Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10337-10014.pdf — page 21]
SECRETSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experiencelearned to live with (See Appendix A for the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) "Standards For Review" and "Key Distinctions Between Those Under FOIA, Executive Order 12356 and the JFK Act," with examples).3. (U) Finally, a Presidentially-appointed assassination review board (the ARRB) had the final say both on postponement and on relevance, subject only to a successful DCI appeal to the President. Although a few appeals were considered, particularly in the early period, none was made.4. (U) The JFK Act called for each agency to review and transfer its relevant material to NARA by 22 August 1993. Thus, a significant set of materials was transferred from CIA to NARA in 1993, reflecting CIA's then-current judgment on the redactions permitted. Subsequent Board reviews and ARRB staff inquiries resulted in the addition of material to that original set of documents, as well as adjustments to the original set, to reflect Board actions generally to release more information. Although many documents have been adjusted or added to the collection, requiring substantive HRG and DO reviews as well as administrative actions, the net number of pages in CIA'S JFK Collection at NARA is about 260,000.SIZE AND NATURE OF THE COLLECTION5. (U) The material requiring line-by-line review included 17 boxes called the Oswald 201 File; 64 boxes called the "Segregated Collection" File, containing those documents made available to the House SubCommittee on Assassinations (HSCA) during its 1978 investigation; 23 boxes of HSCA referrals - staff notes in longhand and type, draft sections of the HSCA final report, correspondence on HSCA letterhead, trip reports - anything referred to us by the National Archives (NARA) for review of possible Agency equities; 19 boxes called "The Holmes Collection" - a reference collection used by the then-DO focal point for FOIA and other JFK queries, Russell Holmes; Presidential libraries material, Church Committee and Rockefeller Commission testimonies, National Security Council papers, PFIAB Minutes and other Community papers made available through the ARRB staff; and 13 boxes called "Miscellaneous," including follow-on questions from the ARRB, a previously overlooked Latin American Division working file, DCI calendars, some DI/OCI
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# SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience"Dailies." Box 64 of the "Segregated Collection" consisted of 72 reels of microfilm of complete files from which the material reviewed by the HSCA staffers was drawn: CIA staff personnel and security files; a duplicate Oswald 201 file; 26 reels of 201 files on Cubans, Russians, and Americans linked with Oswald, the JFK assassination, and the several investigations; DO project history files, and so on.6. (AIUO) Included were printed text, almost illegible Thermofax, photographs, computer listings, typed 3X5 cards, buckslips, routing sheets, handwritten scraps every imaginable form of documentation, with a tremendous amount of duplication, in one instance, 54 copies of a Mexico City cable. Every one of these pieces of paper had to be handled according to NARA instructions, as a unique document for inclusion in the NARA collection for public access and with an Identification Aid for research assistance and retrieval. Among other things, the collection reflected little attention to procedures propounded by NARA itself for Records Management, including destruction of duplicate copies.7. (AIUO) The pressure to meet an initial Congressionally-mandated release date of 22 August, 1993 with the NARA-required Research Identification Forms, resulted in a crash effort at indexing done, mainly, by individuals on loan from the directorates on an overtime basis and generally unfamiliar with the collection and the subject matter. Thus, a major factor in inconsistent redacting of multiple copies of the same document in different boxes was a function of the quality of the indexing and the effort of the reviewers to cope with constantly changing guidelines. Inadvertent release was inevitable.## THE REVIEW PROCESS8. (AIUO) The majority of the reviewers were independent contractors with many years of experience, in some cases senior management experience in at least two directorates. Two HRG reviewers had been Information Review Officers themselves as supergrades, one in the DO, the other in the DA. After the HRG review with suggestions for release in full or with redactions, the documents went to a DO review team. The DO agreement or disagreement was reflected on each document, and the package was returned for a senior-level HRP review prior to forwarding to the ARRB.
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SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience9. (AIUO) As complicated and frustrating as the process was, it wouldn't have worked at all without the on-site presence of the DO team with their link to DO/IMS and the area divisions in Headquarters. Not surprisingly, the DO Headquarters tended to use the familiar FOIA standards, under which much more information could be withheld than was defendable under the JFK law. A major part of the JFK story was Oswald's trip to Mexico City; it took several months for the DO to agree to allow acknowledgment of the existence of a station in Mexico City and many more months to release the name, pseudo, and tenure of the chief of station - information, except for the pseudo, long since in the public domain.10. (AIUO) Another long time debate concerned acknowledgment of teltap and photo surveillance by the Mexico City Station on the Soviet and Cuban embassies and consulates both discussed in open literature but disguised as unidentified sensitive source materials in the Warren Commission report, along with a cropped photo and transcripts of telephone conversations that came to the station from somewhere. One issue, for a long time, was acknowledging that the teltaps were station activities. The ARRB insisted on nearly total release of Mexico City Station traffic, history, personnel, and project approvals because Oswald's trip to Mexico City remained one of the most controversial conspiracy theory aspects of the JFK story. Proof of Oswald's presence there, of his contact with the Soviet and Cuban embassies and consulates, and the reasons therefore, of the station's unfamiliarity with him prior to the assassination became evident through release of the detailed information on the teltap and photo operations.11. (AIUO) After the ARRB staff received the Agency reviewed material, discussion of the validity of the deletions (the "postponements") occurred. In the early stages there was a tendency for the Agency Information Review Officers in the directorates to deny rather than release, to test using FOIA standards until challenged, then back off. In a couple of instances, assertions were made that the information that the ARRB said should be released was so sensitive that an appeal to the President would be made - but it wasn't. The net result of the deny-until-pushed approach was an absence of credibility, leading the ARRB to include the following statement in its Final Report to the President on 30 September 1998:
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SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience"A small number of CIA staff officers, almost exclusively in the Directorate of Operations, unnecessarily impeded the process and damaged the Agency's interests by resisting compromise with all-or-nothing positions."12. (AIUO) As time passed and both Agency and ARRB staffers became better educated in attempting the balance between the public interest and the legitimate need for secrecy, credibility improved, the ARRB members delegated the negotiation process to the staff. Previously, every postponed word, phrase, or paragraph had to the approved by the Board. Toward the end, only remaining disagreements were passed by the staff to the Board.## THE ISSUE OF RELEVANCE13. (AIUO) The ARRB, under the law, determined relevance of file material - the Agency could not do so although it could and did, eventually quite successfully, negotiate. Because of the impact of the Oliver Stone movie "JFK," reflecting a 70-80% public view that the Warren Commission conclusion that Oswald acted on his own was wrong, the ARRB pursued all the major conspiracy theories. Thus, Agency files on the USSR's handling of American defectors, entry and departure controls on foreigners, alien employment and marriage with Soviet citizens, and, particularly, KGB interest in Oswald, and Nosenko's claim to have reviewed Oswald's KGB file in Moscow were declared relevant as was the whole Nosenko bona fides issue. Agency contact with the Mafia to arrange for Castro's assassination, not known to the Warren Commission, were obviously relevant and, by extension, assassination as an Agency activity was considered relevant hence, all such testimony before the Church Committee had to be reviewed. Of particular interest was the plot against Lumumba because of the involvement of the former Chief of the Technical Services Division, which division was also involved in the Castro assassination planning.14. (U) The major conspiracy theory of interest to the Board concerned Cubans: either alleged Castro involvement because of his awareness of plotting against himself or Cuban exiles, furious with JFK for the Bay of Pigs failure. Thus, all files on Agency support to the many Cuban
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# SECRETSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experienceexile groups and CIA involvement in Project MONGOOSE were declared relevant. Hundreds of JMWAVE cables, Mexico City Station documents, and Cuban names, and many with their crypts, were released.15. (U) Those records that the Board concluded "truly had no apparent relevance to the assassination" were designated "not believed relevant" (NBR). Cooperative negotiation resulted in about 50,000 pages being declared NBR.## INADVERTENT RELEASES/FOREIGN LIAISON CONCERNS16. (AIUO) As noted above, inadvertent releases were inevitable. The contributing factors included: guidelines that changed almost continuously as negotiations with the ARRB reduced the claims of current sensitivity; inaccurate and incomplete records on the cover status of retirees; an initial tendency, consistent with FOIA practices, to deny crypts but to release true names- the crypt implying an Agency relationship- if the text did not imply same. (Later: duplicate copies plus mosaic pattern analysis made linkage of some crypts and true name quite easy.); and a surge of inexperienced reviewers loaned during the closing days to meet the agreed NARA deadline for the remaining files.17. (S) The inadvertent releases of former employees names resulted in a few individual complaints but no known foreign government or liaison service complaints. Four foreign governments opposed release of their information. when queried, but no inadvertent releases were involved. (See Appendix C.) The worst slip appears to have been the name of a former NOC, living abroad, who, upon being informed, demanded and received compensation for the violation of his confidential relationship with CIA and the FBI. The other outraged former employee, also living abroad, threatened to contact the President if it became known in his adopted country that he had been CIA. His true name, on a great many documents, is the only redaction; he was of considerable interest to the Board as a key player in the HSCA investigation because he was the Mexico Branch chief and was initially appointed by the DDO to be the focal point for JFK assassination information and briefings. The HSCA allowed him to testify in alias, and the ARRB allowed the substitution of his alias wherever his true name appeared; however, the Board ruled that his true name should be6SECRET
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# SECRETSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experiencereleased in May 2001 or on his death if before that date. Given the volume of the documents in which his name appeared, there were inadvertent releases of his true name.## IMPACT OF THE JFK RELEASES ON FUTURE DECLASSIFICATION PROGRAMS18. (AIUO) Whether the JFK Act is, or should be considered, precedent-establishing has been argued since its passage. It addresses a unique, highly emotional event, of obvious interest to the public; and it should serve as a catalyst for future declassification policy discussion. But it should not be considered to have set a legal precedent. What should result is what the ARRB directed in the case of exact duplicate documents: that they all be handled consistently, with the same, or no, redactions. Other documents concerning the same or a similar event, not exact duplicates but relevant to the issue, and not subject to the tight legal demands of the JFK legislation, could be reviewed in accordance with the exemptions allowed under the FOIA or the Executive Order. However, the basic factor in deciding on release or denial should not be the avoidance of embarrassment through inconsistent or inadvertent release. It should be the current need for protection of sources and methods.19. (U) The JFK experience did demonstrate that a traditional generic sources and methods denial is not always necessary, defendable, or smart. Instead of being negatively reactive, it may well be tactically smarter to be proactive to better ensure protection of important secrets. More on that below.20. (AIUO) LESSONS LEARNED:*   Don't cut costs on indexing. Use experienced indexers. Aim for indexing all materials before review and processing begins. A key focus should be identification of duplicate documents.*   Use retirees with broad Agency experience under staff supervision. Because the most common release problems usually involve DO material, seriously consider an on site-DO team.7# SECRET
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# SECRETSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience*   Develop and keep updating written guidelines, including those for coordinating third-agency documents*   Establish early what is already in the public domain. Take a fresh look at the "official release" philosophy, particularly as concerns former DCIs, Cabinet Officers, Presidents, and Congressional investigations.*   Develop better information on the cover status of retired employees.*   Avoid confrontation on marginal or non-relevant information. Avoid stonewalling on relevant information.*   Because the Information Review Officers are the key implementers of information release policy, ensure that the guidance given them by their Deputy Directors has Agency corporate equity.21. (AIUO) COMMENTS: Information Management, Information Warfare, Information Handling, Information Declassification: at least three of these terms have elicited groans from senior Agency management and a preference to have someone else, some staffer, deal with the subject, keeping the boss out of trouble and minimally informed. But inflexible insistence on continued classification of dated information, particularly that known to the public, ignorance of what has already been declassified and released, and counterproductive stonewalling - these factors have caused trouble and will cause more trouble as the "Information Age" matures.22. (C) In 1976, then DDI Ed Proctor wrote to the DCI, citing "the need to rationalize the classification process." A 1977 memorandum for the Agency's Executive Committee by two of the current HRG contract reviewers urged the development of an O/DDCI level (the Executive Director position having been abolished) policy review of flap potential in information release and a computer-supported index to released documents. At various times in the 1970s, consideration was given to establishing a fifth Directorate of Information Handling. After a good bit of internal agonizing, DCI Gates in April 1992 signed off on HR 70-14 to make "significant historical information available without8# SECRET
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SECRETSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experiencedamage to national security." Subsequently, a centralmanagement focal point was established in the Office ofInformation Management and a system that addresses part ofthe indexing goal and, with its mandatory declassification"metrics" (millions of pages of released documents),modulates some of the outside criticism alleging that CIAis reneging on "openness."23. (AIUO) What is missing is a Year 2000 look at    secrecy. When the FOIA law was passed and the Agency was    traumatized by receipt of 150 public requests a day for    information, we were able to make case law in the courts and    protect sensitive sources and methods by non-arbitrary and    non-capricious use of allowed exemptions. It is obvious    today that a more forward-thinking strategy than the “no    comment" of the 1950s and the "answer the question only as    asked" of the 1970s is needed the JFK experience    demonstrated both the counterproductive result of an all-or-    nothing defense and that credibility and compromise can be    gained without current sensitivity loss. And the fact that    Chairman Porter Goss has joined with Senator Moynihan in    proposing the existence of an outside group on the model of    the JFK Assassination Review Board as arbiter in the    government declassification arena is a very clear signal.24. (AIUO) In my view (and as was the case, briefly,    in the past), this extremely complicated, frustrating, and    ubiquitous topic requires the personal attention of the    Executive Director with "corporate" Agency focused guidance    to the Deputies for their personal attention and policy.    guidance to the IROs. And because the IROS, as the    implementors of their Deputies' policies, determine the    credibility and resource impact levels, they should be    supergrades and experienced in at least two directorates.25. (AIUO) The eventual development of a credible    association with the JFK ARRB was a function of: (1) the    patience and diplomacy of the HRP/JFK Project Officer,    Barry Harrelson and (2) the presence, on site, of the DO    team, without whom this exercise could not have been    completed. Ironically, as is so often the case when an    individual or group is between a rock and a hard place,    as the DO team was between the DO desk officers, the DO/IRO,    and the HRP reviewers, there were allegations of their having9SECRET
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# SECRETSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experiencebeen co-opted. Both the DO team and HRG were seen, at times, as "the enemy." That kind of in-house idiocy needed instant quashing.26. (AIUO) CONCLUSIONS: The JFK Project cost far too much, took far too long, produced no information to change the conclusion that Oswald acted alone. But it did make available to the public previously withheld operational material to negate what DCI Gates had called the most heinous of the conspiracy theories: that CIA was involved in the assassination of the President of the United States. The resource impact was a function of: the unique requirements of the law; the crash nature of the initial release; the National Archives decision that every duplicate must be reviewed and indexed as a unique document; less than satisfactory indexing, contributing to inadvertent releases and time wasted in checking for consistency in the handling of duplicates; problems in determining the cover status of retired employees; and stonewalling.27. (AIUO) Although there was inconsistency and inadvertent release and some resultant retiree anger, we know of no significant national security breech. Previously withheld information from the Church Committee hearings and from the Presidential libraries declared relevant by the ARRB will be titillating and may stimulate FOIA requests, but the variance from FOIA rules was not a legal justification for withholding under the JFK law.28. (U) If this experience leads to a serious objective look at the theory and practice of secrecy in this changed world, perhaps the cost will have been worth it.![Signature of Charles A. Briggs]Charles A. BriggsAttachments:A. Excerpt from Final Report of the ARRB (Standards)B. OGC MemorandumC. Foreign Government Information10SECRET
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SECRETSUBJECT: The JFK Declassification ExperienceDA/OIM/IRG/SCD/CABriggs:bkh/31835 (29 Oct 99)s:/oim/fo/jim/hrp/jfk/C.B. Memo The JFK Declass Exp.docDistribution:Original - Addressee, w/atts1 - C/IRG/SCD, w/atts1 - IRG/SCD/HRO, w/atts (Harrelson)1 - SCD Chrono, w/atts1 - SCD Subj, w/atts11SECRET
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13-00000A
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13-00000B![photo of unknown content]
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OGC-92-5325614 December 1992MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review GroupVIA: W. George JamesonAssociate General CounselLitigation Division, OGCFROM: Robert J. Eatinger, Jr.Assistant General CounselLitigation Division, OGCSUBJECT: Declassification Guidelines Established by thePresident John F. Kennedy Assassination RecordsCollection Act of 19921. The enactment of the President John F. Kennedy   Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 ("the Act") has   created declassification guidelines that are to some extent   different from the Historical Review Program guidelines   established by the Director of Central Intelligence. In the   continuing review of material related to the assassination of   President Kennedy, the guidelines established by the Act must be   used.2. The Act's most fundamental changes are the burden it   creates on agencies to justify continued classification of   information, and a requirement that agencies balance the national   security concerns against the public interest. Under the Act,   information must be declassified unless a showing is made by   clear and convincing evidence that release of the information   would demonstrably impair the national security.3. The Act's guidelines for declassification are found in   its Section 6 and are as follows:Sec 6. GROUND FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OFRECORDS.Disclosure of assassination records or particularinformation in assassination records to the public may bepostponed subject to the limitations of this Act if there isclear and convincing evidence that--(1) the threat to the military defense,intelligence operations, or conduct of foreignrelations of the United States posed by the publicdisclosure of the assassination is of such gravity that