Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 152]
# TOP SECRETapproximate number of troops, tanks, and vehicles for which sea transport would be required." In that same period Lt. Col. Frank Egan and Commander Norman Imler of the WH/4 staff reported they asked the Maritime Branch to draft a memo to the DDP giving information on the foreign cargo vessels that would be required for troop transport, including their ownership, their costs, and on the methods of their acquisition. [^1]Inasmuch as Egan had been requested for the project to become the trainer for the PM forces, it was apparent that some changes were contemplated. The reference to the use of vessels for the transport of tanks would indicate that something beyond hit-and-run exercises were being contemplated. Before mid-October, Lt. Col. Egan and a representative of the Logistics Branch of WH/4 had spelled out some additional details for the Maritime Branch of Special Operations. At that time, according to Mr. Chapman's report, WH/4 was talking about deck loading of 3 LCV's, with 5 armored tanks, 5 2-1/2 ton trucks, one caterpillar dozer, and two gasoline tank trucks -- hardly type of equipment which would be required for 2-3 man guerrilla teams. [^2]-- 144 --# TOP SECRET[^1]: .[^2]: .
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 153]
TOP SECRETBy the first week in November 1960, it had become clear to the most senior planners of the anti-Castro effort -- Jake Esterline, J. C. King, Tracy Barnes, and Richard Bissell -- that decisions were going to have to be made about all aspects of the paramilitary program. The basic question being whether a paramilitary program under CIA aegis should be launched at Castro, or whether, at this time, such a program should become a joint operation between the Department of Defense and the Agency. In the discussion among Agency personnel, in the discussions between Agency personnel and representatives of the Special Group, and in discussions within the meetings of the Special Group, the whole gammut of options was being explored. Barnes, apparently deferring to Bissell, suggested that rather than small team activities something on the order of 10-20 man teams be formed and tried out. Barnes was very emphatic that what was needed at this time, was a willingness to run some risks -- including the risk of defeat. Barnes was critical of the Special Group, pointing out that the apparent belief of the Group was that every operation had to succeed; and that if there were "losses,"- 145 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 154]
13-00000# TOP SECRETfailures, or mishaps," the Special Group seemed towant to cancel everything. This was contrary, com-pletely, to Barnes' concept of operational activity.What both Barnes and Bissell supported in terms ofthe smaller team activity were that:The implementation of such teams wouldindicate whether the dissident elementsin Cuba were likely to rally around suchgroups, once it had been established thatsuch groups could provide guidance andsupply for the anti-Castro activities.These teams also would provide a testof the Castro forces. Could Castro'smilitia or his army contain the guerrillaforces, if such forces were led by cadrestrained by the Agency? Or would the Castroresistance crumble in the face of effectivedissident elements? [^3]Even as this discussion was going on, it becameclear that the small team concept was going to go bythe board; and when the Agency tried to jump the op-tion to a 3,000 man force for making a lodgment inCuba in the conventional manner (e.g., amphibious- 146 -TOP SECRET[^3]: Description of footnote not provided in original document.
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 155]
TOP SECRETassault), the plan was rejected by the Special Group in a meeting of 3 November 1960. The Department of Defense supported the Agency, but State objected and suggested that perhaps the point where covert intervention was possible had passed. Gordon Gray even went so far as to raise the possibility of a fake attack on Guantanamo as a means of justifying overt US intervention. It was at this same meeting that Mr. Livingston Merchant of the Department of State raised the question of whether plans were being made to assassinate Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Che Guevara -- at which point General Cabell, the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, pointed out that such activities as assassination were extremely difficult to manage and that the CIA had no capability for such an operation. 4/Even as the size of the Cuban exile force was being debated, Headquarters cabled to Guatemala (4 November 1960) that the small team concept had gone by the board and that planning should begin for training a conventional amphibious assault force of at least 1,500 infantrymen. Outlines sent to the infantry training base in Guatemala (JMTRAV), emphasized- 147 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 156]
TOP SECRETthe need to instill an esprit de corps among thetrainees. To do this JMTRAV was urged to providefor unit separation, competition in the military arts,and specific identities for the individual unitsthrough the use of scarfs, caps, or some other de-vice. This new training program was to be instigatedin November 1960 and to be completed by the end ofJanuary 1961. [^5]Even as the discussions over the changing con-cept were going on, the Director of Central Intelli-gence and the Deputy Director for Plans were scheduledto brief President-elect John F. Kennedy on 18 Novem-ber. [^6] The concept to be presented to the Presidentwas that a force of 600 men would be landed by LST onCuban shores and that these men would move inland tocreate "a safe area in a mountain fastness. Thesemen, with possibly another 600 man unit in anotherarea, and those who joined them from within, wouldbe resupplied by air drop." [^7] In addition, therewould be new recruits in the pipeline to provide sup-port for those who had landed. An airstrip in Nica-ragua would be used to support air operations, andit was intimated that the US and possibly allied- 148 -TOP SECRET[^5]: [^6]:[^7]:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 157]
TOP SECRETgovernments would recognize that the force lodged inCuba and its nominal leadership was the ProvisionalGovernment of Cuba. 8/One strange and contradictory note which appearedduring WH/4's staff meeting on 15 November to planthe briefing for the DDP prior to his participationwith the DCI in briefing the President elect was thefollowing item stating:Our [CIA's] original concept is nowseen to be unachievable in the face ofthe controls Castro has instituted.There will not be the internal unrestearlier believed possible, nor will thedefenses permit the type strike firstplanned. Our second concept (1,500-3,000 man force to secure a beach withairstrip) is also now seen to be unachiev-able, except as a joint Agency/DOD action.Our Guatemala experience demonstrates wecannot staff nor otherwise timely createthe base and lift needed. 9/How, if in mid-November 1960 the concept of the1,500-3,000 man force to secure a beachhead with anairstrip was envisioned by the senior personnel inWH/4 as "unachievable" except as a joint CIA/DOD ef-fort, did it become "achievable" in March 1961 withonly 1,200 men and as an Agency operation? What wasbeing denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 be-came the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs- 149 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 158]
TOP SECRETOperation in March 1961. Certainly there was no lessening in the controls that Castro had instituted, nor in the efficiency of the military forces and militia that he had at his command by April 1961.*One of the principal problems posed by Project JMATE -- both before and after the concept changed in November 1961 -- was whether the training activity at JMTRAV and JMADD in Guatemala should be, or could be, continued without reflection upon the position of the United States Government. Thomas Mann of the State Department became increasingly concerned about this situation; and the discussions within the Special Group and among the concerned Agencies during the period from the middle of November until the end of the year, focused very frequently on this question. Considering the continuingly favorable reception to Agency activities from Ydigoras Fuentes, Guatemala's* During interviews with the author of this history, Messrs. Bissell, Esterline, and Drain had only slight remembrance of the details of these meetings of 15-16 November 1960 when they ruled out what would be, in effect, the invasion plan implemented in April 1961 at Playa Giron -- and at that time it was minus the joint support of the Department of Defense. This point was completely overlooked by both the Inspector General and the Taylor Committee post mortems on the Bay of Pigs.-- 150 --TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 159]
TOP SECRETPresident, State's concern that the training "places too much strain on the government of Guatemala" appear unrealistic. The Department's real concerns were with potential criticism from the OAS and the UN. Certainly Ydigoras was not interested in the removal of those military units which could most effectively guarantee his continued reign as President of Guatemala -- the Cubans in training for both air and ground activities.*[^1]Even as the Special Group was trying to determine whether or not the forces in training in Guatemala should be removed, the Agency proceeded apace with plans for the staffing necessary to put a 600-man strike force in training. Chief, WH/4 Personnel estimated that in addition to 14 staffers, there would be a requirement for 146 military personnel if such training were to succeed. Well prior to the officially agreed-to change in concept, Chief, WH/4 had anticipated a significant increase in funding* The internal situation in Guatemala vis a vis the training operations is discussed in detail in Volume II of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy.-- 151 --TOP SECRET[^1]: /
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 160]
TOP SECRETfor JMARC requesting of the DDP that:With your approval, in the interim period [as new budget estimates were being prepared], project funds will be used as required to meet operational necessity without strict adherence to the preliminary estimates of last June [1960].*[^1]Although Mr. Bissell approved the request, he made this interesting comment:What is disturbing is that the overrun reported in your memorandum seems to have occurred long before you could be feeling any effect of the [planned expansion] in [PM] plans. [^2]Contrary to suggestions that the President of Guatemala was concerned about the Cuban training activity, a cable of 22 November 1960 to the Director from Guatemala indicated that the ground training base was undergoing a major reorganization because permission for the establishment of a tactical training area at another of the *fincas* (estates) controlled by Roberto Alejos -- this one near San Jose -- was being undertaken. Inasmuch as Alejos was Ydigoras's right hand man and conducted the liaison with the WH/4 representatives for the establishment and operation[^1]: The increased budget being suggested was on the order of $42 million compared to $3 million being discussed in June.[^2]: 10b/TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 161]
TOP SECRETof the Guatemalan training bases, the contradictionin positions between State and the Agency was obvious. 11/As the Special Group discussions were going on,Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 was in Guatemala takinga first-hand look at the air and ground training bases.As noted in another volume, Esterline went stronglyon record in support of the Office of Logistics en-gineer who had been responsible for the reconstruc-tion of the airstrip at Retalhuleu. Jake noted thateven though there had been a sizable cost overrun,the task had been performed on time under the mostadverse weather conditions; and, consequently, sug-gestions from Headquarters that there had been grossinefficiency were unwarranted and unfounded.* Ester-line's review of the situation at JMTRAV, the groundtraining base, indicated that the situation there wasconsiderably more difficult than what he had encounteredat the air training base. He noted, for example, thatthere was a severe lack of qualified senior trainers,stating:* For details on construction of the airfield at  Retalhuleu, see Office of Logistics, Engineering Staff,  RECD, *Agency Engineering Activity, 1947-1966*, Vol. I,  63-67; Vol. II, 132-193. DDS/HS OL-11, Feb 72. S.- 153 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 162]
TOP SECRETWhile a few of these men (from the Domestic Operations Base in Miami) impress me as being good types, for the most part I found them to be too immature and lacking in experience to qualify for the job at hand. In any event, they are not in my judgment worth the $1,000 per month which we have to pay them. I would like most of them to be GS-4, 5, and 6 students that [sic] we trained at Fort Benning in 1951-52. Under no circumstances would I consider putting these people into Cuba with the Cubans.In closing his report on the visit to Guatemala,Esterline presented the following critical observations of the situation as he saw it. Reflecting on the mission and on the resources available, he wrote:I also reviewed the problem in the light of the many gaps in policy approval for JMARC, all of which complicate project planning. By the time I arrived back at Headquarters, I had fairly well convinced myself that it is unrealistic for the project or the Agency to try to "go it alone" in opening up another major base in a third country to train from 1,500 to 3,000 Cubans for a major invasion effort. I discussed my thinking with Col. Hawkins at length, and found that he shared my view. As a result of this discussion, we re-evaluated our capability and presented you [the DDP) with the recommendation that we limit ourselves to preparing a force of 600 maximum to be used in the manner we outlined to you on 16 November. I still feel this recommendation is quite valid given the limitation on real estate that we are presently working under. If it turns out that we can acquire policy approval for the real estate in the interior,- 154 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 163]
13-00000# TOP SECRETI would then agree that, with limited additional help from DOD, we could train a maximum of 1,200 and commit them along the line outlined during the 16 November meeting. Even our present scope of op- erations, however, continues to be en- dangered by the gambit that Mr. Mann and Mr. Merchant are engaged with in the [State] "Working Group." I cannot empha- size this too strongly: if we are re- quired to evacuate Guatemala for reasons of high policy or because of the situation, the project will be seriously damaged unless we have immediately available real estate where these people can be put to work. [^1]Some relief would be provided for the ground training program with the opening up of Alejos finca near San Jose, but the adequacy of the training facil- ities for the ground forces would continue to plague JMARC through the course of the project. Moreover, even though the discussions concerning plausible deniability reached near fever pitch during the dis- cussions of November 1960, at no point did the Special Group of presidential consultants ever step forward with a firm recommendation that the United States assume responsibility and so admit. The most persistent advocate of this position was Thomas Mann, of the Department of State, and why his proposals were never pushed more seriously is one of the unresolved- 155 -# TOP SECRET[^1]: 13/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 164]
TOP SECRETquestions concerning the Bay of Pigs Operation.*Esterline's visit to the bases in Guatemala was almost immediately reflected in the correspondence between the field and Headquarters, with specific emphasis being placed on the assignment to the ground training base, JMTRAV, of senior training officers. Similarly it was stressed that there was a priority need to secure Special Force trainers from the Army, on an ASAP basis. Requirements for materiel jumped, particularly in the number of personal weapons which would be required for added numbers of troops in training. With the acquisition of the additional training site in Guatemala from Roberto Alejos, requests immediately came forward for trucks and jeeps to transport troops to these training areas. The* There also is evidence that at least one of the principal Agency planners, C. Tracy Barnes, contributed to the November confusion. At one point, when serious consideration was being given to the possibility of increasing significantly ly the training activity that might be done in Nicaragua, Barnes introduced what amounted to moral objections to the association or to strengthening the association with the Somoza Government. Barnes emphasized that this would go down hard with the more liberal elements in Latin America. 14/ This argument, of course, was very much in line with the position being advanced by the Department of State -- Thomas Mann excepted.- 156 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 165]
TOP SECRETfield was aware that the increasing number of trainees would create problems, but at the same time, there were indications that the trainers were hopeful that the infiltration teams that had been developed could be held intact. [^1]Just as there was confusion within the Headquarters area over the nature of the program, so, too, was concern reflected in the field's messages to Headquarters. A cable of 28 November 1960 from COS Guatemala to Headquarters requested:Recent cable traffic suggests major changes in near future and COS feels it would be of great assistance to have complete story to assist in dealing with Alejos and Ydigoras. [^2]Even as COS Guatemala was requesting information, the situation in Washington remained in a state of flux. On 29 November, Col. King made a specific attempt to obtain positive guidance through the office of the Deputy Director for Plans. Chief, WH/D, outlined his understanding of the paramilitary planning as follows:(a) On or about 1 February 1961, land by amphibious means a guerrilla force of about 600 trained Cubans to establish a perimeter defense and resistance center in a selected area of Cuba.- 157 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 15/[^2]: 16/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 166]
# TOP SECRET(b) Continue present operations of in- infiltrating small paramilitary teams to organize, train, and lead resistance forces and report intelligence information.(c) Follow up this effort by providing air logistical support to the 600-man guerrilla force in Cuba and all additional guerrilla elements who join to collaborate with this force. [^1]Having outlined his understanding of the planning,Col. King then went on:The following major questions must now be resolved by the Special Group or referred to the President for decision before proceeding further to implement the paramilitary aspect of this program as described above:a. Does either the Department of State or the Department of Defense view the proposed paramilitary concept as not in consonance with policy or for any other reason open to question? If so, why and what alternatives are proposed; what course of action is approved?b. If there is agreement as to the paramilitary concept, then is there agreement that training shall continue in Guatemala?c. If continuance in Guatemala is disapproved, will DOD air-lift the present trainees at once from Guatemala to Saipan for training and provide similar air-lift for up to 300 additional men as they are recruited? The entire group would later be returned to a staging area in Nicaragua for the amphibious operation.-- 158 --TOP SECRET[^1]: 17/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 167]
13-00000TOP SECRET(d) Will the DOD also provide thefollowing:(1) Thirty-eight Special Forceofficers and enlisted men to be usedas instructors in Guatemala or inSaipan, or both.(2) One reactivated LST.(3) Supplementation of logisticresupply air-lift to resistance after1 February. (As detailed an estimateas can be made will be forwarded toDOD if the paramilitary concept isapproved.)[^1]Col. King then closed this memorandum to Mr.Bissell by noting that if the paramilitary conceptwas approved, certain policy approvals would be re-quired. These were listed as follows:a. To use one Florida base, such asOpalocka, for air supply missions in sup-port of guerrilla forces in the targetcountry.b. To use a small number of Americancivilian contract personnel in air andmaritime operations. (No such personnelare to be used in ground operations.)c. To mount air strikes against Cubanair and other military targets. [^2]Whatever else can be said, it is clear that bythe end of November 1960, the original concept of theAgency's anti-Castro effort as one focussing on theuse of small teams infiltrating Cuba and working with- 159 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 18/[^2]: 19/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 168]
TOP SECRETthe dissident elements located within the country had gone by the board. What was now to be undertaken was an amphibious assault in strength -- the strength as yet to be determined -- with the concomitant requirement for heavy air support for resupply and possibly for military support as well. Indicative of the confusion which surrounded this period when the concept was changing were Jake Esterline's remarks shortly following the collapse of the Bay of Pigs when he testified before the Taylor Committee. It appears as though Esterline had been informed -- incorrectly as it turned out -- that in his testimony of 1 May 1961 Lt. Col. Frank Egan had indicated to the committee that the strike force concept has been in being since his EOD in June 1960.*In rebutting what he thought Egan's testimony had been, Esterline reported:My recollection is that Lt. Col. Egan ` came to us about June 1960 and that he* Egan had actually testified that following the Guatemalan revolt he had been sent down to organize the brigade, and he stated that the number of Cuban trainees had been on the order of 420 on 20 November 1960 and had risen to nearly 600 by the first week of December. 20/- 160 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 169]
13-00000# TOP SECRETarrived with certain ideas which he carried from the Pentagon on how best to tackle the Cuban problem. This, however, did not constitute JMATE policy. I am sure you [Col. Jack Hawkins] -- or more particularly, members of your staff -- will find that we had no approved philosophy of the operation within the Project until well in[to] September. The training program which Rocky Farnsworth conducted in Panama was directed solely toward training an instructor cadre in small unit or "guerrilla type" operations. This cadre, when it arrived in Guatemala, in addition to working on building the camp with Carl Jenkins, continued to train the first recruits in the same kind of training they had received.Another example of my positiveness that we were not, at Project level, thinking of the strike operation is the first conversation that we held in my office in Barton Hall when I referred to the fact that the PM staff had been talking about the development of a strike operation, but that I, myself, was not convinced of it at the time and that I preferred to put small teams into existing units at the appropriate time. As I recall, you [Col. Jack Hawkins] had an open mind at that point; although without positive study of Cuba you leaned to the concept I outlined. It was at a somewhat later date, therefore (probably before the first of October), that we talked again and you [Col. Jack Hawkins] stated your conviction that Castro could not be overthrown without a major or catalytic effort being made against him. After deliberation, I came to the same conclusion, and we then began to think in terms of expanding the force to the strength of a reinforced battalion, more or less.The foregoing is important only because General Taylor is going into very- 161 -# TOP SECRET