Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 101]
# TOP SECRETFirst, with respect to preventing the export of Communist subversion by or through Cuba, there is a summary of what we are doing now, and what we can do in the future.Second, with respect to assisting the Latin American nations to resist the impact of Communist subversion, there is a summary of our current programs and a listing of specific additional things which we can do; in other words, a treatment of the subversive question from two points of view -- therapy as regards Cuba; prophylaxis as regards Latin America at large.## Measures to Impede the Export of Communist Subversion By and Through Cuba1.  Programs Now in Motion.The following existing programs are all having some adverse effect on the basic capabilities of the Communists to organize, train, teach, equip, underwrite and export subversive strength into Latin America from Cuba:a. Reconnaissance and Surveillance activities, which unite to provide information and to represent a continuing deterrent to subversive movement.(1) Picket ship patrol of the Windward Passage.This action contributes to the restriction of illicit Cuban sea traffic to Haiti and Dominican Republic area.(2) Aircraft patrol flights out of Guantanamo.These flights, augmenting surface surveillance, keep watch for small craft, fishing and merchant shipping operating in the Caribbean south of Cuba, and waters adjacent to and north of Jamaica.# TOP SECRET
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 102]
(3) U. S. Military execution of specific counter-subversive tasks.This involves action taken in response to spactfle needs, as during the 1962 attempts to export Coban revolutionarior to Central America. These were countered, and probably aborted, by the presence of U. S. Navy destroyers patrolling the coastal areas of Costa Rica at the request of the government of that country.(4) Overflight.Although primarily designed to observe and to document changes in Cuban military capabilities, these flights serva as a reminder of U. S. vigilance and determination.(5) Communications Intelligence.All of the above are supported by and given a sense of direction from the great volume of material provided through the facilities of the Communications Intelligence system.b. Propaganda + Radio and Television.(1) The Voice of America now conducts 2-3/4 hours of short wave broadcasts to Cuba daily. These serve, in some degree, to expose to the Cuban people the subversive activities of the Castro regime.(2) Armed Forces zadio and television broadcasts from the Guantaname Naval Base seek daily to combat the spread of Communism by the orientation of their programs.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 103]
TOP SECRET(3) Et seq.. (additions on this subject should be provided by USIA).c. Intelligence Collection.(1) There is continuous intelligence collection on subversive activities, from workers employed in the Guantanamo Naval Base.(2) Et seq., (should be supplied by CIA).d. The Forum of World Opinion.(1) Elimination of Cuba from Hemisphere organizations exhibites the penalty for conducting subversive activity in her neighboring states.(2) N.S.-Soviet talks regarding removal of Soviet combat forces from Cuba are productive in that they continue the pressure on the USSR, and the Cubans, and keep the subject of subversion before the world.e. Current Political Actions Aimed at Impeding Travel into and out of Cuba.(This is to be provided by State)2. Programs Which May be Undertaken.It is clear that those activities which relate to the denial of agent movement and the suppression of propaganda serve directly to diminish the Communist capability to export subversion from Cuba. It is necessary, however, to contemplate other actions which, while less directly related to subversion, still serve to weaken Cuba and its Communist dictatorship, and thus to eliminate the problem at its source. It is for this reason that there is presented herein a spectrum of actions related directly to Cuba.While it is clear that some actions listed may exceed the horizons of feasibility, in terms of scope, vigor, or the requirements of international relations, it is nevertheless considered necessary that they be set forth in
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 104]
their entirety, in order thatoptions.a. Extend Surveillance of Cuba and the Caribbean.(1) Intensively monitor, observe and report air and sea transportation -- both scheduled and non-scheduled.Communist -- in the Caribbean area contiguous tomulti-national politico-military program providingcooperative Latin American state of suspectedits territorial waters.(2) Exploit fully the intelligence opportunities of system passing through Havana, while reviewing of interrupting the system for security reasons.b. Intensify Psychological Actions.(1) Create problems for the Castro programs by an intensified psychological effort and airborne TV emphasizing the hardships of by the Campesinos while subversive trainees are.(2) Publicize the contrast between Instructors and those of the Cuban peasants.(3) Increase greatly the amount to Cuba, and intensify emphasis on the defection on the Cuban people by the Castro subversive.(4) Conduct airborne televisión to people and Latin American students in Cuba.Castro-subversive efforts are designed Hemisphere.
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c. Intensify Physical Intelligence Gathering Efforts.(1) By non-attributable means -- Cubans and third countryto acquire much more hard intelligence on the natureand scope of subversive training conducted in Cuba and methods of exportation.d. Movement of Personnel.Through multilateral and bilateral political arrangements withLatin American states, seek to impede the movement of persons into andout of Cuba. (This is to be expanded by State).e. Diminish the Physical and Economic Capability of Castro Cubato Train and Export Subversives.It is evident that ready funds, in considerable quantity, arerequired to conduct a subversive training program, not to speak of othercostly factors -- arms, demolitions, fuel, food, propaganda, etc. Specificactions aimed at reducing the Cuban's resources will thus have a directeffect upon their ability to pursue their program of subversion, will causethem to turn to their own internal problems and will give the Russians pauseas to the wisdom of pursuing a program which is costly and marginallyproductive. Likewise, every action which contributes to instability, unrest,apprehension and dissension between Russian and Cuban will reducecorrespondingly both their ability and their opportunity to drive forward ona program of subversive training and exportation. The following actionswill contribute to this end:![TOP SECRET]
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 106]
(1) Attrit Cuban resources(a) Purchase the defection of personnel, aircraft, ships, boats and other valuable items.(b) Conduct non-attributable actions against petroleum resources, upon which much of Cuba's economy depends. Those actions should extend all the way from direct destruction to sabotage through chemical and bacteriological contamination of carriers and storage.(c) By means of intelligence indications (aircraft flights, agents, clear radio transmission, beach jumpers) cause Cuban military forces to stand continually at high alert level and thus to consume supplies which could otherwise be dedicated to subversive training.(2) Diminish Cuban financial resources.(a) Consider introduction of counterfeit currency in large quantities, to distort the Cuban financial posture, and to undermine confidence.(3) Create suspicion and dissension between Cubans and Russians.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 107]
# TOP SECRET1. Programs now in beingsIn appraising the programs which are now in progress it is necessary to reflect that, although they are, many have not yet accelerated to their full thrust and, taken all together, they have certainly not fortified our allies to the point where subversion can be said to be under full control.a. US Military Afforts.United States miliary forces are now participating in a broad spectrum of military and non-military functions in Latin America, all of which contribute to strengthening the ability of the countries to expose and put down subversive activity. Of these, the principal ares:(1) Counterinsurgency, anti-subversion and phychological operations training through the medium of military missions and mobile training teams.(2) Provision of equipment and material on short notice for use in the face of subversion or subversive threats.(3) The conduct of emergency training programs in mob and riot control.(4) Provision of formal counterinsurgency education for Latin American officers and enlisted men in United States Service schools and academies.(5) Provision of civi e action training and assistance.(6) Ancillary military efforts aimed at strengthening the ability of Latin American countries to resist subversions(a) United States provision of maintenance support and assistance for Latin American naval and air units.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 108]
(b) Officer exchange programs.(c) Language training for Latin American military students.(d) International Army. Navy and Air Force Defense Conferences.(e) Coopérative mapping opent tone.(7) Troop information:The United States military is embarked on a program aimed at ma the Latin American military aware of the realities of Communism and Communist subversion. This includes:(a) Translation into Spanish and printing of 50, 000 sets of the series of ten pamphlets entitled, "Democracy versus Communism."(b) Development of an audio/visual film strip based on the "Democracy versus Communism pamphlets for the illiterate Latin American enlisted men. One Hundred and sighty of these films and records have been sent to CINCARIB for further distribution to the Latin American services.(c) Thirteen-hundred copies of the USIA pamphlet "Tactices y Directivas Contra La Farsa Communistat are being procured for distribution among the Latin American military.b. The Politico-Economic Effort (to be supplied by State).c. The Propaganda Effort (to be supplied by USIA).d. The Intelligence and Non-attributable Efforts (to be supplied by CLA).2. Programs Which May Be Initiated:As in the case of Section II, the programs outlined below are within reasonable technical and practients Repcs. However, as they cross the
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 109]
complete spectrum of actions, it is realized that some may be found unsuitable, on political or other grounds:## a. Surveillance(1) Establish a Caribbean sea and coastal surveillance program which provides for multilateral exchange of information and multilateral participation in an alerting system; each country to be responsible for patrolling its own coast.(2) Require a US intelligence input into the Caribbean alerting system and provide selective exchange of intelligence between subscriber nations.(3) Continue the improvement of US communications in Latin America, at high priority, to contribute to the effectiveness of the alerting system.## b. Multinational Counterinsurgency Force.Explore the feasibility of organizing an OAS Counterinsurgency Brigade for deployment throughout Latin America to combat the effects of subversion. Such a proposal, made at this time, would exhibit the serious determination of the U. S. to support vigorously an anti-subversion program.## c. Training and Orientation.Provide for a greatly expanded out-of-country training and orientation program for key segments of each Latin American country's population such as:
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 110]
(1) Enlisted and officer military personnel to be schooled in Panama and/or the United States.(2) Police personnel to be schooled in Panama or the United States.(3) Newspaper personnal to be schooled within the United States.(4) Nurses (male and female) to be trained in the United States.(8) Civilian technicians to be trained in United States training schools.The thrust of such an expanded training program, taking placein the United States, is not just to enhance the chill and education level of the people involved but, even more, to expose the Latins to US influence, to show them our country, to persuade them by close association that our view is correct, and thus to stiffen their resalve to combat subversion in any form.d. Troop Information ProgramExpand greatly the current Latin American troop information program in order to educate the Latin American servicement (and their civilian contemporaries) to the subversive dauger they face.e. News and Propaganda(1) Underwrite, as necessary, and conduct an information program within each country in Latin America using these themess:(a) An exposition of facts on subversive training, movement of subversives and general subversive programs.(b) Objectives of the Communists within onak cs(c) Communist methods of operation
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# SECRET(d) Facts on the decrease in living standards within Cuba since the rise of Castro.(a) Facts on terror and repression in Cuba.## (2) Develop a Pro-American Anti-Communist PressMany Latin American papers, even the anti-communist ones, are infiltrated by communist agents and many of their columnists, proof-readers and linotypers are bought with communist money. Circulation of these papers is artificially inflated by low prices and underwritten by communist funds. The United States must match this financial investment in news control in order to convey the truth to the Latin who, like the American believes what he reads.## (3) Distribute Anti-Communist LiteratureBooks and pamphlets, in large numbers, exposing the reality of communism should be printed in Spanish and Portuguese and distributed through inexpensive commercial sale.f. Travel Controls (to be furnished by State).g. Improve Our Counterinsurgency ProgramsWe should accelerate and broaden counterinsurgency programs in each country of Latin America, driving for a realistic "Internal Defense Plan" for every country and urging Latin American countries to ask for US counter-Insurgency training assistance, for military, paramilitary and police forces. Beyond this we should place specific emphasis upon developing civic action programs in the areas of greatest need.TOP SECRET
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J. Non-attributable actions(1) Instigate and stage selected terrorist incidents in LatinAmerican countries, designed to implicate Castro.(2) Arrange for caches of Soviet-Czech arms to be "discovered"in selected Latin American countries, ostensibly smuggled in from Cuba.IV. Conclusion.It is the belief of the Committee that the actions outlined in thepreceding sections comprise a series of steps which in some areas will stemand in others attack the program of Cuba-based Communist subversion in LatinAmerica. Each individual action embodies some element of usefulness initself, and any combination of actions may generate correspondingly favorableresults. There is no profound relationship which demands the combining ofany specific set of actions.It is recommended, therefore, that an early selection be made of thoseactions listed above whose execution is compatible with national obligationsand dedications in other areas and which are within U. S. capabilities, andthat they be put quickly into effect since the longer the subversive influencesin the Hemisphere are permitted to mature, the more difficult will be theirultimate elimination.And finally, recognizing the diverse nature of the Cold War activitiesinvolved, it is strongly recommended that a single point in the Governmentbe designated and assigned responsibility for supervising execution of thetotal program.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 113]
While we generally concur with the paper prepared by the Department of State, we do not believe that the proposals contained therein present a sufficiently wide spectrum of options or activities to impede and stop Castro/Communist subversion in Latin America. Specifically, we recommend the following additional actions:(1) Measures to attrit Cuban resources:(a) Purchase the defection of personnel, aircraft, ships, boats and other valuable items.(b) Conduct non-attributable actions against petroleum resources, upon which much of Cuba's economy depends. These actions should extend all the way from direct destruction to sabotage through chemical and bacterial contamination of carriers and storage.(c) By means of intelligence indications (aircraft flights, agents, clear radio transmission, beach jumpers) cause Cuban military forces to stand continually at high alert level and thus to consume supplies which could otherwise be dedicated to subversive training.(d) Consider introduction of counterfeit currency in large quantities, to distort the Cuban financial posture, and to undermine confidence.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 114]
(2) The designation of a single point in the Govern-ment to be held responsible for supervising the execution of the totalprogram.(3) An intensified and broadened news and propagandaprogram, including the following:(a) Underwrite, as necessary, and conductan information program within each country in Latin America usingthese themes:1. An exposition of acts on subversive   training, movement of subversives and general subversive programs.2. Objectives of the Communists within   each country.3. Communist methods of operation.4. Facts on the decrease in living standards   within Cuba since the rise of Castro.5. Facts on terror and repression in Cuba.(b) Develop a Pro-American Anti-Communist PressMany Latin American papers, even the anti-communist ones, are infiltrated by communist agents and many of theircolumnists, proof-readers and linotypers are bought with communistmoney. Circulation of these papers is artificially inflated by low pricesand underwritten by communist funds. The United States must matchthis financial investment in news control in order to convey the truth
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 115]
TOP SECRETto the Latin who, like the American, believes what he reads:(c) Distribute Anti-Communist LiteratureBooks and pamphlets, in large numbers,exposing the reality of communism should be printed in Spanish andPortuguese and distributed through inexpensive commercial sale.(4) Greatly expanded training and orientation in theUnited States for key segments of each Latin American country'spopulation, such as:(a) Enlisted as well as officer military personnelto be schooled in Panama and/or the United States.(b) Police personnel to be schooled in Panamaor in the United States.(c) Newspaper personnel to be schooled withinthe United States.(d) Nurses (male and female) to be trained in theUnited States.(e) Civilian technicians to be trained in UnitedStates training schools.The thrust of such an expanded training program,taking place in the United States, is not just to enhance the skill andeducation level of the people involved but, even more, to expose theLatins to US influence, to show them our country, to persuade them byTOP SECRET
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 116]
TOP SECRETclose association that our view is correct, and thus to stiffen their resolve to combat subversion in any form.TOP SECRET
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 117]
# AN ACTION PROGRAMCOMBATTING COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA1. IntroductionWhile there is not total agreement on the magnitude of the Communist effort to export subversion to Latin America, from and through Cuba, there is agreement, at the least, that the program embodies grave potential hazards for the tranqutiity of the Hemisphere. Beyond this, there is also general acknowledgement that the subversion problem is not a new one, that the Communist bridgeheads in Montevideo and Mexios Olty have been sources of infection to mich of Latin America for two decades or more. Finally, there is evidence that the U.S. appreciates these realities, as exhibited in the depth of on-going U.8, programs in all of Latin America, aimed at blunting the Communist subversive thrusts into the continent.The question created by the President's underscoring of the problem is whether or not our efforts in this area are adequate as to Boope, as to coordination, and as to intensity. It is the view of this Committee that they are not. Further, it is the view of the Committee that steps aimed solely at impeding the flow of students and subversivep to and from Cuba will not, of themselves, greatly abate the problem. There must be companion efforts designed both to degrade the basic capability for Cuban-based subversion, as well as efforts to develop a more effective resistance capacity among the Latin American states. The sections to follow are designed with these two requirements in mind.First, with respect to preventing the export of Commu- nist subversion by or through Guba, there is a summary of what we are doing now, and what we can do in the future.
[104-10333-10014.pdf — page 118]
13-00000Second, with respect to assisting the Latin Americannations to resist the impact of Communist subversion, thereis a summary of our current programs and a listing ofspecific additional things which we can do; in other words,a treatment of the subversive question from two points ofview - therapy as regards Cuba; prophylaxis as regards LatinAmerica at large.II. Measures to Impede the Export of Communist SubversionBy and Through Cuba1. Programs Now in Motion.The following existing programs are all having someadverse effect on the basic capabilities of the Communiststo organize, train, teach, equip, underwrite and expertsubversive strength into Latin America from Cuba:a. Reconnaissance and Surveillance activities, whichunite to provide information and to represent a continuingdeterrent to subversive movement:(1) Picket ship patral of the Windward Passage.This action contributes to the restrictionof illicit Cuban sea traffic to Haiti and DominicanRepublic area.(2) Aircraft patrol flights out of Guantanamo.These flights, augmenting surface surveillance,keep watch for small craft, fishing and merchantshipping operating in the Caribbean south of Cuba,and waters adjacent to and north of Jamaica.(3) U.S, Military execution of specific counter-subversive tasks.
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This involves action taken in response to specific needs, as during the 1962 attempts to export Cuban revolutionaries to Central America. These were countered, and probably aborted, by the presence of U.S. Navy destroyers patrolling the coastal areas of Costa Rica at the request of the government of that country.(4) Overflight.Although primarily designed to observe and to document changes in Cuban military capabilities these flights serve as a reminder of U.S. vigilance and determination.(5) Communications Intelligence.All of the above are supported by and given a sense of direction from the great volume of material provided through the facilities of the Commmications Intelligence system.b. Propaganda - Radio and Television.(1) The Voice of America now conducts 2-3/4 hours of short-wave broadcasts to Cuba daily. These serve, in some degree, to expose to the Cuban people the subversive activities of the Castro regime.(2) Armed Forces radio and television broadcasts From the Guantanamo Naval Base seek daily to combat the spread of Communism by the orientation of their programs.(3) Et seq., (additions on this subject should be provided by USIS).c. Intelligence Collection.(1) There is continuous intelligence collection on subversive activities, from workers employed in the Guantanamo Naval Base.(2) Et seq., (should be supplied by CIA.)3