[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 81]
# 14-00000employ it in his speeches but the importance of preserving "democracy, pluralism and liberty" was conspicuously absent.The government's policy was very much to Moscow's liking: secure of US investments, espousal of the doctrine of "idouteqicai plural-Ism" (relations win all status regardless af Ideology and internal political character), closer relations with the socialist camp, and the foster-Ing of en "anti-imperialist (anti-US) front in Latin America.Under the Allende regime, foreign policy was reoriented, and the previously close ties with tha United States were replaced by strong political, economic and scientific ties with the "socialist countries," above all with Cuba and the USSR. The first trip of tha Fereign Minister, Clodomiro Almeyda, outside of Latin America was to the USSR and Enstern Europe, in May-June, 1971. President Allende visited Moscow In December, 1972. Strong idealegical and personal ties linked the Chilean Communist party leaders with the Soviet party leadership and Salvador Allende with Fidul Castro.President Allende's description of the USSR as Chila's "hig brother" (hermano mayor) was no mere figure of speech but reflected the expect-ation of his government that the USSR would be-come the most important socialist ally of the revolution and the main economic bulwark of the regimo. Moscow did, in fact. become the most Important source of socialist camp uconomic aid and credits to the Popular Unity government, totalling $620.0 million ($156.5 million in short term bank credit and $463.5 million in project ald and supplier credits) in the 1971-73 period.The USSR authorised $260.5 million in credits ($98.5 million in short-term credit and $162.0 million in economic aid) to the Allende regime, most of which was nevar utilised. This was far from the massive he'p Allende needed. But Mos-cow was under no illusion that its economic co-operation would decisively influence the Immediate prospects for radical social and economic transformation, although it no doubt helped reduce Chile's dependence on the United States.Soviet influence expanded rapidly as a result of the Chilean Communist party's loyalty to the USSR and the expansion of Soviet-Chilean economic, technical, scientific, cultural, and fisheries cooperation made possible by the victory of the Communist Socialist regime. But Moscow became increasingly alarmed at the deterioration of the economic situation, the violent clashes of the ultra-lat: and the ultra-right, and the growing organisation of opposition forces. particularly after the Papuler Unity government failed in the March, 1973. elections to obtain the majority electoral support required to transform the political and economic structure by peachful, constitutional means.Nevertheless, Moscow was not willing to pro-vide the massive short-trim commodity assist-anco (such as foodstuffs) or untied converteפול currency credits which the regime needed to finance the import of food, spare parts, and מתולפנותry 10o alleviate local shortages. Moscow's $90.5 million in short-terim bank credits was no doub: helpful but paled into insignificance before the need to finance Chulg's import requirements, which, for food alone, were running at the rate of about $700 million a year when the Allende regime collapsed. The Soviet leadership told Chilean Communist and Popular Unity officials that the main effort to improve the economic situ-ation would have to be made by the Allerde go ernment. Moscow repeatedly stressed that the Popular Unity government must reverse the calamitous decline in production and product-ivity to have a chance of winning over a majority of the Chileans to the cause of socialism.Refusing to give Aliendo the hard currency credits he needed to improve his worsening chances for survival, Moscow contented itself with organising solidarity meetings at home and abroad in the hope that these demonstrations would "reach the ears of the Chilean people"(Moscow Radio. 13 August 1973). Allende's loyal ally and "big brother" was willing to sell Soviet machinery and equipment to him-that is, ex-pand Soviet exports financed by long-term credits: -but denied him the short-term hard currency credits he desperately needed.A combination of circunstances - Moscow's costly entanglement in Cuba, economic difficulties at home, shortages of grain and foreign exchange -led the USSR to eschew messive short-teren aid to Chile and to counsel a policy of self-help to the Allende regime a theme repeated fre-quently by the Chitean Communist party leader-ship when referring to Soviet assistance. In the final analysis Moscow watched idly while the via pacifica was destroyed by the disastrous economic policies, the circumvention of the laws, and the tacit encouragement of the ultra-left by President Allende and the Popular Unity govern ment.Moscow pursued a dual strategy in Chile. At the level of state-to-state relations it acted cautiously, adopted a non-interventionist posture, and encouraged anti-Americanism and independ-ence from the United States. Since it realised that the internal balance of forces did not favour the armed struggle, the Popular Urity leadership asured to maintain internal unity, reject the "provocativa and adventurous" overtures of the ultra-left, avoid actions that migh: provate a civil war or military intervention, adapt a more rational economic policy, and consolidate the initial gains of the revolution.At the same time, Moscow did nothing to re-strain direct Cuban involvement in the Chilean revolution. Protected by a friendly. Marxist-daminated government and its Marxist President, Cuba transported large quantities of Semet and Crechoslovak-supplied weapons to the radical left in Chile on the Cutan airline and merchant ships.*See Deuda Externa de Chile. Tomo V. Departamento de Créditos Externos, CORFO, Santiago, 1973, for full details.