Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 13]
13-00000# TOP SECRETIn view of subsequent developments, one inter-esting suggestion made by the Inspector General inNovember 1957 was the following:On the island of Cuba, probably onlya US citizen, in some way known to beconnected with the US Government and"assumed" to be backed by Washington,would have the ability to act as inter-mediary between the various oppositiongroups in the Batista Government andwork out a possible "cease fire." Thiswould have to be done covertly, and anyresults achieved either not ever publiclyannounced or certainly not advertiseduntil after the election. Any publicattempt to bring peace would be fore-doomed to failure by each side probablyindicating exorbitant demands and thenbeing unable to withdraw from itsannounced position.* 9/Although it may have had no relation to theKirkpatrick memorandum, on 25 November 1957, lessthan a week following the Kirkpatrick memorandum,William Wieland of the Department of State notifiedAdolf Rerle, one of the country's leading experts onLatin American Affairs and a former member of the* It is interesting to speculate whether at this  time Kirkpatrick was thinking of William D. Pawley,  former US Ambassador to Brazil and Peru and an  American businessman who operated significant enter-  prises in Cuba, to negotiate with Batista. Within  a year's time, Pawley, who also stood high in the  ranks of the Republic Party contributors, was desig-  nated to undertake such a mission to Cuba.- 5 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 14]
TOP SECRETState Department, that he was enroute to Cuba, ac-cording to Berle, "to see whether anything can bedone to bring the Cuban revolt to any kind of anorderly conclusion."[^1]Berle, with remarkable prescience, noted:It is rough going, anti-intervention isall right up to a point. But we are re-sponsible for keeping order in the hemis-phere quite aside from the proprieties, anda rather bolder policy in that regardseems indicated. [^2]By early 1958, the Agency had become sufficientlyconcerned about the pro-Communist orientation ofCastro's government, and particularly the pro-Castroproclivities of his two principal deputies, ErnestoChe Guevara and Raul Castro Ruz, Fidel's brother, thatpenetration of the Partido Socialista Popular was apriority concern of the field. At least two agentswere successfully placed in PSP ranks, and in March1958, one Agency officer managed to join the Castroforces in the mountains for a period of two weeks andto observe their tactics in combat. In June 1958,Robert D. Wiecha, COB, Santiago de Cuba, got himself"captured" by Raul Castro's forces in order to beable to assist 29 US sailors and marines and 15 US- 6 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 10/[^2]: 11/
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13-00000TOP SECRETbusinessmen who had been kidnapped by Raul Castro.In both instances, the Agency representatives returned unharmed; and both reported on the "radical" and anti-American nature of the Castro movement. According to one source, Wiecha found "definite communist overtones" among the Raul Castro forces.*[^1] 12/Additional documentation of the pro-communist nature of the Castro organization was reported with great frequency during 1958 from contacts the Santiago de Cuba Base had in Oriente Province. Whether Castro's contingent was communist oriented or not, others such as Adolf Berle and his friends (both in and out of State Department), continued to reflect their concern about the possible ways to combat the growing strength of the Castro movement in Cuba. 13/ Berle was most hopeful that the Castro situation could be remedied by cooperation among Latin American liberals working in conjunction with some of the more enlightened Cubans who had broken with Castro (for example, Felipe Pazos and Pepín Bosch) with additional support from the OAS[^1]: The historian for WH Division provided the figures on US captives shown here, but Hugh Thomas indicates 19 US businessmen and 27 servicemen were captured.- 7 -TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET-- and only minor participation from the US Department of State. [^1]At a time when the Agency's fears about the Castro movement were increasing, a rather different proposal was put forward by the Chief of the Para-military Division, Political and Psychological Staff, of the Clandestine Service. Rather than trying to whip Castro, Alfred Cox suggested that perhaps the wisest move for the Agency would be to join Castro. It was apparent, according to Cox, that since Batista was on the way out, we should now try to remedy Castro's hostile attitude toward the United States because of our efforts to prop up Batista. To accomplish this, Cox suggested that:> A practical way to protect United> States interests in this matter would> be to make secret contact with Castro,> assure him of the United States sympa-> thy with some of his objectives, and> to offer him support. The individual> chosen to make the contact should be> of such background that it is clear> that he speaks with the authority of> the United States Government.Obviously, the support must be given covertly so as not to endanger United States relations with Batista. The most effective means of help to Castro would be arms and ammunition. Air dropping of- 8 -# TOP SECRET[^1]: 14/
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TOP SECRETthis equipment might be dangerous from the security aspect. Allowing a ship- load of equipment manned by a Cuban crew to evade our Coast Guard would probably be a better method. The most secure means of help would be giving the money to Castro, who could then purchase his own arms. A combination of arms and money would probably be best.*[^1]By late fall of 1958, when it became apparent that the Batista regime in Cuba was about to go under, the Agency in conjunction with the Department of State supported a plan to have Batista bow out more or less gracefully and to have the government of the country taken over, not by the Presidential candidate who had been elected in the rigged election, but by a junta pending subsequent free, democratic elections. When* Not all Agency reporting out of the Cuban area was biased against、Castro. One report in the fall of 1958 indicated that Castro definitely was not a Communist, citing as a reason for this: "Ninety-five percent of his followers are good Catholics. Three Catholic priests have joined Fidel Castro and his forces in the Sierra Maestra, and one has joined Raul Castro and his troops in the Sierra Cristal. The rebel forces under the Castros, therefore, have four chaplains, while the entire Cuban Army does not have a single chaplain. (Source comment: The United States should not be taken in by President Fulgencio Batista's attempt to label the revolutionary movement as Communist in- spired, dominated, or influenced.)"[^2]The source for this evaluation of Castro was, as one might surmise, a Catholic priest.-- 9 --TOP SECRET[^1]: 15/[^2]: 16/
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13-00000# TOP SECRETtraveling to Miami with William Snow, an Assistant Secretary of State, and Henry Holland, formerly a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Col. J. C. King,Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, met with William D. Pawley on 18-19 November 1958 to discuss a plan which would have Pawley travel to Cuba to meet with Batista in an attempt to convince him to bow out gracefully. Pawley was a long-time acquaintance and friend of Batista from the days when Pawley had been running the Cubana Airline.In return for Batista's support for a friendly military junta -- nominally to be responsible for his ouster -- the representatives of the Department of State and the Agency agreed that Batista should be provided safety for himself, his friends, and his close cronies, particularly those whose lives would be endangered should there ever be a truly violent overthrow of the government. Batista also was to be provided protection for his personal assets in Cuba. Various individuals were identified as possible candi-dates for the junta, and, according to King, the objective was that various of these members would have- 10 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 19]
TOP SECRETsufficient political strength to weaken Castro's sup-port.Following the meeting in Miami, Pawley didundertake the mission to see Batista in Cuba. Arriv-ing on 8 December in Havana he had a series of pre-liminary meetings with the Cuban Foreign Minister,who strongly supported the proposals that Pawleyindicated that he was going to make. Unfortunately,however, the Foreign Minister told Pawley that it wasunlikely that Batista would accept the proposals.The meeting between Pawley and Batista actually tookplace on 11 December 1958 when, according to the re-port from Havana station:Pawley met with Batista for two hoursthis evening. Laid his plan beforeBatista without pulling any punches.Batista] took it calmly. He agreed withmuch of Pawley's analysis of situation,but said he could not take the juntaway out. 17/Batista made no promises, and went through thereasons why he couldn't possibly give up the officefor fear of being called a coward and traitor; thatthere would be a blood bath; and that he had bothmoral and constitutional obligations. COS Havana- 11 -TOP SECRET
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13-00000TOP SECRETnoted Pawley's evaluation of the meeting as follows:Batista will not accept plan, and willmake every effort turn government over toRivera Aguero (the Batista candidate whohad been named Presidential successor ina rigged election). However, unfavorabledevelopments may produce change of attitudeon part of B[atista]. [^1]Following Pawley's visit with Batista, the situ-ation in Cuba deteriorated rapidly and the policies ofthe US Government regarding Cuba were ambivalent. Arepresentative of the Archbishop of Havana, Father BezChebebe, approached the American Consul in Santiago tofloat some proposals for resolving the differences be-tween the two countries. The priest emphasized thatalthough a Castro take over was inevitable:Both Fidel Castro and US interestshad important stake in sugar crop andboth undoubtedly wish resolve problemscaused by present situation. Also saidthat there were matters now mostly minoron both sides which have been sourcesmutual irritation and misunderstandingand that these should be eliminatedsoonest, so that they would not growto affect future relations, which Fatherconsiders inevitable. [^2]In addition, the representative of the Archbishop ofHavana indicated to the Amconsul that:He though[t] US Government couldprofitably send person of confidence,- 12 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 18/[^2]: 19/
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TOP SECRETnot necessarily an official, to discuss mutual problems as discreetly as possible with Fidel. Implied that such would be well received. 20/Despite the fact that the communist proclivities of Fidel Castro and his cohorts had been clearly stated by Agency personnel in Cuba, on 18 December 1958, COSHavana cabled Headquarters strongly supporting the position that the Archbishop of Havana's representative had proposed to the American Consulate, saying:Havana Station feels proposal merits serious State/CIA consideration. Operation this nature could pay big future dividends if fully qualified person could be found for job and dispatched quickly. Regardless how we may feel about Castro and his movement, both will be important political forces for a long time to come. Perhaps candidate could be found through National Catholic Welfare Organization. 21/At about the same time this proposal was being put forward, WH Division had asked the Paramilitary Division (PMD) to establish a small contingency task force, capable of making air drops into Cuba. Two representatives of PMD, Lucious L. Rucker and William G. Redel were sent to Havana -- Rucker to locate and survey possible drop zones and Redel to get himself into position to see if he could locate dissidents who- 13 -TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETwere both anti-Castro and anti-Batista. What WH hoped to accomplish, presumably, was that they could organize these anti-Batista and anti-Castro dissidents and get them armed in time so that they could prevent Castro from taking over the government if Batista should suddenly resign or decide to flee the country. [^22]On 31 December 1958, Paramilitary Division reported to WH Division that a Helio Courier was already in place in Key West with a backup Helio in Washington; a sterile C-54 had been requested from Europe; and the Office of Logistics would have an arms load rigged for a drop by 2 January 1959. [^23]It was not until the last week of December 1958 that President Eisenhower became actively involved in discussions and decisions affecting US policy toward Cuba. His interest was precipitated by a 23 December 1958 Memorandum on Cuba which had been prepared by the Acting Secretary of State and sent to Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, who discussed the memorandum with Eisenhower and the DCI on 26 December. The President apparently indicated that he had not been fully aware of the positions of State and CIA- 14 -TOP SECRET[^22]: .[^23]: .
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 23]
TOP SECRETregarding Castro, and he suggested that meetings of the Special Group under NSC 5412/2 should be held on a weekly basis, with Cuba to be a regular subject for discussion.Gordon Gray and Allen Dulles had some differences of opinion concerning the advisability of reading other individuals into the act. Gray suggested that the President's Board of Consultants (later the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) be made party to the discussions, but Dulles rather strongly suggested that there was a significant difference between the discussions which were intended for the Special Group 5412 on Covert Operations, and PFIAB responsibilities for general problems related to foreign intelligence. Dulles made the specific point that if the Board of Consultants was going to get involved in the details of planned covert operations, they were then in a position of reviewing US foreign policy. The discussion also seems to have verged on the right of Congress to attempt to oversee covert operations -- a point about which Eisenhower expressed himself very strongly, noting that such action by Congress would be an infringement of his prerogative as Commander-in-Chief. 24/- 15 -TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETAt 3:40 on the afternoon of 31 December 1958, there was another high level meeting attended by Messrs. Herter, Murphy, and Rubottom, Department of State; Irwin, Department of Defense; Admiral Burke, the CNO; General Cabell, DDCI; and Gordon Gray at which the Cuban situation was again discussed. Even as the meeting was in progress, Batista was preparing to flee Cuba; and possible US action, including direct intervention by US Marines, was among the topics that were discussed. There also was some suggestion that the US take the responsibility for naming members to a junta to succeed Batista, rather than permitting Fidel Castro and his followers to take over the Cuban Government. 25/With some benefit of hindsight, Eisenhower recalled this period in the following manner:During the rush of these last events in the final days of 1958, the Central Intelligence Agency suggested for the first time that a Castro victory might not be in the best interests of the United States. (Earlier reports which I had received of Castro's possible Communism were suspect because they originated with people who favored Batista.)"Communists and other extreme radicals appear to have penetrated the Castro movement," Allen Dulles said. "If Castro- 16 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 25]
13-00000TOP SECRETtakes over, they will probably participate in the government." When I heard this estimate, I was provoked that such a conclusion had not been given earlier.At another point, the ex-President wrote:Though our intelligence experts backed and filled for a number of months, events were gradually driving them to the conclusion that with the coming of Castro, Communism had penetrated this hemisphere. [^26]B. Castro Takes OverDuring the first few weeks of 1959 following Castro's take over, there was a flurry of activity as Havana Station attempted to keep track of the changes in government. The Station seemed assured that it was cognizant of all of Castro's movements, especially on the developing military capabilities.In fact, when the US Army suggested that the Station provide support for the Army's covert collection of military intelligence under commercial cover in Havana, COS took strong exception to the proposals, emphasizing the Station's own capabilities in this area. COS was overruled by Headquarters, however, and General Cabell assured the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Army that while he was aware that Havana had- 17 -TOP SECRET[^26]:
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TOP SECRETobjected to the Army's proposals, the COS nonethelesshad been "instructed" to cooperate.*[^1]In these early weeks of 1959, US representativesin Havana were predicting that Castro would have adifficult time holding his government together, andamong other things, one report emphasized the proba-bility that Castro would soon find that he would haveto get along with the United States. 29/ The mostlikely threat to relations with the United Stateswas the existence of the naval base at GuantanamoBay, but neither CIA nor State Department representa-tives saw any threat to this installation, and thisbelief was supported in early March 1959 by a SpecialNational Intelligence Estimate that, at most, Castro"sooner or later [is] likely to ask for major increases[^1]: An interesting side note to the discussions at this time was that the Army Attache apparently had planned to use a negro Lt. Col. who was on TDY in Havana to do a study of the new Castro Army. In a memorandum to the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, and to the Chief, Foreign Intelligence Staff, Al Cox, Chief, Paramilitary Division reported -- without ever using the term "black" -- that General Erskine (Army Special Forces) believed that a "color bar" did exist in the Caribbean area and that a better choice than Lt. Col. Reuben Horner, the black officer in question, could be made. 28/- 18 -TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETin the nominal rent now paid for the Guantanamo Base, revision of employment practices which appeared to discriminate against Cuban workers, and perhaps other changes." [^1]In the early spring of 1959, as Castro made known that he was planning to visit the United States, COS Havana revealed ambiguous feelings about the importance of the Castro trip. He noted for Headquarters information that:Washington visit can make or breakCastro. Unless he gets a strong helpinghand from the United States, many seriousobservers feel his regime will collapsewithin a matter of months. [^2]Pointing to the serious economic difficulties of the new Cuban Government, COS Havana indicated that Castro's popularity was very low among the middle and upper classes, but at the same time he emphasized that Castro was "the idol of the masses." [^3] COS Havana did an excellent job of predicting how Castro would act when he arrived in the United States, suggesting that Castro would probably make his pitch, not to the heads of the State Department and to the press, but that he would appeal to the workers, the farmers, the-- 19 --TOP SECRET[^1]: 30/[^2]: 31/[^3]: 32/
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TOP SECRETstudents, and the masses in America to support his revolution. COS emphasized that Headquarters should make no mistake that the Castro Government, while not openly avowed Communist, was heavily infiltrated with Communists and had taken no stand in opposition to Communist positions, and, moreover, there was little question about who would eventually control the Cuban Government. COS did suggest that Headquarters give serious consideration to planting embarrassing questions with reporters to stick to Castro while he was in the US. [^33] Both the Department of State and COS Havana were in general agreement about the results of the Castro visit. COS Havana summarized one of his dispatches as follows:> It would be unwise to assume from the> minor indications to date that Fidel has> undergone a serious change of heart as a> result of his visit to the United States. [^34]In a memorandum to Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Robert Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary of State noted that:Despite Castro's apparent simplicity, sincerity, and eagerness to reassure the United States public, there is little- 20 -TOP SECRET[^33]: [^34]:
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# TOP SECRETprobability that Castro had altered the essentially radical course of his revolution. From his experience here, he has gained a valuable knowledge of American public reaction which may make him a more difficult man to deal with on his return to Cuba. It would be a serious mistake to underestimate this man. With all his appearance of naiveté, unsophistication, and ignorance on many matters, he is clearly a strong personality and a born leader of great personal courage and conviction. While we certainly know him better than before, Castro remains an enigma; and we should await his decisions on specific matters before assuming a more optimistic view than heretofore about the possibility of developing a constuctive relationship with him and his government. [^35]With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that in this period shortly following Castro's visit to the United States the COS Havana may have misjudged a significant development which surfaced almost immediately after Castro's return to Cuba. Remarking on an apparent rash of anti-Communist statements appearing in the Cuban press, one dispatch speculated that:These demonstrations obviously welcome, but possibly most significant aspect is demonstration once again, enormous power Castro, who with few words made anti-Communism popular position. By same token he could reverse trend at any time, and skeptics speculating that current stand is sop intended to make it more difficult for U.S. interests to protest effectively against stringent agrarian reform law. [^36]- 21 -# TOP SECRET[^35]: [^36]:
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TOP SECRETA follow-up dispatch within two days of that cited above provided a more accurate insight as to the depth of the struggle which was, in fact, being waged within Cuba between the pro- and the anti-Communist factions. Reporting on comments made by the Executive Secretary of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) with reference to the confusion among party members regarding statements that Castro had made while he was in the United States, Anibal Escalante laid it on the line that there was a struggle between the left and the right; and he emphasized that the conservative element was trying to take advantage of remarks which Castro had been forced to make while in the United States. According to the source reporting on Escalante's talk, Vice-President Nixon had told Castro that unless he broke his alliance with the Communists, the United States would cut off economic aid to Cuba; and this threat had struck Castro as so serious that he made some unwise statements. The source, however, noted that the liberal forces of the 26 July movement in the Directorio Revolucionario (the DR), were in control of the revolution, and that the- 22 -TOP SECRET