Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 31]
TOP SECRETduty of the PSP was to work toward unity and overcome the counterrevolutionaries. [^1]In a Special NIE of 30 June 1959 on *The Situation in the Caribbean through 1959*, the intelligence community again indicated that the internal situation in Cuba had not been decided. The SNIE commented:The Communists probably do not now control Castro, but they are in a position to exert influence in his regime, and to carry on further organizational work. [^2]Through the summer and into the early fall of 1959, the degree of Castro's commitment to Communism continued to be a major subject of discussion within the intelligence community; and in the weekly reporting that was begun by COS Havana in early June, this topic continually occurred. In August 1959, when the Deputy Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, Rudolph Gomez, assisted Leo Churn in the preparation of an "Urgent Report on Cuba" for distribution to members of the Research Institute of America, Castro's Communist association was prominently featured. At this time, and reflecting the views of both Western Hemisphere Division and the Department of State with whom Gomez had coordinated the paper, Fidel Castro was not- 23 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 37/[^2]: 38/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 32]
TOP SECRETconsidered to be a Communist. His brother Raul Castro,however, was clearly identified as a hard-core Com-munist.*[^39]The internal problem to which Anibal Escalantehad referred in mid-summer came to a head in mid-October 1959 when Hubert Matos, a military leader inCamaguey Province and formerly a strong supporter ofCastro, broke with Fidel over the increasing numberof leadership positions which were being turned overto members of the Communist oriented PSP rather thanto members of the 26 July Movement. Matos resignedas military leader of Camaguey on 19 October 1959 andwas arrested on 20 October. During the months priorto his trial in December 1959, when he was found guiltyof treason and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, a[^39]: * In view of the trend of recent years, it is interesting to note that the Chuẩn report found reason to be somewhat critical of the Senate Internal Security Committee (Sen. Eastland's Committee) for getting involved in matters which were principally of concern to the intelligence community. In this case, the Senate Committee was criticized specifically for taking Diaz Lanz, the head of Castro's Air Force who had defected, and questioning him before turning him over to the intelligence agencies for initial interrogation.TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 33]
# TOP SECRETnumber of others who had been prominent anti-Batistianos also broke with Castro. Among these were Faustino Perez, Minister for Recovery of Illegally Acquired Property; Rufo López-Fresquet, Minister of Finance; Manuel Ray, Minister of Public Works; and Felipe Pazos, head of the National Bank who was removed by Castro and replaced by Che Guevera, whose expertise was in revolution not in banking. As Theodore Draper has said, this was the second civil war for Castro. [^40]Coincidental to the internal squabble that led to Matos's resignation, the Deputy Chief of WH Division, Rudy Gomez, was in Havana (15-18 October 1959) promoting an increase in Station efforts to penetrate the PSP. In the course of this tour, the qualifications of the best of the agents who might conduct this penetration were reviewed with CÒS Havana and Station personnel. Gomez also pointed out that the anti-Communist efforts in Havana should not be limited to those who were FI or PP designees, but everyone in the Station was urged to take advantage of opportunities to push into the Partido Socialista Popular. In reporting on his visit with COS Havana, Gomez noted that-- 25 --# TOP SECRET[^40]: missing content
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 34]
13-00000TOP SECRETthe Ambassador and other members of the AmericanEmbassy in Havana also were very much interested inthe program being advanced; and, in fact, asked Gomezif CIA could "send a qualified Communist expert toHavana to indoctrinate appropriate Embassy officerson Communist doctrines, particularly on their modusoperandi and how Communists working under cover couldbe recognized." Upon his return Gomez received J. C.King's approval to comply with this request.*[^41]Even as Gomez was promising State's representa-tives in Havana assistance in understanding Communistactivities, J. C. King, Chief of Western HemisphereDivision, was going forward to the Director of CentralIntelligence with a memorandum complaining about theDepartment of State's failure to provide CIA with apolicy action paper on Cuba -- a paper which, accord-ing to King, had been promised as early as May 1959,yet had not been received by the end of October. Norwas there any indication when such paper might be* It would appear from this request that both the DDP  and State were remiss in the training of their overseas  personnel. That the Station had to request Headquarters  for support on such an issue is difficult to imagine.- 26 -TOP SECRET[^41]:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 35]
TOP SECRETexpected, despite numerous meetings with Department representatives. King also was particularly critical of the fact that Ambassador Bonsal had been called to Washington on two occasions, but in neither instance had he called on the Agency for consultation -- this despite the fact that there had been indications from the Department that such consultations were to be held. [^42]The ambivalence regarding Castro's relation to the Communist Party was illustrated by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on 5 November 1959 in testifying at the hearings of the Judiciary SubCommittee which was investigating the "Communist Threat to the US through the Caribbean." In response to the question of whether Fidel was a Communist, General C. P. Cabell stated:Our information shows that the Cuban Communists do not consider him a Communist Party member or even a pro-Communist. On the other hand, they are delighted with the nature of his government, which was allowed the Communists opportunity -- free opportunity -- to organize, to propagandize, and to infiltrate. We know the Communists consider Castro a representative of the bourgeoise ... Our conclusion, therefore, is that Fidel Castro is not a Communist, however, he certainly is not anti-Communist. [^43]In an attempt to resolve, at least part of the dilemma a Related Mission Directive was approved on- 27-TOP SECRET[^42]: [^43]:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 36]
TOP SECRET6 November 1959 and "would remain in effect until further notice." The RMD stated in part as follows:For the moment, CIA operations should be carried out on the assumption that the revolutionary government is basically non-Communist, with legitimate reform goals that deserve US respect and support. Covert operations should support overt efforts to arrive at a rapprochement with the present government and to eliminate the conditions described above without resorting to forceful means.If it should be established that the Cuban government is Communist-led or Communist-dominated, or if that government cannot be swayed from adopting measures which intentionally or unintentionally accomplish Communist objectives, the question of direct attacks against Castro will be re-examined. In planning for such a contingency, each existing or new asset should be evaluated in terms of possible future utility from a paramilitary point of view, nor will the development or recruitment of assets be precluded merely because they lack a paramilitary capability. Under no circumstances would any asset be apprised of this contingency planning. In fact, any disposition to undertake violent action should be promptly and emphatically discouraged pending a change in policy at the policy-making level. 44/Even as the RMD was being dispatched to the field, another and more significant program was being evolved in Headquarters. On 11 December 1959, J. C. King, Chief, WH Division prepared a memorandum for the- 28 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 37]
TOP SECRETDirector of Central Intelligence, through the DeputyDirector of Plans, forwarding a program having as itsspecific objective "The overthrow of Castro withinone year, and his replacement by a junta friendly tothe United States which will call for elections 6months after assumption of office." To achieve thisobjective, Chief, WH/D put forward a program, to in-clude among other items the following:1. Clandestine radio attacks on Cuba,   from liberal Caribbean countries.2. Intrusion operations against Castro's   TV and radio, to be mounted from within Cuba.3. Formation of pro-US opposition groups   to establish by force a controlled area   within Cuba.Colonel King then went on to suggest that:Thorough consideration be given to theelimination of Fidel Castro. None of thoseclose to Fidel, such as his brother Raulor his companion Che Guevarra *[sic]*, havethe same mesmeric appeal to the masses.Many informed people believe that thedisappearance of Fidel would greatly ac-celerate the fall of the present govern-ment.* 45/* The reader's attention is drawn to Appendix A (see  page 296) which reproduces the original 11 December  1959 J. C. King memorandum to the DCI. In light of  subsequent investigations, hearings, and publicity  regarding the Agency's complicity in assassination  (footnote continued on following page)TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 38]
# TOP SECRETAs 1959 drew to a close, a final Special NationalIntelligence Estimate, "The Situation in the Caribbeanthrough 1960," indicated that Castro was in to stay,despite internal difficulties. The SNIE saw no seriousthreat to Castro's continued rule, and it pointed outthat if there was direct US intervention, "Most Cubansincluding the military, would react violently." 46/As 1960 began, General Cabell, the Deputy Direc-tor of Central Intelligence, held a joint briefingplots aimed at Fidel Castro and others, pages 2 and 3of Appendix A show two significant corrections in AllenDulles's own handwriting to the text submitted by Col.King. In paragraph 3d, the phrase "thorough consider-ation be given to the *elimination* of Fidel Castro"carries Dulles's pencilled correction making the textread "removal from Cuba" rather than "elimination."At a later point in the same paragraph theoriginal text said "many informed people believe thatthe *disappearance* of Fidel would greatly acceleratethe fall of the present government". Mr. Dulles hassubstituted the word "removal" for the word "disappear-ance." These significant changes in the text on theoriginal copy of King's memorandum -- which the authorhas recovered -- support the contention that the authorhas made in the Foreword to this Volume that the com-ponent (WH/4) officially charged with the conduct ofthe Agency's anti-Castro program was neither chargedwith nor responsible for programs designed to assas-sinate Castro in the course of the Bay of Pigs Opera-tion. Colonel King's memorandum of 11 December 1959,with the pencilled corrections noted above, was con-curred in by Richard M. Bissell and approved by AllenW. Dulles on 12 December 1959.-- 30 --# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 39]
# TOP SECRET(8 January 1960) on Cuba for the Department of Stateand the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He reviewed the in-creasing hold that the Communist idealogy and thoseaffiliated with the Communist Party were exertingthe Castro government. At this time, the DDCI alsodiscussed the need for increased covert and semi-covert programs aimed at Castro -- psychological war-fare, political action, economic action, and para-military action, all of which had been conducted insome degree during the past year. [^47] This 8 January1960 briefing can be used to denote the beginning ofthe serious anti-Castro programs by Central Intelli-gence Agency which would culminate at the Bay of Pigs.-- 31 --TOP SECRET[^47]: The footnote number is 47.
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 40]
TOP SECRETPart IICastro Must GoA. Organizing for Covert Action (January-March 1960)The first mention of a formal Agency structure to deal with the matter of Fidel Castro was noted by Colonel L. K. White, then Deputy Director for Support, in reporting on the DCI's morning meeting of 8 January 1960. White's diary noted:There was considerable discussion of the situation in Cuba, and the Director requested Dick Bissell to organize a special task force to insure that we were attacking this situation from all possible angles. [^1]The instruction was taken to heart, for on 18 January 1960 the WH Division organized Branch 4 (WH/4) as an expandable task force to run the proposed Cuban Operations. The initial Table of Organization totaled 40 persons, with 18 at Headquarters, 20 at Havana Station, and 2 at Santiago Base. [^2]Named to head the new Branch in Western Hemisphere Division, was Jacob D. Esterline, recently returned COS, Caracas, Venezuela, and formerly one of the principals-- 32 --TOP SECRET[^1]: [^2]:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 41]
TOP SECRETin Project PBSUCCESS, the operation which had resultedin the overthrow of the Communist-dominated governmentof Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Esterline wasthe choice of J. C. King, Chief, WH Division; and tothe best of Esterline's recollection, toward the endof his two year tour in Venezuela he had been queriedby King about remaining in Venezuela or coming backto Headquarters to work on the Cuban problem. It wasshortly after his return to the States in January of1960 that Esterline became Chief, WH/4. 3/In addition to his participation in the Guatemalanepisode and his extensive guerrilla warfare experiencein World War II with the OSS, Esterline thinks thathe got the job because J. C. King "had pretty muchconfidence in my judgment."* 4/ The relationshipbetween Esterline and J. C. King, Chief, WH Divisionand the relationship between. King and Richard Bissell,Deputy Director for Plans (DDP) during the course of* The author had heard that Esterline had been directly  selected by the DDP, Richard Bissell, to be the head of  WH/4. Bissell made no mention of this, and it is con-  trary to the story noted above, as told by Esterline.- 33 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 42]
# TOP SECRETthe Bay of Pigs Operation has been the subject of considerable speculation ever since the close out of the invasion. It seems appropriate that some attention should be devoted to this subject before going further into detail about the evolution of the covert plans to oust Castro. One source close to the DDP at the time of the anti-Castro activity stated flatly:A task force was formed under Bissell, excluding J. C. King, Chief, WH/D, from having in fact any control whatsoever over the activity. [^5]The WH/D history states:There was an informal but understood short cut in the chain of command; basic decisions were made at the DDP, DCI, or Presidential level. Although some of the key personnel were detailed from WH Division, the Cuban Headquarter's unit was in another building; and no one pretended that J. C. King was running the show. Jacob D. Esterline ... was the Chief of the Cuban Unit, during the build-up and invasion attempt and took his orders from the DDP. [^6]Walter Elder, formerly Special Assistant to Allen Dulles at the time of the Bay of Pigs Operation has indicated that there was a deliberate attempt to keep King on the outer edges of the anti-Castro activity; but according to Elder, Col. King always knew what was going on and was thoroughly involved in the Bay of- 34 -TOP SECRET[^5]: /[^6]: /
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 43]
TOP SECRETPigs activity from its inception until its conclu- sion.* 7/Esterline himself declined to comment for the record on this particular speculation, but indicated that he was not sure what J. C. King was up to at all times. It is clear, however, that Esterline was in very close contact with Col. King throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation.**Additional insights concerning J. C. King's role in Bay of Pigs Operation have been provided by Richard D. Drain, who was Chief of Operations for WH/4, and by Richard Bissell, the DDP. Drain has stated:J. C. King never was told, I think for understandable reasons, to what extent he[^1] Elder suggested to the author that "they" wanted King out of the operation because of his strong Re- publican affiliations. "They" were never identified, but King was well acquainted with highly placed figures and contributors to the Republican Party.[^2] This will become most apparent in the subsequent discussion of the relationships between WH/4 and William D. Pawley. During the author's initial conver- sation with Esterline about the Bay of Pigs, Esterline did state, in a manner similar to Elder, that J. C. King was out of the mainstream of the anti-Castro effort, because he had known Republican Party affiliations. 8/ There was no elaboration indicating the impact of such affiliations on King's role, and there is nothing in the record to support this allega- tion.- 35 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 44]
TOP SECRETwas in it, to what extent he was not in it. Therefore, from time to time, he would protrude ... sometimes, saying that he was sorry to protrude; and then he would retract; and then he would be in; and then he would be out ... that's as a person. Then again, his Deputy, Ray Herbert, would call and say "I just don't understand Cable 18963 IN from Guatemala today. Would you come over and explain to me what that's all about;" and I would step out of the maelstrom of JMATE ... they were just working flat out ... and go over. There would be the old WH types doing their thing in the old WH way. Maybe two cables a week from the stations, and quite leisurely ... I think what had happened to J. C. King was that he had stayed overlong in the same job; and he was "Mr. WH," by Gawd. With the еxсер- tion of first Guatemala and then Cuba, there was very little that ever happened in Latin America which got to be, given our other worldwide responsibilities in the DDP, a very front priority matter; and consequently, at Staff meetings, for example, they would go around and talk about the Soviet Union and China and Europe and even Africa. Then, if there was any time left, J. C. King would have his time at bat and report some relatively minor thing. Except in the case of Guatemala there was, as everybody knows now, a very substantial paramilitary operation which was run by Richard M. Bissell in his capacity as Special As- sistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination.I think that one of the many reasons ... and I never was able to get much in the way of history on Guatemala as an aid to the study of the Cuban operation ... while the latter was in process ... was- 36 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 45]
13-00000TOP SECRETthat this had never set very well withJ. C. King. He was divested of theGuatemalan experience, and particularlywhen it turned out to be a success ...PBSUCCESS was a success, through dumbluck more than anything else. J. C. ...couldn't take any of the bows for it.All right, that rankled, I am sure. Nowthis one comes along, and rather than ex-pand WH/4, or whatever the hell it was,and leave this JMATE Project within thatBranch, and build up that Branch -- oh,no. Once again the same man, Dick Bissell-- now, however, DDP instead of SAPC --becomes the case officer for the thing;and his assistant, Tracy Barnes, is allover him. One of J. C. King's few verygood men, Jacob D. Esterline, is pulledaside and made Chief of the project ...The old man had a great deal of *amour**propre*, J. C. King did. He was very vain.He had all of the area expertise that onewould like to see in a Division Chief,but he had been at it an awful long time.It was a very incestuous Division. Interms of the rotation, it was solelywithin WH. There were very few peoplein WH who had served outside of theWestern Hemisphere, except in Washington.They were a tight-knit little group, andhere now, for the second time running, oneof their big chances to shine -- therewas a lot of money and all that kind ofstuff -- again had been taken away ...and it was ... it was tough. 9/Where Drain implied that J. C. King was cut com-pletely out of WH/4 activities and operations, Mr.Bissell had indicated that the situation was somewhatdifferent. In the course of an oral interview, the- 37 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 46]
# TOP SECRETformer DDP responded to questions concerning J. C. King in the following manner:Question: I would like to clarify at this point J. C. King's relationship to the Bay of Pigs project. I have heard it on both sides -- that he was involved and that he was deliberately end-run.Mr. Bissell: There is no doubt in my mind that that was the case. I was going to say that both of the things that you have heard have an element of truth in them. There was a deliberate decision fairly early in the game -- I doubt if it was as early as March [1960. In fact,] I am pretty sure that it wasn't, [but] I am reasonably sure that the decision I speak of was made by some such date as June [1960] -- [that] Esterline would take charge of this Project and Esterline would have direct access to me. He would not be under the usual requirement of all the cases going through J. C. King. Now, as the scope of the scale of this operation increased, and with the passage of time, Esterline's direct channel to me came to be more exercised; and there was frequent interchange between Ester- line and myself that didn't go through J. C. King in the sense of a command channel. On the other hand, J. C. was brought into all the consultations and was fully informed from the very beginning about this operation. His advice was sought and given, and I usually found it very good and followed it. I remember no specific case where either J. C. King's specific advice or general attitude toward the operation was inconsistent with, or in conflict with my own.-- 38 --# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 47]
# TOP SECRETQuestion: Why did you make this decision with regard to Jake, coming directly to you and not going through King? Was it just a matter of great efficiency, or what precipitated that?Mr. Bissell: I think it was in part on the model of the Guatemalan operation, and in part, I think, a feeling, probably on my own part - in some degree perhaps on the part of Allen Dulles - that J. C. was not effective enough to handle this kind of very fast moving, quite large scale, quite complex, paramilitary operation.Question: Do you recall any instances where there was a serious conflict between what Jake wanted to do and what J. C. King thought should be done?Mr. Bissell: I don't remember many, if any, and I believe that the relationships between Jake and J. C. were pretty good throughout. [^1]Certainly the written record bears out Bissell's contention that King was fully informed and that the relationship between King and Esterline was, if not love, at least mutually respectful.** The only point of contention between King and Esterline that surfaced in the records concerned the degree to which William Pawley should be involved in affairs related to the organization of the Cuban exiles. At one point, Jake suggested to the DDP that all contact with Pawley be cut off, but in sending Esterline's memorandum through channels, J. C. King noted that he was against cutting Pawley completely off from contact with WH/4. In fact, Pawley was in continuous contact - even though in disagreement - with both Jake and King until the close out of the operation.-- 39 --# TOP SECRET[^1]: 10/