Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 48]
TOP SECRETAnother of the questions which must be addressed in setting the stage of the Bay of Pigs operation is the failure of Richard Helms -- at that time Chief of Operations (COPS) for the DDP -- to become more than marginally involved in the Cuban project. Oral interviews again provided the best explanations, and, consequently, are entered into this record in rather full-detail. Dick Drain, who became COPS/WH/4, made the following comments:Helms was COPS [Chief of Operations]. Either on his own volition, which I suspect or on order -- which I doubt -- Dick Helms completely divorced himself from this thing. I mean absolutely! The one time that I heard from Helms during this entire project was ... I am sitting down there in my chair, as COPS of the project, on a Monday, having spent the entire goddamned weekend working with the guy who is now the head of MI-6 -- Maurice Oldfield, who was then the MI-6 resident in Washington -- trying to get an airplane and some Cubans out of Montego Bay before the Brits in Jamaica came back from their long weekend ... I am sitting there congratulating myself that the plane is out, and the Cubans are out, and the British are back, and it hasn't hit the fan, and I get a telephone call from Dick Helms's long time secretary, "Mr. Helms would like to speak to you." Well, fine ... well, the whole thing on his part was so ... to me ... incredibly apologetic ... three times he said to me in different parts of the conversation ... "As you know, I have nothing to do with this project." What he did have to do with, ever since-- 40 --TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 49]
# TOP SECRETthe Francis Gary Powers thing, he hadbeen a member of an inter-Agency com-mittee that met with periodic regularityto discuss air matters of any sensitivity.I guess he'd had enough to do with thisproject so that somebody [who] had [been]reading the cable traffic told him ..."Well, those nuts down in Quarters Eyeseem to have lost an airplane this week-end." He was going to the regular com-mittee meeting that afternoon, so he hadto ask me the details ... very apologetic-ally. The third time that he said, "Youknow I have nothing to do with thisproject," I said, "Well Mr. Helms, I don'twant to be fatuous about this, but I wishto Christ that you did have because wecould use your expertise." He said,"Hahaha ... yes, well thank you very much,"and that was the end of that. He avoidedthe thing like the plague. One of thereasons may have been that, of course,life went on; and if Bissell was gettingincreasingly immersed in this one thing,somebody had to watch the whole worldwidestore ... which of course Helms was damnedgood at. A less attractive suggestion isthat Helms figured that there was a highlikelihood that this thing would screw up,and he didn't want to have the tar babyaround him. I don't know. 11/Bissell, in responding to the question aboutHelms' role during the course of the Bay of Pigs, com-mented as follows:I think that he [Helms] saw most allof the cable traffic and I think he waspretty well informed as to what was goingon, very well informed; but he was reallyout of the line of command on this opera-tion. There was something of a tacitagreement between us, that he would bedevoting himself to a lot of the other on- 41 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 50]
# TOP SECRETgoing business of the DDP office, because this was taking a great deal of my time.Question: This was a tacit agreement, this wasn't a session in which you and Helms ...Bissell: Let me say this was probably not that explicit. I would make an observation here, and I don't want you to infer anything really beyond what it says, it was not particularly easy -- I did not find it particularly easy -- to discuss things clearly and derive a clear understanding with Dick [Helms] about the division of labor between us when he was my Deputy. I don't imply by this any sense of conflict or rivalry, but he would go ahead and handle certain kinds of matters, and I would go ahead and handle certain kinds of matters. We saw one another, of course, all the time. Quite often I would consult him about something that I was handling. I think rather less often he would consult me. I don't mean to imply however in that any kind of concealment from me -- I never had that feeling at all -- but it really was our habit during the whole time that we were in those positions that the division of labor between us was more tacit than explicit. [^1]Simultaneously with the decision to create a separate Branch in WH Division to handle the anti-Castro activity discussions were begun by both the Special Group 5412 and on an inter-agency basis as to the nature of the anti-Castro effort. Among the many questions raised early in the game was whether-- 42 --# TOP SECRET[^1]: 12/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 51]
TOP SECRETthe US program should be overt or covert, with theovert implications being the ultimate applicationof US military force to oust Castro. DCI Dullesemphasized that contingency planning should be under-taken by the Special Group, without necessarily in-volving either the President or the National SecurityCouncil.The Department of State was concerned that ifFidel Castro were deposed, perhaps his successors, CheGuevara and Raul Castro, would be even worse thanFidel. As reported in subsequent congressional reve-lations concerning CIA's role in assassination plots,it was during the Special Group Meeting of 13 January1960 that the Director of Central Intelligence "empha-sized that we do not have in mind a quick eliminationof Castro, but rather actions designed to enable re-sponsible opposition leaders to get a foothold."[^1]At this same Special Group Meeting, PresidentEisenhower's National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray,predicted with uncanny accuracy the situation whichwould ultimately develop as one of the key weaknessesin the whole concept of the Bay of Pigs Operation.According to the report on the Special Group Meeting:-- 43 --TOP SECRET[^1]: 13/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 52]
# TOP SECRETMr. Gray commented that a problem would be posed for administration officials if a decision should be taken to change our attitude toward Castro, as outlined earlier in the meeting. He acknowledged that any such decision must be kept highly secret, but he foresaw difficulties which would arise, for example, during testimony by the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury before Congress, at public gatherings, etc., if they should have to give an impression that the US was not doing anything about Cuba.[^1]This in fact, was the "damned if I do, damned if I don't" position in which Richard Nixon found himself in the Fall of 1960 and the position in which the United States found itself with reference to both the United Nations and the Organization of the American States throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs operation as the myth of "plausible deniability" overruled common sense. Following the initial Special Group meeting, there was a flurry of activity seeking some solid proposals; and in a CIA meeting of 21 January 1960, C. Tracy Barnes (the Assistant DDP for Action), J. C. King, Jake Esterline, and Dick Helms among others, discussed a whole series of issues which would be basic to the program from this time forward: identification of the principal Cuban leaders -- Ramon Barquin, Justo Carrillo, and Miro Cardona (who would eventually-- 44 --# TOP SECRET[^1]: 14/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 53]
13-00000# TOP SECREThead up the principal anti-Castro organization sup- ported by the Agency) were mentioned; radio propaganda operating out of either Third country or US areas was raised; the training program for both communica- tors and for PM trainers at Fort Randolph in the Canal Zone was discussed; and the possible acquisition of aircraft for support operations and the question of US business as a cover for the operations of the exile groups in the United States were all discussed. The possible involvement of US businesses to put overt pressure on the US government for the possible imposi- tion of economic sanctions and as a covert means of raising money for the support of Cuban exile organiza- tions also surfaced. This initial meeting also recog- nized the problem of trying to gain the support of the more liberal Latin American Governments (e.g., that of Betancourt in Venezuela). [^1]Al Cox, one of the senior officers in paramilitary operations was in attendance, and he would subsequently note:Stringent security precautions were placed on JMARC, including the exclusion of the PP Staff and other Agency compo- nents from all cable and dispatch traffic and from access to correspondence between- 45 -# TOP SECRET[^1]: 15/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 54]
# TOP SECRETthe project and the office of the DDP... In point of fact, such restrictivemeasures were somewhat meaningless insofar as keeping awareness of the project'sactivities away from PP/PMG. The A/DDP/Pgranted permission to PP/C/PMG to read thedaily project traffic, (with Esterline'sknowledge and permission). Esterlinepersonally knew the majority of the PP/PMGsenior officers, and in no time he haddrafted six or seven of these, includingthe Deputy Chief, PMG, for assignment toJMARC ... This, of course, was valuableas a built-in penetration of JMARC inthe best FI and CI tradition.*[^1]Early in February of 1960, Allen Dulles wasbriefed in general terms on the planning that wasbeing initiated by WH Division, and at the same timeJ. C. King told the Director "that the Branch conceptwas used (in establishing WH/4) rather than the termTask Force for greater security and to simplify chan-nels of command." The Director subsequently explainedto the Special Group (3 February 1960) some of theactivities that were being undertaken, noting thatwithin the next week or two, the Group would receive[^1]: * The crypt for the WH/4 anti-Castro operation wasinitially JMARC. Following compromise of this crypt,the project became JMATE (sometime in the period be-tween 6-13 December 1960). Throughout this volumethe project will be identified as JMATE, except indirect quotations.-- 46 --TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 55]
TOP SECRETa paper outlining the Agency's thoughts on the programs which had been initiated against the Castro Government.*[^1]The proposals of which the DCI had spoken were discussed in a DDP review session on 11 February 1960 which was attended by Tracy Barnes, Jake Esterline, Al Cox, Dave Phillips, and Jim Flannery. The focus was on sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry,** propaganda broadcasts, and funding. Noting that WH Division had roughly $50,000 available for immediate use, it was speculated that the "ultimate magnitude" of the anti-Castro effort might reach 3 million dollars -- an estimate that would, in effect, be some 40 million short of the eventual cost. It was stated, however, that funds would easily be obtainable from the Agency reserve to meet any shortages. At this planning session, the training program for the PM cadre at Fort Randolph in Panama was given minor attention; and[^1]: In addition to the Special Group, which included a DOD representative, WH/4 worked directly with other representatives of DOD regarding current developments and the possible coordination of activities vis-a-vis Cuba. 18/** "The big sugar sack?"- 47 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 56]
TOP SECREThere, too, the seeds were planted by Tracy Barnesfor an attitudinal survey of "Cuban society" whichcould have (and should have) caused CIA planners tore-think the whole anti-Castro effort.* 19/A very similar briefing, with somewhat moreemphasis on possible paramilitary action, was givento a high level group from DOD on 12 February 1960;and the agenda for the 17 February 1960 meeting ofthe Special Group, again emphasized that the CastroGovernment was dependent on sugar revenues for bothcontinuation of popular domestic and hemisphericsubversion programs.** 20/ It was further suggestedto the Special Group that dissidents within Cubamight also be stimulated to sabotage, with the ulti-mate result leading to Castro's ouster. 21/ Therecommendation that the DCI made to the SpecialGroup was as follows:* This refers to the Lloyd Free Report, which is  discussed subsequently in this Volume, see pp. 222-226.** The DOD representatives who were briefed were theDeputy Secretary, Mr. Douglas; Mr. John Irwin, Assis-tant Secretary of Defense for International SecurityAffairs; General Erskine; and General Lansdale.- 48 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 57]
TOP SECRETThat CIA be authorized to initiate operational planning, including covert spotting and assessment of potential agents, for eventual sabotage of both Cuban and American-owned sugar mills. Should this course of action prove feasible and desirable, the operation would be designed to deny Castro as much as possible of the revenues anticipated from the 1960 sugar crop. 22/Interestingly enough, although the briefing for DOD had placed considerable emphasis on paramilitary planning, apparently no mention of the subject was made to the Special Group.On 17 February 1960 when Allen Dulles presented the sugar sabotage plan to the Special Group, he emphasized that he was not asking for permission to engage in action, only that he was looking for a Special Group approval. Mr. Irwin (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs) noted that he and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr.. Douglas were all for the plan; and the Group agreed to present the plan to the Secretary of State and to Gordon Gray so that the latter could get the President's reaction.President Eisenhower was less than enthusiastic about the sugar sabotage plan, reportedly doubting that the loss of sugar revenues would impact on- 49 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 58]
TOP SECRETCastro's ability to continue to finance subversive activities in other Latin America areas. President Eisenhower also objected to the focus on economic sabotage, and he would not agree to the plan to identify assets specifically for sabotage operations against the sugar industry. Eisenhower was willing to support a program to identify assets for the sugar industry "and other things as well ... including even possibly things that might be drastic." In addition to identifying assets on a broad basis, the President also requested that a comprehensive covert action program be prepared by Mr. Dulles. This, it was suggested, should go to the Special Group; and if they approved the plans, then the President wanted to discuss them. In any event, action on the PM program would be delayed until Eisenhower returned from his upcoming Latin American visit and gave his specific approval.*[^1]* The Minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 17 February 1960 also noted thatMr. Joseph Scott of State also reported later that Mr. Herter had made exactly the same point.This appears to have been one of the few instances where Department of State representatives indicated support for possible direct action programs rather than political solutions to the Cuban problem.- 50 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 23/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 59]
13-00000TOP SECRETDespite the rather positive doubts that the President had about the sugar sabotage activity, J. C. King charged ahead almost immediately following the Special Group Meeting of 17 February 1960. On 18 February, King and Milo Perkins had a detailed discussion concerning the disruptive effects which might result from interference with the Cuban sugar operation. Perkins was planning meetings with Ambassador Hill and Thomas ("Tommy the Cork") Corcoran, and King brought to Perkins's attention that Corcoran had been willing and able to provide valuable assistance to the Agency in the past. Later in the month, Col. King met with Thomas Mann, the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs (subsequently Assistant Secretary for American Republic Affairs) who reportedly was in favor of both reduced sugar quotas and direct sabotage of Cuban sugar mills. According to King, Secretary Mann also would support both cut backs in US oil companies deliveries to Cuba and actions which might cut back on US tourist trade with the island.[^24]Col. King also consulted with former Ambassador William Pawley, whom he asked to make arrangements for the publication of *Diario de la Marina* in Miami,-- 51 --TOP SECRET[^24]: Missing footnote content
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 60]
TOP SECRETand also "to raise at least a portion of the money, which would be needed for this operation." In addition to Pawley, King also contacted Henry Holland in New York City, suggesting that Holland raise money, through Cuban exile Justo Carrillo, to help pay for the propaganda efforts of New York radio station WRUL. King agreed that Holland could tell prospective donors that the "money was going to be used on behalf of non-Batista groups who were going to make a serious effort to remove Fidel Castro." [^1]In addition to J. C. King's high level contacts, Jake Esterline and Mr. Dulles had a meeting with Abbott Washburn, Deputy Director of the US Information Agency who had requested a briefing on the current state of activities in Cuba -- Washburn was concerned lest there be a conflict of interests between USIA and the CIA's ongoing effort in the area. Washburn presented the Agency with a copy of some proposals which the State Department had approved for implementation by USIA in Cuba. USIA's pitch would be that the long-standing friendship between Cuba and the United States was being endangered by the infiltration of Communists and Communist ideology-- 52 --TOP SECRET[^1]: 25/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 61]
TOP SECRETinto Cuba -- at the same time not denying that theUS was sympathetic to the need for a change in Cuba.The Director and Mr. Esterline agreed that it wouldbe advisable for Mr. Washburn, who was planning tovisit Cuba, to meet Jim Noel, COS Havana, and out-line the USIA program for Mr. Noel's benefit.*[^1]As the propaganda activities were being pushedforward, as plans were being made for training Cubanexiles, and as the possibilities of sabotage, PMaction, and other measures against Castro were beingcontemplated, a cautionary memorandum apparently wasdrafted by one of the individuals most closely con-cerned with the potential anti-Castro operations.The memorandum, undated and unsigned, reviewed theanti-Arbenz operation in Guatemala in light of whatwas being planned for Project JMATE. It noted someof the similarities or differences with respect tothe removal of Jacobo Arbenz in contrast to the pos-sibilities of removing Fidel Castro; and in light ofthe ultimate tragedy at the Bay of Pigs, some of the[^1]: One result of the meeting with Washburn was a decision to turn over a planned USIA anti-Castro cartoon effort to CIA.- 53 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 62]
TOP SECRETkey points made in this memorandum are worth repeating -- even though it is not known who read the piece. Among other things, for example, the author of the memorandum stressed "the unique coincidence of favorable factors" with reference to Guatemala and suggested that it was unlikely that any of these would operate with reference to Project JMATE.It was noted that the Guatemalan leadership was "unusually inept"; that "Communist support for Arbenz came from the local Communist Party, which was immature, badly led, and generally weak"; and, that "we had unbelievable luck." [^27] The memorandum also noted that there were a number of circumstances which would not recur during the course of the anti-Castro activity. Specifically pointing out that where Arbenz was a weak leader, Castro was obviously a strong leader; that Castillo Armas was a Guatemalan leader of high character and standing, but no one of similar stature had surfaced in Cuba to oppose Castro; and that in Guatemala Arbenz had made no changes in the armed forces of Guatemala, and when the crisis came, he could not depend on his army. Castro, on the other hand had eliminated the Batista influence, and filled- 54 -TOP SECRET[^27]: /
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 63]
TOP SECRETthe key military positions with his own followers and "introduced a system of intense ideological in- doctrination." Furthermore, the unknown author pointed out that while Moscow's interest in Guatemala was compartatively mild -- the Soviet Ambassador to Mexico City was the nearest Soviet official available to the Arbenz Government -- in Cuba, the heavy economic and propaganda support from both Moscow and Peiping were a matter of record. 28/The memorandum closed by pointing to three areas where the writer claimed that tactical -- not strategic -- errors were being made. It stated that the blunt propaganda attacks on Castro were forging all anti-US elements in Cuba into a united front and US efforts should be attempting to drive a wedge between Castro, as a victim of international Communism, and the Communists both Cuban and foreign. Secondly, it was pointed out that the propaganda broadcast out of US commercial radio stations, even if the time were legitimately being purchased by Cuban exile groups, would be a "kiss of death" for anyone who tried to deny US intervention in Cuban affairs. In part re- lated to the propaganda activities, the planned use- 55 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 64]
TOP SECRETof US business groups as a cover for the Agency's support of the Cuban opposition, particularly the use of US business as a funding mechanism, was also hazardous in the eyes of the author of the memorandum under study. If the author was correct in assuming that this cover would not withstand careful scrutiny, it would mean that the anti-American contingents would have additional ammunition to use against the US.The memorandum suggested that many of these risks could be eliminated if propaganda activities were moved to Third countries and if fund raising activities were run out of Latin America or Western Europe.[^29]Based on the language, the familiarity with the Guatemala activity and the nature of the critique, it is probable that Tracy Barnes wrote the memorandum in question. The memorandum may have been prompted in part by the increasing attention which the OCB and the Cabinet had been giving to fire bomb attacks on the Cuban cane fields by light aircraft flying out of the United States. The Agency fully supported General Quesada's effort to put an end to such flights.[^30][^29]  Quesada was Director of the Federal Aviation Agency.
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 65]
TOP SECRETFrom 2 March 1960, when the Director briefed Vice President Nixon on Agency activities in Cuba and the state of Cuban affairs, until 17 March 1960, when President Eisenhower formally approved the covert anti-Castro plan, CIA personnel most closely involved in the anti-Castro effort were fully immersed in the efforts to define -- and refine -- a US policy which would be acceptable to President Eisenhower.In the course of this two week period, they were engaged in efforts to satisfy the 5412 Group, the National Security Council, and themselves that they had developed a viable program which would lead to the downfall and ouster of Fidel Castro and his principal cohorts, Che Guevara and Raul Castro, and the elmimination of Communism from the island of Cuba and, in effect, from the Western Hemisphere.During this period of evolution of national policy, WH/4 held its first official meeting as a branch on 9 March 1960. J. C. King and Jake Esterline were in charge of the meeting and outlined the general nature of the programs that were going to be put into operation (propaganda activity, PM training, commo training) and they emphasized the need for cooperation- 57 -TOP SECRET