Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 242]
# TOP SECRETIstanbul, Ankara, and to the Forward Operations Base in Miami. Remembering that Dave Phillips himself was something of an actor, as well as a newspaperman, it is believed worthwhile to repeat this cable in its entirety. The cable read as follows:1.  FYI: HQS IS CONSIDERING THE FOLLOW-ING OPERATION: SHORTLY AFTER A RUSSIAN BOAT HOMEWARD BOUND FROM CUBA PASSES THROUGH BOSPHOROUS A DRIPPING CUBAN CLIMBS ASHORE IN TURKEY. HE CLAIMS TO BE POLITICAL PRISONER ARRESTED BY CUBANS IN HAVANA BUT SENT TO RUSSIA FOR IMPRISONMENT. CUBAN SUBJECT WILL CONTACT LOCAL LATIN AMERICAN CONSULS AND ISTANBUL PRESS FOR EXPLOITATION, THEN RETURN LATIN AMERICA. AFTER BRIEF BUT DRAMATIC EXPOSURE TO PRESS AN "ATTEMPT" WILL BE MADE ON SUBJECT'S LIFE. FOR THIS REASON HE WILL GO UNDERGROUND SO "THEY" WILL NOT LIQUIDATE HIM.2.  FOR HAVA: REQUEST STATION RECRUIT SUBJECT. OBVIOUSLY HE MUST BE SUPERB ACTOR WHO CAN CONVINCINGLY MAINTAIN ROLE IN SPITE OF SKILLFUL PROBING BY DUBIOUS NEWSMEN. HE MUST HAVE MEMORY CAPABLE OF RETAINING THOUSANDS OF "DETAILS" ABOUT HIS ARREST AND FORCED JOURNEY. HE MUST BE KNOWN IN HAVANA SO AS TO BE MISSED WHEN HE IS "ARRESTED." AN ARTICULATE STUDENT TYPE WOULD BE DESIRABLE. SWIMMING ABILITY DESIRABLE BUT NOT ESSENTIAL.3.  SUGGEST THAT IN RECRUITMENT, STATION STATE THERE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE CUBAN PRISONERS REALLY ARE BEING SENT RUSSIA, BUT THAT THIS CANNOT BE PROVED. THUS SUB-JECT'S PARTICIPATION IN THIS PLAY-ACTING WILL BE JUSTIFIABLE DRAMATIZATION OF SOVIET CONTROL IN CUBA. STATION ALSO AUTHORIZED PROMISE FINANCIAL BACKING, LATER- 231 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 243]
# TOP SECRETRETURN TO CUBA WITH FIGHTING GROUP, PER-MISSION WEEKEND WITH ALL THE WORKS INPARIS, ETC.4. IN RECRUITMENT, IT SHOULD BE   STRESSED TO SUBJECT THAT SUCCESS THIS   OPERATION AND STATUS HIS POSITION IN   INTERNATIONAL LIMELIGHT DEPENDS ENTIRELY   ON SECURITY. HIS FAMILY AND FRIENDS MUST   REALLY BELIEVE HE HAS BEEN ARRESTED (AND   STATION MUST ASSIST IN SPREADING WORD OF   HIS ARREST FOR SPECIFIC OFFENSE SO THAT   FACTS WILL JIBE IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGA-   TIONS.).5. ADVISE SOONEST WHEN YOUR MAN IS   SELECTED. HIS BRIEFING WILL BE IN PBPRIME.   HOPE HE MAY BE RECRUITED IN TIME EXFILTRATE   AMPAN BOAT DEPARTING HAVA END OF THIS MONTH.6. FOR ANKA, ISTA: APPRECIATE YOUR   CABLED ASSESSMENT POSSIBLE EXTENT COOP-   ERATION LOCAL SERVICE AND NEWSPAPER ASSETS.   SUGGEST HOWEVER NOT (REPEAT NOT) CONTACT   NON-KUBARKERS UNTIL HEADQUARTERS CAN FOR-   WARD OPERATIONAL PLAN. [^1]A memorandum on the outgoing cable quoted abovewent to Chief, WH/4 from Rudy Gomez, the Deputy Chiefof WH Division on 24 August 1960. Gomez's memorandumread as follows:The DCI, General Cabell, and Mr. Helmsdiscussed this cable on 24 August [1960]and concluded that since Fidel Castro isdefinitely identifying himself more andmore with the Russians, it is not worththe candle to launch an operation suchas that one proposed in subject cable.Mr. Helms said that we may discreetly tryto find a body for this operation, provid-ing we play it very carefully and do not- 232 -# TOP SECRET[^1]: 34/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 244]
13-00000TOP SECRETlet the body in on what we definitelyhave in mind; also, that any furthercables which go out on this proposedoperation are to be signed off by him.Examined in retrospect, it would appear that Mr. Helmshad good reason to be nervous about the proposal!* 35/B. Sabotage and other Exercises**Where WH/4/PP was successful in putting RadioSwan into operation and in supporting Station WRUL in* This proposal provided another of the very few in-  stances where Mr. Helms' name surfaced in relation to  a Bay of Pigs related problem.** Because so many of the sabotage activities of theCuban dissidents were uncoordinated, uncontrolled, anddid nothing to impede the extension of Castro's controlor lessen his support, the author has tried only toillustrate something of the scope of those sabotageoperations over which the WH or WH/4 could exercise adegree of control. In responding to the Taylor Com-mittee's request for an assessment of the effectivenessof its sabotage program, the best that WHD could say was:There are numerous acts of sabotage re-ported from all provinces of Cuba. Theseacts included the burning of cane fields,damaging of power and communication linesand sugar mills, burning of schools andcommercial buildings and damaging of petro-leum and sugar refinery [sic]. It is ex-tremely difficult to verify just whatsabotage damage were (sic) the result ofour team's (sic) activities; however, theyhave claimed the burning of cane fields,the firing of commercial stores, [high]tension lines, and the damage to the oilrefinery at Santiago de Cuba was the re-sult of a raider operation by one of our(footnote continued on following page)- 233 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 245]
TOP SECRETits broadcasts into Cuba, Project JMATE could claimno similarly successful or continuing program ofsabotage and disruption. In fact, one of the earliestand most thoroughly discussed sabotage programs againstCuba -- disruption of the Cuban petroleum industry --was a complete and total bust. Being suggested evenbefore President Eisenhower's authorization of theanti-Castro program, attempts to sabotage and inter-fere with the operation of Cuba's petroleum refineriescontinued until well into the middle 60's -- with atleast one of the sabotage "experts" displaying thesame notable lack of success, but excess of foolish-ness, that characterized his activities during Projectexternal action groups. In addition,we feel that a great deal of the othersabotage were *[sic]* the results *[sic]*of the demolitions we supplied to thevarious teams and other action groupsin Cuba with which we were in contact.Approximately 10-15,000 lbs. of theover 100,000 lbs. of material *[sic]*placed in the hands of internal assetswere demolitions supplies for sabotageaction. 35a/The attack on the Santiago refinery was led by RipRobertson, but his exciting cable about the actiongreatly overemphasized the damage; and the plant op-erations were quickly restored to normal. At thetime, however, the DCI reported it to the SpecialGroup (Chester Bowles, Roswell Gilpatrick, andMcGeorge Bundy) as a "successful" operation. 35b/Robertson's cable is shown as Appendix E (p. 335)
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 246]
13-00000TOP SECRETJMATE. It is a story worth recording here, becauseof the extremely close and continuing relationshipbetween one of the major US oil companies operatinga refinery in Cuba, Standard Oil Company of NewJersey (SONJ), and WH Division.As early as 9 March 1960, the minutes of aSpecial Group meeting reflect conversations thatboth Allen Dulles and Gordon Gray had concerning theproblems being faced by the major petroleum companiesoperating in Cuba -- SONJ, Texaco, and Shell -- andparticularly the need for "discreet means of inter-company consultation" in order to avoid possibleanti-trust prosecution. In a discussion of plannedpara-military operations against Cuba, it was report-ed that on 14 July 1960, Chief, Western HemisphereDivision was approached "by the Standard Oil Company."He [Chief, WH/D] indicated that it appeared thatStandard will be willing to cooperate, perhaps evencarry the ball on certain selected [sabotage] targets.DD/P gave authority to push this contact immediately."*[^36]* Paramilitary Operation Plan I, indicated that among  the specific sabotage targets to be considered for at-  tack in the period between 1 and 30 September 1960,  were petroleum targets. [^37]- 235 -TOP SECRET[^36] /[^37]/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 247]
TOP SECRETBy August of 1960, WH/D had approved a program of "subtle sabotage paying off, without resorting to the more risky and sensational type of sabotage." Unfortunately, however, there was a communications gap between the operations people and the intelligence analysts most familiar with the world petroleum industry and a number of demonstrably unworkable -- though subtle -- sabotage efforts came to naught.*The Cuban petroleum industry also was looked to as an economic-political target as well as a sabotage target. When the US refineries operating in Cuba refused Castro's order to process Soviet crude oil, WH/4 began to think in terms of disrupting the flow of this crude to Cuba by pressuring Onassis and other independent shipping operators to refuse to carry the Soviet oil. It was predicted that such* The Agency's real petroleum expertise and knowledge-ability -- both technically and economically -- on a worldwide basis was in the Fuels and Power Branch (later the Fuel's Branch) of the Office of Research and Reports (later the Office of Economic Research). Aside from the constant irritation of having to work half in the dark in response to WH/D or WH/4, ORR/F&P was constantly having to correct errors, to make apologies, or mend fences with the major US petroleum companies as a result of the lack of coordination between DDP and DDI components.TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 248]
TOP SECRETa plan would force the USSR (then facing a shortageof tanker bottoms in the world market) to transportits own crude to Cuba and to "provide techniciansand make modifications in existing refineries toprocess their crude." This, in turn, was supposedto alienate Venezuela and Mexico, normally amongCuba's crude suppliers.* 39/In addition to petroleum refineries as targetsfor sabotage, plans were also made to disrupt theCuban microwave system. Unlike the plans to disruptthe Cuban petroleum industry -- which would directlyinvolve properties of the international oil companies-- the sabotage program for the microwave networks,as late as February of 1961, specifically stated thatattacks should be limited to the Cuban operated netwith "hands off RCA and Dumont systems, which are toremain intact for later consideration." 40/ Also* In fact, the Cuban refinery technicians themselves  did an excellent job of adapting the plants to the  use of Soviet crude. The former manager of the  Standard Oil refinery commented to this effect after  reviewing the all source intelligence materials avail-  able on the plant. He was pleased -- at least in  one sense -- to note that Standard's training program  has apparently been quite successful!- 237 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 249]
TOP SECRETprohibited were attacks under Agency sponsorship onSoviet and Soviet-bloc targets located in Cuba. J. C.King protested that attacks on Soviet and Soviet-bloctargets by resistance forces not controlled by theAgency were far less efficient than such attackswould be if they were mounted through Agency efforts. 41/In addition to planning for sabotage, WH Division's anti-Castro activity also included extensive plans for the formation of goon squads throughout much of Latin America in an attempt to counter the pro-Castro elements of the various nations. This goon squad program also was of considerable interest to the Deputy Director for Plans, Mr. Bissell. Because of its areawide nature, the activities of the goon squads were run out of WH/D rather than out of WH/4. Among the operations which WH claimed credit for were the following: The disruption in Mexico City of about 400 Castro sympathizers gathered to celebrate the 26th of July movement through the use of stink bombs set off in the meeting place; in Lima, Peru a counter demonstration against some 200 Castro sympathizers also gathered to celebrate the 26th of July movement; and in San Jose, Costa Rica, "A meeting- 238 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 250]
# TOP SECRETof the Amigos de Cuba was broken up by an agent atthe Station, who sprayed the two principal speakers,prominent Costa Rican leftists with 'Who, Me?'."* 42/Among other assets which Chief, WH/D chose tomention in the same context with the goon squads werethe Secretary to the President of one Latin Americancountry:Who can promote action of any of theNational Security Forces.In another country, an:Agency member integrated into thePublic Safety Program serving as anAdvisor to the President on Securitymatters is in a position to recommendpolice action to the President.** 43/In what may have been a ploy intended principallyto obtain a vessel for use in infil-exfil operations,* "Who, Me?" was an obnoxious scent.** In light of subsequent investigations of CIA Activ-ities by the Senate Select Committee in the mid 1970's,it is interesting that the reference to the "ActionSquads" described above also included with referenceto the Dominican Republic an agent:In contact with a group of dissidentscapable of violent action, including assas-sination. This group has killed a numberof agents of the *Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM)*, Dominican Secret Police. 45/- 239 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 251]
13-00000TOP SECRETrather than in direct action programs against Cuba,representatives of the Special Projects Group, Counter-intelligence made a pitch to Chief, JMATE to acquirea vessel which -- for its acquisition, operationalmaintenance, crew, including incentive bonus wouldrun roughly $200,000 for a 6-month period -- couldalso be used in deception operations against Castro.In responding to this suggestion from the SpecialProjects Group, Col. Jack Hawkins quickly put thequietus on this request, noting that it was doubtfulthat the Cubans had either enough sophisticated radaror commo gear so that they would react to "the falseradar presentation, deceptive communications traffic,noise makers, signals, smoke, explosions, etc." Con-sequently Hawkins concluded:In view of the high cost involved,and the other factors mentioned above,I do not concur in the acquisition ofthis craft for deception purposes asproposed in the reference. [^46]- 240 -TOP SECRET[^46]:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 252]
TOP SECRETPart VI## Mr. Nixon's RoleLike so many other aspects of the Bay of Pigs story a great deal has been said about the role that Richard M. Nixon played in the operation during the course of his Vice Presidency, but woefully little solid evidence has ever appeared to verify either the pros or cons on the subject. Because of the continuing repetition of many of these stories, a careful search was undertaken of the voluminous CIA records of the operation in order to recover those items pertaining to Nixon's participation directly or indirectly -- through his aides, assistants, or correspondence -- in the Bay of Pigs operation.During the course of his unofficial visit to the United States in the spring of 1959, Fidel Castro accepted the invitation of the Vice President of the United States to meet with Mr. Nixon in his official office in the Capitol for an informal discussion. Nixon has stated that the meeting was arranged at the request of the Secretary of State Herter, who suggested- 241 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 253]
# TOP SECRETthat the administration might profit if one of itsleaders could gain additional inside information aboutwhat made Castro tick.Nixon has said that he had a 3 1/2 hour meetingwith Castro on 19 April 1959 and that as a result ofthe meeting, he prepared a 4-page secret memorandumand sent copies to President Eisenhower, SecretaryHerter and to Allen Dulles.[^1] In part at least,Mr. Nixon's version of the meeting with Castro wasmade public as early as November 1964 in an articlehe wrote for the Reader's Digest, and these viewswere repeated in somewhat more detail in his recentmemoirs, RN. The thrust of the meeting was that Nixonwas emphasizing the need for Castro to establish ademocratic form of government as he (Nixon) understoodit, with Castro on the other hand emphasizing that the[^1]: In his Reader's Digest article of November 1964 Nixon indicated that copies of the memorandum went to the three individuals as noted in the text above, however, in his recent Memoirs, RN, Nixon states that a copy also went to John Foster Dulles. John Foster Dulles was technically Secretary of State until 22 April 1959, on which date he was succeeded by Christian Herter. At the time of the meeting between Nixon and Castro, however, Mr. Herter had been acting in Mr. Dulles' place. Dulles's death occurred 24 May 1959.- 242 -# TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 254]
# TOP SECRETtype of government he believed in was that which was expressed most vocally by the people. Nixon's most widely known remark about Castro as a result of that meeting was his statement that: "Castro is incredibly naive about communism, or is under communist discipline."Reportedly Castro was not particularly enchanted with the meeting either, for according to a member of his party when Castro emerged from the meeting he "was angry. He swore and added, 'This man has spent the whole time scolding me'."* [^2]Subsequent to his meeting with Castro in April of 1959, Agency records do not reflect any particular interest on the part of the Vice President in Cuban activities until the end of January 1960. On 27 January, and again on 23 February, Col. J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, briefed Gen. Robert Cushman, Mr. Nixon's Aide, at the Vice President's Office. Cushman made it clear that the Vice President was* It was only after making a direct request to Mr. Nixon that a copy of the memorandum was obtained. No copies were found in the files of CIA, State, or the Eisenhower Library. The copy obtained was from Mr. Nixon's personal files. The memorandum was, in fact, classified CONFIDENTIAL rather than SECRET. A copy of the memorandum is attached as Appendix F. [^1]- 243 -TOP SECRET[^1]: 2a/[^2]: 2/
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 255]
TOP SECRETinterested in supporting anti-Castro groups both within and outside of Cuba, including goon squads or other direct action groups to match against the pro-Castro groups in Cuba.Among the other subjects discussed with General Cushman on 23 February 1960 were propaganda attacks on the Castro government and the possibilities of economic sanctions similar to those which had been suggested by former Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland, whose views on the need for economic sanctions had not only been discussed with Agency representatives, but also had been forwarded to the Vice President's office.Another facet of the Agency's anti-Castro efforts which were of some interest to the Vice-President were CIA's relations with the Department of State, which obviously was not one of the Vice President's favorite organizations; but Col. King made it quite clear that all of CIA's actions were undertaken only after policy approval. [^3] After it was pointed out to Gen. Cushman that the Department of State's knowledgeability about Agency operations was on a strict "need-to-know" basis, even for the Ambassador in Cuba,- 244 -TOP SECRET[^3]: After it was pointed out
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 256]
TOP SECRETCushman then showed Col. King some derogatory information that the FBI had provided the Vice President about both Ambassador Bonsal and William Wieland of the Bureau of American Republic Affairs. Col. King's memorandum provided no details about the nature of this information, but the probability is that both were accussed of being too tolerant of Castro and communists. [^4]During one of these meetings in the early part of 1960, Gen. Cushman- noted that the Vice President had suggested that possibly the Agency would want to consult with, or acquire the services of, Col. Edward Lansdale, a member of Gen. Erskine's Special Operations Staff in the Department of Defense. Lansdale's activities in helping to quell the Huk rebellion in the Philippines, apparently were well known to Nixon. [^5]On 2 March 1960, the Director of Central Intelligence gave Vice President Nixon a detailed briefing on "What We are Doing in Cuba." The 7-page briefing paper which had been given to the Director provided information on Castro's pro-communist proclivities, on the whole range of the anti-Castro propaganda effort which was being supported by Agency financing,- 245 -TOP SECRET[^4]: [^5]:
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 257]
TOP SECRETand went into details concerning attempts to rally anti-Castro support, not only in the other Latin American nations, but in the Near and Far East and in Africa. Details were given on the preparations being made for resistance activities including the acquisition of training bases in third countries, and both Ydigoras Fuentes, President of Guatemala, and President Luis Somoza of Nicaragua were noted as having made offers of support for this country's anti-Castro activities.Plans for economic warfare against Castro were also outlined for the Vice President. Delaying deliveries of necessary spare parts for the sugar industry, tightening credit by oil companies to restrict delivery of the essential petroleum products, and possible restriction in sugar quotas were mentioned as under study. One other item which was mentioned in this briefing for Vice President Nixon was the fact that the Agency had "a drug, which if placed in Castro's food, would make him behave in such an irrational manner that a public appearance could have very damaging results to him."[^6] It should be emphasized that at the date of this briefing (2 March 1960), the United States did not yet have an official anti-Castro- 246 -TOP SECRET[^6]: missing footnote
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 258]
# TOP SECRETpolicy -- that would not come until 17 March of 1960. Subsequent to that announced policy, the author has found no other references to drugs or other types of attack which were being considered upon Castro's person, or the persons of any of the other Cuban leaders, as a part of the Agency's official program.*There is some question as to whether it was the Director of Central Intelligence himself, or whether it was Mr. Bissell, or, perhaps, whether it was Col. King who actually briefed the Vice President on 2 March 1960. A stamp on the copy of the original Memorandum for the Director reads: "Noted by DCI 28 March 1960." This copy was sent to the DCI through the DDP and carries Mr. Bissell's initials. The carbon of the memorandum does not show this stamp and the presumption is that it was the Director who did the briefing. A third version of the memorandum is[^1][^1]: See Part VII of this Volume of the History of the Bay of Pigs Operation for clarification of the definition of the Agency's *official* policy regarding the anti-Castro program, as contrasted to the *unofficial* program. The author assumes that regardless of reader's biases regarding the former Vice President, that the fact that he heard about this drug in the course of a briefing will not be construed to make him a member of a conspiracy to assassinate Castro and other of the Cuban leaders.- 247 -TOP SECRET
[104-10301-10004.pdf — page 259]
# TOP SECRETdated 8 March 1960 and was revised to read:For the Director's use at the NSC 5412Representatives Meeting which will con-sider the Cuban covert action programpaper. (This paper was used for Mr. Nixon'sbriefing.)This would seem to imply that perhaps the DCI did in fact do the briefing. While the briefer may not be positively identified, there is no question however, that the Vice President did receive a detailed brief- ing on the Agency's plan for action against Castro prior to the time of Eisenhower's formal proclamation.[^1]In addition to the meeting of 2 March when Mr. Nixon was briefed on the Agency's concerns about Cuba, the Vice President was also a participant in the 10 March 1960 meeting of the National Security Council when President Eisenhower emphasized that Cuba was a danger, that he wanted contingency plans drawn up, and that he wanted Cuba to be a subject for review at all future National Security Council Meetings. Mr. Nixon attended the 17 March 1960 conference when the President[^1]: See Appendix G for copies of the first page of each of the three memorandums on the briefing of the Vice President on 2 March 1960. (For Appendix G see p. 344).- 248 -# TOP SECRET