Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10002.pdf — page 3]
SECRETStates. Bagley, Chief, SR/CI, subsequently di-rected Wigren to begin a chronological tabulationof Oswald's activities in the USSR as collatedfrom various sources. The commission made avail-able to Wigren documents and reports already ac-quired from other US Government investigativeagencies. The commission agreed in principle tohonor CIA sensitivity classifications to documentsoriginated in the Agency for use of the commission.The Agency's role was limited to written communica-tions to the commission.[^1][^1]: 10/By 21 January 1964 Wigren and his colleageshad prepared and transmitted the questions to thecommission for relay to the Soviet Government.Soviet defector Petr Deryabin had contributed tothis endeavor. The questionnaire had four basicparts. The first series of questions sought tomake an assessment of Oswald's mental and physicalcondition. The Soviets were requested to furnishinformation on his medical treatment in the USSRwhile in the hospital following his suicide at-tempt in 1959 as well as any psychological evalua-tions of him. The second series of questions- 73 -SECRET
[104-10301-10002.pdf — page 4]
SECRETsought to assess Oswald's use of and dependence onweapons. He had owned a shotgun in the USSR andhad joined a hunting organization there. Thethird series of questions sought to complete WarrenCommission documentation of Oswald's background andcareer in the USSR. Those items particularlysought were his correspondence with the Soviet Gov-ernment, Soviet Government documents issued to himconcerning his request for asylum and permissionto reside in the USSR, documents and registrationsof his residence and employment in the USSR, anddocuments concerning his departure from the USSR.The final question asked whether Oswald had a policerecord in the USSR and requested information anddocuments if so. [^1]A comprehensive SR/CI/Research paper on theOswald case went to the commission on 25 January1964. This was a detailed chronology of Oswald'ssojourn in the USSR together with an alphabeticallisting of persons in the USSR whom the Oswaldsknew or mentioned. Identifying information was in-cluded whenever available. This chronology was inpreliminary form but the commission urgently required- 74 -SECRET[^1]: 11/
[104-10301-10002.pdf — page 5]
13-00000SECRETcollated material to support the taking of direct testimony. The source material for the chronology included personal documents, interviews, and official and private correspondence. Traces were based on CIA files and the Moscow and Minsk telephone directories. These preliminary name traces were also sent to the commission on the same day as the chron-[^1]ology. The final version of the name traces based on a review of the Oswald papers came to over 150 names; the results were furnished to the commission in late March 1964.[^2]SR/CI/Research prepared for the commission at its request a paper survey of known data on Soviet use of assassination. This study was intended only for background information of commission members with the caveat that CIA as an organization did not believe that the Kennedy assassination was a Soviet-sponsored operation. Much of the material in the assassination study had been published previously within the Agency.[^3]A fortuitous aspect of the SR/CI/Research concerning the Oswald case occurred when Mr. Alexander W. Brasko of the branch discovered by accident- 75 -SECRET[^1]: 12/[^2]: 13/[^3]: 14/
[104-10301-10002.pdf — page 6]
13-00000SECRETa photograph of Oswald in Graphics Register in March 1964. Brasko was seeking photographs of buildings in Minsk, USSR, where Oswald was resettled by the Soviet Government after 1959. Brasko found a copy of a color transparency which showed in a casual setting a young man who bore a remarkable facial resemblance to Oswald and was wearing a shirt identical in pattern and color to a shirt Oswald was wearing in photographs found in his effects following the Kennedy assassination. (Figure 1, page 77). The photograph was taken by an American tourist in Minsk's Central Square in August 1961 at the Palace of Culture. Copies of the photograph were also furnished to the FBI. The Bureau interviewed the photographer and her companions who could contribute little to their original statements when first interviewed by Agency representatives following their Soviet tour in 1961 (not about Oswald, however, whom they did not recall). A copy of this photograph was published on page 268 of the Warren Commission's report.Some of the reports prepared by SR/CI/Research were deemed suitable for publication in the Commission's- 76 -SECRET
[104-10301-10002.pdf — page 7]
SECRET![Palace of Culture, Central Square, Minsk, USSR](photo of Palace of Culture, Central Square, Minsk, USSR)Palace of Culture, Central Square, Minsk, USSR(Oswald is the young man on the right)> [Figure] Figure 1.> Photo depicts the Palace of Culture in Minsk, USSR, with a statue in the foreground and a car with people standing next to it. The car's license plate reads "815 AGY."- 77 -SECRET
[104-10301-10002.pdf — page 8]
SECRETreport in the public record, either as textual material or as footnotes backing up general comments. This required explicit permission from the DDP, and the rewriting or declassification of some material previously submitted to the commission. In August 1964 Warren Commission Assistant Counsel W. David Slawson requested permission to publish in the commission report some memorandums submitted to the commission by SR/CI/Research via CI Staff. Since some of the material submitted to the commission earlier was intended for background use only or contained operational information, the reports in question were resubmitted to the commission in sanitized versions modeled on the originals. The revisions were identified as coming from CIA and appeared primarily in textual and footnote material on pages 258 to 280 of the commission's report.*K. National Intelligence Survey on USSR Intelligence and SecurityAn important, recurring document written in* Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC: 1964.- 78 -SECRET
[104-10301-10002.pdf — page 9]
SECRETAppendix CSource References*1.  Survey of CE in SR Division, Volume II, by    Robert H. Hicks, CI Staff. Aug 55. TS 110604.2.  FY 1955 USSR Operational Plan. TS 91403.3.  SR Division's Operational Program and Budget    for the USSR, FY 1956-57. TS 107830.4.  Memo, Chief, SR for the DDP, sub: Field Trip    Report, 3 Oct 55.5.  Survey of CE in SR Division, by Robert H.    Hicks, CI Staff, Aug 55. TS 110604.6.  1958 Inspection and Review Staff review of    SR Division: "The Role of SR Division,"    23 Dec 58. TS 153028.7.  Memo, I&R Staff for the DDP, sub: Inspection    of SR/CE Staff, 22 Dec 58. TS 153026.8.  SR Division Operational Program, FY 1961,    pp 16 ff. 22 Mar 60, TS 175603.9.  SR Division Notice No. 450, 17 Aug 61. See    also CSHP 76, pp 57-64, for a more detailed    discussion of the 1961 functional reorganiza-    tion, and a list of the members of the    Special Group which proposed it.10. Memo of Conversation, 16 Jan 64; sub: CIA    Work in Support of the Warren Commission;    by Tennant H. Bagley.11. XAAZ-22407, 21 Jan 64, sub: Questions to be    submitted to the Soviet Government, filed    in 201-288248 (Lee Harvey Oswald).* Unless otherwise indicated, all source references  may be considered classified SECRET.
[104-10301-10002.pdf — page 10]
SECRET12. XAAZ-22409, 25 Jan 64, sub: The Oswald Chronology, filed in 201-289248.13. XAAZ-22410, 25 Jan 64, sub: Name List with Traces, and XAAZ-22416, 26 Mar 64; sub: Name List with Traces, 201-289248.14. XAAZ-22414, 28 Feb 64; sub: Soviet Use of Assassination and Kidnapping, 201-289248.15. XAAZ-22420, 29 Apr 64, sub: Photo of OSWALD in Minsk, 201-289248.16. RID AEPAGAN file 74-6-67/1, Archives Job No. 64-619/32.17. 201-91182 (Irma Jung); SB/CI/P Archives DA file-Germany.18. 201-96494 (Anatoliy Nikolayevich Krushin); SB/CI/P Archives DA File-Germany.19. 201-46344 (Gennadiy Kotorovich); RID File 74-6-67/25, Archives Job. No. 65-117/79; SB/CI/P Archives DA File-Germany.20. 201-89924 (Willi von Hohenegg); SB/CI/P Archives DA File-Germany.21. 201-286975 (Guenther Faltlhansl); SB/CI/P Archives DA File-Austria.22. 201-231917 (Calvin Floyd); SB/CI/P Archives DA File-Sweden.23. 201-313667 (Olafur Eggertson Briem) SB/CI/P Archives DA File-Iceland.24. 201-248427 (Guenther Schulz); SB/CI/P Archives DA File-Germany25. 201-314343 (Carlo Gulino); also RID 48-6-28; SB/CI/P Archives DA File-Libya- 376 -SECRET
[104-10301-10002.pdf — page 11]
# SECRETATTACHMENT DSR/CI/RESEARCH ITEMSFOR WARREN COMMISSIONSECRET.
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Attachment DSR/CI/Research Items for Warren Commission1. 21 Jan. 1964 Questions to ba cubmitted to the Soviet Government.2. 22 Jan. 1964 Questionaire for Karina OSWALD.3. 25 Jan. 1964 The "OSWALD Chronology".4. 25 Jan. 1964 Nama lint with traces (preliminary version).5. 5 Fab. 1964 Biographic information on Mra. OSWALD and her relativca.6. 5 Feb. 1964 Letter explaining appendix designations.7. 8 Feb. 1964 Lotter regarding OSWALD'o weapon in the USSR.8. 28 Feb. 1964 Soviet use of assassination and kidnapping.9. 28 Feb. 1964 Soviet press reaction to the assassination of President Kannady.10. 26 Mar. 1964 Name list with traces.11. 6 Арг. 1964 Response to "Certain Questions Posed by the State Department Flica".12. 21 Apr. 1964 Additions to the Chronology of OSWALD in the USSR.13. 24 Apr. 1964 Lydia DINNYTRIX.14. 29 Apr. 1964 Photo of OSWALD in Minok.15. 6 Hay 1964 Contacta batweca tha OSWALDs and Soviet citizens, 13 June 1962 to 22 Novamber 1963.16. 8 May 1964 Marina OSWALD'o notebook.17. 3 Jun. 1964 Documente on Lee Harvey OSWALD furnished by the Soviet Governmcat.18. 5 Jun. 1964 Allegations regarding Intelligonco Training School in Minck, USSA.19. 22 Jul. 1964 Apparent inccasintcacias in materiel furnished tho Commission by CIA and the Department of Stace.20. 24 Jul. 1964 Yekaterina FURTBEVA.21. 31 Jul. 1964 Length of tica required for obtaining Soviet Tourist Visas in Helsinki and Stockholm, 196422. 7 Αυχ. 1964 Soviet hunting cocicties.23. 20 Aug. 1964 Konstantin Patrovich SERCRIVSKY.24. 9 Sept.1964 KGB footnote.25. 10 Sept. 1964 KGB Handling of Foreigners in the USSR.
[104-10301-10002.pdf — page 13]
26. 10 Sept. 1964 Acquaintances of the OSWALDs in Minak.27. 10 Sept. 1964 Financial aid for foreigners in the USSR.28. 10 Sept. 1964 Sacret training locations and procedures in the USSR,29. 10 Sept. 1964 Rates of compensation in the USSR.30. 10 Sept. 1964 Emigration and travel of Soviat nationals.31. 11 Sept. 1964 Geographic-descriptive data on Minak.32. 11 Sept. 1964 Certain questions posed by State Department files.33. 11 Sapt. 1964 Soviet hunting societics.34. 11 Sept. 1964 Length of time required for obtaining Soviet Tourist    Visas in Western Europe in 1964.35. 18 Sept. 1964 Identification of persons appearing in VBI photo D 33-46.36. 18 Sept. 1964 Passport and Visa office.37. 18 Sapt. 1964 Rasettlement of US defectors in the USSR.38. 18 Sept. 1964 Inturist hotels in Moscow.
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 0]
# TOP SECRETCIA Internal Use OnlyAccess Controlled byCIA History StaffTS#795052Copy 1 of 2![CIA Seal]# OFFICIAL HISTORYOF THE# BAY OF PIGS OPERATION# VOLUME III## EVOLUTION OF CIA'S### ANTI-CASTRO POLICIES,### 1959-JANUARY 1961(pages 1-203)# TOP SECRETTS#795052DCI-8December 1979Copy 1 of 2PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENTDO NOT DESTROY
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 1]
13-00000TOP SECRETCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYOFFICIAL HISTORYOF THEBAY OF PIGS OPERATIONDCI-8Volume IIIEVOLUTION OF CIA'SANTI-CASTRO POLICIES,1959-JANUARY 1961December 1979Jack B. PfeifferTOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 2]
TOP SECRET## ForewordThis is the third volume of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation and it focuses on the problems of establishing a policy for the United States Government as Fidel Castro and his cohorts came to power in Cuba.* The policy decided on by the US Government in March 1960 called for the displacement of Fidel Castro, and it was by no means a unilateral decision promoted by the Central Intelligence Agency -- although it is demonstrable that the Agency was far more perceptive than the policy making bodies in recognizing the threat to the Western Hemisphere posed by Castro's communist affiliation. Because the policy makers feared censure by the United Nations and/or the Organization of American States, the myth of "plausible deniability" was the caveat that determined the CIA would be the principal implementing arm for the anti-Castro effort. From inception to termination,* The preceding volumes were:I - Air OperationsII - Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy.- iii -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 3]
# TOP SECRET"deniability" would be the albatross around the necks of Agency planners; and from D-Day minus 2, (*e.g.*; 15 April 1961) it became the strangling cord insuring the failure of the effort at the Bay of Pigs.This volume describes the Agency's organization designed to accomplish the assigned task; and it records the interaction between the Agency and other government components (State and the military in particular), between the Agency and the White House, and among various CIA components as the program evolved. The relationships were sometimes less than harmonious. Particular attention is focused on the roles played by both President Eisenhower who authorized the anti-Castro program and Vice President Nixon who has been charged time and again -- unjustifiably as the record reveals -- with being the mastermind behind the operation.Emphasis also is focused on the drastic change in the concept of the operation between the spring and fall of 1960. From April's plans for the infiltration into Cuba of small teams of Agency trained specialists in communications, sabotage, and para- military operations to provide training and guidance- iv -TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRETto anti-Castro dissidents, November's plans called for an amphibious landing with armor and combat air support to establish a lodgement on Cuba soil from which a provisional government (approved by State and sponsored by CIA) could issue its clarion calls for US, UN, or OAS intervention.Encompassed in this volume are the records of the policy level meetings which considered such items as funding the operation, possible use of US personnel in combat roles, the use of US bases for training or for operations, types of direct action programs (e.g., propaganda drops vs sabotage), and the host of other problems related to Castro's overthrow. It also makes clear that various US corporate interests played an active (sometimes overactive) role in support of the anti-Castro efforts of the Government.This volume also examines official records in light of the allegations of the Senate Select Committee's investigations that the assassination plans being developed by the Mafia were a fundamental part of the official US Government program to overthrow Fidel Castro. There is no basis in fact for this change.- v -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 5]
TOP SECRETFinally, the reader of this volume should gain some insights to the character of various of the principal actors -- Agency and non-Agency -- who were involved most closely with the Government's anti-Castro policy during the period from its inception through the close of the Eisenhower administration. Not all of these impressions are flattering; but the author, who was in no way associated with the operation or the Directorate of Plans (now Operations), hopes that the presentation of the evidence has been as free from bias as possible.Again the author wishes to acknowledge the valuable contributions of the other two members of the CIA History Staff, Mrs. Eulalie Hammond and Mrs. Sharon Bond, to the completion of this volume. Without their unfailing willingness to perform either the 'substantive research or the grimly mechanical tasks required in preparing a volume such as this, the task could have been interminable.For any errors of fact or questionable interpretations, the author alone is responsible.- vi -TOP SECRET.
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TOP SECRETB. A Program of Covert Action Againstthe Castro Regime, 16 Mar 60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300C. CNO Correspondence with Department of Stateand NSC:1) Letter for Allen Dulles from   Arleigh Burke, 17 Mar 60   TS (DD/P 0-1436) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3112) Letter for Gordon Gray from   Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3133) Memorandum for the Special   Assistant to the President   for National Security Affairs   from Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60,   sub: US Policy toward Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318D. Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director(Plans) - Action from J. D. Esterline,2 May 60, sub: Liaison with USAgencies on JMARC Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332E. Attack on Petroleum Refinery atSantiago de Cuba, 13-14 March 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335F. Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum on Meetingwith Fidel Castro, 19 April 1959 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337G. Memorandum for DCI [for Briefing VicePresident Nixon], 29 Feb 60, sub:What We Are Doing in Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344Source ReferencesPart I Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347Part II Castro Must Go . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352Part III Changing Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366Part IV Presidential Resurgence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369- viii -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 8]
13-00000TOP SECRET| Part V    | Direct Action Programs | 374 || --------- | ---------------------- | --- || Part VI   | Mr. Nixon's Role       | 382 || Part VII  | Assassination          | 386 || Part VIII | Conclusions            | 388 |- ix -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 9]
# TOP SECRETTHE BAY OF PIGS OPERATIONVolume III Evolution of CIA'SAnti-Castro Policies,1950 - January 1961Part IBackgroundA. Watching from the SidelinesFidel CASTRO RUZ was identified in one of the earliest reports in Agency files as "one of the young, 'student leaders' in Cuba, who manages to get himself involved in many things that do not concern him." [^1]Beginning in 1948, the activities of Fidel Castro came to be of increasing concern to the Central Intelligence Agency and to the United States Government (USG). By early 1960 the USG officially adopted a covert action program designed to remove the Castro government from control of the island of Cuba. The policy of the USG was to be carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency and would culminate in the operations at the Bahia de Cochinos from 17-19 April 1961.Beginning in 1948 and continuing even after the United States had formulated its official policy of- 1 -TOP SECRET[^1]: Missing footnote text
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 10]
13-00000# TOP SECRETremoving Castro from the leadership of the CubanGovernment, the principal questions faced by CIA'sWestern Hemisphere Division, by the Department ofState, and by other concerned principals in the UnitedStates were: What is Fidel Castro? By whom is hecontrolled? What does he represent? Is he, or is henot, a Communist? The nature of the Agency's interestin answers to these questions is reflected in variousof the records for the period beginning in the mid-1950's when it appeared that the Agency depended inconsiderable part on the reporting from the AmericanEmbassy offices in Havana.Commenting on a report entitled "AntidemocraticAntecedents and Activities of Fidel Castro" preparedby President Batista's Military Intelligence Service(SIM) -- apparently in response to a request from theBuró de Represión a las Activadades Communistas (BRAC)*-- to the Counselor of the American Embassy (Amembassy)in Havana, Lincoln Vinton Chapin, told the CIA repre-sentative among other things, that:* Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities.- 2 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 11]
TOP SECRETThe SIM report is nothing more than a summary of allegations and accusations made against Fidel Castro during the period 1948-1950. This summary has apparently been slanted in an effort to make Castro a "Rojo," but the result is a rather poor one. 2/The Department of State reporter refuted, on a paragraph by paragraph basis, all of the allegations which indicated that Castro had been tied in with Communists, or Communist sympathizers, ever since his university days; and in forwarding the report to Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, the COS Havana indicated that he was furnishing the information because of renewed interest by the State Department in Fidel Castro. 3/The tenor of State reporting continued in a similar vein well into 1957. Charges that Castro was a Communist could not be substantiated, but State did note that in his student days, he "was involved in gangster-type activities." 4/ Havana Embassy reporting also reflected another of the problems of continuing concern to the US Intelligence Community -- would Castro have sufficient force to oust Batista, and were his basic feelings toward the US friendly. 5/- 3 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 12]
TOP SECRETIn the mid-1950's, Havana Station ran seven approved FI projects, most of which were aimed at the Cuban Communist Party, the PSP (Partido Socialista Popular). Agency funds also were used to support the efforts of an anti-Communist organization engaged principally in propaganda activities. 6/Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA's Inspector General, apparently accompanied US Ambassador Gardner and his party to a meeting with President Fulgencio Batista in the summer of 1956, a meeting which prompted the Cuban President to write to the DCI, Allen Dulles, in praise of the meeting.* 7/ In fact, Agency support for the peaceful transfer of power from Batista to a democratically elected successor and amnesty for Castro and his followers, as well as other anti-Batista dissidents, was proposed in a memorandum from the Inspector General in November 1957. 8/* David R. McLean, a former member of the IG's Inspection Staff, attached a cryptic note to the copy of Dulles' letter of response to Batista, which he, (McLean) included in the file of miscellaneous documents on the Bay of Pigs, which were inherited by the present author. McLean suggested that Kirkpatrick helped organize BRAC, but the present author has not confirmed this story.TOP SECRET