Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10226-10090.pdf — page 2]
CLASSIFIEDSECRETHOURS (VER WAIL. WILL SUBSEQUENTLY REPLAY OVER ALL SPANISHPROGRAMS WIE, VOES, AND WET. STATEMENT WILL READ AS FOLLOWS:"RELIABLE REFUGEE SOURCES AND INFO COMING OUT OF CUBA AS WELL AS CUBAN RADIO REPORTS INDICATE CLEARLY THAT CASTRO FORCES HAVE BEEN ON A WAR FOOTING UNDER CONSTANT ALERT EVER SINCE THE DRE ATTACK OF 24 AUG. THEY ARE PREPARED TO CRUSH ANY SIGN OF UPRISING, RESISTANCE OR CUBAN INVASION FROM OUTSIDE. ALL TRUE CUBAN PATRIOTS ARE URGENTLY WARNED NOT TO UNDERTAKE AT THIS TIME AN UPRISING AS THIS IS DESIRED AND EXPECTED BY THE CASTRO COMMUNIST FORCES. LOYAL PATRIOTS MUST FEAR AND EXPECT PROVOCATIONS. LIBERATION WILL COME BUT NOW IS NOT THE TIME TO REVOLT."END OF MESSAGECS Comment: Reported a general uprising in all of the Provinces of Cuba is scheduled for 4:00 a.m. on 31 August.SECRET
[104-10226-10117.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BYHOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERSFILE-TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: 100-5-1INCLUSIVE DATES: AUG. 62- DEC. 63CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:ROOM:DELETIONS, IF ANY: THIRD AGENCY MATERIAL| DATE RECEIVED | DATE RETURNED | REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME) | SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL || ------------- | ------------- | ------------------------ | ------------------------------- ||               |               |                          |                                 ||               |               |                          |                                 ||               |               |                          |                                 ||               |               |                          |                                 ||               |               |                          |                                 ||               |               |                          |                                 ||               |               |                          |                                 ||               |               |                          |                                 |NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE
[104-10226-10117.pdf — page 1]
Pre-datesHSCA request(Call 3rd Agency)
[104-10226-10117.pdf — page 3]
CLAFET SENSITIVE/105715 July 1963Chief, Cf Utaff/L2 C 48 ПраChief, Contact Division, 00Astengted RIB Panetration of bell telephons Laboratories - -106121. Attached are two memoranda, dated 26 June 1963, from our New York Field Office concerning apparent RIB interest in Manfred R. Schroeder and Donald B. Thomas, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Murray Hill, New Jersey. We believe this information should be passed to the FBI immediately. We would appreciate being advised of the date this information is forwarded to the Bureau.2. For your information, permission to brief Dr. Schroeder prior to his trip to the USSR was requested by our New York Office but refused by FI Staff. In view of his employment, however, and previous CD/00 contacts with him, FI recommended he be provided with a strong defensive and realities briefing.3. Further inquiry may be directed to Mrs. Shirley Stetson, CN/08, Support Branch, Room 413, 1717 N Street, N. W., extension 2268.K. M. ASHCRAFTEsorge ViglaCame. 3761Faalai As stated aboveStetson/mmCC: CS100-5-130 JULY 63CS COPYSECRET SENSITIVE100-5-1
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SECRETUNITED STATES GOVERNMENT*Memorandum*TO : Chief, Contact Division DATE: 1 July 1963Attn : Mc Connell/Czajkowski/Lincoln StaffFROM : Chief, New York OfficeSUBJECT: Attempted R.I.S. Penetration of Bell Telephone LabsRef: NY Reports 2988-3 and 2989-31. We thought the attached reports would be of interest to Lincoln Staff from a Soviet realities standpoint. We also felt that they should be brought to the attention of Division management because the M.0. outlined therein is becoming a major factor in dealing with sources who have contact with Sovbloc nationals. It has been our experience that the type of activity outlined has been on a marked increase, particularly since the establishment of the KGB 10th Directorate. Although such activity by Sov legals is taking place throughout the continental U.3., undoubtedly its greatest impact is being felt in the New York and Washington, D.C. areas because of the larga Soviet Government establishments in both of these cities. For this reason it would seem imperative that both WAFO and NYFO be extremely vigilant for such activity in companies and institutions with which they are dealing in order that it may be recognized in its earliest stages and appropriate CI/CE countermeasures instituted. In order to assist other offices in this respect, we plan to write in the near future an article for the Division Newsletter, outlining some of our experiences along these lines.2. We were somewhat disappointed in CI Staff's reaction to our recent request for assistance in defensive briefing of the subject of one of the attached reports. It seems to be quite clear now that our original assumption concerning his being R.I.S. targeted was quite correct and that there is a strong likelihood that his current trip behind the Curtain will be utilized by the opposition for provocation and/or an actual recruitment attempt. We wonder in future cases of this nature exactly what support we may expect from Angleton's shop. Although we feel that we have a fair capability for handling such matters here in New York, we do admit that, at least on this one, we would have felt slightly more comfortable had a CI specialist been along, if for no other reason than to preclude any possible Monday morning quarterbacking by the "old pros."SECRET
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SECRET-2-Subject: Attempted R.I.S. Penetration of Bell Telephone Labs3. Judging by the attached material, it would appear that, despite established Bell policy (see our 16 May memorandum re Case 39,790), the opposition has seen fit to deflower at least two of Bell's scientific virgins. We seriously wonder at this point just how many other Bell people might be in the same boat. Perhaps, as a result of all this, some representation by Bell management to the KGB will be forthcoming, spelling out to that organization, as was spelled out to our own, established company policy pertaining to such matters. In any event, it would appear that at least one or two Bell scientists, and there are probably more, have been giving the R.I.S. more cooperation and reporting than the Agency. Let's hope that in the near future Bell management takes some effective steps to rectify this rather ludicrous, and patently dangerous, situation.Attachments: NY Reports 2988-3and 2989-3Chagle/mgJAY B. L. REEVESSECRET10612
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# MemorandumTO: Chief, Contact Division.Attn: Support (Shirley Stetson)FROM: Chief, New York OfficeDATE: 26 June 1963SUBJECT: Apparent RIS Interest in Manfred A. Schroeder (201-734194) Bell Telephone Labs1. 0930-1230 hours 14 June, Manfred A. Schroeder of Bell Labs received a strong defensive briefing in connection with his June-July trip to the USSR and Bulgaria (see our 7 May Coordination Outline for subject).During Schroeder's briefing, Nagle elicited from him that prior to a trip to the USSR in 1959 he had been contacted by an individual who represented himself as a West German Intelligence Officer. More important, we also learned that, at about the same time, RIS cultivation of Schroeder apparently began.2. Concerning the West German approach, Schroeder indicated that his mother, who resides in Hamburg, was telephoned in 1959 by an individual who claimed to be an old acquaintance of her son's and who was interested in contacting him concerning employment in the US. The caller left a phone number and said that he would appreciate it if Schroeder could call him next time he was in Hamburg. Schroeder's mother relayed the message to her son, and, as requested, he telephoned the caller just prior to his 1959 USSR junket. The individual he called identified himself as a West German intelligence Officer and said that he would like to meet Schroeder as soon as possible. Schroeder agreed. When they met, the individual in question (Schroeder does not recall his name) presented suitable credentials and expressed interest in Schroeder's trip to the USSR. According to Schroeder's account, the West German Intelligence Officer gave him the old "keep your eyes and ears open" pitch, and said him that he would contact him in the first West German city in which he touched down after his USSR trip. Schroeder was contacted in Stuttgart promptly after returning to Germany from the USSR on his way back to the US. Because of his US employment and the fact that Bell paid for his trip, Schroeder became very apprehensive about any further contact with the West German service and at the time of the call indicated that he had nothing to say and wanted no further contact. Other than the cursory examination of credentials (as reported above), Schroeder made no attempt to establish the bona fides of the German who made the approach. We pointed out to Schroeder the unlikely possibility that the approach might not have been bona fide and might, in fact, have been a provocation.* copy attached.
[104-10226-10117.pdf — page 7]
SECRETSENSITIVE10612Apparenty .I.S. ultivation orprior to the above incident. According to his routine Savitainreccived what appeared to be a roultineacoustics facilities in Moscow and Leningrad in connection with. the invitationtimat during his visit he w uld have toSovo acoustics engineer who was very, inttengte, and ind done sever Russian tranlong of timeresult of this correspondence, Searouder recevesut his home a cople of days prior ti dejartfrom an individual who claimed to bein New York. The caller tolddelivery the & spof the State Conmitteecaller, whose na Schroeder. i.Like to deliveSchroeder inliawhich he had t. ..thor condelfinally agreed to inveup the invitation.Schroeder Lavis: Sithe latter decilnd, howeveran area closed strawny Sthe Sov arranged to tout senderChithaun, New Jersey, afor her husband.Schroeder said that his that hew their to her the invitationhat. Dott to the same tha as in the event, was quiteroutine and that he cold recull noti thing outduring the trip. Aring the viis, saisspeaks fluent German, acted as hiscontinually.5.Sometimin e chroeder received aone evening from VladimiKGB SATysAhired.Mentified self spunid that Sola fricsentative of Amtors soPurduev had just completed a visit toto ew York at... secore inaving theps esent to Schroder for an, hencethat Solga insisted on on deliverinin person, and the two ale ar rrangements to have together neThis began a series approximatelyfollowing week in Maniattan.
[104-10226-10117.pdf — page 8]
SENSITIVESubject: Apparent interest in Manfred A. Schroeder;Cell Telephone Labsor more contacts with Volgin, which started until late 1961 when Schroederreceived a note from Volgin stating that he and his family were planning to the USSR in order that his wife could improve there. Incidentally, Schroeder's only other contact with Piradov was in 1962 when he met him in Copenhagen at a professional meeting.6. Schroeder said that most, if not all, of Volgin's phone calls to him were to his home and usually appeared to have been made from pay phones. Schroeder said that his meetings with Volgin included lunches and dinners in Manhattan, socializing at the USSR T.R.O. Meeting, theater, and entertainment of each other in their respective homes. Schroeder claims that his wife accompanied him during most of his contact with Volgin. Other than to his own family, Volgin never introduced Schroeder to any other individuals.7. Schroeder claims that on a couple of occasions he turned over unclassified technical papers to Volgin, who claimed to be an acoustics engineer. Schroeder can't recall whether Volgin specifically requested the information or whether he turned it over to him on his own initiative. At one point during their relationship, Volgin asked Schroeder to write an article on US acoustics work for publication in a Soviet Technical Journal. Schroeder declined.8. In retrospect Schroeder admitted that he had been quite naive about his relationship with Volgin and expressed some concern that security hadn't been more active in admonishing him against development of relationships with Soviet Government representatives. His view of his experiences now completely coincides with ours as a result of our discussion.9. Another factor which obviously enters into Schroeder's R.I.D. picture is his wife's Bulgarian extraction. Schroeder claims that neither he nor, to the best of his knowledge, his wife have ever been approached by Sovbloc representatives in this country concerning his wife's family in Bulgaria. His wife's mother, Ivanalia Mensecik, immigrated to the US in April 1965 and lived with Schroeder and his wife until November 1962 when she returned to Sofia, apparently because she was homesick and couldn't adjust to the new language and life in the US. Schroeder said that his mother-in-law's original exit visa request was rejected in 1958 by the Bulgarian Government, but after he and his wife wrote several letters to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry she was finally granted permission to leave in 1960.SECRETSENSITIVE 10612
[104-10226-10117.pdf — page 9]
SECRETSENSITIVE-4-Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in Manfred R. Schroeder,Bell Telephone labs10. After Schröeder visits the USSR on his current trip, he plans to fly to Sofia to spend approximately a week with his wife's family there. Schroeder had not mentioned the Bulgarian visit in outlining his original itinerary to Bob Martin of this office, therefore, it vas not mentioned in Schroeder's Coordination Outline.11. All of the above would seem to indicate quite strongly that Schroeder, as we originally surmised, has been targeted by R.1.3. In briefing Schroeder, we ran through some of the typical entrapment situations fabricated by the opposition, e.g., women, homosexuals, purchase of drugs for Sov citizens, black market activity, acceptance of letters to mail outside the USSR, commitments to disaffected Sovs, etc. In addition, we stringently admonished Schroeder against any notetaking or photography which could in any way be construed as com- promising. We also alerted Schroeder to the fact that some attempt might be made to use his wife's family as leverage in a recruitment attempt. In this connection, we pointed out to Schroeder that there was a strong likelihood that the R.I.S. and/or Bulgarian service would make an approach to him during his forthcoming visit to Sofia. An approach in Bulgaria would give the Sovs an opportunity for disavowal and also would provide the proper setting for maximum utilization of relatives. When Schroeder mentioned that his sister-in-law, FNU Mensckik, had indicated several times in the past that she would like to leave Bulgaria, we strongly admonished him against making any commitments to her, pointing out that she may possibly be co-opted by the opposition. We told Schroeder that any representations to gain an-exit visa for his sister-in-law should be channeled through the US Legation in Sofia. Schroeder was told that, if any pressure were applied concerning his wife's family, his best reaction would probably be a noncommittal, "I'll think it over when I get home:" All in all, we alerted Schroeder as best we could to the opposition M.O. and prepared him on how best to avoid some of the not so obvious pitfalls which might be in store for him.12. Prior to our briefing of Schroeder, Bob Martin alerted Bell management to all of the ramifications of Schroeder's travel behind the Curtain. The management was informed by Martin that we felt it our obligation to point out to them the strong possibility that Schroeder had been targeted in order that they would have all of the facts available before signing off on his trip.SECRETSENSITIVE10612
[104-10226-10117.pdf — page 10]
SECRETSENSITIVE-5-Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in Manfred R. Schroeder,Bell Telephone Labs13. Assessment of Schroeder: Subject, a very accomplished    scientist, heads up all acoustics research at Bell. He reads    Russian and is fluent in German, French, Spanish, Italian, Dutch,    and English. He impresses us as being a rather savvy, discreet,    cooperative, mature, stable, well motivated individual. We attri-    bute Schroeder's apparent lack of discretion in his dealings with    the Sovs more to the subtlety of the Sov approach than to his own    naivete. It has been our experience that most US businessmen and    scientists are very susceptible and vulnerable to the opposition    approach mainly due to somewhat of a lack of realistic public    education.concerning contacts with Sovbloc nationals. We feel    that Schroeder's degree of cooperativeness with US services has    been enhanced considerably by his feeling that he has really been    taken for a ride by the opposition.Incidentally, when we asked subject for permission to release thisinformation with source disclosure to the FBI, he was at first some-what apprehensive and expressed the desire to talk it over with oneof his Bell superiors before he made any commitments. He finallyagreed, however, when we convinced him that it would certainly be inhis best interest to get on record with the FBI as soon as possible.Most of his apprehension about the FBI seemed to be attributable tothe fact that he has just been granted UB citizenship and, in addition,is now somewhat concerned that his activities with the Sovs in someway may effect his security status which in turn could be very detri-mental to his career.Based on our limited contact with Schroeder, we have every reason tobelieve that he would be suitable for operational use, should thebureau choose to pursue such a course.14. We would strongly recommend that all of the above be passed    to the Bureau ASAP in order that that organization may effect contact    with Schroeder and provide him with proper guidance concerning any    further approaches by Sor or Bloc nationals in this country.Magle/ngJAY B. REEVESSECRETSENSITIVE10612
[104-10226-10117.pdf — page 11]
14-000002. **Born, POB, citizenship:** Born 1 July 1926, Ahlen, Germany. German citizenship papers…. application for US citizenship made 22 January 1963.3. **Home Address:** [redacted]4. **Place of Assignment and Position**Technical StaffBell LaboratoriesMurray Hill, New JerseyHead of Acoustics Research5. **Itinerary:** Subject will tentatively depart US 18 May, arriving Moscow 19 May. He will spend two weeks visiting labs in Moscow and Leningrad at the invitation of D. Oviasiantai, Deputy Chairman, State committee for Coordination of Scientific Research. If the 19 May arrival date is not acceptable to the Soviets, subject will make the trip in June or July.6. **Reason for Trip:** During November 1968, while in Europe, subject received an invitation from the USSR Academy of Sciences to visit various Soviet acoustic laboratories. Because of a tight schedule at the time subject declined the invitation. In early March of this year he received the invitation from Orisbient mentioned above.During his trip, subject will discuss with Soviet counterparts various aspects of voice communications research, electroacoustics, and architectural acoustics. He will also visit Soviet laboratories involved in research in those fields.7. **Security Status:** Subject was granted Secret clearance by Middletown Air Material Command 30 July 1956 in anticipation of his being used on classified project at Bell Laboratories. Alias name check on subject pending.8. **Previous Intelligence Activities:** In 1959 subject was contacted twice by CI/CG New York Field Office for debriefing after a trip to the USSR. At the time he was generally cooperative.![document number] 10612
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-2-but somewhat: apprehensive. He was again contacted in lye for briefing subsequent to a US visit of a soviet counterpart.7. Relatives or Close Friends in Denied Areas: Subject's wife was born in Sofia, Bulgaria. She now reportedly holds US citizenship. In November 1962 Subject managed to arrange for immigration to the US of his mother-in-law, Israel'a Weschler. After a short stay in this country, however, she returned to her home in Sofia in March 1963. In addition to his mother-in-law, presumably there are other relatives of his wife still living in Bulgaria.10. Extent of Previous Trips to Denied Areas: 13-18 August 1959 subject visited scientist laboratories in Moscow and Leningrad.11. Analysis of Subject's Competence: Subject is a very competent acoustics scientist. He reads Russian and is fluent in German, French, Spanish, Italian, Czech and English.12. Extent of Personal Assessment: During our constant limited re-lationships with subject he has given every indication of being discreet, security conscious, mature, and cooperative.13. Extent of Substantive Briefing Proposed and Requirements to be Levied: None. Subject will not be briefed on operations of any kind. No photography or incriminating note taking will be requested of him.14. Defensive and Realities Briefing: Subject will receive routine defensive and Soviet realities briefing.15. Briefing Office and Participants: Briefing will be conducted by CI/CG New York Field Office personnel.16. Funding of Trip: Subject's trip will be funded by his company.17. Orientation Briefing: 15 May 1963.
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# SECRET# SENSITIVEUNITED STATES GOVERNMENTMemorandumTO : Chief, Contact DivisionAttn : Support (Shirley Stetson)PROM : Chief, New York OfficeSUBJECT: Apparent RIS Interest in Donald E. Thomas,Bell LaboratoriesDATE: 26 June 196300-A-3266992(NY-29883)1. During routine debriefing of Donald E. Thomas of Bell Laboratories in connection with his recent USSR visit to attend the Poyov Society Meeting, 5-14 May, Moscow (see NYOR 8878 for Coordination Outline) subject mentioned having had recent contact with a Soviet Government representative in this country. The Soviet in question identified himself to Thomas as Gleb Aleksi Pavlov and gave his address as 1216 First Avenue, Manhattan.2. According to Thomas, his initial contact with Pavlov took place in late March following the International Convention and Show of the I.B.E.E., 25-29 March, New York City (see Case 39843). At the convention Thomas became friendly with two Soviet counterparts in attendance, A. V. Tiel and Anatole Trutka, both of whom Thomas invited to his home for a social visit during their US stay. When the Sovs departed for home following the convention, Thomas saw them off at New York International Airport. It was at the airport that he first met Pavlov, who apparently was seeing off all of the Sov I.E.E.E. delegates. After the Sov delegation had departed, Thomas and Pavlov returned to Manhattan together and, on parting, exchanged addresses.3. A couple of weeks after their initial meeting, Pavlov telephoned Thomas at his home and told him that Tiel and Trutka had asked him to send their warmest regards to Thomas and thank him for the hospitality which he showed them during their trip to this country. During the conversation, Pavlov expressed an interest in renewing his acquaintance with Thomas, and suggested that he would enjoy visiting him at his home in Madison, New Jersey. Thomas said that he would enjoy seeing Pavlov, but that he was currently preparing to leave on a trip to the USSR and Europe and was not scheduled to return to the UB until late May. Thomas suggested that, in view of this, perhaps early June would be a good time for them to plan on getting together. Pavlov replied that he, himself would be in the USSR then, but would contact Thomas when he returned in early July. Incidentally, Pavlov's* copy attachedSECRETSENSITIVE