Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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TOP SECRETOctober 10It seems to me, although the records don't reflect it, that there was a meeting in September, a very brief one, in which I must have been told that there was a specific program going underway. That probably would have been by Henry (Kissinger) and perhaps with Karamessines there. I am not sure. (Haig testimony, p. 12)Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with General Haig. He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from all."(Memorandum/LUBELT, by William Broe, 10 October 1970)Haig recalled the telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 10th. His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation.I do know, and I know that from looking at the record this morning, that Karamessines made a telephone call to me in which he gave a progress report. I recall that. It was in effect a negative progress report, that they were just not coming up with it. (Haig testimony, p. 12)TOP SECRET
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-48-Haig indicated to the Committee that he would have passed along thesubstance of that conversation to Kissinger, and that in general hisrole at the time was one of a conduit to Kissinger:I am quite confident that, given my own concep-tion of my role at that time, that I would haveconveyed that information to Henry,...(Haig testimony, p. 13)***Q. If Mr. Karamessines was unable to see Dr.Kissinger, and talked to you, what degree oflatitude did you have concerning what you wouldpass on to Dr. Kissinger?General Haig. At that time I would consider Ihad no degree of latitude, other than to conveyto him what had been given to me. (Ibid., p. 15)October 14A cable to Santiago for (Colonel Wimert) ostensibly from GeneralBennett, authorized (Wimert) to select two Chilean general officers andconvey to them the following message: "High authority in Washingtonhas authorized you to offer material support short of armed interven-tion to Chilean Armed Forces in any endeavors they may undertake toprevent the election of Allende on October 24...." (Headquarters toStation cable 762, October 14, 1970) Karamessines testified that inthis case "high authority" would have been Kissinger or the President,for no one else could have given (Wimert) such broad authorization.Karamessines presumed that the message had been drafted in, or atleast cleared with, the White House. (Karamessines testimony, p. 91)However, Kissinger did not recall having authorized the October 14thcable. He found the sequence of events puzzling: having been told onthe 10th that little was happening, he would have expected in the
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October 15Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to discuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines gave a run-down on Viaux, Canales and Firado and "the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux did not have more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less--to launch a successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:5. It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence our message was to state: "We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support."6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instructed Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and securely to maintain the capability for Agency operations against Allende in the future.8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply. (Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15 October 1970)![TOP SECRET]
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meeting on the 15th (see below) to have discussed the results of the October 14th message. But the CIA record makes no mention of any such discussion. (Kissinger testimony, p. 53)October 14The Senior Review Group met to discuss Chile. (Karamessines calendar)October 15Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to discuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines gave a run-down on Viaux, (Canales and Tirado) and "the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux did not have more than one chance in twenty-perhaps less--to launch a successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:5. It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence our message was to state: "We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support."6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instructed Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and securely to maintain the capability for Agency operations against Allende in the future.8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply. (Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15 October 1970)
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-50-Kissinger, in his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat more detailed than he would have remembered. (Kissinger testimony, p. 52)He believed the Agency had been told to "stand down and preserve your assets."Kissinger believed that the gist of the October 15th meeting as recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA issued to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based on the October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum of the meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a "high incentive to preserve the maximum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp. 55-56) The October 16th order indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous day, and stated:2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date....4. There is great and continuing interest in the activities of (Girardi, Canales) Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune.   (Headquarters 802, 16 October 1970)Kissinger recalled the October 15th conversation as "turning off the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do them." (Kissinger testimony, p. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony.The conclusions of that meeting were that we had better not do anything rather than something that was not going to succeed.... My 'general feeling was, I left that meeting with the impression that there was nothing authorized."(Haig testimony, p. 13)Lodge further warned that "the US must not appear publicly in the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends" (Cable, Lodge to Harriman, 8/26/63).NW-50055 DocId:32202487 Page 141
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-5-In a cable on August 25, CIA Chief of Station John Richardson reported the result of a conference among himself, Lodge, True- heart, General Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision from Washington and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions", (I.G., C, pp. 7-8) but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his brother from his position in the government.Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation that the United States contemplated suspending aid to the South Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers, p. 212).Later on that same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officers Conein and *Spera* were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh, respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243, but to remind them that "we cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action, win or lose" (SAIG 0304), 8/26/63).A message from the White House on August 29 authorized Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding, but did not involve United States armed forces. Lodge was autho- rized to suspend United States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272, 8/29/63.) A cable from the President to Lodge on the same day stated:[^1] In a cable to Harriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broadcast had "complicated our already difficult problem" by eliminating "the possibility of the generals' effort achieving surprise." Lodge further warned that "the US must not appear publicly in the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends" (Cable, Lodge to Harriman, 8/26/63).[^1]: *In a cable to Harriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broadcast had "complicated our already difficult problem" by eliminating "the possibility of the generals' effort achieving surprise." Lodge further warned that "the US must not appear publicly in the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends" (Cable, Lodge to Harriman, 8/26/63).
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-8-against a coup, but suggested that alternative leadership should be identified and cultivated. The recommendations were promptly approved by the President. (Pentagon Papers, pp.215-116)On October 3 Conein contacted Minh. Minh explained that a coup was being planned, and requested assurances of American support if it were successful. Minh outlined three courses of action, one of which was the assassination of Dien's brothers, Nhu and Can (Conein, p.25; cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).The Acting Chief of the CIA Station, David R. Smith cabled on October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that "we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a protracted struggle" (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).A cable from the Director, CIA to Saigon responded that:"(w)e certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every such threat of which we might receive even partial knowledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of Diem. We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this matter opens door too easily for probes of our position re others, re support of regime, et cetera. Consequently believe best approach is hands off. llowever, we naturally interested in intelligence on any such plan."* The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon by various military units and direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyalist units.** Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted this cable for McCone. Colby testified:"Q: So you were on notice as of that date that the Director personally opposed any involvement by the CIA in an assassination?.""Colby: I certainly was." (Colby, p. 57)
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-9-McCone testified that he met privately with the President and the Attorney General, taking the position that "our role was to assemble all information on intelligence as to what was going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but to not attempt to direct it" (McCone, p. 62). He believed the United States should maintain a "hands off attitude" (McCone,p. 62). McCone testified:"I felt that the President agreed with my position, despite the fact that he had great reservations concerning Diem and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My precise words to the President, and I remember them very clearly, was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that, if Diem was removed we would have not one coup but we would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam and it might last several years and indeed it did." (McCone, pp. 62-63.)McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with the President, but rather "whether we should let the coup go or use our influences not to". He left the meeting believing that the President agreed with his "hands off" recommendation (McCone, pp. 62-63). McCone cabled on October 6:"McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under McCone instructions, as we cannot be in position actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefore" (CIA to Saigon, DIR 73661, 10/6/63).In response, the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters:"Action taken as directed. In addition, since DCM Trueheart was also present when original recommendation was made, specific withdrawal of recommendation at McCone's Instruction was also conveyed to Trueheart. Ambassador Lodge commented that he shares McCone's opinion." (Saigon to CIA, SAIG 1463, 10/7/63)
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-14-None of the informed sources give any indication of direct or indirect involvement of the United States.** It must be noted that on October 30, 1963, Ambassador Lodge notified Washington that there might be a request by ked leaders for evacuation, and suggested Saipan as a point for evacuation (Saigon Station Cable No. 2036, 10/30/63). Conein was charged with obraining the airplane. Between 6:00 and 7:00 on the morning of November 2, Minh and Don asked Conein to procure an aircraft. Conein relayed the request to David Smith, Acting Chief of Station at the Embassy, who replied that it would not be possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours, since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to a country that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in any other country. There were no aircraft immediately available that had sufficient range to reach a potential country of asylum (Conein, p. 54).
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United States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone assassination", although he did state that if the coup succeeded, the United States would support the plotters.d. LumumbaThe chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the assassination plot was authorized by the President. It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot. The juxtaposition of discussions concerning "disposing of" Lumumba and taking "straightforward action" against him at NSC and Special Group meetings with Dulles' cable to the Congo, Bissell's representation to Gottlieb about "highest authority", and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support an inference that the President and the Special Group urged the assassination of Lumumba.Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does, as he said, offer a "clue" about Presidential authorization which, however, should be read in light of the uncertain record of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary testimony of others in attendance at the meetings, including the President's national security advisors. The fact that both the Chief of Station and Gottlieb were under the impression that there was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because
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-17A-this impression was derived solely from Gottlieb's meetingswith Bissell and Tweedy. Neither Gottlieb nor the Chief ofStation had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statementsabout Presidential authorization. Richard Bissell assumedthat such authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles,but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event whenthis occurred.The evidence leads us to conclude that DDP Bissell andDCI Dulles knew about and authorized the plot to assassinateLumumba. However, we are unable to make a finding thatPresident Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassinationeffort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute certaintyin the evidence.
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-19-First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plots, a matter which is not certain. Second, it assumes that Dulles went privately to the two Presidents--a course of action which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than Bissell, testified was precisely what the doctrine of plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing. Third, it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand from a "circumlocutious" description that assassination was being discussed.The chain of assumptions is far too speculative for the Committee to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not able to speak for themselves. Moreover, it is inconsistent with Bissell's other testimony that "formal and explicit" approval would be required for assassination,* and contrary to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy.* If the evidence concerning President Eisenhower's order to assassinate Lumumba is correct, it should be weighed against Bissell's testimony concerning circumlocutious briefings of the Presidents in the Castro case. First, the Lumumba case would imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously. Second, the Lumumba example indicates that the President would discuss such matters openly in an appropriate forum, and would not need to be approached privately. Third, it can be inferred from Bissell's testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had told Dulles that he approved of the plot, Dulles would not have told anyone else of that fact. Yet Gottlieb's testimony in the Lumumba case states that he had been told of Presidential autho-rization for assassination by Bissell, who in turn assumed he was told by Dulles.
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# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM## IDENTIFICATION FORM### AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : SSCIARECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10424RECORDS SERIES :AGENCY FILE NUMBER: R1076CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF CIA INFORMATIONIN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED### DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR: CIAFROM: ELDER, WALTERTO: MILLER, WILLIAM G.TITLE :LETTER/ATTACHMENTDATE: 09/09/75PAGES: 4SUBJECTS :TR TRANSMITTING REQUESTED INFO-DD/O LIAISON CONTACTS-MIAMIDOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION: SRESTRICTIONS: REFERREDCURRENT STATUS: PDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/14/93OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS:BOX 361-9[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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Box 361-9CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYWASHINGTON, D.C. 2050551076IX-C-2-H-PI10/24SSCI BOX # 361-9Review Staff: 75/28839 September 1975Mr. William G. MillerStaff DirectorSelect Committee To Study GovernmentalOperations With Respect To IntelligenceActivititesRoom G-308Dirksen Senate Office BuildingWashington, D. C. 20510Dear Mr. Miller:In partial response to paragraph IV, (14) of your31 July 1975 letter, we enclose for your information aself-explanatory memorandum which reports certain DD/Oliaison contacts in the Miami area.Sincerely,Waet ElderWalter ElderAssistant to the DirectorAttachment:As stated![NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION stamp]![RECEIVED stamp]![APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993 CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM AS SANITIZED stamp]
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SECRETX107628 AUG 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DDO (Mr. John H. Waller)SUBJECT: JMWAVE Contacts with State, County and Local Police Organizations and Individuals, 1960-1973REFERENCE: Mr. Waller's Memorandum to DC/LAD dated 19 August 1975The following is a list from the Latin America Division of contacts between Station JMWAVE and state, county and local police organizations and individuals in the Miami area between 1960-1973:1.  Statea. The Department of Public Safety provided the Station with blank Florida drivers licenses when needed for operational purposes by Station officers. These licenses, which were never used as licenses to drive a vehicle, were filled in with aliases and utilized primarily by Station officers as a means of establishing identification under an assumed name with informants such as Cuban exiles living in the Miami area. The Station's point of contact (1962-1966) was a Colonel H. N. Kirkman, Director of Public Safety.b. The Florida Highway Patrol, which is part of the Department of Public Safety, provided the Station with courtesy cards to facilitate their Agency work which requested Florida highway patrolmen to render assistance to the bearer of the cards. The Station also had access to the Highway Patrol's communication system that could be used in an emergency to establish contact with our officers in various parts of the State of Florida when needed. Major Lee Simmons, Inspector, Florida Highway Patrol, was the Station's point of contact at the time, 1962-1966.c. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles in Tallahassee, Florida, furnished the Station with "blocked" automobile license plates for use on Station vehicles. These plates protected Station personnel and installations, since the records for the plates were withdrawn from the issuing offices. Any inquiries made by outsiders would be fruitless.SECRETDocId:32202614 Page 3SEP 10 1975EZ IMPDETCL BY 012180