Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 134]
# III. The Mechanics of DeclassificationDeclassification involves more than appropriate standards for the release of information. It also calls for the establishment of effective mechanisms to move records through the bureaucracy. Once again, the experience of the Review Board provides valuable lessons that should be of use to this Committee in considering legislation. I would like to draw attention to four important points involving the mechanics of declassification.First, the "referral process" is one of the most significant, government-wide bottlenecks to the declassification of records. Before an agency can release information in its records that was obtained from another agency, it must refer the record to the agency from which it derived that information. Although this procedure is a sensible arrangement that promotes the valuable goal of sharing information among agencies, it becomes a costly and time-consuming obstacle to declassification. Very frequently, records become trapped in the morass of the referral process.The Review Board developed essentially three procedures to help expedite the referral process: (a) establishing joint-declassification sessions where several agencies convened at the Review Board offices (or sometimes at another site) and declassified records; (b) hand-carrying records from one agency to another and having them declassified on-site; and (c) giving agencies notice that unless records were reviewed by a certain date, the Board would simply vote to open the records without receiving the benefit of their input. In my opinion, any legislation designed to improve the declassification process must take into account this referral bottleneck by giving to the independent, supervising agency, the authority to set enforceable timetables.The ability to bring agencies together, such as in the joint-declassification sessions, has important beneficial effects that extend beyond expediting the referral process. In our experience, agencies tended to lose some of their institutional inhibitions as they sat at a table with each other and discussed records openly. Surprisingly, agencies typically assumed that another agency would not release information when the other agency was in fact willing to do so. Frequently, it is the suspicion that one agency does not want to release information that inhibits other agencies from releasing information. Like the COMMO example from Illustration 1 above, the perception of unwillingness to open records is sometimes greater than the need to keep records closed.Second, the Review Board profitted from the power, authorized by Congress, to "direct a Government office to make available to the Review Board ... additional information, records, or testimony from individuals, which the Review Board has reason to believe is required to fulfill its functions and responsibilities...." JFK Act, § 7(j)(1)(C)(ii). This power enabled the Review Board to obtain information about the basis for classifications, the existence of records relevant to completing its mandate,
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 135]
and the circumstances surrounding the creation of records. It is important that an agency with supervisory responsibility over declassification have the authority to obtain the information it needs to accomplish its work.Third, as with the referral process, a frequent bottleneck in the declassification. process is the final transfer of records from the declassifying agency to the National Archives. An independent entity responsible for supervising this process should have the authority and responsibility of guaranteeing that once the declassification process is complete, the final step of making records avallable to the public is taken.Fourth, although the start-up process is very time-consuming, it is a necessary prelude to more efficient and productive work. The start-up time for the Review Board, as I understand is also the case for Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), required education not only of the Board and staff, but also of the agencies. It is important that any future planning of an endeavor of this nature take into account the initial costs and, importantly, take advantages of the lessons leamed by the Review Board. The initial cost can be recuperated in the long run.When an independent agency, such as the Review Board, has the authority to set the agenda (by establishing timetables), sponsor joint declassification sessions, require the production of evidence, and ensure the prompt transfer of declassified records from the agencies to the National Archives, declassification can be a success. I strongly urge this Committee to take advantage of the momentum created by the JFK Act and by ISCAP, and create an authority that will be able to bring independence, consistency, and energy to the process of making the government more open and accountable to the people who have paid for it.IV. Recommendations for Making S. 712 More EffectiveWith regard to S. 712, I wish to summarize the following recommendations that have been offered either explicitly or implicitly in the testimony above:First, the entity responsible for overseeing the declassification process (which, in the current version of the S. 712, is the National Declassification Center), must be genuinely independent of the agencies whose records it oversees. The Center should be staffed by persons who are both sensitive to the genuine secrets of the agencies, but who also are skeptical and demanding of proof.Second, the independent entity should have the power to set reasonable timetables by which an agency must complete the declassification review (or referral review). The independent entity should be empowered to release information on its own authority if agencies do not comply with reasonable timetables. The independent agency should additionally be empowered to obtain information from the agencies that
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 136]
-8-is essential for completing its work.*Third*, the legislation should incorporate a statutory provision that, at a certain point in time, records will presumptively be opened unless the agencies are able to articulate specific and persuasive reasons for continued redactions. Although it would be sensible to provide agencies with the benefit of the doubt regarding declassification for an initial period (*e.g.*, between 10 and 25 years), once this period has passed the presumption should shift decisively in favor of releasing the information.*Fourth*, agencies should be required to do more than provide mere "detailed justifications" (*see, e.g.*, S. 712 § 4(c)(2)(A)) for classifying and refusing to declassify records. The written explanations must be *more than* "justifications," they must be able to convince a skeptical reader who has sufficient information to evaluate the merits of the writing.*Fifth*, it would be highly advisable to provide the declassification entity (the National Declassification Center), with the authority to make binding requests to agencies to search out records that may have been misplaced or misfiled.*Finally*, there is one additional recommendation that I would make that presumably goes beyond the scope of today's hearing and so I will raise it only in passing. I believe it would be advisable for future Executive Orders to break down the "sources and methods" exemption, inasmuch as it is used too casually and it covers a multitude of very distinct issues. To the extent that the Committee is interested, I would be willing to submit additional comments at a later point to develop this issue.I would like once again to thank the Committee for taking seriously the right of the American people to better understand how their government functions. I would be pleased to answer your questions.
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 137]
# STATEMENT OF STEVEN GARFINKELDIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE*NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATIONbefore theCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRSUNITED STATES SENATEMarch 25, 1998Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:I am very pleased to appear before you today to report on our progress in implementing the recently established system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information. On April 17, 1995, the President issued Executive Order 12958, entitled "Classified National Security Information." This Order took effect on October 14, 1995, only two and one-half years ago. While still in its early stages of implementation, the Order clearly attempts to strike an appropriate balance.*The Information Security Oversight Office, or ISOO, is responsible for overseeing Government-wide implementation of the security programs under Executive Order 12958, "Classified National Security Information," and Executive Order 12829, "National Industrial Security Program." ISOO is also responsible for reporting annually to the President on the status of those programs. Created in 1978, ISOO became a component of the National Archives and Records Administration in November 1995. In addition to reporting to the Archivist of the United States, the Director of ISOO receives policy guidance from the National Security Council.Among its functions, ISOO: (1) develops implementing directives and instructions; (2) maintains liaison with all agencies that create or handle classified information; (3) inspects agency programs and reviews their classified records; (4) receives and responds to public complaints, appeals and suggestions; (5) collects and reports to the President and Congress relevant statistical data about the security classification program, including data about its costs; (6) serves as a spokesperson for information about the security classification program; (7) provides program and administrative support for the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel and the Information Security Policy Advisory Council; and (8) recommends policy changes to the President through the National Security Council.
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 138]
On the one hand, it seeks to reduce the permitted level of secrecy within our Government, and to make available to the American people hundreds of millions of pages of historically valuable documents that no longer require protection in the interest of national security. On the other hand, the Order enables us to safeguard the information that we must in order to protect our nation and our citizens.Already, this new system has achieved some rather remarkable results:*   In the last two years, the agencies of the executive branch have declassified more than 400 million pages of permanently valuable government records.*   Of the more than 650 million pages that the executive branch has declassified since 1980, more than 70% of that total took place in the past three years.*   Agencies that never previously contemplated large-scale declassification, like the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, now have in place productive declassification units.*   The Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, a new six member panel representing the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Archivist of the United States and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, has declassified in their entirety more2
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 139]
than 70% of the documents that have come before it on appeal from agencydecisions to keep those same documents classified.*   Original classification decisions, the actions most akin to new secrets, have    decreased to historic lows.*   Anecdotally, those of us who are exposed to a wide variety of classified information    are noting more and more situations in which information that would have been    routinely classified in the past is now routinely unclassified, without any increased    threat to our national security.Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I can state with total confidence that theUnited States Government stands far in the forefront among nations in the manner,timing and extent to which it makes available to its citizens and the general public itsrecords of governance, including its formerly classified records. In conversation afterconversation that I have had over the years with foreign government officials, and withforeign students, researchers, and journalists, one visitor after another has expressedgreat admiration for the degree of openness offered by our freedom of information laws,and our security classification system, with its limitations on classification and itsemphasis on declassifying information as soon as it is prudent to do so.
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 140]
These indicators of progress do not mean that we have all the answers about our security classification system or that there aren't tremendous hurdles to clear. For example, the implementation of the new system has been uneven among the major classifying agencies, and a few are only now just getting started; the costs of implementing the system at some agencies are higher than we anticipated; and resource limitations are having a clear impact on agency compliance and oversight. To be sure, the standards and goals established within the new Executive Order are unparalleled. We are not yet certain that every agency, or perhaps any agency, can achieve them. However, only if the targets are difficult can reaching them be noteworthy.I recognize that the focus of today's hearing is the legislation before the Committee. I will try to answer any questions you may have concerning the similarities and differences between the security classification system that currently exists and the system that S. 712, as currently drafted, would impose. The Administration has serious objections to certain provisions of S. 712, particularly as they could impinge upon the President's authority and flexibility to manage the classification and declassification programs. Legislating in this area can be perilous, given the great deference traditionally given to the President in the areas of national defense and foreign affairs.
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 141]
However, the Administration is prepared to work with the Congress to address these concerns and to establish an effective National Declassification Center. The Administration will identify the revisions that would be required to enable the Administration to support S. 712.
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 142]
# 13-00000Board of Sponsors(Partial List)* Sidney Altman* Bruce Ames* Philip W. Anderson* Kenneth J. Arrow* Julius Axelrod* David Baltimore* Baruj Benacerraf* Hans A. Bethe* J. Michael Bishop* Konrad Bloch* Nicolaas Bloembergen* Norman E. Borlaug* Owen Chamberlain  Abram Chayes* Stanley Cohen* Leon N. Cooper* E. J. Corey  Paul B. Cornely* Johann Deisenhofer* Renato Dulbecco  John T. Edsall  Paul R. Ehrlich* Gertrude B. Elion  George Field  Jerome D. Frank* Jerome I. Friedman* D. Carleton Gajdusek  John Kenneth Galbraith* Walter Gilbert  Edward L. Ginzton* Donald Glaser* Sheldon L. Glashów  Marvin L. Goldberger* Joseph L. Goldstein* Roger C.L. Guillemin* Herbert A. Hauptman* Dudley R. Herschbach  Frank von Hippel* Roald Hoffmann  John P. Holdren* David H. Hubel* Jerome Karle  Nathan Keyfitz* H. Gobind Khorana* Arthur Kornberg* Edwin G. Krebs* Willis E. Lamb, Jr.* Leon Lederman* Wassily W. Leontief* William N. Lipscomb  Jessica T. Mathews  Matthew S. Meselson  Neal E. Miller* Franco Modigliani  Philip Morrison  Stephen S. Morse* Joseph E. Murray* Daniel Nathans* Marshall Nirenberg* Douglas D. Osheroff* Arno A. Penzias* Martin L. Perl  Gerard Piel  Paul Portney  Mark Ptashne  George Rathjens* Frederick Reines* Burton Richter* Richard J. Roberts  Vernon Ruttan  Jeffrey Sachs* Arthur Schawlow* J. Robert Schrieffer* Glenn T. Seaborg* Phillip A. Sharp* Herbert A. Simon* Richard E. Smalley  Neil Smelser* Jack Steinberger* Henry Taube* James Tobin* Charles H. Townes  Robert A. Weinberg  Victor F. Weisskopf* Torsten N. Wiesel  C. S. Wu  Herbert F. York* Nobel laureates# FA.S.Carl KaysenChairmanFEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS307 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E. E-Mail fas@fas.orgWashington, D.C. 20002 Web http://www.fas.org/Phone (202) 546-3300 Facsimile (202) 675-1010Robert M. AdamsVice-ChairmanAnn DruyanSecretaryCharles C. PriceTreasurerJeremy J. StonePresidentCIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF CIA INFORMATIONIN THIS DOCUMENTStatementofSteven AftergoodDirector, Project on Government SecrecyFederation of American Scientistsbefore theCommittee on Governmental AffairsUnited States SenateHearing onS. 712, The Government Secrecy ActMarch 25, 1998National Council MembersEric Hall ArnettRosemary ChalkSteve Fetter*Val L. FitchLinda GottfredsonDavid Hafemeisterex officio: *Robert M. Solow, Andrew SesslerMorton H. HalperinDaniel KammenPriscilla J. McMillanArthur H. RosenfeldRobert SocolowBurns H. Weston
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 143]
# IntroductionMr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to address your Committee on the subject of government secrecy.I believe that this subject is as important as any on the Committee's agenda because it goes directly to the heart of our political system. Government controls on information define the limits of American democracy. Limits on information mean limits on informed debate, limits on the ability of citizens to meaningfully communicate with their representatives, and on their ability to hold elected officials accountable.At the same time, it is self-evident that some degree of secrecy is necessary in certain matters of national security, including the protection of advanced military technologies and the conduct of diplomatic and intelligence activities.A sound government information policy is therefore one that strikes a responsible and appropriate balance between the imperatives of open, accountable government and the requirements of national security secrecy.Such a balance is precisely what has been lacking throughout the modern era of cold war secrecy, leaving us today with a grotesquely distended secrecy system that improperly withholds unimaginable quantities of records from public access while often failing to protect genuine secrets.My hope is that Congress and this Committee will take steps towards a new balance that corrects the failings of the past, and will enact a government information policy that better serves the national interest.In the following remarks, I will first present several assertions about secrecy policy by way of background, and I will then draw some specific conclusions concerning the Government Secrecy Act.## BACKGROUNDI would like to emphasize several points that I believe should form the foundation for congressional deliberation on the future of the government secrecy system.1. Most Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive.One might well suppose that public concern about official secrecy is limited to those who are most immediately affected by it, such as journalists and historians, as well as a small cadre of advocates and activists. But that is not the case.Public surveys conducted for the Department of Defense in 1994 and 1996 consistently found that a majority (55%) of Americans believe that "the government
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 144]
protects too many documents by classifying them as SECRET and TOP SECRET.*[^1]In other words, concern about excessive government secrecy is not simply the province of "special interest" groups; it is shared throughout the general public. Reducing government secrecy truly is a matter of "public interest."Much of this public concern is latent and diffuse, but it crystallizes time and again around specific issues- the JFK assassination, POW/MIAS in Southeast Asia, UFOs, Nazi war crimes, human rights violations in Latin America, and so forth.2. Excessive classification is a fact. But independent review can overcome it.Even if the majority of Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive, they could conceivably be mistaken. But they are not mistaken. It is demonstrably true that government agencies classify too much and fail to declassify information that no longer warrants protection.This problem is illustrated with particular clarity by the fact that agency refusals to declassify records are frequently overturned-- within the executive branch itself- by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), which receives appeals from members of the public for documents that agencies have refused to declassifyDeputy Assistant Attorney General Roslyn A. Mazer, who was appointed by President Clinton to chair the ISCAP, reported recently on the latest activities of her Panel, which includes representatives of the Departments of Justice, State, Defense, CIA, NSC and the National Archives:We have taken final votes on appeals for declassification of more than 70 documents on a wide variety of subjects. Of these, we have voted to declassify more than 70 percent of them in their entirety, while declassifying significant segments of most of the remainder. This is significant in my view because, in each instance, we are voting to overturn an agency's decision reached at its highest level of appeal....*[^2][^1]: Not inconsistently, a majority of those surveyed also favor "a high level of secrecy" for technology with military applications. *Public Attitudes Towards Security and Counter-Espionage Matters in 1994 and 1996* by Tom W. Smith, National Opinion Research Center, prepared for the Department of Defense Personnel Security Research Center, November 1996. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/perssur2.html>.[^2]: Remarks by Roslyn A. Mazer, Chair, Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, before the DoD Historical Records Declassification Advisory Panel, March 6, 1998, emphasis added. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/advisory/iscap0398.html>.