Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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SECRETChecklist for DCI Discussion with HSC1. Your intent to be cooperative and forthcoming.2. Your responsibility to protect S&M. Will need HSC understanding of particularly sensitive matters:--names of agents and sources..--names of cooperating American organizations and contacts to whom we have pledged confidentiality.--material from foreign liaison,--sensitive intelligence methods and techniques of collection.3. Will need to work out security groundrules.--Chairman of USIB Security Committee and CIA Director of Security available to help work out custodial arrangements, compartmented clearances, etc.4. Importance of secrecy agreements. Your willingness to suspend them to permit testimony by current and ex-employees.5. Will confirm with a letter and an employee bulletin which can be used by HSC in dealing with Agency witnesses and interviews.24 July 1975SECRET
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# AGREEMENTS TO BE SOUGHT BY THE DCI WITH## CHAIRMEN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEES1. It would be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees, as has been customary in other Congressional proceedings regarding sensitive matters, that:(a) Departments and agencies shall have the right to request that testimony be given only in executive session, that in some instances testimony be "off-the-record" and that certain testimony be heard only by members and in some cases only by the Chairman and Vice Chairman.(b) Witnesses be afforded an opportunity to review and comment on and/or correct the record of their testimony prior to any publication of it.(c) When questioned about intelligence matters that come under the purview of another organization, witnesses should be permitted to state that a response to the question is not properly within their authority and to respectfully suggest that the appropriate party be called to testify on such matters.2. It would also be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that those agencies furnishing documents to the committees be authorized to excise from those documents, prior to presentation, the names of their personnel under cover or whose personal safety might be jeopardized as well as those of other individuals whose safety or individual privacy, may be jeopardized by disclosure. Also excised should be names of sources, operations. specific details of technical devices and systems maintained in compartmented channels and names of organizations cooperating on a highly confidential basis.3. In view of their susceptibility to foreign countermeasures, it would be desirable if the DCI could obtain agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees not to require presentation of details
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13-00000,of the technology of the technical collection programs. It would also be desirable if the Select Committees adopted the use of Compart-mented Control Systems to protect documents on these programs and cleared only those staff personnel with an absolute need-to-know. The responsible departments and agencies would be glad to advise and assist in any arrangements the Chairmen would desire in this compartmented area.4. Further, it would be desirable if the DCI attempt to secure an agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that they will entertain and consider security principles and guide-lines which will be provided.
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# SECRECY AGREEMENTI,in accepting employment or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, recognize the special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure.I hereby agree to accept the specific obligations set forth below as a condition precedent of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January 27, 1975, hereinafter referred to as the Select Committee.It is my understanding that in the course of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee I will be given access to information from departments and agencies of the Government which is classified in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended. All classified information so acquired by me in the course of my employment remains the property of the United States of America and I further agree to surrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee or his designee(s) or upon my separation from the Select Committee, any classified material which has come into my possession as a result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee.I hereby agree that the burden is on me to determine if information is classified and that I will never divulge, publish or reveal by word, writing, conduct or otherwise any classified information which has come to my knowledge as a result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee without prior written consent of the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative.
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I hereby agree that any information learned during my employment or assignment with the Select Committee which is related to intelligence and prepared for publication by me will be submitted to the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative prior to discussing with or showing to any publisher, editor or literary agent for the purpose of determining whether said material contains any classified information as defined in Executive Order 11652. I agree that the Chairman of the Select Committee, President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative has the authority to make the final determination as to whether information is classified and thus should be deleted from the material submitted.I have been informed of the provisions of 18 U.S. C. 793, 794, 798 and 952; and 50 U:S.C. 783 (b); and 42 U.S.C. 2274; and Executive Order 11652, all of which relate to the protection of classified information, and understand their meaning.Further, I agree to abide by such rules and procedures as the Select Committee shall institute for the protection of classified material. I understand that any breach of any part of the obligations in this agreement could subject me to legal and/or administrative action.I further agree that all the conditions and obligations imposed on me with respect to the protection of classified information by this agreement and applicable security regulations apply during my employment or assignment and continue after that relationship has terminated.I take the obligations set forth above freely and without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion.SignatureDateWITNESS:SignatureDate
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# GUIDES FOR PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS FURNISHED THE SELECT COMMITTEES1. Personnel Security Clearances(a) Background InvestigationIt would be desirable for the Select Committees to stipulate that no staff personnel is to be given access to any classified material, testimony or information received or generated by the committees without prior receipt of a security clearance based on a full field investigation.(b) Secrecy AgreementIt would be desirable for the Select Committees to require a signed secrecy agreement of employees or individuals assigned to the committees' staffs. The agreement should include provisions:1) That acceptance of committee secrecy regulations is a condition precedent of employment or assignment;2) Recognizing US Government property rights to classified information;3) Requiring prior written consent before divulgence of classified information;4) For recognition that breach of the secrecy rules and obligations contained in the agreement could subject the signer to administrative and/or legal action under appropriate statutes;5) That there is no time limit on the terms of the agreement.
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2. Physical and Document SecurityThe Select Committees should adopt rules to insure that the secrecy of any sensitive information received or generated by it be preserved. These rules should be made known to the individuals and agencies who will be called upon to present testimony or materials. Among these should be rules on physical security and document security.(a) Physical SecurityIt would be desirable if the Select Committees adopt the following rules related to physical security:1) All classified material will be stored in safes for safekeeping in the registry of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or similar facility and handled in accordance with the regulations of this registry for classified material.2) Twenty-four-hour guard protection, supplemented by anti-intrusion alarms, should be required on the storage area.3) Areas selected for use in closed session should be guarded against entry by unauthorized persons.4) The committees should arrange for the conduct of audio countermeasures to preclude the possibility of unauthorized use of transmitters and/or recording devices. It should be noted that a foreign clandestine transmitter was located in the Rayburn House Office Building on 12 February 1973.5) At the end of each session of the Select Committees, the hearing room should be examined by a cleared staff officer who will secure any misplaced classified material or waste.
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6) Areas should be designated in which classified material can be reviewed. These arcas should be secure against access by unauthorized personnel. Material should not be removed from these areas for the sake of convenience except when necessary for the work of the committees and should not be transported overnight to the office or residence of personnel of the committees.(b) Document Security1) Committees should select and identify a single location and specific personnel authorized to sign acknowledgement of receipt of classified materials provided to the committees.2) A system of document control should be established to permit control of classified documents to provide for accountability.3) Duplication of documents should be controlled so as to require a record of the document reproduced, the number of copies reproduced and the custodian or receiving personnel. Reproduced classified documents should be subject to the same controls as the original.4) Appropriate arrangements should be made for the destruction of classified waste.5) Transcripts. The committees should give consideration to the necessity of providing appropriate security in the transcription of testimony by committee transcribers. The committees may desire to charge each agency presenting testimony with this responsibility. In some, if not all cases, this might include escort of materials to the place of transcription, the securing of carbons, waste and notes and the return of the transcribed testimony to the committee for safekeeping in accordance with cominittce rules.
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6) Early agreement should be reached on the disposition of classified materials such as storage under seal in the National Archives. The question of access should be determined by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House.3. Compartmented InformationThere is some extremely sensitive information in the intelligence community which is disseminated only to those who have a very strict "need to know" in order to build, perfect, operate or handle the material produced by extremely sensitive foreign-intelligence collection programs.. The sensitivity of these programs rests upon the vulnerability to countermeasures which a foreign government could easily institute if.details of the means of collection became known. Thus, even individuals cleared for Top Secret information do not have access to compartmented information unless they are required to have such knowledge in the performance of their duties. This information is handled in Compartmented Control Systems. It would be desirable if the Chairmen would adopt the Compartmented Control Systems on these extremely sensitive collection efforts and clear only those staff personnel with an absolute "need to know" about such systems, and that documents related to such systems be handled in a compartmented fashion by the Select Committee. The responsible departments and agencies would be glad to advise and assist in any arrangements the Chairmen would desire in this compartmented area.4. Security OfficerIt would be desirable if the committees appointed a security officer with the responsibility of discharging the security rules adopted by the committee and of serving as a point of contact with the departments and agencies of interest to the committee. It would also be desirable if the committee rules required each agency of interest to identify a single point of contact to facilitate provisions of security support required by the committee.
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# ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENMASHINGTON, D.C. 20505Executive Registry75-2289/A16 JUN 1975Honorable Elmer B. StaatsComptroller General of the United StatesGeneral Accounting Office441 G StreetWashington, D. C. 20548Dear Mr. Staats:My attention has been directed to a letter from Mr. Keller, General Accounting Office, to the Honorable William Proxmire dated May 10, 1974, which was placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Proxmire on February 11, 1975. The letter deals with the intelligence community and reviews the General Accounting Office's right to audit and obtain information from the Central Intelligence Agency.Inasmuch as Mr. Keller has treated a subject basic to this Agency's capability to carry out work mandated by Congress, I believe it would serve a useful purpose to review some of the background concerning the use of confidential funds and their relationship to the audit of CIA over the years.Mr. Keller notes in his letter that there are "a fairly substantial number of instances where expenditures are accounted for solely upon a certification by the head of the department or establishment involved." The need is clear in the case of this Agency. The necessity to safeguard certain truly vital foreign intelligence secrets has been recognized by the Congress in its direction to the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. This responsibility was complemented by authorizing certain expenditures "for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature," to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director of Central Intelligence. Such expenditures would apply, for example, to a secret agent operating abroad in a hostile climate whose identity must be protected not only so that he can continue supplying the intelligence involved, but also because his freedom--and on occasion his life--weighs in the balance.Other intelligence activities do not have such obvious security requirements, but are, nonetheless, within the sources and methods concept. Liaison with foreign intelligence and security agencies is extremely important in fields of both positive intelligence and counterintelligence. Such liaisons to be effective depend on the confidence of each service that the other will protect not only the mere fact of the relationships, but also its sources and methods and sensitive information. Compromise of any of these brings not only protests from the foreign liaison service, but in some cases a lessening or even cessation of its cooperation.
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Even overt activities have their own security problems. Thus, many U. S. citizens and others are willing to provide sensitive information to overt intelligence units only on condition that their cooperation in this respect be absolutely protected.This need for the special protection of intelligence sources and methods has been well recognized by officials in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of our Government. Mr. Lindsay C. Warren, then Comptroller General of the United States, in a letter dated March 12, 1948, to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, addressed the provision granting the Director of Central Intelligence the power to certify the expenditure of confidential funds by stating that while it provided "for the granting of much wider authority than I would ordinarily recommend for Government agencies, generally, the purposes sought to be obtained in the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency are believed to be of such paramount importance as to justify the extraordinary measures proposed therein." He went on to say that the "necessity for secrecy in such matters is apparent and the Congress apparently recognized this fully in that it provided in section 102 (d) (3) of Public Law 253, that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Under these conditions, he stated, "I do not feel called upon to object to the proposals advanced...."It has been and it remains the policy of CIA to rely upon vouchered funds wherever possible. (Vouchered funds are those which can be accounted for and audited in conformance with the laws that apply to other Government agencies and with standard Government regulations and procedures.) Currently more than half of the Agency's appropriations are disbursed as vouchered funds. The confidential funds certification authority referred to by Mr. Warren in his March 12, 1948 letter is reserved for "objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature."From the beginning of CIA records for all vouchered fund expenditures were made available to and were subject to a voucher audit by the GAO. Use of the voucher audit procedure allowed the GAO to examine expenditure and collection vouchers and related documents to determine whether expenditures were made legally and solely for the objects for which appropriations were made. Use of the voucher audit procedure also allowed CIA to protect those activities of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, i.e., intelligence sources and methods.Subsequent to the enactment of the CIA legislation, GAO adopted a "comprehensive audit approach," and raised with the CIA Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee the desirability of an expanded audit of Agency activities. The Comptroller General stated by letter dated May 29, 1959 to Subcommittee Chairman Kilday that he did "not recommend any change in section 10 (now section 8) of the Central Intelligence Act" and that "any broadening of our audit activities should not include an evaluation of the intelligence activities of the Agency."
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Mr. Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence agreed that GAO should expand its current audit activities in a letter to the Comptroller dated October 16, 1959, cautioning, however, that the comprehensive audit would have to be limited so as to remain outside the area of sensitive security operations for which by law the Director's certificate must be deemed a sufficient voucher.The results of the trial period of comprehensive audit from 1959 to 1961 were made known to the CIA Subcommittee in a letter of May 16, 1961 from the Comptroller General in which he said the GAO planned to discontinue the audit of CIA activities. He acknowledged that various steps were taken by the CIA "to place the General Accounting Office in a position to make a comprehensive audit of the overt activities of CIA." Nevertheless, he stated that GAO "cannot effectively review and evaluate activities of the Support Component because the confidential and overt activities of this component are integrated to such an extent that we cannot make reasonably comprehensive audits." He further stated "we have been given sufficient access to make reasonably comprehensive reviews of the overt activities of the Intelligence Component, but such reviews, in our opinion, will not be productive of significant evaluations because we cannot feasibly evaluate the extent to which needed overt information is available for collection or determine the need for the intelligence information selected for collation and use in the production of intelligence reports." In short, the Comptroller General was recognizing the conflict between the philosophy underlying a "comprehensive audit approach" and the Director's statutory responsibility and authority to protect intelligence sources and methods.Both the Director and Chairman Vinson, of the House Committee on Armed Services, requested that the Comptroller General continue to audit Agency affairs on a limited basis, but after another trial period the Comptroller General reiterated his earlier view. In a letter to Chairman Vinson dated June 21, 1962, the Comptroller General stated his belief that for maximum effectiveness "it would be necessary for our GAO audit staff to have nearly complete access to CIA activities," and that even to perform reasonably comprehensive reviews would require "complete access to the administrative activities that are performed in support of both sensitive and nonsensitive operations of CIA."Chairman Vinson replied to the Comptroller General on July 18, 1962, stating that, "the restrictions you met within the Central Intelligence Agency are necessary, I believe, for the proper protection of its intelligence activities and should be maintained." The Chairman agreed, however, that in view of the Comptroller General's opinion that a continued audit was not a worthwhile effort, GAO might withdraw from further audit activities in the Central Intelligence Agency.In summary, I believe that several points are deserving of emphasis in assessing the nature and history of GAO's audit activities with respect to this Agency:
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(a) CIA coopered fully in all respects in extending administrative support and in granting security clearances and access to information related to vouchered fund activities...(b) The Chairman of the interested oversight committce in the House of Representatives was fully informed of the nature and status of the activity.(c) This Agency encouraged GAO to conduct and to continue to conduct its activities consistent with the operational and statutory requirements imposed upon this Agency.(d) The decision to discontinue the audit activities was made solely by GAO and was approved by the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.Sincerely,W. E. ColbyDirectorDistribution:Orig - Addressee1- DCI1- DDCI1-ER1- OGC1- DDA1- Compt1- OF1- OS1- OLC Subject (GAO)...w/basic:1- OLC Proxmire file1-OLC ChronoOLC: WPY: cg (13 Jun 75)