[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 131]
-3-categories of information exempt from release (although the clear articulation of such categories is important), but the allocation of the burden of proof to the party that seeks to exempt information from release.Because these four points are inextricably interconnected, I will discuss them in reference to our work and to a series of documents that are attached as exhibits to this testimony.During the past four years, I have spent hundreds of hours talking with officials from more than a dozen agencies and reviewing memoranda that argue against the release of certain types of classified information. It has been my general impression that the officials making such arguments are intelligent, conscientious, competent, and hardworking. (I also have had the general impression that they have sought to be cooperative with the Review Board and that they have made good-faith efforts to comply with the JFK Act.) One nevertheless cannot help but observe a deep-seated, institutional reluctance to release information -- particularly on the part of those institutions that were created for the purposes of collecting secret information and preserving secrets.In order to facilitate declassification, S. 712 requires agencies to articulate their reasons for initial classifications and for exemptions from declassification. For example, Section 4(c)(2)(A) would require the agency to "provide in writing a detailed justification for [an initial classification] decision." Similarly, with regard to the 30-year review, agencies would "certify] to the President at the end of such 30-year period that continued protection of the information from unauthorized disclosure is essential to the national security of the United States...." (Sect. 4(d)(2)). The talented officials who are hired by the agencies will be able to provide such explanations and such justifications. The issue from my perspective is not whether agencies are able to articulate such justifications, but to what extent their justifications can withstand scrutiny. Let me provide some examples where initial justifications for withholding information did not withstand scrutiny.Illustration 1. See Exhibit A. The first illustration is a CIA cable dated November 27, 1963, that has now been released in full. As you can see, the second line of typed text includes the crypts (or cryptonyms) "RYBAT" and "GPFLOOR." These crypts appear in what is called the "slug line" and they are routing and sensitivity indicators. "GPFLOOR" is the crypt that refers to Lee Harvey Oswald. This same crypt appears in the first line of the second paragraph of text. The CIA originally advised that GPFLOOR could not be released in the slug line although it could be released in the text of the cable. I had several discussions with agency officials as they tried to explain why GPFLOOR could be released in one place but not in the other. I could not understand their explanations. At that time I was new to the work and I did not know whether I was simply not bright enough or experienced enough to understand the explanation being offered. I again raised the question in a later meeting with several agency officials that