[104-10217-10221.pdf — page 16]
# SECRET/KAPOKOFLA 2555## TERMINATION:41. The question of termination is not academic at this time, for explicit in the letter of agreement which S/1 signed is his termination on 1 September 1965 unless specific conditions are met. It is doubtful that KUBARK will indeed terminate S/1 on that date unless such action is made imperative for reasons of security or of gross malfeasance on his part.42. In the event of the termination of S/1 we foresee at this time no great cause for concern about possible repercussions against KUBARK personnel or installations. In addition to the use of aliases, RODICAST's meetings with him will be in third countries, and S/1 has not been passed classified information. He does keep in his possession materials for the use of S/W System #64. He received training in the use of these materials (and underwent his LCFLUTTER) & in the apartment of two LCPIPIT contract personnel. This apartment, an LCPIPIT safehouse, was used only once previously for a clandestine meeting, and it will not be used again for at least two months.43. Should it prove necessary to terminate S/1 the greatest danger which we can anticipate at this time grows out of his considerable skill as a writer and the possibility that this skill might be used to attack KUBARK or ODYOKE in some way, perhaps from the forum of the national liberation movement propaganda machinery which he has now forsaken. His knowledge of our operations and personnel has been kept to a minimum. Hence the danger of his pen speaking with great force or effectiveness is, we believe, not great and a problem which, though we must anticipate it, we believe to be remote.## KUBARK OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS:44. All concerned would agree that a KUBARK agent who is unable to service KUBARK operational requirements would not be worth his keep. At the same time, it would be presumptuous to expect that in a situation where the agent is being handled at arm's length and under such disadvantages in time and distance as in S/1's case, KUBARK's operational requirements could be regularly and, if necessary, speedily measured against the agent's capabilities and specific requirements levied on the agent.45. So far in KUBARK's relationship with S/1 we have outlined a general target area for him, levied the requirement that he prove to KUBARK he can effectively penetrate that target area and operate in place, and levied subsidiary KUBARK requirements for him to service as a by-product of his basic operational task. What we have assigned, in effect, is a short term operational mission upon which longer term operations might be based.46. There is evidence in the reams of "testimony" KUBARK has taken from S/1 that he is a man who likes to operate, act, produce. There is also evidence that he, like any other human, consciously seeks approval and recognition of his work. The question to be posed is: Has KUBARK at this time, or will it have on 1 September 1965, an assignment for S/1 in which he can find satisfaction in producing a marketable product and find that approval and recognition which he requires? We must be more specific with him than to say: "Go out to Djakarta and see what you can dig up. We'll meet you again in two months for discussions." Rather, it would be well at this stage to review with the various area divisions those geographic areas in which S/1's talents could be fully exploited (Chile with FUSES?, Venezuela as an FALN penetration?, Djakarta as an AAJA staffer?, Ghana as a DAA writer?, Tanzania as a Government Radio editor?, etc., etc.) and to have a definite assignment for S/1 in hand at the moment we negotiate the extension of his contract.47. Certainly the sudden change of leadership in Algeria can be expected to affect the national liberation movement and personalities in that movement who has drawn succor from the Ben Bella regime. As noted in the section on security, it is reasonable to assume that S/1 will be in a less