Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10227-10000.pdf — page 216]
SECRETINSPECTOR GENERALJUN 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector GeneralATTENTION : Mr. Neil AinslieVIA : Deputy Director for AdministrationSUBJECT : Alleged Illegal Activities (Unidentified Subject--Alleged Abuse of Defector)1. Reference is made to Mr. Ainslie's verbal request for a review of Office of Security files in an effort to provide information pertinent to a case mentioned on page 170 of the Report to the President by the Commission on CIA activities within the United States.2. The case in question from page 170 of the Commission Report is quoted as follows: "In one other case, a defector was physically abused, although not seriously injured. The Director of Central Intelligence discharged the employee in-volved."3. A search of Office of Security file resources has reflected information pertinent to a case in which a defector was physically abused at an overseas location, and the Agency employee was later terminated by the DCI. It is not known whether the following case is identical to the referenced case on page 170 of the Commission Report, but the facts appear to be quite similar.4. Information developed by this Office of possible interest to the Inspector General, pertains to one John Torpats, an ex-CIA employee, and one Eduard Oun, an Estonian defector.5. Torpats was born in 1898 in Estonia, and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1926. Torpats was employed by CIA in February 1949 and was terminated 30 January 1961. The file information reflected that in July 1956, Torpats was found guilty of mistreatment of an alien by a Special Inquiry BoardSECRETE2 IMPDETCL BY 011018
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SECRETin Frankfurt, West Germany. The alien involved was EduardOun, an Estonian who defected from Estonia through Swedenin 1955.6. The incident in Frankfurt involved mistreatment of   Oun during interrogations directed by Torpats. The charges   of physical abuse included the striking of Oun with the fist;   application of turpentine and ointments to various parts of   the body, the scrubbing of Oun's body with a brush, and forc-   ing Oun to stand in the nude as long as eight days during   interrogations with only very brief rest periods.7. Torpats was returned to leadquarters and was brought   before an Employment Review Board for consideration of separa-   tion from the Agency. The Board's recommendations initially   were that Torpats be "transferred to an area outside the   Clandestine Services." Torpats appealed the decision, and a   later recommendation included reduction in grade from GS-14   to GS-13. Torpats later received unsatisfactory fitness re-   ports and engaged in various "in house" battles with Agency   officials concerning his employment.8. Torpats was later terminated in accordince with the   authority granted the DCI under Section 102(C) of the National   Security Act of 1947, as ammended, effective 30 January 1961.   Later in 1961, Torpats filed suit against the DCI contesting   his dismissal, and the U.S. District Court for the District of   Columbia granted the government's motion for summary judgment   against Torpats. Torpats appealed the decision, and the U.S.   Court of Appeals, in 1962, upheld the lower court's ruling   that Torpats' termination was legal.9. The Office of Security file of Eduard Oun contained   little information other than interrogation reports dated 1956.   It was not clear from file information whether Oun entered the   United States after the Frankfurt incident. The most recent   document contained in the Oun file was dated 17 September   1956 and noted that Oun had been psychiatrically examined and   round qualified for Agency sponsored immigration to the U.S.   under Public Law 203.2SECRET
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SECRET10. It is noted that Office of Security files contained    only fragmentary information in regard to certain areas of the    Torpats' case. File review indicated, however, the DDO, OGC    and the Inspector General's office will probably have addition-    al information concerning this matter.Charles W. KaneDirector of Security3SECRET
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SECRET75-2244Review Staff: 75/100823 June 1975MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Rockefeller Commission ContactMason Cargill told me today that the reference in the Commission report to an employee who was fired because he abused a defector came from a deposition by Dick Helms. Helms could not remember an exact name, but from the description which he gave on his deposition, it is clear that the employee who was fired was John Torpats. He was discharged by Allen W. Dulles in 1960.Torpats, himself a Lithuanian refugee, was working in the Defector Reception Center in Frankfort, Germany. In the course of interrogating another Lithuanian defector, Torpats beat him. After Torpats was fired, he sued the Director (then McCone). He lost the case.Walt ElderWalter Eldercc - DCIcc - IGcc - OGCSECRETCB: 007789E2 IMPDET
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SECRETReview Staff: 15/880Mi. kiyaINSPECTOR GENERAL75-277618 June 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector GeneralSUBJECT : Request For InformationThe Rockefeller Commission Report (Pg. 170) says the DCI fired an employee for abusing a defector. Can you uncover the details on this incident? Is it the only such domestic incident known to us? (John Waller says the DDO has no knowledge of "any piece of paper" sent to the Commission on the reported incident or of any others. He suggests checking Office of Security)> [Figure: Signature of Jerrold B. Brown]Jerrold B. Browncc: DDOJohn WallerAdiC Mardiwasian SE/DDODict 51-143 c/iccSECRET
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SECRET30 January 1975MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. GarrisonSUBJECT : Information on Detention of Defector.1. The Deputy General Counsel has requested documents bearing on the decision to confine a defector, particularly the considerations at the time such decisions were made and reviewed, as may be reflected in memoranda for the record, staff studies, etc., leading to the initial confinement, the later decisions to continue that confinement, the decision to move to a new facility in Virginia, and eventually to release him.2. The assumption is that following the initial decision this matter was reviewed formally from time to time, and that those reviews are reflected in some way in the records of the Agency./s/ S. D. BreckinridgeS. D. BreckinridgeOriginal - Addressee1 - SDB Chrono1 - Judy for QA files
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14-00000104-10227-100032025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRETMethodology:1.  The portion of the 11 June 1962 tape in question    was provided to two employees, both of whom are professional    transcribers and native Russian speakers. They were provided    with the background of the difficulty, i.e., that previous    transcriptions of the tape quoted Nosenko as saying that    he had "also been in the States" and that he had used the    alias Nikolayev "both in England and 'u vas' i.e., in the    United States.2. Mr. Kozlov and Mr. Berest produced a transcription   which contains no statement of Nosenko's saying he had been   in the United States. In addition, their rendering of the   sentence pertaining to Nosenko's use of the alias Nikolayev   reads, with no equivocation, "both in England and 'u nas'",   i.e., "in the Soviet Union."3.  Independently, the same portion of tape was given    yet another professional transcriber, a native Russian    speaker. She was given no background whatsoever on the    problem. Her transcript contained no statement of Nosenko's    saying he had been in the United States. In addition, her    rendering of the sentence pertaining to Nosenko's use of    the alias Nikolayev reads unequivocally as "both in England    and 'u nas", i.e., "in the Soviet Union."WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODSINVOLVED E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340SECRET
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# 104-10227-10046 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992# DISPATCHCLASSIFICATION: SECRET/NOFORNPROCESSING| PASS   || ------ || POSTED || ACTION                           || -------------------------------- || MARKED FOR INDEXING              || NO INDEXING REQUIRED             || ONLY QUALIFIED HEADQUARTERS DESK || CAN JUDGE INDEXING               || ABSTRACT                         || MICROFILM                        |TO:INFO:FROM: Chief of Station, WAVESUBJECT: Operational/AZTEC/RifleACTION REQUIRED: REFERENCES State Department requestACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI1. An APOT subsource, Ricardo NUNEZ Garcia, reported on 12 December 1961 that he had that day, by chance, met Manuel F. ORTEGA, a former delegate of Dr. Aureliano Sanchez Arango, at the New Orleans Airport. 201-2843032. NUNEZ stated that ORTEGA said that he was returning that day from a trip to Panama and Guatemala. In Panama he had talked to President CHIARI and had found him to be intimidated, but, to the contrary, when he had talked to President YDIGORAS in Guatemala he had found him extremely anxious to have CASTRO liquidated. YDIGORAS had asked ORTEGA about his visit to CHIARI, and then ORTEGA expressed his opinion, YDIGORAS said it was logical because CHIARI was extremely cowardly.3. According to NUNEZ, ORTEGA further said that a short time ago he had been called by Mr. Bob Hurwitch, Chief of the Cuban Desk in the State Department, and that Hurwitch had told him not to fool around with Sanchez or Julio Garceran because the man who had the support of the U.S. was AM/LASH-1, and that as he, Hurwitch, had knowledge of the great work done by ORTEGA, he did not want him to continue losing more time.4. NUNEZ added that ORTEGA added that a few days later he received a phone call from AM/LASH-1. ORTEGA told NUNEZ that he will help AM/LASH-1, because it was requested, but he would never have done so by his own wish.5. NUNEZ said that ORTEGA continued his travel on to Washington, where he resides at 1119 - 27th Street, N.W., Washington 7.END OF DISPATCHDistribution:3-HeadquartersCS FILE COPY 19-124-25CROSS REFERENCE TO:DATE TYPED: 3 Dec 1961DATE DISPATCHED:DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER:HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER:CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
[104-10227-10121.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992(TYPED O/DDF)ORIG: L.B. KIRKPATRICKUNIT: I.G.EXT : 8856DATE: 2 MAY 1961TO : SEE ATTACHED LISTFROM: DIRECTORCONF: IGINFO: DCI, D/OCI, DOP, COP, A2DP/A, EE 4, FC 5, WL, AF 4, WE 4, WH 4, S/C 2CLASSIFIED MESSAGESECRETROUTINGDEFERREDMAY 3 012ROUTINEPRIORITYOPERATIONALIMMEDIATEOUT52128OUT 57125CITE DIR: 57347-31987TO SEE ATTACHED LIST INFOBOOK MESSAGEFROM ASCHAM1. AS RESULT OF DEFEAT OF THE CUBAN OPERATION CONSIDERABLE COMMENT CONCERNING KUBARK NOW BEING MADE IN PRESS AND IN CONGRESS. MANY PROPOSALS ARE BEING AND WILL BE RAISED CONCERNING KUBARK AND OTHER ACTIVITIES IN THIS AREA OF ODYOKE. ACTUALLY MUCH MIS- INFORMATION GENERALLY REPORTED AND WHILE SOME PROPOSALS ARE FROM RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALS, THERE ARE MANY DISTORTIONS OF ACTUAL SITUATION. DETALS OF CUBAN OPERATION ARE SUFFICIENTLY COVERED IN DEPCIRTEL 1637 AND SUGGEST YOU OBTAIN THIS FOR YOUR INFO. IT IS MY VII V. THAT KUBARK ACQUITTED ITSELF WELL IN MOST RESPECTS, ALTHOUGH I PLA. FULL REVIEW OF OPERATION AFTER REASONABLE PERIOD HAS ELAPSED IN THE MEANTIME PRESIDENT HAS DIRECTED GENERAL MAXWELL TAYLOR 10 TA CLOSE LOOK AT ALL PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS IN AREA OF MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY, GUERRILLA AND ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES WHICH FALL SHORT OF OUTRIGHT WAR. HE WILL GIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO LESSONSRELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICERSECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGESECRETPAGE TWOFROM RECENT EVENTS IN CUBA. IN THIS EFFORT HE WILL BE ASSISTED BY ATTORNEY GENERAL, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, AND MYSELF. HIS REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT BY MAY 15.2. WHILE IN NO WAY WISHING TO LESSEN THE SERIOUSNESS OF DEFEAT IN CUBA BOTH FOR KUBARK AND PBPRIME, I WISH TO ASSURE EVERYBODY THAT OUR PRIMARY EFFORT SHOULD BE TO LEARN FROM EXPERIENCE, GOOD OR BAD. FURTHER, UNLESS INSTRUCTED BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY TO THE CONTRARY, EVERYBODY SHOULD CONTINUE WITH HIS PRESENT ACTIVITIES AND PROJECTS.FOR YOUR INFO, WE HAVE FULLY BRIEFED APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS ON THE CUBAN OPERATION AND IN FACT HAVE MORE THAN EVER BEFORE DURING THIS SESSION OF CONGRESS KEPT THE ARMED SERVICES AND APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES ADVISED ON DAILY BASIS OF VITAL INTELLIGENCE, PERTINENT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND PROBLEMS. WE WILL ENDEAVOR TO ADVISE YOU PROMPTLY OF PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WASHINGTON
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CLASSIFIED MESSAGESECRETROUTINGPAGE THREETOFROM: DIRECTORCONF:INFO:INFOOUT 52128CITE DIRTHAT AFFECT KUBARK, BUT STRESS THAT YOU RECOGNIZE THAT REPORTS ARE OFTEN MISLEADING.IN PUBLIC MEDIAEND OF MESSAGEALLEN W. PULLESRELEASING OFFICERDDCI (in draft)COPS (in draft)COORDINATING OFFICERSSECRETREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.RICHARD M. BISSELAUTHENTICATING OFFICER
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DIRECTORINFOALGIERS VIENNA OKINAWABRAZZAVILLE FRANKFURT SAIPANADDIS ABABA ATHENS SINGAPOREACCRA BERN TAIPEICONAKRY NICOSIA BANGKOKABIDJAN MELBOURNE SAIGONNAIROBI RANGOON VIENTIANEMONROVIA PHNOM PENH KABULTRIPOLI HONOLULU COLOMBORABAT HONG KONG NEW DELHILAGOS DJAKARTA TEHRANLEOPOLDVILLE TOKYO BAGHDADMOGADISCIO SEOULKHARTOUM KUALA LUMPUR AMMANTUNIS WELLINGTON BEIRUTPRETORIA MANILA FATMANDUSECRET
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KARACHIMADRIDPANAMA CITYJIDDASTOCI FOLMASGUACIONANKARABUENOS AIRESLIMACAIEDLA PAZAJA GILYSAN SALVADORBRUSSELSSIO DE JANEIROACCIONMON VIDEOOTTAWASANTIAGO!!COPENHAGEN5.GOTAACALACASLONDONSAN JOSESAN SALVAHELSINKICIUDAD TRUJILLOVIDEOPARISCoroCASPA كله )LCPIPIT(:GUATEMALA CITYREYKJAVIKATAL PACEROMEIFOUCICALPA:LUXEMBOURG :)CITYTHE RAGUEOSLOLISBONREPRODUCTION ESEC...
[104-10227-10150.pdf — page 0]
14-00000104-10227-10150 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRET10 Cctober 1961MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting with Dr. MIRO Cardona on 6 October1. Dr. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a. m. for the meeting we had set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced. As during the first meeting, she remained outside in the car. Our meeting lasted until 12:00 noon.2. First, Dr. MIRO handed me a note in longhand listing the topics discussed with me on 5 October. These points are:a. Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.b. A propaganda campaign should be waged by the Council aimed at:(1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Key West.(2) Cubans in Miami and other U. S. areas by:(a) Subsidising *Diario de las Americas*.(b) Contracting for time on radio stations.(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the Operacion Griete."c. Underground Activities.(1) Provision of monthly funds to Council for procuring Cuban pesos to send to the seven-odd resistance groups in Cuba through reliable channels (such as previously sent through the Italian Embassy).
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(2) Commando action as outlined in plan presented to ma on 6 October.3. Commando PlanThen Dr. MIRC handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine action prepared by his military collaborators, whom he named as Colonel Manuel VARELA Castro, an officer of the Academy, Captain Enrique DESPAIGNE, and Colonel (fnu) MONTEAGUDO, He slated that they were of the BARQUIN group and had been prisoners.With respect to the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba, he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part of them hore, part iu Cubs. Ho reiterated that a commando operation was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro clomente in Cuba ated in exile sa well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation V. S. help would be necessary in providing weapone, arnino, demolitions, equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to have merit, that I arrange to have someone mact with his military mon to work out the details. After all preparations had been made and matoriel provided, etc, the operation would be purely a Cuban affair. (NOTE: Plan turned over to Thorageen at our neeting at 15:30 on 6 October for transmission.)4. Request for Arma, etc, to send to EscambrayDr.MIRO zenmarked that over a month ago he had made a request to Clark for arma for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but to dato bad heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly. "I ask but never hear an answer." He said that the lighters there should be supported. Dr. Mlite stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and a means for delivery of the arme. Cavaldo RAMIREZ 18 chief of the Escambray group.COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?5. Information on Arms Heceived by Castro RegimoUr. MIRO handed ine a lone report which he said was brought to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the U. 5. at the time of President RONDILIO visit. *"He eaid the Ambassador would not divulge the source of the information but commented, "You will know."** Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.2
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Dr. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy of the figures given of planes, guns, etc, received from the Soviet bloe (and Italy and Canada) but even if the figures wore exaggerated 100 per ceat, they would still be impressive.Ho added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300,000 being trained to use them while the economy continues to deteriorate. Ferhaps caly half the militia would be effective. But that is siseable. Thus, he said, the longer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the greater will be the task. "We must act soon, vigorously and effectively, to insure victory. Another defeat would be disastrous and would make Cubnas, Latin Americans and others believo Castro to be invincible. Then would come accommodations and even worse, the traplanting of Castro-backed regimes in the hemisphere. And the U. S. would sufier worst of all, being diacredited for defeat and "gullt of interiorence." "in the UN na nation would stand boside the U. S."6. Proposal that Comell go to Cuba with Commando Group and Establish a Goveroment on Cuban soilDr. MURO then declared that he was convinced that Castro would never be overthrown by all the propagania, the sabotage, commando raido, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating ocononly, and that it was inconceivable to establish a government-irexile for nothing would come of it, that the only solution for defeating the Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Conacil to go to Cuba and estab- lish a goverament cu Cuban soil, ask recognition by all friendly countries and military assistance of its principal ally, the U. S., and that the U.S. be ready to intervene Immediately with its Forces. This would all have to take place in a matter cf 48 hours, otherwise it would fail. I recognise that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many risko, many may be killed. As for myself, I don't care if I die. I have loat all my personal possessions and may son is a prisoner," he reiterated that all roust be well prepared in advance, there must be no vaciliation, everything must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to Beina a piace of Cuban territory, preferably near Guantanamo, and loanie- diately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional government, broadcast by radio to a'l nations an appeal for recognition (and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), requeat U. S. assistance, and the U. 5. should furnish such assistance at once in ade- quate strength to ensure victory.
[104-10227-10150.pdf — page 3]
# SECRETBefore such an action is undertaken, the enemy must be softened by propaganda, cabotage, raids, underground action, and the mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council and its unifying efforts.Dr. MIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government levels. He proposed that he might elaborate a plan with his military collaborators, and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined and considered.Dr. MIRO declared that he was convinced that this Communist dagger in the side of the States could only be eradicated by such action, that the U.S. is and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda, sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention in Cuba, but that if the U. S. goes to the aid of a friendly revolutionary regime established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud."I have no personal political ambitions," declared MIRO. "I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the anti-Castro elements inside and outside of Cuba. If the team isn't considered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must establish itself on Cuban soil, and soon. Time is against us." The Junta del Este agreement will backfire against the U. S. if Castro is allowed to remain in Cuba. In a year, after the politicians of the countries receiving U. S. aid have gotten their hands on U. S. gold, they will say, 'Thanks to Castro, we got this.' And they will spend it as in the past with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the people."## 7. Views about the Judges and LawyersI queried Dr. MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and lawyers and their future status. He said he hoped that they could all reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He declared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council and MIRO and VARONA. Dr. MIRO declared that he, as Prime Minister in the early days of the Castro government, had named LABAU to the
[104-10227-10150.pdf — page 4]
Supreme Court, but that now he considered LABAU unfit to hold any judicial position.## 8. Members of the Revolutionary CouncilDr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council an 10 October. I asked what elements now composed it and what he proposed to add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo:Rescato30 de NoviembreMARAccion Democratica20 de MayoAAA IndopondientoMDCMontecristiHo said ho had invited to join:MRPUnidad Revolucionariaand awaited their reply.He would also like to have the Workers, Students, and the Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He believes Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate should be excluded, but that all other groups should be brought together under the Council.Ho contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestino and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO).## 9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with CubaDr. MIRO declared that he believed finiminent the Argentine rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba (Julio AMOEDO) was ordered to return to Havana (he had boon vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZ.I's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a Secretary of the Argentine Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO today; and further that he (MIRC) had received a phone call last night