Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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-10-develop its interest in the European refuger field, a new instru-inent must be found. Those factors iso tond to indicate roughlysome of the qualities which this instrument cust po93089.1.  No single exile organisation engaged in refugee acti-    vity, including those receivin; NCTS support, is consistently    good in 11l of its local branches. This observation applies    also to those organizations receiving NCP support watch do    not fell into the national council category (the AFGR and    Rumanian Felfaro).Conclusions:In its activity in the European refuges 21:14, SOFEmuat bo completely free to select the organizations and indi-viduals with which it may consider it practic to cooperateon any level. NCPE must therefore not be comm12164 to supportor to cooperate wit!. any organization in all parts andmust be free to sever connections tony time with any orguni-zation or its parts (individuals or sections) with which itfinds it no longer practical to cooperate. NC77 cast be comple-tely flexible in this operation.2.  The rofugee in Europe is confronted with a situation    which is fluid in all its spects. Ho faces clace the closure    of IRO, a multitude of uncoordinated agencios, the continued    existence of some (the voluntary agencies) 18 scertain; the    operations of fothers (the Dil und "ICLE) romain be developed    fully; the scope and activity of another (the State Department    Program) is in the rumor stage. He is uncortaic, suspicious    and rateful of the now status and intentions of 20 loc 1 natio-    nal authorities under whose immediate jurisdiction he must live.    ine fuces the after-effects of mass omigration, saica, although    it ceased some time ago, a deprived him of the most qualified    of his compatriots and honce of stable national Leadership.    For himself, the limited, uncertain and uncocmicated cmigration    on an individual beais which still exists offere but faint hope    for departure from the frontier countries. le Laces almost    impossible employment conditions, depending upon local situa-    tions and seasonal work which often requires die being shifted    from place to placo the employment situation dictates. The    majority, however, must stay in the camps or on the colo. He    faces shifting campe which are often moved or cizzolved by the    loc.1 authorities. These actors combin to procace a demora-    lizing feeling of impermanence and insecurity. They aro, in    turn, aggravated by the unsympathetic attitude of the countries    in which the refugee finds himself, an attitude which frequently    approaches hostility and which is not improved by the presence    in these countries of emb tered expelled ethnic zinorities who    were nce the citizens of the refugee's homeland. The homelindo    is a deplorable feeling of apatay, hopelessness, isolation and    abandonment ani a total lack of any sense of direction or purpose.
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-11-Conclusions :NOF's appro ch to the refugee and his problems must be broad in order that it may icpart a feeling of purpose, airec- tion, continuity and security. This appro ch must have an attractive national flavor which will appel to the refugee"s desire to belong, without encouraging his chauvinistic tendencies, and, indeed, should provide a positive substitute for them. To implecent this approach NCPR's instrument in the field must gain be supremely flexible but susceptible of close and regid control. This instrument must be capable of conveyin;; an impression of seriousness, responsibility and constructive interest, thus inspiring Teeling of confidence on the purt of the authorities and agencies as well as the refugees.3. In general it may be observed that in the frontiers countries there is a not ble lack of knowledge of CEE's role in support of the admittedly limited and relatively negligible refugee activities in which it is thus far indirectly engaged. RFE is, of course, widely known and inest as widely criticized for its failure to accept responsibility for its part in the refugee problem. FINE 18 usually known, out only vaguely and secondarily, and in many cases the picture of its scope, acti- vities nd gouls is distorted. There is a din awareness of FEJE's conection with RFF, but a general Lilure to draw any conclusions therefrom.Conclusion:To engage in refugee activities of any nature or extent without clearly identifying and labelling HCFE an the organiza- tion ultimately responsible for these scrivities is a neodless and senseless failure to exploit a possibility in the form of enhanced 1083 prestige and greater sympathy and cooperation with the work of RFE and FEUS on the part of both refugees and other active agencies. Particularly from the point of view of REE's essential relationship to the refugees it is a serious mistake not to do so. Thorolore the instrument which NOPE adpp for its work in this field must be identifiable only as an CFE operation, clearly related to RFE and FEUE.4. It has dea: mentioned previously that the international anu voluntary agencies tena to regard the exile representatives with skepticism and tend to hold thes at ara's length. This attitude seems partilly to result from their ignorance of exile politics and their understandable reluctance to become involved therein. Their ignorance and disinterest as in several caseB led them to choose refugee assistants and aavisors of unfortunate political background and tendencies from the CFE point of view. Again, however, as mentioned above, the representatives of several of these agencies have expressed a definite interest in having these insuppressible refusee groups somehow organised and controlled.Conclusion :Responsible and direct American control would therefore
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-12-do such to dispel this negative attitude and would pave the wayfor a wore positive and productive cooperation between the natio-nai refugee groups and the agencies clive in their behalf.Tafe cointroi would also it is reable to suppose, help tofill vacuums in exile representation of the kind described .bove.5.  Anoteer weaknose of the organizations surveyed in the    frontier countries is their alzost iveral tendency in greater    or Leaser degrees to discriminate patically or persen lly in    the Distribution of assistance. There is no comparison between    to extent of this woniness in the tense ani unmottled atmosphere    of the frontier countries ad tas more corsal environment of    BA intermediary receiving countries, France and Britain. In    aisition to the injustice of such crimination, definito oppor-    tunities are lost through failure seriovely to attempt to win    0795, through. lens narrow assistance, elements (such as the Czech    and Slovak Separatisto, Hungarian aztrelicta and the Seawabs)    4.1cm now oppose or inthe future siger oppone the political and    national structures which RCF recognizes and supports..Conclusion:Ag-in, close RCFE guidance and control aro indicated sothet injustices way be reduced and swolder NCFE aims implemented,rather than tserted by narrower Interests of short-sighted andussalightened refugos representatives.- V -A. NCFE's approachIf NCFE is to codify its prezect instruments and create newones 10 anifest its interest in the prob. & of refugees inEurope, it sacula first formulate a broad and comprehensiveapproach to the refugee as tipec person in whom and in whoseproblems this interest is to be 820.This approach will, by the nature of CEO's interest in therefugee, aifier zarkedly from those other organisations activein the field.All these organizations, the intelligence agencies, thelocal national governments, the 21g Commissioner and thevoluntary agencies, are interested the Czechoslovak orRuzanian or Pole who crosses the beer because, respectively,he right be a Corcunist agent or have information, he is or mightbe a political refugee or because se saa human being in need.NCE is interested in him because he iz Czechoslovak or Rumanian
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-13-or Pole --a citizen of country whose people were promised at Yalta certain rights and privileges which they have not received because of the violent interference of a Communist Russia. This is also the fund mental theoretical reason for RFE broadcasts to the Czechoslovaks in Czechoslovakia, the Foles in Poland, te. The fundamental practical reuson 1 of course the interest of the United States in these nations and peoples us European politic1 factors.RFS obviously cannot create a military machine capable of liberating the nations of Eastern Europe. It is interested qhite simply in promoting the existence of certain ttitudes, interests und activities which will ono day contribute to the successful fulfillment of the promises made at Yalta. RYS is intereated List mothers should teach their children certain truthe to counter Communist liest that workers should react in certain ways to Communist pressures, tint students should understand the fallacios of the system which they are being seduces or forced to serve. In short, RFE wiohos to direct Czeci.colovaks. in Czechoslovakia, Poles in Poland and Hungarians in ilungary to act in the enlightened self-interest of their respective nations. The fact that this enlightened self-interest, 10 supported by RFE, coincides with our own and other broder intérests serves only to underline its importance.se have tried to point out in this report the ex.ent to which the presence and activities and problems of the refuдоев from NOFA countries in "ostern Europe cannot but be of interest to NCFE. Again, NCFE need not concern itself directly with the feeding, housing, employment and emigration of these people, any more than RFE should itself undertako to raise an hai2my.This is not to say late icrs may not.. ind it advisablo0 0 continue to use limited welfare funds in its work with fugees. But its principal tasks will be to protect its interests by attempting to produce some order out of the cimos of refugees activities by giving to the refugee and his representativen a sense of direction and belonging which the other agencies active in the field are admittedly unable adequately to provide. Without it, the refugee in Europe laost inevitably sinks into a state of hopeless and isolated apathy. He belongs to nothin but the tense na quarrelsome fr.torty of his fellow abandoned. Sitting unoccupied all day, his only activity soon becomes the endless intrigue of the political parties. with few books and less commu- nication with the outside world, and particularly, without constructive leadership and uince, the parties become almost the only organizations with a notional flavor open to the refugee. In this tmosphere it is not surprising that refugee nationalisme become chauvinistic and ideas, of nation interest, subordinated to the narrow and petty goals of the political parties.The voluntary and other agencies and the locl national authorities can hardly provide a constructive substitute since they only approach the refugee as such, reenforcing his apathy by their euch needed gifts, unable to cfier allegiance to anything other than the Churches, opposed or reluctant to undertake any
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-14-altempt at support or guidance of his national tendencies. In#11 firness, it should be noted, however, that the currentapproach to the rofugee on the part of all these agencies is acoracious and considerable leprovement on the exaggerated andIncentive-Killing IRO dolo system.But if NCFR approaches the new auc pae, as well as theolder Dr, not no a neody "refugee" but as a citizen of hiscountry who simply finds himself in a difficult position onthis side of the Iron Curtain rathr than on the other sise,it zuould be possible to appeal to his desire for nationalcontinuity and than to some oxtont appol to his ideas of hisown enlightened self-interest in much the same way that suchappeais are provided for the escapee's compatriots at hozeby 7.This approach woule also take into account the significantfact that many of the new arrivale, (cstimates run as hien asare not real "political refugees". They leave theircountries for economic reasona or because they are fed up orsimply want to try out the conditions in the best which aredescribed to them as no much superior to those in their hozelanie. Among these people there are of course any mistite,incompetent a and undesir bles. No one should delude himselfwith a picture of all refugees as worthy, deservios, honestpeople persecuted by a Communist regime and fleeing for theirvery lives.SCHE interests, however, override this unfortunate reality:no individual who leaves a satellite country for any reasonwhatever should be allowed to fall into such a condition ofdisillusionment that he should consider returning or even considerserting word of his discouragement home. One such return orreport of personal disillusionment can produce a most unfortunatecountereffect to RFE and other Bestern propagands. It is anaccepted fact that there have been such cases and they are infact regarded as one of the factors contributing to the presentloser arrival rate of now oscаресв.Granted thi pproach to the escapee and the old refugeeand Drae a citizen, and the desire to promote among these peoplethe lies of concern for their real self-interests, the ide whichmost acequately describes this approach is that of the "corculate".The functions of a consultere to protect the interestsof the citizen abroad. Katerial assistance is provided only inсавев 21 emergency the consulates principal task is to takean active interest in guiding the citizen to those local agenciesbeat abic to satisfy his wents and to suggest approaches andattitudes most likely to benefit him during his stay abroad.The Lost glaring and urgent example of the need for such consularguidance may be found in the necessity for protecting the Czecho-slovaka in Germany not only from the political opposion of theGermans, but from their own senseless, destructive ana short-sighted political maneuverings.
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-15-## 3. Jodifications of 's present instrument.As indicated above, it will of courah be useful und desirable to incorporate in this approach and in the new instrument, (FECB), designed to implement it, features, (individuals and organisations) of the present instrument which hav demonstrated their effectiveness. However, also an mentioned earlier, in order to sure the freedom of action and freedom of choice of the new instrument, certain modifications of those, fonturos of the present instrument will be required.1. It will first of all be nocennary that those features (individuals and organizations) of the prosent instrument consi-dored suit ble for incorporation in FECS be separated adminia-tratively and financially from their headquarters, since PECS will operate on the basis of the following prodedural approachtSuch individuals or organizations will be incorporated in FECS on one primary s their proved effectiveness in the past and/or their promise of offectiveness uncor CFE guidance; their retention will be dependent upon their ability successfully to continue this performance. This is of course basically an adaptation of part of the approach which has enabled RE and AFS to make effective use of qualified exile personnel for the attain-ment of their own goals.2. For the undirected and uncoordinated system of almost complete lack of control which has hitherto generally prevailed in NCFE's relationship to refuges activities and exile organi-sations, will be substituted a system of control which will preserve at lost the illusion of freedom through the incorγρο-ration of qualified exile orga: Izations and individuals ond the selection of otiors to fill gaps which such organizations and individuals Lave proved unable to fill. The fact of thefr ultimate responsibility to ACFE should be made bundantly clear. That this is in no way incompatible with the atmosphere of an illusion of freedom in which FECS's exile employees will be working is amply proves by the success of RFS national desks. It will be made clear to these employees that they should consider themselves to be working as consuls and consuler assistants under a civil service progr. They should be given the impression that the responsibility for the success of FECS in its attempts to assist the refugeed lies in their hands, and that its failure for reasons of favoritise or dishonesty would constitute un evasion of their patriotic responsibility.## C. Functions and potentialities of FECS.The underlying purpose of FECS is of course to serve the policies and basic interests of NCFE.. Se have tried to indicato the extent to which its work with the refugees would be directly to these interests. Other interests which PECS would have the purpose of serving might be i1) The prevention or misunderstandings on the part of the
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-16-refugees and other agencies active in the field regarding all phases of ACPE work, and particularly that of FCUS and RFE.2) The attempt to keep the NCFE Suropean Representative and the RFE Political Advisor informed of oxile political developments 1: Europe which micht ffect their operations and to control and guide theio dvelop: nts wherever possible to the udvantage of NCPE and RFE. For example, ACFE, designed to wage political varfere on brond front, was recently almost outflanked in Germany. Some organized means of preventing Buch occurences, or at least of reporting their development, should be provided.1. The primary function of PECS is to approach the refug00 os a citizon and by so doing to try and set up conditions and introduce a spirit which will make it possible for the refugoo to encape from the pathy which is his traditional lot and become a positive factor in the struggle of the nest. FCS will attempt to perform this function in several ways:a. Normal consular activity. FECS will engage in the normal concular activities of interventions on behalf of refugees with the local authorition, voluntary agencies, international agencies such as the UN High Commission, or wherever else it might effectively and usefully do so. It will provide translations, verify documents, advise refuzoes on 11 relevant matters in conjunction with those other agencies and generally interest ithelf in all aspects of the refugee's life and problems.b. Material assistance. white material asnistance should be kept to a minimum, it must be recognized that FRCS will be required to provide more help of this kind than the normal consu- ltes, since the physical condition of the person .ppealing for assistance will almost invariably be poor. Other or nications are botter wet up to provide such anteriol needs, and CS should of course attempt to cooperate with their already extensivo efforts to prevent duplicotion. Jut FCS muat have available emergency welfare funds in order to escape the accusation that it is a feath rbed or nother operation to "use" the retugoe.c. Refugee corale. The fundamental practical target of all FECS operations should be the improvement of refugee morale. This morale depends on two factors: the refugee's frame of kind and the atmosphore in which he lives.The refugee's frame of mind should be improved in several ways. The first of these is the citizenship approach which is to govern all 2803 oporations. It should be manifested as soon ae possible after the refugee's arrival and clearance, i omly in the fora of a greeting and briefing from someone not interested in milking the relugee of inforation and aning his questions. This briefing alght include a description of the voluntry agencies which might assist the refugee, a description in simple terms of his logul status and, of course, of the FECS progres, including the nincs and addresses of its representatives in the caps or
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-17-areus to which the refugen might be cont. The refuzon mightaloc be saved consicer ble disillusionmont il at this time howere given a carefully worded description of the difficulteconomic situation in which ho will be obliged for some timeto reasin. For example in Germany, the rolugee should be toldof the presence of large numbers of refugees from the East Zoneand of a German government's natural desire to pulst them.A representative of one of the voluntary agencios Buggestedto us at tas refugees are rarely made to understand that theyare liially accepted into countrios fuced with unusually severeeconomic problems.Secondly, the refugee's frame of aina might be improvedby the installation of reading rooms containing publicationsIn the national languages, some of then gesreć ospegelly tothe refuges and his problems. For example, some of the usofulexilo-organ Led refugee ald Committees such as the Anglo-Rumanianin London and the Hungrian Office in bunicii procuce rol.r'bullotins containing local logul and employmont news of interestto the rougee. Such bulletins should receivo a wider diotri-bution uni others like them should be crouted. In this connection,it should be noted that RP3. publications are not reaching therefu.jeon, among whom our survey has indicated they would bemont welcome and re qucis needed. Also in the rending roomu,radios should be provided in response to the conire, frequentlyexpressed to us, of hearing HPE and other brožúcasts in thenation11nguages.The organization of constructivo meetings, discussions andnational colebretionn would provide an outlet for refugee enthu-siaums if they were supervised by competent lendorclip. 51m1-larly, PMCO Gaould stimulate and possibly provide the meansfor self-help work projects, such as the paintingh of barracks,the planting of gardene nu the organization of sowing cirelos,language courses or discussion groups, etc....The socons factor involved in the question of retugonmorale is that of his environment, the atmosphere in which holives. To a large extent this wtmoepnare would be improved-inwichik lives. To a large extont lais atmosphere would belaproved by the orgurization, noted above, of constructiveCutlets for the energies now dissipated in chauvinistic and pettypolitic i intercal and international strife, both of which inveat times led to murder in the camps.FC3 major effert in this direction, however, should bedirected toward bridging the gup in a constructive maner botween,on the one hand, the voluntary and international agencies andthe local authorities, and, on the other, the essential nationalintereste of the refugee. Occasionally representatives of thevoluntary agencies have mentioned the fact that refugees sometimescooporite with them best when the situation has been explainedby one of their national representatives. For the reasons ofsuspicion on the part of thene agencies cited earlier, this isnot always done. FECS could provide a responsible instrument forso doing.