Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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TOP SECRETmissiles located in Cuba posed to the United States and Latin America. He requested as well a continuing analysis of the numbers and types of Soviet and Oriental (as reported by De Vosjoli) personnel being introduced, the quantities and types of equipment, their probable uses, and all construction activity in Cuba. In response to the President's question about our ability to discriminate between SAM and surface-to-surface missile sites, McCone said we probably could not differentiate between SAM sites and 350-mile surface-to-surface missiles, but that MRBMs and IRBMS could be distinguished. McNamara noted that portable missiles could not be located under any circumstances.The President wondered whether we should make a statement of our position in advance, outlining the courses of action open to us in the event that the Soviets should install missiles in Cuba. He also asked what we could do against such missile sites. Could we take them out by air action, or would ground action be required? Could they be destroyed by a substantial guerrilla action? He also asked what we should do in Cuba if the Soviets decided to precipitate a crisis in Berlin.Secretary Rusk received approval for his proposal that the United States inform its NATO allies, particularly Canada, of the growing seriousness of the situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, strongly opposed his recommendation to remove restrictions on MONGOOSE operations operating out of Guantanamo. McCone again proposed his three-part program to combat the current Cuban
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TOP SECRETsituation. After consideration, the President directed the Defense Department to prepare contingency plans for possible military action against Cuba. He and his advisors agreed, however, that no steps should be taken until full agreement was reached on a policy aimed at completely solving the Cuban problem.Cuba was our most serious problem, McCone shortly afterward told Robert Kennedy, adding that, in comparison, he would readily give up our missile bases in Italy and Turkey. Cuba, he told the Attorney General, was more important than Berlin. It was the key to Latin America; and if Castro succeeded, then most of Latin America would fall to Soviet influence and domination.WORKING DRAFT 99Handle via (BYEMAN) Control System47TOP SECRETBY NO. 018-88copy 2 of 2
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13-00000TOP SECRETforty-eight hours should the President's terms not be met.Sunday morning, October 28, with U-2 overflights continuing and no evidence of slow-down on the Cuban missile sites, Moscow broadcast yet another Khrushchev communique--this one announcing that, in the interest of world peace, the Soviet Union had agreed to dismantle and return the Cuban missiles under United Nations verification. Not waiting for the official text, the President drafted a quick acceptance. The immediate crisis was over.***Serious problems, however, remained. It had become clear to McCone that removing Castro no longer was an objective of American policy, and he was concerned that, as a result of Soviet military and economic aid, Castro would be left in a position to create much mischief. Since no agreement had been reached for on-site inspection, and the SAM system remained in place to limit aerial inspection, the DCI and intelligence community would not be able to verify the removal or check on possible future reintroduction of Cuban missiles. Further, the MONGOOSE operation, tasked with toppling Castro, was in disarray. Lansdale complained he was not being kept informed of JCS planning and that the CIA's Cuban Task Force was acting outside MONGOOSE channels. At the height of the missile crisis (on October 26), a high-level meeting on MONGOOSE agreed to recall intelligence collection teams and discontinueWORKING DRAFTHandle via BYEMAN Control SystemBY NO. 018-88copy 3 of 284TOP SECRET![signature]
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TOP SECRETsabotage operations while relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were so delicate.On November 3, McCone informed the Executive Committee that, despite indications that the missiles were being dismantled, there also were signs that the Soviets were taking steps which might represent a continuing threat to the United States. More IL-28s had been uncrated; some fourteen Soviet ships were en route to Cuba, and there were indications that the Soviets were proceeding with plans to develop a submarine support base at Banes. Stressing the unprecedented nature of the SAM system deployment and the fact that the system remained in place to provide a shield from aerial inspection, McCone emphasized that we did not and could not know the exact number of offensive missiles originally placed in Cuba or whether all in fact had been removed. Indeed, McCone pointed out, there remained a distinct possibility that missile complexes could be hidden from view in Cuba's caves.The President listened to McCone's warning but appeared more concerned about the question of past intelligence failures. For by this time postmortems had begun to surface alleging either a near intelligence failure or the withholding of vital intelligence information on the Cuban missile build-up. Deeply concerned, McCone had already ordered an intensive internal investigation. Now the President himself requested a review of the entire intelligence community, seeking a judgment as to whether better intelligence and intelligence evaluation could have forecast Cuban developments more
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TOP SECREThowever, that the United States continue its surveillance and beprepared to act if a plane were shot down.With the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners and the completionof Donovan's mission, McCone again pressed for low-level flightsover Cuba--a recommendation supported by the USIB but opposed byboth McNamara and Rusk because of its possible politicalconsequences. Noting that the administration could not very wellignore the views of the DCI and USIB, President Kennedy proposedthree sorties on a trial basis. But, after considering the pros andcons, the President on May 21 decided to postpone a subsequentlow-level mission on the grounds of insufficient urgency.Following the missile crisis, Cuban exile groups escalated theiractivities, but the Executive Committee was unable to come to a firmagreement on how to respond. Similarly, the Special Group toconsider Cuban sabotage operations met with disagreement andindecision. It was clear McCone stood virtually alone in his viewthat the United States should sustain an aggressive approach towardsCuba, with the dual aim of getting rid of both the Soviet presenceand Castro. No senior officials went so far as to propose that thecovert action program be stopped; but the original impetus whichhad given birth to the program had all but disappeared.American policy towards Cuba, and especially the Agency's rolein supporting this policy, remained ambigious for the rest ofMcCone's tenure. Officially, the United States held the SovietWORKING DRAFT 99Handle via [BYEMAN] Control System92TOP SECRET
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13-00000TOP SECRETmilitary presence in and Castro's control over Cuba to beunacceptable. Practically, however, the disposition to take strongactions had weakened. Instead, the administration was willing toaccept the removal of the missiles as an adequate foreign policyachievement.McCone never accepted this judgment; he never was comfortablewith the policy restrictions placed on Cuban operations, and henever wavered in his conviction that in order to carry out the taskslevied on him as DCI, he needed the freedom to carry out intensivereconnaissance and covert operations.Under President Johnson, there were flurries of concern aboutCuba; but, after the missile crisis, the momentum had largelydisappeared. The United States government turned its attention toother issues, and McCone found himself once again fully engaged.WORKING DRAFT 99.Handle via BYEMAN Control System93TOP SECRETBY NO. 018-88copy 2 of 2
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TOP SECRET# CHAPTER XVIIIShortly before the coup began, on 1 November 1963, Diem suddenly became cooperative.Lodge and Admiral Harry Felt (CINCPAC) had been at the Presidential palace until almost noon. Rather than see Felt off at the airport, Diem asked if Lodge would remain. Lodge stayed, and Diem proceded to tell him that he could understand President Kennedy's concerns about South Vietnam. Lodge should assure the President that he, Diem, was prepared to take almost any steps the United States considered appropriate to correct existing problems and improve relations.Diem's concessions--if that was what they were--came too late.At about the same time, General Don's aide-de-camp directed Lou Conein to go at once to the Joint General Staff headquarters. Assigned a private telephone, Conein proceeded to provide a comprehensive, current and coherent account of the coup to the CIA station in Saigon. The station, in turn, informed Washington.The first reports reached Washington shortly after midnight. By mid-morning it was clear the coup was likely to succeed. By this time, however, both Diem and Nhu were dead, and the President was
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TOP SECRETconcerned about the circumstances. When the facts became known, he said, he hoped the new government would be able to state that the Ngo brothers had either committed suicide or violated their surrender agreement, rather than been murdered in cold blood.The President was also concerned that the new government might be tempted to offer amnesty to the Viet Cong. He consequently was emphatic that we watch with care the type of political leadership the military group might install. Warning against the installation of ultra-liberals or quasi-Communists with a free hand in political affairs, he remarked that he was more interested in an effective than a "pretty" government.As a result, President Kennedy sent William Colby, in the capacity of Presidential representative, to Saigon--an assignment which McCone noted with pleasure as a mark of great confidence in both Colby and the CIA.On November 18, McCone, Rusk, McNamara and Bundy flew to Honolulu to confer with Lodge and Harkins. McCone later reported that the formal briefing sessions had gone fairly predictably until an economist named Silver from AID had discussed the South Vietnamese economy, with its huge deficits and unfavorable balance of trade. This briefing triggered a lively discussion and the general conclusion that the Vietnamese economic situation was bleak, with no apparent solution in sight.There was other bad news as well. In some areas, the Viet Cong reportedly had a better strategic hamlet and school system than theWORKING DRAFT 99Handle via [BYEMAN] Control SystemBY NO. 018-88copy 2 of 2294TOP SECRET![signature]
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TOP SECRETgovernment. And it was clear to everyone present that the military situation was far from rosy, although Harkins tried to put it in a good light. The meeting decided that a major effort should be made to construct strategic hamlets and to wage anti-guerrilla warfare in the delta region, but McCone returned more discouraged than ever about Vietnam and believed McNamara and Bundy shared this impression. Lodge, McCone remarked, would emerge from Vietnam either as a fourteen-foot-tall political giant or as a thoroughly washed-up government official.***The end of the Diem era marked one kind of transition in Vietnam; President Kennedy's assassination, on November 22, marked another.The day after the assassination, as official Washington and the world were trying to come to grips with the shocking news, McCone told his morning meeting that he knew very little about the new President's personal relationships around Washington or his position on current issues. In late August, Lyndon Johnson as Vice President had been opposed to ousting the Diem regime, but McCone had not even spoken with him since the time of the Cuban prisoner exchange.McCone then reviewed the CIA memorandum on world reactions to the President's assassination and ordered that it be disseminated. He also reviewed the President's Intelligence Checklist and directed
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13-00000TOP SECRETthat it be delivered to the White House as usual. Johnson wasunaware of the checklist, having previously received the CurrentIntelligence Bulletin. McCone reported that Johnson had toldMcGeorge Bundy to carry on as before, and that the Agency shouldtherefore continue to move its publications through the usualchannels until directed otherwise.In other ways, McCone attempted to carry on as before. Beforethe morning meeting, he had instructed Walt Elder to telephoneJohnson's secretary to tell her that he would be at the White Houseat 9:00 a.m. as usual, to give the President his regular morningintelligence briefing. This message was relayed as a statement offact. The only question was whether Johnson would be going to hisold office in the Executive Office Building or to the Oval Office.The word came back that Johnson was on his way to the White House.McCone accordingly was at the White House by 9:00 a.m. At 9:15,President Johnson arrived.Johnson opened the conversation by recalling a long backgroundof association and friendship with McCone. On a number of issueswhich had arisen since McCone had become DCI, Johnson said he andMcCone had seen eye to eye. Expressing great respect for the CIAand complete confidence in McCone as DCI, Johnson said he wantedMcCone to continue in the future doing exactly as he had done in thepast.After McCone in turn expressed his confidence in the Presidentand stated his desire to support him in every way, he reviewed someWORKING DRAFT 99Handle via BYEMAN/ Control SystemBY NO. 018-88copy of 2296TOP SECRET![signature]
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TOP SECRETof the items from the President's checklist, explaining the natureof the publication. Johnson asked that, for the next few days,McCone continue to brief him personally every morning and thatsenior CIA officials brief the President's staff. Johnson alsodirected that any urgent matter of importance be brought to hispersonal attention at any hour of the day or night. In this, hedesignated no intermediary.That noon, McCone met with both Johnson and Bundy to relay theinformation that Lee Harvey Oswald had been in touch with the Sovietand Cuban embassies in Mexico City. That evening, McCone reviewedthis information with Secretary Rusk, in addition volunteering theAgency's assistance in coping with the flood of official visitorscoming to attend the funeral. Rusk agreed to call on him for help.After informing his November 24 morning meeting that he wouldmake an effort to dispel the widely-held view that it was somehow"immoral" for the DCI to be seen openly in his role as a directadviser to the President, McCone briefed Johnson for about twentyminutes in his private residence. The President, McCone suggested,should receive an early briefing on the Soviet long-range strikingcapability, air defense posture, and the condition of the Sovieteconomy. McCone also suggested that the President learn about theCIA's operational programs, adding that the Agency was watchingVenezuela and Ecuador very closely because of Cuban subversiveactivities.That afternoon, McCone met with the President, Rusk, Ball,WORKING DRAFT 99Handle via (BYEMAN) Control SystemBY NO. 018-88copy 2 of 2297TOP SECRET1/mc
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TOP SECRETMcNamara, Bundy and Lodge to discuss the situation in Vietnam.Lodge reported that the United States was in no way responsible for the deaths of Diem and Nhu (had they followed his advice, he said, they would be alive today) and said he was hopeful about the future. The change in South Vietnam's government had been an improvement, and by February or March we would see marked progress.McCone, concerned lest Lodge's statements leave the President with the impression that we were on the road to victory, disagreed. The Agency, he cautioned, had observed a continuing increase in Viet Cong activities since November 1, including military attacks. It had also observed a high volume of messages on the Viet Cong military and political communications networks, which could indicate preparations for sustained guerrilla attacks. Moreover, the new government's military leaders were having considerable difficulty in organizing the government's political structure and were receiving little if any help from civilians, who were staying on the sidelines in their traidtional role as critics. In consequence, McCone could not at this time offer an optimistic appraisal of Vietnam's future prospects.Here, President Johnson observed that he approached the situation in Vietnam with some misgivings. A great number of Americans had questioned the United States' role in supporting the coup, and there were those in Congress who strongly believed we should get out of Vietnam. Both of these factors caused him considerable anxiety. He was not at all sure the United States hadWORKING DRAFT 99.Handle via BYEMAN Control System298TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETfollowed the right course in upsetting the Diem regime; but now that it was done, we had to see that we accomplished our objectives.In addition, Johnson now told them, he had never been happy with American operations in Vietnam. The dissensions within the American community there displeased him, and he told Lodge that he wanted the situation cleaned up. Any official who did not go along with agreed U.S. policy there should be removed.At this point, Bundy remarked that we were searching for a successor to William Trueheart as Saigon Deputy Chief of Mission. What was needed was a capable administrator to run the country team. In response, Johnson repeated that the Ambassador was in charge and that he, the President, was holding him personally responsible for the situation.Vietnam's economy was the subject of particular concern, and McNamara now commented that the United States would have to be generous with its aid, not expecting the South Vietnamese government to produce miracles. Johnson replied that he supported the concept of generous aid but wanted it made abundantly clear that he did not think we had to re-make every Asian after our own image. Too often, he observed, when the United States became involved in the affairs of another country, it felt an obligation to reform the country along American lines. This, he said, was a mistake. He himself was anxious to get on with winning the war; he did not want so much effort devoted to so-called social reforms.Following this meeting, Bundy issued a statement saying that theWORKING DRAFT 99.Handle via [BYEMAN] Control System299TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETUnited States would continue the late President Kennedy's Vietnampolicies as they had been confirmed at a mid-November meeting inHonolulu. McCone also observed that, for the first time, he hadreceived an indication of what the Johnson tone would be.McCone did not brief Johnson on November 25, the day ofPresident Kennedy's funeral, and at a State Department receptionthat evening, the President apologized to McCone for it. Were therewere any developments which required his personal attention?, heasked. McCone replied that there were not and that he would callhim if any developed.The following day, McCone met with the President for abouttwenty minutes. Johnson asked whether all appropriate Agencyresources were being made available to support the FBI'sinvestigation of the assassination. He then told McCone withconsiderable contempt that certain Justice Department officials hadproposed an independent panel, headed by someone like Thomas E.Dewey, to investigate the assassination. Johnson had rejected thisproposal, only to learn that an identical plan would appear as leadeditorial in the *Washington Post*. Furious at what he believed was adeliberate leak, he had finally succeeded in killing the editorialby intervening personally with Katherine Graham.McCone met again with the President on November 28 for aboutthirty minutes. After reviewing the checklist, Johnson questionedhim about South Vietnam, Venezuela, Greece, Turkey, Rumania andYugoslavia. He asked McCone to recommend someone as Ambassador toWORKING DRAFTHandle via (BYEMAN) Control System300TOP SECRET
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# SECRETMcCone HistoryC H R O N O L O G YSECRET
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# SECRET## CHRONOLOGY10 November 1960 President-elect Kennedy announces thatAllen W. Dulles and J. Edgar Hoover willcontinue in their positions.17 April 1961 Landing at the Bay of Pigs22 April 1961 Study group formed (Maxwell Taylor,Arleigh Burke, Robert Kennedy, Allen Dulles)to examine Bay of Pigs operation.4 May 1961 President's Foreign Intelligence AdvisoryBoard (PFIAB) reconstituted with JamesKillian as chairman.28 June 1961 Taylor named Military Representative to thePresident and Chairman of the Special Group(5412).30 August 1961 USSR resumes nuclear testing in the atmos-phere7 September 1961 President Kennedy confers with John McConeon nuclear issues.19 September 1961 Kennedy asks McCone to become the Directorof Central Intelligence.27 September 1961 Kennedy announces the appointment of McCone.13 October 1961 McCone becomes consultant; travels tothe Far East until 23 October.
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# SECRET28 October 1961 Dulles and McCone visit Western Europe until 13 November.21 November 1961 McCone meets with President and Robert Kennedy to discuss new program for Cuba.29 November 1961 McCone sworn in by Chief Justice Warren30 November 1961 McCone attends meeting of NSC committee on nuclear testing.30 November 1961 McCone attends first meeting of United States Intelligence Board (USIB) as chairman.1 December 1961 McCone attends first meeting of Special Group (5412) as DCI.4 December 1961 McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric to discuss NSA and national estimates5 December 1961 McCone establishes study group under Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr..6 December 1961 Mrs. McCone dies.11 December 1961 McCone meets with President Kennedy alone.12 December 1961 McCone calls on J. Edgar Hoover.13 December 1961 DDCI becomes CIA representative on USIB.15 December 1961 McCone meets with Phillipe de Vosjoli.2SECRET
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SECRET27 December 1961 General Cabell announces retirement effective 31 January 1962.5 January 1962 Schuyler, Coyne added to Kirkpatrick study group.6 January 1962 McCone attends NSC meeting on Laos.8 January 1962 McCone meets with Joint Chiefs of Staff.12 January 1962 McCone briefs General Eisenhower in Palm Desert.15 January 1962 McCone's name submitted to Senate Armed Services Committee.16 January 1962 President Kennedy issues letter of instructions to DCI.16 January 1962 McCone meets with Ambassador [Alphand] and Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg.18 January 1962 Confirmation hearings begin18 January 1962 DCI attends first meeting of Special Group (Counter-Insurgency).19 January 1962 McCone meets with The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the PFIAB.20 January 1962 McCone briefs President Truman at Mayflower Hotel.
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SECRET22 January 1962 McCone meets with House Sub-Committee on CIA.28 January 1962 McCone meets with Chiefs of Station from Western Hemisphere Division in Panama until 2 February.31 January 1962 Senate confirms McCone by floor vote of 71-12; total vote is 84-15.6 February 1962 McCone speaks to senior seminar at Foreign Service Institute.8 February 1962 McCone meets with Senate Sub-Committee on CIA.17 February 1962 Richard Bissell resigns as Deputy Director for Plans; succeeded by Richard Helms.19 February 1962 Deputy Director for Research established as new directorate with Herbert A. Scoville, Jr. as head.19 February 1962 McCone meets with Board of Inquiry chaired by Judge Prettyman to study implication of Powers' case.22 February 1962 McCone meets with Major General Marshall S. Carter.28 February 1962 Kennedy receives first briefing by Arthur C. LundahlSECRET