Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10324-10002.pdf — page 191]
SECRETINTERVIEWER: Same government.MR. HALPERN: Same government. Same people involved. Sameappropriations and all that kind of stuff. I don't understand,honestly, as a citizen, what the hell the big difference is.So, but in terms of the future, there has got to be some kindof better rapport than developed as a result of the Church andPike Committee which was strictly adversarial. And you can'thave that and run intelligence. I don't care whether it's NSA,DIA, CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, Drug EnforcementAgency. Any of them. And what is it, there are 11 or 12components in the Community at the moment and all of them have,you've got to understand, what in the hell the world is allabout. And you can't have all of this stuff going up on mediacoverage. And you can't have it be used to help somebody'selection prospects.INTERVIEWER: Both in the Executive and in the Congress.MR. HALPERN: And the Congress. And the leaks, I am sorry tosay, most of the leaks come from the Executive side. I'm sureof that. And I've been writing on that, too. And at leastfrom sitting on the outside, and I don't know whether I amright or wrong, but my own gut feeling is that the leaks asthey appear in the press -- and I don't know for the last 10years what, you know, what really is classified. I've got afeeling for it, that's all. After 32 years in the business youkind of understand some of this stuff. But most of the stuff
[104-10324-10002.pdf — page 192]
SECRETis coming off of the Executive Branch. Somebody is trying to get some kind of yea or nea. Or some pluses. And you can't run it that way. I'm sorry. I'm not looking for an Official Secrets Act, but something that has a better control over who says what, how, where and when. So Church and Pike Committees, if there is going to be any pluses out of those two circuses -- and they were nothing but circuses -- it's got to be along those lines. A greater confidence, greater working together, and a better understanding between the two branches of government that this is a serious life and death business, particularly these days. And if you've got some decent intelligence, I don't care whether it's technical or human -- intelligence is intelligence -- it might save us all in the long run if we know in advance and then can use it in advance.Lots of times Presidents have misused good intelligence. Or wouldn't believe good intelligence. I gave you one example, not a President, but senior officials at the State Department refused to believe intelligence. And I can give you plenty of examples within CIA, the DDI wouldn't believe human source intelligence because it wasn't a picture and it wasn't SIGINT. And chapter and verse, over and over again. And plenty of times the human source reporting was wrong. I'm not saying it's right every time. But there are lots of examples where it was and it wasn't accepted. But there has got to be a better acceptance that this is a profession, not just in CIA. I'm
[104-10324-10002.pdf — page 193]
SECRETtalking about the Community. Around the world there are thousands of people involved and they are all not out to butter their own sides on this thing. And they are trying to help. And you've got to give them a chance. And you've got to work with them and you've got to trust them. As I said many years ago to somebody, I forget, and he put it in the newspaper and he shouldn't have, but he did, I used the phrase something about, "Someday somebody has got to trust somebody sometime" or something like that. And that may come out of all these damn hearings. Take a look at the Iran-Contra Hearings which really just blew you away on the kinds of things that were going on. And partly because the people involved in the White House staff had no concept of what the hell it was all about, what the intelligence business was all about, what covert action was all about. And when you had Senator, oh, who the hell was it, Senator Nunn, I think it was Senator Nunn, try to explain to Admiral Poindexter what the principle of plausible deniability was all about, so help me, Poindexter didn't have a cotton-pickin' clue! I sat here watching this thing and got sick. Watching it. He had no concept of what he was talking about. Senator Nunn knew a hell of a lot more than he did. And he was trying gently to lead him to the correct conclusion of what the definition is. And these guys were from hunger. Neither North nor Poindexter had ever had *any* experience in intelligence work *at all*. And here they were running this
[104-10324-10002.pdf — page 194]
SECRETcountry's separate intelligence network. And it wasunbelievable and frightening. Very frightening.INTERVIEWER: You think also, in these lessons to be learnedthat the relationships between the Agency and the press -- ofcourse, the Agency can only offer, I suppose offer -- and whatI am suggesting here is how one develops trust between theAgency and the press.MR. HALPERN: And the press?INTERVIEWER: Yeah, and the same thing maybe with the public.MR. HALPERN: It's hard. It's hard. I think it's easier forsomething like AFIO to do that kind of creation of trustbecause AFIO has got no ax to grind. It's true, we know lessand less about what's actually going on inside specificoperations. And that is as it should be. Even though a guymight retire one day and come into AFIO the next day and starttalking to the press, he has got enough sense not to getinvolved in specifics. And it took AFIO a long time to developa spirit of cooperation and integrity with the media that arethe, more or less, solid media, the honest media -- not thekooks -- to accept an AFIO statement about something in termsof, you know, good, bad, or indifferent. At first theydidn't. It took us several years to develop this rapport and Igive Dave Phillips a lot of credit for this -- whereby you talkto these guys and try to prove, you know, we've got no axes togrind. We're not trying to hide anything. We've got nothing
[104-10324-10002.pdf — page 195]
SECRETto hide. And try to help them understand why some of theseactivities go on the way they do.INTERVIEWER: And the same thing with the universities andcolleges?MR. HALPERN: You try. You try wherever you can. But that's atough job. Particularly if you get universities and collegesthat don't want to have anything to do with intelligence.That's a dirty thing. And there a lot of them like that.Well, you heard Bob Simmons at the AFIO convention talkingabout the use of academics and intelligence work and all thatkind of stuff as if they are a separate breed of cat. Well,they are not, not in my opinion anyway, even though they mightthink they are. You know, dirty their linen and tar oneacademic, and no academic can go abroad anymore becauseeverybody will assume that they are all intelligence agents.Nonsense. Nonsense. If you are going to Russia or you'regoing to Africa or wherever you go, if you start asking thewrong questions even if you are an honest-to-goodness, nothingmore than a political scientist trying to do a research job inthe middle of Wagadodo, you ask the wrong question there,you're going to get your head handed to you. You don't have tobe in any way even near the United States Government. Or anyother government. Sure, the easiest way the Russians have itis if they charge that everybody in the Peace Corps is a CIAagent, which they did at one time. And a lot of people
[104-10324-10002.pdf — page 196]
13-00000SECRETbelieved them. Or everybody in the Red Cross is a CIA agent or everybody who is an academic from wherever is a CIA agent. And pretty soon, you know, everybody is a CIA agent. One of the problems I think Casey had with the Congressional Hill, and again this is sitting from the outside, is he kind of gave them the back of his hand, which automatically creates an adversarial situation. I don't know how much time he spent wining and dining them. I mean, having them out to breakfast.I remember Directors like Allen Dulles or Dick Helms or McCone and others used to have members of Congress up there on the Agency top floor at the dining room where they had lunch, or breakfast in the Director's dining room. And, you know, tried to talk to them man to man. And tell them a thing or two that they'd want to know and ask them questions. And try to work out some kind of dual relationship without having them become co-equal managers. That's the big problem. I've got no objection to telling a guy who is an elected Representative of the United States, if he is one of a handful of people picked by his colleagues to be privy to all the secrets they need to know to help run the place, within limits, without micro-managing the thing. Yeah, bring them into the thing. Tell them a thing or two. Try to teach them what it is all about and why it is important that they keep their bloody mouths shut.196SECRET
[104-10324-10002.pdf — page 197]
SECRETINTERVIEWER: Do you think, again from the outside, in the last10-12 years, in other words, since the investigation, do youthink the Agency has changed much, has learned much?MR. HALPERN: Well, if Casey is the example, no. I don't knowwhat has happened since, but I would hope that somebody istrying to work out some kind of better relationship.INTERVIEWER: Do you think Turner?MR. HALPERN: Oh, I don't think Turner had any real, maybe hedid, but I can't see it.INTERVIEWER: It wasn't evident.MR. HALPERN: I think Turner is such a blow-hard that I don'tsee how in the hell he could have done it, really. I watchedand listened. I was up there several times when he was upthere testifying on a number of bills, on charter legislationand things like that, which is a tough time to be around. Ithink that AFIO, with all due modesty, AFIO people like WalterPforzheimer and Larry Houston and John Warner and others whohad good connections on the Hill going back to the year one onthe subject and who were believed up on the Hill and acceptedon the Hill -- even some of the staffs couldn't dent thatparticular characteristic of these three guys -- I think theyhad a very good chance and they did influence some peoplebecause they were listened to. They didn't have to be acceptedall the way through, obviously, but at least when these guystalked, people on the Hill, most of the staffers --
[104-10324-10002.pdf — page 198]
SECRETparticularly on the Senate side, not the House side, which was a mess -- and the Senators themselves understood that these were three men of integrity and honesty. And who were trying to explain things to them. And who literally had no axes to grind. They weren't going to get a promotion out of this.INTERVIEWER: And they trusted them.MR. HALPERN: And they trusted them. And they were honest. And my own feeling is, you know, you don't lie to the Congress. Literally, you don't tell them a bald-faced lie. I would never have done what North did or what Abrams did. I mean, it was absolute nonsense. It's not only heresy, it's suicide. If you can't tell them, you say, "I can't tell you." Pure and simple. "I cannot tell you. And if you want to know, please talk to my boss. Ask my boss that question." Well, I know the law says that I am supposed to tell you. I've got to tell you. Well, okay sometime along the way you have to take a chance and say, "I can't tell you. And if I go to jail, I go to jail." But that is not easy to do, obviously. But you don't deliberately lie to these people. That's all. And the system is, if you've got to tell them and then they blow it, well, okay, it's on their head and you've blown it. This is one of the things about it is hard to be an intelligence officer in terms of, these days, trying to be sure you can convince the guy you are trying to recruit or the person you are trying to recruit, male or female, that you can protect
[104-10324-10002.pdf — page 199]
SECRETtheir identity. And I'm not so sure that's possible thesedays. Maybe it is. I hope it is. I knew it was possible inthe old days. But I'm not so sure after what I read so muchthese days whether it is or isn't.INTERVIEWER: Which is again an important observation relativeto the last 10-12 years...
[104-10326-10001.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992MHFNO: 98-2262774 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1/SECRETFRP: ,2,STAFFACTION: EUR/NG (393) INFO: CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGEUR, CIC/OG, CIC/PRC,EUDORECORD, EUR/COPS, EUR/DCCI, EUR/LGL, EUR/NGUK, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD,ORMS/EUR, RYBAT, FILE, CIC/EUR (2/W)98 2262774 ASO PAGE 001 IN 2262774TOR: 301620Z JUL 98 LOND 19048SECRET 3016212 JUL 98 STAFFCITE LONDON 19048TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.FOR: LIMITED DISSEM EUR/NG INFO CIC/EUR, EUR/NGUK, EUR/LGL, EUR/COPSSLUGS: WNINTEL RYBATSUBJECT: PROPOSED DECLASSIFICATION OF BSS DOCUMENT FOR RELEASE TO <JFK>BOARDREF: DIRECTOR 908321 98 2225461TEXT:1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE ADVISE NEXT STEPS ON REVIEW/RELEASE OF BSS DOCUMENT PER PARA 3 IN LIGHT OF BSS' STRONG OBJECTIONS.2. REF DOCUMENT DESCRIBING 1963 INTERVIEW BY A BSS OFFICER OF MRS. LILLIAN SLOBODA WAS PASSED TO H1L/5 LIZ HOLEHOUSE MORNING 30 JULY. IN TWO SUBSEQUENT PHONE CONVERSATIONS, WHICH WERE FOLLOWED UP WITH A TELEX, HOLEHOUSE ADVISED THAT BSS HAD REVIEWED THE 1963 DOCUMENT (CSCI-3/778,353) AND THE CASE, AND BSS DOES NOT/NOT CONCUR *WITH THE RELEASE OF A SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT TO THE<JFK> REVIEW BOARD. TEXT OF BSS TELEX 766 OF 30 JULY OUTLINING BSS' OBJECTION TO RELEASE OF THE DOCUMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:"THE INFORMATION GIVEN TO THE SECURITY SERVICE BY MRS. SLOBODA, AS RECORDED IN THE INTERVIEW REPORT, WAS GIVEN TO US IN CONFIDENCE AND PASSED TO THE U.S. AUTHORITIES IN CONFIDENCE ALSO. ON THE GROUNDS OF ITS AGE AND THE PERSONAL NATURE OF ITS CONTENT, WE WOULD NOT PUBLICLY RELEASE SUCH A REPORT IN THE UK AND ASK THE U.S. AUTHORITIES TO WITHHOLD IT FROM PUBLIC RELEASE IN THE USA."3. PLEASE ADVISE FOR STATION AND BSS INFORMATION WHAT HAPPENS NEXT WITH DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE OF THE DOCUMENT. HOLEHOUSE HAS *ASKED WHETHER, IN FACT, WE CAN DENY RELEASE TO THE<JFK>REVIEW BOARD GIVEN BSS OBJECTIONS. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER EXPLANATION HQS CAN PROVIDE FOR BSS ON THE REVIEW BOARD'S INTEREST IN SOVIET DEFECTORS. BSS IS SOMEWHAT PUZZLED BY THE REQUEST TO RELEASE THIS *PARTICULAR DOCUMENT SINCE THERE IS NO APPARENT CONNECTION TO THE<JFK> *<ASSASSINATION>OTHER THAN THE TIME FRAME.SECRET
[104-10326-10001.pdf — page 1]
MHFNO: 98-2262774                                   SECRETSENSIND: RYBAT                                   PAGE: 24. FILE: NONE. DECL ON: X1, CL REASON: 1.5(C), CL BY: 0491759   DRV LIA 1-87.END OF MESSAGESECRETSECRET
[104-10326-10002.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRETMHFNO: 98-2225461 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1// SECRET FRP: , , , , , ,STAFFCONF: EUR/NG INFO: CIC/CEG, CIC/CEGEUR, CIC/OG, CIC/PRC,EUDORECORD, EUR/COPS, EUR/DCCI, EUR/LGL, EUR/NGUK, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD,RYBAT, FILE, CIC/EUR (2/P)98 2225461 ASO PAGE 001 DIRECTOR 908321TOT: 272154Z JUL 98SECRETSTAFF 272154Z DIRECTOR 908321TO: IMMEDIATE LONDON.FROM: LIMITED DISSEM EUR/NG INFO CIC/EUR, EUR/NGUK, EUR/LGL,EUR/COPSSLUGS: WNINTEL RYBATSUBJECT: PROPOSED DECLASSIFICATION OF BSS DOCUMENT FOR RELEASE TO*<JFK>BOARD*REF: NONETEXT:1.  ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE PASS PARAS 3-4 MESSAGE TO BSS    AND ADVISE WHETHER THERE ARE SERIOUS OBJECTIONS TO RELEASE OF BSS    DOCUMENT (BEING FAXED SEPARATELY).2.  HQS IS FAXING (OR E-MAILING, IF POSSIBLE) DOCUMENTS FOR    STATION AND BSS REVIEW.3.  THE DO<JFK>REVIEW TEAM ADVISED EUR/NG THAT A 1963 BRITISH    SECURITY SERVICE DOCUMENT, WHICH HAD BEEN ATTACHED TO A CIA    DOCUMENT, IS SCHEDULED TO BE RELEASED AT THE END OF THIS WEEK (31    *JULY) TO THE<JFK ASSASSINATION>REVIEW BOARD. THIS DOCUMENT    (CSCI-3/778,353) DESCRIBES A MARCH 1963 INTERVIEW BY BSS IN    HALIFAX OF LILLIAN SLOBODA, WIFE OF VLADIMIR O. SLOBODA, WHO WAS A    DEFECTOR TO THE USSR. THE BOARD IS INTERESTED IN DOCUMENTS IN CIA    POSSESSION PERTAINING TO DEFECTORS TO THE SOVIET UNION AROUND THE    *TIME OF OSWALD AND THE<JFK ASSASSINATION.> EVEN THOUGH CIA    OBTAINED THE DOCUMENT FROM A FOREIGN FRIENDLY SERVICE, IT WOULD    THUS BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DENY RELEASE OF THE DOCUMENT IN    FULL.4.  WITHIN THAT CONTEXT, EUR/NG REVIEWED THE DOCUMENT AND    PROPOSES REDACTION OF ALL REFERENCES TO BSS, CIA AND FBI (LEGATT    LONDON RECEIVED A COPY OF THE INTERVIEW RESULTS IN 1963). THE    PASSAGES WE WANT TO REDACT ARE HIGHLIGHTED ON THE FAXED COPIES    WITH BRACKETS. WE CERTAINLY WILL FORWARD TO THE DO REVIEW TEAM    ANY ADDITIONAL DELETIONS REQUESTED BY STATION AND/OR BSS. ABSENT    THESE FEW PASSAGES ABOUT US/UK INTELLIGENCE, THE DOCUMENT DOES NOT    APPEAR TO AFFECT CURRENT CIA EQUITIES; ON ITS FACE, IT ALSO DOES    NOT APPEAR DAMAGING TO UK INTERESTS. ALTHOUGH WE ARE EXTREMELY    CONCERNED ABOUT THE DECLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION GIVEN TO US BY    SECRET
[104-10326-10002.pdf — page 1]
MHFNO: 98-2225461                                                  PAGE: 2SECRETSENSIND: RYBATFOREIGN SERVICES, RELEASE OF A SANITIZED VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENTWOULD NOT PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGE OUR LIAISON RELATIONSHIP ORCOMPROMISE SENSITIVE SOURCES/METHODS.5. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, WOULD APPRECIATE A RESPONSE BY HQS   COB THURSDAY, 30 JULY, SO WE HAVE FRIDAY FOR DISCUSSIONS IF BSS   HAS SERIOUS OBJECTIONS TO RELEASING THIS DOCUMENT IN EVEN A   SANITIZED FORMAT.6.. FILE: NONE. CL BY: 2051283, CL REASON: 1.5(C), DECLON: X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>RELNO: DORELS0101020330ORIG: EUR/NG(XEASTLI,39474);                       REL: EUR/NG (SHAFFER).END OF MESSAGESECRETSECRET
[104-10326-10010.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992MHFNO: 98-1333007SENSIND: RYBATPAGE: 1CONF: CE/EXO INFO: CE/LGL, CE/R/IO, CE/ST, CE/STR, CE/STSWE,CE/WUMB, CEDORECORD, DC/CE, LIMITED, MDSX, ODPD, RYBAT, FILE, CE/R, CE/W,(3/P)98 1333007 ASPPAGE 001TOT: 012139Z MAY 98DIRECTOR 795035TO: PRIORITY MOSCOW INFO MINSK. 012139Z DIRECTOR 795035FROM: LIMITED DISSEM CE/EXO INFO CE/R, CE/R/IO, DC/CE, CE/LGL,CE/WUMBSLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT*SUBJECT: <ASSASSINATIONS>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD AND DEPT OF STATEREQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN APPROACHING FSB/SVR FOR OSWALD FILEREF: NONETEXT:1. ACTION REQUIRED: WOULD APPRECIATE STATION THOUGHTS ON   *BELOW PROPOSAL TO APPROACH FSB/SVR SEEKING ACCESS TO FILE ON<LEE>   *<HARVEY ((OSWALD)).>2. THE<ASSASSINATIONS>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD (ARRB),   ESTABLISHED BY PUBLIC LAW 102-526 IN OCTOBER 1992, HAS THE   PRESIDENTIAL MANDATE TO IDENTIFY, SECURE, AND MAKE AVAILABLE ALL   *RECORDS RELATED TO THE<ASSASSINATION>OF<PRESIDENT KENNEDY.> THE   IDENTIFIED (DECLASSIFIED) RECORDS WILL BE HOUSED IN THE NATIONAL   ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION. CE HAS HAD SOME DEALINGS   WITH THE ARRB, BEGINNING WITH THEIR REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO THE   RESTRICTED MOSCOW STATION HISTORY FROM THE 1960'S. THE ARRB'S   PREMISE IS TO DECLASSIFY AS MUCH INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE, EVEN   *DOCUMENTS ONLY MOST TANGENTIALLY RELATED TO THE<KENNEDY>   *<ASSASSINATION. >3. PL 102-526 SPECIFICALLY STATES:   "THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD CONTACT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE   REPUBLIC OF RUSSIA AND SEEK THE DISCLOSURE OF ALL RECORDS OF THE   GOVERNMENT OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, INCLUDING THE RECORDS OF   THE KOMITET GOSUDARSTVANNOY BEZOPASNOSTI (KGB) AND THE GLAYNOYE   *RAZVEDYVATELNOYE UPRAVIENIYE (GRU), RELEVANT TO THE<ASSASSINATION>   *OF<PRESIDENT KENNEDY,>AND CONTACT ANY OTHER FOREIGN GOVERNMENT   *THAT MAY HOLD INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THE<ASSASSINATION>OF   *<PRESIDENT KENNEDY>AND SEEK DISCLOSURE OF SUCH INFORMATION."4. THE ARRB HAS REQUESTED STATE AND AGENCY HELP IN GETTING   ACCESS TO THE KGB RECORDS ON OSWALD. THE RECORDS, ORIGINALLY HELD
[104-10326-10010.pdf — page 1]
# 13-00000MHFNO:98-1333007SENSIND: RYBATPAGE: 2*IN MINSK, WERE FLOWN TO MOSCOW IN '63 FOLLOWING THE<ASSASSINATION,>THEN RETURNED TO MINSK WHERE THEY ARE STORED TODAY. WHENAPPROACHED BY STATE AND THE ARRB, THE BELARUSIANS HAVE SHOWNSAMPLES FROM THE FILE BUT HAVE NOT AGREED TO ARRANGEMENTS TO COPY.THE ARRB CHARTER EXPIRES ON 30 SEPT 98 AND THE OLD KGB FILE(S) ISA MAJOR OUTSTANDING REQUIREMENT. STATE HAS MANAGED TO GET THESUBJECT AS THE NUMBER ONE TALKING POINT ON VICE PRES GORE'S RECENTCONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS. THE BELARUSIAN RESPONSE WAS TO TRY ITAGAIN LOCALLY IN MINSK, OFFERING INCREASED "COPY FEES".5. THE ARRB CHAIRMAN HAS COME BACK TO STATE TO ASK THEY   CONTACT THE AGENCY WITH THE FOLLOWING_REQUEST: CAN THE STATION   CHECK WITH THE FSB/SVR TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE RUSSIANS RETAINED   *A COPY OF THE<LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S>KGB FILE IN MOSCOW? CAN WE GET   ACCESS TO THE FILE AND, PRESUMABLY, OBTAIN A COPY FOR THE ARRB?   WE NOTE THAT THE ARRB WILL PROBABLY PUSH HARD TO_DECLASSIFY THE   RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS AS WELL. JOBVIOUSLY SUCH A REQUEST COULD HAVE   SEVERAL IMPLICATIONS WHICH WE MUST CAREFULLY CONSIDER, I.E., THE   RUSSIANS MIGHT ASK FOR FILES OF THE ROSENBERGS OR OTHER NOTORIOUS/   PERSONALITIES. THE HOS CONTEXT IS THAT WE ARE GRAPPLING WITH THE   ARRB ON A VARIETY OF OTHER SERIOUS DECLASSIFICATION/DISCLOSURE   ISSUES AND WE MIGHT BE ABLE IN A BETTER NEGOTIATING POSITION IF WE   COULD BE SEEN AS ASSISTING THEIR EFFORTS TO GET THE OSWALD FILE.6. OBVIOUSLY SUCH AN ACTION HAS TREMENDOUS IMPLICATIONS AND   WE WELCOME A FULL DIALOGUE_FROM STATION ON THIS MATTER.   REGARDS...6. FILE: NONE. CL BY: 714549, CL REASON: 1.5(D), DECL   ON: X5, DRV FROM: LIA 3-82.   CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>   RELNO: DORELS0100952954   ORIG: CE/EXO (CHENGMD, 39263); AUTH: AC/CE/R (BANNERMAN); COORD:   C/CE/R/IO (ZERRUSEN), C/CE/WUMB (WARD); INFO: CE/LGL (WATSON);   REL:DE/-CE-(-LEVEN)END OF MESSAGE
[104-10326-10012.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRETMHFNO: 98-0828136 SENSIND: RYBAT PAGE: 1SECRET-FR-P-STAFFCONF: CE/WUMB INFO: CE/LGL, CEDORECORD, DC/CE, MDSX, NODISSEM,ODPD, PCS/CAB, RYBAT, FILE, C/PCS, CE/W, CED/CIC (4/P)98 0828136 ASR PAGE 001TOT: 131832Z MAR 98 DIRECTOR 728291SECRETSTAFF1318322 DIRECTOR 728291TO: MINSK.FROM: NO DISSEM CE/WUMB INFO CE/W, CE/LGL, CED/CIC, PCS/CAB, DC/CE, OGCSLUGS: WNINTEL RYBAT JYVAPOROUS*SUBJECT: <ASSASSINATION>RECORD REVIEW BOARD (ARRB) MEETINGS WITH BKGB.REF: MINSK 17622 98 0748996TEXT:1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE SEE BELOW.2. REF WAS REVIEWED BY CE/LEGAL AND DISCUSSED WITH OGC/LITIGATION STAFF. BASED UPON THIS REVIEW, (STATION) MAY AGAIN *FACILITATE A MEETING BETWEEN THE (BKGB) AND THE <ASSASSINATION>RECORD *REVIEW BOARD (ARRB) WHO IS LOOKING INTO THE <ASSASSINATION>OF *PRESIDENT<JOHN>F. <KENNEDY,>AND THE TIME<LEE HARVEY OSWALD>SPENT IN MINSK. HOWEVER, STATION SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN MEETINGS OR ANY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH WHAT HAS BEEN DONE IN THE PAST AND IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR ROLE IN THIS MATTER.3. ACCORDING TO REF, ARRB MEMBERS MET WITH THE FOLLOWING BKGB OFFICIALS IN OCTOBER 1996. TRACES, PER REF REQUEST, ALSO FOLLOW:A. ALEKSANDR ((ABLAMEIKA)), PUBLIC RELATIONS DEPARTMENT, BKGB: ALEKSANDR VIKTOROVICH ((ABLAMEYKO)) (201-1479298), BORN 31 AUG 1961, MINSK, TRANSLATOR/REFERENT, BKGB.B. GENNADIY ((NARKEVICH)), A DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, BKGB: AGREE WITH REF THAT THIS IS PROBABLY GENNADIY SEMYNOVICH ((NARKOVICH)), VARIANT NARKEVICH (201-1482358) WHO HAS SERVED AS CHIEF OF THE USA DEPARTMENT AND CHIEF OF THE KGB SECTION FOR MOGILEV REGION. FYI, WE FOUND TWO OTHER BELARUSSIANS NAMED GENNADIY NARKEVICH (OR VARIATIONS THERE OF). THE ARE:(1) GENNADIY V. ((NARKOVSICH)) VARIATION ((NARKEVICH)), EX-PORT CONTROL OFFICIAL AND-DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE-SECRET
[104-10326-10012.pdf — page 1]
SECRETMHFNO? 98-0828136SENSIND-RYBAT-PAGE: 2STATE COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS (SCFER) (DOI: 1993-94).(2) GENNADIY VIKENTOVICH ((NARKEVICH))VARIATION ((NARKEWICZ)), BORN 3 JAN 1938, COUNSELOR BELARUSSIANEMBASSY, WARSAW (DOI: 1996).C. LEV ((PIMENAU)), HEAD OF SECTION (NFI), BKGB: NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES.D. ALEKSANDR ((VERAS)), HEAD OF SECTION (NFI), BKGB: NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES.4. FILE: 227-002-001; 201-1482358. INDEX: ALL-NAMES. CL   BY: 0536008, CL REASON: 1.5(C), DECL ON: X1, DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.CABLETYPE: GECO STAFF 4.0.1.>RELNO: DORELS0100912330ORIG: CE/WUMB (BOYERJU, 52.9.04.); AUTH: CE/W (DYMAN); COORD:-CE/LGL (WATSONEND OF MESSAGESECRETSECRET