Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 11]
13-00000SECRETSUBJECT: Foreign Government InformationAustraliaalso to the conduct of US-foreign relations that the USG is seenas abiding by its agreements with foreign services as well as itsown laws on the release of information.11. (S) Finally, the importance of maintaining good relations with the Australians cannot be overemphasized. As a result of our valuable relationship with our Australian liaison counterparts, the USG receives a large volume of finished intelligence. Due to our shrinking resources, much of this information would not be available to U.S. policy makers were it not provided by the Australians. Additionally, we work together with the Australians around the world on joint collection activities that cover the full spectrum of USG intelligence priorities. Finally, there are several critical collection efforts vital to the USG where we do not have the entrée to collect intelligence independently. In these cases, we rely entirely on the continued good will of the Australian services to provide us with the assistance necessary to meet U.S. policymakers' needs.12. (S) In light of all the above, CIA submits the following two proposals for the Board's consideration. First, the Board could postpone these two documents from release for a short period (we propose 10 months) at which time CIA can reassess its relationship with the Australians. It is possible that the relationship with CIA and Australia could change so that it would be possible to seek their consent for release in full. However, should we seek the consent of the Australians at a future date and the Australians object to the release of the documents, we would ask that the Board seriously consider any negative reaction from the Australians in its deliberations and abide by their desires. A second option would be for CIA to coordinate with the JFK Staff a substitution or some sort of summary of the Australian documents for immediate release. This summary would hide the fact that the letter came from the Australian service, but would reveal what the subject of the letter was. This would avoid the problem of having to go the Australians to seek their consent, which we would have to do even in the case of redactions.13. (U) Should the Board reject these proposals, CIA is willing to work with the Board to reach another mutually agreeable solution. We strongly believe, however, that any approach which suggests that the U.S. Government may ignore its obligations and commitments to foreign governments would seriously undermine the vigorous and healthy diplomatic as well as intelligence relationships that we currently enjoy.14. (S) With regard to the remaining four documents (104- 10012-10078, 104-10012-10079, 104-10012-10081, 104-10009-10222, these are CIA documents-and-with the redactions proposed by the5SECRET
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 12]
13-00000SECRETSUBJECT: Foreign Government InformationAustraliagovernment. As such, CIA consents to the release of these documents with the redactions proposed by the Board.15. (S) Proposal for Future Coordination: With regards to any other foreign government information that may exist in the files, CIA proposes that it approach its liaison services to request their consent in the release of their information when it would be appropriate to do so. Although recent events with Australia make it impossible for CIA to approach them at this time, this may not be so with other services. In cases were CIA believes, because of the nature of the relationship, that it would not be possible to request the consent of the service, CIA proposes that the documents either be postponed from release or that CIA and Board's staff coordinate a summary.![Signature of John F. Pereira]John F. PereiraAttachment6SECRET
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 13]
Attached is a copy of the Australian Demarche on U.S. legislation on declassification. This was given to the U.S. Ambassador to Australia, Ambassador Perkins, by Philip Flood, then Director of the Office of National Assessments (ONA) in September 1995. This demarche was also given to Sandy Berger at the National Security Council by Australian Ambassador to the United States Don Russell on 4 August 1995.
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 14]
# AUSTRALIAN COMMENTS ON## EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958 -### CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION*   The Australian government wishes to register its concern over the 17 April Executive Order on Classified National Security Information and the apparent omission of any explicit provision to protect foreign-sourced information or documentation from automatic declassification onco it is over 25 years old.*   The Australian government understands and supports the democratic principles and cominitment to open government which underpin the Executive Order. We too are improving access to government information, but are maintaining provisions to protect foreign-sourced Information-including U.S. information.*   We do not agree that these principles can be applied by one foreign government to the information or documentation of another government without prior consultation and clearance. Australian-sourced information was and continues to be passed to the U.S. government on the understanding that it will be protected. We adopt precisely the same approach to information that the U.S. shares with us.*   Omission of such consultation would, in the eyes of the Australian government, not be in keeping with the 1962 U.S.-Australia General Security of Information agreement or the many other bilateral and multilateral intelligence co- operation and Information sharing agreements.*   The failure to protect sensitive Australian-sourced information about, for example, our intelligence operations, could have ramifications for our relations with regional countries and compromise Intelligence sources and methods (upon which the U.S. depends in part).*   Australian concerns could be addressed if provision for clearance with originators of foreign-sourced material was embodied in the Information Security Oversight Office Implementation directive to U.S. agencies.*   such an approach should not impede or delay the declassification process — Australia is not seeking this. For example, categories of sensitivity for Australla could be identified. A reasonable time limit could be put on Australian response time after which the U.S. could be free to declassify (we have a similar wrangement with the U.K.).
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 15]
SECRETCentral Intelligence AgencyWashington, D. C. 2050528 January 1997Mr. David G. MarwellExecutive DirectorAssassination RecordsReview Board600 E Street, NWWashington, DC 20530Dear David:This is to acknowledge your letter of 3 January 1997 to the Director of Central Intelligence concerning the Assassination Records Review Board's recent formal determinations with respect to CIA Records.The appropriate Agency components have again reviewed the documents that the Board has decided to release either totally or with some information postponed. While the Agency does not plan to appeal to the President for additional postponements at this time, we ask that the Board reconsider its decisions with respect to six documents. These documents contain information relating to foreign government provided data, foreign liaison relationships, and intelligence sources--information that we believe merits protection under current standards set by the Board. A list of these six documents, together with Agency comments concerning them, is enclosed.We plan no further action on these documents pending discussion with your staff and review by the Board.![signature of John F. Pereira]John F. PereiraChief, Historical Review GroupEnclosure.UNCLASSIFIED WHENSEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURE
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 16]
13-00000SECRETENCLOSURE> (We request that this enclosure be returned to CIA once the> Review Board has completed its deliberations on the issues> discussed below.)(U) The Central Intelligence Agency requests that theAssassination Records Review Board reconsider its determinationon the six documents listed below:(U) 1. 104-10012-10080 and 104-10009-10224(substitute--language for a foreign country document).(S) The foreign government in question has expressedstrong concern about USG and CIA's inability to keep secrets,and current relationships are very tense. If we are required torelease the date and/or narrow the geographic choices tooclosely, the foreign government will be able to identify thedocument as theirs. Because this document is scheduled foranother review in July 1997, we request that the ARRB reconsiderthe inclusion of the date of the document and designation of thecountry of origin as "Pacific Rim Country", and accept ouroriginally submitted wording.(U) 2. 104-10051-10106 (release of location)(S) We request reconsideration of the release of thelocation identified in the last three words in the eleventh line,paragraph eight. This CIA base *currently* is undeclared to thehost government.(U) 3. 104-10055-10072 and 104-10054-10007 (foreigngovernment activity/liaison).(S) Regarding the release of the reference to the passportcamera on page 3, it is not the USG's position to confirm that aforeign government undertakes such activity. In addition this isan on-going operation. Further, releasing the words in questionwould establish a strong inference that the two Agency officerswere permitted by foreign officials to inspect the camera, thusCL BY: 0185904DECL ON: X1CL REASON: 1.5(c)DV FM: AHB 70-9 MULTIPLE
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 17]
13-00000SECRETtending to confirm the liaison relationship. We request that thelast seven words of line four, paragraph "h", be replaced withsubstitute wording such as "the public security facilities".(U) 4. 104-10004-10213 (source)(S) We request that the ARRB reconsider releasing the word"agent" in this context (page 32); suggested substitute,"contact." Nielson was not a paid agent of the REDSKIN projectand does not appear to have worked for the Agency in any othercapacity. To describe him as a CIA agent could cause dangereither to him or his family, especially if they are still inRussia.
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 18]
13-00000![Assassination Records Review Board Logo]SECRETAssassination Records Review Board600 E Street NW · 2nd Floor · Washington, DC 20530(202) 724-0088 · Fax: (202) 724-0457September 5, 1997BY COURIERMr. John PereiraDirectorHistorical Review GroupCenter for the Study of IntelligenceCentral Intelligence AgencyWashington, DC 20505Re: Request to CIA to contact liaison channels regarding LIENVOY intercepts of Oswald telephone calls in Mexico CitySome time ago the Review Board requested informally that CIA contact its liaison channels in Mexico City for information related to Lee Harvey Oswald. During your recent visit here we discussed with you the feasibility of your making such contacts. I am writing in response to your request that we memorialize our request and provide some background information.The Review Board believes that all reasonable steps should be taken to account for all telephonic intercepts of Oswald during his visit to Mexico City in September-October 1963. There is evidence that CIA intercepted some telephone calls through an operation named LIENVOY conducted jointly with components of the Mexican government. We believe that it would be appropriate for CIA to contact directly Mexico City liaison channels to inquire as to whether the Mexican authorities retained copies of LIENVOY telephonic take, specifically the actual recordings of Oswald's telephone calls to the Soviet Embassy during the period of September 27 through October 3, 1963.The Review Board previously has sought information from the Mexican Government through appropriate diplomatic channels. For reasons that are obvious to those familiar with Mexico City issues, the Review Board could not raise with Mexican officials nor with the U.S. State Department the possible existence of additional tape recordings that might be in the hands of certain officials. Thus, at the behest of the Review Board, the Department of State requested that the Mexican federal government and local government agencies conduct general searches of their files for records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Mexican government respondedSECRETBOARD MEMBERS: John R. Tunheim, Chair · Henry F. Graff · Kermit L. Hall · William L. Joyce · Anna K. NelsonEXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: David G. Marwell
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 19]
13-00000SECRETMr. John PereiraSeptember 5, 1997Page 2by sending copies of the same documentation and correspondence that the GOM had made available to the Warren Commission in 1964.The basis for our interest in your contacting appropriate Mexican officials is found in CIA document 104-10004-10199, which was reviewed by the Board on September 19, 1995. On page 5 of this document (not including the cover sheet) information that the Board agreed to protect, due to the sensitivity of sources and methods involved, suggests that the Mexican security forces may have had their own copy of the October 1 intercept on Lee Harvey Oswald. It is unclear whether this statement refers to the transcript or to an actual tape containing the phone call. Nevertheless, it provides enough evidence to warrant additional inquiries on this matter.For your reference we are enclosing copies of the reference documents as well as copies of the correspondence between the DOS and the Mexican government.We would appreciate your contacting appropriate officials to determine what reasonably can be known about this and related matters, and ask that you provide a response to this request by November 14, 1997. We are fully aware of the sensitivity of this type of request and do not wish to take any action that would compromise existing intelligence operations. If necessary, we would be pleased to discuss with you ways in which we might further elaborate on this request, including person-to-person discussions with appropriate officials either here or in Mexico.Thank you for your continued assistance and cooperation.Sincerely yours,![signature]T. Jeremy GunnGeneral Counsel and Associate Directorfor Research and Analysiscc: J. Barry Harrelson, HRGEnclosuresSECRET
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 20]
13-00000SECRETCL BY 611637CL REASON: Section 1.5 CDECL ON: X1DRV FRM: COV 2-8715 January 1998MEMORANDUM FOR:John Pereira @ DCIFred Wickham @ DOLee Strickland @ DAFROM:J. Barry HarrelsonJFK Project OfficerOFFICE:CSI/HRGSUBJECT:ARRB 22 January Meeting -- AgendaREFERENCE:1. The following items are on the ARRB meeting agenda for 22 January 1998:(S) A. Reconsideration of the *State Cover.* The ARRB staff has advised that briefings by senior CIA and/or State officials are not required. However, the Agency and State are welcome to make a presentation if it will add to the information being presented in the "evidence memorandum". The evidence memorandum must be at ARRB no later than Tuesday 20 January. Mr. Gunn has suggested we may want to have individuals standing by for questions. The current plan is for Lee Strickland and me to be available at 600 E. St. NW. to answer any questions.(AIUO) B. Office of Personnel Files in the Sequestered Collection (Microfilm). The ARRB staff will recommend to the Board that personnel files be declared NBR (Not Believed Relevant) and their release postponed until 2017. The Agency position is that the privacy of each individual clearly outweighs the public interest, most of the information in these files has no relevance to the assassination story, and any related information exist elsewhere in the collection. At ARRB staff request HRP is preparing five OP files for review by Board members. The ARRB staff will prepare a memorandum for public release describing the files; their memo will be coordinated with the Agency prior to release.(AIOU) C. Non-related files/documents in the Sequestered Collection (Microfilm). The ARRB staff will recommend that the files and documents (approximately 35,000 pages) designated non-related by CIA during the 1994 review of the microfilm be declared NBR and released in 2017. If the recommendation is accepted by the Board, the ARRB staff will prepare an unclassified description of the records for public release. This too will be coordinated with the Agency prior to release.D. Other possible items:(AIUO) i. ARRB Request # CIA 1--- The ARRB staff may request that the DO documents at issue in this request be declared Assassination Records to be released in full or sanitized form.SECRET
[104-10332-10008.pdf — page 21]
SECRET(S) ii. Crypt LINLUCK-- ARRB staff did not find our evidence memo on this crypt persuasive. They are expected to recommend that the Board reaffirm its decision to release.(AIUO) iii. 1967 IG report on "Castro Assassination Plots" -- ARRB has requested that an updated version be released to NARA by the end of January. Any disagreements between the Agency and ARRB staff may be added to the agenda. HRP and DO reviewers are currently re-reviewing the report.(U) 2. If you have any questions about any of these items please call me.CC: Eileen Wukitch@ DOBecky Rant @ DALinda Cipriani@ DCISent on 15 January 1998 at 05:24:34 PMSECRET
[104-10332-10009.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992-SECRET Box 11 Fldr 11OLC 78-1012/830 May 1978OGC 78-35955-31-78Executive Registry78-8432/11CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONSRELEASE IN FULLMEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceVIA: Deputy Director of Central IntelligenceFROM: S. D. BreckinridgePrincipal Coordinator, HSCAOffice of Legislative CounselSUBJECT: House Select Committee on AssassinationsRequest for Access to the "Hart Report"1.  Action Requested: That you approve the recommendation at paragraph 14 for limited access of selected House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) staff members to a classified, sanitized version of the Hart Report.2.  Background: As you know, the HSCA Staff Director, Mr. Blakey, has requested you in a letter dated 9 May 1978 (Tab A), to provide access to a report prepared by John Hart in 1977 on the subject of the Agency's handling of the Nosenko case. This request is part of an inquiry into hypotheses arising from Epstein's book *Legend*, in which the view is presented that Nosenko was a dispatched agent with the mission of concealing KGB ties with Lee Harvey Oswald. Central to HSCA interest is the question of Nosenko's bona fides. Additional to that issue, interest has developed in the manner in which Nosenko was treated during the period that his bona fides were suspect. These two issues are treated separately below.I3.  The Hart report is directed at the handling of the Nosenko case, addressing the actions and conduct of various officers in the Agency. These matters cannot be treated without also considering the question of Nosenko's bona fides, so there also is considerable review of the methodology employed and the analyses of those handling the matter. Mr. Blakey states in his letter that he has been informed that the report contains no information on the issues of bona fides, being concerned instead only with personnel and internal procedures. This understanding on his part is incorrect, and his letter suggests that he himself has reservations about it.
[104-10332-10009.pdf — page 1]
# SECRET4. The Agency has made available to the HSCA two studies conducted in 1967 and 1963 by SE Division, both of which questioned Nosenko's bona fides. A subsequent study by the Office of Security in 1968 has also been made available; it reached a conclusion contrary to the preceding studies and supports Nosenko's bona fides. Other Soviet defectors have been interviewed by the HSCA staff, as well as knowledgeable CIA officers and retirees. As a result, much of the information on the case has been revealed to the Committee.5. The two SE Division studies, concluding that Nosenko was a KGB agent, were superceded by the Office of Security study, which prevailed. The HSCA investigators reportedly have problems with how the earlier two studies could be rejected so shortly after their completion. As a result, the HSCA seems focused on the issues as viewed at that time. The Hart report has the advantage of having been prepared after a ten year period, during which experience with the validity of Nosenko's information provides the basis for an objective re-examination. It is relevant to HSCA interests that the Hart Report constitutes a convincing statement of the bona fides of Nosenko. Access to this portion of the Hart Report would help broaden and complete the understanding of the HSCA of the matter.6. Because of the above, the Agency has everything to gain and nothing to lose in providing the Hart Report for its review of the issue of Nosenko's bona fides.II7. In addition to the central issue of Nosenko's bona fides, Chairman Stokes has expressed interest in the treatment accorded Nosenko during the period that his bona fides were in question. Nosenko reportedly has provided the HSCA with some detail on this. We have made the point that how Nosenko was treated was a result of the issue, not a part of it. When we questioned the relevance of this line of inquiry to the HSCA charter, HSCA staff representatives assert that their charter extends to the conduct of the intelligence agencies in the Warren Commission inquiry which includes this. The rationale appears a bit contrived and stretched in terms of the real issues. How Nosenko was treated may indicate how concerned CIA was with the man's bona fides, but so far as relating further to the inquiry concerning President Kennedy's assassination, it seems marginal at best. The rationale is so far-fetched that we have been led to consider that its dramatic qualities are attractive for the projected TV spectacular this coming September. It also doubtless provides an opportunity for public criticism for those staff members who have been acknowledged by Mr. Blakey as hostile to the Agency.