Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 178]
# SECRETad hoc basis. Nosenko defected on 4 February 1964, and theSecretary of State, the Attorney General, the Special Assis-tant to the President on National Security Affairs, McGeorgeBundy, General Carroll, Director of the Defense IntelligenceAgency and the FBI were all notified immediately. On S Febru-ary 1904, General Carter reported the defection to an executivesession of USIB and followed this up with formal statements toUSIB members on 11 and 19 February 1964, which stated thatNosenko's *bona fides* had not yet been established. It wasagreed that no DS number would be issued to Nosenko, and thathe would be handled on a special basis by this Agency. Infact, normal USIB interest in Nosenko as a defector droppedoff drastically as it became quickly apparent that he had nopositive intelligence interest of value to any part of thecommunity.The President was informed of the full extent of oursuspicions about Nosenko's *bona fides* by the then Director,Mr. Mccone, on 11 February 1964. Mr. Patrick Coyne, ExecutiveSecretary of the PFIAB, was given a similar briefing byMr. Helms on 19 February 1964.Generals Carroll and Fitch of DIA were also subsequentlyinformed of the problems about Nosenko's *bona fides*.8SECRET
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 179]
SECRETThe Secretary of State, Ambassador Thompson, and other senior officials in the Department of State were informed of our reservations about Nosenko's *bona fides* and our fears that he might be a dispatched KGB agent. In discussions about the possibility of Nosenko's eventual deportation, the Secretary of State expressed serious concern about the adverse reaction that such a move might have on other potential defectors.The Director of Security, State Department, was informed of the *bona fides* problem at an early date. We have worked closely with this office since then on the problem of evaluating the significance of Nosenko's information as it affects the security interests of the State Department.Because so much of Nosenko's information affected U.S. internal security matters for which the FBI bears primary responsibility, and because the possibility that Nosenko was a KGB plant had a direct bearing on the validity of certain FBI operations, the FBI was kept fully informed on our views about Nosenko's *bona fides* and our progress in interrogating and investigating him from the moment of his defection. The FBI liaison officer was told of our reservations on Nosenko's *bona fides* as early as 5 February 1964. The Director of the FBI and his deputy for Internal Security, William Sullivan, were kept completely up to date, and we coordinated all major9SECRET
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 180]
# SECRETaspects of our handling Nosenko with them. After a long meeting with Sullivan and other FBI representatives to review Nosenko's case on 1 April 1964, the FBI interposed no objections to our proposal to restrict Nosenko's movements and commence hostile interrogation. Subsequently, the FBI formally agreed with our findings on Nosenko, at least to the extent that "On considering carefully the results of your interrogations of Yuriy Nosenko and your analysis of his statements and activities, it does appear he is not what he purports to be. While this Bureau is not in a position to draw any conclusion in this case, we do recognize it is possible that Nosenko could be a Soviet plant or agent pro- vocateur."The then Acting Attorney General Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach (and several members of his staff) were apprised of our reservations about Nosenko on 2 April 1964 and an opinion was sought from him both as to interpretation of the exclusion and parole agreement, and as to how we should proceed in the event that it proved necessary to deport Nosenko from this country.Efforts to Keep the KGB from Learning of Our Awareness of Noserio's True StatusFrom the time we learned that Nosenko had been sent to this country on a KGB mission it was obvious that if we were10SECRET
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 181]
SECRETto have the time to analyze and resolve this case, and toplan and execute appropriate countermeasures, it was essentialthat we attempt to keep the KGB from learning of our awarenessof Nosenko's true status. Consequently, detailed knowledgeof the depth and scope of our suspicions about Nosenko, andthe implications thereof, was restricted to a very few peoplein the Agency and the intelligence community. Nonetheless,we did advise key policy echelons and principals in the intel-ligence community, even though this carried the inevitablerisk of leakage.### Soviet Inspired InquiriesIn 1966 there were several indications that the Sovietswere making a serious effort to find out what happened toNosenko and to force him to the surface. The most blatantand unusual of these was the approach by a Soviet journalist,Yuriy KOROLEV (a known KGB agent), to the French magazine*Paris Match* with an offer to provide photographs and materialsfor an exclusive story of Nosenko and his family. Accordingto Korolev, Nosenko's wife was considering an approach to aninternational juridicial organization in an effort to obtaincompensation from Nosenko for damages caused by his abandon-ment of her and her children. In responding to this approachwe quoted a statement, purporting to be from Nosenko himself,SECRET
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 182]
SECRETto the effect that Nosenko considers this approach to represent blatant and cruel manipulation of his family by the KGB and that he will not lend himself to the scheme by agreeing to an interview or in any other way.## Nosenko's StatusTo recapitulate, Nosenko entered the United States on 12 February 1964 on parole to the Agency under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Parole responsibility is delegated to the Agency by the Attorney General under the terms of an agreement executed by the Attorney General and the DCI on 10 February 1955, which states:"After parole of such aliens, the Central Intelligence Agency will assume responsibility for care, supervison and control of a kind and degree it believes consistent with the internal security needs of the United States during continuance of their parole status."In accordance with our understanding of this agreement, and because we had reason to believe that Nosenko was a conscious and willing agent of a hostile intelligence service, we ensured that he was under our direct observation and control at all times from the moment of his arrival in the United12SECRET
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# SECRETStates. From 12 February to 4 April 1964 it was possible to keep Nosenko at a location where he could enjoy a certain amount of movement and of contact with the outside world. After 4 April 1964, for reasons explained above, it was necessary to keep him incommunicado at a location which is known to no one outside of the Agency (and to very few within it). Authorization for Nosenko to remain in this country under the Special Agreement Procedures was periodically extended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.Although his freedom of movement had been severely restricted, Nosenko was not maltreated and he made no complaint about his treatment. On the contrary, we had several written statements from him in which he stated that our handling of him was justified and even beneficial.## DisposalFrom the time that Nosenko was brought to this country we thought about the possibility of his eventual deportation as a contingency measure. In early 1964, we thought that it might be possible to mitigate the political and propaganda drawbacks of a forced deportation by announcing that Nosenko has confessed his true KGB role. With the passage of time, however, and in view of our much firmer conclusions about his real role and mission and our clearer understanding of what
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 184]
SECRETthis implied, it was apparent that great practical problems stood in the way of his deportation to either the USSR or a third country.USSR: Nosenko has categorically stated on numerouss occasions that he will never contemplate return to the USSR, and, although we suspect that he might secretly welcome such a move, we would expect him to act out his part to the end with loud protests that he was being shipped to his death, etc. When the possibility of expulsion was discussed with Department of State officials in 1964, both the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson expressed their concern for the adverse effect this might have on other potential defectors. Forcible repatriation of political refugees is against long established U.S. policy, and would be certain to arouse violent reaction from ethnic minority groups in the United States. Under these circumstances an alleged "confession" by Nosenko would have come under very close scrutiny, and might have backfired very badly. Another point that had to be considered was the possibility that the Soviets, again playing their part, might have refused to accept Nosenko on the grounds that he has renounced his Soviet citizenship.Third Country: Although we believed it likely that Nosenko would accede to deportation to a third country,
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 185]
SECRETthere is certainly no country in the free world on which we could conceivably have unloaded Nosenko without first informing them of his true status. Even if we considered this a desirable objective, it seemed certain that the Department of State would veto such a piece of intergovernmental duplicity on the basis of the political risks involved.15SECRET
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 186]
# SECRETYurily Ivanovich NOSENKONOSENKO is a Soviet intelligence officer who defected in Switzerland in 1964. He was subsequently brought to the U.S., and after a short period of relative freedom, he was confined under strict and relatively austere conditions for a period of approximately three years. Commencing in 1967, he was given increasing amounts of freedom until he was allowed total freedom in 1969. He subsequently married a U.S. citizen, settled in the Southeastern United States and became a U.S. citizen in 1974. lle is presently under contract to the Agen.", providing consultative services and information on subjects germane to his background.NOSENKO was confined when as a result of his debriefing substantive questions were raised concerning his bona fides, and his general behavior raised further concern about his emotional health and generai safety. NOSENKO's debriefing and confinement were ended when it was concluded that he was not a threat to national security. The advice of the Justice Department was obtained at the time of his confinement, and the FEI participated in his subsequent debriefing. NOSENKO's initial entry into the U.S. was coordinated with the Department of State, and they were periodically advised of his status during his confinement up to the time of his final settlement.The strict conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were intended to convey to him the seriousness of his position as a suspected disinformation agent and to make clear to him that his free settlement in the U.S. was precluded as long as this issue was unresolved. It was understood, however, that at any time he could have elected to end his confine-ment and return to the Soviet Union. OS files do not document that this latter condition was explicitly conveyed to NOSENKO, however, it is the recollection of senior staff officers (ADD/O and D/OS) that such was the case, and further that it was a condition routinely applied to other defectors whose bona fides were in doubt.SECRET
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 187]
SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR: General CounselSUBJECT: NosenkoAttached is a report from the Office of Security concerning the aware- ness of other Federal authorities (USIB, State, FBI, and I&NS). We have been advised by ADD/O that Nosenko at all times was advised that he could elect to leave the U. S., but that he could not be ensured of Immediate liberty if he elected to stay; in a sense, we are told, he elected to stay under the conditions then prevailing. We do not yet have documentation on this latter point, other than as shown in the attachment.S. D. BreckinridgeAttachment: a/s
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 188]
# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYWASHINGTON 25, D. C.OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE12 February 1964MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board MembersSUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO1. This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.2. As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.3. NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities, NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.4. In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed account.
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 189]
SECRETof the KG3 operation against U. S. Professor Sarghoorawhich NOSENKO said ho had personally supervised at thedirection of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairaan of the Coasitteefor State Security (KGB).5. During those most recent meetings NOSENKO announced   his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his futura   In the West. lio claimed his new work in the ZC3 (First   Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillanco   and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was ax-   panding and that he would not be able to visit the Nost   with any frequancy. Accordingly, he prepared a request for   political asylua in the United States. lie was taken to   Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interro-   gation. Plans are now being made to remove his to the U. S.6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject   has not boon extensive and that we will require additional   thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides.   It shouid also be noted that MOSENKO's duties were not con-   cerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference,   and he therefore tractoxpected to be able to shed auch, if   any, light on that area of our interest.7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was do-   signed to wreck the conference was most carefully considered.   The decision to accept bis was taken on the conviction that.   the Soviets would not have chosea such a vulnerable agent   (staff officer of the (GB) for this kind of move.Marshall S. CartorLloutenant General, USADeputy Director
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 190]
31 December 1974MEMORANDUM FOR: General CounselSUBJECT : Office of Security reports on PARAGON,NOSENKO, AELADLE, CELOTEX I and IIand MOCKINGBIRD1. Forwarded herewith is a 31 December 1974 memorandum from the Acting Director of Security on subject activities. The material represents responses to questions posed by your office. Obviously, the next phase of the investigation will require more detailed reviews of each activity.2. Questions that occur to us in reading the attached, are:PARAGONWe should spell out what is meant by the statement that the FBI "deferred further coverage to the Office of Security," how it was expressed and what form it took.The taping of two conversations does not seem to constitute "electronic surveillance" in the usual sense. It certainly is not trespatory surveillance. A little more detail on the equipment will be wanted.NOSENKOWe will go to the DDO for any record of DCI knowledge, and report such information as we get.AELADLEWe will want to verify DDCI's approval of entry.
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SECRETCELOTEX IWe will want more detail on the actual surveillance, including possible higher approval.This is responsive to the DCI's request for newspaper articles that led to the surveillance.CELOTEX IIQuestions similar to CELOTEX I.We may want actual copies of newspaper stories for display, in addition to memos, should DCI wish to use it.MOCKINGBIRDNo recorded (in CIA) formal approval by Attorney General. It may be that Justice will have a copy.Does this raise a question of surveillance of congressmen if one is contacted by someone under surveillance?3. Security experts to have reports on Maheu, SIESTA, REDFNEI, surveillance trucks, and Israeli COMINT by COB Thursday.S. D. BreckinridgeAttachments a/s
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 192]
SEGRETEYES ONLY31 DEC 1974MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector GeneralVIA : Deputy Director for AdministrationSUBJECT : PARAGONNOSENKOAELADLECELOTEX ICELOTEX IIMOCKINGBIRD1. Attached is a report concerning Subject topics which was requested by Mr. Scott Breckenridge of your office. As you will note, the report is in a question and answer format with attachments.2. This Office is still gathering material in regard to the SIESTA Project and REDFACE I. In addition, other files are being culled to provide more details, if they exist, on the above mentioned projects.![Sidney Stembridge signature]Sidney StembridgeActing Director of SecurityAttsDistribution: AdseOriginal - 1 - DDAEYES ONLYE2 IMPDETCL BY 010249
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REQUESTI, Yuriy Ivanovich Hosenko, request the Government of the United States of America to grant me political asylwn in the United States of America. This decision has been taken by me as the result of considering this question over the course of several years without any pressure on the part of anyone whosoever. I absolutely do not believe in the truth of the Socialist system. working in the KG3 and knowing more than the ordinary Soviet citizen about the internal situation, the mood of the people and the policies of the Soviet Government, I becane convinced that in the USSR there is not and never will be truth and real freedom as long as the country is governed by the Communist Party. Travelling on official trips abroad to the countries of the west, I was able correctly to understand and become aware of the oxistence of a real and actual free world. The events in Hungary and East Berlin and the split of the Communist Bovement are for me vivid examples and confiria tion of the correctness of my own decision to break forevor with the Soviet Union. I want to assure the Covernment of the United States of America that I will devote all my strength and knowledge to the Government and people of the United States of America.4 February 1964/s/ Yuriy Ivanovich Kosenko
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14-00000# *А.м Положений, приобрести Продам и Полеion colliMonsters. Кисларга в вечерbenzenette Betrager & eccer tipattaessticaccessibileme pasiner a gesuiti- - ?Sicere egeertenties were preusste repurplegu!!
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# UNDERTAKING REGARDING OBLIGATIONS AND SECRECYIn consideration of arrangements being made by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY for my future employment and welfare, I freely acknowledge that I have no outstanding claims of any nature against the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I further acknowledge that there are no commitments to me on the part of the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY which remain unsatisfied arising out of any of my prior associations with the Agency. I fully understand that the current arrangements between myself and the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY are intended to completely encompass all obligations of any nature whatsoever made to me by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.I acknowledge my desire to serve the interests of the United States by fulfilling the obligations which I have accepted in the current arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. I assert under oath, as indicated by my signature below, that I have completely, totally and permanently severed any and all relationships with any other government, its agencies, organs or functionaries including the Communist Party; that I will not in the future advocate, teach, or become a member of or become affiliated with any organization which advocates or teaches opposition to all organized government; that I will not in the future become a member of or become affiliated with the Communist Party or any other totalitarian party; and that I do not now nor will I in the future advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism.I understand fully the need for secrecy regarding my past, present and future relationships with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY and I agree to keep forever secret these relationships and my arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY including all information which I may obtain by reason of any associations with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, with full knowledge that violation of such secrecy may subject me to criminal prosecution under the espionage laws (18 U.S. C. 793, 794) and other applicable laws and regulations. I understand that this is a solenum and permanent undertaking which I must observe even after termination of any contracts or other arrangements with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. In addition, I understand that I may not discuss with or disclose to any person not authorized to hear it any information concerning the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, its activities, or intelligence material under the control of the Agency. I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain from the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY whether or not information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it.I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal this 21 day of April, 1969./s/ IDEN 1 (L.S.)Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of April, 1969.(SEAL)/s/ IDEN 7Notary PublicMy commission expires September 24, 1969