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# 14-00000It also established a guerril'a training base and coordinating centre in Chile. The large intõljig. ency tearn in tha Cohan Embassy in Santiago maintained liaison with the liberation movement in Argentina, Bolivia, ant Uruguay. Cubi's Soviet controlied intelligence service. Dirección General do Inteligencia (DGI), aina had close ties with the Chilean ultra-leftist and other revolutionary exile groups, providing them with training, arras and furids for the armed struggle in Chile and other Latin Amarican countries.## Revolutionaries TrainedSoviet army personnel were directly involved in the training of worker-revolutionaries for urban guerrilla warfare. This occurred during 1972-73 at El Belloto, near Valparaiso, where the USSR had installed a factory for the manufacture of prefabricated housing. The firm (KPD) employed sixteen Pussians, four of whom were engineers and technicians; the remaining twelve, wore Soviet army officers. After working hours, these twelve officers instructed a hard-core of specially. selected worker-revolutionaries in the use of arms, street fighting. and urban guerrilla tactics. The Russian-built factory was kept under constant surveillarice by Chile's naval intelligenco. On the morning of 11 September 1973, naval intelligence arrested the Russians and three days later ex-polled them from the country".This clandestine involvement in training guerrillas in Chile was an exception to Moscow's official line of giving full support to the legal and peaceful path to socialism. But the Soviet leader-ship operates on the principle that sincu every eventuality cannot be foreseen it is batter to take advance measures which might "contradict" the official lice than to be sorry later. In Chile there clearly were some advantages in having some armed revolutionaries under direct Soviet control: Moscow would be able to retain some measure of Influence over the ultra-left, particularly import-ant in the event that this faction was able to seize power. As it turned out. Pussia's "united front" tactics failed, and the armed struggle was aborted by the Chilean military.## Sovlet Industrial EspionareThe Soviet Union made every effort to extract the maximum advantage from its technical assist. ance programme. It assigned 45 technicians to the nationalised cooper industry to help raise productivity, all of whom were engaged in in-dustrial espionage. They were far more interested In gaining first-hand knowledge of the advanced US mining equipment and methods of operation than in assisting Chilaan development. Anches Zauschquevich, executiva vice-prasident of the copper corporation, told me in December 1973 that the specialists during their two-year stay contributed nothing to the improvement et mining operations and wera mainly uccupied in gathering specifications of American equipment, obtaining Information on mining techniques and organisa-tion, and collecting data on costs and product-Ivity.Moscow was also especially interested in fisheries and fishery-related (oceanographic, hydrographic and marine biological research) assistance to Chilo. Fisheries aid gave the Ausston's access to Chilean parts for its fishing, oceanogr:chic and other vessel mil the Chileans with a Soviet maritime presences The growing presence in Chilean waters, arcund the Capa and in cub-Antarctic waters provided a cover for gathering intelligence and cosano-graphic data of use to the Soviet pavy.The Soviet Union offered to supply $300 million in military equipinent to Allende in 1971. but the military refused the offer and decided to continue to obtain arms from the United States and othar Western suppliers. The anti-Cornrnunist military wero disturbed by the deepening economic and political violence under the Popular Unity government, and were anxious not to weaken their military ties with the United States and Wastern Europe by turning to the Sovint Union for arms. M.scow had hoped to establish an important procedent for supplying arms to non-Communist countries in Latin America and further weaken Washington's already strained reissions with the Latin American military, Despite the cool. ness of oficial US-Chilean relations, the United States continued to maintain friendly relations with the Chilean military.The Kremlin was very much aware of the weak. ness of the Aliende regime. Not only was it a minority government (in 1970, 35% and, in 1973, 43% of the electorato supported the Popular Unity coalition) but the armed forces and power-ful national police were strongly anti-Communist. Since the "democratic forces" lacked full political and economic power, Moscow favoured a gradual take-over by the Communists and avoidance of civil war or military confrontation at all costs. Beth the ultra-left and ultra-right opponents of Allende were attacked regularly in the Soviet prass, But the Moverment of the Revo-lutionary Left (MIR), an ultra-left group that pur-sued the armed path and hoped to defeat the opposition forces in a violent confrontation, was singled out for particularly scathing criticism. It was charged with "revolutionary adventprism". contributing to political instability and harming the prospects of survival of the Popular Unity government.From mid-1972 onwards, Moscow realised that the opposition to the Allende governinent was growing and widespread. It was only the shrewd and dilatory personality of Allendackilled in maintaining a balance between the disruptive forces within his own government-that held to-gether the disintegrating fabric of society. There was Soviet criticism of the irrational economic managament, declining agricultural and industrial production, accelerating inflation, and the worsening balance of paynmen's.Soviet observers advised a slower take-over of the economy, nationalising the large firms first but leaving the smaller and medium-sized firms alone for the tima being. In the last moriths before the military coup they saw the handwriting on the wall and urged a consolidation of the economic gains already achieved, collaboration with the opposition political parties (especially the Christian Democrats and avoidance of armed conflict.*Ercilla (Santiago), 10-16 October 1973, and author's interviews with the Chilean mulitary high command, Dec.