Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[157-10011-10005.pdf — page 18]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:SANCHEZFITZGERALDAMLASHDATES:Oct. 29,/1963Nov. 13, 1963CATEGORIES:CastroCard 2 of 2OCCURRENCE: (CARD 2)In a memorandum by SANCHEZ on November 13, 1963, it was reported that "FITZGERALD informed AMLASH that the U.S. is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership." (89) Despite the fact that SANCHEZ reported that "nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the FITZGERALD meeting" (90), FITZGERALD recalled that AMLASH-1 "spoke_repeatedly_of_the_need_for_an_assassination weapon. In particular, he wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance." (90) FITZGERALD said that he told AMLASH "that the U.S. Government would have no part of an attempt on CASTRO's life. (90) However, the SANCHEZ memorandum reported "After the meeting AMLASH stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now asked to know what technical support we could provide him."(90)SOURCE:IG REPORT 1967FILE:STAFF:F.BaronDATE: 7/1/75
[157-10011-10005.pdf — page 19]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:WAINWRIGHTTEPEDINOFITZGERALDAMLASHDATES:November 14,1963CATEGORIES:CastroOCCURRENCE:WAINWRIGHT met with TEPEDINO, who reported to him AMLASH's reaction to his meeting with FITZGERALD. TEPEDINO said that AMLASH dwelt constantly on the fact that "he could not understand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the US Government gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. According to TEPEDINO (AMLASH) feels strongly on this point, and if he does not get advice and materials from a U.S. Government technician, he will probably become_fed_up_ again, and we will lose whatever progress we have made to date."(91)[Figure: "TOP SECRET" stamp diagonally across the page]SOURCE:IG REPORT 1967STAFF:F BaronFILE:DATE:7/1/75
[157-10011-10005.pdf — page 20]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:SANCHEZAMLASHFITZGERALD✓CATEGORIES:CastroDATES:Nov. 19, 1963OCCURRENCE:Nestor SANCHEZ prepared a memorandum for the Record which indicated that the CIA would give AMLASH assassination weapons: "C/SAS (FITZGERALD) approved telling [AMLASH] he would be given a cache inside Cuba. Cache could, if he requested it, include... high power rifles W/scopes.....C/SAS requested written reports on AMLASH operation be_kept_to_a_minimum." (91) (Emphasis-added-)Note: These are shiper/assassin weapons.![TOP SECRET stamp]SOURCE:IG REPORT 1967STAFF: F BaronDATE: 7/1/75FILE:
[157-10011-10005.pdf — page 21]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:SANCHEZAMLASHFITZGERALDDATES:Nov. 22, 1963CATEGORIES:CastroOCCURRENCE:Nester SANCHEZ met with AMLASH in Paris and gave him an assassination device (a ball-point pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe for the injection of poison). (93-93a)According to the IG REPORT, "It is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot, a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against CASTRO." (94)SANCHEZ stated "that he received an OPIM cable from FITZGERALD that night or early the next morning telling him that everything was off." (94) But, the IG REPORT authors did not find such a cable in the AMLASH file. (94)SOURCE: IG REPORT 1997STAFF: F BaronFILE:DATE: 7/1/75
[157-10011-10005.pdf — page 22]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:| HELMS                               | DATES:       | CATEGORIES:   || ----------------------------------- | ------------ | ------------- || MCCONE                              | July 25,1962 | SPECIAL GROUP || PRESIDENT KENNEDY                   |              | MONGOOSE      || FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD |              |               |OCCURRENCE: Helms notes that McCone briefed the panel of the President's foreignintelligence advisory board on political action projects. He pointed out that"each projectmust have his approval to the circulation to the members of the Special Group". Forexample, reconnasiance overflights are now approved. He noted covert financial supportin Peruvian, Greek, Finnish, Italian, and Brazilian elections. Helms "read to the panela-paper-on-the-operation_Mongoose_which_theDirector_had used earlier in the day for givinga briefing to the President."SOURCE: Memorandum for the record, re meeting on CA matterswith the panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence AdvisoryBoard of Helms, dated July 25, 1962 (00870)STAFF:diGenovaDATE:
[157-10011-10005.pdf — page 23]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:TSDETREICHLER, RaymondEDWARDS, SheffieldO'CONNELLGIANCANADATES:LateJanuary1961CATEGORIES:CUBA(Syndicate/Phase I)OCCURRENCE:TSD prepared poison pills (of Botulin) rather than liquid poison. (24).Nreichler, remembers meeting with EDWARDS and O'CONNELL in EDWARDS office to discuss the requirement "(24) for poison pills, which had initially been the preference of GIANCANA.SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967STAFF: BaronFILE:DATE: 7/3/75
[157-10011-10005.pdf — page 24]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:MaheuEdwardsRosselliGiancanaDATES:TrafficanteBrec Kurid ge3 or 4-61CATEGORIES:CastroOCCURRENCE:Breckinridge testified, Maheu on retainer to CIA "in the early days" (Tr. 99) ('50's?) and"on one occasion he obtained a female companion for an *important foreign leader.*" (Tr. 99) Edwards contacted Maheu who contacted Rosselli who contacted Giancana who contacted Trafficante, who "travelled to and from Cuba," (Tr. 100) and who "had a source inside Cuba (who) ...was believed to _have_access_to_Castro_and_a_poison_pill_was_developed_that_he_was_to_insert_ into Castro's food." (Tr. 101)SOURCE:Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75FILE:STAFF:John BaylyDATE:7/2/75
[157-10011-10005.pdf — page 25]
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZEDDATES:Apr 17, 61CATEGORIES: TOP SECRETSYNDICATE/PHASE IIKNOWLEDGE OF PHASE IICARD 1 of 3PERSONS/ENTITIES:"See list of names below.)OCCURRENCE: The list of persons with knowledge of PHASE II of the CASTRO ASSASSINATIONOPERATION differs from those who knew of PHASE I. Those with knowledge of PHASE II are:1.  RICHARD HELMS, DD/P2.  WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, Task Force W3.  JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security    (He knows that Harvey took over the    operation-and-delivered-pills, arms, and-    equipment in April 1962. He does not    know of developments after May 1962.)4.  SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security (He    knows of the fact of the turnover to    HARVEY, but states he knows nothing of    developments thereafter.)5.  J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He stated in    our interview with him that he knew that HARVEY    was having meetings with members of the gambling    syndicate in 1962.)6.  BRUCE CHICISVER, HARVEY's deputy in 1962-    (CHIFEVER Inows that HARVEY was meeting with    Fansters in Reno (sic) in the winter of 1962.)7.  TED SHACKLEY, Chief, JMWAVE (He assisted    HARVEY in the delivery of arms and equipment to    VARONA in April 1962, but presumably did not know    the identities of the recipients nor (con't.)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967FILE:STAFF:BaronDATE:28.6.75
[157-10011-10005.pdf — page 26]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:(Same instruction as card 1.)DATES:Apr 17 '61CATEGORIES:CARD 2 of 3OCCURRENCE:SHACKLEY, cont: the purpose for which the material was to be used.)3. RAY TREISCHLER, TSD (TREISCHLER'S participation was limited to furnishing the pills to O'CONNELL on 18 April 1962.)4. ANTONIO VARONA, the Cuban exile leader (He presumably was not aware of government sponsorship.)5. VARONA'S SON-IN-LAW (He too was presumably not aware of government's role.)11. MACEO, ROSELLI's "Man" (MACEO probably knew there was a government connection, but may not have identified CIA as the agency.)(con't.)SOURCE:STAFF:FILE:DATE:
[157-10011-10005.pdf — page 27]
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZED15-3-94PERSONS/ENTITIES:REKMr. McConeNcGeorge BundyMr. WilsonMr. JohnsonDr. CharylMr. GilpatricDr. ScovilleGon. TaylorCol. SteakleyOCCURRENCE:DATES:CATEGORIES:Oct 9, 1962Special Group (Augmented)*Mongoose*SGA discussed various possibilities of accomplishing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging fromvery low level coverage by tactical aircraft to high performance aircraft and drones. Over-flights and peripheral flights were discussed.It was agreed that the first priority is one high performance mission in the western part of the island, to be accompanied by all out Elint support. Depending on the results of this, a number of similar searches may be mounted. First mission was later approved by higher authority, but the decision on the second proposition left open.The entire package was to be discussed at the USIB, and by Chiefs on Wednesday, October 10th.SOURCE:STAFF:Memorandum for the record, dated October 9, 1962, effecting a meeting ofDATE: POWFILE: Special Group Augmented and prepared by Thomas Parrot.(02821)6/20/75
[157-10011-10005.pdf — page 28]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:Gen LansdaleGilpatrickDon WilsonCheeverDATES:Oct 31, 1961CATEGORIES:MONGOOSESGACUBAOCCURRENCE:As for psychological operations, all CIA assets (including Lawrence Kieves) had been turned over to USIA for operational use.TOP SECRETSOURCE: Oct 31, 1962 memo for the record by Gen Lansdale (00744)STAFF: WallachDATE: July 3, 1975FILE:CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZED15-3-94 lec
[157-10011-10006.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY: SSCIARECORD NUMBER: 157-10011-10006RECORDS SERIES :AGENCY FILE NUMBER :DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : SSCIAFROM :TO :[R][R]TITLE :INDEX CARDS[R]DATE: 06/00/75PAGES: 495SUBJECTS :CASTRO[R]OPERATION MONGOOSE[R]DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION : TRESTRICTIONS: REFERREDCURRENT STATUS: PDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS:Box 139, Book 2 of 3, Index Cards, June/July 1975[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
[157-10011-10006.pdf — page 1]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:Sam GoldJuan OrtaDr. Raymond TreichlerCornelius RooseveltDATES:Dr. Edward GunnSeptember 25, 1961CATEGORIES:CastroOCCURRENCE: In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing the mission, Sam Gold suggested that they not resort to firearms, but that if he could be furnished with some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink. Sam indicated that he has a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official, who had been receiving back payments from the gambling interests who still had access to Castro, and was in a financial bind. Cornelius Roosevelt, Chief, TSD was consulted and assigned Dr. Raymond Treichler to develop a pill that had the elements of rapid solubility, high lethal content, and little-or-no-traceability. Six of these items were produced and after being checked out for their effectiveness by Dr. Edward M. Gunn, Three pills were ultimately turned over to Sam for the mission. Neither TSD nor Dr. Gunn was briefed on the ultimate use of the pills.SOURCE: CIA Justice File R-153 Memorandum by Howard J. Osborn to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subj: Robert A. Maheu dated June 24, 1966.STAFF: RheaDATE: July 1, 1975
[157-10011-10006.pdf — page 2]
NW 50955 DocId: 32203774 Page 3CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZED6-4-94(1)(3)PERSONS/ENTITIES:DATES:CATEGORIES:Oct. 6, 1960Special GroupMONGOOSEPresidential AuthorizationCard 3 of 3OCCURRENCE: (cont.) including some Germans in this group and that we would talk informally to General Gehlen about it. He emphasized that he was asking for no Special Group approval at this time in this specific connection."TOP SECRETSOURCE:STAFF:Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960DATE: Bob KelleyJune 29, 1975FILE: Cage
[157-10011-10006.pdf — page 3]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:Father PeytonPeter GraceDATES:CATEGORIES:Dec. 5, 1960MongooseSpecial GroupOCCURRENCE:The Special Group discussed (1) the possibility of providing sixty thousand dollars from the Cuba budget to sponsor the religious activity of Father Peyton in Cuba; (2) a proposal to survey the possibility of establishing a strike base in Nicaragua; (3) the necessity for the Defense Department to supply 38 military men to CIA. "Mr. Douglas questioned whether the present concept of 600 or 700 Cubans is any longer practicable. He said that it had been his understanding that the current thinking contemplated figures more on the order of 3,000." Mr. Barnes replied that the CIA believes what is required is enough individuals to serve as a rallying point for the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and thus 600 is as useful as 3,000. The CIA justified the request for 38 military men because it now believed it was necessary to train the Cubans in infantry tactics involved in a defense, in addition to the guerrilla warfare training previously contemplated.SOURCE:Special Group meeting minute Dec. 5, 1960STAFF:Bob KelleyFILE:DATE:June 29, 1975
[157-10011-10006.pdf — page 4]
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZED6-4-94(IXA)TOP SECRETPERSONS/ENTITIES:GUNN, Dr. EdwardTREICHLER RayTSDDATES:August 16, 1960CATEGORIES:CUBA(Lethal Cigars)OCCURRENCE:CARD 1 of 2DR. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Office of Medical Services, has a notation that on 16 August 1960, he received a box of Cuban cigars to be treated with a lethal material. (21). He understood them to be CASTRO'S favorite brand. (21). GUNN's notes show that within the next month he contacted Ray Treichler, of TSD, (Sept. 6, 1960) and gave him the box of cigars (21). Treichler recalls "that he did contaminate a full box of 50 cigars with Botulinum Toxin, a virulent poison," (21) which would kill the intended victim upon merely putting it in the mouth. Treichler's notes showed delivery of the box on February 13, 1961, although they do not indicate to whom. (22).FILE:16 Report 77/3/75
[157-10011-10006.pdf — page 5]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:(See the 13 names listed below)CATEGORIES: TOP SECRETDATES:FEB. 1961 (APPROXIMATE)CUBA - PHASE I (Card 1)OCCURRENCE: The I.G. REPORT identified the following persons who knew, in late 1960 or early 1961, of the PHASE I plan to assassinate CASTRO:1. ALLEN DULLES, DCI2. GEN. C. P. CABELL, DDCI3. RICHARD BISSELL, DD/P4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security5. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security, the case officer6. J. D. ESTERLINE, Chief, WH/47. CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief, TSD8. RAY MERCICHLER, Chemical Division, TSD9. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services10. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, FI/D11. SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, Special Assistant to the DD/P (GOTTLIEB's name was encountered repeatedly in this inquiry, but he denies knowing of the operation in 1960-61.)12. ROBERT BANNERMAN, DD/Security13. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He too denies knowing of the operation at the time.)SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 34-35STAFF: BaronDATE: 28.6.75FILE:
[157-10011-10006.pdf — page 6]
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZED11-4-93| PERSONS/ENTITIES:     | DATES:             | CATEGORIES: || --------------------- | ------------------ | ----------- || Sam Gold              | September 25, 1961 | Castro      || Dr. Edward Gunn       |                    |             || Juan Orta             |                    |             || Dr. Raymond Treichler |                    |             || Cornelius Roosevelt   |                    |             |OCCURRENCE: In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing the mission, Sam Gold suggested that they not resort to firearms, but that if he could be furnished with some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official, who had been receiving back payments from the gambling interests who still had access to Castro, and was in a financial bind. Cornelius Roosevelt, Chief, TSD was consulted and assigned Dr. Raymond Treichler to develop a pill that had the elements of rapid solubility, high lethal content, and little or no traceability. Six of these items were produced and after being checked out for their effectiveness by Dr. Edward M. Gunn, Three pills were ultimately turned over to Sam for the mission. Neither TSD nor Dr. Gunn was briefed on the ultimate use of the pills.**TOP SECRET**SOURCE: CIA Justice File R-153 Memorandum by Howard J. Osborn to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subj: Robert A. Maheu dated June 24, 1966.STAFF: RheaDATE: July 1, 1975
[157-10011-10006.pdf — page 7]
## PERSONS/ENTITIES:SANCHEZ Samuel HALPERNAMLASHDr. Edward GUNN## DATES:Nov. 20, 1963## CATEGORIES:Castro## OCCURRENCE:SANCHEZ reported that although AMLASH had wanted "a high-powered, silenced rifle with an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards," (92) he decided finally that he knew, as a Doctor of Medicine, that "we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try." (92)Samuel HALPERN and SANCHEZ requested assistance from Dr. Edward GUNN of the CIA Office of Medical Services. (92) On Nov. 20, 1963, they told GUNN that "the device for administering the poison (a ball point pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe) had to be ready in time for SANCHEZ to catch a plane at noon the next day." (93)The next day GUNN delivered to SANCHEZ a pen capable of injecting a poisonous insecticide known as "black leaf 40". (92-93)## SOURCE:IG REPORT 19## FILE:## STAFF:F Baron## DATE:7/1/75
[157-10011-10006.pdf — page 8]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:HelmsHarvey, Wm.Gunn, Dr. EdwardDATES:5/25/67CATEGORIES:CASTROThe memorandum of April 25, 1967 which introduces the IG's Report on assassination plotting in relation to FIDEL CASTRO indicates that the only written records which served as a basis for the IG Report were: Notes of William Harvey; Records of Dr. Edward Gunn (Office of Medical Services; and, brief records of Ray Treichler (of TSD). Some operational files were also used.For the most part, the Inspector General's office relied upon information given to us orally by people who's memories are fogged by time. (1)"We interviewed everyone whom we could identify as likely to be knowledgeable, with the exceptions of MR. DULLES and GENERAL CABELL." (2)A complete list of the interviewees is attached to the IG Report at Tab A. "If there are significant innaccuracies in the Report they are most likely to occur in faulty ordering of the sequence of events." (2).SOURCE:IG Report/1967FILE:STAFF:BaronDATE:
[157-10011-10006.pdf — page 9]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:Harvey Bissell Kennedy, Robert HALPERNDATES:1961October,CATEGORIES:CastroOCCURRENCE:Halpern testified that in the fall of 1961 he attended a meeting with Bissell and. was the Branch Chief (8). The meeting occured in the middle of Oct. of 1961. Bissell stated at the meeting that he had recently "been chewed out in the cabinet room of the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime. His orders to both and to me to plan an operation to accomplish that end. Halpern testified that no limitations were put on the term "get rid of". Nothing was forbidden (8). The meeting involved only general discussions and not tactics.SOURCE:Halpern 6/18/73STAFF:RheaFILE:DATE:7/1/75
[157-10011-10006.pdf — page 10]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:| Halpern      | Oct 1961 | Castro || ------------ | -------- | ------ || Bissell      |          |        || Gen Lansdale |          |        |OCCURRENCE:Shortly after Halpern's meeting with Bissell, Hapern, and Zoobev were introduced to Gen Lansdale who was the new Chief of Operations for an effort to remove the Castro regime. The initial meeting was concerned with only organizational matters.TOP SECRETSOURCE:Halpern 6/18/75STAFF: PheaFILE:DATE: 7/1/75
[157-10011-10006.pdf — page 11]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:HarveyHalpernHelmsMCCONEDATES:Dec 1961CATEGORIES:CastroOCCURRENCE:Zoche sometime in Dec of 1961, described to Halpern a meeting at the director's office in which McCone had stated that Helms would henceforth "be his man on Cuba." (15) Zordoya told Halpern that Helms had no inkling that he would be appointed head of the Cuban operations before this meeting (13). Sometime after the meeting Helms came to Zombeyza office, checked into the organization of Costas operations and directed that Cuba would be a separate activity and no longer part of the WH Division (14).TOP SECRETSOURCE:Halpern 6/18/75STAFF:RheaFILE:DATE:7/1/75
[157-10011-10006.pdf — page 12]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:| FITZGERALD, Desmond | DATES:     | CATEGORIES: || ------------------- | ---------- | ----------- || HALPERN, Sam        | Early 1963 | CASTRO      || CHEEVER, Bruce      |            |             |OCCURRENCE:DESMOND FITZGERALD originated a scheme to assassinate CASTRO: "The idea was to taken an unusually spectacular sea shell that would be certain to catch CASTRO's eye, load it with an explosive trigger to blow when the shell was lifted, and submerge it in an area where CASTRO often went skin diving." (77)FITZGERALD explored this idea at several sessions with SAM HALPERN and BRUCE CHEEVER, but it was ultimately dismissed as impractical. (77).DISCOVERY LEADS: Note: There is no indication that FITZGERALD told anyone above him in the CIA hierarchy of this plan.SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967STAFF:FILE:DATE: 6/29/75
[157-10011-10006.pdf — page 13]
PERSONS/ENTITIES:SANCHEZ Samuel HALPERNAMLASHDr. Edward GUNNDATES:Nov. 20, 1963CATEGORIES:CastroOCCURRENCE:SANCHEZ reported that although AMLASH had wanted "a high-powered, silenced riflewith an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards," (92) he decided finallythat he knew, as a Doctor of Medicine, that "we could devise some technical meansof doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life inthe try." (92)Samuel-HALPERN--and SANCHEZ requested -assistance from Dr. Edward GUNN of the CIA---Office of Medical Services. (92) On Nov. 20, 1963, they told GUNN that "thedevice for administering the poison (a ball point pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe)had to be ready in time for SANCHEZ to catch a plane at noon the next day." (93)The next day GUNN delivered to SANCHEZ a pen capable of injecting a poisonousinsecticide known as "black leaf 40". (92-93)SOURCE:IG REPORT 1964STAFF:F BaronFILE:DATE:7/1/75
[157-10011-10006.pdf — page 14]
TOP SECRETPERSONS/ENTITIES:KING, J. C. HARVEYIG REPORT EDWARDSBISSELLHALPERNDATES:May 23, 1967CATEGORIES:CASTROOCCURRENCE:The following sources of information were used in preparing the IG REPORT of 1967: (1) Files: Furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Chief of WH Division, and by Col. J. C. KING, former Chief of WH Division. Also, the Director of Central Reference furnished biographic files and intelligence publications. (2) Interviews: Desmond Fitzgerald, Sam Halpern, Bruce Cheever, J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez, J. D. Esterline, Edward Gunn, Howard Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney Gottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard Bissell, Lawrence Houston, Ray Treichler, John Warner, Nestor Sanchez, William Harvey, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, Henry Bortner, Richard Ober.SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967 STAFF: BaronFILE: DATE: 7/2/75TOP SECRETCIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZED11-4-94(1)(A)![photo of page 15]