Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[124-10185-10099_multirif.pdf — page 168]
# MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/ComptrollerVIA: Acting Deputy Director for PlansSUBJECT: Agency Support to the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) for National Democratic (10-14 July 1972) and National Republican (21-24 August 1972) Conventions1. This memorandum is for the information of the Executive Director/Comptroller.2. Authorization for CIA support to the U.S. Secret Service for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions is contained in a memorandum of 7 April 1972 from Chief, CI Staff to the DCI which was concurred in by the ADDP and approved by the DCI on 10 April 1972 (copy attached).3. On 13 April 1972 the COS, WH/Miami met with the Miami USSS representative and Mr. Mastrovito of USSS Headquarters to discuss preliminary planning for Station WH/Miami support to the USSS prior to and during subject conventions. On 17 April 1972 the C/WH/COS and C/CI/LSN met with Mr. Mastrovito at Headquarters to implement the preliminary planning agreed upon in Miami and to determine the extent of Headquarters support required by the USSS.4. The basic agreement mutually concurred in by the USSS and Headquarters representatives provided that:a. Station WH/Miami would conduct name traces on all Cubans of interest to the USSS.b. CIA Headquarters would conduct name traces on all other foreign born persons of interest to the USSS.c. CIA would keep the USSS informed of any events in the Caribbean and Latin American areas that would have any bearing on the USSS protective mission during the convention periods. This would include briefings on Cuba and Cuban policies toward the United States and on activities of Cuban intelligence operations which could affect the security of the conventions.
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# -2-d. Coverage of Latin American exile groups in the United States would be the responsibility of the FBI since CIA had ceased the extensive coverage formerly targeted against these groups since it was now considered an internal security function.5. On 27 April 1972 a meeting was held at a buffer office of Station WH/Miami with the USSS Chief of Communications, Station personnel and a Headquarters representative. It was agreed that name traces would be handled by Miami security Field office courier from the USSS to buffer office until the USSS established communications links from their command post in convention center, at which time trace requests would be sent from the command post to USSS headquarters and relayed to CIA Headquarters. Cuban name traces are relayed to Station WH/Miami by the Signal Center and non-Cuban traces are conducted by WH/COG. Replies to USSS requests on non-Cubans are coordinated with CI/SO.6. Station WH/Miami has arranged the rental of a safehouse about five minutes from convention center which will provide a secure and nearby meeting site for USSS and Agency personnel. This safehouse will be available just prior to and during both conventions. A Headquarters officer will TDY to Miami prior to the conventions and remain until the conventions adjourn to assist the Station in providing the support described in paragraph four above.7. Station WH/Miami is in daily contact with the USSS in Miami, utilizing buffer office as a meeting site when necessary. The location of Station WH/Miami has not been revealed to the USSS. (Station is located some distance from buffer office.) Additionally, the Miami Security Field Office maintains normal liaison with the local USSS Miami unit.8. The Station understands that no personnel will be present at the convention hall, that they will not provide any equipment unique to the Agency, nor will it provide the use of any other facilities other than the safehouse described in paragraph six.
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May 1973SUBJECT: Request for Information on Sensitive ActivitiesYou will recall that in Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972, I believe, Agency funds were made available to the FBI. These funds may still be possibly held in a special account for that use. This is one of the areas where TSD has been very much involved. Chuck Briggs would have the details as this was handled through the Executive Director's office and of course Angleton would have additional information.SignedI-EN-1:ChiefMissions and Programs Staff![eyes only secret stamp]E2 IMPDET CL BY 35773700582NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 171
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8 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR :Deputy Director for OperationsSUBJECT : Areas of Possible Embarrassment to the Agency1. Sometime in the spring or early summer of 1971, Mr. John Dean levied the requirement on the Agency for information relating to the Investors Overseas Service (IOS). The original request was non-specific but it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with the possible adverse publicity that might develop regarding the President's nephew, who was employed by IOS.2. There were multiple channels from the White House to the Agency on this subject:a. Presumably Haldeman and/or Ehrlichman to Director Helms.b. Someone (unnamed) in the White House to the DDCI, General Cushman (see attached telephone conversation). Note that Ehrlichman is mentioned, andc. John Dean to the CI Staff. These various channels were sorted out in time and six reports were passed by the CI Staff to Mr. Fred Fielding for Mr. John Dean.3. The telephone call of General Cushman's is of interest since it gives the flavor of White House concern. It took several days to uncover the fact that the White House interest centered on the involvement of the President's nephew with IOS and possible adverse publicity. The reports submitted to Dean's office were routine in nature and were coordinated with the DCI. After a few months, interest in this subject died down and we did not pursue it further.4. Please return the attachments when they have served your purpose.NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 172SECRETE2 IMPDET CL BY 0545100583
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5. I also include a short note on the Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff prepared by Richard Ober. The original meetings were held in the office of John Dean at the White House and the principal sparkplug for this group activity was the then Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Robert Mardian and then later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mr. Mardian is now appearing before the Grand Jury and it is always possible that he might draw in the Agency.6. Before appointing Ober to the IES Staff as the Agency representative, I had attended various inter-agency meetings pre- sided over by Mardian. I expressed the view to Director Helms that Mardian would require very careful handling due to his inexperience. Furthermore, Mardian was deeply involved in the split between Bill Sullivan and Mr. Hoover. On a confidential basis one or two senior FBI officials stated that Sullivan was secretly passing files to Mardian without Mr. Hoover's permission. This was one of the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from the Bureau.Attachments (5)![Signature of James Angleton]James AngletonChief, Counter Intelligence Staff
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for OperationsSUBJECT: Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Group Activities1. Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Group (CI/PG) is responsible for Staff coordination within the Office of the Deputy Director for Operations for activities and programs involving assistance to foreign police/security forces for the purpose of exploiting such activities and programs for intelligence purposes.2. CI/PG maintains liaison with the Office of Public Safety, Arency for International Reveionont (SP3/) and its training facility, the International Police Academy (IPA). CI/PC also administers and supervises Project IDEN-171- and its training proprietary facility, IDEN-172. In addition, CI/PG coordinates a joint CPS/ATD Technical Services Division, Central Intelligence Agency (TSM/CIN) Technical Investigations Course. CI/PG provides guidance and counsel to the Area Divisions in matters pertaining to molice/security functions and activities. Specific details of these functions are as follows:LIAISON WITH OPS/AIDCI/PG liaison with OPS/AID and IPA is conducted on a daily basis and consists principally of:A. exchange of information on IPA participants, some of whom later attend IDEN-172 courses and who are of interest to Agency components,B. arranging for inclusion of Agency sponsored participants in IPA/CPS/AIDS training prograns,C. arranging for IPA/OPS/MID briefings and tours for foreign police/security representatives sponsored by CIA Area Divisions,
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D. obtaining biographic and assessment data.on IPA/OPS/AID trainces,.E. providing general information pertaining to police/security organizations, activities, equipment, and personalities requested by Agency operating components,F. coordinating the Agency's participation in the Technical Investigations Course designed to familiarize the trainees with the technique required to properly investigate terrorist activities wherein explosives have been utilized,G. obtaining OPS/AID cover for CIA personnel to serve abroad. At one time as many as 50 CIA employees were covered in Latin America, the Far East and Africa. This total has been reduced during the past several years to 10 serving in Thailand, *H. arranging contact between Desk officers and OPS/AID sponsored participants.PROJECT IDEN-171 - PROPRIETARY IDEN-172- training function of IDEN-168IDEN-172 Training Academy is a commercial interprise. It was incorporated under the laws of the State of Maryland in 1952 and conducts its business in the District of Colombia. It is engaged principally in training foreign police/security personnel under an overt contract with OPS/AID, and selling police/security equipment to foreign police/security ty personnel and organizations.IDEN-172 also provides special training programs and briefings to foreign police/security personnel of interest to Agency operating divisions. It provides biographic and assessment data on trainces to country desks. PecentlyIDEN-172 has acquired the capability of providing training to foreign policc/security personnel in VIP protective security for Chiefs of State.* CIA personnel under this cover will not be replaced as such and all will be phased out by June 1974.
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### COMMENTCI/PG does not maintain direct contact or liaison with any law enforcement organization, local or federal, at home or abroad. When the need arises, such contact is sometimes made on our behalf by OPS/AID or DEN-172 without divulging Agency interest. OPS/AID has such contacts at home and abroad because of the nature of its activities (training of foreign police/security personnel at home and abroad), and its Public Safety programs around the world. IDEN-172 has such contacts at home - local and federal level - because its personnel are personally acquainted with law enforcement officers throughout the United States. Members of the [DEN-172 staff (not identified) as CIA) have appeared as guest lecturers at such federal institutions as the U.S. Park Police, IPA, the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Treasury Enforcement Division.3. In addition to the liaison mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Agency maintains liaison in varying degrees with foreign police/security organizations through its field stations. The existence and extent thereof, however, is a decision to be made by the Area Division, and is not the responsibility of CI/PG.4. The CIA station as a member of the Country Team in Montevideo, Uruguay, may have had some contact with Jan Mitrione, who was murdered by the Tupanaros. Dan Citrione, an experienced and respected law enforcement officer, was a bona fide OPS/AID officer assigned to the AID mission in Uruguay, and was never a CIA employee or agent.![signature of James Angleton]James AngletonChief, Counter Intelligence Staff
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SENSITIVEMay '73SUBJECT: The MHCHAOS Program1.  The MHCHAOS program is a worldwide program for clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign efforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domestic U.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the Arab fedayeen.2.  The MHCHAOS program has not and is not conduct- ing efforts domestically for internal domestic collection purposes. Agency efforts are foreign. Foreign-oriented activity in the United States has been of two types:a. Selected FBI domestic sources who travel abroad in connection with their extremist activity and/or affiliations to make contact with hostile foreign powers or with foreign extremist groups have been briefed and debriefed by Headquarters officers. The briefing has included appropriate operational guidance, including defensive advice.> [Figure: a partial image of handwritten note]b. Americans with existing extremist creden- tials have been assessed, recruited, tested and dispatched abroad for PCS assignments as contract agents, primarily sources offered for such use by the FBI. When abroad they collect information re- sponsive to MHCHAOS program requirements, as well as other Agency requirements. They are thus used primarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Com- munists, the North Vietnamese, etc., as their back- ground and their particular access permits. It should be noted that the MPTROIKA aspect of the MPLODESTAR project of the East Asia Division is similar to the MHCHAOS PROGRAM.3.  As indicated earlier, MHCHAOS is a foreign program, conducted overseas, except for the limited activity described above. The program is and has been managed so as to achieve the maximum feasible utilization of existing resources of the Operations Directorate. No assets> [Figure: WARNING NOTICE block]SENSITIVESECRETNW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 177> [Figure: a stamp that says IMPORT CL BY 00130]
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# SENSITIVEhave been recuited and run exclusively for the MHCHAOSprogram. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploi-tation of new and old Agency assets who have a by-productcapability or a concurrent capability for provision ofinformation responsive to the program's requirements.This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collec-tion requirements and operational guidance. This collec-tion program is viewed as an integral part of the recruit-ment and collection programs of China Operations, VietnamOperations, Cuban Operations, Soviet Bloc Division opera-tions and Korean Branch operations. Agents who have anAmerican "Movement" background or who have known connec-tions with the American "Movement" are useful as accessagents to obtain biographic and personality data, to dis-cern possible vulnerabilities and susceptibilities, andto develop operationally exploitable relationships withrecruitment targets of the above programs. These assetsare of interest to our targets because of their connec-tions with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement."Over the course of the MHCHAOS program, there have beenapproximately 20 important areas of operational interest,which at the present time have been reduced to about ten:Paris, Stockholm, Brussels, Dar Es Salaam, Conakry, Algiers,Mexico City, Santiago, Ottawa and Hong Kong.4. The MICHAOS program also utilizes audio opera-   tions, two of which have been implemented to cover tar-   gets of special interest.Paragraph a. deleted because it reveals a sensitiveforeign operation.Paragraph b. deleted because it reveals a sensitiveAgency foreign operation.
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SENSITIVE5. MHCHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and who appear to have extremist connections, interests or background are reported upon. Other individuals are reported upon in response to specific Headquarters requirements received from the FBI because such individuals, are of active investigatory security interest to the FBI.6. All cable and dispatch traffic related to the MHCHAOS program is sent via restricted channels. It is not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the Information Services Division. The control and retriev- ability of information obtained, including information received from the FBI, is the responsibility of the Special Operations Group.7. Information responsive to specific FBI requirements is disseminated to the FBI via special controlled dissemination channels, i.c., by restricted handling cable traffic or via special pouch and specially numbered blind memoranda.8. Information of particular significance, when collected, has been disseminated by special memorandum over the signature of the Director of Central Intelligence to the White House (Dr. Kissinger and John Dean), as well as to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State and the Director of the FBI.NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 179SENSITIVESECRET00593
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SECRET/SENSITIVEFR 73-1838 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for OperationsSUBJECT:Foreign Resources Division OperationalActivities with Possible Flap PotentialREFERENCE:FR Memorandum, 73-180, dated 7 May1973, same subject1.  The answers to your questions are as follows:    a. *Question:* Do we recruit Americans?    *Answer:* Yes, we recruit Americans to be    used as academic support assets and access agents.    These Americans are used for spotting and assess-    ment purposes only and do not perform any recruit-    ments.Paragraph 1. b. and 1. c. are deletedbecause they contain sensitive agencyoperational methods and techniques.SECRET/SENSITIVENW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 180E2 IMPDETCL BY: 05722300611
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d. Question: What is the arrangement re.recruitingout of colleges? Any clearances or prohibitions?Answer: As of now CSI 50-10 specificallyrequires approval by the ADDO or DDO for anyrecruitment attempt made in the United Statesagainst an American member of the academiccommunity or a foreign target attending an Americanacademic institution. This regulation is presently inthe process of revision in that this approval authorityfor academic recruitments in the United States is tobe delegated to Chief, FR. The approval authorityfor recruitment attempts against American studentsoutside the United States is to be delegated to the Chiefof the appropriate area division. The only prohibitionsat the present time are those precluding recruitmentattempts against foreign students here in the United Stateson grants from Ford Foundation, Rockefeller or Fulbright.2. If you have further questions, please let me know.signed/IDEN-173Acting ChiefForeign Resources Division
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# SECRET/SENSITIVEFR 73-1807 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for OperationsSUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational Activities with Possible Flap Potential1. At thr risk of stating the obvious, almost all of the operational activities carried on by FR Division in the United States run the risk that unauthorized disclosure could create embarrassment to the Agency. We have accepted this as a condition precedent and have proceeded with our operational activities in the most professional manner possible under the circumstances. There are certain rather unusual activities in which FR Division has participated and/or is participating that contain some-what greater possibility for embarrassment if discovered. I have listed these below, not necessarily in order of embarrassment potential:a. The New York Base provides a fairly considerable amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the Chinese. This support was authorized by Mr. Karamessines and Mr. Helms. Thus far there has been no problem other than the inordinate amount of time spent by New York Base personnel, not to mention the fairly sizeable amount of money that has been expended in support of these efforts.b. A CIA Officer is to be assigned to FR Division. The CIA Officer is presently assigned overseas under deep cover; his cover is the Mullen Corporation. This is the cor-poration that employed E. Howard Hunt. In discussions between NOCAD and the ADDO, it was decided that the Officer would be pulled out and reassigned in the United States. FR Division was directed to accept this officer for assignment.E2 IMPDETCL BY: 057223NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 182# SECRET/SENSITIVE![image]
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SECRET/SENSITI E/2/We have concluded that the best solution is to have this officer attend a university in the Midwest for at least a year, working towards an advanced degree until there has been time for the situation to clarify itself. We plan to make no operational use of the CIA Officer whatsoever, during the period of time that he is attending the university. Upon completion of his year's study, we will review the situation and decide the next course of action at that time.Paragraph 1. c. is deleted because it contains sensitive Agency operational methods and techniques.d. FR Division has been briefed in general on the existence of an audio operation done by the FBI but with close TSD support in San Francisco. This operation is directed against IDEN-62. I understand the operation has been exceptionally well done. However, the responsibility for this activity has come from Chief, TSD in conjunction with SB Division.e. Three microphones were planted in various locations in the IDEN-61 by the FBI. The equipment was produced by CLA and the overall operation was joint, although no CIA personnel have entered the premises. The operation was deactivated and is presently dormant. The mikes, however, are still in place. If discovered the operation could cause some embarrassment to the American Government, but it is unlikely the finger would point to CIA.NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 183SECRETJOENSITIVE00615
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VIII. CoordinationA. InternalIn developing its cadre of general support assets and access agents, the FR Division maintains close contact with the Domestic Contact Service of the Directorate for Intelligence, using their assets wherever and whenever possible to support FR's operational activities. To a more limited degree, FR Bases maintain contacts with Office of Security and Office of Personnel field representatives, pursuing the occasional leads surfaced by these officers and using their entre to specific individuals who can provide access to targets of operational interest.B. ExternalFR officers in the field maintain coordination with their FBI counterparts. There is limited cooperation with Bureau offices on internal security cases involving Soviet and Bloc officials and the local FBI offices are of occasional help in operations involving other nationals. The local field offices of the FBI are made aware of the presence of FR officers in their jurisdictions and have on occasion provided backstopping on cases where there was some flap potential.Coordination with the FBI of FR Division's agent recruitment activity is governed by an agreement between the Agency and the FBI dated 7 February 1966.The Bases also have contact with local Immigration and Naturalization Service offices although these contacts are less frequent and less important than the contacts with the FBI offices.