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# 672made on behalf of Cambodia. To insure that the program was tailored to realrequirements, to insure that equipment was received by personnel trained intheir use and to insure that material provided under MAP had reasonableexpectancy of maintenance support, items such as force structure, military orga-nization, technical assistance and logistics became matters that came under thepurview of the MEDTC. To have closed our eyes to these aspects in my view,would have ignored congressional concerns regarding efficient management. Idid not consider these functions a violation of the congressional intent inbanning advisors and these functions continued during my tenure. In my beliefthe ban would have been violated had personnel been assigned to military unitsor activities on an around-the-clock basis and involved themselves in most of thematters affecting their units or activity. In prescribing the limits of our assist-ance, the views of the GAO report were useful in guiding our judgment.Question 10. During your tenure as Ambassador, did any U.S. Military Attachésserve with Khmer military units in the field?-What regulations did the U.S. Embassy have to govern the activities ofU.S. Military Attaches and the Military Equipment Delivery Team?-Were any changes in the regulations made after the incident at Kampotinvolving Major Lawrence Ondecker in March 1974?Answer. No U.S. military served with Khmer military units in the field. U.S.personnel from both the Defense Attache Office and the Office of the ChiefMilitary Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia routinely visited and reportedthe military status of Cambodian military units as part of their duties: however.U.S. personnel did not remain with units in the manner which U.S. advisors didin South Vietnam. U.S. personnel were extensively briefed upon arrival regard--ing the Congressional restrictions against advisers to the Cambodian military.The Kampot incident occurred prior to my arrival in Cambodia. Shortly aftermy arrival in Phnom Penh. I received the instructions in effect and determinedthat they were adequate. I did, however, personally impress upon my militarystaff, on several occasions, the need to abide scrupulously by these instructionsand to avoid situations which might be interpreted as infringements of theirprescribed duties.Question 11. In November 1974. the Washington Post reported and the De-fense Department acknowledged that data on potential bombing targets inCambodia was gathered by American reconnaissance flights from Thailand andpassed on to Cambodian military authorities.-When did this practice begin?-Did you know about it, and did you have a role in it?-Do you consider it a violation of the Congressional ban on Americanadvisors with Khmer Republic forces?Answer. It would be inconceivable to me that in a situation as existed inCambodia that military information which we had would be deliberately withheldor denied to a country to which we were providing enormous military andeconomie assistance. The information we had concerning enemy activities inCambodia was a by-product of our own intelligence collecting effort on com-munist forces throughout Indochina. This information was provided to Cam-bodian military authorities but the decision on what action, if any, would betaken was one which the Cambodians made for themselves. The provisions ofinformation preceded my arrival and I am not aware exactly when the practicemay have begun. I was aware of the practice although I did not play a pivotalport in the process and did not consider this procedure as violating congressionalrestrictions on American advisors.Question 12. Did CIA personnel in Cambodia ever act as advisers to KhmerRepublic forces in a fashion similar to their activities in Laos (even if on asmaller scale)?-Could you tell us what role China Airlines played in Cambodia and if itwas in any way associated with CIA activities?-What was the U.S. role in organizing and applying the Khmer "MiddleRange Reconnaissance Patrols" (MERPS)?Answer. Having served both in Laos and Cambodia, and knowing the CIAoperations in both countries, I can honestly say that the CIA did not act asadvisers to the Khmer Republic forces in a fashion similar to their activitiesin Laos. China Airlines, under contract to Air America, transported supplies, notincluding weapons and ammunition, for U.S. agencies in Cambodia. The MiddleRange Reconnaissance Patrols received U.S. military equipment as part of theKhmer Armed Forces and also received some intelligence collection training.