Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 30]
13. The President then turned to Indonesia and stated that he was faced with the necessity of making a decision as to whether or not it was in the national interest to continue aid to Indonesia. This decision had to be made by him in accordance with the foreign aid bill just passed. He said he wanted in writing from Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Mr. McCone their recommendations as to what his decision should be. He also wanted to get reactions from Senator Russell and several other Congressional leaders. He quoted a figure of $25 million which was involved. (Action: The wheels are grinding in the Agency to come up with a pro and con and consequences paper for the Director upon which he may make his recommendation to the President. The figures are somewhat confused and the actual amount appears to be in the neighborhood of $60 million. Mike Forrestal has these figures pretty well tied down and points out that the Presidential decision does not require any action on PL 480 funds.)14. The President then stated that he was totally dissatisfied with the proposed program for alleviating poverty which apparently suggested that he ask Congressional authorization for a lump sum of money which he would administer through some sort of newly-created poverty administration. He said he wouldn't touch it with a ten-foot pole and that if he proposed anything like that on the Hill, they would laugh him out of court and it would probably bring a defeat in the Democratic party in the upcoming elections. He would give absolutely no consideration to anything which could possibly result in graft or pork barrel activities. Any program for the relief of poverty must be designed to get right down to the grass roots out where the poverty actually exists and must be handled by existing Federal, State, and community organizations which are geared in this direction. He mentioned specifically the possibility of utilizing the Bureau of Public Roads and other similar Federal and State organizations. He said that if roads are to be built, they should be built into and out of poverty-stricken areas and to provide access to schools and hospitals and such human needs activities and not, repeat not, for the improvement of major trunk lines and highways. He thought perhaps the people who were receiving this
[104-10310-10020.pdf — page 31]
-7-type of aid could be utilized in the construction of these roads where they would see the results of what they were doing and the purpose of it. He stated that any attempt to organize a new administrative entity to handle this matter would not even get off the ground before the year was out and would merely result in more Government people on the payroll and more bureaucracy. He directed an immediate reappraisal of his program for the relief of poverty and coming up with an entirely different concept for his approval. Mr. Staats and Mr. Murphy indicated they would follow through on this.15. The foregoing covers all pertinent points to the best of my recollection. I shall write a separate memorandum of the tour President Johnson gave us of his ranch and with particular attention to the fact that he built and paid for every improvement on the place out of his own pocket, including the runway, the runway lights, and the dam across the river.![signature of MSC]MSC
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# President:AirportPomadaco Rive -Born - CemeteryCattle - Cont.No Seant fain.Ms. Johan-Erhardt- much taken - amant- articlore - appealed more than Adenauer-Prea say his going to stay home & think of ways to get peace -If others want to come talk OK- but he not make trips just for trips -He want Peau do everything to get it but never at expense of our Security- told Erhardt not to play off debautte agunt US- Germany to say which way they 90-put more into it we had to fight 2 Wald wars beraneof Camay - This Proo, wont going to be a party to any chillyshallying like that - Then Erhardt was ok -Pres. wants round-up from FBIS(CIA) and USIA on world reaction to Erhardt visit - paid i didn't make mony on that deal might as well give up - we got continged as to foreign policy - build up a story - highly favorable reporting -
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# Paragraphs for message to DCI1 January 19641.  The President has not yet approved the 1965 budget and it is being extremely closely held. Agency requirements totaled $122 billion and BOB cuts reduced it to $103 billion. Further cuts are quite obviously in the mill. The '55 total request will be less than '64 and expenditures will likewise be less than '64. There will be departmental reductions in Defense, State, AEC, Agriculture, with increases in HEW and Labor. With relation to Gross National Product, the '65 budget will be the smallest since 1951. This will be the first time in ten years that there has been a decrease in personnel, amounting to approximately 100. The smallest increase during this period was 7200 in 1957.2.  Major legislative proposals will be those that are left over from last session, such as Civil Rights Bill, tax cut, etc. New programs will include a procedure for attack on poverty, new program for aid to education below college level, new program for medicare, preparation for next year's foreign aid bill, etc. Major emphasis on human needs continues.3.  The President wishes to conduct an all-out review of our Cuban policy after returning to W.shington. He particularly wants a more imaginative approach with hard-nosed emphasis on economic denials through pressures on third countries. This in line with his statements at recent Cuban meeting at White House.4.  President personally wrote New Year's message to Khrushchev, released today.5.  President faced with decision on whether or not to continue $25 million aid program to Indonesia. As you know, this is primarily civic action. He wants a study of pros and cons with recommendations in writing from you, Secretary of State, and others. Also wants reaction from Senator Russell and others on Hill. will take up when he returns.6.  Salinger will send me tomorrow the memoranda he wrote on conversations with the Russians as to Fresident's intentions.
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7. President established outstanding rapport with Erhard and things are looking up in that area. 8. President greatly concerned over continuing situation in South Vietnam. 9. President wants General Eisenhower, Mr. Truman, and Mr. Hoover briefed monthly on international and domestic affairs. Stated that had President Truman been getting these regularly, he probably would not have authorized publication of CIA article. In connection with Truman article, this matter not argued at Independence. 10. President much interested in foreign reaction to Erhard talks. We furnished roundup news media reaction to Salinger today.
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13-00000# TOP SECRET2 June 1961MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Interview with Dave Morales, GS-14, Chief of CI Section, Miami Base, 25 May 19611. Morales, who was born in Arizona of Indian and Spanish parents and is bilingual in Spanish and English, former football player, arrived in Miami in October 1960 after spending two years at the Havana Station. He appears to have done a unique CI job in organizing, within the Frente, the future intelligence service for the new government of Cuba that the invasion force expected to install. He also organized two other groups. He did this with the help of a Chilean instructor that was supplied by headquarters, and with *materials training* that WH/4/CI Section, Mr. Simmons, sent down to him.2. The principal group were 39 selected, highly educated Cubans, who were trained as case officers to form the future intelligence service. They are known as the "AMOTS". After being trained they were employed by Morales in doing a series of highly important tasks for the good of the station. These were as follows:a. Penetration of the local anti-Castro organizations.b. Penetration of the pro-Castro organization in Miami, the so called 26th of July organization.c. Preparation of biographical information on all prominent persons in the Frente.d. Carding some 200,000 Cubans in the period of three months.e. A special section of the AMOTS monitored all radio transmissions coming from Cuba. This amounted to eight stations that were covered on a 24 hour a day basis.f. Screefing of all persons recruited for the grade Brignai (but this work first started in November 1960, and by that time 300 or 400 men had already gone to camp). This AMOT screening of the military trainees really amounted to a field check since the various cases were discussed with Cuban sources of information present in Miami.# TOP SECRET
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g. Mail censorship. All mail coming from the military camp in Guatemala was censored by this group before being released for transmittal to Cuba.h. Four of this[^1] were sent back to Cuba with instructions to report on CI targets; chiefly the secret service and the police.3. The second group trained by Morales were 100 selected Cubans who were given training as future CI officials and civil government officials. Of the 100 thus trained, 61 were sent to the camp in Guatemala for training with the brigade. They accompanied the brigade on the invasion, and of the 61 only two were lost, nine were caught and the rest got out, due to the circumstance that most of them were on the steamer Lake Charles which owing to the developments at the beaches did not land its troops. These men were given the job of penetrating inland as fast as possible with the troops and identifing and seizing records and documents of the Castro government. Following that they were to set up the temporary civilian government of Cuba. This group were known as the AMFATS. The members of this group were brought back to Miami where they are now living privately. The third group were the AMCHEERS, a group of approximately 100 older, nonpolitical individuals, who received training from Morales as a reserve in intelligence personnel. Eighty of these had been trained by April 1961 for eventual legal return.4. Morales stressed that POA's had been received on members of all three groups and that the AMOTS received tradecraft training far in excess of that received by the average Agency staff employee.5. After the invasion the Frente leaders endeavord to change the AMOTS into a political organization and remove the chief leaders of the AMOT group. Such a development had been anticipated by the base and prior to that action all files, the most valuable part of the AMOT organization, had been microfilmed (see my interviews with Simmons for more details on this protective maneuver). The chief AMOTS who were thus removed by the Cuban leaders are still organized under Morales as a shadow intelligence organization.6. Personnel shortages. Morales accomplished all of the foregoing with the aid of only two girls one a GS-9 analyst. He tried in vain for more than three months to get a junior case officer assigned, but in vain. This request was forwarded through Simmons, the CI Chief in WH/4. Morales tried to get one or both of two JOTS who were in Miami on TDY, but the JOT office refused to release them tha on the ground that it would interfere with their training. Morales feels that these young officers would have learned more in- 2 -TOP SECRET[^1]: Missing word "these"
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13-00000three months under him than they would learn in three years of formal training. As a result of being so short handed, Morales had to work about 14 hours a day, seven days a week. Otherwise, however, he received excellent support generally, both from Headquarters and the other sections of Miami Base.7. As for suggestions for better operation in the future, Morales made two points. (a) the screening of military trainees should start at a much earlier point than was done this time; (b) more adequate number of personnel should be furnished.U, ShiaR. D. SheaTOP SECRET
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# CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENTDOCUMENT DESCRIPTION| SOURCE                || --------------------- || DOC. NO.              || DOC. DATE             || COPY NO.              || NUMBER OF PAGES       || NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS |MEMO FOR THE RECORDR. D. SHEA1 June 1961REGISTRY| CIA CONTROL NO.        || ---------------------- || DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED || LOGGED BY              |ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns| REFERRED TO    | RECEIVED  | RELEASED | SEEN BY |      |      |                      |      || -------------- | --------- | -------- | ------- | ---- | ---- | -------------------- | ---- || OFFICE         | SIGNATURE | DATE     | TIME    | DATE | TIME | SIGNATURE AND OFFICE | DATE || Mr.Shaffer     |           |          |         |      |      | Shaffer              | 9    ||                |           |          |         |      |      |                      |      || Mr.Dildine     |           |          |         |      |      | W Dildine            | 6/12 ||                |           |          |         |      |      |                      |      || Mr.Kirkpatrick |           |          |         |      |      |                      |      || Mr.Shea        |           |          |         |      |      |                      |      |NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.| TO             | DOWNGRADED               | DESTROYED      | DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) || -------------- | ------------------------ | -------------- | ------------------------ || BY (Signature) |                          |                |                          ||                |                          |                |                          || DATE           | BY (Signature)           | BY (Signature) | TO                       ||                | WITNESSED BY (Signature) |                |                          ||                | DATE                     | OFFICE         | BY (Signature)           ||                |                          | DATE           |                          |FORM NO. 261 APR 55 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.(OP-2) 12-59TOP SECRET
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5 June 1961MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD.SUBJECT: Interview with Clark Simmons, Chief of WH/4's CI Section, 1 June 1961(This memorandum should be read after Morales interview)1. Simmons is a dedicated CI type having spent the last 11 years chiefly on CI matters largely under OTR auspices. He spent two years in Egypt, 1954 to 1956, setting up and training the Egyptian CI Staff, apparently starting from scratch. He has been with OTR since then and came to WH/4 in mid-April 1960. He is about to be transferred to the WH Division Staff and his replacement will be Louis Napoli who will head the new combined FI/CI Section of WH/4. He stressed that the charter of the new combined section will give CI the right to interfere in any operation. This will be spelled out explicitly, thus countering the difficulties that Simmons had in dealing with the PM Section prior to the invasion. Bob Andrews will stay on for CI matters and Seehafer will head the FI part, both under Napoli.2. AMOTS (future Cuban intelligence service trained by Morales at Miami). This idea started when Anderson of WH Division Staff told Simmons that he had a Chilean CI officer who was available for training Cubans. Drawing on his Egyptian experience, Simmons drew the AMOT plan and prepared the training materials and sent them to Morales for execution. It was Morales who subsequently conceived the idea of training the AMFATS (future CI service) and the AMCHEERS, a reserve intelligence corps consisting of older men. These matters are discussed in detail in my memorandum on Morales. Morales also organized a group of former Cuban diplomats presently in Miami to have them available when a new government is set up. Subsequent to the invasion the AMOTS have been substantially changed by Cardona. He has replaced the top AMOTS by political appointees who have no skill in tradecraft. The top men thus fired had anticipated such a move, and, in addition to micro- filming 120,000 cards, they removed all cryptonyms and all memoranda of conversation between them and Morales with the result that the new service doesn't know the identity of the AMOTS who are presently in Cuba. The AMOTS initially numbered 96. The Miami Base now has 18 to 22 of them of whom four are inside Cuba with 14 subsources; all of them producing FI and CI reports. By December 1960 the AMOTS had produced 1,800 intelligence reports and 750 radio monitor reports.
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3. In dealing with the Miami Base, Simmons stuck strictly to the relationship between Headquarters and a foreign station. His command channel was, of course, via Chief of WH/4 to the Chief of Miami Base to Morales. He and Morales understood each other perfectly and there was no other obstacle of any sort in their collaboration. There was no second-guessing or double case offering in CI matters.4. Simmons and his section ran a number of CI ops directly from Headquarters. He referred to the following:a. A certain lady of easy virtue who had a vast acquaintance among the top Castro people.b. A Greek sailor who for eight years has worked for the Agency as a penetration in Communist maritime unions in various countries.c. A certain former Spanish intelligence officer, Amshad, who has been living in Havana in the home of the chief of G-2. Unfortunately, an expected Castro official appointment did not materialize and this operation has not proved to be of much value.d. A former U.S. negro citizen now in the Cuban service.e. Juan Orta, former chief of Castro's executive office, now out of office.5. Simmons gave me the attached copies of four basic documents.Tab A - WH/4 counterintelligence plan, June 1960Tab B - Counterintelligence plan for an FRD security service, late August 1960Tab C - CI program for future project, 20 April 1961Tab D - Counterintelligence assets, 29 April 1961In addition, Morales gave me a copy of a dispatch summarizing Miami's CI assets currently in Cuba, (Tab E).6. Relations with PM Section: Simmons' relations with the PM section seem to have been marked with a considerable amount of friction, perhaps more than always results from the resentment operators feel at the inhibiting influence of the CI man. Thus whenever a PM agent was lost, a CI man would analyse the files and draw a damage sheet showing what the agent knew, etc. Simmons showed me a large file containing about 50 of such cases. This work was made more difficult because the PM people kept only very skimpy records. A CI representative, Rothwell,
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also went over all incoming messages from agents to scrutinize for the use of freedom signals. When the absence of such signals was pointed out to PM they would sometimes claim that the agent had merely forgotten them. CI was able to stop all cable traffic to such agents when under suspicion. After a while Rothwell was delegated to be the CI contact with the PM people, and due to his quiet methods and competence he gained a fair share of their confidence and the work proceeded more smoothly.7. Simmons and his section prepared a 225-page study of Castro's intelligence organization. This document was distributed generally throughout the U.S. intelligence community, as were also some extensive studies on Cuban blockwardens. They also issued CS/CI information reports and Simmons gave a number of briefings to higher-ups. They were able to identify 14 provocative activities by the Cuban services in the U.S., Dakar and Havana. They identified a U. S. employee of the U.S. Embassy in Havana as a Castro penetration agent in 1960. * This document contains the identities of 492 Castro G-2 staff officers.8. From September 1960 to January 1961 Simmons spent half of his time working on the case of the three ST ESCALATE members, i.e., the audio and development team which was arrested in Cuba and is still under arrest. If these men had checked in with the CI Branch before departure they would have warned not to go. Simmons regards this matter of the greatest potential danger to the Agency, e.g., if these men should be sent to Moscow to be milked.9. Simmons described the following difficulties he had had:a. His section was not fully staffed until October 1960, although he went to the greatest lengths to get additional people. He first had a machine run made for a list of CI personnel having a knowledge of Spanish. He checked the records of the individuals thus disclosed. He sent the names thus selected to the WH/4 personnel officer who made a great effort, but in no case was he able to get a man taken off his present job. He feels that the DD/P should in the future tell all his senior officers of the importance of such a project so that the latter will cooperate when their valuable requested. After borrowing Melberg from covert training for two TDY trips, Simmons could not face going to Marchand with a further request, and instead asked Jack Earman in the DCI's office to help him get Melberg for another trip. The Director of Training complained of this irregular procedure. If Mr. Bissell had so informed his senior officers, Simmons feels that they would have received better cooperation. The result of lack of personnel was that they all worked six or seven days a week. Simmons knows of no case of a directed assignment to the project. As it was, he personally had to spend 80 per cent of his time on administrative matters with the result that he could only spend 20 per cent of his time on operations. His final T/O was four case officers, four analysts, two clerk-typists and one secretary.