Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# SECRETReview Staff: 75/100924 June 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceSUBJECT : Senator Gary Hart's Request to Talkto QJWIN While Traveling in EuropeThis is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former agent while the senator is traveling in Europe.The agent is QJWIN. He was first approached in 1958 through the head of the Luxembourg intelligence service. At first he was used mainly to spot potential agents in various European countries. Later he became the major asset under ZRRIFLE. In this capacity he made a brief visit to the Congo, but took no actions.On the weekend of 7 June 1975, members of the Senate Select Committee staff spent many hours at Headquarters reading files, including QJWIN and ZRRIFLE, among others. QJWIN's true name contract is in the file which they read. So is a street and post office address as of 1964, the time when we ended our contract with this agent. We have not contacted him since.We have heard that David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff telephoned QJWIN. This report remains unconfirmed. We have protested to Bill Miller.It is difficult to imagine how a U.S. senator could talk to a former agent without arousing the interest of the local intelligence service (probably Luxembourg) and of the host government who might wonder about the propriety of investigations being conducted on their territory and involving one of their citizens.In any event, an approach of this nature would be of interest to the Department of State, and the senator might wish to consult with the Department before proceeding.Walt ElderWalter ElderCB: 007789E2 IMPDET# SECRET
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SECRETTalking Points For Use With Senator Gary Hart On His ProposedContact With QJWYN1. Senatorial contact with a former CIA agent would run the risk of his exposure to his local government and the press. Because of his former activities and relationships he might be subjected to reprisals from abroad, possible prosecution for espionage at home from his local government and harassment from the media.2. Active as well as former CIA agents abroad would have further cause to believe that the American intelligence service is incapable of protecting its informants from disclosure. Contacting an agent under the insecure conditions involved would violate the Agency's promise to this former informant to protect the confidentiality of the relationship.3. Foreign intelligence services with which the CIA is in liaison would find this approach highly unprofessional and risky. It is bound to raise further questions about the dangers of continued confidential cooperation with the CIA.4. It is possible that the local government involved might lodge a formal protest to the US mission protesting the unusual procedure of a Senate investigating committee interrogating its nationals in violation of its sovereignty without requesting formal permission.6/24/75SECRET
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13-00000SECRETExec Iva Registry75-6905Review Staff: 75/86820 June 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceThis is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former agent of ours while traveling in Europe.You should know that we have been told that the Senate Select Committee staff has already been in touch with this agent by telephone. We do not know how they learned his true name or his whereabouts. We have already advised David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff of a potential problem area in connection with such a proposed meeting. The agent in question is, of course, a subject of interest to the local intelligence service and we doubt that the host government or the intelligence service would agree that a United States senator, especially a member of the Senate Select Committee, may appropriately conduct such investigations within its territory without clearance to do so.In any event, an approach of this nature would be of interest and indeed of concern to the Department of State and the senator might be well advised to consult with them before proceeding.For your information, the agent referred to is QJWIN and we have not been in touch with him since about 1951./s/Walter ElderAlder Handcarriedoing to DCI.EKCB: 007789E2 IMPDETSECRET
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MEMORANDUM FOR: DC/ 6/25 D00More facts, per your request, on the QJWIN matter.Talking points for your use with Sen. Gary Hart are included.H. Knoche 6-24-75(DATE)
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SUBJECT: GUIDELINES FOR MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ANDTHEIR STAFFS WHILE TRAVELING ABROADThere have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BEABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCEINSTALLATIONS.Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. Ther mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions that25 June - latest version, incorporating proposed changes by DOD.
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2could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposureof such liaison.[^1] Several foreign governments or entities thereofnow willing to cooperate privately with the U.S. in intelligenceagreements-exchanges maintain *strongly neutral* or anti-U.S. foreignpolicies; continuation of such agreements-exchanges is thereforedependent upon avoidance of their public disclosure. In manycases termination of such agreements would result in the lossof unique strategic intelligence, and alternate collectionmethods are either not available or are prohibitively expensive.[^2]To help maintain the discreet nature of the visit, it would bepreferable if some reason other than SSC business could begiven to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. Nodeliberate contact should be made with the local press, norshould comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigatingofficers are contacted by the press. Local press publicitypertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost allcases be distasteful to the host government.In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas,discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S.intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and withsenior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits arecontingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himselfto be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon hisreturn, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.[^1]: ![Footnote reference 1][^2]: ![Footnote reference 2]
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II. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGEOF THE VISIT.All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and becauseof his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BECONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operationaldetails are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elementswill only discuss operations in general terms--operationalpriorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operationalenvironment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches,etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted inphysical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking tosee texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements betweenthe U.S. and the host government. These are usually consideredby the host government as extremely sensitive, politically andoperationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent ofthe host government.IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or localservice scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members
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would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC.V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities.VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such
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a visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance.Senate Select Committee principals and staff should understand the distinction between U.S. intelligence installations abroad and joint U.S.-foreign intelligence installations or foreign intelligence installations supported by the U.S. intelligence community. Access to the former is at the discretion of the U.S. Ambassador; access to the latter two is at the discretion of the foreign government involved.VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspiciously and will be easily recognized.
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CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 38 PERPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDTOTAL COPIES 17-2 RUN BYSECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEIADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTEDACTION UNIT BY AT STAFF1 4RF. FILE VR cliplan, destops, cloes.2 5/ps/642, OLC, DAO,3 6ACTION #T 105747 E1A405 PAGE 01 IN 613590TORI201921Z JUN 75 LOND 62615SECRET 201745Z JUN 75 STAFFCITE LONDON 62615TOI DIRECTOR,RYBATREF A, DIRECTOR 707518B. DIRECTOR 7087911. THANK YOU FOR ADVICE REGARDING SENATOR MONDALE'S   PROPOSED VISIT, AND AMBASSADOR AND MINISTER HAVE BOTH BEEN   ALERTED.2. IN RESPONSE TO PARA 6 REF A, COS PLANS TO BRIEF SENATOR   MONDALE ON STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY   AND THE NATURE OF OUR INTERFACE WITH IT WITH PARTICULAR STRESS   ON THE GROUND RULES GOVERNING OUR RELATIONSHIP. COS WILL ALSO   COVER THE STATION'S ORGANIZATION, PRIORITIES, AND THE GENERAL   KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE   ANSWERS TO A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THAT OCCUR TO US:A. WHAT CLEARANCES DO SENATOR MONDALE AND HIS TWO STAFFASSISTANTS HAVE?B. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE SENATOR BEEN INFORMEDABOUT AGEE CASE, AND IN WHAT DETAIL SHOULD THIS CASE BE COVEREDWITH HIM AND HIS TWO ASSISTANCTS? C. TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULDSECRET
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13-000007-71-MFG. 2/75.CABLE SEC DISSEM BY PER TOTAL COPIES RUN BY REPRODUCTION BY OTHERISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED SECRETADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTER BY AT Z STAFFACTION UNIT I RF FILE VR 1 4INFO 2 5ACTION # 3 6T 105747 EIA405 PAGE 02-02 IN 613590TOR:201921Z JUN 75 LOND 62615SPECIFIC CA PROJECTS BE DESCRIBED. ASSUME THERE IS NOT OBJECTIONSTO POINTING OUT THE DAMAGE DONE BY LEAKAGE IN WASHINGTON TOTOHAWKBIT, AS A WAY OF DRAMATIZING THE NEED FOR SECURITY IN THECOURSE OF THE SENATE INVESTIGATION. D. IF THE STATIONIS TO BE RESPONSBIBLE FOR THE SENATOR'S HOTEL AND TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS,WE WOULD APPRECIATE BEING SO INFORMED. E2 IMPDET.
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# OUTGOING MESSAGESIGNAL CENTER USE ONLYAGE COI ACP TOG TPE MRO OCIOMF 0 0 0 0 0 17-2CLASSIFICATIONSECRETMESSAGE HANDLING INDICATORSTAFFDATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER1817332 DIRECTOR 708791CONF: C/EUR6 INFO: FILE C/IPIAN, D00100,C/PS/EG2, P/OLC, olics.c/cl/lop3,INDEX DISSEM BY:NO INDEXRETURN TO PERIP FILESTO: LONDON, VIENNA, BONN, PARIS INFO OSLO, HELSINKI.RYBATYREF: DIRECTOR 707518 (NOT NEEDED OSLO, HELSINKI}1. {REF CONCERNED VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE TO EUROPE IN EARLY JULY ON SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES.}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# OUTGOING MESSAGESIGNAL CENTER USE ONLAGE COI ACP TOQ TPE MRO DCI0 0 0 0 0 0 0CLASSIFICATIONSECRETMESSAGE HANDLING INDICATORSTAFFDATE-TIME GROUPCITEDIRECTORMESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBERINDEX DISSEM BY:NO INDEXRETURN TO PERIP FILES #CONF: INFO: FILE708790PAGE 2 OF PAGESAIRCRAFT.Y5. FOR LONDON. MR. AARON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MURRAY SYMONDS BUT NOT THROUGH CIA ARRANGEMENT. SENATOR MONDALE HAS ASKED FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE (AND PROBABLY MI-L) ON THE BRITISH OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND HOW THE BRITISH COMMAND AND CONTROL AUTHORITIES RUN WITHIN THE BRITISH SERVICE. WE ARE NOT ASKED FOR ANY ASSISTANCE IN THIS AFFAIR.Y6. FOR BONN. SENATOR MONDALE PLANS A SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTACT WITH THE GERMAN EMBASSY AND THE BND7. IN A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE TRIP, MR. AARON SAID THAT IN VIENNA THE SENATOR WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND HOW THESE AFFECT THE OPERATIONAL PICTURE IN THAT CITY. IN BONN THE SENATOR WILL WISH TO LOOK INTO.COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS AND MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN SEEING THE WESTPORT FACILITY. IN PARIS THE SENATOR WILL EXPECT TO REVIEW THE STATION'S VARIED PROGRAM. Y8. WE NOTED THE SENATOR'S INVESTIGATION MAY STILL BE SUBJECT TO HIGHER LEVEL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DIRECTION OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN INFORMED. E2, IMPDET.DATE: 17 JUNE 1975ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS E.H. KNOCHEUNIT: C/EUREXT: 1012WILLIAM W. WELLS, C/EUR JOHN WALLER, SA/DDORELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICERCLASSIFICATION E 2 IMPDETCL BY:
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13-00000SECRETMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONDATE AND PLACE: 17 June 1975 1000 - 1100Room 2E-45SUBJECT: Conversation by Mr. John Waller, SA/DDO withMr. David Aaron, member of Senator Mondale'sstaff, with Regard to the Senator's ProposedTrip to Europe1. According to Mr. Aaron the Senator and Mr. Aaron's itinerary,   while not yet fixed, will be along the following lines:a. 30 June - 1 July: Londonb. Monday, 7 June: Vienna, for one dayc. Paris and Bonn. Although the order has not yet beendetermined, the Bonn stop would be two days and theParis stop, one day.In the period between London and Vienna, the party intends to visitOslo and Helsinki. The purpose of this part of the trip, however,has nothing to do with the SSC and the party does not want or needStation contact.2. Mr. Aaron agrees that in discussions with Stations, the   party should not get into specific operational cases. They want to   discuss "more generic" subjects: operational priorities, relations   with the Embassy, problems, scope of liaison, operating conditions,   etc. Their basic interests are related to "command and control".   It had occurred to Aaron that Vienna would be a good example of a   Station which concentrates on "East - West" operations (read third   country, Sov and Sov Bloc operations). He recognized London was a   liaison station. Mondale, however, was anxious to talk to Cord Meyer.SECRETE2 IMPDETCL BY 055636
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SECRET- 2 -Paris, he felt, would provide some understanding of "third world" operations. Bonn, he felt, would be a good example of the inter- relations of a CIA Station with the Military and the Foreign Service.3. Mr. Aaron stated that he had already sought out Mr. Simon of the British Embassy, requesting that contacts be arranged in London with the appropriate Foreign Office or Intelligence Offices in order to discuss the British experiences in "command and control". Aaron is also interested in how the British Official Secrets Act works. He had heard that it was proving inadequate. Mr. Aaron stated that Simon had not been enthusiastic about the idea but promised to look into it. Aaron felt that it had been better to work directly with Simon, whom he claimed to know, than to involve the Agency's go-between.4. Mr. Aaron intended to make a similar approach to the German Embassy.5. Mr. Waller commented that such approaches to foreign governments would make our liaison services uneasy and could adversely affect their willingness to cooperate. To this reason, we did not favor involving foreign governments -- at whatever level or wherever in the bureaucracy. Moreover, contacts with foreign governments increased the likelihood that the true purpose of the Senator's trip could leak to the press. Mr. Waller mentioned that he would want to bring this to the attention of others.6. Mr. Aaron agreed that the Senator, through press conferences or otherwise, would not make public the fact that his trip was connected with Select Committee investigations.7. Mr. Aaron said that he and the Senator were in touch with Mr. Hyland of the State Department with regard to this trip. He also suggested that they might get in touch with military intelligence services in Washington and in the field. He made specific reference to "Naval Intelligence".8. Mr. Aaron stressed the fact that the itinerary was still tentative and subject to change.SECRET
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SECRET- 3 -9. At one point, Mr. Aaron asked if CIA had any aircraft in Europe which could be put at Senator Mondale's disposal. Mr. Waller replied negatively.10. Mr. Aaron felt that it was unlikely that Mr. Bader would be a member of the Senator's party.Distribution:1 - Mr. Knoche1 - Mr. Wells1 - Miss Page1 - Mr. LeaderSECRET
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# SECRETCABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2TOTAL COPIES 8-1STAFFACTION UNITFILE VR CIDIAN, DDO, OLC, ICSACTION # INFO Yalop3, lops, 9PSIEG2T 892461 EIA462 PAGE 01 IN 608574TORI160921Z JUN 75 VIEN 26077SECRET 166853Z JUN 75 STAFFCITE VIENNA 26877TO: DIRECTOR.RYBATREF: DIRECTOR 7975181. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD GENERALLY PLAN BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE   ON STATION'S POSITION WITHIN EMBASSY, PRIMARY TARGETS.   ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT FOR OPERATIONS, CAN OF   COURSE ADJUST TO SUIT HIS REQUIREMENTS, WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL   COME INTO CLEARER FOCUS AFTER HQS BRIEFING MENTIONED PARA 8 REF.2. IF POSSIBLE, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION THAT STAFF   AIDE, MR. WILLIAM BADER (PARA 2 REF) IS IDENTICAL WITH PERSON OF   SAEM NAME WHO WAS FORD FOUNDATION REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS LATE   SIXTIES AND AT THAT TIME WAS NAVAL RESERVE LIEUTENNANT COMMANDER.3. NO FILE, E2 IMPDET.SECRET
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# MESSAGESIGNAL CENTER USE ONLYOMF 0 0 0 0 0 81-2CLASSIFICATIONSECRETMESSAGE HANDLING INDICATORSTAFFDATE-TIME GROUP141651ZCITEDIRECTORPAGE 1 OF PAGESMESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER707518DISSEM BY: 38CONF: C/EUR 6 INFO: FILE DOI, D/OCI, DAO, CS/RF, OLC, C/IPIAN, DDO/DO, C/cl/OP3, C/OPS, C/LSN/ID, C/PS/EG2.TO: PRIORITY LONDON, VIENNA, BONN, PARIS.YRYBAT YSUBJECT: THE VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE OF MINNESOTA TO EUROPE AT THE END OF THE MONTH. Y1. THE SENATORIAL PARTY WISHES TO VISIT CIA FIELD STATIONS TO EXAMINE AGENCY COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE FIELD. SENATOR MONDALE WILL WISH TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT HOW STATIONS OPERATE AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATION AND THE EMBASSY. PRESUMABLY THE SENATOR WILL ALSO WISH TO EXAMINE OUR COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS.Y2. SENATOR MONDALE WILL BE TRAVELING WITH HIS PERSONAL AIDE, MR. DAVID AARON, WHO IS THE DIRECTOR OF THE TASK FORCE ON COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTI- GATING CIA ACTIVITIES. MR. WILLIAM BADER, A SECOND STAFF MEMBER, MAY ALSO ACCOMPANY THE SENATOR. Y3. HEADQUARTERS WILL REQUEST OF SUGGEST TO SENATOR MONDALE THAT HE USE OTHER REASONS THAN THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION FOR HIS TRAVEL IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS. WE DO NOT KNOW, HOWEVER, IF HE WILL AGREE.YDATE:ORIG:UNIT:EXT:CLASSIFICATIONSECRETRELEASING OFFICERCOORDINATING OFFICERSREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDAUTHENTICATING OFFICERE 2 IMPDETCL BY: 012866
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# OUTGOING MESSAGESIGNAL CENTER USE ONLYAGE COI ACP TOG TPE MRO DCIOMF 0 0 0 0 0 0CLASSIFICATIONPAGE OF PAGES2SE CRETMESSAGE HANDLING INDICATORDATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBERSTAFF DIRECTORCONF: INFO: FILE 707578INDEX DISSEM BY:NO INDEXRETURN TO PERIP FILES #4. YOU SHOULD ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR OF THE SENATOR'S   INTENTIONS TO VISIT HIS MISSION AND THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT.PLEASE ASK THE AMBASSADOR TO RESTRICT HIS CORRESPONDENCE TO WASHINGTONABOUT THIS TRIP TO EITHER CIA CHANNELS OR THE ROGER CHANNEL.LATER RESTRICTIONS MAY BE FORTHCOMING, DEPENDING ON HOW SENATORMONDALE DECIDES TO HANDLE HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS.5. THE CODEL'S TENTATIVE ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS: DEPART   30 JUNE VIA COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT, ARRIVING LONDON 1 JULY; 2 JULY -   VIENNA; 3-4 JULY - BONN; 5-6 JULY - PARIS; 7-8 JULY - LONDON;   9 JULY - RETURN TO THE U.S.6. REQUEST EACH COS ADVISE HEADQUARTERS OF HIS PLANS FOR   BRIEFING THE SENATOR.7. FOR BONN. SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER A VISIT TO WESTPORT.8. HEADQUARTERS WILL OFFER A BRIEFING TO SENATOR MONDALE   AND HIS PARTY AT HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE. E2, IMPDETH9. MORE specific guidance on opeentional discussions to follow.E-H. KNOCHE-LC- RottelumSA/DDO-DATE: 13 JUNE 1975ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLSUNIT: C/EUREXT: 1012DCIRELEASING OFFICERCLASSIFICATIONCOORDINATING OFFICERSDDOAUTHENTICATING OFFICERE 2 IMPDETCL BY: 01.2866REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED