Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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5ne 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector GeneralSUBJECT: Items in John Clarke Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 9 May 19731. Two items in the attached memorandum had not previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against a common target in the U.S."2. In a follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised that involved here was the use of funds appropriatedfor CIA being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of buying an apartment building.There was also Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought the only source of additional information on this subject was Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in those instances where some operational activity was involved or could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, politicalaction influence activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency![SECRET-EYES ONLY]
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funds used. He felt that only Colonel White could supply additional detai He said Senator Russell a Representative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity but asked not to be briefed in detail.![signature of John C. Richards]John G. Richards.InspectorAttachment- 2 -SECRET-EYES ONLY00071
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9 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceSUBJECT: Per your instructions1. I have no recollection of specific contacts with the Ellsberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms' instructions at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment should be a matter of record.2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill Colby is fully conversant are:*   CI activity of Dick Ober, DD/D.*   WHBRINEY and MHMUTUAL investments and accumulation of Government capital.*   Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U. S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against a common target in the U. S.*   Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of L. B. J. trip to SEA.![signature of John M. Clarke]John M. Clarke![eyes only secret mark]
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5 ne 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector-GeneralSUNJECT : Items in John Clarke Memorandumto the Director of Central Intelligence,dated 9 May 19731. Two items in the attached memorandum had not previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CLA funds and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FEI and pro- vision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against a common target in the U.S."2. In a follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised that involved here was the use of funds appropriatedfor CIA being given to the FEI in cashiers checks for the purpose of buying an apartment buildingThere was also Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought the only source of additional information on this subject was Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in those instances where some operational activity was involved or could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, politicalfaction influence activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency![classified document information]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 33
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MEMORANDUM FOR:FBI referred to in para 1 is not shown in other documents in the Agency. It has been kept very close with Mr. Yale, Mr. Magnusson, and possibly Mr. Colby. All Files have been purged.00076(DATE)FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-1011 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.(47)NW 88296. DocId:32989624 Page 34
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07 MAY 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceVIA : Deputy Director for Management and ServicesFROM : Director of FinanceSUBJECT : Special Other Government Agency Activities1. Project MHDOZEN - Colonel White, Executive Director-Comptroller, acting for the Director, authorized the Director of Finance in a memorandum dated 17 November 1971 to obligate $2,700,000 for a sensitive domestic FBI operation and to disperse all or any part thereof in such manner as may be determined by the receiving agency and relayed to Finance by the Chief, CI Staff, DDP. This authorization was reaffirmed by Mr. William Colby 18 April 1972. This Project is still active.2. LPMEDLEY - Rental of office space in New York City for National Security Agency at the request of Dr. Tordella, Deputy Director/NSA and approved by Mr. Karamessines, Deputy Director for Plans.3. Detailees - The Agency has reimbursable and non-reimbursable agreements with the White House, Department of Justice, Defense Agencies, etc., based on signed memoranda between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.4. Project TWOFOLD - Reimbursement from Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agents by a domestic Agency Security proprietary.5. Department of Justice - On 29 April 1971 the Executive Director-Comptroller authorized a payment of $858,555.70 to the Department of Justice for negotiated sensitive services. Details were kept in the Office of the Deputy Director for Plans.![WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED]SECRET EYES ONLYNW 88296 DocId:32989624 Page 35E2 IMPDETCL BY: 00656700077
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and ServicesSUBJECT: Special Report1.  This memorandum is in response to a request to provide information on situations or associations that might appear to be irregular on the surface.2.  Details to the White House and Government Agencies -    Background: For many years the Central Intelligence Agency has detailed employees to the immediate office of the White House per se and to components associated intimately with the immediate office of the President such as the Council on International Economic Policy and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. We have furnished secretaries, clerical employees and certain professional employees on a reimbursable and non-reimbursable basis. At the present time, he, we have no clericals or professionals assigned to the immediate White House office, but we do have one young man detailed to their Communications Section. There are detailees to PFIAB and CIEP. I might point out that we had detailed to the White House as late as the fall of 1970 couriers, telephone operators, a laborer assigned to the grounds and a graphics man who designed invitations for State dinners. By October of 1970, more funds were apparently available to run the White House and most of our detailees were hired as bona fide White House employees. CIA is not the only Agency furnishing the White House with detailees. Levies have been made by this Administration and others on Defense and State and other Government entities whose employees have Top Secret clearances.Professional officers have been and are at the present time assigned to the National Security Council and we have seven clericals on detail to NSC on a reimbursable basis.In addition to the above, we have technical specialists detailed to NSA, an instructor at the National War College and security officers detailed to the Department of State toCONFIDENTIAL E 2 IMPDET C1 By 00393500105NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 36
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protect foreign visitors. Recently, John Hay was detailed to the Secretary of the Treasury along with ur other Agency employees. We have even, in rare. instances, detailed our people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of time.3. Details to the White House and Government Agencies   Discussion: Details to NSC, the White House, NSA and the National War College are probably quite defensible. On the other hand, there may be those who would question Agency employees currently working at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and Mr. Peter Peterson having an Agency employee as his secretary when he was the Secretary of Commerce (she also made a trip with him to Moscow). She is still with him in his present assignment but we expect that she will report to NSC for a new detail sometime this month. Iden 112 served for over ten years as Director of the Office of. Public Safety for AID. This information has been kept "close to the vest" during that entire period of time. He has been approved for disability retirement and is presently on sick leave and will retire automatically at the expiration of this leave.Each detail of an Agency employee to the White House or other Government agency has been carefully considered and approval at a higher level obtained when professionals were involved.4. Project TWOFOLD: I believe the support we are providing to Project MOFOLD is an activity that should be. reported under your guidelines. Since this is an extremely sensitive Project and the Office of Security is reporting on it, I will not repeat the details in my memorandum.5. Individuals Engaged in Domestic Activities: In a more general sense, Contract Personnel Division prepares and executes contracts with individuals engaged by the Agency to carry out domestic activities. We also process Staff Agents who are domestically assigned. None of these assignments are decided in OP. I really have no way of knowing with any degree of certainty what the specific duties of these individuals will be.6. Arrangements with American Firms: In the interest of reporting "too much," I would remind you that Contract Personnel Division writes "agreements" with domestically based American firms to provide cover for Agency assets. The actual assignments are overseas. The arrangements, however, are backstopped, in the main, in the United States.
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# 7. Contractual Relationship - USJPRS:The Agency organization, USJPRS, has a contractual association with approximately 1,500 independent contractors and 45 contract employees. These individuals are unwitting of the fact that they really work for CIA in the performance of their domestic activities. USJPRS (United States Joint Publications Research Service) is a part of FBIS. They perform a translation service of unclassified documents for the Government. The independent contractors work in their own homes and are given assignments as the need arises. The contract employees are "integrated" into the Bureau of Standards and are located in Washington, D. C. They are paid and administered by the Bureau. CIA reimburses the Bureau. Their basic contracts of employment are prepared in Contract Personnel Division.# 8. Hunt Requests a Lockpicker:This is a record of External Employment Assistance Branch's action on a request from Howard Hunt for a lockpicker who might be retiring or resigning from the Agency.Sometime in the spring of 1972, Iden 38 of EEAB received a call from Howard Hunt who asked Iden 38 if he had a retiree or resignee who was accomplished at picking locks. Iden 38 sent him a resume on Thomas Amato who retired 31 July 1971. Iden 38 did not document his EEAB record to show the date of this exchange, but Mr. Thomas-Hester (who also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between March and May 1972.All of the above information was reported to the Office of Security on 4 October 1972 following the FBI's contact with the Agency regarding Howard Hunt.# 9. Resume Sent to McCord:Ross Lambert, a contract employee who retired in September 1971, was a client of the External Employment Assistance Branch in his search for a job after retirement. One of the leads given to Lambert was James McCord's security business. EEAB sent a resume to McCord, but Lambert was not hired.In mid-summer 1972, Mr. Lambert telephoned EEAB from Chicago. (He had a job there with the Halifax Security Co., a lead provided by EEAB, but until this telephone call he had
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not notified EEAB that he had the job and had moved from the D.C. area.) Heaid he had been visited a SpecialAgent of the FBI who told Lambert that his resume had beenfound among McCord's papers. The. Agent wanted to know ifLambert had any connection with McCord. Lambert explainedhow the resume got to McCord. After the Agent left him,Lambert telephoned EEAB. Mr. Kennedy of OP and Iden 29OS were notified immediately.Harry B. FisherDirector of Personnel4CONFIDENTIAL00108
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4 MAY 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceTHROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and ServicesSUBJECT : Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of Logistics1. This memorandum contains *information* for the Director of Central Intelligence.2. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given by the Deputy Director for Management and Services on 7 May that Office Directors report on activities, either under their cognizance or otherwise known to them, the nature of which could possibly need explanation or justification when viewed within the statutory responsibility and authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. The responsibilities of the Office of Logistics (OL) are such that in all matters herein reported, except two, the actions undertaken were at the request of another Agency component. We have prepared a brief description of each action involved and then have included the name of the sponsoring component. The substantive reason for the requests for action by this Office will have to be determined by inquiry to the designated sponsoring component.3. Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the initiative of this Office are as follows:a. A covert procurement proprietary concern, dedicated to the acquisition of firearms, ammunition, and related police-type equipment, is operated in Baltimore, Maryland. It was organized in 1969. This proprietary is operated in order to give the Agency a capability to obtain such materiel without associating the procurement action with the United States Government. It is legally necessary that the proprietary be licensed by both the State and Federal jurisdictions. Since it is located in Maryland, it is appropriately licensed by the Maryland State Police to buy and sell firearms and ammunition.![WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE ELLIGENCE SOURCES AND MEIDOS OLED]-NW-88296-Doeld:32989624 Page 40![EYES ONLY SECRET OL 3-2758]![image]
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# SUBJECT: Sensitive ctivities Performed by th. Office of LogisticsThe Maryland State Police have been briefed on the Agency's association with this proprietary and have assisted us in obtaining the appropriate State license. Similarly, a Federal license has been obtained for the proprietary through an arrangement with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms of the Department of the Treasury. They, too, have been briefed on the Agency's association with this proprietary.b. Under Title 18, Chapter 2512 of the U. S. Code (1968), the sale of electronic intelligence equipment is prohibited except to Federal agencies, and state and local law enforcement agencies. In essence, this law makes it almost impossible to procure electronic intelligence equipment in a covert manner so that no tie or relationship to the United States Government is made. In order for the Agency to covertly obtain such equipment and hide any Government interest, the Covert Procurement Staff of the Procurement Division. has relied on an established working relationship with a U.S. firm. This firm, a prominent supplier located in Maryland, deals in a wide range of law enforcement, police supplies, and equipment. The Covert Procurement Staff has, had a relationship withan officer in the firm for over 15 years. The officer agreed to allow us to place orders through his corporation to major suppliers of this equipment with a billing to an Agency national proprietary.There is an understanding that. if any inquiry is raised by the Department of Justice, the firm's officer would immediately call the Chief of the Covert Procurement Staff who would, through appropriate liaison channels, contact the Department of Justice, identify the Agency's interest in the procurement action, and clear the officer of any responsibility. On 10 September 1971, there was an inquiry about the proprietary fron an FBI agent making a routinė investigation of the officer's books. Through Office of Security liaison with the Department of Justice and the FBI, the agent was informed that it is an Agency notional proprietary. This disclosure closed the inquiry and, since that time, there has been no further inquiry. Most of the DD/O area divisions from time to time submit requisitions to us to acquire surveillance equipment. The majority of the transactions are on behalf of the intelligence service with whom liaison is conducted in various foreign countries. By agreement between this Office and[^2][^2]: ![eyes only secret logo]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 4100111
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# SUBJECT: Sensitive ctivities Performed by the Office of Logisticsthe DD/O, we will not honor any requisition for surveil- lance equipment unless it has been approved by the CI Staff of the DD/O.4. Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the following items are pertinent:a. In February 1971, Colonel L. K. White, the then Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to attend a meeting in his office, also attended by Mr. William Colby. Colonel White explained that the Technical Services Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance to the FBI for a sensitive projectColonel White did not disclose the purpose of the assistance being provided by TSD but did instruct me to assist TSD on purely contractual matters. Since the Office of Logistics has no information concerning the mission or purpose of Project sub- stantive questions concerning the subject should be addressed to TSD. Other procurement actions accomplished for the FBI are reported below. Specific mention is made, however, of the Project because of the dollar magnitude, approximately $1 million, and the complex technical equipment that has been involved in the undertaking.b. The Procurement Division, OL, currently has two requisitions in hand from TSD which would involve reimbursable sales to the FBI. One such requisition in the amount of $36,900 is for two Kestinghouse television cameras. The second requisition in the amount of $11,200 is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by Bausch and Lomb. No action is being taken on either of these requirements pending further instructions which will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management and Services.c. Over the years, this Agency has often supported other Government agencies from a contractual or materiel standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved request, supported by a transfer of funds, the Agency would either enter into "accommodation procurements" for the requesting agency or support the requesting agency by the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or provide a service for, another Government agency when such> EYES ONLY> SECRETNW 88296` Docld:32989624 Page 42
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# SUBJECT: Sensitive activities Performed by the Office of Logisticsaction would be more economical and eliminate the need for one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities readily available from another. A typical example of this procedure is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC. In connection with the current reporting requirement, however, I have had our records researched for the past 2 years and Attachment 1 reflects those transactions which appear to be relevant to the subject of this memorandum.d. In connection with the disclosures during the summer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not properly safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook two acts. I directed the Security Officer from our: West Coast Procurement Office at the Iden 87to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy himself that classified material furnished them by the Agency was both properly safeguarded and accounted for. His report was affirmative. On 23 August 1971, the senior Security Officer assigned to this Office forwarded a letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified information furnished them by the Agency. Of residual interest in this matter, there is summarized the contents of a memorandum of 2 July 1971 to the Executive Director- Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession.This memorandum reports that FBIS regularly disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation but that instructions had been issued to cease distribution of classified reports. While no other direct dissemination went to Rand, other USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing "many" copies of DD/I products to Rand as au- thorized under USIB regulations. The memorandum also states that Rand personnel had requested searches and document retrieval from the CRS facility.5. In connection with action taken for the Office of Security, there are three relevant items:a. The Printing Services Division, OL, was requested by the Office of Security to print a book written by Harry J. Murphy, Office of Security. The book was prepared by Mr. Murphy under a Brookings Institution FederalNW.88296.Docld:32989624 Page 43![EYES ONLY SECRET]