Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 9]
# TOP SECRET1 professional contact with Mr. Merchant. I knew him mostly2 slightly socially.Mr. Baron. When you met regularly with Mr. Satterswateor Mr. Penfield did you discuss Lumumba with them?5 Mr. Tweedy. I am sure we discussed Lumumba in the6 sense of which would be all the time, assessing the situa-7 tion, assessing where Lumumba was heading, where the Congowas heading. I did this with, you know, almost all of theAfrican situations, individual African country situations.We would spend a great deal of time, their points ofview, our point of view, cur perspective, their perspective,but never as an action matter that I can recall.Mr. Baron. Was the assassination of Patrice Lumumbaever contemplated or raised in those meetings?Mr. Tweedy. Never.Mr. Baron. Did you meet regularly in this periodbetween Congolese independence and the announced death ofLumumba with people at the NSC level or people in the WhiteHouse?Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall so at all. For example, ifPresident Eisenhower had an African representative the sameway President Kennedy later had, then I can't recall who hewas. President Kennedy had two. The first name escapesme. He later went on down to South Africa as Ambassadorand one that I saw most of for a considerable period of# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 10]
# TOP SECRETtime was Carl Kazen, recently retired head of the School of Advanced Studies in Princeton.Mr. Baron. During the Eisenhower Administration did you have direct contact with Gordon Gray or Andrew Goodpaster with reference to Congolese affairs.You are shaking your head and we have to put it on the record.Mr. Tweedy. I am alsmot convinced that the answer is no. I am just thinking. I know Gordon Gray quite well. I don't recall ever having policy discussions with him at all, nor General Goodpaster. I think the answer is certainly no.Mr. Baron. You mentioned to me earlier that you had attended only two National Security Council meetings in your memory and that those two meetings were both long after the death of Lumumba, is that correct?Mr. Tweedy. I can only imagine that they must have been because this was well into the Kennedy Administration. I wouldn't be able to put any dates on it now.Mr. Baron. It was during the directorship of John McCone at CIA?Mr. Tweedy. Yes, that is without question. And McBundy was at the meetings. Yes, it must have been well after the death of Lumumba, maybe even the following year.Mr. Baron. During the latter part of the Eisenhower# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 11]
# TOP SECRETAdministration when events in Congo were heatingup, after Congolese independence, what was the general atmosphere in the State Department and at the CIA in relation to Lumumba, the general attitude toward Lumumba?Mr. Tweedy. Well, I think you would have to start by saying what was the general assessment of the situation in the Congo. Lumumba was really sort of the last thing you came down to.The worry in Washington about the situation in the Congo was that here was the largest geographical expression in Africa that thretened to go up in smoke, up because the Kremlin was about to march in and take it over, not because it was about to break up tribally and do all the things that those African countries in their early years were at least vulnerable to. The only trouble with the Congo was if it happened there the side effects would have been infinitely greater than, of course, if it had happened anywhere else.Mr. Baron. What would those side effects have been?Mr. Tweedy. All one culd do was assess those, but it would have set a precedent, for example, the neighboring country by which great store was set by the West was Nigeria and if the same infection crossed that border one was afraid that this would go up in smoke and that in effect there was a possibility of the continent disintegrating before it really had had a chance to get under way under its own aegis.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 12]
# TOP SECRETThis was the concern.Mr. Baron. Were these political side effects only that were being taken into account or were there also fears for American business interests in the Congo that were part of the side effects?Mr. Tweedy. Insofar as my assessments were concerned, and those of the Agency and any conversations I can recall with the State Department, American business was just not a great factor.If you want to talk about business, the big factor, of course, was Katanga and eventually when Tachombe threatened to succeed resulting in the great involvamant of both the U.N. and the U.S. in the Congo affair, the fear there was that if you put together the Congo without Katanga it was like construct-ing a Cadillac and purposely omitting the gas station.Mr. Baron. That is because Kutanga is the home of most of the natural resources that are in the Congo.Mr. Tweedy. That is the only thing that keeps that country going.Now, I don't say there weren't a lot of economic con-siderations in back of that but these were political economic concerns much more than anything parochial, but is whatwas going to happen to U.S. business was not a factor inso-far as I recall.Mr. Baron. So the primary concern was for political# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 13]
# TOP SECRETstability in Africa.Mr. Tweedy. Yes, political stability in Africa. In a quick phrase you put your foot right on that.Mr. Dawson. During the summer of 1960 you mentioned earlier that in the time frame you did not think the Kremlin was ready to march in there, as that was a fear with you but --Mr. Tweedy. I don't mean to say this was nothing that anybody was worred about but it was not the primary concern.Mr. Dawson. But there was significant Soviet interest in infiltrating and taking advantage of the situation in the Congo?Mr. Tweedy. I think it would be much more accurate to say it was our assumption, we were not privy to Soviet intentions with respect to Africa, which I suspect in those days like a great many other things about African culture round the globe were ill informed at that point, and un-doubtedly seeking their own polcies in Africa just the way this country was. It was obviously a worry.Mr. Baron. Was it also our assumption if the Soviets moved into the Congo they would move on the side of Lumumba?Mr. Tweedy. Oh, yes, I think there would have been little doubt in our minds that that would have been the case.Mr. Baron. And is it also true that the general perception at the Agency and in the State Department was that Lumumba# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 14]
TOP SECRET1 posed the threat in the Congo beyond the mere threat ofpolitical instability because of his closeness to the Soviets2 or his willingness to accept aid from the Soviets?3 Mr. Tweedy. It made the cheese more binding but I4 don't think we had any information indicating there was5 any close umbilicus between the Soviets and Lumumba but it6 was potentially there.7 Mr. Baron. And that potential --8 Mr. Tweedy. This increased one's nervousness about the9 situation.10 Mr. Baron. In your capacity as Chief of the African11 Division to whom did you report and from whom did you receive12 orders?13 Mr. Tweedy. Well, the normal chain of command was14 through DDD, Dick Bissell and --15 Mr. Baron. Would you meet regularly with Richard16 Bissell during this period of time?17 Mr. Tweedy. Regularly would be a big word. Not18 necessarily that often. We might talk on the phone. To19 say that I saw him all the time, how often I don't know. It20 would go in fits and starts, undoubtedly but --22 Mr. Baron. In formulating actions to be taken in the23 Congo, would you consult with Bissell before you undertook24 any major operation.25 Mr. Tweedy. Well, depending on what you mean byTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 15]
# TOP SECRET1 major operation. Major operation per se, if you are not2 talking about just intelligence operations, call for in-3 structions and formalization either inside the Agency or out-4 side.5 Mr. Baron. So any major covert action would be6 formulated in consultation not only with Bissell but with the7 DCI, Allen Dulles at that time, and probably higher levels than that.8 Mr. Tweedy. I suppose the DCI, if Bissell felt that9 was necessary, and, of course, he used to talk to the10 DCI without my being present, and undoubtedly certain instruc-11 tions I would receive from time to time undoubtedly stem from12 conversations that Bissell would have had with the DCI and funnelled down to me.14 I didn't always know who talked to whom before I re-16 ceived instructions.17 Mr. Baron. So if you received an instruction from18 Richard Bissell as DDP you would proceed to implement that instruction on the assumption it was fully authorized above the level of DDP?20 Mr. Tweedy. I think I would proceed with it on the21 basis that he was authorized to give me instructions and it was up to him to bloody well know what he was empowered to tell me to do.24 I couldn't run his affairs for him to that extent, but# TOP SECRET![photo of ward a paul phone area 202 546-4000]
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 16]
TOP SECRET14by and large I reckon the Agency worked and that was the way it was set up to work and that is the way it worked, but to say every time Bissell talked to me he always talked to Allen Dulles first I would think is nonsense.Mr. Baron. You didn't consider it your duty to question Bissell about the source of authority for some covert action he was asking you to undertake?Mr. Tweedy. I would have never hesitated to do if I felt that it was necessary to do so.I can't recall having done so. He and I used to have disagreements philosophically on operations. We were very good friends and I never had any hesitation about telling him when I thought he didn't make any sense but --Mr. Dawson. Could you describe that philosophical difference, or is it describable?Mr. Tweedy. Well it varied a lot. I think Dick was by and large inclined to feel that almost anything was possible, you know, in the clandestine service, if they put their minds to it, and my view was this wasn't the case.Mr. Dawson. Thank you.Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss the question of assassinating Lumumba with Richard Bissell?Mr. Tweedy. Yes, this was the way the whole thing came up in the first instance. I can't remember how it came up except undoubtedly we had a conversation.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 17]
TOP SECRET151 Mr. Baron. Do you recall when it came up?2 Mr. Tweedy. No, I don't. It obviously must have come up, I assume, what, the fall of 1960. But I have no way of putting a date to it.4 Mr. Baron. And what was said during that discussion or perhaps I should backtrack first and ask whether this was one discussion or a series of discussions?7 Mr. Tweedy. Oh, we must have discussed it more than once. I think it came up in the sense that Dick would have said we probably better be thinking about whether it might ever be necessary or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which case we presumably should be in position to assess whether we could do it or not successfully.13 Mr. Baron. Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?15 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him in any other sense but a planning exercise, but a planning exercise which, in other words, never were we instructed to do anything of this kind. We were instructed to ask whether such a thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of Station he thinking along those lines as well.21 Mr. Baron. So, in effect you were asked to move ahead at least as far as developing the capability to carry of an assassination if an order should be given?24 Mr. Tweedy. Well, or to examine the potential for doing that.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 18]
# TOP SECRETMr. Dawson. I know that you have indicated you won't be able to put a precise date to this conversation with Bissell or conversations with Bissell, but maybe we can narrow it down a little bit.Would you assume that it would be after the proclamation of the Congolese independence on June 30, 1960?Mr. Tweedy. Oh, yes.Mr. Dawson. Would you assume it would be before Lumumba's being put into U.N. protective custody on September15, 1960?Mr. Tweedy. I think it must have been, yes. I didn't realize he had gone into custody that early.Mr. Baron. So then it would be sometime during the summer or early fall of '60?Mr. Tweedy. What happened to Lumumba after that?Mr. Baron. He was in protective custody at the United Nations force from mid-September until late November and it was in late November that he left to go traveling towards Stanleyville and he was captured by Mobutu's troops at that point in very early December and from early December until mid-January he was in the custody of the Congolese in prison and then it was in mid-January 1961 that he was flown from a prison in Tysville to Katanga where his death was announced shortly thereafter.Mr. Tweedy. That I recall. I have got to assume it# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 19]
# TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-40001 was sometime after September 15th. I don't know.2 Mr. Baron. When you say "after" --3 Mr. Tweedy. After you put September 15 the day he came under. The only thing is I have no recollection that it would have happened as early as, say, early August or early September.6 Mr. Baron. It was in August or early September that8 Lumumba was Premier of the Congo?9 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.10 Mr. Baron. And there was obviously a struggle for power between Lumumba and Kasavubu going on.11 Mr. Dawson. I guess the crucial question.12 Mr. Tweedy. You have really got me at this point.14 Mr. Dawson. It would be whether or not you would have considered the plan had he been in U.N. protective custody.15 If you assume that would be the case, then I don't think any more precision in the date would necessarily be productive.17 Mr. Treedy. My whole recollection of the thing would be that only purpose of the exercise would have been to have a plan when he was in nobody's custody.20 Mr. Baron. That would have been before --21 Mr. Tweedy. That is the only thing that makes sense to me, September, because --23 Mr. Baron. Well, I will go on.25 In a moment I will show you some cable traffic that# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 20]
TOP SECRETwent back and forth between headquarters and the Congo after he was in U.N. custody to see if that refreshes your recollection about the general attitude with regard to Lumumba at that time.Mr. Tweedy. Yes.Mr. Baron. But, you are saying now, that it would only make sense to you that --Mr. Tweedy. In retrospect nothing makes sense to me but --Mr. Baron. -- that this initial consideration of the feasibility of the assassination of Lumumba between Bissell and yourself?Mr. Tweedy. I should have thought that would have been during the period when he was in effect in power. I should have thought, but the record may prove me wrong.Mr. Baron. Did you have any discussion with Bissell where he indicated that his own consideration of the assassination of Lumumba had moved beyond the realm of possibility to an actual plan that he was prepared to carry out or taking steps to carry out.Mr. Tweedy. I cannot recall a conversation with Bissell where in effect he said, let's move from A to B or C to D or something like this. I do not recall that. My recollection of the whole interval when this was under consideration was that it was a planning interval and at no pointTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 21]
# TOP SECRETPhone (Area 207) 344-600019can I recall that I even felt it was imminent that somebody would say go, (a) we never came up with a plan that was go-able. or anything really very close to it. It was always my assumption that at the time anything like this should occur there would have been some kind of real focus on the problem at probably a very considerable policy level within the Agency at which somebody would have said something more about it and it never occurred to me I would get a call or Bissell would ask me to come down to his office and say go to it.Nor were we ever in position where he said that I would merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got that far.Mr. Baron. You didn't have any action plans for assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or were aware of?Mr. Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that ever got anywhere.Mr. Baron. What kind of planning was done?Mr. Tweedy. It was mostly the kind of thing where one asked the Chief of Station to keep in mind what sort of access one might ever have had to Lumumba for whatever purpose. It was this kind of thing, as best I recollect.Mr. Baron. Did you send cables raising the question of gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him?# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 22]
TOP SECRETMr. Tweedy. I suspect that was the first cable thatever went out. In other words, the first cable that everwent out to Larry Hedgman. He must have realized, he wouldhave been perfectly clear on his end, the way one's minds wererunning even though it was purely a contingency.Mr. Baron. I am sorry. I don't think I understoodthat.You say the first cable that went out.Mr. Tweedy. That was the first way that Hedgman wasever advised that there was any thinking of that kind inWashington, was via our cable. I am sure he wasn't back inthe States over anything of this kind.Mr. Baron. Today you distinctly remember a cable sent?Mr. Tweedy. I think I remember that much more distinct-ly than anything I remember in the last few minutes that itwas a cable which asked him to be thinking of that.Mr. Baron. That was pursuant to your conversationwith Mr. Bissell?Mr. Tweedy. That was.Mr. Baron. Did you send that cable or Mr. Bissellsend that cable.Mr. Tweedy. It probably would have been a cable Iwouldhave written and probably released by him.Mr. Baгon. Do you know what was in that cable?Mr. Tweedy. God knows, I don't.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 23]
TOP SECRET21Mr. Baron. For the effect of the language in the cable?Mr. Tweedy. The effect of the language in the cable would be to get Hedgman to be thinking along these lines.Mr. Dawson. Would you describe the purpose?Mr. Tweedy. It would have been the eventuality that we might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally.Mr. Dawson. Is that language you think might have been used or that is how you think it might have been done?Mr. Tweedy. I couldn't even start to reproduce the cable.Mr. Baron. Did you send a number of such cables to the Chief of Station?Mr. Tweedy. I imagine there were a few over a period of time. It was not an intensive correspondence as I remember it.Mr. Baron. It wouldn't be thenormal practice to have an intensive correspondence on such a sensitive subject, would it?Mr. Tweedy. I don't know. It is the only time I ever had one but I have had very sensitive subjects, operationally sensitive subjects that I have dealt with in extensive cables over a very long period of time, but nothing of this nature whatsoever.Mr. Baron. Were these cables from headquarters to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville sent in a speciallyTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 24]
# TOP SECRET1 restricted channel?2 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, all sensitive cables are sent in various types of restricted channels I am sure you aware.4 Mr. Baron. This channel even more tightly held and closely restricted than the normal cable traffic that would6 flow to the Chief of Station?7 Mr. Tweedy. That would be a very fair statement, yes.9 Mr. Baron. Do you know whether the cable included in-10 structions to destroy it after reading it?11 Mr. Tweedy. That wouldn't have been normal.12 Mr. Baron. Would you assume that on a subject like this13 such an instruction would have been given?14 Mr. Tweedy. It would really be up to the Chief of Station, I think. It would be up to the Chief of Station what was in the cable and the degree to which he felt he needed to maintain a record for quick reference purposes in the future.But, he was perfectly capable of keeping a file which would be accessable only to him and the station and if he was sure of his own security within the station I don't think this would have been a problem for him, but to answer your question I don't know what Hedgman himself did.Mr. Baron. What kind of response did you receive from Hedgman or from the Chief of Station in Leopoldville?# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 25]
# TOP SECRET23Mr. Tweedy. It was a serious answer. I can't do better than that. It was a serious answer. It wasn't argumentative, I guess it started to discuss, not the pros and cons of policy, at least I don't recall it did, but what it was that ho might be able to do. It was a disciplined reply to an instruction from headquarters.Mr. Baron. Did he mention any specific means that he had of gaining access to Lumumba?Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall now. I don't recall. I think he said it was certainly not beyond the question that means cauld either be developed or might arise but I certainly do not recall that he came up with any very specific ideas in the first instance. On that I am afraid I am terribly hedgy.Mr. Baron. At the time that you were requesting the Chief of Station to report back on means of gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of eliminating him, was this access made any more explicit in terms of the kind of personal access that would be needed?Mr. Tweedy. I am sure that must have been covered at some point,i.e., in perhaps a series of types of accesses.Mr. Baron. Would this be access to shoot him or would this be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?Mr. Tweedy. I suppose all those types of things might have been considered.Mr. Baron. But this was not access in the sense of --# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 26]
# TOP SECRETfinding a way to sneak inside the U.N. guard to simplysnatch Lumumba from custody, this was clearly access to assassin-ate him, is that correct?Mr. Tweedy. That would certainly be my recollection.Kidnapping was never a factor that I recall at all or evenconsidered, at least I don't remember it.Mr. Baron. In your discussions with Richard Bissellabout the prospect of assassinating Lumumba, did he mention toyou that he had had similar discussions with *Justin O'Donnell*?Mr. Tweedy. I was reminded of *Justin O'Donnell's*role in all this. As you may recall, when I talked to youand Mr. Wides, and until you reminded me I had forgottenthat *Justin O'Donnell* played any role whatsoever and nowthat it has been brought to my recollection I recall it.I recall it almost in detail.I remember being told that he had expressed reservationsor disagreement or refusal to participate to Bissell and Ithink my response to you was if he said that I would believehim but I didn't recall it.Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to youthat he had asked *Justin O'Donnell* to go to the Congo toassassinate Lumumba?Mr. Tweedy. Well, he must have indeed have told methat he was going to ask *O'Donnell* to go to the Congo toexamine the thing on the ground, but I don't recall him ever# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10067.pdf — page 27]
# TOP SECRETsaying, I am going to send O'Donnell sto the Congo to knock off Lumumba, not in those words.Mr. Baron. When you say examine the thing on the ground you mean he would send O'Donnell to the Congo to take a first-hand look at the means?Mr. Tweedy. Yes, conceivably I suppose this all might have resulted in a climax there but at least my recollection certainly was never that he told me that I am sending O'Donnell to the Congo to knock off Lumumba in those words but that he, I am sure the philosophy was that if anything was done you would want to keep it as separate from the station as possible and thus a man from the outside.It was Bissell's idea that O'Connell might be the man.Mr. Baron. The man from outside?Mr. Tweedy. Outside the station.Mr. Baron. The CIA station in the Congo?Mr. Tweedy. Right.Mr. Baron. That such a man would be necessary to carry out an assassination operation if one were to be mounted?Mr. Tweedy. That if one was mounted it would obviously be desirable to do it under auspices which would protect the security of the station or involvement of the station.That I am sure was the philosophy behind it.Mr. Baron. But it is your recollection that O'Donnell,# TOP SECRET