Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10332-10007.pdf — page 34]
# SECRETCentral Intelligence AgencyWashington DC. 2050515 April 1997MEMORANDUM FOR: David G. MarwellExecutive DirectorAssassination Records Review BoardSUBJECT: CIA Employees(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIAonce the Review Board has completed its deliberations on theissues discussed below.)1. (U) Issue. The purpose of this memo is to relate   CIA'S concerns to the Review Board regarding the release of   the true names of CIA employees that appear in the JFK   Collection and to present a proposal on how this problem   might be addressed.## I. Factual Background2. (U) To date, approximately 600 true names of CIA   employees have been identified in the JFK Collection. Some   of these employees are important to the JFK story, and CIA   will continue to work with the Review Board to release as   many of these names as possible. Many names, however,   appear only a few times in the entire JFK Collection and   appear to add nothing to the historical record.3. (U) Under guidelines adopted by the Review Board   on or about 20 March 1996, any names of CIA employees are   presumptively released unless CIA provides specific evidence   to the Review Board that harm to the national security or to   the employee would likely result from such release. Singe   these guidelines were adopted, it has become increasingly   clear that the number of names at issue, and, in most cases,   their tenuous connection to the JFK story, make this   approach unworkable with regard to both CIA's obligation toCL BY: 2224130CL REASON: 1.5 (c)DECL ON: X1DRV FROM: HUM 4-82SECRET
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# SECRETSubject: CIA Employeesprotect national security information and the Review Board's duty to inform the public about the JFK assassination in a timely and accurate fashion. The task of locating and informing hundreds of former employees scattered all over the country and the world has been a formidable one. Some employees have contacted us to report their concerns about a "suspicious" letter purporting to be from CIA which they had received. It would not be surprising, therefore, if many former employees ignored the letter for similar reasons, even though they might have legitimate needs to protect their identities.4. (U) Contacting every named employee and collecting information on each of them to present to the Review Board will clearly take more time and effort than any of us had anticipated. This will have obvious ramifications for how and when the Review Board releases information to the public. More importantly, the decision to publicly acknowledge employees who may have been living for over 30 years under cover is a critical one that should be made not by default, but rather by careful planning and consideration.5. (U) Relevant to this discussion is the fact that the Review Board and CIA have recently agreed upon a policy for releasing true names of sources of intelligence information. It was agreed at that time that there would be a presumption of protecting source names; but in cases where a source was particularly important to the JFK story and there was no overriding national security interest, the name would be released. Although the CIA recognizes that there are some sensitivities involved with sources that do not apply to covert employees, there are also many legal and operational similarities, which are described herein, that justify similar treatment by the Review Board. As is further detailed in Section IV, CIA, therefore, proposes that the Review Board adopt a general policy of protecting employee names that appear in the Collection, with exceptions for those individuals whom the Board believes are important to the JFK story.## Legal Considerations6. (U) As both covert CIA employees and clandestine reporting assets are types of "human sources" of intelligence, many of the same laws apply. Although Section 11(a) of the JFK Act provides that, when the Act requires release of information, it takes precedence over all other laws that would otherwise prohibit release, there are strong governmental national security interests in protecting the true names of CIA employees. CIA believes that it is
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Subject: CIA Employeesimportant for the Review Board to reconsider the laws whichprotect classified information, because they clearly reflecta larger US Government policy to protect covert CIAemployees from disclosure.7. (U) By Executive order and statute, the President   and Congress have made the Director of Central Intelligence   responsible for protecting sources of intelligence. In his   Directive of 22 January 1946 that established the Central   Intelligence Group, President Truman made the DCI   responsible for protecting sources. With the establishment   of CIA, Congress also gave the DCT this responsibility. The   National Security Act of 1947, Section 103(d)(3), codified   at 50 USC §403(3)(c)(5), requires the DCI to protect   intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure. In   addition, §403(3)(d)(2) requires the DCI to ensure that   risks to the United States and those involved in the   collection of intelligence through human sources are   minimized.8. (U) Protecting the identity of individuals working   for CIA, not only covertly but overtly as well, has been of   particular concern to US lawmakers since the establishment   of the Agency. For example, with Section 6 of the Central   Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC §403g, Congress   specifically exempted the CIA from the provisions of any law   requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization,   functions, names, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel   employed by the Agency.9. (U) In 1980, Congress passed the Classified   Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial,   trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving   or potentially involving classified information. Working   with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has   successfully protected the names of CIA employees from   public release even in criminal trials where there are   heightened (i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring   disclosure to the defendant of all government information   relevant to the defense. CIPA allows for *in camera ex parte*   hearings in which the judge can rule on questions of   admissibility and relevancy of classified information,   including the identity of CIA employees who may have   information pertaining to the defense, before it is   introduced either to the defendant, defense counsel, or in   open court. In some cases involving CIA, the judge has   ordered that CIA information be turned over to the defense,   but only in some unclassified form such as in a summary. In   other cases, judges have reviewed the classified information   and ruled that the harm to national security outweighs the
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SECRETSubject: CIA Employeesdefendant's legal rights to the information. In still othercases, the defense was never notified that CIA even hadinformation bearing on the case, as the judge ruled that themere fact that CIA possessed this information was classifiedand outweighed any rights the defendant had. Moreover,under CIPA, the Attorney General has the authority to drop aprosecution in those cases where the risk to nationalsecurity is too great.10. (U) In 1982, Congress again acted to protect CIA    employees by passing the Intelligence Identities Protection    Act of 1982, 50 USC §421 that criminalizes the revelation of    a covert employee or the identity of a source. This act    subjects anyone who reveals information that identifies a    "covert agent" to prosecution and provides up to 10 years in    prison and $50,000 in fines as punishment. This act    specifically defines a "covert agent" as including "an    officer or employee of an intelligence agency...."11. (U) Most recently, President Clinton signed    Executive Order 12958 on classified national security    information that became effective in October 1995. Although    it requires generally that agencies make greater    declassification efforts than under the prior executive    order, Executive Order 12958 affords human sources of    intelligence information, which would include employees,    extra protection from the declassification provisions.    Under E.O. 12958, information that is over 25 years old and    having historical value must be declassified within five    years. However, information revealing the identity of a    human source may continue to be protected.12. (U) The above federal laws show a long-standing    practice by the US Government to protect CIA employees from    disclosure to the public. In carrying out its statutory    obligations, the Review Board should give serious weight to    this policy and afford the protection of CIA employees a    high priority.### Operational Considerations13. (U) For current CIA employees whose names may    appear in the JFK Collection, the operational considerations    for protecting their identity are similar to those for    sources. Many of these employees have worked "under cover"    for CIA. Cover is used to disassociate entire installations    and offices from open linkage to intelligence activities, to    enable intelligence personnel to enter and work effectively    in foreign countries, to shield Agency employees and    authorized clandestine activities from attention by hostile    elements and from media exposure, to facilitate access to
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# SECRETSubject: CIA Employeescertain individuals of intelligence interest, to prevent embarrassment to host foreign governments, and to permit plausible denial of CIA's presence and activities in foreign countries.14. (U) The ability to maintain one's cover is crucial to gathering intelligence. In either a "hostile" or "friendly" country, should the local service become aware of who the CIA employees are, it would increase surveillance and make unilateral operations difficult if not impossible. In some countries, the local government tolerates the CIA presence and agrees to work with us as long as the local population is not aware of the circumstances. Once it becomes known among the locals that certain US Government officials are actually CIA, pressure may be placed on the government to expel those Americans, disrupting liaison and diplomatic relationships. More importantly, covert employees and their families would face increased risk to their personal safety. Even in "friendly" countries, our employees could face some personal risks as well as risks to ongoing operations from extremists who may be living among an otherwise benign local population. In any of these cases, should a covert employee's cover be publicly compromised, that employee may have to be recalled from the field; and it could be difficult to place him elsewhere in an operationally and physically secure location. Thus, maintaining cover is important to a case officer's effectiveness and to the continuation of a career with CIA.15. (S) Maintaining the confidentiality of cover is also important to cover providers. The Review Board will recall from prior briefings by the Agency that covert CIA employees, both in the United States and overseas, can work under "official" (e.g., State Department) cover or "non- official" (e.g., private company) cover. Disclosure of a covert employee would not only be official acknowledgment of the specific cover mechanism employed by CIA but would also negatively affect the governmental or business mission of the cover provider, especially those who provide non- official cover. Acknowledgment of an employee who had been under non-official cover in a host country and possibly in other countries could have a negative impact on the provider's business interests and activities. It would also cast suspicion on that provider's legitimate employees and their families. Further, exposure of cover providers could affect the recruitment and cooperation of such providers by the Agency and Intelligence Community.16. (S) Although the majority of names that appear in the Collection are retired CIA employees, the operational considerations in revealing their affiliation with CIA are
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# Subject: CIA Employeesnot diminished. Similar to sources, many former employees still do not want their past affiliation with CIA revealed. Perhaps their current friends, family, or employers are not aware of this past affiliation; and revelation of that fact could negatively affect personal and professional relationships. Some former employees still live overseas where a revelation of CIA affiliation poses risks to their personal safety. Other former employees travel overseas on business, where a revelation of a past CIA affiliation can threaten their business interests and personal safety. One example of an employee in this category is Robert Fulton, whose name apparently appears only once in the Collection. Fulton retired under Department of State cover; he currently has a consultant business and frequently travels to China. Release of his name would jeopardize not only his business but perhaps even his safety. A similar example is Walter McCabe, who also retired under State cover. He is now working in Russia and several East European countries for a private firm. He does not want his name published, because it could be damaging to his current employer and his professional status.17. (S) Even if a former employee agrees to the revelation of his name in the JFK Collection, this might not be possible for other reasons. In some cases, officially acknowledging a covert employee could threaten ongoing operations on which that employee worked. Foreign nationals recruited by the employee and still providing information to the US Government would be at risk of exposure. Public acknowledgment could reveal the location of CIA stations where the employee worked throughout his career, including some not released by the Review Board. Any individuals who had substantial contact with a former employee overseas and may have believed they were legitimately providing information to a US corporate representative would be upset to learn they were, in fact, aiding the US Government.18. (U) Finally, the identification of case officers by their own service would have a chilling effect on prospective assets. Prospective assets would be unlikely to enter into a clandestine relationship with American intelligence if they believe that CIA does not protect even its own staff employees from public disclosure.## IV. Proposal19. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA employees identified in the JFK Collection, with exceptions made for those individuals who are important to the story of the assassination. The Agency proposes that in most cases a
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APR 15 '97 05:01PM USGOVERNMENTSECRETSubject: CIA EmployeesP.8/14substitution for the true name be used. If the Review Boardis concerned about tracking particular employees throughoutthe records, a particular identifying substitution can beused for a particular employee.20. (S) CIA believes that this approach will not    undermine the Review Board's obligations under the JFK Act.    A review of the JFK Collection reveals that approximately 84    of the 600 names appear only once in the entire Collection.    In such cases, it is difficult to see how the individuals'    identity can add anything of significance to the historical.    record; yet there may be some security concerns still    associated with these individuals. For example, Arthur H.    Stimson retired under cover and is currently living in    Europe. When the CIA notified him that his name appeared in    the JFK Collection and was subject to public release, he    told CIA that he was opposed to having his name released and    believed such a release could pose personal and security    problems. Furthermore, he could not understand why his name    even appeared in the Collection, since he had no    recollection of being involved in anything related to the    assassination.21. (S) With regard to the approximately 500 names    that appear more than once in the Collection, the vast    majority of these individuals played almost no role in the    JFK story. One example of this is former DO officer    Alexander Brasko. His name appears approximately 20-30    times in the Collection simply because he signed off on name    trace requests. Mr. Brasko was a covert CIA employee and    retired under cover. The public release of his name would    provide the public with no additional significant    information about JFK. Tom Flores is another example of a    covert CIA employee whose name appears in the Collection but    has little or no connection to the JFK story. Flores    retired under cover, is living in South America, and objects    to the release of his name. Mr. Flores' recent letter to    CIA is also attached for your convenience.22. (S) The Agency, of course, recognizes that some    names may be particularly important to the JFK story    regardless of how frequently or infrequently they appear in    the Collection. One such example is former COS Mexico    Winston Scott who CIA has acknowledged as a CIA employee.    In such cases, the CIA will continue to work with the Review    Board for an appropriate resolution. The CIA proposes that    the Review Board and its staff identify those individuals    whom it believes are important to the JFK story and whose    names should be released to the public. These names would    carry a presumption of release unless specific evidence is    provided to the Review Board that harm would likely result7SECRET
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13-00000 P.9/14APR 15 '97 05:02PM USGOVERNMENTSECRETSubject: CIA Employeesfrom such release. The CIA will conduct the appropriate searches to determine whether release would pose national security concerns for the US Government or personal safety concerns for the individual. In this way, CIA and the Review Board can concentrate their efforts on individuals who are significant figures in the JFK story, expediting the review of the sequestered collection.23. (U) It is our hope that the CIA and the Review Board can agree on and work out a mutually acceptable policy regarding the identity of CIA employees that will not undermine the important principle of protecting those who work covertly for the US Government. My staff and I are ready to discuss this matter with you at your convenience.Michael J. O'NeilActing General CounselAttachmentA. Tom Flores' letter8SECRET
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13-00000- APR 15 '97 05:03PM USGOVERNMENTSECRETSubject: CIA EmployeesDCI/OGC/LD/LCCipriani 76124 (10 Apr 97)OGC-97-50971Distribution:Original - Addressee1 - GC1 - Lit File - LDG000211 - LCC Signer1 - RDC FYI1 - OGC Registry9SECRETP.10/14
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Secret26 June 1997Memorandum to: Jeremy GunnARRB StaffFrom: Barry HarrelsonJFK Project OfficeCIA/CSI/HRGSubject: Employee Names Scheduled for ARRB ReviewReference: 201 File and "A" Names Lists(We request that this memorandum and its attachments be returned to CIA once the Review Board has completed its deliberations on the names discussed below.)1.  The above reference lists identify the protected CIA employee names in the Oswald 201 file and on the ARRB staff's key figures list scheduled for action by the ARRB at its 9-10 July 1997 meeting. This memorandum is a partial response to the ARRB's request for evidence and addresses those individuals on the list currently employed by the Agency and the changes in status of names.201 ListCurrent employees requiring continued protection. (see attached Cover Staff reports):Walter C. D'Andrade (Andrade, FNU)Robert J. AustinRobert F. LitviakRelease: FNU CoplewoodJoan FieldN. JudkinsFNU PattenHarrison L ScottCarl TrettinW. WalkerCorrections: Remove Kurt Johansson (source) -- incorrectly identified as an employeeAdd Barbara Graham (B. Graham) -- incorrectly dropped from latest listCL BY: 611637CL REASON: 1.5(c)DECL ON: X1DRV FRM: COV 2-87SECRET
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# Secret- Key Figures (A) ListRelease:FNU ConnallyFNU FeinglassDaniel FloresLorna McKayGeorge MiskoDavid Wilsted2. For the remaining 38 names on the lists, we will provide evidence supporting their cover status and the need for continued protection as available. By 7 July you should have either specific evidence or a status of search statement for each individual.![Barry Harrelson's signature]Barry HarrelsonAttachments:Cover history printouts (3) [available in CIA SCIF]SECRET
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13-00000CONFIDENTIAL(When Filled In)#19-1297# SECRECY AGREEMENT1. I, *Morton Mowbray Palmer Ⅲ*, understand that upon entering on duty with the Central Intelligence Agency I am undertaking a position of trust in that Agency of the Government responsible to the President and the National Security Council for intelligence relating to the security of the United States of America. I understand that in the course of my employment I will acquire information about the Agency and its activities and about intelligence acquired or produced by the Agency.2. I have read and understand the provisions of the Espionage Act, Title 18, USC, secs. 793 and 794, and I am aware that unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to the national defense may subject me to prosecution for violation of that Act, whether such disclosure be made while I am an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency or at any time thereafter.3. In addition, however, as I am undertaking a position of trust, I have a responsibility to the Central Intelligence Agency not to disclose any classified information relating to the Agency without proper authorization. I undertake, therefore, not to discuss with or disclose to any person not authorized to hear it such information relating to the Central Intelligence Agency, its activities, or to intelligence material under the control of the Agency. I further understand that this undertaking is a condition of my employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, that its violation may subject me to immediate dismissal for cause or other appropriate disciplinary action, and that this undertaking shall be equally binding upon me after my employment with the Agency as during it.4. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain whether or not information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it, and, therefore, I will obtain the decision of authorized officials of the Agency on these points prior to disclosing information relating to the Agency, and failure to obtain such a decision will be grounds for my dismissal.5. I understand that my unauthorized action or utterance in the nature of a publication or which would reasonably be expected to result in publicity on intelligence or intelligence activities would be in violation of Government and Agency regulations and would be grounds for my dismissal.CONFIDENTIALFORM NO. 368 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS1 DEC 55