Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 66]
TOP SECRETand support from all of the offices that were represented at the meeting, including, among others, the Office of Training, the Office of Communications, the Comptroller's Office, the DDS, DPD, the PP Staff, Personnel (particularly the Military Personnel Division), and the Office of Security. At this initial meeting, Jake Esterline mentioned that Bob Reynolds, Deputy Chief, WH/4, Dave Phillips, Propaganda Officer, Phil Toomey, Political and Psychological Stategist, Bob Wedbee, the Economist, and Ed Stanulus, his Plans and Ops Officer, would be the principals who would be in contact with other Agency elements which would be called on for support. In addition, Esterline also noted that liaison channels would be established with other elements of the US Government, particularly with the Office of Special Operations of the Department of Defense. [^31]It was during the period between 8-17 March 1960 that the previously mentioned covert anti-Castro program which Allen Dulles had agreed (on 17 February 1960) to provide to the Special Group evolved. Among those in the Agency having a direct hand in preparing a suitable paper for the Director's presentation, were- 58 -TOP SECRET[^31]: Missing footnote content
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 67]
# TOP SECRETC. Tracy Barnes, Richard Bissell, Dick Helms, JakeEsterline, J. C. King, and Tom Parrott, among others.Those who figured most prominently among the SpecialGroup representatives at this time were LivingstonMerchant, Department of State; John Irwin, AssistantSecretary for International Security Affairs, Depart-ment of Defense; Admiral Burke, Chief, Naval Opera-tions; and Gordon Gray, the President's NationalSecurity Adviser. Other than the more than a dozenmemorandums and drafts and other papers related tothe development of the policy paper, perhaps a notefrom Richard Helms to C. Tracy Barnes on 8 March 1960best illustrates the seriousness with which the Agencyapproached the task of writing a paper for the Direc-tor. Mr. Helms's note to Mr. Barnes read as follows:Tom Parrott gave me for security latethis afternoon the attached paper for the5412 Group outlining the proposed covertaction program against Fidel Castro.After reading it, I asked Tom to deferconsideration of Cuba until next weeksince I feel that this document needs re-drafting whether it is used by the Direc-tor for an oral briefing or handed to thedesignated representatives for their en-lightenment.I think you will agree with me thatthe paper is poorly drafted and needsconsiderable pointing up in various- 59 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 68]
TOP SECRETplaces. I do not disagree with the listed recommendations in paragraph 6, but I do feel that the backup material in paragraphs 2 and 3 needs recasting. For example, the reference to a "short-wave radio station patterned after Radio Free Europe", is no way, in my opinion, to describe what we have in mind. Also the paragraph on covert economic action is not sufficiently precise and raises more questions than it answers. There are other points, but there is no sense in belaboring them in this note to you.May I ask that you take this matter in hand and advise WH how to put it in suitable shape for use by the Director with the 5412 Group next week. [^32]In the paper to which Mr. Helms referred the problem facing the US was stated rather simply as follows:To replace the present Government of Cuba, headed by Fidel Castro, with one that will be acceptable to the United States; and to cause this change to occur in such a manner that anti-US repercussions are not induced in Latin America. [^33]Throughout the discussion of the Agency's role in the anti-Castro activity, there was a tremendous concern that there be no "anti-US repercussions," not only in Latin America per se, but particularly among the Latin American representatives in the Organization of American States and in the United Nations.The constant quest for plausible deniability would- 60 -TOP SECRET[^32]: missing content[^33]: missing content
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 69]
TOP SECRETbecome the holiest of grails -- constantly, and un- successfully, to be sought throughout the course of the operation by Agency planners.The proposed paper for the Special Group (the paper which Mr. Helms found somewhat lacking) empha- sized those areas highlighted in previous Special Group sessions -- anti-Castro propaganda, disrup- tions of the Cuban economy, including large scale sabotage operations, and the development of instructor cadres to provide both communications and PM training cadres to resistance groups already extant in Cuba. Interesting, too, is the fact that at this early stage of US planning mention was made of the offer from the Guatemalan Government of a training site for the PM cadres, or "action groups" as they were called. A financial annex included in the proposals for the Special Group indicated the need for $900,000 for the remainder of FY 1960 and $1.6 million for FY 1961.* 34/* Apparently Mr. Helms failed to read the financial annex carefully enough, for the estimated requirement for fiscal 1961 which is shown as $1.6 million, was either a typographical error, or a mistake in addition -- the sum of the parts shown for FY '61 is $1.7 million. It also was noted that for the remainder of FY '60, the Agency reserve funds would have to be drawn on to meet these "non-program requirements."- 61 -  TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 70]
13-00000TOP SECRETAs the paper was being prepared for Special Group consideration, J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division had forwarded a memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, providing him with additional information for use during the Special Group discussions; and the transmittal to the DCI recorded that this paper had been used to brief Mr. Nixon on 2 March 1960. King's memorandum covered much the same ground as the paper which went to the Special Group, but contained considerably more detail about the activities of the Castro Government which were directly aimed at overthrowing the legitimate governments and replacing them with Communist oriented governments. Col. King's paper also revealed that both Guatemala and Nicaragua -- the only two governments in Latin America which were to throw their full support behind the Agency's anti-Castro activity -- had made offers at this time for both radio time for anti-Castro broadcasts and, also, for training facilities for anti-Castro groups which the Agency might wish to sponsor. 35/Despite President Eisenhower's previous objections to the over-emphasis on plans to sabotage Cuba's- 62 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 71]
# TOP SECRETsugar industry, King's paper did reflect considerable emphasis on disruption of that economic sector.Another item which Col. King saw fit to include in his memorandum was the following:We have available, a drug, which, if placed in Castro's food, would make him behave in such an irrational manner that a public appearance could have very damaging results to him.*[^1]Even as the Special Group was planning its sessions on the anti-Castro program, so, too, was the National Security Council being geared up for discussions of the same situation. Again, there was great concern over the question of possible loss of prestige should the US act independently of the international organizations. There also was interest in protecting US business and in the protection of US lives, and the question of viability of the Guantanamo Base was of considerable concern to the President's National Security adviser, Gordon Gray. The policy that Gray was advised to recommend to the National Security Council regarding US bases stated:Take action as necessary, including military action, to insure the continued[^1]: For comments on this subject see Part VII of this volume.
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 72]
# TOP SECRETavailability to the United States of bases and base rights in Latin America that are considered vital to the security of the United States. 37/An additional aspect of the basic national security policy for Latin America which Gordon Gray was being encouraged to promote with the National Security Council on 10 March 1960 recommended that:In the event of an imminent or actual Communist seizure of control from within, take all feasible measure(s) to thwart it, including military action if finally required and appropriate to cope with the situation.* 38/Following Gordon Gray's briefing of the National Security Council on 10 March 1960, President Eisenhower approved the following rather innocuous actions:1. Every effort should be made to influence the other members of the Organization of American States to recognize the dangers involved in the Cuban situation and support action with respect to them.* Mr. Gray also was advised to play both sides of the street for with reference to the disruptive efforts of non-Communist groups, the position he was being urged to promote was the following:The United States should be prepared, if required to protect US interests, to take similar actions against subversion or armed rebellion by non-Communist elements hostile to US interests.- 64 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 73]
13-00000TOP SECRET2. The responsible Departments and Agencies should keep current plans to déal promptly with likely contingencies which might develop with respect to Cuba, especially those involving the safety of US citizens in the Guantanamo Base.3. The developments with regard to the situation in Cuba should be reviewed by the Council each meeting, for the immediate future. [^39]Subsequent to the NSC meeting of 10 March 1960, Gordon Gray informed the President that the Special Group had set aside a 2-hour session on 14 March "to discuss the whole range of assets and possibilities in Cuba." [^40] Prior to the 14 March meeting, Messrs. Bissell and King received a somewhat strange memorandum from Allen W. Dulles offering "some suggestions as to possible added 'starters' for our Cuban paper; use your own judgment as to adding them." [^41] Among these starters was Dulles's suggestion that the International Transport Union somehow be induced to refuse to load "dangerous" munitions intended for Cuba and then Dulles made the following rather unusual suggestion:** In addition to the International Transport Union, Dulles also suggested that an attempt be made to induce Cuban laborers to resist unloading explosives that were sent to Cuba, but as he himself pointed out, Castro probably would use the Cuban Army should the dockworkers refuse to do the unloading.- 65 -TOP SECRET[^39]: [^40]:[^41]:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 74]
13-00000# TOP SECRETStress point that while the dynamism is running out of the Marxist-Leninist revolution in Russia, it still remains in China. This explains ChiCom special interest in supporting the Cuban revolution and expanding it, with the ultimate aim of facilitating mass emigration of Chinese to the Latin American continent to meet their over-population problem. (This may be premature, but there may be something to it.) 42/As promised by Gordon Gray, the Special Group Meeting of 14 March 1960 focused exclusively on the Cuban problem, and Mr. Dulles presented the members with the paper entitled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba." Much of the ground was already familiar to the participants, but the memorandum of the meeting reflects a number of items worth review. Even though Dulles's paper placed heavy emphasis on the propaganda needs, even greater emphasis was urged for covert and overt propaganda activities, not only through WRUL, the commercial broadcasting operation, but also through the efforts of USIA's programs for Latin America -- programs which apparently had been sharply curtailed in the recent past. The question of location for the Agency's covert broadcasting activity was again raised and discussed, the question being whether it should be somewhere in the Florida-- 66 --TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 75]
TOP SECRETKeys, in some Caribbean country, or elsewhere.Somewhat more attention was focused on the para- military plans during this discussion than had occurred before, and Mr. Gray was particularly concerned by the Agency estimate that: "it appears no large scale para- military effort (other than wholly overt) will be feasible in less than 8 months"; and he wondered if a crash program was feasible to speed up the training program. 43/ The questions of economic sanctions, OAS and individual Latin American country involvement, the choice of the proper Cuban exiles to represent the government in exile, and the question of a budget -- the $900,000 for fiscal 1960 and the $1.6-1.7 million for 1961 were also the subjects of discussion.One additional subject of disucssion at this Special Group meeting as recorded by Col. J. C. King was:> What would be the effect on the Cuban> scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che> Guevarra[sic] should disappear simultan-> eously. 44/In the reported context of the discussion it is not believed that the term "disappear" was a euphemism for assassination, but rather referred to the ouster of- 67 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 76]
TOP SECRETCastro's government from political power. The paragraph which had raised the question then continued:Admiral Burke said that the only organized group within Cuba today were[sic] the Communists, and there was therefore the danger that they might move into control. Mr. Dulles felt that this might not be disadvantageous because it would facilitate a multilateral action by OAS. Colonel King said that there were few leaders capable of taking over so far identified. One possibility was Nunez Jiminez, the head of the Agricultural Reform Program. No other names were widely enough known to be mentioned.*Other discussion, notwithstanding, the focus of Mr. Dulles's recommendations on 14 March 1960 was that the Central Intelligence Agency should be authorized to take a number of steps which were specifically related to the development of the guerrilla capacity of the anti-Castro groups, both within and without Cuba.The Agency should be responsible for broadening its contacts with such groups and attempting to unify[^1][^1]: This comment and one made five days earlier (9 March 1960) by J. C. King that "unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could be eliminated in one package -- which is highly unlikely -- this operation can be a long drawn-out affair and the present government will only be overthrown by the use of force" were discussed (pp. 93, 114-116) in SSC report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, and it is apparent from the recollections of the participants in the meetings that assassination was not the issue in these two instances.TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 77]
# TOP SECRETthem to direct their efforts against Castro. The DCIproposed that CIA should take the lead in assistingthese groups to develop friendships among various ofthe Latin American Governments which were skepticalof Castro and that the Agency should be responsiblefor identifying and training -- in facilities in theUnited States or elsewhere -- those who would be theleaders of the Cuban guerrilla warfare groups. At theconclusion of the 14 March meeting, it was agreedthat the Agency would revise the paper on the basisof the discussions and plan to present it to PresidentEisenhower later in the week. [^1]As part of the effort to improve the paper onthe proposed anti-Castro operations, the Agency pre-pared additional backup material which could be crankedinto the version which would eventually go to thePresident. On 14 and 15 March, the records revealcopies of two drafts of such a paper, one of whichwas labeled as "revised version, done by [C. Tracy]Barnes, evening 14 Mar," which went into more detailon both the political opposition to Castro and on thepropaganda activities that were being mounted againstCastro. These papers also noted that paramilitary-- 69 --# TOP SECRET[^1]: 45/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 78]
TOP SECRETactivity would "take the longest to become a usable asset."[^46] The most important difference between these papers and the covert action plan presented by Dulles was that the Financial Annex showed a sharp, upward increase in the anticipated costs for FY '61 -- from $1.6-1.7 million to $3.5 million -- with the heaviest increment coming in terms of the proposed paramilitary operation. The sum for PM operations was revised from an estimated $500,000 in Dulles's 14 March presentation to a total of $1.3 million for that same year.From the time Allen Dulles enunciated the covert action plan (14 March) until President Eisenhower approved it (17 March), there was an interesting bit of bi-play between the National Security Council and the Special Group 5412. One of the principal concerns of the National Security Council was the proper US response should the Cubans try to intervene or interfere with operations of the Naval base at Guantanamo Bay, including a possible takeover of the Base. On 16 March 1960, after Gordon Gray had been fully apprised of the proposed plan for covert action submitted by Allen Dulles, Gray was the recipient of a briefing- 70 -TOP SECRET[^46]: /
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 79]
TOP SECRETnote from a member of his own Staff, Samuel E. Belk,for the planned National Security Council meetingof 17 March which again focused exclusively on thesituation at Guantanamo Bay. It appears as thoughMr. Belk, even though he was a member of the NSCStaff was completely in the dark as to the planningthat had already been undertaken with regard toCastro's ouster. At a time when the President hadalready indicated that proposals for economic actionor direct sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry wereless than what he desired, Mr. Belk, for whateverreason, suggested again that with the new sugarlegislation, perhaps Castro could be straightenedout. In addition, Belk suggested a plan which was"unconventional and radical" -- having PresidentEisenhower send a message directly to Castro tellinghim that he was concerned over the deterioration ofrelations between the two countries and suggestingthat Castro have private conversations with an emissarywhom the President would personally designate.Staffer Belk believed that this was a "can'tlose" situation for the US. If Castro refused tomeet with Eisenhower's representative, then he would- 71 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 80]
TOP SECRETbe condemned throughout Latin America. The US on theother hand would receive the blessings of the OAS andthe UN for its efforts. If Castro did agree to meetwith the President's representative, then relationsbetween the US and Cuba probably would be improved. 47/Mr. Belk's suggestions apparently never went beyondMr. Gray.At 1430 hours on 17 March 1960, Mr. Dulles pre-sented his covert action plan to a combined meetingof the National Security Council and the principalsof the Special Group. In attendance with the Presi-dent were Vice President Nixon, Secretary Herter, Mr.Merchant, Mr. Rubottom, Secretary of Treasury Ander-son, Secretary Irwin, Admiral Burke, Richard Bissell,Colonel King, Gordon Gray, Major John Eisenhower, andGeneral A. J. Goodpaster. Based on General Goodpaster'sreport on the meeting:The President said that he knows of nobetter plan for dealing with this situa-tion. The great problem is leakage andbreach of security. Everyone must be pre-pared to swear that he has not heard ofit. He said we should limit Americancontacts with the groups involved to twoor three people, getting Cubans to domost of what must be done ... He under-stood that the effort will be to under-mine Castro's position and prestige ...- 72 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 81]
13-00000# TOP SECRETThe President told Mr. Dulles he thought he (Dulles) should go ahead with the plan and the operations. He and the other agencies involved should take account of all likely Cuban reactions and prepare the actions that we would take in response to these ... The President said he would like some groundwork laid with the OAS to let the Latin American countries know that if the Cubans were to start to attack our people in Cuba we would be obliged to take action ...The President said that at the next meeting, he would want to know what is the sequence of events by which we see the situation developing - specifically what actions are we to take. He said our hand should not show in anything that is done. In the meantime State should be working on what we can do in and out of the OAS ... Essentially, the job is to get the OAS to support us. [^1]During the course of this meeting, Secretary of the Treasury Anderson exhibited great concern over the welfare of the US firms which had investments in Cuba; and he was pushing for US intervention to protect these private property rights. The President, however, cut him rather short on this. Vice President Nixon, too, indicated some concern with the American business interests in Cuba; and suggested that steps might be taken to cut off the flow of new capital investment by US firms in Cuba, terminating private- 73 -# TOP SECRET[^1]: 48/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 82]
# TOP SECRETbusinesses already there, and reducing American tour-ism.*[^1]President Eisenhower's approval of the 17 March 1960 covert action program against the Castro regime thus set US policy. Briefly restated, the four major courses of action called for the formation of an anti-Communist exile political opposition located outside of Cuba which would be the focal point for all of the anti-Castro elements, provision for a powerful propaganda offensive against the island, perfection of a covert intelligence-in-action network organization within Cuba, and the development of a paramilitary force outside Cuba, with the necessary logistical support for covert military operations on the island.**[^2][^1]: * Col. King prepared a memorandum on the same meeting, but, strangely enough, failed to include a list of the participants. The fact that the President, Vice President, and Secretary of State were in attendance could not be known from King's memo alone. 50/ Not in attendance at this meeting was Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4. This was one of numerous instances where higher level personnel -- in this instance, the DCI, Col. King, and Bissell -- were the principals in a meeting at which Esterline would seem to have been an equally legitimate participant.[^2]: Even as President Eisenhower was approving the anti-Castro effort a Special National Intelligence Estimate was in process and would state that Castro was not "demonstrably under the domination or control of the international Communist movement." (SNIE 85-60, 22 March 1960, p. 3. S.)- 74 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 83]
TOP SECRETIt is particularly important in light of changes which were subsequently made in the covert action plan to note the language of the approved policy with reference to the paramilitary operation:Initially, a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase, a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the US so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train, and lead resistance forces recruited there, both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance.At no point in this Presidentially-approved plan for covert action by the Agency is there any hint of invasion. The paramilitary activity was clearly to be in the context of guerrilla warfare with leadership and training to the dissident activities inside Cuba being provided by Cubans trained by United States technicians.*Finally, with reference to the approved* Colonel Jack Hawkins (USMC) who was Chief, WH/4/PM correctly noted in his memorandum for record of PM operations for Project JMATE that:> The only approved, written policy governing paramilitary action against Cuba is contained in paragraph 2d of the Policy Paper approved by the President on 17 March 1960." (Emphasis added by author.) 51/- 75 -TOP SECRET