Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 4]
CONFIDENTIAL(1) Groups outside the United States which advocateassassination of government officials as a political weaponand which appear to constitute an existing threat to thePresident or any persons named in Article I, Paragraph B.above;(2) Sabotage and assassination training by hostileintelligence services or groups and the identity of personsso trained who appear to constitute an existing threat tothe President or any person named in Article I, Para-graph B. above;(3) Plots in the United States or abroad to assassinatea Chief of State or other high official.D. This agreement shall be reviewed by representatives of the CIAand the Secret Service annually, or at such more frequent occasions aseither the CIA or the Secret Service may request, to make certain thatthe system of reporting is both practicable and productive. Revisionsmay be made on the authority of the Deputy Director of the CIA and theChief of the Secret Service.IV. Provision of CIA Personnel to Protect the PresidentA. On occasion the use of a large number of armed officers isrequired to carry out the protective functions of the Secret Service due tosuch factors as the size of the crowds, the number of persons to be pro-tected or the existence of a national emergency. At such times CIA may,at the request of the Secret Service, detail some of its security officersCONFIDENTIAL
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 5]
CONFIDENTIALto the Secret Service in order to augment the Service's capacity to carryout its protective functions in the most secure manner.B. Such officers detailed by the CIA will be designated officers ofthe Secret Service under the direction and operational control of the Chiefof the United States Secret Service. No person shall be so detailed unlesshe has qualified in the use of firearms either in accordance with standardsestablished by the Chief of the United States Secret Service, or in accord-ance with standards established by the Director of Security of the CIA.Persons so detailed will be authorized to carry firearms and to performsuch other protective functions and duties as are authorized by law, asprovided by section 3056 of title 18, United States Code, as amended.V. Implementation of AgreementA. The Secret Service and the CIA undertake to maintain an activeliaison to insure the prompt passage of available information concerningindividuals reported to the Secret Service by the CIA and evaluated bythe Secret Service as dangerous to the President or any person named inArticle I, Paragraph B. Furthermore, in order to effect the best possiblesecurity of such persons, the Secret Service and the CIA will take suchsteps as are necessary to insure that the terms of this Agreement arefully carried out.Dated: 27 March 1965Central Intelligence AgencyBy Marshall S. CarterDeputy DirectorUnited States Secret ServiceBy James J. RowleyChiefCONFIDENTIAL
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 6]
CONFIDENTIALAPPENDIX AInformation to Be Furnished on Individuals Reported by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Secret Service1. Identification Data to the extent available to CIA, name or names of individual (including prior legal names, aliases and pseudonyms), address, photograph (or staternent as to availability of such), physical description, date and place of birth, employment and marital status;2. Reason or Reasons for Reporting statement of the class or classes in Appendix B, which the individual reported fits;3. A summary or excerpts, as appropriate, of such portions of any CLA file on an individual reported which cause him to fit any class or classes in Appendix B.CONFIDENTIAL
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 7]
CONFIDENTIALAPPENDIX BTypes of Individuals to Be Reported by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Secret Service1. Individuals who have made threats of bodily harm against, or have attempted to cause bodily harm to, officials or employees of Federal, state or local Governments or foreign government officials while they are residing in or planning an imminent visit to this country; provided that such threats or acts are made against the Government official or employee because of his official status;2. Individuals who threaten or attempt to redress a real or imaginary grievance against Federal, state or local Governments or any employee or official thereof by other than legal means;3. United States citizens who defect or indicate a desire to defect;4. Nationals of any country in the Sino-Soviet Bloc (including the USSR and Communist China) located in the United States, and who have escaped from the control of any such country, or who, being outside such jurisdiction and control, are unwilling to return thereto, and who have been of special interest or value to the United States, and who cannot be eliminated as a possible source of danger to the President or any person named in Article I, Paragraph B;5. Subversives, communists, racists and fascists in the United States who meet one or more of the following criteria:CONFIDENTIAL
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 8]
CONFIDENTIAL(a) Evidence of emotional instability or irrational or suicidal behavior, particularly in persons who have a record of transitory residence or employment;(b) Expressions of strong or violent anti-United States sentiment;(c) Prior acts (including arrest or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.The term "subversives" shall mean persons (including members of the Communist Party and Communist front organizations) who knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise or teach the duty, necessity or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Government of the United States or the government of any state, district or possession thereof or the government of any political subdivision therein by force or violence or by the assassination of any officer of any such government.CONFIDENTIAL
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 9]
13-00000.LAST MONTH|  1963 OCTOBER 1963   || :------------------: ||    S M T W T F S     ||      1 2 3 4 5       ||   6 7 8 9 10 11 12   || 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 || 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ||    27 28 29 30 31    ||  1963 NOVEMBER 1963  || :------------------: ||    S M T W T F S     ||         1 2          ||    3 4 5 6 7 8 9     || 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 || 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 || 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 ||  1963 DECEMBER 1963  || :------------------: ||    S M T W T F S     ||    1 2 3 4 5 6 7     ||  8 9 10 11 12 13 14  || 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 || 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ||       29 30 31       |Friday 22 NovemberA. M. P.M.|                            |                                       || -------------------------- | ------------------------------------- || 8:45                       | 1:00                                  || 9:00 Intelligence Briefing | 1:15                                  || 9:15                       | 1:30                                  || 9:30                       | 1:45                                  || 9:45                       | 2:00                                  || 10:00                      | 2:15                                  || 10:15                      | 2:30                                  || 10:30                      | 2:45                                  || 10:45                      | 3:00                                  || 11:00                      | 3:15                                  || 11:15                      | 3:30                                  || 11:30                      | 3:45                                  || 11:45                      | 4:00 General Carter returned from JSA || 12:00                      | 4:15 ave d meatt of                   || 12:15                      | 4:30 for wirt kennedy                 || 12:30                      | 4:45                                  || 12:45                      | 5:00                                  |MEMORANDA326 Friday, November 22, 1963 39
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 10]
13-00000LAST MONTH1963 OCTOBER 1963SMTWTFS1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 11 1213 14 15 16 17 18 1920 21 22 23 24 25 2627 28 29 30 311963 NOVEMBER 1963S M T W T F S1 23 4 5 6 7 8 910 11 12 13 14 15 1617 18 19 20 21 22 2324 25 26 27 28 29 30NEXT MONTH1963 DECEMBER 1963S M T W T F S1 2 3 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 1415 16 17 18 19 20 2122 23 24 25 26 27 2829 30 31Sat.-Sun. 23-24 November|       |                     A.M.                      |      | P.M. || ----- | :-------------------------------------------: | ---- | :--: || 8:30  |           DCI, Helms, clirs, R.Jajk           | 1:00 |      || 8:45  |  with col. White Dr. Jelini, Mr.Kirkpatrick   | 1:15 |      || 9:00  |                    at EAST                    | 1:30 |      || 9:15  |            Whit, Helms, Cline, LBK            |      |      || 9:30  |                                               | 1:45 |      || 9:45  |                                               | 2:00 |      || 10:00 |                                               | 2:15 |      || 10:15 |           met w/Whatin Kirkpatrick            | 2:30 |      || 10:30 | at Langley. Colored white, joined for a while | 2:45 |      || 10:45 |                                               | 3:00 |      || 11:00 |                                               | 3:15 |      || 11:15 |                                               | 3:30 |      || 11:30 |                                               | 3:45 |      || 11:45 |                                               | 4:00 |      || 12:00 |                                               | 4:15 |      || 12:15 |                                               | 4:30 |      || 12:30 |  to White House to pay respects to fresinant  | 4:45 |      || 12:45 |           tirr. by w/Mr Kirkpatrick           | 5:00 |      |MEMORANDASUNJAY-8:30 Meeting at East Bldg w/DCI & Intell Brickin, briefers, General Canter left at 12:00 for-12:15 meeting at DCI's house; then he was to go home327 Sat, Nov. 23, 1963 38 328 Sun, Nov. 24, 1963 37
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 11]
13-00000LAST MONTH1963 OCTOBER 1963S M T W T F S1 2 3 4 56 7 8 9 10 11 1213 14 15 16 17 18 1920 21 22 23 24 25 2627 28 29 30 311963 NOVEMBER 1963S M T W T F S1 23 4 5 6 7 8 910 11 12 13 14 15 1617 18 19 20 21 22 2324 25 26 27 28 29 30NEXT MONTH1963 DECEMBER 1963S M T W T F S1 2 3 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 1415 16 17 18 19 20 2122 23 24 25 26 27 2829 30 31# Monday# 25## NovemberA.M. P.M.8:45 clinc - at EAST8.30 Det, Kavanessing: PiSmith1:009:00 1:159:15 1:309:30 1:459:45 2:0010:00 Left to pick up Mrs Carter 2:1510:15 and Mrs. Me come to go to 2:30St. Matthew's10:30 2:45 Returned from Funeral10:45 after going to Quarters11:00 3:0011:15 3:15 Mr. Hetnes11:30 3:3011:45 3:4512:00 President Kennedy's funeral 4:00at St. Matthew's12:15 4:1512:30 4:3012:45 4:455:00MEMORANDA 6:30 St. C.al - Dinner hosted by General BarnesDr. Montage's - Navy Junior Club. (Red Room) in honorof visiting British JIC frank, Informal(do I will stop by - drinks - or way to other engagements)329 Monday, November 25, 1963 36Cancelled due to death of President Kennedy
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 12]
13-0000014 February 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting at 1600 on 13 February1. Present were Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone,   Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Mann,   General Carter, Mr. FitzGerald, and Peter Jessup. General   Taylor and Mr. FitzGerald were present only for the Cuban   item.2. Prior to the arrival of Mr. Bundy, General Taylor   mentioned to Mr. Alexis Johnson an upcoming trip of the Joint   Chiefs of Staff to Norfolk, Fort Bragg, and Panama. After   some jocular bantering, Mr. Johnson vetoed the Panama portion   of the trip, with General Taylor hoping that this denial was   purely for the physical protection of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.3. Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility that he might   go to Saigon next week to see what was going on out there. He   stated that we were not getting sufficient timely information   from the Ambassador and that while he and Mr. McNamara   might be going out later as a follow-up to their December trip,   he felt the need to go now. General Taylor pointed out that   there have been a great many visitors to Saigon in recent months   and perhaps we should give them a rest out there for a while.   In any event, he thought perhaps the newly-created NSAM com-   mittee headed by Sullivan would want to make such a trip. General   Taylor seemed reluctant to have Mr. McCone go at this time.   Mr. Johnson said he would take a look at it and be in touch with   Mr. McCone early next week.4. The first item on the agenda was a discussion of   the Vance memo of 10 February on "Clandestine and Covert   Activities Against Cuba." Mr. Vance stated that he was strongly   for this course of action, that the risks were minimal, and that
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 13]
- 2 -the JCS and Secretary McNamara also strongly supported it. Mr. Johnson pointed out that he would be much happier if the paper had been sent to the Cuban Coordinating Committee in accordance with usual procedures. Mr. Vance stated that the committee knows all about it and are for it. Mr. McCone stated that he was disturbed over the trend of events in Cuba and that this particular paper really does not go far enough. He pointed out that our economic denial program was eroding away and that the courses of action proposed by Mr. Vance's memo gave Castro maximum grounds for righteous indignation without really accomplishing anything. Mr. Vance stated that prior activities in this regard had created great consternation in Cuba, and Bundy challenged this and asked for proof. Mr. McCone pointed out the many times that we have had to stand down actions of this type in order to avoid raising the noise level. General Taylor said that what we really must do is to reaffirm the belief of the senior policy makers to the President that a program of this type must be continued. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the Secretary of Defense had previously stated to the President, along with Secretary Rusk, that they were not enthusiastic for this type of activity but he noted now that Mr. McNamara had reversed his position. Bundy pointed out that we have been somewhat hesitant to go ahead full force on these actions because we did not want to prejudice our position before the OAS in connection with the Venezuelan arms cache. Mann stated that our entire program as regards Cuba was ineffective insofar as it could result in any overthrow of Castro. At about this point both Mr. Mann and Mr. McCone stated that we should do everything possible to create provocations and distressing actions against Castro. Bundy stated that the low risk actions appear unrewarding and that rewarding actions have too high a risk. Mann stated that we need to do a lot more homework before the next OAS meeting (presently unscheduled) and Bundy said in any event we must have a top-level Cabinet Meeting with the President to discuss this whole matter. The agenda item was left as follows:a. Mann is to get the Crimmins staff hard at work on the Vance paper and on other alternative courses of action to include pros and cons, noise levels, estimated results, etc.
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 14]
b. Mann is to send around a draft OAS resolution which was prepared during Martin's time.c. As to the specific paragraphs of the Vance memo, Bundy indicated his personal views (not an Administration commitment) that items 1 and 2a were OK; 2b for Cuban ships only; 3a should be intensified; 3b and 3c were directly connected to a separate black-list enterprise; 4 was OK. As for actions against Cuban subversion in Latin America, on paragraph 1 we should see just what our opportunities are, and on paragraph 2 CIA should determine just what we think the local traffic will bear and just what our capabilities might be.Finally, after a very short discussion on low-level reconnaissance requirements for Cuba, General Taylor and Mr. McCone decided to pay close attention to high-level results on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, and to take a fresh reading on the matter on Monday. Action: DD/I to cover the low-level matter over the weekend, DD/P to ride herd on the activities generated by the Vance memo.5. The next item was a very cursory review of the covert action programs for Japan, France, Tibet, Taiwan, and China. Mr. Vance asked how we could measure the effectiveness of such actions and Mr. McCone pointed out to him that this could not be really adequately measured and gave all the reasons therefor. Mr. Vance stated that he was just getting broken into this type of activity and he would appreciate some briefings by the action officers. (It was subsequently arranged through Pete Jessup to have Colby and Bill O'Ryan make appointments with Secretary Vance specifically to discuss French operations and our Far Eastern operations.6. Mr. McCone then brought up the matter of the SAC U-2 aircraft in Manila as covered in his memorandum of 13 February which was not given any distribution. Mr. McCone said that ever since 1954 it had been established policy that all reconnaissance flights over denied and unfriendly territory or covert flights over
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 15]
- 4-friendly territory were a responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence with the customary approvals of the Special Group and that he wished this policy reaffirmed and proper direction be given so that the DCI would designate the organization and resources to be used, either SAC or CIA. Mr. Vance stated that NRO was involved and that upon receiving the urgent requirement from CINCPAC for this single flight and upon learning that the Taiwan assets were stood down because of fuel control problems, the JCS, Mr. McNamara, and he had agreed that SAC should fly the flight. He stated that Mr. McAfee of the State Department had been informed on Sunday night and that the Base Commander in the Philippines also knew about it. He stated that there were only two targets concerned and that with luck they could be obtained with a single flight. Mr. McCone pointed out that the question had not been raised with him by Steakley as to military aircraft or sanitized aircraft nor was he aware of the cover plan that might be utilized in the event of difficulties. Mr. Vance stated it would be the regular cover plan of a weather ship off course. Vance said this was a one-shot problem only and that as soon as it was completed, the planes and crews would be withdrawn. He said both he and McNamara were greatly surprised when they learned that SAC had sent three airplanes and seven crews to perform this single mission. He said they could understand the need for two airplanes in case one aborted but certainly not this large contingent. He said this had no connection with the South Vietnam broad coverage mapping and that the Taiwan assets should be used for this.7. It was apparent that all were in agreement that the Director of Central Intelligence had the responsibility for approving requirements for photo coverage and for determining the appropriate resources to be used for this coverage whenever it required overflights of denied or hostile territory or whenever it required covert flights over friendly territory. Mr. Bundy stated that the DCI should prepare the necessary directive to this effect and circulate it to the other members of the Special Group for their approval at the next meeting. Action: DD/S&T
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 16]
13-00000- 5 -to prepare for me by no later than noon Monday the simplest,most concise, directive along the foregoing lines.![Signature]Marshall S. CarterLieutenant General, USADeputy DirectorDistribution:Original - DDCI1 - Elder/EnrightParas 1-5 to Mr. Paul Eckel DDP/SGOParas 6 & 7 - DD/S&T
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 17]
STODETEYES CAY18 January 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Disarmament Meeting on 18 January 1964at the White House1. At 2:45 this date Mr. Alexis Johnson informed me that there would be a meeting with the President at 3:15 p. m., in the White House to discuss the most recent revision of his proposed statement to the Geneva Conference, and that I was expected to be there. Upon arriving at the meeting place I was handed a draft by Adrian Fisher. It subsequently developed that McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, and the President must have had this draft for at least long enough to have thoroughly reviewed and considered it. In any event, I read it immediately and was struck by the fact that in those areas of the original draft as given to Mr. McCone by Dr. Scoville in which the DCI had taken exception, ameliorating language had been inserted in the new draft to considerably temper and meet objections of Mr. McCone. The draft was now much more a speech by the President as to what he hoped might develop as a result of mutual give and take rather than a statement of U. S. policy and definite intentions.2. The President entered the room shortly, accompanied by Bill Moyer and Jack Valenti. Others present were Rusk, McNamara, General Taylor, Dr. Seaborg, Adrian Fisher, and myself. Alexis Johnson was not present.3. The President opened by stating that he had read the revised draft and wanted to know if there were any objections to it. Dr. Seaborg pointed out that he had some hesitancy about opening totally his closed-down plants for international inspection (paragraph 3, page 3) but that there were many ways of deter- mining whether or not the reactor was in fact shut down he simply did not want to give carte blanche to inspectors overrunning the entire plant. This position was adopted. Dr. Seaborg thenSTORETEYES CZY
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 18]
13-00000SECRETEYES ONLY- 2 -said that he wanted it understood that the closing down of theplants was not necessarily a permanent commitment and thatwhenever it became necessary or desirable, in the absenceof international agreement to the contrary, we should retaincomplete freedom of action to reopen a reactor any time wechose. This position was agreed.4. Mr. McNamara pointed out that he had been working   steadily the last few days to get agreement in the Pentagon on   a paper substantially in accord with this draft and that the only   thing that now gave them a problem was subparagraph (c) on   page 4 as to the establishment of nuclear-free zones. He said   if this could be deleted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the   Department of Defense would buy the paper. Their concern   was that we would get so involved in these zones that we would   lose freedom of action to shift nuclear weapons through the   Canal Zone, for example, or by air through overflights.   Secretary Rusk pointed out that they had discussed this a num-   ber of times before, that it was nothing new, and that he would   hope we could establish nuclear-free zones in Latin America   and Africa for example. The President said that when the   crunch came he depended on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that   he must have them on his side. Accordingly the paragraph on   nuclear-free zones was eliminated.5. I then stated that the President should know that there   was on record a letter from Mr. McCone pointing out some   problem areas that could develop in a number of these points,   particularly as to our getting back into a position of letting up   on the need for full and adequate verification. I further said   that aside from the intelligence aspects of the problem, there   were certain policy matters as regards reaction of West Germany,   and particularly France, that should be considered. The President   then asked for Mr. McCone's letter and glanced through it rather   hurriedly. General Taylor asked to see the letter and he did the   same. I then gave a copy to Secretary Rusk, particularly pointing   out those portions of DCI's letter concerning his membership on   the Committee of Principals and his reservations at the policySECRETEYES ONLY