Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 315]
EYES ONLYSECRET2Revolution", to develop a political position consistent with that slogan,and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive politicalalternative to Castro. This vocal opposition will: serve as a magnetfor the loyalties of the Cubans; in actuality conduct and direct variousopposition activities; and provide cover for other compartmented CIAcontrolled operations. (Tab A)b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis ofpopular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means formass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propagandaoffensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition.The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and shortwave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island.The target date for its completion is two months. This will be supple-mented by broadcasting from U.S. commercial facilities paid for byprivate Cuban groups and by the clandestine distribution of writtenmaterial inside the country. (Tab B)c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covertintelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be respon-sive to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition. Such anetwork must have effective communication and be selectively manned.to minimize the risk of penetration. An effective organization canprobably be created within 60 days. Its role will be to provide hardEYES ONLY302
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 316]
13-00000EYES ONLYSECRETintelligence, to arrange for the illegal infiltration and exfiltrationof individuals, to assist in the internal distribution of illegalpropaganda, and to plan and organize for the defection of key individualsand groups as directed.d. Preparations have already been made for the development ofan adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanismsfor the necessary logistic support of covert military operations onthe Island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after care-ful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a secondphase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locationsoutside of the U.S. so as to be available for immediate deployment intoCuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there bothbefore and after the establishment of one or more active centers ofresistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum ofsix months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limitedair capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration alreadyexists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and whenthe situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel thiswith a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercialoperation in another country.3. Leadership: It is important to avoid distracting and devisive rivalry   among the outstanding Cuban opposition leaders for the senior role in theEYES ONLYOCPOET303
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 317]
EYES ONLYSECRETopposition. Accordingly, every effort will be made to have an eminent,non-ambitious, politically uncontentious chairman selected. The emergenceof a successor to Castro should follow careful assessment of the variouspersonalities active in the opposition to identify the one who can attract,control, and lead the several forces. As the possibility of an overthrow ofCastro becomes more imminent, the senior leader must be selected, U.S.support focused upon him, and his build up undertaken.4. Cover: All actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalf of   the opposition council will, of course, be explained as activities of that entity   (insofar as the actions become publicly known at all). The CIA will, however,   have to have direct contacts with a certain number of Cubans and, to protect   these, will make use of a carefully screened group of U.S. businessmen with   a stated interest in Cuban affairs and desire to support the opposition. They   will act as a funding mechanism and channel for guidance and support to the   directorate of the opposition under controlled conditions. CIA personnel will   be documented as representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the   cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to   support the opposition. $100,000 has already been pledged from U.S. sources.   At an appropriate time a bond issue will be floated by the council (as an   obligation on a future Cuban government) to raise an additional $2,000,000.5. Budget: It is anticipated that approximately $4,400,000 of CLA funds   will be required for the above program. On the assumption that it will not
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 318]
EYES ONLYSECRET5reach its culmination earlier than 6 to 8 months from now, the estimated requirements for FY-1960 funds is $900,000 with the balance of $3,500,000 required in FY-1961. The distribution of costs between fiscal years could, of course, be greatly altered by policy decisions or unforeseen contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations. (Tab C)6. Recommendations: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized to undertake the above outlined program and to withdraw the funds required for this purpose as set forth in paragraph 5. from the Agency's Reserve for contingencies.EYES ONLYSECRET 305
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 319]
# THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION1. CIA is already in close touch with three reputable opposition groups (the Montecristi, Autentico Party and the National Democratic Front). These all meet the fundamental criteria conditional to acceptance, i.e. they are for the revolution as originally conceived--many being former 26th of July members--and are not identified with either Batista or Trujillo. They are anti-Castro because of his failure to live up to the original 26th of July platform and his apparent willingness to sell out to Communist domination and possible ultimate enslavement. These groups, therefore, fit perfectly the planned opposition slogan of "Restore the Revolution".2. An opposition Council or Junta will be formed within 30 days from representatives of these groups augmented possibly by representatives of other groups. It is probably premature to have a fixed platform for the Council but the Caracas Manifesto of 20 July 1958 contains a number of exploitable points. Two of the CIA group leaders were signers of the Manifesto. The following points are suggested as a few possibilities:a. The Castro regime is the new dictatorship of Cuba subject to strong Sino-Soviet influence.b. Cuba is entitled to an honest, democratic government based on free elections. There is no hope of this as long as Castro throttles the rights of legitimate political parties and the freedom of expression.
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 320]
13-00000..EYES ONLYSECRET2c. A realistic agrarian reform program providing for individual ownership of the land must be put into effect.d. Individual freedoms must be restored and collectivism in commerce and education must be eliminated.e. Sino-Soviet influence in the affairs of Cuba must be eliminated.A special research group of Cubans with American support is planned to refine and expand these planks and to produce propaganda materials based on the above platform for use by and on behalf of the opposition Council.EYES ONLYSECRET307
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 321]
# PROPAGANDATab B1.  Articulation and transmission of opposition views has already begun. Private opposition broadcasts (i.e. purchase of commercial time by private individuals) have occurred in Miami (medium wave) and arrangements have been made with Station WRUL for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts (short wave) and Florida (broadcast band). Presidents Betancourt and Ydigoras have also agreed to the use of commercial stations for short wave broadcasts from Caracas and Guatemala City. CIA has furnished support to these efforts through encouragement, negotiating help and providing some broadcast material.2.  As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at least one "gray" U.S.-controlled station. This will probably be on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these will be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience and as the operation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. Such an additional facility might be installed on a U.S. base in the Bahamas or temporary use might be made of a shipborne station if it is desired to avoid "gray" broadcasting from Florida.
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 322]
EYES ONLYSECRET3. Newspapers are also being supported and further support is planned for the future. *Avance*, a leading Cuban daily (Zayas' paper), has been confiscated as has *El Mundo*, another Cuban daily. *Diario de la Marina*, one of the hemisphere's outstanding conservative dailies published in Havana, is having difficulty and may have to close soon. Arrangements have already been made to print *Avance* weekly in the U.S. for introduction into Cuba clandestinely and mailing throughout the hemisphere on a regular basis. As other leading newspapers are expropriated, publication of "exile" editions will be considered.4. Inside Cuba, a CIA-controlled action group is producing and distributing anti-Castro and anti-Communist publications regularly. CIA is in contact with groups outside Cuba who will be assisted in producing similar materials for clandestine introduction into Cuba.5. Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours in Latin America. They will be followed by others of equal calibre. The mission of these men will be to gain hemisphere support for the opposition to Castro. Controlled Western Hemisphere assets (press, radio, television) will support this mission as will selected American journalists who will be briefed prior to Latin American travel.EYES ONLYSECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 323]
Tab CFINANCIAL ANNEXI. Political Action|                                                           | FY-1960 | FY-1961 || --------------------------------------------------------- | ------- | ------- || Support of Opposition Elements and other Group Activities | 150,000 | 800,000 |II. Propaganda|                                                                            | FY-1960 | FY-1961 || -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------- | ------- || Radio Operations and Programming (including establishment of transmitters) | 400,000 | 700,000 || Press and Publications                                                     | 100,000 | 500,000 |III. Paramilitary|                                                                | FY-1960 | FY-1961   || -------------------------------------------------------------- | ------- | --------- || In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air Support Material and Training | 200,000 | 1,300,000 |IV. Intelligence Collection|        | FY-1960  | FY-1961   || ------ | -------- | --------- ||        | 50,000   | 200,000   || Totals | *900,000 | 3,500,000 |*These figures are based on the assumption that major action will not occur until FY-1961. If by reason of policy decisions or other contingencies over which the Agency cannot exercise control, the action program should be accelerated, additional funds will be required.
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 324]
# Appendix C-1CNO Correspondence with Department of Stateand NSC:*1) Letter for Allen Dulles   from Arleigh Burke,   17 Mar 60
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 325]
# UNCLASSIFIEDROUTING AND RECORD SHEETSUBJECT: (Optional)Ltr from Admiral SucksFROM:DD/PTO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)|                         | DATE | OFFICER S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)                                                                                      || ----------------------- | ---- | ------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- || 1.  C/WH Division       |      | дже                | 1. Admiral Burke sent this over to the Director on the afternoon of 17 March and the latter handed to me. I do not believe it requires a reply but pass it to you for any value it may have. || 2.                      |      |                    |                                                                                                                                                                                              || 3.  C/WH/4              |      | (                  |                                                                                                                                                                                              || 4.  Whither com/cary    |      |                    |                                                                                                                                                                                              || 5.  Starling Hand Carry |      |                    |                                                                                                                                                                                              || 6.  Efrom               |      |                    |                                                                                                                                                                                              || 7.  CNH Cuba File       |      |                    |                                                                                                                                                                                              |RM3jr.311
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 326]
13-00000CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS17 March 1960![flag] TOP SECRETPERSONAL - TOP SECRETDear Allen:Enclosed is a memorandum my staff pre- pared containing some suggestions which might be useful to you in your work. Naturally, I do not agree with quite all the comments contained in the memorandum, but I know that you will forgive the impatient young lad for his desire to make sure no opportunity is left uncovered.Warm regards.Sincerely,![signature] ARLEIGH BURKEThe Honorable Allen DullesDirector of Central IntelligenceEnclosure312PERSONAL - TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 327]
13-00000Appendix C-2CNO Correspondence with Department of Stateand NSC:2) Letter for Gordon Gray from   Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60313
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 328]
13-00000![flag] CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONSTOP SECRET16 March 1960Dear Gordon:Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum on U.S. action in Cuba which may be of interest to you.Sincerely yours,![signature]ARLEIGH BURKEThe HonorableGordon GraySpecial Assistant to the Presidentfor National Security AffairsThe White HouseEnclosure![TOP SECRET stamp]314
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 329]
13-00000TOP SECRETOp-603D/jrr16 Mar 1960Via:Op-603DOp-033U. S. Action in Cuba (S)1.  The recommendations contained in the paper on "U.S. Actions in Cuba" were intended originally to provide the broad outline for a carefully laid out program for causing the Castro regime to be replaced by a friendly government. It was intended that State would logically control and coordinate all aspects and provide the guidance as to the specific actions required of the other departments of the government. The paper was not interpreted in this manner by those who received it and the search appears now to be for specific actions which can be used to accomplish the end desired.2.  The following are offered as possible specific actions which can be taken in support of our position on Cuba - You might desire to have OO inject these items into the NSC meeting, 16 March.a.   IADB - Chairman, or the Chief of the U.S. Delegation, attempt to have a delegation other than U.S. introduce a motion for the Board to consider the gap in hemispheric defense resulting from the Cuban situation or for the Board to recommend that the OAS study the influence of Kommunist in Cuba.b.  Commercial - Oil companies are not being paid by Cuba. State could request the oil companies to point out to the governments who produce the oil the effects on their economies of the loss of the Cuban market.c.  Schools and War Colleges - The Services could include in courses for foreign officers the effect on hemisphere defense of the establishment of a Kommist dictatorship in Cuba.d.  Commercial - Do Latin Americans hold stock in the expropriated properties in Cuba? If so, State could request the companies concerned to include in their dividend mailings, information pointing out the effect on the companies' earnings and the stockholders' dividends of expropriation of property without compensation and, for the oil companies, non-payment for oil delivered.e.  State, in conjunction with CIA, publish a weekly or bi-weekly letter documenting the actions of the Castro Government for the previous period. Included would be:(1) Violations of human rights.(2) Kommunist trends and actions.(3) Dictatorial and undemocratic actions.315Copy 2 of 4 copiesPage 1 of 3 copiesTOP SECRETTOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 330]
Distribute this to:(1) All U.S. diplomatic posts.(2) Army, Navy an Air Force for further distribution to units or officers in contact with Latin Americans.For use as talking points to:(1) Discredit the Castro regime.(2) Build support for the U.S. position.(3) Alert Latin Americans as to the Kommunist aspects.f. All Services - Prepare and distribute speech material suitable for inclusion in various types of addresses. Material should cover:(1) Kommunistic aspects of present Cuban Government.(2) Threat of Kommunisn in Cuba to hemispheric defense.(3) The dictatorial aspects of the Cuban regime.(4) The Cuban regime's actions against the basic human rights.(5) The strategic importance of the Guantanamo Naval base.(6) The logic of the firmness of the treaties by which we hold Guantanamo and the formal commitment of the Castro regime on taking power to honor Cuba's international commitments.Distribute this material to the Services and to their Leagues and Associations for maximum use in public speeches.g. IADB - Have General Skaer, as Director of the Staff, IADB, inject into the monthly intelligence briefings at the IADB information on the latest Soviet Bloc actions and the progress of International Kommunism in Cuba.h. State, in conjunction with CIA and the Service intelligence agencies, hold special briefings once each month on the general situation in Cuba with special emphasis on the Kommunistic aspects for the following:(1) U. S. officials of the OAS and UN.(2) U.S. personnel of the Staff of the IADB.(3) Official U.S. personnel in Washington having duties involving close contact with Latin Americans.i. All Services provide special briefings on a one-time basis along the line of h. above for officers and enlisted personnel of units proceeding to Caribbean or South American ports.j. Navy endeavor to have a good reporter or author prepare a story containing the Navy's views on Guantanamo for publication in a national magazine with wide circulation in Latin America.
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 331]
13-00000TOP SECRETK. Navy - Accept Mr. Merchant's offer in his letter of March 10 to Admiral Burke on a complete briefing of State Department activities vis a vis the Cuban situation in an effort to prod State to move faster.1. State - Brief all individuals and groups of U.S. Nationals going to Latin America on the Komunist threat in Cuba for further dissemination to host country personnel.Very respectfully,J. E. POND, JR.317Page 3 of 3 pagesTOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 332]
Appendix C-3CNO Correspondence with Department of Stateand NSC:3) Memorandum for the Special   Assistant to the President   for National Security Affairs   from Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60,   sub: US Policy toward Cuba
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 333]
13-00000![Seal]ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSEWASHINGTON 25. D. C.INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRSMAR 16 1960MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENTFOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRSSUBJECT: U.S. Policy toward CubaEnclosed is an exchange of letters on the above subject between Admiral Burke and Under Secretary Marchant, both of whom have authorized that I make the correspondence available to you for whatever help it may be in connection with the discussion of this subject at the Council meeting this coming Thursday.![Signature]Deputy Assistant Secretary2 EnclsA/s318
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 334]
13-00000SECRET![stamp]10 Mar 60Dear Arleigh:I was much interested in your personal letter of February 25, 1960, on Cuba and the Caribbean situation, in which I noted a marked degree of similarity in the suggestions of the Navy and of our people here concerning the need to reverse the trend in Cuba and the methods which are best calculated to achieve this result.As you are doubtless aware from the briefing which Dick Rubottom and I gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff on January 8, 1960, most of the courses of action suggested in the memorandum headed "Recommendations for U. S. Actions in Cuba," which you transmitted with your letter, were initiated some time ago and are constantly being intensified. To recapitulate, our own thinking on the Cuban situation as it relates to Communism and our own security interests has been as follows:a. The maximum objective of International Communism--in the immediate future--is the consolidation of a radical, anti-American Revolution friendly to the USSR in Cuba and the utilization of Cuba as a base to promote similar revolutionary movements in the Caribbean. The minimum objective of the Communists, if they are unable to achieve the foregoing, is to make the United States pay as high price as possible for the elimination of the undesirable features of the Cuban Revolution. In particular, the Communists stand to gain by provoking us into armed intervention, or otherwise taking interventionist actions in violation of our commitments in a manner which could be made to appear as if the United States reacted the same way as the Soviets did in Hungary and other satellites.b. UnlessAdmiral Arleigh Burke,Chief of Naval Operations,Department of the Navy.SECRETISA(R&C) FILE COPY319I 12989/60