Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10215-10246.pdf — page 175]
# SECRETSecurity Information                                                TAB-7-103Page 2by this time devoting approdrately half his time to ar work. Since that time HUMANOID'S zain cuties have been to act as cutout and direct those apunts, with the exception of the low level pene- tration who was dropped in aid-1952. HONANOID's most important single activity has been in debriefing the hih-level penetration agent who ho has been ablo to develop to a polut where HUMANOID and this one agent constituto the most imortant assets of the station.b. In the course of his operational cuties, subject has proved himself to be very security conecicus and to possess a degree of initiative which hae Lanresced the station chief on more thaл опо оссавіon. He has participated in setting up cafehouses, was responsible for recruiting the two nail intercept arents, and has provided the facilities for photographing the material these two arents turn over to bia for rapid processing and return to normal mail chunnala. Subject has reerited two additional arente, both of whon are presently being ured, and carried out a cold recruitment atterpt on a Covunist which is still reading. A participated in a tocinical sur voillance operation in early 1951 during which he was in charge of the nonitoring post toother with an indigenous agent under his direction. The operation was blown after a short time due to cir cumstances beyond his control, switch had no relation, to the operation itself or the way in which he ran it. Extensive checking cubsequently showed that he was not compraised and that his quick action prevented any discovery of the technical surveillance equipment itself. kost recently, MURANOID surreptitiovaly entered the Cocmanist Party head quarters in Costa Rica on Hay Day and carried off over 75% of the official records of the Party.c. Subjoet is an expert photorrapher and at one time operated his om photography shop in San Jose. He is also fairly proficient in send- ing Morse code, is trained in the use of firoaras, and has studied and worked with charts and maps. No ves trained in jungle warfare during eleven mantas in the col theater during the last war whiم with the Air Force. He is considered expert in writing reparts. Subject has proved himself to to knowledgeable in the usual techniques of covert operations after four years of working in San Jose, and las proved to be invaluable to the station in spotting and/or recruiting additional agente.d. HUMANOID is married to a Costa Rican woman and has two children. His wife is conizant of his intelliſence activities, and has sided his on several occasions. There are no indications that she has in any way comprondsed his security.# SECRET
[104-10215-10246.pdf — page 176]
# SECRETSecurity InformationEHB-3-403Page 3e. The question of a career status was discussed with subject over a year ago when he was in touch with the former chief of station now at Headquarters, but no commitments were made in this record, although he was told that it would be considered, depending on his future activities. He indicated his willingness to continue his operational activities in any other country when his course of studies ended in March 1953 at the University of Costa Rica. He is presently accepted for the March 1954 class at the University of Buenos Aires where he hopes to get his BS in Economics. He has discussed the question of covert training at Headquarters some time in late 1953 prior to going to Argentina. It is Headquarters' understanding that he would come to Headquarters some time in late August or September for approximately two months covert training, after which he might be directed to await departure for Argentina until some time in mid-January 1954 in order not to arrive in the area too long before his schooling starts.f. Additional personal information on subject will be found in the San Jose Station file.4. HUMANOID appears to be a promising prospect for consideration as one of the individuals to be introduced into Argentina under unofficial cover, in accordance with Country Plan objectives. Should you find his qualifications of interest and favor his entry into Argentina as a Mission asset, please advise as early as possible, in order that necessary travel details and training schedules can be arranged at Headquarters. In view of the higher standard of living in Buenos Aires and subject's excellent record of service, an amendment of his present contract would be effected while he is in Washington. Our present thinking is in terms of annual compensation at GS-7 level ($4205). An American student with a wife and two children will probably discover this amount to be none too ample to maintain a normal standard of living. Your comments and suggestions will be appreciated, particularly with regard to any allowances that would be appropriate.5. An early reply would be especially helpful, since HUMANOID has already remained in Costa Rica three months beyond the date of completion of his studies and should leave there by August. (He was requested by the San Jose Station to remain through July to cover the impending elections.) We shall await your reply pending any further action regarding HUMANOID.2 July 1953 /mihJ. C. KINGBy: J. HeynDistribution:3.- Buenos Aires2-WHD (WH/III/Costa Rica/B.A. Chrono)1-WH/II-Report (yellow)SECRET![DESENSITIZED KAPOK]
[104-10215-10246.pdf — page 177]
## CLASSIFIED MESSAGECENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYSECRETSECURITY INFORMATIONROUTING19 JUNE 1953OUT 69436TO: SA REPT ARGENTINA (BUENOS AIRES) J. G. HEYW WH 3992FROM: SPECIAL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ROUTINECONF: (WH 4)20412 22 JUNE 53INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/PLANS, FI/RI 2DIR 09060TO: SOUND INFO: SSAIJ CITE: DIR1. SUBJECT IS HUMANOID AMERICAN CONTRACT AGENT OF PROVEN VALUE, 4 YEARS SERVICE WITH COSTA RICAN STATION.2. WHEN HUMANOID HERE LATE 52 HQ SUGGESTED ARGENTINE ASSIGNMENT IF HE ABLE DEVELOP COVER. HE HAS NOW ARRANGED ENTRANCE BUENOS AIRES UNIVERSITY. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS AFTER REVIEW HIS FILE. DISPATCH FOLLOWS WITH DETAILS.3. FOR SSAIJ: POUCH HUMANOID FILE TO BU.![signature of J. C. King, chief WHD]J. C. KINGCHIEF, WHD![signature of R. N. Dahlgren, chief, branch II, WHD]R. N. DAHLGRENCHIEF, BRANCH II, WHDSECURITY INFORMATIONIT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGECOPY NO.(44)
[104-10215-10246.pdf — page 178]
VIA:(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)TO :Chief, WINDFROM :Chief of Station, San JoséDISPATCH NO.HRSA-60DATE: 8 January 1953SUBJECT: GENERAL- OperationalSPECIFIC- Security Review of Current OperationsProject HUMANOIDRef: TRSW-8161. The following comments on reference are submitted for your information and files. It is to be noted that the headquarters reviewing officials have arrived at a number of the same conclusions that we have with regard to the security of the Project and the possible lines of action to be followed.2. With regard to Paragraph 6 of reference, we feel that although the security risk of contact and communications between HUMANOID and HUMANOID-3 has not been removed, it has been reasonably minimized. After the closing of HUMANOID's photo shop in November, 1951, several meetings were carried out at night on park benches while attempts were being made to locate a secure safehouse. This method was not satisfactory because of the impossibility of handling and discussing written materials, the brief time limit demanded, and the possibility of accidental recognition of one or the other. A number of meetings were held at the home of HUMANOID at night with pre-arranged safety-danger signals. Although the obvious security hazards here were aggravated by the fact that a Communist Party sympathizer lives in the neighborhood, the risks were deemed less serious than park meetings. A safe house was located in May, 1952, and was used for several meetings, but was compromised and abandoned when several school acquaintances of HUMANOID passed by and saw him unlocking the front door. Meetings were again held at the home of HUMANOID on a staggered schedule while search for suitable safehouses continued. (At least ten apartments and offices were examined and rejected by HUMANOID and the writer during this period.) A new safehouse was rented on 1 November, 1952, and is presently being used for meetings. However, both HUMANOID and HUMANOID-3 have agreed to abandon this place at the end of the month, because actual use has demonstrated security weaknesses in exit and entry. Another safe office is presently under investigation, and attempts have been made to limit the live contacts by brush meetings in darkened streets and use of a post office box for non-sensitive reports. We are also actively searching for suitable two-way dead drop facilities in a further effort to minimize live contacts.
[104-10215-10246.pdf — page 179]
Pago 2SECRETSECURITY INFORMATIONHRSA-603. With regard to Paragraph 7 of reference, it is to be noted that HUMANOID's relations with the Diroctor of the Post Office have been strengthened considerably in recent months. The Director has been outspokenly anti-Communist in several long discussions and has referred once or twice to the fact that his personal war against the local Communists, 1.0., interception and confiscation of Communist propaganda, appears to go unrecognized by the Costa Rican government. Ho intimated that he is more aware of the dangers presented by Communist activitios than are the security a thoritios. We feel confident that no Costa Rican officials are actively attempting to identify higher elements in the net, control the operation, or dotect the nature of our intelligence interests. The Director's personal consorship mounts to little more than confis- cating obvious Communist proparanda (most of which is turned over to us in bulk) and opening lettors for perusal. He has no facilities for copying such letters and maintains no files of past correspondence. The Chief of the Costa Rican Intolligence Service is well known to us and on the rara cccasions when ho requests the Director to intercept a letter we hear of it from either the Director or HUMANOID-2.4. In view of the dovolopment of more intimate relations between HUMANOID and the Director and the latter's interest in whether any record exists of his cooperation in anti-Communist activities, we have obtained preliminary PRO data from him and are presently con- sidering the possibility of roquesting clearance as a paid aent. This will be the subject of a future dispatch. Further indication of the lack of detailed information on the part of the Costa Rican authorities concerning this project is contained in TRSA-1272.5. With regard to Paragraph 8 of reforonce dispatch, we have long been concerned over the lack of additional cutouts and the scope of responsibilitics presently assigned to HUMANOID. We hope to separate the mail intercept and the Vanguardia Poplar operations in the near future. As previously reported, the possibility exists that *HUMANOID will depart Costa Rica some time during 1953. We have already begun turning over the postal intercept activity to HUMIST. When clearance is obtained for HUMORESCUE, and further observation is completed, we contemplate turning HUMANOID-3 over to HUMORESQUE. In addition, we are gathering PRO deta on additional potential cutouts.6. With regard to Paragraph 9 of reference, it is to be noted that we were in the process of developing cordial relations with Major Jorge PACHECO as an Erabassy officer concerned with visa security risks, international travel of Communists, arms sauggling from the U.S., etc. PACHECO resigned as Chief of Detectives some sonths ago and is not presently connected with the government. We have main- tained friendly relations with him, however, on the possibility that ho may again at some future date return to a responsible position.7. Concerning Para raph 10 of refereme, it is to be noted that HUMANOID will quite likely depart Costa Rica during 1953,SECRET
[104-10215-10246.pdf — page 180]
Page 3SECRETSECURITY INFORMATIONHRSA-60thereby eliminating the security aspects of the fact that his intelligence activitios are known to a wide circle of indigenous agents. The Director of the Post office is under consideration for recruitment as a paid agent. It is not believed that subject's wife represents a security hazard. Our limited observation of her indicetes that she is discreet, a conclusion which is strengthened by the fact that no security breeches have occurred as a result of her generalized awareness of HUMANOID's intelligence activitios. It is expected that she will apply for U.S. eitizenship in the rear future.8. Headquarters' recommendation that HUMANOID exercise extreme cantion in all of his intelligence activities will be followed. The diagram attached to reference is acurate with the one addition that HUMIST is cognizant of the postal intercept activity. During this developmontal period, HUMANOID has been acting as a cutout betweon HUMIST and the Chief of Station. In the near future direct contact will be established between HUIST and the Chief of Station, and HUMANOID withdrawn from this activity..9. We appreciate the exhaustive review of this project prepared by headquarters. It is our desire to keep headquarters promptly informed of all minor details as well as major developments. However, we frequently find in the sifting and evaluation of those matters demanding attention at any given time that either routine reporting or current operations must suffer.James K. RussoSECRETSECURITY INFORMATYARVDP
[104-10215-10246.pdf — page 181]
VIA: Air (SPECIFY ABR OR SEA POUCH)# SECRETSECURITY INFORMATIONCLASSIFICATIONDISPATCH NO. HRSA-51TO: Chief, WHDFROM: Chief of Station, San JoséDATE: 2 January 1953SUBJECT: GENERAL - OperationalSPECIFIC - HUMANOIDRef: SANJ 905, DIR 248761. As indicated in references, subject travelled to Washington in early November, 1952, on personal business and contacted Elmer C. Mercer upon arrival in order to discuss the possibilities of a future assignment in another Latin American country. After discussion with WHD officers, according to subject, Mercer indicated that reassignment to another country would be considered. An assignment in Argentina was tentatively discussed with the understanding that subject must arrange his cover personally and his departure from San José must have our concurrence. It was also mentioned that subject might be afforded approximately three months training in Washington prior to departure for Argentina, and that a new contract would be prepared.2. Since his return to San José, subject has ascertained that he can transfer to the School of Economic Sciences, University of Buenos Aires, in order to obtain his B.S. degree. He has approximately one more year of schooling before cbtaining his degree. Contact with the Argentine Consul indicated no difficulties would be encountered in making the transfer or obtaining a visa and that job opportunities in the photographic field are favorable.3. In view of the fact that subject's services will be needed here for the remainder of the presidential electoral campaign, it will be mid-July before he can be released. Subject is aware of this time consideration and is planning to enter the University of Buenos Aires at the beginning of the school year in March, 1954. This tentative schedule will permit a few months training in Washington subsequent to July, 1953, and will also permit a period of a few months orientation in Argentina prior to the start of the school year.4. Headquarters comments are requested on the above matter as well as information as to what commitments, if any, were made to subject while in Washington. Subject states it will be necessary to take his wife and two children to the U.S. with him if training is required. His wife is planning to apply for U.S. citizenship.![signature]FORM NO.MAR. 1949 51-28 A# SECRETCLASSIFICATION201-168771201-168681HRSA-51
[104-10215-10246.pdf — page 182]
Page 2SECRETSECURITY INFORMATIONERSA-515. We would be interested in any available information for passing to subject, such as whether the organization will pay his passage to the United States for training and to Argentine for assignment, etc.James K. RussoSECRETSECURITY INFORMATION
[104-10215-10246.pdf — page 183]
VIA: AirSPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH# SECRETSECURITY INFORMATIONCLASSIFICATIONTO: Chief, WHDFROM: Chief of Station, San JoséSUBJECT: GENERAL- OperationalSPECIFIC- Communist Party Penetration OperationsDATE: 16 JUN 1953Ref: HRSW-1061. Headquarters attention is invited to Project HERRLIANT which has as its objective the recruitment of a party member or the introduction of a new member into the Communist Party in the Cuopos area. HUMILIANT-2 has made some progress in this regard, having been accepted in the Communist syndicate and having widened his circle of Communist acquaintances in the area. This project is expected to produce a low-level, long-term penetration of the party in one of the most critical labor areas of Costa Rica.2. HUMANOID has recently been instructed to canvass the lists of second and third echelon Communists and sympathizers in the San José area for possible defectors. Heretofore, most of the station's attention has been directed towards members of the Political Commission with negative results. However, a review of available operational data on the top leaders is once again being made with the likelihood that HUMANOID will be used for at least one approach immediately prior to his departure. This approach will be in addition to the search for a second-string recruitment. Also, an effort is being made to locate an appropriate individual who will be instructed to join the party as a new member. On 6 June 1953 another contact was had with the subject of AREA-95 with negative results.3. Any penetration of the Communist Party is the same as a penetration of the PFI as the actual leadership is almost identical. We are hopeful that KUOOWN efforts will result in the PFI being declared illegal this week.4. No specific plans have been made as yet for HUMIDOR's use in the labor field except that we are considering the possibility# SECRETSECURITY INFORMATIONCLASSIFICATIONCOPY 201-168881FORM NO. 51-26AMAR 1949
[104-10215-10246.pdf — page 184]
Page 2SECRETSECURITY INFORMATIONHRA-168that the school work can be tied in with labor research or investigation, i.e. the preparation of a school paper which would require contact with labor leaders and conditions. Headquarters will be advised of this angle after HRIDGE arrives in Costa Rica and gets settled.James K. Russo11 June 1953SECRETSECURITY INFORMATION15-16-3
[104-10215-10246.pdf — page 185]
VIA: AirSECRET DISPATCH NO. LIPSA-175TO: Chief, WIIDDATE: 16 JUN 1953FROM: Chief of Station, San JoséSUBJECT: GENERAL: OperationalSPECIFIC: HUMANOID1.  Attached hereto is a memorandum prepared by HUMANOID outlining his desire to depart Costa Rica on or about 1 August 1953 for training in the U.S. prior to reassignment to Argentina.2.  In view of the fact that HUMIDOR has arrived in San José and the presidential elections will take place in July 1953, we have no objection to a departure date of 1 August, feeling that sufficient time remains for a thorough briefing and orientation of HUMIDOR.3.  In the unlikely event that HUMANOID is unable to complete his cover arrangements in Argentina and in view of his willingness to serve in any area, it is suggested that consideration might be given to his use in Venezuela.4.  It is requested that headquarters advise as to the status of its plans for the training and reassignment of subject.Encl:1.  Memo16 June 1953James K. Russo
[104-10215-10246.pdf — page 186]
# SECRETSECURITY INFORMATION5 Juno 1953Memo to Janes K. Russo re Departure Lotable for CANDIDCertain circumstances surrounding my application for residence in Argentina through thoir Labessy here in San Jost have given rise to a suggestion in roicronce to my tiactable for departure. Originally it was agreed by all concerned that a departure shortly after the local elections (say 1 August 1953) would be most convenient for the station. There was some questica as to aceeptance at the University of Buenos Aires, bat it was lator decided that a moro direct assurance of ontry could be arranged by actual application for resident status right here at San Jose. This process was begun immediately. Subsequent conversations with Russo, however, have given me the impression that headquarters will await the approval of the resident perait before arranging my čeparture for the U.S.Actually there have been no unusual obstacles encountered in the routine preparation of documentation, but nevertheless, the Argentine Consul assures me that "roselts will not be fortheo ing in less than three months." Accordingly, this would place the most optimistic results some time in late Soptember.Meanwhile, for rather urgent personal reasons, I am anxious that my departure for the U.S. be realized as per the original understanding, that is, shortly after the local elections. By this plan, correspondence can bo maintained with the Argontine Embassy here at San Jond as concorns the arrival... of the documentation, and my proposed training period can con- ceivably be accomplished within this interval of time. If the resident permit is denied, or the delay unusually great, an alternate aroa might then be considered..I fully comprehend the uncertaintics involved in making such a departure without the residence at the future station positively established and as prepared to enter and work in any area selected at the discretion of the organization. What I an trying to avoid cost of all is a possible interim waiting period of several months in a more or less casual status. If such is inevitable, then let it take place Stateside!HUMANOID.SECRETSECURITY INFORMATION![signature]
[104-10215-10246.pdf — page 187]
# CLASSIFIED MESSAGECENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**SECRET**SECURITY INFORMATIONFORM NO. 35-NOV 19511 JUNE 53TO: DIRECTOR, CIAFROM: SA REP SAN JOSEACTION: WH 4INFORMATION: COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, PP/PAD, FI/RI 2IN 29507ROUTINE0422Z 2 JUNE 53SANJ 989TO: DIR CITE: SSANJRE: DIR 06369 (OUT. 64611), SSANJ 981 (IN 22509 )STATION CAPABILITIES BELIEVED STRONG. ALTHOUGH PPI MANAGEDRECONSTRUCT CERTAIN VITAL DOCUMENTATION, WE IN POSSESSION 85% THEIRLEGAL PAPERS, RECORDS, ETC., ALONG WITH HIGHLY COMPROMISING VANGUARDIAPOPULAR RECORDS DISCUSSING PLANS AND POLICIES FOR PPI. IMEDIATEEXPLOITATION THIS MATERIAL WAS DELAYED PENDING OUR APPRAISAL PPI.CURRENT AND POTENTIAL OPPOSITION FIGUERES CAMPAIGN, PARTICULARLYTO CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES. HOWEVER, CHECK WITH VICE PRESIDENTOREAUNO ON 29 MAY INDICATED ASSEMBLY LIKELY TO LEGALIZE PPI FIRSTWEEK JUNE IN VIEW LACK POSITIVE EVIDENCE COMMIE FRONT. OREAURUNOSTATED PRESIDENT ULAIE (ALSO RECD ULATE) CONTINUES UNDERESTIMATEDANGERS COMMUNISM BUT THAT HE, UREAMUAO, WOULD LIKE TO SEE PPIKNOCKED OUT OF ELECTORAL RACE. ACCORDINGLY, WE MAILED PORTION PPIRECORD3 AND SELECTED COMPROMISING VP MATERIAL TO CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVECOMMITTEE STUDYING LEGALITY WITH COVER LETTER STATING AUTHOR WASDISAFFECTED COMMIE WHO HAD TAKEN PAPERS FROM COMMIE HQS. IF THIS FAILS.**SECRET**SECURITY INFORMATIONIT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE201-168771COPY NO.
[104-10215-10246.pdf — page 188]
SECRETSANJ 989PAGE TWOIN 29507WE PLANNING MAIL OTHER DOCUMENTS TO LOCAL PRESS. ALSO, SLATE OFPPI DEPUTY CANDIDATES VULIERABLE AS OUR FILES REFLECT COMUNISTBACKGROUND OR SYMPATHIES IN MANY CASES. BILLINGTON PRESENTLYPREPARING LETTERS TO PRESS EXPOSING KNOWN COMMIES. FURTHER KUGOWNACTION MAY NOT BE NECESSARY BUT WILL BE RECOMMENDED IF NEEDED.(END OF MESSAGE)SECRET