Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# May Have Killed Hir selfBY LARRY SAKAMOTOINS Staff Writerpolice raised earlier was believedyesterday the by Communist agent...Amy intelligence are Although U.S. Armybody was fishido declined comment, TokyoBay, March 12. may papers reported that Duganltted suicide. was engaged in undercoverInvestigation of the flow of U.S.military equipment into theThe far, both Japanese hands of the Chinese CommU.S. military police Investiga: nists.orseve announced that theyFare up against a "stone wall" Tokyo police officials revealedgaining cluues to the death of yesterday--and the U.S. ArmyM. Sgt. Emmett F. Dugan, 39, confirmed that they have ask:of Crafton PA. ed Army authorities in the U.S.to question Mrs. Maud DuganA Tokyo police official rated In order to exhaust all possibi-yesterday in connection with lities.the case:"There is one definite post- An Army spokesman at Campbility the: Dugan was not mur- Zama, said 2nd Army list-dered, as is generally believed, quarters at Ft. Merde. Md. nadbut may save committed been asked by Japanese policecide... to contact Mrs. Dagan."We are pursuing our inves-tigation to possible suurida Some of the questions whichwith: utmost thoroughnes." Japanese police wanted put toDagan, whose wife has re Mrs. Dugan were those ccheern-turned to the United States ing a description of the linen,watch. contents of his waifeand clothes of Pastor when hedisappeaDugan disapeared Feb. 4 af-ter leaving ! wife at a Tokyohotel.Supporting the theory thatDagan may have committedsuicide, Tokyo Universitypatholete said it is "possible"for a person to drown himselfwithout water being found inperson's lungs if the body is inan advanced stage of decomposition.An autopsy revealed nowater in Dugan's lungs.Police authorities said "thecause of death has not been de-termined but we are fairly surethat bet dot die of suffoca-tion or poisoning."When Dugan said goodby tohis wife on Feb. 4. Indicationsare that the sensed death wasnear when he handed her an in-suranes policy, saying, "If Idon't return, you'll need these."Meanwhile, the Army spokes-man said, "nothing new" hasbeen uncovered in the case thusfar.Dugane fluent Chineseand was to have many"contact among Chinese livingin Japan
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# 13-00000GENUINE![image of genuine Korean currency]COUNTERFEIT![image of counterfeit Korean currency]
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Re: Teams 25 & 26, U.S. Army Coordinat-ing Detachment (USACRAFE8177 A.U.),Korea. 1956-1957. And RA HIDoperations sponsored and directed byU.S. Military Intelligence."Completely true!"## UNC Rejects Red## Kidnaping ChargePANMUNJOM, Korea (AP)-The U.N. Command Saturday labeled "completely false" a Communist charge that an armed raiding party from the Republic of Korea broke into a North Korean village and killed a farmer and kidnaped a teen-age boy."There is no evidence that these actions were done by the military personnel of the U.N. Con mand." U.S. Maj. Gen. Matthew K. Deichelmann told Conaminist North Korean members of the Military Armistice Commission.He sold the Communist clat could have been manufactured fou propaganda,MAL. GEN. Chung Kok Rok senior CCommunist delegate to the conmission, demanded immediate return of the 17-year-old North Korean boy allegedly kidnaped 2.Gon. Chung al also handed the V.N. side a list of 150 North Eoreans it aimed have been kide naped from North Korea since the Korean war eaded three years ago.Techmann said the roster was accepted and would be studied.": MERELY pointed out that is wws a well-known fact that many thousands of uncappy people live ing undge an inuman rezime rask et their lives to escape to the laws where they live according to their Conscience, he and he ariged.The North Korean side called thetik meeting of the Armis- commission plain of De kidnaping.eichtmann sad stoentine's
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13-00000R. C. NagellBox 2337, Grd Cen StaNew York, N.Y. 10017U.S.A.![Stamp with text 'Berlin kennen, Planetarium und Sternwarte' and value '90' in german language]Mr. Francis X. PlantSpecial AssistantOffice, Under Secretary of the ArmyRoom 1E520, The PentagonWashington, D.C. 20300USA![Envelope border pattern]
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![Document Page]
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XXXCPT ROBERT C. NOLAN, ASN 01438346 CPT RICHARD C. NAGELL,ASN 02028346*Team 26, Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities FarEast (C-CRAFE)*ACRAFE*USACRAFEHIDFOICICDIAISON SECTION, ARMY COORDINATING DETACHMENT
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13-00000![Postmark with Washington D.C. 6 May 1970]Mr. Francis X. PlantSpecial Assistant to the Under Secretaryof the ArmyRoom 3E520, The PentagonWashington, D.C. 20310
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13-00000SECRETChief, Research Branch, SRS3 MAR 1965Robert J. LeonardJohn Richard SLOSS#34490His name is perhaps identical with a name among six names of Agency employees found on a mentally disturbed and disaffected former CIC intelligence officerwho alleges contact with Russian and Cuban Intelligence agents.CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAMRELEASE IN FULL 1998SECRET
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3. The name of John SLOSS may be identical with the name J. SLOSS found on the person of Richard Case NAGELL when arrested in connection with a bank robbery in El Paso, Texas, on 20 September 1963. A notebook found on NAGELL made reference to Fair Play for Cuba Committee, the addresses of Foreign Embassies, the names of purported CIA agents and other information. Although NAGELL is unquestionably mentally unbalanced, he tells a story of being involved in espionage which is not fully contradicted by evidence. There is no apparent explanation of why the name J. SLOSS as well as five other names of CIA personnel should have been in the possession of Richard Case NAGELL. The weird story of NAGELL is contained in a chronological listing of his activities appended to this memorandum.
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14-00000104-10306-100032025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 199226 March 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Notes on Special Group Meeting, 26 March 19631. Low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. Comparative result of high-level versus low-level photography were demonstrated by Mr. Lundahl. After considerable discussion, it was decided that the matter would be held in abeyance for a week pending further developments on the Donovan matter. In general, Gilpatric's attitude was against low-level on the basis of Defense intelligence needs, but would agree if State felt periodic low-levels would establish "right of access". Johnson expressed general objection at this time. McCone expressed two prevailing viewpoints within CIA, but recommended proceeding with low-level. Bundy agreed to put the matter to higher authority for final decision. McCone suggested he was willing to accept responsibility for further delay.Action: Matter to be reconsidered each week.2. Reconnaissance of Indonesia. State, Defense, and Bundy all opposed overflying Indonesia. Mc Cone recommended we support the British effort and it was agreed that the matter would be put to higher authority for decision.3. Monthly Report of NRO was reviewed. McCone reported in detail on the failure of recent CORONA shots; specifically referred to failures of January, February, and March, and the fact that November and December were not usually productive of good photography. He advised Special Group that new estimates of Soviet capability could not be made until the Fall, rather than in June and July as is customary. He advised that the next flight was scheduled for Saturday, 30th of March, and it will be a standard CORONA. Gilpatric reported that adequate emergency back-up arrangements were being made, and delays of a type occurring in the last 90 days would not be recurring.McCone reported the difficulties incurred with the U-2 generators and brushes and the fact that this had caused a standdown of flights in the Far East, but not in Cuba. Condition was reported as having been corrected and the North Korean, North China flight is on a weather alert.
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4. The two papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs on sabotage operations and additional covert programs were returned for consideration by the Cuban Affairs Committee. It was noted that the Cottrell Committee had not acted on these papers. The procedure adopted was for Cottrell Committee action and recommendations in much the same way that we now get Ambassador endorsement of covert activities elsewhere. There was a general concensus that actions against Cuba shipping would not be final although it would be an irritant, since plan called for damaging and making ships inoperative rather than destroying them. Several details of the additional Covert Action Program were discussed. The paper is to be revised and reviewed by the Cottrell Group.5. [Col. Steakley reported on the results of several recent Elint missions, and Elint destroyer operations in the Far East and Elint operation into the Baltic. Dr. Scoville reported on the Chasse operation.]6. [Question was raised as to the results from overflights over Laos.Action: I would like a thorough briefing on this as I have heard nothing on this.]7. [It was reported that SAC seriously questioned CIA's conclusion that the SA-3 sites in Russia are low-level intercept ground-to-air missile sites. Apparently SAC has prepared a report on this. Gilpatric noted the March 18th CIA memorandum reaffirming our conclusions.Action: DD/I must pursue this matter and explore with SAC their reasons for questioning our conclusions. This is the second time in weeks that these conclusions have been questioned. Advise me.]JAM/ji
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26 April 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Special Group (5412) meeting, 25 April 1963Attended by Bundy, Johnson, Gilpatric, McCone1. CIA weekly report on our activities was reviewed without comment. No requests were made. No actions are needed.2. Extensive discussions of DCI's recommendations for low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. Gilpatric raised the question of political consequences. Johnson responded that Mr. Hughes had submitted a paper to him indicating the Soviets would take a harder line under these provocations. He reported that Thompson appeared to feel that low-levels would be used as a basis to halt withdrawal and possibly intensify the situation in Laos and elsewhere and that our interests would be adversely affected. I took the position that intelligence requirements were such that low-levels must be continued. It was agreed to go to higher authority with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense present. Arrangements were made for a meeting about 6:30, 25 April.3. Mr. FitzGerald presented the proposed new covert policy toward Cuba, reviewing the situation and specific operations in considerable detail. The Group were impressed with the planning. They were not prepared to act, and suggested the matter be discussed with higher authority, and also that action be withheld until the Standing Group had further deliberated on the question.4. Covert action in the Congo was discussed. Bronson Tweedy reported briefly. The CIA proposal was approved.5. The proposed feint operations of GROSBEAK were discussed in some detail. Colonel Steakley suggested this operation might prejudice their ELINT operations. However, it was agreed that the exercise would be undertaken during the May dark-of-the-moon period and the results reported back to the Special Group prior to reaching a decision for reaching approval of continuing operations. Jorgenson was instructed accordingly.ACTION: CIA is authorized to undertake this operation; it should be watched carefully, reported accurately and fully, and brought before the Special Group at the time we're considering the June operations.
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6. The status report on the Italian elections was briefly discussed. Approval was expressed on the manner in which this had been handled. Apparently, the political observers on Mr. Bundy's staff views coincided with those reported by the Rome Station.7. McCone reported on the proposed plan for the April 30-May 1 meeting on British Guiana. Mr. Bundy and Mr. Johnson expressed the view that it was important that the strike be continued. They were concerned that it might be settled prior to May 30 and CIA was instructed to look into this and jointly with MI6 take such action as might be indicated as desirable to ensure the continuation of the strike. Mr. Bundy expressed the view that the $10,000 a day figure in the CIA paper would be cheap if a continuation of the strike for a protracted period would ensure the fall of Jagan and the destruction of his political support.ACTION; McCone should discuss with Helms and, if desirable, to arrange for a discussion with Fulton by Cline or by McCone in Paris over this coming weekend.JAM/bd (tape)
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Spec. brp file11 April 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting, 11 April 19631. Reconnaissance of Laos and North Vietnam was reviewed. The Group expressed approval of the CIA program. They authorized two flights over Laos and North Vietnam on the assumption that one of the NEFA flights would cover the extreme western targets desired by Sarit. If, on the other hand, the four India Communist China border flights were not executed at this time, then CIA was authorized to fly three flights over Laos and North Vietnam to cover all of the targets desired by both Sarit and COMOR.2. Status of negotiations for India - Communist China reconnaissance was reported. It was agreed that this question should be pursued further by CIA. No immediate action was indicated. Dr. Scoville reported that no further information would be forthcoming from either India or Thailand until about the 20th of April.3. Cuban operations. The proposed infiltration-exfiltration operations, past and projected, were reviewed and approved. The proposed program of sabotage and harrassment, both the general program and the detailed plan, was discussed at length. It was reported by Mr. Bundy that this program was developed more or less at the direction of higher authority. It was not the intention of higher authority to approve and authorize specific actions; what he was seeking was detailed information concerning our capability and what might be expected on a series of operations which were within our capability. I took the position, which was supported by Alexis Johnson (somewhat less vocally, however) that I questioned the advisability of proceeding with the program until we had crystallized the total policy designed to remove the Soviets from Cuba and also remove Castro. I said I was not clear as to how this was to be accomplished, nor did I feel that there was any agreed series of actions designed to meet this end objective. Therefore, it appeared to me that we are projecting a few of the annoying operations, none of
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which would permanently impair the facilities under attack nor would they seriously impair Castro's economic or military posture and, hence, serve no useful purpose. Furthermore, I estimated that under the laws of averages, a number of the teams would be rolled up and they would as they had in the past attribute the whole thing to the U.S. Government and the CIA. Since we had stood down the ALPHA 66 and others, more or less disenfranchised ourselves from the Cuban colony in Miami as a result of the Miro Cardona incident, we would have no plausible denial and in fact would find ourselves in a rather difficult position. It was agreed this matter should be further studied and reported on next Thursday, and possibly discussed with higher authority on Friday. An important part of this issue is the SNIE now under preparation which has to do with the future of Castro.ACTION: I should discuss this subject with General Carter and some of the Senior Staff on Friday morning to prepare an agreed CIA position and also to schedule the completion of the SNIE.4. North Vietnam monthly report was accepted.5. [^1] The funds for Kong Le were approved. However, Alexis Johnson was asked to go back to Ambassador Unger with an insistent message that Phoumi support Kong Le with money now in which came from the United States. However, if this appeal failed, the support recommended in the paper should be given for a limited period of time.6. [^1] The covert annex to the Bolivian internal defense plan was remanded because the Special Group (CI) had remanded the basic internal defense plan. However, there was no objection expressed to the annex but it must not be construed that the Special Group approved any subjects covered in the annex.7. [^1] The Colombian internal defense plan was not considered.8. [^1] Colonel Steakley submitted a report on inadvertent over-flights by reconnaissance since 1 January 1961. This report was noted. DCI raised the question as to why he had not been informed. Apparently this was an oversight as written procedures had been established by Colonel Steakley for prompt informing of all members of Special Group when instances of this type occurred. Apparently, Alexis Johnson was[^1]: 98[^1]: 98[^1]: 98[^1]: 98
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informed by Colonel Steakley's office and he was under the impression that I was informed. However, he was on leave and therefore did not know that I had not been informed.9. British Guiana situation was opened up for discussion and placed on the agenda for next week. Alexis Johnson reported on Mr. Burdette's position, substantially parallelling Helms', with the effect that he was disappointed in the British position, that he felt time had run in favor of Jagan, and they would like an appeal made to Macmillan. Bundy took exception. McCone stated that CIA felt much as Johnson reported and furthermore objected to the British plan to involve CIA in its own political actions which would be attributable both whether they succeeded or failed. It was agreed to place subject on agenda for next week.ACTION: Subject should be carefully reviewed by staff.JAM:bd
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24 May 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Special Group 5412 Meeting - 23 May 19631. After general discussion the North Viet Nam paper as presented by Colby was approved with the exception of Item b. State took the position that work with isolated ethnic groups in North Viet Nam should not be undertaken unless specifically approved by the Department. Defense raised the question of more extensive operations than anticipated by CIA and indicated that the JCS had developed a plan which would be submitted to the Secretary of Defense and then to the Special Group. I raised the question as to whether the General Harkins command working with the South Viet Nam army could conduct truly covert operations north of the 17th parallel, pointing out that if such actions were attributed to either the United States or the South Viet Namese, then the North Viet Namese with their substantial military organizations could retaliate against the South Viet Nam with punishing consequences. The JCS plan was not formally presented. No actions were taken although it is expected that it will be presented in the near future.ACTION: General Carter has had this matter under consideration with Admiral Riley. We should receive and study the JCS plan immediately upon its approval.2. Defense indicated that the Army have developed plans for large- scale operations against Cuba involving sabotage. No presentation was made however the Special Group was advised that such a plan would be forthcoming.3. Plan for disposing of the 14,000 sacks of sugar in Puerto Rico was discussed. I explained the actions being taken by DDP under FitzGerald's direction and indicated the sugar would probably be sold by the Soviets to a New York sugar broker who would in turn sell it to a non-U.S. port. The 800 bags in question would be disposed of.4. I reported the current status of British Guiana as outlined in the attached paper.ACTION: Mr. Bundy asked that Mr. Helms follow British Guiana closely and keep in close communication with me and with him.
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## 5. The probable position of the Nenni Socialists at their July Congress was discussed.ACTION: CIA was requested to explore the possibility of political action at this time designed to influence a favorable decision by the Congress concerning the Party's support of NATO and the West as contrasted with the taking of a neutral position. As an alternate possibility, it was suggested that the Party might be influenced to refrain from making support of NATO an issue on which the Government might be brought down. Such a course would make it possible for the Christian Democratic Party to conduct its support of NATO even though the CD are closely associated with the Nenni Socialists.McCone stated that Mr. Karamessines would report on this matter at the earliest possible time.[^7]## 6. After a brief discussion on conditions in Haiti, Mr. Bundy stated that NSAM ________ would be issued and would impose on CIA certain responsibilities for covert action among exile groups.ACTION: CIA should immediately study the prospect of creating an exile group around dependable leadership, prepare a plan, estimate of cost, and a forecast of success of intervention in Haiti and make specific recommendations on course of action if one is indicated. Care should be taken not to initiate action until policy has been agreed upon at appropriate levels of Government and of higher authority. Under no circumstances should a course of action by tied to a particular date or be otherwise inflexible.[^7]## 7. After a brief discussion of the overflight problem in India, Special Group urged that CIA seek an appointment with Amb. Bowles prior to his departure in order to acquaint him with the background of this program, the history of the attitude of the Indians, the current status and other dimensions of the problem so that he will be fully informed upon his arrival in New Delhi and will not necessarily be prejudiced by the views of Amb. Gailbraith.[^7]JAM/mfb
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# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Special Group Meeting - 27 June 19631. In connection with the scheduled monthly overflights, Johnson brought up the question of overflights on Laos and North Viet Nam, stating that he understood the COMOR requirements for Laos had been completely filled and nothing was left over, but there was a requirement for one flight on North Viet Nam. McCone answered he was not sure but would check up. It was agreed that any unfilled requirements on Laos would be taken care of.2. Reference use of Chinats in North Viet Nam, this is O.K., providing the use is part of a South China mission which then passes over North Viet Nam, because weather conditions permit, and then exits.. State would not agree to a straight North VietNam-La os flight flown by ChiNat pilots because of the political implications if anything happened.3. The program for Labor Training in Spain was O.K.4. The Cuban program was reviewed by Mr. FitzGerald and was approved. McCone brought up the question of extensive coastal defenses being built up by the Cubans as evidenced by the arrival of new PT boats and advised the Group that we must plan contingent methods for evading such coastal defenses. Also McCone stated that he had asked for a review of all reports for the last 90 days because of his continuing concern over the large number of unexplained reports we are getting on Cuba which indicates some ominous situation might be developing.JAM/mfb