Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 80]
-83-Group agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. (Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960)The next day CIA Director Allen Dulles, who had attended the Special Group meeting, personally cabled to the (Chief of) Station in Leopoldville that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE . . A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION" (CIA Cable (OUT 62966) Dulles to Leopoldville, 8/26/60). Dulles added: "YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE."Although the Dulles cable does not explicitly mention assassination, Richard Bissell -- the CIA official under whose aegis the assassination effort against Lumumba took place -- testified that, in his opinion, this cable was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting and signaled to him that the President had authorized assassination as one means of removing Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33-34, 61-62; see Section 7(c), *infra*). Bronson Tweedy, who bore the primary administrative responsibility for activities against Lumumba, testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy that no measure, including assassination, was to be overlooked in the attempt to remove Lumumba from a position of influence (Tweedy, 10/9/75, pp. 4-5).On September 19, 1960, Bissell and Tweedy cabled the (Chief of) Station to expect a messenger from CIA headquarters. Two days later, in the presence of the President at a meeting of the National SecurityNW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 81
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Council, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "would remain a grave danger as long as he was not yet disposed of" (Memorandum, 460th NSC Meeting, 9/21/60). Five days after this meeting, a CIA scientist arrived in Leopoldville and provided the (Chief of) Station with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and informed him that the President had authorized this operation.Two mitigating factors weaken this chain just enough so that it will not support an absolute finding of Presidential authorization for the assassination effort against Lumumba.First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration responsible to the President for national security affairs testified that they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledge of, an assassination plot.Second, the minutes of discussions at meetings of the National Security Council and its Special Group do not record an explicit Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba. The Secretary of the Special Group maintained that his memoranda reflect the actual language used at the meetings without omission or euphemism for extremely sensitive statements (Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 18-19). NSC staff executives stated, however, that there was a strong possibility that a statement as sensitive as an assassination order would have been omitted from the record or handled by means of euphemism. Several high Government officials involved in policy-making
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-94-7/21/60). Nonetheless, the attitude toward Lumumba even at these early meetings was vehement:Mr. Dulles said that in Lumumba we were faced with a person who was a Castro or worse . Mr. Dulles went on to describe Mr. Lumumba's background which he described as "harrowing" . It is safe to go on the assumption that Lumumba has been bought by the Communists; this also, however, fits with his own orientation. (NSC Minutes, 7/21/60)The President presided over the other two NSC meetings. After looking at the records of those meetings, Johnson was unable to determine with certainty which one was the meeting at which he heard the President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 16).However, the chronology of meetings, cables, and events in the Congo during this period makes it most likely that Johnson's.testimony refers to the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960.The meeting of August 18 took place at the beginning of a series of events that preceded the dispatch of a CIA scientist to Leopoldville with poisons for the assassination of Lumumba.* The September 7 meeting took place in the midst of this series of events.* The major events in the series, each of which is discussed in detail in other sections of the report, may be summarized as follows: The week following the NSC meeting of August 18, the Special Group was informed of the President's "extremely strong feelings about the necessity for very straightforward action" and the Group agreed to consider "any particular kind of activity ivity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). At this meeting, DCI Allen Dulles commented that "he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60; see Section 7 (a) (iii), infra) The next day, Dulles sent an "Eyes Only" cable under his personal signature to the Chief of Station in
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 83]
-95-The NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, was held three weeks before the "quasi-coup" in the Congo -- the dismissal of Lumumba by Kasavubu -- which Johnson remembers as taking place "not long after" he heard the President's statement. The only other meeting at which Johnson could have heard the statement by the President was held on September 7, two days after this event.Robert Johnson's memorandum of the meeting of August 18, 1960, indicates that Acting Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon* introduced* Leopoldville, indicating that it had been concluded in "HIGH QUARTERS" that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE AND THAT . . . THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION" (CIA Cable OUT 62966, Dulles to (Chief of) Station, 8/26/60). The Dulles cable added:WE WISH GIVE YOU WIDER AUTHORITY . . . INCLUDING EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT . . . YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE. (CIA Cable, 8/26/60) (See Section 2, *supra*, for more complete treatment of this cable.)On September 19, a CIA scientist was dispatched from headquarters to the Congo on an extraordinarily sensitive assignment (CIA Cable OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 9/19/60; see Section 4(a), *supra*) On September 21, in the presence of the President at an NSC meeting, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of" (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60; see Section 7(a)(iv), *infra*). Finally, on September 26, the CIA scientist arrived in the Congo, provided the (Chief of) Station with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and informed him that the President had ordered the DCI to undertake an assassination effort (see Sections 4(a)-4(c), *supra*). The (Chief of) Station stated that he received confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to follow the instructions he had been given (see Section 4(e)(i), *supra*).** In 1960, Dillon served as Undersecretary of State, the "number two position in the State Department," the name of which subsequently changed to Deputy Secretary of State. In this position, he frequently (Continued)
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-107-on September 21, 1960, Allen Dulles stressed the danger of Soviet influence in the Congo. Despite the fact that Lumumba had been deposed from his position as Premier and was in UN custody, Dulles continued to regard him as a threat, especially in light of reports of an impending reconciliation between Lumumba and the post-coup Congolese government:Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the monent but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60.)Three days after this NSC meeting, Allen Dulles sent a personal cable to the (Chief of Station) in Leopoldville which included the following message:WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP[OLDVILLE], SETTING HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable, (OUT 73573), Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)On September 26, (Sidney Gottlieb), under assignment from CIA headquarters, arrived in Leopoldville (CIA Cable (IN 18989), Leopoldville to Director, 9/27/60), provided the (Chief of) Station with poisons, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and assured him that there was Presidential authorization for this mission (see Sections 4(b)-4(c), *supra*).Marion Boggs, NSC Deputy Executive Secretary, who wrote the memorandum of the discussion of September 21, did not interpret Dulles' remark as referring to assassination::.
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## -114-Other Eisenhower Administration officials who were active in the Special Group in late 1960--Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston Merchant, and Deputy Secretary of Defense James Douglas--stated that they did not recall any discussion about assassinating Lumumba (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, pp. 1-2; Merchant affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1; Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75).(c) Richard Bissell Testified That, Despite His Lack of a Specific Recollection, He "Strongly Inferred" That the Assassination Effort Against Lumumba Was Authorized by President Eisenhower and Allen DullesRichard Bissell's testimony on the question of high-level authorization for the effort to assassinate Lumumba is problematic. Bissell insisted that he had no direct recollection of receiving such authorization and that all of his testimony on this subject "has to be described as inference" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48). Bissell began his testimony on the subject by asserting that it was on his own initiative that he instructed (Justin O'Donnell) to plan the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 54-55). Nevertheless, Bissell's conclusion--based on his inferences from the totality of circumstances relating to the entire assassination effort against Lumumba--was that an assassination attempt had been authorized at the highest levels of the government (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 32-33, 47-49, 60-62, 65).
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As discussed above, Bissell testified that the minutes of meetings of the Special Group on August 25, 1960 and the NSC on September 21, 1960 indicate that assassination was contemplated at the Presidential level as one acceptable means of "getting rid of Lumumba" (see Sections 5(a)(ii) and 5(a)(iii), supra).There was "no question", according to Bissell, that the cable from Allen Dulles to the (Chief of) Station in Leopoldville on August 26, which called for Lumumba's removal and authorized Hedgman to take action without consulting headquarters, was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting Dulles had attended the previous day (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 31-32). Bissell was "almost certain" that he had been informed about the Dulles cable shortly after its transmission (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 12).Bissell testified that he assumed that assassination was one of the means of removing Lumumba from the scene that is contemplated within the language of Dulles' cable (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 32):It is my belief on the basis of the cable drafted by Allen Dulles that he regarded the action of the Special Group as authorizing implementation [of an assassination] if favorable circumstances presented themselves, if it could be done covertly. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 64-65.)Dulles' cable signalled to Bissell that there was Presidential authorization for him to order action to assassinate Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62):
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 87]
Q: Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President Eisenhower wanted Lumumba killed?Mr. Bissell: I am sure he didn't.Q: Did he ever tell you even circumlocutiously through this kind of cable?Mr. Bissell: Yes, I think his cable says it in effect. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 33.)As for discussions with Dulles about the source of authorization for an assassination effort against Lumumba, Bissell stated:I think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles would have said either the President or President Eisenhower even to me. I think he would have said, this is authorized in the highest quarters, and I would have known what he meant. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48.)When asked if he had sufficient authority to move beyond the consideration or planning of assassination to order implementation of a plan, Bissell said, "I probably did think I had [such] authority" (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62).When informed about the (Chief of)Station's testimony about the instructions he received from (Gottlieb), Bissell said that despite his absence of a specific recollection:I would strongly infer in this case that such an authorization did pass through me, as it were, if (Sid Gottlieb) gave that firm instruction to the Station(Chief.) (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40.)Bissell said that the DCI would have been the source of this authorization (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40).
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-117-Bissell did not recall being informed by (Gottlieb) that Gottlieb had represented to the(Chief of)Station that there was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 46). But Bissell said that assuming he had instructed (Gottlieb) to carry poison to the Congo, "there was no possibility" that he would have issued such an instruction without authorization from Dulles (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47). Likewise Bissell said he "probably did" tell (Gottlieb) that the mission had the approval of President Eisenhower (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47). This led to Bissell's conclusion that if, in fact, the testimony of the(Chief of)Station about (Gottlieb)'s actions is accurate, then (Gottlieb)'s actions were fully authorized:Q: In light of the entire atmosphere at the Agency and the policy at the Agency at the time, Mr. (Gottlieb)'s representation to the Chief of Station that the President had instructed the DCI to carry out this mission would not have been beyond the pale of Mr. (Gottlieb)'s authority at that point?Bissell: No, it would not. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 65).Bissell further stated:Knowing Mr. (Gottlieb), it is literally inconceivable to me that he would have acted beyond his instructions. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 41.)With respect to his assignment to (Justin O'Donnell) to "plan and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 24) Bissell testified that "it was my own idea to give
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 89]
-118-(O'Donnell) this assignment" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50). But hesaid that this specific assignment was made in the contextthat an assassination mission against Lumumba already had autho-rization above the level of DDP (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50; seealso pp. 32-33, 47-48, 60-62).
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-4-that, while he could have created the capability on his own, any urgings would have come from Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a later appearance, however, Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of the capability and that the context was a briefing by him and not urging by Bundy. Bundy said he received a briefing and gave no urging, though he raised no objections. Rostow said he never heard of the project.William Harvey testified that he was "almost certain" that on January 25 and 26, 1961, he met with CIA officials [Sidney Gottlieb][^1], the new Chief of CIA's Technical Services Division, and [Arnold Silver][^2] a CIA recruiting officer, to discuss the feasibility of creating a capability within the Agency for "executive action" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). After reviewing his notes of those meetings,* Harvey testified that they took place after his initial* As to the date of these notes, Harvey was asked whether his notations "25/1-[Sid G][^3]" and "26/1-[AS][^4]" indicate that he spoke to [Sidney Gottlieb][^1] and [Arnold Silver][^2] in 1961, as opposed to 1962. Harvey testified as follows:Q: And is it your judgment that that is January 26, 1961 and is about the subject of Executive Action?Harvey: Yes, it is.Q: And it followed your conversation with Mr. Bissell that you have recounted?Harvey: . . . [W]ell, when I first looked at this, I thought this, well, this has got to be '62, but I am almost certain now that it is not. If this is true, this might place the first discussion that I had with Dick Bissell in early January and this is difficult to pinpoint because there were several such discussions in varying degrees of detail during the period in the spring, and very early in '61 to the fall of '61 period, but I did find out fairly early on that [Silver][^2][^1]: 03[^2]: 03[^3]: G[^4]: AS
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discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said,might have transpired in "early January" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p.52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harveyabout the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75,p. 10).had -- or that[^3] Bissell had discussed the question of assassi-nation with Arnold Silver, and this discussion, at the veryleast, had to take place after I know Bissell already haddiscussed the matter with Silver (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).Harvey had also testified that, after receiving Bissell's initial in-structions to establish an executive action capability:the first thing I did . . . was discuss in theoreticalterms with a few officers whom I trusted quite implicitlythe whole subject of assassination, our possible assets,our posture, going back, if you will, even to the funda-mental questions of A, is assassination a proper weaponof an American intelligence service, and B, even if youassume that it is, is it within our capability withinthe framework of this government to do it effectivelyand properly, securely and discreetly. (Harvey, 6/25/75,pp. 37-A, 38).The Inspector General's Report connected Silver and Gottlieb to theearly stages of the executive action project as follows:Harvey says that Bissell had[^3] already discussed certainaspects of the problem with Arnold Silver and with SidneyGottlieb. Since Silver was already cut in, Harvey usedhim in developing the Executive Action Capability....Harvey's mention of him / Gottlieb in this connectionmay explain a notation by Dr. Gunn that Harvey instructedGunn to discuss techniques with Gottlieb without associa-ting the discussion with the Castro operation. (I.G.Report, pp. 37-38).It is evident from the testimony of Harvey and Bissell that the turn-over to Harvey of the Roselli contact in November 1961 was discussedas part of ZRRIFLE (see Section (d), infra). Thus, their initialdiscussion of executive action can, at the least, be dated beforeNovember 1961 and the "25/1" and "26/1" notations would have torefer to January 1961.[^3]:
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-18-bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19-20). Harvey did not recall any mention of the White House or any higher authority than the DDP in his November meeting with Bissell (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 60-61).Although Richard Helms was briefed and given administrative responsibility (as DDP) for Project ZR/RIFLE three months later, he did not recall that ZR/RIFLE was ever contemplated as a capability to assassinate Castro (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 55). Asked whether the actual assassination efforts against Castro were related to ZR/RIFLE (executive action), Helms testified: "In my mind those lines never crossed" (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 52). However, Bissell's testimony leaves more ambiguity: "the contact with the syndicate which had Castro as its target . . . folded into the ZR/RIFLE project . . . and they became one" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47). When asked by Senator Baker whether the executive action "capability . . for assassination" was "used against Castro", Bissell replied that it was "in the later phase". (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47). The instruction from Bissell to Harvey on November 15; 1961, however, preceded the reactivation of the CIA-syndicate assassination operation against Castro by approximately five months.(iii) Use of Agent QJ/WIN in AfricaQJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background who had been recruited by the CIA for certain sensitive programs involving surreptitious entries which pre-dated Project
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-19-ZR/RIFLE. Harvey testified that QJ/WIN's function after the adventof Project ZR/RIFLE in 1961 was restricted to the "spotting" of.potential assets for "multi-purpose" covert use.However, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey wasassigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agentQJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by Arnold Silver hissupervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey, as theChief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on which Silver worked,had ordered QJ/WIN's mission to the Congo (CIA Dispatch (MUDW 147,11/2/60) and arranged the financial accounting for the missionafterward (Memorandum to Finance Division from William K. Harvey,1/11/61). [QJ/WIN's activities in the Congo are treated in detailin the discussion of the Lumumba case; see Section _____, *supra*.]There are two factors which may raise a question asto whether QJ/WIN was being used in an *ad hoc* capacity to developan assassination capability before ZR/RIFLE was formally initiated.First, there is a similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey,QJ/WIN, Silver, and Gottlieb were connected with the Lumumba matterand reappear in connection with the subsequent development ofZR/RIFLE. Second, Bissell informed Harvey that the development ofan assassination capability had already been discussed with Silverand Gottlieb before Harvey's assignment to ZR/RIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75p. 52; I.G. Report, pp. 37-38).Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any firmevidence of a connection between QJ/WIN and the plot to assassinateLumumba.
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-4-Documents indicate that consideration was given within the CIA to airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic.At a June 21, 1960, meeting with [Ned Holman] of the CIA Western Hemisphere Division, Ambassador Farland reportedly suggested possible sites for the drops.(CIA memo, 6/21/60)Documents also indicate that a meeting was held around the end of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom and Col. J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division.Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant Secretary's view regarding "To what extent will the U.S. government participate in the overthrow of Trujillo." A number of questions were raised by King, among them:"c. Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene?"King's handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom's response to that question was "yes" (CIA memo of 6/28/60; King affidavit)*On July 1, 1960, a memorandum directed to General Cabell, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared for Colonel King's signature and, in his absence, signed by his principal deputy, [Rudy Gomez] (I.G. Report, p. 26). The memorandum stated that a principal leader of the anti-Trujillo opposition had asked Ambassador Farland for a limited number of arms to precipitate Trujillo's overthrow, and recognized that such arms* Neither King nor Rubottom recalls such a meeting, nor does either recall any proposal for supplying sniper rifles. (Rubottom affidavit, King affidavit.)