Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 120]
d. The Forum of World Opinion.(1) Elimination of Cuba from Hemisphere organizations exhibits the penalty for conductive subversive activity in her neighboring states.(2) U.S.-Soviet talks regarding removal of Soviet combat forces from Cuba are productive in that they continue the pressure on the USSR and the Cubans, and keep the subject of subversion before the world.e. Current Political Actions Aimed at Impeding Travel into and out of Cuba.(This to be provided by State)2. Programs Which May be Undertaken.It is clear that those activities which relate to the denial of agent movement and the suppression of propaganda serve directly to diminish the Communist capability to export subversion from Cuba. It is necessary, however, to contemplate other actions which, while less directly related to subversion, still serve to weaken Cuba and its Communist dictatorship, and thus to eliminate the problem at its source. It is for this reason that there is presented herein a full spectrum of actions related directly to Cuba. While it is clear that some actions listed may exceed the horizons of feasibility, in terms of scope, vigor, or the requirements of international relations, it is nevertheless considered necessary that they be set forth in their entirety, in order that the President may contemplate the full array of options.a. Extend Surveillance of Cuba and the Caribbean.(1) Monitor, observe and report upon all air and sea transportation - both scheduled and non-scheduled, both Free World and Communist - in the Caribbean areas contiguous to Cuba. Develop an agreed multi-national politico-military program providing for inspection by each cooperative Latin American state of suspected carriers within its territory, or its territorial waters.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 121]
(2) Consider, at a time when the criticality of the situation dictates, re-instituting the quarantine of Cuba giving as a reason evidence of the export of agents and materials of subversion by and through Cuba.b. Intensify Psychological Actions.(1) Create problems for the Castro regime and its subversive programs by an intensified psychological effort emphasizing the hardships and sufferings being endured by the Campesinos while subversive trainees are given favored treatment.(2) Publicizing the contrast between living conditions of USSR instructors and those of the Cuban peasants.(3) Increase greatly the amount of VOA broadcast time tailored to Cuba, and intensify emphasis on the degradation and suffering brought on the Cuban people by the Castro subversive effort.(4) Conduct airborne television broadcasts aimed at the Cuban people and Latin American students in Cuba, dwelling on the theme that Castro's subversive efforts are designed to destroy the tranquility of the Hemisphere.c. Intensify Physical Intelligence Gathering Efforts.(1) By non-attributable means - Cubans and third country nationals endeavor to acquire much more hard intelligence on the nature and scope of subversive training conducted in Cuba and methods of exportation.d. Movement of Personnel.Through multilateral and bilateral political arrangements with Latin American states, seek to impede the movement of persons into and out of Cuba.(This to be expanded by State.)5
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 122]
e. Diminish the Physical and Economic Capabilityof Castro Cuba to Train and Export Subversives.It is evident that ready funds, in considerable quantity, are required to conduct a subversive training program, not to speak of other costly factors - arms, demolitions, fuel, food, propaganda, etc. Specific actions aimed at reducing the Cubans' resources will thus have a direct effest upon their ability to pursue their program of subversion, will cause then to turn to their can internal problems and will give the Russians pause as to the wisdom of pursuing a program which is costly and marginally productive. Likewise, every action which contributes to instability, unrest, apprehension and dissension between Russian and Cuban will reduce correspondingly both their ability and their opportunity to drive forward on a program of subversive training and exportation. The following actions will contribute to this end:(1) Cause unrest, fear and suspicion in the Castro regime.(a) Introduce many small inexpensive sabotage kits into the country. Even if utilized by only a small number of malcontents, in the aggregate they would waste valuable resources, take Communist lives and divert the attention of the regime from its dynastic programs.(b) Introduce very large numbers of small inexpensive firearms and ammunition into the country. Such action would cause grave unrest in the Castro regime and among the Russians, and would result, inevitably, in costly search operations.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 123]
(2) Attrit Cuban resources.(a) Purchase the defection of personnel, air- craft, ships, boats and other valuable items.(b) Conduct non-attributable actions against petroleum resources, upon which much of Cuba's economy depends. These actions should extend all the way from direct destruction to sabotage through chemical and bacterial contamination of carriers and storage.(c) By means of intelligence indications cause Cuban military forces to stand continually at a high alert level and thus to consume supplies which could otherwise be dedicated to subversive training.(3) Diminish Cuban financial resources.(a) Introduce counterfeit currency in large quantities, to distort the Cuban financial posture, and to understand confidence.(b) Create rumors of bank failures.(4) Create suspicion and dissension between Cubans and Russians.Since the Russians are doubtless a major factor in training programs conducted in Cuba, such action will interfere with their interrelationships will diminish directly the subversive training capa- bility:(a) Initiate a Russian language program beamed to Cuba and designed to attract Russian listeners. Once an audience is established, undertake to cause the Russians to question the purpose of, wisdom in, and personnel risk involved by their presence in Cuba.7
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 124]
(b) Exploit the presence of the Red Army in Cuba by driving a wedge between the Soviet soldier instructors and the Cuban population. Efforts to attain this chjective would tholude the use of live double agents, planted rumors, incidents oreated by guerrilla thesurgents, and propaganda designed to identify the hardship of the peasant with the Soviet intrusion.(c) Develop astion'plans for Cubans to kidnap, harass and destroy Russian techniciens. Offer bounty, through olandestine sources, for destruction of Russian personnel.(Aaditional astions, adbed directly at the subversive training and distribution potential in uba, should be added by other Egencies, in their breas of competence).III. Measures Designed to Enhance the Capabilities of the Latin American Staten to Resist Commmist Subversion1. Programs now in beingsIn appraising the programs which are now in progress it is necessary to reflect that, extensive though they are, many have not yet accelerated to their full thrust and, taken all together, they have certainly not fortified our allies to the point where subversion can be paid to be under full control.a. US Military Efforts.United States military forces are now participating in a broad spectrum of military and extra-military functions in Latin America, all of which contribute to strengthening the ability of the countries to exposa and put down subversive activity. Of these, the principal ares8
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 125]
(1) Counterinsurgency, anti-subversion and pay-chological operations training, through the medium of military missions and mobile training teams.(2) Provision of equipment and material on short notice for use in the face of subversion or subversive threats.(3) The condust of emergency training programs in mob and rist control.(4) Provision of formal counterinsurgency educn- tion for Latin American officers and enlisted men in United States Service schools and academies.(5) Provision of civic action training and assistance.(6) Ancillary military efforts aimed at strengthen- ing the ability of Latin American countries to resist subversions(a) United States provision of maintenance support and assistance for Latin American naval and air units.(b) Officer exchange programs.(c) Language training for Latin American adlitary students.(4) International Amy, Navy and Air Force Defense Conferences.(e) Cooperative mapping operations.(7) Troop informationsThe United States military is embarked on a program aimed at making the Latin American military autre of the realities of Communism and Communist subversion. This includens9
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 126]
(a) Translation into Spanish and printing of 50,000 sets of the series of ten pamphlets entitled, "Democracy versus Communism".(b) Development of an audio/visual film strip based on the "Democracy versus Communism" pamphlets for the illiterate Latin American enlisted men. One-hundred and eighty of these films and records have been sent to CINCARIB for further distribution to the Latin American services.(c) Thirteen-hundred copies of the USIA pamphlet "Tactices y Directivas Contra La Farsa Communista" are being procured for distribution among the Latin American military.b. The Politico-Economic Effort (to be supplied by State).e. The Propaganda Effort (to be supplied by USIA).4. The Intelligence and Non-attributable Efforts (to be supplied by CIA).2. Programs Which May Be Initiated.An in the osse of Section II, the programs outlined below are within reasonable technical and practical competence. However, as they cross the complete spectrum of actions, it is realized that some may be found unsuitable, on political or other grounds.a. Surveillance:(1) Establish a Caribbean sea and coastal surveillance program which provides for multilateral exchange of information and multilateral participation in an alerting systems each country to be responsible for patrolling its own coast.(2) Require a US Intelligence input into the Caribbean alerting system and provide for exchanging intelligence between subscriber nations.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 127]
(3) Continue the improvement of US communications in Latin America, at high priority, to contribute to the effectiveness of the alerting system.b. Multinational Counterinsurgency Force.Explore the feasibility of organizing an OAS Counterinsurgency Brigade for employment throughout Latin America to combat the effects of subversion. Such a proposal, made at this time, would exhibit the serious determination of the U.S. to support vigorously an anti-subversion program.c. Training and Orientation.Provide for a greatly expanded out-of-country training and orientation program for key segments of each Latin American country's population such as:(1) Enlisted and officer military personnel to be schooled in Panama and/or the United States.(2) Police personnel to be schooled in Panama or the United State.(3) Newspaper personnel to be schooled within the United States.(4) Nurses (male and female) to be trained in the United States.(5) Civilian technicians to be trained in United States training schools.The thrust of such an expanded training program, taking place in the United States, is not just to enhance the skill and education level of the people involved but, even more, to expose the Latins to US influence, to show then our country, to persuade them by close association that our view is correct, and this to stiffen their resolve to combat subversion in any form.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 128]
d. Troop Information ProgramExpand greatly the current Latin American troop information program in order to educate the Latin American servicemen (and their afvilion contemporaries) to the subversive danger they face.e. News and Propaganda(1) Undezurite, as necessary, and conduct an information program within each country in Latin America using these themes:(a) An exposition of facts on subversive training, movement of subversives, and general subversive programs.(b) Objectives of the Communists within each country.(c) Communist methods of operation.(d) Facts on the decrease in living standards within Caba since the rise of Castro.(e) Facts on terror and repression in Cuba.(2) Develop a Pro-American Anti-Communist PressMany Latin American papers, even the anti-communist ones, are infiltrated by communist agents and many of their colummmists, proof-readers and linotypers are bought with communist money. Circulation of these papers is artifically inflated by low prices and underwritten by communist funds. The United States must match this financial investment in news control in order to convey the truth to the Latin who, like the American, believes what he reads.(3) Distribute Anti-Communist LiteratureBooks and pamphlets, in large numbers, exposing the reality of communism should be printed in Spanish and Portuguese and distributed through inexpensive commercial sale.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 129]
f. Travel controls(1) We should strive for an OAS embargo on travel to and from Cuba. If unable to achieve a majority decision in the OAS we should pursue the matter on a bilateral basis, outside of the framework of the OAS, and inject these Cuban isolationist criteria into acceptance requirements of the "Alliance for Progress".(2) We should initiate measures against Cuba directed at preventing Latin Americans from entering Cuba or returning to their own countries and prevent the travel of Cuban personnel and goods to other Latin American countries. The "Alliance for Progress" should be used as a lever, adding these requirements to the acceptability criteria.(3) We should promote arrangements which permit extradition of individuals who are charged with sub-versive activities8. Improve Our Counterinsurgency ProgramsWe should accelerate and broaden counterinsurgency programs in each country of Latin America, driving for a realistic "Internal Defense Plan" for every country and urging Latin American countries to ask for US counter-insurgency training assistance, for military, paramilitary and police forces.h. Sponsor Land and Political ReformIntensity action through OAS channels to bring about land and political reform in Latin America in order to reduce the susceptibilities of the "have-nots" to communist subversion.1. Support Labor and Youth ReformsEncourage reforms to ameliorate the frustrations of labor and youth. With labor, it is a matter of economics; with youth, it is a matter of orientation.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 130]
# SECRETUnless sufficient reform is made to satisfy the aspirations of the laborer; and unless sufficient evidence is presented to embryonic intellectuals that Castroism is the greater of the political/economic evils facing them, Castro will continue to find a fertile bed for his seeds.J. Non-attributable actions(1) Through third parties, seek and destroy the communist agents, fund resources, and subversive capability wherever it exists.(2) Penetrate communist party labor and youth groups in the Latin American target countries.Objectives would include:(a) Publicized exposure of the apparatus.(b) Frustration of subversive plans and apprehension of leaders by government authority.(c) Counterespionage against future subversive planning.(3) Instigate and stage selected terrorist incidents in Latin American countries, designed to implicate Castro.(4) Arrange for caches of Soviet-Czech arms to be "discovered" in selected Latin American countries, ostensibly smuggled in from Cuba.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 131]
IV. ConclusionIt is the conviction of the Committee that the actions outlined in the preceding sections comprise a program which offers promise of meeting and ultimately reversing the process of Cuba-based Communist subversion in Latin America. Each individual action embodies some element of usefulness in itself, and any combination of actions may generate correspondingly favorable results. There is no profound relationship which demands the combining of any specific set of actions.It is recommended, therefore, that an early selection be made of those actions listed above whose execution is compatible with national obligations and dedications in other areas, and that they be put quickly into effect since the longer the subversive influences in the Hemisphere are permitted to mature, the more difficult will be their ultimate elimination.And finally, recognizing the diverse nature of the Cold War activities involved, it is recommended that a single point in the Government be designated and assigned responsibility for supervising execution of the total program.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 132]
Originating Agency:Subject:Date:Other Agency Equities (check those that apply:)DIANavy ☑ONIOSDJoint StaffUSAFNSCState Dept. ☑CIAOther(Please specify below)> The Department of State has no objection to the> release or declassification of this document in full> under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Record> Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)> Reviewed on 7/20/97
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 133]
# IX.A.3.d. General Pressures to Create a ContingencyIn order to accomplish the overthrow or reorientation of the Cuban regime without harming the United States image and with minimum distortion of bilateral US-USSR relationships, there must be careful coordination and phasing of our future actions and demeanor. There must be a plan capable of getting us from where we are now to where we want to go, by gradually increasing pressures until the objective is achieved. These pressures should be designed to create opportunities and contingency situations for further exploitation, along the way.The optimum orchestration of such a Cuban program must obviously be developed as the future unfolds. But in order to provide overall guidance within this Government, a plan tracing the mainstreams of effort is required. This plan is divided into eight headings with a gradually increasing level of effort described under each of these headings. The progress through the various phases is visualized as taking place in a coordinated but not necessarily symmetrical manner. In other words, we may be in the most vigorous phase of propaganda while not yet having reached the final phase with regard to subversion but nonetheless the decision to proceed to the respective phase in either category would be coordinated as part of an overall governmental orchestration.A program scenario capable of producing a decisive change or exploitable contingency over an 18-month period follows.US Posture - Initially the US image should be that of willingness to do all that is necessary to keep Castro's military threat nil and his subversive threat to the Western Hemisphere at an acceptably low level. It should be characterized as one during which the USG, having been.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 134]
extremely reasonable despite Castro's intransigence, is waiting for signs of more favorable change in Cuba. Later the US image should change to one in which the US is being "led" by the majority of the OAS into OAS initiated and sponsored pressures against Cuba. These would consist of measures less than those certain to overthrow Castro but going beyond the earlier measures, in the expectation that resulting internal pressures might eliminate Castro or provide an occasion for decisive action. Pressures would be applied in such fashion as to represent both a carrot to the Cuban people to get rid of Castro regime and a stick toward the present regime. Still later the US stance should become publicly, "at last" to join the OAS majority in seeking vigorous pressures on the Castro regime without yet irrevocably committing US prestige to decisive action. Finally, if and when the orchestration and circumstances have brought the US position to such a point that decisive action is possible, and if earlier pressures have not eliminated Castro or do not give promise of eliminating, some decisive action might be considered. This need not be an invasion by US forces and could be re-imposition of total blockade or a disarming airstrike, dependent on the circumstances.OAS Action - The USG will need to devote major attention to the strengthening of the solidarity of the OAS as a source of regional opposition to the Castro regime. These efforts should go forward openly along several lines, quite apart from the covert effort to organize the majority on specific issues. This effort to achieve solidarity should consist of frequent briefings of the OAS nations through all appropriate channels, Consultative Meetings of Foreign Ministers of the OAS, efforts to set up an OAS military organization with occasional commitment of troops
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 135]
for training, and all other feasible developments of regional themes, suchas intensive efforts to build up the counterinsurgency capabilities of theregion. It is very necessary, in view of the general LA situation tocontinue all measures necessary to isolate Castro.Initial QAS action should be the enlargement of the bases for theinvocation of the Rio Treaty. This broadening should be against the con-tinued presence of Soviet troops (unless negotiations with the USSR indicatethat this aspect should be deferred) and/or against Castro's continuedsubversive activity. Concomitantly, the recent study of the SpecialConsultative Committee on Security should be given wide publicity andthe US should press for implementation of its recommendations.The OAS, in the near future, probably after publication of the resultsof the foregoing study and enlargement of the basis for invoking the RioTreaty to include subversion, should again formally warn Cuba againstpromotion of any more subversive activities. The OAS should formallystate that should Cuban subversive activities rise above some (unspecified)level, a "new condition" would exist which would justify decisive actionagainst Cuba. All episodes of subversion or sabotage which could beattributed to Castro should be highly publicized. The majority OAS supportshould be organized to neutralize the Brazilian co-existence theme.Bilateral approaches and economic quid pro quos should be used to winBrazil to the U.S. view within OAS.Still later, at an appropriate time, the OAS should make an officialfinding, from its studies initiated earlier, that the Castro regime hascontinued, despite warnings, to conduct aggressive and subversive actionsin Latin America. A summary publication of subversive activities or
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 136]
White Paper should be promulgated through the OAS. Later a "new condition" should be found formally to exist, following which the US would state that the earlier US-USSR modus vivendi regarding Cuba has come to an end. Following the above, an OAS vote should call for the remaining LA nations to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba and for all members to restrict their nationals from travel to Cuba. Castro should be officially labeled as a major threat to the hemisphere and to the objective of the Alliance for Progress.The OAS might then declare that Castro's subversive activity constitutes warlike activity and proclaim a prohibition against any warlike activity being conducted by Cuba within an ocean and land area around the entire LA continental and Caribbean area. Intervention of aircraft and ships carrying arms, subversive agents, propaganda materials, etc. could be authorized.Still later at an appropriate time the OAS should vote, under the Rio Pact, to punish Castro's aggression. This action could take the form of a resolution for all members to take such action including the use of force as individually considered appropriate or to endorse any specific decisive action to which the members had agreed.The USG should brief its Allies on the views of the OAS and warn that the situation may get worse. Later, as a result of "OAS insistence" the Free World should be urged to extend or re-affirm trade embargos to all items except food stuffs, medicines, and medical supplies; to apply shipping restrictions; NATO should be persuaded to include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited; free world industrial nations should be dissuaded from shipping to Cuba