Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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-50-Tweedy might have been unaware of the true purpose of (Gottlieb)'s visit (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 20-22).Bissell did not recall cables concerning the dispatch of a messenger and subsequently confirming that his instructions were to be followed, but he said "This sounds highly likely. I would expect, given the background, that the confirmation would have been forthcoming" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 43).It was "very probable," according to Bissell, that he discussed the assassination of Lumumba with (Sidney Gottlieb), who was then his Science Advisor[^1] (Bissell, 9/10, p. 14). Bissell said that on a number of occasions he discussed with (Gottlieb) "the availability of means of incapacitation, including assassination" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 60).Although he had no "specific recollection," Bissell assumed that, if (Gottlieb) went to the Congo, he had approved the mission, (which "might very well" have dealt with the assassination of Lumumba) (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 18, 20, 44). Despite his absence of specific recollection of these events, Bissell said, "There is nothing in mind that I remember that would be in conflict" with the testimony of the (Chief of) Station that (Gottlieb) carried poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).Bissell testified that it would not have been against CIA policy in the fall of 1960 to send poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).[^1]: .
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-51-He classified "the act of taking the kit to the Congo. . . as still in the planning stage" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 49). Bissell acknowledged, however, that the dispatch of poisons and paraphernalia with which to administer them was an extraordinary event:It would indeed have been rather unusual to send such materials -- a specific kit. . . of this sort -- out to a relatively small station, unless planning for their use were quite far along. (Bissell, 9/10, p. 37).Nonetheless, Bissell said that he "probably believed" that he had sufficient authority at that point to direct CIA officers to move from the stage of planning to implementation (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 60-61). In light of his absence of a specific recollection of these events, he stated that "if it be taken as established that Mr. (Gottlieb) took specific instructions 'to implement,' " (Gottlieb) would not have been acting beyond the mandate given to him by Bissell and it would show that the assassination plot "had then passed into an implementation phase" and that "authorization was given" (Bissell, 9/10/ pp. 39, 41, 49).NW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 50
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-52-5.  The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination    Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives    in the Congo(Justin O'Donnell), a senior CIA officer in the clandestineoperations division in 1960, testified that during this period hehad been asked by DDP Richard Bissell to go to the Congo to carryout the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12).(O'Donnell) said that he refused to participate in an assassinationoperation, but proceeded to the Congo to attempt to draw Lumumbaaway from the protective custody of the UN guard and place him inthe hands of Congolese authorities (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, pp. 13-14).Shortly after (O'Donnell)'s arrival in the Congo he wasjoined by a CIA agent with a criminal background who was used thefollowing year by the CIA as part of a program to develop a stand-byassassination capability. Late in 1960, one of the operatives ofthe (Chief of) Station in Leopoldville approached this agent of(O'Donnell)'s with a proposition to join an "execution squad" (CIACable (IN 18739), Leopoldville to Director, 12/7/60).Despite the fact that (O'Donnell) was initially approachedto be part of the plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba, it is un-likely that (O'Donnell) was actually involved in the implementationof that plot by the (Chief of) Station. Whether there is any connec-tion between the assassination plot and either of the two operatives --QJWIN and WIROGUE -- is less clear.NW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 51
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-53-(a) (O'Donnell's Operations in the Congo(i) Tweedy and the (Chief of) Station Agreed that a Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to the Congo to Concentrate on the Assassination OperationIn early October, 1960, several cables sent in the specially restricted PROP channel dealt with a plan to send a "senior case officer" to the Congo to aid the (Chief of) Station with the assassination operation.*On October 7, Bronson Tweedy informed Hedgman that he "WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH TDY [TEMPORARY DUTY] SENIOR CASE OFFICER RUN THIS OP" by supervising a third country national operative (CIA Cable (OUT 78336), Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/7/60).On October 15, Tweedy requested Hedgman's reaction to the suggestion of dispatching the senior case officer as soon as possible to concentrate on the assassination operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396), Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60). Two days later, the (Chief of) Station replied affirmatively:BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA. (CIA Cable IN 28936), (Chief of) Station to Tweedy).The (Chief of) Station advised that his responsibilities for "MULTIPLE OPS" had restricted the amount of time he was able to devote to the assassination operation (CIA Cable, 10/17/60).* See Section 4(e), supra, for full treatment of these cables.
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-54-## (ii) Bissell Discussed Assassination of Lumumba With (O'Donnell)and Sent Him to Congo: October-November 1960Probably shortly after the (Chief of) Station's cable of October 17 requesting the assignment of a senior case officer to concentrate on the assassination operation, Richard Bissell broached the subject with CIA officer (Justin O'Donnell).At that time, (O'Donnell) was the Deputy Chief of a component of the Directorate of Plans -- the CIA's covert action arm (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 8).(Justin O'Donnell) testified that in October of 1960, he was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassinating Patrice Lumumba (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, pp. 11-12; 9/11/75, pp. 19, 43):(O'Donnell): He called me in and he told me he wanted to go down to the Belgian Congo, the former Belgian Congo, and to eliminate LumumbaQ: What did you understand him to mean by eliminate?(O'Donnell): To kill him and thereby eliminate his influence.Q: What was the basis for your interpreting his remarks, whatever his precise language, as meaning that he was talking about assassination rather than merely neutralizing him through some other means?(O'Donnell): It was not neutralization . Clearly, the context of our talk was to kill him. (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, pp. 11-12.)(O'Donnell) reacted strongly to Bissell's instruction:I told him that I would absolutely not have any part of killing Lumumba. He said, I want you to go over and talk to (Sidney Gottlieb). (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 12.)
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-55-(Gottlieb) was a CIA scientist who was at that time the ScienceAdvisor to Bissell (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 14).(O'Donnell) said it was "inconceivable that Bissell would directsuch a mission without the personal permission of Allen Dulles"(O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 44). But the question of authorizationwas never raised by Bissell:I assumed that he had authority from Mr. Dullesin such an important issue, but it was not dis-cussed, nor did he purport to have higherauthority to do it. (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 15.)(O'Donnell) promptly met with (Gottlieb) and testified that he was"sure that Mr. Bissell had called (Gottlieb) and told him I was comingover" (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 13; 9/11/75, p. 7). (O'Donnell saidthat (Gottlieb) told him "that there were four or five ... lethalmeans of disposing of Lumumba" (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 13). (O'Donnellrecalled that "one of the methods was a virus and the others in-cluded poison" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 12; 9/11/75, p. 7). (O'Donnell)said that (Gottlieb) "didn't even hint ... that he had been in theCongo and that he had transported any lethal agent to the Congo"(O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 7-A).After speaking with (Gottlieb), (O'Donnell) said:I then left his office, and I went back toMr. Bissell's office and I told him in noway would I have any part in the assassina-tion of Lumumba ... and reasserted inabsolute terms that I would not be involvedin a murder attempt. (O'Donnell) 9/11/75, p. 43.)NW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 54
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-56-(O'Donnell) said that in one of his two conversations with Bissell about Lumumba, he raised the prospect "that conspiracy to commit murder being done in the District of Columbia might be in violation of federal law" (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 14). He said that Bissell "airily dismissed" this prospect (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 14).Despite his refusal to participate in assassination, (O'Donnell) agreed to go to the Congo on a general mission to "neutralize" Lumumba "as a political factor" ((O'Donnell), 9/11/75, pp. 43-44):> I said I would go down and I would have no> compunction about operating to draw Lumumba> out [of UN custody), to run an operation to> neutralize his operations which were against> Western interests, against, I thought,> American interests. (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 13.)(O'Donnell) added that his objective was to neutralize Lumumba's influence ... and his activities against [a Congolese leader], whom at that time you might say was our close instrument, he was the man we had put our chips on. (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 20.)Bissell also recalled that, after their discussions about assassination, (O'Donnell) went to the Congo "with the assignment ... of looking at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 53).Although (O'Donnell) did not formulate a precise plan until he reached the Congo, he discussed a general strategy with Bissell:
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-57-Mr. (O'Donnell): I told Mr. Bissell that I would be willing to go down to neutralize his activities and operations and try to bring him out [of UN custody] and turn him over to the Congolese authorities, that is correct.Senator Mondale: Was it discussed then that his life might be taken by the Congolese authorities?Mr. (O'Donnell): It was, I think, considered in the -- not to have him killed, but then it would have been a Congolese being judged by Congolese for Congolese, crimes. Yes, I think it was discussed. (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 38.)There was a "very, very high probability" that Lumumba would receive capital punishment at the hands of the Congolese authorities, according to (O'Donnell (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 24). But (O'Donnell) "had no compunction about bringing him out and then having him tried by a jury of his peers" (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 14).Although (O'Donnell) had expressed his aversion to assassination to Bissell and had undertaken a more general mission to "neutralize" Lumumba's influence, it was clear to him that Bissell was still interested in the assassination of Lumumba:in leaving at the conclusion of our second discussion ... he said, well, I wouldn't rule out that possibility -- meaning the possibility of the elimination or the killing of Lumumba -- I wouldn't rule it. In other words, even though you have said this, don't rule it out.... There is no question about it, he said, I wouldn't rule this other out, meaning the elimination or the assassination (O'Donnell) 9/11/75, p. 45).(O'Donnell) had a distinctive recollection that after his second discussion of Lumumba with Bissell, he met with Richard Helms in order
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-58-to make his opposition to assassinating Lumumba a matter of record (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, pp. 44-45):[I]n the Agency, since you don't have documents, you have to be awfully canny and you have to get things on record, and I went into Mr. Helms' office, and I said, Dick, here is what Mr. Bissell proposed to me, and I told him that I would under no conditions do it, and Helms said you're absolutely right. (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, pp. 15-16).Richard Helms testified that it was "likely" that he had such a conversation with (O'Donnell) and he assumed that (O'Donnell)'s version of their conversation was correct (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 22-23).William Harvey testified that (O'Donnell) had informed him about the conversations with Bissell:Mr. (O'Donnell) came to me and said that he had been approached by Richard Bissell to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of Patrice Lumumba. He also told me that he had declined to undertake this assignment. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9.)Harvey said that in a later conversation with Bissell, Bissell told him that he had asked (O'Donnell) to undertake such an operation (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9).(O'Donnell) said that within forty-eight hours of his second discussion with Bissell, he departed for the Congo (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 45-46).* Helms testified that he did not follow-up on this conversation in any way. He did not recall why (O'Donnell) had gone to the Congo or what his mission was (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 32-33).
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-59-(iii) Bissell Testified That he Asked (O'Donnell) to Planand Prepare for an Assassination OperationBissell remembered "very clearly" that he and O'Donnell)discussed the assassination of Lumumba in the fall of 1960 (Bissell,6/9/75, p. 75) and that (O'Donnell) reacted negatively (Bissell,9/11/75, p. 18). According to Bissell, O'Donnell said that hethought that assassination "was an inappropriate action and thatthe desired object could be accomplished better in other ways"(Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54).Bissell also confirmed the fact that he had asked(O'Donnell) to see (Sidney Gottlieb (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 44).Bissell differs with (O'Donnell)'s account on only oneimportant point -- the degree to which Bissell's initial assign-ment to (O'Donnell) contemplated the mounting of an operation asopposed to contingency planning. (O'Donnell) flatly testified thatBissell requested him to attempt to kill Lumumba. In his firsttestimony on the subject, Bissell said that he asked (O'Donnell)"to investigate the possibility of killing Lumumba" (Bissell,6/11/75, p. 54; see also pp. 55, 75). In a later appearance,however, Bissell stated that (O'Donnell) "had been asked to planand prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75,p. 24).Bissell said that after his conversations with (O'Donnell), hefelt that it would be necessary to "postpone" the assassinationoperation because, "given (O'Donnell)'s reaction, there was a risk
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-60-that the planning of such an operation would be blown" (Bissell,9/10/75, p. 25). Despite his impression that he might have de-activated assassination operations against Lumumba at that time,Bissell could not preclude the possibility that the Hedgman/(Gobblieb) poison plot continued to move foward:[T]his had been in my mind a very sensitive assignment to him, limited -- with the knowledge of it limited very narrowly even within the Agency. And it is difficult to separate recollection from inference on occasion. But I seem to recollect that after this conversation with him, I wanted this put very much on the back burner and inactivated for quite some time. Now that doesn't rule out the possibility that some action through completely different channels might have gone forward. But the best of my recollection is, I viewed this not only as terminating the assignment for him, but also as reason for at least postponing any- thing further along that line. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 25-26).In Tweedy's mind, (O'Donnell)'s eventual mission to the Congo was linked to assessing the possibility for assassinating Lumumba rather than to a general plan to draw Lumumba out of UN custody(Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 26).(iv) (O'Donnell) Arrived in the Congo and Learned That a Virus Was in the Station SafeOn October 29, the (Chief of) Station was informed through the PROP channel that (Justin O'Donnell) was soon to arrive in Leo- poldville "IN FURTHERANCE THIS PROJECT" (CIA Cable OUT 86798, Fields) to (Chief of) Station, 10/29/60). On November 3, (O'Donnell) arrived
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-61-in Leopoldville (CIA Cable (IN 38052), Leopoldville to Director, 11/4/60). (Chief of) Station Hedgman testified that he had been made aware by cable that (O'Donnell) was coming to the Congo (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 40). Hedgman said it was "very possible" that as a new (Chief of) Station he took the dispatch to the Congo of a senior officer like (O'Donnell) as a signal that CIA headquarters was "dissatisfied with my handling" of (Gottlieb)'s instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 42).Hedgman had a general picture of (O'Donnell)'s mission:I understood it to be that -- similar to mine, that is, the removal or neutrali- zation of Lumumba ... I have no clear recollection of his discussing the assassi- nation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 54.)Hedgman said that he had no recollection of (O'Donnell) indicating one way or the other whether he was considering assassination as a means of "neutralizing" Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55).Hedgman said, "in view of my instructions, I may have assumed that he was" considering assassination (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). Generally, however, Hedgman perceived (O'Donnell) as being unenthusiastic about his mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 56, 88-89).When (O'Donnell) arrived in the Congo, he met with the (Chief of) Station, who informed him that there was "a virus in the safe" (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 7-A; 6/9/75, p. 16). (O'Donnell) said he assumed it was a "lethal agent" (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 37), although Hedgman was not explicit:I knew it wasn't for somebody to get his polio shot up to date. (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 16.)NW 50955 DocId:32202487 Page 60
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-62-He added that if the virus was to be used for medical purposes,"it would have been in the custody of the State Department"personnel, not the CIA station (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 36).(O'Donnell) said that he did not recall that Hedgman mentionedthe source of the virus (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 8).* But (O'Donnell)assumed that it had come from (Sidney Gottlieb)'s office:It would have had to have come from Washington,in my estimation, and I would think, since ithad been discussed with Gottlieb that itprobably would have emanated from his office.(O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 28.)Hedgman did not recall discussing (Gottlieb)'s trip to the Congowith (O'Donnell), but "assumed" that he did so (Hedgman, 8/21/75,pp. 60-61).(O'Donnell) was "certain" that the virus had arrived before hedid (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 24). He was surprised to learn thatsuch a virus was being held at the Leopoldville station becausehe had refused an assassination mission before departing for theCongo (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 17).(O'Donnell) stated that he knew of no other instance where alethal biological substance was in the possession of a CIA station(O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 50). He assumed that its purpose wasassassination:* When (O'Donnell) was informed about Hedgman's testimony on  the visit of (Gottlieb) to the Congo and the plot to poison Lumumba,  he said, "I believe absolutely in its credibility" (O'Donnell),  9/11/75, p. 53). (O'Donnell) found nothing in the facts as he knew  them, nor in Hedgman's character to raise a question about that  testimony. (O'Donnell) regarded Hedgman as "an honest and a decent  man" (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 19) -- "a totally truthful man"  (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 56).
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My feeling definitely is that it was for a specific purpose, and was just not an all-purpose capability there begin held for targets of opportunity, unspecified targets. (O'Donnell) 9/11/75, p. 49.)At several points, (O'Donnell) stated that he did not think that Lumumba was the target specified for the use of the virus (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 17; 9/11/75, p. 48). But he allowed for that possibility:I supposed it was for a lethal operation, very possibly Lumumba, but very possibly in connection with other people. (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 24; accord. 6/9/75, p. 17.)His final word on the subject was that he assumed that the "specific purpose" of the virus was the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 50).(O'Donnell) said that the (Chief of) Station never indicated that (O'Donnell) was to employ the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 52). In fact, (O'Donnell) testified that Hedgman "never discussed his assassination effort, he never even indicated that this was one." (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 54.)While Hedgman has no direct recollection of discussing his assassination operation with (O'Donnell), he "assumed" that he had at least discussed with (O'Donnell) the problem of gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 55, 60). (O'Donnell) testified, however, that because he was "morally opposed to assassination" he would "absolutely not" have
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-64-explored the means by which such access could be gained, nor would he have undertaken a mission to the Congo if it involved assessment of the situation for an assassination operation by someone else (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 26).(O'Donnell) was "sure" that he "related everything" to Hedgman about his conversations with Bissell concerning the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 46). Hedgman, however, had no recollection of learning this from (O'Donnell) (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 56).Beyond this, (O'Donnell) said that his discussions of assassination with Hedgman were general and philosophical, dealing with "the morality of assassinations" (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, pp. 46, 54):From my point of view I told him I had moral objections to it, not just qualms, but objections. I didn't think it was the right thing to do. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 9).When asked to characterize Hedgman's attitude toward assassination based on those discussions, (O'Donnell) said:I will answer your question just as fairly and as scrupulously as I can. I have a great deal of respect for Hedgman. And if he said something, I would believe him to be speaking the truth as he knew it without shading it.... The best I could say, I think, would be this, that he would not have been opposed in principle to assassination in the interests of national security.... I know that he is a man of great moral perception and decency and honor, and so forth. And that it would disturb him to be engaged in something like that. But I think I would have to say that in our conversations, my memory of those, at no time would he rule it out as being a possibility. (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 18.)
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(v) O'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize" Lumumba by Turning Him Over to Congolese Authorities and Requested the Assignment of Agent QJWIN to Leopoldville as His Alter EgoAfter (Justin O'Donnell) arrived in the Congo, he formulated a plan for "neutralizing" Lumumba by drawing him away from the custody of the UN force which was guarding his residence:(O'Donnell): [W]hat I wanted to do was to get him out, to trick him out, if I could, and then turn him over ... to the legal authorities and let him stand trial. Because he had atrocity attributed to him for which he could very well stand trial.Q: And for which he could very well have received capital punishment?(O'Donnell): Yes. And I am not opposed to capital punishment. (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, pp. 20-21.)*To implement his plan, O'Donnell made arrangements to rent "an observation post over the palace in which Lumumba was safely ensconced"* According to an earlier report from the (Chief of) Station, it was the view of the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations that arrest by Congolese authorities was "JUST A TRICK TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA" (CIA Cable Leop (Chief of) Station to Director, 10/11/60). The (Chief of) Station proceeded to recommend Lumumba's arrest in the same cable:STATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED [CONGOLESE] LEADERS ARREST LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CONTINUE BE THREAT TO STABILITY CONGO UNTIL REMOVED FROM SCENE (CIA Cable, 10/11/60).