Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 112]
SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John K. GreaneyAssociate General CounselFROM : Deputy Director for OperationsSUBJECT : DDO Coordination on DDS&T's Review ofDeletions from The CIA and the Cultof Intelligence by Marchetti and MarksREFERENCE : DDS&T-5193-76/1 dated 27 May 19771. Appropriate Components of the DDO have reviewed the following items (deletions) listed at Tab C of referent for coordination with the DDO and concur with the DDS&T that they are all properly classified in accordance with E.O. 11652 and should so remain:| Item | Manuscript Page || ---- | --------------- || 25   | 47              || 159  | 181             || 160  | 182             || 161  | 183             || 162  | 184             || 163  | 184             || 164  | 185             || 205  | 234             || 208  | 235             || 209  | '236            || 295  | 424             || 297  | 425             || 299  | 426             || 301  | 427             |2. In Tab D of referent, the DDS&T deferred to DDO or OS the decision on the classification of Item 190, manuscript page 214, relating to Soviet capabilities to make intelligible the sounds picked up by audio devices discovered in the code room of the American Embassy in Moscow. The appropriate DDO Component finds that this item must remain classified SECRET since it relates to cryptography and is exempt.from the General Declassification Schedule ofSECRETE2 IMPDET CL BY 018630
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 113]
SECRETE.O. 11652, exemption category 5B(2).3. Specific classification and exemption authority for each item, if needed, is available from SA/DO/0.William W. WellsO/SA/DO/O:NAShepanek:kaw (1542)DistributionOriginal & 1 - Addressee2 - DDO1 - ADDO1 - Ex Reg2 - DDS&T2 - SA/DO/0SECRET
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 114]
MEMORANDUM FOR: General CounselATTENTION: John GreaneySUBJECT: Review of Deletions from The CIA and the *Cult of Intelligence* by Marchetti and Marks1. The responsible and knowledgeable components of this directorate have reviewed the appropriate deletions from subject book per your request. The review was made to determine whether each deletion was still classified under EO 11652 or whether the information in each deletion has been officially released by the U.S. Government.2. Attached, Tab A, is a list of the deleted items reviewed by this directorate. Tab B is a list of those items of primary interest of this directorate. All of these items remain classified; however, portions of one item, 135, can be released. Tab C is a list of those items which we determined are still classified under EO 11652; however, some portions of three items can be released, but we recommend that all of the items in Tab C be coordinated with other indicated elements. Tab D is a list of items we determined are not of concern to this directorate and should be referred to other indicated elements. Tab E is a list of the four items mentioned above which we believe portions can now be released. The portions in red brackets remain classified and should not be released.3. Since many of the deleted items involved the National Security Agency (NSA), we attempted to coordinate our determinations through our contacts at NSA. We were told that any coordination must be handled between the NSA and CIA General Counsel. As a result, no further coordination with other elements was attempted.4. This memorandum completes the DDS&T action on the court ordered review of the deletions from subject book.![signature]ERNEST J. ZELLMERAssociate Deputy DirectorforScience and TechnologyAttachments:As Stated
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 115]
# TAB A## DELETED ITEMS IN THE MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT## REVIEWED BY THE DDS&T| Item | Page || ---- | ---- || 25   | 47   || 86   | 104  || 87   | 104  || 88   | 105  || 91   | 106  || 92   | 107  || 135  | 134  || 136  | 135  || 155  | 177  || 157  | 179  || 158  | 180  || 159  | 181  || 160  | 182  || 161  | 183  || 163  | 184  || 164  | 185  || 165  | 185  || 166  | 185  || 167  | 185  || 170  | 189  || 171  | 189  || 172  | 189  || 173  | 190  || 174  | 191  || 175  | 191  || 176  | 192  || 177  | 193  || 178  | 194  || 187  | 200  || 188  | 201  || 189  | 202  || Item | Page || ---- | ---- || 190  | 214  || 191  | 214  || 192  | 215  || 204  | 233  || 205  | 234  || 208  | 235  || 209  | 236  || 245  | 268  || 248  | 269  || 254  | 327  || 258  | 331  || 259  | 331  || 260  | 331  || 267  | 337  || 268  | 337  || 269  | 337  || 275  | 394  || 295  | 424  || 297  | 425  || 299  | 426  || 301  | 427  || 302  | 427  || 304  | 430  || 306  | 431  || 312  | 442  || 313  | 450  || 324  | 474  || 325  | 474  || 327  | 475  || 328  | 476  || 329  | 480  |
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 116]
Tab BITEMS OF INTEREST TO THE DDS&TAND REMAIN CLASSIFIED| Item | Manuscript Page |                       || ---- | --------------- | --------------------- || 91   | 106             | SECRET, 5B(2) and (3) || 92   | 107             | SECRET, 5B(2) and (3) || *135 | 134             | SECRET, 5B(2) and (3) || 136  | 135             | SECRET, 5B(2) and (3) || 155  | 177             | SECRET, 5B(3)         || 158  | 180             | SECRET, 5B(2) and (3) || 163  | 184             | SECRET, 5B(2) and (3) || 165  | 185             | SECRET, 5B(3)         || 166  | 185             | CONFIDENTIAL, 5B(2)   || 167  | 185             | CONFIDENTIAL, 5B(2)   || 188  | 201             | TOP SECRET, 5B(2)     |*Can be sanitized and portions released.
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 117]
ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAINCLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS| Item | Manuscript Page |                        || ---- | --------------- | ---------------------- || * 25 | 47              | DDO                    || * 87 | 104             | DOD (DIA)              || 88   | 105             | DOD (DIA)              || 157  | 179             | OS                     || 159  | 181             | DDO, OC, ERDA          || 160  | 182             | DDO, OC, ERDA          || 161  | 183             | DDO, OC, ERDA          || 162  | 184             | DDO, OC, ERDA          || 163  | 184             | DDO                    || 164  | 185             | DDO                    || 172  | 189             | NSA                    || 187  | 200             | DOD (Navy)             || 189  | 202             | DOD (Navy)             || 204  | 233             | NSA and DDO            || 205  | 234             | DDO                    || 208  | 235             | DDO                    || 209  | 236             | DDO                    || 245  | 268             | DOD (SAFSS)            || 248  | 269             | DOD (SAFSS)            || 254  | 327             | DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff || 258  | 331             | DOD (SAFSS)            |*Can be sanitized and portions released.
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 118]
Tab CContinued| Item | Manuscript Page |              || ---- | --------------- | ------------ || 259  | 331             | DOD (SAFSS)  || 260  | 331             | DOD (SAFSS)  || 267  | 337             | DOD (Navy)   || 268  | 337             | DOD (Navy)   || 269  | 337             | DOD (Navy)   || *275 | 394             | OL           || 295  | 424             | DDO          || 297  | 425             | DDO          || 299  | 426             | DDO, NSA     || 301  | 427             | DDO, OC, NSA || 302  | 427             | NSA          || 304  | 430             | NSA          || 306  | 431             | DOD (Navy)   || 312  | 442             | NSA          || 313  | 450             | NSA          || 329  | 480             | NSC Staff    |*Can be sanitized and portions released.
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 119]
Tab DITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS| Item | Manuscript Page |                         || ---- | --------------- | ----------------------- || 86   | 104             | O/DCI                   || 170  | 189             | NSA                     || 171  | 189             | NSA                     || 173  | 190             | NSA                     || 174  | 191             | NSA                     || 175  | 191             | NSA                     || 176  | 192             | NSA                     || 177  | 193             | NSA                     || 178  | 194             | NSA                     || 190  | 214             | DDO or OS               || 191  | 214             | State Department        || 192  | 215             | State Department        || 324  | 474             | DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff || 325  | 474             | DOD                     || 327  | 475             | DDI and DOD             || 328  | 476             | DDI, DOD and NSC Staff  |
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 120]
ITEMS SANITIZED FOR POSSIBLE RELEASEItem 135, Manuscript page 134"A somewhat similar sale of a proprietary occurred in 1967 when CIA decided to get rid of a technical research laboratory in the Boston area."Item 25, Manuscript page 47"Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the Nationalists first to run guerrilla attacks against mainland China and then in more recent years to use Taiwan as a base for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist pilots trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of the mainland and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation aimed at China during the Cultural Revolution."Item 87, Manuscript page 107"The Agency also had a project to determine where American prisoners of war were being held in North Vietnam and to communicate with them! Scale models of the prisons were constructed from aerial and satellite photography and from other intelligence, and studies were made to learn which prisoners had tried or might be willing to try to communicate. Some of the prisoners, on their own, had earlier used their infrequent letters to their families as a means of sending coded messages relating where they were being held. Thus, the Agency worked out schemes to use return mail from the families to send answers back! Meanwhile, the Technical Services Division of the"Item 275, Manuscript page 394"New optics for satellite cameras and improvements in 'over the horizon' radars. These technical contracts were almost always drawn up under the cover of being between the scholar (or the university) and some government agency other than the CIA (the Defense Department or some component thereof were the most"
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 121]
Tab CITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAINCLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS| Item.     | Manuscript Page |                        || --------- | --------------- | ---------------------- || * 25 [^1] | 47              | DDO                    || * 87      | 104             | DOD (DIA)              || 88        | 105             | DOD (DIA)              || 157       | 179             | OS                     || 159 [^2]  | 181             | DDO, OC, ERDA          || 160[^3]   | 182             | DDO, OC, ERDA          || 161[^4]   | 183             | DDO, OC, ERDA          || 162[^5]   | 184             | DDO, OC, ERDA          || 163[^6]   | 184             | DDO                    || 164[^7]   | 185             | DDO                    || 172       | 189             | NSA                    || 187       | 200             | DOD (Navy)             || 189       | 202             | DOD (Navy)             || 204       | 233             | NSA and DDO            || 205[^8]   | 234             | DDO                    || 208[^9]   | 235             | DDO                    || 209[^10]  | 236             | DDO                    || 245       | 268             | DOD (SAFSS)            || 248       | 269             | DOD (SAFSS)            || 254       | 327             | DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff || 258       | 331             | DOD (SAFSS)            |*Can be sanitized and portions released.[^1]: EA - China[^2]: China/India[^3]: " "[^4]: " "[^5]: " "[^6]: " "[^7]: " "[^8]: NE Iran[^9]: LA -[^10]: LA -
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 122]
Tab CContinued| Item     | Manuscript Page |              || -------- | --------------- | ------------ || 259      | 331             | DOD (SAFSS)  || 260      | 331             | DOD (SAFSS)  || 267      | 337             | DOD (Navy)   || 268      | 337             | DOD (Navy)   || 269      | 337             | DOD (Navy)   || *275     | 394             | OL           || 295[^11] | 424             | DDO          || 297[^12] | 425             | DDO          || 299[^13] | 426             | DDO, NSA     || 301[^14] | 427             | DDO, OC, NSA || 302      | 427             | NSA          || 304      | 430             | NSA          || 306      | 431             | DOD (Navy)   || 312      | 442             | NSA          || 313      | 450             | NSA          || 329      | 480             | NSC Staff    |*Can be sanitized and portions released.
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 123]
Tab DITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS| Item | Manuscript Page |                         || ---- | --------------- | ----------------------- || 86   | 104             | O/DCI                   || 170  | 189             | NSA                     || 171  | 189             | NSA                     || 173  | 190             | NSA                     || 174  | 191             | NSA                     || 175  | 191             | NSA                     || 176  | 192             | NSA                     || 177  | 193             | NSA                     || 178  | 194             | NSA                     || 190  | 214             | DDO or OS               || 191  | 214             | State Department        || 192  | 215             | State Department        || 324  | 474             | DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff || 325  | 474             | DOD                     || 327  | 475             | DDI and DOD             || 328  | 476             | DDI, DOD and NSC Staff  |
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 124]
# Page 45Hussein and the U.S. Government became increasingly concerned about the strong and strident propaganda voice of Radio Cairo. Both parties shared a desire to counter its anti-American, anti-Hussein line (which was not new), so the CIA funded the building of a Jordanian television station. A CIA owned, New York based proprietary company, named RTV, provided the technical expertise and management skills to put the station in operation.[^7]Still another example of a country where the CIA enjoys a special relationship is Nationalist China. On Taiwan, however, the CIA's link is not with President Chiang Kai-shek but with his son and heir apparent, Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo. One former CIA chief of station, Ray Cline, now the State Department's Director of Intelligence and Research, became something of a legend within the Clandestine Services because of his frequent all-night drinking bouts with the younger Chiang.Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the Nationalists first[^25] to run guerrilla attacks against mainland China and then in more recent years to use Taiwan as a base for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist pilots trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of the mainland and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation aimed at China during the Cultural Revolution.In South Vietnam, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker insisted on personally conducting all important meetings with President Thieu; sometimes Bunker was accompanied by the CIA chief of station when there was Agency business to be discussed. But there has been another CIA officer in Saigon who has known Thieu for many years and who has retained access to the Vietnamese President.According to a former assistant to Ambassador Bunker, this CIA officer has served as conduit between Thieu and the American government when a formal meeting is not desired or when Thieu wishes to float an idea.Over the years, the CIA has provided Thieu personally with millions of dollars in untraceable, "black bag" funds (laundered money) in addition to the hundreds of[^7]: .[^25]: .
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 125]
Page 257the information straight forwardly, thereby, handicapping the analysts in makinga confident judgment of the accuracy of the report's content. [^1]Some intelligence analysts, both inside and outside the CIA, receive large numbers of this type of report every day, many of which do come from actual agents. But by mixing together information supplied by audio surveillance (which is, by definition, an accurate account of what was said) with agent reports which are sometimes exaggerated or false, the Clandestine Services confuses and often misleads those people within the U.S. government whose function it is to analyse foreign events and indirectly those leaders who make decisions based on that intelligence analysis.In the mid-1960s, the Far East Division of the Clandestine Services and the experts of the Scientific and Technical Directorate combineddfooces to carry out one of the Agency's most imaginative (if ultimately unsuccessful) intelligence collection operations ever undertaken. At that time, top-level U.S. government officials were disturbed by reports that Communist China was on the verge of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system. They knew that the threat posed by Chinese ICBM's would play an important part in the decision, then under consideration, to go ahead with an American anti- ballistic missile (ABM) deployment program. As a matter of the highest priority, the CIA was told to find out what was happening at Shuangch'engtzu, the Chinese missile test site in the far western corner of Inner Mongolia.The Agency's technical specialists responded by designing a nuclear-ppwered device which could monitor certain key electronic emissions coming from the missile site, well over a thousand miles away, and then rely the information to a CIA listening post. The plan was to emplace the device on a mountain peak called the Nanda Devi, at an altitude of more than 25,000 feet, in the Indian Himalayas from where it would have an unobstructed "line-of-sight" to the secret test facility. As the device was being perfected in the CIA laboratories, the Clandestine Services took on the responsibility for the most[^1]: *
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 126]
difficult phase of the operation -- installing the machine on the mountain top.The first thing that had to be done was to gain the permission of the Indian government to implement the scheme, not a large problem in view of the CIA's close relations with the Indian intelligence service. The Indians not only agreed but, surprisingly, insisted on full participation in the project. Next, the Agency recruited a group of experienced mountain climbers to carry the device, complete with its nuclear powerpack, pp the mountain and put it into operation. A well-known American mountaineer who had previously conquered Mt. Everest, Barry Bishop, was contacted and convinced to lead the climb. Overall control of the operation, however, was placed in the hands of an experienced CIA case officer.That summer, the Agency operator along with the American and Indian climbers, and a group of Sherpa porters, were brought together at a secret CIA training base in the Rocky Mountains to practice as a team and to learn how to assemble the monitoring device once they got it to the top of Nanda Devi. Cover for the operation was carefully built by leaking information in international mountaineering circles that a joint American-Indian expedition was planning an ascent of one of the more difficult Himalayan peaks. During the winter, the technicians completed work on the sensor device, and a few months later the CIA chief of station in Delhi reported that all logistical and cover arrangements with Indian intelligence had been completed. The monitoring device was clandestinely flown to a secure staging area in northern India by a transport plane from one of the Agency's proprietary airlines. Next, the climbers were brought together and taken to the camp in the foothills of the Himalayas from where they and the Sherpas would begin their long, difficult ascent of the Nanda Devi.Things went well at first, but after the expedition passed the snow line, the Indians began to tire and became irascible, claiming that they were backpacking too much weight. The CIA case officer redistributed the load by convincing the
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 127]
would do. Progress slowed and, behind schedule, the team reached the base camp from where the final ascent to the mountain's summit would be made by a small party of climbers accompanied by a few porters. Soon after the group had started for the peak, one of the Sherpas returned to base camp to tell the CIA man, who had remained behind to handle communications with the staging area, that the Indians were causing trouble at the higher altitudes. The case officer immediately set out to reach Bishop and the summit team in an effort to restore peace among the climbers. The project was now weel off schedule, and any more delays would have endangered the entire expedition because of the onset of bad weather. With some difficulty, the Agency operator was able to get the team moving again, and it finally reached its target near the top of the Nanda Devi. Amidst howling winds and at temperatures well below zero, the climbers assembled the monitoring device and put it into operation. With spirits high, the group returned to base camp and the news of the successful installation was sadioed back to the staging. area.But within a few short months, the signals that the sensor had been sending from the Nanda Devi stopped. The CIA dispatched a plane to fly over the mountain and photograph the monitoring site. It was learned that the device had been knocked over by a snow slide. When the Indian government was informed of the development, it complained to the CIA station in Delhi that the nuclear generator might be polluting the headwaters of the sacred Ganghes River which flow out of the Himalayas. The Indian concern was about religious pollution, not ecological.The CIA reacted by planning another climbeof the mountain for the following year, both to retrieve the damaged equipment and implace a new monitoring system -- this one powered by a non-nuclear generator. The climbing team, led by Bishop, was gathered together again and this time it reached the top of the mountain with comparatively little difficulty. The new device was set up, but after an extensive search, the atomic generator from the year