Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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-2-I am particularly appreciative of your recognition that certain sensitive aspects of our intelligence activities must receive special consideration and treatment by the Select Committee in the course of your work. As we discussed, such matters as the identities of our sensitive sources, the material provided to us by cooperating foreign intelligence services, the details of technical devices and systems and of operational methods, the identities of certain of our employees who could be targets of kidnapping or assassination, the identities of American citizens and organizations who have cooperated with U.S. intelligence, and some additional materials the public disclosure of which would create serious foreign policy or national security problems, should be protected not only from exposure, but indeed from the risk of exposure. We should also work together to protect certain other information which, if improperly disclosed, might impair the privacy rights of individuals. Where these kinds of considerations are present, I anticipate that appropriate understandings can be arrived at to avoid the risk of exposing such matters and at the same time to satisfy the Select Committee's need for a full understanding of our activities.As I stated to you, employees of the Central Intelligence Agency will be available to the Select Committee for staff interviews and for testimony. As we have discussed, this might require, in some circumstances, special arrangements to protect the identity of particular employees whose physical safety or future career might be placed in jeopardy by exposure. I anticipate that suitable safeguards can be established to avoid such dangers. I assume the Committee will make its own arrangements with respect to ex-employees as to whom I no longer have the authority to direct their cooperation. However, I am available for whatever assistance I can provide in this regard.As you are aware, all employees of the Central Intelligence Agency are required to sign a secrecy agreement when they enter on duty. This is a condition of employment, and it requires that they keep forever secret all classified information gained during the course of their employment. The secrecy agreement further requires that they may not disclose classified informa- tion, either orally or by publication, without prior authoriza- tion from the Director of Central Intelligence. Under the secrecy agreement, an employee's obligations with respect to the protection of classified information continue after his employment with the CIA has been terminated.NW 88296 Docld:32989532 Page 116
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-3-It is my desire that the secrecy agreements signed by our employees shall not impair the necessary work of the Select Committee. To accomplish this, and in recognition of the security protection contemplated by the Select Committee, I have determined that disclosure of otherwise protected information to the Select Committee or its designated staff members will constitute an authorized provision of information within the meaning of the secrecy agreements. This letter may be used to indicate such authorization for any Agency employee or ex-employee to furnish information to the Select Committee or appropriate staff members on matters which would otherwise be covered by their secrecy agreement, but which are not among the particularly sensitive matters such as mentioned above. With respect to those particularly sensitive matters, different procedures are obviously necessary. Accordingly, where any matter included in these sensitive categories would be involved in responding to the Committee, the employee should express his concern and, if possible, propose a way of responding to the Committee without exposing such sensitive details. If the Committee believes that a disclosure of those aspects is nevertheless necessary, the matter will be discussed between the Committee and the Agency. I am prepared to consult with the Committee at any time to avoid difficulties in this area and quickly determine together the appropriate course of action to be taken.With the good faith evident in our discussions on these matters, I believe that these arrangements will enable me to discharge my responsibilities to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, while at the same time to provide the Select Committee with all the information it needs to accomplish its task.As we have agreed, it is in the national interest as well as that of the Select Committee and the U.S. intelligence community to ensure that your review proceed as smoothly and as expeditiously as possible. Toward that end, I have instructed all CIA personnel to respond in a spirit of cooperation.Sincerely,![Signature of W. E. Colby]W. E. ColbyDirectorNW 88296 Docld:32989532 Page 117
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# THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCEWASHINGTON, D. C. 2050510 April 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB PrincipalsSUBJECT: Community Aspects of Inputs to Congressional Committees Investigating Intelligence![FBI ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/19/01 BY SP-2ALM #MOR16]1.  The Intelligence Community Staff, with John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy/IC, as my representative in these matters, will keep the Board and other appropriate officials advised as to progress of the investigations conducted by the Senate and House Select Committees investigating intelligence activities. In particular, it will ensure that we are kept informed as to materials which are formally being provided to the Select Committees by all elements of the Community. The USIB Ad Hoc Group will assist on this matter and provide the mechanism for regular and constant communications.2.  In response to this assignment, the Intelligence Community Staff is establishing a registry for documentation relating to the investigations. This registry will be a source of reference of all responses, testimony, et cetera, provided by USIB agencies and available to your designated representatives.3.  In order to make the registry useful to the Board, it is essential that it include:a. File copies of documents or other materials which each Intelligence Community element provides to one of the Select Committees where the originating agency`considers the materials to involve aspects of Community activities, and/or which may result in follow-on queries concerning. the functioning of the Community. The availability of this documentation will be of particular importance if it is expected there will be subsequent inquiries relating to the materials provided and involving elements of the Community other than the originating element.NW 88296 Docld:32989532 Page 118
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b. An abstract of each formal input to a Select Committee - unless the Intelligence Community registry is provided with an actual copy of the material itself. A proposed format for such abstracts is attached.![signature of W. E. Colby]W. E. ColbyAttachment:As stated
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![CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA]# EMPLOYEE# BULLETIN![#MDR16 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/19/01 BY SPJALM/JTG]No. 442 12 March 1975Senate Select Committee To ReviewU.S. Intelligence ActivitiesSenate Resolution 21 established a Select Committee of the Senate to review U.S. intelligence activities. The Resolution calls for a comprehensive review of the total U.S. intelligence effort and is not restricted to the recent charges and allegations against CIA alone. Consequently, it is likely to be far-ranging in its impact.It is in all of our interests to see that the Select Committee receives full understanding of our activities and their contribution to the country as expeditiously as possible. I have every confidence that the inquiry will be responsible, and constructive, and will produce new understanding of, and improvements in, the American intelligence system.It is with this conviction that I have pledged my personal cooperation and that of the CIA. I have advised Senators Church and Tower, the Committee Chairman and Vice Chairman, that employees of the CIA will be available to the Select Committee for Staff interviews and for testimony. We are working with the Committee Staff to design procedures to facilitate their work in examining topics of concern.Attached to this bulletin is a letter which I have sent to Senator Church. To facilitate the necessary work of the Committee and in recognition of the security protection contemplated by the Committee, I have determined that disclosure of otherwise protected information to the Select Committee or its designated Staff members will constitute authorized provision of information within the meaning of the Secrecy Agreements signed by each CIA employee, subject to the special procedures and limitations set forth in the letter regarding particularly sensitive matters. Senator Church has agreed that reference to sensitive data in any Committee report will be subject to consultation between the Committee and the Agency.NW 88296 Docld:32989532 Page 120
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The cooperative spirit of our relationship with the Committee and its Staff must at the same time take account of the rights of Agency employees. The Committee Staff has agreed to advise employees of their Constitutional rights at the beginning of any interview or other appearance.When a current Agency employee is selected to be interviewed by the Select Committee Staff, the Staff Director or Chief Counsel will normally notify Mr. John M. Clarke, who is my principal liaison with the Committee and its Staff. Mr. Clarke, in turn, will notify the employee. The purpose of this is in no way to inhibit the work of the Committee. It is intended to allow time for the employee to gain general legal guidance if he wants it, and to obtain security guidance from an appropriate senior officer.My own belief is that after a careful review of all U.S. intelligence activities, the Committee will address needed legislative changes and will reaffirm their confidence in the importance and contribution of U.S. intelligence programs.![signature of W.E. Colby]W. E. ColbyDirectorAttachment: a/sDISTRIBUTION: ALL EMPLOYEES
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## Issues Identified1. Economic Intelligence and National Security -- new discussion.   TREASURY   CIA2. Covert Action and the Law.   CIA VOSD3. The Intelligence Budget -- open, block or closed -- notional procedures for handling past, present and future.   OMB4. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for Intelligence.   CIA and OSD5. GAO and the Audit Authorities of U.S. Intelligence Agencies.   CIA and OSD6. Confidential Funds Authorities, Contingency Reserves, Legal Base, History and Use.   CIA and OSD   FBI-MINTZ7. Cover for Foreign Intelligence Actions, Legal and Administrative Issues,   CIA and State8. Intelligence Files and Privacy.   FBI and OSD9. The "fact of" question -- international, legal and political considerations.   State10. "Sources and Methods" Legislation.    OMB and Justice11. An additional issue (identified by Mr. Hills) address -- adequacy or inadequacy of present classification procedures.    Legal Office, Justice, was assigned the initial responsibility of drafting a paper with inputs from the Agencies.12. Executive Branch Oversight of - NSC Intelligence Community.Names are to be forwarded ASAP.
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FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMANJOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMANPHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.GARY HART, COLO.WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTORUnited States SenateSELECT COMMITTEE TOSTUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITHRESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510March 12, 1975![Executive Registry 75-1266]![Ad Hoc Staff 75-103]Mr. William E. ColbyDirector of Central IntelligenceCentral Intelligence AgencyWashington, D.C. 20505Dear Mr. Colby:![#MOR16 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1119/01 BY SP2 ALMAG]On behalf of the Senate Select Committee To Study GovernmentalOperations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, I want to thankyour for your letter of March ll, and the copy of the Employee Bulletinyou have issued to all CIA employees. As we jointly recognize, inorder for the Committee to carry out a thorough inquiry, in accordancewith the mandate contained in S. Res. 21, the Agency's full cooperationwill be necessary. Your recognition that our mandate authorizes all,past and present, agency employees to cooperate fully, and withoutimpediment due to secrecy agreements, will serve to facilitate ourexpeditious collection of material relative to that mandate.I particularly appreciate your statement recognizing our securityprecautions. As you know, your staff was very helpful to the Committee'sstaff in designing those precautions.The Staff Director and the Chief Counsel will, under the directionof the Committee, notify Mr. John Clarke of the members of the Committeewho have been designated to carry out studies, inquiries and investigationsrequired to meet the tasks specified in S. Res. 21.It is the Committee's understanding that the members of the Committeeand designated staff will have access to any and all information whichthe Committee determines is necessary for its inquiry. We recognize,however, that the Committee inquiry may touch on sensitive areas, suchas the identity of CIA personnel, sources, or cooperating organizationswhose disclosure could place persons in actual jeopardy. In the eventthat the Committee inquiry touches on such sensitive areas, which matterswe have already discussed in our meeting of February 27, we should discussjointly, and as you suggest quickly, what procedures might be followedshould the Committee decide it requires more information in these specificareas.NW 88296 Docld:32989532 Page 123
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Mr. William ColbyPage TwoMarch 12, 1975I welcome these first steps in close cooperation and hope thatit forecasts an expeditious and thorough inquiry that will result inthe strengthening of our nation's intelligence activities under thelaw.Sincerely,![Signature of Frank Church]Frank ChurchChairmanNW 88296 Docld:32989532 Page 124
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10 April 1975# The Third Agency Rule1.  As early as November 1953, the third agency rule was included in Executive Order 10501, which has now been revoked. Section 7(c) prohibited the dissemination of "classified defense information originating in another Department or agency" to an agency "outside the receiving Department or agency without the consent of the originating Department or agency." The only exception to this rule is that dissemination may be made under the authority of Section 102 of the National Security Act. This section authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using, where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities."2.  Historically, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to disseminate intelligence has referred to "finished intelligence." This product is the end result of contributions from members of the Intelligence Community. Therefore, in this situation the finished product is a homogenous product and therefore the approval for further dissemination beyond the receiving agency must come from the Director of Central Intelligence.3.  Executive Order 10501 was superseded by Executive Order 11652 which became effective 1 June 1972. This Executive order did not specifically cover the third agency rule. However, it does provide the following controls: Sec. 9. Special Departmental Arrangements. The originating Department or other appropriate authority may impose, in conformity with the provisions of this order, special requirements with respect to access, distribution and protection of classified information and material, including those which presently relate to communications intelligence, intelligence sources and methods and cryptography.4.  In anticipation of the implementation of Executive Order 11652, a directive was issued on May 17, 1972 entitled "National Security Council Directive Governing the Classification, Downgrading, Declassification and Safeguarding of National Security Information." This directive does not contain the term "third agency rule" but does have four subsections which relate to procedures which are similar to what historically had been called the third agency rule. These sections are:A.(2) Determination of Need-to-Know. In addition to a security clearance, a person must have a need for access to the particular classified information or material sought in connection with the performance of his official duties or contractual obligations. The determination of that need shall be made by officials having responsibility for the classified information or material.
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D. Consent of Originating Department to Dissemination byRecipient. Except as otherwise provided by Section 102 of theNational Security Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 495, 50 U.S.C. 403,classified information or material originating in one Departmentshall not be disseminated outside any other Department to whichit has been made available without the consent of the originatingDepartment.E. Dissemination of Sensitive Intelligence Information.Information or material bearing the notation "WARNING NOTICE --SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED"shall not be disseminated in any manner outside authorizedchannels without the permission of the originating Departmentand an assessment by the senior intelligence official in thedisseminating Department as to the potential risk to the nationalsecurity and to the intelligence sources and methods involved.F. Restraint on Special Access Requirements. The establish-ment of special rules limiting access to, distribution andprotection of classified information and material under Section 9of the Order requires the specific prior approval of the head ofa Department or his designee.5. Examples of the application of the third agency rule are:(a) In a national security estimate, contributions arereceived from all members of the Intelligence Community, thendisseminated to members of the community under the authorityof the DCI. Recipients may not disseminate the estimate outsidethe Intelligence Community without the approval of the DCI;(b) A CIA intelligence report disseminated to the StateDepartment may not be sent by the State Department to theDepartment of Commerce without the permission of the CIA;(c) Information which the CIA furnishes the President'sCommission may not be disseminated to other agencies or to theCongress without the concurrences of CIA. Thus, a requestfrom the Congress to the Commission for CIA information shouldbe referred to CIA for action so that the necessary protection ofthe information can be insured;
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(d) If the Navy Department discusses one of its operations with CIA, CIA may not include information about that operation in papers it disseminates to other agencies unless it has received the permission of the Navy Department. The distinction here is that a Navy operation would not be considered part of the finished intelligence mechanism and therefore would not fall within the statutory authority of CIA to disseminate intelligence;(e) If a State/DOD joint cable is disseminated to CIA, CIA may not send the information to the FBI until CIA has received the concurrence of both State and DOD.
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CODETO SACS ALEXANDRIABALTIMORENEW HAVENNEWARKOMAHAFROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116395)SENSTUDY 75TELETYPEURGENT5/2/75PERSONAL ATTENTION1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar1 - Mr. S. F. PhillipsCAPTIONED MATTER PERTAINS TO BUREAU'S HANDLING OF REQUESTSFROM SENATE AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEES TO STUDY GOVERNMENTALOPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. INCONNECTION WITH WORK OF THESE COMMITTEES, STAFF MEMBERS MAYINTERVIEW CURRENT AND FORMER FBI EMPLOYEES. THE SENATE SELECTCOMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF HAS ALREADY INTERVIEWED SOME FORMEREMPLOYEES. NEWARK TELETYPE APRIL 30 LAST "ADMINISTRATIVEINQUIRY; 1964 DEMOCRATIC PARTY NOMINATING CONVENTION,ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY," REPORTED ADVICE FROM FORMERSPECIAL AGENT JOHN P. DEVLIN THAT HE HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED BYMICHAEL T. EPSTEIN, SSC STAFF MEMBER, CONCERNING DEVLIN'S PARTPersonnel File of Each Former SASEE NOTE PAGE THREEAssoc. Dir.Dep. AD Adm.Dep. AD Inv.Asst. Dir.:Admin.Comp. Syst.Ext. AffairsFiles & Com.Gen. Inv.Ident.InspectionIntall.LaboratoryPlan. & Eval.Spec. Inv.TrainingLegal Coun.Telephone Rm.Director Sec'yMAY 16 1975MAIL ROOMTELETYPE UNITMAY 0 2 1975NW 88296 Docld:32989532 Page 128
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TELETYPE TO SACS, ALEXANDRIA ET ALRE: SENSTUDY 7562-116395IN FBI'S ACTIVITIES AT DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION, ATLANTIC CITY,AUGUST 22-28, 1964.SET OUT BELOW ARE NAMES AND LAST KNOWN ADDRESSES OF FORMERBUREAU AGENTS ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL SQUAD AT ATLANTIC CITY,AUGUST, 1964. EACH OF THESE FORMER AGENTS IS TO BE IMMEDIATELYCONTACTED AND ALERTED THAT THEY MIGHT BE APPROACHED BY THE SSCSTAFF. THEY ARE NOT, REPEAT NOT, TO BE ADVISED OF THE AREA WHICHMAY BE COVERED IN ALTY INTERVIEW OF THEM BY THE SSC. THEY SHOULD,HOWEVER, BE TOLD THAT IN THE EVENT THEY ARE INTERVIEWED AND DURINGTHE COURSE OF SAME, QUESTIONS ARE ASKED WHICH RELATE TO SENSITIVEBUREAU OPERATIONS, THEY CAN REQUEST THAT AN FBI AGENT BE PRESENT.CONTACTS WITH THESE FORMER AGENTS TO BE HANDLED PERSONALLY BYSAC OR ASAC. IN THE EVENT THIS NOT FEASIBLE FOR JUST CAUSE, TOBE HANDLED BY A SENIOR SUPERVISOR.IMMEDIATELY AFTER CONTACT, RESULTS SHOULD BE FURNISHED BUREAUBY TELETYPE IN ABOVE CAPTION. IF A. FORMER AGENT NO LONGER INYOUR TERRITORY OR TEMPORARILY AWAY, SET OUT LEAD TO OTHER OFFICEIMMEDIATELY WITH COPY TO FBIHQ.NEWARK SHOULD INCLUDE RECONTACT WITH DEVLIN FOR PURPOSEINDICATED ABOVE AND ALSO FURNISH BUREAU ANY INFORMATION DEVLINMAY HAVE FURNISHED YOUR OFFICE IN ADDITION TO THAT IN YOUR TELETYPE.NW 88296 Docld:32989532 Page 129- 2 -
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TELETYPE TO SACS, ALEXANDRIA ET ALRE: SENSTUDY 7562-116395ALEXANDRIA: HAROLD F. LEINBAUGH, 1643 NORTH VAN DORN,ALEXANDRIA. WILLIAM P. GEORGE, 8338 WAGON WHEEL ROAD, ALEXANDRIABALTIMORE: DONALD G. HANNING, 18 OXFORD STREET, CHEVY CHASENEW HAVEN: HOBSON H. ADCOCK, 65 GLENBROOK ROAD, STAMFORD,CONNECTICUT.NEHARK: LEO THOMAS CLARK, 1421 ATLANTIC AVENUE,ATLANTIC CITY. JOHN PATRICK DEVLIN, 39 BENNINGTON ROAD,LIVINGSTON, NEW JERSEY. HOWARD J. WILSON, 30 CAMPBELL ROAD,SHORT HILLS, NEW JERSEY.OMARA: JOHN J. QUINN, IOWA LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY,JOHNSTON, IOVANOTE: Addresses are most recent available in personnel filesof these former Agents. The Newark teletype mentioned was sentup with an informative note advising that we had checked withMr. James Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, andhe interposed no objection to our contacting former Agents whoparticipated in the special squad we had at Atlantic City in8/64 and advising them they might be approached for interviewby the SSC. Assistant Director Mintz concurred in the IntelligenceDivision recommendation that we, on approval, contact the formerAgents as indicated in this outgoing teletype. Deputy AssociateDirector J. B. Adams advised of his agreement with this recommen-dation and for instructions to go forward to the field.Howard J. Wilson, one of the former Agents designatedto be contacted, resigned for family reasons after being censured,suspended, placed on probation, and transferred for unsatisfactorywork performance detected during an inspection of the Newark Office.However, there is no evidence in his personnel file suggestingWilson is hostile to the Bureau and the INTD believes he should beincluded among those former Agents to becoontacted.