Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10322-10056.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 199224 OCT 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceSUBJECT: Supplementary Information on James Earl RayREFERENCE: DDO Memorandum for DCI dated 23 October 1975Subject: Background for Rather Interview -James Earl RayDick Ober (then in CI) who wrote all the early Ray cables, recalls that he had numerous discussions with the FBI on the matter, and is certain that whatever we did was undertaken at the request of the FBI. Because of the fast moving situation, most of his discussions with the FBI were on the phone, and not the subject of written memoranda. The paper clipped outgoing cable in referring to Eric Galt (the man initially identified by the FBI as the assassin of Dr. King) requests "addressees make every effort determine if Galt is or has been in your area. Information para one should be passed to liaison and any other likely sources. FBI requests that any information reported be evaluated as to reliability and that as much detail as possible be provided. Cable any positive reply priority to HQS. and pass to legal attache if any in your country." There is a scribbled note in the file, presumably in Ober's hand, which reads: "4. Ray fingerprints: FBI agreed to my proposal we send to field for liaison." Ober, also logically points out that the FBI would not have provided us later with a fingerprint formula (see attached cable), a detailed physical description and photos unless they wanted this passed on to overseas liaison services. (Note that our cables did not go, for example, to Ottawa or Mexico City?)David H. BleeAssociate Deputy Directorfor OperationsAttachmentsE2 IMPDETCL-BY-035768
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13-00000ORIG: Richard OberUNIT: CIOP/DOEXTI: 6537DATE: 18 Apr 68CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATIONMESSAGE FORMTOTAL COPIES:ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS SEEN BY16273849510SECRETINDEX DESTROY RETURN TO BRANCH FILE RICNO INDEX FILE IN CS FILE NO.INFORID COPY FILE VR CS/RF, DCI D/DCI, DDPADOP, C/EUR, C/WH, C/FE, C/NESECRET19 0132 ZCITE DIRECTOR 92664TO: PRIORITY NO NIGHT ACTIONBOOKASUNCION, BANGKOK, BARCELONA, BEIRUT, BERLIN, BERN, BOGOTA,CARACASBRASILIA, BRUSSELS, BUENOS AIRES, COPENHAGEN,FRANKFURT, GENEVA, GEORGETOWN, GUATEMALA CITY,GUAYAQUIL, THE HAGUE, HAMBURG, HELSINKI, HONG KONG,KINGSTON, LA PAZ, LIMA, LONDON, MADRID, MANAGUA, MONTEVIDEO,NEW DELHI, LISBON, MANILA, MUNICH, OSLO, PANAMA CITY, PARIS,PORT AU PRINCE, PORT OF SPAIN, PORTO ALEGRE, QUITO, RECIFE,RAWALPINDI, RIO DE JANERIO, ROME, SAN JOSE, SANTO DOMINGO,SAN SALVADOR, SANTIAGO, SANTIAGO DE LOS CABALLEROS, SAO PAULO,STOCKHOLM, TEGUCIGALPA, TOKYO, VIENNA, ZURICH.RYBAT WOMUSE1. FOLLOWING INFORMATION FURNISHED BY LNERGOCONCERNING SUSPECTED ASSASSIN OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.NAME ERIC STARVO GALT, ALIAS HARVEY LOWMYER, ALIAS JOHNWILLARD, BORN 20 JULY 1931, HEIGHT FIVE FEET EIGHT INCHES TORELEASING OFFICERCOORDINATING OFFICERSSECRETGROUP 1Excluded from automaticdowngrading anddeclassificationREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.RAYAUTHENTICATINGOFFICERCOPY NO.
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QRIG:UNIT:EXT:DATE:CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATIONBY __________ PER __________ #CONFI:MESSAGE FORMTOTAL COPIES:SECRETROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY16273849510INDEX DESTROY RETURN TO BRANCH FILE RILNO INDEX FILE IN CS FILE NO.INFO:RID COPY FILE VR(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number) (pi)TO CITE DIRECTOR 92664FIVE FEET ELEVEN INCHES, WEIGHT 160-175 POUNDS, MEDIUMBUILD, BROWN HAIR, PROBABLY CUT SHORT, BLUE OR HAZEL EYES,MEDIUM COMPLEXION, RACE WHITE. OCCUPATION: HAS CLAIMEDEMPLOYMENT AS SEAMAN. REMARKS: NOTICEABLY PROTRUDINGLEFT EAR; REPORTEDLY IS A LONE WOLF; ALLEGEDLY ATTENDEDDANCE INSTRUCTION SCHOOL; HAS REPORTEDLY COMPLETED XXXCOURSE IN BARTENDING; CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELYDANGEROUS.2. WILL POUCH PHOTO OF GALT TO ANY ADDRESSEE   DESIRING IT. ADVISE.3. GALTS CURRENT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. WHILE HAVE   NO REASON BELIEVE GALT HEADED FOR YOUR AREA, DESIRE   COVER ALL POSSIBILITIES.4. REQUEST ADDRESSEES MAKE EVERY EFFORT DETERMINE   IF GALT IS OR HAS BEEN IN YOUR AREA. NEXXX INFORMATION PARA ONE   SHOULD BE PASSED TO LIAISON AND ANY OTHER LIKELY SOURCES.RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERSSECRETGROUP 1Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassificationREPROL TION DY OTHER MAN THE ISSUING OFF MIS PROHIBITED.AUTHENTICATINGOFFICERCOPY NO.
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13-00000UNIT:EXT:DATE:CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATIONBY____________PER._________#CONF: INFO: FILE VRRID COPYMESSAGE FORMTOTAL COPIES:SECRETROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY|     |     || --- | --- || 1   | 6   || 2   | 7   || 3   | 8   || 4   | 9   || 5   | 10  |INDEX DESTROY RETURN TO. BRANCH FILE RNO INDEX FILE IN CS FILE NO.(classification) (date and time filed) (elito) (F(reference number)TO Γ LNERGO REQUESTS THAT ANY INFORMATION REPORTED BE EVALUATEDAS TO RELIABILITY AND THAT AS MO MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLEBE PROVIDED. CABLE ANY POSITIVE REPLY PRIORITY TO HQS ANDPASS TO LEGAL ATTACHE IF ANY IN AT YOUR COUNTRY.DC/CI (in draft)(Mr. Hunt)E/COPSWH/FI (by phone)(Mr. Smyth)DC/FE (by phone)( Mr. Smith)CI/OP/DODDP by direction/St. for C/NERELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICERSECRETGROUP IExcluded from automatic downgrading and declossilicationCOPY NO.REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
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13.00000104-10322-101012025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992OLC/HSCAr. Breckinridge29N0078Donaldt VogelDDCI14 DEC 197812. Don Vasel    DOSE/OR Talked to SalesIconaron aboveSuppose Selectrying theExecutive Registry of the meeting with Stores.178-72/3/114 DEC 1978SECRET SENSITIVEBY HANDFORM 610 USE PREVIOUS3-62 EDITIONSSECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNALUSE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED
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13-00000SECRET SENSITIVEExecutive Registry29 November 1978MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central IntelligenceVIA : Deputy Director for OperationsActing Chief, Soviet/East European DivisionFROM : Donald F. VogelDCSE/ORPSUBJECT : Talking Paper for Briefing Chairman Stokes,HSCA, on KITTY HAWKSIGNED BY : Donald F. VogelDCSE/ORPCONCURRENCE : Deputy Director for OperationsORIGINATED BY : Donald F. VogelDCSE/ORPACTION :DISTRIBUTION : Original - DDCI1 - Executive Registry (dummy copy)1 - DDO1 - ADDO1 - DDO Registry (dummy copy)1 - C/CI1 - AC/SE1 - DCSE/ORPWARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS.INVOLVED E2 IMPDET CL BY 007117SECRET SENSITIVE![Executive Registry stamp]
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13-00000SECRET SENSITIVEDD/0.78:7248Executivo Registry78-721329 November 1978MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central IntelligenceVIA : Deputy Director for OperationsActing Chief, Soviet/East European DivisionFROM : Donald F. VogelDCSE/ORPSUBJECT : Talking Paper for Briefing Chairman Stokes,HSCA, on KITTY HAWK1. The Chief Counsel of the House Select Committee on Assassination, Mr. G. Robert Blakey, has requested access to "all reports and documents referring to an operation code named KITTY HAWK," which Mr. Blakey describes as "a project concerning the debriefing of a Soviet defector and a KGB analysis of the Kennedy assassination." You propose to provide Chairman Stokes an oral response to this request.2. Chairman Stokes may be informed that "KITTY HAWK" is not a defector but is a very sensitive in-place KGB source with whom we have not had recent contact but who is known to be alive and well. There has been some mention of KITTY HAWK in the press in connection with the current investigation of the fate of Nicholas SHADRIN, an FBI-CIA double agent who disappeared in 1975 while in Vienna for a meeting with the KGB. In spite of the unfortunate publicity, however, KITTY HAWK has apparently been able to survive KGB scrutiny thus far, and we continue to abide by the Director's statutory obligation to protect his identity.3. We have reviewed our holdings on KITTY HAWK and have found no reference to any "KGB analysis of the Kennedy assassination" or any other information pertinent to the Committee's interest. Discussion of the assassination ofWARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVEDE2 IMPDET CL BY 007117SECRET SENSITIVE
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SECRET SENSITIVE- 2 -President Kennedy took up only a small portion of the time spent in debriefing KITTY HAWK. You may wish to inform Chairman Stokes that in 1966 KITTY HAWK volunteered his impression that Kennedy's assassination "was planned and carried out by VIP's, possibly due to Kennedy's opposition to Texas oil interests." He added that he believed that the KGB was embarking on a "disinformation" campaign to have the assassination blamed on President Johnson, but he had no specific details of this campaign. KITTY HAWK also said that he was "personally well acquainted" with Lee Harvey Oswald's background because he had helped prepare the file on Oswald which was turned over to the United States Government by the Soviet Government. KITTY HAWK was not questioned further on this point, and there is no further reference in the KITTY HAWK file to any KGB or Soviet Government activity with respect to the assassination.4. Although strictly speaking it is not relevant to this inquiry, you should be aware of the fact that KITTY HAWK supported Nosenko's bona fides by reporting that Nosenko had done the KGB considerable damage (more than Golitsyn) and that the KGB was looking for Nosenko and intended to kill him if they found him. This is pertinent because those who hold to the theory that Nosenko was a plant tend also to subscribe to the belief that any KGB source or defector who supported Nosenko's bona fides was also KGB-controlled. Introduction of KITTY HAWK into the assassination controversy can only serve the purpose of obfuscation.Donald F. VogelCONCUR:Deputy Director for OperationsDateSECRET SENSITIVE
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# CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM.RELEASE AS SANITIZED1999MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: DCI Meeting with Chairman Boland of HPSCI, 5 Dec. 1978At the Director's request, he met with Chairman Boland accompanied by the Legislative Counsel in the HPSCI offices. He asked to brief the Chairman alone on two private matters.1. With respect to the first, the Kampiles Case, the DCI informed Chairman Boland of the sensitive source information involved in the case after the Chairman indicated that he was interested in this information. The DCI reminded Chairman Boland that the DDCI had offered to brief him when the Kampiles Case first broke but that the Chairman had not deemed it necessary to receive the information at that time. After the communication, Chairman Boland agreed with the DCI that it might be best not to brief Mr. Mazzoli or other Members of the Committee. The DCI informed the Chairman that he might have some personal difficulty with Mr. Mazzoli on the question during his first appearance in the New Year, but it was agreed that the DCI would be able to make his explanations. ( S)2. The DCI briefed Chairman Boland on a personal matter and indicated that he had briefed Chairman Bayh on the same question. (C)3. Messrs Latimer and O'Neil joined the meeting at this point. The DCI discussed the Iranian situation, the alleged intelligence failure and the hand-written memo from the President. He indicated that the President's displeasure had not been directed at him personally, but at the subject of political reporting in general, both overt and covert, and Chairman Boland described the answer which he had given to ABC News a week ago on this point. The Chairman had apparently stated that political reporting was an Embassy function and not one solely the responsibility of the Intelligence Community. (C)4. Charters: The DCI asked HPSCI to get involved in the Charters questions at an early stage and not wait for the Senate to finish its work. Because of the Church Committee legacy there are likely to remain some important differences between the Senate and the Administration on Charters questions on which the DCI stated it would be helpful to have the HPSCI view during the negotiation process. Tom Latimer then asked that we make sure we keep him supplied with all the position papers that have been developed by the Working Group which we agreed to do. (C)5. Finally, the DCI discussed the Authorization Bill and our hope that an FOIA repealer and a provision permitting our security people to carry guns be included. Mike O'Neill later called back to obtain our language on these questions which we have agreed to supply him. ( C )From the standpoint of the Committee, Chairman Boland asked whether we had had any extensive involvement with SAVAK during the reporting period on Iran. The answer was negative with respect to Iranian domestic
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13-00000SECRET2activity. Secondly, the Chairman brought up the question as to whether we had received any report from Guyana about the goings on at Jonestown at the time of the Ryan incident. The Director replied that (our Chief of Station) had picked up some information on Jonestown subsequent to the incident and had passed it to the State Department since it involved U.S. persons. Later Tom Latimer and Charlie Rose asked me for a full readout of our information from Guyana so that the Committee would be in a position to state clearly what the limitations on our knowledge in that area are.(C)Frederick P. HitzLegislative CounselDISTRIBUTION: DCIDDCIDDOERMP (OLC)OLC Record CopyFPH ChronORIGINAL CLBY 532-112DECL OREVW ON 12/7/98EXT BYND 6 YRS BY 532-112REASON 3D3SECRET
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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRETHALPERN, SAMInterview by Brian Latell, Michael Warner7 APRIL 1998MW: This is the interview with Sam Halpern, done by Brian Latell and Michael Warner in the spaces of the Center for the Study of Intelligence on the 7th of April, 1998.BL: Sam, you told me that you read recently the IG report on the Bay of Pigs.SH: I did, and the responses....BL: Which were recently declassified by the Agency, and you told me that you had never seen it before, and that had you seen it when you were running Operation Mongoose you would have learned some critical lessons. You said that it was a shame that you had not seen it.SH: That's right. Neither did Bissell; I mean, neither did Harvey and neither did Ted Shackley. Harvey's dead so I couldn't ask him, but I asked Ted the other day whether he had ever seen the report, and he said no he had never seen it and nobody had ever talked to him about it. So here you have the man in charge of a new Cuban Bay of Pigs SIC Operation, although we weren't going to send in 1,000 troops. And you have the guy in charge of the whole thing, Bill Harvey, and of course the DDP himself, Dick Helms. Helms by that time....When we were doing Mongoose, none of the three people, none of the three senior people ever saw the damn thing. I think McCone was wrong not to let those three people, at least those three people, see the thing, because the sections dealing with the organization and management of the whole Bay of Pigs Operation had lessons for what we were doing in Mongoose, and we were running the same kind of operation in terms of trying to overthrow a foreign government.BL: What, in particular, would you have done differently? What specifically, what lesson specifically applied to Mongoose?1SECRET
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SECRETSH: I think one of the biggest things was a Governmental structure and what and how it was done, and how it was done under Mongoose. Fortunately under Mongoose CIA was not the main target of the Government structure. We were part of a Government-wide operation, as opposed to the Bay of Pigs. The Bay of Pigs as I read the report was basically a CIA operation supported to some extent by the Defense Department and politically by the State Department. In Mongoose it was totally different in that directions all directions - came from the White House, basically Bobby Kennedy, through the voice of a fellow called General Edward Landsdale. But in terms of the management of the thing, one of the best things that ever happened in Mongoose was that the three senior people who were involved in this, namely John A. McCone as DCI, Dean Rusk as Secretary of State, and Bob McNamara as Secretary of Defense, refused, flat out, to follow the original concept of Mongoose, which was that Ed Lansdale would be set up as Chief of Operations reporting to Bobby Kennedy, the Attorney General. All the other agencies of Government the three I mentioned plus Commerce, Treasury, USIA, and God knows how many other pieces would all have detailed men, money, and material to Lansdale, in effect creating a brand new agency. The three senior members of the cabinet that I mentioned, except for the Director, three senior members said "no, we can't do that. Congress appropriates the money to us and we're responsible for the money and the manpower and the material. We'll put our shoulders to the wheel, we'll follow all your orders, but only through command channels." That's what made Mongoose different than the Bay of Pigs. In the Bay of Pigs the CIA stood out like a sore thumb, and in Mongoose CIA was subdued in terms of just being part of a whole series of people that were involved. In terms of the organizational structure, and the management of the thing, I think that with Harvey, particularly, in charge, and with Helms as his boss as DDP, we avoided one problem automatically in there were two senior men who organized our part of Mongoose the way we in the Agency had always done in terms of headquarters and the field station. We regarded Miami, which was headed by Ted Shackley, as almost the equivalent of headquarters. It was JMWAVE. He had more people under his command than we had in the branch, or in the task force up in Washington. I think he ended up with about 600 staffers including commo and logistics and God knows what else.BL: So you did solve that problem?
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13-00000SECRETSH: We solved that problem.BL: Because the IG report criticized the Bay of Pigs Operation because of the poor coordination/communication between Miami and Headquarters.SH: We did it without knowing that. We set up our organization without knowing what way they had done it before. It was sheer luck. You had Harvey and you had Helms. Two old hands in the DDP business, and that's the way we set it up. But I think if we had known what the problem was in the Bay of Pigs operation I think we would have been helped a bit, in terms of at least watching out for that because there could have been a real problem if somebody had said it back here, "Hey you're doing it all wrong you know; you can't have a station in the United States." Well, in this case we didn't even ask anybody, and we didn't ask Landsdale, and we didn't the President, and we didn't ask Bobby, we just did it our way, and with the support of a guy called Larry Houston, CIA's General Counsel, who said, "Set it up any way you want to," in effect. "You guys are responsible and you are reporting to the President; go, and go with God.” And we did. But I think we would have felt a lot more, at least I would have felt more comfortable, in knowing that we weren't going to face some of the problems that Jake Esterline had faced. One of the things we didn't have to worry about, and Jake did have to worry about, is this business of the air support. We weren't worrying about air support because we weren't operating in Air Branch or anything like that. Jake's problem, for example - which Bissell thought he had solved by that memorandum that he wrote in October of 1960 where he set up the command relationship between DPD and Branch 4....It's fine on a piece of paper, but I asked Jake specifically "How'd it work?" He said it didn't. Those things just don't happen the way you write them on a piece of paper and dictate in a memorandum.MW: Development Plans Division, DPD, acted as an independent entity and basically answered to the DDCI Cabell.SH: Well, first they answered to a guy called Bissell. It was Bissell's private air force, and he ran it as his private air force. Fortunately we didn't have to worry about that one, but Jake did, and all the memorandums in the world didn't help any on that one. Listening to3SECRET
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13-00000SECRETJake on that - in terms of trying to get air support - it was basically on a person-to-person basis. It's what you can wheedle out of somebody and get them to do it the right way instead of being able to command them and not having to spend your time massaging a guy's back. That's one of the key problems I thought, and also Jake's relationship, or Washington's relationship with Miami, was obviously, if you read the report, and even the rebuttal, I thought it was very confusing. Case officers did not know really who their boss was. Maybe they should have looked at who was writing their fitness reports, I suppose is one way, but it was too haphazard. We tried to organize it, again it was sheer luck. We tried to organize it, as I say, as if Miami was a foreign station and Ted had all the rights and privileges of a Chief of Station abroad. The fact that he was in the United States didn't bother us at all; we never thought of it that way. Largely because you've got a guy like Harvey in charge, who, despite the fact that he was a gruff SOB, had a heart of melted butter when it came to his own troops. He would never let anybody, at any level, blast at one of his troops without himself, in effect, taking out of his guns and shooting the SOB who did it.I'll give you a perfect example of that. I was on a telephone call to J.C. King, and J.C. was chewing me out on the phone about something I wasn't even involved in, but anyway he chewed me out. I finished my conversation with him, if you want to call it that, hung up, and at that time Harvey buzzed me to come in and see him. So I came in and I must of had a hang-dog look on my face or something, and he looked up at me and he said, "What's the matter with you?" I said J.C. just chewed the ass out of me. He said, "For what?" I said, "Nothing, I wasn't even involved." He didn't ask any questions. He picked up the phone and dialed to J.C. Himself. Before I could say anything he started to read J.C. the riot act, in only his language, which makes paratroop language look like a church meeting. In effect he said, "Look, if there is anybody that's going to chew out my troops, I'm going to chew out my troops. Don't you ever do that again without checking with me first. If you've got trouble with some of my troops you talk to me and not to them." Moves his arm as if he is slamming down the receiver. I think J.C. must have lost his ear then. It was awful. Ok, you got a guy like Bill Harvey in charge - Jake couldn't do that. But Jake for example, Jake and Col. Jack Hawkins both resigned from the Bay of Pigs operation up in the Agency. Bissell took them to his house, on a Sunday morning, talks them into reneging and staying with the4SECRET