Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 96]
37# TOP SECRET961 Mr. Aaron. Let me ask one last question.2 Mr. Angleton. When I say technical assistance, that is a quite different matter.3 Mr. Kirbow. You do not mean technical assistance in the nuclear field whatever?4 Mr Angleton. He knew what I was stating was this stuff that has come out in volumes of Sadat's resume of CIA's help to the Israelis, which was accurate.5 Senator Tower. By technical assistance here, as I understand it, he means technical assistance and nuclear weapons development.6 Mr. Angleton. That is right. And that is deliberately on his part a misstatement of the fact. And that is what I am trying to say.7 Senator Tower. He did admit to technical assistance in terms of intelligence?8 Mr. Angleton. No, it wasn't a question of my admitting, I told him that it was well-known that in the whole field of ELINT and many things, that we have worked closely with the Israelis?9 Senator Tower. But not specifically, technical assistance and nuclear weapon development?10 Mr. Angleton. That subject wasn't in existence.11 Mr. Aaron. Mr. Angleton, is it possible that one source of this story could be alleged operations by the Israelis# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 97]
38TOP SECRET97intelligence service in the US in regard to the efforts to acquire nuclear technology or material?Mr. Angleton. No.Let me just state my own feeling about some of this. After he talked to me about having all those great sources which were better than Hirsch's, he said, I also have talked to Israeli intelligence. Well, I knew right away that that was a lie. I said, after 22 years' work with some people, they would have been having me out of bed at 3 in the morning. In other words, in 22 years I have never known them to withhold anything germain to our common activity. So that for American jounalists to go and try to pump things out of me regarding the subject, he wouldn't have got home before -- that is the first thing. That is the fact. And he said this Israeli fellow said something about, something I don't discuss, or words to that effect, I can't remember that part of it.So there isn't much more to say about that.Mr. Aaron. Were there Israeli intelligence efforts in the US in the 1960's or at any time aimed at acquiring either nuclear technology or information that would have a bearing on this story?Mr. Angleton. There have been many efforts by many countries to acquire technical knowledge in this country, and that doesn't exclude the Israelis.Mr. Kirbow. Do you have specific knowledge of instancesTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 98]
# TOP SECRETwhile you were employed with the Agency, Mr. Angleton? I believe that might be a fair question.Senator Tower. In your capacity as Head of Counter-intelligence, did it ever come to your attention -- did you ever have any certain knowledge that Israeli agents were actually trying to acquire nuclear secrets in the US, atomic secrets?Mr. Angleton. Do I have to respond to that?Mr. Kirbow Would you like to go off the record a moment, Mr. Chairman.Senator Tower. We can go off the record.(Off the record discussion)Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that perhaps we defer that subject for the moment. I am sure we will be meeting with Mr. Angleton again.Senator Tower. Then, too, we can get the FBI matter in the meantime.I have just a couple of questions that I would appreciate it if Mr. Angleton would give us his evaluations as an expert on. And they go back to his testimony relative to the Kennedy assassination.As I recall, you said that immediately after the assassination Golitzén on his own initiative communicated with you and advised you that it was normal practice for a defector who had a military background to be processed in Department 13?# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 99]
TOP SECRETMr. Angleton. Interrogated, or processed.Senator Mathias. And that the implication certainly of this was that Oswald was an ex-Marine, and had been through this process, and that therefore at least that he might have been acting within the context of the Soviet plan, is that right?Mr. Angleton. That is the thrust of what he was trying to say. His English is such that it is very difficult.Senator Mathias. I understand. But then some years later -- my recollection is that you said it was in 1967 or 1969 -- you learned that the KGB had spent six month of employment of their top operators in the investigation of the Kennedy assassination, and wouldn't this fact in your mind negate the implication of the original Golitzen call or that they were involved?Mr. Angleton. I want to congratulate you, because that man is a man who is also a suspect of Nosenko.Senator Mathias. You mean in 1967?Mr. Angleton. Just to show you the ground you are treading on, Golitzen gave us information regarding the penetration of our own organization. And we worked down to an identity. And the FBI disagreed with us. And I am talking about not a few minutes, but several weeks and months of work. And the Bureau's attitude was, you have got the wrong man, and the allegation therefore does not affect the CIA, and weTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 100]
TOP SECRETadvise that you send it to the Army.And I might add, the man who wrote that memorandum was the Burt Turner I mentioned who was one of the competent FBI analysts. So it was in limbo. And we stated that "X" was the penetration agent, and the Bureau refused to accept that. And in 1967 a Soviet -- on whom we had a dossier on this thing, because he was once stationed in India, and therefore we knew who he was, and all the rest of it -- with an unknown coming to us as Nosenko was, he was a real man, we had years of surveillance on him, and so on. And he came, and he alleged -- and he was a TDC, temporary duty in Washington here -- and he established contact with the first Mrs. Helms. And eventually I was called to take the case. And he stated that among his missions to the US was to effect the redefection or the return to the Soviet Union of a man, and that man was the man whom we had identified as a Soviet agent. And he went into the whole background, that this man was one of the highest grade illegals that they had ever had, and he was in our Agency.So this had a tremendous impact on Burt Turner, because he was one of the two interrogating officers. And I can't talk to you about professional pride, but for a man of his competence to have done it the wrong way, that hurt.So I had a question injected, which was, what do you know about George Blake?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 101]
# TOP SECRETAnd then his response was, he says, we think he is dead.Now, hwere is a man who is supposed to be Special Assistant to the Head of Counterintelligence in KGB, whose mother was a secretary to Litvinov, and he comes therefore from the aristocracy, as Nosenko does, because his father was the Minister of Maritime Affairs. And there is a statue of Nosenko's father. And Golitzen had told us that men chosen for very dangerous missions of penetration and duplicity came from the aristocracy. Everyone trusted them, and their fathers and their families are heroes of the Soviet Union.So here was this man who said as to Blake, we think he is dead.Two to three weeks later is when Blake escaped from Scrubb's Woods to the Soviet Union. Now, if he had come to the US to exfiltrate as the Special Assistant to the Head of Counterintelligence, to exfiltrate a person who worked in the West as an illegal from the end of World War II, and gradually worked into us, why wouldn't he have known the exfiltartion plans of George Blake, which would have been simultaneous, because he was a Headquarters man here on TDC.So we handled him for six or seven weeks.And some of the most telling parts of the interrogation was that when he went back to the Soviet Union he would have access to archives. And what was on our mind, and what cryptonym that we wanted him to work up -- and this would# TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 102]
TOP SECRET1 relate to the third part of the damage part on Golitzen --2 what did Golitzen know that they did not know he knew? What3 agents in the West could be under our control as a result of Golitzen's disclosures regarding those things?4 And you can see the tremendous quality this man had of5 almost getting from our man those four or five crytonyms,6 which would have told them what they wanted to know, because7 there are cases they are not sure whether he knows or doesn't8 know, and so on. And these are officials, and so on.9 So he wasn't given that. He was given stuff that was10 sort of medium low level stuff, you couldn't call it chicken11 feed -- but we never told him we disbelieved in him. And he12 said, if you do those things for me, I have an opportunity,13 because of my mother and so on, to become Head of the American14 Department of the KGB.15 And the other thing he wanted, was, we took him to the16 Soviet Agency and we came out later for contacts, and he stated17 there was a telegram there, and he had been requested to18 acquire all the information possible on the whereabouts of19 Golitzen and Nosenko. And I was actually in Wisconsin. And20 I called my Deputy long distance and I said, if there is any21 proposal put up by that individual that would expose -- and I22 use the crytonym name of Golitzen -- don't.23 A week later is when he got to Moscow and he sent a cable24 to tell us that he can give them word on everything on25 TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 103]
TOP SECRET103Phone (Area 202) 544-6000Golitzen.1 Coming back to what you stated, with our litmus paper and2 with our analysis of him, we treated him as a walk-in, as a3 part of the thing to confirm Nosenko's bona fides, and the4 build-up. And he is the one who gave the full_description of5 the fact that for six months the place was immobilized for this6 investigation, of all the high level all over the works, is7 the way he put it.8 Senator Mathias. You contrasted the way that the Russians9 treat a returned defector, and the way we treat them. And10 in that connection, to your knowledge was Oswald every11 interrogated when he teturned from Russia?12 Mr. Angleton. I don't know -- I probably would know, but13 I don't know whether the military -- normally that would fall14 within the jurisdiciton of the military, since he was a15 military man who defected. So I don't know the answer to that.16 Senator Mathias. What about from Cuba?17 Mr. Angleton. I can't answer that.18 Senator Mathias. Or at any time?19 Mr. Angleton. I think the Bureau interviewed him.20 Senator Mathias. The Bureau, not the CIA?21 Mr. Angleton. I am certain we never did, no.22 Senator Mathias. But you think the FBI did?23 Mr. Angleton. That is just my sensation that they did.24 Senator Mathias. We will follow that up.25TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 104]
TOP SECRET104This is the very last question. You referred to files that are maintained on persons who have some contact with the Soviet Union and the Soviet nationals. And I would like to pursue that in a personal way.About two years ago Arbotov was in this country, and he came to lunch in my office. And we had several members of Congress there. Would this kind of thing be a matter of record?Mr. Angleton. If there was any technical coverage from the Soviet Embassy, then my answer would be yes.Senator Mathias. My recollection is, he came with one person with him, whose name I don't remember.Mr. Angleton. If the Bureau had him under surveillance and he came here now, I am getting onto ground I don't know the newspaper said Mr. Hoover gave an order that the Hill was off-base, and when the Soviet came here he was never surveilled, and whom he saw was unknown. That is what the newspaper said. My own observation would be in any technical coverage of an installation, the door of an individual, would result in dossiers on all people who had contacts, if the man was suspect or there is a reason.Senator Tower. Excuse me. You are talking about a Soviet person visiting members here on the Hill?Senator Mathias. Yes. And what I am trying to get at is the circumstances under which a file or dossier might beTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 105]
46TOP SECRET105opened on a member of Congress, and I offered myself as aguinea pig that Arbatov lunch as a starting point.At this point my question is on purely hypotheticalpoint. I plan to go next week with the Senate group which ismaking a parliamentary visit to Russia. And may see Arbatovin Moscow I would assume it would be likely Would thatbecome a continuing entry in such a dossier as far as you know?Mr. Angleton. We don't have any coverage in Moscow.Senator Mathias. Is that the kind of thing that --Mr. Angleton. We are not living in a very ideal worldin the Agency. We can't even process the hard material.Senator Mathias. Since it is a hypothetical question,let me make it even more hypothetical. Let's say our mission,instead of visiting Moscow, visits Rome or Paris or someplace,where it is very easy for you to operate. And there weremeetings with Russians who were known to have visitied me inWashington. Would that be the kind of thing which would getto a Congressional file?Mr. Angleton. No. I imagine the British MI-5, though,because of the Russians in London, would pass through liaisonto us, there was something suspicious, would pass througha report on the meeting. And we have examples where Czechdefector told us about a member of Parliament, a Soviet agent,and what the cryptonum was, and how he was recruited. And youhave got other cryptonyms on British members of ParliamentTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 106]
TOP SECRETthat you have not then identified. We know what they passed or some of the stuff which was passed.Senator Mathias. Assuming a file was set up on that lunch two years ago --Mr. Angleton. The file wouldn't be set up there on the fact -- with your name on it, it would be the Soviets, and you would be buried in the file, which would probably be that thick, of that Soviet activity in the US. And there would be the fact that he was here, and that he went to New York, and he did this or that.Senator Mathias. So that wouldn't show up in Mathias' file, that would show up in an Arbatov file?Mr. Angleton. That is right. That is the way it is supposed to be. And the only time where I can see a file would be opened on an American Congressman or Senator would be where there was a substantial basis for opening up that file. But that wouldn't be at the initiative of the CIA, it would be a matter that would go to the FBI and the Attorney General, and then there would be somebody in the Senate or the Congress who would be contacted and notified, and so on. And I think Mr. Hoover's practice was that he would learn through his own sources that a person who is not good was going to have lunch with a Congressman or was cultivating him, and he would pick up the money -- or this is what they say. And I think this is the way he handled it -- he would simplyTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 107]
TOP SECRETcall him on the phone and say, I think you should know thefollowing, and there would be a notification that Mr. Hoovernotified, et cetera. He called me once when there wasn'tenough time factor for him to send a letter to me. He said,you are doing something at such and such an hour, you shouldknow that this man is a homosexual, or so on and so on. Andit may have been useful to change the course in a hurry. Butit is formalized in the Bureau. When Mr. Hoover intervenedon those things it was either a question of time or aquestion of emphasis. But the formal part goes on regardless,if a person, regardless of who he is, is involved, or ispassed a document, or comes up in a telephone tap, or anynumber of things, their is a record on it.Senator Mathias. In other words, you are saying what apolitical friend of mine once said, that you don't get newsunless you make news?Mr. Angleton. That is one way of looking at it.Senator Mathias. That is all, Mr. Chairman.Mr Angleton. I want to commend you again on thatquestion, because that fixes several things. Because if thereis one thing I regret about leaving the Agency, it is theunresolved cases. And that is one of the biggest, because weknow so much about that person when he was in India. And hewas the most sophisticated, cultivated, high level intelligenceperson.TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 108]
TOP SECRETSenator Baker. What would you do, Mr. Angleton, to try to rehabilitate the Agency in particular in counterintelligence capability, since you feel that it is deteriorating, what things in particular would you do?Mr. Angleton. My feeling is that the Agency has to go through the purgatory that -- these fires that no man would put out -- and therefore let it be shocking or whatever. And let all the political repercussions take place, and if you go to purgatory, my view is, the bigger the fires, the better. So my view is, let it all come out. And let people take the consequences. I am not a believer that an agency can have two fathers. And I don't believe in inferiors reporting on their superiors by directive. And I don't believe that the Agency below the Director has to be responsive to two authorities.Senator Baker. What two authorities?Mr. Angleton. I mean the Congress and the Executive. In other words, if Colby is asked, what do you know about Chile, my view is that on Chile would yoy please ask the White House. And that is what I am trying to get at, at least so then they can come back with Colby after the Executive part has told Colby what it might be. But to throw the burden on the Director to respond to a question on Chile, gives him he is always in that dual position. And something doesn't seem to work that way. And the lower you go in the Agency, even toTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 109]
TOP SECRETmy level, to be resonsive to more than one authoity is chaos. And I am not making any puns.Senator Baker. To be responsible to the Congress and to theMr Angleton. The word response is what disturbs me somewhat, because the secrets that we have just been discussing here are so germain to everything in this country relating to the world balance of power and what the Soviets will strike at, and what the role of detente is That is what I am trying to get at. The Executive -- in other words, the intelligence community has never really had a day of peace in a way. When Hoover passed away, and Gray came aboard, everyone in the intelligence community believed, now we can normalize this situation. It has never been normal before. Mr. Hoover never attended an Agency meeting. Mr. Hoover never permitted one of his representatives to go beyond this jurisdiciton question. And you cannot run a government that way and you cannot run counterintelligence that way. So when Mr.Gray came to see Mr. Helms and Helms called me in before him and said, what position should I take, and I said, he wants to come and normalize relations, and he wants to reestablish liaison. And he said, I wouldn't accept it form him, they are the ones who brok it off. Therefore tell him that when he has read your correspondence with Mr. Hoover, and reviewed all of that if he feels that he is capable of handling it, that you will beTOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 110]
TOP SECRETprepared to sit down and discuss the question of liaison, because liaison is a tiny part of the question of penetration and double agents and all the rest of it.And in fact that happened, and everybody thought, we had got a captain that didn't make admiral aboard who will settle this. And then we will have his demise.And then you had Mr. Ruckelshaus come in as as acting Director. And then the Watergate and all of that. So there has never been a stabilizing factor in this Government as it relates to, not counterintelligence alone, but the intelligence community. And now I amstrongly opposed to professionals being Directors.I would say that a professional Director of the Agency doesn't work, he doesn't have a basis on the outside, or the perspective. And I think the Rockefeller Commission's observations were first rate in terms of the idea of two Deputy Directors who have to be confirmed and whatnot. And I think that no directorate should be expected to follow the nuts and bolts and at the same time handle all the duties of meeting and all the rest of it and try to keep an eye inside the business.Senator Baker. What do you think of the Rockefeller Commission reports?Mr. Angleton. I don't see anything wrong with itSenator Baker. Do you think it will work?TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10005.pdf — page 111]
TOP SECRETMr. Angleton. I really don't know this area. So I am not competent to speak or go around seeing what will happen in Congress, just on the simple question of Chile and the leakages and the damage that is done to US posture abroad, how much of it does this take?Senator Baker. It wouldn't take many. That is an argumentative thing.Mr. Angleton. All the cases we are discussing, in the hands of the wrong people, and our files in the hands of the wrong people, would have very decisive political impact upon our elections. That is what I mean, to be very frank about it.Senator Baker. How would that happen?Mr. Angleton. There are all kinds of information which, if it falls into the wrong hands or should they want to use it for their own ulterior motives, would be absolutely damaging.Senator Tower. In other words, this information could be used by politicians as a political football?Mr. Angleton. Precisely. But a man who would do it damages --Senator Mathias. Would you give an example?(Off the record discussion)(Whereupon, at 6:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)TOP SECRET
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 0]
157-10014-10006 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination System Date: 7/7/2015Identification FormAgency InformationAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10006RECORD SERIES : HEARINGSAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 01-H-08Document InformationORIGINATOR: SSCSGOFROM: ANGLETON, JAMES; MILER, SCOTTYTO:TITLE:DATE: 01/22/1976PAGES: 74SUBJECTS: ANGLETON, JAMESCIA, METHODOLOGYMILER, SCOTTYDEFECTORSFBICOUNTERINTELLIGENCEDOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPTCLASSIFICATION: Top SecretRESTRICTIONS: ConsultedCURRENT STATUS: WithholdDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 06/24/1997OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS: Box 1v9.1NW 50955 DocId:32423394 Page 11
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 1]
Date: 07/31/95Page: 1JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : SSESGO SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10006RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGSAGENCY FILE NUMBER : 01-H-08DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCSGOFROM : ANGLETON, JAMES; MILER, SCOTTYTO :TITLE :DATE : 01/22/76PAGES : 74SUBJECTS : ANGLETON, JAMESCOUNTERINTELLIGENCECIA, METHODOLOGYFBIMILER, SCOTTYDEFECTORSDOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPTCLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRETRESTRICTIONS : REFERREDCURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULLDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/24/97OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS : Box 1[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 2]
# TOP SECRET ORIGINALVol. 1 OF 3NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATIONUnauthorized Disclosure Subjectto Criminal Sanctions# The United States SenateR2352Report of ProceedingsINVENTORLEOON 2/15/77BY BCHearing held beforeSenate Select Committee to Study GovernmentalOperations With Respect to Intelligence ActivitiesThursday, January 22, 1976..Washington, D. C.(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned overto the Committee for destruction)WARD & PAUL410 FIRST STREET, S. E.WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003(202) 544-6000![TOP SECRET Stamp]
[157-10014-10006.pdf — page 3]
smnTOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-600012 TESTIMONY OF:3 James Angleton--accompanied by--4 Scotty Miler56789CONTENTSPAGE31011WARD & PAUL12131415161718410 First Street. S.E., Washington, D.C. 2000319202122232425TOP SECRET