Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10302-10030.pdf — page 25]
# TOP SECRET DINARWestern HemisphereBRAZILFurther changes in the Brazilian cabinet are expected following the resignation last week of Finance Minister Carvalho Pinto. A moderate leftist, Ney Galvao, was appointed Pinto's successor, but there remains a possibility that Leonel Brizola--who had been actively pushed for the post by the extreme left--may eventually receive some ministry. There is widespread belief in the army that War Minister Jair Ribeiro will also be replaced in the near future. As one responsible Brazilian commentator has remarked, with Goulart "every minister is an interim one."Ney Galvao's appointment actually reduces the previously slight prospect that Brazil's critical financial problems would be handled effectively. Galvao's qualifications in the economic field are weak at best and his record as head of the Bank of Brazil does not command confidence within the business community. Before taking his new post, he served as minister without portfolio in charge of coordinating foreign trade policies, a job he performed without any particular distinction.Although his views are perhaps somewhat to the right of Goulart's, Galvao can be expected to toe the adminstration line faithfully. Moreover, Galvao's appointment may be a temporary expedient designed to allay fears that Brizola would succeed Pinto. Galvao is a personal friend of Brizola and there is speculation that Brizola will, in fact, eventually move into the Finance Ministry.The new finance minister inherits almost insurmountable economic and financial problems. Chief among these are a rampant inflation that may see the cost of living increase 80 percent this year, and a staggering foreign debt involving approximately $1 billion in payments due over the next two years.The severity of the economic situation and Goulart's apparent intention to assume greater personal direction over financial policies increase the possibility of radical measures that might be detrimental to foreign creditors and investors. Goulart reportedly is considering nationalization of all public utilities and cancellation of mining concessions. Measures such as these could lead to further deterioration of Brazil's economic position. (SECRET)
[104-10302-10030.pdf — page 26]
# TOP SECRET DINARWestern HemisphereAREA NOTEBolivia: The political competition between Bolivian Vice President Juan Lechin and President Victor Paz Estenssoro is bound to intensify sharply as each maneuvers to line up support for the presidential nomination at next month's convention of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR). Lechin probably still hopes to pull an upset by dislodging Paz or at least to demonstrate sufficient strength to assure himself of retaining his vice-presidential post. Paz seems certain, however, to be able to control the party's convention, assure his renomination, and designate his own running mate.If the forthcoming convention repudiates Lechin, he may well withdraw from the MNR and establish a "popular front" political party. He probably could count on the support of political groups ranging from leftist extremists to disgruntled factions within right-wing parties. It would seem unlikely, though, that these disparate groups could coalesce into an organization powerful enough to defeat Paz' well-organized machine in the elections set for June. (SECRET)27 Dec 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page 18TOP SECRET DINAR
[104-10302-10030.pdf — page 27]
TOP SECRETTOP SECRET
[104-10303-10003.pdf — page 0]
# KENT EXTRACT
[104-10303-10003.pdf — page 1]
Mr. William M. Kent joined the Agency in December 1951. He had previously received a degree in diplomatic and public relations from the Latin American Institute, New York City and had served time in the U.S. Army from 1946 to 1948. He graduated from the Latin American Institute with the highest honors and 4 awards.Mr. Kent was initially assigned to the Office of Special Operations as a clerk typist and, after six months, in June 1952, was assigned to Panama as an intelligence officer under non-official cover. In July 1956 he returned to Headquarters where he worked as an area operations officer in the Western Hemisphere Division. After a successful stint in the Cuba[^1] section he was assigned as an operations officer to Caracas. After an excellently productive tour in Caracas, Mr. Kent was selected to join JMWAVE in Miami. There he really shone as attested to in the following quote from his fitness report: "He has been placed in most difficult positions, particularly in the handling of incompatible people and groups which he has managed without alienating either side and on various occasions accomplishing the impossible by satisfying everyone concerned." After his tour in Miami, he headed several sections in Headquarters in the Western Hemisphere Division, In 1967 he was transferred to New Orleans and then to the Washington Base. In both places he worked under non-official cover[^2] From 1970 until his retirement he served in several capacities ranging from the planning and guiding of Covert Action programs to occupying managerial positions. During these eight years he received seven strong and three outstanding overall ratings. Of special note are the various commendation and laudatory reports concerning Mr. Kent's performance during the "Chilean crisis". Because of his excellent performance during the Chilean crisis he again was asked to help the Latin American Division during several investigations. He performed admirably as reflected in a commendation written by the Deputy Chief of LA Division on 5 December 1975: "When confronted with a need to produce a paper on Chile in a short timeframe, I instinctively turned to him. It was not only because he had expertise on Chile, but to service in the Chile Branch, but because he is highly skilled in written presentation. He organizes his material well and presents it in a lucid, highly readable manner. On the first occasion, he helped us prepare a paper that was eventually used by the Director in his presentation before the Senate Select Committee on 14-15' July. On the second occasion his contribution[^1]: section[^2]: From
[104-10303-10003.pdf — page 2]
13-00000-2-was used by the DDO in his appearance before the SenateSelect Committee on 28 October. Both of these paperswere excellent and have withstood critical scrutiny."Mr. Kent has now left the Agency after 26 years ofdistinguished service as an operations officer and as amanager both in the field and at Headquarters. On theoccasion of his retirement, it is appropriate that Mr.Kent's career achievements be suitably recognized. Itis recommended that he be awarded the Career IntelligenceMedal in recognition of his long and distinguished service.
[104-10303-10007.pdf — page 0]
#2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 19921 June 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. ColbySUBJECT: Special Activities1. Following our recent conversation, I have searched my memory and Mr. McCone's files for examples of activities which to hostile observers or to someone without complete knowledge and with a special kind of motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities exceeding CIA's charter.2. First, as we discussed, on 7 March 1962, DCI McCone, under pressure from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, agreed to tap the telephones of columnists Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify their sources for classified information which was appear - ing in their columns. Because the primary source appeared to be in the Department of Defense, McCone ordered me personally to brief General Joe Carroll, Director of DIA, orally, which I did. I understand more complete information on this operation is available from the Director of Security. I, personally, managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of what precise actions were taken, what information was gained, what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated.3. As a result of a developing relationship with Philippe de Vosjoli, the SDECE representative in Washington, and also as a result of certain information conveyed by Anatole Golitsen, James Angleton, with the approval of Dick Helms, agreed to mount a counterespionage operation against the French Embassy in Washington. This involved breaking and entering and the removal of documents fromSECRET/SENSITIVE2.3EYES ONI00457
[104-10303-10007.pdf — page 1]
# EYES ONLY2the French Consulate. On 18 June 1962, DCI McCone and Helms briefed Secretary of State Rusk generally on the operation without going into operational details. Later on the same day, President John F. Kennedy was briefed. Actual breaking and entering occurred somewhat later, and on 15 April 1963, DCI McCone met with President Kennedy alone and briefed the President on the details of this new phase of the operation. On the same day, the Attorney General was briefed and he agreed that he would not mention it to the FBI unless the FBI themselves raised it with him. On 3 February 1964, DCI McCone met alone with President Lyndon B. Johnson and briefed him on the operation. On 4 February McGeorge Bundy was briefed. On 6 February 1964 in a briefing of Secretary of State Rusk on the results of the operation, Rusk expressed reservations about the propriety of such an operation. He raised this same concern in subsequent conversations with McCone on 17 April 1964, 28 May 1964, and 14 June 1964. On 12 September 1964 Rusk continued to express grave reservations and repeatedly suggested that the French be informed directly that we knew about their espionage operations in the United States and ask them to desist. In a meeting on 28 May 1964 Rusk expressed these reservations in the presence of DCI McCone and President John F. Kennedy Secretary of Defense McNamara was also present, and there is no record that he had previously been made aware of this operation.4. Although certain activities never got beyond the planning stage, there are, I believe, three examples of such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation. One involved chemical warfare operations against the rice crops in both Cuba and North Vietnam. A second involved a paramilitary strike against the Chi-Com nuclear installations. Outside the United States Government, General Eisenhower was briefed on such planning. A third, which assumes a new significance today, involved a proposal by Angleton and Helms for a greatly increased intelligence collection effort against foreign installations in this country. This planning also involved a scheme for selected
[104-10303-10007.pdf — page 2]
3exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the Soviet intelligence service. The reasons are still unclear to me as to why the FBI chose to brief the PFIAB to the effect that CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and indiscriminately in this country, to greatly increase the Agency representation in the Moscow Embassy, and generally to use KGB-type tactics, also extensively and indiscriminately. This led to a heated exchange between DCI McCone and Mr. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting taking place in the presence of the Attorney General. It is clear that the FBI was opposed to any such proposal then, as now, and the plan never went forward.5. During the period when Des FitzGerald was in charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI McCone's office learned, quite by accident, that FitzGerald had secured the cooperation of several prominent US business firms in denying economic items to Cuba. There was no question but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but know- ledge of this operation had to be rather widespread.6. On 17 April 1964, Mr. Robert B. Anderson came to DCI McCone on behalf of American business interests, offering to insert some $300,000 to try to secure a favorable result in the elections in Panama. Shortly after this approach, Mr. Clyde Weed of Anaconda Copper Company made a similar proposal to McCone in connection with elections in Chile. On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of the 303 Committee, it was decided that the offers of American business could not be accepted, it being neither a secure way nor an honorable way of doing such business. This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent ITT hearings, but I am not surprised that McCone has forgotten that he helped to set the precedent of refusing to accept such collaboration between the Agency's operations and private business.7. At the direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy, / McCone injected the Agency, and particularly Cord Meyer,
[104-10303-10007.pdf — page 3]
into the US labor situation, and particularly to tryto ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany andWalter Reuther. Cord Meyer steered a very skillfulcourse in this connection, but the Agency could bevulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany's back,or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany'swishes.8. There are three examples of using Agency   funds which I know to be controversial. One was the   expenditure of money under Project MOSES in securing   the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners. Details of   this operation are best known to Larry Houston, Mike   Miskorsky, George MacManus, and James Smith. Second,   as you well know, when Lou Conein received his summons   to report to the Joint General Staff Headquarters on   1 November 1963 a large amount of cash went with him.   My impression is that the accounting for this and its   use has never been very frank or complete. Third, at   one of the early Special Group meetings attended by   McCone he took strong exception to proposals to spend   Agency funds to improve the economic viability of West   Berlin, and for an investment program in Mali. His   general position was that such expenditures were not   within the Agency's charter, and that he would allow   such spending only on the direct personal request of   the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or   the White House.9. I raise these issues of funding because I   remember the Agency's being severely criticized by the   House Appropriations Subcommittee for having spent $3,000   for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors   to secure the release of prisoners from Cuba.10. Under the heading of old business, I know that    any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried    about the fact that conversations within the offices and    over the telephones were transcribed. During McCone's
[104-10303-10007.pdf — page 4]
ES CAT5tenure, there were microphones in his regular office,his inner office, his dining room, his office in EastBuilding, and his study at his residence on White HavenStreet. I do not know who would be willing to raise suchan issue, but knowledge of such operations tends tospread, and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on thisscore.11. Also under the heading of old business, I    well remember the hue and cry raised, especially by Carl    Kaysen in the White House, when the Agency injected a    contaminating agent in Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet    Union. Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, there was    a disposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs,    and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard    officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced    with surprisingly little excitement at the time.12. During my stint on the 7th floor there was    a special arrangement with the Office of Communications    whereby the Director's office gained access to non-CIA    traffic. This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after    Admiral Rayborn became DCI. He had visited the Signal    Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy    in the Dominican Republic for Under Secretary George Ball,    Eyes Only. He returned to his office and proceeded to    discuss this telegram with George Ball who was naturally    quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as    to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did.    Ben Read in the Secretary of State's office and I spent    several weeks putting this one to rest.13. Finally, DCI McCone, as you and I well know,    operated on a very lofty plane, and I think certain of    his activities could be misunderstood. One example was    his decision in July of 1964 to have Aristotle Onassis and    Maria Callas flown from Rome to Athens on Air Force KC 135.    Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the    attention of the local press and in due course Mr. John
[104-10303-10007.pdf — page 5]
Hightower, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for Washington, came to see me to ask about the propriety of this action.14. The use of Fairways Corporation aircraft has been remarkably secure, but DCI McCone himself forgot about the cover arrangement and became quite exercised when he saw Candidate Goldwater land in the San Francisco airport for the Republican National Convention in 1964 aboard the Grumman Gulf Stream with the highly visible tail number N 8 E. This was, I explained to him carefully, a perfectly legitimate charter, but he didn't like it.15. McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen in Washington. In fact, they gave him a gift and a luncheon when he left Washington, which is perhaps indicative of the press's relations with him. However, in the case of the Ross and Wise book, *The Invisible Government*, he did try to bring pressure on the publisher and the authors to change things. They did not change a comma, and I doubt that this old saw willever sing again.16. Finally, and this will reflect my Middle Western Protestant upbringing, McCone's dealings with the Vatican, including Pope John X X III and Pope Paul VI, would and could raise eyebrows in certain quarters.17. The above listing is uneven, but I have a sinking feeling that discipline has broken down, and that allegations from any quarter which cast these things in the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention, and no amount of denial would ever set the record straight. If I may be of any assistance in tracking down further details, I am of course at your disposal, but I would point
[104-10303-10007.pdf — page 6]
13-00000EYES COZY7out that I was very much in the position of the enlisted man who knew that the commissioned officers were aware of these activities and better able to judge their propriety and possible impact or misinter- pretation.![Signature of WALTER ELDER]WALTER ELDEREYES ONLY00463
[104-10303-10008.pdf — page 1]
S May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & TechnologySUBJECT: TSD Support to Other Agencies1. Technical Services Division's charter (CSI 1-8) requires that it provide technical assistance to both CLA operations and other activities as may be directed by the Deputy Director for Operations.2. Over the years the chief non-CIA recipients of this support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency for International Development, and the White House.3. While varying widely among the different recipients, these services have included training and materials, and in a few instances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance, secret writing and related communications, personal protection, alias documentation and questioned document examination, disguise, concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcotics detection, and counter-sabotage/terrorism.4. In most instances requirements for this support are 'received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels. Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy also is required.5. The attachment lists the primary services provided to the organizations named in Paragraph two.
[104-10303-10008.pdf — page 2]
6. [Issuance of forged personal identity documentation by TSD] is controlled according to two broad criterias type of requester; and type of documentation requested. A request for denied area documentation from a DDO Area Division is honored after proper validation. Free world documentation may require some extra coordination however. A Swiss passport would not be issued without coordination with the EUR Swiss Branch; an Irish passport would not be issued for use anywhere in the Commonwealth area without the approval of the British Desk; Hong Kong documentation is not to be used in Hong Kong unless approved by Hong Kong Chief of Station.7. Unless ordered otherwise by higher Agency authority, no U.S. documentation is issued by TSD Headquarters without prior coordination with the Office of Security and the Central Cover Staff. TSD/Regional Bases require at least the validation of U.S. documentation requests by the COS, or his designated representative, of the requesting Station. Because it could be used in order to obtain [a U.S. passport in alias], no U.S. Birth Certificate is issued without approval of the DDO via Central Cover Staff. Backstopped major credit cards are issued by Office of Security, not TSD.8. Provision of *forged* documentation to non-DDO requesters, whether they be CIA or other Agency requesters, always requires approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance would be validated by FI Staff/Departmental Coordination Group at Headquarters or by the COS overseas having responsibility for coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated with DDO/NARCOG. Requests for documentation of Immigration and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs Staff.9. [Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has been issued, TSD retains photographs and records of such support until the documentation has been returned to TSD. If the material is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded of the outstanding documentation.]AttachmentDistribution:O & 1 - Addressee, w/attSidney GottliebChiefTechnical Services Division