Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 206]
TOP SECRETPerhaps best illustrative of the merry-go-roundwhich the Special Group had been riding for at leasttwo months was Willauer's closing statement:In our discussions we weighed withoutcoming to a conclusion the advantages ofa rapid, effective action by direct warin terms of getting matters over withwithout a long buildup of world opinionvs. the inevitability of such a build upunder any seven month program. [^38]Having reviewed the meetings during the lastfew weeks of the Eisenhower administration, it isinteresting to review the comments of some of thosewho were principally involved, as they looked backon that period. One of the most immediate responseswas found in Fidel Castro's virtuoso performance forthe Cuban television audience on 23 April 1961 whenhe explained the invasion to them. Among other things,Castro claimed:That on certain occasions, we have alsobeen in danger of direct aggression. Thisdanger always has been lurking about usand at certain times has gathered consider-able support in the minds of leading circlesof the United States. One of those momentswhen this type of direct aggression wasvery near was at the end of December [1960]and the beginning of [January 1961], andthat is to say, during the last days of theEisenhower administration. [^40]- 198 -TOP SECRET[^38]: [^40]:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 207]
13-00000TOP SECRETSo concerned was Castro at this time that he put his armed forces in a state of alert for a two week period, covering the transition from the Eisenhower to the Kennedy administration. [^1]The other principal protagonist at this time, remembered it in a somewhat different manner. The former US President wrote of this period in the following manner:Covert training of exiles for any possible future operations against Castro was going forward. Units were growing steadily in strength and efficiency against the time when actual tactical planning could be undertaken. In December [1960], I suggested to the State Department that the time might be propitious for organizing a "front" against Castro among the refugees, with the United States recognizing the leader and his associates as the legal government of Cuba, with the priviso, however, that the exiles themselves would voluntarily select from their own number an acceptable "head of government." I added that if they could do so at once, I'd like to see recognition accorded promptly -- if possible, before January 20...So, to the incoming administration, we left units of Cuban refugees busily training and preparing hopefully for a return to their native land. Because they had as yet been unable to find the leader they wanted -- a national leader to be both anti-Castro and anti-Batista -- it was impossible to make specific- 199 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 41/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 208]
TOP SECRETplans for a military invasion, However, their hatred of Castro, their patriotism, and their readiness to sacrifice for the restoration and freedom in Cuba could not be doubted. 42/In the statement just quoted, Eisenhower's emphasis was on the fact that during his administration all that took place was a training program that there was no specific plan for the invasion of Cuba. This was re-emphasized in an interview that he held on 10 September 1965 when he said: "There was no tactical or operational plan even discussed" when he turned the presidency over to John F. Kennedy. 43/According to this same interview:The retiring President stressed that there had been no decision as to how the Cuban forces would be used, if at all. Eisenhower had made no commitments that might bind the new President in dealing with the Castro problem. In fact, the armed refugee group was still so small and relatively unprepared that it could easily have been disbanded if the incoming administration considered its existence unnecessary.And, more specifically,Eisenhower felt that Kennedy shared his judgment that the new administration need not rush a decision regarding the Cubans. "At no time did I put before anybody anything that could be called a plan (to invade Cuba)," declares the former President. He emphasizes that there was "no mandate, no- 200 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 209]
# TOP SECRETcommitment by me, or by anyone in my admin-istration," and he doubts that Kennedy felt"he was frozen to any position by me."[^44]Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's NationalSecurity Adviser, also supported his former boss whenqueried about the Eisenhower role in the Bay of Pigsactivity, stressing that the emphasis during Eisen-hower's administration was on training the Cuban ex-iles and providing them with equipment. Like theformer President, Gray, too, said that there was "nomilitary plan".The definition of a military plan, however,seems to have focused on an actual site for the land-ing; and in this sense, Gray certainly was tellingthe truth because no such choice had been made at thetime that Eisenhower left office. In his own words,Gray stated:There wasn't any military plan formu-lated by the time the Eisenhower admini-stration went out. Of course, the Presi-dent was fully aware of and conversantwith the decision to train and arm indi-viduals. And the concept was one thatwas sort of changing in the EisenhowerAdministration. First we were thinkingin terms of the old infiltration of smallgroups. Then they were thinking of thepossibility of landing of people, unitsized groups. And no decisions had beenreached at that time. It was only that- 201 -TOP SECRET[^44]: 44/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 210]
# TOP SECRETthere was training. That was clearly authorized, and it was clearly contemplated that there would be or could be a military action. But it simply was not true that Kennedy inherited a plan that he couldn't change. As a matter of fact, the planning that was done in his administration was changed. The Bay of Pigs was not the first landing point. That was changed. But none of that, no planning process in the Eisenhower administration had got to the point of discussing what would be the landing point. [^1]What both Gray and Eisenhower conveniently ignored, as has been pointed out in the preceding discussion, was the major change that was made in the concept in November of 1960. What was to have been an infiltration of numerous small teams of communicators and PM trainers became an amphibious invasion plan calling for a major enlargement of the exile Brigade and an air operations plan which would be critical to both the Brigade's landing and its ability to be sustained once ashore in Cuba. What was yet undecided as Eisenhower was succeeded by Kennedy were the issues which the Special Group had argued throughout the weeks from mid-November into January the number of troops that should be or could be trained, the facilities that would be available for training sites (possibly in third countries or in the United- 202 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 45/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 211]
TOP SECRETStates), the possible commitment of the United States personnel (as "volunteers" or contracts), and possible overt US intervention to remove Fidel Castro.*[^46][^46] Despite the availability of documentary records and autobiographical information about President Eisenhower's role in the anti-Castro program, it is interesting to the historian that the subject of the Bay of Pigs apparently was banned as a topic in oral history interviews conducted with Eisenhower and various of his senior subordinates who were close to the operation. Included among this group, in addition to Eisenhower himself, were James H. Douglas, Jr. (DOD), Thomas Mann (State), Gen. David Shoup (USMC), Thomas S. Gates, Jr. (DOD), and Livingston Merchant (State).- 203 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 212]
TOP SECRETCIA Internal Use OnlyAccess Controlled byCIA History StaffTS#795052Copy 1 of 2![logo of central intelligence agency]OFFICIAL HISTORYOF THEBAY OF PIGS OPERATIONVOLUME IIIEVOLUTION OF CIA'SANTI-CASTRO POLICIES,1951-JANUARY 1961(pages 204-388)TOP SECRETTS#795052DCI-8December 1979Copy 1 of 2PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENTDO NOT DESTROY
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TOP SECRETVolume IIIContents(pp. 204-388)PagePart V Direct Action Programs . . . . . . . . 204A. Propaganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204B. Sabotage and other Exercises . . . . . . 233Part VI Mr. Nixon's Role . . . . . . . . . . . 241Part VII The Question of Assassinations . . . . . 277Part VIII Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290AppendixesA. Memorandum for the Director of CentralIntelligence from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59 . . 296B. A Program of Covert Action Againstthe Castro Regime, 16 Mar 60 . . . . . . . . 300C. CNO Correspondence with Department of Stateand NSC: 1) Letter for Allen Dulles from    Arleigh Burke, 17 Mar 60    TS (DD/P 0-1436) . . . . . . . . . . . . 311 2) Letter for Gordon Gray from    Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60 . . . . . . . . . 313 3) Memorandum for the Special    Assistant to the President    for National Security Affairs    from Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60,    sub: US Policy toward Cuba . . . . . . . 318TOP SECRET
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13-00000TOP SECRETPageD. Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - Action from J. D. Esterline, 2 May 60, sub: Liaision with US Agencies on JMARC Activities . . . . . . . 332E. Attack on Petroleum Refinery at Santiago de Cuba, 13-14 March 1961 . . . . . . . 335F. Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum on Meeting with Fidel Castro, 19 April 1959. . . . . 337G. Memorandum for DCI (for Briefing Vice President Nixon), 29 Feb 60, sub: What We Are Doing in Cuba . . . . . . . 344Source ReferencesPart I Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347Part II Castro Must Go . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352Part III Changing Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366Part IV Presidential Resurgence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369Part V Direct Action Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374Part VI Mr. Nixon's Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382Part VII Assassination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386Part VIII Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 215]
13-00000TOP SECRETPart VDirect Action Programs## A. PropagandaThe desire of WH Division to undertake the propaganda operation against the government of Fidel Castro, antedated the formation of Branch 4 in the Division by more than two months; for on 27 October 1959 in a Memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, J. C. King proposed:That CIA undertake clandestine propaganda operations targeted at Cuba. These operations would employ primarily radio broadcasts and other means of propaganda, and at informing the Cuban masses of the truth. [^1]Col. King's memorandum pointed out that representatives of various of the Cuban opposition groups organized in the United States had requested Agency assistance to set up propaganda operations directed against the Cuban mainland, and, in addition, he also indicated that he and the Director of Communications, Gen. McClelland, had his people studying the best methods for carrying out such propaganda broadcasts.- 204 -TOP SECRET[^1]: A handwritten '1/' is present at the end of this sentence in the document.
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 216]
TOP SECRETKing's initial memorandum contained no information about potential locations of transmitters, personnel security, inter-Agency coordination or costs.Almost immediately following the memorandum from Col. King to the Director, the subject of propaganda directed against the Castro government was introduced to discussions in the Special Group. Following the first such meeting at which the subject came up seriously, the DCI requested that WH Division provide more specifics on such matters as requirements for real estate, recommendations for someone to be in charge of the propaganda operations, the equipment that would be required, and how the broadcasting might be controlled. By mid-November, following additional discussions both within the Agency and by the Special Group, WH Division proposed that the broadcasts originate from the Yucatan Peninsula under the guidance of Manuel Benitez, and from Costa Rica under the Monte Cristi Group, headed by Col. Ramon Barquin. The presumption was that the Yucatan operation would be self-sufficient, but that the Costa Rican operation would be CIA funded, supported, and directly under Agency control. The estimated costs that were mentioned in- 205 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 217]
TOP SECRETmid-November 1959 were roughly $80,000 each for theoperations in Costa Rica and Yucatan, plus an addi-tional $12,000 for intrusion broadcasts which wouldoriginate within Cuba. [^2]Before the end of November, the plans to utilizethe Yucatan peninsula had been abandoned because itwas feared that the President of Mexico would notgive his approval for such an activity; and by theearly part of December, President Figueres of CostaRica had made it clear that he did not want the propa-ganda operation to be set up in Costa Rica. Conse-quently, there was considerable discussion about thepossibility of getting permission from PresidentBetancourt of Venezuela to agree to permit the broad-casts from his country. Some members of the SpecialGroup also suggested the possibility that the anti-Castro broadcasts might be originated from other ofthe Latin American countries, a project which Mr.Dulles discouraged because of the lack of suitablebroadcast facilities that would be available in coun-tries outside of the immediate Caribbean area. Some-where along the line C. Tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A andMr. Bissell's right hand man, came up with the- 206 -TOP SECRET[^2]: actual footnote is not present in the document
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 218]
TOP SECRETsuggestion that broadcasts against Castro could be originated from continental United States. How Barnes came by this proposal is not known, for no such activity was ever given the slightest sanction. 3/By early February of 1960, however, an equivocal agreement apparently had been reached with President Betancourt, for a memorandum from WH Division indicated that:One pilot [anti-Castro] tape has been made and has been played for the benefit of President Betancourt of Venezuela. He has agreed not to interfere if we initiate broadcasts from available transmitters in Venezuela. 4/Even though thought had been given to the establishment of a special transmitting facility for the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), or whoever would run the anti-Castro broadcasts, Betancourt had made it clear that he would not permit the establishment of special new transmitting facilities in his country.On or about 17 March 1960, the same date that President Eisenhower approved the formal anti-Castro program for the US Government, JMATE had prepared its propaganda program which, after outlining various phases of the activity, stated:- 207 -TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETIt is planned to concentrate all capabilities available to the U.S. Government on the [Cuban] target. In addition, it will be necessary for CIA to create such unilateral, FRD, and third country operations as may be feasible and useful. All facets of psychological operations will be exploited through mass media means, including: radio, television, motion pictures, press and publications, books, leaflets, posters, handbills, and rumors. The major emphasis will be placed on gray materials. Liaison will be conducted as necessary with other U.S. Government agencies. Black operations will be carefully coordinated within CIA prior to implementation. All direct dealings with members of the FRD will be under unofficial cover. [^5]The outline of the propaganda program made it clear that funding of the propaganda operation was going to be a major problem, and it was also clear that CIA was going to be responsible for a considerable portion of this. But even as the propaganda program was being formulated, Col. J. C. King was in New York working with Henry Holland to approach a number of American businessmen whose companies had interests in Cuba. Their objective was to raise funds to support the FRD propaganda operations which might be operated through Station WRUL in New York, a station that was directed by Mr. Walter Lemon who worked closely with the CIA. Lemon, in fact, was ready to- 208 -TOP SECRET[^5]: /
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 220]
# TOP SECRETmount radio program operations almost immediatelypending receipt of material and guidance from theAgency.*[^6]With reference to King's approach to Mr. JohnLoeb, of Loeb, Rhodes & Company, the businessmanstated that he would contribute his personal fundsto the anti-Castro propaganda effort; and in addition,he would approach the directors or heads of othercompanies that were also involved in Cuba -- individ-uals whom he thought were well enough off to makepersonal contributions. With reference to contribu-tions of this nature:It was decided that personal contri-butions were most advisable because theywould not require action and approval byBoards of Directors, and therefore couldbe most easily concealed. The sum dis-cussed was $50,000.*[^7]The plan for private funding of WRUL was introuble from the start. As early as April 1960, Chief[^6]: Among those that Col. King met with on 15 March1960, were Mr. John Loeb of Loeb, Rhodes & Company,Mr. Lapham of Banker's Trust Company, and the presidentof the Freeport Sulphur Company, Mr. Wright.[^7]: Other companies, including American and ForeignPower Co. and the Freeport Sulphur Co., made donationsin the company names and the Agency notified the Com-missioner of Internal Revenue about the donations sothat they could be treated as corporate tax deductions. 7a/- 209 -# TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETWH/4 had requested Chief, WHD's permission to obligateJMATE funds for support of the station; but Chief,WHD refused, indicating that private money would beavailable. In October 1960 a similar proposal wasmade and rejected for the same reasons. By December1960, however, payment from JMATE funds was authorizedbecause private funds were unavailable. 7b/In terms of the broadcast facilities that wereto be established under the propaganda program, CIAwas to create and control both short and medium waveshipborne radio broadcasting operations, and to investi-gate the feasibility of an airborne radio transmittercapable of black broadcasts into Cuba.* Aside fromthe broadcast operations, there were a number of ad-ditional programs calling for printing facilities forthe production of propaganda materials and secure* The airborne medium wave transmitter apparently  was ruled out early in the planning stages because  it was "a terribly expensive operation." Based on  DPD's estimates, Phillips figured that three flights  per week to six selected Cuban cities -- among others,  Havana, Santiago and Cienfuegos -- over a two month  period would show operating costs in excess of $83,000,  plus an additional $60,000 for transmitting equipment  on a C-54, and a cost of $250,000 if the C-54 were  lost. 7c/-- 210 --TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETeditorial offices so that the propaganda materialscould be prepared. 8/It was shortly after the formulation of thepropaganda program that David A. Phillips becameChief of the WH/4 Propaganda Activity. Phillipshad done propaganda work for the Agency at the timeof the Guatemalan activity, but subsequently retiredand had been in private business in Havana. Accord-ing to his own story, he had intended to stay inprivate business; but in the course of Castro's riseto power, he was recontacted by Agency personnel andpersuaded to take on the job of running the Agency'spropaganda campaign against Castro.*According to one interviewer:> In the Guatemalan campaign, Phillips> had worked with a handful of completely> controlled Latin American propaganda> writers, and had been able to develop a> single credible propaganda line. Now,> however, he had to work under Washington> orders, to offer radio broadcasting time> to all the major and competing Cuban> exile groups. Much of the Phillips'* For Phillips' own story of his employment and his  re-employment by the Agency, see his book *The Night  Watch* (New York: Atheneum, 1977).- 211 -TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRETeffort went into overcoming the idea that CIA financed radio programs should become a forum for the varying views of rival exile splinter factions. Phillips was principally in Washington ... [but] there were frequent trips to Miami and New York, and Phillips himself coordinated CIA covert broadcasting with Henry Loomis, Director of USIA's Voice of America. 9/All indications are that Phillips had an excellent staff which was highly motivated and certainly extremely busy during the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation.*The key point in Dave Phillips's propaganda opera- tion was to be the 50,000 watt radio transmitter located on the larger of the two Swan Islands -- this so called "larger" island being roughly 1 3/4 miles long by 1 1/4 miles wide. US possessions, the Swan Islands are located roughly 100 miles NE of Honduras in the Caribbean Sea. Already located on the island was a Federal Aviation radio beacon, and a Department of Commerce weather station. In April 1960, the cover story which was devised for the* Among those who worked in Phillips's Political and Psychological Section in WH/4, were William Kent, John Isaminger, Phillip A. Toomey, Earnest I. Harrison, Paul Oberst, and Michael J. Maney. 10/ Illustrative of the desire to placate the various exile factions was the proposal by the Forward Operations Base to give the spokesmen of the factions air time on WRUL on a rotating basis to present the position of the particular group. FOB was to assume responsibility for WRUL programming on 1 December 1960, and was of the opinion that such programming would "have desired effect on creating semblance [of] united anti Castro opposition." 10a/- 212 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 224]
TOP SECREToperation of the two radio transmitters (one 50,000 watts and the other 7,500 watts) was that the Navy was going to purchase scientific signal time from the Gibralter Steamship Company, an Agency proprietary, which was nominally the operator of a commercial radio station then being established.The loading of the transmitters, the unloading, the construction of the facilities to house the transmitters, and the installation of the transmitters was done by the Navy Seabees under the direction of Alfred Cromartie of CIA's Office of Logistics. James Burwell, a logisitcs officer who was thoroughly involved in the JMATE operation, reported that the construction activity at Swan Island required the movement of 180,000 pounds of equipment from the Washington Depot, aboard Agency trucks for delivery to Norfolk and the reloading aboard two LST's. In addition to locating the transmitters and constructing the facilities for housing the transmitters, a crude landing field also was cleared. The total time involved was approximately 20 days, and the cost was something under $225,000.