Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10306-10016.pdf — page 10]
# Notes on Remarks by President Kennedy before the National Security CouncilTuesday, January 22, 1963I will start by reviewing areas of policy which will be before us in the coming months and indicate the general attitude which I have toward them and to emphasize where we might put our emphasis in the next few months.The responsibilities of the United States are worldwide and the U.S. is the only country which is recognizing its wide responsibilities. We are part of NATA, SEATO, etc. and support other pacts even though we are not a part of them. Other nations are not doing their share.Would like to say a word first about Cuba.The indications are that the importance of timing is of paramount importance in reaching judgments -- both by the USSR and the US. Our big problem is to protect our interests and prevent a nuclear war. It was a very close thing whether we would engage in a quarantine or an air strike. In looking back, it was realy that it presented us with an immediate crises and the USSR had to make their judgment and come to a decision to act in twelve hours. In looking back over that four or five day period, we all changed our views somewhat, or at least appreciated the advantages and disadvantages of alternate cources of action. That is what we should do in any other struggle with the Soviet Union -- and I believe we will be in one in the future. We should have sufficient time to consider the alternatives. You could see that the Russians had a good deal of debate in a 48 hour period. If they had only to act in an hour or two, their actions would have been spasmodic and might have resulted in nuclear war. It is important that we have time to study their reaction. We should continue our policy even though we do not get Europe to go along with us.
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TOP SECRET2. The time will probably come when we will have to act again on Cuba.Cuba might be our response in some future situation -- the same way the Russians have used Berlin. We may decide that Cuba might be a more satisfactory response than a nuclear response. We must be ready -- although this might not come. We should be prepared to move on Cuba if it should be in our national interest. The planning by the US, by the Military, in the direction of our effort should be advanced always keeping Cuba in mind in the coming months and to be ready to move with all possible speed. We can use Cuba to limit their actions just as they have had Berlin to limit our actions.In thematter of Europe, the US has been faced since 1958 with deGaulle's position. ... nuclear veto by French .... President Eisenhower reviewed the problem and took the position that it should be reviewed by the NATO nations -- the NATO nations would not act. ... no agreement between the Three. That decision this Administration also supported. However, this decision has not produced the present contention with the French. Even when I was in Paris last June, de Gaulle said he would make some proposal in regard to NATO itself. All through his speeches and his memoirs he indicates it is his desire to have a Europe in which France would be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and to the Western World as an equal. If we had given him atomic weapons he would be difficult to deal with.De Gaulle did not question our support of Western Europe because we have maintained strong representation there, but the French have not. They have not been aggressive as we have been and, therefore it is not a distrust of us that we will desert Europe but it is that he feels that France shou'd assert a position as a strong France and cease its growing reliance on the U.S.
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FUP SECRET3.Having made such proposals to the US and Great Britain and been turned down, he has made the same turn to Germany. This is not so bad as it has prevented Germany moving to the East. And, historically, Germany's trade has been to the East. There is not much harm to us in this position. With Great Britain joining the Common Market, this would strengthen Europe but France will not let them in at this time. If G.B. does go in, it will cost us a good deal in trade, but it will be good for the stability of Europe. France keeping Britain out is a setback for us, but a more severe setback for G.B. They are going to have a difficult time in Europe. It is our interest to strengthen Europe and the unilateral concept, and deGaulle is opposed to this. By strengthening the multilateral concept, it strengthens NATO and increases their dependence on us. This strengthens our invluence in Europe and gives us the power to guide Europe and keep it strong. The events of the past two weeks makes it important for us to support the multilateral concept and that is why deGaulle is more opposed to it. It will be difficult to work this out, but it is important that we do so. But we should not be wholly distressed.After all we have done for France in so many ways, deGaulle has opposed us in many places throughout the world - in NATO, in the Congo and other places - but he is there and we have to live with it. One way we can do so is to strengthen the mutilateral force and NATO.Our negotiators on trade matters will have to be very careful to protect our interests. Our trade balance is of great concern and is not under control. If we get down to the $12 billion coverage of our national reserve we will be in trouble. We will have pressure on the dollar and pressure from the Congress and they will begin to follow a much narrower policy. We will
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TOP SECRET4. We will be very tough about the actions that Europe takes. We maintain large forces in West Germany. If West Germany does not maintain sufficient forces but instead concentrats on agricultural production for instance to our detriment, we must take a strong position. At present we are paying helf of Norway's air and sea power for instance and supporting NATO, and they are "living off the fat of the land" while we are paying for their protection. In the coming months we must concentrate on howwe can protect the interests of the United States. We have pursued a very generous policy. We have lost our economic power over these countries. Now we are running out and if the French and others get atomic capacity they will be independent and we will be on the outside looking in. Do not think that the Europeans will do anything for us even though we have done a lot for them. So we must have all our representatives looking out very strongly for the U.S. interests. We must be sure our economic house is in order and use our military, policital power to protect our own interests.Regarding our attitude toward the neutrals. There is criticism about our lack of difference between the Allies and the neutrals. the Pakistanis are critical, but we must recognize the importance of the Indians. If they joined the Chinese we would have no free south Asia. The Pakistannis are struggling against the Indians and the Afganistans. They will use or attempt to exploit our power. Our interest is to make a strong sub-continent. We will use the country that can help further that aim. We have used India lately. We do not like their present leadership, but we can use them. While doing this we have moved away from the Pakistannis and they are moving closer to the Chinese and against the Indians. We have not been able to persuade
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TOP SECRET98the Pakistannis or the Afganistans to chance their policy on India. These forces were there long before we came on the scene and we cannot do much about it -- we cannot settle all the disputes, but we want to keep them free from the Communists. We cannot permit those who call themselves neutrals to be completely taken into the Communist camp. We must keep our ties with Nassir and others, even though we do not like the leaders themselves.With regard to AID which is going forward under General Clay, we hope we can tie this whole concept of aid to the safety of the United States. This is the reason we give aid. The test is whether it will serve the United States and if we can equate it to that. AID is not a good word. Perhaps we can describe it better as Mutual Assistance -- though this is an old term. Some countries can go it alone, but we must do all we can. We must make every effort to keep a country out of the communist bloc. It is more difficult to get a country out of a communist bloc once it is in. It sometimes seems hopeless. The Congress may cut the heart out of Foreign Aid and this is a great danger to the safety of the United States. Even the French give more aid than we do on a per capita basis. We will probably take a cut, but we do not want to hurt our Defense effort. We would not like four or five countries to suddenly turn communist just because we did not give a certain amount of aid. We must look this over very carefully and put aid on the basis it will best serve our own interest.
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6. 98Turning to the domestic scene we will have a deficit of a bout $12 of $12½ billion. We have made an effort to hold the deficit down and we have in the past three years. Except for Defense and Space and Interest on the Debt we have increased the National Budget but it has been increased less than it was under the previous Administration. With the tremendous movement from the country to the cities, we have had many problems. While the costs have increased, the receipts have dropped. We have only increased about 1% a year in the growth rate during the past ten years. This is serious, particularly with the great increase in population.98I think this Tax Bill is very important. If we get another recession in this country it will have a bad effect on the gold reserve. It will have a bad psycological effect on the people of the U.S. And when we see the strong position that Mr. Khruschev is taking with regard to agricultural and other domestic sections of the economy -- and if we just drift, we will look very bad to other nations.Furthermore, the deficit is a reflection of the fight in the hot and 98 cold war we have been fighting during the past fifteen years. If we go to a deficit of $12 billion, this would be a most serious affair for the United States. If we can go forward with the present Tax Bill, we will be in much better shape. All of these matters -- the tax program, AID, defense, etc. are all related.98The Military are disturbed because of our failure to go forward with certain programs. For instance: The B-70, Nike-Zeus, Skybolt. As a matter of fact, we are going forward with a large program and there is a limit to how much we can do, and if the necessity develops we will do more
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TOP SECRET7.This Administration has spent a good many millions more than has been appropriated for Space and Defense -- and perhaps we should spend more.One of our big jobs will be to persuade our colleagues in Europe to do a better job themselves. If we maintain six divisions in Europe and they only maintain a force which will permit them to fight only two or three days -- if we have sufficient force to fight and supply for ninety days and those around us can only fight for two or three days, then we should take another look. France carries their burden abroad, but not in Europe. We should consider very hard the narrow interests of the United States as well as the interests of the Free World. If we grown weak economically, our influence will grown less and less and if that happens, our Free World's position will grown weaker. De Gaulle is basing his whole position on the position of the United States. He can do this because he feels we will maintain our military power in Europe and he can bank on it.[^1]Mr. Foster is engaged in the Test Ban. We might be successful here if the Russians need it and if they know that we will change this if the Chicoms develop an atomic capacity. If they do we will have great difficulty in protecting Asia. If the Test Ban Treaty is successful it will inhibit the Russians from starting a nuclear war and if so we should make every effort to conclude the treaty. But if the nuclear test ban includes only the Russians and the U.S. it is not worth very much.. We should support Foster all we can until we see where it is going. If we get a successful treaty, we will fight it through if it will help us. (On the Hill ?)[^1]Thanks for your cooperation. All worked well together and harmoniously. Hope we can maintain the mutual relations which have been so good in this Administration.[^1]: 7
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13-0000023 March 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILESUBJECT: Meeting on the Multi-lateral Forces - 5:30 p.m., 22 March, 1963ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretaries McNamara, Gilpatric, Rusk, Ball, General Taylor, Ambassador Merchant, Mr. McCone, Mr. Kaysen and several othersThe purpose of the meeting was to receive Ambassador Merchant's report on his visits to the Capitals. Merchant reported qualified success, indicating reservations by the German, Italians and British for various reasons, the two most prominent ones being:a. Problem of control;b. Use of surface ships versus submarines.A long discussion ensued in which it was evident that there was no clear-cut decision on the part of those in attendance as to the extent of the control of the United States versus control by European countries since it seemed to mean that control should shape up so that missiles could not be fired without United States clearance; on the other hand the United States should not be able to unilaterally decide to fire the missiles. However, no country or group of countries exclusive of the United States should be likewise able to fire them.There was a difference of opinion between State and Merchant on the one hand, and of the President on the other, as to whether Merchant's discussions should be reviewed with the Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, and Joint Committees at this time. The President was insistent that no approach be made to Congress at this time. Merchant dissented from this viewpoint but agreed to the President's directive.It was felt that the final expression of viewpoints should be sought from the Germans and the Italians, and it was agreed to draft a letter to Adenauer seeking an expression from him, with a similar letter to the Italians, though it was thought that no opinion should be sought from the Italians because of the impending election.
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13-00000SECRET EYES ONLYWith respect to submarine versus surface ships, McNamara restated the opinion that surface ships were better and were quite invulnerable because they would operate in coastal waters where several thousand ships of all types would be operating and therefore the missile ships could not be readily identified and attacked.The President seemed to feel that the multi-lateral forces idea was not going to go any place; as he wound up, he seemed to be thinking more of how the idea could be put to bed without its failure being used against the United States or his administration to the advantage of de Gaulle and others who held stricly to the "European control" idea.No action was required on our part. I expressed no viewpoint at this meeting.JOHN A. MCCONEDirectorJAM/mfb
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# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting with the President on Cuba at 1100 on19 December 19631. Included in the meeting were Acting Secretary of State   Ball, Acting Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Secretary Cyrus   Vance, Secretary Douglas Dillon, Ambassador Thompson,   General Wheeler, Mr. Donald Wilson, Mr. McGeorge Bundy,   Mr. Bromley Smith, Mr. Edwin Martin, Mr. Ted Sorensen,   Mr. John Crimins, Mr. Gordon Chase, Mr. George Ready,   Mr. Bill Moyers, General Carter, Mr. Helms, and Mr. Fitz-Gerald.2. The President, after full discussion, postponed any   sizable operations by FitzGerald, primarily to avoid any possible   embarrassment to our OAS negotiations on the Venezuelan arms   cache. We are authorized to continue to put forward proposals   for operations and also to continue preparations for air ops. The   main thrust was to greatly increase political action with Canada,   Britain, Spain, Italy, and others in an effort to promote greater   economic blockade.3. Mr. Bundy later stated that his analysis of the meeting   was that the President would continue to approve smaller   FitzGerald-type operations even though they would be relatively   unrewarding if they would assist in keeping up the morale of the   troops on shore, of our agents, and otherwise help in keeping the   ball rolling.Marshall S. CarterLieutenant General, USAActing Director
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting at the White House 19 December 1963PRESENT: The PresidentThe State Department: Under Secretary George W.Ball, Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson,Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson,Assistant Secretary for Inter-AmericanAffairs Edwin Martin, Coordinator of CubanAffairs John H. Crimmins.The Defense Department: Deputy Secretary RoswellGilpatric, Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance.Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Wheeler.USIA: Deputy Director Donald M. Wilson.The Treasury Department: Secretary Douglas Dillon.The White House Staff: Executive Assistant to thePresident McGeorge Bundy, Messrs. George Reedyand Williams Moyers.and Gordon Chase.CIA: General Marshall S. Carter, Messrs. RichardHelms and Desmond FitzGerald.1. The President arrived at the meeting approximately five minutes early -- prior to the arrival of several members of the group including Mr. Bundy. Without a formal introduction I commenced the scheduled briefing on the Agency Cuban program at the urging of the President and despite the activities of the Presidential photographer.2. The President appeared interested in the number of agents inside Cuba but made no particular comment concerning the program until the subject of economic denial was introduced. He asked to be told what additional measures could be taken to step up the denial program. I said that the![illegible]
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2The principal soft spots among free world countries appearedat the present time to be Canada, the U.K. and Spain.The President requested a memorandum setting forth specificsconcerning leaks of economically strategic items from thesethree countries together with recommendations as to whatcould be done to stop these leaks. He requested UnderSecretary Ball to prepare to make demarches to the govern-ments of these three countries as well as any othersengaged in the Cuba trade contrary to our interests. Heappeared particularly interested in the subject of econo-mic denial and returned to it several times.3. After hearing a brief description of our progress   in connection with promoting disaffection among the Cuban   military, the President said that it did not seem to him   that we had gone very far along this line and that one   day those concerned in Cuba matters, including himself,   would have to face the "grand jury" (of domestic public   opinion) to account for our progress in our attempts to   find a solution to the Cuban situation. I pointed out   that the program being presented was, with the exception   of the economic denial item, entirely a covert program and,   if run at full capacity, would tax the capabilities of the   clandestine services -- in other words, that if new and   broader measures against Cuba were to be undertaken, they   would have to be within the overt field.4. After a brief description of the sabotage and   harassment program the subject of the proposed Matanzas   raid was discussed. After hearing the pros and cons the   President stated that he did not feel that the present time   was a good one to conduct an operation of this magnitude   which carried a less than 50 percent chance of success. He   said that he felt that such an operation, if pinned directly   on the U.S., might cause the Soviets to move in the wrong   direction with respect to Cuba, i. e, increase their econo-   mic aid or their military presence. Recognizing that a   cessation of raids would have a bad morale effect within   Cuba, he agreed that low risk operations, with admittedly   lower economic and psychological impact, should be con-   ducted. He further stated that planning for such opera-   tions as Matanzas should be continued. General Wheeler   raised the possibility of air strikes against major targets   by autonomous groups. This was discussed and it was agreed   that in view of the fact that preparations would take at   least three months, these preparations should proceed and   the question re-examined at the time that capabilities have   been perfected.
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35. On the question of autonomous groups the President asked the cost of these operations (five million dollars). He also asked the cost of Cuban operations for the current year (21 or 2 million dollars) and the total Agency budget.6. The intelligence summary concerning Cuba prepared by General Carter for the meeting was examined.7. Mr. Bundy then reviewed current U.S. policy vis-a-vis Cuba. He then went down a check list of possible new courses of action taken from the Department of State paper prepared for the December 13 Standing Group meeting. Unilateral actions presented were:(1) Air attacks by our autonomous groups. No further discussion.(2) Selective relaxation of U.S. controls against exile groups in Florida. No comment on Mr. Bundy's generally unfavorable presentation.(3) Military feints. No comment on generally unfavorable presentation.(4) Low-level reconnaissance flights. Comment by Assistant Secretary Martin concerning the value of keeping open the franchise for low-level flights. Acknowledgement of certain value to the intelligence community. No decision requested.(5) Extension of efforts to eliminate free world shipping from the Cuba trade. No decision requested.(6) Presidential declaration concerning U.S. policy on Cuba designed to stimulate anti-Castro dissidence in the armed forces. Mr. Bundy's comments indicated that there was room for a stronger statement than that made by President Kennedy in Miami.(7) Talks with the Soviets and the Cubans. Not elaborated and no comment.(8) Other forms of covert actions. Not specified or elaborated.