Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 180]
# SENSITIVECovert Action Operations Concerning Right-Wing RegimesCATEGORY I1.  ETHIOPIA: A project for covert support of the Ethiopian labor movement was first approved for FY 1965. The purpose of the support was to encourage the development of the labor movement as a democratic force and as one of the few mass representative organizations in Ethiopia. The project was terminated at the end of FY 1973. The total approved budget for this project from its inception in CY 1964 to its termination in CY 1973 was $291,006. Covert support to the Ethiopian labor movement was approved by the Special Group on 22 August 1967, on 25 March 1970, on 26 May 1971, and on 8 May 1972.2.  SOUTH VIETNAM: From 1955 to 1975, a series of projects was begun designed to build up grass social institutions as a means of strengthening the democratic foundations of the country. One of the most long-lasting of these was aimed at supporting the soundly demo- cratic labor movement through the provision of guidance and funds to facilitate its growth among the workers and rural village peasants and tenant farmers.3.  GUATEMALA: In 1972-73, the Guatemala City Station with access to the government succeeded in dissuading the President from military action against Belize.4.  HAITI: As early as 1963, the Special Group discussed ways and means of influencing the Duvalier dictatorship. In 1967, a modest project was approved for the support of Haitian exile radio broadcasts for the purpose of offsetting "the inflammatory propaganda broadcasts to Haiti from Radio Habana."5.  DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: In 1963, CIA was directly involved in the successful efforts to prevent the return to the Dominican Republic of General Elias Wessin y Wessin and forestall his leadership of a right- wing coup designed to prevent the holding of free elections.6.  GERMANY: From 1948 to 1960, CIA exploited an asset in a neo- Nazi political movement both as a source of intelligence concerning its plans and actions and as a means of covertly sabotaging the movement and its European counterparts.SECRETSENSITIVE
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SECRETSENSITIVECATEGORY II1.  SOUTH AFRICA: In 1959, after consultation with the Special Group, the DCI approved an overall expenditure of $165,000 to a leading South African political figure designed to encourage the creation of a new political party. This party was established in 1960. The objective was to influence the liberalization of the South African Government by having a legally constituted party in opposition to apartheid. The activity was terminated in 1962.2.  SOUTH AFRICA: A project was initiated in 1962 to encourage the development of a multiracial trade union organization which opposed apartheid. It was funded through a European philanthropic organization. State Department approval was received in June 1963. A total of $311,705 was spent on this activity. The project was terminated in 1968.3.  KOREA: In 1963, the Special Group approved a covert action project designed to encourage *emerging civilian government* vis-a-vis the military leadership following President Rhee's resignation and in anticipation of forthcoming elections; it proposed to support a group of National Assembly members.4.  KOREA: The Special Group approved in 1967 a project designed to support a private, rural self-help organization to encourage more participation by rural farmers in local and national politics to increase their influence on the Government of the Republic of Korea; it involved the creation of agricultural training centers in rural villages, a news-letter and student rural services. It was terminated in 1970 as a project, but the movement has been continued under the auspices of the government.5.  ARGENTINA: Between 1950 and 1955, efforts of the CIA were directed at countering Peron's program to obtain wide support in Latin America for his Movement of Latin American Trade Unionists (ATLAS) which was designed as one element of his campaign to expand his influence in the area. Partially as the result of CIA's efforts, the movement never caught on and it was abandoned with Peron's ouster from power.6.  BRAZIL: From the early 1960's through the ouster of Goulart and the assumption of power by the conservative Brazilian military, to 1972, CIA supported a rural cooperative movement in the impoverished Northeast. This support was provided in spite of strong opposition to the movement first by the Goulart government and then by Brazilian military authorities in that area and in spite of the effect particularly after 1974 on liaison and diplomatic relations if this support by the USG were discovered. The project was terminated in 1972.SECRETSENSITIVE
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SECRETSENSITIVE7. NICARAGUA: During the period 1962 to 1966, CIA participated in efforts to interdict moves by General Somoza to purchase arms for military actions against his neighbors.8. SPAIN: In 1963, the Special Group approved a program to train 15-20 Spanish democratic labor leaders a year outside of Spain to build an effective cadre of Spanish labor leadership. In 1966, the Special Group approved a modest program designed to strengthen the Christian Democratic movement in Spain through supportive efforts with youth, political and labor elements.
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22 JUL 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John WallerSpecial Assistant to DDOSUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action OperationsAgainst Right-Wing GovernmentsREFERENCE: SS/CAG Memorandum of 18 July 1975,Same SubjectWe have reviewed referent memorandum and have the following comments on those paragraphs which concern European Division.13. GERMANY. While this case is somewhat bizarre and does not represent a productive operation, we pose no objection to its being presented to the Senate Select Committee.14. SPAIN. We have no objection to the presentation of these programs to the Senate Select Committee for review although we share concern expressed by SS/CAG that a leak of this information would be detrimental to the base negotiations.sigstd/William W. WellsWilliam W. WellsChief, European DivisionDDO/DC/E/NW:MFBuell:tj (22 July 75)Distribution:Orig. & 1 - Addressee1 - SS/CAG1 - C/EUR1 - DC/E/NW1 - E/G1 - E/IBE2 IMPDETCL BY 061414
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SECRET/SENSITIVE25 JUL 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Group, Services StaffSUBJECT : Covert Action Operations Against RightWing Regimes1. Attached are revisions of the descriptions of the three covert action operations in Africa, cited in your memorandum to Mr. John Waller dated 18 July 1975.2. In the case of Ethiopia, we understand from your discussions with Mr. Clifton Strathern that the labor project has not been eliminated from your list but that the Director will request that discussion of it be limited to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman only of the Senate Select Committee. The Director should be informed of the potentially embarrassing procedural errors in the presentation and review of this project before the 303 Committee, and the risks of exposure to two former assets who have been jailed by the new Ethiopian regime.3. The Ethiopian labor program was undertaken without 303 Committee knowledge or approval. Subsequently, the project was presented to the 303 Committee on 22 August 1967 and Mr. Walt Rostow, then Chairman of the Security Council, asked why it had not been brought before the Committee before. He was told that for projects costing $20,000 or less, it had been the DCI's discretion to determine if a given project was sufficiently politically sensitive to warrant bringing it before the committee. Mr. Rostow directed that the 303 Committee should examine all political action projects. Nevertheless, the project was not submitted to the Committee for review in 1968, 1969 or 1973.4. In addition to these procedural errors, the arrest in 1974 and continued detention of two Ethiopian labor leaders who are former assets under this project, and accusations inE2 IMPDETCL BY 009904.SECRET/SENSITIVE
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13-00000SECRET/SENSITIVEthe Ethiopian press that the trade union organization receivedsupport from the U.S. Government, make any disclosure of CIAinterest in the labor organization potentially dangerous toour former assets. Neither of the former assets was arrestedbecause of his CIA connections, and neither of the two assetsnor the labor organization have been accused of CIA involvement.An admission now of CIA support to Ethiopian labor or to thetwo Ethiopian labor leaders in jail could be a sentence ofdeath for them.5. In the case of South Africa, CIA support to a leading   South African political figure to encourage the creation of a   new political party remains a very sensitive matter. The   principal agent is still a leading and respected spokesman   for the opposition party in South Africa and is a leading member   of the South African parliament. Exposure of the operation   could lead to his identification which would be extremely   damaging to him, to the opposition party and to our govern-   ment's relations in South Africa. For these reasons, we believe   it would be desirable for the DCI to limit discussion of this   operation to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Select   Committee only.6. The European philanthropic organization which was used   to fund the development of a multiracial trade union organiza-   tion in South Africa was the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES),   located in Germany. The South African labor officials and   organizations which received funds from FES were not aware   that the actual origin of the funds was the United States   Government and presumably do not now know of U.S. Government   or CIA involvement. Aside from exposing a U.S. Government   involvement where none is known to have existed, FES was used   to support a number of other covert action operations in Africa   and elsewhere and exposure of the foundation would have   ramifications other than in South Africa. The Director should   be briefed on FES and its range of activities on behalf of CIA   if he has not already been informed.Attachments:As Stated Above![signature of Clifton R. Strathern]Clifton R. StrathernDeputy Chief, Africa Division2SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRET21 JUL 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John WallerSpecial Assistant to the DDOSUBJECT : Covert Action Operations AgainstRight Wing GovernmentsREFERENCE : Chief, SS/CAG Memorandum, dated18 July 1975Subject: "Summary of Covert ActionOperations Against Right Wing Governments"1. EA Division is concerned about Reference and its possible   use in briefing the Senate Select Committee. Specifically, our concern   centers on describing the EA operations contained in the attachment to   Reference as "were mounted against" "right wing governments"..   None of the EA operations DNSCOOP, DNSPROUT (both of which   took place in Korea) and TUMIX (which took place in Vietnam) -:   were or should be so described as being mounted against the government   then in power. In fact, just the opposite is true. All of these   operations, while covert in the sense that the U.S. Government hand   was never disclosed, were primarily designed to broaden the base of   the governments in power and enhance its stayability by providing   advice and support to "grass root elements" in an attempt to get these   elements to function as a more cohesive organization in seeking   participation in the governmental process.2. While all of the operations have been terminated, the   DNSCOOP operation is perhaps the most sensitive of the three, in that   it represented an initial effort by the Agency to establish contact with   opposition elements in South Korea. As noted above, the purpose of   this contact was not to overthrow the ruling government but rather to   assist the opposition in establishing itself as a more viable force in its   effort to establish a two-party system in South Korea. The Agency todayE2 IMPDETCL BY 014848SECRET
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13-00000SECRETmaintains contact with the major opposition leaders in South Korea and this contact is well known to and approved by the U.S. Ambassador in Korea as well as the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Department of State.3. We see no real value to be gained if any of these operations were to be raised with the Senate Select Committee.Robert D. Brown, Jr.Acting Chief, East Asia Divisioncc: DC/Operations StaffC/SS/CAG2SECRET
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# SECRETJuny 20.SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling AbroadThere have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:-- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distastefull to a host government.# SECRET
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SECRET- 2 -In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide- lines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms - operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.SECRET
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SECRET- 3 -No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.SECRET
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# SECRETLABLI SE DISSEM 15PERSON UNIT NOTIFIEDTOTAL COPIESRUN BYREPRODUCTION BY OTHISSUING OFFICE IS PROHI٦٤ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTEDACTION UNITFILE UR. C/IP/AN, OPP, D/%CSTAFF142536C/EUR 6ICS, C/OPS, C/PS/E62, C/PS/PGACTIONT 126005CY-SA/DDOE1A165PAGE 01IN 620738TOR 3013012 JUN 75LOND 628897SECRET 301128Z JUN 75 STAFFCITE LONDON 628897TO: DIRECTOR.RYBATREF DIRECTOR 7128721. IN MEETING WITH COS ON 30 JUNE, AMBASSADOR TOLD COS THAT HE HAD LUNCH WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE AND ENGAGED IN BRIEF GENERAL DISCUSSION OF INVESTIGATION OF BKHERALD BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. AMBASSADOR FOUND SENATOR MONDALE ENTIRELY REASONABLE IN HIS APPRUACH AND FULLY AWARE OF DIFFICULTY OF JUDGING EVENTS AND DECISIONS OF EARLY 1960'S BY STANDARDS OF 1975.2. AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT SENATOR MONDALE STATED THAT HE HAD MADE SOME EFFORT TO CONTACT BRITISH ON JUNE 28 WITHOUT SUCCESS. IN LIGHT OF REF, COS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO CONTACT SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE, IN CONVERSATION WITH COS ON 30 JUNE, RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMAN, JIC, REPORTED THAT BRITISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK FORWARDED REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE TO MEET WITH BRITISH ON 38 JUNE, SINCE SYKES HAD TO BE IN PARIS ON 28 JUNE AND HOOPER HAD NOT YET RETURNED FROM HIS ASIANSECRET
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SECRETADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTEDSTAFFT 126005 EIA165 PAGE 02-02 IN 620738TOR1301301Z JUN 75 LOND 628897TRIP, U.K; EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WAS ASKED TO INFORM MONDALE THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME. THIS IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND IN EVENT SENATOR RAISES THE POINT WITH HQS.E2 IMPDET.SECRET
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# 13-00000CABLE - DISSEM BY PEPPERSON. UNIT NOTIFIEC SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY AT STAFFACTION UNIT FILE VR. c/planioooC/EURE c/B/EGL. A/ole dlicsACTION - NFO dalop3.|     |     || --- | --- || 1   | 4   || 2   | 5   || 3   | 6   |T 121509 EJA815 PAGE 01 IN 619528TOR12716512 JUN 75 BONN 41001SECRET 2712172 JUN 75 STAFFCITE BONN 41001TO: DIRECTOR.RYBATFROM GRAVERREF DIRECTOR 7087911. IT WILL GREATLY FACILITATE PLANNING SCHEDULE FOR SENATOR   MONDALE IF A MORE SPECIFIC ITINERARY CAN BE OBTAINED TOGETHER   WITH SOME INDICATION OF HOW MUCH TIME THE SENATOR PLANS TO MAKE   AVAILABLE TO US DURING HIS BONN VISIT. IN VIEW OF THE UNUSUAL   CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC THAT GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ARE   NOT CENTRALLY LOCATED IN ONE PLACE, PLUS THE SPECIAL NATURE OF   BERLIN, I AM GIVING THOUGHT TO HAVING CHIEFS OF BASE BERLIN AND   MUNICH PARTICIPATE BUT AS OF PRESENT TIME WE UNCERTAIN EVEN WHAT   DAY SENATOR WILL ACTUALLY BE IN BONN.2, WE ALSO PERPLEXED BY PARA 6 REF RE "SIMILAR INDEPENDENTCONTACT WITH THE BND" SINCE, AS HOS AWARE, THE BND IS LOCATEDIN MUNICH, WE ARE EQUALLY PUZZLED BY THE COMMENT IN PARA 7ABOUT 'SEEING THE WESTPORT FACILITY' WHICH SEEMS TO SUGGESTRESURGENCE OF LONG-STANDING MISCONCEPTION THAT WESTPORT IS ASECRET
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13-00000CABLE SEC LISSEM BY PEF TOTAL COPIES RUN BYPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED SECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTEDACTION UNIT BY AT ZSTAFFRF. FILE VR 1 42 53 6ACTION #NFOT 121509 EIA815 PAGE 02-02 IN 619528TOR:2716512 JUN 75 BONN 41001PHYSICAL FACILITY HOUSING AND PROCESSING DEFECTORS, THEREIS NO WESTPORT FACILITY AS SUCH, JUST A FEW SAFE APARTMENTSIN FRANKFURT, AND I PLAN TO BRIEF THE SENATOR ON WESTPORTACTIVITIES AS PART OF THE BONN PRESENTATION. IF THE SENATORPLANS TO VISIT ANY OTHER LOCATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC INADDITION TO BONN WE URGENTLY REQUEST EARLY ADVICE THEREOF.3. ASSUME SENATOR HAS BEEN BRIEFED IN GENERAL TERMS AT LEAST   ON AGENCY PROCEDURES FOR TRACING AND CLEARING OPERATIONAL SOURCES,   REPORTING ON THEIR ACTIVITIES, AND AGENCY FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING   PROCEDURES, BUT WOULD PLAN USE THESE PROCEDURES AS FRAMEWORK   IN DESCRIBING EXERCISE OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN THE FIELD,   IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING GENERALIZED DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR AREAS   OF STATION OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY.4, WILL GREATLY APPRECIATE ETA OF SENATOR AND PARTY BONNAS SOON AS THIS CAN POSSIBLY BE PROCURED. E2 IMPDET.SECRET
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# SECRETCABLE SEC DISSEM BY 2 PER TOTAL COPIES 19-1 RUN BPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED 4EUR BY A AT1145 STAFF PRECEDENCACTION UNIT 4EUR6 I RF. FILE VR GIAN, 606, OLC, ICS,INFO 9Kilop3, 9OPS, 4PSIEG2T 120565 Ε1A892 PAGE 01 IN 619109TOR1271119Z JUN 75 LOND 62823SECRET 271112Z JUN 75 STAFFCITE LONDON 62823TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.RYBATREF A. DIRECTOR 708791B, STATE 146723 DTD 21 JUNEC. STATE 150884 DTD 26 JUNE1. WE NOTE CHANGES IN SENATOR MONDALE TRIP.2. REFS B & C INDICATE MONDALE ARRIVING 28 JUNE   DEPARTING 29TH, TRAVELLING NORWAY THEN RETURNING TO WASHINGTON   VIA LONDON ON 7 JULY. NO MENTION OF OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY   EXCEPT MRS. MONDALE. REALIZE INFO MAY BE COVER FOR TRIP, BUT   WOULD LIKE CLARIFICATION. DOES SENATOR EXPECT BRIEFINGS   LONDON ON 28TH VICE 30 JUNE AND 1 JULY?3. PLS ADVISE. E2 IMP DET*NO RECORD IN CABLE SECRETARIATSECRET
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# OUTGOING MESSAGESIGNAL CENTER USE ONLYCLASSIFICATIONSECRETMESSAGE HANDLING INDICATORSTAFF DIRECTORCONF: EUR INFO: FILE CLIP/AN, DDS, DDO/A0,OLC, C/SS3; c/ps/eq2,c/ci/op3TO: LONDON.YRYBAT YREFS: A. LONDON 62701 |IN 6160871B. LONDON 62615 |IN 6135901 4AS YET WE HAVE NOT HEARD FURTHER ON THE MONDALE VISITNOR HAS EUR DIVISION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF ANY OF THEMEMBERS OF THE CODEL. IN ANSWER TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS,WE HAVE ALREADY FORWARDED TO LONDON BY SEPARATE CHANNEL THE CLEAR-ANCE STATUS OF THE PARTY. WE HAVE QUERIED ABOUT THE SENATOR'SKNOWLEDGE OF THE AGEE CASE, BUT KNOW OF NO SPECIAL BRIEFING GIVENHIM. WE PRESUME HE HAS READ THE NEWSPAPERS. SHOULD THE SUBJECTARISE, WE ARE PREPARED TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS FORTHRIGHTLY.RATHER THAN DISCUSSING SPECIFIC COVERT ACTION PROJECTS AND DIVULGINGSOURCE NAMES, YOU SHOULD COVER THE GENERAL IDEAS BEHIND COVERTACTION ACTIVITIES, THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THEY WERE DEVELOPEDAND WHY THEY WERE TERMINATED. E2, IMPDET.DATE: 25 JUNE 1975ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLSUNIT: C/EUREXT: 1012WILLIAM W. WELLS, C/EURJOHN WALLER, SA/DDOREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
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T 112809 EIA332 PAGE 01 IN 616087TORI241622Z JUN 75 LOND 62701SECRET 241451Z JUN 75 STAFFCITE LONDON 62701TO: DIRECTOR,RYBATREF A, DIRECTOR 708791B, LONDON 62615 (813590)1. RE PARA 5 REF A, RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMAN, JIC, INFORMED COS AT LUNCH 24 JUNE THAT AS RESULT OF REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE VIA MURRAY SIMONS, SYKES AND SIR LEONARD HOOPER ARE TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO MEET WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 1 JULY TO DISCUSS BOTH HOW POLICY CONTRO IS EXERCISED OVER BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND HOW BRITISH OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT WORKS.2. SYKES MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE AND HOOPER WERE THE ONLY ONES AUTHORIZED TO DEAL WITH SENATOR MONDALE AND THAT SENATOR MONDALE WILL NOT BE MEETING WITH GNGRAPH OR JAGUAR REPS,3. WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY TO GUIDANCE REQUEST IN REF B.E2. IMPDETSECRET