Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[124-10185-10214.pdf — page 3]
SAM NUNN, GEORGIAERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINABRISURADEY, NEW JERSEYALAN GRANSTON, CALIFORNIADENNIS DICONCING, ARIZONAHOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIOJOHN H. GLENN, JR, OHIO.ORRIN HATCH, UTAHFRANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKAARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIAJOHN WARNER, VIRGINIAALFONSE M. D'AMATO, NEW YORKJOHN C. DANFORTH, MISSOURIGEORGE MITCHELL, MAINE, EX OFFICIOROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIOGEORGE J. TENET, STAFF DIRECTORJAMES H. DYKSTRA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTORL. BRITT SNIDER, GENERAL COUNSELKATHLEEN P. McGHEE, CHIEF CLERKOFFICE OF THESECRETARY OF DEFENSE**United States Senate**SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCEWASHINGTON, DC 20510-8475February 7, 1990SSCI #90-508The Honorable Dick CheneySecretary of DefenseThe PentagonWashington, D.C. 20301Dear Secretary Cheney:The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annualbudget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.S.counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, inRoom SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building. We requestthat you make available to testify at that hearing Mr. RichHaver, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense forIntelligence. Other witnesses invited to testify at thishearing are FBI Director William S. Sessions, Mr. Ivan Selin,Undersecretary of State for Management, and Mr. Ted Price,the announced successor to Mr. Gardner Hathaway as CIAAssociate Deputy Director for Operations and head of the CIACounterintelligence Center.We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discusswith the Committee the results of the Administration's reviewof counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s,whether recent changes in the threat and operatingenvironment require modifying objectives in the 1990s, andthe implications for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation,program direction, and possible legislation. The hearingwill also consider issues identified in the testimony from agroup of prominent citizens scheduled for March 22, and wewill be in touch with you further on those matters.We would like Mr. Haver to address in his writtentestimony and be prepared to discuss the following questions:(1) What are the results of his review of DoD counter-intelligence which you stated was "an early and highpriority" in your letter of May 31, 1989? (2) To what extenthas political change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europediminished their intelligence threat in the 1990s and therequirements for CI operations and security measures againstthat threat? (3) To what extent do other traditionalthreats, such as the PRC and Cuba, require greater attentionin the 1990s? (4) What are the emerging threats in the 1990sfrom third world and "friendly" intelligence services, aswell as narcotics traffickers and terrorists? (5) What newchallenges do technological advances and transfers tocriteria countries and terrorist groups pose in the 1990s?(6) What are the consequences of these changing threats for![photo of SECRET ENCLOSURE Sec Def Cont Nr. 90/51066 X52444]
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SECRETMemorandum to Director, FBI12. ISSUE: The Committee believes the FBI does not share all information contain in its files with other members of the intelligence community when asked and that a centralized file would ensure full information is available to all intelligence agencies.QUESTION: What are the advantages and disadvantages of a single database for CIA, FBI, and DOD?RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That the INTD, ASD, CID, and RMD prepare responses for the questions identified above and submit those questions to the Congressional Affairs Office by close of business April 5, 1989 in the format currently in use classified as appro- riate with a heading for issue, question, summary response, details, and approval signed by the appropriate Assistant Director or Deputy Assistant Director and date signed.APPROVED:Director Adm. Servs. Off. of Cong.Exec. AD-Adm. Crim. Inv. & Public Affs.Exec. AD-Inv. Ident. Off of Lia.Exec. AD-LES Inspection & Intl Affs.Intell. Rec. Mgmt..Laboratory Tech, Servs.Legal Coun. Training2. That the Congressional Affairs Office coordinate the preparation of briefing materials and prepare the Director's opening statement and briefing book.APPROVED:Director Adm. Servs. Off. of Cong.Exec. AD-Adm. Crim. Inv. & Public Affs.Exec. AD-Inv. Ident. Off of Lia.Exec. AD-LES Inspection & Intl Affs.Intell Rec. Mgmt..Laboratory Tech. Servs.Legal Coun. Training- 5 -SECRET
[124-10185-10214.pdf — page 5]
SECRET/SENSITIVE# United States SenateSELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCEWASHINGTON, DC 20510-6476#88-3613October 17, 1988DAVID L. BORER, OKLAHOMA, CHAIRMANWILLIAM S. COHEN, MAINE, VICE CHAIRMANLLOYD BENTSEN, TEXASWILLIAM V. ROTH, JR, DELAWARESAM NUNN, GEORGIAORRIN HATCH, UTAHERNEST F. HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROLINAFRANK MURKOWSKI, ALASKBILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEYARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVAALAN CRANSTON, CALIFORNIACHIC HECHT, NEVADADENNIS DECONCINI, ARIZONAJOHN WARNER, VIRGINIAHOLVARO A METZENBAUM, OHIOROBERT C. BYRO, WEST VIRGINIA, EX OFFICIOROBERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIOGEORGE TENET, STAFF DIRECTORJAMES H. DYKSTRA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTORKATHLEEN P. McGHEE, CHIEF CLERKHonorable William SessionsDirectorFederal Bureau of InvestigationWashington, D.C. 20535Dear Director Sessions:The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is conducting a comprehensive review of U.S. counterintelligence and security programs and capabilities. Included in this review will be Executive branch efforts to stem the flow of sensitive technology and equipment to foreign governments.Recent press reporting has alleged that such transfers have been made by the military offices of Egypt and Israel. Accordingly, I request that the FBI brief the Committee staff on any unauthorized transfer of technology and equipment from the United States by the Egyptians and by the Israelis. For the latter, we are particularly interested in any role played in these transfers by the Israeli Defense Procurement Mission and Trade Center in. New York.Sincerely,![Signature of David L. Boren]David L. BorenChairman![Signature of William S. Cohen]William S. CohenVice ChairmanSECRET/SENSITIVE62-116295-1729
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# MEMORANDUMSECRETTo : Mr. S. M. McWeeney Date 4/20/88From : M. V. HaleSubject : SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI)REQUEST TO DISCUSS THE OFFICE OF LIAISON ANDINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (OLIA) AND THECOUNTERINTELLIGENCE SITUATION IN WEST BERLINThis communication is classified SECRET.Reference memorandum captioned as above dated 4/14/88.PURPOSE: To set forth results of briefing of John Eliff,Professional Staff, SSCI, conducted by Office of CongressionalPublic Affairs Supervisory Special Agent John S. Hooks, Jr., UnitChief Roland O. L'Allier, Jr., Intelligence Division, andOLIA Deputy Chief Martin V. Hale on the issue of Federal Bureauof Investigation (FBI) representation in Berlin.RECOMMENDATION: None, for information only.APPROVED:Director Adm. Servs. Off. of Cong.Exec. AD-Adm. Crim. Inv. & Public AffsExec. AD-Inv. Ident. Off of Lia.Exec. AD-LES Inspection & Intl. AffsIntell. Rec. MgmtLaboratory Tech. Servs.Legat Coun. TrainingExec AD AdmExec AD InvExec AD LESAsst.Dir.:Adm.Servs.Crim. Inv.Ident.Insp.Intell.Lab.Legal Couns.Off.Cong &Public Affs.OLIARec. Mgnt.Tech. Servs.TrainingTelephone Rm.Director's Sec'y1 - S. M. McWeeney1 - J. H. GeerAttn: J. E. Tomlinson1 - J. K. O'BrienAttn: J. S. Hooks, Jr.1 - S. A. Pimentel1 - T. E. Crosson1 - M. V. HaleMVH:(CONTINUED - OVER)SECRETClassified by: 3642Declassify on: OADR18DEC 22 1988![illegible stamp]![illegible writing on the right]
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SECRETMemorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeneyRe: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison andInternational Affairs (OLIA) and theCounterintelligence Situation in West BerlinDETAILS:Mr. Hale opened the session, advising Mr. Eliff that, on his recent trip to Western Europe to visit certain U. S. Embassies and establishments, including the U. S. Mission in West Berlin, where Legal Attaches were desired and needed, he had conferred with appropriate U. S. military, U. S. Department of State (USDS) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel in order to present the FBI's case for representation in West Berlin. During these discussions, Mr. Hale was advised that staff members of the SSCI had recently visited West Berlin concerning counterintelligence issues and Mr. Hale, in that context, wished to brief Mr. Eliff regarding the FBI's perspectives on opening a Legal Attache, particularly from a counterintelligence point of view.Mr. Eliff stated that although he had not recently visited West Berlin, he was intimately familiar with the intricacies of the counterintelligence atmosphere in West Berlin and supported the FBI's presence there. He indicated he was well aware of the gap which existed in the counterintelligence coverage of U. S. civilians, both students and businessmen in that neither the U. S. military nor the U. S. civilian intelligence intelligence components were addressing the threat to these individuals and this for two reasons.The first involved the basic functions of the U. S. intelligence components in West Berlin, a function he described as being the collection of positive intelligence as opposed to counterintelligence, the latter being at best a secondary requirement.(CONTINUED - OVER)SECRET-2-
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SECRETMemorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeneyRe: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison andInternational Affairs (OLIA) and theCounterintelligence Situation in West BerlinDETAILS CONTINUED:The second reason for this gap involves the legal guidelines under which the U. S. military, by virtue of their authority of an occupying power in West Berlin, conducts technical surveillance and mail openings. Mr. Eliff stated that, as an occupying power, the U. S. military, much like the FBI domestically, is the entity which conducts telephone monitorings of criteria country establishments and personnel in the U. S. sector of West Berlin. It also opens certain mail of interest from the East which passes through this sector. However, whenever there is an overhear of a U. S. national or whenever there is mention made of a U. S. national in a piece of correspondence, that U. S. national's name is not disseminated to any other U. S. intelligence agency. This lack of dissemination is as a result of a lawsuit in the early 1970s against the U. S. Army which, at that time, had in fact been monitoring the activities of U. S. nationals. As a consequence of this lawsuit, very stringent guidelines were written which compelled the U. S. military to use the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to monitor Americans including stringent guidelines for minimizing overhears of U. S. nationals when monitoring non U. S. nationals.The net results of these restrictions is that, according to Mr. Eliff, 15 years worth of overhears of U. S. nationals as well as the like potential collection of names of U. S. persons via mail openings has been lost.Mr. Eliff advised it was his belief these minimization restrictions were too stringent and should be amended to allow for dissemination. He however stated that he thought the issue should be brought up after the upcoming elections in that he did not believe a "lame duck" administration would be interested in undertaking the issue.(CONTINUED - OVER)SECRET-3-
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SECRETMemorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S.. M. McWeeneyRe: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison andInternational Affairs (OLIA) and theCounterintelligence Situation in West BerlinDETAILS CONTINUED:As an aside, Mr. Eliff indicated that Allan Kornblum,Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, Department of Justice,had visited West Berlin on two occasions and was conversant withthis U. S. military monitoring issue.Mr. Eliff also stated that he further supported an FBIpresence in West Berlin in that his study of thecounterintelligence venue in that city indicated to him that themany double agent cases run by the U. S. military there were runfor parochial reasons with no strategic view ofcounterintelligence. He stated that even though the U. S.military services were professional and did coordinate theturnover of some of their many double agents to the FBI whenthese agents are rotated back to domestic assignment, he believedthe FBI should have input at the outset of these double agentcases insofar as the double agent technique was a fundamentalcounterintelligence tool which demanded consultation with theprinciple counterintelligence service, the FBI, at theirInception in order to better globally address counterintelligenceissues.He stated he believed FBI presence in West Berlin wouldtherefore be necessary if the U. S. were to have a coherentnational counterintelligence strategy.Mr. Eliff concluded by reiterating his support for theFBI's presence in West Berlin, by indicating that he would bewilling, were we to ask, to indicate his support of this positionto the USDS, the U. S. military and the CIA as well as Mr. JeffSmith, Chief Staffer for Senator Sam Nunn, the latter also wellversed in counterintelligence issues and a potential strongsupporter of the FBI's cause.Messrs L'Allier, Hooks, and Hale thanked Mr. Eliff forhis time and indicated that the FBI had designated a newassistant Legal Attache in Bonn whose function would largely beto travel weekly to West Berlin in order to prepare the FBI'Scase for a permanent presence there.SECRET-4-
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PAGE THREE DE HQ 0155 SECRET1) CURRENT FBI RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) COMPONENTS [IN NEW YORK.] THE STAFF MEMBERS HAVE REQUESTED THAT THEY BE GIVEN A TOUR AND BRIEFING AT THE MEGAHUT FACILITY. ACCORDING TO SSCI STAFF MEMBER, NSA HAS POSED NO OBJECTIONS, AND INTD HAS NO OBJECTIONS EITHER. HOWEVER, TOUR AND BRIEFING SHOULD BE HANDLED BY THE SUPERVISOR, AND COMMENTARY SHOULD BE GUARDED. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD TARGETS BE IDENTIFIED, AND NO DISCUSSION SHOULD ENSUE WITH REGARD TO COVERAGE OF OR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH COVERAGE OF NON-HOSTILE TARGETS.THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FBI AND CIA SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS "EXCELLENT." SSCI STAFFER REQUESTED THAT INVITATION BE EXTENDED TO [NEW YORK CIA FOREIGN RESOURCE DIVISION (FRD)] REPRESENTATIVE TO ATTEND THIS PORTION OF THE DISCUSSIONS. THIS REQUEST HAS BEEN DENIED, AND SSCI STAFFERS HAVE BEEN ASKED TO CONTACT CIA/FRD INDEPENDENTLY.2) UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION BEFORE CONGRESS. SSCI STAFFERS HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN KNOWING VIEWS OF FIELD ON UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS; PROBLEMS. VALUE, ETC.? INTD SUGGESTS DISCUSSION BE CONFINED TO DESCRIBING "SHOPRITE"