Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 16]
-15-(a) Dulles Cables Again for "Elimination" of Lumumba,and a Messenger is Sent to Congo With a HighlySensitive AssignmentOn September 19, 1960, several days after Lumumba placed himself in the protective custody of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Leopoldville, Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed a cryptic cable to Leopoldville to arrange a clandestine meeting between the Chief of Station and "Sidney) Braun," who was traveling to the Congo on an unspecified assignment:["SID"] SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX 27 SEPT. . WILLANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS (SID) FROM PARIS". . ITURGENT YOU SHOULD SEE ('(SID") SOONEST POSSIBLEAFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFYHIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO YOU.(CIA Cable, OUT 71464) Bissell/Tweedy to Chiefof Station, 9/19/60.)The cable bore a highly unusual sensitivity indicator"PROP" -- that restricted circulation at CIA headquarters to theChief of the Africa Division.** In a letter of September 23, 1975, the Chief of the CIA Review  Staff informed the Committee that "PROP" was normally used "to  denote sensitive personnel matters" (Seymour R. Bolton to Frederick  A. O. Schwarz and Frederick D. Baron, 9/23/75. It appears that this  sensitivity indicator, while created for other purposes, was utilized  by Bissell, Tweedy, and the Chief of Station to restrict distribution  of their communications about an assassination operation. The cable  traffic cited in this report that was sent through the PROP channel  did not touch upon personnel matters except in terms of recruiting  additional CIA officers and agents for the assassination operation.
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 17]
-16-The Bissell/Tweedy cable informed the Chief of Station that he was to continue to use this indicator forALL [CABLE] TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOUINSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF.(CIA Cable, 9/19/60.)The (Chief of) Station -- referred to herein as "Hedgman"* -- testified to a clear, independent recollection of receiving such a cable. Hedgman stated that in September of 1960 he received a "most unusual" cable from CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 11, 43). The cable advised, in his words, that:someone who I would have recognized would arrive with instructions for me.... Ibelieve the message was also marked for my eyes only ... and contained instructionsthat I was not to discuss the message with anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 12-13.)Hedgman said that the cable did not specify the kind of instructions he was to receive, and it "did not refer to Lumumba in any way" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 12).Three days after the Bissell/Tweedy message that Hedgman was to meet "Sid" in Leopoldville, Bronson Tweedy uses the same sensitivity indicator on a cable sent to Hedgman on an "Eyes Only" basis (CIA Cable, (OUT 74837,) Tweedy to Leopoldville, 9/22/60).* Due to fear of reprisal from Lumumba's followers, the (Chief of) Station for the Congo from mid-summer 1960 through 1961 testified under the alias "Hedgman" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 2; 8/25/75, p. 4).
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 18]
-17-Tweedy's cable indicated that a third country national would be required as an agent in the PROP operation:IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR PROP OBJECTIVES,BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SUCH BE PROVIDED THROUGHTHIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH [AMERICAN]ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED. (CIA Cable,9/22/60.)Tweedy expressed reservations about two agents that the station was using for other operations and said "WE ARE CONSIDERING A THIRD NATIONAL CUTOUT CONTACT CANDIDATE AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT FILL BILL"* (CIA Cable, 9/22/60). Despite Tweedy's concern about the two existing station contacts, he indicated that the (Chief of) station and his "colleague" -- presumably the man identified as ("Sid") who was to arrive in the Congo shortly to explain the PROP operation to Hedgman -- were to be afforded considerable latitude in exercising their judgment on the conduct of the operation:YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READOVER YOUR SHOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESSOPPORTUNITIES. OUR PRIMARY CONCERN MUST BECONCEALMENT [AMERICAN] ROLE, UNLESS OUT-STANDING OPPORTUNITY EMERGES WHICH MAKESCALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET. READYENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKEBASED OUR HIGH REGARD BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONALJUDGMENTS. (CIA Cable, 9/22/60.)* This is probably a reference to agent QJWIN, who was later dispatched to the Congo. His mission is discussed in Sections ______ and ______, infra.
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 19]
-18--On September 24, Allen Dulles personally issued a cable to Leopoldville expressing in absolute terms his desire to "eliminate" Lumumba:WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT INELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITYRESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HEFAILS IN LEOPOLDVILLE), SETTING HIMSELFIN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable,OUT 73573), Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)Dulles had expressed a similar view three days before in the presence of the President at an NSC meeting, stating:Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60)(b) Gottlieb Delivers Lethal Substances to the Chief of Station in the Congo for the Assassination of LumumbaThe Chief of Station reported through the PROP channel to Bronson Tweedy that he had made contact with the man dispatched to Leopoldville with a highly sensitive assignment on September 26. (CIA Cable (IN 18989), Leopoldville to Tweedy, 9/27/60) This was the same week in which Dulles cabled about the "elimination" of Lumumba and made his statement to the NSC about the "grave danger" that existed as long as Lumumba was not "disposed of".Hedgman testified about the identity of ("SID") the messenger referred to in the first cable through the PROP channel:Q: Who was the messenger who arrived?Hedgman: Mr. (Sidney Gottlieb
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 20]
- 19 -Q: And at that time, you knew who he was?Hedgman: I recognized him as an officer of the Agency. . . I believe he referred to the fact that I had received a message and that he was the person concerned. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 15-16)The message carried by (Gottlieb, then Science Advisor to DDP Richard Bissell) was unmistakeably clear according to Hedgman:Hedgman: It is my recollection that he advised me, or my instructions were, to eliminate Lumumba.Q: By eliminate, do you mean assassinate?Hedgman: Yes. I would say that was . . . my understanding of the primary means. I don't think it was probably limited to that, if there was some other way of doing it.Q:. Of doing what?Hedgman: Of removing him from a position of political threat. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 17-18.)Hedgman said that he and (Gottlieb) also may have discussed non-lethal means of removing Lumumba as a "political threat", but he said, "I cannot recall with certainty on that" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 28).He clearly recalled the discussion of assassination, however:Q: And what did Mr. (Gottlieb) indicate with regard to the possibility of physically eliminating him?Hedgman: It was my understanding that that was probably expected of me. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 18.)And again:Q: I take it that once you started discussing these lethal agents, there was no doubt in your mind that the kind of elimination he was there particularly to discuss was killing Lumumba?
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 21]
Hedgman: There was no doubt in my mind that this was one of the way[s], and probably what they thought was the only way that would work (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 25).Hedgman explained (Gottlieb) provided him with poisons as a means of assassination:Q: And what did he tell you with regard to how that might be accomplished?Hedgman: .. He brought some biological agents. I assume that that's the correct word. But in any case, poisonous agent with him, which he passed to me....Q: These were lethal biological substances?Hedgman: Yes. That was my understanding as a non-expert. (lledgman, 8/21/75, pp. 18-19.)Hedgman testified that he received "rubber gloves, a mask, and a syringe" along with the poisons and that (Gottlieb) instructed him in their use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 20-21). Hedgman indicated that this paraphernalia was for administering the poisons to Lumumba:Q: [W]hen he ((Gottlieb)) came to the Congo to give you lethal biological agents for the assassination of Lumumba, was it clear at that time that the means for administering those biological agents was to inject them into a substance that was to be ingested by Lumumba, whether it be food, or drink, or toothpaste or any other substance that was to be ingested?Hedgman: That's my recollection, yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 82; accord. p. 24.)Hedgman said that the means of assassination was not restricted to use of the poisons provided by (Gottlieb):This was not a sine qua non that I employ this. If there were another method, another way, it would have been acceptable. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 22]
For example, Hedgman testified that he may have "suggested" shooting Lumumba (to Gottlieb) as an alternative to poisoning (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29).There was a firm requirement, however, that the means of assassination should not be traceable to the United States:The biological substance, or specimens, what have you, I think it was up to my judgment, and if there was a better way -- certainly. [T]he point I now recall was in no way, if I implemented these instructions, no way could it be traced back to the United States. It had to be a way which could not be traced back ... either to an American or the United States government. (lledgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)Hedgman said (Gottlieb) assured him that the poisons were produced to meet this requirement:I believe I raised the point that poisons left traces in the human body, which could be found on autopsy ... I believe that I was assured that these ... lethal agents would [leave] normal traces found in people that die of certain diseases. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 23.)Hedgman said that he had an "emotional reaction of great surprise" when it first became clear that (Gottlieb) was there to discuss an assassination plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 30). But the (Chief of) Station said that he did not give any indication that he would not carry out the instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46). Instead, he told (Gottlieb) he "would explore this" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46) and left him with the following impression:I think it would be a fair impression that he would take away the thought that I was going to look into it and try and figure if there was a way ... I believe. I
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 23]
-22-stressed the difficulty of trying to carryout such an operation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,p. 47.)The cable that Hedgman sent to headquarters reporting hisinitial contact with (Gottlieb) was clearly an affirmative responseto the assignment. The(Chief of) Station said that he and (Gottlieb)were "ON SAME WAVELENGTH." (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville toTweedy, 9/27/60.) Hedgman was "afraid" that Mobutu's governmentwas "weakening under" foreign pressure to effect a reconciliationwith Lumumba, and said:HENCE BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENTWITH SECURITY INDICATED. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)(c) Hedgman Testified That (Gottlieb) Told Him ThatPresident Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assassinationof LumumbaHedgman testified that in the course of their meeting inLeopoldville, (Dr. Gottlieb) informed him that President Eisenhowerhad authorized the assassination of Lumumba:Q: Did you raise with him the question of authori-zation of such instructions to you?Hedgman: Yes, I did. That's my quite strongrecollection, that I did.Q: What do you recall in essence was what yousaid to him?Hedgman: In essence, I think I must have pointedout that this was not a common or usual Agency tactic,and I may have probably said that I never heard ofit being done, which I had not, never in my trainingor previous work in the Agency had I ever heard anyreferences to such, in my recollection at least, suchmethods. And it is my recollection I asked on whoseauthority these instructions were issued.Q: And what did Mr. (Gottlieb) reply?
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 24]
-24-Hedgman cautioned that he was recalling events long past:Hedgman: Gentlemen, after fifteen years, I cannot be 100 per cent certain, but I have always, since that date, had the impression in my mind that these orders had come from the President. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 34.)But he left no doubt about the strength of his "impression":Q: You have a very firm recollection that he (Gottlieb) represented to you that the President of the United States directed the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, is that correct?Hedgman: That's my recollection. Yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 102; accord, p. 34.)(d) Headquarters Makes the Assassination Plot "Highest Priority" and Authorizes Steps in Furtherance of ItOn the basis of his talks with "Sid," Hedgman listed a number of "possibilities" for covert action against Lumumba. At the top of the list was the suggestion that a particular agent be used in the following manner:HAVE HIM TAKE REFUGE WITH BIG BROTHER.WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BRUSH UPDETAILS TO RAZOR EDGE. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)Hedgman indicated that he would begin to follow this course by re-calling the agent to Leopoldville. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.) He informed headquarters: "PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY" (CIA Cable, 9/27/60).On September 30, the Chief of Station urged that headquarters authorize "exploratory conversations" with this agent so
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 25]
-26-The same day, through the PROP channel, Hedgman received authorization from headquarters to proceed with his top priority plan:YOU ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH (SCHOTROFFE) TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUTOUT ROLE. ... APPRECIATE MANNER YOUR APPROACH TO PROBLEM. (CIA Cable, (OUT 75900,(Fields) to Leopoldville, 9/30/60.)In this cable, (Glenn Fields,) Assistant Chief of the Africa Division, expressed a "HOPE ... FOR MODERATE HASTE" (CIA Cable (OUT 75900,)Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60.)According to the report of the (Chief of) Station, (Gottlieb) left the Congo to return to headquarters on October 5 in view of the "EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS" (CIA Cable (IN 24171,) Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60). The "expiration" of (Gottlieb's) "materials" probably refers to the date beyond which the substances would no longer have lethal strength. Although the relation of the "expiration date" to (Gottlieb's) departure is unclear from the cables, it probably signifies that some of the biological substances had lost their toxicity. Nonetheless, the (Chief of) Station indicated that (Gottlieb) left some biological substances that were still lethal and that he intended to proceed with the assassination operation:((SID)/ LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING USEFULNESS. (CHIEF OF STATION) PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP. (CIA Cable (IN 24171,) Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 26]
-27-By this point, Hedgman had conducted his "exploratory con-versation" with the agent who was his best candidate for gainingaccess to Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60). Hedgman testifiedthat the subject he "explored" was the agent's ability to find ameans to inject poison into Lumumba's food or toothpaste (Hedgman,8/21/75, p. 60):I believe that I queried the agent who hadaccess to Lumumba, and his entourage, indetail about just what that access, whataccess he actually had, as opposed to speak-ing to people. In other words, did he haveaccess to the bathroom, did he have accessto the kitchen, things of that sort.I have a recollection of having queried himon that without specifying why I wanted toknow this. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 48.)On October 7, the Chief of Station reported to headquarterson this meeting:CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH[AGENT] ... AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES[AGENT] SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BYHQS. ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP BALL, BELIEVEHE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHINLIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE.Hedgman testified that his exploratory steps left him withdoubts about the wisdom or practicality of the assassination plot:[C]ertainly I looked on it as a pretty wildscheme professionally. I did not think thatit ... was practical professionally.Certainly ... to keep the U.S. out of it....I explored it, but I doubt that I ever reallyexpected to carry it out. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 111.)
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 27]
-28-However, his cables indicate that he was planning to continue to implement the operation and sought the resources to do it successfully. He urged headquarters to send him an alternate operative for the assassination mission in the event that they found his first choice unacceptable:IF HQS BELIEVE [AGENT'S CIRCUMSTANCES]BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECESSITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRDCOUNTRY NATIONAL. (CIA Cable (IN 24171,)Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)Tweedy cabled the (Chief of) Station the same day that he "HAD GOOD DISCUSSION. YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT" -- presumably referring to a de-briefing of (Gottlieb) upon his return to the United States.(CIA Cable (OUT 78336), Tweedy to Leopoldville, 10/7/60.) Tweedy indicated that he wasCONSIDERING DISPATCHING THIRD COUNTRYNATIONAL OPERATOR WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES,SHOULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVERPERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAYACTIVE OR CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS.(CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/7/60.)This expression of support for the operation was followed by an extraordinary pair of cables from headquarters on October 15, 1960. One of these cables was issued by a desk officer in CIA's Africa Division and released under Bronson Tweedy's signature, as Division Chief, and sent to Leopoldville through standard CIA channels, which would allow for distribution of the message toNW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 28
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 28]
-29-appropriate personnel in the CIA station and the United States embassy. This cable ... generally discussed the possibility of covertly supplying certain Congolese leaders with funds and military aid (CIA Cable (OUT 81476) Director to Leopoldville, 10/15/60). This cable also delimited the kind of action against Lumumba that would be authorized:ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW STAND BEHINDIS TO SUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING[LUMUMBA], DESIRABLE AS MORE DEFINITIVEACTION MIGHT BE. ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULDHAVE TO BE ENTIRELY CONGOLESE. (CIA Cable(OUT 81476,) Director to Leopoldville,10/15/60.)On the same day that this message was dispatched, a second cable was sent to Leopoldville. This cable was issued personally by Bronson Tweedy and sent in the special PROP channel for Hedgman's "EYES ONLY" (CIA Cable (OUT 81396) Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60).YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMALCHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A PARA[GRAPH]ON PROP TYPE SUGGESTIONS. YOU WILL PROBABLY RE-CEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING BLOC[LUMUMBA] REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALLSTUDYING CONGO SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DIS-POSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CON-SIDERATION.RAISE ABOVE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANYAPPARENT DUPLICATION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FORSPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE ANDALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. (CIA Cable (OUT 81396) Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60).Thus, Tweedy resolved the apparent duplication of cables by indicating that communications about the assassination mission wereNW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 29
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-30-restricted to the PROP channel and that the assassination mission was to move forward. He went on to request Hedgman's reaction to the prospect of sending a senior CIA case officer to the Congo on a "DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT ... TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY THIS ASPECT" (CIA Cable (OUT 81396), Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60). This referred to CIA officer [Justin O'Donnell] who testified that in late October he was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassinating Lumumba.*In the course of suggesting the assignment of an additional officer to the Congo, the cable provided insight into the reason that the assassination mission had not progressed more rapidly under the (Chief of) Station:SEEMS TO US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVYGIVE NECESSARY CONCENTRATION PROP. (CIACable (OUT 81396), Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60.)Again, in contradiction of the limitations on anti-Lumumba activity outlined in the cable sent through normal channels,Tweedy's cable also proposed a plan to kidnap Lumumba:POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FORABDUCTION [LUMUMBA], EITHER VIA ASSAULTON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MOREPROBABLY, IF [LUMUMBA] ATTEMPTS ANOTHERBREAKOUT INTO TOWN ... REQUEST YOUR VIEWS.(CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60.)* For a full account of the meeting between Bissell and (O'Donnell and O'Donnell's) subsequent activities in the Congo, see Section 5(a), infra.
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 30]
-31-This series of cables sent during, and after (Gottlieb)'s visit to the Congo demonstrated a clear intent at CIA headquarters to authorize and support rapid progress on the assassination mission. The cables also show an intent to severely restrict knowledge of the assassination operation among officers in CIA's Africa Division and among United States personnel in the Congo, including those who were aware of and involved in other covert activities.(e) The (Chief of) Station Moves Forward With Assassination PlotThe testimony of the (Chief of) Station, taken fifteen years after the events in question and without benefit of review of the cables discussed above, was compatible with the picture derived from the cables of a fully authorized and tightly restricted assassination operation. Hedgman's testimony is at variance from the cables only with respect to the lack of vigor with which he claims to have pursued the assignment which he dealt with in an affirmative, aggressive manner in the cables.(i) The (Chief of) Station Testified That He Requested and Received Confirmation of the Assassination Plan from HeadquartersHedgman testified that, after receiving (Gottlieb)'s instructions, he cabled CIA headquarters seeking confirmation that he was to carry out (Gottlieb)'s instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 36). Hedgman did not recall whether he identified (Gottlieb) by name, and he doubted that he "would have" mentioned the President in such a cable (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 36, 43).
[157-10005-10297.pdf — page 31]
-32-Hedgman described the extraordinary security precautions he took cabling his request for confirmation of the assassination instructions:> There was some special channel ... because> it was handled differently than any other> normal message. For example, it was not put> on a regular cable form, which, you know,> you have several copies for your various files.> And it was my recollection that I personally> carried the message to the communicator to> encrypt, and that was worded in a doublt-talk> way that even the communicator would not> necessarily know what it was about."> (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 42-43.)This description approximates the PROP channel that was used for all cables relating to the assassination mission.Hedgman testified that soon after cabling his request for confirmation that he was to carry out the assassination assignment, he received an affirmative reply from headquarters:> I believe I received a reply which I interpreted> to mean yes, that he was the messenger and his> instructions were ... duly authorized.> (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 37-38.)Despite the cryptic nature of the cables, Hedgman said "I was convinced that yes, it was right." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 44, 50.)Hedgman did not recall receiving any indication, either from Gottlieb or by cable, that he was to await further authorization before using the poisons (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 38). Hedgman expressed some uncertainty about whether he "had an absolute free hand" to proceed with an assassination attempt without receiving "final confirmation" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 38, 47, 53).