Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 151]
# TOP SECRETIt is not feasible to investigate in details all of the proposals for action submitted by individuals and groups. Experience has indicated that generally the exile claims without foundation and the preponderance of their proposals are not feasible. As a matter of practice such individuals or groups are not satisfied with a single rebuff, but make their offers to individuals in CIA, the Departments of State, Defense and Justice or with members of Congress, the press, and other non-governmental individuals or agencies. A specific action or proposal may have had merit at one point, but from a security standpoint, the persistence of the proposer may have negated the potential of his proposal and could have compromised an otherwise workable scheme.In order to minimize affiliation with exile groups, the most apparent solution which is suggested frequently envisages the recruitment of Cubans who have no political affiliations. While this may be possible, experience has indicated that it is not probable. Those Cubans in the U. S. who have associated with U. S. personnel and those who speak English are generally marked. Those whose language capabilities and economic stature combine to limit their social mobility are more likely to turn to, accept and become involved in the social, political or cultural cloisters of Cubans in the U. S.There are additional political and psychological problems in seeking recruits from among Cubans who have fled and generally desire to remain united with families and friends. Their motivation to participate in activities against Castro generally can be measured in terms of their assimilation and economic success in the U. S. Experience has shown that internal oppositionists may resent external Cuban leadership. As the exile groups compete for political prestige and material support, so do the representatives of the internal resistance groups.The problems of exiles attempting to determine the extent of U. S. commitment and associated security implications are discussed elsewhere in this paper.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 152]
## Timing.Obviously, the successful execution of well-planned clandestine or covert operations is time consuming. Recruitment, isolation and training cannot be accomplished in a matter of days. There is no standby reservair of multi-purpose agents. The operations themselves call for split second timing and are subject both to nature's elements (weather, tides, moon, season) and other unanticipated and unpredictable circumstances (Cuban alerts, contact with patrols, compromise of internal contacts, actions of anti-Castro groups, or other world events).Timing problems are compounded by the increased security requirements and the requirements for synchronised actions.More effective operations can be undertaken when there is some general continuity in the program and there is an opportunity to plan in greatest detail. From a practical standpoint, it is extremely difficult to maintain individual or group motivation and aggressiveness when operations are delayed, aborted, canelled or subjected to continual modification.## ASSETSIn considering U. S. assets for covert and clandestine operations against Cuba, it is well to review briefly in an historical context, the situation which faces the U. S.Prior to Castro's assumption of power, U. S. efforts in the field of intelligence and clandestine operations in Latin America lagged behind efforts in other more immediate problem areas of the world. At the time Castro assumed control in Cuba, there was much open controversy on the question of Castro's subservience to communism, but generally it was assumed that the change of government in Cuba was in the well-known Latin tradition. Later, it was realized that the change of government was not just a change in personalities, but a revolutionary change in governmental system. At this point, early in 1960, plans were developed to assist the people of Cuba in overthrowing their government. This plan
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 153]
culminated in the abortive Bay of Pigs Operation in late April 1961. It has been conceded that the Bay of Pigs Operation caused many dissidents and potential resistance groups to expose themselves and be "rolled up" in the Cuban security operations which came in the wake of this fateful operation.During the six month period which followed the events of April 1961, the U. S. was not in a position to expose itself further to any suggestion of clandestine actions against Cuba. The experts involved in that operation were reassigned and little or no effort was made to further endanger any residual assets in Cuba which may have survived the Cuban security operations of the spring and summer of 1961.By late 1961, another effort was organized to determine what assets were available for operations in Cuba. It suffices to state that an inventory revealed that the few reliable assets in the target area were essentially intelligence agents and could not be spared for conversion to clandestine operations. Gastro had consolidated his security mechanism to the point that by early 1962 it was quite clear that insertions of agents in useful areas would be most precarious. The large reservoir of motivated Cubans who had participated in the Bay of Pigs Operation were either imprisoned or had lost their cover. They were no longer an available source for clandestine operations. During the first nine months of 1962, the emphasis was placed on intelligence gathering rather than clandestine operations or political action in the target area.Because of certain operational difficulties most of the operational missions undertaken during the spring and summer of 1962 were aborted or compromised. Gastro's accusation, coupled with the public appearance and "confessions" of "U. S. agents" caused the operational program to be periodically discontinued. No attempt was made during or immediately after the missile crisis to continue the program.4. ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSEThe role of the Department of Defense in clandestine and covert areas has been the subject of much controversy both within the Department of Defense and within the Central Intelligence Agency.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 154]
TOP SECRETBy charter the Department of Defense does not play the principle role in the fields of clandestine or covert operations. The Department of Defense is not specifically precluded from assuming a principle role and, in fact, there is specific authority for the Department of Defense to assume such a role when the scope of a particular operation exceeds the capabilities of the Gentral Intelligence Agency. From U. S. lessons learned in Laos and Cuba (during the Bay of Pigs Operation) the size of those operations were considered beyond the capabilities of the CIA. (At least the resources of men, money and matoriel available to CIA were strained severely). In such circumstances when DoD assets far exceed those of CIA, it may be preferable to give DoD the primary sale and respon GIA render required support. Again security becomes a major factor when an operation reaches such a magnitude that DoD is forced to assume the responsibility. Many argue, with some justification, that when the operation is of a magnitude that the DoD must assume the responsibility, it is at the paint of losing its cover or clandestine wrappings and DoD may suffer the consequences.Except for participation during World War II, few individuals in the Department of Defense were concerned with clandestine operations prior to 1960. Experiences of the military in Germany, Laos, Guba and Vietnam served to underline many of the capabilities and limitations of the military in these fields. There are many emotional organisational chaflict of interest aspects involved in a consideration of the role the military should assume. Ons view is that the military can and should assume a greater role immediately. Supporters of this view bass their arguments on some demonstrated inefficiencies committed under CIA management in the past, the planning experience of DoD, and the breadth and depth of resources in men, money and materiel available to the Department of Defense. Some of the more emotional support of this view stems from the military's frustration of GIA's apparent inability to take bold actions (probably combined with some inbarn jingcism).SECRET
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 155]
# PSECRETThe proponents in DoD of a more cautions approach are sensitive to the commitment of U. S. military resources in the unconventional field at the expense of implicit responsibilities in the conventional area. There is soms opposition on moralistic grounds and there is concern that the inability to maintain security in any sizeable covert or clandestine operation could subsequently reflect adversely on the military establishment or the professional military as a group. Other objections include a reluctance to assume the responsibilities and risks entailed in operations of this nature and a preference to play a supporting role to the "professionalism" of CLA. Some bureaucratic or organizational lethargy may also Influence military views.In the past, the military has played an essential role in three major categories -- money, men and materiel. From the fiscal standpoint, the Department of Defense can provide vast expenditures with relatively great flexibility.The vast resources in manpower of the DoD (with military technical and linguistic skills, overseas experience, physical conditioning and personal dedication and aggressiveness) provides a very lucrative potential for DoD participation in clandestine and covert actions. The major problem in this connection is the separation of the individual from the military Service. The mechanics of individual cover, dummy records, and the administrative processing is essentially no great problem. The difficulties appear in the consideration of family and military associations. It is relatively easy to quickly isolate and "sheep dip" an air crew or a small boat crow for one short mission, however, this process is not easily extended for any protracted period. There is usually a requirement to consider carefully the pay and allowances of military personnel, operating independently or in conjunction with CIA personnel on clandestine and covert operations.The material assets of the Department of Defense can play a major role in CIA's overall operation. DoD can provide cover for many of CIA's training, supply and storage installations. DoD is involved in surveillance activities. The DoD inventory of aircraft![image of secret logo]
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 156]
SECRETand ships with trained crews are adaptable to infiltration and exfiltra-tion missions. DoD stocks of arms, foodstuffs and equipment alongwith Dob's ability to sanitize, package and ship for serial or surfacedelivery quantities of supplies is a significant asset.There is a general misunderstanding concerning the use ofArmy Special Forces units, Navy SEAL teams, Air Force Jungle Jimorganizations or Marine Corps special units in covert and clandestineoperations. While it is entirely possible and feasible to convertindividuals or units for clandestine or covert operations, the basicmission of Special Forces originally was oriented toward the organiza-tion of resistance forces in support of overt military operations. Subse-quently, the charter of Special Forces was expanded to incorporatecounter-insurgency operations in friendly territory. Both of thesemissions are essentially overt in nature and there is a lack of experienceand doctrine for the commitment of Special Forces in clandestine orcovert operations. This generally applies to units of the other mili-tary Services. Any major reorientation of the mission of these unitswill detract from their current requirements and could jeopardize,for example, the ability of our Special Forces to assist in the organiza-tion of a resistance in Cuba in support of a conventional military opera-tion there.5. INTELLIGENCEIt is essential to an understanding of the problem to realizethat since late 1961, all U. S. intelligence estimates have indicatedthat there is little likelihood of an internally sparked Cuban resistanceto be of any significance. According to CIA there is little possibilityof getting advance information of any uprising without this informationalso reaching officials of the Castro Regime. It is also estimated thatthere is little likelihood that any resistance groups would be able to"hold out" in any organized form for more than a week or two. Castropersonally is quite aware of the potential of a guerrilla resistance andmoves ruthlessly, committing disproportionate forces to ensure thatthe spark does not mature.![image]
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 157]
There has been a lack of useful intelligence on Cuba. This has caused the U. S. to place primary importance on clandestine intelligence operations with a corresponding lack of emphasis on other clandestine operations. In order to undertake operations, vast amounts of current operational intelligence are needed. The priority for this operational type intelligence has been relegated to a relatively unimportant station in the spectrum of our intelligence requirements for Cuba. This is particularly true when there are limited assets and so much pressure to obtain reliable information or confirmation on sophisticated conventional weapons or Soviet activities. Normally, different methods of operation are employed in a different physical environment for those seeking operational intelligence.It should be pointed out that the lack of intelligence has been used as a crutch in not pressing for more clandestine operations actions. This view can be justified, but no commander who commits forces on the battlefield ever knows all he wants to know about his enemy. Somewhere in between lies the answer. There must be an acceptance of certain gaps in operational intelligence and consequently some additional operational risks; otherwise, no meaningful actions will ever be taken.6. PARAMETERS OF FUTURE ACTIONThis portion of the paper is designed to indicate in general terims the latitude of clandestine and covert actions based upon past experience and those pertinent factors which might serve to limit or modify U. S. action in these areas. This should not be interpreted to indicate the limits of future actions.Clandestine and covert activities prior to and during the Bay of Pigs operation can be characterised as bold and far reaching. The future orientation of U. S. activity in this field is conditioned largely by the failure of that operation. Clandestine and covert actions since April 1961 can be summarized as being cautious, intermittent, and low level. The current attention directed towards "things Cuban" places even more stringent requirements on U. S. activities in the clandestine and covert environment.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 158]
Following are examples of the types of activities which could be undertaken. This is not an exhaustive list, but is presented to illustrate the types of activity which might be considered.a. Intelligence and Counterintelligence(1) Interrogation of refugees.(2) Counterintelligence in U. S.(3) Legal travellers.(4) Glandestine intelligence agents.(5) Air and naval surveillance.(6) Communications surveillance.(7) External sources (where Cuba is represented officially or quasi-officially or where refugees and travellers can be reached).(8) Intelligence provided by third countries.(9) Defectors (inside or outside Cuba). It is important to note that the security mechanism in Cuba renders suspected potential defectors relatively inaccessible. The development of a defector program requires vast amounts of operational intelligence which has not been available. There are additional problems in seeking defections from among those who have families. The Cuban security apparatus combines with geography to further restrict attempts on the part of many who might defect if there was any reason to believe they could leave Cuba. Those who have sought asylum in other embassies in Havana have been refused exit visas for such prolonged periode that their information, when finally released, is practically useless.(10) Penetrations (inside or outside Cuba). Extreme caution must be used to prevent the compromise of any penetrations which can be made. Penetrations in the communist apparatus outside of Cuba may be of little utility or Cuban requirements of such low priority as to limit the scope of such attempts.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 159]
b. Propaganda and Psychological Operations(1) Radio and television directed at Cuba (black, white or grey).(2) Printed material (mail, airdrop, or packed with other material destined for Cuba). Airdrop is severely limited by Cuba's air defense capability.(3) Radio and television and printed material to Latin America.(4) Counterpropaganda(5) Rumor, threat, or other campaigns using all available communication assets, to include telephone. Propaganda should reach the proper target, should be consistent [Cuba versus other parts of Latin America). Psychological actions could include air dropping of foodstuffs and medicine, Russian language broadcasts, large scale military actions near Cuba of a deception nature, rumors and "plants" of information, etc.c. Political Actions(1) Inside Cuba to instigate demonstrations, establish a resistance net, or to take a particular action.(2) External to instigate demonstrations against Cubans.(3) Tours of Cuban exiles to Latin America and elsewhere (educators, jurists, labor leaders, women, youth, 'entertainers, religious and cultural groups, etc.). NOTE: Many of the above-actions can be accomplished overtly.d. Economic Actions(1) Sabotage of agriculture, power, industry, internal or external transport, communications, administration, or storage facilities.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 160]
(2) Covert operations to prevent sale of purchase of items destined for Cuba or coming from Cuba, (sugar, tropicals, etc.) NOTE: Since the Sino-Soviet commitment to Cuba is preponderant, a large portion is not susceptible to U. S. action; however, the remaining trade with the Free World, although relatively minor, is critical to Cuba and provides the U. S. with a lucrative target.(3) Counterfeiting. Because Cuba has essentially a barter market and mass distribution is difficult, this may not represent a useful activity. There are other very far reaching implications which must be considered against a relatively meager and short lived gain.e. Sabotage and Harrassing Actions(1) Sabotage of leaders homes, offices and military installations. (Economic sabotage included in paragraph d above).(2) Actions designed to withdraw people from harvest or to overwork military elements. (To include actions from rumors to major military exercises).(3) Radio or television intrusion or jamming.(4) Bribing, embarrassing, blackmailing, assassinating, coercing and kidnapping leaders.(5) Attack, seizure, search or harrassment and sabotage of air and naval traffic.(6) Attack, intimidation and harrassment of Cuban representatives abroad.f. Paramilitary Operations(1) Raids.(2) Prison breaks.(3) Weapons caches.(4) Reconnaissance in force.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 161]
8. Provocations or auto provocations. Contrived operations can be undertaken; however, it appears preferable to capitalize on real provocations which occur almost daily, in some form. Through political and psychological handling many of these real provocations can be developed into provocative acts.7. FUTURE OPTIONSA discussion of future options should be related specifically to the overall objective and should consider the factors indicated in paragraph 2 above.There may be advantages to taking clandestine actions for actions sake alone in order to (a) demonstrate and publicise continued Cuban resistance, (b) keep the resistance potential alive, (c) accede to demands for a spectacular action, (d) indicate a reprisal for actions by the Cuban Regime, (e) test, probe, deceive or harrass the internal security mechanism in Cuba and (f) establish a psychological climate for other overt actions.So long as Castro remains the "David" and the U. S. remains the "Goliath," the U. S. will have a major problem of image making in Cuba, Latin America and the world. Since April 1962, there are indications that the fascination for "Fidelisme" has waned significantly but to the Cubans, the Latin Americans and many other new-born states, Castro is still the "David" and the only Latin who has successfully challenged the North American giant. The recognition and support of a resistance leader (real or imaginary) in Cuba would only provide a partial solution to this problem.As the economic situation in Cuba becomes more intolerable, the U. S. may expect greater dissension and more manifestations of unrest, to include outbreaks of violence. At some point, the U. S. could be called upon to support openly such an effort. Obviously, it would be extremely embarrassing to the U. S. to be unable to respond before the resistance is crushed completely. In any event, it would be extremely difficult for the U. S. to support such a resistance in a clandestine or covert manner for more than a few days. Such support could serve to alert Cuba to U. S. intentions.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 162]
Theoretically, the most desirable event which could take place would envisage a major split of Cuban leadership involving relatively proportionate military and internal security forces. It is difficult under present circumstances to visualize a Cuban leader of such stature even considering such a move, since he has no real assurance of immediate U. S. military, economic and political support so vital to his tenure and so necessary to prevent a counter coup from those deriving strength from the heavy Sino-Soviet economic orientation of the present regime.The U. S. continues to be extremely vulnerable to acts of auto provocation by the Cuban Regime. It is not beyond the realm of possibility to have Cuban directed attacks of Guban military elements (disguised as exiles or U. S. personnel) on soft and emotional targets in Cuba.. Such an action could serve to help Castro, consolidate internally and to seriously embarrass the U. S. internationally.8. SUMMARYThe U. S. finds itself in an uncomfortable position of waiting for the breaks in Cuba and not knowing precisely when or how the breaks will occur. As time goes on the changes for an internally inspired revolt become increasingly more remote. Barring a major political schism in which major elements of the security forces are split, there is little promise of an internally sparked revolt of sufficient magnitude to permit the U. S. to muster multilateral representation or support and intervene on behalf of this resistance.According to authoritative sources, the U. S. will receive little or not advance notice of such an uprising and according to intelligence estimates there is little likelihood of such an uprising surviving for more than a few days. Also, it has been indicated that there is little likelihood of such a resistance could gain control of a radio station to request outside assistance. (It is recognized, however, that this probably would be one of the principle aims of any such action group.)17