Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 136]
13-00000# TOP SECRETsenior officer or any position to be filled that theywould fill it without any hesitation whatsoever." [^1]But, in contrast, Eisemann pointed out:I can't say that was true on the opera-tional side of the shop. A ContingencyTask Force, a program developed by theClandestine Services, was designed tomake available Agency personnel who couldbe pulled out of any position that theywere assigned to and moved into any urgent,.high priority type of project. JMATEProject, was a high priority project; andthe Contingency Task Force concept, in myopinion, failed at that point because theClandestine Services did not provide thetop quality people we needed for the posi-tion to be filled. After JMATE Project ...the Contingency Task Force was completelyabolished. Many people in the Agency weredesignated from the Support and the Opera-tional side to fill various positions asthey would come up, but it didn't work fromthe Clandestine Services side. We had realproblems, trying to get qualified ... topqualified people ... to do those jobs. Inmy opinion, the Contingency Task Force wasa failure. It was set up and designed sothat qualified personnel would be completelyimmunized and processed and ready to go withpassports at any given time. But youcouldn't get the people you wanted -- I'mtalking about qualified key professionalsin the Clandestine Services -- because theDivision heads in the Clandestine Serviceswould not release those people. [^2]Dick Drain, who became Chief of Operations forProject JMATE was among the severest of the criticswith reference to the personnel assigned to ProjectJMATE. Pointing to his own case; Drain stated:- 128 -# TOP SECRET[^1]: 116/[^2]: 117/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 137]
13-00000# TOP SECRETI don't mean to be unduly immodest, but really, I didn't have any qualifications for this [WH/4] except that I was there and unemployed -- had no Spanish language whatsoever, and my entire exposure had been punching cows in Arizona in 1940. That doesn't really bring you up much on Latin America and latinos, and any of that ... I had never been on an amphibious operation, and if that was characteristic of my qualifications, it really characterized the whole damned operation ... about which, it seemed to me, there was a good deal of well-meaning hypocrisy. Allen Dulles, always meaning what he said, would say repeatedly, "now, I want the very best people assigned to this project ... there is nothing more important that we are doing than this; and I want directed assignments ... I want people pulled out of tours overseas if necessary, this thing must be manned." Everybody would solemnly nod and, then, much like the case of Vietnam ... humans being humans ... we would tend to get the people that the area Division Chiefs found "excess" -- which normally meant "found insufficient." With many notable exceptions, we did not get the very best people available. 118/Although Drain levelled his broadside at all of the Divisions in the DDP, he was most critical of the Western Hemisphere Division:More of this staffing would have come from WH if there had been more competent people within WH. WH suffered, in my opinion, from a surfeit of ex-FBI officers who had been picked up at the time that the Agency took over from the Bureau in Latin America ... but there were damned few of them that had any particular experience ... One of the main things that plagued me was that I could never- 129 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 138]
13-00000TOP SECRETfigure out, because nobody ever made it clear, where the hell the project stood vis-a-vis WH ... J. C. King never was told, I think for understandable reasons, to what extent he was in it, and to what extent he was not in it. 119/As with other of the principals who were involved in the WH/4 effort, Drain was extremely complimentary of the Support element assigned to WH/4, stating as follows:This is a little ironic, because with Bissell as the DDP, you would have thought that if the directed assignment thing worked anywhere, it should have worked within the DDP. It worked less well there than it did within the DDS. Red White, soldierly like he was, took absolutely sincerely, what the Director said, when he said "I want the very best people assigned to this." So we got Mike King to run the finance, not some stumblebum with garters on his sleeve ... the best finance officer they had. Our logistics support and Bill Eisemann, they were really hand picked by Red White ... The DDS or the DDA, whatever they called it then, deserved very high marks for being uniquely the people to put their back into it. The DDI really wasn't asked; and that was too bad, because we could have used, it seems to me, some input from the DDI. Our own intelligence report structure was not bad. The Chief, FI was a nice old guy, Whedbee; and we had some reports officers who were quite competent in the DDP sense; but the thing was so compart-mented from the DDI, in any event, that the idea of drawing down on DDI talent to get in on this, was not well received. I had suggested it because I had been- 130 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 139]
# TOP SECRETin the DDI and I knew where the talent was. For example, on just such a mundane, but important thing, as topography and geography and beach stuff ... Christ, I well knew from the time that I worked for Lofty Becker ... that there was in old ORR ... in the geographic thing ... Jim [Brammell], ... Otto Guthe ... I mean, they would have been glad to supply people ... and we didn't ask. So you can't say that DDI didn't provide, unless you understand that they didn't provide because they really weren't asked.*[^1]Although the Agency's own personnel assignments have been criticized, the assignment of two of the key military personnel involved in the JMARC operation proved to be quite successful. Col. Jack Hawkins, United States Marine Corps, and Lt. Col. Frank Egan, United States Army, were in charge of the overall PM activity (Hawkins) and the PM training (Egan) for the Cuban exile brigade. Hawkins, who was serving on the Staff of the Marine School at Quantico, Virginia at* Drain's suggestion that the DDI was left completely in the cold during the Bay of Pigs operation overstates the case.. As early as January 1959 there is evidence that Mr. Helms agreed to cut the DDI in on "useful intelligence to which it would be well for the DD/I to have access" from State cable traffic on Cuba being carried over CIA channels. A "massive" study of Cuban telecommunications facilities prepared by ORR in the fall of 1960 led Mr. Bissell to send a memo of commendation for the Communications Branch through the DDI. Obviously the DDI knew something was a-foot. 120a/[^1]: 120/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 140]
TOP SECRETthe time that he was assigned to Project JMARC, hadtaken part in the battles of Bataan and Corregidor;had been taken prisoner with the fall of Corregidor;and escaped from the Japanese prisoner of war campat Davao, Mindanao; and joined the Philippine guerrillaforces, leading raiding parties and harassing attacksagainst the Japanese army in the Philippines. Afterseven months of such activity, he was evacuated bysubmarine from the Philippines in November 1943 andwas awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for theseactions. After returning to the United States foradditional training, in November 1944 Hawkins againreturned to the Pacific area where he was an assistantoperations officer taking part in the assault andcapture of Okinawa. For this service, he received aBronze Star Medal. During the Korean conflict, hewas Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, IstMarines; and he led the Battalion in combat 'duringthe Inchon landing and in subsequent operations inKorea. For his participation in the Inchon-Seoul op-eration, Hawkins had received the Silver Star Medalfor heroism. From March 1956 to the summer of 1959when he entered the Naval War College, Hawkins had- 132 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 141]
TOP SECRETserved as liaison officer with the Amphibious ForcesAtlantic in Norfolk, Virginia -- a pertinent assign-ment for his transfer to Project JMARC.Lt. Col. Egan's military record showed a well-trained infantry officer who had served overseas inthe European Theater during the course of World WarII; an infantry officer including an infantry train-ing officer in much of the period following WorldWar II; and a staff officer in the Special WarfareDivision of the United States Army in 1958, servingwith the Director of Plans, in Washington from 1958to 1960. Immediately prior to his assignment toProject JMATE, Colonel Egan had been on the Operationsand Training Staff of a Joint Support Group, head-quartered in Washington. Egan EOD'd with Project JMATE,27 June 1960, and Hawkins on 29 August of 1960. 121/Both officers received high marks from Mr. Bisselland Jake Esterline, and particularly from Dick Drain,who stated:I thought they [Hawkins and Egan] werefirst rate ... I mean first rate, not com-pared with the jaded World War II memory,but first rate in terms of officers thenserving in the armed forces of the UnitedStates. The Hawkins selection was anexcellent one. I don't myself, know how- 133 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 142]
# TOP SECRETone could have found a better man. People have said ... "Well, the son of a bitch just worked out in the Philippines as a stay behind ... what did he know?" He knew a lot. He had written a book on guerrillas. He was sharp, he was smart, and honest, and not overly ambitious. I am sure that he saw this as a way to further his career, of course. Military men, I think, tend to maximize that more than Agency people. But that was not his motivation -- or his primary motivation. He had around him some really first rate help ... not very high ranking ... but we didn't need an awful lot of high ranking ... we needed some hard workers. Frank Egan, who went down to do the training, was the man that I would have picked. He was probably the most disputable of the bunch because he was pretty volatile. He has been condemned for leading the Cuban manpower to believe that they were going to get more support than he had any right to let them know about. Well, I wasn't there, but I know damned well that if I had been, I would have been priming up the Brigade to do this tough job, not by counseling them as to the difficulty of it ... at least, exclusively ... or, giving them lectures about now you will really have to do this on your own, because you are not going to get one iota of assistance from the armed forces. You don't normally train a group to conduct an operation of this sort by playing on their fears. If, down there at the end of the line -- first in Guatemala and then in Nicaragua -- Egan led them to believe that they were going to get them more help than he had any right to let them know, well, I can understand why that would have happened.* 122/* With reference to Colonel Hawkins, Jake Esterline has noted:(footnote continued on following page)
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 143]
TOP SECRETBy way of illustrating some of the problems encountered in acquiring adequate personnel for the JMATE operation, on the very day that President Eisenhower was approving the anti-Castro program, a memorandum was being sent to the Deputy Director for Plans from the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division noting that two individuals assigned to the Office of Training were urgently needed for service in WH/4. Colonel King reported to the DDP that although Colonel Matt Baird, Director of Training, was agreeable to the release of the two individuals to serve as PM trainers, Baird insisted that the men could not beI guess that it is only fair to say that that assignment [Project JMARC] cost him his general's star, and a good many other things in terms of his record. 123/The author of this history attempted to arrange oral history interviews with Colonels Hawkins and Egan, but in neither case would the individuals consent to such interview. In addition, the author also asked each man if he would be willing to respond to a series of written questions, and neither would agree to this. It was made quite clear to the author that both individuals harbored considerable resentment about their relationships and association with the Agency at the time of the Bay of Pigs. In a similar manner, Col. John F. Mallard, United States Marine Corps who was Liaison Officer between the Agency and the Department of Defense, at the time of the Bay of Pigs, also rejected the author's request for either an oral interview or a response to written questions.TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 144]
# TOP SECRETreleased until suitable replacements could be found to take over their tasks in the Office of Training. King, therefore, appealed to the Deputy Director for Plans for their immediate release. [^1]Not only did the Clandestine Service encounter difficulty in obtaining personnel from within its own units to serve in WH/4, it also appeared to draw blanks in terms of Cubans willing to volunteer for the struggle against Castro. In response to a November 1959 memorandum to all WH field stations and bases asking that they supply the names of Cubans who would be willing to work as agents against the Castro Government, WH/4/FI reported the results of its search, stating that as of June 1960:Many of the Agents who were proposed by other WH Stations for use in Cuba were either found unacceptable, or did not want to accept such an assignment. Other stations were unable to come up with any assets who might gain access to the desired targets in Cuba. [^2]The problem which Col. Baird had raised back in March concerning replacement for personnel who might be assigned to Project WH/4 was not actually resolved until June of 1960 when:Colonel White announced that DDS personnel on full time detail to JMARC- 136 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 124/[^2]: 125/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 145]
TOP SECRETwould be transferred to the project Tableof Organization, effective the beginningof the first pay period in July 1960.Employees on detail to the project fromthe Clandestine Services offices will notbe transferred since DDP considers themtemporary assignments with the personnelreturning to their parent office when theproject is completed. Colonel Whitepointed out, that although DDS personnelwould be transferred to the project, there-by relieving slots in the various DDS ele-ments, each office head should keep inmind that his employees will be returningto him, and he should plan accordingly.[^1]Colonel White's comments are quite understandablein view of the fact that of 104 personnel on duty withJMATE on 7-8 June 1960, only 32 were Clandestine Serv-ices careerists; and excepting a few with DDI careerdesignations, the bulk of the personnel were Supportcareerists. By 14 June 1960, Colonel King was appeal-ing to the DDP for an increment which would bringtotal JMATE personnel to 234, including 131 employeeswho were to be in the field. Apparently, however,the Deputy Director for Plans approved a total ceilingof only 158 staff personnel by the end of June 1960;and in August of 1960, Chief, WH Division forwardeda revised staffing guide, calling for a total of 274positions and requesting that "as soon after 15 Augustas is possible, a total of 40 additional staff personnel"- 137 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 126/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 146]
# TOP SECRETbe added to the 158 who were then on duty -- making a new total of 198.Although Mr. Bissell approved the recommended increment, he nonetheless wrote a memorandum to C. Tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A, suggesting that Barnes and Dick Helms (surprisingly) take a close look at the JMATE staffing pattern to see if there were areas of duplication, particularly between the field bases and Headquarters. The DDP suggested that in the areas of FI and PM there might be slots in either the Forward Operations Base in Miami or in JMOARSMAN -- the Panama Training Site -- where possibly the staffs could be transferred during slack periods to conduct similar operations in other parts of the JMATE operation.* [^1][^1]: * Lest the reader be confused by the term "Forward Operations Base," this was the JMWAVE activity in the Miami area, which continued to operate subsequent to the Bay of Pigs. At the same time that the Bay of Pigs operation was getting under way, there was considerable emphasis from various individuals in Headquarters for establishment of a "Forward Command Post," which also might be located in the Miami area, possibly in the communications complex. Some even suggested the possibility of establishing a sub-command post in a third country. In any event, no Forward Command Post was established. 128/- 138 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 147]
TOP SECRETBy early November 1960, as the concept of the operation was shifting from one of guerrilla warfare and infiltration to invasion, the staffing pattern for WH/4 was again increased. Mr. Bissell authorizing a total of 308 positions. Even as he signed the approval, however, Mr. Bissell noted his reservations, saying:I have signed this request to indicate my approval, but do so with a good deal of concern. I realize that this is a very major and top priority activity and I also realize that the senior officers engaged in it continue to be heavily overworked. On the other hand, I am fearful that the addition of large numbers of personnel will not in fact reduce the load on those individuals who are most overworked, but may instead create additional burdens of management without contributing significantly to the success of the underlying activities. I am concerned also that we may be simply running out of suitable people in the Agency in certain categories. Accordingly, I urge you to re-examine even the double-starred positions in the staffing guide submitted with your request to see whether they are all in fact of a high order of essentiality.*[^1]* Much of the staffing problem, of course, traces back to the failure of the DDP to insure early on that only the best people be assigned to the WH/4 project. As early as August of 1960, it had been indicated that the DDP might be leaning toward the use of directed assignments, but nothing ever came of this. [^2][^1]: 129/[^2]: 130/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 148]
13-00000TOP SECRETEven before Mr. Bissell's memorandum of earlyNovember 1960, indicating the possibility that expertsin certain areas might no longer be available fromwithin the Agency, proposals had gone forward request-ing permission for the use of American contract person-nel in the maritime operations. Unlike the brouhahathat was precipitated by the early suggestions for theuse of American volunteers from the ground forces,the authorization for the use of US contracts in mari-time activities apparently was granted without muchdebate. The statement of the requirements for theuse of the US contracts indicated that US citizenswould be put under contract to act not only as trainersfor the crews of LCI'S, LCU'S, LCVP's, and SK's, butalso, that they would serve in key positionsas LCI captains, LCI diesel engineers, andLCU coxwains during training and operations,where qualified Cubans cannot be obtained.This would require their entering Cubancoastal waters and, on occasions, touchingon Cuban beaches, when operations so re-quire.It is essential for operations thatthese key positions be held by qualifiedand dependable men. At this time, it isnot expected that Cuban trainees qualifiedfor such positions or possessing thenecessary aptitude and character to permitsuccessful training will be found. If- 140 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 149]
# TOP SECRETthey are located, the use of U.S. contract personnel will correspondingly be cut down. Staff personnel will assist in the training of all crews but will not be used in operations. [^1]Not only were such contract employees authorized,but by early November 1960 a cable from Headquarters to the Forward Operations Base noted:In view degree risk involved rendezvous-type mission request Case Officer advise all Maritime contract personnel bonus this type mission be hereafter $100.00. Bonus for Cuban territory beach landings or caching would remain $500.00. [^2]By the early fall of 1960, the question of rotation of staff personnel for Project JMATE had become a serious matter. Many of those who had initially joined the project had come in on 90-day rotation periods, and in a cable to Headquarters, Ernie Sparks, the overall Liaison Officer for Project JMATE for COS Guatemala, requested that Headquarters approve a rotational plan since:Most personnel adjusted family and business problems to period they told they be absent and fact they on duty seven days a week as well as being confined to training areas which lack recreation facilities. [^3]Bill Eisemann, who was Chief of Support for WH/4, was particularly critical of the 90-day TDY assignments, saying:- 141 -# TOP SECRET[^1]: 131/[^2]: 132/[^3]: 133/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 150]
13-00000# TOP SECRETThey [the DDP] would bring a man in, and then another man would come in to replace him. It was really a tremendous task to keep up with it, because a lot of these people had personal problems. In some cases they would cable and request release from their assignment for personal reasons. We attempted to satisfy most of these requests. Herb Juul was the assigned Personnel Officer within the project. He had to constantly keep a check on the location of our personnel, and when their time was up for replacement, he would then visit with the Clandestine Services, and also the Support components, and give them a listing of the names of potential TDY returnees.The Support components and Clandestine Services then provided names of people who would be replacements. That was a hell of a task, now, believe me. When you have a full time project running 15 months or more, you have people returning on a 90 day basis, and constantly being replaced ... you can't expect the greatest efficiency in operations. 134/- 142 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 151]
TOP SECRET## Part III### Changing ConceptsIt has already been pointed out that the initial planning for paramilitary operations against Castro was to be based on extremely small units. Two or three man units, including a communicator, would be trained and infiltrated (or dropped) into Cuba to work with a dissident group. One trainer would be the adviser for the types of guerrilla warfare activities which the anti-Castro dissidents might undertake safely and reasonably securely. There had been some signs of dissatisfaction with this particular type of program prior to the summer of 1960. By the late summer of 1960 and through the fall there was to be a complete and radical shift in the concept of the paramilitary operations in which the forces backed by CIA should engage. In late August-September, there were some clues that changes in the nature of operations were being contemplated. During the last week of August and in the initial week of September 1960, Savilion Chapman claimed that he and a Col. Evans, Acting Chief, PMG/DDP, were "briefed by WH/4 planners on the- 143 -TOP SECRET