Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10307-10006.pdf — page 10]
(b) Nickle Industry: The seat of thisimportant industry unfortunately is in two small towns in Orienteprovince. Lightly populated areas which are of strategic importancealways pose rugged operational obstacles. The nickle towns areno exception. Numerous well-meaning persons in the U.S. haveattempted to help us obtain access to this critical target.not until late September was the Agency able to turn up (byvirtue of a New Orleans recruitment) a source of viable leadsto key personnel. By cut-off date, however, we had not been ableto bring any lead to function. Most promising is a lead to thetechnical supervisor of the Nickle complex.(c) Sugar: Two former high-level penetrationsof the Sugar Industry defected to the U.S. soon after the inceptionof TFW. Throughout the summer it was not possible to identifya suitable candidate to replace them. A New York source in earlyOctober succeeded in placing us in touch with the chief sugarotechnician)in Cuba. This operation should be fully productiveby Christmas 1962.
[104-10307-10006.pdf — page 11]
# 13-00000To illustrate the results of this operational data, we have recently been preparing the recruitment in place or defection of one of the principal officers of the Cuban Foreign_Service in Europe. We have been able to develop the proposals through an already defected diplomat and the effectiveness of his approach and a reading on the diplomats reactions can be provided to us independently by three other agents in close contact with him as well as through a technical surveillance operation.## G. LiaisonThe most fruitful liaison relative to the Cuban target has been conducted with (European) and a few of the (Latin American) services. Specifically, the following services have been the most cooperative and helpful: The (British), (Dutch), (French), (Spanish), (Italian) (Greek), Norwegian, (Danish), (West German), (Mexican) (Argentinian) (Uruguayan), (Canadian) and (Chilean).Some of these services are working closely with the Task Force both in Washington and Miami, cutting corners on procedure, protocol and actually exceeding their own official instructions. This has been particularly true after the announcement of the President on 22 October 1962. The degree of this effort is remarkable and runs all the way from full cooperation to an outstanding exertion of personal commitment, resourcefulness, and imagination to find ways to help our effort.To cite only a few of the current FI operations developed through liaison services, the (Spanish) service has given us (4 resident agents (including (2 diplomats). The (French) service has provided us with one (resident diplomat who communicates directly with us (by W/T). The (Danish) and (Dutch) services, have given us control of (maritime assets calling at Cuban ports), and they have also participated in joint operations using (legal travellers).In addition to mounting operations against Cuba, several (European) services have provided (secure diplomatic courier) services for the transmittal of our own (agents' communications) and for the (infiltration of S/W and W/T and other materials) to our agents inside Cuba. Services in (Belgium) and (Holland) have been particularly helpful in the development of an operation to deny Cuba (access) to an (urgently needed solvent for petroleum products). To date it appears that efforts to make this (product unobtainable) to the Cubans has been successful.In general, the (West European) services have been cooperative in assisting us to mount operations against Cuba and against installations in their own territory. (Latin American) services, have been most helpful in developing operations against Cuban targets in their own countries, apparently because of the (Latin Americans') increasing concern with the threat of Cuban subversion on their territory.
[104-10307-10006.pdf — page 12]
13-00000V. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES, EITHER POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, INTHE AGENCY'S COVERAGE CAPABILITY, WHICH TOOK PLACE DURING THEPERIOD.The initial, significant change effected by the Agency to increase and improve its Cuban intelligence coverage capability was to establish a Cuban Task Force at Headquarters and to staff it with experienced intelligence officers. These officers were selected from other operating Divisions within the Agency. Many of them spoke Spanish and all of them have had extensive experience in various intelligence assignments both at Headquarters and in the Field. This newly created Task Force was charged with the responsibility to direct, advise, support, and/or coordinate all phases of the Agency's intelligence operations directed against Cuba.At the same time, the Task Force Field Station in Miami was strengthened considerably with increased numbers of experienced staff officers and facilities for mounting intelligence operations against the Cuban target. This concentration of experienced personnel into the Cuban Task Force, both at Headquarters and at the Miami Field Station, was a positive and significant effort to increase the Agency's intelligence coverage capability in order to satisfactorily fulfill the priority requirements and tasks which had been levied on the Agency as a result of the Communist takeover in Cuba.To further improve our coverage-capability, the Agency communications office set up a special facility in Miami to (intercept electronically internal communications) within Cuba. These (inter-24 cepted communications) are processed in Miami and then forwarded directly to Headquarters, Miami Field Station, (and to NSA for action 24 and/or further dissemination) The (NSA) disseminates to the other members of the intelligence community the information that has been intercepted and processed by this special Agency communication facility. This facility cooperates and coordinates its operations closely with (NSA) and is used by NSA) to assist in the (interception) 24 of (internal communications) in Cuba. 29In addition to setting up within the Agency an organization whose primary mission is concerned with all phases of intelligence operations directed against Cuba, all other operating Divisions within the Agency were directed to give top priority attention to the development of intelligence operations against Cuba. This has resulted in the diversion of certain assets who had the requisite access to Cuban targets as well as the experience or capability.
[104-10307-10006.pdf — page 13]
The response of the various Agency components, both by Headquarters Desks and by the Field Stations, has been most satisfactory and has aided the Task Force considerably in the performance of its assigned mission. Within the Task Force, selected officers have been designated to assist, advise, and coordinate on all phases of Cuban intelligence operations with the various geographic division desks. This arrangement has provided for a continued, increased coverage capability of the Cuban target by insuring a regular review of current, developmental, and planned intelligence operations of all available Agency intelligence assets which could be directed against Cuba.The above points are ones that reflect significant changes which have taken place during this period. In addition, it should be pointed out that there has been an intensification and concentration of all operational techniques applicable to the particular type and character of the Cuban target. There has been a substantial increase in the recruitment and training of agent assets. There has been an extensive increase in the establishment and use of clandestine communications methods and channels. The use of SW, one way voice radio, and WT as methods of communicating with agents inside Cuba has been greatly expanded. And since certain (Western Nations still maintain Embassies in Havana, courier) channels for the delivery of of letters and packages)[^24] by the (diplomatic pouch) have been developed and are being used extensively. [^24]The above points are discussed elsewhere in this paper but they are mentioned here briefly in the context of being closely related to significant changes in the Agency's intelligence capability.[^24]:
[104-10307-10006.pdf — page 14]
VI. WHAT SUPPORT FOR COLLECTION FACILITIES-WAS REQUIREDFROM OTHER AGENCIES? HOW WAS IT SECURED FROM THEM? WAS IT TIMELYAND EFFECTIVE? WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WAS LACKING?The conduct of intelligence collection operations oftenhas depended on timely and effective support from other U.S. govern-ment agencies. Several government agencies provided support tointelligence operations directed against the Cuban target on both aregular and a standby basis. In fact, each and every request forpolicy approved support was granted and carried out rapidly andeffectively. For example, the Department of State has expedited theissuance of visas on selected cases at our request as well as grantingvisa waivers to individuals of operational interest to the Agency.In addition, Foreign Service personnel interview, debrief, and attemptto establish the bona-fides of potential intelligence assets whovoluntarily contact a U.S. Embassy or Consulate. This is often donealone and some times in collaboration with an agency officer priorto introducing the agency officer for further development and ex-ploitation as the case may require. These types of support areprovided regularly by the Department of State and contribute consid-erably to the effectiveness of many complex intelligence operations.Another U.S. government agency which has given invaluablesupport to the Agency's intelligence collection operations is the FBI.The FBI has provided biographic data, investigative reports, andoperational leads to individuals of known or potential operationalinterest. This support has been maintained on a regular and continuingbasis. Close liaison relations between the FBI and this agency aremaintained at Headquarters and at various Field Stations. This closeliaison has resulted in a better understanding of the needs andrequirements of each Agency in the successful accomplishments oftheir separate responsibilities as well as providing a rapid channelfor providing support and assistance when requested.The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service has facil-itated the entry into the U.S. of persons of operational interestto the Agency; and has provided guidance and support for cases whichinvolve unusual alien residence and/or naturalization proceedings.Liaison with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service isparticularly close and harmonious at the Miami Field installationwhere the bulk of the cases involving persons of operational interestto us originates.Reports provided on a regular basis by the National SecurityAgency have been a source of operational leads which have been followed
[104-10307-10006.pdf — page 15]
up for[^29] the development of collection assets. The disseminations by the (N.S.A) also serve as an effective means of checking selected information and activity that has been provided by other sources of information. The (NSA) also collaborates in the dissemination of certain information with the CIA (communication facility) in Miami, an Agency unit engaged in the (electronic interception) and processing of Cuban (Internal Communications)[^24].Liaison with the aforementioned U.S. government agencies is maintained on a continuing and regular basis both at the Headquarters level in Washington, D.C. and at appropriate field installations by designated Agency components. It has been our pleasurable experience that these agencies, in addition to others such as the Department of Agriculture where specific operations required guidance in their par- ticular fields of competence, have provided timely, effective, and professional support and guidance, in support of policy approved intelligence collection operations as required in the national interest. Without such support, the task of intelligence collection would have been in many instances much more difficult and, in many cases, impossible.[^24]:[^29]:
[104-10307-10006.pdf — page 16]
# VII. AGENT SUMMARIESThe scope and nature of the Agency's Foreign Intelligence operations is most clearly seen in the character, personal ambition and caprice of the human material present, namely the agents involved. The following sketches of the individual agents engaged in these operations have been compiled in recognition of the vital ingredient which these human beings bring to an appreciation of the Agency's FI operations. It will be noted that a majority of the agents work, or have been worked, out of Miami, the city which has been the center of anti-Castro Cubans, the major pool of potential agents, since 1959.Other geographical areas are represented in mathematical sequence, in fact according to the number of Cuban exiles in residence at a given place. This same mathematical order applies with reference to the jobs these agents hold. Thus, if a Cuban has a function, the performance of which is important in sustaining the island, hence important to the Cuban Regime, the Agency has sought the services of this man as its agent.[^24] For this reason, several agents are in the employ of the airlines and of merchant marine shipping businesses. So too, with diplomacy. Every foreign diplomat now accredited to the Regime in Havana has been examined by the Agency as a prospective agent. Forty percent of these diplomats were approached. Of this number about one half took our bait and have accepted assignments which range from marginal involvement in "intelligence" (e.g., using their diplomatic immunity to carry our materials), to active participation in our operations.Finally, one type of Cuban who played an influential, though limited, role during the past six months was the defector (who is not mentioned elsewhere in this paper). The defector is the official who for one reason or another cannot remain in or be persuaded to remain in place and report on his job. Owing to the nature of this particular person, it is difficult to draw hard lines between those who genuinely reject their Government and those who merely quit in self-interest, but during the past six months, the Agency tapped in on the defections of about ten Cubans of consequence, profiting from their information in all cases and from their psychological exploitation when circumstance would permit.[^24]
[104-10307-10024.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992ATOP SECRET - SENSITIVE27 November 1962Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/P with DCI and approved generally in principle by DCI. Fully concurred in by DD/P.MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceTHROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)SUBJECT: Operational Plan for Continuing Operations Against Cuba1. Action: This memorandum is for your information and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this memorandum is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we believe should be taken by CIA against Cuba for the predictable future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for the reorientation of the current effort into a long term denied area type of operation of the highest priority.I. ASSUMPTIONS:A. The United States Government will give public assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons are present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
[104-10307-10024.pdf — page 1]
13-00000B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cuba, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal conditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary, guerrille, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of policy.D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cuba may serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over Cuba has been substantially weakened.E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will-2-
[104-10307-10024.pdf — page 2]
severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubansboth inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasinglydifficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents alreadyrecruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and otherefforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probablywill continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effortagainst Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimateobjective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a verylong-term basis as the United States Government, we believe,will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troopsto support such an overthrow. The United States Governmentin its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will notexpress the above factors to them in the context or with thebluntness stated here.G. In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two"course of action, i.e., unlimited support of Cuban exilesand exile groups with no real control or objective purposesin the hope that these groups will be able to shake theCastro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasinglyattractive at various levels in the United States Government.H. As a matter of policy, political pressures andeconomic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressivesabotage against Cuba will be continued.-3-
[104-10307-10024.pdf — page 3]
I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commandoand sabotage operations, except in rare selective instanceswill serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productivesince, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intelli-gence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those veryfew instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated.Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA foraction against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authoritywill insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligencecoverage of Cuba.J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use offacilities, real estate and basing outside the United States,particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary anddesirable.K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue.(Validity of this assumption is questionable)## OBJECTIVES:Based on the above assumptions, the following objectivesappear to be proper for continuing CIA operations againstCuba:A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolateand assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cubafrom the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of theFree World.B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and therest of the world.-4-
[104-10307-10024.pdf — page 4]
C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on Bloc resources used to support Cuba.D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter- intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis on:1.  Capabilities and intentions of the government.2.  Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other security organs.3.  Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.4.  State of potential resistance, including the morale and temper of the populace.5.  Militia and military order of battle and equip-    ment.6.  The loci of power and of possible stresses and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.7.  Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China, the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World and uncommitted nations.8.  The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban economy.-5-
[104-10307-10024.pdf — page 5]
E. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/ Bloc relationships.III. OPERATIONAL PLAN:A. Espionage and Intelligence Collection - All feasible effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelligence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelligence collection and related operational activity at the present time and its development during the past six months is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document breaks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service. Set out below are specifics of operational action it is proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase intelligence coverage of Cuba.1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection-6-
[104-10307-10024.pdf — page 6]
with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be induced to reinstitute their regular flights from Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as possible after the settlement of the current negotiations and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka refugee interrogation center will be re-established with the same personnel.2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communica-   tions with the (131) recruited agents now resident in Cuba. To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort will of course depend upon the stringency of future Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible as yet to accurately forecast.3. Third Country Operations: The priority on re-cruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort will be made to increase this coverage, both through the development of additional resident agents in Cuba