Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 44]
# OUTGOING MESSAGEAGE COI ACP TOG TPE MRO DCIOMF 0 0 0 0 0 0CLASSIFICATIONSECRETMESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR DATE-TIME GROUP CITE MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMOERDIRECTOR785722ROUTING1 4 72 5 83 6 9PAGE OF PAGESX6CONF: INFO: FILE0 INDEX DISSEM BY:0 NO INDEX0 RETURN TO PER0 IP FILES #4. WHERE APPLICABLE {SUCH AS JAKARTA} BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO   DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH STATION COORDINATION ROLE UNDER DCIDS FOR   CLANDESTINE MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS.Y5. FOR CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON: IT PROBABLY WOULD ALSO BE   USEFUL TO PROVIDE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WITH ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT   ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. HE WOULD ALSO   BE INTERESTED IN STATION'S ESTIMATE OF HOW NEW GOVERNMENTS WILL   CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICIES, VIS-A-VIS UNITED STATES.Y6. FOR JAKARTA: IN ADDITION TO STABILITY OF SUHARTO   REGIME THE CONGRESSMAN MIGHT APPRECIATE A REVIEW OF THE PORTUGUESE   TIMOR SITUATION AND HOW THAT WILL INFLUENCE THE STABILITY OF   THE REGION.Y7. THIS VISIT IS SEPARATE FROM TRIP OF PRESTON, SNODGRASS,   CALLOWAY AND CARY DISCUSSED IN DIRECTOR 778574.48. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE ARMED   SERVICES COMMITTEE.Y9. SEPARATE CABLE FOLLOWS TO CANBERRA ON SENSITIVE ASPECTS   OF VISIT. NBA ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS: YDATE:ORIG:UNIT:EXT:CLASSIFICATION RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICERSECRET REPRODI 'ON BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS! HIBITED E 2 IMPDETCL BY: 058913
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 45]
# OUTGOING MESSAGESIGNAL CENTER USE ONLYOMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0CLASSIFICATIONSECRETMESSAGE HANDLING INDICATORDATE-TIME GROUPCITEDIRECTOR785722PAGE OF PAGESX7MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBERCONF: INFO: FILEINDEX DISSEM BY:NO INDEXRETURN TO PERIP FILES #JAKARTA 6 JAN, ETD 9 JAN YCANBERRA 9 JAN, ETD 11 JAN YSYDNEY 11 JAN, ETD 14 JAN YWELLINGTON 14 JAN, ETD 16 JAN E2, IMPDET.H* INQUIRY CONCERNING CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION.** HQS CONTACT WITH D. MILFORD ON TRIP TO AUSTRALIA.![signature of DDS&T/OEL]![signature of OLC]![signature of SA/DDO]![signature of EA/PMI]DATE: 24 DEC 75ORIG: B.J.HOUSTONUNIT: ACEAEXT: 9373![signature of DAVID BLEE, A/DDO]DAVID BLEE, A/DDORELEASING OFFICERCLASSIFICATIONSECRET.![signature of BILL J. HOUSTON, ACEA]BILL J. HOUSTON, ACEAAUTHENTICATING OFFICERREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDETCL BY: 058913
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 46]
FORM 302067-71 MPO. 2/78CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 4% PER CSSR #112. TOTAL COPIES 10-6PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDSECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER TOISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTEDACTION UNITSTAFF PRECEDENCCLEA3BP FILE. VR DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF?14ACTION #DDO, SA/DDO D/OLC2536T 494891E1A755PAGE 01IN 754484TOR:1280501Z NOV 75SEOU 25948SECRET 280348Z NOV 75 STAFFCITE SEOUL 25948TO: DIRECTOR.RYBAT PLMHCONGAREF: SEOUL 25761 (736898)1. FOLLOWING LETTER WAS PREPARED BY GENERAL RICHARD G. STILWELL, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, AND FORWARDED TO DOD CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON FOR REVIEW AND PASSAGE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, THE LETTER WAS PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REQUEST TO BOTH GENERAL STILWELL AND LT. GENERAL JAMES HOLLINGSWORTH, COMMANDER, I CORPS, CAMP RED CLOUD, FOR LETTERS SIMILAR TO HIS REQUEST OF AMBASSADOR SNEIDER. GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH PREPARED A LETTER WHICH WAS REWORKED INTO THE FOLLOWING LETTER WHICH WAS SENT BY GENERAL STILWELL AS REFLECTING BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND HIS OWN VIEWS. THE LETTER WAS FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON AS AN SSO BACK CHANNEL MESSAGE AND HAS SINCE BEEN CLEARED BY DOD FOR RELEASE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. THE TEXT OF THIS LETTER WAS GIVEN TO COS BY GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH.2. QUOTE " DEAR MR. MILFORD:SECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 47]
FORM 302067-71 MFG. 2/75CABLE SEC DISSEM BY________________________PER_________________ TOTAL COPIES___________RUN BY____________PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED__________________________________________________________________________________________ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED___________________________________________BY_______AT__________Z_________________ACTION UNITINFORF. FILE VRREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.STAFF123456ACTION #T 494891 EIA755 PAGE 02 IN 754484TOR:280501Z NOV 75 SEOU 25948GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH AND I WERE EXTREMELY PLEASED AT THE INTERESTYOU SHOWED IN THE PROBLEMS WE FACE HERE IN KOREA. I AM ONLY SORRYTHAT OUR SCHEDULES DID NOT PERMIT US TO EXPLORE THE CHALLENGES WEFACE HERE AND OUR CAPABILITIES TO DEAL WITH THEM IN GREATER DETAIL.THIS LETTER INCORPORATES BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND MYVIEWS.AS FIELD COMMANDERS, WE ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE AREA OFINTELLIGENCE - AND FOR GOOD REASONS. A COMMANDER HAS A FUNDAMENTALINTEREST IN PROTECTING HIS COMMAND AND ASSURING THAT, SHOULDHOSTILITIES OCCUR, HIS COMBAT RECOURSES ARE EMPLOYED IN THE MOSTEFFECTIVE MANNER POSSIBLE.ORGANIZATIONALLY, THE US INTELLIGENCE SETUP IN KOREA IS VIABLE.THE RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES,I.E., CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY(DIA), AND NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) WORK EFFECTIVELY INCONCERT WITH OUR INTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND THOSE COLLECTION ELEMENTSWHICH ARE UNDER OUR CONTROL TO PROVIDE AN INTEGRATED ANDEFFICIENT FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE. WE HAVE BEEN MOST IMPRESSED WITH THEDEDICATION AND PROFESSIONALISM OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ASSIGNEDTO THOSE NATIONAL AGENCIES; AND WE HAVE EQUALLY HIGH RESPECT FOR OURSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 48]
FORM 302067-71 MPG, 2/75CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__________PER__________TOTAL COPIES__________RUN BYPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDS E C R E TREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITIADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED__________BY__________AT__________ZSTAFFACTION UNIT I RF. FILE. VR1 4N2 5ACTION # F3 6OT 494891 EIA755 PAGE 03 IN 754484TOR1280501Z NOV. 75 SEOU 25948OWN PEOPLE. THIS TEAM IS RESPONSIVE AND GIVES US A GREAT DEALOF QUALITY INTELLIGENCE.LIKE ALL COMMANDERS, HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT FULLY SATISFIED WITH ALLASPECTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. THE PRIMARY NEED IS FORRELIABLE WARNING INTELLIGENCE. BECAUSE OF OUR PROXIMITY TO THEENEMY'S AIRFIELDS, AND THE FACT THAT MANY OF OUR TROOPS LIVE WITHINTHE RANGE FANS OF HIS EMPLACED WEAPONS SYSTEMS, WE MUST CONSTANTLY BEALERT FOR THOSE ANOMALIES IN HIS BEHAVIOR WHICH WOULD TIP US OFFTO IMPENDING ATTACK. UNFORTUNATELY, BECAUSE OF HIS READINESS ANDTHE FORWARD DISPOSITION OF HIS FORCES, INCLUDING FORWARD POSITIONINGOF SUPPLIES, WE DO NOT HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF ASSURANCE THAT WEWILL HAVE MUCH WARNING. WHILE WE MIGHT HAVE DAYS OR WEEKS, IT ISMORE PROBABLE THAT WE WOULD HAVE ONLY HOURS. TO PARTIALLY OFFSET THIS,US AND ROK FORCES MAINTAIN A HIGH DEGREE OF ALERT, PREPARED TOQUICKLY ENGAGE THE FORCES OF THE NORTH SHOULD THEY INITIATEAN ATTACK. CONCURRENTLY, WE AND THE NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCECOMMUNITY ARE SEEKING WAYS TO IMPROVE OUR SYSTEMS AND METHODOLOGIESTO INCREASE OUR ASSURANCE OF TIMELY WARNING.NATIONALLY MANAGED COLLECTION PROGRAMS GIVE US INVALUABLEINTELLIGENCE ON THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE POTENTIAL ENEMY. YET WES E C R E T
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 49]
# SECRETFORM 3020b7-71 MFG. 2/75CABLE SÉC DISSEM BY PER TOTAL COPIES RUN BYPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDACTION UNIT STAFFRF. FILE VR 1 42 53 6ACTIONINFOT 494891 EA755 PAGE 04 IN. 754484TOR 280501Z NOV 75 SEOU 25948STILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT GAPS IN OUR HOLDINGS ON THE ACTUALLOCATIONS AND IDENTITIES OF HIS UNITS, HIS COMMAND AND. CONTROLSTRUCTURE AND HIS WAR PLANS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WHILE THEEXCELLENT TECHNICAL COLLECTION PROGRAMS IN PHOTOGRAPHY AND ELECTRONICENCE SUINTELLIGFMZ CUUPPLY A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY'SCAPABILITIES, WE ARE STILL LACKING INTELLIGENCE ON HIS INTENTIONS.UNFORTUNATELY, INTELLIGENCE ON WHAT HE IS THINKING AND PLANNINGWOULD COME LARGELY FROM HUMAN SOURCES, AND GIVEN THE CLOSEDNATURE OF HIS SOCIETY AND HIS STRICT AND EFFECTIVE SECURITYMEASURES, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO COLLECT THIS KIND OFINFORMATION.THE PREPONDERANCE OF REQUIREMENTS FOR HUMAN SOURCE CLANDESTINEINTELLIGENCE FALL WITHIN THE PROPER PURVIEW OF THE CENTRALINTELLIGENCE AGENCY: AND THAT AGENCY IS UNIQUELY QUALIFIEDTO PERFORM THIS VITAL FUNCTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS A NEED.FOR A CAREFULLY MANAGED, LIMITED MILITARY EFFORT TO FOCUS ONSTRICTLY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. A PRIMARY MILITARY TARGET OF THISNATURE IS THE TUNNEL NETWORK THAT THE NORTH HAS BEEN DETECTEDCONSTRUCTING UNDER THE DMZ. THIS IS A LABOR INTENSIVE EFFORT, ANDEXPLOITATION OF CLANDESTINE TECHNIQUES WOULD BE A MEANS OFSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 50]
FORM 202067-71 MPO. 2/75CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__________PER________________TOTAL COPIES________RUN BY______________________PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED__________________________________________________________SECRET______________________________REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITIADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED__________BY__________AT__________ZACTION UNITIRF. FILE. VRSTAFF1.42536ACTION #NFOT 494891 EIA755 PAGE 05 IN 754484TOR:280501Z NOV 75 SEOU 25948DISCOVERING THE TUNNELS BEFORE THEY ARE USED AGAINST US.IN THE AREA OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WE HAVE REQUESTED A HIGH ALTITUDE PLATFORM TO BE OPERATED OVER THE SOUTH KOREAN LAND MASS TO GIVE US A DEEPER AND MORE EFFECTIVE LOOK INTO THE ENEMY'S ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT. THE REQUESTED SYSTEM INCLUDES A DOWN LINK CAPABILITY WHICH WOULD GIVE US A NEAR REAL TIME READ OUT OF DATA COLLECTED. OUR PROPOSAL HAS RECEIVED STRONG SUPPORT FROM DIA AND NSA. WE ALSO HAVE HIGH INTEREST IN INSURING THAT WE WILL HAVE DOWN LINK ACCESS TO NATIONALLY MANAGED OVERHEAD PHOTOGRAPHY SYSTEMS, WHICH ARE NOT YET OPERATIONAL.WE ARE AWARE OF THE COSTS INVOLVED IN FIELDING MODERN COLLECTION SYSTEMS AND THE UPGRADING OF CURRENT ONES. NONETHELESS, GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH AND I SHARE THE VIEW THAT, GIVEN OUR MISSION AND OUR PROXIMITY TO POTENTIAL BELLIGERENT, WE MUST HAVE THE BEST INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE. I AM SURE THAT YOUR TRIP TO KOREA GAVE YOU A FEEL FOR THE SENSE OF URGENCY THAT WE LIVE WITH HERE, AND WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOUR COLLEAGUES IN THE CONGRESS WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION AND HELP TO INSURE THAT OUR FORCES CONTINUE TO GET THE KIND OF SUPPORT NEEDED TO DO THE JOB TO WHICH WE ARE DEDICATED.SECRET
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13-00000FORM 3020D7-71 MFG. 2/75CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__________PER__________ TOTAL COPIES__________RUN BYPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDSECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITELADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED__________BY__________AT__________Z| ACTION UNIT || :---------: ||    INFO     |RF. FILE. VR.STAFF|  1  || :-: ||  2  ||  5  ||  3  ||  6  |ACTION #T 494891 EIA755 PAGE 06-06 IN 754484TOR:280501Z NOV 75 SEOU 25948SINCERELY YOURS, "UNQUOTEE2, IMPDET.SECRET
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13-00000CABLE SEC DISSEM BY 49 PER SP 112 TOTAL COPIES 11-1 RUN BY RSECRETPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THANISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDSTAFFADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTEDACTION UNITBY AT Z14RF. FILE VR DC/REVIEW STAFF, CSRF,25JEA 3ACTION #NFODDO, SA/DDO, DOLC36T 448045 EIA080 PAGE 01-01 IN. 736898TOR:100349Z NOV 75 SEOU 25761SECRET 100322Z NOV 75 STAFFCITE SEOUL 25761TO: DIRECTOR.RYBAT PLMHCONGAREF: SEOUL 25730 (IN 732789)FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATE 264382 (ROGER CHANNEL)10 NOVEMBER 1975: QUOTE SUBJECT: LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD.REF: SEOUL 8531. 1. LETTER HAS BEEN FORWARDED TO MILFORD AS RECOMMENDED, ONLY CHANGE IN TEXT PROPOSEDPARA 5. REFTER WAS DELETION OF FINAL SENTENCE, OWING TO SENSITIVITY OF REFERENCE TO "CLANDESTINE OPERATION" IN LETTER LIKELY TO BECOME PART OF PUBLIC RECORD. UNQUOTE,*NO RECORD IN CABLE SEC.SECRETSA/DDO10 NOV 75 13 48
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# 13-00000FORM 302007-71 MFG. 2/76CABLE SEC DISSEM BY LA PER SP 112 TOTAL COPIES 13-2 RUN BYPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED.ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT ZACTION UNIT I RF. FILE. VR. Det, ploca, DCI (REVIEW STAFEACTION # NFO DDO, CORE, SAADDO, DOLCT 424247 EIA337 PAGE 01 IN 728294TOR:3103452 OCT 75 SEDU 25687SECRET 310314Z OCT 75 STAFFCITE SEOUL 25687TO: DIRECTOR.RYBAT PLMHCONGAREF: SEOUL 25649 (724591)*1. REGRET DELAY IN REPORTING FOLLOWUP DISCUSSION   WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. HE MET WITH COS FOR APPROXIMATELY   ONE HOUR MORNING OF 28 OCTOBER PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. DCOS   BROUGHT THE CONGRESSMAN TO COS RESIDENCE AND THEN EXCUSED   HIMSELF TO MEET WITH CONGRESSMAN LUCIEN NEDZI (SEOUL 25657).2. AS IT TURNED OUT NOTHING OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE   DEVELOPED AT THIS MEETING. R SPROVIDED BOTH AN OPPORTUNITY   TO REVIEW VARIOUS POINTS DISCUSSED IN THE PREVIOUS SESSION   WITH COS EMPHASIZING THE AEZFCY COMMAND AND CONTROL   PROCEDURES FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS PLUS THE MANAGEMENT BY   OBJECTIVE AND COST EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW PROCEDURES.3. COS PERMITTED THE CONGRESSMAN TO READ A STERILIZED   COPY OF SEOUL 25388 LESS THE FINAL PARAGRAPH AND THEN   DISCUSSED HIS PROPOSAL TO TRY TO DEVELOP A MINORITY   REPORT AROUND THIS TYPE I-83 94.SECRET
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FORM 3020b7-71 MFG. 2/75CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__________PER__________TOTAL COPIES__________RUN BYPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED__________SECRET__________REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED__________BY__________ATSTAFFACTION UNIT1 RF. FILE. VR142536ACTION #NFOT 424247 EIA337 PAGE 02-02 IN 728294TUR:310345Z OCT 75 SEOU 2568.7STUDY AND EXPLAINED WHY DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WAS FEASIBLE.THE CONGRESSMAN CONCURRED BUT RESTATED HIS DESIRE TO NOWFOLLOW UP HIS KOREA INQUIRIES AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL ANDSOMEHOW INCORPORATE VARIOUS ASPECTS INTO HIS REPORT. HEREINTERATED HIS STRONG DESIRE TO MEET WITH GENERAL WALTERS.COMMENDED MR. SHACKLEY TO THE CONGRESSMAN FOR SPECIFICDISCUSSIONS ON THIS AREA.4. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS QUITE PLEASED AND APPRECIATIVE   OF THE DISCUSSIONS HERE AND WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL.   HIS PROBLEM REMAINS ONE OF FOCUS AND STAFF ASSISTANCE.   E2, IMPDET.CS COMMENT:*COS forwards a resume of points covered during more thansix hours of off the record discussions with Congressman Dale Milford (D-Texas)on 25 October 1975.
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```13-00000```CABLE SEC DISSEM BYTOTAL COPIES 12-21 RUN BYSECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THANISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED,ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTEDACTION UNITSTAFF PRECEDENCE`C/EA3` D/DCI, DDO, D/OLC, CSRF SA/DDOT 414520 E1A827 PAGE 01 IN 724591TOR 280440Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649SECRET 280300Z OCT 75 STAFFCITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 1 OF 4 Sec 1-4 of 4TO: DIRECTOR,RYBAT PLMHCONGAREF: A. SEOUL 23646 (723138)B. DIRECTOR 759641FOLLOWING IS A RESUME OF POINTS COVERED DURINGMORE THAN SIX HOURS OF OFF THE RECORD DISCUSSIONSWITH CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD (D-TEXAS) ON 25 OCTOBER 1975.BECAUSE OF FEVER COS HAD NOT BEEN RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL ANDDISCUSSIONS WERE THEREFORE HELD AT THE HOSPITAL SITTINGROOM.1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD OPENED THE DISCUSSION   BY REITERATING CONCERNS SURFACED THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON.   IN ADDITION TO HIS REFERENT A ASSESSMENT, HE STATED   THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE FIRST PHASE OF THE COMMITTEE   REPORT WILL STATE THAT:A. DUPLICATION OF INTEL MISSIONS RESULTED INMULTICHANNEL FORWARDING OF INFORMATION.B. BUREAUCRATIC INEFFICIENCY RESULTED IN DELAYSSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 56]
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY: ______ PER: ______ TOTAL COPIES: SECRET RUN BY: ______PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED: ______REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THANISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDADVANCE COPY ISSUED/BLOTTED BY: ______ AT: ______ Z: ______STAFFACTION UNIT I RF. FILE VR 1 42 5ACTION# INFO 3 6T 414520 E1A827 PAGE 02 IN 724591TO R: 28 04 40 Z OCT 75 SE OU 25 64 9IN FORWARDING OF INTELLIGENCE,C. NEW LEGISLATION AND NEW PERMANENT, PREFERABLEJOINT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ARE REQUIRED.2, THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT THE COMMITTEEINQUIRIES ARE POLITICAL IN NATURE AND IN HIS OPINIONTHERE IS NO PRETENSE OF OBJECTIVITY. TIME FACTORSDID NOT PERMIT HIM OR OTHER MEMBERS TO PERSONALLYOR SERIOUSLY ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED SOTHAT FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, MOST MEMBERS WERE "PRISONERSOF THE COMMITTEE STAFF", HE HAS NOT BEEN HAPPY WITHTHIS SITUATION AND HAD INITIALLY PROPOSED THAT EACHCOMMITTEE MEMBER BE PERMITTED TO PERSONALLY SELECTONE STAFF MEMBER FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE COMMITTEE,HE HAD LINED UP A TOTAL OF SIX MEMBERS TO BACK THISAPPROACH, WHEN THE CHAIRMAN AGREED TO LET HIM SELECTONE STAFF MEMBER IF HE IN TURN WOULD DROP HIS SPONSORSHIPOF THIS PROPOSAL, HE AGREED, BUT SAID THAT HE HAD ASYET BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY AN APPROPRIATE CANDIDATE.HE DISMISSED THE CURRENT COMMITTEE STAFF AS STARRY-EYEDLIBERALS OUT TO MAKE A NAME FOR THEMSELVES, HE ISSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 57]
CABLE SEC DISSEM BYPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDTOTAL COPIESSECRETADVANCE COPY ISSUED/BLOTTEDACTION UNIT RF FILE VRACTIONT 414520 EIA827 PAGE 03 IN 724591TOR:280440Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649ACTIVELY SEEKING A CANDIDATE FOR EMPLOYMENT AS HISSTAFF ASSISTANT ON THE COMMITTEE, BUT DID NOT APPEARSANGUINE THAT HE WOULD COME UP WITH THE RIGHT MAN,3. CUS NOTED THAT DIRECTOR COLBY WOULD BETHOROUGHLY DELIGHTED WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AJOINT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE SINCE HEWAS NOW OBLIGED TO REPORT TO SIX SEPARATE COMMITTEES.COS EVIDENCED SOME SKEPTICISM THAT A JOINT OVERSIGHTCOMMITTEE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. THE CONGRESSMAN WASNOT OPTIMISTIC IN THE SHORT TERM BUT BELIEVED THATA JOINT COMMITTEE WILL EVENTUALLY BE ESTABLISHED,HE SAID THAT RIGHT NOW THE AGENCY IS ESSENTIALLY INAN UNDERDOG POSITION AND IS GOOD COPY, HOWEVER,OVER THE LONGER TERM, INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIPSCORES NO POINTS WITH THE FOLKS BACK IN HOMETOWN USA SOTHAT IN TIME CONGRESSMEN WILL NAMEUVER TO AVOID THEASSIGNMENT.4. THE REAL PROBLEM AS HE SEES IT IS TO FORM ACOMMITTEE THAT WOULD HAVE CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES OFTHE HOUSE AND HAVE PROCEDURES THAT WOULD PERMIT EFFECTIVESECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 58]
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY____________PER________________TOTAL COPIES_______________RUN BYPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED___________________________________________SECRET_______________________ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED____________BY_____AT______Z__________________________REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAACTION UNITISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED| I   | RF. FILE | VR  || --- | -------- | --- || N   |          |     || F   |          |     || O   |          |     |ACTION #STAFF| 1   |     | 4   || --- | --- | --- || 2   |     | 5   || 3   |     | 6   |T 414520   E1A827   PAGE 04   IN 724591TOR1280440Z OCT 75   SE OU 25649OVERSIGHT FUNCTION TO BE EXERCISED AND IN A SECUREMANNER. THE CONGRESSMAN IS PUSHING A PROPOSAL THATTHE HOUSE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP BE COMPOSED OF ONEMEMBER NOMINATED FROM THE ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE,ONE FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ONE APPOINTEDBY THE SPEAKER, WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE COMMITTEETO BE NOMINATED BY THE SPEAKER WITH CONCURRENCE BYTHE HOUSE MEMBERS,5. THE PRESENT HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE (HSC) IS   TO BE PHASED OUT AS OF 31 JANUARY, THE CONGRESSMAN   WAS OF TWO MINDS AS TO WETHER THE COMMITTEE'S LIFE   SHOULD BE EXTENDED. IF TERMINATED ON SCHEDULE, THE   SPOTLIGHT WOULD FADE AWAY BUT THE RESULT WOULD BE   VARIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR "BAD" LEGISLATION, IF   CONTINUED, THE POLITICALLY INSPIRED MANIPULATION OF   THE COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE SEEKING SENSATIONAL   HEADLINES, HE SAID THAT HE FRANKLY DID NOT KNOW   WHICH WAS WORSE.6. THE CONGRESSMAN'S STATED INTENT, WHICH HE   SHARES WITH CONGRESSMAN DAVID C. TREEN IS TO FILESECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 59]
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY____________PER____________ TOTAL COPIES RUN BYS E C R E TPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED:ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT Z| ACTION UNIT | I   | RF, FILE | VR  |     || ----------- | --- | -------- | --- | --- ||             | N   |          |     |     || ACTION #    | F   |          |     |     ||             | O   |          |     |     || STAFF |     |     || ----- | --- | --- || 1     | 4   |     || 2     | 5   |     || 3     | 6   |     |T 414520 EIA827 PAGE 05 IN 724591TOR:280440Z OCT 75 SEQU 25649A DISSENTING MINORITY REPORT FOCUSING IN A POSITIVE MANNER ON THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION RATHER THAN THE HISTORICAL ISSUES THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS FOCUSED IN A NON-OBJECTIVE MANNER. HOWEVER, SINCE DECEMBER IS FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES NOT A WORKING MONTH, THIS GIVES HIM ONLY THIRTY DAYS TO PUT TOGETHER A REPORT. SINCE HE IS A MEMBER OF THREE HOUSE COMMITTEES AND CHAIRMAN OF ONE SUB-COMMITTEE WITH NOT EVEN ONE STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE SELECT COMMITTEE HE IS FINDING IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A MINORITY REPORT. HE TURNED ASIDE THE SUGGESTION THAT FAVORABLE WITNESSES BE CALLED AS IMPRACTICAL. HE SAID, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IF HE ASKED GENERAL WALTERS OR PRESTIGIOUS AND KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONALITIES WITH INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUNDS TO APPEAR, THEY WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO MAKE AN OBJECTIVE AND BALANCED PRESENTATION, THE COMMITTEE'S LINE OF QUESTIONING WOULD BE CONFINED TO THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE "DEAD CATS" OF TEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS AGO. HE ALSO FORESAW NO POSSIBILITY OF MODIFYING THE MAJORITY VIEWS OR THE MAJORITY REPORT, HE WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT SAM ADAMS'S E C R E T
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 60]
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY_________________PER______________TOTAL COPIES___________RUN BY______________PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED________________________________SECRETADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED___________BY______AT______ZACTION UNIT| I   || --- || N   || F   || O   |RF. FILE. VR.ACTION #REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THANISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDSTAFF| 1   | 4   || --- | --- || 2   | 5   || 3   | 6   |T 414520 EIA827 PAGE 06-86 IN 724591TORI280440Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649ALLEGATIONS ARE BEING ACCEPTED AS FACT WITHOUT REBUTTAL PERMITTED, HE WAS PUSHING FOR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ALL INDIVIDUALS CITED BY ADAMS BUT WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER HE COULD OBTAIN COMMITTEE AGREEMENT. IF NOT, HE INTENDED TO EMPHASIZE THIS POINT IN THE PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT.7. THE CONGRESSMAN IS TENTATIVELY CONSIDERING A MINORITY REPORT THE THRUST OF WHICH WOULD BE THAT HESECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 61]
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY____________PERPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDTOTAL COPIESSECRETRUN BYREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAI ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDSTAFF1 42 53 6ADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED BY AT ZACTION UNIT RF FILE VRACTION #INFOT 414531 EI A838 PAGE 1 IN 724594TOR:280502Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649SECRET 280300Z UCT 75 STAFFCITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 2 OF 4TO: DIRECTOR,RYBAT PLMHCONGAHAD TAKEN A CURRENT LOOK AT THE INTEL COMMUNITY IN A CRITICAL AREA (KOREA) AND FOUND IT ALIVE AND WELL, AND HAD FOLLOWED THE INTEL FLOW THROUGH THE CYCLE "ALL THE WAY TO THE FURTY COMMITTEE", HE STATED THAT WHAT HE NEEDED WAS SOME "VEHICLE" TO TIE THIS ALL TOGETHER FOR PURPOSES OF HIS REPORT. COS NOTED THAT USIB IN WASHINGTON HAS RECENTLY COMPLETED A COMPREHENSIVE ALBEIT HIGHLY CLASSIFIED REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE KOREAN TARGET IN A EFFORT TO IDENTIFY ANY PROBLEM AREAS AND TO TAKE PROPER REMEDIAL ACTIONS, COS NOTED THAT HAVING ONLY RECENTLY ARRIVED HERE HE HAD OF COURSE UNDERTAKEN A THOROUGH IN-COUNTRY REVIEW IN ORDER TO ASSURE HIMSELF OF THE ADEQUACY OF OUR IN-COUNTRY PROGRAMS. THE CONGRESSMAN SEIZED ON THESE REVIEWS AS THE POSSIBLE BASIS OF HIS REPORT, HOWEVER, HE WANTED TO DEALSECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 62]
CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__________PER___________________ TOTAL COPIES___________RUN BYPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED,_______________________________________ S E C R E TADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED__________BY_____AT_____Z______________________ REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAACTION UNIT| I   || --- || N   || F   || O   |RF. FILE. VR. ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDACTION # STAFF| 1   | 4   || --- | --- || 2   | 5   || 3   | 6   |T 414531 EIA838 PAGE 82 IN 724594TOR:280502Z OCT 75 SEOU 25649WITH "UNCLASSIFIED ASPECTS" OF THE REVIEW. (HOW ONE RECONCILES THIS CANNOT BE SUGGESTED FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT, IT MERELY EMPHASIZES THE LACK OF FOCUS AND THE CONGRESSMAN'S DESIRE TO DO SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE, BUT HIS INABILITY TO FIND A "HANDLE".)8. THE CONGRESSMAN COMMENTED THAT THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IN THE COMMITTEE'S HANDS IS A MAJOR PROBLEM, THE HSC RULES STATE CLASSIFIED MATERIAL MUST NOT BE RELEASED BUT THESE RESTRICTIONS DIRECTLY CONTRAVENE HOUSE REGULATIONS ON THIS POINT AND WOULD NOT BE SUSTAINED IF CHALLENGED, HOWEVER, SINCE THE HARRINGTON EPISODE HE DOUBTED THAT THE HSC'S SPECIAL RULE WOULD BE CHALLGNGED (ACCORDING TO THE CURRENT HOUSE RULES ANY MEMBER CAN ASK FOR A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF ANY CLOSED COMMITTEE HEARING AND USE IT ALMOST WITH IMPUNITY).9, COS WAS PREPARED TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF REFERENT B GUIDANCE IF WE SENSED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN WOULD BE RECPTIVE TO THIS LINE OF PRESENTATION. GIVEN THE UNORTHODOX MANNER IN WHICH THIS HADS E C R E T