Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10302-10000.pdf — page 15]
# TOP SECRETthe United States, that Donovan says he is not a Communist, and that Fideldidn't know how to go about making any accommodation with the U.S.because he was so closely surrounded by advisers who were watching every-thing he did. Mr. McCone said that Castro had specifically requested thatthe President, the Attorney General and the DCI be advised of his attitude.Mr. Clifford asked why Castro wanted the DCI to know, and Mr. McConesaid he had no idea, because at no time during the Donovan negotiations wasany indication given that CIA was being consulted or advised. Dr. Killianthen suggested that the Board turn to the briefing on Cuba. Mr. McConesaid there were several things he wished to discuss before going on to thatbriefing.2. Mr. McCone reported that on coordination the NRO agreement was   in effect and working pretty well. An agreement had been reached on the   complete and comprehensive use of the NPIC facilities by DIA, and NPIC   was developing well. The Special Group has expanded its review of counter-   insurgency activities to include those of the DOD, and they are now cognizant   of DOD activities in this field. In the field of current intelligence reporting,   we are now attempting to correct the DIA and CIA bulletins and to establish   one bulletin with increased DIA input and with DIA issuing addendum.   Mr. McCone said this was supported at the DOD stage by the Secretaries.   He noted that he was attempting to get all issues with the DOD settled by the   15th of May so that they can be fully implemented before Mr. Gilpatric leaves   in June. He said that in the clandestine collection field the work of Defense   was being fully and carefully coordinated on a regular basis. Mr. McCone   said that reasonable progress was being made on the five areas of coordina-   tion. He said that he and Mr. McNamara had postponed the reorganization   of USIB. It was going along all right as it was and they didn't see any point   of creating problems on the Hill by a reorganization at this time.3. Mr. McCone reported that recent CORONA and TACKLE flights over   China produced the best photography we have ever had, and that he had not   set up a formal briefing for the Board because of their busy schedule. He   advised that there was one point concerning ICBM complexes in the Soviet   Union which he wished to call to the attention of the Board. The last CORONA   flight had revealed one new ICBM complex and this now located these   installations in 18 separate places. He noted that these complexes ranged   from four pads to possibly as many as 18. This might well indicate that   18 launching pads were standard, and if the support facilities are proportioned   similar to the one with 18 pads, there might well be as many as 18 times 18   launching pads, or a total of about 450. Mr. McCone advised that at this time   we were analyzing each one to determine the level of support facilities.
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TOP SECRETThe photograph was being reviewed for clearer guide lines as to construction time. He said he saw no reason to change the mid-'63 estimate of 125 to 150 launching sites, but there might be reason to change the future estimate. Dr. Langer asked how many sites there were with 18 pads and Mr. McCone replied, "Only one."4. Dr. Land stated that CORONA was getting better and better, and he hoped that all of those in the pursuit of a better vehicle would not forget that CORONA is doing the job. Mr. McCone replied that this was true, and said that he had the schedule for satellite launchings which he would leave with the Board. This called for CORONA-M once a month to July, with an extra one in May, and CORONA-J once a month from May 1963 to July 1964, with two in September. If trouble develops with the "J" configuration, "M" can be continued once a month until March. The next [LANYARD]shot is scheduled for early next month and will be followed by three more. The first [GAMBIT] shot is scheduled in June, and will then be launched once a month through all of 1964. Mr. McCone noted that if there were future failures, there should be no hiatus and a maximum of only seven days' delay between shots.5. Mr. McCone reported that the OXCART vehicle would have one more flight at Mach 2.5, and then would be pushed up to its full speed and altitude. General Doolittle noted that the next increase presented very serious engineering problems. Mr. McCone said that this was thoroughly understood but he wanted the Board to be apprised of the status.6. Mr. McCone reported that he was establishing a panel to make a judgment as to what additional steps should be taken to bring satisfactory photography in the area of resolution. He noted that he felt we were dealing too much in optimistic hope at the present time, and that he wanted the best possible judgment as to the resolution that could be achieved from satellite photography in order to be weighed with the political decision of overflying the Soviet Union. He stated that he had gone to Cambridge to see Dr. Edward Purcell in an effort to persuade him to chair a panel which would be composed of the best brains from both inside and outside the Govern- ment. He reported that he felt he must be able to tell the President when satellite photography would reach the desired resolution. Mr. McCone advised that he had a memorandum establishing the terms of reference of this committee which he would submit to the President's Board. He noted that there were many studies oriented toward the most exotic types of reconnaissance, including the best read-out, but that he wanted this com- mittee to be completely impartial and objective and therefore was establishing it under his personal direction. He noted that he had the enthusiastic support
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# TOP SECRETof DOD in doing this. He said he would like the support of the President'sBoard and their thoughts on the terms of reference and the membership,including whether they thought some members of the Board might sit on thecommittee or whether this would present a conflict of interest, as the Boardhad apparently felt in a previous matter.Dr. Killian asked if this panel was supposed to look at the future poten-tiality of satellite photography, and Mr. McCone then read to the Board theterms of reference in his memorandum. He noted that he thought this panelshould be constituted at this time because there were serious doubts in theU.S. Government about flying an aircraft over the USSR. Mr. Cliffordasked if the panel would deal with politics, and Mr. McCone replied, "No."Dr. Land asked what the relations of the panel would be with NRO andMr. McCone replied that NRO would support the panel. Gen. Doolittle notedthat the Air Force had a committee on satellite survivability, andMr. McCone said that he knew this, but felt that that committee was not fullout and not devoting the effort that the seriousness of the problem warranted.Gen. Doolittle replied that he was a member of that committee and hethought they were giving the problem very serious consideration. Mr. McConesaid he thought the problem involved a vast amount of work and he wasconcerned because all of the views were not being pulled together. He notedthat what was necessary was to get an authoritative expression as to whatresolution was required down to the nearest inch in order to determine theengineering of missiles..Mr. Land asked what Dr. Purcell had said, and commented that hethought such a panel would be all right if it was composed of four or fivewho knew what they were talking about. Mr. McCone replied that he wasnot sure he had been able to get Purcell, and that he might have to askDr. Land to persuade Purcell; Dr. Land replied that he might be able to do it.7. Mr. Pace asked whether there had been one or two U-2 flights over   China. Mr. McCone replied that there had been two, and that they had   produced some interesting results. These included progress on a possible   gaseous diffusion plant. He noted that the preparations are just half those   of the Soviet plant, of which it may be a duplicate. He said that this was   not understood, and noted that, as presently constituted, the plant could not   produce cascades to develop the quality of the top product. He noted that it   could possibly be another process, metallurgical or textile, but on another   area there were a large number of cooling towers. Mr. McCone advised   that he had set up a special group under Dr. Roddis to study the Chinese   nuclear energy program. This group has made a report in which they pointed   out the paucity of the information available. However, they had put together-4-
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TOP SECRETa whole lot of intelligence information and had come to the conclusion that the Chinese Communists were making a tremendous effort in this field and were possibly nearer the stage of exploding some device. He reported that the Board of Estimates was making a new estimate on the subject at this moment and that the program was being supplemented by intensive over- flights. Dr. Land asked whether the DCI saw any problems in using the A-12 over China, and Mr. McCone said that he didn't and, furthermore, that he personally didn't see any problem in using it over the USSR.8. Mr. McCone advised that he had taken some additional steps to pull together the Agency's scientific and technical assets. He had established a Research and Development Review Board. He said that it didn't seem wise at this time to relocate OSI and TSD. The Office of Scientific Intelligence analyzes and makes estimates on the basis of incoming intelligence, and its removal from DD/I would take away an essential link in the process of that area. He said further that TSD was directly linked to the operational aspects of DD/P, and he didn't feel it should be removed from that area. He noted that the Research and Development Review Board would meet under General Carter biweekly and would provide cross fertilization and coordination. He said that he would provide a copy of the memorandum establishing this Board and read to the Board the membership.
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# TOP SECRET9. Mr. McCone then turned to a discussion of Cuba and stated that he was giving the Special Group this afternoon a study showing the results of 51 days' reconnaissance over Cuba and that this was disturbing when the four principal targets were analyzed. There were 59 occasions when weather precluded any readout of what was going on in these four Soviet military camps. Some of the camps were not seen for five or six days in a row and in one instance for as long as 12 successive days. Mr. McCone then read from the memorandum on reconnaissance over Cuba dated 23 April 1963 and said he would provide the Board with a copy.The DCI then reported that James Donovan during a nighttime drive to Veradero had passed a convoy of 25 very large trucks, the type generally carried on railroad flatcars. Mr. McCone stated that an examination of the photography for that day and the following day provided absolutely no trace of the convoy. Dr. Land stated that the DCI's previous statement may have provided the answer as to where this convoy might be. The DCI said he planned to recommend low-level flights in order to provide more information.10. At this point Mr. FitzGerald was asked to give his presentation on operations in Cuba. He commenced by displaying the chart which indicated the number of resident agents, illegal teams, legal teams, shipboard agents and penetrations of Cuban installations. He noted that the number of illegal teams had risen to three as a result of a successful operation on Sunday, and one of these teams had as many as 100 subagents with extensive coverage in the province of Pinar del Rio. Dr. Langer asked what the subagents were looking for, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that their coverage was mostly military. Mr. Murphy asked if these agents were all strictly collecting intelligence, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that this was their primary purpose at the moment, but the illegals could create a resistance net if this was desired. He pointed out that the policy at the present time precluded attempt-ing to develop a large scale dangerous activity.Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that the penetration of Cuban installations were mainly diplomatic installations and that some 14 Cuban diplomats were our agents. Mr. Clifford asked how the information was gotten out of Cuba, and Mr. FitzGerald replied that it was mostly by secret writing transmitted 10 to Mexico City by mail and then forwarded to Washington. He said there were four radios in Cuba and that we now had a greatly improved medium 24 speed transmitter that was quite small, the size of about two cigarette cartons and it could get a message off in just 60 seconds. He said that there was a smaller and better transmitter currently in the process of development.
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TOP SECRETDr. Land asked if the loss of this transmitter would compromise others. Mr. FitzGerald replied that it would not compromise any other agents except the one apprehended, and the DCI noted that it would simply compromise the instrument.Mr. Murphy asked concerning the quality of substantive reporting, and Mr. FitzGerald noted that the 1,040 reports looked impressive, but it was quite true that this was not a true indication. He said that some of the reporting was very good, and there were two Cuban ambassadors on the payroll who provided some first-rate reports and were closest to the bone in what Castro was thinking. Mr. Murphy asked if we had Castro's immediate entourage penetrated, and Mr. FitzGerald said his sister worked for us but that she didn't always have inside information. He pointed out that the 665 reports from resident agents were primarily on military targets, and the intelligence community felt they were really worthwhile as a supplement to overhead reconnaissance. General Doolittle asked if an illegal[^1] team was two men and Mr. FitzGerald replied "yes". Mr. Murphy asked whether these agents provided information on Soviet troop strength and equipment, and Mr. FitzGerald replied in the affirmative. Mr. Clifford noted that with just two illegal agent teams in Cuba at this time we were back to where we started from in 1962. Mr. FitzGerald commented that the casualty rates were very high and referred to the charts "Legal Resident Agents in Cuba" and "Illegal Agent Development".(At this point Mr. McCone left the meeting and Mr. Cottrell came in.)Mr. Gray asked if the modest number of agents was a result of policy or operations. Mr. FitzGerald replied that this was primarily a result of operations and noted that it was not the result of lack of effort, but because of the high attrition rate and the dangers involved. He went over the lists of what had happened to the agents that were put in. He noted that it was presently planned to carry out approximately five operations a month. Mr. Murphy asked if there was evidence of organized resistance in Cuba. Mr. FitzGerald replied "yes", but they were now small bands scattered throughout the island. He noted that Castro had broken up the large country-wide resistance networks last summer. He then produced the chart entitled "Illegal Infiltration -- Exfiltration Operations" and commented on this.Mr. Murphy asked if the groups on the island committed sabotage, and Mr. FitzGerald said the policy presently precluded major sabotage operations and limited it to "subtle sabotage". Mr. Murphy asked what constituted "subtle sabotage", and Mr. FitzGerald described it as tying a rock to a wire and throwing it across high tension lines.[^1]: 724
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11. The Board then turned to Mr. Cottrell and asked him to describe the work of his group. Mr. Cottrell said the President had become concerned there were so many government agencies dealing with so many Cuban groups, and he had set up the group under Mr. Cottrell to coordinate all of this activity. He said that his immediate group consisted of a representative of Defense and CIA, and there were additional committees or groups reporting to them. He outlined the general policy guidance under which they were operating and under questioning from Mr. Murphy stoutly denied that the policy was basically defensive in nature, and it was directed toward getting rid of communism and Castro in Cuba. It was further explained that CIA's activities were coordinated through this group.12. Dr. Killian then asked Bruce Clarke to give a brief report on the situation in Cuba, and with the aid of photographs Clarke analyzed the present Soviet troop strength on the island and explained how these figures were arrived at. At 12:00 this session was recessed to permit the presentation by DIA.Lyman B. KirkpatrickExecutive DirectorLBK: drm: regDistribution:by #1 - DCI#2 - DDCI#3 - Ex Dir#4 - ER- 8 -
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13-00000Subjects covered in briefing 23 April 1963:1. Discussion of the release of the three American prisoners in Cuba.2. Coordination on NRO agreement - "in effect and working well".3. Report on photographic results of Corona and Tackle flights over China mentioned there would be one more Ox flight at Mach 2.5724 and then be pushed to full speed and altitude.4. Reported on establishment of Purcell Panel.5. Discussion of U-2 flights over China and results.6. Establishment of R&D board to pull together the Agency's scientific and technical assets.7. Discussion of Cuba; DCI said plans to recommend low-level flights to provide more information.8. FitzGerald gave presentation on operations in Cuba.9. Cottrell described the work of his group.10. Bruce Blark gave report on the situation in Cuba.
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SECRETAs advised 10124.m.22 april 1963.LOK20 April 1963MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. KirkpatrickLBKDCI does not want to meet the Board with Cottrell and requests that you advise the Board that Cottrell is not privy to many operational matters. Your suggestions seemed agreeable to Mr. McCone.WelderW. ElderSECRET
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SECRET22 April 1963SUGGESTED TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT'SFOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD, 10:15 A. M., 23 APRILto11:15 A.M.I Coordination.a. NRO Agreement--currently in effect.b. NPIC--agreement with DIA is fairly well solidifiedwith not too many differences in opinion.c. Counterinsurgency--new system whereby DOD goesto the Special Group now in effect.d. Current Intelligence Reporting--now in negotiationstage with DIA.e. Clandestine Intelligence Collection--close coordinationbetween CIA and DIA now in effect.II Recent CORONA Coverage plus Recent TACKLE FlightsIII Progress on OXCART.a. Establishment of the Purcell Panel.IV Scientific and Technical Intelligence in CIA.a. Report of the Roddis Panel on Chinese nuclear energycapabilities.b. The CIA Research and Development Review Board.SECRET![document page]
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13-00000Handle via BYEMANControl System17 April 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTORSUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence AdvisoryBoard, Tuesday, 23 April 19631. The President's Board has asked that you meet with them on   the 23rd from 10:15 to 11:15. They have suggested that the later half   of this period be devoted to a review of both operations and intelligence   on Cuba and have suggested that Mr. Cottrell attend for that period.2. Assuming that the question of the Board's charter and proce-   dures will have been settled prior to the 23rd, I would suggest that you   may wish to give them a quick review of outstanding matters including   their_recommendations and perhaps a briefing on the latest C   and [T.] 99 flights.Lyman B. KirkpatrickExecutive Directorcc: DDCIHandle via BYEMANControl System
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13-0000028 March 1963MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director LBKReference the attached memorandum from the Director, I will of course be pleased to meet with the President's Board on Tuesday, 23 April, and would appreciate very much your informing Pat Coyne accordingly. I hope that you will be able to be present also in accordance with your normal procedures. If not, I would appreciate your appointing an appropriate representative. If you can find out in advance from Mr. Coyne just what the Board may want, it would be most helpful. In the meantime, please ask the staff to prepare appropriate briefing memoranda on whatever will be appropriate at that time.!!!Marshall S. CarterLieutenant General, USADeputy DirectorAttachment:Memo to DDCI from DCI dated 28 March 1963 (ER 63-2540)MSC:blpDistribution:Original - Addressee w/att1 - DDCI w/cy att1 - ER w/cy att
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13-00000Executive Registry |23-254028 March 1963MEMORANDUM FOR: General CarterIn discussions with Dr. Killian, he mentioned that his Board were meeting for one day. He had been advised that I would be in Europe at that time. The meeting date is April 23rd. Dr. Killian specifically requested that you be available for an hour or so on that date, and I said I would convey this request to you.![signature]John A. McConeDirector
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13-00000(CLASSIFICATION)Handle Via Indicated Controls99[BYEMAN]8/19/98AssasinationRecordMichelleWARNINGThis document contains information affecting the national security of the United States within the mean-ing of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the designated controls.This document contains information referring to Projects:(CLASSIFICATION)
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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSI ATION TOP AND BOTTOMUNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRETCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYOFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP| TO  | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE               | INITIALS || --- | ---------------- | ------------------ | -------- || 1   | DCI              | Noted by DCI       |          || 2   | Exec Dir         | Approved with      |          || 3   |                  | 3 minor changes as |          || 4   |                  | noted.             |          || 5   |                  |                    | WEkker   || 6   |                  |                    |          ||  | ACTION | DIRECT REPLY | PREPARE REPLY ||  | APPROVAL | DISPATCH | RECOMMENDATION ||  | COMMENT | FILE | RETURN ||  | CONCURRENCE | INFORMATION | SIGNATURE |Remarks:Distribution to other than DDCI andyourself awaits your approval.FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDERFROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATEExecutive Director 31 Dec 62| UNCLASSIFIED | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET || ------------ | ------------ | ------ |FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 0-587282