Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10425-10008.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992MEMORANDUM FOR: General CounselSUBJECT: Declassification of Warren Commission Documents1. In accordance with existing arrangements, we have been asked by the National Archives to review four Warren Commission documents for possible declassification. One of the documents is classified in its entirety, whereas only certain segments of the others remain in classified status. Copies of the affected materials are attached.2. We see no reason to continue the restriction on document B. Similarly, document A would normally require no further withholding from the public domain, but we checked with Mr. David Murphy, an Agency official under (Department of State cover) and he requested that his true affiliation not be revealed at this time. He is still under cover and uncoordinated revelation of his true status could become an embarrassment to the (Department)3. Documents C and D would go beyond what we want to release now about our dealings with defectors and the determination of their legitimacy.4. A suggested reply to National Archives is attached. We recommend your signature.Raymond G. RoccaDeputy ChiefCounter Intelligence OperationsAttachmentsDistribution: E2 IMPDETOrig & 1 - Addressee CL BY 0065931 - DC/CIOPS/Chrono√1 - Warren Commission File1 - CIRA/RS/ChronoSECRET
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13-00000MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Marion JohnsonNational ArchivesSUBJECT : Mandatory Review of Four WarrenCommission Documents1. Pursuant to your request we have reviewed the attached four documents in order to determine whether the classifications ascribed to them need to be retained. Our conclusions are detailed below.2. Top Secret Document, Subject: Conference with the CIA on March 12, 1964 (List No. 1, Item 19).   There are only two segments of this document which have continued to be classified at our request, specifically the name of one person in paragraph one and the entire second paragraph. We should now like to remove all restrictions concerning paragraph two, but we want to continue to withhold the person's name in paragraph one.3. Top Secret Document, dated 24 June 1964,   Subject: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko (List No. 1, Item 27)   We have no objection to the declassification of this document in its entirety.
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4. Top Secret Document, Pages 63-73 from   Transcript of the Executive Session of the President's   Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy,   January 21, 1964 (List No. 2A, Item 1)We wish to continue the classificationof this segment of the transcript.5. Top Secret Document Entitled Report of   Proceedings Held at Washington, D.C., June 23, 1964   (List 2A, Item 18)We wish to continue the classificationof this document.
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13-00000ATTACHMENTS
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992# SECRETALN-72-7711 March 1977MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Miami Field OfficeFROM : Chief, Domestic Collection Division,Operations Services Group, Alien BranchSUBJECT : Case 578451. Please show the attached photographs of an unidentified man to Subject. A photograph of this man was published in the Warren Commission report on the assassination of President Kennedy. Copies have also been widely distributed in news media by journalists critical of the Warren Commission investigation. The unidentified man visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City during October 1963. As of October 1963, he was described as approximately 35, athletic build, about 6 feet tall, blond receding hairline with balding top, and wore khakis and sport shirt.2. We would appreciate any information Subject is able to provide on this man.3. Should you obtain any OIR reports, please use referent CPLA-006877.![Signature of JACKSON R. HORTON]Attachments:As stated![initials FJNiemiec/ltg]E 2 IMPDET CL BY 006875SECRET
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13-00000Source - (Ramiro Perez Rodriguez) 05JC 2019UPW
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13-00000CONFIDENTIAL 181608Z MAR 77 STAFFCITE DCD/MIAMI 13919TO: DCD/HEADQUARTERS.WNINTEL/WOMACE INTERNAL USE ONLYMIAMI OIR-06870-77SUBJECT: UNIDENTIFIED KGB OFFICERREF: DCD CASE 57845CPLA-0068771. ON 17 MARCH 1977, A FORMER MEMBER OF THE CUBAN GENERAL   DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE (DGI) WAS REQUESTED TO IDENTIFY AND   PROVIDE INFORMATION ON AN UNIDENTIFIED MAN. THE FORMER DGI MEMBER   IDENTIFIED THE MAN AS YURI (LNU), A KGB OFFICER, WHOM HE MET IN   MOSCOW IN 1964 WHILE ATTENDING AN INTELLIGENCE COURSE IN THAT   CITY, HE SAID THAI YURI, A FLUENT ENGLISH AND SPANISH SPEAKER   WAS ACTING AS A TROUBLESHOOTER FOR THE CUBAN GROUP, ABOUT 15,   ATTENDING THE COURSE.2. THE FORMER DGI MEMBER SAID THAT THE CUBAN GROUP, ALONG WITH   THE BULGARIANS, WERE QUARTERED IN THE SAME BUILDING IN MOSCOW AND   THAT YURI LIVED WITH THEM. ANYTIME THAT THE CUBANS HAD A PROBLEM   YURI WOULD SOLVE IT FOR THEM. HE ALSO SAID THAT YURI WAS A GOOD   FRIEND OF JUAN (PSEUDO), A KGB OFFICER WHO TAUGHT THE CUBANS ABOUT   THE AGENCY AND THE WEST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE APPARATUS. JUAN TOLD   THE FORMER DGI MEMBER ONE DAY THAT HE HAD SERVED IN MEXICO FOR   ABOUT 20 YEARS AND IN THE US CLANDESTINELY FOR ABOUT 10 YEARS. AT   THE TIME JUAN WAS ABOUT 55 YEARS OLD. YURI DID NOT ATTEND CLASSES   WITH THE CUBAN GROUP. HE WAS ONLY ENTRUSTED WITH THEIR WELFARE.E2 IMPDET CL BY 011668CONFIDENTIAL
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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRET/SENSITIVEhand carried to Pecy's office 1 Feb 1531 January 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of DefenseJames R. SchlesingerSUBJECT : Analysis of Soviet Policy towards the United Statesby an ex-Member of the KGB1. Several weeks ago I talked to Bill Nelson, DDO,*   regarding a more thoughtful use of our Soviet KGB Source's knowl-   edge of fundamental Soviet Bloc policy. The information relates   to the clandestine programs of the KGB sponsored by the   Central Committee in its reorientation in May of 1959 against the   United States as the "main enemy." My suggestion was to submit a   number of your speeches and solicit Source's critique as seen   through the eyes of an ex-KGB officer. Mr. Nelson stated that he   had no objection as long as there was a description of the   Source with a statement that his study did not necessarily repre-   sent the views of CIA. I should add that the FBI and other serv-   ices are on record to the effect that they have never been able   to disprove Source's factual information although they do not   necessarily agree with his hypotheses (see Attachment A).2. Attachment B sets forth the highlights and chronology of   his professional career in the KGB. This alone does not convey the   true significance of his defection to the Agency in December 1961.   From 1953 until 1961 various circumstances and events led to his   disaffection with the system and hardened his determination to   defect should his family be reunited. His concern was for his*Bill has taken sick leave for the next ten days and has not 054519seen this letter.SECRET/SENSITIVEImpossible to Determine03034
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SECRET/SENSITIVE2young daughter who lived with her grandparents in Russia. In 1961 she was permitted to visit Source and his wife abroad, and this triggered his defection. Overall, the case is one where we unwittingly had an agent in place in the KGB who was breaking down Soviet compartmentation of the KGB, both in the First and in the Second Chief Directorate. His purpose was to obtain information of great value to the West should he have the opportunity to defect.3. By way of special talents, he is essentially an analyst and historian. He was frequently called upon by senior members of the service to study and make recommendations where there were conflicts over cases affecting more than one depart- ment. In his drive to gain more knowledge outside of his par- ticular sphere, he managed on one occasion to be appointed to: the Inspector General's team which gave him access to the logs of KGB production indicating the overall espionage production obtained by the KGB. The investigation was initiated by the Politburo who complained of the delay in receiving the product derived from espionage, such as British Admiralty, Cables and Plans, NATO documents, etc. This gave Source freedom to in- spect the processing of secret information and to trace its handling from the moment it arrived in Moscow, the translation of the product and its preparation for the Politburo. Unfortunately, the names of agents were not indicated, but it enabled Source, after his defection, to identify the actual documents which were identified by Western services on the basis of his description. This, in turn, led to investigative action and important counter- intelligence successes in the West.4. Source has cooperated with some nine intelligence and security services under our aegis. He has imparted first-hand knowledge of major covert political programs from the days of LENIN to 1961. This knowledge was acquired from reading deeply into the archives and records of the activities of Soviet intelli- gence services beginning with the Revolution. Equally important was his long tenure in the Higher Counterintelligence School where he was able to milk KGB officers from many departments of the Service abroad who were brought back for short periods of retraining.5. Because the Administration, the State Department and the Agency, in part, appear to be firmly entrenched in their views regarding the policy of Detente, I believe that a prelimi-. nary unofficial reading of these materials by an expert in your Department might generate an interest in the Source and his views.SECRET/SENSITIVE00000-
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SECRET/SENSITIVE3This could lead to a symposium in which he would be invited to participate and respond to adversary views. His reaction to such a proposal is unknown. He has always resisted control in the sense of being an agent of any given country. Further, he does make demands for classified information and position papers including the nature of the sources before addressing himself to any particular problem. Nevertheless, his paper on your speeches were obtained from him using only unclassified information.6. His production has run into several thousands of pages of transcripts of interviews including meetings which he had with other foreign intelligence and security services. The range of his information is so vast and detailed that we are hard put to use it as an overlay for interpreting current Soviet events. We have learned from experience that if we give him a problem with an adequate data base, he will computerize and re- arrange his basic information to support his analysis of any new subject. This approach has been fruitful because in supporting his thesis, he often reveals new information of value.7. Attachment C is a sensitive report received from our Israeli liaison; Attachment D is an assessment regarding the activities, role, modus operandi and reason for Ambassador DOBRYNIN's success vis-a-vis the United States (which is incomplete wherever an asterisk is indicated); and Attachment E is a rough draft of his review of the following books:- SOVIET STRATEGY FOR THE SEVENTIES, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY and CONVERGENCE OF COMMUNISM AND CAPITALISM - A SOVIET VIEW - submitted to us during your tenure in the Agency by Mr. Don Cotter. We intend to follow up on this at some future date. This, and other attachments, are partly drawn from a draft manuscript which he has in his posses- sion. The manuscript runs to over two thousand pages. He guards it jealously and is reluctant to publish it at this time. He has permitted me to read several chapters, and they are of unique interest because of the classified information (based on documents) which he read in Moscow.8. By way of digression, a bird's eye view is set forth below of Source's theme.9. The major reorganization (which produced the KGB Department of Disinformation) and the gradual reorientation of the KGB and GRU was completed at the end of 1958 when SHELEPIN suc- ceeded General SEROV as the chairman of the KGB. (General SEROV, who worked with KHRUSHCHEV in the Ukraine, was downgraded to head the GRU). This development climaxed two years of inspection by aSECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE4special committee headed by SHELEPIN who worked under the Central Committee to investigate activities and policies of the KGB and GRU. They concluded that the Intelligence Services had not carried out deStalinization which required that the services follow the Leninist concepts of intelligence and its role in political action. By way of explanation, the OGPU and Cheka were credited under LENIN with having saved the Revolution. This was accomplished by suppressing enemies at home, mounting successful penetration operations into Western governments, the manipulation of agents of influence and conducting massive disinformation programs by feeding deception to the West through their intelligence services. Under STALIN the services degenerated into instruments of personal terror to preserve his cult of personality and lost sight of the overall political, economic, and military objectives of the Soviets.10. Before STALIN's death, there were anti-Stalinist elements who were uncovered and repressed, but their cause to find a Leninist solution to post-war problems continued after his death. For example, MALENKOV began serious investigations into the KGB and other police organizations by enlisting the talents of the Leninist/Marxist rxist Institute. It was his objective to have the investigation culminate in open revelations regarding the crimes of STALIN and the activities of the police state. The course which was set would have ultimately led to the trials of KHRUSHCHEV and many members in the leadership who were prominent in advancing the Stalinist regime as syncophants and "boot-lickers."11. MALENKOV was unfortunately outmaneuverd by the collective which voted against him on issues, particularly regarding Germany. Even in victory, KHRUSHCHEV could not stem the tide let loose by MALENKOV; therefore, in order to survive, he had to "steal" the process of de-Stalinization and shape it to his own ends and the survival of himself and his friends. This led eventually to the "secret speech" regarding STALIN's crimes in which he twisted the facts to exonerate himself and his followers. This led to unrest in the Bloc and the Hungarian Revolution which forced KHRUSHCHEV and his cohorts to initiate plans and programs which represented a return to LENIN.12. In May 1959, a secret, six-day series of meetings was held for Government bureaucrats possessing a COMINT security clearance. It was attended by approximately two thousand members from different parts of the Government. The purpose was to hand down and explain in Leninist terms the decisions of the Central Committee relating to the deStalinization of the intelligence services and to set forth policies which would result in their reorganization and reorientation.SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE13. The principal speaker was SHELEPIN who was supported by General GRIBANOV of the Second Chief Directorate as well as many other senior officials of the Government and Services. SHELEPIN gave a broad analysis of the world situation stressing that the USSR and the USA had reached an atomic stalemate. Accepting this to be a fact, he stated that all plans for war such as stay-behind net-workers should be abandoned. He outlined programs and reforms for the Intelligence Services which were accomplished under LENIN and which required the intelligence potential to be in harness with all other departments of the Government. He stressed that each intelligence operation should be designed to help achieve broad political objectives. Noting that the letter "P" (Politika) had been obliterated from OGPU by STALIN, SHELEPIN announced the creation of the Department of Disinformation within the KGB but subject to the control and direction of the Central Committee. The Department's task was to use all organs of Government to implement strategic disinformation in accordance with directives. This was meant to include all channels to the West; namely, diplomatic, press, military, cultural and economic. This was in addition to the use of double agents and provocateurs.14. In discussing the various objectives, SHELEPIN expounded on the wisdom of pursuing peaceful coexistence in the developed countries and wars of national liberation in the underdeveloped countries, noting that these courses of action were not contradictory.15. Shortly thereafter, the Central Committee charged the KGB with the recruitment of two thousand additional S&T staff officers in order to exploit on a broad basis the opening to the West. The purpose for this increase was to gain Western technology as well as to effect the recruitment of agents and agents of influence in the Western scientific world. It should be noted that one of the more efficient and productive elements of the KGB and GRU had always been their successful acquisition of scientific secrets and R&D from the West. SHELEPIN noted that the change of balance of military power could only be achieved through this additional strength of acquiring the technological and strategic secrets of the West. This would also strike at the USA and hasten its isolation.16. According to the Source, he learned in 1961 that the KGB had acquired approximately one thousand new staff officers for S&T in accordance with the Central Committee directive and that about one thousand slots remained to be filled. In 1961 he and some six hundred KGB officers attended an important lecture given by a senior general of the Defense Ministry. The lecture was to outline the S&T tasks which the KGB would be expected to undertake.SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRET/SENSITIVEHe stressed that the objective of the Soviet and the Bloc was not only to achieve parity with the West but to overtake the United States and swing the balance of military power to the Soviets.17. The general stated that the USSR was fourteen years behind the United States in electronic technology but that the gap would be remedied by coordinated action in the following fields:a. A greatly increased espionage effort because of the addition of one thousand staff officers to the S&T of the KGB and the Academy of Sciences;b. Disinformation, i.e., programs to mislead the United States and the West regarding Soviet technology which would lead the Western scientific community into expensive and time-wasting blind alleys of R&D;c. To acquire new technology through trade agreements; andd. To make treaties and other diplomatic arrangements by which the Soviets and Bloc would acquire information and which would permit Soviet scientists to gain access to the United States scientific community for the purpose of spotting potentials for the KGB and GRU. Most important, he said, was that treaties could be used to block the natural technological growth of the Western powers, in particular, the United States.18. As noted above, the lecture on shortcomings of Soviet technology in electronics was delivered in 1961. Attachment F is a National Intelligence Bulletin (TOP SECRET UMBRA) dated 16 July 1974, which has a direct bearing on Source's information regarding the aforementioned lecture. The National Intelligence Bulletin begins with the following:"Leading officials of the Soviet electronics industry have told visiting US experts that the Soviet Union is four or five years behind the United States in integrated circuit technology. The US experts, who tested Soviet equipment in this field, have confirmed the Soviet judgment."SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE7Integrated circuits are needed to meet the size, weight, power, and reliability of modern military equipment as well as the needs of many civil electronic systems."Admittedly, the question of electronics covers only one phase of the question of military power, and we have not been able to pursue this question of technology further, given our ever-shrinking assets.19. Since my days are numbered here, I do feel an obligation to dispatch these papers for analysis and comment by your expert before my time runs out.20. As previously noted, this package represents a unique dis- semination, unofficial in character. It is requested that this exercise be tightly held and that we consider modalities for the future exploitation and/or discussions of the product and the Source. We and our allies regard Source to be the most valuable Soviet defector since World War II.21. At your convenience I would appreciate a short acknowledge- ment of the above and a reaction from your reader. In the event that these papers do not stimulate any worthwhile interest, I would ap- preciate their return for the use of my successor.Kindest personal regards from,![Signature of James Angleton]James AngletonAttachments: as statedSECRET/SENSITIVE
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U.S.S.R.Report No.: 1-6444Subject: MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATIONSource: Born 1938 In RIGA, has an academic education and is a sociologist by profession. He acquired his academic training in Moscow and Baku. In 1962 he worked for about six months with the M.V.D. in Baku and after that; until 1963, he worked as a lecturer in philosophy in Baku. In 1966-1967 he did his doctoral work at the University of Moscow. From 1967 until December 1973 when he left the U.S.S.R., he worked in Yaroslavl and in Baku. He was a member of the Sociology Association of the U.S.S.R. From 1964 he was an active member of the Communist Party in Azerbaydzhan and was a member of its Central Committee. He was closely associated with the First Secretary of the Azerbaydzhani Party. He cooperated willingly and made the impression of being a highly intelligent and educated man with analytical ability, good perception and excellent memory.Validity of Information: November 1973Reliability: B/2-3
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13-0000018U.S.S.R.Subject: THE U.S.S.R. AND CHINA1. On this subject, Source can report on the opinions of people like   KHALIPOV, ALIYEV, SUKHODEYEV, GVISHYANI (KOSYGIN'S son-in-law), OSIPOV   and Polkovnik-General BYCHENKO (FNU) (Commander of the P.V.O. In the   BAKU Area). The following is a gist of the main ideas:a. The danger of war with China is not taken seriously in officialcircles of the U.S.S.R. and particularly in military circles.General KHALIPOV said more than once that common interestsoutweigh the differences between the two Communist countries.The majority in those circles are of the opinion that thespreading of warnings about war with China is a deliberatepiece of dis-information by the Soviet authorities in orderto justify the keeping of a large mobilized force. It wasoften said that neither China nor the Soviet Union fear anattack by the other side. China needs anti-Soviet propagandafor her own internal purposes and the U.S.S.R., in order tokeep millions of mobilized soldiers.b. In those circles it is thought that war with China is impossiblefor the following reasons:(1) Even given the use of nuclear weapons, it would take atremendous effort to destroy just the military potentialof China. KHALIPOV mentioned a figure: 200 atomic bombs..../...