Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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-33-Hedgman summarized his testimony on this question in his second appearance:I probably had authority to act on my own but ... it was possible that I had to go back and get clearance for my action. (Hedgman, 8/25/75, p. 11; see also 8/21/75, p. 39.)Hedgman testified, however, that a "policy decision" had been made -- that assassination had been "approved" as "one means" of eliminating Lumumba as a political threat (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52).I thought the policy decision had been made in the White House, not in the Agency, and that the Agency had been selected as the Executive Agent, if you will, to carry out a political decision. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52.)Although Hedgman assumed that the President had not personally selected the means of assassination, he testified that he was under the impression that the President had authorized the CIA to do so and to proceed to take action:Hedgman: ... I doubt that I thought the President had said, you use this system. But my understanding is the President had made a decision that an act should take place, but then put that into the hands of the Agency to carry out his decision.Q: Whatever that act was to be, it was clearly to be assassination or the death of the foreign political leader?Hedgman: Yes.Q: Instigated by the CIA, initiated by the CIA?Hedgman: Certainly if those -- if [Dr. Gottlieb]'s lethal agents were employed, that would have been the result, yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 104.)
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-34-Nonetheless, Hedgman said he had no "desire to carry out these instructions" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 106). Whether or not he felt there was authority to attempt an assassination without seeking final confirmation, he said that he would have checked with headquarters before taking action:I think probably that I would have gone backand advised that I intended to carry out andsought final approval before carrying it outhad I been going to do it, had there been away to do it. I did not see it as ... amatter which could be accomplished practically,certainly. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 51-52.)He proceeded to affirm that his reason for seeking a final approval would have been to receive assurances about the practicality of the specific mode of assassination that he planned to use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 53).(ii) The Chief of Station Took "Exploratory Steps" in Furtherance of the Assassination Plot and Testified That He Destroyed Cable Traffic Related to the PlotHedgman testified that after (Gottlieb's) visit, he locked the lethal substances in the bottom drawer of his safe, "probably" sealed in an envelope marked "Eyes Only" with his name on it (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 48-49). He said that his secretary was the only other person with access to the safe and that she would not have examined a package marked in this fashion (Hedgman, 3/21/73, p. 49).Hedgman testified that it was "possible" that he pre- served the poisons in his safe until after Lumumba's death; at any
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 34]
-36-The cable traffic conforms to Hedgman's recollection. For two months after (Gottlieb's) arrival in the Congo, a regular stream of messages flowed between the Leopoldville (Chief of) Station and headquarters through the PROP channel. In late September and early October the cables concerned the initiation of Hedgman's top priority plan -- recruiting the aid of a particular agent thought to have sufficient access to Lumumba's entourage to be able to poison Lumumba.* In mid-October, Tweedy notified the (Chief of) Station that the assassination mission remained "HIGHEST PRIORITY", and he suggested sending additional personnel to Leopoldville to intensify "CONCENTRATION" on this operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60).**These cables were followed by Hedgman's report to Tweedy on October 17 that the agent he had picked for the assassination mission* CIA Cable (IN 18989, (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 9/27/60; CIA Cable (IN 20857, (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable (OUT 75900, Fields to (Chief of) Station, 9/30/60; CIA Cable (IN 24171) (Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60. See Section _____, *supra*, for full treatment of these cables.** See Section _____, *supra*, for more complete text of this cable.
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 35]
-37-HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE.THUS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPSINTEL NEEDED THIS JOB. (CIA Cable(IN 28936,) (Chief of) Station to Tweedy,10/17/60.)Hedgman testified that this operative left Leopoldville "sometimein October" which terminated their discussions about gaining accessto Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75,p. 61). The (Chief of) Station continued to communicate with head-quarters about finding a means to move forward with the assassina-tion operation and securing the necessary manpower to do so.Hedgman confirmed Tweedy's view that although the assassinationoperation was still his highest priority, he was overburdened withresponsibility for other operations so that he could not concentrateon the progress of the assassination mission:ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THISOP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME,VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. (CIA Cable,(IN 28936,) 10/17/60.)Due to his workload, the Chief of Station responded enthusiasticallyto Tweedy's suggestion of an additional case officer:BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICERHANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA . . . IF CASEOFFICER AVAILABLE (CHIEF OF STATION) WOULDDEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTINGAND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS. (CIA Cable(IN 28936,) 10/17/60.)
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 36]
-38-The (Chief of) Station concluded this cable with the following cryptic recommendation, reminiscent of his testimony that he may have "suggested" shooting Lumumba to (Gottlieb) as an alternative to poisoning (lledgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29):IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQSPOUCH SOONEST HIGH POWERED FOREIGN MAKERIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SCOPE AND SILENCER.HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT.HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES NOW FORBIDDEN,WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENINGOF HUNTING SEASON. (CIA Cable (LH 28936.)10/17/60.)The first sentence of Hedgman's recommendation clearly refers to sending a sniper rifle to the Congo via diplomatic pouch. The rest of the message is probably an oblique reference to the possibility of shooting Lumumba at the "OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON" -- in other words, at the first opportunity to find Lumumba outside the residence where he remained in UN protective custody. This interpretation is bolstered by a report sent the next month by the (Chief of) Station through the PROP channel for Tweedy's "EYES ALONE." Hedgman's cable described the stalemate which prevailed from mid-September until Lumumba's departure for Stanleyville on November 27; Lumumba was virtually a prisoner in UN custody, but inaccessible to CIA agents and the Congolese:TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BUILDING IN SEVERALWEEKS. HOUSE GUARDED DAY AND NIGHT BYCONGOLESE AND UN TROOP... CONGOLESETROOPS ARE THERE TO PREVENT TARGET'SESCAPE AND TO ARREST HIM IF HE ATTEMPTS.UN TROOPS THERE TO PREVENT STORMING OFPALACE BY CONGOLESE. CONCENTRIC RINGSOF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSER-VATION POST IMPOSSIBLE. ATTEMPTING GET
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-39-COVERAGE OF ANY MOVEMENT INTO OR OUT OFHOUSE BY CONGOLESE... TARGET HAS DISMISSEDMOST OF SERVANTS SO ENTRY THIS MEANS SEEMSREMOTE. (CIA Cable (IN 42478) (Chief ofStation to Tweedy.)Hedgman testified that all of his cable traffic about theassassination question would have been sent with the sameextraordinarily stringent security precautions -- presumably re-ferring to the PROP channel which concerned (Gottlieb's visitand the confirmation of authorization for his instructions:I would have sent in a special channelanything dealing with Lumumba, at leastthat would touch upon his removal in oneway or another. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 62.)The (Chief of) Station also testified that sometime beforeleaving the Station, he destroyed all cable traffic relating tothe assassination mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 89). Hedgman'sbest recollection was that he had received instructions to destroythose cables (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96). Hedgman said he had neverbefore in his tenure as (Chief of) Station in the Congo destroyedcable traffic because of its sensitivity (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 91).But he stated that the cables relating to assassination weredestroyed because of their extremely sensitive nature.* He said* It is possible that copies of cables dealing with such a  sensitive operation were also destroyed at CIA headquarters.
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( that eventuallyI destroyed a great deal of traffic, because the Congo was a highly sensitive area in which at one period I recall we had all of our files in the burn barrels. I mean, when you wanted a file, you went over and dug it out of the burn barrell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 91.)At the conclusion of his testimony about the assassination plot, the Chief of Station was asked to give a general characterization of the advisability of the plot and the tenor of the times in which it took place. His response indicated that although he was willing to carry out what he considered a duly authorized order, he was not convinced of the necessity of assassinating Lumumba:I looked upon the Agency as an executive arm of the Presidency.... Therefore, I suppose I thought that it was an order issued in due form from an authorized authority.On the other hand, I looked at it as a kind of operation that I could do without, that I thought that probably the Agency and the U.S. government could get along without. I didn't regard Lumumba as the kind of person who was going to bring on World War III or something.I might have had a somewhat different attitude if I thought that one man could bring on World War III and result in the deaths of millions of people or something, but I didn't see him in that light. I saw him as a danger to the political position of the United States in Africa, but nothing more than that. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 110-111.)
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 39]
-41-(f) Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the Degree of Support for and Perpetration of the Assassination PlotThere is a great variance between the testimony of Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy and the picture of the assassination plot presented by the (Chief of) Station and the cable traffic from the period. While the weight of the evidence demonstrates that the assassination effort was the "highest priority" at CIA headquarters among operations in the Congo, Bissell has no direct recollection of (Gottlieb's) mission to the Congo and Tweedy can recall nothing more than consideration of the feasibility of an assassination attempt.(i) Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation To Poison LumumbaAs Chief of the Africa Division, Bronson Tweedy was the principal liaison at CIA headquarters with the (Chief of) Station in Leopoldville for all instructions, plans, and progress reports concerning the effort to assassinate Lumumba, which were communicated through the special PROP channel. Most of the reports and recommendations cabled to headquarters by the (Chief of) Station on the assassination operation were marked for Tweedy's "Eyes Only."Tweedy personally signed both the cable which initially informed the (Chief of) Station that ("SID") would arrive in Leopoldville, with an assignment (CIA Cable (OUT 71464), Bissell/Tweedy to (Chief of)
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 40]
Station, 9/19/60) and the cable of October 7 indicating that hehad debriefed (Gottlieb) upon his return from the Congo (CIA Cable(OUT 78336), Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/7/60). Tweedy was alsothe "Eyes Only" recipient of Hedgman's reports on (Gottlieb's)arrival in the Congo (CIA Cable (IN 18989), (Chief of) Station toTweedy, 9/27/60) and the subsequent communication's about the planwhich emerged from the discussions between (Gottlieb) and Hedgmanas the top priority -- infiltration of an agent into Lumumba's en-tourage to administer a lethal poison to the Congolese leader (CIACable (IN 20857) (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable,(Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60; CIA Cable, (Chief of) Stationto Tweedy, 10/17/60).Tweedy testified, however, without benefit of reviewing thesecables, that he had no knowledge of the plot to poison Lumumba:Do you have any knowledge of a messengerfrom CIA headquarters having to go to the Congoto provide the (Chief of) Station in the Congowith instructions to carry out the assassinationof Lumumba, if possible, and also provide himwith the tools to carry out such an assassination,namely, poisons and medical equipment for admin-istering them?Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not. (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 30-31)* See Sections 4(a) - 4(e) for full treatment of the cables sent  in the PROP channel between Tweedy and the (Chief of) Station in  Leopoldville.
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When asked his opinion about the truth of the testimony received by the Committee that poisons were delivered to the Congo by (Gottlieb), who carried instructions that they were to be used in the assassination of Lumumba, Tweedy replied:There is nothing in my experience with the Agency which would really bear on that point whatsoever. (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 39-39)Tweedy added that if (Gottlieb) went to the Congo as a courier, "I will bet I knew it, but I don't recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 35).Tweedy testified that it was "perfectly possible" for lethal bio- logical substances to have been sent to the Congo, "but I don't recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 30).In response to a question about whether he knew about a cable from headquarters informing Hedgman that a messenger was to come to the Congo with instructions for him, Tweedy said that he would be "very surprised if I didn't (know), but I certainly have no recoll- ection of it whatsoever (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 31).Tweedy said that he "was not going to gainsay" the testimony of the (Chief of) Station that a cable was sent to headquarters through a special channel requesting confirmation that the instructions were to be carried out but he did not recall it (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32-33).Tweedy commented that rather than questioning the truth of the testimony of the (Chief of) Station,* the discrepancies in their* Tweedy expressed a high regard for the general credibility of the (Chief of) Station. Tweedy said that he never had occasion to doubt Hedgman's veracity or integrity, adding, "I would trust his memory and I certainly trust his integrity." (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)
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-44-testimony could be attributed to his own lack of recall:I'really am having trouble with this. I had to be reminded of so many things. [T]he things that I recall the most vividly about all my African experiences were. . . the things I was basically concerned with all the time, which was putting this division together and the rest of it. When it comes to operational detail I start fuzzy and you would have thought with something like thinking about Mr. Lumumba in these terms, that I would have gone to bed and got up thinking about Lumumba, I can assure you this wasn't the case. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 34)Tweedy was firm, however, in his disbelief that "Gottlieb) would have left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have empowered [him]. . . to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any further recourse or reference to headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32, 36). Tweedy said:In such a matter of this kind, headquarters would have wanted to have a last word up to the last minute. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)(ii) Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating Lumumba and He Cabled Hedgman About Gaining Access to Lumumba For the Purpose of AssassinationDespite Tweedy's lack of recollection about the actual plot to poison Lumumba, he did recall exploring the feasibility of an assassination attempt.Tweedy testified that he had discussed the subject of assassinat Lumumba "more than once" with Richard Bissell in the fall of 1960 (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 14-15). Tweedy stated that he did not know
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 43]
whether Bissell had consulted with any "higher authority" about exploring the possibilities for assassinating Lumumba (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 28). Generally, Tweedy said, when he received an instruction from Bissell he would proceed to implement it on the assumption that it was fully authorized above the level of DDP:I would proceed with it on the basis that hewas authorized to give me instructions and itwas up to him to bloody well know what he wasempowered to tell me to do. (Tweedy, 9/9, p.13)Tweedy characterized his discussions with Bissell about assassinating Lumumba as "contingency planning" (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 28):Tweedy. . .I think it came up in the sense that Dick would have said we probably better be thinking about whether it might ever be necessary or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which case we presumably should be in position to assess whether we could do it or not successfully.Q. Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him in any other sense but a planning exercise, never were we instructed to do anything of this kind. We were instructed to ask whether such a thing would be feasible and to have the (Chief of) Station be thinking along those lines as well. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 15)Tweedy said that the planning that he undertook pursuant to his conversation with Bissell included "a few" cables that he remembers sending to the (Chief of) Station asking him to keep in mind what sort of access one might ever have had to Lumumba. .[in] the eventuality that we might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally. (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 19-21)
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-46-Tweedy did not recall inquiring about gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of abducting him from UN custody (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 24);rather he "supposed" that various means of assassination were being explored:Q. Would this be access to shoot him or would this be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?Tweedy. I suppose all those types of things might have been considered. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 23)Q. In your discussions with Bissell, about the feasibility of an assassination operation, did poisons come up as one means that was being considered and which the (Chief of) Station should explore?Tweedy. I am sure it must have. After all, there are not many ways of doing it. Shoot a man, poison him, of course you could, I suppose, stab him or something like that. But basically you are talking about a contingency plan which I assume has the best possibility of protecting the involvement of the U.S. Government and if you want to do it in a manner which would be as distant, if that is the right word, as possible, I think poison would then stand high on the list of possibilities.Tweedy did not "recall specifically" the response from the (Chief of) Station, but said he was "sure" that he received "a serious answer. . a disciplined reply to an instruction from headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 23,27).Although Tweedy did not recall sending or receiving cables in a special channel concerning the ''messenger" to the Congo or confirmation of his instructions, he acknowledged that the cables exploring access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassination would have been
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 45]
-47-sent in a channel that was even more closely restricted than the normal CIA’cable traffic (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 22, 32-33). Tweedy said destruction of such cable traffic would have been left to the discretion of the (Chief of) Station and he did not know whether Hedgman destroyed the Station's copies (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 22).Tweedy said "I would be surprised if I didn't" have a conversation with (Sidney Gottlieb) about "anything in his inventory that could possibly be used, including lethal biological substances (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 68-69). Tweedy "suspected" that "the first conversation along these lines would undoubtedly have been held between Dick Bissell and (Sidney Gottlieb)," which Tweedy then would have "followed-up" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 69).Tweedy maintained that the period in which he explored the means of access for assassinating Lumumba remained "a planning interval and at no point can I recall that I ever felt it was imminent that somebody would say 'go'" (Tweedy, 9/9. pp. 18-19):Tweedy. It was always my assumption that at the time anything like this should occur there would have been some kind of real focus on the problem at probably a very considerable policy level within the Agency. . . and it never occurred to me that I would get a call or Bissell would ask me to come down to his office and sya go to it. Nor were we ever in a position where he said that I would merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got that far.Q. You didn't have any action plans for the assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or were aware of?
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 46]
Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that ever got anywhere. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 19)It is difficult to reconcile the cable traffic with Tweedy's testimony that no action plans were launched and that no authorization for implementing the assassination operation, authorization for Hedgman's approach to his agent to explore access to Lumumba's entourage is in accord with Tweedy's description of his inquiries about gaining access to Lumumba.However, the fact that Tweedy was personnaly informed that the (Chief of) Station "PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP" (CIA Cable (IN 24171) (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60) is harder to reconcile with his statements that a "go ahead" on the operation was never imminent, especially in light of Tweedy's PROP cable the next week. which told the (Chief of) Station that Lumumba'sDISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CONSIDERATION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY (CIA Cable (OUT 81396), Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60)(iii) Bissell Testified That He Did Not RecallWhether The Assassination Operation HadMoved From Planning To ImplementationBut It Was Not Against Agency Policy toSend Poisons to The CongoRichard Bissell testified that he did not remember discussing the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba with Bronson Tweedy, but it seemed "entirely probable" to him that such discussions took place (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 3-4).
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 47]
-49-Bissell said he "may have" given Tweedy specific instructions aboutsteps he was to take to further an assassination plan, but he didnot remember to do so (Bissell, 9/10,p.4). Bissell said thatexploring access to Lumumba --"almost certainly" seeking informationfrom the (Chief of) Station about access for poisoning -- would havebeen a "key part" of his "planning and preparatory activity" buthe had no specific recollection of cable communications on thissubject (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 6-8). Bissell remembered that he wasaware that the (Chief of) Station had an agent thought to have directaccess to Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10, p. 80).Bissell testified that he "most certainly" approved any cablesthat Tweedy sent to the (Chief of) Station seeking information aboutgaining access to Lumumba but it was so sensitive a matter (Bissell,9/10, p. 8) Bissell added:I think Mr. Tweedy, on the basis of an oral author-ization from me, would have had the authority tosend such a cable without my signing off on it.(Bissell, 9/10, p. 8)Bissell believed that Tweedy would have known of (Gottlieb)'s tripto the Congo, although it was possible that Tweedy was "cut out ofknowledge of the specific operation" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 21).Bissell's lack of recollection of discussing his assignment to(Justin O'Donnell) with Tweedy was the reason for his speculation that* Bissell's assignment to (O'Donnell) is discussed in Sections 5(a)  (i) and 5(a)(ii), infra.