Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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13-00000ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONIDON 5-218DDO NOTICEGENERALNO. 5-2184 August 1976the essential facts. He should retain one copyfor possible future reference and one copy shouldbe forwarded to the SA/DO/0.b. It is recognized that the badge access and thelength of the stay in the building by the staffmembers may lead to unscheduled contacts. Ifsuch contacts are connected with the officialduties of the staff, then appropriate commentsshould be forwarded to SA/DO/O on the form citedabove. Officers should be careful not to allowconversations to drift to areas of interest notcovered by official interviews. If this does takeplace, however, we shall rely on the officerconcerned to inform the SA/DO/O of these develop-ments.5. SECURITYThe blue badge should be sufficient to indicate thatstaff members should be treated as visitors in thepresence of persons not connected with their officialduties. Persons introduced under alias should becareful that the alias is protected if a chancemeeting takes place in the presence of other col-leagues. In this connection, persons interviewedshould be careful not to expose associates who havenot been interviewed.William W. WellsDeputy Director for Operationscy: A/DDCI (Mu. Bolten) 18deg 763ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY
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# CONFIDENTIAL27 August 1976MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs of Divisions and StaffsFROM : Philip F. FendigSA/DO/0SUBJECT : Guidance for Interviews with HouseAppropriations Committee StaffREFERENCE : DON 5-218, 4 August 19761. You have been scheduled at the time indicated on the cover sheet of this memorandum for a briefing to be given to the five members of the Surveys and Investigations Staff team from the House Appropriations Committee. The subjects which the team would like you to cover are contained in the memorandum distributed prior to the DDO staff meeting on 25 August 1976 and discussed at that meeting. I have explained to the Surveys and Investigations team that topic e (personnel policy and practices) will be discussed at a separate briefing to be given by the Chief, Career Management Group. You should touch on the other topics suggested in the memorandum mentioned above.2. General guidelines are contained in reference notice. The following may be helpful, however, in preparing your briefing. Our general intention is to be as forthcoming as possible while drawing the line clearly at any information which would lead to the identification of a specific source, intelligence method, cooperating person or group with which the Agency has a relationship of confidence, or confidential matter involving a cooperating foreign intelligence service. The fact of liaison with foreign services can in most cases be acknowledged, but details of the relationship and the subject matter of joint or shared operations should not be disclosed.3. In the briefing contemplated on management policies and practices, most of the above sensitive areas would not appear to arise, but you may find that questions will tend to bring out some more sensitive areas and these should be deferred with an agreement of looking into the possibility of providing further information later. The staff has already had access to basic budgetary material, including funds andCONFIDENTIAL
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# CONFIDENTIALpersonnel strengths broken down by component, and a listing by cryptonyms and funding levels of all OPACTS. They have been given a briefing on the current organization of the Directorate of Operations and are aware that its staff elements will shortly be reorganized. They have a listing of all overseas stations and bases. If you have further questions on material already provided to the Committee, please check with this office.4. Most of the briefings are scheduled to take place in room 2 D 0117; if possible, a member of my staff will be present. We would appreciate, however, a short Memorandum for the Record, using the attached "Interview Form" as a general guide. Space is somewhat limited, but you should bring any supporting personnel you desire to have participate in your briefing. The Surveys and Investigations team is aware that aliases may be used by those with solid cover status; please advise this office if any persons intend to use an alias during these briefing sessions.5. We will be happy to assist in any way, including follow-up matters which may be developed in the course of these briefings.att![Philip F. Fendig's signature]Philip F. FendigCONFIDENTIALE2 IMPDETCL BY 012860
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August 18, 1976MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Philip F. FendigSA/DO/OFROM L. M. Walters, Staff MemberHouse Appropriations CommitteeSurveys and Investigations StaffRequest arrangement for comprehensive briefings with appropriate officials regarding the subjects outlined below be provided to HAC S&I Staff members George C. Baird and Leon F. Schwartz.1. Paramilitary Covert Action CadreProvide in this briefing data relating to the organization, utilization and cost data for this activity for the periods FY 74, 75, 76 and projected data for FY 77 and FY 78. Organizational data should include manning and equipment levels for the aforementioned periods.2. Reorganization of the Directorate of OperationsBriefing should include rationale behind the proposed reorganization and manpower and dollar savings to be effected by such a change. If additional expenditures in either dollars or manpower positions are involved, justification should accompany the presentation. Explain in detail how the Directorate of Operations plans to absorb the FY 77 loss of 100 manpower positions, if imposed in the pending Appropriations Bill.3. The Special Projects GroupExplain the rationale behind the transfer of Israel from the Near East Division and providing it with special status by placing it directly under DDO. Additional manpower and dollar costs accompanying this change should be addressed.4. Coordination Within the Intelligence CommunityBriefing should show the identity and purposes of the various task groups established (both within CIA and community-
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wide) which have been specifically established to deal with the collection vs. analysis problem. Impacts and changes brought about or anticipated within DO as a result of these groups' actions should be covered.5. Management Policies and Practices of Each DO Staff and Division, (a separate briefing by each) including but not limited to:a. Overview of role of staff or divisionb. Decision-making processes and how coordinated in DO, CIA and intelligence communityc. Organizational structured. Program development, and execution from initiation to budgeting to implementation, including development of annual plans, their flexibility, and degree of autonomy of case officers, chiefs of stations, desk officers and division or staff directors.e. Personnel policies and practices including recruitment, training promotion, position classification, establishment of station complements and rotational policies.f. Management and accounting controls to assure compliance with laws, executive orders, policies and regulations and assurance that funds and other assets are properly used, expended and receipted for.While the order of arranging the presentations is not critical, it is suggested that, if possible, item (1.) be presented earliest and that item (5.) be instituted the week of August 30. Please coordinate with either Mr. Baird or myself for prompt scheduling of these sessions. Also, it would be appreciated if a copy of charts or other documentary material used in the presentations could be provided to the attendees during each briefing session.
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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICA TOP AND BOTTOMUNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET# OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP| TO  | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE | INITIALS || --- | ---------------- | ---- | -------- || 1   | MR FENO16        |      |          || 2   |                  |      |          || 3   |                  |      |          || 4   |                  |      |          || 5   |                  |      |          || 6   |                  |      |          || ACTION      | DIRECT REPLY | PREPARE REPLY  || ----------- | ------------ | -------------- || APPROVAL    | DISPATCH     | RECOMMENDATION || COMMENT     | FILE         | RETURN         || CONCURRENCE | INFORMATION  | SIGNATURE      |Remarks: *Copies: To Shepard, Soveen*For your info I have attached pages 6 and 77 DD/0 76-3259 7 26 may 1976, covering the A/DOO's position with Mr. SNODGRASS on MBO.Also attached is a page from the DLI's statement to The Committee on the same subject (no date).FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER| FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | DATE       || --------------------------------- | ---------- || WALKER                            | 10 Sept 76 || UNCLASSIFIED | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET (40) || ------------ | ------------ | ----------- |FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions1-67
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SECRET-6-in attempting to be both forthcoming and helpful to him and the Committee in understanding the DDO's problems. At the same time Mr. Snodgrass pointed out that while he had no quarrel with Mr. Shackley, he continued to be irritated with the totality of the Agency's attitude toward providing him with data. Mr. Snodgrass then launched into a long litany on how the Agency had not been responsive in terms of his needs as he perceived them in the time frame February to May 1976. With that as a backdrop Mr. Snodgrass then launched into his inquiry as to why the Agency was not willing to give him full access to Management by Objective docu- ments. The dialogue which followed on this topic had a natural ebb and flow to it, but the key point that emerged from this is that Mr. Snodgrass continues to feel that unless he can see the Management by Objective documents he will not be able to have a firm understanding of DDO man- power allocation procedures. Secondly, Mr. Snodgrass claims that CIA's position that it will show Management by Objective documents to members of the Committee and not the Staff is an obstructionist tactic. His point being that the members of the Committee do not have the time to look at such documents and they thus depend on the Committee Staff for this type of substantive review. According to Mr. Snodgrass this means that if the Agency will not provide data to the Staff, it is in fact denying information to the Committee members. Attempts were made by Mr. Shackley to show how men of good will on both sides of this question could have an honest difference of opinion on the issue. In this framework Mr. Shackley re- iterated the DDO position that access to Management by Objective docu- ments by Mr. Snodgrass would impact adversely on the whole question of sources and methods as well as the integrity of the reporting system. As a followup to this position an effort was made to find out exactly what it was about the DDO manpower allocation system that Mr. Snodgrass did not understand and which he thought he might find out about from an examination of the Management by Objective documents. It was hoped that through this line of inquiry an alternate approach could be discovered which would enable us to deal with Mr. Snodgrass' problems. Our probes in this direction were unsuccessful in clarifying the issue. One can only conclude that Mr. Snodgrass is committed to finding some sort of a formula or equation which will enable him to test our manpower allocation system. We have repeatedly outlined to him the variable factors that goSECRET
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SECRET-7-into making judgments on operational deployment of manpower such as what targets are in a country, what are the great power interests in a particular country, what is the operational environment in the country i. e., permissive or not, what are the cover possibilities, what are our liaison equities, and what are our needs for regional support from a particular country. These explanations are taken aboard by Mr. Snodgrass, but he is looking for something else which has less variables in it when, in fact, there is no magic formula for determining how one gets people to commit treason. This portion of the meeting ultimately ended on a friendly note but left unresolved the question of what was it that Mr. Snodgrass really wanted on the issue of manpower allocations and what could CIA tell him that we haven't already told him. (ACTION REQUIRED: Mr. Snodgrass is currently preoccupied with drafting his report on the House Appropria- tions Committee Mark-up of the DDO FY 77 budget. Once this task is completed Mr. Chin, OLC, will return to see Mr. Snodgrass and will try to obtain an elaboration of what specifically are the manpower issues that trouble Mr. Snodgrass. In this context Mr. Chin has been asked to try to determine if a review, position-by-position, of two or three typical Stations within the DDO might give Mr. Snodgrass the insight into manpower allo- cations that he is currently seeking.)9. Comment. In net assessment terms one would have to conclude that the 25 May meeting achieved the optimum that could be expected from this kind of an encounter. On the one hand the attached briefing book which was examined by Mr. Snodgrass was accepted by the latter as a first rate product. For this the A gency gets high marks. On the other hand, the Management by Objective system, because he can't see the documents, leaves Mr. Snodgrass frustrated and irritated. This evokes acrimonious complaints from Mr. Snodgrass with the end result being that the burden for seeking a solution to a problem created by Mr. Snodgrass is placed on the Agency. In short, we have ended up where we expected to be. Put another way, there appears to be no prospect for establishing the type of dialogue with Mr. Snodgrass which satisfies the interests of both parties. We are inevitably doomed to being in an adversary relationship with him, although it is incumbent on us to continue to minimize, to the extent thatSECRET
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# MBOMr. Mahon. Would you please provide the Committee staff with some samples of these performance reports, sanitized as you think appropriate?Mr. Bush. I would be willing to bring some down and discuss them with the Committee off the record, Mr. Chairman. But I am reluctant to do that, and I am even more reluctant to provide the documents themselves or to have their contents described to the Committee by anyone who is not intimately familiar with espionage, counterintelligence and covert action operations and with the entire management system used by the Operations Directorate.There are a number of reasons for my position. One serious concern revolves around the effects on our internal processes of the sort of inquiry you propose. One of the primary reasons that our internal management system is effective is that participation is strictly limited to those immediately concerned. Given that we are all human beings, there is no escaping the fact that knowledge that the reports in question are being read, or may at some future time be read, by outsiders will lead to their being written with a view to their possible impact on an extended readership. There will be a tendency for the managers in the field to slant their discussions of problems and to exaggerate accomplishments. Inevitably, the net effect will be to reduce the usefulness of the system.Another difficulty involves security. To be useful for judging performance, the reports must be very detailed. Thus they discuss recruitments in terms of numbers, the specific access of agents to information, recruitment techniques, and so forth. By the time all this sensitive material on sources and methods is removed, any samples are going to consist primarily of disconnected bits and pieces or of unenlightening generalizations.And I have a third problem with this request. The reports themselves are but one part of a very complex and thorough process we use for internal management. It takes a detailed familiarity with the process to appreciate its effectiveness. Thus, I feel strongly that someone from the Agency who has that intimate knowledge should be present if and when you want to consider the reports.
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRETDOI 50-10DDO INSTRUCTIONNO. 50-10OPERATIONS-GENERAL4 September 1973## 3. DEFINITIONSWithin the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply. Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operational use" employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a deter-mination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable as-surance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the Deputy Director for Operations for decision.### a. Operational UseOperational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or train-ing of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Direc-torate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that in-dividual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an ele-ment of the Operations Directorate.### b. DDO ElementAny person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mech-anisms.### c. Operational ContactAny association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO operations.## 4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USEa. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction:(1) Operational Use is Prohibited (see paragraph 5):(a) Members and trainees of ACTION;(b) Fulbright grantees;2SECRET
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# SECRETDOI 50-10DDO INSTRUCTIONOPERATIONS-GENERALΝΟ. 50-104 September 1973(c) Officials or employees of the International Association for CulturalFreedom;(d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller andCarnegie Foundations;(e) Employees of US private detective, investigative agencies.## (2) Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence (seeparagraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF .SA/ADDO,(a) Employees of other U.S. Government agencies;(b); DDO agents or assets in the United States;(c), Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered byjother U.S. agencies;(d). Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada,the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories)!¡ and New Zealand;i.(e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands;(f) (Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries.## (3) Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO (see para-graph171)(a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public infor-Imation media;(b) [CARE employees;(c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities;'(d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries☐ in the United States;(e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned| in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees whereverlassigned;(f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies; 1(g) (Officials of the Vatican State;(h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees;(i) [Members of educational or private voluntary organizations;(j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute;(k) (Volunteers to America.l## (4) Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division (seeparagraph 8):(a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas;(b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations forganizations not assigned in the U.S.;(c) Members of the academic community.b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type ofrestriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicablein his particular case.3SECRET
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13-00000SECRETDOI 50-10DDO INSTRUCTIONNO. 50-10OPERATIONS-GENERAL4 September 1973.5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITEDa. *Members and Trainees of ACTION*(1) It is Agency policy that members and trainees of *ACTION* will not be used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term "members of ACTION" will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated with *ACTION* except trainees.)(2) It is Agency policy that former members of *ACTION* may be employed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction only in accordance with the following:(a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of *ACTION* may be employed or used operationally by any element of the Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his separation from *ACTION*.(b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of *ACTION*, but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such organization, if a period of at least twenty-four months has elapsed since his separation from *ACTION*.(c) The employment or use of a former member of *ACTION* under the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations.(3) Former trainees whose *ACTION* service included duty or training overseas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former members of *ACTION* (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees who did not serve at any time as members of *ACTION* and whose *ACTION* service did not include duty or training overseas may be employed or used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained.(4) A former member or trainee of *ACTION* whose employment or use is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which he had been assigned while with *ACTION*(5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division from private corporations and other organizations employing former *ACTION* personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may originate with former *ACTION* personnel. However, any direct briefing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of *ACTION* is subject to the following:(a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations must be obtained.4SECRET