Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10001.pdf — page 6]
SECRETparent WH Division. In that year total obligationsfor Cuban operations were $41,498,743, or almost four times the $11,003,991 spent in the rest of Latin America. Except for Cuba 1961 was a representative year, and these were the obligations for regular stations throughout the hemisphere:|           |            |                |          || --------- | ---------- | -------------- | -------- || Brazil    | $1,498,101 | Colombia       | $301,389 || Mexico    | 1,384,505  | Dominican Rep. | 261,148  || Venezuela | 922,424    | Costa Rica     | 231,351  || Argentina | 802,302    | El Salvador    | 222,037  || Chile     | 646,768    | Honduras       | 103,820  || Panama    | 579,310    | Nicaragua      | 92,088   || Uruguay   | 521,082    | Haiti          | 77,675   || Guatemala | 418,778    | Paraguay       | 54,606   || Peru      | 380,422    | West Indies    | 41,864   || Ecuador   | 336,367    | Puerto Rico    | 24,377   || Bolivia   | 303,210    |                |          |Until the nearly 1,200 prisoners taken at the Bay of Pigs could be ransomed with shipments of pharmaceuticals, CIA regularly supported their dependents in the United States. In the opinion of the General Counsel, if a dependent had sued, courts would probably have found that Cuban Brigade members were entitled to the benefits of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. Thus by mid-1962 CIA was disbursing $311,500 per month to the dependents, plus bonuses and medical care for invaders who managed to return. These expenses, however, were paid from special funds outside- 244 -SECRET
[104-10301-10001.pdf — page 7]
the WH Division budget. 277/Probably Castro's attempt to export his revolution reached its peak in 1962. The first Castro-inspired guerrilla action in Latin America occurred in March of that year, when Indians in the interior of Peru attacked the towns of Huampani and Satipo. A Lima Station penetration agent identified their leader as Cuban-trained and reported that radios and weapons had been smuggled in from Cuba to start the attack. 278/At year's end the US Government planned to assemble for the Organization of American States a white paper on Cuban subversion in Latin America, and in February 1963 WH Division chiefs of station met in Panama to discuss their contributions with the DCI. From this meeting came a picture of Castro's campaign of subversion.Argentina reported that left-wing Peronists were an attractive target for Cuba: police had captured a group of terrorists organized and directed by John William Cooke, an ex-Peronist then in Cuba.Bolivia knew of 217 activists trained in Cuba within nine months and was looking forward to debriefing- 245 -SECRET
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# SECRETEveryone breathed easier, and the Chief, WHDivision, described the operation as "one of themost tightly held of our Cuban activities." Twoyears later the hold was not so tight, for on 26 March1965 the *New York Times* front-paged a reasonably com-plete and accurate account of the great sugar-sabotageoperation under the headline:PRESIDENT KENNEDY BALKEDCIA PLOT ON RUSSIAN SUGARPress services picked up the story. UnitedPress International doffed its cap to "enterprisingU.S. agents," but added that "White House interven-tion foiled the Central Intelligence Agency's Carib-283/bean melodrama." CIA, as usual, had no comment.For across-the-board coverage of Cuba inthe early 1960's the Mexico City Station was tops.Reporting on the Cuban Embassy, the COS said in Feb-ruary 1963:We intercept their mail, photographall the people who go in and out of theEmbassy, cover their telephones completely,and within a few hours of the conversa-tions have resumes of all the phone calls.We cover their trash, and this has beenfound to be useful. And included in theusefulness was the discovery of a man whowas doublecrossing us, who we thought wasa good penetration of the Embassy.- 252 -SECRET
[104-10301-10001.pdf — page 9]
CIA had seven different microphones in the Cuban Embassy, one hidden in a leg of the coffee table in the Ambassador's office. Like most audio operations, this one produced a lot of chaff, but it also yielded bits of operational information showing connections between the Embassy and local Communists and students. At the airport the station was getting photographs of all travellers to Cuba, plus about 300 photos per day of their passports and documents.24[Included in the take from the Cuban Embassy were the serial numbers of weapons bought by Communists for smuggling into Guatemala, plus the names and positions of the sellers. Complicating the exploitation of this information was the fact that the weapons had been sold by Mexican officials, and while the station wanted to stop the smuggling and apprehend the Communist smugglers it had no desire to upset sensitive relations with the Mexican Government.8 [Two high-level officers of the Cuban Embassy,one of them the cultural attache] were recruited CIA penetrations. The station had sent three agents into Cuba and was getting reports from them by secret- 253 -SECRET
[104-10301-10001.pdf — page 10]
writing. Meanwhile it was servicing 17 accommoda-tion addresses for Headquarters and Miami.In spite of all this, there was little exploi-table evidence that Cuba was using Mexico as a basefor subversion in the rest of Latin America. Mexicowas the only Latin American nation to maintain diplo-matic relations with Cuba in the face of an OAS reso-lution intended to isolate the island. Anxious toretain this bridge to the Western Hemisphere, Castrohad ordered his Embassy to do nothing which might beconsidered offensive by the Mexican Government. [^1]No such restraint was applied to Venezuela,where Castro-supported terrorism was rampant. On2 November 1963, on a tip from a *campesino*, the*Servicio de Inteligencia de las Fuerzas Armadas*(SIFA) found a cache of more than three tons ofCuban arms on a beach on the Paraguana Peninsulain northwest Venezuela. CIA learned about it promptlythrough liaison.Jonathan G. Hanke, a Caracas case officer,brought sample weapons to Washington, where CIA wasable to raise the serial numbers and Cuban Army in-signia which had been ground off. Richard Helms,- 254 -SECRET[^1]: 284/
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SECRETblocs in the country: Barrientos, supported by thecampesinos; General Alfredo Ovando Candia, supportedby the army, and the Communists and leftists, sup-ported by tough mine and factory workers. To haveBarrientos elected, CIA first had to promote acredible election by underwriting the campaigns ofboth the selected winner and his token oppositionat the polls.The real question was whether elections wouldbe held at all. In 18 months the La Paz Stationspent $585,000, first to persuade the armed forcesto clamp down on the leftists, then to persuadeBarrientos to run, then to convince Ovando he shouldnot interfere, and finally to promote enough politi-cal opposition to make the election plausible. Ina genuine *tour de force*, COS Lawrence M. Sternfieldproduced what OAS observers called a democratic andhonest election--and got the results from the elec-toral tribunal four days before the election.On 7 April 1964 President Lyndon B. Johnsonpresided at a White House meeting which laid downgeneral guidelines for CIA action against Cuba.Others at the meeting included Secretary of State- 279 -SECRET
[104-10301-10001.pdf — page 12]
# SECRETDean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara,General Maxwell Taylor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,Presidential Advisor McGeorge Bundy, DCI John A.McCone, DDP Richard Helms and FitzGerald. There wasno question about charging CIA with the followingtypes of activity:1. Collection of intelligence.2. Covert propaganda to encourage low-risk forms of active and passive resistance.3. Cooperation with other agencies in economic denial.4. Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential dissident elements inside Cuba.5. Indirect economic sabotage.There was sharp disagreement, however, over whether CIA should continue infiltrating sabotage agents into Cuba. McNamara, Taylor and McCone favored more sabotage raids, but Rusk and Bundy feared that CIA raids might undermine the US "clean hands" posture in the OAS or give the Soviets an excuse for delaying turnover of their surface-to-air missile- 280 -SECRET
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SECRET(SAM) sites to the Cubans.Finally Rusk recommended that CIA's raiding assets be kept in being but not actually used--at least until the OAS and SAM sites problems could be clarified. The President accepted this recommendation. Although CIA did try to keep its sabotage agents ready, the White House decision spelled the end of the Agency's sabotage (though not support and intelligence-collecting) infiltrations of Cuba. [^306]Agency-sponsored radio propaganda aimed at Cuba reached its peak in early 1965 with an actual expenditure of about $1,500,000 and expansion still planned. The semi-notional Cuban Freedom Committee served as cover for Radio Free Cuba, which broadcast a total of 77 hours weekly from transmitters in Miami, Key West, and New Orleans.Started in 1961, the Cuban Freedom Committee retained a public relations firm and spent $7,000 annually to establish its cover by soliciting *bona fide* public contributions. In its first year these totalled $5,000, but by 1965 public support had dwindled to $200. One of the difficulties was that any widespread US appeal for funds for Radio Free Cuba- 281 -SECRET[^306]: 306/
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# SECRETwould perforce have to attack Castro, and might there- fore be considered domestic propaganda exceeding CIA's charter.Outside the committee, CIA operated a trans- mitter calling itself Radio Americas and broad- casting from Swan Island, and bought time for anti- Cuban broadcasts from three commercial stations. Programming on these four stations totalled 119 hours weekly in addition to the 77 on Radio FreeCuba. [^1]Swan Island, roughly a mile and a half long and three-quarters of a mile wide, lies in the Carib- bean 125 miles north of the Honduran coast. Both the United States and Honduras claimed sovereignty over the island in the 1960's. The US Weather Bureau had manned a weather station there since 1949, and CIA first set up a covert transmitter in 1954 to support its propa- ganda against the Arbenz regime in Guatemala.*Apart from the question of its real impact-in Cuba and the psychological problems of a staff living[^1]: Under a 1971 agreement the US relinquished its claim to sovereignty but retained the right to operate a weather station.- 282 -SECRET
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SECRETin almost total isolation, the Swan Island transmitter raised a nightmare of cover complications. Operating as Radio Americas, it was supposedly under cover of the Vanguard Service Corporation, an Agency proprietary which offered no services, and the Gibraltar Steamship Corporation, another proprietary which operated no steamships. A Boston millionaire who claimed to own the island collected rent from the Vanguard Corporation, which could not afford to argue, but not from the Weather Bureau, which disputed his claim. Vanguard contracted with Coastal Air of Miami for one light-aircraft supply flight a week and with the Logistics Service Corporation of Philadelphia, a Philco subsidiary, to maintain the island facilities and transmitting equipment. All of this enabled CIA to play tapes and broadcast the commentaries of the three Cuban announcers stationed on the island, but it did not prevent Radio Habana from pinpointing the transmitter and calling it a CIA propaganda mechanism.[^308]Nevertheless in early 1965 Congressman Roman C. Pucinski (D-Ill.), a member of the Cuban Freedom Committee executive board, was pressing CIA to saturate- 283 -SECRET[^308]:
[104-10301-10001.pdf — page 16]
SECRETthe Cuban airwaves and smuggle or airdrop transistorradios into Cuba to expand the audience. Inside theAgency FitzGerald politely rejected the congressionaladvice but pointed out that WH Division already wasplanning the University of the Air,* which wouldbroadcast college-level courses to divide the loyalty309/of Cuban students.Another congressional critic was SenatorEugene McCarthy (D-Minn.), perennial sponsor of billsto create a CIA Watchdog Committee and author of aJanuary 1964 *Saturday Evening Post* article entitled"The CIA Is Getting Out Of Hand." In April 1965FitzGerald and Seymour Bolten of WH Division metwith the Senator to discuss the Christian Democraticsocial and political programs of the Catholic Churchin Latin America. After this meeting McCarthy, adevout Catholic, considerably tempered his assess-310/ment of the Agency.US relations with Cuba entered a new phaseafter the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 when Agency* This project was abandoned following press expo-  sure of CIA's relations with American universities  and student groups.- 284 -SECRET
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SECRETfacilities provided the Kennedy administration with positive information on the buildup of Soviet missile capability on the island. This episode is documented elsewhere and is outside the scope of this present paper.One of FitzGerald's major successes against Cuba was in the field of economic warfare--called the MHVIPER program in CIA. After a hurricane ripped through the island in 1964, Castro's economists and publicists began a campaign to persuade free-world sugar brokers that the Cuban sugar crop had been badly damaged and exports would be low. The object, of course, was to drive up sugar prices on the world market, on which Castro depended for hard currency to finance imports.At first the campaign worked and sugar prices did skyrocket. But FitzGerald was not convinced, and sent Natalie Scott[^3] to London to study economic reports from the British Embassy in Havana. Partly on the basis of her research, the US Government's sugar-crop forecasters concluded that despite the hurricane Cuba would harvest more sugar than ever. FitzGerald arranged to have a Department of- 285 -SECRET[^3]: Natalie Scott
[104-10301-10001.pdf — page 18]
# SECRETState official leak this general conclusion to the *New York Times*. Sugar prices dipped, but rallied when Castro indignantly denied the *Times* story. The Department then officially announced the US Government estimate that there would be no shortage of Cuban sugar. As it turned out, the US estimate was right.After the official announcement world sugar prices dropped several cents per pound, and this time they stayed down. At a time when fluctuations of one cent a pound meant millions of dollars to the Cuban economy, publication of the essentially correct estimate upset Castro's attempts to manipulate the market. [^1]Late in the summer of 1964 the DDI told Fitz-Gerald that the Department of State was inquiring informally about the possibility of setting up a CIA channel for plausibly deniable clandestine contacts with Cuba. FitzGerald replied:It seems to me that the establishment of a continuous two-way conversation with Fidel Castro at a time when we have nothing to convey to him would be a serious mistake.... It may be that Secretary Rusk feels that the present establishment of conversations with Fidel Castro should- 286 -# SECRET[^1]: 311/
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SECRETbe considered in order to make sure that we will have the ability to speak to him when or if the time comes. On this score I do not feel there is any reason for worry. There are a number of ways in which we can communicate to Fidel Castro virtually at a moment's notice. 312/Part of CIA's economic warfare against Cuba involved an elaborate scheme to supply tampered petroleum additives through an Agency mechanism in Antwerp. This was planned as subtle sabotage; after being mixed with Soviet petroleum the additives would surely but imperceptibly incapacitate Cuban machinery. Unfortunately, the doctored additives proved anything but subtle and the Cubans promptly discovered they 313/ were unusable.Also a failure was an attempt by Francis S. Sherry and William C. Boner, Jr., of the Cuban Operations Group (WH/COG) to persuade Detroit automobile executives to produce spare parts deliberately designed to break down. Sherry and Boner went to Detroit in early March 1965 and explained to manufacturing vice presidents that the defective parts could be sent to Cuba through third-country suppliers. But the automobile executives refused to cooperate; they feared that their companies' reputations would- 287 -SECRET
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SECRETbe ruined if the doctored parts accidentally got in-314/to the wrong channels.In the wake of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 and the active years of 1962-1964,anti-Castro operations began to diminish in 1965.Operations continued but at a slower pace. John L.Hart had the title of Deputy Chief, WH Division, forCuba (DCWHD/C), and operated a large base in Miamiwith virtual autonomy. A chain of safehouses,training sites and boat-moorages stretched throughthe Florida keys to Key West. From these CIAlaunched maritime operations which regularly placedand retrieved agents from the Cuban coast, but whoseintelligence product often did not justify the315/effort.Meanwhile CIA ran a dwindling number ofon-island intelligence agents, including somehandled in cooperation with the US Navy base atGuantanamo, where hundreds of Cubans still workedby day and returned to Castroland at night. Asthe Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI)improved and expanded under Soviet tutelage, CIAagent networks were rolled up and even singleton- 288 -SECRET
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SECRETagents dropped out of contact. Typical was RadioHabana's 12 May 1965 announcement that "31 counter-revolutionaries, members of a CIA espionage network"had been arrested. Of the 14 actually named in thebroadcast, WH Division identified six who had workedwith Juan Bautista Perez Luis (AMTAUP-10), chiefgardener at the naval base and principal agent forCIA. Although he had been debriefed in Miami in Jan-uary, Perez' location and status were not known inMay. 316/Probably the most successful political oper-ation in WH Division's history was the Chilean elec-tion of 4 September 1964 in which Eduardo Frei ofthe Christian Democratic Party decisively defeatedSalvador Allende, Marxist leader of a Communist-dominated coalition.* Drawing on covert mechanismsestablished by Santiago Station years earlier, plusnew procedures and assets developed for the election,the campaign to assure Frei's victory cost CIA about$2,600,000. Its success kept Allende at bay until1970, when no such intervention by CIA was authorized.* For a full description, see "The Chilean Election  Operation of 1964, a Case History, 1961-1964."  CSHP-1.- 289 -SECRET
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SECRETthat FitzGerald had won the President's confidencein several meetings. Freeman, who had been in Mexicoonly a few months, apparently simmered down after histalk with the assistant_secretary. 318/The Mexico City Station devoted a major partof its time to running or supporting operationsagainst Cuba; 47 percent of its cable traffic con-cerned Cuban operations. Mexico was the only LatinAmerican country maintaining diplomatic relationswith Castro and had the only direct air link to Ha-vana. WH Division assigned top priority to recruit-ing agents in place in Cuba, and Mexico City Stationnot only ran its own operations but supported thetentative plans of other stations.The variety and volume of technical operationscreated a heavy workload managing safehouses, listen-ing posts, and vehicles. For photography alone thestation had six base houses commanding the entrancesto target embassies, two mobile photosurveillancetrucks, and three agents trained in photosurveillanceon foot. It was such projects that provided informa-tion on the visits of Lee Harvey Oswald, PresidentKennedy's assassin, to the Cuban and Soviet Embassies- 293 -SECRET
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SECRETin Mexico. 319/CIA's clandestine information on Oswald, including a photograph showing him in front of the Soviet Embassy, was turned over to the FBI, which promised to safeguard Agency sources and methods. Instead, the Bureau showed the photograph to Oswald's mother in Dallas and told her it was a CIA photo. The mother gave the press a garbled story about the photo, the FBI gave the press the correct story, and eventually CIA's clandestine information became part of the voluminous Warren Commission report on the Kennedy assassination. In the process Mexico City Station had to abandon its photosurveillance base houses, which had been thoroughly blown. 320/In the early 1960's WH Division built an extensive political polling mechanism around the Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems, a proprietary whose project cryptonym was JMTUBA. From 1962 to 1966 the institute conducted 20 polls in nine Latin American countries. Their cost cannot be computed because many of the expenses were charged to other projects.In FY 1965, for example, political polls in- 294 -SECRET
[104-10301-10002.pdf — page 0]
# SECRETCIA Internal Use OnlyAccess Controlled by DDP# HISTORICAL STAFF# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY# THE CLANDESTINE SERVICE HISTORICAL SERIESCS HP 334# COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONSSOVIET RUSSIA DIVISION1946-1965byFrederick WaltersAugust 1972David H. BleeChief, SB DivisionVOLUME ICopy No. 1: SBCopy No. 2: O/DDPSECRET
[104-10301-10002.pdf — page 1]
13-00000SECRETavailable to SR/CI/Research on that particular sub-ject. Some of these studies were sterilized sub-sequently for passage to a wider list of recipientsthan the sensitivity of the original productionpermitted. Some studies were translated and givento foreign liaison services.* Many of these studieswere the result of suggestions for research topicsfrom other SR Division offices, CIA-wide components,and organizations outside the CIA.Throughout the period of this history, SR/-Reports, in coordination with Chief,SR/CI, had re-sponsibility for the dissemination of timely generalCI reports on the RIS. The area division concerneddisseminated CI reports on the RIS which were clearlyof only local significance.J. Warren Commission StudiesThe President's Commission on the Assassina-tion of President Kennedy, also known as the WarrenCommission, through its General Counsel, Mr. J. LeeRankin, frequently called upon the CIA for information* Attachment C lists the more important studies  disseminated by SR/CI/Research and its predecessor  organizations.- 71 -SECRET
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SECRETin 1964. SR/CI/Research Branch responded to many of these requests for information working through CI Staff which assumed managerial control for CIA communications with the commission. The branch furnished information to the commission on a wide variety of topics concerning the RIS, Lee Harvey Oswald, and Oswald's associates in the USSR.*In a meeting between CIA representatives and Messrs. Allen Dulles and Rankin of the Warren Commission on 14 January 1964, Rankin asked that CIA draft questions to be included in a letter to the Soviet Government concerning the Oswald case. The questions were to be "not too technical," should be sent soon, and were to be phrased in generalities in order to allow the Soviets more flexibility than would a longer, more pointed letter based on concrete US Government findings. These questions constituted the first direct involvement of Wigren and his Research Branch in the commission's work.The commission wished to account in detail for all of Oswald's activities outside the United* See Attachment D.- 72 -SECRET