Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# SECRET## EYES ONLY- 3 -level. Mr. Rusk indicated he had seen Mr. McCone's letter. (Subsequently Mr. Adrian Fisher stated that they had worked all afternoon and most of the night in revising the original draft to meet the objections raised by the DCI and he thought that they had moderated their language and weasel-worded the statement adequately to meet DCI's objections.) The President then asked me if I had any specific, further objections to the statement now that the nuclear-free zone problem had been eliminated and that the DCI's letter was on record. I stated that depending upon what was actually finally determined as an international agreement, we might be in serious trouble on verification but that this problem would come later. I felt that as a statement by the President there was adequate protection in future negotiations to ensure the best interests of the United States. (I subsequently checked with Adrian Fisher who assured me that there was no backoff in ACDA and State from the requirement for adequate verification and that the additional words inserted in the latest draft were specifically to meet DCI's prior objections. In other words, DCI's letter of comment is a matter of record with the President and the other principals at the meeting, and the President commented that the Central Intelligence Agency was certainly a smooth-operating outfit. It was obvious that he had his tongue in his cheek in this regard to indicate that we not only covered our rear but our flanks as well.) The President then directed a number of actions as regards Congressional briefings, preparation of a talk for him to make to the American public in explanation of his Geneva Conference statement. In connection with this speech for American consumption, he directed that it be prepared so that any tenant farmer could understand it -- ten words per sentence, four sentences per paragraph, and four-letter words throughout.6. This ended discussion of the Geneva Conference statement.7. New subjects:a. There was then a discussion of a letter to Khrushchev but I was not aware of the contents nor were the contents mentioned. The discussion revolved around the date at which such a letter would be made public.
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SECRETEYES CLY-4-b. The President then expressed his great concern over the emergent situation in Panama. He said that he had proposed injecting himself directly into the problem yesterday with a public statement and approaches to the OAS specifically to lay down publicly exactly what the facts were as regards Panamian aggression, intrusions into the Zone, killing of American soldiers with rifle bullets by snipers while they were armed only with bird shot, etc., etc. He said that he had been dissuaded from this course by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and others. He said he was shocked to read in this morning's New York Times a story (presumably the Tad Szulc article) that pretty well covered exactly what his proposals were. He said he still felt it was a good idea and that he thought Harriman, Rusk, McNamara, Johnson, and others should assemble small groups of Latin American Ambassadors and tell them what he, the President, wanted to tell them. He thought it was an even better idea if he did it himself. I did not get the impression that a decision was made in this regard nor do I think any action will be taken as a result of this meeting. Unfortunately the discussion centered then on the security aspects of leaks to the public and the President expressed in no uncertain terms, with great persuasiveness and even more emphasis, his unhappiness at his complete inability to say anything to anyone without its immediately being in the papers or getting around town. He made some very pointed comments reflecting on the integrity of the State Department and of the Department of Defense in this regard. He felt the situation had become extremely serious in the past two months since he had become President and did not recall any such problem when he was meeting periodically with President Kennedy. He said he was prepared to clean house wherever necessary to overcome this. Secretary Rusk pointed out that this had been going on for twenty years and was nothing new and McNamara agreed. The President thought it was worse than he had ever seen it before and that in his 22 years on the Armed Services Committee and around the Hill he had never been involved in anything like this nor had he ever beenENTRETEYES OLY
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SCORETEVES CUTY- 5 -bothered by reporters once he had made it clear that he was not the talking kind. No decisions were taken, no actions directed although both Rusk and McNamara indicated they would immediately take whatever steps were feasible to improve the situation.c. The President then reverted to Cuba and said that he questioned seriously whether these sabotage efforts were the proper thing for the U. S. to be doing. He thought they were both hypocritical and ineffectual and while he understood the need for some of them to maintain the morale of internal dissidents to the Castro regime and to maintain the morale of Cuban exiles, he thought probably these considerations were outweighed by the hypocrisy of our seeking peace and talking peace and conducting this sort of activity on the side. Rusk said that he had never been in favor of this program and had the same doubts the President did. McNamara said that he too had never been in favor of this program and questioned our participation. I stated that while this program was conducted by the CIA, every action taken had the full approval of the Special Group on which the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense were adequately represented and that the program was designed in part for the specific purpose of generating internal sabotage and dissidents with a view to creating as many problems as possible for Castro and with a view to getting an escalation of anti-Castro activities in Cuba, that over the long run any type of effort such as this was an irritant to Castro and that such action had some effect, even though slight, on the Cuban economy. I said that over the long run you could not expect the Castro regime to fall from these actions alone but that every little bit helped, and that we had noticed over the past four months a considerable increase in sabotage actions generated from internal Cuban elements over which we exercised no control. I said that I could not take exception to the fact that this policy was a hypocritical one in the light of a peace offensive although I did not feel we were trying to make peace with Castro. I also pointed out that sabotage activities in NorthSEONETEYES ONLY
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# SECRETEYES ONLY- 6 -Vietnam likewise had hypocritical aspects. At this point Mr. McNamara demurred and said North Vietnam was an entirely different matter but he gave no reasons therefor and this point was not developed further. General Taylor noted that in connection with sabotage operations they kept Castro constantly on the alert and kept his forces heavily occupied running hither and yon. The President noted that this was probably true but so little gain in it and generally seemed disaffected with sabotage efforts. Rusk pointed out that there was some value in maintaining some pressure of this type since to completely desist would eventually lead Castro to believe that he was immune from retaliation. The President then directed that he wanted a complete review of our Cuban policy and some new, imaginative thinking developed. I stated that this was presently heavily in train in all appropriate agencies of the Government, and Rusk and McNamara nodded their agreement. The President said he would want to meet as soon as people had drawn up their proposals. In connection with Cuba the President noted that he continued to desire the most drastic pressures on our Allies to insist upon their cooperation and assistance and compliance in our economic denial program against Cuba. He said that Segni and Erhard had both assured him we could count on the full cooperation of Italy and West Germany to cease any further Cuban trade. He said he wanted similar discussions prepared for him whenever he met these leaders and for our leaders to take the same line in any discussions they might have.d. There was minor discussion as regards the situation in South Vietnam with no one indicating any great enthusiasm or any great surge of hopefulness as to the present situation. The President stated he was most unhappy to be making a speech indicating that things were improving and then to have a USIA spokesman and an Embassy spokesman state in Saigon that things were falling apart. He said somebody was getting poor advice as well as poor information and he was inclined to think it was he. He said that he was new in the job and that he had in the past several months based his actions onSECRETEYES ONLY
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SEERETEYES ONLY- 7 -the advice and guidance he had received from his principaladvisers whom he considered professionals and expertsin their fields. He said he was beginning to have seriousdoubts that his own judgment had been wrong in a numberof cases although he was the first to admit that he had beenwrong in the past throughout his life at various times andwas certainly no more immune than anyone else frommaking mistakes. I got the distinct impression that he wasmighty unhappy with some of the actions he has taken as aresult of recommendations from State. I also got the feelingthat from here on out he is much more liable to use his ownintuition and prescience as to what should be done and whatshould not be done in the daily operations of his actions inthe foreign policy field.e. Turning to more pleasant matters, the Presidentnoted that the dinner he had given for the CongressionalCommittee leadership had been a complete success and thathe was going to repeat it again on the 23rd and the 30th. Hehad received nothing but highly favorable accolades fromthe people who had attended and many of them indicated itwas the first time they had ever been in the White House andcertainly the first time they had had an adequate briefing bythe Administration leadership. The President said that hehad received a phone call saying that he should continue thisand he was certainly going to do so. He had also beenpromised that at least in large measure as a result of thisbriefing he would have a tax bill reported out by Wednesday.The President then said we could do a lot better. He toldRusk and McNamara that they should take a nap in the after-noon prior to these two dinners so they would be muchfresher and more alert -- that they had done an A No. 1 jobbut not quite up to the caliber that they had put on for thelabor leaders -- in his mind that performance could not havebeen better. The President said he had planned for thebriefing to be twenty minutes and that instead it had lastedan hour. He said that this was entirely too long and thatMr. McCone alone had spoken for seventeen minutes. HeSEERETEYES ONLY
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SECRETEYES ONLY- 8 -then said that for the next two dinners he was going to have only two briefers and the briefing would be scheduled for fifteen minutes and that twenty minutes was the absolute maximum he would sit still for. He said he wanted Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara to work this out together, with Mr. McNamara covering both the U. S. military and the Soviet military as covered by Mr. McCone, and Rusk covering the Soviet economy and the world roundup as covered by Rusk and McCone at the last hearing. I subsequently checked with Bill Moyer to determine whether this was a change from the President's instructions to Mr. McCone or whether it might have been an oversight. Mr. Moyer stated that the President had given much thought to this and since Mr. McCone would be away, he had changed the system to the one just enumerated. This makes abundant sense to me under the circumstances and I considered any further discussion either with Moyer or the President inappropriate.8. The meeting then broke up at 4:15 because the President had to go out to dedicate a building.9. The foregoing notes are in a single copy and will be shown only to the Director upon his return. Any actions indicated will be directed by me at the Monday morning meeting. I will send a very short, sanitized report of this meeting to Mr. McCone by cable.![signature]Marshall S. CarterLieutenant General, USAActing DirectorSECRETEYES ONLY
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4 January 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting with President Johnson on 31 December 19631. The background as to the purpose of this visit is covered in my Memorandum for the Record dated 1 January on my visit to Independence to see Mr. Truman.2. We departed Kansas City airport in the early afternoon of 31 December, arriving at the Johnson City airport shortly before 3:00. This airport was built by President Johnson in his own back yard and was subsequently turned over to Johnson City as their airport. We were taken to the Johnson residence and made comfortable in the combination office-sitting room just off the dining room. Coffee was served and in a few moments the President and Mrs. Johnson joined us. After appropriate welcoming to the ranch, Mrs. Johnson retired to her household chores.3. Mr. Murphy briefed the President on our discussions with Mr. Truman and reported to the President Mr. Truman's desire to help in any way he could during the coming year. Mr. Murphy followed generally the comments indicated in my previous memorandum as put forward by Mr. Truman. I thought he gave a much too favorable report on Mr. Truman's condition and mental agility. This was understandable to me since Murphy is one of the junior old cronies of Mr. Truman. The President asked me for my reaction and I gave it substantially in accordance with the last paragraph of my Truman memorandum. I told the President that I certainly felt Mr. Truman was willing to do anything he could or was asked to do to assist President Johnson; that my own reaction was that Mr. Truman was in some respects senile and living 90% on memories and his past. I stated that I thought there was certainly nothing wrong with Mr. Truman's mind or alertness but that I felt some caution should be exercised in just how Mr. Truman's assets might be utilized. The President made no comment except to note
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- 2 -wryly that he himself occasionally had problems with his memorybut that he did not think he was yet living with it entirely. ThePresident then noted that we should have been briefing Mr. Trumanmore often and that perhaps had we done so, it would have pre-vented the type of article he had recently published about the CIA.The President then stated that he wanted President Hoover,President Eisenhower, and President Truman briefed monthly onthe international situation as well as on the domestic situationand what his programs were. (Action: This requires follow-upwith the White House and possibly a discussion between Mr. McConeand the President since Mr. McCone indicated informally that hethought once a month was too often and that, in any event, whileCIA can handle the international situation, we should have someother agency handle the domestic situation.)4. The President then made a number of statements which   seemed to be in part his philosophy of operations and in others a   repetition of his conversation with Erhard. It was difficult to   separate when he was repeating what he had said to Erhard and   when he was stating a Johnson principle.5. The President stated that he was much taken with Erhard   and that he thought him a smart, articulate German who was much   more appealing than Adenauer. Erhard apparently attempted to   feel the President out as to his reactions to various statements and   positions taken by deGaulle. The President got the impression that   Erhard was initially trying to play off deGaulle against the President.   Mr. Johnson told Erhard that as far as he, Mr. Johnson, was con-   cerned, he was going to do everything possible to promote a peaceful   world but without in any way relaxing either our guard or our military   strength; he was prepared to walk around the world if necessary to   promote peace when he was convinced that such walking would assist --   on the other hand, he had no intention of making trips just to cultivate   friends and promote the giving away of U. S. resources in an effort   to entice people to join our camp; if they wanted to come in willingly   with their eyes open, he would welcome them but he felt it was time   for other nations to do some thinking on their own and to make their
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own judgments without the need for U. S. persuasion in the formof concrete financial and military aid. Accordingly, the Presidentintended to stay home and do his own heavy thinking as to justhow he can best promote peace -- if this led to trips, then hewould take trips. If people wanted to come to see him to talkabout peace or other matters, he would be delighted to receivethem but there must be something worthwhile to talk about andsomething that will lead in the proper direction. He said thatduring his lifetime the United States had been forced to fight twowars because of Germany and that he was not going to allow anysituation to develop which might lead in that direction again so longas he was President. He said he would not be a party to any shilly-shallying in that direction and that Germany must make up its ownmind and see which way they intend to go. If it were going to betoward deGaulle, then say so. If it were going to be toward theUnited States and its concept of a free world, then say so and proveit by putting more effort into their actions in this regard - moreeffort in the way of more money and more support of United Statespolicies. He told Erhard that this was the way he felt and therewas no point in Erhard trying to play off deGaulle against PresidentJohnson nor to try to get Germany in the middle between those twonations. The President said that Erhard apparently accepted thisfrank talk and for the rest of the visit never once mentioned deGaulle.6. The President then directed that Salinger acquire from   USIA and CIA a roundup of world reaction as to Erhard's visit. He   said that if we did not make any money on that deal, we might just   as well fold up our tent insofar as influencing foreign visitors was   concerned because he, the President, had really put out and had   really talked turkey to Erhard -- which was the only way he, the   President, knew how to talk. He said that this administration was   being criticized for either having no foreign policy or a poor one   and that he therefore wanted as much publicity as possible on the   highly favorable aspects of the Erhard visit. (I subsequently had   a CIA report prepared and forwarded to Salinger on 1 January,   pointing out that it was an initial report and that a real reading on   Ambassadorial and Governmental reactions would be coming along
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-4-later since it takes more time to acquire these from somewhat sensitive sources.7. The President then went on to say that people seem to have the impression he was going to sit back and try to keep things on an even keel so as not to disturb the upcoming election. He said that this was a wrong impression for people to have and that he intended to do everything he possibly could to ensure maintaining and augmenting the great forward momentum that President Kennedy had been developing toward world peace and proper domestic policies. He said that this was a time for real action and that the United States must get itself out of this trend of thought that it sits back and reacts to others' actions rather than creates actions of its own. He is tired of reacting -- he wants to act and let others react to him and this is one of the things he intends to think about during upcoming months. He therefore urges the most imaginative thinking possible both in and out of Government to see how best his ends can be attained. He pointed out that this was not going to be easy because this was an election year and lots of people would be looking for ways to attack him and his policies. He said, however, that he could not sit by and watch this opportunity for promoting peace and understanding among nations to dissipate simply because it was an election year in which he would be politically involved.8. The President then said that he had been totally dis- satisfied with what the State Department had proposed he send to Khrushchev and he had therefore sat down at the desk (pointing) and had in his own handwriting composed the New Year's message to Khrushchev. He intended to continue to promote every possibility for a basis of understanding looking toward peace and again reiterated that any agreement would never be at the expense of our own security.9. He then asked me for a briefing of any current situations that he should be brought up to date on. I brought him up to date on Cyprus, on Cuba, and on South Vietnam since he had indicated that he had read recent Checklists.
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10. As to Cuba, he stated his dissatisfaction with our present policies and actions connected therewith and said that shortly after his return to Washington, and probably after the State of the Union message, he wanted a comprehensive review of the Cuban situation and our policies and he wanted the most imaginative and forward thinking people put to work on seeing what else could be done. He did not feel the sabotage efforts would ever really result in any ultimate goals for U. S. interests but was prepared to accept some of them if they promote internal dissidents and assisted the morale of the people we were working with in Cuba. He stated he was not at all satisfied with the Governmental actions taken thus far to curtail free world trade with Cuba. He said he had told Erhard that he could not tolerate West German trade with Cuba and that Erhard had assured him that while it was very small, he would put a complete stop to it as soon as he returned to Germany. The President directed that thorough preparation be made so that when Pearson visits the United States, Mr. Johnson can take him on in the same manner and similar preparations should be made for other free world countries doing appreciable business with Castro.11. There was then a discussion with Staats and Murphy about some sort of pork barrel program which was to be canceled and which Hubert Humphrey and Elvis Stahr had taken violent exception to. Apparently the President had received a vitriolic letter from Elvis Stahr about this matter because he commented that he now understood why Stahr had made such an inadequate Secretary of the Army. The lines of action directed by the President as to preparation of responses was not a matter for CIA.12. There was then a discussion as to some sort of adjust- ment in tax procedures which, by reducing a figure from 15 to 14, would save some $800 million this year. Neither Mike Forrestal nor I heard this loud and clear but I think it had to do with adjusting withholding tax deductions. In any event, no decision was reached by the President and the conversation was directly with Staats and not for the rest of the group.