[104-10326-10017.pdf — page 1]
MHFNO: 98-0457370SENSIND: SECRETPAGE: 2ENDLESS NUMBER_OF MEETINGS TO BUILD WILL BE GONE WITH THE FIRST PUBLICATION LOCALLY CONFIRMING OUR USE OF STATE COVER.4. MOREOVER, BILATERAL U.S.-ARGENTINE RELATIONS HAVE NEVER BEEN' CLOSER; THESE WOULD BE TARNISHED, NOT IRREPARABLY BY ANY MEANS, BUT UNNECESSARILY, BY OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF CIA USE OF STATE COVER. HISTORICALLY RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA HAVE BEEN STRAINED, AND IT IS ONLY DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS THAT A NEW PRESIDENT AND HIS BOLD FREE-MARKET REFORMS HAVE PUSHED ARGENTINA SQUARELY INTO THE DEMOCRATIC ORBIT. CURIOUSLY, THE CLOSE POLITICAL RELATIONS AND OUR STEADILY-IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH LIAISON MEANS THAT BOTH PARTIES -EMBASSY DIPLOMATS AND SENIOR LIAISON OFFICERS-- WONDER WHY WE NEED TO SPY HERE IF WE CAN GET VIRTUALLY ANYTHING WE ASK FOR FROM LIAISON OR FROM ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. INDEED, IN THIS RELATIVELY OPEN, COMFORTABLE ENVIRONMENT, AN INDICATION THAT STATION WAS WORKING ON INCOMPATIBLE LOCAL TARGETS WOULD BE ESPECIALLY DAMAGING.5. AT THE RISK OF BORING THE READER WITH DETAIL, EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IS SO OPEN A WORKPLACE THAT THERE IS NO REAL CLEARED ACCESS AREA (CAA), BUT RATHER A "HYBRID" CAA, TO USE THE RSO'S PHRASE. THIS MEANS THAT FSN'S HAVE LONG HAD OFFICES ON THE THIRD FLOOR, WHERE THE *EXECUTIVE>OFFICES AND REPORTING OFFICES (INCLUDING STATION) ARE LOCATED. NEEDLESS TO SAY, STATION IS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE LOCAL CONFIGURATION OF OFFICES, SINCE IT TENDS TO IDENTIFY OUR UNILATERAL OFFICERS. IN THIS ENVIRONMENT, WHERE EMBASSY OFFICERS DO NOT HAVE A FULL APPRECIATION OF THE ROLE/NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE IN SUCH AN OPEN, FRIENDLY SOCIETY, OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF CIA'S USE OF STATE COVER WOULD ONLY REAFFIRM THEIR POINT OF VIEW. OUR FEW UNILATERAL OFFICERS WOULD ESSENTIALLY THEN BE DECLARED. STATION WOULD HAVE TO ATTEMPT TO CHANGE OUR COVER PROFILE BY OBTAINING MORE NOC OFFICERS WHILE REDUCING THE NUMBER OF UNILATERAL C/O'S. AS HEADQUARTERS IS AWARE, UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES THERE ARE FEW NOCS, AND THE SELECTION AND TRAINING OF NEW ONES TAKES YEARS AND IS EXPENSIVE. IN THIS SCENARIO, BUENOS AIRES WOULD NEVER RECEIVE ENOUGH PRIORITY TO WARRANT SENDING THREE NOC OFFICERS TO REPLACE THE THREE UNILATERAL SLOTS WE CURRENTLY HAVE. THE END RESULT WOULD BE THAT WE WOULD COLLECT VERY LITTLE INTELLIGENCE ON MAJOR PORTIONS OF OUR OPERATING DIRECTIVE (OD). SPECIFICALLY, INTERNAL POLITICAL REPORTING, WHICH IS A FIRST PRIORITY OBJECTIVE, WOULD BE ZEROED OUT, AND REPORTING ON THE WP AND ES TARGETS, BOTH SECOND PRIORITY OBJECTIVES, WOULD BE NON-EXISTENT. THIS WOULD BE A SERIOUS LOSS TO THE USG, SINCE OUR WP REPORTING HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN THE ONLY MEANS OF LEARNING TO WHAT EXTENT THE ARGENTINES ARE RESPECTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND NOT REBUILDING THEIR MISSILE PROGRAM. ON THE ES TARGET, WE WOULD LOSE SIGNIFICANT REPORTING ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND THE IMPACT OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS IN THE AMERICAS. PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANTLY, HOWEVER, WE WOULD LOSE THE TRUST OF KEY HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND OF SOME SENIOR LIAISON OFFICIALS, WITH THE PREDICTABLE RESULT THAT IT WOULD TAKE YEARS TO REBUILD THE RELATIONSHIP.6. IN TERMS OF A SECURITY THREAT, BUENOS AIRES REMAINS THE ONLY CAPITAL IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE THAT HAS BEEN THE VICTIM OF TWO HIZBALLAH BOMBINGS, KILLING HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE. A TERRORIST INFRASTRUCTURE EXISTS-IN-THE-TRI-BORDER AREA OF ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND PARAGUAY, WITH TIES INTO BUENOS_AIRES AS WAS-PROVEN-TWICE. TWO   SECRET