Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10332-10007.pdf — page 78]
SECRETFOLLOW-UP ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY COVER OFFICERBLOCK RECORDS IN OFFICE OF PERSONNEL|     | YES | NO  | EFFECTIVE DATE | EOD / 726 53 || --- | --- | --- | -------------- | ------------ || X   | YES | NO  | EFFECTIVE DATE | EOD          |BLOCK CREDIT RECORDSBLOCK TELEPHONE LOCATOR RECORDS|     | YES | NO  | EFFECTIVE DATE | EOD || --- | --- | --- | -------------- | --- || X   | YES | NO  | EFFECTIVE DATE | EOD || PREPARE FORM 1551                                                                                      | ISSUE I.C. CARD TYPE: *Returned* |                                     || ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------- | ----------------------------------- || X                                                                                                      | W-2 FORM TYPE: *State*           | HOSPITALIZATION INS. CARD TYPE: AGE || ---                                                                                                    | ---                              | ---                                 || MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION PERTAINING TO DEPARTING EMPLOYEE                                             |                                  |                                     || IF EMPLOYEE HAS APPLIED FOR NEW EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CONTACTING CCS WHAT EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE WAS USED? |                                  |                                     || ---                                                                                                    | ---                              |                                     || SUBJECT | X   | HAS | HAS NOT RETURNED ALL COVER DOCUMENTATION. IDENTIFY DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RETURNED. |     || ------- | --- | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --- |RELATIVES EMPLOYED BY CIA (name and relationship)*None:*DEPARTING EMPLOYEES ACKNOWLEDGEMENTI certify that I have been briefed by the Central Cover Staff on this date and I understand that:I will be acknowledged as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency in accordance with the instructions set forth in the Cover Briefing Section above.| X   | I will not be acknowledged as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. || --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |I have been informed of the employment references applicable in my case.![signature] 25 June, 1980 U.A. C. M.C.h.DATESIGNATUREREMARKS"*Talk to strip*"ID # 189485, 9-11-78, clp 1885-SHE: 15 Feb 80Returning on contract*Limited. Ide: IPC*Retirement address:*Local ad*2401 "H" ST. NWWash, DCCCS/OCB/MCCS/DFBCCS/COBCCS/CSBCCS/OCB/SCOMPONENTDATECenco 3-03-80CCS/CT2-25-80NAME AND SIGNATURE OF COVER OFFICERKathy HillSECRET
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 0]
104-10332-100082025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992![Assassination Records Review Board seal]Assassination Records Review Board600 E Street NW 2nd Floor Washington, DC 20530(202) 724-0088 Fax: (202) 724-0457August 23, 1995HAND DELIVEREDCIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF CIA INFORMATIONIN THIS DOCUMENTJohn A. HartinghInspector-in-ChargeJFK Task ForceFederal Bureau of Investigation10th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20535![Copy provided to CIA by FBI handwritten note]RE: Foreign Government LiaisonDear John:This morning, Jack Tunheim, Phil Golrick, and I met with Kenneth Duncan and several State Department representatives regarding how best to implement the JFK Act as to information obtained from foreign governments through liaison channels. We had a very constructive discussion of the affirmative role the State Department could play in encouraging foreign governments, through appropriate diplomatic channels, to agree to the release of such information pursuant to the JFK Act. The Review Board believes that Section 10(b)(2) of the JFK Act contemplates that the State Department play precisely such a role.As for now, we will hold in abeyance requests for evidence on foreign liaison postponements to which the FBI has not yet responded. This will give us the opportunity in the near future to work with the State Department and the FBI to establish orderly procedures to persuade the foreign governments in question that it is in our countries' mutual interests to release liaison information in assassination records. Until such procedures are in place, we request that the FBI not make further contact with foreign law-enforcement or other government officials regarding the release of liaison information in assassination records.1BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair Henry F. Graff Kermit L. Hall William L. Joyce Anna K. NelsonEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 1]
Mr. John A. HartinghAugust 23, 1995Page 2Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any question.Sincerely yours,![signature]T. Jeremy GunnAssociate Director for Research and Analysisand Acting General Counselcc: Kenneth A. DuncanDepartment of State
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 2]
Secret13 February 1996Note to:Bob Skwirot,ARRB StaffSubject:Liaison related documentsReference:Phone call between Ellie and Jeremy,12 February 1996Attached are a list and documents (13) which show liaison relationships between the CIA and host services. They illustrate the problem of protecting liaison while releasing stations. These Documents were acted on by the Board at the January 5 meeting.Attachments as statedOFFICIAL USE ONLY WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTSSecret
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 3]
SECRETATTACHMENT104-10017-10040: Although the Board continues to protect the liaison cryptonym in both paragraphs, the text shows Station cooperation with the Swedish service.104-10017-10058: Although the liaison cryptonym remains protected, Paragraph 4 indicates liaison with the Swedish service.104-10018-10089: Board has made a determination to release "your liaison" in Paragraph 1 in addition to identifying Stockholm Station.104-10018-10091: With release of Stations (Stockholm, Helsinki, Copenhagen, and Oslo), text reveals liaison with the respective local services.104-10017-10036: Although the liaison cryptonym is protected, the context of the cable clearly shows Station (if released) has a liaison relationship with the Swedish service.104-10015-10425: The text of this cable from Rome, responding to a multi-Station message, states that liaison traces will follow. Once the identification of the Station is released, the existence of a liaison relationship with the Italian service in November 1963 is revealed.104-10015-10420: Cable from Oslo in clear text indicates "no liaison" traces; therefore, if the identification of the Station is released, it will acknowledge the liaison relationship between the Station and the Norwegian service.104-10015-10159: Paragraph 4 contains information that will show that Oslo Station had a technical operation directed against the Cuban target in Norway in November 1963. Also context of the cable reflects that the following Stations have a relationship with their local liaisons: Paris, Rome, Madrid, Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, the Netherlands, London, and Ottawa.SECRETCL BY 0563956REASON 1.5(d)DECL X5; X5DRV LIA 3-87
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 4]
SECRET104-10015-10225: Paragraph 2 of the cable reflects that Rome Station had a technical operation in conjunction with the Italian liaison. Please note: The Board continues to protect the cryptonyms.104-10015-10230: Cable reflects that Station had the access to photograph US passports at the Amsterdam Schipol Airport. It can be implied that that capability is due to a liaison relationship with the Dutch service.104-10015-10255: Cable reflects The Hague Station had a photo operation in the Netherlands. When reviewed with 104- 10015-10230, it will be clear that the operation refers to the Schipol Airport operation.104-10018-10088: Cable clearly shows that both Oslo and Stockholm Stations have a liaison relationship, in their respective countries if the Stations are released.104-10018-10080: At the bottom of Page 2 of the cable is the phrase "assume Stockholm still planned ask its liaison to interrogate." Release of Station and this phrase clearly reflects a liaison relationship with the Swedish service.
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 5]
SECRETFrom the Desk of Linda C. CiprianiNOTE FOR: J. Barry HarrelsonFROM: Linda C. CiprianiDATE: 04/29/96 04:26:36 PMSUBJECT: Memo re Mexican Liaison (S)CL BY 2224130CL REASON 1.5(d)DECL ON X1DRV FM LIA 3-82The following is a draft memo for Jeff. Bob Caudle is looking at it now so there may be more changes. Please let me know if there isanything incorrect here. I have a feeling Jeff will want a meeting with me rather than just the memo. Also, knowing him, he may wantto deal with Tunheim on this directly since he was involved in this. I will let you know.1. **Action:** That you advise as per paragraph 7.2. **Background:** You will recall that you spoke with Chairman Tunheim of the JFK Board about the attached cable and the importance of protecting the phrase *"with Mexicans"* because it gives away liaison involvement in a tel-tap operation. At its 16 April meeting, at which I was present, the Board reconsidered its initial decision, but determined that the phrase could be released.3. It had just come to HRG's attention that this same cable was released in full by the Board, with no objection by CIA, in September 1995. CIA probably did not contest this release because an excerpt from this cable, containing the phrase at issue, had been inadvertently released *even prior to that*. It is, therefore, no longer possible for CIA to argue before the Board for the protection of this phrase in the current cable or to appeal this release to the White House. *to the National Archives in Aug 93*4. CIA is now in somewhat of an embarrassing position because it has strenuously argued that the release of this phrase would cause *"clear and convincing damage"* to the national security only to find that this phrase has been released with CIA acquiescence for at least seven months, with no ostensible damage. Conceivably, the Board could see this incident as a justification of their second-guessing our damage assessments, and could give us a much more difficult time in the future.SECRET
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 6]
SECRET5. On the other hand, CIA could use this situation as a way to highlight the problems HRG has had with the JFK review process that documents are being reviewed and released to the National Archives in such quantity and speed that it is difficult for CIA to focus on any one document and, more importantly, how seemingly innocuous information in one document can actually be quite significant in relation to prior or subsequent releases. Since September, when this cable was originally released, the issue of protecting Mexican liaison has become increasingly important because of other releases on this subject and because of your appearance before the Board in February.6. Furthermore, this prior release should not impair our ability to continue to protect the fact of Mexican involvement in this tel-tap operation. Although we have argued to the Board that this phrase "with Mexicans" gives that relationship away, the cable does not, in fact, directly do so. In fact, the reason for the Board's insistence that this phrase should be released was the very fact that the cable did NOT directly state that the Mexican's were involved in the tel-tap. We should be able to use their arguments to continue to protect the liaison relationship.7. Our only recourse is to acknowledge to the Board that CIA has no basis to bring an appeal to the President since this cable has already been released in full. We should, however, maintain our position that we believe this information is damaging especially in light of releases to National Archives since September, and that we never would have acquiesced to the release in September if we knew then what would be released on this subject in the ensuing months. Although this message does not necessarily need to be conveyed by you to Tunheim and could be handled by John Pereira and David Marwell, given your past dealings with the Board on this issue, you may prefer to do this.8. In order to avoid problems like this in the future, HRG is immediately dedicating several personnel to the task of reviewing boxes of documents and determining what our releases have been on subjects. HRG will also be double checking documents going to the Board to make sure that ne duplicates of prior releases are being sent. You should be aware, however, that there is only a rudimentary CIA computer index listing our releases and that it is impossible to do accurate computer searches about our releases on specific subjects. Although HRG personnel are extremely knowledgeable on what has been released, with over 220,000 CIA documents currently in the collection, it is suprising that mistakes like this have not happened more often.CC:SECRET
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 7]
13-00000SECRET15 October 1996MEMORANDUM FOR:FROM:SUBJECT:Assassination Records ReviewBoardJohn F. PereiraChief, Historical Review GroupForeign Government InformationAustralia(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once theBoard has completed its deliberations on the issues discussedbelow.)1.  (S) Issue: This memorandum will address CIA's position    on the review and declassification of foreign government    information that appears in the JFK collection. This issue has    come to CIA's attention because of the recent review by the JFK    Board of Australian liaison documents. The Agency believes it is    important to address this issue at this time because this is the    first instance that this type of foreign liaison document has    been reviewed by the Board and it is possible that such    information will appear again in CIA's collection. This memo    will, therefore, focus on the larger issue of a United States    Government (USG) agency's legal obligations in the dissemination    and declassification of foreign government information but will    also address the specific issue of the six "Australian documents"    (documents: 104-10012-10078, 104-10012-10079, 104-10012-10080,    104-10012-10081, 104-10009-10222, 104-10009-10224).2.  (S) Conclusion: CIA does not object to the release of the    information in these six documents, but is only concerned about    protecting foreign government information. Therefore, the Agency    does not object to the release of the four CIA documents in the    redacted form proposed by the Board. With regards to the two    Australian letters, the Agency has no authority to unilaterally    agree to their release in any form. Pursuant to its legal    obligations, CIA ordinarily seeks the consent of the foreign    government prior to declassifying their information. However,    for reasons described herein, it is not possible to even seek the    consent of the Australians at this time, nor would it be likely    that the Australians would give it. Rather than going to the    Australians against its better judgment or requesting theCL BY: 2224130CL REASON: 1.5(d)DECL ON: X5DRV FM: LIA 3-82SECRET
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 8]
SECRET# SUBJECT: Foreign Government InformationAustraliaPresident to agree to the unilateral declassification of foreign government information, CIA proposes that the release of the Australian documents be either postponed for a short time or that a substitution be made.3. (U) Legal Authorities: The procedures governing the declassification and dissemination of foreign government information are set out in Executive Order 12958, as well as Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDS). Executive Order 12958 defines foreign government information as including (1) information provided by a foreign government, or any element thereof, with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information and/or the source of the information, are to be held in confidence; or (2) information produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangements with a foreign government, or any element thereof, requiring that the information, the arrangements, or both, are to be held in confidence. Id., at §1.1 (d)4. (U) Foreign government information is subject to a classification determination under E.Ο. 12958, section 1.5(c). When so classified, U.S. government agencies are obligated to protect that information from unauthorized disclosure. The E.O. requires that foreign government information shall either retain its original classification or be assigned a U.S. classification that shall ensure a degree of protection *at least* equivalent to that required by the entity that furnished the information. Id., at 1.7(e). Furthermore, agencies are required to safeguard foreign government information under standards that provide a degree of protection *at least* equivalent to that required by the originating government. Id., at 4.2(g).5. (U) Pursuant to his authority as head of the intelligence community to protect all classified information from unauthorized disclosure, the Director of Central Intelligence has issued Directives (that is, DCIDs) setting out the procedures for the declassification and dissemination of foreign government information. Intelligence obtained from another government or from a combined effort with another government, may not be released or authorized for release without its consent. DCID 5/6 attachment § C.3. Furthermore, the release of intelligence that would be contrary to agreements between the U.S. and foreign countries is expressly prohibited. Id., at § C.5.6. (U) Finally, the very fact of intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and specifically named foreign countries and government components is classified SECRET unless a different classification is mutually agreed upon. DCID 1/10-1. Such information may be declassified only with the mutual consent of the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved. DCID 1/10-1.
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 9]
13-00000SECRETSUBJECT: Foreign Government Information(Australiathe U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved.DCID 1/10-1.7. (U) National Security Considerations: The importance of   such coordination with foreign governments prior to the release   of their information cannot be overemphasized. Should CIA, or   for that matter any (USG) agency fail to coordinate where   required, not only would it be a violation of the aforementioned   E.O. and directives, but it would chill relationships it has   developed with foreign services over the years. If such lack of   coordination became known, foreign services would hesitate to   share crucial intelligence information with CIA if they believed   it would be released, in spite of any agreements or U.S. laws to   the contrary, without their consent. Furthermore, the U.S. could   not expect foreign services to safeguard U.S. government   information that it shares with its liaison partners in order to   pursue authorized intelligence and foreign policy objectives.8. (S) According to its legal obligations described herein,   CIA coordinates the dissemination and/or release of foreign   government information. Its obligation to do so is similar to   its obligation to coordinate declassification efforts with   another USG agency should the CIA possess any of that agency's   documents. For example, CIA could not declassify and release to   the public FBI information located in CIA files without   coordinating with that agency. Similarly, CIA has no authority   to unilaterally declassify foreign government documents or   information in its files.9. ($) Coordination with Australia: As two of the documents   at issue here are letters from the Australian service (104-10009-   10224, 104-10012-10080), CIA is legally obligated by E.0. and   agreement with the Australians to seek the consent of the   Australians prior to their release, even in redacted form. The   issue of coordinating with the Australian service is a timely   one. In most cases, CIA would not have an objection to going to   the foreign government and seeking their consent for declas-   sification. However, several events that have occurred in the   last few months depict just how seriously Australia considers any   indication that the U.S. is unable to protect from release their   classified information. Based on the incidents described   below, it is CIA's position that even asking the Australians for   consent to release would threaten the current relationship.*   Within the last year, a demarche was made by the Australian    government expressing strong concern that U.S. declas-    sification legislation expressly spell out that no information    provided to the USG by the Australian service be declassified    without its permission. A copy of this demarche is provided    for the Board's review. (See attached.) It is worth noting    that this demarche is not between_intelligence-services-but3SECRET
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 10]
SECRETSUBJECT: Foreign Government InformationAustraliarather between governments - it was literally-delivered-by-the Australian Ambassador to the National Security Council andto the U.S. Ambassador to Australia. The manner in which theAustralians treated the demarche demonstrates that theprotection of classified information is receiving top priorityin the Australian government and is not just a concern oftheir intelligence community.*   On two recent but separate occasions the Australian service    passed to CIA information indicating that there would be    assassination attempts on two non-U.S. citizens. CIA    requested that it pass this information on to the targets, but    the Australians refused. They argued that the information was    not specific enough and would endanger a source. The    Australians stated that if they believed the information was    useful, they would pass it themselves. The Australians were    concerned that CIA had even asked to pass on this information,    and questioned what they perceived as CIA's willingness to    share their information with third parties. Finally, they    stated that the easiest way to protect their information was    simply not to pass it to CIA anymore.*   Just this month, a senior official of the Australian service    approached the CIA with accusations that a former Agency    employee allegedly may have disclosed their classified    information. The Australians believe that this disclosure    may be related to the loss of all agent reporting sources    in a country of particular interest to them. The DDCI    promised the head of the Australian service to launch an    investigation into the matter.*   The Australian service recently expressed grave concern to CIA    about a book published by an American USG official which    alludes to a relationship between the CIA and the Australian    service. Even though this book was not an official CIA    acknowledgment of a liaison relationship, to the Australians,    this incident called into question the CIA's ability to protect    that relationship.10. (S) Under the circumstances, it would be an affront to    the Australians to be asked for their consent in light of the    above events which have all occurred in the last year. The    Australians would not only be extremely upset with CIA, but would    certainly deny their consent. Should the Australians deny their    consent, CIA would have no authority to agree to the release of    the information and would be obligated to do all it could to    prevent disclosure. It is crucial not only to CIA's mission butSECRET