Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10439-10113.pdf — page 27]
# SECRET# CLANDESTINE SERVICESINSTRUCTION NO. 10-5CSI NO. 10-5SECURITYRevised 17 July 1958the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, or his designee, will, if the Office of Security does not recommend against the use of the individual, determine whether an Operational Approval should be granted and will notify the Office of Security of its decision. However, in the event the Office of Security recommends against the use of an individual and the Clandestine Services still desires, on a calculated risk basis, to use the individual, the Counter Intelligence Staff will inform the Office of Security of this fact. In this event, the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Security Support Division will endeavor to arrive at an agreed position and, to this end, the former will hold the granting of the Operational Approval in abeyance until five days have elapsed after the Office of Security has been advised of this intention. The Counter Intelligence Staff will notify the Office of Security whenever it has:(1) Granted an Operational Approval or a Provisional Operational Approval.(2) Cancelled an Operational Approval.e. In Operational Approval cases the Office of Security will forward investigative reports, name check results, etc., to the Counter Intelligence Staff. In extremely sensitive cases, however, particularly those in which the security or good of the Agency as a whole is involved, the Office of Security will not be obliged to furnish all investigative material. In such cases the Office of Security will inform the Counter Intelligence Staff that such material has been withheld and will, upon request, discuss the matter with the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, or other appropriate official of the Clandestine Services.f. A Provisional Operational Approval may also be requested where circumstances warrant. A search of the indices of the Agency, including those of the Office of Security, is a minimum requirement for issuance of a Provisional Operational Approval.g. Whenever interest in an individual under consideration for either an Operational Approval or a Provisional Operational Approval is terminated for any reason, the requester, in order to prevent needless processing, will notify the Counter Intelligence Staff promptly so that the latter may in turn advise the Office of Security.## 5. COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS AND PROPRIETARY APPROVALSa. All background material will be assembled by the interested divisions and will include any biographic data; information of an investigative or security significance; information-relating to character, reputation, politics, past employment, residences, and other activities; favorable and unfavorable information; PRQ Part I or its equivalent (in duplicate); and field traces. This material is forwarded directly to the Office of Security in its original form. (Traces need not be obtained from the Records Integration Division; see paragraph 5.b., below.) A brief practical statement of the scope, nature, and geographical area of use of the subject will also# SECRET
[104-10439-10113.pdf — page 28]
# SECRETCLANDESTINE SERVICESINSTRUCTION NO. 10-5CSI NO. 10-5SECURITYRevised 17 July 1958be furnished to the Office of Security. The requester should also furnish to the Office of Security any suggestions regarding the investigation to be conducted and any particular points to be emphasized in the investigation, such as, special skills, abilities, and weaknesses of the subject. The requester should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (1. e., Government or commercial) to be employed in the conduct of the investigation and whether the subject has been briefed as to the fact of a pending investigation and, if not, why this is not feasible.b. In Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval cases, the files of the Records Integration Division will be searched by representatives of the Office of Security. All files of the Records Integration Division, except those portions containing specific sensitive operational data, will be made available to the representatives of the Office of Security. In those instances where a document of interest contains sensitive operational data, designated professional personnel within the operating division will review that portion of the information and furnish therefrom to the representatives of the Office of Security all information of the nature described in paragraph 5.a., above. The Office of Security will conduct appropriate investigation in each case and will issue or deny Covert Security Approvals and Proprietary Approvals, and Provisional Covert Security Approvals and Provisional Proprietary Approvals.c. The Office of Security will retain the investigative files in Covert Security Approval cases or Proprietary Approval cases, but will:(1) Make available to the Counter Intelligence Staff any significant information in cases where Covert Security Approvals or Proprietary Approvals are granted.(2) Immediately call to the attention of the Counter Intelligence Staff any new evidence in Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval cases that reflects the subject's connection with a foreign government, the Communist Party, or any front organization of the Communist Party.d. Where the Office of Security issues or denies a Covert Security Approval or a Proprietary Approval, formal notification will be directed to the requester. In the case of disapproval one copy of the security disapproval will be forwarded to the Counter Intelligence Staff. Where a Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval is denied and the Clandestine Services still desires to use the subject on a calculated risk basis, the Office of Security will, upon request, furnish to the Counter Intelligence Staff a summary of the investigative data. Thereafter, the Counter Intelligence Staff, the requester, and the Security Support Division will attempt to reach an agreed position.e. A Covert Security Approval or a Proprietary Approval may be preceded by a Provisional Covert Security Approval or a Provisional Proprietary Approval.4SECRET
[104-10439-10113.pdf — page 29]
# SECRETCSI NO. 10-5SECURITY19 September 1963CLANDESTINE SERVICESINSTRUCTION NO. 10-5f. Unless otherwise designated by the Office of Security, investigative data in either Operational Approval or Covert Security Approval cases involving aliens may be shown to proper offices of the division and may, if deemed necessary by the division, be forwarded to the field. The dispatch or cable in such cases will be coordinated with the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Office of Security. No investigative data will be transmitted or disclosed to other than Agency staff officials without the specific prior approval of the Office of Security. The need-to-know principle will be applied strictly in such cases. No investigative data regarding United States citizens will be transmitted to the field without the specific prior approval of the Counter Intelligence Staff and the Director of Security and subsequent to such approval without coordination with the Office of Security on the dispatch or cable involved.## 6. COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS FOR LIAISON WITH UNITED STATES OFFICIALSRequests for Covert Security Approvals for Liaison with U. S. officials, whether such officials are in the United States or abroad, will be transmitted directly to the Office of Security. Each request shall be specifically indicated as a request for a Covert Security Approval for Liaison. The request shall be accompanied by all available biographic information, to include wherever possible in cases of civilian employees of United States Government agencies the name, date and place of birth, the employing agency, and the position and assignment of the person involved. In cases involving military personnel the minimum biographic information required shall consist of the name, date and place of birth, rank and serial number, and the parent service. In each case the details of the liaison with the individual must be set forth.## 7. SERVANTS OF AGENCY EMPLOYEESRequests to headquarters for appropriate checks on domestic personnel employed in the homes of Agency employees overseas shall be forwarded by the requester to the Office of Security accompanied by all available biographical information and the results of overseas investigations.## 8. EMPLOYEES OF OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIESProper clearance of staff or contract employees (including indigenous employees) of other U.S. Government agencies for operational use includes notification to and approval by the employee's parent agency in Washington. Requests for clearance will be forwarded to the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff, Attention: CI/Liaison. Clearance will not be given until the approval of the parent agency has been obtained. If, after such approval is obtained, it is decided that the employee will not be used as requested, or upon termi- nation of use, CI/ Liaison will be notified so that the employee's parent agency may be advised.## 9. EMPLOYEES AND OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN SERVICES.Requests for searches of the indices of other United States agencies or the Office of Security, or investigation of employees or officials of foreign5SECRET
[104-10439-10113.pdf — page 30]
# SECRETCLANDESTINE SERVICESINSTRUCTION NO. 10-5CSI NO. 10-5SECURITY19 September 1963intelligence services with whom Agency employees maintain liaison, shall be forwarded by the requester to the Counter Intelligence Staff for processing to the Office of Security. Such requests shall be transmitted with complete results of field traces, all available biographical information, and a statement as to the service which the subject represents.## 10. NOTIFICATION OF TERMINATION OR DISCONTINUANCE OF COVERT SECURITY APPROVALS OR PROPRIETARY APPROVALSThe Office of Security shall be promptly advised by the requester of the discontinuance of interest in or termination of employment or use of a person on whom a Covert Security Approval or Proprietary Approval has been requested or granted.## 11. SPECIAL SERVICESa. Requests for Covert Name Checks and Special Inquiries will be transmitted to the Office of Security through the Counter Intelligence Staff. Each request shall indicate the reason for the inquiry, shall specify the exact action required, and shall contain all available background and/or biographical information concerning the subject.b. In the case of Special Inquiries, the request should also indicate what would be the most plausible type of cover (i. e., general Government or commercial) to be employed during the inquiry and any other information which would provide guidance as to the conduct of the investigation.## 12. DOUBLE AGENTSThe operational decision authorizing the doubling of an agent of a foreign power will be coordinated with the Counter Intelligence Staff even though no Operational Approval or Provisional Operational Approval is required.## 13. DEFECTION AND RECRUITMENT IN PLACENo attempt to defect or recruit in place (a) a member of the Communist Party or (b) a government official of a denied area country shall be made in the United States without prior coordination with the Counter Intelligence Staff which will immediately inform the Director of Security and such other United States agencies as may be appropriate.Richard HelmsDeputy Director (Plans)5SECRET
[104-10506-10024.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992## SECRETJune 1977SUBJECT: Juan FALCON Tamar1.  This name was traced because FALCON claimed support of CIA in activities against Cuba. There is no indication in Headquarters traces that he worked for the CIA.2.  UFGA 4948 (Memo from AMOT-2 from AMDIAL-2, #AA 134, dated18 July 1962:On 17 July 1962 Cuban Station "Radio Rebelde" interviewed Juan FALCON Tamar, alleged National Coordinator of the MRR Revolutionary Recovery Movement under arrest in Cuba. FALCON stated that they engaged in performing a series of sabotages, such as burning the "Petroquimica" of Cotorro; a plan to destroy national transport in general; destruction of 3 buses of Rte #33; a plan for systematic destruction of the economy which included, among other things, the poisoning of cattle. FALCON admitted planning the assassination of Carlos Rafael RODRIGUEZ; which he attributed to CIA, and also mentioned assassination of Fidel CASTRO. FALCON said that the assassinations were being planned when he was arrested. FALSON claimed to have the support of the CIA.3.  For document, see MRR Section of Task Force material.Researcher: Martin MillerLAD/JFK Task Force
[104-10506-10024.pdf — page 1]
LALCON ZAMAR, JUANSEX M DOB ?CIT CUBAOCC ?A CUBA, HAVANA,SUBJ CLAIMS TO BE FORMER OFFICIAL MRRRE RADIO INTERVIEW OVER CUBAN RADIO 17 JUL 62.FALCON ZAMAR, JUANSEX M DOB ?CIT CUBAOCC ?A CUBAAKA ESTEBAN, JUANWORKED IN PROPAGANDA SECTION OF MRR IN AUG 60FALCON ZAMAR, JUANSEX M DOB ?CIT CUBAOCC ?A CUBALEADERS OF MRR.TRIED AND SENTENCED BEFORE.THE ORDINARY WAR COUNCIL IN MAR 63,HABANA, CUBA.FALCON ZAMAR, JUAN ESTEBANSEX M DOB ?CIT CUBAOCC ?MRR MEMBER, POLITICAL PRISONER AT LA CABANA, NOV 64.FFN 19-120-30-71/4
[104-10506-10024.pdf — page 2]
FALCON -TAR JUANSIX M DOB ?CIT CUBAOCC ?A CUBA, HAVANA, SUBJ CLAIMS TO BE FORMER OFFICIAL MRRRE RADIO INTERVIEW OVER CUBAN RADIO 17 JUL 62.0103937FALCON ZAMAR, JUANSEX M DOB ?CIT CUBAOCC ?A CUBAAKA ESTEBAN, JUANWORKED IN PROPAGANDA SECTION OF MRR IN AUG 60019-132-032UFGA-08466 E0119 APR 63P20FLD INDEX ONLY1 607 629FALCON ZAMAR, JUANSEX M DOB ?CIT CUBAOCC ?A CUBALEADERS OF MRR TRIED AND SENTENCED BEFORE.THE ORDINARY WAR COUNCIL IN MAR 63,HABANA, CUBA.019-120-018UFGA-09395 E0111 JUN 63019-132-5-96/6P2FLD INDEX ONLY1 669 932FALCON ZAMAR, JUAN ESTEBANSEX M DOB ?CIT CUBAOCC ?MRR MEMBER, POLITICAL PRISONER AT LA CABANA, NOV 64.FFN 19-120-30-71/4019-005-030UFGA-2592409 SEP.66P4FLD INDEX ONLYUFGA Q50
[104-10506-10024.pdf — page 3]
FALCON, JUANSEX M DOB ?CIT CUBAOCC ?RE PRESS CLIPPINGS, ETC. CONCERNING SUBJ'S17 JUL 62 PRESENTATION ON CUBAN TV.019-120-018UFGA-0482019 JUL 62P1FLD INDEX ONLY0515341FALCON, JUANSEX M DOB ?CUBACIT CUBAOCC ?A CUBA, HAVANA CITY.LDR OF THE MRR IN HAVANA.019-300-011UFGA-1165311 OCT 6312-132-5-96/3FLD INDEX ONLY1 886 712FALCON, JUANSEX M DOB C 39CIT CUBAOCC ?AKA ESTEBANDATA ON MBR MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACIONREVOLUCIONARIA /MRR/. MRR NATIONAL CO-ORDINATOR. MAR 62. /3/ MRR LEADER /JAN 62/REPORTEDLY VALIANT AND GENEROUS BUT GETSLOST IN SMALL DETAILS. /8/ PRESENTLYIN PRISON IN PBRUMEN JUL 62.019-120-018UFGA-04977 A.C21 AUG 6219-9-9P7FLD INDEX ONLY302179FALCON, JUANSEX M DOB ?CIT CUBAOCC ?A CUBAAKA ESTEBAN, JUANMBR MRR019-132-032UFGA-08466 E0119 APR 63FLD INDEX ONLY1 614 636
[104-10506-10024.pdf — page 4]
FALCON, JUANSEX M DOB ?CIT CUBAOCC?RE PRESS CLIPPINGS, ETC. CONCERNING SUBJ 'S17 JUL 62 PRESENTATION ON CUBAN TV.019-120-018UFGA-0482019 JUL 62P1FLD INDEX ONLY0515341FALCON, JUANSEX M DOВ?CUBACIT CUBAOCC?A CUBA, HAVANA CITY.LDR OF THE MRR IN HAVANA.019-300-011UFGA-1165311 OCT 6312-132-5-96/3FLD INDEX ONLY1 886 712FALCON, JUANSEX M DOB с 39CIT CUBAOCC ?AKA ESTEBANDATA ON MBR MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACIONREVOLUCIONARIA /MRR/. MRR NATIONAL CO-ORDINATOR. MAR 62. /3/ MRR LEADER/JAN 62/REPORTEDLY VALIANT AND GENEROUS BUT GETSLOST IN SMALL DETAILS. /8/ PRESENTLYIN PRISON IN PBRUMEN JUL 62.00019-120-018UFGA-04977 A. C21 AUG 6219-9-9P7FLD INDEX 79FALCON, JUANSEX M DOB?CIT CUBAOCC?A CUBA.AKA ESTEBAN, JUANMBR MRR019-132-932UFGA-08466 ΕΟΙ19 APR 63FLD INDEX ONLY1 614 636
[104-10506-10024.pdf — page 5]
FALCON, Juan CubaSubject, former coordinator of the MRR, was interviewed on CMQ Television by REVOLUCION director Carlos Franqui, EL MUNDO director Luis Gomez Wanguemert, and HOY assistant director Raul Valdes Vivo. A portion of this interview was monitored from Havana Radio. Text follows.(Havana, 18 July 1962, FBIS No. 110.)FALCON, JuanSubj, national treasurer of MRR in about May 1962 was apprehended with about 35 other MRR members.00-3,278,507, 23 Oct 63.FALCON, JUAN.SEX M DOB ?CIT CUBAOCC ?A CUBAAKA ESTEBAN, NOM DE GUERRECONTACT SUBJ OF 201-281397. NATIONAL COORDINATOR OF THE MRR SINCE MAY 61.201-281397UFGA-0380416 APR 62P1![text: 1 312 732]Falcon, Juan CUBASubj is a well known Corcmunist in Alpuizar, Habana Province. Is about 30 years old.(00-1-3,215,261, 26 Mar 62)
[104-10506-10024.pdf — page 6]
FALCON, JuanCubaSubject, former coordinator of the MRR, was interviewed on CMQ Television by REVOLUCION director Carlos Franqui, EL MUNDO director Luis Gomez Wanguemert, and HOY assistant director Raul Valdes Vivo. A portion of this interview was monitored from Havana Radio. Text follows.(Havana, 18 July 1962, FBIS, No. 140.)FALCON, JuanSubj, national treasurer of MRR in about May 1962 was apprehended with about 35 other MRR members.00-3,278,507, 23 Oct 63.FALCON, JUANSEX M DOB ?CIT CUBAOCC ?A CUBAAKA ESTEBAN, NOM DE GUERRECONTACT SUBJ OF 201-281397. NATIONAL COORDINATOR OF THE MRR SINCE MAY 61.201-281397UFGA-0380416 APR 62P11 312 732JuanSubj in a well known Communist in Alquizar, Habana Province. In about 30 years old.(00-1-3,215,261, 28 Mar 62)
[104-10506-10028.pdf — page 0]
1104-10506-10028 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992Declassified and Approved for Release by the Centrai intelligence Agency Date: 2003FBI w/oREVIEWED BY FBVJFK TASK FORCEON 9/27/98dakRELEASE IN FULLRELEASE IN PARTTOTAL DENIALRETIRED FILEJOB 84-2772BOX 7 FOLDER-001DESENSITIZEDper Dol 70-17
[104-10506-10028.pdf — page 1]
# TOP SECRET## DOCUMENT DESCRIPTIONSOURCE: Latin America Division/DDOCONTROL NUMBER: SC-01755-77DATE OF DOCUMENT: 29 June 1977DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED:COPY NUMBER (S): 1 and 5LOGGED BY:NUMBER OF PAGES: 148 DOCUMENT NO:NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS: 4FROM: AC/LA DivisionDATE: 29/6/77| TO OFFICE  | NAME                    | SIGNATURE                              | DATE       || ---------- | ----------------------- | -------------------------------------- | ---------- || 1 SA/C/LAD | William C. Sturbitts    | ![Signature of William C. Sturbitts]   | 6/30/77    || 2 C/LA/COG | Frederick W. LaTrash    | ![Signature of Frederick W. LaTrash]   | 6/30/77    || 3 AC/LAD   | George V. Lauder        | ![Signature of George V. Lauder]       | 30/Jun/76  || 4 ADDO     | Theodore G. Shackley    | ![Signature of Theodore G. Shackley]   |            || 5 IG       | Scott Breckinridge, Jr. | ![Signature of Scott Breckinridge, Jr] | 13/July/77 |ApprovalActionCommentConcurrencesInformationDirect ReplyPreparation of ReplyRecommendationSignatureReturnDispatchFileSEC. CL. ORIGINDATE OF DOC DATE REC'D DATE OUT SUSPENSE DATE CROSS REFERENCE OR POINT OF FILINGTOFROMSUBJ.ROUTING DATE SENTCOURIER NO. ANSWERED NO REPLYHandle via Comint Channels# CONFIDENTIAL# SECRET# TOP SECRETGROUP IExcluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
[104-10506-10028.pdf — page 2]
SC-01755-77MEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector GeneralATTENTION : Mr. Scott Breckinridge, Jr.VIA : Acting Deputy Director for OperationsFROM : George V. LauderActing Chief, Latin America DivisionSUBJECT : Latin America Division Task Force Reportof Possible Cuban Complicity in theJohn F. Kennedy Assassination1. Attached is the Latin America Division report of   findings relative to Cuban complicity in the assassination   of former President John F. Kennedy. This research which was   conducted from mid-October 1976 to June 1977 at the direction   of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, E. Henry Knoche,   reviewed all Agency operations conducted against Cuba from   1 January 1960 to 1 January 1965 (concentrating on the period   1 January 1960 to 22 November 1963). We found no definitive   proof that the Castro regime was implicated in the Kennedy   assassination.2. The report is comprised of the following sections:LAD/JFK Task Force - How Research was conductedAttachment A: Chronology of Findings (125 pages)with a Top Secret Annex (14 pages)Attachment B: List of Task Force participantsAttachment C: Outline of the complete LAD/JFKTask Force files and descriptionof their contents.
[104-10506-10028.pdf — page 3]
13-00000SECRET/SENSITIVEThis massive and thorough research effort with all back-up documents has been assigned the official classification number 019-604-001. This report is submitted in the format requested by Mr. Scott Breckinridge, Jr., Task Force Leader.![signature of George V. Lauder]George V. LauderAttachments, a/sSECRET/SENSITIVE-2-
[104-10506-10028.pdf — page 4]
# SECRET/SENSITIVEJune 1977SUBJECT: Latin America Division/JFK Task Force How Research was Conducted1. The LA Division Task Force to investigate records in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy was formally organized in mid-October 1976. Its purpose, basically, was to research all Agency operations conducted against Cuba from 1 January 1960 to 1 January 1965 (concentrating on the period up to 22 November 1963) for any evidence that such operations might have provoked the Government of Cuba to take executive action against President Kennedy. Researchers were also alert to activities seemingly directed against the U.S./CIA.2. Reference to material for this research was obtained from the LAD Registry, the Cuba Desk machine runs, and a special comprehensive file listing prepared for this purpose by ISS (Information Services Staff). It was originally thought that material pertinent to the search would number approximately 900 operational folders, plus related 201 dossiers. It was later determined, however, that a thorough review should include additional operational and subject files which brought the total to well over two thousand files. In view of the date of the material, much of it, both operational# SECRET/SENSITIVE
[104-10506-10028.pdf — page 5]
- - 2 -and subject `, has been retired to Archives at Warrenton, Virginia. The remainder is held at Headquarters in IP/Files or IP/Archives. All 201 dossiers are retained at Headquarters. This material is easily retrievable through the use of specific job numbers and file reference numbers recorded and retained in the LAD/JFK Task Force files (too numerous to cite herein.)3. Following is a breakdown of the types and numbers of files reviewed, criteria employed in the research, the findings, and organization of the material:a. Types and Number of Files Reviewed:1.  Operational 1,729    (601 with findings and    1,128 with no findings)2.  Subject 547    (186 with findings and    361 with no findings)3.  Cuba Policy Files 1014.  C/WHD Chrono Files (TFW Chronos) 37 (13 -49)5.  Official 201 dossiers 100 plus    TOTAL 2,514b. Criteria Used in the Research:As a guide the research group followed some 33 Terms of Reference provided by the Deputy IG, which were compiled on the basis of issues raised in Book V,
[104-10506-10028.pdf — page 6]
- 3 -of the Senate Select Committee Final Report on theAssassination. (Book V, and a 23 May 1967Memorandum for the Record by the Inspector Generalon Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro, were requiredreading for the researchers.) In addition to theTerms of Reference, the group remained alert to otheritems of interest brought to its attention by the IGstaff, on an ad hoc basis. A name trace was alwaysrun, and/or 201 dossier, if available, reviewed, onany individual allegedly involved in an assassinationplot against President Kennedy or Fidel Castro. Thistask was made somewhat easier as the result of amemorandum prepared by the Cuba Desk, in August 1975,based on traces of the names in the Black Book thatFidel Castro passed to George McGovern which dealtwith individuals allegedly involved in assassinationattempts against Castro.c. Findings and Organization of the Findings:Each researcher submitted a draft paper noting theSubject of the folder (s) reviewed, a brief description of theactivity, and a copy of the document (s) (findings) whichcontained information believed to be pertinent to the re-view. Also included were Job numbers, Official Filenumbers, inclusive dates of material researched, andnumber of volumes reviewed. Beginning in January 1977, atthe request of the IG Staff, the researchers also begannoting FBI and/or other government agencies knowledge of