Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 14]
SECRETEYES ONLYSUBJECT: Soviet DefectorA Soviet defector, defected to a representative of this Agency in 1964. The responsibility for his exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of the Clandestine Service and he was brought to this country. After initial interrogation by representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safehouse in Maryland, where he was confined and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when he was moved to a specially constructed "jail" in a remote wooded area at ISOLATION. The SR Division was convinced that he was a dispatched agent but even after a long period of hostile interrogation was unable to prove their contention and he was confined at ISOLATION in an effort to convince him to "confess."This Office together with the Office of General Counsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality of the Agency's position in handling a defector under these conditions for such a long period of time. Strong representations were made to the Director (Mr. Helms) by this Office, the Office of General Counsel, and the Legislative Liaison Counsel, and on 27 October 1967, the responsibility for his further handling was transferred to the Office of Security under the direction of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral Rufus Taylor.The Soviet defector was moved to a comfortable safehouse in the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly, sympathetic conditions by his Security Case Officer, Mr. Bruce Solie for more than a year. It soon became apparent that the Soviet defector was bona fide and he was moved to more comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom of independent movement and has continued to cooperate fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Office since that time. He has proven to be the mostE2 IMPDETSECRET CL BY 000988EYES ONLY00023
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 15]
SECRETEYES ONLYvaluable and economical defector this Agency has everhad and leads which were ignored by the SR Division wereexplored and have resulted in the arrest and prosecutionof Soviet recruited agents -in severalcountries throughout the world. He currently is livingunder an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wifeand remarried an. American citizen. He is happy, relaxed,and appreciative of the treatment accorded him and states"while I regret my years of incarceration, I have.no bitterness and now understand how it could happen."2SECRETEYES ONLY00024
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 16]
# SECRETEYES ONLYI. SURVEILLANCE'SA. SIESTADuring the periods 1-20 February, 12 April-7 May and 9-20 August 1971, a surveillance was conducted of Miss Deborah Fitzgerald, a former staff employee, and Orlando Toro Nunez, a Cuban national with whom Miss Fitzgerald had become professionally and emotionally involved. Surveillance was predicated upon information that Miss Fitzgerald had been seeking from employees information in Information Processing Division files, and that employees were visiting a photographic studio operated by Miss Fitzgerald and Nunez in Fairfax City, Virginia. In addition to physical surveillance, one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio was made, and an attempt to enter the apartment of Nunez was aborted because of a door lock problem.B. PARAGONPursuant to a request from the CI Staff, approved by the DCI, surveillances were conducted of Iden 69 and her associates at various times from May to September 1971. Iden 69 an acknowledged Latin American revolutionary, had long been a source of the WH Division and had given information regarding a plot to assassinate or kidnap Vice President-Agnow and the DEI. Surveillances included coverage of the activities of Iden 69 during two visits to the United States, technical coverage of debriefings of her by WH Division representatives in New York City, and surveillance, including mail coverage, of several American citizens alleged to be part of the plot. Although most of the surveillance occurred in New York City, surveillance of one of the individuals included extensive coverage of a commune in Detroit.C. CELOTEX IAt the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was conducted of Iden 180 of the Washington Post duringSECRETEYES ONLYE2 IMPDET(CL BY 00098800026
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 17]
# SECRETEYES CALYthe periods 6-9 October, 27 October-10 December 1971 and on 3 January 1972. In addition to physical surveillance, an observation post was maintained in the Statler Hilton Hotel where observation could be maintained of the building housing his office. The surveillance was designed to determine Iden 180 sources of classified information of interest to the Agency which had appeared in a number of his columns.## D. MUDHENAt the direction of the DCI, surveillance was conducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his "leg men," Britt Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear, from 15 February to 12 April 1972. In addition to the physical surveillance, an observation post was maintained in the Statler Hilton Hotel directly opposite Anderson's office. The purpose of this surveillance was to attempt to determine Anderson's sources for highly classified Agency information appearing in his syndicated columns.## E. BUTANEAt the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was conducted on Victor L. Marchetti from 23 March to 20 April 1972. The purpose of this surveillance was to determine his activities and contacts both with Agency employees and other individuals in regard to his proposed book and published magazine articles exposing Agency operations.## II. POLICE SUPPORT### A.During 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions, the Intelligence Division of the Metropolitan. Police Department was provided a communications system to monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the Washington area. This system consisted of a radio receiver and an Agent at the Intelligence Division Headquarters and several automobiles from an Agency Field Office equipped with radio receivers and transmitters and manned bytwo Agency employees, as well asia representative of the Intelligence Division, Metropolitan Police Department. The benefit to the Agency was that the communications over this system were monitored at the Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of possible actions by the dissidents against Agency installations.
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 18]
SECRETEYES ONLYB. During the period from 1968 to 1973, severalitems of positive audio equipment consisting pri-marily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tonedial recorders were loaned to the MetropolitanPolice Department, Fairfax-County, - Virginia, PoliceDepartment, Montgomery County, Maryland, PoliceDepartment, New York City Police Department, and theSan Francisco, California, Police Department.III. GENERAL SUPPORTA. SRPOINTER-Since 1953, this office has operated a mail inter-cept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mailand, at various times, other selective mail at KennedyAirport in New York City. This operation included notonly the photographing of envelopes but also surrepti-tious opening and photographing of selected items ofmail. The bulk of the take involved matters of inter-nal security interest which was disseminated to theFederal Bureau of Investigation. This program is nowin a dormant state pending a decision as to whetherthe operation will be continued or abolished.B. AELADLEFor several years the Office of Security has pro-vided support to a Russian defector ofinterest to the CI Staff. This support has consistedof numerous things, including documentation for a changeof identity on three occasions.C. REDFACE IIn July 1970, this office made a surreptitiousentry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occu-pied by a former defector working under contract forthe Agency. This involved by-passing a contact and3SECRETEYES ONLY00028
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 19]
SECRETEYES ONLYsonic alarm system, entering a vault, and enteringa safe within the vault. The purpose of the opera-tion was to determine whether the individual hadany unauthorized classified information in hispossession.D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGSIn January 1971, the Director approved a requestfrom the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and DangerousDrugs, to provide covert recruitment and securityclearance support to BNDD. This has been accomplishedthrough the medium of a proprietary of the Office ofSecurity operating inFalls Church, Virginia. Supportincludes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph,medical clearance, and training. It has been dividedinto three phases: (1) A CI operation to place indi-viduals in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegalactivities of other BNDD employees; (2) Recruitmentof Chinese or Spanish speaking covert Agents; and (3)Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BNDDbut actually employed by BNDD, although this fact isknown only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD.In this case, arrangements were made for all pay andother employee benefits to come from CIA on a reim->bursable basis.E. KITTENS PROJECTAs a result of a request from the Department ofState, approved by the DCI this office has, sinceOctober 1972, provided protection on a 24-hour basisto two sons of a foreign leader who are attending schoolin the United States. This support includesthe financing of the protection and the detail to theDepartment of State of six armed Agents of this officewho are documented as State Department Office of Securityemployees.F. MERR-IMAG-From February 1967 to November 1971, anOffice of Security proprietary, recruited and handledseveral Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring4SECRETEYES ONLY00023
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 20]
SECRETEYES ONLYdissident groups in the Washington area considered to be potential threats to Agency personnel and installations. One of these Agents_so successfully penetrated one dissident group that the Agent was turned over to the FBI for handling. In addition, during this period, the Office of Security field offices were tasked with collecting available intelligence on dissident groups. All such information was included in a periodic report distributed to appropriate parts of the Agency and to certain outside Government agencies.F. ANTLERSSeveral months ago, at the request of CI Staff, and with the approval of the DDP and the DCI, this office arranged to move a sensitive defector out of a European country via commercial transportation and gain entry into the United States without leaving any trace of his true identity.
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 21]
11 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: General: Office of Security Survey1. At the Director's instruction, and with the concurrence of the then DD/P, the Office of Security developed informants in RID to report on the activities of RID employees on whom security questions had arisen. This program, which included upwards of a dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of three, only one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current interest.2. The principal object of Security's interest through this informant is a female who was employed in RID for a number of years until she resigned in 1969. Her resignation coincided with the initiation of a security review on her by the Office of Security, but Security does not know whether the employee was aware of this security review at the time of her resignation.3. Security's interest in this employee was occasioned by reports that she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance with a Cuban national. Reporting by one informant, who was also being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have an intelligence interest in the female. The same informant also subsequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among clerical and secretarial employees of the Agency. Among these employees is one girl who works in a biographic section in SB Division.4. Subsequent to her departure from the Agency, the ex-RID employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the Cuban and joined him as partner in a photographic business. In this capacity she solicited business among CIA employees, especially those requiring passport photos. Recently, she and the Cuban sought to employ Security's informant in this business on a part-time basis.
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 22]
5. Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive, but it is inconclusive. He is known to have been a member of anti-Castro organizations this country. There are all reports that his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time. There are other episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part with some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established.6. The Office of Security has had at times a second informant in this case. His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the principal informant.7. There is conclusive evidence that the Cuban expressed interest in certain 201 files in the Agency, and there are good grounds for believing that the RID female employee delivered at least one such file to the Cuban while she was still in RID. There is also evidence that the female employee in SB Division has continued in frequent contact with her friend, the ex-RID employee, and the Cuban. On one occasion, she served as intermediary for contact instructions from the Cuban to O/S's principal informant. The informant has no knowledge, however, of any other requirements that may have been levied on or satisfied by the SB employee. Neither does he know of the extent of contacts by this couple with other Agency employees except social contacts.8. The Office of Security has been running this operation for over two years, in an effort to obtain conclusive proof of its intelligence nature. CI Staff has been kept informed. The FBI, which was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take responsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CIA's internal security. As a result, the Office ofSecurity has been inhibited in the actions it can take against the Cuban suspect. On the other hand, Security has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of compromising the operation.[^1]9. It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures to resolve doubts about the case. O/S has followed the course of watchful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant action himself that would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge of the relationship between the Cuban and the several other current Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues-2-00063[^1]: JFLIO
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 23]
to be quite limited. Neither the Cuban nor his girlfriend have made any further approaches to Security's informant recently, although he continues to see them ocially. Thus, there is slireason to believe that further waiting will produce a break in the case.10. There are two courses open to the Office of Security now. It can attempt to have the Agency employees known to be in contact with the Cuban transferred to nonsensitive positions. This might alert the Cuban to our penetration of the operation, particularly since a plausible reason for transfer would be difficult to develop for some of the persons involved. Alternatively, Security could move overtly and charge the Agency employees with violation of the security regulation requiring reporting of contacts with foreign nationals. This would, of course, terminate the Office of Security's operation.11. One of these courses of action should be chosen promptly. The possibility that the employee in SB Division may be passing information on CLA's Soviet operations is too great to warrant further delay in moving against her. Moreover, it is possible that the Cuban has current productive penetrations of RID. Thus, the risk of damage to the Agency seems clearly to outweigh any. possible gains from continuing this CI effort.> [Figure: Signatures of JALUKA and John Q. Lawrence]- 3 -![SOET logo]00061
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 24]
ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY9 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management & ServicesSUBJECT: Press Allegations re Use of AgencyPolygraph1. This memorandum is for your information only and confirms a report I made to you by telephone earlier today.2. On 22 July 1971, an article was carried on American proposals relative to the SALT talks in The New York Times over the by-line of Iden 181. It was devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotes from a Presidential advisory memorandum the White House had sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, a few days earlier. The President was alleged to be furious with this unauthorized disclosure of classified information and directed a sweeping investigation within the United States Government to determine the source of the disclosure. Investigation was conducted under the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and Mr. David Young, Staff Assistants to Mr. John Ehrlichman, Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs.3. On the basis of investigations conducted by State Security and Defense officials, four individuals--one individual in the Department of Defense and three individuals in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--were tabbed as leading suspects. Mr. Egil Krogh contacted me on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraph the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect in the Department of Defense.![photo of JFKOK]ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY00065
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 25]
4. I informed Mr. Krogh that from time to time in matters involving the national security the Agency had detailed to Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of State Security, a polygraph operator and a polygraph machine for his use in polygraphing State Department employees who were recipients of allegations concerning their loyalty. I emphasized that this procedure had the Director's approval and that State clearly understood that the examination was their total responsibility. I further informed him that this was the only way we could undertake to entertain his request and that even then it would require the specific approval of the Director. Mr. Krogh asked me to obtain such approval and work out such arrangements with Mr. Gentile.5. Later that same day, Mr. Krogh called Mr. Gentile and inquired as to whether the arrangements had been made. Mr. Gentile indicated they had and suggested that the same polygraph operator be used to examine the Defense suspect. Mr. Krogh informed Mr. Gentile that he considered this an excellent idea and that he would instruct Defense officials to make their man available to Mr. Gentile for a polygraph examination.6. The four individuals were Iden 182 of the Department of Defense and Iden 183, and Iden 184, Iden 185 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The polygraph examinations resulted in clearing the four men and the results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature to Mr. Gentile on 29 July 1971. A copy of my covering memorandum is attached.7. Iden 186, a staff writer for The Washington Post, in an article dated 3.September 1971, stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees suspected of leaking information on the SALT talks in July. Mr. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 26]
ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLYBureau of Investigation, denied this allegation in a letter to *The Washington Post* and said that the polygraph examinations had been consucted by another agency. Speculation centered around the Agency, but after a day or so, press speculation in this regard died away.8. Iden 186 apparently has never been satisfied and has been pressing Mr. Charles Bray, State Department spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement. Mr. Bray learned today that Iden 186 plans to use a press conference to be held at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon to press this point further. Mr. Bray has been given guidance by Mr. Gentile to avoid confirmation but if this is impossible he will indicate the examinations were conducted by State Department Security officials utilizing an operator and a machine detailed to the Department for this purpose. I do not know whether or not the fact that the government-wide investigation was directed by Mr. Egil Krogh is known to Iden 186 but I suspect that it is and that this is the reason why the matter has been raised again. Mr. David Young was instrumental in pushing my office to conduct an internal Agency investigation of this disclosure and the White House was satisfied that no Agency employee was the source.Attachment![signature]Howard J. OsbornDirector of SecurityADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY00067
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 27]
# MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector GeneralSUBJECT: Items in John Clarke Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, dated 9 May 19731. Two items in the attached memorandum had not previously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for. FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against a common target in the U.S."2. In a follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised that involved here was the use of funds appropriatedfor CIA being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of buying an apartment building.There was also Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought the only source of additional information on this subject was Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in those instances where some operational activity was involved or could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, politicalaction influence activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 28]
funds used. He felt that only Colonel White could supply additional detai He said Senator Russell Repre- sentative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity but asked not to be briefed in detail.Attachment![signature of JFKUDA] / ![signature of John G. Recliards] John G. Richards.Inspector- 2 -SECRET-EYES OILY00071
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 29]
9 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceSUBJECT : Per your instructions1. I have no recollection of specific contacts with the Ellsberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms' instructions at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment should be a matter of record.2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill Colby is fully conversant are:-- CI activity of Dick Ober, DD/D.-- WHBRINEY and MHMUTUAL investments and accumulation of Government capital.-- Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U. S. real estate for FBI and provision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against a common target in the U. S.-- Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer Presidential representational expenses of L. B. J. trip to SEA.![signature of John M. Clarke]John M. ClarkeEYES ONLYSECRET