Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10307-10024.pdf — page 7]
and through the development of additional legal travellers.4. Liaison Operations: We will continue to press the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint dispatch to Cuba. The services most effectively co-operating at this point in this connection are the (British) (Dutch) (French) (Spanish) (Italian) (Greek), (Norwegian, Danish, West German (Mexican) (Argentinian), (Uruguayan) (Canadian) Chilean) (and Israeli) Direct approaches to several of these services either by you personally or in your name, as you prefer, are being separately recommended. Personal representation by you to the services underlined above would be useful. In addition, we will re-survey all other liaison services with which we are in contact and reiterate to those appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem. In connection with the liaison problem generally, we will endeavor to induce all of the liaison services to make greater use of their national assets, both inside and outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to possible utilization of the (Vatican)5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime assets through liaison services, we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and-8-
[104-10307-10024.pdf — page 8]
particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the (twenty)officers and crew members aboard(six) Cuban vessels we arenow running as controlled agents.6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At   the present time we are running (12) Cuban diplomats   stationed outside Cuba as controlled agents and have viable   operations aimed at an additional (20) Cuban diplomats.   We propose to continue and intensify the current program   of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuban official   representative abroad to whom we can gain access and   concerning whom we have any reason to believe a   susceptibility to approach exists. These additional   penetrations will be attempted both through unilateral   operations and where appropriate in conjunction with   liaison services.7. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations   Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or   telephone tap coverage of Cuban official installations   in (Chile) (Italy), Mexico), (The Netherlands) (England)   (Uruguay), Greece) Spain, (France) and Canada) No   major expansion of this coverage is presently   contemplated, but we will continue to survey additional   targets of opportunity and wherever possible install   coverage in those cases where the additional intelli-   gence from this type of source over and above what we   are now receiving would appear to make such installation   worthwhile.
[104-10307-10024.pdf — page 9]
8. Communications Intelligence: We will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communications. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even increase their (seaborne) intercept coverage of Cuban communications.9. Communist Party Operations: A complete survey has been made world-wide of all Communist Party penetration operations and wherever any such penetration can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban targets, this will be done, except in those cases where such action would result in unacceptable prejudice to the operations in the area where the agent is now based. It is believed that the most lucrative field for the redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will be Latin America where there are (65) penetrations of various communist parties. Of this (65) the survey we have conducted indicates that (23) have some direct pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these (23) w111 be directed against these targets unless in any case there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The remaining cases in the total of (65) are bein individually examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.-10-
[104-10307-10024.pdf — page 10]
10. **Illegally Infiltrated Agents**: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and at the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar del 24 Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as possible, train additional agents legally resident in Cuba.11. **Exfiltration**: As feasible, agents and potential recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for training, indoctrination, supplying with communications, and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible, this will be done through legal travel channels, but where this is not possible, it will be done wherever feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration facilities, primarily our maritime assets.-11-
[104-10307-10024.pdf — page 11]
# SPLITTING THE REGIMEB. Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress or strain within the regime and between the regime and other nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible fashion. This is basically a long term effort. A great deal of work already has gone into this and the current status of this program and the proposed further expldtation of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed at actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United States Government to support them and it is entirely possible that any such effort might fail unless supported with military forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I above would appear unlikely.C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is proposed to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but no active or wide scale program is contemplated.-12-
[104-10307-10024.pdf — page 12]
D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrilla Type Operations:Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking such operations in order to fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban conditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.E. Economic Warfare: It is proposed to continue and intensify the program already undertaken to deny through clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic materials to Cuba.F. Counterintelligence: The current counterintelligence and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and related services will be continued and as possible intensified. This program has developed substantially and it should be possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelligence operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba.G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare:In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified:1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.
[104-10307-10024.pdf — page 13]
13-00000to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin Americanattitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrowof the Castro-communist regime.2, Assist State in the development of post-Castroconcepts, leaders, and political groups.3. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the   propaganda and political action activities of the CRC   and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as   appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside   Cuba.4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the   Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum   use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during   the missile crisis.5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime   in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis   on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated con-   clusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of   Soviet imperialism.6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-   sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational   capability has been established and policy authority is   granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material   into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers,   with special emphasis on selective black operations.-14-
[104-10307-10024.pdf — page 14]
H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continue the clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence collection, psychological warfare and other approved missions. As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort as possible from areas outside the continental United States, and particularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decides on a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept which contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directed action operations of Cuban groups against Cuba, it is believed that efforts should be made to transfer as much as possible of the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligence type operation into the political field, which is the province of the Department of State. In this connection, it is believed it would be advisable to press for the creation within the Department of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs to handle the overt government relationships with Cuban exile groups.IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:Maximum implementation of the above plan which provides for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence, the implementation of related programs as outlined, and the maintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity as well as take advantage of any future substantial changes in internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit and make advisable the following:-15-
[104-10307-10024.pdf — page 15]
A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures and personnel of Task Force W.B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component of the WH Division under different direction.C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.D. The removal of the past framework which required detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of even minor operational details and decision by committee on points which it is believed are completely within the purview of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.V. RECOMMENDED ACTION:A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan is recommended.B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miami and Havana at the appropriate time.D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled-16-
[104-10307-10024.pdf — page 16]
subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational mechanism be abolished.F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendations will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force W within the DD/P.![Signature]WILLIAM K. HARVEYChief, Task Force W-17-
[104-10308-10023.pdf — page 0]
# DISPATCHTO Chief, Task ForceINFO. FROM Chief of Station, JMWAVESUBJECT Operational/GYROGEOperational DebriefingsACTION REQUIRED. REFERENCESAction Required: None.Reference: UFGA-4088.During the month of May 1962 the following persons, 'processing through the CAC, were considered to be of operational importance to JMWAVE.1. Rafael *ARRIBAS Rodriguez (A 12 895 148). Subject, a former Medical Products Salesman, had contacts with two employees of the Post Office in Cuba. The leads he provided were considered marginal and dropped for further operational exploitation.2. Jose Francisco *AZOR Ores (A 12 911 733). Subject, a rural census taker for the INRA, is undergoing a thorough debrief- ing on OB and cartographic information by the AMOTs.3. Manuel CABRERA Rodriguez (A 12 911 477). Subject, a former railroad worker in Camaguey and ex-Rebel Army Battalion Commander, was debriefed on positive intelligence information. The results of this debriefing were forwarded to Reports for dissemination.4. (Dr). Jaime *CARBONELL Rivero (A 12 907 852). Subject, a former night club owner in Havana, submitted two plans to assassinate Fidel Castro. The results of this debriefing were forwarded to Headquarters in UFCA-4176, dated 31 May 1962.5. Abel Julio *COLINORIO Vasquez (A 12 971 774). Subject, a former Naval Chauffeur and member of the END, is being de- briefed on operational leads and positive intelligence.6.06 Rafael Rinaldo *DIAZ Veira) (A 12 444 465). Subject, a Pharmacist) and co-owner of a medical testing clinic in Pinaro del Rio, was recruited, trained in SW before he returned to Cuba. JMWAVE plans to start a new collection network centered(continued)Distribution:3-HeadquartersCS COPYDATE TYPED 25 June 62DATE DISPATCHED 9 2DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-4543HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 19-120-33CLASSIFICATION SECRET4/P/
[104-10308-10023.pdf — page 2]
# CONTINUATION OF DISPATCHalso offered to re-infiltrate to contact (MARTINEZ). Subjectcould not provide sufficient detailed biographic data on06 (MARTINEZ) with which to risk using a KUBARK internal asset tocontact him. An investigation was initiated through theAMOTS to determine more biographic data so serious consider-ation could be given for contacting (MARTINEZ).17. Manuel Felix SUAREZ Pozo (A 12 903 186). Subject, a lawyer    and a former underground member in Havana, was debriefed    further on operational leads. Letters to the more important    members of his group have been written in an effort to    establish communications and to exploit their operational    potential.18. Miguel Archangel SUAREZ Valdez (A 12 895 991). Subject, a    former resistance group member, was debriefed further on    operational leads and is currently expecting a courier from    the resistance group leader in Havana, who allegedly has agents    who have access to a Soviet COMINT station.19. Miguel Angel YANES Garcia (A 12 903 525). Subject, a former    employee in the Ministry of Public Works and a member of the    END, was debriefed for operational leads and positive    intelligence. Subject refused to reveal any FND assets in    Cuba and he had only margianl intelligence to provide.END OF DISPATCH
[104-10308-10024.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992(                                                   SECRET                                                )November 1976MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC)Encrypted AMBUDJob # 64-239/53File #19-124-25Inclusive Dates: 61 thru 64Volumes: 141. Desæription:A organization formed in New York City on 22 March 1961 under the guidance of the U.S. Government for the purpose of unifying the various exile groups in the U.S. File smacks of exile disappointment in U.S. Government's policy which seemed to abandon plans to liberate Cuba. (See attached.) Material concerns resignations, coalitions, agreements, in-fighting, political aspirations of the various players,. organizational structure and financing.2. Findings:WAVE 6617 (IN 98730) dated 1 April 1963:Cable from WAVE to Headquarters. Stated that the exile colony is in an uproar over notices to the Cuban exile action leaders prohibiting travel outside of Dade County. Reaction among exiles appears universal over this issue and was anti-U.S. and anti-Kennedy. Even though notices only sent to selected leaders, the order was interpreted as applicable to all exiles and the beginning of co-existence.LAD/JFK Task ForceAttachment:
[104-10308-10024.pdf — page 1]
- 2 -b. UFGA 3926 dated 1 May 1962: 19-124-25Dispatch from JMWAVE to Headquarters, which forwarded (not attached) a paper prepared within the Station on-the subject of the restructurization and revitalization of the C.R.C. Noted that the Station had major concern with regard to the extent and scope of non-CIA support, in the clandestine field, to the CUBAN exiles and to the CUBAN underground. It would appeciate info furnished by Hqs. or other field stations."(Marty Miller)-Researcher
[104-10308-10029.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: AMCANOEJob # 65-535/28File # 19-6-91Dates included:Volumes: 111. Description:This project concerns U.S. contacts for a resistance group in Cuba. Support of the Unidad de Liberacion Nacional (ULN) and their plans and efforts to overthrow CASTRO.Principle players are:AMCANOE-1 (201-0283570) Eduardo GARCIA MolinaAMCANOE-2 (201-0726572) Enrique Alfredo GARCIA MolinaAMCANOE-3 (201-0727185) Antonio Jose RAMIREZ Mendez, captured and executed in Jan 64;AMCANOE-4 (201-0729621) Armando SOSA RodriguezAMCANOE-5 (201-0727186) Marcelino PEREZ DiezAMCANOE-6 (201-0729610) Orlando OROPESA PerezAMCANOE-7 (201-0729080) Benjamin ACOSTA Valdes, captures tried and killed by firing squad 15 Sept 63.AMCANOE-9 (201- ) Juan AMESTOY Dominguez, killed 29 Sept 63 in a gun battle.
[104-10308-10029.pdf — page 1]
2. Review of these files turned up the following documents:TDCSDB-3/654-571, dated 9 May 63: Concerns efforts of Cuban lawyer Paulino A SIERRA of Chicago to unify exiles and an offer by Chicago businessmen to support the overthrow of CASTRO.Memo for the Record dated 3 March 1964: a friend of AMCANOE-1 who is a businessman and ship owner, with interests in a slot machine business (placing them in gambling houses), placed him in contact with elements of the underwrold, through a former St. Louis police officer. Through the police officer there was reportedly a tie-in with the Cosa Nostra. The latter reportedly offered to assassinate CASTRO at a price of $150,000 dollars.UFGA-15233, dated 15 April 1964: Report on a Byron CAMERON who said that he represented an unidentified group of persons who had made contact with two Cuban gangsters who were willing to kill Fidel CASTRO. CAMERON reportedly was associated with a Mr. S.W. TYLER (no identifiable traces) of Caribbean Producer, Inc., Miami Springs, Fla., and Herbert F. JENNE (no traces) with the firm F.A. Johnson, Inc., Fort Lauderdale, Fla.UFGA-15954, dated 11 May 1964: CAMERON mentioned contact with unidentified group willing to assassinate selected Cuban leaders: Fidel CASTRO, Raul CASTRO and Che GUEVARA. CAMERON made fairly clear that the MAFIA was involved.Jane ZeranceResearcher
[104-10308-10043.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRETFebruary 1977MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: JMARC ProgramJob # 62-705/8File # 19-120-15/2Dates Included: 1960-61Volumes: 91. Description:These files concerned all the support activitiesfor the training and supply of all the infiltration forcesin 1960-61.2. Findings:a. MASH 1470 (IN 38669) 6 Nov 60:The deputy of Manuel ARTIME (AMBIDDY-1) reported that (Eduardo OJEDA Camaraza) had contactedAMYUM/AMRUNG complex in Havana for help in accomplishingmission and if his bona fides were not establishedAMRUNG/AMYUM may arrange to kill (OJEDA) as he was eithervery untrustworthy or positive CASTRO penetration/provocateur.b. RIMM 5846, 4 June 1961:Radio message received from agent # 84 -"Functionary Italian Embassy by the name of MORATORI sayshe works for one intelligence org. of yours, he says he isin contact with Martin Elena and others and that you haveplans for invasion within 30 days after killing Fidel,advise if we can confide in MORATORI."
[104-10308-10043.pdf — page 1]
c. BELL. 0897 (OUT 9804) 6 June 1961:"MORATORI unknown to us. Do not confide in him.MORATORI's information of pending invasion within 30 days after killing Fidel not true. Beware of rumor mongers and provocateurs."LAD/JFK Task ForceAttachments: a/sChris HopkinsResearcher: (Martin Miller)
[104-10308-10043.pdf — page 2]
# SECRET13-00000DATE: 6 NOV 60TO: DIRECTORFROM: JMASHRE Filing (check one):No C8 Record Value. Destroy.RI file this copy as indicatedACTION: WH 9 (MR.ISAMINGER, WH NOTIFIER deck 3:15, 6 NOV.)INFO: COP, ADDP/A, S/C 2Signature: Thonpoon17-120-15/2.* ROUTINGNOV 6 1838Z 60OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATEIN 38669OPIM DIRINFO PRITY HAVA, CITE MASH 1470JMNETREF A. MASH 1466 (N38221)B. TRAV 0083 (IN-26165)1. FOLL FROM MANOLIN GUILLOT (AMBIDDY-1 DEPUTY) MORNING 6 NOV:A. FNU (RECAREY) COUSIN OF ONE OF GUAT TRAINEES, ARRIVED MASH FROM HAVA AFTERNOON 5 NOV. SPECIFIC MISSION TO ESTABLISH BONA FIDES (EDUARDO OJEDA CAMARAZA)B. (RECAREY) TOLD AMBIDDY COMPLEX MASH (OJEDA) HAD MADE CONTACT AMYUM/AMRUNG COMPLEX HAVA FOR HELP IN ACCOMPLISHING MISSION. IN ATTEMPT ESTABLISH OWN BONA FIDES HAD TOLD PERSONAL STORY IN SOME DETAIL: INCULDING MASH RECRUITMENT, TRAV TRAINING, PBPRIMER ADVISORS, NAMES OF SOME TRAINEES, MISSION IN CUBA ETC.C. TOLD HAVA CONTRACTS NEEDED HELP BECAUSE HE NO LONGER HAD ACCESS FAMILY FINCA, OPS CLIMARE NOT WHAT HE HAD EXPECTED.2. (RECAREY) PLANS RETURN HAVA MORNING 7 NOV. AS SITUATION NOW STANDS:A. MASH CAN ESTABLISH BONA FIDES THROUGH MASH AMBIDDY CONTACTS WHICH WILL GUARANTEE SOME DEGREE AMRUNG/AMYUM COOPERATION BUT AT EXPENSE CONFIRMATION ANY CLAIMS (OJEDA) MAY HAVE MADE RE TRAINING,SECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.(35)
[104-10308-10043.pdf — page 3]
CLASSIFIED MESSAGESECRETASH 1470IN 38669 PAGE 2B. IF BONA FIDES NOT ESTABLISHED AMRUNG/AMYUM MAY ARRANGEKILL OJEDA AS EITHER VERY UNTRUSTWORTHY OR POSITIVE CASTRO.RE Filing (check one):RI file this copy as indicatedPENETRATION/PROVOCATEUR.Branch copy filed as indicated:RE Indexing (check one):3. PLS ADVISE AS TO DESIRED MASH ACTION OR TDY CASE OFFICER   Signature:ZABOTH TO HANDLE. BELIEVE MASH CAN DELAY RECAREY RETURN 24/48 HRS.END OF MESSAGES/C NOTE: BEING SERVICED FOR DUPLICATE MSG NUMBER.![RI COPY]![ges]![3rd folder]FORM 1389. USE PREVIOUSEDITIONS:SECRET