Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[124-10185-10099 (c06716626).pdf — page 7]
| Name                   | Compartmented Clearance Designated Briefed (SI, TK, B) | Date and Place of Birth | Social Security No.  || ---------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------- | -------------------- || White, William         | * B 7/10                                               | 8-8-39 Pa.              | 168-30-9147          || Wides, Burton. Victor  | * B 4/17                                               | 6-14-41 NJ              | 139-30-1936 TF Badge || Wiik, Carol Ann        | * B 5/23                                               | 4-21-51 Mass.           | 017-40-7170          || Wilson, Otis           | * B 6/10                                               | 5-16-20 Va.             | 557-14-5461          || Zimmerman, Peter Brown | already briefed                                        | 3-26-46 Ill.            | 227-60-1093          || Zimmerman, Phebe       |                                                        | 12-1-50 Ohio            | 271-54-1724          |29 JUL 1975
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/ComptrollerVIA: Acting Deputy Director for PlansSUBJECT: Agency Support to the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) for National Democratic (20-14 July 1972) and National Republican (21-24 August 1972) Conventions1. This memorandum is for the information of the Executive Director/Comptroller.2. Authorization for CIA support to the U.S. Secret Service for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions is contained in a memorandum of 7 April 1972 from Chief, CI Staff to the CCI which was concurred in by the ADUP and approved by the DCI on 10 April 1972 (copy attached).3. On 13 April 1972 the [COS, MI/Miami] met with the Miami USSS representative and Mr. Nastrovito of USSS Headquarters to discuss preliminary planning for [Station MI/Miami] support to the USSS prior to and during subject Conventions. On 17 April 1972 the C/MI/COS and C/CI/LSN met with Mr. Hastrovito at Headquarters to implement the preliminary planning agreed upon in Miami and to determine the extent of Headquarters support required by the USSS.4. The basic agreement mutually concurred in by the USSS and Headquarters representatives provided that:a. [Station MI/Miami] would conduct name traces on all Cubans of interest to the USSS,b. CIA Headquarters would conduct name traces on all other foreign born persons of interest to the USSS.c. CIA would keep the USSS informed of any events in the Caribbean and Latin American areas that would have any bearing on the USSS protective mission during the convention periods. This would include briefings on Cuba and Cuban policies toward the United States and on activities of Cuban intelligence operations which could affect the security of the conventions.
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 1]
d. Coverage of Latin American exile groups in the United States would be the responsibility of the FBI since CIA had ceased the extensive coverage formerly targeted against these groups since it was now considered an internal security function.S. On 27 April 1972 a meeting was held at a buffer office of Station Miami with the USSS Chief of Communications, Station personnel and a Headquarters representative. It was agreed that name traces would be handled by Miami security Field office courier from the USSS tonifer office until the SSS ostablished communications links from their command post in convention center, at which time trace requests would be sent from the command post to USSS headquarters and relayed to CIA Headquarters. Cuban name traces are relayed to Station Miami by the Signal Center and non-Cuban traces are conjucted by H/CO Replies to USSS requests on non-Cuisans are coordinated with (CI/SO.6. Station Miami has arranged the rental of a safehouse about five minutes from convention center which will provide a secure and nearby meeting site for 'SSS and Agency personnel. This safehouse will be available just prior to and during both conventions. A Headquarters officer will TOY to Viami prior to the conventions and remain until the conventions adjourn to assist the Station in providing the support descried in paragraph four above.7. Station Miami is in daily contact with the USSS in Miami, utilizing buffer office as a meeting site when necessary. The Location of Station Miami has not been revealed to the USSS. (Station is located some distance free buffer office.) Additionally, the (Miami Security Field office maintains formal liaison with the local USSS Miami unit.8. The Station understands that no personnel will be present at the convention hall, that they will not provide any equipment unique to the Agency, nor will it provide the use of any other facilities other than the safehouse described in paragraph six.
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 2]
May 1973SUBJECT: Request for Information on Sensitive Activities- You will recall that in Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972, I believe, Agency funds were made available to the FBI. These funds may still be possibly held in a special account for that use. This is one of the areas where TSD has been very much involved. Chuck Briggs would have the details as this was handled through the Executive Director's office and of course Angleton would have additional information.SignedIBN-1:ChiefMissions and Programs Staff67![EYES ONLY SECRET stamp]E2 IMPDET CL BY 35773700582
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 3]
8 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director for OperationsSUBJECT : Areas of Possible Embarrassment to the Agency1. Sometime in the spring or early summer of 1971, Mr. John Dean levied the requirement on the Agency for information relating to the Investors Overseas Service (IOS). The original request was non-specific but it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with the possible adverse publicity that might develop regarding the President's nephew, who was employed by IOS.2. There were multiple channels from the White House to the Agency on this subject:a. Presumably Haldeman and/or Ehrlichman to Director Helms.b. Someone (unnamed) in the White House to the DDCI, General Cushman (see attached telephone conversation). Note that Ehrlichman is mentioned, andc. John Dean to the CI Staff. These various channels were sorted out in time and six reports were passed by the CI Staff to Mr. Fred Fielding for Mr. John Dean.3. The telephone call of General Cushman's is of interest since it gives the flavor of White House concern. It took several days to uncover the fact that the White House interest centered on the involvement of the President's nephew with IOS and possible adverse publicity. The reports submitted to Dean's office were routine in nature and were coordinated with the DCI. After a few months, interest in this sub-, ject died down and we did not pursue it further.4. Please return the attachments when they have served your purpose.SECRETE2 IMPDET CL BY 05451?00593
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 4]
5. I also include a short note on the Intelligence Evaluation JFK (1)(B)   Committee and Staff prepared by Richard Ober. The original   meetings were held in the office of John Dean at the White House   and the principal sparkplug for this group activity was the then   Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Robert Mardian   and then later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mr.   Mardian is now appearing before the Grand Jury and it is always   possible that he might draw in the Agency.JFK(1)(B)6. Before appointing Ober to the IES Staff as the Agency   representative, I had attended various inter-agency meetings pre-   sided over by Mardian. I expressed the view to Director Helms   that Mardian would require very careful handling due to his inex-   perience. Furthermore, Mardian was deeply involved in the split   between Bill Sullivan and Mr. Hoover. On a confidential basis   one or two senior FBI officials stated that Sullivan was secretly   passing files to Mardian without Mr. Hoover's permission. This   was one of the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from   the Bureau.![signature] JFK (1)(B)James AngletonChief, Counter Intelligence StaffAttachments (5)
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 5]
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for OperationsSUBJECT: Counter Intelligence Staff,[Police Group] Activities1.  Counter Intelligence Staff, [Police Group] [CI/PG] is responsible for Staff coordination within the Office of the Deputy Director for Operations for activities and programs involving assistance to foreign police/security forces for the purpose of exploiting such activities and programs for intelligence purposes.2.  CI[PG] maintains liaison with the Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development (OPS/AID) and its training facility, the International Police Academy (IPA). CI[PG] also administers and supervises Project IDEN-171 and its training proprietory facility, IDEN-172. In addition, CI[PG coordinates a joint OPS/AID Technical Services Division, Central Intelligence Agency (TSD/CIA) Technical Investigations Course.] CI[PG] provides guidance and counsel to the Area Divisions in matters pertaining to police/security functions and activities.] Specific details of these functions are as follows:LIAISON WITH OPS/AIDCI[PG] liaison with OPS/AID and IPA is conducted on a daily basis and consists principally of:A. exchange of information on IPA participants, some of whom later attend IDEN-172 courses and who are of interest to Agency components,B. arranging for inclusion of Agency sponsored participants in IPA/OPS/AID training programs,C. arranging for IPA/OPS/AID briefings and tours for foreign police/security representatives sponsored [by CIA Area Divisions,]
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 6]
D. obtaining biographic and assessment data.on IPA/OPS/AID trainces,.E. providing general information pertaining to police/security organizations, activities, equipment, and personalities requested by Agency operating components,F. coordinating the Agency's participation in the Technical Investigations Course designed to familiarize the trainees with the technique required to properly investigate terrorist activities wherein explosives have been utilized,G. obtaining OPS/AID cover for CIA personnel to serve abroad. At one time as many as 50 CIA employees were covered in Latin America, the Far East and Africa. This total has been reduced during the past several years to 10 serving in Thailand, *H. arranging contact between Desk officers and OPS/AID sponsored participants.PROJECT IDEN-171 - PROPRIETARY IDEN-172- training function of : IDEN-168IDEN-172 Training Academy is a commercial interprise. It was incorporated under the laws of the State of Maryland in 1952 and conducts its business in the District of Colombia. It is engaged principally in training foreign police/security personnel under an overt contract with OPS/AID, and selling police/security equipment to foreign police/security personnel and organizations. IDEN-172 also provides special training programs and briefings to foreign police/security personnel of interest to Agency operating divisions. It provides biographic and assessment data on trainees to country desks. RecentlyIDEN-172 has acquired the capability of providing training to foreign police/security personnel in VIP protective security for Chiefs of State.* CIA personnel under this cover will not be replaced as such and all will be phased out by June 1974.
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 7]
- 3 -COMMENTCILPG does not maintain direct contact or liaisonJFK with any law enforcement organization, local or federal,(1)(B) at home or abroad. When the need arises, such contact isJPKC1XB) sometimes made on our behalf by OPS/AID or IDEN-172 withoutdivulging Agency interest] OPS/AID has such contactsat home and abroad because of the nature of its activities(training of forcion noiice/security personnel at homeand abroad), and its Public Safety programs around theworld. IDEN-172 has such contacts at hore - local andfederal level - because its personnel are personally JFK (1) (B)acquainted with law enforcement officers throughout theUnited States. Mombers of the IDEN-172 staff (not identified) JPK(X)(6)as CIA) have appeared as guest lecturers at such federalinstitutions as the U.S. Park Police, IPA, the U.S.Secret Service, and the U.S. Treasury Enforcement Division.3. In addition to the liaison mentioned in the   previous paragraph, [the Agency maintains liaison in varying JFK(U)(B)   degrees with foreign police/security organizations through   its field stations.] The existence and extent thereof,   however, is a decision to be made by the Area Civision,   and is not the responsibility of CI/PG. JFK(1)(6)4. The CIA station as a member of the Country Team in   JPKC)(B) Montevideo, Uruguay, may have had some contact with Dan   Mitrione, who was murdered by the Tupamaros. Dan Citrione,   an experienced and respected law enforcement officer, was   a bona fide OPS/AID officer assigned to the AID mission   in Uruguay, and was never a CIA employee or agent.JFK(1)(B)James EngletonChief, Counter Intelligence Staff00599SCORET
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 8]
SENSITIVEMay 73SUBJECT: The MHCHAOS Program1.  The MHCHAOS program is a worldwide program for clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign efforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domestic U.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the Arab fedayeen.2.  The MHCHAOS program has not and is not conducting efforts domestically for internal domestic collection purposes. Agency efforts are foreign. Foreign-oriented activity in the United States has been of two types:a. Selected FBI domestic sources who travel abroad in connection with their extremist activity and/or affiliations to make contact with hostile foreign powers or with foreign extremist groups have been briefed and debriefed by Headquarters officers. The briefing has included appropriate operational guidance, including defensive advice.b. Americans with existing extremist credentials have been assessed, recruited, tested and dispatched abroad for PCS assignments as contract agents, primarily sources offered for such use by the FBI. When abroad they collect information responsive to MICILAOS program requirements, as well as other Agency requirements. They are thus used primarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Communists, the North Vietnamese, etc., as their background and their particular access permits. It should be noted that the MPTROIKA aspect of the MPLODESTAR project of the East Asia Division is similar to the MHCHAOS PROGRAM.3.  As indicated earlier, MHCHAOS is a foreign program, conducted overseas, except for the limited activity described above. The program is and has been managed so as to achieve the maximum feasible utilization of existing resources of the Operations Directorate. No assets![warning notice sensitive intelligence sources and methods involved]SENSITIVESECRET![E-2 impact cl by 0512]
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 9]
# SECRET,## CORPORATE COVER1.  Central Cover Staff (CCS) is responsible for the placement of Agency operational personnel under the cover of bona fide U.S. companies abroad and in the U.S. This process involves the selection of companies; research on their locations and key personnel; clearances; contacts with companies to solicit cooperation with the Agency; arrangements for integration of Agency personnel into the companies, including letters of understanding; funding of salarios, allowances and expenses; and, continuous monitor- ing of each integrated case throughout the course of the cover use. The overall objective is to match the individual being placed, the company, and the location, in a manner that will ensure achievement of the Agency purpose and pro- tection of the company integrity.2.  Currently, there are 191 integrees for whom cover is provided by 140 companies; 179 integrees are located in 47 foreign countries and 12 are located in the United States. To maintain this placement level, CCS personnel are re- searching and monitoring approximately 250 to 300 companies at any given time.3.  To minimize the adverse consequences to a cooperating company, and to preserve the Agency's operational equity in the event of exposure of an individual under cover, it has been established policy that no more than two individuals would be furnished cover by the same company. At the present time this ratio is confined to approximately 25% of the total number of companies now being used and efforts are under way to effect further reductions toward the goal of one individual per company.4.  In addition to the primary corporate cover function described in paragraph 1. above, CCS maintains continuing contact with two U.S. car rental firms and two U.S. credit card firms for the purpose of obtaining backstopped credit cards in alias for operational use in the United States and abroad by Agency personnel. 42 such cards are now being used by 34 individuals.SECRET,
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 10]
SECRET## DEVISED FACILITIES COVER1.  Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains 311 back-stopped notional facilities which were created to provide cover for Agency personnel in the United States and abroad and to provide an attributable source for Agency funds used in operations and requiring concealment of Agency or U.S. Government interest. The facilities comprise 43 corporations providing personal status cover, payrolling and tax attribution sources, and other miscellaneous support such as title to property, funding, etc.; 61 sole-proprietorships providing status and operational cover, including payrolling and tax attribution; and 207 non-registered companies providing support for high risk operational requirements, agents abroad, corporate reimbursements, and proprietary funding.2.  224 Agency personnel engaged in operational activities are payrolled by the facilitics, an essential procedure permitting the reporting of Agency salaries without documenting the Agency as the source.3.  The facilities provide a capability for passing Agency funds to 30 Agency proprietaries and 97 bona fide companies on a continuing basis. 225 bank accounts located in 36 banks throughout the United States provido the mechanisms for transmittal of these funds.SECRET
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 11]
# UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTMemorandumTO : MR. W. R. WANNALLFROM : MR. W. O. CREGARSUBJECT: SENSTUDY 751 - Mr. J. Cochran, Jr.1 - Mr. R. J. Gallagher1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall1 - Mr. W. O. CregarDATE: July 24, 19751- Mr. W. A. Branigan1 - Mr. A. B. Fulton1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford1 - Mr. F. S. Putman1 - Mr. J. W. Redfield1 - Mr. T. J. McNiffMy memorandum dated 7/23/75 captioned as above advised you that this Bureau had received from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 190 pages extracted from a 693-page document prepared by CIA citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its activities may have exceeded its legal mandate. Some of the CIA activities cited in this document include references to Bureau operations of an extremely sensitive nature and it was also noted that the Senate Select Committee has had access to this document. It was recommended that pertinent pages extracted from the CIA document be routed to the respective Bureau Division and/or Intelligence Division Section believed to have an interest in the material contained therein for the purpose of fully identifying the subject matter and making an assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation is involved.This is to advise that the following pages from the document were furnished to the following Divisions and/or Sections of the Intelligence Division on the morning of 7/24/75 for the purpose of review, assessment, and recommendations, if any:General Investigative Division - Pages 107, 108, 111, 149-151, 155, 156, 158-161, 178, 180, 181, 296, 298, 301, 353 and 354Laboratory Division - Pages 65-67, 113, 118, 119, 182, 202, 221, 222, and 234, (pages 238-240 and 248 were furnished for information purposes as these pages contained information concerning techniques used and/or developed by CIA which may be of interest).Intelligence Division Section CI-1 - Pages 23, 24, 28, 29, 70, 72, 73, 77, 136, 140-142, 298, 329, 582, 615, and 628.
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 12]
Memorandum to Mr. W. R. WannallRE: SENSTUDY 7562-116395Section CI-2Pages 30 and 329Section CI-3Pages 26, 59-61, 282, 290, 292, 295, 310, 334, 361-363,368, 371, 373, 376-379, 384, 385, 458, 468-470, 591-593,and 615.Section IS-1Pages 188, 189, 283, 330Section IS-2Pages 29, 30, 171, 190, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 203,330, and 482.Section IS-3Pages 521 and 549Recipients of above pages were requested to respond toabove request by memorandum captioned as above to reach theSenstudy Project, Room 4063 JEH by the afternoon of 7/28/75.ACTION: None. You will be advised of results of above requestedassessment.Existence of the 693-page CIA document and theinformation contained therein should be closelyguarded and disclosed only on a need-to-knowbasis.- 2 -
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 13]
# PROJECT MOCKINGBIRDProject Mockingbird a telephone intercept activity, was conducted between 12 March 1963 and 15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington-based newsmen who, at the time, had been publishing news articles based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this Agency and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newmen's office and at each of their homes, for a total of 3. The connections were established with the assistance of a telephone company official 'who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col. Sheffield Edwards. Col. Edwards' authority for the activity was Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence. The latter conducted the activity in coordination with the Attorney General (Mr. Robert Kennedy), the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Robert McNamara), and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Gen. Joseph Carroll). In addition to Office of Security personnel directly involved in the intercepts and research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3 other Agency officials are on record as witting of the activity: the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (General Marshall S. Carter), the Inspector General (Lyman Kirkpatrick) and the General Counsel. (Mr. Lawrence Houston).The intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying contacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources of information. For example, it was determined that during the period they received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members, of whom 11 were identified; 16 government employees, including a staff member of the White House, members of the Vice President's office, an Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals. A number of other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but the short span of the activity precluded positive identification, It was observed that through these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and official data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.Since the termination of Project Mockingbird, those materials related to it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access of two Office of Security professionals.62-116 37.5-47500022ENCLOSURESECRET EYES ONLYWARNING NOTICESENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES