Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Cuba28 January 1963The Executive Committee met on Friday, January 25th, and approved the new policy as outlined by the Coordinator.Decisions bearing on covert operations were reached as follows:1.  The Special Group will have the responsibility of continuing review of the program for infiltration of covert intelligence agents. Progress will be regularly checked with the Group. Higher authority made a particular point of saying that, although the objective of "intensified covert collection" is approved, nonetheless, CIA should not feel it is under pressure to "get good men killed" in the process. In other words, the advantages to be gained from intensliled collection must be continually weighed against the risks. This will be done by the Special Group.2.  The Attorney General expressed great interest in the extent to which key members of the Brigade will be brought into planning and current operations. He thought that they should be thoroughly consulted on plans for intelligence teams and he indicated that he will personally keep an eye on progress in this regard.3.  The use of propaganda balloons was disapproved at this time. It apparently was not clear as to exactly how far CIA should go in maintaining its current capability for launching balloons.******At Mr. Bundy's suggestion I had a long talk with Cottrell on Saturday, the 26th. We discussed in particular the method of operation with the Brigade. I pointed out some of the security aspects that would have to be watched, but expressed the opinion that a workable method of operation could be devised so that the Brigade leaders could provide motivation and could feel a sense of participation, without having to bring them so closely into the details of target areas, dispatch, commo, etc., as to constitute a security hazard. I cited the Agency's experience with the NT8 as a possible guideline in this regard. We agreed that after Mr. PitzGerald returns from Panama, about the first of February, the three of us should discuss this matter further.TAP
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# SECRETEYES ONLY8 February 1963MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 8 February 1963PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hilsman,and Mr. FitzGerald1. Agent Operations in CubaMr. FitzGerald discussed with the Group the CIA paper of 6 February which recommends a total of five maritime infiltration/ exfiltration operations during the next thirty days.He emphasized that these black operations are entirely of an intelligence nature and that they should be viewed only as a supplement to intelligence coverage accomplished by other means. In the latter connection, the point was made that information obtained by agents of this type can contribute to the targeting of aerial reconnaissance sorties and can assist in making the process of photo interpretation more meaningful.Mr. FitzGerald also emphasized that the teams now proposed are comprised of only one to three agents. He noted that the agents available are particularly well motivated, and that those whose primary motivation was toward action rather than intelligence have been weeded out.The consensus of the Group was that while agent operations of this type cannot be considered as a primary or major source of intelligence, nonetheless this type of operation is consistent with U.S. objectives in the Cuba situation and that approval of these five should be recommended.(These missions were approved by higher authority, 9 February 1963)2. Subsidy to Venezuelan NewspaperMr. McCone reported on financial arrangements which have been made in connection with subsidy of the Venezuelan newspaper, whichSECRETEYES ONLY
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SECRETEYES ONLY- 2 -98was approved at the meeting of 31 January 1963. He said that Agency funds on deposit with the Morgan Guaranty, which will serve as collateral against the bank's loan to the new entrepreneur of this newspaper, would draw interest at 4%, while the purchaser will pay the commercial rate of 6%. The Chairman expressed satisfaction with this arrangement.![Signature of Thomas A. Parrott]Thomas A. ParrottDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McConeSECRETEYES ONLY![Signature]
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- SECRET  EYES ONLY28 February 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 28 February 1963PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McConeColonel Steakley was present for Items 1-31. Reconnaissance - DOD Monthly ForecastThe Group had no objection to the BOW TIE missions as planned. Mr. McCone alluded, however, to the unexplained military activity that is going on in eastern China, and asked about the capability of BOW TIE to check on this. It was pointed out that the BOW TIE program consists of comparatively shallow penetration which would probably not reach the kind of military target Mr. McCone had in mind. Accordingly, Colonel Steakley was asked to confer with COMOR to find out whether requirements exist for deeper penetration in the area, and if so to bring in an appropriate proposal to the Special Group.In connection with project AMOS, Mr. Johnson read a message from Lord Home to the Secretary of State. Home said that while the RAF and the Air Ministry will be glad to have the advantage of the intelligence resulting from the mission, nonetheless this represents a departure from the previous pattern of flights in the area. Additionally, the flight will, according to Home, go closer to the coast than the RAF is allowed to go. He was willing to agree to the mission, provided it was not viewed as establishing a precedent, and on the stipulation that Secretary Rusk personally accepts the risk entailed. Mr. Johnson said that Secretary Rusk is willing to accept this risk.The Group approved AMOS, subject to check by Mr. Bundy with higher authority, and on the understanding that the Group will have a chance to take a last look at it shortly before the scheduled date of 19 March. Colonel Steakley was also asked to report to the Group on the results of the mission. (This mission was later approved by higher authority.)In this connection, Mr. McCone commented on the great importance of obtaining intelligence on the Soviet low-level SA-3 system. The Group agreed that this is a high-priority requirement, in order toSECRETEYES ONLY
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# SECRET EYES ONLY- 2 -provide a basis for estimating accurately the chances for successfullow-level penetration of the USSR. Mr. McCone will arrange to havea USIB paper prepared on this subject.The Group noted the DESOTO destroyer voyage, which will now include a courtesy call at Djakarta.Colonel Steakley told the Group that CINCLANT has tried out the MELON PATCH photography missions, operating under the ten mile restriction which was laid on by the Special Group at its meeting of 31 January. It is now apparent to CINCLANT that adequate photography of the desired areas cannot be obtained at that distance. The Group agreed that the ten mile restriction should remain in force. In coming to this conclusion they made the point that in case of real need for this type of coastal intelligence, there would be adequate time to obtain it after an emergency actually was in effect; and further, any such information collected now would have to be up-dated before operations could be mounted based on it.The revised RED DOG missions, to be flown in C-47's, and the proposal to fly some BRASS KNOB missions from the Canal Zone, were approved.Colonel Steakley was asked to give the Group a report on the results obtained from the last mission into the Sea of Okhotsk.Colonel Steakley told the Group that the JCS will make no recommendation on low-level coverage of Laos (ABLE MABEL) until after the results of the Agency effort explained below.The Group made a point of saying that although the time is not now propitious for covering the COMOR priority targets in Cuba with low-level flights, it may well prove desirable to do this on fairly short notice. Therefore this matter should be kept under constant review by operating elements.## 2. Reconnaissance - CIA Monthly ForecastMr. McCone told the Group that the weather has suddenly opened up over North Vietnam and that the mission to cover that area, via Laos, which was approved by the Special Group on 17 January, will actually be launched tonight. He said that after this is completed the airplane will be ferried to Taiwan in accordance with the discussion at the meeting of the 25th of February, transiting Laos on the way. Mr. McCone also reported on the recent successful GROSBEAK mission.SECRETEYES ONLY
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SECRETEYES ONLY- 3 -3. Removal of Soviet TroopsMr. McCone said that we still do not know very much about the removal of Soviet troops from Cuba. Mr. Bundy stated that the official government position is that available information is insufficient to justify any change in the estimated figures of Soviets on the island. He added that no change can be made in these figures without specific approval by higher authority.4. Testimony on CubaMr. McCone commented on the difficulties encountered by officials who are required to testify before Congressional committees on the Cuban situation, in light of the propensity of these committees to question witnesses on statements made by other officials. Mr. Bundy recognized that this is a problem and said that in an attempt to alleviate it he has had several documents brought together. These include a compendium of the President's remarks on the subject; the DCI's report to the Killian Committee; a report by Assistant Secretary Martin; and most recently, the CIA-prepared paper on subversion in the hemisphere. He added that the basic responsibility for co-ordinating public statements rests with the Secretary of State.5. Italy - Status Report on Election OperationThe Group noted that this project is progressing, but is still in its early stages.6. Chile - Proposed Political ActionThe Group approved the proposal dated 25 February, subject to approval by higher authority. (This was later granted.)7. Agency Operations in Latin AmericaMr. Gilpatric inquired as to the feasibility of mounting intelligence or other operations against selected military personnel in Latin America. Mr. McCone said that some of this is being done but that he will have it studied further.8. Progress on Cuban OperationsMr. McCone told the Group that none of the five agent operations approved by the Group on the 8th of February has been successful. He noted that there have been a number of aborts due to weather,
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13-00000SECRETEYES ONLY- 4 -failure of equipment, and failure of rendezvous plans. He saidthat efforts are continuing to carry out these operations success-fully, but indicated some unhappiness with the results to date andthe prospects of success. He alluded particularly to the qualitiesof the agent personnel.JapanattThomas A. ParrottDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McConeSECRETEYES ONLY
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EYES ONLY14 March 1963MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUPSUBJECT: Approval of Cuba PapersAll members of the Special Group have now approved the following memoranda from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs:a. "Covert Propaganda to Stimulate Passive Resistance and Low-Risk, Simple Sabotage," 8 March 1963.b. "Proposed Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations in Cuba - 15 March 1963 to 15 April 1963," 11 March 1963.Thomas A. ParrottDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McConeEYES ONLY
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26 March 1963MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 26 March 1963PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.Dr. Scoville, Mr. McMillan, and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1-5.Mr. Lundahl was present for Item 1.Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 5.1. Low-Level Reconnaissance, CubaIn connection with the USIB recommendation for resumption of low-level coverage of Cuba, Mr. Lundahl showed the Group examples of the additional information that can be obtained from low-level photography as contrasted with high-level coverage. This had to do particularly with identification of materiel, spotting of personnel, etc.Mr. McCone emphasized that low-level coverage would give us additional information on the numbers of Soviet troops and possibly on Soviet intentions, and similar subjects, but that it would not represent a qualitative shift in the body of intelligence available. It would not reveal anything that would be of major security interest to the U.S. and which could not be picked up by high-level coverage.Mr. McCone also referred to the progress of certain negotiations which have been holding up active consideration of low-level photography. He said that there are differences of opinion among people closest to this situation as to what the effect of resumption of such photography actually might be on the negotiations.Mr. Gilpatric said that Defense is not convinced of the urgency of this proposition and would not favor it at this time, unless others feel that there is an overriding political reason for undertaking the project. He said that he would prefer to see this capability reserved for identifying the type of threat that we might otherwise not be aware of, or used at a time when there was some political advantage to be gained by low-level flights.See special minutes for additional item
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-SECRET-- 2 -Mr. Johnson said that the Secretary of State does not believe that there is any foreign policy reason for mounting the operation at this time, and in fact the Secretary and other high officials in the Department feel that from a policy point of view it would be inadvisable now.The Group then agreed that the resumption of low-level coverage would not be recommended at this time, but that it would be kept under weekly review.2. Reconnaissance, IndonesiaThe Group noted the intelligence justification for this proposal and the political objections to it, and the Chairman agreed to discuss it with higher authority as an example of a situation where clear-cut differences of interest exist. He said that if there was any doubt from that quarter he would have all the principals participate in further discussion with higher authority. (The proposal was later disapproved by higher authority.)3. Peripheral Reconnaissance Operationsa. Colonel Steakley gave the following brief reports on a number of peripheral missions:(1) The ELINT coverage of the Sea of Okhotsk produced good results. He said that this area is now so well covered with radars that consideration should probably be given as to whether the rules requiring an abort in case of an AI lock-on should be relaxed.(2) The AMOS mission, directed against SA-3's in the Baltic, did not result in any ELINT take from the radars associated with the SA-3's. He said that some question now arises as to whether these weapons are in fact SA-3's or perhaps a later generation of the SA-2.(3) A DESOTO destroyer mission off the Soviet Maritime Provinces resulted in Soviet instructions to shut down their radars when the ship approached.b. The Group approved four missions (UNA, DANIEL, FLOYD and GEORGE) using new ASD-1 equipment. This includes two in the Baltic area, one in the Black Sea, and one flying from England to the Black Sea.SECRET
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4. ELINT BalloonsDr. Scoville gave the Group details of the operation in the Sea of Japan, employing balloons against TALL KING radars. He said that the results indicate that perhaps these radars are not as efficient as we had thought, but that further analysis is proceeding.5. Covert Operations, Cubaa. ProceduresNoting that the shipping sabotage paper of 19 March had not been considered by the Cottrell committee as a body, the Special Group asked that such proposals be considered in that way before submission to the Special Group. In passing the recommendations to the Special Group it should be indicated what the position of the various Cottrell members was, just as is done in the case of political projects coordinated with State and the ambassador. Each member of the Cottrell committee would see to it that his own agency staffed the paper in the normal way for submission to the Special Group.b. Sabotage of ShippingThe substance of the 19 March paper was then considered. Mr. McCone raised a question as to exactly what the U.S. objective now is in this and related fields, and questioned in addition whether we may be trying to manage exile groups too closely.There was some discussion as tothe actual value of carrying out the proposed sabotage, that is whether enough damage could be done to hurt the Castro regime seriously. The consensus of the Group seemed to be that activity of this kind should not be undertaken if it could be expected to yield only small gains, but that if its effect would be really significant then that would be a different matter.Considerable doubt was expressed about the proposal for sinking and setting fire to ships. None of the members felt that there was any particular objection to the use of abrasives or other damaging materials.The proposal was then remanded for group consideration by the Cottrell committee. This committee is asked to look at the proposal in relation toeeverything else that is going on or is under serious consideration, in order to assess its true potentiality. Mr. FitzGerald was authorized to modify the proposal to the extent
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13-00000- 4 -of considering possible unilateral action as opposed to using anexile group as a cutout. Mr. Bundy will explore exactly what thefeeling of higher authority is with respect to relations with exilegroups.c. Additional ProgramsMr. Johnson mentioned the activities of the NTS, which hasbeen broadcasting in Russian to the Soviet troops over Radio Caribein the Dominican Republic. Mr. FitzGerald agreed to add this to thepossibilities listed under radio broadcasting.Mr. Johnson questioned the extent to which proposition b.,involving inciting Cubans to commit aggressive acts against Sovietpersonnel, is in accord with current objectives.On the matter of propaganda balloons, most members of theGroup felt that these might be useful in connection with the particulartarget mentioned - the May Day concentration which is expected in Havana.Mr. Johnson had some reservations which he wanted to check out furtherin the Department. It was agreed that should State take a favorableview, then the matter would be presented to higher authority.As to the request for Defense training facilities, Mr.Gilpatric asked that Mr. FitzGerald discuss the needs with SecretaryVance. Mr. FitzGerald said that the principal requirement which can-not be met in CIA facilities is adequate space for weapons training.Members of the Group recalled that the objection to the use of Defensefacilities at the time it was presented during the MONGOOSE period,was that this would make it difficult, if not impossible, to denyofficial U.S. involvement. Mr. Bundy said that he saw no objectionif the purpose was to train Cubans for eventual open hostilities, butthought that in this case the objective might be better achieved byhaving them undergo regular U.S. Army training. The other membersagreed.![signature of Thomas A. Parrott]Thomas A. ParrottDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McCone
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# TOP SECRET(CLASSIFICATION)BYE-12693-63Cy 1Handle Via Indicated Controls97BYEMANWARNINGThis document contains information offecting the national security of the United States within the mean- ing of the espionage lows U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its transmis- sion or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the sofety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of ony foreign govern- ment to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoc- trinoted and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the designated controls.This document contains information referring to Projects:CORONA IDEALISTTOP SECRET(CLASSIFICATION)
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 4 April 1963PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, Mr. HughesDr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1 and 2.Commander Yates was present for Item 1.1. DOD Peripheral ReconnaissanceThe DOD monthly forecast of peripheral reconnaissance activities was noted. Special note was taken of mission ULCER GULCH, which all members approved. Consideration of YANKEE PASHA was deferred for at least a week because of certain points raised by the Secretary of State. Mr. Bundy said that he himself would normally have no objection to this operation but that conditions at the moment make it inadvisable to go ahead at this precise time.Colonel Steakley was asked to brief the Group on the special navigational safeguards which would be used in the YANKEE PASHA operation, at a later meeting when Mr. Johnson could be present.Commander Yates briefed the Group on certain submarine operations. Mr. Gilpatric undertook to assure himself that adequate procedures exist for notifying members of the Special Group and other key officials in the event of an untoward incident.2. Reconnaissance Missions, Far EastMr. McCone briefed the Group on the results of two recent missions. He pointed out that there are now no authorizations outstanding for high-performance reconnaissance in the Far East.The recommendations in the NRO paper for the Special Group, dated 4 April, were approved with the exception of 7. b (Laos), which was deferred for later consideration, Mr. McCone agreed to mention these approvals to higher authority, but it was felt that no further formal approval was required.
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SECRETEYES ONLY- 2 -All members of the Group expressed their interest in getting on with plans for resuming FALCON missions. It was noted that one of the principal problems in this area is the question of a base. It was agreed that we should probably approach this from the point of view of obtaining a standby agreement with the Indian Government to permit staging in and out of that country. Dr. Scoville said that a message had gone out to the field on this point last night. The Chairman asked that word be sent to the Ambassador that high-level interest in this proposition does exist in Washington.3. Status Report on Italian ElectionsCIA's paper of 1 April was noted.4. Low-Level Reconnaissance, CubaThe Group took no action on this subject.5. Covert Subsidy for Kong LeAt Mr. Hughes' suggestion, it was agreed that CIA should look into the possibilities of a covert payment to Kong Le.6. Cuban OperationsThe Group recommended approval of the following papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs:a. Sabotage of Shipping, 19 March, as amended by a memorandum from the Deputy Coordinator, 2 April 1963.b. Russian Language Broadcasts, 2 April 1963.c. Propaganda Inciting Cubans within Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops, 2 April 1963.Mr. Bundy and Mr. FitzGerald will obtain final approval from higher authority.![signature of Thomas A. Parrott]Thomas A. ParrottDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McCone![Secret eyes only stamp]4/mc