Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 43]
b. Working space was also a great problem. From May through September 1960 they were working seven or eight in a single room.c. Dr. Willets, chief of the JOTP refused to release two JOTS whom Morales wanted as assistants in Miami. One of these is named Ben Ramirez and is very fluent in Spanish.10. For the future Simmons recommends:a. That an LCFLUTTER operator be assigned to each base permanently, not withstanding the expense. The need for such a man (at times can be very urgent.b. There should be one cleared Staff D room containing all relevant files so that the entire job can be done in one room. This means all Staff D files involved, all operating cards, personality and report cards, so that, for instance, a CI analyst can gothere and do a complete job in perfect security. The Staff D yield was a "gold mine".c. If CI section had been told the time and place of the invasion they could have checked their records on the area and the adjacent areas and have given the brigade recommendations for document seizing, etc. in the towns that would be passed through.11. Despite difficulties referred to above, Simmons feel that the results of his section's work were very good, and that one indication of this is that the upper echelons of the Agency sent him many matters for handling that were not strictly of a CI nature; for instance, inquiries from the DCI, from Congress, etc.12. In cases where the CI Section discovered that an agent communicating by radio was not using hissafety signals, CI would help the PM or other section to handle that agent in subsequent communications so that he would be kept alive. This sometimes required that requests by the agent for supplies be complied with. In one case LUGLOG. Simmons was intent on preserving the man so that he could be used at the end for purposes of deception. The agent requested an air drop and it was decided to comply. Simmons said that Gen. Cabell disclosed to the Cuban aircraft a crew that was to make the air drop that the agent was a double agent. Accordingly the crew did not even go near the drop, nor did PM Section advise Simmons until four days later that this had occured. The result was that the man was immediately taken off the air and Simmons had indications that he was shot. If Simmons had been advised earlier of the failure to make the drop, he could have tried by a suitable message to explain the omission.![signature of R. D. Shea]R. D. Shea
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 44]
# JMARC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLANca. 10TAB 4I. MISSIONTo develop and/or maintain and extend, through agents and other covert means, intelligence coverage of the organization, personnel, target interests, modus operandi, operations and assets of the Cuban Intelligence and Security Services and the Cuban Communist Party; to similarly develop intelligence coverage of activities affecting the Caribbean area which are conducted by the U.S.S.R., by the U.A.R., and by the Chinese Communists or other pro-CASTRO officials and groups; to protect current and future CI, FI and CA operations through analysis of their operational plans and through examination of new operational proposals; and to coordinate designated CI matters with the CI Staff and with staff and geographic commonents of WH Division.II. REFERENCEJMARC OPERATIONALPLANIII. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONIt is essential that an aggressive counterintelligence program be devised and implemented to ensure sound operational security for JMARC operations. The MARC counterintelligence effort will, therefore, be directed towards acquiring information concerning the organizations, personnel, target interests, modus operandi, operations and assets of foreign intelligence and security services active in the Caribbean area; towards analyzing JMAI.C operational proposals and steps in light of what is learned about opposition intelligence capabilities and activities; and towards containing inimical activities directed against JMARC assets and operations.
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 45]
13-00000IV. ORGANIZATIONThe following personnel and facilities are required for successful attainment of JMARC CI objectives.a. Personnel: One senior CI officer; four operations officers; five analysts (three with a proficiency rating of "high" in reading Spanish); three clerk typists; one secretary. Initially, two case officers and one analyst should be sent to the JMARC Forward Operations Base (FOB) to carry out assigned tasks discussed below. Two analysts (with at least high proficiency rating in reading Spanish) will be assigned to the task of screening certain information reports. Two analysts (one senior) and a clerk typist will form a records unit for the CI Section at Headquarters; two operations officers and a clerk typist will form an operations unit for the CI section at Headquarters.b. Facilities: The CI section at Headquarters will require working space for ten personnel and for the following heavy office equipment: eight desks and chairs; eight standard typewriters; one card safe; three four-drawer safes. Standard office supplies should be provided. The CI operations unit at the FCB will require support commensurate to its size.V. PHASINGA. PREPARATORY PHASE1. Principal Objectives: To acquire current CI information on opposition services in Caribbean area through developing counterintelligence operations and through recording CI information.SECRET
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 46]
2. Operational Tasks:a. The Branch/4/CI officer will:(1) Keep Chief, Branch/4 informed on CI requirements, opportunities and developments affecting his branch.(2) Keep FI Deputy, WH Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff, and the latter's appointed staff representatives (Victor Wallen, Robert Brown, Paul Burke, and Birch O'Neal), informed on CI matters in which they have an agreed interest (see below).(3) Direct assistante CI personnel in performance of those jobs relating to the responsibilities cited below.(4) Carry out such other tasks which may be assigned to him by Chief, Branch/4.The senior CI officer and individual section officers designated by him will accomplish the followings:(1) Familiarise themselves with selected Branch and CI Staff redord assets and with designated branch and division personnel pertinent to their responsibilities in order to effectively exploit these assets and to coordinate work on CI operations with the appropriate persons.(2) Familiarize themselves with current CI operations affecting Cuba which are directed by Branch/4, by CI Staff, and/or by WH Division with the objective of assuming responsibility for these.(3) Plan, coordinate, initiate and conduct CI operations not specifically assigned to Paul Burke or Birch O'Neal of CI Staff.
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 47]
- 4 -(4) Prepare draft CI requirements for FI/D analysts (*accomplished*).In addition, prepare or locate and forward to other Branch/4 officers pertinent CI requirements and operational guidance papers pertinent to these officers' assigned responsibilities. (To date, I have forwarded my own study on "Utilization of Exile Groups in Clandestine Operations" to Jerry Droller.)(5) Prepare an operational summary format for use by operations officers reviewing cases (*accomplished*).(6) Prepare a defector register format card (*accomplished*) and organize and maintain a register of defectors.(7) Exploit certain research and operational support assets of the Clandestine Services in order to help all Branch/4 sections in the achievement of their objectives. To this end, one analyst will work on materials controlled by CI Staff.(8) Examine current operations and/or programs in the FI and CA fields in order to ensure that CI opportunities are fully exploited and to identify operational security threats and to recommend sound courses of action which will prevent or counter such threats.b. CI Staff components (cited in each instance) will have the following responsibilities:(1) *Chief, SID, CI Staff*: Action responsibility for penetration and double agent operations against Cuban Intelligence and Security Services at home and abroad (as agreed to by Chief, WH Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination will be effected with WH/4/CI and all traffic will be released by WH/4.
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 48]
(2) Deputy Chief, ICD, CI Staff: Action responsibility for penetration of Cuban Communist Party via third countries, using Cubans as agents (as agreed to by Chief, WH Division and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination will be effected with WH/4/CI and all traffic will be released by WH/4.(3) Victor Wallen, Operations Division, CI Staff: Responsibility for compiling records and studies on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services. To this end, Victor Wallen will:(a) Prepare and maintain a briefing notebook on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services (accomplished).(b) Prepare a guide for screening WH/4/Reports personality cards and other record assets in order to identify suspect persons aiding or abetting Cuban clandestine activities (accomplished).(c) Prepare lists of suspect persons and maintain these lists on a current basis for exploitation by all Branch/4 sections and other Agency components with operational interest. (Initial lists have been prepared in 13 books).(d) Prepare or assemble CI requirements, as requested, which pertain to the maintenance of CI notebooks on the Cuban services. (Initial requirements have ben drawn up for Ernie Sparks use.)(4) Deputy Chief, CI/ICG: Responsibility for compiling records and studies on Cuban Communist Party. To this end, questionnaires have been prepared for Agency officers assigned the task of interrogating persons knowledgeable of Cuban Communist Party personnel and activities.
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 49]
- 6 -(5) WH/FI will prepare studies of CASTRO subversive activities abroad.3. DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE1. Principal Objective: To advance our knowledge of opposition services and to develop a security service for the Cuban Government in exile.2. Operational Tasks:a. WH/4/CI: During this second phase, WH/4/CI personnel will:(1) Screen operational correspondence and cable traffic for leads to CI operations against the Cuban Intelligence and Security Services and the Cuban Communist Party and forward pertinent leads and CI information to appropriate CI Staff component and/or authorised security officers of agencies of U.S. intelligence community.(2) In coordination with Political Action Section of WH/4, outline an organisation for a security intelligence service for the Cuban Government-in-Exile and list its functions in detail.(3) Continue and/or complete all tasks cited in Phase I.(4) Staff the FOB with two operations officers and one analyst to perform those functions necessary to the initiation and conduct of secure CI operations and CI portection activities.b. CI Staff: The SIG, ICG, and OPS/WH, as indicated, will carry out the following activities:(1) Revise the notebook on Cuban Intelligence and Security Services as required (OPS/WH).(2) Prepare organizational studies and blacklists of Cuban Intelligence and Security Servicespersonnel, and black lists of persons aiding or abetting Cuban clandestine activity, in
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 50]
- 7 -three categories of sensitivity for use by the Agency, bydesignated members of the United States intelligence community,and by authorized components of the Cuban Government-in-Exile.(OPS/WH)(3) Revise lists of suspect persons as required. (OPS/WH)(4) Prepare special studies on Cuban Intelligence and SecurityServices and on the Cuban Communist Party and other groups andorganizations active in the Caribbean area, as required. (OPS/WH)c. WH/FI will continue studies of CASTRO subversive activities abroad.VI. COORDINATIONCoordination en CI operations and on operational support activitieswhich involve WI/FI, CI Staff and WH/4/CI will be affected by senior CIofficer of WH/4. Communications on these matters will be by telephoneand/or personal meetings. CI aspects of WH/4/FI and CA operations will bediscussed by appropriate section officers and the senior CI officer or thelatter's designates.
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 51]
# COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN FOR AN FRD SECURITY SERVICETAB BI. MISSIONTo select, assess, organize, train on-the-job and support FRD personnel for a security service capable of protecting the FRD, its personnel, installations, secrets and activities from sabotage, subversion and espionage.II. REFERENCESA. Project Operational PlanB. Project Political Action PlanC. Project Counterintelligence PlanD. Project Counterintelligence Budget for Fiscal Year 1961III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONIt is essential that the Agency create an aggressive service for FRD-Project activities. Since there is no certainty that the leaders of the FRD will achieve and hold responsible positions in a new Government of Cuba, and since there is an everpresent threat that political or operational flaps may destroy the FRD as an effective Project instrument, it is essential that the Agency's role in creating an FRD security service be carried out under cover of the BENDER-CARR group. It is also essential that the leaders as well as rank and file members of the FRD pay more than lip service to the requirements of an effective security apparatus, even though these requirements dictate a need for major changes in the modus operandi of individual members. To this end the BENDER-CARR group must direct the FRD to accept, in return for its support, controls and limitations which must be imposed by the security service if operational security is to be achieved.The Agency's objectives in establishing and supporting a security service for the FRD are:A. To protect its operational interests in the FRD; andB. To acquire counterintelligence information through participation in FRD operational security activities.The security service of the FRD will have as its objectives:A. Screening all personnel holding significant FRD positions;B. Screening new adherents to the FRD;
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 52]
C. Maintaining pertinent file information on FRD personnel;D. Maintaining physical security of FRD installations;E. Staffing FRD debriefing centers;F. Enforcing personnel security regulations;G. Indoctrinating FRD members on personal security;H. Monitoring malcontents; andI. Aoquiring both positive and counterintelligence information.To build a security service for the FRD capable of attaining Agency and FRD objectives, it is necessary for the Agency:A. To supervise the selection, assessment and training of eight candidates;B. To identify and select secure office sites in Miami, New York, Washington and Mexico City, and to procure a secure safehouse training site in Miami;C. To create an organization which can fulfill assigned security functions.D. To supervise the training of thirty-two additional candidates to staff the organization;E. To support the organization through the BENDER-CARR group by providing sanitized record data, special training, financial backing, and, at need, operational facilities; andF. To supervise through the BENDER-CARR group the organization's day-to-day activities.To implement the plan for an FRD security service, BENLER-CARR representatives in Mexico City, Miami, Washington and New York will be briefed on the plan for an FRD security service. The Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, vill be directed by BENDER to select seven officers to be processed for jobs with the service. Processing will include medical examination, polygraph, and psychological assessment of the candidates. They will later be briefed on the objectives and functions of the security service by a representative of the BENLER-CARR group. They will be trained on-the-job by a Chilean ex-police officer who will be recommended to the FRL by the BENDER-CARR group. The training will cover subjects pertinent to the service's day-to-day
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 53]
security responsibilities as spelled out in the organizational plan. The FRD security components in Mexico City, Washington and New York will be initially assigned one officer each from the first group of eight candidates. The remaining five candidates will be assigned to Miami. Of those candidates subsequently trained for the security service, two additional men will be assigned to Washington; six to New York; six to Mexico City; and eighteen to Miami.## IV. ORGANIZATIONThe organizational structure of the FRD security service and of the Agency's related support structure are outlined in Attachment "A"; the facilities and personnel required to staff and support these structures are discussed below:### A. Facilities1.  Security office sites in Mexico City, Miami, Washington and New York. (These will be selected by the Office of Security; the Office of Security will identify these sites to the BENDER-CARR group, which in turn will direct their use by appropriate FRD components.)2.  A training site will be selected in Miami by the Office of Security and identified to the BENDER-CARR group, which in turn will recommend it to the Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee.3.  One four-drawer safe will be acquired by the Office of Security for use in each office site in the above-named cities.4.  Appropriate office supplies will be assembled by the FRD component in each site.### B. Foreign Personnel1.  A Chilean police officer has been selected and recruited as training officer for the security service. The BENDER-CARR group will recommend him to the FRD for this job as an individual who, in its experience, is best suited for the job, and as one who is most acceptable to the BENDER-CARR organization.
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 54]
2. The BENDER-CARR group will direct Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, to immediately select seven officers for processing and training prior to assignment in the FRD security service. Later, thirty-two additional officers will be selected for processing and training.C. Staff Personnel1. BENDER-CARR representatives will deal directly with Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, in all matters pertaining to the security service.2. Project CI officers will provide through BENDER-CARR representatives all advice, guidance and support to the security service and its chief.V. PHASINGA. Preparatory Phase (25 August - 15 September):1. Primary Obiective:To implement the plan for the security service by selecting, assessing and training an initial cadre of eight officers, including chief of the proposed service.2. Operational Taaksta. Advise BENDER-CARR representatives in Mexico City, Miami, Washington and New York, by dispatch where appropriate, before 26 August, of the Agency's plan and objectives regarding an FRD security service.b. Advise Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, through BENDER, to select seven officers to participate with him in processing and training for assignment to the FRD security service.c. Procure from each candidate a complete PHS, a certification of health dated this year, and three letters of recommendation from as many FRD sponsors.d. Arrange for polygraph examination of candidates through the Project security office.e. Procure through the Project security office an appropriate training site in the Miami area which will accommodate a minimum of eight trainees and an instructor.
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 55]
-5-f. Assign trainer to Miami after BENDER gets concurrenceof Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee.g. Arrange for Project CI officer in Miami to brief traineron his assignment.h. Quarter trainer in training site.i. Advise FRD representative to purchase minimm officesupplies from list to be provided by the Project CIofficer.j. Provide trainer with a curriculum and a training schedulewhich encompass on-the-job application of techniques andskills.k. Discuss with Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Sub-committee, the organization and functions of the proposedsecurity service.l. Initiate training of eight candidates (including Chiefof the service) and processing of others.m. Get signed secrecy agreement and loyalty oath fromeach student.n. Identify and assess (for recruitment) potential agentcandidates as Agency-controlled sources.B. Development Phaset (16 - 30 September)1. Primary Obiective!To build the security service in a way which will enable itto perform its assigned functions.2. Operational Tasks:a. Assign trainees to FRD components in the cities named above.b. Complete processing of remaining candidates.c. Procure secure office sites in the cities named aboveor check the sites previously selected.d. Initiate training of remaining candidates.
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 56]
e. Activate a records center in Miami and provide it with sanitized record data.f. Forward physical security plan and physical security regulations to Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, through BENDER.g. Forward operational security regulations for security service to Chief, through BENDER.h. Forward administrative procedures (involving communications among FRD elements, document controls, etc.) to Chief, through BENDER.i. Give remaining trainees their security service assignments.j. Recruit candidates selected in Preparatory Phase.C. Action Phase (30 September on):1. Primary Obiective:To identify and contain rabid CASTROITES, Cuban Communists, members of the Cuban Security Services, and Orbit espionage and sabotage personnel.2. Operational Tasksa. Move the security apparatus into Cuba with the FRD.b. Provide FRD security service with black lists and record data pertinent to the above objective.c. Monitor FRD security activities through the BENDER-CARR group.D. Consolidation Phase:1. Primary Obiective:To direct the FRD security service in its efforts to maintain public security and to contain foreign services activities.2. Operational Tasks:a. Request existing security units in the country to stay on the job and to protect arm supplies, record assets, and security force facilities.
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 57]
13-00000-7-b. Continue to funnel sanitized arrest lists affecting CASTRO security personnel to the FRD.c. Monitor FRD security service activities in Cuba.VI. COORDINATIONThe above plan will be coordinated with the Political Action, FI, and Support Sections of the Project.VII. SUPPORTSee SUPPORT ANNEXES.
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 58]
13-00000FOR FUTURE(present) TABC20 April 1961MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, 1/4SUBJECT: CI Program for JMATE Project1. Objectives:a. To add to our knowledge of objectives, operations and assets of the CASTRO services.b. To bring about the defection of selected key personalities in the Castro Government and military services.c. To plan and mount deception operations involving Agency-controlled double agents and W/T-W/T links. To date, four W/T operators in Cuba are deemed suspect. The fate of our two double agents, who may have mis-identified the SOURCE of the radio for the Red tide assault on Cuba, will be determined during the course of the next few days. It is anticipated that other candidates for double agent operations will be identified in the States; their exploitation will be coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.d. To support and direct the ABOT Intelligence and Security Service in Miami in the fulfillment of agreed upon objectives.e. To support and direct 44 ABOT officers and agents now in Cuba, in the collection of intelligence pertinent to Project needs, and in the fulfillment of such other covert action assignments which may be deemed within their competence.f. To introduce into Cuba unilaterally-controlled counter-intelligence agents.g. To intensify the Project's Communist Party penetration program.h. To increase counterintelligence operations run into Cuba in conjunction with liaison services of friendly countries.i. To counter the espionage, subversive and sabotage operations directed by the Castro services against other States within the Western Hemisphere. This to be done in conjunction with the services of these countries with which we maintain liaison.C