Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10400-10316.pdf — page 18]
# DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCEWASHINGTON, D. C. 20505The Honorable Otis G. Pike, ChairmanSelect Committee on IntelligenceHouse of RepresentativesWashington, D. C. 20515Dear Mr. Chairman:In our conversation on Friday you asked for the statutory basis for the compartmentation principle. I wish first to respond to your inquiry and then suggest a manner in which your staff can receive access to the sensitive material protected by special compartmentation systems.The current basis for the U.S. Government security classification system is Executive Order 11652, promulgated on 8 March 1972. Historically, foreign intelligence has been treated as one category of classified national security information. There are numerous statutory recognitions of the importance of national security information, e.g., the Freedom of Information Act. Consequently, much foreign intelligence is classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP SECRET according to specifications set forth in the Order. Not all foreign intelligence, however, is classified national security information under the provisions of the Executive Order (e.g., an American source providing foreign information or assistance). Also, the potential risks attendant with the compromise of a foreign intelligence source or method differ substantially from the risks attendant with much classified defense information.Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides: "That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." In recognition of this responsibility, National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 (17 February 1972) instructs the Director of Central Intelligence to, "...develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."
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Since the National Security Act did not provide for an authority corresponding with the DCI's responsibility in this area, the Directive provides that the Members of the U.S. Intelligence Board are responsible for: "The supervision of the dissemination and security of intelligence material." The Director of Central Intelligence, acting with the advice of the U.S. Intelligence Board, has promulgated a number of directives, regulations and security manuals, related to the protection of foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence sources and methods, and applicable to the overall U.S. intelligence community.The fundamental security principle involved in the protection of foreign intelligence and of its sources and methods is a strict application of "need to know" --a principle referred to in Executive Order 11652, Section 6(A). This applies the simple mathematical premise that the fewer the number of individuals made privy to a secret, the less likely that it will be disclosed. The security principle of "compartmentation" involving special access and information dissemination controls is designed to ensure that only those individuals whose "need to know" has been specifically approved by some higher authority, who have been specially indoctrinated, and who undertake special commitments to protect it are provided access to a particularly sensitive category of foreign intelligence sources and methods. Compartmentation assists in the application of the "need-to- know" principle by ensuring that individuals are provided access to only that information clearly essential to the performance of their duties.Compartmentation was undoubtedly a major contributing factor involved in the nation's secret development of the atomic bomb during World War II, and the principle is still implicit in security procedures related to ERDA's "RESTRICTED DATA" as reflected in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In the field of U.S. foreign intelligence activities, compartmentation was practiced throughout the development and operation of the U-2 reconnaissance program. One of the major foreign intelligence categories of activities using formalized compartmentation procedures today involves the matter of foreign signals intercept for intelligence purposes, i.e., communications intelligence. Title 18 of the U.S. Code Section 798 recognizes the special character of this material by providing specifically for prosecution for the unauthorized disclosure of information concerning any communications activities of the United States without the
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-3-necessity to show intent to harm the United States. The reason for the application of strict compartmentation procedures to communications intelligence and other foreign intelligence activities reflects the extreme vulnerability of the sources. Once an opposition becomes aware of which of its communications we are intercepting, it can take swift remedial action, and the source can be forever lost.On Friday afternoon, copies of the secrecy oath used by the executive branch with respect to three compartmented access control systems were made available to you along with the revised forms developed for and executed by certain members of the staff of the Senate Select Committee to Study Intelligence Activities. I would hope that the enclosed agreement modified for the House Select Committee, combining all three compartments into one document, would meet your particular concerns.For your information, in addition to the Senate Select Committee's use of the modified secrecy oath dealing with compartmented access, the following House and Senate committees have obtained compartmented access for their staffs, which was granted after the normal briefings and signing of the secrecy oath:Armed Services CommitteeAppropriations CommitteeAeronautical and Space Sciences CommitteeMay I reiterate the points I made on Friday:a. No material is being withheld from members of the Committee.b. We are prepared to and did brief the staff of the Committee on noncompartmented matters, based upon your certification of their security clearance and the fact that they entered into an appropriate secrecy agreement with you, a copy of which you provided.c. The compartmentation procedures of the Intelligence Community have been established pursuant to statute and National Security Council Intelligence Directives. The simplest way for the staff to obtain access to this compartmented material would be to accept the normal secrecy arrangements as modified in the enclosed. This would ensure against difficulties in access to such compartmented material throughout the
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-4-Intelligence Community. It is clear that the obligations assumed here would run between the staff member and the Committee and in no way would provide any control or influence over them by me or any element of the Intelligence Community.d. It would undoubtedly be feasible to develop another procedure to ensure special protection of the sensitive matters currently included in the compartmented systems, but this would involve review and discussions with various interested parties which would undoubtedly take some time and delay your investigations.I hope you will agree that this is the simplest and easiest manner of solving a practical matter so that we can proceed with the substance of your investigations.Sincerely,![Signature of W. E. Colby]W. E. Colby
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Distribution:1-DCI1-DDCI1-IG1-OLC1-E.H.Knocke1-SC/DCIWhite House Distribution:1-Rod Hills1-Phil Buchen1-Jay French
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CONFIDENTIAL# COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE INDOCTRINATIONI have been informed that pursuant to law (Sections 792, 793, 794, 795, 797 and 798 of Title 18, United States Code) I am not to discuss with or disclose to any person any information relating directly or indirectly to the below identified compartmented Programs, unless such person is currently authorized to discuss or receive such information or material of the particular category involved. I am aware that the responsibility of ascertaining that such an authorization for another person is valid and current, rests with me.I acknowledge that it is my responsibility to inform myself of the contents of the above mentioned sections of Title 18, U.S. Code, as they pertain to performance of my duties. I am aware further that if a change in my status renders it no longer necessary for me to receive compartmented intelligence, my name will be removed from the list of persons authorized to receive such material.News media reports concerning any of these compartmented materials does not relieve me of my obligation under the oath signed below.I acknowledge that I have been briefed on the following compartmented systems or programs:# OATH OF SECRECYI do solemnly swear that I will not discuss with or disclose to any person, regardless of his official position or status, any information relating directly or indirectly to Compartmented Intelligence, any information derived therefrom, or the nature of the sources of such intelligence, until I have ascertained that such person has been authorized to discussCONFIDENTIALE-2 IMPDETCL BY
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CONFIDENTIALand handle this material, and that his authorization has not been révoked, except in the performance of my official duties on the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and in accordance with the requirements set forth in the rules of such Committee.Social Security Number SignatureWitness DateCONFIDENTIAL
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13-00000# CONFIDENTIALCE NTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYWASHINGTON, D.C. 20505HSC MAT. FURN.Review Staff: 75/256320 August 1975Mr. A. Searle FieldStaff DirectorSelect Committee on IntelligenceRoom 232Cannon House Office BuildingWashington D. C. 20515Dear Mr. Field:> HSC SECURITY:> : Dir 0/s approvalAround the end of July, Mr. Roeder, obviously impressed by your admonitions about the need for security, asked if I could work up a package of guidance on how to handle classified documents. Our Office of Security put this together, and while I think Mr. Roeder had in mind something more applicable to an individual than to an office, I thought I would pass this on to you for whatever use you care to make of it.Incidentally, we have not yet carried out the physical survey of your quarters which you requested on 29 July. I have been in touch with Ms. Hess, and our Office of Security will conduct one as soon as she is ready. We may have some other recommendations for your consideration when that is done.Sincerely,![signature of Jerrold B. Brown]Jerrold B. BrownAssistant to the DirectorAttachment: a/scc: D/OS> ATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION> Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions.> ![line]CONFIDENTIAL![American Revolution Bicentennial 1776-1976]Classified by 003717Exempt from Central DeclassificationSchedule of E.O. 11652; ExemptionCategory: 53 (1), (2), (3) or (4)Declassified only on approval of theDirector of Central Intelligence
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CONFIDENTIAL14 AUG 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review StaffATTENTION : Mr. Jerrold B. BrownVIA : Acting Deputy Director for AdministrationSUBJECT : House Select Committee on Intelligence -Protection of Classified MaterialsREFERENCE : Memo dtd 31 Jul 75 to D/Sec from JerroldB. Brown, subject: Request for SecurityAidsIn accordance with the request in the referenced memorandum for a "package" to be used by the House Select Committee on Intelligence for the protection of classified material, the attached suggestions are provided for your assistance. In view of the lack of a comprehensive physical security survey of the area which will be used to store the Committee's classified material, specific recommendations must be deferred. In this connection, we plan to have Mr. Edward J. McGrath of the Physical Security Division (extension 3494) meet with appropriate representatives of the Committee for the specific purpose of conducting a security survey of the proposed quarters in the Rayburn Building. For your information, Mr. Searle Field, Staff Director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, requested such a survey on 29 July 1975. Pending the results of this survey and its recommendations, the attached general physical security measures are recommended in an effort to provide the requisite protection for the Committee's classified material.![Signature of Robert W. Gambino]Robert W. GambinoDirector of SecurityAtts.Distribution:Orig & 2 - Adse1 - ADD/AE3. IMPDETCL BY 056966OS 5 12 065CONFIDENTIAL
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13-00000ATTACHMENT
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CONFIDENTIALGENERAL SUGGESTIONSFOR THEPROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL1.  Designate a Committee member as the Security Officer responsible for the overall control handling and protection of the classified material.2.  Establish and maintain a register of all Committee personnel who are authorized to review classified material and insure that no unauthorized personnel will have access to the material.3.  Establish a central document control system whereby all classified documents are properly logged upon receipt and annotated as to disposition.4.  Designate a Document Control Clerk who will be specifically responsible for the logging and control of all classified material. Appropriate records should be established to reflect that all classified material is properly logged in and out, by date and time, to authorized members of the Committee.5.  In the event material is designated as being of a codeword or compartmented nature, special physical security features as enunciated by the Ad Hoc Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board and later adopted as policy should be adhered to. (Specifics regarding these requirements will be provided in the course of the pending survey.)6.  All guards assigned to the physical security control over the Committee's storage area should be U. S. citizens and possess appropriate security clearances.7.  If feasible, a reading room should be established within the designated storage areaCONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIALfor the Committee's classified material, andall research and review activities of thematerial should be restricted to this area.8.  In those instances where the Committee meets    in Executive session, every effort should    be made to insure that the site being used has    been subjected to a technical security inspec-    tion to negate the possibility of unauthorized    transmitting or recording devices. This area    of concern could pose serious security deficien-    cies in the event the same area would be used    initially in public session and then closed for    the Executive session without such an inspection    being made.9.  Adequate safeguards should be utilized in the    transmission of classified material under the    cognizance of the Committee from one area to    another.10. Reproduction of any portion of the Committee's    classified material should be prohibited    without the express approval of the St Staff    Director. In this instance, notes, extracts,    summaries, etc., made from classified material    must also be provided the same degree of    protection as that provided to the source    material.11. Access controls to the storage and reten-    tion area should be established to insure that    only authorized personnel are allowed entrance.12. Storage of all classified material should be    within the designated area as opposed to any    areas or outside offices.13. Security protection should be provided to    all Committee transcripts during the tran-    scription process as well as during the    periods while they are in transit.14. A security check procedure should be estab-    lished to inspect the areas where the Com-    mittee meets at the termination of each    session to insure that no classified material
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13-00000# CONFIDENTIALor notes, etc., are inadvertently left un-secured. (Attached are examples of SecurityCheck Sheets.)15. Arrangements should be made to insure that    there are adequate facilities for the    destruction of classified waste material.    In this instance, such waste material should    be provided protection until its final    destruction.16. Only approved classified material destruc-    tion methods should be utilized. (Details    regarding this can be obtained in the course    of the pending survey.)17. All Committee personnel granted access to    classified material by the Staff Director    should be briefed on their obligations and    responsibilities regarding the unauthorized    disclosure of such material.18. Specific physical security recommendations    applicable to the proposed storage area for the    Committee's classified material, consistent    with sound security principles, must be deferred    until the completion of the survey. This would    also include recommendations relative to the    type of storage containers which the Committee    proposes to use.19. Pending the completion of a security survey at    the new storage site, it is suggested that the    protective measures currently in effect at the    temporary storage facility in Room 232, Cannon    Building, not be changed.# CONFIDENTIAL
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ATTACHMENT![photo of a page]
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13-00000Area Security Check Sheet| Items to be Checked                                                                         | Checker || ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------- || Desks (Including Drawers)                                                                   |         || Tables (Including Drawers)                                                                  |         || Chairs                                                                                      |         || Floor                                                                                       |         || Window Ledges                                                                               |         || Typewriters                                                                                 |         || Stenotype Machines                                                                          |         || Reproduction Equipment                                                                      |         || Trash Receptacles                                                                           |         || Charts, Exhibits, Chalkboards                                                               |         || Notebooks, Paper Pads, etc. (Check to insure that imprints of classified notes not present) |         |
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UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL CONFIROUTING AND RECORD SHEETSUBJECT: House Select Committee on Intelligence -Protection of Classified MaterialsFROM:Director of SecurityEXTENSION NO.6777 File with 75-2563 20 AUG 75DATE1 4 AUG 1975TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whomINITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)RECEIVED FORWARDED1. Edward Ryan 14 AUGUST 75 ER   DD/A Coordinator   4E-27, Hqs.2. ADD/A 7   7D-26, Hqs.3. 4. The Review Staff WE   6D-0120 Seymour5. Attn: Mr. Jerrold B. Brown6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.
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CONFIDENTIAL14 AUG 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review StaffATTENTION : Mr. Jerrold B. BrownVIA : Acting Deputy Director for AdministrationSUBJECT : House Select Committee on Intelligence -Protection of Classified MaterialsREFERENCE : Memo dtd 31 Jul 75 to D/Sec from JerroldB. Brown, subject: Request for SecurityAidsIn accordance with the request in the referenced memorandum for a "package" to be used by the House Select Committee on Intelligence for the protection of classified material, the attached suggestions are provided for your assistance. In view of the lack of a comprehensive physical security survey of the area which will be used to store the Committee's classified material, specific recommendations must be deferred. In this connection, we plan to have Mr. Edward J. McGrath of the Physical Security Division (extension 3494) meet with appropriate representatives of the Committee for the specific purpose of conducting a security survey of the proposed quarters in the Rayburn Building. For your information, Mr. Searle Field, Staff Director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, requested such a survey on 29 July 1975. Pending the results of this survey and its recommendations, the attached general physical security measures are recommended in an effort to provide the requisite protection for the Committee's classified material.Robert W. GambinoDirector of SecurityAtts.Distribution:Orig & 2 - Adse1 - ADD/AE3 IMPDETCL BY 056966OS 5 12 065CONFIDENTIAL
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# SECRETTHE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCEWASHINGTON, D. C. 20505Intelligence Community StaffDCI/IC 75-26202 September 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating GroupSUBJECT: House Select Committee on IntelligenceAttached is a paper from the Chairman, USIB SecurityCommittee, outlining security arrangements made by the HouseSelect Committee on Intelligence.Jack E. ThomasMajor General, USAF (Ret.)Chief, Coordination Staff, ICSAttachmentThis Document May Be Downgradedto Unclassified When Removed FromAttachment![image: stamp showing that the document is classified secret]
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# SECRETUNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARDSECURITY COMMITTEESECOM-D-1052 September 1975.MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Coordination Staff, ICSSUBJECT: House Select Committee on IntelligenceOn 29 August 1975, Mr. Robert Gambino, Director of Security/CLA; Mr. William H. Standiford, Deputy Chief, Physical Security Division, Office of Security/CIA; and I viewed the permanent space of the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence at the invitation of Mr. A. Searle Field, Staff Director of the Committee. We believe the security arrangements made and being made are satisfactory for the storage of compartmented information." Attached is a memorandum outlining the security arrangements.Donald E. MooreChairmanAttachmentThis Document May Be Downgraded to Unclassified When Removed From Attachment![stamp: CLASSIFIED BY 356793 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11352, EXEMPTION CATEGORY: § 58(1), . (3) or (4) AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Date Impossible to Determine]SECRET