Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10011-10000.pdf — page 18]
NO OBJECTION on eveниеNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILNDA 2/23/94No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for DIA deletions. (1)(A)CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED2 Feb 94(1)(A)8/10/98PERSONS/ENTITIES:SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,TAYLOR, R KENNEDY, JOHNSON, GILPATRICKGEN. DECKER, LANSDALE CRAIG, MCCONEHARVEY, PARROTT, DUQUEDATES:MAY 3, 1962CATEGORIES:SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTEDMONGOOSEOCCURRENCE: LANSDALE gave interim report on the progress of stepping up recruitment of Cubans into the US Army. "The Attorney General commented that the President wishes to have a large number." Mr. HARVEY "gave a rundown on progress to date with agent teams and in the general field of intelligence." He said, "that three agent teams have been infiltrated." "A significant development is that Major DUQUE has refused to allow agents responsive to him to be dispatched on purely intelligence-gathering missions." HARVEY also reported on two attempts made to intrude into Havana TV programs.TOP SECRETSOURCE: MEMO FOR RECORD, MINUTES OF MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED ON PROJECT MONGOOSE, 3 MAY 1962. (00023)STAFF: DiGenovaFILE:DATE: 7/2/75
[157-10011-10000.pdf — page 19]
NW 50955 DocId: 32203768 Page 20NO OBJECTIONNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL2/23/94PERSONS/ENTITIES:HARVEY, LANSDALENo DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for CIA deletions, (1)(A)2/8/94DATES:June 19, 1962CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED7 Feb 94(1)(A)8/10/98CATEGORIES:MONGOOSEOCCURRENCE: It was agreed that Harvey was to work towards reaching a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig, the Cuban economic official who defected to Mexico, where he can be surfaced to make public charges of Cuban Communist operations against Latin American nations. Harvey was to generate a story from Cuban refugee sources that the original Cardenas incident consisted of a demonstration concerning the shortage of food. This was to cause ridicule of the Communist regime's use of MIGs, tanks and troops against the unarmed people of Cardenas. "The-Guban-source-to-story need not await your determination of the true cause of the Cardenas demonstration."SOURCE: Memorandum for William Harvey, CIA, from Lansdale, re: Impact Actions, 19 June 1962 (00395)STAFF:di GenovaDATE: July 1, 1975FILE:
[157-10011-10000.pdf — page 20]
NO OBJECTION excisedNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL2/23/月4No DoD objection to public disclosurepursuant to P.L. 102-526, except forCIA deletion. (D(A)218194CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZED7. Feb 94(CA)CATEGORIES: k8/10/98PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,(Lansdale), TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER,ROIG RUSK, KOHLER, HURWITCHJune 20, 1962 Special Group AugmentedJuly 31, 1962 MONGOOSEJune 12, 1962May-17, 1962 June 22, 1962OCCURRENCE:Due to reports of popular unrest, political strife, and economic disruptions inside Cuba, it was suggested that the Special Group Augmented consider the value of having an SNIE on Cuba made in the immediate future. The CIA has agreed as a matter of priority to reach a stage *in the interrogation of Pedro Roig, where he can be surfaced* to make public charges of Cuban Communist operations against Latin American nations. For operational effectiveness, the CIA has selected a new area in Cuba for its initial radio broadcasts from a submarine for "Voice of Cuba." The Navy states that the new area is feasible and State has concurred in the theme and content of the broadcast. They will take place around the end of the month. *No proposals for actions by the Department* of State have been submitted since the appointment of State's special representative, Mr. Hurwitch. They are expected on June 22, 1962.SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group AugmentedFrom Lansdale re: Progress, Operation MONGOOSE, 20 June 1962(00397-00398)FILE:STAFF:di GenovaDATE: July 1, 1975
[157-10011-10000.pdf — page 21]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:SPECIAL GROUP-AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,Lansdale, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER,ROIG RUSK, KOHLER, HURWITCHOCCURRENCE:DATES:June 20, 1962July 31, 1962June 12, 1962May-17, 1962CATEGORIES:Special Group AugmentedMONGOOSEJune 22, 1962Due to reports of popular unrest, political strife, and economic disruptions inside Cuba, it was suggested that the Special Group Augmented consider the value of having an SNIE on Cuba made in the immediate future. The CIA has agreed as a matter of priority to reach a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig where he can be surfaced to make public charges of Cuban Communist operations against Latin American nations. For operational effectiveness, the CIA has selected a new area in Cuba for its initial radio broadcasts from a submarine for "Voice of Cuba." The Navy states that the new area is feasible and State has concurred in the theme and content of the broadcast. They will take place around the end of the month. No proposals for actions by the Department of State have been submitted since the appointment of State's special representative, Mr. Hurwitch. They are expected on June 22, 1962.SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group AugmentedFrom Lansdale re: Progress, Operation MONGOOSE, 20 June 1962(00397-00398)FILE:STAFF:di GenovaDATE: July 1, 1975
[157-10011-10000.pdf — page 22]
NO OBJECTIONNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL2/23/94PERSONS/ENTITIES:SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZERHarris CraigNo DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for CIA deletions. (1) (A)2/8/94CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED7 Feb 94(1)(A)CATEGORIES:Special Group AugmentedDATES:June 27, 1962June 21-23, 1962 MONGOOSE7/1/626/21-23/62OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, Roig, has begun to provide names of other Cuban G-2 personnel abroad. Effective July 1, 1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operations representative.SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400)FILE:STAFF: di GenovaDATE: July 1, 1975
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NO OBJECTION s excirceNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL187 2/23/94PERSONS/ENTITIES:SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZERHarris CraigNo DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for CJA deletions. (DCA)218194DATES:June 27, 1962 Special Group AugmentedJurre 21-23, 1962 MONGOOSE7/1/626/21-23/62CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZED7 For 94(1)(A)CATEGORIES: 28/10/98OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, Roig, has begun to provide names of other Cuban G-2 personnel abroad Effective July 1, 1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operations representative.SOURCE:Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400)FILE:STAFF:di GenovaDATE:July 1, 1975
[157-10011-10000.pdf — page 24]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZERHarris CraigDATES:June 27, 1962June 21-23, 19627/1/626/21-23/62CATEGORIES:Special Group AugmentedMONGOOSEOCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, Roig, has begun to provide names of other Cuban G-2 personnel abroad Effective July 1, 1962-Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army-will-replace-Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD-operations representative.SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400)FILE:STAFF: di GenovaDATE: July 1, 1975
[157-10011-10003.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992Date: 08/15/92Page: 1JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10003RECORDS SERIES :AGENCY FILE NUMBER :DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIAFROM :TO :[R][R]TITLE :INDEX CARDS[R]DATE: 06/00/75PAGES: 161SUBJECTS :OPERATION MONGOOSE[R]DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION : TRESTRICTIONS: REFERREDCURRENT STATUS: PDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS:Box 132, Book 4 of 5, Index Cards, June, 1975[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTEDNW 50955 DocId:32203771 Page 1
[157-10011-10003.pdf — page 1]
NO OBJECTIONNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILPERSONS/ENTITIES:BISSELLDULLESGRAYMERCHANTDATES:Aug. 12, 1960CATEGORIES:MONGOOSESpecial GroupOCCURRENCE:On August 12, 1960 the Special Group heard a summary of the budget for Cuban operations from MR. BISSELL. Approximately 13 million dollars were required to finance Cuban operations for the fiscal year and a balance of 10-3/4 was necessary for the remainder of the fiscal year. Major subheadings in the budget were (1) political action, (2) propaganda, (3) paramilitary, (4) intelligence collection, (5) counterintelligence, (6) communications support, (7) support.It was agreed "This matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next 10 days. This was believed to be wise, not because any (continued)SOURCE:Minutes of Special Group meeting, August 12, 1960FILE: CageSTAFF:DATE: Robert KelleyJune 29, 1975
[157-10011-10003.pdf — page 2]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:1DATES:Oct. 6, 1960CATEGORIES:Special GroupMONGOOSEPresidential AuthorizationOCCURRENCE: (cont.) including some Germans in this group and that we would talk informally to General Gehlen about it. He emphasized that he was asking for no Special Group approval at this time in this specific connection."TOP SECRETSOURCE:Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960FILE: CageSTAFF:DATE: Bob KelleyJune 29, 1975![photo of NO OBJECTION as exercised NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 1/6/94]![photo of CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO(1) (B) DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED 7/12/93]
[157-10011-10003.pdf — page 3]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:HELMS PRESIDENT KENNEDYMOCONEFOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARDDATES:July 25,1962CATEGORIES:SPECIAL GROUPMONGOOSEOCCURRENCE: Helms notes that McCone briefed the panel of the President's foreignintelligence advisory board on political action projects. He pointed out that"each projectmust have his approval to the circulation to the members of the Special Group". Forexample, reconnasiance overflights are now approved. He noted covert financial supportin Peruvian, Greek, Finnish, Italian, and Brazilian elections? Helms "read to the panela paper on the operation Mongoose which theDirector had used earlier in the day for givinga briefing to the President."SOURCE: Memorandum for the record, re meeting on CA matterswith the panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence AdvisoryBoard of Helms, dated July 25, 1962 (00870)FILE:STAFF:diGenovaDATE:7/3/75
[157-10011-10003.pdf — page 4]
NO OBJECTION as excisedNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL1/6/94| PERSONS/ENTITIES: | DATES:       | CATEGORIES:    || ----------------- | ------------ | -------------- || LANSDALE,         | Mar 2, 1962  | Special Group✓ ||                   | Nov 30, 1961 | mongoose       |OCCURRENCE: Lansdale traces the history of the project from its inception on Nov. 30, 1961 through March 1, 1962. Under the latter date, he notes, "The Chief of Operations /Lansdale/is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412 Augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress." (00181) Lansdale also submitted an intelligence plan for basic intelligence collection upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro. The plan itself-at-pages-00183-through-00187, included establishing intelligence-agents-inside Cuba; collecting intelligence from Cubans inside the United States; counterfeiting ration cards and currency inside of Cuba; geographical surveys of air fields, military installations, communications centers; attempts to place trained agents inside the government organizations or to defect officials "in place"; and negotiating for British help in contaminating lubricants and fuels to cripple Cuban transportation. "The British want to know, 'how serious are you?', before risking their assets to help the U.S.". "..(00180-00187)SOURCE: Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962on the Cuba Project (00180-00187)FILE:STAFF:di GenovaDATE: June 30, 1975
[157-10011-10003.pdf — page 5]
NO OBJECTION an excisedNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL(1)(B)CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZEDelu 7/12/93PERSONS/ENTITIES:(continuation)DATES:CATEGORIES:Card 3 of 4OCCURRENCE: CARD 3"CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stopage of some Cuban transports) is not expected until mid-1962. CIA is introducing *lubzol*, a corrosive additive to Cuban locomotive diesel fuel oil through commercial suppliers in Beligium. A similar project was noted for jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba.Lansdale noted that the CIA had concluded that its realistic role should be to at least create the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit-provocative actions in support of a shift to overaction. Lansdale wanted them to reevaluate to see whether or not they could make a greater effort. An outline of what the 33 tasks are for each of the entitities involved then follows in Lansdale's memo. The memorandum notes that the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the project through the appropriate organizations and departments of the government. In this regard the memo notes "Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popularSOURCE:STAFF:FILE:TOP SECRETDATE:
[157-10011-10003.pdf — page 6]
NW 50955 DocId: 32203771 Page 7![NO OBJECTION as exceed NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 1/6/94]![CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED lee 7/12/93]PERSONS/ENTITIES:CARD 3DATES:CATEGORIES:Card 3 of 3OCCURRENCE: (continued from Memo for the Special Group re: Cuba Project, Jan. 24, 1962 detectives and foreign police officials." (00106)In regard to Task #7 of General Lansdale's review this memo notes, "Moreover, the development of a resisitence movement will not remain controllable, so that operational time tables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions." (00107)The memorandum notes that six men to form the initial nucleus for work for inside Cuba have been assessed in depth. Fifteen locations have been selected-as-suitable-centers for resistence. It was also noted that in support of State's efforts, CIA has conducted pro- paganda operations including a number of mass demonstrations in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil Chile, Columbia Costa Rica Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.SOURCE:TOP SECRETSTAFF:FILE:DATE:
[157-10011-10003.pdf — page 7]
# NW 50955 DocId: 32203771 Page 8![photo of NO OBJECTION as exeisel. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 1/6/94]![photo of CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT lec 7/12/93]PERSONS/ENTITIES:LANSDALE,DATES:Mar 13, 1962CATEGORIES:Special Group AugmentedMONGOOSECUBAY,Card 1of2OCCURRENCE: The planning for Operation MONGOOSE was prepared on a format of separate planning for each department and agency involved. Revised planning along that line was submitted with this memorandum. Activities already approved were marked with an asterisk. Approved were dispatching one intelligence agent operation to a key area selected by the CIA, ("Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection,...However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.") (00207), Carribbean Admissions Center cpa-Locka, Florida. Periodic intelligence estimates, continued negotiating for British help in contaminating locamotive lubricants, two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba approved for March 16-31, 1962, develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S., develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962 in South America andSOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmentedfrom Lansdale re: Institutional Planning, Operation MONGOOSE,13 March 1962 (00206-00213)FILE:![photo of STAFF DATE di Genova July 1, 1975]
[157-10011-10003.pdf — page 8]
NO OBJECTIONNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILPERSONS/ENTITIES:SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,Lansdale, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER,ROIG, RUSK, KOHLER, HURWITCHDATES:June 20, 1962July 31, 1962June 12, 1962May 17, 1962CATEGORIES:Special Group AugmentedMONGOOSEJune 22, 1961OCCURRENCE: Due to reports of popular unrest, political strife, and economic disruptions inside Cuba, it was suggested that the Special Group Augmented consider the value of having an SNIE on Cuba made in the immediate future. The CIA has agreed as a matter of priority to reach a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig where he can be surfaced (to make public charges of Cuban Communist operations against Latin American nations). For operational effectiveness, the CIA has selected a new area in Cuba for its initial radio broadcasts from a submarine for "Voice of Cuba." The Navy states that the new area is feasible and State has concurred in the theme and content of the broadcast. They will take place around the end of the month. No proposals for actions by the Department of State have been submitted since the appointment of State's special representative, Mr. Hurwitch. They are expected on June 22, 1962.SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group AugmentedFrom Lansdale re: Progress, Operation MONGOOSE, 20 June 1962 (00397-00398)STAFF:di GenovaDATE: July 1, 1975
[157-10011-10003.pdf — page 9]
## PERSONS/ENTITIES:SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,(Lansdale), TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER,(ROIG), RUSK, KOHLER, (HURWITCH)## DATES:June 20, 1962July 31, 1962June-12, 1962May-17, 1962## CATEGORIES:Special Group Augmented MONGOOSEJune 22, 1962## OCCURRENCE:Due to reports of popular unrest, political strife, and economic disruptions inside Cuba, it was suggested that the Special Group Augmented consider the value of having an SNIE on Cuba made in the immediate future. The CIA has agreed as a matter of priority to reach a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig where he can be surfaced to make public charges of Cuban Communist operations against Latin American nations? For operational effectiveness, the CIA has selected a new area in Cuba for its initial radio broadcasts from a submarine for "Voice of Cuba." The Navy states that the new area is feasible and State has concurred in the theme and content of the broadcast. They will take place around the end of the month. No proposals for actions by the Department of State have been submitted since the appointment of State's special representative, Mr. Hurwitch. They are expected on June 22, 1962.SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group AugmentedFrom Lansdale re: Progress, Operation MONGOOSE, 20 June 1962(00397-00398)FILE:STAFF:di GenovaDATE: July 1, 1975
[157-10011-10003.pdf — page 10]
NO OBJECTIONNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILdefer to NSA1/6/94Reviewed by NSAon 1/10/94 GMBelease in Part★ should be markedSECRET SPOKEPERSONS/ENTITIES:SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZERDATES:July 11, 1962CATEGORIES:Special Group AugmentedMONGOOSEOCCURRENCE: Notice to Special Group that operational representatives are preparing assessments of Operation MONGOOSE. These will cover among other things "factors worth considering in deciding on a future course of action (We have a working definition of four possible future courses of action)." Memo quotes NSA summary on intelligence problems which notes that *Intelligence has been obtained of Soviet participation in Cuban tactical air training, Cuban air defense performance, and the presence of Soviet-type air-defense equipments.*sec 6(1)(b)SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmentedfrom Lansdale re: Progress OPERATION MONGOOSE 11 July 1962(00428-00430)FILE:STAFF:DATE: di GenovaJuly 2, 1975
[157-10011-10003.pdf — page 11]
NO OBJECTIONNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILCIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZEDRec 7/12/93PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:LANSDALE, HARVEY, MONGOOSE, SPECIAL July 24, 1962MONGOOSESpecial Group AugmentedGROUP-AUGMENTEDJuly 11, 1962July 31, 1962July 23, 1962March 16, 1962CARD ONE OF TWOOCCURRENCE: As to Phase I, CIA staff personnel up to 477 are devoting full time to this effort. "A very large number of additional personnel are devoting part time efforts to Operation MONGOOSE." Hard intelligence coverage of Cuba has been developed. Fifty-nine controlled agents inside of Cuba exist. Not so successful on infiltrating intelligence reporting in resistence cadre teams. Failure to meet the original schedule of team in-filtrations primarily-was-due-to-two-factors: "(a)-Lack-of-policy-approval-by-higher authority to make any extensive utilization of Department of Defense personnel and support." "Had we been permitted to mount a more intensive and agressive, the original infilitration schedule probably would have been met, possibly exceeded." The speed and extent of future infiltration teams for resisitence purposes into Cuba "will of course depend upon policy approvals by higher authority and the amount of support we can count on thereunder." "It is our opinion that there is an excellent chance such a revolt could be incitedSOURCE: Memorandum for Lansdale from William K. Harvey STAFF: (CONTINUED)re: Operation MONGOOSE--end of Phase I, July 24, 1962 (00452- DATE: di Genova00458)FILE!July 2, 1975
[157-10011-10003.pdf — page 12]
NO OBJECTIONNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCILCIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO (1)(B)DECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZEDlec 7/12/93| PERSONS/ENTITIES:               | DATES: | CATEGORIES:                                || ------------------------------- | ------ | ------------------------------------------ || Gen. Lansdale William K. Harvey | 8/7/62 | SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED OPERATION MONGOOSE |OCCURRENCE:HArvey states that the estimated cost of CIA in terms of personnel assigned full-time to Operation Mongoose would have to be increased to at least $600 (if stage two of Mongoose went into effect) and that the estimated fiscal budgets for 1963 and 1964 would have to be increased to over $100 million.TOP SECRETSOURCE: Aug 8, 1962 memo from Gen Lansdale to the Special Group Augmented (00587)STAFF: WallachFILE:DATE: July 2, 1975