Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 23]
SECRET / NOFORN# PAPER: THE IMS TEAM FINALLY GOES HOMEIn May 1980 the IMS analyst group detailed to the CI Staff to deal with the paper inherited from the Angleton Staff finally completed its work and returned to IMS. In all, during the preceding four and a half years some 600 feet of CI Staff files had been reviewed, about 375 feet by IMS and 225 feet by CI Staff personnel The Analysis Group main index had been reduced from 500,000 cards in 1975 to 28,000.## DERYABIN RETIRESPeter (Petr) Deryabin retired in January 1981 on the eve of his 60th birthday. One of the early group of KGB officers to come to the West following the death of Stalin in 1953, he had defected in Vienna in 1954. Since that time he had been continually associated with, and in effect a ward of the CI Staff. For a number of years he, along with other defectors,114SECRET / NOFORN
[104-10302-10000.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992DD/P2-130327/23/62.Executive Registry62-526525 July 1962MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President'sForeign Intelligence Advisory Board1. On 20 July 1962, the Director and the Deputy Director (Plans) met with Messrs. Robert Murphy, Gordon Gray, William Langer, and J. Patrick Coyne to discuss certain aspects of the Agency's Political Action Programs. The Director sat with the Panel from 10:30 'til noon, the Deputy Director (Plans) was present from 10:30 to 12:30 and from 2:00 to 3:30.2. The Director opened the discussion with a historical description of the Agency's covert financial support to political parties in the fight against Communism. He described in detail the procedures now in effect whereby Political Action Projects are originated, staffed out, and cleared with appropriate elements of Government. He pointed out that each project must have his approval prior to its circulation to the members of the Special Group. At this point, he digressed to inform the Panel that reconnaissance overflights are now approved by the Special Group and subsequently by the President. He said that this same procedure applies to peripheral flights although to a lesser degree. He terminated this part of the discussion by stating that in his opinion "all covert action programs are now handled in an orderly, correct manner".CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAMRELEASE AS SANITIZED1998
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3. The Director then described in some detail Agency covert financial support in the recent [Peru] elections, the last [Greek] elections, and the [Finnish] election. He also described our activities in connection with the Italian political parties. Following this, he covered our plans for the upcoming [Brazilian] elections. He touched on our thoughts with regard to the political situation in British Guiana.4. At this juncture, the Director discussed Agency labor operations. He read to the group a short paper which outlined our support to anti-Communist labor unions in [France] and [Italy] our work through the [ICFTU] and our relationships with [American] labor and the assistance [United States unions] have given us.5. Agency support to cultural organizations was raised by Dr. Langer, and the Director covered in some detail the current status of our support plus that of the Ford Foundation to the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the International Commission of Jurists. He touched on the Asia Foundation, and our desire to try to obtain the services of Mr. Livingston Merchant to head it.6. In the time remaining to him, the Director went over with the Panel country by country an extended list of political parties and leaders supported by the Agency throughout the world. What he did not have an opportunity to cover in this list the Deputy Director (Plans) finished during the remainder of the morning and during the afternoon session.
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-3-7. Also in the afternoon, the Deputy Director (Plans) read to the Panel a paper on Operation Mongoose which the Director had used earlier in the day for briefing the President. This paper was used on the instruction of the Director. The Panel asked questions about Agency activity involving Cuba, all of which were answered with the exception of one having to do with the role of the Attorney General. This query was raised by Mr. Gray who recognized and gracefully accepted the fact that he was not answered directly.8. Before the afternoon session adjourned, the Panel raised the question of the total dollar amount of funds expended annually for covert action. The Deputy Director (Plans) showed them a chart compiled by DDP-PG, dated 4 April 1962. This chart gives the precise dollar amounts expended annually. These figures vary from the Congressional ones since the support slice is not included.Richard HelmsDeputy Director (Plans)Distribution:Original - The Director1 cc - Exec. Director1 cc - C/CA-IO1 cc - DD/P
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# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board1. On 1 November, the Deputy Director (Plans) met with Messrs. Robert Murphy, Gordon Gray, and J. Patrick Coyne to present a follow-up briefing on the Agency's political action programs since the one held on 20 July 1962. The meeting lasted from 2:30 to 4:45.2. There was little discussion on Cuba. In response to Mr. Murphy's inquiry, I told him that a good intelligence job had been done but that I thought it desirable to have this studied by the Board on the basis of a paper which the Director was having prepared and which Mr. Kirkpatrick had assured Mr. Coyne would be submitted to the Board after the Director had had an opportunity to review it.3. The Brazilian election program was covered in considerable detail. Points covered were: (a) the reason for the program, (b) the manner in which candidates were chosen, (c) the amount of money involved, (d) the methods of funding, and (e) the coordination of State and the Agency on the entire scenario. Following the presentation of the factual elements, there was considerable discussion of the political situation in Brazil and the direction in which that Government seemed to be tending.
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-2-4. CIA-sponsored activities at the Helsinki Youth Festival was the next item presented. A full report was given which followed carefully the post-mortem written by the CA Staff.5. As for CA activities in the remainder of Latin America, the following countries were covered: Dominican Republic, Chile, [Peru] and [Venezuela], [Haiti] and [British Guiana] were then touched on, with particular reference to the sensitivity of the [US-UK] cooperation on the latter.6. In Southeast Asia, an up-to-date report was presented on operations in Laos, South Vietnam, and North Vietnam. Problems in connection with North Vietnamese operations were specifically identified.7. On the [Sino-Indian] conflict, the Panel was made aware of pending and current requests from the [Indian CIB] for assistance in the training of guerrilla forces. The role of the Tibetans was also identified. In response to a query from Mr. Murphy, I said that I did not see any requirement at this time for an increase of our permanent establishment in [India] expressing the opinion that any trainers and paramilitary experts which we might send could be covered for us by the [Indians].8. In Europe, CA programs in the following areas were updated: Berlin, France and Italy, [Spain] [Finland], and [Cyprus]
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-3-Mr. Murphy seemed particularly interested in the level of activity in Italy and our efforts to cut it back.9. At one point in the briefing, I spoke of the change in status of the African-American Institute and told of our negotiations with the Ford Foundation on the Congress for Cultural Freedom. I mentioned the Department of State veto on passing funds to Holden Roberto[^6]. There was some discussion of the Yemen and associated problems. Here, I simply gave an intelligence briefing on the Yemen and the effects of the revolution there on Saudi Arabia and the British position in the Aden Protectorate.Richard HelmsDeputy Director (Plans)Distribution:Original - Director, CIA1 cc - Exec. Director1 cc - Chief, CA1 cc - DD/P[^6]: [photo of Roberto holding a check]
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# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD17 April 1963SUBJECT: Meeting on CA Matters with the Panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board1. On 15 April, at DDP's request, I met with Messrs. Robert Murphy, Gordon Gray, and J. Patrick Coyne to brief them on major covert action developments since their previous briefing on 2 November 1962. The meeting lasted from 10:00 to 12:15.2. At Mr. Murphy's request, I began with a description of our electoral operations as approved by the Special Group in Chile, the Dominican Republic, [Brazil] and Guatemala. Mr. Murphy was particularly concerned with the situation in [Brazil] and both he and Mr. Gray found it difficult to understand why the State Department[^6] continued to provide large-scale economic assistance when [Goulart][^7] had to date refused to clean house of the Communists and fellow travelers both within the government and the labor movement. They were interested in knowing that we were in touch with some of the military leaders who are opposed to [Goulart] and they seemed to feel that a military coup at some point might be preferable to allowing a country [as large and powerful as Brazil] to drift into the hands of the opposition. Both gentlemen wished to know the amounts that we had expended in these electoral operations and our own estimate of the results. They did not question either the need for intervention or the size of our effort; although in the [Chilean] case Mr. Murphy wanted to be sure that we had evidence that the funds passed through [Italian][^8] hands actually reached the [Chilean] Christian Democrats.3. Mr. Murphy then raised the [Argentine] problem and said that he had been informed in New York that the State Department was putting considerable pressure on the [Argentine] regime to persuade it to hold the elections scheduled for [June] 1963. He questioned the wisdom of this pressure, pointing out that there was a real danger of the [Peronistas] returning to power if the elections were held. He asked our opinion and I said that, despite the pressure, there was still considerable doubt whether the elections would actually take place.[^6]:[^7]:[^8]:
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I added that the more responsible military_were trying to work out with the [Guido]government and the non-[Peronist] political parties a formula which would prevent the [Peronistas] from making large gains on the national level.4. On the subject of [Haiti], Mr. Murphy felt that, in so small a country action should be possible to remove [Duvalier] and wondered why it had not been done. I pointed out that we had as yet no policy approval for such action but that we were active in identifying and making contact with opposition elements both within [Haiti] and in exile. I described some of the difficulties, such as [Duvalier's] control of the arms in the palace and his widespread penetration of opposition plotting that had just resulted in the rolling up of a coup attempt by [Haitian] army officers.5. Mr. Gray noted that he had seen in the newspapers a report of our recent decision to allow Radio Liberty to broadcast in Russian to the Soviet troops in Cuba. He was heartily in favor of such action but wondered how we were able to obtain approval of it when the Administration seems so anxious to avoid actions that might appear to be provocative to the Soviets. I informed him that there had, in fact, been some delay in obtaining the approval.6. Both the gentlemen asked for detailed information on the structure and workings of the Latin American Policy Committee (LAPC) and asked whether we felt this committee in any way hampered or interfered with the approval process in the Special Group. I said that both Chief, WH and myself were well pleased with the way the LAPC operates and believed it to be highly useful.7. I then briefed them on actions which were taken in Southeast Asia, particularly the measure to strengthen the border police in the [north of India]. I told them that [Nehru] was aware of these actions and they wanted to be certain Mr. [Bowles] was clearly instructed prior to his departure [as ambassador].8. Both men objected to press reports that certain Administration officials believed the Soviets to be exerting a helpful and restraining influence in Laos. I had to agree with them that it was hard to maintain such a view in the face of the increasing aggressiveness of the Pathet Lao, and I described the existing policy limits on our relations with [Phoumi] and [Kong Le]. I then described the present state of the Soviet-Chinese
[104-10302-10000.pdf — page 9]
13-00000split and some of our efforts to exploit and exacerbate these tensions. Mr. Murphy asked for specific information on the extent of trade, if any, between China and the Soviet Union and the amount of the out- standing Chinese debt to the Soviets. I agreed to provide this via Mr. Coyne. Mr. Gray asked about the depth and extent of our intelligence from Peking and the China mainland, and was critical of the information supplied to us by the Chinese Nationalists. I said that intelligence operations in China were not my field but that I would make sure that a report on this did get to them.9. I went on to describe the cultural ferment within Russia and recent action Khrushchev had taken to discipline the dissident writers and artists. They were very much interested in the actions welhad taken to exploit this situation and particularly interested in the current issue of *Encounter* and in the account therein of the Khrushchev tirade at the recent art exhibition.10. On Cuba I explained that I was not in a position to brief them in depth and any questions in this field would be handled by the Director or DDP. I did, however, brief them on the Krulak Committee and the recent meetings in Managua regarding measures that could be taken to limit the export of subversion from Cuba. (I have sent to them via Pat Coyne the CIA Memorandum on the present scope of the Cuban subversive training effort.)11. I described the covert support to the [Italian] political parties for the forthcoming parliamentary election as approved by the Special Group. Mr. Murphy had not previously known of the decision to lend some selective support to the [Nenni autonomists] and described this decision with some surprise "as quite a switch."[^8]12. Finally, when informed of the policy limitations on our relations with the [Angolan Nationalists] and [Holden Roberto],[^6] Mr. Murphy expressed himself as being in agreement with those limitations and seemed to feel that the best course to follow was to assist the [Portuguese] Government in its attempts to control the situation. He said that he had met recently for the first time with [Roberto Holden] in New York last week and was not impressed by the man.36/mc[^6]: [^8]:
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13-0000013. The meeting was throughout a cordial one and I detected    no evidence of a critical attitude towards the Agency's covert    action program.CORD MEYER, JR.ChiefCovert Action StaffDistribution:Orig. - Director, CIA1- Exec. Director1 - DDP1 - C/CA4яяА гл 10 от VH.23
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UNCLASSIFIED INTERNAL CONFIDENTIAL SECRETROUTING AND RECORD SHEETSUBJECT: (Optional)FROM:C/CANO.DATE:TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)|                   | DATE      | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) || ----------------- | --------- | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- || 1. Exec. Director |           |                    | LBK                                                                                                     || 2. PFIAB          |           |                    |                                                                                                         || 3.                |           |                    |                                                                                                         || 4.                |           |                    |                                                                                                         || 5.                |           |                    |                                                                                                         || 6.                |           |                    |                                                                                                         || 7.                |           |                    |                                                                                                         || 8.                |           |                    |                                                                                                         || 9.                |           |                    |                                                                                                         || 10.               |           |                    |                                                                                                         || 11.               |           |                    |                                                                                                         || 12.               |           |                    |                                                                                                         || 13.               |           |                    |                                                                                                         || 14.               |           |                    |                                                                                                         || 15.               |           |                    |                                                                                                         || RECEIVED          | FORWARDED |                    |                                                                                                         |SECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNALUSE ONLY UNCLASSIFIEDGPO 1961: 0-593644
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13-0000023 April 1963
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13-00000(CLASSIFICATION)Handle Via Indicated Controls99[BYEMAN]DCICopy 123[BXE 4242-63]8/19/98AssassinationRecordMichelleSave cy 2of thestdocument tochos. Enrighton 7Aug 1964WARNINGThis document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the mean-ing of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its transmis-sion or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign govern-ment to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoc-trinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the designated controls.This document contains information referring to Projects:CORONA99[TACKLE](CLASSIFICATION)
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# TOP SECRET24 April 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,1015, Tuesday, 23 April 1963Present: Dr. Killian, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Clifford, Mr. Pace,Gen. Doolittle, Mr. Gray, Dr. Langer, Dr. Land;Staff members Messrs. Coyne and Ash;From CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. FitzGerald,Mr. Bruce Clarke, Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick1. When Mr. McCone entered the room the group had been discussing the release of the American prisoners in Cuba, and it had been explained to the Board that the three CIA men who had been imprisoned had been released. Mr. Murphy had asked what their cover story had been and had been told that they represented themselves as conducting audio surveillance for commercial interests, and that their fictitious names had apparently held up during interrogation.Mr. Murphy asked Mr. McCone the conditions of the release of the 22 and the DCI explained that at Castro's request we were trying to obscure the fact that there had been a quid pro quo in releasing the four Cubans in exchange for the 22 Americans. The Attorney General had arranged the release of the three Cubans who had been accused of, but not convicted of sabotage, and Mr. McCone had personally arranged the release of Molina with Governor Rockefeller, who had granted him executive clemency with deportation. Mr. McCone noted that the release of the three CIA persons was very important to the Agency, and that nothing in the agreement for the release involved any other commitments.Mr. Murphy asked what the DCI thought was behind Castro's making these releases. Mr. McCone replied that it was probably domestic foibles, and that Donovan was the only thread open to the United States. Mr. Clifford asked if we had everyone out that we wanted. The DCI replied that he knew of no one else there that we wanted. He reported that Donovan had to make a statement that he would not return to Cuba, advised that he had no intention of returning at this time, and he would have to use another cover if he did return. Dr. Land asked why Castro did all this, and the DCI said we didn't really know, but one possibility offered by Donovan was that Castro apparently is interested in trying to reach some rapprochement with![stamp Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]