Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 50]
Top Secret(Annex A)December 1964 (continued)as to send someone to the United States to locate and killNOSENKO. later identified RESHETNYAK as a KGBofficer.)Comment: NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a UkrainianMinistry of Foreign Affairs officer on thestaff of the Disarmament Delegation.29 January 1965According to a sensitive source(from conversations with unrecalled KGB officers:It is common knowledge amongKGB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB andCPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as aresult of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was beingconsidered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summarystatement of his activities was prepared in the Second ChiefDirectorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary containedconsiderable "compromising information", concerning NOSENKO;if acted upon properly, it would have removed him fromconsideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summarymaterial, ran a line through all of it, and added the nota-tion: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is thatGRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO'sdeficiencies because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendshipwith NOSENKO's father.Comment: NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOVwas responsible for sending him to Geneva in1964, but after retracting his claim thatGRIBANOV had played any special role in hisassignments, he asserted that BANNIKOV approvedthe 1964 trip. NOSENKO denies that his fatherand GRIBANOV were acquainted.
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# Top Secret(Annex A)8 February 1965According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer: Prior to NOSENKO'Sdefection he was Deputy to the Chief of a department in theSecond Chief Directorate. While working in the Seventh the KGB officer(Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow, on threeseparate occasions participated in conferences between"important people" of the Second Chief Directorate and theSeventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these.Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rankof captain in the KGB. attributed this (the the KGB officerdisparity between job and rank) to the influence whichGRIBANOV exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO.Comment: the KGB officer NOSENKO the KGB officer NOSENKO has never identifiedalways claimed that he had been a lieutenantcolonel in the KGB until October 1966, when heretracted that claim and asserted that he hadbeen only a captain.According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer: GRIBANOV has been dismissed fromthe KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living ona small pension. His dismissal occurred immediately afterNOSENKO's defection. In addition, not less than 50 otherpeople were dismissed, many of whom were close friends ofGRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and SecondChief Directorates, with the majority from the Second ChiefDirectorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second ChiefDirectorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointmenthas not yet been approved by the Central Committee of theCPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (F.A.)SHCHERBAK.
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Top Secret(Annex A)8 February 1965 (continued)Comment: GRIBANOV was reported in operational contact with a senior Western diplomat until late autumn 1964 (almost a year after NOSENKO's defection), when he turned over that contact to another KGB officer.9 February 1965According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer:The amount of damage caused by NOSENKO's defection is "unpredictable". NOSENKO knew few employees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad, but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by virtue of seeing them in the dining room which is reserved for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.Early June 1965According to a sensitive source (from conversations with KGB officers:Major General BANNIKOV is currently temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having replaced GRIBANOV who was expelled from the KGB because he supported NOSENKO in his career. GRIBANOV is working in a small city outside Moscow as the chief of security at an unimportant military plant and is now a "nothing".
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# Top Secret(Annex A)15 July 1965According to a sensitive source from a KGB officerwho attended the Moscow meeting described): A meeting of all First Chief Directorate personnel at KGB Headquarters was held on 15 July 1965. The meeting was devoted to the circumstances of the expulsion of the Chief of the Second (British) Department of the First Chief Directorate, Ye. A. TARABRIN, about three and a half months earlier. I.A. BELOV and other officers also attended the meeting. According to official statements made at the meeting, after the defection of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to determine which employees knew him and the nature of their relationship. During this TARABRIN was questioned; he said he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of limited contacts within the KGB. The investigation determined, how- ever, that TARABRIN attended several parties at which NOSENKO was present. Girls invited by NOSENKO were also there.described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was afforded a hearing and was accussed of willfully concealing vital information. As a result he was expelled from the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights.Comment: NOSENKO had most recently asserted that he met GRIBANOV socially only three times during his KGB service, and on each occasion TARABRIN was present. NOSENKO said he twice provided girls for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN, once in October or November 1963 in circumstances similar to those referred to. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of "Service No. 2", the reorganized Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate.391# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy: 10
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Top Secret(Annex A)Summer 1965 According to a sensitive source:As a result of NOSENKO's defection, many KGB officers were punished, expelled from the Party, and from the KGB. These included KGB Chairman SEROV, and Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV had been expelled from the Party and from the KGB. GRIBANOV had been especially friendly with NOSENKO, had given him many privileges, and they were "buddies and night buddies".Comment: SEMICHASTNYY, not SEROV, was KGB Chairman in 1965. SEROV became head of the GRU in 1958.Winter 1965-1966Source, a self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agent (from KGB officer V.G. SVIRIN, a colleague of her husband at the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKKNR) in 1960-1962. said Source that SVIRIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations against the American Embassy in Moscow):NOSENKO's father was a Minister or General and his mother was Jewish and "always involved in some blackmarketeering". NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB. When NOSENKO defected, everyone said he was detestable. NOSENKO told the Americans about the microphones and things (sic) in the Embassy.
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Top Secret(Annex A)Winter 1965-1966 (continued)Comment:Source's allegation is the single report from any source describing NOSENKO as other than a KGB officer.March 1966According to a sensitive source, (from unidentified sources in Moscow): NOSENKO, who was not personally known to , was an important Source boss in the KGB. When NOSENKO was a young man, he was in the GRU Military Academy and was then sent to the GRU Information Department for a short time; in all, perhaps for a year. NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person while in the GRU and "not very good". He was to have been discharged from the GRU; however, his father, who was a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. It was the opinion of persons to whom talked that NOSENKO had given very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information which included all means of KGB coverage of people in Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc. Based on NOSENKO's information the American Embassy found many of the microphones.393Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
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March 1966 (continued)Top SecretComment: NOSENKO has claimed that he rejected an offer to attend the Military Diplomatic Academy (which he, like, called the GRU - Source Military Academy), by choice accepting assignment to the Far East on entry to the GRU in 1951. At the time, the Military Diplomatic Academy was a four-year course; if NOSENKO did attend the school, he could not have served as he claimed in the GRU. is Source the sole source (besides NOSENKO) who alleged NOSENKO served in the GRU.394Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
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13-00000Top Secret(Annex A)![blacked out content]![blacked out content]395Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
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Top Secret(Annex A)Mid-1966Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV, a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine *Paris Match*. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". AS KOROLEV spoke only broken French and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the matter at that time.Comment: KOROLEV is believed identical with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press International *Moscow* correspondent, Henry SHAPIRO, whom both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified as an agent of the KGB (*Second Chief Directorate*) KOROLEV has travelled previously to Brussels as a correspondent for the Soviet publication *Sputnik*, and to Japan and the United States as a correspondent for *Novosti*, the Soviet news Agency. The offer by an official Soviet press representative of information on a "Soviet secret agent", which turned out to refer to NOSENKO, is without precedent.October 1966Soviet journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with an interpreter to renew his offer to *Paris Match* editors to provide a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 59]
Top Secret(Annex A)October 1966 (continued)life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background statement KOROLEV provided *Paris Match* editors stated:"NOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police organization, defected to the USA without his family about two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.: it was granted to him. This was the most serious defeat of the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espionage and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquainted with the country's leading families and homes. NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident (the defection). Very soon the wife will apply to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is possible that this case will be given much publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA." KOROLEV displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family could be obtained and that interviews with them and with others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a *Paris Match* correspondent.Comment: A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon the wife's request.28 January 1967According to a sensitive source (from personal knowledge): Referring to his own knowledge of KGB organization, [redacted] said if NOSENKO heard his explanation, he would call [redacted] a child, since NOSENKO knew these matters better than [redacted] because he had served at KGB Headquarters longer.SourceTop Secret
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Top Secret(Annex A)February 1967According to a sensitive source (from unidentified GRU sources in Moscow):NOSENKO worked only in RU Information Department of the GRU, and only for about five or six months, after which he went to the KGB.May 1967According to a sensitive source:The KGB assumes that NOSENKO divulged the whole system of surveillance of Americans. He worked on it, knew all about it and exposed the whole system of work. He knew all the posts, the sources (few words unclear) he knew all the surveillance groups and knew surveillants by sight.According to a sensitive source: When NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Department he worked only in the Center (Headquarters) in Moscow. He worked badly there, and received bad efficiency reports, as a result of which he had arguments. Then with his father's help he went to the KGB.5 June 1967According to a sensitive source:There had been some KGB suspicions of Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was in Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts which he had not reported, and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva to investigate him. Rezident KULEBYAKIN is still suspicious of SHAKHOV.Comment: NOSENKO claims he was sent to Geneva in 1962 to investigate SHAKHOV.398Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
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# SECRET## ANNEX A - STATEMENTS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS### ABOUT NOSENKOSECRET
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# ANNEX ASTATEMENTS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS ABOUT NOSENKOPages 361 - 398 of the previous summary contain statements by Soviet officials including several sources in regard to NOSENKO. These remarks cover the period of February 1964 to June 1967.None of the quoted information with the exception of a statement a Source (a self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agen by who stated NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB, raises a question concerning the identity of NOSENKO or whether he was actually a KGB officer. It is not considered that the remark by SOURCE can be given any particular weight or that it represents any material evidence he was not a KGB officer.Of the cited information from Soviets in regard to NOSENKO, the most important, other than statements by GOLITSYN which are sensitive Source #1, sensitive Source #3 cited elsewhere, is the information from and sensitive Source #2 and probably in that order. Source #1, Source #3 and Source #2 had no personal knowledge of NOSENKO and most of their comments were based on information from third parties or obtained through conversation. There are discrepancies between what Source #1 and Source #2 have reported about NOSENKO and what NOSENKO has
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 63]
said, but under the given circumstances of how Source #1 and Source #2 acquired the information, certain discrepancies should be expected.No discrepancies would appear highly suspicious. It should be noted that Source #2, Source #3 and Source #1 and have furnished no information that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector.It is felt that information from Source #1, Source #3 and Source #2 and is a factor which should be given due consideration in the NOSENKO case, but the fact that they furnished no information indicating that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector should not be considered as absolute proofhe was not dispatched by the KGB. A decision as to whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched should be based on a full consideration of all available information. It must be realized there is a possibility NOSENKO could have been dispatched by the KGB and Source #1, Source #3 and Source #2 be completely unaware; conversely, a determination that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB does not establish the bona fides of Source #1, Source #3 or Source #2.NOSENKO, until October 1966, stated that a telegram had been received in the Geneva Residentura ordering NOSENKO to return to the USSR in connection with an expected conference on tourist matters. The telegram,
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 64]
according to NOSENKO in interviews prior to October 1966, had beer received in the Residentura the morning of the same day he met his CIA contacts and stated he had defected.In October 1966, NOSENKO responded to a casual mention of the "recall telegram" with a complete retraction of his previous state- ments on the subject. NOSENKO stated, and has subsequently maintained, that there was not a "recall telegram." He has explained that he inventeci the "recall telegram" matter because he was concerned about his personal safety in remaining "in place" for a longer time. NOSENKO has stated he thought the alleged "recall telegram" would be accepted by CIA as a logical reason for his precipitate defection.3SECRET
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13-000004
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Certain of the discrepancies noted in the previous summary between information from Source #1 and Source #2 and from NOΣΕΝΚΟ have been clarified and certain discrepancies could not be clarified. In some instances the information from Source #1 and Source #2 is adjudged to be inaccurate. The judgment is based on the hearsay nature of the reporting by Source #1 and Source #2 measured against the absence of any reason to question this part of his life as related by NOSENKO. Examples are information from Source #1 that NOSENKO had been
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 67]
affiliated with the KGB since about 1947 and information from Source #2 that NOSENKO attended the GRU Military Academy and that NOS ENKO worked in the GRU Information Department in Moscow. There are also certain discrepancies between information furnished by Source #2, Source #1 and Source #3 in and in regard to the life and career of NOSENKO prior to 1964.In regard to discrepancies previously noted between information from Source #1 as to certain KGB officers whom Source #1 understood NOSENKO had personally met and concerning whom NOSENKO had pre-viously indicated no knowledge, a satisfactory explanation has been obtained for certain of the discrepancies during current interviews with NOSENKO. In certain other instances, a completely adequate explana-tion is not available but there is just as adequate reason to believe Source #1 had obtained incorrect or incomplete information as there is to believe NOSENKO is being deceptive in his failure to recognize a name and/or photograph.As an example of previous noted discrepancies which have now been completely clarified, it was previously stated that NOSENKO had never commented on the KGB telephone book which Source #1 had re-ported NOSENKO, had in his possession.During current interviews, NOSENKO, in response to a query concerning
[104-10534-10173.pdf — page 68]
how an officer in the SCD would obtain the telephone number of anFCD officer, gave a detailed report including information that therewas at least one complete SCD telephone directory in each roomoccupied by SCD officers. In addition, NOSENKO stated he had accessto a directory which was maintained in the office of the Chief of theDepartment and which listed the KGB officers down to Section Chiefsin the various geographical Directorates throughout the USSR.It is interesting to note that there is a discrepancy between theinformation furnished by concerning the telephone directorySource #1and the description furnished by NOSENKO. This is quite logicalsince could hardly give an accurate description of a telephoneSource #1directory which he had never seen.
[104-10535-10001.pdf — page 0]
# ACTIVIDADES DE "LEE HARVEY OSWALD", EN MEXICO.El 26 de septiembre de 1963, Oswald, tomó el omnibus No. 5133 - de la Linea Continental Trailways, en Houstón y partió a las 2.35 A.M., rumbo a Laredo, Texas, pasando por Corpus Christi y Alice. Dos turistas britanicos- el Dr. John B. McFarland y su Esposa que tomaron el mismo Autobus, se fija ron en Oswald, aproximadamente a las 6 A. M. y Oswald, les comentó que iba- a Cuba, via la Ciudad de México.Oswald, cruzo la frontera entre Laredo, Texas y Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, entre la 1.30 y las 2.00 P. M. De Nuevo Laredo, Mex., viajó con desti no al Distrito Federal en el Autobus No. 516, de la Linea Flecha Roja, que par- tió a las 2. 15 P. M. el cual tenia calculada su llegada al D. F., a las 9.45 A. M. del día siguiente (27), en el curso del viaje que duró 20 horas aproximadamente Oswald, conoció a dos jóvenes de nacionalidad australiana a las que les comen tó que hacia tiempo habia visitado la Unión Soviética, y que les recomendaba - cuando arribaran a México, D. F., se hospedaran en el Hotel "Cuba", ya que él en anteriores visitas se habia hospedado en ese lugar.El Autobus, llegó a la Ciudad de México, con 15 minutos de retra so, eran las 10 A. M.. aproximadamente, posteriormente Oswald, se hospedó en la habitación No. 18, del Hotel "Comercio", ubicado en la Calle de Sahagun -- No. 9, Colonia Guerrero.Luego de haberse registrado en el mencionado Hotel Oswald, se- dedicó sin demora a la tarea de obtener el permiso para entrar a Cuba, porque, las Autoridades mexicanas no permiten a ningun Ciudadano Estadouni dense que viaje abordo de un Avión con destino a Cuba, sin la visa correspon-- diente; el pasaporte de Oswald, tenia un sello que té impedia viajar a Cuba.Ese mismo dia se entrevisto con SILVIA TIRADO DE DURAN, Ciu- dadana mexicana, empleada de la Embajada de Cuba en México y le solicitó un visado para Cuba en Transito para la Unión Soviética y fundamentó ésta solici- tud, con la presentación de su pasaporte en el cual se indicaba que habia vivi-- do en Rusia, durante tres años, presentó tambien su Cedula de trabajo de ese
[104-10535-10001.pdf — page 1]
- 2 -país, escrita en ruso, cartas en el mismo idioma y comprobantes de que estaba casado con una mujer de nacionalidad Soviética llamada MARINA O SWALD.Ademas dijo que era director de una Organización de apoyo a Cuba en la Ciudad de Nueva Orleans y miembro del Partido Comunista de los Estados Unidos. Dijo que tenia la intencion de viajar a Cuba el día 30 de septiembre de 1963, y permanecer por dos semanas o más tiempo.Oswald, antes de visitar la Embajada Cubana, se habia entrevistado con AVEL ANTONOVICH YATSKOV y con VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV, ambos funcionarios consulares de la Embajada de la URSS. en México, que prestaban servicio como Agentes de la KGB. Sin embargo Oswald no pudo lograr el visado soviético.Ese mismo dia por la tarde, Oswald, regresó a la Embajada Cubana, llevando fotografias de pasaporte, siendo recibido por la Señora DURAN, ésta llamó a la Embajada de la URSS., para preguntar si se le iba a otorgar la visa a Oswald, en la Embajada Soviética le contestaron que habria una demora para esa visa de unos 4 meses/ Oswald, al enterarse de esa situación se puso furioso, ya que al no obtener la visa Soviética, le negaban automáticamente la visa en transito para Cuba. La Señora DURAN, al notar la actitud de Oswald, llamó a EUSEBIO AZQUE Consul de la Embajada de Cuba en México, para que tratara de calmar a Oswald, pero la conversación entre ambos se tornó en agresiva. AZQUE, le dijo a Oswald, que en su opinión, gente como él perjudicaba a la Revolución Cubana y que por lo tanto no se le daría la visa que solicitaba.Durante el día 28 de ese mismo mes y año, Oswald, siguio insistiendo ante las Embajadas de la URSS. y de Cuba, para obtener los visados correspondientes, sin obtener resultados positivos.El 29 de septiembre de 1963, Oswald, asistió a una corrida de toros y que por la tarde habia visitado algunos museos y habia visto una película en algun Cine de la Ciudad de México.El lunes 30 del mismo mes, Oswald, comenzo a hacer los preparativos para regresar a los Estados Unidos, reservando un espacio en Transportes del Norte a través de la Agencia de Viajes "Transportes Chihuahuenses"