Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[124-10164-10151.pdf — page 2]
# SUBJECT: Alleged Information on Assassination of President Kennedycause of Vlasenco's nationality, and the timing of the assassination six months after the blockade of Cuba, Kovacs concludes that the assassination was ordered by "Brezhnev and Fidel Castro."e. Vlasenco told Kovacs in November, 1963 that he rented the apartment, dealt in precious stones, and had lived there for four years. Vlasenco was away from the apartment during the day, dressed well, had no family and no car. Kovacs guesses he saw him three times during the two week period.f. Kovacs asked that the above story be passed to Senator Edward Kennedy, and at first refused to identify himself and the characters in his story to anyone but the Senator or his emissary because he was afraid for his life. It was for that reason also that he claims he did not come forward until now. Kovacs was assured that his story would not appear in any newspaper or magazine (which he feared would happen), but would be sent to Washington by a coded message. Towards the end of the interview Kovacs alluded to his need for money (CR $500,000 about US $11,500) to fund his inventions; one a dirigible which could carry "any amount of cargo," and one a pump which could pump liquids hundreds of miles. When asked if he had made an effort to interest local entrepreneurs, Kovacs replied that he had expended considerable effort, "but they laugh at me." Kovacs appears to have a confused thinking process and lively imagination and his story is contradictory. He probably came forward in the hope that his information would be worth money. We do not know whether he himself believes the story he related.[^1] 2. Our representative in Rio de Janeiro has been advised to have no further contact with Kovacs. Should addees wish to pursue the matter, Kovacs' present address is Rua A. 46, Vila Luiza, Pavuna, Rio de Janeiro.3. This Agency has no identifiable traces on Kovacs or Vlasenco.CIR 316/00637-80
[124-10168-10040.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM# IDENTIFICATION FORM## AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY: FBIRECORD NUMBER: 124-10168-10040RECORD SERIES: HQAGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-116391-41X## DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR: FBIFROM: PAPICH, SAMTO: DIRECTOR, FBITITLE:DATE: 03/13/1970PAGES: 85SUBJECT: CIA ACT, ANTI-CASTRO ACTDOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: SecretNEW CLASSIFICATION:REVIEW DATE: 11/03/1998UPDATE DATE: 02/12/2001STATUS RedactRESTRICTIONS:JFK Act 6 (1)(A)JFK Act 6 (1)(B)JFK Act 6 (1)(C)COMMENTS: EBF, INC ADMIN PAGESNW 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 1
[124-10168-10040.pdf — page 1]
###Prior Release was made to Rockefeller CommissionTO: The Director DATE: 3/13/79 3/16/8/FROM: SA Sam Papich CLASS. & EXT. BY SPA-REASON-FCIM II, 12.4.2 23DATE OF REVIEW 3/13/90SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIAALL INFORMATION CONTAINED CIA INFO ON pg 21422HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED only was Declassed perEXCEPT WHERE SHOWN John E. Bacon 8/27/80OTHERWISEReference is made to my letters dated March 2 and March 5, 1970. In my letter of March 5, 1970, I stated "it is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an extensive list of justified grievances." It is my under-standing that the Director desired that this list be identifiod.. Enclosed herewith is a list of approximately 75 items.This list should not be considered absolutely complete. Preparation was predicated on my personal recollection and a review of Bureau records. To make this list more complete and specifically accurate would necessitate the review of thousands of files. The enclosed list can be supported by Bureau records. Inis 1000 relicet om ine same items is unknown. also must be kept in mind in connection with our evaluation of the alleged CIA grievances which I previously listed.I realize that it is presumptuous on my part, but fif the Director feels that our Dureau work can benefit by a personal discussion between the Director and myself, I am available until april 3, 1970. I plan to leave the area. jimmediately thereafter for an extended period.ACTION:REC-ET 62-80750-4/8For information.Enclosure CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO ST 102DECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION.1 - Mr. DeLoach1 - Mr. Sullivan N THIS DOCUMENT.1 - Mr. PapichSJP:HP/8/98(4)Classified byClassified by TZExempt from CDS Category 243Date of Declassification medefinite11-11-15OADR (JFK)2/9/985668 SLO/GELJFKNW 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 2
[124-10168-10040.pdf — page 2]
# SECRET![CIA Seal]**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505OFFICE OF THE DIRECTORKP 1/8/98 AS BRACKETED RG.3 20 March 1970The Honorable J. Edgar HooverDirectorFederal Bureau of InvestigationWashington, D. C.Dear Mr. Hoover:FBI INFOCLASO 5668 SLO/Gee(JFK) 2/9/98 4/2/98We have completed our review of domestic positive intelligence collection engendered by your letter of 11 March 1970. We warmly welcome periodic reexamination by our two agencies of the implementation of the 1966 agreement and the collection of positive intelligence which you proposed. I concur also with your comments that there is a need for close coordination of our efforts in the field of positive and counterintelligence collection. To be most effective, I agree that it is essential for this Agency, together with your Bureau, to conduct a continuing analysis of clandestine collection activity. The product is of growing importance to the national security and to the United States Intelligence Community. Therefore we endorse your proposal for a reexamination and bespeak your desires as to how this might be conducted.With regard to the 1966 set of ground rules, which you sent to the then Director, Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., the competent work of our respective representatives did, in fact, produce an effective and realistic agreement. I welcome your statement that no major problems have been encountered since its adoption.I feel strongly that there are other related subjects, of similar importance to the national security, which warrant periodic reexamina- *tion since they have a direct bearing on domestic clandestine collection of positive intelligence.REC 8 1 MAY 6 1970![Stamp: GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]SECRETEXP. PROC. MAR 20 1970.NW 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 3
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As a result of our review, engendered by your letter, I believe that the following subjects are deserving of your personal consideration:(1) Audio coverage. Audio coverage provides timely intelligence of inestimable worth to U.S. officials for policy planning, early warning, and accurate guidance necessary for the improvement of operational and collection activity here and abroad. Audio coverage is unique production because it is readily subject to local cross-checking and evaluation which is far more difficult and costly to achieve abroad. Further, such coverage is on targets which affect directly the national interests.For several years your Bureau had been receptive to requirements and leads which resulted in valuable coverage. The quality of your production proved that your Burcau alone possesses capabilitics and experience which cannot be duplicated by any other U.S. agency.On 2 October 1969 two related requests for audio coverage were submitted by this Agency pertaining to positive intelligence targets, one of whom had KGB connections. (I refer to the case of ________ and ________.) Your Bureau replied that henceforth the Agency should refer all such cases directly to the Attorney General for approval.It is suggested that the question of audio coverage be reopened between representatives of your Bureau and this Agency. I would welcome your thoughts and observations on this subject.I wish to assure you that I believe that this sensitive type of collection should be implemented under rigid and stringent controls. This is absolutely necessary in order to maintain the highest standard of security both in instituting the coverage and for the exploitation of the product. (An excellent example of this is demonstrated in your effective and secure production of SCOPE.(3)
[124-10168-10040.pdf — page 4]
SECRET(2) Mail Coverage. Another much needed intelligence tool is mail coverage.. Its importance has been proven in the past. I have the impression that it has been discontinued, and I would suggest that our representatives should confer and examine together whether this asset might be deployed against communications of the Soviet Block the New Left, and identified foreign agents.(3) CIA Technical Services. A significant expenditure of this Agency's money and personnel has been committed to research and development for the improvement of technical aids. This Agency has provided your Bureau with an appreciation of our resources and capabilities, and has offered you at cost or gratis our most sophisticated equipment.Although we will continue these services, we would welcome any suggestions from your Bureau for improvement in the technical field including proposals how these assets can be better employed. Your comments will be particularly appreciated in view of our mutual interests in implementing Operation(4) Courses in Positive Intelligence Requirements and Reporting. Since the collection and reporting of positive foreign intelligence is, as you say, only incidental to your main internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities, I realize that your personnel are somewhat at a disadvantage in carrying out the evaluating and reporting processes necessary for the conduct of positive intelligence. At our 1966 conference, we offered to institute positive intelligence training courses, including reports writing and*this section describes sources for Technical intelligence Collection.*SECRET
[124-10168-10040.pdf — page 5]
SECRETanalysis, for FBI personnel. In soliciting your views on the desirability of this type of training, I wish to reiterate our willingness to provide such instruction. It would be designed to expose the needs of the Intelligence Community in depth, thus making the Current Intelligence Reporting List (CIRL) more meaningful to your personnel.(5) Seminars on Opposition Services. Given the growing sophistication and increased capabilities of hostile intelligence services, it is suggested that CIA and FBI experts in this field meet as required at our respective Headquarters, the Washington and New York Field Offices, in order to keep abreast of new developments, modus operandi, operational tasks, and diverse missions of opposition services. I know that you will agree with me that no opportunities for improvement should be overlooked which might heln to negate the efforts of hostile services who are charged with undermining the security of the United States. These sessions should also provide an opportunity to explore and devise new means to penetrate and neutralize these inimical forces.(6) Live Bloc Sources. The record of our cooperation and coordination to exploit live penetrations and defectors from Bloc sources proves the success of our mutual effort.I believe that there is room for substantial improvement in achieving a more uniform and efficient exploitation of the positive intelligence potential of certain of these sensitive sources. I would invite your thoughts on how we may better coordinate requirements for these sources and establish a more thorough evaluation of their positive intelligence production before it is given general dissemination within the Government. Our review would suggest that there are good reasons for consultation to explore the development of higher quality live sources, for example code clerks.[^1][^1]: (5)
[124-10168-10040.pdf — page 6]
SECRET(7) Live Sources in the Non-Bloc Area.. Sources such as code clerks and diplomats are a fertile field for procurement of much-needed intelligence relating to the activities of certain Latin American and Middle Eastern countries which are expanding their sübversive and terrorist activities, even to the United States. I do not feel confident that both agencies have adequately exploited the full potential of this field, and would urge that this subject be explored by our respective representatives.(8) New Left and Racial Matters. There is already a substantial exchange of information in this field. Limitations of manpower raise a serious question as to whether both agencies can keep pace with future unpredictable developments. The increasingly close connection between these forces in the United States and hostile elements abroad has been well established by both of our agencies. I feel it would be in our mutual interest to determine how we can best emplov more wisely our limited manpower, knowing that this problem, which embraces bombings, hijacking, assassination, and the demeaning of law enforcement officers, is international in scope.(9) Relations with Domestic Field Offices and Legal Attaches. I do not feel that there are any serious conflicts in this area but there may be room for improving the quality of liaison in order to expand positive intelligence collection. Given the changing situations both here and abroad, periodic re-examination of field relations could assist both agencies to make mutually-agreed adjustments.Mr. Hoover, I wish to assure you that I value highly your personal judgment in affairs bearing on the national security. I know that your experience is derived from a unique lifetime of dedicated service to our country. In this spirit, I welcome sincerely your observations on the foregoing agenda and solicit your thoughts regarding any other item which you deem worthy of the attention of your Bureau and this Agency.Faithfully yours,Richard HelmsDirectorNW 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 75SECRET
[124-10168-10040.pdf — page 7]
# SECRETCASES AND/C SITUATIONSINVOLVING CONFLICTS WITH THECENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)IN THE DOCUMENT, KP 1/8/98(1) MOCASE (THY BORIS MORROS CASE)This was a sensitive Soviet-espionage case which originated in 1943 and terminated for the most part in 1957. The case had many wide foreign ramifications and historically has been, and undoubtedly will be, one of the most important and involved cases of Soviet operations in this country and abroad. We did not disseminate any information of significance in this case until 1954. On various occasions when the Liaison Agent has become involved in heated arguments with CIA officials, they have seen fit to raise this case as an outstanding example of FBI failure to cooperate with the Agency. The position taken by CIA was that it should have been advised regarding the Soviet operational activity in foreign countries, claiming that the Agency would have had the opportunity to develop more information of significance, identify Soviet agents, and possibly prepare conditions for recruitment or doubling of Soviet operatives. We did not disseminate our reports to CIA because of the extreme sensitivity of the case. We actually did not permit CIA to handle any investigations relating to the MOCASE until 1957.In 1957, CIA complained that it certainly had every right to have received the information earlier because many aspects of the MOCASE pertained to CIA employees and operations. CIA further argued that it had been greatly handicapped in effectively carrying out the leads in 1957 because the leads were given to the Agency at the same time that the case was publicized. The Agency argued that the failure of the Bureau to coordinate with CIA those French aspects of the case permitted the French, rather than the U. S., to play a dominating role in Europe.PAR MANGOLD RELEASE (CA88-1826)5668 SLO/GCL(1)(6)(JFK) 2/9/98 4/2/98SECRET4801-NW 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 8
[124-10168-10040.pdf — page 8]
# SECRETHow much information CIA has developed over the years concerning our operational activity in Mexico City is unknown. However, we should bear-in mind that former Special Agent George Munro Handled many of our operations in Mexico, including key infor-mants, and subsequently began performing services for CIA after he left the Bureau. We also should not forget that Americans operating in Latin American countries for one agency are heavily exposed to the resources of another U., S., intelligence or investigative agency. This Agent knows from personal experience that operating in these areas constitutes a "very small world" and the exposure to leaks and errors is considerable.(3) THE ABEL CASEAlthough CIA has not raised the point for several years, the prevailing attitude was, and probably still exists, that the FBI did not play it square with CIA in the Abel age by not making certain that the Agency was given the proper recognition for its contri-butions. CIA feels that in the first place, there would not have been any U. S. access or availability to the source in this case, Reino Hayhanen, because CIA took the full responsibility for moving Hayhanen from France Ito the U. S. in 1957. CIA claims it took the risk and responsibility of doing this after the Bureau declined to become involved in any operation designed to transport Hayhanen to the U. S. It should be noted that Hayhanen iwas an alcoholic and that his first contacts with CIA in Paris raised questions concerning Hayhanen's mental stability.After Hayhanen arrived in the U. S., we arranged access to him for a period, the purpose of which was to obtain a complete story of his intelli-gence activities in the U. S. and we were particularly interested in identifying all of his associates, es-pecially the man who later was identified as Rudolph Abel. After a short handling period in the U. S., we dropped Hayhanen because he became a problem. It was an extremely critical situation because we had not yet identified Abel. CIA agreed to take the responsibility for the carrying and safeguarding of Hayhanen but weSECRET- 4 -
[124-10168-10040.pdf — page 9]
# SECRETcountries with far better impressions than in the past. In addition, we have learned more about these countries, their services, and their security chiefs by spending a few minutes with them. Needless to say, this kind of treatment has also immeasurably helped our Legal Attaches.(7) CIA-DUTCH INTEREST IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITYIn 1965, the Dutch Internal Security Service was in the process of investigating individuals in Holland who allegedly had been engaged in Soviet-espionage activity. The Dutch wanted to have certain individuals in the U. S. interviewed and approached CIA to make inquiry at the Bureau. At that time, our relations with the Dutch had been practically nonexistent because the Dutch had failed to honestly deal with us in the case of Joseph Petersen, a Dutch Official who had been clandestinely collecting intelligence at the National Security Agency. When CIA approached us, we told the Agency that the Dutch could submit their request through diplomatic channels. We subsequently told CIA we would not handle the interviews for the Dutch. We stuck to our position. CIA surrendered but felt that we were impairing their efforts to gather information concerning Soviet-espionage activities in Europe.(Walter G. Krivitsky, Bufile - 100-11146)(8) COLONEL JOHN GROMBACH (PAT O'BRIEN)Colonel John Grombach was a retired U. S. Army officer who, during World War II, established a private intelligence network, operating throughout the world but primarily in Europe. His sources included any number of European exiles who came to the U. S. While he was in business, he was financed by the State Department, then the Department of the Army, and in the later 1940's and into the 1950's by CIA. Grombach established contact with the Bureau through one of his subordinates, Pat O'Brien, who periodically called# SECRET- 7 -
[124-10168-10040.pdf — page 10]
SECRETon us and furnished information which Grombach felt was of interest us. This dissemination through Pat O'Brien continued during the period of Grombach's relationship with CIA. We never informed CIA that we were receiving such information which also was of interest to the Agency. It is possible that Grombach had given the same data to CIA but we do not know. CIA and Grombach clashed and the relationship was severed in an atmosphere of severe bitterness. In the last years of its dealings with Grombach, the Agency had successfully penetrated the latter's organization and allegedly had identified many of the sources. CIA hinted to the Liaison Agent that it had become aware of the relationship between Grombach's organization and the Bureau. How much CIA really learned about this relationship is not known but if its penetrations were significant, the Agency may have developed evidence to justify a charge that the Eureau had withheld information from CIA, particularly when we were receiving the data from an organization which was financed by the Agency[^3]. (Bufile - 92-77906)[^3]: This footnote number is circled on the page.(9) COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT(Herbert Hoover Commission - 1954)In October, 1954, a task force of the captioned Commission initiated a survey of CIA's operations under the leadership of General Mark W. Clark. In January, 1955, we were advised by a representative of the task force that Senator Joseph McCarthy had furnished the group a list of CIA employees who were considered subversive. CIA became cognizant of this development and there was talk within the Agency that the Bureau had furnished the names to the Senator. When the Liaison Agent was informally approached on this, he flatly told the Agency to officially submit its charges. The Agency never did. What information CIA may have had on this matter as it pertained to the Bureau is not known. It is possible that the Agency's attitude was strictly predicated on a knowledge that we maintained liaison with the Senator's Committee. (Relations with CIA, Bufile - 62-80750)SECRET- 8 -
[124-10168-10040.pdf — page 11]
# SECRET(10) INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.During the 1950's, we gave our Legal Attaches numerous leads stemming from internal security cases in the U.S. In many instances we did not see fit to notify CIA although the Agency always maintained that you could not separate "internal Security" from "counter- intelligence," namely a lead in France pertaining to a communist in the U. S., warranted advising CIA, if not at least asking the Agency to handle the lend. In the last several years, it is not believed that there is any basis for complaint since we have regularly been notifying CIA concerning subjects of cases who travel abroad. If the Legal Attache is investigating, CIA is notified in order to avoid duplicate efforts. There have been exceptions where we have taken the position that CIA should not be notified because of the sensitivity of the matter. How many such exceptions are known to CIA cannot be established from our files; however, we should bear in mind that wiem our Legal Attaches investigate, they contact many of the same foreign officials normally contacted by CIA. How many of these foreign officials are CIA informants, or on the Agency payroll, is unknown.(11) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBAWe operated informants in Cuba when we had a Legal Attache's Office in Havana. Informants reported on activities of communists and other subversives in that country. During the period we operated these informants, we did not coordinate our operations with CIA. We did not advise the Agency that we had such sources. However, in 1960, after Castro came on the scene, it became infeasible to handle certain informants in a secure manner. Approval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA. What these informants may have subsequently told CIA about past Bureau operations is unknown. This item is being cited in the event CIA had evidence to establish that we had been operational in Cuba and had not coordinated with the Agency pursuant to Directives. (Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont, February 5, 1960, re: "Partido Socialista Popular," 64-200-210, 2377 and Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, February 3, 1960, re: "Narcisco Tauler Beneficto, 134-8539-4)(5)