Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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3. Revised January Peripheral Reconnaissance Schedule.The JRC paper dated 8 January 1964 was approved as amended. No change was made in the following BOX TOP missions: Jane, Paula, Ruby, Eric, Marvin, Frank, Dwight, Lloyd, Karl, Everett, and Hugh. Operations Cliff and Alf were amended resulting in the cancellation of Operation Cliff. Mission Calvin's track was changed permitting it to approach the Latvian coast no closer than 25 nautical miles rather than 20 miles as originally proposed.Mr. McCone raised the question of the increasing number of flights authorized by the JRC. Colonel Steakley said that the number of supporting flights required for every reconnaissance platform was largely responsible for the increase. He also pointed out that there is currently a review of COMOR requirements for Cuba being prepared to determine whether they can be eased in order to permit a considerably lessened operational schedule.4. Monthly Report No. 12 on North Vietnam.This report was noted by the Special Group![Signature of Paul Eckel]Paul EckelDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McCone
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13-0000031 January 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUPSUBJECT: Proposed Cuban Operations for February 1964Special Group members approved by telephone the following infiltration/exfiltration operations proposed for February:Numbers 411, 415, 421, 422, 423, 425, 3121, and 3126.Operations involving sabotage (Numbers 414, 424, 3111, and 3112) were not considered by Group members pending an overall review of Cuban operations, now completed but not yet studied.Peter JessupDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. VanceMr. McCone
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# SECRET EYES ONLYMSCFile14 February 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 13 February 1964PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.General Maxwell D. Taylor, Mr. Thomas A. Mann, and Mr. Desmond FitzGerald were present for Item 1.Lt. General Marshall A. Carter was present for Items 1 and 2.1. Cuba - Covert Activities.A lengthy discussion took place on covert action potential to weaken the Castro regime. The first part of the discussion constituted an exchange of opinion of a general nature.The following points were emphasized: Continued covert action received support although divergence on the level of activity was registered. There was a consensus that the present level of operations was no longer effective in attaining the basic objective of toppling Castro but harassment might keep the regime off balance. There was an area of disagreement on proofs of effectiveness of current and past measures.Mr. Bundy summarized the dilemma by noting that the high risk, dangerous operations are the rewarding ones and the low noise, innocuous operations prove to be unrewarding.Mr. Mann emphasized that considerably more homework had to be completed before the next OAS meeting (presently unscheduled). Mr. Bundy indicated that a Cabinet level meeting with higher authority would have to be held eventually to determine how far the United States was willing to go. Mr. Bundy turned the discussion to the specific Department of Defense paper.On Sabotage, Mr. Vance stated that he could speak for the Secretary of Defense; his attitude had turned to a harder line.On Harassment of Free World Shipping to Cuba, paragraph 2.a. was considered work in progress. On paragraph 2.b. the attitude was negative, particularly as to ships of other than Cuban flag.# SECRET EYES ONLY
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13-00000# SECRET-2LYOn Covert Economic Activities, paragraph 3.a. is part of the present program. Paragraphs 3.b. and c. are part of an overall blacklisting problem which remains to be explored.On Encouraging Dissidence Among Factions, the consensus was to intensify these activities.Actions against Cuban Subversion in Latin America, paragraphs 1 and 2: A good look should be taken at this type of activity and a determination should be made on a country-by-country and case-by-case basis.On the last paragraph of the paper, it was decided that these efforts constitute work in progress with the exception of shipping surveillance which is under active study by the Department of Defense. A paper on this problem will be ready next week. It was understood that this was an expression of members' opinion on types of action but that specific operational proposals would be submitted to the Special Group as heretofore.Mr. Bundy then asked Mr. Mann to prepare papers covering the major issues of Caribbean surveillance, the blacklisting of firms trading with Havana, covert actions, and types of retaliation.2. Review ProgramsOn the review programs for Japan, France, Tibet, Taiwan, and China, it was agreed that the papers as prepared were the most useful way to present the material to members. Mr. Vance indicated he had a number of questions in depth but that he would not take the time at this meeting. Mr. McCone then directed that the area specialists would be made available at Mr. Vance's con- venience to answer any questions he might have. Mr. Bundy concluded that since a time factor was not involved, formal approval of these papers could be made at a future meeting. Mr. Johnson remarked that State had already registered its approval.![signature]Peter JessurDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. VanceMr. McCone
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13-0000024 February 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 20 February 1964PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.> The "Proposed Covert Funding of the Somali Parliamentary> Elections" was approved by the Special Group.The previously considered review program papers on France,Japan, Tibet, Taiwan, and China also were approved.The minutes of the Special Group meeting of 13 February 1964were modified at the request of Mr. Vance in the following context:In paragraph one under "Cuba - Covert Activities," subheadingSabotage, the phrase "he fully supported the paper under discussion"has been substituted for "his attitude had turned to a harder line."![signature of Peter Jessup]Peter JessupDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. VanceMr. McConeSee Special Minutesfor additional item![illegible text]
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28 February 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 27 February 1964PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.Mr. Bruce Cheever was also present for Item 1.1. CubaThe Special Group approved the following infiltration/exfiltration and/or caching and resupply operations: Numbers 411, 3121, 415, 422, 431, 3126, 432, 423, 416, 433, 434, and 3122, with the proviso that in regard to Number 434, a double agent operation, the cache would contain money and medicine but no weapons in case the Cubans decide to terminate the operation and publicize the cache.The four sabotage missions, specifically Numbers 414, 3111, 424, and 3119, were again placed in abeyance pending eventual resolution by higher authority of the entire problem of higher noise level operations.2. KenyaThe Political Action Operation on Kenya was approved without discussion.Peter JessupDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. VanceMr. McConePlease see special minute for additional items.
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13-000003 April 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group, 2 April 1964PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.Mr. Desmond FitzGerald was present for Items 1 and 2.Mr. John Waller was present for Item 3.Colonel Ralph D. Steakley was present for Item 4.1. Cuba - Proposed Operations during April 1964.In discussing the proposed Cuban operations for the month of April 1964 and three separate papers submitted to all members for noting, the following conclusions were reached: The five infiltration/exfiltration operations were approved as were the five caching operations. However, the five sabotage proposals were tabled.Referring to the paper entitled, "Status of Sabotage and Raiding Capability against Cuba," Mr. FitzGerald emphasized the economic and morale aspects of maintaining this potential and the influences of deterioration when it remains in stand-by status. Mr. Bundy then stated that the time was overdue for submitting to higher authority the entire question of covert operations against Cuba. The problem of autonomous exile groups and their potential for conducting operations on their own and the momentum of these groups even if support should be cut off was also discussed. It was clear that the groups headed by Artime and Ray constitute a considerable threat.Mr. Bundy indicated that next week he would call a meeting with higher authority and the Secretaries of Defense and State. Mr. FitzGerald would outline the current status of operations against Cuba, and it was hoped that definite policy lines could be determined for future covert activity against Castro.2. Chile - Support for Chilean Presidential Elections of 4 September 1964.The paper, "Support for Chilean Presidential Elections," was approved. Mr. FitzGerald announced that a solution to the slight difference of opinion between Ambassador Cole and the CAS in SantiagoPlease see special minute for additional items.
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-2-98had been reached and that attribution of U.S. support would beinferred but there should be no evidence of proof. Mr. FitzGeraldindicated that this was operationally feasible.3. Zanzibar - Proposed Political ActionThe paper on Proposed Political Action in Zanzibar wasapproved. Mr. Waller gave a short briefing on the operationalclimate which emphasized the cooperative attitude of the Britishservices and the growing likelihood that Jomo Kenyatta could bepersuaded to support the West more actively.4. JRC Monthly Reconnaissance Forecast.98The JRC Monthly Reconnaissance Forecast for April 1964 wasapproved.![signature of Peter Jessup]Peter JessupDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. VanceMr. McCone
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SECRET23[BYE 2656-64]28 APR 1964Series B, Copy!MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central IntelligenceSUBJECT: Overflight of Cuba on 1 May1. Although it may, in fact, have little substance, the thought occurs that if Castro is seriously considering a "shoot-down" of a U-2, from a propaganda standpoint he could not select a better time than 1 May, the traditional Communist holiday, and more significantly the Fourth Anniversary of the "infamous" Francis Gary Powers incident.2. From a psychological viewpoint, identification of a new U-2 shoot-down with that incident on May Day four years ago might have considerable appeal to Fidel and might conceivably influence his judgment in reaching a determination to take such action.3. Recognizing that this association is rather tenuous, it might still be worth considering a stand-down of U-2 overflights on that one day. This would not seriously impair our intelligence effort and it would deprive Castro of the opportunity to exploit this rather unique circumstance should he have any inclination to do so. OK?JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.Deputy Assistant Director(Special Activities)SECRET
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EYES ONLY1 May 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group, 30 April 1964PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Hughes, General Carter Mr. Vance,/and Mr. McCone.Colonel J. C. King and Assistant Secretary of State Mann were present for Item 1.Mr. Bruce Cheever and Mr. Theodore Shackley were present for Item 2. Assistant Secretary Mann was also present for Item 2.1. The Chilean Situationa. During a 35-minute discussion of the 4 September Chilean election, Assistant Secretary of State Mann and Colonel J.C. King outlined some of the problems and prospects for the Frei candidacy. Colonel King, who had recently returned from Santiago, outlined some of the covert efforts planned or underway which included financial support to Frei, Italian CDU assistance, emphasis on the woman's vote, Catholic and labor union assistance, fragmentizing the opposition Socialist party, distribution of propaganda, and possible assistance from long-standing United States industrial interests.b. Some of the obstacles faced by the democratic forces were underscored: the strong Chilean anti-clerical tradition, the unimpeded rise in the cost of living, the formidable outside support being afforded Allende, the political apathy of the military and the third man candidacy of Duran.c. The Special Group decided: (a) that contact should be made with Ambassador Cole to urge his return for a visit in the coming weeks, (b) that talks with American business interests should proceed to determine the amount and method of their support, and (c) It was further decided that higher authority would be apprised of the closeness and importance of this Chilean election and that the Group itself would continue to review the problem in the coming weeks.2. The Current Cuban Operational Climate and the Proposed Operations for May 1964.a. A 25-minute briefing was provided on Cuban operations by the Chief of CAS, Miami, Mr. Theodore Shackley. He gave a thorough summary of the policy framework in which programs have been established and provided detail on the techniques used to accomplish these missions. He enumerated successes achieved to date and indicated the types of difficulty encountered.
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13-00000EYES ONLYThe briefing was well received and members expressed the opinion that the session had been extremely useful.b. The Special Group approved the proposed infiltration/ exfiltration operations into Cuba during May 1964.3. Recruitment of Chinat Personnel for Maritime Operations of 34-A.a. On the proposal to recruit Chinat personnel for maritime operations of 34-A, Mr. Vance and Mr. McCone were in favor and felt that enactment of the maritime program was long overdue. It was noted that the Ambassador had already registered approval. State, however, requested that the matter be held in abeyance until the return from Ottawa on 1 May of Alexis Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk. Mr. Hughes felt that the introduction of additional Chinese Nationalists into this theatre was not in accordance with existing policy. Mr. Bundy was of the opinion that the proposed temporary introduction of 64 persons for sea operations was not a significant number.b. As the minutes were going to press on 1 May, the Secretary of the Special Group was informed by telephone that State Department agreement was obtained with the following proviso: That an intensive and high priority effort on training of South Vietnam Nationals be undertaken as rapidly as possible "for future maritime operations."4. Action 29 - OPLAN 34-AAction 29, OPLAN 34-a, proposed by DOD was disapproved.5. Monthly Forecastsa. The NRO Monthly Forecast for May 1964 was approved.b. The JRC Monthly Forecast for May 1964 was approved.![signature of Peter Jessup]Peter JessupDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. VanceMr. McConeEYES ONLY.
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# FROM THE COORDINATOR OF CUBAN AFFAIRS# TO THE SPECIAL GROUP6 JANASUBJECT: Standby Capability for the Launching of Propaganda Leaflet Balloons1. The purpose of this memorandum is to present for your consideration and approval, a proposal to modify the current status of the CIA propaganda balloon launching capability. If approved, CIA proposes to cease the rental of helium and tanks, which will mean that if utilization of the capability is desired, either Department of Defense will have to provide the helium or it will have to be commercially procured at the time. These alternates are considered acceptable.2. BACKGROUND: In the fall of 1962 the CIA as part of the MONGOOSE program, as approved by the Special Group (Augmented), developed a covert capability for the launching of propaganda leaflet balloons targetted against Cuba. The capability consisted of a properly outfitted merchant vessel, ostensibly chartered and operated by Cuban exiles. In December 1962 and in the early months of 1963, several proposals were made by the CIA to utilize this capability
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but each time they were tabled for further consideration. In April 1963 a specific proposal to launch propaganda balloons on May Day 1963 was submitted to the Special Group and on 9 April 1953, the proposal was disapproved by higher authority (see Memorandum for Members of the Special Group from Mr. Thomas Parrott, dated 9 April 1963). In view of the prevailing situation, the CIA proposed to dismantle the capability as it was expensive to maintain and its security was sure to deteriorate. However, at the 18 April 1963 meeting of the Special Group, several members of the Group felt that in a crisis such a capability might be useful and it was agreed the CIA would stockpile the balloons, helium and other equipment and be prepared to mount operations as required utilizing U.S. Navy or other vessels and crews, to be provided by the Department of Defense. (See Minutes of 18 April 1963 Meeting of the Special Group.) In accordance with this directive, the CIA has stored the required equipment and has been keeping helium on hand on a rental basis.3. The annual expense for maintaining this capability on a standby basis has been approximately $30,000 of which [$18,500] has been for the rental of helium tanks and compressor. A review of the capability leads the CIA to the
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3conclusion that the capability can be maintained at anacceptable degree of readiness without having the heliumtanks on hand. In the event utilization is desired, theDepartment of Defense would be able to provide the heliumas well as the launching vessels and crews or if necessary,helium could be commercially procured within the timefactor necessary to ready the other components of thesystem. The CIA therefore proposes to terminate itscurrent arrangements for the rental of the helium tanksand compressor.4. It is requested that approval be granted for the   CIA to proceed, as outlined in paragraph 2 above, with the   termination of rental contracts for helium tanks and con-   pressor.
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# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 4 June 1964PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.1. ItalyAt the request of Mr. McCone, the paper on the covert action program in Italy for FY-1965 was deferred until he had time to study it more carefully.2. NSAM 303NSAM 303 was circulated and the new designation for the Special Group 5412, the 303 Committee, was noted.3. North Vietnama. The DOD paper dated 19 May 1964 entitled "North Vietnam Operations" was discussed at some length.b. Each annex of the paper was noted. In Annex A, Physical Destruction Target List, the members concurred in Mr. Vance's recommendation to accept all targets with the exceptions of 1, 5, and 7. Target 5 was bracketed with Nos. 14 and 15 in Annex B and is subject to the same treatment indicated below.c. In Annex B, Psychological Operations, the listed targets were approved except that Nos. 14 and 15 were to be examined further by DOD and CLA on the operational level. Mr. McCone stated that in regard to the Meo tribesmen (No. 14) this had been a CIA operation for some months and should be continued to be handled in the same way. He further felt that tribal operations of this type should be done covertly.d. In regard to Annex C, Intelligence Operations, the targets 1, 2, and 3 were approved and the Committee agreed to Mr. Vance's veto of target 4.See Special Minute for Additional Item
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4. CubaThis minute also notes the telephonic approval obtained from all members on 30 May for a single emergency exfiltration operation in and out of Cuba scheduled for early June.Peter JessupDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. VanceMr. McCone
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# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 18 June 1964PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance, Mr. Johnson.Mr. Mann and Mr. FitzGerald were also present.A general discussion was held on problems arising from increased activities on the part of organized Cuban emigre groups, independent adventurers, purported plots to assassinate Castro and the general edginess and instability on the island.None of those present appeared to feel that it was either realistic or practical to sever connections with or to withdraw support from the two principal emigre organizations, those of Artime and Ray.The recent escapades and overall capabilities of Manolo Ray were deplored but it was agreed first: that steps should be taken to get the Puerto Rican authorities to release his ship; second: that he should be promptly advised in accordance with the stated policy established by the late President to cease forthwith all activities from the United States Mainland and find himself a new base of operations; third: no monies would be forthcoming, specifically a requested $25,000, until point two above has been accomplished. No help was to be offered in finding Ray a new Caribbean base. Mr. Mann was particularly interested that Ray not be encouraged to transfer to the Dominican Republic because of the fragility of the regime.The next subject discussed was the recent visit of Major Oliva to both the Attorney General and Assistant Secretary Mann. It was pointed out that Oliva is both a zealot and a man of integrity and that his only interest in life is leading a return to his homeland. Any attempts to put Oliva into business would be expensive and undesirable at this time. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would ask the Attorney General if he would be willing to dampen Cliva's ardor.The activities of Artime from Nicaragua were discussed next. Alexis Johnson pointed out that Artime raids could conceivably provoke Castro into utilizing Cuban SAM sites; he said this possibility should not be discounted. But it was also pointed out that Artime's recent sugar mill raid succeeded in leading Castro to mobilize many persons involved in important sugar harvesting and thus constituted a successful economic warfare byproduct.
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SECRETEVES OULY-2-It was estimated that Artime's schedule of one operation per month was overly optimistic; one every three months was about all Artime could accomplish. The decision was to drive home to Artime that his greatest value was not in hazardous hit-and-run actions but in his survival as a continuing psychological threat in being.Mr. FitzGerald, in discussing the current situation in Cuba, stated that he believed the regime was in considerable difficulty. There has been a large increase in the number of executions and mass arrests. He also cited the fact that an entire CIA Pinar del Rio net has been rolled up by Castro's security forces and the key man executed. The sugar and crop prospects were not good, the world price having dropped. Some of the members were surprised at this picture and stated it did not seem to conform to the daily bulletins. Mr. McCone said that he would ask for a SNIE on the current situation in Castro Cuba.A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the matter further. Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement.Peter JessupDistribution:Mr. JohnsonMr. VanceMr. McCone