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the reasons for this fierce reaction wwal repaystudy. Probably they included a happy chance ofUning. Several of the most fashionable mattersof Western political protest had passed intohistory or been shadowed by disillusionmeat lathe year or two before Allende's downfromViet Nam and Greece to Black Power cou theStudent Movement. Allende's diarantis endsupplied a new cause just when it was wantedFamiliar double standards were certainly in-volved. Nobody at the Labour Party Conference,for example, thought it necessary to ask whysuch a royal welcome should be offered to therepresentative of a government which had in-cluded one of the vay few Communist particsoutside Eastern Europe to approve the Russianinvasion of Crechoslovakia, A Paviovian response to the very idea of "revolution" was alsoclearly in evidence-and made all the more eager,It seemed, by the fact that this particular revolution had been taking place at such a safe distancoin such sublimely foreign parts. There aperhaps, a characteristic love of worldly failuretoo-for it was difikult to read some of the moreextravagant expressions of grief at Allende'sdeath without sensing a touch of gratification atthe idea that Good lind once more succumbed toEvil and so delivered another martyr untoHeaven before he could be corrupted by thepractical demands of life on Earth. But most ofall, perhaps, the response seemed to stem fromIgnorance and wishful thinking-always the twomost powerful sources of political romanticism-which left the facts of life in Allende's Chileeither unknown or imured and the Geld wideopen, therefore, to the creation of instant mythHence the composite picture, now acceptedthroughout a wide spectrum of Western liberaland left-wing opinion, of Allende as a genuinesocial democrat of impeccable constitutionalpropriety who met his end at the hands of afascist conspiracy on behalf of a minority "rulingclass" aided and abetted by the United Statesof America.To replace this romantic vision with somethingapproaching reality may already be impossible,for myths undoubtedly possess a life of their ownImmune to rational challenge. To attempt to toso also may entail some risk of abuse, for itseems to be a common assumption nowadaysthat anyone who seeks a rational explanation ofa military coup d'etat (unless it happens torepresent a left-wing interest) is necessarily afascist beast.I SHOULD MAKE IT PLAIN, therefore, that I amconcerned here with Allende's Chile and not withwhat has taken its place. I hold no brief formilitary juntas, nor for the stummary executions,mass imprisonments, censorship or whatever thatthe Chilean junta may have inspired or toleratedduring its early months of power. Indeed, becauseI happen to know and like Chile as a country andcount a number of Chileans among my friends Ifeel some personal sadness at the country'spresent plight. But I feel no surprise nor, I amafraid, much morel shock. Military men will bemilitary men, the world over; and in any caseChile was left in such a mess by Allends thatsome vindictiveness, alas, was only to be cazadwhen he fell.Nor am I concerned with Chilean micht-have-beens, I accept that the country needed prouizمsocial reform and I believe that it عطponidhave been achieved without violence by ademocratic government that was ready to workpragmatically within the constitution and with aproper respect for what the economic andpolitical fabric of Chile would stand.But that is not the point any more. What I amconcerned about is how the country came to itspresent pass. And without wishing to speak ill ofthe dead, it seems to me necessary to say outrightfor the sake of the living that the Chilean coupwas largely Aliende's own fault and that the mythswith which it has been surrounded on the Left arenot merely a falsification of Chilean history buta potential danger to the future of liberal andsocial democratic politics in the Western worldas well. Indeed, what is most disturbing to meabout the fashionable Western reactions to eventsin Chile is their revelation of the degree to whichrevolutionary romanticism has combined withleft-wing cynicism in recent years to corrupt ourown politics. It is certainly "co accident" that,for example, the British Labour Party which souncritically adopts Allende's cause is also theparty which has permitted its self-avowedMarxists and utopian socialista to zain factionalpositions of unprecedented power.I will leave others to pursue that theme,however. All I want to do is to try to set some of.the Chilean record straight-or at any rate;straighter-by looking in some detail at three ofthe main myths that now surround the end ofAllende and his famous experiment..## 1. The American Intervention MythTHIS FOUND its most virulent expression inthe equation of Allende's downfall with thatof Dubcek. Yet in the absence of any Americanarmed assault to compare with the Soviet invasionof Czechoslovakia-let alone the fact thatwhereas Dubcek's Parliament supported himagainst the Russians, a majority of Allende'sCongress invited him to resign-there were only :stereotype suppositions to sustain inIn general, the American intervention mythseemed to derive from that.characteristic LatinAmerican and left-wing scapegoat complex whichinsists that the Yunquis are responsible for every-thing (except, of course, anything good). Gar-nished with historical fact (Guatemala, the Bay ofPigs, etc.) this is frequently transmuted in LatinAmerican affairs into a plausible anti-Americansmear; and the state of Washington politics in1973 was, of course, guaranteed to give such asmear extra credence this time. The New Statesman offered a fine example. "The likelihood isthat the trail will lead back to the Pentagon", itassured its readers, "if a proper investigation canever be mounted. But in default of this it doesseem possible to say that Nixonism and its allieswere already too heavily implicated in tAddicts of the ITT conspiracy theory Eight أمتناto work out, incidentally, why ITT in de was reverLaken over by Alience, even after the notoriousmemorandum became public propety. Was itperhaps, because its operations there were mostlylosing money and Allende did not want to share itsSnancial enbarrasmeatu? Or was it that he knew thecompany had pien tan an ciative political stick tobeat his opponents with and he did not want to throwkaway by kicking the company out? Either way.T's appareat immunity from reprisal did notsuggest that to took sa chamcan vary seriously.