Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 65]
SECRETD. Both to give QRPHONE/1 time to cleanse his tattered image and because there are almost as important operational tasks in West Africa, the idea is to move him (1) to Nigeria or (2) to Ghana for perhaps a year. This is to be done in concert with a suitable strengthening of his cover (i.e. two or three more stringerships) and a concurrent mutation of his political posture to that of a plain old anti-imperialist rather than the more confining pro-Mao stance. He would be run directly by Lagos or Accra Station against local targets but with periodic trips to other parts of Africa for cover as well as operational purposes. Meantime, in the intervening months the dust may settle a bit in Tanzania, the close association with opposition elements would be allowed to fade and QRPHONE/1's writings and pronouncements concerning Tanzania would be calculatedly designed to support the Nyere government.E. At the appropriate time, a year or so perhaps, he then moves PCS to Tanzania.3. If you concur with the above, I will procede to staff this out more formally here at Headquarters and to advise LCPIPIT.![signature]Roderick I. SweetBranch 3Covert Action StaffDDP/CA/B3/RSweet:ckjDistribution:Orig. & 1- C/CA/B32 - CA/B33SECRET
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 66]
# PROJECT QRPHONEPART A. CHARTS REQUESTEDChart I: For the period FY 1967 through FY 1971 provide the number of disseminated reports according to the subject field of the report. The headings would be: Fiscal Year, African Independance Movements, Anti-US Demonstrations, European Maoist Groups (etc., or whatever other subject fields you wish to set up).Chart II: List the specific events or organizations against which covert action was in fact undertaken and give the number of QRPHONE reports which were submitted on such events/organizations.PART B. QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION1. What is the basic reason for this being a CA Staff project (other than history)? To provide multi-divisional tasking for FI purposes of general U.S. intelligence interest? To provide CA operational information for possible DDP use?2. As regards FI reports, which have lately been described as being of only marginal interest, the main criticisms appear to be a lack of depth and detail. CA Staff's counter to this has been that QRPHONE goes as far as he can, and can go no further through elicitation. Have these depth/detail criticisms been valid? Is our defense valid, or could he reasonably be expected to elicit more depth and detail than he does?3. If he can go no further through elicitation and we wish to keep him on the FI path, what is implied? That he develop and run agents himself? That he actually goes to work for an organization of intelligence interest to us? How realistic would either of these lines of pursuit be?
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 67]
# CI AssessmentRod = this rough draft.Draft.1958Q/1 worked for Agence France Presse - Paris. He was discharged by AFP when Ollie Harrington (American negro) brought forgery charges against him.Q/1 sent to a weekly American publication and to the British daily The Observer, over the signature of O. Harrington, xxx violently anti-French articles which were printed and could have brought about the expulsion of author. William G. Smith (still in Paris), Richard Wright (deceased) widow still living in Paris and John Flint all took sides with Harrington.230 July 1964. Accusations received from unidentified Americans, members of USA CP reportedly forward to Verges, editor of *Revolution* certain documents which established Q/1 was working on behalf of CIA. This was because of fight over money that was due Q/1 and his wife. (Q/1 had his lawyer bring suit against Verges and finally in 1969 Verges agreed to pay certain amount and also an apology. This Q/1 can use to counteract the accusations by Verges.Fall 1966 FBI Report: Source recently advised that during the Fall 1966, a member of an Italian pro-Chinese Marxist Leninist Organization stated that Subject was suspected of being a spy for CIA. This person reported this to Rene Raindorf a member of the Jacques Grippa Pro Chinese Belgian CP.June 1967: XXXX FBI Report: GRIPPA and RAINDORF indicated to a member of an American pro-Chinese Communist organization that they thought highly of Q/1 and that they were of the belief he was doing a good job (in the cause of
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 68]
militant Marxism-Leninism).March 1968: Stockholm. _AFTONBLADET_ Radical Social Democratic Daily 18 March 1968 published Photo and Biog Data on & Q/1 in conjunction with story recent redefectionAmerican soldier Ray Jones implying Q/1 responsible in part Jones redefection.Note: Bjorn Kuam, an Aftonbladet journalist who is a friend of G/1's wrote him a long inttex and unsolicited letter the day following the appearance of the article in which he denounced his paper for libeling Q/1 and gave Q/1 advice on how to proceed to clear his name.Stockholm. _TIDSIGNAL_ / Fadical Weekly - Also published article re Q/1.Bo Hanmar editor of TIDSIGNAL is pro-Cuban, and be 0/1 loyal@ to Williams who is anti-Cuban. They oppose Q/1 for his pro-Chinese and anti-Cuban stance.May 1969: 8 Report from Pretoria 6916 (in 49487) That 0/1 is now suspected widely of being both a CIA agent and a South African Intell contact.Dec. 1969" Report from FBI: Source stated that he overhcard Cleaver accuse Bon Wright from Chicago of being seen in company of Q/1 whom Cleaver characterized as a well known CIA agente This was at the Algerian Congress - Falestine Dec. 1962.
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 69]
1970Feb. SYNIC: a London publication of leftist orientation, carried an article mentioning Q/1 by name and stating that he is widely believed to be an CIA agent. (Two of the four persons listed as contributons to SYNIC were at the Algiers Palestine Solidarity Meeting which Q/1 attended in Dec. 1969.They were members of the British delegation representing the PalestineSolidarity Committee (PSC) which was a rival delegation to that led by A. Manchanda in which Q/1 sat. This W/ Q/1 believes this story was printed in order to discredit the Manchanda-led Palestinian group which is in competition with the PSC.8 Feb. 1970: BEIRUT 6963 (IN 262712). Reliable Source reported that during his conversation with Ghassan KANAFANI, latter mentioned 0/1 and accused him of being a CIA agent. (Q/1 believes KANAFATI picked suspicion of 9/1 due to accusatio tions against Q/1 spread in Beirut by Palestinian personalities who were formerly in London and who picked up story as result of accusation leveled against Q/1 in SYNIC.)
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 70]
## QRPHONE REPORTING| Cuban | AAPSO AAJA | African Liberation | War Crimos Tribunal | Anti-US | European Communism | FBI | FBI SR* | Total Dissens |     |     || ----- | ---------- | ------------------ | ------------------- | ------- | ------------------ | --- | ------- | ------------- | --- | --- || 2767  | 3          | 5                  | 13                  | 27      | 12                 | 24  | 22      | 106           |     |     || FY63  | 1          | 3                  | 24                  | 32      | 27                 | 27  | 43      | 30            | 187 |     || FY69  | 1          | -                  | 12                  | -       | 17                 | 10  | 2       | 43            | 85  |     || 770   | -          | -                  | 13                  | -       | -                  | 9   | -       | 9             | 31  |     || Y7L   | 1          | -                  | -                   | 1       | -                  | 1   | 3       | -             | 31  | 37  ||       | 6          | 8                  | 63                  | 59      | 57                 | 73  | 67      | 113           | 446 |     |itive Reports
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 72]
SECRET29 November 1971MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CA/B-3SUBJECT: QRPHONEREFERENCE: Your Memorandum, Subject: QRPHONEOperations in Europe, Dated 24 November19711. I made some notes in the margin of referent memorandum upon first reading it. However, since these are too brief, I thought it best to let you have my thoughts on this matter in fuller form.2. As you may know, we had tried for years to give QRPHONE more meaningful assignments, but there are certain facts about him and the operation today which simply cannot be ignored. It seems to me that your memorandum takes inadequate account of these factors.a. Security: RODIGAST's and QRPHONE's personal security cannot be faulted, in my judgment. However, that has not protected QRPHONE from accusations of being CIA, which have haunted him throughout the years. This is such an endemic charge in the milieu in which he operates that I feel certain he would have had the same charges leveled at him whether or not the Ollie Harrington incident had happened in Paris.b. Location: Apart from the efficiency of the French police, there are a number of good reasons arguing against the desirability of QRPHONE's even going to Paris for a meeting, let alone being stationed / there (e.g., protection of RODIGAST's identity, the Harrington incident, and the location there of the Wright clan). I cannot imagine why he would consider it, or why we should advocate it.SECRET![Excerpts from automatic declassification]
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 73]
SECRETA different cover for a move to Rome might be developed, but not that of a Maoist developing new cells. Rome Station is glad to have him come there and give them "grass roots" reports whenever he visits, but would they want him permanently??c. Substance: More generally, QRPHONE cannot just simply show up and start forming nuclei -- there are already Maoist nuclei -- the various Marxist-Leninist parties (miniscule though they may be) that existed, and they continue to exist with or without Chinese help. If he were to have something to offer them -- money, preferably -- they might welcome him with open arms. Otherwise he will encounter built-in jealousy, animosity, rivalry, and a source of accusation all over again.d. Credentials: As a Maoist intellectual (or an intellectual Maoist??), QRPHONE can travel all over. As a Maoist activist, he has only minimal credentials. The only group he is actively involved with is Manchanda's insignificant group -- and even with that he has never carried a placard, and I doubt if he has even helped them with making up a placard. He has helped them with their press releases, leaflets, etc. In short, with the written word, not the deed. By nature which we must also take into consideration -- QRPHONE is no longer a "doer" -- if he ever was one. And I doubt very much that he can at this stage in his life become a "doing" radical. We would be misusing his natural talents, which could still serve us well, in favor of dubious undertaking.In effect, the proposal (if I read it correctly) is to have QRPHONE develop a group which would serve to distribute anti-Soviet material. I cannot judge if that would be worth the cost ($40,000??) to Rome, but I doubt it. I also do not know enough about the "Andy Ness" operation to comment on that aspect, particularly as to its feasibility in a sophisticated European community.e. Book Dispatch Sale: Shopping him around to the European Stations is the wrong approach, in my judgment. In the first place, any Station likely to have a use for him is already extremely well up on QRPHONE's background. There are only three Stations really2SECRET> [Figure: handwritten annotations on the right side of the page, from top to bottom, reads: "Sponsors the ...", "for that the ...", "don't think so", the last one is hard to read]
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 74]
SECRETheavily involved in anti-CP ops (in which field I suppose this would fall), and those three have former CI/ICG men who know QRPHONE well: Breckenridge, Hornstein and Friend. QRPHONE has talents and abilities and weaknesses which can best be explained/sold in person, not through dispatch. I think, that the way to do it, if at all, is by Spence during a visit to these Stations.f. "CI-Type" Review: A review of the file will show how often this has been done, and how thoroughly. (I can understand Horvath asking for a security review -- he had no background knowledge of the operation that would have given him this information.) I do not know what you now expect to find. In all frankness, and unless CI Staff feels the need for yet another review and is willing to undertake it, I would consider a Staff-internal review pretty much a waste of time.3.  Having gone around this problem several times in the past several years with CI Staff and the pertinent area divisions (as the files will clearly show), I am most doubtful that any of them will consider QRPHONE of sufficient interest (current or potential) to pay what it costs to maintain him. We may be able to justify it since we attempt (as no one area division would) -- and to some extent succeed -- to target him on a multi-divisional basis. In light of these considerations, and since I have developed serious reservations on the long range viability of this operation (in terms of the cost-effectiveness factor), I believe that the first order of business is to undertake a basic assessment of the project. After some internal discussions, this will also, of course, entail consultations with the CI Staff and at least three area divisions.4. I will appreciate receiving your comments by mid-December.Fred W. ValtinDeputy ChiefCovert Action StaffDistribution:Original & 1 - AddresseeSECRET
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 75]
# SECRET24 November 1971MEMORANDUM OF MEETINGSUBJECT: QRPHONE Operations in Europe1.  Mr. Leo Horvath, EUR/CA, and myself briefly discussed prospective QRPHONE operations on 8 November. During the discussion I outlined to him a general proposal which had been bruited about during my recent TDY at LCPIPIT in mid-October. In substance, this proposal was that following QRPHONE's forthcoming trips through Scandinavia and Africa, he then repair to either Rome or Paris for an extended period of time. In either of these locations he would then attempt to identify and to enlist the cooperation of various unwitting contacts in the left sector of the student and youth population, who could assume in time the trappings of a Maoist study group. QRPHONE would have excellent cover for doing so inasmuch as he is an established writer of the Maoist stripe. His relationship with these contacts or followers would not be set in the routine JKLANCE operational context. Rather, he would guide and motivate such contacts as would an alleged covert representative of a Maoist group, and would claim to have been a member of a larger such group say, in Britain. He would, of course, imply to his followers that he is attempting to develop a similar nucleus in (France) (Italy) or whenever, as good Communists should.2.  Operational activity would be of a twofold nature. First, exploitation of the prospective group of Maoists would follow along lines of a typical black Communist cell, emulating the kind of notional movement which Mr. Andy Ness developed in the Middle East some seven or eight years ago. Hopefully, these unwitting followers, in turn, would each recruit two or three other sympathizers who over time could distribute anti-Soviet literature and perform other low-key CA operations, as directed by the Station, and which could be attributed to the PRC. Presumably their actions would result in some local embarrassment to the USSR and the PCI. Second, QRPHONE, himself, would no doubt enhance his own Maoist credentials--already strong--to the point where he might well become![GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]SECRET
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 76]
# SECRETof focal interest to the PRC. This could lead toinvitations to Peking (as it did in Ness's case) andpossibly an FI operation of consequence vis-a-vis theChina target.3. The efficacy of the aforementioned scheme seemed   to pose some doubts to Mr. Horvath. On the one hand, he   did not feel that either Rome or Paris Stations had   sufficient case officer strength on hand to direct and   support a tricky operation of this type which might have   only marginal utility, in their view. As for Paris,   the French police, being as efficient as they are, would   probably come upon QRPHONE's "black net" in time, and   could conceivably pose security problems for him. As   an alternative, Mr. Horvath proposed that CA Staff write   a general dispatch to all EUR Stations describing the   asset and indicating that the Staff would like to see   greater use made of QRPHONE's capabilities on the   Continent. The dispatch should ask the Stations to comment   on the service that QRPHONE might provide them and suggest   the means for accomplishing it. Mr. Horvath also asked   that, prior to forwarding the dispatch, a security review   be conducted of this case. He did comment that, if the   security review indicated no severe compromises of   QRPHONE's cover or personal security, it would be a   pity not to make greater use of this agent's notable   contacts in the European leftist community.4. Accordingly, I agreed with Mr. Horvath's two   recommendations; namely, to conduct a security review of   the case and, subsequently, to forward a blanket dispatch   to the Field, if appropriate. I mentioned that we would   still like to raise the possibility of a black operation   in Paris and Rome in that dispatch and to this, Mr. Horvath   posed no objections.Donald W. MuntzChief, Branch 3Covert Action StaffAddendum: Following the above conversation, Miss Jane Longhas initiated a CI type of review of the Subject'ssecurity status.# SECRET
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 77]
DDP/CA/B3/DMuntz:lbDistribution:Orig - C/CA1 - DC/CA1 - C/EUR/CA1 - QRPHONE 2011 - C/CA/B32 - CA/B3/ChronosSECRET3SECRET
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 78]
# CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATIONPERSON/UNIT NOTIFIEDADVANCE COPY ISSUED SLOTTEDBY:DISSEM BYACTIONCA-3 FILE, VR DDP AsstP. c/Eur c/f/soACTION NO436SECRET 231613Z JUN 71 CITE LCPIPIT 21251 23 JUN IN 36399.5BERN INFO DIRECTOR LONDONRYBAT DIDORIC QRPHONEREFS: A. OEPA-3285B. LCPIPIT 20673(IN 344001)1. DATES OF QRPHONE/1 VISIT TO SWITZERLAND CHANGED.Q/1 WILL NOW VISIT GENEVA 27 JUNE TO 4 JULY.2. FILE: 200-124-156/3, AND 201-306052.GP-1SECRETForm 547a ProcessedSECRETP&L DISSEMRYBATCS COPY201-306052
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CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATIOCLASSIFIED MESSAGE**SECRET**TOTAL COPI -0-1ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS-SEEN BYDISSEMB 33/30 PER CAFILE, VR DOP ADDP clEUR cla/soACTION UNITCCA 3ACTION NO081SECRET 271644Z MAY 71 CITE LCPIPIT 20673BERN INFO DIRECTOR LONDON 27 MAY IN 344001RYBAT DIDORIC QRPHONEREF: OEPA-32851. PER REF AND MASLOTT CONVERSATION WITH BACHMAN,QRPHONE/1 RECEIVED VISA TO VISIT SWITZERLAND 10-17 JUNE TO COVER EXHIBITION OF BLACK AMERICAN ART BEING HELD AT RATH MUSEUM IN GENEVA.2. QRPHONE/1 INSTRUCTED LIMIT SELF TO JOURNALISTIC PURSUITS DURING SWISS STAY.3. FILE: 200-124-156/3 AND 201-306052.SECRETCS Copy201-30605227 May 71
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 80]
4. The charge is made that QRPHONE is too thinly spread and there is a recurring urge that his targetting be better focussed. Can he in fact be better focussed on a multi-divisional basis or would focussing, in practice, result in his being narrowed down to a primarily divisional target?5. Granting that the CIA label is somewhat indiscriminately used for character assassination in the conspiratorial fringe in which QRPHONE has been operating, isn't he in fact stuck with this label and in view of the international character of this conspiratorial fringe, won't it turn up wherever he goes? In this milieu is there really much chance he will be given any significant information (and not deception information) by anyone who will do so because he wants the information passed to CIA?6. When he was looked into in April 1968 by a Chicom official, what do we suppose to be meant by the officials finding that it was not clear if he was completely reliable in a Marxist-Lenist sense?7. How eagerly sought-after are travelers to China now-a-days? What is the forecast as to demand for such travelers by next summer?8. With a reportedly anti-US, white, British wife and 3 small children, how really mobile is QRPHONE in a PCS sense? If we should move QRPHONE and family to a new location for a trial period and it didn't work out, wouldn't resettling him have considerable complications?9. In how many languages does QRPHONE have verbal and written fluency?10. What are the current clearance limitations upon our use of QRPHONE?11. One gathers from the project renewals that QRPHONE'S CIA status is known to MI-5, MI-6 and Scotland Yard. A French service penetration (UNDERBID/39) indicated
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 81]
that Rodigast was under some suspicion. QRPHONE hasbeen refused entrance at the border by the Swissauthorities. Does anyone doubt that in view of thegroups and individuals he contacts on his travels hehas a dossier in each of these countries? Does anyonedoubt that in many of these dossiers the alleged CIAconnection is recorded? In view of this, isn't it a factthat probably the safest place for him to be contactedis London, in spite of whatever tradecraft he andRodigast may practice? In spite of a rapport and back-ground knowledge elements which he undoubtedly benefitsfrom with Rodigast, are these factors worth the extrahandling complications? Doesn't this handling methodessentially double the cost of the operation?12. What were the reasons for the break with "Fair    Play for Cuba?" the break with Verges? Does QRPHONE    have a power base at all among American negroes (SNCC    doesn't like him and it is recorded in the renewals that    blacks and revolutionaries sense that he is not "sincere")?13. Can't we determine right here at Headquarters    the degree of interest in the Italian branch in having    a rather low-level propaganda operation involving anti-    Soviet propaganda ostensibly emanating from pro-Chicom    sources? Now that the PRC has decided to go "legit,"    what is our best estimate as to the likelihood that they    will lose interest in previous and current pro-Chicom    fringe groups?14. Other than on the above, if we asked QRPHONE    to become involved in depth with one of the groups he    is in touch with, wouldn't he have to act "more Royalist    than the King," and wouldn't he be the first to come    under suspicion in case action against the group pointed    to a leak?15. If he could not take covert action himself    through such a group to what extent are we now or    potentially likely to become involved with covert    action by other groups against:*   anti-Vietnam action*   African liberation movements*   New Left groups*   pro-Chicom groups*   Fedayeen groups
[104-10217-10225.pdf — page 82]
16. What are QRPHONE's real talents? Why hasn't he been able to do more about establishing himself on a more self-sustaining basis? Is it because of the targets we keep pushing him on? What is meant by these allusions to QRPHONE's "work discipline?" Do his talents possibly point toward some covert action use in a role where the CIA label is relatively less important?