Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# TOP SECRETaware of some sort of planned assassination activity.One of the principals of WH/4 recorded that on 24 Feb- ruary 1961 he:Asked Ed [Stanulis], Dave P[hillips], [Ed) Hinkle, (Bob) Moore, and Jake (Ester- line] why not proceed with Operation AMHINT to set up a program of assassina- tion. 12/Although the author of that remark was Chief of Operations for Project JMATE, he was unaware, as re- ported earlier in this chapter, of the Mafia connection; but he had indicated that one of his hopes was that the invasion might lead to the death of Castro.* In response to a specific question about the AMHINT pro- gram, all he could say was:I said that I was not failing to give some attention to the business of assas- sination. Now, here on the 24th of Feb- ruary, when I asked Ed, Dave Phillips, Hinkle, Moore, and Jake "why not proceed with Operation AMHINT to set up a program of assassination," either none of those bastards knew anything about Sheffield Edwards and Maheu in the Mafia ... or some of them did, and didn't see fit to say "Drain, take your AMHINT and stuff it. We've got this thing pretty well* See pp. 279-281.- 285 -TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETcovered." What I would love now [is] tosee an outline of AMHINT.*[^1]A few days after the reference to the AMHINT assas-sination program, WH/4 Propaganda Notes contained thefollowing statement: "I[saminger] phoned following lineto Wilkinson from Swan: ... attempted assassination ofGuevara"; and Chief Operations WH/4 made a cryptic note:"CI and D watch Gueverra *[sic]* assassination attempt."[^2]When asked about the possibility that WH/4 was directly in-volved in an attempt to assassinate Che Guevara, the formerChief of Operations for the project wrote:My only memory of this is that we did notplan a Che assassination, but must have gottenintelligence that an attempt on him had beentried, planned, discovered or speculatedon. [^3]If one can assume that the statement "CI and D watchGueverra *[sic]* assassination attempt" translates as "Counter-Intelligence and Division D watch Guevara assassination* The author of this history has unsuccessfully tried to  track down this particular project. AMHINT was related  to the work of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil  (DRE), an anti-Castro organization inside Cuba. The only  evidence that has been found which might have been related  to an assassination attempt concerned an AMHINT request  of 14 January 1961 for "Silenciadores Rifles de marilla  telescopica." (A request for rifles with silencers and  telescopic sights.) This might have had to do with a DRE  plan to assassinate the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba rather  than a plan to kill Castro. When the FOB in Miami heard  about the plan against the Soviet official they "immedi-  ately sent ... [word] to AMHINT-1 forbidding planned  'atentado' [assassination]."[^4][^1] 13/[^2] 15/[^3] 16/[^4] 14/
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13-00000# TOP SECRETattempt" then the comment from Chief of Operations appearseminently sensible, for Counter-Intelligence and DivisionD (which was responsible for intercept traffic) would bethe two most likely sources to pick up information shouldan attempt be made on Guevara's life particularly sincesuch an item probably would not be reported overtly in theCuban press or radio.One final item which was surfaced during the courseof research concerning the possibility that WH/4 hadactually included an assassination program as part of itsoperational planning concerns a carbon copy identifiedonly as "Must Go List." The single sheet of unknown prov-enance lists and identifies in the following order elevenindividuals:Che Guevara - Minister of IndustriesRaul Castro Ruz - Chief of Cuban ArmedForces, and wife, Vilma Espin de CastroBlas Roca - International Communist leaderand Secretary General of Communist PartyRamiro Valdez Menendez - Minister ofInterior (G-2)Carlos Olivares - Deputy Foreign MinisterCarlos Raphael Rodriguez Communist leader,editor of newspaper HOYLazaro Pena Communist leader labormovementAbelardo Colome - Deputy in G-2Captain Rogelio Acevedo Chief of MilitiaAnibal Escalante - Communist leaderArmendo Hart Davalos Minister of Education,and wife, Haydee Santamaria de HartPencilled in on the bottom of the paper is a note:"List forwarded E. L. by C/WH/4 in Nov [1960]."** A copy of the list follows p. 287. The list should  read Armando, rather than Armendo, Hart.TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETasked if he could identify the "Must Go List" theformer Chief of WH/4 stated:Well, I know all these people ... Someof them I know personally, like ArmandoHart ... I entertained Hart in my home anumber of times ... the miserable bastard.I have never seen that list in my life,but this is the whole top gang at thattime. Now many of them were later elimi-nated from the power structure by Castro,and by Raul Castro ... They got rid ofOlivares, and Roca was pushed aside ...Armando Hart was also half nuts at thispoint, and he still is. I guess he isstill fairly prominent, but he is notreally in the power structure. AbelardoColome -- I don't even know who he is.I wish to help you, but I don't know. [^1]The former Chief of Operations for WH/4, in re-sponse to the question of whether the "Must Go List"meant anything to him, replied as follows:No! Huh! "List forwarded E. L. byChief WH/4"... Eddie Lansdale ... E. L.would be Eddie Lansdale. Chief, WH/4was Jacob D. Esterline. In November, Iwas there ... No "Big Daddy." Well,whether this "Must Go" is in terms ofthe assassination, or in terms ... [of]nobody, none of these people must beallowed to have a role in the new govern-ment. I guess "Must Go" came to passeventually in the case of number one onthis list, Che Guevara. Raul ... I myself,contemplating the future government, thoughtit might be interesting to try to keepRaul in, with Fidel out. Capture whatmagic there was in the name of Castro,but do it with that little homosexual,instead of with Fidel, the real man. I- 288 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 17/
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13-00000TOP SECRETdon't even know the rest of these guys --Hart, Escalante, etc. 18/By way of summarizing, it would appear that CIA'Sofficial anti-Castro program as reflected in ProjectJMATE did not include assassination as an integralpart of its operational planning, but would not havebeen averse to eliminating Castro or other of theCuban leaders if the opportunity had been afforded.Based on records, however, WH/4's principals were inno way privy to, or participants in, the Mafia assas-ination planning at the time of the Bay of Pigs.- 289 -TOP SECRET
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13-00000TOP SECRETPart VIIIConclusionsThis volume has traced the history of the CIA's official anti-Castro program from its inception in 1959 through the end of the Eisenhower administration in January of 1961. It emphasized that in the initial period when Castro's revolution was taking place, the Agency, reflecting the policies of the US Government, was caught betwixt and between -- to move with Castro or to move *against* Castro. Shortly following his take-over, it became clear that Castro had little or no intention -- nor apparently concern -- for establishing cordial relations with the "Colossus of the North." Instead, he turned to the Soviet Union and its allies for military, technical, and economic assistance. It became clear that a new philosophy was being introduced into the Caribbean basin and that this philosophy was directly contrary to the interests of the United States Government and to the governments of many of the Latin American nations, whether democratically governed or governed by dictatorships of the right.- 290 -TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETAs Castro's threats became more serious, and as increasing pressures were put on legitimate economic interests of the United States in Cuba, pressures within the United States Government led to a decision that Castro must go. With great concern about the impact any overt, anti-Castro activities by the United States Government would have on the United Nations and on the Organization of American States, it was decided that a covert plan of action would be adopted. This was the officially sanctioned program approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March of 1960.It broadly outlined the political, economic, propaganda, and paramilitary programs which would be implemented in an attempt to oust Fidel Castro. CIA was to be the principal action agent for the bulk of the program.Once the official US position was announced, CIA made organizational plans to carry out the policy. A separate Task Force within the Western Hemisphere Division was established under the leadership of Jacob D. Esterline, on whose shoulder Col. J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division perched and peered. Initial concepts of the Central Intelligence Agency called for a propaganda program to be run out of a radio
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13-00000TOP SECRETstation based on Swan Island and by Agency financedradio operations out of Station WRUL in New York City.Strong support was to be provided for anti-Castropublications launched in the area of Miami. Para-military programs initially called for the trainingof cadres of communicators and paramilitary instructorswho would go into Cuba and provide leadership andtraining for the numerous dissident elements thatreportedly were ready to move against Castro.Unfortunately, however, as the summer of 1960drew to a close, it became apparent that Castro'smilitary strength and training programs were sharplyimproving and that the initial plan to infiltratesmall teams to organize the dissidents no longer wasfeasible. Consequently, the concept changed to oneof a landing in force, the acquisition of a defensiblebase in Cuba from which a Provisional Government mightcall for assistance from the United States Governmentif the invaders themselves could not arouse sufficientsupport to force the overthrow of Castro.This volume emphasized that following his decisionin March 1960 that there should be an anti-Castro pro-gram, President Eisenhower remained quiescent on the- 292 -TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETquestion of developments of the anti-Castro programuntil late in the fall, following the election of 1960and the defeat of Mr. Nixon. At that time Mr. Eisen-hower reinjected himself into the program and stimulatedaction to the point where some of CIA's planners hopedthat -- in addition to the propaganda program which wasalready underway -- paramilitary operations might beinitiated. Apparently this was feared by Castro,too, for in his famous TV broadcast on the Bay of Pigshe said:When our country was in danger ofdirect aggression and mobilized itself,it waited for the [Kennedy] presidentialinauguration thinking that this man[Kennedy) would do something different,because all in all, we didn't understandwhy a man who assumed the administrationof the United States would want to bearthe guilt of someone else's mistakes.* 1/This was not to be, however, for aside from considerableemphasis on the propaganda activity, there was onlylimited support for sabotage activities prior to the* Raul Roa, Castro's Foreign Minister charged that  in the Eisenhower administration Vice President Nixon  and General C. P. Cabell, ADCI, were two of the most  vigorous proponents of direct action, with Cabell  proposing air and naval protection for the invasion  and, if necessary, use of US marines to hold the  beachhead. 2/- 293 -TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETend of Eisenhower's administration. There was considerable concern over the necessary formalities of diplomacy in order that the United States not be involved in investigations by either the UN or the OAS for its anti-Castro program.Because it has been so widely publicized that ex-Vice President Richard Nixon was one of the principals in planning the Bay of Pigs Operation, this volume has attempted to put the role that Nixon played into the proper context. It was the role of an interested senior officer in the Executive Branch, and by no stretch of the imagination could Nixon's role be construed to have had a major impact on the development of operational planning by the Central Intelligence Agency in its anti-Castro effort.Similarly, because of the sensationalism which surrounded the Senate Select Committee's report on Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, including Fidel Castro and the implications that the Mafia plot was a part of the authorized planning for the Bay of Pigs Operation, thorough examination of the evidence was undertaken to determine if this allegation was supportable. It was not. The Mafia operation was run- 294 -TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETaside from, apart from, and independent of the formal anti-Castro program which was undertaken by CIA. At most, four or five senior officials -- Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell, Shef Edwards, Bill Harvey, and possibly, Tracy Barnes -- probably were knowledgeable about the Mafia connection and Mr. Maheu.In terms of Project JMATE itself, the few bits of information which indicate the possibility of assassination attempts against the Cuban leadership also fail to demonstrate any responsibility for their initiation on the part of WH/4. If anything, the evidence would indicate that WH/4's position was one of watchful waiting and wishful thinking that dissident Cubans would themselves eliminate the Castros and Che Guevara. The possibility, of course, that Agency-supplied weapons might be involved in such an attempt cannot be ruled out. [^1]Obviously it would be foolish to contend that those principally responsible for developing CIA's anti-Castro program would have objected to the assassination of Fidel Castro. On the other hand, this was not one of the basic concepts nor intentions of the official program of the Central Intelligence Agency.-- 295 --TOP SECRET[^1]: /
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Appendix AMemorandum for the Director of Central Intelligencefrom J. C. King, 11 Dec 59
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UNCLASSIFIEDINTERNALUSE LYCONFIDENTIALSECRETROUTING AND RECORD SHEETSUBJECT: (Optional)FROM:Chief, Western Hemisphere DivisionNO.DATE11 December 1959TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)|         | DATE              | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) || ------- | ----------------- | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- || 1. DD/2 | RECEIVED 12/11/59 | FORWARDED 12/15/59 | D/S                                                                                                     || 2. DOT  | 12/12/59          | 12/15/59           | AUD!                                                                                                    || 3. C/WH |                   |                    |                                                                                                         || 4.      |                   |                    |                                                                                                         || 5.      |                   |                    |                                                                                                         || 6.      |                   |                    |                                                                                                         || 7.      |                   |                    |                                                                                                         || 8.      |                   |                    |                                                                                                         || 9.      |                   |                    |                                                                                                         || 10.     |                   |                    |                                                                                                         || 11.     |                   |                    |                                                                                                         || 12.     |                   |                    |                                                                                                         || 13.     |                   |                    |                                                                                                         |USE PREVIOUSEDITIONSSECRETCONFIDENTIALINTERNALUSE ONLYUNCLASSIFIED
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13-0000011 December 1959MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceVIA: Deputy Director (Plans)SUBJECT: Cuban Problems.This memorandum requests approval by the Director of the recommendations contained in paragraph 3.1. Estimate of the Situation.a. A dictatorship of the far left is now established. It is not only unfriendly to the United States in oral criticism, but has taken action against American properties, both industrial and agricultural, which, if permitted to stand, will encourage similar actions against U.S. holdings in other Latin American countries.b. We do and must expect a major increase in the scale and effectiveness of Cuban aid and participation in revolutionary actions against other countries of Latin America now friendly to the United States. In addition to those that have already been targets - Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, recent intelligence indicates a direct interest by Castro in Colombia and Peru. Betancourt's position in Venezuela would be gravely weakened by Castro successes, and it is believed only a question of time before an alliance would be established between the powerful Communist Party of Venezuela and the Castros.c. Rapid nationalization of the banks, industry and commerce is reportedly contemplated. If this occurs, the small group in control will have at its disposition several hundred million dollars from the sale of the sugar crop early in 1960. Part of these funds may be used to further their revolutionary objectives against other countries of the Caribbean and South America.d. Castro has lost the support of the upper class and most of the middle class. He probably still has a sufficient following from the masses to maintain control until further inroads can be made in his popular support and the opposition more effectively unified.e. Propaganda action to reduce his following, while essential, in itself will probably not be enough to dislodge him. His approaching stranglehold on Cuba will be broken only by violent action.f. It is my personal opinion that if Castro is successful in consolidating his position and remaining in power for two more years,297
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-2-lasting damage may occur to the United States' already weakenedposition of leadership in Latin America.2. U.S. Objective.The overthrow of Castro within one year, and his replacement by ajunta friendly to the United States which will call for elections sixmontas after usarption of office.3. Reccomended Action:a. Clandestine radio attacks frca Caribbean countries of theliberal group, working closely with us and using Cuben nationals forbroadcasting.b. Intrusion operations against Castro's N and radio, tobe mounted from within Cubac. The encouragement of pro-il.S. Coposition ops, excludingBatista and Masferrer supporters, to establish by force a controlledarea within Cuba. This would have the following advantages:(1) It wound permit the establishment of a radio station,long were, which would reach all of the stations in Cuba.Since it would be on Cuban soil, the problems of joint opera-tions with other countries would be eliminated.(2) A controlled area would be a rallying point forthe growing opposition to Castro in the same wenner that the25th of July movement in the hills of Oriente became therallying point of many who turned against Batista.(3) It would be a means of testing the strength and fibreof the opposition, and separating the men from the boys.(14) The reportedly large fregemented elements of theconstitutional Cuban Army would have a place to go.(5) A sizeable guerrilla movement within Cuba wouldcurtail Castro's plans for revolutionary action againstother countries.d. Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of FidelCastro. None of those close to Tidel, such as his brother Raul
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-3-or his companion Che Guevarra, have the same Desmeric appeal tothe passes. Many informed people believe that the disappearanceof Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the presect Government.![signature of G.C. King]G.C. KingChief, Westeral Hemisphere Division.cc: DDCI![signature of Richard M. Bissell Jr.]CONCUR:Deputy Director (Plans)The recommendation/contained iparagraph 3 is/approved:![signature]Director of Central intelligenceDate
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# Appendix BA Program of Covert ActionAgainst the Castro Regime16 Mar 60
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EYES ONLYSECRETThis document is our basic policy paper. It was approved by the President at a meeting in the White House on 17 March 1960.EYES ONLYSECRET300
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13-00000EYES ONLYSECRET16 March 1960# A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention. Essentially the method of accomplishing this end will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative.Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U.S. before the covert action program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U.S. to act in a crisis.2. Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of action:a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba. It is hoped that within one month a political entity can be formed in the shape of a council or junta, through the merger of three acceptable opposition groups with which the Central Intelligence Agency is already in contact. The council will be encouraged to adopt as its slogan "Restore theEYES ONLY301