Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFID. JAL SECRET(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DD/P 5288OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP| TO   |              | INITIALS | DATE    || ---- | ------------ | -------- | ------- || 1    | DD/P         |          |         || 2    |              |          |         || 3    | CIO - 1028-X |          |         || 4    |              |          |         || 5    |              |          |         || FROM |              | INITIALS | DATE    || 1    | CIO          | TWB      | 25 Sept || 2    |              |          |         || 3    |              |          |         |APPROVAL INFORMATION SIGNATUREACTION DIRECT REPLY RETURNCOMMENT PREPARATION OF REPLY DISPATCHCONCURRENCE RECOMMENDATION FILERemarks: The attached reply was received from Mr. Shepardson in response to my request for them to study prospects for broadcasts to the Baltics. Reference your letter of 30 July to C.D. Jackson.SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED UNCLASSIFIEDFORM NO. 30-4SEP1947
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SECRETSECURITY INFORMATIONSeptember 14, 1953917-15788Dear Mr. lidwood:/ short time ago the question was asked of us whether RCFE would recommend the extension of RFE broadcasting to the Baltic states. The question was made the subject of several papers which were prepared for, and circulated to, and there after discussed it three meetings of the RCFE policy committee.Following these discussions, the RCFE position is as follows:Broadcasts of the RFE type (i.e. the type to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary), directed at the three Baltic countries, would be plainly advantageous to the United States in terms of NCFE's objectives. There are even stronger arguments for starting such broadcasts at once than there were for starting them two years ago. However, now, as during the 1951 discussions, the problem rises whether such broadcasts (Voices of Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) cannot without damage to diplomatic usage -- be handled by the Voice of America. The fact that the Soviet occupation of the Baltic nations has never been recognized by the Government of the United States would appear to remove the restraints under which the Voice of America must operate where the local government has an American diplomatic mission accredited to it.If the Voice of America can transmit Voices of Free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, we would not want to compete with them and would consider it preferable that they should do the job with the whole prestige of the non-recognition policy of the United States Government behind them. If we knew for certain that the Voice is not going to handle the task (which would be a different one and in addition to what we believe to be their present transmissions in the Baltic languages) then we would add the baltic nations to the list of unfinished business to which RFE must direct its attention whenever sufficient resources become available.However, sufficient resources are far from being available at the present time, and, urgent as are the needs of the Baltic listening audience in the present period of ferment:tion of freedom throughout the satellite area, our first task must necessarily be to hold the audiences we already have in the face of the electronic war that is being waged against our transmissions by enemy jamming. RFE's original budget for 1953-54 was based on an orderprogram to maint: in present gains in the three main targets (Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary)SECRETSECURITY
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Page 2Mr. Hadwood917-1and to develop our present scanty capabilities in Fulgeria, and the lesser targets of Romania, and Albania. The original budget cut of about 1,500,00, ne Fellowed by a second cut of 1,000,000, make it doubtful if RFE can even mintain fel! audience-rorching capabilities to all of its main target areas, let lene maintaining the seenty capabilities to the other targets mentioned above. Indeed, the LOVE Board of Trustees 111 pro bly vote on September isth (1) not to expand Bal-gerien brodents, (11) to shorten Rom nien broadents, and (lii) to elimin: to broadents to sinis.To enter the Baltic gres, as a real and not teken target, veuld (I am informed by RF) cost additional sumse morey several times groter than the cuts that have recently been made. Much so we would like to see this new are opened up in what is generally regarded as "RFE style", either by VOA or ourselves, I see no hore of RFE's being able to undertake the task until their budget alloc:tions can not only reach, but substantially exceed, the mount needed to preserve existing programs (egainst enemy interference) st their existing audience-reaching level. And certainly if such budget additions were in sight, it would be necessary for us to consider, longside the Baltic plan, the relative desirability of:(a) Strengthening still further the signal to the three principal targets,(b) Initiating the often discussed pian for in-stalling transmitters in Turkey or Greece for reaching Romania and Bulgaria more effectively,(c) Broadcasting to Albania as more important target than the Baltic states.Cone usion:Unless it is red rded as of pramount national in-teret that RFE type broadcasts be made to the Eltic states; andUnless it is clear that Vos is not in a position to provide such programs; andUnless it is clear that such development by SFE is more important thing
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Page 3Mr. Hidwood017-1(1) Additional signol strengths to Czechoslo-vikis, Poland and Hung ry,(11) Additional signal strength and programsto Bulgaria and Romante, preferably from a new transmitterinstallation, andUnless an adecuate sum of money for one or all ofthuse operations is in sight,!!CRE does not recommend the extension of pro der stingto the three Eltic states.Sincerely yours,![signature]SECURITY INFu
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September 18, 1953Memorandum for Messrs. Joseph B. PhillipeWilliam DurkeeThomas Braden ✓George MorganAbbott WashburnThe attached memorandum is self-explanatory and was written to me by Mr. Jackson while he was away on vacation.Could someone--perhaps Mr. Phillips--let us know when it has been decided how David will be handled?Many thanks.![signature of Marie McCrum]Marie McCrumSecretary to C. D. JacksonAttachments
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SECRETSECURITY IN........THE WHITE HOUSEWASHINGTONSeptember 17, 1953.Miss McCrum:I have a feeling that no one on our side is prepared to keep a firm hand on the Jean Paul David trip.David is himself a king-sizo free wheeler. Although he is unquestionably one of the French "doers," as opposed to "talkers," in this field, he is also quite a big-mouth and inclined to over-talk, over-promise and over-indulge in cloak-and-dagger stage setting. U he hasn't got a guard, armed to the teeth, with a beret and a half-burned cigarette glued to his underlip, lurking outside the dining-room, he can't enjoy hię meal.The plot is complicated by the fact that as far as the U. S. Is concerned he has always been strictly covert. This time he arrives as strictly "overt" so no one on our side will really know how to behave since everyone will have to do and be the exact opposite of what they did and were during David's last trip.I would suggest that you show the attached to Abbott Washburn, George Morgan, Tom Braden and/or Bill Durkee, and Joe Phillips (also this note) and suggest that they work out who should consider himself responsible. I personally hope Joe Phillips will be willing to take it on.Incidentally, the American who handles David best is Helen Kirkpatrick. She might conceivably be drafted as chaperone for this trip.C. D. J.SECRETSECU......
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COPYThe following is from a dispatch written by Mr. William Tyler, dated 22 June 1953.1. After a recent conversation with Jean Paul David, at which time he outlined his activities and ideas in connection with the mission with which he is charged by Georges Bidault, I received a letter from him.2. It will be seen from this letter that David is most anxious that the report which he will make on his survey should represent, without committing any one country, a systhesis of the views and the resources of the Western powers allied under NATO, in the broad field of propaganda and psychological warfare designed to build support for Western defense policy and to promote the achievement of the objectives of these policies.3. It occurs to me that a difficulty which we have to face, and which we are probably unique in having to face, is due to the organisational structure within which we operate officially in the general field under discussion. In a country like Italy, for example, it is possible for David to have exchanges of views with high officials of the government and to feel reasonably sure that even though such views are not to be taken as a commitment, they do in fact represent the disposition of the government in question, or any government likely to succeed it, toward these problems. In our case, however, it seems to me that it will requiro careful preparation to determine with whom David should consult and to work out a constructive position which will influence his report and his recommendations in a direction which we approve.4. It is particularly difficult for me to make specific recommendations, since developments in Washington in the last few months are difficult to keep up with from overseas. It would, therefore, be particularly helpful to have headquarters' views at this stage on the following points, assuming that David will go to the States in late September on the last leg of his survey:a. With whom should he mest for basic discussions. (It occurs to me that a suitable body, if still in existence, would be the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee.)b. Within what limits at this time are we prepared to discuss the problem of concerted action for the psychological strength of the North Atlantic Community.5. As headquarters is aware, C. D. Jackson knows David personally, and it would perhaps be useful to arrange for conversations with him and any group he might have in mind. It is true that the position of David with regard to this Agency is anomalous, since the survey on which he is engaged, far from relating to covert operations, is of the most official
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-2-SECRETSECURITY INFORMATIONkind possible. As headquarters has pointed out, his interests in his present mission in reality pertain more to the State Department and NATO than to us, and it seems to me that we should not be in the direct line of fire except in the capacity of individual observera or participants in the conversations he will have. It would, therefore, seem to be all the more important that we arrive at a clear understanding among ourselves as to how David's trip to the States will be organised and what is to be the respective role of the component elements in the psychological effort with regard to his survey./S/ WILLIAM TYLERSECRET
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ATTACHMENT #1(TRANSLATION)Translation of Letter from Jean-Paul DavidJune 19, 1953My dear Bill,You know that - probably toward the end of Septomber- I am to leave for the United States on a mission entrusted to me by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.Mr. Bidault is concerned - and justly so, about the problems connected with the objectives of my survey, and my desire is to produce a realistic report since I wish to avoid (you know my way of thinking) the traditional phraseology which generally takes the place of action.To date, in Italy, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway .. I have successively conferred with the Prime Ministers, Ministere of Foreign Affairs, of Defense, of the Interior, of Education. I have also sometimes mat with the Chiefs of Staff, and specialiste of information and of psychological varfare.To all of them, I have said:"Mr. Bidault has requested me to make this survey and you have before you the text of the French note which speaks for itself and seems to require no further comment. I want to ask you to state, in writing and without in any way committing your Government or your particular services, what solutions seca reasonable. I wish to gather all constructive ideas on this enttor. Your ideas will bo useful, perhaps, to other countries - even if you think them inapplicable in your own. Then, I shall make a synthesis of the reports so assombled adding thereto the thoughts of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in this respect. And, at the (NATO) 'Conference of the 14 at the end of October, we shall have available a program on the basis of which constructive action can be taken."There, in telegraphic style, is my argument. I should add that evorywhere I found an excellent welcome, everyone accepted this method end praised me substantial reports.But, if in small or medium-size countries, I have encountered no major difficulties, I have no idea of the way of thinking of your compatriots on such matters. And this note is for no other reason than to ask you to express your thoughts, in view of the excellent advice you can givo na.
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-2-I want to emphasize that, in my mind, the reports and suggestions gathered from all the specialists of all the ministries of any particular country will not commit any country in any way. I will name no one, compromise no one. I want to gather the sum of the ideas and resources of the Atlantic Community in this domain and add a few personal ideas which seem workable.That is why, my dear Bill, I ask for your contribution as I would like to carefully prepare this trip across the Atlantic. Please forgive this long letter. Tell me what you think of all this.s/ Jean Paul David
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SECRETSECURITY INFORMATION16 September 1953MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCESUBJECT: Whitney Sheperdson Phone Call to You of Yesterday,15 September, Concerning Forced Labor1. The central facts in this business are as follows:a. NCFE had a letter sent to the President of the United Statessigned by various individual exiles expressing their gratificationto the United States Government for its "initiative in placing as anitem for the agenda of the 8th session of the General Assembly of theUnited Nations the matter of 'Evidence of Existence of Forced Labor'.b. At this Division's direction the Department of State wasasked to prepare an answer to this letter for the President's signa-ture which NCFE could publicly exploit in cooperation with the UnitedStates Mission to the United Nations.c. Late Friday afternoon this Division was informed by the De-partment that no answer could be forthcoming as the U.N. Delegationhad decided not to push the forced labor matter at this time. NCFEwas informed to this effect the same afternoon and again on Monday bythis Division.d. Because its letter was not being answered, NCFE erroneouslyassumed that the work it was doing on forced labor in cooperationwith the U.N. Delegation was to be of no avail and in fact that itwas the decided policy of the United States Government not to forcethis issue at this or any other time.e. The net effect of this matter is as follows:(1) The Department of State will draft an answer for thePresident's signature which will be transmitted to Secretary ofState, Dulles for his personal approval after consultation withAmbassador Lodge. The approved answer will then be transmittedto President Eisenhower for his signature. Public exploitationSECRET
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SECRET- 2 -SECURITY INFORMATIONOf the letter by NCFE will be undertaken on the guidance of the United States mission of the United Nations. In the meantime, NCFE will continue to work with the United States Mission to the U.H. but the timing and use of the materials developed by NCFE is to be determined by the United States Delegation.![signature of THOMAS W. BRADEN]THOMAS W. BRADENChief,International Organisations DivisionSECRET
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14-00000Treasury No: Sta4.  5514ALH/JFF10. 4333 AX8 September 1963MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central IntelligenceSUBJECT: British Foreign Office uneasiness concerning the tone and content of EFE broadcasting to the European satellites, and related matters.1. Attached hereto is a memorandum of conversation prepared by Tracy Barnes, who sat in on a conversation which took place on 4 September in my office with Messrs. Rob Scott and Adam Watson of the British Embassy. Tracy's memorandum covers the conversation quite fully, but I should like to point out certain impressions and conclusions of my own which I believe to be worthy of your consideration.2. It was quite evident that Rob Scott, who, as you know, is the new Minister, and Watson had received some fairly strong prodding from Sir William Strang, and it was equally apparent that they were not particularly well prepared as they were somewhat embarrassed when called upon for specifications- unable as they were to produce these. Three other features of the conversation which struck me rather forcibly were the following:a. The fact that they placed primary emphasis on the absolute necessity at the present time of keeping the US-UK copybook completely stainless until such time as there shall (may?) have been a high-level four-power meeting, including the Soviets, and until such time as it shall have appeared clearly that the Soviet Government is not prepared to make concessions and otherwise adopt a conciliatory approach. This is a fairly evident British line which they have been peddling for some time and I do not doubt that you heard something of it while in London. If followed to the letter and permitted to order our conduct, the result would be that we would, adopt a total "sweetness and light" program for an indefinite period of time.b. The fact that the Embassy representatives said that they had no intention of speaking with the State Department about any of this aroused some slight suspicion on my part that they may have been deliberately bypassingSECRETSecurity Information
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the Department in the hope of retting a better deal directly witi. us. This is the more my impression, since if the Fritish "sweetness and light" line is to be adopted and carried out in both letter and spirit then the State Department ind icter ho get into Mre as well. Obviously the utterances of top State Depertment officials, both here and abroad, and State Dena Lment actions are much were important Tor the pia-poste of tills particular British approach than are the actions and utterances of sur uneficial pray and black media. I reported the substance of the conversation to General Cabell who authorized me to bring it to the attention of Doc Matthews, which I have done, and at the same time requested him to advise us if the Dopart- ment hears anything about Lids from the British Embassy[^7]C. Finally, Adam Watson dragged in by the tail some questions about the so-called "Freedom Corps", and asked me whether I could confirm that there had been a substantial "heating up" of tits old proposal within the past month or six weeks. I replied that if this iden --Mich was a very old one indeed in US Covernment cireles -- cad reached any particuler climax within the past month, 1 was not aware of it. I said that I and heard that the State Duratment was considering asking the Foreign Office what if thought about such a prthen replied that the State Department had, in fact, submitted this question to the Foreign Office and that the Foreign Office had replied Chat it recommended most strongly against any broaching of this subject at least until after the derman elections. I thanked No. Watson for bringing me up to date, and the point tas not farthor pursued.Enel (1)Home for Pecord did3 September, sed byC/PP: Conv. betw. MessrsWisner, Scott, Watson andDarnes.CC: C/PPFrank G. WisnerDeputy Director (Plans)SECRETSecurity Informatice[^7]: ![photo description]
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SECRETSecurity Informat558911 September 1953MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PPSUBJECT: Recent conversation with menters of the FO staff of the British Embazzy re RFE broadcasts, etc.REFERENCES:a. Memo dtd Cept 3 from DD/? to DCT; Subject: British Foreign Office uneasiness concerning tone and content of PPE broad-casting to the European satellites, and related matters.b. Memo for Record dtd 8 September from C/PP: Subject: Conv. betw. Megers Wisner, Scott, Watson and Parnes.1. I am returning to you the original of the Feference a. memorandum for the file. Mr.Wisner asked whether you had shown your copy of this memorandum to Mr. Braden -- he thinks that both Mr. Braden and Mr. Durkee should see it.2. Mr. Wisner asked me to tell you that his suspicions of Mr. Watson's sheepishness were rather fully confirmed by a subsequent conversation in which Mr. Watson admitted to Mr. Wisner quite frankly that neither he nor Mr. Rob Scott had had very much stomach for their mission that day. Mr. watson rather doubted that we would hear any more about this.Attached:Ref. a. memorandum.![signature]BJSECRETSent, inf
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# SECRETSecurity Information25 August 1953MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)SUBJECT: RFF Coverage of ICFTU DevelopmentsThe attached extracts from RFE's Daily Guidance Bulletin are evidence of the day to day coverage that RFE is giving to ICFTU decisions. In addition we are setting up an arrangement whereby RFF. will have continuing liaison with a member of the special committee appointed by the ICFTU. Through this channel we hope to supply RFE with documentary material on workers' conditions in the satellites and to insure also that the line taken by RFE toward labor issues is not in conflict with the ICFTU position.DCIO: CM/mfDistribution:Orig - Addressee via Jacobs1 cc - CIO1 cc - DCIO1 cc - RICORD HEYER, JR.Deputy ChiefInternational Organizations DivisionSECRETSecurity Information