Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 118]
# TOP SECRETThe President concluded the meeting, by saying that he would like to urge caution with respect to the danger of making false moves, with the result of starting something before we were ready for it.* 93/One of the most persistent problems which was to surface by early fall of 1960 concerned the need for the anti-Castro operation itself, and the bulk of the questioning came from the Department of State, principally from Thomas Mann, who soon was to become the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs. Mann already had been involved in some of the prior discussions concerning the anti-Castro activity in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for* In his memorandum of a meeting with the President on 17 August 1960, Gordon Gray noted that in discussing the CIA meeting planned for 18 August, that in addition to Messrs. Dulles and Bissell, a third CIA officer might possibly be in attendance; and he also noted that the Vice-President had been invited to attend the briefing. According to Gray's record, however, neither the Vice-President nor the third CIA representative were in attendance at the briefing of 18 August. The attendance of the Director and Mr. Bissell, but with no CIA representative from WH/4, was further illustration of Jake Esterline's criticism that at too many high level briefings, CIA's representatives were individuals who, high ranks notwithstanding, were the furthest from the operation -- yet they were responsible for informing the nation's policy-makers about the details of the anti-Castro program. 94/It is also interesting to note that this off-the-record meeting which was arranged by Gordon Gray lasted only 23 minutes, and this included at least a short time for a brief discussion related to Francis Gary Powers. 95/- 110 -# TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETEconomic Affairs. In early September of 1960, Chief,WH/4 learned from a member of the Department of Statethat Mr. Mann was going to ask for a restudy of thebasic concept of JMATE, or, if he did not ask forthat re-evaluation, he would ask for immediate reviewand rescheduling of the timetable for the JMATE oper-ation. At this time and in view of the lack of prog-ress both in developing any great cohesion withinthe FRD in organizing the dissidents within Cuba,the questions seemed in order. The reaction of Chief,WH/4 however, was that an attempt should be made toblunt Mr. Mann's efforts, noting for example:The degree to which we are already com-mitted in JMARC would pose a monumentalsecurity problem alone if we were suddenlyinstructed to cease and desist from furtheractivity. As of this moment, they havewell in excess of 200 people engaged inair, ground, and communications trainingin Guatemala. Additionally, our across-the-board propaganda activities are beingstepped up daily. A drastic reschedulingof either activity, therefore, could bringabout serious repercussions. [^96]The precise nature of these "serious repercus-sions" was not spelled out. As time passed, however,it would be charged that the cessation of the Agency-sponsored training activities would loose a flood of- 111 -# TOP SECRET[^96]: .
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 120]
13-00000# TOP SECRETCubans back into the exile community; and they would charge that the United States feared to undertake the task of ousting Fidel Castro. This, in turn, would mean that the US would lose face in the eyes of the Democratic Latin American republics. Jake Esterline speculated that Mann did not believe that the Cubans were willing to support an insurrection against Castro.A suggestion which was made to counter the possible Mann proposals was that:To strengthen our position, therefore,we are bending every effort to get atleast one supply airdrop into the targetcountry, prior to the Assistant Secretary'sreturn to the United States ... Success-ful action in this area should weighheavily on Assistant Secretary Mann'salleged new attitude. 97/Just how one -- or even more -- successful air drops would in any way influence Mann's opinion about the receptiveness of the Cuban population to a possible insurrection effort was not explained. That there were dissidents on the island was unquestioned, the problem was the degree of strength and effectiveness that they might be able to demonstrate.** Fortunately for the continuation of Project JMATE, the hurry-up air drop to which Jake Esterline referred did not set the criteria for the continuation or dissolution of the project. This air drop was a complete (footnote continued on following page)- 112 -# TOP SECRET
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13-00000# TOP SECRETMr. Mann would continue to raise questions con-cerning the feasibility of discontinuing the trainingin Guatemala, and in on-going meetings with Agencyrepresentatives including the DCI, the DDP, Chief, WH,as well as Chief, WH/4 and others, Mann continued toraise questions about the effect on Project JMATEshould all the American trainers and Cuban traineesbe pulled out of Guatemala immediately. Mann alsoquestioned the exact timing for Project JMATE. Ashe raised such questions, the Assistant Secretary forLatin American Affairs was informed by CIA that theywould much prefer that the training of the Cubanexiles take place in US bases, both for purposes ofsecurity and for efficiency. But they also pointedout that it had been the decision for the SpecialGroup and the "highest levels" that such trainingshould take place in third countries, rather than inthe US. Mann persisted, however, suggesting thatthe question of maintaining the training base inand total bust, the supplies being dropped to theguerrillas fell into the hands of Castro's forces;and the aircraft itself made a forced landing inMexico and was not recovered. See Volume I of thishistory, Air Operations.- 113 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 122]
# TOP SECRETGuatemala or removing it to the US should be raised again with the Special Group. The Agency's representatives agreed to this suggestion "with the strictest proviso that no move from Guatemala could or should be made until adequate staging facilities in the Zone of the Interior have been prepared." 98/Tracy Barnes put the question of moving the base from Guatemala to the Zone of the Interior in a somewhat different context than had been suggested by Esterline and J. C. King. Barnes recommended consideration be given, among other items, to:The fact that a move from the present training sites to the US should not be made too hurriedly and the importance of avoiding a decision at a later date that the training in the US is a bar to operational use. I realize that this latter point would be a complete contradiction of the present theory but, after all, there is an intervening election; and political views can shift so that everything possible should be done to avoid our getting ourselves into the box where we move to the US for one reason and then find that the US move is used against us to prevent or limit ultimate operations.* 100/One additional point which was made by Jake Esterline and J. C. King in their conversations withSource reference No. 99 not used.-- 114 --TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 123]
TOP SECRETSecretary Mann was that the sudden pullout of the training program in Guatemala might very well lead to the overthrow of President Ydigoras by the pro- communist elements which were already in evidence in opposition to the Ydigoras regime. It was indicated that should the troop training be moved from Guatemala to the United States, 300 Guatemalan troops would be trained as a special security force for the Guatemalan government.[^1]During these discussions in the late fall of 1960, Mann also raised the issue of economic sanctions which had been touched on in the early spring. At this time however, the Agency's representatives believed that Mann was talking in terms of a one to three year quarantine period, in an attempt to disrupt the Cuban economy -- a quarantine, however, which would not interfere with the flow of goods from the Communist countries. This was a point of some contention between State and CIA, with the Agency people convinced that the Soviet Union would make up any deficiencies that tended to impede seriously the economy of Castro's Cuba. [^2]In the context of a possible move of the training facilities to the United States, Chief, WH prepared- 115 -TOP SECRET[^1]: /[^2]: /
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13-00000# TOP SECRETa memorandum for the DDP indicating that the needfor training bases to be located in the southernpart of the United States should include an infantrytraining base capable of handling 3,000 men withrange facilities, tactical training areas, an air-field for training air and ground crews in the utili-zation of B-26, C-46 and C-54 aircraft, aerial gunnery.and bomb range facilities, and maritime training andstaging facilities. It was suggested that the air-field logistical base should be located in southernFlorida, and permission to use Ramey Air Force Basein Puerto Rico to stage black over-flights to Cubashould be obtained. The maritime facilities wouldbe located on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico and alsoin southern Florida.In a meeting with the Special Group, the DeputyDirector for Central Intelligence put forth the pro-posals concerning the movement of training bases tothe United States; and although he was supported bythe Department of Defense representatives -- Mr.Douglas and Gen. Lansdale -- Livingston Merchant ofthe Department of State, normally one of the hardliners of the Department, seemed to have ambivalent- 116 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 125]
TOP SECRETfeelings at this time about the training program. Possibly Merchant was succumbing to Mann's arguments suggesting that the time for military action was so far down the line that US efforts should be concentrated on economic sanctions at this time. 103/Adolf A. Berle, who would become one of the Kennedy administration's principal advisers on Latin America, also seemed to be swayed by Tom Mann's argument in favor of economic sanctions, Berle suggesting that the embargo be expanded to include the shipment of arms and ammunition both to Cuba and from Cuba to other parts of Latin America. 104/Although it has been indicated that the Department of Defense would apparently support the Agency in its request for the establishment of training facilities in the continental United States, DOD did balk at the use of military personnel in third country areas in support of Project JMATE. Although Deputy Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas began to question whether his department had actually been committed to support CIA's anti-Castro effort, it seems clear that policy approval for the use of Department of Defense personnel in Project JMATE had been established- 117 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 126]
TOP SECRETwith the approval of the President's comprehensiveprogram of covert action against Fidel Castro inMarch 1960. 105/The difficulties encountered with the Departmentof Defense concerning the assignment of Special Forcetrainers from the US Army to the Guatemalan trainingbases has already been spelled out in considerabledetail in another volume, but even as the Departmentof Defense was taking a negative attitude toward thepossible use of DOD personnel in either training orcombat activities, the Agency was proposing the re-cruitment of either American or foreign volunteersto serve as combat troops for Project JMATE. TheBureau of American Republic Affairs of Departmentof State, however, put the quietus on the plan forobtaining foreign volunteers; but J. Foster Collins,the Chief of the Covert Action Staff, suggested tothe Deputy Director for Plans that possibly he (theDDP) could convince Livingston Merchant of the needto re-examine the Department of State policy.** The problem of the Special Force trainers is dis-  cussed in Volume II of this history, *Participation  in the Conduct of Foreign Policy*.- 118 -TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETCollins was particularly enthusiastic about the pros-pects for recruiting Germans, Greeks, and Turks to serve as volunteers; but in the end, State's view prevailed, and there were no contingents of either American or foreign volunteers.[^1]During the period of buildup and organization of WH/4 for the JMATE effort against Castro, the Agency encountered some problems with the US Navy, but none of these were as serious as the difficulties encountered with the Department of Defense per se, the Air Force, or the United States Army. The exist-ence of the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba presented an unusual situation in view of the planning that was taking place. Apparently, however, there was no disagreement between the Agency and the Navy that prohibited Guantanamo from being used to mount anti-Castro activities or from being used as a safe haven area for those who might have been detected engaging in sabotage, propaganda, or other anti-Castro activities. The purpose of such restrictions, of course, was to prevent the Cubans from claiming violations of the legal and binding international agreement between the United States- 119 -# TOP SECRET[^1]: 106/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 128]
13-00000TOP SECRETand the Government of Cuba over the lease of GuantanamoBay. So serious was this issue in fact, that theAgency agreed that all Cubans participating in over-flights of Cuba would be told that Guan-tanamo Naval Base was not to be used asa safe haven, and that if they landedthere, they would be turned over to theCuban authorities. [^1]The Guantanamo Base also presented a major dif-ficulty for the Department of State. Evidence of thissurfaced in early October of 1960 when it was reportedthat during a meeting of the State Working Group onCuba a suggestion was put forward that the US try toinfluence Latin American nations to approve US reten-tion of the base. One proposal had been made thatthis be done through the Inter-American Defense Board(IADB), where a resolution apparently was about to beintroduced asking for a definition of the relationsbetween Cuba and the USSR, with the expectation thatthis might force Cuba's resignation from membershipon the IADB. According to Col. John F. Mallard, theAgency's liaison officer with the State Working Group:In addition, State desires that theIADB, make some statement on the impor-tance of Guantanamo Bay to Latin Americanhemisphere defense. This statement would,in effect, give Latin American approvalto U.S. retention of this base. [^2]- 120 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 107/[^2]: 108/
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13-00000# TOP SECRETThis frame of reference concerning GuantanamoBay led the Executive Officer of WH/4, Ed Stanulis,to prepare an extremely sharp memorandum for Chief,Western Hemisphere Division raising some questionswhich are as pertinent to CIA today as they werewhen they were raised in 1960. Stanulis wrote asfollows:I realize that this Agency is animplementing arm of the Executive Branchand has no right or privilege in the areaof formulation of U.S. national policy.I believe that within this framework wewho are part of this Agency are permittedto comment on certain State Departmentor other Executive Department propositionsthat appear, on the basis of our ownpersonal observations and experience, tobe counter-productive to the best interestof the United States. I am convincedthat the course of action, described inparagraph 1 (that the U.S. use the IADBto win Latin American support for theU.S. retention of Guantanamo) is in factwithin this category.It is high time that the U.S. take anunderstandable public position in mattersof international agreement, compact, con-tract, and treaty. The rights of the U.S.to the Guantanamo Bay area have been clear-ly and legally described in several docu-ments which bear the signatures of thethen reigning and cognizant governmentsof the United States and Cuba, respectively.Certainly the assistance of any single orplural Latin American national entity (ies)seems to me to be indicative of an admittedweakness on the part of the United States- 121 -TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETand its conviction of its legal inter- national rights.I suggest that this Agency make known to the State Department its feelings in this matter, as described above (if addressees agree). I realize that consider- able discussion could be waged in terms of legally and/or logically presenting our case. This memorandum is not intended to meet these requirements.One observation that might be included is the fact that the current Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, has on at least two occasions in U.S. mass media of sizable circulation stated that the United States would not tolerate any invasion of Guantanamo or hostile abroga- tion of our treaty arrangements to the base. I believe it is significant to note that no responsible member of the Executive Branch (including the President of the United States) has contradicted his state- ments. On the basis of this evidence, it would appear to me that the official overt position of the United States is crystal clear and we need not at this time place ourselves in a position of indebtedness or vulnerability with any other Latin American nation in terms of the Guantan- amo issue. 109/By early November 1960 Secretary of State, Christian Herter, had decided that the matter of Guantanamo needed to be discussed at a higher level; and, consequently, he introduced the subject on the agenda for the National Security Council meeting of 7 November 1960. The Secretary emphasized the need for coordination of military and political planning- 122 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 131]
13-00000# TOP SECRETin case of an attack on the naval base. Herter indicated two extreme possibilities: one, that in case of an attack, the United States respond with only sufficient military force to protect the base itself; and another, that the United States decide that an attack on the base was in fact an act of war and apply such military power as necessary. Herter also suggested, of course, that there would be possible responses between the two extremes, with activities in the OAS or the UN possibly having some bearing on the US response -- the sort of contention that undoubtedly must have raised the hackles on Mr. Stanulis again. The Secretary of State did specify, however, that the US response to an attack on Guantanamo would be the result of a decision made by the President of the United States.As will be pointed out subsequently, the Cubans would make charges about Guantanamo being the center for anti-Castro activities, and there would be a few instances where anti-Castro Cubans were able to find refuge within the confines of the base. Overall, however, there was a surprising degree of neutrality with respect to the naval installation during the course of the Bay of Pigs operation.- 123 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 132]
TOP SECRETIt is also important to mention at this time the Agency's relations with the Commander in Chief, CINCLANT, Admiral Dennison. Before the end of October 1960, the Admiral had made it clear to the Agency's representatives that he believed it impossible for him to conduct the affairs of the Atlantic Fleet in the Cuban area properly until he received further information -- specific information -- about the Agency's planned operations against Castro. When this report on Dennison was brought to the attention of the Chief of the Agency War Plans Staff, F. P. Holcomb, Holcomb assured the Admiral that any request for information which he cared to lay on the Agency would be promptly answered. By this time, Dennison indicated that he had already been in touch with General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS, and the expectation was that such briefing on Cuban affairs by CIA was being laid on.Holcomb, quite truthfully, indicated that neither he nor the Agency's liaison officer to CINCLANT, Commander Ray E. Millard, were privy to the planned operations of WH/4. Once having assured the Admiral of the willingness of CIA to cooperate and provide- 124 -TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECREThim with the necessary information, Holcomb thennoted:It was the impression of the CIAofficers present that Admiral Dennison isa cooperative officer and favorably andobjectively inclined towards CIA, andthat if his needs can be met, he willundoubtedly follow a positive and helpfulcourse. 111/On 2 November 1960, Richard Bissell, Jacob Ester-line, and Colonel Jack Hawkins traveled to Norfolk toAdmiral Dennison's headquarters. The CIA representa-tives received a general briefing by the Navy on con-tingency plans for Hispaniola and Cuba, and in return,they briefed the Navy on Project JMATE. Mr. Bissellgave an overview of the CIA operation, Esterline dis-cussed the political and propaganda aspects, andHawkins talked about the PM program, including theplan for a 1,500-man invasion force to seize a lodge-ment on the island of Cuba. Hawkins emphasized thatthis last objective could not be met until March orApril of 1961.* 112/[^1][^1]: In a telecon with the author of this history on15 May 1978, Admiral Dennison indicated that it wasextremely late in the course of the Bay of Pigs oper-ation before he received any briefing from CIA on theanti-Castro operation. He made it sound, in fact,as though he was not briefed until shortly before the(footnote continued on following page)- 125 -# TOP SECRET
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13-00000# TOP SECRETD. Personnel and TrainingFrom the time of the official approval of the anti-Castro policy by President Eisenhower until the collapse of the effort at the Bay of Pigs the question of personnel and personnel management for Project JMATE was of constant concern. Even though the Director of Central Intelligence "emphasized the significance of the Project, by saying that he would recall Agency personnel from any station in the world if the individual's abilities were required for the successful achievement of JMATE objectives," some of those who were closest to the personnel problem believed that DCI Dulles failed completely to keep that promise. 113/ Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 has remarked as follows:It was obvious that as the operation began to increase in size that the Divisions didn't have the personnel, the senior personnel, to staff out the organization; or if they did have them, they weren't about to release them from theLSD (Landing Ship Dock) which was to carry the landing craft to the area of the Bahia de Cochinos was ready to load at the naval base at Vieques for the invasion. As the text above confirms, however, the Admiral was read into the act relatively early in the game and should have had plenty of time to make preparations for the activities of April 1961.- 126 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 135]
# TOP SECRETthings they were doing, because they were considered indispensable, which was probably correct. It was on that basis, I think, that when people like Dick Drain came back home from -- in Dick's case, I think he came in from Greece -- where he had a pretty good record -- but he was not re-turning to Headquarters to go into an assignment, and Dick Bissell put him in the operation with us. Gerry Droller had been around Headquarters for a long time, had been quite a bit of a replacement problem. He was very bright, he was a German specialist, had a pretty good political background; and Gerry and Howard Hunt, for whatever reason, were sort of selected, not by us, but they were told they were going to be the people who would handle the political aspects of the operation. [^1]Esterline also noted that the shortage of competent personnel became particularly critical when the operational concepts began to change and to expand. He claimed that when serious problems came up none of the GS-18 case officers were available to make decisions. [^2]Bill Eisemann, Chief/Support/WH/4, was more specific in his criticism of the personnel management for Project JMATE. After emphasizing that Colonel L. K. White, the Deputy Director for Support (DDS), did insure that the support elements got the best people for Project JMATE, "he [White], directed all Support office heads that if there was a need for any- 127 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 114/[^2]: 115/