Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[124-10273-10007_multirif.pdf — page 201]
(d) Investigative guidelines with reference to Title 11, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Regulation of Explosives, prepared by the Attorney General, submitted by letter to the FBI 1/11/73.7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/75.8. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/8/7510. LOCATION OF FILE COPY. FBI file 62-116395-6511. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS:These agreements and guidelines have direct bearing on the scope of responsibility of other intelligence community members and are in the nature of controls for both the FBI and other community members where common interests and responsibilities are present.NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.- 2 -
[124-10273-10007_multirif.pdf — page 202]
2 - Mr. S. F. PhillipsMay 1, 1975MATERIAL FOR SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)INVESTIGATING INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES1. TITLE/SUBJECT: Organization of the FBI2. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION: FBI3. NATURE OF MATERIAL: Letterhead memorandum (LHM)4. DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified5. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION STAMP: NA6. SUMMARY OF CONTENTS:LHM refers to a request for the titles and number of FBI field Agents assigned to internal security, intelligence collection, and/or counterintelligence matters, operations, or activities, together with the percentage of total Agent manhours devoted to such matters. LHM advises that a current survey of all FBI field offices had been made to obtain the desired data but that since the information is considered highly sensitive, it was not being furnished directly to the SSC, but being maintained in the Intelligence Division at FBIHQ available for review by appropriately cleared personnel of the SSC Staff upon request.7. REQUESTER/DATE OF REQUEST: SSC. 3/19/758. RELEASING AUTHORITY: FBI9. DATE OF SUBMISSION: 4/21/7510. LOCATION OF FILE COPY: FBI file 62-116395-8211. RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROBLEMS: None.62-116395SFP: ekw (4)NOTE: Original via liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
[124-10273-10053.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992Memorandum to Mr. W. R. WannallRe: Senstudy 7562-116395## SSC FOREIGN TRAVELThe CIA was informed by Senator Walter F. Mondale, a member of the SSC that he intended to travel to Europe to inspect some of the CIA covert intelligence sites in Norway and other locations. The White House, and particularly Mr. Roderick Hills, was very concerned about this type of trip feeling that it could cause all sorts of problems with friendly foreign intelligence services and possibly result in a discontinuance of agreements between CIA and some of the friendly foreign intelligence services. Mr. Colby felt that such trips had been arranged for in the past involving congressmen and that some good came out of such trips. The Committee discussed the pros and cons of the contemplated trip by Mondale and possibly Senator Gary Hart, also a member of the SSC, and decided that the purpose and procedures for such trips would be discussed with Senator Church by Mr. Colby and a senior official of the Department of State.## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATESThe SSC has asked Colby for detailed briefings as to how National Intelligence Estimates are prepared by the United States Intelligence Board for the NSC. Colby contemplates giving a rather detailed briefing to the SSC on this procedure accompanied by several senior officials of the Intelligence Community Staff.ACTION:For information and record purposes.![signature]![signature]I recommend that we confirm this by letter to Senator Church. I have been unable to find any other documentation that it was accepted by the Committee.![signature]
[124-10273-10070.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992Office Mem**SECRET**TO: MR. BOARDMANFROM: A.H. BELMONTSUBJECT: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)GOVERNMENTDATE: January 22, 1958On January 10, 1958, (Harry Stone) of MI-5, Liaison Representative with the Bureau, confidentially advised that his Service had determined that Soviet illegal agents all over the world, when they want a meet with their Principal, are under instructions to send a proper communication to "K. S. Smirnov, Central Post Office, Vladimir, U.S.S.R." Mr. Stone stated(s) that the aforementioned information was being made available to the Bureau and the (RCMP) only.On the basis of this information, we immediately instructed the Washington Field and New York Offices to institute confidential inquiries with appropriate Post Office officials to determine the feasibility of covering outgoing correspondence from the U.S. to the (U.S.S.R.), looking toward picking up a communication dispatched to the aforementioned address.On January 21, 1958, SAC Powers of the New York Office called advising that his preliminary inquiries at first disclosed that such coverage could possibly be effected at LaGuardia Airfield. Powers stated that he subsequently received a call from the Chief Post Office Inspector who told him that he would not be able to make such arrangements and explained that something had happened in Washington on a similar matter and that Bureau Headquarters should take up the matter with Post Office Headquarters here in Washington. The Post Office Inspector said that it did not involve our agency and because of what was going on in Washington at the present time, he just couldn't do it on his own.Almost simultaneous with this advice, Mr. James Angleton of CIA approached our Liaison Agent, (Sam Papich) on a personal basis. He indicated that if it were known within CIA that he was volunteering this information to the Bureau, he would lose his job. Mr. Angleton stated it had come to the attention of CIA, through the Post Office, that we were making inquiries concerning the coverage of mail to the (U.S.S.R), and as a result CIA was expecting to receive an inquiry in Washington from the FBI. Mr. Angleton then admitted that this coverage was one of the biggest and most secret operations being conducted by CIA. He stated the coverage is actually made through the Post Office in New YorkWAB:hmmcc: 1- Boardman1- Belmont1- Branigan
[124-10273-10070.pdf — page 1]
273-10070ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.10/26/00CLASSIFIED BY SPALM/elyDECLASSIFY ON: 25XMDR-16
[124-10273-10070.pdf — page 2]
MEMO TO: MR. BOARDMANRE: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)and in view of the volume of material being sent from the U.S., their coverage is an extensive and expensive operation. He indicated that they had to set up an elaborate array of IBM machines to tally and tabulate the results. In addition a complicated indexing procedure was involved, as well as complex scientific examinations of the material. He said two or three hundred CIA employees are exclusively engaged on various facets of the coverage. Angleton also indicated that the cost of the operation was well over a million dollars a year, He further indicated that the coverage has been in existence in excess of a year and he stated that the sole purpose for the coverage was to identify persons behind the Iron Curtain who might have some ties in the U.S. and who could be approached in their countries as contacts and sources for CIA. Angleton indicated that CIA had successfully developed several sources through this means. He stressed the confidential nature of his information and stated that while other officials of CIA more directly concerned with the coverage were expecting a visit from the FBI he was passing this along for our guidance.It would appear that our inquiries of the Post Office officials in New York have flushed out a most secret operation of CIA. The question immediately arises as to whether CIA in effecting this coverage in New York has invaded our jurisdiction. In this regard, it is believed that they have a legitimate right in the objectives for which the coverage was set up, namely, the development of contacts and sources of information behind the Iron Curtain, and according to Angleton they have had some success: in this regard. At the same time, there is an internal security objective here in which, because of our responsibilities, we have a definite interest, namely, the identification of illegal espionage agents who may be in the United States. While recognizing this interest, it is not believed that the Bureau should assume this coverage because of the inherent dangers in the sensitive nature of it, its complexity, size and expense. It is believed that we can capitalize on this coverage by pointing out to CIA our internal security objectives and holding them responsible to share their coverage with us. Of course, we are not interested in the identities of the numerous persons in this country legitimately corresponding abroad. The Post Office has indicated there are approximately four thousand items of correspondence to the U.S.S. R. each day. Angleton said they have not come up with a microdot or secret message communication as yet.ACTION:1.  On the basis of our inquiries conducted in New York, we are in a position and should, through Liaison, approach CIA, informing them that it has been indicated that their Agency has coverage of mail going to the U.S.S.R We should get from them the details of their coverage and explain our interest in being furnished with the results of the coverage as it might effect internal security matters
[124-10273-10070.pdf — page 3]
## SECRETMEMO TO: MR. BOARDMANRE: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE U.S.S.R.)2. It is believed that we can and should furnish CIA with the name and Moscow address furnished us by the British, telling CIA that we want to (s) be advised of any communications going to that address. We will not explain to them our interest in the particular address and, therefore, we will not be violating the confidence of the British. (5)3. In view of the highly sensitive nature of this coverage, we will have to work out arrangements so that knowledge of it is strictly confined within the Bureau. We will handle this the same as handle communications intelligence data.SECRET-3-
[124-10273-10070.pdf — page 4]
# Office MemorandumTO : MR. L. V. BOARDMANFROM: MR. A. H. BELMONTSUBJECT: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)Reference my memo of 1-27-58 advising of the briefing given our Liaison Agent by CIA representatives on 1-24-58 as to the nature and extent of CIA coverage of mail going to and coming from (Russia) Our Liaison Agent determined that CIA began this coverage approximatelý a year and a half ago through confidential arrangements made with postal authorities. Initially, this coverage involved photographing of envelopes; these envelopes were not to be opened. The envelopes were microfilmed and the names and addresses appearing thereon were indexed with IBM equipment. Several months ago CIA began opening some of this mail, microfilming the contents and indexing pertinent data therein. Approximately 250, 000 names have been indexed by CIA. Examination of certain of this mail for microdots and secret writing has been made to a limited extent because the volume of mail has been too humerous for the establishment of a practical system without delaying movement of the mail. CIA has advised that to date it has not discovered any microdots or secret writing or information revealing evidence of Soviet intelligence operations in the United States. CIA has also advised that this program has not reached its full potential, but that its system of opening mail is rapidly increasing. CIA has expressed a willingness to furnish us any information obtained from this coverage which we feel would be of interest to us.An analysis has been made of CIA capabilities as revealed to the Liaison Agent and it is believed we should request that CIA furnish us information of the following types, both that which has been received in the past and that which they will obtain int the future1) All correspondence of a suspicious nature, such as that containing double talk, et cetera.2) All correspondence indicating that the Soviets may be utilizing a hostage situation, i.e., correspondence indicating pressure being exerted on Soviet citizens who have close relatives in the U.S. or pressure being exerted on individuals in U.S.3) Any information appearing in correspondence indicating weaknesses or dissatisfaction on the part of any Soviet presently in the United States so that the Bureau might give consideration to feasibility of approaching such individuals for defection or double agent purposes.4) Any information appearing in correspondence Indicating Soviet control or direction of the Cp, USA.cc - Messrs. Boardman BelmontBranigan LitrentoBaumgardner JDDonohueRapich Turner
[124-10273-10070.pdf — page 5]
# SECRETBelmont to Boardman (2-6-58)re: COVERAGE OF MAIL TO THE (U.S.S.R.)With regard to the above coverage, it is believed desirable that Liaison make arrangements for us to review at CIA any material of this nature and we will then select that which appears to warrant investigation and then make appropriate checks. This procedure will eliminate having CIA sending us a bunch of worthless material with the possible expectation that we will be running out leads for them. It is believed this arrangement can be worked out with CIA in a proper fashion.In addition to the above it is believed the following arrangements can be effected with CIA:1) Place stops against names and addresses of individuals possibly presently engaged in (Soviet) espionage to determine if they are in correspondence with (U.S.S.R.) This would include a check of the back traffic on these individuals also. We would, of course, make these stops on a highly selective basis.2) Request CIA to place stops against addresses in (Soviet Russia) believed by the Bureau to be mail drops or suspected mail drops. (It should be noted that we already have placed a stop with CIA against the name and address of K. S. Smirnov, Central Post Office, Vladimir, U.S.S.R., which, according to information received from Mi-5, is a drop utilized by (Soviet) illegal agents all over the world arranging emergency meetings.We will, of course, continue to analyze this coverage by CIA to see that we obtain maximum benefits.RECOMMENDATIONS:1) That information received from this source be hereinafter designated as (Bureau Informant 200) Records Section has advised that this informant symbol has not been previously used.2) That this matter and any mail relating thereto be labeled "June" and then filed and maintained in the (Sovme) Unit, Room 1734 (the regular repository of "June" mail) to afford maximum security to this source.3) That our Liaison Agent orally advise CIA of the type of data set forth above that would be of interest to us and make arrangements with CIA so that we can review this type of information in order to select that which we feel will warrant further investigation. Liaison should also perfect the arrangement with CIA so that on a continuing basis we can place appropriate stops with them.4) In view of the extreme sensitivity of this matter, a confirmatory memorandum will not be furnished to CTASECRET
[124-10273-10070.pdf — page 6]
# SECRETCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYWASHINGTON 25, D. C.MEMORANDUM FOR: DirectorFederal Bureau of InvestigationAttention: Mr. S. J. Papich6 February 1958SUBJECT: HUNTER Report #11. The intercept project that has been explained orally to (Mr. Papich) will be referred to as Project HUNTER in correspondence between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency.2. This explanatory memorandum constitutes HUNTER-Report #1. Future disseminations will be numbered consecutively.3. In submitting possible traces on individuals of interest to you, reports will be submitted in the following form:a. If the individual named in the intercept appears to be identical with the individual of interest to you, you will be furnished a reproduction of the exterior, and of the contents if the item has been opened.b. If the individual named in the intercept is only possibly identical with the individual of interest to you, only machine run listing of the items will be submitted. In such cases a reproduction of the exterior and of the contents, if the item has been opened, will be available upon request.4. In order to facilitate your reading of machine run entries, there follows an explanation of the various types of replies which you will receive in connection with requests. A hypothetical request for any addressee in the U. S. of mail from (P. KROVAN) whose location is believed to be in Moscow, might result in the following reply:
[124-10273-10070.pdf — page 7]
# SECRET| Date         | Name In                 | Ref Loc | Name Out         | Ref Loc | Ban Firms || ------------ | ----------------------- | ------- | ---------------- | ------- | --------- || A 57CO5C3325 | KROVAN, Paraskoviya (*) | ABB     | EVOSWA, Wasyl () | KM      |           |This reply has the following meaning:"A" has no present meaning. All numbers are now preceeded by "A" only to allow for future additional classifications. None are presently contemplated."57CO5" is the date of intercept, namely: "57" is the year. "C" indicates the month. The code key for months is set out as Enclosure 1. "05" is the day of the month. Thus, "57C05" is 5 March 1957.The group "C3325" is our own internal filing number.The "Name In" entry identifies the correspondent inside the (USSR).The asterisk in "Ref" column indicates that (KROVAN) sent the letter.The entry in "Loc"(ation) column indicates the area or city inside the (Soviet Union) from which the letter was mailed. In this case it was mailed from the western section of (Ukrainian SSR). The code key used for this column is set out in Enclosure 2. This code key is to be used for all items prior to 1 January 1958, on which date a 4-place code was instituted in order to designate more precisely the localities within the (USSR). A copy of this new code is enclosed as Enclosure 3.The "Name Out" entry identifies the correspondent outside the (USSR). In both the "Name In" and "Name Out" columns, the last or family name is listed first.The absence of an asterisk in the "Ref" column after EVOSWA indicates that she is the recipient of the letter.The entry in the second "Loc"(ation) column indicates the state of the U.S. (in this case, New Jersey) to which the letter was addressed. The code key used for this column is set out in Enclosure 4. You will note that some 3-digit entries indicate large cities within a state, thus KO indicates New York State and KOA indicates New York City. For your convenience an alphabetical list of the states with their code indicator is set out in Enclosure 5.2
[124-10273-10070.pdf — page 8]
SECRETThe absence of an "X" in the "Ban" column means that the letter was not opened and that only the exterior is recorded in our files.5. Since the hypothetical request was for mail from(P. KROVAN,) who is believed to be located in (Moscow) only the listing as set out above would be furnished, since it would not appear that(Paraskoviya KROVAN,) located in the western section of the(Ukrainian SSR) is identical. If in connection with future investigation or information otherwise available, you may believe that(KROVAN) may be identical with the individual of interest to you, you need reference only the HUNTER report number and request the exterior photographs of item No. A57C05C3325, which will be reproduced from the original film and made available to you.6. If the hypothetical request is for any mail from the(Soviet Union to Rose ESTERSON,) who resides in Chicago, the reply might be as follows:| Date    | Name In                | Ref Loc | Name Out         | Ref Loc | Ban Firms || ------- | ---------------------- | ------- | ---------------- | ------- | --------- || A57D230 | 57018 (AVRUNINA, Vera) | (*) AAA | (ESTERSON, Rose) | KKB     | X         |The difference in this listing from that previously illustrated is as follows:"U" is our internal identifying designator. The first date is the date of the intercept. The second date is the date of the communication inside the letter. The "X" under the "Ban" column indicates the letter was opened. Again this indicator would indicate only a possible identification since KKB under "Loc" indicates California. In this instance upon request, identifying the HUNTER report number and referencing both A57D23U and 57D18 mumbers, the outer envelopes and their contents will be reproduced and furnished to you.7. Normal service of either of the above requests will be 24 hours. In an emergency we could service the request in a few minutes.8. If your first request had been for (KROVAN, or P. KROVAN, or Paraskoviya KROVAN) located in the western section of the (Ukrainian SSR) you would have initially received the photograph of the envelope. Likewise, in the second instance, if your request had3SECRET
[124-10273-10070.pdf — page 9]
SECRETbeen for ESTERSON, or R. ESTERSON, or Rose ESTERSON locatedin Chicago, or Illinois, you would initially have received photographedcopies of the envelope and its contents.9. In order to insure most efficient servicing of your request,   it is suggested that you submit trace requests as follows: List the   last name first with any known first and given names or initials, and   address including state, city and street, if known. If an exact address   is not known, a probable state or section will be helpful but is not   required. The same would apply to the (USSR) The above should be   listed on duplicate 3 x 5 cards. If only a phonetic name is known,   various combinations of spellings would be appreciated, together   with any other data such as probable address or area. Where an   address is known and there are individuals, other than the subject,   at this address to whom the questioned communication might be   addressed, their names should also be given. For record purposes   and in order to facilitate our answers to your request, would you in   turn number each card as HUNTER Request No.10. On each request will you also indicate whether the request    is for a one-time check or whether the name should be put on the    Watch List. If the latter, please indicate the duration of the Watch    List, i. e. 30, 60, 90 days, or "until cancelled". If a Watch List is    requested, you should also indicate the treatment desired when a    possible hit is made, i. e. photograph outside only; photograph    outside and contents; photograph outside, contents, and examine for    S/W or microdots. Specifically indicate any Watch List item which    should not be opened. In this connection you may also desire to give!    us a white list of correspondents of interest to you whoare not Watch    List subjects but whose mail should not be opened in the course of    our normal openings for spot-checking for operational or intelligence    information. In some instances you may desire to indicate that you    are to be informed immediately when a hit is made and prior to the    receipt of the letter by the addressee.11. It is possible to make a special machine run of the names    of all correspondents either addressor, addressee, or both, from    any specific area in the (USSR) to the United States or to any specific    state or city in the U.S., or vice versa. There are various other    combinations that could be run, such as all letters mailed in Florida    either on a specific date or for any given period. If the above-listed4SECRET
[124-10273-10070.pdf — page 10]
SECRETor any other type of exploratory processing is desired, a presentation of the problem will enable us to tell you immediately what we can do, -how long it will take, and the amount of work that is involved. While this type of service is possible, it does involve a great deal of work and should be requested in connection with very important cases only.FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:![Signature of James Angleton]J. AngletonJames Angleton![Signature]Enclosures (5)SECRET