Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10330-10100.pdf — page 3]
# SECRETDave - CSI answers to your question on JFK project.I forwarded them to Comptroller, too.D/ Comptroller provided additional background, also attached.NOTE FOR: Rebecca V. StrodeFROM: John F. PereiraOFFICE: CSI/HRGDATE: 11/06/97 11:38:33 AMSUBJECT: CSI Resource Request regarding JFKCC: GinaIn Brian Latell's absence, I am providing the following response to the Exdir's questions regarding the request for additional resources for review of JFK documents:1.  What is the size of the JFK declassification problem? How much work remains to be done?- An additional 40-50,000 pages of CIA records remain to be reviewed by 30 September 1998.- A large volume of documents are being referred to CIA by other agencies for review, including the FBI, State, and Presidential Libraries. The documents are either CIA-originated or contain CIA information. No figures are available, but we estimate at least 40,000 pages.- The JFK Board has also asked CIA to re-review approximately 130,000 pages of material that we released earlier to the National Archives. The reason is to determine whether information deleted earlier can now be released.2.  How many people do you have working on the JFK project now?- Following are dedicated to the JFK project:- One staff officer (Project leader Barry Harrelson)- 13 independent contractors (work 3/4 days per week)- The DO unit detailed to CSI to coordinate the review of JFK records recently added two contractors and may add more.3.  What difference would X more make?- The additional resources requested would allow us to increase the pace of the review of CIA documents and third agency referrals. Unless the pace is increased, it is highly unlikely that the Board's requirement to complete the review and declassification of all JFK-related records by 30 September 1998 could be met.# SECRET
[104-10330-10100.pdf — page 4]
SECRETCC: Brian S. Latell, (Patricia F. Duryee,) Rodney A. Snyder, (Rex H. Latham-C-, Robert E. (Leggett,) J. Barry HarrelsonSent on 6 November 1997 at 11:38:33 AMSECRET
[104-10330-10100.pdf — page 5]
SECRETCL BY: 0693020CL REASON: Section 1.5 CDECL ON: 6 November 2007DRV FRM: FIN 7-82TO: Rebecca V. StrodeFROM: Cynthia R. BowerOFFICE: COMPTDATE: 11/06/97 12:09:41 PMSUBJECT: Re: CSI Resource Request regarding JFKSome background information for you:(S) First, although Congress authorized and appropriated $5.5 million for classification management, it is unlikely that CSI will receive the full $5.5 million. Why? Congress levied a tax on DoD procurement that will have a significant impact on CIA's program because of the fact that our entire budget is incorporated in DoD's budget as Other Procurement Air Force. As a result of that tax, CIA has to take about a $49 million reduction across all programs (per SAC direction). This will impact on all activities -- including new adds. Each activity can expect to lose about 1% of its resources. We will identify specifically how to take this cut at Friday's offsite.(C) In addition, CIA has a large FY98 unfunded bill (about $143 million). On Friday, we will determine how to reduce and/or pay that bill. One of the proposals on the table for paying that bill is to use some of the Congressional add money- obviously, we would have to work this with the Hill, but the bottom line is that some of the declass money may be redirected to other priorities.(C) Finally, we may decide to use some of the adds to prepay some FY99 shortfalls. We are already aware of a shortfall in FY99 of about $180 million.(U) So, the bottom line is that no one should count on getting the full amount of their add until we have finalized our decisions on FY98 and FY99 unfundeds.(C) All that said, if CSI does receive some or all of the money added by Congress, they do have the flexibility to allocate that money to other priorities. However, they should attempt to meet the spirit of the language in the Authorization Act. Specifically, the language reads, "The Senate bill added $5.5 million to enhance declassification efforts, with a particular emphasis on those documents relating to Guatemala and Honduras. The House amendment added $8 million for classification management. the conferees agree to provide $5.5 million for declassification and classification management and request that the Director of CSI report to the Congressional Intelligence Committees on progress in declassifying documents of historical significance, the volume of documents involved, the mechanism for review, the anticipated date of completion of this effort, and how the process can be improved."(U) Hope this helps. CRBCC: Mary K. SturtevantSECRET
[104-10330-10100.pdf — page 6]
AIUOClassification of Material TransmittedHISTORICAL REVIEW GROUPCENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCEPhone #703-613-1806PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELYCLASSIFIED FAXSUBJECT: JFKFROM: John Pereira X31805SENDING FAX NO. 703-613-3060DELIVER TO: Becky Strode, EXDIR OFFICERECEIVING FAX NO. 703-734-1819DATE TRANSMITTED: 11/7 PAGES TRANSMITTED: 5 (including cover sheet)TRANSMITTED BY: BarberaMESSAGE:Becky, this is info you requested on JFKAIUOClassification of Material TransmittedEXDIRD/EXDIRComptrollerDCC Plans
[104-10330-10100.pdf — page 7]
31 October 1997# Request for Additional Funds for the JFK Assassination Records Review Project, through 31 September 1998.Reference: Ltr. to Executive Director form J. Jeremy Gunn,Executive Director, Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB), copy attached.## Background.1.  The ARRB will go out of business on 31 September 1998. Before that date, it has a statutory obligation to complete its review of all records held by the U.S. Government which relate to the assassination of President Kennedy, determine those which are relevant to the assassination story and ensure that the same are transferred to the National Archives. As the board begins its final year, it has become increasingly concerned about the pace of the review and transfer process. Referent letter is the latest of a number of exchanges dealing with that concern.2.  CSI/HRG has carefully reviewed its current position with respect to its ability to meet the deadlines imposed and has concluded that it cannot fully do so without additional resources, at least through 30 September 1998. This conclusion is based in large measure on three changed circumstances:A. The ARRB has recently exercised its statutory authority and designated additional CIA records to be within the JFK collection (to date approximately twenty cubic feet or 40,000 pages). Additional records may be identified as , the ARRB staff continues its review of Agency files.B. Over the past three months we have received an increase in the number of "Assassination Records" referred from third agencies which include both Agency documents held by another agency or third agency documents which must be reviewed because they contain CIA information; andC. The ARRB itself has established a deadline which was not anticipated. All agencies had understood that the review process and ARRB action would have to be completed by 30 September, but it was widely assumed that final processing and transfer of the documents to the National Archives could occur after that date. However, the Board has now mandated that all relevant records which are not duplicates must be transferred to custody of the National Archives before it goes out of business.
[104-10330-10100.pdf — page 8]
## Additional Resources Requested.3. The following estimate is based on our understanding of the ARRB requirements at this time.A. Review of records: equivalent of 2 man-years (3 contractors -- average daily contractor cost $270);B. Preparation of documents for National Archives: equivalent of 1.5 man-years (2 contractors -- average daily contractor cost $180);C. Indexing: approximately one-man year of overtime ($25 hourly rate);D. Reproduction: approximately one-man year of overtime ($25 hourly rate).Estimated cost FY98: $300,000
[104-10330-10100.pdf — page 9]
# Request for Funds for Declassification of Korean Documents1.  Background. In December 1995, the Director of Central Intelligence drafted a Policy Directive calling for the implementation of a community-wide systematic declassification program under the leadership of the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI). The Community Historical Review Advisory Committee (CHRAC), chaired by the Director of CSI, was formed last year to implement the DCI's directive and to select and prioritize topics for historical declassification review by the Intelligence Community. At the October meeting of the CHRAC, the agency representatives approved the review of materials related to the Korean War as the first topic for historical declassification to be done collectively by the Intelligence Community.2.  The Korean Project. Funds are requested for the Agency to fully participate in this project. With funding, CSI, in cooperation with the Agency's automatic declassification program (OIM/IRG/ADD), will review for possible declassification intelligence records related to the Korean War period (1 January 1950 through 27 July 1953). The review would be done concurrently with the rest of the Intelligence Community. The joint effort will be coordinated by CSI.3.  The Project's Cost. Preliminary research done by CIA's History staff indicates there are approximately 100 boxes, about 150,000 pages, of material that will have to be reviewed from archival material belonging to several Agency directorates. The following costs would be incurred during such a review:*   Document Preparation (select pertinent documents for copying and organize them for reviewers) - One contractor for 50 days ($13,000)[^1]*   Copying Expenses - One copier, at 75 pages per hour for 2000 hours ($50,000)[^2]*   Document Review (contractor document review to make declassification determinations with guidance supplied by staff supervisor) - One contractor doing 2 reviews of each document at a rate of 200 pages per day ($390,000)[^1]: Contractor is approximately $270 per day.[^2]: Copiers are approximately $25 per hour.
[104-10330-10100.pdf — page 10]
- Document Massaging (input of staff supervisor, time for outside coordination, and preparation of final copies for NARA) - Approximately 1/3 of a staff officer's time for 1 year and 2 contractors for a total of 384 days  ($135,000)[^1]TOTAL COST $588,000[^1][^1]: The total is a conservative estimate that could escalate depending upon the complexity of the project and the need for outside coordination. Costs not included in this total are paper, cost of equipment maintenance, ADP support, document coordination expenses of other directorates, share of cost of CSI support personnel and cost of putting finished declassified documents into MORI.
[104-10330-10102.pdf — page 0]
# SECRETCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYWASHINGTON, D.C. 20505EXECUTIVE DIRECTORThe Honorable John Raymond TunheimChairmanAssassination RecordsReview Board600 E. Street N.W.Washington, D.C.Dear Judge Tunheim:(C) I have just received informal word of the decisions the JFK Board made at its 17 November 1997 meeting. Most of the Board's decisions--those relating to the CIA presence in Warrenton, CIA's involvement in various non-governmental organizations, and the details of CIA funding of the Cuban Revolutionary Council--are very welcome. I must, however, urge the Board to reconsider its decision to release documents in a form that would reveal the Agency's use of State Department cover.(C) We stand behind the position that we have presented in writing and in discussions with the Board on previous occasions. I would welcome an opportunity to have a senior CIA representative meet with the Board at your convenience to explain why the Agency considers this information so sensitive and to answer any questions you may have. Meanwhile, I offer the following summary of our fundamental concerns.(S) Effective official cover is necessary to enable our officers to work overseas in often hostile and volatile environments. Official cover also enables the Agency to conduct its business with allied liaison services in countries where host governments would find it politically unacceptable to acknowledge a cooperative relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency. In all such settings, State Department cover is critically important because its use affords our officers the rights and privileges set forth in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Immunity--diplomatic immunity, in particular. Indeed, the effectiveness of the Agency's use of State Department coverCL BY: 2217297CL REASON: 1.5 (c)DECL ON: X1DRV FROM: COV 2-87SECRET
[104-10330-10102.pdf — page 1]
SECRETJudge TunheimClearly illustrates the purpose behind the Director's statutory obligation to protect intelligence methods from unnecessary and inappropriate disclosure.(S) No other cover mechanism can provide our officers the operational utility and personal security that State Department cover does. Achieving effective cover requires that our officers be fully integrated into State Department entities, offices, and functions. Our officers are routinely assigned State Department duties to make it harder for hostile services and others who might try to harm or expose our officers to identify them as Agency employees. Official acknowledgment of even the fact of Agency use of State Department cover would increase dramatically the risks that both Agency officers and our State Department colleagues encounter in serving US interests around the world.(S) State Department cover continues to be an important intelligence method. Its use is undiminished since the 1960s, and it will remain essential for the foreseeable future. I urge the Board to reconsider its recent decision insofar as it concerns the Agency's use of State Department cover. In this regard, we will be forwarding a more comprehensive memorandum addressing the damage issue prior to the next Board meeting, and we would also like to offer the Board the opportunity for a personal appearance by a senior CIA representative should that be appropriate.Sincerely,![Signature of David W. Carey]David W. Carey
[104-10330-10118.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRET13 May 1998MEMORANDUM FOR:Executive DirectorAssassination Records Review BoardFROM:J. Barry HarrelsonJFK Project OfficerSUBJECT:CIA Proposal on Alias Documentation andAccommodation Addresses in AssassinationRecords## I. (U) Background and Recommendation1.  (C) Alias documentation includes materials carried on the person of any CIA officer or foreign asset traveling and conducting business under a fictitious identity. Aliases are widely used by CIA officers working under both official and non-official cover. They are also used by those on TDY status traveling to or from Headquarters as well as between field stations.2.  (S) This package contains five kinds of information relating to cover methods currently in use in connection with aliases:A) Foreign government forgeries (the Mexican and Panamanian passports used by David Morales under various aliases);B) US federal and state documents (social security cards, drivers licenses, and birth certificates);C) Business documents used with the prior agreement of the company, organization, or association they represent;D) Forged business documents;E) Accommodation addresses (“residences of record” for anyone working under alias).3.  (S) Many of the specific forms of alias documentation represented in this package are identical to those used today by Agency officers and assets using aliases and operating under both official and non-official cover. Moreover, certain aspects of their use in support of non-official cover cause CIA particular concern in the event of disclosure:SECRET1
[104-10330-10118.pdf — page 1]
SECRET*   Use of non-official cover is expanding rapidly in response to changes in CIA targets following the collapse of the USSR.*   The use by CIA of non-official cover and the details of how it is employed are less well known than our use of official cover.*   Some of our most uniquely valuable human intelligence comes from this method.*   Non-official cover affords its user no diplomatic immunity. Since some of CIA's most hostile targets necessitate the use of non-official cover, our officers and assets working against these targets run the risk of being arrested, imprisoned, or worse.4.  (S) The likelihood of damage from disclosure of specific information on alias documentation and accommodation addresses runs the gamut from "certain" to "unpredictable." Based on past evidence, public release of references to the forged Mexican and Panamanian passports would be virtually certain to draw a reaction from those governments that would harm US diplomatic relations and deny CIA its use of a currently valuable tool. The probability of litigation from disclosure of business documents is also quite high.*   The damage from release of 25--30 year-old addresses and specifics on seemingly innocuous pocket litter is less predictable. Nonetheless, it has broad implications for both the current use of non-official cover and for the safety of individuals associated with these methods in the past, and therefore CIA can not afford to ignore it. To manage the risk, if denied the option of postponing the release, would require an extremely time consuming review of each piece of information on a case-by-case basis.5.  (U) None of the information being considered for release adds significantly to the historical record on the Kennedy assassination. The minimal added value from its release is small in comparison to the damage, both certain and potential, that would result. Since the cost-benefit ratio is so skewed, we recommend that release of specific information on alias documentation and accommodation addresses be postponed and that generic substitute language be used in its place.## II. (U) Discussion of Potential Damage6.  (C) Disclosure of information relating to the five categories discussed in paragraph 2 above can reasonably be expected to cause the following types of damage:a) Damage to diplomatic relations with Mexico and Panama;b) Litigation from private sector firms;c) Potential damage to a growing intelligence collection method;
[104-10330-10118.pdf — page 2]
SECRETd) Potential physical danger to CIA officers and assets;e) Potential threats to CIA's agreements with other US government entities.7. Category by category, the specific kinds of damage most likely to result from disclosure of the five types of information outlined in section 2 above are:⇒A) *Foreign government forgeries.*(The Mexican and Panamanian passports carried by David Morales.)a) (S) *Damage to US diplomatic relations with Mexico and Panama* would result from release of information on Morales's passport documentation. In the past, CIA's production and use of various countries' passports, birth certificates, and other official documents have been done both with and without specific agreement from those countries. With respect to the documents in this package reflecting our use of Mexican passports, the latter was undoubtedly the case. Moreover, CIA still continues to provide its assets and officers with forged Mexican passports without the agreement of the Mexican government.*   The Mexican government has always been extremely sensitive to issues of national sovereignty and would almost certainly express official public resentment at CIA's usurping of its unique authority by producing false passports and birth certificates of Mexican citizens.(S) There are concrete examples of past incidents involving disclosure which have resulted in strong censure and the threat of diplomatic action: In the aftermath of the Iranian takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1978, among the papers the Iranians discovered were forged Belgian and West German identification documents including passports. Upon reading this in the Iranian media, Belgian intelligence officials summoned our people and threatened that if all such documents were not destroyed immediately and the practice ended, there would be exceptionally dire consequences in the spheres of both diplomatic relations and intelligence cooperation.*   Besides the insult to its sovereignty, at least one additional strong factor in the Belgian government's acrimonious representation was the desire to avoid any association with CIA, however spurious, of Belgian citizens living, working, or traveling abroad.(S) The Germans also registered their ire in strong terms, noting that in using German passports outside the Warsaw Pact theater we had exceeded our negotiated right to reproduce their documentation for use by our officers. During this demarche, similar threats were made to end the liaison relationship with their intelligence service.SECRET3
[104-10330-10118.pdf — page 3]
SECRET• As a result of such flaps, CIA has little recourse but to accede to direct demands that we cease using a given country's documentation, which narrows our range of options for providing officers with operational aliases.→B) **Federal and state documents**(Social security cards, FAA documentation, driver's licenses, birth certificates)e) (C) *Potential threat to CIA's agreements with other US government entities.* At present, sixteen states assist CIA in providing documentation for alias identities, including drivers licenses. There is an unwritten understanding with each that CIA will do all it can to protect the confidentiality of this agreement. Although the immediate damage from release of this would certainly be less severe than the harm done to US diplomatic relations from the release of information on passport forgery, these arrangements could be terminated if they receive too much publicity and state officials or politicians were publicly embarrassed.• Termination of any of such agreements would curtail CIA's options for providing its officers with solid cover.→C) and D) **Business documents**(either forged or produced with prior negotiated agreement)(Rotary club, record and book club membership, AAA, specific bank cards, travel club, Continental Insurance Co.)b) *Litigation from private sector firms;*c) *Potential damage to a growing intelligence collection method;* andd) *Potential physical danger to CIA officers and assets.*b) (C) *Litigation from private sector firms*. The same probability of litigation applies to both forged documents and those produced with the permission of certain companies. Many of these firms conduct business abroad in a variety of political environments that range from friendly to hostile. For reasons relating to loss of revenue and physical threats to their employees and other assets, they cannot afford to have even the public hint of an association with CIA, let alone official disclosure of this fact.• The *likelihood of litigation from such disclosure would be high*. CIA's Office of General Counsel has on file a number of letters from private sector firms setting forth their right to take legal action in the event of the disclosure of their relationship with CIA.• In the past, some firms have taken legal action against CIA for disclosure of an association that adversely affected their business.SECRET4