Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[124-10180-10295.pdf — page 0]
# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM## IDENTIFICATION FORM## AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY: FBIRECORD NUMBER: 124-10180-10295RECORD SERIES: HQAGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR.105-93072-4TH NR 101, 102, 1ST NR 102## DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR: FBIFROM: LEG, PATO: DIRECTOR, FBITITLE:DATE: 12/03/1963PAGES: 5SUBJECT: LHO, POST-RP, ASSOC, LIAISON WITH CIA, CONTACT, GIBSON, RICHARD, FPCCDOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: SecretNEW CLASSIFICATION:REVIEW DATE: 10/23/1998UPDATE DATE: 02/12/2001STATUS RedactRESTRICTIONS: JFK Act 6 (1)(B)COMMENTS: INC CABLRGRAM, 2 MEMONW 50953 DocId: 32174879 Page 1
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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10MAY 1062 EDITIONOSA GEN. REG. NO. 275010-100-03UNITED STATES RNMENT# Memorandum SECRETTO : Director, FBI (105-93072)FROM : Legat, Bern (105-248) (RUC)SUBJECT: RICHARD THOMAS GIBSONIS - CUBADATE: 12/17/63CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATIONIN THIS DOCUMENTAS SANITIZED.JM 7/1/98ReBulet to CIA dated 9/30/63 and Paris cable dated 12/3/63, latter captioned LEE HARVEY OSWALD, IS - CUBA.JOHN DIMMER, Office of Special Adviser (covert CIA), the Embassy Bern, informed that GIBSON had been located in Paris. In view of this, this case is being RUC'D in this office.(JFC) 8/17/98CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SUD/GCLDECLASSIFY ON 25X (4)ALL INFORMATION CONTARSENEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIEDEXCEPT WHERE SHOOOTHERWISE> [Figure: A series of signatures and annotations are present throughout the document, indicating reviews, classifications, and routing information.  The word CONFIDENTIAL is stamped across the bottom, with SECRET faintly below it.]3 - Bureau(-1 -Liaison)1 - Legat Paris (sent direct)1 - BernHDG/hcs(5)61 JAN 61964NW 50953 DocId:32174879 Page 2
[124-10181-10009.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992JFK Assassination SystemIdentification FormDate: 3/25/201## Agency InformationAGENCY: FBIRECORD NUMBER: 124-10181-10009RECORD SERIES : LOAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-358-42## Document InformationORIGINATOR: FBIFROM:TO:TITLE:DATE: 00/00/0000PAGES: 1SUBJECTS: SEE FBI 62-109060-3385DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION: SecretRESTRICTIONS: 1BCURRENT STATUS: RedactDATE OF LAST REVIEW: 06/24/1994OPENING CRITERIA: APPROVAL OF CIACOMMENTS:
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AIRTELTO DIRECTOR, FBI (62-109060)FROM LEGAT, LONDON (62-358) (RUC)ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENTJOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY 11/22/63,DALLAS, TEXASMISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNINGOn 6/22/64 Mr. R. E. CARTER, CIA, London[^7] on a highly confidential basis, furnished the following information which comes from a tisur on the Cuban Embassy, London, operated by British Security Service, MI-5 and British Secret Intelligence Service, MI-6. This conversation occurred on 5/8/64 and was between MARIO RIVA PATTERSON, Counselor, Cuban Embassy, London and an unidentified male visitor, possibly a Colombian. The conversation was in Spanish and indistinct at times[^5]. Information is as follows:"The visitor after a question half of which is not heard asks if in the case of the assassination of KENNEDY II (?) FOSTER (ph and indistinct) was ever in Cuba. RIVA replies in the negative. He says that this man applied for a visa to go to Cuba at the Consulate in Tampico. He was refused a visa. Had he been to Cuba he would have had his passport."VISITOR: "A typical F.B.I. job."RIVA: "A thing (una cosa) of the Imperialists - to kill him in the end - really disgusting -"It is possible that the individual referred to above as FOSTER may have been OSWALD. Above furnished for the Bureau's information.3 - Bureau1 - Liaison (sent direct)1- LondonCWB:rn[^5]ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
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# File #:62-116395# Serial Scope:1ST NR 14412ND NR 1444, 3RD NR 14441ST NR 1445 THRU 14471449 THRU 145214571459 THRU 14631465 THRU 14671469, 14701472 THRU 14741475
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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERALWASHINGTON, D.C. 20530FEB 10 1976TO: John A. Mintz, Assistant DirectorLegal Counsel DivisionFederal Bureau of InvestigationFROM: Steven K. BlackhurstAssistant Special Counsel forIntelligence CoordinationSUBJECT: Senate Select Committee Requestdated February 9, 1976Attached is a letter from the Senate Select Committeedated February 9, 1976. Please arrange for an appropriateresponse.24/ENCLOSUREEX-115EC-3862-116395-1475cc: Paul Daly7 MAR 19NW:88326 DocId:32989603 Page-2
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# Security Requirements for Government EmploymentExecutive Order 11785. June 4, 1974.AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 10450, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSESBy virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including 5 U.S.C. 1101 *et seq.*, 3301, 3571, 7301, 7313, 7501(c), 7512, 7532, and 7533; and as President of the United States, and finding such action necessary in the best interests of national security, it is hereby ordered as follows:SECTION 1. Section 12 of Executive Order No. 10450 of April 27, 1953, as amended, is revised to read in its entirety as follows:"Sec. 12. Executive Order No. 9835 of March 21, 1947, as amended, is hereby revoked."SEC. 2. Neither the Attorney General, nor the Subversive Activities Control Board, nor any other agency shall designate organizations pursuant to section 12 of Executive Order No. 10450, as amended, nor circulate nor publish a list of organizations previously so designated. The list of organizations previously designated is hereby abolished and shall not be used for any purpose.SEC. 3. Subparagraph (5) of paragraph (a) of section 8 of Executive Order No. 10450, as amended, is revised to read as follows:"Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in, any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons (hereinafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State, or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States, or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means."SEC. 4. Executive Order No. 11605 of July 2, 1971, is revoked.The White House,June 4, 1974.RICHARD NIXON[Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 3:05 p.m., June 4, 1974]"Presidential Documents"Volume 10 Number 23Pages 572 and 573June 10, 1974NW 88326 DocId:32989603 Page 9
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# Office of the Attorney GeneralWashington, D.C.December 5, 1947MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOOVERDIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONThis will refer to your memorandum of November 22 with reference to the Marais Childs column appearing in The Washington Post on November 18, 1947 and to your letters of November 21, the one addressed to Mr. Childs and the other addressed to Mr. Paul A. Walker, Acting Chairman, Federal Communications Commission.It is my view that the Bureau's practice of passing along to the various Government departments and agencies information which comes to its attention in connection with the conduct of investigations normally and regularly within the Bureau's jurisdiction is entirely appropriate and correct. Indeed, it would appear that the Bureau would be remiss in its duty if it failed to pass along information coming to it which might prove to be in the interest of the general welfare. It is not the Bureau's responsibility to determine whether the information is or is not of importance to the particular agency in the carrying out of its current activities and responsibilities and whether or not any action is taken by the department or agency is not, of course, a principal concern of the Bureau.I believe, therefore, that the Bureau should continue its practice of passing along information which it is believed. might be of interest to the various departments and agencies. At the same time I believe that it would be appropriate either (a) to prepare a circular to the various departments and agencies explaining the Bureau's purpose in furnishing information from time to time, or (b) to make a particular effort for a time when transmitting individual items of information to explain in the transmittal memorandum the Bureau's purpose in. making such transmittal.Attorney Gensfal
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# United States Department of Justice## Federal Bureau of Investigation### Washington 25, D. C.November 21, 1947Mr. Paul A. WalkerActing ChairmanFederal Communications CommissionWashington, D. C.Dear Mr. Walker:Under date of November 18, 1947, there appeared in the column of Mr. Marquis Childs in the Washington Post the following statement attributed to Mr. Clifford J. Durr of the Federal Communications Commission: "Already the FBI is furmishing to the commission unsolicited reports on individuals connected with radio, and I can assure you that if you should be told the kind of things contained in many of these reports you would dismiss the information as baseless gossip,"The Federal Bureau of Investigation has referred to the Federal Communications Commission from time to time information which it has received in the course of its regular investigations which appeared pertinent or material to matters within the jurisdiction of the Commission. It is the policy and practice of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to avoid any attempts to evaluate the significance of information relating to matters without its jurisdiction or the effect of such information upon the contemporary policies and programs of other agencies. As a result, the Bureau furnishes to the various Government departments such information as it receives which appears pertinent to the operations of those Government departments. In so far as is practicable, the Bureau attempts to evaluate the reliability of the source of this information without attempting to make any suggestions as to the use which should or should not be made of the information itself.Mr. Childs, in his column quoting Mr. Durr's statement, adds the following observation upon Mr. Durr's statement: "Note the word 'unsolicited'. It indicates that the FBI initiated investigations and sought to influence FCC decisions by sending reports on certain individuals to the commission. If this is happening, it is something Congress should know about."I desire to advise you that this Bureau has not at any time attempted in any manner or degree to influence FCC decisions. The material which has been transmitted to the Commission was sent solely for the purpose of affording the Commission information which came to the Bureau from various sources; which information, it was believed, might be of interest to the official activities of the Commission.NW 88326 Docld:32989603 Page 11
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In the light of the statements made by Mr. Durr and since these statements have not been repudiated by any other members of the Federal Communications Commsssion, I must assume that the material which the Bureau has been fuwnishing to the Commission is not desired by the Commission. I am consequently discontinuing the transmittal of such data to the Commission upon the assumption that the material is of no interest to the Commission.Very truly yours,John Edgar HooverDirector- 2 -NW 88326 DocId:32989603 Page 12
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# DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICEWASHINGTON 25, D. C.April 7, 1948TO THE HEADS OF ALL DEPARTMENTS ANDINDEPENDENT AGENCIES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.In memorandum of October 7, 1947, I called attention to the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has primary investigative jurisdiction of Section 3-A (61-1, Title 18, USC) of the Hatch Act. It is also pointed out that under the provisions of a presidential interpretation dated 30 October 1947 the Federal Bureau of Investigation has the responsibility of investigating all charges of disloyalty on the part of federal employees within the executive branch of the Government.The Federal Bureau of Investigation has sufficient investigative personnel under its direct supervision to carry out its responsibility in the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Vir-in Islands. However, it does not have personnel stationed in other areas of the world. Therefore, it has been necessary, in order that the Bureau may be enabled to carry out its responsibility, to arrange by agreement with the Departments and Agencies principally concerned for the delegation of the actual investigative work to certain other departments of the Executive Branch in those areas where it has no investigative personnel.It is recognized that there are two major classes of loyalty investigation. The first is the routine loyalty check of applicants for classified positions or of incumbents of such positions initiated in accord with Executive Order 9835. The second type is that in which doubt of loyalty of incumbents arises independently of the routine check. Procedures in regard to these two types must necessarily vary.1. Routine loyalty checks of employees stationed overseas.The Federal Bureau of Investigation will direct specific requests for the assistance of other agencies in handling the actual investigative work in accordance with the following principles:A. The Department of the Army, Navy, or Air Force shall be requested to utilize its own facilities for the necessary investigation of any of its own civilian personnel stationed outside the continental limits of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.The Federal Bureau of Investigation will continue to have the sole responsibility of conducting such investigation as is necessary within the continental limits of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.NW 88326 DocId:32989603 Page 13
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- 2 -involving civilian personnel of the Army, Navy or Air Force. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will refer to the appropriate agency all available material and will request investigation, and upon completion thereof, the reports should be furnished to the Federal Bureau of Investigation as provided hereafter.B. With respect to the necessary investigation of any of the personnel of other Departments and Agencies stationed outside the continental limits of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands--1. Requests for such investigation of Federal civilian employees stationed in occupied areas or areas under military investigative jurisdiction shall be directed to the Department of the Army, Navy, or Air Force for transmission to the Theater Commander or Area Commanding Officer, who will utilize for this purpose any appropriate investigative facility of the United States available in his area of command.2. Requests for such investigation of any Federal civilian employees stationed in unoccupied areas shall be directed to the State Department for transmittal to its appropriate foreign office, which will utilize for this purpose any investigative authority of the United States available in that country, or, in case no competent investigative facilities are available in that country, the principal diplomatic officer shall refer the matter for investigation to the principal diplomatic officer stationed in a nearby country where investigative facilities are available.The reports of completed investigations shall be returned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in response to its original request for assistance through the same channels utilized in transmitting the request for investigation, for consolidation with such material as the Bureau may have available in its files, or may have developed by investigation, and for further processing in line with the procedures which have been developed for carrying out the Loyalty Program.II. "Complaint Type" loyalty checks of employees stationed overseas.Such inquiries normally originate in the field and must be handled with the utmost possible dispatch. The agency in which the case originates will notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation as soon as a preliminary inquiry in the field has established grounds for a full investigation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will immediately check its files and inform the field agency
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of any dorogatory information which it may have on file. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will at once open a full field Investigation within the continental limits of the United States, etc., when such investigation is required by the availability of information within those areas. Completion of such investigation will be reported to the originating agency through hormal channels.A. The Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force will utilise their own facilities for the necessary investiga tion of any of their own civilian personol stationsd outside the continental limits of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.B. With respect to the necessary investigation under Class II of any of the personnel of other Eepartments and Agencies stationed outside the continental limits of the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Fuerto Rico and the Virgin Islandai1. In occupied areas the Theater Commander will have full responsibility to utilise any appropriate investigative facility of the United States available in his area of command.2. In unoccupied areas the principal diplomatio officer will be responsible for utilizing any investigative facility of the United States which is available in the country of his jurisdiction, or, if there is no such investigative facility available within the country of his jurisdiction, he shall refer the matter to the principal diplomatio officer stationed in a nearby country in which investigative facilities are available.The reports of completed investigation shall be forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investination through normal channels.It is understood that the declaration of emergency, or the establishment of martial law within areas of the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Tuerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands will have the effect fof making those areas "occupied territory," with the consequent application of procedures described in sections IA and BI and IIA above,The agrcexent which this memorandua serves to record has to do only with the establishing of a method of handling actual investigations in areas where the federal bureau of Investigation has no investigative fa.. cilities. Furthermore, the prodecures heroin crescribed do not rurport to limit in any way, or dolay the excrcise of, the authority possessed byNW 88326 Docld:32989603 Page 15
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- 4 -certain Lepartment and agency reads summarily to dismiss employees where necessary in the interest of National Defense.These Loyalty investi,stions should be given preferential attention and prosft panaling in all instances.TUL. vi. ClarkAttorney weneralNW 88326 Docld:32989603 Page 16
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## VIE kännsHonorable Philip YoungChairmanCivil service CommissionWashington 25, D.C.Dear Mr. Young:As you know, subsection (d) of section 5 of Executive Order No. 10450 requires that there be returns promptly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigations conducted by all agencies under the order which develop information of the type described in the subsection. The subsection further requires the FBI to make a full field investigation in cases so reported by it. However, except as indicated below, the FBI is not requesting to duplicate investigative efforts contemplated in the limitation on low investigative facilities, an agreement was worked out in coordination with administration of Executive Order No. 10450 with respect to determinations in certain areas. It is suggested that the procedure be continued in connection with investigations to be carried out by the FBI under Executive Order No. 10450. These are as follows:(1) The FBI will contact all necessary investi-gations in the continental, United States, Alaska, Territory, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.(2) The departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force will each use its own facilities to conduct investigations in connection with its own civilian personnel outside the areas listed in (1) above.(3) With respect to the investigation of civilian personnel, other than personnel of departments named in (2), above:(a) the leading commander or High Commis-sioner will utilize any appropriate investigativeNW 88326 DocId:32989603 Page 17
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- 2 -facilition of the United States available to him in an occupied area or in areas under military investigative jurisdiction;(b) In other areas the Department of State will utilize any investigative authority of the United States available in the country, concerned. If no complete investigative facilities are available in that country, the investigative facilities of the United States in a nearby country will be utilized by the Department of State.To repeat, the foregoing represents the arrangement between agencies with respect to investigations abroad carried out in the administration of Executive Order No. 9635, and accordingly the procedures utilized will merely involve continuing present procedures. In the absence of any indication of disagreement with the procedures outlined above, this Department will conduct itself on the theory that they remain in effect.Sincerely,WILLIAM P. ROGERSDeputy Attorney GeneralIdentical letters to:Honorable John Foster Dulles, Secretary of StateHonorable Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of DefenseNW 88326 DocId:32989603 Page 18
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Mr. Fillian P. RogersDeputy Attorney GeneralDirector, FBI# EXECUTIVE ORDER PROVIDING SECURITY## REQUIREMENTS FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENTApril 14, 1953Pursuant to your requests, memoranda dated February 4, 1953, February 26, 1953, April 6, 1953, and April 10, 1953, have been submitted to you containing observations regarding proposed drafts of the above Executive Order. Pursuant to the request of Mr. Eduard S. Lazowska of the Department, who delivered a copy of a new draft of this proposed Order on the evening of April 13, 1953, the following observations are set forth for your information and consideration:In connection with the provision in paragraph 3 (a) which allows the Civil Service Commission, in certain cases, to authorize less than the minimum amount of investigation stated in this paragraph but which meets the requirements of the national security, it is felt the Civil Service Commission must exercise extreme care to insure that any investigation authorized, particularly with respect to individuals who may have access to confidential information, goes, in effect, meet the requirements of the national security.In connection with Section 4 of the craft, your attention is invited to my previous observation that this Bureau feels it should conduct the additional investigation that may be appropriate only in those cases in which the purpose of the additional investigation is to develop information of a loyalty or subversive nature. In this connection it is observed that the provisions or sections 8 (b) and 8 (d) may be intended to accomplish this purpose. However, it is suggested that you may desire to have the order state more clearly regarding what agencies have the responsibilities to conduct the additional investigation requested in section 4.In connection with Section 5 of the craft, the thought occurs that its provisions as to what agency is required to conduct "such investigation as may be appropriate" may not be entirely clear. It is believed that the intent of this section is to provide that upon receipt by an agency of information necessitating investigationNW 88326 Docld:32989603 Page 19