell may not recollect that I did not give him this instruction, but I do, Mr. Chairman.The Chairman. Did Mr. Bissell at any time during the period under question, or at any later time, ever inform you of CIA activities or involvement in assassination attempts against any foreign leader?Mr. Bundy. No.The Chairman. Doesn't it strike you as strange, since Mr. Bissell was aware of such attempts, that he would not have told him?Mr. Bundy. Well, I don't want, for reasons that I have already explained, to speculate as to why he did or did not. I was operating, working on the assumption that I would know that kind of thing if it existed.The Chairman.Senator Mathias?Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to leave the record, or Mr. Bundy's mind, or in the alternative, my mind, in a state of confusion as to what exactly Mr. Bissell's recollection was.Now, he was depending somewhat on Mr. Harvey's recollection and notes in the first instance. But as I recall, he was very clear as a matter of independent recollection that he had been horsed along a couple of times by the White House on proceeding with the development of the Executive Action Capability. And that was a matter of independent recollection,TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 44]
TOP SECRET1 it didn't' depend on anybody else's notes or anybody else's2 refreshing his recollection.3 Mr. Bundy. That he didn't say to me, and I have no way4 of commenting on it.5 The Chairman. I think we must carefully review the6 record on that score.7 Senator Baker. It may be necessary to ask him to come8 back for that purpose.9 May I ask a question there?10 Mr. Bundy, do you have any recollection of any specific11 covert plans that would involve poisons, hypdermic syringes,12 or other potentially lethal devices in conjunction with acti-13 vities against Cuba?14 Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection of any specific plan.15 I do have a very vague, essentially refreshed recollection16 that I heard the word poison at some point in connection with17 a possibility of action in Cuba. But that is as far as I18 have been able to take it in my own memory.19 Senator Baker. Can you remember who may have men-20 tioned it to you and what the purposes of the poison may have21 been?22 Mr. Bundy. Nothing at all about it in detail.23 Senator Baker. A poison pen?24 Mr. Bundy. No, some kind of poison about which -- one25 thing that does stick in my mind is that it seems totallyTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 45]
TOP SECRET1 impractical because it was going to kill a large group of2 people in a headquarters mess, or something of that sort.3 Senator Baker. Do you remember whether the plan was4 declared non-feasible or infeasible by the Department of5 Defense?6 Mr. Bundy. No, I have no such recollection.7 Senator Baker. Do you remember anything about a hypodermic8 syringe to carry poisons in a ballpoint pen?9 Mr. Bundy. That is the sort of thing that I was asked10 the other day, and I said I remember it, and then it seems to11 me about ten seconds later was that what I was remembering was12 murder mysteries and nothing related to Cuba. I have no13 recollection of connecting anything like that to Cuba.14 Senator Baker. I have another question, but I will15 wait, if you have something else.16 The Chairman. Go ahead, sir.17 Senator Baker. Do you feel that you have a good insight18 into the relationship between the President and his brother19 Robert Kennedy in this respect, that is, having to do with20 Cuba operations, and Robert Kennedy and Richard Helms?21 Mr. Bundy. I have a pretty good picture of the relation-22 ship between President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy on Cuba,23 and on many other things. It is a recollection which grows24 stronger as the administration goes on, because I got to25 know them better, and, of course, they got to know me better,TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 46]
TOP SECRET1 and the relationship tends to become closer, my relation with2 both of them. I had known the President for many, many3 years, and the Attorney General much more briefly.4 I do not -have any clear picture of the relationship5 between the Attorney General and Mr. Helms. My curbstone6 judgment would have been that it was not close.7 Senator Baker. Based on your insight, did the Presi-8 dent delegate to Robert Kennedy substantial aspects of Cuba9 policy during the period we are speaking of?10 Mr. Bundy. I wouldn't put it that way, Senator11 Baker. He certainly counted on the Attorney General to be12 a kind of gingerman on a great many subjects, of which Cuba13 and counterinsurgency were the two that came more closely with-14 in my area of interest.15 Senator Baker. Counterinsurgency meaning what?16 Mr. Bundy. Counterinsurgency meaning all those efforts17 like the Green Berets and organizing to be able to assist18 countries threatened by Communist subversion internally.19 Senator Baker. Are you speaking of counterinsurgency20 as it led to Cuba, or as a general capability?21 Mr. Bundy. There was a separate committee, the Special22 Committee on CI, counterinsurgency. And the Attorney General23 was an active member of that. And I used to see him playing24 this very important role of poking and prodding, and why can't25 you do more, and why can't you do better, and why aren't weTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 47]
TOP SECRET1 making more progress.2 Senator Baker. Who was on that committee?3 Mr. Bundy. I am sorry, I can't decide from recollection.4 General Taylor was again the Chairman, but the membership was5 different.6 Senator Baker. Do you have minutes or records of that7 group?8 Mr. Schwarz. No.9 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request10 that with Mr. Bundy's assistance after this hearing that we iden-11 tify as much as we can what that group is, and make a fomral12 request for documentation.13 Mr. Aaron. We have reviewed some of that material at14 the John F. Kennedy Library. It is essentially in fact the15 group that reviewed paramilitary operations and potential16 insurgency situations.in a number of countries. There was an17 insurgency list. It did not seem to relate to the subject18 we are speaking of here. So we did not request the documents.19 But we could have gotten them.20 Senator Baker. Will you do that, please?21 Is that agreeable, Mr. Chairman?22 The Chairman. What is your request?23 Senator Baker. I would like documentation or any records24 relating to the counterinsurgency group during the period in25 question.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 48]
TOP SECRET1 The Chairman. Let me suggest that we designate a mem-2 ber of the committee staff to undertake that review, and3 report back to the committee.4 Would that be satisfactory?5 Senator Baker. That is fine. I just want to know if6 there is any worthwhile documentation.7 The Chairman. Yes. Because it may be entirely ancillary8 to this issue.9 Senator Baker. Let me ask Mr. Bundy this. Would that10 group have been important toward American policy during this11 period?12 Mr. Bundy. The CI Group?13 Senator Baker. Yes.14 Mr. Bundy. I would think only most marginally,15 Senator Baker, simply because the existence of other groups,16 the Special Group Augmented or the MONGOOSE Group, was so17 clearly dominant and was the Central Committee for that sub-18 ject.19 Senator Baker. The gingerbread man concept?20 Mr. Bundy. The gingerman concept.21 Senator Baker. The gingerman concept. There is a22 difference.23 Do I directly infer from that description that the24 President would authorize Robert Kennedy to urge and expedite25 action to move from assignment to assignment and to push peopleTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 49]
TOP SECRET1 along to produce a result?2 Mr. Bundy. In a general way that is right. But the3 form it took in the areas in which I was concerned was in one4 sense quite informal. I know of no instance where the Attorney5 General tried to replace the normal channel -- let's stay away6 for the moment from the covert question and the Cuban ques-7 tion, which I know you will want to talk about more precisely --8 but if he felt, as he often did, that American policy in9 Africa, for example, was insufficiently sensitive to the aspir-10 ations of black people in Africa, he wouldn't fire off a kick, he11 would come in and say, why can't you people do something about12 the State Department on news and stuff.13 Senator Baker. There is some evidence -- we had direct14 testimony that Mr. Helms, who was DDP at the time in ques-15 tion, rather than DCI, clearly thought that the authority of16 the Agency was to overthrow the Castro regime by any means, in-cluding assassination.18 And when pressed on the source of that authority he de-19 signed to say that anyone specifically told him that, but20 that he talked to Robert Kennedy frequently about it. Would21 this be in the gingerman concept you are speaking of?22 Mr. Bundy. Now we are right at the specific point I23 would like to make. But everything I knew about Bobby Kennedy24 when he was goading and spurring people on is that he never25 took away from the existing channel of authority its authorityTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 50]
# TOP SECRET1 or responsibility.2 Senator Baker. Would what I describe be consistent3 with whatyou describe?4 Mr. Bundy. Not if it is interpreted as meaning that he5 was providing a separate channel of authority.6 Senator Baker. What I meant was just what it was, and7 that is, Helms described for us meeting with Kennedy apparently8 to stimulate the Agency's activities to produce the overthrow9 of the Castro regime, and that he met regularly with Kennedy10 in this respect.11 Mr. Bundy. I don't know how often they met or what was12 said, I know nothing about that. I would have said, just in13 passing, that the Attorney General's relationship to the Direc-14 tor of Central Intelligence was much closer and more impor-15 tant than his relationship to Mr. Helms.16 Senator Baker. I am correct, am I, that Helms at the17 time was DDP and not DCI?18 Mr. Schwarz. That is right.19 Senator Baker. Do you have any idea why he would have20 met regularly with the DDP rather than the DCI?21 Mr. Bundy. I have no idea that he did. I know that he22 met often and intimately and easily with the Director of23 Central Intelligence, who was a close personal friend of his.24 Senator Baker. You are speaking of Mr. McCone?25 Mr. Bundy. Mr. McCone.# TOP SECRET