Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 140]
CABLE BEC DIBSEM BY__________PER__________PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDTOTAL COPIESSECRETRUN BYREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAIISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITECSTAFF1.42536ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTEDACTION UNITBY__________AT__________ZRF. FILE. VRACTION#INFOT 344592 EIA750PAGE Ø2IN 699594TOR:291627Z SEP 75BUEN 34519HQS APPROVAL. OTHER INFO COULD BE SHOWN AT DESCRETION OF COS.SUBJ OF ROGERS LETTER RE SHOWING INTEL REPORTS TO AMB PRIOR TODISSEMINATION WAS THEN RAISED BY AMB. AMB SAID HE TOOK POSITION THISWAS POLICY MATTER WHICH HAD TO BE SOLVED IN WASHINGTON AND HAD SOINFORMED ROGERS. (COS SAW DRAFT OF LETTER TO ROGERS TO THIS EFFECT.)AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING AMB HANDED COS A NEWS ITEM (HAVANAMERIDIANO 80 IN SPANISH 1-15 JUL 75 PP 5-6, ARTICLE BY CARLOS MARIAGUTIERREZ ENTITLED AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HILL SEEN AS CIA AGENT INARGENTINA) AND ASKED THAT ARTICLE BE SHOWN TO VISITORS IN CAR, AMBTRUEHEART READ ARTICLE AND COMMENTED SOMETHING TO EFFECT THATARTICLE DID NOT SEEM TO HIM TO BE ANYTHING TO BE VERY CONCERNEDABOUT. MR. AARON DID NOT READ IT. POUCHING COPY. (AMB SUBSE-QUENTLY TOLD COS ARTICLE HAD BEEN GIVEN TO HIM IN WASHINGTON BYDEPUTY ASSISTANT RYAN.)2. ON WAY TO AIRPORT AFTER MEETING WITH AMB, TRUEHEART   MENTIONED AMB'S REQUEST TO SEE THEIR CREDENTIALS. SINCE THEY HAD   NONE, THEY SHOWED THEIR PASSPORTS. (AMB LATER TOLD COS HE HAD   ASKED TO SEE CREDENTIALS SINCE HE WANTED TO SEE FOR HIMSELF EXACTLY   WHAT THE LIMITS OF THEIR AUTHORITY WERE.) COS INFERRED THAT   VISITORS WERE TAKEN ABACK BY AMB'S REQUEST BUT MEETING WITH AMBSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 141]
CABLE SEC DISSEM BYPERPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDTOTAL COPIESSECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH/ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDSTAFF142536ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTEDACTION UNITBYATZRF FILEVRACTION #INFOT 344592 E1A750PAGE 03IN 699594TOR:291627Z SEP 75BUEN 34519WAS NONETHELESS HARMONIOUS. (AMB LATER CONFIRMED THIS IMPRESSION.)3. AMB TELEPHONED COS MORNING 28 SEP AND GAVE HIGHLIGHTS OF   DISCUSSION WITH VISITORS. FULLER ACCOUNT GIVEN IN HIS OFFICE EARLY   MORNING 29 SEP. AMB CHARACTERIZED VISITORS AS INTELLIGENT AND   BUSINESSLIKE. AMB HAD IMPRESSION THEY SATISFIED WITH VISIT TO BUENOS   AIRES AND WITH COOPERATION THEY RECEIVED FROM EVERYONE. HE   SPECULATED THAT THEIR REPORT WOULD BE WRITTEN IN MANNER WHICH SERVES   INTERESTS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE. AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS HE SATISFIED   WITH BKHERALD OPERATION IN ARGENTINA. ONLY AREA WHERE HE HAD A   QUARREL WITH BKHERALD IS THAT OF COMMUNICATIONS: AMB BELIEVES STATE   DEPT SHOULD CONTROL ITS OWN COMMUNICATIONS: HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO   BKHERALD HAVING ITS OWN COMMO, ALSO. REGARDING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF   BKHERALD ACTIVITY, AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS THAT BECAUSE OF   TERRORIST PROBLEM HE DID NOT WANT TO KNOW ABOUT BKHERALD ACTIVITIES   IN DETAIL AND TRUSTS COS TO TELL HIM WHATEVER HE NEEDS TO KNOW.   VISITORS SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN THIS VIEWPOINT, AMB SAID HE HAD   HAD A PROBLEM WITH ONLY ONE STATION CHIEF WHO NOW DECEASED, WIN   SCOTT, AND WITH ONE FORMER DIRECTOR, RICHARD HELMS. AMB EXPLAINED   THAT BEFORE HE WENT TO SPAIN AS AMB, DIRECTOR HELMS HAD TOLD HIM   SIXTY PERCENT OF MADRID STATION'S EFFORTS WERE DIRECTED AGAINSTSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 142]
CUBANS. ONLY LATER DID AMB FIND OUT BY CHANCE ABOUT SPORLONEFFORT DIRECTED AGAINST NORTH AFRICA. AMB SAID MR. HELMS AWARE OFHIS SENTIMENTS AS IS GENERAL WALTERS. EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENTBY VISITORS, AMB TOLD COS THAT AMB CRIMMINS HAD BEEN CRITICAL OFBKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.4. CURIOUSLY, AARON ASKED DCOS' SECRETARY FOR DATE EVENING   26 SEP. ALTHOUGH IT TURNED OUT BE PRIMARILY SOCIAL EVENT AND HE   DID NOT ATTEMPT ELICIT INFORMATION FROM SECRETARY, AARON DID MAKE   FOLLOWING COMMENTS OF INTEREST:(A) HE SAID HE HAD BEGUN TRIP WITH CERTAIN AMOUNT ANTI-BKHERALD BIAS BUT THIS HAD BEEN MUTED SOMEWHAT BY FAVORABLEIMPRESSIONS HE HAD OBTAINED OF VARIOUS BKHERALD OFFICERS IN THEFIELD WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN.(B) HE SAID HE THOUGH BUENOS AIRES' EMBASSY POLITICALSECTION WAS "JEALOUS" OF BKHERALD.(C) HE IMPLIED HIS EGO HAD BEEN BRUISED ON TRIP BECAUSEPEOPLE FREQUENTLY ASSUMED AMBASSADOR TRUEHEART, NOT HE WAS SENIOROFFICER. HE SAID HE NEXT PLANS TRIPS TO EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE,HEADQUARTERS, THEREFORE, MIGHT WISH ALERT FUTURE STATIONS HE WILLVISIT OF PECKING ORDER.
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 143]
CABLE GEC DISSEM BY__________PER__________TOTAL COPIES__________RUN BYPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.SECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEADVANCE COPY ISSUED: BLOTTED BY__________AT__________STAFFACTION UNIT| I   || --- || N   || F   || O   |RF FILE VR| 1 | 4 || 2 | 5 || 3 | 6 |ACTION #T 344592 EIA750 PAGE 05-05 IN 699594TOR:291627Z SEP 75 BUEN 345195. VISITORS DEPARTED BUENOS AIRES 27 SEP AT 2130 HOURS ON   SCHEDULE.6. AMB SAID HE HAD A GOOD TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MR. RICHARD   SAMPSON IN WASHINGTON, MENTIONING ESSENTIALLY SAME POINTS REPORTED   DIRECTOR 744995.7. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET.CS Comment: *Aaron and Trueheart's 26 September conversations with COSand DCOS.SECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 144]
SECRET 2522342 SEP 75 STAFFCITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 SECTION 1 OF 2TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO.RYBAT PLVWCADETREF DIRECTOR 7456261. COS AND DCOS HELD TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR WILLIAM TRUEHEART AND MR. DAVID AARON MORNING 25 SEP AND THEN ATTENDED LUNCHEON AT WHICH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOSEPH MONTLLOR, EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR WAYNE SMITH, AND FBI REP ROBERT SCHERRER ALSO PRESENT. EARLIER IN MORNING TTHE TWO VISITORS MET PRIVATELY WITH CHARGE MONTLLOR AND IN AFTERNOON TRUEHEART TALKED PRIVATELY WITH SMITH. (AARON BECAME ILL AND REMAINED IN HOTEL.) COS AND DCOS ALSO HAD DINNER ALONE WITH VISITORS EVENING 24 SEP.2. AARON CLEARLY IN CHARGE. (AT LUNCHEON TRUEHEART EXPLAINED THAT AARON IS HEAD OF THE COORDINATION AND CONTROL WORKING GROUP, ONE OF FOUR WORKING GROUPS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE, AND TRUEHEART IS SERVING AS CONSULTANT.) AARON ASKED MOST OF QUESTIONS. BY NATURE AND TONE OF SOME OF AARON'S QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS, WE SUSPECT THAT HE HAD PREFORMED NOTIONS WHICH ANTI-BKHERALD. (E.G., ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET PROGRAM DISCUSSED BELOW.)SECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 145]
13-00000LABLE BEC DIBERM BYPERPARBON/UNIT NOTIFIEDTOTAL COPIESHUN BYSECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEIARVANGE COPY IBSUED SLOTTERACTION UNITBYATZSTAFF142536RF. FILE VR.ACTIONINFOT 337339E1A706PAGE 02IN 697014TOR:2523372 SEP 75BUEN 345033. IN DISCUSSING BKHEARALD APPROACH TO SOVIET TARGET, AARON   ASKED IF IT REALLY MADE SENSE. TRY RECRUIT SOVIET IN "OUT OF WAY   PLACES" WHERE SOVIET, EVEN IF RECRUITED, WOULD NOT LIKELY HAVE ACCESS   TO INFORMATION OF VALUE TO USG. WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR INTERESTS NOT   PRIMARILY IN LOCAL SOVIET ACTIVITIES BUT IN INTERNAL SOVIET MATTERS,   POINTED OUT ACCESS SOVIETS HAVE TO THIS INFO EVEN WHILE ABROAD, SAID   SOME SOVIETS RECRUITED ABROAD SELECTED FOR INTERNAL HANDLING, ALSO   POINTED OUT CI VALUE OF CERTAIN TYPES INFO PROVIDED BY RECRUITED RIS   OFFICERS, NONE OF THIS SEEMED IMPRESS AARON, WHO CONTINUED QUESTION   VALUE OF BKHERALD SOVIET OPS IN MANY (BUT UNDEFINED) AREAS, SAID HE   HAD WORKED IN WHITE HOUSE WHERE HE SAW ALL INTEL, FOUND IT HARD   JUSTIFY BKHERALD SOVIET PROGRAM INPUT ON BASIS INTEL PRODUCTION. WE   ARGUED THIS IS ONE PROGRAM WHERE LARGE AMOUNT CASE OFFICER TIME   REQUIRED ON WORLD-WIDE BASIS IN ORDER ACQUIRE THE FEW GOOD SOURCES   WHO CAN BE PICKED UP AND WHO ARE PICKED UP. TRUEHEART ASKED FOR   EXAMPLES, AND WE REFERRED THEM TO HOS FOR DETAILS. TRUEHEART SAID   IT HIS IMPRESSION THAT BKHERALD NOW IN A Soviet PHASE", WHEREAS IN   EARLIER YEARS IT HAD BEEN IN COVERT ACTION OR OTHER PHASES. WE SAID   SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN MAJOR TARGET, AND OUR APPROACH TO THEM HAS   BEEN REFINED OVER THE YEARSSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 146]
SECRETT 337339 EIA706 PAGE 03 IN 697014TORI252337Z SEP 75 BUEN 345034. KEEN INTEREST WAS SHOWN IN STATION RELATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR AND DEGREE TO WHICH STATION ALLOWED AMBASSADOR EXERCISE CONTROL OVER, OR AT LEAST HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF, ITS OPERATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, DEGREE TO WHICH WE WOULD COORDINATE RECRUITMENT PROPOSAL OF GOVT OFFICIAL PRIOR TO MAKING PITCH. ANSWER: AMB WOULD BE INFORMED IF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY OR HIGH RISK INVOLVED, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE HERE THUS FAR. ASKED WHO DETERMINES IF AMB SHOULD BE INFORMED. ANSWER: COS. ASKED WHETHER AMB HAD PLACED CERTAIN POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT TARGETS OFF LIMITS. ANSWER: HE HAD NOT. THEN ASKED WHETHER, IF SUCH INJUCTION EXISTED, WE WOULD ADHERE TO IT OR TRY TO CIRCUMVENT IT. ANSWER: WE WOULD ADHERE TO IT. ASKED WHETHER AMB SATISFIED WITH WORK OF STATION AND ITS MISSION. ANSWER: WE BELIEVE SO, BUT DEFER TO AMB (WHO WILL RETURN BUENOS AIRES MORNING 26 SEP AND WILL TALK WITH TRUE- HEART,)5. BOTH WANTED KNOW HOW STATIONS'S REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON LOCAL POLITICAL SCENE WERE GENERATED (I.E., PRIMARILY BY HQS OR THROUGH DISCUSSION WITH AMB AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS). IT CLEAR THAT THRUST OF QUESTION WAS TO DETERMINE DEGREE TO WHICH STATION COOPERATED/COORDINATED WITH AMB AND OTHER SENIOR EMBASSY OFFICERS.SECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 147]
CABLK BEC DISSEM MY__________PERPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED,TOTAL COPIESHUN BYSECRETADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT ZACTION UNITREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THATISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITESTAFF1 RF. FILE VR 1 42 5ACTION#NFO3 6T 337339 ΕΙΑ706 PAGE 04 IN 697014TOR:2523372 SEP 75 BUEN 34503ANSWER: WE RECEIVED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FROM HOS ON CONTINUING BASIS, AND THESE FORM GOOD DEAL BUT NOT ALL OF GUIDANCE WE FOLLOW ON INTERNAL TARGET. WE ASSURED VISITORS WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT REPORT- ING FROM OTHER EMBASSY COMPONENTS AND THEIR NEEDS, VISITORS PROBED DEEPLY INTO MANNER IN WHICH STATION COORDINATES ITS REPORTING AND FORUMS THROUGH WHICH IT RECEIVES THIS GUIDANCE. WE MENTIONED TWICE WEEKLY POLITICAL MEETING PLUS COUNTRY TEAM MEETING AND FREQUENT INFORMAL CHATS WITH AMB AND OTHER OFFICERS. WE ALSO POINTED TO OUR PROCESS OF SHOWING REPORTS PRIOR TO DISSEMINATION TO POL SECTION AND OTHER INTERESTED COMPONENTS. REGARDING VOLUME OF REPORTS, WE SAID AVERAGE IS OVER 20 PER MONTH. REGARDING DISTRIBUTION OF HOS DISSEMINATED REPORTS, WE SAID AMB. RECEIVES ALL REPORTS AND, EXCEPT FOR EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ITEMS (WHICH ARE RARE), OTHER INTERESTED OFFICERS DO ALSO.6, IN RESPONSE THEIR QUERIES, WE ACKNOWLEDGED PRODUCTIVE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH LOCAL INTEL SERVICE (WHICH NOT IDENTIFIED BY NAME) BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL. SAID COS AND DCOS ONLY STATION OFFICERS DELCARED TO LIAISON. ASKED WHETHER WE IN TOUCH WITHBRITISH INTEL REP. ANSWER: YES, BUT THIS NOT SUBSTANTIVE RELATION- SHIP. THEY WANTED KNOW HOW WE HAD MET HIM, AND WE SAID RELATION-SECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 148]
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__________PER__________ TOTAL COPIES__________________________N BY__________PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED__________________________________________________________________________________________________SECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER TIISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED__________BY__________AT__________Z__________STAFFACTION UNITIRF. FILE VR1 42 5ACTION#NFO3 6T 337339 Ε1Α706 PAGE 05 IN 697014TOR1252337Z SEP 75 BUEN 34503SHIP HAS EXISTED FOR YEARS, AND CONTACT IS PASSED FROM ONE PERSONTO ANOTHER. ASKED WHETHER THERE SDECE REP IN BUENOS AIRES. ANSWER:WE NOT AWARE OF ANY. NO MENTION MADE OF ANY OTHER LIAISON CONTACTSAND SUBJECT OF LOCAL POLICE NOT RAISED.7. SUBJECT OF NOCS NOT RAISED.8. ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS. ANSWER:   WE   NONE OTHER THAN A FEW CONTACTS UNDER AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM.   STRESSED INFO COLLECTION ROLE OF THESE AGENTS AND CONTINGENCY NATURE   OF CONTACT IN COVERT ACTION CONTEST. ASKED WHETHER WE RECRUITING   NEW AGENTS. ANSWER: WE CONSTANTLY STRICE TO UPGRADE CALIBER OF   OUR REPORTING SOURCES AND THEREFORE ARE RECRUITING NEW ONES AND AT   SAME TIME WEEDING OUR LESS PRODUCTIVE ONES. WE EXPLAINED HOW ACCESS   OF GIVEN AGENT CAN CHANGE FROM ONE TIME TO ANOTHER DUE TO CHANGES   IN POLITICAL SCENE.9. FEW QUESTIONS ASKED REGARDING STATION STAFFING, WE   EXPLAINED IN RESPONSE QUESTING WHETHER STAFFING ADEQUATE THAT STATION   CUT BY OVER 30 PERCENT OVER LAST 18 MONTHS OR SO, INCLUDING CASE   OFFICERS WE ADMITTED THIS RESULTED IN CUTTING OF SOME LESS   IMPORTANT CONTACTS BUT NO LET UP IN EFFORTS AGAINST HARD TARGETS.   WE EXPLAINED FUNCTIONS OF EACH CASE OFFICER AND STRESSED TEAMSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 149]
# 13-00000CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__________PER__________ TOTAL COPIES__________RUN BY__________PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED__________SECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THANISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDADVANCE COPY ISSURD/SLOTTED__________BY__________AT__________ZSTAFFACTION UNITRF.. FILE VR.1 42 53 6ACTION #T 337339 EIA706 PAGE 06-06. IN 697014TOR:2523372 SEP 75 BUEN 34503CONCEPT IN WORKING AGAINST HARD TARGETS. OD OBJECTIVES ANDPRIORITIES WERE IDENTIFIED BY OD INSELF NOT PROVIDED.SECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 150]
SECRET 252234Z SEP 74 STAFFCITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 FINAL SECTION OF 2TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO.RYBAT PLVWCADET1. CONSIDERABLE INTEREST SHOWN IN SUBJECT OF TERRORISM. WE DESCRIBED TWO PRINCIPAL TERRORIST GROUPS (MONTONEROS AND ERP) AND STRESSED DIFFICULTIES OF PENETRATING THESE GROUPS. AARON SAID THAT CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HAD MENTIONED TO HIM THE CASE OF SOURCE FROM ANOTHER AREA WHO HAD PROVIDED COVERAGE IN THIS AREA. (AMB AWARE OF COVERAGE BY PJTENNIS-3 FROM TIME OF HIS FIRST VISIT AND HAD MENTIONED IT TO MONTLLOR,) WE EXPLAINED HOW SOURCE SUCH AS THIS CAN ESTABLISH GOOD CONTACTS AT HIGHER LEVEL AND PROVIDE GOOD INFO. WE STRESSED THAT OUR INTEREST WAS IN COLLECTING INFO BEARING ON SECURITY OF U.S. PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY. AARON ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD PROVIDE TO LIAISON INFO FROM OUR AGENT WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO CAPTURE TERRORISTS DURING MEETING WITH OUR AGENT, ANSWER: NO, FOR SEVERSL (OBVIOUS) REASONS, WHICH WE SPELLED OUT.2. EVENING 25 SEP AARON APPEARED TO HAVE RECOVERED FROM ILLNESS, WENT SHOPPING WITH TRUEHEART. BECAUSE BUENOS AIRES STORES WILL BE CLOSED 26 SEPT AND BECAUSE AARON NOT LEAVING
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 151]
13-00000CABLE BEC DISSEM BY ________ PER ________ TOTAL COPIES ________ RUN BY ________PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDSECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDSTAFFADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED ________ BY ________ AT ________ ZACTION UNIT1RF. FILE VR1 42 5ACTIONNFO3 608-08T 337290 Ε1Α660 PAGE 14IN 6970TOR:2523012 SEP 75 BUEN 34503UNTIL NIGHT 26 SEP AND TRUEHEART NIGHT 27 SEP, WE ANTICIPATE WEWILL HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM. THESE WILL BE COVEREDIN NEXT CABLE.12. WISH THANK INFO ADDEES FOR THEIR PROMPT AND USEFUL WRAP-UPS.E2 IMPDETSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 152]
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 7 PER LAB (G) TOTAL COPIES 6/1 RUN BY 8SECRETPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDSTAFFADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTEDACTION UNITCLA3ACTION #FILE VR DDO1 42 53 6T 345167 E! A304 PAGE 01-01 IN 699882TOR: 291957Z SEP 75 BRIL 24777SECRET 291925Z SEPT 75 STAFFCITE BRASILIA 24777TO: BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.RYBAT PLVWCADETREFI BUENOS AIRES 34519/(rn699594)REF PARA 3 SENTENCE "EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENTBY VISITORS, AMBASSADOR TOLD COS THAT AMBASSADOR CRIMMINSHAD BEEN CRITICAL OF BKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE."FYI, AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS ON HOME LEAVE AND RICHARD JOHNSON,DCM, WAS CHARGE AT TIME OF AARON'S AND TRUEHEARTIS VISIT TOBRASILIA. IN THE SHORT TIME COS HAS BEEN IN BRASILIA,CRIMMINS HAS BEEN MORE THAN COOPERATIVE AND APPEARED TOBE MORE APPRECIATIVE OF BKHERALD'S EFFORTS THAN MOST STATEOFFICERS. WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD GETELABORATION ON HILL'S REMARKS ON LOW KEY BASIS. E2, IMPDET.SECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 153]
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 6 PER LH 8E,0, TOTAL COPIES 6-19PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED SECRETADVANCE COPY INQUED/SLOTTEDC/LA EIQIBY CAT 1510 zACTION UNIT RE FILE VR 000ZLA3ACTION NFOT 329488 E1A040 PAGE 01 EYES ONLY IN 694147TORI231523Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723SECRET 2314092 SEP 75 STAFFCITE BRASILIA 24723 SECTION 1 OF 2TOI: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.RYBAT PLVWCADET1. HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART   AFTERNOON 22 SEPT, TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO   OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S   ACTIVITIES.2. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN   DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS. FOL IS HIGHLIGHT   OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY AND MONDAY.3. AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS   OPERATIONS--E.G. LINE OF COMMAND FROM HOS AND STATION'S   RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES. HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN   PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM   STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF   QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER   OUR OPERATIONS. BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL   ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS,   FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEETSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 154]
T329488 E!A040 PAGE 02 IN 694147TOR:231523Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCUIATED IN THE OD. PERIODICREPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO HOS TO APPRISE THEM OF WHAT WEHOPED TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO OUR OD PRIORITIES, AND THIS WASFOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISED AGAINSTTHESE PRIORITIES. A "REPORT CARD" SYSTEM EXISTED WHERE INWE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE. AARON WAS INTERESTED INHOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USED) WORKING ONTHE HARD TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSETARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS(RECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE C/0.THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN THEHARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUITRECEIVED A ZERO SCORE, HOWEVER, IF THE C/O WORKING ON THEHARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE. HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OFACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONEOR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES, AND ALL IN ALL DID HISHOMEWORK, WORKED HARD WAS AGGRESSIVE, BUT WAS NOTSUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLE,HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD GRADE, AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK OFSUCCESS IN RECRUITING A HARD TARET INDIVIDUAL EVER HELD
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 155]
UP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCETHIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THATEARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT.4, THE NOC PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTHAARON AND TURE HEART, THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMESOR COVER COMPANIES, BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR NOCS(SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND IN CASETHE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHETHER CUTOUTS WERE USED INCONTACTING NOCS (NO, DIRECT INSIDE C/O CONTACT UNDERSCRUPULOURS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTHTHE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS. WERE GIVENTHEM AND NOCS WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT INGETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED).5. AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE   PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF   INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A CO/0 SPENT HIS DAY,   THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID   WE ENSURE THAT C/OS DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME   INDIVIDUAL (CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE   CONTROL), WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 156]
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__________PERPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED______________________SECRETADVANCE COPY 188UED/SLOTTED BY____AT_____ACTION UNIT1RF. FILE. VR2ACTION #3456T 329488 ΕΙΑ040 PAGE 04 IN 694147TOR:2315232 SEP 75 BRIL 24723DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT (PENETRATION OFLIAISON AND JOINT EF FORT WITH LIAISON--TEL ET AP S,SURVEILLANCE, ETC.--AGAINST HARD TARGETS), DISCUSSIONS ONCOVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME, DESPITE HQSBRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THEDIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MEDIA OP AND A COVERT POL ACTION OP.MUCH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER. WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FORPOLITICAL ACTION OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTOTHAT ACTIVITY, IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN INPOL ACTION IN BRAZIL FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING ASSUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE FON SUCH ACTION,THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZEROPAGE 3 BRASILIA 247236EGEUNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE. IT WASEXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL MEDIA CAPABILITY AS WELL ASAN AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAYRESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THECHILEAN VARIETY,6. AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT, WANTED TO   KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELYSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 157]
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY PERPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDTOTAL COPIES RUN BYSECRETADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT ZACTION UNIT STAFF1 RF FILE VR 1 42 53 6ACTION #T 329488 E1A040 PAGE 05 IN 694147TOR: 2315232 SEP 75 BRIL 24723HOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL COS SPENT IN TRAINING (COULDN'T HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN TRAINING BUT SAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY, THAT OVER THE YARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE PHOTOGRAPHY, COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT: INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS WRITING, ETC. MENTION WAS MADE OF MID-CAREER COURSE, PLUS SENIOUR SEMINARS AVAILABLE TO OFFIERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE AT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETC.) (AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE AND ASKED FOR PARTICULARS,)7. ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND TUREHAEART WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER COB HAD AUTHORITY TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HOS WITH INFO TO STATION (YES, ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR TO THE LOCAL SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE FIRST SENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC. PRIOR TO ONWARD TRANSMISSION.) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY DID SEESECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 158]
# 13-00000CABLE SEC DISSEM BY PER TOTAL COPIES RUN BYSECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDSTAFFADVANCE COPY ISBURD/SLOTTED BY AT Z|     |     |     || --- | --- | --- || 1   | 4   |     || 2   | 5   |     || 3   | 6   |     |ACTION UNIT I RF FILE VR.ACTION INFOT 329488 EIA040 PAGE 06-06 IN 694147TOR1231523Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723THOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT TO THEM. INTEL ON MAJORITEMS-SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIESVIS-A-VIS THE U.S.-WAS SHOWN TO THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TOSUBMISSION, STATION MADE IT A PRACTIVE TO CHECK INTELOUT WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR TOTRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIALBY THE STATION. THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION ISREQUIRED TO LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHENSENSITVE INFO AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED.THIS HAD NOT HAPPED IN THE COS'S SHORT TENURE INSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 159]
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ____________ PER ____________ TOTAL COPIES ____________ RUN BY ____________PERSON UNIT NOTIFIEDSECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THANISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDSTAFFPRECEDENCEADVANCE COPY ISSUED, BLOTTED BY ____________ AT ____________ACTION UNIT| I   | RF  | FILE | VR  || --- | --- | ---- | --- || N   |     |      |     || F   |     |      |     || O   |     |      |     |ACTION#T 329420 EIA971 PAGE 01 IN 694101TOR:231508Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723SECRET 231409Z SEPT 75 STAFFCITE BRASILIA 24723 FINAL SECTION OF TWOTO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.RYBAT PLVWCADETBRASILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTS CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THE AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL ZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY. SECURITY WAS THE CARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION.8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL SECTION--WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED ACCORDINGLY).9. AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVESECRET