Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 94]
TOP SECRETThe Chairman. Going back to the doodle sheet, thelast item in your handwritten underlined -- do you have this?Mr. Bundy. The Lansdale concept?The Chairman. Is that concept?Mr. Bundy. Concept. I don't wonder you ask.The Chairman. Do you recall what you meant by that?Mr. Bundy. My guess -- and this is a reconstructionreally -- is that that has to do with the Lansdale plan whichwe were referring to a minute ago, his long memorandum ofAugust 8, outlining all the things that might now be doneunder the MONGOOSE.Mr. Smothers. Would that have been planned plus?Mr. Bundy. We argue about plans -- this is againreconstruction -- and I think I saw it in some discussion --we argued about plans A and B and C, and settled on so-calledB Plus, which I hope you have for the record, because thatwould show what the decision was.Mr. Schwarz. We do have it.The Chairman. This was the 10th day of August 1962. Andthat was about the time that some concern was given to beexpressed as to the possibility that the Russians were movinginto Cuba -- moving missiles into Cuba. You have on thememorandum, I think, "USSR will put missiles". Do you recallwhat you meant by that?Mr. Bundy. I think what that is, a hand followingTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 95]
TOP SECRET1 somebody elses, and the somebody else would most likely to2 be Mr. McCone.3 The Chairman. All right.4 Where are we, Mr. Schwarz.5 Mr. Schwarz. In NSAM 181 -- which will you please mark6 as Exhibit 5. You will find it at Lansdale Tab 41.7 (Document referred to was marked8 as Lansdale Exhibit No. 5 for9 identification.)10111213141516171819202122232425TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 96]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Schwarz. Do you have that in front of you, Mr.2 Bundy?3 Mr. Bundy. Yes, I have.4 Mr. Schwarz. This reflects a number of options or5 study that the President called for in the light of the6 evidence of new block activities in Cuba. Was that evidence7 connected with the missiles?8 Mr. Bundy. Well, there was quite a buildup reported9 in the press and in the intelligence initially of Soviet10 military personnel, of Soviet surface-to-air missiles. And11 the crucial question was, what for and what is coming. And12 the Director of Central Intelligence -- who was proved in13 the end to be right - was almost alone in his belief that14 this was going to lead to a nuclear capability in Cuba that15 could hit the U.S. And he raised these questions in the16 month of August in a number of different ways. And the17 National Security meeting from which this memorandum emerged18 reviewed those problems, and as the memorandum itself shows,19 the heavy emphasis of the President's concern and of the20 Group's concern on the likelihood that developed and what21 should be done about it, or in preparation for it, in August.22 Mr. Schwarz. The memorandum has quite a range of matters23 to be considered. And they range from, if I can use the24 characterization, on the soft side, Item 1, which was consider-25 ation of the U.S. pulling its missiles near the Soviet Union outTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 97]
# TOP SECRETof Turkey, two, on the hard side, Items 7 and 8 , whichare military possibilities of invasion or some other militarypossibilities in connection with Cuba. Now, is that atypical exercise that that White House, the President andyourself would go through to look at a number of options...ranging from the soft to the very tough?Mr. Bundy. Yes.Let me say in passing that there was nothing soft aboutthe problem of getting the Jupiter missiles out of Cuba.Mr. Schwarz. Conciliatory, would that be the word?Mr. Bundy. It problem of actually getting them outwhich we came to in the following year was one whichdemanded great diplomatic energy and finesse on the part ofthe State and Defense Departments. But you are right. Awide range of issues charactically would be discussed. Andthe President had a habit of trying to look at problems frommany angles.Mr. Schwarz. Were you fully in touch with the Presidentin connection with what became the missile crisis.Mr. Bundy. Yes.Mr. Schwarz. Was there any discussion of assassinatingFidel Castro during that period?Mr. Bundy. None.Mr. Schwarz. Was there agreement reached that as partof the solution to the missile crisis that related to U.S.# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 98]
TOP SECRET                                                                                     961 action vis-a-vis Cuba. There was a so-called no invasion2 pledge. There was an undertaking on our side that if the3 offensive capabilities -- and there was an argument on what4 those were -- were removed, we on our side would undertake --5 I don't want to present this language as if it is deeply6 mathmatically precise -- but there was an undertaking on our7 side that there would not be an assassination of Cuba.8 The Chairman. Was that ever published?9 Mr. Bundy. Yes. If my language is inconsistent with10 what was published, then what was published should take11 precedence, because I am only trying to report that.12 Mr. Schwarz. Did this agreement exclude the sabotage13 of Cuban facilities?14 Mr. Bundy. Not in my view or in anyones' view in the15 U.S. Government. Just to give you an example of things it16 did not exclude, it did not exclude continued surveillance,17 which is not perfectly normal in relations between friendly18 states, that you overfly and check out what they are doing.19 But surveillance was an explicit and public part of the20 necessary concern for U.S. satisfaction with the resolution21 of the Cuban missile crisis.22 Mr. Schwarz. Recognizing again that this is calling for23 an opinion, during the course of the missile crisis did24 anything happen with respect to the attitudes and actions of25 either the President or the Attorney General that in yourTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 99]
TOP SECRET1 opinion bears upon the likelihood that at other times one2 or the other of them ordered the assassination of Fidel3 Castro?45678910111213141516171819202122232425TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 100]
TOP SECRETWARD: amtPhone (Area 202) 544-60001 Mr. Bundy. Well, yes. There are a great many things that2 enter into my judgment about whether the President or the3 Attorney General would ever have done that, and I would like4 to say, Mr. Chairman, that the most important point I want to5 make, just from where I stand personally is that I find the6 notion that they separately, privately encouraged, ordered,7 arranged efforts at assassination totally inconsistent with8 what I knew of both of them. And as an example, I would cite --9 and only one among very many -- the role played by the Attorney10 General in the Missile Crisis, because it was he who, most11 emphatically, argued against a so-called surgical air strike12 or any other action that would bring death upon many, in favor13 of the more careful approach which was eventually adopted by14 the President in the form of a quarrantine or a blockade.15 The Chairman. Well, Mr. Bundy, let me put what may be16 the same question a little different way.17 You came to know both the President and the Attorney18 General rather intimately in the period of your long associa-19 tion with them, did you not?20 Mr. Bundy. Yes, Mr. Chairman.21 The Chairman. Based upon that acquaintanceship, do you22 believe, under any of the circumstances that occurred during23 that whole period, either one of them would have authorized24 the assassination of Fidel Castro?25 Mr. Bundy. I most emphatically do not.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 101]
TOP SECRET991 Let me make a more general point that comes at it from another way.If you have heard testimony that there was pressure to do something about Cuba, there was. There was an effort, both from the President in his style and from the Attorney General in his style to keep the government active in looking for ways to weaken the Cuban regime. There was. But if you, as I understand it, and not even those who pressed the matter most closely as having essentially been inspired by the White House can tell you that anyone ever said to them, go and kill anyone.Let me say one other thing about these two men, and that is that there was something that they really wanted done, they did not leave people in doubt, so that on the one hand, I would say about their character, their purposes and their nature and the way they confronted international affairs that I find it incredible that they would have ordered or authorized explicitly or implicitly an assassination of Castro. I also feel that if, contrary to everything that I know about their character, they had had such a decision and such a purpose, people would not have been in any doubt about it.The Chairman. Then have you any way to explain to the Committee, or any explanation to give to the Committee, as to why Mr. Helms would testify that he was under, or that he had no doubts, that the Agency was fully authorized to proceed to not only develop schemes, but to engage in active attempts toTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 102]
# TOP SECRET31 assassinate Castro?2 Mr. Bundy. I have no explanation of that. 1003 Senator Mondale. Part of our attempt to solve this riddle4 of what would appear to be a record at the highest level, which5 is at least not directly an order of an assassination plot or6 attempt, and square it with the fact that attempts were made, is7 to seek to understand the personalities and motivations and8 methods of operation of people further down the chain of9 command.10 We have heard quite a few evaluations of Mr. Harvey as11 a free-wheeling, James Bond kind of operator, and it has been12 suggested through some disquiet and apprehension at higher13 levels about the nature of his conduct. And I would -- I don't14 know. I am beginning to have doubts about Mr. Helms whom I15 have always admired. There is, for example, a memorandum that16 is in the record to Mr. Rusk in response to a memo which the17 Secretary wrote Mr. Helms following an article appearing in18 some Cuban newspaper charging that the Mafia had been hired and19 used by the CIA to assassinate Castro, in which Helms specifi-20 cally and categorically denies flat out that any such relation-21 ship existed when in fact it did and when in fact Mr. Helms was22 part of it.23 Now, how do we sort this out? Is Mr. Helms someone who24 might have, on his own, gone beyond the authority conferred25 upon him by persons higher up?# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 103]
TOP SECRET1011 Mr. Bundy. Well, if you had asked me that question a2 year ago, Senator, I would have said in my experience with him3 he was not such an officer, but I have no way of dealing with4 the kind of thing you have just described.5 Senator Mondale. It shatters me because I have always6 respected him. Because we know that these assassination attempts7 occurred. We know that Mr. Helms was a part of it. We have8 testimony that Mr. Helms and Mr. Harvey met and agreed not to9 tell Mr. McCone what they were doing. And then we have a10 document here -- well, that was Cubella -- and then we have a11 memo from Helms to Rusk which, in Minnesota language looks12 like a lie. Now, I just don't know. Maybe there are other13 explanations.14 The Chairman. The memo to Rusk had to do with Cubella15 rather than the Mafia.16 Senator Mondale. Is that it? It was not the Mafia?17 Mr. Schwarz. It was Cubella, except if you just substitute18 Cubella for the word Mafia.19 The Chairman. What you said otherwise is correct.20 Senator Mondale. But he was involved personally with21 Cubella, wasn't he? And he knew that, and this memo said no.22 Is there a plausible explanation?23 Mr. Madigan. Helms has one.24 Senator Baker. Helms' position is that he did not lie,25 that he did not have anything to do with the Cubella incident,TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 104]
TOP SECRET1 is that right?2 Mr. Madigan. I think Helms claimed that Cubella is in3 the strict context of the memos, operating on his own.4 The Chairman. Well, I believe rather than speculate, we5 had better look back carefully, and that ought to be another6 subject for Mr. Helms when he returns.7 Senator Mondale. Well, then I will stand corrected.8 Senator Hart of Michigan. Would you yield?9 I want to make the same record note that I suspend the10 comment I made about that document yesterday. I thought it was11 a flat-out lie.12 Senator Mondale. I did too. I withdraw that, and I think13 it would be good if the staff would write us a little memo.14 Senator Baker. Fritz might like to know that yesterday I15 asked Counsel if they, as a combined staff operation, would16 prepare for us, and I believe they agreed to do this, prepare17 for us two briefs, one citing the testimony and the exhibit18 evidence, that would support an inference that the authority19 was Presidential; and another brief, citing the record and the20 exhibit evidence citing the inference that it was not. There is an abundance of both, to be frank with you. So that we22 can lay them down side by side and make our own separate23 judgment.24 Do I understand the staff is going to do it?25 The Chairman. That is right.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 105]
TOP SECRET                                                                                                           1036  Now, I have a couple of items of business, and you have1  been testifying for quite a long while. I think you ought to2  be given a break, Mr. Bundy.3  Mr. Bundy. Do you want me to come back, Mr. Chairman?4  The Chairman. Yes, please, if you want to take a break5  for about five or ten minutes and then be available out in the6  anteroom, that will give us a chance to take care of this7  business.8  (Pause)9  (Whereupon at 11:17 a.m. the witness left the hearing10 room.)TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 106]
TOP SECRET1041 The Chairman. We seem to have a developing problem for2 reasons unexplained with the Justice Department. I have3 already mentioned one aspect of that problem, in connection with4 the failure of the Department to supply most of the material5 that we have requested, though that request was put to the6 Department two months ago, and it has been decided already by7 the Committee that Mr. Levy and Mr. Kelley should be brought8 before the Committee in the hopes that these delays can be9 overcome.10 The first question before the Committee is when that can11 be done. It is suggested that the Attorney General has Tuesday12 morning available. If it is all right with the Committee, I13 would like to schedule his appearance, together with that of14 Mr. Kelley, for Tuesday morning.15 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I don't mean to intrude my16 personal convenience into this consideration unduly, but if17 the Attorney General could do it at Tuesday noon, say, it would18 help me. I have a commitment in Tennessee Monday night. If19 I catch the Tuesday morning plane I can't get here until 11:50.20 If that's not possible, I will cancel Monday.21 The Chairman. This is procedural in character, so it is22 not altogether important that every member be present. I think23 that from the standpoint of this Committee schedule, Tuesday24 morning, the Attorney General and Mr. Kelley would be good,25 would it not?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 107]
TOP SECRET1 Mr. Miller. Yes.2 Senator Baker. Well, why don't you leave it Tuesday3 morning.4 The Chairman. We are only informed that he has Tuesday5 morning available.6 Mr. Gitenstein.. I spoke to Doug Marvin, one of his7 Executive Assistants, and he said Tuesday was a possibility,8 Wednesday is a problem because he has a Cabinet meeting and9 he wasn't sure about Tuesday and he was going to get back to10 us in the next hour or two.11 The Chairman. Well, let's see if we can't set it up12 Tuesday.13 Senator Baker. If you can set it up Tuesday afternoon and14 nobody objects, that would be better for me.15 The Chairman. Well, if we can, we'll set it up Tuesday16 afternoon.17 Senator Mathias. What is that for?18 The Chairman. That is for Levy and Kelley to appear for19 the purpose of telling us why they can't, or why it has taken20 two months and we still are waiting for the documents, most21 of the documents we requested.22 Senator Mathias. Well, I won't be here, but that's no23 reason.24 Senator Baker. Are you going to be here Tuesday25 morning?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 108]
TOP SECRET1069 that situation, how we have been informed and if we can rely on1 Senator Mathias. Don't worry about it.2 The Chairman. All right.3 The second thing I would like to bring up in this connec-4 tion is that I was informed yesterday by the staff that the5 FBI has undoubtedly received instructions that none of its6 agents are to be interrogated or interviewed by the staff of7 this Committee. I would like someone who knows the details and8 can be very specific to tell the Committee the exact status of10 that information as being authoritative.11 Mr. Elliff. Yesterday morning at 9:00 o'clock or shortly12 thereafter, I received a phone call from the FBI's liaison with13 this Committee with respect to a series of interviews that had14 been arranged with the Bureau some relating to the Huston Plan,15 some relating to Martin Luther King matters. I was informed that16 I had to address this request to the Justice Department in orderto secure approval for these staff interviews.1718 I then called our liaison in the Justice Department,19 Special Counsel William O'Conner, and he told me I might as20 well submit these requests in writing, because the Justice21 Department would take at least ten days to give us an answer22 on these requests and he didn't know what the answer was going23 to be.24 I then explored with him what some of the reasons might be25 for this delay and what the problems seemed to be, and the 'TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 109]
TOP SECRET1071 explanation that he gave me verbally was that the fact that2 the Committee had notified the Department in its letter of3 June 27th that certain cases that we were investigating were4 abuse cases meant that any interviews that would be conducted5 in connection with those matters would be considered by the6 Department to be demand interviews, and therefore this brought7 into play the provisions of the Federal Regulations which8 require the Attorney General's approval.9 Then the question as to whether the Attorney General would10 approve or not involved two issues. First was that since we11 had indicated the likelihood of an abuse in a particular area12 that the Department itself would have to consider whether it13 should institute a criminal investigation of that matter, and14 then, if so, whether our interview would interfere with that15 ongoing criminal investigation.16 And second, that the Department considered that any inter-17 views undertaken by the Committee in such cases might inadver-18 tently immunize the subject of the interview, and he referred19 generally to some cases and we have attempted to do legal20 research on those cases and find this to be a very shaky position:21 but they have good lawyers over there and if they want to come22 up with a sophisticated argument, we expect that they could be23 able to do that.23 The Chairman. Lawyers can make an argument over anything.24 Mr. Elliff. That's so. And so the final conclusion isTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 110]
TOP SECRET                                                                                                      108Phone (Area 202) 544-6000111 that he did anticipate that subpoenas would be required2 in every instance and this position is very difficult for us to.3 accept because interviews, the low-key interview in the non-4 pressure situation is an opportunity to elicit information that5 is not matched by the formal subpoena situation, and to be6 able to proceed initially by interview and then confirm, under7 oath, via subpoena, is just absolutely essential for an effective8 investitation. So this is where we stand on this issue.9 We later received a letter pertaining to an earlier10 request for interviews relating to FBI COINTELPRO disruptive11 activities where we had asked for certain interviews, and this12 letter did not go into specifics, but merely stated that there13 were problems that would have to be resolved, that the charac-14 terization of an area of the Committee inquiry as abuse might15 significantly alter arrangements of access to witnesses who16 are present employees of the Department.17 The Chairman. In other words, the thrust of all of this18 is that the more serious the nature of the inquiry, the more19 difficult it will be to obtain the information, that if we are20 concerned about a possible illegality or abuse, then the21 Department will make it as difficult as possible for us to22 secure the information.23 Mr. Elliff.. I might add that it seems to be in the nature24 of the documents also, the more serious the allegation, the more25 resistance there is to providing us --TOP SECRET![photo]
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 111]
# TOP SECRET109121 They have givemus va good many documents. They2 have not given us the documents on the controversial matters.3 They've given us plenty of documentation on less controversial4 matters.5 The Chairman. I think it is ironic that the resistance we6 get from the Justice Department is so much more substantial than7 the resistance we have gotten from the CIA.8 Senator Baker. That's not necessarily so. I agree with9 you the resistance is unfortunate and inappropriate, but I10 can think of a request for documentation from the CIA that is11 now more than a month old and they haven't had the good grace12 to tell us no. They have told us nothing.13 The Chairman. But on the whole we've gotten a greater14 measure of cooperation from the CIA.15 Senator Schweiker. I wonder, does either counsel know,16 Mr. Chairman, whether the Attorney General or the FBI Director17 initially confirmed whether they made any commitments to18 Congress about supplying documents or materials to the19 Committee?20 Mr. Miller. Senator Mathias can tell you, and Senator21 Hart.22 Senator Schweiker. Might there be a statement in their23 testimony in confirmation, in agreeing to furnish Congress with24 materials of this nature?25 Senator Mathias. Yes, those statements were made, but let# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 112]
TOP SECRET110131 me say, since my opinion has been asked, that I had a most2 discouraging talk with the Attorney General a couple of weeks3 ago. I went down to talk to him about privacy legislation and4 the Department of Justice at the moment is taking about as hard5 a line as any kind that I know of in the last fifteen years.6 Its whole kind of attitude --7 Senator Tower. I just wonder if we shouldn't take this up8 with them.9 The Chairman. I think we should, but I think we should10 also, in advance of that, in view of the kinds of signals we11 are now getting from the Justice Department, indicate that we12 believe that these objections that they are raising, or questions13 that they are raising, are a serious impediment procedurally14 to our Committee and that we have every intention of interviewing15 such agents as may be necessary, and that if necessary, we will16 subpoena them.17 Mr. Elliff. Our feeling is it is preferable not to18 proceed by subpoena, but we do have a subpoena for one FBI19 agent which we brought with us today which we would like to20 proceed with.21 The Chairman. Can you give us the facts of that case?22 Mr. Epstein. This is an agent who is presently in Atlanta,23 Georgia, and the information we've received from other witnesses24 was that in 1964, I believe, he visited a newspaper editor in25 Atlanta, closed the door, put his hat on the desk, and said heTOP SECRET