Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10089.pdf — page 6]
# TOP SECRETTESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWEEDYMr. Baron. We discussed this cable in your previous appearance, did we not?Mr. Tweedy. August 26th.May I correct the date? It is August 26th.Mr. Baron. Certainly.Mr. Tweedy. It is rather important.Mr. Baron. It is August 26th.Mr. Tweedy. Yes, we did indeed discuss it the last time.Mr. Baron. After you took another look at this cable this morning before we went on the record, you made a remark to the effect that this cable was a source of authority as far as you were concerned at the time.Is that your impression now?Mr. Tweedy. Yes.Let me just add to that a bit. The cable per se I did not remember, but it is perfectly obvious the cable is the authority.When I first talked to Mr. Bissell about this, he certainly implied the only reason the subject was being raised is because it had been of national policy level concern. I do not think it could be more clear-cut than that. This was basically, this was the formal expression of that by the Director himself.I cannot remember which came first, did I see this cable first, or did I talk to Mr. Bissell first. I suspect that I talked to Mr. Bissell first. It must have been absolutely i# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 the same time period.2 This marely confirmed what I think I probably heard from Mr. Bissell first.4 Mr. Baron. In this discussion with Mr. Bissell, you are5 referring to the subject of getting access to Lumumba for the6 purpose of assassination.7 Mr. Tweedy. I think it probably came up in the sense that the thrust of the American position was that there was no9 solution in the Congo without the fall from power of Mr. Lumumba,10 and no measure should be overlooked to achieve this -- constitu-tional, revolutionary and indeed, executive action, if you want to call it that.12 Mr. Baron.. Meaning assassination?13 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.14 But none of these possible measures wers excluded, and the main point was that everybody agreed that Lumumba had to go or16 Wo ware in for very serious trouble in the Congo.18 Mr. Baron. You were referring a moment ago in discussing this cable from Allen Dulles to the fact that when you first discussed the possibility of assassinating Lumumba as one means of removing him from power with Richard Bissall, Bissell referre to this cable.23 Mr. Tweedy. No, I would have seen this cable when it wer out. I am afraid you cannot pin me down on this, because I cannot remember the sequence of events. It would have been aTOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETperfectly natural follow-up to my discussion with Bissell. It is conceivable that this went out before I talked to Bissell, I do not exclude that, but the two ware totally in tandem.Mr. Baron. Having taken a look at all of the documents that we are about to introduce into the record today, before we begin taking your testimony on the record, are you able to pinpoint with any more precision your initial discussion with Mr. Bissell of the prospect of assassinating Lumumba?Mr. Tweedy. Pinpoint it in terms of time?Mr. Baron. Yas.Mr. Tweedy. No, not in terms of time. I can only assuMr. Baron. It would have taken place shortly before this Allen Dulles cable?Mr. Tweedy. Either shortly before, or shortly after, because the next series of cables obviously get the show, as it ware, on the road.May I comment just generally on those cables as a group? There are no surprises in them as far as I am concerned, in terms of detail. Much of it, even to this day, I still do not remember.One aspect emerges very clearly for me, that we were ver careful about examining this on the possibilities of doing anything against Lumumba. Basically, this whole period was a Series of exchanges with the field who were seeking, as you car see from that cable traffic, various measures that might perfor# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET71 or achieve the goal, including, indeed assassination, but not ,2 by any means limited to that, that we were in trouble finding3 means which appeared secure, particularly means which kept the4 U.S. hand hidden. It is the to and from, and the atmosphere5 of it which is very familiar to me; the details of it, much of6 it even on reading them, is rather unfamiliar to me. I found7 no surprises in it.8 Mr. Baron. Having refreshed your recollection by reviewing9 these cables, can you add any greater specificity to the record10 about the substance of your conversations with Richard Bissell11 on the possibility of assassinating Lumumba?12 Mr. Tweedy. I think what we used to do, as I remember it,13 when it came to the technical exchange with the Station on one14 asset versus another, the possible security weakness of this15 man versus the possible strengths of another, Bissell left this16 largely to me. I do not mean to say that we did not from time17 to time review it. He did not debate with me on whether White18 Clam.10 was somebody who was worth dealing with or not, because19 he had Belgian connections, for example.20 Mr. Baron. You are saving he would have left the operati:.!21 details to you?22 Mr. Tweedy. The operational details of trying to come יי23 with some solution that looked as if it made sense, and had a24 promise of success. I do not recall that we would discuss this25 type of a cable in detail. As you can ses, he released quitsTOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET1 a number of them, because he wanted to remain familiar with2 them.(Discussion off the record.)4 Mr. Baron. Back on the record on this subject.5 Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not have any further recollection of6 detailed discussions with Bissell on this. On the other hand,7 it was perfectly clear that he remained actively interested in8 it. I am sure that he was the one that had the idea of Justin9 O'Donnell, for example, I think he undoubtedly came up with10 that idea. As you recall, I had forgotten entirely that Justin11 O'Donnell had ever played a role in this. I am sure when he12 fixed on O'Donnell the possibility to assist the Chief of Station13 he must have discussed this with him. I can almost say I14 remember it, but hardly.15 Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of what Bissell16 said to you in the series of discussions on the prospect of17 assassinating Lumumba about the level at which the exploration18 of this prospect had been authorized?19 Mr. Tweedy. No. That is the aspect I was never clear on20 except that it was perfectly clear to me that he was quite21 confident that this was -- I am now talking about the elimination22 of Lumumba by whatever means. I am not talking necessarily23 about assassination: I want to be quite clear on that.24 I was quite clear in my mind that the policy levels of25 Washington were agreed that Lumumba must go. I cannot go any# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 further than that. I cannot say, for example, that Bissell2 said I think as an Agency we should consider assassination on3 this or that this had been discussed with the policy levels4 of government. I do not know, and it was never made clear to5 me nor does this cable make clear, but it was perfectly clear6 that Mr. Dulles felt quite quiet in his mind about discussing7 any of these aspects with the State Department or the Ambassador.8 Mr. Baron. Off the record.9 (Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)10 Mr. Baron.. We are back on the record now.11 When we stopped, we were discussing your account of your12 meetings with Richard Bissell where the subject of assassinating13 Lumumba had arisen among other means that had been considered14 in disposing of Lumumba. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate15 directly or indirectly to you that he had the authority of the16 President of the United States for moving forward with an17 operation which might include assassinating Lumumba?18 Mr. Tweedy. Let me make it quite clear, he certainly19 never mentioned the President at all.20 Mr. Baron. By name?21 Mr. Tweedy. By name, or even by any indication. It was22 merely my impression reinforced, certainly, either before or23 after, of this cable of Allan Dulles that this was a policy24 level decision, but the extant to which the Executive had25 assassination discussed with him at all, I cannot comment on.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 It is perfectly obvious that the Agency felt that it had2 the support of the. Executive in efforts to eliminate Lumumba.3 It was at least my impression throughout this whole period that4 if it ever came down to the point where somebody said, I think5 we can do it, and we decided upon the means, that someone would6 have said, well, bafore we do, obviously there has to be final7 approval. I would not have known where the final approval8 would have come from. I would not expect that my correspondence9 with the Chief of Station in Leopoldville would result in the10 assassination of Mr. Lumumba without further reference.11 Mr. Baron. You were under the impression that whatever12 steps you were involved in toward eliminatir.g Lumumba, as you13 put it, were fully authorized at the highest level of the14 government?15 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I was.16 Mr. Baron. That would include the President?17 Mr. Tweedy. I do not really think I can answer that18 question., Mr. Baron. Wher. somebody at my level, fairly serior19 though it was, receives clear-cut assurances that the policy20 level wants something done, it is very difficult for him to21 judge whether the President per se has bean in contact with the22 Agency or that he has done this through his National Security23 Advisor, the Secretary of Stats, or who-ver. There could he24 no way that. I could judge that.25 I think it would be quite misleading if I were to try toTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETread into it either then or now.Mr. Baron. Whatever impression you had of the extent of the authority for the steps that you were taking to eliminate Lumumba was derived from your conversations with Richard Bissell?Mr. Tweedy. And the cable.Mr. Baron. And the cable by Allen Dulles.Mr. Tweedy. Which marely indicated to me that the Agency was confident that it had its policy guidance and was thus acting accordingly.Mr. Baron. Between this cable on August 26th which Allan Dulles dispatched to the Congo and the cable we will now mark Exhibit 2, which is a cable from yourself to Leopoldville on Septembar 19th, marked Eyes Only, Guthman from Jadwin--(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 Mr. Baron. Were there any other meetings that you recall2 between yourself and Richard Bissell where he asked you tomove beyond the exploratory stage to the implementation stagein assassinating Lumumba?5 Mr. Tweedy. I do not know at all. I just do not recall6 that that ever occurred.7 Mr. Baron. Let us turn, then, to this cable.8 This cable indicates --9 Mr. Tweedy. This is the one on the 19th?10 Mr. Baron. Yes.11 (Discussion off the record.)12 Mr. Baron.. Back on the record.13 This cable begins with your indication to the Chief of14 Station that someone was proceeding shortly to the Congo who15 would announce himself as Sid from Paris.16 First of all, to backtrack, Guthman, in this cable, is17 the Chief of Station, is that right?18 Mr. Tweedy. Correct.19 Mr. Baron.. Who we agreed would be referred to as the20 Chief of Station or by hin alias, Hedgmena, and Jadwin is --21 Mr. Tweedy. My pseudonym.22 Mr. Baron. Did you have a first name in the pseudonym?23 Mr. Tweedy. Thomas K.24 Mr. Baron::. Who was Sid from Paris?25 Mr. Tweedy. I was trying to think. The identity is SidTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET131 Brown. Sid Brown as a name means nothing to me.2 Mr. Baron. If I represent to you that we have had testimony from *Sidney Gottlieb* that this identity stood for himself, does that refresh your recollection?5 Mr. Tweedy. It would not surprise me. It was my assumption that it probably was, but I could not recall, so I find -- in other words, your explanation, I think, is what I would have expected..9 Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection of dispatching *Sidney Gottlieb* on a mission to the Congo?1: Mr. Tweedy. I have the most unclear recollection that I discussed with Mr. Bissell *Sidney Gottlieb*'s going to the Congo. I have no recollections of any conversations I had with Mr. *Gottlieb* himself, although I am quite convinced I had them.16: In other words, it is inconceivable to me that he would have gone to the Congo without seeing me. I cannot recall the substance of our discussions, although I assume, and I imagine Mr. Bissell must have shared in this, we discussed what it was all about, the operational problems involved, so that he, in turn, could be somewhat sensible about what his own supporting role in this might be.When I say this, it is a reasonable assumption but it is not direct recollection..Mr. Baron. Does this cable indicate to you that you didTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 dispatch *Sidney Gottlieb* to the Congo on a highly sensitive2 mission?3 Mr. Tweedy. It does indeed.4 When you say I dispatched him, I would say it would be5 more accurate to say that Mr. Bissell and I dispatched him. I6 am sure the authority for him going would have come from he7 rather than me, but we arranged the details.8 Mr. Baron. Your comment about the fact that the authority9 would have flowed from Mr. Bissell directy is borne out, is it10 not, by Mr. Bissell's initials on this cable?11 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, exactly.12 Mr. Baron. Was that a fairly unusual practice, to have13 both the DDP and the Chief of the Africa Division sign a14 cable?15 Mr. Tweedy. Quite common. Throughout the organization16 on matters of either particular sensitivity or so important that17 the DDP wished to be constantly informed about correspondence18 on a subject, the Chief of the Division would originate and19 send out cables and have it actually signed off by the DDP.20 That was quite a common practice in the Agency.21 Mr. Baron. Do you have a recollection, having seen this22 document, of the fact that you set up a special channel using23 the YOPROP sensitivity indicator?24 Mr. Tweedy. I did not recall YOPROP, but I recall special25 channels.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 Mr. Baron. This would have restricted all traffic from2 yourself to Chief of Station, is that correct?3 Mr. Tweedy. Yes. My Deputy would also have access to it4 in my absence.5 Mr. Baron. That would be Glen Fields?6 Mr. Tweedy. Yes.7 Mr. Baron. Would Richard Bissell have access to it?8 Mr. Tweedy. Indeed he would.9 Mr. Baron. Allan Dulles also?10 Mr. Tweedy. Certainly if he wanted, absolutely.11 Mr. Baron. Why was a special communications channel set12 up in this cable?13 Mr. Tweedy. Because of the sensitivity of the subject..14 This, agair., was a frequent procedure in the Agency on sensitivematters. If one was about to mount a sensitive operation, oneof the first things normaliy done was to set up specialcommunications procedures so the dissemination of the messagescould be restricted to what was required.18 Mr. Baron. In this case, the aspecially sensitive subject towhich you were restricting communications access was the elimi-nation of Lumumba by one means or another?21 Mr. Tweedy. That is correct..22 Mr. Baron. What was the assignment that Sidney Gottliewas to explain to the Chief of Station wher: he arrived in theCongo?TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 Mr. Tweedy. That, I do not recall. I can only assume2 that Sidney Gottlieb would have discussed with the Chief of3 Station instruments which TSD might have which could be of4 assistance in an assassination attempt. I assumed he discussed5 his inventory, whatever it might be, and the two presumably were6 trying to come to some conclusions as to what might have the7 best chance or the most practical chance of being used.8 This is my assumption. I think in this early stage, that9 would have been the purpose of the exercise.10 Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you the testimony of Sidney11 Gottlieb about two conversations that he had at Headquarters12 before he undertook the mission to the Congo in September of13 1960.14 First, when Dr. Gottlieb looked at this cable and some15 subsequent cables which we will discuss today, he said these16 cables applied to himself. He confirmed the fact that he took17 a trip to the Congo and arrived on September 26th as is indicated18 by a subsequent cable, and left on October 5th, as is indicated19 by another cable.20 Dr. Gottlieb said before he left the Congo -- I am sorry,21 before he left for the Congo -- he had a conversation with you22 and Glen Fields in which you instructed him to take a lethal23 material to the Congo and give it to the Chief of Station,24 with instructions to assassinate Lumumba if it were possible25 and to instruct the Chief of Station in the technical means byTOP SECRET![photo of a stamp]
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TOP SECRET1 which this lethal material could be administered through2 Lumumba's food or toothpaste or something that he would ingest.3 Mr. Gottlieb also testified that in that conversation you4 indicated to him that these instructions were being given at5 Richard Bissell's authority.6 Did that conversation take place?7 (Discussion off the record.)8 Mr. Tweady. His testimony does not basically refresh my memory. The only aspect of it which I would find unrealistic is9 that he had an instruction from me to tell the Chief of Station10 to use this material and go ahead and assassinate Lumumba, as11 if, in effect, that is all the authority that was necessary.12 To be frank, that does not make sense. The rest of it is13 perfectly feasible. I do not recall it in the detail, but I14 am not going to deny what Sid said. I think his recollection15 that I told him, in effect, to go to the Chief of Station and16 sort of get the show on the road and use the poison and17 assassinate Lumumba without any further ceremony is just not the way it would have happened.18 Mr. Baron.. Why is that?19 Mr. Tweady. For the simple reason that under no circumstance would that instruction have been given by me without reference.20 to higher authority up through the chain of command.21 Mr. Baron. When you say reference to higher authority,22 what do you mean.?TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET181` Mr. Tweedy. My higher authority in the first instance2 would be Mr. Bissell.3 Mr. Baron. Dr. Gottlieb did testify --4 Mr. Tweedy. I understand.5 Mr. Baron. -- that you referred in your conversation with6 him to the fact that you had authority from Mr. Bissell for the7 assignment you were giving to Gottlieb.8 Mr. Tweedy. The only thing that Mr. Gottlieb, would disagree9 on is that there would be no further reference, which his10 statament implies from Leopoldville before they took any action11 on this matter, in other words, take the final action on this12 matter, and that was never a matter, to the best of my recollec-13 tion, that was ever delegated by Mr. Bissell. In other words.14 Mr. Bissell never said, look, you have the picture, go ahead15 and do it in your own good time without any further reference16 to me or anybody else, nor is the tenor of this correspondence17 as I read it that way at all.18 Mr. Baron. Do you recall if Mr. Bissell ever want as far19 as telling you that if an opportunity arose to carry off the20 assassination of Lumumba in a situation where it would be21 practically impossible to confirm, that there was authority22 for proceeding with the assassination with Headquarters, that23 the Chief of Station would be, under those circumstances,24 authorized to proceed to assassinate Lumumba?25 Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET191 Mr. Baron. Do you have a recollection about that one way2 or the other?Mr. Tweedy. I do not recall that he ever put it to ma4 this way.5 Mr. Baron. Let us then break down your statement about this6 meeting with (*Dr. Gottlieb*) into component parts.7 You agree now, having heard *Dr. Gottlieb's* testimony, that8 it is true that you had asked (*Dr. Gottlieb*) to go to the Congo?9 Mr. Tweedy. Indeed, as I assumed I had, yes.Mr. Baron. It is also true that you knew that (*Dr. Gottlieb*)was to carry a lethal material to the Chief of Station in theCongo?Mr. Tweedy. If he says so, I do not disagree with him.I do not frankly recall that at this point, but I am perfectlywadded to accept what he says.Mr. Baron. Assuming, for the moment, that you would haverequired the Chief of Station to check back with Headquartersbefore he carried out an assassination mission, would it betrue that you assigned *Dr. Gottlich* the task of instructingthe Chief of Station to assassinate Lumumba on that basis?Mr. Tweedy. (*Dr. Gottlich*) was the head of the TechnicalServices Division, or whatever it was called in those days.Mr. Baron. Let me jump in for a moment.At this point, for about a year and a half, he was theScience Advisor to Mr. Bissell, and he moved to TachnicalTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET201 Services shortly thereafter.2 Mr. Tweedy. The way you put it to me was that I instructedGottlieb to assassinate Lumumba. The answer to that is, I am4 sure I never instructed Gottlieb, to assassinate Lumumba. This5 is the way you put it to me.6 Mr. Baron. Let me correct that.7 What I meant to say was, would you have asked Gottlieb8 to convey the instruction to the Chief of Station that he was9 to assassinate Lumumba if he found a way to do it and if he10 confirmed it with Headquarters?11 Mr. Tweedy. My answer to that is almost certainly not.12 That would have been covered in other correspondence, which I13 think is demonstrated by these cables, to the Chief of Station14 direct from me with authority of Mr. Bissell. I would not have15 used, neither would Mr. Bissell, Mr. Gottlieb as the channel16 for this instruction.17 Mr. Baron. Dr. Gottlieb has also testified that, aside18 from carrying the materials to the Chief of Station and19 instructing in their use and giving him an instruction about a20 mission to assassinere Lumumba, that he had one further role21 in the Congo; he was to serve as a technical advisor to the22 Chief of Station on the feasibility of using these biological23 substances to carry off the operation.24 As Gottlieb put it, Gottlieb was to stay down there for25 a short period of time to determine the technical feasibilityTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET211 of the operational plan that the Chief of Station might come2 up with.3 Mr. Tweedy. This seems quite reasonable to me. Presumably:4 with his technical knowledge of the nature of these materials5 he would be in a position to either comment on or advise the6 Chief of Station as he attempted to put together some kind of7 operation. That makes good sense to me.8 He would require, basically, a technical advisor.9 Mr. Baron. *Dr. Gottlieb* also testified that the materials10 he took with him were of a fairly short life. Their toxicity11 would wane within a matter of weeks.12 Given that bit of information to refresh your recollection.1314 does that make it more likely that *Gottlieb* was there, to aid15 the Chief of Station in actually carrying off the administrationof these drugs, as opposed to giving him general instructions16 in the use of such lethal substances?17 Mr. Tweedy. I do not know really that I can comment on18 that. If the materials would deteriorate fast, the use of them,19 if possible, I would stress the latter, would necessarily haveto be expeditied, but the overwhelming concern of Headquartersand the field, again, demonstrated in this correspondence wasour concern that this thing could be done at all, that it bedone right, securely, and that the U.S. hand should beconcealed.If this was at odds with the life of these materials,TOP SECRET