Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10431-10006.pdf — page 9]
(2) War with China would in fact be a war of mutual attrition and even in the case of a formal Soviet victory and a change-over in Chinese leadership - the U.S.S.R. will be unable to feed the hungry masses of China. According to GVISHYANI, there are a hundred million hungry people in China, and in the U.S.S.R. there is not enough food for the population. A Soviet victory would thus double the needs of the Soviet Union in this respect and would put too great a strain on her economy.2. From some conversations mainly with KHALIPOV, Source concluded that the Soviet Union is preparing for war with Western Europe rather than with China; here are his. reasons:a. The substitution of old weapons for new ones takes place first and foremost in the western parts of the Soviet Union, and not on the border with China, except in the VLADIVOSTOK area, and this not be- cause it is near to China, but, mainly, because it is near to the U.S.A.b.. According to KHALIPOV, two or three days will be enough for the Soviet Army to conquer Western Europe and he elaborated:England has about 920 tanks and 1500 planes;France - about 900 tanks and about 1500 planes;Germany - about 500 tanks and about 1000 planes;All this put together is but about a sixth of what the U.S.S.R. can put in the field against the West within 2 or 3 days; and until the West decides on counter-measures it will be too late.3. According to Source, who bases his opinion on his conversations with the a/n people, not only is the Soviet Union in no fear of a war with China, but the even thinks China will join her in a war against the West
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U.S.S.R.Subject: ANDROPOV, GRECHKO AND GROMYKO AS MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO1. Many Soviet personalities, close to Government circles, are of the opinion that ANDROPOV's, GRECHKO's and GROMYKO's inclusion in the Polit-buro should be examined against the backgroun of two tendencies current within Soviet ruling circles with regard to U.S.S.R. policy towards China and the U.S.A.a. A policy of detente with China is supported, according to these personalities, by SUSLOV and SHELEPIN. These two think that the Soviet Union should strive for closer relations with China by adopting a tough policy towards the capitalist countries; a policy of detente with the West weakens the Soviet position in the International Communist Movement and at the same time strengthens the ideological attitudes of China.b. A policy of detente with the WestBREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, GROMYKO, GRECHKO, ANDROPOV and particularly KIRILENKO - on the other hand support a policy of detente with the West in general and with the U.S.A. In particular. This group stresses the need for the modernization of Soviet production pro-cesses. After this vital objective is achieved, the U.S.S.R. should adopt an even tougher policy towards the West than in the past.2. Thus the membership of the three in the Politburo is designed to Srengthen BREZHNEV's position. It should be remembered that these three oxo a personal debt to BREZHNEV: it was BREZHNEV who made them what they ere now. It should also be kept in mind that the membership in the
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Politburo of the Minister of War, the Head of the K.G.B. and of the Foreign Minister, has a special significance; it is an indication that BREZHNEV is about to make most important decisions and needs the support of the Armed Forces, the K.G.B. and of the Foreign Office.The general opinion in circles of the intelligentzia, and particularly in scientific circles, is that a war against the West is being planned. Iccording to this opinion, BREZHNEV's admission of these three Ministers to the Politburo is a very unusual act in the history of the Soviet Union. A similar step was taken only once before, when STALIN admitted VOROSHILOV, MOLOTOV and BERIA to the Politburo about two months before the outbreak of war between the U.S.S.R. and Germany.
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# DEVELOPMENTAL AND RECRUITMENT APPROACHES TO AMERICANS## THE SOVIET SECURITY THREAT IN THE DETENTE PERIOD1. The aura of detente in the Soviet and Bloc relations during the last year and a half, we believe, has created a favorable climate for recruitment and penetration in the West. This paper deals with the problems as we see them. There are related counter-intelligence issues which involve internal security: the leakage and exchange of economic, scientific and political information; the sale of technological information; and the impact of disinformation and agents of influence on American policy. As has been noted in our previous forums, since 1961 when KAGO brought us documentary evidence* that Soviet intelligence had launched a full-scale penetration effort against the "Main Enemy," we have seen a steady and continuing Soviet effort to effect penetrations of the U.S. Government. Detente has done nothing to blunt this effort. Soviet intelligence has worked steadily on the American target and has been quick to seize upon the openings to the West which KRUSHCHEV was the first to label "Detente." BREZHNEV has made the word the cliche of the moment. It has been clear to Soviet intelligence, as it has been apparent to Western counterintelligence, that Soviet policy designed to exploit Western technology and, hopefully, change the balance of military power has created new opportunities for Soviet espionage.2. These new opportunities may be characterized as a plethora of choices: a harvest almost unprecedented since the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.) period and the 1958 Central Committee decision to assign to the KGB a new vital role in the policy to exploit the West by returning to the principles of LENIN. Soviet intelligence now finds more Americans, both official and unofficial:a. Anxious to exchange all types of information;b. Willing to discuss virtually any subject;c. Inclined to believe there is truly a latent and potentially viable dissident movement in the USSR which can be influenced if only the American people-to-people concept could prevail;*Referred to and quoted in Attachment A.
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2d. Convinced that there is a bonanza for the Americanbusinessman in the USSR and that "business" can alter theSoviet lifestyle and reduce governmental, i.e., CP control;e. Believing that the Cold War was a myth created byAmerica;f. Anxious to atone for the "sins" of Vietnam andinterventionist policies;g. Anxious about China and nuclear weapons;h. Believing there is more merit to direct USSR-USAnegotiation if America attempts to negotiate in tandem withits Western allies or other nations;i. Ready to believe there are many, if not legions, ofSoviet citizens, particularly the young "intellectuals," who are willing to cooperate with the West to advance free-dom for the Russians;j. Ignorant about Soviet ideological consistency and purpose.3. Addressing ourselves only to manifestations of the Soviet security threat outside the U.S., we are concerned that the climate for penetration, particularly for the recruitment of Americans, has become too permissive. The attitudes outlined have not only made America more vulnerable but have made the counterintelligence job more difficult. Not only has Soviet-American contact increased in geometric proportions, but there is also increasing evidence that the always relatively loose security check rein on official Americans has lengthened even more. As discussed elsewhere, it is apparent the Soviet-inspired attacks on Western intelligence, when coupled with domestic attacks of whatever origin against American intelligence and security organs, have had a direct bearing on opportunities for Soviet intelligence to attempt to develop and recruit Americans.4. In an attempt to cope with the problem of Soviet and Bloc recruitments and penetrations, we have - since August 1965 - collected statistics and case data on a government-wide basis of recruitment attempts made against American personnel abroad and foreign employees of the United States Government. Our objective has been to collect, record, collate and analyze such information in order to:a. Identify officers and agents of Soviet, Bloc, Cuban and Chinese Communist services;
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b. Identify U.S. Government employees who are being targetted by these adversary services;c. Determine the scope of activity of these adversary services by area, date and *modus operandi*;d. Determine the scope of targetting against any specific U.S. Government agency;e. Help us understand the extent of foreign intelligence efforts against the U.S. Government and to obtain other perspectives about possible disinformation and deception operations;f. Facilitate management of double agent cases;g. Furnish counterintelligence and operational guidance to our field stations in their efforts to mount aggressive operations against the adversary;h. Provide the Agency and other U.S. Government agencies, as appropriate, information about the scope and type of penetration efforts being made against U.S. Government installations abroad.5. Our evaluated cases* of penetration and recruitment attempts over the last nine years by the Soviet, Bloc, Cuban and Chinese Communist services are as follows:```1965. - 1171966 - 1311967- 721968. 971969- - 861970- 601971 561972 781973- 45```Total 742*The unit in these and the other statistics in this review is the single case of penetration or the recruitment incident as established by evaluation of confirmed reports, unconfirmed or circumstantial information, and other specific reporting and information.
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6. Over the whole period the penetration and recruitment efforts have been fairly stably distributed by service as follows:Soviet - 58% of the casesBloc - 37% "Cuban - 4% "Chicom - 1%7. Over the range of cases, recruitment and penetration efforts have been directed at U.S. officer personnel in 30% of the cases, other staff in 5%, communications personnel in 5%, enlisted ranks in 9%, local employees in 30%* others in 22% of the cases.8. Looking more particularly at our information on Soviet and associated recruitment and penetration efforts for the Detente period--the past four years--there is the following distribution of adversary service case effort:|      | Soviet | Bloc | Cuban | CPP | Yearly Totals || ---- | ------ | ---- | ----- | --- | :-----------: || 1970 | 41     | 29   | -     | -   |      60       || 1971 | 32     | 21   | 3     | -   |      56       || 1972 | 47     | 28   | 3     | -   |      78       || 1973 | 31     | 12   | 1     | 1   |      45       |9. It is clear that Soviet penetration and recruitment operations, up to and including the last year, against U.S. Government installations and representatives abroad have not been materially affected or inhibited by "Detente." Some representative cases since 1968 are cited in Attachment B. The cases have been sanitized to protect the innocent. They are included solely to suggest the range, precision and persistence of the Soviet, Bloc, Cuban and Chinese Communist penetrations effort.10. This is not the end of the problem. Our data consists essentially of information on approaches and pitches voluntarily reported by American personnel. The 1973 case figures (and those for 1974, thus far) hold up very well as valid indicators of the persistence of Soviet and Bloc penetration efforts in spite of, or because of, Detente permissiveness. However we acknowledge that we have no way yet of judging exactly the impact of Detente on the reporting mood of the official Americans who are being targetted.*This covers only local employees outside of Iron Curtain installations. Local employees in U.S. installations behind the Iron Curtain are regarded as actually or potentially under the control of their respective security services and are therefore not considered in this calculation.
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11. Soviet Bloc modus operandi--the operational techniques used against Americans--include all the known gambits and have changed little over the past decade. There have been slight tactical shifts both abroad and in the Soviet Bloc to take advantage of the "spirit of Detente," for example, but the basic M/O remains what it was in the 1920's and 1930's.12. In addition to diplomatic and official access to U.S. officials, Soviet Bloc intelligence officers frequent the places--bars, restaurants, clubs and other international, national and local organizations--that provide them with opportunities to meet American personnel or U.S. Government employees. In their recruitment efforts, Soviet Bloc intelligence officers have utilized the theme of peace, friendship, and mutual cooperation and they have offered the bait of exchanging information to develop "common" interests and cooperation to obtain information. They have utilized the ploy of professional advancement or business interests for one or both parties when attempting to gain cooperation or buy information to try to remove the stigma of espionage in their development negotiations as well as in some recruitment attempts. They continue in their efforts to obtain access to both American and indigenous female employees throughout the world by using officers or local indigenous male and female agents to cultivate these target personalities. Recently they have used the language lesson gambit--even with CIA personnel. Local personnel, ranging from servants to higher officials, have been recruited and targetted either to obtain employment with Americans or to develop personal as well as official access to American officials. They have attempted to recruit foreign local employees to report about the interests and activities of their American employers. They employ sex and financial remuneration as bait, use personal compromise as a threat, seek out personal weaknesses to utilize as operational opportunities, make direct recruitment approaches based on compassionate or nationalistic grounds, utilize audio and other technical mechanisms, etc.13. This summary examination of the recent case evidence of the essentially unchanged Soviet and Bloc recruitment effort against official Americans abroad is not the whole Detente story. There is also a great interest by the Soviets in recruiting U.S. students abroad. The primary objective of that recruitment effort is to guide the student eventually to obtain employment with the U.S. Government. Such efforts are only indicative of the fact that the Soviets view their penetration of the U.S. Government, via students, as a continuing and long-range program.14. A recent additional dimension to the problem of Soviet and Bloc recruitment of Americans has been the access the Soviets have developed to American businessmen--many of whom are privy to
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U.S. Government secrets through defense-related contracts--who travel to the USSR and entertain Soviet trade delegations in the U.S. The concern we have previously expressed about the role of Lt. General Yevgeniy N. PITOVRANOV and the Soviet intelligence officers in the foreign trade business was well founded and, in fact, we believe was somewhat understated. It is now evident that PITOVRANOV controls most if not all of the activities going on where American business encounters Soviet trade officials, in the International Trade Center to be built in Moscow, in exhibits in the USSR and abroad, in the patents and licensing agreements, in the supervision of the travel of trade delegations to the U.S. and the like.15. Reports which reveal that the KGB is active among American businessmen are beginning to surface. Not too surprisingly, these reports indicate that their techniques are both subtle and blatant. One of the most blatant approaches to American business involves Igor ARTEMYEV, who is attached to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. ARTEMYEV claims to be a student in the U.S. to study relationships between U.S. companies and their foreign subsidiaries and licensing agreements between U.S. and foreign companies. In the course of his research, ARTEMYEV sends detailed questionnaires to U.S. companies. The questionnaires are the kind required by our Securities and Exchange Commission. While some companies do not respond, there are those that do. ARTEMYEV also visits various companies to talk with officials. On one occasion he replied to a question about the level of classification of the meeting by saying it was "confidential." With that kind of access, who needs to recruit in the classic sense.16. PITOVRANOV's people are very evident in various trade delegations under their Chamber of Commerce cover, and they are applying what appear to be classic assessment techniques. It has been our experience to date that they are thinking long-range and are themselves not interested in the cheap shot or quick pitch, although these devices are being employed against some American businessmen who visit Moscow. There are also strong indications that the Soviets are using recruited agents among the rapidly expanding demi-monde of fixers, many Russian-speaking, who gain employment as the in-house experts who "know how to deal with the Russians" and who find employment with American firms as guides and advisors accompanying U.S. delegations to Moscow.Attachments
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The following are highlights of the chronology of Source's (Subject's) professional career:September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where he remained until July 1945. At that time Subject left the Artillery School before completion of the course and enrolled in a Counterintelligence School.1945-1946: Student at the one year course, Military Counterintelligence School, *GUKR/"SMERSH,"* Moscow.1946-1948: Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section *(otdeleniye)* of the *SK* (Soviet Colony - security of Soviet officials abroad) Department *(otdel)* of the First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate of *MGB*. Headquarters in Moscow. During the period November 1947 to September 1948 Subject held the title of *Referent* and his office was designated the Fifth *(SK)* Department of the Third (Eastern) Directorate of the *KI* (Committee for Information), but his functions were unchanged.1948-1950: Student at the two-year course, Higher Intelligence School of the *KI*. Subject studied general subjects and the English language; he was one of 30 students who specialized in counterintelligence during the second year of the course.
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1950-1951: Desk officer, Operation Case Officer, supervising *SK* activities in China, assigned to the *SK* Section, Eastern Department, First Directorate of the *MGB* Headquarters in Moscow, the *SK* functions having reverted from the *KI* to the *MGB* in 1949.September 1951: At his request Subject was transferred as a desk officer to the Anglo-American Section, Counterintelligence Department of the First Directorate, *MGB* Headquarters in Moscow.November 1951: Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational Case Officer."December 1951: The *KI*, was dissolved and former state security elements were returned to the *MGB*. Subject's functions continued the same, but, in the reorganization, he was assigned to the CI Section of the American Department of the Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the First Chief Directorate of the *MGB*.March 1952: Subject and an unidentified young colleague wrote a joint letter through the Central Committee of the CPSU to STALIN making suggestions for a fundamental reorganization of Soviet foreign intelligence and counterintelligence work.September 1952: While on vacation in the Georgian SSR Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour meeting, with his friend, with STALIN, MALENKOV, and BERIYA. STALIN thanked the two officers for their suggestions, discussed intelligence matters in detail and asked them to send him a letter with specific proposals
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for necessary reorganizations, together with the names of recommended chiefs. In a subsequent letter they recommended Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV, then in prison for "political crimes," and Yevgeniy Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR. STALIN met Subject and his friend a second time. OGOLTSOV was released from prison and appointed Chief of the First Chief Directorate, with PITOVRANOV as his deputy. A Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MGB was then formed, containing a Counterintelligence Department with an Emigre desk and seven geographical desks. Subject was appointed by OGOLTSOV as chief of the American Desk, supervising approximately 15 staff persons.March 1953: When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control of the State Security apparatus, which he combined with the MVD into a unified MVD, he replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees. Subject was reassigned as deputy chief of the Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department of the Second (new designation for foreign Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. Subject supervised activities against emigres in Austria and Germany.October 1953: Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in Vienna, Austria, as an operational case officer in the Emigre Operations Group.August 1954: Subject was transferred to the British Sub-Group of the Anglo-American-French Group of the KGB residency in Vienna. His duties were of a counterintelligence nature, i.e. concerned with penetration of foreign intelligence services.
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13-000001955-1959: One of 170 students at ading the four year internal security-counterintelligence course, the *KGB* Higher School Juridical Institute. He presented and successfully defended his thesis on the subject of *SK* activities among Soviet delegations and tourist groups traveling abroad. He received his diploma in August 1959. During his school tour Subject also spent several weeks in on-the-job training as a student assigned to pertinent elements of the *KGB's* Second (Internal Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate, with access to operational files on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow who were *KGB* targets.September 1959: Subject was assigned as a Senior Operational Case Officer responsible for NATO information within the Treaty Organizations Direction, Information (Reports) Department, First (Foreign) Chief, Directorate, *KGB* Headquarters, Moscow. His function was to translate, edit and summarize information reports obtained by *KGB* agents abroad and to disseminate the pertinent information to the Central Committee of the CPSU, members of the Presidium, including KHRUSHCHEV, and, in the case of information with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY, the Minister of Defense. At one time, during a CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about the delays in translation and processing and Subject was assigned to study the situation. Thus he examined registry logs showing the titles of agent information reports, the place acquired, the date received and the date of dissemination of the finished Russian intelligence reports to the government.April 1960: Subject was transferred to the American Section