Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 137]
crucial spare parts and equipment which are not on the COCOM list. Still later the US should increase the vigor with which she seeks, through. briefings, pressures, etc., to increase the effectiveness of all economic measures and should seek to persuade all non-bloc nations to limit their airline services to Cuba and to withhold transit rights to Soviet aircraft serving Cuba. At an appropriate point in the orchestration, food stuffs should be added to the prohibited trade list, with US using its influence to extend this embargo throughout the Free World. The ultimate extension of economic actions, would be the application of a blockade to Cuba. This could be a phased weapon consisting of a, blockade on POL, with the prospect of total blockade to follow.Surveillance over Cuba -- Until it becomes apparent that the Soviet Union has no intention of removing any additional military personnel, aerial surveillance should be limited to appropriate high altitude coverage with low level surveillance avoided except for thoroughly suspicious indications.Later, at a suitable point in the orchestration, occasional low altitude surveillance of "suspicious" areas should be undertaken in such fashion as to be clearly visible to the Cuban people; while avoiding AA defenses.Still later, suitably timed, the United States/OAS should initiate very frequent low altitude surveillance. This should be increased in intensity to the point at which our aircraft would literally seek out AA defense sites in search of provocative acts or, in the absence of Cuban reaction, to deflate Castro's image.In any decisive action at the end of the road, surveillance should be at saturation levels.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 138]
# Regional SurveillanceThe OAS or the Caribbean nations should take the initiative in organizing, as a part of a Caribbean security arrangement, a surface ship and aerial surveillance of the coastal and offshore waters of the Caribbean nations. These patrols should be progressively moved out from the shores of the nations being protected into the Caribbean approaches to Cuba, tying in with an OAS proclaimed zone in which movement of subversive agents, materials, forces, or arms is prohibited. Toward the end of the crescendo, they should operate close to the shores of Cube. There should be increasing surveillance and control of land boundaries. There should be improved systematic exchange of intelligence on subversive activity.# PropagandaThere should be established immediately a radio station (Radio Free Cuba), probably in Florida, using covert funds, with regularly scheduled Cuban broadcasts available to all Cuban political groups. Its content should be the middle converse between VOA and Radio Swan.Initially, through public statements, VOA, etc., maintain the theme of the U.S. "watchful waiting" for change in the Castro regime. Maintain the currently enhanced VOA wave facility beamed to Cuba. Highlight positive results in Latin America of the Alliance for Progress. We should warn Cuba unofficially through the suggested Radio Free Cuba of the consequences of continued subversion and of Castro's present track. Still later, prior to any decisive action, if taken, this theme should go out officially over VOA and in announcements of public officials.Initiate and organize clandestine newspapers and leaflet operations. Infiltrate Cuban exile publications. Play up, on all media, the threat
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 139]
of Castro to the regimes of the Western Hemisphere and the objectivesof Alliance for Progress. Remind the Cuban people that Castro came topower on a pledge to provide political freedom. Remind them of the socialgoals he held up while he destroyed that freedom. Contrast their presenteconomic chaos with those economic goals of land and housing reform..Remind them that he preached nationalism while delivering their countryto the Soviet military occupation. Point out how each shift of goal wasaccompanied by the destruction of earlier ones. Ask what Castro has leftto offer. Conclude that only the mutual fear of retribution amonghis elite remains to hold them in power. Use slogans such as "L 64"(Liberty in '64), etc.Still later initiate through public broadcast, training in therudiments of seditions activity.Still later urge the many small revolutionary-cells to make contactwith neighboring groups. Warn and threaten the Castro regime throughall media; exhort the people to organize to join enlarged resistance groups;seek to build up resistance heroes. Endeavor to deflate Castro throughthese broadcasts. Stress the freedom of the Cuban people, post-Castro, tochoose their own political and social structure.Subversion -- There should be an initial period of no increase insubversive efforts by the U.S., until the bilateral phase of the Cubanaffair is completed and it is clear that the Soviet Union will removeno additional military personnel.After that time minimal covert contacts should be established withinCuba for the distribution of newspapers and leaflets. Minimal acts ofdefiance and sabotage should be initiated. For example, exhort groups- 7 -
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 140]
of 3 or 4 friends, without establishing external rebel affiliation, to paint L'64, etc., on walls or to cofit isolated acts of sabotage. The purpose, would be to establish rebel connotation and to generate leadership. This would lead to the establishment of rudimentary cellular training in seditious activity. Minimal supply of critical items should be initiated to subversive groups within Cuba on a case-by-case basis. Potential leaders should be identified. Contingency planning, covert and unilateral, should continue. The number of Cuban exiles taken into the United States Armed Forces for training and formation of reserve units should be significantly increased. A similar program for "freedom fighters for Cuba" should be undertaken for volunteers from other LA nations. At a later point in the crescendo, departures from the Cuban armed forces in organized units should be encouraged. All covert effort should be exerted toward coordinating the cells, pockets, and groups resisting Castro, inside and outside Cuba. This would be a transition period from sporadic acts in isolation into organized subversion. Fuel and food supplies should be sabotaged. An organized supply system should be put into effect with large numbers of fishing craft situated around the island to make both scheduled supply of deliveries and deliveries of opportunity. As various groups are identified in revolt, they should be worked into the supply system. New LA and Cuban fighters training outside Cuba, should be introduced in the same way into these organized movements within Cuba. There should be frequent leaks of planned US invasion and appropriate denials to frustrate the suspicious Castro. Fleet and air "training" demonstrations should be scheduled off Cuba. At the same time it should be made clear to rebel leaders that an externally launched invasion is not to be expected until a revolution has come from within, with external logistic assistance.- 8 -
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 141]
It should be emphasized to the reiel leaders that the U.S. does not expect the clock to be turned back with regard to social conditions.Still later a complete orchestration should be woven together, coming to a crescendo through the optimal exploitation of all the main-strears discussed in the categories above. Propaganda should reach the maximum denunciation of the regime, exhorting to revolt, holding up the prospect of peace and a better life should the Cuban people join their resistance leaders. Subversion should be stepped up by introduction of all available externally trained resistence fighters, provision of maximum logistic support, etc. At the apropriets sime, if this resistance novement needs the assistance of external forces there should be an OAS structured air strike, related to an appropriate Castro mis-step, to disarm Cuban offensive and defensive power and to destroy all POL storage. This attack should be coordinated with all-out sabotege.An invasion force should be kept in readiness for use, if required to save the resistance, once the all-out internal resistance efforts has been initiated.Criteria -- The pressures discussed in all categories above should be appropriately coordinated. The period of moderation should end after one or two months when it is apparent that no further Soviet military personnel are to be removed. Moderate pressures should then comence, lasting for a period of two to three months, until some episode of escalation by Castro or other appropriate event, makes further pressures feasible. If such an event is not forthcoming, OAS major insistance should lead to escalation of pressures. After another short period, again preferable triggered by an appropriate Castro episode or alternatively by a majority OAS vote still more vigorous pressures should be initiated.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 142]
If Castro has initiated a suitable war-like act, such as firingon surveillance aircraft, pressures should be escalated to the maximumimmediately rather than gradually.- 10 -
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 143]
# DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYOFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONSWASHINGTON 25, D.C.IN REPLY REFER TOOp-613C/sgSer 000950P61MAR 1 1963SECRET Downgraded to CONF upon removal of enclosuresMEMORANDUM FOR MR. J. A. CALIFANO, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THESECRETARY OF THE ARMYSubj: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on CubanAffairs: Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion (U)Ref: (a) Your Memo No. 13 of 28 FEB 1963Encl: (1) through (8) Proposed actions (TS)1. As requested by reference (a), specific and direct actions   designed to resolve problems of Cuban subversion are sub-   mitted herewith as enclosures (1) through (8).W.F.A WENDTDirector, Strategic Plans DivisionEXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADINGDOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLYPAGE NO 1 OF 1 PAGESCOPY NO. 1 OF 10 COPIESReproduction of this document inwhole or in part is prohibitedexcept with permissica of theissuing office or higher authority.Top Secret
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 144]
# Top SecretSECRETPROPOSED ACTIONS WHICH MIGHTBE-TAKEN UNILATERALLY BY THE US,BILATERALLY, OR THROUGH THE OAS, TOIMPEDE THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVETRAINEES TO AND FROM CUBAA. Institute effective procedures to insure that U.S. citizens do not travel to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).B. Continue U.S. restriction against U.S. airline service to Cuba. (This is important to avoid giving other airlines an excuse to reestablish air service) (unilateral U.S. action).C. Thoroughly examine Latin American constitutions and laws to determine the legal capability or impediment to control of travel of their citizens to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).D. Arrange for adverse publicity on individuals who are known to have undergone subversive training in Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).E. Spread rumors of epidemics in Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).F. Sabotage aircraft proceeding to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).G. Increase U.S. efforts to establish identity of all Latin Americans travelling to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).H. Encourage Latin American countries to pass new legislation, or enforce existing legislation, restricting the travel of their citizens to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).I. Persuade Latin American governments to prevent re-entry to their country of persons suspected to have been trained in subversion in Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).J. Persuade LA countries to tighten border security measures by appropriate authority (unilateral U.S. action). Supply equipment and POL for patrol and surveillance. See enclosure (6).K. Cubana's Britannia aircraft are in disrepair (2 or 3 of 5 are operational). Under existing agreements, Cuba mustReproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited except with permission of the issuing office or higher authorityEXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADINGDOD DIR $200.10 DOES NOT APPLY.ENCLOSURE (1) to CNO Ser/Memo 000950961SECRET
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 145]
# Top Secretseek Mexican concurrence in using new equipment (IL-18) on the Havana-Mexico City route. We should persuade Mexico to refuse the new aircraft on grounds of safety, facilities, or other reasons. We should also encourage Great Britain or other sources to cut off spare parts (unilateral U.S. action).L. Encourage hemispheric countries to deny unscheduled traffic stops to Cubana airlines (unilateral U.S. action).M. Persuade friendly governments in LA and elsewhere to harass ships and aircraft traveling to Cuba with administrative delays (minute examination of air worthiness certificates, customs, documents, etc.) (unilateral U.S. action).N. Seek arrangement whereby other Latin American countries would cooperate with Mexican efforts to deny travel their nationals to and from Cuba via Mexico (see Mexico City Tel 2221) (bilateral U.S. action).
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 146]
Sensitive,SECRETCol. J. K. Patchell - X7572718 April 1963# U. S. POLICY CONCERNING CLANDESTINE AND COVERT ACTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST CUBA1. INTRODUCTIONThe purpose of this paper is to provide, within security limitations, a useful guide for the consideration of clandestine and covert actions as a part of a future projection of U. S. actions toward Cuba.The paper is designed to be as objective as possible without compromising many details of highly sensitive information. For this reason, the paper focusses on general principles. The study is not intended to be critical. It is not designed to justify the past nor to predict the future.The discussion of the factors conditioning U. S. policy in the realm of the clandestine and covert may seem elementary and somewhat philosophical; however, these factors provide the general parameters within which future actions can be considered. Any attempt to determine the proportionate influence of any particular conditioner would be speculative.2. MAJOR CONDITIONING FACTORSFollowing are listed a number of the major conditioning factors which probably have influenced past U. S. policy in the clandestine and covert areas. This is not an exhaustive list, but it describes briefly a few of the elements which must be considered in the process of making valid and conclusive determinations:a. Objective.It is most desirable to determine the U. S. objective in precise terms. When the objective is clarified andEXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADINGDOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 147]
# SECRETunderstood, actions can be developed to achieve that objective. The extent of the U. S. commitment, as reflected by the determination of the objective, is an important factor in the determination of the commitment of U. S. resources and has great significance in theIt must be understood that the creation of a resistance under the situation currently obtaining in Cuba probably envisages an ultimate U. S. commitment to direct military action. There can be no advanced guarantee of the success or the security of such an operation, nor is there any realistic brake upon the ultimate outcome which may be susceptible to rapid escalation. Current intelligence estimates indicate little likelihood of the success of a Cuban inspired revolt without significant external support.In support of (or as a prelude to) overt U. S. or multilateral actions, there are general misconceptions and certain grave risks inherent in (a) seeking a solution to the Cuba dilemma wholly by clandestine or covert means, (b) placing disproportionate reliance on clandestine and covert activity, (c) developing clandestine or covert actions in isolation of or significantly in advance of U. S. policy, and (d) developing actions for the sake of action alone or in order to capitalize on some intriguing gimmickery.Obviously, the determination of U. S. objectives is beyond the realm of the clandestine and covert and cannot be considered in the context of Cuba alone. Serious judgments must be made in relation to the broad world environment. Actions against Cuba may be detrimental to U. S. aims by causing intensified security measures in Cuba, counteractions elsewhere, or the unnecessary## b. Risks.A good "rule of thumb" with respect to clandestine or covert actions is that the risks entailed are in direct proportion to the usefulness of the operations.## c. Attribution and Deniability.U. S. leadership will always be concerned with clandestine or covert actions which may be attributed to the U. S.SECRET
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 148]
# SECRETIt is reasonable to assume that Cuba will attribute to the U. S.(at the time of Cuba's choosing) any actions, real or manufactured,which they desire. Assuming that the U. S. will receive the blameregardless of the out sensibilities of those involved; attributeto Cuba is not a relevant measure except as it may limit the overallflexibility for action.Deniability, while quite relevant, is a relative factor.Every effort can be made to disassociate participants, to utilizesanitized material, and to operate from covert bases. Suchefforts, when carried to an extreme, tend to jeopardize the securityof the operation. Generally, an attempt is made to strike a reasonablebalance to achieve "plausible deniability," a term obviouslysubject to widely varying judgments.In summary, the determination of deniability issubjected to judgments at all levels of those who have access,including the curious and those who develop personal emotionalinvolvements. Theoretically, the solution appears to be to seeka reasonable balance between almost complete deniability (anexample in which few actions can be taken and the associated admin-istrative or security precautions outweigh or jeopardize the opera-tion itself) and reasonable safeguards to insure that the proof ofU. S. implication cannot be developed.In this connection there is a mandatory requirementfor unanimity of denial on the part of U. S. officials. This unanimitymust obtain despite the magnitude, persistence, or accuracy of theCastro/Communist propaganda machine. The stated denials of U. S.officials generally are anticipated. Official statements which in-dicate or hint at U. S. involvement identified as internal U. S. governmentdissent ion may be all that is required to compromise an otherwisesecure operation.It should be pointed out that as a result of U. S.accepted complicity in U-2 flights and the Bay of Pigs operation,the U. S. is in a significantly more sensitive position with respectto clandestine and covert actions. U. S. admissions tend to give# SECRET
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 149]
PSECRETgreater credibility to the accusations of the Castro or Sino/SovietBloc and alert our enemies to the possibility that the U. S. mayundertake actions of a less conventional nature.d. Stability.It may be desirable to undertake actions whichachieve little press coverage (visibility or noise level). It isdifficult to determine with any accuracy beforehand the extent ofthe publicity to be achieved. The Castro Regime generally cancontrol the timing and magnitude of public release. The worldpress for the most part is not subject to U. 8. control except asthe U. S. may achieve success through counter-propaganda.It is reasonable to conclude that & progressivelyincrossing or static noise level is the most acceptablatically increased noise level may be acceptable when accompaniedby significant (headline) overt items which serve to distract theattention of the public.e. Morality and Selectivity.There is a natural reluctance to undertakeclandestine or covert actions which result in the death or seriousinjury to innocent Cubans. Meaningful actions will certainlycause harm to certain elements, but some of the destructive actionswhich could be undertaken may be counterproductive in that theystrike at the wrong targets. Unfortunately, it is difficult to achievethe desired degree of selectivity in uncontrolled operations, imple-mented in secrecy.The creation of food, clothing and medical shortagesand the sabotage of storage or distribution facilities undoubtedly mayhurt the economy but those committed to the Castro Regime maysuffer relatively little. Such actions may do little but weaken aninactive or apathetic populace while increasing the internal securitymechanism.DP SECRET
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 150]
There are obvious moral judgments attached to many of the proposals for actions directed against Cuba. When the judgments of various individuals differ, the resulting U. S. position probably reflects the least common denominator. Many proposals may be unacceptable because the deniability factor is too low or the proposals may be of a nature that premature commitment and subsequent disclosure would not be desirable since the weapon may be worthy of a more far reaching impact. There is an understandable frustration in the U. S. resorting to the application of sophisticated clandestine weapons against a small state which theoretically could be brought to its knees in a relatively short period of time through the application of conventional weapons.There is an imposing array of intriguing or amusing "tricks" which are of no real or lasting consequence. These could subject the U. S. to adverse criticism on moral grounds or extend the parameters of warfare to new dimensions.4. Recruitment and Exile Politics.The recruiting problem deserves consideration in any paper considering clandestine and covert actions. Obviously, the recruitment of a sole individual involves a system of screening which theoretically must not be compromised either in the process of sorting or during the subsequent utilization and post-utilization periods. There is a marked tendency for Cubans to talk, to brag, or to infer participation in secret operations. Individuals personally and scores of exile organizations are quick to capitalise on the real or imaginary activities of their members. These Cuban exile organisations compete for recognition, prestige and material support which they hope will stem from their participation in clandestine or covert activities. There is a constant flow of proposals for action and requests for assistance or official recognition. Some individuals and organisations merely desire to publicize their affiliations with some member of the U. S. Government.