Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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13-00000SECRETEYES ONLYSpec Grp File26 April 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUPSUBJECT: Proposed New Covert Policy and Programs Toward CubaAs a follow-up to yesterday's Special Group discussion on the proposed new covert policy and programs toward Cuba, the following decisions have been made:On Item 1. of the summary from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, dated 19 April, additional planning and consultation is approved. This will include further refinement of the Rules of Engagement (in this connection, also see the minutes of yesterday's meeting); an assessment of the capabilities of specific groups; and an estimate of the scale and scope of activities which selected groups could carry out successfully.Item 2.a. of the above-mentioned paper is approved. To the extent possible, it is desired that the Special Group be informed in advance of specific proposals under this heading.. It is recognized that this willin many cases not be feasible.Item 2.b. is disapproved.Further planning for individual elements of Item 2.c. is approved, with the understanding that targets will be justified in terms of their usefulness rather than with regard to the noise level they might generate. Specific operations will be referred back through normal channels (i.e., the Special Group in the first instance) for final approval before execution.Item 2.d. is approved.Thomas A. ParrottDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McConeSECRETEYES ONLY
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SECRETEYES ONLY- 2 -missions (both contained in papers from the Coordinator of CubanAffairs dated 7 May).There was no objection by the Group to any of the infiltration/exfiltration operations. This approval includes the seven CIAoperations, the infiltration of a radio operator in support of theU.S. Army, and approval of rendezvous opportunities which may arisewithout adequate time to bring them to the Group. The Group alsonoted Mr. Cheever's description of a proposed exfiltration to becarried out by the MRR, with some support by CIA.With regard to the two sabotage missions, Mr. Cheever said thathe thought the chances were excellent of carrying them out successfully.He said, however, that the critical problem would arise the followingmorning, when sea and air interception might well take place. Heemphasized that under the circumstances that could be expected in theaftermath of such sabotage, the Cubans might well disregard anyterritorial limits in the course of hot pursuit of the saboteurs.He added, in answer to questions, that there is no doubt that Cubanswould recognize these operations as being externally mounted, andthat the agents would certainly talk if captured.Mr. Cheever mentioned three possible operational plans which mightminimize the danger of capture by Castro forces, but emphasized thatthese were by no means operationally well-designed nor was he re-commending them, and further that they did not come within any exist-ing policy approvals.The feeling of the Group was that the damage that could be doneto the Cuban economy by successful execution of either of thesemissions was not sufficient to outweigh the disadvantages. The Grouprecognized that the responsible CIA operators feel themselves underobligation to continue to develop suitable proposals, and they thoughtthat CIA should be encouraged to keep on doing this. The difficultyof maintaining agent morale in the face of continued inaction wasrecognized. Mr. Cheever was commended for his frank and explicitoutlining of the pros and cons.4. Cuba - NTS BroadcastsMr. McCone and Mr. Cheever said that CIA does not object to theDepartment of State's proposal to subsidize NTS broadcasts from theDominican Republic, addressed to Soviet troops in Cuba. They pointedout that this concurrence is subject to the caveats that the Agencywill be unable to accept responsibility for monitoring and control of
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SECRETEYES ONLY- 3 -the content of the broadcasts, and that contact with the NTS will have to be made through its headquarters in Frankfurt, rather than directly with the U.S. representative of the NTS. With these under- standings, the proposal was approved5. Political Action, BoliviaThe CIA paper of 3 April 1963 on the above subject was approved.6. Air Proprietary, East AfricaThe CIA paper of 3 May 1963 on the above subject was approved.7. Intelligence on CubaMr. McCone said that he is concerned about gaps in U.S. intelligence on Cuba. He said that this leads him to favor resumption of low-level reconnaissance. The other members of the Group felt that under existing circumstances, this type of reconnaissance will not meet the needs that Mr. McCone perceives. Mr. Johnson suggested that penetrations of the Cuban Government would be more productive in trying to assess Castro's possible intentions.DistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McConeThomas A. Parrott
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# SECRETEYES ONLY9 May 1963MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 9 May 1963PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McConeDr. Scoville was present for Items 1 and 2.Captain Dankworth was present for Item 1.Mr. Cheever was present for Items 3 and 4.1. Peripheral ReconnaissanceThe Group approved operation YANKEE PASHA, which had been originally presented at the meeting of 4 April and deferred at that time, with the understanding that the aircraft would not approach the Soviet coast closer than 15 miles.2. Reconnaissance of the Sino-India BorderWith particular reference to an incoming message from Ambassador Galbraith, the Group noted that the Indians had refused to grant staging rights in India or to allow refueling over that country. In light of this, all members of the Group felt that plans for these missions should be shelved for the time being. Mr. McCone noted that the aircraft now at Takhli will, therefore, depart before the 17th of May, the date on which SEATO exercises begin.The Group specified that in conveying the decision to the Indians it should be made perfectly clear that the standdown is due to their own view of the urgency of such coverage, not to any reluctance on our part.(The point was made that in the meeting of the CI Group, just concluded, an allegedly improved road network south of Tchepone, in Laos, had been mentioned. The CI Group had felt that harder intelligence should be obtained on this network. Dr. Scoville undertook to make sure that this target is highlighted in planning for additional high-performance coverage of Laos.)3. Cuba - Proposed Agent OperationsMr. Cheever outlined in some detail the infiltration/exfiltration operations proposed for 15 May to 15 June, and the two possible sabotage
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13-000006 June 1963MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 6 June 1963PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric (Items 1-7), and Mr. McConeColonel Steakley was present for Items 1 and 2.Mr. Lundahl was present for Item 2.Mr. George Miller was present for Item 5.Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 7.Mr. Karamessines was present for Items S and 9.1. DOD Reconnaissance 98With respect to the two PAYSTATION missions which were deferred last week, the Group decided that the 12-mile proposal should be scrapped and that the 30-mile one should be flown for ELINT only.2. Reconnaissance of Cuba 98Mr. Lundahl showed the Group sample pictures from the two PEG LEG missions of 5 June.Mr. McCone said that before making any recommendation as to further missions of this kind, he wished to have the USIB consider the matter. In the meantime CIA and DIA are analyzing the results.Mr. Lundahl and Colonel Steakley raised the question of the advisability of including some color film in future missions. The Group felt this kind of thing should be left to the best judgment of the operators.3. Far East Reconnaissance 98Mr. McCone reported that two out of the existing four authorizations for high-performance reconnaissance of China have been exhausted. It was agreed that the "bank" should be restored to the original four.It was noted that no further requirements now exist for this type of reconnaissance of Laos, but there are some targets remaining in North Vietnam.3/mc
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## Reconnaissance of the Middle EastMr. McCone reported that the British will probably not approve the request to use an RAF base on Cyprus for high-performance coverage of Middle East areas. He said that the feasibility of using Wheelus is being explored and that a new recommendation will be forthcoming to the Group.## ELINT CollectionMr. Miller briefed the Group on ELINT projects QARAGE (Cuba) and MOONBEAM (Japan). No objection was voiced to either proposal.## Channels to CastroThe Group discussed various possibilities of establishing channels of communication to Castro. All members of the Group agreed that this is a useful endeavor. Mr. Bundy cautioned that of course Castro should not be made privy to any official U.S. positions, while Mr. McCone emphasized the necessity of keeping any such approach entirely secret so far as the public is concerned. It was agreed that proposals of this kind which are particularly unusual, would be discussed with the Special Group in advance.## Cuba OperationsMr. FitzGerald briefed the Group on the results of infiltration/ exfiltration operations during May, and on proposals for the coming month. The latter were approved.## Italy, Assessment of Results of Election OperationMr. Karamessines discussed with the Group the results of the recent Parliamentary elections in Italy, and the effect of the election project, so far as can be ascertained. He elaborated on the CIA paper of 4 June.## Italy, Proposed Aid to PSI AutonomistsMr. Karamessines briefed the Group further on the proposal to give aid to Nenni and his autonomist group of the PSI, as outlined in the CIA paper of 1 June.
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- 3 -The Group agreed to recommend approval of this project to higher authority. Mr. Bundy will take this up on Monday, June 10th. He suggested that in the meantime all necessary preliminary alerting be accomplished, so that Nenni can be informed in the event of favorable action, before the meeting of the PSI Central Committee on June 12th.Thomas A. ParrottDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McCone
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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 20 June 1963PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, and Mr. Hughes.Colonel King was present for Item 3.Mr. Colby was present for Item 4.Mr. Critchfield was present for Item 6.1. Reconnaissance of Southeast AsiaMr. McCone reported that all high-performance missions scheduled for this area had been held up during the past week, due to bad weather.2. Sabotage Program, CubaIn connection with the new Cuba sabotage program approved yesterday, Mr. McCone suggested that CIA make a report to the Special Group every two weeks. The Group agreed with this procedure. They felt that such a report need not be in written form nor very elaborate, and that it should consist of a briefing on activities during the preceding period and those planned for the next one. Mr. Bundy commented that keeping the Group informed in this way constitutes protection to the operators, since all agencies concerned are thereby given a continuing feeling of just what is going on.3. Haiti - Political ActionThe CIA paper of 17 June was approved. Mr. McCone said he has some reservations about the quality of any possible replacements for Duvalier, but agreed that it is necessary to take some action in order to prevent Haiti eventually going very far to the left. Colonel King, in support of the paper's recommendations, said that in his opinion we have no feasible alternatives but to cooperate with Bosch in attempting to unseat Duvalier, and that if this is not done we are likely to end up with a far worse situation.Mr. Hughes told the Group that the State Department shares the reservation about the quality of alternatives, but it also recognizes the necessity of taking some action. He said the Department is principally worried about the possibility that the U.S. hand in any such operation might be revealed.
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-2-Colonel King cautioned that we will not be in a position to know how many useful exiles can be recruited until we give it a try. Mr. McCone and Colonel King said that probably the most promising way in which the desired objective can be obtained is eventually to accomplish the defection of significant elements of the Army, the Palace Guard, etc.[^7]4. Monthly Report on North Vietnam OperationsMr. Colby gave a report on results of operations during the past month, and those planned for the immediate future.5. Congo - Training of Special Army UnitThe Group approved the State-CIA proposal to hold the Congo paramilitary project, originally approved on 29 November 1962, in abeyance.[^7]6. Iraq - Soviet Materiel Objectives and Related ProblemsThe Group approved the recommendations contained in CIA's paper of the 19th of June.Mr. McCone pointed out that this sort of action could conceivably lead into considerably broader activities, and emphasized that the proposal immediately at hand is carefully limited. The Group agreed that approval of these recommendations does not imply any sort of commitment to additional actions[^7]7. Plans for Immediate FutureMr. Bundy asked Mr. McCone to act as Chairman of the Special Group next week, if he wishes to have a meeting. During the time that the Presidential party is away, DOD peripheral flights, particularly in the European area, should be carefully screened.[^7]LapanattThomas A. ParrottDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McCone
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- 3 -98that the U.S. government stands behind previously-expressed commitments to ensure that India does not use its own increased military strength to mount an attack on Pakistan.It was agreed that State and Defense should draft a paper for higher authority, outlining this proposed approach to the Pakistan government, with a CIA representative participating in the drafting of the paper to the extent necessary to assure that the intelligence interests and the views of the Special Group are adequately reflected.YapausttThomas A. ParrottDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McCone
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# SECRET EYES ONLY27 June 1963MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 27 June 1963PRESENT: Mr. McCone, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Gilpatric.Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1-3.Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 5.1. British Suggestion Regarding Reconnaissance FlightsThe Group reviewed the message received from the British Foreign Office through the British Embassy, suggesting that during the period of the Harriman-Hailsham visit to Moscow reconnaissance flights be suspended, as well as the suggested draft reply presented by Mr. Johnson. The Group approved the language of the reply, the gist of which was that while appreciating the UK suggestion, we do not find it possible to agree to suspend all such flights. We believe that most of them have virtually no risk, and that to cancel all of them would break a routine long familiar to the Soviets; we might then find it difficult to resume. However, we undertake to screen with particular care all flights scheduled during the period of this visit, so as to reduce selectively to a minimum those which might be regarded by the Soviets as sensitive.In the course of the discussion of these messages, the members of the Group agreed that probably the British motive in making the suggestion is to provide a political gesture that would be apparent to the Soviets. From this point of view, the pattern of DOD peripheral flights was examined and the conclusions were that:(a) Particularly sensitive flights are scheduled sporadically. Therefore, no isolated definite pattern in any one area that would be noticed by the Soviets if cancelled and that would provide political impact on Soviet leaders, can be identified. (b) A world-wide stand-down during the period of the visit could accomplish this purpose, but would be undesirable for the reasons set forth in Mr. Johnson's draft. (c) Peripheral flights in particularly sensitive areas (i.e., Baltic Sea, Black Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk) are subject to Soviet reaction in the form of identification intercept by fighters. However, it is believed that these have become sufficiently routine so they are not brought to the attention of high levels ofSee special minutes for additional items.
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- 2 -98the Soviet government. (d) In the case of the Sea of Okhotsk, however, no flights will be scheduled during the visit. Baltic flights will be very carefully reviewed. Black Sea flights should not require cancellation. In general, all flights around the Soviet periphery will be subject to special review during this period.2. NRO Forecast 98The NRO monthly forecast for July was approved.3. Use of Chinese Pilots in Southeast Asia 98The NRO paper of 25 June, proposing the substitution of Chinese Nationalist pilots for Americans for the high-performance coverage of North Vietnam and Laos, was discussed.Mr. Johnson said that the State Department's view is that if Chinese Nationalist missions out of Taiwan are so scheduled as to cross over the border into North Vietnam from time to time, they have no real objection (on the understanding that the cover story would be that the pilot had strayed off course.) On the other hand, the Department is unable to concur in any deep penetration into the southern part of North Vietnam, or into Laos. The latter country is considered particularly sensitive in this respect.In light of the State position, the Group agreed to proceed as at present with the modifications suggested by Mr. Johnson.4. Spain - Labor Program 98The CIA paper of 21 June was approved as presented.5. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration OperationsMr. FitzGerald briefed the Group on the results of the previous month's operations.Mr. McCone called particular attention to the continuing buildup of fast patrol boats in the Cuban inventory, and said that in light of this we must begin to draw contingency plans for alternate methods of delivery of agents and supplies against the eventuality that the patrol boats may become too great a hazard. He suggested the possibility of such means of delivery as submarines.
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- 3 -Mr. McCone went on to say that continuing reports are now being received, alleging the existence of various exotic items of materiel in Cuba. No one report appears to stand up, but he has directed that all such reports for the past ninety days be examined in total context, so as to see whether on this basis any possible pattern might emerge. Mr. McCone added that he personally feels very uneasy about the situation in Cuba.Thomas A. ParrottDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McCone
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# MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 11 July 1963PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. William Bundy and Mr. McConeColonel Steakley was present for Item 1.Mr. R. Jack Smith was present for Item 2.Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 2 and 3.Mr. Colby was present for Items 4 and 5.1. Peripheral ReconnaissanceThe Group approved the agreement reached last week between State and the JRC on the handling of certain possibly sensitive operations during July. Specifically, REX 1 and 2 were approved with the understanding that the nearest point to the Kuriles would be 15 miles instead of 14, at the northern end of the track. URBAN and RAY were approved, in light of the fact that overt flight plans will be filed.It was noted that the Chiefs had already deferred operations YANKEE PASHA, VERNE and THOMAS at least until after completion of the Harriman mission.Of the three new missions presented by JRC, RED DOG/HAWKEYE and the special photographic operation in European Turkey were approved as presented. Mission RAINHAT-Track 2 was approved with the stipulation that the nearest point to the target country will be 12 miles rather than 10.The British note concerning proposed reconnaissance of the Soviet Northern Fleet (British name, Operation BARGOLD) was discussed. Colonel Steakley stated that the standard British restrictions on such operations are that no aircraft will approach closer than a quarter of a mile or will go under 500 feet, but he said that we have been unable to determine whether the current restrictions, mentioned in the British note, are more stringent than this. He told the Group that U.S. rules provide for no harassing action and for no flights below 2000 feet (this height limit being primarily because of flight safety, in view of the expected presence of British aircraft at a lower level). The Group felt there is no objection to overflying Soviet vessels under these conditions, despite the apparent British ban on this for their own aircraft.
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-2-State will inform the British Minister that we propose to proceed in this manner.## 2. Cuba - Status of Soviet Personnel and MaterielMr. McCone reminded the Group that he had asked for a review of intelligence reports on the situation inside Cuba over a 90-day period, so as to see whether any possible pattern might emerge. He said this review is just now being completed, it having involved examination of 30,000 to 40,000 separate reports. He expects a draft to be available to him by Monday or Tuesday. This will probably take the form of an Agency memorandum, but DIA will be asked to review it.The Chairman said that the Cuban situation will be of great importance in connection with Governor Harriman's negotiations; accordingly, he asked that an informal reading on the results of this review be made available as soon as possible, before a formal paper is fully completed.Mr. Smith then summarized CIA's latest views on the status of Soviet personnel and equipment. He said that there is insufficient evidence on which to base any change in the current estimate of 12,000 to 13,000 Soviet troops. He said that it appears the Soviets are now engaged in training Cubans for eventual transfer of Soviet equipment to them. No combat equipment has been seen leaving Cuba, since last fall.Mr. Smith added that the equipment which was seen leaving on 6 July appears on close examination by photo interpreters to be communications and generator vans, rather than missile guidance equipment.Mr. McCone said that the Japanese Ambassador to Cuba has expressed his conviction that some offensive Soviet missiles still remain in Cuba. CIA and State will debrief the Ambassador on this point today.## 3. Cuba - Agent OperationsMr. FitzGerald told the Group about two additional infiltration/exfiltration operations which were carried out in the last days of June, after his last report. He then mentioned highlights of proposals for the next month. These proposals, as presented in the Coordinator's paper of 9 July, were approved.