Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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The fact that agency classification policies often cannot withstand scrutiny even within the executive branch points to the root of the problem. The problem is not that classifiers are dishonest or acting in bad faith; in general, they are doing a thankless job the best they can.The problem rather is the natural and often unconscious tendency of all bureaucracies to limit the flow of information to outsiders. As Sen. Moynihan observed, "The problem is that organizations within a culture of secrecy will opt for classifying as much as possible, and for as long as possible."[^3] If they go unchecked, agencies will hoard information beyond all reason, which is how we got to where we are today.Fortunately, Ms. Mazer's remarks also reveal a solution to this unavoidable problem, and that is independent review of agency classification decisions. The record of the ISCAP demonstrates that unnecessary classification can be reduced or eliminated when contested classification actions are reviewed by "outsiders" who share the agency's commitment to national security, but who do not share its Weberian tendencies toward bureaucratic secrecy.Only such independent reviewers are capable of separating the national security wheat from the bureaucratic chaff. I believe that this is a crucial principle which should inform Congressional action in this area.3. Congress is free to legislate on secrecy policy.The Justice Department "strongly opposes a statutory framework for the safeguarding of national security information," arguing in effect not only that the President has the authority to set and implement classification policies, but that he has exclusive authority to do so.[^4]The Committee should recognize that this is a natural and predictable response from the executive branch, which seeks to preserve its prerogatives and to maximize its own freedom of action. But I believe the Justice Department overstates its case.[^3]: Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy ("Commission Report"), 1997, Chairman's Foreword, page xxxix. Available in searchable "html" format at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/index.html>.[^4]: "Subjecting the protection of national security information to statutorily-required standards or procedures would raise constitutional concerns to the extent that it would limit the President's ability to discharge a core constitutional responsibility as he sees fit." Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General on the Government Secrecy Act of 1997, September 15, 1997.
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There is no question that Congress has the right and, I would say, the obligation to legislate in this area, particularly since the executive branch has failed to manage the secrecy system in a way that best serves the national interest. As Harold Relyea of the Congressional Research Service has pointed out:Pursuant to its constitutional authority "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces" (Article I, Section 8, clause 14), as well as the "necessary and proper" clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 18), Congress has long established rules, regulations, and procedures of general effect for the government and the armed services.... These clauses would appear to empower Congress with authority to legislate policy and procedure comparable to that prescribed by presidential executive order to effect security classification.The right of Congress to enact secrecy-related legislation has also been clearly recognized by the Supreme Court. Prior to the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, the Court held in *EPA v. Mink*, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) that Congress had not intended for the courts to examine the propriety of classification decisions or procedures. But, as Kate Martin of the Center for National Security Studies has noted, the Court also found that:Congress could certainly have provided that the Executive Branch adopt new procedures or it could have established its own procedures-- subject only to whatever limitations the Executive privilege may be held to impose upon such congressional ordering.And of course Congress has enacted legislation dictating classification policy on numerous occasions, including the statutory classification framework of the Atomic Energy Act and the National Security Act, in which Congress (not the President) assigned the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.Furthermore, Congress has also successfully enacted statutes requiring[^5] Statement by Harold C. Relyea, Congressional Research Service, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on "A Statutory Basis for Classifying Information," March 16, 1994, page 48ff.[^6] 410 U.S. at 83 (1973). See Testimony of Kate Martin, Director, Center for National Security Studies, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on "A Statutory Basis for Classifying Information," March 16, 1994, page 66ff, for further elaboration of related Court rulings, and her conclusion that "the only possible constitutional limitation would be that the Congress could not order disclosure of advice given to the President that would constitute a state secret."
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disclosure of certain classified information, including the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act (P.L. 102-526) and legislation concerning the State Department's *Foreign Relations of the United States* series (P.L. 102-138). In addition, Congress has granted itself the authority to declassify any information in its possession.[^7]Today, several more bills mandating declassification are pending before Congress, including: S. 1220, "The Human Rights Information Act"[^8]; S. 1232, a bill to declassify the private journal of Dr. Glenn Seaborg[^9]; and S. 1379, "The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act."[^10] Each of these bills was introduced because the public had no choice but to turn to Congress in order to correct the failings of executive branch classification and declassification policies. If the Justice Department position were to be taken at face value, all of these bills-- as well as the Freedom of Information Act itself-- would be unconstitutional, and executive branch officials would have completely unchecked power to withhold whatever information they chose.In short, while the executive branch is entitled to advise Congress to stay out of national security information policy, Congress must be guided by the larger national interest and has every right to reject that advice, as it has in the past.4. The secrecy system is not as bad as it could be.A statutory secrecy system should be conceived as a means, not an end in itself. In considering legislative changes to secrecy policy, Congress should aim to fix what needs fixing, but also to preserve what warrants preserving.In particular, the Committee should recognize the changes that were inaugurated with President Clinton's executive order 12958, and which have already produced some impressive results.Most important, from my point of view, is the order's automatic declassification provision (section 3.4) which requires the declassification of most historically valuable 25 year old documents by April 2000. This provision has generated an unprecedented surge in declassification, reported at nearly 200 million pages in FY 1996 alone.[^11][^7]: See Senate Resolution 400, section 8.[^8]: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1220.html>.[^9]: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1232.html>.[^10]: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1379.html>.[^11]: 1996 ISOO Report to the President <http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/isoo96.html>.
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So Congress need not and should not consider classification policy in a vacuum. It must start with the reality of classification policy as it is today and "first, do no harm." Legislative changes to the classification system should begin by affirming what is positive in current policy-- and then building on it.# THE GOVERNMENT SECRECY ACT OF 1997The Government Secrecy Act contains a number of important provisions which are derived from the two-year investigation of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. The Act's two most positive innovations-- a "balancing test" and a National Declassification Center- are also the ones that have elicited the strongest opposition from the executive branch. I will comment briefly on each of these, and suggest one other area for Committee consideration.1. The balancing test and judicial review.Section 4(c)(1) of the Act would require officials to weigh or "balance" the potential benefit from disclosure against the need for protection in making classification and declassification decisions, and further dictates that if there is significant doubt about the need to 'classify the information, it shall not be classified.From the perspective of a non-governmental consumer of government information, this is the Act's single most important provision.In the abstract, the idea of "balancing" is unexceptionable and is almost built into the practice of classification. Executive order 12958 includes a discretionary balancing test for declassification (sect. 3.2b) as well as a "significant doubt" standard (sect. 1.2b) for classification. (Interestingly, the CIA promulgated a balancing test during the Carter Administration which remains in effect today [32 C.F.R. 1902.13(c)].)This provision of the Act has drawn agency opposition not because of its balancing requirement _per se_, but because it would allow judicial review of agency balancing decisions under the Freedom of Information Act. The idea that courts would presume to "second guess" agency classification decisions is profoundly unwelcome to classifiers, who warn of disastrous consequences if their judgment is questioned.This warning is self-serving and needs to be taken with large grains of salt. Similar concerns contributed to President Ford's decision to veto the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, which allowed judges to determine whether information had been "properly" classified.[^1] Fortunately, Congress overrode that veto and it turned out that the opponents' fears were not realized.[^1]: See President Ford's veto message at 120 Congressional Record H36243-4.
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To the contrary, judicial review has been a potent factor in making the FOIA as useful a tool of democracy as it is. Indeed, it has been persuasively argued that the courts are not *sufficiently* diligent in reviewing agency classification decisions.[^1]The CIA has warned of "costly legal challenges that risk second-guessing of DCI/CIA judgments." This is a considerable exaggeration since in practice, no judge would reject a sworn affidavit from the DCI that certain information must be withheld. But at the same time, CIA classification judgments are *in need of* the checks and balances that judicial review would provide, particularly when it comes to the invocation of "sources and methods." Thus, the Secrecy Commission last year found that:the sources and methods rationale has become a vehicle for agencies to automatically keep information secret without engaging in the type of harm analysis required by executive orders as a prerequisite to keeping other kinds of information secret. The statutory requirement that sources and methods be protected thus appears at times to have been applied *not in a thoughtful way but almost by rote*.[^2]Federal court judges will never reject a "thoughtful" or even a merely plausible argument about the need to protect intelligence sources and methods. But the possibility of judicial review will serve to discourage indefensible "rote" classification.Dire warnings of the consequences of judicial review of classification have not been borne out by the last 24 years of judicial review under the FOIA, and there is no reason to believe that courts would suddenly become reckless now when confronted with a balancing test.I would add that any suggestions of a "flood" of lawsuits resulting from this provision are certain to be exaggerated. For the typical FOIA requester, there are huge "barriers to entry" to the judicial system. Legal representation is absurdly expensive, and *pro bono* assistance is generally available only in cases of considerable national importance or when victory is all but assured. In the last twenty years I must have filed hundreds of FOIA requests, but have brought suit under the FOIA only once.The absence of effective "checks and balances" on executive branch classification actions has helped to produce today's bloated and highly arbitrary classification system. A balancing test that is subject to judicial review is the most[^1]: 13"National Security Information Disclosure Under the FOIA: The Need for Effective Judicial Enforcement," *Boston College Law Review* 25: 611-643 (1984).[^2]: 14Commission Report, Chapter III, page 70, *emphasis added.*
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appropriate solution.[^1]## 2. A National Declassification CenterThe proposed National Declassification Center is a response to the fragmented quality of declassification policy, and to the inadequacy of executive branch oversight, which the Secrecy Commission described as "the critical missing link."[^2]As currently conceived, however, the Center risks becoming an extraneous bureaucracy that agencies are free to utilize or not, as they wish, and that has little or no independent authority. In order to fulfill its intended purpose, the Center should be assigned specific tasks and authorities. For example:*   The Center could be assigned to perform independent review and approval of all agency declassification guides, so as to ensure their consistency and compliance with the provisions of the Act and the executive order.*   The Center could be assigned to perform or to coordinate the declassification of all documents involving multiple agency "equities," in order to optimize the efficiency of the declassification process.Perhaps most important, the Center could undertake in an expanded form many of the oversight responsibilities now assigned to the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) and the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP).ISOO, under Steven Garfinkel's leadership, has a profound understanding of the intricacies and shortcomings of secrecy policy and, in my opinion, has generally demonstrated good judgment about what is appropriate and achievable and what is not. But ISOO's staffing and resource levels are laughably low when compared to its nominal responsibilities. This disparity between resources and responsibilities sends a message throughout the executive branch that "we're not going to take secrecy oversight seriously."[^1]: The characteristic risks and benefits of information disclosure, and the mechanics of actually balancing them in practice are elucidated by Arvin S. Quist in *Security Classification of Information*, Vol. 2: Principles for Classification of Information, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, TN, Report No. K/CG-1077/V2, April 1993, Chaps. 5, 6. Of particular interest, Quist discusses how legal standards for weighing evidence that are already part of the judicial process-- such as "beyond a reasonable doubt," "clear and convincing evidence," and "preponderance of the evidence"-- could be used in balancing and in any subsequent review (pp. 61-69).[^2]: Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 42.
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The ISCAP, meanwhile, is doing a fine job, but on a tiny scale. And it is already operating at full capacity, although its tasks are expected to escalate sharply in coming years. As ISCAP Chair Roslyn Mazer has noted,When I consider what the next few years may hold for ISCAP, I fear that to a considerable extent we may become victims of our own successes-- and the caseloads that these successes may engender. Unfortunately, ISOO [which also supports the ISCAP] is a very small organization that faces ever-increasing demands on its resources from the dramatic changes in the classification and declassification systems now underway.... the onus on the ISCAP's staffing structure may very well prove too much to bear.[^17]Therefore, one straightforward "fix" that Congress might consider, at least in the interim, would be to significantly increase the stature and resources available to these two organizations so as to help fill in the "missing link" of executive branch oversight.But whether Congress chooses to invigorate the existing oversight entities or to establish a new National Declassification Center, the goal should be one that has been clearly formulated by the Secrecy Commission:Oversight should be the responsibility of a strong and active organization, independent of the agencies that classify, perhaps modeled after agency inspector general offices. To be truly effective, such an organization should also possess the means to compel agency compliance with established policies.... Equally critical is that such a body have adequate resources, whether through a budget line item or the reallocation of resources from the principal classifying agencies.[^18]3. What About the "Other" Classification System?If the Government Secrecy Act became law, we would not just have a statutory secrecy system-- we would have *two* statutory secrecy systems: one for national security information and one for atomic energy information, prescribed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This may be too much of a good thing.The existence of two parallel classification systems has proven to be a significant obstacle to efficiency in secrecy policy, as numerous records must undergo separate declassification reviews under each system.[^17]: Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above.[^18]: Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 44.
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Even the high-level executive branch officials who are members of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel have been flummoxed by the difficulties in coordinating the declassification of information controlled under the Atomic Energy Act. This is particularly absurd because, according to Ms. Mazer, information that is similar or identical to much of what we have seen designated as FRD [i.e. classified under the Atomic Energy Act] has been in the public domain for many years, often as a result of a prior Department of Energy declassification review. Moreover, there appears to be no system in place to get *this information declassified,* even though the Departments involved- Energy, Defense, and State-- acknowledge that it is innocuous.[^19]The perpetuation of two distinct classification systems would represent a significant compromise of the Government Secrecy Act's goal of "a more stable and cost-effective set of policies and a more consistent application of rules and procedures."Therefore, I would suggest that the Committee consider the feasibility of consolidating both classification systems into one.## CONCLUSIONAlthough the Cold War has officially been over for several years now, we still face the challenges of adapting the inherited structures of that era to the present day. Fixing the classification system is foremost among those challenges.It is only natural that any significant changes to the status quo will be resisted by the bureaucratic systems that are now in place. But the Committee should have confidence in the traditional American mechanism of "checks and balances."By installing new checks and balances into a classification system that has long been allowed to function unilaterally, Congress can induce prudent changes that will advance the national interest in open and accountable government, while more efficiently protecting genuine national security information.[^19]: Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above, emphasis added.
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# H.R. 1553, 1-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF THEASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD[Page: E876]HON. DAN BURTONin the House of RepresentativesTHURSDAY, MAY 8, 1997*   Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing H.R. 1553, which amends the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992–Public Law 102-526–to provide 1 additional year for the Assassination Records Review Board to complete its work. This legislation would extend the Review Board 's September 30, 1997, termination date under current law to September 30, 1998. H.R. 1553 authorizes $1.6 million in fiscal year 1998 for this purpose. I am pleased that the Honorable Henry Waxman, the ranking minority member on the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, and the Honorable Louis Stokes, who sponsored the 1992 Act and who chaired the House Select Committee on Assassinations that was established in 1976, are original cosponsors of H.R. 1553.*   The purpose of the 1992 legislation was to publicly release records relating to the Kennedy assassination at the earliest possible date. The Assassination Records Review Board was set up to review and release the voluminous amounts of information in the Government's possession. The FBI, the Secret Service, the CIA, the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, the Church Committee in the Senate, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations have all held assassination records, and records have also been in the possession of certain State and local authorities as well as private citizens. When this legislation was considered, nearly 1 million pages of records compiled by official investigations of the assassination had not been made available to the public, some 30 years after the tragedy. Congress believed that simply making all relevant information available to the public was the best way to respond to the continuing high level of interest in the Kennedy assassination, and was preferable to undertaking a new congressional investigation. The 1992 law requires the Review Board to presume that documents relating to the assassination should be made public unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. I believe that the release of this information is important to ensure accountability in the Government and to clearly demonstrate to Americans that the Government has nothing to hide.*   As a result of the Review Board 's efforts, over 10,000 documents have been transferred to the national archives and Records Administration for inclusion in the JFK collection. At the end of 1996, that