Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10328-10038.pdf — page 80]
13-00000124-90107-10391; 1; 10/2017124-90107-10393; 2; 10/2017124-90107-10395; 5; 10/2017124-90107-10396; 2; 10/2017124-90107-10398; 6; 10/2017124-90107-10399; 4; 10/2017124-90107-10400; 4; 10/2017124-90107-10402; 1; 10/2017124-90107-10403; 3; 10/2017124-90107-10410; 5; 10/2017124-90107-10412; 39; 10/2017124-90107-10413; 5; 10/2017124-90107-10417; 9; 10/2017124-90107-10419; 4; 10/2017HSCA Documents: Open in Full180-10105-10076; 0; 10/2017HSCA Documents: Postponed in Part180-10110-10017; 100; 10/1999180-10110-10028; 91; 10/2003180-10113-10119; 35; 10/2003180-10128-10002; 18; 10/2017180-10131-10328; 86; 10/2017180-10142-10250; 3; 10/2017180-10142-10428; 1; 10/2017180-10143-10157; 6; 05/2001180-10143-10297; 23; 10/2017180-10144-10213; 13; 10/1999180-10144-10227; 48; 10/199970
[104-10328-10038.pdf — page 81]
13-00000180-10144-10240; 7; 10/2017180-10144-10244; 4; 10/2017180-10144-10327; 1; 10/2017180-10145-10078; 1; 10/2017180-10145-10216; 8; 10/2017180-10145-10227; 2; 10/2017180-10145-10234; 2; 10/2017180-10145-10239; 16; 10/2017180-10146-10067; 1; 10/2017180-10147-10190; 1; 10/2017NSA Documents: Postponed in Part144-10001-10270; 48; 10/2017144-10001-10271; 10; 10/2017144-10001-10272; 10; 10/2017144-10001-10273; 15; 10/2017144-10001-10274; 8; 10/2017144-10001-10275; 19; 10/2017144-10001-10276; 28; 10/2017144-10001-10277; 31; 10/2017144-10001-10279; 38; 10/2017144-10001-10280; 8; 10/2017144-10001-10282; 1; 10/2017144-10001-10283; 34; 10/2017144-10001-10284; 28; 10/2017144-10001-10285; 18; 10/2017144-10001-10286; 28; 10/2017144-10001-10287; 51; 10/2017144-10001-10288; 5; 10/201780
[104-10328-10038.pdf — page 82]
13-00000144-10001-10289; 11; 10/2017144-10001-10290; 38; 10/2017144-10001-10292; 26; 10/2017144-10001-10293; 12; 10/2017144-10001-10294; 13; 10/2017144-10001-10295; 10; 10/2017144-10001-10296; 11; 10/2017144-10001-10297; 13; 10/2017144-10001-10298; 14; 10/2017144-10001-10299; 31; 10/2017144-10001-10300; 9; 10/2017144-10001-10301; 14; 10/2017144-10001-10302; 10; 10/2017144-10001-10303; 8; 10/2017144-10001-10304; 10; 10/2017144-10001-10305; 22; 10/2017144-10001-10306; 11; 10/2017144-10001-10307; 12; 10/2017144-10001-10308; 8; 10/2017144-10001-10309; 11; 10/2017144-10001-10310; 24; 10/2017144-10001-10311; 13; 10/2017144-10001-10312; 14; 10/2017144-10001-10313; 9; 10/2017144-10001-10314; 13; 10/2017144-10001-10315; 27; 10/2017144-10001-10316; 13; 10/2017144-10001-10317; 9; 10/201781
[104-10328-10038.pdf — page 83]
13-00000144-10001-10318; 11; 10/2017144-10001-10319; 8; 10/2017144-10001-10320; 29; 10/2017144-10001-10321; 8; 10/2017144-10001-10322; 23; 10/2017144-10001-10323; 9; 10/2017144-10001-10324; 12; 10/2017144-10001-10325; 12; 10/2017144-10001-10326; 16; 10/2017144-10001-10327; 12; 10/2017144-10001-10328; 9; 10/2017144-10001-10329; 17; 10/2017144-10001-10330; 16; 10/2017144-10001-10331; 12; 10/2017144-10001-10332; 13; 10/2017144-10001-10333; 12; 10/2017144-10001-10334; 11; 10/2017144-10001-10335; 13; 10/2017144-10001-10336; 10; 10/2017144-10001-10337; 11; 10/2017144-10001-10338; 8; 10/2017144-10001-10339; 10; 10/2017144-10001-10340; 13; 10/2017144-10001-10341; 13; 10/2017144-10001-10342; 20; 10/2017144-10001-10343; 9; 10/2017144-10001-10344; 12; 10/2017144-10001-10345; 11; 10/201782
[104-10328-10038.pdf — page 84]
13-00000144-10001-10346; 18; 10/2017144-10001-10347; 11; 10/2017144-10001-10348; 10; 10/2017144-10001-10349; 14; 10/2017144-10001-10350; 13; 10/2017144-10001-10351; 22; 10/2017144-10001-10352; 14; 10/2017144-10001-10353; 8; 10/2017144-10001-10354; 9; 10/2017144-10001-10355; 10; 10, 10/2017144-10001-10356; 11; 10/2017144-10001-10357; 12; 10/2017144-10001-10358; 16; 10/2017144-10001-10359; 20; 10/2017144-10001-10360; 8; 10/2017144-10001-10361; 9; 10/2017144-10001-10362; 11; 10/2017144-10001-10363; 11; 10/2017144-10001-10364; 5; 10/2017144-10001-10365; 26; 10/2017144-10001-10366; 7; 10/2017144-10001-10367; 24; 10/2017144-10001-10368; 10; 10/2017144-10001-10369; 14; 10/2017144-10001-10370; 19; 10/2017144-10001-10371; 11; 10/2017144-10001-10372; 15; 10/2017144-10001-10373; 11; 10/201783
[104-10328-10038.pdf — page 85]
144-10001-10374; 10; 10/2017144-10001-10375; 22; 10/2017144-10001-10376; 49; 10/2017144-10001-10378; 6; 10/2017PFIAB Documents: Postponed in Part206-10001-10000; 25; 10/2017206-10001-10001; 45; 10/2017206-10001-10002; 85; 10/2017206-10001-10003; 35; 10/2017206-10001-10004; 20; 10/2017206-10001-10005; 92; 10/2017206-10001-10006; 11; 10/2017206-10001-10007; 18; 10/2017206-10001-10008; 15; 10/2017206-10001-10009; 16; 10/2017206-10001-10010; 19; 10/2017206-10001-10011; 55; 10/2017206-10001-10012; 106; 10/2017206-10001-10013; 65; 10/2017206-10001-10014; 6; 10/2017206-10001-10015; 12; 10/2017206-10001-10016; 19; 10/2017206-10001-10017; 19; 10/2017US ARMY (IRR) Documents: Open in Full194-10001-10228; 0; None194-10001-10372; 0; None194-10001-10373; 0; NoneUS ARMY (IRR) Documents: Postponed in Part84
[104-10328-10038.pdf — page 86]
13-0000085194-10001-10378; 2; 10/2017194-10001-10379; 1; 10/2017194-10001-10380; 1; 10/2017194-10001-10381; 1; 10/2017194-10002-10155; 3; 10/2017194-10002-10156; 2; 10/2017194-10002-10157; 2; 10/2017194-10002-10159; 1; 10/2017194-10002-10160; 1; 10/2017194-10002-10161; 6; 10/2017194-10002-10162; 1; 10/2017194-10002-10163; 5; 10/2017194-10002-10164; 1; 10/2017194-10002-10182; 3; 10/2017194-10002-10183; 4; 10/2017194-10002-10185; 25; 10/2017194-10002-10187; 41; 10/2017194-10002-10189; 17; 10/2017194-10002-10192; 1; 10/2017194-10002-10195; 7; 10/2017194-10002-10201; 2; 10/2017194-10002-10203; 59; 10/2017194-10002-10204; 4; 10/2017194-10002-10205; 1; 10/2017194-10002-10206; 17; 10/2017194-10002-10207; 1; 10/2017194-10002-10208; 34; 10/2017194-10002-10209; 2; 10/2017
[104-10328-10038.pdf — page 87]
13-00000194-10002-10212; 5; 10/2017194-10002-10213; 2; 10/2017194-10002-10214; 5; 10/2017194-10005-10079; 1; 10/2017194-10005-10080; 5; 10/2017194-10005-10081; 3; 10/2017194-10005-10082; 1; 10/2017194-10005-10083; 2; 10/2017194-10005-10084; 5; 10/2017194-10005-10085; 4; 10/2017194-10005-10087; 2; 10/2017194-10005-10088; 2; 10/2017194-10005-10089; 10; 10/2017194-10005-10090; 4; 10/2017194-10005-10091; 4; 10/2017194-10005-10092; 6; 10/2017194-10005-10093; 3; 10/2017194-10005-10094; 1; 10/2017194-10005-10095; 1; 10/2017194-10005-10096; 2; 10/2017194-10005-10097; 1; 10/2017194-10005-10098; 2; 10/2017194-10005-10099; 1; 10/2017194-10005-10100; 2; 10/2017194-10005-10101; 2; 10/2017194-10005-10102; 3; 10/2017194-10005-10103; 2; 10/2017194-10005-10104; 4; 10/201786
[104-10328-10038.pdf — page 88]
13-0000087194-10005-10105; 3; 10/2017194-10005-10106; 1; 10/2017194-10005-10107; 2; 10/2017194-10005-10108; 1; 10/2017194-10005-10109; 2; 10/2017194-10005-10110; 2; 10/2017194-10005-10111; 4; 10/2017194-10005-10117; 2; 10/2017194-10005-10118; 3; 10/2017194-10005-10119; 3; 10/2017194-10005-10120; 2; 10/2017194-10005-10121; 2; 10/2017194-10005-10122; 2; 10/2017194-10005-10123; 1; 10/2017194-10005-10124; 2; 10/2017194-10005-10125; 5; 10/2017194-10005-10126; 4; 10/2017194-10005-10127; 5; 10/2017194-10005-10128; 3; 10/2017194-10005-10140; 7; 10/2017194-10006-10000; 6; 10/2017194-10006-10001; 10; 10/2017-194-10006-10002; 4; 10/2017194-10006-10003; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10005; 4; 10/2017194-10006-10008; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10009; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10010; 3; 10/2017
[104-10328-10038.pdf — page 89]
13-0000088194-10006-10011; 3; 10/2017194-10006-10012; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10013; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10014; 2; 10/2017194-10006-10015; 3; 10/2017194-10006-10016; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10017; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10018; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10020; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10021; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10022; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10024; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10029; 2; 10/2017194-10006-10032; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10033; 3; 10/2017194-10006-10036; 3; 10/2017194-10006-10037; 2; 10/2017194-10006-10038; 4; 10/2017194-10006-10039; 12; 10/2017194-10006-10040; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10041; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10042; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10043; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10044; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10045; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10046; 2; 10/2017194-10006-10048; 2; 10/2017194-10006-10051; 2; 10/2017
[104-10328-10038.pdf — page 90]
13-00000NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL RELEASES89194-10006-10053; 2; 10/2017194-10006-10054; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10055; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10056; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10057; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10058; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10059; 4; 10/2017194-10006-10060; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10061; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10062; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10177; 1; 10/2017194-10006-10178; 3; 10/2017194-10006-10179; 2; 10/2017194-10006-10180; 5; 10/2017194-10006-10181; 6; 10/2017194-10006-10183; 2; 10/2017194-10006-10184; 2; 10/2017194-10006-10185; 2; 10/2017194-10006-10186; 3; 10/2017194-10006-10187; 2; 10/2017194-10006-10188; 2; 10/2017194-10006-10194; 2; 10/2017194-10006-10195; 2; 10/2017194-10006-10196; 2; 10/2017194-10006-10197; 2; 10/2017194-10006-10198; 2; 10/2017194-10006-10207; 1; 10/2017
[104-10328-10038.pdf — page 91]
13-00000After consultation with appropriate Federal agencies, the Review Board announces that the following U.S. Army records (IRR) are now being opened in full:194-10002-10181; 194-10002-10184; 194-10002-10186; 194-10002-10188; 194-10002-10190; 194-10002-10191; 194-10002-10193; 194-10002-10194; 194-10002-10196; 194-10002-10197; 194-10002-10198; 194-10002-10199; 194-10002-10200; 194-10002-10202; 194-10002-10210; 194-10002-10211; 194-10002-10215; 194-10003-10157; 194-10006-10004; 194-10006-10006; 194-10006-10007; 194-10006-10023; 194-10006-10025; 194-10006-10026; 194-10006-10027; 194-10006-10028; 194-10006-10030; 194-10006-10031; 194-10006-10034; 194-10006-10047; 194-10006-10049; 194-10006-10050; 194-10006-10052; 194-10006-10182; 194-10006-10189; 194-10006-10190; 194-10006-10191; 194-10006-10192; 194-10006-10193After consultation with appropriate Federal agencies, the Review Board announces that the following Church Committee records are now being opened in full:157-10011-10079; 157-10014-10076NOTICE OF CORRECTIONS:On August 6, 1998 the Review Board made formal determinations that were published in the August 24, 1998 Federal Register (FR 98-22482, 63 FR 12345). The Review Board determined that the following records are not believed relevant to the JFK Assassination:US ARMY (IRR) Documents194-10001-10323194-10001-10415194-10001-10417194-10001-10421On August 25, 1998 the Review Board made formal determinations that were published in the September 15, 1998 Federal Register (FR 98-24741, 63 FR 12345).The following document was mistakenly included in the list of Church Committee90
[104-10328-10038.pdf — page 92]
13-00000documents opened in full: 194-10013-10383September 22, 1998![signature]Laura A. DenkExecutive Director91
[104-10330-10010.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRET15 May 1995FOR:David MarwellExecutive Director, ARRBFROM:John PereiraCIA/Historical Review GroupSUBJECT:Mexico City/Sensitive InformationThe Directorate of Operations prepared the attached statement to assist the Assassination Records Review Board. The statement explains the sensitivity of the records related to telephone tap operations in Mexico City. This may help provide a perspective for further discussions on the subject.![signature of John Pereira]John PereiraAttachmentSECRET
[104-10330-10010.pdf — page 1]
SECRETSUBJECT: Release of Information on Mexico City Teltaps1. Protection of sources and methods and liaison equities require that references to the Mexico City Station teltap activity be excised from any documents released under the auspices of the JFK Assassination Record Collection Act of 1992. While the teltap activity mentioned in the documents under review occurred some thirty plus years ago, the joint teltap operation with Mexican liaison has never been terminated; it continues to this day in a slightly different form.2. Release of any information that would constitute official USG acknowledgment of the existence of the joint teltap operation would have a serious adverse impact on current operations. Relations between the Station and the liaison service would be affected, with the likely outcome of discouraging liaison from cooperating in similar ventures in the future with Mexico City Station. Official acknowledgment of the existence of the joint teltap in the 1960's would embarrass the liaison service given Mexico's strong brand of nationalism and sensitivity towards the issue of sovereignty vis a vis the United States. The service probably would terminate its cooperation with the Station on the current joint teltap operation in order to be able to defend itself against domestic critics.SECRET
[104-10330-10026.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRETDD/01-3059- 7 NOV 1995MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, JFK Assassination Records Review BoardFROM: David CohenDeputy Director for OperationsSUBJECT: Release of JFK Documents1. I understand the JFK AARB is presently considering the release of documents which would identify CIA stations to the public. I am opposed in general to revealing the locations of our stations and would prefer instead to substitute the station name with a regional designation, e.g. European Station vice Brussels. I would be willing, however, to open certain stations during a specific window of time if they are substantively relevant to the assassination investigation and provided that the documents in question are sanitized to conceal the permanent presence of the station. (S)2. In all but a handful of instances, public acknowledgment of a station would be a political embarrassment to the host government and would threaten ongoing sensitive operations and liaison relationships. In a few instances, the damage probably would be minimal or not at all as long as the presence appears to be temporary. I have surveyed the involved components and determined the damage to national security which would follow such release. (S)3. I strongly urge that you not allow the information regarding the Congo and Senegal to be released. The Congo is now Zaire and the station in the 60's would have been in Leopoldville, now Kinshasa where we are currently located. Our current relationship with the Zaireans is not a full-blown liaison type, but more of a limited relationship with certain individuals from the services. In the past, we have had closeCL BY 0695930CL REASON: 1.5 (C)DECL ON: X1DRV FRM LOC 3-82SECRET
[104-10330-10026.pdf — page 1]
SECRETSUBJECT: Release of JFK Documentsrelationships with the Zaireans because of our need for their cooperation in assisting with a Presidentially-mandated program and will need to improve our relationship over the next several months to accomplish our goals in that part of the world. We also continue to have a Station in Dakar, Senegal. We have liaison there and would not want to jeopardize it. In dealing with developmental contacts, there have been recent instances where potential assets have voiced concern about our Agency's ability to keep its relationships clandestine. To expose our station there would further hamper developmental relationships and eventual recruitments. (S)4. Within the context of our European presence, I have the following comments:Brussels - Public acknowledgment would force the government and liaison service to pay closer attention to Station operations and therefore present a threat to ongoing sensitive operations. (S)Helsinki - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment of a CIA station would embarrass the government and liaison; thereby inhibiting the close and productive liaison relationships we now enjoy as well as presenting a threat to ongoing sensitive operations. (8)Paris - No additional damage. (8)Bonn - No specific damage. (S)Berlin - No specific damage. (8)Luxembourg - Public acknowledgment would embarrass the government and inhibit liaison cooperation; thus endangering ongoing operations. (S)The Hague - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from the press and create political problems for the government and liaison. This would endanger the continuation of sensitive joint operations. (S)2SECRET
[104-10330-10026.pdf — page 2]
SECRETSUBJECT: Release of JFK DocumentsOslo - Public acknowledgment would draw questions from the press and threaten very productive and very sensitive ongoing joint operations. (S)Madrid - Public acknowledgment would draw press attention and embarrassing questions for the government and liaison service. This would further damage an already delicate liaison relationship which is vital to us for counterterrorism operations. (S)Stockholm - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment would be politically embarrassing for the government and liaison services. This would likely endanger any continuation of joint operations. (S)Geneva - A neutral country. Public acknowledgment would create political problems for the government and liaison service and force greater attention to our operations. This would create an intensive counterintelligence atmosphere for our operations; likely to cause a decrease in our operations. (S)London - No specific damage. (S)Ottawa - No specific damage. (S)5. Our Eastern European stations pose a unique problem when we consider public exposure. Prague Station is recovering from operating for almost fifty years in an undeclared status. During the last three years we have managed, with much effort, to begin the establishment of good working relations with the host government and internal/external services. As a result, the station has recently begun some very sensitive and high-level bilateral operations. These obviously depend upon the good will of the host service. The Czech citizenry came of age in an atmosphere in which distrust of intelligence services in general, and the CIA in particular, was thoroughly ingrained. That distrust lingers in the public's mind even today. Exposure of our station's previously undisclosed presence and operational activities during the Cold War will necessarily raise questions about our activities then, and almost certainly lead to further3SECRET
[104-10330-10026.pdf — page 3]
# SECRETSUBJECT: Release of JFK Documentsinquiry about our present relationship. It is doubtful that our relationship, and certainly our very sensitive operations, could withstand the resulting public debate. The existence of Prague Station, past and present, cannot be surfaced at this time without serious damage to national security. (S)6. Public acknowledgment of our stations in Managua, San Jose, Panama City, San Salvador, Santo Domingo, Buenos Aires, Lima, Santiago, and Montevideo would not further damage our operational capabilities in a specific sense. Overall, any release of information about a clandestine service breeds distrust in professionalism and will put future operations at risk. (S)7. We receive significant national collection systems support from Australia which affects national system collection efforts against Tier IA targets throughout Asia. We would jeopardize this by releasing the presence of our station to the public. Tokyo is a special case in that there is continuing disagreement regarding our station. We should not complicate the current "Spy Mania" atmosphere in Tokyo. There have been two incidents regarding our presence in Japan during the present year. Any further disclosure would exacerbate the tension and create an untenable operational atmosphere for our station and personnel. (8)8. Public acknowledgment of a station in India would be a problem for the U.S. Government. U.S. and India foreign relations are always delicate; the Indian Government is very sensitive to perceived slights to its national sovereignty, and public acknowledgment of a station would prove embarrassing to the Indian Government which in turn could ask that the station be closed. If the station were closed or significantly downsized, it would affect a large number of important intelligence collection operations. (8)9. Public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia would be a problem for Tunisia vis-à-vis its Libyan neighbor. Libya and Tunisia share a border which means the Tunisian Government must act with some prudence regarding its relations with Libya. The Libyan Government would almost certainly respond very negativelySECRET
[104-10330-10026.pdf — page 4]
13-00000SECRETSUBJECT: Release of JFK Documentsto a public acknowledgment of a station in Tunisia and might well engage in harassment/sabotage/terrorist actions in Tunisia to show its displeasure. If the Tunisian Government should ask that our station be closed, the U.S. Government would lose a capability to collect on Libya, north African stability, and Islamic extremiam. (8)10. Public acknowledgment of a station in Morocco would be a problem for Morocco vis-à-vis its Islamic fundamentalist population. Morocco, like so many countries with a majority Muslim population, has a growing Islamic fundamentalist problem, and Islamic fundamentalists are frequently opposed to the U.8. in general and the Agency in particular. Public acknowledgment of a station in Morocco could cause its Islamic fundamentalist population to react negatively and demand that our station be closed. If the station were closed, the U.8. Government would lose intelligence on the western Sahara conflict, north African stability and Islamic extremism. (S)11. In those instances where I have indicated damage to operational capability and national security, I would feel compelled to seek a reversal of any decision to make a public acknowledgment. In those cases where I indicate "no specific or additional damage", I am prepared to accept your decision yet I must call your attention to the general damage done to us by any disclosure of operational presence. Our operational capabilities are in direct proportion to the confidence placed in our ability to protect source identities and operational methods. Disclosure to the public of our presence weakens this confidence. (S)![signature]David Cohen5SECRET
[104-10330-10044.pdf — page 0]
# SECRET2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992OCC-95-14907 DEC 1995MEMORANDUM FOR: JFK Assassination Records Review BoardVIA: Associate Deputy Director for OperationsAssociate Deputy Director for Operations/Human Resources and ProgramsFROM: Eric L. QualkenbushChief, Office of Central CoverSUBJECT: Proposed CIA Name Release1. The Agency strongly objects to the release of names of individuals presently under cover, whether active employees or separated employees. As described below, this action would breach Agency commitments to these individuals who agreed to work under cover in addition to breaching our obligations to the cover providers.2. Employees sign a secrecy agreement (Attachment A) upon entering on duty with the Agency. This agreement pledges the employee's secrecy to information which is classified and has not been publicly acknowledged by the Agency and requires the employee to protect such information from unauthorized disclosure. This secrecy agreement, as long as it remains in force by mutual agreement, obliges CIA to protect the identities of Agency employees, our cover providers and covert activities.3. Because this secrecy agreement creates a moral as well as legal bond between the Agency and the employee, it is Agency policy to protect the names of former employees who have separated under cover unless the Agency and the employee mutually agree to remove the cover. Identifying as CIA those employees who are mandated by the Agency to use a cover story, i.e. Department of State or the "ABC" Corporation, for their entire Agency career as well as into their years after separation from the Agency, jeopardizes:*   the personal safety of former employees;WARNING NOTICEINTELLIGENCE SOURCESOR METHODS INVOLVEDCL (0489932)CL REASON: 1.5 (c)DECL ON: X1DRV FROM: COV 2-87SECRET