Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10306-10018.pdf — page 18]
# TOP SECRETwithdrawal of assistance to Karamanlis, which he felt had a great deal to do with his loss of office.[^1]d. [I pointed out to the President that we could expect some trouble in Brazil.]e. The President asked about the future of Prime Minister Inonu of Turkey. I stated that we expected that his government would fall and that he would lose office soon after his return.[^1]f. [I repeated to the President briefly my meeting with President Macapagal which is covered in a separate memorandum prepared by Mr. Colby.]g. [Also I raised the question of the importance of our taking iniative in the Indonesia matter by working with Macapagal. We might bring Indonesia round and also straighten out the Malayasia problem.]2. The President then turned to Cuba. He asked how effective our policy was and what was the future of Cuba. He asked how effective the economic denial program was and how we planned to dispose of Castro. He said he did not wish any repetition of any fiasco of 1961, but he felt that the Cuban situation was one that we could not live with and we had to evolve more aggressive policies. He looks to us for firm recommendations. In this connection we should prepare a briefing and also we should study carefully various courses of action.3. The President then raised the question of the deal between the Rumanian government and the Ferguson company for the procurement of a steel mill and asked whether I thought this was a good thing. I replied affirmatively, stating that in my opinion economic relations with the satellites would tend to break down the closemess of ties between the satellites in Moscow and this should be a very definite policy effort on our part. I noted that Moscow had discouraged the Rumanian steel mill because it did not fit into their pattern of economic integration of the satellites and the Soviet Union. The President then stated that he agreed that we should attempt to pull the satellites away. He then brought up the question of Tito and asked if I could give him the name of the best man who could serve as Ambassador to Yugoslavia who would be able to "win the girl away from Khrushchev." He said that in his opinion this man should be an experienced, able man, perhaps in his 50's and preferably a Republican, who could carry the confidence of the Republicans and a personality who could win Tito's confidence and allegiance. I responded by stating that I would prepare a list of competent people who I felt could- 2 -[^1] 98
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98serve in this capacity and also in others. In this connection, the President stated that he was not satisfied with the Ambassador-elect to Yugoslavia and had therefore held up the appointment. His request for help and the suggestion of names in connection with Yugoslavia and the satellites is along the same line as to who would be a good representative in South Vietnam.4. The President asked concerning our relationships on the Hill. I said that they were excellent. The only problem was a continual harangue for a Joint Committee on Intelligence. I said that I felt that if Senator Russell would expand his Committee to include Fulbright and Hickenlooper, and Vinson expand his Committee to include two members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, that the issue would be put to rest. The President said he thought this was a good idea and that he would speak to both Fulbright and Russell about it.5. I then reviewed the brochure on the OXCART by giving the President a broad picture of this development. I explained that surfacing of it was a problem which had been under consideration by Defense and CIA which I had discussed with President Kennedy. I said that McNamara was pressing for a rather early release but that President Kennedy felt that the timing of the surfacing was of very great importance. I said that I felt that the timing was even of greater importance now and I had some reservations about surfacing this vehicle in the first few days of President Johnson's administration. The President seemed to agree and suggested that McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and I meet with him on Friday for a discussion of this problem.No arrangements were made as to the time of Friday morning's briefing.JAM/mfb (tape)- 3 -
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# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 25 November and 26 November1. On Monday, November 25th, there was no briefing of the President, although there was a short visit with him at the State reception on Monday evening. The President then expressed regret that events of the day prevented a briefing and asked if there was any development requiring his attention. I replied there was none and would call him if any developments came to my attention.2. On Tuesday, the 26th, I briefed the President, reviewing all items on the Check List and the world reaction summary contained in the Bulletin. Briefing and discussion on other matters consumed about 15 or 20 minutes.3. The President asked if our entire applicable resources had been made available to the FBI in connection with their report, which he had ordered. I replied affirmatively.NOTE: I should call J. Edgar Hoover concerning this. (DCI did this at 11:20 on 11/26/63)4. The President asked my appraisal of the situation in Vietnam. I replied that I was less optimistic than was the report received from Ambassador Lodge.5. Mr. Bundy stated the first order of business was to assist State and assign a Deputy Chief of Mission capable of running the Country Team and the American official community. Bundy recommended Mr. Sullivan, Harriman's deputy. The President plans to have a man in position not later than January first.6. McCone stated that there remained a number of individuals in Saigon who continued to be troublemakers and should be removed. Bundy confirmed this and stated actions were to be taken. No names were mentioned.NOTE: Apparently the President's appointment secretary will be a Mr. Moyrs. We should get to know him.
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7. The President noted with some considerable contempt the   fact that certain people in the Department of Justice had suggested   to him on Saturday that an independent investigation of the President's   assassination should be conducted by a high level group of attorneys   and jurists, probably headed by Governor Dewey. President Johnson   rejected this idea, and then heard that the identical plan was to be   advanced in a lead editorial in the Washington Post. The President   felt this was a deliberate plant and he was exceedingly critical. He   personally intervened, but failed with Mr. Al Friendly and finally   "killed" the editorial with Mrs. Graham.JAM/TMLee/mfb
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# MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: South Vietnam Situation25 November 1963ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Ball,Messrs. Bundy and McCone, Ambassador Lodge1. Ambassador Lodge reported that the change in government had been an improvement, that he was hopeful over the outlook, that he expected a speedup of the war, he thought by February or March we would see marked progress. Lodge stated that we were not involved in the coup, though we put pressures on the South Vietnamese government to change its course and those pressures, most particularly on indications of withdrawal by 1965, encouraged the coup. Lodge stated that there were indications that North Vietnam might be interested in arrangements which would be of a nature satisfactory to us. He did not elaborate. He that that everybody was very happy after the coup and showed some pictures of the crowds in Saigon. He mentioned that Gen. Don would be here and that those talking with him should influence him to put on all the pressure he could. He spoke most highly of the Papal delegate and his intention to see the Pope on Wednesday. He carried with him a letter from the Papal Delegate and also from the Bishop of Saigon, apparently praising the actions in upsetting the Diem government. Lodge said he saw dangers of an anti-Christian move and this was his purpose in seeing the Pope. He made a point that Bishop Thuc had engaged in serious persecutions involving the imprisonment of a great many people, including three Catholic priests. He also made the point that Can, Diem's brother, also engaged in a variety of activities of persecution and the execution of individuals and that Can had, on his own premises, a burial ground for his victims. Lodge said that we were in no way responsible for the death of Diem and Nhu, that had they followed his advice, they would be alive today. He said that he saved Can from assassination and that Bishop Thuc was out of Saigon under orders from the Papal delegate. (Note: I question whether the Papal delegate can order a Bishop out of a country.) The tone of Ambassador Lodge's statements were optimistic, hopeful, and left the President with the impression that we are on the road to victory.
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At this point McCone stated that our estimate of the situationwas somewhat more serious. We had noted a continuing increasein Viet Cong activity since the first of November as evidenced bya larger number of Viet Cong attacks. We also noticed withconsiderable concern a high level of message volume on the Viet Congmilitary and political networks and this might quite possibly reflectpreparations for further sustained guerrilla pressures. FurthermoreI stated that the military were having considerable trouble incompleting the political organization of the government and werereceiving little if any help from civilian leadership. Indeed it seemedto us that the competent civilians were staying on the sidelines andcontinuing their traditional role of critics rather than turning in andbeing helpful. I concluded by stating that we could not at this pointor time give a particularly optimistic appraisal of the future.The President then stated that he approached the situation withsome misgivings. He noted that a great many people throughout thecountry questioned our course of action in supporting the overthrowof the Diem regime. He also noted that strong voices in the Congressfelt we should get out of Vietnam. Both of these facts give thePresident considerable concern. He stated that he was not at all sure thatwe took the right course in upsetting the Diem regime but this was adecision that he did not have to make as it was a *fait accompli*. Hesaid now that it was done, we have to see that our objectives wereaccomplished. (Note: The inferences were that, left to his owndevices, he would not have supported the courses of action which ledto the coup.)The President then stated he has never been happy with ouroperations in Vietnam. He said there had been serious dissensionand divisions within the American community and he told theAmbassador that he was in total charge and he wanted the situationcleaned up. He wanted no more divisions of opinion, no morebickering and any person that did not conform to policy should beremoved. At this point Mr. Bundy stated that we were searching fora replacement for Truehart and what we wanted was a capableadministrator who could run the Country Team. The President againrepeated his insistence that the Ambassador was the Number One man andhe, the President, was holding the Ambassador personally responsible.Secretary McNamara stated that he had examined the economicsituation and that he felt we must give generously of economic aidand must not ask the South Vietnamese government to do the impossibleat this particular time.
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P.19The President then said that he supported this, but at the same time he wanted to make it abundantly clear that he did not think we had to reform every Asian into our own image. He said that he felt all too often when we engaged in the affairs of a foreign country we wanted to immediately transform that country into our image and this, in his opinion, was a mistake. He was anxious to getdong, win the war - he didn't want as much effort placed on so-called social reforms.Note: I received in this meeting the first "President Johnson tone" for action as contrasted with the "Kennedy tone". Johnson definitely feels that we place too much emphasis on social reforms; he has very little tolerance with our spending so much time being "do-gooders"; and he has no tolerance whatsoever with bickering and quarreling of the type that has gone on in South Vietnam.The meeting was followed by a statement to the press which was given out by Bundy to the effect that we would pursue the policies agreed to in Honolulu adopted by the late President Kennedy. A picture was taken of the President with Lodge, McNamara, Rusk and Ball.JAM (tape)/mfbReferences: 1. IN-66988, 23 Νοv 632. SC No. 11709/63, 18 Nov 63Subj: The Military Situation in South Vietnam
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# TOP SECRET DINAR 99## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN23 November 1963## DAILY BRIEF*South Vietnam:* The accelerated tempo of Viet Cong activity in the post-coup period continues.While the 149 Viet Cong attacks recorded during the week ending 18 November are a drop from the previous week's record high of 233, the number is still about 50 percent above normal for this year. The attacks continue to be on a small scale. They are targeted primarily against strategic hamlets and outposts, with government paramilitary forces bearing the brunt.24Continuing(high message volumes on) Viet Cong military and political networks may reflect preparations for sustained guerrilla pressures.The Saigon government apparently is proceeding with a purge of military officers holding high military, intelligence, and provincial posts under Diem. On 22 November it announced the suspension of 31 officers. Some of these are under arrest. The purges may be partly in response to the demands of student and Buddhist groups seeking revenge against prominent figures who sided with Diem during the Buddhist crisis. (TOP SECRET/DINAR)99199TOP SECRET(DINAR)![photo]
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26 November 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson - Sunday,November 24th at 10:00 a. m.I briefed President Johnson at his residence at 10:00 a. m. Briefing consumed approximately 20 minutes. Reviewed the Checklist and I made the following points:1. I explained the space event. [Soviet ships are in place which would indicate a long range ICBM test. However, the ranges are not up, the area is not cleared and therefore the possibility is that a planned ICBM or Lunar shot has been deferred. ]2. I stated I felt the President should, at an early opportunity, receive a briefing on Soviet long range *defensive* capability, their current air defense capability and the status of the Soviet economy.3. I referred briefly to our estimate of the Cuban situation, the condition of their economy and our operational plans against Cuba.4. I stated that we are watching Venezuela and Ecuador with great care. I gave the President a copy of the November 24th Summary of World Reaction to President Kennedy's Assassination.JAM:mcm
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25 November 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson, November 23rd,about 9:15 a. m. The conversation lasted approximately 15 minutes.1.  The President entered Mr. Bundy's office alone and no one was present during the conversation.2.  The President opened the conversation by recalling a long background of association and friendship with me personally, his respect for the Agency, the fact that on a number of issues that had arisen since I took office as DCI he and I had seen eye to eye, he had complete confidence in me and expressed the wish that I continue in the future exactly as I have in the past.3.  I confirmed my confidence in him, my desire to help and support him in every way and my willingness to continue in the future as I have in recent months.4.  The President then asked of any world developments. I reviewed details of the Checklist with him and explained the institution of the "President's Checklist" with which he was not familiar. I stated that we would continue the publication of the Checklist in the future as we had in the past.5.  It was agreed that for the next few days I would brief the President in the morning personally and that senior staff officers would brief the President's staff each morning as I have in the past. The President asked that any matters of urgent importance be brought to his attention at any time, day or night. He designated no intermediary.
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6. At 12:30 I went to the President's office in the Executive Office Building to tell him of the information received from Mexico City. In attendance was Mr. Bundy. Following this I had a brief exchange with President Eisenhower who was visiting with President Johnson at the time.7. This evening I called Secretary Rusk and reviewed with him the information received from Mexico City, most particularly the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban Embassy by Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald. I explained to Rusk the information that we had transmitted to the FBI and to the authorities in Dallas. Rusk had not known of these developments prior to my communication with him.8. I offered the assistance on the part of Mrs. McCone and me personally and also the Agency in connection with the appropriate handling of official visitors arriving from all over the world who might overwhelm the State Department's capacity. Rusk appreciated this offer and said he would call on me. He further said that there may be visitors we would like to meet with and, if so, he would make appropriate arrangements. He indicated that he intended to avoid having all incoming visitors appear as guests of the United States. Each had their own embassy to take care of them, however, he thought there might be some obligations in which I could be helpful. He said that following the Arlington service on Monday afternoon he would hold a reception in the Department which would be in the form of some kind of a buffet and this would be the extent of any planned activities. He thought it was quite probable that the President would meet with several Heads of States at various times on Tuesday and Wednesday.JAM:mcm(tape)
[104-10306-10020.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992General Carter:Here is your written message. I have taken no ac trous,Welder![signature]
[104-10306-10020.pdf — page 1]
# SECRETURGENT30 October 1962MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall S. CarterAt the Executive Committee meeting this morning, the President directed as follows:1. CIA do everything possible to insure no refugee or emigre provocative actions against Cuba are undertaken with or without our knowledge during the next several days. The Miami station and the MONGOOSE Task Force should be alerted to exercize every precaution to see that no unauthorized attempts are made. This should be done without discussion or disclosure to the refugee groups.2. CIA should attempt to estop Alpha 66 actions during the next several days. The President was informed by DCI we have no contact with or control over Alpha 66. DCI was instructed to attempt through every resource available to influence Alpha 66 to stand down operations during the next several days.3. The activities of Operation MONGOOSE are to be stopped during the next several days and therefore all prior approvals for sabotage, infiltrations, guerrilla activities, caching of arms are to be temporarily suspended. The direction of Operation MONGOOSE will be reconsidered after current negotiations are completed.NOTE: After the meeting McCone, Bundy and the AG discussed the approved plan of sabotaging Cuban ships or shipping (Item 2-B of Lansdale's memorandum of 10/26) and it was the opinion of Bundy, DCI and the AG that these operations should be suspended for the next several days.NOTE: General Lansdale was informed by DCI by grey phone of 1, 2 and 3 above - 10/30 at 11:00 A.M.4. The President requested that all the principals who are attending Executive Committee meetings and those in the Departments who were in intimate contact with the Committee's procedures and decisions not contact anyone of the Press for the next several days. Press contacts are to be made by Salinger and Sylvester and a representative of State. Any necessary Press contacts by CIA, and these must be kept at a very minimum, perhaps should be made by Col. Grogan. (This was not mentioned in the Executive Committee meeting.)SECRET
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# SECRET30 October 1962URGENTMEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall S. CarterAt the Executive Committee meeting this morning, the President directed as follows:1. CIA do everything possible to insure no refugee or emigre provocative actions against Cuba are undertaken with or without our knowledge during the next several days. The Miami station and the MONGOOSE Task Force should be alerted to exercise every precaution to see that no unauthorised attempts are made. This should be done without discussion or disclosure to the refugee groups.2. CIA should attempt to estop Alpha 66 actions during the next several days. The President was informed by DCI we have no contact with or control over Alpha 66. DCI was instructed to attempt through every resource available to influence Alpha 66 to stand down operations during the next several days.3. The activities of Operation MONGOOSE are to be stopped during the next several days and therefore all prior approvals for sabotage, infiltrations, guerrilla activities, caching of arms are to be temporarily suspended. The direction of Operation MONGOOSE will be reconsidered after current negotiations are completed.NOTE: After the meeting McCone, Bundy and the AG discussed the approved plan of sabotaging Cuban ships or shipping (Item 2-B of Lansdale's memorandum of 10/26) and it was the opinion of Bundy, DCI and the AG that these operations should be suspended for the next several days.NOTE: General Lansdale was informed by DCI by grey phone of 1, 2 and 3 above - 10/30 at 11:00 Α.Μ.4. The President requested that all the principals who are attending Executive Committee meetings and those in the Departments who were in intimate contact with the Committee's procedures and decisions not contact anyone of the Press for the next several days. Press contacts are to be made by Salinger and Sylvester and a representative of State. Any necessary Press contacts by CIA, and these must be kept at a very minimum, perhaps should be made by Col. Grogan. (This was not mentioned in the Executive Committee meeting.)
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13-00000SECRETThe above has been communicated to you by telephone. This memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementa- tion by you.![signature]JOHN A. McCONEDirectorJAM/mfbOrig & 3cc to addresseelcc - DCI chronolcc - DCI #5 file- 2 -
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SECRETThe above has been communicated to you by telephone. This memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementation by you.![signature of JOHN A. McCONE]JOHN A. McCONEDirector- 2 -
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SECRET-EYES ONLYNovember 14, 1962MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter, DDCIAttached is a copy of a memorandum for my file outlining policy decision in connection with the Cuban prisoner transaction. In your absence this memorandum was discussed with Messrs. Helms, Houston, Miskovsky and McManus, and upon receiving final approval from higher authority at 1:45, Mr. Houston was instructed by me to initiate appropriate actions.It is exceedingly important that great care be exercised to minimize the publicity and to emphasize humanitarian interest on the part of the United States Government in securing the release of the prisoners. Both the President and the Attorney General are anxious that the explanations given the Cuban Families Committee be handled with great care. I agree with this and urge that extreme caution be taken to avoid attribution or CIA implication in this matter.SIGNED:John A. McConeDirectorAttachmentJAM:at1 cc - DCI Chronocc - DCI Memoranda1 cc - Memo for the RecordSECRET-EYES ONLY