Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[124-10185-10099_multirif.pdf — page 15]
# PROJECT MOCKINGBIRDProject Mockingbird, a telephone intercept activity, was conducted between 12 March 1963 and 15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington-based newsmen who, at the time, had been publishing news articles based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this Agency and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newmen's office and at each of their homes, for a total of 3. The connections were established with the assistance of a telephone company official 'who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col. Sheffield Edwards. Col. Edwards' authority for the activity was Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence. The latter conducted the activity in coordination with the Attorney General (Mr. Robert Kennedy), the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Robert McNamara), and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Gen. Joseph Carroll). In addition to Office of Security personnel directly involved in the intercepts and research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3 other Agency officials are on record as witting of the activity: the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (General Marshall S. Carter), the Inspector General (Lyman Kirkpatrick) and the General Counsel. (Mr. Lawrence Houston).The intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying contacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources of information. For example, it was determined that during the period they received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members, of whom 11 were identified; 16 government employees, including a staff member of the White House, members of the Vice President's office, an Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals. A number of other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but the short span of the activity precluded positive identification. It was observed that through these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and official data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.Since the termination of Project Mockingbird, those materials related to it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access of two Office of Security professionals.SECRET EYES ONLY
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SECRETEYES ONLYSUBJECT: Soviet DefectorA Soviet defector, defected to a representative of this Agency in 1964. The responsibility for his exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of the Clandestine Service and he was brought to this country. After initial interrogation by representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safehouse in Maryland, where he was confined and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when he was moved to a specially constructed "jail" in a remote wooded area at I-SOLATION. The SR Division was convinced that he was a dispatched agent but even after a long period of hostile interrogation was unable to prove their contention and he was confined at ISOLATION in an effort to convince him to "confess."This Office together with the Office of General Counsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality of the Agency's position in handling a defector, under these conditions for such a long period of time. Strong representations were made to the Director (Mr. Helms)-by this Office, the Office of General Counsel, and the Legislative Liaison Counsel, and on 27 October 1967, the responsibility for his further handling was transferred to the Office of Security under the direction of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral Rufus Taylor.The Soviet defector was moved to a comfortable safehouse in the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly, sympathetic conditions by his Security Case Officer, Mr. Bruce Solie, for more than a year. It soon became apparent that the Soviet defector was bona fide and he was moved to more comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom of independent movement and has continued to cooperate fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Office since that time. He has proven to be the mostE2 IMPDETCL BY 00098800023SECRETEYES ONLYNW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 17
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SECRETEYES ONLRvaluable and economical defector this Agency has everhad and leads which were ignored by the SR Division wereexplored and have resulted in the arrest and prosecutionof Soviet recruited agents -in severalcountries throughout the world. He currently is livingunder an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wifeand remarried an American citizen. He is happy, relaxed,and appreciative of the treatment accorded him and states"while I regret my years of incarceration, I haveno bitterness and now understand how it could happen."2SECRETEYES ONLY00021
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# SECRETEYES ONLYI. SURVEILLANCESA. SIESTADuring the periods 1-20 February, 12 April-7 May, and 9-20 August 1971, a surveillance was conducted of Miss Deborah Fitzgerald, a former staff employee, and Orlando Toro Nunez, a Cuban national with whom Miss Fitzgerald had become professionally and emotionally involved. Surveillance was predicated upon information that Miss Fitzgerald had been seeking from employees information in Information Processing Division files, and that employees were visiting a photographic studio operated by Miss Fitzgerald and Nunez in Fairfax City, Virginia. In addition to physical surveillance, one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio was made, and an attempt to enter the apartment of Nunez was aborted because of a door lock problem.B. PARAGONPursuant to a request from the CI Staff, approved by the DCI, surveillances were conducted of Iden 69 and her associates at various times from May to September 1971. Iden 69, an acknowledged Latin American revolutionary, had long been a source of the WH Division and had given information regarding a plot to assassinate or kidnap Vice-President-Agnew and the DCI. Surveillances included coverage of the activities of Iden 69 during two visits to the United States, technical coverage of debriefings of her by WH Division representatives in New York City, and surveillance, including mail coverage, of several American citizens alleged to be part of the plot. Although most of the surveillance occurred in New York City, surveillance of one of the individuals included extensive coverage of a commune in Detroit.C. CELOTEX TAt the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was conducted of Iden 180 of the Washington Post duringNW 88296 DocId:32989624 Page 19# SECRETEYES ONLYE2 IMPDETCL BY 00098800026
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# SECRETEYES ONLYthe periods 6-9 October, 27 October-10 December 1971 and on 3 January 1972. In addition to physical surveillance, an observation post was maintained in the Statler Hilton Hotel where observation could be maintained of the building housing his office. The surveillance was designed to determine Iden 180 sources of classified information of interest to the Agency which had appeared in a number of his columns.## D. MUDHENAt the direction of the DCI, surveillance was conducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his "leg men," Britt Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear, from 15 February to 12 April 1972. In addition to the physical surveillance, an observation post was maintained in the Statler Hilton Hotel directly opposite Anderson's office. The purpose of this surveillance was to attempt to determine Anderson's sources for highly classified Agency information appearing in his syndicated columns.## E. BUTANE-At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was conducted on Victor L. Marchetti from 23 March to 20 April 1972. The purpose of this surveillance was to determine his activities and contacts both with Agency employees and other individuals in regard to his proposed book and published magazine articles exposing Agency operations.## II. POLICE SUPPORT### A.During 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions, the Intelligence Division of the Metropolitan Police Department was provided a communications system to monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the Washington area. This system consisted of a radio receiver and an Agent at the Intelligence Division Headquarters and several automobiles from an Agency Field Office equipped with radio receivers and transmitters and manned by two Agency employees, as well as a representative of the Intelligence Division, Metropolitan Police Department. The benefit to the Agency was that the communications over this system were monitored at the Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of possible actions by the dissidents against Agency installations.
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# SECRETEYES ONLYB. During the period from 1968 to 1973, several items of positive audio equipment consisting primarily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone dial recorders were loaned to the Metropolitan Police Department, Fairfax-County, - Virginia, Police Department, Montgomery County, Maryland, Police Department, New York City Police Department, and the San Francisco, California, Police Department.## III. GENERAL SUPPORTA. SRPOINT-ER-Since 1953, this office has operated a mail intercept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail and, at various times, other selective mail at Kennedy Airport in New York City. This operation included not only the photographing of envelopes but also surreptitious opening and photographing of selected items of mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of internal security interest which was disseminated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program is now in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether the operation will be continued or abolished.B. AELADLEFor several years the Office of Security has provided support to a Russian defector of interest to the CI Staff. This support has consisted of numerous things, including documentation for a change of identity on three occasions.C. REDFACE IIn July 1970, this office made a surreptitious entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occupied by a former defector working under contract for the Agency. This involved by-passing a contact and> [Figure: Image of the word SECRET and EYES ONLY]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 21
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# SECRETEYES ONLYsonic alarm system, entering a vault, and entering a safe within the vault. The purpose of the operation was to determine whether the individual had any unauthorized classified information in his possession.D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGSIn January 1971, the Director approved a request from the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, to provide covert recruitment and security clearance support to BNDD. This has been accomplished through the medium of a proprietary of the Office of Security operating in Falls Church, Virginia. Support includes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph, medical clearance, and training. It has been divided into three phases: (1) A CI operation to place individuals in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegal activities of other BNDD employees; (2) Recruitment of Chinese or Spanish speaking covert Agents; and (3) Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BNDD but actually employed by BNDD, although this fact is known only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD. In this case, arrangements were made for all pay and other employee benefits to come from CIA on a reimbursable basis.E. KITTENS PROJECTAs a result of a request from the Department of State, approved by the DCI, this office has, since October 1972, provided protection on a 24-hour basis to two sons of a foreign leader who are attending school in the United States. This support includes the financing of the protection and the detail to the Department of State of six armed Agents of this office who are documented as State Department Office of Security employees.F. MERRIMACFrom February 1967 to November 1971, an Office of Security proprietary, recruited and handled several Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoringNW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 224SECRETEYES ONLY00023
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# SECRETEYES ONLYdissident groups in the Washington area considered to be potential threats to Agency personnel and installations. One of these Agents_so successfully penetrated one dissident group that the Agent was turned over to the FBI for handling. In addition, during this period, the Office of Security field offices were tasked with collecting available intelligence on dissident groups. All such information was included in a periodic report distributed to appropriate parts of the Agency and to certain outside Government agencies.F. ANTLERSSeveral months ago, at the request of CI Staff, and with the approval of the DDP and the DCI, this office arranged to move a sensitive defector out of a European country via commercial transportation and gain entry into the United States without leaving any trace of his true identity.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: General: Office of Security Survey11 May 19731.  At the Director's instruction, and with the concurrence of the then DD/P, the Office of Security developed informants in RID to report on the activities of RID employees on whom security questions had arisen. This program, which included upwards of a dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of three, only one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current interest.2.  The principal object of Security's interest through this informant is a female who was employed in RID for a number of years until she resigned in 1969. Her resignation coincided with the initiation of a security review on her by the Office of Security, but Security does not know whether the employee was aware of this security review at the time of her resignation.3.  Security's interest in this employee was occasioned by reports that she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance with a Cuban national. Reporting by one informant, who was also being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have an intelligence interest in the female. The same informant also subsequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among clerical and secretarial employees of the Agency. Among these employees is one girl who works in a biographic section in SB Division.4.  Subsequent to her departure from the Agency, the ex-RID employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the Cuban and joined him as partner in a photographic business. In this capacity she solicited business among CIA employees, especially those requiring passport photos. Recently, she and the Cuban sought to employ Security's informant in this business on a part-time basis.
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5. Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive, but it is inconclusive. He is known to have been a member of anti- Castro organizations this country. There are all reports that his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time. There are other episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part with some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established.6. The Office of Security has had at times a second informant in this case. His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the principal informant.7. There is conclusive evidence that the Cuban expressed interest in certain 201 files in the Agency, and there are good grounds for believing that the RID female employee delivered at least one such file to the Cuban while she was still in RID. There is also evidence that the female employee in SB Division has continued in frequent contact with her friend, the ex-RID employee, and the Cuban. On one occasion, she served as intermediary for contact instructions from the Cuban to O/S's principal informant. The informant has no knowledge, however, of any other requirements that may have been levied on or satisfied by the SB employee. Neither does he know of the extent of contacts by this couple with other Agency employees except social contacts.8. The Office of Security has been running this operation for over two years, in an effort to obtain conclusive proof of its intelligence nature. CI Staff has been kept informed. The FBI, which was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take responsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CLA's internal security. As a result, the Office ofSecurity has been inhibited in the actions it can take against the Cuban suspect. On the other hand, Security has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of compromising the operation.9. It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures to resolve doubts about the case, O/S has followed the course of watchful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant action himself that would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge of the relationship between the Cuban and the several other current Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues
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• to be quite limited. Neither the Cuban nor his girlfriend have made any further approaches to Security's informant recently, although he continues to see them ocially. Thus, there is slineason to believe that further waiting will produce a break in the case.10. There are two courses open to the Office of Security now. It can attempt to have the Agency employees known to be in contact with the Cuban transferred to nonsensitive positions. This might alert the Cuban to our penetration of the operation, particularly since a plausible reason for transfer would be difficult to develop for some of the persons involved. Alternatively, Security could move overtly and charge the Agency employees with violation of the security regulation requiring reporting of contacts with foreign nationals. This would, of course, terminate the Office of Security's operation.11. One of these courses of action should be chosen promptly. The possibility that the employee in SB Division may be passing information on CLA's Soviet operations is too great to warrant further delay in moving against her. Moreover, it is possible that the Cuban has current productive penetrations of RID. Thus, the risk of damage to the Agency seems clearly to outweigh any.possible gains from continuing this CI effort.John O. Lawrence- 3 -SECRET-NW-88296-Deeld:32989624 Page 2600061
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# ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY9 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management & ServicesSUBJECT: Press Allegations re Use of Agency Polygraph1. This memorandum is for your information only and confirms a report I made to you by telephone earlier today.2. On 22 July 1971, an article was carried on American proposals relative to the SALT talks in The New York Times over the by-line of Iden 181. It was devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotes from a Presidential advisory memorandum the White House had sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a few days earlier. The President was alleged to be furious with this unauthorized disclosure of classified information and directed a sweeping investigation within the United States Government to determine the source of the disclosure. Investigation was conducted under the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and Mr. David Young, Staff Assistants to Mr. John Ehrlichman, Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs.3. On the basis of investigations conducted by State Security and Defense officials, four individuals--one individual in the Department of Defense and three individuals in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--were tabbed as leading suspects. Mr. Egil Krogh contacted me on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraph the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect in the Department of Defense.ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLYNW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 2700065
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4. I informed Mr. Krogh that from time to time in matters involving the national security the Agency had detailed to Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of State Security, a polygraph operator and a polygraph machine for his use in polygraphing State Department employees who were recipients of allegations concerning their loyalty. I emphasized that this procedure had the Director's approval and that State clearly understood that the examin- ation was their total responsibility. I further informed him that this was the only way we could undertake to enter- tain his request and that even then it would require the specific approval of the Director. Mr. Krogh asked me to obtain such approval and work out such arrangements with Mr. Gentile.5. Later that same day, Mr. Krogh called Mr. Gentile and inquired as to whether the arrangements had been made. Mr. Gentile indicated they had and suggested that the same polygraph operator be used to examine the Defense suspect. Mr. Krogh informed Mr. Gentile that he considered this an excellent idea and that he would instruct Defense officials to make their man available to Mr. Gentile for a polygraph examination.6. The four individuals were Iden 182 of the Department of Defense and Iden 183, Iden 184, and Iden 185 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The polygraph examinations resulted in clearing the four men and the results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature to Mr. Gentile on 29 July 1971. A copy of my covering memorandum is attached.7. Iden 186, a staff writer for The Washington Post, in an article dated 3 September 1971, stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees suspected of leaking information on the SALT talks in July. Mr. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal
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ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLYBureau of Investigation, denied this allegation in a letter to The Washington Post and said that the polygraph examinations had been conducted by another agency. Speculation centered around the Agency, but after a day or so, press speculation in this regard died away.8. Iden 186 apparently has never been satisfied and has been pressing Mr. Charles Bray, State Department spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement. Mr. Bray learned today that Iden 186 plans to use a press conference to be held at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon to press this point further. Mr. Bray has been given guidance by Mr. Gentile to avoid confirmation but if this is impossible he will indicate the examinations were conducted by State Department Security officials utilizing an operator and a machine detailed to the Department for this purpose. I do not know whether or not the fact that the government-wide investigation was directed by Mr. Egil Krogh is known to Iden 186 but I suspect that it is and that this is the reason why the matter has been raised again. Mr. David Young was instrumental in pushing my office to conduct an internal Agency investigation of this disclosure and the White House was satisfied that no Agency employee was the source.![signature of howard osborn]Howard J. OsbornDirector of SecurityAttachmentADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY00067NW-88296-DocId:32989624_Page 29