Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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TOP SECRETorganization in the United States, that the time hadcome for Diggs and Pulley to be asked "to foregotheir efforts on behalf of Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga."This recommendation was approved by General C. P.Cabell on 13 October 1960.*[^22]Insofar as the available records show, the con-tacts between Vice President Nixon's office, and the* More nonsense from Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga would  surface again in the summer of 1961 following Castro's  offer to free the Bay of Pigs prisoners in return for  US tractors when Garcia bounced up with another pro-  posal for the planned escape of the prisoners -- pro-  viding, of course, that he be given a bundle of bucks.In fact, the hand of Garcia reached from beyondthe grave to touch on the BOP operation. On 2 August1976, almost a year after Garcia's death, the Washing-ton Star carried a UPI dispatch saying that Rep. ThomasN. Downing (D., Va.) had affidavits claiming that:In return for support of the invasion[of Cuba] from Mario G. Kohly, a popularright-wing leader who was exiled fromCuba, then Vice President Nixon agreedin October 1960 to order the CIA toarrest the leftist leaders and turnthem over to Kohly for "elimination"after Premier Fidel Castro was thrownout of office.The affidavits reportedly came from a former CIA con-tract agent and Mario G. Kohly, Jr., son of the would-beinvasion leader. These materials were supposed to havesome bearing on House of Representatives's investigationof the assassination of President Kennedy; but there isno indication that they were given any credence. [^23]- 268 -TOP SECRET[^22]: [^23]:
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# TOP SECRETCentral Intelligence Agency -- except for the Garcia case -- for all practical purposes ended by August 1960.*The only other significant involvement between the Vice President and the Central Intelligence Agency, prior to the change of administration on 20 January 1961, concerned a briefing of the Democratic candidates for President and Vice President of the United States, prior to the 1960 election. On 23 July 1960, following the Democratic convention, Allen Dulles briefed Sen. John Kennedy, and on 28 July Senator Lyndon Johnson. In his memorandum to President Eisenhower, who had directed that Dulles give these briefings, the DCI reported that in the two hour period for each briefing he had covered US relations with the Soviet Union, developments in the Berlin situation, in the[^1][^1]: Whether this reflects the concentration of the Vice President's activities on the upcoming November election, whether the principal contacts came to be maintained between Col. J. C. King and Nixon's office -- with the consequent reference memoranda being included in J. C. King's files, which have disappeared from the sight of God and man -- or whether, in fact, this is an accurate reflection of the limited contacts, the author cannot confirm. His inclination is to believe that the contacts probably were as limited as described above.- 269 -# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETCongo, and in Cuba. Kennedy was briefed again on19 September 1960, and again the briefing touchedon relations with the Soviet Union and on the troublespots in the world, including Cuba. The White Housewas informed of this briefing prior to the event; andsubsequent to the briefing of Kennedy, Mr. Dullesreported on the meeting to both Jerry Morgan of theWhite House Staff and also to Brigadier General AndrewGoodpaster, Staff Secretary to the President. [^24]The exact nature of the briefings that Dullesgave to Kennedy on Cuba is of particular historicalimportance in terms of the election of 1960. In thelast of the famous TV debates between candidates Nixonand Kennedy, Mr. Kennedy, in the course of condemningthe Castro regime and suggesting that the United Statestake stronger action against Castro, made the statementthat:We must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista democratic anti-Castro forces inexile, and in Cuba itself, who offereventual hope of overthrowing Castro. Thusfar, these fighters for freedom have hadvirtually no support from our Government. [^25]Based on his knowledge and interest in supportingthe anti-Castro program that had been authorized by- 270 -TOP SECRET[^24]: [^25]:
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TOP SECRETPresident Eisenhower in March 1960, Nixon was put in a Catch-22 situation; for as he said:President Eisenhower had instructed Allen Dulles, head of the CIA, to brief the Democratic candidate on all opera- tions, including Top Secret operations. I knew that Kennedy had already received two briefings from Dulles. I immediately had a member of my staff call the White House on the security line to ask if these briefings covered Cuba. A member of the White House Staff indicated they had. (Several months after the election, Allen Dulles was to state that his brief- ing of Kennedy had included Cuba but not the training program for Cuban exiles.) At the time of the debate, however, and after checking with the White House, I had to proceed with the assumption that Kennedy had been briefed on the secret program.I was faced with the heads-he-wins, tails-I-lose proposition. If in the TV debate I were to reveal the existence of the training program and point out that I had been one of its strongest advocates, I would pull the rug out from under Kennedy's position. But if I did so, the project would be doomed, and also the lives of the brave men, both inside and outside of Cuba, who were receiving training and assistance.I had only one choice: to protect the security of the program, I had to oppose Kennedy on his position of advocating that the United States openly aid anti-Castro forces inside and outside Cuba. 26/It is interesting to observe that Nixon became more philosophical about the impact of the final TV- 271 -TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETdebate with regard to the outcome of the 1960 elec-tion as time passed. In 1964 he would write "Mostobservers agree that our positions on the Cubanissue could well have been the decisive factor [inthe outcome of the election)." But in his recentmemoirs he expressed doubt that any single factorin such a close election could really have changedthe outcome.*[^27]Following the TV debate in which Kennedy hadraised the issue of assistance for Cuba, Nixon quicklylashed back at Kennedy. The result of the introduc-tion of the Cuban issue into the late stages of the[^27]: * In an interesting conversation with Fawn M. Brodie who is writing a Nixon biography, the author of this history, in response to Brodie's concern about the fact that Nixon knowingly lied to the American public, emphasized that plausible deniability was of real concern at the time of the TV debate. He also emphasized the Catch-22 aspect of the situation as explained by Nixon. The author also suggested to Mrs. Brodie that it seemed equally valid to infer that perhaps Kennedy had been leaked detailed information about the anti-Castro program and that he used this device to put Nixon in a corner during the TV debate. Arthur Schlesinger, of course, claimed that the Kennedy comments "were no more than a rhetorical flourish. Neither Kennedy nor his staff knew about the secret Cuban Army in Guatemala."[^28]TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETelection campaign, struck sensitive nerves withinthe Agency; and on 26 October 1960, General Cabellmet with Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's NationalSecurity Adviser, indicating that the discussion anddebate about Cuban issues were touching onareas which, in the end, might be damaging to thenation's interest. On 27 October at the SpecialGroup meeting, Mr. Gray reported that he had talkedto "certain Nixon people in the White House" in anattempt to enlist their support to bring such dis-cussions to an end. [^29]It was not until 18 November 1960 that Presi-dent-elect John F. Kennedy was fully briefed by Direc-tor of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, and theDeputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell, on theextent of the anti-Castro activities being plannèdby the United States Government. [^30] Mr. Nixon'smisconception of the extent of the briefing thatKennedy had received in the pre-election period wasnot finally clarified however, until 20 March 1962when Allen Dulles addressed a memorandum to John A.McCone, his successor as Director of Central Intelli-gence, stating as follows:- 273 -TOP SECRET[^29]: insert footnote here[^30]: insert footnote here
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# TOP SECRETI have read the portions of Mr. Nixon's book with regard to the intelligence briefings which he understood Senator Kennedy had been given by me with respect to Cuba during the campaign. I have also seen the White House statement issued today on this subject.There has been here, I believe, an honest misunderstanding. This was probably due to the nature of the message Mr. Nixon writes he received as to these briefings. The Cuban situation was, of course, dealt with in the briefings I gave to Senator Kennedy. The last briefing I gave him was over a month before the debate in which the issue arose.My briefings were intelligence briefings on the world situation. They did not cover our own Government's plans or programs for action -- overt or covert. [^1]As previously noted, however, by 1964, if not earlier, Mr. Nixon had accepted the fact that he had made an error in assuming that Kennedy had received a more detailed briefing than in fact he truly had.By way of concluding this segment on Richard Nixon's involvement in the Bay of Pigs activity, it should be clear that by no stretch of the imagination was Nixon "the architect of the Bay of Pigs."* [^2][^1]: A statement made to DCI Stansfield Turner by Fawn Brodie who attributed it to Tom Braden, an old CIA man, in a TV documentary on the CIA made by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
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13-00000TOP SECRETIt is equally clear that Mr. Nixon, principally through his aide, General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., was fully read into the plans that were being developed by the Central Intelligence Agency for the ouster of Fidel Castro. This interest was especially strong in the period from the winter of 1960 through the late summer of 1960. It also should be apparent to the reader that while some of the Vice President's interest -- particularly in his insistence on placating William Pawley, especially in giving undue attention to Pawley's concerns that the Agency-sponsored Cuban-exile organization was being taken over by the pro-Communist groups -- was politically motivated, his basic concern was the fear of the establishment of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere. Certainly his constant interest and offers to provide help for the Agency in its relations to other branches of the US Government fall into the latter, rather than the former, category. The unanswerable question, of course, is whether Cuban Communism would play such a large role in international- 275 -TOP SECRET
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13-00000TOP SECRETaffairs in 1979, particularly in the third worldcountries, if Richard Nixon had been elected Presi-dent in 1960.** Indicative of the more forceful role that Nixon  would have had the US play was the comment that he  reportedly made to William Pawley several weeks be-  fore the 1960 election, when Nixon indicated that he  favored breaking relations with Cuba -- at that time  -- recognizing a Government-in-exile, and then assist-  ing that Government in its efforts to oust Castro. 33/- 276 -TOP SECRET
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13-00000TOP SECRETPart VIIThe Question of AssassinationsIn his testimony before the Senate Select Com- mittee to Study Governmental Operations, Intelligence Activities, Richard M. Bissell, formerly CIA's Deputy Director for Plans, testified fully and completely to the role that he, Sheffield Edwards, and William Harvey played in negotiations with Robert Maheu and Mafia figures John Rosselli and Momo Salvatore Giancana on plans for the assassination of Fidel Castro. In addition to the individuals just named, it also appears highly probable that Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence (and possibly both Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy) was aware that Castro was an assassination target. Unfortunately the Senate Com- mittee Report and the media coverage of the investi- gation of the Central Intelligence Agency's partici- pation in assassination plots made it appear that the Mafia involvement was a fundamental part of the Agency's response to President Eisenhower's March 1960 authori- zation for CIA to be principally responsible for the ouster of Fidel Castro. In fact, the activities of- 277 -TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETMessrs. Bissell, Edwards, and Harvey, with Maheu and the Mafia remained strictly compartmented and isolated from the officially authorized Project JMARC -- the Project which came to be known as the Bay of Pigs operation. Bissell himself stated:I don't remember. I have no recollection that [there was] any specific other plot against Castro during this period when the Bay of Pigs operation was in preparation. I do remember my own feeling that the Mafia plot had a very modest chance for success, and that it was not something to be depended on in any way. I don't remember others. [^1]Bissell also told the author of this history that:Shef [Col. Sheffield Edwards, Director, Office of Security] would occasionally let me know what was going on [vis-a-vis the Mafia]. In effect, he and his immediate subordinate were case officers for that activity; and I don't think anybody else [was] involved. I think probably Tracy [Barnes] may have known about it, but I don't think anybody else involved with the Bay of Pigs operation knew anything about it, whatever. My recollection is that it never went to the Special Group, and that is the view of [McGeorge] Bundy.* [^2]* Interestingly enough, at the same time that Col. Edwards was concerned about the elimination of Castro, CIA's Deputy Director for Support, Col. L. K. White, noted:Shef Edwards and I met with General Cabell and Jack Earman [on 22 March 1961] to point out to them that we were not(footnote continued on following page)[^1]:[^2]:
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# TOP SECRETJacob D. Esterline, who was Chief, WH/4, the component of Western Hemisphere Division specifically created to run the anti-Castro project, disclaimed either responsibility or knowledgeability about the Mafia connection.* 4/ Richard D. Drain, who became Chief of Operations for WH/4 was more voluble on the subject of the assassination attempts which were reported by the Senate Select Committee. In an interview which touched, among other things on the planned assassination of Castro by the Mafia-types Drain commented:furnishing the Director the personal protection which we should be furnishing in these critical times, particularly with regard to the dangers inherent in the Cuban situation. General Cabell agreed to talk with the Director about this, and to try to obtain his approval to increase Mr. Tighe's force to six people. 3/* Esterline claimed that on one occasion as Chief, WH/4 he refused to grant Col. J. C. King, Chief, WH Division, a blank check when King refused to tell Jake the purpose for which the check was intended. Esterline reported that King nonetheless got a FAN number from the Office of Finance and that the money was used to pay the Mafia-types. It was subsequent to the Bay of Pigs operation when he found out about this, and Esterline told the author of this history that he expressed his strong opposition to the funding of such activities to J. C. King. 5/- 279 -TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETI've been giving you lessons here about [how] a COPS should know a little about everything ... Well, I promise you, until it came out in 1975, this allegation, at least, that Shef Edwards and Mr. Maheu were working with the Mafia to assassinate Castro, concurrent with the Bay of Pigs Operation, that is the first time I ever heard about it. Ever! ... My thought, when I saw this, was Jesus Christ, I must have been a little over-compartmented, because we had spent a considerable amount of nervous energy figuring out how are we going to get a shot at the old son-of-a-bitch concurrent with the landing. If anybody with whom I participated in planning for that ... something that we never had figured out how to do, because so many of our agents went down just prior to the invasion. If anybody that was involved in that ever spoke a word about any other exercise going on to get Castro, I never heard it; and my initial reaction when all this came out, during this last year was ... well ... why did they give me the idiot treatment? Then it occurred to me that maybe there was very good reason for me not to know. You don't need to know ... compartmentation ... even from COPS is not unheard of ...Well, mind you, I am not saying what I've just said in any kind of pique; and I certainly don't want to leave you -- or this tape recorder -- with the impression that had I known about this, I would have been opposed. I must say, I don't think I would have enjoyed the instrument very much -- whereas we put out an awful lot of bullshit to the Cubans about the restoration of democracy and all that. Those Cubans, that were working with us were not, I submit, working for the re-establishment of the Mafia as a controlling factor in Havana. I had a helluva lot rather, in- 280 -# TOP SECRET
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13-00000TOP SECRETcontemplating the assassination of Castro, contemplated in the way that we were contemplating it -- that is, can we get a Rip Robertson close to him? Can we get a really hairy Cuban -- I mean a gutsy Cuban -- to be infiltrated with this one thing in mind? We surveyed all of our agent material to see who could take a shot at him, but the assassination of that charismatic guy, coincidental with the invasion, would have been a highly desirable thing. Whether the instrument to be picked should have included the Mafia, I think I might have questioned at the time. It was part of my job ... to ask, "Now wait a minute ... What are we doing here? ... If this comes out ... what will we look like? Not only to ourselves, which is important, but to the Cubans."[^6]In light of Drain's comments about the desirability of having the good guys in the white hats eliminate Castro, rather than the Mafia guys in the black hats, a specific attempt was made to see what the official records revealed about such plans. Although far from satisfactory or complete, there is evidence to indicate that the white-hatted guys would have had no objection -- as reported by Mr. Drain -- if a successful assassination attempt could have been made. Contrary to General Cabell's reported put down of Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant for Merchant's query about the possibilities of taking- 281 -TOP SECRET[^6]: No footnote
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TOP SECRET"direct positive action" against the Castro brothersand Che Guevara, WH/4 records reveal interest, andpossibly limited, direct participation, in a numberof such activities.*For the most part, however, the various piecesof evidence that seemed to implicate WH/4 in assas-sination plots against Castro or other of the Cubanleaders proved to be cold trails. The peripateticHoward Hunt claimed, even prior to the Senate inves-tigations, that after a visit to Havana in the springof 1960, he prepared a report recommending among otherthings that the Agency should:... Assassinate Castro before or coincidentwith the invasion (a task for Cuban patri-ots) ... Barnes and Bissell read my report... and said it would weigh in the finalplanning ... So far as I have been ableto determine no coherent plan was everdeveloped within CIA to assassinate...* As the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,  Cabell pointed out to Mr. Merchant that such action  was highly dangerous both in conception and execution,  and, further, he indicated that it was beyond the  Agency's capability. 7/ The Senate Select Committee  chased its tail at some length over the interpretation  of the term "direct positive action," as used by  Merchant. Only someone (even a Senator) who consist-  ently engaged and in omphaloskepsis would have a  problem understanding the meaning to be anything other  than assassination.- 282 -TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETCastro, but it was the heart's desire of many exile groups. * 8/In another instance, it appeared possible that an agent named Rivero, a Cuban exile, might have been in training to make an assassination attempt because it was reported that he was taken to the Warrington *[sic]*, Virginia firing range where he was checked out in the use of the Special .38 Airweight semi-hammerless pistol; British Welrod pistol, single shot, a 9mm parabellum with silencer; carbine with folding stock; and a 7.65mm British Welrod with silencer. He is to be also checked out this week in the use of a sporting rifle with telescopic lens attachment.It was revealed subsequently that upon his reinfiltration into Havana, Rivero had two principal sabotage missions -- one against the Esso refinery and the other aimed at the Havana Electric Company. 9/In mid-July 1960, there reportedly was an internal Cuban attempt on Castro's life, an attempt in which neither WH/4 nor the Mafia played a part. A cable from Santiago de Cuba reported:* Hunt alleged that when he asked Barnes about the status of his recommendation he was told that it was "in the hands of a special group." Jake Esterline and Jim Flannery (Executive Officer of the DDP at the time of the Bay of Pigs) both disclaimed knowledge of any memorandum prepared by Hunt. A search of WH/4 records failed to surface any such report.TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETOn 15 July 1960, the Cuban Government un- covered a plot to kill Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz on 26 July 1960 during his visit to Mina del Frio, an army camp in the Sierra Maestra mountains, between Bayamo and Manza- nillo in Oriente Province. Three captains and approximately 100 soldiers had been ar- rested and more arrests are expected. 10/In addition to Richard Bissell and Dick Drain, Jake Esterline the Chief of Project JMATE was also very emphatic in denying that assassination of Castro or the Cuban lead- ers was a part of the JMATE Program. In response to a question of whether various of the special arms that were being forwarded to the PM training sites were intended for use against the Cuban leadership, Esterline responded:No, I think it [silenced weapons in par- ticular] is for hit and run operations, where they could do their maximum damage and get out without necessarily alerting people ... I know of no -- within JMARC as I knew it -- I know of no attempt, no plans that were made to assassinate. As a matter of fact, the constant battle with Cubans during those years was to tell them that we weren't going to get involved in any assassination, that if there was going to be an overthrow, it was going to be, obviously, a bloody op- eration; but no Cubans were going to be sent in there, to "make an assassination attempt." It was going to be a ground-roots revolution.* 11/Some contradictory evidence, however, indicates that WH/4, if not principally responsible, was certainly* It is known that at least one assassination plot against Castro and his advisers -- an attack by four men using US rifle-grenades -- was proposed by anti-Castro Cubans to COS Havana, but the COS gave the originator of the plan "no encouragement whatsoever." 1la/- 284 -TOP SECRET