Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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13-00000EYES ONLYSECRETCOPY2 May 1960MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - ActionSUBJECT : Liaison with United States' Agencies on JMARC Activities1. This memorandum contains information for the Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - Action.2. The attached chart on liaison with other agencies of the United States' Government on JMARC activities is restricted to those contacts that are made on a regular basis, such as the weekly policy meeting with the Department of State, and to offices which, we must contact quite frequently to solicit their support, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service.3. As you know, infrequent contacts are made at various other levels of the Executive Branch including:a. Brigadier General Cushman, Vice President Nixon's military assistant.b. NSC 5412 Representatives.c. Certain United States' Senators and Representatives, particularly Senator George Smathers of Florida.4. In the early stages of JMARC we had almost daily contact with Rear Admiral S. B. Renkin, USN, who was the action officer on the movement of two radio transmitters and construction of the broadcasting facility on Swan Island.5. Through Raymond Millard (Mallard?), the Agency is in close touch with CINCLANT at Norfolk. Robert Reynolds, Deputy Chief, WH/4, has briefed selected senior officers on JMARC 4. Mr. Reynolds is the designated CIA alternate for the CINCLANT force under provisions of the Contingency Operations Plan for Cuba.Attachment:Chart mentioned in paragraph 2.J. D. ESTERLINEChief, WH/4SECRETEYES ONLY332
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13-00000SECRETEYES ONLYOFFICE NATURE OF DISCUSSION CIA REPRESENTATIVE COPY FREQUENCYSTATE DEPARTMENTOffice Inter-American Affairs (ARA) Policy Col. J. C. King Weekly(Mr. Rubottom)Cuba Working Group (State, USIA) Overt Programs Robert Whedbee Daily(Chaired by Ambassador Mallory)Consular & Security Affairs Passports for Aliens Mr. Pennington (OS) As required(Mr. John Haynes)Office of Intelligence & Research "Talent" Matters E. A. Stanulis As required(Ambassador J. Lampton Berry)Inter-departmental Defector Committee Cuban "Defectors" Robert Whedbee As requiredLatin America Task Force Program Coordination Paul E. Oberst Weekly(Chaired by John Hill (ARA)DEFENSE DEPARTMENTOffice of Special Operations Defense Support E. A. Stanulis As required(Capt. Burns B. Spore, USN) Robert Young (CC)Office of Special Operations Briefing J. D. Esterline Weekly(Capt. Burns B. Spore, USN)Collateral Support Section, Cover Robert Young (CC) As RequiredOffice of Naval Intelligence(Cdr. Frank Day, USN)Operations Branch, Collection Cover Robert Young (CC) As requiredDivision, ACSI (Army)(Col. Stewart McKinney)SECRETEYES ONLYContinued
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13-00000SECRETEYES ONLYCOPYOFFICE NATURE OF DISCUSSIÓN CIA REPRESENTATIVE FREQUENCYUNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCYDirector, Voice of America Coordination David A. Phillips Weekly(Henry Loomis)IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICEOffice of the Director U. S. Entry of Cubans Mr. Pennington (OS) As required(Mr. Hennessey)SECRETEYES ONLY334
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# Appendix EAttack on Petroleum Refinery atSantiago de Cuba13-14 March 1961
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13-0000020914 MAR 61BEARIKBELL 15'DO/P, COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, OC & BELL %CMAR 14 09202 61• OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATEIN 3307IM BELL KOLA WAVE CITEIZIP, TAGDAR COMMOFOLLOWI. 3 RECEIVED FROM BARBARA AT 146638Z; NR4 140600Z373 BTRE YOUR MSG NUMBER 49. CAJICK SENDS.TEAUP DEBARKED 130945R MARCH. SNEAKED PAST SEVERALCAYO RATON: ISLAND COVERED WITH BRUSH AND TREES.ERY WITHOUT DISTURBING OCCUPANTS TWOTO MAINLAND NEAR REFINERY ENCOUNTERING STORMBACKED OUT IN WATER TO 256 YARDS FROM REFINERY FOR CLEANXITS INIRED 200 ROUNDSCRACK AND CAUSING BRIGHT EXPLOSIONON DEPARTCU BY FAKT TEACUP HUGGING BEACHWE DARKENED-AFRMIELLY DONALEDLOSIONSORIGEZDATTAL MANSION FIRING AND WAS DROPPED INTO WATER. MOTORS ON
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13-00000CLASSIFIED MESSAGE RU 3343PAGECAT CUIT BUT RESTARTED IN FEW MINUTES. AT HARBOR ENTRANCE ATAST 350 CALIBRES AND 126 MILIMETER ENGAGED US PLUS PLENTY SMALLIS AND ONE STRONG SEARCHLIGHT. LEFT SEARCHLIGHT POINTINGOWN INTO WATER AND SILENCED 20 MILLIMETER BUT 50'S FOLLOWEDACUP OUT TO SEA WHERE BARBARA J MADE FINE PICK UP RIGHT ONATION OF COMPLETED AT 130400R.[Tune screwed up?]See Pirl2. AT NO TIME DID TEACUP FIRE AT ANY EXCEPT THOSE OBVIOUSLYAMING ABOUT PREVENTING TEACUPS DEPARTURE.TEACUP. COOLEST SEEN BY CACICH TO DATE. SUGGEST FOUR OFMATERIAL AND HOS COULD USE THEM IN PRE-INVASIONMINUS ONE IF FOUR TEA'S ORGANIZED AROUND THEM.END OF MESSAGE336
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13-00000Appendix FRichard M. Nixon's Memorandumon Meeting with Fidel Castro,19 April 1959
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RICHARD NIΧΟΝLA CASA PACIFICASAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIAJuly 27, 1979I am enclosing a copy of the summary of my conversation with Fidel Castro in 1959, as you requested in your letter of July 19th.With best wishes,Sincerely,Dr. Jack B. PfeifferCIA HistorianWashington, D.C. 20505enclosure, 4 pages337
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13-00000COPYCOPYCOPYCONFIDENTIALApril 19, 1959Summary of conversation between The Vice President andFidel Castro:When Castro arrived for the conference he seemedsomewhat nervous and tense. He apparently felt that he hadnot done as well on "Meet the Press" as he had hoped. Hewas particularly concerned about whether he might have irri-tated Senator Smathers for the comments he made with regardto him. I reassured him at the beginning of the conversa-tion that "Meet the Press" was one of the most difficult pro-grams a public official could go on and that he had done ex-tremely well -- particularly having in mind the fact that hehad the courage to go on in English rather than to speakthrough a translator.The subjects we discussed were no different fromthose on which he had made public statements on severalother occasions. A brief summary, however, might be of in-terest, particularly in view of the comments I made with re-gard to the positions he took.I suggested at the outset that while I understood somereasonable time might elapse before it would be feasible tohave elections it would nevertheless be much better from hisviewpoint if he were not to state so categorically that itwould be as long as four years before elections would be held.I urged him to state his position as being in favor of havingelections at the earliest possible date and that four yearswould be the maximum amount of time that would elapse beforeelections were scheduled. He went into considerable detailas he had in public with regard to the reasons for not hold-ing elections, emphasizing particularly that "the people didnot want elections because the elections in the past had pro-duced bad government."He used the same argument that he was simply reflect-ing the will of the people în justifying the executions of warcriminals and his overruling the acquittal of Batista's avia-tors. In fact he seemed to be obsessed with the idea thatit was his responsibility to carry out the will of the peopleCOPYCOPYCOPY338
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COPY-2-COPYwhatever it might appear to be at a particular time. It was also apparent that as far as his visit to the United States was concerned his primary interest was "not to get a change in the sugar quota or to get a government loan but to win support for his policies from American public opinion."It was this almost slavish subservience to prevailing majority opinion -- the voice of the mob -- rather than his naive attitude toward Communism and his obvious lack of understanding of even the most elementary economic principles which concerned me most in evaluating what kind of a leader he might eventually turn out to be. That is the reason why I spent as much time as I could trying to emphasize that he had the great gift of leadership, but that it was the responsibility of a leader not always to follow public opinion but to help to direct it in the proper channels -- not to give the people what they think they want at a time of emotional stress but to make them want what they ought to have.I pointed out that it might be very possible that the people of Cuba were completely disillusioned as far as elections and representative government were concerned but that this placed an even greater responsibility on him to see that elections were held at the very earliest date, and thereby to restore the faith of the people in democratic processes. Otherwise, the inevitable result would be the same dictatorship against which he and his followers had fought so gallantly. I used the same argument with regard to freedom of the press, the right to a fair trial before an impartial court, judge and jury, and on other issues which came up during the course of the conversation. In every instance he justified his departure from democratic principles on the ground that he was following the will of the people. I, in my turn, tried to impress upon him the fact that while we believe în majority rule that even a majority can be tyrannous and that there are certain individual rights which a majority should never have the power to destroy.I frankly doubt that I made too much impression upon him but he did listen and appeared to be somewhat receptive. I tried to cast my appeal to him primarily in terms of how this place in history would be affected by the courage and statesmanship he displayed at this time. I emphasized that the easy thing to do was to follow the mob, but that the rightCOPYCOPYCOPY339
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thing in the long-run would be better for the people and, of course, better for him as well. As I have already indicated he was incredibly naive with regard to the Communist threat and appeared to have no fear whatever that the Communists might eventually come to power in Cuba. He said that during the course of the revolution there had been occasions when the Communists overplayed their hand and "my people put them in their place." He implied that this would be the situation in the future in the event that the Communists tried to come to power. As a matter of fact, in his attitude toward Communism, both internally and from an international standpoint, he sounded almost exactly like Sukarno had sounded to me when I visited Indonesia in 1953, In our discussions of Communism I again tried to cast the arguments in terms of his own self-interest and to point out that the revolution which he had led might be turned against him and the Cuban people unless he kept control of the situation and made sure that the Communists did not get into the positions of power and influence. On this score I feel I made very little impression, if any.Speaking to him from a personal standpoint I urged him at the earliest possible moment to bring good strong men into his government and to delegate responsibilities to them in the economic and other areas where he presently was making many decisions. I tried to point out that unless he did this he would have a workload which would be so great that he could not provide the leadership and the vision that the Cuban people needed for the great issues. I put as much emphasis as possible on the need for him to delegate responsibility, but again whether I got across was doubtful.It was apparent that while he paid lip service to such institutions as freedom of speech, press and religion hìs primary concern was with developing programs for economic progress. He said over and over that a man who worked in the sugar cane fields for three months a year and starved the rest of the year wanted a job, something to eat, a house and some clothing and didn't care a whit about whether he had freedom along with it. I of course tried to emphasize that here again as a leader of his people, he should try to develop support for policies which could assure economic progress with freedom rather than without it.
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He indicated that it was very foolish for the United States to furnish arms to Cuba or any other Caribbean country. He said "anybody knows that our countries are not going to be able to play any part in the defense of this hemisphere in the event a world war breaks out. The arms governments get in this hemisphere are only used to suppress people as Batista used his arms to fight the revolution. It would be far better if the money that you give to Latin American countries for arms be provided for capital investment." I will have to admit that as far as his basic argument was concerned here I found little that I could disagree with!We had a rather extended discussion of how Cuba could get the investment capital it needed for economic progress. He insisted that what Cuba primarily needed and what he wanted was not private capital but government capital. He gave me some rather confused arguments as to why plants that were licensed and/or owned and operated by the government would serve the best interests of Cuba better than privately owned enterprises. I told him quite bluntly that his best hope as far as the United States was concerned was not in getting more government capital but in attracting private capital. I explained that government capital was limited because of the many demands upon it and the budget problems we presently confronted. I pointed out that private capital on the other hand was expansible and that he would be serving the interests of Cuba far better by adopting policies which would attract it, I pointed out that there was competition for capital throughout the Americas and the world and that it would not go to a country where there was any considerable fear that policies might be adopted which would discriminate against private enterprise. At this point he, at considerable length, tried to explain why he had said and done some of the things which had appeared to be anti-private enterprise up to this time. Here again on this point I doubt if I made too much of an impression.He explained his agrarian reform program in considerable detail justifying it primarily on the ground that Cuba needed more people who were able to buy the goods produced within the country and that it would make no sense to produce more in factories unless the amount of money in the hands of consumers was increased.
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13-00000COPYCOPY-5-COPYHe rather bitterly assailed the United States press for what he called their unfair reporting of the revolution after he came to power. I, of course, tried to explain that speaking from some personal experience, it was necessary to expect and to learn to take criticism both fair and unfair. I would not be surprised if his sensitivity with regard to criticism might eventually lead him to take some rather drastic steps toward curtailing freedom of the press in the future.He also spoke rather frankly about what he felt was a very disturbing attitude on the part of the American press and the American people generally. His argument went along this line: "yours is a great country -- the richest, the greatest, the most powerful in the world. Your people, therefore, should be proud and confident and happy. But everyplace I go you seem to be afraid -- afraid of Communism, afraid that if Cuba has land reform it will grow a little rice and the market for your rice will be reduced -- afraid that if Latin America becomes more industrialized American factories will not be able to sell as much abroad as they have previously. You in America should not be talking so much about your fear of what the Communists may do in Cuba or in some other country in Latin America, Asia or Africa -- you should be talking more about your own strength and the reasons why your system is superior to Communism or any other kind of dictatorship."In my turn of course I tried to explain that we welcomed the industrialization and development of Latin America, that one of our best customers was Canada, for example, which was highly industrialized and that as economic conditions improved in any country this was not only good for that country but good for us as well. I also tried to put our attitude toward Communism in context by pointing out that Communism was something more than just an idea but that its agents were dangerously effective in their ability to grasp power and to set up dictatorships. I also emphasized, however, that we realized that being against Communism was not enough -- that it was even more important that we make it by our actions, by what we say and what we do abroad that we convince people every place that we want to help them achieve economic progress in a climate of freedom.COPYCOPY342COPY
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13-00000COPYCOPY-6-COPYSeveral other subjects were discussed but none that I think are worth noting at this point. Significantly enough, he did not raise any questions about the sugar quota nor did he engage in any specific discussions with regard to economic assistance. His primary concern seemed to be to convince me that he was sincere, that he was not a Communist and that his policies had the support of the great majority of the Cuban people.My own appraisal of him as a man is somewhat mixed. The one fact we can be sure of is that he has those indefinable qualities which make him a leader of men. Whatever we may think of him he is going to be a great factor in the development of Cuba and very possibly in Latin American affairs generally. He seems to be sincere. He is either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline -- my guess is the former, and as I have already implied his ideas as to how to run a government or an economy are less developed than those of almost any world figure I have met in fifty countries.But because he has the power to lead to which I have referred, we have no choice but at least to try to orient him in the right direction.COPYCOPYCOPY343
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# Appendix GMemorandum for DCI[for Briefing Vice President Nixon],29 Feb 60.
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13-00000SECRET28 Mar 6029 February 1960MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceVIA: Deputy Director (Plans) RubySUBJECT: What we are doing in Cuba.1. This memorandum is for information only, and is for the Director's   use at meeting with the Vice President on 2 March 1960.2. IntelligenceSome highlights of recent intelligence which justify the actions beingtaken or planned against Cuba are:a. Rapid build-up of events which indicate slide toward Communist orbitand intensified efforts implement internal programs towards establishmentCommunist dictatorship. Public feeling among middle and upper classCubans and students has reached new high on Commimist issue and numerousstation contacts ranging from left to right have declared that situationcannot be tolerated, and that they are now convinced Communists controlCuba.b. The Chief of Cuban intelligence activities in Mexico is on a tripthrough Central America to initiate activities for the establishment ofa pro-Castro revolutionary movement in each country aimed at the over-throw of existing government. Cuban Embassies serve as cover.c. Considerable intelligence has been received of Cuban attempts toestablish an operational relationship with guerrilla groups in Colombiawith ultimate goal of overthrowing the Colombian government.d. French intelligence reports "Che" Guevara is talking of includingMartinique and Guadeloupe in a Caribbean Federation headed by him.344
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13-00000MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceVIA: Deputy Director (Plans)29 February 1960SUBJECT: What we are doing in Cuba.1. This memorandum is for information only, and is for the Director's   use at meeting with the Vice President on 2 March 1960.2. IntelligenceSome highlights of recent intelligence which justify the actions being taken or planned against Cuba are:a. Rapid build-up of events which indicate slide toward Communist orbit and intensified efforts implement internal programs towards establishment Communist dictatorship. Public feeling among middle and upper class Cubans and students has reached new high on Communist issue and numerous station contacts ranging from left to right have declared that situation cannot be tolerated, end that they are now convinced Communists control Cuba.b. The Chief of Cuban intelligence activities in Mexico is on a trip through Central America to initiate activities for the establishment of a pro-Castro revolutionary movement in each country aimed at the overthrow of existing government. Cuban Embassies serve as cover.c. Considerable intelligence has been received of Cuban attempts to establish an operational relationship with guerrilla groups in Colombia with ultimate goal of overthrowing the Colombian government.d. French intelligence reports "Che" Guevara is talking of including Martinique and Guadeloupe in a Caribbean Federation headed by him.345
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13-000008 March 1960MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceVIA: Deputy Director (Plans)SURJECT: What we are doing in Cuba.1. This memorandum is for information only, and is for the Director's   use at the NSC 5412 Representatives Meeting which will consider the Cuba   covert action program paper. (This paper was used for Mr. Nixon's briefing.)2. IntelligenceSome highlights of recent intelligence which justify the actions beingtaken or planned against Cuba are:a. Rapid build-up of events which indicate slide toward Communist orbitand intensified efforts implement internal programs towards establishmentCommunist dictatorship. Public feeling among middle and upper classCubans and students has reached new high on Communist issue and numerousstation contacts ranging from left to right have declared that situationcannot be tolerated, and that they are now convinced Communists controlCuba.b. The Chief of Cuban intelligence activities in Mexico is on a tripthrough, Central America to initiate activities for the establishment ofa pro-Castro revolutionary movement in each country aimed at the overthrow of existing government. Cuban Embassies serve as cover.c. Considerable intelligence has been received of Cuban attempts toestablish an operational relationship with guerrilla groups in Colombiawith ultimate goal of overthrowing the Colombian government.d. French intelligence reports "Che" Guevara is talking of includingMartiniqua and Guadoloupe in a Caribbean Federation headed by him.SECRETIP: JHP 22 Jan 74346
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TOP SECRETSource References*Volume IIIPart IBackground## A. Watching from the Sidelines1.  State, Amembassy Havana: Memo from V. Lansing Collins, 17 Nov 48, sub: Fidel Castro Ruz. C.2.  Memo for Chief, WHD from COS Havana, 20 Dec 55, sub: Fidel Castro Ruz. S. (ΗΚΗ-A-2261)3.  *Ibid.*4.  State, Memo for Mr. Braddock from [Army?] Attache, 14 Oct 57, sub: Fidel Castro Ruz. (Memo No. 185.) S.5.  State, Memo from Vinton Chapin, 19 Jun 57, sub: Biographic Information Concerning Fidel Castro Ruz. (Memo No. 869). c.6.  David R. McLean, *Western Hemisphere Division, 1946-65*, Vol. I, 191-192 (DDO/HP 324, 2 Dec 73). S.7.  Letter to General His Excellency Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar from Allen W. Dulles, 7 Jul 56. (ER-8-4007/a). U.8.  Memo (no addressee) from Lyman B. Kirkpatick, 19 Nov 57, sub: How to Bring Peace in Cuba. S.9.  *Ibid.*10. Beatrice B. Berle and Travis B. Jacobs (eds), *Navigating the Rapids, 1918-1971*, (Ν.Υ., 1973), p. 681. U.* Unless otherwise specified all sources are SECRET. Copies or notes of all sources cited are filed under HS/CSG 2632.