Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10219-10153.pdf — page 107]
SECRETrepairmen and others who might accidentally discover one of our LIFEAT taps. Also, should GERENDI be compromised through any of his other operations, it is conceivable that the EGMORNING and Cuban Exiles LIFEAT taps would be discovered by one of the local police agencies.(5) Recommendations - It is suggested that a replacement be found as soon as possible to relieve GERENDE of his present LIFEAT duries.LICOOL-7(1) Target - A planned technical installation against a person of interest to the Station and to Headquarters.(2) Personnel - LIMITATION-5 and his wife, LIMITATION-6, are the LICL-7 Base House operators, LIMITATION-5 has been with KUBARK for several years. He was at one time the LIAXIOM Base House operator. He presently works for the DuPont Company. He dresses well, speaks some English and could be described as belonging to the rising middle class of Mexicans. His wife can do photographic work and has had previous experiance with KUBARK in the dispatching of car surveillances by radio, LIMITATIONS-5 and 6 are not participating in any active work perkling the installation of L1000L-7 in their apartment. LIMITATION-5 receives a monthly salary of $000.00 (MN) and LIMITATION-6 receives $400.00 (MN) monthly.(3) Communications - A complete communications plan does not exist between GERENDE and LIMITATION-5. At the present time it is only necessary for GERENDE to see LIMITATION-5 on pay day and when Harvey C. MULFORD destres to visit the apartment for technical surveys and other work. Therefore, GERENDE and LIMITATION-5 utilize an open code telephonic means of getting together. So far, this has worked quite well, but it will be necessary later to set up a more sophisticated commmmications system.(4) Security - The operational aspects of LICOOL-7 are under the jurisdiction of Matthew S. DINGLEY; therefore, the author of this report is not familiar with the security ramifications, if any, surrounding this technical installation and the agents operating it.(5) Recommendations - None.SECRET
[104-10219-10153.pdf — page 108]
SECRETh. MISCELLANEOUSAlso on the payroll as worthwhile assets are GERENDE's brother-in-law, LIPSTICK-38, and his sister, LIPSTICK-40. GERENDE and LIPSTICK-38 process and print all the LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA and truck photos. LIPSTICK-40 does non-sensitive translation work for the Station, Both LIPSTICKS-38 and 40 are handled by GERENDE. They do not have contact with other agents or with station officers, LIPSTICK-38 receives a monthly salary of $1,000,00 (MN). LIPSTICK-40 receives the equivalent or $1,75 U. S. in pesos per hour for her work,Although it is not adviseable from the security point of view to have any Indigenous agent aware of all three of our LIMERICK photographic bases and the photo truck, the load on the Station photographer several months ago resulted in just such a solution to the problem, Previously, GERENDE and LIPSTICK-38 had processed only the photographs from LIMITED, LILYRIC and the truck,5. RECOMMENDATIONSRecommendations have been included in several sections of this paper, Those same recommendations, excepting those which have already been carried out or are in the process of implementation, are listed below in a composite form to facilitate the readers' overall comprehension.a. Continue the reorganization of communication arrangements with all agents,b. Relieve GERENDE of his LIFEAT duties (B GMORNING and Cuban Exiles taps) as soon as possible.c. Continue to use GERENDE for the time being as the principal agent in charge of LIMITED, LILYRIC, LICALLA, the Photo Truck, LIJERSEY, LIMITATIONS-5 and 6, and LIPSTICKS 38 and 40.d. Arrange a warning system of communications for removing GERENDE to PBPRIME should he be compromised to one of the local police agencies,e. Purchase a new photo truck for use by LIPSTICKS 2 and 24.f. Begin planning for a compartmented photo truck operation which will later permit termination of LIPSTICK-2,g. Spot and recruit at least three indigenous agents from the middle class social level to form the nucleus of a new LIJERSEYSECRET
[104-10219-10153.pdf — page 109]
SECRETsurveillance team.h. Eventually separate GERENDE from elther LIJERSEY surveillance team duties or the three photographic base houses, preferably the former. The two types of activities are not compatible with each other and should not be handled by the same principal agent.l. Implied, but not specifically stated elsewhere in this paper, is the suggestion that GERENDE be given a "cooling off' and training period of two to three months in PUPRIME. Of course, this will not be possible until other assets are developed to take over GERENDE's present duntes. After his return from PBPRIME, GERENDE could be used to develop new support assets which would be completely compartmented from all of his previous operations, personnel and activities.6. CONCLUSIONSIt would take several weeks of uninterrupted study of files to write a really comprehensive security review of GERENDE's operations and activities, However, based on the facts contained in this paper, it is the Station's opinion that GERENDE probably is not now known to the local police agencies as a KUBARK or FBPRIME agent. It is believed that GERENDE could be identified by the local police agencies at any time they choose to interrogate LIPSTICKS-12 and 30 in detail or when one of the other agent assets formerly or currently associated with GERENDE is compromised, Furthermore, if GERENDE is arrested, he could compromise most of the Station's support assets, plus the BGMORNING and Cuban Exiles portions of LIFEAT.Given several months time, the slow process of compartmentarion can be introduced into GERENDE's operations. Such compartmentation, however, will never reach the truly desirable point, but some improvement over the existing situation can be made, If GERENDE can emerge basically unscathed from the current incidents, then KUBARK will have an extremely valuable long-range support asset.Quinton N. OUSLER21 October 1958SECRET
[104-10219-10153.pdf — page 110]
# ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF RAMOND H. GERENDE'S ACTIVITIESSECRET![chart of ramond h. gerende's activities]GERENDELICCOL-7LILYRICLIMITEDPHOTO TRUCKLIJERSEYSECRET
[104-10219-10153.pdf — page 111]
# 14-0000050-6-25/3Statio, Mexico City23 July 1958Chief of Statio, MexicoOperational SecurityMonthly Review of Project LIPSTICKRefinements on proposals in Paragraph 7A. MXKI 1743B. MKCI-1755C. MXKI-17771. Referencea outlined the arrest of LIPSTICK-47, the subsequent arrests of LIPSTICK-12 and 30, their interrugation by the Mexican Secret Service and their eventual release from prison. References truly portrayed the incident with the following exceptions:a. None of the arrested men was tortured.b. LIPSTICK-45 was never arrested.c. Only LIPSTICK 12, 30 and 47 vare arrested,d. LIPSTICK-29 was not taken from his home by force.. In fact he was never arrested.2. While under detention the arrested men told the story as it appears in Attachment A which, was written by LIPSTICK-30. It is not believed that the men said anything more because:a. The substance of the story vas told to Station Mexico identically via three (3) seperate and epartmented sources, i.e. from the arrested man, from the attorney, Raul F. CaMiCHA, and from the Counselor of Canadian Embassy, Sidneyb. Each operation mentioned in Attachment A, which was susceptible to a check by the Secret Service, vas investigated by them. However, no operation ort mentioned in Attachment A vas investigated by the Secret Service.c. LIPSTICK-47, who had only been with the team about one and a half months and who did most of the talking, did not know any information other than that in Attachment A.d. LIPSTICK-12 and 30, who knew considerably more about our operations, are both made of sterner stuff than LIPSTICK-47 sand have keener minds.e. The "ring of truth" that Attachment A has. It is not believed that the Secret Service is sufficiently sophisticated to concoct such a believable story.f. The combined opinion of every Case Officer who has known LIPSTICK-12 and 30 that they did not reveal any information other than that contained in Attach-ment A.g. On 10 July 1953 LIPSTICK-12 and 30 were examined by Martin F. REMALEY on ICYLUTTER. REMALEY vas satisfied that the results of this examination completely exonerated LIPSTICK-12 sed 30 from say cooperation with the Mexican Police. The results of those tests are attached as Attachment B.3. In order to assess what possible damage might have been done to Station Mexico's operations if the arrested men had told the Secret Service everything they knew, there follows a list of those operations known to the arrested men:a. LIPSTICK-47 did not know anything more than he told the Secret Service as outlined in Attachment A.53CLASSIFICATIONSECRET/KAPOKPAGE NO-1
[104-10219-10153.pdf — page 112]
-2-b. LIPTICK-12:(1) He was reamitted by LIUTATION tat that he works for Station Mexico but does not know in what capacity LIUTATION 18 employed.(2) He knows that LIQUATTOO, LOOTATION-3 and LITTATION-6 vark for Station Mexico, but dues not know in what expeditises they work.(3) He knows the true name of Thomas O. U 77, Zevard P, GUERER, Matthew B. DINGLEY, Oliver J. SCANLEY, Wilfred O. CLOVER, Kaywand S. GEORGE, Harvey P. DEMERHOLTZ, Boyd I. FULHAM and Clyis K. SEATON.(4) He knows all of the details of the FURMARIC 9 and REMEO operations.(5) He participated in the raid on Alfredo Guerra Borges' apartment.(f) He knows of LUUICK Car A (photo trus).(7) the knons all of the present LIISICA surveillance team and LISSICK- and it was used to be with the team.(8) Through surveillance, he knows of the following operations:LITARURE Samuel BrooksLIJAQ Maurice Halperin1.LAXIOM 9 indigenous employee of the U.S.Kalend Abbiate (Fremonts Rosen) Embassy in Mexico CityIMPRO LIMETADZAlfred Kaufman & Martha Dodd Stern LIVESTOCK-2LIVESTOCK-3 KELIAISI (Michael ROXX & Jare MartaLIMSTOCK-1 RIMEIRO AntunesSurveillance of various officials of the Portico Comunista MexicanoSuveillance of various Soviet officials. Es probably known of the existence of the LIMITED base since this base dispatched the intio cera on sur-veillance or Soviet officials.Samuel RODRIGUEZ Rodrigues - individual who desired to purchase the LDIET base.c. LIPTICK-30:(1) Se was recruited by Ramoud S. GERANDE. Is Nuova that GERANDE works for Station Mexico but does not know in what capacity.(2) He knows the true names of Thomas O. 77, Zevard P. SECHEN, Matthew B. DINGLEY, Wilfred O. CLAVER, ORiver C. STARLING, and Harvey P. DEMERHOLTZ.(3) He participated in the raid on the apartment of Alfreso Querra Borges.(4) Ee knows of the LIPSTICK vehicle (photo truck).
[104-10219-10153.pdf — page 113]
(5) He knows all of the present LIPSTICK team and LIPSTICK-12(6) Through surveillance, he has learned of all the operations as listed in the case of LIPSTICK.4. At the present time the LIPSTICK team is inoperative. The team members are working at their various cover jobs and writing a critique on the surveillance techniques they used which caused these to be arrested.Matthew S. DINGLEY has stopped all sensitive contacts and turned them over to Quinton K. OWSLEY as a precautionary measure should WHALEY be under surveillance. DINGLEY continues to see LIPSTICK-30 who now administers the team, and DINGLEY also continues to be the case officer for LIVERPOOL.LIPSTICK-47 has been fired and the LIPSTICK officers have been ousted and the furniture stored in a public warehouse. With the unofficial cooperation of Nogales and Monterrey Bases, Wilfred G. GANIER was smuggled out of Mexico.5. Future planning for the LIPSTICK team will depend upon the results of operational tests and additional deductive reassessment based upon the actions of the team and the results obtained. General Miguel NAJAR Simoeti, Chief of the Mexico Secret Service, has agreed to protect the team fully and assume responsibility for their actions for the sum of $250.00 U.S. per month. HOLINAR has also promised to issue the team credentials from the Secret Service, or some other official investigative agency, after the presidential inauguration in November of 1958. The future of the LIPSTICK team will depend upon the following factors:a. It is not believed that the Secret Service demanded, nor even suggested, that the team report future activities to the Secret Service. (Test leads, susceptible of checking, will be given to the LIPSTICK team to determine if they are being reported to the Secret Service)...b. Degree of access to Secret Service files given to the LIPSTICK team.c. Effectiveness of General MILIAN's protection.7. Station Mexico recommends that the LIPSTICK team be allowed to continue operations for a period of three months at which time a reassessment will be made based upon the evidence accumulated over that period of time. The reassessment will be concerned mainly with whether or not the team is really under the control of the Secret Service and the degree of success of their "penetration" of the Secret Service.FaelaMSD/bet22 July 1958Distribution:3 - HQe2 - Files
[104-10219-10153.pdf — page 114]
SECRET6 November 1958MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III/MexicoSUBJECT: Raymond H. GERENDEREFERENCE: HWM-A-113681. This dispatch represents the type of operational reporting we need. I think any answer to the Station should lead off with an expression of appreciation for a good job. Maybe it will encourage them to write more of this type.2. GERENDE is very exposed, and should be taken off some of his jobs at once. Specifically, my ideas are as follows:3. Re para. 3 a, agent is very capable and should be retained if secure means can be found. Getting rid of him would not solve the problem. As long as he is in Mexico he is vulnerable. Some thought should be given to how he would be supported in the event of arrest. Personally, I believe the Station would do better to sacrifice a case officer than permit things to drag on to the point where GERENDE might tell all to the police.Recommendations:a. GERENDE be briefed so as to be ever ready with an innocuous story to tell the police in the event of arrest.b. GERENDE be told to contact one of already blown Station officers like HAZLETT in the event of arrest and that the Station officer be ready to appear personally at police station to free GERENDE. If the case officer named for this city and GERENDE both know the innocuous cover story, there should be little problem. I have done it myself. A good cover story is "looking for draft dodgers" or some such tale which does not have implications of working against Mexican citizens.c. That if not allowed to communicate directly GERENDE should tell the senior officer present at police station that he works on (cover story) for HAZLETT and insists HAZLETT be sent for.d. That a second blown case officer's name be given as an alternate for HAZLETT, who is often out of town and unavailable.SECRET
[104-10219-10153.pdf — page 115]
SECRET- 2 -e. That GERENDE be taken off LIFEAT at once and allsuspicious audio equipment be removed from his home or offices.At present, LIFEAT is the only illegal activity being engagedin by GERENDE; if he is made merely in connection with hisphysical surveillance activities he is not likely to be hurtby the Mexicans.f. Concur preparations should be made to hide out GERENDEif it is known he is to be arrested.4. Re para. 4 a, GERENDE's participation in LIMITED is O. K.   I believe no law is being broken. However, LIMITED is probably blown   to the Soviets. Hermis the more real danger. Station should find out   who is the registered owner of the phone at LIMITED. Prior to leaving   Mexico I noted to MAHONEY it was still held in the name of LIMESTONE-3   (now fired and hence a possible threat).5. Re para. 4 b: This is the same situation as LIMITED but not   so likely blown to the Soviets. There is no reason why GERENDE should   not continue this work.6. Re para. 4 c, LICALLA is a very special problem and should   be taken up at once with Headquarters elements working on LIMESA/LIMUST.   I thought LICALLA had been cancelled out when LIMESA began to shape up.   I consider it a danger to LIMESA. Has LICALLA produced anything of   value? I think we could vacate this in such a way that the agents in   LICALLA would have no cause to be suspicious. (Put an obvious tail on   the agent, scare him off, etc. This would throw off the Mexican police,   too, in the event they are already wise to LICALLA through LIPSTICK 47.   We could pretend to believe the Soviets ran the tail and the game is up.)Recommendation: Get rid of LICALLA unless very productive. Betterdo this before the remodeling begins.7. Re para 4 d, photo truck. LIPSTICK-2 does know of the locations   of some of the basehouses on LIFEAT since he was a line inspector.Recommendations:a. New compartmented truck should be set up. Don't use falsenames and addresses. It could result in great harm.b. LIPSTICK-2 be sent off to some small town as "residentagent" for general work and to get him out of the area.SECRET
[104-10219-10153.pdf — page 116]
## -3-8. Re para. Le. I have no particular thoughts on LIJERSEY but think it consistent for GERENDE to handle it.9. Re para. 4 f: GERENDE should be taken off LIFEAT at once, even if it means losing lines. As of March this year the Station had enough agent personnel to handle bases for 24 lines. They should be able to fill the gap even though LIMESTONE-3 and his tribe ware fired. Only 12 lines are now being handled (latest report). The way CERENDE is handling his LIFEAT work seems to be treaking all the rules wo set up inseven years of experience.10. Re para. 4 g, LICOOL-7. I see no harm in GPP2NDE's hamiling the operational aspect of this case. But through ATIC-5 the police could get bace to LIMITATION and the rain LIRICK tap, that is, if they were able to make GERENDE talk before we could save hing The danger to LIMITATION was not brought out in the Station's survey.11. In re para. 5, recommendations -a. Approve.b. Det his off LIFEAT right now.c. Concur, but liquidate LICALLA.d. This needs some discussion, What do we do with GERENDE in the U. S.?e. Concur.f. Concur with reservation noted above.g. O. K.h. I don't see why he can't handle all these jobs since they are physical surveillances.i. Not a bad idea.12. Final observations:a. What is GERENDE's cover?b. We must be sure he is not overworked. Sloppy work has resulted from people being overworked.![signature of Charles W. Anderson]CHARLES W. ANDERSONWH/VI![unreadable word]
[104-10219-10153.pdf — page 117]
# OFFICIAL DISPATCHVIA ATB(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)DISPATCH NO. H-802-5760SECRETCLASSIFICATION201-11952324 DEC 57 13 01TO : Chief of Station, Mexico CityFROM : Chief, WHIDSUBJECT { GENERAL - OperationalSPECIFIC - Raymond H. CLAANDEACTION REQUESTED: Sign and Return Contract ExtensionAttached are original and two copies of an extension of Subject's contract to be signed and witnessed and returned to Headquarters.![signature of J. King]J. C. KingCHIEF, WHID19 December 1967Attachment3, as stated aboveDistribution:3 - Mexico City, w/atts.1 - WH/Mailroom1 - WH/III/Chrono1 - RI1 - SubjectWH/III/Mexico/Sulc:jck![signature of J.C. King](Releasing officer)J. C. KING, CHIEF, WHIDFORM NO. 51-29JUN 1949![stamp: SECRET]CLASSIFICATION![signature of R. Dahlgren](Authenticating officer)R. N. DAHLGREN, C/WH/III
[104-10219-10153.pdf — page 119]
# OFFICIAL DISPATCHVIA:*Specify Air or Sea Pouch*DISPATCH NO. H-226-5626201-11/523DEC 3 196!TO: Chief of Station, Mexico CityDATE:FROM: Chief, AHDSUBJECT:GENERAL - OperationalSPECIFIC - Raymond H. GARDE1. Effective 1 October 1957, the contract (as amended) for subject, effective 1 October 1955, is extended for a period of two (2) years.2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.26 November 1957Distribution:3- Mexico City1- WH//Ailron1- WH/III/Chrox1- Subject1- RIWH/III/Mexico/D/LMartin Applefor J. C. KING, CHZZ, (SD)B. DAHLGREN, C/WH/IIIFORM NO. 51-29JUN 1949SECRETCLASSIFICATION
[104-10219-10153.pdf — page 120]
LIPSTICK Quarters, Cn. fingert          m 871327 112 37c. Rajumnd U, a contract agent, was cover provided byLUDWIG and is responsible for LIPSTICK office number 2.supervise the activities of the LILWIC surveillanceteams (to execute project discussed in 5).responsible for the activities of the fixed surveillance boothouse, LILWIC.(1) LILWIC is a second story apartment which affords a view into the right angle of the main gate of the installation.photographs from the top of the house downward.The equipment is the same as that used in LICALIA and the film is processed in the same way. LILY-12 lives in this apartment and is responsible for the photographic and physical surveillance. reports duplicate those submitted by the LILWIC bench.are superior in quality to those obtained from other LILWICLILY-12 is an efficient stay photographer.Also, this base offers a better position from which to take photographs.(2) contacts in private investigative agencies are used to check leads from other operations. During June and July 1957 received training at headquarters and both he and the Case Officer feel this training has been most beneficial.
[104-10219-10153.pdf — page 121]
Air Pouc..SECRET201-A-8700Chief, Wa DivisionChief of Station, Mexico City19 November 1957OperationalWilliam .eren BRASS (201-2008)Refrence: 124-562ACTION REQUESTED: None1.  There is attached for Headquarters retention a translation of a report concerning the Subject. The original report was obtained through a private detective agency in Mexico City which had been contacted by Raymond H. GURNDE. GURNDE posed as a businessman seeking credit and character reports on the comercial firm of Gibbs, Alonson y Cie., S.A. de Mexico. This was a useful assignment for the detective agency in order that Station Mexico could assess the investigative assets of the agency for possible future operational exploitation.2.  The sub-source of JMA-0021, the former SOT chief in Mexico, knows the Subject personally. The Case Officer will contact him direct for additional information on the Subject and his activities.Willard C. CurtisEncl.MSD/bet15 Nov 57Distribution3 - QS w/atchmt2 - Files'COPYSECRETLIPSTICK/20
[104-10219-10153.pdf — page 122]
SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Finance DivisionFROM: Contract Personnel DivisionSUBJECT: Contract Extension for Raymond H. Gerende1. Effective 1 October 1957 , the contract (as amended) for the subject individual, effective 1 October 1955 , is extended for a period of two (2) years2. All other terms and conditions of the contract (as amended) remain in full force and effect.UNITED STATES OF AMERICABYContracting OfficerAPPROVED:SECRET