Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10014-10018.pdf — page 113]
# TOP SECRET111141 noted from reading The Constitution that we were picturing2 Dr. King as a moral leader and something of a hero and then this3 agent went on to talk in great detail about Dr. King's personal4 life which he claimed he had learned from a confidential source,5 and our interest in interviewing this agent obviously relates6 to the circumstances surrounding that visit to a newspaperman,7 who directed him to do that, what the purpose of that visit8 was, whether there was any documentation --9 Senator Baker. Who was the newspaper man?10 Mr. Epstein. His name was Eugene Patterson and he was11 with the Atlanta Constitution at that time. He's now with a12 newspaper in Florida.13 The Chairman. Do you believe the subpoena now to be14 necessary because of what you have been told by the Justice15 Department?16 Mr. Elliff. We have other agents which we would like to17 proceed with at the interview level, so we would like to proceed18 at both levels to get their reaction to both types of requests.19 What is their reaction to a subpoena going to be, what is20 their reaction to a renewed request to interview going to be?21 So we crystallize each issue.22 Senator Tower. I still think it might be good for us to23 hold that up until we talk about it, since they are coming in24 Tuesday morning or Tuesday sometime, it's not going to push25 things too far.# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET112151 Senator Hart of Michigan. Would it be useful, at least,2 if it is the feeling of the Committee to authorize you people,3 or Bill, today, to say that the Committee barely suppressed its4 outrage and that it won't do, and we will see you Tuesday?5 Don't wait till Tuesday.6 The Chairman. I think something should be said, actually.7 Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, it prejudges the hell out8 of it, but unless we get an extension to 1980 for this Committee9 The Chairman. I think you're right. Something needs to be10 said publicly that the Committee is determined that we feel11 that not only has time -- we've already said, we've already12 made public the letter we have sent. I think a follow-up needs13 to be that we are concerned that impediments that are now being14 suggested which would interfere with the Committee's right to15 interrogate witnesses, we do not intend to allow the Committee's16 work to be obstructed and if necessary we will be prepared to17 subpoena witnesses though we would hope that that would not18 have to be the case.19 Senator Baker. And we are going to try to work it out20 from Tuesday.21 The Chairman. We're going to try to work it out from22 Tuesday.23 Senator Baker. I have a business matter.24 The Chairman. So does Senator Mondale.25 Senator Mondale. Just one point.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET113There is this troublesome dictum in U.S. vs. Nixon about what might be nondiscoverable, all of which seems to bear on sort of foreign policy matters.Am I correct -- I think we're going to hear a lot about that -- but am I correct in reading that decision that it really almost standsl wholly that they have the duty to produce all of the documentation and that case holds for that proposition, so that in our CIA matters, while they might raise some of this dictum, the FBI has no such defense, unless we're really trodding on those same grounds.Mr. Epstein. Of course, there is another issue in the Bureau materials, because we're on the issue of investigative files, which has never been really litigated, and that is the propriety of Executive Privilege when it comes to that.I might add that the importance of the issue of going to subpoena on these really raises that, because if we go to subpoena on documents, then that is going to be worthless unless we know in advance that we are going to win in court in a short period of time, including whether we have jurisdiction to be there.Senator Mondale. In other words, you are saying they are going to raise the Executive Privilege defense, but that was the Nixon defense.Mr. Epstein. I think that they would love for us to be in the position of having to issue a subpoena for documents,TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET17 because then it would be a year.1 Mr. Schwarz. The problem is the Ervin Committee was found2 not to have jurisdiction to issue the subpoena.3 The Chairman. Well, we know we're going to do the next4 step on that.5 Now, may I raise one other point --6 Senator Baker. That's not quite true. The Ervin Committee7 wasn't found to have no jurisdiction or standing to seek the8 documents or to issue subpoenas, but they failed to carry the9 burden of proving that it was required under the mandate of10 their inquiry.11 Now, I have another matter, Frank.12 The Chairman. We have two or three matters. Can I13 recognize Senator Mondale first, because he had asked it.14 Senator Mondale. A few days ago, when the White House15 people were here, they showed us a document which we have in16 our files which disclosed that President Nixon in 1970 had17 ordered the delivery of three machine guns to some people in18 Chile and had done so with instructions that that order should19 go directly to some subordinate officials in CIA and should be20 done without advising the official channels. And it is thought21 that they were directed against a General Schneider, who was22 a top official in the Chilean government opposed to a coup.23 He was a Constitutionalist.24 Schneider was killed, and there was a machine gun in the25 TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 possession of those who did so.2 Now what I would like is, while we finish this cycle on3 assassinations, that we include among our studies of alleged4 assassinations this matter and we request the documentation, of5 all appropriate documents, under the category of assassination.6 Mr. Schwarz. Senator, when that document came to our7 attention, we questioned a person who expands upon the allega-8 tions contained in the documents. I wrote a letter to the9 White House and the CIA. We wanted forthwith to receive10 copies of all such documents relating to the passage of weapons.11 We have had no response from the CIA.12 Mr. Hills, we met with in the White House a week ago13 Tuesday or Wednesday, and I said we must have the documents and14 'he said you cannot have them until you have the briefing on15 Chile, because we refuse to accept this as an assassination16 plan.17 The Chairman. May I make this suggestion, Senator18 Mondale?19 First of all, I believe that it is absolutely imperative20 that the Committee complete its investigation on the issue of21 the assassination of foreign government leaders before the22 recess and issue its report. That puts us under great pressure,23 but if we don't do it, I am going to ask the Committee to stay24 on the job. I would like very much to go to China, that is my25 first opportunity in forty years to go to China, and I haveTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET19 1161 such a trip laid on, but I am going to set it aside and ask2 the Committee to continue its work right into the recess until3 this is done. Otherwise, we are in a hopeless situation.4 Senator Schweiker. I think, Mr. Chairman, if we don't5 finish it by then, we never will.6 The Chairman. We never willl7 I think we should look into this assassination, it is an8 assassination. I think it's part of our responsibility to9 look into it. But it is not an assassination, whatever the10 CIA input may have been, it is not an assassination of a head11 of state, and so therefore I don't want it to further delay12 the completion of this phase of our inquiry.13 Now with that in mind, I am in full accord with what14 Senator Mondale says.15 Senator Schweiker. Could we put it to another phase and16 not in this phase?17 The Chairman. Yes, we are going to have a phase on Chile,18 anyway. It would fit into the Chilean case.19 Senator Mondale. It is significant because if we accept20 their interpretation that it is not assassination, then we21 avoid an understanding that we had that these documents, all22 supposed to be available , then we get into a discovery problem.23 In other words, I know what we're getting at, and I would24 guess that we should proceed as rapidly as possible, but we25 shouldn't hold up the cycle of --TOP SECRET![white square]
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TOP SECRET20                                                                                                                                       1171 Senator Schweiker. Well Fritz, there is another question2 along the same lines, and that is why I don't want to see it3 cloud this issue, and that is the Glomar Explorer, stopped by4 the NLRB proceeding was shown to have stopped in Chile just5 about a week or so before Allende was killed, just by coincidence6 for mechanical repairs. I would like to find out that one,7 too.8 But this is a whole new thing. This puts us into the9 Chile thing. Because I'm just as interested as you are. I10 don't see that it hurts anything to put it in a Phase II11 proposition with Chile.12 The Chairman. And Fritz, we can say that the Committee13 regards it in the category of assassination, but we can differ-14 entiate it from the initial report, which does deal with15 foreign leaders.16 Senator Hart of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, before you go to17 a new subject -- and I am uneasy raising this -- but your18 reply reminds me, you say that we are going to conclude assassina-19 tions and issue our report before we go on recess. I think that20 disposes too readily of the problem that is going to confront21 us in a very few weeks, and that is having heard all of this,22 now what do we do? I don't think we have decided yet how we23 are going to present, once we open the doors, we've got to know24 how we are going to handle it. I don't think we ought to lock25 ourselves in at the moment to a written report, as we leave town.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1181 the first of August.2 Senator Baker. I agree with you 100 percent.3 The Chairman. This Committee has got to get its business done and I know the purpose of the delay downtown is to make it as difficult as possible for us to cope with our work. We will be engulfed completely if we cannot deal with this phase of our work in the time that we have given it and put it over until the fall. What I'm suggesting is not just simply the report of the Committee. We are going to complete our witnesses, we have time to issue such a report.11 I am also suggesting the recommendations the Committee will make with respect to this issue. We have to put this behind us. It is just folly not to do it, because we must get on with the other phases of the report and there is no reason we cannot do it. If we can't do it by the end of this month, then we're not going to be any more advantaged or any better advantaged to then go out on our recess and come back and take it up anew in the fall. It is a very clear-cut issue.19 Senator Hart of Michigan. But what is not clear-cut to me is how we report to our peers.21 The Chairman. We will take that up.22 Senator Schweiker. We discussed that at one meeting. We had a little informal meeting. Maybe you missed that, Phil.24 The Chairman. There is nothing that could be gained by putting it off or defering it or postponing it. It is veryTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET119221 clear that we are working at a highly intensified pace in2 order to get the necessary evidence, and then there is no reason3 why we can't address ourselves to this question.4 Senator Hart of Michigan. The only reason that I raise5 that is that I am as anxious to conclude this chapter, but this6 Committee, as a Committee, then must decide the ultimate7 question: do you have open hearings? Do you go to a closed Senate?89 The Chairman. That will be a top item of consideration for the Committee.10 I have only deferred this discussion thinking11 that we had best get all of the evidence first. That is all.12 Then we will take it up at an appropriate time and discuss it.13 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, do I understand the situation14 to be then it is your hope that we will finish our Executive15 Session testimony before the August recess, but not a report16 to the Senate?17 The Chairman. No, that is not my position. My position is18 that we should complete the testimony and make our report and19 recommendation on this issue.20 Senator Baker. But without prejudice to a future determina-21 tion of whether we have public hearings?22 The Chairman. Oh, yes, that's always open to us. But I --23 let me make it -- let's not have any misunderstanding there.24 It is always open to this Committee to decide whether25 public hearings on this or any other issue should be arranged inTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-60001201 23 the fall. Obviously, we cannot have them until fall.2 My personal position is against public hearings on the3 issue of assassination. But what I am proposing is that the4 Committee make its report, and I think that is a question the5 Committee will have to take up and decide, and I think the6 appropriate way to disclose these facts, and I personally believe7 they must be disclosed, is through a report of the Committee8 that is made public, and I think that report should be made9 before the recess.10 Senator Baker. I don't think we can do that.11 Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman, physically we have got three12 weeks. Whether we can hear all of these witnesses and sit down13 and prepare the report and have the Committee agree on the14 report, report it to the Senate and have the Senate act on it15 in three weeks is questionable in my mind. I, like you, want16 to do it, but I wonder if we can do a workmanlike job and do17 it in that time.18 The Chairman. Well, let me say this, that the very request19 that Senator Baker has made, and I hope we don't get into a too20 prolonged liscussion on this issue because we cannot decide21 it right now, but the very report that Senator Baker has asked22 for is now in the process of preparation. That report gives,23 by necessity, as much of the meat, the briefs that Senator24 Baker has asked for, as much of the report, laying out the25 factual, the evidence that the Committee has seen. And I thinkTOP SECRET![photo of 410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003]
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TOP SECRET121241 this can be done. I know that we have to work very hard to do2 it, but I know that our position will be much worse in every3 way if we fail to do it.4 Now without trying to decide that now, let us proceed.5 Senator Schweiker. May I make one comment on that, Mr.6 Chairman?7 I have had vacillating feelings on public hearings, and I8 think what I have come down on is this. I think we should go9 ahead and issue a preliminary report without public hearings.10 I think we should put the matter of public hearings in abeyance11 until we get into the Chile thing and some of the other areas12 of so-called assassinations that may not be Presidential13 assassinations per se and leave the Committee option that we14 may well want to elect to go into what happened in Chile15 publicly and bring up that assassination if that is what we16 determined.17 I have trouble determining at this point in time whether18 we should have public hearings, and I think we ought to keep19 that option open as we go along.20 The Chairman. I have no argument with the Senator on that21 score.22 Senator Schweiker. I know. As I say, it reconciles with23 your views and it protects the rights of those who say they24 want public hearings.25 The Chairman. I have no argument with that.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET122251 Senator Baker has another matter.2 Senator Baker. It won't take but a brief moment.3 I think I owe the Committee a report on the statement that I made to the Press a few moments ago. I did not intend4 to make a statement, but that it becomes impossible to avoid5 when you step outside in these circumstances.6 The Chairman. It is a good thing for you that Senator7 Morgan is not present.8 Senator Baker. As some of you may know, the news last9 night and again this morning carried a story to the effect that10 a Colonel, a retired Colonel in the Air Force by the name of11 Fletcher Prowdy, has alleged by Alexander Butterfield was an12 associate or an employee or a plant of something of the sort of13 the CIA when he was at the White House.14 I was asked if I had any comment on that. I was asked if15 I was surprised by that, and my reply was I had heard that16 story before. I had never commented on it because I had no17 proof of it. And it's really so. As you know, in this town18 if you don't have confirmation of it you get into deep19 trouble.20 Second, that I think it is worthy of looking into, and I21 said I thought the Prowdy statement added a new dimension to22 the rumors and I thought that it did warrant further investiga-23 tion, that I would recommend that to this Committee at the24 appropriate time.25 TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETThe Chairman. That is fine, and I have also said that I would ask the Committee for an investigation of this charge, and Bill Miller tells me we have already received from the Agency a preliminary report that is not satisfactory. We are pursuing it and getting further information.Senator Schweiker?Senator Schweiker. I have a brief matter I would like to seek the Committee's advice on.Could we go off the record a minute?The Chairman. Yes.(Discussion off the record.)Senator Hart of Colorado. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, I have an item of business also.When I was in Europe last week and pursuant to the direction of the Chairman and staff I tried to contact our friend QJWIN to try to wrap up that lihnk of the chain with, I must say, the complete cooperation of the CIA and Mr. Colby, who in fact sent a person over there to help uncover this individual. We know who he is and where he is.The CIA American contact talked to him, largely for the reason that he feels extreme loyalty still to the Agency and to one or two particular people that he worked with and through. He opted not to meet with me or anybody else. The feeling is, both on my part and Mr. Colby's, that if we got his contact in that chain to get in touch with him directly that he would talkTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET124271 to us, and I leave it to the Committee whether this is2 important enough for us to pursue and it would probably involve3 a couple of people going back over.4 Senator Baker. What is your recommendation?5 Senator Hart of Colorado. My own feeling, based almost6 purely on the principle that no stone should be left unturned7 is that we should do it.8 There are some unanswered questions. He was here in the9 states in '63, he was not confined to one operation and we10 don't know what he was doing.11 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would recommend that we12 commission Senator Hart to do that for us.13 Senator Hart of Colorado. It would take the cooperation14 of one of the witnesses we've had here before to do it.15 The Chairman. What is your recommendation, Senator16 Hart, I'm sorry?17 Senator Hart of Colorado. That we should do it, that we18 should get the cooperation of Mr. O'Donnell.19 The Chairman. That we should do what?20 Senator Baker. Interview QJWIN in Europe.21 Senator Mathias. Which means somebody has to do it and22 take O'Donnell with him.23 Senator Baker. Take Mathias and Hart.24 The Chairman. It is a very sensitive matter, if his25 cover -- well, one thing this Committee must worry about --TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET1 Senator Schweiker. What would you hope to get out of2 it, Gary?3 Senator Hart of Colorado. What his orders were, what his4 scope of authority was, what he was doing over and above -- well,5 what he was doing in the Congo, what he was doing over and6 above his Congo operations, why he was in Florida in 1963.7 The Chairman. Well, Gary, when you told me this, you8 told me that this man had said to the CIA go between who was9 trying to arrange this interview that first of all he preferred10 not to be questioned, and secondly, if he were questioned, he11 would lie.12 Senator Hart of Colorado. That was on the basis of the13 appointment we were trying to arrange then, and that was purely14 because of his loyalties to the Agency. The case was not15 presented well to him. What I am saying is if we took back his16 contact for whom he feels loyalty and the fellow should talk,17 I think the feeling of the person who had made the original18 contact is that he would talk.19 It was not presented to him in the way that the Agency20 wanted him to do it.21 The Chairman. How valuable do you think this information22 is to the Committee? I'll tell you my concern. My concern is23 the one thing I have feared more than anything else, in this24 investigation is that we take some action that allows them to25 say that we have blown the cover of some valuable agent abroad,TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET291 and this is what they feared all along, and the whole intelli-2 gence apparatus would be gravely weakened and the man in the3 field would be jeopardized by investigation of this kind.4 We take that chance with this kind of and what do we5 learn from it? Is it worth that chance?6 Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, that question could be7 asked of any witness that we have in here. Number two, the CIA,8 Mr. Colby and the Chief of Station in Amsterdam, have no doubts9 that this can be carried out without any security breach what-10 soever. Now that's the CIA. He has not worked for them in11 ten years.12 The Chairman. And the CIA would be the first to jump13 upon the breach and say, we told you so.14 Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, I leave it to the1.  5 Committee. I can't tell you what we're going to find out, it    16 may be zero.    17 Senator Mathias. The Station Chief does not raise that as    18 one of the dangers.    19 Senator Baker. Yes, they did.    20 Senator Hart of Colorado. Nor does Colby.    21 Mr. Wides. Mr. Chairman, excuse me. The paper that    22 suggests the possibility that Mr. Win might have been in the    23 United States in 1963 is a paper involving the activity records    24 of William Harvey who will be here this afternoon and that may    25 be that you can get more testimony under oath from him that willTOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET1 shed some light as to whether he was just using QJWIN as a cover2 which is what he told me, the designation for billing, or3 whether he's willing to give out some more testimony.4 The Chairman. Well, let us get that additional informa-5 tion --6 Senator Baker. One further point, Mr. Chairman, that might7 be of interest if my memory is correct, and I believe it is8 correct, is that the major commercial cover for the Agency in9 Amsterdam was run by the Mullin Company10 Senator Hart of Colorado. Frank, he's not worked for the11 Agency in ten years. He's not an active agent.12 The Chairman. Suppose that he were to tell us something13 that is of importance, then how do we cross-examine him? Then14 we have to bring him here for cross-examination, then we have15 blown his cover.16 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, may I say one other thing?17 I meant to say it, and I frankly forgot, just so my colleagues18 know what I'm about and not that I'm doing it behind their19 back.20 I got a call last night from one of the editors of Harper's21 magazine in Europe relaying to me that Bernard Barker wanted to22 talk to me, and he thinks about the Butterfield situation, and23 I intended to call him, but I wanted you to know that.24 The Chairman. That's fine.25 Let's defer decision right now, on that decision, Senator# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETPhone (Area 202) 544-6000128311 Hart.2 Let's get our witness back and complete his testimony this3 morning.45678910111213141516171819202122232425WARD & PAUL410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003TOP SECRET