Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 128]
Page 260before was not found. Again after only a few weeks, the second sensor device[^1] stopped working. This time the failure was attributed to a mechanical malfunction.At this point, the Agency gave up on mountain-top monitoring of the Communist Chinese missile program, turning to other systems and new, improved satellites for acquiring the information it was seeking. The Indians were thanked and compensated for their cooperation. And the American climbers were presented with secret medals by a grateful, but disappointed, CIA.[^2]The fertile imaginations of the S&T experts during the following years produced many more unique collection schemes aimed at solving the mysteries of China's strategic missile program. Most eventually proved to be unworkable, and at least one entailed a frighteningly high-risk potential. The silliest of them all, however, called for the creation of a small one-man airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases. In concept, an agent along with the suitcases would somehow be infiltrated into the denied area where, after performing his espionage mission, he would assemble the aircraft and fly to safety over the nearest friendly border. Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to have anything to do with this scheme, and the project died on the drawing boards.A second system was a device, long and tubular like a rocket, that could[^3] be dropped by a U-2 or another aircraft near the missile test site, its fall slowed by a parachute so that the device would penetrate only two or three feet into the ground on impact. Afterwards, the system, an aerial rising from its top, would activate itself and perform its electronic sensing tasks. Still later, the device would transmit its findings to a listening post, most likely a circling aircraft. The need for secret air penetration deep into a foreign and hostile power to deliver the monitoring device and additional similar flights to retrieve the data collected and stored by the machine raised serious questions as to the system's utility and worth. The S&T[^4][^1]: 162[^2]: 7[^3]: 163[^4]: 7
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 129]
Page 201specialists, fascinated by the technical aspects of the project, seemed, however[^164] oblivious of the dangers involved in secretly flying near a Chinese missile installation and dropping an object in an action that could quite easily appear to a startled radar operator as a lone bomber engaging in a surprise nuclear attack. Development of the Costly system was, therefore, pushed ahead. The technicians were more concerned with the fact that the test drops of the device in the southwestern U.S. desert usually resulted in the system burying itself several feet below the ground surface or so jarring the delicate instrumentation that the device failed to self-activate and function properly.[^7]A third system was a model airplane roughly the size of a large bird, such as a condor, which was powered by a miniature nuclear engine and which could be launched from outside China and guided to the missile test site well over a thousand miles away, all the while soaring in patterns that would resemble on the air defense radar scopes the flight patterns of a large eagle. Once over the target, the plane's electronic sensors and tiny television cameras would be turned on to record activities below and relay the information either to its launch site or much more likely a hovering aircraft that had penetrated Chinese airspace for this purpose. Millions of dollars were expended by the CIA in research on this "baby U-2" that called for numerous breakthroughs in the state of the technical arts. Its chief advantage was, of course, that if and when it was shot down there would be no pilot to confess it had been on an Agency-sponsored spying mission.The technical difficulties involved in the air-drop system and the model airplane device were too great and time consuming for either to be fully developed by their inventors before improvements in intelligence satellite surveillance programs were achieved, thus negating the justifying requirement for these questionably and potentially provocative collection systems before they could be put into operation. Other clandestine collection devices -- a few more sensibly contrived, most, however, of dubious value -- were also being
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 130]
restore the Shah to power. Over the years, the Shah had shown his gratitude by allowing the Agency to use Iran as a base for electronic and radar surveillance of the Soviet Union. The CIA station chief in Iran usually maintained much closer contact with the Shah than the American ambassador. (With the 1973 appointment of former CIA Director Helms to the past of American ambassador in Iran any Agency-State conflicts then presumably disappeared.)By 1968, the Agency had developed a new type of over-the-horizon radar for surveillance of the Soviet Union which it wished to install near the Soviet border in Iran, As was normally the case, CIA representatives carried out most of the negotiations with the Iranis. However, when Ambassador Armin Meyer was informed of the details of the proposed agreement, he raised some questions with the CIA station chief that blossomed into an inter-agency dispute. At this point Meyer cabled the State Department for instructions and advice.In the way of background, it should be understood that CIA communications clerks handle nearly all classified cables between American embassies overseas and Washington -- for both the CIA and the State Department. To have a separate code room for each agency in every embassy would be a wasteful procedure, so a senior CIA communications expert is regularly assigned to the administrative part of the State Department in order to oversee CIA's communicators who work under State cover. In theory, CIA code clerks are not supposed to read the messages they send for State, but any code clerk who wants to have a successful career quickly realized that his promotions depend on the CIA and that he is well advised to show the CIA station chief copies of all important State messages. The State Department long ago implicitly recognized that its most secret cables are not secure from CIA inspection by setting up special communications channels which sppposedly cannot be deciphered by the CIA.When, in 1968, Ambassador Meyer ran into troubles with the CIA station chief secure channel (Roger) Dept. Has in Teheran, Meyer switched his communications with State in Washington, to one of those "securo" channels, called "Roger." He needed to be able to discuss the
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 131]
Page 319situation in private with his superiors. But Bob and his cohorts at FI/D were one step ahead of Ambassador Meyer. They had figured out a way to intercept his cables and the replies he received from Washington. So shortly after each State message was sent, Bob would appear in the CIA executive suite with a copy of the message for the personal inspection of the Director. Written on top of each intercepted cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should be kept especially confident because State was unaware that the CIA had a copy. Despite Agency knowledge of all of Meyer's instructions and information, Meyer and State's director of Iranian Affairs in Washington refused to yield to Agency pressure for a quick settlement. Even after these two men met at CIA headquarters with the Deputy Director of CIA, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, they still insisted that the Agency's plans for the new installation were unacceptable to the U.S. government as a whole. CIA Director Helms was so aggravated by this continued resistance that he personally telephoned Secretary of State Rusk to settle the matter. Rusk promptly ended the dispute by agreeing completely to the CIA position.Bob was also involved in another series of events which started when FI/D worked out a liaison arrangement with the codebreaking service of a certain South American government. This arrangement was ostensibly for the purpose of allowing the CIA and the other country to cooperate in decoding messages sent by third countries. However, FI/D tood advantage of the liaison to intercept the secret communications of the host South American government. Such arrangements were normal procedure to Bob. The intensely dedicated law and order advocate saw nothing wrong in practicing this sort of duplicity on an allied government which cooperated in good faith.FI/D's liaison with the South American country continued for a long period of time until relations between the United States and that nation soured over unrelated issues, and as a result FI/D was forced to break off the relationship. However, FI/D did not give up hope that the previous working arrangements could be restored.
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 132]
Page 311Sometime later, Bbb suggested to an officer in the CIA's executive suite that the Agency should help the South American country obtain a channel in the international satellite communications network, Comsat. Always the secretive operator, Bob did not explain why the Agency should do this, and the other CIA man replied that CIA, afterall, was not the American foreign aid program; and wether or not this particular country received a Comsat channel did not seem to be a matter concerning CIA. Only later did the executive suite officer learn from other sources that FI/D had worked out a deal with the South American country in which liaison would be restored in return for a Comsat channel (which CIA would intercept). But Bob could not bring himself to share his scheme aven with a fellow Agency employee in the Director's office.Eventually, the South American country received the Comsat channel; the country restored liaison with FI/D; and CIA again had access to all of that country's secret messages.[^7]Bob's job with FI/D is by no means one of the dirtiest jobs in the Clandestine Services. There are operators in the paramilitary fields who probably conceive and carry out more distasteful machinations. But Bob is in a position where, on a regular basis, he misrepresents himself and even lies within the U.S. government -- not to mention the deceit he and his colleagues perpetrate on friendly foreign governments which in good faith enter into liaison agreements with FI/D.Bob X is one of these dodinary looking people who mow their lawn, love their wives, and do some very nasty things for the CIA.Fow other devoted family men who lived in suburban Washington homes similar to Bob X's are named James McCord and E Howard Hunt. Both had long, relatively successful careers with the CIA and rose to roughly the same upper-middle level of the bureaucracy as Bob X has. McCord was a CIA security officer, specializing in protecting the Agency's physical facilities. Hunt was an onerator who plaved a leading role in the Bay of Pigs and who took part[^7]: Image of the number 7 in a circle
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 133]
Agency had become involved in a chain of events which forced it to intervene militarily in a second country to protect its operation against Cuba. The President may have set the original policy, but there was no way he could have known that simply by approving an attack on Cuba, he would set in train Agency paramilitary activities against Guatamala.CIA operations can have another unforseen effect on American foreign policy. They can subject the country to blackmail if something goes wrong. For instance, after th CIA pilot was shot down and captured by Indonesia in 1958, within rive days the US government approved the sale for local currency of 37,000 tons of American rice and lifted an embargo on $1 million in small arms and other military equipment. Considering at that moment, the CIA was actively backing an armed revolution against the Sukarno regime these would have been strange actions indeed for the US government to take if it were not extremely concerned about saving the captured pilot.A somewhat similar incident occurred in Singapore in 1960 after a CIA lie detector expert was flown specially into the city to make sure that a locally recruited agent was trustworthy. When the Agency technician plugged is his polygraph machine in a hotel room, he blew out all the fuses in the building. The*This was not the only time that the CIA blew major seas.*During the mid-1960s, the Agency added to its facilities on Taiwan by building a huge electronic
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 134]
lie detector man, a CIA case officer, and the local agent were soon all under arrest. The Singapore government and the British, who were in the process of granting Singapore its independence, were both quite disturbed bythe indident. Negotiations then ensued to secure the men's release. According to Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the US government offered$3.3 mil- lion to get them out. Lee claimed that he wanted ten times as much and consequently took nothing. In any case, the two CIA officials were subsequently freed, the newly installed Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, wrote a secret letter of apology to the Singapore leader. In 1965, Lee mentioned the affair in a speech as an example of the type of activities engaged in by the CIA. The State Department then issued a routine denial furnished by the CIA--State's press office not realizing the truth of Lee's charges. Lee reacted by publicly producing Rusk's letter of apology, and State was forced to retract its original statement, although it still maintained that no ransom had ever been offered. As well as embarrassing the US government and making headlines around the world, the incident caused the State Department to revamp its internal system for making announcements about intelligence matters.Blackmail was agin the theme in the mid-1960s when the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, quietly informed the installation for surveillance of the Chinese mainland. When the device was turned on for the first time, it knocked out a large part of the island's power. In this case, the local government reacted in a much more friendly manner than did Singapore's.
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 135]
US govent that he might oust certain intelligence installations from his island. The CIA had a major interest in the matter, s. it operated a Foreign Broadcast Information Service FBIS! listening post there, and the Pentagon was also concerned about the possible loss of its large electronic surveillance facilities. The view in the intelligence community was that Makarios had to be mollified at practically all costs. Finally, government negotiators reached a secret deal with the wily old archbishop, and he received a special payment of about $10 million in return for letting the bases remain. The CIA put up half of the money, using the Director's Contingency Fund for this unforseen expense.In general, the presence of American intelligence facilities in a foreign country can have an important effect on American policy toward that country, especially in the Tgird World. Closely aligned countries, such as England, Jermany, Japan, and Australia, have usually allowed the United States to set up electronic spying bases as part of the general framework of cooperation between allies. But to the less developed countries, the presence of an American installation is both a threat and an opportunity. The threat comes from domestic opposition forces who look on the base as an example of "neo-colonialism" and use it as a weapon against those in power. The opportunity arises out of the fact that the United States will pay dearly for the right to install its eavesdropping equipment--and to keep it in place, as Archbishop Makarios discovered.
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 136]
The only American military bases in Africa are in fact primarily intelligence facilities. These are Kagnew in Ethiopia and Kenitra in Morocco.[^7] Both host governments have been severely criticized by internal forces and neighboring countries for giving the United States a foothold in their nations, but both have been handsomely rewarded in terms of receiving American military and economic assistance which had added up over the years into the hundreds of millions of dollars. While comparatively modest amounts of aid would have probably been supplied, even if there had been no bases, the large size of the programs represented, in effect, a direct payment for the intelligence facilities.Similarly, from 1956 until the end of 1969, the US Air Force operated a huge base near Peshawar in Pakistan, which was primarily an intelligence facility. For several years before Francis Gary Powers' abortive flight over the Soviet Union in 1960, CIA U-2 planes used Peshawar as a principal take-off point for reconnaissance flights over and along the edges of the Soviet Union. In addition, military intelligence set up a vast array[^7] of electronic listening devices there to monitor activities within the Soviet Union. From the early days of the Eisenhower administration, the United States had allied itself more closely with Pakistan than with India in those two countries' traditional struggle. Yet, at least some experts on the region believe that an important factor in the American "tilt" toward Pakistan, at least until the late 1960s, was the desire to hold on to the
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 137]
penetration, while clearly fortuitous, are not unique in clandestine operations.In 1964, it was learned that the American embassy in Moscow had been thoroughly bugged by the KGB. Scores of Soviet audio devices were found throughout the building. Counterespionage and security specialists determined that the equipment had been installed in 1952 when the embassy had been renovated, and that the bugs had been operational for roughly twelve years. The damage report asserted that during this entire period -- at the height of the cold war -- Soviet intelligence had probably intercepted every diplomatic cable between Washington and the embassy. This assessment was based on the discovery of election audio devices in the code room which would have allowed the Soviets to hear distinctly the sounds being made by the typewriters and cryptographic equipment. It was a reasonably easy technological feat -- well within Soviet capabilities -- to translate such sounds into their true alphabetical meaning.American suspicions about the Soviet eavesdropping were apparently aroused early in 1964 when Soviet leader Khrushchev made a remark to Ambassador Fay-Foy Kohler about Kobler's role in blocking the shipment to the Soviet Union of steel for an important pipeline. Taken in context, Khrushchev's remark indicated to Kohler that there was a leak somewhere in American security. Kohler started a massive investigation, and within a month or two, forty-odd bugs were found embedded in walls throughout the embassy. Although Kohler would later claim there was no connection between the discovery of the bugs and the investigation he ordered after his conversation with Khrushchev, the timing would seem to indicate otherwise.In any case, the official damage report concluded that for those twelve crucial years at the height of the Cold War, the Soviets almost certainly knew every diplomatic secret which was communicated between the American embassy in Moscow and Washington. The damage report noted, however, that this Soviet knowledge may well have worked to the advantage of the United States at least in one instance in 1953 when the Korean War armistice was being negotiated. At the time, U.S. bargaining position with the North Koreans was that if a particular
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 138]
13-00000SECRETDDA 77-241228 APR 1977MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. HalpernFROM:H. G. BeanActing Executive Officer/DDASUBJECT: Fairways CorporationREFERENCE: Attached memorandum from Central Cover Staff1.  With reference to paragraph 4 in the attached memorandum from Mr. Latta, to the very best of our knowledge the CIA sponsorship of the Fairways Corporation has not been officially placed in the public domain. There has been at least one newspaper article relating to Fairways and, in addition, at least one short television news item on the same subject. However, official confirmation of the allegations of a relationship which was made in these media presentations has been carefully avoided.2.  There has been official acknowledgement of the fact that CIA's Office of Training runs a proprietary to provide executive transportation. Such a statement appeared in the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. However, here again there has been no acknowledgement that such an entity was identical with or related to the Fairways Corporation.3.  The DDA concurs with the position of CCS as expressed in paragraph 2 of Mr. Latta's memorandum.Attachmentcc: CCSH. G. BeanSECRET![CLASSIFIED BY 058779]
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 139]
# SECRET21 April 1977MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDAFROM: M. L. LattaDeputy Chief, Plans and Review GroupCentral Cover StaffSUBJECT: Fairways Corporation1.  Per our telephone conversation today, attorneys for Victor Marchetti have requested release of the 168 items previously deleted by court order from the book, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*. Fairways Corporation was referred to CCS by the SA/DO/O for review in this connection.2.  Fairways Corporation is the subject of four items (107, 128, 129, 279, on pages 123, 132, 133, and 403 respectively,) in the original manuscript. The position of CCS on all four items is that they are still classified, since they describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an operational support facility located in the U.S., and are therefore exempt from declassification under Section 5(B)(2) of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652.3.  According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby may have responded to the question in a manner which could have been construed as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, CCS files contain other evidence that the matter was considered to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fairways and asked that the subject be withheld from public disclosure.
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 140]
SECRET4. Per our conversation, CCS has stated in its response to the SA/DO/O that DDA would comment further on the extent to which CIA sponsorship of Fairways may have been placed in the public domain since the court order (i.e., since February 1975).5. Please direct your comments to SA/DO/O. For your information, Mr. Halpern, Room 6 D 0120, red line x9588, is preparing an overall response on the subject for the SA/DO/O.![Signature of M. L. Latta]M./L. Latta2SECRET
[104-10438-10237.pdf — page 141]
MEMORANDUM FOR:Recordattached are DDO Devesion responses coordinating DDS4T response to John Gretany, OGC, on declassification of deletions from The Cult of Intelligence by Marks-Marchathi.On the basis of the attached a memo of DDO position was prepared and sent to Mr. Breary ands the DDO's signature.action Completed. Ms StepanekDate June 1977FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS5-75 EDITIONS