Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 41]
Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that by the 26th of July the Harriman negotiations in Moscow might have reached a crucial stage; he asked how flexible are the sabotage operations planned for that day (as explained by Mr. FitzGerald to the Standing Group on Tuesday). He said he was not suggesting that any change in the basic guidance for sabotage operations is indicated, but it is evident that in times of particular sensitivity all potentially provocative activities should be subject to review.In this connection, Mr. FitzGerald said that because of light factors these operations could not be run any later than July 28th, in this month's moon period. He pointed out that if it should appear that it would be advisable for political reasons to postpone the operations until the August dark-of-the-moon period, then as much advance notice as possible should be given the agents, in order not to damage their morale unduly. It was agreed that by the time of next week's Special Group meeting it should be possible to make some kind of judgment about the possible progress of the Harriman talks, and that a decision could be made at that time whether or not to postpone these particular operations.4. Vietnam - Monthly Status ReportMr. Colby outlined the results of the past month's agent operations. In summary, he said that he believes the covert propaganda activities are beginning to catch on, but that so far there is not a great deal of tangible result to report in the sabotage field.5. Tibet - Status ReportMr. Colby expanded briefly on the paper of the 8th of July, on the status of projected Tibetan agent operations. He emphasized that the trainees will be sent back to India in the very near future, and that discussions will then take place jointly with the Indians as to details of overland infiltration into Tibet. Planning for air drops of agents is being deferred until sufficient operational intelligence can be built up to permit reasonable decisions.6. Guatemala- Covert Annex (Revised) to Internal Defense PlanThis annex was noted by the Group. Particular attention was called to the agreed assessment that the Arevalo threat no longer exists.Distribution:Mr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McConeThomas A. Parrott
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 42]
18 July 1963MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 18 July 1963PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McConeColonel King was present for Item 2.Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 3.Mr. Sheldon was present for Item 4.1. ReconnaissanceMr. McCone reported that during the last week no high-performance missions were flown in the Far East, due to bad weather.2. Haiti - Political ActionMr. McCone and Colonel King reported that the following changes have taken place in the Haitian picture since the Special Group approved, on June 20th, the proposal to reach a covert understanding with President Bosch on the use of Haitian exiles in the Dominican Republic. The developments are:a. It has been demonstrated that these exiles are of very little use, because of insecurity, lack of cohesive purpose or of adequate leadership, etc.b. President Bosch has now decided that he is unwilling to allow such an exile force to use his country as a base for military operations against Duvalier.c. Duvalier's own capabilities have improved greatly, due to such things as: the widespread purge of potentially-dissident Army officers; clearance of the border areas; and, most recently, the elimination of the Barbot brothers.Colonel King said that everyone concerned with the project agrees that Duvalier must be removed in some manner or other. However, in light of the factors mentioned above, operating elements have concluded that the existing plan is unworkable, and that it is best to switch to a different kind of operation. This would include in the first instance, training of selected exiles in intelligence collection, in communications, and in cross-border operations. Such training
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 43]
- 2 -98Could be given at a base in the Continental U.S. or in Puerto Rico; Support and facilities may be required from DOD. The long-range objectives would be to establish a clandestine organization capable of gathering intelligence and eventually building up and arming an effective opposition in Haiti; to establish friendly relations with, and if necessary, support individuals capable of playing a constructive role in a future Haitian government; to encourage and support individuals and organizations who are both anti-Duvalier and anti-Communist; and to attempt to spread dissension among Duvalier advisers and to subvert some of them.Colonel King emphasized that the $200,000 already approved would cover the training activities, but that it is impossible to estimate now how much the subversion operations might require, if suitable opportunities should be identified.The Group agreed to recommend this new course of action to higher authority.(There was no objection by higher authority to the program as presented, in the light of the changed conditions.)3. Cuba - Sabotage OperationsMr. FitzGerald was asked to reschedule tentatively for the middle of August the special operations planned for the 26th of July, in light of the negotiations going on in Moscow. Mr. Bundy cautioned that it is entirely possible that by the middle of August the negotiating process might have gone into another phase which would make it necessary to cancel the operation once more.4. Technical Installations - Pakistan 98The Group considered the CIA paper of 17 July, with attachments, which outlined the difficulties which have been encountered recently in getting the Pakistani government to go along with expansion of our special intelligence facilities in that country. Mr. McCone emphasized his feeling and that of the USIB as a whole, that any wasting of this asset would represent a very serious loss to the intelligence community.After some discussion the Group agreed that the best method of approach is to make it entirely clear in presenting the proposed three-year MAP program to Pakistan authorities that the maintenance and expansion of U.S. intelligence facilities at Peshawar is an essential part of the bargain. It can also be reaffirmed to Ayub at that time
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 44]
15 August 1963MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 15 August 1963PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.Mr. FitzGerald and Mr. Cheever were present for Items 1, 2 and 5.C.Dr. Whelan, Colonel Ledford, and Mr. Cunningham were present for Items 3 and 4.1. A Non-Violent Program to Inhibit Free World and Neutral Trade with CubaThe operational proposal dated 12 August, was approved by the Special Group, with the two changes in wording made by the State Department. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that to make this operation convincing, a "big bang" on a Cuban ship will be carried out before the operation is implemented. He further pointed out that in paragraph 2.a. of the paper, the reference to "real ... sabotage" applied to Cuban shipping only. Item 2.c. in the operational proposal was thought to be of low priority and is to be placed at the bottom of the list.2. Cuba - Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro GroupsMr. FitzGerald recommended that the paper dated 13 August be submitted at this time for discussion only rather than decision by the Special Group. This recommendation was made because the members of the Group had not been given sufficient time to study the proposal. The paper had been presented in hasty fashion because CIA had received reports that the exile group in question was beginning to scatter and prepare for an operational program not influenced by CIA.There was some discussion of the effects of using a British island for launching these operations and as to the desirability of striking Cuban shipping on the high seas. Decision on this operation was deferred until the next meeting.See special minutes for additional items
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 45]
3. Defensive Armament for GROSBEAK AircraftThe Special Group approved the paper of 11 August as presented, subject to confirmation that the sidewinder heat-seeker missile, already compromised, would not lead to a security problem should a GROSBEAK plane be lost.4. GROSBEAK Overflight of LaosThe proposal was approved to overfly Laos in order to fulfill COMOR requirements for radar order of battle information in support of current and future missions.5. Miscellaneous ItemsA. Mr. McCone briefly described the current status of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RadLib). He stated that he hoped there would be no change in the State Department policy with respect to the radios because of the extensive commitments, international agreements, and political implications in RFE and RadLib. Mr. McCone indicated that there appeared to be a feeling in some quarters of the Department of State that, because the U.S. may be entering a period of "detente" with the Soviet Union, efforts should be made to reduce the causes of tension and conflict, Since the two radios are major irritants to the Soviets, CIA should, therefore, modify or reduce some of these activities. The Special Group opined that this was not the time to change U.S. policy with respect to RFE and RadLib. Mr. Johnson said he would look into this further.B. The matter of the Soviet attempt to establish a consolidated headquarters at Lietzenburger Strasse in West Berlin, was raised by Mr. McCone. He opposed such a development forthe following reasons:(1) The formation of such a headquarters would lay the groundwork for future Soviet claims to an equal footing with the U.S. in West Berlin.(2) Its establishment would severely handicap CIA operations against the USSR target in West Berlin.(3) Such a center would improve on the USSR's ability to concentrate its operations against Western targets.(4) It would in effect increase Soviet prestige in West Berlin.
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 46]
EYES ONLY- 3 -98Mr. Bundy stated he was aware of the problem and believed that the British who had been reluctant to support the position of the U.S. and the French, now concurred that a refusal to the Soviets should be made. This concerted action, it was believed by the Group, would succeed in preventing the Soviets from establishing such a consolidated headquarters.c. Mr. FitzGerald reported that recent discussions held with Artime have indicated that he is somewhat disgusted with Luis Somoza who has not behaved sensibly, but that he does have respect for his brother, General Anastasio Somoza, with whom he can deal more rationally. Artime will make greater use of Costa Rica in order to decrease his operational commitments in Nicaragua and increase this security.Paul EckelDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McCone![signature]
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 47]
# EYES ONLY8 August 1963MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 August 1963PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General CarterMr. FitzGerald was present for Item 1.Mr. Herbert was present for Item 2.Mr. Baird was present for Item 3.1. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration OperationsOf the 13 Cuban operations approved by the Special Group, 2 are to be externally-mounted sabotage operations which will be subject to possible reconsideration up to 12 August 1963. The other 11 operations approved are designed to meet the need for expanded intelligence collection activities and to develop viable internal resistance organizations.Mr. FitzGerald made a special report on Luis Somoza's conversations with exile leaders. Somoza wants the Cuban exiles to begin aggressive harassment operations against Castro and indicated that the Nicaraguan government was willing to give them a base as well as support, including military aid. Somoza intimated that this may result in Castro's launching an offensive against Nicarague. If this occurs, Somoza would expect U.S. protection and possibly intervention. Mr. FitzGerald further stated that Manuel Artime, leader of the Movement for Revolutionary Recovery, would be in the U.S., at which time all aspects of his program would be examined. In order to avoid unfavorable complications with Somoza, two operational changes will be suggested:a. Artime should concentrate on getting resistance started inside Cuba and de-emphasize armed attack and external sabotage.b. Artime should shift the main weight of his operations to Costa Rica. There should be no break, of course, between Artime and Somoza.In this connection Mr. Johnson raised the Costa Rican Foreign Minister's question regarding Artime. It was agreed that Mr. FitzGerald would work out the language of the reply with Mr. Cottrell, giving asSee special minutes for additional items
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 48]
much encouragement to Costa Rica's support of Artime as possiblewithout showing his activities.General Carter mentioned the eagerness of William D. Pawley toimplement an operational plan against Cuba, purportedly designed tocreate a situation which might ultimately require U.S. intervention.The consensus of the Special Group was that an independent operationorganized by Pawley, would not be desirable. Efforts should be madeto bring him into CIA's current operational thinking.Mr. FitzGerald also reported that the Attorney General had sentMr. Harry Ruiz Williams to the Agency to present a plan which turnedout to be a series of 4.2 mortar attacks on the Cuban coast mountedfrom Guatemala. It was agreed that such attacks, in addition to beingimpractical logistically, would also tend to give substance to the"Somoza plan" and therefore should be discouraged.2. Bolivia - Covert Action 98The CIA paper of 2 August was approved.[^1]3. CIA Training Activities 98Mr. Matthew Baird, Director of CIA's Training Activities, madean oral report on CIA's counterinsurgency training and courses. Mr.Baird emphasized that ever since the establishment of the Office ofTraining in January 1951, CIA has concentrated on the covert aspectsof training. It has not duplicated in any way courses offered by theDepartment of Defense, the Foreign Service Institute or universities.During fiscal 1963, CIA sent over 2000 students to 1275 courses at 166government and educational institutions. In addition, during the sameyear, CIA trained 4214 students in 432 runnings of 64 different courses,all directly or indirectly relating to counterinsurgency.Mr. Baird said that strong emphasis has always been placed onresistance operations and guerrilla and paramilitary activities. Themethod of instruction in CIA is based on case studies of currentoperations. CIA trained, during fiscal 1963, 150 junior officers (witha drop out of less than four per cent) and gave instruction to 174foreign personnel in counterinsurgency, or directly related fields.Mr. Bundy raised the question as to how CIA courses were inspected.General Carter replied by pointing out that these courses are con-tinuously inspected by the Inspector General, the President's Board ofConsultants, and the Deputy Director, Plans, who heads up the clandestineservices.[^2][^1]: The CIA paper of 2 August was approved.[^2]: Consultants, and the Deputy Director, Plans, who heads up the clandestine services.
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 49]
- 3 -The consensus was that Central Intelligence was meeting its counterinsurgency training obligations and that because of the covert character of the training, an inspection team external to CIA was probably not desirable.Paul EckelDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricGeneral Carter
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 50]
SECRETEYES ONLY29 August 1963MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 29 August 1963PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General CarterColonel Steakley was present for Items l'and 2.Mr. Cheever was present for Item 3.1. Monthly Reconnaissance Forecastsa. NROThe NRO forecast for September was approved as presented, with one exception. This had to do with the second Laos/North Vietnam flight, which had been requested in order to "replenish the bank." Mr. Johnson asked that he be briefed on the results of previous reconnaissance in this area so that he could weigh the value of the product against the political risk involved.It was noted that this procedure will not delay operations, since one approval remains outstanding for Laos/North Vietnam.b. DODThe DOD September forecast was approved with the exception of the proposed trip of the USS THOMASON. Mr. Johnson objected to the proposal to transit the Kita Uruppu Suida Passage. He said that the Department is in favor of continuing to exercise our rights of free navigation in the Sea of Okhotsk; but the projected voyage of the hydrographic ship REHOBOTH satisfies this requirement. Further, U.S. merchant shipping does transit the Passage. In view of these considerations, he did not believe it desirable at this time to send a U.S. warship on this route. The Group concurred with Mr. Johnson's position.General Carter said that in view of certain other indications recently received, YANKEE PASHA is considered by the intelligence community to be even more urgent than before.Mr. Johnson raised a question about the mission of the USS STATEN ISLAND in the Chukchi Sea, asking whether the objective could not be met by staying 15 miles from shore rather than 12. Colonel[^1][^1]: Colonel
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 51]
Steakley explained that the mission of the ship is to obtain informa-tion on hydrographic "stations" located 12 miles out and that the restriction suggested would not enable the vessel to accomplish this. Mr. Johnson then concurred.Colonel Steakley briefed the Group on certain sensitive reconnaissance operations.Colonel Steakley gave a brief summary of the deployment of MIG fighters in the China coastal areas. He said that as of now there are no MIG-21's in the area, the MIG complement consisting of 17's and 19's. He saw no need to revise any of the projected BOW TIE missions because of these fighters.2. Negotiations for Indian BaseThe Group noted the report from New Delhi that the Indian Intelligence Service finds itself unable to give assurances to the Prime Minister about the security of personnel on the projected temporary base at Char Batia, and that approval for use of this base has, therefore, been withheld.Mr. Gilpatric and General Carter pointed out that the DIA is anxious to have the Sino-Indian border area covered, because this has not been done since January. General Carter said that he had intended to have the USIB reassess the priority of this requirement at its meeting yesterday, but that other matters had made it impossible to bring it up.The Group felt that this should be discussed with USIB next week. They agreed, however, that in the absence of a really persuasive case for the priority of the requirement, it would be inadvisable to attempt to run the operation once more out of Takhli without Indian assistance. They felt that other things being equal, it would be preferable to revert to the original proposal of having a permanent Indian base available in December.3. Cubaa. The Group then turned to consideration of the paper from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated 12 August 1963, "Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups." In answer to questions, Mr. Cheever said that the project for support of Commandos L would be useful but not essential. He felt that the economic damage which this group might inflict would probably be comparatively minor. On the other hand there would be some psychological advantages to be gained, and also such operations would serve to keep the Cuban security forces busy.
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 52]
SECRETEYES ONLY- 3 -In view of the personal interest expressed by Mr. McCone in the project when it was tabled at the meeting of 15 August, it was agreed that no decision should be made until after the DCI's return.b. Mr. Cheever briefed the Group on the successful disposal of the contaminated sugar which has been in Puerto Rico.c. Mr. Cheever discussed the "After Action Report" on the two sabotage operations conducted the middle of August. Mr. Johnson commented on the amount of materiel that had been left behind at the site of one of these operations, and asked whether it is possible that the Cuban agents did this deliberately, in order to involve the United States. Mr. Cheever acknowledged this possibility, but felt that it had simply been a question of "green troops" behaving in this manner their first time under fire.The Chairman asked that an estimate be prepared, assessing Castro's probable reaction to this sabotage. He also asked Mr. Cheever to see that the Attorney General is briefed on the results of the operations.4. Costa Rica - Re-establishment of Institute for Political EducationThe CIA paper of 26 August was approved as presented.5. GROSBEAK ArmamentDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricGeneral Carter![signature of Thomas A. Parrott]Thomas A. Parrott![scribbled writing]
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 53]
# SECRETEYES ONLY5 September 1963MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 5 September 1963PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1 and 2.Mr. Colby was present for Items 3-5.1. Cuba - Agent OperationsMr. FitzGerald commented on several reports from inside Cuba, which indicate that the morale of the people was raised considerably as a result of the Santa Lucia and Casilda sabotage operations. He cautioned that some of these reports might be somewhat overdrawn, but it appears certain that the sabotage did have a beneficial effect in this way.He then discussed with the Group the general philosophy of these operations, and plans for the future within the capabilities of the available agents. Among other things, he pointed out that there is a limited number of targets on or near the coast and that the most attractive ones are, at the same time, the most difficult to attack; the available teams are not yet ready for assignments of this difficulty. On the other hand, smaller and more vulnerable targets are being selected. It is proposed to hit a lumber mill in September.Mr. FitzGerald went on to say, in connection with the scope and pace of these operations, that it would not be desirable to knock out all available targets in the near future, even if it were possible to do so. This is because this type of attack is designed to stimulate resistance inside Cuba, apart from whatever intrinsic value it might have.The Group agreed with the approach. They felt that the reaction to the two missions in August was most satisfactory and that it is essential to keep this sort of thing up, selecting a limited number of worthwhile targets. Mr. Bundy commented particularly on the silence that had been maintained by the agents, which has resulted in the noise level being of a different character than might have been expected otherwise. Mr. FitzGerald was authorized to proceed with a relatively soft target, such as a lumber mill.See special minutesfor additional items# SECRETEYES ONLY