Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 188]
TOP SECRETcrews for both resupply and combat.* The air opera-tions were the subject of considerable discussion.Concerning the possibility of launching air strikesfor three days before the invading force landed,Willauer objected, pointing out that this would givethe OAS ample time to get involved in the act. Wil-lauer then raised the question of whether all of thetactical bombing could be done on D-Day. The answerto that from Col. Hawkins was "no," but Hawkins saidthat it could be done on D-2, if permission were givenfor dawn airstrikes to take out Castro's air forceand military targets, with additional sorties duringthe course of D-l and follow-up raids on D-Day priorto the landings. Moreover, Hawkins pointed out thatif an attempt were made to withhold the airstrikesuntil D-Day, the Castro air force would have an op-portunity to attack the ships which would be carryingthe invasion troops.In a similar manner, a strong case was made forthe use of the Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua air base to* Hawkins wanted "pilots who can work over key targets  without tearing up installations we will later need."- 180 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 189]
TOP SECRETlaunch strikes against Cuba. Apparently there was some discussion of limiting use of this base to only two or three days -- at least some of the State Department people pushed this idea -- but WH/4 pointed out that it was inconceivable in view of the nature of the planned air operations, that the air support operation could be in and out of Nicaragua in this period. It was pointed out to Willauer that efforts had been made to get permission to use US bases, or other closer bases to Cuba than Nicaragua, but without success. Willauer, himself was positive that no US bases would be made available for the strike against Castro.One other interesting aspect of this initial meeting with Willauer, concerned the transition between the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. Willauer stressed that the ground rule at the Department of State was that the Kennedy people could not be sought out to discuss specific problems unless they initiated requests for information, and it was Willauer's opinion:That the only practical way to get decisions on the project before 20 January would be to have the Director [the DCI],- 181 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 190]
# TOP SECRETwhose position re the new administration is different than Mr. Herter's, to go to Mr. Kennedy in person and seek to get him committed. It would be very difficult for State people to try to approach Mr. Kennedy via Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bowles. [^1]During the 21 December 1960 meeting of the Special Group, Allen Dulles briefed the attendees on a meeting that he had participated in the previous day in New York, with a group of American business-men. The meeting had been called by Henry Holland, who was one of the principal fund raisers for the FRD, and in attendance at this meeting were the Vice President for Latin America of Standard Oil of New Jersey, the Chairman of the Cuban-American Sugar Company, the President of the American Sugar Domino Refining Company, the President of the American & Foreign Power Company, the Chairman of the Freeport Sulphur Company, and representatives from Texaco, International Telephone and Telegraph, and other American companies with business interests in Cuba. The tenor of the conversation was that it was time for the US to get off of dead center and take some direct action against Castro.Suggestions were made to sabotage the sugar crop -- the question being whether to burn the cane[^1]: 15/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 191]
TOP SECRETfields or ruin the refineries; to interrupt theelectric power supply; and to put an embargo on food,drugs, and spare parts for machinery. Dulles opposedthe embargo on food and drugs, but the feeling ofthe business group was that it was time to get toughand, hopefully, the blame for an embargo would belaid on Castro. Another interesting suggestion volun-teered was that the US Navy should blow up a ship inLevisa Bay in order to force the shutdown of thenickel plant at Nicaro which formerly had been ownedand operated by the US Government. [^1] In his usualcautious manner, Gordon Gray suggested that theSpecial Group not authorize any action until he hadcleared the matter with his "associate."This group of businessmen also indicated thatthey were going to undertake the publication ofspecific papers on issues and programs related tothe post-Castro Cuba, which would be designed tohelp US policy planners. Mr. Dulles, of course,emphasized that policy planning was not his respon-sibility; this was the responsibility of the Depart-ment of State. He did comment that "what he wasinterested in was getting rid of Castro as quickly- 183 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 16/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 192]
TOP SECRETas possible and in this field he had direct responsi-bility and would welcome any ideas or suggestions onhow this might be achieved." [^1]The high-level business group which Dulles metwith was also extremely concerned about the possibleorientation of any anti-Castro government in exile,particularly that it should not be left-oriented.Michael Haider, Standard of Jersey's Vice Presidentfor Latin America, for example, forwarded a memorandumto Col. J. C. King in early January 1961 identifyingas members of an extreme leftist group which hadformed in Miami to oppose Castro, Manolo Ray, AurelianoSanchez Arango, Rufo López Fresquet, and Dr. RaulChibás among others. Mr. Haider worried that unlessmore positive steps were taken to force the conserva-tive Cuban exiles into a cohesive organization, thatany post-Castro government would automatically be inthe hands of the leftists.* [^2]In addition to strong positive suggestions fromUS businessmen, Brigadier General Lansdale, Office of[^1]: 17/[^2]: 18/* Haider was consistent at any rate -- "leftists"  with Fidel or "Fidelistas sin Fidel" were held to be  equally bad for US business interests.- 184 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 193]
# TOP SECRETSpecial Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense, also had some suggestions which he made to Mr. Bissell about the conduct of the Agency's anti-Castro program. For whatever reason, in late December 1960 Lansdale forwarded to Bissell a number of suggestions which had been presented to him by an Army reservist who had put in two weeks of active duty with OSO at Lans-dale's direction researching Cuban political objectives. Inasmuch as the Agency had devoted many months to the study of this subject, and all other aspects of the anti-Castro effort, it appears a rather gratuitous insult that Lansdale would have forwarded this kind of paper to Bissell. 19/ What response, if any, Bissell made to this memorandum is not known.The Special Group held its last meeting of 1960 on 29 December, and there were, in addition to the standing problem of the use of US air bases to sup-port the operation against Cuba, the questions of the use of a Nicaraguan air base, the political organ-ization of the Cuban exiles, and considerable discus-sion about the possibility of initiating action against Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. It was emphasized that Mr. Pawley was strongly in favor of intervention- 185 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 194]
TOP SECRETin the Dominican Republic, even suggesting that anovert operation against Trujillo be mounted concur-rently with the Cuban operation. The members of theSpecial Group, however, were unwilling to buy thisparticular plan of action; but they did support Mr.Bissell's proposals for some limited covert actionoperations aimed at the Trujillo regime.James H. Douglas, Deputy Secretary of Defensequestioned the feasibility of "expanding the initialbeachhead into a full-scale takeover of the CubanGovernment"; but Mr. Bissell pointed out that sucha project was unrealistic unless "One or all of thefollowing situations develops: (a) overt support,(b) a major revolutionary uprising, (c) massive useof air support." 20/ The Group was apparently inagreement that the Agency should make every effortto insure that no abortive small-scale insurrectionsbe attempted to overthrow Castro. 21/In view of the fact that the US would breakdiplomatic relations with Cuba on 3 January 1961,the minutes of the Special Group meeting of 29 Decem-ber 1960 present an interesting historical problem.In summarizing Livingston Merchant's report of his- 186 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 195]
TOP SECRETmeeting with President Eisenhower, on 28 December,the minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 29 De-cember read as follows:The latter [President Eisenhower] madetwo points: (a) it would be desirable toobtain the cooperation and support of indi-vidual Latin American Governments, (b) itwould be desirable, if possible, for US tobreak relations with Cuba, in concert withother countries some time before January20th. 22/In contrast to the suggestion that the US breakrealtions with Cuba, prior to the inauguration ofKennedy, General Goodpaster's record of the Merchant-Eisenhower meeting of 28 December reported that:He, [President Eisenhower] thought,however, that [Presidents] Frondizi,Prado, and others should take diplomaticinitiative to get Latin American countriesto take a position that they would liketo remove Castro from power, but, lackingthe means to do so, would like the US totake the lead. The President said it wasclear to him that Latin Americans must bebrought to see the necessity of action.He was inclined to think that it mightbe time to recognize the anti-Castrofront as the Cuban Government. He addedthat he would like to see a definitemove taken in this matter before January20th, and said that the State Departmentshould be thinking of some definiteaction that could be brought about be-fore that time. 23/"Thinking of some definite action" differs consider-ably from the suggestion that the President thought- 187 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 196]
TOP SECRETit would be "desirable" to break relations with Cubaprior to 20 January of 1961.At the Special Group meeting of 29 December 1960,it also was suggested by Mr. Merchant that the Group'smembership for discussions on Cuba be expanded to in-clude Ambassador Willauer, Assistant Secretary ThomasMann, and C. Tracy Barnes. [^24] As already has beennoted, in his retrospective view of the Bay of Pigsoperation Jake Esterline was quite forceful in hisopinion that the Agency's representatives at suchhigh level meetings should have been someone likeeither himself or Col. Jack Hawkins who were the mostknowledgeable about the status of the operation and,indeed, the whole operational plan.** It is the considered opinion of the author of this  history that Esterline had a valid criticism. A re-  view of the records of the Bay of Pigs Operation, indi-  cates that one of the most voluminous correspondents  was C. Tracy Barnes, that a great deal of the written  material is repititious ad nauseam, and that Barnes  belabored issues which were common knowledge to the  principals in WH/4. Illustrative of this, for example,  was a 28 December 1960 memorandum which Barnes wrote  to Jake Esterline. It began as follows: "It has been  a little while since we have had an internal DDP hoe  down on your project. In the meantime, a number of  important points have been raised." [^25]The memorandum then proceeded to run through allof the issues which, by this time, were common knowledge(footnote continued on following page)- 188 -TOP SECRET[^24]:  Document annotation.[^25]: Document annotation.
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 197]
TOP SECRETOn 2 January 1961 Fidel Castro notified the United States Government that it would have to cut its Embassy staff in Havana to eleven persons. On 3 January 1961, President Eisenhower held a meeting at the White House to discuss the Cuban situation. In addition to the President, and the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the participants included the members of the Special Group, plus General Goodpaster, Mr. Bissell, Thomas Mann, and Tracy Barnes. Among principal questions, of course, were if and when the United States should break off diplomatic relations with Cuba; and after some initial hesitation, before the day was over the United States did break relations officially with the Cuban Government.*to those who were even marginally involved in planning the anti-Castro operation and contributed nothing in particular to understanding of any of them.Similarly, Barnes' memorandum for the DCI in preparation for a 3 January policy meeting, rehashed the same information that Barnes had presented to Chief, WH/4, just a few days before. 26/ Barnes appears to have suffered a severe case of verbal diarrhea.* Before the firm decision was made to break diplomatic relations, there was great concern within the Agency that the COS, a communicator, and a PM officer, and possibly a fourth individual be retained as members of the Staff. 27/- 189 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 198]
TOP SECRETThe other subject of conversation was whether there now was cause or reason for direct US inter- vention in Cuba, and the decision was that no such action should be taken unless the Cuban Government took aggressive action against US citizens in Cuba or damaged official US property (e.g., Guantanamo).In the course of the discussion about the status of Agency planning for anti-Castro activities, the question was raised about increasing the number of trainees. This was ruled out pending the suitability of training sites to handle additional numbers.Training sites in the US still were denied, in part, again, because of the fear of compromising the US position in the Organization of American States or in the United Nations.The high level White House meeting also agreed that it would be useful to brief members of the new administration, particularly the Secretary of State, but "no definite schedule was agreed upon but the concensus [sic] of the meeting was that appropriate briefings should be considered for the near future."[^28]In the few days following the 3 January decision to break relations with the Castro Government, the- 190 -TOP SECRET[^28]:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 199]
# TOP SECRETAgency retained control of US communications out of Havana -- the Ambassador deciding that he preferred to relieve the female Department of State communications officer and retain the services of her male counterpart from the Agency. During this hectic period, the communications officer was instructed to pack up as much gear as possible and destroy that which remained. Even if all the gear were not destroyed,CIA's Director of Communications indicated "there would not be any extreme compromise." In any event, however, the last message from Havana Station -- on 7 January 1961 at 16382 -- statedThis last msg from HAVA Station. All files and crypto material destroyed ... on evening 6 Jan [1961] Swiss amb placed "Carta de Proteccion" notices on emb doors minimizing possibility takeover of bldg by GOC.*[^29]Even as the 'debate over the breaking of diplomatic relations was taking place within the Eisenhower administration, Col. Jack Hawkins addressed a memorandum to Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 which provided an excellent summary of the policy decisions which needed[^29] Authorization for complete shutdown had been set for 0300Z on 7 January 1961. [^30]TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 200]
TOP SECRETto be made if strike operations were to be conducted against the Castro government. In the course of his eight page memorandum, Hawkins reiterated the need for resolution of the problem that had particularly bothered the Special Group -- that was whether the Kennedy administration was interested in following through on the plans that had been made. Assuming that the Kennedy administration did intend to follow through on the program which had been initiated, Hawkins suggested that considering the rapid build up of Castro's military forces the strike operations be conducted not later than 1 March 1961. The question of air strikes was basic to Hawkins's planning -- on this he was quite firm. In discussing the general question of air operations Hawkins said:It is axiomatic in amphibious operations that control of air and sea in the objective area is absolutely required. The Cuban Air Force and naval vessels capable of opposing our landing must be knocked out or neutralized before our amphibious shipping makes its final run in to the beach. If this is not done, we will be courting disaster.Then, by specific recommendations, Hawkins urged the following:1.  That the air preparation commence not later than dawn on D minus 1 Day.
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 201]
TOP SECRET2. That any move to curtail the number of aircraft to be employed from those available be firmly resisted.3. That the operation be abandoned if policy does not provide for use of adequate tactical air support.In order to insure the success of both the air strike and the air drop operations which would provide the logistical support for the troops holding the lodgment on Cuban soil, Hawkins urged, as he had in the past, authorization for the use of contract American pilots, the use of the airfield at Puerto Cabezas as an advance strike base, and the use of air bases in the United States for the launching of logistical flight operations.*[^31]Much the same ground indicated in Hawkins memorandum was rehashed in preparing Mr. Barnes and the DCI for a Special Group meeting of 5 January 1961.[^31] There is no indication that Hawkins ever changed his attitude about the need for the introduction of some US pilots into both the strike and logstics air operations, even though his much quoted cable of 13 April 1961 from Puerto Cabezas repeated the high praise for the B-26 pilots who were about to undertake the D-2 air strike. See Volume I of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Air Operations, Part III, A for discussion of the Hawkins cable in the context of the air operations.- 193 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 202]
TOP SECRETSomewhat more emphasis than Hawkins had given to it was placed on the political organization and the needs for structuring the exile political group to conform accurately to the sentiments of those Cubans who did oppose Castro. Otherwise, much of the same focus was to be given to the questions regarding air bases, the size of the invasion force, and the number of trainees who could be accommodated in the camps, and other of the problems that had already been discussed time and time again. 32/ Similarly, in discussions prior to the 12 January 1961 meeting of the Special Group, much of this same ground continued to be replowed without any positive resolution by the Special Group members. 33/During the course of the frequent sessions of the Special Group in the final weeks of the Eisenhower administration, the Director of Central Intelligence also was required to make a presentation before the CIA Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on 6 January of 1961. Among other things, the record of this meeting stated as follows:Mr. Dulles then gave a fairly detailed picture of CIA action with respect to Cuba, mentioning the two-pronged program of- 194 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 203]
TOP SECRETpropaganda including radio and publica- tions and the paramilitary effort. Again he pointed out that this is an expensive program running to approximately $28 million. Mr. Dulles discussed the radio effort and paramilitary effort in some detail, indicating the numbers of Cubans being trained and the supply efforts and the bases. 34/Because of the subsequent charges which would be made by historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and others writing on the Bay of Pigs, it is important to emphasize that among other CIA personnel attending this briefing was Robert Amory, Jr., the Deputy Director for Intelligence, who, according to Schlesinger and some of the later "experts," was supposed to be in almost total ignorance of any planning for an operation such as took place at the Bay of Pigs.** Other Agency personnel in attendance at this briefing were General Cabell, DDCI; Colonel L. K. White, Deputy Director for Support; Richard Helms, Chief of Operations for DDP; Emmett Echols, Director of Personnel, and John Warner, Legislative Counsel. It also should be noted that Mr. William A. Tidwell, Jr. of Amory's office was appointed in January 1961 to be Chief of the Office of Operations in Miami. 35/ Organizationally at this time, the Office of Operations was under the Deputy Director for Intelligence. In view of the efforts being made in the Miami area to recruit Cubans for training in the exile Brigade, it is inconceivable that Tidwell and the Deputy Director for Intelligence were not fully aware of the plans that were being made to unseat Castro until after the invasion had collapsed at Playa Giron.- 195 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 204]
TOP SECRETOn 10 January 1961, President Eisenhower got involved in a meeting concerning the planned operations against Castro. On that day the New York Times broke a story about the training of the Cuban troops in Guatemala. As the ex-President himself wrote:On the morning of January 10 [1961], the New York Times carried an article, with a map, describing the training of anti-Castro forces in Guatemala ... It told most of the story. I decided that we should say nothing at all about this article. Believing that my successor might want some day to assist the refugee forces to move into Cuba, I considered that we were limited in what we could say about them. [^36]Whether a meeting had been planned prior to the appearance of the New York Times article is not known, but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did call on the administration to send a representative up to the Hill on 12 January 1961, in order to provide further explanation of the Times article. Of the two candidates being considered to appear before the Senate, Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs, or DCI Dulles, it was decided to send Mr. Dulles to appear before the Senate Committee. However, President Eisenhower raised certain questions as to the right of a Committee to ask questions on foreign-- 196 --TOP SECRET[^36]:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 205]
TOP SECRETpolicy affecting the security of the United States. He [Eisenhower) commented that when this is demanded as a right you are "sunk," and wondered how much right have they got, inasmuch as the Constitution says that it is the responsibility of the Chief Executive. 37/The culmination of the Special Group discussions, which had taken place with increasing frequency between mid-November 1960 and mid-January 1961, was the report of the Joint Planning Committee issued by Willauer on 18 January 1961. The conclusions were predictable -- there were decisions that needed to be made, but these could not be made until the new administration became fully aware of the extent of the anti-Castro programs that had been evolving. As Willauer himself said in his final memo:In the absence of these decisions, or at least most of them, there is a grave danger that the December 6 plan (updated) may have to be abandoned, as an effective means of overthrowing Castro without more overt support, and that the only practical course of action for the *physical overthrow* of Castro, will be either: (1) open U.S. war with Cuba, or (2) a seven-month overt training by the U.S. on United States soil of a Cuban-Latin American invasion force, which will be planned to strike with at least overt U.S. logistical support.* 38/* Willauer probably meant to refer to the 8 December 1960 plan. See pp. 173 ff.- 197 -TOP SECRET