Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 84]
TOP SECRETplan, the overall budget for the remainder of FY '60,and FY '61 of $4.4 million was approved with thecaveat that should there be cost overruns, these couldbe drawn up from the Agency's reserve for contingen-cies.** A copy of the approved Program of Covert Action  Against the Castro Regime is given as Appendix B.  (Appendix B, page 300). The reader is also  urged to examine Appendix C, a set of correspondence  between the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh  Burke, and Livingston Merchant, the Undersecretary of  State for Political Affairs. (Appendix C  page 311.) Admiral Burke apparently had become ex-  tremely agitated about the rise of Castro to power  in Cuba; and on 26 February of 1960, he had forwarded  a paper on US action in Cuba, to both Secretary Merchant  and also to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for  International Security Affairs, Irwin, in which the  Navy's senior officer took it upon himself to examine  the various options available to the United States to  reassert itself in the Western Hemisphere vis-a-vis  the growth of Communist power represented by Castro.  Admiral Burke outlined a series of options that were  available to the United States, such as multilateral  action through the OAS, unilateral overt action by  the US, or covert unilateral action by the US.Leaning heavily on both the Monroe Doctrine andArticle 5 of the Inter-American Treaty of ReciprocalAssistance (the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of 1947) Burkemade a series of recommendations covering the sameground propaganda, organization of the anti-Castroexiles who were in the US, or direct US military inter-vention which had already been considered at highlevels and were already familiar to both SecretariesMerchant and Irwin. On 10 March 1960, Merchant repliedto Burke's memorandum noting "a marked degree of simi-larity in the suggestions of the Navy and of our peoplehere concerning the need to reverse the trend in Cubaand the methods which are best calculated to achieve(footnote continued on following page)- 76 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 85]
# TOP SECRETWith reference to his action of 17 March 1960,President Eisenhower subsequently wrote:this result." Merchant then went on to review thebidding that had already been done, particularly inthe Special Group, on the question of how to handleCastro, emphasizing, of course, that State was verymuch concerned that precipitate action against Castro'sgovernment would work, if not immediately, certainlyin the long run, to the detriment of the United States,particularly in its relations to the other governmentsof Latin America.Whether the response did not satisfy AdmiralBurke or whether he sincerely believed that the Navy,more than any other US Agency, should be principallyresponsible for setting US policy toward Cuba is notknown. In any event, on 16 March 1960, he forwardedanother set of proposals for US action in Cuba to bothGordon Gray, the Special Assistant to the Presidentfor National Security Affairs, and to Allen W. Dulles.Burke's comments on the transmittal sheets to thesetwo individuals are interesting. To National SecurityAdviser Gray he wrote:Dear Gordon: Enclosed is my copy of amemorandum on U.S. Action in Cuba whichmay be of interest to you. Sincerely yours,Arleigh Burke.To the Director of Central Intelligence he wrote:Dear Allen: Enclosed is a memorandummy Staff prepared containing some sugges-tions which might be useful to you in yourwork. Naturally, I do not agree withquite all the comments contained in thememorandum but I know that you will for-give the impatient young lad for his de-sire to make sure no opportunity is leftuncovered. Warm regards. Sincerely,Arleigh Burke.Why one of the recipients was cautioned about "the im-patient young lad" and the other was not is something(footnote continued on following page)-- 77 --TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 86]
# TOP SECRETOn March 17, 1960, less than two weeks after my return from Puerto Rico, I ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to begin to organize the training of Cuban exiles, mainly in Guatemala, against the possible future day when they might return to their homeland. More specific planning was not possible because the Cubans living in exile had made no move to select from among their numbers, a of a mystery. Certainly the proposals by one J. E. Pond, Jr., reflect at least, Pond's youth and immaturity. For among other things in his memorandum, Mr. Pond suggested that the Navy: "Accept Mr. Merchant's offer in his letter of March 10 to Admiral Burke of a complete briefing of State Department activities vis-a-vis the Cuban situation in an effort to prod State to move faster." Or, with reference to action that the State Department should take, he suggested: "Brief all individuals and groups of U.S. nationals going to Latin America on the Kommunist [sic] threat in Cuba for further dissemination to host country personnel." Two items which had not appeared in other of the papers related to the evolution of US policy to oust Castro which were introduced by Mr. Pond, were that the IADB (Inter-American Defense Board) become involved in the anti-Castro effort -- an exceedingly naive suggestion considering that the members of this group were far from unanimous in condemning the Castro Revolution. And the second unique contribution of this paper which Admiral Burke saw fit to forward to two very senior members of the Executive Branch, was the spelling throughout the paper of Communist with a "K". These last proposals that Admiral Burke had forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence ended up in the files of Chief, Western Hemisphere Division. The memorandum having been sent down from Mr. Bissell's office, with the following notation to Col. King:Admiral Burke sent this over to the Director on the afternoon of 17 March, and the latter handed [it] to me. I do not believe it requires a reply, but pass it to you for any value it may have.- 78 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 87]
13-00000# TOP SECRETleader whom we could recognize as thehead of a government in exile.* 52/* In preparing this comment, the former President ap-  parently had to call on his own memory, on the memory  of Gen. Goodpaster, and the memory of Gordon Gray.  Based on his own recollections Eisenhower said that  neither his own nor Goodpaster's records contained  anything about the 17 March 1960 meeting. Similarly,  Gordon Gray wrote to Eisenhower:You may recall that not so very longafter I became your Special Assistant, ina meeting you had with Allen Dulles andme you gave instructions that activitiesof the so-called "Special Group" shouldnot be recorded in any place except thefiles of the Director of the Central In-telligence Agency. You did not wish thatthere be other copies. It was for thisreason that I did not seek a copy of theMarch 17th paper for my files, nor did Imake notes at that meeting.Subsequent to March 17th, I began tomake memoranda of every meeting on thatparticular subject because I had a hunchthat someday these might be important, andI intended to put them in your hands at theappropriate time, understanding, of course,that you might wish to have them destroyed.Incidentally, there were no carbons orother copies made of these memoranda. Bynot making copies, and by planning to putthe documents in your own hands for what-ever disposition you wished to make ofthem, I sort of rationalized my violationof your instructions about not making suchmemoranda. I hope I need not assure youthat it was not my practice to violateyour instructions and this is the onlyinstance of such that I can recall. 53/- 79 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 88]
TOP SECRETB. Forging the ToolFollowing President Eisenhower's approval of the anti-Castro program which had evolved from the numerous discussions, meetings, and briefings previously mentioned, the Agency's leadership then faced the problem of acting directly to implement the anti-Castro program. Problems which had been discussed philosophically prior to this time now had to be put to the test of practicality. Among the problems of principal importance during the period from March to September 1960 were the following:*   The establishment of the leadership of WH/4 and the acquisition of personnel for WH/4;*   Extensive coordination between Agency representatives and representatives of other US Government Agencies and, at the same time, a high level of intra-Agency coordination.*   The initiation of a paramilitary training program for those Cubans who would be directly involved in helping to dispose of the Castro Government:*   Attempting to establish project parameters and to give proper consideration to possible changes in the concept of the program as time passed;- 80 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 89]
# TOP SECRETAnd, finally, to retain the credibility andviability of the operation despite numerous wildhaired proposals that were being put forward at vari-ous times during the months under study -- proposalswhich never should have been offered let alone givenany serious consideration.As previously noted, WH/4 was established byCol. King in January of 1960; however, it was notuntil 24 March 1960 that Mr. Bissell apparently of-ficially got around to approving the new Branch, forin a memorandum for the Deputy Director for Support(DDS), it was noted:The SSA-DDS has advised of the DDP'sapproval of the creation of a new opera-tional Branch, the abolishment of anexisting Section, and the creation of anew Section within the WH Division Head-quarters Staffing complement.The 15 new positions required by the Branch would bemore than offset by the decrease in the DDP complement.The same memorandum indicated that the Wage andSalary Division of the Office of Personnel had approvedthe various grades that had been proposed and then thememorandum went on to state:The approval limits the usage of therequested positions to the duration of the- 81 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 90]
13-00000# TOP SECRETCuban crisis; after which all the positions in the new Branch and Section will be re- viewed for reclassification purposes. 54/The question of financing and budget for project JMATE had already caused concern among those responsible for the formulation of the anti-Castro policy, and soon after the President's approval of the project, the question of budget and finance surfaced. By 24 March 1960, the Deputy Director for Support noted that:"Jack Earman advised me that the Director had approved of the paper calling for the release of $900,000 from the reserve for Project JMARC." 55/ Indeed the Director had signed such a paper calling for the $900,000 as "an unprogrammed requirement for which other funds are not available." 56/In his memo to the Comptroller concerning the release of funds from the Agency reserve, the Director was also careful to point out that it would be the responsiblity of Chief, WH Division to certify that the funds had been expended as specified for the project; that additionally, the DDP or his designee would have to approve each certification; that the only Headquarters file on the budget for the project would be maintained by WH/Division; and that the- 82 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 91]
TOP SECRETfile would be complete as to the purpose of the expenditure, the date, those who were involved as payees, and any other details; and finally that access to this financial file would be "limited to persons specifically authorized by the Deputy Director (Plans)."*[^57]In the first meeting following the Presidential approval of the anti-Castro program, Jake Esterline called the members of WH/4 together to announce that the program had been given the crypt of JMARC; and he further pointed out that 1 May 1960 was the target date for the beginning of training at Fort Randolph in Panama. (This date was predicated on the assumption of a satisfactory report from the Inspection Team which was to travel to Fort Randolph on 27 March.) Medical and security officers were to be assigned to the training base and the communications link was to be established with Headquarters. In this early* Unlike some suggestions that had been forwarded by the WH/4 Finance Officer, Michael King, the Director's Memorandum placed budgetary responsibility with the DDP and Chief, WH Division. Chief, WH/4 was not even included on the routing for the Director's Memorandum. The WH/4 Financial Officer, on the other hand, had suggested that certain of the responsibilities for approval of funding be given to the project Chief, or the Chief, WH/Division.[^58]- 83 -TOP SECRET[^57]: [^58]:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 92]
13-00000TOP SECRETmeeting, Esterline emphasized that training at theFort Randolph and Fort Sherman areas of Panama wasgoing to be extremely limited; and since there wouldbe no training areas in the United States, thirdcountry training activities would need to be estab-lished. He emphasized again that secrecy was ofparamount importance if the operation was to succeed,and stressed that the establishment of a Government-in-exile was a key point to making the planned opera-tion credible. Esterline further indicated that sucha government hopefully could be announced by the earlypart of April and that the Headquarters for such agovernment could be located either in Puerto Rico orCosta Rica.Esterline also made an appeal for personnel tostaff both the Panama training activity and Base Two,the Coral Gables Headquarters which later would beknown as JMWAVE. One interesting point made at thisfirst meeting was that:Mr. [Scudder) Georgia reported thatthe DDS Offices concerned had nominatednearly all of the personnel required by1 and 15 April respectively. Action wasbeing taken to make all these availableat once ... [and] it was agreed that DDSrepresentatives would meet once a week- 84 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 93]
TOP SECRETto review activities, determine the status of commitments, and prepare a brief report for Chief, Branch 4. 59/In another Branch meeting soon after the one just mentioned, Esterline reemphasized, as he and others would do throughout the course of the operation, the need for security practices designed to protect the fact of Agency involvement in this covert operation. He also indicated the considerable degree of cooperation which already was being required from other services. Dave Phillips provided a specific example of this, emphasizing that without the close cooperation of the United States Navy, it would have been difficult to transport the two radio transmitters which were going to be installed on Swan Island. Moreover, Phillips reported that a crew of Seabees would be responsible for constructing the facilities to house the transmitters and the quarters for personnel who would conduct the propaganda effort from Swan Island. Because the activities then established on Swan Island were under the control of the Federal Aviation Administration, C. Tracy Barnes (the A/DDP/A) was to meet with the Director of FAA, Gen. Elwood Quesada, to clear with him the problems that were- 85 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 94]
13-00000TOP SECRETinvolved in establishing this Agency activity on theisland. 60/ Coordination also had to be effectedwith the United States Coast Guard in order thatthere be no interference with maritime activities;and the Immigration and Naturalization Service wasalerted to the need to facilitate the entry of Cubandefectors. 61/As attempts were being made to establish theparameters for the operations against Castro, a mostprescient memorandum was directed to Chief, WH/4from Paul Oberst, Chief, Covert Action, WH Division.Oberst apparently had been associated with PBSUCCESS,the project which resulted in the ouster of the ArbenzGovernment in Guatemala in 1954; and recalling someof the "pitfalls and counter-productive aspects" ofthat particular operation, Oberst wrote as follows:I have the impression that our basicJMARC plan commits us to a rather firmtimetable. In my judgment, we shouldhave great flexibility in deciding theappropriate time for kicking off anyparamilitary operations. Before suchoperations are initiated, we should havefirm evidence that our propaganda andpolitical action operations have irrev-ocably undermined Castro's prestige,both in Cuba and abroad. We should notinitiate paramilitary actions until weare convinced that they will not enable- 86 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 95]
13-00000TOP SECRETCastro to recuperate lost prestige and rally local and foreign sympathy and support. Generally speaking, current area attitudes toward the Castro regime are satisfactory from our (CIA) point of view. However, this could change radically and rapidly, if there are any premature paramilitary actions. When the time comes for paramilitary activity, we should make every effort to conceal any invasion actions. To avoid or minimize Castro's counter propaganda, the paramilitary operations must appear to be an internal uprising by dissident elements within Cuba. This, of course, would require clandestine infiltration of personnel and arms before the hostitlities begin.In my opinion, Castro will inevitably charge the US with responsibility for JMARC operations, and many Latin Americans and other foreign observers will be inclined to accept such charges with or without supporting evidence. Therefore, what we need is a massive diversionary effort that will either obscure the fact of our involvement or make our involvement palatable. This diversionary tactic might be accomplished by exploiting unanimous Latin American revulsion toward the Trujillo regime ... If it became known, or strongly suspected, that we were supporting operations to bring about a transition to democratic government in the Dominican Republic, the waters would be suitably muddied, and a climate prepared for the Cuban effort.* 62/* Debatable though Oberst's philosophy regarding the Dominican Republic might be, serious attention to his initial comments regarding paramilitary activities against Castro might have halted -- or at least seriously altered -- the operations which would ultimately conclude at the Bahia de Cochinos. As with other of the cautionary and restrained proposals which would be put forth prior to launching the invasion, little heed (footnote continued on following page)- 87 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 96]
# TOP SECRETIn mid-April of 1960 WH/4 made the first presen-tation for the DCI since the basic program had beenapproved by President Eisenhower in mid-March. Inattendance in addition to the DCI were: Gen. Cabell,Mr. Helms (C/OPS), Herman Horton (CI Staff), and C.Tracy Barnes, Mr. Bissell's Deputy. This high levelgroup was informed that broadcasting activity fromSwan Island was scheduled to begin on 17 May 1960 andthat very special operations were being carried outin order to provide stories for propaganda use. Ac-cording to Dave Phillips who made the presentationapparently was paid to Mr. Oberst's proposals.About the same time that Oberst's memorandumwas going forward, the DDP was calling for WH/4 toprepare daily progress reports as one way of eliminat-ing the need for crash-type responses or actions.In discussing the contents of such reports, it wasindicated that:The Progress Report should generallynot exceed one page in length, and thatwe should not hesitate to include it initems which were not favorable to ourprogress, in other words, setbacks orhandicaps which we might have encountered. [^63]Also, by way of keeping informed about develop-ments related to the operation, Chief WH/4 instituteda series of weekly meetings with the operational ele-ments of the DDP "for the purpose of insuring opera-tional coordination similar to that achieved by themeeting of support elements every Tuesday morning." [^64]-- 88 --TOP SECRET[^63]: [^64]:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 97]
TOP SECRETon propaganda, excellent results were being obtained. The reports on the evolution of the government in exile and the buildup of the stay-behind network and on paramilitary activity indicated that much work still remained to be done to get these activities off the ground. Further, it was pointed out to the DCI and the DDCI that budget estimates were rapidly escalating, principally because:Direct costs of nonexpendable equipment [were] being charged against the project which, in fact, was the major cause of the project's over-obligation. It was the opinion of all concerned that such property should be held on a Memorandum Receipt basis without cost to the project, and that charges, if any, should be reflected as direct costs only if property was found unserviceable or was not returned to communications stock supply after the project is terminated. The DCI was advised that this matter would be discussed with the Comptroller for resolution. [^65]Most important in connection with this briefing, was the DCI's comment that:With respect to personnel needs, he assured all, no matter whether personnel were overseas or in the US, he would arrange to obtain personnel required in support of JMARC. [^66]The meaning of Chief/WH/4's comments to the DCI, was made quite clear within a few days when Admendment No. 1 to the project was submitted to the Director[^65]: /[^66]: /TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 98]
TOP SECRETfor approval. The amendment concerned the need for more money and pointed out that:Not only has the initial $900,000 already been expended, but it is currently estimated that an additional $1.0 million is immediately required to carry the activity through 30 June 1960 ... Note is also made ... of possible contingencies amounting to an additional $1.4 million for which no funds are requested at this time. [^67]In addition to an early updating for the DCI, WH/4 also undertook to educate the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban problem very soon after the Eisenhower approval of the anti-Castro program. On 8 April 1960, General Cabell headed a CIA delegation including Mr. Bissell, Col. King, and Jake Esterline which briefed a very high level group of Department of Defense representatives in the JCS conference room at the Pentagon.* General Cabell made only introductory remarks, and the bulk of the briefing was conducted by Mr. Bissell with some assistance from[^67]: Included among the Defense participants were Thomas Gates, Secretary of Defense; Gen. Twining, Chairman, JCS; Gen. Shoup, Commandant U.S. Marines; Admiral Burke; CNO; General Erskine, Chief, Special Ops, U.S. Army; Gen. White, COS/USAF; and Gen. Woolnough, representing COS/Army. [^68][^68]: /TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 99]
# TOP SECRETJ. C. King. Apparently Jake Esterline, the man whohad the monkey on his back as project chief satquietly by.The suggestion which had been made by PaulOberst that the "waters be muddied" by making itappear that the US was backing the anti-Trujilloforces in the Dominican Republic was not introducedduring the course of this briefing of the JCS, eventhough the Dominican Republic was included as a partof the overall briefing. What did emerge with refer-ence to the Dominican Republic was a concensus thatif Trujillo were ousted, there was a strong possibilitythat Castro might move into the Dominican Republicwhere he probably would be received as a conqueringhero.In the course of the discussion which followedthe briefing, Admiral Burke emerged as the principal"hawk," indicating his willingness to move fleet unitsinto the Port au Prince, Haiti area because the sug-gestion had been made that if Castro went into theDominican Republic it would only be a few days timebefore he also would be welcomed into Haiti. In ad-dition, Burke made it quite clear that should the- 91 -# TOP SECRET