Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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5. The recommendation to overfly Laos was held in suspension. DoD was asked to bring in specific details of the particular 34A operations which required such overflights and the probable advantages of continuing the operations by means of overflying Laos. State held very positive view against Laotian-overflights.6. The proposed infiltration and exfiltration operations in Cuba were approved. Mr. FitzGerald was warned not to cache arms with agents felt to be under Castro control. He stated that this particular Cache involved money and other things, but no arms. The caching of small quantities of arms elsewhere in Cuba was approved. Memorandum on the operation of autonomous exile groups was noted and no instructions were given to restrain these operations. The overall question of future sabotage operations was discussed. Mr. Bundy agreed to bring the matter before the President and senior Cabinet officers promptly.7. The Chilean political action as outlined in the CIA paper of April 1st was approved. It was pointed out that since the paper was drafted, COS and Ambassador in Santiago had reached an agreement about the handling of funds.8. Proposed political action in Zanzibar was approved. Mr. Waller gave a brief account of the results of the favorable negotiations with the British. Understood that implementation of this paper was to be coordinated with the British in accordance with agreement reached in London.OTHER MATTERS:1. Statement was made that a CIA U-2 was "painted" with radar on February 24th, implication being that the CIA U-2 was in the vicinity of Phnom Penh.ACTION: I would like to know the facts on this.2. Question was raised about need for continuing the 30 mile intrusion into Cambodi and Laos. Indications were that the photography had produced no useful information for MACV.ACTION: This question should be studied and brought up for discussion at meeting on April 9th. I should cable Carter to investigate fully.
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27 February 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting of 5412 Group1. The question of the extent of the SAC planes operations in South Vietnam was discussed against the background of Dr. McMillan's letter of February 26th.1.  Overflights of South Vietnam -- O.K.2.  Overfly that part of North Vietnam which is within 30 miles of South Vietnam or of the coast line.3.  That part of Laos which is within 30 miles of the South Vietnamese border.4.  That part of Cambodia which is not more than 30 miles from South Vietnam.With respect to 4., instructions were to be given that the primary purpose of the flights was to survey border activity and the 30 mile shot is provided to give range and operational flexibility. I felt in reviewing McMillan's proposal that if the SAC planes were to go as far north as the 21st parallel, then they should go all the way to the China border and the proposed CIA operation out of Takhli should be abandoned. This raised the question of whether civilian or military planes and pilots should be over North Vietnam to the extent which could not be explained as being "off course". All agreed that the SAC Air Force operations should be either limited as outlined above or should cover the entire country. It was decided to refer the matter to higher authority for decision. I interposed no objection to SAC's overflight of North Vietnam but merely took the position that if they went as far north as proposed by McMillan, they should cover the entire country.2. The program of infiltration and exfiltration of Cuba was approved with the exception of one operation -- operation #434 -- about which Mr. Cheever explained that he thought the agents we were resupplying were under Cuban control and the resupply operation was for the purpose of deception. It was agreed that the resupply should be confined to money and
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medicine and that the small amount of arms involved should not be cached. Otherwise the operation was approved.Alexis Johnson and Mr. Bundy raised questions of the consequences of finding an arms cache or knocking over an infiltration at the time of the OAS debate on the Venezuelan problem. Arguments were persuasive that we should go slowly during this period. I read from the February 25th Cuban checklist of the deterioration of the spirit of the people of Cuba, the feeling that we were about to recognize the Castro government and the apathy toward further resistance as evidence of the price we are paying for slow-downs and deferments of action against Cuba. I said that I thought our Cuban program was in complete disarray. We had no policy or covert operations. We now are hesitating on infiltration and exfiltration, our economic denial program was failing, while Castro is making significant progress.3. The forcast of NRO activities for March was approved.4. The status report on political action in Kenya was approved.JAM/mfb- 2 -
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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSEWASHINGTON 25, D.C.February 10, 1964MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDYAttached is a paper which I would like to table for discussion at the next meeting of the 5412 group.Cyrus R. VanceAttachmentcirculatewill you circulate to membersask VA Johnson's people to bring Mannor from Cilinis both chief will bring
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# TOP SECRET EYES ONLYFebruary 10, 1964MEMORANDUMSUBJECT: Clandestine and Covert Activities Against CubaThe objective of the U. S. Government is to overthrow the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba. In accomplishing its objective, the U. S. is not willing to risk nuclear war or, at this time, substantial deterioration in its relations with its Allies, or significant escalation in tensions between this country and the Soviets. Thus, any covert U. S. program should be set at a level that is not likely to incur such risks. Such a program would appear to be a low-risk, clandestine program of harassment and sabotage directed against Cuba. In addition, a program of higher risks seems justified when it is directed against Cuban subversion of Latin America.Actions Against Cuba1.  Sabotage. A low level campaign of sabotage and harassment against Cuba might include such targets as the Canete Saw Mill, smaller POL storage plants (such as the one at Pilon), the Nazabal warehouse and pier, and ships (such as barges or Cuban patrol boats). Where possible, it would seem desirable to make the raids appear to have come from within Cuba. Cuban ships outside Cuba can be sabotaged by discreet means (such as placing sand in gears or sugar in fuel).2.  Harassment of Free World Shipping to Cuba.a) Initiate a more comprehensive program of overt and covert pressure against Free World firms trading with Cuba. In this connection, develop a comprehensive list of firms doing business with Cuba, check them against known DOD off-shore and foreign purchase suppliers so that appropriate retaliation can be applied against those suppliers.b) Place unactivated incendiary and explosive devices in cargoes and on ships bound for Cuba and subse- quently "tip off" port or shipping officials so that they will search and discover the devices with the attendant publicity.
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## 3. Covert Economic Activities.a) Intensify covert activities directed against critical commodities destined for Cuba with resort, if necessary, to carefully considered and controlled preclusive buying.b) Make it known discreetly through the press that we maintain careful records of the companies dealing with Cuba, suggesting without saying so that these records constitute a potential "blacklist."c) Form a group of responsible and qualified Cuban exile businessmen to maintain pressure on firms trading with Cuba by indicating that such firms will have no future in a post-Castro Cuba.4. To the extent possible, encourage dissidence among different factions in Cuba - Peking, Moscow, Nationalist -- by spreading rumors, internal and external sabotage designed to accomplish this purpose (such as actions against homes of leaders, etc).Actions Against Cuban Subversion in Latin America1. Develop a list of vulnerable Cuban agents in Latin America against whom a concentrated program of bribery, blackmail and coercion can be instituted.2. Carefully select key Latin American members of the Havana-Peking school and institute a program of kidnapping, and personal and physical harassment, while attempting to attribute these acts to rivals who support Moscow. Institute the reverse process as a retaliatory program against Moscow supporters.Any of the foregoing activities would be conducted against a background of U. S. propaganda (black, white and gray) and political activity designed to increase internal dissension within Cuba, to support economic isolation of Cuba, to avoid splitting with our allies over the Cuban issue and to reduce, and perhaps eliminate, Castro subversion of Latin America. In addition, surveillance activities should be significantly stepped up.
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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 199226 March 1963ADDITIONAL NOTE IN MY MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THEPRESIDENT:The President and I engaged in a brief discussion of the Sovietplans with respect to Cuba. He indicated that he once felt that theSoviets would withdraw all of their forces from Cuba, but that he hadnow reached the conclusion that the plan had changed. Bundy volunteeredthat they at no time had said specifically that they were to withdraw allof their forces, in fact their particular wording was somewhat vague.McCone stated that indicators were conflicting. On the one hand, certaininformation such as the recent Brazilian intercept and report of Castro'sown statements would lead one to the conclusion that a gradual andcontinuing withdrawal would take place; that the Cubans were trained andbecame proficient in operating advanced sophisticated Soviet equipment,This would take many months, probably the balance of the year andCastro welcomed this period of time because it would mean a continuingSoviet interest in Cuba. On the other hand, DCI pointed out that buildingof permanent installations and the arrival of undisclosed but apparentlysophisticated equipment, although in small quantities, neverthelessimportant volume would indicate a conclusion that Soviets were there tostay, but perhaps on a somewhat reduced scale.JAM/ji (taped)Imc
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SECRETThe President then suggested a meeting be held this afternoon to determine a number of matters.1.  We should establish what our contacts are with the groups so that we can guide them effectively, whether we can stand down the operations.2.  A policy statement which State is undertaking.3.  The question of prosecution which the AG would undertake.4.  Discussing with UK since there is evidence that much of this originated in the Bahamas.5.  The question of any informal discussion with the Soviet Union.At the meeting attended by AG, McNamara, McCone, Cottrell, Douglas Dillon, it was decided to send a group to Miami this afternoon for discussion with the Miami representatives of the FBI and CIA, Immigration officials, Coast Guard, etc. Principal purposes would be to:1.  Find out all we know about the groups, who they are, where they are, and what can be done about them.2.  Lateral transfer of information between CIA and FBI Miami. Apparently there is not sufficient exchange between CIA and FBI in Miami.3.  Ways and means of using Customs and Coast Guard for some of this.4.  Warning the unauthorized groups in advance of actions we intend to take against them. Also warning the suppliers of explosives, arms, etc.5.  FCC shut down illicit radio stations, provide a truck equipped with DF-equipment to locate the stations.6.  Explore what could be done to influence the groups away from Soviet targets. In this connection, the AG favored a complete standdown before any attempt was made to guide the groups.7.  Alexis Johnson expressed greatest concern over the plane matter and asked that the group take immediate action to immobilize the plane.
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Excerpt from President's Press Conference -- April 3THE PRESIDENT: As you know, our best information is that they did not come from the United States. We have already indicated that we do not feel that these kind of raids serve a useful purpose. It seems to me in some ways they strengthen the Russian position in Cuba and the Communist control of Cuba and justify repressive measures within Cuba which might otherwise not be regarded as essential. So that we have not supported this and these men do not have a connection with the United States Government. I think a raid which goes in and out does indicate the frustrations of Cuban exiles who want to get back home and who want to strike some blow, but I don't think that it increases the chances of freeing Cuba.
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CONFIDENTIAL AttachmentJohn A. McConeDEPARTMENT OF STATEEXECUTIVE SECRETARIATMarch 26, 1963MEMORANDUM FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:Draft letter to the Presidentfrom the Secretary regardingthe problem presented byCuban refugee groupsThe President has called an NSC Executive Committee Meeting for Friday, March 29 at 12:30 p.m. to discuss the problem posed by Cuban refugee groups.The Secretary has asked me to make available to you the attached proposed letter from him to the President which will serve as a basis for discussion at tomorrow's meeting. The letter has not yet been signed by the Secretary but presumably will go to the President in its present form. If any substantive changes are made at the time of signature I shall so inform you.![Signature]William H. BrubackExecutive SecretaryAttachment:As stated.CONFIDENTIAL Attachment
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CONFIDENTIALTHE SECRETARY OF STATEWashingtonGroup IExcluded fromautomatic down-grading and de-classificationDRAFT LETTERTO BE USED AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE NSC EXECUTIVECOMMITTEE MEETING FRIDAY, MARCH 29 at 12:30 p.m.Dear Mr. President:I am concerned that hit and run raids by Cuban exiles may create incidents which work to the disadvantage of our national interest. Increased frequency of these forays could raise a host of problems over which we would not have control..Actions such as yesterday's exile attack which caused substantial damage to a Soviet vesse¹ may complicate our relations with the USSR without net advantage to us.I therefore propose several measures which could impede or deter further attacks of this nature.First, the intelligence community could increase its efforts in Miami to develop hard information about projected raids. This is current¹y communicated to Customs authorities charged with investigation of violation of arms control.Second, Customs and the Coast Guard, on the basis of this information can ston and search the vessels. (They now do this, and picked un about 50 men and four boats last year.) Arms and vessels are confiscated, and participants arraigned if a violation of aw hasThe President,The White House.CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL- 2 -occurred. Bail is set in accordance with the severityof the violation. An increase of one or more vesselsto facilitate current customs and Coast Guard operationsin the Miami area would be helpful.Third, CIA, FBI and Customs officials in Miamicould quietly inform suspects in the exile communitythat the United States intends to intensify enforcementof violations of pertinent laws relating to exile raids.Fourth, the FCC could locate and close down illegalradio transmitters operating out of the Miami area inconnection with these raids.Fifth, we can inform the British Government of ourplans to try to control these activities and expressour understanding that the British Government hasbecome increasingly concerned about the possibilitythat British territory in the Bahamas may be used forthese raids and may be considering action to policethese areas more effective'y.These measures have not been discussed with any ofthe senior officials of the Departments concerned, butif any of the measures commend themselves to you, Isuggest that a meeting of the interested Departmentsbe called to discuss the problem.Faithfully yours,Dean RuskCONFIDENTIALMarch 28, 1963
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13-0000029 March 1963MEMORANDUMSUBJECT: Unauthorized Cuban Raids1. Organizations such as the Second Front of Escambrey, Alpha 66, and Lamba 66 are well-known in the Cuban colony in Florida and Puerto Rico. Their plans are discussed openly, are picked up by CIA and reported almost daily in our CIA bulletins.2. There is no doubt that the individuals are in and out of Florida and Puerto Rico. The boats, outboard motors, guns, ammunition and explosives originate in the United States from legally licensed or unlicensed sources (of which there are many). We believe that the operations are staged out of the Bahamas and other non-U.S. areas.3. The operations are skillfully executed by men of obvious courage and dedication. Apparently the organizations are building up and we can expect more rather than fewer instances in the future.4. Obviously raids of this type will exascerbate problems with Castro and more particularly the Soviet Union and, from that standpoint, are desirable. However, successful harrassment will create very considerable annoyance, will stimulate internal dissension, will complicate Castro's problems and will have very considerable effect in discrediting Castroism in Latin America. Inability of Castro to deal with these raids might cause the Soviets to question the strength of his position and therefore reappraise their own position in Cuba. It is impossible to predict the result of such reappraisal. On the one hand it might cause them to question their presence in Cuba; on the other to reinforce it; and finally, might cause them to open up a discussion of their presence with the United States.5. Finally, although it is outside of the competence of the Intelligence Community, it is my personal view that a concerted and publicized effort to "stand down" these operations would probably draw more public and press criticism in the United States than would result from tolerating these acts while officially disassociating the government from them through denial of both responsibility and control.JOHN A. MCCONEDirector
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13-0000028
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13-00000#29SECRET29 March 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Executive Committee Meeting - 12:30 p.m. - 29 March 1963IN ATTENDANCE: All present, plus Cottrell, Kaysen, Dungan and othersThe President raised the question of what should be our policy on hit-and-run raids and asked my views. I reported my views as per the attached memorandum of 29 March. Secretary Rusk stated that the United States would be blamed for unauthorized raids, the Soviets would expect that we could stop them and they would immediately take counter actions such as escorting ships, etc. On a minimum, we should act to disassociate ourselves and do all possible not to permit the continuance of unauthorized raids.Dillon stated that we could not stop them because of the number of ports, small ships, inadequate coast guard facilities, etc. McNamara countered by saying that we could stop them by utilizing military resources. As a second alternative he suggested we might explore modifying our course of action and finally, should disassociate ourselves from responsibility. The Attorney General outlined various steps that could be taken to identify the leadership of the various groups and to either prosecute them or exclude them from the country through immigration procedures. Thompson and Harriman expressed particular concern over the reported airplane that was ready to bomb Soviet ship. Practically all in attendance thought that we should try and guide the operation away from attacks on Soviet ships because of obvious reaction of the Soviets. The Vice President felt that we would be criticized either from letting them go on the one hand, or stopping them on the other. He felt the military should immediately study that which should be done to stop them and all actions should be taken to halt the unauthorized raids.![CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED]29/23/98
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13-00000# TOP SECRETUNCLASSIFIED when blank-TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document—Automatically downgraded or declassified when filled in form is detached from controlled document.# CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT| DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION  || --------------------- || SOURCE                || DOC. NO.              || DOC. DATE             || COPY NO.              || NUMBER OF PAGES       || NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS || REGISTRY               || ---------------------- || CIA CONTROL NO.        || DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED || LOGGED BY              |ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.| REFERRED TO || ----------- || OFFICE      || RECE IVED || --------- || SIGNATURE || DATE      || TIME      || RELEASED || -------- || DATE     || TIME     || SEEN BY     || ----------- || SIGNATURE   || OFFICE/DIV. || DATE        |NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.| DOWNGRADED     | DESTROYED                | DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA) || -------------- | ------------------------ | ------------------------ || TO             | TO                       | TO                       || BY (Signature) | BY (Signature)           | BY (Signature)           || OFFICE         | WITNESSED BY (Signature) | OFFICE                   || DATE           | OFFICE                   | DATE                     ||                | DATE                     |                          |FORM 8-73 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.TOP SECRET(40)