Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 121]
ABLE SEC DIGGEM BY PAHENBON/UNIT NOTIFIEDTOTAL COPIER RU:SECRETBY AT ZDYANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THANISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDICTION UNITSTAFF1 42 53 6ICTIONRF FILE VRNFOT 33 35 76 EIA0 22 PAGE 03 IN 695650TOR: 242029Z SEP 75 MONT 21403COS ANSWERED WE WOULD FIRST INSTRUCT THE AGENT HOW TO HANDLEHIS OVERT CONTACT BUT, DEPENDING UPON RELATIONS, MIGHT ALSODISCUSS THE MATTER FRANKLY WITH POLITICAL OFFICER. WHAT ABOUTDEFENSE ATTACHE? ANSWER: THE SAME,5, THIS LED TO DISCUSSION OF INTER-AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER.HAVING JUST FINISHED WITH DEFENSE ATTACHE, AMBASSADOR TRUEHARTSAID DEFATT INDICATED HE HAD MANY SOURCES REGISTERED ANDTHEREFORE WE WERE PROSCRIBED FROM RECUITING THEM. COS POINTEDOUT SOURCE REGISTER IS FOR COVERT AGENTS ONLY AND SINCE DEFATTHERE IS PROCSCRIBED FROM RUNNING COVERT AGENTS, NONE OF HISSOURCES ARE IN INTER-AGENCY SURCE REGISTER. COS ADDED THATMANY DEFENSE ATTACHES MISCONSTRUE THEIR REGISTERING OF THEIRAGENTS IN PENTAGON SERIES AS SYNONOMOUS WITH REGISTRATION INTHE INTER-AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER,6. TRUEHART ASKED IF WE EXERTED "REAL CONTROL" OVER DEA'S   OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED BY DCID. COS SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY   WE EXERTED NO CONTROL OVER DEA NOR ARE WE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO   TRY TO DO SO, WE DO COORDINATE CLOSELY, REGISTER THEIR SOURCES,   PROVIDE TRACES AND ASSITANCE, ENCOURAGE LIAISON TO COOPERATE FULLY   WITH THEM, ETC. IN ADDITION, WHEN A DEA OPERATIN ISSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 122]
CABLE NEC DISSEM BY ____________ PER ____________ TOTAL COPIES ____________ RUYPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIKLISECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAIISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDLOVANCE.COPY TOPUKO.BLOTTED BY ____________ AT ____________ Z ____________ STAFFACTION UNIT| 1   |     || --- | --- || 2   |     || 3   |     ||     || --- || 4   || 5   || 6   |ACTION INFORF. FILE VRT 333576 EIA022 PAGE 04 IN 695650TORI242029Z SEP 75 MONT 21403BEING MOUNTED TO UNDERTAKE A DRUG BUY WE ARE REQUIRED TO KNOWENOUGH ABOUT THE CASE IN ADVANCE TO ADVISE THE AMBASSADORAS TO THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS INVOLVED, IF THERE ARE ANY.7. TRUEHART ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT WE WORK WITH LIAISON ON   TH E OSOVIET TARGET AND WHETHER WE HAVE TELTAPS. HE WAS ADVISED   LIAISON SHARES WITH US THE PRODUCT OF THEIR TELTAPS AND THAT   LIAISON IS PREPARED TO MOUNT JOINT OPERATIONS WITH US AGAINST   SOVIET TARGET, THAT WE ARE NOW INTENDING TO APPROACH THIS   MATTER WITH LIAISON IN A MORE PLANNED WAY. AARON ASKED   HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION WOULD WE ADVISE AMBASSADOR IN ADVANCE   OF MOUNTING JOINT OPERATION WITH LIAISON TO BUG RESIDENCEE OF   A SOVIET OFFICIAL, WE SAID PROBALBLY NOT SINCE THERE WOULD BE   NO FLAP POTENTIAL, AARON WANTED TO PURSUE THIS BUT STRANGELY   ENOUGH TRUEHART AGREED FULLY AND EXPLAINED THAT IF SOME ELEMENT   WENT AWRY THE LIAISON SERVICE WOULD BE THERE TO SET IT RIGHT.8. AARON AND TRUEHART SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME ANALYZING OD   NON-COMMUNIST WORLD COVERT ACTION OBJECTIVE K-2 INVOLVING AGENTS   OF INFLUENCEM. THIS PARAGRAPH WAS READ SEVERAL TIMES TO THEM ON   THEIR REQUEXT, THEY. WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG THE AGENT OF INFLUENCE   PROGRAM HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE, IN LATIN AMERICA (ANSWER: TWO ORSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 123]
T 333576 EIA022 PAGE 05 IN 695650TOR1242029Z SEP 75 MONT 21403THREE YEARS IN ITS PRESENT FORM THOUGH WE HAVE BEEN DOING THIS KIND OF THING FOR YEARS. WE STRESSED THAT THIS PARAGRAPH IN TWO PLACES CONTAINED THE PHRASE "SUBJECT TO POLICY APPROVAL" WHICH MEANT THE AMBASSADOR AND WASHINGTON, WHILE THEY UNDERSOTOOD THIS POINT THEY WANTED TO KNOW IF WE WOULD COORDINATE IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR OR THE DEFENSE ATTACHE ON THE RECRUITMENT OF A SENIOR URUGUAYAN GENERAL AS A POSSIBLE AGENT OF INFLUENCE. ANSWER: NO. DO WE HAVE ANY RECRUITED AGENTS OF INFLUENCE IN URUGUAY, ANSWER: NO. ARE WE WORKING ON THIS? ANSWER: YES. THEN AARON ASKED IF IT WAS TRUE THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME WE DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY THROUGH COVERT AGENTS OF INFLUENCE TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVE WHICH PRESUMABLY COULD THREATEN PRIORITY U.S. INTERESTS IN URUGUAY. ANSWER: TRUE AT THE PRESENT TIME, WE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO RURN TO OTHER AGENTS POSSIBLY INCLUDING LIAISON SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY IN THE NEAR FUTURE, PRIOR TO OUR ACQUISITION OF AGENTS OF INFLUENCE, AARON ASKED WHY THAT PARAGRAPH IN OD SPOKE OF MAINTAINING THE CAPABILITY TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES THAT THREATEN THE STABILITY OF URUGUAY SINCE THERE IS LITTLE U.S. COMMERCIAL INTEREST IN URUGUAY, WE ANS EWEREED THAT URUGUAY IS
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 124]
# SECRETT 333576 E1A022 PAGE 06-TORI242029Z SEP 75 IN 695650 MONT 21403CLEARLY IN THE WESTERN CAMP, VOETES ANTI-COMMUNIST IN INTERNATIONAL FORUM AND IS CONSIDERED A FIRIEND OF THE U.S. AARON ASKED IF SIMILAR PROVISIONS WERE WRITTEN INTO THE OD'S OF OTHER STATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, I.E, TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES THAT THREATEN INTERNAL STABILITY. WE SAID WE DID NOT KNOW, CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON THE MILITARY, TRUEHART POSED HYPOTHETICAL CASE ABOUT RECRUITMENT FOR FI PURPOSES OF A PRIVATE SECRETARY TO A MINISTER. WOULD WE COORDINATE THISSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 125]
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY ...............PER.............. TOTAL COPIES P BYPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDS E C R E TREPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH/ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEADVANCE COPY ISSUED-SLOTTED BY AT Z STAFFACTION UNIT, I RF FILE VR 1 4N 2 5ACTION F 3 6OT 333589 EI A034 PAGE 07 SOTOR: 242034Z SEP 75 IN 695658MONT 21403S E C R E T 241945Z SEPT 75 STAFFCITE MONTEVIDEO 21403 FINAL SECTION OF 2TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.NI ACT BUENOS AIRESRECRUITMENT IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR. ANSWER: NO,TRUEHART THEN POSTULATED CASE WHERE RECRUITED SECRETARYCONFESSES TO MINISTER THAT SHE HAD BEEN FURNISHING US WITHCOPIES OF THE MINISTERS CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE. WOULDTHIS NOT HAVE FLAP POTENTIAL HE ASKED? ANSWER: YES.TRUEHART THEN MUSED THAT AMBASSADOR SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHTTO KNOW PRIOR TO OUR RECRUITMENT OF THE SECRETARY. HE DIDNOT SEEM SATISFIED WITH THE EXPLANATION THAT WE ARE THEOPERATIONAL PROFESSIONALS WHO WOULD JUDGE THE RISK PRIOR TORECRUITMENT AND WOULD BE MONITORING THE CASE THROUGHOUT. WEPRESUME, THEREFORE, BY EXTRAPOLATION TRUEHART WOULD WANT THEAMBASSADOR TO BE THE SUPER-CASE OFFICER MONITORING ALL OUROPERATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FLAP POTENTIAL.9. SOME OF THE EASIER QUESTIONS WERE ALLOCATION OF MAN   POWER (ABOUT TWO OFFICERS NOW ON SOVIET/BLOC TARGET, HOPE   PUSH THIS TO THREE WHILE REMAINING OFFICERS COVER OTHERS E C R E T
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 126]
13-00000.SECRETT 333589 E1A034 PAGE 02 IN 695658TORI242034Z SEP 75 MONT 21403OBJECTIVES). HOW IS OVER-ALL BUDGET ARRIVED AT (DIALOGUE WITH HEADQUARTERS, SYSTEM STILL IN FLUX) AND IS BUDGET BOVIDED BY OBJECTIVES (YES) WITH SUBORDINATE LINE ITEMS CALLED WHAT (PROJECT ACTIVITIES), WAS THERE ANY FLEXIBILITY DURING THE COURSE OF THE FISCAL YEAR? ANSWER: SOME WITHIN PROJECT ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES BUT NOT BETWEEN OBJECTIVES WITHOUT HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL, DO WE HAVE A REGULAR PROGRAM OF BRIEFING REGULAR EMBASSY OFFICERS ON OUR ACTIVITIES SO THEY UNDERSTAND BETTER? ANSWER: NOT IN ANY FORMAL SENSE. AARON IMPLIED THIS MIGHT BE DONE BETTER AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL.10. IN DISCUSSIONS ON TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, WE POINTED OUR MOST OF OUR TARGETS ARE IN BUENOS AIRES. COULD WE RUN AGENTS FROM HERE AGAINST THOSE TARGETS IN ARGENTINA? ANSWER: YES, BUT ONLY IF COORDINATED WITH AND APPROVED BY HQS AND BUENOS AIRES STATION. CONCERNING MANPOWER, WE SAID WE ARE AT PRESENT UNDERTAKING A REVIEW OF BOTH TERRORIST AND NARCOTICS TARGET TO DECIDE THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THEN THE MANPOWER REQUIRED SO THESE EFFORTS ARE IN A STATE OF FLUX. WE SAID WE WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT BUENOS AIRES MAY NOT HAVE NARCOTICS IN ITS OD BUT THAT THEY HAVE A VERY FULL PLATESECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 127]
BLE SEC DISHEM BY _ _ _ PER _ _ _TOTAL COPIES RUNSECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THANISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDRSÓN/UNIT NOTIFIED _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _IVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY _ _ _ AT _ _ _ Z _ _ _STAFF1 42 53 6TION.UNITRF. FILE VRNFO50IN 695658T 333589 EIA034 PAGE 03-05 MONT 21403TOR:242034Z SEP 75OF OTHER THINGS TO DO.11. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON NOCS WE ADVISED WE H    NONE IN URUGUAY, E2, IMPDET.SECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 128]
# SECRETCABLE SEC DISSEM BY: 6 PER LhE,O, TOTAL COPIES 6-11PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED:ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED:DC/LA E.I.D.I.BY C AT 1510 23 205 PM 75ACTION UNIT: LA3INFO: RE. FILE. VR. 000ACTION:T 329488 E1A040 PAGE 01 EYES ONLY IN 694147TOR 1231523Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723SECRET 231409Z SEP 75 STAFFCITE BRASILIA 24723. SECTION 1 OF 2TOI: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.RYBAT PLVWCADET1. HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART AFTERNOON 22 SEPT. TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S ACTIVITIES.2. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS. FOL IS HIGHLIGHT OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY AND MONDAY.3. AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS OPERATIONS--E.G, LINE OF COMMAND FROM HOS AND STATION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES. HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER OUR OPERATIONS. BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS, FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEETSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 129]
THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCUIATED IN THE OD. PERIODICREPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO HOS TO APPRISE THEM OF WHAT WEHOPED TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO OUR OD PRIORITIES, AND THIS WASFOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISED AGAINSTTHESE PRIORITIES, A "REPORT CARD" SYSTEM EXISTED WHEREINWE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE, AARON WAS INTERESTED INHOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USED) WORKING ONTHE HARD TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSETARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS(RECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE C/0.THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN THEHARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUITRECEIVED A ZERO SCORE. HOWEVER, IF THE C/O WORKING ON THEHARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE, HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OFACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONEOR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES, AND ALL IN ALL DID HISHOMEWORK, WORKED HARD WAS AGGRESSIVE, BUT WAS NOTSUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLE,HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD GRADE, AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK OFSUCCESS IN RECRUITING A HARD TARET INDIVIDUAL EVER HELD
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 130]
CABLE SEC DISGEM BY__________PER:__________TOTAL COPIES__________R. BY:PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED__________SECRET__________REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAIISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDADVANCE COPY ISSUED/BLOTTED__________BY__________AT__________Z__________STAFFACTION UNIT  I | RF. FILE | VR |   | 1 | 4 |ACTION #   NFO |   |   |   |   | 2 | 5 ||   |   |   |   | 3 | 6 |T 329488 EIA040 PAGE 03 IN 694147TOR:231523Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723UP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCETHIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THATEARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT.4. THE NOC PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTH   AARON AND TURE HEART, THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMES   OR COVER COMPANIES, BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR NOCS   (SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND IN CASE   THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHETHER CUTOUTS WERE USED IN   CONTACTING NOCS (NO, DIRECT INSIDE C/O CONTACT UNDER   SCRUPULOUS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH   THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN   THEM AND NOCS WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN   GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED).5. AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE   PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF   INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A CO/0 SPENT HIS DAY,   THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID   WE ENSURE THAT C/OS DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME   INDIVIDUAL CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE   CONTROL), WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WASSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 131]
T 329488 EIA040 PAGE 04 IN 694147TOR:2315232 SEP 75 BRIL 24723DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT (PENETRATION OF LIAISON AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LIAISON--TEL ET APS, SURVEILLANCE, ETC.--AGAINST HARD TARGETS). DISCUSSIONS ON COVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME, DESPITE HOS BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MEDIA OP AND A COVERT POL ACTION OP. MUCH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR POLITICAL ACTION OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTO THAT ACTIVITY, IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN SPÓL ACTION IN BRAZIL FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING AS SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE FOR SUCH ACTION, THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZEROUNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL MEDIA CAPABILITY AS WELL AS AN AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE CHILEAN VARIETY.6. AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT, WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELY
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 132]
# SECRETCABLE SEC DISSEM BY: _________ PER: _________ TOTAL COPIES: _________ BY: _________PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED: _________ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY: _________ AT: _________ Z: _________| STAFF |     || ----- | --- || 1     | 4   || 2     | 5   || 3     | 6   |ACTION UNIT: I RF. FILE. VRACTION: NFOT 329488 EI A040 PAGE 05 IN 694147TOR: 231523Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723HOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL COS SPENT IN TRAINING (COULDN'T HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN TRAINING BUT SAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY, THAT OVER THE YARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE PHOTOGRAPHY, COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS WRITING, ETC. MENTION WAS MADE OF MID-CAREER COURSE, PLUS SENIOUR SEMINARS AVAILABLE TO OFFIERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE AT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETC.) (AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE AND ASKED FOR PARTICULARS.)7. ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND TUREHAEART WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER COB HAD AUTHORITY TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HQS WITH INFO TO STATION (YES, ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR TO THE LOCAL SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE FIRST SENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC. PRIOR TO ONWARD TRANSMISSION.) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY DID SEESECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 133]
13-00000CABLE SEC DISSEM BY . . PER TOTAL COPIES BYPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED, SECRETADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAACTION UNIT ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED!RF FILE VR STAFF1 42 53 6ACTION #NFOT 329488 EIA040 PAGE 06-06 IN 694147TOR:231523Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723-THOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT TO THEM. INTEL ON MAJOR- ITEMS-SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIES  VIS-A-VIS THE U.S.-WAS SHOWN TO THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO  SUBMISSION, STATION MADE IT A PRACTIVE TO CHECK INTEL  OUT WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR TO  TRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL  BY THE STATION. THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS  REQUIRED TO LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHEN  SENSITIVE INFO AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED.  THIS HAD NOT HAPPED IN THE COS'S SHORT TENURE INSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 134]
CABLE SÉC DISSEM BY_____________________PER____________________TOTAL COPIES________________RU..PERSON UNIT NOTIFIED____________________________S E C R E T_________________________ADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOITED________BY_______AI_________ACTION UNIT| I   || --- || N   || F   || O   || RF  | FILE | VR  || --- | ---- | --- |ACTION #T 329420 EIA971 PAGE 01 IN 694101TOR:231508Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723SECRET 231409Z SEPT. 75 STAFFCITE BRASILIA 24723 FINAL SECTION OF TWOTO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES.RYBAT PLVWCADETBRASILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTSCONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THEAMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANALZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY. SECURITY WAS THECARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION.8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF   THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE   POLITICAL SECTION--WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL   OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE   PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS   PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A   CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY   SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER   SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED   ACCORDINGE).9. AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVESECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 135]
13-00000CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__________PER_____________________TOTAL COPIES_______R...BYPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED____________________________ S E C R E TADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED__________BY_____AT_____ZREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEEACTION UNIT'RF FILE VRSTAFF1 42 5ACTION #INFO3 6T-329420 EIA971 PAGEIN 694167TOR:231508Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723COLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSEBUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS INFACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADOR-IAL -DUTIES.10. THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE    NAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR    UNILATERAL PENETRATION EFFORTS FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL.11. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIOS AND THE    CIRLS AND TAILORED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY.    THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE    SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN    SAY, STATE.12. VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT SPORLON ACTIVITIES IN RIO    EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT NSA    WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION    TO THE SPORLON PRODUCTS (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID    CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN    WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE INTERCEPT PROGRAM WERE    HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS.)13. ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONSS E C R E T
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 136]
CABLE SZC DISSEM BY__________PER__________TOTAL COPIESPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDSECRETADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT ZACTION UNITSTAFF1 42 53 6ACTIONRF. FILE VR.INFOT 329420 EIA971 PAGE 63 IN 694147TOR:231508Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723WERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE BOTHSURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TOAUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BYU.S. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFOMUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES OFAGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTACT,ETC.14. AARON EVINCED GREAT INTEREST IN THE COVER    PROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY. HE WAS TOLD THAT COVER COULD    BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF    OFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS,    THAT THEY GAVE ALMOST 5ØPERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON THE ACTUAL    WORK OF THAT SECTION, THEN SPENT THE REST OF THE WORK    DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH    THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION    AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES.15. AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE    PAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED    MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND OSO OFFICERS HAD    A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHERSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 137]
# SECRETCABLE BEC DIABEM BY ______ PER ______ TOTAL COPIES R IVPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDADVANCE COPY ISSUED/BLOTTER BY AT ZACTION UNITIRF FILE VRNFACTION #OREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THANISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDSTAFF142536T 329420 E1A971 PAGE 04 IN 69419TOR:231508Z SEP 75 BRIL 24723TRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO EQUALLY GOOD WORK IN THE OSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.)16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION. AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING, AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING AT THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH @ THE MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY WORKED.17. AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY THE EMBASSY WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO. MONTEVIDEO AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS, ISSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 138]
CABLE SIC DISSEM BY PERPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDTOTAL COPIES RSECRETADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED. BY AT ZACTION UNITRF FILE VRACTION # INFOT 329420 EIA971 PAGE 05-05 IN 69411TOR:2315082 SEP 75 BRIL 24723A WINE LOVER AND WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST OF THE LOCALPRODUCT.18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY NIGHT, AARON WAS ASKED BY    THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY. HE    OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY OF    THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF    MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH    MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES. E2, IMPDET.SECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 139]
SECRET 2915472 SEP 75 STAFFCITE BUENOS AIRES 34519TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO,RYBAT PLVWCADETREF BUENOS AIRES 34511 (698265)*1. VISITORS MET WITH AMBASSADOR HILL FOR ONE HOUR AND A HALF EVENING 27 SEP AT HIS RESIDENCE AND THEN WENT DIRECTLY TO AIRPORT. AFTER INTRODUCING VISITORS TO AMB COS WITHDREW AND WAITED IN ANOTHER ROOM, (UPON. DEPARTING COS HEARD AMB ASK VISITORS FOR THEIR CREDENTIALS.) AMB LATER TOLD COS HE SUGGESTED TO VISITORS THAT COS BE PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION BUT THEY PREFERRED TO TALK WITH HIM PRIVATELY. COS WAS CALLED IN, HOWEVER, TO PARTICIPATE IN LAST FEW MINUTES OF DISCUSSION. IN COS PRESENCE, MR. AARON ASKED AMB WHETHER HE THOUGH HE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEE ALL INFORMATION PRODUCED WITHIN HIS MISSION, TO WHICH AMB REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. AARON THEN ASKED AMB WHETHER HE IN FACT SAW ALL INFO. AMB REPLIED HE DID NOT KNOW, BUT HAD CONFIDENCE IN COS IN THIS REGARD. AARON THEN ASKED COS WHETHER HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO SHOW AMB ALL STATION REPORTING, ANSWER: OPERATIONAL REPORTING IDENTIFYING AGENTS OR CLANDESTINE METHODS OF OPERATION COULD NOT BE SHOWN TO AMB WITHOUTSECRET