Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 32]
TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY1 July 1964MEMORANDUM FOR: HeadquartersSUBJECT: LEEWIY, George M.(Emergency Instructions Regarding Custody of)#262 622 C SD/11.  Attached are instructions and procedures to be followed in the event of emergency situations affecting the SUBJECT's health, safety and custody, as well as the security of the safehouse where SUBJECT is currently being held.2.  This is to formalize instructions which, for the most part, are already in effect and have been briefed to the personnel of the District Field Office who are concerned with this case.3.  Dissemination of copies of these instructions to members of the Special Security Detail will be made upon notification of Headquarters approval.![signature of JOHN D. MOLLE, Special Agent in Charge, with the date 2 July 64]Attachment:Emergency Instructions (2)TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY
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# EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONSInstructions and procedures are set forth below for the handling of emergency situations such as fire, the escape or attempted escape of SUBJECT, and the sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBJECT. Should such situations arise, it might be necessary to call on the Police, the Fire Department, or outside medical facilities for assistance. It is possible that in such an event representatives of the press or curiosity-seekers in the local community might be attracted to the site, thereby creating security problems with respect to the custody and protection of the SUBJECT from a publicity standpoint.In view of the above, it is therefore imperative that these instructions be thoroughly understood and memorized by all personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on this case.## FIRE(Main House)1.  In case of fire in the Main House, the person discovering the fire should apply the nearest fire extinguisher, unless, in his judgment, the fire has reached such proportions where available equipment would be useless. Simultaneously, he should dispatch another member of the Security Detail to alert the Senior Security Agent (SSA) and the other occupants of the house. If no one is available in the immediate vicinity, the person discovering the fire should alert others in the house by shouting "FIRE".2.  Upon being notified of a fire, the SSA shall be responsible for directing the fighting of the fire, protecting classified and sensitive documents and equipment on the premises, calling the local Fire Department if circumstances warrant, and evacuating personnel. Also, at the first available opportunity, the SSA should call the SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and furnish him with all particulars concerning the situation and the action being taken.3.  In utilizing members of the Security Detail in fighting a fire, it should be borne in mind that two guards must be maintained on the third floor at all times, so long as the SUBJECT remains confined to his quarters. If it should become necessary to remove the SUBJECT from his quarters during an emergency, a minimum of four guards should be present unless circumstances are such as to make this infeasible. In
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EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS(Continued)any event, every possible security precaution should be taken during the movement of FJEJECT, including the use of handcuffs or any other restraining devices deemed necessary in order to maintain proper custody and control over the SUBJECT and prevent his escape.4. If, in the judgment of the SSA, a fire has reached, or is likely to reach proportions that it could not be controlled by firefiziting equipment on the premises, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire Department. In this event, the Security Detail should move with dispatch to remove the SUBJECT from the premises prior to arrival of the Fire Department. The SUBJECT should be placed in an automobile, accompanied by four members of the Security Detail, and driven away from the premises. At appropriate intervals, telephone calls should be made to the safehouse. If no anower is received, the cognizant DEO official should be contacted.for instructions as to whether to return to the safehouse or proceed to an alternáto site.FIRE(Tenant House)1. In case of fire in the Tenant House, the occupants thereof should be instricted to immediately notify the Main House and to use any available means to combat the fire until assistance arrives, unless the fire is out of control, in which case all efforts should be directed towards the evacuation of the occupants of the premises. It should be clearly understood that in no case should any of the occupants of the Tenant House call the Fire Department. This decision is the sole responsibility of the SSA.2. Upon notification of a fire in the Tenant House, the person notified should immediately inform the SSA and assist in the dispatching of available personnel and fire extinguishers to combat the fire. If, in the judgment of the SSA, the fire has reached, or is likely to reach, proportions that it could not be controlled by the available firefighting equipment, it shall be his responsibility to notify the Clinton Fire Department and to take necessary precautionary measures to prevent the observation of the SUBJECT by riremen or other unauthorized persons who might be attracted to the scene.-2-
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EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS(Continued)3. At the first available opportunity, the CCA should call the SAC or ASAC, or if they cannot be reached, a senior DFO Agent, and furnish him with full particulars concerning the situation and the action being taken.## ESCAPE OR ATTEMPTED ESCAPE1. Strict vigilance and security should be maintained on a 24 hour basis in accordance with established procedures in order to discourage and prevent the SUBJECT's escape. If SUBJECT should make an attempt to escape, sufficient force should be used as is necessary under the circumstances in order to subdue the SUBJECT and maintain custody and control over him. However, unnecessary brutality and the indiscriminate use of force will not be condoned.2. All personnel assigned to the Special Security Detail on duty at the site shall be alerted by means of the emergency alarm and/or other appropriate means, and brought into play on any escape attempt. Should the SUBJECT succeed in escaping from the house proper, the SSA shall be responsible for coordinating and directing a hot pursuit of the SUBJECT by all means available.3. The use of firearms should be scrupulously avoided except in extreme circumstances of self-defense. However, the SSA under circumstances that indicate there are no other means of preventing SUBJECT'S total escape, may direct a qualified firearms-trained agent to fire shots over SUBJECT's head followed by verbal warning to halt. In no event, except in self-defense as stated above, will an agent shoot directly at the SUBJECT.4. At the first available opportunity, the EAC/DFO, or in his absence, one of the ASACs, should be telephonically advised of all the circumstances surrounding an escape attempt. In no case shall the Police be notified unless authorized by the SAC or ASAC.## ILLNESS OR INJURY1. In case of sudden illness or serious injury to the SUBJECT, Dr. Charles BOHRER, or other physician designated by him in the event
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EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS(Continued)of his absence, should be imediately notified and advice obtained asto any emergency action which should be taken pending his arrival.Likewise, the CAC or ASAC/DC should be notified immediately aftertalking to the doctor in order that he might be apprised of the situationand any instructions or treatment prescribed by the doctor. Regardlessof any instructions given by the doctor, no action shall be taken toremove the SUBJECT from the premises or to communicate with any hospitalor ambulance service without the prior authorization of the SAC or ASAС.2. Should it become necessary to remove the SUBJECT to a hospital   or other location away froz the premises, every possible precaution   should be taken to maintain close custody and control over hin, and to   prevent disclosure of his true identity and status to unauthorized   persons.GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION1. Two men on duty on third floor who will keep SUBJECT under   constant observation twenty-four hours a day.2. Four men in attendance whenever SUBJECT leaves cell while   confined to third floor.3. Six men in attendance whenever SUBJECT is taken to interrogation   room on second floor, all to remain available in adjoining room for   removal signal from visitors.4. Coveralls taken froc 53JECT at 2200 hours and returned the   following morning at 0700 hours daily, leaving SUBJECT in shorts and   undershirt overnight.5. Military appearance end prompt shift schedules maintained at   all times when in presence of 52ст.6. Careful room search, Lecluding clothes and burk, to be conducted   every time SUBJECT leaves celi.7. SUBJECT must stand in West corner of cell facing wall whenever   anyone but Dr. BOHRER enters cell.--
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EMEPSENCY INSTRUCTIONS(Continued)8. Windows in cell to remain blacked out and doors to other rooms on 3rd floor to be closed and locked when SUBJECT leaves cell, in order to prevent his becoming oriented to surroundings.9. No unnecessary conversation shall be conducted with GJEJECT or among agents, nor shall any mention of last names be made within SUBJECT'S hearing.10. SUBJECT is not to have access to newspapers and magazines, nor permitted to hear radio or television, nor shall there be any discussion of news events within his hearing. He may be provided selected reading material upon authorization of Headquarters personnel concerned with the case.11. Recording devices to be promptly activated in order to pick up any coments by SUBJECT or conversation between him and the doctor or other operational personnel.12. Any unusual or significant comments, movements or activities of TJEJECT to be promptly brought to the attention of the SSA.13. Telephone numbers of key Security and Operational personnel, as well as photographs and physical description of SUBJECT to be maintained in a secure place for ready reference by the SSA.14. Should it become necessary to answer questions by the Police or Fire Department regarding the site, personnel at the site, or with specific reference to the SUBJECT, such inquiries should be handled by the SEA with the senior Police or Fire Department official on the scene. The SSA should converse in private with such official, and identify himself by utilizing his DODD credential. He should explain briefly, and only to the extent necessary, that the property is leased and that it is used occasionally for training purposes. All inquiries concerning the SUBJECT should be parried, if possible. However, if necessary, it may be explained that the SUBJECT has a mental disorder which sometimes requires special treatment. He should not be identified under his alias or otherwise. The SSA should tactfully but firmly request that his om identity, plus his DOD affiliation, be held in strict confidence, especially with regard to the press. Inquiries by members of the press or menters of the civilian population should be answered by stating that the site is rented by a private group who meet periodically for recreation.-5-
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EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS(Continued)SPECIAL CONTACTS1. George PANESAULIS, Chief of Folice, Prince Georges County.   (Personally known to SNODDY under GOLIATH)2. Licutenant MOON, Commanding Officer, Barracks H, Waldorf,   Maryland, Maryland State Police. (Personally known to FEPPALL   under GOLIATH)3. Emergency Ambulance - Greenbelt Volunteer Fire Department.   (Can be cotained through SHODEY)Above not to be contacted unless asthorized by SAC or ASAC.-6-
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OLC-C6755 August 195)MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Bricing of day Congrealonal Contacts on theYuriy Ivanovich Nascako Case1. The Director having approved the proposal in my draft remo   of 17. June 1959 (copy attached) regarding the briefing of key congressional   contacta on the history and status of the Yurly Ivanovich lesekno case, I   have briefed the following staff officers of Agency congressional Subcon:-   mittesa along the lines proposed on the dates indicated:Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel, HouseArnwi Sərvices Committee -- 23 July 1759William Woodruff, Assistant Chief Clerk, SonateAppropriations Committaa -- 24 July 1969Edward Braswell, Chief of Staff, Senate ArmedServices Committee -- 24 July 1959Robert Michaels, Staff Assistant, liouse AppropriationsCommittee -- 27 July 19622. I suggested to each that they mention the matter to the respective   chairmen when and if they thought it appropriate. None of the stail officera   registered particular concera or curiosity about the case and I think it   doubtful that all of our chaarmon have been intermed. Neverthelesa, I   think we have adequately covered the matter and see no need to pursue it   further at this time.JOHN MAURYLegislative CounselAttachment:Ilutribution:Original - CLC Subject1.2031- Chief, CI Stat1- Chief, SB Civision1- D. Jocurity: CCC1-CLC ChrocoSECRET
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DRAFT:JMM - 19 June 1969SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Nosenko.СавеThe following paragraphs are proposed as guidance for briefing key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko case. They are based primarily on material provided by SB Division, and have been cleared by SB, CI Staff and the Office of Security. It is proposed that the Chairmen and/or senior staff officers of each of the Agency Subcommittees be briefed along the lines indicated.1. This case goes back sometime into history and you may recall having heard of it several years ago. From time to time it has received press play, both when it first broke in early 1964 and occasionally since.2. Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a Staff Officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR, and son of a former Minister of Shipbuilding in the USSR, defected to the Agency in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4 February 1964. He was then brought to the United States where he has since been in the custody of the Agency undergoing extensive debrieüngs by officers of the Agency and the FBI.
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SECRET EYES ONLY3. Nosenko had been a KGB officer for approximately ten years at the time of his defection. Nosenko has provided a large quantity of counter-intelligence data and a limited amount of positive intelligence. For example, one of his reports played a part in the negation of a major hostile penetration in Great Britain. Where appropriate, his information has been shared with the FBI, other U.S. Government agencies and foreign liaison services. This has resulted in extensive and continuing investigative activity. In addition, Nosenko identified many hundreds of Soviet Intelligence Officers and provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization of the KGB, its operational doctrine and its techniques and methods.4. In debriefing him it became apparent that Nosenko, the privileged and undisciplined son of a former ranking Minister of the Soviet Government, was a particularly complex personality, one given to exaggeration of his own importance. In this regard, certain aspects of his life history, when weighed against other information already in our possession, raised some doubts concerning his veracity. To permit extensive and prolonged debriefing, arrangements were made to accommodate Nosenko under highly secure conditions. These arrangements were dictated, during the initial phases at least, by the additional need to provide Nosenko with continuing personal protection since there was the distinct possibility that, as a KGB officer.
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he would be targetted for "executive action" if the Soviets should discover his whereabouts: With the passage of time, this latter factor is considered to be sufficiently diminished to justify a phased normalization of Nosenko's situation--this despite the fact that some points remain unresolved concerning his bona fides.5. The Agency, with the assistance of the FBI, is continuing to look into those questionable aspects of the case, while remaining alert to the possibility of hostile interest. However, during the full period of his stay in the United States Nosenko has cooperated with his interrogators and with the other officers responsible for his safety and welfare, and our current efforts are being directed toward his gradual adjustment to a normal, independent status. As a step in this direction, he is now living in his own private apartment, subject to some protective surveillance.6. This action is being taken in full recognition of the normal problems of readjustment experienced by many defectors as well as the fact that Nosenko is a potentially greater problem than most. He is an individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be predictable or wise from the point of view of his own security. We are hopeful that Nosenko is sensible enough to realize that undue publicity caused by any rash action on his part could lead to unpleasant, perhaps even dangerous consequences, particularly for himself. We therefore believe it appropriate to take this calculated risk in an attempt to steer him toward a reasonably normal life.
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# NOSENKOQuestion #1 - Conditions under which Nosenko was held while at Clinton? Locked in? Let outside for entertainment? Prisoner? Treatment?Answer:During the period of 4 April 1964-13 August 1965, Nosenko was held in strict confinement under the following conditions:a. Confinement in single room except for periods of interrogation.b. Constantly under guard and subject to 24 hour visual observation with regular room search.c. Dress was coveralls and food was of sufficient quantity but limited in variety.d. No unnecessary conversation was permitted, radio and television were not allowed, newspapers or any information concerning current events were forbidden and reading material was extremely limited.Question #2 - Conditions at ISOLATION. Same as above.Answer:During the period of 13 August 1965 to 25 October 1967, conditons cited above were basically maintained with the following additons or changes:a. From February 1966 to May 1967, Nosenko was furnished no reading material.b. After May 1967, Nosenko was periodically given a different volume of the Encyclopaedia Britannica to read.c. From February 1966 to October 1967, Nosenko was not permitted cigarettes.d. Subject was permitted daily exercise in a small confined area outside the building when weather permitted.
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Question #3 - Did McCone or Raborn have any information on this:What?Answer:Office of Security records contain only limited information in regard to this question. The SE Division (then SR) was the responsible office for the confinement of Nosenko until late October 1967 when total responsibility was transferred to the Office of Security by the DCI. It is presumed that the DCI was at least generally aware of the confinement of Nosenko and the conditions of confinement, but any definite statement must be based on SE records.Question #4 - Where is Nosenko working now?Answer:Nosenko is currently employed at his personally owned residence in North Carolina. He is engaged in research and analytical work based on his previous knowledge of the KGB and other Soviet matters. He is in the Washington, D. C. area for several days approximately every six weeks for direct interviews by the FBI and Office of Security personnel.Question #5 - Is he working for CIA?Answer:Nosenko has been employed by the Agency on a full-time contractual basis since 1 March 1969. The original contract has been periodically amended to reflect additional remuneration, primarily to compensate for cost of living increases. In late 1972, Nosenko was compensated by mutual agreement for salary not received during the 1 April 1964 to 1 March 1969. In addition, on 12 July 1973 Nosenko signed an acknowledgement and release of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency from any claims prior to that date.Question #6 - What is his legal status?Answer:Nosenko was naturalized as a United States citizen in April 1974.
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SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector GeneralSUBJECT : The Nosenko CaseAttached please find a summary of a document written in 1967 to the General Counsel outlining the Nosenko case and explaining to him actions which had been taken with regard to Nosenko. As noted in the first paragraph, in October 1967 Nosenko took up residence in the Washington area and was advised that, should he wish to leave the apartment for any location whatsoever, he was free to so do. In other words, from that date, Nosenko was essentially a totally free man. That he chose not to flee in any way may be indicative of his attitude toward the manner in which he was handled prior to October 1967.While one can criticize the fact that Nosenko was kept *incommunicado* for approximately three years, and therefore presumably denied full civil rights, the attached document does indicate, we believe, that the Agency was on the horns of a dilemna in this regard. There were legitimate doubts about. Nosenko's bona fides and concern that he was a Soviet plant. There was no country to which he could be deported save the Soviet Union, and Nosenko himself refused to return there. Yet, in the United States, save when isolated from society, he was considered to be a continuing threat to national security.Recognizing that only legal experts can judge definitively the merits of the case, it seems to the writer that the Agency had no choice but to hold Nosenko *incommunicado* pending resolution of his bona fides. He was admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, namely as a parolee to the Agency. As a parolee, Nosenko *de facto* from the date of his entry to the United States did not enjoy the full civil rights of the normal citizen. He was a ward of the Agency, in a sense, and the Agency was ultimately responsible for hisSECRETE2 IMPDETCL BY 018307
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SECRETconduct. There were at the time very legitimate reasons to believe that full and total release of Nosenko would be an abrogation by the Agency of its legal responsibility. To gainsay that decision in retrospect is, we believe, an error. In sum, the act of defection places the defector at the mercy of the laws of the country to which he defects. It is the obligation of the accepting country to see to it that the laws are followed. In the Nosenko case, it seems to us that the Agency acted in a fully responsible manner to ensure that its responsibility for the defector was met. While it was unfortunate that it took so long to resolve the matter, we can find no fault with the fact that the Agency met its responsibility to both the United States and to Nosenko himself.Attachment: A/S2SECRET
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# SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKOIn early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was provided a summary of the Nosenko case. The memorandum sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the Agency's legal basis for its handling of Nosenko through that date and on the legal aspects on the eventual disposition of Nosenko. Shortly subsequent to this sesorandum to the General Counsel, Nosenko took up residence in October 1967 in an apartment in the Washington area and was reminded that should he wish, he could travel freely anywhere at anytime. He gradually created a new life for himself in the United States and has indicated on several occasions that he holds no ill feeling about his handling by the Agency at anytime.BackgroundNosenko voluntarily established contact with CIA representatives in Geneva in 1962. He identified himself as a staff officer of the KGB's internal security directorate and offered to sell counterintelligence information. This offer was accepted and he was recruited as an agent in place andSECRET