Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[124-10168-10040.pdf — page 12]
# SECRET(12) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN BRAZIL-1959In 1959 the U. S. Ambassador in Brazil accused our Legal Attache of engagin "in uncoordinated covert intelligence activity "of a nature which I believe exceeds his terms of reference." The Ambassador further indicated that CIA was unhappy over the Legal Attache's activities and the Agency allegedly had told the Ambassador that the Legal Attache had disseminated information from a source who was a fabricator or a provocator. This situation arose as a result of the Legal Attache's operation of an informant in Brazil Some of the information that he received from the informant was of a derogatóry nature and related to a Brazilian ho was being touted as a Presidential candidate. CIA asked for the identity of the informant and we told the Agency that the person could not be identified because he did not wish that his identity be disclosed. This case is being cited because CIA may have evidence that we had been operational in Brazil Shad not coordi nated pursuant to Directives, and that the matter was further aggravated because of the alleged unreliability of the information. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, May 1, 1959, re: "William I. Friedman, Legal Attache, Rio de Janeiro," 67-429340) and (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, May 25, 1959, re: "Soviet-Satellite Activities - Brazil 134-7667-48)(13) BORDER COVERAGEIn June, 1957, our Phoenix Office presented a problem concerning the Bureau's handling of informants on the Mexican border. These informants were operating inside Mexico. The problem was predicated on situations which might arise as the result of CIA's endeavors to develop informants who already were being handled by the Bureau. It was pointed out that CIA logically could come in contact with such sources and could make approaches for recruitment. It was recommended and approved that in order to protect our coverage in the border area, a valuable, trusted, and reliable confidential source would continue to be utilized even if he were contaced by CIA. Our policy was that we would not identify our sources to the Agency.# SECRET
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SECRETHow much CIA learned about our border coverageis not known. Again, it is pointed out that formerBureau Agent George Munro may have been knowledgeable.As indicated, he later began performing services forCIA. If CIA learned that we were operating informantsin Mexico, it could use such information as additionalevidence of Bureau failure to cooperate and coordinatewith the Agency pursuant to Directives. (MemorandumRoach to Belmont, June 14, 1957, re"Communist CoverageAlong the Mexican Border, Relations with CIA,"100-356015-1238)(14) CARPORT CASEIn May, 1957, the Bureau's double Agent in thecaptioned case was advised by his Soviet contact that hewas to have a meeting in Switzerland during the periodJune 16-19 1957. A question arose as to whether CIAshould be informed concerning the double Agent'sgravelto Switzerland It was recommended and approved that wenot advise CIA.What is important here is that CIA establishedcontact with our double agent at one point. The Agencymay have had further contact without our knowledge. TheAgency may have also picked up the contact with the Sovietsin Switzerland. The case is being highlighted since wecannot exclude the possibility that the Agency has evidenceto demonstra, that we were operational in Europe and wedid not coordinate with the Agency. (Memorandum Braniganto Belmont, June 10, 1957, re; "CARPORT," 105-25453-1825)(15) CIA REQUESTS FOR LUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.On September 25, 1958, CIA inquired if W. C.Sullivan could give a lecture on the communist movementin the U. S. It was recommended that Sullivan give thelecture. Such lectures were being afforded in other partsof the Government. The Director made the notation "Wecannot make Sullivan available to this outfit." TheAgency accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusalSECRET- 11 -
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SECREto cooperate on a most important subject of interestto both agencies. (Memorandum Sullivan to Belmont,October 1, 1958, re: "Request for Lecture on Communismby.CIA,").(16) CASE OFOn July 9, 1956, an official of the StateDepartment confidentially advised the Bureau thata CIA employee in Moscow, had beeninvolved in an affair with a Soviet girl. Accordingto our source, allegedly had furnished informationto the Eviet girl. We checked with the State Departmentand CIA and we confirmed that had been involved inan affair and that he had been recalled. According toCIA and State Department, there was no indication thathad been involved in any espionage against theU. S. CIA gave consideration to requesting the Bureauto identify its source and then changed its mind.Whether CIA has documented this as an instance wherethe Bureau failed to cooperate by not volunteering thesource is a matter of conjecture but, it is a case thatshould be kept in mind. (Bufile(17) THE OPERATIONIn April, 1963, we became involved with CIA inthat Agency's efforts to collect sensitive informationrelating to French Government intentions to conductespionage against the U. S. CIA had access to a sensitivesource, who was in a position to makeavailable highly important French documents. On April 11,1963, CIA informed us that our Legal Attache in Parishadlocally contacted CIA concerning this matter. CIA Head-quarters was highly disturbed because its office in Parishad not been cut in on this operation and the Agency wantedto be informed regarding the nature and the extent of ourdissemination of CIA information to our Legal Attache. We- 12 -SECRET
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SECRETdetermined that the Legal Attache had made inquiries in Paris[^5] in response to leads which had been sent from Bureau Headquarters. This matter is being highlighted because it was a vitally important operation to CIA and the Agency had received indications that information had been leaked to French[^5] authorities. We have no evidence or reason to believe that the Legal Attache Office ever involved itself in any such leak. However, we should not, under any circumstances, discount the fact that CIA has penetrated French[^5] services and has had access to sensitive information in Paris[^5]. The French[^5] have always had an outstanding capability of tapping phones and installing microphones in Paris[^5]. Such coverage on U. S. officials, including their residences, should never be excluded. The information we had conveyed to our Legal Attache possibly may have been acquired by the French[^5] through clandestine coverage. CIA possibly could charge us with handling their sensitive information in an insecure manner by transmitting it to Paris[^5] without conferring with the Agency.In connection with alleged French[^5] espionage activity in the U. S., CIA has never been satisfied with the efforts made by the Bureau. The Agency possibly could take the position that we looked lightly at the allegations and did not pursue a matter which, in their eyes, merited a more aggressive approach. (Bufile –For some time, CIA has held to a position that the French Intelligence Service (SDECE)[^5] is penetrated by the Soviets[^5]. The Agency has pointed out that if the French[^5] are collecting sensitive information in the U. S., the product is ending up in Moscow[^5]. In January, 1964, we reviewed the status of our investigation of French[^5] intelligence activities in the U. S. The Director commented "I think this whole thing has been imaginary on the part of CIA which has been played as a sucker by I would waste no more time on it at least until all CIA restrictions are removed." CIA did impose restrictions by not permitting us to pursue certain leads because it feared that its sensitive source would be jeopardized. (Bufile –-- 13 --SECRET[^5]:
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SECRETfrom CIA. We did not obtain clearance from CIA for the inclusion of this information in our monograph.. Clearance approval was not obtained because of the urgency of the document. CIA was irritated because it considered our action a distinct violation of the third agency rule. The Agency "never made any protest.(21) BUREAU INFORMANTS IN GUATEMALA[s)In 1966, and 1967, we were operating informants in Guatemala[s) At the inception of our operational activity, CIA was not informed. In one case, we finally were able to effect the necessary arrangements with CIA whereby the Bureau would be permitted to run the informant in Guatemala[s) In the second instance, we established an agreement with CIA in October, 1967, that we could continue handling an informant in Guatemala with the understanding that the Bureau Agent, on the occasion of each visit, would confer with the local CIA office on political information collected from the informant. These two cases had all the makings of a conflict. CIA was under the definite impression that we had been running these informants before we had finally coordinated with them. It is true that the CIA Chief in Guatemala was much incensed but no issue was made at CIA Headquarters and thematter was put to rest.CIA may have developed concrete evidence that we were operating in Guatemala bearing in mind that in a place such as Guatemala City it would not be difficult for a CIA intelligence officer to spot an FBI Agent in contact with Guatemalans. Our potential vulnerability is that we were operating in Guatemala without coordinating with CIA.(22)The information emanating from the caption 1 sensitive Bureau operation has been disseminated to CIA and other agencies for several years. The sensitive source has traveled abroad numerous times and his trips- 15 -SECRET
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# SECRET(25) ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON WITHDUTCH INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICE - 1950In January, 1960, our Legal Attache, Bonn,traveled to Holland for the purpose of exploring arrange-ments for liaison with appropriate Dutch Authorities. TheU. S. Ambassador raised questions, pointing out that, overthe years, all relations with the Dutch authorities hadbeen handled through CIA. He indicated that before therewas any change in procedure, it would be necessary forCIA and FBI to come to some form of an agreement. AllenDulles subsequently expressed disappointment in that hisAgency had not been contacted by the Bureau prior toexploring the liaison arrangement. We eventually conferredwith CIA and came to an agreement satisfactory to allparties concerned.Again, CIA could cite this as an instance wherewe failed to coordinate with the Agency in line withNational Security Council Directives. (Memorandum Frohboseto Belmont, March 3, 1960, re: "Legal Attache OperationsNorway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands," 66-18973-123)In the latter part of 1959 we gave consideration toestablishing a Legal Attache in Copenhagen, Denmark. Thepurpose of the assignment was to follow Bureau leads inDenmark, Norway, Sweden, and Holland. We did not informCIA of our intentions. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont,January 14, 1960, re: "Legal Attache Operations, TheNetherlands," 66-18973-113)(26) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCEINFORMATION TO FOREIGN SERVICES - 1962By letter dated November 7, 1962, CIA raisedquestions concerning the propriety of Bureau disseminationof counterintelligence information to foreign intelligenceservices. CIA, at that time, had particular reference toinformation which our Legal Attache had transmitted to theGreek Intelligence Service concerning KGB operations. CIAtook the position that pursuant to the coordinating- 17 -SECRET
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SECRETDirective, the Bureau was obligated to coordinate with CIA prior to such dissemination. The particular data had emanated from one of our sensitive sources. We resp aded to CIA by stating that the information was the product of an internal security operation and did not relate to any operational activity abroad. CIA again surrendered. The Agency could argue that it was responsible for following Soviet matters with the Greek Intelligence Service and that we had an obligation of coordinating with the Agency. (Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan, November 9, 1962, re:(27) "THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT, "A BOOK AUTHORED BY DAVID WISE AND THOMAS ROSSIn August, 1963, we received information indicating that Wise and Ross were in the process of gathering material for a book pertaining to activities of U. S. intelligence activities. Both Rosa and Wise contacted the Bureau. It was recommended that liaison orally advise CIA that these two individuals were preparing a book concerning U. S. intelligence agencies. The Director noted "I see no reason doing so."It is not known if CIA was aware of the contact with the Bureau. Wise and Ross subsequently published the book which contained extremely derogatory information concerning CIA. (Memorandum Jones to DeLoach, re: "David Wise of the "New York Herald Tribune" and Thomas Ross of the "Chicago Sun Times")(28) COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICAIn April, 1960, CIA inquired if the Bureau would give any consideration to assisting the Agency toward developing coverage in Africa. CIA was looking for the services of any Negro informant who might be available. The Agency also inquired about placing a Negro in the Communist Party, USA, under a plan which would have as an eventual objective, the sending of the informant to
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# SECRETIn the same month, CIA inquired if the Bureau would reestablish technical surveillance coverage on who CIA felt was a key figure in the transmittal of scientific intelligence data to the Intelligence service. We declined to reinstitute the coverage. CIA considered the matter important because of its relationship to the Mideast crisis.[^6]On October 21, 1969, we told CIA that future requests from CIA for technical surveillance coverage should be transmitted by the Agency directly to the Attorney General.CIA has never made any official comment or protest but it has considered the afore-mentioned action by the Bureau as unfriendly and uncooperative. The Agency has looked to the Bureau as the logical point of contact and as the only organization having the resources and capabilities of adequately determining if such coverage is even feasible.MISCELLANEOUS ITEMSThe Liaison Agent recalls fragments of other situations or conflicts which occurred over the years and which resulted in the voicing of CIA displeasure or criticism. The Agent cannot recall the names of the cases which is necessary to acquire the required data. There was one instance early in the 1950's which involved information received from a source of unknown reliability charging Allen Dulles with having been a communist and a spy while in Europe. We disseminated the information to several agencies. Dulles exploded but never lodged a protest.The Agent also has recollection of instances when CIA alleged that its source or informant was compromised by Bureau revelation of CIA information during the course of interviews conducted by us. Technically, this would be a violation of the third agency rule and, if CIA had hard core facts, we would be vulnerable, particularly if an important informant was lost. CIA never made any official issue or protest.- 24 -SECRET[^6]: (S)
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# SECRETLIST OF BUSRAU GRIEVANCES1.  ATTACKS AGAINST BURFAU (HEXICO CITY AND FRANCE - 1951)Although Agent Papich did not begin handling Liaison with CIA until 1952, it is important to refer to highly significant differences with CIA which culminated in a serious conflict in the Fall of 1951. Our Legal Attaches in Mexico City and Paris reported that CIA representatives were attacking the Bureau, were endeavoring to piace us in an unfavorable light, were questioning our jurisdiction, and were making disparaging remarks concerning the Bureau. Some of this was summed up by characterising it as covert hostility within CIA, stemming largely from disgruntled former employees of the FBI.In October, 1951, General Walter Beddíl Smith, then Director of CIA, asked to meet with the Director and other Bureau representatives for the purpose of discussing the existing differences. General Smith denied that there was any covert hostility against the Bureau and maintained that there was a gene al feeling of respect for us. He admitted that there had been isolated instances of friction for which CIA must accept its share of responsibility.It is my recollection that the Director and other Bureau officials did meet with General Smith, at which time guidelines were set forth for maintaining future relations between the two agencies. I was not able to find a memorandum of record covering this meeting. (2.  PROSELYTING OF EUREAU PERSONNEL BY CIAThe Agent clearly recalls that carly in the 1950's We encountered difficulties with CIA because the Agency allegedly was recruiting Bureau-employed personnel. We vigorously pro- tested, and subsequently the Agency advised that it would follow a policy of not having any contact with a Bureau employee until the individual had been separated from the Bureau for a period of at least thirty days. The Agent could not locate the back- ground of this matter in the files reviewed by him. It is pos- sible that the pertinent information lies in the personnel file of some former Bureau Agent.
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# SECRET7. CASE OF POLISH SEAMEN - DEFECTORS - 1954By latter dated October 13, 1954, a very stron letter of protest was sent to General T. J. Botts of the Intergency Defector Committee at CIA. THIS lóttới hắdo reference to political asylum which was being considered for certain Polish sailors who had been seized by the Chinese Nationalist Government. General Detts disseminated a memorandum indicating that members of the Committee had agreed that in view of commitments made by the United States and Chinese officials, that failure to arrange re-entry for the Polish seamen would have an adverse effect on the over-all United States Defector Program. We emphasized to General Betts that this matter had never been officially presented before the Defector Committee. He was informed that his action was not conducive to mutual cooperation.8. CIA INTERVIEW OF ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES - DISCUSSION WITH ALLEN DULLES SEPTEMBER 27, 1955On September 27, 1955, the Liaison Agent met with Allen Dulles, at which time the CIA Director's attention was referred to a matter which had not yet developed into a serious situation but if not properly followed could lead to conflicts between the two agencios. Dulles was referred to the contacts of aliens in the United States made by CIA personnel without first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. The requirement for such clearance was clear-cut and pursuant to an established agreement. (62-80750; memorandum Roach to Belmont September 28, 1955, "Relations with CIA")9. CIA APPROACH OF A NATIONAL ACADEMY GRADUATE (1955)In November, 1955, an incident arose when CIA approached a National Academy graduate to utilize his so services in Guatemala. This approach was made while the graduate was attending National Academy classes. A protest was made to key CIA officials for not having advised us prior to establishing contact with the Academy graduate. (Re:10. In December, 1955, we received information indicating that CIA was in contact with an individual whom the Bureau was developing for utilization in a double agent operation. We learned that CIA representatives had established contact with and had given him some advice and guidance without first checking with the Bureau. We protested to CIA.# SECRET
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SECRETus that he had been advised by a CIA official that the FBI would be furnishing operational guidence to him. We had never become involved in any such arrangement, and we later determined that a CIA official had been in exror án making the above described misrepresentation. We_profested the CIA official's handling of this matter. (Re:Orx15. On July 20, 1956, we determined hat one Military Attache had been in contact with the Czec Washington, D. C. We further ascertained that was a CIA employee. We were informed by CIA on July 21, 1956, that the Agency had no information concerning reported contacts with the Czechs. We later interviewed and it was indicated that ☑ in fact, had been in contact with a CIA official concerning his meetings with the Czech Military Attaches We protested and CIA submitted a letter of apology. (Momorandum Belmont to Boardman July 21, 195616. In July, 1956, a statement was made by a State Department official to the effect that a CIA employee allegedly had advised that the subject, & Soviet agenty was being per- mitted to enter the United States so that his activities could be covered and so that the Bureau would be in a position to promote a defection. The Bureau was not in possession of any information indicating that we had sanctioned the entry of the subject for the purpose described above. The State Department official was unable to recall the name of the CIA employee involved; inquiry at CIA was negative. We were not in a position to identify the CIA employee without conducting investigation within the Agency or without the Agency coming up with the identity.17. By letter dated November 8, 1956, we strongly pro- tested to CIA because representatives of that Agency had inter-. viewed an alien in the United States without first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. It should be noted that there was a well-established agreement whereby it was incumbent upon CIA to first check with the Bureau before interviewing any alien in the United States. (Letter to CIA November 8, 1956,SECRET- 5 -NW 50953 DocId:32169180 Page 23
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SECRET18. DARRELL PATRICK HAMMER 6)(Hammer)s was a former student at Columbia University with whom we had been in contact because of his association witha (Soviet) assigned to the United Nations. (5) In December, 1950, (Hammer) made a trip to (Russia) where he was contacted by an unidentified individual and was given a letter indicating that the writer was a Colonel in the AGD and that he was interested in cooperating with the United States. When (Hammer)s returned to the United States, we permitted CIA to interview the subject because of the Agency's foreign intelligence interests. We subsequently interviewed (Hammer), at which time he informed us that he had been cautioned by CIA not to furnish pertinct information to the Bureau. CIA denied that any such statement was made. (Re: Darrell Patrick Hammer(s)19. CIA REQUEST FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING A HIGH-SPEED CAMERA-1957The San Francisco Office furnished information indicating that CIA had requested a firm in California to furnish that Agency information regarding all foreign inquiries pertaining to a high-speed camera manufactured by the company. The matter was reviewed because we wanted to be certain that CIA was not invading our jurisdiction. We did not develop evidence that CIA had overstepped its jurisdiction. The Director did make a notation, "O.K., but it does seem to me we give CIA a protty wide authority to explore such a field. H"(Memorandum Belmont to Boardman April 10, 1957, "Flow of Intelligence Information to Soviets and Satellites through So-Called Channels")20. On May 28, 1957, CIA advised that one of its representatives in the field had interviewed the captioned alien who had agreed to cooperate with the Agency after he returned to . CIA conducted this interview without first obtaining clearance from the Bureau. Such clearance was necessary pursuant to an established agreement. A vigorous protest was made to the Agency. (Re: