Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 163]
SECRETSo long as the Sino-Soviet Bloc continues to subsidise Cuba,the internal economic situation will probably not become intolerablefor those committed to the Castro Regime. The Sino-Soviet Blocwould stand to suffer severely if they undertook any major reductionin their support of Cuba.Castro has cautiously avoided provocative actions of sufficientmagnitude to incur the wholesale wrath of the U. S. or to provide ajuridical basis for overt intervention. To Castro's liking, U. S. optionshave been narrowed to U. S. instigated open conflict economic pressuresor to a time-consuming and frustrating multilateral approach utilisingthe OAS mechanism.The U. S. may again be afforded the opportunity to take increasedovert actions (such as blockade or other stringent measures). Unlesspreplanning on this or other actions is accomplished beforelland, covertactions in support of these overt measures will be limited to only thoseopportunities upon which the U. S. can capitalize with the means at itsdisposal at the time.From the standpoint of the Cuban Regime, there appears to belittle likelihood that any clandestine actions will be taken directlyagainst the U. S. However, the recent aircraft attacks or warningsagainst U. S. boats indicates the possibility of uncontrolled action onthe part of individuals of the Castro Regime.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 164]
# ANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE(Prepared for the Meating of ________, February __, 1963, 4 P.M.)FROM: Coordinator of Cuba AffairsSUBJECT: Psychological Program in Support of U.S. Policy on Cuba## ObjectivesThe basic program adopted by the Executive Committee on January 25, 1963 sets forth major objectives for our policy toward Cuba. It als commits us to "be prepared to increase the political, economic, psycho- logical and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created."This memorandum outlines a program that will meet the psychologica: requirements of our overall policy.## Role of Psychological OperationsA successful psychological campaign cannot be viewed solely as a propaganda exercise or an informational program. It should cover action and statements--all that is said or done solely or primarily for psycho- logical effect. This definition sets off psychological activities from those actions undertaken primarily for their direct value--whether in ti fields of intelligence, military, political, or economic action.One of the tasks of psychological operations is to exploi. other vities to maximum advantage, or to seek to minimize any negative aspects of such activities. In designing and carrying out action program directed at Cuba, it shall be the task of the Coordinator and his Group
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 165]
TOP SECRETto balance possibly conflicting interests and to determine which, in any given circumstance, shall have priority.Strategy and TacticsWe must keep in mind constantly the relationship between what happens in Cuba and the overall struggle between ourselves and the Communists. We should seek to insure that the Cuban situation will develop in a way that will:a) lead to the collapse or overthrow of the Castro regime;b) demonstrate to the Cuban people and to the world at large that communism is not a solution for the problems of a developing country;c) discredit Castro and his associates and their methods of opera- tion throughout the Americas;d) insure that the burden imposed by Cuba on the Soviet Union and the satellites adds substantially to the mounting evidence that efforts to export communist revolution are unsuccessful and ex- cessively costly.Our focus should always be on the first of these objectives--the end of the communist regime in Cuba. But pending achievement of this, we can move toward the other objectives. And they, after all, are of major importance to our overall strategic purposes.TOP SECRET
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 166]
We have the possibility of insuring that so long as Cuba remains Communist it will serve as an open, bleeding wound that will weaken the Communist cause generally. This strategic concept is one which the Communists have tried to use against us.Our tactical approach should be designed to fit this overall concept. It calls for the utilization of every available weapon in our aresenal and engagement, day-in and day-out, in a multi-faceted struggle at all levels.Our initial aim should be to weaken steadily the capability, confidence and will of the enemy (inside and outside Cuba) and, correspondingly, to strengthen our side. We need not, indeed ought not, stake everything on one great effort. Nor should we concentrate on simply building up our forces and husbanding them "until the right time comes" for a final showdown.Instead, our effort should be directed toward achieving an unbroken series of small successes, encompassing gains on the part of anti-Castro elements and failures on the part of the regime itself. Our aim should be that the end of each day would see the position and prospects of the Castro regime and little worse than they had been at sunrise.A factory breakdown because of a shortage of spare parts or sabotage, an increase in absenteeism, lengthened queues at the food stores, failure to get a field planted--whether because of neglect or lack of seed, a
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 167]
TOP SECRET-4-resort to terrorist methods against the populace, an unexplained fire, creation of suspicion in a minor but key official, the sudden appearance of antiregime slogans on walls, a defection from the armed forcesé-these and similar things, whether major or minor, and over and over again on a mounting scale, will have a cumulative impact, In the long run, they can be equivalent to a major victory.The important thing is to keep-the pressure on, to never give the regime a respite, to see that the series of small defeats and setbacks is unbroken and unending, Our purpose is to create a situation in which the regime and its supporters steadily lose hope and heart, in which they come to accept the certainty of eventual defeat.Meanwhile, repercussions would be felt throughout the Communist world. Assistance to the regime would increasingly be regarded as a "rat hole" operation. The "example of Cuba" would become the reverse of expectations; *fidelismo* would become a term of opprobrium.In short, the goal is to bring about the elimination of the Castro regime without resort to direct and massive force. We cannot rule our the possibility that some reliance on force may become necessary to insure final victory for anti-Castro forces. But the greater and more effective is the effort herein outlined, the more we are likely to insure that overt force requirements will be minimal.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 168]
Specific programs to carry out this kind of approach to the Cubanproblem are submitted in Annexes A and B.## Audiences and TargetsThe psychological program should be directed at the following primary audiences or target groups:1) *the Cuba people*. Our goal should be to encourage dissatisfaction with the present and hope for the future once Castroism is eliminated. It should be made clear that the next chapter of Cuba's history must be written by the Cubans. But they should know that they will have friendly support from others.2) *the Castro regime*. Our goal should be to create dissension, doubt and hopelessness inside the ruling clique.3) *Latin America*. In programs directed at the peoples and governments of the hemisphere, our goal should be to weaken the influence of the Cuban regime and its propaganda, to encourage solidarity within the OAS family, to counter Cuban influence in key groups (youth, labor, intellectuals), to encourage actions that counteract Cuban programs of subversion and insurrection.4) *the Soviet Union and other Communist states*. To picture Cuba as a steady drain on already limited resources, to insure that i is such a drain, to encourage the Soviets to limit and eventually eliminate their involvement in Cuba.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 169]
5) Other countries. To insure understanding of what is involved in the Cuban situation, to use Cuba to disprove that communism provides useful answers to the needs of developing countries, to expose the continuing danger of communist efforts to export revolution.6) the Home Base. To provide the American people and the Congress with the full facts of the Cuban situation within the limits of legitimate security considerations.AssetsThe psychological program toward Cuba should utilize the full range of the Government's capabilities for action and information. These include, among others: a) public statements by the President and other officials;b) informational assets such as the public affairs and Congressional relations agencies of State, Defense and other agencies;c) the Government's research and analysis facilities;d) overseas information programs in all media, especially the facilities of the U.S. Information Agency;e) the diplomatic mechanism for both formal and informal contacts;f) capabilities for unattributed programs of action and information.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 170]
# Coordination and GuidanceIn carrying out the kind of many-sided offensive described herein, it will be necessary to provide for coordinating various programs. We must be sure that what we do in one area reinforces what we do elsewhere. It will be necessary to provide careful and regular policy guidance to those responsible for action. This task is assigned to the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs. He should establish the necessary machinery on an inter-departmental basis.## U.S. Posture toward CubaThe picture we should seek to create is one of a confident and decisive United States moving forward in cooperation with its other friends, dealing with the Cuban situation but not exclusively preoccupied with Castro. We should not appear to be in doubt or confusion. We should take note of developments in Cuba promptly and react to them quickly. Our answer to claims, charges or attacks should be swift. Our machinery must be geared to permit answers to Castro and his henchmen immediately and effectively. If he makes a speech tonight, our reply should be on the airwaves tomorrow at the latest.Cur approach should not be defensive. We should not confine ourselve to answering Castro but as much as possible force him onto the defensive. We should insure that he is required to do the answering, the explaining, the disagreeing as much as possible.Attachments: Annex A - Guidelines for Attributable Programs Annex B - Guidelines for Unattributable Programs; EB 11 1953
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 171]
ANNEX AGuidelines for Attributable Programs## Current Requirements1.  There should be a statement, preferably by the President, explaining overall U.S. policy toward the Cuban question. It would provide clarification of where we stand on Cuba and how we hope to see the future develop. It would provide the basis for statements, private and public, for all other officials concerned. It would inform the Cubans how we regard their future; tell Latin Americans how we see the problem and our view of their role; underline to the Soviet bloc our determination to oppose communism in this hemisphere; further clarify for our own people the seriousness of the problem and our determination to support the cause of freedom in Cuba with all feasible means.The Coordinator should arrange for preparation of such a statement and submit a draft to the White House.2.  It is our policy to seek elimination, or at least material reduction, of the Soviet military presence in Cuba. Efforts now underway to achieve this end should be given a reasonable chance. If they fail to produce the desired result within a reasonable time, we should be prepared to move forward along other lines. The Coordinator should develop a program to meet this contingency. Meanwhile, the continuing presence of Soviet forces should be described as an exacerbating influence in East-West relations and a symbol of foreign domination and control in Cuba.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 172]
3. Clarification of our position on "non-invasion" would be desirable. This could be covered in 1 above. It should be clear that we do not regard invasion of Cuba by the United States as a desirable or useful course. But the possibility of such action in given circumstances cannot be eliminated. The door should be left open for any action that we and our allies in the hemisphere may regard as necessary in the future to counter aggressive moves by the Cuban regime.4. We need to have clearly in mind our position regarding a possible internal revolt. This, too, could be covered in 1 above. We should avoid statements for the present which could reasonably be expected to encourage an open revolt. We should avoid for the present anything that could be read as a firm pledge to come to the aid of anyone who moves against Castro. We should make clear, however, that we are prepared to support and cooperate with any elements who succeed in ending communist dominance in Cuba and who are committed to establishing in Cuba a free and democratic government responsive to the desires of its own people.5. We should exploit by available means all evidence of internal discontent and opposition. Defections from the Cuban regime should be exploited extensively and quickly as soon as security considerations are mat.6. The Coordinator should arrange for up-to-date surveys of the following:
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 173]
-3-a) programs now underway in the psychological field;b) U.S. capabilities in this field with a view to exposing anyobvious remediable gaps in our resources for conducting a signi-ficant psychological effort against Cuba;c) Castro's propaganda machine--how does it work? how much effortgoes into it? how can we weaken it?d) major lines of the Cuban propaganda offensive--favorite themes,techniques, principal targets, etc.;e) current position of Castro and his regime in Latin America--main areas of influence, by country and by groups.f) the past record on leaflet drops--how effective, advantages ofplane vs. balloon drops, comparison of delivery by other means,possibilities of such a program being used to attack us in theUN or among the Cuban people.Themes for Information ProgramsInformation media should exploit the following themes to the max-imum extent practicable. Hard data supporting these themes should bespotted on a day-to-day basis and used. Commentaries and discussionsshould be tailored to take full advantage of these attitudes.(To Cuban audiences)1. Castroism is doomed; it is on the slippery slope to oblivion.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 174]
SECRET2. Cuba is an unwilling instrument of Soviet 'policy, subject to the whims and moods of a foreign power.3. Moscow will use Cuba as it sees fit and for its own purposes, giving help and withdrawing it to suit the Kremlin's desires.4. Castro has isolated his country from its traditional friends, from the hemisphere in which its roots of history, culture, religion, and well-being are sunk.5. Communism has failed to solve the problems of Cuba--has lowered rather than raised its standard of living.6. The Cuban revolution has been perverted and betrayed.7. Freedom, independence and diversity are the "wave of the future."(To Latin American audiences)1. Use the above as appropriate.2. Castro and the Russians are using Cuba as a base for subversion, espionage and sabotage against neighboring states.3. Castroism promises bloodshed, terror and economic stagnation.4. The Hemisphere's most promising course is vigorous efforts to ? achieve the goals of the Alliance for Progress.(To Soviet and Bloc audiences)1. The above as appropriate.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 175]
-5-2. Cuba represents a steady drain on already limited Soviet and   bloc resources; every shipment to Cuba means things *do not* appear   on Soviet shelves.3. Castro really supports the Chinese, not Moscow; he is using   Soviet help to promote Castroism not Moscow's policy.The above lists do not pretend to be exhaustive. They are but thebeginning of a catalog of themes we can exploit in our information andpropaganda offensive.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 176]
## ANNEX BIt is the judgement of the Coordinator that this annex covering intelligence and covert actions should be submitted separately after the Executive Committee reaches a conclusion on the overall psychological program and the attributable activities set forth in Annex А.See par 4 page 2 aboveTS.00.51
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 177]
# TOP SECRETDOCUMENT RECORD(AR 380-5)DATE RECEIVED DATE OF DOCUMENT NUMBER OF COPIES COPY NUMBER(S)2-11-63 noneLOCAL TS CONTROL NUMBER (If applicable) TS 0051OFFICE OR HEADQUARTERS OF ORIGINATOR TYPE OF DOCUMENT AND ADDRESSEE(S)Mr. Califano Draft Memo for NSC Exec. ComteUNCLASSIFIED SUBJECT OR SHORT TITLEPsychological Program in Support of U.S. Policy on CubaNUMBER AND DESCRIPTION OF INCLOSURES TO DOCUMENT (Indicate addition and/or deletion of inclosures with dates)Annex A (5 pgs) and Annex B (1 pg)DISTRIBUTION DATA DATE OF DISTRIBUTIONCOPY NO. ADDRESSEE (Print or type) COPY NO. ADDRESSEE (Print or type)FOR: INTRA-OFFICE ROUTING DATAACTION ☐ INFORMATION SUSPENSE DATECHECK TO CHECK TO* Mr. CalifanoNAMES OF ALL PERSONS HANDLING ATTACHED-DOCUMENT OR WHO HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF ITS CONTENT WILL BE LISTED BELOWNAME (Print or type) DATE NAME (Print or type) DATEA. Carter 2-11-63FORMDA MAY 60 969 EDITION OF 1 JAN 58 IS OBSOLETE. REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROMCLASSIFIED INCLOSURES
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 178]
# SUBJECT: Future Cuban Leadership# INTRODUCTIONFollowing is a proposal for the creation of an imaginary Cuban leader. This proposal is presented primarily to fill gaps existing in the present policy study. It will become obvious that this proposal can be utilized in conjunction with current programs as well as many of those programs proposed for the future. It may be necessary to address this proposal or a similar proposal separately and in advance of the policy study; however, in the event no pressing requirement exists, it is suggested that this proposal be considered in conjunction with the policy study and handled on a closely held basis.# REASON FOR PROPOSALFollowing are listed a number of indications that the leadership question will be addressed in the near future:a. With the termination of U. S. support to the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) a vacuum has been created. Various exile groups in the U.S. and elsewhere will be vying for recognition and support in an attempt to fill this void.b. There has been constant pressure on the U. S. and on other Latin American countries to recognize a government in exile. This proposal could serve to lessen or eliminate much of this political and psychological pressure.c. This proposal could serve to reduce the bickering among exile groups and may serve to resolve some of the problems of Cuban exile unification.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 179]
d. The proposal could emphasize the development of a native "David" in opposition to Castro, the Cuban "Goliath." This could serve the U.S. image by making Castro the "Goliath" rather than the "David" who opposes the "North American Giant. "e. This proposal could serve to prevent the U.S. from making premature commitments to a leader or a particular exile group and could be used as a device to test exile response.f. This proposal could retain for the U.S. the ability to control future selections of leaders or groups (timing and political ideologies).g. This proposal could permit the U. S. on a progressive basis to influence the idealogies of the resistance and thus to influence the platform of a future Cuban Government.h. The publicity associated with the prolonged existence of a resistance in Cuba can serve to delay the furtherance of the *de facto* recognition of the present Cuban Regime.## OBJECTIVETo create an imaginary leader or image of resistance in Cuba. This image would serve as a focal point for resistance directed against Castro by Cubans or Latin Americans.## DEVELOPMENTAn imaginary name of a resistance leader could be developed utilizing a popular name from Cuban history, a name associated with resistance in Cuba or a newly devised name. The name selected should typify a person who is friendly to the Cuban people, is anti-communist, is willing to fight against the Regime, and is little-but tough. There is no requirement for a detailed staff study in order
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 180]
to determine this name. "The Little Bull," "The Little Worm," "The Friendly Worm," "The Fighting Friend," "The Tough Peasant, " or any such name which is acceptable and meaningful in Spanish could suffice. Over a period of several months the name could be "dropped" or leaked through U.S. officialdom, in diplomatic channels, in intelligence channels or within the Cuban exile community. Specific acts against the Regime could be credited to this individual or members of his group. Communications could be arranged between this individual and his subordinates to be picked up either by Castro's censors or by radio intercept in Cuba or in the U. S.After a period of time, all unexplained incidents and actions for which credit has not been seized by some other exile group would automatically be ascribed to our imaginary friend. At some point in time it could be leaked that the U. S. is, in fact, supporting this imaginary person. Similarly, other Latin American countries may, without inducement, publicly follow the U.S. pattern.During the course of this operation it is quite possible that the Castro Regime could indicate that the activities of this individual were terminated, that the individual was captured, that he was being pursued, or that he was an imaginary faker or fraud. Such action would only serve to further publicize the actions of the individual and so long as resistance in general continued the fame of our "Cuban Kilroy" would spread. Humorous antics could be credited to our imaginary friend and rumors of his exploits of bravery (ala Zoro) could be circulated.At some point in time it may be wise to indicate what this individual stands for. (It will become obvious that he is opposed to the Regime in Cuba.) It could be possible to indicate little-by-little his political platform in very general terms -- realizing that the mistique and the "generalness" connected with his operation is, in fact, the power behind the operation. Ultimately, Cubans and others may demand that he proclaim his complete political views or even that he present himself physically. Since this is not desirable,