Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD19 Jul 972SUBJECT: Conversation with Jack Bauman1. While on leave visiting Disney World in Florida, I dropped in to see Jack Bauman who lives in Winterhaven, Florida. Jack retired from the Agency about five years ago on disability due to a serious heart condition. He was with the Office of Security for about 20 years prior to his retirement.2. During a private conversation Jack told me that he had been interviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with the McCord-Hunt affair. I asked him why he had been interviewed, and he told me that in late 1971 he had been contacted by Howard Hunt who suggested that he consider an assignment as Security Officer for the Republican Party. Jack visited Washington in January 1972 to discuss the proposed position with Howard Hunt who apparently was acting on behalf of the Republican Party. Jack furnished a resume to Hunt and discussed the position with him. Ultimately, he decided not to accept the position because he felt that his heart condition would not allow him to become involved in such activity.3. According to Jack, during the meeting with Mr. Hunt they discussed some of the requirements of the job. At that time they discussed a need for both a positive and a counteraudio program and a need for a good security system both before and during the National Convention. Jack indicated that he sincerely believed that the Republican Party did need a security officer and a good security programmer but felt that he could not afford to accept the job even. though it was a very lucrative offer. Apparently, money was not a problem.![CLASSIFIED BY A876-16]![EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION]![CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY]NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 59
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4. When Jack declined, he indicated the Mr. Hunt asked   for any other recomendations he might have. According to Jack   he told Mr. Hunt that most of the people he knew were still in the   Agency, but he did furnish the name of! IDEN-108 who might be   possibly ready to retire from the Agency.5. Jack informed me that he assumed that the Bureau   obtained his name due to the resume he furnished Mr. Hunt. He   said that the Bureau had talked to him on three or four occasions   and that he had written up about a 40 page statement concerning   his dealings with Mr. Hunt. When asked about Mr. McCord, Jack   said that he really did not know McCord that well and declined any   knowledge of Mr. McCord's technical capability.6. Mr. Bauman indicated that he had not been in touch   with Mr. Hunt since the early part of 1972 and knew nothing of   the Watergate operation. He stated that he had gained the impres-   sion from the Bureau interview that the technical devices were being   removed at the time of the arrest and were not being installed as   originally reported.7. All of the above information was volunteered by Mr.   Bauman, and I really did not get involved in any discussion on the   matter other than to comment that I hated to see the Agency's name   connected with such an incident in any way. The above conversation   took place during a 10 or 15 minute period and no other discussion   relating to this incident was held. It is being reported for the record   and for information of the Director of Security.Charles W. KaneCONFIDENTIALEYES ONLY00153NW 88296. Docld:32989624 Page 60
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DD/M&S 73-1809MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and ServicesSUBJECT: Contacts with Individuals Named in the Watergate Matter1. I am addressing this to you instead of to the Director of Central Intelligence since I doubt that the information contained herein is of such significance to warrant his interest and because it has been on record with the Agency since July 1972. However, if you feel that the information is of such interest that it should be forwarded to the Director I shall put it in the proper format to do so.2. My only contact with anyone named in connection with the Watergate and related matters was through Mr. Jack Bauman a former Agency employee now retired and living in Winterhaven, Florida. In December 1971 Mr. Bauman called me from Florida and advised that he wanted to get in touch with Howard Hunt. He said that he did not have Hunt's home phone number and that it was probably unlisted but that since Hunt was a former employee, could I contact Hunt and ask him to give Mr. Bauman a call. I had only met Hunt once about 10 years before but I agreed to relay the message. I called Howard Hunt at his home and told him that Mr. Bauman did not have his home phone and requested he call Mr. Bauman. Mr. Hunt thanked me for relaying the message and said that he would call Mr. Bauman. This seemed of little consequence to me in December 1971 but in July 1972 Iden 17 of the Office of Security contacted me in regard to the FBI investigation of the Watergate situation. At that time I informed Iden 17 of the telephone call from Mr. Bauman in December 1971. Attached is a copy of a Memorandum for the Record prepared by Iden 17 as a result of our conversation.3. In the summer of 1972 I took my family to Disney World in Florida and took that occasion to drop in to see Jack Bauman. Mr. Bauman told me in a private conversation that he had been interviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with the Watergate affair and he related to me his contact
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(2)with Howard Hunt. On 19 July 1972 after my return from Florida I reported this conversation to the Director of Security and made it a Memorandum for the Record. This memorandum was sent to Mr. Colby and a copy of the memorandum is attached.4. Other than knowing Mr. McCord through his employment with the Agency and meeting Howard Hunt once in about 1959, I do not know nor have I had any contact with any individuals named or knowledge of related matters now receiving attention in the press.Charles W. KaneSpecial Assistant to theDeputy Directorfor Management and ServicesAtts> [Figure: The text EYES ONLY SECRET is displayed.]NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 6200153
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17 July 1972MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Charles W. KaneIden 1081. Last week Special Agent Arnold Parham of the FBI con-tacted the Acting DD/OS. He asked whether or not the Subjects worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. Previously, requests of this nature were followed up by the FBI with an interview of the subjects.2. I briefed Mr. Colby who is the Agency's focal point on the "Watergate" case and the Acting DD/S of the FBI inquiry. Mr. Colby suggested that we determine the extent of involvement and indicated that we advise the Bureau of their employment.3. When Agent Parham was again contacted and advised of the Subjects' employment with the Agency, he indicated that the Bureau does not wish to interview them.4. The office of the DD/PS will interview Iden 108 the same fashion as Mr. True was previously interviewed.5. I called Mr. Kane both at his office and his residence 'and learned that he is in Florida and will return to duty on 17 July. I called Mr. Kane this morning to advise him of the inquiry.6. Mr. Kane stated that he has no firm conclusion as to how the Bureau obtained his name. He stated that he has seen Mr. Hunt on only one occasion in 1959. At that time Hunt was the Chief of Station, Montevideo. The meeting was occasionedNW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 6300160
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by the fact that Mr Kane accompanied a technic sweep team to the Montevideo station. Mr. Kane stated further that around Christmas time of 1971 he received a call from Jack Bauman who wanted to get in touch with Mr. Hunt. Mr. Bauman asked Mr. Kane how he could get in touch with him. Mr. Kane obtained Mr. Hunt's telephone number through telephone information channels whereupon he passed the number on to Mr. Bauman.7. Mr. Kane stated that he has information that Jack Bauman has talked to the FBI on several occasions in connection with the current investigation and that he surmises that the Bureau may have obtained his name from him.signed Iden 17Deputy Director of Security
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SECRET/SENSITIVE8 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceTHROUGH: Deputy Director for Management and ServicesSUBJECT: Involvement in Sensitive Domestic Activities1. As chief of the DDP Systems Group prior to 1969, I was involved in providing data processing support for the following sensitive projects:a. CI Staff - Mr. Richard Ober's program for processing data of U.S. citizens believed to be militants, subversives, terrorists, etc.b. FI Staff and Office of Medical Services program for recording data on foreign and U.S. physicians from American Medical Association records.c. A Systems Group sponsored program of common concern listing travel of U.S. citizens to and from Communist countries.2. In the same capacity my staff and I briefed police officers from New York State and Chicago at the DCI's request (Admiral Rayborn) on data processing techniques related to biographic intelligence (unclassified).3. As a member of O/PPB, I have been aware of five programs with possibly sensitive domestic overtones.a. DDS&T/ORD's contract with the University Iden 103 for "The VIP Health and Behavior Prediction System."b. DDS&T/ORD's Project which involved the collection of data on dangerous drugs from U.S. firms. I believe Mr. Helms terminated this program last Fall.SECRET/SENSITIVE00163NW-88296 Docld:32989624 Page 65
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CONFIDENTIAL E-21 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Research Project on Robert Vesco1. On 16 October 1972 Messrs. Freckinridge and Heintzelman,   in the course of a Survey, were briefed on activities of the   Atlantic/Pacific Division of the Office of Economic reports. One   project cited was a query from the Director, apparently at the re-   quest of Secretary Shultz, to the effect, "What do we know about   Vesco," the man then running IOS. Two of OCR's analysts were assigned   to the project and, working through the Domestic Contact service,   spent a day going over the files of the Securities and Exchange   Commission. There apparently was some contact also with EUR Division   of the Deputy Directorate for Plans and with the Office of Current   Intelligence.2. The information above is based on rough notes and obviously   is sketchy. It is cited now not to suggest any wrongdoing but because   of the current publicity about Vesco and the probability of continuing   probes into the subject by the press and the courts.Scott D. FreckinridgeH. Henry HeintzelmanNW 88296 DocId:32989624 Page 6600173
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22 Maj 973MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector GeneralBill--Attached are the reports Bill Colby asked to see:1.  Restless Youth (September 1968), No. 0613/68, Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 78).    This document was produced in two versions--one with the chapter on radical students in America (pages 25-39) which was sent only to the President, Walt Rostow, and Cy Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense); the other version without the references to the American scene was disseminated to twenty people outside the Agency. This document without the material on the US was updated in February 1969 and copies were sent to the Vice President and Dr. Kissinger. A still more abbreviated edition was sent to the Attorney General in March 1969.2.  Black Radicalism in the Caribbean (6 August 1969), No. 1839/69, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 142).3.  Black Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look (12 June 1970), No. 0517/70, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 98).Please note that these are our record copies and should be returned.AttachmentsEdward W. ProctorDeputy Director for IntelligenceSECRET/SENSITIVE
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> [Figure: A rectangular box with CIA written inside.]NW 88296 DocId:32989624 Page 68
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CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY8 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceFROM : Deputy Director for IntelligenceSUBJECT : Activities Possibly Outside CIA's Legislative Charter1. This memorandum responds to your instruction to report any activities which might be considered outside CIA'S legislative charter.2. All Office and Staff chiefs in the Intelligence Directorate have reviewed the past and present activities of their components. I have received responses from all of them, and none reported any activities related to either the Watergate affair or the break into the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Although contacts with three of the people allegedly implicated in these incidents were reported, these contacts were on matters other than the two improper activities:Hunt: Col. White, Richard Lehman, and I talked to Hunt in late 1970 regarding his preparation of a recommendation in support of the Agency's nomination of R. Jack Smith for the National Civil Service League Award.Mitchell: While Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General, an OCI officer was assigned the task of providing him with daily briefings on foreign developments.CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
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- Young:  Harry Eisenbeiss and Clarus Rice of CRS had frequent contacts with Young during the summer of 1972 in connection with Executive Order 11652 and the implementing NSC directive. This involved visits by Young to CIA to discuss information storage and retrieval and several meetings of an inter-agency group dealing with the implementation of the Executive Order and directive.3. In accordance with my instructions, several Offices reported domestic activities which might appear questionable to outsiders. Their responses are attached. Most of these activities are clearly within the Agency's charter, but there are a few which could be viewed as borderline.- DCS collects information on foreign students studying in the US.- DCS collects information on physicians practicing in the US who have studied abroad (mostly foreign nationals).- DCS accepts information on possible foreign involvement in US dissident groups and on the narcotics trade when sources refuse to deal with the FBI and ENDD directly.- DCS assesses the suitability and willingness of US citizens to cooperate with CIA.- DCS, for six months in late 1972 and early 1973, was acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas calls.- Information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods.- NPIC and COMIREX review satellite imagery from NASA programs to identify photography too "sensitive" for public release.
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- NPIC has examined domestic coverage for special purposes such as natural catastrophies and civil disturbances.- OCI, in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence memoranda on possible foreign connections with the US anti-war movement and world-wide student dissidence (including the SDS) at the request of the White House.- CRS is regularly involved with Customs in examining the contents of motion picture film cans addressed to the Soviet, and occasionally other foreign, embassies to acquire positive foreign intelligence.- FBIS has on occasion supplied linguists to work directly for another agency, e.g., to the FBI to translate Arabic in Washington.- FBIS monitors radio press dispatches and reports covered by copyright. These are circulated within the Government and stamped "Official Use Only". This has gone on for three decades without problems.- FBIS has monitored and reported on foreign radio broadcasts of statements and speeches of US citizens such as those by US POWs in Hanoi, Jane Fonda, and Ramsey Clarke.- FBIS has run the Joint Publication Research Service under Department of Commerce cover since 1957. JPRS is a facility for obtaining translations of unclassified publications in foreign languages and contracts with private individuals to do this work. Most of these individuals are not witting of the CIA-JPRS relationship.![signature of EDWARD W. PROCTOR]EDWARD W. PROCTORDeputy Director for IntelligenceAttachments
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SECRETCIA INTERNAL USE ONLY7 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceVIA : Deputy Director for IntelligenceFROM : Director of Current IntelligenceSUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events1. OCI began following Caribbean black radicalism in earnest in 1968. The emphasis of our analysis was on black nationalism as a political force in the Caribbean and as a threat to the security of the Caribbean states. Two DDI memoranda were produced on the subject: "Black Radicalism in the Caribbean" (6 August 1969), and "Black Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look" (12 June 1970). In each a single paragraph was devoted to ties with the US black power movement; the discussion primarily concerned visits of Stokely Carmichael and other US black power activists to the Caribbean and other overt contacts.2. In June 1970, Archer Bush of OCI was asked to write a memorandum with special attention to links between black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of black power in the US. The record is not clear where this request originated, but it came through channels from the DCI. The paper was to be treated as especially sensitive and was to include material provided by the Special Operations group of the CI Staff. The CI Staff material was voluminous but did not provide meaningful evidence of important links between militant blacks in the US and the Caribbean. This, in fact, was one of the conclusions of the paper. The memorandum was produced in typescript form and given to the DCI.SECRETCIA INTERNAL USE ONLYNW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 72
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SECRETCIA INTERNAL USE ONLY3. For several months in the first half of 1968 the Caribbean Branch wrote periodic typescript memoranda on Stokely Carmichael's travels abroad during a period when he had dropped out of public view. Our recollection is that the memoranda were for internal CIA use only, although a copy of one was inadvertently sent to the FBI.Richard Lehman.Director of Current IntelligenceSECRETCIA INTERNAL USE ONLY00189NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 73
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7 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for IntelligenceSUBJECT: DCS Domestic ActivityTo the best of my knowledge, DCS has not engaged in any activity outside the CIA charter or that could be construed as illegal. Some of the functions that we perform under HR 1-13f (i) of providing operational support within the US to all elements of CIA and to the USIB-member agencies, however, are perhaps borderline or could be construed as illegal if mis- interpreted. For example:1.  Provide personality and assessment data on certain foreign students and visiting foreign scientists and officials.2.  Identify foreign students in the US through collection of foreign student lists from certain universities.3.  Provide personality and assessment data on US citizens to determine their suitability and willingness to cooperate with the Agency.4.  Introduce cooperative US businessmen and academicians to Agency personnel who are in alias but using CIA credentials.5.  Collect information on possible foreign involvement or penetration of US dissident groups, but only in a passive manner and only when the source has refused to pass the information directly to the FBI.6.  Collect information on the narcotics trade, but again only in a passive manner when the source has refused to pass the information directly to BNDD or the FBI.
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SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity7. Collect specific information and supply duplicate or master keys for foreign hotels.8. Collect medical information from cooperative contacts on foreign leaders who have received medical treatment or examinations in the US.9. Obtain computer tape records of physicians practicing in the US who have studied abroad. Although most were foreign nationals, some were US. The taped information included school, present business address, date of birth, and specialty.10. Acquire routing slips recording the fact of overseas telephone calls between persons in the US and persons overseas and telephone calls between two foreign points routed through US switchboards. This activity lasted for approximately six months but has ceased.11. This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational techniques and methods.![signature of JAMES R. MURPHY, Director, Domestic Contact Service]
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SECRETEYES ONLY7 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceVIA : Deputy Director for IntelligenceFROM : Director of Current IntelligenceSUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events1. In late spring of 1968 Walt Rostow, then Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, tasked the DCI with undertaking a survey of worldwide student dissidence. Confronted by timult at campuses like Columbia and mindful of the violence accompanying student outbursts at Berlin's Free University and elsewhere, Rostow sought to learn whether youthful dissidence was interconnected: spawned by the same causes; financed and hence manipulated by forces or influences hostil to the interests of the US and its allies; or likely to come under inimical sway to the detriment of US interests.2. The paper was prepared by Paul Corscadden of OCI with the assistance of the CA and CI Staffs. The DDI, D/OCI, and Corscadden met with Rostow to elicit the reasons for his or the President's concerns and to agree on the sources to be examined, the research methods to be followed, etc.3. Written during the summer of 1968, the most sensitive version of *Restless Youth* comprised two sections. The first was a philosophical treatment of student unrest, its motivation, histor, and tactics. This section drew heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on Students for a Democratic Society and affiliated groups. In a sense, the survey of dissent emerged from a shorter (30 page) typescript study of SDS and its foreign ties the same author had done for Mr. Rostow at the DCI's request in December 1967. (We no longer have a copy.)![handwritten text for classification]SECRETEYES ONLYNW-88296 Docld:32989624-Page-76
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SECRETEYES ONLY4. Because of the paucity of information on foreign student movements, it was necessary to focus on SDS which then monopolized the field of student action here and abroad. A second section comprised 19 country chapters--ranging from Argentina to Yugoslavia--and stood by itself as a review of foreign student dissidence.5. Because SDS was a domestic organization, the full paper *Restless Youth*, including the essay on world-wide dissent went only to nine readers. A copy may be in the Johnson Library.6. Following the paper's favorable reception by the President and Mr. Rostow, the DCI briefed the NSC on student dissent. The sensitive version subsequently was updated and sent to the White House in February 1969.7. The less sensitive text was disseminated in September 1968 and then updated and issued again in March 1969 and August 1970.Richard LehmanDirector of Current IntelligenceSECRETEYES ONLY![image of document number]