Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 100]
TOP SECRETCuban government launch an attack on Guantanamo, the Navy was prepared to defend that base. In Burke's opinion, the Navy had adequate force available to do that.* 69/Whether a direct result of this briefing of the JCS or not, there was a noticeable improvement in WH/4's relations with the military services before the end of April 1960. On 19 April, for example, $150,000 was to be funneled from the CIA's Director of Logistics to the Comptroller, US Army, ostensibly as a working fund for the 2750th Maintenance Unit, Fort Randolph, Canal Zone. This money, of course, was to be used for necessary construction, renovation, procurement of material, and hire of native labor as necessary to improve Fort Randolph as a training site for the PM insturctor cadre. 71/Before the end of April 1960, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved, in principle, the Agency's* This briefing for the senior personnel in the Department of Defense, would have taken place in any event; but it may have been prompted by the reluctance of the designated DOD liaison officer with WH/4, Capt. Burns Spore (USN), to do much more than listen to WH/4's requests for the assignment of DOD personnel to the project and for real estate for use in the training program until he received a green light from the SecDef. 70/- 92 -TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETrequest for overflight photo coverage of the islandsoffshore of Cuba. The decision on this matter wastaken up, not only with the Air Force, but also withJ. Lampton Berry of the Department of State.* Al-though the authorization and plan for these overflights,presumably by the U-2, antedated the shootdown ofFrancis Gary Power's U-2 in the Soviet Union, it wasrecorded that:Ambassador Berry had called to saythat the Department . . . had approved themission, but insisted that extremelytight security be exercised throughoutand that Col. Benson (USAF/Operations)inform Ambassador Berry before eachsortie so that the Department would beproperly prepared to respond to anyemergency. 72/The first flight, incidentally, was tentatively sched-uled for the weekend of 30 April - 1 May of 1960.**In April of 1960, in addition to working withthe Army, the Agency representatives also began towork with the Covert Limited Warfare Committee of* Berry was a Career Minister and former Ambassador  Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (AE&P) to Ceylon who  was at this time assigned to the Bureau of Intelligence  and Research.** Powers was shot down over the USSR on 1 May 1960.- 93 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 102]
# TOP SECRETthe Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense. One of the particular problems of concern in this relationship was that of covert sea transportation which might be necessary to lift anti-Castro forces back to the island of Cuba. Even though all the planning about which there is a record at this time concerned only cadres for guerrilla warfare training and the infiltration of communications experts, on 25 April 1960, Savilion Chapman of DDP's Maritime Branch met with a Captain Thomas (USN) and a Col. Anderson (USMC) who were members of the DOD/CIA Covert Limited Warfare Stockpiling Committee, and discussed among other interesting subjects:The acquisition from the Navy of two Landing Ship-Tanks (LST) and four Air-Sea Rescue Craft (AVR), the training of the Cuban crews for these vessels, and the means of covert transfer of the vessels from the Navy to the Agency.*[^73]In addition to the requested overhead reconnaissance of the Cuban coastline by the Air Force, the[^73] * It is rather strange that at this early date in April 1960 discussions were being held concerning the acquisition of LST's. There had been no discussions concerning the movement of a large body of Cuban troops back into their homeland; and, consequently, the discussion re LST's seems highly out of place.- 94 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 103]
# TOP SECRETMaritime Branch representatives also discussed beach gradient problems with the Marine Corps and representatives of the Navy's Hydrographic Office. It was ascertained that much work needed to be done in order to upgrade information suitable for planning the use of LST's for beaching and landing of troops and vehicles. 74/In the weeks immediately following Eisenhower's announcement of the anti-Castro policy, the Department of State seemed to be operating in a world of its own -- making elaborate plans for Cuban briefings and the flow of information on Cuba's internal developments. On 25 March, for example, Roy Rubottom, Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs, was the originator of an elaborate memorandum which provided a check list of current operations and ten categories of activity related to developments in Cuba. From the tenor of the paper itself, it seems as though Rubottom was ignorant of the Cuban issues before the Special Group, of the discussions among CIA, State, and Department of Defense, and of the President's approved plan for covert action. Nor was there any evident awareness of the various overt- 95 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 104]
TOP SECRETprograms with reference to the Cuban problem. 75/About this same time, Allen Dulles made known to the Special Group his displeasure that the Depart- ment failed to consult with the Agency prior to announcing the reappointment of Philip Bonsal as US Ambassador to Cuba. 76/The Rubottom plan apparently had some impact, for by the end of April 1960, Gordon Gray was calling on Douglas Dillon, the Undersecretary of State, to find someone in the Department -- Dillon himself -- to be "constantly seized of the Cuban problem and who would take steps to assure that all of the activ- ities of various groups were in harness and that all needed decisions were made when needed."* 77/ Mr.Gray also specified some of the problems which would face a Chief of Staff on the Cuban activity, noting:[Livingston Merchant] has set up two groups, one under the chairmanship of Mr. Mallory. In addition, there is the Special Group, of which Livie is a mem- ber, and in his absence Ray Hare sits. Further, there is a special activity* This, of course, apparently ignores or disregards the creation of WH/4 and the responsibilities desig- nated to the Agency by Gray's boss, President Eisen- hower.- 96 -TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETproceeding under the chairmanship of Bob Anderson, with which you may or may not be familiar. Allen Dulles has a particular liaison with Bob in this matter. The Defense Department, of course, has many interests. 78/The suggestion that Undersecretary Douglas Dillon be made Chief of Staff responsible for coordinating the programs with reference to Cuba did not sit well with the Agency; and after the matter had been surfaced at a meeting of the Special Group on 28 April, Chief, WH/4 prepared a memorandum stating in part with reference to Dillon:The Agency would not look with favor on this arrangement. Mr. Barnes and the Director, therefore, plan to go over to State on Monday afternoon [2 May 1960] and head off this new development. Mr. Barnes believes that a short paper setting forth what we are already doing in the fields of coordination and liaison should be adequate to support their point of view. 79/Whether resistance to the suggestion that Dillon become Chief of Staff for the nation's anti-Castro program was in itself distasteful to the Agency or whether it was simply opposition to the idea that State should take over the direction of a program which would basically be carried out by the Agency is not revealed in the records. Presumably both elements- 97 -# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETentered into the picture. In any event, Gordon Grayseemed cavalier in disregarding the creation of WH/4and the liaison arrangements which had already beenmade. (See Appendix D.)* But whatever the explana-tion, Mr. Dillon did not become Chief of Staff forthe nation's Cuban program.Although it was not included on the list ofAgencies with which CIA maintained liaison and con-tacts at this time, mention should be made of theCIA-FBI contacts concerning Cuba. Technically theFBI was prohibited from engaging in intelligenceoperations overseas, but in mid-June 1960, Chief,WH/4 revealed that the FBI reportedly had plans forinstalling a stay-behind network -- using Mexicansand Cubans -- to be activated in case diplomaticrelations between the US and Cuba were broken. Chief,WH/4 suggested that the CI Staff get in touch withthe FBI Liaison Officer, Sam Papich and ask for anexplanation of the Bureau's plan. 80/ About thesame time that Chief WH/4 was evincing concern aboutFBI activities in Cuba, Chief, WH Division noted in* Appendix D, page 332.
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 107]
13-00000# TOP SECRETa memorandum for the Acting Director of Central In-telligence that:A thorough investigation has been madeof the relations between the Havana Stationand the Havana Office of the Federal Bureauof Investigation. It has been concludedthat the operations of the FBI have neitherinterferred with nor conflicted with theStation's operations. 81/Col. King's memo also stated the Bureau's long-time contacts in the Cuban area were a benefit toboth the Bureau and to the Station pointing out thatfrequently the Station was called on to participatein, or actually undertake, the debriefing of variousindividuals who had come into the FBI offices to volun-teer information. On occasion, the Bureau had eventurned over specific operations to the Station.Chief, WH Division went even further when,during the course of one of the weekly interdepart-mental meetings in State, it was suggested by Mr.Gray and Mr. Mallory that the FBI was exceeding itsjurisdiction, and that perhaps this should be broughtbefore the NSC for consideration. Col. King reportedthat he remained non-committal at this time, but didpoint out that he thought the jurisdictional issueshould be "soft-pedaled." He did say, however, that- 99 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 108]
# TOP SECRETthe memorandum he had prepared on this subject was being held in the files should questions about this particular Bureau activity ever be raised. King also recommended that the Agency not take the initiative in raising the question. 82/Neither Col. King, nor anyone else involved in the anti-Castro operation ever registered a formal protest against the FBI's activities in the Havana area. By mid-summer 1960, the relationship became even closer, particularly as the Agency expanded activities at the Forward Operations Base, JMASH (later JMWAVE) in Miami. In one report concerning the number of the Cuban exiles in the Miami area who were under suspicion of -- or were -- working for Castro, or who were trying desperately to get support from one or another US Agency, an FBI agent made a rather interesting forecast to the CIA representative with whom he was exchanging information.According to the report from Miami, an FBI agent told me that his personal opinion was that it would be virtually impossible, if not completely impossible, to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime using Cuban exiles. He thought the only solution to the problem, and the one that stood the best chance of success, was to- 100 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 109]
13-00000TOP SECRETgo in with the US Marines. He admittedthat this was only his personal opinion,but he felt that in view of his experienceand contact with the Cuban exiles, he hada good point. I could not help agreewith him. 83/Agent George Davis apparently was extremelyinterested in full cooperation with the Agency, quick-ly accepting the Agency representative's proposalthat they visit the FBI offices once or twice eachweek to compare notes; and the CIA field representa-tive, in turn, agreed to pass on to Mr. Davis in theFBI any information which the Agency might acquirepertaining to FBI interests.** The Forward Operations Base (FOB) opened in May  1960 in Coral Gables, Florida, and it was the second  FOB that had been established since the formation of  WH Division -- the initial base having been set up  during the anti-Arbenz operation in Guatemala in 1953-1954. In general, the Miami FOB paralleled the organ-      ization of Headquarters with FI, CI, CA, Support, and      PM units. FOB reported directly to the Chief, WH      Division, not to Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4. Ini-      tially the satellite communications center for relaying      commo between Headquarters and the field -- including      facilities in the Florida Keys concerning the maritime      operations -- was established; and ultimately the commo      link would connect Headquarters with the operations in      Guatemala and Nicaragua. The cover firm for the base,      was Clarence A. DePew & Sons, a notional cover for      an organization engaged in classified research.A series of some 32 reports has been prepared onthe FOB, and the reports are available through theRecords Management Officer of WH Division. These(footnote continued on following page)- 101 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 110]
TOP SECRETIn addition to its concern with the interests of other government agencies in the Cuban problem, in mid-summer of 1960 the Agency also was required to provide intelligence briefings for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates of the major political parties. While the intelligence briefings were scheduled to consider the world situation, considerable emphasis was being given to both Cuba and the Dominican Republic. In preparation for Mr. Dulles' briefing of the Democratic nominee, John F. Kennedy, on 23 July 1960, WH/4 prepared a detailed Cuban briefing paper touching on the principal aspects of the exile organization, the propaganda plan, penetration of Cuba by personnel from communist countries (including the Soviet Union, Red China, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany), and the play that Castro was making in the Latin American world for pro-communist sympathizers. In addition, emphasis also was given to the reports deal basically with the period between 1962 and 1968; and while there is some feeling that the story of the Bay of Pigs operation should go into extensive detail on the initial operations of the FOB, this author has chosen not to do so, focusing instead on only those broad aspects of the problem relating to the Miami Base. [^1]- 102 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 84/
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TOP SECRETplanned program for paramilitary training and opera- tions under the aegis of CIA. Insofar as can be determined, however, there is no indication that in his pre-election briefing of the Democratic Presidential candidates that Mr. Dulles went into any specifics on the Agency's anti-Castro plans. [^85]As mentioned previously, one of the continuing problems requiring coordination within the Executive Branch was the increasing budget demands for Project JMATE. From an estimate of some $2.5 million of budgeted and reserve funds, which had been made available for the program by mid-August of 1960, Mr. Bissell appeared at a special Group meeting, requesting that an additional $10.75 million be released from reserve funds to meet the ever-increasing needs, particularly for the paramilitary and propaganda programs. The decision of the Special Group following Mr. Bissell's appeal was that:This matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial expenditures which- 103 -TOP SECRET[^85]: missing footnote
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 112]
TOP SECRETshould not be undertaken without a reason-able assurance that the operation was to go forward. 86/On 22-23 August of 1960, after discussions with Mr. Stans and Mr. Macy, the Agency was notified that the requested $10 million for FY 61 would be made available from the Agency Reserve for Contingencies.* 87/C. Cooperation and ChallengeAs already mentioned, immediately following the Eisenhower decision to promote the anti-Castro program, there was a considerable degree of cooperation between CIA and other of the concerned Agencies -- the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and others. As WH/4 continued to expand and develop the various programs -- propaganda, covert action, staybehind networks, and paramilitary operations -- there were ever increasing contacts between CIA and the representatives of other* One explanation for the sharply increasing demand for reserve funds may lie in the fact that materiel was being written off upon issue, rather than upon consumption -- an aspect of the operation that was explained to the author by William E. Eisemann, formerly Chief, Support WH/4. 88/- 104 -TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETgovernment agencies. Perhaps the best way to describe the period from the summer of 1960 until the early fall was as a period of cooperation and challenge. Cooperation because the needs of the Agency represented National Policy. Challenge to most if not all of CIA's proposals -- proposals which concerned the nature of the propaganda effort, the size and make-up of the exile military force which was being organized, the location of training sites, the types of technical materiel (including aircraft) being requested, and, most important by the end of this period, the specific nature of the military operation which was to be mounted against Fidel Castro.By early June 1960, the program for paramilitary training of Cuban exiles was jumped from some 60 to 500 or more trainees -- even though the actual training of the initial instructor cadre at Fort Randolph in Panama had not yet begun and the FRD was only in the initial stages of negotiation for PM and commo training facilities in Guatemala. It was anticipated that the increased number of PM trainees would be recruited out of the Miami area, from other Latin American countries where Cubans had taken up residence,- 105 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 114]
13-00000TOP SECRETand from others who might be recruited inside Cuba. The emphasis on the PM training at this time was to be on weapons, demolitions, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare tactics; and the weapons familiarization was to be with the M-l carbine, the Garand and Spring- field rifles, the Thompson sub-machine gun, and the .45 Colt automatic pistol. This, of course, was the weapons mix in the Agency's stockpile of standard arms packs. 89/It must be presumed that the call for increases in the number of PM trainees was related to the con- tinued importation of Soviet weapons and technicians and the increasing strength of the Communist Party in Cuba. An NIE written in mid-June 1960 on "The Situation in Cuba," for example noted that the Castro regime was "deeply and increasingly influenced by Com- munists .. no longer any prospect of democratic govern- ment under his [Fidel Castro's] regime." As was past estimates, this particular NIE was unable to answer the question of whether Castro himself was a Communist. The NIE also mentioned that no strong opposition leader to the Castro regime had emerged, nor did the opposition at that time "pose a serious threat to- 106 -TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETthe regime." One weakness touched on by the NationalEstimate concerned the Castro militia which was char-acterized as "only partially armed, and for the mostpart poorly trained ... [and] appears to have little,if any, effectiveness as an organized combat forcein conventional operations." For either of the fore-going reasons, perhaps, an increase in the number ofPM personnel might (a) assist in bringing a strongdissident leader to the fore, or (b) develop thecapability to overcome the Castro militia. [^1]The question of an increased number of PMtrainees surfaced in a late August briefing for Presi-dent Eisenhower, Secretaries Gates, Dillon, and Ander-son, and Generals Persons, Lemnitzer, and Goodpasterby the DCI and Mr. Bissell. After President Eisenhower'sNational Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, summarizeddevelopments since the March announcement of the anti-Castro program, Mr. Dulles provided some specificsconcerning the organization of the FRD and its prin-cipals, noting that the Headquarters for the FRD hadbeen established in Mexico City, in lieu of the invi-tation of President Ydigoras of Guatemala to permitthe FRD to operate from his country. Mr. Dulles- 107 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 90/
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13-00000TOP SECRETnoted that at this time, it was particularly importantthat the US presence in Guatemala not be revealed.When the discussion turned to the PM forces, the De-partment of Defense representative, Mr. Gates, madeit quite clear that he was concerned about the pos-sibility of US military personnel being involveddirectly in the military operations inside Cuba.Mr. Bissell responded that US military personnel inthird countries would be used only as instructors --not as cadre leaders for either an invasion or aguerrilla warfare effort.Bissell did stress, however, that there wasneed for a standby force, preferably of non-Americans,with special training in guerrilla warfare to pro-vide a leadership complement to the Cubans when "push"came to "shove," a recommendation that provoked somedifferences of opinion during the course of thisbriefing for the President when it was suggestedthat US officers might be required to direct theseforces. Mr. Dulles proposed withholding this dis-cussion until the Agency and the JCS could talk thematter over. Mr. Gray seemed to be determined thatthe issue of the force level and make-up be resolved- 108 -TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETat this particular time. According to his own reportof his position at this meeting,Mr. Gray pointed out that it would beunwise to mount any kind of an operationwithout the determination to see itthrough and that an abortive effort wouldbe worse than no effort at all. He there-fore thought that if this backup forcewas essential to ultimate success, fullconsideration should be given to it atthis stage in the planning. Mr. Dullesagain urged that a decision on this bedeferred.*[^1]In support of Mr. Gray and in some contradictionto Mr. Bissell's view that perhaps the Cuban PM forcewould be able to carry off the effort without any out-side help, the President was reported to have indicatedthatHe would go along so long as the JointChiefs, Defense, State, and CIA think wehave a good chance of being successful.He wouldn't care much about this kind ofcost [the $10 million increase notedearlier]; indeed, he said he would de-fend this kind of action against allcomers and that if we could be sure offreeing the Cubans from this incubus,$25 million might be a small price to pay.--* In light of today's relations between the United  States and other of the major world powers with the  third countries, Gordon Gray displayed in the  summer of 1960- a degree of foresight with which  he has never been properly credited. For he noted  at that time that if the US failed to deal firmly  with Cuba, there was an obvious danger that other  small nations would be encouraged to undertake harass-  ments of the major powers. 92/-109 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 91/