Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10336-10034.pdf — page 1]
# MEMORANDUMSeptember 12, 1998To:Laura DenkExecutive Directorcc:Bob SkwirotCIA Team LeaderFrom:Michelle CombsAssociate Director for Research and ReviewSubject: CIA-IR-35 Source Identified in RIF 104-10151-10206In CIA Informal Request for Additional Records and Information CIA-IR-35, the Review Board requested additional information on a source identified-in RIF number 104-10151-10206 as having given the CIA additional information on Lee and Marina Oswald and their time in the Soviet Union. At the request of the Review Board, the CIA searched its compartmented files and databases for additional information on this source and the raw intelligence information given by this source to the CIA. CIA provided the source's 201 file which was examined by the Review Board staff. No assassination records were designated from this 201 file. CIA also provided sections of briefing reports, an audiotape, and portions of transcripts of conversations between the source and interviewers on Lee Harvey Oswald. A final memorandum from this source was also found to be located in the post-1978 volume of Oswald's 201 file. All of these materials were designated as assassination records and will be included in the JFK Collection at the National Archives.Given the recentness of the information and the sensitivity of the source, the Review Board agreed to protect the source's true name and cryptonym. Documents from this source are identified as the product of "a yalued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for internal counter-intelligence efforts."e:\combs\cia-ir35.wpdFile 4.20.1 and 4.20.4
[104-10336-10034.pdf — page 2]
# SECRETOIM-98-008406 August 1998MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive DirectorAssassination Records Review BoardFROM: (U) Lee S. StricklandChief, Information Review GroupCentral Intelligence AgencySUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym1. (S) The CIA Deputy Executive Director has asked that I respond to the Assassination Records Review Board (“ARRB
[104-10336-10034.pdf — page 3]
13-00000SECRETSUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER CryptonymItinformation to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source. It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source (identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER). It concludes by stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has had his "... bona fides ... fully established [by CIA]." It is this final fact which is critical to our request. By having released this substantive information -- "bona fides ... established" -- and by otherwise having IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, we must protect the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.5. (C) The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions:*   what information was compromised?*   what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information?*   what understanding of the information did the service(s) have?*   what information did the intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the United States?6. (C) The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access. Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service.7. (S) With further respect to question three, if a foreign government fully understands the substance (i.e., the import), they will be able to exploit the information fully and the damage will be far beyond the ostensible value. A perfect example of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case. The information compromised was a seemingly innocuous operational manual for a2SECRET
[104-10336-10034.pdf — page 4]
13-00000SECRETSUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonymsatellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastatingto American intelligence. The Soviets, based on otherinformation they had acquired through signals intelligence,concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-operational was in fact operational and actively imaging theirterritory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-operational, they had taken no countermeasures (i.e.,concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove ofintelligence. Immediately upon learning the true status, theytook extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence wasdirectly and immediately lost.8. (S) With further respect to question four, we have the   quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service   believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment   of the United States; if they do not, the United States may   escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical   question that a foreign country must answer and it is the   critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in   our fold.9. (S) In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by   what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own   knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially   released document and the Los Angeles Times article. The   Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to   the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they   know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he   said; they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus   incorporated his information into our operational practices and   activities. And it would be critically damaging today to confirm   to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow   them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a   US intelligence success.10. (C) Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion,    we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the    Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did    not know was whether we had accepted his story or not. Indeed,    the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and    this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the    Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period    of time.3SECRET
[104-10336-10034.pdf — page 5]
13-00000SECRETSUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER/Cryptonym11. (S) In sum, question 4 -- *bona fides* -- is the CI key. The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including, of course, information on the public record via the media.12. (S) While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage is the most critical and legally compelling issue, there are three additional points of relevance vis-à-vis harm:*   First, is foreign relations. In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate. tensions.*   Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service. This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the *bona fides* of defectors. The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.*   And third, there is an equitable issue. The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control; the CIA has pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that it is publicly known at least to some degree. However, because his wife, child and father remain in Russia today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and consider postponement also for this reason. Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release. But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.4SECRET
[104-10336-10034.pdf — page 6]
SECRETSUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that this important information can be postponed from public release.![signature of Lee S. Strickland]Lee S. Strickland5SECRET
[104-10336-10034.pdf — page 7]
13-00000SECRET![Office of OIM Information Management logo]# CIA TALKING POINTSre Protection of "IJDECANTER" CryptonymBefore the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)26 AUGUST 1998*   The ADDO -- Jim Pavitt -- has asked that I address the Board on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of Operations and the CIA.*   We request the postponement of certain very limited information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER).*   It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the *Los Angeles Times* article of 29 December 1997, would:    *   provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter- intelligence effort,    *   result in concomitant damage to US counter- intelligence interests, and,    *   have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and prospective intelligence sources given this disclosure which could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence.*   Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose and objectives, we propose however:    *   a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g., "TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym (IJDECANTER) in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable, and/or,SECRETCL BY: 0619849 C/IRG/OIMCL Reason: 1.5(c)Decl On: X1Drv From: HUM 4-82
[104-10336-10034.pdf — page 8]
- if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the nature of a factual description of the source (e.g., "a valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for internal counter-intelligence efforts."- As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety.- The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source.- It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source.- It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source (*identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER*).- It concludes by stating that this source (*IJDECANTER*) has had his "... *bona fides* ... fully established [by CIA]."- It is this final fact which is critical.- By having released this substantive information -- *"bona fides ... established"* -- **AND** by otherwise having *IJDECANTER* known to the public in true name and crypt, **THEN WE MUST PROTECT** the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.- I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from this disclosure -- the disclosure of the crypt in this particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment.
[104-10336-10034.pdf — page 9]
SECRET• The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions:• what information was compromised?• what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information?• what understanding of the information did the receiving intelligence service(s) have?• what information did the receiving intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the other party?• The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.• Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service.• Question 3 is important (e.g., Boyce Lee case) but is not really an issue here since the US fully understood the information presented.• Question 4, however, is the quintessential factor for exploitation.• If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset (e.g., a defector), they act on the information to the detriment of the other service.
[104-10336-10034.pdf — page 10]
SECRET• If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully or to some degree.• This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold.• In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the Los Angeles Times article.• The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to the United States;• they know or suspect what he told the US;• they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said;• they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities.• And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success.• In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key.• The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document.• But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including,
[104-10336-10034.pdf — page 11]
13-00000SECRETof course, information on the public record via themedia.*   There is additional damage that will accrue from not officially protecting the identity of IJDECANTER*   Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a devastating, compounding consequence for an intelligence organization.*   It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets -- current and past -- who will logically fear that CIA will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at some future point in time.*   Their fear could be sufficient to force them to take self-protective measures (e.g., disengagement by current assets or public statements by inactive ones).*   Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA. Indeed, we know form experience that this complicates our ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly against the harder targets (e.g., terrorism).There are other damages that I will touch only briefly upon in the interests of the Board's time. They are not insignificant, however.*   ONE, is foreign relations.*   In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal.*   This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.5SECRET
[104-10336-10034.pdf — page 12]
SECRET• TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service.> This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the bona fides of defectors.> > The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.• THIRD, is an equitable issue.• The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control;• The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship;• While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to some degree -- nevertheless his wife, child and father remain in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial action the current government might take.• Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release.• But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.
[104-10336-10034.pdf — page 13]
13-00000SECRETg:\irg_frontoffice\general\lss\arrbijtp.doc(last modified at 1500 hours, 25 august 1998)7SECRET
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 0]
104-10337-100012025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992![seal of central intelligence agency]Washington D.C. 20505April 1992The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.ChairmanCommittee on Government OperationsHouse of RepresentativesWashington, D.C. 20515Dear Mr. Chairman:The Director has asked me to respond to your letter of April 6, 1992 requesting certain information regarding CIA holdings of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. We do have a significant number of records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, although many of these records were originated by the FBI or by investigating committees of the Congress. We believe that a significant portion of our records could be released if H.J. Resolution 454 were enacted into law.I should also point out that the Central Intelligence Agency is currently embarking on its own review of assassination records. I would expect that this review will result in the public release of a significant body of information.To help the committee understand the nature and number of CIA records pertaining to the assassination, I am enclosing the answers to the specific questions you raised in your letter.Sincerely,Stanley M. MoskowitzDirector of Congressional AffairsEnclosure
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 1]
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.SUBJECT: Agency Records on the JFK AssassinationOCA/LEG/DMPearline:rw 23 April 1992 (OCA 1123-92)(OCA 1123-92/1)(OCA 1123-92/2)Original - Addressee (w/enclos)1 - DCI1 - DDCI1 - ExDir1 - ER1 - D/OCA (w/enclos)1 - DMPearline Signer (w/enclos)1 - OCA/LEG Subject File (w/enclos)1 - OCA Record (w/enclos)1 - D/Center for the Study of Intelligence (w/enclos)
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 2]
# OCA 1123-921. Did the CIA retain possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations? If so, how many pages of such records does the Agency have in its possession? What is the nature of these records?Yes, the CIA retained possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). The Agency has approximately 300,000 pages of such records which include microfilm of CIA's Oswald file (originally collected in response to the Warren Commission's inquiry, then added to) as well as records collected in response to specific requests from the HSCA. Although these records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA operations against Cuba and Castro, Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the USSR, and Oswald's activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. The vast majority of documents pertaining to Oswald were created in response to specific inquiries from the Warren Commission and HSCA. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the HSCA staff, as well as materials relating to the Garrison investigation, Watergate, Cuban exile activities, and copies of FBI reports relating to Oswald. Because the HSCA was also investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., there is also some material on the Black Panthers and the civil rights movement.2. Does the CIA have records outside of those related to the HSCA that may be considered relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy? If so, please describe such records and the approximate number of pages.The CIA responded to requests from the Warren Commission and the HSCA (approximately 300,000 pages, see above). The CIA has never, however, attempted to locate every document bearing on every conceivable angle or theory relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. If the Agency were asked to explore newly advanced theories the search for documents could be a rather large undertaking involving the review of thousands of additional documents. To conduct any further search, CIA would require specific guidelines describing the kinds of records sought.3. Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originate with the FBI? If so, approximately how many?We believe that between 40 percent and 50 percent of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originated with the FBI.
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 3]
4. Did any of these records originate with any other Federal, foreign, state, or local agency? If so, please describe which agencies and the approximate numbers.A small number of CIA's records pertaining to the assassination of JFK, probably less than 5%, originated with the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Another small number of records, also less than 5%, are original HSCA records stating Committee requests to CIA.5. How many of these records have been reviewed for release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)? How many of these records have been released pursuant to such requests?CIA has released 7,432 pages of records pertaining to the assassination of JFK, representing 1,969 documents, under the FOIA. There is no documentation of how many JFK assassination records CIA has reviewed under FOIA.6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many records would be released under the standards contained in House Joint Resolution 454?It is very difficult to estimate the number of documents that would be released if the Joint Resolution passed because consideration for protection of classified information and other sensitive categories of information would be required on a document by document basis. We would review our holdings carefully to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released, consistent with the DCI's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods and with privacy interests of individuals involved.
[104-10337-10001.pdf — page 4]
UNCLASSIFIED![Central Intelligence Agency logo]CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYDCI History Staff316 Ames BuildingWashington, D.C. 20505Phone (703) 351-2621FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEETTRANSMITTED DATE: 4/21/92 PAGES TRANSMITTED 8(cover sheet included)TRANSMITTED TO:NAME: JOHN PEREIRAORGANIZATION: OGCBLDG, ROOMTELE/EXT: 76160 (FAX 874 3208)SUBJECT: OCA LETTER (W/ENCL) & INR MEMO (W/O ATT.)* CIA HS DRAFT MOU WITH STATETRANSMITTED FROM:NAME: KEN MCDONALDBLDG, ROOM: 316 AMESTELE/EXT: 30147 (FAX 522 9280)MESSAGE:John - The OCA letter (which Doved Pearline sent us yesterday) has suggested changes on it. I think I sent you an earlier draft of our proposed access memo of understanding with state, to which the Wilcox memo refers.![Signature of Ken McDonald]UNCLASSIFIED