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but even if he had, it might not have worked. To support Castro's Cuba is televed to have cost Moscow the equivalent of stout $1 million a day for inany years. To support a similar réguno in Chile would probably have cost even more. There was never the slightest sign that Mr Brezhnev, or anyone else in the Kremlin, was ready to accept such a burden.To sum up, then, it seems to me that the idea of an American conspiracy to overthrow Allende is both unproven and unnecessary to explain his downfall. I am not saying, of course, that Washington was not relieved to see him go; although I think some American officials would have preferied to see him stumbison for sometime longer in the hope that growing disillusionment would infect even bis stoutest supporters and accordingly diminish the chances of his being made a martyr when nenmesis finally overtook him. But in general the American attitude scems to have boen a predictably cautious one:*Thou shalt not kill, but neef'st not strive**Officlously to keep alive....*A realistic Chilean government embarked on its "road to socialisın" would surely have bargained for that much, and (on a truly Marxist analysia such as Alitude professed) it should have expected much more that America would move in for the kill as soon as possible. Yet while adopting a deliberately provocative stance, Allende took no steps to protect himself against possible American reprisals, declined to compromiso for the sako of other Western help, and failed to provide grounds even for his supposed Marxist friends to help him.It was magnificent, perhaps, but it was not politics. At the very least, Allende noust to convicted here of a lack of realism that would probably have boen fatal to any statesman any-where.2. The Ruling Class   Conspiracy MythTHE PICTURE of Allende being overthrown by what has been variously described as a "revolt of the privileged" a series of "bosses' strikes" or a "conspiracy of the traditional ruling class" contains so many misconceptions that it is hard to know where to begin to sort them out. One idea, however, seems basic to them all: that Allende and his Popular Unity coalition were somehow the uniquely legitimate representatives of "the People's Will" That such an odd belief should have gained any currecсу whatever outside purely propagandist circles is a mark of the confusion that surrounds the Chilean experience in the minds of many non-Chileans. To judge from published comments, such as those referring to the "defeat of the democratic will", some of Allende's sympathisers abroad seem even to believe that he not merely enjoyed a massive popular majority of the vote but was also the first President of his country to do so.Yet the facts are beyond dispute. Chile was and had been for many years a functioning democracy with a constitution which vested executive power in the President and legislative power in Congress. Both in theory and in practice, no doubt, there were serious weaknesses-es revez'd, for instance, in the inability of previousto press through social reforms ei wiftly es many Collars would have wished. But by co mon comment the system was the best and most stable in Latin Amerion and it had enabled Zende himself to coatest the Presidency unsucity three times before he finally won it at his from attempt in 1970. There was no doubt of the legitimacy of that victory. But, unfortunately for those who saw it as a unique expression of "the people's will", it was gained only through a narrow plurality in which Allende obtained just over 562% of the poll. Ilis nearest rival, ody a couple of percentatge points behind was the candidate of tie conservative National Party, where members in Congress opposed Allende from the start. Another 28% went to the third candidate, a radical reformist from the Christian Democrat party, many of whose members in Congress at first gave Allende the benefit of the doubt, hoping he would modify hit avowel Marxiun in practice to a kind of reformiam compatible with their own ideas and the existing constitution.In the mid-term Congressionali elections of March 1973, the Popular Unity coalition raised Its share of the vote to 41% (although this tima the "legitimacy" was suspect owing to opposition allegations of substantial eloctoral fraud). But the opposition parties retained a large majority: lo Congress where, by that time, most of the Qiristian Democrats had joined the Nationalista in outright antagoniun to the President. On these facts it veure plain that, so far froin representing "Die J'eople's Will", Allende never actually ro precated more than a substantial minority Interest. Only if "the l'eople" are identified as being those who voted for Allende, while the rest -the majority-are relegated to the status of "non-people" can any other interpretation be sustain 1. But that, of course, is just what is implied by the myth of the "ruling class conspiracy."IP THERE WAS a "ruling class" in Chile it was tha of the politicians and the surrounding establishment drawn mostly from the narrow upper end of Chiie's prosperous middle class. Allende himself and many of his ininisters and leading supportas were as much part of that group as, were their political opponents. But, ironically, it was a group that often zuTered less than others from Allende's socialism because its members on both sides generally possessed enough cash or property to exploit the black market at home or slip into Byreeable exile if things got too rough-in any case, to survive (like Allende himself until his death) in very reasonable comfort. But the people who did most to overthrow Allende were rarely of this group at all. With the possible exception of some naval officers, the armed forces were very much apart from the establislunent of any political colour; and even after Allende brought the service commanders into his government they remained aloof from, and remarkably little known by, those relatively small circles in Santiago which were accustomed to set the country's political tone.Indeed, as events since the coup d'état hav shown, Chile's military men-like their counter parts elsewhere were probably as contemptuous of the politicians (and as ignorant el poütics) as the politicians were of them. They had stayed outside politics for nearly 40 years, and if Allende