Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 16]
TOP SECRET14My own impression as to this matter -- and I have already testified to the fact that I am relying on a recollection of a meeting of which there is no record -- is that had I been briefed on this essentially hypothetical internal, undirected character, it did not appear to me to be a matter that required further authority outside the CIA. That may or may not have been right, but that is the quick judgment I appear to have reached. Because I certainly did not raise the question with others.Senator Baker. Do you recall that, Mr. Bundy, or is that your surmise?Mr. Bundy. That is my reconstruction more than my --I know I did not raise it, I did not press the question, and I did not feel, therefore, that it was a question that needed further analysis, and it did not, so far as I know, get further consideration inthe White House. My own recollection is that I didn'thear the words again in any serious con- text that I can recall until this year.The Chairman. And you cannot recall who it was who briefed you?Mr. Bundy. I really cannot.Mr. Schwarz. Can you narrow the field?Mr. Bundy. I can narrow the field. It would have to have been a senior officer at the Agency, or someone with previous understanding in the White House. I have no reason to supposeTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 17]
TOP SECRET15Phone (Area 202) 544-60001 that it was the latter, but I cannot exclude that.2 The Chairman. Might it have been Bissell himself?3 Mr. Bundy. It surely might have been.4 The Chairman. Based upon your best recollection of that5 briefing, you have already testified that you interpose no6 objection?7 Mr. Bundy. I am pretty sure I satisfied myself as to8 the character of the enterprise. But I did not interpose an9 objection.10 The Chairman. Do you recall, then, having reported the11 briefing to the President?12 Mr. Bundy. No, I don't.13 The Chairman. Did it strike you -- before I ask that14 question, based upon your best recollection of the briefing,15 were you told that this was a new capability that was being16 developed, or were you told simply that the Agency possessed17 such a capability?18 Mr. Bundy. I would put it that the Agency was working on19 such a capability, but without any great sense of precision.20 The Chairman. Were you given the impression at21 that briefing that the Agency was seeking your authority or22 the authority of the White House?23 Mr. Bundy. I think they were testing my reaction, as24 I now look back on it. But I do not recall that they were25 seeking authority. If it had come to me as a matter of WhiteTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 18]
TOP SECRET1 House authority, I know from the context -- my own concept2 of my job what I would have done.3 The Chairman. What would you have done?4 Mr. Bundy. I would have had to take the matter to the5 President, because I had no independent authority.6 The Chairman. And you have testified that you did not7 take the matter to the President?8 Mr. Bundy. As far as I can recall, Mr. Chairman.9 The Chairman. Well, this is a subject dealing, as it10 does, with the development of a capability to kill that would11 have been of the character that if you had been asked for12 authority you would have discussed with the President?13 Mr. Bundy. That is right.14 The Chairman. And furthermore, is it not a subject of15 a character that you would be very likely to recall?16 Mr. Bundy. If I had been asked for authority I would17 recall it. If I were the initiating or deciding agent, I18 would recall that I had had that role.19 You speak of the seriousness of it. It deals with a20 capability to kill. One of the sobering facts about coming21 into the government from outside into a sensitive position22 like that one is the number of things on which you are briefed23 which deal with the capability to kill. Contingency plans24 for protecting West Berlin, contingency plans for the use of25 nuclear weapons -- shelf plans, a shade more remote, perhaps,TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 19]
TOP SECRET171 for the use of different kinds of gases -- an operational plan2 for the invasion of Cuba -- these were uncertainties as to3 whether there would have to be military landings in Laos. In4 the context of 1961 -- and I am not in any sense trying to un-5 derstate the seriousness of the context of 1975-- this was a6 hypothetical kind of a thing with two strong locks between7 it and any decision. And I simply didn't pay it the attention8 then that we are paying to it now. We are right to pay9 that attention now.10 The Chairman. I understand that very well. And this11 Committee is endeavoring in every way it can to place this12 whole issue within the context of the time. Nevertheless, we13 are faced with a very real dilemma. We know that at the very14 time you were being briefed the Agency was not only interested15 in developing a capability, but was in fact engaged in a16 series of attempts to assassinate Castro, and had been in-17 volved in other murder plots and murder attempts against the18 leaders of certain foreign governments.19 The question we are endeavoring to answer is whether20 the Agency had been authorized by the policy makers of the21 government to engage in this activity, or whether it was22 operating fast and loose on a wild gambit of its own in an23 area of extreme sensitivity that could have the most serious24 repercussions upon the government of the U.S. and its25 reputation in the world.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 20]
TOP SECRET1 We are told by Mr. Bissell, who apparently was not only2 a very good friend of yours, but also a very good friend of Mr.3 Rostow's --4 Mr. Bundy. That is right.5 The Chairman. -- a man whose credibility as a witness6 would seem to have to be respected -- that he was at least7 engaged in developing such a capability on direct instructions8 from the White House.9 But when we pressed him for specifics, his testimony10 becomes very vague. He can't remember just who it was who11 told him, he can't dispute the record, which says that in effect,12 he so advised Mr. Harvey when he engaged Mr. Harvey to develop13 the capability. And everyone else of high authority in14 the Administration that we have questioned so far testifies15 that it was not the policy of the Administration to engage in16 assassination, and no such attempts were ever authorized,17 and indeed, with the exception of one occasion in the Special18 Group, the subject never even surfaced for discussion.19 And when it did, if it did, it was quickly shot down.20 Nevertheless, the CIA was in fact embarked upon such21 attempts during the period under review.22 Now, we are led to conclude either that we are not23 being told the truth concerning the policy of the Administration,24 which is very hard for me to accept, given the reputation of25 the witnesses that have come before us, for integrity andTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 21]
TOP SECRET191 truthfulness, or that the CIA was running wild, and acting on2 its own initiative, engaging in murder plots, murder attempts,3 and not informing, let alone securing the authority from,4 those in government who held the responsibility, which in a way5 is even more frightening.6 Now, you tell us that you remember being briefed. You7 don't remember advising the President. It didn't seem too8 important at the time. Did you ever follow up on whether such9 a capability had in fact been perfected by the agency?10 Mr. Bundy. I don't recall pursuing the matter at all,11 Mr. Chairman, any more than I would have pursued any other12 shelf capability on which no question was being pushed to me,13 either from below or above.14 If I may go back and comment on one aspect of your,15 I think, important and impressive description of16 the difficulty the Committee faces, I am sure that if in the17 early months of 1961 I had known what I now know, in part from18 the newspapers and in part from discussions with your staff,19 about what was really in train, I would have had a very20 different approach.21 Senator Mondale. Mr. Chairman.22 The Chairman. Senator Mondale.23 Senator Mondale. Yesterday Secretary Rusk testified be-24 fore us. And some of the minutes or notes made following one25 of themeetings of the Special Group Augmented at least suggestTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 22]
TOP SECRET201 that the question of assassination occurred. And, Mr. Rusk2 said, did you think anyone would bring that up at a town3 meeting? And by that I gather he meant that these meetings4 had large attendance from all different groups and prinicples5 and staff assistants and so on, and as a result, if there6 were matters of exceeding delicacy, that was not the forum7 at which such matters would be discussed.8 Would you comment on that?9 Mr. Bundy. Yes. My impression would be that the10 Secretary was probably referring to the much discussed meeting11 of August 10, 1962.12 Senator Mondale. Right.13 Mr. Bundy. That was a large meeting, 16 or 18 people.14 And the comment seems to be pertinent to that meeting. The15 Special Group as such, the one which I would have had in16 mind, for example, in early 1961, was set up under a national17 security regulation of some sort whose number was 54/12.18 Senator Mondale. That was the Special Group.19 Mr. Bundy. That was the Special Group. And the SpecialGroup in and of itself was quite a small group.21 Senator Mondale. But people would volunteer to attend22 Mr. Bundy. No.23 Senator Mondale. They would not?24 Mr. Bundy. No. The meeting of August 10 is a very25 special meeting in a variety of respects. That included --TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 23]
# TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-6000211 The Chairman. You were present at that meeting?2 Mr. Bundy. I was present. My memory is entirely3 a refreshed memory on this, I had no recollection of the4 meeting until recent months. But I have found a scratch5 pad that I apparently doodled on on that date, and it6 shows who was there, and not much else.7 Mr. Schwarz. There were some beautiful drawings.8 Mr. Bundy. There were.9 They were not very beautiful drawings.10 The Special Group Augmented met in August -- and this11 does coincide with my general recollection of the matter --12 in response to concerns wihch were first, I think, and most13 energetically pressed by Mr. McCone with respect to, what the14 hell are the Russians doing in Cuba. And that was the center15 of that meeting, and the center of later meetings, and the cen-16 ter of a national security action memorandum of considerable17 complexity which was put out toward the end of August, most18 of which dealt with this question, how do we know what they19 are going to do, what do we do if they do it, and so forth,20 with respect to missiles in Cuba.21 It was therefore in a sense much more than an ordinary22 MONGOOSE meeting, let alone a Special Group meeting. And23 while I quite agree with the Secretary that that meeting as24 a planning session for anything as horrendous as assassina-25 tion is implausible in the extreme. Quite serious covert# TOP SECRETNW 30993 DocId:32423406 Page 24![WARD & PAUL, 410 First Street, S.E.. Washington, D.C. 20003]
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 24]
TOP SECRET221 actions were discussed in the Special Group. And as your2 Committee pursues its studies of covert action it will find3 that that group is the anodal point for policy decisions, good4 or bad, well or badly handled. And that was quite a small5 group.6 Senator Mondale. The reason I ask that is that it seems7 to me that the Chairman's question pursues the two alternatives,8 either what we now know to have occurred was ordered at the9 highest level, or at a very high level, such as the Special10 Group Augmented, or they operated on their own, in which case11 they were out of control and irresponsible, or there was some12 extra communications system that went around the formal struc-13 ture that we have been examining, and would account for the sense14 of authority that these operators testified to when they15 were with us.16 Now, their testimony was not very specific. They said,17 we thought we had authority, and we think we heard from18 somebody, and so on.19 What are the changes, based upon your experience, that20 there was such extra official communications and order passin21 Senator Baker. Before Mr. Bundy answers, I might say22 to Senator Mondale that I am struck by the first paragraph23 of the Inspector General's report, which we don't have here24 now, I don't believe, but as I remember it, it says, it is25 difficult to reconstruct history of assassination plots, becauseTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 25]
TOP SECRET23of the high sensitivity of the subject matter, no written records were kept, and it was not discussed at open meetings. That is generally what was said. And it seems to me that is implying, then, that as a matter of policy there was no formalization of this sort of communication.I am sorry to interrupt.Senator Mondale. Yes.And in that August 10 meeting two or three principals testified that it did come up. And in fact it is not reflected in the notes.Mr. Bundy. Perhaps the best way for me to begin at least with an answer to your question is to describe my own sense -- my own understanding of the way in which covert operations of all types were brought forward. And this was perhaps the most important and the most constantly reiterated fact of the process that I was exposed to when I began to consider this whole range of subjects on coming to Washington. And whether it was with Mr. Gordon Gray, my predecessor, or with Allen Dulles, or with incoming and outgoing friends in the Department of State, or with Mr. Bissell, or with anyone else concerned with these matters, what I learned then and what I applied throughout my time there to the best of my ability was that all covert operations, whether intelligence operations, clandestine political activity, and clandestine propaganda activity, and clandestine subversion, or sabotage,TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 26]
TOP SECRET241 which did occur in the case of Cuba, all of them took their2 authority from and came for their authority to the 54/123 group.4 And when there was a question in such a meeting as to5 whether the matter required further judgment, it was the6 responsibility of the Chairman of that group to make sure that7 that was checked out.8 The papers will usually say, higher authority, et cetera,9 et cetera, and the President's name will often not appear --10 any more than the precise character of the operation is likely11 to appear in the minutes for the reasons that Senator Baker12 has spoken of.13 But I never knew of any operation of this kind of any14 sort, with one exception, which is quite different, which did15 not have that channel. The exception is the Bay of Pigs,16 which was so big, so complicated, and overflowed in so many17 directions, and in which the President himself was involved in18 so many ways, as he fully recognized and explained at the time,19 that it did not go through this Committee process, it went20 through a quite Presidential process, and everybody involved21 knew that..22 But with that one exception, I would have told you up23 until the beginning of this current public discussion, that24 was the way it went, and that nothing went outside it, and25 that the Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agencies, withTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 27]
# TOP SECRET1 their more sensitive" intelligence operations, were meticulous2 in that respect.3 Now, I clearly am wrong. But that is what I would have4 told you.5 Senator Mondale. Well, are you wrong?6 In other words, what you testified to --7 Mr. Bundy. Excuse me, I misstate myself. I beg your8 pardon for interrupting.9 I am wrong in that things happened that didn't go through10 that group.11 Senator Mondale. Yes.12 In other words, that is the big question, either they wer13 acting on authority, which apparently flowed around channels --14 The Chairman. Covertly --15 Senator Mondale. Covertly -- or they were acting on their16 own, and our attempts to find direct authority in these official17 meetings led us nowhere.18 And your testimony is that you find it very unlikely19 that there was this covert way of communicating authority.20 Mr. Bundy. My testimony was that I wouldn't21 have believed it existed. I have to consider the same al-22 ternative that the Chairman has so clearly pointed out. I23 don't find it agreeable to conclude that the Agency was a24 rogue elephant at a time when I strongly believe it was not.25 Senator Mondale. We asked General Taylor that question,# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 28]
# TOP SECRET261 and he said he found it incredible to believe that they2 would have gone around the Special Group Augmented with such.3 Mr. Bundy. General Taylor, of course -- and this is an4 important point -- was a-pointed to this responsibility after5 the Bay of Pigs, after a review of the failures that led to6 the Bay of Pigs, and after a conclusion had been reached that7 it would strengthen the White House to have a man with a parti-8 cular responsibility for the oversight of intelligence opera-9 tions. He was called military representative to the President,10 but in the announcement of his appointment -- I happened to11 look it up the other day -- President Kennedy made it clear that12 he would be his representative for intelligence matters.13 And he did in fact take over the chairmanship during the time14 that he was military representative of all of the Special15 Groups, 54/12, the Special Group Counterinsurgency, and the16 Special Group Augmented, MONGOOSE. And when he said --17 if he has testified that his expectation would have been18 that nothing was going to go around him, he is saying exactly19 what I thought through the same period.20 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, in that respect --21 The Chairman. Before I forget the question, let22 me ask, since you were at the August 10 meeting, and since23 we have received testimony buttressed by certain documentary24 evidence that the subject of assassination of Castro did25 come up at that meeting, do you have any recollection of# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 29]
TOP SECRET1 subject coming up or being discussed?2 Mr. Bundy. I don't recollect the meeting. And I don't recollect the subject ever coming up in a meeting of that size, or indeed in any -- I don't have any recollection of it coming up, although I do have a general recollection of there being times at which this possibility was heard of. I wouldn't want to testify that I never heard anyone say, there is somebody thinking about this, because that would be different from my vague recollection.10 But I have no recollection of that meeting, and therefore none of any specific statement made by anyone in it.12 The Chairman. Senator Baker?13 Senator Baker. In that connection, before I go to the question I had in mind, is it fair to say, Mr. Bundy, that all, or virtually all, of your testimony this morning, about MONGOOSE, about the August 10 meeting, and about the general situation, is from reconstructed memory rather than first impression memory?19 Mr. Bundy. I didn't want to go that far, Senator Baker. My knowledge, my sense of what 54/12 and Special Group Augmented were, and where they stood in the line of authority, is very clear, and is not reconstructed. I spent five years -- except for the time when General Taylor was there, I was the chairman of these things.25 Senator Baker. Let's take a piece at a time, then.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 30]
TOP SECRET1 On the question of the Executive Action capability, I2 believe referred to as the ZRRIFLE project --3 Mr. Bundy. Imust say that if I had known that was its4 name I would have looked harder, Senator Baker.5 Senator Baker. It is a fairly picturesque name -- as6 to Executive Action Capability, or ZRRIFLE, do you have a7 separate recollection?8 Mr. Bundy. I have a recollection of what I think of9 is one, I don't want to say there wasn't more, but of10 one discussion of the matter. And I know I was informed of11 it in some fashion at the time.12 Senator Baker. Do you remember by whom?13 Mr. Bundy. That is my difficulty, as I said earlier,14 I don't know.15 Senator Baker. The reason I ask is, from the other16 documentation I have, which consists primarily of the17 Inspector General of the CIA's report, and maybe other18 material that I can't think of at the moment, it is clear19 and unmistakeable that they think of RZRIFLE or Executive Ac-20 tion Capability as a White House initiative, or a White House21 request of considerable insistence from the White House that22 they get on with the job.23 Mr. Bundy. That is totally inconsistent with my un-24 reconstructed recollection.25 Senator Baker. Let me track that carefully.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 31]
TOP SECRET1 Do you recall that there was not?2 Mr. Bundy. I Can only speak for myself here, and for3 my colleague Rostow, and my knowledge of his assignments.4 I recall that his assignments would have made it wildly out5 of place, and totally out of character, for him to initiate a6 matter of this kind. And I recall that I did not. And I7 recall that quite independently of any reconstruction of8 recent months.9 Senator Baker. I would like to limit this, then,10 just to yourassignment.11 Was it your general assignment to take care of so-12 called covert operations?13 Mr. Bundy. It was my assignment -- may I take a minute14 on this?15 Senator Baker. Yes, sir.16 Mr. Bundy. There were two ways in which I could become17 involved in covert -- three ways. I might have thought up18 an idea myself. I will have to say that I have no recollec-19 tion that I ever did. It was not a subject in which I had20 an independent personal motivating interest. So,there were21 two ways in which I could get involved in it. One was by22 a proposal upward from the Agency or the Defense Intelligence23 Services, which would come to the Special Group.24 And the other was when the President had an interest--25 and I did have an interest -- from time to time in theseTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 32]
TOP SECRET301 matters. He had a great interest at different points in 1961, 1962, in doing more about Cuba. And part of the more he wanted to do was covert. And he would say so to me. And I would say so to somebody else.Senator Baker. Can you give us examples of that?Mr. Bundy. No, I can't. I can only say that the kind of things he was talking about was, why do all these raids not get us anywhere? They say they can do something about the oil refineries, why don't they? These are purely hypothetical, Senator Baker, but they would be in a category, subversion and sabotage.Senator Baker. WAs it Harvey that was spoken of as our 007?Mr. Schwarz. Once yesterday.Senator Baker. Do you remember when Mr. Harvey was brought to see the President at the Oval Office?Mr. Bundy. I have been told about that, but I am afraid that is non-refreshed recollection. I don't know anything about it.Senator Baker. Would that have been the character of the things that the President was interested in, 007?Mr. Bundy. I am not going to try to repair the record at this late stage and say that the President never read Ian Fleming.Senator Baker. Or ever seen Ian Fleming?TOP SECRET