Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10224-10006.pdf — page 199]
# RECOMMENDATION FOR HONOR AWARD(WEGULATIONS P-20-635 & AFR 20-635)TO: Honor Awards Board THROUGH:DATEFROM: 18-December-1958Office of SecuritySECTION INAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED(Last) MCCORD, (First) James Walter (Middle)PERSONAL DATAPOSITION TITLE Actg. Sup. Chief/SR3/03GRADE GS-14OFFICE ASSIGNED TOSecuritySTATION Headquarters(Field) (specify location)LEGAL RESIDENCE (Number, street, city, zone, state)5701 Floyd Avenue, Springfield, VirginiaCITIZENSHIP AND HOW ACQUIREDBirthIF ANY OF THE ABOVE ITEMS WERE DIFFERENT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL RECOMMENDED AT THE TIME OF THE ACT OR SERVICE, INDICATESUCH DIFFERENCES.RECOMMENDED AWARDCertificate of Merit with DistinctionPOSTHUMOUSNAME OF NEXT OF KINRELATIONSHIPADDRESS (Number, street, city, zone, state)Ruth McCordWife5701 Floyd Avenue, Springfield, Va.IF PREVIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS WERE SUBMITTED FOR THIS ACT OR SERVICE, INDICATE TYPE OF AWARD RECOMMENDED, BY WHOM, DATE,ORIGINATING OFFICE, AND ACTION TAKEN.SECTION IIRECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR HEROIC ACTIONARE YOU AN EYEWITNESS TO THE ACT?NOIF ORIGINATOR IS NOT AN EYEWITNESS, ATTACH AFFIDAVITS OR CERTIFICATES OFEYEWITNESSES OR INDIVIDUAL HAVING PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS.PERSONNEL IN IMMEDIATE VICINITY OR WHO ASSISTED IN ACT OR SHARED IN SAME HAZARD:FULL NAMEPOSITION TITLEGRADEOFFICE ASSIGNED TOLIST ANY OF THE ABOVE PERSONS GIVEN AN AWARD OR RECOMMENDED FOR AWARD FOR PARTICIPATING IN ACT:FULL NAMETYPE OF AWARDCONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ACT WAS PERFORMED:LOCATIONINCLUSIVE DATESTIME OF DAYPREVAILING GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS AND OBSTACLES ENCOUNTERED:SECTION IIIRECOMMENDATION FOR AWARD FOR ACHIEVEMENT OR SERVICEGermany and Washington, D.C1 July - 15 August 1958... 600
[104-10224-10006.pdf — page 201]
# SECRET1 November 1958.SUBJECT: American C-118 Aircraft Downed in SovietAzerbaijan 27 June 1958 by Soviet M10-17'sOn 27 June 1958, a C-118 cargo plane, assigned to the U. S. Air Force in Wiesbaden, was fired on and forced down near Gendarkh, Soviet Azerbaijan. The plane was carrying nine U. S. airmen, three of whom are assigned to this Agency. They are Colonel Dale D. Brannon, Major Robert E. Crans and Major Bennie A. Shupe. The other six men were regular Air Force members assigned to Wiesbaden, Germany. The nine men were en route from Wiesbaden to Teheran and Pakistan on a flight carrying cargo for CIA. Col. Brannon and Major Crans were planning to get off the plane in Teheran had the plane remained on course.The plane, while en route to Teheran from Nicosia and as a result of bad weather and navigation error, went off its plotted course and crossed into Soviet Armenia. There it was intercepted and fired on by three MIO-17's and caught fire in the left wing. Five of the crew bailed out and the other four rode the aircraft down to a safe landing on a small airstrip at Gendarkh in Soviet Azerbaijan. The crew members who had remained on the plane to its landing got out safely and the plane was burning fiercely when the crew last saw it. The part of the crew that parachuted was surrounded by Soviet peasants, some of whom beat and struck at the crew members. One of the men, Major Bennie Shupe, CIA employee, was taken by the mob to a telephone pole and narrowly escaped hanging before being rescued by the Soviet military.Major Shupe and the remainder of the crew were turned over to the Soviet military, and after an overnight stay in a Soviet military garrison near Stepanakert were taken to a city believed to be Yevlakh, and then flown to Baku, Russia. There they underwent interrogation by Soviet intelligence officers, at least one of whom had served in the United States, as a Soviet Purchasing Commission employee 1943-45, and later in Canada in 1949-55 as First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy. This RIS officer, Vladimir Bourdine, later served in 1955 as a personal interpreter for Khrushchev in a meeting with Prime Minister Nehru of India. Bourdine interrogated Colonel Brannon of CIA at considerable length during the period 30 June - 3 July 1958, while the crew was imprisoned in the MVD Headquarters building in Baku. Following their individual interrogations, the crew members were required to appear separately before a Commission of Soviet officials at the Baku MVD Headquarters who questioned them about the border violation by the C-118 aircraft, and requested them to sign statements attesting that they had been well-treated and received adequate medical care by theSECRET
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SECRETSoviets. The inquiry by the Commission was perfuctory and did not involve an interrogation in the intelligence sense. The crew was then transported to Astara on the Soviet-Iranian border on 7 July 1958 and turned over to the American Air Attache.On 2 July 1958 this Agency received information indicating that the Soviets might be considering releasing the nine fliers. Since no date or place of release was indicated, cables were sent to the various peripheral CLA stations around the Soviet border indicating the possi- bility of impending release. The Air Force agreed to alort its Air Attaches in the same areas of the possibility of impending release. At the same time a team of Agency personnel, including a medical officer, an Air Maritime officer, and two representatives of the Security Office were dispatched to Wiesbaden from Headquarters in anticipation of the release of the fliers. Three hours after the team arrived in Germany, the place of release was learned from the Soviets to be Astara on the Soviet-Iranian border, anil a USAFE plane was dispatched that hight from Wiesbaden with the Air Maritimo team member aboard destined for Teheran to await the turnover of the American fliers at Astara. The fliers were turned over on 7 July 1958, were immediately flown to Wiesbaden, Germany where an initial joint CIA-AF debriefing of them was begun, and where initial press interviews were held, following careful briefing of the crow as to the text and limitations to be observed. Two days later, two members of the crew, one of whom was Major Shupe, a CIA employee, were permitted to give an interview to the Paris representative of Time-Life. Members of the CIA team were pre- sent during these press Interviews, under appropriate cover arrangemonts, to furnish guidance to the CIA personnel.Following the initial debriefing, the entire crew was flown to Washington, D. C. on 18 July 1958, for a more extended debriefing. These debriefings were completed on 6 August 1958 and covered the various aspects of possible compromise of the security of CIA personnel, operational and cover units activities, as well as various positive intelligence and counter-intelligence matters.The three CIA men aboard the plane were extremely knowledgeable of highly sensitive Agency operational activities and of the identities of numerous CIA personnel, Colonel Brannon, as Commander of the CIA Air Support Operations in Europe, was knowledgeable of CIA operational activities on a world-wide banis, with many of these projects being extremely sensitive. Colonel Brannon and Major Robert Crans each carried briefcases containing classified material, and Brannon carried an address book containing several names, addresses and telephone numbers of CLA personnel and cover units. The two briefcases are believed to have been destroyed by the fire in the aircraft after landing. The address book of Brannon was taken from him by the Soviet- 2 -SECRET
[104-10224-10006.pdf — page 203]
SECRETpeasants on landing and was later turned back to_him by_the Soviet--Commission members at Baku. Neither he nor other members of the crew were questioned about either of the briefcases, their contents, nor about the address book and its contents. We assume that the Soviets have or will process the names in the address book through their Moscow files. Some of the other crew members carried personal notations in their wallets relating to a few other CIA personnel.We have received no indications that Colonel Brannon or the other crewmen were drugged or otherwise tampered with by the Soviets. Brannon and some of the others did receive shots the first night and second day from the Soviet military for their wounds and burns; however, these shots are believed to have been for legitimate medical reasons.The substance of the questioning, treatment and techniques of interrogation has been exhaustively explored with all the crew members in the course of the debriefings. In summation, the interrogations of the crew members were superficial and do not appear to have been backed up by close coordination and communication with Moscow for intelligence research purposes. It is possible that the quick ac-knowledgment by the Soviet Foreign Office of the landing of the C-118 in Soviet territory precluded the MID from fully exploiting the crew members. Colonel Brannon and Captain Kane were separated from the group and given preferred treatment, apparently with the intention of developing them for information purposes. We are convinced that both men handled themselves extremely well and did not disclose any infor-mation concerning the Agency or its activities.To date we have no indication that the Soviets knew at the time they interrogated the crew wen, that the flight of the C-118 was con-nected with CIA in any way, nor that they knew three of the men aboard were CIA personnel. We do believe that in time the Soviets, through Brannon's address book, which lists the open Agency telephone number EX 3-6115 below his name on the first page, will connect him and possibly others in the address book with CIA. Since the Soviets questioned him about the 7170th Support Group and the 7405th Support Squadron in Wiesbaden, it is therefore presumed that they will asso-ciate those units with this Agency.In addition to this report, debriefings of the crewmen were taped and typed, which will total some 7,000 - 9,000 pagee when completed, are being distributed to the CI Staff and-3-SECRET
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SECRETother interested components of this Agency as they are completed. Questions were solicited by this Office of all interested components, in order to cover all matters in the debriefings of interest to the Agency. Careful arrangements have been made with the Air_Force_in_ order that Agency interests will be adequately protected and proper security will be maintained in the handling of information and reports derived from the debriefings, and so that no compromise of the Agency interest in the flight of the C-118 will be made to the press.CONCLUSIONS:A. It is our opinion that the possible compromises arising out of this incident are relatively minor in nature and that no major compromises occurred.B. That the Soviets "missed" on the true nature of the flight and personnel of the C-118.C. That the reasons the crew members were given an early release were as follows:1.  Primarily, the Soviet interrogators failed to use all of the leads at their command, particularly Brannon's address book, and failed to break the crewmen through interrogation.2.  The crew did not inadvertently disclose through interrogations, the purpose of their flight, its relation to the Agency and that of three of its crew to CIA..3.  The Soviets apparently failed to check out the names and other data in Brannon's address book through their files prior to release of the crew.4.  No incriminating information or material was immediately recovered from the burned aircraft.5.  Several of the crew destroyed incriminating building passes and notations in their wallets while on their way down in their parachutes, or immediately after landing in their chutes.6.  There were either no leaks or insufficient leaks of incriminating information through any room conversa- tions at Baku among the crew, which may have been moni- tored by the Soviets, or such conversations as there may have been were not properly interpreted, or inter- preted soon enough to tip the Soviets that there was something unusual about the flight or the crew.
[104-10224-10006.pdf — page 205]
SECRET7. The crew members were all in uniform and not in mixed civilian and Air Force clothing, which properly established their cover.8. Sufficient pressures were exercised ty Agency, State, Air Force, and Zzecutive action a the Soviets to effect the release of the crew-as-soon-as-possible.9. A factor that probably had an important bearing, was the early acknowledgent by the Sovie: Foreign Office of the downing of the aircraft and the attempte by the Soviets in the early stages to make this appear as a deliberate violation of the Soviet air frontier. This tended to take the "play" away from the MVD and military intelligence. In addition, this Government was stepping up the pressure for the release of the nine Army personnel who landed in East Germany in a helicopter, and the Soviets probably had no desire to create a duplicate of this incident.10. Safeguards taken by the Agency and the Air Force were such that there was no leak to the press, during the crew's internment, of the fact that there was an intelligence connection of the flight and crew of the C-118.D. That it is not believed, based on the evidence at hand, that the crew was drugged or otherwise tampered with medically.E. That there are valuable points of guidance from a cover, operations, policy and code of conduct standpoint which can be gathered from experiences of these crewmen in the hands of the Soviets and can aid the Agency and its personnel in any future situation of a similar nature in which the Soviet military and RIS interrogators are encountered.LOTION TAKEN TO SAFEGUARD AZICI INTEREST IN THIS MATTER:A. All possible steps were taken during the period immediately preceding and immediately after the release of the crew to effect the minimum of publicity and to safeguard and limit such publicity as was given out, in order to avoid disclosing the CIA connection of the flight and some of its crew.B. Throughout the entire debriefing process in Germany and in the U. S., the maximum care has been taken to safeguard the information taken by transcript and classify it so that there would be access to the informatica therein on a need-to-know basis and by only properly cleared persons.-5-SZCRET
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SECRETC. Steps were taken immediately by the German-Station-after the downing of the C-113 to change the combinations of the safes and locks in the buildings to which the crew had access.D. The three men from this Agency who were aboard the flight, Brannon, Crans and Shupe, and the aircraft commander, Lyles, are being removed from the German area, being returned to the U. S. The three CIA crewmen are being returned to duty with the Air Force from the Agency.E. Steps are continuing to be taken to properly safeguard Agency interests and personnel in regard to names of Agency personnel who appeared in Brannon's address book or in other notations appearing in any papers carried by other members of the crew.RECOMMENDATIONS:A. Continue to take all possible steps to prevent any disclosure to any unauthorized persons, particularly the press, about the CIA personnel aboard the C-118, or the true nature of the flight.B. Continue to take all possible steps to change the cover designation of the units appearing in Brannon's address book to prevent any further compromise of these units.C. Permit no further publicity about the flight itself, in order to minimize the possibility of the press learning of the CIA interest in the flight of the C-118.D. Carefully follow all matters relating to the International Court of Justice interest in this flight, in order to prevent any compromise of Agency interests.-6-SECRET
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SECRET(When Fill-id In)# LANGUAGE DATA RECORDPART I-GENERAL1581241. NAME (Last-First-Middle)McCord James W JV2. DATE-OF-BIRTHJAN 26 243. LANGUAGERUSSIAN 6544. TODAY'S DATENOV 18 585. I HAVE NO PROFICIENCY IN ANY FOREIGN LANGUAGEPART 11-LANGUAGE ELEMENTSSECTION A. Reading (40)1. I CAN READ TEXTS OF ANY DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE ON IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.2. I CAN READ TEXTS OF MOST GRADES OF DIFFICULTY, OF A GENERAL NATURE OF IN FIELDS I AM FAMILIAR WITH, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.3. I CAN READ TEXTS OF AVERAGE DIFFICULTY (newspapers, reference materials, etc.). USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.4. I CAN READ SIMPLE TEXTS, SUCH AS STREET SIGNS, NEWSPAPER HEADLINES, ETC.. USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.5. I HAVE NO READING ABILITY IN THE LANGUAGE.SECTION B. Writing (41)1. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS WITHOUT USING THE DICTIONARY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH VERY FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS. IN NATIVE STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY.2. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL WITH COMPLETE SUCCESS, USING THE DICTIONARY ONLY RARELY. I CAN WRITE FACTUAL NARRATIVE AND EXPOSITORY MATERIAL WITH REASONABLE CLARITY, WITH FEW GRAMMATICAL ERRORS, BUT IN A STYLE WHICH MAY NOT BE NATIVE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.3. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH OCCASIONAL MINOR GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY OCCASIONALLY.4. I CAN WRITE PERSONAL LETTERS AND SIMILAR SIMPLE MATERIAL, WITH REASONABLE SUCCESS IN CONVEYING MY MEANING, BUT WITH MANY GRAMMATICAL ERRORS AND IN A VERY FOREIGN, AWKWARD STYLE, USING THE DICTIONARY FREQUENTLY.5. I CANNOT WRITE IN THE LANGUAGE.SECTION C. Pronunciation (42)1. MY PRONUNCIATION IS NATIVE.2. WHILE NATIVES CAN DETECT AN ACCENT IN MY PRONUNCIATION THEY HAVE NO DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING ME.3. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OBVIOUSLY FOREIGN, BUT ONLY RARELY CAUSES DIFFICULTY FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.4. MY PRONUNCIATION IS OCCASIONALLY DIFFICULT FOR NATIVES TO UNDERSTAND.5. I HAVE NO SKILL IN PRONUNCIATION.CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDESECRET
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14-00000CONTINUATION OF PART 11-LANGUAGE ELEMENTSSECTION D. Speaking (43)1. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS I CONVERSE FREELY AND IDIOMATICALLY IN ALL FIELDS WITH WHICH I AM FAMILIAR.2. I SPEAK FLUENTLY AND ACCURATELY IN NEARLY ALL PRACTICAL AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS-I-CAN-CONVERSE-IN-MOST FIELDS-- I-AM-FAMILIAR.--AND-I-UNDERSTAND SOME POPULAR SAVINGS, LITERARY QUOTATIONS, AND COMMON PROVERBS3. I GET ALONG QUITE WELL IN SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL AND CAN CONDUCT ROUTINE BUSINESS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS4. I MANAGE TO GET ALONG IN THE MOST COMMON SITUATIONS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL.5. I HAVE NO ABILITY TO USE THE LANGUAGE IN ANY OF THE ABOVE RESPECTS.SECTION E. Understanding (44)1. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE: I UNDERSTAND NEARLY EVERYTHING I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.2. I UNDERSTAND NON-TECHNICAL CONVERSATION ON NEARLY ALL SUBJECTS, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE, I UNDERSTAND MOST OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES, INCLUDING MOST JOKES AND PUNS.3. I UNDERSTAND NEARLY ALL CONVERSATION ON TOPICS OF DAILY LIFE AND TRAVEL, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE I UNDERSTAND MUCH OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO, AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.4. I UNDERSTAND THE SIMPLEST CONVERSATION, BOTH FACE-TO-FACE AND ON THE TELEPHONE: I UNDERSTAND SOME OF WHAT I HEAR ON THE RADIO AND AT THE MOVIES, PLAYS, AND LECTURES.5. I AM NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE.BEFORE CONTINUING - CHECK PART II TO ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE CIRCLED ONE NUMBER PER SECTION.PART 111-EXPERIENCE AS TRANSLATOR OR INTERPRETER (45)1. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS A TRANSLATOR.2. I HAVE HAD EXPERIENCE AS AN INTERPRETER.3. BOTH OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.4. NONE OF THE ABOVE STATEMENTS APPLY.PART 1V-CERTIFICATIONI CERTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION GIVEN ABOVE IS TRUE AND ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. THIS CERTIFICATION CONSTITUTES MY APPLICATION FOR A MAINTENANCE AWARD PROVIDED I AM ELIGIBLE UNDER THE TERMS OF REGULATION NO. 29-115. PAR. 101(4). I UNDERSTAND THAT I MUST PASS AN OBJECTIVE LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY TEST BEFORE I BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR AN AWARD, AND THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE OF TESTING, ANNUAL MAINTENANCE AWARDS WILL BE CUMULATIVE AS OF THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF COMPLETING THIS FORM.DATE SIGNED: SIGNATURE:17 Nov 58 James W McCord Jr(101) C E
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HEADQUARTERSUSAF, IDRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR STAFF(FIELD EXTENSION)Washington 25, D.C.CERTIFICATEI concur in the Reserve assignment of James W. McCord, Jr.Captain AO 2 099 263 with this organization. In the(Grade) (SN)event of partial or full mobilization, he will be made available for active military service.I certify that no delay in his entry on active duty will be requested by this employing agency if he is ordered to active military service during a period of mobilization.Date: 12 Jan 1956L. FormellaCaptain, InfantryMobilization Training Officer
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# SECRET![CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SEAL]# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYWASHINGTON 25. D. C.OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR9 DEC 1955MEMORANDUM FOR: James W. McCord, Jr.SUBJECT: Notification of Membership in the Career Staff1. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence, it gives me pleasure to inform you that your application for membership in the Career Staff has been accepted by the CIA Selection Board. The effective date of your membership is 22 August 1954.2. Please indicate that you have received this notification by signing in the space provided below and return it to the Head of your Career Service. He will forward it to the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board.3. Because your membership in the Career Staff is classified information, it is necessary that this notification be conveyed to you in this manner. The application for membership which you signed has been endorsed on behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence by the Executive Director of the CIA Selection Board and placed in your permanent Official Personnel Folder.FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE![Signature of Harrison G. Reynolds]Harrison G. ReynoldsChairman, CIA Selection BoardNoted:![Signature of James W. McCord, Jr.]Date: 10 January, 1956
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# SECRETCAREER SERVICE QUESTIONNAIRESECTION I (To be completed by employee)NAME (Last) (First) (Middle) AGF GRADE NO. OF MOS. IN CAREER DESIGNATIONMcCORD, James W. 30 GS-13 Grade 2 SecuritySTAFF OR DIVISION BRANCH POSITION TITLEOffice of Director of Security Special Assistant to Director of SecurityNO. OF MOS. IN PRESENT NO. OF MOS. IN OSS NO. OF MOS. IN CIG NO. OF MOS. IN CIA10 36DATA ON ALL PERMANENT DUTY OVERSEAS OR IN U.S. FIELD (Include any TDY during last two years)APPROXIMATE DATES OF SERVICE COUNTRY LOCATION TDY PCS COMMENTSFROM TO STATIONAugust 1951 June 1953 U.S. San Francisco xField OfficeINDICATE WILLINGNESS TO SERVE TOUR OF DUTY OVERSEAS PCSA x YES B ONLY UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS CINDICATE ASSIGNMENT PREFERENCE IF PRECEDING ANSWER IS "A" OR "B"PREFERENCE COUNTRY STATION TYPE OF POSITION1ST Japan Tokyo Security2ND Germany Frankfurt Security3RD South America Rio de Janeiro SecurityIF ANSWER ABOVE IS "B" STATE CONDITIONS. IF ANSWER ABOVE IS "C." EXPLAIN YOUR REASONSINDICATE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS OVERSEAS IN WHICH YOU WILL NOT SERVE AND EXPLAIN REASONSNoneINDICATE RELATIONSHIP AND AGE OF EACH DEPENDENT TO BE MOVED OVERSEASWife - 26 Daughter - 9 YRS.Son - 2INDICATE KNOWN MEDICAL RESTRICTIONS WHICH THE AGENCY WAS IMPOSED ON YOUR SERVICENoneFORM NO. 59-174 SECRET MAY BE CONTINUED UNDERREMARKS ON REVERSE SIDE. 141-