Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10306-10025.pdf — page 118]
FriLAST MONTHSEPTEMBERSu Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa1 23 4 5 6 7 8 910 11 12 13 14 15 1617 18 19 20 21 22 2324 25 26 27 28 29 30OCTOBER-1961Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat1 2 3 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 1415 16 17 18 19 20 2122 23 24 25 26 27 2829 30 3120NEXT MONTHNOVEMBERSu Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa1 2 3 45 6 7 8 9 10 1112 13 14 15 16 17 1819 20 21 22 23 24 2526 27 28 29 30Α. Μ.1:00 P.M.8:459:00 Dave Humphrey 1:15 Reany9:15 1:309:30 1:459:45 2:0010:00- White Hau 2:1510:15 Cabinet Room 2:30 Spanne fur2:45 Situation Room10:30 at White Hause10:45 3:0011:00 3:1511:15 3:3011:30 3:4511:45 4:0012:00- Toms Schreyer 4:1512:15 4:3012:30 4:45 Deputies Fely12:45 5:006:00 Mrs. Schreyer293 Friday, October 20, 1961 72
[104-10306-10025.pdf — page 119]
# TueLAST MONTHOCTOBERSu Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa1 2 3 4 5 6 78 9 10 11 12 13 1415 16 17 18 19 20 2122 23 24 25 26 27 2829 30 31NOVEMBER-1961Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat1 2 3 45 6 7 8 9 10 1112 13 14 15 16 17 1819 20 21 22 23 24 2526 27 28 29 3014NEXT MONTHDECEMBERSu Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa1 23 4 5 6 7 8 910 11 12 13 14 15 1617 18 19 20 21 22 2324 25 26 27 28 29 3031A. Μ.P. M.JedevectX63458:451:00 Lunch. John Starnes9:001:15 Colm. Cesedein R9:151:30 Large Dining Rm.9:301:459:452:0010:002:1510:152:3010:30 The President2:4510:453:0011:003:1511:153:3011:303:4511:454:00 Spec, Hp Bfng & Mr.12:00Malone12:154:1512:30 NSC Bfrs.4:3012:45 Col. King of L.A. Lurney Team4:455:00 NSC Bfng8. Pined-Hery Kuck for Ken Oak - Blair House   Stag. Rektik.Tuesday, November 14, 1961
[104-10306-10025.pdf — page 120]
LecaescitsFriLAST MONTHNOVEMBERSu Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa1 2 3 45 6 7 8 9 10 1112 13 14 15 16 17 1819 20 21 22 23 24 2526 27 28 29 30DECEMBER-1961Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat1 23 4 5 6 7 8 910 11 12 13 14 15 1617 18 19 20 21 22 2324 25 26 27 28 29 30311NEXT MONTHJANUARYSu Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa1 2 3 4 5 67 8 9 10 11 12 1314 15 16 17 18 19 2021 22 23 24 25 26 2728 29 30 31A. Μ.P. M.8:451:00 Lt. Lunch ein office9:001:159:151:309:301:459:452:0010:00 Jon Rox + lead Lucas 2:1510:152:3010:302:45 Daved Nurpley10:453:00- Geo. Rerte]3* 11:00. Geo. Macto .] (hes) file. 3:15 (Tote I. Mumply 3  11:15  3:30 gue C.S. Officeil  File on the 73  11:30 Frank Regnal d.  3:45 De ravel return  11:45  4:00  12:00  4:15  12:15  4:30  12:30  4:45  12:45  5:00  6:15 Attorney General  Row 5115 Juketice (1024 St  Kinner for TSD Resured Ed (dem de long)  Alibi Club 7:30-Info.Friday, December 1, 1961303/тк
[104-10306-10025.pdf — page 121]
Sat-sunLAST MONTHNOVEMBERSu Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa1 2 3 45 6 7 8 9 10 1112 13 14 15 16 17 1819 20 21 22 23 24 2526 27 28 29 30DECEMBER-1961Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat1 23 4 5 6 7 8 910 11 12 13 14 15 1617 18 19 20 21 22 2324 25 26 27 28 29 303130-31NEXT MONTHJANUARYSu Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa1 2 3 4 5 67 8 9 10 11 12 1314 15 16 17 18 19 2021 22 23 24 25 26 2728 29 30 31Sat. A. М. Sun.8:45 1:009:00 1:159:15 1:309:30 1:459:45 2:0010:00 2:1510:15 2:3010:30 2:4510:45 3:0011:00 3:1511:15 3:3011:30 3:4511:45 4:0012:00 4:1512:15 4:3012:30 4:4512:45 5:00Sat. P. M. Sun.2 12/31-New Year's Eve. Dinner -/nov Mr. Hector Leppmen364 Sat., December 30, 1961 1 365 Sun., December 31, 1961 0
[104-10306-10025.pdf — page 122]
LAST MONTHDECEMBERSu Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa1 23 4 5 6 7 8 910 11 12 13 14 15 1617 18 19 20 21 22 2324 25 26 27 28 29 3031JANUARY-1962Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat1 2 3 4 5 67 8 9 10 11 12 1314 15 16 17 18 19 2021 22 23 24 25 26 2728 29 30 31NEXT MONTHFEBRUARYSu Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa1 2 34 5 6 7 8 9 1011 12 13 14 15 16 1718 19 20 21 22 23 2425 26 27 288:45 1:009:00 1:159:15 1:309:30 1:459:45 2:0010:00 2:1510:15 2:3010:30 2:4510:45 3:0011:00 3:1511:15 3:3011:30 3:4511:45 4:0012:00 4:1512:15 4:3012:30 4:4512:45 5:001 Monday, January 1, 1962 364
[104-10306-10025.pdf — page 123]
BushTueLAST MONTHNEXT MONTHDECEMBERFEBRUARY| Su  | Mo  | Tu  | We  | Th  | Fr  | Sa  || --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- ||     |     | 1   | 2   |     |     |     || 3   | 4   | 5   | 6   | 7   | 8   | 9   || 10  | 11  | 12  | 13  | 14  | 15  | 16  || 17  | 18  | 19  | 20  | 21  | 22  | 23  || 24  | 25  | 26  | 27  | 28  | 29  | 30  || 31  |     |     |     |     |     |     || Su  | Mo  | Tu  | We  | Th  | Fr  | Sa  || --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- ||     | 1   | 2   | 3   | 4   | 5   | 6   || 7   | 8   | 9   | 10  | 11  | 12  | 13  || 14  | 15  | 16  | 17  | 18  | 19  | 20  || 21  | 22  | 23  | 24  | 25  | 26  | 27  || 28  | 29  | 30  | 31  |     |     |     || Su  | Mo  | Tu  | We  | Th  | Fr  | Sa  || --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- ||     |     |     |     | 1   | 2   | 3   || 4   | 5   | 6   | 7   | 8   | 9   | 10  || 11  | 12  | 13  | 14  | 15  | 16  | 17  || 18  | 19  | 20  | 21  | 22  | 23  | 24  || 25  | 26  | 27  | 28  |     |     |     |8:451:00 Leech - T. Barnes9:001:159:151:309:301:459:452:0010:002:1510:152:3010:302:4510:453:00 My Lemis Gulick AF11:003:1511:153:3011:303:4511:454:0012:004:1512:154:30 Sir John Codealer Bennett (2723)12:304:4512:455:005:30 - Dew Prescat Bush9 Tuesday, January 9, 1962 356
[104-10307-10006.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992EVES ONLYSECRETCONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP14 APRIL THROUGH 14 OCTOBER 1962Task Force WForeign Intelligence BranchEVES ONLYSECRET
[104-10307-10006.pdf — page 1]
# III. WHAT TARGETS WAS THE AGENCY ABLE TO COVER AND WITH WHAT FREQUENCY AND CONTINUITY?The following remarks apply to agent coverage only, that is, coverage by means of individuals on the island of Cuba, or elsewhere in the world. Audio devices or telephone taps on Cuban installations abroad or Cubans living abroad have produced intelligence which has served operational ends, in other words, information which has provided critical data used in the spotting, assessment and recruitment of agents. Due to the standard security measures taken in most official installations, these technical operations have been able to provide only a limited amount of positive intelligence. In general, agents have produced information essentially in accordance with their known access at the time of recruitment. Responsibility for many of the agents dealt with during the present reporting period was simply assumed by TFW from past efforts against Cuba. In many instances, these agents had been recruited strictly on an "availability" basis, and indeed had no particular access. A major effort was made at the inception of TFW to winnow out those persons who could make no contribution and to redirect those who could. This process of redirection, which was conducted via time consuming and generally inefficient S/W channels, resulted in the conversion of a number of heretofore unusable agents into sound, pertinent reporting sources. Though, in most instances, TFW operations officers had never had personal contact with these agents, they succeeded in inducing many of them to spot, develop and recruit sub-agents. This technique succeeded, despite the obstacles involved in vetting candidates and advising agents via S/W means. In regard to the recruitment of new agent assets during the reporting period, TFW was able to be guided by specific, priority needs. Accordingly, the many new assets acquired were chosen because of specific access to target personalities or institutions. The assigned targets and extent of coverage are indicated below.## A. MilitaryDuring the reporting period, in the latter half, the Agency's major effort to obtain intelligence from agent sources, centered on Cuban military affairs. The reporting obtained covered matters ranging from military policy to detailed OB. Almost every agent contributed to this effort, with the consequence that the coverage of military matters was wide-spread and continuous. Despite the fact that 95% of this information was provided via S/W (much of it from totally untrained sub-sources who had no military experience), such was the detail and volume of the data, that our agents were able to give us highly significant information on troop and materiel' movements, location and nature of military sites, etc. The following agents served as the major sources of military information during the reporting period:
[104-10307-10006.pdf — page 2]
13-000001. Cuban (insurance) executive, who had a large and diversified net, provided intelligence in late June 1962 which specifically anticipated the massive Soviet military build-up which ultimately took place in Cuba. Throughout the build-up itself this agent provided an almost continuous stream of OB intelligence on missile, maritime and air phases of the build-up. He provided the initial reporting on delivery of IL-28's to the island.2. A relative of a former Cuban president whose government connections provided him on several occasions with information on attitudes of various military factions toward Castro and the Soviets. Agent also provided some detailed missile OB.3. U.S. citizen who established contact with a resistance chief (in Pinar del Rio) during July 1962, provided, in the course of several reports, an inventory of Soviet installations throughout the province. The maintenance of communication with this agent was extremely arduous in virtue of his most exposed position.4. A Havana (surgeon) who took special horseback trips to cover the Soviet installation at Torrens Reformatory.5. A former lawyer, resident of Santiago provided information on Cuban armymmine laying along roads in Santiago area, as well as on Soviet troops and materiel movements.6. A western diplomat who provided photographs of Soviet-occupied hotels in Havana, Soviet troop and materiel movements in the Havana area.7. A Cubana official who provided comprehensive data on state readiness of Cubana air materiel.8. A merchant in Camaguey who had provided general observational reporting on military activities in his area.9. A former wife of a Cuba Airlines pilot who has contacts among Cuban Airline pilots from whom she obtained some air OB.10. A shipping clerk at Cardenas harbor reported sporadically on activities at the port.11. A construction company employee at Guantanamo Naval Base reported on Cuban OB in the environs of the base.12. A public accountant in Havana who is the leader of a counter-revolutionary group, reported military information acquired through his group contacts.13. A Havana bartender who reported considerable quantities of OB data obtained from his large circle of varied acquaintances in Havana area.14. A retired railroad official reported data on rail shipments.
[104-10307-10006.pdf — page 3]
15. A lawyer in Havana reported on Rancho Boyeros Airport in Havana where (a certain airline) is one of his clients.16. A (pineapple) firm manager in Pinar del Rio recruited in July 1962 reported on military developments in his area.17. A Cuban employee of a foreign embassy recruited in July 1962 in Havana reported some OB information which was obtained through casual contacts.18. A customs inspector (at Jose Marti Airport) in Havana was the source of good reporting on Sov/Bloc cargo shipments to Havana, including military cargos.19. A physician in Havana who reported on military movements.20. A Cuban Airlines official, with limited access, reported Air OB.21. A foreign intelligence service staff officer in Havana reported military Oв.22. A second foreign intelligence service staff officer in Havana reported military OB.23. A number of maritime assets who have reported on Sov/Bloc military cargo deliveries to Cuba.b. Political. Throughout the reporting period, the Agency was able to produce intelligence on Cuban political affairs at the ministerial level and above. This intelligence was derived essentially from sources who had but limited access to persons of high rank or in key positions. This type of access placed a premium on Agent elictation skills and the ability to distinguish between rumor and fact, plus an aptitude for remaining afloat in dangerous waters. The most significant political information was provided by the following agents:1. An official (in the Ministry of Economics)who, (in the capacity of advisor to Ernesto GUEVARA) was able to glean information on Cuban political affairs.2. A relative of a former Cuban president who through this connection and his own social position is able to maintain contact with high-level officials in Cuba.3. A Cuban doctor (who gives medical treatment to Cuban officials and)who is reporting limited intelligence, by direction, until he is able to develop direct access to important high-level officials.
[104-10307-10006.pdf — page 4]
4. (A cultural) attache of a West European Embassy in Havana who picks up information from other diplomats and from Cuban contacts on political matters. A sub-agent of this asset has also been a source of medium-level political information.5. A West European Ambassador in Cuba who provides political information he obtains from foreign and Cuban contacts.6. A (Cuban Ambassador in Western Europe) who has been reporting with utmost detail and frequency on high-level political matters of which he is aware.7. The Ambassador to Cuba of a Latin American country who reports political intelligence obtained through his Cuban and foreign contacts.8. A former protege (of Raul CASTRO) who retains contacts with government leaders and who is a new asset developing his reporting capabilities on political matters.9. The Ambassador in Cuba of (a North African) country who has provided high-level political information.10. A Cuban lawyer in Santiago whose brother-in-law, (a high-ranking official) provided intelligence on GOC/Soviet relations.11. A staff officer of a foreign intelligence service assigned (to a cover position) in a Havana Embassy who has produced some political intelligence responsive to our requirements.12. A Cuban manager of an intervened U.S. company who has relatives in the PSP and in the government. To date, his reporting has covered general political developments.13. A librarian and teacher who is a relative of a (former justice) of the Cuban Supreme Court) and who has high-level government contacts. This agent has been reporting political personality data and some political information.14. A (Cuban Ambassador in Western Europe) who has reported political information to which he has access.15. In addition, there are a number of agent penetrations in Cuban diplomatic establishments overseas who provide a variety of miscellaneous political information concerning Cuban activities in the areas concerned.
[104-10307-10006.pdf — page 5]
c. Economic. The Agency was able to produce a continuous amount of intelligence from Agent sources on the Cuban sugar, oil and transportation industries, much of which was in the form-of statistical summaries. In a number of instances, this intelligence was provided by agents who had direct access to this information by virtue of their jobs. We also have been able to get continued reporting on general economic conditions and foreign trade. Among the most significant agents reporting economic information were:1. A Cuban (insurance) salesman, previously noted, who through his extensive contacts and sub-agents has been able to provide information on sugar production, (insurance) affairs and the Cuban banking system.2. An official of the (Ministry of Economy), (a close associate of Che GUEVARA, who has provided useful economic intelligence.3. A relative of a former Cuban president, previously noted, who has provided detailed import-export figures; detailed documentary reports on petroleum.4. A (high-level) official of Cubana Airlines who reportedly provided high-level information on Cubana Airlines, particularly financial and materiel affairs.5. A resident of Mexico and (director of an Italian-controlled pharmaceutical) firm who travels to Cuba where he has good contacts in the Ministry of Industry, who has reported economic information.6. A Dutch businessman who has access to Cuban economic officials and who has provided useful economic information.7. U.S. trained Cuban engineer who provided detailed reports on (petroleum) industry.d. Sociological and General Conditions. The Agency has provided a steady and relatively heavy flow of intelligence covering such matters as the state of resistance activities, mood of the populace, living conditions, etc., from agents in nearly every Cuban province. A survey of agents reporting this type of information has not been completed, because almost all of our agents have reported on this low priority topic from time to time.4. Within the Terms of the Agency's Mission, What Target Was It Unable to Cover and Why?a. Paragraph 3 above sets forth in general the degree to which the major Cuban targets were covered during the reporting
[104-10307-10006.pdf — page 6]
period. The key military, political and economic targets were clearly defined and assiduously pursued by TFW. The immense pressure of time must continuously be borne in mind if the attack on the Cuban problem is to be granted its full perspective. Even before TFW assumed responsibility for collection against Cuba, it was clear that intelligence on Soviet, Satellite and Chinese Communist Cuban policy and maneuvers would be formulated and planned at the highest level in the respective governments. Equally clear was the fact that the clandestine search for insights into the Cuban policies of these governments would enjoy only as much success as the clandestine search for any intelligence regarding any policies of these governments. Time restrictions alone ruled out the hope that adequate coverage of these key denied area targets could be achieved. As a consequence, every facet of the TFW collection program was geared to the search for top priority Cuban intelligence; from sources in the free world and on the island every agent or agent candidate was evaluated in terms of his access to such intelligence. Translated into espionage terms, this meant that every agent or candidate was examined sharply to determine whether and how he could help penetrate the GOC, the Cuban armed forces or the managerial and policy levels of the Cuban economy. Below is an account of the success of this effort; it will be seen that most major target areas were under direct, specific assault.b. Political.1. Cuban Communist Party: In late May a close relative and confidant of the Chief of the Cuban Communist Party was singled out and developed by a Cuban principle agent. The candidate provided highly valuable information throughout the summer of 1962. Though the information was obtained indirectly by the agent it was but a portion of what he could produce. Thus the ultimate aim of the operation was to effect the candidate's direct recruitment. The drive toward this goal continues, and though we are optimistic that the 6 months effort thus far invested will result in the direct recruitment of a high-level 29 Communist Party member, it would be inaccurate to say that as of the close of the reporting period, the Party had been penetrated at a significant level.2. GOC Ruling Circle.(a) In May 1962 TFW spotted a Cuban legal traveller whose brother-in-law has been a member of the GOC from its inception. The agent was recruited under specific instructions to attempt to induce his relative to report on GOC policy matters. Though TFW had only 12 hours with the agent
[104-10307-10006.pdf — page 7]
before dispatching him to Cuba, he has attempted to carry out his instructions. By October he had succeeded in eliciting significant information from the target, and was confident his full recruitment was simply a matter of time. One inhibiting feature affecting the pace of this operation is the fact that the agent lives in Santiago while his relative, the target, is a resident of Havana. Unquestionably the full recruitment of the target could help fill an important gap in our reporting on GOC activities.(b) In June 1962 TFW obtained a lead to a person very closely related to Fidel CASTRO. Throughout the summer extensive but necessarily circumspent negotiations were conducted to bring this person to Mexico where full recruitment, training and briefing would be possible. The negotiations culminated in success. The agent was met and trained by Agency personnel in September and early October and dispatched to Cuba on 15 October with the specific mission of reporting on the thoughts, plans and activities of the CASTROS and other leading GOC figures. Since the target, prior to recruitment did not possess the kind of political awareness which would have led him systematically to observe those GOC personalities to whom he had matural access, the Agency was denied any prime political intelligence from this source during the reporting period.(c) Throughout the summer 1962, TFW received various reports, the tenor of which were that Ernesto 'Che' GUEVARA would like to defect from Cuba. Each report proved, upon closer inquiry, to be groundless, until we learned in late September that a Mexican industrialist had claimed GUEVARA had asked him in 1961 for assistance in leaving Cuba. Though many of the facets of this disclosure tallied with other known data, exploitation of this exceedingly important lead was hamstrung by the inability to aline a qualified agency officer with the widely travelling Mexican. This lead illustrates well the frustrations involved in pursuing high-level targets within a rigid time framework, and with a limited number of available personnel. It also illustrated the need to persist, when the target is of sufficient importance, in the follow up of "far-out" leads.## 3. Military(a). In late July TFW recruited a Cuban legal traveller expressly because of his close relationship with a member of the Cuban General Staff[^6]. Once again only a few hours was available in which to train the agent. Nevertheless, during August, September and October the agent persisted in his efforts[^6]: ![staff member of the Cuban General Staff]
[104-10307-10006.pdf — page 8]
Juerita?release
[104-10307-10006.pdf — page 9]
13-00000to develop the target and was able to provide significant OBat the same time. Neither this, nor the other efforts topenetrate the Cuban military at high-level, however, had metwith full success by the end of the reports period.(b) The Cuban lawyer recruited in May 1962(see paragraph 2a above) developed a second target in September,a former member (of the Cuban General Staff) now awaiting reassign-ment. The agent was instructed to recruit and train thismilitary Officer in S/W. At the end of the reporting periodit was not possible to determine the success of this potentiallyexcellent operational development.(c) Included in this discussion is thepartially successful recruitment of a Cuban army engineer whois stationed in Santiago. The agent cited in (2b above) hasbeen in contact with this target, a captain, since July 1962,but has not succeeded in completing the full recruitment. Hehas obtained OB from the captain, but we feel the operationwill not have reached its full potential until the captain hasbeen trained in S/W and is reporting directly to us.(d) Since mid-August the Agency has beenpursuing a lead to the G-3 of the Cuban Army. The basis of thispursuit was fitted together from innumerable reports, and finallycentered, in early October, on a plan to try to effect the recruit-ment using a letter from a former army and prison comrade. Bycut-off date, the developmental activity had reached the pointwhere the only remaining matter was to deliver the letter intothe hands of the Officer.3. Economic. The Agency has striven to identify key   figures in the Cuban economy and to develop assess to them as   rapidly as possible, wherever the opportunity has arisen. Oil,   Nickle and Sugar Industries have been assigned to us having the   highest priority.(a) Petroleum: TFW recruited and sent toCuba in January a yound (U.S. trained engineer. In May) he reportedhe had obtained a position in the (Institute of Petroleum) Toolowly himself to be of major value, we have steadily guided him in an enterprise aimed at recruitment of the chief of the petroleum industry. The families of the two man had been close friends.The effort involves many imponderables and must be carried out viaS/W. Still, the major aim is deemed worthy of the investment.Meanwhile the agent has been able to provide intelligence ofincreasing value.51nJ