Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 260]
TOP SECRETgave a formal "go" to the Covert Action Plan of theAgency which had been agreed to by the 5412 Group.Mr. Nixon's only reported comments during this meet-ing concerned the cutting off of new capital to Cuba,the pulling out of private American firms, and thepossibilities of reducing tourism to stop the flowof American dollars into Cuba. 7/Perhaps one of the reasons why Vice PresidentNixon has been attributed with playing a major rolein the Bay of Pigs activity has to do with the re-lationship between Nixon's office and Mr. William D.Pawley, former US Ambassador to Peru and Brazil anda US businessman with extensive investments in Cubaand interests in various other parts of Latin America.Pawley also was a principal contributor to the Repub-lican party, particularly to Mr. Nixon's cause. Ap-parently hopeful of an appointment as Assistant Secre-tary of State for Latin American affairs -- assuminga Republican party victory in the 1960 presidentialelection -- Pawley was a widely known conservative.In the spring of 1960, shortly following Presi-dent Eisenhower's decision to promote the anti-Castroprogram, Pawley's contacts with the Agency (particularly- 249 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 261]
TOP SECRETwith WHD) and with Nixon's office became increasinglyfrequent and apparently quite close. On 21 March 1960,four days after formal approval of the anti-Castroprogram, Jake Esterline met with Pawley to plan ameeting to be held in Pawley's Miami residence whichwould include the DCI, Col. King, Gen. Cushman, andWalter J. Donnelly, Vice President of United StatesSteel and former ambassador to Venezuela as well asMr. Pawley. Of the session with Pawley, Chief, WH/4wrote:Details and the agenda were not dis-cussed other than to say the principalemphasis would be on reviewing what workcould be done throughout the hemisphereand public opinion on the pending opera-tion against Castro. Mr. Pawley was toldthat the time had arrived for careful coor-dination of all activities; that permissionhad been granted for an all-out operation;a government in exile will be formed posthaste; that the acceptable non-Batistagroups will be put into contact with eachother almost immediately; and that Mr.Pawley's contact, Rubio Padilla, willfigure prominently in this effort ... Itwas carefully explained to Mr. Pawley thatany action involving exiles now should bemost carefully coordinated with Chief,WHD and Chief, Branch 4 to avoid any flaps.* 8/* Esterline also mentioned in his memorandum that  Pawley had provided some information on the Dominican  Republic which he asked Esterline not to pass beyond  CIA until he, Pawley, had the opportunity to give the  information directly to Vice President Nixon.- 250 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 262]
TOP SECRETThe meeting mentioned in the foregoing paragraph was convened in Pawley's Miami residence on 1 April 1960, and the Agency's representatives briefed, among other things, on the problems being faced by the Cubans in exile who were trying to form a government. There was considerable discussion as to who should be the nominal leaders of this government in exile, with Pawley pushing in particular for Dr. Rubio Padilla and the Agency's representatives suggesting Dr. Antonio Varona. For the benefit of the Vice President's representative, it was stressed that none of the Latin American countries seemed particularly anxious to provide a base of operations for the government in exile. The group was informed by the Director of Central Intelligence and by Col. King that, in addition to US Government financing, arrangements were being made to have private confidential sources help defray the costs of the Cuban government in exile. Col. King pointed out that over and above a bond issue which will be floated in the name of the government in exile with Mr. Pawley's help, that donations are being made by private citizens and corporations. He indicated that confidential arrangements- 251 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 263]
TOP SECREThave already been made with the Bureau of Internal Revenue to permit individuals or corporate entities making donations to claim these donations as contributions to the US Government for tax purposes. He cautioned that this arrangement was being limited to a very small group. 9/The question also was raised about the relationship of the anti-Castro program to the Organization of American States. Mr. Pawley suggested that rather than lean toward the OAS, better use should be made of the US Military Mission in the Latin American countries, especially having them pass the word on about the dangers of the Castro Government to one and all in the Western Hemisphere. Other items of importance that were discussed by the group were the planned propaganda program and "the present pathetic effort on the part of the Catholic Church to face up to the Communist plot in Cuba."This meeting demonstrated that from the very outset of the formalization of a US anti-Castro policy Mr. Nixon was being fully informed of the plans that were underway to accomplish the US objectives, and that certain private American citizens were closely involved in the planning. Within a very short time after the April meeting at Pawley's residence, however,- 252 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 264]
TOP SECRETsenior Agency personnel -- notably C. Tracy Barnes,the ADDP/A -- began to question the Agency's rela-tionship with Mr. William Pawley, particularly asPawley's support for Rubio Padilla was apparentlyintended to establish a group of Pawley supportedCubans in exile in opposition to the FRD, the Agency'ssupported exile group. Barnes's concern was thatif the US continued to support the extremely conserv-ative element represented by Pawley's group, itwould be charged that any anti-Castro action under-taken by the US would be "on the basis of protectingeconomic royalists."What Barnes stressed to Mr. Bissell, the DDP,was the need for the US to decide whether or not itwished to be charged with supporting reactionarymovements in Latin America, not only in Cuba, butin the rest of the Central American and Caribbeanareas as well. Once having made up its own mind,Barnes suggested that CIA's position be worked outwith State "and thereafter take it to Mr. Nixon,giving him at that time, a thorough and completebriefing so that there can be no doubt in his mind- 253 -TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETas to where we stand, and what we propose to do."* 10/When Rubio Padilla and the FRD failed to get together, Pawley informed Chief, Western Hemisphere Division that he was withdrawing from support of the Agency's anti-Castro operation; and Pawley told Col. King that he intended to make his views regarding the FRD known to Vice President Nixon. In addition, Pawley also had a meeting with President Eisenhower on 12 or 13 May 1960 at which time he stated his opinions with regard to the Dominican Republic and probably with reference to Cuba. In view of Pawley's recalcitrance to continue to work on the funding of the FRD, the DDP, ADDP/A, Chief WH/D, Chief WH/4 and others, discussed the *pros* and *cons* of cutting off the communications channel between Pawley and the Rubio groups into Cuba -- a channel which was provided by the Agency's communications facility.Chief, WH Division got the group to agree that the communications channel should be continued because* Mr. Barnes's thoughts probably were transmitted to Director Dulles for in a meeting of the Special Group on 19 May 1960, the DCI categorized the Cubans supported by Pawley as "unreconstructed reactionaries." 10a/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 266]
13-00000TOP SECRETit did provide a window to the activities of the Pawleygroup. Moreover, the Pawley group had a duplicatechannel into Cuba and would not necessarily have beenrestricted by denial of the Agency channel. A restric-tion was placed on the transmittal of communicationswhich would be prejudicial to CIA operations in Cuba;but it was agreed that Pawley should be advised ofthe cancellation of such messages by Chief, WesternHemisphere Division. The monitoring of such cabletraffic, however, was to be the responsibility ofChief, WH/4, Jake Esterline.Because of Pawley's close ties to the Eisenhoweradministration, the Deputy Director for Plans agreedthat the discussion regarding Pawley should be broughtto the attention of the Director of Central Intelli-gence and that Mr. Dulles should be urged to bringthis matter before both President Eisenhower and VicePresident Nixon. [^1] By the first week of June 1960,however, Jake Esterline apparently had reached theend of his tether, for in a Memorandum to the DDP,he wrote:It is our firm conviction, based onmonths of discussion, that Mr. Pawley'sviews on the Cuban situation are highly- 255 -TOP SECRET[^1]: ![Footnote 11] There is no relevant information to extract from the footnote
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 267]
13-00000# TOP SECRETpersonal and rigid. These views in our opinion are inimical to the best interest of the United States. Mr. Pawley has refused to budge from his position and has continued to seek official endorsement of his views at the high levels of the government. The flagrant disregard for security reflected in Havana cable 4820 dated 4 June 1960 requires Chief, JMARC to recommend that all contact with the Rubio-Pawley group be immediately and finally severed. If such action is not taken, no guarantee can be made for the security of the JMARC operation. In point of fact, the information in the foregoing message indicates that security already has been damaged severely. [^1]Among other things, the Havana cable which had aroused Chief, WH/4 stated that the following information was being circulated in anti-Castro circles in Cuba:US Government now backing Rubio group and no other group. Group has entre to Veep. For a time Pawley was having trouble with an Agency or Agencies who wanted (to) back another junta, but after Pawley offered (to) withdraw completely, he was talked out of doing so, and given assurance his group only would be backed, [and this] resulted resignation person backing other group. [^2]Headquarters prepared a priority cable to be sent to both Havana and to the Forward Operations Base, which had also picked up the disinformation being spread by the anti-FRD group. The text of the- 256 -# TOP SECRET[^1]: [^2]:
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13-00000TOP SECRETcable read in part as follows:You have been authoritatively advised that US Government is not (repeat not) backing Rubio group and that it has no intention of ever doing so. It complete fabrication that Pawley was given US Government assurance that only his group would be backed. No resignations of any kind occurred, nor are any foreseen. Mention Veep in such context and on this particular level sheer foolhardiness and can only reflect most adversely on those Cubans who guilty misrepresentation of facts and severest indiscretions. 14/The cable apparently was never forwarded to either Havana or to Miami, presumably because of op- position from Col. J. C. King who had noted and ini- tialed on his copy of the Memorandum from Jake Ester- line recommending that all contact with the Rubio- Pawley group be "immediately and finally severed" the following: "I do not concur with severing of all contacts."* 15/* As will be noted subsequently, whether it was political expediency or conviction that Pawley could actually do some good, the relationship among Pawley, Chief, WH Division, and Chief, WH/4 continued through- out the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation. If any- thing in fact, the relationship between Pawley and Jake Esterline appears to have become mutually sup- portive, particularly as the operation drew to its unsuccessful conclusion.- 257 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 269]
TOP SECRETOn 20 June 1960 at the request of GeneralCushman, Jake Esterline joined him for lunch, thepurpose being to provide the General with sufficientinformation on the state of the anti-Castro programso that he could bring the Vice President up to datefrom the time of the Miami meeting that had takenplace at William Pawley's house.* Among the pointscovered were the developments related to the organ-ization of the FRD and the fact that Mr. WilliamPawley's candidate, Señor Rubio, had decided not tojoin the Frente. According to Esterline's memorandum:Dr. Rubio's failure to join the Frente,however, has not held up progress in form-ing the junta, and/or the other importantaspects of the operation.General Cushman was told that the Frente's headquarterswere to be established in Mexico, and it was on thisoccasion that Esterline introduced General Cushman toE. Howard Hunt, who was going to move to Mexico withthe Frente.*** The meeting of 21 March 1960.** Insofar as can be determined, this probably wasthe first occasion on which Richard Nixon heard thename of E. Howard Hunt.- 258 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 270]
TOP SECRETChief, WH/4 also touched on the programs that were being beamed out of Swan Island, on the preparation being made for training paramilitary types, base communications, planned paramilitary activities, the choice of a Third Country's staging area, and that the operation was still scheduled to begin during the month of November 1960. Gen. Cushman noted that the Vice President requested this information in order to prepare for an upcoming NSC meeting at which he would be a senior official. The Vice President's aide also asked if there were any particular problems with relation to the operation that Chief, WH/4 wished to have brought to the attention of the Vice President. Esterline reported that the only problems that had occurred concerned political differences among the exiles, but that for the moment all factions seemed to be quiescent. Chief, WH/4 also indicated to Gen. Cushman "that much had yet to be done vis-a-vis other countries in the hemisphere to ensure that JMARC would have adequate support at the eleventh hour."* 16/On 22 June 1960, General Cabell -- Acting DCI at the time -- briefed a special meeting of the National Security Council on the Cuban situation. The Vice* Except for Guatemala and Nicaragua, such support would never be forthcoming.- 259 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 271]
# TOP SECRETPresident presided and the meeting was attended by the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the Director of the Office of Civil & Defense Mobilization, the Acting Attorney General, a representative of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, among others, Messrs. Bissell, King, Esterline, and McMahan of the Central Intelligence Agency.[^1]A great deal of the briefing was devoted to the FRD and its leadership -- their policies, their background, and the internal difficulties and bickering. The propaganda picture also was discussed, with particular emphasis again on radio broadcasts from Swan Island. Gen. Cabell stated that the paramilitary plan was to develop a force of 500 men who would be divided into 25 20-man teams. The teams would go into Cuba to organize and to train indigenous dissident groups. Cabell emphasized that the implementation of the paramilitary program depended on the existence[^1]: Knight McMahan was on the Staff of the Deputy Director for Intelligence -- that component of the Central Intelligence Agency which, according to some of the "authorities" on the Bay of Pigs, was presumably uninformed and unaware of the Agency's anti-Castro program.- 260 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 272]
TOP SECRETof viable dissident forces which "have not emergedin strength."The ADCI also mentioned the plans to create ananti-Castro air force, but his comments about thisair force (even at this time) were very much in error.According to General Cabell:Some trained Cuban fliers are currentlyavailable and we hope soon to have accessto additional numbers. "Sterile" aircraftfor their use have been mothballed by theDepartment of Defense and earmarked forCIA use. These craft can be made availablein a matter of hours. [^1]As reported in an earlier volume of this history, nei-ther the aircraft nor trained Cuban pilots would beavailable for missions against Castro's Cuba untillate in the fall of 1960.*In the NSC briefing, Cabell also made some inter-esting comments about the resistance that might beencountered in an attempt to oust Castro, emphasizingthat intelligence reports had indicated that Cubamight organize "a 'foreign legion' comprised of highlytrained regular military personnel, drawn from Com-munist nations, mainly the eastern satellites. Shouldthis eventuality occur it would seriously affect the* See Volume I of the Official History of the Bay of  Pigs Operation, Air Operations.- 261 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 18/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 273]
13-00000TOP SECRETprobable success of any purely clandestine paramili-tary operations." Cabell then introduced a suggestionwhich would be heard right up to the time that theinvasion fleet was being boarded -- that "volunteers"to be acquired for the anti-Castro forces, such volunteersto be drawn from US Special Forces.*[^1] 18a/As the presiding officer at the special NationalSecurity Council meeting, Vice President Nixon raiseda number of questions with the Department of Staterepresentatives concerning support that the Organiza-tion of American States would likely give to thiscountry's anti-Castro efforts; and he also posed aseries of questions concerning the economic pressuresthat the United States might put on Cuba. The ques-tions concerned sugar, oil, and tariffs in particular;and the Vice President urged that "strong, positiveaction [be taken] to avoid becoming labeled "UncleSucker."[^2] 19/* No such volunteers were permitted in the case of  the ground forces, but in the last two days of the  Bay of Pigs Operation such volunteers were accepted  for combat air operations. See Volume I of this  History, Air Operations.- 262 -TOP SECRET[^1]: *[^2]: /
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 274]
13-00000TOP SECRETOn 1 July 1960, Jake Esterline received an inter-esting telephone call from General Cushman, contain-ing two messages from the Vice President. First, Mr.Nixon was interested to know if there were any obsta-cles that the Agency was encountering vis-a-vis otheragencies in support of JMATE; and if there were, theVice President indicated that he personally wouldhelp to resolve such problems. The second requestwas a bit more sticky. Gen. Cushman saidthat the Vice President has commissionedhim to keep Mr. William Pawley happy and,in connection with this, he has also beeninstructed to keep Mr. Pawley briefed onhow things are moving. General Cushmansaid he realized that this is much againstour desire, as concerns Mr. Pawley, butthe fact remains that he (Pawley) is a"big fat political cat" and, as such, theVice President cannot completely ignorehim. 20/Esterline allowed that he understood the General'sproblem and suggested that with a few hours advancewarning the Agency would provide the Vice President,or the General, with such briefing materials as nec-essary for any given meeting with Mr. Pawley -- afterfirst clearing the paper with the appropriate agencyofficials and within the security regulations thatapplied to Mr. Pawley. Esterline indicated in his- 263 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 275]
TOP SECRETmemorandum that he immediately informed the DeputyDirector for Plans, and the Assistant Deputy Directorfor Plans, Mr. Bissell and Mr. Barnes, respectively,about the call from General Cushman.*Jake Esterline apparently took the Vice Presi-dent's offer to help CIA with difficulties it mighthave with other agencies to heart. In a memorandumfrom C. Tracy Barnes, concerning a more effectivecommercial cover for Radio Swan, it appears, fromBarnes's response, that Esterline must have suggestedthat the services of Vice President Nixon be engagedto resolve a difficulty between the Agency and theFCC over the use of commercial advertising to make* The following interesting comments also appeared  in Esterline's memorandum on the conversation with  General Cushman:This information (regarding Cushman'stelephone call) could not be given to Col.King, as he had just departed on a three-day trip. This memorandum will be avail-able to Col. King, however, upon his re-turn Wednesday, 6 July.Contrary to the opinions of many who have sug-gested that Col. J. C. King was read out of the anti-Castro operation, this memorandum would indicate that,in fact, extreme care was being taken to make surethat J. C. King was read into the act.- 264 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 276]
# TOP SECRETSwan appear more legitimate. Barnes, however, took exception and recommended that the US Government should consider overt sponsorship of the Swan broadcasts.[^21]It was also in July 1960 that Vice President Nixon's office, principally through the person of General Cushman, first indicated an interest in the activities of one Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga. Garcia was a Cuban exile who claimed to have extensive backing both within the Cuban community in Miami and among dissidents inside Cuba. At one point he claimed that he could raise a force of 2,000 men in the Miami area and 10,000 men inside of Cuba -- if he were given proper financial support for training and equipping these men. Garcia's name first came before the Agency in mid-June 1960 following a meeting he had with a Cuban exile who was an Agency contact. During this[^21]: Whether the FCC was chastened by Mr. Nixon or whether a determination was made concerning the increased use of commercial advertising for Radio Swan is left in doubt. But Barnes's suggestion of official USG participation in Swan was rejected. A note from Esterline on the official routing slip from Barnes forwarding this memorandum read: "I believe Mr. Bissell reversed this position?" To this query King noted "Yes" on the buck slip.- 265 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 277]
TOP SECRETinitial meeting Garcia claimed that he had large stores of military equipment in Spain, that he had additional promises of assistance from General Franco, and that he had contacts in the White House who had given him the "go ahead" for an invasion of Cuba!Word of Garcia apparently got to the FBI, to General Cabell, and apparently to the Office of Vice President Nixon. In any event, on 9 July 1960 Jake Esterline met with Mr. Marshall Diggs, a Washington lawyer and Garcia's sponsor, where he was told of Garcia's grandiose plans to overthrow Castro. In a follow-up meeting in Diggs's office on 11 July, Mr. Phillip Toomey, WH/4/Prop met with Garcia, Cameron Pulley, and two reputed underwater demolitions experts. Garcia went into his act about how his force could overthrow the Castro Government, assuming that he could get some financial assistance for training and equipping the troops. Mr. Pulley proceeded to tell Mr. Toomey that Garcia's project was part of a program that was being promoted by former Senator Owen Brewster for the entire Caribbean area -- apparently a program designed to eliminate all the bad guys. Following another meeting on 13 July and after- 266 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 278]
TOP SECRETlistening to Garcia denounce the FRD leaders as Communists -- as well as being unimpressed by his credentials -- on 15 July 1960, Marshall Diggs was informed that the Agency had no interest in supporting Mr. Garcia. On 20 July 1960, Chief, JMATE met with General Cushman to tell him that a full study had been made of the representatives of Señor Garcia; and as a result, the DCI probably would get in touch with Mr. Diggs and/or Senator Brewster and explain to them "the wisdom of their desisting from pushing Garcia as an outstanding Cuban military leader."The subject dragged on, however; and at one point Mr. Pulley, who with Mr. Diggs and ex-Senator Brewster, was a strong supporter of Mr. Nixon, indicated that the administration's policies with regard to Cuba might hurt the Vice President in the upcoming election. Moreover Pulley also is reported to have indicated that a congressional investigation of the anti-Castro plan was possible. The Director of Central Intelligence was advised on 26 September that because of Garcia's threats to expose everything he had learned about possible Agency involvement in the anti-Castro effort, including the Cuban exile- 267 -TOP SECRET