Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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28 December 1962MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting of the DCI with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Friday, December 28, 0930 a. m.SpecificSubject : Discussion of Cuba1. At 0930 Dr. Killian opened the meeting with a statement to the Director that the Board had read the report and appreciated the great amount of work that had been put into it. He commented particularly on the lucidity of the report and said the Board had also looked at the changes which had been sent to them this morning. The Director commented on page 90, the final conclusions, and said that he still did not feel sufficient attention had been paid to important indicators. Mr. McCone then said that there were one or two other subjects that he wanted to mention to the Board before getting into the Cuban report. These are covered in separate memoranda.2. After coverage of the other subjects, Dr. Killian then asked Mr. McCone whether he had any further comments to make on the report. The Director, referring to conversation the previous evening, said he had no further comments and that he thought it was understandable why his personal position had not been included in the report. He noted that these were covered in his October 31 memorandum for the record which the Board had. Dr. Killian asked if the Board did have this and Mr. Coyne
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2. noted that Dr. Killian had seen it at the previous meeting. Mr. McConewent on to say that the Board should realize that the people in receiptof his cables had been receiving intelligence on an hour to hour basis.Mr. Clifford noted that the Director's messages would be of tremendousinterest in any Congressional investigation and thought that the Board shouldhave copies of them. Mr. McCone replied that he realized this and wouldsupply copies.3. Mr. Gray asked if they could then turn to question 16. Dr. Killian   asked the question, which was whether the existence of the Special Group   had complicated the intelligence program and he noted particularly the   detailed decisions made by the Special Group in relation to Mongoose.   Mr. McCone replied no, in fact the Special Group had assisted. He noted   the way it operated and said that the Augmented Special Group, with the   Attorney General, served as authority to stimulate intelligence gathering   through increased use of agents, refugee interrogations and third country   activities. He noted that prior to Mongoose there had been a hiatus and   that everything apparently had stopped after the Bay of Pigs. In December   of last year there had been no interrogation of refugees, no agents and no   Miami set up. At the instigation of the President, the Attorney General   and himself, all of this had been built up. Mr. Murphy asked why opera-   tions against Cuba had stopped and whether this was for psychological   reasons. The Director said it was psychological. There had been   investigations and there was general discouragement. Dr. Killian said
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wasn't there a similar danger now and that there seemed to be a general euphoria and a feeling of success. Mr. McCone said there was a great danger inherent in Cuba. The SAM sites were still there as well as many other things. He said a week ago Monday he had brought this up forcefully in the Executive Committee and the President had issued instructions that word be gotten to the Soviets that any interference with our reconnaissance over Cuba would bring an instant reply with action from the United States. This word was communicated by Stevenson to Kuznetzov and by Thompson to Dobrynin. He said that the present understanding is that we will fly two or more high level flights a day, or if weather or other reasons fore- stall these flights, there will be a request made to the President for low level flights. He noted that low level flights could escalate a critical situation.4. Mr. Pace asked if there were any prohibitions on intelligence collection on Cuba today. Mr. McCone replied yes. We would like a more aggressive pattern of agent infiltration. He said he thought it was important that in the next three or four months there be extensive intelli- gence operations to find out the trend of developments in Cuba. He said he thought the Soviets might move completely out of Cuba, and certainly this was one impression they were trying to convey; or second, that they would recognize they had a good piece of real estate which they would want to maintain for subversion through Latin America, and a base of operations. This would involve a control of Castro and while they might not re-install offensive missiles, they will always have the
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capability to do so. Mr. McCone said he was inclined to believe that thesecond alternative would be followed, and obviously the intelligence effortshould be at a maximum to discover Russian intentions.5. Mr. Murphy said obviously there should be an all out effort   to penetrate the Cuban government. The DCI said yes, that every effort   should be made to exploit cracks in the top in their monolithic structure   and that more and more agents should be put it. He noted that only this   week a team had been infiltrated and another team exfiltrated. Mr. Murphy   asked how many there were in a team and the Director replied [^1]6. Mr. McCone went on to say that we are making extensive efforts   to utilize third countries in the Cuban intelligence effort and mentioned   the [British][^2] [Canadians][^3] [French][^4] [Germans][^5]and one or two Latin countries.   He said that he expected some invaluable information would be produced   by discussions with Donovan and Noland. We already know that Castro   had a fight with Che Guevarra. Castro also spent three hours with the   captain of the [African Pilot][^6] and the captain had indicated that he wanted   to talk to intelligence immediately on landing in Florida. Mr. McCone   said that he intended to get the Special Group, immediately after the   first of the year, to approve a program for extensive intelligence activities.   He said that he did not believe that any efforts should be made at this time   to stimulate an uprising and that all of our resources should be concen-   trated on intelligence collection.---[^1]: three to five[^2]: 8[^3]: 8[^4]: 8[^5]: 8[^6]: 24
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5. 7. Mr. Pace asked whether this plan would include using Guantanamo.   The Director replied that he did not recommend the use of Guantanamo. He noted that if it was used as a base for intelligence operations, and we got caught, Castro could mobilize world opinion against us. Dr. Killian said that Castro assumed that we used it in this way whether we do or not.8. General Doolittle asked how frequently we are overflying Cuba now. The Director replied that there were two flights a day at present, but if the weather is bad and our program slips, there is authority to fly additional daily flights. General Doolittle asked how frequently this gave complete coverage of the island and Mr. McCone said that it worked out to about once a week. He noted that some areas such as harbors were covered more frequently, and that COMOR had worked out a system of priorities for aerial reconnaissance.9. Mr. Pace then asked if we had studied the possibilities for the use of Guantanamo and what could be achieved in using it as a base for operations. The Director replied that we had made no such study.10. Mr. Pace then inquired about restrictions on U-2 flights during September and said that apparently effort was made to penetrate critical areas by agents and therefore he thought we should have explored using Guantanamo. Mr. McCone pointed out that the operators had proposed a series of agent infiltrations in August, but that this was not approved. Nobody at the policy level, including the JCS, would approve these operations.
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13-00000                                                                                                            6.11. Mr. Gray then asked if the situation in January looks different than it did in August, would there be accelerated operations. The Director said he would re-open the whole question if that was the case.Mr. Pace returned to the subject of Guantanamo and said that in his opinion if effective use could be made of it this should be done regardless of policy inhibitions. Dr. Killian asked if Guantanamo was used for SIGINT purposes. Mr. McCone said that he was sure it was and referred to Mr. Kirkpatrick who read from the NSA memorandum on their expanding activities in June, noting the additional positions were activated in June and the fact that there some floating positions established near Santiago de Cuba.12. Mr. Murphy then asked what was the difference between Mongoose and Mongoose B-plus. Mr. McCone replied that the first phase of the Mongoose operation was to determine the intelligence potential in Cuba. This was fairly successful despite extreme difficulties. He mentioned that there were 100, 000 informers organized on a block and community basis throughout the island and that these people controlled ration cards and travel, thereby making all movement difficult. He said the second phase of the Mongoose operation considered three or four different levels of activity. "A" was the most violent, directed toward precipitating a revolution. "B" involved extensive sabotage. " B plus" was somewhere between the two and therefore involved even more activity, such as mining harbors. Mr. McCone said that his big problem
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7. is the question of United States policy. He did not wish to put CIA in the position of stimulating an uprising unless he was certain that U. S. policy would commit troops to back the uprising. He noted that on August 10, when he forecast MRBMs in Cuba to the Secretary of Defense, he had discussed the ramifications of an uprising in Cuba extensively. Dr. Killian asked who chaired the Special Group on Mongoose. Mr. McCone said he wasn't sure whether it was Bundy or the Attorney General and turned to Mr. Kirkpatrick, who didn't know.13. Mr. Pace asked whether an assessment had been made of the accuracy of NPIC interpretations on Soviet missiles. He said he wondered whether there were flaws which might change some of our estimates. Mr. McCone replied that, quite to the contrary, there was no instance where NPIC failed. He said that, for example, the September photography of San Cristobol showed some construction equipment. In retrospect we know it was for developing missilesites, but the photography could be interpreted as being only a few trucks for agricultural purposes.14. Dr. Killian said that he was very concerned about the clear implication that the Soviet Union would soon be developing better camouflage techniques. This, plus the lack of resolution in the photography, might pose considerable difficulties. Mr. McCone said that this was a different story. He noted that he was concerned about the adequacy of coverage of the Soviet Union. He noted that the targets for coverage were reviewed repeatedly, but at the present time of year the light was poor and the coverage was bad. He noted that there was a certain margin
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allowed in the estimates to take into account missile sites that might not have been seen. The DCI said that NIE 11-8 had just been reviewed and that an amending memorandum would be issued shortly. He said obviously it was impossible to say precisely what was going on in the Soviet Union.8. 15. Dr. Killian said that he was terribly concerned about the fact that the public now seems to feel that we have swung all the way from a missile gap to a great superiority over the Soviet Union, and that this was obviously the wrong way. Mr. McCone said he agreed that this was definitely wrong. Mr. Murphy asked whether the government was putting out this information. Mr. McCone said he didn't know and that he felt it was wrong and dangerous and would develop complacency and might even result in an economy minded Congress cutting the Defense budget drastically. Mr. Murphy noted that it was implicit that we should have precise knowledge on what was going on inside Russia. Mr. McCone said that in his presentations to Congress he specifically made the reservation each time that there were obviously things we didn't know. Dr. Killian noted that even photography can be wrong and can give an erroneous impression; e.g., that nothing is there. Mr. McCone acknowledged that this was a danger. Dr. Killian asked whether Congress, the President and the Secretary of Defense understood this danger. Mr. McCone replied that he always stressed it, and he also stressed that intelligence was commencing to have almost absolute dependence on photography.
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9. 16. Mr. Pace commented that since November there had been 72 overflights of Cuba, and yet for a much greater length of time there had been no U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, which was a much more important target. He said that obviously there must be great gaps in our knowledge on the USSR. General Doolittle said it was even worse than that. He noted that CORONA had given no valuable intelligence on Cuba and that apparently the U-2 gave questionable intelligence so that low level reconnaissance was needed. The Director said this wasn't accurate, that the U-2 gave all of the intelligence that was needed to convince the OAS and our other allies. The low level flights were needed for backstopping possible military operations. Mr. Pace asked if it was correct that CORONA had produced no valuable intelligence on Cuba and Mr. McCone said that this was true. General Doolittle noted the closeness of the dangers and commented that if the Cubans had moved faster and gotten the camouflage up, we might never have discovered the missiles.17. Dr. Killian noted that the time was drawing to an end and said that the Board would make a strong recommendation on an intensive research program on sensors to break through camouflage.18. Mr. Murphy asked if the Director had noted any difference in the philosophy of the State Department in regard to intelligence. He noted that the Department had played quite a role during the Cuban
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9/22/88OK dabBob,Substitute language"technical details"m
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10. crisis. Mr. McCone said yes, he thought there had been a change in theState attitude and noted that it and others had been quite timid on the U-2and other intelligence activities. He said that he was having a recapitu-lation made of the inhibitions on intelligence operations which mightinterest the Board. He cited the fact that we had been prevented fromcovering China North Vietnam and North Korea. He said that a secondU-2 had been sent to Formosa and that the wraps had been taken offFar Eastern reconnaissance. On the other hand, every time there wasan overflight State got very nervous and had made several telephonecalls.19. Dr. Killian again expressed the Board's appreciation for the    report and for Mr. McCone's taking the time to be with them. Mr. McCone    replied that he would be happy to consider any suggestions the Board had    concerning the report, except that he felt the conclusions should stand as    presented. If, however, there were any additional substantive matters,    there might well be additional conclusions that could be drawn.20. This session was completed at 10:40.![signature of Lyman B. Kirkpatrick]Lyman B. KirkpatrickExecutive DirectorLBK:rmOrig - DCIcy 2 - DDCIcy 3 - DD/Pcy 4 - DD/Rcy 5 - DD/Icy 6 - IGcy 7 - Exec Dir (PFIAB files)
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992ROUTING| TO:                                | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE           | INITIALS || ---------------------------------- | ---------------- | -------------- | -------- || 1                                  |                  |                |          || 2                                  |                  |                |          || 3                                  |                  |                |          || 4                                  |                  |                |          || ACTION                             | DIRECT REPLY     | PREPARE REPLY  |          || APPROVAL                           | DISPATCH         | RECOMMENDATION |          || COMMENT                            | FILE             | RETURN         |          || CONCURRENCE                        | INFORMATION      | SIGNATURE      |          || REMARKS:                           |                  |                |          ||                                    |                  |                |          || FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. | DATE             |                |          ||                                    |                  |                |          ||                                    |                  |                |          |CONTROL NO.COPY __________ OFHandle Via# COMINTChannelsAccess to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:![triangle shape]NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATIONUnauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions19# TOP SECRET(Security Classification)
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TOP SECRETNOFORNCOPY NO. 107SC NO. 00556/639 December 1963DAILYSUMMARY![Central Intelligence Agency seal: an eagle perched above a shield with a star, surrounded by the words 'Central Intelligence Agency United States of America']CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYTHIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL![text: GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]NOFORNTOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET DINARDAILY SUMMARY9 December 1963This summary of significant information has not been coordinated outside the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports received, nor does time permit the complete evaluation of all reports which are included.CONTENTS## MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:Three independent clandestine sources have reported on the unloading of military equipment from the Soviet vessel METALLURG BAIKOV in Havana harbor on 19 or 20 November. (Page 1)Soviet "coastal defense rockets" now belong to Cuban Army artillery forces, according to a recent speech by Raul Castro; however, Soviets still appear to be involved in the (communications net) which serves the cruise missile system. (Page 1)## FIDEL CASTRO'S SPEECH:In a 6-7 December speech devoted mainly to education, Castro digressed to discuss the situation resulting from Venezuela's charge that the arms cache discovered on a Venezuelan beach last month had come from Cuba. Castro implied that the arms had been planted by CIA and are being used as a pretext for new action by the "imperialists and their lackeys" against Cuba. He expressed confidence that whatever the result, the Cuban revolution will not be defeated. (Page 2)## CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION:Faure Chomon Mediavilla is replacing Omar Fernandez as transportation minister; Major Jesus Montane Oropesa will be new communications minister. (Page 3)(Heavy rainfall) has apparently caused damages to military facilities in (Pinar del Rio) Province and hampered travel in Oriente Province. (Page 4)iTOP SECRET DINAR
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# TOP SECRET DINARTHE PRESIDENT'S ASSASSINATION:A Spanish-language daily in New York claims Madrid police are holding a self-confessed plotter against the late President. (Page 4)INSURGENCY AND CIVIL UNREST:A fire on a farm near (Cardenas, Matanzas) Province, has destroyed one acre of (henequen) (Page 4)An attempt has been made to shoot the chief of the (PURS) in (Velasco, Camaguey) Province. (Page 5)A militiaman arrested in Guantanamo on 3 December for suspected counterrevolutionary activities has been freed. (Page 5)The (DSE unit at Ciego de Avila) has captured one insurgent and reports the surrender of another; a resident of (Jucaro) has been arrested for cashing an out-of-circulation 50-dollar bill. (Page 5)Thirty-two people attempting to flee Cuba were captured by Cuban security forces on 8 December; this may be related to an earlier report which stated that an undetermined number of residents of Las Villas Province fled the country from an unknown point of embarkation. (Page 6)Several minor incidents of sabotage have been discovered on CUBANA aircraft. (Page 6)A DRE leader in Mexico City announced that 126 Cuban militiamen were killed in a clash with guerrillas near Sancti Spiritus, Las Villas Province. (Page 6)CUBAN AIR FLIGHT CONNECTIONS:(Spain) has approved regularly scheduled Havana-(Madrid) flights by CUBANA airlines, according to an intercepted message.. (Page 7)SHIPPING SUPPORT FOR CUBA:The Argentine Government and the owners of the SS ANAMAR are determined that it will not take a cargo of Soviet-purchased coffee to Cuba. (Page 7)TOP SECRET DINAR
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# TOP SECRET DINAR## OAS DEVELOPMENTS:The (Brazilian OAS delegate) informed his government on 5 December that several (OAS delegates) have been impressed by the Cuban claim that the weapons found in Venezuela last month had actually been planted there by the US. Apparently unaware that elaborate efforts had been made to erase all indications of the Cuban origin of the weapons, they wonder why Cuba would permit evidence of its involvement in sending arms to Latin American guerrillas to be traceable to. (Page 7)The (Venezuelan OAS ambassador) dispatched an urgent message to his (foreign minister) on 6 December expressing misgivings as to the attitudes of members of the special (OAS) committee appointed to investigate Venezuela's charges against the Castro regime. (Page 8)In relation to the investigation of the (Venezuelan) arms cache, the (Brazilian delegate) to the OAS has been instructed not to show "sympathy or excessive understanding in relation to Cuba." (Page 9)## SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS:A clandestine source has reported, possibly as a current rumor, that Fidel Castro visited Moscow around 15 November; there is no current evidence that he made any public appearances in Cuba around that date. (Page 9)## BLOC ECONOMIC RELATIONS:Five Polish merchantmen have been assigned to Cuban run. (Page 10)The Soviet-made AN-12 transport has landed in Cuba. (Page 10)## NON-BLOC RELATIONS:The Moroccan foreign minister has received a Cuban "good-will" mission for the second time; local expectation is that formal relations will be re-established shortly. (Page 11)The President of (Dahomey) declined an invitation to attend the 1 January anniversary celebration in Cuba. (Page 11)TOP SECRET DINAR
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# TOP SECRET DINARCUBAN SUPPORT OF EXTERNAL SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES:The (Chilean ambassador) in (Venezuela) is convinced of the accuracy of (Venezuelan) charges of Cuban subversion. (Page 11)There is an additional report on the use of a Cuban transport plane to supply pro-Castro groups in Venezuela with weapons. (Page 12)Cuban Chargé Lasalle in Bolivia is reportedly supplying weapons to the leftist section of the governing party, as the serious political crisis there becomes more intense. (Page 12)A clandestine source has reported that two Cubans are with a group of Peruvian leftists currently hiding in Bolivia, and that Castro has agreed to provide money and guerrilla training for a rival group. (Page 12)ivTOP SECRET DINAR