Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10306-10020.pdf — page 6]
14 November 1962# MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE CUBAN PRISONERS.The meeting took place at the residence of the Attorney General at 10:30 a. m., on Thursday, November 14, at the DCI's request.McCone explained that he had had dinner the evening before with Mr. Edward Foley (former Under Secretary of the Treasury, legal representative and a Director of the Drug Industry Association).Mr. Foley had questioned DCI concerning the negotiations for release of Cuban prisoners in exchange for some 50 million dollars in drugs, and stated that Mr. Donovan had been in touch with members of the industry (presumably Pfizer and Merck) in the past few days, that indications were that the transaction was to be worked out promptly, and the subject would undoubtedly be discussed at length at the Industry's Board of Trustees meeting in New York on November 16th.Mr. Foley stated that the Industry had no clear understanding of the Government's position, most particularly in view of Cuban developments of the last three weeks.After explaining to Foley the background of the transaction I told him that Mr. Donovan had been told to do absolutely nothing in this matter and expressed great surprise that the subject was a topic of current discussion among members of the Industry.In the meeting with the Attorney General I expressed grave concern over the situation, pointing out that CIA had 20 million dollars on covert deposit in the Bank of Canada and that two Letters of Credit had been been issued by the Bank, one in the amount of 10 million dollars to Pfizer, and one for even million dollars to Merck. As long as this money was on deposit and the letters outstanding, there was a danger of publicity emanating from either Donovan or the drug industry, or both. Despite the fact that no official government
[104-10306-10020.pdf — page 7]
SECRET-EYES ONLYconnection had ever been admitted, publicity would implicate the Administration and CIA in the negotiation because of recent press stories (most particularly the Herald Tribune articles) identifying Administration and CIA activities and citing the exact amount of 17 million dollars as representing the Government cost of the drugs. I pointed out that certain elements of competition between the members of the drug industry made it almost a certainty that "leaks" would come from industry sources as long as the letter of credit were outstanding, regardless of Mr. Donovan's denials.Furthermore, consummation of the transaction seemed totally unrealistic in view of current difficulties with Castro and if an article appeared indicating we were still pursuing this transaction, the American public and a great many others would be confused and disenchanted.For the above reasons, and feeling that damaging publicity undoubtedly would appear, I strongly recommended that we arrange for the bank to withdraw the Letters of Credit, and for the withdrawal of a substantial part of the money from the [Bank of Canada]. Also advise Mr. Donovan that the pursuit of this effort must await a better climate although our interest remained constant. I urged that action be commenced today.The Attorney General, after some discussion involving an exploration of possible alternatives, agreed with the course of action.We agreed that we should carefully explain to the Families Committee and possibly to Miro Cardona that we were in no way abandoning our intention to secure the release of the prisoners but were forced because of circumstances beyond our control to set the negotiation aside pending further developments on other important problems involving our Cuban relationship.McCone discussed the above with Mr. Bundy who personally approved the action and, in turn, received approval from higher authority. The latter was communicated to the DCI by telephone at 1:45 p. m.Copy to General Carter w/ covering memoJOHN A. McCONEDirectorSECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10306-10020.pdf — page 8]
TOP SECRETNovember 6, 1962MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Cline, DD (I)SUBJECT: Castro as a Threat to the Americas.I think that in analyzing Castro's potential in the Western Hemisphere as covered by paragraphs 9 through and including 21, we should consider his posture and potential under various alternatives of possible United States decisions and probable Soviet policies.Let us assume for the moment that the United States meets the exact letter of the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange and no more. This would mean the withdrawal of IL 28s, the halting of the establishment of a submarine base, and some acceptable form of inspection verifying the removal and assuring against the reintroduction of offensive devices, U.S. commits not to invade. At this point U.S. commitment on propaganda, sabotage, guerrilla activities and other actions designed to overthrow Castro is not very clear, but I think that we can assume that such activities if attempted would be no more successful in the future than they have been in the past, which is about zero.
[104-10306-10020.pdf — page 9]
# TOP SECRETHaving reached this point, the Soviets have at least three alternatives:One, they can abandon Castro, reduce military and economic aid, cut their losses, and in such event Castro would soon collapse. Current intelligence does not support such a probable Soviet course of action, otherwise they would not be disposed to leave such quantities of extremely valuable modern military hardware, including the SAM sites, communications equipment, and extensive Naval and ground equipment and a large number of technicians.Second, they could maintain about the same level of economic and military support as in the past, although I would feel this could not be a very reasonable assumption from the standpoint of military support as the presence of large amounts of additional military equipment, including those mentioned above, would necessitate a higher level of military support than before in order to provide operational readiness, training, maintenance, spare parts, replacements, etc. This does not mean more economic supportalthough I think Castro could insist upon it on the grounds that Soviet equipment is a burden to him and of course Dorticos alluded to this in statements in New York.- 2 -
[104-10306-10020.pdf — page 10]
13-00000TOP SECRETThird, the Soviets having accomplished one of their objectives, that of securing a U.S. guarantee against invasion, will increase their military and economic aid so that all military materiel will be work- able at all times and the Castro economy will be reasonably well off.Under each of these alternatives, Castro's posture and his effect on the United States and other Western Hemisphere countries will differ vastly and I would suggest that your paper be oriented so that it will project for the benefit of policy makers the consequences, favorable or unfavorable, under these several alternatives.It is my personal opinion that Mikoyan will return to New York in a few days and will announce an agreement for some perfunctory Red Cross ground inspection of the missile sites and nothing else, will deny any intention of a submarine base, will dismiss the IL 28 issue as wholly beyond the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement, will indicate that all Soviets are leaving Cuba except economic and agricultural advisers, and will state most persuasively that the Khrushchev-Kennedy agreement has been fulfilled to the letter and demand our non-invasion commitment.He will then build Castro up and indicate Soviet intention for supporting in every way and to go right down the line with him.- 3 -
[104-10306-10020.pdf — page 11]
13-00000Castro will feel secure, his political and military structure will be manageable, and Cuba will be used by Castro and the Soviets more aggressively in the future than it has in the past in disturbing Western Hemisphere countries.This is the situation I fear, and I think our policy makers whose negotiations are trending toward the establishment of a set of conditions and commitments which will make the third case mentioned above a probability, should have the benefit of our thinking as to the consequences. In doing this, equal attention should be given to the first two alternatives.In further reference to the paper, the historical background is excellent, the country by country annex useful, although if time permitted we might get the chiefs of station to give the current view of their contacts as Win Scott did. The inventory of equipment is useful but I propose that it be broken down into three columns, a pre-July 1st, 1962, added since July 1962, and the total as of now.John A. McCone- 4 -
[104-10306-10020.pdf — page 12]
26 September 1963MEMORANDUMSUBJECT: CIA activities in South Viet Nam1. Prior to January 1962 the CIA maintained a modest station in South Viet Nam, the purpose of which was to support the Ambassador and Headquarters with reports on the internal situation in South Viet Nam, the activities of the Viet Cong and the Communists and their threat to the government, and to assist the government in its internal security problems. Among other things we trained and equipped Special Forces whose mission was to conduct a variety of unconventional activities such as the infiltration of V.C. centers, interdiction of supply routes, interfering with V.C. communications, sabotaging V.C. efforts, harrassment, etc.The CIA station created about a dozen training centers throughout South Viet Nam in which selected nearby villagers would be trained in community defense and civic action. It issued arms and thus provided the actual defense of the strategic hamlets created in the areas. These activities were carried on with the support of the U.S. Special Forces. As the activities expanded, a determination was made to shift prime responsibility to the military, with CIA in support, and the switch has been accomplished successfully.About 75,000 South Viet Namese have been trained.
[104-10306-10020.pdf — page 13]
# SECRETCIA created a South Viet Namese intelligence organisation,established a civilian intelligence system and trained the personnel.In addition the Agency assisted in the development of intelligenceapparatus within the SVN military.In addition a variety of activities were supported designed toassist the basic objective of winning the war.Without exception all CIA programs in South Viet Nam werecoordinated with the Ambassador and also in Washington. CIA tookno unilateral actions nor involved itself in designing policy. CIA hasbeen represented at all policy meetings in Washington, including NSCand Executive Committee meetings and all of the McNamara-PearlHarbor mpetings held to review progress. The activities of thestation were examined by all inspection teams such as GeneralWheeler's mission, General Krulak's several missions,Mr. Forrestal's missions, etc. At no time prior to recent surgeof critical publicity have CIA's activities in Saigon been reportedother than cooperative and an integral part of an accepted and agreedpolicy.2. CIA Reporting,In June 1962 I traveled extensively in South Viet Nam.I reported upon my return that repressive measures of the Diem/Nhuregime were causing considerable criticism and that there was- 2 -
[104-10306-10020.pdf — page 14]
SECRETdanger of a coup. This situation was watched carefully by our CIA station and at frequent intervals we reported that the image of the regime was tarnishing and hence its effectiveness was questionable. A number of estimates and a great number of reports and appraisals were issued, each one warning that the deterioration of the regime's popularity gave rise to serious question concerning the future trend of the war and CIA warned that unless corrective measures were taken by the regime to improve its image, it was quite possible the war would be lost or that a popular uprising would cause the removal of the regime. For 18 months at frequent intervals rumors of coups were received by our station and were reported to the Ambassador and to Washington. Throughout this period our Chief of Station at the direction of the Ambassador met once every two weeks with Ngo Dinh Nhu, explored all problems relating to the situations in which we had a common interest, and reported to the Ambassador. Contacts were also maintained with many groups in South Viet Nam, with military leaders and with knowledgeable citizens.A review of the reporting over 18 months and resulting estimates bear out that the Agency consistently warned of the deteriorating situation and the possible consequences.- 3 -
[104-10306-10020.pdf — page 15]
During this period we also analyzed the progress of the war and the thrust of our reporting was to the effect that as the American advisers were able to exercise their influence on the South Viet Namese military, and our Embassy and General Harkins were able to persuade Diem to reorient and redeploy his forces, gradual but consistent favorable progress was made.## 3. Attitude of the Station and OthersIn any difficult situation involving guerrilla warfare where progress can not be measured in territory won or lost, and in casualties and prisoners, differences of opinion among observers arise. Likewise Americans required to work with a stubborn and authoritarian regime often become exasperated by the difficulties involved. Furthermore Americamaccustomed to our civil liberties, freedoms, and the rights of the individual are shocked by the conduct of a government which deprives the individual of these privileges. Finally an American community living among natives, many of whom are visiously critical of the government (and this is the case in Saigon and Hue), are bound to be influenced by, and to a degree espouse, these criticisme.For these reasons there have been serious differences within the American community.
[104-10306-10020.pdf — page 16]
Within the CIA station there are differences of opinion. Some feel the cause is hopeless with the Diem regime in power. Others feel it best to go along with the regime until a better one appears. The reporting has been, however, consistent and has coincided with the views of Ambassador Nolting.Within AID and USIA there have been strong differences of opinion and the same is true of the Embassy staff. On the other hand, the military which is devoted to the single task of defeating the Viet Cong, had turned its back on political problems and concentrated on military problems and have been steadfast in refusing to be deterred by internal political issues.Many people have become highly emotional, have talked too much and have given the impression of very deep splits.-5-onig-med by oca at Reston firchen - 9/26/632 cc - W. Elder..
[104-10306-10020.pdf — page 17]
## Situation in the last several weeks.The Hue incident on May 8th was a serious setback for the Diem Government. The agreement with the Buddhists on June 16th was designed to improve the situation. The agreement was never carried out. Increasing agitation by the Buddhists culminated in the raids on the pagodas on August 21. This was carried out apparently at the direction of Nhu by the Special Forces, some of whom are in the Saigon - Hue area and by the military. In this connection it is to be noted that neither MACV nor CIA maintained absolute control over the deployment of the Special Forces and it is to be noted that substantial units of them were deployed to the north and engaged in their regular assignments.The action on August 21 broke the camel's back as far as those in the United States Government who felt that the cause would be lost if the Diem regime remained. Therefore, a cable was sent to the Ambassador instructing him to insist on effective reforms including reducing the influence and authority of the Nhus and if this could not be accomplished by persuasiba to take such action as would accomplish this objective even though it meant removing the regime.The fault in this instruction was that there existed at the time no firm estimate as to the possibility of successfully reforming the regime and no plan for a successor regime.At this point CIA was asked by the Ambassador and General Harkins to query certain military leaders and to determine whether the
[104-10306-10020.pdf — page 18]
resentment had created a body of opinion among the military, the SecurityForces and the public that would carry off a coup and establish a newgovernment. CIA reported this condition did not exist. During the week ofAugust 26 and without taking a position as to whether the regime should orshould not be removed, the Agency urged care and deliberation. It pointedout that to act precipitously and without assurance of success a civil warwould inevitably result, the war against the Viet Cong would be lost andthe Communists would take over.This position was highly exasperating to those who wished tomove precipitously. It is for this reason that the advocates of action tomove precipitously without coordination and without intelligence supportare now carrying on a campaign against the Central Intelligence Agencyand the Station.
[104-10306-10020.pdf — page 19]
13-000002 September 1964MEMORANDUM FOR: General CarterYou will note from the very brief memorandum of my discussion with Secretary Rusk that he made two requests -- the first, a study of the reasons for lack of action of the Communists in Southeast Asia. This is a matter I discussed at this morning's meeting and I hope that we can have an OCI memorandum on my return.The second question was concerning clandestine channels to Castro, the Chinese Communists and Hanoi. This should be given serious thought by DDP. Each situation differs. I am sure we could, if we desired, open up a channel to Castro. The Peiping and Hanoi situations are more difficult. In one respect there is a channel open to Peiping through Warsaw, but it is not effective. Perhaps the [Taipei Station] would have some thoughts on this. Also, there is a channel to Hanoi through the (Canadian) representative on the ICC; however this obviously is an "official" channel and is not very productive. I think it would be well to go over this matter with Dick Helms when he returns.Secretary Rusk expects comments on both these points next week.![signature of JOHN A. MCCONE]JOHN A. MCCONEDirectorAttached:Copy of MR on Discussion with Secretary Rusk#5 file
[104-10306-10021.pdf — page 0]
# SECRET EYES ONLY2 January 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 2 January 1964.PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter.Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1 and 2.Colonel Steakley was present for Items 3 and 4.1.  Cuba - Proposed Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations During January 1964.The infiltration/exfiltration operations in the January 1964 forecast were approved. Three sabotage operations, numbers 3111, 414, and 417, were approved by the Special Group subject to the concurrence of higher authority. Decision was deferred on a sabotage operation, number 413, against the petroleum refinery and storage facilities near Santiago. Mr. Johnson said that before he could exercise judgment as to the importance of this operation he must have an analysis as to what effect the total or partial destruction of this refinery would have on Cuban petroleum production and economy generally. The Group agreed that such an analysis should be prepared and be presented along with this sabotage operation for Special Group action at its next meeting.2. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations During December 1963.Mr. FitzGerald reviewed the accomplishments during the month of December. He emphasized a successful exfiltration activity of a recently activated ratline. This is the second time in two months that this ratline has successfully exfiltrated agents in danger of arrest. He also gave a resume of the underwater demolition operation (number 3117) which damaged a Cuban PT boat (Soviet-type P-6). Also, during the same operation self-destroying anti-boat mines were placed in the harbor entrance to inhibit pursuit. One of the mines was detected resulting in a Cuban government directive to all ports to take precautionary measures.# SECRET EYES ONLY
[104-10306-10021.pdf — page 1]
SECRETEYES-ONLY3. DOD Monthly Reconnaissance Forecast.Mr. Johnson presented a paper dated 30 December 1963 expressing the State Department's concern regarding a number of the missions described in the January 1964 schedule of the Joint Reconnaissance Center. Mr. Johnson enumerated the types of missions which he regarded as particularly sensitive, such as: (a) coordinated or dual missions involving two planes in the same area at the same time; (b) those flown too close to Soviet territory; (c) radical changes in altitude of planes while under surveillance of Soviet radar; and (d) other radical variations of route.Mr. Johnson listed 14 DOX TOP missions on which State Department needed further study before approval would be given. These missions are as follows: Jane, Paula, Ruby, Cliff, Alf, Eric, Marvin, Frank, Dwight, Kari, Lloyd, Everett, Hugh, and Calvin. The Special Group requested a coordinated position on these missions as to their necessity and whether they can be run without a significant or provocative pattern change while under Soviet radar surveillance. This coordinated position is to be presented to the Special Group at its next meeting. All other missions in the JRC forecast were approved.4. NRO Monthly Reconnaissance Forecast.The NRO forecast (paper dated 20 December 1963) was approved as presented. General Carter gave a resume of the excellence and uniqueness of the information obtained in the "T" and "C" series.5. The North Vietnam Working Group.Mr. Johnson reported that the Interdepartmental Working Group on North Vietnam Operations has about concluded its report. All members of the Special Group agreed that the report should be critically noted at the highest levels of the Government. It should then be reviewed by the Special Group and presented to higher authority for decision.![signature of Paul Eckel]Paul EckelDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McConeSECRETEYES ONLY
[104-10306-10021.pdf — page 2]
10 January 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 9 January 1964PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.The Attorney General and Mr. FitzGerald were present for Items 1 and 2.Colonel Steakley and Mr. Kiefer were present for Item 3.1. Cuba - Consideration of Sabotage Operations.Mr. FitzGerald requested the Special Group to approve a sabotage operation against the petroleum refinery and storage facilities near Santiago. The proposal was disapproved.Another sabotage proposal was made by Mr. FitzGerald against a sawmill located on the north coast of Oriente Province. The attack is to be conducted by a commando team which will place incendiaries and demolitions at critical locations throughout the installation. A second target, which may be attacked as security factors permit, is a large floating crane which has been anchored in the area and which appears to be used in loading ore from a near-by mine. This operational proposal with its two targets was approved subject to the concurrence of higher authority. Also, it was the consensus of the Group that the views of higher authority should be obtained on what is desired generally in the field of sabotage activities in Cuba.2. Cuba - Proposed Clandestine Intelligence Operations.The Department of the Army requested approval for two operations: (a) the establishment of a clandestine net using the Second National Front of the Escambray, and (b) the infiltration of a radio operator agent into Cuba. CIA has agreed to provide support for both these proposals. The two operations were approved.See special minutes for additional item