Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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(CLASSIFICATION)Handle Via Indicated Controls99[BYEMAN]WARNINGThis document contains information offecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18, Sections 793 and 794. The low prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States. It is to be seen only by U. S. personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels. Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining to the designated controls.This document contains information referring to Projects:(CLASSIFICATION)
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# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting of the Special Group (5412) - 8 August 1963Present were: McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Alexis Johnson, General Carter and Paul Eckel1. Reconnaissance Requirements for Current Contingency in the Far EastThe requirements for overflights were approved subject to the following:For the Sino-Indian border when a base becomes available. Bundy wanted to know if we were ready for a high-level approach to Nehru. I asked him to hold off until we had taken a better reading and our team had returned. As to the Mainland of China, to include Manchuria, Bundy did not want to go near the Soviet border and felt that 10 or 15 miles was entirely too close. He had no objection to anywhere over the Mainland of China providing we kept well clear of the Soviet border. I told him that if we did this we would not be meeting the requirement to keep track of anything occurring on the Sino-Soviet conflict along the border and the general consensus was that we could do without this type of reconnaissance rather than run the risk of an incident. The Group established a "bank of two" missions for operations against Laos, north of the 17th parallel, and against North Vietnam. There appeared to be no problem about replenishing the bank when it was drawn down. The mission against Laos south of the 17th parallel was approved. The mission for covering North Korea was approved as a high priority requirement subject only to the return of Secretary Rusk.2. Cuban Operations of AugustMr. FitzGerald briefed the Special Group along the lines of his briefing notes (SAS 63-481 of 7 August). Everything was approved except that State had an opportunity to reclama the sabotage operations if they felt the need--Johnson said he would know definitely by Sunday (presumably thinking that Rusk may have had some private conversations with Khrushchev that could indicate the need for soft pedaling actions in Cuba).
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3. The covert action project for Bolivia was approved.4. Matt Baird put on a fine briefing on CIA counterinsurgency training. Bundy indicated he would reassure the Attorney General and I do not think we will have any further problem as to outside inspections or overseeing of our training program.5. There was no discussion of the minutes or next week's agenda.6. I reported on the high-level coverage of Cuba in accordance with the Keber memorandum, and I also gave them a briefing of our U-2 carrier operations to include the pornographic pictures.M. S. C.
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SECRET19 JUL 1353MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting of the Special Group 18 July 1963PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge BundyMr. John A. McConeMr. Roswell GilpatricMr. U. Alexis JohnsonMr. Thomas A. ParrottMr. Desmond FitzGerald1. The undersigned was present at this meeting only for the brief item on Cuba which involved the final decision whether or not to postpone the two external sabotage operations planned for 26 July. Mr. Bundy referred to the fact that the Agency representatives had previously stated that they would prefer, in terms of the morale of the case officers and agents, to have a decision to postpone made at the earliest possible moment rather than to have such a decision reached at the last minute. Mr. Bundy stated that in light of this he felt it reasonably certain that Higher Authority would consider that negotiations in Moscow were proceeding in a sufficiently favorable manner to warrant a postponement decision at this time. Mr. Bundy said that if the undersigned did not hear from him during the course of the day Higher Authority's decision to postpone could be assumed. Mr. Bundy further said that it was only fair to warn that there might be a resumption of Moscow negotiations at a later date -- perhaps August -- and that these resumed negotiations might in turn call for postponements. (Mr. Bundy did not call and the operations have been postponed until approximately the 15th of August.)![Group 1 Excluded from Automatic Downgrading and Declassification]SECRET
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SEORET22.  On the morning of the 19th of July the under- signed called Mr. Bundy and confirmed this fact and said that a field message now indicated the possibility of an internal sabotage operation to take place on the 26th. Mr. Bundy said that such an operation would be perfectly acceptable and that the only bar was on "across water" operations. Mr. Bundy also added that Higher Authority asked him to convey to us the fact that Higher Authority, in reaching the decision to postpone, was well aware of the morale problem that might result among the Agency case officers and therefore had con- siderable difficulty in reaching the decision. Mr. Bundy authorized the undersigned to quote Higher Authority accordingly to any staff personnel concerned and to add that Higher Authority retains his enthusiasm and interest in the program.![signature]Desmond FitzGeraldChief, Special Affairs StaffCEORET
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# SECRET30 AUG 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting of the Special Group 29 August 1963PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge BundyGeneral Marshall CarterMr. Roswell GilpatricMr. U. Alexis JohnsonMr. Thomas A. ParrottMr. Bruce B. Cheever1.  Mr. Johnson opened the discussion of the paper "Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups" (i.e., Support to Commandos L) by commenting that he was under the impression that Mr. McCone had indicated at the last Special Group Meeting that he would look into the proposal further and that Mr. Johnson wondered what his views now were.2.  Mr. Cheever was not able to express Mr. McCone's personal views on this matter, but pointed out in general terms the reasons why we considered the proposal desirable as a supplement to the already approved program. Further discussion centered on the question of the use of British territory and the possibility of attribution of the raids to the United States. No mention whatsoever was made regarding the question of attacking Cuban ships. After an inconclusive discussion, Mr. Johnson reiterated his desire to hear Mr. McCone's personal views on the proposal. Mr. McBundy concurred and the question remains open until the next Special Group Meeting.3.  Mr. Cheever has the distinct impression that State continues to be completely opposed to this proposal and hopes Mr. McCone will "shoot it down" for them, whereas it is believed that Defense will concur but will not "front-run" the proposal. Mr. Bundy appears open-minded on the matter.> [Figure: Stamped text "SECRET" and "GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification"]
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SECRET- 2 -4. Mr. Cheever briefed the Group on the operation to remove and destroy the "Streatham Hill" contaminated sugar. The briefing covered the chronological details from initiation of negotiations for purchase until completion of the dumping of the sugar at sea. Identities of the various brokers, cover companies, etc. were not asked for nor revealed. The Group expressed its satisfaction with the operation. (Mr. Parrott had previously advised Mr. Cheever that Mr. Bundy did not desire a paper on this matter.)5. The after-action report on the Casilda/Santa Lucia operations was briefly discussed. Mr. Johnson questioned the motives for the amount of material abandoned on the scene. Mr. Cheever commented that while it was unfortunate that the material had been left, it was explainable in terms of the reaction of soldiers under fire and especially those in their first fire fight. The Guatemala press release on "Commando Mambises" was favorably commented on by Mr. Johnson. Mr. Bundy asked about the comment in the after-action report that "One cannot predict what Castro's ultimate reaction or reprisal will be." Mr. Cheever stated some of the people who closely study Castro believed that he would be personally furious over the attacks and that one could expect more reaction than had appeared to date. In response to Mr. Bundy's question whether there would be additional operations of this type next month, Mr. Cheever advised that several were in the planning stage, but that until he talked to our people coming up from Miami this weekend, he could not be certain but that he doubted we would ask to mount any the next moon period. Mr. Cheever mentioned the cancellation of the scheduled South Coast Caching operation due to the Cuban alert, the execution of the three members of the DOGGO team, and the probable doubling of the ATHENA team. Mr. Bundy asked if the Attorney General had been briefed on Casilda/Santa Lucia. When advised to the contrary, he asked that this be done when the Attorney General returns to Washington next week (week of 3 September).
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THE WHITE HOUSEWASHINGTONSeptember 23, 1963SECRET EYES ONLYMEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUPSUBJECT: Covert Operations Against Cuba - Security Within the GovernmentAs you know, in August the U. S. Government directed two "exile" raids against targets in Cuba. From the evidence now available, it appears that our security, with respect to U. S. participation in these operations, was excellent.While there will always be public speculation as to the extent of U. S. involvement in raids of this type, I think we would all agree readily that it is important that there be only speculation, and no direct knowledge. Unfortunately, the maintenance of a high degree of security is not a simple matter in view of the numbers of people within the Government who have to know a little or much about a U. S. -directed raid against Cuba. For example, without counting CIA personnel and secretarial and staff personnel of other agencies, there were probably over 20 people in the Executive Branch who knew details of the August raids while many other people were generally acquainted with the U. S. involvement. Among others, the Navy knew where the attack boats were going; the Coast Guard, Customs, and INS knew about the "comings and goings" of the raiders; a few DOD people, who had to procure special equipment for the raids, could presumably surmise that something was going on somewhere; and a few intelligence watch officers and press officers were told, for their background, that the U. S. Government was aware of the raids.I think there are two important, if obvious, security lessons we have learned from the August raids -- one, that it is in the nature of the problem that many people probably have to know something about such raids; and two, that these people apparentlySECRET - EYES ONLY (page 1 of 2 pages)
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SECRET - EYES ONLY -2- September 23, 1963can maintain adequate security. At the same time, in view of the truth that security leaks are more likely to occur when substantial numbers of persons are involved, it seems essential to me that we constantly convey the high importance of security to others who are privy to information about our covert activities against Cuba. May I ask that members of the Special Group take such steps within their areas of authority as they think appropriate, and may I in particular urge that the Central Intelligence Agency, as executive agent for these enterprises, emphasize the importance of security to all those with whom it has necessary business on these matters, so that we can maintain the high level of security set in these recent operations.![signature of McGeorge Bundy]McGeorge BundySECRET - EYES ONLY (page 2 of 2 pages)
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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 19921 October 1963NOTES FOR MR. McCONE:1. DDP has prepared for your information a summary of General Chiang Ching-kuo's visit to the U.S. Attached to this summary are the four most important papers as follows:a. Your position paper;b. CIA commitments paper;c. Memorandum for the record on DDP briefings;d. Record of conversation with the President.The visit is considered to have been a success and Chiang Ching-kuo returned with an understanding that any abrupt move by his government to recover the mainland with military force would not be supported by this country. Chiang Kai-shek has accepted the position paper and CIA's commitments paper, and our station is now working out cooperation on intelligence and operational activities against the mainland.2. In commenting on the proposal to send Dr. Cavanagh to Rome, Bill Harvey suggests that Cavanagh be certified to the Vatican as your personal representative, and suggests you might do this through Cardinal Cicognani or Archbishop O'Connor. Request your guidance.3. DDP has run another assessment of the reliability of the documentary material provided by Penkovskiy and see no reason to change their statement of 31 May to USIB that it was "a most serious penetration of Soviet officialdom and one that will hurt them for years to come". Helms suggests you have this assessment checked with DDI and OSI and if they concur, re-assure USIB along the above lines.4. Dez FitGerald briefed the Joint Chiefs recently on his overall program against Cuba. In the discussion the main thing that emerged was General LeMay's view that the present program was far too small to
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overthrow Castro. General LeMay wondered why we did not use bombings. There was also a discussion of Navy and Air Force programs to protect raiders in international waters and in the event of hot pursuit. It was agreed that further planning would be conducted.5. John Warner has reviewed the record of recent congressional debates on the test ban treaty and finds 13 senators made reference to you. No one criticized you. Senators Pastore, Humphrey, and Anderson praised you.6. John Warner has prepared a recommendation based on his reading that our standing in Congress is currently on the decline. He suggests that you meet privately with such members as Russell, Saltonstall, Vinson, and Arends to seek advice and develop a strategy for public statements by these members and other Subcommittee members.7. Mr. Kirkpatrick has forwarded a memorandum on efforts to obtain a replacement for Colonel Grogan.8. Dick Helms has forwarded a memorandum of his briefing of the Bureau of Budget officials on the Agency's covert action programs. McGeorge Bundy attended and offered 2 opinions: (a) that there be a regular annual briefing of the Special Group on covert operations as a whole, and (b) that during the present period of apparent detente there might well be very good reasons for investing even greater resources in covert actions.9. John Bross has forwarded a memorandum for the record on your meeting with Generals Carter, Blake, and Carroll about personnel security. Bross is presently drafting a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on this subject which is being reviewed by Houston and Bannerman.
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10. Mr. Gilpatric has written you a letter confirming His conversation about assigning Frank Hand as Special Assistant to General Carroll. I suggest I pass this to General Carter for Agency action.W. Elder
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 199218 June 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: 303 Committee Meeting - 18 June 19641. Item I: Autonomous OperationsThis was raised in view of Manuel Ray's request for $25,000 and indications that he is attempting to make a new expedition to Cuba in a chartered ship. Various courses of possible action with Ray were discussed, ranging from cutting him off altogether to giving him the money. It developed that Ray is acting inconsistently with the agreement with him which was that he would operate outside the United States. Therefore it was decided that we would tell him that he must abide by the agreement, that he must find a base of operations outside the United States and if he does we will endeavor to secure the release of his ship which is now in Puerto Rico, and that we will give him financial support.2. With respect to Artime, it was pointed out that Artime's operations are very costly. CIA has put $4.6 million into this operation this year - the future bill will be large, but not as great. FitzGerald reported that Artime planned one hit and run operation a month, but he noted he would be lucky if he could pull off one every 3 months. Bundy seemed to feel Artime was more of a threat than an operator and should be maintained for that purpose and operations discouraged. FitzGerald pointed out this is not practical. It was agreed to proceed with Artime recognizing that U.S. or CIA support of him would probably be "blown". Furthermore it was suggested that he be cautioned to be careful and not follow unduly reckless courses of action.3. There was a long discussion on the implications of the CIA June 10th memorandum reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading Cuban government leaders. This report was taken most seriously by the group. It was felt that the purpose of advising us through CIA of these plans was to put us on notice and therefore we should not fail to take appropriate precautionary actions to see that no assassination attempt of which we had knowledge was carried out. It was decided that appropriate authorities, i.e. Department of Justice and the FBI, should be notified and urged to take appropriate action against the individuals involved.I took the position that we are overly exercised, that I was inclined to write the whole thing off as Miami cocktail party talk rather than definite plans. Had I seen the Memo before it was distributed, I would have investigated the sources and the credibility of the whole thing before taking action. However the group were more concerned than I and therefore planning to discuss the subject with the Attorney General and possibly Mr. Hoover.
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I pointed out that copies of the Memorandum had been sent to the Attorney General and the Department of Justice but there had been no conversation on the subject.ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms steps we should take to establish the credibility of the report; also communicate with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I should call the Attorney General personally.4. Prior to the meeting Mr. Vance asked my opinion of using the 22 million psyops leaflets which inadvertently had been printed on U.S. manufactured white sulphite paper, all as reported in MACV cable MAC SOG 5050 dated 18 June 1964 (IN 09143). I told Vance that I felt we should go ahead. It was too bad it had been done this way, but it is one of those things that a person not thoroughly acquainted with this type of operation might overlook. He was in agreement and presumably will instruct the release of the leaflets.jam/mfb- 2 -
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# TOP SECRETNON-CIA TELETYPED MESSAGE 09143 1f3**ACTION:** FE 1-8TE IF Ø3400 RUEPIAADE RUMSMA 1647F 18/0641Z0 180627ZFM COMUSMACVTO RUEPCR/WHITEHOUSERUEPDA/SECSTATERUE PDA/O SDRUEPIA/CIARUEKDA/JCSINFO RUHPA/CINCPACZEN/AMEMB SAIGONRUHPA/CAS HONOBTTOP SECRET MAC SOG 5050LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SPECIAL HANDLING SPECATEXCLUSIVE STATE FOR SULLIVAN, OSD FOR MCNAMARA AND ANTHISWHITE HOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY, CIA FOR MCCONE, CARTER ANDHELMS, JCS FOR GEN TAYLOR, INFO AMEMB SAIGON FOR AMB LODGEAND NES, CINCPAC FOR ADM FELT.A. OPLAN 34A1. IN ORDER TO MEET OPERATIONAL SCHEDULES FOR JUNE AND   JULY PSYOPS LEAFLET DROPS, TWENTY TWO MILLION LEAFLETS
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13-00000CLASSIFIED MESSAGETOP SECRETWERE PRINTED ON SIXTEEN POUND US GRADE WHITE SULPHITEPAPER. THIS WAS NECESSITATED DUE TO UNAVA ILABILITY OFOTHER PAPER SUITABLE FOR IHIGHSPEED LEAFLET PRESS.2. UNLESS THESE PRINTED LEAFLETS ARE AUTHORIZED FOR   DISSEMINATION OVER NORTH VIETNAM UNDER SCHEDULED OPLAN   34A OPERATIONS NUMEROUS PSYOPS OPPORTUNITIES EXPLO ITABLE   UNDER PRESENT LIGHT OF THE MOON PERIOD WILL BE MISSED AND   TIMELINESS OF SEVERAL OF THESE LEAFLETS WILL BE LOST.3. REALIZE SUBJECT OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL BECOMES INVOLVED   HERE BUT FEEL IN THIS CASE PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE ATTRIBUTION   TO UNITED STATESTUST BE JUDGED IN LIGHT OF FOLLOWING CIR-   CUMSTANCES:A. PAPER STOCK USED IS STANDARD US MANUFACTURE OB-TAINED THROUGH US ARMY QUARTERMASTER SOURCES AND ISASSUMED TO BE AVAILABLE ON WORLD MARKET FOR SALE TO ANYCONSUMER. MAP SUPPORTED FORCES SUCH AS ARVN OR OTHERSCOULD HAVE ACCESS TO SAME TYPE PAPER.B. ANY DESIRE TO ATTRIBUTE OPLAN 34A ACTIONS TO USCOULD BE MORE READILY SUB STANT IATED BY DRV PRODUCING AGENTPERSONNEL OR MORE CRITICAL ITEMS LOST IN SOME PREVIOUSTEAM OPERATIONS.C. PAPER STOCK ITSELF IS NOT ONLY ATTRIBUTABLE ITEM,BUT ALSO OFFSET PRINTING PROCESS EMPLOYED WITH OTHER TYPEPRINTED MATTER.D. IN ESSENCE ALL OPLAN 34A ACTIONS ARE DESIGNED TOIMPRESS DRV THAT PRESSURE IS BEING APPLIED BY MAJOR POWER.USE OF US PAPER AND ייןIRECT INDICATION OF US INVOLVEMENTTOP SECRET
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGE# TOP SECRETIN 09143 PAGE 3of3TEND CONTRIBUTE TO THAT BASIC OBJECTIVE.E. ONLY CHEMICAL ANALYSIS COULD ASCERTAIN THAT PAPERUSED IS U.S. MANUFACTURED STOCK.F. IN ANY EVENT, U.S. BLAMED BY DRV FOR ALL OPLAN 34AACTIONS THEY CHOOSE TO PUBLICISE AND U.S. IN EACH CASECOULD CHOOSE TO DENY OR IGNORE ACCUSATIONS.4. REQUEST APPROVAL TO PROCEED WITH DISSEMINATION OF PRE-   PARED LEAFLETS AT THIS TIME AND UNTIL SUITABLE FOREIGN   SOURCE PAPER STOCK CAN BE OBTAINED WHICH SHOULD BE WITHIN TWO WEEKS.5. IN ORDER TO MEET CURRENT JUNE SCHEDULE REQUEST REPLY   WITHIN 48 HOURS.GP-1BT# TOP SECRET
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3 AprilMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Special Group Meeting (5412) - 2 April 19641. Briefly reviewed the status of North Viet Nam operations 34A. All concluded that the results have been negative and disappointing. I took the position this was to be expected but that now the period of organization had past, we might get some better results.The CIA IDEALIST-TACKLE program was approved except for the North Korean flight. Defense interposed an objection to this flight on the grounds that they were nearing agreement for the release of helicopter crews which have been held in North Korean custody.ACTION: This particular flight should be withheld. USIB and most particularly DIA should be informed in the meeting On Wednesday, the 8th.2. Discussed the problem of captains and crews for the SWIFT and NASTY craft and the necessity of withdrawing the German mercenaries and the Swedish captains. This was recognized as a must. It was agreed that substitution of Chinese Nationalist captains was acceptable on an interim basis.ACTION: DDP to arrange with Secretary Vance for appropriate actions by the Department of Defense through their representatives in Taiwan for the recruitment, movement, compensation and care of these captains.3. Reviewed DoD peripheral reconnaissance which was approved after extended discussion of capabilities of the new radar in Cambodia. It was agreed that the field would be instruded to carefully observe operation of this radar to determine whether the U-2s were being picked up by it. If this turned out to be a regular practice by the Cambodians, the matter should be resubmitted for reconsideration.ACTION: The field should follow this carefully with MACV4. Review of ground rules for U-2 in North Viet Nam as outlined. Secretary Vance's paper was approved.