Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 64]
-66-(O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 20).* (O'Donnell) also "spotted" a member of the UN guard and made his acquaintance to recruit him for an attempt to lure Lumumba outside UN protective custody (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 20; 9/11/75, p. 21).(O'Donnell) said that he cabled progress reports on his plan to CIA headquarters (O'Donnel), 9/11/75, p. 26). He also said that he informed the (Chief of) Station about his plan (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 56).In connection with his effort to draw Lumumba out of UN custody, (O'Donnell) arranged for a CIA agent, whose code name was QJWIN, to come to the Congo to work with him (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 19):What I wanted to use him for was ... counter-espionage[.]... I had to screen the U.S. participation in this ... by using a foreign national whom we knew, trusted, and had worked with ... the idea was for me to use him as an alter ego. (O'Donnell) Tr., pp. 19-20.)In mid-November, two cables from Leopoldville urged CIA headquarters to send QJWIN as soon as possible (CIA Cable IN 41261), Leopoldville to Director, 11/11/60) with this message:LOCAL OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE IMMEDIATE EXPEDITION OF QJWIN TRAVEL TO LEOPOLDVILLE. (CIA Cable IN 41556), Leopoldville to Director, 11/13/60.)* A cable from the Chief of Station to Tweedy in mid-November reported that the double guard of United Nations and Congolese troops around Lumumba's residence thwarted this plan: "CONCENTRIC RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POST IMPOSSIBLE" (CIA Cable (IN 42478), (Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60).
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-67-The cables contained no exploration of this sense of urgency about the "operational circumstances."(b) Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November-December 1960QJWIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background, recruited in Europe (Memorandum to CIA Finance Division, Re:Payments to QJWIN, 1/31/61), and supervised by CIA officer (ArnoldSilver) In November 1960, at (O'Donnell)'s request (O'Donnell), 6/9/75,p. 19), agent QJWIN was dispatched to the Congo by (Silver) to under- take a mission that "might involve a large element of personal risk."(CIA Cable IN 36814, 11/2/60.)*A dispatch from the CIA headquarters on his pending trip to Africa made clear the high degree of sensitivity accorded to his mission:In view of the extreme sensitivity of the ob- jective for which we want him to perform his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do... Instead, he was told ... that we would like to have him spot, assess, and recommend some dependable, quick-witted persons for our use.... It was thought best to withhold our true, specific requirements pending the final decision to use [him].(CIA Dispatch, (AUD 147, 11/2/60.)* Part of the purpose in dispatching QJWIN to Africa was to send him from the Congo to another African country for an unspeci- fied mission. QJWIN's mission to this country is not explained in the cable traffic between CIA headquarters and the various sta- tions that dealt with him.There is no indication in CIA files as to whether QJWIN com- pleted this mission. (O'Donnell) said he had no knowledge of any mission that would have taken QJWIN to this country (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 32-33).
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This message itself was deemed too sensitive to be retained at the station: "this dispatch should be reduced to cryptic necessary notes and destroyed after the first reading." (CIA Dispatch, 147, 11/2/60.)QJWIN arrived in Leopoldville on November 21, 1960 (CIA Cable (IN 49486) 11/29/60) and returned to Europe in late December 1960 (CIA Cable (OUT 54710), Director to Leopoldville, 12/9/60).The CIA Inspector General's Report said that QJWIN had been recruited earlier by (Arnold Silver) for use in a special operation in the Congo [the assassination of Patrice Lumumba] to be run by (Justin O'Donnell). (I.G. Report, p. 38.)However, both (O'Donnell) and Bissell testified that (O'Donnell) refused to be associated with an assassination operation.* Instead, (O'Donnell) said he went to the Congo to attempt to snatch Lumumba from the protective custody of the U.N. guard and place him in the hands of the Congolese army. (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, pp. 13-14, 37.)According to (O'Donnell), QJWIN was a man who was capable of undertaking an assassination mission:(O'Donnell): ... I would say that he would not be a man of many scruples.Q: So he was a man capable of doing anything?(O'Donnell): I would think so, yes.Q: And that would include assassination?(O'Donnell): I would think so.(O'Donnell), 9/11/75, pp. 35-36.)* See Sections 5(a)(ii) and 5(a)(iii) above.
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 67]
But (O'Donnell) had no knowledge that QJWIN was ever used for an assassination mission (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 36, 42).(O'Donnell) said that, as far as he knew, he was the only CIA officer with supervisory responsibility for QJWIN and QJWIN did not report independently to anyone else (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 28).When asked if it was possible that QJWIN had a mission independent of that he was performing for (O'Donnell), he said:(O'Donnell): Yes, that is possible -- or it could have been that somebody contacted him after he got down there, that they wanted him to do something along the lines of assassination. I don't know. (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 29.)But he discounted this possibility as "highly unlikely" because it would be a departure from standard CIA practice -- placing an agent in a position of knowledge superior to that of his supervising officer (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 29).Despite O'Donnell's doubt that QJWIN had an independent line of responsibility to the (Chief of) Station, a cable of November 29 shows that Hedgman was aware of WIN's activities.In that cable, the (Chief of) Station reported through the PROP channel to Tweedy that QJWIN had begun implementation of a plan to "PIERCE BOTH CONGOLESE AND UN GUARDS" to enter Lumumba's residence and "PROVIDE ESCORT OUT OF RESIDENCE" (CIA Cable (IN 49486), (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 11/29/60). (O'Donnell) said that he had directed QJWIN to make the acquaintanceship of the member of the UN force whose help he sought for the plan to snatch Lumumba from UN custody
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-70-(O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 21). But Lumumba had left UN custody at this point to travel toward his stronghold at Stanleyville. This did not deter QJWIN:VIEW CHANGE IN LOCATION TARGET, QJWINANXIOUS GO STANLEYVILLE AND EXPRESSEDDESIRE EXECUTE PLAN BY HIMSELF WITHOUTUSING ANY APPARAT (CIA Cable, 11/29/60).It is unclear whether this latter "plan" contemplated assassination as well as abduction. An affirmative reply from headquarters came through the PROP channel the next day which was also susceptible of interpretation as an assassination order:CONCUR QJWIN GO STANLEYVILLE... WE AREPREPARED CONSIDER DIRECT ACTION BY QJWINBUT WOULD LIKE YOUR READING ON SECURITYFACTORS. HOW CLOSE WOULD THIS PLACE [UNITEDSTATES] TO THE ACTION? (CIA Cable (OUT 98314),Chief of Africa Division to Chief of Station,11/30/60.)(O'Donnell) said that agent QJWIN's stay in the Congo was "co-extensive with my own, allowing for the fact that he came after I did." (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 19.) (O'Donnell said he left the Congo around the time of Lumumba's death in Katanga at the hands of Congolese authorities. (O'Donnell, p. 20.) QJWIN left in December shortly after Lumumba was captured by the Congolese army.In a memorandum to arrange the accounting for QJWIN's activities in the Congo, William K. Harvey -- under whom (O'Donnell) had worked before being detached for assignment to the Congo -- noted the success of QJWIN's mission: "QJWIN was sent on this trip for a
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 69]
-71-specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been completed" (Memorandum for Finance Division from William K. Harvey, 1/11/61). (O'Donnell) explained Harvey's reference to the fact that QJWIN's mission had been "completed" by saying that once Lumumba was in the hands of the Congolese authorities "the reason for the mounting of the project ... had become moot" (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 35). When asked if he and QJWIN were responsible for Lumumba's departure from UN custody and subsequent capture, (O'Donnell) said: "Absolutely not" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 35). Harvey did not recall the meaning of the memorandum, but he assumed that (O'Donnell)'s return from the Congo constituted the "completion" of QJWIN's mission (Ilarvey, affidavit, p. ).Despite the indication in the Inspector General's Report that QJWIN may have been recruited initially for an assassination mission and the suggestive language of the cables at the end of November, there is no clear evidence that QJWIN was actually involved in any assassination plan or attempt. The CIA officers who were involved in or knowledgeable of an assassination plot against Lumumba gave no testimony that tended to show that QJWIN was related to that plot. The (Chief of) Station had a "vague recollection" that QJWIN was in the Congo working for (Justin O'Donnell). (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) But Hedgman did not recall why QJWIN was in the Congo. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) QJWIN was not a major operative of Hedgman's. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy did not recall anything about QJWIN's mission in the Congo
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-72-(Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 54-57; Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 54, 61).William Harvey, from whose division QJWIN was on loan for his Congo assignment, had no specific knowledge of WIN's activities in the Congo:I was kept informed of the arrangements for QJWIN's trip to the Congo and, subsequently, of his presence in the Congo. I do not know specifically what QJWIN did in the Congo. I do not think that I ever had such knowledge.... If QJWIN were to be used on an assassination mission, it would have been cleared with me. I was never informed that he was to be used for such a mission. (Harvey affidavit, p. )He stated that Arnold Silver probably wrote the memoranda concerning QJWIN and submitted them for HARVEY's signature (llarvey affidavit, p. ).(c) QJWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIFLEAfter leaving the Congo in early 1961, QJWIN was used by CIA officer William Harvey as the principal asset in Project ZRRIFLE, a project which included research into a capability to assassinate foreign leaders.* QJWIN's role in Project ZRRIFLE was to "SPOT" figures of the European underworld who could be utilized as agents by the CIA if required. Harvey stated that before the formation of Project ZRRIFLE:* For a full treatment of Project ZRRIFLE, see Section infra, on the "Executive Action Capability."
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-73-Arnold Silver had not previously used QJWIN as an assassination capability or even viewed him as such. (Harvey affidavit, p.)Although Harvey also had discussions with (Sidney Gottlieb) in connection with Project ZRRIFLE, he believed that (Gottlieb) never mentioned to him either QJWIN's activities in the Congo or (Gottlieb)'s own trip to Leopoldville (Harvey affidavit, p.). Harvey had consulted with Arnold Silver about the initiation of Project ZRRIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).The (Chief of) Station in Leopoldville testified that he had never heard of Project ZRRIFLE, nor was he aware of any CIA project to develop the capability of assassinating foreign leaders. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 93.) Furthermore, Hedgman said that he was "quite certain" that he never discussed assassination capabilities or assets with Harvey at any time. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.)Hedgman testified that Arnold Silver came to the Congo on a counter-intelligence mission during his tenure, but they did not discuss the plan to assassinate Lumumba. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 92.)An interesting note on the value accorded QJWIN by the CIA and the inherent predicament for an intelligence agency that employs hoodlums is found in a cable from CIA headquarters to Arnold Silver in 1962. The CIA had learned that QJWIN was about to go on trial in Europe on smuggling charges. The cable suggested:IF ... INFOR TRUE WE MAY WISII ATTEMPT QUASII CHARGES OR ARRANGE SOMEHOW SALVAGE QJWIN FOR OUR PURPOSES. (CIA Cable OUT 73943), 4/18/62.)
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-74-(d) Agent QJWIN Was Asked By Hedgman's Operative WIROGUE to Join an "Execution Squad": December 1960The one incident where there is an explicit reference to assassination in connection with QJWIN involved his contact with WIROGUE, another asset of the Congo station.WIROGUE was an "essentially stateless" (European) who was "a forger and former bank robber" and had fought with the French Foreign Legion) (Inspector General Memorandum, 3/14/75.) He was sent to the Congo after being given plastic surgery and a toupee by the CIA so that he would not be recognized by Europeans traveling through the Congo. (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) WIROGUE was assessed by the CIA as a man who "LEARNS QUICKLY AND CARRIES OUT ANY ASSIGNMENT WITHOUT REGARD FOR DANGER" (CIA Cable (OUT 86554) Africa Division to Leopoldville, 10/27/60).The Chief of Station described WIROGE as "a man with a rather unsavory reputation, who would try anything once, at least." (Hedgman, 3/21/75, p. 96.) Hedgman used him as "a general utility agent" because "I felt we needed surveillance capability, developing new contacts, various things." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96.) Hedgman supervised WIROGUE directly and did not put WIROGUE in touch with (Justin O'Donnell). (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)A report on agent WIROGUE, prepared for the CIA Inspector General's office in 1975, described the training and tasking he received:
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 73]
On 19 September 1960 two members of Africa Division met with him to discuss "an operational assignment in Africa Division." In connection with this assignment, WIROGUE/1 was to be trained in demolitions, small arms, and medical immunization.... In October 1960 a cable to Leopoldville stated that ... Headquarters [had] ... intent to use him as utility agent in order to "(a) organize and conduct a surveillance team; (b) intercept packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (d) execute other assignments requiring positive action. His utilization is not to be restricted to Leopoldville." (I.G. Memorandu, 3/14/75.)WIROGUE made his initial contact with Hedgman in Leopoldville on December 2, 1960 (CIA Cable (IN 18739), 12/17/60). He was given two instructions by Hedgman: (1) to "build cover during initial period;" and (2) to "spot persons for [a] surveillance team" of intelligence assets in the province where Lumumba's support was strongest. (CIA Cable (IN 18739), 12/17/60.)Soon after receiving these instructions, agent WIROGUE approached QJWIN and asked him to join an "execution squad." This incident is described by Leopoldville (Chief of) Station Hedgman in a cable to CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 99):QJWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WIROGUE REPORTED LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, JAPAN, SOUTH! AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROPE. QJWIN SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUSINESS. STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE. 14 DEC QJWIN REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE MEMBER "EXECUTION SQUAD." WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT INTERESTED, WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS. UNDER QJWIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER SAID HE WORK-INF FOR (AMERICAN) SERVICE.... IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS, WIROGUE MENTIONED QJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM. THEN [CHIEF OF STATION) TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE HAD MADE APPROACH LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN NO STEPS. [CHIEF OF STATION) WAS UNABLE CONTRADICT, AS DID NOT WISH REVEAL QJWIN CONNECTION (CIA). (CIA Cable,NW 50955 DocId: 32202489eopoldville to Director, 12/17, 60.)
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-76-The cable also expressed Hedgman's concern about WIROGUE's actions:LEOP CONCERNED BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELINGAND LACK SECURITY. STATION HAS ENOUGH HEAD-ACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO NOTABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND WHO NOT WILLINGFOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. IF IIQS DESIRES, WILLINGKEEP HIM ON PROBATION, BUT IF CONTINUE HAVEDIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE WIROGUE RECALL BESTSOLUTION. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director,12/17/60.)WIROGUE's attempt to recruit QJWIN for an execution squad is explained by Hedgman as a mistake and by the actions of QJWIN as an unauthorized, unexpected contact which he did not initiate.The Chief of Station testified that he had not instructed WIROGUE to make this kind of proposition to QJWIN or anyone else. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.) He added:I would like to stress that I don't know what WIROGUE was talking about as a[n] "execution squad," and I am sure he was never tasked to go out and execute anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.)Hedgman suggested that WIROGUE may have concocted the idea of an execution squad:His idea of what an intelligence operative should do, I think, had been gathered by reading a few novels or something of the sort. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.)(Justin O'Donnell) had no knowledge of an attempt by anyone connected to the CIA to recruit an execution squad and no recollec-NW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 75
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-77-tion of WIROGUE (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, pp. 39-42). (O'Donnell men-tioned that agent QJWIN was considered for use on a "strong armsquad," but said that this was for purposes more general thanassassinations:surveillance teams where you have to gointo crime areas ... where you need afellow that if he gets in a box can fighthis way out of it. (O'Donnell), 9/11/75,p. 36).Richard Bissell recalled nothing of the WIROUGE approach toQJWIN (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 71). Bronson Tweedy did recall thatWIROGUE was "dispatched on a general purpose mission" to the Congo(Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 63). But Tweedy testified that WIROGUE would"absolutely not" have been used on an assassination mission againstLumumba because "he was basically dispatched, assessed and dealtwith by the balance of the Division" rather than by the two peoplein the Africa Division -- Tweedy himself and his deputy, GlennFields --) who would have known that the assassination of Lumumbawas being considered (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 64-65).The (Chief of) Station said that if the WIROGUE incident wasconnected to an actual assassination plan, he would have transmitteda message in a more narrowly restricted channel than that in whichthis cable was sent. His cable on WIROGUE's approach to QJWIN wassent to headquarters with a security designation that allowed muchwider distribution than the PROP cables that he sent and receivedconcerning the (Gottlieb) assassination assignment. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,p. 102.) In contrast, he limited distribution of the cable about
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-78-WIROGUE only as a CIA officer would "normally do ... when you speak in a derogatory manner of an asset." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 101)The Chief of Station maintained that WIROGUE's proposition to QJWIN to join an "execution squad" could be attributed to WIROGUE's "freewheeling" nature. Hedgman said:I had difficulty controlling him in that hewas not a professional intelligence officeras such. Ile seemed to act on his own withoutseeking guidance or authority ... I foundhe was rather an unguided missile ... thekind of man that could get you in trouble be-fore you knew you were in trouble....(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 96-97).But Hedgman did not disavow all responsibility for WIROGUE's actions:[I]f you give a man an order and he carries it out and causes a problem for the Station, why then as Chief of Station, well, you accept responsibility. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)In sum, the Chief of Station testified that despite the fact that the CIA was interested in the assassination of Lumumba during this period, agent WIROGUE's attempt to form an "execution squad" was an unauthorized, maverick action, unconnected to the CIA assassination plan.Nonetheless, the fact that WIROGUE was to be trained in "medical immunization" (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75) raises the possibility that he was connected to the plot to assassinate Lumumba by means of lethal biological substances. The 1975 report on WIROGUE's case
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-79-by the Inspector General's office leaves this question open. The report concludes with the statement that "WIROGUE/1 spent most of his time trying to develop contacts and was not directly involved in any particular operation." (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) But, when the report was circulated in the Inspector General's office, the following comment was handwritten by Scott Breckinridge, one of the principal authors of the 1967 report on CIA involvement in assassination attempts: "ROGUE's pitch is too clear to be discarded out of hand as 'exceeding instructions.'" (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75)6. The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing About Lumumba's Death in KatangaThere is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bring- ing about Lumumba's death in Katanga. The CIA officers most closely connected to the plot to poison Lumumba testified uniformly that they knew of no CIA involvement in Lumumba's death.(a) Lumumba's Escape from UN Custody, Capture by Congolese Army, and Imprisonment at Thysville: November 27-December 3, 1960The strongest hint that the CIA may have been involved in the capture of Lumumba by Mobutu's troops after his departure from UN custody on November 27, was contained in a PROP cable from the Chief of) Station to Tweedy on November 14 (CIA Cable IN 42478, (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60). In the cable, Hedgman re- ported that an agent of his had learned that Lumumba'sPOLITICAL FOLLOWERS IN STANLEYVILLE DESIRE THATHE BREAK OUT OF HIS CONFINEMENT AND PROCEED TOTHAT CITY BY CAR TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY.(CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)
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-80-The (Chief of) Station was confident that he would have foreknowledge of Lumumba's departure and that action plans were prepared for that eventuality:DECISION ON BREAKOUT WILL PROBABLY BE MADESHORTLY. STATION EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY[AGENT] OF DECISION WHEN MADE.... STATIONHAS SEVERAL POSSIBLE ASSETS TO USE IN EVENTOF BREAKOUT AND STUDYING SEVERAL PLANS OFACTION. (CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)There is no other evidence, however, that the CIA actually gained prior knowledge of Lumumba's plan to depart for Stanleyville.In fact, a cable from Leopoldville on the day after Lumumba's escape betrays the station's complete ignorance about the circumstances of Lumumba's departure (CIA Cable (IN 48484), Leopoldville to Director, 11/28/60).But the same cable raises at least a question as to whether the CIA was involved in the capture of Lumumba enroute by Congolese troops:[STATION] WORKING WITH [CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT]TO GET ROADS BLOCKED AND TROOPS ALERTED[BLOCK] POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTE. (CIA Cable, 11/28/60.)A cable of December 2 reporting Lumumba's capture militates against CIA involvement, however, because it portrays the Congolese forces as the source of the station's information (CIA Cable (IN 10643), Leopoldville to Director, 12/3/60).The (Chief of) Station testified that he was "quite certain that there was no Agency involvement in any way" in Lumumba's departureNW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 79
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-81-from Uil custody and that he had no foreknowledge of Lumumba'splan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 63-64). He stated that he consultedwith Congolese officers about the possible routes Lumumba mighttake to Stanleyville, but he was "not a major assistance" in track-ing down Lumumba prior to his capture (lledgman, 8/21/75, p. 65).Despite the fact that (O'Donnell) had planned to draw Lumumbaout of UN custody and turn him over to Congolese authorities, heinsisted that Lumumba escaped by his own devices and was not trickedby the CIA (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 22).(b) Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Where He Was Killed:January 17, 1960The contemporaneous cable traffic shows that the CIA waskept informed of Lumumba's condition and movements in January of1961 by the Congolese and that the CIA still considered Lumumbaa serious political threat. But there is no direct evidence ofCIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba's death in Katanga.* Excerpts from cable traffic of January 1961 and from the  testimony of CIA officers Hedgman, Tweedy, O'Donnell, and Helms  (investigative report) should be inserted.