Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10332-10000.pdf — page 9]
13-00000SECRETAlias Documentation, piiOIM 98-0004413 April 1998MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Executive DirectorVIA:Director of Information ManagementFROM:Lee S. StricklandChief, Information Review Group/OIMSUBJECT:Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues1. (AIUO) Per your request at our 1 April bi-weekly meeting, we have summarized below the significant issues which are under deliberation and negotiation with the JFK Board. Our approach on protecting Agency equities is multi-step:*   First, with the staff, we argue relevance although the statute and implementing regulations define "assassination records" very broadly as including*   any records related to the assassination or Oswald,*   any records concerning the various conspiracy theories, and*   any records within the scope of previous investigations including the Church Committee, Pike Committee, Warren Commission, or House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA),[^1]*   Second, with the staff, we argue that release would cause current damage although the exemptions under the JFK statute are much narrower than the corresponding exemptions under the FOIA, and*   Third, if we fail to convince the staff, we must proceed to a more detailed and formal presentation to the Board.[^1]: (AIUO) It is the materials collected by the HSCA which are the most numerous and often the most troublesome in terms of sensitive equities. They are generally referred to as the "sequestered collection."SECRETCL BY: 0219849CL REASON: 1.5(c)DECL ON: X1DRV FROM: Multiple
[104-10332-10000.pdf — page 10]
13-00000SECRETSUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues## ISSUE 1 -- Unacknowledged Covert Actions2. (S) Within records surfaced by the Ford Library is a document -- a Helms Memorandum for the Record on a PFIAB meeting which contains references to CIA covert financial support to political parties in Peru, Greece, Italy and Brazil and to labor unions in France and Italy.[^2]3. (S) After much negotiation, the ARRB staff has agreed to recommend to the Board that the information related to those covert actions be considered non-related and the documents designated "Not Believed Related" (NBR). The document will be grouped with similar “NBR" documents and be presented to the Board for final action at the 13 April or 12 May meeting.## ISSUE 2 -- Alias Documentation and Accommodation Addresses4. (S) The CIA security file of former Agency employee, David Morales (deceased -- true name already released), within the sequestered collection contains documentation on five of his alias.[^3] We anticipate similar problems as we re-review other security files within the sequestered collection. We are considering a compromise with the following elements:*   protect all references to official documents reflecting the alias such as social security cards, drivers licenses,*   release items designated as pocket litter such as club cards,*   protect elements of accommodation addresses to avoid identifying specific locations, and*   lastly, make a decision to actually release or protect the alias itself depending on the timeframe and its importance to the JFK story.5. (S) However, disagreements on the actual implementation (e.g., protect house number but release street name of accommodation address) have prevented a final resolution at this[^2]: (S) See Attachment 1.[^3]: (S) See Attachment 2.- 2 -SECRET
[104-10332-10000.pdf — page 11]
SECRETSUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issuestime. We are also exploring with the DO senior management whether the blanket release of pocket litter (whether *lawfully obtained or forged*) might present media or operational issues today. Accordingly, we have requested that the issue be postponed until the May meeting.ISSUE 3 -- Organizational Materials6. (S) This request (one of the earliest and known as CIA-1) asked for organization charts on various Agency directorates and/or components for the years 1958-1968. All Agency directorates provided material responsive to the request and the ARRB staff has selected items for inclusion in the JFK collection. Remaining at issue are three DO charts -- a 1961 generic DDP organization, a 1963 generic DDP organization, and a detailed JMWAVE organization. The DO has agreed to release the first two and remain adamantly opposed to the release of the JMWAVE chart given its similarity to current organizational plans.7. (S) This issue will be presented by ARRB staff to the Board at the 13 April meeting where they will recommend that the DDP generic charts be accepted (good for CIA) and that the JMWAVE chart be declared as an assassination record (bad for CIA); an actual vote by the Board will not take place until the May meeting.ISSUE 4 -- Mexico City Tapes8. (S) This request asked for a thorough search of Agency files and documents for and CIA "... surveillance 'take' from Cuban and Soviet facilities in Mexico City at the time of the Oswald visit and in the immediate wake of the assassination." Among the items provided by the DO were five boxes containing audio tapes from telephone taps on the Cuban and Russian embassies and facilities. A number of the tapes are dated[^4][^4]: (S) See Attachment 3.
[104-10332-10000.pdf — page 12]
SECRETSUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues22 November 1963; many others are dated 23 November 1963 through December 1963.[^5]9. (S) This is one of the most complex requests because of the following facts:*   at one time, there was a tape of Oswald in existence but it has since been lost or erased;*   the relevance of these tapes is argued even though they do not contain the Oswald conversation;[^6]*   this was not an unilateral operation but rather a joint operation with the Mexican Government;*   there is a confidential request from the ARRB to the Mexican Government for any copies of the actual Oswald conversation they may possess; and,*   quite obviously, the sensitivity is not so much the mere fact that we possess such tapes but our release of the extent and actual conversations captured.10. (S) The good news, at least at this time, is that the ARRB staff has agreed to postpone Board consideration until May and, in the interim, the Agency will have an opportunity to review (i.e., listen and transcribe) and determine the sensitivity and provide detailed arguments in this regard.ISSUE 5 -- Protection of LITAMIL-9[^5]: (S) The scope of this request is quite significant; it includes five boxes of 185 tapes from operations against both the Cuban and Russian Embassy.[^6]: (S) The ARRB staff position on the relevance of the tapes has three forms: There could be conversations about Oswald and/or the assassination on the 22 Nov + tapes which could give clues to Oswald's visit to Mexico City on 25 September - 3 October. The absence of any conversation about Oswald or the assassination would itself be of historical interest. Or, there are transcripts of intercepted telephone conversations that mention the assassination in the collection and, thus, by definition, the tapes are assassination records.- 4 -SECRET
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 199225 June 1993MEMORANDUM FOR:Chief, Historical Review GroupChief, Information Management ServiceDirector, Center for the Study of IntelligenceFROM:John BergSpecial Assistant to the Associate DeputyDirector for OperationsSUBJECT:Release of JFK Assassination RecordsREFERENCE:A. Memorandum from DDO dated 9 June 1993:Subject: Release of JFK AssassinationRecords -- Differences;B. Memorandum by Dave Gries of 22 June 1993:Subject: JFK Assassination Records-- Proposalfor discussion1. Regarding the items discussed in the referenced memos, it appears that a further interpretation is required.--On the subject of cryptonyms, we cannot give wholesale approval for their release, but if the crypts have been previously blown or exposed they can be released. There may be cases in which, if the crypt has been retired, does not relate to existing or another project and does not contain a valid digraph, it may also be released. Note, however, that crypts which are related to a series (ZZBOAT/1, ZZBOAT/2 etc.), would, when exposed, link operations or assets to one another or which refer to other operations or projects cannot be released.--On the subject of pseudonyms, if the pseudonym has been previously blown, there is no objection to its release. Note that release of pseudonyms serves to link officers with assets/operations and this "guilt by association" could lead to futher, undesireable, exposures. Care must also be taken so that the release of pseudonyms is not done in such a manner so as to enable a researcher to accummulate through an inspection of numerous documents the approximate size of a given station. (The sense of this is to mean that only a small number of pseudonyms would be considered for release.)SECRET
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 1]
# SECRETSUBJECT: Release of JFK Assassination Records--On the subject of cable, dispatch and file numbers, there is no objection to the release of this information as it pertains to Mexico City, to include 201 numbers of key players in the JFK story. All hqs cable numbers can be released as can dispatch numbers to Mexico City. The release of cable/dispatch numbers from other Stations can only be done if there has been prior public identification of a Station in that location. The release of file numbers pe se, however, would reveal the methodology by which we file/store and retrieve information-- which is still in practice today and thus we cannot approve it on a blanket basis. Blanket release of 201 numbers reveals similar information as well as targeting/acquistion methodologies which we similarly need to continue to protect.2. I realize that the above guidelines continue to mean that much information will be "blacked out." As bad as it may appear, none of this information is substantive and its omission does not detract from the "story." Its release, however, could permit detailed analyses of our commo, methodology, contacts and staffing which we cannot accept.New Subject: Release of William Pawley's name3. It is agreed that an attempt will be made to locate Pawley's next of kin to request their permission to release information pertaining to his relationship with CIA. If the next of kin cannot be indentified or located, the subject can be revisited. (Note: the information in the Congressional record or in the book "Deadly Secrets" notes that there was contact and even support between Pawley and the CIA but does not identify the full extent of that relationship.)![signature of Lindy John Berg]SECRET
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 2]
1 November 1993MEMORANDUM FOR: Linda FlorC/MRS/LA/MRSFROM : Joanne HarrisSUBJECT : JFK Project - Review of Cuban FilesI reviewed 106 files to ascertain the status of Cuban assets which were listed in the attached. Seventeen were found to be former assets, pre-1970, and most of the seventeen were involved in the Bay of Pig Operation. Additionally, the following five appear to be candidates for protection from public disclosure.a. AMIRE/1 - 201-274049A Career Agent, AMIRE/1 died of natural causes in October or November 1968. The DCI sent a letter of condolence to his wife.b. WILDCAT - 201-294213FBI Double Agent. PNINFINITE assisted in ops in Mexico. He was still active as of March 1982.c. WKSCARLET/3 - 201-300985Formally terminated in 1974. Caracas Station had contact with him until circa 1976, at which time he was implicated in bombing of a Cuban plane and was incarcerated in Venezuela. As of March 1993, he was still involved in questionable activities.d. AMICE-14 - 201-307337Worked for PNINFINITE through early 1970's.e. AMMUG/1 - 201-749651Cuban defector. He was terminated in 1967, but was used through 1971.
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 3]
13-000007 June 1995Memo for FileSubject: ARRB request re "slug line" deletionsThe policy of deleting ALL crypts & designators in the slug line was questioned by ARRB members at the 18 May meeting with CIA. The DO representatives present (Sander) & McNair) deferred to the Office of Communications.Per 6 June 1995 discussion with Don Hatch, DA/IRO, "the slug line is strictly an internal distribution line", and the release of crypts or other designators in the slug line is not a communications issue; slug crypts are not "commo generated". The DA has no objection to the release of otherwise releasable crypts in the slug line of CIA cables.The DA response was provide to J. Gunn, ARRB staff, and Bill McNair, DO/IRO, via phone on 6 June 1995.![signature of Barry Harrelson]Barry HarrelsonCC: HRG reviewersDO reviewers
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 4]
# Assassination Records Review Board600 E Street NW - 2nd Floor Washington, DC 20530June 6, 1995Mr. John PereiraDirectorHistorical Review GroupCenter for the Study of IntelligenceCentral Intelligence AgencyWashington, D.C. 20505Dear John:As you know from our meeting with you on May 18, 1995, as well as from previous meetings with ARRB staff members, CIA's current practice of redacting the sluglines from its cables in the JFK Assassination Collection is of interest to the Assassination Records Review Board. As a result of discussion on this topic at the May 18 meeting, the Board in fact asked those present from CLA to provide it with any additional information available in support of this practice.If you have any further information in support of redacting otherwise releasable cryptonyms when present in cable sluglines, we would appreciate receiving it by this afternoon, so we can present it to the Board at its meeting tomorrow morning.With many thanks for your assistance in this matter.Sincerely yours,![Signature of David G. Marwell]David G. MarwellExecutive Director
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 5]
13-0000027 September 1995Note to: HRG and DO reviewersSubject: Phone call from Bill McNair, 21 September, 1995, reAM cryptsBill left the following message on my voice mail:"I have just talked with Peg Sanders, DC/LA Division,and unless we see a specific incident where giving up an AMcrypt will betray an asset, then let it go. I don'tbelieve there is any place we will see that. She is will togive up all AM crypts simply because there are so manyiterations going back...and things have been changed."BarryHRG Senior Reviewer
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 6]
SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review GroupFROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.DO, Focal Point for ARRBSUBJECT: Position on Release of Cryptonyms, CountryDesignators, Action Indicators and Employee TrueNamesDuring the period since the ARRB last met, the DO has considered the four issues listed below that have not yet been addressed with the Board. These issues appear throughout the JFK collection and by stating our position up front we hope to facilitate the Board's review and to reach an agreement that will be mutually satisfying to the Board and the Agency.Cryptonyms - Except for cryptonyms related to operational assets or activities involving Mexico or Miami, the Agency will release the main component of cryptonyms and withhold only the two-letter digraph. Treating cryptonyms in this manner will protect the nationalities of individuals and operations that are not pertinent to Oswald or the JFK investigation and render an easier reading of the written material.Country File Designators - We will delete the first element of operational activity and operational interest files in those instances when the credibility of the narrative is not affected. The first element of the file number corresponds to the alphabetical position of the country name which is easily discernible, whereas the subsequent two elements relate to type of activity or interest and specific subject.Action Indicator (Slug) Lines - Generally, we will release the entire action indicator line of a document. Occasionally, however, we will withhold portions when theSECRETCL BY 0695930DECL OADRDRV HUM 4-82
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 7]
13-00000SECRETSUBJECT: Position on Cryptonyms, Country Designators, ActionIndicators and Employee True Namescontext identifies a source or a relationship with aspecific liaison service.True Names of Staff Employees - In most instances wewill release names of employees who have retired in an overtstatus and were serving in Headquarters when cited in adocument. We will continue to protect the true names ofemployees cited as serving in a field position. Referencesto field personnel in true name are uncommon, however, sincepseudonyms are normally used in correspondence betweenHeadquarters and the field.![Signature of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.]Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.2SECRET
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 8]
SECRET8 November 1995MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeremy Gunn,ARRB StaffFROM: Barry Harrelson,CIS/CSI/HRGSUBJECT: Issues re Cryptonyms, CountryDesignators, Action Indicators andEmployee True Names (U)Attached is memorandum from the DO Focal Point for the ARRB addressing the release of cryptonyms, country designators, action indicators and employee true names. The memorandum is intended to provide guidance to you and your staff and complements information provided in previous discussions. Ellie and I welcome the opportunity to discuss these issues with your staff. (U)![Signature]AttachmentUnclassified When SeparatedFrom Attachment.SECRET
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 9]
13-00000CONFIDENTIAL24 June 1998MEMORANDUM FOR: Historical Review ProgramATTN: JFK Project OfficerFROM: Frieda OmastaAssociate Information Review Officer, DDASUBJECT: ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC, ISOTROPIC, MKCOSMOS1. This is further to our memorandum dated 16 June   1998 (attached) wherein the Directorate of Administration   (DA) asked to provide a determination with respect to the   release of ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC or ISOTROPIC.2. On 16 June, we advised you that these three terms   together with the term MKCOSMOS were reviewed and the DS&T   determined that ISOTROPIC and MKCOSMOS must be withheld in   their entirety and the DA determined that ISOLATION and   ISOMETRIC must be withheld as well. Please be advised that   the association to this Agency of the locations referred to   by these four crypts is classified in light of the fact that   the locations, themselves, are under military cover.   Accordingly, any crypts, slugs, or other words associated   with the locations and linking them with the CIA must not be   released.3. We hope the information provided above will assist   you.Attachment: As StatedCONFIDENTIALCL BY: 393504CL REASON: 1.5(c)DECL ON: X1DRV FROM: LOC 1-82
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 10]
SECRET16 June 1998MEMORANDUM FOR: Historical Review ProgramATTN: JFK Project OfficerFROM: Frieda OmastaAssociate Information Review Officer, DDASUBJECT: ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC, ISOTROPIC, MKCOSMOS1. This is in response to your request that we review the attached material and provide you with a determination as to whether ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC or ISOTROPIC can be released. We also reviewed the material with respect to MKCOSMOS as well.2. The Directorate of Administration (DA) has completed its review and we have determined that ISOLATION and ISOMETRIC must continued to be withheld. We forwarded your request to the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) and DS&T has determined that ISOTROPIC and MKCOSMOS must continue to be withheld as well. I have identified below the documents in which these terms are used.| Document No.    | Crypts                  || --------------- | ----------------------- || 104-10177-10248 | ISOLATION and ISOTROPIC || 104-10177-10228 | ISOLATION and ISOTROPIC || 104-10177-10231 | ISOLATION and ISOMETRIC || 104-10177-10230 | ISOMETRIC and MKCOSMOS  |3. Copies of the documents referred to above are returned herewith with these terms highlighted in yellow for deletion. Also returned are three documents that did not contain this information (10197, 10198 and 10199). This concludes DA action on this request. If you have any questions, please call Frieda on 31201 or Becky on 31204.SECRETUNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVALOF ATTACHMENTSAttachments: As Stated
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 11]
13-00000SECRETOIM-98-008406 August 1998MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive DirectorAssassination Records Review BoardFROM: (U) Lee S. StricklandChief, Information Review GroupCentral Intelligence AgencySUBJECT: (S) Protection of *IJDECANTER* Cryptonym1. (S) This memorandum responds to the Assassination Records Review Board (“ARRB" or "Board”) regarding their current deliberations as to postponement of certain very limited information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (*IJDECANTER*). It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document ((SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed (with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 1997, would provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counterintelligence effort and concomitant damage to US intelligence interests.2. (S) Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose and objectives, this memorandum also proposes a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g., “TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym *IJDECANTER* in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable.3. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this memorandum, to limit access to those individuals properly cleared, and to return it to Agency representatives at the conclusion of your deliberations.4. (S) As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety. The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had providedCL BY: 0619849 C/IRG/OIMCL Reason: 1.5(c)Decl On: X1Drv From: HUM 4-82SECRET
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 12]
13-00000SECRETSUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonyminformation to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source. It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source (identity redacted_but, in fact, IJDECANTER). It concludes_by stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has had his "... *bona fides* fully established [by CIA]." It is this final fact which is critical to our request. By having released this substantive information -- "*bona fides* ... established" -- and by otherwise having IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, we must protect the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.5. (C) The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions:*   what information was compromised?*   what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information?*   what understanding of the information did the service(s) have?*   what information did the intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the United States?6. (C) The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through/a/combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access. Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service.7. (S) With further respect to question three, if a foreign government fully understands the substance (i.e., the import), they will be able to exploit the information fully and the damage will be far beyond the ostensible value. A perfect example of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case. The information compromised was a seemingly innocuous operational manual for a2SECRET