Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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-18-(with this message on September 24. (Task Force Log, September 23))Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, testified:So this was in a sense not Track II, but in a sense another aspect of a quiet and hopefully non-violent military coup.... This was abandoned when the military were reluctant to push Frei publicly...and, number two, Frei was reluctant to leave on his own in the absence of pressure from the military.... There was left as the only chance of success a straight military coup.(Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1975, p. 6)At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported:Strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor Schneider will act. For that reason any scenario in which either has to play an active role now appears utterly unrealistic. Overtures to lower echelon officers (e.g., Valenzuela) can of course be made. This involves promoting Army split.(Stn. to Hqs. 424, September 23, 1970)2. Military SolutionPresident Frei's failure even to attempt to persuade his own party convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende ended all hope of using him to prevent an Allende presidency. (November 18 memo, Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October, it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leader- ship of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneider, consti- tuted a stumbling block. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970; Santiago 439, September 30, 1970) The Agency's task was to cause a coup in a highly unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented by Frei's inaction, Schneider's strong constitutionalism, and the absence of organization and enthusiasm among those officers who were interested in a coup.A three-fold program was set into motion:
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-20-David A. Phillips, Chief of Station in Rio de Janeiro, was summoned back to Washington to head the operation. With the exception of the Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy James Flannery and the head of the Chile Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware of the task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had responsibility for Chile. The task force had a special communications channel to Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic about Track II. (November 18, 1970, Helms to Kissinger memo, page 3) Most of the significant operational decisions were made by Phillips, Broe and Karamessines, who met on a daily basis.It should be noted that all those involved with the task force described the pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed, Karamessines has said that Kissinger "left no doubt in my mind that he was under the heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was placing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished." (Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, page 7) The Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, James Flannery, testified that pressure was "as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme." (Flannery testimony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just constant, constant....Just continual pressure....It was coming from the White House." (Broe testimony, August 4, 1975, page 55)C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency RelationsThe CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the Chilean military to carry out its task. However, the U.S. Army Attache in Santiago, Colonel Paul Wimert, knew the Chilean military
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very well due to his five years of service there and his broad personal contacts among the Chilean officers. Following a proposal by the Chief of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting intelligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military, the senior military which we had not maintained and did not have, but which we felt confident that our military representative in Chile had....And we got the approval of the DIA to enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to procure intelligence.(Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested message for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28, 1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized transmission of a message directing the Army Attache:...to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence, his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal military figures who might play a decisive role in any move which might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense Attaché of this message, or give them any indication of its portent. In the course of your routine activities, act in accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously, I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion with the CAS chief.* General Bennett returned to the United States on the evening of October 10, 1970. General Philpott was Acting Director in Bennett's absence.
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-22-This message is for your eyes only, and should not be discussed with any person other than those CAS officers who will be knowledgeable. CAS will identify them. (Headquarters 380 to Santiago)For this and all subsequent messages intended for the Army Attache, the secret CIA communications channel was used.Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that initially the Army Attache would be used only to "obtain or procure" intelligence on Chilean military officers.* (Philpott, p. 11; Karamessines, p. 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the Army Attache, however, did in fact trigger his deep involvement in the coup attempt. According to the Attache's testimony, he received day-to-day instructions from the Chief of Station, and on occasion, the COS would show him messages ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him to take certain actions. The COS also transmitted messages from the Army Attache to these Generals.General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track II and that he never received any communication relating thereto, nor did he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the Army Attache.General Philpott also testified that he had no recollection of anything connected with Track II after his initial meeting with General Cushman on September 28. (Philpott, p. 16)U. S. Army Colonel Robert C. Roth, who in September and October 1970 was the Chief of the Human Resources Division, Director of Collection, DIA,* In this connection it should be noted that when questioned about this letter, General Philpott testified that he recalled signing an authorization such as that contained in the first paragraph of Headquarters 380 but that he did not recall the authorizations and instructions in paragraphs two and three.
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testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott on"a priority requirement to identify Chilean personalities who might behelpful in preventing the election of Allende as President of Chile."(Roth, Vol. I, p. 6) Though Roth recalls no mention of Track II as such,the goal of this mission is identical to that described in the messageof September 28 bearing Philpott's signature.Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activitiesconnected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meetingon October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic material on Chileangenerals which focused on their willingness to participate in a militarycoup. Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representative attended.The chronology also shows that on October 21, Roth delivered a message toMr. Broe to be sent by CIA channels.* A message was sent to Col. Wimertthat same day, ostensibly from General Bennett, which authorized:FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS hasbeen rescinded. This action does not repeat not implychange in our estimate of situation. On the contrary,it is intended to place us in a posture in which we canformally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situa-tion develops as we anticipate. Request up date on situa-tion. (Santiago 446; Ref: Headquarters 762) (Headquarters934, 21 October 1970)Roth testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when hefollowed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information onChilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA. Philpott also instructed him that* Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this  message and also pressed him on several occasions to seek a re-  sponse from Broe to an earlier message to Colonel Wimert). (Roth,  Vol. II, p. )
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- 23a -"any further action on the subject would henceforth be the responsibilityof the CIA and that DIA would perform normal support functions." (Roth,p. 8)*Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities describedby Roth were routine DIA activities. However, Colonel Roth testified:I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, isthat I was informed that there was concern at the highestU.S. Governmental level over the possible election of Allende,that DIA then had a priority responsibility of coming up withthe identities of key Chilean personalities that would be help-ful, and so forth. I have nothing specific as to the nature ofthe instructions or the channels through which they came.Q. It was your sense at the time that you were working on aproject that if it had not been initiated by, at least hadthe attention of or concern of, the highest level?* Roth's chronology also indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe  be queried on two or three occasions regarding a report from [Wimert]  and that Philpott instructed that only he (Philpott) would communi-  cate with Cushman if the need arose. (Roth, p. 11) Roth also testi-  fied that Philpott advised him that communications with [Wimert] would  be by CIA channels. (Roth, p. 41)
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Colonel Roth. That was my impression at the time.Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department that the highest level of government usually indicated the President of the United States?Colonel Roth. I would assume that.The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify Generals Bennett and Philpott as either the sender or recipient. Among these documents is a message relating to Track II which bears Philpott's purported signature. (Undated message. ca. 14 October 1970) General Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted that it was and he could not recall signing it, or having seen it. (Philpott, p. ) CIA also produced messages of October 14 (Headquarters 762) and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying instructions from General Bennett to the Army Attache. General Bennett testified he did not authorize these messages:It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military assistance area. It goes beyond the responsibility which I had in terms that I would have to get the authority or the approval of the Secretary through the Chairman for covert action of this magnitude. This message would not have been signed by me. (Bennett testimony, p. 21)According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testimony, p. 84)The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents bearing on the issue of Wimert's Track II instructions or responses. A DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel O. Graham, the present Director of DIA, produced no copies of communication documents for the September-October 1970 period. (Graham, p. 6) However, Roth testified that detailed memoranda for the record which he prepared on his activities are missing from the files. (Roth, Vol. II, p. )
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CIA officials maintain that they acted faithfully in transmittingmessages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending amessage without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was particularlyforceful in this regard:...I can recall no instance in my experience at the CentralIntelligence Agency in which a message was received for anindividual, an officer of the government anywhere, in what-ever department, which was not faithfully, directly, promptlyand fully and accurately delivered to that officer, or to hisduly authorized representative.(Karamessines testimony, p. 79)We may have played tricks overseas, but it stopped at thewater's edge, and we didn't play tricks among ourselves oramong our colleagues within the Agency or in other agencies.(Karamessines testimony, p. 79)We could not remain in business for a day...if this had beenthe practice of the Agency. It would have been no time atall before we would have been found out, a single instanceof the kind of thing you are suggesting might have takenplace would have put us out of business.(Karamessines testimony, p. 80)Dr. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the [Army] Attache'srole or that he authorized any messages to be sent to the [Army] Attache.(Kissinger testimony, p. 22)The investigation to date has not resolved the conflict between thestatements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials. There arefour possibilities that could explain the conflict. First, GeneralsBennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track II and communicated theirgeneral instructions to the [Army] Attache. This possibility would becontrary to their sworn testimony. Second, General Bennett was not awareof Track II but General Philpott was and communicated general instructions tothe [Army] Attache. This possibility is supported by Roth's testimonybut would be contrary to Philpott's sworn testimony and his duty tokeep General Bennett informed. Third, the CIA acted on its own, and,after receiving initial authority, from General Philpott, co-opted and ordered
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# -26-the Army Attache without further informing any member of the Department of Defense of the White House. This possibility would be contrary to the sworn testimony of David Phillips, William Broe, Thomas Karamessines, and William Colby. Fourth, members of the White House staff authorized the CIA to convey orders to the Army Attache on the basis of high or highest government authority. Further, that the White House staff directed that the Army Attache's superiors in the Pentagon not be informed. This possibility would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr. Kissinger and General Alexander Haig.## D. The False Flag BaseIn order to minimize the risks of making contact with the dissident Chilean officers, the task force decided in late September to set up a "False Flag Base," i.e., to send four staff officers to Chile posing as nationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert's contacts with Chilean military officers. Given the limitations of the Station's resources and Colonel Wimert's visibility, Headquarters felt the use of "False Flag Officers" was necessary because "We don't want to miss a chance." One of these officers posed as a Brazilian intelligence officer so that "any flap would be a Brazilian one." (Headquarters 363, September 27, 1970)*The use of "False Flag Officers" is not, according to David Phillips, "an unusual practice," either by the CIA or foreign intelligence services. (Phillips testimony, pp. 47-48)
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-27-The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and reported separately on their contacts to a "deep cover" CIA officer in Santiago who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the Chief of Station, they received their instructions from Washington and not from him. (Chief of Station testimony (Felix), August 1, 1975, p. 27)E. Chief of StationAlthough most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know of Track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable and the Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean officers.The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic:I had left no doubt in the minds of my colleagues and superiors that I did not consider any kind of intervention in those constitutional processes desirable....And one of the reasons certainly for my last recall (to Washington) was to be read the riot act-which was done in a very pleasant, but very intelligible manner. Specifically, I was told at that time that the Agency was not too interested in continuously being told by me that certain proposals which had been made could not be executed, or would be counterproductive. (Chief of Station (Felix) testimony, August 1, 1975, p. 10)The Chief of Station's objection to Track II did not go unnoticed.The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Report should not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on action taken." (Headquarters 612, 7 October) Very simply, Headquarters wanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency itself.
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-29-IV. CIA Efforts to Promote a CoupA. The Chilean ConspiratorsAnti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key individuals. One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before. * Following the "Tacnazo" revolt, and his dismissal from the Army, Viaux retained the support of many non-commissioned and junior officers as well as being the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups. (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July 15, 1975)Another individual around which plotting centered was General Camilo Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago Garrison. General Valenzuela was in league with several other (active duty) officers, (including Admiral Hugo Tirado, Navy Commander in Chief, General Vicente Huerta, Director, General of the Carabinero (police) Corps, General Canales, Director of the Military Academy, and General Joaquin Garcia, second in command, Air Force) (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, November 18, 1970) All of these officers, with the possible exception of (Canales) were in contact with Viaux as well.***This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of drama- tizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as an abortive coup.**The record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military officers is incomplete. The record does show, however, that Viaux met with (General Huerta) around October 7. (Chile Task Force Log, October 7). On October 12 Viaux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October). One cable from Santiago indicates that (Admiral Tirado) may have been a member of Viaux's inner circle of conspirators (Station 545, 16 October 1970) At the very least, (Tirado) was in contact with Viaux.Although a distinction can be made between the Viaux and Valenzuela groups, as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony before the Committee, the principal distinction between the two was that the latter was led by active duty military officers. The two groups were in contact with each other. The record also indicates that they worked together in at least two of the three Schneider kidnap attempts.
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-30-There was considerable communication among the various plotting elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified:...I might add here that it seemed that a good dozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean senior officers were privy to what was going on (in addition to President Frei and they were all talking to one another exchanging views and trying to see how best to mount the kind of coup that they wanted to see take place. (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)B. Contacts Prior to October 15The CIA's initial task in Chile was to assess the potential within the Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly that anti- Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police), but were immobilized by "the tradition of military respect for the Constitution" and "the public and private stance of General Schneider, Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict adherence to the Constitution." (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to overcome "the apolitical, constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military." (Ibid, p. 2)Since the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by General Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the U.S. Government would support a coup both before and after it took place. (Headquarters to Station 611, 7 October 1970) This effort began in earnest on October 5 when Colonel Wimert) informed both an Army General ("Station's priority contact") an an Air Force General of the pro-coup*The military officers were told, for example, that should Allende be prevented from taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostra- cized, but rather can continue to count on us for MAP support and main- tenance of our close relationship." (Hqs. 075517, 7 October 1970)
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# -31-U.S. policy. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6)*Three days later the Chief of Station told General Huerta, Commander of the Carabineros that "the U.S. Government favors a military solution and is willing to support it in any manner short of outright military intervention." (Task Force Log, 9 October) General Huerta informed the COS that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean Army high command. (Task Force Log, 10 October)On October 7, Colonel Wimert approached members of the War Academy in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons. This was Colonel Wimert's first contact with the Army Lt. Colonel to whom he would ultimately pass three submachine guns on October 22. At this meeting, the Lt. Colonel told Colonel Wimert that he and his colleagues were trying to exert force on Frei to eliminate Gen. Schneider to either replace him, send him out of the country. They had even studied plans to kidnap him. Schneider is the main barrier to all plans for the military to take over the government to prevent an Allende presidency. (Santiago 483, 8 October)*According to the CIA's wrap-up report on Track II, between October 5 and October 20, the CIA Station and the (Army) Attache--for the most part the latter--made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero officials. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 8 November 1970)**In his testimony, Colonel Wimert indicated that the Lt. Colonel was affiliated with General Canales (Wimert testimony, p. 52) In a cable sent to Headquarters on October 18, in which the Lt. Colonel's request for three submachine guns was made, the Station indicated that Wimert believed the Army officer, and his companion, a Navy Captain were in league with Admiral Tirado (Station 562, October 18) At another point in his testimony, Wimert stated, "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy Captain and the Army (Lt. Colonel) and the Air Force General over here." (Wimert testimony, p. 107) The Committee has been unable to determine the exact affiliation of the Army Lt. Colonel. However, as previously stated, both General Canales and Admiral Tirado were affiliated with General Valenzuela and Admiral Tirado was in contact with General Viaux.