Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 170]
(1988), which upheld the power of the same court division to appoint independent counsels to investigate executive branch misconduct.If the Committee nevertheless concludes that this approach is undesirable, I would offer two alternatives for consideration, conceding that both are also susceptible to possible constitutional objection. The first would be for the President and the leadership of the House and Senate each to appoint a given number of Board members. Each body has interests in, and responsibility for, certain of the records at issue. I would not make these appointments subject to Senate confirmation, since they are not policy positions, and confirmation would only delay the task at hand. A second alternative would be the approach suggested by the ACLU: adopt some variant of the formula used last year by Congress in establishing the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation in the State Department, namely to have the President appoint based on specific criteria, i.e. background in particular disciplines, with most of the members coming from lists submitted by designated professional associations.Once the Review Board, however it is appointed, is constituted, it would appoint an executive director, and the first step in the process would be to make available to the Executive Director all Government assassination materials. Where the Executive Director suspects that the agencies have failed to-9-
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 171]
submit some of the relevant records, he or she has authority toquestion the agencies and to use the subpoena power of the ReviewBoard to obtain any additional records.The Executive Director, assisted by employees of the ReviewBoard and, if deemed necessary, detailed from elsewhere in theGovernment, would undertake the initial screening of theserecords. If the Executive Director concluded that a particularrecord was appropriate for release, the record would automaticallybe released, unless the record implicated personal privacy or theExecutive agency or congressional committee with responsibilityfor that record filed an appeal with the Review Board. In thismanner, many records could be promptly released without formalReview Board deliberations.If the Executive Director determined that a particular recordwas not appropriate for release under present circumstances orthat the record implicated personal privacy concerns, he or shewould automatically be required to refer that decision to theReview Board.The Executive Director would also be permitted to referparticularly difficult decisions, or decisions requiring furtherinvestigation, to the Review Board.In deciding on appeals and referrals from the ExecutiveDirector, the Review Board would have authority to conduct-10-
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 172]
hearings and subpoena records and witnesses.The Review Board would have final say as to the release or non-release of all materials, except that in the case of Executive branch materials, the President would have the authority to supersede the Board's determination and postpone release. But each time the President did so, he would be required to explain his reasons, both in a notice to the public and to the Congress. Decisions by the Review Board itself to postpone release of records would also have to be explained to the public and Congress.Finally, under the Joint Resolution, no item would remain permanently sealed. The Review Board, before finishing its work, would designate as to every item still withheld a specified time or a specified occurrence following which the item could be released. The files would then be transferred to the Archives, where the Archivist would have a continuing duty to reconsider them for release under the standards set by the Joint Resolution.Materials released by the Archivist or the Review Board would be available in the Archives for public review and copying.Our Joint Resolution makes clear that an Executive branch agency or congressional committee retains its existing powers under the law to release a particular record even if the Joint Resolution does not require it to do so, and that the members of-11-
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 173]
the public can continue to use the Freedom of Information Act to request from the agencies documents related to the assassination.Mr. Chairman, this Resolution may appear complicated, but the matter of disclosure is itself complicated. It cannot be accomplished arbitrarily or summarily. The process established by the Resolution, in my view, is logical and takes account of all the interests and equities in the disclosure of these documents. In the end, I think it will result in all of the pertinent information pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy being made public in a prompt and orderly way, and, in doing so, will help restore confidence among the public in our Government.Since the Joint Resolution was introduced, comments have been received from the Justice Department as well as others suggesting the need for change.With regard to the reaction of the Justice Department, I must say I found it very unfortunate that the Department chose to take what I found to be an extreme, hard-line position in opposing many of the key provisions of the Resolution. Rather than showing the flexibility needed in this unique circumstance to deal cooperatively with the Congress on a matter that is a serious concern for many Americans, the Justice Department chose to reassert familiar claims of Executive privilege and all of the other reasons asserted over the years to block the release of government information.-12-
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 174]
The whole point of this legislation was to create newcriteria and new procedures to maximize the release of informationhitherto withheld by the Government. The old laws and oldprocedures have been tried for the last 30 years, and have notproduced the type of disclosure needed to restore the confidenceof the American people.It seems to me that just this once, where the public policyinterest in full disclosure of these records is so apparent, theJustice Department could dispense with its usual "to-the-last-man"defense of Executive branch prerogatives, and help us deal withsolving the problem.I feel obliged to take special note of one point in theJustice Department letter, and that is their claim that theExecutive branch must have not only increased safeguards over itsown material -- but also have the ability to veto release of anycongressionally-created assassination record. This strikes me aspreposterous, particularly coming from a department that isostensibly so concerned to preserve a separation of powers. IfCongress wants to release information it has developed, thePresident should not be able to stand in the way.Hopefully, the Committee will yet be able to obtain executivebranch cooperation and move forward with this process. The publicexpects action on this matter, as the many letters, postcards, and-13-
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 175]
13-00000telephone calls to congressional offices demonstrate.Having said this, there are, in fact, several points raised by the Justice Department's letter, and by private citizens in touch with me, which I believe merit further consideration by the Committee.1. Perhaps the most important matter involves setting the boundaries of "assassination material." The Joint Resolution defines "assassination material" as "a record that relates in any manner or degree to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy...." But given the wide range of theories that have developed as to who killed President Kennedy and why, many types of records arguably relate in some manner to the assassination. What records regarding, for example, Cuba, Vietnam, and organized crime should be covered? This matter requires careful consideration.The Justice Department urges a substantial narrowing of the definition of "assassination material," apparently to only those records that on their face directly concern the assassination. I am concerned that this formulation may be too narrow. There is widespread public suspicion that some sort of conspiracy led to the murder of President Kennedy. If we go out of our way to avoid records that might shed light on activities linked to such an alleged conspiracy, we make little progress toward assuring the public that it has the full story. If we err on the side of-14-
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 176]
inclusiveness, and as a result learn a bit more about theoperations of our government and our foreign policy in the early1960's, I think we will benefit. My only concern would be thatthe search becomes so broad that it delays action of the releaseof documents clearly germane to the assassination. But whererecords have already been segregated, such as the executive branchmaterials obtained by the House Assassinations Committee, fullreview is probably appropriate.I do, however, suggest that the Committee, either in theJoint Resolution itself or in report language, set more preciseparameters defining "assassination material," or else direct theReview Board to do so promptly after it is established.Otherwise, we may end with widely varying interpretations by thevarious records agencies and committees as to what documentsshould be forwarded to the Review Board executive director.2. As the Justice Department's letter to Chairman Glenn   noted, the Joint Resolution, as drafted, would give an agency or   committee control over release of a record it originated even if   that record contained information obtained from another agency or   committee. I agree that this provision should be changed to give   agencies authority over release of their own information.   However, the change suggested in the Justice Department letter may   not by itself do the trick, because a record, for example a   lengthy congressional report, may contain both information-15-
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 177]
developed by the body that created the record and informationoriginated by a- xecutive agency. Instead of letting either ofthese two "orig zing bodies" have veto power over the release ofan entire document, we should work out language that give anagency or committee control over release of that portion of adocument for which it was responsible even if other information inthe document was originated elsewhere.3. On reflection, I think it would be best to amend the   Joint Resolution to make the records of the Review Board itself   subject to the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, and   to make the Board's proceedings subject to the Sunshine Act and   the Administrative Procedures Act. A law mandating increased   government openness should not itself establish an exception from   general standards for accountability. I still strongly believe,   however, that we should avoid subjecting the Board to extensive   court litigation over the release of the J.F.K. files themselves   either under the standards set by the Joint Resolution or under   the Freedom of Information Act.4. Section 11(a) should probably be amended to make clear   that the Joint Resolution's provisions take precedence not only   over other laws, but also over executive orders and regulations.5. A sentence might be added to Section 8(f) to ensure that   the public is clearly informed when summaries or substitutes are   released instead of actual records or information: "Any such
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 178]
13-00000.summary or substitution shall be clearly labeled as such when released to the public."6. The Joint Resolution should probably be amended to recognize the records of the Rockefeller commission as a component of this effort. The Archives would be the appropriate custodian of Rockefeller commission materials for purposes of the Joint Resolution.I thank the Committee for this opportunity to express my views on this measure.-17-
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 179]
13-00000Statement for the Senate Committee on Government Affairs,May 12, 1992Ernest R. MayCIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF CIA INFORMATIONIN THIS DOCUMENTIt is an honor to be invited to testify on this bill.I am a professor of history. at Harvard University, where Iteach both in the history department and in the John F. Ken-nedy School of Government. While I have done research onthe history of intelligence agencies and have served inWashington from time to time as a consultant, I do not speakas an expert on the matter before the committee. My com-ments are merely those of a historian looking at legislationdesigned to unearth historical source material.The bill now under consideration seeks to clear doubtsabout President Kennedy's murder. The Warren Commission hadthe same aim. Its make-up was supposed to reassure the pub-lic. It failed. The Commission reported in 1964. Almostwithin months, books challenging its findings hit best-seller lists.Over time, other theories multiplied. Now, it takeswhole books just to list books about the murder. Some ofthese books picture the CIA or FBI as plotters. This is notnew. A number appeared in the 1970s. Recently, this par-ticular set of theories has found new life. Two books ofthis genre reached best-seller lists in the spring of 1992,and Oliver Stone's film, "JFK," became a box office hit.
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 180]
2The bill now under consideration would open records so that the public can be reassured that these theories are fantasies. The stated aim is to "contribute to the trust of the people in their government."To achieve this, the bill proposes to create a five-person Review Board. As reassurance against a cover-up in behalf of the President or Congress, the District of Columbia Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals would appoint the Board. (The Supreme Court presumably is thought too partisan; besides, it might bring to mind Chief Justice Warren.)The bill says that members of the Board are to be "distinguished and impartial." Otherwise, it demands only that they not be currently in government employ and that they never have been involved in any investigation of the Kennedy murder.The Board and its Executive Director would have wide powers. They would look at all materials relating to the murder. If they suspect any agency of withholding material, they would have a right to conduct a hunt. The bill gives the Board power to subpoena records and persons, to take testimony under oath, to grant immunity to witnesses, and to punish defiance.
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 181]
13-000003The Board's decisions are to be final unless the Presi-dent himself intervenes to insist that some piece of in-formation not be released. The bill giving the Board itspowers is to "take precedence over any other law, judicialdecision ..., or common law doctrine" that might be in con-flict.My comments on this bill are mostly cautionary. Iquestion whether *any* legislation can achieve all that thisbill seeks to achieve. I question giving to a court-appointed Review Board such broad responsibilities andpowers. I believe that a Review Board differently selected,with a more limited mandate, could do a better job.The first cautionary point concerns the aim of clearingdoubts about the Kennedy murder. Even if every bit ofrelevant documentation becomes public, it will not yield astory that all Americans will accept. Why should it?Though we now know just about everything about the PearlHarbor attack, new conspiracy theories continue to be woven.One of the latest has Winston Churchill as the villain!Despite more than a century of research, new theoriesstill appear about conspirators helping John Wilkes Boothkill Lincoln. The chances are that the same will always betrue for Oswald and Kennedy. After another decade or so,
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 182]
however, Kennedy's murder will probably become, like Lincoln's, more an interest of buffs than of the public at large.The chances of clearing away all doubts are lessened by the fact that every bit of relevant documentation will not be released. This bill itself speaks of protecting secret agents and intelligence sources and methods. It speaks also of privacy rights. CIA and FBI reports and National Security Agency intercepts contain much material that, by these criteria, would have to remain secret.In fact, still more material may be kept from the public. This bill refers only to protecting the privacy of living persons. If the Review. Board yields to human feelings, it may extend protection to families and friends. Suppose, for example, that it sees raw FBI files recording old accusations against some Cuban-American. Even if the person is dead, anyone ever connected with that person could suffer should the accusations become public. If the Review Board suspects that the accusations were malicious and false, will it not choose to leave the files secret?Also, it has to be assumed that some files will turn out to have been lost or destroyed. The proposed Review Board would thus have to confess not only that it chose to
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 183]
13-000005leave some material under wraps but that other material was simply missing. Would spinners of conspiracy theories take the Board's word? Would they not instead accuse it of colluding in concealment of "smoking guns"?The Review Board would meanwhile be under pressure not to let privacy rights or other considerations inhibit release of documents. Investigative reporters, writers, and docudrama producers would hammer at it. So would scholars, including many interested in subjects other than the Kennedy murder. So would others with axes to grind.Some material sought might have only a remote relationship to the murder. The clamor would be no less ferocious. How much of the central files of the FBI and CIA would have to be opened, for example, to persuade disciples of Mark North or Mark Lane or Oliver Stone that neither FBI nor CIA officers participated in a murder plot?The Review Board would surely be urged to pursue data on the possible involvement of right-wing extremists. Obvious items would include not only FBI files but also tax returns. Imagine the scope of possible documentation if, in fairness, the Review Board also sought data on financial transactions by individuals associated with Vice President Lyndon Johnson!
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 184]
6I' forecast, in other words, that new evidence will not dispel conspiracy theories. At most, it will curb some of the more adventurous theorizing.I also forecast that, if release of the evidence is managed as this bill proposes, one of two results will follow.If the Review Board yields to outside pressures, it will conduct a fishing expedition. Much embarrassing and possibly harmful information will be made public. Alternatively, the Review Board will resist pressure. It will define its mandate narrowly. It will be prudent in what it reveals. It will then be accused of a "whitewash." The latter result could make matters worse rather than better. Suspicion could be fed, not allayed.There may, however, be better means of doing what needs doing. The current bill would have the Review Board and its Executive Director examine all materials to be released. They would be charged with ferreting out undisclosed material, and they would have effective responsibility for deciding what would and would not be released.An alternative would be a bill simply enjoining holders of records to identify and locate materials that, in the language of the current bill, "relates in any manner or de-
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 185]
# 7green to the murder of President Kennedy. The injunction would apply to all congressional committees and all executive agencies, including the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, and the National Archives. The bill could direct these record-holders to make the materials public. It could specify that the only materials to be held back would be those itemized in the current bill -- agents, intelligence sources and methods, etc.Where legislative writ does not run or is disputable, a statute could urge voluntary action. The current bill asks such cooperation from state and local agencies and foreign governments. A statute that sought to avoid constitutional disputes could ask the same of the President regarding records of the White House and Executive Office.This alternative bill could require or request public reports describing materials withheld from release - their characteristics and quantities, the general reasons for non-disclosure, and plans for eventual release.A Review Board could be created with a limited - and more workable - mandate.Its first duty could be to review record-holders' guidelines. These might well differ from agency to agency. Procedures for searching National Security Agency files of
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 186]
8communications intercepts might not be the same as those for searching the much less voluminous files of CIA stations and headquarters divisions. The Board could try, however, to ensure comparative uniformity in the diligence of searches. The Board could try also to ensure comparative uniformity in definitions of what is to be withheld. It might urge, for example, that the intelligence sources and methods criterion apply only to sources and methods in current use, not just to any ever used.The Board's second duty could be to scan materials that record-holders proposed actually to withhold. The Board might question record-holders' decisions. If so, it could ask that the agency or committee think again. If differences continued, the Board could appeal to the President or, for Congressional documents, to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House.In a final public report, the Board could describe any still unresolved differences. While the description would be in generalities, the issues would become publicly known. The broad purpose of the Board's report would be to validate the record-holders' non-disclosure decisions.Such a Review Board could be selected by comparatively traditional methods. Nominations could be asked of the
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 187]
9American Bar Association, the American Historical Association, the American Political Science Association, or kindred bodies. Appointments could be made by the President, with advice and consent of the Senate.Unless the quantity of material withheld proved to be much larger than I would expect, the Review Board could be kept small. It could probably manage with minimal staff.I believe that this alternative statute would accomplish all that can be accomplished. It would leave the onus for release or non-release of records on those already familiar with these records. Committees of Congress would make rules for their files. The President, the heads of departments; the Directors of Central Intelligence and the FBI, and the Archivist of the United States would make rules for theirs.This alternative statute would limit the powers and responsibilities to be thrust on an untried and potentially vulnerable Review Board. It would create a Board with the assignment only of checking the coherence and consistency of criteria for disclosure and non-disclosure.Since the invitation to testify included questions reaching beyond the current bill, I take the opportunity to respond to that concerning general declassification