Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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d. NCFE then informs this division of progress being made and supposedly requeurs authority to depart from such completed policy papers.To date two such policy directivce have been written. The first was a plan for the reorganization of the kumani an National Council. It was submitted to ICFE, and their criticisms and suggestions have been incorporated. The plan is now being oxecuted.The second was a similar State Department-CIA paper on the reorganization of the Bulgarian Hational Commd tiec. This will be submitted to NCFE on Thursday, 10 July, and a similar course of action will be followed.4. I realize that this will seem to you as a somewhat simple and obvious way of insuring coordination, but the fact is that it had never been done before. I hope that it results inas fow flaps as possible and as few occasions when people are running off in all directions.5. A current case where people are running off in all directions is the Folish situation. Tida broke at the very time wo were beginning work on a coordinated CIA-State-NCFE paper. NCFE has been operating upon the assumption that if a Polish National Council is to be formed, all groups are to te represented. Unknown to NCFE, and in fact to mo, EE Division has been smaking attempts to unify two of the three main groups by holding conversations with representatives in London. There are a good many chargea and counter-charges flying about at present on this situation. The man abroad is saying he had informeu NCFE of what he intended to do, and people in NCFE say he hadn't. We are trying to straighten it out, but the situation is illustrative of how the plan above outlined can prevent such flaps.
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28 November 1952MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)SUBJECT: Proposed Visit by Robert Lang with Officials of CIAREFERENCE: EYES ONLY Memorandum to C/P from Richard Helms,Acting Chief, Operations, DD/F, dated 25 Nov. 19521. After consultation with Mr. Dirkee, I would like to make the following comments on Mr. Helms' memorandum. Mr. Helms is correct that Mr. Lang has had difficulty in dealing with CIA. Mr. Helms is also correct if he understood that this state of affairs is the responsibility of Admiral Miller. (To Admiral Miller's responsibility must be added that of Spencer Phoenix, Vice-President and Treasurer.)2. Within and outside NCPI, Admiral Miller's dealings with Mr. Lang are based on two attitudes:a. Miller's desire to have control of his organization by having everything channeled through him; andb. Miller's desire to maintain an autonomous organization which will accept over-all policy guidance from the highest levels of the government, but which will not allow either domination by, or close contact with, CIA in order to discuss that organization's problems or to be informed of its vehemently disordered activities.In this connection, a statement by Admiral Miller in a letter to Mr. Alan Valentine, until recently President of the Committee for Free Asia, is of interest:1 August 1952"It was good to see you, if just for an instant, in Washington."For your private ear, I might tell you that we won our battle hands down. Merely to confirm this, our Executive Board is having lunch in Washington with Allen and Pedell next Monday. This will be a general talk, but I am sure that policies will come up for discussion. Happily, everything seems to be sailing along in good shape."
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This letter was written at a time when the 10 Division had achieved for CIA its first detailed budget from NOTE and was further arking a mutuality of relations between NCPE and (Is, ultimately defined in Memorandum of Understanding, dated 24 September, signed by H. B. lllor and Alien W. Duiles. It proves what at the time we only suspected, that Killer was calling on support from Valentino against CIA..3. Mr. Poniz 1 ang maont Admiral Filler's tendency for tight adaimotration. Poth cave carried on a camped within N to disorodit Killer. However, Mr. menix, perhaps Lang, and almost all of tho responsible officials for back #iller in tas attitude towards CIA. for example, despite mpeated roquostu-ty / and as recontly as wroe weeks ago by DOCI personally, Millor has refused to tum over to CIA a liet of NCPF employees. Even a request ly C to John Hugnes has failed to produce this list.In addition, Br. Phonix acts as the Semen oxport in NCFE, cutting out Lang. Peniz alone has negotiated and dealt with Gordan higa officials on AFE's position in Germany. Fr. Lang and Pir. Phenix have fundamental disputes about how are a German problema should bo handlod. rart of dr. Lang's desire for poracial talks with officialo of the Department of stato grows out of ids with to get baoking for his position.4. In a sense, ilfe is the last NCF boation to bo nealad. Mr. Leng'e statement that he has received Artwally no muidance, policy or otherwise from this organization 10 largely a play on words. fr. Lang has not cought the guidance of nombers of his own organization, much less the guidance of CIA. seen the 10 Division bok over responsibility for NOFT, the CIA intelligence support unit, waica expplied RFT Information and guidance, was abolished on Mr. Lang's arivico that such information and ridance wero m longer necessary. RFE broadcasting policy is sot dom in a handbook wich has been thoroughly examined and nocepted by CLA and from time to time specific guidance nas teen given to . HFE accepts any materials and midance as suggestions, not orders. We beliove Lang is gotting all the guidance tnore is to ivo, and that he is looking for the kind of dah poilcy forecasting which does not exist.5. These are the political facts of life for the 10 Division, and indeed for CIA. Tie [ Avision has attempted to deal with wala situation by: (1) winning the confidence of the Virectors and Division heads of NOFF, and (2) maintaining friendly personai relationship with both Admiral Miller and Mr. Spencer Enenix. Much propress has been made in gaining knowledge of, anxi control over, the activities of NCTE.Aside from friendly dealings, our specific concept of gaining control over NCFE as a whole, has been to push and oncourage the thought that NCFE should be operated as a whole. The present sparation and uncoordinated activities of divisions, cupeciaily KFF, while perhars
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necessary in the past, is not satisfactory at present. Added to this has been the theme that there must be a re-thinking of what NCFE has done, is doing, and should do in wie future. Our efforts aro bapinning to bear fruit. We have found that these lines have struck a responsive chord among the working personnel of NOTE. In many ways, the current RFE difficulties in Germany - unfortunate as they are -- nave been holphil, for they have made it clear to everybody concerned, including Mr. Long, that re-thinking of objectives and tocniquou based on comp- arative offort by CF and CIA as a wholo is vital if the orgardgation is to do ito job effectively.6. To reformulate our own and NCFE's ideas, the 10 Division has been and is carrying on discussions with the officials and working personnel of NOWE. In some of these diucussions, Mr. Francis D. Stevena of the State Department has been a direct participant. Ine 10 Division has also boen exploring these matters with officials of CIA and the Department of State.7. Inoce discussions have covered a wide variety of subjects whial: oan generally be described as follows:a. What 18 NCPE's place as a whole in American policy toward the satellito natione; what is American policy; what modifications are likely?b. How can ICPT, especially the Division of Emigro Halations, contribute more effectively to psychological and political warfare, not only for effects behind the Iron Curtain but in the time world For example: How can NCFD securely engage in furtior activities in the pattern of its successful actions at the United Nations Clave Labor Hearings and the Intorm tional fod Cross Meetings at Toronto?c. Should NCF continue to apport enigra councils, or should some other technique be developed wmics can onabio it to make more effective use of emigres for psychological wariate purposes!d. How can the Research and iublications Division, the Divi- aton of Intellectual Cooperation, and the Free University boat contribute to those efforts?e. Is NCFE efficiently organized/ what, for example, is the affect of the Division of sikre kelations' dealings wiin emigros on the position of RFE in Europe, etc.?f. How tho formidable research and information resources of NOFE can socurely be used by Ag. How can NCE be geared more closely to the activities and needs of CIA?SECIDIV
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h. Analysis of Radio Free Europe's effectiveness, programming, political position in Germany, how RFT can be used to support CIA operations specifically, alternate broadcasting sites for KFE ato.1. How can CIA give specific guidence to RFE? What kind of information is wanted, for example, by RFE? What studies and means of overcoming Jamming can be made available to RFE? How can American and Brition logations in the satellites best provide guidance and information for RFE?7. These are some of the topics being discussed. In a few weeks the time will come in my opinion when the main outlines of this common thought will be sufficiently clear so that the working officials of NCFE, including Kr. Lang, should meet with officials of CIA and the Department of State for two main purposesta. A briefing on U.S. policy toward CIA operations berind the Iron Curtain so that trace officials will see clearly the way in watch they are expected to fit into total U.S. efforts, and the manner in wizich they should operate.b. Analyze and contribste, in come detail, to the main lines of thought developed in order to arrive at comprehensive working policy for HCPE, and detailed methods of its cooperation with CIA.8. For the foregoing reasons, I suggest that Mr. Lang does not, at this time, come down to meet the CIA.officials as sugposted by Mr. Helme but that Mr. Lang'e visit be a part of the ID Division's over-all effort to gain working control over NCEE au briefly outlined above.THOMAS W. BRADENChiefInternational Organizations DivisionIO:TONIC:WPD/ehOrig - Addressee (thru CPP)1 cc - AC/OP/DD/P1 cc - CPP1 cc - IO/TONIC1 cc - CIO1 cc - RI
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# MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, IO Division# SUBJECT:Formation of a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organisation# REFERENCES:Memorandum to IO, Subject: Current U. S. Attempt to form a Unified Rumanian Refugee Organization, dated 12 September 19521.  The NCFE negotiations for a united Rumarian refugee organization appear to be culminating successfully. Although a number of differences have been resolved, a few controversial matters remain. These points have been discussed several times, both with the NCFE and the refugees, but are of such importance as to warrant special attention and emphasis at this moment.2.  The most urgent problem, the one most likely to nullify the recent efforts and cause further difficulties, is that of General Fedescu. The problem is to find a position which the General will consider sufficiently imrortant for him and which we will consider sufficiently innocuous to ensure that he cannot interfere with the Committee. A majority of the refugees are in accord on the necessity for placing limitations of activity on the General. For operational reasons, we require such limitations. The existing good relations between the NCFE and the General should be utilised to persuade the General that a passive, honorary position is the only way to guard his health for, by implication, later action. He must be made to realise that he is not being shelved but is being saved. If he cannot be prevailed on to adopt this attitude, he will have to be told with complete frarkness that his obstructionian cannot be tolerated, that he will have to remain passive outside, rather than within, the new organisation or risk losing the assistance he now receives. The first method is the more desirable, and it is sucrested that the General's secretary, Earbu Niculescu, to incorried of the NCFE's intention and warned of the latter ster if his cooperation is not obtained in expediting the General's acceptance of a rassive role. Niculescu shoule be dealt with quite frankly and informed of the consequences, to his as well as to the General, if he does not cooperate.
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3. In regard to paragraph 4 of reference memorandum, the matter of the Council apparently has not seen discussed thoroughly with the refugees. The laportence of an organization for the masses of refugees, controlled by the Executive Committee of 16-17, unould not be underestimated. The workin: commissions proposed by Visoianu (European Federation Movement, Phi, rustications, etc.) should be drawn from the Council rather than from the refugees at large. Further, there are many refugees for whom the Commit:06 has no need, ror we at present, who desire to participate in a refugee organization. That the desire to belong to something is particularly strony among the youncer refugees, 1.c. those of potential operational value, is evidenced by the number who have affiliated with the Iron Guard, other fanatic organizations, student, and professional groups. Kerbership should be oper. to large nembers of rofugees (exclusive or hard-core Iron Guards, Communists, criminals, etc.), and should be manifested by membership cards. To strengti.en the sense of participation small annual ques could be required or subscription to this Committee rcwspaper (which would be suidized so that subscription cost would not be excessive). The formation of this Council is considered particularly worthwhile since it offers a way to draw worthy refugees from less cosiracle organisations and to develop their usefulness for the future.4. With respect to the secret fund in the possession of Mr. Cretsianu of the kuwaarian hational Committee, we do not consider that an issue should be mace of the discursing and control of this money. Foth 1801enu and Cretzianu have agreed te account for the funds and to auditing of the books. It is rossicle that a finance cormittce, consisti of Cretzianu and one or two others, will be anointed in the new orgarisstion to handle the зив-sidies and to audit the secret fund.5. Heports that Gafencu has developed an intransigent attitude toward the new committee have been received from several surces. As Mr. Pol beare is in Zurope and is a friend of Cafeucu's, it is suposted that he attempt to cotain again Dafencu's cooperation with the current negotiations.6. It is requested that this memorandum be forwarded to the ICHE so that the information may be of immediate assistance in the negotiations planned for this week.JOHN E. BAKERChief, SE
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# SECURITY INFORMATION26 November 1952MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.SUBJECT: Results of debriefing of Czech DefectorREFERENCE: Memo from Bob Joyce 17 Nov. 52, attaching State Cable from Frankfort #131. I am sure Rob Joyce will upon reflection not allow himself to be troubled by the remarks of one Czech defector to the State Department Mission in Germany.2. These are the facts:a. Radio Free Europe has been most careful in its handling of the subject of liberation. They have not in the past nor do they now allow anyone to speak on the air of "liberation now".b. Attached for your information is a detailed guidance on this subject issued by Radio Free Europe - policy which governs all of their broadcasts.c. As an example of how careful Radio Free Europe is on this subject, RFE did not use Mr. John Foster Dulles' recent controversial campaign speech on the subject of liberation because they believed that even though it was news and a statement made by a responsible American, it might be misinterpreted behind the Curtain.3. I think that Radio Free Europe has maintained excellent discipline on this subject. You can imagine that it is under considerable pressure from Iron Curtain emigration to take the line of early rope for liberation in the prospect that in some way American public opinion and world opinion might be thus committed to a policy of liberation by armed forces.4. I would be glad to have you show this memorandum to Mr. Joyce if you care to do so. He should know that everyone is constantly on the alert and carefully watching the problem as raises.AttachmentSpecial Guidance.dtd 2 Sept. 52THOMAS W. BRADENChiefInternational Organizations DivisionSECURITY INFORMATIONCIO:WPD-TWB/eh 1 cc - IO/TONICOrig & 1 - Addressee 1 cc -C10 1 cc - RI
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SECRETEYES ONLYMEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, P & F25 November 1952SUBJECT: Talk with Mr. Robert Lang1. I spent an hour and a quarter in New York on Friday, 14 November, with Mr. Robert Lang of Radio Free Europo. The major portion of this time was devoted to a briefing by Lang of the NCFE structure and the position which RFE occupies in it, including the philosophy of RFF operations. Iang gave an impressive performance and struck me on such short acquaintanco as an individual of ability, Judgment, and onergy.2. Mr. Lang made quite a point of the fact that his operation inside NCFE io virtually independent. He intimated that he receives no guidance from the President or other officers and has exponded considerable effort in the past seoing to it that an iron curtain 18 kopt between FFE and the top command of ICFE. Ho said that if RFE had not developed and expanded according to a philosophy which it itself had originated, it would have got nowmare and would still be frustrated by what he kept refcrring to as the "old State Department line" as exemplified by the viows of Devitt loole, Fred Dolbeare, and others. He then pointed out that he had received virtually no guidance, policy or otherwise, from this organization. Also he claimed to suffer from lack of contact with us. lno stated that when ho saw Mr. Dulles a week or so ago, it was the first time he had talked to anyone in authority here in many a moon. As far as Hr. Fraden and company are concerned, he said that they dealt largely with Adiral tillor and his immediate staff. It was clear that ho would prefer to deal directly with Washington. He also feals inhibited by the fact that he has to cajolo Admiral iller into per- mission to como to viashington. ha cited as evidence an incident re- cently when he felt obliged to ask a friend in the State Department to intercode with Admiral Miller to permit him to come down hore for consultation.3. There was nothing bitter or frustrated in r. Lang's re- marks. Rather he struck me as an individual who was discussing the facts of life, be Miat they may.4. I told him that I would discuss with you the wisdom of having him como down here for a day some time in the next week or soSECRET
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SECRETSECURITY INFORMATION- 2 -In order to spend a couple of hours around a table with Tracy Barnes, Al Ulmer, Eric Tima, and other appropriate individuals, at which session he would have an opportunity to set forth his problems and invite whatever assistance we as an organization can provide.5. After you have read the foregoing, I would like to talk with you and Mr. Eradon for the purpose of passing on DD/P's reactions to my suggestion.cc: Chief, IORichard HelmsActing Chief, Operations, DDPSECRETSECURITY INFORMATION
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SECRETSecurity InformationDEAP 138724 November 1952MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organisations DivisionSUBJECT : Dr. J. H. Retinger1. Please note and return to Mr. Dulles the attached letter from Dr. J. H. Retinger who has asked Mr. Dulles for an appointment during his visit in Washington between November 25 and 28. You will also note that Mr. Dulles does not propose to answer the letter nor (presumably) to grant the appointment. I am not sure whether you are familiar with the background on Retinger including our past difficulties with him. If you are not, I think it is important for you to have a look at the files which include numerous items of derogatory information concerning Retinger and his declared hostility toward the National Committee for Free Europe. We went to the mat with our British friends in what I believe proved to be a successful effort to have Retinger removed from the key position which he held on the so-called McMillan Committee. (You are aware of the fact that the british Service is now working with the McMillan Committee and in support of it.)2. Retinger's position as Secretary General of the European Movement -- as evidenced by the letterhead -- is probably known to you. Because of our interest in this activity, it is important for you and the appropriate members of your staff to be fully on notice of Retinger's connection and past performance. I could not be very enthusiastic about or too hopeful for the production of genuinely constructive results -- in keeping with policies of the United States Government of any organization of which Retinger would be the Secretary General. To the extent that his loyalties can be determined, it is clear that they do not run toward the United States.Attachment (1)Letter to DDCI from Dr. Retingerdated 15 November 1952.cc: DDCIC/PP(Signed) FRANK O. WISNERFRANK O. WISNERDeputy Director (Plans)SECRETSecurity Information
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SECRETDF 1371.21 November 1952MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, International Organizations DivisionSUBJECT : Leland Stowe; I&S Approval of NCFE Request.1. This memorandum will record the understanding arrived at in a conversation today with Colonel Edwards, Chief of I&S, and reported orally to Mr. Durkee by me. Admiral Miller telephoned me today with an urgent request that we give our authorization and approval to the use of Mr. Stowe for a further period of six months in the capacity of a consultant to IFE and not as a regular employee. This was the same basis on was finally approved for the first period of six months which is about to expire.2. In discussing this matter with Colonel Edwards I refreshed his recollection as to certain features of the original arrangement, including the fact that Stowe is an extremely capable individual who has attracted other good people, notably Russell Hill, into the effort, and who has no serious security raps against him. (He is not regarded as a loyalty or security risk but rather as a source of possible embarrassment in view of certain earlier writings of his.) Admiral Miller informed me and I passed on to Colonel Edwards the fact that there have been no questions or flurries of any kind concerning Stowe and the further fact that he has been doing a very effective job. Colonel Edwards approved from a security standpoint the continuation of Mr. Stowe as a consultant to IFE for a further period of six months.3. I requested Mr. Durkee to so advise Admiral Miller at the earliest possible moment. I assume he has done so.![signature of FRANK G. WISNER]FRANK G. WISNERDeputy Director (Plans)cc: C/PPSECRET
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SECRET(When Filled in)DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCESUBJECT OF DOCUMENTNCFEDOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION2. RI FILE NO.3. DISPAJCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.BRITISH4. DATFNov. 19525. ANALYST6. DATE PROCESSED7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION10. D139EMINATED IN11. DATE12. CROSS REFLHAKU TO THIS FILEDOCUMENT DISPOSITION13. TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO.PERTINENT INFORMATIONTHIS PREERSTO A TOP SECRET DOCUMENTFILEDSECTION BY TS98119115. FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.FORM 867 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.SECRET(7-46)