Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 134]
7 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: O/DDISUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs1. This memorandum responds to the DDI's request for a listing of any questionable involvements in domestic affairs. I do not believe that CRS is doing anything that a reasonable man could construe as improper.2. CRS does, of course, have several programs to acquire still pictures, movies, videotapes and books either privately, secretly or without acknowledgement that CIA is the actual end user. CRS is regularly involved with Customs in looking at the content of film cans addressed to the Russian Embassy in Washington. Customs occasionally also provides access to other film from denied areas. It may be addressed to private citizens or organizations or other embassies. These efforts are aimed at acquisition of positive foreign information.3. CRS files do not generally bear on U.S. citizens or organizations. The biographic file- building criteria specifically excludes U.S. nationals unless the person has become of such major importance in the political life of a foreign country that the file is essential. (To my knowledge, only 2 persons so qualify. One is the wife of the opposition leader of Guyana and the other is Hope Lang. Our Cuban files probably include some persons who are now U.S. citizens but we have no way to separate them; we have files on U.S. defectors to Cuba.)
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SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs4. The CIA Library has several informal snag files intended to aid the librarians in answering the kinds of questions that they know they will get on a continuing basis. An appointments file is a collection of clippings on appointed federal officials: who holds what job when and what is his background? The extremist files are a collection of folders on a variety of organizations and a few people with intricate organizational links. Any sort of extremism is grist for these particular files. And a few persons, e.g., Rap Brown and Eldridge Cleaver, have dossiers consisting almost exclusively of clippings from public media. These files are unclassified and consist mostly of clippings from the public press: U.S., foreign, underground, scholarly.5. I am not aware of any other kind of involvement in domestic activities that is not related to development of techniques or logistics or legitimate training of CRS personnel.H. C. EISENBEISSDirector, Central Reference Service-2-
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# SECRET18 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: DDISUBJECT: Sensitive ActivitiesJFK(1)(B)1. FBIS has been engaged in no activities related to the Ellsberg and Watergate cases.2. FBIS operations occasionally extend to the domestic arena. From time to time, FBIS linguists are made available to DDO or Office of Communications components for special operations (usually abroad) involving close-support SIGINT work or translation of audio take. On one occasion recently DDO, on behalf of the FBI, requested the services of several FBIS linguists skilled in Arabic to work directly for the FBI on a short- term project here in Washington. The arrangements were made by Mr. Oberg of the DDO CI Staff. He said the project was very highly classified and that FBIS participation was approved by Mr. Colby and the Director. FBIS participation was approved by the Director of FBIS after a check with the ADDI.. Other examples of sensitive linguistic support work are help in the handling and resettlement of defectors, the recent assignment of an employee to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to transcribe recordings in a rare Chinese dialect, and the detailing of another Chinese linguist on two occasions to assist in the U.S. military training of Chinese Nationalist cadets.3. Within its responsibility for monitoring press agency trans- missions for intelligence information, FBIS publishes and distributes some material which falls in a "gray" area of copyright protection, libel, and privacy of international communications. Press services controlled by national governments and transmitted by radioteletype without specific addressees, e.g. the Soviet TASS service and the PRC's NCNA, are monitored by FBIS and the material is disseminated without restriction. The legality of this has been affirmed by decisions of the Office of General Counsel. However, we also monitor some in-house, correspondent-to-headquarters dispatches which are considered private point-to-point transmissions. FBIS therefore avoids public distribution of material monitored from these circuits by labeling them with an "Official Use Only" caveat. The same caveat is used on material which we monitor from other press agencies which are protected by international copyright, e.g. Agence France Presse (AFP), the Middle East News Agency (MENA), and the Iraqi Nes Agency (INA). This procedure has allowed FBIS to disseminate news
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SEONETagency material for nearly three decades without problems. Recently, however, the Office of General Counsel has ruled that an "Official Use Only" caveat will not bar such material from the general public under the Freedom of Information Law and we are accordingly looking into alternative measures, among which are: (1) the purchase of news services with rights to publish and disseminate; and (2) the classification of those items vital to the government's business which we must continue to monitor and report. An ultimate decision will be weighed against the risk of present procedures.4. The routine FBIS monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts often involves statements or speeches made by U.S. citizens using those radio facilities. Examples are statements made or allegedly made by American POW's in Hanoi, by Jane Fonda in Hanoi and by Ramsey Clark in Vietnam. At the request of FBI and the Department of Justice, and with the approval of the CIA Office of General Counsel, we have on occasion submitted transcripts of such broadcasts to the Department of Justice as part of that Department's consideration of a possible trial. In such cases, we have been required to submit names of FEIS monitors involved, presumably because of the possibility they might be required as witnesses. (In one case in 1971, an FBIS staff employee was directed to appear as an expert witness in the court-martial of a Marine enlisted man charged with aiding the enemy in a broadcast from Hanoi.) FBIS views all this with misgivings. Monitoring of such broadcasts is incidental and we rue attribution of their news to FBIS, and we should not be considered policemen maintaining surveillance of traveling Americans.5. FBIS is an overt organization, but one aspect of its operations is under Department of Commerce cover. The Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) was established in 1957 to provide the means through which great volumes of material from unclassified foreign publications could be translated by large numbers of independent contractors in the United States on a piece rate basis. Contractors are not witting of their CIA employment. This use of cover is an anomaly in FBIS and contains some risk of embarrassment to the Agency and to Commerce if it becomes public knowledge. The surfacing of JPRS was given study in 1969, but after consideration of all the pros and cons it was decided at the Executive Director-Comptroller level not to proceed at that time. FBIS is presently taking a second look.![signature of E. H. Knoche]E. H. KNOCHEDirectorForeign Broadcast Information Service-2-SECRETSERETNE00203
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# SECRET,8 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & TechnologySUBJECT : TSD Support to Other Agencies1. Technical Services Division's charter (CSI 1-8) requires that it provide technical assistance to both CIA operations and other activities as may be directed by the Deputy Director for Operations.2. Over the years the chief non-CIA recipients of this support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency for International Development, and the White House.3. While varying widely among the different recipients, these services have included training and materials, and in a few instances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance, secret writing and related communications, personal protection, disguise, concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcotics detection, and counter-sabotage/terrorism.4. In most instances requirements for this support are received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels. Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy also is required.5. The attachment lists the primary services provided to the organizations named in Paragraph two.SECRET
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-2-This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods.8. Provision of forged documentation to non-DDO requesters, whether they be CIA or other Agency requesters, always requires approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance would be validated by FI Staff/Departmental Coordination Group at Headquarters or by the COS overseas having responsibility for coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated with (DDO/NARCOG). Requests for documentation of Immigration and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs Staff.9. Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has been issued, TSD retains photographs and records of such support until the documentation has been returned to TSD. If the material is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded of the outstanding documentation.AttachmentDistribution:O & 1 - Addressee, w/attSidney GottliebChiefTechnical Services Division
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JFK(C)Department of DefenseATTACHMENTDocuments, disguise, concealment devices, secret writing,flaps and seals; counterinsurgency and counter sabotage courseshave been furnished to all intelligence elements of the Departmentof Defense and certain elements of the Special Forces. All requestsare coordinated with the FI Departmental Coordination Group atHeadquarters and with the (Chief of Stations) overseas. In turnthese elements furnished TSD with exemplars of foreign identitiesdocuments, foreign cachets, foreign intelligence secret writingsystems, foreign intelligence concealment devices. (Selectedaudio requirements have been furnished overseas for CI -typecases.)Federal Bureau of InvestigationAt the request of the FBI we cooperate with the Bureauin a few audio surveillance operations against sensitive foreigntargets in the United States.Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous DrugsBeacons, cameras, audio and telephone devices foroverseas operations, identity documents, car-trailing devices,SRAC, flaps and seals and training of selected personnelresponsible for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau.All requirements are sent to (DDO/NARCOG) for coordinationwith area divisions and for action by TSD if appropriate.Requests overseas are coordinated with the (COS) or hisdesignee before action by TSD is taken.Immigration and Naturalization(CI analyses of foreign passports and visas, guidance indeveloping tamperproof alien registration cards, specialfluorescent stamp inks have been furnished the Service.) Requestsare forwarded directly to TSD for coordination within TSD iftechnical, with the FI Departmental Coordination Group if oper-ational.JAKUB)SECRET00217
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# Department of StateTechnical graphics guidance on developing a new United States Passport, analyses of foreign passports, car-armoring and personnel locators (beacons) for Ambassadors have been supplied the State Department. In addition analyses and exposure of black letter operations against the United States abroad are made. All graphics requirements are forwarded to TSD for further coordination within the Division. The Department of State furnishes exemplars of foreign passports, foreign visas and in the past passports on a priority basis.# Postal ServiceThe Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected personnel attend basic surveillance photographic courses, has been furnished foreign postal information and has been the recipient of letter bomb analyses, furnished special fluorescent ink, typewriter analyses. Requirements are coordinated with the DDO and DDO/EA.) The Post Office has furnished TSD with exemplars of letter bombs and mail insertion capabilities for CA material destined for foreign countries. We also have an arrangement with the Post Office to examine and reinsert a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving in the United States.# Secret ServiceGate passes, security passes, passes for Presidential campaign, emblems for Presidential vehicles; a secure ID photo system have been furnished this Service. Blanket approval for graphics support has been granted to the Deputy Director for Operations. In each case TSD requests approval from the DDO.# U. S. Agency for International DevelopmentWe furnish instructors to a USAID-sponsored Technical Investigation Course (Counter Terror) at Los Fresnos Border Patrol Academy, Los Fresnos, Texas. Instructors are under Department of the Army cover and the funding of our participation is under an approval of a CI-Police Group project. Courses are given Spring and Fall each year. Instruction is given at the- 2 -
[124-10185-10099.pdf — page 142]
request of CI/PG.) Trainees represent internal security or national police from all countries participating in AID Police assistance programs.White HouseStationery, special memoranda, molds of the Great Seal have been furnished the Social Secretary. The Deputy Director for Operations is apprised of these requirements.Police Respresenting Washington, Arlington, Fairfax and AlexandriaDuring the period 1968 - 1969 a series of classes reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic audio, locks and picks, countersabotage and surreptitious entry were given to selected members from the above mentioned cities. Overall training was approved by the Director of Centeral Intelligence) and in turn validation was required for each course from the Director of Security.SECRET
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# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEETFROM:Sidney GottliebChief, TSD203 South BuildingEXTENSION NO.X-2831 DATE 8 May 1973TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)|     | DATE RECEIVED | DATE FORWARDED | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment) || --- | ------------- | -------------- | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ || 1.  |               |                |                    | DDS&T Attached herewith are additions explanations of TSD support to other U.S. Government agencies.   || 2.  |               |                |                    |                                                                                                        || 3.  |               |                |                    |                                                                                                        || 4.  |               |                |                    |                                                                                                        || 5.  |               |                |                    |                                                                                                        || 6.  |               |                |                    |                                                                                                        || 7.  |               |                |                    |                                                                                                        || 8.  |               |                |                    |                                                                                                        || 9.  |               |                |                    |                                                                                                        || 10. |               |                |                    |                                                                                                        || 11. |               |                |                    |                                                                                                        || 12. |               |                |                    |                                                                                                        || 13. |               |                |                    |                                                                                                        || 14. |               |                |                    |                                                                                                        || 15. |               |                |                    |                                                                                                        |
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ATTACHMENTFEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONTSD has had a close working relationship with the FBI over the past few years. The FBI is the only organization that has been fully briefed on TSD audio techniques and equipment. The following are situations where TSD equipment and guidance were involved in operations:(A) Identity 59 - Four masked transmitters were installed. Two have failed and two remain workable.(B) Identity 60 - A TSD built masked transmitter was installed to collect emanations from a cryptographic machine. The system continues to function when samples of the emanations are needed.(C) Identity 61 - Two transmitters have been installed and are operating. One is specifically designed to collect the sounds of typewriting, the other is a straight audio transmitter to collect conversations. A FBI agent is manning the listening post. A third system is not operating, probably due to battery expiration. The tape made from this room was made by the National Security Agency before failure.(D) Identity 62 - TSD furnished equipment and consultation covering Identity 62. First masked switched transmitters were used in two apartments used as temporary quarters. Later masked switched transmitters and microwave transmitters were installed in the permanent quarters along with mic and wire installations, entirely furnished by the Bureau. This installation is not fully operational because the full complement of personnel have not yet arrived.
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(E) Iden 4 - This is an operation with additional participation by National Security Agency. It is designed in anticipation of the Identity 64 in Washington. The listening post was obtained by using the Agency covert mechanisms for procuring the property. New systems are being designed and produced by using TSD's covert contractor mechanisms and TSD engineers.(F) Identity 65 - Ten masked audio devices purchased from TSD were installed in Identity 65 by the FBI. Part of the equipment was installed in November and December 1971, the remaining equipment was installed 17 - 25 March 1972. Tests made by a TSD officer from a temporary FBI listening post on 8 - 9 November 1972, proved that the target equipment no longer functioned and was believed discovered by the occupants.(G) TSD has furnished equipment items which constitute an on-the-shelf capability to engage in photo and audio surveillance operations which might not be known to the Agency. In one case it is known that a relatively unsophisticated device was used against a domestic target.
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SECRETTSD/SDB Memo #138-738 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR:Chief, TSDATTENTION:Executive OfficerSUBJECT:Contacts with Domestic Police Organizations1. In December 1968, July 1969 and December 1970, SDB provided basic countersabotage familiarization training for selected members of the Washington metropolitan area police departments. The training was given at the Fairfax County police pistol and rifle range. Authorization for the training came from DDP and Chief, Office of Security.2. On occasion during the past few years, under the auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice and with the approval of CI Staff and Office of Security, SDB provided training and familiarization to police officers of several domestic police departments in the uses of the Explosives Residue Detection Technique and Trace Metals Detection Technique. These techniques had been declassified and are currently available to the law enforcement community. The National Bomb Data Center publishes periodic guidance in their uses.3. In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities in the field of countersabotage and counterterror, SDB officers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City police department, Dade County (Miami) Florida Dept. and the Los Angeles Police Dept. Also, in March 1973, two SDB officers attended the Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Conference in Sacramento, California, sponsored by LEAA. When the recent letter bomb menace began in September 1972, our liaison with the NYCPD bomb squad paid off in that we had complete information on letter bomb construction in hours, enabling the Agency to make worldwide dissemination within a day./s/ Identity 120C/TSD/OPS/00223EZ IMPDET/CL BY
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# 73-2381JFK(B)ORD-2328-73• 9 MAY 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and TechnologySUBJECT : Repeated Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign Intelligence ActivitiesThe 7 May survey has been repeated and refined with respect to all (ORD Services) or dealings with other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters. In addition, this report covers all our activities dealing with the research and development of intelligence equipment for foreign use which has been tested in the United States and might have collected domestic information. Again, each member of (ORD) available today was asked either directly or through his supervisor to provide the above requested information, whether he was directly involved or not. We have used all diligence to search our records available to us during this time period to ensure this is a complete and factual list.for Sayre StevensDirector of Research & DevelopmentAttachments:1 - Contacts with Other Government Agencies2 - Domestic Tests![photo of stamps and signiture]
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CONTACTS WITH OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WHICHCOULD OR HAVE RESULTED IN USE OF CIA-DEVELOPEDTECHNOLOGY IN ADDRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS## Executive Office of the PresidentCORD represents DD/S&T on the R&D Sub-Committeeof the Cabinet Committee for International NarcoticsControl that is concerned with research support ofthe narcotics control problem.(Dr. Leonard Laster, OST)(Cianci/LS)## Office of Telecommunications PolicyTechnical surveillance countermeasures andphysical security information was exchanged withthem.(Noe/TA)## Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)Techniques and equipment for navigation andtracking was discussed with BNDD.(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD)(Van Dewerker/TA)(Noe/TA)Technical information was exchanged relatingto the development of simple, portable sensor systemsfor the detection of concealed bulk narcotics andnarcotic laboratory effluents.(Mr. John Gunn andMr. Bill Butler, BNDD)(Parker/DSP)Audio tapes were processed to improve theirintelligibility. The source of the tapes was unknown.(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD)(Scott/An)SECRET00220ATTACHMENT 1