Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10330-10070.pdf — page 1]
SECRETSUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sourcesassets to one-time contacts. It is our understanding that additional source names appear throughout the JFK Collection and will be reviewed in the future. It is important, therefore, that the Review Board and CIA agree on a consistent method of dealing with source names appearing in the JFK Collection at this time so as not to impede the future review of documents.4. (C) The Review Board has recently developed a policy for releasing the true names of covert CIA employees. Although there are many similarities between covert employees and sources, there is an important difference that should be reflected in the way the Review Board looks at this issue. With CIA covert employees who are mentioned in this collection, it has been possible in some instances to go to them and seek their permission to reveal their names. Some of these former employees have even been made available for interviews and depositions. With most sources, it is not possible to do this. First, CIA has dropped contact with some of these sources and may not be able to locate them. Attempting to find these individuals would create some risk of creating suspicions that they were or are associated with this Agency or the U.S. Government. If CIA were unable to locate a particular source, there would still be some risk in releasing his name. Just because CIA cannot locate him, does not mean that he is not alive and well- known in his own community. Even if we were able to locate a source without risk to his safety, it is probable that he would not want to be visited by the CIA again after so many years. More than likely, sources do not now want their past association revealed when they have undoubtedly moved on in their lives to do other things. Some may be in political or private enterprise positions where CIA affiliation would damage them professionally and/or harm them and their families personally.5. (U) Another important distinction that needs to be taken into account is the difference between CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) “sources." Perhaps the most significant difference is that many FBI sources provide information with the understanding that the information and the source will be publicly revealed. FBI sources are often used in criminal prosecutions as witnesses. CIA, on the other hand, promises secrecy and confidentiality to its sources. CIA sources rarely appear at public trials. In fact, not only is the identity of CIA sources protected from public acknowledgment, but also it is closely held within the Agency itself. Another difference is the fact that a2SECRET
[104-10330-10070.pdf — page 2]
SECRETSUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sourcesforeign national cooperating with CIA is usually committinga unique violation of his own country's laws--espionage. Ifone gets caught committing espionage, the punishment in manycountries is for a capital offense. On the other hand, aforeigner who cooperates with the FBI is not usuallycommitting espionage. Cooperation may be with the fullknowledge of his government--such as cooperation in acriminal investigation. Therefore, the risks forcooperation with the FBI are not usually as great ascooperation with CIA. In addition, the FBI has greatermeans for protecting individuals who provide information toit, for example, the witness protection program, which CIAdoes not have.## Legal Considerations6. (U) Although Section 11(a) of the JFK Act provides   that when the Act requires release of information, it takes   precedence over all other laws that would otherwise prohibit   the true names of sources. CIA believes that it is   important for the Review Board to consider the laws, which   have been growing and developing over the years, to protect   classified information because they clearly reflect a larger   U.S. Government policy to protect intelligence sources.7. (U) By Executive Order (E.O.) and statute, the   President and Congress have made the Director of Central   Intelligence (DCI) responsible for protecting intelligence   sources. In his Directive of 22 January 1946 which   established the Central Intelligence Group, President Truman   made the DCI responsible for protecting sources. With the   establishment of the CIA, Congress also gave the DCI this   responsibility. The National Security Act of 1947, Section   103(d)(3), codified at 50 U.S.C. §403(3)(c)(5), requires the   DCI to protect intelligence sources from unauthorized   disclosure. In addition, §403(3)(d) (2) requires the DCI to   ensure that risks to the United States and those involved in   the collection of intelligence through human sources are   minimized.8. (U) Protecting the identity of individuals working   with or for CIA has been of particular concern to U.S.   lawmakers since the establishment of the Agency. For   example, with Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Act of   1949, 50 U.S.C. 1949 §403g, Congress specifically exempted   the CIA from the provisions of any law requiring the   publication or disclosure of the organization, functions,   names, titles, salaries or numbers of personnel employed by   the Agency. Although the purpose of this law is to protect
[104-10330-10070.pdf — page 3]
SECRETSUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sourcesemployees of the CIA, and not assets or contacts, it indicates Congress' intent from early on to protect those working covertly for the U.S. Government.9. (U) In 1980, Congress passed the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial, trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving or potentially involving classified information. Working with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has successfully protected intelligence sources from public release even in criminal trials where there are heightened (i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring disclosure to the defendant of all government information relevant to the defense. CIPA allows for in camera ex parte hearings in which the judge can rule on questions of admissibility and relevancy of classified information, including the identity of human sources who may have information pertaining to the defense, before it is introduced either to the defendant or defense counsel, or in open court. In some cases involving CIA, the judge has ordered that CIA information be turned over to the defense, but only in some unclassified form such as in a summary. In other cases, judges have reviewed the classified information and ruled that the harm to national security outweighs the defendant's legal rights to the information. In still other cases, the defense was never notified that CIA even had information bearing on the case as the judge ruled that the mere fact that CIA possessed this information was classified and outweighed any rights the defendant had. Moreover, under CIPA, the Attorney General has the authority to drop a prosecution in those cases where the risk to national security is too great.10 (U) In 1982, Congress acted to protect human intelligence sources by passing the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. §421 which criminalizes the revelation of a source's identity. This Act subjects anyone who reveals information that identifies a covert agent to prosecution with up to 10 years in prison and $50,000 in fines. A covert agent includes: (a) a U.S. citizen whose intelligence relationship with the U.S. Government is classified and is acting abroad as an agent, informant or source of operational assistance to an intelligence agency; and (b) an individual, other than a U.S. citizen whose past or present intelligence relationship to the U.S. is classified information and who is a present or former agent or informant of, or is of operational assistance to, an intelligence agency.
[104-10330-10070.pdf — page 4]
SECRETSUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources11. (U) These statutes are just a few examples of a larger government policy to protect human sources from public disclosure. There has also developed over the years a significant amount of case law which further implements this policy. For example, in *Sims v. CIA*, 10 S.Ct. 1981 (1985), the Supreme Court held that pursuant to the National Security Act, the DCI had the authority to protect from release to Freedom of Information Act requesters the identities of individuals conducting research on projects financed by CIA. The Supreme Court further stated that the DCI's authority to protect sources was broad, and was not limited to only those individuals who were guaranteed confidentiality.12. (U) Most recently, President Clinton signed an Executive Order on classified national security information which came into effect in October 1995. Although it requires that agencies make greater declassification efforts than the prior Executive Order, Executive Order 12958 affords human sources extra protection from its declassification provisions. Under E.O. 12958, information that is over 25 years old and has historical value must be declassified within five years. However, information revealing the identity of a human source may continue to be protected.13. (U) The above federal statutes and case law show a long-standing practice of protecting human sources who provide intelligence information to the U.S. Government. In carrying out its statutory obligations, the Review Board should give serious weight to this policy and afford the protection of human sources the highest priority.III. Operational Considerations14. (U) As the Review Board is well aware, in order for CIA officers to effectively collect intelligence around the world, they cannot acknowledge publicly that they work for CIA and, conversely, CIA cannot acknowledge a particular individual's affiliation with it. This is true even more so with sources. In addition to the risk to a source's personal safety, discovery of a CIA source would also reveal any operations he was conducting and CIA case officers with whom he was meeting or might even cast suspicion on the[^1] (U) The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552 is another example of a federal statute that allows for the protection of human sources. Although the FOIA generally mandates release of government documents, exemption b(3) allows for withholding from release information that is exempted from disclosure by statute. The National Security Act has been held by the Supreme Court to be such a withholding statute. *Sims v. CIA*, 105 S.Ct. 1981 (1985).[^1]: SECRET
[104-10330-10070.pdf — page 5]
# SECRETSUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sourcesaffiliation of innocent family and friends. This is no less true with a source who no longer works for the Agency. A source's prior affiliation with CIA is normally still classified in order to protect him, his former contacts at CIA, the CIA facilities at which he may have been meeting with case officers, the cover mechanisms employed to protect his affiliation with CIA, and the operations which he conducted.15. (U) The public disclosure of an individual's affiliation with CIA could and, in fact, has threatened the safety and lives of not only the source, but also their families, colleagues, officials of foreign governments and other foreign nationals with whom they have had contact. The Review Board will certainly recall the Proenza case (since this was released by the Board in August 1995) in which a number of Cuban officials were falsely believed to be CIA agents. They were arrested, convicted and spent years in prison for their alleged treasonous activities and their professional and personal lives were ruined. The threat of violence to those who are in fact associated with CIA is even more real. These individuals live and work in foreign countries, many of which have a local population hostile to the United States and especially CIA. If one should doubt the risks that those affiliated with CIA face, one only has to recall that, in 1992, two CIA employees were murdered while waiting to turn into CIA Headquarters in Virginia. If this type of attack is possible right at the CIA's front gate, it is not hard to imagine the personal risks that those working with the CIA abroad face. Clearly, the risk is that much greater for those who are sources: for example, as a result of Aldrich Ames' disclosures to the KGB, 10 Soviets who were covert assets of the CIA were executed.16. (U) Incidents such as these clearly demonstrate that the policy of protecting association with the CIA is an important one. Individuals associated with CIA have been and will continue to be subjected to threats, reprisals and physical injuries from foreign intelligence services, terrorist groups, and other persons or organizations hostile to CIA or the U.S. Government. Individuals choose to undertake these risks for many different reasons, but it is with the condition that the CIA will protect their cooperation with the U.S. Government.IV. Proposal17. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA sources in the JFK Collection. The Agency proposes that in
[104-10330-10070.pdf — page 6]
SECRETSUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sourcesmost cases a substitution for the true name be used. In prior releases of these same documents, the Review Board agreed to redact the true name and substitute "source." If the Review Board is concerned about tracking particular sources throughout the records, a particular identifying substitution can be used for an individual source throughout (for example, "Mexican source 1").18. (S) Among the names that are currently being considered for release by the Review Board, the following are some that the CIA proposes be treated in this manner:*   True name of LIRING/3, an encrypted asset of the CIA and unilateral penetration of the Cuban Embassy. His wife also worked_at_the Embassy and he was apparently suspected as being CIA though it was never proven. LIRING/3 at some point disappeared and we have no way of knowing what his current situation is.*   True name of ERTHYROID/3, the unilateral penetration of the Nicaraguan Service. The Review Board will recall that it has already been fully briefed on ERTHYROID/3 and had agreed to the protection of the fact that he was a unilateral source.*   Anthony C. M. Devere (1041001210022) was [is] a member of the British_Service. As such, he was [is] a liaison source. This raises concerns about protection of our liaison relationships. Moreover, Mr. Devere's identity constitutes "foreign government information" which, as the Board has already been informed, the CIA does not have the authority to release.19. (S) Another type of name that similarly should be protected from release is the new identity provided to a defector. Although defectors do not face some of the dangers that "assets" overseas face, they are still given new identities for their protection because there is some risk to their personal safety even in the U.S. For example, in this collection the identity of Golitsyn appears in documents being reviewed this month. Since the time of his defection, Golitsyn has utilized successive identities, because they have been unofficially disclosed, that have not[^2][^2]: (S) Golitsyn's identity had to be changed again. However, there is a risk that revealing this former identity could lead to the identification of Golitsyn's current identity.
[104-10330-10070.pdf — page 7]
SECRETSUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sourcesbeen officially released and that are closely held within the Agency. This is done for his own protection and that of his family even though they live in the United States. CIA cannot, at this time, agree to the official release of Golitsyn's assumed new identities or for that matter of any defectors that appear to date in the collection.20. (S) CIA has noted that in some cases a source is identified by only a first name or a code name. Where CIA has been unable to identify any information about that individual or there is no other source revealing information that has been revealed in the JFK Collection, it would be possible to release that name. For example, in a few documents, the name "Tota" appears. To date, CIA has been unable to determine who this person is and there does not appear to be any further source revealing information in the collection. It is probably that "Tota" is just a code name or a street name known to his colleagues. As "Tota" is a common name, such a release would not threaten the particular individual or his family, and as the person can not be identified it would not seriously undermine the U.S. Government policy to protect intelligence sources.21. (U) The Agency recognizes that some names may be particularly important to the JFK story. In such cases, the CIA is willing to work with the Review Board to come to the appropriate resolution. CIA proposes that it conduct a record search for information on that individual. It may be that in these cases, if the person is deceased and has no living family, that the Review Board and the CIA can agree that the value of revealing the true name outweighs the need to protect that source from disclosure.22. (U) It is our hope that the CIA and the Review Board can work out a mutually agreeable policy regarding the identity of human sources that will not undermine the important policy of protecting those who work covertly for the U.S. Government. As usual, my staff and I are available to discuss this matter with you.![signature of John F. Pereira]John F. PereiraChief, Historical Review Group8SECRET
[104-10330-10070.pdf — page 8]
SECRETSUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human SourcesDCI/CSI/J.Pereira: apd/x31805 (13 Dec 96)G:/CSIFO/SHARED/Pereira.docDistribution:Original - Addressee1 - CSI/HRP Chrono1 - D/CSI1 - C/CSI/HRG1 - Barry Harrrelson, CSI/HRP1 - Linda Cipiriani, OGC9SECRET
[104-10330-10081.pdf — page 0]
# CLASSIFIED FAX# TRANSMISSIONARRB202-724-0088To: Barry Harrelson Date: March 31, 1997Fax #: 703-613-3060 Pages: 17, including this cover sheet.From: Michelle CombsSubject: DS&T and DO Briefing QuestionsCOMMENTS:Barry,Attached are the final versions of the DS&T and DO briefing questions. There are no changes in the DS&T questions. Questions have been added to the DO list to reflect our conversation March 19 and 20. You, of course, already have our detailed explanations for the earlier DO questions. If you have any questions or if there are any problems, please give me a call. I should be in all day. See you tomorrow.Michelle
[104-10330-10081.pdf — page 1]
# HTLINGUAL1.  What kinds of records might the DS&T maintain on the HTLINGUAL project? How could these records be queried?## Castro Assassination Plots1.  What kinds of records would TSD or other offices of DS&T have maintained on the various Castro assassination plots? How might a search query be framed to isolate these records?
[104-10330-10081.pdf — page 2]
# SKUNK WORKSA Personal Memoir of My Years at LockheedBEN R. RICH AND LEO JANOS![logo of little, brown and company]LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANYBOSTON NEW YORK TORONTO LONDON
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P.2![LIBRARY OF CONGRESS SEAL] SEP 15 1994COPYRIGHT OFFICECopyright © 1994 by Ben R. RichAll rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, except by a reviewer who may quote brief passages in a review.First EditionLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataRich, Ben R.Skunk Works: a personal memoir of my years at Lockheed/Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos. — 1st ed.p. cm.Includes index.ISBN 0-316-74330-51. Lockheed Advanced Development Company — History. 2. Rich, Ben R. — Career in aeronautics. 3. Aeronautics — Research — United States — History. I. Janós, Leo. II. Title. III. Title: Skunk Works.TL565.R53 1994.338.7'623746'0973 — dc2094-8732MV-PAPublished simultaneously in Canada by Little, Brown & Company (Canada) LimitedPrinted in the United States of America
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# OVERFLYING RUSSIA153The next thing we tried was something called a Salisbury screen, a metallic grid applied to the airplane's undercarriage in the hope of deflecting incoming radar beams, but it worked only at some frequencies and altitudes and not at others.Kelly thought it was more practical to try special iron ferrite paints that would absorb a radar ping rather than bounce it back to the sender. The paints were moderately effective but inhibited heat dissipation through the airframe's outer skin and we experienced overheating engine problems. But the paint lowered the radar cross section by one order of magnitude, so we decided to give it a try. We called these specially painted airplanes "dirty birds" and shipped the first one out for flight testing in April 1957. Our test pilot, Bob Sieker, took the U-2 up to over seventy thousand feet and suddenly radioed that he was experiencing rapid airframe heat buildup. Moments later his engine blew out and the face-plate blew off Bob's oxygen mask as his pressure suit instantly inflated. The U-2 dove straight down and crashed. It took us three days to locate the wreckage and Bob's body. An autopsy revealed that above seventy thousand feet he had suffered acute hypoxia and lost consciousness in only ten seconds. The culprit that killed him was a defective faceplate clasp that cost fifty cents.The CIA was so desperate to buy time for these Soviet over-flights that Bissell got Kelly to sequester four of our test flight engineers and have them write a bogus flight manual for a U-2 twice as heavy as ours and with a maximum altitude of only fifty thousand feet that carried only scientific weather gear in its bay. The manual included phony instrument panel photos with altered markings for speed, altitude, and load factor limits. Four copies were produced and then artificially aged with grease, coffee stains, and cigarette burns. How or if the agency got them into Soviet hands only Mr. B knew, and he never told.
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# Questions for Follow-up DO Records BriefingApril 1, 19971. At what point did the DDP begin to keep records of destroyed records? For example, in a *Cold Warrior* footnote, Tom Mangold reports that as any of Angleton's files were destroyed, "a complete record was carefully maintained about what had been done. (George) Kalaris signed off on every file and the DCI's office was notified." (p. 143) Where are these records?2. Could an archival search be run on specific topics for retired records at the CIA's Record's Center? Perhaps an ARRB staffer could be present during the search to review the abstracts and to suggest other fields or topics to be searched?3. Could a crypt search for records containing relevant crypts be run through cryptographic reference? How would queries need to be framed and stated?4. Why is it so difficult to develop a list for all personnel (official, contract, administrative, or TDY) assigned to the post referenced in RIF 104-10065-10199 from 1959-1964?5. We have been working to identify all technical and surveillance operations in and on the Cuban and Soviet consulates and embassies in Mexico City between September 1 and December 1, 1963. How can we frame a search query to determine if we have a comprehensive and complete list of all operations at that time?6. How can a search query be framed to document all electronic take produced by the Mexico City Station in the immediate wake of the assassination (the first month) and during the period of Oswald's visit? How can we verify that what exists in the Sequestered Collection represents all records of the technical production that was available at the time of the assassination? If additional records or original production still exists, where would it be stored or filed? What searches could be conducted to retrieve any additional records? If such electronic take has been destroyed, do records exist of the destruction?7. Could you describe the process by which operational funds are proposed, approved, received, and distributed (circa 1963). What funding and disbursement records exist? How are they organized? How should a request be formulated to institute a reasonable search of these records?