Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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CONFIDENTIALNovember 1972 truck drivers strike (See Note No. 18). Another regulation decrees that stations must interrupt their transmissions whenever the Interior Minister judges it to be necessary in the interest of the internal security of the State. Still another regulation authorizes the Central Bank to control the importation of equipment and spare parts for radio, television, and the press.The Government moved quickly after the 1970 presidential election to obtain control of key stations. The Socialist Party gained control of Radio Portales, Chile's most popular station, and purchased Radio Corporación from El Mercurio (Portales has subsequently slipped in popularity). The Communist Party purchased Magallenes, an important Santiago station. The Communist Party recently also purchased Radio Simón Bolívar (formerly pro-opposition) in Concepción (as well as four other stations in southern Chile in preparation for the Congressional elections in March 1973). The rightist National Party daily La Tribuna quoted the former owner as saying that "the age of privately-owned mass media (in Chile) is over" with only the Government, strong economic consortiums, and the most powerful political parties capable of sustaining media operations. La Tribuna says the Corarounist Party is now the most powerful (single) broadcaster in southern Chile.PDC-oriented Radios Balmaceda and Cooperativa, however, have to date successfully resisted Government enticements and pressures (see Section VI. A. The Opposition Media Reaction). Palmaceda -- a radio station which over the years had carned a reputation for objective newscasts -- has been the number one target of the UP in the radio field. It has suffered more temporary closures than any radio facility. The station was shut down, for example, 17 hours in June 1971 for broadcasting an alleged "alarmist" report during the State of Emergency decreed after the assassination of Perez Zujovic, a former interior minister in the Frei Government. At the same time a UP station, Portales, received nothing more than an admonition for transmitting "alarmist" news more acceptable to UP propagandists. During the August-September 1971 period Radio Balmaceda was shut down on three separate occasions under similar pretexts (see Note No. 10).CONFIDENTIALR-4-73 February 27, 1973 10
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CONFIDENTIALIn radio as in the press the Government has used CUP committees to formulate exaggerated wage demands, to forment strikes, and to form ramp unions. CUP unions at Radio Pacifico, for example, forced the owner to sell out to a cooperative formed by employees when wage demands could not be met. The radio station subsequently was purchased by the Radical Party -- a member of the UP coalition.The principal Governinent weapon, however, is its control over public service advertising, which traditionally has provided the bulk of revenues for Chilean radio stations. The Government has dangled the prospect of advertisements in return for favorable news treatment, but the bait has not been picked up by the major opposition radios which recognize that their independence is at stake. The economic squeeze makes the future of Chilean independent radios appear bleak.C. TelevisionSince its inception in Chile in 1962, television has made great strides, but the medium still lags behind radio, especially in the provinces where technical conditions for viewing are poor. According to the best estimates available, there are 350,000 sets in Santiago and a total of 500,000 sets in the country. Chile is served by the following television channels: 1) A national network with some 21 outlets throughout the country; 2) the Catholic University channel in Santiago; 3) a separate Catholic University channel in Valparaíso; and 4) the University of Chilg channel in Santiago.The Government clearly recognizes television's importance as a propaganda vehicle, and under the direction of an Allende confidante, newsman Augusto Olivares (Socialist and a suspected member of the ultra-left MIR -- Movement of the Revolutionary Left), it has transformed Chile's only nationwide television channel into an outright political instrument of the Government coalition. Slanted commentaries favoring UP policies, character assassinations intended to smear political and class opponents, and a steady drum-fire of Socialist propaganda in news and cultural programming became standard fare.CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIALAt the same time network authoritice made it difficult under a variety of pretexts for opposition spokesmen to air their views in contravention of the State television statute, For example, the authorities frequently obliged all television channels and radios to carry official statements and denied opposition spokesmen equal time, resorting to the legal fiction that the official staternents were transmitted voluntarily.A popular political chat show "A Tres Bandas," in which opposition representatives freely debated UP representatives (the only such show carried nationally), was cancelled in August 1972 after two years of UP agitation against it. The Government defended the step by alleging that the program had poor listenership and by pointing to a ruling granting all political parties equal time to express their views on twice-weekly 20-minute slots. The original chat show format provided several hours of open-ended and frequent face-to-face confrontation, usually embarrassing to the Government.The University of Chile station has consistently asserted the Marxist line since its inception, but the two remaining university channels have successfully fought Government control to date (Sce Section VI. C. University Confrontation and Television Freedoms). None of the university channels, however, is national in scope.D. Magazines and Book PublishingEarly in 1971 the Government purchased the plant and equipment of the PDC-controlled Zig-Zag publishing empire - one of the most modern in Latin America. The GOC announced the purchase after prolonged negotiations, provoked originally by the excessive demands of a Communist-led union. Under the terms of the accord the Government purchased Zig-Zag's plant and equipment, the company's national line of comics, and several magazines while Zig-Zag retained several mass-circulation magazines (Ercilla and Vea being the most important) under a two-year contract with the Chilean Treasury. The Zig-Zag infrastructure formed the basis for the newly-established Government-owned Quimantu National Publishing Enterprise. The accord with Zig-Zag has been scrupulously observed to date.
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CONFIDENTIALQuimantu quickly began turning out magazines, comic books, and textbooks pushing UP policies. Comic books like *Firme* were designed for mass consumption and aimed at adults with low cultural levels, while others like *Ramona* were aimed at the teen-age market. *Cabrochico*, another comic book, was geared to pre-teens. The format of some Quimantu products closely resembled competing Zig-Zag products. The weekly *Ahora*, for example, was designed to compete with *Ercilla*. After eight months *Ahora* collapsed, rejected in the market place by Chileans who were turned off by heavy-handed political propaganda.E. FilmsThe Government's film production company, Chile Films, became the UP's principal propaganda arm in the film field. Rival Chilean private producers went out of business, squeezed by rising production costs and discriminatory tax and exchange rate treatment that denied them needed equipement and spare parts from abroad. Chile Films signed a comprehensive exchange accord in March 1971 with the Cuban Cinematographic Institute (ICAIC) (See Section V. C. *Exchange of Persons, Visitors, and Exchange Agreements*).Chile Films also initiated agreements with the experimental film institute (leftist) at the University of Chile, the film institute at the Communist-dominated State Technical University (UTE), the Government information office, the film department of the Communist-dominated CUT (Central Unica de Trajabadores -- the major labor organization), the national television network, and the University of Chile television station. The stated purpose of the accords was to "develop the new Chilean film industry."Its products are intended to glorify the roles of workers, peasants, and students in the march to Chilean-style Socialism, romanticize the proletarian role of the Chilean Communist and Socialist Parties, and attack the "bourgeoisie" and their "imperialist" allies. Despite an intense publicity buildup, however, few films actually appeared in the 1970-72 period. Most of the films that were produced appeared to be pieced together from newsreel film taken during the Allende presidential campaign or from post-election political rallies.
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CONFIDENTIALThe Government's delay in making public the results of June 1972 elections for top posts in the Communist-dominated CUT tabor federation also damaged Government credibility. The opposition media scored heavily in a barrage of charges of irregularities and vote fraud with a public that takes justified price in clean elections.B. The Papelera ConfrontationThe Compañía Manufacturera de Papeles Y Cartones (known as the Papelera), Chile's major private producer of sewsprint, became another propaganda battleground cast by the opposition in terms of "freedom versus Marxist totalitarianism."In October 1971, the Government, carrying out a long-standing pledge, announced that CORFO (the Government Development Corporation) had opened negotiations to buy out the Papelera through the purchase of its stock. The opposition media inediately launched a campaign to warn the public that the free press would be crippled if newsprint distribution were placed at the mercy of Government suppliers. At the same time, the opposition media pleaded with private shareholders to refuse to sell to the Government. In addition, a "freedom fund" was created enabling private persons to buy up Papelera shares to prevent the company from falling into Government hands.For several months pro- and anti-Government media carried out daily an intensive propaganda battle in advertisements, news stories, and editorials. Both sides resorted to the familiar numbers game: the pro-Allende media claimed that the Government was besieged by willing shareholders eager to sell out; the opposition asserted that shareholders were resisting temptation. Government propagandists argued that newsprint production was essential to the State and must be controlled by the State; the opposition said Papelera must remain in private hands as a patriotic duty.Thwarted to date in its attempt to buy out Papelera shareholders, the Government has not hesitated to use other measures -- price controls, labor-induced production shortages, and strong-arm tactics -- to prevent the delivery of raw material to the plant. The Government press also circulated rumors that Jorge Alessandri (former PresidentCONFIDENTIALR-4-73 February 27, 197326
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CONFIDENTIALof Chile and a leading shareholder and board chairman of the *Papelera*) had made a deal with Allende to give the Government control over the *Papelera* to weaken the will of private shareholders and their supporters. That the *Papelera* still withstands these combined pressures a year later is a tribute to a determined defense of the firm by an opposition Congress, to the loyalty of the bulk of the *Papelera* employees, and to an aroused and alerted opposition media.The battle for control of the *Papelera* will continue and the odds are not good for the company. Repeated requests for price increases sufficient to absorb cost increases forced on the firm in part by Government economic policies were not met, and the firm declared in September 1972 that it could not meet lean payments due to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDR). Finally, in December 1972 the Government authorized new price increases averaging 45 per cent, which were, however, inapplicable to the price of newsprint. The *Papelera* gains some breathing space but Government pressures on the company are certain to continue. The price increase itself may be viewed as a form of pressure.The battle has spilled over into the halls of the Chilean Congress. Partly to protect the *Papelera*'s independent status, the PDC sponsored a "three areas" constitutional amendment designed to give Congress some control over which businesses can be incorporated as social- property by the Government, (The *Papelera* is one of the firms appearing on the Government's original list of 91 firms to be absorbed by the Government as social property.) The amendment still a bitter bone of contention between the Government and the opposition would, among other points, declare null and void CORFO's attempted purchase of *Papelera* stock in the absence of Congressional approval. [^1]C. University Confrontation and Television FreedomsGrowing opposition confidence fed by an election victory at the University of Chile in April 1972 and by stiffening opposition attitudes at Santiago's Catholic University had important spill-over effects in television programming at two channels run by Catholic University. Increasing opposition effectiveness even raised the possibility that the Marxist-controlled University of Chile channel for the first time in its existence might be obliged to inject some objectivity into its output.CONFIDENTIALR-4-73 February 27, 1973[^1]: 13
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CONFIDENTIALIncumbent University of Chile Rector Edgardo Boeninger, an independent with Christian Democratic sympathies, gained 51.9 per cent of the vote for rector in April against three other contenders repre- senting the UP coalition and leftist splinter groups, including the MIR. An independent-PDC state alto gained control of the previously Marxist-controlled Superior Nomative Council. The victory was billed by the opposition media as another victory for democracy and pluralisin over Marxist totalitarianism. [^14] In the process tector Boeninger became a hero of the opposition media and a symbol of "democratic" defiance of Government efforts to impose its will on an independent university. The opposition's rallying cry became "Defend a democratic and pluralist university." Translated into media terms it became "We want a democratic and pluralistic university TV channel."Rallying behind that slogan, opposition supporters at the two Catholic Universities (Santiago and Valparaiso) began to ease out leftist influence in the news departments of the two university channels. UP supporters, however, remain at the technician level at the Santiago channel and can be expected to create problems for their opponents. Opposition authorities who now control the channel are proceeding cautiously against them.A more significant indication of UP long-range attitudes toward television freedoms has been the Government's persistent refusal to permit university television stations to extend their networks throughout Chile. In September 1972, President Allende blocked the opposition's most recent attempt to obtain legislative sanction for such an extension by vetoing selected iterns in a PDC-introduced bill. The Government claimed that its own bilf pending before Congress and allowing universities to establish stations only within the territory in which the seat of each university is located -- would create a national network for all recognized universities on an "equal and non-discriminatory" basis, What the Government did not say was that the bill if passed would preserve the State Network's position as the only single channel that can be viewed by a national television audience. Presumably the Government bill also would permit the Communist-dominated State Technical University to operate a television station in Santiago in competition with Santiago's Catholic University channel which, according to available public opinion surveys. is viewed by approximately 69 per cent of the capital's audience. [^15]CONFIDENTIALR-4-73 February 27, 197328[^14]: [^15]:
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CON DENTIALErcillaOctober 5, 1972Demonstrators Protest President Allende's Veto of Bill Permitting: University (Santiago) to Extend Rs Television (Channel 13) Throughout Chile.In subsequent developments the Catholic University at Santiago as nevertheless extended its television service to the Concepción metropolitan area, third most important in Chile, via a television epeater in Talcahuano, The Government has ordered that the epeater cease operation as the University lacks a concession under 1952 law to function in that area. The University has refused to comply, claiming that the 1970 National Television Act, which uthorizes the universities to operate television channels, is the overning statute and that it needs no additional concession to perate in any part of Chile. Meanwhile the repeater is still functioning (as of February 15, 1973) while the legal (and political) ebate continues.CONFIDENTIAL-4-73 February 27, 197329
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# Allende in Retrospectgovernment control of the economy and of the excess profits that the private sector had used for luxury consumption or had sent out of the country as profit remittances to foreign companies. At the same time, the fact that the policy remained within the letter, if not the spirit, of the law meant that intervention by the military was unlikely.Allende's constitutionalist and legalist strategy was not universally accepted within his coalition. Most of his own Socialist Party—beginning with its newly elected General Secretary, Senator Carlos Altamirano--and several other groups further to the left, such as the MIR (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revolutionary Left) and the VOP (Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo Organized Vanguard of the People), were openly doubtful about the wisdom of relying on elections and "bourgeois legality" to achieve power and advised preparation for an armed confrontation with the forces of reaction, which they foresaw as inevitable. Allende's effort to portray the transition to socialism as peaceful in character was not assisted by the publication of his conversations with French revolutionary theorist Régis Debray in early 1971.In these, Debray declared that "in the last analysis and until further notice, political power comes out of the end of a gun," and Allende repeatedly stated that his differences with apostles of violence like Ché Guevara were only "tactical," because the Chilean situation required that he observe legality "for the time being." Allende himself organized an armed personal bodyguard, the so-called GAP (Grupo de Amigos Personales), and—we now know—as early as December 1971 received reports on the illegal importation and distribution of arms to the MIR and to his bodyguards.While there were thus intermittent hints of revolutionary alternatives, Allende's basic economic strategy was "socialist consumerism," combined with a rapid expansion of state control in industry, trade and agriculture, and his basic political strategy[^1] See Régis Debray, *The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende*, New York, Random, 1971, pp. 52, 77, 91, and 97. *El Mercurio* (International Edition) Feb. 18-24, 1974, p. 3, reproduces the report, found in the presidential palace.[^2] On "socialist consumerism" see Paul E. Sigmund, "Two Years of Popular Unity," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1972, pp. 38-51.> [Figure] A Santiago rally in November 1970 celebrates the first anniversary of the Allende presidency—in the foreground, a picture of Latin revolutionary Che Guevara.> ![photo of a crowd celebrating the anniversary of the Allende presidency with a picture of Che Guevara in the foreground]--Photo by Claus Mayer for Black Star.48
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# Allende in Retrospect> [Figure: Symptomatic of leftist attacks on Chilean institutions, a Santiago wall poster denounces the country's Supreme Court as "Protectors of Fascist Sedition."]> -Photo by Juan de Onis for The New York Times.tably, however, it also produced political divisions within the military itself, which had hitherto been relatively aloof from the process of polarization. It was soon apparent, for instance, that General Prats was willing to give the government the benefit of the doubt in nearly every instance that its decisions or actions were challenged. Conversely, the Navy was noticeably less enthusiastic, and in January Admiral Ismael Huerta resigned from the cabinet over plans for the initiation of what he took to be a food-rationing system. It is now also known that the first plans for a possible coup were made by intermediate-level officers at the end of 1972."Food distribution became a critical issue as the black market continued to expand, with much of Chile's agricultural production going into illegal channels because of the government's refusal to increase the official prices paid for agricultural produce. The result was, in effect, two separate price systems—a subsidized, state-owned distribution system oriented primarily toward the low-income groups and a flourishing black market aimed at middle- and upper-income groups. The expansion of the powers of government-appointed Supply and Distribution Committees (JAPS) to deal with the black-market problem led the opposition to charge political manipulation of food distribution; nonetheless, the government seemed powerless to combat black-market operations.# The March 1973 ElectionsThe congressional elections in March did not resolve anything. Chile's right-wing parties had hoped that food shortages and economic difficulties would produce a two-thirds majority against the government, which might in turn permit the impeachment of the President, but the results, while showing an anti-government majority of 56 percent, gave the Allende regime 44 percent—a larger vote than most observers had predicted. The opposition pointed out that the vote of the pro-government forces had declined from the 50 percent they had registered in the 1971 municipal elections, while the government compared its 44 percent with the 35 percent that Allende had received in 1970. In fact, the only proper basis for comparison was the11162IrSictr.Prerein:IncrigUnivTrewhuDITYreport*The New York Times (New York), Sept. 27, 1973.54