Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 72]
Apprehensive middle-class homeowners man a watchtower along a security wall built around their Santi-aso neighborhood; a Socialist slogan on the cutside of the wall counters with "We Will Win."> -Photo by Santi Visalli for Photoreporters.1969 congressional elections. On that basis, the Inftist parties had suffered a slight loss in votes but I had achieved a slight gain in seats. Certain oppositionists later argued that the Left would have suffered much greater losses had it not been for a government-assisted electoral fraud involving some 200.000-300,000 votes, but the statistics presented in support of the argument are unconvincing."While the government's interpretation of the elections as proot that it was expanding its popular support was not accurate, the election results indicated "at at least it had not lost popularity as rapidly as revious governments faced with similar economic reverses. Despite a wage readjustment in October, frat wages had dectired 7 percent in 1972, and rag inflation continued to consume the wage increase. nearly 1973. However, the combination of discriminatory distribution of government-produced goods and appeals to class consciousness seemed to have stemmed the erosion of support, at least amorg the masses of the poor.Unfortunately for the government's longer-range interests, the deliberate accentuation of class consciousness had an opposite effect on the middle class, driving middle-class areas to organize themselves into "Neighborhood Committees" to defend themselves. It also, for the first time, led many to arrn themselves for a possible confrontation, which seemed more likely now that the safety valve of an impending election was no longer present. A government proposal to limit full wage readjustments to those making less than three times the minimum wage did nothing to reassure the hostile middle-income groups.Before the elections, it had been rumored that there might be another attempt in March at an accommodation between the regime and the opposition forces, possibly under the auspices of the military. Any possible accord of this type was quickly prevented by the publication, two days after the elections, of a government decree calling for the initiation in June of a single national unified school system, which would follow a common curriculum including compulsory courses in socialism and work---Sweet of the Investigating Committee of the Ca net, reproduced in the Libro Bia2030.new wors in 1973 omit the 21-10-24teen 100 young to vote in 1970 15rally the number of "fraudulent" voters est.maica in שחן55
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 77]
# Allende in Retrospect![Salvador Allende hurries through the corridors of the Presidential Palace with his personal bodyguard on the morning of September 11, 1973]Salvador Allende hurries through the corridors of the Presidential Palace with his personal bodyguard on the morning of September 11, 1973, shortly before taking his own life during the military coup d'état.-Photo by The New York Times.flict between the executive and legislative branches. During the same weekend, Allende met with the leaders of his Popular Unity coalition and called for the holding of a plebiscite on his conduct of office. Although this step was reportedly opposed by the Socialists, Briones subsequently asserted that Allende planned to announce the plebiscite in a radio address at noon on the day of the coup.Meantime, after a stormy session with Allende on September 7, the military commanders proceeded on Sunday, September 9, to draft the text of the pronunciamiento issued on September 11. They did not secure the agreement of the National Police until early on the morning of the coup itself, and only after the fourth-ranking officer in seniority had taken over the position of police commander.On September 10, Navy units set sail from Valparaíso for previously scheduled maneuvers, but that evening they returned to port and by early morning of the 11th had seized control of that city. Concepción, the third-ranking city in Chile and a known center of leftist activism, was taken over without a hitch. Santiago required a few hours longer.To justify their action, the military commanders broadcast a communiqué to the nation. While admitting that the Allende government had initially come to power by legal means, they announced that it had "fallen into flagrant illegitimacy" by violating fundamental rights, by "artificially fomenting the class struggle," by refusing to implement the decisions of the Congress, the judiciary and the Controller-General, by causing a critical decline in agricultural, commercial and industrial activity in the country, and by bringing about a state of inflation and anarchy which "threaten the internal and external security of the country." The coup leaders concluded:These reasons are sufficient in the light of classical doctrine . . . to justify our intervention to depose a government which is illegitimate, immoral, and unrepresentative of the overwhelming sentiment of the nation."At 9:30 a.m., when it was apparent that no one but the GAP, his personal bodyguard, was ready to defend him, Allende broadcast his last message to[^1] *Libro Bianco, pp. 248-49.*[^1]: Information from the author's personal interviews with Patricio Aylwin, Jan. 11, 1974, and Carlos Briones, Jan. 14, 1974.[^2]: Accounts of pre-coup military activities appear in *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Sept. 17, 1973; *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Sept. 25, 1973. *Le Monde* (Paris), Dec. 19, 1973, and Robert Moss, "Chile's Coup and After," *Encounter* (London), March 1974, pp. 72-80.
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 94]
MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BYHOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERSFILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: MFR FUOMEN/RSHORS CHILEINCLUSIVE DATES: SEPT. 1973-MAY 1974CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:DELETIONS, IF ANY:ROOM:| DATE RECEIVED | DATE RETURNED | REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME) | SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAI || ------------- | ------------- | ------------------------ | ------------------------------- ||               |               |                          |                                 ||               |               |                          |                                 ||               |               |                          |                                 ||               |               |                          |                                 ||               |               |                          |                                 ||               |               |                          |                                 ||               |               |                          |                                 |NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 95]
C/LA/ANESC/JP/DMSSUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUESTAND FIELD NONFICATION OF ACTIONTO: (Station/Base)Santiago, ChileFROM: (Division)C/LAINFORMATION FOR REQUESTERSCOMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.ITEM 3-ALL FILE TITLES MUST BE STRIKIY SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.ITEM 9-ALL REMARKS MUST BE STRIFILE.ITEM 7 AND 8-USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPACH SYM-BOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS, AND LETT HEODQUARDING FLI-MINIS ACCORDING TO LOLISH NUMEPIC CONIS.ITEM 10-ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE, CITE ANY FILES, SUCH AS ZOL OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RE-LATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS REQUESITEM 10 IS ALSO PT. USED TO GIVS. REASONS FOR 110 ACTION, REQ-QUESTED, TO IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF MAIL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.ITEM 11-A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE AC-QURSIS. CONGULI YOUR 110 ON ANY PECULUMS MALA.INFORMATION CONCERNING FILE|                 |                    |     || --------------- | ------------------ | --- || 1. TYPE OF FILE | 2. COUNTRY NUMBER  |     || X SUBJECT       | PROJECT            | 015 ||                 | CODE (FILE NUMBER) |     ||                 | CATEGORY NUMBER    |     ||                 | 124                | 052 |3. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECTS PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)FUOMENACTION REQUIRED|                          |                || ------------------------ | -------------- || 4. ANALYSIS ACTION       | 5. DISPOSITION || OPEN FILE                | RETAIN         || CLOSE FILE INDICATE DION |                || AMEND FILE TITLE         |                || REOPEN                   |                ||                          |                |6. REMARKS OF FIELD DISTRIBUTION7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)HCS8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK, INST)015|                 |     || --------------- | --- || 9. FILES ACTION |     || HOLD IN         |     || CS FILES        |     || RESTRICTED      |     || X UNRESTRICTED  |     |10. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)11. ENDORSEMENTSIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.1748EFFECTIVE DATE12. COORDINATIONSIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O. (WHEN APPLICABLE)13. RID APPROVALREQUEST APPROVED BYCODE FILE NUMBERFORM12-65 812OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS MTS 12-65SECRET381-CS CO
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 96]
CABLE SEC DISSEM DPERSON UNIT NOTIFIEDSECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTEDSTAFFACTION UNITRF FILE VR PHAN EURF 588 0/48ACTIONT 375103 EIA916 PAGE 01-31TOR12616282 AUG 74 IN-345016HAMB R5462SECRET 2816:15 AUG 74 STAFFCITE HAMBURG 25462TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, BONN BASE.MACRUNCH FUOMEN REDLEGREF: EGGA-6103, 12 AUG 741. ARTICLE BY PROF. JAMES THEBERGE, PUBLISHED IN SOVIET ANALYST, VOL. 3, NO. 17. 15 AUG, ENTITLED: "KREMLIN'S HAND IN ALLENDE'S CHILE" IS IDEAL FOR PURPOSES OUTLINED IN REF, WE ATTEMPTING TO PLACE, WILL ADVISE. SUGGEST HO INCLUDE ARTICLE IN PRESS COMMENTS.2. FILE DEFER, E2 IMPDET.
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 97]
14-00000
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 98]
SECRETTRANSMITTAL MANIFESTTO Chief, EUR Division FROM COS, Helsinki No. 669923| ITEM NO. | DESCRIPTION       | REMARKS                          || -------- | ----------------- | -------------------------------- ||          | Newspaper article | FUOMEN/PSYCH Ref: HELSINKI 22455 ||          | Hand for final    |                                  ||          |                   |                                  ||          |                   |                                  ||          |                   |                                  ||          |                   |                                  ||          |                   |                                  ||          |                   |                                  ||          |                   |                                  ||          |                   |                                  ||          |                   |                                  ||          |                   |                                  |FORM 12368. Obsolete Forms 1236 and 1236a-12 ONLY which may be usedSECRETE2 IMPDET(13-47)
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 100]
CONFIDENTIALSTAFFLUAS* 977141 E14232PAGE 01TOR1221103Z MAY 74TN 239073HELS 22459TO: DIRECTOR INFO STOCKHOLM, SANTIAGO,FROM: PSYCH1. IN EVENT NOT ALREADY KNOWN TO ADDEES. CALL ATTENTION TO NEWLY PUBLISHED BOOK ON CHILE BY SWEDISH JOURNALIST/ AUTHOR ANDRES *(?UM" (U") ENTITLED "TO SOM SOCIALISM AND REAR FASCISM, WHICH SEEMS UNUSUALLY BALANCED, COMING FROM YOUNG SWEDE. ACCORDING TO : MAY 74 REVIEW IN FINNISH SWEDISH-LANGUAGE DAILY "NYA WOSTADSBLADET", KUNG--WHO VISITED CHILE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER ALLENDE'S TIME--LABELS THE SWEDISH DEBATE ON CHILE AS MOVE-SIDED" AND ANALYSES IN DETAIL ALLENDE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS UNDER ALLENDE'S THREE YEARS, AND THE CONCOMITANT POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT LED ALLENDE TO MEASURES WHICH WERE "INCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND EXISTING LAWS".KUNG NOTES THAT AGGRESSIVE CLASS POLITICS, WHETHER REACTIONARY OR REVOLUTIONARY, CAN BRING ABOUT A MOVE AGAINST A SOCIALIST OR FASCIST DICTATURE" BUT, HE ADDS, "NO CONDITION OR MISTAKE DURING ALLENDE'S TIME CAN BE USED AS EXCUSE FOR THE COUP."CONFIDENTIAL
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 101]
CONFIDENTIAL|          |     |      |     |     |     || -------- | --- | ---- | --- | --- | --- || ACTION # |     | INFO | PI  | PDF | VP  |* 27743 E1A230 PAGE 22-32 IH 239575  TOR10211032 MAY 74 HELS 23453AND THE *BLOODBATH* THAT FOLLOWED.2. KUNG (BORN: 1945, GAVLE, SWEDEN) IS FORMER (1969-72)   EDITOR FOR SWEDISH RADIO'S "OBS". NOW LIVES IN MALMO. HAS   PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN ON, INTER ALIA, LATIN AMERICA AND BALTIC   STATES.4. FILE REFER: E2 IMPDET.CONFIDENTIAL
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 102]
CABLE BEC DISSEM BY 28TOTAL COPIES 381PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED SECRETADVANCE COPY ISSUED/SLOTTEDACTION UNITC/WH8ACTIONRF FILE VR C/18/ON. C/EUR6 C/SS3C/PS/FG3 S/OSG/ICLOPST 172681 EIA126 PAGE 01-01 IN 274496TOR:2716312 JUN 74 SAGO 29396SECRET 0715442 JUN 74 STAFFCITE SANTIAGO 29396TO: DIRECTOR INFO PARIS.RYBAT HYSAGEREFS: A. PARIS 48989 (J273492)B. DIRECTOR 5595141. STATION CONCURS WITH PARIS ASSESSMENT. IF ALLENDE ACTUALLY   DID WANT TO SURRENDER. JUNTA COULD ONLY SUFFER FROM PUBLICIZING   FACT.2. FILE: 56-6-42/3, 201-927906. E2 IMPDET![signature]SECRET
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 103]
CABLE SEC DIBSEM BY PERTOTAL COPIES 27.1 FUN BYSECRETPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTEDACTION UNIT BY AT STAFFof wH8 FILE VR 9PLAN 966 clossINTEACTION # 9853 9ps/263T 169854 E1A366 PAGE 01 IN 273492TOR:0620192 JUN 74 PARI 48989SECRET 2618242 JUN 74 STAFFCITE PARIS 48989TO: DIRECTOR INFC SANTIAGO. TuomenRYBAT HYSAGEREF: DIRECTOR 5595441. DEFER SANTIAGO RE PARA 5 BUT WE FEEL THERE LITTLE TO BE GAINED IN PSYCH TERMS FOR EUROPEAN AUDIENCE TO ATTEMPT CLARIFY WHETHER ALLENDE KILLED WHILE FIGHTING OR ATTEMPTING SURRENDER. JUNTA'S PRESTIGE SO LOW IN EUROPEAN EYES THAT SUCH HAIR SPLITTING WOULD NOT MAKE MUCH DIFFERENCE OR COULD ACTUALLY REBOUND AGAINST JUNTA SHOULD IT EMERGE HE DIED WHILE WANTING SURRENDER.2. SHOULD IT DEVELOP THAT FANATICS AROUND ALLENDE REFUSED ALLOW HIM SURRENDER, THEN THIS MIGHT BE ANOTHER STORY BUT THIS NOT CLEAR FROM REF AND ALSO NOT KNOWN IF GARCES COULD MAKE SUCH VERSION STICK BECAUSE OF HIS EARLY DEPARTURE FROM NATIONAL PALACE.3. FILE:/56-6-42/31 221-987906. E2, IMPDETSECRET
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 104]
# DISPATCH10 Chief of Station, HelsinkiINIO. C/WH DivisionFROM Acting Chief of Station, SantiagoSUBJECT FUOMEN PsychACTION REQUIRID REFERENCESCLASSIFICATION SECRETX MARKED FOR INDEXINGNO INDEXING REQUIREDONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXINGMICROFILMRef: HELSINKI 22455If available, we would appreciate receiving four copies of Andres Kung's book mentioned in reference. E2 IMPDET.Leslie H. BERBERIANDistribution:2 COS Helsinki - To Out Porch1 C/WHDRECORD COPYCROSS REFERENCE TODISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER HCSA-18904DATE 3 Hay 1974CLASSIFICATION SECRETHOS FILE NUMBER 15-124-52Defer
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 105]
NETHERLANDSCHILEAN REFUGEES IN NETHERLANDS POINTED OUT AS FUGITIVESEditorial by N. van Nieuwenhuysen; Reformatorisch Dagblad,Dutch, 19 April 1974, P5The Chilean refugees in the Netherlands seem to be having adjustment problems. These rather prolonged symptoms seem to be caused among other things by the fact that they still find it hard to accept that the socialist dream of their Marxist president is definitely over and that their country is now being ruled by a small group of reactionaries who are trying to keep the people under control through terrorism, repression, and torture. Such problems will take you quite a ways in the Netherlands and those idealists were quick to take advantage of it.WelfareWhat is the situation? Most of the approximately 250 refugees with a high school or university education do not work. About half of them have been housed at the "Huis ter Schie" in Overschie, where they enjoy the sunshine on the terrace or play volleyball in the yard. Board and lodging are free and at the end of the week they pick up another 25 guilders pocket money. In addition they receive free language instruction, commuter tickets for the bus, and compensation for each trip they have to take.Do you get the idea that they are better off than many old people in the Netherlands? You are probably right, because the Chilean exiles do not have to live on welfare: they are being paid from the frozen funds which had been allocated for development aid to their fatherland, Chile. So you can see how well our tax money is being spent.
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 106]
Considering that this small group of pampered exiles is preaching revolution even here and with a full stomach, it may be useful to point out a few facts. These are facts which are well known in the Ministry in The Hague but for some reason never made it to the Netherlands press.## FactaThe great majority of the refugees are not even Chilean nationals. They are natives of Bolivia, Brazil, and Uruguay. They came to Chile as a result of illegal and revolutionary activities in which they had been involved in these South and Middle American countries, the ultimate consequences of which they did not wish to suffer.They felt at home in Allende's Chile because Allende showed sympathy for their situation. His first action as president, after his inauguration in November 1970, was to declare amnesty for all those who "were members of terrorist underground organizations," those who during the last months of his predecessor's regime had been charged with bank robbery, the armed robbery of self-service stores, the theft of weapons from military arsenals, kidnapping, and attempted murder.The fact that some of those revolutionaries received Chilean diplomatic status was due to Allende's policy of granting residence permits to this type of revolutionaries. These refugees with a high school or higher level education seemed to have no adjustment problems in Chile. As a result they soon found their way to important key positions in the government.The fugitives didn't suffer any sleepless nights in Chile either, because they felt protected by a militant Marxist army, armed to the teeth. Some 10,000 revolutionaries, from all points of the compass, were at their disposal.## DefinitionIn the Berner Tageblatt, a Swiss newspaper which is known for not exaggerating, Dr. Mario Puelma, from the University of Freiburg, wrote the following: "The concept of political refugee is only of limited value when applied to Chile. Whatever one's attitude toward the military junta
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 107]
may be, one thing is certain: the Chilean refugees were not pursued only because of their ideology, their status, or their origin. This is the traditional, humanitarian definition for a refugee. For the most part they are people who, in their own country, could be legally charged with crimes which are punishable under any Judicial system.These refugees carried out activities in Chilo which were against the constitution. As a matter of fact, they are specialists in violence. This is why they sought asylum in the foreign embassies in Santiago and why there are so many foreigners among them."8463CSO: 8014/2087-W
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 109]
![photo of the document page]
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 111]
# OUTGOING MESSAGESIGNAL CONTINUSE UNI 35-3OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0SECRETSTAFFCONF: EURT INFO: FILE IP/AN, WHT) 555 013/INT.PS/EG4, 056/10, 015/IT65°TO: BONN BASE INFO BONN, SANTIAGO, HAMBURG.YFUONYX CAGUAPPY TOFOCUS YREFS: A. BONN BASE-31991 JIN 2620141B. DIRECTOR 51865741. FOR REF A FEATURE, SUGGEST BASE PROVIDE CAQUARRY WITHAPPROPRIATE INFO ON REBOFUGEES AVAILABLE IN NUMEROUS HAS TRACE CACLESSENT BOlill. WE ARE UNABLES IDENTIFY ANY REFUGEES LIVING IN GERMANYUNDER FALSE IDENTITY.Y2. AIRMAILING TO BEROUTSAS BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON LEFTIST BR800EFFORTS TO DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME, INCLUDING:YA. LcBEFORE PRESS SUMMARIES OF FRONT ACTIVITIES.YB. NEWS BULLETING PUBLISHED BY BRITISH CHILE SOLIDARITYCOMMITTEE, WHICH CONTAINS "INTERNATIONAL NEWS" SECTION AND ASECTION GIVING CHILEAN REFUGEE QUOTAS BY COUNTRY.YC. ARTICLES RE RUSSELL TRIBUNAL ON CHILE, HELD ROME,APRIL 74..4D. MAY 1974 WIENER TAGEBUCH ARTICLE ON CHILE BLACK BOΟΚ.ΥE. APRIL 1974 FRANKFURT-STADT RUNDSCHAU ARTICLE RE CHILEAN
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 112]
OUTGOING MESSAGESIGNAL CENTER USE ONLYOMF 0 0 0 0 0 0CLASSIFICATIONSECRETSTAFFCONF:INFO: FILE 556979DIRECTORDISSEM BY:000SOLIDARITY MEETING HELD FRANKFURT 24-27 APRIL.43. WE ARE UNABLE SUGGEST KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSON OF STATURE FOR INTERVIEW ON LEFTIST-EFFORT DISCREDBIT REGIME. AS ALTERNATIVE, SUGGEST CAGIJARRY OR NETWORK REPORTER MIGHT SEEK INTERVIEW OF DR. MARIO PUELMA, PROFESSOR OF CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY AT FREIBURG UNIVERSITY, WHO WROTE TWO-PART ARTICLE IN 88015-16 JANUARY ISSUES OF BERN DAILY BERNER TAGBLATT ON SUBJECT CHILEAN REFUGEES. IN ARTICLES PUELMA GIVES BACKGROUND OF TERRORIST MOVEMENT IN CHILE AS IT DEVELOPED AS RESULT OF ALLENDE GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND CITES EXAMPLES OF "REFUGEES" AND THEIR ACTIVITIES TO SHOW THAT "TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF.. POLITICAL REFUGEE, WITH RESPECT TO CHILE, CAN BE APPLIED ONLY IN VERY LIMITED SENSE..." (SEE QRPEG 8026, REF B, FOR QUOTES FROM SUMMARY OF ARTICLES.4. SUGGEST FEATURE INCLUDE POINT THAT EFFORT TO DISCREDIT CHILEAN REGIME IS ENCOURAGED, IF NOT ORCHESTRATED, BY SOVIET FRONTS AND THAT PUBLICITY GENERATED BY "SOLIDARITY" CAMPAIGN (E.G., "INTERNATIONAL NEWS" SECTION OF BRITISH COMMITTEE BULLETIN) HAS IDENTIMIDATING EFFECT PRECLUDING OBJECTIVITY. BENEATH SUPERFICIAL SHOW OF "SOLIDARITY," EUROPEAN LEFTISTS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT HAVING CRIMINAL/DATE:ORIG:UNIT:EXT:
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 113]
# OUTGOING MESSAGEOMF 0 0 0 0 0 0PAGE 3# SECRETSTAFFCONF: INFO: FILEDIRECTORDISSEM BY:$$556999$$TERRORIST "REFUGEES" IN EUROPE, AND COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN CRITICALLY ANALYZING EVENTS LEADING TO CHILE COUP AND REASSESSING THEIR OWN PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFULLY DEALING WITH NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES AND ASSUMING POWER BY NON-VIOLENT MEANS. MIGHT ALSO MAKE POINT THAT WITH VIETNAM NO LONGER AN ISSUE, CHILE REPRESENTS ONE FOCUS FOR ENGENDERING UNITY BETWEEN COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST LEFT IN WESTERN EUROPE.Y5. FOR INFORMATION OR POSSIBLE INTERVIEW ON EXTREME LEFTIST VIEWS/ACTIVITY, SUGGEST CAQUARRY OR ZDF REPORTER MIGHT CONTACT "SOCIALIST BUREAU," SPONSOR OF SOLIDARITY MEETING HELD FRANKFURT 24-27 APRIL. (SEE BONN 31174 AND BBONN 31869). FOR INFORMATION OR POSSIBLE INTERVIEW ON JUNTA VIEWS, SUGGEST CONTACT DEUTSCH-CHILENIS-CHER BUND (SEE BERLIN B1306, OCT 733.6. FILE: 200-126-107/11. E2 IMPDET.ADATE: 30 MAY 1974ORIG: CONNIE MOORE:SRMUNIT: E/CAGEXT: 66408/1389# SECRET
[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 114]
SECRETCABLE SEC DISSEM BY:PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDTOTAL COPIESRUN BYREPRODUCTION BY OTHER TH.ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEDADVANCE COPY ISSUED STOPMUUACTION UNIEAYACTIONRFFILEVRSTAFFBYS88, OSGloc clopsOSGIC CIISI WAS PARTT 149793 514850PAGE 01IN 265992TOR:3011442 MAY 74SECRET 301122 MAY 74 STAFFCITE BANGKOK 59314TOI DIRECTOR 150 SANTIAGO.REDLEG AEFIS-REFSI A. BANGKOK 59065 (J 260348) WH/6/Socy Fil: FUOMENB.D-08 5545571. MILTON C. EPOUSH AND RALPH K. TOLGIEN MET WITH EMILIO GALETEKI   ON 25 MAY AND PASSED REF B INFO. TOLGIEN HAD FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH   GALETZKI ON 29 MAY TO DISCUSS HIS ENCOUNTER WITH ARTHUR CUNNING.2. GALEMEN: MET CUNNING AT HOME OF ROBERT B. HARTFORD. U.S.   CITIZEN EMPLOYED IN POPULATION DIVISION OF ECAFE. HARTFORD IS   PRO-ALLENDE AND ORGANIZED SMALL SOCIAL GATHERING OF INTERESTED   PERSONS TO MEET CUNNING AND DISCUSS CURRENT SITUATION IN CHILE.   CUNNING IS DESCRIBED AS ABOUT FORTY YEARS OLD, BLACK HAIR, FULL   BEARD AND AVERAGE BUILD. HE IS A DEMOGRAPHER EMPLOYED BY UNITED   NATIONS AT CENTRO LATINO AMERICANO DE DESARROLLO (CELADE) IN   SANTIAGO. HE ARRIVED CHILE IN OCTOBER 1972 WITH HIS WIFE. CUNNINGDEPARTED SANTIAGO 27 MAY FOR DELHI, KATHMANDU AND NEW YORK ANDPLANNED RETURN SANTIAGO APPROX 22 JUNE.3. CUNNING TALKED VERY LITTLE ABOUT ALLENDE REGIME AND   CUNNINGSECRET