[104-10225-10027.pdf — page 62]
# Allende in RetrospectBy Paul E. SigmundWorld attention has moved away from Santiago since the bloody overthrow of Salvador Allende last September, but the questions that were raised at that time still need answering. Where should the primary responsibility be placed for the tragic events on and after September 11, 1973? Was it, as the Left contends, the result of a fascist counterrevolution aided and abetted by the forces of imperialism? Was it, as the Right asserts, the only available response to Allende's attempt to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat by a mixture of guile and force? Did it mark the "death of a dream" of the establishment of socialism by democratic means, and was it thereby one more demonstration that Marxism must use force to accomplish its goals? Were there internal and external political and economic factors which made it impossible for Allende's experiment to succeed, or was the downfall of the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) coalition government the consequence of a series of ideologically-influenced analyses and mistaken policy choirces which, if they had been different, might have produced another result? A review of the course of the Allende government with the aid of the considerable new material that has become available in recent months may help to answer these questions.Allende's opponents never tire of pointing out that he was elected with only 36 percent of the vote in a three-way race. What they do not mention is that in the congressional run-off between the two front-running candidates he was elected president by a lopsided majority vote of 135-35. Ho received the support of the centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in the run-off in return for his agreement to the adoption of a Constitutional Statute of Democratic Guarantees protecting freedoms of expression, education and religion, and guaranteeing the independence of the military from political control. The text of the statute, which was added to the Chilean Constitution shortly after Allende's election, reflected the fears of non-Marxist groups that the new Marxist President would use the considerable power of the Chilean executive to undercut and eventually destroy all opposition to a Marxist take-over.Mr. Sigmund is Professor of Politics at Princeton University. Among his published works are Models of Political Change in Latin America, 1970, and The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (2nd rev. ed., 1972). He has visited Chile nine times since 1963, most recently in January 1974 to do research on a forthcoming book dealing with Chilean politics.# Political and Economic StrategyWhen he took office, Allende promised that he would follow a "second model" of Marxism—the via Chilena to socialism, "with meat pies and red wine." To prove that this model was "anticipated by the classics of Marxism," he quoted from Friedrich Engels on the possibility of... a peaceful evolution from the old society to the new in countries where the representatives of the[^1] Allende's supporters in the Popular Unity coalition consisted of his own Socialist Party (Partido Socialista-PS), the Communist Party (Partido Comunista-PC), the main body of the Radical Party (Partido Radical-PR), the leftist Catholic "Movement of Popular United Action" (Movimiento de Accion Popular Unido-MAFU), and two other smaller groups. The largest opposition groups wore the centrist Christian Democratic Party (Partido Democrata Cristiano-PDC) ard the rightist National Party (Partido Nacional PN)..In retrospect, it is ironic that the Chilean Senate never acted on a constitutional amendment proposed early in 1970 to establish a second-round popular election, which would have provided the President thus elected (probably the right-wing candidate, Jorge Alessandri) with a clear popular mandate.45