Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 217]
SECRETSUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling AbroadThere have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:-- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distastefull to a host government.SECRET
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SECRET- 2 -In sum, except in the case of very sensitiveareas, discreet arrangements can be arrangedfor SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations andwith senior officers within the covering Embassyprovided the SSC member does not publicly declarehimself to be on SSC business and maintains hisStation contacts on a discreet basis.Members of the SSC and their staff should notquestion Station personnel on specific operationaldetail. It is more fitting that Washington be theplace where operational details are conveyed tothe SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide-lines are best understood, where the most completeand authentic records are kept (many Stationsfinding themselves in dangerous crisis situations,have periodically destroyed their files). Thereis no reason, however, that Station Chiefs shouldnot discuss operations in general terms -- opera-tional priorities, the kinds of operations, theoperational environment, relationships with theEmbassy, the service attaches, etc.Members of the SSC and their staff should notinterview agent personnel. Foreign agentpersonnel frequently are under hostile orlocal service scrutiny. For them to be placedin touch with SSC members would be to run anunacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damagecould be done to agent morale and motivationif they were to think their role had beenrevealed to members of Congress.Members of the SSC and their staff should notin most cases be in contact with members ofhost country's intelligence or security services.Many services will find contact with the SSCpolitically difficult and will avoid it. Theyfurther regard that their relationships with CIA,the information they pass us and the sort ofcooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.SECRET
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- 3 -No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 220]
SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the SelectCommittee and Their Staffs WhileTraveling AbroadThere have been already and there will continue tobe members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) whowish to travel abroad and be in conversation with ourStations. It is important that we agree on guidelinesto avoid serious security problems from arising. Thefollowing specific guidelines are considered important:-- Members of the SSC and members of its staffshould not publicly appear to be abroad forpurposes of investigating CIA installations.CIA Stations abroad, all of which are undersome form of cover, have and need varyingdegrees of protection from exposure. Atone extreme are Stations behind the ironcurtain or in other particularly sensitiveareas which need maximum protection. Atthe other extreme are Stations which enjoyclose liaison with the host government andare thus less sensitive. In the first case,Stations existing under strict cover conditionsin sensitive environments, the very presence ofSSC members could be highly provocative byflaunting the fact of CIA's presence. Buteven in countries in which we enjoy a goodliaison with the host country's securityservice, there remains a need to be discreet.Many countries whose services want to becooperative with CIA cannot afford public orparliamentary exposure of the relationship.Local press publicity pertaining to an SSCinvestigation abroad would in almost allcases be distastefull to a host government.
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 221]
In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 222]
- 3 -No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 223]
6/18/75SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling AbroadThere have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable.I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR SOME PURPOSE OTHER THAN THE INVESTIGATION OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 224]
that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposureof such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with theUnited States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford publicexposure of such relationships. Some reason other than SSC businessshould be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff tohelp maintain the discreet nature of the visit. No deliberate contactshould be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSCmatters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by thepress. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad.would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government.In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreetarrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence:activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officerswithin the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon theSSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC businessat the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on abasis satisfactory to the Ambassador.Ⅱ. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGEOF THE VISIT..All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of hisknowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.
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### III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNELSHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards.Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government.### IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be
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to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would bedone to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to berevealed to Members or staff of the SSC.V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITYSERVICES WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSCpolitically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that theirrelationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information theypass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters.Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find itdifficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members orstaff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigationcould well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of arelationship with U.S. intelligence activities.VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGNTECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites,the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressionalrepresentatives, especially where there is public knowledge of theCongressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered
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13-000005essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host countryin advance.VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERSAND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representativesof the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), asappropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize thevisitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, therestraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case andthe considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details,names and terms in an overseas environment.Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times thatthey and their activities are matters of great interest to oppositionintelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staffmembers, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardlytravel inconspiciously and will be easily recognized.
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 228]
# SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling AbroadThere have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important:-- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distastefull to a host government.
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SECRET- 2 -In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis.Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc.Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress.Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.SECRET
[104-10400-10311.pdf — page 230]
SECRET- 3 -No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases.Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.SECRET
[104-10400-10316.pdf — page 0]
# SECRET# SECURITY FOR COMMITTEES11 March 1977MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James M. PottsChief, Africa DivisionMr. Richard S. SampsonChief, Europe DivisionMr. Alan D. WolfeChief, Near East DivisionMr. Richard F. StolzChief, Soviet/East European DivisionFROM : John D. WalkerO/SA/DO/0SUBJECT : Guidelines for Providing Informationto the House Appropriations CommitteeSurveys and Investigations StaffConcerning Foreign Intelligence andSecurity Services1. Since members of the S&I Staff will be talking with your Divisions in the near future, it may be worthwhile to review the guidelines as to what may be said concerning relationships with foreign liaison services. In the broad sense, liaison services constitute both a source and a method.2. We are prepared to discuss the following:a. The identification and responsibilities of the liaison services in a particular area to the extent that we can draw on sources other than information derived through the established liaison relationship, i.e. overt information or information from penetrations which will not endanger the source.b. In further describing the liaison services, we can provide information on the objectives, key personnel, strength, budgetE2 IMPDETCL BY 012860SECRET
[104-10400-10316.pdf — page 1]
13-00000-SECRETand methods of operations of services provided that such data will be drawn from open sources or penetrations and not from details of liaison arrangements with the services themselves.c. Agency manhours and funds devoted to liaison with the foreign services.d. In the case of SIGINT liaison, further details on such arrangements, including the scope of funds and equipment provided to such foreign services.d. We are prepared to provide general comments on the degree of operational cooperation with the Station. If technical support, for example, provides a useful input, we can state that the liaison service provides technical support, using a qualifying adjective to define, such as excellent, limited, etc.3. We have no objection to the provision of foreign intelligence reports based on liaison with such services. Source descriptions should be those used in the disseminated report.4. We will not make available details on liaison arrangements, information on sources and methods of such services which have been obtained through liaison or jointly controlled sources or other information which would reveal Agency sources and methods or violate the trust on which the official liaison relationship is based.5. The S&I Staff approves close liaison relationships and believes that these relationships are cost effective.John D. WalkerO/SA/DO/O:JDWalker:kaw (1542)DistributionOriginal1 - C/AF1 - C/EUR1 - C/NE1 - C/SE2 - SA/DO/0SECRET
[104-10400-10316.pdf — page 2]
# Guidelines for Providing Informationto Congressional Oversight Committees onForeign Intelligence and Security ServicesThese guidelines take into account the fact thatforeign intelligence and security services, when actingin connection with the Agency's official liaison withthem, constitute both a source and a method and thusrequire the statutory protection accorded any otherintelligence source or method. The guidelines alsorecognize that the duly constituted oversight bodies ofthe Congress have expressed an interest in such servicesand in the general scope, nature and extent of the Agency'srelationships with them. The purpose of these guidelinesis to provide a formula for dealing with these twosometimes conflicting objectives.The Agency is prepared to provide, upon specificrequest, appropriately classified and sanitized informationto oversight committees on the following aspects offoreign intelligence and security services:a. The identification of the governments withwhose services CIA has liaison arrangements;b. Agency man hours and funds devoted toliaison with foreign services;...c. In the case of SIGINT liaison, furtherdetails on such arrangements, including the scope of
[104-10400-10316.pdf — page 3]
funds and equipment provided to such foreign services;d. Information on the objectives, key personnel,strength, budget and methods of operation of such services,provided that such data will be drawn from open sources orpenetrations and not from the details of liaisonarrangements with the services themselves;e. Where relevant, foreign intelligence reportsbased on liaison with such services.The Agency will not make available to the oversightcommittees the details of liaison arrangements withforeign services, information on sources and methods of..such services obtained through liaison or jointlycontrolled sources, or other information which wouldreveal Agency sources or methods or violate the trust onwhich these official liaison relationships is necessarilybased.In the event of substantial allegations of improperactivities conducted by foreign intelligence or securityservices with which the Agency is presumed to maintainliaison, every effort will be made to provide all relevantfacts which bear on such allegations. Where this wouldinvolve departure from the above guidelines, the Directorwill be prepared to meet with the Chairman or Vice-Chairmanof the committee to seek a satisfactory resolution of suchproblems.
[104-10400-10316.pdf — page 4]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDMr. Colby, Mitch Rogovin and Mr. Knoche met with Chairman Otis Pike at 9:30, 7/24 in Chairman Pike's office to discuss groundrules, etc. for the House Select Committee on Intelligence.Mr. Colby left the following material with Pike:1.  16 June 1975 Letter to the Honorable Elmer B. Staats Comptroller General of the United States, Signed by Mr. Colby. The letter deals with the GAO's audit of the Central Intelligence Agency. (Attached)2.  Guide to Central Intelligence Agency Statutes and Law dated September 1970 (without the Ryan Amendment on Foreign Intelligence). (Filed in 6D0120)3.  Three Groudrules papers: (Attached)    --Agreements To Be Southt By the DCI With Chairmen of the Select Committees    --Secrecy Agreement    --Guides for Protection of Classified Information And Documents Furnished The Select Committee4.  11 March 1975 Letter from Colby to Senator Church. (Attached)Rosemarie R. Hesterberg