Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 75]
TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-60001 knowledge that he was involved with Cuban operations affiliated2 with the CIA?3 Mr. Halley. No.4 Again, at the time I had no knowledge of Robert Maheu. I5 have since read about Robert Maheu in the Press, allegations:6 and so forth. The name is familiar to me now.7 Mr. Baron. The same question for Sam Giancana.8 Mr. Halley. Again, I say in answer that at the time that9 I was involved in '62 and '65 I did not know anything about10 Sam Giancana. I have since read in the Press about him.11 Therefore, the name is familiar to me today.12 Mr. Baron. Did you know at that time that Sheffield13 Edwards, who was then Director of the Office of Security, was14 connected in any way with those efforts against Castro personally15 or against the Castro government?16 Mr. Halley. At that time, Shef Edwards was known to me17 as Director of Security. That is all. I had no knowledge of18 his involvement in any activity against Fidel Castro in a19 personal sense.20 Shef Edwards did help Security Officers assigned to my21 staff in Miami. Therefore I would periodically go to him about22 the performance of his officers who were on my staff. So during23 the time that I was involved in Cuban affairs, yes, I did see24 him, yes, I did talk to him about Cuban affairs in Miami, the25 performance of his officers on my staff, but nothing about anythingTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 76]
TOP SECRET75Phone (Area (202) 544-60001 that he might be doing, you know, against Fidel Castro.2 Mr. Baron. I will represent to you that we have testimony3 from Edwards and from Jim.O'Connell who was an officer working4 in the Office of Security under Edwards that they were involved5 in the early stages of an assassination plot against Castro6 which was run out of the Office of Security and later transferred7 to the DDP. But you are saying that you had no knowledge of8 any such operation at that time?9 Mr. Halley. I had no knowledge. As I told you before, I10 did not even know Jim O'Connell.11 Mr. Baron. Do you know a man by the name of Juan Orta?12 Mr. Halley. That name is familiar to me. It is a name13 that has appeared, you know, across my scope. I cannot tell14 you why I am familiar with it. I would have to have a trace15 run, you know, and look at the results of the trace. But the16 name Juan Orta is known to me. That does ring a passive bell17 in my memory.18 Mr. Baron. Do you remember William Harvey having any19 direct contact with Juan Orta?20 Mr. Halley. No, I do not.21 Mr. Baron. You do not have any specific recollection of22 Juan Orta's point of involvement in operations against Castro?23 Mr. Halley. Juan Orta, no. It is a name I am familiar24 with. I think you will find, you know, that there are a number25 of names you asked me to look at that other thing a numberTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 77]
# TOP SECRET76Phone (Ares 202) 544-60001 of names that do ring balls with me. I really would have to2 have back-up material to clarify why they ring a bell. This is3 one that happens to ring a bell with me, but I have no way of4 linking it to anything, and certainly I do not link it in any5 way in my memory to Mr. Harvey.6 Mr. Baron. Do you remember ever hearing of a Cuban contact7 of William Harvey's who went by the name of Maceo?8 Mr. Halley. No, I do not.9 Mr. Baron. He also used the name of Garcia Gomez and:10 the name Godoy:11 Mr. Halley. The only name that rings any bell with me12 in Cuban contacts is Arturo Godoy. Is this the same man?13 Mr. Baron. We do not have the first name of that alias.14 In what connection had you heard of Arturo Godoy?15 Mr. Halley. My recollection is I've known Arturo Godoy16 is that he was the fellow who was active in the Cuban immigre17 community in Miami. That is all I can tell you at this point.18 I would have to go back.19 Mr. Baron. You do not remember what group he was connected20 with?21 Mr. Halley. No, I do not. But it was a name that22 obviously, you know, frequently referred to in reports. You23 know at one time we did monitor the Cuban community as to what24 was going on in terms of these various groups and what they25 had been doing. For some reason, Arturo Godoy rings a bell with# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 78]
TOP SECRET771 me. As I recall, he was some sort of an activist in soma2 Cuban exile group. To give you a definitive answer, you know, I3 would have to get the name, trace him, have *a run* on this fellow4 and try to put it together in some kind of context, but that is5 the only Godoy that rings any bells with me.6 Certainly in my relationship with Harvey, this has no7 meaning to me. Godoy and Harvey just do not ring any bells.8 Mr. Baron. One more name that we already discussed, that9 is Tony Varona.10 Mr. Halley. Yes.11 Mr. Baron. You said that you did know Tony Varona?12 Mr. Halley. I know of Tony Varona, that he was leader of13 the consejo, the revolutionary counsel that had been set up to14 sort of administer the Bay of Pigs operation. In the post15 Bay of Pigs era, Nua Cardona and Tony Varona were people who16 still appeared on the exile scene and were prominent. We had17 some dealings with Nua Cardona, officers in the Station had18 dealings with Nua Cardona and Tony. Varona to pay off, you know,19 injuries to peopoe who had been suffered during the Bay of Pigs,20 'things like that, widows and so on. I know who he is and so21 forth, the name is very familiar to me. I never personally met22 with Tony Varona.23 Mr. Baron. Were you aware that William Harvey had an24 independent line of communication with Tony Varona?25 Mr. Halley. No, I am not.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 79]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Baron. Would it surprise you if that were the case?2 Mr. Halley. The Tony Varona thing would surprise me, frankly. I think I would not -- I would be surprised, yes.4 Mr. Baron. Why is that?5 Mr. Halley. Well, because here is a case where the guy was a prominent exile figure, essentially residing in Miami, and7 I knew of no contacts or had no reasons to suspect any contacts with this kind of an exile figure, though once it specifically9 appeared, I was aware of and it was discussed. This was done under FitzGerald's stewardship with the Task Force. I was11 aware of that. I would be surprised if someone was in touch with Tony Varona and I did not know about it. If you told me13 that is what happened, that is what Harvey has testified to, I accept that. I am surprised by it.15 Mr. Baron. What was the nature of the CIA relationship to Artime?17 Mr. Halley. Well, the Miami Station had no direct relation ship with him. As to the nature of the project, you know Artime19 ran from the Agency, from other people who actually worked with him on a first time basis.21 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of a project called AMLASH?22 Mr. Halley. Let me make sure we are talking about the same thing.24 Mr. Baron. Off the record.25 (Discussion off the record.)TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 80]
TOP SECRET79. 1 Mr. Baron. We have just gone off the record to straighten2 out the fact that we are both talking about the same Cuban' high3 military officer who was known to the CIA by the cryptonym of4 AMLASH.5 Correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Halley, that you and I agree6 that we are referring to the same person that we have identified7 off the record?8 Mr. Halley. Yes, we have.9 Mr. Baron. Were you aware of contacts between AMLASH-1,10 as he was known, and Artime?11 Mr. Halley. I think at the time that this was going on, I12 do not know whether I was or I was not -- I was aware that the13 CIA was in touch with AMLASH.14 Mr. Baron. Did you deal directly with the case officers15 who ran AMLASH?16 Mr. Halley. I did not. My recollection of this AMLASH17 case is as follows. At some point in time; I had a conversation18 with Desmond FitzGerald in Washington during one of my periodic19 visits to Washington from Miami. We discussed at that meeting20 the nature of our approach to the military establishment in21 Cuba. In the context of that conversation, Mr. FitzGerald asked22 me if I thought whether it would be a good idea for him to meet23 one of these Cuban military personalities, and he subsequently24 identified to me the personality he was talking about was25 AMLASH-1.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 81]
# TOP SECRETMy advice to him was that it would probably not be a good idea for him to meet him, and the only thing that I could see coming out of that kind of a contact would be that he, Mr. FitzGerald, would get a personal feel for what makes some of these people tick, in human terms, and that that probably was too high a price to pay for the prospect if anything went wrong, an individual as prominent in Washington as, both within the Agency and the social world in Washington, would be exposed in the Press. That would create a flap that I thought was not worth what would be gained from that meeting.Mr. Baron. Would this have been in the fall of 1963?Mr. Halley. I have no recollection of the time.Subsequent to that, Mr. FitzGerald told me that he had indeed met him and that he had had an interesting conversation with him. I subsequently recall that this gentleman was met in Spain at some point in time --Mr. Baron. This gentleman being AMLASH-1?Mr. Halley. This gentleman, being AMLASH-1, was met in Spain. I also recall after having left the Cuban activity that I read a Press article showing that he had been apprehended and I remember reading the publicity of that particular activity. It is also my recollection that we put in a cache for him.That is about the sum and substance of it.Mr. Baron. Do you recall what the purpose of that cache# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 82]
# TOP SECRET1 was? Was it a cache of arms?2 Mr. Halley. It was a cache. I think that you could3 gostothe record to establish what was in the cache. I do not4 recall specifically what the material was that was in the5 cache.6 Mr. Baron. At the point that you were having these7 conversations with Desmond FitzGerald, though, in the first8 instance the prospect of his contact directly with AMLASH-1,9 in the second instance his reaction to his contact with AMLASH-110 do you recall FitzGerald mentioning to you the fact that11 AMLASH had requested assurances that high officials of the U.S.12 government would stand behind him if he undertook operations on13 behalf of the CIA?14 Mr. Halley. I do not recall this at the time.15 You know, I also want to say, as you probably know from16 the record, I was later Chief of the WH Division from 1972 to17 1973, and I did read some of the files. I am familiar with18 the case. But at the time I am trying to be schizophrenic,19 you know, to put this in the time sequence in which we are20 talking about. My recollection of that is that I did not know21 that.22 Mr. Baron. It would then be your testimony that Mr.23 FitzGerald never broached with you the subject of making a24 representation to AMLASH-1 that Robert Kennedy or other high25 officials of the U.S. government would stand behind him?# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 83]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Halley. I do not recall that kind of a conversation2 taking place with FitzGerald in this timeframe that we are3 talking about.4 Mr. Baron. Do you recall any such conversation at any5 point?6 Mr. Halley. No, I do not, in the timeframe that we are7 talking about.8 Mr. Baron. When I say at any point, I mean at any point.9 since 1962.10 Mr. Halley. Well, you know, in the period 1972-73, I did11 look at some of the files, I did read some of the files. I am12 familiar that such conversations took place and that there13 were a series of meetings. You know, I know who the case14 officer was and so forth.15 Mr. Baron. You never discussed the subject directly with16 FitzGerald?17 Mr. Halley. With FitzGerald, no. I can only say that my18 knowledge of that is secondhand from having subsequently read19 the files.20 Mr. Baron. Was it your impression at that time that one21 of the objectives of the contact with AMLASH-1 was the assassinat-22 tion of Fidel Castro or other high Cuban leaders?23 Mr. Halley. No. I never had the impression that assassinat-24 tion was a thrust of the activity. In other words, we were25 working across-the-board, both in the context that DesmondTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 84]
TOP SECRET831 FitzGerald and his staff were working on what I was doing in2 Miami to try to establish contacts with the Cuban military.3 In other words, we saw this as a multi-faceted approach. First,4 we wanted penetrations of the Cuban military so that we could5 collect intelligence. What were their strengths, weaknesses,6 what was their mood, where were things going? Secondly, we7 wanted from these sources operational intelligence. Who -- in8 other words, who in these groups were dissatisfied as Fidel9 consolidated. Who could provide leadership for a counter-10 movement against Fidel?11 We were looking for people, once we had identified them,12 to see if we could establish contacts with any of these leaders13 so we could see whether there was a basis for working toward14 an overthrow of the Castro government. You know, those were15 the basic steps.16 Now as you got down to talking about how you overthrow17 Castro, obviously the question comes in of how does a 'group who18 wants to run a coup or take power take power, and obviously19 one of the things that has to be looked at is where does the20 existing leadership going to be during this event, who has21 control of the various units. So our discussions were all in22 that context.23 Mr. Baron. Would it have surprised you or would it24 surprise you now to learn that at least part of the contact25 with AMLASH would have involved planning for an assassinationTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 85]
TOP SECRET1 attempt against Castro.2 Mr. Halley. I certainly was not aware of that at the3 time, as I recall from, you know, looking at the files in the4 '72-'73 period, seeing any evidence of that in the file at the5 time.6 Mr. Baron. There are fourteen folders in the AMLASH file.7 Did you read all of those files?8 Mr. Halley. No, I did not.9 Mr. Baron. How did you gather your impression that that10 was in the AMLASH files?11 Mr. Halley. I think I may have read one or two volumes12 of whatever my question was at the time, because these cases13 keep coming up. You know, there must have been some inquiry14 at the time that necessitated my looking at the folder or15 discussing it with my staff and so on.16 Mr. Baron. As far as you knew, what was the objective of17 the contact with Artime?18 Mr. Halley. You mean the CIA contact with Artime? :19 Mr. Baron. Yes,20 Mr. Halley. As a concept, the Artime thing was looked at21 as another track, an approach to the overall Cuban problem to22 see if they could sort of do it on their own. If they could23 simply be given, you know, X number of dollars, some equipment,24 some guidance, and give them an opportunity to find a Cuban25 solution to what was a Cuban problem. That was also, you know,TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 86]
TOP SECRET1 and if you have not, you should talk to the people who ran the2 Artime operation, when this was set up, I think I participated3 in giving Artime some tutorial training for a couple of weeks4 when this operation was first established in order to familiarize5 him with some of the problems of trying to manage a large6 operation against Cuba because he had been out of things for a7 couple of years.8 Mr. Baron. Were you aware that he had been supplied a9 weapon which we already agreed could be characterized as an10 assassination weapon?11 Mr. Halley. You say "we." You and I?12 Mr. Baron. Yes.13 Mr. Halley. Which weapon was that?14 Mr. Baron. A high-powered rifle with long-range and low15 muzzle velocity.16 Mr. Halley. I am aware of the fact of this project that17 Artime was involved in that he got a number of weapons, any18 number of which could have been used for sniper type activities.19 I am aware of the fact that he had a base in Nicaragua to20 have activities, so I would find it hard to single out a weapon.21 My recollection of that that he was given a large number of22 weapons.23 Mr. Baron. Was one of Artime's objectives to have been24 to assassinate Fidel Castro?25 Mr. Halley. Not that I am aware of.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 87]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear any discussion to the2 effect that the Agency was attempting to achieve through Artime3 indirectly. what they did not want to achieve directly in a4 fashion that would be attributed to the CIA, namely the5 assassination of Castro?6 Mr. Halley. I think that you have tied two issues together7 there and I do not think I can answer the question that way.8 I would like to separate the question into two parts.9 Mr. Baron. Go ahead.10 Mr. Halley. The first part, as I mentioned to you earlier11 the CIA did establish a relationship with Artime and he was12 given funds and other support to run his approach to solving13 the Cuban problem. Ile was one of two such activities that were14 run at the time. And therefore I think that your statement is15 correct that perhaps he was set up so that there could be no16 direct attribution in his activities to the United States,17 because he set up a base in Nicaragua, and the story as I recall18 it was put out that he was receiving assistance from the19 Nicaraguan government, and therefore there was a part of the20 whole cover story, if you will, for him.21 So, yes, there was an attempt to set him up as a parallel22 track or a separate track. That does not follow from that, in23 my perspective, that was geared towards an assassination24 operation, because that was a fantastically large operation25 involving lots of people, you know, with substantial amounts ofTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 88]
# TOP SECRET871 money. I was opposed to it at the time. And once it was set2 up, and I did what I was supposed to do, which was to train3 Artime and contribute to his training, I then did not pay an4 awful lot of attention to the thing except what I picked up,5 you know, over the years, and again in the '72-'73 period,6 and talked to officers who had, you know, more intimate knowledge7 of it and got an appraisal of it as to what they thought had8 occurred.9 Mr. Baron. Had you heard at any point that Artime was10 supplied weapons for the specific purpose of assassinating11 Castro?12 Mr. Halley. No, not for the specific purpose of assassina-13 ting Castro.14 Mr. Baron. Was it your general impression that AMLASH-115 was a reliable agent?16 Mr. Halley. I really do not know that much about him,17 you know. This was an operation that was run at that time out18 of Washington and, you know, my knowledge was as I described it19 to you, the conversations with FitzGerald, Madrid, newspaper20 articles, so forth, in that particular timeframe.21 Mr. Baron. Did the CIA to your knowledge use any gambling22 Syndicate contacts inside Cuba or people outside Cuba who were23 connected to gambling interests inside Cuba for any operational24 purpose including the intelligence gathering?25 Mr. Halley. The only case that I recall is this case that# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 89]
# TOP SECRET881 I mentioned to you earlier when we were in touch with an2 individual whose name I cannot remember who had been involved3 with one of the gambling houses in Cuba who came to us with4 leads to Soviets from a missile site who wanted to defect.5 That is the only case that I know of. I cannot think of the6 man's name. I can give you a physical description of him, and7 so forth. I honestly cannot think of his name.8 Mr. Baron. You are not aware of any other use of people9 with gambling interests in Cuba for intelligence gathering?10 Mr. Halley. Not that I am aware of. If you have something11 specific that you want to pursue, if you can give me some otherr12 clue than that, I just do not, out of my past memory, I simply13 do not recall any other case but that one.14 Mr. Baron. Are you aware of any contact between the CIA15 and Meyer Lansky?16 Mr. Halley. No, I am not aware of any contact between the17 CIA and Meyer Lansky.18 Mr. Baron. Was Howard Hunt connected with any Cuban19 operations during the period of your tenure at JMWAVE Station?20 Mr. Halley. Howard Hunt was involved in the Bay of Pigs21 Operation. After the Bay of Pigs Operation wss over, he did not22 participate in the Cuban activities that I was aware of. You23 may know something that I do not know, because, you know, you24 have asked me a couple of questions here of things that I am25 not aware of. You may know something that I do not, but# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 90]
TOP SECRET1 certainly he did not come across my horizon at the time that I2 was in Miami.3 Mr. Baron. Have you ever heard the phrase Executive4 Action?5 Mr. Halley. Yes.6 Mr. Baron. What does that signify to you?7 Mr. Halley. Well, Executive Action is some sort of a8 euphemism -- to eliminate somebody, I guess is how it appears9 in the popular jargon.10 Mr. Baron. Did you hear it in the Agency?11 Mr. Halley. No, I think that this is a term that has been12 bandied about in the Press that has come about in the Press to13 be synonymous with killing somebody or something like that.14 Mr. Baron. It is not, as far as you know, a euphemism in15 common usage within the Agency?16 Mr. Halley. No.17 Mr. Baron. Had you ever heard of the ZRRIFLE Project run18 by William Harvey?19 Mr. Halley. No, I do not know what it is.20 Mr. Baron. Have you ever heard of --21 Mr. Halley. I want to make sure here that I am accurate,22 you know. You are asking me ZRFIFLE. That is a cryptonym for23 something.24 Mr. Baron. Let me explain further.25 Mr. Halley. I want to sort of say, in the last thirteenTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10046.pdf — page 91]
# TOP SECRET1 years I have seen literally --2 (Discussion off the record.)3 Mr. Halley. Let me go back. You asked me about ZRRIFLE.4 This is one of a thousand or hundreds of cryptonyms. Every day5 I read, you know, hundreds of pages of traffic, so when you ask6 me do I know what ZRRIFLE is, I must answer you off the top of my head no. I have tried to be helpful. I have asked you7 several times if you could give me a steering tip or show me8 what direction you are going, I might be able to try to comment9 on it, but ZRRIFLE as such means nothing to me. You really10 could not expect that it would, given the thousands of these11 things that come across my desk.12 Mr. Baron. That is absolutely understandable. I want to13 try to see what happens in the way of getting an unrefreshed14 recollection from you, then I will go back over these two,15 especially the next one, QJWIN. Do you recall a CIA asset who16 went by the cryptonym OJWIN?17 Mr. Halley. No, I do not. Knowing the system, and so18 forth, normally it would have something to do with Spain. It19 does not ring any bells with me. That is all I can give you,20 a sort of Pavlovian response. You flash QJWIN on the screen,21 I am telling you now I do not know, but it probably has22 something to do with Spain.23 Mr. Baron. Were you aware that a project involving the24 development of a capability of carrying on assassination was25 TOP SECRET