Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 131]
TOP SECRET321 (Whereupon, at 12:00 noon the witness re-entered the2 hearing room.)3 The Chairman. All right.4 You understand that the oath still applies to this part5 of the testimony?6 Mr. Schwarz will renew the questioning.7 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, I want to call your attention now8 to 1963, the Missile Crisis is over. Was there another reassess-9 ment of Cuban policy in the winter and spring of '63?10 Mr. Bundy. Yes, there was.11 Mr. Schwarz. Again, did that reassessment of Cuban policy12 involve a lot of reassessment of a lot of options?13 Mr. Bundy. That is my refreshed recollection.14 Mr. Schwarz. All right.15 We've shown you a lot of documents, mostly by you in that16 period, but some to you as well, and was one of the options the17 consideration of the possibility that Mr. Castro might defect18 or might be communicated to in a way that would bring him around19 more closely to the United States?20 Mr. Bundy. The question of opening communications with21 Fidel Castro arises in 1963, I think at more than one time,22 and without having my attention drawn to specific documents, I23 wouldn't be able to spell that out very much.24 Mr. Schwarz. But you agree that it is in there, and it25 is in there?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 132]
## TOP SECRET33 1301 Mr. Bundy. Yes.2 Mr. Schwarz. Now did you also consider, in the spring of3 1963, as you had in the fall of 1961, what would happen if4 Castro died or were killed?5 Mr. Bundy. What we did, we certainly posed the question,6 the precise form is not clear to me, but what I now know from the7 documents you have shown me, is we posed to the Director of the8 Office of National Estimates, a Dr. Sherman Kent --9 Mr. Schwarz. And what did Dr. Sherman Kent say in response10 to that inquiry?11 Mr. Bundy. Well, I would have to look at his response.12 Mr. Schwarz. All right.13 I would like to then mark a string of documents so you14 can have that in front of you.15 All right, would you mark as item 6, Bundy item 6, the16 Bundy memorandum to the President dated January 4, 1963, which17 appears at Bundy Tab K.18 (The document referred to19 was marked Bundy Exhibit20 No. 6 for identification.)2122232425## TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 133]
TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-60001 Mr. Schwarz. I'll mark a string, Mr. Bundy, and if Mr.2 Kelley could put it in front of you, we'll then talk about3 them.4 As Bundy Exhibit 6-A, the memorandum for the record,5 Meeting on Cuba, 3 April '63, between the President, the Attorney6 General, yourself and five or six other people.7 Mr. Bundy. Right.89 (The document referred towas marked as Bundy Exhibit10 No. 6-A for identification.)111213141516171819202122232425410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 134]
TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-600013235 Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-B, the Special Group minutes of2 April 11, 1963.(The document referred towas marked Bundy ExhibitNo. 6-B for identification.)34567891011121314151617181920212223242576000030574WARD & PAUL410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003TOP SECRETNW 50930 DOCID:32423406 Page 135
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 135]
TOP SECRET36 1331 Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy Exhibit 6-C, the memorandum also2 dated April 11, 1963 from Mr. Gordon Chase to yourself, headed3 Cuban Policy.(The document referredto was marked Bundy: -Exhibit 6-C foridentification.)TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-6000WARD & PAUL410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003NW 50935 DocId:32423406 Page 136
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 136]
TOP SECRET371 Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-D, the minutes of a meeting of2 the Special Group, 18 April 1963.3 (The document referred4 to was marked Bundy5 Exhibit 6-D for6 identification.)78910111213141516171819202122232425TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 137]
TOP SECRET135381 Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-E the Summary Record of NSC2 Standing Group Meeting, April 23, 1963.3 (The document referred4 to was marked Bundy5 Exhibit 6-E for identification.)678910111213141516171819202122232425TOP SECRET![Phone (Area 202) 544-6000]![WARD & PAUL]![410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003]![76000030577]HW 50955 DocId: 32423406 Page 138
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 138]
TOP SECRET136391 Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-F, the memorandum for Mr. Bundy,2 Subject, Cuba Policy, dated April 23, 1963.3 (The document referred4 to was marked Bundy5 Exhibit 6-F for6 identification.)78910111213141516171819202122232425TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 139]
TOP SECRET137401 Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-G, the Agenda for the meeting of2 the Standing Group, meeting Tuesday, April 30th, the document3 being dated April 29th and signed by you.4 (The document referred5 to was marked Bundy6 Exhibit 6-G for7 identification.)8910111213141516171819202122232425TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 140]
TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-6000411 Mr. Schwarz. 6-H, the memorandum for members of the2 Standing Group dated May 2, 1963.34 (The document referred to was marked Bundy5 Exhibit 6-H for identification.)678910111213141516171819202122232425WARD & PAUL7600030530410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003TOP SECRET138
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 141]
TOP SECRET139421 Mr. Schwarz. Finally, as Bundy 6-I, the Central2 Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates, May 13th,3 1963, draft memorandum, Subject: Developments in Cuba and4 Possible U.S. Actions in the Event of Castro's Death.5 (The document referred6 to was marked as Bundy7 Exhibit 6-I for8 identification.)910111213141516171819202122232425TOP SECRET![logo of ward & paul] Phone (Area 202) 544-60007600030591410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003NW 30935 DocId:32423406 Page 142
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 142]
TOP SECRET43                                                                                    1401  Mr. Schwarz. Now, have you had a chance to read them2  again, Mr. Bundy?3  Mr. Bundy. Yes.4  Mr. Schwarz. In summary, Mr. Bundy, is it a fair characterization of these papers that you were, iand the Standing..56  Group was, examining the question of what the situation would7  be if Castro were to die?8  Mr. Bundy. That is one of the things we were examining, certainly.910 Mr. Schwarz. That was a gamut of matters I tried to11 pose at the beginning of this line of questioning?12 Mr. Bundy. Yes.13 Mr. Schwarz. That was one of the things you were consider-14 ing?15 Mr. Bundy. Right.16 Mr. Schwarz. This was a period of time, as the fall of17 1961 may also have been, when people asked about or talked18 about assassinations as a means of causing Mr. Castro's death.19 Mr. Bundy. I am not aware of much conversation on that20 subject in the spring of '63, so I would have to take your21 word on that.22 Mr. Schwarz. I am asking you, I have no word on that.23 Mr. Bundy. No, I don't think there was much discussion in24 the spring of '63 on that subject.25 Mr. Schwarz. Well, let's see if we can agree on someTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 143]
44TOP SECRET1 things first.2 Can we further agree that the ultimate conclusion was that3 Castro's death would not be desirable for the United States?4 Mr. Bundy. The recommendation, or the assessment, which5 comes back from the Office of National Estimates, makes it6 clear that the odds would be that, upon Castro's death, his7 brother Raul or some other figure in the regime would, with8 Soviet backing and help take over control.9 Then it goes on to say that there might be divisions and10 splits, but that it was unlikely that anti-Communist forces11 would be able to take over without extensive U.S. help and12 probably U.S. military intervention.13 Mr. Schwarz. All right.14 Now, I would like to avoid having to go through every15 single document.16 Mr. Bundy. So would I.17 Mr. Schwarz. And see if I could get you to agree with18 this statement. You do agree that you were looking at a19 situation that would exist as if Castro were killed?20 Mr. Bundy. That is one of the things we were looking at.21 Mr. Schwarz. And in connection with that, was his being22 killed by assassination one of the ways which you understood23 he might be killed?24 Mr. Bundy. I don't have any recollection of that point,25 of it being on our minds.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 144]
TOP SECRET45142Mr. Schwarz. All right.Then why were you looking at the question of his beingkilled? Was there something known?Mr. Bundy. I really don't have any independent of it.My sense of events in 1963 is that the internal pressure fromwithin the Administration to "do something about Cuba" wasvery much lower. There was, however, external pressure. Therewas political pressure in the United States, critics of theAdministration were making speeches about how not enough wasbeing done and we must get rid of the Castro regime, and as Ithink I may have said earlier, and I would like to say now,I think that one reason for getting an estimate of this kindwas to get it on record from the point of view of those whodid not think we should be fussing with questions of assassina-tion or anything like it, that it was not a sound policy,leaving aside its moral meaning and wider political meaningfrom the point of view of the narrow objectives we had in Cuba.Mr. Schwarz. Who was taking the position that assassina-tion could be --Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection on that.Mr. Schwarz. But someone was?Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection on that.Mr. Schwarz. You have no recollection of any positionbeing taken pro or con?Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection of any specificTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 145]
TOP SECRET461 conversation or position that triggered this particular2 inquiry.3 The Chairman. Well, isn't it perfectly plausible that4 this inquiry sought to examine what the situation would be in5 the event of Castro's death by whatever means it might occur?6 Does it necessarily follow that because the Administration7 was making such a plausible inquiry against such a contingency8 that might arise at any time that therefore it was within the9 mind of the Administration to kill Castro? I don't see the10 connection.11 Mr. Bundy. Well, you make my point, Mr. Chairman. That's12 just my point.13 Mr. Schwarz. Now in connection with that, would you look14 at your own Agenda for the April 19th meeting, 6-G?15 Under item 1 -- you distinguish between item 1 and item16 2. Item 1 is the possible use of contingencies for the17 achievement of wider political objectives; and item 2 is programs18 that might be initiated by the United States government.19 I call your attention to the fact that the reference to20 the possible death of Castro is one of the items under item21 1 and not under item 2.22 Mr. Bundy. That is correct.23 Mr. Schwarz. And do you regard that as relevant to the24 exchange you had with the Chairman just now?25 Mr. Bundy. It seems to me it bears out the Chairman'sTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 146]
TOP SECRET14547. 1 point, that you have a number of possible things that might2 happen, that you would then have something to do something3 about, or to act in the light of. The other are the things4 that you might do without waiting for some contingency to5 arise.6 Mr. Schwarz. Now the only remaining question I have on7 this group of documents is, how was it that the subject of the8 death of Castro -- do you investigate the possibilities of the9 death of foreign leaders as a regular matter?10 Mr. Bundy. Well, the question ,"After: Stalin, What?" was11 the staple of discussions in the 1940's, everywhere, academies12 and I would assume inside the United States government; the13 question after DeGaulle was a question about Western European14 policy for a great many years. And one could pick smaller15 figures, more and less controversial, and have the same kind of16 question coming up, in a situation in which a particular17 individual is as dominant a figure in a set of events which18 it had the two, quite contrasting but heavy consequences of the19 Bay of Pigs and the Missile Crisis, it doesn't seem to me to20 be an irrational question to ask, without any relation as to21 whether the United States itself would have any active advisory22 role or any role whatever in having that event come to pass.23 Mr. Schwarz. All right.24 Would you mark as Exhibit 7 the September 20 document25 which is the page -- which states the assassination of CastroTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 147]
TOP SECRET481 was excluded in order to avoid his martyrdom.2 (The document referred1443 to was marked Bundy4 Exhibit No. 7 for5 identification.)678910111213141516171819202122232425TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 148]
TOP SECRETMr. Schwarz. Mr. Kelley, would you take over the ques-tioning of Mr. Bundy, with the permission of the Chairman, onthat particular series of documents, which is at the heading,September 20th '63 on the chronology.Mr. Kelley. Yes.Let me show Mr. Bundy the documents.Mr. Schwarz. Well, first, will you tell us where thedocuments are, because I couldn't find them under the headingyou gave us.Mr. Kelley. Yes.In Bundy Book 2, there is at Tab A the memorandum datedJuly 25th, 1963 from Mr. George Denney to Mr. Crimmins,entitled "Cuba, Possible Courses of Action.At Tab B of Bundy Book 2 is a memorandum dated September20th, 1963, from Gordon Chase to Mr. Bundy, and this memorandumsummarizes the Denney memorandum of July 25th.Mr. Bundy, did you review these documents with members ofthe staff earlier this week?Mr. Bundy. Yes, I did.Mr. Kelley. Do you have any independent recollection ofthese documents?Mr. Bundy. Well, as I read a document of this kind, whichcomes to me from a member of my own staff, I am very oftenreminded and I am in this case, that this is a document whichI did review and that it reflects his arguments as I then heardTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 149]
TOP SECRET1471 them.2 Mr. Kelley. Who was Mr. Gordon Chase?3 Mr. Bundy. Well, he was an assistant of mine at the time with special responsibilities for Cuban affairs, and perhaps4 more widely in Latin America. He was at that time a foreign5 service officer secunded to the White House.6 Mr. Kelley. Did he have any responsibility for covert7 actions?8 Mr. Bundy. No.9 Mr. Kelley. Did he provide staff assistance to you with10 respect to the Special Group or the Special Group (Augmented)?11 Mr. Bundy. Well, he may have done in some exceptional12 case when I needed his opinion on a matter, but in ordinary13 cases he would not have been party to Special Group work.14 Mr. Kelley. What kind of things did he do with the15 special responsibility for Cuba? What did that involve?16 Mr. Bundy. He would be keeping in touch with the Cuban17 Task Force, which by this time was in the Department of State,18 the MONGOOSE operation having been disbanded. He would have19 been responsible for keeping me alert to matters that were20 proceeding in that Task Force that might have an implication for21 the White House.22 Mr. Kellay. Who was the head of the Cuban Task Force?23 Mr. Bundy. Well I don't want to get this wrong, but I24 think by this time it was Mr. Crimmins.25 TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 150]
TOP SECRET148511 Mr. Kelley. Mr. Crimmins was in the State Department and2 he was a foreign service officer?3 Mr. Bundy. That is right.4 Mr. Kelley. The Cuban Task Force, what was that?5 Mr. Bundy. Well, it was the successor to the MONGOOSE6 group, but much less oriented toward secret operations than7 MONGOOSE, and the review of secret operations then came back8 under the complete control of the Special Group, by now, I9 think, called the 303 Committee, which was a lineal successor10 of 5412.11 Mr. Kelley. I call your attention now to Mr. Denney's12 mémorandum, which is at Tab A in Book 2, and it is true, is13 it not that the memorandum is to Mr. Crimmins?14 Mr. Bundy. Right.15 Senator Tower. Do you have any independent recollection16 of this memorandum?17 Mr. Bundy. I have no knowledge that I ever saw it, and I18 did not find it familiar when I looked at it the other day.19 Mr. Kelley. It is true, is it not, that Mr. Chase's memo20 to you summarizes this much longer memorandum by Mr. Denney?21 Mr. Bundy. Is that what it is?22 Mr. Schwarz. Does it do that, Mr. Kelley, because Chase23 memorandum starts by saying, here is a summary of Paul Sakwa's24 Mr. Kelley. I think that is an error in Mr. Chase's memo,25 because it is clear that what is being summarized here is Mr.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 151]
TOP SECRET1 Denney's memorandum.2 Mr. Bundy. Let me suggest that you focus on Mr. Chase'smemorandum with respect to my recollection and responsibility,that is clearly the operative document.5 Mr. Kelley. With respect to Mr. Chase's memorandum, inhis summary of the rationale of proposals, he states, as second,"the present importance of Castro as a nationalist symbol makeshim the obvious operational target; assassination is excludedto avoid Castro's martyrdom."10 Do you have any recollection of why he would excludeassassination? Does that imply to you, or do you recollect,whether Castro's assassination was being considered and hereis a staff paper excluding it, because someone asked them toconsider it?15 Mr. Bundy. No, I think it's a simple statement of whatI would regard as a rationale assessment of the situation bywhoever the original author was, and certainly by the staffman with respect to a subject that emerges directly from thenotion that he is an operational target, whatever that meansand goes on to say, but we don't mean assassination, becauseit would make him a martyr, what other reasons against: thatthere may be. It doesn't seem to me that you can read thestatement that assassination is excluded as an inference thatsomebody else is including it.25 Mr. Kelley. That's all.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 152]
TOP SECRET150531 Mr. Schwarz. In any event, Mr. Bundy, the document says2 it is excluded.3 Mr. Kelley. That's right.4 Mr. Schwarz. Now at that period of time in the fall of5 1963, were you aware that through the offices of Ambassador6 Atwood, or Mr. Atwood, as he may have then been called, and7 through the offices of a French journalist called Jean Daniel,8 another effort was being made to establish contact with Mr.9 Castro?10 Mr. Bundy. I remember the Atwood effort, as I recollect11 that he came to see me about it. I don't recollect specifically12 Jean Daniel, although it strikes a chord as you mention it.13 Mr. Schwarz. What the purpose, very briefly, of Mr.14 Atwood's effort?15 Mr. Bundy. Well, as I understood it, he had been approached16 by someone he knew from Cuba and had been given to understand17 that there was interest in, Castro had an interest in, opening18 communication, and he was exploring with us whether he could be19 encouraged to undertake such an explanation.20 Mr. Schwarz. And did you encourage him?21 Mr. Bundy. The exact form of our message to him, or our22 if you want to call it, the instruction to him, the President's23 decision, I can no longer recollect, but my impression is that24 we were interested, and that we did want him to explore it without25 engaging the President any more than he could help.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 153]
TOP SECRET541 Mr. Schwarz. But was the President in fact informed and 1512 in fact approved the actions taken?3 Mr. Bundy. That is my understanding.4 Mr. Schwarz. Is it your understanding or your recollection?5 Mr. Bundy. It is my recollection, but it is a recollection6 that is refreshed by what I have learned and hearing more about7 it in the last few days.8 Mr. Schwarz. Now, were you told, in the fall of 1963,9 that assassination devices had been requested by a Cuban for10 the purpose of assassinating Mr. Castro, and that assassination11 devices were offered to the Cuban in the fall of 1963?12 Mr. Bundy. No.13 Mr. Schwarz. Now again, here, calling for a matter of14 opinion, as a matter of opinion, do you believe that at the15 same time, at a possible rapprochement with Mr. Castro was being16 pursued, the President would have authorized or permitted the17 passage of assassination devices intended for their use on18 Mr. Castro?19 Mr. Bundy. Absolutely not.20 Mr. Schwarz. I have nothing further on Castro.21 The Chairman. Is there more?22 Mr. Schwarz. Well, on Trujillo and Diem, with respect to23 Diem --24 Mr. Smothers. Well, if you're going on to something else,25 there are a couple of things.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 154]
TOP SECRET152Phone (Area 202) 544-6000551 Going back to an earlier memorandum which I don't believe2 is in the Bundy materials, but it has been talked about3 previously in a Committee hearing, a memorandum which will be4 identified as a Memorandum for the Record, dated 16:October5 1962, a memorandum signed by Mr. Richard Helms.6 (The document referred7 to was marked Bundy8 Exhibit No. 8 for9 identification.)1011WARD & PAUL12131415. 161718410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 2000319202122232425TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 155]
TOP SECRET1535651 Mr. Smothers. Mr. Bundy, I am going to read through this2 memorandum and ask you a couple of questions about that. It's3 a memorandum from Helms for the record on MONGOOSE.4 Reading from this memorandum, Mr. Bundy, reading from5 Paragraph 2: "The Attorney General" -- well, let me read the6 entire paragraph.7 "The Attorney General opened the meeting" we're talking8 about a MONGOOSE meeting-- by expressing the general dissatis-9 faction of the President," --"'dissatisfaction of the President'"10 in quotes -- "with Operation MONGOOSE."11 Mr. Bundy. What date are we at? The date?12 Mr. Smothers. The date of the memorandum is 16 October13 1962.14 "He pointed out that the Operation had been underway for a15 year, that the results were discouraging, that there had been16 no acts of sabotage, and that even the one which had been17 attempted had failed twice. He indicated that there had been18 noticeable improvement during the year in the collection of19 intelligence, but that other actions had failed to influence20 significantly the course of events in Cuba. He spoke of the21 weekly meetings of top officials on this problem, and again22 noted the small accomplishments, despite the fact that Secre-23 taries Rusk and McNamara, General Taylor, McGeorge Bundy and he24 personally had all been charged by the President with finding25 a solution. He traced the history of General Lansdale's personalTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 156]
TOP SECRET                                                                                                         1541 appointment by the President a year ago.2 "The Attorney General then stated that in view of this3 lack of progress, he was going to give Operation MONGOOSE more4 personal attention. In order to do this, he would hold a meeting5 every morning at 0930 with the MONGOOSE operational representa-6 tives from the various agencies (Lansdale, Harvey, Hurwich,7 Ryan and General Johnson)."8 Now, the best of our information, Mr. Bundy, is that these9 meetings were in fact held on a daily basis as indicated, and10 that they did involve Lansdale and these members of the working11 group noted.12 Were you aware of such meetings?13 Mr. Bundy. I have no independent recollection of them, but14 that does not sound implausible to me at all.15 Mr. Smothers. It doesn't sound implausible to me that the16 Attorney General Lansdale and members of the working group to17 develop MONGOOSE activities with him?18 Mr. Bundy. To report to him how they were getting on, and19 to see if he couldn't, by listening to those reports and keeping20 a lively -- keeping his lively concern in their consciousnessmove the thing more rapidly.21 Mr. Smothers. This is your interpretation of giving more22 personal attention to it?23 Mr. Bundy. Exactly.24 Mr. Smothers. You say you had no knowledge of these in25TOP SECRET