Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 160]
13-00000CABLE SEC DISSEM BY PER TOTAL COPIES RUN BYPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED SECRETADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT ZACTION UNIT RF FILE VR STAFF1 42 53 6ACTION # INFOT 329420 E1A971 PAGE IN 6941TOR:231508Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723COLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSEBUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS INFACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADOR-IAL DUTIES.10. THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE    NAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR    UNILATERAL PENETRATION EFFORTS FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL.11. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIQS AND THE    CIRLS AND TAILORED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY.    THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE    SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN    SAY, STATE.12. VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT SPORLON ACTIVITIES IN RIO    EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT NSA    WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION    TO THE SPORLON PRODUCTS (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID    CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN    WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE INTERCEPT PROGRAM WERE    HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS.)13. ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONSSECRET
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CABLE SEC DISSEM BY __________ PER: __________ TOTAL COPIES __________ RL BY __________PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED: __________ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY __________ AT __________ Z __________| ACTION UNIT | I   | RF  | FILE | VR  || ----------- | --- | --- | ---- | --- ||             | N   |     |      |     ||             | F   |     |      |     ||             | O   |     |      |     |ACTION #|     | STAFF || --- | ----- || 1   | 4     || 2   | 5     || 3   | 6     |T 329420 Ε1Α971 PAGE 03 IN 694147TOR:2315082 SEP 75 BRIL 24723WERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE BOTHSURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TOAUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BYU.S. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFOMUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES OFAGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTACT,ETC.14. AARON EVINCED GREAT INTEREST IN THE COVER    PROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY. HE WAS TOLD THAT COVER COULD    BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF    OFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS,    THAT THEY GAVE ALMOST 5ØPERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON THE ACTUAL    WORK OF THAT SECTION, THEN SPENT THE REST OF THE WORK    DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH    THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION    AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES.15. AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE    PAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED    MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND OSO OFFICERS HAD    A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHERSECRET
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13-00000CABLE SEC DIBBEM BY__________PER__________TOTAL COPIES__________RUN BYPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDSECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THANISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED__________BY__________AT__________ZSTAFF|   1   |   4   ||   2   |   5   ||   3   |   6   |ACTION UNIT | I RF. FILE. VR.ACTION # INFOT 329420 EIA971 PAGE 04 IN 69410TOR:231508Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723TRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO EQUALLY GOOD WORK IN THE OSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.)16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION. AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING, AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING AT THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY, AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH @ THE MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY WORKED.17, AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY THE EMBASSY WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO. MONTEVIDEO AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS, 1$SECRET
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CABLE SEC DISSEM BY PERPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDTOTAL COPIESSECRETADVANCE COPY ISSUED/BLOTTED BY AT ZACTION UNIT| I   | RF  | FILE | VR  || --- | --- | ---- | --- || N   |     |      |     || F   |     |      |     || O   |     |      |     |ACTION #T 329420 EIA971 PAGE 05-5TOR:231508Z SEP 75 IN 694187BRIL 24723A WINE LOVER AND WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST OF THE LOCAL PRODUCT.18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY NIGHT, AARON WAS ASKED BY THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY. HE OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY OF THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES. E2, IMPDET.SECRET
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SECRET20 August 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, LA DivisionSUBJECT: Transmittal of SSC Memo Announcing the Intention of SSC Staffers to Visit Latin America1. Attached is a xerox of a letter from the SSC Staff Director (Review Staff 75-2399) describing travel plans to Latin America on the part of SSC Staffers. This is for your information. You will be alerted when this becomes firm and an itinerary is established.2. Also attached is an agreed upon memo giving guidelines of such trips. Supplementing this should be a briefing of the travelling of SSC Staffers before they go and a notification of the stations involved as to what the guidelines are.John H. WallerSA/DDOAttachmentAs stated aboveDistribution:Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att2 - SA/DDOE2 IMPDETCL BY 055636SECRET
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# SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling AbroadThere have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.1. **MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.**Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection.The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions6/25/75
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that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposureof such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with theUnited States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford publicexposure of such relationships. To help maintain the discreetnature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason otherthan SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC membersand staff. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press,nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigatingofficers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertainingto an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases bedistasteful to the host government.In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreetarrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligenceactivities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officerswithin the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon theSSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC businessat the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceedingon a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.II. **THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THEVISIT.**All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of hisknowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.
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III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BECONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms--operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENTPERSONNEL.Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.
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V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICESWILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGNTECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.
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## VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS ANDSTAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized.
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# 13-00000HURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMANOYER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMANE, MINN.HOWAND H. BAKER, JR., TENN.LESTON, KY.BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.AN, N.C.CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD,COLO.RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTORFREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSELCURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL# United States SenateSELECT COMMITTEE TOSTUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITHRESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510August 12, 1975File![ROSEW STAFF 75-2399 Stamp]![Wave: CLAY 3 LArffecan Completed bocefong on 17 Sept 1975. may Signature]Mr. Seymour BoltenAssistant to the DirectorRoom 6D0120.Central Intelligence AgencyLangley, VirginiaDear Mr. Bolten:This letter is to confirm an oral request by Committee staff for an orientation briefing for a visit to South America which two members of the staff, David Aaron and William Trueheart, have been asked to make next month.Although plans are not yet firm, it is expected that they will be free to travel during the second and third weeks of September. It is proposed that they visit Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, and Montevideo. If time permits, they might also visit another consular post in Brazil and/or Buenos Aires.The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA relations in the field with Embassy and Station officers. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed.Messrs. Aaron and Trueheart are not expected to consult with officials of the host government and, so far as the Committee is concerned, the latter need not be informed of the visit.Sincerely yours,![Signature]William G. Millercopy to Mr. Hyland, State Department
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# MESSAGESIGNAL CENTER USE ONLYAGE COI ACP TOO TPE MINO DCIOMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0CLASSIFICATIONSECRETMESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBERSTAFF 0220492 DIRECTOR 714410CONF: EUR 8 INFO: FILE IPAN DDO DSOLDO OLCOICS PS/PGTO: PRIORITY LONDON.4REF: STATE 137637, 30 JUNE 1975 41. SHENATOR TOWER, MEMBER OF SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (ASC) AND VICE CHAIRMAN OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING CIA. IS TRAVELING IN EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND AIR FORCE ESCORT. STATE HAS ADVISED THAT SENATOR TOWER WILL BE IN LONDON 3-7 JULY WHERE HE WILL CALL ON MINISTER HEALEY ON 4 JULY AND CINCUSNAVEUR ON 7 JULY.2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELING ON ASC BUSINESS, SENATOR TOWER MAY TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE ACTIVITY IN U.K. IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING, STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING HIM WITH ONE. YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL INTEL EXCHANGE WITH THE BRITISH BUT SEE NO NEED TO TOUCH ON ANY JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. STATIONS SHOULD NOT OFFER ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND BRITISH SERVICE CONTACTS.3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, IN THE EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: HAS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDLINES FORDATE:ORIG:UNIT:EXT:
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# SECRETITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL HQS BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OFS AND ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL.TERMS, I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY AND LOCALI MILITARY SERVICES. IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS.. HQS IS ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIE, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY, AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. E2 IMPDET.HDATE: 2 JULY 1975ORIG: GEORGE B. HOLMESUNIT: EURBCEXT: 1413{TELECOORD}SA/DDO - WALLER IN.SUBSTANCEOLC - MILLER R.CHIN
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# SECRETSTAFFCONF: FLIR 8 INFO: FILE, IP/AN, OLC, cr/op2 PS/EG2 DSDO/00 600/00 SA/DDO ICS, PS/PGTO: IMMEDIATE BONN, MUNICH. YNIALT BONN MUNICHLIAISON YREF: MUNICH 30382 |IN 621567 41. AS YOU AWARE, IN ADDITION TO BEING A MEMBER OF THE SENATE   ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (ASC) SENATOR TOWER IS VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE   SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING CIA. SENATOR TOWER IS   TRAVELLING TO EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND   WITH AIR FORCE ESCORT. WE HAVE NOT DETERMINED HIS DETAILED ITINERARY   BUT WILL ADVISE YOU AS APPROPRIATE WHEN WE DO. Y2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELLING ON ASC BUSINESS SENATOR TOWER MAY WELL   TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE   ACTIVITY IN THE FRG. SHOULD HE DO SO, THIS ASPECT OF HIS VISIT   SHOULD NOT BE PUBLICIZED, BUT, IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING,   THE STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING HIM   WITH ONE. YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL LIAISON EXCHANGE   WITH THE BND, OMITTING THE DETAILS INVOLVED WITH OUR INTEL EXCHANGE   AND JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. THE STATION SHOULD NOT OFFER TO   ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND ITS FRG LIAISON CONTACTS.DATE:ORIG:UNIT:EXT:
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# MESSAGESIGNAL CENTER USE CONLYOMF 0 0 0 0 0 0CLASSIFICATIONSECRETMESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBERSTAFF DIRECTOR'CONF: INFO: FILE 713701THE COS WILL PROBABLY WISH TO MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY BRIEFING SENATOR TOWER MAY REQUEST. Y3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: HQS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL HQS BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL TERMS, I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY (CONSULATE) AND LOCAL MILITARY SERVICES. IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS. HQS IS ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. E2 IMPDET.HDATE: 1 JULY 1975ORIG: GALEN PEARY/HPUNIT: E/G/CILEXT: 1582CLASSIFICATIONSECR
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# SECRETSENSITIVE28 July 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Seymour BoltenReview StaffVIA: Mr. John WallerSpecial Assistant to the DDOSUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted atRight-Wing Governments1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper   providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing   governments, which is responsive to a question from the Senate Select   Committee.2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive   by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to   today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could   impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the other dis-   closures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our   past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military   base negotiations now underway. With this problem in mind, we have   broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those oper-   ations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and   Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about   which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if abso-   lutely necessary.3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use   (with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist   the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela, which was pro-   vided to you directly by LA Division.4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information   to the committee. However, should it be necessary to do so, we would   appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances   of any use of this material outside of the Agency.E2 IMPDETCL BY 055377SECRETSENSITIVE
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13-00000SECRETSENSITIVE5. We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision of this material to the Select Committee.Attachments, a/sDonald J. PurcellChief, Covert Action GroupServices StaffSECRET2SENSITIVE
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 178]
SECRETSENSITIVE28 July 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Seymour BoltenReview StaffVIA: Mr. John WallerSpecial Assistant to the DDOSUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted atRight-Wing Governments1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing governments, which is responsive to a question from the Senate Select Committee.2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the other disclosures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military base negotiations now underway. With this problem in mind, we have broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those operations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if absolutely necessary.3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use (with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela, which was provided to you directly by LA Division.4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information to the committee. However, should it be necessary to do so, we would appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances of any use of this material outside of the Agency.SECRETSENSITIVEE2 IMPDETCL BY 055377
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5. We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision of this material to the Select Committee./s/ Donald J. PurcellDonald J. PurcellChief, Covert Action GroupServices StaffAttachments, a/s