Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 11]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.Comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKHOV is still "under suspicion", according to a sensitive source.## Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament DelegationNOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation. (KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.) To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never reported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants provided him.]NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings at any time.Top Secret
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 12]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## Yu.I. GUKImplying that their friendship was of long standing, NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to the residency and was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations in Geneva. He described his "big, big friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the residency.Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to GUK. According to several sources (see Annex A, because of his friendship with NOSENKO, GUK was dismissed from the KGB.## M.S. TSYMBALIn 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose back- ground would have made them suitable for the Special (Illegals) Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Head- quarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence, NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was granted access in 1964.281Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 13]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)## NOSENKO's InformationSLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First Chief Directorate because of his business transactions with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with some Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited the Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he might make some contacts or do something interesting" while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had a file on SLESINGER, and a senior case officer in the American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M. DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent of the Seventh Department who was director of a photo- graphic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence. SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents. who could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted. to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed, no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the Soviet Union before, several times.Comment:A sensitive source had reported to the FBI that the KGB suspected SLESINGER to be an FBI "plant" and that KGB officer "might be trying to develop SLESINGER to act as a courier or in some other agent capacity."NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER, reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa. In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a Soviet official who exhibited "intimate: knowledge" of his business in New York City and had asked whether SLESINGER had "ever been bothered by the FBI."294# Top Secret
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 14]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)Comment: (Continued)In 1966 SLESINGER reported to the FBI. that he was in touch with a Moscow photographic shop proprietor, and he described evidence of KGB interest in him during his visit to Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in contact with a number of Soviet officials from the United Nations.NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Directorate case.## (KOTEN'S) Arrest and the KGB AgentNOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that KOTEN was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the agent's name, but from the description he provided he is believed identical with a KGB S&T agent identified earlier on the basis of a May 1962 report from a sensitive source.## NOSENKO's InformationKOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens, particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently inspired such contacts.] Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second Directorates had concluded that KOTEN might be a "provocation agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the Communist Party in the United States.295Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 15]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)NOSENKO's InformationSHUBIN was a native of California of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor in New York City. SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958 or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN was the target of Seventh Department case officer A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They very furtively said that they were interested in him," from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent. NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV'S office and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according to another version, SOKOLOV'S office was advised by others). SOKOLOV'S office eventually apologized for having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU'S interest in SHUBIN.Comment: Earlier, identified an agent apparently identical with SHUBIN and FBI sources reported SHUBIN's travel to the USSR in summer 1961 and in September 1963.SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited the Soviet Union during that period it was not as an American tourist under his true name. Consequently, he could not then have been the tourist target of the Seventh Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further contradiction: NOSENKO could not have noticed his name while reviewing tourist lists in the Seventh Department, because he claims he was in the American Department at the time.
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 16]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHERE-PANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deepwoods, "where a person could lose himself for life". On theseventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku,where he was on his way to the Iranian border.A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carryingS.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department offi-cers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow,interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessedto having given the documents to the Americans. When askedwhy, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", andbesides, he thought he might ask the Americans for somemoney in return for the documents. He confessed that on4 November he had passed the documents to an American touristwho was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said hehad given the documents to the American in the entrancehallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was alsohoused.Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the twofixed surveillance posts which had been established, theSecond Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticismfor not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clocksurveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGBthat if he had detected his surveillants he would havewritten to the government and newspapers a letter of protestagainst "such an indignity, such persecution", and thenwould have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proofof his guilt.Comment: Other sources, including sensitive sources, have also reported various aspects of theCHEREPANOV incident.NOSENKO's assertions with respect to theCHEREPANOV case, however, are not material tohis claim that he was Deputy Chief of theSeventh Department at the time.
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 17]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## The Recall TelegramNOSENKO's InformationOn 3 February 1964, NOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB Legal Residency once during the morning before he met with CIA and again that evening after 1800; there were at those times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of 4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there were again no such messages for him. Later in the morning of 4 February, however, after attending a session of the Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and found that a telegram from KGB Headquarters had arrived, instructing him to return to Moscow immediately to participate in the KGB conference on tourism. After relating the substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thenceforth in CIA custody.Comment: Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO'S assertion regarding the existence of the recall telegram. According to Special Intelligence, there were enciphered communications from Moscow to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and later, but there was none from 1815 on 3 February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.324Top Secret
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 18]
# Top Secret(SEVENTII DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## NOSENKO'S Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall TelegramNOSENKO maintained throughout his interrogations in 1964 and 1965 that there was the recall telegram and that it prompted his defection. In October 1966, however, while being questioned again, NOSENKO stated that there had been no telegram recalling him to Moscow from Geneva, and he signed the following statement:"On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in Moscow had been received in the KGB Residency in Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said at the time that this telegram said that I was recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent interviews and interrogations by American authorities in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that the story was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous and afraid that my contacts with American Intelligence might be noticed."## Knowledge of Other Seventh Department OperationsThe notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 (see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited in the description of these operations in Annex B, these operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service in 1962-1963 as either Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 19]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964: SummaryTo substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of (SVENCHANSKIY) the arrests of KOTEN and BARGHOORN, and the investigations of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV, his discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his assignment to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as he described and they were as he described (there are substantial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Department operations. They do not accurately characterize, as NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions which he claimed to have held.KGB Counterintelligence OperationsAmong American Tourists1962-1963Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to326Top Secret![TS No. 197124 Copy]
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 20]
# Top Secret(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)## Other Sources - 1964 and 1965As indicated in Annex A, a sensitive source reported several items of information he stated he obtained from various KGB colleagues. According to these reports, GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB as a consequence of NOSENKO'S defection, it was rumored that GRIBANOV was to be fired because he had been NOSENKO's friend and patron, that GRIBANOV was held responsible for the defection of his protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSENKO's assignment to Geneva in 1964 despite knowledge of facts making NOSENKO ineligible, that GRIBANOV was a long-time friend of NOSENKO'S father, that NOSENKO had been a deputy to a Department Chief despite his junior rank because of GRIBANOV's influence, and that GRIBANOV was dismissed from the KGB and Party because he willfully withheld information about NOSENKO'S procuring women for parties which he and the General arranged.## NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to refer to this special and personal relationship, which touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.); recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruitment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.); NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in 1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 21]
# Top SecretSUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONSCONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDESNOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO'S claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, "the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence", paralyzed the work of KGBThe examination has compared each element of NOSENKO'S biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?Top Secret
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 22]
13-00000TOP SECRET1.  Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study entitled, *The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO* dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.2.  Certain portions of Annex A of this study are deleted since it contains information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.3.  We request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A when your review has been completed.Attachment: As Stated AboveWARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVEDE2 IMPDET CL BY 011340TOP SECRET
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 23]
Top SecretAnnex AStatements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO4 February 1964NOSENKO defected in Geneva.6 February 1964The Chief of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon that NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February. They speculated privately between themselves that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in an auto- mobile accident.8 February 1964An official spokesman of the Soviet Mission in Geneva reported to the Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert temporarily assigned to Geneva", had been missing for four days.9 February 1964Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared.10 February 1964The Swiss press quoted unidentified Soviet sources as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected.
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 24]
Top Secret(Annex A)10 February 1964 (continued)A U.S. Department of State press release was issued identifying NOSENKO as KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States.According to a sensitive source, Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO would have a great deal of important information which he could impart to intelligence agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them. He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American and British nationals.According to a sensitive source,The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities working in lleadquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly familiar with all KCB personalities in Geneva and certainly knew some KGB personalities in other countries.Comment: NOSENKO identified a number of KGB officers in Geneva; he asserted that some others, known by CIA to be connected with the KGB, were not.
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 25]
# Top Secret(Annex A)10 February 1964 (continued)According to a sensitive sourceNOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for approximately sixteen years, since about 1947, and was an employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the Ukraine.Comment: NOSENKO claims to have served in the GRU until 1953, when he entered the KGB.According to a sensitive source,It appeared quite certain to several KGS officers that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB.Comment: NOSENKO was at the time claiming to have been a KGB lieutenant colonel.According to a sensitive source, from KGB officersThe photograph which appeared in U.S. newspapers is not that of NOSENKO. One worked with NOSENKO for several years in KGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate.363Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10