[104-10221-10310.pdf — page 3]
# 5. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT. On occasion, AMCARDON-1 10 used to carry out certain operational support tasks. In such instancos, CARION-1 makes his inquiries or carries out the required action within the context of his normal journalistic activities. The use of ANCAREON-1 for operational support tasks enables JHWAVE to harness the investigative facilities of the Identity 3. Several xamples of how AMCARDON-1 has been used in operational support tasks are outlined below:## a. Andrew ORDONO Camps.In March 1963, Andrew *ORDONO-Campe*, DPOD 30 September 1914, Gibara, Cuba, A 12 837 617, arrived in Miami and was given routine CAC processing. The details of this processing are contained in MA-0085, dated 12 March 1963. Aftor being rolonged by CAC, ORDONO was interviewed by the Identity 3, and a sensational story was developed. In view of this story, JUWAVE tried to locate ORDONO for debriefing. This effort was not productivo thus AMCARDON-1 was asked to locate ORDONO, ALCANDON-1 did locato ORDONO in Houston, Texas. See WAVE-6307, dated 25 March 1963, for details.## b. Discrediting Carlos BANDIN of the UNN Splinter Group.In UFGW-2555, dated 13 September 1963, loadquarters suggested that JUWAVE might be able to discredit Carlos BANDIN Cruz (201-309611): of the MRR splinter group as a result of DANDIN's over inflatod claims relative to his faction invading Cuba. Headquarters intorest in discrediting BANDIN was also stimulated by the fact that BANDIN' irresponsiblo publicity stunts were causing problema for AUDIDDY-1. As a result of Headquarters' interest in this matter, HEUTENAN had à luncheon session with AMCARBON-1 on 24 September 1963, at which AMCARDON-1 was advised that the DANDIN faction of the MRR was loss than accurato in its claims relative to its activities in Cuba, In view of this, REUTEMAN suggested that the Identity 3 might want to soft poddlo any future war communiques which the BANDIN faction might relonso, AMCARDON-1 stated that, in view of REUTEMAN'G comments, the Identity 3 would not only soft peddle, but would ignore the DANDIN faction in the future. Once DANDIN was dincredited with AMCARDON-1, the word was soon leaked by AMCARBON-1 to other newspapermen that BANDIN was not a reliable sourco, As a result of this action, the BANDIN group has received minimal media coverage in South Florida since September 1963.# 6. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. In the period February 1963 to February 1964, ANCARDON-I has furnished JMWAVE with operational intelligence as outlined below:## a.In HAVE 4836, dated 21 February 1963, AMCARBON-1 reported that AMBEND-1 was back in Miami and was the object of a great deal of press interest in view of AMBEND-1's release from a Havana prison. AMCARDON-1 also indicated that AMBEND-1 would probably be a knowledgeable source.on the current activities of the UR in Cuba. This operational intelligence was most helpful in terms of keeping JMWAVE informed on AMEEND-1's movements. Subsequent developments revealed that AMCARDON-1 could not contact AMBEND-1, and thus AMBEND-1's return to the United States did not cause the publicity stir that was initially anticipated.## b.In WAVE 6176, dated 22 March 1963, AMCARDON-1 reported that the Identity 3 was attempting to research a full feature article on the Bay of Pigs invasion. The intent of this article was to furnish a recapitulation of the entire tactical situation. In this connection, AMCARBON-1 pointed out that he was