Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# SECRETdifficult please of the operation -- installing the machine on the mountain top.The first thing that had to be done was to gain the permission of the Indian government to implement the scheme, not a large problem in view of the CIA's close relations with the Indian intelligence service. The Indians not only agreed but, surprisingly, insisted on full participation in the project. Next, the Agency recruited a group of experienced mountain climbers to carry the device, complete with its nuclear powerpack, pp the mountain and put it into operation. A well-known American mountaineer who had previously conquered Mt. Everest, Barry Bishop, was contacted and convinced to lead the climb. Overall control of the operation, however, was placed in the hands of an experienced CIA case officer.That summer, the Agency operator along with the American and Indian climbers, and a group of Sherpa porters, were brought together at a secret CIA training base in the Rocky Mountains to practice as a team and to learn how to assemble the monitoring device once they got it to the top of Nanda Devi. Cover for the operation was carefully built by leaking information in international mountaineering circles that a joint American-Indian expedition was planning an ascent of one of the more difficult Himalayan peaks. During the winter, the technicians completed work on the sensor device, and a few months later the CIA chief of station in Delhi reported that all logistical and cover arrangements with Indian intelligence had been completed. The monitoring device was clandestinely flown to a secure staging area in northern India by a transport plane from one of the Agency's proprietary airlines. Next, the climbers were brought together and taken to the camp in the foothills of the Himalayas from where they and the Sherpas would begin their long, difficult ascent of the Nanda Devi.Things went well at first, but after the expedition passed the snow line, the Indians began to tire and became irascible, claiming that they were backpacking too much weight. The CIA case officer redistributed the load by convincing the
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would do. Progress slowed and, behind schedule, the team reached the base camp from where the final ascent to the mountain's summit would be made by a small party of climbers accompanied by a few porters. Soon after the group had started for the peak, one of the Sherpas returned to base camp to tell the CIA man, who had remained behind to handle communications with the staging area, that the Indians were causing trouble at the higher altitudes. The case officer immediately set out to reach Bishop and the summit team in an effort to restore peace among the climbers. The project was now weel off schedule, and any more delays would have endangered the entire expedition because of the onset of bad weather. With some difficulty, the Agency operator was able to get the team moving again, and it finally reached its target near the top of the Nanda Devi. Amidst howling winds and at temperatures well below zero, the climbers assembled the monitoring device and put it into operation. With spirits high, the group returned to base camp and the news of the successful installation was sadioed back to the staging area.But within a few short months, the signals that the sensor had been sending from the Nanda Devi stopped. The CIA dispatched a plane to fly over the mountain and photograph the monitoring site. It was learned that the device had been knocked over by a snow slide. When the Indian government was informed of the development, it complained to the CIA station in Delhi that the nuclear generator might be polluting the headwaters of the sacred Ganghes River which flow out of the Himalayas. The Indian concern was about religious pollution, not ecological.The CIA reacted by planning another climb of the mountain for the following year, both to retrieve the damaged equipment and implace a new monitoring system -- this one powered by a non-nuclear generator. The climbing team, led by Bishop, was gathered together again and this time it reached the top of the mountain with comparatively little difficulty. The new device was set up, but after an extensive search, the atomic generator from the year
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# SECRETbefore was not found. Again after only a few weeks, the second sensor device stopped working. This time the failure was attributed to a mechanical malfunction.At this point, the Agency gave up on mountain-top monitoring of the Communist Chinese missile program, turning to other systems and new, improved satellites for acquiring the information it was seeking. The Indians were thanked and compensated for their cooperation. The American climbers were presented with secret medals by a grateful, but disappointed, CIA.The fertile imaginations of the S&T experts during the following years produced many more unique colrction schemes aimed at solving the mysteries of China's strategic missile program. Most eventually proved to be unworkable, and at least one entailed a frighteningly high-risk potential. The silliest of them all, however, called for the creation of a small one-man airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases. In concept, an agent along with the suitcases would somehow be infiltrated into the denied area where, after performing his espionage mission, he would assemble the aircraft and fly to safety over the nearest friendly border. Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to have anything to do with this scheme, and the project died on the drawing boards.A second system was a device, long and tubular like a rocket, that could be dropped by a U-2 or another aircraft near the missile test site, its fall slowed by a parachute so that the device would penetrate only two or three feet into the ground on impact. Afterwards, the system, an aerial rising from its top, would activate itself and perform its electronic sensing tasks. Still later, the device would transmit its findings to a listening post, most likely a circling aircraft. The need for secret air penetration deep into a foreign and hostile power to deliver the monitoring device and additional similar flights to retrieve the data collected and stored by the machine raised serious questions as to the system's utility and worth. The S&T
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SECRETspecialists, fascinated by the technical aspects of the project, seemed, however[^64] oblivious of the dangers involved in secretly flying near a Chinese missile installation and dropping an object in an action that could quite easily appear to a startled radar operator as a lone bomber engaging in a surprise nuclear attack. Development of the Costly system was, therefore, pushed ahead. The technicians were more concerned with the fact that the test drops of the device in the southwestern U.S. desert usually resulted in the system burying itself several feet below the ground surface or so jarring the delicate instrumentation that the device failed to self-activate and function properly.[^7]A third system was a model airplane roughly the size of a large bird, such as a condor, which was powered by a miniature nuclear engine and which could be launched from outside China and guided to the missile test site well over a thousand miles away, all the while soaring in patterns that would resemble on the air defense radar scopes the flight patterns of a large eagle. Once over the target, the plane's electronic sensors and tiny television cameras would be turned on to record activities below and relay the information either to its launch site or much more likely a hovering aircraft that had penetrated Chinese airspace for this purpose. Millions of dollars were expended by the CIA in research on this "baby U-2" that called for numerous breakthroughs in the state of the technical arts. Its chief advantage was, of course, that if and when it was shot down there would be no pilot to confess it had been on an Agency-sponsored spying mission.The technical difficulties involved in the air-drop system and the model[^166] airplane[^167] device were too great and time consuming for either to be fully developed by their inventors before improvements in intelligence satellite surveillance programs were achieved, thus negating the justifying requirement for these questionably and potentially provocative collection systems before they could be put into operation. Other clandestine collection devices -- a few more sensibly contrived, most, however, of dubious value -- were also being[^64]: specialists, fascinated by the technical aspects of the project, seemed, however[^7]: that the device failed to self-activate and function properly.[^165]: A third system was a model airplane roughly the size of a large bird,[^166]: air-drop[^167]: model
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Agency had become involved in a chain of events which forced it to intervene militarily in a second country to protect its operation against Cuba. The President may have set the original policy, but there was no way he could have known that simply by approving an attack on Cuba, he would set in train Agency paramilitary activities against Guatamala.CIA operations can have another unforseen effect on American foreign policy they can subject the country to blackmail if something goes wrong. For instance, after th CIA pilot was shot down and captured by Indonesia in 1958, within rive days the US government approved the sale for local currency of 37,000 tons of American rice and lifted an embargo on $1 million in small arms and other military equipment. Considering at that moment, the CIA was actively backing an armed revolution against the Sukarno regime these would have been strange actions indeed for the US government to take if it were not extremely concerned about saving the captured pilot.A somewhat similar incident occurred in Singapore in 1960 after a CIA lie detector expert was flown specially into the city to make sure that a locally recruited agent was trustworthy. When the Agency technician plugged in, his polygraph machine in a hotel room, he blew out all the fuses in the building. The*This was not the only time that the CIA blew major ses overseas. During the mid-1960s, the Agency added to its facilities on Taiwan by building a huge electronic
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lie detector man, a CIA case officer, and the local agent weresoon all under arrest. The Singapore government and the British,who were in the process of granting Singapore its independency,were both quite disturbed bythe indident. Negotiations thenensued to secure the men's release. According to SingaporePrime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the US government offered $3.3 mil-lion to get them out. Lee claimed that he wanted ten times asmuch and consequently took nothing. In any case, the two CIAofficials were subsequently freed, the newly installed Secretaryof State, Dean Rusk, wrote a secret letter of apology to theSingapore leader. In 1965, Lee mentioned the affair in a speechas an example of the type of activities engaged in by the CIA.The State Department then issued a routine denial furnished bythe CIA--State's press office not realizing the truth of Lee'scharges. Lee reacted by publicly producing Rusk's letter of a-pology, and State was forced to retract its original statement,although it still maintained that no ransom had ever been offered.As well as embarrassing the US government and making headlinesaround the world, the incident caused the State Department torevamp its internal system for waking announcements about in-telligence matters.Blackmail was agin the theme in the mid-1960s when thePresident of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, quietly informed the [^296]installation for surveillance of the Chinese mainland. When thedevice was turned on for the first time, it knocked out a large [^297]part of the island's power. In this case, the local govermentreacted in a much more friendly manner than did Singapore's.
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SECRETUS government that he might oust certain intelligence installations from his island. The CIA had a major interest in the matter, so it operated a Foreign Broadcast Information Service FBIS listening post there, and the Pentagon was also concerned about the possible loss of its large electronic surveillance facilities. The view in the intelligence community was that Makarios had to be mollified at practically all costs.Finally, government negotiators reached a secret deal with the wily old archbishop, and he received a special payment of about $10 million in return for letting the bases remain. The CIA put up half of the money, using the Director's Contingency Fund for this unforseen expense.In general, the presence of American intelligence facilities in a foreign country can have an important effect on American policy toward that country, especially in the Third World. Closely aligned countries, such as England, Germany, Japan, and Australia, have usually allowed the United States to set up electronic spying bases as part of the general framework of cooperation between allies. But to the less developed countries, the presence of an American installation is both a threat and an opportunity. The threat comes from domestic opposition forces who look on the base as an example of "neo-colonialism" and use it as a weapon against those in power. The opportunity arises out of the fact that the United States will pay dearly for the right to install its eavesdropping equipment--and to keep it in place, as Archbishop Makarios discovered.SECRET
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SECRET14 June 1977MEMORANDUM FOR: See DistributionFROM : Norbert A. ShepanekO/SA/DO/0SUBJECT : DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination onCertain Deletions in the Cult of*Intelligence* by Marchetti - Marks1. In conjunction with the current review of the deletions in subject book for possible declassification, the DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies of the deletions pertinent to your component are attached (see page 3).2. Please review the deletions using the same criteria applied during the review of deletions within the exclusive purview of the DDO. If you find that any of the items have been legally placed in the public domain, please provide the details.3. The following items should be reviewed by the components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by 23 June 1977:| Item | Manuscript Page | Review Responsibility                                                           || ---- | --------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- || 25   | 47              | EA Division                                                                     || 159  | 181             | EA Division and NE Div.                                                         || 160  | 182             | " " " "                                                                         || 161  | 183             | " " " "                                                                         || 162  | 184             | " " " "                                                                         || 163  | 184             | " " " "                                                                         || 164  | 185             | " " " "                                                                         || 205  | 234             | NE Division                                                                     || 208  | 235             | LA Division                                                                     || 209  | 236             | LA Division                                                                     || 295  | 424             | EA Division                                                                     || 297  | 425             | EA Division and EUR Div.                                                        || 299  | 426             | EA Division and EUR Div.                                                        || 301  | 427             | AF Division                                                                     || 190  | 214             | SE Division (Office of Security may be appropriate action office for this item) |E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630SECRET
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SECRET4. Where more than one Division is involved, a single coordinated reply may be provided. If there are any questions, please contact the writer on x1542.(signed) Norbert A. ShepanekN. A. ShepanekAttachmentsAs Noted AboveO/SA/DO/O:NAShepanek:kaw (1542)DistributionOriginal*   C/EA/CA*   E/FP/FC*   NE/COPS*   C/AF/Plans*   C/SE/OSG*   LA/FOIA*   SA/DO/0SECRET
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# SECRETsituation. in private with his superiors. But Bob and his cohorts at FI/D were one step ahead of Ambassador Meyer. They had figured out a way to intercept his cables and the replies he received from Washington. So shortly after each State message was sent, Bob would appear in the CIA executive suite with a copy of the message for the personal inspection of the Director. Written on top of each intercepted cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should be kept especially confident because State was unaware that the CIA had a copy.Despite Agency knowledge of all of Meyer's instructions and information,Meyer and State's director of Iranian Affairs in Washington refused to yield to Agency pressure for a quick settlement. Even after these two men met at CIA headquarters with the Deputy Director of CIA, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, they still insisted that the Agency's plans for the new installation were unacceptable to the U.S. government as a whole. CIA Director Helms was so aggravated by this continued resistance that he personally telephoned Secretary of State Rusk to settle the matter. Rusk promptly ended the dispute by agreeing completely to the CIA position.Bob was also involved in another series of events which started when FI/D worked out a liaison arrangement with the codebreaking service of a certain South American government. This arrangement was ostensibly for the purpose of allowing the CIA and the other country to cooperate in decoding messages sent by third countries. However, FI/D tood advantage of the liaison to intercept the secret communications of the host South American government. Such arrangements were normal procedure to Bob. The intensely dedicated law and order advocate saw nothing wrong in practicing this sort of duplicity on an allied government which cooperated in good faith.FI/D's liaison with the South American country continued for a long period of time until relations between the United States and that nation soured over unrelated issues, and as a result FI/D was forced to break off the relationship. However, FI/D did not give up hope that the previous working arrangements could be restored.
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# SECRETSometime later, Bbb suggested to an officer in the CIA's executive suite that the Agency should help the South American country obtain a channel in the international satellite communications network, Comsat. Always the secretive operator, Bob did not explain why the Agency should do this, and the other CIA man replied that CIA, afterall, was not the American foreign aid program; and wether or not this particular country received a Comsat channel did not seem to be a matter concer. ing CIA. Only later did the executive suite officer learn from other sources that FI/D had worked out a deal with the South American country in which liaison would be restored in return for a Comsat channel (which CIA would intercept). But Bob could not bring himself to share his scheme ven with a fellow Agency employee in the Director's office.Eventually, the South American country received the Comsat channel; the country restored liaison with FI/D; and CIA again had access to all of that country's secret messages.Bob's job with FI/D is by no means one of the dirtiest jobs in the Clandestine Services. There are operators in the paramilitary fields who probably conceive and carry out more distasteful machinations. But Bob is in a position where, on a regular basis, he misrepresents himself and even lies within the U.S. government -- not to mention the deceit he and his colleagues perpetrate on friendly foreign governments which in good faith enter into liaison agreements with FI/D.Bob X is one of these dodinary looking people who mow their lawn, love their wives, and do some very nasty things for the CIA.Fow other devoted family men who lived in suburban Washington homes similar to Bob X's are named James McCord and E Howard Hunt. Both had long, relatively successful careers with the CIA and rose to roughly the same upper- middle level of the bureaucracy as Bob X has. McCord was a CIA security officer, specializing in protecting the Agency's physical facilities. Hunt was an operator who plaved a leading role in the Bay of Pigs and who took part
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13-00000S-E-C-R-E-T23 June 1977MEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/OFROM : William W. PhelpsEUR/FP/FCSUBJECT : Coordination of Deletions in Marks-MarchettiBookREFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memorandum of 14 June 1977European Division concurs that the two items involvingEUR (Item 297, page 425 and Item 299, page 426) should remainclassified.![Signature of William W. Phelps]William W. PhelpsS-E-C-R-E-TE 2 IMPDETCL BY 003283
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S-E-C-R-E-T23 June 1977MEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/OFROM : William W. PhelpsEUR/FP/FCSUBJECT : Coordination of Deletions in Marks-MarchettiBookREFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memorandum of 14 June 1977European Division concurs that the two items involving EUR (Item 297, page 425 and Item 299, page 426) should remain classified.William W. PhelpsE 2 IMPDETCL BY 003283S-E-C-R-E-T
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13-00000SECRETJUN 23 1 12 PM '7723 June 1977MEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/0ATTENTION : Mr. Norbert A. ShepanekFROM : Joyce R. HerrmannChief of Operations, NE DivisionSUBJECT : DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination onCertain Deletions in the Cult ofIntelligence by Marchetti - MarksNE Division has researched the seven DDS&T items cited in reference and to our knowledge none of the items cited have been legally placed in the public domain. Therefore, the items remain classified under Executive Order 11652 as listed below:| Item | Manuscript Page | Exemption  || ---- | --------------- | ---------- || 159  | 181             | 5B (2) (3) || 160  | 182             | 5B (2) (3) || 161  | 183             | 5B (2) (3) || 162  | 184             | 5B (2) (3) || 163  | 184             | 5B (2) (3) || 164  | 185             | 5B (2) (3) || 205  | 234             | 5B (2) (3) |![Signature of Joyce R. Herrmann]Joyce R. Herrmann![WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIDENGE SOURCES AND METALS MOND]SECRETE2 IMPDETCL BY 054979
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SECRET23 JUN 1977MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DDO forExternal OversightATTENTION : Norbert A. ShepanekFROM : Katharine C. HartActing Chief, Soviet/East European DivisionSUBJECT : Deletions in the *The Cult of Intelligence*by Marchetti - MarksREFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Subject: DDS&T Requestfor DDO Coordination on Certain Deletionsin the *Cult of Intelligence* by MarchettiMarks, dated 14 June 19771. We have reviewed the item relating to SE Division   interests referred to the DDO for coordination by the DDS&T.   This concerns an item from the Marchetti and Marks book,   *The Cult of Intelligence*. Checking against official disclosures   we have determined the item is still properly classified under   Executive Order 11652.2. Item No. 190, manuscript page 214, relating to Soviet   capabilities to make intelligible the sounds picked up by audio   devices discovered in the code room of the American Embassy in   Moscow, remains classified SECRET. This item relates to   cryptography and is exempt from the General Declassification   Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(2).![signature of Katharine C. Hart]Katharine C. HartSECRETE2 IMPDETCL BY 014652