Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10330-10083.pdf — page 4]
APR 15 '97 04:59PM USGOVERNMENTSECRETP.6/14Subject: CIA Employeescertain individuals of intelligence interest, to prevent embarrassment to host foreign governments, and to permit plausible denial of CIA's presence and activities in foreign countries.14. (U) The ability to maintain one's cover is crucial to gathering intelligence. In either a "hostile" or "friendly" country, should the local service become aware of who the CIA employees are, it would increase surveillance and make unilateral operations difficult if not impossible. In some countries, the local government tolerates the CIA presence and agrees to work with us as long as the local population is not aware of the circumstances. Once it becomes known among the locals that certain US Government officials are actually CIA, pressure may be placed on the government to expel those Americans, disrupting liaison and diplomatic relationships. More importantly, covert employees and their families would face increased risk to their personal safety. Even in "friendly" countries, our employees could face some personal risks as well as risks to ongoing operations from extremists who may be living among an otherwise benign local population. In any of these cases, should a covert employee's cover be publicly compromised, that employee may have to be recalled from the field; and it could be difficult to place him elsewhere in an operationally and physically secure location. Thus, maintaining cover is important to a case officer's effectiveness and to the continuation of a career with CIA.15. (S) Maintaining the confidentiality of cover is also important to cover providers. The Review Board will recall from prior briefings by the Agency that covert CIA employees, both in the United States and overseas, can work under "official" (e.g., State Department) cover or "non-official" (e.g., private company) cover. Disclosure of a covert employee would not only be official acknowledgment of the specific cover mechanism employed by CIA but would also negatively affect the governmental or business mission of the cover provider, especially those who provide non-official cover. Acknowledgment of an employee who had been under non-official cover in a host country and possibly in other countries could have a negative impact on the provider's business interests and activities. It would also cast suspicion on that provider's legitimate employees and their families. Further, exposure of cover providers could affect the recruitment and cooperation of such providers by the Agency and Intelligence Community.16. (S) Although the majority of names that appear in the Collection are retired CIA employees, the operational considerations in revealing their affiliation with CIA are5SECRET
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# SECRETSubject: CIA Employeesnot diminished. Similar to sources, many former employees still do not want their past affiliation with CIA revealed. Perhaps their current friends, family, or employers are not aware of this past affiliation; and revelation of that fact could negatively affect personal and professional relationships. Some former employees still live overseas where a revelation of CIA affiliation poses risks to their personal safety. Other former employees travel overseas on business, where a revelation of a past CIA affiliation can threaten their business interests and personal safety. One example of an employee in this category is Robert Fulton, whose name apparently appears only once in the Collection. Fulton retired under (Department of State cover; he currently has a consultant business and frequently travels to (China). Release of his name would jeopardize not only his business but perhaps even his safety. A similar example is (Walter McCabe, who also retired under (State) cover. He is now working in Russia and several East European countries for a private firm. He does not want his name published, because it could be damaging to his current employer and his professional status.17. (S) Even if a former employee agrees to the revelation of his name in the JFK Collection, this might not be possible for other reasons. In some cases, officially acknowledging a covert employee could threaten ongoing operations on which that employee worked. Foreign nationals recruited by the employee and still providing information to the US Government would be at risk of exposure. Public acknowledgment could reveal the location of CIA stations where the employee worked throughout his career, including some not released by the Review Board. Any individuals who had substantial contact with a former employee overseas and may have believed they were legitimately providing information to a US corporate representative would be upset to learn they were, in fact, aiding the US Government.18. (U) Finally, the identification of case officers by their own service would have a chilling effect on prospective assets. Prospective assets would be unlikely to enter into a clandestine relationship with American intelligence if they believe that CIA does not protect even its own staff employees from public disclosure.## IV. Proposal19. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA employees identified in the JFK Collection, with exceptions made for those individuals who are important to the story of the assassination. The Agency proposes that in most cases a
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APR 15 '97 05:01PM USGOVERNMENT P.8/14SECRETSubject: CIA Employeessubstitution for the true name be used. If the Review Board is concerned about tracking particular employees throughout the records, a particular identifying substitution can be used for a particular employee.20. (S) CIA believes that this approach will not undermine the Review Board's obligations under the JFK Act. A review of the JFK Collection reveals that approximately 84 of the 600 names appear only once in the entire Collection. In such cases, it is difficult to see how the individuals' identity can add anything of significance to the historical record; yet there may be some security concerns still associated with these individuals. For example, Arthur H. Stimson retired under cover and is currently living in Europe. When the CIA notified him that his name appeared in the JFK Collection and was subject to public release, he told CIA that he was opposed to having his name released and believed such a release could pose personal and security problems. Furthermore, he could not understand why his name even appeared in the Collection, since he had no recollection of being involved in anything related to the assassination.21. (S) With regard to the approximately 500 names that appear more than once in the Collection, the vast majority of these individuals played almost no role in the JFK story. One example of this is former DO officer Alexander Brasko. His name appears approximately 20-30 times in the Collection simply because he signed off on name trace requests. Mr. Brasko was a covert CIA employee and retired under cover. The public release of his name would provide the public with no additional significant information about JFK. Tom Flores is another example of a covert CIA employee whose name appears in the Collection but has little or no connection to the JFK story. Flores retired under cover, is living in South America, and objects to the release of his name. Mr. Flores recent letter to CIA is also attached for your convenience.22. (S) The Agency, of course, recognizes that some names may be particularly important to the JFK story regardless of how frequently or infrequently they appear in the Collection. One such example is former COS Mexico Winston Scott who CIA has acknowledged as a CIA employee. In such cases, the CIA will continue to work with the Review Board for an appropriate resolution. The CIA proposes that the Review Board and its staff identify those individuals whom it believes are important to the JFK story and whose names should be released to the public. These names would carry a presumption of release unless specific evidence is provided to the Review Board that harm would likely result7SECRET
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13-00000APR 15 '97 05:02PM USGOVERNMENTSECRETSubject: CIA EmployeesP.9/14from such release. The CIA will conduct the appropriate searches to determine whether release would pose national security concerns for the US Government or personal safety concerns for the individual. In this way, CIA and the Review Board can concentrate their efforts on individuals who are significant figures in the JFK story, expediting the review of the sequestered collection.23. (U) It is our hope that the CIA and the Review Board can agree on and work out a mutually acceptable policy regarding the identity of CIA employees that will not undermine the important principle of protecting those who work covertly for the US Government. My staff and I are ready to discuss this matter with you at your convenience.![Signature of Michael J. O'Neil]Michael J. O'NeilActing General CounselAttachmentA. Tom Flores' letter8SECRET
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13-00000APR 15 '97 05:03PM USGOVERNMENTSECRETSubject: CIA EmployeesDCI/OGC/LD/LCCipriani 76124 (10 Apr 97)OGC-97-50971Distribution:Original - Addressee1 - GC1 - Lit File - LDG000211 - LCC Signer1 - RDC FYI1 - OGC Registry9SECRETP.10/14
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13-00000APR 15 '97 05:03PM USGOVERNMENT P.2 P.11/1417 March 1997Ms. Beth MillsDear Ms. Mills,Your letter of 4 Maroh was delivered to me on 10 March, and this reply will be sent via the same channel.I wish to go on record as demanding that my name not be released in ANY document disclosed concerning the Kennedy assassination.First, I shall describe my present circumstances; and thereafter I will address the legal points in the legislation,I retired in 1974 in a clandestine status, using a State Department cover, which has worked reasonably well since then. I reside in Caracas, Venezuela. This city (and the entire country) is still populated with Communists and ex-Communists who formed part of the Marxist conspiracy to overthrow the democratically elected Governments in the 1960s and 70s. Many of these persons are now members of Congress and a few are in the President's Cabinet. During my service in Venezuela, as COS, I maintained liaison with civilian and military officers, during which time I worked with these to overcome the guerrilla offensive, and to combat the Communist Party after it accepted "pacification." I left in 1972 and went to Vietnam, from which I returned to Venezuela as a private oitizen. Because of my wife's long employment and friendships, we are as closely connected with the Jewish Community as two Christians can be.Given my somewhat exposed position as COS, my true affiliation was known to a number of important Venezuelan Government officials. In any event, soon after my return, I was informed by the Venezuelan Government that an important Communist leader had learned of my return, and that "I was living in Urbanizacion Miranda (a small and somewhat isolated Caracas suburb) and that I was training right wing paramilitary personnel." They were right about where I lived, but
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13-00000APR 15 '97 05:04PM USGOVERNMENTP.12/14,P.3Confused Boy Scouts with "right wing paramilitary personnel." I worked as a volunteer leader for the Boy Scouts of America and the Venezuelan Scout Association from 1974 to about 1991.In any event, the Venezuelan Government was sufficiently concerned about the matter, that it offered me a group of bodyguards. I turned down the offer, and asked them to provide me with an automatic pistol for my protection. I still have that pistol.The country has changed somewhat since that time. There are still a number of underground radical groups who resisted pacification, and try to foment violence wherever possible. Along the Colombian border they appear to be linked up with the Colombian ELN and FARC. In addition to these, the country has been infiltrated by radioal Moslem movements. A Cuban Embassy, with its usual collection of intelligence officers, is located in Caracas. Further Iran, Iraq and Lebanon also maintain diplomatic posts here, and probably support the Muslim extremists.Under present circumstances, my cover has prevented me from coming to the attention of these people. However, I feel vory strongly that if my name is released, I will again become a potential target for these and other persons who wish to embarrass the United States and/or adversely affect U.S./Venezuelan relationships. I was recently decorated by the Venezuelan President for my contributions to good Venezuelan/American relations.I have no intention of leaving Venezuela under any circumstancos.Any connection I may ever have had with the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination, was lughly peripheral. Any documents which may be released, could include my job title (rather than my name) without reducing the value of said documents.Since I will be quite dead in 25 years, I cannot object to my name being
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released at that time.Although not mentioned as an option in your letter, I would like to be permitted to review the documents containing my name which you are being obliged to release. When I retired, I gave up all links with former sources. One of these popped up in the New York Times last week. Some others may still be alive, and in need of protection, although as I recall, none had any useful data concerning the assassination. If the sources are to be exposed, I feel very strongly that they are entitled to all the protection we can afford them. I will be in the Washington D.C. area in November 1997, and would be willing to review these documents.In terms of the provisions you cite for exceptions in your letter, (A) I consider myself a person (Agent?) whose identity ourrently requires protection.The cover I am using, provided by the State Department, is (B) an intelligence method which is currently utilized.The public disclosure of my name as part of the assassination record (C.3) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion is so substantial that it outweighs the public interest. I cannot resist defining the public interest in this matter as "public morbid curiosity."The public disclosure of my name as part of the assassination record (C.4) would probably compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a government agent and a cooperating individual or foreign government, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest. I was COS in Bolivia when the assassination occurred. I was in close touch with the Bolivian Government security chief at that time, and with the Minister of Interior, and we probably interchanged data on the murder, although they could provide nothing useful. Also, the Station was probably tasked to query all of our sources on the matter, again with negative results. The revelation of my name and the identities of liaison contacts and unilateral sources would not only imperil me, but would also einbarrass the Bolivian Government, and
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could endanger current activities of the Agency in that country. I do not recall whether in my subsequent assignment as Chief of the Cuban Task Force, any mention of the assassination came up. However, if it did, revelation of my name could not only imperil those agents of the time who survive, compromise our operational methods, but also, make me a prime target for the Cuban intelligence service.None of the above should be construed as a waiver of my rights, or those of my heirs, to take legal action to prevent the release of my name and/or to collect damages, both civil and punitive, resulting from the release of my name. There exists an implicit contract between ine and the Agency dating from when I accepted the inconveniences of a clandestine retirement. The Agency undertook to provide a LASTING cover for me. It should be noted that this implicit contract predates Public Law 102-526 by some 18 years. Naturally, I am going to inform my legal advisor of this entire matter. I suggest that you pull together a set of all documents pertaining to my retirement, so that these can be made available for his review.I refrain from comment about a U.S. Congress that would pass such a bill, and a President who would fail to veto it. (You of course, are not to-blame.) The New York Times and the Washington Post, will, of course, be drooling to get their hands on your papers. I don't envy you because this is an extremely complicated matter. Unfortunately, the release on a lot of non-pertinent information will go a long way to reveal the soope and role of the Agency in Latin America to any analyst who wants to review the material and piece it together. I believe that this role is not significantly different today than it was when President Kennedy was murdered. Only the targets and the gadgets have changed.Sincerely yours,Thomas J. Flores
[104-10330-10100.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992![Assassination Records Review Board Logo]# Assassination Records Review Board600 E Street NW · 2nd Floor · Washington, DC 20530(202) 724-0088 · Fax: (202) 724-0457October 28, 1997Mr. David W. CareyExecutive DirectorCentral Intelligence AgencyWashington, DC 20505Re: **Completing the Review of JFK Assassination Records**Dear Mr. Carey:I would like to congratulate you on your new appointment at the Agency and wish you the very best of success in the difficult challenges that lie ahead.As you probably are aware, the Assassination Records Review Board has been mandated by Congress and the President to oversee the declassification and transfer to the National Archives of all records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. During the past three years we have received excellent cooperation from CIA in regard to the processing of the relevant Agency records. From our perspective, this is due in significant part to the work of John Pereira, Chief of the Historical Review Group, and J. Barry Harrelson, who has shouldered the extremely complicated, burdensome, and frequently thankless task of overseeing the project. Both of them have proved to be superb representatives of the Agency. We also very much appreciated receiving a strong message of support from your predecessor, Nora Slatkin, who advised us in a meeting on October 16, 1996, of her full support for the project and her willingness to commit the necessary Agency resources to complete the project.Because the Review Board is now in the final twelve months of its statutory tenure, I thought it would be appropriate to advise you of our goals for the upcoming year. It is our wish to be able to state in our Final Report to the President and to Congress that CIA has made all reasonable attempts to locate, review, and declassify all available records on the Kennedy assassination. We would like the Review Board to be able to assure the American people that the Agency has been fully cooperative in this enormous and difficult task, and that the Agency no longer retains any "secret" files on the assassination. In addition, we are obligated to keep Congress informed, on a monthly basis, of the status of our work and any difficulties that would interfere with our ability to achieve our objective.Although many important strides have been made to further our goals, we nevertheless perceive that the pace of review and declassification of Agency records will need to beBOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair · Henry F. Graff · Kermit L. Hall · William L. Joyce · Anna K. NelsonEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell
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Mr. David W. CareyOctober 28, 1997Page 2accelerated in order for us to succeed. We must keep in mind that the goal includes reviewing, processing, and transferring to the custody of the National Archives *all* identified assassination records by September 1, 1998. (We do not perceive that duplicate copies of such records need be transferred by September 1.) Many time-consuming difficulties inherent in this project have been overcome, and we perceive that the pace of review is accelerating. Nevertheless, we wanted to signal to you our concern that, unless the pace of review increases further, we may not be on target to satisfy what I hope to be our common objective.It is our firm intention to complete our task within the congressionally mandated time limit. If CIA is unable to pre-review and process its records consistent with completion of this task, the Review Board will vote to release-in-full all relevant CIA records and mandate that custody be transferred to the National Archives in a timely way. We sincerely hope that it will not be necessary for the Board to make wholesale decisions on unreviewed records and we will be pleased to work with the Agency to see that such a step is unnecessary. But we are prepared to make such decisions to the extent they are required to fulfill our own responsibilities. Although it is our perception that CIA may wish to devote additional human resources to this project, we of course leave such decisions to the sound judgment of knowledgeable CIA officials.We therefore strongly urge the Agency to take all appropriate steps to complete its review of records in an orderly and systematic manner. To the extent that the Agency is able to satisfy appropriate deadlines, there will be no need for us to resort to any unfortunate -- but potentially necessary - measures to complete our own obligations to Congress, the President, and the American people.If you would find it helpful, the Review Board members and I would be pleased to discuss these issues with you or others at the Agency.Sincerely,![signature]T. Jeremy GunnExecutive Directorcc: Assassination Records Review Board
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYWASHINGTON, D.C. 20505EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR21 November 1997CSI 97-536Dr. T. Jeremy GunnExecutive DirectorAssassination RecordsReview Board600 E Street, NWWashington, DC 20530Dear Dr. Gunn:CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONSRELEASE AS SANITIZED2000Thank you for your letter of 28 October in which you outline the Assassination Records Review Board's goals for the coming year. I appreciate the complimentary remarks you made about the "excellent cooperation" that CIA has been providing to the Board.You raised a concern that the Agency may not be able to increase sufficiently the pace of the review process to meet the 1 September 1998 deadline for completing the transfer of records to the National Archives. You also expressed the view that if any records are not reviewed by the deadline, the Board will vote to release them in full and mandate that custody be transferred to the National Archives.You can be assured that we are committed to taking all necessary steps to meet our statutory obligation to review all of the Agency's assassination-related materials. It is important that a proper review of all relevant records be done. This will allow us to recommend to the Board what information warrants continued protection.We appreciate the great responsibility that Congress and the President have given to the Board to inform the American people about the assassination. We share the Board's goal of declassifying and releasing the relevant records to the fullest extent possible.Please convey my regards to Chairman Tunheim and the other Board members, and assure them of our continued cooperation.Sincerely,![Signature of David W. Carey]David W. Carey![DCI EXEC REG stamp]