Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# SECRETSecurity Information.-5-19. KELLY continued by stating that he was apprehended by the Greek Police, allegedly for safe keeping in April 1951. He was placed in detention and remained under Greek control until his departure from Greece to Frankfurt by air. From Frankfurt he was transported to Panama where he arrived on 5 September 1951. He was placed in detention at a hospital in Panama and was of the opinion that perhaps the hospital was an exterminating establishment for undesirables. Later, however, he said he learned otherwise and through a friend, Mr. Stanley, learned that he was sent to Panama to undergo several physical check-ups and that after that was completed he would be removed to an area some 50 miles away where he would enjoy full freedom. Also that he would remain at his new location long enough to learn a language and prepare himself for resettlement. When he inquired how long that would be he was told that would be about six months.20. In March 1952 KELLY was transferred to DTROBALO. He stated that he remained at DTROBALO for six months and after that period he confronted the authorities concerning his release and resettlement. Approximately one month later KELLY said he informed the Station authorities that he would leave the area if they did not release him as initially promised. He stated that he was apprehended and placed in confinement until his release in May 1953.21. KELLY advised that the above is a true account of his past experiences and in view of my limited stay in DTROBALO would appreciate any answer I could give him regarding questions that have never been resolved and consequently have disturbed him. KELLY apparently had a list of questions prepared which he drew from a notebook and proceeded to read. The questions were as follows:a. Why was he apprehended by the Greek Police?b. Why was he placed in confinement in Panama and later at DTROBALO?c. How much longer must he remain at DTROBALO?d. Is there any possibility of his working with the organization (CIA) to complete the mission he initiated?e. What happened to the texts he wrote that were taken to the United States by Mr. Willard Allan?f. Why haven't any of his old friends visited him during the past two years?g. In regards to his family --KELLY stated that only as a last resort and only if he had to remain at DTROBALO would he want his family there. He would prefer working and saving sufficient money($2000) to purchase or build a home for them in Greece and drop the whole matter.In response to the above questions I told Kelly that:a. He was apprehended by the Greek Police because of his proposed negotiation with the French IS.b. He was placedSECRET
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Security Informationb. He was placed in confinement at Panama to undergo mental and physical check-ups to assure his recovery from the ordeal which he had undergone. His confinement at DTROBALO was to prevent his contemplated and announced escape.c. KELLY's stay at DTROBALO apparently is dependent on his qualifications to meet resettlement requirements. I told him I was not able to judge when he had fulfilled those requirements. There was also the task involved of finding suitable positions for individuals with varied skills in South America.d. I told KELLY that there was no opportunity for him to work with the organization because the men and organization as known to him are no longer existent.e. I told KELLY that I believe the texts were returned to Greece but that I would make a further check on my return to Washington.f. KELLY was told that the people whom he knew in Athens and Sofia were no longer with the organization and therefore it was impossible for them to visit him.g. I told KELLY that I did not know anything about his wife and child other than the fact that KELLY was married and that his wife and child resided in Athens. I again queried KELLY concerning his wishes regarding his family. KELLY asked how long it would take to bring the family to South America if that were possible. I replied that I had no definite answer. KELLY said that only if he knew he had to remain at DTROBALO indefinitely would he request to have his wife and child with him.COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:A. I found KELLY to be a frail, nervous, alert, and extremely talkative person. During the twelve hour conference with KELLY I frequently interrupted him to query him on persons and activities he referred to in his story only to find him replying briefly and persistently requesting to be allowed to continue relating his thoughts and feelings.B. In relating his story of the organization he established and members who comprised the organization KELLY appeared to have a clear and concise picture of operations he directed and names and descriptions of people with whom he had come in contactlC. It is my opinion that KELLY knows little about operations in Greece. I believe KELLY was so wrapped up in his own abortive missions and personnel difficulties while in Greece that he paid little, if any, attention to operations that were running concurrently. KELLY mentioned names of agents who are bing currently used in Bulgarian operations; however, he referred to them as Bulgarians whom he had met
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SECRETSecurity Information-7-whom he had met in Athens and tried to recruit for his organization, or else he had been told of them by other sources. In reply to queries and in his own story, he made no statement which would indicate that he is cognizant of current Bulgarian operations.D. I feel confident that KELLY realizes that his chances of resuming his role in Greece are at an end and therefore he has resolved to do the next best thing and that is to contact a former Greek companion (Mr. Karapides) who is a successful business man in Caracas, Venezuela and seek employment. KELLY is eager to be resettled and to get out of DTROBALO.E. I recognize that KELLY is familiar with certain former operations and agents involved in those operations which, if revealed to unauthorized persons, could become embarrassing. However, I feel that KELLY's knowledge of current operations is so minute that the security risks involved to our current operations would be very little, if any, if he were resettled. Therefore, my recommendation is to process himfor resettlement.SECRET
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# SECRETSecurity Information27 March 1953MEMORANDUM FOR: ASWING-CHTE OPERATIONS, Chief, FI/STCSUBJECT: Lyle O. KellyREFERENCE: Memorandum from Acting Chief, Operations, DD/P dated7 January 1953, to Chief, SE1. Since this Division has no facilities for the disposal of hard-core cases, the matter of Subject's disposal was discussed with the Chief, DDP/Admin after receipt of reference. It is am instant arching the time offringt Mat any time in ss matting avionizemimp for the handling of sinh casesx.2. For your information in making ultimate disposition of this case, The hear future this Division has reached the conclusion, based on facts set forth in the following paragraphs, that Kelly, if released from confinement, will be a source of serious embarrassment to CIA.3. Subject, a Bulgarian refugee in Greece, was the principal agent in an ill-fated operation run from October 1950 to March 1951. The operation resulted in a major expose and trial in Sofia during 1951. The agents used were those selected by Subject, at least one of whom was probably an operative of the Bulgarian Militia and acted as the betrayer of his colleagues.4. Subject's behavior during his employment was extraordinarily bad and characterized by a complete lack of security and a conscious effort on his part to aggrandize himself at the expense of the United States and his fellow agents. Unfortunately, during the time of his use by us, he acquired considerable information about CIA personnel, operations and installations in Greece. He was permitted to come and go freely in the certain CIA offices in the American Embassy.5. Through another informant the Athens Station learned in early 1951 that Subject had contacted French Intelligence officers in Greece and had agreed to sell complete details on U. S. plans for operations against Bulgaria for the sum of 16,000,000 drachmae. All subsequent information on this transaction corroborates the veracity of the original informant's stery including a French document secured through another CIA channel which shows that as early as 1949 Subject had been an agent of a Franch Intelligence network run by the Military Attache of the French Embassy in Athens.6. At the urgent detention request of the Athens Station that Subject be removed immediately from Athens, arrangements were made for his transportation and incarceration at DTROBALO. To facilitate his removal, Subject was told that he was being taken to the United States for a meeting of important satellite refugee leaders. He was flown by CIA plane to Germany, and from there to Panama by U.S. Army plane.
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13-00000SECRETSecurity Information-2-7. The American case officer who handled him in Athens reported, "Early in our relations with Kelly we foresaw the need to curb him or eliminate him from our operations. Since, however, he was necessary to us, we tried to use him, restraining him and teaching him the while. Kelly, unfortunately, did not learn - he got worse. He 'borrowed' and stole money from many sources. He lied to many people, including us, and he developed an infantile megalomania in which he persisted in considering himself the forthcoming Minister-President of Bulgaria." During his detention incarceration at DTROBALO, we understand that these same character traits have been evidentfor some time8. This Division believes that Subject's confinement should be continued indefinitely to preclude the probability that he would again try to contact the French or another Intelligence Service, foreign Governments, or the press in order to capitalize on the information he possesses concerning CIA, its operations against Bulgaria, the details of his removal from Athens and information of disposal methods acquired during his incarceration at Panama.detention at DTROBALO.JOHN B. BAKERCHEEF, SE![signature]![text]![text]SECRET
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13-00000File KellyRe KELLY CASE4 April 19521.  A well-placed, reliable source (A-l) has stated that the 1949 files of French Intelligence network "Ulysse" of Captain Michel de la Roncier (Military Attache of the French Embassy, Athens) listed Dimitri Dimitrov as an agent and contains the following information:"30 years old, a member of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party. He is a student and fled to Greece in 1946. He was in contact with the British brothers Baret (or Barev) while the later were in Greece. He is a contact of the Aliens Directorate. He received an order from the Americans requesting him to go to Washington for a tie. His file contains two reports, one dated April 1949 concerning the military situation and the other dated 6 April 1949 containing an account of the Greek Government Council of Coordination. (Translations of these two documents was not made because the contents no longer seem to be of any importance)."2.  His prior connection with the French in 1949 doubtless led Dimitrov to make the later offer to Florimond to sell US information for 16,000,000 drachmae. Florimond was chief of the other French network in Greece operating from Salonica while de la Roncier conducted French operations out of Athens.3.  The Baret or Barev brothers undoubtedly are Tsenko and Ivan Barev, now worked in Paris and Rome, respectively. They are Bulgarians who have/and may be still working with the British.LTAbove memo given to Col Smith. The info was furnished by Mr. Driscoll of S0-3. French Intel documents giving the above were intercepted by a penetration of French Intel files. Dimitrov was designated as Uly 62 on the list of agents. LT
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# SECRETSECURITY INFORMATIONMEMORANDUM FOR: WH DIVISIONATTENTION: Colonel Smith29 February19522.51SUBJECT: Kelly Case1. In accordance with your request, the following information, which may be helpful in connection with subject's rehabilitation, is furnished.2. All the information we have concerning Kelly's life prior to his arrival in Greece was furnished by Kelly himself and is almost wholly unsubstantiated. This, in brief, is Kelly's story: He was born 7 May 1924 in Medkovets, Bulgaria. He studied philology in 1942-43 at the University of Sofia. In 1942 he joined a secret branch of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union and worked closely with Dr. Georgi M. Dimitrov in anti-Fascist activities (a clain which Dr. Dimitrov has denied.) After emerging briefly from hiding in September 1944, he again went underground, engaging in antd-Communist activities in various cities and towns in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Macedonia. where he urged members of the Agrarian Party to take action against the Communists. In October 1946 he was arrested by the police, sentenced to death, but not executed as the Communists wished to use him as a witness against the Agrarian leader Nikola Petkor. On 23 July 1947 he escaped to Greece.3. Further light is thrown on Kelly's experiences in a manuscript which he claimed to have written and delivered to U. S. authorities in Greece with the prupose of finding a publisher for this, and other, material. It subsequently developed that Kelly was not the anthor of these papers but rather had furnished information to a Greek friend (John Calavanos) who was the real author. A rough translation of one of these documents is enclosed.4. Because of his undeniable organizational ability, tremendous energy and glib, but largely untruthful, salesmanship, Kelly was able to organize a group of Bulgarian immigrants in Greece into what he called the Bulgarian Democratic Blos. His use by this agency was believed advisable inasmuch as his organisation provided the potential for recruiting infiltration agents within a shorter time and with fewer political strings attached than any other emigre groups. Furthermore, his organisation provided a convenient name for use as a front to cover operational activities. As a result of the limited recognition and support. given him and of his bon success in providing agents, Kelly developed a certain megalomania and consequently lost his initial popularity through dictatorial conduct and completely unwarranted behavior as the future head of the liberated Bulgarian state. An American case officer who was intimately involved with the Kelly operations at this period has furnished the following statement:SECRET"Early in201-45145
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2. SECRET C   SECURITY INFORMATION"Early in our relations with Kelly we foresaw the need to curb him or eliminate him from our operations. Since, however, he was necessary to us, we tried to use him, restraining him and teaching him the while. Kelly, unfortunately, did not learn - he got worse. He 'borrowed' and stole money from many sources. He lied to many people, including us, and he developed an infantile megalomania in which he persisted in considering himself the forthcoming Minister-President of Bulgaria."On the Kelly credit side, the statement adds:"We suspected at the time that he was not the new 'white hope', but we needed someone through whom we could obtain bodies. We obtained bodies through Kelly and actually have accomplished some substantive work. Thus it must be remembered that Kelly performed a useful service for us."5. The incident which made of Kelly an immediate disposal problem developed along these lines: In early 1951 Kelly informed a member of our staff in Athens that he had been contacted by a French Vice Consul in Salonica with a view to obtaining his, Kelly's services, for the French. We informed Kelly that he could continue his contacts with the Vice Consul until it could be determined what the French had in mind. Upon our ascertaining that Kelly's connection with the French was counter to U. S. interests, Kelly was instructed to break off all contacts. This he failed to do. In the meantime, a former Kelly man, who had become disillusioned with Kelly's misrepresentations, informed us that Kelly had agreed to give the French complete information on U. S. plans for operations against Bulgaria for the sum of 16,000,000 drachmas. All subsequent information on this transaction which our Athens station was able to learn corroborates the veracity of the account.6. Although the extent of Kelly's knowledge of operations was limited, it was considered extremely undesirable to allow these facts to fall into French hands. Arrangements were therefore made with Greek authorities for Kelly's arrest just prior to his scheduled meeting with the French representative to whom he was to deliver the information and from whom he was to receive the money. In view of these facts, it was immediately apparent that Kelly was of no further operational use and presented a definite security threat, for he was revealed as the type who, in order to reap personal advantage or to curry favor with potential supporters, was likely to reveal to the highest bidder whatever operational information he had gathered. There have been no later developments which have changed our position in the matter.7. Information concerning subsequent developments in the handling of this disposal case are already known to your division.EnclosureSE/PC/2-LT-1fDistribution: Addressee -Orig & 1SE/PC - 2 SD/RE - 2GRATIAN M. YATSEVITCHDeputy for Policy Coordination, SESECRET
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21 January 1952MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting with Col. Smith of WH re Kelly Case, 20 December 1951.1. Messrs. Potts, Adamson, and Gregg met with Col. Smith on 20 December 1951 for the purpose of discussing a new development in the Kelly care and determining the future course of action in regard to the disposal of Kelly. The new development was the statement by the Athene Senior CIA Representative during his visit to Washington in early December to the effect that Kelly no longer constitutes a security hasard to current Bulgarian operations in Greece since the knowledge that Kelly has about Bulgarian operations is now outdated. At present as far as Bulgarian operations in Greece are concerned the main problem is to keep Kelly out of Greece and, if possible, prevent his direct correspondence with people in Greece, in order to preclude his interfering with and stirring up the Bulgarian emigration in that country.2. It was pointed out to Col. Smith that in view of this new development, SE/PC feels that it is now possible to begin planning and effecting the permanent disposal of Kelly. Col. Smith indicated that he felt that no imediate solution would be necessary, as Kelly could be treated as an exploited agent and handled under the disposal and rehabilitation projects which the WH Division is now developing. Col. Smith felt that Kelly could be held for a few more months, if necessary, in his present location until these projects were approved. However, in view of the possible imediate and permanent solution to Kelly's disposal offered by his friend Johannes Karapides in Caracas, Venezuela, it was agreed that the following action would be taken as soon as possiblesa. WH would brief the Caracas Chief of Station and investigate Karapides.b. WH would attempt to learn more from Panama about Kelly's relationship to Karapides.c. WH should investigate the problem of documenting Kelly for
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13-00000SECRET- 2 -possible disposal in Careces.d. SE/PC would attempt to check on Karapides life andactivities when he was in Greece.3. During the discussion of possible solutions to the Kelly   case, it was explicitly understood and agreed between Col. Smith and   the representatives of SE/PC that responsibility and initiative for   Kelly's disposal now clearly rests with the WH Division and that the   responsibility of SB/PC extends only to that support and assistance   specifically requested by the WH Division. It was further understood,   however, that SE/C still has a direct interest in Kelly's disposal   in view of his wife and child's presence in Greece and their present   undetermined relationship to Kally's permanent disposal, i. e, whether   it is possible and desirable that they join hin.CHARLES P. ADAMSONSECRET
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# PARTIAL-PERSO TY HISTORY OF LYLE KELLY1. Financial Finagling in Greece(a) In February, 1951, when Kelly was head of the Democratic Bloc, three of his men arrived in Athens, coming directly from IRO camps. They needed shelter, but had no money. They were put on salary, but it was not enough to cover the sixmonths advance rent which it is the custom to pay when a lease is made in Athens. Thus Kelly's advance account was credited with the amount of ($850, which was to be used to pay the rental advance. The three men were to pay it back in monthly installments.Two such installments were paid by the men when Kelly was "interned" by our people. The men were then able to complain that Kelly had forced them into quarters best described as "very inadequate, insecurean and unhealthy."Comparing the quality of the quarters with the amount advanced for rent, it becomes quite certain that Kelly made some sort of deal with the landlord in order to make some money.It should be kept in mind that Kelly forced three of his own countrymen to live in these quarters, from which they were forthwith removed for health and security reasons.(b) Just prior to his removal, it was discovered that Kelly had a cash shortage of over $100 which was not accounted for in any way. When an attempt was made to collect the money, it was discovered that Kelly had spent it on himself.2. Manuscript EpisodeIn. December, 1950, Willard Allen, in accordance with a promise made to Kelly, brought with him to this country three manuscripts, ostensibly written by Kelly. Allen was to see what he could do to have these manu- sripts published here. Kelly hoped to thus exploit and dramatize hie escape from Bulgaria. He was given, by us, a $300 advance on the publi- cation of the manuscripts.On December 14, 1951, in a conversation with Mr. Allen, it was learned by us that Kelly had not written the manuscripts at all. Allen learned this himself when the real author wrote to him demanding the return of his works. The author said that he had a statement from Kelly disclaiming all credit for the manuscripts. Furthermore, the real author had seen nothing of the $300 given to Kelly, although they apparently had agreed to go 50-50 on any profits realized from the publication of the manuscripts.Et is clear that Kelly lied to us, and used someone else's literary talentsin the hope of gaining noteriety and money himself.3. Relations with the FrenchIn early 1951, Kelly informed our people in Athens that a French Vice Consul from Salonica had contacted him in the hope of getting Kelly to work for his country. Kelly was allowed by us to continue seeing this man until it was determinedjust what the French wanted in the way of information. This point was reached, and Kelly was told not to see his Frenchman or any Frenchmen after a certain Thursday. We know definitely that Kelly saw saw his Frenchman on the following Friday, Saturday, and