Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# MemorandumTO: FilesFROM:DATE: 29 January 1964SUBJECT: THE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #3511641.  According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Samuel WISE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.2.  Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted Security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.3.  In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.4.  In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.5.  On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:"SOFT ON COMMUNISM: Representative Francis E. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to "rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal adviser when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."
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SECRET6.  Samuel WISE, "Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow" who    is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin WISE Jr., #74574,    SD & SSD, who apparently was once a contract employee on    The State Department reviewed WISE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of    September 1962 a Samuel G. WISE was Second Secretary of the American    Embassy in Moscow. At that time WISE advised in a cable to the State    Department that it appeared that Bruce Frederick DAVIS, #352267, who    defected from the United States Army in Germany on 18 August 1960, had    not expatriated himself. DAVIS' case is very similar to that of    OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years    after his defection and prior to making application for return to the    United States.[^7]7. WISE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and   was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did   not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been   interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953,   WISE was granted a CSA to permit his use as a contract employee on   in New York City. His CSA was cancelled on 24 March 1958.8. WISE was named as a friend of William Orville MUNSELL, #61693-DL,   during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952.   WISE, according to MUNSELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington,   D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the   only person she knew by name with whom MUNSELL was friendly. According   to the informant, WISE was a student at Columbia University whose address   was 423 Furnald Hall. MUNSELL was Security disapproved for CIA employment   in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social   basis, while attending Denver University from 1946 to 1951, with persons   of questionable loyality. In November 1954, MUNSELL was of interest to   project with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia;   however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after   Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.9. WISE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale,   New York, which was attacked by a Citizen's Group, which alleged Communist   influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in   addition to MUNSELL.
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# TOP SECRETJOHN A. MCCONETHE SIXTH DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCEByWalter ElderEdited by Mary S. McAuliffe, DCI Staff Historian1987The attached is a draft history which has not been forwarded for review outside the DCI History Staff.WORKING DRAFTHandle via [BYEMAN] Control SystemTOP SECRETCL BY BYE-1DECL OADRDERIVED FROM BYE-1BY NO. 018-88copy 2 of 2
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# CHAPTER IVIn the meanwhile, Cuba remained a sore point for both the CIA and the Kennedys.Shortly after the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy asked General Maxwell Taylor to chair a small commission, consisting of Robert Kennedy, Allen Dulles and Admiral Arleign Burke, to investigate. Highly critical of the piecemeal and acquiescent administrative decisions which had accompaned the operation's progress, the Taylor report was mild in comparison with the severely critical internal report prepared by CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick.Robert Kennedy also produced a personal Bay of Pigs report to the President, which he discussed with McCone in late November 1961. The Attorney General was especially critical of Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans, because Bissell had told the President the operation was likely to succeed. Robert Kennedy was also highly critical of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for spending only twenty minutes studying the planned operation before making its first report to the President endorsing the operation.It is worth noting that McCone was the only official in the
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13-00000TOP SECRETgovernment privy to all the studies of the Bay of Pigs operation,including the Taylor report, Robert Kennedy's personal report, theKirkpatrick report, and the views of the President's ForeignIntelligence Advisory Board.McCone did not dwell on the Bay of Pigs after he took office, buthe did draw several conclusions. Firmly believing the decision to goahead was a mistake, he nevertheless thought it an even worse mistaketo dismember the operation once underway, contending that the CIAshould have appealed directly to the President to reverse thedecision to stand down the air strikes. Concluding as well that themembers of the Taylor commission had been too closely involved withthe events to have sufficient perspective, he believed the CIA andJCS had to bear special responsibility for advising the new Presidentto go ahead, since at that time these were the only two Washingtonorganizations dealing with international affairs which possessedcomplete continuity.Taking a detached view of the operation, McCone was able toconcentrate on what the Agency could do to avoid similar mistakes inthe future. Leery of large-scale operations involving the Agency'sparamilitary capability, McCone strove, with mixed results, to removethe CIA from such enterprises. He also stressed the importance ofplanning an operation from beginning to end (an attitude whichdominated his approach during the Cuban missile crisis). Finally, heinsisted that the Agency's estimative function be privy to plannedoperations, providing early and frequent judgments.WORKING DRAFT 99Handle via BYEMAN Control SystemBY NO. 018-88copy 2 of 235TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETCuba, however, remained a subject of considerable concern. In April 1961, shortly after President Kennedy established the Taylor Commission, Presidential adviser Walt Rostow speculated that Cuba might join with the Soviet Union in setting up an offensive air or missile base. He additionally posed that Cuba might build its conventional military strength and develop its subversive network to threaten other Latin American nations from without and within. "Its ideological contours are a moral and political offense to us," he concluded, "and we are committed, by one means or another, to remove that offense...."The Kennedy administration proceeded to address the situation directly. At a White House meeting which McCone attended in late November 1961, the President announced that General Edward Lansdale, acting under the direction of the Attorney General, had already begun to study possible actions to overthrow the Castro regime. These covert activities, explained Robert Kennedy, included anything possible to create internal dissension and discredit Castro. He then proposed that, to accomplish this goal, Lansdale head up a committee made up of representatives of Defense, State, USIA, and CIA, which would cut across organizational lines.McCone decided that the administration and the Agency both seemed in a state of shock so far as Cuba was concerned. Although skeptical from the beginning about the Lansdale program's prospects for success, he nevertheless recognized that the CIA had a special role and responsibility so far as Cuba was concerned. He himselfWORKING DRAFTHandle via BYEMAN Control SystemBY NO. 018-88copy 2 of 2TOP SECRET![signature]
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TOP SECRETsupported the notion of dynamic action, but urged that such action not be reckless. Consequently, he recommended that the Lansdale group report to the 5412 oversight committee, which was properly qualified to give political guidance and evaluate proposals for action. In addition, although McCone agreed the facilities of all agencies should be made available for such high-priority operations, he emphasized that these should remain in place and not be removed to form a new unit under Lansdale.In this way, MONGOOSE, as it came to be known, was launched. With the White House's decision to go ahead (keeping the 5412 Committee fully informed), McCone proceeded to discuss the Lansdale operation with top Agency officials. Acknowledging that the project had to be closely held--Lansdale had asked that the CIA'S representative, Richard Helms, report only to the DCI--McCone nevertheless stated he intended to skip no appropriate echelon of the Agency, as such a course would deprive him of the advice of other senior officers. Action would be at the Helms level, and the Agency would offer Lansdale all necessary support and assistance, but without excluding the participation of other Agency members within the strict security guidelines laid down by the President. Further, McCone directed the Board of National Estimates and the DD/I to undertake a continuing evaluation of MONGOOSE, viewing such precautions as a major step toward overcoming the compartmentation which had excluded the DD/I from any advance knowledge of the Bay of Pigs landing.WORKING DRAFT 99Handle via BYEMAN Control System37TOP SECRET.BY NO. 018-88copy 2 of 2![signature]
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TOP SECRETSignificantly, McCone insisted on bringing analytical and estimative functions to bear on Cuban operations from the beginning. Further, he insisted that truly clandestine actions be small. Most importantly, he required that careful records be kept of actions and conversations, himself setting an example by keeping meticulous memoranda for the record.MONGOOSE represented McCone's first working encounter with Robert Kennedy. The Attorney General, McCone immediately realized, was a dynamic force with a keen interest in the intelligence community, as well as a strong influence on the President. McCone became quite close to him. MONGOOSE also reinforced McCone's awareness of the extent of the administration's obsession with Cuba. He consequently accepted as a personal charge the administration's desire to overthrow Castro. He was not, however, about to allow Lansdale or anyone else dictate the use of CIA sources. Had he detached Agency resources for Lansdale's use, McCone would have lost control. He further insisted on the checks and balances of 5412 committee overview.The Special Group (5412 Committee), made up of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other appropriate representatives, had been established in 1955 by National Security Council Directive 5412/2 to provide interdepartmental coordination of covert actions. In general, the Group's cognizance extended to anyWORKING DRAFTHandle via BYEMAN Control System38TOP SECRET
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TOP SECREAPcovert activity which, because of its impact, could, if exposed,reflect on the official position of the United States. Thus, asizeable activity aimed solely at intelligence collection throughclandestine methods could come under the Group's scrutiny.Conversely, small political actions, with little flap potential,could be undertaken without referring the activity to the Group.The Kennedys, however, were sufficiently alarmed over the threatof Communist subversion and covert aggression that, in January 1962,another special committee, Special Group (Counterinsurgency),appeared. Largely the brainchild of General Maxwell Taylor, SpecialGroup (CI) aimed at identifying those areas where an insurgent threatexisted or threatened to emerge, directing the use of appropriateresources to counter that threat.In practice, the CIA had always been reluctant to expose itsactivities to an interdepartmental body. The Defense Department hadbeen similarly reluctant to submit its extensive program ofperipheral reconnaissance flights to Special Group review, although,beginning in June 1961, the group began to consider these flights.The Special Group's influence depended, in the final analysis, on theattitude of the President and the Special Group chairman, as well ason the temper of the DCI. Allen Dulles served as an advocate for theCIA's proposed activities. John McCone took the position that, asDCI, he was a personal adviser to the President and thus free toapprove or disapprove the CIA's proposals as he saw fit.The entire Cuban situation was difficult from the outset, andWORKING DRAFT 99Handle via (BYEMAN Control SystemBY NO. 018-88copy 2 of 239TOP SECRET![signature]
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TOP SECRETMcCone was careful to warn the President and Attorney General that he anticipated no quick or easy road to success. With the approval of Ambassador Alphand, a close personal friend of McCone, the French embassy in Havana had agreed to serve as the Agency's Cuban eyes and ears, with Philippe de Vosjoli, SDECE's Washington representative, reporting directly to McCone. De Vosjoli reported that at least ninety percent of all Cubans supported Castro, while McCone added that of twenty-seven or twenty-eight CIA agents in Cuba, only twelve presently were in communication. Contact even with these was infrequent, and an additional team of seven, infiltrated in December, had been captured (with two featured on a television "confession" show).Nevertheless, at a Special Group meeting in April 1962, McCone urged a review of our national policy toward Cuba and asked that we consider more aggressive action, including direct military intervention. Noting that various intelligence reports suggested that Castro was in deep trouble, he questioned whether the military strength of the Castro government was as large and as effective as had been understood. In response to objections that such a course might lose us friends in Latin America, McCone countered that a show of strength was more likely to win than lose us friends.Shortly thereafter, McCone learned from the Attorney General that there was some movement afoot to exchange our prisoners from the Bay of Pigs for food. (Castro had offered to release the prisoners in exchange for a large quantity of drugs and medicines). Later, inWORKING DRAFTHandle via BYEMAN Control SystemTOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETearly June, McCone suggested forming a committee to negotiate such arelease. Robert Kennedy was generally sympathetic, but did not atthat time request covert support for the project. The subject wasleft for further discussion, with an agreement that it would not bediscussed with anyone in CIA, Defense, or State who was active inCuba operations.In mid-July, McCone and Robert Kennedy reviewed the Cubansituation in considerable detail. Kennedy thought that, althoughconsiderable intelligence had been acquired, the program's actionphases had been disappointing. Shortly after, McCone had theopportunity to review MONGOOSE with the President. Since thebeginning of February, McCone reported, nine intelligence collectionteams (about half the originally-planned number) had been infiltratedinto Cuba and maintained in place, thousands of Cuban refugees hadbeen systematically interrogated in Florida, and a number ofthird-country agents recruited inside Cuba. U-2 overflights werebeing conducted on a regular two-a-month schedule. The operation wascosting the CIA about $1 million per month in direct costs and evenmore in indirect support costs.Although McCone was skeptical about the aims and operations ofMONGOOSE, he believed the CIA bore a special responsibility tocollect intelligence on Cuba. He therefore told the President thatthis collection effort had produced a substantial amount of hardintelligence on conditions inside Cuba, and a continuation wouldprovide additional intelligence, possibly revealing opportunities forWORKING DRAFT 99.Handle via BYEMAN Control System41TOP SECRET
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13-00000TOP SECRETpolitical, guerrilla or insurgent activities designed to overthrowCastro. McCone added, however, that many individuals felt that moredynamic actions were called for, including mass landings and militaryactivity. McCone did not agree. Our intelligence, he said, did notsupport this point of view, and any such attempts would face disasterunless the United States was prepared to commit large military forcesto support them.In the meantime, Castro had officially cast his lot with theSoviet Union, and indications were increasing that the USSR waswilling to invest substantial amounts of money, not only to keep theCuban leader afloat, but to enhance his capability to create mischieffor the United States. After 1 February 1962, our U-2 flights overCuba increased from one to two per month, and intelligence reportsrevealed steady Soviet shipments of military as well as economic aid.On August 4, McCone learned that eleven Soviet ships believed tobe carrying arms were bound for Cuba. McCone asked for furtherdetails. On August 5, he received a breakdown on the ships, and hedirected immediate U-2 coverage (which began the following day).According to reports, up to 5,000 Soviet technicians had arrived, inaddition to military communications equipment. The preliminary U-2readout, however, was not very helpful, and another flight wasplanned for August 11.On August 10, McCone met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk,presidential military adviser General Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy,Deputy Secrety of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and the AttorneyWORKING DRAFT 99Handle via (BYEMAN) Control SystemBY NO. 018-88copy 2 of 242TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETGeneral. It was during this meeting, which approved intensifying MONGOOSE operations, that McCone first shared outside the CIA his fear that the Soviets might introduce offensive missiles into Cuba. His statement had little immediate impact. The experts unanimously and adamantly agreed that this was beyond the realm of possibility. McCone's conclusion that the USSR might put offensive missiles into Cuba was set in motion by the continuing influx of Soviet military equipment. It was intensified by the arrival of Soviet personnel, then brought to a head by reports which suggested that the Soviet Union was preparing to install surface-to-air missiles (SAMS) there.Why, asked McCone, would the Soviet Union place SAMS in Cuba? If the United States were to launch a military attack, the SAMS could be easily and quickly destroyed. The SAMS were not being put there to protect Cuban canecutters; therefore, McCone argued, their real purpose was to blind the United States by deterring further U-2 overflights. This action would then permit the Soviet Union to take further steps which they could reveal at a time of their own choosing.McCone then asked himself what he would do if he were in Khrushchev's shoes. The United States and Soviet Union were balanced in nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, but the USSR had a decided edge in intermediate and medium-range missiles. These missiles could not, however, reach the United States from Soviet launch pads. The USSR had not deployed these missiles outside its borders, presumably because they could be redirected against the
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TOP SECRETSoviet Union if they fell into the wrong hands. However, Cuba was one place where the Soviets could safely put their missiles. As McCone put it, "If I were Khrushchev, I'd put offensive missiles in Cuba. Then I'd bang my shoe on the desk and say to the United States, 'How do you like looking down the end of a gun barrel for a change? Now, let's talk about Berlin and any other subject that I choose, including all your overseas bases.'"McCone had confidence in the logic of his conviction and was prepared to alert the top policy levels. He recognized that he lacked hard evidence, but was convinced that the implications of putting Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba would be so serious for American national security interests that the contingency should be considered as soon as possible.He stood absolutely alone.At noon on August 21, he met with Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson, the Attorney General, Maxwell Taylor, General Lyman Lemnitzer (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff), and McGeorge Bundy to review the Cuban situation. He noted that since their last meeting on Cuba, the CIA had received intelligence indicating an enormous increase in Soviet military support to Cuba. Further, there now were indications of construction work by Soviet personnel, as well as technicians to handle the newly-delivered Soviet equipment. While the nature of the construction remained unknown, McCone warned that it could be missile sites. For, he emphasized, we had to consider the possibility that
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TOP SECRETthe Soviets would install offensive weapons in Cuba.The group proceeded to consider various courses of action open to the United States should the Soviets place MRBMs in Cuba. McCone had a three-part proposal already in hand, calling for 1) an immediate aggressive political action program to awaken Latin America and the Free World; 2) a provocative action against Guantanamo or some other vital American interest, leading to instant United States retaliation; and, 3) immediate commitment of sufficient U.S. military forces to occupy Cuba, destroy the regime, free the people, and establish Cuba as a member of the community of American States. McCone noted that the group was reluctant to consider committing U.S. military forces, however, both because of the magnitude of the task and because of concern about Soviet retaliatory actions elsewhere in the world.Reaching no conclusions on any course of action, the group at length asked McCone to brief the President on the situation. The following day, McCone reported in detail to the President, adding the personal report of De Vosjoli, who had recently visited Cuba. The President, who appeared quite familiar with the situation, expressed concern, but agreed with General Taylor and McCone that policy decisions should wait until the next day, when he would meet with his principal advisers.On August 23, therefore, President Kennedy met with Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and McCone to discuss Cuba. The President requested an analysis of the threat which offensive