Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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8. In connection with bilateral and multilateral   actions involving the cooperation of the OAS and nations   of the Caribbean, Mr. Bundy stated that the nature and   import of the recently discovered arms cache in Venezuela   constitutes a point of departure for such actions as search   and seizure on the high seas or an OAS-sponsored quarantine   against arms shipments. Mr. Helms then briefly described   the nature of the arms cache and the plans involving those   arms as set forth in captured Venezuelan communist documents.   Mr. Helms showed a map prepared from those documents indi-   cating the manner in which the arms would have been used   to tie up the city of Caracas during the recent election.   Mr. Martin then briefed concerning OAS action with regard   to the arms cache. He said that the committee appointed   by the OAS to investigate had called for additional   evidence from the Venezuelan government which would take   two to three weeks to assemble. He said that he felt that   the OAS report would be out in mid-January although the   question of Cuban defense against the Venezuelan charges   had not yet been resolved. Mr. Bundy referred to the   efforts being made to increase the effectiveness of sur-   veillance of arms smugglers in Central America and referred   to the possibility of an OAS-sponsored search and seizure   on the high seas.9. Under Secretary Ball stated that the Department of   Justice has warned that a number of students, some of more   respectable stripe than the last group which visited Cuba,   were planning to try to visit Cuba during the Christmas   vacation and that there is evidence of larger numbers   planning to do the same thing during the summer. He said   that the Attorney General was bothered by this and had   suggested the relaxation of present rules concerning travel   to Cuba. Mr. Ball said that the Department of State is   tentatively opposed to such relaxation particularly because   of its effect on Latin American countries. The President   strongly concurred with the Department of State position.   He said that he did not propose to change or relax present   regulations.![signature of Desmond FitzGerald]Desmond FitzGeraldChief, Special Affairs Staff
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# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD13 December 1963SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 13 December - 9:30 a. m.1. Introduced General Carter but was unable to explain his responsibilities.2. Introduced Peer de Silva. The President spoke briefly of what he expects of the Station and the representatives of the Government in the Saigon community.3. Reviewed the Checklist. I emphasized (a) the dangers of the hostages in Bolivia, stating however that while 21 lives are extremely important, nevertheless, we must avoid a policy decision the consequence of which might mean the lives of an undertermined thousands of people in the future. In fact I was saying we must not give the Communists the upper hand in this argument. I explained the critical location of the prisoners, and (b) I called the President's attention to the international oil situation and the deadlock between OPEC and the international oil companies and the opening that this is affording the Italians and possibly the French.4. Noted Item C in the notes, stating we felt, from sensitive sources, Spinelli's observation was incorrect but there was a possibility of a sufficient withdrawal by the Egyptians to make a favorable demonstration of intentions by which we could persuade Fiasal to withhold military aid to the Royalists for an extended period of several months.NOTE: Carter and de Silva left the room at this time.5. I told the President that subject to Rusk's approval, I intended to issue a series of articles on the weakness of the Soviet economy, drainage on their gold supply, over-commitments on foreign aid, etc. for the political figures who are wavering between leaning on the
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98[ Soviets or the West, such as Sukarno and certain South Americancountries, so that they will understand they are not leaning on verymuch when they lean on the Soviets.6. Explained that I had given a complete briefing to General Eisenhower and conveyed to the President General Eisenhower's expression of friendship and support.7. Discussed briefly my talk with Robert Kennedy and urged the President to send a message to Kennedy but not to see him until after the first of the year. I asked for the President's approval to invite Kennedy to accompany me to Saigon.NOTE: This invitation has been extended but Kennedy felt it was untimely because of personal family commitments, responsibilities to Jackie, concern on the part of his wife, Mrs. Kennedy, and for other reasons.8. Mr. Bundy joined in part of these discussions. The President asked what the Attorney General intended to do, that is, stay on or leave. I told the President the Attorney General intended to stay on as Attorney General, but it was not clear to what extent the President wished him to become involved in the activities outside the area of the Office of the Attorney General, such as, intelligence work, NSC problems, counter insurgency matters, etc. I explained to the President that I had told Bobby he could not bring back the intimacy of relationship with the President which he had had with his brother because that was a blood relationship, not an official relationship. A type of relationship which is seldom found between brothers and never found between officials, either in business or government.9. I gave the President a copy of the memorandum on Soviet Foreign Aid.JAM:mcm
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# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 9:45 - 6 December 19636 December 1963The first part of the meeting involved a discussion with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, William Bundy and McGeorge Bundy concerning the procedures on MLF.Rusk requested, and received, approval to brief General Eisenhower and will arrange to have Amb. Merchant, Admiral Ricketts and General Goodpastor present at the briefing. Rusk reported that a group of "young Republicans" opposed the MLF.Rusk also received approval to brief certain Congressional leaders in small groups, but to intimate that no government, including the United States Government, is committed to the MLF program.[^98]Rusk gave an optimistic report on progress and stated the most important objectives of the MLF was to give the Germans a sense of participation in nuclear weapons planning and operations under a scheme providing adequate control by other Allied nations, including the United States. [^98]McNamara stated that Mr. von Hassel had advised him that the MLF was a "must" or else the Germans would undoubtedly pursue an independent course in developing their own national nuclear weapons resources. Rusk indicated that failure to proceed with the MLF might force a German-French arrangement on nuclear weapons. McNamara stated there was no military requirement for the MLF but the force will have a military (?) utility and will permit a reduction in planned United States national capabilities and hence the cost, which is considerable, is not really an additional U.S. military cost. [^98]The President then suggested a briefing of Congressional leaders, both Democratic and Republican, Senate and House, substantially along the lines of the NSC briefing of yesterday afternoon. I brought up the question of security and pointed out the dangers. The President asked that I develop a 10 or 15 minute briefing on Soviet strategic capabilities, Soviet defense and Soviet economy, going just as far as I possibly could without endangering sources and methods.ACTION: Discuss with Cline, et al.[^98]
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98The meeting then continued with the President, McGeorgeBundy and McCone. I discussed the foreign aid figures as includedin the 6 December memorandum and the special report on SovietForeign Economics Programs of 25 October, and stated that Iwould prepare for the President some special graphics which wouldshow Soviet foreign, economic and military aid, both extensions anddraw-downs, to non-Communist countries and Cuba.NOTE: Mr. Rostow raised the question earlieras to the validity of comparing our aid figures withUSSR's aid figures because the latter did not includeaid to satellites. His position is that since we includeaid to NATO countries, particularly Turkey, Greece,South Korea, etc., we should examine USSR aid to theirsatellites in addition to Cuba. This should be examined.I do not know whether the figures are available.The President reviewed the Checklist and I made the followingcomments:981. I expect the USSR to expand the test ban agreement to cover   underground tests and it was quite possible they would soon make claims   for vast improvements in seismology. I mentioned the recent informa-   tion on the LASER beam.2. I pointed out the seriousness of the Cambodian situation   stating the fact that the Khmer Serei clandestine radio had been located   in Southeast Thailand and that my information was that the Thais were   not inclined to put it out of business because the Cambodians were   broadcasting unfavorably against them.3. noted the additional indicators of possible conflict over   Malaysia.I then explained to the President the source of our informationthat the Soviet Intelligence Service, on orders from Moscow, wasattempting to stimulate communications from India to him, Chief JusticeWarren and the Attorney General, urging a full probe into theassassination of the President. I stated that this report comes from avery reliable penetration and we evaluate it quite highly.We then discussed the assignment of Peer de Silva to Saigon.I stated that the staff had made such recommendation to me, but thatI felt it was only a good move if he was to remove Ambassador Lodge.He felt that to do this would have political repercussions and would be
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tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the military junta, that it would indicate President Johnson's support of Diem rather than the present authorities. Therefore he stated he could not move to remove Lodge but hoped that Lodge would remove himself and become a candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency and would be the nominee. (Note: I told the President he wanted things too easy). I told the President that Lodge would destroy de Silva if he opposed his assignment or did not like him, or wished to get rid of him. The President said he would communicate most emphatically with Lodge in this regard and asked Bundy to write an appropriate communi-. cation. I told the President this would do no good, that Lodge was absolutely unconscionable in matters of this kind and he had resorted to trickery time and time again during the Eisenhower administration and that he never failed to use the newspapers in order to expose an individual or block an action. I therefore could only conclude that if he was going to keep Lodge on that it would be better to stay with David Smith as Chief of Station, who is a most competent officer but young and not fully experienced, but this proposal did not meet his request that the best and most experienced man we can find be placed on the job. The President said he would exercise the full power of his office to keep Lodge in line and felt our responsibilities in South Vietnam are so great that CIA should have a "four-star man" on the job and that is what he wanted.JAM/mcm
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# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Discussion with the President at his residence on Sunday, Dec. 1 -10:00 o'clock about 30 minutes. No one was in attendance.1. Reviewed a series of reports. There was no Checklist.2. The President asked about news from Venezuela, particularly concerned about Chenault.[^98]3. Briefly reviewed a clandestine report from Bonn as a means of indicating sources to CIA not available to others.[^98]4. Reported to the President that the UN Commission to Saigon felt a bit critical towards the U.S. presence; however we are in some doubt as to whether they will include such criticism in their public report.[^98]5. Briefly reviewed the final report on the Alvarado case in Mexico City.6. The President then brought up the question of men in government. Emphasized the need for men, particularly young men. I urged the President to discuss this matter with the Business Council and with the AFL-CIO group. He said that meetings would be arranged this coming week.7. I advised the President that I was to meet with Halaby to pursue the SST problem[^98]8. I requested the President to instruct Bundy that Memorandums of Conversation with Heads of State should be distributed to me automatically. Also that the State Department be instructed to send such Memorandums to me. The President agreed.NOTE: This should be followed up by Mr. Cline. Bundy will apparently discuss this matter later with the President who agreed that such distribution should be automatic except in very special circumstances in which he wished distribution held to his own personal files for reasons of his own choice. I could take no exception to this decision.9. We should contact Hoover concerning identification of people sending in ads and letters to the Dallas newspapers.NOTE: I should call Hoover concerning this.JAM/mfb (tape)[^98]:
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TOP SECIET2 December 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDEYES ONLY--NO DISTRIBUTIONSUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 30 November 1963Throughout the conversation the President mentioned a number of very personal problems and asked my help and also asked that Bundy and I act as a team in trying to help him solve some of his problems.1. He indicated that there must be some Cabinet changes. By inference he made reference to the Attorney General, but not by direct statement. Apparently he is waiting for the Attorney General to decide what role, if any, he wishes to play in the Johnson Adminis- tration.2. He stated that Secretary Celebrezze is very anxious for a judgeship and that he, Johnson, was extremely favorably impressed with Sargent Shriver and thought he would be an excellent Secretary of H. E. W. This was enthusiastically endorsed by both Bundy and myself.3. He raised the question of whether Mrs. Kennedy might be a very able ambassador.4. He was deeply critical of the handling of Ayub. He questioned whether Ball was the proper man to have gone forward to negotiate with Ayub. He felt that we needed a new ambassador and he asked for recommendations, the name of an ambassador who could handle that Embassy, and more particularly handle Ayub. At this point he asked that Bundy and I work together in searching out names of individuals who might be helpful in a number of critical areas. I protested his criticism of Ball, stating that I felt that Ball had done a very good job in his mission to Pakistan. The President expressed the highest regard for Ayub.
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5. He then turned to a discussion of Latin America. Expressed criticism of the Alliance for Progress. Stated that Moscoso was not the man to handle it and he should be replaced and asked who could be his replacement. He also stated that we had not handled the OAS positively enough. He was very critical of our ambassador to the OAS, Acting Ambassador Ward Allen, and asked for recommendations for a replacement.[^7]6. Throughout the conversation it appeared that President Johnson is not going to be satisfied with the organization as it is now composed and that he will make changes, and at the same time he does not intend to make changes just for the sake of change nor does he intend to move in the "hangers-on of the last 20 years." Apparently he has had a vast number of approaches from people who he termed to be political hacks and said he didn't want any part of any of them.JAM:mcm(tape)
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2 December 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting with the President, 11:00 a. m., November 30th,in attendance Mr. Bundy, meeting lasted approximately1 1/2 hours1. Reviewed the Checklist. The President immediately   raised the question of what we were doing about Colonel Chennault.   He expects most serious public reaction and has a feeling that we   are "drifting" on this situation. I assured him we and the Venezuelan   government were doing all that was possible. However, he requested   more positive action on a report on the actions being taken.NOTE: Wish a full report from the station for Sundaymorning briefing.2. No other Checklist items raised any serious questions.3. The President again raised the question of what we were   going to do in Cuba. Bundy advised that a policy meeting was scheduled   for Monday, time not set, to discuss Cuban policy. I pointed out to   the President the statements of President Kennedy on September 5th,   September 13th, and November 20th, 1962 and then I showed the evidence   that proved absolutely that arms had been imported into Venezuela from   Cuba. I stated that most positive efforts should be made immediately   to secure complete OAS agreement on a course of action which would   involve a series of steps ranging from economic denial through blockade   and even to possible invasion, but that it must be OAS action, otherwise   it would involve confrontation with Khrushchev. I stated that if the   action was a Hemispheric action I didn't see that the USSR could do   much about it. The President agreed but decided to await the policy   meeting on Monday.NOTE: DD/P and WH should prepare full recommendationsfor positive actions which might be taken unilaterally withthe Caribbean states or with the OAS, for my use in thepolicy meeting.
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4. I reviewed the report from Mexico City station, 27 November, advising the number of Soviets in Cuba, indicating that this report which we thought was quite responsible more or less verified our own current estimates.5. Reference the Oswald matter, reviewed with the President CAS Mexico City 7127 reporting on the interrogation of Alvarado. We briefly discussed the composition of the Review Board announced by the President on the 29th. Discussion of the Oswald situation was inconclusive and no action required.6. The President then brought up the question of Pakistan and I reviewed briefly the intelligence community's feeling of concern and their view that our Pakistan relationship was of the greatest importance. Bundy mentioned the forthcoming December meeting between Ayub and General Taylor. The President made no comment but seemed to feel that Taylor should remain in the United States because of serious Defense budget problems. Bundy reviewed the great number of commitments we have made to Pakistan and that we would come to their defense if India should use our arms to attack Pakistan. The President expressed the greatest of confidence in Ayub and a feeling that we had not been forceful enough with him, had not given him a feeling of confidence in our motives and that he had drifted into the thought that we would abandon him in favor of India. He stated that he wished this corrected in a most positive manner.7. I reviewed our Cuban overflight program advising the President of the USIB criteria and the extent to which flights were being carried on.8. Reviewed briefly the TACKLE China overflight and stated these had been stood down since the loss of the last plane but we intended to resume which the President thought was proper.ACTION: I wish flight plans to meet COMOR priority in targets for at least two flights for submission to the Special Group next Thursday.9. I advised the President that the ChiCom-India border flights had been completed and that we now planned to brief the Indians, Thailand and very possibly Pakistan. I stated the equipment had been withdrawn from Takhli.- 2 -
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10. I advised the President that the CORONA mission was up    and would be brought down on Monday. Also suggested that at an    early opportunity I brief him on the CORONA program.11. Reviewed the Venezuela overflight plan as outlined in    memorandum for the Special Group and President approved.NOTE: I have communicated this approval to GeneralCarter and instructed him to proceed.JAM:mcm(tape)
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29 November 1963Late developments on the Mexico City investigation of Oswald's activities1. Results of the first interrogation of Silvia Duran have been received. Reveals nothing other than confirmation of Oswald's effort to secure authority to enter USSR via Havana. His requests were refused.2. Result of second interrogation of Silvia Duran has not as yet been received.3. FBI dispatched a man from Washington to Mexico City at the request of Ambassador Mann.4. The Nicaraguan, Alvarado, has been turned over to the Mexican authorities for questioning, by the CIA station at the specific request of the FBI.   NOTE: CIA Headquarters refused this turn-over until FBI request received because FBIis in control of the investigation.5. Alvarado's story becoming increasingly questionable because of a public statement carried by Mexico City radio and press prior to Alvarado's entering the picture, to the effect that Oswald had received $5,000 from the Cuban Embassy.To be used by DCI in meeting with the President at 10:30 on 29 November 1963 with Secty. McNamara and Bundy.
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# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting at his residence with President Johnson10:00 a. m. Thursday November 28th.for approximately 30 minutes1. The President reviewed the Checklist and made the following comments:a. Are we doing all possible to keep Venezuelan authorities informed? I reviewed briefly our penetrations and our activitiesb. What is the real future in South Vietnam? The President expressed the desire for an objective appraisal and any recommendations that I might have for modification of policy, changes of personnel and draw up a rough estimate of what is the outlook. The President continues to be concerned over public reaction and Congressional reaction against our activities in South Vietnam. The President is obviously opposed to Lodge (his opposition goes back to conflicts in the Senate). He asked for recommendations as to who would be a good man and who could run the American team.He noted Item b. in the Check list and I pointed out the press exaggeration and distortion which appeared in the *New York Times*. He asked that I personally meet with the head of the Times in New York, pointing out how such distorted reports seriously damage the American interests. I stated that I would do this.We discussed Item 2.f. having to do with the high level of communications traffic and I stated that this could be considered as an unfavorable indicator.The President noted without comment report on Israel, USSR, India military aid and Burmac. The President asked what the outlook was with Greece. I told him that we expected that Karamanlis would eventually be restored to power. The President stated that he had vigorously opposed our