Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 67]
# TOP SECRETyourself and Fields would indicate to you that he wasn't being considered at that point for an assassination mission?Mr. Tweedy. I will put it differently. As far as I know he was never considered for an assassination mission at all.He thought he was presumably being sent ouf for deeds of daring in the PM field and began to talk rather lusty when he arrived, but I think he was soon put straight.Mr. Baron. PM is paramilitary operations?Mr. Tweedy. Yes.Mr. Baron. Let me show you a document we will mark Exhibit 7, dated December 17, 1960, which is a cable to the headquarters, marked to Director from Leopoldville dealing with WIROGUE on an approach. he made to agent QJWIN.(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 7 for identification.)# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 68]
# TOP SECRETMr. Tweedy. Yes, I know that. This is the one we dis-cussed two months ago and this happens all the time.Mr. Baron. We are referring specifically to QJWIN'sreport that"WIROGUE had offered him $300 per month to par-ticipate in intel net and be member" --I am sorry -- "member'execution squad'".Mr. Tweedy. Yes; I remember all of this as a resultof your having previously brought it to my attention and Irecall it, it was a typical example of an agent or assetfull of piss and vinegar exceeding his brief and he wascertainly put back on the track very early on.But in this business do not confuse execution squadwith anything to do with the assassination of Lumumba or any-thing else. It had nothing to do with that.Mr. Baron. You are saying even though you wouldassume that Mr. Hedgman's testimony about poisons coming tothe Congo and instructions to carry out an assassinationcoming to the Congo was true, the approach that WIROGUE madeto QJWIN was probably not a part of that mission.Mr. Tweedy. It was quite specifically not a part ofthat mission. There was a chapter of accidents. You haveseen it happen, I have seen it happen, a thousand times be-fore, two people who are periphically involved in the samething and run into each .er and one smells something on theother.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 69]
# TOP SECRETMr. Baron. Again, why are you so sure that this would not have been connected in any way to the assassination mission?Mr. Tweedy. I thought I made that clear because this man went out up to a point through what I would call the open channel, it was developed by the Division, giving training by the Division and was sent out. This had nothing to do whatsoever with the other thing and wouldn't have been handled that way.Mr. Baron. Could he have been instructed by Mr. Hedgman, after he got to the Congo, that he was to undertake recruitment of assets for participation in an assassination mission as part of his general duties in the Congo?Mr. Tweedy. It is purely a speculative question. He could have been but Hedgman would also have been required and would have told headquarters what he was doing with him. That was not the purpose for his being sent. The purpose for which he was sent out was unspecific at the time, generally in the PM field.Mr. Baron. Did this report create a flap at headquarters at the time when the cable was sent?Mr. Tweedy. No, not at all.Mr. Baron. It would have been considered a fairly usual --Mr. Tweedy. It is not.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 70]
# TOP SECRETMr. Baron. -- example of free wheeling by an operative?Mr. Tweedy. It is the sort of thing that can happen.What you want to do is put a stop to it. But no great problem.The problem must have lasted 30 minutes.Mr. Baron. Have you ever discussed events in the Congo with Sidney Gottlieb?Mr. Tweedy. Have I ever discussed events in the Congo with Sidney Gottlieb?I can only assume I must have seen Sid during this period, during this period, but I don't recall any discussions. In fact, if there had been any discussions with Sidney-Gottlieb on the Congo it would have been at that time.Mr. Baron. Why would that be so?Mr. Tweedy. Otherwise Sidney Gottlieb would have had no interest in the Congo.Mr. Baron. So you mean if there had been any discussions between yourself and Sidney Gottlieb it probably would have --Mr. Tweedy. It would have surrounded these events.Mr. Baron. The development of lethal biological substances in his laboratory?Mr. Tweedy. Yes, sir. Not necessarily that, because I think that would have been Sidney Cottlieb's business as to what he developed in his laboratory. My only interest presumably would have been was there anything in his inventory# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 71]
TOP SECRETthat could possibly be used if we ever wanted to use something.Mr. Baron. You might have had at least an exploratory conversation with him on that subject?Mr. Tweedy. I would be surprised if I didn't.Or perhaps Bussell had a conversation with him and then I followed it up, something like that. I would suspect that probably the first conversation would undoubtely have been held between Dick Bissell and Sidney Gottlieb but this is merely what I would suspect was the way it occurred.I don't say that that is the way it occurred. But other than that no conversation with Sidney Gottlieb on the Congo at all.Mr. Baron. I am at the end of my questions on specific facts concerning the Congo during this period of time leading up to Lumumba's death which, as you know, is the narrow subject of our inquiry right now, and first of all I want to say that I appreciate tremendously and know that the Committee is appreciative and grateful for your testimony here today. It is a difficult subject. It is only one narrow aspect of what the Committee is undertaking, and unpleasant, but unnecessary aspect to assemble.I wonder if you have any facts that you would like to add to the record that you think are necessary to put our discussion today into context?Mr. Tweedy. I think the strongest recollection about.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 72]
TOP SECRETmy period as Chief of the African Division and the Congo -- let's leave the balance of Africa out -- and U.N. and U.S. involvement in the Congolese matter, that I have never seen an element of the Agency so totally involved in a matter which clearly had the highest policy approval. I am not talking about Lumumba, I am talking about the Congo.Mr. Baron. There was an extreme sense of urgency at that time?Mr. Tweedy. Not only an extreme sense of urgency, the U.S. was supporting the U.N., the Agency was supporting the U.S. Government, the U.S. Government requests. What the Agency was doing was very closely coordinated appropriately with any organs of government that need to be covered, mostly State, the White House. I must say the Executive Department was very much working as a team during these days. AGain for-get Lumumba. I am now talking the whole Congo action. And I never felt that anything we were doing was wandering off in-to left field or that I didn't know the way the White House was thinking about things, or the State Department was thinking about things, and the National Security was thinking about things, and I have no reason to believe they ever felt that they didn't know how CIA was thinking about things. It was an extra-ordinarily close thing.I remember Mennen Williams trying to form a Congo club. When I retired from the African Division I wasTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 73]
TOP SECRET71 given a little thing for a watch chain, if I had one, which would be a member of the Congo Club, and it was rather typical of the way the government worked on this thing and I personally felt excellent advised that the U.S. was absolutely right to support the U.N. on this. I think it could have been a total disaster if Kutanga had been allowed to succeed, and although Mobutu was acting like an ass now, that is Africa for you, but on the whole that country has done pretty well and I consider we had a considerable role in giving it a chance to move the way it has.There are going to be ups and downs with the things but that is the way it is. I feel very strongly about it.Does that somewhat answer your question, does that help?Mr. Baron. I simply wanted to give you a chance.Mr. Tweedy. I felt that very strongly and no other assignment that. I have ever had was this kind of government team and cooperation ever really required. because we weren't engaged or I wasn't engaged in that kind of activity.Mr. Baron. Is this government team efforts that you ar.. talking about one that was primarily put together to carry out the paramilitary activities in the Congo in the latter part of the 60's, '62, '63.Mr. Tweedy. It was put together to preside over whatever activity the United States Government felt it neededTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 74]
# TOP SECRETto be engaged in in the Congo. This included such things as purely policy questions of what the Ambassddor to the U.N. might say to the Secretary General of the U.N.or what the President might want to say conceivably I suppose to the Chief of the Belgium state on such matters. Everything certainly didn't just involve what CIA was going to be involved in. It was the whole policy ball of wax with respect to the Congo which obviously had many ganglia and which the CIA part and paramilitary activity was just a bit.Mr. Baron. Did this high degree of organization and intensity of concern begin sometime after the death of Lumumba or had it gotten rolling?Mr. Tweedy. I think --Mr. Baron. After the Congolese independence?Mr. Tweedy. I think the U.S. Government was thoroughly seized with the intimate problem and danger of a disintegrating Congo that started in the earliest days of independence and continued and, of course, when the Tachombe-Kutanga thing became a fact of life, which is basically why the U.N. was there, then, of course, that was it.In other words, I would say that U.S. involvement, U.S. concern, merely moved with the events, as anybody could read them in the press just continued and continued, but one thin: was perfectly clear, was that the U.S. was quite determined to see this thing through. Nothing had been clearer than# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 75]
# TOP SECRETthe way President Kennedy presided over those two meetings.He was annoyed by the Congo and irritated by it and he was worried that he had to spend so much bloody time on it, but he was damn well determined to see the thing through and he was continually goosing his staff to do just that , but in support of the U.N. We weren't going to do it all by ourselves. It couldn't have been clearer.Mr. Baron. All right, as I mentioned before, the Committee is interested in your wisdom on policy-making and analysis in the intelligence community generally and there may be other members of the Committee staff that would like to call upon you to testify on other subjects because of your long experience in Agency activities.But I want to thank you now for your complete cooperation and the tremendous amount of information that you have provided on this one subject that has been very helpful?Mr. Tweedy. Thank you, Mr. Baron. I can assure you anything I can do to help the Committee in other areas I will be glad to do it and if I don't think I can help because I don't think I know enough about the subject I will just say so, otherwise: am not afraid to put my two bits in.Mr. Baron. As far as your two bits goes, we would be interested in your two bits worth on policy recommendation in general, institutional, critique or suggestions for change or any kind of recommendations that you would care to make,# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 76]
# TOP SECRETand we will take that up at some point in the future. But you have obviously had a good deal of experience at the policy level in the Agency and we like to take advantage of that.That is all, thank you.Mr. Tweedy. All right, than you very much.(Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the hearing was concluded.)---# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992Date: 08/04/95Page: 1# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORM# AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10081RECORDS SERIES: HEARINGSAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 10-H-13# DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM: GOODWIN, RICHARDTO :TITLE :DATE: 07/10/75PAGES: 61SUBJECTS: ASSASSINATION, TRUJILLODOMINICAN REPUBLICCIAEISENHOWER, DWIGHTDOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPTCLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIEDRESTRICTIONS: OPEN IN FULLCURRENT STATUS: RELEASED WITH DELETIONSDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/12/98OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: Box 3[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTEDNW 50955 DocId: 32423469 Page 1
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 1]
# TOP SECRETNATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATIONUnauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal SanctionsThe United States SenateR478Report of ProceedingsHearing held beforeSenate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence ActivitiesThursday, July 10, 1975Washington, D.C.(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)WARD & PAUL410 FIRST STREET, S. E.WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003(202) 844-6000TOP SECRET![photo of a black square]
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 2]
# TOP SECRETCONTENTSPhone (Area 202) 544-6600PAGE12 TESTIMONY OF 53 Richard M. Goodwin.456 EXHIBITS7 EXHIBIT FOR IDENTIFICATION8 No. 1 109 No. 2 1110 No. 3-A 2111 N9. 3-B 23121314151617181920212223242576 U 0 0 0 0 5 1 3 ? ?WARD & PAUL410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 3]
# TOP SECRETEXECUTIVE SESSIONThursday, July 10, 1975United States Senate,Select Committee to Study GovernmentalOperations with Respect toGovernmental Activities,Washington, D. C.The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 5:02 o'clockp.m. in Room S-128, The Capitol, the Honorable Frank Church(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Baker andSchweiker.Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; FrederickA. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, MinorityCounsel; Charles Kirbow, Charles Lombard, Michael J. Madigan,David Aaron, Joe Dennin, Elizabeth Culbreth and Patrick Shea,Professional Staff Members.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 4]
TOP SECRET21## PROCEEDINGS2The Chairman. We will come back into order.3Mr. Goodwin, would you please take the oath?4Do you swear that all the testimony you are about to give5in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and6nothing but the truth, so help you God?7Mr. Goodwin. I do.8The Chairman. I am given to understand that there has9been some problem in connection with your appearance here todayand that there are some notes that you have that you feel you10need for purposes of your testimony which you have not brought11with you. Is that the case?12Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I think they might be helpful. They13have been in storage for several years and I just had no access14to them. I have to go get them out of the storage. They were15notes -- my files and everything have been in storage for16several years. I've had no access to them. And they consist17of the files that I brought from the White House with me.18The Chairman. Have you been interviewed by members of the19staff and shown certain documents that the staff believes will20be pertinent to your testimony?21Mr. Goodwin. I have been shown documents connected with22the Dominican Republic and the assassination of Trujillo today.23The Chairman. And do you believe that you are prepared24today to give us testimony relating to Mr. Trujillo or do you25TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 5]
TOP SECRET1 believe that you need to or ought to review those notes beforeyou give any testimony?Mr. Goodwin. Well, I'm of course fully prepared to testirto the best of my recollection to any matter, and I thinkprobably in the case of the Dominican Republic, the documentshave been adequate. I think there's a good chance that goingthrough the files may very well add something to my recollectionof Cuba and Castro.The Chairman. Well I will have this suggestion to make。We will take your testimony on the Trujillo matter today, andthen -- how long will it take you to get your files and reviewthem and come back fully prepared to give us your testimony onthe other issues?Mr. Goodwin. Well, it will take a day or two. It ispossible I will not be able to get access to them until Mondaymorning. It's kind of like trying to get to Pocatelloand find them in a warehousa, because I'm up in Rumford, Maine.But I am sure that it would not take more than a day or two.The Chairman. So that if the Committas were to give youthat opportunity, would you then get those files, review them,and respond to the request by the Committee that you appear thefirst of next week to testify?Mr. Goodwin. If that is your wish, certainly.The Chairman. We are most anxious to complete the recordand your testimony is necessary, and it would certainlyTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 6]
TOP SECRET1 accomodate our need if you would cooperate.2 Mr. Goodwin. I would be glad to.3 The Chairman. All right.4 With that understanding then, Mr. Schwarz, are you5 prepared to proceed with the questioning on Trujillo?6 Mr. Schwars. I'm sorry Mr. Goodwin that we didn't hava7 a chance to get together. I thought we were going to have a8 chance to do that on Tuesday, and I have not had a chance to9 speak to you but I do know some of the material, and perhaps10 we can work on the material.11 Before we do so, could you state your full name and your12 address please?13141516171819202122232425TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 7]
TOP SECRETTESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. GOODWINMr. Goodwin. Richard M. Goodwin, 1536 32nd Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.Mr. Schwarz. And as a master of course, we tell all of our witnesses what they no doubt know, that they have their right to counsel, and you know that, and if you want to stop to obtain counsel, you know that you can do that?Mr. Goodwin. I already have too many lawyers.Mr. Schwarz. And you know what your constitutional rights are?Mr. Goodwin. Hopefully.Mr. Schwarz. Now, what connection did you have with the Dominican Republic in the winter and spring of 1961?Mr. Goodwin. I came into the White House as Assistant Special Counsel to the President, having worked on Latin American affairs policy statements in the proceeding campaign. I became involved in Latin America. And from that period until I left to go to the State Department, I was involved on a daily basis with Prasident Kennedy and his activities in Latin America which included what was happening in the Dominican Republic in terms that I drafted contingency plans, I prepared cables that went to Mr. Dearborn focussing on the areas that you are interested in, and I was with him every day on something connected with Latin America.Mr. Schwarz. Without your turning to the documentaryTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 8]
TOP SECRET1 material, would you racount for the Committee your understandin2 of what the United States government policy toward the Dominic3 Republic was in the winter and spring of '61 and what actions4 were taken to implement that policy.5 Mr. Goodwin. Well, that policy was a continuation of the6 policy established by President Eisenhower when he, in7 accordance with the vote of the OAS, voted to sever - decided8 to sever diplomatic and commercial relations with the Dominican9 Republic and the situation which you know arose was precipitated10 by the attempted assassination of President Betancourt by the11 President of the Dominican Republic.12 So that from that point on when we came in, the feeling13 was, first of all, of course that Trujillo was even more14 at odds with the philosophy of the Alliance for Progress than15 had been and beyond that, having cut off diplomatic and other16 relations, that Trujillo's time: dh office was probably.17 numbered. The principal support of the regime in that decade18 which was often in great domestic difficulty had been the19 concept of American support, it strengthened Trujillo against20 his opposition.21 At that point our policy became one of trying to anticios.22 at least, the fall of Trujillo. Of course the Castro thing23 was very much in everybody's mind and the principal concern :24 the President, the one thing he didn't want was for Trujillo25 to go and a Communist leader to come in. So I think the policyTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 9]
TOP SECRET1 was to keep up our economic and diplomatic pressure to hope2 that when Trujillo went, however he went, whether violently or3 peacefully or died a natural death that the succession would4 be a moderate, democratic group friendly to the interests of5 the United States in the Caribbean and therefore try to keep in6 touch with and halp out and keep communications open with7 the potential successor groups, and it was very hard to8 pinpoint.9 Mr. Schwarz. What steps did you take during the period10 of time you were involved, or prior thereto, if you know11 about it, in order to assist one or more of the dissident12 groups?13 Mr. Goodwin. Well, we did all sorts -- everything from14 policy statements, the use of USIA, the use of economic15 pressure, to maintain our network of contacts with exile16 groups principally'in New York and elsewhere. A certain number17 of limited covert operations, some transfer of arms. Dearborn18 of course was one of the principals, his principal instruction19 was to try to keep all channels of communication open, he was20 zealous in this because he disliked Trujillo intensely himself21 and felt that he ought to be allied with these other groups.22 And I read through the sort of overall planning papers, and I23 think they fairly reflect that range of operations.24 None of them were terribly effective.25 Mr. Schwarz. In connection with the transfer of arma,TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10081.pdf — page 10]
# TOP SECRET1 what, to your understanding, was the time at which authorization2 was provided to transfer arms?3 Mr. Goodwin. January 12, 1960, under President Eisenhower.4 Mr. Schwarz. And that was at a meeting of the Special5 Group?6 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I don't know because they didn't let7 me in that week, but there was an NSC action memorandum of8 some kind which just set forth the authorization. I don't really9 know the procedure.10 Mr. Schwarz. When were the arms passed?11 Mr. Goodwin. I don't know. I became aware of the transfer12 of arms. The transfer I think you're thinking of is the13 transfer of a couple of carbines and .38 pistols. After the14 transfer had been made, the message of communication that15 came to us from the Dominican Republic along with the request16 for the transfer of machine guns which were to be used in an17 effort to kill Trujillo, the smaller guns were to be given as18 Dearborn told me later in conversation after the assassination19 because these people felt their own lives were in danger,20 especially if they embarked on anything as risky as trying to21 kill Trujillo, and they wanted some self-defense weapons, and22 they were given to them for self-defense and then they made a23 request that they wanted weapons to try an assassination, they24 wanted a machine gun.25 Assassinating Trujillo, of course, a lot of people had# TOP SECRET