Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# GORDON GRAY: Short SummaryGordon Gray was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1958-1961. During this period Gray represented President EISENHOWER at Special Group meetings at which the following subjects were discussed: "any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of LUMUMBA"; provision of small arms to opponents to TRUJILLO in the Dominican Republic; and detailed planning for "how the U. S. wishes to move against CASTRO".Gray's testimony should involve the following questions (see attached list of exhibits):## CASTRO1. What was Admiral Burke referring to at the March 14, 1960, NSC meeting when he spoke of "a plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package deal"? (Exhibit at Tab E)2. Is there a connection between the plan referred to by Admiral Burke at the March 14 NSC meeting and the discussion at the March 14 Special Group meeting on the "effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raoul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously"? (Exhibit at Tab F)3. Were President Eisenhower or Mr. Gray aware that on August 16, 1960, the CIA Office of Medical Services received a box of Cuban cigars to be treated with poison for use against Castro? (Exhibit at Tab 0)4. Were President Eisenhower or Mr. Gray aware that in August 1960 Bissell asked Edwards to find underworld contacts with Cuba for an assassination mission? (Exhibit at Tab R)5. At the November 3, 1960, Special Group meeting, was Mr. Merchant referring to planning for assassination when he asked whether planning had been done "in taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raoul, and Che Guevara"? How does General Cabell's response (that Merchant's suggestion "is beyond our capabilities") square with the fact that shortly before November 1960 the CIA had made contact with the Mafia for a Castro assassination effort? (Exhibit at Tab V)## TRUJILLO1. Was Vice President Nixon referring to assassination at the April 14, 1960, NSC meeting when he said "getting rid of Trujillo would be a favorable development"? (Exhibit at Tab H)
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2. Was the Special Group, Mr. Gray, or President Eisenhower aware that Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom was reported, on July 1, 1960, by the CIA Western Hemisphere Division Chief to have approved delivery of high-powered rifles with telescopic sights to Trujillo opponents? (Exhibit at Tab YZ)3. When President Eisenhower was reported at the July 28, 1960, NSC meeting to have said that "until Trujillo is eliminated . . .", was he referring to an assassination? (Exhibit at Tab M)4. On January 12, 1961, the Special Group approved making available "small arms" to dissidents in the Dominican Republic. Were these assassination-type weapons such as the rifles with telescopic sights referred to in Exhibit at Tab YZ? (Exhibit at Tab X re January 12 meeting)5. Did the attempts by Trujillo to assassinate President Betancourt of Venezuela prompt the Special Group to favor supplying arms to Dominican dissidents who might try to assassinate Trujillo? (Exhibit at Tab K)## LUMUMBA1. When Mr. Gray commented at the August 25, 1960, Special Group meeting that "his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straight-forward action", was he referring to assassination? Do Mr. Dulles' reservations indicate that he was objecting to a suggested assassination? (Exhibit at Tab P)2. When Mr. Gray said at the Special Group meeting on September 8, 1960, that "he hoped that agency people in the field are fully aware of the top level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss", was he referring to assassination of Lumumba? (Exhibit at Tab S)## COMMAND and CONTROLWhat was the command and control system for covert action operations in the Eisenhower Administration?## Pertinent RelationshipsPresident Eisenhower Gray was the President's liaison to the intelligence community and the National Security Council (including the Special Group).DCI Allen Dulles Gray met with Dulles in the Special Group.DDP Richard Bissell Gray knew Bissell well. Bissell initiated the CIA-Gambling Syndicate plot to assassinate Castro and the Executive Action capability.
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TO: Fritz Schwarz and Curt SmothersFROM: Frederick BaronDATE: July 6, 1975SECRET## GORDON GRAY: SHORT SUMMARYGordon Gray was Special Assistant to the President for Natonal SecurityAffairs from 1958-61. During this period Gray represented President EISENHOWERat Special Group meetings at which the following subjects were discussed:"any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid ofLUMUMBA;" provision of small arms to opponents of TRUJILLO in the DominicanRepublic; and detailed planning for "how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO"Gray's testimony should involve the following questions:- Did any of the Special Group meetings implicitly or  explicitly contemplate or plan assassination attempts  against LUMUMBA, TRUJILLO, or CASTRO?- To what extent were CIA plans against these leaders  authorized by or made known to President EISENHOWER,  Gordon GRAY, DCI Allen DULLES, or the Special Group as a whole?- What were the general command & control practices?Questioning of Gray should focus upon the following documents:- Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.- Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.- Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere  Division to the Acting DCI.- Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.## PERTINENT RELATIONSHIPSPresident Eisenhower Gray was the President's liaison to theintelligence community and the NationalSecurity Council (including the Special Group).DCI Allen Dulles Gray met with Dulles in the Special Group.DDP Richard Bissell Gray knew Bissell well. Bissell initiated theCIA-Gambling Syndicate plot to assassinate CASTROand the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability.President Truman Gray was Secretary of the Army andSpecial Assistant to the PresidentLivingston Merchant Undersecretary of State for Political Affairsrepresenting the State Department at SpecialGroup meetings.NW 50955 DocId:32423488 Page 17
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EXHIBITS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF GORDON GRAYCastro*Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.Special Group Minutes, August 12, 1960.LumumbaSpecial Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.Special Group Minutes, September 8, 1960.TrujilloMemorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief,Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI.Minutes of the Special Group of December 29, 1960.Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.
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3 November 1960MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell, Gen. Lansdale1. CubaMr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant said he would check into the progress of the State Department group which has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas, supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that perhaps things have now progressed to a point where covert activities of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be effective. Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mr. Gray cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the population in ways which the Communists have developed so well. The latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of exiles under CIA control. Now the same people are beginning to feel more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic deprivations being experienced by the middle and upper classes, time is actually working on Castro's side. Mr. Merchant said that he foresaw that there would occur a point in time beyond which covert intervention would not do the job.Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to "clean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force. He suggested the possibility of using the CIA-backed exiles to mount a simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt
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intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo this would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray said that he had had the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point. He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would be met with a previously-agreed-on response.Mr. Merchant stated that, apart from any attack on Guantanamo, he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant that it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up the mess." He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would be met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation like Algeria.Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically the possibility of U. N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious doubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure. Mr. Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent a final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice should rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or preparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention.Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr. Merchant agreed that this is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared to move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibilities of keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed.In this connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using a refugee organization - either an existing one or a contrived one - to backstop the operations.
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Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to havethe Department of Defense investigate the availability of specificlocations that would be suitable.Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has beendone for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara.He said that without these three the Cuban Government would beleaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would benecessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointedout that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerousin conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans.He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneousaction, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestionis bevond our canabilities.
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# 4. Supply Drops - CubaGen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had not taken place because of the absence of specified communication from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed that the Group had no objections. The members so signified.# 5. U-2, CubaGen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued that we are analyzing the exact results on a priority basis and that some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of this kind before the middle of next week." The other members appeared to have the same reaction.# 6. Policy Consideration Re Cuban ExilesMr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however, that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take; that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups other than those under the direction of CIA..The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make arrangements for this.# 7. Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis Cape CanaveralMr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum
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on this subject, which had been discussed with the rest of the Group on 20 October 1960.![Signature of THOMAS A. PARROTT]THOMAS A. PARROTT5SECRET-EVES CHLY
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# SECRETEYES ONLY15 aug 6012 August 1960MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting - II August 1960PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Dulles, and Bissell2. Budget for Cuban Operations: Mr. Bissell summarized the budget which had been prepared as a basis for seeking a release from the Reserve to finance Cuban operations for the balance of the fiscal year. The budget for the year totals approximately thirteen and a quarter million dollars, not including provision for the replacement of material with an estimated value of 1.6 million dollars to be withdrawn from Agency inventory. Since 2.5 million dollars of budgeted and Reserve funds have been made available for this program by an earlier action, the balance required is about ten and three-quarters million dollars. Mr. Dulles stated that a release of ten million would be requested at this time since there is inevitably a wide margin of uncertainty as to what the actual costs will turn out to be. Mr. Bissell stated the amounts required by major sub-headings as follows:Political Action $ 960,000.00Propaganda 2,152,120,00Paramilitary 8,055,753.00Intelligence Collection 833,200.00Counter Intelligence 325,400.00Communications Support 229,420.00Support 731,713.00$ 13,287,611.00 TotalPROPERTY OFTHE WHITE HOUSE OFFICEEYES ONLYSECRETNW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 24
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SECRETEYES ONLY-2-It was agreed that the operations in question must go forward and that the amount did not seem unreasonable for activities of this scope and scale but it was understood that Messrs. Merchant and Gray could not state that they had reviewed in any detail the manner in which the estimates had been arrived at. Following further discussion, it was agreed that this matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial expenditures which should not be undertaken without reasonable assurance that the operation was to go forward.![Signature of Richard M. Bissell, JR.]RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.Deputy Director(Plans)![Unreadable image]EYES ONLYSECRET![Text: PROPERTY THE WHITE HOUSE OFFIC]NW 50955 DocId:32423488 Page 25
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SECRET C-X-31 July 1960![stamp] ![stamp]MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central IntelligenceVIA: Deputy Director (Plans)SUBJECT: Clandestine Delivery of Arms to Opposition Leadership in the Dominican Republic.1. This memorandum recommends action by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence. Such recommendation is contained in para 5.2. While Ambassador Farland was in the Dominican Republic, a principal leader of the opposition requested that a limited number of arms be made available which could be used to precipitate the overthrow of the regime of General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. These arms presumably would be used against key members of the Trujillo regime.Within recent months, the Trujillo regime has become increasingly unstable due to growing opposition within the professional and middle classes to the excesses of the dictatorship. Political oppression of those groups has brought about severely strained relations between the Catholic Church and the Trujillo regime. Most knowledgeable sources have been predicting that the fall of the regime is imminent.Since the fall of the Trujillo regime appears inevitable, it is in the interest of the U.S. that our relations with the opposition be as close as possible, providing the arms as requested would contribute significantly toward this end.3. It is proposed to procure and deliver to underground opposition forces in the Dominican Republic twelve (12) sterile U.S. rifles, Model 1903 (Springfield), with telescopic sights, together with five hundred (500) rounds of ammunition for same. Arms and ammunition are immediately available at DOD depot; approximate cost is $2700. It is planned to deliver those weapons by air through DOD facilities provided arrangements can be worked out with the opposition for their reception. If they cannot be delivered by air, plans are currently being studied in the CA staff for delivery by sea.4. Approval for delivery of these arms has been given by Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, who requests that the arms be placed in the hands of the opposition at the earliest possible moment.![stamp]SECRETNW 50955 DocId:32423488 Page 26![Property of the white house office]
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SECRETPage Two5. It is recommanded that the opposition in the Dominican Republic be provided the arms as requested.SIGNEDChiefWestern Hemisphere Divisioncc: DDCICONCUR:Deputy Director(Plans)DateThe recommendation contained in paragraph 5 is approved:SIGNEDDirector of Central IntelligenceDate 2 JUL 1960DDP/WH :klb (1 July 60)Distribution:Orig & 1 - Addressee1 - DDCI1 - DDP1 - COPS1 - C/WHDPROPERTY OFTHE WHITE HOUSE OFFICESECRET 02290
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29 December 1960MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 29 December 1960PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Bissell3. Air Drops - CubaMr. Bissell notified the Group of plans for five supply drops in the next three days.5. Dominican RepublicMr. Bissell gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the Trujillo regime. He emphasized that although support would be given to the Figueres group, there is no intention of establishing a para-military force as such, since this would be impractical in view of requirements for Cuba. He also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.The Group agreed with the proposal as outlined and felt that it should be mentioned at the Tuesday meeting. It was noted that Mr. Pawley feels that overt intervention in the Dominican Republic should be mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operation. The consensus of the Group was that this would not be entirely consistent. However, it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention may be.6. CubaMr. Merchant reported a brief conversation he had had with Mr. Gray's associates this morning. The latter had made two points: (a) it would be desirable to obtain the cooperation and support of individual Latin American governments, (b) it would be desirable, if possible, for the U.S. to break relations with Cuba, in concert with other countries, some time before January 20th.
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12 January 1961MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 12 January 1961PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles3. Delegation from the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary FrontMr. Dulles reported the information received from General Goodpaster to the effect that a large delegation from the above-mentioned group reportedly will visit Washington on Saturday.5. Contingency Planning for Cuba.Mr. Willauer outlined a proposal to establish a task force consisting of representatives of State, CIA, Defense and the Joint Staff to draw up contingency plans covering the possible eventual use of overt U. S. forces.All members agreed that such planning is an essential step.Mr. Gray asked that a preliminary report of the task force be available for the meeting of January 19th.7. Capture of Supplies in CubaIn answer to a question, Mr. Barnes gave details of the Cuban government's capture of materiel from two airdrops plus one cache.
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# 9. Dominican RepublicMr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State that limited supplies of small arms and other materiel should be made available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final transportation into the country being provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project.# 11. U-2 Flights - VietnamMr. Dulles and Mr. Parrott outlined generally the results of the three successful U-2 flights over Vietnam, noting that Hanoi had not been covered because of clouds, and that it is planned to fly a mission to cover that area as soon as the weather permits.The Group agreed that no such flight should take place after January 20th. They also requested a brief memo summarizing results, for the meeting of the 19th.