Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 59]
13-000002. Assets:a. AMOT Security Service: The ANCT complex is made up of 97AMOT staff and clerical personnel, 34 AHFASTS (security-counterintelligence teams) located in the Miami area, and63 ANCHEERS (senior Cuban citizens drawn from banking,commercial and ranching circles in Cuba), also located in Miami.b. An Agency-controlled Communist Party penetration agent located in Havana.c. An Agency-controlled agent with access to leftist and Communist circles in the Western Hemisphere, now in NewYork City.d. An agent candidate with access to engineering circles in Havana, who will be available for assignment in Cuba inJune of this year.e. A third country agent under diplomatic cover now assigned to, and in place at, Havana.2. Other CI assets inside Cuba:Through the AMOT and other clandestine channels approximately 30 individuals, the majority of whom are Army officers, had indicated a willingness to defect in place and help the opposition forces when the strike came. Although the rebellion was crushed before it could advance sufficiently for the 30 individuals to fulfill their commitment, it may be assumed that some of these people are still willing to cooperate and may be recruited for the purpose of furnishing information now denied us and possibly for performing certain operational functions such as establishing assets and recruiting agents. At the Granma Base, for example, where approximately 4,000 troops are stationed (according to AMOT-34), three captains have indicated willingness to cooperate. The Infantry commander agreed to try to take the base and the nearby cadet school. Assuming that he had that capability, it may be further assumed that he could recruit agents and informants at these bases.Other possible assets of this type include the chiefs of the Fourth and Fifth INRA Zones in Pinar del Rio and the Chief of Police in Santa Clara, Las Villas Province.In addition we have on hand a list of potential defectors who have shown disillusionment with CASTRO, and who have been approached but who have not yet declared themselves. It is possible that the turn of events may have heightened their disillusionment; may be worth trying to recruit them at this time.
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 60]
# Problems and Resolutions:..a. AMOT-KUBARK Relationship. The Agency must recognize the possibility of strained feelings because of the failure of the invasion. It is believed that the Agency representative in Miami will be able, because of his excellent personal relationship with the Chief of the AMOT service, to maintain a satisfactory working relationship.b. Status of AMOT Agents in Cuba. The Agency must anticipate the need to exfiltrate AMOT agents now in place in Cuba in the event their positions become untenable.c. Operational Climate. The Agency must anticipate the development of an increasingly unfavorable operational climate inside Cuba in view of the increased security measures being implemented by the Castro services.d. Compromised Agent Assets Inside Cuba. The Agency must assume that the paramilitary assets inside Cuba have probably been compromised by Castro security counter measures taken at the time of the invasion. Each of these assets or must be examined to determine their continued usefulness. The inclusion of trained CI officers, such as the AMOTS or AFTI, in various teams infiltrated into Cuba can serve to ferret out and neutralize identified penetrations.DistributionsOrig 1 - Addresses1 - WE/4/CI ChronoClark W. SimmonsChief, WE/A/CI
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 61]
SECRETTAB D29 April 1961MEMORANDUM TO : Chief, W4/OpsSUBJECT : CI Capabilities in the Post-Strike PhaseREFERENCE : Memorandum for the Record, Subject : Re-evaluation of CI Assets Available for Exploitation Against Cuba (dated 28 April 1961)*CI Program for JM/WE Project*, dated 20 April 1961. This paper was prepared at the request of Chief, WI/4 on 20 April 1961, to indicate CI capabilities in the post-strike phase.DSECRET
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 63]
13-0000010 July 1962MEMORANDUM FOR:Director of Central IntelligenceTHROUGH:Deputy Director (Plans)SUBJECT:Juana (Juanita) CASTRO Ruz1. ACTION: None. This memorandum is for your informa-tion.2. In connection with Task Force W efforts to split the Cuban leadership, some time ago we targeted Juana Castro Ruz, half-sister of Fidel and Raul Castro Ruz. A number of reports have been received indicating that Juana Castro Ruz opposed the strong communist nature of the Cuban regime and was prepared, at least to some extent, to cooperate with anti-regime elements. In May 1962 we reestablished contact with and recruited Mrs. Virginia Leitao De Cunha, Cuban born wife of the Brazilian ambassador to the USSR and a long time personal friend of Juana Castro Ruz.3. On 11 June 1962, on our instructions, Madame De Cunha proceeded to Havana where she maintained frequent contact with Juana Castro Ruz and other prominent Cuban leaders until 1 July 1962. She discussed the current regime quite frankly with Juana Castro Ruz and, according to Madame De Cunha, she obtained Juana's agreement to provide intelligence on the Cuban political leadership and to work against the Cuban communist regime, short of engaging in activity which might result in direct personal harm to her brothers Raul and Fidel. According to Madame De Cunha, Juana has agreed to proceed to Mexico or the United States in this connection and return to Cuba after discussions with "the Americans".4. We are making the necessary arrangements with Madame De Cunha to have Juana Castro Ruz proceed to Mexico as soon as possible in order that we may attempt a direct re-cruitment. You will be kept advised of any future develop-ments of importance in this case.WILLIAM K. HARVEYC/TFW
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 65]
13-00000AMF-2-017177/5-62-0173Executive Registry67-31010 January 1962MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Support)SUBJECT : Project JMATEREFERENCES : a. Recommendation approved by the President,4 August 1961, Subjects Covert ActionProgram Against Oubab. C/MHD Memorandan to DCI, Subjects Actionwith respect to the Agency Reserve forContingency held by the Burean of theBudget, approved by DCI 19 October 19611.  The references cited established the current MATE    activity and obtained funds in the amount of $5.36 millions    to operate the project during the period 1 July - 31 Doomber1961. 2.  As set forth in paragraph four of reference "b" it    is intended that the financial and audit requirements of this    prejest be regularised to the extent possible consistent with    operational requirements.3.  In the Project Authority, reference "a", on a rugast    1961, and in subsequent discussions, the President approved    covert operations including the funding of various persons,    groups, or activities, Cuban and non-Cuban, which, in our    opinion, may be able to advance the over-all objectives of    JMATE. These individuals, groups, and activities are and    will be many and varied. In many instances we will be able    to exercise little or no control over the funds, materiel,    arms, or equipment given such entities nor receive any suitable    accounting from them.
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 66]
4. I have, therefore, authorized the Deputy Director (Plans) to pass to such persons, groups and activities, such JMATE monies, materiel, arms and equipment as in his opinion may be necessary to support such persons, groups and activities. The Deputy Director (Plans) is authorized to delegate this authority to the COP/DDP, the Chief, Western Headsphere Division, the Chief, WH/4, and Chief, JMWAVE, as he may desirn.5. Funds advanced in accordance with this authority shall be accounted for in accordance with normal Agency requirements except, that, with respect to activities not controlled or administered by the Agency, such as those described in paragraph 3 above, certifications by the person passing funds to the activity may be accepted as final accounting when approved by an official designated above. Such certifications shall state the amount passed, date, and general purpose of the payment, and that further accounting is not practical.6. During the Project development, writing of sub-projects as set forth in paragraph four of reference "b" will be deferred. In lieu, thereof, the project will provide you with copies of reference "a" which will be supplemented by more formal docunentation when specific projects evolve as deterained by the Deputy Director (Plans). With the exception of the activities cited in paragraphs three and four above, activities which in the opinion of the Deputy Director (Plans) lend themselves to regularisation through administrative plans or fiscal annexes will be so documented.7. This authority does not amend regulatory authorities in respect to administrative matters covering Agency personnel.SIGNEDJOHN A. MC CONEDirectorCONCURS:15/ComptrollerDateCC: DDCIDDPDLSComptrollerC/Audit StaffLSA CPCDDCDDate L/6v
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 67]
# DISPATCHTO: Chief, a. DivisionINFO:FROM: Chief of Dare, J.MESUBJECT: Operational/JATE/ACTStatus ReportACTION REQUIRED. REFERENCESAction Required: For information and fles1. Following is a brief summary of JAVE/KDSK current assets in the Target Area (Cuba):a. AMCT-34: Subject is a source of operational intelligence in Rabana. the are maintaining contact via Sv. Subject had a W/T set, cached it and no longer has access to it. ARY-1 has been instructed to deliver another one to him.b. AMCT-48: Subject is a source of operational intelligence in Oriente Frovince. we are in contact with Subject via a cutout at the Guantanamo Naval Base.c. AMCT-106, 107 and 108: These three Subjects are sisters. They provide AC1-34 with operational intelligence in Fabana.d. Rolando MANGUART Julias Subject is an AXT sub source in Pinar del Rio. Subject is currently reorganising his assets in that Province.e. Jose Manuel FERNANDEZ Quintanas Subject is an ACT sub source in the Port of Habana.f. Violeta MACIAS is an AMCT live drop in Habana and is still active.g. Norberto MARTINEZ is an ACT sub source and is active in Habena and Pinar del Rio Provinces.2. JAVA/KUD SK current and future plans are to continue to support and direct the existing assets it has in Cuba as outlined in paragraph 1 above. Moreover plans are now in motion for the followingsa. Exfiltrate, either legally or black, MANGUART and MARTINEZ for further training and return to the target areaDistributions: 3- WHDDATE TYPED: 22 May 61DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER: UPGA-1639HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER: 19-5-3ORIGINATING
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 68]
SECRETUPGA-1639Page -2b. Recruit and dispatch in the near future of at least four other agents to the target area.c. Exfiltrate AMOT-b6 for training and return to the target area. Plan is also to provide him with a trained radio operator.3. WAVE/KUDESK is in the process of reorganising both the AMOT and AMFAST complex as follows:AMOT is being reorganisedAROT-7 (political within REMO) AMATTER-5 (military matters independently and/orAMOT-16 (controlled penetrations within AMOT and/orand pro-Castro activitiesAMPUTEE-1 (general technical asset for telephoneIn support of other Base WAVE Sections, the KUDESK Section will develop and recruit assets for use in the target area. An example is making available at least twelve AMOT/AMFASTS for commando type raids on the Cuban coast and mainland.4. WAVE/KUDESK will continue its primary mission of:a. The detection, identification and neutralization of hostile intelligence action.b. Provide security checks on agents, potential agents and assets, andc. Provide, with the security section of Base JMATE, security checks on ODYCKE covert relationship with Cubans and Cuban organizations. In addition the AMOT Sect will continue to develop an apparatus to be used as an Agent Corps which can be used in the rollup of Castro and Communist agents support of the post-Castro government. AMOTS, AMOT-PS, A-FASTS and AM All be the main source for thySECRET
[104-10310-10104.pdf — page 0]
# SECRET21 May 1976File: SSC/LAMEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John WalkerA/SA/DDOFROM: Arthur C. CloseDeputy Chief, Cover & Commercial StaffSUBJECT: CIA Relations with Lykes Steamship CompanyREFERENCE: Review Staff Memorandum (RS-76-0421/A), dated19 May 19761. Cover and Commercial Staff (CCS) files reveal that three CIA employees served under cover of the Lykes Steamship Company during all or part of the period 1962 through 1964. One Agency officer was placed abroad under Lykes cover from 1961 to 1968. A second served under the same cover from 1953 to July 1962 before leaving the Agency to take a bona fide position with the company; he later agreed to assist the Agency as an intermittent source in Europe from 1964 to early 1967. A third officer was placed with Lykes in this country in 1961 and underwent training in anticipation of an overseas assignment; he was withdrawn the following year when the assignment abroad was canceled.2. There is no reference to Mr. Owen Barnell in CCS files.Arthur C. Close
[104-10310-10116.pdf — page 0]
# SECRET20 May 1976MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DDOFROM : Jackson R. HortonChief, Domestic Collection DivisionSUBJECT : SSC Request for Information on Lykes BrothersSteamship Company and Owen Johnson DarnellREFERENCE : Review Staff Memorandum 76-0421/A dated 19 May 19761. The Domestic Collection Division (DCD) utilizes the Lykes Brothers Steamship Company primarily as a source of foreign intelligence information. Secondarily, DCD provides introductions for Cover and Commercial Staff officers to Lykes Brothers/officials for operational discussions and, on occasion, obtains assessment data from Lykes Brothers/sources on foreigners of potential operational interest. Correpondence in the DCD file on this company for the year 1962, 1963 and 1964 was confined to responses to military services requests for the registration of various Lykes Brothers employees in the Interagency Source Register and memoranda concerning a proposal to utilize an employee of Lykes Brothers, who was a member of a U.S. delegation to the USSR for the collection of foreign intelligence information on the Soviet Union.2. DCD records indicate that Owen Johnson Darnell was considered a "source lead" in years prior to 1965 but he was never used as a source. His file was routinely destroyed in June 1971, along with other files on "source leads" which had been inactive for five years, as authorized by Chief, DCD.Jackson R. HortonJACKSON R. HORTON
[104-10310-10118.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 199230 October 1975MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Chief, CI Meeting with Mr. Paul Wallach, ChiefCounsel of Senate Select Committee on Intel-ligenceThis meeting occurred on Wednesday, 29 October 1975 as a result of concern on the part of Senate Select Committee officers that the Agency was not forthcoming with file material related to the Lee Harvey Oswald case, i.e., the assassination of President Kennedy. The following points were made by the principals as indicated.Chief, CI - To open the meeting Mr. Kalaris made it clear that the Agency is anxious to demonstrate that we have nothing to hide and that all pertinent material was made available to the Warren Commission. He added that the procedure for making material available to the Senate Staff posed certain problems with regard to sources, methods and liaison, which were delaying the turnover of material. He then presented several examples of the sanitization process in which cables taken directly from the 201 file were edited so that all evidence of source, method and liaison information was removed.Chief Counsel - As an opening reply Mr. Wallach stated that his position was that he considered that the Senate Committee should have the same access as the Rockefeller Commission. He added that in his discussions with several senators on his committee they had mentioned reports that a Rockefeller reviewing official by the name of Belin who had had access to the original file, had appeared on several talk shows and was going to write a book based on his review of Agency holdings on the Oswald case.Chief, CI - Mr. Kalaris then pointed out that there were certain particularly sensitive aspects of the material which could not be released for use outside of the building.
[104-10310-10118.pdf — page 1]
13-00000He gave two examples of this. One was the fact that the Mexican Government security liaison contact on the case was the current President of Mexico. He said, and Mr. Wallach agreed, this was obviously a matter which had to be protected. The second case was the Mexican Government penetration of the Cuban Embassy. Again Mr. Wallach agreed.Chief, CI - Mr. Kalaris then suggested that the answer might very well be for the Senate Committee review officers to work with the original file with the exception of those particularly sensitive items which would either be sterilized or summarized. Mr. Kalaris added that to establish the sensitivity of these items he would be willing for the sterilizations/summarizations to be spot checked against the originals by the Senate reviewers.Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach conferred with his colleagues and then agreed that this would be acceptable. He did inquire as to approximately how many such items there would be. He was informed by Mr. Kalaris that it was somewhat difficult to access but that there should not be more than 100 such items.Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach commented that it would be necessary for his people to take notes, but he would agree that these notes not be taken from the building. The purpose of the notes is simply to allow the reviewers to keep track of where they have been and what they have seen. It was agreed at a minimum that their notes would be checked with us.Chief, CI - At this point Mr. Kalaris called Mr. Blee and requested approval of the above procedure. Mr. Blee concurred.Chief Counsel - Mr. Wallach commented that his people would tab those sterilized or summarized items which they wanted to discuss and we would confer with them on those points.2
[104-10310-10118.pdf — page 2]
CommentMr. Wallach mentioned that Mr. Proctor (DDI) is a family friend and he wanted to make contact by phone.At the end of the day the reviewers returned the three files of other agency documents and offered their notes for review. It was agreed they would return on Monday to start reviewing files and that we would have at least 15 volumes ready for them. Mr. Wallach was to call on Friday to confirm our readiness.![signature]Robert G. WallDeputy Chief, CI/OGcc: Chief, CIADDOSA/DDOReview Staff - Walt Elder
[104-10310-10142.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITEDADVANCE COPYISSUEDSLOTTEDINDEX: YES NOCLASSIFY TO FILE NO.DISSEM BY: 53X-REF TO FILE NO.:FILE RID RET. TOBRANCHDESTROY SIG.ACTION EUR 6RID COPYFILE, VR. RI/AN, DDP, ADDP, Cl, ci/1c2, 4/1005/1#079U/RA, SECUR 4, CA/PROP, CA 5SECRET 151047Z MAR 69 CITE ZURICH 1629DIRECTOR INFO BERN17 MAR 69 IN 15450REF DIRECTOR 832091. NAGELL LAST APPEARED AT ZURICH CONSULATE MORNING 7 MARCH AND STATED THAT IF HE RECEIVED NO SATISFACTION BY FIVE O'CLOCK THAT AFTERNOON HE WOULD CARRY OUR HIS THREATS AND EXPOSE US GOVERNMENT ON RADIO, TELEVISION AND IN THE PRESS.2. HE THEN DISAPPEARED, NOTHING FURTHER HEARD FROM HIM AND, NO PUBLICITY GIVEN. MORNING MONDAY 10 MARCH CONSULATE ZURICH ADVISED BY TELEPHONE FROM US CONSULATE BARCELONA THAT NAGELL HAD APPROACHED THEM AND MADE SIMILAR THREATS.3. FILE: 201-746537. (NAGELL)SECRETSECRET1-1241_
[104-10320-10038.pdf — page 0]
# SECRET20 NOV 1968Executive Registry68-5160/1XAAZ-35926MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceVIA: Deputy Director for PlansSUBJECT: Letter for Director from Sir Charles Spry (ASIO)1. Attached is a sealed letter from Sir Charles Spry, Director General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (who provided a copy of the letter to the Chief of Station, Melbourne), and a suggested reply for your signature.2. Sir Charles letter to you recommends against declassification of the Warren Commission document CD-971, which refers to our investigation of anonymous telephone calls to the Canberra Embassy before and after the, assassination of President Kennedy.3. I consider the points made by Sir Charles in his letter to be valid and accordingly recommend against the declassification of CD-971 in the foreseeable future. CI Staff concurs with this recommendation.William E. NelsonChief, Far East DivisionAttachments, 5A. Letter from Sir Charles SpryB. Letter Replying to Sir Charles SpryC. FA/W 3806, subject: Declassification of Warren Commission Document CD-971D. Copy of CD-971E. FA/W 3530, subject: Request for Release of Warren Commission Documentcc: DDCIDDP/FE/PMI/AN: Amos Taylor, Jrl:arc (19 November 1968)Distribution:Orig & 1 - Addressee 1 - C/CI Staff1 - DDCI 1 - CFE2 - DDP 1 - CFE/PMI1 - ADDP 1 - CFE/PMI/AN![table with text in each cell]![Record copy]26 Nov 68201-28924838-1
[104-10320-10039.pdf — page 0]
# SECRET26 NOV 1968Sir Charles C. F. SpryDirector GeneralAustralian Security Intelligence OrganizationG. P. O. Box 5105BBMelbourneDear Charles,Thank you for your letter of 15 October recommending against the declassification of Warren Commission document CD-971. I might mention that our inquiry to you in August (1968) was in anticipation of further pressure for the release of Warren Commission papers, a pressure which has not materialized. Accordingly, there is not, at the present time, any intention to release CD-971.Should the question be raised at some future time, the points made by you in your letter provide every reason to keep the document out of the public domain.With kindest regards,Sincerely,/s/ Richard HelmsRichard HelmsDirectorcc: DDCISignature Recommended:Deputy Director for PlansDDP/FE/PUI/AN/Amos Taylor, Jr. (X 5502):aib (25 November 1968)1 - ADDP1 - CPE1 - PHI1 - PAI/ANDistribution:Orig - Addec2 - DCI1 - DDCI2 - DDP
[104-10320-10039.pdf — page 1]
SECRETIP.8-4635/126 NOV 1968Sir Charles C. F. SpryDirector GeneralAustralian Security Intelligence OrganizationG. P. O. Box 5105REHolbourneDear Charles,Thank you for your letter of 15 October recommending against the declassification of Warren Commission document CD-071. I might mention that our inquiry to you in August (1968) was in anticipation of further pressure for the release of Varren Commission papers, a pressure which has not materialized. Accordingly, there is not, at the present time, any intention to release CD-971.Should the question be raised at some futuro time, the points made by you in your letter provide every reason to keep the document out of the public domain.With kindest regards,Sincerely,/s/ Richard HelmsRichard HelmsDirectorDocument Number 1042-9476for FOIA Review on SEP 1976cc: DDCISignature Recommended:1 - ADDP1 - CPE1 - MII1 - PAI/ANDistribution:Orig - Addee2 - DCI1 - DDCI2 - DDPDeputy Director for PlansDDP/FE/PUI/AN/Amos Taylor, Jr. (X 5502):aib (25 November 1968)40-1> [Figure: Handwritten annotations on the right side of the document read "CORRES RELATING TO THIS - INCLUDING NAVY SO OK OF 27 June 68 TO REZERVIE - FILED IN MAIN 0/S/W/O FILE"]