Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10005-10424.pdf — page 3]
SECRET-2-interested in establishing the identity of our officers driving these vehicles (who might be engaged in a clandestine meeting or other operational activity) would be referred to the Commissioner's office, who would then "block" the information from being released. The Divisions records (1962-1966) list Mr. Arch Livingstone as the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles.2. Countya. The Criminal Intelligence Bureau of the Dade County Sheriff's Department provided the Station with access to other law enforcement agencies at state, county and local levels anywhere in the United States for the purpose of keeping track of Cuban exile movements. Through this office the Station could also arrange to obtain vehicle accident reports. Access to these reports was of particular value when Station Officers, on occasion when driving with alias documentation and involved in an automobile accident, had identified themselves in alias because of the presence of agent personnel in the vehicle. The Criminal Intelligence Bureau also provided the Station with access to Cuban exile police records held at various sub-stations within Made county. At the time (1962-1966) a Lieutenant Leslie J. VanBuskirk was in charge of the Criminal Intelligence Bureau.b. The Broward County Sheriff's Office provided the Station with identification of owners of automobiles and boats registered by Cuban exiles and other foreigners within the county. No names were recorded as the Station's point of contact in Broward County.c. The Collier County Sheriff's Office provided information on berthing sites in Naples, Florida. This information was of security value as the Station maintained a major operational berthing site in Naples, and it was necessary to have advance information on over-the-road shipments and logistic movements in the area. Douglas Hendry was listed as the Station's point of contact, 1962-1966.d. The Monroe County Sheriff's Office provided berthing site information south of Miami down to the Florida Keys. This information was of interest to keep track of Cuban exile boat movements into the Caribbean. Reace Thompson was listed as the Station's point of contact, 1962-1966.SECRET
[157-10005-10424.pdf — page 4]
The Station maintained liaison with the City of MiamiPolice Department, especially with the Criminal IntelligenceSection and the Detective Division. These offices provided 24the Station with access to police records on Cuban exilesliving in Miami. The Criminal Intelligence Section (1962-1966) 06,08was headed by Lt. (Harvard Swilley), a Sergeant (Gow was in charge)of the Detective Division, and a (Mr.) Demby was chief of theCommunications Division.Contact (with twenty-six other police departments in DadeCounty, including the City of South Miami, Coral Gables, and 24Miami Beach for operational purposes) was available to theStation through liaison with other major police departmentsin the area.
[157-10008-10150.pdf — page 0]
157-10008-10150 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 Date: 2/23/201JFK Assassination SystemIdentification FormAgency InformationAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10008-10150RECORD SERIES: MEMORANDUMAGENCY FILE NUMBER:Document InformationORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM: JOHNSON, LOCHTO: SENIOR STAFFTITLE: SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS RETRIEVED FROM LBJ LIBRARYDATE: 07/21/1975PAGES: 14SUBJECTS: CASTROCOVERT ACTION AGAINST CU BALBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENTSDOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION: UnclassifiedRESTRICTIONS: :CURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/11/1994OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS: Box 393-1v9 1NW 47129 DocId: 32203658 Page 121
[157-10008-10150.pdf — page 1]
5. Memo from Chase to Bundy, 4 December 1963.Plans for a meeting regarding Cuban policy. John Crimmins will present several options for discussion including unleashing of Cuban exiles and the intensification of the covert program.6. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 December 1963.This memo is mainly important because it reveals who in the Admin- istration was dealing with Cuban policy. The list of people to attend the meeting on Cuba held this day included: Lyndon B. Johnson, Rusk, Ed Martin, McNamara, McCone, Helms or les Fitzgerald, Don Wilson, Bundy, and Chase.7. Memo, Bundy to Lyndon B. Johnson, 12 December 1963.For a press conference, Bundy recommends the following language regarding Cuba: "...say...that you expect to take every available means to stop and turn back the spread of Communism in this hemisphere."8. CIA Summary of Costs for Cuban Operations, FY 1960-1964, dated 15 December 1963.This table reveals that the CIA spent $106,155,774 on Cuban Opera- tions, almost 50 percent of which was spent on paramilitary action ($47,815,122). The total covert action budget (psychological and para- military warfare) was approximately $81,000,000 in this four-year period.9. Chase minutes on meeting with Lyndon B. Johnson, 27 December 1963.The meeting appears to be the first major briefing for the new Presi- dent on Cuba. Desmond Fitzgerald did most of the briefing, which in- cluded a detailed description of CIA assets in Cuba, proposed sabotage plans, and attempts by the CIA to stimulate an internal coup which would dislodge Castro. The CIA was aiding two exile groups in particular: one led by Manuel Artime, the other by Manolo Ray. Bundy recommends that Lyndon B. Johnsoake "a more vigorous line / toward Cuba/ than we have in the past."10. Memo, Bundy to Lyndon B. Johnson, 9 January 1964.Bundy recommends a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of covert sabotage against Cuba. He notes that Rusk and McNamara do not support the program of sabotage, while 'McCone and the CIA are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealings with the Castro problem." Bundy concludes: "...in your position, I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal, ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy."
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action up to or including invasion."18. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 21 April 1964.Notes that Alexis Johnson is in charge of contingency planning for a coup in Cuba.19. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 14 May 1964.This memo suggests that a primary goal of the Johnson Administration was "to keep the lid on Cuba" until after the November Presidential elections. Thus, the continued exile raids were viewed negatively since they increased the noise level. The memo makes it clear that the exile raids were becoming completely beyond U.S. control despite CLA financial support to the groups.20. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 June 1964.Chase notes that Castro has executed three anti-Castro Cubans and jailed two others as CIA agents. CIA admits having a connection with the executed Cubans "but that it is completely deniable."21. Memo, Helms, DDP, to DCI, 10 June 1961. Subject: "Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Government Leaders"The CIA was made aware of certain plans to kill Castro. The Agency told the sources, according to Helms, that "the United States Government would not, under any circumstances, condone the planned actions." Apparently on 2 March 1964 a wealthy Cuban exile was approached with a Cosa Nostra offer to assassinate Castro for $150,000. The wealthy exile turned down the offer. Similar offers were make to other Cuban exiles in early March. A leading figure in the negotiations was Byron Cameron, a shippin;-businessmen from Ft. Lauderdale. An agreement was finally made to pay the Cameron group $100,000 for killing Castro, plus $2,500 for expenses. Julio Lobo Olavarria, a wealthy Cuban exile in New York was to pay much of the honey, and did pay the $2,500 on 25 April Though Cameron's group remained anonymous, it was clear the Mafia was involved. Cameron aled that his contact was a police officer in the St. Louis (Mo.) Vice Squ22. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 15 June 1964. Subject: "Assassination of Castro."Referring to the above memo from DDP 10 DCI, Chase notes that John Crimmins feels the matter should be discussed at a Special Group meeting.
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"John's own inclination is that the U.S. Covernment cannot knowingly permit any criminal American involvement in this sort of thing, "notes Chase, "and should go all out to stop the plot." In marginal notations, Bundy agrees with John and with the need to forward the matter to the Special Group.23. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 16 June 1964, wth attachment (Des FitzGerald's "A Reappraisal of Autonomous Operations")FitzGerald makes a defense of the autonomous operations. Tom Mann and Chase disapprove of the operations, though for different reasons.24. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 18 June 1964.Chase warns that further U.S. support of the autonomous groups is more likely to lead to a U-2 shootdown and a Caribbean crisis than the overthrow of the Castro regime. Chase continues to be worried about noice levels and the November election. This memo is very much like his 14 May memo (see Item 19).25. Memo for the Record, Peter Jessup, 22 June 1964.In a reference to Helm's memo on assassination (see Item 21), it was pointed out in a 303 Committee meeting of 18 June that "these reports, in effect, put the United States Government on notice that failure to take preventive action could be construed as condonation. " The AG said Justice would look into the matter.26. Memo, McCone to Bundy, 19 August 1964.McCone summarizes the FBI investigation of Cuban exile plots against Castro as outlined in Helm's memo of 19 Jime (See Item 21). The Bureau interviewed many people allegedly invo ved, most of whom denied the existence of such a plan. (The Bureau did not intervew Cameron, since he was out of the country). The mostateresting finding was that Lobo had in fact discussed the matter witCIA.27. Memo, Chase to Bunny, 10 November 1961.The election past, Chase et al. agreed that "we can usefully do some
[157-10008-10150.pdf — page 4]
-7-basic review work on Cuba." FitzGerald pushes for re-institution of CIA-directed covert program.28. Memo, R.C. Bowman to Bundy, 12 November 1964, with JCS attachment    dated 30 October 1964. Subject: SQUARE DANCE.A contemptable proposal intiated by the Army to use germ warfare againstCuban sugar and livestock. Bowman and Bundy agree that the White House should"remain aloof from formal consideration of 'Square Dance' at this stage."I believe this plan for covert action *is* even more shocking and unacceptablethan plans for assassination
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29. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 12 November 1964, and attachment (apparently    a Bundy memo for a meeting with LBJ on 7 April 1964).The Bundy memo suggests that LBJ approved various options "short ofwar to get rid of the Castro regime," including the possible contaminationof sensitive Cuban imports (not food). The Chase memo indicates that aFitzgerald operation was underway in November 1964 to ship contaminatingelements into Cuba.30. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 30 December 1964.The Artime group is out of control, though State, Defense and CIA(as well as Bundy) all agree that it would be unwise to try to interferewith him at this stage.31. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 5 January 1965.Chase reports a plan told to Crimmins and the CIA about an Artime plotto stage a "palace coup" during which Castro and other top leaders would be"neutralized." D-Day was to be March 13. This matter was to be discussedat an upcoming Special Group meeting on whether or not "to cut off Artime'swater." Chase notes: "CIA at this point is loath to make a hard evaluationof the Artime/Cubela plot."32. Memo to 303 Committee, unsigned, 18 January 1965, presumably a CIA    document.Discusses the virtues of continuing Underwater Demolition Teams againstships in Cuban harbors. If such activities are disallowed, the CIA shouldbe authorized to reduce its commitment in the paramilitary field.33. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 8 February 1955.This memo indicates that not even Actime had his group in control. Thememo also discusses CIA covert activities British Guiana, such as pene-trating the PPP and proping up the democratic trade unionism.34. Memo, Murat Will (INR) to Peter Jessup, White House staff,    23 February 1965.Recommends immediate termination of Artime support.35. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 March 1965Discussion of who is for maintainin; a covert capability against Cuba(presently on the shelf) and who is opposed. Chase guessed that CIA wouldbe opposed ("fish or cut bait"); State would not. Rusk's general attitudetoward Cuba at this time was to keep the temperature low while sorting outthe Vietnam problem.
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-9-36. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 4 March 1965.Chase recommends phasing out support to Artime. The CIA is considering diluting pesticides sent to Cuba; this is similar to the kinds of tactics mentioned in Items 28 and 29 above and are a manifestation of the moral bankruptcy of U.S. policy. Also some talk here of backing a new exile group, RECE, though not much enthusiasm for the idea from anyone apparently. Oddly, CIA wishes to drop its paramilitary capability, while DoD and State want the capability maintained.37. Memo, Grant Hilliker (State) to Burdy, 18 June 1965.This is a summary of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The ultimate objective is still to replace the Castro regime. The memo notes that "the paramilitary program involving CIA-controlled actions was set aside even before it really started."38. Memo, Bundy to LBJ, 26 June 1965.Adm. Raborn recommends reactivation of a paramilitary effort against Cuba. Bundy, Tommy Thompson, Rusk, McNamara, and Cy Vance are against this chiefly because of the concomitant international noise level. "Most of us," Bundy writes, "do not recommend visible violent actions against Cuba." Raborn's recommendations said nothing about assassination.39. Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 30 May 1966.Rostow notifies the President that a CIA exfiltration mission ran into ambush and the agents were captured. The President could expect "the noise level of Castro's charges of 'threatened Yankee aggression' may go up."40. Memo, Karamessines, DDP, to Rostow, 7 August 1967.This memo is important because it lists the names of two or three Cubans who worked on CIA missions. If they are in the U.S., it may be worthwhile talking to them about their activities.41. Memo, W.G. Bowde -Rostow, 18 December 1967.The new CIA emphasis on developing contacts within Castro's inner circle. Dave Phillipe was to be in charge of the new CIA Cuba-program. Bowdler advises that "we be alert to indications that Castro is looking for accommodation or his disillusioned lieutenants want to know where we stand if they move to dump him."
[157-10008-10234.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10008-10234RECORDS SERIES:AGENCY FILE NUMBER: R354DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM: INDERFURTH, RICKTO:TITLE:COMMISSION FILESDATE: 00/00/00PAGES: 15SUBJECTS:LIST OF MATERIAL CONTAINED IN ROCKFELLER COMMISSION FILEDOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION: TRESTRICTIONS: REFERREDCURRENT STATUS: PDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 10/07/93OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS:BOX 437-16[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[157-10008-10234.pdf — page 1]
C-VI-4 Phone interview with Richard Goodwin, May 23, 1975Goodwin stated Kennedy had not been aware of the passage of guns.C-VI-5 John Gorden, May 29, 1975C-VI-6 Dr. Edward Gunn, May 17, 1975Re: poison pillsC-VI-7 William Harvey, April 10, 1975C-VI-8 McCone/Handwritten notes, April 18, 1975C-VI-9 Robert McNamara, April 15, 1975C-VI-10 Phone interview with Robert Murphy, June 30, 1975C-VI-11 James O'Connell, June 17, 1975C-VI-12 Conversation with Fletcher Prouty, June 11, 1975C-VI-13 Phone interview with Roy Rubottom, June 30, 1975C-VI-14 Notes on Dean Rusk interview, April 20, 1975C-VI-15 Interview with Nestor Sanchez, May 19, 1975 1(A)C-VI-16 Interview with Frank Sturgis, April 3,4, 1975C-VI-17 Interview with Maxwell Taylor, May 16, 1975C-VI-18 Conversation with Will Wilson, May 14, 1975
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C-VIIC-VII-1 Letter/Jeanne Davis to Belin re: Review of NSCDocuments Relating to Assassination, May 30, 1975Attachments include excerpts from SpecialGroup/303 Committee meetings.C-VII-5 Memorandum/Cargill to Files re: Justice Depart-ment Documents Relating to Plots to AssassinateCastro, May 21, 1975These documents relate to the wiretappingincident in Las Vegas.C-VII-6 Memorandum/Cargill to Files re: Documents fromDPD Files Related to Cuban Operations, 1959-1961,May 21, 1975C-VII-10 Memorandum/Cargill to Files re: Persons Identifiedin 1967 IG Report, May 15, 1975C-VII-18 Letter/Jeanne Davis to Belin re: NSC Documents,May 9, 1975Contains excerpts from a paper prepared forNSC discussion on May 5, 1961 re Cuba. Dis-cusses "If Castro were removed from thescene."C-VII-22 Letter/Dean Rusk to Belin, April 28, 1975C-VIII> [Figure: Stamped text "Project TAMA" and a handwritten "1(B)"]> Reform to the "Intelligence exploitation" of> the United Nations 15th General Assembly by> the CIA. There were allegations that there> was a CIA plot against Castro to be carried> out while he was in New York. Documents and> papers in this file are directed towards this> charge.
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-9-C-IX-28 Letter, Dearborn to Mann, October 27, 1960C-IX-29 Memorandum of conversation re assassination, May 3, 1961C-X Trujillo II (3)C-X-1 Transmittal letter/Knoche to Gray re: CIA documents concerning Dominican Republic, June 17, 1975C-X-2 Agency Memorandum: Review of Dominican Operation for the Period Immediately Prior to, During and Subsequent to Trujillo's Death, June 20, 1962C-X-3 Memorandum to Acting DCI from DDP re: Clandestine Delivery of Arms to Opposition Leadership in the Dominican Republic, July 1, 1960C-X-4 Memorandum/Plan of the Dominican Internal Opposition and Dominican Desk for Overthrow of the Trujillo Government, October 3, 1960C-X-5 Memorandum/Pouch Restriction Waiver Request and Certification, April 7, 1961C-X-6 Cable re arms signed by Bissell, March 9, 1961C-X-8 Memorandum for Chief, White House Division re: Request for Guidance on the Dominican Republic, 28 June 1960C-X-9 Memorandum/Meeting on Project 02(MDEED, April 11, 1961C-X-10 Special Briefing Paper on CIA covert activities against D.R. requested by Richard Goodwin, May 13, 1961C-X-11 Memorandum/Conference with Source 1 and Source 2, February 13, 1961
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C-X-12 Memorandum/Meeting with IMDECK 4, February 16, 1961MDECK the "King pin of the plot."Discussion of ways to assassinate. 1(B)C-X-13 Cable/re training Dominican in sabotage, February 27, 1961C-X-14 Cable/re discussion of planned assassination attempt March 3, 1961C-X-15 Cable/re delivery of arms, March 7, 1961C-X-16 Request by UMDAGGER for weapons, March 14, 1961 1(B)C-X-17 Cable/re arms delivery, March 16, 1961C-X-18 Letter/Dearborn to Devine, March 16, 1961"...picnic...salad...pineapples."C-X-19 Cable/re arms, March 17, 1961C-X-20 Cable/re assassination plan, March 20, 1961C-X-21 Cables/20 March 1961 - 31 May 1961C-XI Miscellaneous Materials (2)C-XI-2 June 1964 CIA Memorandum for DCI entitled "Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Government Leaders"C-XI-3 Sheffield Edwards Memorandum, dated May 14, 1962, re briefing of AG (R. Kennedy) of "sensitive CIA operation."
[157-10008-10238.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10008-10238CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF CIA INFORMATIONIN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZEDRECORDS SERIES:6/12/98AGENCY FILE NUMBER: R421DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR: SSCIAFROM: TREVERTON, GREGTO: SCHWARZ, F.A.O. JR.TITLE:MEMORANDUMDATE: 07/02/75PAGES: 8SUBJECTS:TRUJILLO ASSASSINATION: MISSING DOCUMENTSDOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION: SRESTRICTIONS: REFERREDCURRENT STATUS: PDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 10/07/93OPENING CRITERIA:COMMENTS:BOX 437-23[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTEDNW 50955 DocId:32203746 Page 1
[157-10008-10238.pdf — page 1]
MEMORANDUMTO: F.A.0. Schwarz, Jr.FROM: Greg TrevertonDATE: July 2, 1975SUBJECT: Trujillo Assassination: Missing Documents1. May 11, 1960. State Department Memorandum after debriefing of Ambassador Farland.2. July, 1960. State Department documents with respect to the proposal for an air drop of 12 Springfield rifles "fixed and sighted." Rubottom had concurred in proposal. Mentioned in IG Report, page 26.3. No date known. Cable informing Dearborn of plans to make the drop of the Springfields.4. (December 29, 1960). Draft CIA proposal approved at the Special Group meeting, December 29, 1960.5. February 10, 1961. Cable to CIA Headquarters, apparently from Chief of Station asking that one "small-size high-power weapon" be sent in each pouch.6. March 17, 1961. Station to Headquarters Memorandum indicating that Dearborn had requested three pistols to be transferred to the dissidents.7. March 26, 1961. Station to Headquarters Cable requesting permission to pass three carbines to the dissidents.8. May 5, 1961. Item from the record of the NSC meeting, this date, reflecting President's views with regard to the Dominican Republic.9. May 25, 1961. Minutes of the Special Group meeting, this date.10. June 5 or 6, 1961. CIA Memorandum for J.D. Esterline entitled "ODACID    (State Department) views on passage of arms."11. June 7, 1961. Memorandum from J.C. King describing White House meeting, this date,12. May 10, 1962. FBI interview of the Dominican who had interrogated the assassins.GT:rs
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MEMORANDUMTO: David AaronFROM: Frederick A.0. Schwarz, Jr.DATE: July 6, 1975This will confirm our conversation concerning obtaining proof with respect to the alleged peace talks with Castro in October and November 1963. Box 45 "Cuba-William Attwood," reviewed by Susan Pitts in the Kennedy Library, is said to contain "correspondence concerning arrangements for negotiations for U.S./Castro talks, 10-11/63." We have also heard stories about French journalist Jean Daniel being an emissary from Kennedy to Castro at that time. As you know, during October and November assassination devices were being prepared and were offered to AMLASH.You ought to at least see from the documents and from taking some single-Senator testimony from Attwood whether there was a genuine effort to make peace; if so, was that communicated to the Agency? Was the AMLASH assassination effort consistent?In the telephone conversation I had with Arthur Schlesinger he said he thought Bill Attwood was more important than Daniel. Schlesinger will be here in Washington on July 9 and 10 and plans to come see us at 9:00 a.m. on July 10.Would you take care of all of the above.cc: Curtis SmothersWilliam Miller