[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 84]
# CONTINUATION OF DISPATCHconstitutional problem with their responsibilities to IDEN. The ideaof passing out political information on exiles is repulsive to him."It should be noted for the record that JAGUAR itself has not givensuch an explanation to JKLANCE, but, knowing JAGUAR's bureaucraticposition and its traditionally conservative role in the SMORANGEcommmity, it may be that JAGUAR in fact is thus inhibited.5. As to QRPHONE/1, SMOVID on 15 June 1970 followed up his March   1970 complaints to JADHIN about QRPHONE/1's contacts with expatriates   in London. SMOVID expressed JAGUAR's concern about QRPHONE/I's security   and its view that QRPHONE/1's information was of carginal value. SMOVID   emphasizing that he was expressing a view personally endorsed by   SMUPSILON, outlined three possible options: withdraw QRPHONE/1 from   the country; stop running and tasking QRPHONE/1 as an agent; or have   JAGUAR take over the running of QRPHONE/1. (1)RPHONE/1 subsequently was   instructed to stop pursuing his SMORANGE targets.)6. Thus JELANCE is stymied. The question is whether there is   anything that can be done to improve the situation. The one new factor   in the equation that possibly could be used to reopen the discussion   with a view to amcliorating the situation is the fact that there now   is a different IDEN than when the February 1970 SMOTH explanation was   offered. Even though JAGUAR has not specifically given that explana-   tion,. to JELANCE, the Station, without reference to SMOTH's explana-   tion presumably could elect to reopen the discussion in terms of a   possible change of atmosphere since the change of IDEN. Such a dis-   cussion at least should give an indication of whether SMOTH's explana-   fion is JAGUAR's (and JKLANCE's) major obstacle.7. Were QRPHONE/1 permitted to resume his London contacts he   could obtain some information of the type JKLANCE would like to get   from JAGUAR. But, in view of the June 1970 SIUPSILON-approved SMOVID   demarche to JADWIN, it might be unwise, for the moment at least, to   sound out JAGUAR about reactivating QRPHONE/l. he would appreciate   receiving London Station's views on this subject.8. One final point that should be noted is that MCGRILLEN, in   forwarding the above-mentioned JAGUAR report on 24 December 1970,   mentioned that visiting ZIBET officer Jeremy R. FREYMARK recently had   discussed these JKLANCE requirements in London with SMOVID, SMENDIVE   end SMEVICT and that it was MCGRILLEN's understanding that "it was   generally agreed to limit our requests in the future to selected   targets on which there is evidence of coup plotting or subversion."   MCGRILLEN added that he looked forward to any followup questions based   on the above criteria that Headquarters wanted the Station to submit to   JAGUAR. FREYMARK's recollection of his talks with JAGUAR is at slight   variance with NCGRILLEN's account. FREYMARK recalls that he had agreed   to limit JKLANCE's future requests to those cases in which JKLANCE had   an active interest and where there was good reason to suspect a real   threat to the stability of the African country against which the London-   based African sight be acting. Accordingly, there is attached a select   list of individuals about whose contacts and activities JKLANCE would   like to have updated information from JAGUAR. The type of information   yo desire is indicated by the illustrative questions and other data   in support of our request. Whereas we would like to have unsolicited   and regular, reporting on these targets, we realize that JAGUAR is not   equipped or prepared to accept such a continuing requirement. te believe   that the attached list along with the paragraph five discussion pegged   to a change of IDENS are good pegs for GIBSON or his designee in re-   gpening the discussion with JAGUAR.