Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10332-10016.pdf — page 4]
SECRETSUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources11. (U) These statutes are just a few examples of a larger government policy to protect human sources from public disclosure. There has also developed over the years a significant amount of case law which further implements this policy. For example, in *Sims v. CIA*, 10 S.Ct. 1981 (1985), the Supreme Court held that pursuant to the National Security Act, the DCI had the authority to protect from release to Freedom of Information Act requesters the identities of individuals conducting research on projects financed by CIA. The Supreme Court further stated that the DCI's authority to protect sources was broad, and was not limited to only those individuals who were guaranteed confidentiality.12. (U) Most recently, President Clinton signed an Executive Order on classified national security information which came into effect in October 1995. Although it requires that agencies make greater declassification efforts than the prior Executive Order, Executive Order 12958 affords human sources extra protection from its declassification provisions. Under E.O. 12958, information that is over 25 years old and has historical value must be declassified within five years. However, information revealing the identity of a human source may continue to be protected.13. (U) The above federal statutes and case law show a long-standing practice of protecting human sources who provide intelligence information to the U.S. Government. In carrying out its statutory obligations, the Review Board should give serious weight to this policy and afford the protection of human sources the highest priority.III. Operational Considerations14. (U) As the Review Board is well aware, in order for CIA officers to effectively collect intelligence around the world, they cannot acknowledge publicly that they work for CIA and, conversely, CIA cannot acknowledge a particular individual's affiliation with it. This is true even more so with sources. In addition to the risk to a source's personal safety, discovery of a CIA source would also reveal any operations he was conducting and CIA case officers with whom he was meeting or might even cast suspicion on the[^1][^1]: (U) The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552 is another example of a federal statute that allows for the protection of human sources. Although the FOIA generally mandates release of government documents, exemption b(3) allows for withholding from release information that is exempted from disclosure by statute. The National Security Act has been held by the Supreme Court to be such a withholding statute. *Sims v. CIA*, 105 S.Ct. 1981 (1985).
[104-10332-10016.pdf — page 5]
SECRETSUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sourcesaffiliation of innocent family and friends. This is no lesstrue with a source who no longer works for the Agency. Asource's prior affiliation with CIA is normally stillclassified in order to protect him, his former contacts atCIA, the CIA facilities at which he may have been meetingwith case officers, the cover mechanisms employed to protecthis affiliation with CIA, and the operations which heconducted.15. (U) The public disclosure of an individual's    affiliation with CIA could and, in fact, has threatened the    safety and lives of not only the source, but also their    families, colleagues, officials of foreign governments and    other foreign nationals with whom they have had contact.    The Review Board will certainly recall the Proenza case    (since this was released by the Board in August 1995) in    which a number of Cuban officials were falsely believed to    be CIA agents. They were arrested, convicted and spent    years in prison for their alleged treasonous activities and    their professional and personal lives were ruined. The    threat of violence to those who are in fact associated with    CIA is even more real. These individuals live and work in    foreign countries, many of which have a local population    hostile to the United States and especially CIA. If one    should doubt the risks that those affiliated with CIA face,    one only has to recall that, in 1992, two CIA employees were    murdered while waiting to turn into CIA Headquarters in    Virginia. If this type of attack is possible right at the    CIA's front gate, it is not hard to imagine the personal    risks that those working with the CIA abroad face. Clearly,    the risk is that much greater for those who are sources:    for example, as a result of Aldrich Ames' disclosures to    the KGB, 10 Soviets who were covert assets of the CIA were    executed.16. (U) Incidents such as these clearly demonstrate    that the policy of protecting association with the CIA is an    important one. Individuals associated with CIA have been    and will continue to be subjected to threats, reprisals and    physical injuries from foreign intelligence services,    terrorist groups, and other persons or organizations hostile    to CIA or the U.S. Government. Individuals choose to    undertake these risks for many different reasons, but it is    with the condition that the CIA will protect their    cooperation with the U.S. Government.IV. Proposal17. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is    important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA    sources in the JFK Collection. The Agency proposes that in
[104-10332-10016.pdf — page 6]
# SECRETSUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sourcesmost cases a substitution for the true name be used. In prior releases of these same documents, the Review Board agreed to redact the true name and substitute “source.” If the Review Board is concerned about tracking particular sources throughout the records, a particular identifying substitution can be used for an individual source throughout (for example, "Mexican source 1").18. (S) Among the names that are currently being considered for release by the Review Board, the following are some that the CIA proposes be treated in this manner:*   True name of LIRING/3, an encrypted asset of the CIA and unilateral penetration of the Cuban Embassy. His wife also worked at the Embassy and he was apparently suspected as being CIA though it was never proven. LIRING/3 at some point disappeared and we have no way of knowing what his current situation is.*   True name of ERTHYROID/3, the unilateral penetration of the Nicaraguan Service. The Review Board will recall that it has already been fully briefed on ERTHYROID/3 and had agreed to the protection of the fact that he was a unilateral source.*   Anthony C. M. Devere (1041001210022) was [is] a member of the British Service. As such, he was (is) a liaison source. This raises concerns about protection of our liaison relationships. Moreover, Mr. Devere's identity constitutes "foreign government information" which, as the Board has already been informed, the CIA does not have the authority to release.19. (S) Another type of name that similarly should be protected from release is the new identity provided to a defector. Although defectors do not face some of the dangers that "assets" overseas face, they are still given new identities for their protection because there is some risk to their personal safety even in the U.S. For example, in this collection the identity of Golitsyn appears in documents being reviewed this month. Since the time of his defection, Golitsyn has utilized successive identities, because they have been unofficially disclosed, that have not[^2] (S) Golitsyn's identity had to be changed again. However, there is a risk that revealing this former identity could lead to the identification of Golitsyn's current identity.[^2]7
[104-10332-10016.pdf — page 7]
SECRETSUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sourcesbeen officially released and that are closely held within the Agency. This is done for his own protection and that of his family even though they live in the United States. CIA cannot, at this time, agree to the official release of Golitsyn's assumed new identities or for that matter of any defectors that appear to date in the collection.20. (S) CIA has noted that in some cases a source is identified by only a first name or a code name. Where CIA has been unable to identify any information about that individual or there is no other source revealing information that has been revealed in the JFK Collection, it would be possible to release that name. For example, in a few documents, the name "Tota" appears. To date, CIA has been unable to determine who this person is and there does not appear to be any further source revealing information in the collection. It is probably that "Tota" is just a code name or a street name known to his colleagues. As "Tota" is a common name, such a release would not threaten the particular individual or his family, and as the person can not be identified it would not seriously undermine the U.S. Government policy to protect intelligence sources.21. (U) The Agency recognizes that some names may be particularly important to the JFK story. In such cases, the CIA is willing to work with the Review Board to come to the appropriate resolution. CIA proposes that it conduct a record search for information on that individual. It may be that in these cases, if the person is deceased and has no living family, that the Review Board and the CIA can agree that the value of revealing the true name outweighs the need to protect that source from disclosure.22. (U) It is our hope that the CIA and the Review Board can work out a mutually agreeable policy regarding the identity of human sources that will not undermine the important policy of protecting those who work covertly for the U.S. Government. As usual, my staff and I are available to discuss this matter with you.![signature of John F. Pereira]John F. PereiraChief, Historical Review Group8SECRET
[104-10332-10016.pdf — page 8]
SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human SourcesDCI/CSI/J.Pereira: apd/x31805 (13 Dec 96)G:/CSIFO/SHARED/Pereira.docDistribution:Original - Addressee1 - CSI/HRP Chrono1 - D/CSI1 - C/CSI/HRG1 - Barry Harrrelson, CSI/HRP1 - Linda Cipiriani, OGC9SECRET
[104-10332-10016.pdf — page 9]
MEMORANDUMSeptember 25, 1998To: Laura DenkExecutive Directorcc: Bob SkwirotCIA Team LeaderFrom: Michelle CombsAssociate Director for Research and ReviewSubject: No Evidence of Contact Between Lee Harvey Oswald and the CIA's Office of OperationsOne of the enigmas that has surrounded Lee Harvey Oswald's defection and re-defection is the question of whether the CIA's Office of Operations (later the Domestic Contacts Division) interviewed or took note of Oswald either before his trip or upon his return from the Soviet Union. The available evidence is somewhat contradictory. The CIA has long claimed that Oswald was never a source, asset, or employee of the CIA. Yet, a November 25, 1963 memorandum discusses the recollections of a CIA staff officer that the Agency considered interviewing Oswald. Further, another former CIA officer, Donald E. Deneselya, has stated that he recalls reading an OQ debriefing report in the summer of 1962 from a former Marine re- defector who had worked at the Minsk Radio Factory. The Review Board could not corroborate the recollections of the two former CIA officers with additional records or information.In an effort to clarify the mystery, the Review Board searched for records that might confirm or deny any contact between Oswald and the CIA before or after his time in the Soviet Union. In the early 1960's, the Office of Operations (00) was a part of the Directorate of Intelligence. This office, which interviews American citizens who might have come into contact with information or individuals of intelligence interest overseas, later became the Domestic Contacts Division (DCD) of the Directorate of Operations. This office normally only contacts individuals after receiving questions or requirements from intelligence community customers looking for particular types of information.The Review Board staff examined OO records and operational histories to gain an understanding of OO practices in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The Review Board staff could find no evidence of contact between Oswald and OO either before or after his time in the Soviet Union. Had Oswald departed for his trip to the Soviet Union through New York City, as did most travelers, he possibly might have come to the attention of OO. The Review Board staff did not locate any reference or record to Oswald's departure from New Orleans via freighter that predates the assassination. The Review Board staff also could not locate any information to
[104-10332-10016.pdf — page 10]
13-00000document an OO interest in Oswald upon his return from the Soviet Union. While OO was interested in interviewing tourists to the Soviet Union for general information in the 1950's, by 1962 only travelers with special access, knowledge, or skills were of intelligence interest. OO had no specific policy covering contacts with returning defectors although a local field office could initiate a contact if justified by a particular situation. According to the records located, OO only made contact with three of twenty-three defectors in the 1954-1962 time period. No records or reporting showing any OO contact with Oswald could be located. The Office of Operations did interview re-defector Robert Edward Webster in June 1962 on his work at the Plastics Institute of Leningrad.While a DCD "A" file on Oswald does exist in the CIA's sequestered collection, most of the documents in the file are from the mid-1970's, none predate the assassination, and the file appears to have been created as DCD personnel attempted to locate any evidence of contacts with Oswald in response to various congressional investigative bodies. This file has been processed for inclusion in the JFK Collection at the National Archives.File 4.50 (Wrap Up Memos)
[104-10332-10016.pdf — page 11]
SECRET9 October 1997Memorandum to: Jeremy GunnExecutive DirectorAssassination Records Review BoardFrom: J. Barry HarrelsonJFK Project OfficerCIA/CSI/HRGSubject: October 14 Meeting - Source NamesReference: "A" Name List of Sources(CIA requests that this memorandum and its attachmentsbe returned once the Review Board has completed itsdeliberation on the names discussed below.)1.  Manuel Calvillo, an unwitting source of Alfonso    Wichtrich (see below). Calvillo became a figure in the JFK    story, when Elena Garro de Paz identified him as the person    who sequestered her in a hotel after she protested at the    Cuban Embassy. Because of this link to stories related to    Oswald's visit to Mexico City, Calvillo is considered a JFK    assassination figure. His name and all assassination-related    information have been released in collection. However, his    crypt when linked to his true name has been deleted. The    CIA requests that his crypt not be released when associated    with the true name in order to protect Wichtrich and other    involved with the LIHUFF project. The linkage of Calvillo's    true name with his crypt could lead to his association with    and identification of Wichtrich and his assistant.2.  CIA concurs with the release of the following name    in the specific documents cited:Miguel Nazar-Haro in documents 104-10052-10058and 104-10014-10016.Because of the relationship of this individual with the CIA,future documents containing his name must be reviewed on acase-by-case basis; there may be situations in which theAgency will request that the name be protected.SECRETCL BY: 611637CL REASON: 1.5 (c)DECL ON: X1DRV FRM: COV 2-87
[104-10332-10016.pdf — page 12]
SECRET3. Phillipe Thyyraud De Vosjoli:Former head of the French Service in Washington (1951-63), De Vosjoli retired and became a CIA/FBI asset. As a USG asset, he had contact with German and Canadian Intelligence Services in the mid-1960s and early 1970s. He became a naturalized US citizen c.1971. Apparently his case was not handled in normal defector channels as the responsible component has no records of De Vosjoli. His 201 file shows that his last substantive contact with the Agency was in 1972 and was initiated by him from Florida. Although De Vosjoli has publicly acknowledged his unilateral relationship with the Agency during his tour in Washington, it is not clear if the extent of his activities following his defection is widely known. Official confirmation of his "defection" could potentially affect the Agency's foreign liaison relationships.4. The CIA requests that the three names discussed below from the A List be protected. All are, or were, covert assets of the Agency. The Agency has a moral, and possibly a legal, obligation to protect their identities. As a basic tenet of the covert relationship, the Agency agreed to protect the fact of their relationships with the USG; and they, in turn, promised to keep those relationships secret. To our knowledge, the individuals have honored this basic contractual commitment. The Agency believes that the possible harm to the individuals, their families and/or associates, and the potential for damage to sensitive intelligence operations, outweigh the contribution the release of these three names would make to public understanding of the assassination. The Agency is particularly concerned about the erosion of the principle of protecting the identity of sources and the potential chilling effect on future agent operations and recruitment. The Agency is further concerned about the possibility of liability to the individuals and their families for failure to honor its commitments of confidentiality.A. Franklin Anthony Garcia Wheelock.The Agency acknowledges that Wheelock is a key figure in the Alavarado story, and it has released all information (including his crypt) except for his name. It is not known if Wheelock is still alive. However, he had five children who may still be living in Nicaragua and are probably unaware of their father's Agency relationship. The release of his name could have negative repercussions for Wheelock and his family. Nicaragua is a small, provincial place, and Wheelock's patronymic name is a prominent one in the country. Revelation of his name and his relationship with CIA would be quickly disseminated within Nicaragua, and his family members would be easily identified. SuchSECRET
[104-10332-10016.pdf — page 13]
# SECRETidentification could result in anything from public humiliation to dangerous retaliation by the thriving leftist Sandinistas. In either case, disclosure would undercut the Agency's ability to recruit sources in small countries such as Nicaragua.B. Jose Marie Mankel.Mr. Mankel is a central figure in the Agency project named ZRRIFLE. The Agency has released his crypt and al- most all the information related to the project. Mankel's relationship with the Agency commenced in November 1960 and ended in February 1964. Our files do not reflect any contact since that time. It is presumed that, if Mankel is still alive, he is living in Luxembourg.Mankel had numerous acquaintances in European criminal circles, and, on behalf of Agency/ZRRIFLE interests, he sought out individuals from this element. Acknowledgment that Mankel worked for the USG/CIA could result in personal harm to him, his family, and associates. In addition, his 201 file, which is in the JFK collection, contains a number of references to his support of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Given the potential compromise of individuals and operations totally unrelated to the JFK story, the Agency requests that Mankel's true name continue to be protected. Coordination with DEA may also be required in this case. Mankel's 201 File is available for review in the CIA secure area.C. Alfonso Rudolph Wichtrich.A WWII intelligence officer, Wichtrich worked with the Agency in Panama during 1947-49 and in Mexico City from 1954-70 in various capacities (Station contact, field agent, and contract agent). A prominent businessman, he was general manager of the Royal Crown Cola Company in Mexico and later was executive vice president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico. During the JFK time frame, he was primary agent on a CA project (LIHUFF), initially set up to support a conservative front organization. He later became the sole focus of the project. In that role he also served as the cut-out for an unwitting individual, Manuel Calvillo (see above). Wichtrich's only link to the JFK story appears to be his relationship with Calvillo. A review of his files (OP, 201, C, Production) by the ARRB staff did not identify any other connection to the JFK story. A selection of documents from his file are attached.# SECRET
[104-10332-10016.pdf — page 14]
SECRET> Given Wichtrich's high profile, the release of his name> could impact both past and future intelligence operations> and directly affect Mr. Wichtrich and his family. His son> had contact with the Panama City Station in 1979; we are> trying to determine the extent of that relationship. In this> case, the Agency believes that the potential for harm> clearly outweighs the contribution the release of> Wichtrich's name would make to the JFK assassination story.![signature]J. Barry HarrelsonAttachments: As statedSECRET
[104-10332-10020.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review GroupFROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.DO, Focal Point for ARRBSUBJECT: Position on Release of Information Pertaining to Mexico City Station and the JFK Assassination RecordsESG 95-0214 July 19951. At its monthly meeting on 17 July the ARRB will be addressing the issue of the Mexico City Station and its operation in light of any deletions made by the Agency to protect sources and methods. The issues of greatest concern are those surrounding the joint teltap operations run by the Agency and the Mexican Services, official acknowledgment of which could have an impact on liaison and foreign relations. We therefore, wish to maintain protection of this information.2. We are willing to release information which indicates the existence of operational teltaps against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies as long as they appear unilateral and we can continue to protect the existence of any participation of the Mexican Services. We are willing to release documents which indicate the existence of Mexico City Station during times outside the window which we have acknowledged when they contribute significantly to the historical record. These steps will be useful to the historic record and reveal the extent of coverage employed against these targets. We would want to continue protection of the information which identifies coverage of other countries and individuals other than Lee Harvey Oswald.3. We also agree to release of the following:   A. Pseudonyms of employees, aliases of employees, and file numbers.CL BY 524343DECL OADRDRV COV 2-87
[104-10332-10020.pdf — page 1]
13-00000SECRETSUBJECT: Position on Release of Information Pertaining to MexicoCity Station and the JFK Assassination RecordsB. Cryptonyms, such as those in the LI series, unless they appear in the context of liaison operational equities (such as LITENSOR and LITEMPO).C. We need to continue the protection of the cryptonym LIENVOY.This cryptonym is used extensively throughout the collect to describe the joint activity from different perspectives. Individual occurrences may not seem to reveal anything significant but, when looking at the cryptonym in context over the entire collection it reveals the joint activity which we are trying to protect.4. Regarding the revelation of names of employees who retired under cover, we request the Board to table its final determination until the individuals have been contacted and informed that their name is being considered for release. This will allow the individual to consider the impact it will have and convey relevant information. The Directorate database is not set up to track individuals who were involved in specific operations. We need the assistance of the employees to know their operational involvement's. Office of Central Cover has prepared and is coordinating a letter to be sent to the employees which will both inform them and solicit their assistance/comments.![signature of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.]Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.2SECRET