Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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14-00000104-10225-100352025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992INDEXCLASSIFIED MESSAGESECRETACTIONREPRODUCTION PROHIBITEDINFOFILE, DE SECUE/ CCS3(CKA) c/fpsSECRET 252311Z CITE JMWAVE 4480DIRECT ORTYPIC ANKUGREFERENCE DIRECTOR 570111. JMWAVE RECORDS SHOW FROM ARRIVAL JMWAVELATE 64 THROUGH DECEMBER 65 AMMUG/1 USED AS STAT US COVERINTER-UNIVERSITY COMMITTEE FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTION,WHICH WAS PROVIDED BY HEAD QUAT.TERS. JOB TITLE WAS RESEARCH-ER WITH SALARY $600 PER MONTH. AMMUG/1 CLAIMS NO KNOWLEDGEOF THE BALTIMORE COMPANY, AND SEARCH JMWAVE FILES FAILSPRODUCE ANY INFO THAT AMMUG/1 CONNECTED WITH ANY SUCHCOMPANY. REQUEST HQS CLAR IFY.2. AS IN CASE NUMBEROUS OT HER PERUMEN AGENTS, JMWAVE   REVISED 23/1 COVER 1 JAN 66 TO MEET TAX REQUIREMENTS AND   TO PROVIDE EFFECT IVE STATUS COVER. STATION NEGLECTED INFORM   WOGAME RE THIS CHANGE. SCHEAFFER EMPLOYMENT THUS BEGAN   1 JAN 55 THERE WAS NO INTER IM EM FYMENT.3. SEVERAL OTHER CRED IT CHECKS SINCE AMMUG/1 EMPLOYED   BY SCHEAFFER HAVE WORKED SMOOTHLY. AMMUG/1 ATTEMPTING   PURCHASE HOUSE LOCALLY WHICH APPEARS SE REASON FOR PRESENT
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SECRETPAGE 2 JMWAVE 4480 SECRETCHECKS. APPRECIATE EARLY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT INQUIRIES TOEX PED ITE CLOSING PURCHASE.SECRETBTNNNNSECRET"
[104-10226-10001.pdf — page 0]
14-00000104-10226-100012025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 199221 January 1965MEMORANDUM FOR RECORDSUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO1. The DDP and Chief, SR met with Ambassador Thompson in his office to advise him of our plans to proceed to hostile interrogation in order to clarify the NOSENKO case. The DDP explained that while we had reached a firm conclusion late last year that NOSENKO was a pro- vocateur and that hostile interrogation was in order, we decided to review these conclusions with representatives of the FBI. After some unavoidable delay, a series of meetings was held with the FBI at the level of Deputy Director for Security, Mr. William C. Sullivan. The find- ings of the FBI, which agreed generally with our own views, were formulated in a letter to the Director signed by John Edgar Hoover. A copy of this memorandum was shown to Ambas- sador Thompson by the DDP with the comment that the FBI and ourselves now have a common understanding on the case which was something both the DCI and the Director, FBI, agreed would be necessary.2. DDP went on to say that we would hope to begin hostile interrogations in the near future but before we did, we wanted to discuss the case with Ambassador Thompson in light of the various contingencies which might arise during the course of these interrogations. DDP felt that it was preferable to advise Ambassador Thompson well in advance of our intentions so that if consultations with the State Department became necessary on a contingency basis, Ambassador Thompson would be in possession of the background. Ambassador Thompson first asked if we were sure that NOSENKO could not escape and turn himself into the Soviet Embassy. We told him that we had established him in a country house with a large security guard which we felt made escape improbable. Ambassador Thompson then asked if there was a possibility that NOSENKO might commit suicide. We said psychiatrists did not believe he was the type to do so and that our security surveillance was such that we were alert to this possibility and would try to prevent it. Ambassador Thompson also wondered if there had been any communications concerning NOSENKO from the
[104-10226-10001.pdf — page 1]
Soviet side. He replied there had been none since si thethis country. confrontation last year following NOSENKO's arrival inWe then mentioned the attempts on several -occasions by NOSENKO's wife and mother to contact himthrough the Embassy in Moscow brit added that these attemptsceased in March 1964 and nothing has been heard from themsince.3. Ambassador Thompson then asked if NOSENKO had   provided information which would discredit any American   officials. We answered in the negative, pointing out   that he had reported on former French and Canadian   ambassadors. We Tater qualified the statement on Americans,   pointing out that NOSENKO did provide information on a few   Americans of lesser rank as well as private citizens.4. The DDP then noted that after we reached a   point of no return in our interrogations, we might decide   that NOSENKO would have to be turned back. Ambassador   Thompson expressed concern that the Soviets might use this   action to discourage defections. We explained that when we   came to the point that a turn-back appeared desirable, we   would hope that a statement could be made by the U. S. Govern-   ment which would establish NOSENKO as a provocateur. The   DDP then described the AEJOYFUL case in brief terms to   Ambassador Thompson, emphasizing the parallel planning and   the possibility that a quadripartite statement by the govern-   ments might be considered. The DDP did note, however, that   AEJOYFUL was in British hands and that they have the major   responsibility even though we and other security and intelli-   gence services had agreed on the handling of the case. The   DDP then noted that in past cases where we had turned back   people with intelligence backgrounds at their own request,   the Soviets had not made publicity capital of these actions.5. The earlier mention of our discussions with the   FBI recalled to Ambassador Thompson some of the material on   Soviet political issues which he has been receiving recently   from the FBI. He commented that it was his very strong im-   pression that the information was being fed to us by the   Soviets. He said that it either consisted of information   we already knew or that which the Soviets would not object   to our having. He asked our views on this. The DDP com-
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pented that it was Che opinion of several officers in the Clandestine Services that some of these FEJ sources were mader Soviet control whereas the FBJ believed them to be genuine.0. In summing up our position on the NOSENKO case for Ambassador Thompson, the DDP referred to the kinds of information the Soviets had given up throw SOSENKO. lie Rade particular reference to the Jolmson ce and observed that if the Soviets were prepared to provid this kind of build-up to insure the success of NOSENKO's mission, it must then be very important to them. In conclusion, the DDP said that he would send a letter for the record to Ar. Highes on the topic of NOSENKO to which Ambassador Thompson agreed.David E. MurphyChief, SR Division
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 19926 Apr 6119-120-26UR6 April 1961Chief, Contact DivisionSupportChief, Miami OfficeMemorandum of Visit to: Julio Pablo RODRIGUEZ Nogueira1330 S.W. 22nd AvenueMiami, Florida1.  Mr. Frank Watterson, representative of the US State Dept. in Miami, advised this office that Subject arrived in the US on 31 Mar 61 as an exile and that he might have information of interest to this office.2.  On 4 Apr 61, Luis J.C. Rodriguez interviewed Subject in Watterson’s office. An examination of Subject’s passport disclosed that he was born on 23 Jan 1943 in Havana, Cuba.3.  Subject stated that he is a member of a clandestine organization named United Revolutionary (UR), which is composed of 26 underground groups. The Coordinator for military operations of UR was Major Humberto SORI Marin, who was arrested recently. Among the leaders of UR are Rogelio GONZALEZ bottero known by his nom de guerre of "Faveloso"; and Rafael DIAZ also "Ralpa". All three individuals were arrested recently and UR is completely disorganized as a result.4.  Subject also stated that his mission with UR was to serve as courier between the organization and the Catholic Chaplain at the Cabana fortress. The liaison between the Chaplain and Subject was Fray BALSIERO, who is the sexton at the Jesus de Miramar Church, in the suburb of Miramar, near Havana.5.  Subject also made a trip to Sancti Spiritus in the Province of Las Villas bringing a radio transmitter for the anti-Castro guerrillas operating in the Escambray. Through the above mentioned priests, Subject obtained some information furnished by prisoners held in the Cabana fortress which is being forwarded in a repent memo.6.  Subject intends to remain in the US indefinitely and has been instructed to contact a Cuban national named "Barcelo", who resides at 1321 S.W. 22nd Ave., Miami. Barocio is the UR representative in Miami.7.  No further contacts with Subject are anticipated.JUSTIN F. GLEASON[signature]L/Rodriguez/embAction chief inguerillaCommand &security risk(re discipline)by [illegible]
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992## SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD4 May 1961SUBJECT: Briefing of Mr. Maurice Oldfield, MI-6, by WR/4, Clark Simmons1. In view of the request of Mr. Maurice Oldfield, MI-6 representative, for identities and further particulars regarding the Robert Morten Geddes case a meeting was held on 2 May 1961 with WH/4/CI, Clark Simmons, with Mr. Cleveland C. Cram and John C. Roberts of WB/6 also present.2. At the outset Mr. Oldfield provided the following information:a. Robert Morten Geddes is a British subject born in Lima, Peru, on 7 April 1932. He holds British passport No. C-34880, issued at Nasagua on 14 June 1958. He was not registered at the British Consulate in Havana and was regarded as being American or Canadian.b. Two employees of the British Embassy, Havana, has visited Geddes in the Havana jail (military G-2 section) on Sunday evening, 30 April 1961, and had a 15-minute conversation with Geddes alone under circumstances which they felt were not monitored. Geddes stated to them: (1) On 19 April he was arrested by the militia (in civilian clothes) at his hotel; (2) He had been interrogated three times and gave the impression that he had not disclosed anything of importance; (3) He was accused of being a CIA agent, and told that he could be shot because of the existence of civil war; (4) During the third interrogation Geddes was shown what they were a message in Spanish signed by Geddes which was sent allegedly by him by radio-transmitter asking that CIA send arms to Cuba.c. The British Embassy in Havana learned on Saturday, 29 April 1961, that Geddes had regularly been "picked up" at the Havana airport on his trips to and from Miami. (Mr. Oldfield was not certain what exact interpretation could be given to the term "picked up").3. After relating the above, Mr. Oldfield stated that his service is interested in obtaining an estimate of the sort of story the Cubans might use against Geddes or in provocation against the British Embassy, perhaps to prove that the British Embassy had been in collusion with the U. S. He referred to the following specific questions which he had submitted earlier on 2 May and which were relayed by WB/8 to WH/4; R. Hopkins for answers to be given in the afternoon session by Clark Simmons.SECRET
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# SECRET2a. What was the identity of the agent inside Cuba who gave GEDDES the message he brought to the CIA contact in Miami on 11 March 1961;b. What was the identity--or case or names--used by the CIA case officer in Miami;c. Was Geddes given any means of clandestine radio-transmission;d. What were the instructions given to GEDDES by his case officer.4. Mr. Simmons replied as follows:a. The only means of communication given to Geddes, besides his open code phone contact with his wife in Boca Raton, was a very simple SW system. Geddes was not given any means for clandestine radio-transmission.b. Simmons then read and related the following chronology of Geddes' activities from WH/4 files:11 March: Geddes came to Miami on the night of 11 March and made contact with Cabbage/4, a Cuban in Miami who was in contact with the CIA office. Geddes had a message from Cabbage/1 a CIA contact inside Cuba. C-4 put Geddes in contact with a CIA case officer in Miami on 12 March. Geddes claimed to be an active member of the United Revolucionaria, a resistance group inside Cuba of which C-1 was a member. At that Geddes said the Cuban Navy has a plan to attack all pro-Castro facilities and then flee Cuba on or about 22 March. Geddes did not ask for any money. His activation was not known. The case officer instructions to Geddes were related solely to Geddes' report that the Cuban Navy would defect. Geddes returned to Havana,16 March: Geddes departed for HAVANA.20 March: We heard indirectly Geddes had phoned his wife and indicated that the individual (C-D with whom he had been collaborating in Calzad Revolucionaria was in trouble. The fact behind this was that one of our agents (member of the UR) inside Cuba had against instructions visited his wife in Cuba. As a result a UR set of reved peresos was arrested including C-1. Besides C-1, aces of the others of this net of Geddes' activities.21 March: Geddes returned to Miami.26 March: Geddes came to Havana. He was given a simple SW system. Beginning about 25 March we had reason to suspect Geddes as a possible provocateur since the detection had not come off and possibility of keeping the defection of the Navy secret in itself was implausible.27 March: Geddes sent a SW message to Miami regarding the possible Cuban NAVAL defection.28 March: Through open ocde telecon with wife said defection of Navy not for 3 to 4 April.39 March: Geddes called wife on telephonas.SECRET
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SECRET- 3 -1 April: Geddes sent an 88 message which was hand-carried toKIWI by a courier. Geddes also had a telecon with his wife onthis day.2 April: Geddes said in telecon to wife that naval conspiratorswould meet on 3 April and Geddes would give on on 5 April a finaldate for the defection.4 April: Geddes indicated in telecon to wife that the Navaldetection would take place "any day" now.7 April: We received a message from Geddes delivered by a thirdparty (courier) that the Navy plans to defect on 5 or 7 April.Geddes returned to Miami and said the date was not set for 8 or 9April.10 April: Geddes returned to Havana.11 April: Geddes telephoned his wife that the defection could takeplace on 13 or 14 April.18 April: Geddes in telecon with wife reported that the defectionwould be on 17 or 18 April.c. During the account of the above chronology, Simmonsmade the following comments:(1) The CIA agent inside (C-1) vouched for Geddes but we here inHeadquarters do not know to what extent C-bas proved into the back-ground of Geddes and his contacts. We have did advise Miami not totake any action until we had obtained British concurrence but bythat time Geddes had already returned to Havana. He reiterated thatGeddes was a walk-in and was never treated as an agent.(2) Geddes and his forecast regarding the defection of the CubanNavy were suspect from the outset. He claimed to be a Britishcitizen but was already performing for the U.S.(3) To Mr. Oldfield's question as to whether Geddes had any accessto a W/T man, Simmons replied that to his knowledge Geddes only hadphone contact with his wife, SW and use of courier.(4) No arms deliveries were involved in the contact with Geddes.(5) Simmons said he would look into whom Geddes could contaminateor put the finger on.(6) To Mr. Oldfield's phantom repeated request for identities ofC-4, C-1, the Miami case officer, and the set that was arrested on16 March, Simmons replied that only the DCI has the authority torelease such information.(7) The Miami case officer never served inside Cuba.SECRET
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SECRET- 4 -5. After Mr. Oldfield had put a number of questions to Bianca the latter asked Oldfield whether Geddes is possibly a British agent which Oldfield emphatically answered in the negative.6. Mr. Oldfield said that he would now send off a communication to his service indicating that Geddes might be a phoney—a provocateur. However, he asked that he be provided with the following:7. CIA appreciation of the United Revolucionaria;b. Identities of C-1, C-4 and members of the net with whom C-1 was arrested on March 18 (Note: Sismora acknowledged that besides C-1 conceivably several other members of this net might have known of Geddes and his activities.)c. Identities of the couriers who had contact with Geddesd. The identity of the CIA case officer--the name or names used by him in contacts with Geddes;e. Chronological summary of the visits of Geddes to Miami and returns to Havana; also a list of the nature of his communications to Miami (by telecon, courier, etc.) and communications sent to him in Havana.John G. RobertsDC/WE/6SECRET
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# DISPATCHChief of Station, JMWAVEChief, Special Affairs StaffDIVCUR/TIPIS/OperationalReactions from WH to UR Propaganda and Desire to concentrate UR efforts on PELUANGAR: As IndicatedRSP: UFGA 9274, 27 May 19631. Paragraph 3 of ref: Concerned elements at headquarters studied the attachments with interest; however, the material was not considered of special operational import to merit specific guidance to witting contacts in the UR.2. Any additional effort by the UR to reach and influence PIH audiences will be highly valued.END OF DISPATCHDistribution:3 - AddresseesCLASSIFICATIONS-E-C-R-E-T18 June 63 21 JUN 1963UTM-27719-120-26SAS/NCR/PA-PROF Bruce Mac MasterC/SAS/HOBC/WH/CA 18 JUN 1963C/SAS> [Figure: Distribution list table showing routing and destroy instructions]
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14-00000104-10226-100872025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992TRANSMITTALOFTDCS INFORMATION REPORT|                     |                   || ------------------- | ----------------- || ORIG.               | Jane S. Ingle::jg || UNIT                | TFW/Intel/Reports || EXT.                | 5547              || DATE                | 27 August 1962    || CONFIRMATION COPIES | TFW 12            || INFORMATION COPIES  |                   |CLASSIFICATION255SECRET(When Filled In)255ROUTINGAug 28 13 44262TDCS-3/520,846-SL6F.CI/OPS, CI/IC, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 5, IW 2, CA 2, CA/PRG, OS, WE 6,WE 4,DATE DISTRIBUTEDPRECEDENCE27 August 1962ROUTINEDISSEMINATIONBASED ON (FIM. Rpt. Prof.)|         |                 |               |     || ------- | --------------- | ------------- | --- || TFW/FI  | 2 TFW/PROP-RA 1 | WH/R          | 1   || TFW/Int | 2 TFW/SI  1     | WE/3          | 3   || TFW/R   | 2 TFW/WAVE  1   | WE/R          | 1   || TFW/CI  | 2               |               |     || TFW/PM  | 1 WH/PACY 2     | OS/SSD/Bauman | 1   |WAVE-7632 (IN-11670)WAVE-7114 (IN-46173)UFG-1396UNION (UNION-11)Liaison: GEVALUATIONREQUESTEDOFSTATEARMYNAVYAIRHANDLING INSTRUCTIONSNO FOREIGN DISSEM![signature]![UR logo]DD/P INTERNAL USE ONLYAUTHENTICATING OFFICER![authenticating officer stamp]CLASSIFICATIONSECRET(When Filled In)COORDINATING OFFICER(S)W.S. ComptonWE/3/RE (in draft)RELEASING OFFICER![releasing officer signature]for TFW/IntelCOPY NO.
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# TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAMCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYThis material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Esplonage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSS-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM| COUNTRY                     | CUBA                                          || --------------------------- | --------------------------------------------- || SUBJECT                     | PLANNED UPRISING BY OPPOSITION GROUPS IN CUBA || DATE DISTR.                 | 27 AUGUST 1962                                || DATE OF INFO.               | AUGUST 1962                                   || PLACE & DATE ACQ. APPRAISAL | FRANCE, PARIS (25 AUGUST 1962)                || SOURCE                      | AN OFFICIAL FRENCH SERVICE.                   |1. MEMBERS OF THE UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA (UR) REPORTED TO THE FRENCH EMBASSY IN HABANA THAT ON 10 AUGUST THEY WERE INVITED TO ATTEND A MEETING ON 14 AUGUST ORGANIZED BY THE DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL (DRE) AND THE MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (MRP). THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING WAS FOR THE THREE GROUPS TO PLAN A STAGE OF ACTIVE WARFARE. THE UR WAS ADVISED BY THE FRENCH EMBASSY NOT TO PARTICIPATE, BUT THE UR COULD NOT CONVINCE THE DRE AND THE MRP TO REVERSE THEIR DECISION FOR AN UPRISING SCHEDULED FOR THE LAST DAYS OF AUGUST, WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A GENERAL UPRISING OF ALL INTERNAL RESISTANCE GROUPS.2. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCARIBCLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSS-E-C-R-E-T/ NO FOREIGN DISSEM| STATE | ARMY/ACSI | NAVY | AIR | JCS | SECDEF | NSA | NIC | USIA | OCI | ONE | OCR | ORR | OO  | DIA | INS || ----- | --------- | ---- | --- | --- | ------ | --- | --- | ---- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM
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CLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSS-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEMTDCS -3/520,8461167047173PAGE 23. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: AMERICAN EMBASSY, PARIS, TELEGRAM NO. 984, DATED 26 AUGUST 1962, REPORTED INFORMATION FROM THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN HABANA ON THIS AGREEMENT FOR A GENERAL UPRISING DURING THE LAST DAYS OF AUGUST.END OF MESSAGECLASSIFICATION - DISSEMINATION CONTROLSS-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992TO: DIRECTORFROM: JAWAVEACTION: TFV 10 (MR. KAPPEL, TFW ISSUED TEMPO COPY 2315, 30 AUG)INFO : DCI, DO/P, ADOP, SOD-5, CA 2, CA/PEG, CA/PROP, CA/O CI/OS, CI/IC 2, FI, FI/D, FI/INT 2, IV 2, WH 7, DD/1, AD/CI 2, AD/NE, S/C 2AUG 31 03102 62OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATEIN 14497INI4497OPIM DIR CITE WAVE 7910GYROSE INTELREF A. WAVE 7985 (CA/14487).B. WAVE 7886 (CA 14220).1. REFS REFLECT MOST RECENT ACQUISITION INTEL RE TIMING GENERAL UPRISING. DISTURBING ASPECT RECEIPT THIS INFO IS FACT IT REACHING KUBARK VIA WIDE VARIETY SOURCES BUT ULTIMATE END SOURCE ALWAYS UR. ANALYSIS THIS INFO INDICATES IT HANGS TOGETHER RATHER WELL AND IN MANY INSTANCES VARIETY OF CHANNELS VIA WHICH IT RECEIVED WOULD NORMALLY TEND SERVE AS CROSS CHECK OR CONFIRMATION. WE CONFIDENT THIS INTEL COMING FROM UR CHANNELS WHICH EXILE UR REGARDS AS BONA FIDE. WAVE IN IT IALLY REGARDED INFO AS ACCURATE REFLECTION WHAT UR EXPERIENCING IN CUBA. HOWEVER INVESTIGATION AND REAPPRAISAL THIS INFO LEADS CONSLUSION INFO NOT ACCURATE AND MAY BE REFLECTION 0-2 DECEPTION OR PROVOCATION OP.2. COLLATION ALL INTEL WHICH OBTAINED FROM UR SOURCES RE UPRISING CUBA HAS IDENTIFIED FOLLOVING GROUPS AS SCHEDULED PARTICIPATE THIS REV OLT. OUR COMMENTS RE INQUIRIES WITH THESE GROUPS REVEALS FOLLOWING
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A. DRE REPEAT DRE. PEDRO YNTERIAN CARCIA STATES DRE HASNO INFO RE SCHEDULED REVOLT.B. MRP REPEAT MRP. AMRAZZ-1 CLAIMS HAS NO INFO RE INTERNALREVOLT.C. 30 NOV REPEAT 30 NOV. AMICE-8 REPORTS HIS FACTIONRECEIVED CODED CABLE 33 AUG FROM CUBA WHICH REQUESTED ARMS ASSITUATION DESPERATE AND THEY NEED HELP. AM ICE-8 SENT CODED REPLY38 AUG STATING HOLD OFF FROM ANY PRECIPITOUS ACTION. AMICE-8 HASNO INFO RE TIMING ANY REVOLT.D. JUVENTUD ANTICOMUNISTA CATOLICA REPEAT JUVENTUDANTICOMUNISTA CATOLICA. (CATHOLIC ANTI-COMMUNIST YOUTH) AMPAN-4REPORTS THIS GROUP HAS NO INFO RE REVOLT.E. MRR REPEAT MRR CESAR BARO INDICATES HE HAS HAD COMMOFROM CUBA LAST FEW DAYS BUT NO MENTION MADE ANY REVOLT.F. ELN REPEAT ELN. (EJERCITO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL).WE TRYING OBTAIN INFO FROM THIS GROUP.G. FND REPEAT FND. WE TRYING OBTAIN INFO FROM THIS GROUP.H. FAL REPEAT FAL. HAVE NO INFO OR READY ACCESS THIS GROUP.I. SECUNDO FRENTE ESCAMBRAY REPEAT SECUNDO FRENTEESCAMBRAY. WE TRYING OBTAIN FROM THIS GROUP.3. VIEW PARA 2 INFO PLUS GENERAL KNOWLEDGE INTERNAL CUBAN   SCENE WHICH STEMS FROM DAILY CONTACT REFUGEES, RECEIPT AGENT   TRAFFIC, ETC. MUST CONCLUDE THAT BALANCED JUDGEMENT CONTINUES   INDICATE BONA FIDE POPULAR UPRISING NOT LIKELY AT THIS TIME.4. HAVE NOT EXCLUDED PROVOCATION POSSIBILITY THEREFORE   HAVE ARRANGED FOR ANCORE-2 BROADCAST FOLLOWING STATEMENT 2008