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subversion of Allende for them to be exonerated:now" (14,9,73). The chane is almost ectoplasmically vaque yet simultaneously all-embracingBut what woes it actually rest ea?First, presu:nably, the celebrated memorandumof ITT which suggested ways of preventingAllende froin assuming the Presidency in 1970and of toppling his regime if he did so. There is,of course, no doubt of this memorandum'sauthenticity, nor of its appalling folly; and withsuch organisations admittedly pushing theirconspiratorial notions at the heart of Americanpolitics it is not surprising that suspicions ofYanquí skuldurgery were aroused. But there is amajor snag for anyone who sees the memorandumas evidence of actual dirty work: simply, that all.Inquiries so far indicate that its recommendationswere never adopted They were studied by theCIA, where one department produced a contingency plan based upon them: But neither thememorandum nor the plan seems to have receivedassent at any higher level; and given the kind ofpublic exposure to which the workings of the....White House, the CIA and most other things inWashington Lave been treated during the Water-gate crisis (including the allegations of Nixon'spersonal involvement with ITT), I am hard-pressed to believe that if such assent had beengiven it could have been kept quict until now.Secondly, in support of the American intervention theory, it is pointed out that the U.S.maintained its contacts with the Chilean armedforces and continued to supply them with armswhen other American aid to Chule was suspended. Therefore, so the implication goes, the 1.Pentagon was deliberately keeping open theoption of Inspiring a military coup against an.unwelcome government. But this is obviously atwo-edged argument. For one thing, an armythat is still getting its toys to play with is usuallyrather more than less likely to endure the folliesof its tuling politicians gladly. And for another,what would have been said if the Americans hadactually suspended arms shipments to forceswhose commanders were serving in Allende'scabinet? The outery about "Yanqui imperialism"and "Pentagon politics" may easily be imagined.Thirdly, the strangulation of foreign aid andcredit is laid at Washington's door as a majorweapon in a cold war against Allende from thestart. At first glance this has more substance to it.The U.S. certainly suspended further commercialcredits of its own to Chile after Aliende hadnationalised the American-owned copper mineson terms amounting to contion. As the majorpower in the World Rank and the IMF the U.S.also argued there against further aid for Chile:and to the extent that it was successful it must haveadded to Allende's financial difliculties. But itwas not able to prevent other Western countries(e.g. Holland and Sweden) from continuing tooffer credit; it never persuaded Britain to clasedown its small aid programme; it did not excludethe re-scheduling of most of Chile's foreign debtrepayments in 1972 and it had not prevented thediscussion (incomplete at the time of the coup)of a similar re-scheduling for 1973. In short, theU.S. influence may have limited Western aid andcredit but it was far from being able to condemnAllende's Chile to economis purdah. In any case,Chile was not one of the under-developed world'shard cases, totally dependrat on external aid andcredits for its survival The wealth of its coppermines alone ensured that in normal times it was29rot move than marginally "nid-worthy", andwith sensible conomic management it ought tohave two albic to withstand a good deal ofexternal pressure. Unfortunately, nolly witheven a nodding acquaintance withacould have classified the management of tمنAllende povernment as anything but disastrousTo a great extent it placed itself beyond the palefor any but the most trusting-or deliciocreditors. But even if that had not been sy, and ifthe blame for Chile's economic difficulties couldhave been laid fairly and squarely at Washington'sdoor, Allende would surely have had srail causefor complaint. It was, ufter all, his administrativawhich announced its immediate determinatisa to"expropriate imperialist capitalrealise a polkyof self-tinarwing... and review, denuke andrepudiate, as the case may be, treaties or acreements limiting our sovereignty, specifically thereciprocal assistance treaties, the mutual aidpacts, and others, between Chile and the United iStates" (The Feople's Unity-Basic Traof Government, 1970).It was also his administration which promisedto "repudiate the agreements between us and theInternational Monetary Fund" (The replGovernment-First 40 Steps, 1970). These toldIntentions were never fully realised, it is true;but they were expressed as otlicial policy beforethe United States or any other "imperialistpower had actually done anything to embarrassAllende's goverrument. In other words, it wasAllende who decided to pick the quarrel. It seerusnalve, to say the least, to complain that hischosen opponents took defensive nieasures. Whatelse were they expected to do?THOSE WHO DO COMPLAIN of Americanaction, nevertheless, might be better employed in asking why Allende got so little supportfrom most of the governments which professed tobe his friends. Except for Cuba, which offered enthusiastic (but not always practical) advice toAllende, as well as supplying arms and trainingfor his militant Left, the world's established Maraist governments were consistently cool to the"Chilean experiment." The farthest the SovietUnion would go to show its approval was toopen a 12-year credit in roubles for leanimports of Russian industrial goods and to agreto take a limited amount of Chilean copper fora year or two in repayment. But the hard currencyloans that Chile really needed to plug thethat quickly opened berweer. Allende's vasmispromises and performance were never forecoming from any Marxist source. Nor was thatsurprising. In the nature of things, Maxistcountries rarely have hard currency to spare andthey were unlikely to devote what little they mighthave to bailing out a régime which seemed intratupon over-reaching itself in every directica.Conceivably, Allende would have done betterfor himself and his country if he had sabandoned the "free" world market allocaand taken Chile at once into the controlled tradebloc of the Communist world in the hope ofgetting total Soviet support. Dut that would havemeant imposing a completely centralised avancyand strict political control inside Chilomin shortabandoning the romantic pretence of 300-sinicaal revolution" for the more custrevolution by dance. To his credit peAloe was woning (or unabile) 15