Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 81]
# CONTROLLED DISSEM21 MAR 1972Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the Republican National ConventionSUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:Indications.remain limited, thus far, of foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972. The concept of coordinated international support for domestic activities in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific call for international support of disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.BACKGROUND:At the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held in Versailles from 10-13 February 1972, there was mention of American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the Conference's "Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for inter- national support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party. Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 1.3 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Commission" states:"In the United States particularly, the protest against the war is voiced more and more strongly, under various forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, demon- strations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly calls for support to these progressive and antiwar forces in the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylum to deserters and to support their right to repatriation. All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peacc, and independence and freedom in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia."CONTROLLED DISSEM00554
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 82]
CONTROLLED DISSEMDEVELOPMENTS:The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Convention, is planning, in addition to demonstrations, for a "large exposition in the campsights (sic) called Expose 72, which with movies, exhibits, displays will portray the struggles of people all over the world." Plans for activities at Expose 72 are believed to include (a) the use of a special television network to broadcast video-taped messages from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demonstrations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address systems of live telephone calls.from the Vietnamese in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the United Nations. In addition, the SDCC has suggested that, in order to "outflank NIXON domestically and internationally," international opposition can be expressed "by obtaining the authority of other countries and liberation movements to carry their flags in SDCC demonstrations."
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 83]
MEMORANDUMSUBJECT: Technical Operation Against IDEN-76 Embassy in 1971 and 19721. A technical penetration of the IDEN-76 Embassy in Washington, D. C. was mounted by the FBI with the support of *this Agency* in April-May 1971. This operation, which used Agency equipment and technical *expertise* but was managed operationally by the FBI, was initiated only after then-Director Richard Helms had gone over the head of former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to obtain the approval of then-Attorney General John N. Mitchell. The operation was discontinued at the Agency's request on 2 February 1972 when it appeared that Director Hoover intended to testify before Congress concerning audio installations in the U.S. and identify this operation as *CIA* instigated.2. The operation consisted of the following three technical devices:a. An AC-powered, masked transmitter and two switches in the office occupied by the Deputy Chief of Mission.b. An AC-powered, masked transmitter in the office of the Ambassador's secretary which was
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 84]
-2-designed to pick up high quality audio of typing in the office. It was hoped to break these audio signals into clear text using advanced computer techniques developed by Division D. No useful product, however, was ever obtained.c. A battery-powered, masked transmitter and switch concealed in the door of the Embassy, which would supply crytographic information for NSA. (Produced excellent quality signals until it became inoperative in early 1972 because of battery failure.)3. In December 1972 the Agency requested reactivation of the operation for a 60-day trial period in spite of the limited value of intelligence produced previously (22 disseminations of only moderate interest). Reactivation was requested because of strong interest in the special IDEN-76 government mission arriving in Washington in late December to conduct high-level talks with U.S. State Department officials concerning debt renegotiation and other major items outstanding between the-two-countries. The operation was reinitiated on 21 December 1972 but was discontinued again on 22 February 1973 by Acting
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 85]
-3-Director L. Patrick Gray at this Agency's request. Our request was prompted by a decision that the intelligence production of this operation did not justify the risks involved in continuing to run it in the sensitive political climate caused by the mounting disclosures about CIA involvement in LDEN-76 This was especially so because of our reservations about maintaining proper security for the listening post which, as with other operational aspects of the case, was under FBI management.
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 86]
SECRETe. Alias Social Security Cards. 171 backstoppedaccounts have been established for contract personnelwhose relationship with the Agency cannot be revealedbut who are entitled to Social Security coverage.Following expiration of the contractual relationship,at an appropriate time the alias and true name accountsare merged permitting the individual to receive com-plete benefits upon reaching the age of eligibility.f. Alias IRS Tax Accounts. 54 Social Securitynumbers have been registered for the purpose of open-ing 54 new bank accounts since 1 July 1972. 87 in-dividual tax accounts have been established with IRSon an unwitting basis in 14 cities in the United States.g. Notional Facilities. 311 notional facilities(43 corporations: 61 sole-proprietorships; 207 lawyersand 61 telephone answering service addresses are main-tained by CCS in 58 citics in the United States.h. Alias Signatories on Bank Accounts. 24 aliasesfor signatures on 25 proprietary entity and one notion-al company bank accounts are in use by 9 officers and 1proprietary-hire as follows:CCS/Ilqs - 5 officers (12 aliases) on 8proprietary entities and 1notional company.CCS/NY PMC* - 3 officers (9 aliases) on 13proprietary entities.CCS/NY PMC* - 1 proprietary-hire (1 alias)on 3 proprietary entities.CCS/MD PMC* - 1 officer (2 aliases) on 2proprietary entities.*Proprietary Management Company-3-SECRET00510
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 87]
sensitive nonofficial cover cases under the guiseof normal commercial annuities. Backstopping forthis arrangement is provided through CCS-procuredbank accounts and Post Office boxes. 19 retireesare currently being handled.k. Credit Union Arrangements for Selected Non-official Cover Tersonnel. Dividends (interest) carnedon Credit Union accounts by individuals under coverare not reported to the Internal Revenue Service basedon 50 U.S. Code 403g or Internal Revenue Code Section6041.Individuals under cover may borrow money from theCredit Union for the purchase of real estate; however,the mortgage is recorded in the name of a clearedlawyer and not the actual lendor (Credit Union).Paragraph 1. deleted because it contains sensitiveAgency operational methods and techniques.
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 88]
SECRETJFK(178) JFK(B)PROPRIETARY ENTITY COVER1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains three domestic proprietary management companies which provide funding and operational support for 49 Agency entities, including 13 controlled and directed by CCS.2. The three proprietary management companies are staffed by 9 cmployees; they furnish assistance in the commercial, business and investment aspects of on-going operations, manage the legal and commercial affairs of entities supporting operations, and provide cover and funding channels for operational activities as required. Most importantly, professional services are furnished in a manner responsive to required security standards and at a cost considerably less than would be charged by bona fide management firms.3. The 13 proprietary entities directed by CCS provide cover for ten individuals in the United States and three overseas. Operationally, the companies provide commercial funding channels on a world-wide basis and serve as corporate owners of equipment, inventory and aircraft and as collection mechanisms for outstanding notes and loans in order to conceal U.S. Government affiliation or interest.SECRET,00526
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 89]
SECRET7 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for OperationsSUBJECT: Items for Possible Use in Briefing the DCI1. This Memorandum is submitted in order to identify to you for possible briefing of the Director activities which in certain contexts could be construed as delicate or inappropriate.2. At the request of the Director of Security, from approximately mid-October 1972 to mid-January 1973 Safesite number 583 was made available to the U.S. Marshal's Service for use as a secure residence by an Assistant U.S. Attorney who reportedly was under threat of assassination by organized criminal elements.3. SB Division over the past three months has interviewed four graduate students as prospective candidates for assignments under American business cover in the USSR. They were encouraged to locate cover jobs on their own.4. For approximately two years the SB Division has had the cooperation of the Commander of the Morals Division of the District of Columbia Police Department in training officers scheduled for assignment to the USSR and Eastern Europe in how to conduct themselves if placed under arrest. The arrangement was made through the Office of Security.5. Since late 1972 CIA has taken part in seven FBI training courses at Quantico, Virginia in response to requests from the FBI. We have shared with them through lectures and discussions lessons we have learned which are relevant to their counter- espionage responsibilities.E2 IMPDETCL BY 059952
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 90]
SENSITIVEhave been recuited and run exclusively for the MHCHAOS program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploitation of new and old Agency assets who have a by-product capability or a concurrent capability for provision of information responsive to the program's requirements. This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collection requirements and operational guidance. This collection program is viewed as an integral part of the recruitment and collection programs of China Operations, Vietnam Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet Bloc Division operations and Korean Branch operations. Agents who have an American "Movement" background or who have known connections with the American "Movement" are useful as access agents to obtain biographic and personality data, to discern possible vulnerabilities and susceptibilities, and to develop operationally exploitable relationships with recruitment targets of the above programs. These assets are of interest to our targets because of their connections with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement." Over the course of the MHCHAOS program, there have been approximately 20 important areas of operational interest, which at the present time have been reduced to about ten: Paris, Stockholm, Brussels, Dar Es Salaam, Conakry, Algiers, Mexico City, Santiago, Ottawa and Hong Kong.4. The MICHAOS program also utilizes audio operations, two of which have been implemented to cover targets of special interest.Paragraph a. deleted because it reveals a sensitive foreign operation.Paragraph b. deleted because it reveals a sensitive Agency foreign operation.SENSITIVESECRET
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 91]
SENSITIVE5. MHCHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and who appear to have extremist connections, interests or background are reported upon. Other individuals are reported upon in response to specific Headquarters requirements received from the FBI because such individuals are of active investigatory security interest to the FBI.6. All cable and dispatch traffic related to the MHCHAOS program is sent via restricted channels. It is not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the Information Services Division. The control and retrievability of information obtained, including information received from the FBI, is the responsibility of the Special Operations Group.7. Information responsive to specific FBI requirements is disseminated to the FBI via special controlled dissemination channels, i.e., by restricted handling cable traffic or via special pouch and specially numbered blind memoranda.8. Information of particular significance, when collected, has been disseminated by special memorandum over the signature of the Director of Central Intelligence to the White House (Dr. Kissinger and John Dean), as well as to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State and the Director of the FBI.SENSITIVESECRET00593
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 92]
SECRET/SENSITIVLFR 73-1838 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for OperationsSUBJECT:Foreign Resources Division OperationalActivities with Possible Flap PotentialREFERENCE:FR Memorandum, 73-180, dated 7 May1973, same subject1.  The answers to your questions are as follows:    a.  Question: Do we recruit Americans?        Answer: Yes, we recruit Americans to be        used as academic support assets and access agents.        These Americans are used for spotting and assess-        ment purposes only and do not perform any recruit-        ments.Paragraph 1. b. and 1. c. are deletedbecause they contain sensitive agencyoperational methods and techniques.SECRET/SENSITIVEE2 IMPDETCL BY: 05722300611
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 93]
d. **Question:** What is the arrangement re. recruiting out of colleges? Any clearances or prohibitions?**Answer:** As of now CSI 50-10 specifically requires approval by the ADDO or DDO for any recruitment attempt made in the United States against an American member of the academic community or a foreign target attending an American academic institution. This regulation is presently in the process of revision in that this approval authority for academic recruitments in the United States is to be delegated to Chief, FR. The approval authority for recruitment attempts against American students outside the United States is to be delegated to the Chief of the appropriate area division. The only prohibitions at the present time are those precluding recruitment attempts against foreign students here in the United States on grants from Ford Foundation, Rockefeller or Fulbright.2. If you have further questions, please let me know.signed/IDEN-173Acting ChiefForeign Resources Division
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 94]
SECRET/SENSITIVEFR 73-1807 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for OperationsSUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational Activities with Possible Flap Potential1. At thr risk of stating the obvious, almost all of the operational activities carried on by FR Division in the United States run the risk that unauthorized disclosure could create embarrassment to the Agency. We have accepted this as a condition precedent and have proceeded with our operational activities in the most professional manner possible under the circumstances. There are certain rather unusual activities in which FR Division has participated and/or is participating that contain some- what greater possibility for embarrassment if discovered. I have listed these below, not necessarily in order of embarrassment potential:JFK (1)CB)a. (The New York Base) provides a fairly considerable amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the Chinese. This support was authorized by Mr. Karamessines and Mr. Helms. Thus far there has been no problem other than the inordinate amount of time spent by (New York Base) JFK(1)(B) personnel, not to mention the fairly sizeable amount of money that has been expended in support of these efforts.b. A CIA Officer is to be assigned to FR Division. The CIA Officer is presently assigned overseas under deep cover; his cover is the Mullen Corporation. (This is the cor-] JFK(1)(B) [poration that employed E. Howard Hunt.] In discussions between NOCAD and the ADDO, it was decided that the Officer would be pulled out and reassigned in the United States. FR Division was directed to accept this officer for assignment.E2 IMPDETCL BY: 057223SECRET/SENSITIVE00611
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 95]
# SECRET/SENSITI. E/2/We have concluded that the best solution is to have this officer attend à university in the Midwest for at least a year, working towards an advanced degree until there has been time for the situation to clarify itself. We plan to make no operational use of time CIA Officer whatsoever. during the period of time that he is attending the university. Upon completion of his year's study, we will review the、 situation and decide the next course of action at that time.Paragraph 1. c. is deleted because it contains sensitive Agency operational methods and techniques.d. FR Division has been briefed in general on the existence of an audio operation done by the FBI [but with close] (TSD support) in San Francisco. This operation is directed against IDEN-62. I understand the operation has been exceptionally well done. However, the responsibility for this activity has come from Chief, TSD in conjunction.e. Three microphones were planted in various locations in the IDEN-61 by the FBI. [The equipment was produced by CIA and the overall operation was joint, although no CIA personnel have entered the premises.] The operation was deactivated and is presently dormant. The mikes, however, are still in place. If discovered the operation could cause some embarrassment to the American Government, but it is unlikely the finger would point to CIA.
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 96]
SUBJECT: Sensitive activities Performed by the Office of Logisticsaction would be more economical and eliminate the need for one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities readily available from another. A typical example of this procedure is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC. In connection with the current reporting requirement, however, I have had our records researched for the past 2 years and Attachment 1 reflects those transactions which appear to be relevant to the subject of this memorandum.d. In connection with the disclosures during the summer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not properly safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook two acts. I directed the Security Officer from our West Coast Procurement Office at the Iden 87 -- to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy himself that classified material furnished them by the Agency was both properly safeguarded and accounted for. His report was affirmative. On 23 August 1971, the senior Security Officer assigned to this Office forwarded a letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified information furnished them by the Agency. Of residual interest in this matter, there is summarized the contents of a memorandum of 2 July 1971 to the Executive Director-Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession.This memorandum reports that EBIS regularly disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation but that instructions had been issued to cease distribution of classified reports. While no other direct dissemination went to Rand, other USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing "many" copies of DD/I products to Rand as authorized under USIB regulations. The memorandum also states that Rand personnel had requested searches and document retrieval from the CRS facility.5. In connection with action taken for the Office of Security, there are three relevant items:a. The Printing Services Division, OL, was requested by the Office of Security to print a book written by Dr. Harry J. Murphy, Office of Security. The book was prepared by Mr. Murphy under a Brookings Institution FederalEYES ONLYSECRET
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 97]
# SUBJECT: Sensitive ctivities Performed by the Office of Logisticsthe[DD/0] we will not honor any requisition for surveillance equipment unless it has been approved by the CI Staff of the[DD/D]4. Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the following items are pertinent:a. In February 1971, [Colonel L. K. White,] the then Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to attend a meeting in his office, also attended by Mr. William Colby. Colonel White explained that the Technical Services Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance to the FBI for a sensitive project Colonel White did not disclose the purpose of the assistance being provided by TSD but did instruct me to assist TSD on purely contractual matters. Since the Office of Logistics has no information concerning the mission or purpose of Project sub-stantive questions concerning the subject should be addressed to TSD. Other procurement actions accomplished for the FBI are reported below. Specific mention is made, however, of the Project because of the dollar magnitude, approximately $1 million, and the complex technical equipment that has been involved in the undertaking.b. The Procurement Division, OL, currently has two requisitions in hand from TSD which would involve reimbursable sales to the FBI. One such requisition in the amount of $36,900 is for two Westinghouse television cameras. The second requisition in the amount of $11,200 is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by Bausch and Lomb. No action is being taken on either of these requirements pending further instructions which will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management and Services.c. Over the years, this[Agency] has often supported other Government agencies from a contractual or materiel standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved request, supported by a transfer of funds, [the Agency] would either enter into "accommodation procurements" for the requesting agency or support the requesting agency by the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or provide a service for, another Government agency when suchEYES ONLYSECRET