Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 68]
# TOP SECRETDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON 25, D.C.SENSITIVEUNCLASSIFIEDDEC 30 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFSUBJECT: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)Reference: JCSM 809-63, Subject as above, dated October 21, 1963.Enclosed herewith are three copies of the plan on the above subject which has been prepared jointly on a restricted basis by representatives of the Departments of State and Defense in coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency. The plan, which has been revised to reflect generally the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in reference, provides a conceptual basis for US response to a Cuban military coup and has been approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director, Central Intelligence Agency as a basis for appropriate detailed planning. Mr. McGeorge Bundy has been advised of the foregoing and requested to inform the President of the existence of the plan on a suitable occasion. It is anticipated that the Secretaries of State and Defense may subsequently be requested to brief the President on its outline.In accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraph 8c, page 22 of the plan, it is requested that current CINCLANT plans be revised as necessary to reflect the concept of military operations described in the plan and that you advise me when this has been accomplished.In accordance with paragraph 8b, page 22 of the plan, representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency in coordination with representatives of the Departments of State and Defense will develop a plan for the introduction of the "Special Team" into Cuba which will subsequently be circulated for appropriate action and further detailed planning by agencies concerned.* Enclosure A to JCS 2304/205-1** Appendix to Enclosure B to JCS 2304/205-2Enclosure: (3 cys)As Stated![signature of Cyrus R. Vance]Cyrus R. VanceSecretary of the ArmySYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWEDBY JCS ON 19 OCT 1989CLASSIFICATION CONTINUEDNo.7/5 0354TOP SECRETSENSITIVEEXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADINGDOD UNCLASSIFIEDNOT APPLY
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# TOP SECRET SENSITIVEA CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBAUNCLASSIFIED1.  *Problem*. To provide planning guidance for US response to a coup in Cuba in order to assure that US intervention, if undertaken, results in replacement of the Communist government with one acceptable to the United States.2.  *Assumptions*.a.  The leaders of the coup may or may not be aware, from previous contact with CIA, that if they agree to and appear capable of meeting certain specified conditions (see paragraph 2.d. below), their revolt will be supported by the US if a US "special team" (see paragraph 3.b.(1) below) confirms that the criteria for support have been adequately met. Thus, the coup could be triggered in one of two ways: The leaders, in secure radio contact with CIA, implement their plan with US concurrence and establish a Provisional Government in full expectation of forthcoming US support barring a complete and immediate crushing of the uprising; or, less acceptably, the leaders, in the belief that they can meet probable criteria for US support, initiate the coup without consulting with or obtaining the concurrence of the US but establish a Provisional Government, hoping that the US will intervene.b. If the US had prior knowledge of the coup, up to forty-eight hours would be required after initiation of the action to introduce into Cuba and receive reports from a "special team" which would obtain information to assist in making a decision to support the insurgents; if the US did not have prior knowledge, a longer time would be required.This document contains 22 pages.Copy No. ______ of ______ copies.Series ______OSA, ASC Control No 7/5 0354 Re 2304/205-3SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWEDBY JCS ON 19 OCT 1989CLASSIFICATION CONTINUEDUNCLASSIFIED
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c. US intervention would be based on:(1) A pre-arranged call for help from a Provisional Government set up by the insurrectionists (preferably to the OAS, although US action would mt await formal OAS approval), or(2) A call for help from the insurrectionists after a coup had started without prior US concurrence, if the US determined that the insurgents met generally the criteria for support, or(3) Intervention by local Soviet forces.d. A coup should meet the following criteria to be supportable, recognizing that specific criteria will depend upon the situation existent at the time:(1) Have some power base in the Cuban army or militia in order to survive.(2) Be prepared to establish a Provisional Government, however rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political viability to provide an adequate political basis for overt US action (not required if Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban patriots).(3) Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership.(4) Seize and hold a significant piece of territory, preferably including Havana, long enough to permit the US plausibly to extend support and some form of recognition to the Provisional Government.e. Policy Considerations. For purposes of this paper, US policy affecting US support to a revolt in Cuba is summarized below.(1) The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale invasion of Cuba (except in the case of Soviet intervention or the re-introduction of offensive weapons) or the contrivance of a provocation
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TOP SECRETUNCLASSIFIEDwhich could be used as a pretext for such action.(2) By the same token, it is not US policy to encourage un- organized and uncoordinated mass uprisings since these would be too easily crushed by indigenous Cuban military forces. The likelihood of any spontaneous uprising surviving long enough to receive adequate US aid is small unless it is a part of, or followed immediately by, a planned and coordinated revolt led by a significant element of the Cuban military forces.(3) Once a revolt begins, the involvement of Soviet forces, either tactical formations or troops manning air defense installations, would result in immediate implementation of OPLANS 312 and 316.3. Sequence.. of Operations. The concept of operations set forth in this paper is based on the following general sequence of events:a. Upon receipt of word that the dissident leaders have agreed to and appear capable of meeting the criteria for US support, approval would be given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time.(In the event that a coup were initiated without prior US knowledge, the US would proceed as described below but introduction of the special team into Cuba would probably be delayed and its task of gathering in- formation made more difficult. Consequently, it might not be possible for the US to make a decision to support the coup in time to commit forces needed to sustain it.)b. Upon receiving word that a coup had been initiated, either on a pre-arranged basis with CIA or as a surprise to the US Government, the US would:3UNCLASSIFIEDTOP SECRET SENSITIVE
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UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET(1) Introduce into Cuba a "special team" to obtain information which would assist in making a decision to support the insurgents. This team, composed of several persons representing DOD, State, and CIA, would meke contact with the coup leaders within twenty-four hours of the start of the coup if the US had prior knowledge of the plan, probably later if not. The report of the findings should be received by CIA within twenty- four hours after the team's arrival on the island but this might not be possible without prior knowledge of the insurgents' plans. In any event, reliable reports from trained/ observers in Cuba would be of great value to making a decision to intervene in order that the US would not commit its prestige to the support of an uprising which might collapse prior to the point at which US help has become effective enough to sustain and expand it. (The special team, augmented as appropriate by CINCLANT, would remain in Cuba as a liaison element with the Provisional Govern- ment if the US intervened and would be directed to report immediately to CINCLANT for operational control at the time the decision was made to intervene.)(2) Order forces needed to establish an air and sea blockade of Cuba to take assigned stations in preparation for implementing the blockade; commence generating and positioning forces required for the implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.c. A recommendation to intervene, based on a multiple source intelligence assessment including the special team's report, would be made to the President. This would be the critical decision because, once made, certain actions would ensue immediately and, henceforth,UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET
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UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRETthe US would be committed to the ultimate success of the coup. These actions would include:(1) The assumption by CINCLANT of command of all military and para-military operations in Cuba.(2) Prompt introduction of small groups of personnel for the purposes of intelligence, reconnaissance, communications and liaison with the insurgents, and provision of unattributable logistic support by airdrop or submarine. In the event that the US delayed public announcement of the decision to support the coup, this assistance would be provided in such a manner as to minimize public knowledge of active US involvement in Cuba.(3) When authorized by the President, direct the special team to have the coup leaders proclaim a Provisional Government, if one has not already been established, and request US and OAS assistance in order to provide justification for a blockade and consultation within the OAS. As soon as the request for help is received, the President would announce publicly that the US will isolate Cuba by means of an air and sea blockade to become effective at (time, date). The justification for this unilateral, interim action would be based on Paragraph 3 of Resolution 2 of the Punta del Esta meeting of Foreign Ministers until such time as the COAS/OC established a collective basis for the blockade, as well as to insure that support for either side is not provided from external sources. Actually, the announcement would be designed to immobilize the Cuban Navy and Air Force, encourage indigenous support for the insurgents, and reinforce a warning to the Soviet Union not to intervene. (See Paragraph 7.a. below).UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET
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UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET SENSITIVE(4) Complete positioning of forces for implementation of portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.d. The US would have the option of replying to a formal call for help by either publicly announcing immediately its intention to support the Provisional Government and initiating overt military operations, or responding by establishing a blockade without admitting other support for the coup. In the latter case, the US would, between the time of the Presidential announcement of the blockade and public announcement of the other forms of support, employ small groups of intelligence and reconnaissance units, thereby providing visible evidence to the insurgents that support is forthcoming and yet providing a facade of non-intervention while the US consults with its allies to gain their political support.At the same time, the US would be generating and positioning forces required for significant overt military operations. Upon publicly announcing US intent to support the Provisional Government, the US would initiate overt logistical and air support to the insurgents. There is a possibility that this level of assistance and demonstrated US intent would be sufficient to bring down the Castro regime, if the coup carried with it a significant element of the Cuban armed forces. However, it is probable that the US would have to introduce conventional forces incrementally as required to sustain the uprising and should be prepared to and would implement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316, as required.4. Facts Bearing on the Problem.a. The Situation in Cuba. The Government has an excellent surveillance network, both internally and with respect tot he air and seaUNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED![seal image]SECTION 1. AUTHORITY AND PURPOSE1.01 This Directive is issued under the authority of reference (a), and implements reference (b). It supplements the guidance provided in references (c) and (d).1.02 Purpose. This Directive establishes policy, assigns responsibility, and prescribes procedures for the handling of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), Special Access Program (SAP) information and other classified information and material. This Directive applies to all Department of Defense (DoD) components, military personnel, DoD civilian employees, and DoD contractor personnel with SCI, SAP or other classified information or material within their possession, or for which they have been assigned responsibility.SECTION 2. POLICY2.01 It is DoD policy that SCI, SAP, and other classified information and material will be marked, handled, stored, transported, disseminated, and destroyed in accordance with applicable national policy and DoD regulations.2.02 DoD personnel who have access to SCI, SAP, and other classified information and material have a continuing personal responsibility to protect such information and material from unauthorized disclosure.![signature image]SECURITY INCIDENTSPECIAL HANDLINGCSCWGCONTROL #0432
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# SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORNOFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEWASHINGTON 25, D.C.13 MARCH 1962DECLASSICICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF CIA INFORMATIONPROMECTS DOCUMENTMEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBASubject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)1.  Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.2.  The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.3.  This plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. The plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.4.  Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that projects would be operable within the next few months.EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATICREGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10DOES NOT APPLYSECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
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TOP SECRET COECIAL HANDLING HOFORN5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it is recommeded that primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.![signature of William H. Craig]WILLIAM H. CRAIGBrig General, USADOD/JCS RepresentativeCaribbean Survey GroupEnclosurePretexts to JustifyMilitary Interventionin Cuba2TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
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# TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORNMEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECTSubject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate objective which would provide adequate justification for US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. The plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an inter-national image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.1# SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
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TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN4. Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that projects would be operable within the next few months.5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.EnclosurePretexts to: Justify Military Intervention in Cuba2TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
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# TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORNENCLOSUREPRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military intervention in Cuba).1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack on base.(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).3# SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
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TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to installations.(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City.(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- napthalene.(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)).b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.c. Commence large scale United States military operations.3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms:a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness. to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN
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TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORNThe terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Repúblic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modify- ing an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months.5TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN