Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 54]
SECRETEYES ONLY- 2 -There were some questions as to the feasibility of having somewhat larger teams, but Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that that is not practicable now. Mr. Bundy suggested that special attention be given to electric power installations to the extent that adequate assets are available for that purpose. He also noted that the two August operations had been carried out in a professional and sophisticated manner, which leads naturally to the accusation of Agency sponsorship. He urged that to the extent possible attempts be made to vary the method, for example by launching the attack from the shore side rather than from the sea, as Mr. FitzGerald had previously said will be the case with the lumber mill. Mr. Bundy felt that in this way the "CIA signature" might be blurred.The Group then discussed the paper prepared by the Board of National Estimates, on possible Castro reaction to sabotage operations. No issue was taken with the conclusions of this paper, but there was some discussion as to how the Soviets would react to any requests made of them by Castro to assist him in combatting sabotage. In this connection, Mr. McCone called attention to the increasing currents of tension between the USSR and Cuba.Mr. FitzGerald then summarised the results of last month's infiltration/exfiltration operations and those proposed for next month.2. Cuba - Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro GroupThe Group then turned to further discussion of the paper from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated August 13, on the subject of Comandos L.In response to objections stated at earlier meetings to the use of a British base, Mr. FitzGerald said that it would be feasible to take off from a point in the northern Bahamas, rather than from one of the keys very near Cuba. This would considerably reduce the dangers of hot pursuit.Mr. Johnson said that purely apart from the British problem, whether or not such a change in location would alleviate it, he does not feel that the type of activity proposed accomplishes the agreed objective of reaching internal resistance elements.The Chairman, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone all felt that support of this group in the manner outlined, should be considered as action additional to that designed to contact the resistance. Further, they felt that it would be perfectly feasible, and in fact necessary, to avoid any involvement with the British in this matter. It was finallySECRETEYES ONLY
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 55]
SECRETEYES ONLY-3-decided that Mr. Bundy would discuss the proposal with higher authority, noting the reservations expressed by Mr. Johnson. In the event of favorable reaction by higher authority, Mr. Bundy will talk further to Mr. Johnson.Mr. McCone said that he would like to see more activity of this general nature and asked whether this could be accomplished if larger numbers of Cuban personnel were obtained. Mr. FitzGerald replied that the problem is not numbers, but the degree of training and competence. In this connection, he noted that the Artime group should be ready to go in November.3. Interdiction Operations Along Route 7Mr. Colby briefed the Group in detail on the successful inter- diction of Route 7 in Laos by a thousand-man force of Meos, in early August. He pointed out that the success achieved could be attributed to adequate operational intelligence, security, size of the group, and the support of the Parus.4. North Vietnam Status Report Number 7Mr. Colby touched on the highlights of agent activity in North Vietnam during August, and on plans for similar activity during the coming month.5. Operations in Denied Areas of the Far EastMr. Colby said that a review has been made of experience with agent operations in the denied areas of the Far East, including North Korea, China, Tibet and North Vietnam. He said that as a result of this review, serious doubts have arisen as to the results that can be expected from small teams, either in intelligence or in action. He said that he proposes to discuss with the DCI in the near future, certain changes in the method of operation in such areas. This might take the form of concentrating on developing a spirit of resistance rather than on a search for resistance elements or on carrying out minor sabotage. It might also involve much larger groups of people. In this connection, he pointed to the success of the thousand-man operation against Route 7.SECRETEYES ONLY
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 56]
- 4 -98Mr. Gilpatric noted that the Wheeler report, recommending the use of South Vietnamese nationals for activities of this nature in North Vietnam, is to be discussed next week with the Joint Chiefs. Mr. McCone suggested that the Chiefs should be briefed by Mr. Colby.![Signature of Thomas A. Parrott]Thomas A. ParrottDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McCone
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 57]
# SECRET EYES ONLY24 October 1963MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 24 October 1963PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McConaMr. Helms was also present.Mr. FitzGerald and Mr. Cheever were present for Items 2-5.1. United States Evaluation Board (USEB)Mr. Helms reported that the USEB was established in 1950 by a National Security Council Intelligence Directive. The Board was required to perform certain functions in connection with U.S. cover and deception programs. Membership on the Board was limited to the Service Departments, FBI, CIA, JCS, and the Department of State.According to Mr. Helms the USEB has not met in recent years. However, it was agreed by the Special Group that its functions had considerable significance and should be continued. Since USEB was originally organised only to deal in the military sphere, it was recommended by Mr. Helms that a new directive be written and coordinated, which would encompass all national deception programs, and be submitted to the Special Group for approval. It was also determined that the new USEB would report to the Special Group.2. Cuba - Forecast of CIA Sabotage OperationsThe proposed sabotage operations for November through January was noted by the Group. The operation plan against petroleum storage facilities in Niquero was deleted and an operation against a sawmill located at Canete in Northern Oriente Province, was substituted. Specific operational proposals for November will be submitted to the Special Group for approval at the next meeting.3. Cuba - Proposal for Air Strikes Against Cuban TargetsThis operational proposal was deferred by the Special Group pending an estimate to determine the Cuban reaction to an air strike on the Santiago refinery, and specifically what effect it might have on the U.S. reconnaissance operation. CIA will prepare the estimate.See special minutes for additional itemsSECRET EYES ONLY
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 58]
# SECRETEYES ONLY4. Cuba - Reeppraisal of Previous Proposals for Support of   Autonomous Anti-Castro GroupeMr. FitsGerald informed the Group that CIA is dropping itsearlier proposal to support Comandos L, due to the crackdown onexile raids by various U. S. and British government agencies. Berecommended that a plan of "selective relaxation" be adopted, designedto relax current stringent controls on selected anti-Castro groups inorder to avoid all raids being charged to CIA.The suggestion is that the "selective relaxation" be accomplishedby authorising CIA to tell appropriate U.S. enforcement agents thatcertain activities are of interest to CIA and should not be molested.CIA would not actually get involved but would simply screen thesegroups to permit some freedom of movement on the part of the betterones. This would be without the knowledge of the groups.Mr. Johnson raised the question of difficulties of controllingexile groups should any group succeed in engaging in activities notto the liking of the U.S. Government. This possibility was admitted.Mr. FitzGerald cited the Manolo Bay group as one group which a"selective relaxation" would assist. This autonomous group is re-ceiving financial and limited logistic assistance from CIA, and desiresto mount an infiltration operation from Florida. He has good con-nections in Cuba and should be urged to proceed. Mr. Bundy stated hewas not enthusiastic about Ray operating from U.S. territory. Mr.Bundy stated he would discuss this proposal with higher authority.5. Cuba - Infiltration OperationMr. FitsGerald reported that one of the small boats used in the21 October infiltration operation reached Mexico and is in the handsof local authorities, friendly to us.. There were three persons onboard, ona dead, ons injured, and the other all right.The fate of the second small boat is unknown. The mother shipwhich escorted the two small boata was attacked, but evaded itsattackers and escaped. There is a possibility that some team or boatcrew members may have been captured and if so, a "show trial" may beexpected.6. Proposal to Form and Support a Political Action Committee on   Religious Freedom in the USSRThis project was not approved as proposed. It was agreed thatthe concept wes sound but there should be further exploration as toSECRETEYES ONLY
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 59]
SECRETEYES ONLY.- 3 -whether private capital could not be used instead of government funds. The project was referred back to CIA with the suggestion to explore whether the World Council of Churches or the National Council of Protestants and Jews might be interested in obtaining and contributing funds for carrying out the aims set forth in the paper.7. Cyprus - Political ActionThis operation was approved although the Special Group members agreed that until after the elections there should be no new effort to initiate operational activity among the Greek veterans.8. Vietnam - Coup PlottingMr. McCone expressed his fear that the top U.S. diplomatic and military officials in Saigon are becoming too involved in conversations between General Don and Conein. Such involvement could destroy Conein's usefulness and involve Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins in operations difficult to deny.The Special Group authorized the sending of a coordinated message to Lodge and Harkins emphasizing (a) the setting up of a more secure system of contacts with General Don and other Vietnamese military; (b) the preparation of an E-bassy assessment of General Don's status, the group he represents and future plans; (c) the tightening of control over the Don/Conein meetings.Special Group members agreed that they should firm up their policy thinking with respect to Vietnam before Ambassador Lodge returns to Washington, and then hear what Mr. Lodge has to say on what courses of action should be taken.(Signed)/Paul EckelDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McCone
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 60]
EYES ONLY6 November 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Special Group, 5 November 1963PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.The Attorney General, Mr. Helms, Mr. Cheever, Dr. Wheelon, and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1 and 2. The Attorney General and Mr. Helms were present for Item 3.1. Cuba - Sabotage Operation in Southeast Pinar (No. 3105).Mr. Helms briefed the Group on the background of the mission and on events leading up to the infiltration attempted on 21-22 October. On the basis of available information, the best estimate is that Castro's security forces penetrated the reception committee and laid a trap which resulted in the capture of some personnel.The subsequent press coverage of this affair renders the further operational use of the mother ships REX and LIDA to be undesirable in the immediate future.2. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration OperationsMr. Cheever presented a low-key sabotage operation, No. 3111, against a warehouse and pier on the north coast of Cuba. This activity is to be carried out by a small commando team which will land on the pier and the warehouse.Mention was made by Mr. Cheever of some problems with British patrols which have unwittingly exposed some of CIA's operations. Mr. Bundy stated that he would mention this to the British Ambassador and CIA would follow up on a service-to-service level in order to prevent further unnecessary incidents.In addition, the Special Group tentatively approved two other operations. These are No. 3112, a sabotage operation against a sawmill located in northern Oriente Province and No. 3115, the infiltration of a radio operator to provide communications for a ratline.Mr. Bundy has placed the above three operations on a "fail safe" basis pending concurrence in each case by higher authority.See special minutesfor additional items
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 61]
3.  Cuba - Peace FeelersMr. Bundy stated that is has come to the attention of the White House that Castro would like to have a talk designed to bring about some kind of "arrangement" with the U.S. To hear what Castro has to say and to know on what basis he might wish to negotiate would be of some use to the U.S. Mr. Bundy suggested that for this initial talk Mr. William Attwood, currently on the staff of Mr. Stevenson at the United Nations, might be a likely candidate since Mr. Attwood has been in touch with Mr. Carlos Lechuga Hevia, the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Also, Attwood has a fairly friendly relationship with Castro based on previous acquaintance.In the Group discussion which followed it was thought inadvisable to allow Mr. Attwood, while on the UN staff, to get in touch with Castro. The suggestion was made that he might be removed from his official UN status and then go to Cuba for the ostensible purpose of writing an article for *Look* magazine. In this way it might be learned how badly Castro might want a detente with the United States.It was suggested by Mr. Helms that it might be profitable to "war game" this problem and look at it from all possible angles before making any contacts.A further suggestion was made by Mr. Bundy that Dr. Rene Vallejo Ortiz, Castro's aide and personal physician, might be flown to Mexico with Castro's proposals and discuss them with the U.S. Ambassador in Mexico City.The Attorney General emphasized that as a prelude to all this the U.S. must require some fundamental steps such as the end of subversion in Latin America and removing the Soviet troops in Cuba before any serious discussion can take place about a detente.Mr. McCone stated that it might be possible to use again Mr. James Donovan who is known to have excellent relationships with Dr. Vallejo. Vallejo might be flown to the UN for such talks or better still Donovan could go to Cuba.It was decided by the Special Group members not to try to reach a firm decision at this time but to study the problem for several days and attack it again.![signature of Paul Eckel]DistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McCone
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 62]
SECRETEYES ONLY6 November 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUPSUBJECT: Cuban OperationsAt a special meeting of the Special Group on 5 November, it tentatively approved, subject to higher authority concurrence, three Cuban operations scheduled for implementation on 8, 10, and 13 November. On 6 November higher authority disapproved all Cuban operations scheduled to be run into Cuba before 12 November. The two operations dated 8 and 10 November are therefore disapproved.![Signature of Paul Eckel]Paul EckelDistributionMr. JohnsonMr. GilpatricMr. McCone
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 63]
# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Cuban OperationsA meeting was held this morning with higher authority on the above subject. Present were: Mr. Rusk, Mr. McNamara, Mr. Robert Kennedy, Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Cheever, and Mr. Shackley.Mr. McCone gave a brief summary of recent developments inside Cuba. He stated that the military is generally loyal to Castro. There have been some disorders but not very extensive. Castro's internal security forces appear to be well organized. He has developed a system of informers which is becoming increasingly effective. The economic situation is deteriorating largely because of the enforcement of economic sanctions, and Hurricane "Flora" although its damage was not as great as originally thought. The Soviets appear to be continuing the gradual withdrawal of personnel from Cuba although recently 1,000-2,000 troops have come in. There now seems to be a kind of "Soviet MAAG" program concerned mainly with training Cubans in all types of military activity including the handling of missiles. There has been some removal of the more sophisticated types of electronic equipment. Some new tanks have arrived in Cuba, estimates run from 25 to 50.Mr. FitzGerald reported on Cuban operations under six main headings: (a) Covert Collection, (b) Propaganda, (c) Economic Denial, (d) Disaffections in the Military, (e) Sabotage and Harassment, and (f) Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups.(a) Covert Collection. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that inside Cuba CIA has three kinds of agent activities: (1) "singleton" (2) collection nets, and (3) agents involved in "black net" operations. While there is encouraging improvement in the geographical spread of these agents, there is still, understandably, a fairly heavy concentration of agents in the Havana area.A question was raised as to how many agents in all of these activities have been lost. Mr. FitzGerald said that in the neighborhood of 25 had been either captured or killed in the past year.
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 64]
The reasons for these casualty figures are the increasing effectiveness of Castro's internal security forces and discovery brought about when agents try to obtain food. No matter how good the documentation, an outsider in a community is viewed with suspicion.(b) Propaganda. The activities of CIA in this field are the mailing of leaflets and radio broadcasts. Some 30-40,000 leaflets per month have been mailed and during a day there are 32 hours of programs emanating from seven different stations. It is believed that there is a very excellent listening public. The programs appeal to people in a wide variety of jobs and professions. There is some jamming but it is spasmodic and generally confined to Havana.(c) Economic Denial. Mr. FitzGerald reported that the U.S. economic denial program is contributing to Cuba's declining economy. Mention was made that the economic denial program would be more effective if the Canadians were willing to cooperate. Up to now they have not gone along with U.S. efforts, and they are supplying many items essential to Cuban economy. The UK and Spain are continuing to deal in certain types of goods required by the Cubans. Commodities going into Cuba in 1962 from the free world reached $101 million. While this represents less than in 1961 the amount is still too high.(d) Disaffections in the Military. While the military is loyal to Castro as has been noted there are indications that some leaders would like to break with the regime but lack courage and opportunity. Mr. FitzGerald commended a CIA-DIA task force which prepared a report covering some 150 Cuban military leaders. Out of this figure there are some 45 which look interesting from CIA's operational viewpoint. Mr. FitzGerald reported that CIA is in touch with three persons who are in the military or who have highly placed contacts in such circles. The aim is to use these three individuals to establish contact with military personnel inside Cuba. The principal aim is to get military leaders who have become disenchanted with the Castro regime to dare to talk and plot Castro's downfall with each other.(e) Sabotage and Harassment. Mr. FitzGerald mentioned four successful sabotage operations against a power plant, oil storage facilities, a sawmill, and an underwater demolition operation against a floating crane in one of Cuba's harbors. It is believed that the publication of these successful sabotage activities in the Cuban press has tended to raise appreciably the morale of the people. Also, such sabotage continues to keep pressure on the Castro regime and adds to the growing economic problems facing the country.(f) Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups. The question was asked from where would the autonomous groups operate. Mr. FitzGerald replied that they would operate from outside U.S. territory. He mentioned
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 65]
# EYES ONLYtwo bases of the Artime group, one in Costa Rica and the other inNicaragua. Also it was hoped that the autonomous group under Manolo Raywould soon get itself established in a working base, possibly Costa Rica.Mr. FitzGerald said that much could be accomplished by these autonomousgroups once they become operational.A question was asked as to what decisions remain to be made. Mr.FitzGerald replied that we were looking for a reaffirmation of the programas presented, including sabotage and harassment. When asked what wasplanned in sabotage for the immediate future, he said that destructionoperations should be carried out against a large oil refinery and storagefacilities, a large electric plant, sugar refineries, railroad bridges,harbor facilities, and underwater demolition of docks and ships. Thequestion was also raised as to whether an air strike would be effectiveon some of these principal targets. The consensus was that CIA shouldproceed with its planning for this type of activity looking towardJanuary.The State Department raised questions with respect to sabotageactivities in Cuba. The thought was advanced that there may be arelationship between such hit and run attacks on Cuba and the delay ofAmerican convoys en route to Berlin. A further question was posed asto the over-all importance to the United States of sabotage operations,especially since it is so difficult to keep them from being directlyattributable to the U.S. It was thought that the hit and run type effortmight in fact invoke loss of support inside Cuba and may even result inbringing more Soviet troops back into Cuba. Somehow the U.S. must pinresponsibility for these activities on Castro. The U.S. in fact must beready to retaliate when it can be fairly well established that Castro isattempting with arms, money and men to foment Communist uprisings in anyLatin American country.The consensus was that since CIA's sabotage operation is in themain low cost and since it does worry the Castro regime, denies him someessential commodities, stimulates some sabotage inside Cuba and tends toimprove the morale of the Cubans who would like to see Castro removed,CIA should proceed with those operations planned for the coming week end(November 15 through 17).The view was expressed that CIA, in connection with the Departmentof Defense, should concentrate on attempting to catch Castro red-handeddelivering arms to Communist groups in Latin American countries. It wasdetermined that during the next 90 days from this date an attempt wouldbe made by means of air patrols and surface ships to identify shipscarrying arms for Castro to Latin American countries. It was hoped thata ship with Cuban arms could be picked up. Conversations are to be
[104-10306-10024.pdf — page 66]
EYES ONLYinitiated by the Secretary of the Navy with CIA to map out a three-month operation against Cuban shipping. It was also determined that the Colombian and Venezuelan governments should be asked to join with the U.S. in developing a joint patrol designed to identify ships carrying weapons from Cuba destined for revolutionary groups in Latin American countries.![signature of Paul Eckel]Paul Eckel[^4][^4]: SECRET EYES ONLY