Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# 13-00000-PAGE BDAN 43387 SECRETCONTROL IN FIELD. WE OPINED THIS IS TO SOME EXTENT DIRECTION INWHICH COORDINATION HAS TRENDED OVER THE YEARS BUT LOCAL COMMANDERSPROBABLY FEEL HIS CONTROL UNDERMINED THEREBY.4. TURNING TO BKHERALD OPS, MR. AARON SAID HE RECALLED   FROM WASHINGTON BRIEFING THAT GERMAN STATION HAD SIZEABLE ALLOT-   MENT FOR OFFICER ENGAGED IN POLITICAL COVERT ACTION ON REGIONAL   BASIS. WE EXPLAINED THAT MONIES IN THIS PROJECT ALMOST EX-   CLUSIVELY FOR SALARY AND EXTENSIVE TRAVEL OF OFFICER (HERZFANZ   NOT MENTIONED BY NAME) AND NOT USED FOR AGENT PAYMENT OR OTHER   PURPOSES. THIS SEEMED TO SATISFY AARON.5. HE ASKED NUMBER QUESTIONS ABOUT: *"FANCY"* POLITICAL SOURCES,   ALONG: LINE THAT THESE COULD PERHAPS BE HANDLED AS NORMAL   DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS AND ASKED WHETHER THESE CONTACTS DID NOT   REPRESENT HIGH RISK IF EXPOSED. STIGGINS EXPLAIND AT SOME LENGTH   THAT THESE SOURCES VERY FEW-IN NUMBER, AND WERE PRODUCT OF SEVERAL   FACTORS, INCLUDING MANY YEARS CONTACT WITH SPECIFIC CIA   OFFICERS, MAKING POINT THAT AGENTS CONFIDENCE IN CIA BASED ON   MANY YEARS ASSOCIATION. WE ESTIMATED FLAP POTENTIAL SLIGHT   THESE LONG-STANDING: CONTACTS, WHICH COULD BE EXPLAINED AS OLD   FRIENDSHIPS. FOR REASON THAT THEY WERE, IN FACT SUCH, THESE   RELATIONSHIPS COULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO STATE DEPARTMENT   OFFICERS. WE MENTIONED THAT SOME OF THE LOWER-LEVEL DEVELOPMENTAL   OPERATIONS ACTUALLY REPRESENTED HIGHER RISK AND CITED GENERAL   OUTLINE OF *"HILTON AFFAIR"* (WITHOUT NAMES) AS EXAMPLE HOW   DEVELOPMENTAL CASE COULD BE TROUBLESOME. EMPHASIZED THERE HAD   BEEN FEW OF THESE OVER YEARS6. AARON ASKED SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT FEDREP REACTION IN   EVENT OUR INCOMPATIBLE SOURCES EXPOSED. WE RESPONDED THAT IN   GENERAL GERMANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN EMBARRASSING US AND THAT THIS   KEY ELEMENT, PLUS: FACTOR THAT WE HANDLED ALL INCOMPATIBLE ACTIVITY   VERY CAREFULLY, LED US TO CONCLUSION THAT WE WERE NOT RUNNING   RISK MAJOR EMBARRASSMENT BY CONDUCTING LIMITED NUMBER OF THESE   OPERATIONS. POINTED OUT THAT A CERTAIN NUMBER OF THESE OPERATIONS   ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE COVERAGE THOSE AREAS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS   AND SOME ECONOMIC FIELDS WHERE GERMANS NOT COMPLETELY CANDID   WITH US EMBASSY RE THEIR ACTIVITIES.
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13-00000PAGE 3 BONN 43387 S E C R E T7. MR. AARON ASKED ABOUT EXTENT WE KEPT AMBASSADOR INFORMED   ON OUR ACTIVITIES IN WEST GERMAN FIELD. WE REPLIED THAT AMBASSADOR   SAW VIRTUALLY ALL REPORTING AND THEREFORE KNEW WHERE SOURCES,   LOCATED BUT THAT AS RULE WE DID NOT CLEAR WITH HIM ON INDIVIDUAL   CONTACTS, MAKING REFERENCE TO "SOURCES AND METHOD'S" PROVISION OF   OUR REGULATION AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. POINTED OUT THAT EACH   CASE TREATED SEPARATELY BUT THAT AMBASSADOR AND EMBASSY/CON-   SULATES HAVE NOT HAD INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTAL CONTACT WITH   YOUNGER POLITICAL FIGURES OUTSIDE BONN AREA. ON OTHER HAND HE   CLEARLY QUITE CONCERNED WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY WITH RESULT THAT WE   GENERALLY ASSUMED HANDS-OFF ATTITUDE ON FONMIN.8. MR. AARON INQUIRED RE STATION CASE OFFICER STRENGTH AND   GIVEN FIGURES CITED IN POSITION REPORT DATED OCTOBER 74 (FORWARDED   HQS BY TM DATED 25 SEPT 74.) WE EXPLAINED THAT BREAKDOWN SOMEWHAT   ARBITRARY AND SAID THAT FOR NUMBER OFFICERS (THOSE ENGAGED IN   LIAISON, SUPPORT, ANALYSIS, FOR INSTANCE) IT NOT ALWAYS EASY TO   CATEGORIZE THEIR EFFORTS.9. HE PROBED IN SOME DETAIL ON OUR NOC STRENGTH AND WE   ANSWERED CANDIDLY. MR. AARON SEEMED SURPRISED AT SMALL NUMBERS   NOC OFFICERS IN STATION AND SAID HAD HEARD OPINION FROM SOME CIA   OFFICERS THAT NOC PREFERABLE TO OFFICIAL COVER. WE SAID FELT   THIS DEFENDENT ON LOCATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES AND THAT HERE IN   GERMANY ARMY COVER READILY AVAILABLE, GENERALLY QUITE SATISFACTORY   AND COST CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN NOC COVER. AARON ASKED SEVERAL   QUESTIONS RE REASONS WE WOULD PUT OFFICER IN GERMANY UNDER NOC.   WE EXPLAINED NOC PRIMARILY USED FOR PERSONNEL WE PLANNED KEEP   ASSIGNED GERMANY SEVERAL YEARS AND WHERE NOC PROBABLY MORE SECURE   AND FOR INSTANCES WHERE IT PROVIDED BETTER ACCESS. WHEN HE PUSHED   FOR FURTHER EXAMPLES WE MENTIONED HAD RECENTLY CONSIDERED PUTTING   OFFICER UNDER STUDENT COVER IN HEIDELBERG WHERE OFFICIAL CHINESE   STUDENTS SIGNIFICANT TARGET REPRESENTED BUT THAT THIS PLAN DROPPED   FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REASONS. WE MADE NO MENTION USE JOURNALIST   COVER AND DID NOT IDENTIFY ANY COVER FIRMS BY NAME.10. AARON ASKED STIGGINS WHICH OF WHAT AARONS ENVISAGED AS THREE    PRINCIPAL DUTIES TOOK MOST TIME. AARON OUTLINED COS DUTIES AS    MANAGEMENT OF STATION, EMBASSY RESPONSIBILITIES AND COORDINATION    OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. STIGGINS SAID MANAGEMENT OF
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13-00000PAGE 4 BONN 43387 SECRETSTATION CLEARLY REQUIRED MOST TIME AND FURTHER THAT WITHIN STATION,THE EFFORT AGAINST THE HARD TARGETS CONSUMED THE MAJOR PART OF HISTIME AND EFFORT.11. AMBASSADOR BRIEFED ON OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH AARON PRIOR.    TO HIS SESSION WITH HIM. E2 IMPDETSECRET
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# SECRET 161856Z OCT 75 STAFFCITE BONN 43389.TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR.RYBATREF BONN 43387(IW716059)1. AMBASSADOR BRIEFED COS AFTERNOON 16 OCT ON HIS HOUR AND ONE-HALF SESSION WITH MR, AARON ON 15 OCT. DISCUSSION COVERED THREE MAIN TOPICS: (A) RISKS AND NEED FOR "FANCY POLITICAL SOURCES" IN BONN; (B) COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS; AND (C) DEGREE TO WHICH AMBASSADOR COGNIZANT OF STATION ACTIVITIES.2. ON POINT OMA. AMBASSADOR STATED THAT MOST STATION POLITICAL SOURCES WERE OF LONG-STANDING AND COMMENCED IN THE EARLY POST WAR/OCCUPATION ERA. THEY WERE BASED ON PERSONAL FRIENDSHIPS AND UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE EARLY POSTWAR YEARS AND WERE IN HIS BELIEF LIKELY TO PROVE IRREPLACEABLE. THAT IS, AMBASSADOR OPINED THAT SIMILAR CLOSE ASSOCIATIONS COULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED BY STATION IN TODAY'S POLITICAL CLIMATE AND IMPLIED THAT HE EXPECTED COVERAGE TO GRADUALLY WITHER AWAY. BECAUSE OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE RELATION-SHIPS, AMBASSADOR BELIEVED RISK WAS VERY LOW AND STATED THAT.SECRET
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ABLE SEC.DISSEM BPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDSECRETACTION UNITRF FILE VRACTIONINFOT: 389723 E1A645PAGE 02IN 716124TOR:161937Z OCT 75BONN 43389THE COVERAGE PROVIDED BY THESE SOURCES WAS OF DEFINITE VALUESINCE THE INFORMATION WAS NOT OBTAINED BY OFFICIAL EMBASSYCONTACTS.3. REGARDING PARA 1.B., AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED TO AARON   THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT STATION WAS NO LONGER   INVOLVED IN LARGE-SCALE COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS AND THAT HE   ASSUMED EXPLANATION PER PARA 4 REF WAS IN ACCORD WITH FACTS.   COS 'EMPHATICALLY ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT THERE WERE NO   COVERT ACTION FUNDING OPERATIONS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY THE   STATION, AND THAT WE HAD BEEN MYSTIFIED BY MR. AARON'S   REFERENCE TO THE LARGE BUDGET FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES BUT HAD   CONCLUDED THAT IT MUST APPLY TO SALARY AND EXPENSES OF   HERZFANZ WITH WHICH AARON SEEMED TO AGREE.4. WITH RESPECT TO THE AMBASSADOR'S KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIFICS   OF STATION ACTIVITY, THE AMBASSADOR STATED FIRST THAT HE OF   COURSE "HAD A PRETTY GOOD IDEA" ABOUT THE IDENTITY OF SOME   OF OUR SOURCES BUT HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY ADVISED OF THE   IDENTITIES OF ANY OF THEM, HE FOUND THE SITUATION ACCEPTABLE   HOWEVER, FIRST BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH COS PER-   SONALLY FOR THE LAST TWENTY YEARS AND HAD CONFIDENCE THATSECRET
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13-00000LE SEC DISSEM BY____________PERPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDTOTAL COPIESRUN BYSECRETADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT ZREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEACTION UNITSTAFF1 RF. FILE VR. 1 42 53 6ACTION #NFOT 389723 EI A645 PAGE 03 IN 716124TOR: 161937Z OCT 75 BONN 43389COS WOULD ADVISE HIM OF ANYTHING HE OUGHT TO KNOW. LOOKINGBACK ON THE RECORD OF THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, THEAMBASSADOR SAID HE CONCLUDES THAT IN FACT THE AMBASSADORS INBONN HAD BEEN KEPT APPROPRIATELY ADVISED AND THE ABSENCE OFFLAPS WOULD SUBSTANTIATE THE JUDGMENT EXERCISED BY THE RE-SPECTIVE STATION CHIEFS OVER THE YEARS.5, MR, AARON DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH WITH THE AMBASSADORTHE FEASIBILITY OF CHARGING THE AMBASSADOR WITH GREATER DIRECTRESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISION OF THE CLANDESTINE EFFORT.AMBASSADOR STATED THAT IF IT WERE ASSIGNED TO HIM AS A MISSIONHE WOULD MANIFESTLY HAVE TO DISCHARGE IT AND WOULD AS HE SAW ITPROBABLY NEED A STAFF OF AT LEAST TWO COMPETENT OFFICERS TOCARRY OUT THE PRACTICAL STAFF WORK ON HIS BEHALF. MR. AARON THENRAISED THE QUESTION OF THE BRITISH SYSTEM ABOUT WHICH THE AMBASSA-DOR MADE THE PERTINENT OBSERVATION THAT IT WAS A QUESTION FOR THEGOVERNMENT TO DECIDE. IF IT WAS DECIDED TO SUBORDINATE CLAN-DESTINE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD DIRECTLY TO THESCORPAE THEN APPROPRIATE ART ANGEMENT COULD AND WOULD BE MADE.THE LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION BY MR. AARON THAT ATLEAST A NUMBER OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ARE
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13-00000TOTAL SOFIES RUN BYSECRETSLOTTED BY AT ZACTION T RF. FILE. VRACTION #NFOREPRODUCTION EY COTH:ISSUING OFFICE IS PROMSTAFF1 42 53 6T 389723 E1A645 PAGE 04-04 IN 716124TORI161937Z OCT 75 BONN 43389GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE BRITISH SYSTEM AS A MEANS OFINVESTING AMBASSADORS WITH DIRECT AUTHORITY OVER CLANDESTINEINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, E2 IMPDET.SECRET
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EYES ONLY385983 E1A898 PAGE 01 17:5701TOR:1615142 OCT 75 BONN 43369SECRET 1613022 OCT 75 STAFF *Recommend dissemination To D/OLC & DCI ReviewCITE BONN 43369TO: DIRECTOR.RYBAT PLKMBALL1. MR. AARON MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AT LUNCHEON 15 OCTOBER, SAID HE WAS STAFF EMPLOYEE OF SENATOR MONSDALE AND WAS HEAD OF SELECT COMMITTEE TASK FORCE FORMERLY CALLED WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE BUT RENAMED COMMAND AND CONTROL TASK FORCE. MR. AARON SAID HE FELT COMMITTEE WOULD CONCLUDE ITS WORK IN FEBRUARY AS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED.2. AARON SAID IT HIS OPINION THAT AS CONCERNED WRONGDOINGS CIA'S RECORD WAS PROBABLY BETTER THAN SOME OF THE OTHER INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. HE MENTIONED THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION IN THIS CONTEXT. HE SAID IF WE FELT THAT CIA HAVING DIFFICULT TIME WITH CHURCH COMMITTEE WE SHOULD WAIT AND SEE WHAT HAPPENS TO FBI WHO WERE "GOING TO HAVE THEIR CLOCKS CLEANED." SAID FBI HAD GONE 50 YEARS WITHOUT REVISION AND VAST AMOUNT OF WRONGDOING HAD RESULTED FROM THIS SITUATION.3. ALSO OF INTEREST, COLONEL SMITH, DEPUTY TO DCSI USAREUR GENERAL DILLARD, WHO WAS PRESENT DURING AARON'S SESSIONS WITH ARMYSECRET
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13-00000BLE SEC DISSEM BY PERRSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDTOTAL COPIES RUN BYSECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THANISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z| STAFF |     || ----- | --- || 1     | 4   || 2     | 5   || 3     | 6   |TION UNITRF. FILE. VR.TION #INFOT 388983 EIA898 PAGE 02-02 IN 715761TOR:161514Z OCT 75 BONN 43369COMPONENTS, INFORMED US 15 OCTOBER THAT HIS IMPRESSION BASED ONTALKS WITH MR. AARON, LATTER WOULD LIKE SEE CIA TAKE OVER POSITIVECOLLECTION ELEMENT OF THE 66TH MIG, MR. AARON MADE SIMILARCOMMENTS TO US, AS WE REPORTING SEPARATELY. E2 IMPDET.
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13-00000PER EUL 30 TOTAL COPIES 6 - 5UNIT NOTIFIC SECRET REPRODUCISSUING OSTAFFCL COPY ISSUED SLOTTEDIN UNIT BY AT z1RF FILE VR DDO 2EUR 3 N 3ACTION INFOT 389706 EIA620 EYES ONLY IN 716119PAGE 01 LOND 66-94TOR:1619312 OCT 75SECRET 161650Z OCT 75 STAFFCITE LONDON 66194TO: DIRECTOR,RYBAT PLKMBALLREF A. DIRECTOR 752556B. DIRECTOR 7545861. AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIM FOR AN HOUR AND   FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OCT. IN RESPONSE TO   HIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE   OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONING OF   THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED, WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL, THE   INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION   AND OUR RELATIONSSHIPS WIH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE   EMBASSY. AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL   FIGURES.2. IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING,   AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONING:A. HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATEDWITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. COSREPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLYSECRET
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T 389706 E1A520 PAGE 02 IN 716119TOR:1619312 OCT 75 LOND 66194IF THERE WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR SENSITIVITY HE WOULD PROBABLY ALERT THE AMBASSADOR. COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK CONSIDERABLY.B. HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAM COORDINAATED WITH THE BRITISH SUCH AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION TO LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL, COS STATED THAT HE WOULD SEEK AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCH SITUATION.C. HE ASKED IF COS WOULD APPROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE DIRECTLY OR THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A PROGRAM. COS REPLED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO GNGRAPH AND THAT THEY WOULD INSURE COORDINATION WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE.D. HE ASKED IF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BOTH INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE U.K. AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD . COS REPLIED THAT ACTION OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BUT THAT HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED ONSECRET
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SECRETSTAFFT 389706EIA620PAGE 03TOR:161931Z OCT 75IN 716119LOND 66194COLLECTION OPERATION, AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER IN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS. COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN, THAT THIS MIGHT WORK. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORE, OF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT MANY OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.E. IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTH THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON THE STATUS OF ANY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS TAKING PLACE IN THE U.K.3. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:THE BRITISH WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE LEAKS AND
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CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON. THE PAD BEEN REASSUREDBY US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THEPRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTIONOF THE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PRPARED TO GIVE US, AARON SAIDHE WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR ASTHE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED.B. COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIABLEDEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT.THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERYEFFECTIVE COVER PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR GNGRAPHREPRESENTATIVES SERVCING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONEOF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULDBE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOMEPROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY,AARON SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THISPROBLEM.C. COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TOWHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OFDAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVESANCTIONS, COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUCH
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DISSEM BY PER TOTAL COPIES RI IVSECRETPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED,REPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH/ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED. BY AT Z STAFFACTION UNIT I RF. FILE VR 1 4N 2 5F 3 6OACTION #T 389706 E1A620 PAGE 05-05 IN 716119TOR 1619312 OCT 75 LOND 66194COVERAGE ON AGEE JAGUAR WAS PROVIDING FOR US.4. IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS. AARON REPLIED THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER. HE SPECULATED THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FEBRUARY. THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED OUT IN A COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED. E2 IMPDET
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13-000006. Oct 75 1658.Review Staff: 75/3149/aDate 6 October 1975Marge FileTO : CIA Task ForceFROM : The Review Staff, Walter ElderSUBJECT : SSC/HSC RequestRECEIVED: Date 3 October Time 1905The attached letter requests an orientation briefing for David Aaron who is travelling again, this time to Switzerland, West Germany, and the United Kingdom.Comments: 1st Meeting-Briefing on 8 oct 1975 by Fendig2nd Briefing -10 oct 75 by Fendig.|          | Action | Info || -------- | ------ | ---- || SC/DCI   |        | X    || A/DDA    |        | X    || A/DDI    |        | X    || A/DDO    |        |      || A/DDS&T  |        | X    || OGC      |        | X    || OLC      |        | X    || IG       |        | X    || B. Evans |        | X    |
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FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMANJOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAPHILIP A, HART, MICHHOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN, BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.GARY HART, COLO.WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTORFREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSELCURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL# United States SenateSELECT COMMITTEE TOSTUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITHRESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, SATH CONGRESS)WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510October 5, 1975REVIEW STAFF75-3149Mr. Seymour Bolten :Assistant to the Director:Room 6D0120Central Intelligence AgencyLangley, VirginiaDear Mr. Bolten:This letter is to request an orientation briefing for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to make this month.Although plans are not yet precise, it is expected that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October 16 and 17.The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with the Ambassadors, Embassy Station officers and military commanders.. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the Department of State in the control of intelligence activities.Sincerely,William G. Millercopy to Mr. Hyland, State Department
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# 13-00000FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CI IANJOHN G. TOWER TEXAS, VICI HMANFHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. DAKER, JR., TENN.AVALTER F. MONDALE, MUN BARRY GOLDWATER, AΡΙΖ.WALTER D. HUDOLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MO,ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA,GANY HART, COLO.WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTORFREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSELCURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSELUnited Siales SenateSELECT COMMITTEE TOSTUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITHRESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES(PURSUANT TO 5. RES. 21, SITH CONGRESS)WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510October 3, 1975REVIEW STAFF75-3150Mr. William G. HylandDirectorBureau of Intelligence and ResearchDepartment of StateWashington, D.C. 20520Dear Mr. Hyland:This letter is to request an orientation briefing for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to make this month.Although the plans are not yet precise, it is expected that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October 16 and 17..The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with the Ambassadors, Embassy Station officers and military commanders. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the Department of State in the control of intelligence activities.Sincerely,William G. Millercopy to Mr. Bolten, CIA
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UNCLASSIFIEDINTERNALONLYCONFIDENTIALSECRETROUTING AND RECORD SHEETSUBJECT: (Optional)FROM: John Waller2B-1415EXTENSION NO.9135DATE26 September 1975TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)DATEOFFICER'S INITIALSCOMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)1. Mr. Rajarian   10/16   WR   Note:   Attached is worth reading   report on a trip of Daniel   Aaron and Bill   Tridons (both sse)   to Latin America.   Note fence (8,   BRIL 24723.2. John Waller   FileThanks!nSigna3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 7 OCT 75 14 50.FORM3-62610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONSSECRETCONFIDENTIALINTERNAL USE ONLYUNCLASSIFIED
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13-00000,ABLE SEC DISSEM BY _PER LA (EO) TOTAL COPIES 6-9 RUN L. 24ERSONTUNIT NOTIFIED SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THANISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED24WICE COVER SLOTTER BY AT Z STAFFCTION UNIT RF FILE VR DDO 1 42 53 6A3STON EYES ONLYNFOT 333576 E1A022 PAGE Ø1 IN 695650TO R: 242029Z SEP 75 MONT 21403SECRET 241945Z SEP 75 STAFFCITE MONTEVIDEO 21403 SECTION 1 OF 2TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR.NACT BUENOS AIRESARYBAT PLVWCADET1. COS HAD TWO-HOUR SESSION WITH TRUEHART AND AARON LATE-   MORNING 24 SEPTEMBER, GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT BOTH WERE   BUSINESS-LIKE: QUESTIONS WERE INCISIVE AND DESIGNED TO ASCERTAIN   HOW A STATION FUNCTIONS IN AN EMBASSY, PARTICULARLY VIS-A-VIS   THE AMBASSADOR, RATHER THAN HOW MONTEVIDEO STATION IS FUNCTIONING   IN URUGUAY. HENCE MANY QUESTIONS WERE HIGHLY HYPOTHETICAL, MOST   IMPORTANT IMPRESSION WAS THAT FORMER AMBASSADOR TRUEHART (WHOM   COS HAD MET IN NIGERIA YEARS AGO) FEELS THAT AN AMBASSADOR   SHOULD BE FAR MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ALL REPEAT ALL STATION   OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO JUDGE POSSIBLE "FLAP POTENTIAL".2. COS DID NOT SHOW OD TO VISITORS SINCE THEY DID NOT ASK   TO READ IT BUT INSTEAD READ PORTIONS OF IT TO THEM AND DISCUSSED   IT WITH THEM.3, THEY ASKED INITIALLY WHAT THE AMBASSADORS INJUNCTIONSWERE WITH RESPECT TO PROHIBITED OPERATIONS. COS SAID# 1SECRET
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BLE SEC DISSEM BY PERTOTAL COPIES RUNSECRETERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTED BY ATSTAFF1 42 53 6CTION UNITINFORF FILE VRCTION #T. 333576 E1A022 PAGE 02 IN 695650TOR1242029Z SEP 75 MONT 21403AMBASSADOR DOES NOT WANT COVERT OPERATIONS OF A POLICTICAL NATURE IN URUGUAY WITHOUT HIS PRIOR APPROVAL NOR DOES HE WANT US TO MOUNT "ELECTRONIC" OPERATIONS WITHOUT APPROVAL. COS OPINED THIS LATTER INJUNCTION MEANT UNILATERAL EFFORTS. AARON ASKED IF WE HAD ON-GOING PRESS PLACEMENT MEDIA OPERATIONS. COS SAID WE DID HAVE SOME BUT THESE WERE OF ROUTINE NATURE. AARON PURSUED MATTER, ASKED IF AMBASSADOR WAS FULL Y AWARE OF THIS TO WHICH COS RESPONDED THAT HE PRE SUMED SO, COS ADDED HE HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY COVERED THIS POINT WITH THE AMBASSADOR SINCE COS ARRIVAL HERE LESS THAN ONE MONTH AGO.4. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHART QUESTIONED AT LENGTH WHAT KIND OF THINGS WE COORDINATE WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND IN WHAT DEPTH PRIOR TO INITIATION OF AN OPERATION. WHAT KIND OF AGENTS WOULD WE IDENTIFY BY NAME TO THE AMBASSADOR? COS SAID HE WOULD BE INCLINED TO REVEAL TO THE AMBASSADOR THE NAME OF ANY SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH WHOM THE AMBASSADOR WAS DEALING OFFICIALLY AND INTIMATELY, BUT THIS WOULD IN LARGE PART DEPEND ON THE AMBASSADORS WISHES HIMSELF. WOULD WE INFORM THE POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF OF THE IDENTITY OF ONE OF OUR AGENTS WHOM THE POLITICAL OFFICER WAS TRYING TO DEVELOP?SECRET