Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10232-10018.pdf — page 12]
SEOMET-13-I told Lr. Piro that I was anxious to work out some manner of linking these groups with ir. Kiro and the Council, without having to channel direction and funds through Dr. Miro, since these groups are now function- ing well under existing arrangerents.Dr. Viro aid he would te cleased to meet with them outside of the Council, and they say continue to function as collateral organizations independently; but that they realize that they have one direction. Dr. Viro added that like the independent magistrates with their attitude - they are injuring the Council.Dr. Piro Carented that he wanted the magistrates to have an election and select their leader according to the results of a vote. He reiterated that all the collateral organisations rust operate within the orbit of the Council; and that he would be glad to discuss with them their opinions just as he as & professor had done with students--often tires resulting in excellent ideas and viewpoints.Then I rectioned that I had read in one of our magazines a laudatory item describing his dekonstrated capabilities as a rediátor between political groups and individuals.Dr. Miro again returned to his belief that funds of all organizationa should funnel through the Council because every Cuban has a sense of sc011 that inclènes b to go where he knows the money is dispensed; that this is sad but true; and that those who are still outside and hope to get direct support, they knew that the money was here (in his hands), would core running without urging. He then said that he had seven hundred dollars, more or less, for each organization's operating expenses. He concluded by saying that he didn't wish to operate without us (Agency) or without any of the Agency people, but merely desired to pull together the diverse groups and other activities.He then referred to his comersations with Mr. Berle and General Taylor, and his view expressed to them that in the April affair he felt that the Agency ted functioned more or less effectively - soretires their people hac teen "rough", or "tough", but that he had no complaint; that the lack of air cover no doubt caused defeat. khen he had been quarried by resorters and other on specific questions designed to pry secreta out of cir, he had replied, "I didn't see them," or siciliar evasions, and thus had endeavored to be loyal to us.He said his son had been certain that his father would be with the expeditionary force, and, in route to the Bay of Pigs from Guaterala the son had searched for hir on the boats, and was disillussioned because his father wasn't there.SECT
[104-10232-10018.pdf — page 13]
SECRET-14-Again he emphasised his view that the students sent to Latin American countries on propaganda missions should be indoctrinated by people in the Council to prepare them for the cross examining that they would undergo, and thereby prepare them against trans and foolish statertnts; and to insure that no Batista supporters were sent out. He orphazised that one of the first questions asked of these propaganda erissaries would be "hith what roney do you come here?" "khat Yankee organization is behind you." He added, "The people have to be well prepared to answer; just as I had to undergo a succession of penetrating questions when I first went into exile in Argentina ai could answer ther without hesitation because of a clean record."Again ho came back to his urgurent that the collatoral organizations should function through the Council - not "forgetting the Agency, but not being forgotten by the Agency." I told Dr. Miro that I hoped during the course of the week to have a series of conversations in the course of which certain decisions and colutions would be reached that would enable me to sit down with him the following week and work out sore details on propagancia and other ratters.Dr. Miro then asked, "How best can the security of this nation be Insured the Agency dealing directly with these people or working with ther through Firo?" And he emphasized that he was concerned both with the security of Cuba and of the United States, and that these people (Cubans with whom the Agency is dealing directly) at any moment when they felt they were losing out or were not sufficiently paid - would ask for more, and, being Cubans, right to very indiscrete; but that if they had to deal with Miro they sould be obligated to go to hit with their complaints. He said that just as a bee seeking sweets will go to any source, but if there is only one source it will go to that ones and that thus all groups Lust look to the Council.Again Dr. Miro returned to his thesis that sooner or later there rust be var to overthrow Castro, and that Cutans and Azericans must realise this; that as a preliminary the Cubens must carry out sabotage, etc., but just as blockades didn't overthrow France or Mussolini, reither would they cause the fall of Castroj further that if saborage vas conducted with- out being a part of an overall plan of missions, the people inside Cuba would come to react adversely to the sabotage and align themselves with Castro.He then expressed his view that time is teing sadly wasted in trying to bring the Latin American countries into agreerent with the U.S. against Castro, because, unfortunately, many are ruled by dictators and they fear concerted action against themselves, but if the U.S. attacks and destroys Castro they will applaud. Arain he repeated that the Punta del Este agreerent might well cause cany countries to say, "Thank you Fidel, and not, thank you Fr. Kennedy."Dr. Miro emphasized that he wanted to collaborate with us fully. Then the conversation turned to the dissolution of the FRD by Varona, and Dr. Piro declared that this step was difficult for Varona, to take because he
[104-10232-10018.pdf — page 14]
-15-had teen its cheef and in a high position and had thus subriitted to the Council. He declared his esteer for Varoni, a very brusque son but very hobeat. Ho cald Varona had declared with respect to the Argentine docucents that, "They are in Miami. I don't fool like sending ther to Argentina because they don't belong to Argentina. They telong to the thief that is Castro. Argentina has diplomatic relations with Cuba and if it feels like it, will send the documents to Cuba." Varona declared in the SIP that the Argentin military ren had deceived him because, having stated that they didn't trust the Argentine Foreign Office, they nevertheless took to arrentine the three docurents that wero riven to ther ans upon arrival turned her over to the Foreign Office. Viro edded that Varona stated tis clearly in the SIP reeting where two Argentine delegaten wore present. They said, ",ithout rentioning και 68, Doctor, do you declare this before the SIP?" "Yes, I declare it," ho replied, "an't they shut up.Kiro added that Verons had declared last night, "Let then give us arms to finish off with Castro, but give ther to un! Whoever has them, give them to usi Dr. Miro then declared, "Were willing to diser bark, but here wo era just playing: ide and seek."Dr. Viro then referred to his view that Diario de las Azerican should receive a small subsidy; thut sovetimes it published articles unfavorable to the li.s, but that usually, and it subsidized, would eliminate advorce iters,Then I returned to the aubfact of the budget and concern hat ere on the Cowicil mayroil richt also be on H.E.. payroll. Ho repliord that for Octocer to would have thor swear that they were receiving no other Loney and rerarked that rary are on the payroll. He enwerated the different sections - delegations in Latin American countries, each person (two or three at rost in each country; received only enough to live cris without operating funda, lie said each chief of organization in the Council received 1400, "which is very little,"He added that during the past outh with funds left over, he had ser.t to Fexico $3,00 because 30:6 240 peole had arrived there in need and hungry. He said C.I.A. aided with 15,000 and he had sent $3,000 because trey were Cutars. Further, that re had crovide! each organization with $700 for its expenses of sailing, offic a, car, etc., tut that tals wasn't a Fixed sur. He added that whatever ves left over he wanted to send to Cuta t those who re righting there.He ceclared , "As fore they car reduce the budget to the wininum provided that they send funds to Cube; but as Groblers rust be resolved. This tayroll was rorised to re when I was rave president of the Council, and I didn't create it."
[104-10232-10018.pdf — page 15]
SECRET-16-I quarried about the expenses of his recruitment section, and he said be had told Paula to eliminate that item since recruiting is now done elsewhere, but the Military personnel in recruiting should be grouped in the military so that some form of intelligence agency could be maintained to provide information.He affirmed that his military staff really consisted of three officers (Tarele, Domaigre, Pontoagulo) but that they had exrenpon of office, transportation, and secretarial help. As for his social welfare section, he said this had been established by and was necessary for dispensing redidainos, etc., for Cuban refugees here.He declared that he hadn't touched any of the expenses (inherited from F(D)) except operating expenses, in order to give him a margin of funds to meet unforeseen urgent expenses.He said, "I told Paula to eliminate all that could be eliminated; naturally he would have to consult with you." (Agency)Relative to the Naval Section he said he planned to eliminate their expense allowance but not the section itself, because he deems it essential for matters such as sending arms to Cuba, since they cannot be sent by air; and that an office is necessary for them but their expenses must be cut off slowly.As for the Medical Section which had been created before, he said only two "rutilados" (casualties) remained and that the section was to be eliminated. He reiterated that these sections had been created by us (Agency) and that they could only be eliminated gradually.He affirmed that there was left for his use only some eleven or twelve thousand dollars for matters such as attendance at the SIP and Incenia affairs, and such minor propaganda affairs, but that he felt he should have restored to him the funds for propaganda (that had been going through Lestre).I assured him that it was certainly intended that the Propaganda Commission now function under him as the propaganda section of the Council and that if Lestre was not considered to be its chief, that he should designate no one else. He declared that Lestre was in New York, had talked to Varona yesterday, and asked Varona that he should do, to which Varona replied, "Resign."Piro then said he would like to put Conte Aguero in as head of propaganda but that Conte would not agree unless he told him to. Piro cautioned that the staff which Lestre had was very good but that Lestre was no good because he wanted to spend the whole day at a swimming pool. He mentioned Arrel del Cerro, Fermin Peinado, Ruben Dario Kurbaud. He said Angel del Cerro would be a good chief of propaganda, but that for this he would also like a good adviser such as Conte, who really is no expert to talk, but would like to be president. Piro said
[104-10232-10018.pdf — page 16]
SECRET-17-Humberto Medrano, a reporter, also would be good to direct propaganda efforts. He added that testre, chief of propaganda for the film, which no longer exists, is the one who continues receiving the propaganda funds from Paula. He declared that he (Miro) didn't control these funds; that he didn't have anything except a bureaucracy.I told him that I considered this problem of propaganda section and its operators should be corrected right away. He added that he felt that Radio Swan should be put under the propaganda section of the Council; further, that the propaganda section had to quit sending printed matter to the Latin American countries and instead send a format to each country so that they could be printed them with the terms used in each country; in Argentini, in Argentine style, in Brazil, in Portuguese; in Parara, in the manner of speaking in Panama; that such propaganda must be paid for. He affirmed that Humberto Medrano was a great reporter and hard worker and could handle this well; that Fermin Peinado was a fine worker who now is having a struggle to live, but works well at propaganda matters.Again he said that the propaganda funds should pass through his control, and that I would take this up upon my return to Washington. Again he declared that he felt plans must be made for him and the Council to return to Cuba. I said this was a matter for the future.We terminated our meeting with my statement that it would probably not be till the following week when I would return to Miami, after getting matters resolved in Washington. He said that he would probably be returning to Miami on Wednesday after the press luncheon..I added that if it seemed desirable for him to come to Washington on route to Miami, I would call him; that otherwise I would look forward to seeing him in Miami. I said I felt we had covered a lot of ground, and thanked him for giving me so much of his time to our meeting.Again he reiterated that he desired responsibility for all groups and that if he wasn't considered to be the right one, that he was ready and willing to resign. Upon this, we finished and I escorted him to the elevator of the hotel.SECRET
[104-10232-10019.pdf — page 0]
14-00000104-10232-100192025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992# DISPATCH|                            |                                                   |      || -------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------- | ---- || TO                         | CLASSIFICATION                                    |      || Chief of Station, JMWAVE   | SECRET                                            |      || INFO                       | PROCESSING                                        |      || FROM                       | PRO-                                              | ACTV || Chief, WH Division         | X   NO INDEXING REQUIRED                          |      || SUBJCT                     | JMZIP/Operational - Contact with Dr. MIRO Cardona |      || ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES |                                                   |      |For your information, transmitted herewith is a report of contact with subject written by Theodore F. PASSAVOY, and a memo of WH/4 comments.(END OF DISPATCH)Attachment - 1| CROSS REFERENCE TO || ------------------ || CLASSIFICATION     || SECRET             ||                            |                 || -------------------------- | --------------- || DATE TYPED                 | DATE DESPATCHED || 19 Oct 61                  | 20 OCT 1961     || DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER |                 || UFGW-606                   |                 || HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER   |                 || 19-124-25                  |                 |
[104-10232-10019.pdf — page 1]
SEONET10 Octobor 1961MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. MIRO Cardona on 6 October1. Dr. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a. m. for the meeting we had   set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced.   As during the first meeting, che remained outside in the car. Cur   meeting lasted until 12:00 noon.2. Fizet. Dr. MIRO handed me a note in longhand listing the   topics discussed with me on 5 October. These points aro:a. Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency supportshould receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.b. A propaganda campaign should he waged by the Councilaimed at:(1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Key West,(2) Cubans in Milami and other U. S. areas by:(a) Subsidizing Diario de las Americas.(b) Contracting for time on radio stations.(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the OperacionGrieta,"c. Underground Activities.(1) Provision of monthly funde to Council for procuringCuban ревоs to send to the seven-odd resistancegroupe in Cubs through reliable channels (such aspreviously sent through the Italian Embassy).
[104-10232-10019.pdf — page 2]
(2) Commando action as outlined in plan presented to me on 6 October.3. Commando PlanThen Dr. MIRO handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine action prepared by his military collaborators, whom he named as Colonel Manuel VARELA Castro, an officer of the Academy, Captain Enrique DESPAIGNE, and Colonel (inu) MONTEAGUDO. He stated that they were of the BARQUIN group and had been prisoners.With respect to the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba, he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part of them hore, part in Cuba. He reiterated that a commando operation was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro elementa in Cuba and in exile as well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation U. S. help would be necessary in providing weapons, ammo, demolitions, equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to have merit, that I arrange to have someone meet with his military men to work out the details. After all preparations had been made and material provided, etc. the operation would be purely a Cuban affair. (NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompson at our ne eting at 15:30 on 6 October for transmission.)4. Request for Arms, etc. to send to EscambrayDr.MIRO remarked that over a month ago he had made a requost to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly, "I ask but never hear an answer." Fie said that the fighters there should be supported. Dr. MIKO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and a means for delivery of the arms. Osvaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the Eecambray group.COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?5. Information on Arms Received by Castro RegimeDr. MIRO handed me a long report which he said was brought to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the U. S. at the time of Fresident FRONDIZI's visit. He said the Ambassador would not divulge the source of the information but commented, "You will know,"* Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.
[104-10232-10019.pdf — page 3]
SCOTDr. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy of the figures given of planes, guns, etc. received from the Soviet bloc (and Italy and Canada) but even if the figures were exaggerated 100 per cent, they would still be impressive.He added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300, 000 being trained to use them while the economy continues to deteriorate. Perhaps only half the militia would be effective. But that is siseable. Thus, he said, the langer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castre, the greater will be the task. "We must act soon, vigorously and effectively, to Insure victory. Another defeat would be disastrous and would make Cubane, Latin Americans and others bolleve Castro to be invincible. Then would come accommodations and even worse, the implanting of Castro-backed regiunes in the hemisphere. And the U. S. would suffer worst of all, being discredited for defeat and "guilt of interference." "In the UN no nation would stand beside the U. S, "6. Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and Establish a Government on Cuban SollDr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro would never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the sabotage, commando ralds, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating economy, ard that it was inconceivable to establish a government-inexile for nothing would c: me of it, that the only solution for defeating the Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Council to go to Cuba and estab- ilch a government on Cuban soil, aak recognition by all friendly countries and military assistance of its principal ally, the U. S., and that the U.S. be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces. This would all have to take place in a matter of 43 hours, otherwise it would fall. I recognise that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many rieke, many may be killed. As for myself, I don't care if I die. I have loat all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner. He reiterated that all must be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation, everything must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to ceizo a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Guantanamo, and imame- diately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition (and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. 9. assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in ade- quate strength to ensure victory.3
[104-10232-10019.pdf — page 4]
SECRETBefore such an action is undertaken, the enemy muat be softened by propaganda, sabotage, raide, underground action, and the mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council and its unifying efforts.Dr. WIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government levele. He proposed that he might elaborate a pian with his militar y collaborators, and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined and considered.Dr. MIRO dcclared that he was convinced that this Communist daggor in the side of the States could only be eradicated by such action, that the U.S. is and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda, sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention in Cuba, but that if the U. S. goes to the aid of a friendly revolutionary regirne established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud."I have no personal political ambitions," declared MIRO. "I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the anti-Castro elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team isn't con- sidered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must establish itself on Cuban soil, and soon. Time is against us. ""The unta del Este agreement will backfire against the U. S. if Castro is allowed to remain in Cuba. In a year, after the politicos of the countries re- ceiving U. S. aid have gotten their hands on U. 8. gold, they will say, Tharke to Castro, we got this. And they will spend it as in the past with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the paople."7. Views about the Judges and LawyeraI queried Dr. MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and lawyers and their future status. tie said he hoped that they could all reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He de- elared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council and MIRC and VARONA. Dr. MIRO declared that he, as Prime Ministor in the early days of the Castro goverurnont, had named LABAU to the4