Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10010.pdf — page 9]
SECRETare assisting in some reduction of the personality files. The Registry also handles the pouching. This task is also the largest in the WH Division, particularly in lateral pouching. On one occasion, at Headquarters' request, Mexico City handled the lateral pouching to 35 stations and bases of one document.59. The problems of the Registry are compounded by the lack of training provided personnel assigned to the Registry. Personnel problems in the Registry are many and diversified. First of all, with the limited mumber of personnel and the great burden of work, a large amount of overtime has been required. Secondly, it has been difficult to get people to accept an assigment to the Mexico City Registry because the tasks are dull, tedious, and infinitely demanding of the individuals' time. The morale in this section was poor. We made several recommendations to the chief of station pointing out to him a conscientious effort must be made by all members of the station to reduce the workload in the Registry. In this connection, we suggested that individual case officers accept the responsibility for periodic cleaning of files which they used, and of which they have the most intimate knowledge. We further recommended that maximum discrimination be used in determining material which should be filed and that wherever possible the sheer bulk of the filing be reduced. We further recommended that overtime be made voluntarily whenever possible, but that in any event personnel be provided with a full weekend off from time to time.60. The chief of the Registry is the only senior person assigned to the Registry and has no deputy or other person competent to take his place during his temporary absence. The chief at the time of our inspection had taken very little time off, including weekends in the two years of his tour. We feel that one of the positions in the Registry should be re-evaluated for possible upgrading to includes the duties of deputy chief of Registry.It is recommended that:The Chief, WH Division, request the Director of Personnel to conduct a review of the function of Deputy Chief, Registry, Mexico City Station, to determine whether or not such a position should be established in an appropriate grade.No. 78- 23 -SECRET![illegible]
[104-10301-10010.pdf — page 10]
13300000SECRET61. We found the Registry to be a controversial matter between    Headquartere and the chief of station. The newly assigned deputy    chief of station, whe primarily had supervisory responsibility over    the chief of Registry, was making a determined effort to reduce the    vorkload in the Registry and to seek means of relying upon Head-    quarters files rather than station files. We vere told that on    several occasions, Headquarters had reached the point of demanding    that Mexico City reduce its Registry to a sise comparable to other    stations. Each time such a decision was reached, there would be    a concurrent flap which would prove the value of Mexico City's    ability to instantly retrieve information from their files. One    of the most noteworthy of such flaps took place in November 1963,    when Mexico City's files trought forth detailed information on    Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban end Soviet Ribassies in    Mexico City.62. the nature of Mexico City's operations, particularly ite    technical operations LIENVOY and LIFEAT produce[voluminous filos.] 24    Until some system is devised for this[information] to be quickly 24    24 [digested and retrieved] in Headquarters, we believe that there is    no alternative to the present systen Mexico City is employing.    However, we believe that a determined effort must be in Headquarters    for[processing and retrieval] of such information.    24It is recommended that:The Chief, WE Division, in collaboration with theChief, Records Integration Division, devise a systemfor reducing the volumns of files held in Narico City,while maintaining a capability for rapid retrievalfrom Headquarters of information essential to presentand future operatione in Mexico.No.7963. Moxico City is one of the great setropolises of the world    and the booming economy of Mexico is reflected in its housing. It    is difficult to find housing which cougares exactly with United    States housing because the Spanish tradition of servants' quarters,    large space, and grand entertainment are a basic way of life.    However, in such a great city, there is naturally a large selection    of housing within this limitation. There are good apartments, but    such apartments usually are more expensive than allowances will    permit for single occupancy. Housing for officers and families is    generally quite good, not plentiful, but with prudent selection,    adequate housing can be found within reasonable range of the- 24 -SECRETIM/S
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 0]
# SECRETThe Special Investigations Group of the CI Staff (CI/SIG)CI/SIG (the Special Investigations Group) did not exist prior to the establishment of the CI Staff in early 1955, Its major functions as described in CSI No. 70-1 of March 1955 are much more modest than the functions ascribed to it in a write-up by the Staff in early 1973. The 1955 description of functions is as follows:"Special Investigation Unit"Major Functions"Performs the CI investigation and analysis of any known or potential security leak in the Clandestine Services organization, whether in headquarters or in the field, from the standpoint of its effect on (1) existing operations, and (2) the cover of personnel. In performing this function, maintains close working relations with the Security Office, the latter being primarily concerned in such cases from Agency security rather than an operational security stand-point."By 1973 the description of tasks which had been assigned to CI/SIG or which they had absorbed during the course of events over a period of nearly two decades provides a much broader range of functions and responsibilities. They are listed as follows:"CI/Special Investigations Group"1. Conducts research into the long-range validity of CIA operations in terms of known or potential hostile capabilities, including penetrations, and of Agency security."2. Carries out coordination with the Office of Security in such cases."3. Maintains and uses sensitive counterintelligence holdings, including certain Comint and defector materials, to match these against operational and personality data and thus to derive operational leads."4. Coordinates and cooperates with counterintelligence and security elements of other departments and agencies of the USG to detect, tabulate, and take counter-action against hostile plans or approaches abroad for the recruitment of American officials (American Targets Program).SECRET144
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 1]
SECRET"5. Plays a direct role in sensitive counterintel- ligence liaison with closely allied foreign intelligence services on hostile penetration plans and operations.""6. Reviews compatibility between cover and assignments of CIA staff members.""7. Maintains central data on leaks to the news media and assists the Office of Security, as necessary, in determining the sources of leaks.""8. Maintains central data on the nature and extent of known compromise of Agency staff personnel to intelligence services, whether liaison or hostile.""9. Prepares studies of individuals, including [journalists] whose foreign intelligence connections are a source of concern.""10. Carries out additional and sensitive tasks as assigned by the C/CI."The first chief of the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) (as it was called in CSI NO. 70-1) was Birch O'Neal, a former FBI officer who had transferred to CIA after World War II.* In the mid-fifties SIG had rather slim picking and appears to have spent most of its time investigating various aspects of the [LMAYFOWL] complex (the [Boris Morros] case) as it affected US interests based on information the Agency acquired from foreign sources. Then in 1962 SIG received its biggest shot in the arm with the defection of Golitsyn who brought with him several dozen leads to American citizens including some supposedly in CIA. The handling of these leads was assigned to SIG by Angleton, including the information emanating from Golitsyn, which related to foreign countries. Thus O'Neal and his assistant, Jean Evans, played a major role in directing the handling of the Golitsyn leads (or "Serials" as Angleton invariably called them). The activity continued through- out the sixties reaching its apex in the period 1964-65 when the HONETOL investigations (of CIA staff officers) was at its most*The term Special Investigations Group (SIG) became common usage in the sixties but no exact date can be assigned for this change.SECRET
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 2]
SECRET98Israel, and a contract agent in New York. In addition to the Office of the Chief (including two special assistants and a Secretariat) the Staff was composed of seven "Divisions" and four "Groups."[^1]For fiscal year 1958 the CI Staff budget was $1,650,000.[^1]The sum of $1,800,000[^1] was allotted for Fiscal Year 1959, and $2,060,000[^1] was to be requested for 1960. Specific figures were quoted in the appropriate sections for projects or support, such as travel. Otherwise the budget was almost solely for salaries of Staff personnel.The survey next gave brief attention to deception, agreeing that it had to be carefully compartmented and that it best belonged in the CI Staff. On the subject of the Special Investigation Unit, however, the survey took its first serious exception to the organization and operation of the Staff stating:"Hence, in order not to contaminate a senior staff (CI Staff) with Agency employee investigation and/or exploitation, this should be done by individuals with CE ability within a special section of the Office of Security. It is"Recommended that:"a. The DD/P release for assignment to the Office of Security several individuals, as may be appropriate, of proven CE ability to handle and exploit all cases of CE aspect involving Agency personnel;"b. SID and its function be eliminated from CI Staff; and"c. The DCI approve the above recommendations."The survey team took special note of the Projects Branch of CI Staff, the section that handled the mail opening project. How it was operated and viewed in 1959 is not without interest in view of its subsequent role in the "Family Jewels" issue when it was revealed to the Rockefeller and Church Committees. Thus it is revealing to note the 1959 survey found nothing wrong withSECRET[^1]: 24
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 3]
the mail opening program except they worried about its securityand also thought it would be more effective if expanded. Thisis how the survey described the project in 1959:"a. The Project Branch conducts a project ofcensorship within the US of mail from the USSR whichis called HTLINGUAL. Originally this project wasdeveloped by the Office of Security at the requestof SR Division in 1952. Its purpose was to identifyand to obtain samples of handwriting and basic back-ground facts on long established correspondencebetween persons in the USSR and the United States.Such information was to be used operationally tosustain any communications with secret writing,which would likely pass the Soviet censors and couldbe picked up in the U.S.A. The interception is doneat the central Post Office in New York, and theletters are delivered to the Agency for processingand return. As the need for Soviet communicationcamouflage lessened with the increase of legaltravel to and from the USSR the Project was re-oriented and expanded toward direct CI and FI goalsin September 1956, and it was taken over by theCI Staff."b. At present this group includes [^1] employees in New York and [^2] at Headquarters.Those in New York are under the Office of Security;-those in Headquarters under the CI Staff. Theyearly cost is the total of the various salaries."c. The primary purposes of this Project are toproduce CE information, operational leads and anypositive intelligence that can be gleaned from themail."d. The operation in New York photographsabout 50,000 envelopes per month out of a total ofabout 200,000 letters coming from the USSR to in-dividuals in the U.S.A. via New York. These filmsare forwarded to Headquarters and examined in theProjects Branch and some 10,000 of them are selectedon the basis of Agency interest in the areas oforigin in Russia. These 10,000 negatives are thenmade into prints, and the names of the addresseesare recorded alphabetically on IBM cards. From theIBM cards RI makes a continuing record and a copyof this record of names is returned to the ProjectsBranch."e. About 1,000 of these intercepts are openedper month in New York by the Office of Security,the letters verifaxed and copies sent to the ProjectsBranch at Headquarters. There is a watch list ofsome 500 names on file both in the Branch at Head-.quarters and in the Security Office in New York andany letters coming from or going to any of the names[^1]: five[^2]: fifteen
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 4]
SECRETon this list are opened. This watch list is revisedquarterly. It is made up of names of interest princi-pally to CI, SR Division, and the Security Office,and includes names listed by the FBI."f. There are trained linguist-analysts in theBranch who extract information of interest from theintercepts, and the disseminability of this informationis determined by the Chief of Projects Branch. Atpresent the rate of dissemination from Projects Branchruns at an average of about 150 per month and thenumber is increasing. Sixty percent of these dissemina-.tions are positive intelligence. The disseminations:are controlled by the Deputy Chief of CI Staff."g. SR Division has obtained valuable operationalleads from this Project, and the FBI wants as much`information as it can get by this means."h. There are 40 individuals in CIA who areofficially cleared to know about this Project. Theseinclude members of SR Division, Office of Security,CI Staff, and RI Machine Records, COPS, DD/P, DD/S,Director of Personnel (due to his previous service in theDD/P) and the Chief, FI Staff. The DCI, DDCI and the IGStaff also have access to the Project."i. It would appear from present results that muchmore value could be obtained from this Project if moreintercepts were opened. Project Branch is at present-handling four times as much volume as it did in the pastwith the same number of personnel and at the same cost.Its staff at Headquarters is capable of handling 2,000per month with the present T/O, but the New York staffcould not supply that number of opened intercepts unlessits personnel was increased. It is felt by the Branchthat a rate of 4,000 intercepts per month would be agood future goal. It is estimated that this wouldrequire an increase of one interceptor, one secretaryand one letter opener in New York and an addition toProject Branch at Headquarters of four linguist-analysts,four clerical personnel and one reports officer."j. The Office of Security, which works withProject Branch, is agreeable to the gradual expansion ofthe operation. It would be in favor of expanding atpresent to the extent of opening more intercepts, andtaking samples of these intercepts for S. W. This couldbe done by the aforementioned increase of Security Officepersonnel in New York without an immediate increase in theHeadquarters staff. It would be operationally much morefeasible if a secure room could be obtained in the PostOffice in New York for their sole use. Since the DCImade the original arrangement for this operation with theChief Postal Inspector, any changes in the system ofoperation should be made in the same way. This is theonly level at which such arrangements could be accom-plished securely."SECRET
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 5]
versus area division prerogative in the conduct of operations.Noting that there might have been some immediate reasons for the CI Staff to take on operational aspects in its efforts to increase CI activity, nevertheless it concluded these reasons were not necessarily based on the best operational and organizational procedures and methods. The normal staff functions, the survey opined, could be carried out effectively with a much smaller but highly experienced staff whose impact and counsel would more favorably be received by the operating elements of the DD/P. The team also concluded that there had been insufficient attention given to penetrating hostile intelligence organizations and recommended that:"Chief, CI direct the efforts of the CI Staff toward the development of programs for the aggressive pursuit of penetration activity against hostile intelligence services."In a forward to the report, the Inspector General of the day, Lyman Kirkpatrick, directed special attention to one particular aspect of CI work."The Special Investigation Division assists the Office of Security in using DD/P assets to trace leads concerning CIA employees. This is probably a necessary assist to the Office of Security but should be handled with the utmost of discretion and security. It would be very seriously damaging to the efforts of the CI Staff if it ever became known that it was engaged in any activities involving CIA employees. An analgous situation is the stir caused by the occasional misimpression created abroad that CIA reports on other US Government employees. Thus within CIA the Office of Security must be the sole unit to bear the stigma of being concerned with fellow employees."Unfortunately this sensible warning was not heeded by CI Staff management, or by the management of the Clandestine Service as a whole for that matter. Instead, in the mid-1960s the CI Staff, with SIG in the vanguard, hypnotized by the allegations of Golitsyn, launched HONETOL the active investigation of numerous Agency employees (five in particular) with generally
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 6]
SECRET SENSITIVE NOPORN NO.279 P.8had written a provocative analysis that found Nosenko bonafide and challenged as incorrect the Monster Plotassessments to the contrary. Even more provocative, he hadprovided a copy directly to then DDCI Richard Helms whenstymied within the Soviet Division in promoting his view.[^1] Kalaris first learned of this well after McCoy joined thestaff, when McCoy himself told him. Angleton, on the otherhand, was certainly not unaware of this part of McCoy'sbackground, and it is likely that he and Rocca and Milerinterpreted Kalaris's selection of McCoy as evidence thatKalaris was out to discredit them.Kalaris, originally having been summoned home to takeover temporarily until a replacement for Angleton could befound, had a title in the beginning as "Acting Chief,CIOPS." In March, Nelson told him, "We haven't foundanybody yet," and as time went on it looked increasingly asif he and Colby were not going to find anyone. But by thistime Kalaris was becoming intrigued with what he was doing,and with the potential of the job. He went back to Brasilia[^1] 10to see his family in late March, and when he returned hetold Nelson he would take the job on a permanent basis. InJune, the "Acting" was dropped and Kalaris became Chief,CIOPS.What Kalaris Found...The State of AffairsAs he looked around, Kalaris found what struck him as adesolate situation. Mountains of traffic were coming in tothe staff, but none of it seemed to be of much importance.The staff had no relationship with the Soviet Division orSECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN[^1]: ![photo of 1/ ][^1]: ![photo of 6]
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 7]
SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORNany of the other geographic divisions. If the divisions had any significant cases, Kalaris was unaware of them because the divisions were giving him nothing of substance. McCoy's arrival in the staff made this picture unmistakably clear since, fresh from SE Division and a position therein that made him privy to virtually all the division's sensitive cases, he was able to tell Kalaris what he was missing on the SE front.It also before long became evident that there was an element of a two-way street in this situation. Soviet-East European cases were discovered in CI Staff files that the area divisions had never been informed of or had only limited information about. These included such cases as MORINE (a past FBI source of voluminous GRU operational documents who was known to the Soviet Division but whose operational leads had been shared neither with that division nor with the other geographic divisions in whose territory the Soviet agents were working); [KITTYHAWK] (a KGB officer who had contacted CIA during a visit to the United States several years back and who figured in a double-agent game being run by the FBI); [GRIDIRON] (Leslie James Bennett, former senior officer in Soviet counterespionage in the Canadian RCMP who had resigned from that service in 1972 under a cloud of suspicion engendered by the Angleton staff and its guru Anatoliy Golitsyn--a case never briefed to either SE or EUR Division); and [MHPIVOT] also known as [OZONE] (Constantin Dumitrachescu, a Romanian intelligence officer who defected in [Israel] in 1972 and subsequently came to this country and was debriefed by CIOPS officers, but whose information and leads had not been furnished to the area divisions).Many of the people in the staff had been hand-picked by Angleton. They had been in their jobs for a number of years and were well settled into their way of doing things. So
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 8]
well in fact that most had given up hope of ever goinganywhere else or accomplishing anything new.Compartmentation was a way of life, and management wasremote from the rank and file. Kalaris was appalled tolearn that his chief of support, who had worked in the stafffor four or five years, had never met Angleton; he had onlyseen him from a distance. The overall atmosphere seemed toKalaris to be conditioned by doublethink and mirrors.Compartmentation in the Angleton staff had been carriedto such extremes, however, as to become counterproductive.With Angleton not disposed to be forthcoming with hissuccessor, and Rocca and Miler taking their lead from him(and Hood already having left the staff and the Agency somemonths earlier), it was difficult for the Kalaris team tofind out what the staff had been doing. Like the blind menand the elephant, the personnel below the top leadership hadnever been exposed to more than their own narrow slice ofstaff activities, and accordingly even with the best of willthey were limited in what they were able to tell the newmanagement. The MORINE case (see below) provided a vividillustration of this point.Mccoy, with his Soviet Division background, wasparticularly struck at the almost total absence of Sovietexpertise in the staff. There was no Russian languagecapability and no realistic area knowledge, and whatexperience there was in Soviet matters was dated andlimited. This was the case not only in R&A, but in theOperations Group as well.One of the first things Kalaris had to do afterassuming office was find out what was in the safes andvaults in the Angleton premises. This ultimately tookmonths, as there were several vaults and many safescontaining among them large quantities of paper. All this