Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 48]
# SECRETdebriefed on counterintelligence matters during five meetings in Geneva. He then returned to the USSR. He came to Geneva again in January 1964 as the security officer for the Soviet disarmament delegation. After a number of meetings with his CIA handlers he defected on 4 February 1964 and was secretly taken to Frankfurt, Germany, crossing the Swiss-German border on the night of 4/5 February with alias U.S. Army identity documents. In Geneva and again upon arrival in Frankfurt, Nosenko wrote out an asylum request, requesting political asylum from the U.S. Government.Because serious doubts about Nosenko's *bona fides* had arisen on the basis of the information he had provided both in 1962 and in the meetings in Geneva in 1964, it was originally planned to do a detailed *bona fides* debriefing and assessment in Germany before making any decision about moving Nosenko to the United States. However, *unprecedented action* by the Soviet Government in respect to the defection of one of its citizens forced a change of plans. On 9 February, unidentified Soviet sources in Geneva leaked the news to the press that Nosenko, described as an "expert attached to the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference" had disappeared, and that it was presumed that he had defected.2SECRET
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SECRETBecause of mounting pressure from the press, which included much speculation that Nosenko was a high level scientist or disarmament expert, it was decided that the State Department would make a brief announcement acknowledging Nosenko's request for asylum in the U.S. and identifying him as a member of the KGB. This was done on 10 February. On 11 February, the Soviet Government delivered a note to the American Embassy in Moscow asking how Nosenko left Switzerland and requesting an immediate interview with him and his release. On 12 February, Soviet Ambassador to the Disarmament Conference TSARAPKIN held a press conference in Geneva in which he accused the Swiss Government of failure to cooperate in locating Nosenko. Although the Swiss categorically rejected these charges, the American Ambassador to Switzerland recommended that Swiss authorities be allowed to interview Nosenko to convince themselves that Nosenko had left Switzerland of his own free will.On 12 February 1964, on the instructions of the Director, Nosenko was brought to the United States. He travelled by commercial air, again using alias U.S. Army identification, and was admitted to the country at New York City (in true name) on parole under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.3SECRET
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## SECRETOn 13 February, representatives of the Swiss and SovietEmbassies in Washington advised the State Department thatthey desired interviews with Nosenko. On 14 February, inMoscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO called in AmbassadorKOHLER and protested "impermissable activities" on the partof the U.S. in Nosenko's case. Soviet press spokesmen tookan even harder line to Western correspondents, and accusedthe U.S. of kidnapping Nosenko. On the afternoon of 14 Sep-tember, at two separate interviews, he spoke first to SwissEmbassy and then to Soviet Embassy representatives. Atthese interviews, which were also attended by State Departmentand INS officials, Nosenko confirmed that he left Switzerlandof his own free will to seek asylum in the U.S. In addition,he replied to questions of the Soviet Embassy representativeto the effect that he was renouncing his Soviet citizenship.On the evening of 14 February, the U.S. State Department madea brief formal reply to the Soviet protest, then issued abrief statement to the press noting that the interviews hadbeen held and that Nosenko had confirmed his desire to remainin this country.From the time of his arrival to 4 April 1964, Nosenkowas housed in the Washington area. During this period, reg-ular systematic debriefing was commenced, and Nosenko wasSECRET
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SECRETmade available to representatives of the FBI for debriefing on matters affecting their responsibilities. Although allowed out for evening and week-end excursions, Nosenko was at all times accompanied by O/S personnel. In addition, he took a two-week vacation to Hawaii, again accompanied by case officers and security guards. Evidence continued to mount that he was a KGB plant, and at the same time it became obvious that it would be impossible to proceed further to resolve the many suspicious points and contradictions that had arisen without changing the conditions in which he was being held. Nosenko was growing increasingly uncooperative, especially when sensitive areas were touched upon, and constantly pressed for the legalization of his status in the U.S. and the issuance of an alien registration card. At the same time, Nosenko's heavy drinking and other unruly personal habits were causing increasing difficulties to the security personnel charged with keeping him under control and out of trouble at all times in accordance with Agency local responsibility. It was clear that it was only a matter of time before he created a public scandal. More importantly, he was in a position to communicate with the KGB since physical control could not be absolute.On 4 April 1964, Nosenko voluntarily underwent a polygraph examination. The results of this examination indicated deception5SECRET
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SECRETon a number of critical points indicating that he was sentby the KGB to perform one or more missions which also involvedhis penetration of the Agency and its operations. It wasdecided, therefore, that the physical circumstances of Nosenko'sstay in this country would have to be drastically changed ifthe Agency were to carry out its counterintelligence responsi-bilities and adhere to the terms of the parole agreement. Asa result, he was moved to quarters where his movements couldbe more easily controlled, and his outing privileges weresuspended pending resolution of *bona fides*.It is worth noting that had we not taken the above actionbut accepted Nosenko at face value, it is quite possible thatwe would have proceeded with a series of operational actionson the basis of his information. The results of some of theseactions could have been very embarrassing to the U.S. Governmentpolitically and damaging to U.S. national security. For exam-ple, his chief operational proposal at the time, and one thathe was most insistent that we should proceed with immediately,involved the compromise of a very senior Soviet official.*Bona Fides*Beginning in April 1964, hundreds of hours were devotedto interrogations of Nosenko (in which he willingly cooperated)and a great deal of time was spent on exhaustive collateral6SECRET
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SECRETinvestigations. We concluded that it had been established beyond reasonable doubt that Nosenko was a KGB agent who established contact with CIA, subsequently defected on KGB instructions, and that he came to the United States on a deception mission. The implications of this mission had a grave and direct bearing on U.S. national security. Although our findings were supported by the results of two polygraph examinations, the nature of the evidence was inadmissable in a court of law. In any case, it is clear that Nosenko had not been in a position to perform any overt act of transgression of U.S. espionage laws since 4 April 1964 when he was placed in a restricted area and deprived of any conceivable means of communication with the KGB.Nosenko did not admit that he defected on KGB orders or that he came to the U.S. on a KGB mission. He has admitted, however, that he made numerous lies about his personal history and about the details of his KGB service to U.S. officials, both before and after arriving in the United States.Coordination with Other U.S. Government AgenciesUSIB Members. In accordance with the DDCI's ruling relating to a defector who has been a member of a hostile intelligence service, Nosenko's status and handling was discussed at an executive session of USIB and decided on an7SECRET
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SECRETad hoc basis. Nosenko defected on 4 February 1964, and the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, General Carroll, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the FBI were all notified immediately. On 5 February 1964, General Carter reported the defection to an executive session of USIB and followed this up with formal statements to USIB members on 11 and 19 February 1964, which stated that Nosenko's *bona fides* had not yet been established. It was agreed that no DS number would be issued to Nosenko, and that he would be handled on a special basis by this Agency. In fact, normal USIB interest in Nosenko as a defector dropped off drastically as it became quickly apparent that he had no positive intelligence interest of value to any part of the community.The President was informed of the full extent of our suspicions about Nosenko's *bona fides* by the then Director, Mr. Mccone, on 11 February 1964. Mr. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary of the PFIAB, was given a similar briefing by Mr. Helms on 19 February 1964.Generals Carroll and Fitch of DIA were also subsequently informed of the problems about Nosenko's *bona fides*.8SECRET
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SECRETThe Secretary of State, Ambassador Thompson, and other senior officials in the Department of State were informed of our reservations about Nosenko's *bona fides* and our fears that he might be a dispatched KGB agent. In discussions about the possibility of Nosenko's eventual deportation, the Secretary of State expressed serious concern about the adverse reaction that such a move might have on other potential defectors.The Director of Security, State Department, was informed of the *bona fides* problem at an early date. We have worked closely with this office since then on the problem of evaluating the significance of Nosenko's information as it affects the security interests of the State Department.Because so much of Nosenko's information affected U.S. internal security matters for which the FBI bears primary responsibility, and because the possibility that Nosenko was a XC2 plant had a direct bearing on the validity of certain FBI operations, the FBI was kept fully informed on our views about Nosenko's *bona fides* and our progress in interrogating and investigating him from the moment of his defection. The FBI liaison officer was told of our reservations on Nosenko's *bona fides* as early as 5 February 1964. The Director of the FBI and his deputy for Internal Security, William Sullivan, were kept completely up to date, and we coordinated all major9SECRET
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# SECRETaspects of our handling Nosenko with them. After a long meeting with Sullivan and other FBI representatives to review Nosenko's case on 1 April 1964, the FBI interposed no objections to our proposal to restrict Nosenko's movements and commence hostile interrogation. Subsequently, the FBI formally agreed with our findings on Nosenko, at least to the extent that "On considering carefully the results of your interrogations of Yuriy Nosenko and your analysis of his statements and activities, it does appear he is not what he purports to be. While this Bureau is not in a position to draw any conclusion in this case, we do recognize it is possible that Nosenko could be a Soviet plant or agent provocateur."The then Acting Attorney General Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach (and several members of his staff) were apprised of our reservations about Nosenko on 2 April 1964 and an opinion was sought from him both as to interpretation of the exclusion and parole agreement, and as to how we should proceed in the event that it proved necessary to deport Nosenko from this country.Efforts to Keep the KGB from Learning of Our Awareness of Nosenko's True StatusFrom the time we learned that Nosenko had been sent to this country on a KGB mission it was obvious that if we were10SECRET
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# SECRETto have the time to analyze and resolve this case, and toplan and execute appropriate countermeasures, it was essentialthat we attempt to keep the KGB from learning of our awarenessof Nosenko's true status. Consequently, detailed knowledgeof the depth and scope of our suspicions about Nosenko, andthe implications thereof, was restricted to a very few peoplein the Agency and the intelligence community. Nonetheless,we did advise key policy echelons and principals in the intel-ligence community, even though this carried the inevitablerisk of leakage.## Soviet Inspired InquiriesIn 1966 there were several indications that the Sovietswere making a serious effort to find out what happened toNosenko and to force him to the surface. The most blatantand unusual of these was the approach by a Soviet journalist,Yuriy KOROLEV (a known KGB agent), to the French magazine*Paris Match* with an offer to provide photographs and materialsfor an exclusive story of Nosenko and his family. Accordingto Korolev, Nosenko's wife was considering an approach to aninternational juridicial organization in an effort to obtaincompensation from Nosenko for damages caused by his abandon-ment of her and her children. In responding to this approachwe quoted a statement, purporting to be from Nosenko himself,11SECRET
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# SECRETto the effect that Nosenko considers this approach to repre-sent blatant and cruel manipulation of his family by the KGBand that he will not lend himself to the scheme by agreeingto an interview or in any other way.## Nosenko's StatusTo recapitulate, Nosenko entered the United States on12 February 1964 on parole to the Agency under the provisionsof Section 212 (d) (5) of the Immigration and NationalityAct. Parole responsibility is delegated to the Agency bythe Attorney General under the terms of an agreement executedby the Attorney General and the ECI on 10 February 1955,which states:"After parole of such aliens, the Central Intel-ligence Agency will assume responsibility forcare, supervison and control of a kind anddegree it believes consistent with the internalsecurity needs of the United States during con-tinuance of their parole status."In accordance with our understanding of this agreement, andbecause we had reason to believe that Nosenko was a consciousand willing agent of a hostile intelligence service, weensured that he was under our direct observation and controlat all times from the moment of his arrival in the United12SECRET
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# SECRETStates. From 12 February to 4 April 1964 it was possible to keep Nosenko at a location where he could enjoy a certain amount of movement and of contact with the outside world. After 4 April 1964, for reasons explained above, it was necessary to keep him incommunicado at a location which is known to no one outside of the Agency (and to very few within it). Authorization for Nosenko to remain in this country under the Special Agreement Procedures was periodically extended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Although his freedom of movement had been severely restricted, Nosenko was not maltreated and he made no complaint about his treatment. On the contrary, we had several written statements from him in which he stated that our handling of him was justified and even beneficial.DisposalFrom the time that Nosenko was brought to this country we thought about the possibility of his eventual deportation as a contingency measure. In early 1964, we thought that it might be possible to mitigate the political and propaganda drawbacks of a forced deportation by announcing that Nosenko has confessed his true KGB role. With the passage of time, however, and in view of our much firmer conclusions about his real role and mission and our clearer understanding of what13SECRET
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# SECRETthis implied, it was apparent that great practical problems stood in the way of his deportation to either the USSR or a third country.USSR: Nosenko has categorically stated on numerous occasions that he will never contemplate return to the USSR, and, although we suspect that he might secretly welcome such a move, we would expect him to act out his part to the end with loud protests that he was being shipped to his death, etc. When the possibility of expulsion was discussed with Department of State officials in 1964, both the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson expressed their concern for the adverse effect this might have on other potential defectors. Forcible repatriation of political refugees is against long established U.S. policy, and would be certain to arouse violent reaction from ethnic minority groups in the United States. Under these circumstances an alleged "confession" by Nosenko would have come under very close scrutiny, and might have backfired very badly. Another point that had to be considered was the possibility that the Soviets, again playing their part, might have refused to accept Nosenko on the grounds that he has renounced his Soviet citizenship.Third Country: Although we believed it likely that Nosenko would accede to deportation to a third country,
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SECRETthere is certainly no country in the free world on which we could conceivably have unloaded Nosenko without first informing them of his true status. Even if we considered this a desirable objective, it seemed certain that the Department of State would veto such a piece of intergovernmental duplicity on the basis of the political risks involved.15SECRET
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SECRETYurily Ivanovich NOSENKONOSENKO is a Soviet intelligence officer who defected in Switzerland in 1964. He was subsequently brought to the U.S., and after a short period of relative freedom, he was confined under strict and relatively austere conditions for a period of approximately three years. Commencing in 1967, he was given increasing amounts of freedom until he was allowed total freedom in 1969. He subsequently married a U.S. citizen, settled in the Southeastern United States and became a U.S. citizen in 1974. He is presently under contract to the Agency, providing consultative services and information on subjects germane to his background.NOSENKO was confined then as a result of his debriefing substantive questions were raised concerning his bona fides, and his general behavior raised further concern about his emotional health and general safety. NOSENKO's debriefing and confinement were ended when it was concluded that he was not a threat to national security. The advice of the Justice Department was obtained at the time of his confinement, and the FBI participated in his subsequent debriefing. NOSENKO's initial entry into the U.S. was coordinated with the Department of State, and they were periodically advised of his status during his confinement up to the time of his final settlement.The strict conditions of NOSENKO's confinement were intended to convey to him the seriousness of his position as a suspected disinformation agent and to make clear to him that his free settlement in the U.S. was precluded as long as this issue was unresolved. It was understood, however, that at any time he could have elected to end his confinement and return to the Soviet Union. OS files do not document that this latter condition was explicitly conveyed to NOSENKO, however, it is the recollection of senior staff officers (ADD/O and D/OS) that such was the case, and further that it was a condition routinely applied to other defectors whose bona fides were in doubt.SECRET
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SECRET13 JUN 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: General CounselSUBJECT: NosenkoAttached is a report from the Office of Security concerning the awareness of other Federal authorities (USIB, State, FBI, and I&NS). We have been advised by ADD/O that Nosenko at all times was advised that he could elect to leave the U. S., but that he could not be ensured of immediate liberty if he elected to stay; in a sense, we are told, he elected to stay under the conditions then prevailing. We do not yet have documentation on this latter point, other than as shown in the attachment.S. D. BreckinridgeAttachment: a/sSECRET
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYWASHINGTON 23, D. C.OFFICE OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE12 February 1964MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board MembersSUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO1.  This memorandum refers to the State Department release of 10 February on subject case and provides additional background as well as information on his current status.2.  As a KGB staff officer, NOSENKO is regularly assigned to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB in Moscow but was included in the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference as part of a cover arrangement which permitted him to carry out intelligence and security functions in Geneva on behalf of the KGB.3.  NOSENKO also attended various sessions of the Disarmament Conference held in Geneva in 1962. During the course of these sessions, NOSENKO sought contact with officials of the U. S. Government, informed these officials that he was affiliated with the Soviet State Security apparatus and volunteered to aid the U. S. Government in detecting Soviet subversive activity directed against the U. S. Government. During the course of his contact with U. S. authorities, NOSENKO stated that his cooperation with the U. S. Government originated with his distaste and hatred for the Soviet regime in general, with his desire to obtain revenge for the unjust death of his father, a senior official in the Soviet shipbuilding industry, and with the general admiration of the Americans with whom he had come in contact within the Soviet Union.4.  In late January 1964, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, again masquerading as a member of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. Subject secretly notified his CIA contacts in the United States concerning his presence in Geneva and arranged to meet with these contacts. During a series of meetings NOSENKO provided information including documents concerning Soviet State Security activities within the USSR and abroad and a detailed accountE2 IMPDETCL BY 063344HR 10-239 January 1975
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SECRETof the KG3 operation against U. S. Professor Barghoorawhich NOSENKO said ho had personally supervised at thedirection of SEMICHASTNIY, the Chairman of the Copaitteefor State Security (KGB).5. During those most recent meetings NOSENKO announced   his desire to leave the USSR permanently and seek his futura   in tho Nost. tio claimed his new work in the ZC3 (First   Deputy Chief of that department charged with the surveillance.   and recruitment of American visitors to the USSR) was ax-   panding and that he would not be able to visit the Nost   with any frequency. Accordingly, he prepared a request for   political asylum in the United States. He was taken to   Frankfurt, Germany where he is currently undergoing interro-   gation. Plans are now being made to remove his to the U. S.6. It should be noted that CIA contact with Subject   has not boon extensive and that we will require additional   thorough interrogation to establish Subject's bona fides.   It shouid also do noted that NOSENKO's Juties were not con-   cerned with substantive aspects of the Disarmament Conference,   and he therefore tractorated to be able to shed auch, if   any, light on that area of our interest.7. The possibility that NOSENKO's defection was do-   signed to wreck the conference was post carefully considered.   The decision to accept his was taken on the conviction that   the Soviets would not have chosea such a vulnerable agent   (staff officer of the KGB) for this kind of move.Marshall S. CartorLloutenant General, USADeputy DirectorSCOVET