Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 9]
SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN                                                                                                                              NO.279 P.11had to be reviewed, and not only for the purpose of determining what it was all about. Significant segments of this material, it was discovered, were unique to the CI Staff and had never been integrated into the DO file and records system. Information from the mail-intercept program, for example, was indexed inside the CI Staff, but reflected nowhere outside. Other material largely duplicated files maintained by other elements. Some files contained mostly press clippings. Decisions had to be made and action taken, item by item, on indexing, transfer of files, determinations of what needed to be retained and what could or should be destroyed, etc. As the magnitude of this task became evident, arrangements were made for personnel from IMS to be detailed to the staff on a long-term basis to go through the material.In a vaulted area across from Angleton's office a couple of safes were found for which no combination could be located, and which accordingly had to be drilled by specialists from the Office of Security. Kalaris rejects as untrue the image conveyed in Mangold's book about Angleton that has him personally leading SWAT teams of safecrackers as they went about opening the Angleton safes,* but it is correct that he was present during the drilling. He had never seen this operation performed before, and was interested to observe how it was done.Some curious and some disquieting things turned up as the new team gradually made its way through the CI Staff premises.--On the lighter side, in one safe two Bushman bows and some arrows were found. Concerned about the possibility that the arrows might be poisoned, Kalaris had them sent--* Tom Mangold, *Cold Warrior*, Simon & Schuster, 1991, pp. 327-330SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 10]
SEP. 28.1998 3:33PM A SECRET SENSITIVE NUFUKN NO.279 P.12very carefully--to OTS for examination. When they were returned, with a judgment that they were harmless, Kalaris gave them to Angleton as a personal memento.* CI Staff Memo CI 136-75, 10 July 1975SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 11]
SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN--In a more serious vein, files were found on theassassinations of President John F. Kennedy and his brotherRobert F. Kennedy. These included autopsy pictures of theremains of Robert Kennedy. Although Nosenko's account ofthe KGB's involvement with Lee Harvey Oswald and his denialthat the KGB had anything to do with the murder of JohnKennedy might reasonably explain an Angleton interest in theJohn Kennedy assassination, neither Kalaris nor Blee, withwhom Kalaris consulted on this bizarre finding, had any ideawhy Angleton had the pictures. Neither could they think ofany reason why it was appropriate for CI Staff files tocontain them. They were accordingly destroyed.--Angleton's dogged pursuit, inspired by Golitsyn andhis theories, of Soviet intelligence penetration of CIA hadled to secret investigations, stretching over a period ofmany years, of over forty serving CIA officers. Known asthe HONETOL cases, and later sometimes referred to in thepopular literature as the Great Molehunt, this activity hadproduced extensive files in the CI Staff.* In addition,several hundred files were found on American citizens whowere not CIA personnel but on whom Golitsyn analysis hadsimilarly cast some sort of KGB shadow. Among the mostnoteworthy of these were files on W. Averell Harriman andHenry Kissinger. Most of these files were composed entirelyof newspaper reports and a few FBI reports.--Classified materials, in quantities that ultimatelyfilled several packing boxes, were eventually found inGolitsyn's possession at his upstate New York farm house.Some of this material consisted of personnel-type files onCIA staff officers. Golitsyn, who resisted returning thesedocuments when Kalaris sent people to retrieve them,* The term "HONETOL," used as an acronym, allegedly derives  from a combination of parts of the last name of FBI Director  John Edgar Hoover and the first name of Soviet KGB defector  and Angleton guru Anatoliy Golitsyn.SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 12]
SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORNmaintained that Angleton and Miler had given these files to him to review and to keep as long as he needed them, and he was not finished with them yet. Ultimately, all the files that were found were retrieved from Golitsyn, though it has never been possible to be certain that this represented all the files that he in fact had.--A potentially explosive find surfaced in June: a bag of mail from the mail-intercept--HTLINGUAL--program. It had been the public exposé of HTLINGUAL and the MHCHAOS program, infiltration of domestic leftist and dissident groups in search of insidious foreign sponsorship, in a front page story by Seymour Hersh in *The New York Times* on 22 December 1974 that had precipitated Colby's decision to force Angleton's retirement, and led to establishment in 1975 of the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities in the United States, and the Church (Senate) and Pike (House) committees to investigate CIA and its activities. Both these programs had been CI Staff responsibilities. CIA was receiving letters from citizens who believed CÍA had intercepted their mail, a CI Staff representative had just finished briefing the Senate Select Committee Staff on the subject,[^1] and Colby on 10 July would be making a statement on the mail-intercept program before the Postal Facilities, Mail, and Labor Management Subcommittee of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee. The bag of mail was a hot potato.Kalaris's memorandum to ADDO Blee dated 3 July 1975 tells the story.**"1. In the course of preparing for a move of CI Project materials from one vault to another, we found, on top of a shelf, a dispatch [dated] 27 March 1972 from COS Panama City to Chief WE. This dispatch forwarded 114 items mailed from the Soviet Union to various persons in the U.S.[^1]: Ernest Tsikerdanos, CI 088-75, 17 June 1975**CI 113-75, 3 July 1975SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 13]
SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORNThese had been in a package delivered to a doctor in theCanal zone, who turned them over to the Station which inturn forwarded them to Headquarters. The dispatch waspassed to CI Staff by WH Division in 1972. A note on thedispatch indicates that CI Staff took no action other thanto process the materials into its files; but the CI Projectcontinued to hold the originals. At the time CI Projecttheorized that a mailing label on a package from OlympusCorporation in New Hyde Park, New York, to the Canal zonedoctor had fallen off the package for the doctor, and beenerroneously fastened to the package containing the Sovietmail."2. This is the only case as far as we know in whichthe original mail has been held by this Agency. In allother cases we examined the mail, opened it surreptitiously,photographed it, and put it back into the mail channels fordelivery to the addressee. Thus, this presents us with apeculiar problem. The letters have all been opened with aletter opener. We do not know at what point along the waythe letters were opened.""3. We solicit your advice. There seems to be atleast two courses which we might pursue. We could sendthese items to the people to whom they are addressed, undercover of a letter explaining how we had acquired the mailand apologizing for our delay in forwarding it. Anothercourse of action would be to reinsert the mail into thepostal system by forwarding it under cover of a memorandumto the U.S. Postal Service. In the memorandum we wouldstate that the mail came into our hands overseas, and wasinadvertently held. The memorandum would further state thatthis Agency does not know at what point the mail was opened.""Attachments: 114 Items2 Hungarian Custom's [sic] DeclarationsSECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 14]
SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN1 U.S. Registered Mail/Return Receipt65 Post Cards25 Letters1 [Swedish Custom's (sic) Declaration"--The person who brought the letters to Kalaris, the supervisor of the summer employee who actually found them, was known to be an Angleton loyalist, and Kalaris could see a trap unfolding in front of him if he mishandled the matter. The deliverer could be expected to tell Angleton just what was done with the letters, and Angleton to find ways to exploit any ill conceived decisions. After due deliberation, the staff of the Senate committee was informed, and on 16 July, not quite two weeks after the initial memorandum on this subject, the DCI sent the mail to the Postmaster General under cover of a letter explaining the situation. The Postmaster General in turn sent a copy of this letter, along with the actual mail and a letter of his own, to each addressee. The Postmaster General's letter referred to "apparent interception and acknowledged retention of this mail by the CIA," and described the matter as "a serious violation of your rights" and "abuse of the mails."* In due course some of the recipients wrote letters to the DCI asking whether CIA had dossiers on them.In April a folder with some MORINE material was found in an R&A safe and delivered to McCoy, who, believing that he had stumbled upon an overlooked vein of counterintelligence gold, brought the matter to Kalaris's attention. MORINE in fact had not been overlooked by Angleton, but this was not apparent at the time. The discovery of this folder led to a memorandum to Nelson a few days later, entitled "Skeletons in the CIOPS Closet,"* CI 180-75, 15 August 1975SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 15]
SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORNthe staff, on its own and without coordination with the24division, had passed to foreign liaison a copy of a FISScontaining division-controlled NOFORN information.Paper and Records: Disposal and ReintegrationThe paper-and-records problem was high on the agenda ofissues that needed to be addressed. The quantity that theAngleton vaults and safes contained was almost overwhelming,and much of this had never been made available outside thestaff. Integration of this unique data into the DO recordssystem not only made common sense; it was an obviousprerequisite to the staff rejoining the directorate.Kalaris had no problem in principle with the concept ofkeeping certain information within the staff, as SE did withits AESTORAGE system, but the Angleton team had goneoverboard. Whether for reasons of bureaucratic style orfear of penetration of the Agency, information of all kindsand from all kinds of sources had been held privately. Allthis had first to be reviewed to identify what wasappropriate to retain and what was not, and the appropriatethen made retrievable.In the wake of the Rockefeller Commission investigationand the Church and Pike committee hearings, the Agency andthe DO were busy writing regulations and providingguidelines to operating elements on what was and was notproper activity, particularly vis-à-vis US persons. Forthe CI Staff, this heavily involved definitions of subjectsand activities that merited staff attention. ExecutiveOrders would later provide a framework, albeit oftenmaddeningly imprecise, for these questions, but the first ofthose addressing US foreign intelligence activitites, E.Ο.
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 16]
SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN11905, was not issued until February 1976.* In the meanwhile, advice from the Hill and the lawyers supplied the framework. And there appeared to be hundreds, perhaps thousands of files in the Angleton staff that had been created and maintained according to criteria, e.g., anticommunism, that did not fit these guidelines.Establishment of a guideline that counterintelligence files were not to be established and maintained solely on the basis of items in the press provided for elimination of a large percentage of the material that had been collected by the Angleton staff, prominent among this being files on Henry Kissinger, W. Averell Harriman, and some 30-40 US congressmen, among others. Common sense provided other working guidelines such as, for example, the simplistic role of thumb: if a file has some linkage to reality, retain it; if not, destroy it. People from RID were brought in to help decide what should go into the overall records system, and what did not belong there. Some of them effectively moved into the staff. And they were not the only outsiders to do this. In July 1975 the Department of Justice sent some lawyers to review the HTLINGUAL material, and when they discovered that there were 27 boxes of it in one of the staff vaults it was decided that the best place for them to do their work would be right there. Three desks were set up for them in the vault.Some statistics from monthly reports at the time give a glimpse of the Augean task of dealing with all of this paper and records.-- January 1976: Five Branch personnel spent 2-1/2 days reviewing all files held in the branch for a count ofSigned by President Gerald R. Ford, February 18, 1976.SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 17]
SEP.28.1998 3:37PM A NO.279 P.19how many of these files were on US citizens. Total count was 1,018 files on Americans.-- March 1976: All (41 linear feet) Golitsyn file material held in records center has been recalled and a review begun. In May six more feet were acquired from SE.1/-- July: CI/R&A Index currently contains about 255,000 cards, down over 11,000 in last ten months.-- August: Golitsyn material has now been consolidated; about 15 linear feet have been destroyed.-- September: Approximately 40,000 cards were destroyed; they duplicated a more complete index maintained by SE/CI.-- October: CI/R&A index has been purged of all cards duplicated in DO main index--over 12,000 cards were removed and destroyed.-- February 1977: Four ISG analysts were assigned to R&A to assist in the processing and integration of CI Staff records into the DO central system.The "HONETOL" files appalled the new CI staff in their} f numbers and, as they were read, their scope and the hollowness of the reeds upon which they had been built.*HONETOL had not yet become notorious to the outside world, but inside it was perceived as a problem of major proportions. If, on the one hand, these files actually* The term "HONETOL" meant Golitsyn leads to a penetration of the United States--CIA as well as other US institutions. This led to two kinds of files: the leads themselves, as Golitsyn provided and described them (e.g., a file on the lead "Sasha"); and files on suspects, i.e., persons suspected of being the subject of a lead. Actual leads were very few; suspects were very many.55SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 18]
SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORNcontained evidence of a penetration of CIA, this clearly was of vital importance. If, on the other hand, they did not, it was important that this be recognized and the files and suspicions appropriately dealt with. Julian Fox[^1] a lawyer by education who joined the staff in late summer 1975, was assigned to study these files. A procedure was developed whereby he reviewed each one by one, and prepared a summary of its contents. This went forward to Kalaris with, in each instance, a recommendation on the cover sheet for disposition. On file after file these cover sheets ended up saying the same thing: that the file had been reviewed, that the conclusion had been reached that there was nothing of merit in it, and the file should be destoyed. The review of the file on Richard Kovich, for example, which was eight pages long, was dated 22 December 1975.* Kalaris, concurring, sent it to Addo Blee with a handwritten note that the material in this case would be packaged and held with instructions that it should be destroyed as soon as the Senate released CIA from its embargo on destruction, and that the summary memo and cover sheet would constitute the only future record. The HONETOL files received steady but not priority attention. It took somewhat over a year for Fox[^1] to make his way through all of them. Nothing of merit was found in any of them.A special approach was developed to get the MORINE/ data into central indices. As a result of the compartmentation applied to MORINE in the Angleton staff, much of the existing MORINE information was squirreled away and not immediately appreciated. The rejuvenated exploitation program produced a flood of [ZRTAFFY] correspondence with field stations, but this was slow to yield indexable material. It was not until the end of 1975 that a focused* Richard Kovich was one of the three CIA staff officers most severely affected by the HONETOL witch-hunt.[^1]: Julian Fox
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 19]
SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORNanalytical effort on MORINE got underway. Beginning then with the cassette material (*CC CPSU*) International Department trainee names), and later with country summary reports when analysis and liaison feedback fleshed out an understanding of GRU residency personnel and operations, MORINE data were provided by the staff to SE Division, which in turn conveyed them on to RID under SE Division document (SX) numbers as *AESTORAGE* information. Names of GRU officers, code names and true names (where known) of agents and developmentals, support assets, etc. were indexed in this fashion.***People ResponsibilitiesThe Kalaris staff inherited responsibility for a handful of defectors and certain contract personnel who had been working for the Angleton staff. This responsibility was not particularly welcomed, but it had to be dealt with.The defectors were Golitsyn, Nosenko, Deryabin, and [^6] [^8] Rastvorov, and a former [^7] Romanian intelligence officer by the name of [^6] Constantin Dumitrachescu, also known as [^1] MHPIVOT/1.The Soviets were well known, at least by reputation, to the SE alumni on the staff, but the [^8] Romanian was a total surprise. They had never heard of him.*In early 1972 the [^24] Israeli internal service (Shin Bet) had approached CIA through Angleton and asked for assistance in arranging the defection and resettlement of[^6]: *Chief, SE (Blee) had been aware of [^6] Dumitrachescu's defection at the time, and had deduced, and ultimately obtained confirmation from the DDO, that Angleton had arranged to bring him to the United States and had him squirreled away.
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 20]
# SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORNThis would suggest that Angleton may have lacked the opportunity that others had had to observe the kinds of behavior Soviet defectors have displayed in sorting out who the important players are in matters affecting their future, and figuring out how to deal with them.*--In the eyes of some who knew him, Angleton viewed himself more as chief of an operational entity than of a staff. Few gave him high marks as an effective staff, as opposed to operations, officer. His secret travels in Western Europe, not to mention to Israel, to meet with senior liaison officials with whom he had developed confidential relationships constituted a form of independent operational activity. The proposal, ultimately stillborn, in 1965 for Angleton to develop special counterintelligence units in Vietnam** displayed certain parallels with his conduct of counterintelligence abroad as Chief of the CI Staff in the way in which the local station would be effectively cut out and command channel and communications would run direct to counterintelligence headquarters in Washington. The proposed special counterintelligence (SCI) units for Vietnam were modeled after SCI units employed by X-2, the counterintelligence arm of the wartime OSS--where Angleton began his intelligence career. Perhaps those early experiences shaped in some way Angleton's later preference for conducting counterintelligence--by himself, without involvement of the area divisions and stations....and What To Do About It: Game planThe PlanIn assessing the state of affairs in the staff, it did,[^1]: Angleton may have had some exposure, probably during the 1950s, to pre-War (1938) KGB defector Aleksandr Orlov.[^2]: As described in Cleveland C. Cram's history of the CI Staff (to 1974), Vol.X, pp. 1004 ff
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 21]
streamline our procedures."*By 1976 the office of the Executive Officer of the Staff included a Privacy Act Section with four positions in addition to a three-person Records and Registry Section. (FOIA and Privacy Act requests were handled together.) But this by no means solved the problem. In the fall of 1977, as DO ceiling and personnel reductions were being meted out and the staff was trying to gear itself to getting along with less, the DDO was advised that the staff's Privacy Act Section was so strained and its personnel under so much pressure that henceforth it would not accept deadlines imposed by elements outside the staff. When requirements were received, the section would advise the requester how much time would be required to complete the work.But normal FOIA and Privacy Act requests were not all; there were also specialty requests that had to be met. All had the common denominator of the staff's unique files and records. These included such matters as:-- FOIA requests for information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald.** Handling these required the creation of a task force of 13 operations officers and analysts, plus clerical personnel, and their full-time efforts for over a month.-- Requests for interviews and/or information from the Senate and House Select Intelligence Committees, and the Department of Justice.-- A review of the Rosenberg case by a Federal court, which caused problems with regard to related VENONA* CI 131-75, 9 July 75** Nosenko's assertion that he was familiar with the KGB'S assessment of and involvement with Oswald in the Soviet Union had led to endless debriefing, analysis, and cross-checking research on this subject.
[104-10301-10011.pdf — page 22]
SEP.28.1998 3:41PM A SECRET SENSITIVE NOFORN NO.279 P.24United States: "In each case you open a file on there mustbe a demonstrable *CI* interest. Please assure that thisguideline is followed meticulously."## Double Agent BranchWas charged with the conduct of and coordination on double agent operations abroad. Since the vast majority of DA cases were run by the US military services, the FBI, or--in some instances--foreign-liaison services, the branch was very heavily a coordinator rather than active runner of operations.## Area Operations BranchWas charged with coordination with the area divisions on matters of *CI* interest, and with stimulating *CI* disciplines and practices in the area divisions and field stations. The centerpiece of the branch's activity was management and conduct of the *CI* Survey program. Consisting itself only of the branch chief and two clericals, the branch staffed its survey teams with detailees from the area divisions and *CI* Staff officers borrowed from other branches of the staff, both Ops and R&A.## Counteroperations BranchWas charged with operations designed to counter and disrupt the activities abroad of foreign intelligence services inimical to US interests. Charles Anderson, an LA Division officer who was brought in to the staff by Sternfield to head the branch, had had considerable experience in CA operations, and the branch's activities reflected this background. Virtually all had a clear CA character, from promotion of a book about the Tupamaros and terrorism in Uruguay, to a press campaign in Europe designed to expose the Curiel apparatus as an instrument of Soviet intelligence, to a paper on the Cuban intelligence residency in Chile during the Allende regime. Primary orientation was toward Latin America, with heavy focus on terrorist organizations and activities. Anderson's operations tended to be highly imaginative, often complex.