Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 13]
13-00000SECRETSUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonymsatellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastatingto American intelligence. The Soviets, based on otherinformation they had acquired through signals intelligence,concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-operational was in fact operational and actively imaging theirterritory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-operational, they had taken no countermeasures (i.е.,.concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove ofintelligence. Immediately upon learning the true status, theytook extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence wasdirectly and immediately lost.8. (S) With further respect to question four, we have the   quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service   believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment   of the United States; if they do not, the United States may   escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical   question that a foreign country must answer and it is the   critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in   our fold.9. (S) In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by   what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own   knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially   released document and the Los Angeles Times article. The   Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to   the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they   know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he   said; they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus   incorporated his information into our operational practices and   activities. And it would be critically damaging today to confirm   to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow   them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a   US intelligence success.10. (C) Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion,    we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the    Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did    not know was whether we had accepted his story or not. Indeed,    the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and    this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the    Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period    of time.3SECRET
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 14]
SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER CryptonymSECRET11. (S) In sum, question 4 -- *bona fides* -- is the CI key. The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including, of course, information on the public record via the media.12. (S) While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage is the most critical and legally compelling issue, there are three additional points of relevance vis-à-vis harm:*   First, is foreign relations. In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.*   Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service. This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the *bona fides* of defectors. The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.*   And third, there is an equitable issue. The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control; the CIA has pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that it is publicly known at least to some degree. However, because his wife, child and father remain in Russia today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and consider postponement also for this reason. Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release. But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 15]
13-00000SECRETSUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER Cryptonym13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that this important information can be postponed from public release.Lee S. Strickland5SECRET
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 16]
SECRETSUBJECT: Protection of IJDECANTER CryptonymOIM/IRG/LSS: blo/31287 (6 August 1998)Distribution:Orig - Adse1 - EXDIR1 - ER1 - D/OCA1 - D/OPA1 - Principal Deputy General Counsel1 - D/OIM1 - DA/IRO1 - DCI/IRO1 - DO/IRO1 - DI/IRO1 - DST/IRO1 - LSS signer file1 - OIM/IRG Chrono1 - Subject File: ARRBg:/irg_fr'1\general\lss\arrb_ijd.doc6SECRET
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 17]
# SECRET## CIA TALKING POINTSre Protection of "IJDECANTER" CryptonymBefore the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)26 August 1998*   The ADDO -- Jim Pavitt -- has asked that I address the Board on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of Operations and the CIA.*   We request the postponement of certain very limited information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER).*   It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the *Los Angeles Times* article of 29 December 1997, would:    *   provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter-intelligence effort,    *   result in concomitant damage to US counter- intelligence interests, and,    *   have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and prospective intelligence sources given this disclosure which could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence.*   Mindful, however, of the Board's statutory purpose and objectives, we propose however:    *   a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (*e.g.*, "TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym IJDECANTER in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable, and/or,# SECRETCL BY: 0619849 C/IRG/OIMCL Reason: 1.5(c)Decl On: X1Drv From: HUM 4-82
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 18]
13-00000SECRET*   if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the nature of a factual description of the source (e.g., "a valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for internal counter-intelligence efforts."*   As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety.*   The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source.*   It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source.*   It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source (identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER).*   It concludes by stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has had his "... bona fides ... fully established [by CIA]."*   It is this final fact which is critical.*   By having released this substantive information -- "bona fides ... established" -- AND by otherwise having IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, THEN WE MUST PROTECT the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.*   I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from this disclosure - the disclosure of the crypt in this particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment.2SECRET
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 19]
SECRET*   The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions:    *   what information was compromised?    *   what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information?    *   what understanding of the information did the receiving intelligence service(s) have?    *   what information did the receiving intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the other party?*   The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.*   Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service.*   Question 3 is important (e.g., Boyce Lee case) but is not really an issue here since the US fully understood the information presented.*   Question 4, however, is the quintessential factor for exploitation.*   If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset (e.g., a defector), they act on the information to the detriment of the other service.3SECRET
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 20]
SECRET*   If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully or to some degree.*   This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold.*   In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the Los Angeles Times article.*   The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to the United States;*   they know or suspect what he told the US;*   they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said;*   they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities.*   And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success.*   In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key.*   The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document.*   But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including,
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 21]
SECRETof course, information on the public record via the media.*   There is additional damage that will accrue from not officially protecting the identity of IJDECANTER.*   Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a devastating, compounding consequence for an intelligence organization.*   It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets -- current and past -- who will logically fear that CIA will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at some future point in time.*   Their fear could be sufficient to force them to take self-protective measures (e.g., disengagement by current assets or public statements by inactive ones).*   Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA. Indeed, we know form experience that this complicates our ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly against the harder targets (e.g., terrorism).*   There are other damages that I will touch only briefly upon in the interests of the Board's time. They are not insignificant, however.*   ONE, is foreign relations.> In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal.> > This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 22]
SECRET• TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service.• This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the *bona fides* of defectors.• The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.• THIRD, is an equitable issue.• The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control;• The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship;• While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to some degree -- nevertheless his wife, child and father remain in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial action the current government might take.• Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release.• But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 23]
13-00000SECRETg:\irg_frontoffice\general\lss\arrbijtp.doc(last modified at 1500 hours, 25 august 1998)7SECRET
[104-10332-10002.pdf — page 24]
# SECRETNew Memo\StandardCL BY: 031682-1998-DOCL REASON: Section 1.5 CDECL ON: X1DRV FRM: COL 1-8225 September 1998MEMORANDUM FOR: Bob SkwirotFROM: Charles A. Briggs-Y-OFFICE: DCI/CSI/HRGSUBJECT: Mexico City Station HistoryREFERENCE:The Mexico City Station History contains at least 99 separate cryptonyms, for the most part concerning projects, but in some cases, individuals, covering the period 1947 to June 1969. In every case, there is identifying information included with the crypt, ranging from a brief parenthetical phrase to several pages of detail. Since the information far exceeds that thought relevant to the JFK story, both in time and substance, an approach designed to provide a maximum amount of information and guidance for historians concerned with the JFK assassination, with a minimum of gratuitously useable leads for curious or hostile FOIA requestors concerning CIA activities generally, was chosen and is reflected in the version the Board has for consideration.The norm in handling cryptonyms when the entire crypt is not released is to protect the digraph - the location indicator. What I've done here, to avoid unraveling, in effect, the whole history of Station activity for subsequent curiousity seekers, is to reverse the process, releasing the digraph and protecting the root - specifically because the text identifies each crypt. The Board is familiar with the decision to release almost all LI-crypts in full - while protecting identifying information. The major relevant Ll projects (LIENVOY, LITEMPO, LICALLA, etc.) have had both the full cryptonym and most of the details released.> [Figure] A box contains the following text: Station-and-Operation-Directorate division histories are among the most sensitive documents in the Agency. They are very tightly controlled within the area divisions - they are not available to cleared employees in other directorates or, traditionally, outside of the division within the Operations Directorate. Thus concern about the release of the Mexico City History pages that, viewed through the widest of lenses, do not appear to be relevant to the JFK story, is very great.CC:New Memo\Standard
[104-10332-10007.pdf — page 0]
104-10332-10007 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992document had 47 pg Dif.So page count is wrong
[104-10332-10007.pdf — page 1]
CONFIDENTIAL7 January 1994MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson @ DAFROM: Bryant RogersSUBJECT: MEETING WITH LINDA FLORESREFERENCE: On 6 Jan we met with Linda Flores from the DO to discuss HRG concerns with regard to CIA's contacts in the 60's with well known Cubans and Cuban Organizations.The outcome of this discussion was that the DO agrees that we can release the names of those major players with whom CIA worked with as long as we stay within the 60-63 time frame, with some overlap into 1964 for continuity, when needed. We then discussed our relationships with major anti-Castro organizations. It was agreed that we could release the fact that as a funding vehicle for the US Govt, CIA provided support including funding in general terms. In some cases we may find it necessary to reveal gross ballpark figures for annual budgets. The DO would prefer that we continue to protect specific funding amounts where possible. They were specifically concerned about releasing specific amounts paid to individuals or families of Bay of Pigs members where individuals could claim that one was paid more than another. In supporting these organizations it was acknowledged by the DO that we could release generic operational activities such as publishing journals or financing goodwill tours by prominent exile Cubans to Latin America The DO reminded us that in reviewing these relationships with Cubans and organizations, it was important to protect CIA personnel, agents and assets and any specifics on tradecraft.When asked about Bay of Pigs training sites, Linda felt that the actual location should still be protected in spite of the fact that they have been mentioned in open literature.With regard to DO location numbers (19 for Cuba) she thought this was OK for the 60-63 time frame but would check with LA Div. She had no problem with the release of the Bell location in cables since it was no longer used.CC: J. Barry Harrelson @ DARichard D. Kovar-Y-@ DAJohn F. Pereira @ DACONFIDENTIAL
[104-10332-10007.pdf — page 2]
SECRET8 November 1995MEMORANDUM FOR:Jeremy Gunn,ARRB StaffFROM:Barry Harrelson,CIS/CSI/HRGSUBJECT:Issues re Cryptonyms, CountryDesignators, Action Indicators andEmployee True Names (U)Attached is memorandum from the DO Focal Point for the ARRB addressing the release of cryptonyms, country designators, action indicators and employee true names. The memorandum is intended to provide guidance to you and your staff and complements information provided in previous discussions. Ellie and I welcome the opportunity to discuss these issues with your staff. (U)![Signature]AttachmentUnclassified When SeparatedFrom Attachment.SECRET
[104-10332-10007.pdf — page 3]
13-00000SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review GroupFROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.DO, Focal Point for ARRBSUBJECT: Position on Release of Cryptonyms, CountryDesignators, Action Indicators and Employee TrueNamesDuring the period since the ARRB last met, the DO has considered the four issues listed below that have not yet been addressed with the Board. These issues appear throughout the JFK collection and by stating our position up front we hope to facilitate the Board's review and to reach an agreement that will be mutually satisfying to the Board and the Agency.Cryptonyms - Except for cryptonyms related to operational assets or activities involving Mexico or Miami, the Agency will release the main component of cryptonyms and withhold only the two-letter digraph. Treating cryptonyms in this manner will protect the nationalities of individuals and operations that are not pertinent to Oswald or the JFK investigation and render an easier reading of the written material.Country File Designators - We will delete the first element of operational activity and operational interest files in those instances when the credibility of the narrative is not affected. The first element of the file number corresponds to the alphabetical position of the country name which is easily discernible, whereas the subsequent two elements relate to type of activity or interest and specific subject.Action Indicator (Slug) Lines - Generally, we will release the entire action indicator line of a document. Occasionally, however, we will withhold portions when theSECRETCL BY 0695930DECL OADRDRV HUM 4-82
[104-10332-10007.pdf — page 4]
13-00000SECRETSUBJECT: Position on Cryptonyms, Country Designators, ActionIndicators and Employee True Namescontext identifies a source or a relationship with aspecific liaison service.True Names of Staff Employees - In most instances wewill release names of employees who have retired in an overtstatus and were serving in Headquarters when cited in adocument. We will continue to protect the true names ofemployees cited as serving in a field position. Referencesto field personnel in true name are uncommon, however, sincepseudonyms are normally used in correspondence betweenHeadquarters and the field.![signature of Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.]for Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.2SECRET
[104-10332-10007.pdf — page 5]
# 13-00000![Assassination Records Review Board Logo]# Assassination Records Review Board600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530(202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457November 9, 1995# HAND DELIVEREDMr. John Pereira, DirectorHistorical Review GroupCenter for the Study of IntelligenceCentral Intelligence AgencyWashington, D.C., 20505Re: ARRB requests for evidenceCIA HAS NO OBJECTION TODECLASSIFICATION AND/ORRELEASE OF CIA INFORMATIONIN THIS DOCUMENTDear John:I thought that it might be helpful to you if I were to provide you with our current assessment of the status of our review of the Agency's assassination records and point to where we would like to proceed in the future.I would like to begin by acknowledging the efforts made by the Historical Review Group to facilitate our review of records. It has been, as you know, a difficult and time-consuming process both for the Agency and the Review Board. We very much appreciate the personal cooperation of you and your staff.We continue to be concerned by the slow progress that has been made. Although we perceive that the task has been more difficult and time-consuming than Congress anticipated, we have found that the careful education process in which we have been involved has helped educate us with respect to your concerns and, we hope, has helped demonstrate to you the Review Board's concerns.We must, however, begin to pick up the pace. In many circumstances we are reviewing and then re-reviewing the same documents over and over again. We are also frequently put in the position of not being provided with evidence in a timely manner so that we can make our presentations to the Board. While many of these difficulties are understandable -- and perhaps even inherent to the start-up of the process in which we are engaged -- we must expedite the process. Rather than dealing with dozens of records at Board meetings, we need to move towards a schedule where hundreds of records will be reviewed at Board meetings. From our perspective, it seems that it is essential that the Agency be prepared to allocate significant additional resources to the process of reviewing the records and making evidence available to the Board.BOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair • Henry F. Graff • Kermit L. Hall • William L. Joyce • Anna K. NelsonEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell