Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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Mr. Mann commented that he thinks we cannot maintain training anywhere in Latin America indefinitely, although he does think we could maintain small airstrips without too much danger. He said that he believes everyone in Guatemala knows by now the true nature of our activities there, and that if they are going to be publicized before the world he would rather have them exposed in the U.S. rather than in Latin America. He recognized that this would be highly embarrassing for this country, but that for most Latin American governments it could be fatal. He spoke of the impending OAS investigation of Guatemala, and conceded that OAS support would be required to carry out training successfully in the U.S. To this, Mr. Merchant replied that he did not think exposure of such activities on American soil would be acceptable, particularly in the U. N.Mr. Bissell then said that he has agreed for some time with Mr. Mann's point as to the strain on Guatemala. He said that we have developed an evacuation plan to be used in the event of outside investi- gation, but that this is not a satisfactory answer to the problem. He said that within about four weeks an alternate site could be established in Nicaragua but that this would be very expensive, would tie us into the Somoza brothers, and would call attention to Nicaragua in the same way as Guatemala.Mr. Bissell said that he foresaw several possibilities for constructive change in the training operation, some for the immediate future and some over a period of longer range. They include:a. A sort of refugee camp in the U.S. ostensibly designed for temporary care of Cuban exiles. This story could be defended but it is difficult to say for how long or how effectively.b. A guarded military facility in the U.S. This could be handled more securely, but the existence of an area where peculiar things are going on could not be kept secret indefinitely. An alternative would be private property such as the King Ranch, but this would take longer to arrange than a military base.c. Vieques Island, off Puerto Rico. This is fairly remote, but the government of Puerto Rico is already trying to get the U.S. Marines out.
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d. The CIA site on Saipan. This would be very secure but would require a large amount of airlift.e. Fort Randolph, in the Panama Canal Zone. At this location the trainees could be kept secure but would almost certainly know where they were.Mr. Douglas said that a military base could be made available, such as Laughlin Air Force Base near Del Rio, Texas. He said that the use of such real estate might be tied into some sort of cooperation with Tracy Voorhees' Committee on Cuban Refugees. He felt also that the U. S. capability for intervention in Cuba will probably not be effective enough unless there is more overt participation than has been contemplated to date. Gen. Lansdale said that he and Gen. Bonesteel were of the same opinion.Mr. Gray supported this general position, stating that when the current Cuban plan was approved, the situation in that country was different than it is now. Since then, the Cubans have received sizeable amounts of bloc arms and have organized a militia, and Mr. Gray wondered how effective a few hundred exiles could be. Mr. Dulles acknowledged that it would be necessary to have internal support if the Castro government were to be successfully overthrown; he felt that there is reason to believe such support might develop, perhaps within the militia itself.Mr. Mann expressed the opinion that the way to proceed is to seal Cuba off from the rest of Latin America and to settle down for a one or two year wait, presumably to see whether the tide might not turn in our favor. He said that in the meantime we could infiltrate small groups of trained Cubans as a token, but that we should postpone a decision on a striking force for four or five months. In this general connection, Mr. Bissell said that even if it is finally decided that overt U.S. forces should be used, there still should be a nucleus of trained Cubans available. Therefore, our present activities should be continued in any case.Summing up, the Group decided that the possibility of splitting the present body of trainees into three or four groups should be examined urgently (particularly in view of Mr. Mann's estimate that the OAS investigation might take place in two or three weeks). Alternate sites to be examined would include Vieques, Laughlin AFB and Fort Randolph.
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The latter location should absorb no more than 200. Mr. Douglas cautioned that the use of DOD facilities should at the present time be considered as a holding operation rather than a continuation or stepping up of present training. The possibilities of establishing a kind of CCC under the Voorhees auspices should be examined.### Advice to Assistant Attorney GeneralMr. Parrott tabled the draft of suggested advice to Mr. Yeagley in connection with Cuban exiles. Mr. Douglas felt that it was not desirable to give Mr. Yeagley any piece of paper. He suggested that Yeagley should simply be advised that the Group feels the best method of procedure might be to prosecute one test case, e.g. Masferrer, but not to institute wholesale prosecutions. In answer to a question, Mr. Parrott stated that he did not know whether this procedure would satisfy Mr. Yeagley, but that he would discuss it with Mr. Gray, who had by that time left the meeting. (Later, Mr. Gray talked to Yeagley, who appeared satisfied with the oral guidance.)### U-2 for CubaMr. Bissell summarized the results of the first U-2 flight over Cuba and asked for the Group's permission for two additional sorties to fill in the remaining 50% coverage. The Group agreed, subject to Mr. Gray's concurrence. (This was obtained later.)
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23 November 1960MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDPROPERTY OFTHE WHITE HOUSE OFFICESUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 23 November 1960PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Gen. Lansdale, Dulles and Bissell2. CubaMr. Bissell reported that further consideration following the meeting of last Saturday had led to a tentative conclusion that Saipan would be the best place to which to move the bulk of the Cuban trainees. He emphasized the security advantages of the location, and said that it is believed the move can be accomplished with our own transportation plus two roundtrips by C-124s. These we would request the Department of Defense to provide. We would probably move some small commando-type units - about 50 men - to Fort Randolph. Mr. Bissell also stressed the fact that additional construction costs would be significantly less at Saipan than anywhere else.The DCI agreed in general with this preliminary thinking. He urged, however, that the matter of morale of the trainees be borne constantly in mind, and that the move not be accomplished all at once. Gen. Lansdale agreed. Mr. Dulles also asked that President Ydigoras be informed.Mr. Bissell concluded that plans would not be firmed up until receipt of Defense's report on facilities available in the U.S.Mr. Bissell then spoke of the report of a possible attempt by Cuban dissidents to take over the Isle of Pines. He explained that we have nothing to do with the plan and would in fact be unable to give much support to it. He said that it is highly questionable whether this attempt will take piace m the reported time schedule, or indeed at all, but emphasized that this illustrates how initiative might be taken by others, so that we could be presented with drastic requests for assistance on very short notice. Mr. Bissell also mentioned the report of possible major sabotage to be carried out in the very near future. In addition, he said that we now have six B-26s, plus eleven crews, available for combat, with other aircraft for supply. He noted that Nicaragua might be used for refueling in the event of actual operations, but that the immediate objective would be to obtain strips on the Isle of Pines. Mr. Dulles remarked that this would of course require an active revolt.Mr. Dulles also mentioned the proposal by Peter Grace to encourage Father Peyton (described as a sort of Catholic Billy Graham) to carry out activities in Cuba.
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30 November 1960MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 30 November 1960PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant and Mann; Douglas; Gray; Dulles and Bissell2. CubaMr. Gray solicited the Group's assistance in arriving at a consensus of views as to what exactly had been decided as a result of the high-level meeting of the day before. The following points were agreed:a. Mr. Gray's associates stand ready to deny U.S. activity based in Guatemala, even though it may become blown (Mr. Douglas urged that every effort be made to make it possible to deny plausibly).b. If the program is enlarged, additional facilities may be obtained, but at this stage not in the U.S. No training of Cubans will be conducted in the U.S. under present circumstances. (Mr. Bissell told the Group of the possibility of an additional finca in Guatemala.)c. Evacuation plans should be kept in readiness. (Mr. Mann said that he thought he could arrange a week's
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notice before any OAS committee actually visitedGuatemala and that it might be possible even then toavoid actual investigation on the spot. Mr. Bissellsaid that if we do have a week, evacuation could becarried out by Agency aircraft; if more speed isrequired DOD assistance might be necessary.Mr. Douglas, with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissellconcurring, felt that the possibility of emergencyevacuation to Florida under the guise of ordinaryrefugees should be kept in mind.)Mr. Dulles suggested that questions on Cuba might be asked atthe next Presidential press conference and that we should be preparedwith a statement along the lines that we do not entirely discouragerevolutionary activity. Mr. Merchant said he would arrange to havea draft prepared along these lines. In this connection, Mr. Parrottreported the request from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley forguidance as to possible action against an alleged collaborator ofGeneral Pedraza. (Note: Mr. Yeagley was later told that we have nooperational interest and no objection to the Department of Justice'spursuing the case. Mr. Yeagley said that they would proceed withinvestigation, but that it is by no means certain the case will evercome to trial.)Mr. Gray then outlined his understanding of his friends' desireswith respect to organization of the anti-Castro effort. He said that theprincipal need foreseen was for an individual to serve as a focal pointfor diverse interests in this situation, and to be available to meet withMr. Gray's friends at any time. In addition, someone should beavailable to deal with the FRD and to talk to other Latin Americangovernments.After a considerable amount of discussion, the consensus of theGroup was as follows: Probably two men will be required, one to handlethe overt and the other the covert aspects. They would work togetheron a daily basis and both would have the entire picture in mind, butresponsibility for the execution of covert operations would have to restwith CIA. The overt man should ideally be a government official,preferably someone senior in the Foreign Service or the Departmentof State. There should be a sort of "board of directors" to overseeall aspects of the operation. This should be the Special Group plusSecretary Anderson when matters of major policy are considered.(Mr. Gray was not entirely sure that his friends would accept the two-man concept but Mr. Dulles and Mr. Merchant emphasized that whether
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## SECRET-EYES ONLYthere were one man or two, CIA would have to maintain its own organizational integrity.)There then ensued a lengthy examination of qualifications and availability of a number of individuals. It was finally decided that, taking all things into consideration, including the aspect of quick availability, Ambassador Willauer would probably be the best choice. On the CIA side, Mr. Dulles nominated Mr. Barnes. It was recognized that these nominees would have to be checked with Mr. Gray's associates.Mr. Mann suggested that Mr. Willauer might also do the FRD job, but the DCI pointed out that this requires a covert approach and must be done by the Agency.As to Mr. Pawley, it was decided that it would be unwise to have him embark on a grand tour or to endow him with official government status. Mr. Merchant said he would not object, however, to Mr. Pawley's talking to President Frondizi.Mr. Gray then mentioned the report which had reached his friends about a representative of the FRD who had apparently just returned from a trip around Latin America. It was noted that the individual referred to was probably Sardinius, and Mr. Dulles said he would obtain a written report of the trip, for passage to Mr. Gray's associates.Mr. Bissell reminded Mr. Douglas of the outstanding request to the DOD for thirty-eight NCOs and officers for service outside the U.S.![signature of THOMAS A. PARROTT]THOMAS A. PARROTT![stamp of 02741]SECRET-EYES ONLYNW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 53PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OICE
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17 February 1960MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 17 February 1960PRESENT: Messrs. Gray, Irwin, DullesMr. Joseph Scott of the State Department sat in as an observer.1. CubaThe project providing for covert spotting and assessment of potential agents for eventual sabotage of sugar mills was discussed at some length. Within the limits outlined - that is, that no action would be initiated under the terms of any approval reached at this meeting, but rather that approval would cover only the identification and evaluation of assets - the Group expressed general approval. Mr. Dulles reiterated that he was not asking for approval actually to proceed with operations. Mr. Irwin stated that he and Secretary Douglas were enthusiastic about the project. It was agreed that it should be presented to the Secretary of State and that Mr. Gray would discuss it further.(Later Mr. Gray reported that he had discussed this matter with his associate. The latter had made two points:a. He doubted the efficacy of the proposed action, feeling that if it were successful in denying money to the Castro regime which could otherwise be used for subversive activities, the Cuban government could obtain offsetting funds from other sources..b. He would not agree to identifying assets for this particular sabotage operation. He would agree that the Agency could proceed to spot and assess potential agents for a variety of possible tasks. He said that once this![stamp of SECRET - EYES ONLY]
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was done and a comprehensive program of suggested action was drawn up, it should be submitted to the Special Group, and if the Group recommended approval it should probably then be discussed with him. It was stipulated that in any case no action should take place until his return from the trip on which he is about to embark.Mr. Scott also reported later that Mr. Herter had made exactly the same point as outlined in b. above.)2. Dominican RepublicThere was a brief discussion of the situation in the Dominican Republic. Mr. Irwin commented that the Defense Department is most interested in determining whether or not a sort of Third Force can be identified.
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28 December 1960MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 28 December 1960PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray and Dulles2. Special Meeting on CubaMr. Gray said that it is desired to set up a special meeting on Cuba for 9:00 AM Monday, 2 January. His associates wanted particularly to make certain that everyone concerned "clearly sees the sequence of events." He also said that Mr. Pawley had had a recent conference in the White House.Mr. Gray asked that Mr. Merchant and Mr. Douglas determine whether their respective Secretaries wish to attend. He said that Mr. Willauer would also be on hand. Finally, he asked that the Army colonel (Lt. Col. Egan) who had given such an enlightening description of the qualities of the Cuban volunteers be on hand for the meeting. It was noted that Col. Egan is currently out of the country, but the DCI agreed to have him brought to Washington for the meeting.
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# SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCECONCLUDING REMARKSYou will, I hope, permit me some personal, but I think not unimportant observations. I hope that you will complete your work as expeditiously as possible as I feel very strongly the need for a viable Central Intelligence Agency operating, of course, within its charter. I believe that the present furor about C. I. A. is impeding it in the performance of its mission and the sooner it is able to go about its business, not in a fish bowl, the better our country will be served. I believe that we will continue to need effective, intelligent collection and analysis for our policy makers and I think there will be occasions when covert activities should be undertaken in the interests of our National security.Finally, one thing that bothers me, Mr. Chairman, is that there is tremendous concern now -- and I don't suggest that it is improper -- with the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, while at the same time people seem not to be equally concerned about what the Soviet Union is up to in this country, especially through its very many KGB agents here. I would hope that a Congressional Committee would be interested enough to investigate this most serious matter.
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## PERSONS/ENTITIES:PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, DOUGLASDILLON, GENERAL GOODPASTERLand Under state## DATES:July 5, 1960## CATEGORIES:TRUJILLO## OCCURRENCE:On July 5, 1960 President Eisenhower met with Secretary of State Herter, Secretary of the Treasury Dillon. Also present were Gen. Goodpaster and General Persons. The memorandum of the conference stated: "With regard to the Dominican Republic, Mr. Herter said there are various things being done which could result in a provisional government being set up. The President said if such a government were set up we should recognize it quickly. We could then move in with troops on their request if need should arise. In so far as the question is one of internal intervention, we must use the CIA in order to avoid attribution. The President thought we should knock out of any documents on file any reference to starting a revolution."## SOURCE:Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower(Whitman File) (DDE DIARY SERIES) - Abilene## STAFF:Kelley## FILE:## DATE:July 6, 1975---## PERSONS/ENTITIES:VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, MR. GRAY,DOUGLAS DILLON## DATES:March 14, 1960## CATEGORIES:CASTROMONGOOSE## OCCURRENCE:At a National Security Council meeting on March 14, 1960 Mr. Dillon said: "Our objective is to bring another government to power in Cuba...there is no apparent alternative to the present government in the event Castro disappears. Indeed the result of Castro's disappearance might be a Communist takeover.""Mr. Dulles reported that a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being worked on. Admiral Burke suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should-be-package deal, since many of the leaders around Castro were even worse than Castro."## SOURCE:Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series) 436th NSC meeting, March 10, 1960 - Abilene## STAFF:Kelley## FILE:## DATE:July 6, 1975---## PERSONS/ENTITIES:VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLASDILLON, H. SHELDON (CIA), MR. LAY## DATES:April 14, 1960## CATEGORIES:TRUJILLO## OCCURRENCE:AT a National Security Council meeting on April 14, 1960, Vice President Nixon presiding, ": 'Mr. Dulles reported.. Trujillo's position continued to weaken and was now quite precarious... (he) thought further attempts will be made to kill or oust Trujillo.""Mr. Dillon said there was one favorable aspect... if Trujillo-could-be-removed from power in the Dominican Republic while pro-Castro elements were prevented from seizing power in that country, our anti-Castro campaign throughout Latin America would receive a great boost. The Vice President agreed that getting rid of Trujillo would be a favorable development for us."## SOURCE:Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 441st meeting, April 14, 1960) - Abilene## STAFF:Kelley## FILE:## DATE:July 6, 1975NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 58
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## PERSONS/ENTITIES:VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLASDILLON, H. SHELDON (CIA), MR. LAY## DATES:April 14, 1960## CATEGORIES:TRUJILLO## OCCURRENCE:On April 14, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting Mr. Dulles reported that a SR. Betancourt /no relation to Venezuelan leader/ had defected from Cuba and predicted three outcomes with respect to Castro: (1) an assassination that would make Castro a martyr, (2) Castro's suicide as a result of the failure of the Cuban experiment and (3) a trend to a socialist dictatorship and a Batista terror regime.Pres This indicate that asSSRS) was 1st a favored alternative at NSC level!## SOURCE:Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower(Whiteman File) (NSC meeting series, 441 st meeting, April 14 1960)FILE: - Abilene## STAFF:DATE Kelley July 6, 1975---## PERSONS/ENTITIES:PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON, ALLEN DULLES## DATES:July 7, 1960## CATEGORIES:TRUJILLOCASTROMONGOOSE## OCCURRENCE:At a National Security Council meeting on July 7, 1960 Mr. Dulles stated: "The Venezuelan government was engaged in an all-out effort, through the OAS and otherwise, to isolate, condemn and cause the downfall of Trujillo. An important reason for the vigor of the Venezuelan efforts was the fact they have convincing evidence that Trujillo was responsible for the assassination attempt on Betancourt /President of Venezuela/** * "Betancourt believes another attempt will be made momentarily and therefore it wants a showdown without delay." Mr. Dulles further explained that the Venezuelan Foreign Minister wants the United States to lead the way in breaking relations with Trujillo and that Betancourt wants a meeting of the OAS nations to deal with the Trujillo problem.## SOURCE:Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 450th NSC meeting, July 7, 1960) - Abilene## STAFF:KelleyDATE July 6, 1975---## PERSONS/ENTITIES:PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, VICEPRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON, ALLEN DULLES## DATES:July 7, 1960## CATEGORIES:TRUJILLOCASTROMONGOOSE## OCCURRENCE:On July 7, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting "Mr. Dulles stated that he believes, and the intelligence community agrees, that the problem of Trujillo must be settled before the problem of Castro can be dealt with, even though Castro is the greater threat."The NSC minutes further state that the United States told Betancourt of Venezuela that the United States can't act without knowing who the successor to Trujillo would be. The U.S. will work with Betancourt and Figueres of Costa Rica on suggestions for a successor for Trujillo. President Eisenhower suggested a government in exile be ready to go into the Dominican Republic in the event of Trujillo's downfall.## SOURCE:Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower(Whiteman File) (NSC meeting series, 450th NSC meeting, July 7, 1960)- Abilene## STAFF:KelleyDATE July 6, 1975NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 59