Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 161]
EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS(Continued)8. Windows in cell to remain blacked out and doors to other rooms on 3rd floor to be closed and locked when SUBJECT leaves cell, in order to prevent his becoming oriented to surroundings.9. No unnecessary conversation shall be conducted with SUBJECT or among agents, nor shall any mention of last names be made within SUBJECT'S hearing.10. SUBJECT is not to have access to newspapers and magazines, nor permitted to hear radio or television, nor shall there be any discussion of news events within his hearing. He may be provided selected reading material upon authorization of Headquarters personnel concerned with the case.11. Recording devices to be promptly activated in order to pick up any comments by SUBJECT or conversation between him and the doctor or other operational personnel.12. Any unusual or significant comments, movements or activities of SUBJECT to be promptly brought to the attention of the SSA.13. Telephone numbers of key Security and Operational personnel, as well as photographs and physical description of SUBJECT to be maintained in a secure place for ready reference by the SSA.14. Should it become necessary to answer questions by the Police or Fire Department regarding the site, personnel at the site, or with specific reference to the SUBJECT, such inquiries should be handled by the SSA with the senior Police or Fire Department official on the scene. The SSA should converse in private with such official, and identify himself by utilizing his DODD credential. He should explain briefly, and only to the extent necessary, that the property is leased and that it is used occasionally for training purposes. All inquiries concerning the SUBJECT should be parried, if possible. However, if necessary, it may be explained that the SUBJECT has a mental disorder which sometimes requires special treatment. He should not be identified under his alias or otherwise. The SSA should tactfully but firmly request that his own identity, plus his DOD affiliation, be held in strict confidence, especially with regard to the press. Inquiries by members of the press or members of the civilian population should be answered by stating that the site is rented by a private group who meet periodically for recreation.-5-
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 162]
EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS(Continued)SPECIAL CONTACTS1. George PANESAULIS, Chief of Police, Prince Georges County.   (Persually known to ENODDY under GOLIATH)2. Licutenant MOCH, Commanding cficer, Barracks H, Waldorf,   Maryland, Maryland State Police. (Personally known to PEPPALL   under GOLIATH)3. Emergency Ambulance - Greenbelt Volunteer Fire Department.   (Can be cotained through S1600)Above not to be contacted unless asthorized by SAC or ASAC.-6-
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 163]
# 14-00000OLC 69-66755 August 1969MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Case1. The Director having approved the proposal in my draft memo of 13 June 1969 (copy attached) regarding the briefing of key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko case, I have briefed the following staff officers of Agency congressional Subcommittees along the lines proposed on the dates indicated:Frank Slatinshek, Assistant Chief Counsel, House Armed Services Committee -- 23 July 1969William Woodruff, Assistant Chief Clerk, Senate Appropriations Committee -- 24 July 1969Edward Braswell, Chief of Staff, Senate Armed Services Committee -- 24 July 1969Robert Michaels, Staff Assistant, House Appropriations Committee -- 27 July 19692. I suggested to each that they mention the matter to the respective chairmen when and if they thought it appropriate. None of the staff officers registered particular concern or curiosity about the case and I think it doubtful that all of our chairmen have been informed. Nevertheless, I think we have adequately covered the matter and see no need to pursue it further at this time.![signature of John H. Maury]JOHN H. MAURYLegislative CounselAttachment:Distribution:Original - CLC Subject File1 - DDS1 - Chief, CI Staff1 - Chief, SE Division1 - D. Security1 - CGC1 - CLC ChronoSECRET
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 164]
DRAFT:JMM-19 June 1969SUBJECT: Briefing of Key Congressional Contacts on the Nosenko.CaseThe following paragraphs are proposed as guidance for briefing key congressional contacts on the history and status of the Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko case. They are based primarily on material provided by SB Division, and have been cleared by SB, CI Staff and the Office of Security. It is proposed that the Chairmen and/or senior staff officers of each of the Agency Subcommittees be briefed along the lines indicated.1.  This case goes back sometime into history and you may recall having heard of it several years ago. From time to time it has received press play, both when it first broke in early 1964 and occasionally since.2.  Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a Staff Officer of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR, and son of a former Minister of Ship-building in the USSR, defected to the Agency in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4 February 1964. He was then brought to the United States where he has since been in the custody of the Agency undergoing extensive debriefings by officers of the Agency and the FBI.
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 165]
SECRET ENRS EXAM3. Nosenko had been a KGB officer for approximately ten years at the time of his defection. Nosenko has provided a large quantity of counter-intelligence data and a limited amount of positive intelligence. For example, one of his reports played a part in the negation of a major hostile penetration in Great Britain. Where appropriate, his information has been shared with the FBI, other U.S. Government agencies and foreign liaison services. This has resulted in extensive and continuing investigative activity. In addition, Nosenko identified many hundreds of Soviet Intelligence Officers and provided a considerable quantity of useful information on the organization of the KGB, its operational doctrine and its techniques and methods.4. In debriefing him it became apparent that Nosenko, the privileged and undisciplined son of a former ranking Minister of the Soviet Government, was a particularly complex personality, one given to exaggeration of his own importance. In this regard, certain aspects of his life history, when weighed against other information already in our possession, raised some doubts concerning his veracity. To permit extensive and prolonged debriefing, arrangements were made to accommodate Nosenko under highly secure conditions. These arrangements were dictated, during the initial phases at least, by the additional need to provide Nosenko with continuing personal protection since there was the distinct possibility that, as a KGB officer.
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 166]
SECREThe would be targetted for "executive action" if the Soviets should discover his whereabouts: With the passage of time, this latter factor is considered to be sufficiently diminished to justify a phased normalization of Nosenko's situation--this despite the fact that some points remain unresolved concerning his bona fides.5. The Agency, with the assistance of the FBI, is continuing to look into those questionable aspects of the case, while remaining alert to the possibility of hostile interest. However, during the full period of his stay in the United States Nosenko has cooperated with his interrogators and with the other officers responsible for his safety and welfare, and our current efforts are being directed toward his gradual adjustment to a normal, independent status. As a step in this direction, he is now living in his own private apartment, subject to some protective surveillance.6. This action is being taken in full recognition of the normal problems of readjustment experienced by many defectors as well as the fact that Nosenko is a potentially greater problem than most. He is an individual whose actions during resettlement may not always be predictable or wise from the point of view of his own security. We are hopeful that Nosenko is sensible enough to realize that undue publicity caused by any rash action on his part could lead to unpleasant, perhaps even dangerous consequences, particularly for himself. We therefore believe it appropriate to take this calculated risk in an attempt to steer him toward a reasonably normal life.
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 167]
# NOSENKOQuestion #1 - Conditions under which Nosenko was held while at Clinton? Locked in? Let outside for entertainment? Prisoner? Treatment?Answer:During the period of 4 April 1964-13 August 1965, Nosenko was held in strict confinement under the following conditions:a. Confinement in single room except for periods of interrogation.b. Constantly under guard and subject to 24 hour visual observation with regular room search.c. Dress was coveralls and food was of sufficient quantity but limited in variety.d. No unnecessary conversation was permitted, radio and television were not allowed, newspapers or any information concerning current events were forbidden and reading material was extremely limited.Question #2 - Conditions at ISOLATION. Same as above.Answer:During the period of 13 August 1965 to 25 October 1967, conditons cited above were basically maintained with the following additons or changes:a. From February 1966 to May 1967, Nosenko was furnished no reading material.b. After May 1967, Nosenko was periodically given a different volume of the Encyclopaedia Britannica to read.c. From February 1966 to October 1967, Nosenko was not permitted cigarettes.d. Subject was permitted daily exercise in a small confined area outside the building when weather permitted.
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 168]
Question #3 - Did McCone or Raborn have any information on this: What?Answer:Office of Security records contain only limited information in regard to this question. The SE Division (then SR) was the responsible office for the confinement of Nosenko until late October 1967 when total responsibility was transferred to the Office of Security by the DCI. It is presumed that the DCI was at least generally aware of the confinement of Nosenko and the conditions of confinement, but any definite statement must be based on SE records.Question #4 - Where is Nosenko working now?Answer:Nosenko is currently employed at his personally owned residence in North Carolina. He is engaged in research and analytical work based on his previous knowledge of the KGB and other Soviet matters. He is in the Washington, D. C. area for several days approximately every six weeks for direct interviews by the FBI.and Office of Security personnel.Question #5 - Is he working for CIA?Answer:Nosenko has been employed by the Agency on a full-time contractual basis since 1 March 1969. The original contract has been periodically amended to reflect additional remuneration, primarily to compensate for cost of living increases. In late 1971, Nosenko was compensated by mutual agreement for salary not received during the 1 April 1964 to 1 March 1969. In addition, on 12 July 1973 Nosenko signed an acknowledgement and release of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency from any claims prior to that date.Question #6 - What is his legal status?Answer:Nosenko was naturalized as a United States citizen in April 1974.
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 169]
SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector GeneralSUBJECT : The Nosenko CaseAttached please find a summary of a document written in 1967 to the General Counsel outlining the Nosenko case and explaining to him actions which had been taken with regard to Nosenko. As noted in the first paragraph, in October 1967 Nosenko took up residence in the Washington area and was advised that, should he wish to leave the apartment for any location whatsoever, he was free to so do. In other words, from that date, Nosenko was essentially a totally free man. That he chose not to flee in any way may be indicative of his attitude toward the manner in which he was handled prior to October 1967.While one can criticize the fact that Nosenko was kept incommunicado for approximately three years, and therefore presumably denied full civil rights, the attached document does indicate, we believe, that the Agency was on the horns of a dilemna in this regard. There were legitimate doubts about. Nosenko's bona fides and concern that he was a Soviet plant. There was no country to which he could be deported save the Soviet Union, and Nosenko himself refused to return there. Yet, in the United States, save when isolated from society, he was considered to be a continuing threat to national security.Recognizing that only legal experts can judge definitively the merits of the case, it seems to the writer that the Agency had no choice but to hold Kosenko incommunicado pending resolution of his bona fides. He was admitted to the United States under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, namely as a parolee to the Agency. As a parolee, Nosenko de facto from the date of his entry to the United States did not enjoy the full civil rights of the normal citizen. lHe was a ward of the Agency, in a sense, and the Agency was ultimately responsible for hisSECRETE2 IMPDETCL BY 018307
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 170]
# SECRETconduct. There were at the time very legitimate reasons to believe that full and total release of Nosenko would be an abrogation by the Agency of its legal responsibility. To gainsay that decision in retrospect is, we believe, an error. In sum, the act of defection places the defector at the mercy of the laws of the country to which he defects. It is the obligation of the accepting country to see to it that the laws are followed. In the Nosenko case, it seems to us that the Agency acted in a fully responsible manner to ensure that its responsibility for the defector was met. While it was unfortunate that it took so long to resolve the matter, we can find no fault with the fact that the Agency met its responsibility to both the United States and to Nosenko himself.Attachment: A/S2# SECRET
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 171]
SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKOIn early or mid-1967, the Agency General Counsel was provided a summary of the Nosenko case. The memorandum sought an advisory opinion from the General Counsel on the Agency's legal basis for its handling of Hosenko through that date and on the legal aspects on the eventual disposition of Nosenko. Shortly subsequent to this memorandum to the General Counsel, Nosenko took up residence in October 1967 in an apartment in the Washington area and was reminded that should he wish, he could travel freely anywhere at anytime. He gradually created a new life for himself in the United States and has indicated on several occasions that he holds no ill feeling about his handling by the Agency at anytime.BackgroundNosenko voluntarily established contact with CIA repre-..sentatives in Geneva in 1962. He identified himself as a staff officer of the KGB's internal security directorate and offered to sell counterintelligence information. This offer was accepted and he was recruited as an agent in place andSECRET
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 172]
SECRETdebriefed on counterintelligence matters during five meetingsin Geneva. He then returned to the USSR. He came to Genevaagain in January 1964 as the security officer for the Sovietdisarmament delegation. After a number of meetings with hisCIA handlers he defected on 4 February 1964 and was secretlytaken to Frankfurt, Germany, crossing the Swiss-German border-on the night of 4/5 February with alias U.S. Army identitydocuments. In Geneva and again upon arrival in Frankfurt,Nosenko wrote out an asylum request, requesting politicalasylum from the U.S. Government.Because serious doubts about Nosenko's *bona fides* hadarisen on the basis of the information he had provided bothin 1962 and in the meetings in Geneva in 1964, it was orig-inally planned to do a detailed *bona fides* debriefing andassessment in Germany before making any decision about movingNosenko to the United States. However, *unprecedented action*by the Soviet Government in respect to the defection of oneof its citizens forced a change of plans. On 9 February,unidentified Soviet sources in Geneva leaked the news to thepress that Nosenko, described as an "expert attached to theSoviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference" had dis-appeared, and that it was presumed that he had defected.2SECRET
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 173]
SECRETBecause of mounting pressure from the press, which included much speculation that Nosenko was a high level scientist or disarmament expert, it was decided that the State Department would make a brief announcement acknowledging Nosenko's request for asylum in the U.S. and identifying him as a member of the KGB. This was done on 10 February. On 11 February, the Soviet Government delivered a note to the American Embassy in Moscow asking how Nosenko left Switzerland and requesting an immediate interview with him and his release. On 12 February, Soviet Ambassador to the Disarmament Conference TSARAPKIN held a press conference in Geneva in which he accused the Swiss Government of failure to cooperate in locating Nosenko. Although the Swiss categorically rejected these charges, the American Ambassador to Switzerland recommended that Swiss authorities be allowed to interview Nosenko to convince themselves that Nosenko had left Switzerland of his own free will.On 12 February 1964, on the instructions of the Director, Nosenko was brought to the United States. He travelled by commercial air, again using alias U.S. Army identification, and was admitted to the country at New York City (in true name) on parole under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.3SECRET
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 174]
# SECRETOn 13 February, representatives of the Swiss and SovietEmbassies in Washington advised the State Department thatthey desired interviews with Nosenko. On 14 February, inMoscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO called in AmbassadorKOHLER and protested "impermissable activities" on the partof the U.S. in Nosenko's case. Soviet press spokesmen tookan even harder line to Western correspondents, and accusedthe U.S. of kidnapping Nosenko. On the afternoon of 14 Sep-tember, at two separate interviews, he spoke first to SwissEmbassy and then to Soviet Embassy representatives. Atthese interviews, which were also attended by State Departmentand INS officials, Nosenko confirmed that he left Switzerlandof his own free will to seek asylum in the U.S. In addition,he replied to questions of the Soviet Embassy representativeto the effect that he was renouncing his Soviet citizenship.On the evening of 14 February, the U.S. State Department madea brief formal reply to the Soviet protest, then issued abrief statement to the press noting that the interviews hadbeen held and that Nosenko had confirmed his desire to remainin this country.From the time of his arrival to 4 April 1964, Nosenkowas housed in the Washington area. During this period, reg-ular systematic debriefing was commenced, and Nosenko was# SECRET
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 175]
SECRETmade available to representatives of the FBI for debriefing on matters affecting their responsibilities. Although allowed out for evening and week-end excursions, Nosenko was at all times accompanied by O/S personnel. In addition, he took a two-week vacation to Hawaii, again accompanied by case officers and security guards. Evidence continued to mount that he was a KGB plant, and at the same time it became obvious that it would be impossible to proceed further to resolve the many suspicious points and contradictions that had arisen without changing the conditions in which he was being held. Nosenko was growing increasingly uncooperative, especially when sensitive areas were touched upon, and constantly pressed for the legalization of his status in the U.S. and the issuance of an alien registration card. At the same time, Nosenko's heavy drinking and other unruly personal habits were causing increasing difficulties to the security personnel charged with keeping him under control and out of trouble at all times in accordance with Agency local responsibility. It was clear that it was only a matter of time before he created a public scandal. More importantly, he was in a position to communicate with the KGB since physical control could not be absolute.On 4 April 1964, Nosenko voluntarily underwent a polygraph examination. The results of this examination indicated deception5SECRET
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 176]
# SECRETon a number of critical points indicating that he was sent by the KGB to perform one or more missions which also involved his penetration of the Agency and its operations. It was decided, therefore, that the physical circumstances of Nosenko's stay in this country would have to be drastically changed if the Agency were to carry out its counterintelligence responsibilities and adhere to the terms of the parole agreement. As a result, he was moved to quarters where his movements could be more easily controlled, and his outing privileges were suspended pending resolution of *bona fides*.It is worth noting that had we not taken the above action but accepted Nosenko at face value, it is quite possible that we would have proceeded with a series of operational actions on the basis of his information. The results of some of these actions could have been very embarrassing to the U.S. Government politically and damaging to U.S. national security. For example, his chief operational proposal at the time, and one that he was most insistent that we should proceed with immediately, involved the compromise of a very senior Soviet official.*Sona Fides*Beginning in April 1964, hundreds of hours were devoted to interrogations of Nosenko (in which he willingly cooperated) and a great deal of time was spent on exhaustive collateral
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 177]
# SECRETinvestigations. We concluded that it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that Nosenko was a KGB agent who established contact with CIA, subsequently defected on KGB instructions, and that he came to the United States on a deception mission. The implications of this mission had a grave and direct bearing on U.S. national security. Although our findings were supported by the results of two polygraph examinations, the nature of the evidence was inadmissable in a court of law. In any case, it is clear that Nosenko had not been in a position to perform any overt act of transgression of U.S. espionage laws since 4 April 1964 when he was placed in a restricted area and deprived of any conceivable means of communication with the KGB.Nosenko did not admit that he defected on KGB orders or that he came to the U.S. on a KGB mission. He has admitted, however, that he made numerous lies about his personal history and about the details of his KGB service to U.S. officials, both before and after arriving in the United States."Coordination with Other U.S. Government AgenciesUSIB Members. In accordance with the DDCI's ruling relating to a defector who has been a member of a hostile intelligence service, Nosenko's status and handling was discussed at an executive session of USIB and decided on an