Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 15]
SECRETEYES ONLY9 April 1963MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUPSUBJECT: Status of Approvals for Covert Actions, Cuba1. Propaganda Inciting Cubans to Commit Acts Against Soviet Troops   Approved by higher authority, on the understanding that the propaganda will be non-attributable to the United States.2. Sabotage of Cuban-Owned Shipping   This was approved by higher authority. It was noted that the suggestion for external explosive charges had been deleted from the proposal approved by the Special Group last week. (This will be considered along with other suggestions in an over-all sabotage paper, in accordance with decisions reached at the special meeting of 3 April.)3. Soviet Language Broadcasts   The Radio Liberty proposition has been approved, with the understanding that there will be no "opening fanfare" in connection with the inauguration of the program; if a ceremony is unavoidable it must be played in a low key. The proposal for a Unidad Revolucion-aria program is disapproved. The suggestion for intrusion on Radio Moscow broadcasts is disapproved.4. Leaflet Balloons   This proposal has been disapproved by higher authority.![signature of Thomas A. Parrott]Thomas A. ParrottDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McConeSECRETEYES ONLY
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SECRETEYES ONLY11 April 1963MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 11 April 1963PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. McConeDr. Scoville, Colonel Ledford and Colonel Steakleywere present for Items 1 - 3.Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 4.1. Reconnaissance, Northern Laos 98It was agreed that the proposal for this coverage, which was contained in the NRO paper of 4 April and which was deferred last week, should be approved.Mr. McCone mentioned the difficulties which have arisen with Sarit, noting particularly that he is unwilling to give permission for the renewed use of Takhli until certain Thai officials return to Bangkok from Paris, which will be around the 20th of this month. Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility of basing the aircraft in the Philippines or Taiwan, if the Takhli possibility should fall through completely.The DCI said that if it proves impossible to mount missions designed to cover the Sino-Indian border, then three will be required for Laos and North Vietnam. If on the other hand the Sino-Indian missions are run, then only two additional ones would be required to cover Laos and North Vietnam, since some of the area could be covered in the process of the Sino-Indian coverage.Mr. Bundy will clear these proposals with higher authority.2. Coverage of Sino-Indian Border Area 98Dr. Scoville reported on the difficulties encountered in obtaining Indian approval for staging aircraft through that country, stressing the fact that the chief of the intelligence service will not be available in India until the 16th of this month, and no decision can be expected before then. He said that the time before the onset of the monsoon season is getting short. Dr. Scoville said that efforts are continuing to get staging approval from the Indians, as well as approval from the Thais to base in Takhli.SECRETEYES ONLY![signature]
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# SECRETEYES ONLY-2-3. Inadvertent Overflights by Reconnaissance AircraftColonel Steakley distributed a memorandum listing the four inadvertent overflights of Soviet territory by U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, since January 1961.He commented that in previous years the rate of such incidents was considerably higher. Mr. Bundy asked him to provide for the Group in the next week or so a recapitulation of such incidents, going back to approximately 1949.Colonel Steakley said that both CINCPAC and the Joint Reconnaissance Group believe that the incident of 10 April, when an ELINT aircraft flew over one of the Kuriles, appears to represent a violation of established procedures and instructions. CINCPAC has asked for a full report.Mr. McCone questioned the efficacy of the system of advising Special Group members of such incidents. Colonel Steakley said that a procedure has been specified and he undertook to provide a copy to Mr. Parrott for the information of the Group. He said that he would take special measures tomake sure that these instructions are followed.4. Cuban OperationsMr. FitzGerald expanded orally on the paper of 9 April, giving a summary of the recent results in the agent infiltration program, and outlining proposals in this field for the next month. The Group approved this projection. In response to a question about the status of Manolo Ray's people, Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA was in touch with him from time to time, and that any plan he has to offer for activity against Cuba will be sympathetically received, but that he has not to date come up with any such proposal.The comments from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, dated 11 April, on the three papers being considered at today's meeting were noted. The Group requested that these comments be withdrawn and destroyed for security reasons. With specific reference to the comment that a proposed sabotage action should not be carried out on the target date of the 20th or 21st of April, Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that this date had been set before the status of the Donovan negotiations was known. He said that of course no activity of this kind would be allowed to interfere with those negotiations at this stage.There then ensued a lengthy discussion of the entire question of sabotage. The Group agreed that the papers before it were responsive to requests which had been levied on CIA to come up with general and specific proposals. On the other hand, all members of the Group recognized that a searching examination must be undertaken in the lightEYES ONLY
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 18]
SECRETEYES ONLY- 3 -of all pertinent factors, to determine whether we wish to change the present policy. It was agreed that in order to provide a firm basis for judgment, we must get a clearer picture of capabilities, of the prospects of success, the extent of benefits to be gained from successful operations, the dangers of repercussions and of reprisals, etc., etc.With respect to external operations to be mounted by exile groups, it was agreed that this sort of activity poses a real dilemma. Particularly in view of the recently-enunciated policy toward exile raids, it becomes increasingly difficult to disavow plausibly responsibility for such acts. The U.S. is thus placed in the position of either appearing to be ineffective in controlling the exiles or of bearing the onus of active involvement in the operations.Mr. McCone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of proceeding with sabotage operations, to include training, until an over-all policy is made clear on steps to be taken to assure the removal of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro. He also commented on the ineffectiveness of Cuban agents and the fact that they would undoubtedly talk if captured. Mr. FitzGerald confirmed the second point, but felt that these particular Cubans are perhaps more effective than the usual run.It was decided that probably Friday, the 19th of April, a pre-sentation should be made to higher authority at which time all responsible individuals should have an opportunity to express their views. A paper will be prepared, outlining: a proposed broad program for sabotage as well as examples of specific operations; a sense of the scale of activity which could reasonably be expected and the benefits from it; an estimate of what could be achieved by the use of internal assets; possible repercussions; and how such activity would fit into overall policy. CIA is to coordinate with State in the preparation of this paper.5. Annexes to Internal Defense PlansThe Colombia annex was noted. In view of the fact that the basic IDP for Bolivia had earlier been remanded for revision by the Special Group (CI), the covert annex for that country was held over until the overt plan is considered by the CI Group.6. North Vietnam OperationsThe monthly report was noted and approved.SECRETEYES ONLY
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# SECRET EYES ONLY18 April 1963*ER-63-3278*MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 18 April 1963PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McConeThe Attorney General, General Taylor, Mr. Murrow, and Mr. FitzGerald were present for Item 1.## 1. Cuban OperationsMr. FitzGerald said that in view of the postponement of the meeting tentatively set for tomorrow with higher authority, the proposed sabotage actions for April will be cancelled and two caching operations, in Pinar del Rio and Matanzas, will be substituted. The Group approved this.Mr. FitzGerald told the Group that in view of the negative decision on balloons, he was proposing to dismantle the capability, which is expensive to keep in being. He said that if it were desired to start the program up at any time after dismantling, it would take about three months. A number of members of the Group felt that in a real crisis balloons could be of considerable value. Accordingly, it was agreed that balloons and helium should be stockpiled, with the idea that if a situation should arise in which balloons would be useful, launching could be accomplished by a U.S. vessel, without worrying too much about attribution under those circumstances. In commenting on his opposition to the earlier proposition, Mr. Murrow said that he believes that balloons can be useful as a part of an integrated program.The Group then turned to discussion of the papers from the Co-ordinator of Cuban Affairs dated April 16th, 17th, and 18th. It was noted that there had not been time for adequate staffing of these papers and that the principals had not been able to examine them carefully. In this connection, Mr. McCone said that he wanted the Office of National Estimates of CIA to review the papers, in light of their estimative content. It was thus agreed that the papers should be staffed and sharpened up for presentation at next week's meeting. Mr. Johnson suggested that a possible format might be to produce one paper which would be prefaced by the guidelines currently contained in the Coordinator's paper of April 18th. This would be followed by a summary of sabotage capabilities and the pros and cons of various types, and then recommendations.SECRETEYES ONLY
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# SECRET EYES ONLY- 2 -Mr. Bundy and Mr. McCone expressed some doubts as to whether we are in a position to decide major problems of this type until we have a clearer picture of what the over-all policy toward Cuba is likely to be for the next six months to a year and a half. Mr. Bundy pointed out that the noise level which would be involved in many of these proposals would be considerably more than it has been to date, and he felt that we must decide whether we are willing to accept this. He added that he did not feel that such a development would necessarily be bad, but it would certainly be different from the low-level activities prevailing now. He was not sure whether, or to what extent, it would be possible to embark on the activities proposed in the Coordinator's papers, without a drastic change in U.S. policy. In this connection, Mr. Johnson said that he particularly likes the proposals for supporting internal resistance operations, since these will not generate a high noise level.Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that the paper of April 17th, on a "Maximum Covert Action Program" consists basically of sabotage and harassment, plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who may be responsive to our advice but certainly not to our command. He mentioned some of the difficulties that would flow from supporting one group and not others. Mr. McCone said that if such groups become active, it will be obvious that they have U.S. support because it is well known that they do not have adequate assets now. He and Mr. Bundy agreed that, despite the fact that some Central American governments might be used as cutouts, the U.S. would be blamed for their activities and this must be clearly recognized before embarking on such a course. They felt additionally that we must be sure that such a program would contribute to over-all policy objectivęs.Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald referred to the CIA estimate that time istrunning in favor of Castro, and Mr. FitzGerald said that some of these activities are designed to slow down or possible stop the trend of events in his favor.It was noted that the program for shipping sabotage, which has already been approved, is in process of possible implementation. It was agreed that this process should not be interrupted2. Reconnaissance of Laos 98A COMOR paper, suggesting that certain targets in Southern Laos be included in the proposed missions for Northern Laos, was distributed and no objection was expressed to it. Mr. Bundy noted that he had not yet had an opportunity to clear the original proposal with higher authority.# SECRET EYES ONLY
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SECRETEYES ONLY25 April 1963MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 25 April 1963PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1-4.Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1-5.Mr. Jorgensen was present for Item 3.Mr. Tweedy was present for Item 6.1. Forecast of NRO Activities for MayThis forecast was noted.2. Reconnaissance of Laos and VietnamMr. McCone referred to a paper prepared by the JCS at the request of the Secretary of Defense, outlining a possible schedule of reconnaissance missions over Laos and Vietnam, which seemed to Mr. McCone to be unduly heavy. Mr. Gilpatric explained that the paper had been drawn up as an annex to a draft contingency plan, and was responsive to a direct request from the Secretary of Defense to indicate a sizeable capability for high-level reconnaissance for intelligence purposes. Mr. Gilpatric added that it is clearly understood that such activity would not represent a "show of force," and that the latter would require low-level activity. Mr. McCone agreed with this point and emphasized the unusual sensitivity of any high-level reconnaissance of denied areas.Mr. Gilpatric assured the Group that these plans are all of a contingency nature and that at this point they are by no means approved.3. Proposed "Feint" Operations, GROSBEAKMr. Jorgensen summarized the paper of the 22nd of April. He said that these proposals are frankly regarded as experimental.
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SECRETEYES ONLY- 2 -98Colonel Steakley said that from the JCS point of view, suchfeints might represent a tactical advantage, in that they coulddivert enemy defenses from actual operations. On the other hand,the JCS procedures are designed so as not to be provocative inconnection with peripheral and BOW TIE missions. He felt that thisproposal, which is frankly designed to be provocative, could havethe effect of inducing quicker and more intensive reaction to theJCS flights.On the understanding that the feint activities would be closelycoordinated with military missions in the area, it was agreed thatthe proposed program should be tried for the month of May. At theend of this period, a report on the results will be made to theSpecial Group.4. Low-Level Reconnaissance, Cuba98The DCI said the USIB unanimously reaffirmed yesterday thepriority intelligence requirements for low-level coverage of Cuba.Mr. Bundy added that there is high-level interest in reviewing thissituation.Mr. Johnson said that in the view of the Bureau of Intelligenceand Research of the State Department, the Soviets would interpreta resumption of low-level flights as an indication of the adoptionby the U.S. of a harder line toward Cuba. More significantly,Ambassador Thompson is very much opposed to such resumption at thistime; he feels that this could result in a reduction in the rate ofwithdrawal of Soviet troops or a Soviet decision to withdraw none atall in the future, and it might affect Soviet policy in Laos in amanner adverse to U.S. interests. The importance of the Harrimanmission with respect to this last proposition was noted. Mr. Johnsonsaid we should know the results of the Harriman mission in a day ortwo.It was agreed that the matter would be discussed with higherauthority this afternoon.5. Proposed New Policy and Program toward CubaMr. McCone opened the discussion of this topic by pointing outthat the overt and multilateral pressures now being applied to Cubaare useful; on the other hand, while they will slow Castro down theywill not hurt him critically, and the interest of our allies inmaintaining such pressures will almost certainly erode as time passes.Similarly, any sabotage program can hurt the Castro government, butnot lethally; and in order to be effective at all, it must be done onSECRETEYES ONLY/mc
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# SECRETEYES ONLY-3-a continuing basis and cannot be subjected to a stop-and-go treatment.The DCI went on to say that any such activity is bound to be attributedto the United States and if we are to carry through with it, we mustbe prepared to accept the accompanying noise level. He said that asabotage program will not be entirely beneficial to U.S. interests;on the minus side, there is the fact that this will complicate therunning of intelligence operations and it could result in Cubanretaliation. Additionally, Mr. McCone said he is not in favor ofextreme types of sabotage such as complete destruction of crops,contamination of water supplies, etc. He would prefer open inter-vention to this kind of thing.The DCI said that the combination of economic and otherpressures with sabotage activities, might provide a feasible climatefor a successful attempt to fragment the Castro organization. Heforesaw the possibility of such fragmentation leading to assumptionof power by a military dictatorship, which would probably be friendlyto the U.S. In this connection, Mr. FitzGerald said that we havea line on certain high-ranking officers who are not entirely sympa-thetic to the regime. He pointed out, however, that a major opera-tional obstacle to capitalizing on this situation is the difficultyof persuading individual Cubans of this type to place their trustin each other. In addition, we will have to be able to assure themthat the U.S. will be sympathetic to possible successors to the pre-sent government, even though such people may have been former Castrosupporters.Mr. FitzGerald touched on the proposed support to selected Cubanexile groups, for autonomous operations, as being one of the key pointsof the possible new program. He made the point that there is no usein the U.S. trying to deny that it backs such operations, since itwill be accused of this in any case, and the accusations will begenerally believed; further, such a posture is not detrimental to U.S.interests. Mr. Bundy agreed with this point. He added, however,that a "scenario" will have to be worked out, clearly indicating whoin the government should respond to accusations in this field andwhat in general they should say.Mr. Bundy questioned a statement in the paper to the effect thatcovert action which might be used as a pretext for overt militaryintervention is ruled out. Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald said thatthe purpose of this statement was to indicate that the covert programis not specifically directed toward the end of providing such apretext, but that it is not intended to preclude such a situation ifit should turn out to be desirable at some time in the future.Mr. FitzGerald then described a number of possible sabotageoperations. In this connection, he pointed out that the paper con-tains a proposal for the placing of limpets, carrying suitable delaymechanisms, on the outside of Cuban ships so as to explode at sea.SECRETEYES ONLY
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13-00000SECRETEYES ONLY- 4 -He noted that Secretary Vance does not particularly like this pro-position because of the possibility that the explosions would beattributed to torpedoes. While recognizing the validity of Mr.Vance's argument, Mr. Gilpatric felt that this risk was acceptable.The Chairman summed up the preliminary reactions of the Group tothe proposals as follows:a. The proposition for dealing with selected exile groupsis a good one, but the method of dealing with them will have to bemore carefully defined.b. There is no objection to limpets, subject to furthertechnical studies.c. Surface attacks on Cuban ships do not appear particularlyattractive, nor do shore-based attacks of a similar nature.d. Externally mounted hit-and-run attacks against landtargets appear worthwhile. The operations in this category whichcan be run in May, will be discussed with higher authority. Refineriesand power plants seem to be particularly good targets. Operationsof this kind will be especially valuable if done in conjunction withother resistance activities.e. Internal resistance should be stimulated, again inconjunction with related operations.6. Covert Action, CongoThe CIA paper of 19 April was approved with little discussion.The Chairman said that his only concern was whether we are committedto spending money at this rate forever. Mr. Tweedy said first thatif the Adoula government should fall, it would probably be in theU.S. interest to support a successor government in a somewhat similarway and, secondly, he pointed out that there are no firm commitmentsmade, although of course the recipients do come to expect a subsidy.Mr. Bundy said he would mention this project to higher authority.7. Final Status Report, Italian Election ProjectMr. McCone ran over the highlights of the prognostication forthe Italian elections, as summmarized in the CIA paper of the 22nd ofApril. He noted that virtually all the allocated money will havebeen passed by this time. Mr. Bundy said that the CIA forecast isgenerally consistent with reports he has had from Italian sources.
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13-00000SECRETEYES ONLY- 5 -8. British GuianaMr. McCone said that representatives of CIA and of MI-6 are scheduled to meet on the 30th of April and the first of May. They will consider: an up-to-date assessment of the situation; a proposed British operational plan; alternative proposals if thispplan proves not feasible; identification of Indians who might provide alternative leadership to Jagan; the division of operational responsibility; and an inventory of operational assets.The DCI said it is estimated that a continuation of the current strike would require expenditures on the order of $10,000 a day. The Group felt that if this could result in the defeat of Jagan, it would be well worth it. Accordingly, Mr. McCone undertook to look into the situation immediately and to assure that support for the strike is not cut off, pending a broader decision. He said he might see James Fulton of MI-6, during his forthcoming trip to Europe, to coordinate views.Thomas A. ParrottDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McConeSECRETVP