Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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Page 2*   collection totaled approximately 3.1 million pages and was used extensively by researchers from all over the United States. The Review Board was in the news last month when it voted to make public the Abraham Zapruder film of the Kennedy assassination.*   The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 originally provided a 3-year timetable for the Assassination Records Review Board to complete its work. Unfortunately, there were lengthy delays in the appointment of Board members, and as a consequence the Review Board was scheduled to cease operations before it even began its work. As a result, in 1994 Congress restarted the clock by extending the 1992 law's termination date for 1 year, until September 30, 1996. The Review Board subsequently exercised its authority to continue operating for 1 additional year, until September 30, 1997. Because the review process proved to be more complex and time-consuming than anticipated, the President included in his fiscal year 1998 budget a request for a 1-year extension of the Review Board 's authorization.*   I support the Assassination Records Review Board 's request for a 1-year extension of its authorization so that it can complete its mission in a professional and thorough manner. I have always believed very strongly that Congress should not indefinitely continue funding for Federal entities that were clearly intended to be temporary in nature. The Review Board has informed me that it is confident that it will be able to finish its work and complete its final report if Congress will extend its life for 1 additional year, until September 30, 1998.THIS SEARCH THIS DOCUMENT THIS CR ISSUE GO TONext Hit Forward Next Document New SearchPrev Hit Back Prev Document HomePageHit List Best Sections Daily Digest HelpDoc Contents Extens. Contents CR Issues by Date
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# TESTIMONY OF ATHAN G. THEOHARISPROFESSOR OF HISTORYMARQUETTE UNIVERSITYMILWAUKEE, WISCONSINonS.J. Res. 282"The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act"Before theSENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRSMAY 12, 1992
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# STATEMENT OF ARNAN G. THEOCHARISI am a professor of history at Marquette University, specializing in U.s. intelligence and surveillance policy, and have published extensively on matters relating to the history of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As a consultant in 1975 to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (the so-called Church Committee), I researched classified and nonclassified records deposited at the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson presidential libraries and since 1978 have filed numerous Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for FBI records.I welcome this opportunity to testify on S.J. Res. 282, the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, and the question it raises: Should Congress create a special Review Board and authorize it to release or postpone the release of relevant Government records?There are precedents for legislating procedures governing the release of "Government records relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy," most notably the Freedom of Information Act of 1966, as amended in 1974, mandating the release of and stipulating the exemptions for withholding agency records. The congressional response to the so-called Nixon-sampson agreement of 1974 offers a further precedent. Rejecting former President Richard Nixon's claimed right to retain exclusive control over the records pertaining to his presidency, including the right to destroy the so-called Oval Office tapes, Congress rescinded this agreement, created the Brownell Commission, and enacted the Presidential Records Act of 1978. Presidential records were public records, and not a president's personal property, Congress affirmed when defining the criteria to govern the disposition and release of all presidential records.As in the case of the Nixon presidential records, there exists widespread public suspicion bout the Government's disposition of the Kennedy assassination records stemming from the beliefs that federai officials (1) have not made available all Government assassination records (even to the Warren Commission, Church Committee, House Assassination Committee) and (2) have heavily redacted the records released under FCIA in order to cover up sinister conspiracies. S.J. Res. 282 effectively addresses these concerns first by creating an impartial body, the proposed Executive Director and Review Board, with the authority to review and if necessary subpoena all relevant records and then by establishing the criterion of full disclosure except in cases where "clear and convincing justification exists for postponing" the release of specified documents.There is reason to believe that all relevant Government records pertaining to the Kennedy assassination have not been released and cannot be precisely identified by persons outside the executive branci. It might not be the case that all such records were filed under specific names and programs (Oswald, Ruby, Ferrie, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, Warren Commission). The federal intelligence agencies, for example, had in the
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-3-during the 1980s agency officials have withheld information clearlyrelevant to an understanding of the relationship of the agencies toindividuals identified directly or indirectly with the Kennedy assassination.Administrative and legislative changes encouraged such non-disclosure--notablyPresident Ronald Reagan's 1982 classification order, legislation of 1984totally exempting CIA "operational" files from disclosure, and legislationof 1986 authorizing the FBI to withhold and deny the existence of FBIinformant files. Section 6 dovetails FOIA's exemptive provisions but,at the same time, introduces a stricter non-disclosure standard to requirerelease unless "the threat to the military defense, intelligence operationsor conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by its disclosureis of such gravity that it outweighs any public interest in its disclosure."My skepticism about agency practices in withholding documents, moreover,is based on my experiences as a frequent user of the FOIA. I recognizethat this is not the proper forum for reviewing how federal agencies haveprocessed FOIA requests but think the following examples shed light onwhether the FOIA, and its provisions accepting agency discretion, can beexpected to ensure full and reasonable disclosure.In 1980, I filed an FOIA request for the Official and ConfidentialFile of former FBI Director J. Eigar Hoover and in 1983 received approximately6,000 heavily redacted pages of this 17,700 page file. Exercising my rightto appeal these withholdings, I eventually (in 1985) received approximately2,000 additional documents. Granted the right of a second appeal, at thistime I offered a detailed folder by folder challenge, arguing that muchof the withhela information was already in the public domain and furtherthat since the former FBI director had maintained in his office derogatoryinformati, a on presidents, members of Congress, and other prominentpersonalities the question of what use had been made of this informationrequired its release. These arguments proved somewhat convincing and in1989 the FBI released approximately 15,000 pages including informationformerly redacted in the earlier processed releases.The enclosed Fortas document (see Appendix A) was one of the documentsreleased to me in 1989, but withheld entirely both in 1983 and 1985.When withholding this document (and five others pertaining to the samematter), the FBI had originally claimed that its release, would revealFBI sources and methods and violate personal privacy rights. Yet, Fortashad not been acting as a FBI Criminal Informant or Security Informantwhen concerting with FBI Assistant Director Cartha Deloach in 1966 andthe withheld information records Fortas's willingness to service thepolitical and bureaucratic interests of President Lyndon Johnson andFBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.This example, because the FBI had evaluated the same document threetimes, offers insights into the criteria employed to deny the releaseof records. And while the agency ultimately decided to disclose, this
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wiretap authorization question cannot be resolved.The heavily redacted Grunewald files further disclosed that Grunewald became the subject in 1953 of a third FBI wiretap. In 1952, a House Committee held public hearings on the subject of influence peddling that centered on Grunewald's activities, among others. This inquiry proved embarrassing to the Truman Administration and was exploited by the Republicans during the 1952 presidential and congressional campaigns. In 1953, the new Republican-controlled House revisited this issue. Particularly interested in Grunewald, the so-called Kean Committee sought assistance from the Justice Department. The heavily redacted records (see Appendix C), however, preclude answers to the questions as to why concurrent with this congressional inquiry Attorney General Herbert Brownell had requested and authorized this wiretap and whether the Justice Department's assistance to the Committee included information learned from this wiretap. (I have only appended a summary of one FBI report to the Attorney General, based on this wiretap. The released transcripts of this 1933 wiretap, in contrast to those released to me involving the 1941 and 1945 taps, were heavily redacted--the FBI withheld on personal privacy grounds the names and intercepted conversations of Grunewald's telephone partners, rendering the released transcripts virtually incomprehensible and of minimal research value.)I have gone into detail on the Fortas and Grunewald matters as I think they offer insights into the processing of FOIA requests, an issue central to these hearings. It has been my experience that the "culture" of the intelligence agencies encourages agency officials to interpret the FOIA exemptive provisions broadly but also that more semor agency officials will release even embarrassing information in those instances when their decisions are potentially subject to critical scrutiny. The Review Board procedure promotes this needed accountal lity. At the same time, the Board's independence can undercut public suspicions that claimed national security or privacy justifications are a mask to preclude full disclosure. Surely now, thirty years after President Kennedy's assassination and with the end of the Cold War, we should be able to assure the public that relevant Kennedy assassination records are neither secreted nor withheld for bureaucratic reasons.While I doubt that the rlease of the Kennedy assassination records will conclusively resolve the question "who killed Kennedy," I am convinced that the procedures outlined in S.J. Res. 282 will undercut suspicions that records documenting a government conspiracy are being purposefully withheld. Release of the Kennedy assassination records, moreover, will service other significant research interests of the scholarly community. Let me conclude by briefly list some of these non-assassination-related questions: (1) the liaison relationship between the FBI and the CIA before and after the assassination; (2) the liaison relationship between the FBI and the Secret
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-6-Service and the background to the FBI's revised delimitation agreement of 1964 with the Secret Service; (3) the politics of presidential commissions (the purpose for creation, the level of agency cooperation, and the responses of federal agencies, Congress, the White House, and the public to the Warren Commission's findings); (4) the paradox of the FBI's apparent disinterest in Oswald (Soviet defector and Fair Play for Cuba Committee activist) in contrast to the intensity of FBI interest in more respectable national leaders (Eleanor Roosevelt,. Adlai Stevenson, Joseph Alsop, Ernest Hemingway, even John Kennedy); and (5) the FBI's and the CIA's relationships with and uses of informants and sources recruited to provide foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal, and "subversive activities" information.
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# TESTIMONY OF SENATOR DAVID L. BOREN## BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS## ON THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992May 12, 1992Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Committee to discuss with you Senate Joint Resolution 282, the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992.The purpose of this legislation is to provide for a comprehensive process ultimately leading to the release of all materials held by the United States Government regarding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Congressman Louis Stokes, the distinguished former Chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, has introduced identical legislation in the House of Representatives. I am particularly pleased, Mr. Chairman, to have you as an original cosponsor of this legislation.We have had at least four substantial federal government investigations into the Kennedy assassination: the first conducted by the Warren Commission appointed by President Johnson in 1963; the second, by the President's Commission on CIA
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Activities -- the Rockefeller commission -- in 1975; the third by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence -- the Church Committee -- in 1975 and 1976 as part of its investigation of CIA assassination plots against foreign leaders; and finally, the extensive investigation of the House Assassinations Committee in 1978 and 1979.Each of these investigations, particularly the Warren Commission and House Assassinations Committee investigation, produced long, detailed public reports concerning the Kennedy assassination. In addition, literally hundreds of books and articles have been written on the subject.Yet still, almost 30 years later, the questions remain.The recent release of the controversial film "JFK" has raised them anew, suggesting that answers may well lie in the assassination records and other materials that remain sealed by our Government. Even prior to the release of "JFK," in fact, there were diligent efforts made by researchers as well as concerned legislators to open these files for public review.Mr. Chairman, I do not know what all of these files contain. Specifically, I do not know whether they contain information that would call into question or undermine the findings of the previous investigations or not.-2-
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But it seems to me the time has come to open these files to the public and let them speak for themselves. Let historians and journalists and the people read them, and draw the appropriate conclusions.As a general principle, the Intelligence Community should make available its records after the passage of a reasonable amount of time when current sources and methods would no longer be compromised. The American people have a right to assure themselves to the greatest degree possible of the accuracy of the historical record of our government. The timely release of all documents of historic value and importance helps to assure that even the most secret programs of our government will be operated in accordance with basic American values. Current intelligence operations will be even more carefully conducted when it is recognized that they will be scrutinized by the public during the lifetime of many of those who administered the programs.This is not to say that all of the files should simply be pulled from the vaults, turned upside down and dumped onto Pennsylvania Avenue for general consumption. Careful review is required to ensure responsible public policy and fundamental fairness. Even after almost thirty years, there remain governmental interests, as well as individual privacy interests, that we must consider. But these concerns must not stand in the way of disclosure unless they are shown in a given case to be especially compelling.
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What this Resolution proposes is a comprehensive, government- wide review of the Kennedy assassination records conducted under the auspices of an impartial, independent board.It may be useful to state precisely what these records are. First, they encompass all of the records of the FBI, the CIA, Secret Service, military intelligence, and other Executive branch agencies which may pertain to the Kennedy assassination. They also include the records of the Warren commission, the Rockefeller commission, the Church committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Many of these records are now stored under seal at the National Archives, while many others remain in agency files. The Rockefeller Commission files were claimed by President Ford as part of his personal papers and then deeded by him to the Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan. There may be other relevant records at the Kennedy and Johnson presidential libraries. These presidential library records are administered by the National Archives, and thus we envision that they would be subject to this Joint Resolution.I can report to you briefly on the status of one group of these records -- the Church committee files, which are now in the custody of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. All of the Church committee files are housed in some 500 boxes in a single small room at the National Archives. There is a rudimentary index, but it is not always sufficiently descriptive.
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and a file-by-file review is probably necessary. My staff has examined some of these files, and we believe the process of separating out J.F.K. assassination materials -- once that term is more precisely defined (as I will discuss in a moment) -- will not prove especially cumbersome or time-consuming. The Kennedy assassination investigation was only a small component of the Church committee's work and the investigation conducted concerned only the role of the intelligence community in investigating the assassination; it did not seek to determine who killed President Kennedy. In addition, many of the Church records are in fact copies of records originated by other agencies. However, the Church staff did interview numerous witnesses, both inside and outside of government, and the transcripts and notes of those interviews, among other materials originated by the Church committee, are an important part of the J.F.K. files.Although many government records on the J.F.K. assassination have previously been released by the Archives and as a result of Freedom of Information Act litigation, a great deal remains shielded from public view. Approximately twenty boxes of the internal files generated by the Warren Commission are still sealed. Experts estimate that a much greater volume of FBI and CIA files remain sealed. Many pages of documents that have been released have been so extensively redacted that their informational value is minimal. The extensive files of the House Assassinations Committee, some 848 boxes of materials on both the Kennedy and King assassinations, currently are sealed until the-5-
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13-00000year 2029.To date, these records have been withheld from the public due to a variety of concerns: the fear of damaging foreign relations and military defense, the concern for disclosing the identities of confidential sources or informants, and the desire to protect the privacy of individuals. While these concerns may yet retain some validity in a very few isolated cases, it seems to me that with the passage of time, there should remain very few objections to full disclosure. I believe it is time to review these records, not in terms of the old assumptions, but rather in light of the need for openness and to encourage confidence in the Government. We need to assure ourselves of the facts, that there is not information lurking somewhere in the Government that would shed new light on what remains perhaps the most heinous and enigmatic crime of this century.The Joint Resolution would make it much harder to justify the continued shielding of a document from public view. It would also create a process by which many records could be promptly released. Any arguments made for withholding any document or portions of it must be weighed against the strong public interest in disclosure. The resolution establishes this kind of balancing test -- with a strong presumption in favor of disclosure.In addition, to address the problem of heavily redacted and therefore meaningless documents, the Joint Resolution borrows a-6-
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page from the Classified Information Procedures Act, the law that covers the handling of secret information in criminal trials. Under that law, federal judges have discretion to permit introduction in evidence of summaries or substitutes in place of classified information. The Joint Resolution provides for creation of such summaries or substitutes where appropriate, so that the public can learn essential facts about the Kennedy assassination from a document even where references to private matters or crucial national security secrets would render the document itself mostly unreleasable at present.In all cases, the Joint Resolution requires that the presumption be in favor of release. All records will be released unless there is clear and convincing evidence that postponing release is essential to a vital interest.Now let me briefly discuss the process established by the Joint Resolution for applying these disclosure standards.The Joint Resolution creates a five-member panel called the Assassination Material Review Board. The members of this Review Board would be distinguished private citizens outside of government who have had no prior involvement with previous inquiries into the Kennedy assassination. This Review Board, aided by an executive director and staff, would play the central role in the release of the assassination materials. The Board would be required to complete its work within two years of its-7-
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first meeting, although it is certainly expected that it could be completed much more quickly. The point is to proceed expeditiously, while still doing a careful job.We faced a difficult choice in deciding who should appoint the Review Board, and I am aware your Committee is looking at other alternatives. I am certainly amenable to this, but let me give you some idea of why we came out as we did. Given the allegations of government cover-up and the potential for perceived conflict of interest, allowing the President or Congress to appoint the Board did not seem appropriate. We settled instead on the special three-judge federal court division that appoints independent counsels for criminal investigations.The Justice-Department, in an April 27, 1992, letter to Chairman Glenn, worries that "it is not clear" that our approach to appointing the Review Board is constitutional. In addition, some may feel that a judicial panel is ill-suited to make appointments for this task. The judges themselves, who have very small staffs and other concerns, might well prefer to avoid this assignment. In short, we recognized that this approach would raise possible constitutional objections, as well as practical ones, but, on balance, we felt the appointment authority should rest with an impartial source without no interest or stake in the outcome. I believe a strong argument can be made that the appointment process is constitutional under the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in *Morrison v. Olson*, 487 U.S. 654