Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 52]
UNCLASSIFIEDCONFIDENTIAL[X] SECRETROUTING AND RECORD SHEETSUBJECT: (Optional)FROM:Rad SweetCA/B3DATE5 January 1972TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)|             | RECEIVED | FORWARDED | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)   || ----------- | -------- | --------- | ------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- || 1. DC/CA/B3 |          |           |                    | - I'm all for the long-range objective cired: attached                                                   || 2.          |          |           |                    |                                                                                                          || 3. C/CA/B3  |          |           |                    | An assessment of 211 by Andy Hen, neil(I potential to become a persuasive dialectician, will be of value || 4. DC/CA/3  |          |           |                    | 3-4 PY1 - attached background info on COR Phad alternative may be useful to you prior any 17 Jan-        || 5. Nod lis  |          |           |                    | Meeting chúa subject son - I have been proposal to ne-direct oil to & the East Africa.                   || 6.          |          |           |                    |                                                                                                          || 7.          |          |           |                    |                                                                                                          || 8.          |          |           |                    |                                                                                                          || 9.          |          |           |                    |                                                                                                          || 10.         |          |           |                    |                                                                                                          || 11.         |          |           |                    |                                                                                                          || 12.         |          |           |                    |                                                                                                          || 13.         |          |           |                    |                                                                                                          || 14.         |          |           |                    |                                                                                                          || 15.         |          |           |                    |                                                                                                          |[X] SECRETCONFIDENTIALUNCLASSIFIED
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 53]
SECRET5 January 1972MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CA/B3SUBJECT : Chicom Aspect of QRPHONE/1's Operational Potential1. In continuing my efforts to probe operational areas for the redirection of QRPHONE/1, I talked at length on 3 January with his former case officer (Mr. Richard Berkey) and received a very favorable prognosis regarding QRPHONE/l's mobility (i.e. his possible move to another European city or to Africa), his agent recruiting capability (preceded by additional training), and the prospects of making himself attractive to the Chicoms (again preceded by appropriate training).2. In pursuit of the latter item I talked at length today with Mr. Andrew Ness, the FE Division expert on long-range Chicom and CP penetration programs. I described in detail QRPHONE/1's background, current status, and the variety of plans we have in mind and received Ness' reactions as follows:A. The butterfly characteristics that QRPHONE has demonstrated thus far will never result in his becoming of interest to either the Chicoms or the Soviets for any operationally meaningful purpose. While the Soviets would perhaps see him as potential FI source, the Chicoms would not even do that.B. Chicom officers abroad are still totally obsessed with Communist doctrine and its strategic and tactical application to a degree significantly more zealous than their Soviet counterparts. Therefore, in looking at potential foreign assets the Chicoms discard persons of shallow substance as far as their knowledge of Communism is concerned. They are interested in only those who have a serious intellectual understanding of Communist doctrine and a serious revolutionary goal. The thousands of leftists of whatever coloring floating around Europe are seen as only of marginal use to the Chicoms and certainly not the sort that they would take into their confidence.SECRET![GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 54]
SECRETC. To become of long-term operational use to us in the sense of exploiting his possible long-term use to the Chicoms, QRPHONE/1 should do two things: join an existing "acceptable" organization such as the Trotskyite Party or a black radical party and, at the same time begin a serious study of Marxist/Maoist doctrine. As he gets into this program (preceded by some ten days training and close Headquarters direction) he should begin to seek out Communist intellectuals, party members, leaders of radical groups, etc., to ask questions about the dialectic, seek additional guidance, borrow books and so forth. In doing this he will in time come into the attention of the professional spotters the Chicoms have and begin to develop the sort of bona fides that the Chicoms, in time, will find appealing. He should also in this period seek out Chicom officials with the same requests for help. The key here is to demonstrate not that QRPHONE/1 is simply sympathetic, with Maoism or any other Communist shading but that he is a dedicated serious revolutionary.D. A quicker way to come into the Chicom spot- light might be for QRPHONE/1 to join the Black Panthers, the SDS or one of the other radical groups with which the Chicoms are already known to be in touch. He will obviously have to sweat out a period of probation in joining any such group until he divests himself of his tattered leftist reputation and those JKLANCE accusations. Ness feels that a successful passing of this baptismal period will depend solely on QRPHONE/1's willingness to plunge wholeheartedly into a serious study of the terribly boring and lengthy volumes of the dialectic. As he demonstrates his capability to move more deeply into this field to the satisfaction of the "spotters" he will be accordingly provided additional help and encouragement by Chicom contacts and officials.E. The Chicoms will be looking at him as a possible asset in their long-range targetting of the American revolution, hense QRPHONE/1's utterances ought to be couched in terms of his ultimate aim of contributing to and participating in the American revolution. In other words the Chicoms would see little or no use for QRPHONE/1 operationally in Europe or Africa (just as we would assess and recruit a Thai for operations in Thailand, not in Nigeria).2SECRET
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 55]
SECRETF. Ness felt that should we pursue the above as a long-term operational goal for QRPHONE/1, the city in which this takes place is almost irrelevant. He could do it perhaps as well in an African setting as in Europe and his cover status i.e., with LPWEAKLY, really makes no difference because the Chicoms would test the fiber man himself and would not be deterred by his external trappings.3. In answer to my question, Ness said he would be happy to meet with QRPHONE to assess his potential in this area and then, assuming we all decided to go ahead with such redirection, Ness could train him and guide him thoroughly enough to get him well on the track by spending some seven to ten days with him on a concentrated program.![signature]Roderick I. SweetBranch 3Covert Action StaffDDP/CA/B3/RISweet:ckj (5 January 1972)Distribution:Orig. & 1 - C/CA/B32 - CA/B33SECRET
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 56]
# SECRET28 DEC 1971MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA Branch 3SUBJECT: Review of Project QRPHONEREFERENCE: My Memorandum, "Review and Planning," dated 23 November 19711. As stated in referenced memorandum we are beginning a review in depth of certain CA Staff projects. I propose to meet with you and relevant branch personnel to examine Project QRPHONE on or about 21 January 1972. Please advise me when the necessary preparations have been made for this review and we will fix a mutually convenient time.2. Prior to our meeting, I request that the two charts of Part A of the attached listing be drawn up and copies sent to me and CA/PO. It is not necessary to prepare written responses to the questions posed in Part B of the attachment. These questions provide the basis for our oral review at the time the meeting is held.![signature]Fred W. ValtinActing ChiefCovert Action StaffCA-71-1369# SECRET![declassification information]
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 58]
SECRET17 DEC 1971MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Chief, Covert Action StaffSUBJECT: QRPHONEREFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Same Subject, Dated 29 November 19711. What follows below are some initial comments of mine on the referent memorandum, per your request. We really feel in Branch 3 that for a variety of reasons, we need more time to deliberate on QRPHONE's future operational activity than the previous two weeks, Partly this is due to extended absence by the case officer in charge who has been plagued with a recurring Illness--I believe you are familiar with this. It is also in part attributable to the Section Chief's being new to the position and having his time absorbed by matters of current priority. So if you don't mind, we should like to address ourselves further to this subject following the Christmas holidays. At that time we should like to initiate some meetings on this matter both with yourself and with other area components including representatives from CI Staff.2. Background: Your memo, of course, was triggered by an earlier one of mine which proposed that QRPHONE become operationally engaged in attempting to establish a black Communist cell in either Paris or Rome. The purpose of this would be twofold-- namely, to exacerbate relations thereby between the Soviet Union and mainland China through various low-key covert action undertakings, and in the process to further enhance QRPHONE's own credentials as a Maoist activist. This tentative assignment, it should be noted, arose because Branch 3 personnel had become increasingly aware of the possibility that ORPHONE's project status might be terminated in the not too distant future. While it is true that in the immediate preceding month or so, we have benefited from his intelligence reporting, it is all too clear that over the past two years, he has been of diminishing utility to CA Staff and other area divisions. In discussing his future with his recent case officer, Miss Chatelan, her recommendation was that unless something could be found for him In the near future, we should give serious consideration to terminatingSECRET
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 59]
SEGREThis services during the coming year. Thus my foregoing proposalarose from a desire on my part not to terminate an asset of provedcapabilities without giving the agent in question suitable opportunityto become useful once more.3. CI Type Review/QRPHONE Personal Security: Your memo   makes out there have been frequent security reviews of QRPHONE's   security status, and you question the efficacy of our doing still one   more. On this let me point out that in making such a security assess-   ment, we would be doing so in response to a current request by the   area division concerned whose cooperation we need to direct this   agent. One hardly needs stress that such a request probably should   be honored in the interests of maintaining good relations even if its   fulfillment means redundant work. But apart from this, the case   officer also informs me that the case file does not contain any general   summary of the alleged security breaches involving QRPHONE and   their implications vis-a-vis his activities. It is true however that his   security status has been reviewed for each annual project review and   that assessments of his security status were made following each   alleged breach, but no up-to-date summary exists. As for our own   gut feelings on his personal security, one hazards that he is still in   pretty good shape. I agree with you that many of the past charges   leveled against him are of the same ilk as those leveled against other   leftist colleagues(who do not have any Agency association) by their   rivals. And as for the structure of his case officer relationship--   that is, having him handled by a deep cover officer from an adjacent   country--this would appear to be secure in the extreme (so much   so that one would advocate that it be dropped due its operational   Inefficiency.)4. Location: We tentatively agree that in all likelihood Paris   should not be the venue for our proposed operational undertaking due   the location of the Wright clan. Rome, however, might do very well.   If not Rome, perhaps you or EUR Division might suggest another   locale. As for the question as to whether or not the Rome station would   want him permanently, only time and his own perational success could   determine this. One hazards that if QRPHONE were able to make his   way with some good local leftists and had promise of developing some   kind of relationship with mainland China representatives, the station   might come to regard him as a capital asset.2SECRET
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 60]
SEGI..5. Substance: You noted that ORPHONE . . . "cannot just simply show up and start a leftist nuclei . . ." Why not? Others have. He is a well-known leftist in intellectual circles in Europe and has written many articles in praise of Mao. This should do for a start. As for what he might have to offer local leftists money, energy and ideas will do. A great deal of money. of course, Is unneeded, but some is. We can supply it. As for ideas and energy, he has both. Concerning the "built-in jealousy, animosity, etc." which such action would likely engender on the part of local rival leftists, this may or may not occur. But is this such a calamity If it should occur? Are not leftists usually fighting among themselves anyway? In any case, we have nothing to lose by trying to salvage this agent. What we have to lose by not trying is an agent asset of proved worth.6. Credentials: You say in effect that QRPHONE has not been known as an activist but only as an intellectual, (Frankly, the distinction is not very important in my mind.) Be that as it may, he has written many articles on leftist subjects and has talked to Innumerable leftists around Europe over the years. True, he has not been involved in such actions as street demonstrations, but we would not like him to be so personally involved in the future in any case. What we would want him to do is to write pamphlets, informally recruit associates to his group and provide a little money to the group as might be required for various undertakings. Aside from the organizing and funding, actually this is not very different from what he has been doing--except that it will be in one place for a change.7. Book Dispatch Sale: You may be very correct in saying that shopping him around to European stations by book dispatch is a poor way to solicit useful tasks for QRPHONE. But again, I took my lead from C/EUR/CA who made a request along these lines. Certainly sending book dispatches wouldn't hurt any. If Spence is willing at some future time to visit various field stations and to attempt selling QRPHONE's services personally, we would be happy to have him do so. We, of course, don't know when he will be available to do so, and time is passing.8. Concluding Comment: I really feel that we should relate to you in some detail the success which Andy Ness once had with the kind of undertaking which we have proposed for QRPHONE. It may Interest you. On the other hand, it may be perfectly possible that the situation which Andy Ness once manipulated is not applicable toCECRET
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 61]
SECRETthe conditions which would confront ORPHONE In say Rome. ButIf we are not to channel his energies in this direction, it is incumben:upon us to think of something else for him to do before we beginthinking about writing him off. And so when you suggest that . . ."the first order of business is to undertake a basic assessmentof the project. . ." I agree. And to this end, we should like a coupleof weeks more before coming to you with some general conclusionsof ours about the current viability of thi. case and some futurealternative course of action.Donald W. MuntzChief, Branch 3Covert Action StaffSECRET
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 62]
UNCLASSIFIEDCONFIDENTIALSECRET# ROUTING AND RECORD SHEETFROM: Roderick I. Sweet Branch 3 Covert Action StaffEXTENSION NO. 7767 DATE 17 December 1971TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)|            | RECEIVED | FORWARDED | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) || ---------- | -------- | --------- | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- || 1. C/CA/B3 |          | 13/7      |                    | 1-4. That has always taken                                                                              || 2. DC/CA/3 |          |           |                    | a big interest in this                                                                                  || 3. Don     |          |           |                    | cass, and so he will                                                                                    || 4. Poos.   |          |           |                    | have to be brought into the                                                                             || 5. Jave    |          |           |                    | planning. This of course                                                                                || 6.         |          |           |                    | a good idea - and                                                                                       || 7. Holy    |          |           |                    | your analysis of past filios is excellent. Providing                                                    || 8. Phm 201 |          |           |                    | Af is fast, we should                                                                                   || 9.         |          |           |                    | give it major considerations.                                                                           || 10.        |          |           |                    | Let us not, however,                                                                                    || 11.        |          |           |                    | totally discard the                                                                                     || 12.        |          |           |                    | some play just yet.                                                                                     || 13.        |          |           |                    | du                                                                                                      || 14.        |          |           |                    | 4/63 -                                                                                                  || 15.        |          |           |                    | Returned per: your request                                                                              |SECRETCONFIDENTIALUNCLASSIFIED
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 63]
SECRET17 December 1971MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CA/B3SUBJECT: Operational Redirection of QRPHONE/11. In response to your request that I examine the QRPHONE/1 project to determine how it might best be redirected in order to gain greater value for the time and money involved, I have talked at some length with appropriate officers in CI/SO and Africa Division. I have been advised that the primary reasons for QRPHONE/1's dwindling productivity are as follows:A. Key centers of activity of the radical left in Europe are London, Paris, and Stockholm. For different reasons QRPHONE/1's access in these three capitals is either circumscribed or off target. The British have asked that he not operate in London against African targets. His reputation among target groups of interest to us in Paris and Stockholm has been so tarnished that he has not taken into their confidence significantly enough to be of value.B. Although he has a multitude of contacts among the left, virtually all are shallow, periodic, and then very brief when they do occur. Even his correspondence to the more important radical leaders, which used to be quite informative, has fallen to almost nothing.C. Because his contacts are so cursory, he has been unable to develop a close and continuing personal relationship with any one of them in order to develop the intimate confidence so necessary for operational exploitation.D. His cover has always been thin and thus has circumstantially at least lent credence to the periodic allegations of his being a JKLANCE agent.SECRET
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 64]
# SECRETE. Close case officer direction has been made very difficult. because of the echelons existing between QRPHONE/1 and LCPIPIT, coupled with relative infrequency of field case officer meetings.F. What contacts he has within the African target, for example, are rendered virtually useless because his case officers are unfamiliar on a timely basis with Africa Division requirements and also miss valuable operational leads simply because they do not recognize them. (This is no fault of the case officers because they obviously have little opportunity to keep abreast of such requirements.)G. The somewhat artificial nature of his trying to portray a pro-Mao stance may help him a bit with targets similarly inclined but renders him ineffective with other political shadings among the left.2. With all of the above in mind and without belaboring the history of this project, the following recommendation is offered and has been concurred in informally by CI/SO and Africa Division officers with whom I have talked.A. Accepting the fact that QRPHONE/1's operational utility in Europe is minimal, I propose LCPIPIT be directed to begin making arrangements for his transfer PCS to Africa and, hence, his operational control transferred to Africa Division as soon as feasible.B. From the point of view of MHCHAOS requirements and Africa Division's own requirements, both elements felt QRPHONE/1 could best be exploited in Tanzania. It is one of the two most active cities in Africa for the radical left, it is a hot-bed of both Soviet and Chicom shenanigans, and it is politically vital to East African stability.C. However, because of QRPHONE/1's well-known association with two exiled Tanzanian opposition politicians in London and current reports that these oppositionists are plotting the overthrow of President Nyere (perhaps with Soviet assistance), it would be very imprudent for QRPHONE/1 to arrive bag and baggage in Dar es Salaam in the near future. Nyere and his police might well conclude that QRPHONE represents the advance probe of the coup plotters and promptly throw him into jail.2# SECRET