Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10406-10139.pdf — page 10]
# SECRETDOHB 70-1-1CHAPTER III, ANNEX B15 November 1974## 8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIESThe Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk.IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted.Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail.## 9. 201. DOSSIER CANCELLATIONA 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer.## 10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGSMachine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special.### a. Standard ListingsIssued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest26.7SECRET
[104-10406-10139.pdf — page 12]
# SECRETDOHB 70-1-1CHAPTER III, ANNEX B15 November 1974All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions must be destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard.b. Non-Standard ListingsBased on one or more of the following selection criteria:(1) Country of location(2) OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation)(3) Citizenship(4) Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years)(5) Occupation.These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and. 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an Ol code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters; bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords:(a) Surname(b) Given name(c) Date of birth(d) Country of birth(e) Citizenship(f) OI code(g) Location26.9SECRET
[104-10406-10139.pdf — page 13]
SECRETDOHB 70-1-1CHAPTER III, ANNEX B15 November 1974Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two Ol codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice.c. *Scheduled Listings*Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually.d. *Special Listings*Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements.e. *Request for Listings*All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical -201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine lisť system should be made to the component Records Management Officer.SECRET
[104-10406-10139.pdf — page 14]
13-00000SECRETDOHB 70-1-1CHAPTER III, ANNEX BAttachment 215 November 1974AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGSNote: 201. files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following cate-gories of people.1. *Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE)*a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above..b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches.c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID).(Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E/for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.)2. *British Commonwealth*a. All positively identified members of MI-5/and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services.b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS).c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given.d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS).3. *Cuba*Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI).4. *Israel*All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR//should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interestMilitary attaches.Assistant military attaches.Identified intelligence officers.26,15SECRET
[104-10406-10139.pdf — page 15]
13-00000SECRETDOHB 70-1-1CHAPTER III, ANNEX BAttachment 215 November 19745. North VietnamAll diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.6. USSRa. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning.26.16SECRET
[104-10406-10139.pdf — page 16]
# SECRETCLANDESTINE SERVICESHANDBOOK NO. 43-1-170-1-1CSHB 43-1-1CHAPTER III15 February 1960## ANNEX B## PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS1.  A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.2.  The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or -functional area of interest.3.  It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control43SECRET
[104-10406-10139.pdf — page 17]
SECRET70-1-1CSHB-43-1-1CHAPTER III, ANNEX BCLANDESTINE SERVICESHANDBOOK NO. 43-1-115 February 1960of the Cuban desk on the *dramatis personae*. In addition to 201 per-sonalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying dataof persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be oftangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data otherthan that given in the listing itself.4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system,identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is notyet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbersof the following type but in the same series:IDN-123457These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are car-ried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings,where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" col-umn. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters,either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatchis written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number forit may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file numberin the dispatch form as follows:Dispatch Symbol and No.ΧΥΖΑ-12345Headquarters File No.201-6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon therequest of stations or desks which are developing special identificationprograms within the 201 system. The field receives current notifica-tion of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index CardService..44SECRET
[104-10406-10139.pdf — page 18]
SECRETCLANDESTINE SERVICESHANDBOOK NO. 43-1-170-1-1CSHB 43-11CHAPTER III, ANNEX B15 February 19607. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they _must_ be brought into the 201 system.45SECRET
[104-10408-10027.pdf — page 0]
104-10408-100272025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992DD/P.1-1220MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)SUBJECT: Related Mission Directive for Mexico1. Attached is the revised Related Mission Directive for Mexico.2. Your approval is requested.J.C. KingChief WH DivisionCONCUR:(Signed) S. M. HINESChief, DDF/PSChief, FAChief, CAO Chief, CIAPPROVED:Deputy Director (Plans)3 JUN 1961Date Approved24 January 1961Distribution:Orig & 2 - WHD1 - FG1 - CA1 - CI1 - SR1 - FI/Plans1 - FI/INT1- RIA COPY
[104-10408-10027.pdf — page 1]
# RELATED MISSION DIRECTIVE FOR MEXICO1. GENERAL PROVISIONSA. National Policy. The long-range national policy objectives of the U.S. Government toward Mexico are to reduce to an ineffectual level the influence of international Communism, to encourage democratic government, and to keep the Mexican government friendly and favorably inclined toward U. S. policies. Further guidance is given in the current OCB Regional Operations Plan for Latin America.B. Operational Emphasis. The Station's primary emphasis will continue to be placed on clandestine collection[^1]Operations and covert action operations against the Sino-Soviet bloc, Cuban, and Communist elements in Mexico.C. Changes in the RMD. This basic policy instruction for activities in Mexico has been revised in light of the Station's last Annual Assessment of Progress Report and to reflect more accurately operational conditions, capabilities and direction. In view of the importance and threat presented by Communist Cuba to U. S. interests in Latin America, coverage of Cuban revolutionary activities in Mexico has been made a specific requirement under Priority A. Priority B objectives and tasks include refinements of desired efforts and also provide for covert action operations against Cuban targets in Mexico. The former task for production of motion pitures and their distribution has been deleted, as it is no longer a valid requirement; two former tasks pertaining to the possible use of foreign diplomats have been combined; a task to develop young potential political leaders (ZREAGER) has been added. Two previous Priority C objectives have been eliminated, as there is no established Mexican intelli-,[^2]gence service, and the Station regularly reports on activities of the security services, Coverage of Chinese Communists has been raised to Priority B coincident with the elimination of the former Pricrity C section.D. Contingency Reporting. In addition to the specific objectives set forth in Section II, the Station will from time to time be called on to attempt to satisfy Intelligence[^1]: 24[^2]: 29
[104-10408-10027.pdf — page 2]
# 13-00000Guides and Intelligence Directives, but it is expected that these requirements be satisfied utilizing existing assets. of particular interest on a continuing basis is information on: (a) any indications that Mexico may be used as a base for clandestine activity directed against the U. S. (CI Book Messages 88 and 115); (b) activities of non-bloc intelligence services, especially those that are potentially harmful to U. S. interests; (c) the plotting of revolutionary groups according to their current importance in attempts to overthrow the regimes of their respective Latin American countries; (d) the current alignment and activities of political 24 forces with the potential for assuming control of the Mexican Government; (e) U. S. Communists residing in Mexico; and (f) the Spanish Communist group.It will be noted that certain previous contingency reporting requirements have been amended as follows: The former levy for reporting on the stability of the Mexican Government has been changed to a more realistic and meaningful statement as reflected by (d) above. This modification is appropriate, as political changes in Mexico are most likely to occur within the framework of constitutionality. The previous charge for reporting on secret shipments of strategic materials from Mexicc スと to bloc countries is no longer specifically required and has been deleted.## II. OBJECTIVES### PRIORITY A1. Obtain information on Sino-Soviet bloc plans and activities in Nexico, including those of bloc intelligence services.a. Continue and, where possible, increase physical and technical surveillance of bloc installations and residences.b. Through controlled agent assets, identify and monitor the activities of bloc personnel; if conditions warrant, attempt recruitment or defection of bloc personnel.> [Figure: Image of the number 2]> [Figure: Image of the text 3/RS inside a circle]
[104-10408-10027.pdf — page 3]
Continue CI operations against bloc intelligence personnel.2. Seek to reduce and, if possible, eliminate Commmunist and leftist control or influence in key governmental and non-governmental organisations, political parties, mass media outlets, and other elements that influence public or official opinion and policies.a. Develop political action penetration agents in key functional groups, such as students, teachers and labor, in order to disrupt and reduce their capacity for carrying out action harmful to U. S. objectives and interests.b. Expose and discredit illegal or subversive Sino-Soviet bloc activities and representatives in Mexico, as well as the activities and personnel of international and local Communist front organizations.c. Identify, discredit, and if possible eliminate Communists and pro-Communists from strategic positions in government, educational institutions, state-controlled industrial and agricultural enterprises, labor unions, and student organizations.d. Provide support and give guidance to individuals and organizations that can be induced to produce and disseminate anti-Communist, pro-Free world propaganda via redio, television, newspapers, or other media, and carry out political action operations against Communist or other anti-U. S. elements.e. Identify, develop, and utilize important non-Communist political, business or civic leaders to carry out propaganda, economic or political actions against Communist influence and induce them to support views coinciding with U. S. Government policy interests.f. Continue to support and guide anti-Communist youth and student organizations, publications or agents, and when necessary, develop additional assets in key Schools in Mexico City and selected provinces3
[104-10408-10027.pdf — page 4]
8. Develop and support covert press assets on the staffs of influential newspapers. 24h. Develop access to individuals and organizations in the labor field and support non-Communist leaders and groups in key unions. 273. Obtain information on the organizational structure, key personnel, financing, covert plans and activities of the Communist Party of Mexico (PCM), Communist front organizations and groups, especially the Fartido Popular Socialista (PPS), and non-Communist and/or anti-U. S. groups that may be susceptible to exploitation by International Communism.a. Exploit and extend existing penetrations in the PCM and the FPS 24b. Maintain penetrations of the PCM and seek to penetrate the anti-ENCINA wing of the PCH 24c. Develop and, if conditions warrant, recruit a key source in the Workers' University capable of monitor- 24 ing cultural contacts between the University and bloc diplomatic installations.d. Continue to monitor the activities of selected Communist-influenced labor unions and front groups 27 through the penetration in the PPST if conditions warrant, make selected recruitments in the unions 24 or groups4. Continue to obtain information on Cuban Revolutionary activities in Mexico and support U. S. Government efforts against the CASTRO regime.a. continue to conduct penetration operations of Cuban Embassy and induce defections of Cuban diplomats. 24b. Recruit agents in Mexico for operational use in Cuba.c. Secure support of high Mexican Government officials for the conduct of operations against Cuba. 24d. Continue to provide operational support for activities
[104-10408-10027.pdf — page 5]
e. Utilize propaganda media, political action assets, and other covert means to combat the influence of Cuban revolutionary ideologies in Mexico.PRIORITY B1. Combat ultra-nationalistic and anti-U. S. activities in Mexico and propagandize the dangers of Communism.a. Utilize existing media and political action assets to combat anti-U. S. propaganda or activities.b. Utilize existing media and political action assets to prevent or negate collaboration between ultra-nationalis and Communists.c. Utilize media and political action assets to prevent or negate the socio-economic and cultural penetration plans or activities of the Sino-Soviet bloc.d. Spot and develop for future covert collaboration young local figures who show potential for political leadership and who may be influenced to become generally favorable to U. S. interests.2. Obtain information on the secret intentions and activities of the Mexican Government in foreign affairs, particularly toward the U. S., the Sino-Soviet bloc, and Cuba.a. Continue to develop and influence high level contacts In the Mexican Government, particularly the Office of the President and the Foreign Ministry3. Collect information on the Sino-Soviet bloc.a. Continue penetration of airline and steamship offices and official government agencies to obtain advance information on travellers.b. Recruit or obtain the willing collaboration of selected travellers to bloc countries, especially those who will remain in bloc countries for an extended period and who may be on scientific missions.
[104-10408-10027.pdf — page 6]
o. Recruit third nationals and Latin American diplomats to be assigned or transferred to bloc countries.24d. Obtain [Communicationg]intelligence on bloc diplomatic traffic244. Obtain information on the Chinese Communists in Mexico.a. Spot, assess and recruit or develop sources in the Chinese community.24b. Exploit the Gobernacion files on Chinese living in Mexico and effect penetration of the SMACP24
[104-10408-10078.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992LOUIS STOKES, CHIC, CHAIRMARICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.SAMUEL VINE, OHIOWALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C. STEWAR MC KINPHEY, CONNYVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF. CHARLES TONE, NEDR,CHRISTOPHER J. DOOD, CONN HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICAHAROLD E. FORD, TENNFLOYD J. FITHIAN, INDROBERT W. KOGAR, PA.(202) 223-4626# Select Committee on Assassinations## U.S. House of Representatives3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515FEB 21 1978Mr. Patrick CarpentierOffice of the Legislative CounselCentral Intelligence AgencyWashington, D. C. 20505Dear Mr. Carpentier:In connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of President John F. Kennedy, I am writing to request that by March 1, 1978, the Central Intelligence Agency provide a statement explaining in detail the reasons for which a 201 file may be opened. This statement should address the following possible criteria, individually or in any combination, as well as any other possible criteria not specifically listed:1. Possible and actual sources of intelligence information;2. Possible and actual intelligence agents, assets, or contract employees;3. Travelers, particularly travelers to communist or unfriendly countries;4. Individuals who defect or have attempted to defect to communist or unfriendly countries;5. U. S. servicemen or former U. S. servicemen who pose counterintelligence dangers by revealing, offering to reveal, or threatening to reveal military or intelligence secrets to communist or unfriendly countries;6. Individuals whose suspected counterintelligence activities precipitate changes in United States military or intelligence codes, methods, sources or procedures;
[104-10408-10078.pdf — page 1]
Mr. Patrick CarpentierPage Two7. Individuals who have been contacted by communist   or unfriendly intelligence organizations or in-   strumentalities thereof;8. Individuals who have received money or other   items of value from communist or unfriendly   governments or instrumentalities thereof; and9. Possible and actual foreign intelligence agents   or employees.Please address this statement to the time period 1958-1964 in particular, and indicate whether there were anychanges in such criteria during these years. Finally, wouldyou please specify in your response under which criteria, orcombination of criteria, if any, the opening of a 201 filewas considered to be mandatory during this period.Sincerely,![Signature of G. Robert Blakey]G. Robert BlakeyChief Counsel and DirectorGRB:mgj