Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 225]
TOP SECRETThe first test signals from Swan Island were sent on 17 May 1960, and from that time until the close out of the Bay of Pigs Operation, the station was one of the two or three principal voices aimed at Castro's government. [^1] Shortly after the initiation of the broadcast from Swan, a true tempest in teapot was brewed over the question of whether or not export licences were going to be required for goods moving from the mainland to support operations at Swan Island. Involved in this brouhaha were the Department of Commerce, the US Customs Service, and numerous Agency components -- Cover Staff, Commercial Division, the Office of Logistics, and the Office of Security. Bill Eisemann, WH/4's Chief of Support, had his hands full! Common sense ultimately prevailed and the question of export licences was dropped. [^2]Even before Swan went into operation, there was some question within the government as to whether the CIA or the United States Information Agency should be principally responsible for propaganda broadcasts directed at Cuba. Within a few weeks following the beginning of operations at Swan, this question was resolved in a meeting in Senator Mundt's office which- 214 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 11/[^2]: 12/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 226]
# TOP SECRETincluded representatives from the Agency, Mr. AbbotWashburn, the Director of the United States Informa-tion Agency, and various of Mr. Washburn's seniorpeople. The meeting made clear that the Agency wasdoing medium wave broadcasting directly into Cuba.Although it was not specified at the meeting inMundt's office, CIA also was supporting station WRUL,which had made a direct application on its own initia-tive for funding such broadcasts -- even though theAgency was behind such broadcasting and such financ-ing. [^1]The Navy, however, got goosey about the coverstory which was being presented. Despite a strongeffort on the part of senior Agency representativesto convince Rear Admiral S. B. Frankel -- who wasdesignated as the Chief representative of the Officeof Naval Intelligence by Admiral Fauste, then Directorof ONI -- the Navy declined further involvement insupporting the cover story.* The hassle with the[^1]: * The thrust of the Agency's 27 April 1960 briefingfor Adm. Frankel was that the USN was already so heavilyinvolved in the project that it would do them more harmthan good to withdraw. Information on this meetingwith the Navy and other information pertaining to thedevelopment of the Swan Island facility is contained inthe sources listed under Reference 14/.-215 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 227]
TOP SECRETNavy was successfully resolved when the Agency found that through its own resources it would be able to provide for resupply of all of the Island's needs, including transportation of personnel between JMWAVE in Florida and Swan Island without undue difficulty.The problem of security of the island -- particularly the fear that perhaps Castro would send saboteurs to the island -- was never put to any real test. In fact, what might have been the only serious security incident was most successfully resolved by Robert Overjord, the Security Officer for the island and the Deputy Chief of Base. The incident took place in July 1960 when a group of 14 Honduran students landed to assert a claim to sovereignty of the Swan Islands by the Republic of Honduras, and it was reported as follows:A potentially dangerous situation was averted by the tactful handling of the group by Mr. Overjord who persuaded them to leave their armament of 13 pistols and three submachine guns aboard their boat and conducted them on a tour of the island. The group leader indicated that he wanted to take a census of the population, and was furnished with pertinent information, with no divulgence of Agency interest in Radio Swan or its personnel. Upon completion of the census, the group was permitted to raise the Honduran flag, was given lunchTOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 228]
TOP SECRETand refreshments, and departed shortly thereafter. The good judgment and discretion of Mr. Overjord are felt to be directly responsible for avoidance of what could have been a serious incident involving loss of lives, or injury to Agency and other island personnel.*[^1]The question of the exact nature of the broadcasts from Swan was the subject of much discussion, both prior to the opening of the station and subsequent to its first broadcast. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, for example, called Jake Esterline, Chief, Project JMATE to report on conversation that he (General Cabell) had with "a person of considerable importance who was very familiar with Cuba," concerning the nature of the propaganda. which should be aimed at the Cuban population. Cabell stated that according to this important person, if tapes of Castro's radio broadcasts could be acquired and then patched together for rebroadcasting to the Cuban population for hours on end, the effect would be "to bore the people horribly with Castro, but would[^1]: The island was manned by 24 people, all but nine of whom were CIA personnel. The nine were unwitting technicians of the Philco Corporation.
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 229]
TOP SECRETalso pointedly reveal the inconsistencies of his statements." Following receipt of this call from the Deputy Director, Esterline passed the word on to Dave Phillips with the comment that he thought perhaps such broadcasts might be used as filler during the intervals when Swan was not doing its regular broadcasts.*[^1]By early August 1960, however, the official policy for the Swan propaganda broadcasts aimed at Cuba, was to be "the Revolution Betrayed." This theme was formalized by the Department of State; and at the direction of the Secretary of State, copies of a 105 page document addressed to this theme were presented to members of the National Security Council, to members of the Inter-American Peace Committee, and to US Embassies in the Latin American countries.* COS Havana forwarded another suggestion for a possible propaganda attack on Castro based on a May 1960 issue of *Confidential* magazine, which apparently carried an article called "An American Mother's Terrifying Story -- Fidel Castro Raped my Teenage Daughter." It was COS Havana's suggestion that wide publicity be given to this article in the Spanish language, presumably including broadcasts from Radio Swan. [^2] Available records do not indicate whether this suggestion was adopted.- 218 -TOP SECRET[^1]: /[^2]: /
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 230]
TOP SECRETInstructions were that the Embassies could furnish copies of the document to the foreign ministers and to other high officials in their respective countries. Additionally, the NATO Council also received a copy of this document; and it was the hope of the Department of State that the document would have some impact on the upcoming meeting of the foreign ministers of the Western Hemisphere countries, which was to begin 16 August 1960 in San Jose, Costa Rica. According to one interview of WH/4's propaganda chief, Dave Phillips, the theme of the Revolution BetrayedHammered across the idea that Castro had double-crossed the Cuban people by abandoning the programs and promises that originally won him support. None of CIA's propaganda, spoken or printed, ever urged the populace to rise up against Castro. This appeal, suicidal before the invasion, would be used when, and if, a Provisional Government obtained a lodgement on the island. [^1]According to Phillips's interviewer:Friendly third country diplomats in Havana monitored CIA's principal broadcasts and confirmed that the signals were loud and clear. To verify its audience the Swan Island radio offered simple gifts (ball point pens were a favorite) to any listener who would write to the station. Considering the police controls inside Cuba, listeners' letters were an act of defiance to the regime. There was a[^1]:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 231]
TOP SECRETa flood of letters including, duringfreak radio propagation periods, re-quests for ball point pens from NewZealand.*[^19]Another evidence of the success of the Swan broadcastswas related to the Director of Central Intelligence byCol. King, Chief, WH Division, who pointed out that WHhad a copy of a letter from a Cuban listener who, inthe form of a letter bitterly attacking Swan, made itclear that the Swan broadcasts were coming in loud andclear. 21/Before the end of the summer of 1960, Swan wason the air on both short-wave and medium-wave for atotal of 10 hours a day, in addition to which theyalso began to utilize programs that had been preparedby the FRD. One problem which would plague Radio Swan-- as well as other elements of Project JMARC -- wasthe shortage of Spanish language capability. Among[^1]: It appears that perhaps baseball cards also weregoing to be offered as an inducement to get listenersto indicate that they had picked up Swan's broadcast.A propaganda note from WH/4 for 9 August 1960, forexample, reported: "M[aney] spoke to Ken Harris,Special Acquisitions. He has contacted a companymaking baseball cards who claim 'this most unusualorder ever received.' Will get cards, but curiouswhat was wrong with bubble gum." 20/TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 232]
# TOP SECRETother evidence of the need to have someone with Spanish language capability immediately available at Radio Swan, were the following: A machine-run of Agency employees failed to surface anyone with sufficient Spanish language to undertake an announcer's job; inability to exploit the fatal shooting of a Venezuelan child by a pro-Castro goon, could not be turned to US advantage; and by mid-November 1960 WH Division was requesting that a requirement be laid on to the Department of Defense for a serviceman with native fluency in Spanish who could be used as an announcer at Radio Swan.*[^1][^1]: In the instance of the death of the Venezuelan child, the pro-Castro Cuban press was able to get the story out before it could be broadcast from Radio Swan. The pro-Castro press claimed that the death had been caused by a counter-revolutionary. (Sources for the foregoing discussion related to the lack of Spanish language capability are listed in reference 22/.)The lack of Spanish language capability was felt throughout the project, not only in the propaganda effort. As late as January 1961, for example, the training facility in the Canal Zone was pushing Headquarters for the services for a two week period of an Air Force sergeant who was fluent in Spanish. The training base wanted the sergeant to assist in briefing and debrief-ing an infiltration team. The request was denied, however, because there was a greater need for the man's services as an instructor at the air training base in Guatemala. 22a/ In another instance, a request from COB Miami for promotion of a clerical from GS-4 to GS-5 was based on the fact that "her services as a translator have been of the greatest importance to the Base since her arrival." 22b/- 221 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 233]
TOP SECRETDespite the handicap imposed by the lack of Spanish language capability at the Station, Radio Swan was the most effective of the propaganda activities supported by the Agency; and with Station WRUL, New York, these Agency-sponsored radio broadcasts were the most effective means of providing the general Cuban population with anti-Castro ammunition. Additionally radio propaganda -- via both short and medium wave transmitters -- was to play an important role immediately following the landing of the anti-Castro forces on Cuban soil. [^23]Aside from radio broadcasts, other media activities in which WH/4 PP engaged were the newspaper *Avance in Exile* and the magazine *Bohemia Libre*. Both of these were published in Miami by the exile groups, and at one time *Bohemia Libre* was reputedly the most widely circulated Spanish language weekly in the world. Although barred in Cuba, selected items from both publications were broadcast by Swan or WRUL. [^23a]One of the strangest of all activities in which WH/4 PP engaged was a public opinion survey conducted by the Lloyd Free organization to assess the attitudes of the Cuban people toward the Castro regime. If WH/4's- 222 -TOP SECRET[^23]: [^23a]:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 234]
# TOP SECRETplanners expected that the survey would show a strong core of internal opposition to the Castro government, they were to be sadly disappointed. Working with "a competent Cuban research organization" Free's report was based on a series of a thousand interviews with a cross section of the urban population of Cuba "both in Havana and in other cities, towns, and villages throughout the island." Among the findings of the Free survey, the following comments were included in the summary report of mid-August of 1960:*The great majority of Cubans surveyed felt that both they personally and their country were very much better off than during the days of Batista. The prevailing mood was one of hope and optimism.Attesting the apparently genuine enthusiasm of the great majority for the Revolution, the Castro Government and its program were the replies when the sample was asked about the worst aspects of life in Cuba today. Despite the fact that` this question was designed to illicit unfavorable comments, a very sizable majority named as the worst aspects of the present situation items which implied sympathy or support for the present regime. At the top of the list (mentioned by one-third of all respondents) was regret or apprehension over the fact that there is opposition to the Revolution and to the Revolutionary regime; (and) that there are misguided counter-revolutionaries and reactionaries.- 223 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 235]
# TOP SECRETEven in describing the worst aspects of the present situation, only 30% of all respondents mentioned items which could be construed as criticisms, explicit or implicit, of the Castro regime. Only a few such subjects received significant mention, with each being referred to by only a small minority of total respondents: e.g., the danger of or trend toward Communism (7%); criticism of the Revolution's program (7%); economic difficulties (7%); unemployment (6%); confusion and disorganization (5%).In view of the overwhelming popularity of the Revolutionary program, it is patently clear that criticisms of Castro's program, as such, will fall very largely on barren, if not counter-productive ground.The only positive statements that appeared in the Free report, insofar as the objectives of WH/4 were concerned, were to the effect that successful attack on the Castro Government should be made in terms of the inability of the government to meet the projects it had outlined because of "the unwise and unrealistic means it is employing in the execution of its program"; and "the Revolution and its program are being perverted through the insidious influence of the Communists."** The information concerning the Free report, is contained in source reference 24/.- 224 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 236]
TOP SECRETIt is interesting to record the reaction within the Agency to the Free report:C/JMARC lamented the fact that the Lloyd Free report evidently has gotten into the hands of the Cuban Government and will probably be used with devastating effect at some point during the meeting [the upcoming OAS Conference scheduled for San Jose, Costa Rica]. He told ADDP/A that he felt the Department of State would have to be prepared to sacrifice Mr. Free's report on the proverbial "alter of gold." The point was made strongly to ADDP/A that the Free report, in fact, is not at all valid other than for a limited "sample" of the City of Habana. ADDP/A agreed, but said he did not think State should be made aware of the fact CIA actually paid for the report. He further indicated that he was still endeavoring to find out how the report -- copy of which CIA never received in full -- got out of control.* 25/The substance of the Free Report appeared in the *New York Times* and also in a Peter Edson column which was reported to be syndicated in 600 newspapers. In passing this information on to the DDP, Chief, WH/4 suggested that "the survey, in the opinion of WH/4* Chief, WH/4 apparently misread the significance of the Free report because, as the report points out, the most serious opposition was, in fact, in the Havana area, which included the heaviest sampling of opposition sentiment.- 225 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 237]
TOP SECRETProp, will be used in Cuban propaganda" -- somethingof an understatement!* 26/* Logic would seem to indicate that if WH/4's princi-  pals could not subscribe to the results of Free survey's  that WH/4/PP might have been tasked to make a serious  study of the impact which Castro's propaganda and his  achievements were having on the will of the Cuban public  to resist outside interference. In an interview with  the author of this history, Dave Phillips stated that  Enno Hobbing had provided the editorial guidance for  WH/4's propaganda efforts; but that to his (Phillips's)  knowledge, no study ever was conducted of the Castro  propaganda effort. In retrospect, Phillips indicated  that this probably was an oversight. 27/On the subject of surveys of questionable valueduring the Bay of Pigs Operation, mention should bemade of a contract JMATE negotiated with Klein andSaksto initiate a survey of Cuba's present[May 1960] economic position that willalso contain an outline of proposals thatwould sound (sic) as a platform for a suc-cessor government to the Castro regime.The cost, which will be borne by JMARC,will be about $20,000. This is merely thefirst phase of the projected comprehensiveeconomic program.Why, with CIA's in-house economic talent (in theEconomic Research Area of the Office of Research andReports) and the surfeit of government economists fa-miliar with Latin America, WH/4 thought it necessaryto negotiate an outside contract for a study such asindicated is truly incomprehensible! That the Kleinand Saks contract was not blocked at the DDP or DCIlevel is equally incomprehensible. The company's"Preliminary Outline of Economic and Financial Govern-ment Platform to Serve the Interests of the People ofCuba and to be Compatible with the Interest of theHemisphere and the Free World of Which Cuba is a Part"-- which was presented in typescript -- was 15 pagesof platitudes about the best of all possible worlds. 28/- 226 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 238]
TOP SECRETWH/4 PP also became involved in the propagandaactivity that was intended to offset the plannedvisit of Nikita Khrushchev to Cuba in the summer of1960. In an Eyes Only memorandum to the Director ofCentral Intelligence, Col. J. C. King informed AllenDulles that it had been learned that Khrushchev hadaccepted an invitation from the Government of Cubato visit that country. Working with Havana Station,a two-pronged program was being developed with theintention of either forcing the cancellation of thetrip or indicating the opposition of the Cuban peopleto Communism. Havana Station was to be responsiblefor organizing church opposition to the visit, andWH/4 and other elements of WH Division would be re-sponsible for instigating rumors throughout LatinAmerica that an assassination attempt would be madeon Khrushchev's life if he appeared in Cuba.One of the WH/4's contacts suggested that leaf-lets should be prepared depicting the crucifix upsidedown, to signify the Soviet treatment of religion,and that these leaflets should be distributed widelythrough Cuba. [^29] There is no indication that thisparticular leaflet was ever devised, but in at least- 227 -TOP SECRET[^29]: There is no indication that this particular leaflet was ever devised, but in at least
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 239]
13-00000TOP SECRETone instance, the Hammer and Sickle was used to formthe 'T' in the word *Traidor* on a sticker that wasbeing prepared for propaganda use. 30/ In anticipa-tion of the possible visit, 10,000 stickers of ananti-Khrushchev, anti-Soviet nature were forwardedfrom Headquarters to Havana Station. The legendon one of these was "Cuba, Yes; Russia, No; Khrushchev,No;" and a second item showed a prisoner behind barsformed by the stripes of the Cuban flag with the words*Sin Palabras* -- "Without words."[^1]Despite these advanced preparations, no oppor-tunity was presented to utilize the propaganda stickers.**Although both Castro and Khrushchev were in attendanceat the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations inNew York, 19-28 September 1960, and even though Castroflew out of New York in an Aeroflot jet, the Khrushchevvisit did not materialize at this time.[^2][^1]: * See following two pages for copies.[^2]: ** More detailed information on propaganda leafletsand the dissemination of such materials by air drop isgiven in Volume I of this history, *Air Operations*.*** Khrushchev flew from New York directly to Moscowat the close of the UN session. On 22 October 1960 inthe course of an interview in Moscow with a Cubanjournalist Khrushchev did state that he wanted to visitCuba and its people as soon as possible. 3la/- 228 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 240]
# TOP SECRETIf not particularly successful in projects other than Radio Swan, WH/4/PP cannot be charged with lack of imagination. Among other projects, it was proposed that the Office of Medical Services' psychiatric study of Fidel Castro be surfaced because the profile was not particularly flattering to the Cuban leader; and the Castro image also would have suffered if a dis- orienting drug could have been placed in Castro's food. These proposals were similar in intent to others aimed at the Castro "image" as revealed in the Senate Select Committee investigation of CIA plots against the Cuban leader.In light of a rumor that had been picked up to the effect that the Cubans reportedly were painting some of their British Sea Fury aircraft with the American flag -- said planes to be used in a provoca- tion action to discredit the United States -- WH/4 investigated the possibility of doctoring some photos of the Sea Furies with the flag being painted on in order to forestall any such provocations by the Cubans. Unfortunately, however, the Agency art shop pointed out that it would be technically infeasible to attempt to make such fake photos. With the idea in mind of a- 229 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 241]
# TOP SECRETpropaganda campaign aimed at terrorizing Castro's militia (and apparently at the request of Col. Jack Hawkins, Chief, WH/4/PM), WH/4/PP gave some thought to preparing a purported secret order to Castro's militia to establish an "elite suicide squad" which would fight on even after the defeat of the other troops. The gentleman who would later become infamous in connection with the Watergate activity, E. Howard Hunt, and Dave Phillips assessed the possibility of sending a white painted "flight of truth" airplane on a trip to several of the Latin American countries, bringing -- in a "Billy Graham type operation" -- the message of Castro's betrayal of the Cuban Revolution. But this esoteric plan, too, never got beyond the planning stage. [^32]None of the foregoing proposals however, were in the same league with the propaganda plan that came to be known as "the Dripping Cuban." The WH/4 Propaganda Notes for 19 August 1960 stated:P[hillips] dispatched cable on SpecialOperation to HAVA. (Cuban jumping ship inBosphorous). [^33]In fact, the cable that Dave Phillips had originated was addressed not only to Havana, but also to- 230 -# TOP SECRET[^32]: [^33]: