Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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July 15, 1952Revised July 20, 1952# AN NCFE APPROACH TO THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE SITUATION-1-## INTRODUCTIONReduced to its simplest terms, the European refugee problem can be resolved, saving liberation, only by the assimilation, or at least the integration of the refugees into the countries which receive them or by their emigration to countries better able to do so. National and international programs vast in scope and cost are required for these purposes, and it is obviously not within NCFE's power or interest to engage directly in them. But, in an indirect way, while paying attention only to its direct and fundamental interests, NCFE can contribute to the success of both types of programs, at least so far as they concern refugees from the ten NCFE countries.The first step is, of course, for NCFE to analyze its position in relation to the European refugee situation and to formulate a policy accordingly. NCFE has been a constantly and rapidly growing organization, fully occupied with the immediate problems of expansion which have confronted it. NCFE has been deprived of the opportunity to pause and consider the consequences of its expansion in a changed situation, much less to deal with these consequences.Several basic factors have combined to alter NCFE's position in relation to the European refugee situation. While IRO operated, NCFE was in a position to make a distinction between the exile elite and the mass of refugees, who were under the protection of the IRO in Europe. IRO, however, ceased to exist at the beginning of 1952. IRO's several successor organizations have yet to prove their ability effectively and completely to perform its functions. During the early years of NCFE's existence, the frontier countries, Germany, Austria, and Italy, and the intermediary receiving countries, France and Britain, were absorbed in post-war reconstruction or subjected to military occupation and hence were generally not in a position to take an active interest in the refugees as an instrument of their foreign policies. NCFE in the U.S., therefore, could afford to ignore most developments of exile activity in Europe, reassuring itself that the headquarters of most of the exile National Councils were in the U.S. under nominal U.S. control. Normally, of course, each of these countries has specific interests in Eastern Europe, which do not necessarily coincide with those of the U.S. As conditions approach the normal in each of these countries, NCFE's grounds for self re-assurance become less solid. Until its May 1, 1951 initiation of saturation broadcasting to Czechoslovakia, which marked its appearance as an instrument actively affecting
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-2-the countries whence the refugees flee, RFE could also ignorethe presence of the ref gees in the west. This, however, isno longer the case.Fundamentally, any NCFE interest in the European refugeesituation is an aspect of the general HCFE relationship withexiles. In the changed European situation in which this inte-rest land will be manifested CFE should reconsider its basicinstruments for such relationships: the National Councils.Thoir exceptions, gaps, and shortcomings should be carefullyunalyzed and the conclusions drwan therefrom. The inadequacyof the national Councils as a basic instrument in the changedsitustion in Europe will be indicated in this report. Certainad ptations of this instrument and the cretion of new oneswill be required if iNCYE is to carry out its functions andrealize its potentilities.- II -WHY NCFE IS CNC NED I CHE EUROPEANREFUGES PROBLTHIS CORRI## A. The Extent of ilCFE'a Concern to Date:In the past MCPE hus net directly concerned itself withthe over-all problem of refugees ircm behind the Iron Curtsin.This policy of CrE has manifested itself in the following ways.NC75 has consistently made it clear that its enief interest liesin what it regarded as the political and intellectuel elite ofemigrations from the various Iron Curtain countries. Certainelements of this political and intellectual olite, however,realized the necessity and the importance of channeling someof their activities toward the mass of their respective emigra-tions on national basis. This realization was dictated eitherby humanitarian or strictly re-listic political principles, orby a combination of the two. Accordingly, these elements of theelite approached CFE with their proposula for CFE material andmoral support of such: ctivities. These proposals differed widelyand were implemented at varying periods over the last threeLers, with the result that presently ACPE is incirectly supportingrefugee activities on a national basis at an annual amount of2118.168.00, and with the further result that these activitiesure confused, haphazard, erratic, ill-coordinated ani unjustlyand inexplicably disproportionate. Some nationality groups,as for instance the Hungerians, have been receiving relativelylarge amounts for refugee activities, with other groups, as forexample the Foles, who have a large emigration, receiving nothing.The vehicles for the channeling of this support have alsodiffered widely. Originally, NC?? 's theory in providing supportfor sucit activities was ba ed upon the existence of National
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-3-Councils or Committees, the idea being that the National Councils should themselves undertake such activities in order to gain for themselves the necessary standing in their respective emigrations. This was not altogether inconsistent with NCFE's policy of emphasis (upon direct ssistance only to the intellectuan and political elite, but was a subsequent development thereof.The most ambitious and long-lived of these Hational Councils' refugee projects has been the Refugee Service of the Hungarian National Council, which is the best and almost sole surviving example of NCFE's origin 1 theory. The record, however, even of this prize example, is an extremely spotty one (detalls to follow in a descriptive report to be submitted separately). More importantly, the resons for the spottiness of the dic's record ure not all attributable to the HINC itself; many, indeed, ure due to the situation in which the HCN'spproach to the refugee problem, which hus provided financial support, but little or no guidance or moral support. *Kugler fins has shud had to operate and "Ihlow ated to AerasIn the Rumanian case, NCFE' support for refugec activities was originally channeled through the kumanian ilational Council, which ceased to enjoy NCFE recognition in 1950. Since that time, NCFE support for Rumanian refugee activities has been given to Rumanian welfare, Incorporated, an organi:tion entirely outside the National Council category, and which includes Americans on ita Board of Directors.In the Czechoslovak case, CPE his channelod its support for refugee activities through the Council of Free Chechoslovakia, a National Council, which was the victim of a political split lasting from January 1951 until July 4y 1952. The Council of Free Czechoslovakia, in turn, channeled some of this support to en organization which enjoys the status of voluntary agency, the American Pund for Uzechoslovak kefugees. This organization, like Rumanian welfare, Inc., includes Americans on its Board of Directors, which is chaired by Professor James Shotwell. Unlike Rumunian welfare, however, the AFCR in Germany and Austria received from IKO or HICGG and USCOA facilities and/or financial support as did other larger organizations such as the NCWC, the Lutherun World Federation, the World Council of Churches, the American Joint Distribution Committee, etc. which simred with it the status of voluntary agency. There is no doubt that Czechoslovak refugees have been, to some extent, the victims of the political fluctua- tions of their leadership in the 1.3., and that, in sense, NCPE must also accept som responsibility for allowing the political situation to have had repercussions of this nature.In the case of the Albanians, no specific sums in the budget (which has been provided by CFE) of the National Committee for a Free Albania have been earmarked for aid to Albanian refugees; although despite this the NCFA has, it is reported, que chiefly to close American supervision in kome, m.naged to ac more for Albanian refugees in Italy than other National Councils, as for instance the ill and BNC in Italy.
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-5-the price of a meal or a night's lodging which would carry them over the necessary period of time which it always takes until the machinery of other agencies can be persuaded to start grinding for the assistance of these people. However, as time went on, NCFE assistance was also being given, directly or indirectly, to agencies which gave particular attention to material aid, as for instance the APCR and Rumanian Welfare, neither of which has any clear and responsible relation with a National Council, yet each of which has been the victim, to some extent, of the vagaries of exile politics.Some of the elements which seem, either consciously or unconsciously to have been operative in the development of this NCFE policy of only limited and indirect concern with the over-all problem of refugees from Eastern Europe were the following:1.  Refugees in the mass were already the direct concern of a large, well-staffed and well-financed international organization, the IRO, which meant that the problems confronting the National Councils and other organizations of the exile elite were limited in scope.2.  Until the initiation of saturation broadcasting to Czechoslovakia on May 1, 1951, NCFE (through RFE or any other instrument) was not itself an active factor in the refugee problem. It was not directly associated with the refugee himself, either through indirectly stimulating him to flee or through his increased value for information purposes.3.  The National Councils and Committees were considered to be a suitable instrument qualified to deal with the refugee problem in the limited manner in which it confronted them during the existence of IRO. It was felt that any credit for assistance to refugees could appropriately be given to the national councils, which would in turn reflect to the credit of NCFE, the U.S. and the Free West in general.-III-THE CHANGED SITUATIONU.S. AND EUROPEWhile IRO operated NCFE was in a position to make a distinction between the exile elite and the mass of refugees who were under the protection of the IRO in Europe. INC, however, ceased to exist at the beginning of 1952. Even before IRO disappeared, care and maintenance of refugees in and out of camps had passed to the various local national authorities. IRO's functions of protection and care for the refugee in both legal and material aspects respectively from arrival to emigration have been divided
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Among these governments and two international agencies, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and PICMS, none of which has been provided with the means adequate to the performance of their tasks assigned it, and the latter of which are only just becoming fully operational. In consequence of IRO's closure the various voluntary agencies, such as CNC, LWF and KCC, etc., have been deprived of facilities which were provided by IRO in the past, with the result that they have been compelled to curtail their activities. Neither of IRO's successors has assumed the vast and vital coordinating function performed by IRO, with the result that the present confusion is discouraging. It may develop that the New State Department - MSA program for neo-refugees will clarify this confused situation, but at present it, itself, is as yet unknown factor and naturally rumors regarding it at the field level have thus far only served to confound the confusion.The period of INC's existence coincided with the period of mass emigration, whereas at present emigration possibilities are small and uncertain, with the result that to the hard core remnant, which cannot be moved, is being added to the small but steady flow of new arrivals, most of whom are unable to emigrate and who must also face the appalling employment conditions in the frontier countries of Germany, Austria, Italy and Triest (in the other frontier countries of Greece and Turkey the situation is probably similar) and the intermediary receiving countries such as France and Britain. Out of the more slowly moving remnants, particularly in the frontier countries, the possibility exists for the formation of more stable national committees, which would hence be more susceptible of control.During the early years of NCFE's existence the frontier and intermediary receiving countries were either absorbed in post-war reconstruction or were subject to military occupation and hence were not in a position to take an active interest in the refugees as an instrument of their foreign policies. NCPE, in the U.S., therefore, could afford to ignore most developments of exile activity in Europe, reassuring itself that the headquarters of the exile national councils were in the U.S. under nominal NCFE control. Normally, of course, each of these countries has specific interests in Eastern Europe, which do not necessarily coincide with those of the U.S. There are now strong indications that the situation is more rapidly approaching its more normal aspect and that it is still in the process of change in this direction.In January the British-backed Central and Eastern European Commission of the European movement held its first meeting in London; in April the French Comité Nationale pour l'Europe Libre emerged; and in June the Germans attempted to bring about the emergence of a central organization of refugees, which, in its composition reflected traditional German sympathies with the Separatist movements of Eastern Europe, a policy which is in direct conflict with that of NCFE and RFE.. Although the authorities, particularly in the frontier countries, probably lack
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-7-special financial means to engage in ctivity on an NCPE-scale,they do ponnens, by virtue of their control of the logal Andwelfare framework within which the refugen must existh the meansto extend or withhold benefite 30 as to influence the refugee.political situntion to their advantage. It seems resonable tosuppose that as these nationa gain in strength and indeperdance.this process will continue at an increasing rate.As a result of the factors described above, the refugeefinds himself in an increasingly hostilo environment, coprivedof an olfactive international protector and incapable, alone,unsided and unulded clonaly to aos his interests and defendthem from exploitation. The Crochoslovaks and Foles in Germanyprovede atrising examples of shortsighted, aimless exilepre-occupation with utorile political manouvering to the advan-tugo of their German houts. At the same time, the voluntaryagencies in Germany, which, fter Iho's domine, were ntudcortain facilities by RICOC must, after thoratification of thecontractual agroemonts, look to the Gorman Government forwhatever facilities it may choose to grant them.Until its May 1951 initiation of aturation broadcastingto Czechoslovakia, which arked its appearence as a: nst nstrumentactively affecting the countries whence the refugees lee, REEcould also ignore the presence of the refugees in the west.Since that time, however, the steady expansion of RFE's activityand its increasing need of refugeon as informational sources haveled to stron, accusations that ASS 10 evading its responsibi-lities und failing to accept the consequences of its own effec-tiveness. Although RFE expressly refrains from specificallyinciting its audiences to flee, its comparisons of life in theheat with life in the Easty inevitably constitute an indirectencouragement to cocope. Those accusatione and resentment areill-concealed amon, the representatives of the various interna-tional and voluntary agencies.RFE's information service men, who, of RFE's personnel, arein closest contact with the refu.oes, sympathize with thiscriticism and wish that they could do more for the refugees thanthey are prosently able to do on their own. These RFE informationgatherers are in competition with an endless series of rivalsHeeking this valuable commouity. ity. They usually present the refugeезwho have been holpful in providing them with information withpresents of food, cigarettes or money. Although they would liketo be in a position to move more than this for their into mants,they cannot, for, as they explain, they are not in the welfarebusines8. One of their special difficulties is to persuade therefugees to come to them in the first place. Almost universallythey have reported that if the refugees were made to r alize thatFree Europe was doing something or them, they would be more willingand even eager, to come to the Rrs information offices in the campsto give freely of their information. Furthermore, RES's propa-ganda can be dangerously wenkoned by the boomerang effect of thefew disillusioned refugees who return to their homel.nda.
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-8-In consequence of the closure of ItO and the absence of any authority capable of organizing and controlling the refugee national committoes a double vacuum oxists. In respect to the first vacuum, thờ UM High Comutusion, PICEK, the voluntary agencies and the State Department program have yst to prove their ability to fill it. In respect to the second vacuum, the Brisiah, the. French, the Italiano, the Austrians and the Gormans have tie possibilities of filling this vacuum. Of these, the Veran interest is most likely to provide the most direct and immediate conflict with NCFE-RFE interonta. The fact that the Ger. ans have deconstruted an interest in these committeos and particularly in support of the Soparatiat clements indicates that liове comm1-ttees are not without political importance: Becaues of the political ambitions or a nebst desire to serve of tasir lenders and of the nend of the refugee for apokesmen and representativos in their doulinge with local authorities, auch committees will always exist, whether or not they ro controlled or supported. If these committees re to be controlled at uil, 1: 13 obviously to NCFR's advantage that they be controlled by NCFE. It would b০ dungorous to assume that this control could be exercised solely through the "loudera" residing in the J.3. as the opportunity exists for theun leaders and for those in Europe to play off one Bestern Power against another. It has already been demons-trated in ono caso that the branch of a national council, with headquarters in the U.3., que to the exigencies of the local situation may be obliged to follow a policy which is quite contrary to the interests of NCFE.In addition to the major double vacuum described above, our survey has disclosed the existence of a number of cinor vicaums in exile representation which have been filled by unecrupulous self-appointed national representativos whose presence has been largely responsible for the skepticism and mistrust with which exile representatives are frequently regarded by the international and voluntary agencies. This unfortunate factor may be traced to the lack of recognized accreditation for such representatives, to the absence of any responsiole and c nsistent field supervision, control and backing of worthy and quali lified representatives. In this regard, representativos os of the N ilich Commission and th voluntary agencies have xpressed u definite interest in offorté to order the chaotic national representativos.- IV -RECONS SIDERATI TIGH OF NOFE'S BASICIN VIRU ON RELATIONWITHAs we have shown above, it is to NOFE's interest to attempt to order this confused situation, and if the attempt is to be made, careful consideration must be given to the selection of the tools wiich are to be used. The Division of NOFE which has hitherto dealt with NCFE's relations with the exiles, und indirectly with the refugees, he been the National Councils Divisions. This Division
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-9-hus used as its basic instrument the National Councils and Committees which have their headquarters in the U.S. NCFE'S experience over the past three years has served conclusively to modify the initial view of the National Councils as suitable instruments for the creation not only of an atmosphere of positive and constructive cooperation, but even for the effective Implementation of NCF policy and purpose.The divisive factors of exile have resulted in:1.  The absence of any Polish National Council which can qualify for NCFE recognition;2.  The absence of any Romanian National Council which can qualify for NCFE recognition;3.  A prolonged split ( a year and a half) in the Council of Free Czechoslovakia;4.  A precariously balanced Hungarian National Council.Other factors have produced a Bulgarian National Committee which is unsatisfactory from almost every point of view. Genuine and productive reform of the BNC will doubtless prove a prolonged and difficult process. This leaves the NCF with a National Committee for a Free Albania, which could stand reform and which, nevertheless, has always been closely supervised by Americans and with the three Baltic Consultative Panels which were established entirely by NCFE in the first instance.No single national council during its existence, with the possible exception of the three Baltic Consultative Panels, has demonstrated itself as being capable of even reasonably efficient and just administration of its own affairs. In each case NCFE has been obliged to stop in, at first exercising only cursory supervision, but at present attempting to introduce systems of closer administrative and financial control and supervision, which, unless made sufficiently rigid, will doubtless prove as unsatisfactory as they have been in the past.Where national councils do exist branches or sections of these councils which have demonstrated their effectiveness can and should be used where practical to implement on secondary level NCFE projects and policies. For the primary implementation of these projects and policies, however, a more permanent, ordered and controllable apparatus must be found, one not liable to the naturally disruptive tensions of exile life. Even where unity in a national council can be produced, experience has proved that its continuity is at best tenuous and unreliable, with the result that the council becomes a delicate and cumbrous apparatus which must subordinate the achievement of practical goals to the maintenance of this temporary and elusive unity.Further factors disclosed by our survey reinforce the conclusion that if NCFE is, as we believe it must, effectively to