Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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2. that STOCKFOOD met AMLASH/1 and AMWHIP/1, presumably in alias but I do not know the details. It was also apparent by the time AMLASH/1 left that he knew UNSHA FU/5 was working for KUBARK and we knew that UNSHA FU/9 was aware to some extent of AMLASH/1's plans (UNSHA FU/9 had been recruited by KUBARK at that time). It was agreed that AMLASH/1 would need the address of UNSHA FU/13's parents for a/w letters to KUBARK (UNSHA FU/13 is wife of UNSHA FU/9).AMLASH/1 first arrived in Paris in late November or early December 1964. AMWHIP/1 STOCKHOOD and ONTRICH (tdy from Headquarters) met with him in Paris (this time in a safe house of the Station. AMLASH/1 left for PERUMEN from Madrid on 20 February 1965. During this stay in Paris AMLASH/1 met the following KUBARK staffers and agents:STOCKFOOD, CLOADER, RODAMERAMWHIP/1, UNSHA FU/9, UNSHA FU/5, UNSHA FU/13You will recall that in December 1964 UNSHA FU/5 had a nervous breakdown and AMLASH/1 played an important part in convincing UNSHA FU/5 that he should agree to hospitalization. It was in this connection that CLOADEN and RODAMER met AMLASH/1.CLOADEN subsequently met with AMLASH/1 two or three times to received reports for STOCKHOOD. These meetings were street meetings or in the home of UNSHA FU/5.During this stay, AMLASH/1 traveled to Madrid at least once to meet with ANBIDDY/1 and AMBANG/1. I am not aware of results of those meetings except that AMLASH/1 was seeking the physical instruments to carry out his plan to eliminate ANTHO.There was no additional contact with AMLASH/1 in Paris subsequent to February 1965 but the Station (CLOADEN and HERLEES) did have subsequent contact with UNSHA FU/5, UNSHA FU/9, AMLASH/2 and AMLASH/3. You will recall that it was AMLASH/3 who made the "joking" pitch to HERLEES on 6 May 1965. AMLASH/2 and HELSH/3 were both aware of AMLASH/1 plans.
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# Paris Station personnel known to AMLASH/1Peter J. KYMINGHAM*   not known what alias used. Some meetings were held in KYMINGHAM's hose in 1962/63. It is not known if other staff personnel (other than ONTRICH) were met then by AMLASH/L.Jul K. STOCKWOOD*   calias not known for sure but believe ho used "Roberto". AMWHIP/1 knew STOCKWOOD as embassy officer and called him there.Peter H. GLOADER*   Known as "Dick". True name not used unless told to AMLASH/1 by UNSHAFT/5 or UNSHAFU/9.Milton P. RODAMER*   not AMLASH/1 only once, when transporting UNSHAFT/5 to hospital. Known to all as "Dr. ......" (cant remember aka used).Dr. Lipsich*   cleared Dr. at American Hospital, Paris. AMLASH/1 met him briefly when admitting UNSHAFU/5 to hospital.Walhace A. CROWERY (from MADR)*   met in 1962 during explosives training in Paris. Details not known.Agents (involved to some degree)UNSHAFU/5UNSHAFT/7UNSHAFU/13APLASH/2AMLASH/9AMWHIP/1Peter M. GLOADE7 March 1966
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992DISTRI:ACTION:INFO:CLASSIFIED MESSAGEDATE: 08 JUNE 62FILE: 08/08452SECRETCLASSIFICATIONDEFERRED PRIORITY INITIALS DTG INCOMING NUMBERRR ROUTINE OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE FAS 072128z IN-06069TO WAVE INFO DIR MANA GUAT SALV CITEPACY 8025TEGU SANJ (MASSEY ACTING)REF: WAVE 44671. AMTEASE-1 ARRANGING FOLL FOR AMBUD-1 VISIT PACY:A. RECEPTION TOCUMEN INTL AIRPORT;B. BREAKFAST WITH NARCISCO CARAY, RECOOR UNIV OF PANAMA; ARLOSAROSEMENA, PANAMA DELEGATE OAS-PRESIDENT PACY LAW ASSOCIATION; ANDLUIS ALFARO, PRESIDENT SAN FERNANDO MEDICAL CLINIC:C. SUPPER WITH HYHULA-1 (IDEN) AND DULCIDO GONZALEZ, LEADINGANTI-COMMIE INDUSTRIALIST;D. TIMES FOR INTERVIEW WITH HYJULA-1, PRESIDENT CHIARI, FORMINGALILEO SOLIS, AND OTHERCABINET MINS;E. TOUR UNIV OF PANAMA AND HOS DEMOCRATIC LABOR UNIONS;2. STATION FINANCING PORTION OP FOR LOCAL PROP VALUE. WILL   AIRMAIL CLIPPINGS, FOTOS MANA SALV GUAT SANJ TEGU FOR POSS REPLAY,   ALTHOUGH ITEMS MAY NOT BE TINLY ALL CASES.END OF MESSAGESECRETCLASSIFICATIONINCOMING
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGESECRETCLASSIFICATIONDATE: 08 JUNE 62FILE: 08/0835ZDEFERRED PRIORITY INITIALS DTG INCOMING NUMBERRR ROUTINE OPERATIONAL FAS 072136Z IN-06066IMMEDIATETO WAVE INFO DIR MANA SALV GUAT CITE PACY 8026TEGU SANJ (MASSEY ACTING)REF PACY 8025IDEN A: MARCO ROBLES, MINISTER GOVERNMENT AND JUSTICE.END OF MESSAGEACTION INFOCOSCOPSDC/OSSOFXCIIIAIRADITRCOMMOFISECRETCLASSIFICATIONINCOMING![photo of a message form]
[104-10236-10053.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992DISTRIACTIONIINFO:|            |             |          |                 || ---------- | ----------- | -------- | --------------- || DEFERRED   | PRIORITY    | INITIALS | INCOMING NUMBER || RRRROUTINE | OPERATIONAL | RF       | 11558           ||            | IMMEDIATE   |          |                 || TO         | INFO        | DTG      | CITE, KNS 02081 || DIR        | WAVE        | 1010082  | NUMBER          |GYROSE AMBUDREF A. DIR 40582B. KNGS Ø2021. COS BELIEVES HIS REF B APPRAISAL JAMAICAN POLITICAL CLINATE RE ESTABLISHMENT AMBUD DELEGATION HERE CORRECT. JAMAICAN GOVT WANTS NOT BE OVERTLY INVOLVED IN COLD WAR AND OUT OF CONCERN FOR SA SAFETY LARGE JAMAICAN COMMUNITY CUBA WILL MAKE STRENJOUS EFFORT TO STAY OUT. HOWEVER THEY WILL HELP COVERTLY WHEREEVER POSSIBLE. ANY ATTEMPT INVOLVE JAMAICAN GOVT AGAINST ITS WILL AT THIS TIME WOULD RESULT IN NET LOSS OF COOPERATION NOW AND IN FUTURE, STATION REGARDS INCREASING COOPERATION OF RUABBE SERCIVE IN CUBAN OBJECTIVES OF CONSIDERABLE VALUE.2. IF HQS BELIEVES AMBUD REP SHOULD VISIT JAMAICA TO TEST POLITICAL XKXXM CLIMATE IN GOVT, STATION WOULD CONCUR MOST RELUCTANTLY IN (PTN GELD WILL FWD) WITH FRANK (DIAZ) SILVEIRA DURING CARIBBEAN GAMES WHOM GOVT WANTED TO THROW OUT FOR HIS STATMENTS TO PRESS ABOUT PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT AMBUD REPRESENTATION HERE. INX ANY EVENT STATION WOULD INSIST NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS PRECEDE JAMAICAN GOVT RULING. SHOULD GOVT REJECT AMBUD FOLLOWING ADVANCE PUBLICITY THIS COULD BE MAJOR EX VICTORY FOR CUBAN CONSULATE, SHOT IN ARM TO FACING "FRIENDS OF CUBASECRETCLASSIFICATIONINCOMING
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGESECRETDATE:FILE:INCOMING NUMBERIN 11558CITE KINGS 8268--- PAGE 2---COMMITTEE" (COMPRISING LOCAL COMUNISTS AND RAS TAFARIS), AND GIFT TO BUDDING NEW COMMUNIST FRONT "SOCIALIST PARTY OF JAMAICA".3. SINCE STATION COULD NOT PLAUSIBLY DENY RESPONSIBILITY FOR AMBUD TO RUABBE AND GOVT OPPOSED TO USE OF JAMAICA FOR COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY PURPOSE AGAINST CUBA, COS BELIEVES IT ADVANTAGEOUS TO KUBARK AND ODYOKE FOR AMBUD STAY OUT OF JAMAICA UNTIL SENTIMENT CHANGES.END OF MESSAGEGROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATIONSECRET
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14-00000104-10236-10054 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992FORM2.47 12024DISTR:ACTIONIINFOCLASSIFIED MESSAGESECRETCLASSIFICATIONDATE: Ø3 ост 62FILE: $303392DEFERREDPRIORITYINITIALS DTORR ROUTINEOPERATIONALINMEDIATEINITIALE KØ215147INCOMING NUMBER11128CITEKNGS 0202NUMBERTODIR WAVEINFO RIGYROSE AMBUDREF A. WAVE 9150B. KNGS Ø1671. COS DOES NOT QUESTION POSSIBILITY COVERAGE CUBAN PROBLEM FROM   JAMAICA MIGHT BE EXTENDED BUT BELIEVES DELEGATION SUCH AS AMBUD WHOSE   PRESENCE OVERT WOULD PROVE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE. STATEMENT OF PRIME   MINISTER BUSTAMANTE 4 SEPTEMBER THAT GOVT WOULD NOT ALLOW JAMAICA BE   USED FOR COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY PURPOSE AGAINST CUBA MUST BE TAKEN   SERIOUSLY. REASON FOR THIS STATEMENT IS CONTINUING AND FREQUENTLY   REITERATED CONCERN OF JAMAICAN GOVT FOR SAFETY OF 25, JAMAICANS   RESIDENT IN CUBA.2. STATION FEELS CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS MADE IN GAINING COVERT   SUPPORT THROUGH RUABBE FOR CI EFFORT AGAINST CUBANS WHICH WAS EXTENDED   TO SOME ACTUAL ASSISTANCE FOR ANTI-CUBAN ACTION DURING CARIBBEAN GAMES.   WISH POINT OUT HOWEVER THIS CONTINGENT UPON MAINTENANCE COVERT NATURE   OF ACTIVITY. IN FACE DECLARED GOVT POSITION COS BELIEVES ANY EXPANSION   JAMAICA OF ACTIVITIES AGAINST CUBA MUST BE COVERT. FURTHER SINCE   VERY DIM VIEW TAKEN OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF DR FRANK DIAZ SILVEIRA BY   LOCAL AUTHORITIES WHEN HE INDICATED 14 AUGUST HE WOULD SEEK PERMISSION   OPERATE ON ISLAND AS AGENT OF COUNCIL, COS DEE INITELY OF OPINION AMBUDSECRETCLASSIFICATIONINCOMING
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGEDATE: Ø3 OCT 62FILE: Ø303392SECRETDEFERRED PRIORITYROUTINE OPERATIONALIMMEDIATEINFO11128CITE KNGS Ø202PAGE TWOTYPE DELEGATION IN JAMAICA WOULD BE HARMFUL TO KUBARK AND ODYOKEINTERESTS (SEE KNGS Ø123).3. COS PREPARED CONSIDER ASSIGNMENT STAFF OR CONTRACT AGENT TO   JAMAICA UNDER NON-OFFICIAL COVER TO HANDLE CUBAN AND RELATED   HAITIAN AND DOMINICAN PROBLEMS. HOWEVER WOULD PREFER STAFFER UNDER   OFFICIAL COVER TO SHARE KUTUBE/KUWOLF GENERAL STATION OPS. EMPHASIS   HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE BE ON CUBAN COVERAGE. WOULD NEED   ADDITIONAL SECRETARY TRAINED IN COMMO AND ADMIN.4. IN VIEW PRODUCTIVE LIAISON AND DEVELOPING UNILATERAI. ACTIVITIES   STATION COULD INCREASE REPORTING NOW IF SECRETARY ADDED TO ABSORB ADMIN   CHORES.5. REQUEST HQS CONSIDER ASSIGNMENTS PROPOSED BY COS.END OF MESSAGEGROUP 1 - EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.SECRET
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRET10 October 1961MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. MIRO Cardona on 6 October1. Dr. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a. m. for the meeting we had set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced. As during the first meeting, she remained outside in the car. Our meeting lasted until 12:00 noon.2. First, Dr. MIRO handed me a note in longhand listing the topics discussed with me on 5 October. These points are:a. Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.b. A propaganda campaign should be waged by the Council aimed at:(1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Key West.(2) Cubans in Miami and other U. S. areas by:(a) Subsidizing *Diario de las Americas*.(b) Contracting for time on radio stations.(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the "Operacion Grieta,"c. Underground Activities.(1) Provision of monthly funds to Council for procuring Cuban pesos to send to the seven-odd resistance groups in Cuba through reliable channels (such as previously sent through the Italian Embassy).
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# SECRET(2) Commando action as outlined in plan presented on 6 October.## 3. Commando PlanThen Dr. MIRO handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine action prepared by his military collaborators, whom he named as Colonel Manuel VAREL stro, an officer of the Academy, Captain Enrique DESPAIGN and Colonel (Inu) MONTEAGUDO. He stated that they were of group and had been prisoners.With respect to the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba, he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part of them here, part in Cuba. He reiterated that a commando operation was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and in exile as well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation U. S. help would be necessary in providing weapons, ammo, demolitions, equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to have merit, that I arrange to have someone meet with his military men to work out the details. After all preparations had been made and materiel provided, etc. the operation would be purely a Cuban affair, (NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompson at our meeting at 15:30 on 6 October for transmission.)## 4. Request for Arms, etc. to send to EscambrayDr.MIRO remarked that over a month ago he had made a request to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly, "I ask but never hear an answer." He said that the fighters there should be supported. Dr. MIRO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and a means for delivery of the arms. Osvaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the Escambray group.COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?## 5. Information on Arms Received by Castro RegimeDr. MIRO handed me a long report which he said was brought to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the U. S. at the time of President FRONDIZI's visit. He said the Ambassador would not divulge the source of the information but commented, "You will know."Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.2
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SECRETDr. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy of the figures given of planes, guns, etc. received from the Soviet bloc (and Italy and Canada) but ever if the figures were exaggerated 100 per cent, they would still be impressive.He added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300,000 being trained to use them while the economy continues to deteriorate. Perhaps only half the militia would be effective. But that is sizeable. Thus, he said, the longer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the greater will be the task. "We must act soon, vigorously and effectively, to insure victory. Another defeat would be disastrous and would make Cubans, Latin Americans and others believe Castro to be invincible. Then would come accommodations and even worse, the implanting of Castro-backed regimes in the hemisphere. And the U. S. would suffer worst of all, being discredited for defeat and "guilt of interference," "In the UN no nation would stand beside the U. S."6. Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and Establish a Government on Cuban SoilDr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro would never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the sabotage, commando raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating economy, and that it was inconceivable to establish a government-in-exile for nothing would come of it; that the only solution for defeating the Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Council to go to Cuba and establish a government on Cuban soil, ask recognition by all friendly countries and military assistance of its principal ally, the U. S., and that the U.S. be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces. "This would all have to take place in a matter of 48 hours, otherwise it would fail. I recognize that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many risks, many may be killed. As for myself, I don't care if I die. I have lost all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner." He reiterated that all must be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation, everything must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to seize a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Guantanamo, and immediately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition (and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U. S. assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in adequate strength to ensure victory.
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# SECRETBefore such an action is undertaken, the enemy must be softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council and its unifying efforts.Dr.. MIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government levels. He proposed that he might elaborate a plan with his militar y collaborators, and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined and considered.Dr. MIRO declared that he was convinced that this Communist dagger in the side of the States could only be eradicated by such action, that the U.S. is and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda, sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention in Cuba, but that if the U. S. goes to the aid of a friendly revolutionary regime established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud."I have no personal political ambitions, " declared MIRO. "I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the anti-Castro elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team isn't con- sidered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must establish itself on Cuban soil, and soon. Time is against us. ""The Punta del Este agreement will backfire against the U. S. if Castro is allowed to remain in Cuba. In a year, after the politicos of the countries re- ceiving U. S. aid have gotten their hands on U. S. gold, they will say, 'Thanks to Castro, we got this.' And they will spend it as in the past with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the people. "7. Views about the Judges and LawyersI queried Dr. MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and lawyers and their future status. He said he hoped that they could all reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He de- clared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council and MIRO and VARONA. Dr. MIRO declared that he, as Prime Minister in the early days of the Castro government, had named ALABAU to the
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Supreme Court, but that now he considered ALABAU unfit to hold any judicial position.8. Members of the Revolutionary CouncilDr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council on 10 October. I asked what elements now composed it and what he proposed to add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo:Rescate30 de NoviembreMRRAccion Democratica20 de MayoAAA IndependienteMDCMontecristiHe said he had invited to join:MRPUnidad Revolucionariaand awaited their reply.He would also like to have the Workers, Students, and the Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He believes Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate should be excluded, but that all other groups should be brought together under the Council.He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO).9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with CubaDr. MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba (Juho AMOEDO) was ordered to return to Havana (he had been vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a Secretary of the Argentine Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO today; and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night
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SECRETfrom a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO to go to Buenos Aires to arouse anti-Castro sentiment of the people, inasmuch as some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent. (FERNANDEZ said he had already written MIRO a letter.) MIRO says, "Of course, I cannot go. I have the Consejo meeting on the 10th. Furthermore, I am going to New York. on October 11th or 12th for the SIP (Socieded Interamericana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted 12 minutes to address the meeting."10. MIRO to attend Homage to LACERDA (Brazilian who    Precipitated QUADROS' resignation) on October 15Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (after 11 and 12 October SIP meeting) until October 15th to attend the homage for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brazil. MIRO probably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark of his location.I commented that I would probably remain in Washington next week in view of his plans, but that I might go to New York City to meet with him; if so, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meeting time and place through Clark.11. Propaganda CommissionI asked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization and structure of the Propaganda Commission. He stated that it is outside the Consejo and not under his direct control, although the Council accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CASTRILLO had resigned as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERO to handle it. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda.12. MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO    being Recognized as Head of a Provisional GovernmentI asked Dr. MIRO if he believed that there were many anti- Castro Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) who favored PRIO, or the head of the Supreme Court to be the provisional president if a government were to be established on Cuban soil. Dr. MIRO declared that the revolution is a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former regime. The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He de-
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nounced PRIO's activities against the Council and its efforts to unifythe anti-Castro elements. He said that the people should be given anopportunity to elect their chief of state after Castro's overthrow andreestablishment of order in the island.13. Offices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario)When questioned about his business and private telephones,MIRO said, "The business phone is also in my house. I have no officeexcept in my house, but that phone is always busy (JEfferson 2-4680).So use the other phone (JEfferson 4-2751) when you wish to call me.""I need to have a small office somewhere away from my homebecause all the activities there are driving my wife crazy. I want tofind something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation -merely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and one for meetings.of the Council, etc. The FRD had a place but at that place also was thepress, the refugee center, etc. It would not be satisfactory. The FRDis now practically dead. It was the forerunner of the Consejo as theunifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance,"14. MIRO's Views on Coordinating the Activities of Other Exile    GroupsAfter Dr. MIRO reiterated his view that he should be thechannel for funds and coordinating the activities of groups outside theConsejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), etc., I said that I under-stood that some of these elements were unwilling to function under the.Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that anActivity Committee might be organized with a delegate from each ofthese groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo.This would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in withthe Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO repliedthat this would merely set up another Consejo outside of and parallel tothe existing Consejo. I did not pursue this further, not having enoughbackground of these organizations to be able to discuss the mattereffectively.15. Telephone Conversation with MIRO or. 7 OctoberBefore my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 October,I telephoned to Dr. MIRO froin the airport. He appreciated the call andasked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by7