Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 60]
TOP SECRET59 on two or three points. And I said, I am exercising my rights under the CIA, and so on.But he said, I have got to run, and it was about five past five And I asked him if he understood in effect what he was doing, the implications.And he said that is the responsibility, I would assume.And I said, what about Mr. Meyer, and building up to be our successors?And we were about the same age And he introduced Meyer over the years into more sensitive operations, and all the foreigns with whom we worked agents and what not. And the reaction to him universally was, he was to be the successorAnd he said, that is something I will have to negotiate.And I said, what do you mean negotiate?And he said, we will talk about it next week.So, I got up and shook hands with him and walked out.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 61]
TOP SECRETSenator Baker. Do you know of anyone having electronic surveillance conversational recording in the Oval Office other than the Presidential (?) capability?Mr. Angleton. Never.Senator Baker. Do you know of anyone who ever penetrated the Presidential apparatus?Mr. Angleton. Never, Senator.What has come out about the Joint Chiefs and all that stuff in the paper?Senator Baker. I am speaking of anyone who might have penetrated the taping capability in the Oval Office?Mr. Schwarz. Can I follow up some of the questions that Senator Baker asked you about Oswald?What about the pictures, one of which was a picture of Leontov that was in a piece of paper found in Mr. Oswald's pocket when he was arrested in Mexico?Mr. Angleton. There is an allegation.Mr. Schwarz. What connection is there between that picture and that allegation and Lee Harvey Oswald?Mr. Angleton. The only thing is, Oswald's trip to Mexico was to go to Cuba allegedly to contact the Soviets.Mr. Schwarz. And was Leontov then in Mexico, or --Mr. Angleton. I don't know, because the double agent whom we believe was actually controlled by the Soviets.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 62]
TOP SECRET1 Byetkov, gave us information which we would now regard as2 private, which would tend to absolve the Soviets of any3 implication with Oswald.4 Mr. Schwarz. When you acquired from a number of sources5 the information that the KGB had spent some six months --6 Mr. Angleton. We only acquired the hard stuff of six7 months and what they did from one man who was very high in theKGB.8 Mr. Schwarz. Without getting into what his name was,9 when did you acquire the information?10 Mr. Angleton. 1967, or thereabouts.11 Mr. Schwarz. So it was after the Warren Commission had12 reached its conclusions?13 Mr. Angleton. Did you have any such information during14 the life of the Warren Commission?15 Mr. Angleton. I think the only thing was the Nosenko --16 Senator Baker. Which was suppressed by whom?17 Mr. Angleton. We suppressed it, because Nosenko arrived18 at a very brief time after the assassination as a KGB defector.19 Senator Baker. And he is the one that you think now as20 a planted agent?21 Mr. Angleton. Yes. They thought he was sent on a22 mission.23 Mr. Schwarz. Suppressed by whom?24 Mr. Angleton. Suppressed from the Warren Commission.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 63]
TOP SECRETMr. Schwarz. You said that Nosenko, one of the reasons you suspected Nosenko was a double agent, or a planted agent, rather, was because he was saying things that were contradictory to some other high quality person who theretofore had been giving you information before Nosenko came to this country?Mr. Angleton. That is right.Mr. Schwarz. What was the nature of the information relating to the Kennedy assassination that the high quality person had given you?Mr. Schwarz. Let me say this so that it makes a little more sense.In December 1961 a member of the KGB in Helsinki defected to us. His name is Golitzen. He has never been in service, except Jack Anderson came out with an erroneous account of it, alleging that he had stated there was a plot to assassinate Nixon. He did not make such a statement.Mr. Kirbow. Do you think this statement should be on the record?Mr. Angleton. I don't mind it being on the record after the Anderson article. They have been looking for him.Now, his is probably without any question the most major defection since World War II as far as Soviet intentions, Soviet organization, and Soviet operations are concerned. And the reason, among others, that it was so important wasTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 64]
TOP SECREThe had decided to defect many years prior to December of 1961, if the opportunity ever arrived. And therefore he used those many years breaking down the compartmentalization of the KGB in order to acquire the kind of information which would be most valuable to the US, and to our allies.Therefore he refused many assignemtns abroad, but tried to always remain in headquarters and get himself appointed to investigative commissions and other things of this sort which would get into everybody elses's business. Among other things, he spent many years in the training schools for people who came back for six weeks from different parts of the world to brag about their achievements. And he absorbed all of this information.And among other things, he stated that he gave the crytograms and circumstantial evidence of penetrations throughout the West.And then the Soviets rapidly transferred 300 of their people after his defection. And as is normal in a case of this kind, the big problem is to write a damage report, which means the whole service would come to a standstill. And the objective would he to review all paper files and everything that showed his initials. And you usually would have three categories of information: you would have information which he definitely had knowledge of, and information which he did not have knowledge of, and information which you are notTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 65]
TOP SECRET5 ceratin about.Now, when we did a similar operation on the Sergeant Dunlop who was working in the National Security Agency and committed suicide, if I am not mistaken we came to approxi- mately 400,000 documents that he could have had access to, although he may not have had. And it is interesting to note that after his assassination, in a search of the quarters, the Bureay, or whoever did the search, found six of my letters to NSA relating to information from Golitzen.9 Senator Baker. Did you speak of the assassination?10 Mr. Angleton. What did you say?11 Mr. Miller. Did you say Mr. Dunlop?12 Mr. Angleton. After his suicide. I am sorry.13 Mr. Miller. You used the term assassination.14 Mr. Angleton. I meant suicide.15 Mr. Miller. The word is interesting, because it is charged, as you know, that he was assassinated.17 Mr. Angleton. Maybe I was thinking out loud or something18 In any event, the 1969 Golitzen reports to NSA were in a plastic bag, as I recall, in the attic. And there was a question of whether he passed them before or after.21 Mr. Schwarz. Now, what we were on was, I was asking you, you testified earlier23 Mr. Angleton. I just wanted to say Golitzen was so enormous to the Western world because we immediately moved onTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 66]
TOP SECRET                                                       65those cases which were perishable, the French, the British, and ourselves, et cetera. And we had never had a second Chief Director, which means the FBI type of Soviet, defector in our lives, and all of this out of the blue, and no contact as in Geneva six months after the defection of Golitzen.Mr. Schwarz. And the date is when in relations to the Kennedy assassination?Mr. Angleton. Well, this was a contact, this was not a defection. He came to us once for information prior to the assassination.And then in Moscow the Soviets -- and I am not going into a lot of names, a member of the Second Chief Directorate, gave an American tourist a stack of documents from the Second Chief Directorate, the FBI, relating to how they got , and others of our agents, which showed they didn't get them through a two-headed source, but they got it through a on our side.So the leads rant into the thousands from Golitzen, and thousands and thousands of pages of transcript, interrogation, exhibiting photographs, and identifications, which in turn would refresh his memory on other courses. And out of that came the finalization of the case of Philby, Burgess, and all that, the Vassily case in the British Admiralty, and some other cases, and many cases in France and so on.Mr. Kirbow. Did Oswald show up at that time?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 67]
TOP SECRETMr. Angleton. No, not from Golitzen.But when the assassination took place --Mr. Schwarz. The Kennedy assassination?Mr. Angleton. When the Kennedy assassination took place, Golitzen called me immediately and stated that the modus operandi with any defector from anybody's army to the Soviet Union required that he go through processing by the 13th Department of the KGB.Mr. Schwarz. Which is their assassination department?Mr. Angleton. Which is their assassination department, which is called their Affairs for Executive Action.And there are two reasons for it. Number one was, to find out what sophisticated weaponry or training he might have had that would be of use to them. And number two, whether it was more valuable to reinfiltrate him into the National Army for future activity.Mr. Schwarz. Of the nature of assassinations?Mr. Angleton. Of anything. It could be sabotage, or intelligence, or whatever.AND THIS WAS THE SOP on the dealing with military defectors.Now. when the Soviet Government turned over to the US all the documents that led to the interest regarding Oswald stay in the Soviet Union, there was nothing there indicating processing by Department 13. Then after the assassinationTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 68]
## TOP SECRETNosenko, whom we hid once in Geneva, he went back to Moscow. And in my view he would have never come back on the scene CHEREPANOV because they brought this Cheraponov thing in to have the locus shifted from where we would have controls, in Geneva, to Moscow where they would have all the controls. And that would be the Directorate. And therefore they would have the direct means of counteracting and mutilating the leads and the importance of Golitzen's defection.But the tourist gave the documents to the American Embassy. And we photographed them. The Charge insisted on giving them back to the Soviets on grounds that it would be appropriate.Mr. Schwarz. These are not the official documents dealing with Oswald but the documents that the man tried to pass in Switzerland?Mr. Angleton. The Second Chief Directorate, he took all of the documents out of the FBI Soviet section and gave them to the tourist and we read how we got caught on things.So there is the assassination. Cheraponov allegedly was chased to the Turkish border and shot. And in my view this is a myth, because in 1948 Cheraponov was stationed in Belgrade, and he tried to defect to us, and at another time tried to establish liaison and contact with the Birtish MI-6, at a time when Philby was Chief of Intelligence, meaning that the approach would have been under Philby in 1948, and## TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 69]
9TOP SECRET 681 then he reappears in the early 1960's as a member of the2 Second Chief Directorate.3 That is enough of Cherapanov. But it is important only4 from the Soviet point of view, the best laid plans fall apart.5 And then out of the blue, Nosenko, whom we would never have6 seen again, reappears after the assassination in Geneva, and7 tells us he wants to defect.8 Mr. Schwarz. And he provided information which was9 inconsistent with Oswald being the Russian agent?10 Mr. Angleton. I am coming to that.11 So immediately we tried to get the breadth of his career12 so that we know where the priorities are. And the first thing13 he tells us is that while he was in the Second Chief14 Directorate in the American Section, Oswald's KGB dossier went15 over his desk. And his first story, as I recall it, was that16 it was two volumes or three volumes. And finally it went down17 to one volume and a small sheaf of papers.18 Also he said that the dossier showed clearly that Oswald19 was mentally unbalanced, and that he was a poor shot, and20 therefore couldn't get a hunting license, and a lot of stuffof this sort.21 And then on all of these outstanding leads -- penetra-22 tions, of the French, the Americans, the British codes, bugging23 of the Embassy, all of these different sorts -- Nosenko had24 something to do which diverted us from Nosenko's leads. And25 TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 70]
10TOP SECRET1 in the normal course of events, we might have put Golitzen in2 contact with Nosenko, which may have meant the assassination3 of Golitzen, because the whole approach of Nosenko was one4 where logically you would bring them in and have two bodies,5 one from the First Chief Directorate, that is, Golitzen, the6 CIA part of the system, and the other from the FBI part of the7 system, and therefore you would have a very strong balance8 against the KGB. But we didn't do that. Because there were9 certain things, litmus papers, questions put to Nosenko. And10 as far as I was concerned, if he was bona fide he would have11 answered one way, and he did not answer that way. And they had12 to do with some deeper secrets regarding a meeting of the13 2000 members of the KGB and the Soviet Government in May of14 1959, presided over by Shelepin and attended by many members15 of the Central Committee on the reorientation of the Soviet16 Services and the return to Leninism wherever intelligence17 operations has a political objective. And this is a part of18 the process of de-Stalinization. And so when we took him19 unwittingly chronologically through his career, he omits20 all of this phase. And we had three or four or five other test21 things, where their damage report would not show that Golitzen22 had access, because it was part of his way of getting in and23 breaking compartmentation. And therefore they would have no24 evidence that he had sufficient knowledge.25 Mr. Schwarz. And so Nosenko looked funny to you, heTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 71]
TOP SECRET1 looked wrong to you?2 Mr. Angleton. Absolutely.3 Mr. Schwarz. He looked like a plant to you?4 Mr. Angleton. Precisely.5 Mr. Schwarz. And among the information that he provided to you was that Oswald was a mental case and was a bad shot?6 Mr. Angleton. Right.7 Mr. Schwarz. And you had also received from Nosenko --8 Mr. Angleton. Golitzen -- from Golitzen -- information that suggested the normal practice was for Department 13, which had responsibility from the Russian KGB for assassinations, to interview military defectors. And we had observed that when the Russians transferred documents concerning Oswald, that there was no reference in there to any such debriefing by Department 13. And another important part of it is that there was a man who was handling George Blake from London, who was Counselor of the Soviet Embassy. And when he returned he became head of the 13 Department, General Rodin. But he was there under an alias as a civilian. He was the Chief of the KGB in London, and a very high grade man. Then he took over the Department 13 and reinvigorated it.21 Mr. Schwarz. And what was his connection with Oswald?22 Mr. Angleton. I am saying that he was head of Department 13, and was head of Department 13 at a time -- I mean, he had a long history in that, in other words, the prominence of25 TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 72]
TOP SECRETDepartment 13 and this is a point I think I should make, that the Agency, unlike the Soviets, does not have an assassination department. The Soviets have always had an assassination department, which is totally sealed off from the rest of the organization. People from the outside know very little about what goes on in that. People career-wise stay in there. And they report to the Chairman of the KGB, and drop off, who in turn report to the Politboro. And therefore it is an entirely sealed organization which is capable of all forms of action, whether it be sabotage -- an illegal sabotage or what, an illegal directorate which is independent of the rest of the KGB -- nuclear sabotage, and all this type of thing, and infiltration of enemy forces in the event of war. And of course assassination, the assassination of Ukrainian leaders in West Germany.Mr. Schwarz. Do you recount that simply because it makes more significant the absence of any reference to Oswald because you are giving evidence as to the vigor of Department 13, or did you recount it because there is a more direct connection with Oswald?Mr. Angleton. This is related to what I told Mr. Dulles,I thought it was absolutely wrong to close the door on the life of the Commission, and instead there should be a statement that we are not in a position -- that on the fact available to us during the given period, these are our conclusions. AndTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 73]
13TOP SECRETthen to spell out in detail Department 13 and its organization -- and the burden of proof shigts. But not only the burden of proof, but you never know when a worm goes into somebody's head to defect from Department 13. And that bring you up on the entire story.Mr. Schwarz. So you have recounted the importance of Department 13. You have recounted the significance in your mind of the absence of any reference to Department 13 in the documentation on Oswald turned over by the Soviets to the US. And you have recounted the strange nature of the information provided by Nosenko.Mr. Angleton. Correct.Mr. Schwarz. Let me ask you another line of questions about each one of these items. As to the Nosenko information, you stated that that information was suppressed from the Warren Commission?Mr. Angleton. The word suppression is probably not the right word because, I will be very honest with you, I was told the other day that the information was given classified, and it was given to Helms or somebody, or Mr. McCone, who passed it as a classified document. I have asked for it, but I haven't seen it.Mr. Schwarz. Why did you say a moment ago that it was suppressed?Mr. Angleton. Because I never knew where it went. WhenTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 74]
TOP SECRET1473I was sitting in the position as to where that information would go, I was opposed to it. And my pfficial position was that. And I ghought until relatively recently that it never went.And then all of a sudden they have declassified a lot of stuff. And Mr. Rocha, who was the point of record of the Agency's dealing with the Warren Commission, told me that Nosenko stuff was the stuff they were declassifying. Now, his role was not one of the executive nature. Actually it was simply because he was a great scholar and a great many other things, and therefore he had the most catholic background to handle something as eomplex as the Warren Commission, not in exercising executive power, but working on behalf of the Director and all the Directorates and everything pertaining to the Warren Commission. He is a tidy individual. And in fact Mr. Belin has made a great deal of use of him in the Commission's business, and he is the one that had done all the digging for the Commission, and so on, on a whole series of matters that I am not familiar with.But my point to you and this is very difficult to explain is that the question of Nosenko created a very great division in the life of all counterintelligence as to bona fides, as in all questions of when you are dealing with double identification agents, there is always dispute.But let me just line up the order of battle here. OurTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 75]
TOP SECRETChief of the Soviet Division accepted the fact that the man was a provocation. His Chief of Counterintelligence accepted the fact that the man was a provocation.Mr. Schwarz. Do you mean provocation, or providing false information?Mr. Angleton. An Agent Provocateur.I said he was false. My man said he was false. And it isn't a parrot affair, each one reads the same stuff and analyzes and come to their own conclusion. And Golitzen, who defected, based only on the Geneva, first encounter in Geneva, not the defection, had predicted in advance that because of the enormity of his defection they would send a provocateur into the West to destroy and mutilate his leads.So it was a question of awaiting, you might say, who knocks on the door. And here is Nosenko.Now, since then the Chief of the Soviet Division who is no longer there, has recanted in a way -- the Inspector General went into all this -- he is today the NIO dealing in Soviet Affairs, the National Intelligence Officer on Soviet Affairs. And his counterintelligence man, a fellow named Pete Bagley, who is the brother of the two Admirals Bagley, and one of the best men we had, left the Agency and is now in Belgium in private life. And I can go all the way through these other people who have been dispersed. But the record will clearly reflect that the preponderance of all individualsTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 76]
TOP SECRET1 was that Nosenko was sent on a mission.2 Mr. Schwarz. And provided false information?3 Now, is it your current understanding that what was4 provided to the Warren Commission was the raw infomration.5 brought by Nosenko, or was the Warren Commission also provided6 with the opinion of persons such as yourself and others as you7 have recounted that he was providing false information?8 Mr. Angleton. I don't think the Warren Commission was9 ever faced with the issue of the internal issues of Golitzen10 or Nosenko.11 Mr. Schwarz. You first said that the information was12 suppressed from the Warren Commission, and then you said no,13 it is your understanding now --14 Mr. Angleton. Well, the word suppression isn't the right15 word, I said. One went to argue the matter and it was agreed16 by higher authority that the information shouldn't be --17 Senator Mathias. There was a value judgment made as to18 the usefulness of the material?19 Mr. Angleton. That is right -- and not to do what the20 Soviet in our mind wanted us to do, which eas to give it21 prominence and have it come out as an official part of the22 record and documents and articles, and so on.23 Mr. Schwarz. But your current understanding is that the24 information was provided?25 Mr. Angleton. That was classified, and never came out inTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 77]
TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-6000761 public.2 Mr. Schwarz. But was nevertheless provided to the3 Commission?4 Mr. Angleton. It was made known to them in some fashion.5 Mr. Schwarz. Was it made known to them at the same time6 that at leat certain experts withing the Agency thought it7 was false information?8 Mr. Angleton. I think, as I understand it now, that in9 spite of our feelings, either Helms or McCone made apresentation of it.10 Mr. Schwarz. But without mentioning your feelings,11 certain experts thought that it was false?12 Mr. Angleton. I can't respond to that. I don't know.13 Mr. Schwarz. What about the information derived from14 Golitzen, which indicated in your expert opinion that the15 documents provided by the Soviet Union were, I think you put16 it, funny, or strange, or misleading, because they did not17 include any reference to debriefing by Department 13, was that18 information provided to the Warren Commission?19 Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't think so. But all20 I can say there is this, to be realistic. No one would expect21 the Soviet Government, regardless, to provide documents,22 secret documents, on Oswald, whether he was or was not their23 agent. And I say, I can go all the way back through history,24 the way they falsified the official record, they had it with25TOP SECRET