Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# 13-00000## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYNOT FOR PUBLICATIONCOUNTRY: New York, USSUBJECT: Marilyn MonroeREPORT NO.DATE DISTR: 3 August 1962NO PAGES:REFERENCES: MOON DUST Project3 August 1962SUBJECT: Wiretap of telephone conversation between Reporter Dorothy Kilgallen and Howard Rothberg (A); Wiretap of telephone conversation of Marilyn Monroe and Attorney General Robert Kennedy (B). Appraisal of Contents.1. Rothberg discussed the apparent break up of subject with Kilgallen and the Kennedys. Rothberg told Kilgallen that she was attending Hollywood parties hosted by the "inner circle" among Hollywood's elite and was becoming the talk of the town again. Rothberg indicated in so many words, that she had secrets to tell, no doubt arising from her trists with the President and the Attorney General. One such mentions the visit by the President at a secret air base for purpose of inspecting things from outer space. Kilgallen replied the she know what might be the source of visit. In the mid-fifties Kilgallen learned of secret effort by US and UK governments to identify origins of crashed spacecraft and dead bodies, from a British government official. Kilgallen believed the story may have come from the late forties. Kilgall- said that if the story is true, it would cause terrible embarrass Jack and his plans to have NASA put men on the moon.2. Subject repeatedly called the Attorney General and complained about the way she was being ignored by the President and his brother.3. Subject threatened to hold a press conference and would tell all.4. Subject made reference to "bases" in Cuba and plans of the President's plan to kill Castro.5. Subject made reference to her "diary of secrets" and what the newspapers would do with such disclosures.
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13-00000SECRETCIA INTERNAL USE ONLY15 May 1995MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Ellie NeimanDO JFK Review TeamFROM:Barry HarrelsonSenior Reviewer, CSI/HRGSUBJECT: FBI Request For CIA's OpinionOn Proposed FBI Release Of AgentSpecific Data1. The FBI has asked for an Agency response on the following matter.2. HRG counterparts at the FBI are engaged in serious discussions with representatives of the Review Board concerning withholding the identities of FBI confidential informants. In the course of those negotiations, FBI officers advise they are increasingly concerned about being able to withhold the crypts and, possible even the true names, of three former Soviet agents. Given that view, they believe it would assist their overall efforts and negotiating position if they could release additional information on one or more of the three Soviet-agents.3. The three former Soviet agents are:a. "TOPHAT" also encrpyted as BOURBON;" true name is provided on separate attachment.b. "SHAMROCK" true name on attachment.c. "FEDORA" also encrpyted or known as "IRONCLAD" "SCOTCH" AND "JADE;" true name on attachment.4. Attached are seven documents that the FBI is considering for release. Two of them are CIA documents found in the FBI JFK file. HRG has been unable to locate these documents in the CIA JFK collection.5. Please provide DO views on the FBI proposal.![Signature of Barry Harrelson]Barry HarrelsonAtts: A/SSECRETCIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
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SECRETCIA INTERNAL USE ONLYIDEN ATTACHMENT TO 10 MAY 1995 MEMORANDUMThe following names and descriptions are keyed to paragraph 3 of the 10 May memornadum:a. Dmitriy Fedorovich POLYAKOV; reportedly died as a result of Ames disclosure.b. Nikolay Romanovich MAKAREVICH; whether he is dead or alive is not known.c. Aleksiy Isadorovich KULAK (Kulyak ?); reportedly died of natural causes.SECRETCIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
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FBI file26.7.95Passed this excised portion of OO's 7 Jan 95 memo to the FBI.NOTE: GOT LEE CARLO'S concurrence to do so beforehand.a. SHAMROCK's real name, Nikolay Romanovich MAKAREVICH may not be released. His identity has remained a secret for 30 years. We do not know if MAKAREVICH is alive or dead, and believe that exposure could damage him and his family.b. Tom RYAN's name should be deleted from the front cover of the SHAMROCK debriefing. Mr. RYAN retired under cover, and is employed as an intelligence contractor on a sensitive project.c. The name and cover name of NARKULYANI ("Greta") should be deleted.
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# SECRETNO FOREIGN DISSEMOCI No. 1586/64CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYOffice of Current Intelligence4 June 1964CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUMSUBJECT: Cuban Subversion in Latin AmericaSince July 19631. Cuban subversive efforts in Latin America are continuing at a steady pace, despite recent major setbacks in such countries as Venezuela and Brazil. From July 1963 through December, when Havana evidently believed a "second Cuba" was likely in Venezuela, Cuban propaganda stressed the inevitability of Castro-inspired revolutions in the hemisphere. Since the first of this year, however, Cuban leaders have muted direct exhortations to violence and have emphasized other policy priorities. Nevertheless, the Cuban potential for subversion in Latin America remains high.2. In his speech of 26 July 1963, Castro recaptured much of the militant tone of his speeches in late 1962. He made it clear that he regards Cuba as the main source of inspiration and guidance for inevitable revolutions in the rest of Latin America. He claimed that what has been done in Cuba can take place "exactly the same way in many Latin American countries." The hemisphere's militants, he said, must take advantage of conditions presently favoring revolution and "open the breach." On 28 September, Castro said that while "imperialists believe they can destroy the Cuban revolution," the Cubans believe that before that could be accomplished "many other revolutions like ours will appear on the continent." On 24 November, Che Guevara said the spreading of revolution in the hemisphere "is also our responsibility and it is part of our daily preoccupation."NO FOREIGN DISSEMSECRET
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# SECRETNO FOREIGN DISSEM3. What emerged from these and other Cuban pronouncements was the apparent conviction of Castro and his aides that further Communist revolutions in Latin America are inevitable, that Cuba can speed up the process, and that in Cuba's own interest it is urgent that revolutionary action be initiated wherever possible and as soon as possible. It is logical to assume that despite recent official soft-pedaling of the issue, the basic Cuban viewpoint remains the same. Cuban leaders continue to believe that the very presence of their regime will inspire other Latin American revolutionaries to action, and undoubtedly will continue to give assistance to these efforts.4. Cuba's policy of revolution in the hemisphere has suffered severe defeats, however, since the 3-ton Cuban arms cache was discovered on a Venezuelan beach on 1 November 1963. For example, OAS action stemming from that discovery is pending; despite the Cuban-supported terrorist campaign, constitutional government in Venezuela was successfully transferred following President Leoni's dramatic election victory last December; and the outbreaks of violence in Panama last January failed to upset constitutional processes there. The April revolt in which President Goulart of Brazil was overthrown was also a severe defeat for Havana. These reverses may have produced a feeling in Havana that a breathing spell is necessary. In addition, Castro may have been cautioned to moderate his revolutionary tactics when he visited the USSR last January. This year has been designated "the year of the economy." This and Cuba's all-out campaign to obtain needed commercial and industrial goods from West also may be factors prompting Havana to lessen its public expressions of support for revolution. More-over, Castro may believe that a soft-pedaled policy on revolution now may pay dividends after the US elections in November. He probably assumes that conditions for a US-Cuban modus vivendi--on his terms--will be more favorable then.5. Nevertherless, evidence presented in the accompanying country-by-country index shows that Cuba has continued since the first of the year to promote, finance, and otherwise support pro-Castro groups and individuals in Argentina, Brazil, (before the April revolt), Chile, Panama, British
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# SECRETNO FOREIGN DISSEMGuiana, and other countries. Indeed, on at least two recent occasions, Che Guevara was quoted as restating familiar Cuban views on revolution. In an interview published in an Italian newspaper in March, Guevara reiterated that the road to "national liberation" in Latin American must take a turn to violence. He emphasized that violence would be "necessary" in "almost all" Latin American countries, for "there is no other way." In an April interview in Algiers, Guevara said: "It is very, very, very, very, but very, hard to achieve liberation in Latin America by employing peaceful means."6. A number of reliable clandestine sources have provided information on the many facets of Cuba's subversive effort in Latin America. The most serious_form of subversion from Havana is its training of other Latin Americans in the practical arts of guerrilla warfare. As many as 1,500 received such training in 1962. It is estimated that several hundred Latin Americans who traveled to Cuba in 1963 also received such training. It has been learned that "scholarship students" who go to Cuba ostensibly to study "agriculture" receive guerrilla warfare training. This instruction encompasses the use and management of communications equipment; the techniques of military intelligence, including methods of establishing intelligence networks to obtain information from peasants; training in a variety of weapons, including rifles and small arms, which are readily available in most Latin American countries; training in explosives, and training in guerrilla tactics, including instruction on how to operate independently in the countryside for extended periods of time. A separate training school reportedly trains Communist youth from other Latin American countries. The school's one-year course is divided between the study of Communist theory and practical training in political agitation and subversive activities. Reports from returning trainees confirm that the Cubans are developing extensive files on most Latin American countries on subjects pertinent to the planning and development of further subversive activity. Detailed questionnaires submitted to argentine, trainees requested comments on possible air drop zones, weather conditions, locations of military bases, competence of local authorities, border and frontier controls, and a long list of similar questions, obviously designed to build up a body of basic knowledge un argentina.3NO FOREIGN DISSEMSECRET
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# -SECRET-NO FOREIGN DISSEM7. Latin Americans returning to their countries after having received training in Cuba often take a round-about route to conceal the fact that they have been in Cuba. Many Moscow satellite Bloc controlled flights to Prague. They then go through Europe to some other Latin American country, from which they enter their own. Cuba gives these travelers documents which show no indication that they had been in Cuba. Some guerrilla warfare trainees are chosen for intelligence assignments and are given special training in clandestine communications, which permits them to maintain a contact with Cuba after they have returned home.8. In addition, Latin Americans who receive guerrilla warfare and other types of training in Cuba are encouraged, on their return home, to pass on what they have learned. Cuba-trained men are known to have been conducting such training in Costa Rica, Panama, British Guiana, Peru, and elsewhere. Thus, the Castro-oriented revolutionary effort in Latin America has a potential for steady growth even if there should be a lessening in the actual training program in Cuba.9. Numerous reports have alleged that Cuba is supplying arms clandestinely to some Central and South American-based extremist groups. Only in the case of the arms cache discovered in Venezuela on 1 November, however, has there been incontrovertible proof of Cuban complicity in such efforts. A good deal of the undeniably extensive arms traffic which goes on in several areas of the hemisphere is basically a continuation of long-established patterns of arms smuggling between nationals of the countries involved. Cuba does possess over 100 fishing vessels and some cargo planes which are well-suited to gun-running or air drops, but we cannot confirm that they are used for this purpose. In addition, Cuban leaders have always stressed the importance of Latin American revolutionaries procuring their own weapons from local sources. Moreover, some financing from Havana undoubtedly is used to buy arms.10. Another important aspect of Havana's efforts in Latin America is centered on supporting and guiding hemisphere front organizations. Havana has long sought to establish a new hemisphere-wide
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# -SECRETNO FOREIGN DISSEMlabor organization which could serve as a platform for spreading pro-Castro propaganda among urban labor movements. The embryonic Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL), which held its constituent congress in Brazil in January 1964, ends Havana's quest. This Brazilian congress was such a total failure, however, that it is doubtful if in the near future CUTAL will provide Havana with the type of organization it envisaged. Cuba's support for the 9 March Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC) also was well established. This conference, too, ended in near-failure. Havana now is attempting to organize another hemisphere "soli-darity-with-Cuba" congress in Montreal, Canada in July. This proposed congress--which, however, is being officially discouraged by the Canadian government--would be modeled on a similar effort staged in Niteroi, Brazil in March 1963.5NO FOREIGN DISSEM-SECRET-
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# SECRETNO FOREIGN DISSEMANNEXCountry-by-Country Rundown on Cuban Subversion## 1. ArgentinaClandestine reporting for the past year confirms that the Cubans are cooperating with small extremist Peronist groups in an attempt to establish a coordinated subversive effort in Argentina. Extreme-left wing Peronists such as *John Cooke*, *Americos BarnzOS*, *auplio Garregori* and *Hectors Villalon* have been in close liaison with Cuban agents in *Haазаланмаскі*, and elsewhere. *Galrego* appears to be the principal support agent of a group of Argentine terrorists and left-wing Peronists believed to be directed and supported by the *Cuban embassyongMontevideo*.Last January, *Galego* traveled to the provinces of Jujuy and Salta, near the Bolivian border where Argentine police discovered pro-Castro guerrilla camps in March. Some guerrillas who were arrested in that raid are known to have had guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. Among the propaganda items found at these camps was a book written by Jorge Ricardo Masetti, who was in Cuba in 1963 as a director of Prensa Latina. He is thought to be "Commandante Segundo" and is probably in charge of the small guerrilla bands discovered in northern Argentina in March and April. One of the FAL rifles found in the hands of the guerrillas possessed the same specifications as those found in the 1 November Venezuelan arms cache. It is believed to be of Cuban origen.> [Figure] Summary of Argentines having received indoctrination or subversive training in Cuba since 1960. At least 222 Argentines traveled to Cuba in 1963; 26 traveled to Cuba from January through April 1964.## 2. BoliviaCuban subversive activity in Bolivia has been centered on attempts to strengthen pro-Castro sentiment among the followers of extremist Vice-1-NO FOREIGN DISSEMSECRET
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-SECRETNO FOREIGN DISSEMPresident Juan Lechin. Through its embassy in LaPaz, Cuba reportedly has given Lechin and his sup-porters some arms and money to aid his bitter strug-gle with President Paz Estenssoro for politicaldomination of the country.Charge Roberto Lassale said the Cuban governmentbelieved it necessary to organize well-armed combatcadres from among various leftist-extremist groups.He said Havana was prepared to supply the requiredarms.Cuban government was willing to provide financialand material support to Lechin for his campaignto unseat President Paz in the 31 May presidentialelections. Lechin was scheduled to meet with Cubanagents in early April to discuss his financialneeds and to determine what he was prepared to of-fer in return for the proposed Cuban assistance.In addition, the Comittee of Anti-ImperialistStruggle, a pro-Castro Bolivian youth group whichaspires to establish a terrorist organization onthe model of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of Na-tional Liberation, was organized last year withthe help of Mauro Garcia, then an officer of theCuban embassy. Members of this group were caughtin November 1963 attempting to plant bombs at thehome of the commander of the Bolivian Air Forceand near the residence of the US Ambassador.The Cuban government continues to regard Boliviaas a staging area from which to send trained sub-versives into neighboring countires. It is pos-sible that some Cuban support for guerrillas innorthern Argentina may have come across the borderfrom near-by Bolivia. Bolivia also has long beena favorite transit area for terrorists returningto Peru after having received guerrilla warfaretraining in Cuba. In August 1963, a Bolivian Com-munist Party (PCB) member in north Bolivia led-2-NO FOREIGN DISSEM-SECRET-
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police to an arms cache which was to be used to sup-port guerrilla operations in Peru. Bolivian authori-ties have uncovered and dispersed at least three pro-Castro guerrilla groups in this area in the past year.Some 300 Bolivians have received guerrilla indoctrination as of mid-March 1964. About 70 Bolivians have traveled to Cuba through April 1964.## 3. BrazilBefore the overthrow of President Goulart, Cuba was engaged in an active subversive effort in Brazil providing funds, guerrilla training, and propaganda support to Communist and pro-Communist groups. Operating primarily through its embassy in Rio de Janeiro, Havana collaborated closely with Francisco Juliao's Peasant Leagues in northeast Brazil and with Leonel Brizola, Goulart's violently anti-American brother-in-law. The former Cuban ambassador privately described Brizola as having the best prospects for starting a Castro-stule revolution in Brazil. The ambassador appeared to be favoring him over Juliao from late 1963 until the April overthrow.In late February, a usually reliable source reported that Brizola agreed to accept offers of Cuban financial assistance to finance his expanding press and radio activities and to "buy some arms" from his Popular Mobilization Front. The same source reported Brizola received his first subsidy from Havana in 1963, using it to buy arms. In addition, a usually reliable source in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City reports that about 10 days before the beginning of Goulart's overthrow, Havana sent money to Brazil in an effort to bolster the Brizola forces. Four Cuban couriers reportedly took the money to Brazil Mexico City.Cuba also maintained a substantial propaganda operation in Brazil, primarily through the local office of Prensa Latina. A Communist party member in the state of Bahia revealed, for example, that the local Communist newspaper was financed by Cuba. The number of Brazilian-Cuban Cultural Institues
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# SECRETNO FOREIGN DISSEMhad increased to the point where they covered all major cities; Rio alone had seven. Similar or- ganizations existed at the national level, such as the Society of Friends of Cuba and the National Committee Against Intervention in Cuba. Cuba also broadcast daily to Brazil in Portuguese.Brazil under Goulart also afforded Cuba an excellent base for promoting hemisphere-wide, pro- Cuban front groups. The constituent congress of the Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL)-- which is planned to replace the moribund Confedera- tion of Latin American Workers (CTAL)--was held in Brazilia in late January. The Brazilian delega- tion to the Cuban-supported Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC), held in Santiago, Chile on 9 March, was headed by President Goulart's nephew, who brought a letter from the President warmly sup- porting the conference. Brazil was also used as a transit area for some Latin American subversives returning to their countries after having received training in Cuba.In late April, the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB), which follows a pro-Chinese line, was reported to have directed two Cuban-trained leaders to begin paramilitary operations in Sao Paulo and Goias. CPB members have been encouraged by their Cuban comrades--many have been trained in Cuba--but Havana is not known to have given them direct support.> [Figure: A handwritten annotation that reads: "At Least Eight Brazil Trans Travelers to Cuba in"]## 4. British GuianaThe government of Premier Cheddi Jagan is openly pro-Castro. Thus, Cuban activities in British Guiana, in contrast to subversive efforts elsewhere in the hemisphere, are designed to support rather than to bring down the existing regime.Clinton Adlum, the Cuban trade representative in Georgetown, is probably giving both political and economic advice to Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP) Cuban ships call frequently at British Guiana ports to deliver food and fuels and to pick up rice.-4-NO FOREIGN DISSEM-SECRET-
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# SECRETNO FOREIGN DISSEMNumerous unconfirmed reports have stated that these ships also transport arms to British Guiana which allegedly are then shipped elsewhere in Latin America.The vehicle for British Guianese trade with Communist countries, as well as for Cuban funding of Jagan's regime and the PPP, is the Guyana Import Export (GIMPEX). Havana ordered payment of $300,000 to the manager of GIMPEX in September, ostensibly for payment of goods, according to a usually reliable source. It is unclear, however, whether the money was ever actually paid. GIMPEX has loaned such funds in the past both to the government and to the PPP publishing house. Another source reports that the publishing house passes the funds to Janet Jagan for PPP salaries and expenses.Georgetown officials believe Cuban-trained terrorists are behind much of the sporadic violence which has occurred during the months-long strike by the pro-Jagan sugar workers union; it is attempting to gain an official endorsement by the Guianese sugar industry. A senior official has told the US Consul General that six or eight Cuban-trained youths provide the technical support for this group's growing terrorist efforts in Georgetown. Another source reports some Guianese were receiving guerrilla training in the interior of the country in November 1963, presumably for the newly-formed Guyana Liberation Army.> About 40 Guianese have received training in sabotage. At least 25 have traveled to Cuba in 1963.5. ChileThe Cuban effort in Chile concentrates on support for the presidential campaign of Salvadore Allende. Allende is the candidate of the Communist-dominated Popular Revolutionary Action Front (FRAP), and he has a chance of being elected in the September presidential elections. Allende has visited Cuba on several occasions; his campaign manager was in Havana in January. While there, he was promised financial support for Allende's campaign. A usually reliable source reports that Che Guevara recently said: "Watch Chile, it will be the next Latin American country to enter our camp."-5-NO FOREIGN DISSEM-SECRET