Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 51]
ENCLOSURE BMEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMYSubject: Courses of action related to Cuba (U)The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the courses of action that might be taken by the United States to contrive a pretext for US military intervention in Cuba. They are of the opinion that the discussion in the Appendix thereto would be useful to you in your capacity as Executive Agent of the Department of Defense for Policy toward Cuba.GROUP 1EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATICDOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATIONJCS 2304/189(Rev. 5/13/63)JUL2 - 1125TOP SECRET
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TOP SECREP SENSUNCLASSIFIED FOR SEGRETAPPENDIXDISCUSSIONINTRODUCTION1. Purpose. This report is in response to a request from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to consider the desirability and requirements of a fomented revolt in Cuba. It includes an examination of engineering an incident or a series of incidents as a cause for invasion and consideration of pertinent comments received from CINCLANT.2. Summary. Study of the desirability and the requirements of a fomented revolt in Cuba and of the advantages of engineering an incident or a series of incidents rather than trying to generate and coordinate action from inside involving many Cubans of doubtful reliability leads to the conclusions that:a. It is unlikely that an effective spontaneous revolt will occur in the near future.b. Any uprising without US overt support is likely to be short-lived because of the improved Cuban/Soviet.military capabilities presently in Cuba and Castro's increasingly efficient internal security operations.c. There appears to be little likelihood that the Castro communist regime will risk a direct provocation that could be used as a pretext for US intervention.d. Unless the United States intervenes militarily, the Castro government will become more firmly entrenched and its efforts and ability to spread international communism will increase.e. The United States should intervene militarily in Cuba and could (a) engineer provocative incidents ostensiblyNSITIVE1(Rev. 5/13/63)URCLASSIFIEDAppendixSECRET
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f. perpetrated by the Castro regime to serve as the cause of Invasion or (b) foment a revolt within Cuba which would call for US military intervention. Engineered provocation would provide greater advantages in control, timing, simplicity, and security than would a fomented revolt. It would be most difficult to generate a widespread effective revolt. However, the staging of a local uprising as a contrived incident should not be precluded.g. The United States should:(1) Initiate a coordinated program to create a pretext for US military intervention in Cuba.(2) In support of the above, undertake a flexibly phased effort to build Cuban resistance potential, commencing with the intensification of intelligence collection and sabotage in Cuba, and the creation of a framework for guerrilla activity.(3) At a propitious time, launch appropriate military action to remove the Castro communist government.h. Implementation of the above would involve many agencies of the United States Government. It would appear necessary that one governmental organization should be given the primary responsibility for developing such a national plan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development of this national plan.i. The broad concepts herein and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be forwarded to the Special Group (5412 Committee) for consideration under the provisions of NSAM 57.j. CINCLANT's concept for fomenting a revolt in Cuba while containing much merit, should be re-examined both for its timing and for the large-scale guerrilla activity it envisages.
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b. Conduct physical and psychological military harassment of the Cuban regime and covert and clandestine operations as directed.c. Undertake military action in Cuba in accordance with contingency plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and directed by the President. The primary purpose of the US military intervention would be to assure the overthrow of the Castro communist government and to assist in the establishment of a new, non-communist government acceptable to the United States.20. The implementation of any of the suggested courses of action in this study would involve many agencies of the United States Government. It would appear necessary, therefore, that one single governmental organization be given the primary responsibility for developing a national plan.21. Because of the extensive military operations involved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development of this national plan. In addition, for a contrived revolt, they should be assigned the specific responsibility for develop- ing the military and paramilitary aspects of the plan. This would require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to seek a determination under NSAM 57 when a revolt contrived by the United States were an operation large enough to warrant control of covert forces by the Department of Defense and that CINCLANT be designated as the DOD agent. In this connection, CINCLANT has developed a specific concept for political and military action in Cuba.CINCLANT CONCEPT22. The CINCLANT concept provides for inciting a revolt in Cuba, followed by overt, large-scale US military operations. The proposed timing of operations permits completion in 15-18 months. Supporting operations by CIA, State, and USIA will be required.
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVEUNCLASSIFIEDSECRET23. Preliminary operations require the introduction by CIA as soon as practicable of assets into Cuba for the development of intelligence, the organization by State of a Free Cuban Government (FCG), the development of a propaganda plan by USIA, and the development of a suitable cover plan.24. Actual operations would commence with the execution by CINCLANT of OPLAN 380-63 about 15 January 1964. This plan calls for infiltrating of UW forces into Cuba for area assessment, establishing guerrilla bases, developing military units, establishing escape and evasion nets and conducting subversion. On about 15 June 1964, UW forces would be augmented and would accelerate subversive operations to create conditions favorable for establishing a Free Cuban Government on Cuban soil and for employment of conventional forces.25. CINCLANT then proposed that on about 15 July mobilization of forces for US conventional operations would begin. Execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 312 would commence on 26 July 1964 followed by D-Day OPLAN 316, about 3 August 1964..26. Although the foregoing schedule is approximate, it should be noted that the Free Cuban Government would be required to exist at least for 18 days in the face of the Castro government's excellent counterguerrilla ability. This time requirement appears to be excessive, but it could be shortened.. The criteria for United States recognition of a new government could be met in this period. The Free Cuban Government could claim it:a. Was in actual possession of the governmental machinery.b. Was administering it with general acceptance by the population; and,c. Was prepared to honor international obligations.TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE(Rev. 5/13/63)13UNCLASSIFIEDAppendixTOP SECRET
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27. The UW forces required for CINCLANT OPLAN 380-63 are approximately:(1) Headquarters, Joint - 6 Off 42 EMUnconventional Warfare TaskForce, Atlantic (JUWTFA)(2) UW Operating Base - 36 Off 482 EM(3) Support Units - 15 Off 331 EM(4) Special Forces - 1 Group Headquarter(reinf.)2 Companies (reinf.)(5) Submarines - 2(6) APD - 1(7) SEAL Teams - 1(8) Air Commandos - 150 Personnel20 Aircraft4 Air Control Teams(9) CIA Forces - Internal and Externalassets as required by• CINCLANT.28. CINCLANT does not have UW forces assigned at this time, however, a nucleus JUWTFA staff is included within the CINCLANT staff and has the capability for preparing UW plans for normal contingencies. Planning or conducting UW operations of the magnitude envisaged in CINCLANT's concept in this plan is beyond current capabilities.29. At an appropriate time in preliminary operations the activation of the JUWTFA as a separate organization and the assignment to it of full wartime headquarters complement of 48 officers, 56 enlisted men, and five civilians would be required. Approval of any concept in principle or for planning purposes, however, would not necessitate the
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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE UNCLASSIFIED TOP SECRETactivation of a separate headquarters. In this case, CINCLANT would re-evaluate his staff capabilities and submit appropriate recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.30. CINCLANT in a related outline concept recommended, concerning the use of Cuban nationals in UW operations, that "As practical, the Military Services should initially form their Cuban nationals into integral, all Cuban units . . .". It is considered that the creation of a "Cuban Expeditionary Force" in anticipation of its employment in the execution of OPLAN 316 is a risk which cannot be justified and should not be undertaken. There appears to be no reason, however, why Cubans could not be formed into small teams for use in UW activities. It is estimated that from two to four hundred carefully selected Cubans could be used in this role. It would be appropriate for the CIA in a supporting role to select and train the individuals forming them into teams of appropriate size to be made available for joint use by CINCLANT or by CIA, as necessary.31. For other details of training Cuban nationals, see JCSM-350-63.32. The force levels in CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316 are adequate to cope with the improved Cuban military capability and the presence of Soviet troops on the island.33. The experience of the JUWTFA during the Cuban crisis in October 1962, indicates that the present military supply system in the CONUS will be unable immediately to provide equipment and supplies in the required configuration for projected UW operations in Cuba. The Army is currently studying prestockage of UW equipment and will submit proposals for approval and financing.TOP SECRET SENSITIVE(Rev. 5/13/63)15 Appendix
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34. The conceptual outline submitted by CINCLANT does not provide an exact plan in detail for contriving a revolt in Cuba. However, his general concept would provide for:"a. Incremental steps in replacing the present communist dominated government of Cuba by infiltration, subversion, unconventional warfare, limited conventional actions and finally full-scale invasion in that order, if necessary.b. The capability of US to withdraw at any point in the process if unfavorable international reactions or pressures require it; or if the Cuban people themselves, in a successful revolt, overthrow the present regime and form a government favorable to US interests.c. An ambiguous atmosphere during the critical phases in its development which would not present the Soviets with a direct confrontation of power until events would preclude timely action on their part to prevent our intended result in Cuba.d. Utilization of the OAS Forum and support without being dependent upon OAS approval or disapproval for the necessary intermediate steps leading up to OAS recognition of a Cuban Government in exile and the final, decisive military action.e. Maximum utilization of the Cuban refugee elements in the US for political and military support without depending upon their effectiveness for the ultimate success of the plan.f. No maldeployment of US forces, affecting the over-all US military posture, until the final decisive stages of the plan are ready for execution, thus reducing maldeployment time.g. The most economical use of US resources to accomplish the defeat of Castro communism.h. A definite time scale of events culminating in the defeat of Castro's communist government and establishing the groundwork for the installation of a government compatible with the aims of the OAS and friendly to the US by 1 October 1964."
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY: ARMYRECORD NUMBER: 198-10004-10011RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERSAGENCY FILE NUMBER :DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR: ARMYFROM: R. D. ALBROTO : OFFICE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMYTITLE: TRAINING OF CUBAN REFUGEES IN NICARAGUADATE: 12/11/63PAGES: 11SUBJECTS: ANTI-CASTRO CUBANSARTIME, MANUELCUBAN BRIGADEKENNEDY, ROBERTCUBAN EXILE TRAINING IN NICARAGUADOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIEDRESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULLCURRENT STATUS: OPENTE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 10. Memo regardingtraining of Cubans in Nicaragua, recriutment effortsof Manuel Artime, meeting between Artime and RobertKennedy, and Cubans in US Army.[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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# SECRETACSI-CX 2031011 DEC 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMYATTN: MR. JOSEPH CALIFANO, GENERAL COUNSELSUBJECT: Training of Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua (S)1. (U) REFERENCES:a. Memorandum for Record, 19 Nov 63, above subject, to office, Secretary of the Armyb. Intelligence Report #2870006563, 9 Aug 63, Subject: Prominent Cuban Exiled Leaders visit Nicaragua (U), from USARMA, Nicaraguac. Intelligence Report #2870009363, 31 Oct 63, Subject: Puerto Cabezas and Cuban Exiles (U), from USARMA, Nicaraguad. Summary of Information, 1 Nov 63, 112th INTC Gp, Subject: Cuban Officer Training Program (U)e. Memorandum for Record, ACSI-CX, 19 Nov 63, Subject: Cuban Brigade Member (U)2. (S) Reference 1a, prepared at the request of your office, advised that query by USARMA, Managua within the U. S. Embassy there, revealed no indication that Colonal Thomas D. McPhail, 0-30613, USA, Retired, the former Chief of USA Military Mission in Nicaragua was in anyway involved in the training of Cuban refugees in Nicaragua.3. (C) During the above inquiry, the USARMA, Managua called attention to two intelligence reports he had furnished (references 1b. and 1c above) reporting Nicaraguan press comment on the visit of exiled Cuban refugee leaders Dr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa, Dr. Carlos PRIO Socarras, Dr. Manuel Antonio DE VARONA, Dr. Francisco FERNANDEZ Pla, Dr. Laureano BATISTA, Dr. Orlando PUENTES, DE, MignoL DE LEON, and Roberto RODRIGUEZ to Nicaragua during July and August 1963. The USARMA's comment on the newspaper speculation and rumors concerning this visit was that he "does not have any firm information or indicators that anti-Castro forces are being trained in Nicaragua."OSA. ASG. CONTROL NO. 2873BWARNING NOTICEDECLASSIFIED BY ARMYSENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVEDDECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITYDATE: 20051798-490-63DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS:NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIEDDOD DIR 5200.10
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# SECRET13-0000011 DEC 1963ACSI-CXSUBJECT: Training of Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua (8)4. (C) Reference ld. from the A. C. of 8, G-2, Fourth Army reports efforts by Mr. Manuel ARTIME Buesa, to get some of his former associates in the Bay of Pigs invasion, to resign their U.S. Army commissions and go with him to a revolutionary camp in Nicaragua. A copy of this reference is inclosed for your information. CONARC, Fourth Army and 3rd Army have been directed to continue to report on the alleged recruiting activity by ARTIME.5. (C) Reference 1s. reports information received from Ft. Holabird, Md. that a former Cuban Brigade member, 2nd Lt. Jose Raul VARONA Gonzales, 0-2312303, had been invited by 2nd Lt. Eneido OLIVA (former second in command at the Bay of Pigs) to visit Washington, D. C. on 18 Nov 63 to meet with Mr. Kennedy, the Attorney General. VARONA is a student leader reportedly in the Cuban invasion. When VARONA returned from Washington Mr. Kennedy, but did say that he had met with Lt. OLIVA. The actual purpose of the meeting is not known. A copy of reference le. is inclosed for your information. Mr. Robert Kennedy did confer on 17 Nov 63 with Manuel ARTIME Buess, Roberto SAN ROMAN aka Roberto Perex SAN ROMAN, Jose SAN ROMAN aka Jose Peres SAN ROMAN, and Enrique Jose EUIK William Alfert. They were also scheduled to meet with Mr. Robert Kennedy on either 21 or 22 November 1963. There is no indication that Ft. Holabird student VARONA was present.6. (C) This office has no information whether Mr. Kennedy is aware of ARTIME's alleged recruiting activity. The information in paragraphs 3 through 5 above, and the inclosures hereto, are furnished in the event that they may be of some pertinence to your inquiry regarding Colonel McPhail, reference la. above.2 Inel[Sgd] R. D. Albiro, Col. GSR. D. ALBROColonel, GSDirector of Foreign Intelligence![stamp]WARNING NOTICESENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVEDSECRET![stamp]DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVINOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIEDOD DIR 5200.10
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEMIDENTIFICATION FORMAGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : JCSRECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10010RECORDS SERIES : TAYLOR PAPERSGENCY FILE NUMBER :DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR: JCSFROM : EARLE G. WHEELERTO :TITLE: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ON CUBA, 1100 HRS, 19 DEC 1963DATE: 12/19/63PAGES : 3SUBJECTS : POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBAOPERATIONS, CUBADOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIEDRESTRICTIONS: OPEN IN FULLCURRENT STATUS: OPENE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/31/97OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS : Wheeler, Box 193. Memorandum reporting meeting withPresident on Cuba. 1 Document.Cuba Selected Documents#5[R] ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting with President on Cuba, 1100 hrs, 19 Dec 19631. The following persons were present at the meeting:White House: The PresidentMr. McGeorge BundyMr. SmithState: Mr. ThompsonMr. BallMr. JohnsonMr. MartinMr. CrimminsDefense: Mr. GilpatricMr. VanceGeneral WheelerCIA: General CarterMr. FitzGeraldMr. HelmsTreasury: Mr. DillonUSIA: Mr. Wilson2. Mr. FitzGerald briefed the President on Agency operations covering the following areas:a. Collection of intelligence.b. Propaganda activities.c. Economic denial actions.d. Exploitation of Cuban military disaffection.e. Sabotage and harrassment activities.f. Support of autonomous anti-Castro groups.
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3. a. The President was most interested in economic denial actions. He was informed that talks would be undertaken in the immediate future with representatives of the Canadian and British governments relative to the supply of spare parts and critical materials by Canadian and British firms to Cuba. It was stated that Spanish firms re likewise active in this area, as well as a number of essentially fly-by-night firms located in a number of foreign countries. No reputable American firms are engaged in supplying Cuba and, in fact, have been helpful in preventing their foreign affiliates from engaging in this traffic. Apparently. State regards the Canadian, the British and the Spanish efforts as being the real trouble spots. The President directed that State undertake talks, as appropriate, with the governments of firms concerned to dissuade them from this practice.b. Under questioning, Mr. FitzGerald stated that exploitation of Cuban military disaffection is a long term undertaking. While there are disaffected Cuban military men in important posts, they have not, to date, made any contacts with each other nor formed any sort of group. However, Mr. FitzGerald considers that any successful operation to overthrow Castro emanating from within Cuba will have to be supported by the Cuban military if it is to have any real likelihood of success.c. During the discussion on sabotage and harrassment, the President expressed his reluctance to undertake high risk actions at this time for two reasons:(1) Current attempts to get OAS agreement to various actions directed against Cuba might be jeopardized; and(2) The Soviets seem to be watching closely the new administration's policies toward Cuba, and it might influence unfavorably the success of our efforts to achieve further reductions in Soviet military personnel in Cuba.4. Mr. Helms briefed on the significance of the arms cache discovered in Venezuela. Mr. Martin briefed upon the activities of the OAS survey group now in Venezuela and the results, to date, of their survey. He stated that the group apparently had accepted that the arms had been introduced for subversive purposes, but that the survey group was asking of the Venezuelan government further information regarding propaganda activities directed against the Venezuelan government, etc. He does not expect that the commission will report
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to the GAS prior to 10 January 1964. In the meantime, our effortis devoted to ascertaining the maximum that the OAS is preparedto do as a result of the Venezuela affair. They are hopeful that theCAS will support an increased surveillance system. He thinks it istoo early to expect a complete break in economic and travel relationsbetween OAS countries and Cuba.5. There was some discussion of further actions we might   take to increase pressures and harrassments at an appropriate time.   Among other items mentioned were the effect of low level reconnaissance   flighto from time to time and the desirability of executing such flights   at intervals to maintain the viability of our "right" to do so. While the   President did not express disapprobation, neither did he express   Approval. In fact, no real decisions were taken at this meeting which   must be regarded, I think, as being an important orientation session.Signed - Earle G. WheelerEARLE G. WHEELERGeneral, United States ArmyChief of StaffCOPIES TO:Chairman, JCS #1CGARCNO #4CMC 5Director Jt Staff (Attn: SACSA) #Army General Counsel #7UNCLASSIFIEDSENSITIVE![photo of text that reads cy#8 ocs tsc]![photo of text that reads cy#9 ocs tsc]![photo of text that reads cy#10 ocs tsc]
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# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM## IDENTIFICATION FORM## AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : JCSRECORD NUMBER: 202-10002-10117RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1963AGENCY FILE NUMBER : JCSM-77-64## DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR: JCSFROM: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFTO: SECRETARY OF DEFENSETITLE : A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A COUP IN CUBADATE : 01/31/64PAGES : 58SUBJECTS : POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBACOUP IN CUBACONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBADOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIEDRESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULLCURRENT STATUS : OPENDATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1963, Box 4. Memo for Chairman, JCSregarding contingency plans in the event of a coup in Cuba.[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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# TOP SECRET-SENSITIVETHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFWASHINGTON 25, D.C.UNCLASSIFIEDSM-161-6431 January 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ATLANTICSubject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)1. Transmitted herewith is a conceptual proposal, subject as above, which has been developed jointly by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency.2. This concept envisions a coup occurring in Cuba which may, if supported by the United States, achieve US national objectives by the elimination of the communist regime and establishment of a Cuban government acceptable to the United States.3. The proposal provides for US military intervention in a flexible manner covering a spectrum ranging from provision of logistic support to full execution of OPLANS 312, and 316. Conditions under which military intervention at a level LESS than that of OPLAN 316 might be undertaken are generally in consonance with those described in JCS Message 8970, DTG:070155Z March 1963.4. It is desired that CINCLANT prepare a separate contingency plan to support a coup in Cuba within the context of conditions described in the attachment hereto.For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:![signature of M.J. Ingelido]M. J. INGELIDOBrig Gen, USAFSecretaryAttachmentUNCLASSIFIEDGROUP 1EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATICDOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATIONTOP SECRET-SENSITIVECopy 11 of 22 copies, each of 1 page, Series A![systematically reviewed by JCS on 19 OCT 1989]