Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 4]
SECRET-3-until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conakry.b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their cooperation in curbing then. Also instructed cur Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station chiefs in furnishing the nares of nationals of those countries travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging them: (1) to institute tightor controls on their own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the Brazil over Currants of Brazil as a way station for transporting subversivec.c. As a result of representations made to the British government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit points for passengers. The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 5]
SECRETreturned to their point of origin.d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to carry refugees from Havana to Central America. CMA, as a result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with this project.e. Instructed U.S. Missions in Curacao and the Ha gue to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The GovernorNW 50953 DocId:32112623 Page 6
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 6]
# SECRETindicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with H.M.G.h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban government in its efforts to find a short route for return, of the 58 American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Fan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Habana to New York.1. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest in the use of their aviation facilities.Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory, citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials concerned.j. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 7]
SECRET-6-urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegates to a preparatory meeting planning for the II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries which participate in the International Union of Architects asking them to urge the cooperation of governmental authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of their citizens to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September 29-October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.1. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to commence food parcel shipments to Cuba, on a commercial basis, that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 8]
SECRET-7-2. Control of Movement of Cuban PropagandaCentral Intelligence AgencyResponding to the urging of the CIA Station police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16 August Cubana flight.3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and ArmsDepartment of Defensea. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the month of July at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were received from any other government during the period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, whichSECRET
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 9]
SECRET-S-was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Havana until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.Central Intelligence AgencyAt the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima the Peruvian Government lab in August published a new anti-terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five years imprisonment for persons who particiate in guerrilla activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a 200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.Department of StateInstructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.SECRET
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 10]
## 4. Control of Transfer of FundsDepartment of StateCooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963,## 5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency CapabilitiesDepartment of Defencea. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15 October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month is expected to improve military communications within the United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organizations and agencies.
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 11]
-10-Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 days per week duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is the military focal point for relaying information concerning the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed which would interfere with effective operations in those countries.d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily.
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 12]
SECRET-11-Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing actions.c. During the period of this report, the SCIATT conducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned as replacement crew members.f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs provided other Central American countries was conducted during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team (MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Precently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter-subversion.h. During the reporting period MTTs conducted training in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 13]
-12-1. Civic Action MTTs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.6. Exchange of Intelligence re. Cuban SubversionCentral Intelligence AgencyCIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal security organizations with whom they are in liaison information concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances, the furnishing of information to the internal security service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similar information to the foreign office by the Ambassador or his representative. The response to this information has varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to pay attention to the information and take action on it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government showed little inclination to follow up on the information.Department of Statea. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 14]
SECRET-13-brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this actionbe taken as soon as possible.b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidenceof communist activity to the OAS.7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commerical and Cultural   Missions.Central Intelligency Agency(To be filled in by Mr. Wheeler)
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 15]
SECRET-14-Department of StateInstructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement of Cuban vission in internal politics of Bolivia, and, at the Embancy's discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.8. Other Special ActionsDepartment of Statea. Obtained action by to COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting De Cocument to the governments and urging them to implement the specific and general recommendations contained therein as soon as possible.b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August 26-23 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the Managua Security Conference countries later this year.
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 16]
SECRET-15-c. Reassured President Schick of Nicaragua in the most emphatic terms that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty did not mean that our attitude toward Castro has altered in the slightest, and stressed our interest in seeing steady progress by all the Isthmian countries in implementing the recommendations of the Managua Security Conference to block Cuban subversive efforts.d. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson, newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.United States Information Agencya. The Agency's press service during the reporting period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America carried a total of 23 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based subversion in addition to the regular reporting of developments in the hourly newscasts.SECRET
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 17]
SECRET-16-b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based subversion, USIS posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from the Latin American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and press output.The main developments treated in the Agency's radio and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice President's accusion of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the statement by State Department Press Officer Richard Phillips that "potential subversive agents" from Cuba to the Caribbean area were passing through Gran Cayman, the expulsion of a Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained terrorists in Honduras,/Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike. A Voice of America roving reporter in Latin America provided several reports on the subversion picture in countries he visited.c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work onSECRETNW 50953 DocId:32112623 Page 18
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 18]
-17-three pamphlets during the perfod based on Castro's report of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress), the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the area.SECRETNW 50953 DocId:32112623 Page 19
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 19]
SECRETSeptember 30, 1963TO:Members of Subcommittee on Castro-Communist Subversion.FROM:Chairman, Subcommittee on Cuban SubversionSUBJECT: Report for July - August on Actions Taken to Combat Castro-Communist Subversion.Attached is a draft of the Subcommittee's report for July and August on actions taken to counteract Castro-communist subversion in the hemisphere. The draft has been prepared on the basis of the material which you furnished with certain modification. The CIA member will note that I have extracted from his submission the items of action taken and placed these in the body of the report. The intelligence information contained in the submission I have made into an annex. I think it is very useful to have the intelligence data form part of the report, and request that in the future the CIA member prepare his submission in two parts.May I have your comments on the draft by close of business October 1, 1963.Copies to: CIA - Mr. Wheeler (2)IGB - Col. Haig (1)UGIA - Ms. Vagley (1)EAB - Mr. Noss (1)Justice - Mr. Geoghegan (1)ALM:McGoudler:js9/30/6362-10.8553-5ENCLOSUREGROUP 1Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 20]
GROUP I-Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassificationSECRETANNEX ACIA Intelligence Annex1. Travel to and from Cuba## BrazilChartered Cubana Airlines flights between Cuba and Brasil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuban Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights since late July have carried nearly 400 non-Cubans.The first of the recent series -- on 25 July -- brought 71 Latin American passengers to Havana for the 25 July celebrations. The other four flights -- on 15, 22, 23 and 29 August -- transported over 200 Latin Americans to Brazil from Havana. Some of the aircraft involved returned to Cuba with smaller numbers of passengers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers had been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had probably received training there. Of the passengers on these four flights to Brazil, 75 were natives of Caribbean area countries. Their circuitous travel through Brazil was evidently designed to help conceal the fact that they had been in Cuba.## Costa RicaTwo Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a chartered Cabana plane which was turned back to Havana at Grand Cayman on 11 July 1963. One was Luz Marina Hernandez Salazar, the only Costa Rican woman known to have been sent to Cuba for training as a guerrilla warfare instructor. She had been in Cuba since September 1962. The other Costa Rican passenger was Carlos Guillen, former head of the Costa Rican Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution, who had been in Cuba since November 1962.## EcuadorThe CIA Station in Quito reports that the military junta, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can be expected![secret] 62-108553-5.ENCLOSURENW 50953 DocId:32112623 Page 21
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 21]
to follow the guidance of the Embassy and the Station incontrolling travel to and from Cuba and the Soviet bloc. Theactivities of Cuban subversion in Ecuador, at least for thepresent, have been greatly inhibited by the mass arrests ofCommunists and pro-Cubans and by the outlawing of the CommunistParty by the junta.HondurasIt is reported that the Honduran Communist Party hasissued orders to its members not to attempt to travel to Cubaat the present time. This action is apparently the result ofthe increasing vigilance of the Honduran government and thegreater implementation of stricter travel controls.## 2. Movement of Cuban Propaganda### GuatemalaAccording to an unconfirmed report received in July,a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of Guatemala isbeing formed in collaboration with *Prensa Latina* and is to bemanaged clandestinely. It expects to receive news by shortwaveradio from Cuba and print bulletins for distribution by radiostations. This may indicate a pattern by which *Prensa Latina*will attempt to distribute on a more clandestine basis in otherareas in Latin America.HondurasIt was reliably reported that in mid-July 1963, asmall coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communistpropaganda on the northern coast of Honduras, the boxes havingbeen transferred at sea from a larger vessel.## 3. Movement of Guerrillas and Arms### ArgentinaExtremist members of the Peronist Party, apparentlyunder the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon andJohn William Cooke, are apparently receiving encouragement andpromises of large sums of money from Cuba in support of theirefforts to train and organize subversive groups in Argentina.
[119-10021-10413.pdf — page 22]
# SECRET-3-Villalea has stated that his plan calls for expanding and accallerating subversive activities in Argentina calcinating in a complete take over within two yearu. There is so iniics clon slut Peron himself ans amand to this plan. It has beca reported that leaders of the Communist Party of Argentino have buen greatly annoyed by the tendency of the Castro regime to support the revolutionary Paroniots without having consulted the Comunist Party of Argentine.It is reported that the so-called Amy of ibtional Liberation (AML) of Argentina, which is a relatively quali Castroist organization directed from Cuba by John Willian Cocke, has in recent teoks been negotiating for the purchase of ams and has been offered mutanshdan guns, barookes and other verpong by two or three private suppllars. It was reported, however, that tho ANL vas baving difficulty getting enough dollars from Cuba to make significant purchased possible.## BoliviaThe Bolivion Mindatry of Foruiga Relations on 23 August protested formally to the Ceben Charge d'Affaires in La Fas against the Cuban mouny support to the sinera during the recent crisis. Subsequ however, Foreign Minister Fellan informed the Cube that he need not fear that the Coveramans of Bolivia break dipicentić relationa with Cuns. There has, in fact, bora no hard information linking the Cuben Enkassy with the prommet nining crisis in spite of scce coconflamed roports of Cobsa support.## BrazilCuben Anbaseador to Pins12, Reel Roa Kouri, is reported to have attempted to enco Cereant ftagne loader Francisco Jailso to revitalize the ens in norteora Brazii. According to 2000 горporte efforts are being anda to umify the leadership and bring dissident elmente cader the general direction of Julizo. Other ruperts invests that, although the Cuban Sobassy is providing guidanca artly financial support to the rovereat, it had not yet the Internal disgension in the leagues.