Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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14-00000104-10231-104182025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRET11 January 1962MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of OperationsSUBJECT : PM Case Officers in Contact with Segments of the CRCa. MIRO CARDONA, President of the CRC - periodic contact with Mr. Glenn J. Fransworth.b. CARLOS HEVIA, Naval Advisor - Gordon Campbell and Lloyd Lindland.c. HIGINIO DIAZ (Nino), Military Advisor - Eugene Norwinski.d. HUMBERTO NUNEZ, Military Coordinator of Frente Anti-Communista Cristiano - Thomas M. Hewitt.e. JOSE FERNANDEZ BADUE and CUCHO FLEITES, MDC - Thomas Hewitt.f. CARLOS RODRIGUEZ, 30th Nov Group - Gordon C. Jung.g. CESAR BARO, MRR - Thomas C. Clines.h. RAUL MENDEZ PIREZ and EUIS SANCHEZ, Rescate - Thomas Hewitt.i. ERNESTO D'ESPAIGNE, Military Sector- Eugene Norwinski.j. OSVALDO SOTO, 20 May - Thomas M. Hewitt.![signature of GLENN J. FARISWORTH]GLENN J. FARISWORTHChief, PMSECRET
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14-00000104-10232-100042025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 199210 October 1961MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. MIRO Cardona on 6 October1. Dr. MIAC arrived about 9:50 a. m, for the meeting we had set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced. As during the first meeting, she remained outside in the car. Our meeting lasted until 12:00 noon.2. Firet, Dr. MIRO handed me a note in tonghand listing the topies dieeussed with me on 5 October. These points are:a. Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council,b. A propaganda campaign should be waged by the Council aimed at:(1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Koy West.(2) Cubans in Miami and other U. 3. areas by:(a) Subsidizing *Diario de las Americas*.(b) Contracting for time on radio stations.(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the Operacion Grieta."c. Underground Activities.(1) Provision of monthly funds to Council for procuring Cuban pesce to send to the seven-odd resistance groups in Cuba through reliable channels (such as previously sent through the Italian embassy).
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(2) Commando action as outlined in plan presented to me on 6 Cctober.3. Commando PlanThen Dr. MIRO handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine action prepared by his military collaborators, whom he named as Colonel Manuel VAKELA Castro, an officer of the Academy, Captain Enrique DESPAIONE, and Colonel (fnu) MONTBLACUDO. He stated that they were of the BAROUIN group and had boon prisonera.With respect to the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba, he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part of them here, part in Cuba, He reiterated that a commando operation was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and in exile as well as to conduct sabotage that would further weakon Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation U. 9. he'p would be necessary in providing weapons, aramo, dermolitions, equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to have merit, that I arrange to have someone meet with his military mea to work out the detalis. After all preparations had been made and materie! provided, etc, the operation would be purely a Cuban affair. (NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompson at our ne eting at 15:30 on 6 October for transmission.)4. Request for Arme, etc. to send to EscambrayDr.MIRO remarked that over a month ago he had made a request to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro insurgente in the Escambray, but to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly, "I ask but never hear an answer. " He said that the fightere there should be supported. Dr. MIRO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and a means for delivery of the arms. Osvaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the Escambray group.COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?5. Information on Arms Received by Castro RegimeDr. MIHC handed me a long report which he said was brought to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the U. 3. at the time of President FRONDITI's visit.* He said the Ambassador would not divulge the source of the inforination but commented, "You wil know."*Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.
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SecretDr. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy of the figures given of planes, guns, etc. received from the Soviet bloc (and Italy and Canada) but even if the figures were exaggerated 100 per cent, they would still be impressive.He added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300,000 being trained to use them while the economy continues to deteriorate. Perhaps only half the militia would be effective. But that is sizeable. Thus, he said, the longer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the greater will be the task. "We must act soon, vigorously and effectively, to insure victory. Another defeat would be disastrous and would make Cubans, Latin Americans and others believe Castro to be invincible. Then would come accommodations and even worse, the implanting of Castro-backed regimes in the hemisphere. And the U. S. would suffer worst of all, being discredited for defeat and "guilt of interference." "In the UN no nation would stand beside the U. S."6. Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and Establish a Government on Cuban SoilDr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro would never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the sabotage, commando raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating economy, and that it was inconceivable to establish a government-in-exile for nothing would come of it; that the only solution for defeating the Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Council to go to Cuba and establish a government on Cuban soil, ask recognition by all friendly countries and military assistance of its principal ally, the U. S., and that the U.S. be ready to intervene immediately with its forces. "This would all have to take place in a matter of 48 hours, otherwise it would fail. I recognize that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many risks, many may be killed. As for myself, I don't care if I die. I have lost all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner." He reiterated that all must be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation, everything must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to seize a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Guantanamo, and immediately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition (and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. S. assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in adequate strength to ensure victory.
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SECRETBefore such an action is undertaken, the enemy must be softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council and te unifying efforts.Dr. MIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government levels. He proposed that ho might elaborato a plan with his military collaboratorn and I suggested that he do thie so that it might be examined and considered.Dr. MIRO doclared that he was convinced that this Communist dagger in the side of the States could only be eradicated by such action, that the U.8. to and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda, sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention in Cuba, but that I the U. E. goes to the aid of a friendly revolutionary regime established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud."I have no personal political ambitions," declared biIRO. "I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose miesten is to unify the anti-Castro elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team len't con- sidered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must establish itself on Cuban soll, and soon. Time is against us. ""The unta del Este agreement will backfire against the U. S. f Castro is allowed to remain in Cuba. In a year, after the politicos of the countries re- coiving U. 9. aid have gotten their hands on U. S. gold, they will say, 'Thanks to Castro, we got this.' And they will spend it as in the past with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the people. "7. Views about the Judges and LawyersI queried Dr. MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and lawyers and their future status. He said he hoped that they could all reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He de- clared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council and MIRC and VARONA. Dr. URO declared that he, as Prime Minister in the early days of the Castro government, had named LABAU to the
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# SECRETSupreme Court, but that now he considered LABAU unfit to hold any judicial position.## 8. Members of the Revolutionary CouncilDr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council on 10 October. I asked what elements now composed it and what he proposed to add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo:Roscate30 de NoviembroMRRAccion Democratica20 de MayoAAA IndependienteMDCMontecristiHe said he had invited to join:MRPUnidad Revolucionariaand awaited their reply.He would also like to have the Workers, Students, and the Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He believes Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate should be excluded, but that all other groups should be brought together under the Council.He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO).## 9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with CubaDr. MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba (Julio AMOFDO) vra ordered to return to Havana (he had been vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a Secretary of the Argentino Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO today, and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night5
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from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIROto go to Buenos Aires to arouse anti-Castro sentiment of the people,Inasmuch as some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent.(FERNANDEZ said he had already written MIRO a letter.) MIRO says,"Of course, I cannot go. I have the Consejo meeting on the 10th.Furthermore, I am going to New York on October 11th or 12th for theSIP (Socieded Interamericana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted12 minutes to address the meeting."10. MIRO to attend Homage to LACERDA (Brazilian who    Precipitatod QUADKOS' resignation) on October 15Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (after11 and 12 October SIP meeting) until October 15th to attend the homagefor LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brasil. MIROprobably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clarkof his location.I commented that I would probably remain in Washington nextweek in view of his plans, but that I might go to New York City to meetwith him; if so, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meetingtime and place through Clark.11. Propaganda CommissionI asked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organizationand structure of the Propaganda Commission. He stated that it is out-side the Consejo and not under his direct control, although the Councilaccountant has been passing funds to it. He said CATRRILLO had resignedas head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERO to handleit. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda.12. MIRO'S Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO    being Kecognized as Head of a Provisional GovernmentI asked Dr. MIRO if he believed that there were many anti-Castro Cubans (both la and out of Cuba) who lavored PRIO, or the headof the Supreme Court to be the provisional president if a government wereto be established on Cuban soll. Dr. MIRO declared that the revolutionis a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any formerregime. The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He de-
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nounced PRIO's activitica against the Council and its efforts to unify the anti-Castro elemente. He said that the people should be given an opportunity to elect their chief of state after Castro's overthrow and reestablishment of ordor in the island.13. Offices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario)When questioned about his business and private telephones, MIRO said, "The business phone is also in my house. I have no office except in my house, but that phone to always busy (Jefferson 3-4680). So use the other phone (JEfferson 4-2751) when you wish to call me.""I need to have a small office somewhere away from my home because all the activities there are driving my wife crazy. I want to find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation - merely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and one for meetings. of the Council, etc. The FRD had a place but at that place also was the press, the refugee center, etc. R would not be satisfactory. The FRD is now practically dead. It was the forerunner of the Consejo as the unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance."14. MIRO's Views on Coordinating the Activities of Other Exile GroupsAfter Dr. MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groups outside the Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), etc., I said that I understood that some of these elements were unwilling to function under the Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that an Activity Committee might be organized with a delegate from each of those groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo. This would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in with the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied that this would merely set up cacther Consejo outside of and parallel to the existing Consejo. I did not pursue this further, not having enough background of these organisations to be able to discuss tho matter effectively.15. Telephone Conversation with MIRO on 7 OctoberBefore my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 Cctober, I telephoned to Dr. MIRO from the airport. He appreciated the call and asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by
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SECRETthe ALABAU Lawyers' group in proclaiming Julio CARCERAN (one of the chief justices in exile) as "President of Cuba at War." He expressed his indignation at this unilateral "political" move by ALABAU and his adherents among the exiled lawyers and judges. He added his best wishes to me and reminded me that he would probably go to New York on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa) meeting. I replied that I would appreciate if he would contact Clark after his arrival to give his location in New York City, and that Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, if this seemed desirable. I suggested that in future phone conversations I would be known as JUANITO. He agreed with pleasure that this would be a good procedure. I wished him Godspeed and he replied likewise to me.16. CommentDuring these first two meetings I endeavored to establish myself favorably with Dr. MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing up details of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals. I listened, asked various questions, and he talked at length.In future meetings, after I have gained further background and have more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be required.
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRET20 October 1961MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. Miro in New York City on October 16, 1961The meeting with Dr. Miro on October 16 was postponed from 10:00 until such time as his audience terminated with Cardinal Spellman. He arrived at my room at about 10:50. He declared that the Cardinal had wept when he learned the details of the suffering of the Cubans at the hands of Castro; declared that the Archbishop of Miami wasn't doing enough for the Cuban refugees; that the U.S. wasn't doing enough for them; that Castro must be overthrown. Miro told the Cardinal that in all Latin America there were going to be organized acts of sympathy for the Cuban sufferers. The Cardinal said he would say a Mass for them on October 17. He invited Miro to see him at any time.Miro answered my query as to the Lacerda affairs by stating that it was very successful; 2,800 people were inside the auditorium and another 1,000 people outside; that Lacerda had received such applause.The Inter-American Press Association affairs also had given an opportunity to present the Cuban tragedy. He said that he (Miro) had told how Fidel had shot 31 people in September alone, and other details; had described how Communist was gaining ground day by day; that in Cuba they have installed a powerful radio station broadcasting to Latin America; that ten countries have broken with Cuba, but Argentina has not; that everybody is confused.He informed me that as for the documents relating to the Cuban plots in Argentina, the Argentine military men came to talk to Varona, and he gave them some documents that have no importance. The officers told Varona textually "We have no confidence in the Argentine Foreign Office," nevertheless, when they arrived there, they turned over the documents to the Foreign Office. But these documents had no importance; they were merely to demonstrate that there had been an extradition of documents, and that they were originals. The important documents are held by Varona in Miami.Miro said they also visualized another act involving Lacerda in Miami, but that his "administrative" budget really does not provide for propaganda activities (such as the Current SIP and Lacerda affairs). I countered that it was considered that his budget was sufficient for him to conduct more propaganda activities; obviously nothing on a major scale - but some things.
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-2-Miro declared that internal propaganda and clandestine action in Cuba could not be delayed any longer. I agreed on the necessity, and that it was believed that measures are necessary to forment in Cuba the opposition to Castro. "The people are against himi" declared Miro. "But increase it," I answered. Miro then stated "If this action doesn't stem from the Consejo (CRC) - not as an independent agency, but in close contact with you (the Agency), - what we forment is a complete disorder in Cuba, and afterwards no government can succeed; secondly, if we do not have a central plan, and carry it out well in a more or less limited period of time, there will merely be more shooting of people (prisoners) by Fidel.""And this is my insistence. How I am afraid to go to Miami. What am I to tell the people there? What do I do? Converse? Meanwhile the Agency keeps on infiltrating people into Cuba but disconnected from the Council. I was told in my conversation with the President to amplify the membership in the Consejo. I have endeavored to do that. In the Council there are other great organizations - delegates from each of the organizations - that ask me for arms, dynamite, things, and I am here powerless. Therefore I must work with you people in order to see how we may hand over arms and a plan of action so they may see that this is not merely an endless series of sabotage actions." I replied, "Well, I believe that a well-worked-out plan that shows good chances of success will be favorably considered.""How about arms for the Escambray?" asked Miro. I replied that it was my understanding that arms for the Escambray could only be landed on the North Coast; how then would they get to the Escambray? Miro said that the boat which had made many trips (working for YOU), would have to establish communication and find out when they would pick up the arms; what cannot be done is abandon Cavaldo Ramirez in his situation of anguish because he is the only real regional focus of resistance that there is there, and he has been really left in a desperate situation for three months.I interposed that there seemed some question about the paper from Ramirez asking for arms, whether it was the real thing. "Perfectly identified" replied Miro. "He assured that it is perfectly identified and requests have come to me through different channels asking for these arms. I am still waiting now for a month and a half. All you have to do is tell us the means of delivery, the people to contact and then deliver to our Cubans the arms, dynamite, fuses. I am still waiting, and criticism (of Cubans against inaction) increases daily.""All the delegations of revolutionary groups in the Council ask me for arms and means for fighting. But I cannot provide them anything. Meanwhile the Agency is infiltrating people into Cuba without counting on the Consejo for anything. This puts it into an absurd position - merely a "council painted on the wall." I have said, "Look for someone else if I am not considered able to do the job but we must work. I have confidence in the Agency, but I cannot work in this fashion."