Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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StifET-2-b. Unless we were indefinitely to occupy Cwa nilitorily, tis caly solution to the Cuban problea is necessarily the Cams of a Coca leadership willing to and capable of corcraing the country along lines acceptable to the Cuban pople and along lines consistent with basic U. S. wliy ith respect to Latin Azerica. This will tes tics. On the shad, it is cootful that ay Con Covenant which re alited fica V. 5. cored or other overt intervertica could Icag survive aus withiratal. On the otos, despite car on Lang-standing plagivings carcerning Cantso, se 10 ea inosce Olt he cos into power with overhelsing support taly in Cwa but cliccare in the caiopbare, icluding is this Ontry. Although that support has largely evaporated La the United States-end, to a lesser extent, in responsible dfraics in the other Latin Acerican Repal 10 Castro cad, rWauitriy, his sofora pogren still cafoy very considerable at in his country. Cons, over the dialliolad with Coolico, Evo yet to find ca alternative lectorchip Aich thay believe wald actually carry out the afora sa la lic opinion still domis. Opposition cienco tainted tration with the Etiata rogies are still piitically maxpiable and could act esteblich a clable governmcat, Cation groups that might be aceptable to ce are beginning to organise care offcatively bat, ce best, it will bafore they are ready for vicom cation.c. The priery cbjective of U. S. plley chezld be the ccoalcretion of the oractice of an affetiw, patriotic ove- coat friendly to the United Sisto within Cha and coong atles to counter Cubels current escai. The firot Cesk is to cere, imate & was eble to so, a alimte la via responsible and fricily Cubens wild find it wrth Aile to expose Castro plicies thich bely the Cossabte and tancias goed U.S.Aten relaticas. Ca the pooltiva sida, two aid cod are taking astions and making starcanismica wald cascaraga cual eleccats to ergenics are offcatively and to expool as sport ad collensctica in their offono badeva political cad corals progress for Ceta by taking. a dharat rood then the great con sedals. At the briefing, we gave en indicatica of the covert cocivities Jony tore this end, alla ladiection of the aicosine cetributed effort aid as bom cieszy for over a year to idatify and eas to bite plaisa tareast- cat the beatophere the Casalst cops of Cetica probica. enog policies are guided by theIncrease
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SECRET## -3-Increase fairly rapidly if it is clear to Cubans that Castro himself is responsible for political and economic deterioration of the country. However, the consolidation of the opposition will be slowed down if Castro can succeed by wrapping the flag of patriotism and nationalism about himself in further convincing the Cuban people that the United States has aggressive designs on the Cuban nation as a whole and that the United States rather than Castro's policies is responsible for Cuba's difficulties. We must, therefore, exercise the greatest care that we do not uncircumspectly transform the developing dissatisfaction of the Cuban people with Castro into a fight between the United States and Cuba, for no self-respecting Cuban could then afford to support us against his own country.4. While we believe that inter-American action through the OAS and/or some economic action by the United States in defense of its rights may play an important role at the proper time, we must not let these possibilities cause us to lose sight of the critical fact that no solution will be possible until an alternative leadership is ready to move in. If the application of collective or unilateral pressures could bring the Castro Government down before an acceptable leadership is ready to take over, the probabilities are civil war or a take-over by even more Communistic elements. Either would bring us closer to armed intervention. Thus, while we are going ahead in the process of influencing the other American Republics to see the Communist and other aspects of the Cuban situation as we do and preparing the ground for possible Inter-American consideration of the Cuban problem, we intend to control the timing of any such motion insofar as possible to coincide with the development of an alternative leadership. It is also the intention of the Administration to propose to the Congress that the President be given discretionary authority to alter sugar quotas in the national interest and we have developed and are putting into effect an action plan to obtain the release of the United States from certain other economic commitments which impair our ability to take action in the economic field when this could contribute to safeguarding our interest or to the creation of conditions favorable to a leadership opposed to Castro's policies.
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13-00000With respect to all these matters, a most important element is time. Time is needed for Cuba to realize that the deterioration of their political and economic life is due to Castro's excesses, including his connections with International Communism. Time is needed for an alternative leadership to emerge and to compromise effectively for action. Time is also needed further to awaken Latin American opinion to the dangers of the situation and for Latin American Governments to come around more to the point of view that the Cuban situation is a matter of common concern, not just a U.S.-Castro quarrel. We are using all available facilities to make this time as short as possible, but our experience in other difficult situations in the Near East and Central America indicate that immediate results are not to be expected. In the meantime, we are going to have, we believe, to exercise restraint from taking actions which, while reflecting our own great sense of concern and urgency, would actually retard the process of change which we all desire.I should point out also that, while action in the OAS at the right time may be desirable as a means of encouraging an alternative Cuban leadership, we would probably have to contend with Soviets in the United Nations. It is almost certain that the Cubans will try to anticipate or counter any U. S. approach to the OAS by going directly to the United Nations. Furthermore, actual "enforcement action" by the OAS would probably be brought up before the United Nations under Article 53 of the UN Charter even if we argued that any action taken by the OAS constituted only "recommendations" to governments. This reinforces our view that action in the OAS--which can be taken under the Charter by convoking a meeting of Foreign Ministers, as well as under the Rio Treaty and the Caracas Resolution--should primarily be viewed as a means of strengthening Cuban opposition to Castro's policies at the right moment rather than as a means of quarantining Cuba and waiting to see what happens. It would at present be somewhat difficult to bring a case against Cuba under the Caracas Resolution since the latest Special National Intelligence Estimate--which we have asked to be reviewed--does not find the Cuban Government to be Communist-dominated at present. If our own estimate does not yet substantiate the case, it would be difficult in a short time to persuade less well-informed governments that "the political institutions" of Cuba are under International Communist control or domination.As you are aware, our basic national policy (5901/1) views overt intervention as a last resort to be approved by the President when all else fails. We would be most reluctant to make or concur in such recommendation to the President until there had been a reasonable chance for all other solutions to be tested.Thank you.322
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Thank you again for sending me a copy of your memorandum. As you know, the NSC is keeping the Cuban problem under constant scrutiny, having discussed it in some detail at its January 14 meeting and again this morning. At the first of the meetings, the Secretary of State reviewed the policy toward Cuba which has been approved by the President, and the consensus of this morning's meeting was that this policy is essentially correct. We anticipate that, at future meetings of the NSC, there will be further discussions concerning Cuba to determine whether there should be a modification of policy toward that country. In view of the fact that today's NSC meeting indicated continued agreement on the validity of the policy discussed in January, it would appear unnecessary to develop new policy documentation at this time, especially as the proposals in your Envoy memorandum closely parallel policies which are already underway. Should you, or your colleagues on the Joint Chiefs, desire a further briefing on our actions and operational plans to carry out the policy, I should be more than glad to arrange it.Sincerely,Livingston T. MerchantUnder Secretary for Political Affairs
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13-0000026 FEB 1963SECRETS.C.T - PERSONALDear Livie:I am becoming increasingly concerned over deteriorating conditions in the Caribbean. I am especially concerned over the present situation in Cuba, in whose security the Navy is directly interested by reason of this island's strategic location with respect to the sea approaches to the southern United States and the Panama Canal, and because of the location there of the Guantanamo Naval Base. Cuba appears to be in the process of falling under the domination of International Communism. Should this trend continue unchecked and a communist dominated or "front government" become a reality, a direct threat to the security of the United States would be presented. Additionally, a communist controlled state in Cuba would serve as a base of operations for the further spread of communistic influence in the Western Hemisphere having as its aim the isolation of the United States from Latin America.Because of my concern, I am taking the liberty of sending you the attached paper as indicative of current Navy thinking in this matter, - namely that positive action to reverse the present trend should be initiated to the end that the communist threat is eliminated and a stable, friendly government established in Cuba. Action taken now in the case of Cuba will also facilitate and provide a foundation for any similar actions which may be necessary to prevent the spread of communism in Latin America and to stabilize other areas where unrest is appearing.I am also sending a copy of this letter and the enclosure to Jack Irwin.Sincerely,ARLEIGH BURKEThe Honorable Livingston T. MerchantNew State Department BuildingWashington 25, D. C.Enclosure: Paper on U.S. Action in CubaCopy to: Mr. J. E. Irwin II, (OSD/ISA) w/enclosure324PERSONAL - SECRETS.C.T
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# INTRODUCTION1. The Castro Movement in Cuba is a vehicle by which international communism appears to be gaining a foothold in the western hemisphere. If the present trend continues, it will soon be too late for the United States to stem the Soviet incursion into this hemisphere. This situation, in its many ramifications, presents an immediate threat to the security of the United States and to that of our important neighbors in North and South America.2. What action can be taken to prevent the establishment of a communist state in Cuba and to restore a stable, friendly government?# BACKGROUND3. The U. S. has never renounced the Monroe Doctrine. This was reaffirmed by Secretary of State Dulles in his address to the Nation on July 12, 1954, on International Communism in Guatemala. In that address, Mr. Dulles stated:> "For several years international communism has been probing here and there for resting places in the Americas. It finally chose Guatemala as a spot which it could turn into an official base from which to breed subversion which would extend to other American Republics."> "This intrusion of Soviet despotism was, of course, a direct challenge to our Monroe Doctrine, the first and most funda- mental of our foreign policies."The United States is bound by treaties which commit it to seek settlement of hemispheric disputes by peaceful means, but which also provide for action in the event of aggression either from outside the hemisphere or within. Article 5 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at Rio de Janeiro, 1947, requires each contracting party to send to the Security Council of the UN complete information "concerning the activities undertaken ... for the purpose of maintaining Inter-American peace and security."Article 6 of this treaty states:"If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack ... or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately inPage 1325
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order to agree on ... the measures which should be taken for thecommon defense and for the maintenance of the peace and securityof the Continent."The Declaration adopted by the Tenth Inter-American Conference atCaracas, Venezuela, March 1954, states:"That the domination or control of the political institutionsof any American State by the international communist movement,extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereigntyand political independence of the American States, endangeringthe peace of America, and would call for the meeting of consultationto consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance withexisting treaties."The 26th of July Movement succeeded in displacing Batista on 1 Jan 1959.Since that time the Castro regime has followed increasingly the classicstrategy for establishing a communist state. The communist time table isdelineated in American Embassy Havana Dispatch no. 903 dated 29 December1959. The ruthless elimination of the opposition, assumption of dictatorialpowers, suspension of elections, the "Hate America" campaign, the studiedbreakdown of the economy and confiscation of property, the initiation ofrelations and trade with the Soviet Union, the forbidding of anti-communistactivity and the breakdown and reconstitution of the Armed Services andpolice are all typical communist maneuvers.The majority of the Cubans are not yet committed to the acceptance ofcommunism nor are they aware of the trend of the Revolution in this direction.The lower classes, however, continue to give full support to Castro and theRevolution.It has not yet been proved that Castro himself is a communist. However,some of his principal deputies as well as other leaders are believed to becommunists. In any case, individuals susceptible to communist influence areoccupying key positions in the Government as well as in all important organ-isations and trade unions. Two developments are noticeable. Communistsare being appointed openly and are being elected (in trade unions) to keypositions. Hidden communists in the 26th of July Movement are takingpositions in seeming opposition to the open communists.At present the Cuban Armed Forces are disorganized and apparently capableonly of guerrilla warfare. Intelligence reports indicate that the SovietBloc may be supplying technicians to assist in training the new forces andsupplying arms to the new government. There is no present indication thatthe fall of the Castro Government is imminent. If it should fall, however,the government would most probably emerge as a communist government becausePage 2326
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13-00000S.CRETopposition leaders have been eliminated and there appear to be no leaders ofstature remaining around whom anti-Castro/anti-Communist peoples could rally.Should Castro fall or be assassinated, mob action which would probablyresult would jeopardize the safety of Americans in Cuba. Finally, in theworst extreme, the possibility of direct support for Cuba by the Sovietbloc, even to the extent of an open mutual security agreement, cannot bedisregarded.DISCUSSION4. Three basic courses of action are open to the U. S.A. Multilateral action through the OAS.B. Unilateral Overt Action by the U. S.C. Covert Unilateral Action by the U.S.All subsidiary actions, such as economic pressure and moral suasion,which will assist in achieving the objective should also be taken in additionto the above.A. MULTILATERAL ACTION THROUGH THE OAS.The machinery exists in the declaration and agreements of the OASfor the U. S. to request convocation of the Organ of Consultation of theOAS with subsequent investigation of the government in Cuba, and, ifapproval of the member states is obtained, intervention to prevent aCommunist take-over.(1) Advantages:(a) It would be in consonance with our national policy andour treaty commitments under the OAS.(b) It would strengthen the OAS and would reassure the FreeWorld and the Latin American States of U. S. willingness to live up tocommitments.(2) Disadvantages:(a) Uncertainty of support for OAS action by other LatinAmerican States.(b) Delay in OAS action could result in a Communist controlledfront government being a "fait accompli" in Cuba.(c) Could result in the entire problem ending in the SecurityPage 3
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13-00000Council of the where the soviet Union has a veto.## B. MILITARY ACTION BY THE U.S.The U. S. has the capability to seize Cuba by direct military action, and after a consolidation period, cause the establishment of a friendly, non-communist government.### (1) Advantages:(a) It would be in consonance with the Monroe Doctrine, which is still basic U. S. policy with respect to the Western Hemisphere, and would solve the problem.(b) It would serve notice to the world that the U. S. will not tolerate the establishment of a communist or communist "front" regime in the Western Hemisphere.(c) It would re-emphasize to the world that the U. S. will not hesitate to act when its security is at stake.(d) It would dispel any illusions by the world at large that the U. S. is unwilling, and unable to act no matter what the provocation. It would also probably stop the "baiting of the U.S." in which some minor powers throughout the world indulge.### (2) Disadvantages:(a) It would violate our OAS commitments to seek settlement by peaceful means.(b) It would lead to charges of aggression against the U.S., both in the OAS and in the United nations, with the resulting possibility of UN and OAS action against the U. S.(c) It would prove that the U.S. is not willing to abide by its treaties if U. S. interests dictate otherwise.(d) It could isolate the U.S. from the other American States.(e) It would violate the principle of non-intervention.## C. COVERT UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE U.S.The U. S. could assist rebel groups covertly to overthrow the present government and re-establish a friendly government. Concurrently, it could take all possible measures to alert all friendly nations and the U.S. people and branches of the U. S. Government to the danger of the threatPage 4328![SECRET]
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SECRETin order to discredit Cuba and bring world opinion to the side of the U.S.(1) *Advantages*:(a) U. S. would not be charged with aggression.(b) If carried out successfully, Free World and Latin American opinion would be favorable to the U. S.(2) *Disadvantages*:(a) There is no certainty of success.(b) The effort might well come too late.In considering and comparing the above courses of action, the basic assumption that the United States cannot and must not permit within the Western Hemisphere the establishment of any government dominated by the International Communists is paramount. Therefore, if other courses of action fail, the U. S. must, even in the face of adverse world opinion, take unilateral action to prevent such as occurrence.Until the situation reaches the stage where direct unilateral action by the U.S. is the only means left, it appears that a combination of those parts of courses of action A and C which have a fair chance of success should be followed in order to utilize the prime advantage given under A, i.e., the cooperation and good will of the other American States.CONCLUSIONS5. The following conclusions are reached:a. The establishment of a communist government, or a "front" government following communist precepts, in Cuba would be a direct threat to the security of the U. S. and would endanger hemispheric security.b. The U. S. should initiate positive action to eliminate the threat before a communist or "front" government in Cuba is a "fait accompli."c. Although the revolution still has the support of the masses, the resulting government in Cuba is following the path of international communism. Although they are not yet aware of the trend toward communism, Castro has the personal loyalty of the masses,d. American holdings are being confiscated. American lives may be endangered if stable, responsible government is not ensured.e. The Monroe Doctrine is still basic U. S. policy with respect to the Western Hemisphere.Page 5329SECRET
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2. Procedure exists under the Declaration of Caracas to request action by the against a Communist threat to hemispheric security.c. The U.S. should proceed to document the extent of infiltration of communists into key positions in Cuba and the extent of extra-Western hemisphere communist support of the present Cuban regime.k. The U. S. should initiate a campaign to apprise all U. S. agencies, the U. S. public, and the other American States of the threat in order to gain support for any future action that may be taken.1. The U. S. should covertly support the Cuban opposition.j. The U. S., after having gained the required support, should present its case before the OAS in order that joint action by the members of the OAS may be taken to eliminate the communist threat and establish a friendly, stable government in Cuba.k. The U. S., as a last resort, should take unilateral military action to eliminate the threat.RECOMMENDATIONS6. To accomplish the above, the following plan of action is recommended:a. Immediately document the communist time table and the communist take-over in Cuba.b. Use all resources and media to make the U.S. and the other American States aware of the threat. The following should be utilized to accomplish this:(1) Intelligence briefings of:(a) U. S. Government officials.(b) Newspaper representatives and editors.(c) U.S. businessmen operating abroad and going abroad.(d) The LADB members and Latin American diplomatic personnel and military attaches.(e) The Catholic Church (possibly through the Apostolic Delegate).(f) Church groups operating in Latin America.(g) Latin American officials visiting the U. S. and U. S. installations.
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(2) orientation of radio broadcasts and news reports, both govern-...(3) The U. S. Information Service.(4) All country teams.c. Covertly support the Cuban opposition. Select and groom trusted Cubans as appropriate to assume responsible posts in a friendly government.d. Be prepared to use force to safeguard and evacuate U. S. Nationals should the situation deteriorate to the point where they are endangered.e. When support has been gained, request, in conjunction with other members of the OAS, convocation of the Organ of Consultation of the OAS under the terms of the Declaration of Caracas to:(1) Seek OAS action to call on Cuba to place herself under OAS auspices "in order to preserve the revolution for the people and prevent communist take-over," and;(2) Seek action to intervene by force in the event the above fails, and;(3) In whatever joint group is formed to accomplish the above, keep U. S. participation to a minimum in order to force the Latin American States to assume their responsibilities to the Hemisphere and to counter accusations of U. S. imperialism.f. In the event time does not permit completion of the above, or as a last resort, be prepared to take unilateral military action to establish a non-communist government in Cuba.
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13-00000Appendix DMemorandum for Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) -Action from J. D. Esterline, 2 May 60