Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10100.pdf — page 59]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:MR. GRAY, PRESIDENT EISENHOWERDATES:July 28, 1960CATEGORIES:CASTROTRUJILLOMONGOOSEOCCURRENCE: On July 28, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting President Eisenhower said: "Until Trujillo is eliminated, we cannot get out Latin American friends to reach a proper level of indignation in dealing with Castro. It was noted that Venezuela was trying to separate the Cuban and Domincan Republic problems in OAS forms. On this matter, "The President said if we attempted to take any action with respect to Cuba before settling the Trujillo situation, we would be the loser."Does "elimination" mean "assassination"?SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of July 28, 1960FILE: AbileneSTAFF:DATE KelleyJuly 6, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, MAURICE STANS, MR. GRAYDATES:Aug. 25, 1960CATEGORIES:LUMUMBAOCCURRENCE: On August 25, 1960 the minutes of the National Security Council meeting that day state: "The President suggested the United Nations might recognize Katanga. Mr. Stans suggested that we might base ourselves on Tshombe and Kasavubu and throw out Lumumba by peaceful means." (page 15)SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of AugustF25,E1960 - AbileneSTAFF:KelleyDATE: July 6, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, GORDON GRAYDATES:Sept. 21, 1960CATEGORIES:LUMUMBAOCCURRENCE: On September 21, 1960, at a National Security meeting, Mr. Dulles said: "A recent attempt to assassinate Mobutu had failed. ***Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment, but Lumumba was not disposed of and remained a great danger as long as he was not disposed of."SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of Sept. 21, 1960)FILE:NW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 60STAFF:KelleyDATE July 6, 1975
[157-10014-10100.pdf — page 60]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, GORDON GRAYDATES:Oct. 24, 1960CATEGORIES:LUMUMBAOCCURRENCE:On October 24, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting Mr. Dulles reported:"An intercepted UAR /Egypt7 message indicated that five Congolese soldiers had attempted to assassinate Mobutu on the 15th of October. The US had prior information of this attempt and had warned Mobutu... if he had not been warned, it was probable that he would have been caught." (page 16)SOURCE:Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, minutes of meeting, October 24, 1960)FILE:AbileneSTAFF:KelleyDATE July 6, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:GORDON GRAY, MARION W. BOGGSDATES:Feb. 12, 1960CATEGORIES:LUMUMBACASTROTRUJILLOOCCURRENCE: On Febraury 12, 1960 a "special" National Security Council meeting was held, and Marion W. Boggs, Deputy Executive Secretary, attended as Acting Executive Secretary. The only record of this meeting appearing in the NSC meeting series of minutes is a one-page notation which states: "On instructions from the Executive Secretary no memorandum was written"What was discussed? is not indicated in document..SOURCE:Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, special NSC meeting, Feb. 12, 1960FILE:Abi LeveSTAFF:KelleyDATE: July 6, 1975PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:OCCURRENCE:SOURCE:STAFF:FILE:DATE:
[157-10014-10100.pdf — page 61]
MOTE ON GRAY TESTIMONY FOR FAOS:short summaryIf we don't re-write the Gray «конаimgy, you should note to the senators that since we w drafted it we have received a new batch of key documents from the Eisenhower library which are reflected (quoted) in the Gray Chronology.Add NNON to short fummaryNW 50955 DocId:32423488 Page 62
[157-10014-10100.pdf — page 62]
To: FilesFrom: Frederick BaronRe: DELETION IN SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES OF NOVEMBER 3, 1960Date: July 7, 1975In a phone conversation with Jim Wilderotter of the White House, Wilderotter assured me that after the line "beyond our a capabil- ities" on page 3, there was a double space followed by Item 2, which deals with the African continent (not Congo), followed by a double space, then Item 3, which deals with Southeast Asia.Wilderotter assured me that neither item related to our inquiry. He said that there was nothing deleted on page 3 that related to KCuba.
[157-10014-10100.pdf — page 63]
# EXHIBITS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF GORDON GRAYCastro*Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.Special Group Minutes, August 12, 1960.LumumbaSpecial Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.Special Group Minutes, September 8, 1960.TrujilloMemorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI.Minutes of the Special Group of December 29, 1960.Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.* The Special Group Minutes of February 17, 1960 could be used for two purposes: (1) To establish the general atmosphere in the Special Group of planning, sabotage, operations in Cuba; and (2) The fact that, at least in this case, Gray's "associate" was President Eisenhower.
[157-10014-10100.pdf — page 64]
MEMORANDUMTO: FilesFROM: Frederick BaronDATE: July 5, 1975SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH GORDON GRAY# TOP SECRET## GENERAL BACKGROUND1. Staff Responsibilities Under Eisenhower:Gray said that the structural chain of command ran directly from the DCI to the President during the Eisenhower administration. Allen Dulles was able to approach Eisenhower directly, rather than through Gray.Andrew Goodpaster staffed President Eisenhower on many of the same subjects that Gray worked on. Gray was responsible for long-range planning; Goodpaster was responsible for spot work. Gray said that Goodpaster and he kept each other "intimately informed". However, Gray said that any covert action program would go through him and not Goodpaster. "Although I would tell Goodpaster about anything I discussed with the President." Some covert action programs were extremely tightly held, for example, on the U-2 incident only the following people were knowledgeable: Eisenhower, Goodpaster, and John Eisenhower."I didn't live with Eisenhower 24 hours a day. I don't know everything that he did. But I do think I knew every major decision, approval, or action of Eisenhower's."2. Special Group FunctionAt the 54/12 committee, Gray said, "I represented the President's interest, that was my role."
[157-10014-10100.pdf — page 65]
Gray said that shortly after the BERLIN TUNNEL, Eisenhower said,"I want the 54/12 comunittee to consider any action that impinges uponthe sovereignty of another country."Gray said that in almost every case, a proposed covert action wouldhave been discussed with the State Department and would have been staffedout before Special Group meeting. "Most of the rest of us did not have a chanceto reflect before the meeting."Gray said that during his tenure, there was no chairman of the 54/12(Special Group). But perhaps Merchant conducted the meetings.Gray said that during the transition to the Kennedy administration, heasked McGeorge Bundy to promise him that the Special Group would not bewashed out. Gray explained that the Special Group was necessary for theprotection of the President. The Special Group discussions allow the Presidentthe chance to know in advance about actions which are potentially embarrassingto him. The President's representative to the Group (Gray, then Bundy) has theright to object to an action and take it up with the President. The Presidenthas a chance to know about everything that goes on in the Special Group, andthrough his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the President wouldhave a chance to say "no" to a proposed action. Gray said that the presenceof the Special Group would protect a President from operations such as assass-inations.3. "His Associate":Initially, Gray did not recognize the phrase used by Parrott in theSpecial Group minutes 'Mr. Gray's associate" or "his associates". Gray'sfirst reaction was that "his associates" would probably refer to membersof his NSC staff.
[157-10014-10100.pdf — page 66]
-3-But after seeing the minutes of the Special Group mecting of February 17, 1960, Gray said that it was clear that in those minutes "his associate" referred to President Eisenhower.Gray said that he never used the phrase "associate", that was Parrott's phrase. Gray was not aware the phrase was used at the time in those minutes and couldn't, without reconstructing each minute, be sure it referred to the President in each case. He said that when he attended the meetings, he would refer to "the President" directly.(Note: Since the phrase "the President" is never used in Parrott's minutes, it is fair to assume that at least some of the references to "Mr. Gray's associate" are euphemisms for President Eisenhower.)NSC DOCUMENTSGray recalls that the President called him, and perhaps Allen Dulles, into his office shortly after Gray's appointment and said that "no minutes, notes, or memos of Special Group meetings are to be kept, except by the DCI and they are to be kept in the DCI's files." Gray said that Dulles was not present at this meeting. He knows that he would have told Dulles shortly afterwards.Gray did not keep personal notes of the Special Group meetings. Although he did defy the Presidential directive in one specific instance, by deciding to make a memorandum of every meeting with the President relating to the subject of Cuba. These memoranda are on file at the Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas.Gray said that he never reviewed Thomas Parrott's minutes of the Special Group. But the NSC minutes were passed to the principals at the
[157-10014-10100.pdf — page 67]
-4-meeting for their review. Gray prepared the "records of action" forthe NSC, along with Jimmy Lay, Gray's assistant.LUMUMBAGray said that he did not remember the August 25, 1960 meeting atwhich it was reported that Gray commented that "his associates had expressedextremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straight-forward action"in relation to LUMUMBA. Gray said at first that he did not rememberLUMUMBA's position in the Congo. Gray said that he did not remember talkingwith Eisenhower about LUMUMBA.However, Gray does remember that "we were anti-LUMUMBA and wanted tosee him removed from his position of responsibility."In reference to the August 25 meeting, after he had seen the minutesof the meeting, Gray said that "when I said 'straightforward action', certainlyassassination would be one possibility." Gray continued to say that AllenDULLES was consistently in opposition to assassination and 'he was probablysaying to me that assassination was one of the things we shouldn't do."With reference to testimony received by the Select Committee from RobertJOHNSON, a State Department official who was a member of the Policy PlanningCouncil, he said that he had no recollection of a meeting in the summer of1960, at which President EISENHOWER ordered the assassination of LUMUMBA orsaid words to that effect.Gray said that he knows Bronson TWEEDY, but he never discussed LUMUMBAwith TWEEDY.
[157-10014-10100.pdf — page 68]
-5-## TRUJILLO"I am sure there was no discussion with EISENHOWER about the assassination of TRUJILLO.""I don't see how the DCI and the Department of State could have approved arms shipments without going up to the Special Group. The DCI should have taken a suggested course of action to the Special Group after checking with State."Gray said: "A high-powered weapon with a telescopic site would connote to me that it would be used for the purpose of assassinating an individual."## CUBAGray said that President EISENHOWER would frequently remark at meetings on Cuba that an operation should be planned so that it would be carried through successfully, otherwise it should not be planned at all.Referring to the minutes of the Special Group meeting of February 17, 1960, Gray said that at some point during that period of time, Allen DULLES brought his sugar mill sabotage plan to President EISENHOWER, who listened attentively. Afterward, the President said, "I don't think sabotage of sugar mills will do something significant. Bring me a complete plan." Subsequently, DULLES brought the President a four-point program: propaganda; economic sanction; sabotage; and the training of Cuban exiles.GRAY said the President approved this memo. (Note that Gray also said that he made a memo of this meeting and subsequent meetings on Cuba.)