Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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TOP SECRETJCS 1969/32112 March 1962Page 2165UNCLASSIFIEDCOPY NO. 1SPECIAL DISTRIBUTIONNOTE BY THE SECRETARIESto theJOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFonNORTHWOODS (S)A report* on the above subject is submitted for consider-ation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.F. J. BLOUINM. J. INGELIDOJoint Secretariat* Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint SecretariatEXCLUDED FROM GDSEXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATICREGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE5200.10 DOES NOT APPLYTOP SECRETJCS 1969/3212165UNCLASSIFIED
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# TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN![Department Seal]THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFWASHINGTON 25, D.C.## UNCLASSIFIEDMEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE13 March 1962Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)1.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.2.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.3.  Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:![signature of L.L. Lemnitzer]L. L. LEMNITZERChairmanJoint Chiefs of StaffSYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWEDBY JCS ON 21 May 84CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED1 EnclosureMemo for Chief of Operations, Cuba ProjectEXCLUDED FROM GDSEXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATICREGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10DOES NOT APPLY# TOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NOFORN## UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED`he 1969/93'![TOP SECRET-NOFORNSPECIAL HANDLING]JCSM-272-6210 April 1962MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSESubject: Cuba1.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban    problem must be solved in the near future. Further, they    see no prospect of early success in overthrowing the present    communist regime either as a result of internal uprisings    or external political, economic or psychological pressures.    Accordingly they believe that military intervention by the    United States will be required to overthrow the present    communist regime.2.  The United States cannot tolerate permanent existence    of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere. The    present regime in Cuba provides communism with a base of    operations for espionage, sabotage and subversion against    Latin America. The stability of some governments in Latin    America 15 already threatened by the overt and covert actions    of the Cuban government. Continued existence of this com    munist government increases the probability that one or    more other nations in Latin America will become communist    or communist dominated. This will greatly increase the    problems currently facing the United States and the Organiza-    tion of American States. While considered unlikely, it is    possible for the Sino-Soviet bloc to establish military    bases in Cuba similar to US installations around the bloc    periphery. Establishment of such bases would increase US    defense costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet    the threat.3.  Time favors the Cuban regime and the communist bloc.    They are provided with the opportunity to continue with    their subversive efforts in Latin America. Increasing    internal security measures by police state methods decrease![TOP SECRET-NOFORNSPECIAL HANDLING]![EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATICREGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10DOES NOT APPLY]EXCLUDED FROM GDSSYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWEDBY JCS ON 2 MAY 84CLASSIFICATION CONTINUEDUNCLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET GORNSPROANDLINGUNCLASSIFIEDThe possibility of internal uprisings within Cuba. The steady improvement in military defenses strengthens the resistance which must be overcome in the event of US military intervention and could lengthen the time required to secure control of the government and the island. The continuing indoctrination of the Cuban youth creates a growing nucleus for a communist underground after the elimination of the present government. This creates a problem for the future which is steadily increasing in magnitude.4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States can undertake military intervention in Cuba without risk of general war. They also believe that the intervention can be accomplished rapidly enough to minimize communist opportunities for solicitation of UN action. Forces available would assure rapid essential military control of Cuba. Continued police action would be required.5. In view of the increasing military and subversive threat to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere posed by the communist regime in Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that a national policy of early military intervention in Cuba be adopted by the United States. They also recommend that such intervention be undertaken as soon as possible and preferably before the release of National Guard and Reserve forces presently on active duty.For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:L. L. LEMNITZERChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff2TOP SECRET NSPEOHANDLINGUNCLASSIFIED
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9 March 1962UNCLASSIFIEDCOPY OF COPIESSPECIAL DISTRIBUTIONREPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ANDJOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THECARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUPto theJOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFonCUBA PROJECT (TS)The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requestedthat he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staffon this matter by 13 March 1962.EXCLUDED FROM GDSUNCLASSIFIEDTOP SECRET SPECIAL HANDLING NAFARN
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# UNCLASSIFIEDJUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)THE PROBLEM1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise description of pretexts which they consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action.3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of action proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the Quantanamo area.4. For additional facts see Enclosure B.DISCUSSION5. The suggested coursesof action appended to Enclosure A are based on the premise that US military intervention will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations forum should be favorably affected by developing the international image of the Cuban government as rash and irresponsible, and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere.6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the present time it will continue to hold good only as long as there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is[^1] Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.[^2] Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Chief of Naval Operations, subject: "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.
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UNCLASSIFIEDas yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore, since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time frame of the next few months.CONCLUSION7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However, these suggestions should be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.RECOMMENDATIONS8. It is recommended that:a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
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# ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE AUNCLASSIFIED## PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military intervention in Cuba).1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo 'to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):(1) Start rumors (many). Use olandestine radio.(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack on base.(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).7Annex to Appendix to Enolosure AUNCLASSIFIED
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(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to installations.(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Quantanamo City.(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- napthalene.(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)).b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.c. Commence large scale United States military operations.3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms:a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.8Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A
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# UNCLASSIFIEDThe terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida.(real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.5. A "Ouban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely' against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloo incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of oivil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions.. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modify- ing an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months.Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A9UNCLASSIFIED
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7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-soheduled flight.a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba. the drone will being transmitting on the inter- national distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radioAnnex to Appendixto Enclosure A10
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# UNCLASSIFIEDstations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to "sell" the incident.9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGS.b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared.c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.# UNCLASSIFIED11Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A
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TOT DEORETE STEGIAL HANDLIKNOFORNENCLOSURE BFACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEMUNCLASSIFIE1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated* that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt intervention.2. The need for positive action in the event that current covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 March 1962, as follows:" - determination that a credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United States to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for positive US military action."3. It is understood that the Department of State also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification for US military intervention in Cuba.* JCS 1969/303** JCS 1969/31312Enclosure BUNCLASSIFIED
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# JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORMCuba Selected Documents #3## AGENCY INFORMATIONAGENCY : JCSRECORD NUMBER: 202-10002-10018RECORDS SERIES: JCS CENTRAL FILE 1963AGENCY FILE NUMBER: JCS 2304/189## DOCUMENT INFORMATIONORIGINATOR : JCSFROM: J-5TO: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFFTITLE: COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA (CASE II)DATE: 05/01/63PAGES: 36SUBJECTS POLICY, CUBAREVOLT IN CUBACOVERT OPERATIONS, CUBAOPLAN 312OPLAN 316DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENTCLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIEDRESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULLCURRENT STATUS: OPENTE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/23/97OPENING CRITERIA :COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1963, Box 4. Report to Joint Chiefs and Joint Staff discussing courses of action toward Cuba.[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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TOP SECRET SENSITIVEJCS12304748(Paper revised by Sec Def)CLASSIFICATION CANCELLEDGOERSICSHORDISTRIBUTION AFOR
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COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CUBA CASE IITHE PROBLEM1. In response to a request from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide comment and recommendation concerning the requirements for and the desirability of fomenting a revolt in Cuba; giving consideration to the advantage of engineering an incident as an alternate cause for invasion.FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM2. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff by CM-437-63, dated 25 March 1963*, requested that a study be made of the requirements to plan and incite a revolt in Cuba. He stated, in part therein, "In view of past difficulties in infiltrating agents into Cuba and of obtaining reliable information out of Cuba, it will always be extremely difficult to contrive a timed uprising in proper relation to US preparations to exploit it. Hence, "consideration should be given to the advantages of engineering an incident as a cause for invasion rather than trying to generate and coordinate actions on the inside involving many Cubans of doubtful reliability."3. CINCLANT has forwarded a proposed concept** for a "Cuban revolt well conceived, timed, recruited, and supported overtly by US military forces" and a related letter*** on the use of Cuban nationals.DISCUSSION4. For discussion, see Enclosure B.* Enclosure to JCS 2304/176  ** Attachment to JCS 2304/171  *** Attachment to JCS 2304/168
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13-00000Unless the United States intervenes militarily for the 1Castro government will become more firmly entrenched as its 2efforts and ability to spread international communism will 3increase. 45. The United States should intervene militarily in Cuba 5   and could (a) engineer provocative incidents ostensibly 6   perpetrated by the Castro regime or (b) foment a revolt in 7   Cuba. 86. Engineered provocations would provide greater advantages 9   in control, timing, simplicity and security than would a 10   fomented revolt. It would be most difficult to generate a 11   widespread effective revolt. However, the staging of a local 12   uprising as a contrived incident should not be precluded. 137. The United States should: 14a. Initiate a coordinated program to create a pretext 15for overt US military intervention in Cuba 16b. In support of the above, undertake a flexibly phased 17effort to build Cuban resistance potential commencing 18with the intensification of intelligence collection and 19sabotage in Cuba, and the creation of a framework for 20guerrilla activity. 21c. At a propitious time launch appropriate military 22action to remove the Castro communist government. 238. It would appear necessary that one governmental organi- 24   zation be given the primary responsibility for developing a 25   national plan. 269. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the 27   development of this national plan. 2810. The broad concepts herein and the views of the Joint 29    Chiefs of Staff should be forwarded to the Special Group (5412 30    Committee) for consideration under the provisions of NSAM 57.* 31* Enclosure to JCS 1969/217JCS 2304/189 104(Rev.: 5/13/63)UNCLASSIFIEDTOP SECRET
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### RECOMMENDATIONS12. It is recommended that:a. The memorandum and are cause tv which beile to the above conclusions, be forventea on a Jeecial Handlingb. The memorandum 12-164105 and Enclosure 13, together with the