Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10216-10338.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992ORIG. W. INWRIGHT/diUNIT. W/C/PI/TCEXT. 6153DATE, 24/MARCH/1965MESSAGE FORMSECRETTC-CA-PATO: PARISFROM: DIRECTORCONF: OCLWNE 5 INFO FILE,UR; DOP,AnDD, ClwE 3, C/CITO PRITY PARIINFO CITE DIRDESENSITIZEDPBRUMEN UNSNAPU AMLASH AMWHIPREF: PARI 9995 (IN 29053)*955041. DO NOT BELIEVE UNSNAPU/9 FIRING IN ITSELF A HAZARD TO AMLASH/1. HOWEVER, DO FEEL IT NECESSARY ATTEMPT DETERMINE BACKGROUND TO UNSNAFU/19 STATEMENT THAT U/9 WAS "DIRTY KUBARK AGENT", I.E. WAS THIS JUST HEATED UNCOMPLIMENTARY EPITHET OR WAS IT BASED ON DSE KNOWLEDGE MADE AVAILABLE TO U/19. IN EITHER CASE, BELIEVE IT MERITS RELAY TO AMLASH/1. SUGGEST FOLLOWING: WHEN AMWHIP/1 ARRIVES PARI IN NEAR FUTURE, ASK HIM ATTEMPT WITH GREAT CAUTION DETERMINE IMPLICATIONS U/19 ABOVE ACCUSATION. THEN HAVE HIM CALL HIS JEWELER FRIEND IN HAVANA, JOSE IGLESIAS, OSTENSIBLY ON BUSINESS MATTER AS COVER, AND RELAY PERTINENT DETAILS OF U/9 INCIDENT AS ROUTINE FRIENDLY GOSSIP. AMWHIP/1 SHOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM INSURING THAT MUTUAL FRIEND IGLESIAS WILL RELAY THE NEWS POSTHASTE TO ANLASH/1. BELIEVE THIS SECURE ENOUGH AND EMINENTLY FASTER AND MORE CERTAIN THAN S/W LETTER.2. IF AMWHIP/1 FEELS THIS METHOD UNSAFE AT THIS TIME ANY REASON, ADVISE SOONEST. XXXXXXXXXXX3. PLS KEEP HQS CURRENT ALL ASPECTS THIS MATTER.END OF MESSAGERELEASING OFFICER 24-26 SECRET/RYBATREPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
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MESSAGE FORMSECRET/RYBATPAGE TWOCITE DER: 95584*WH/C/Comment: UNSNAPU/19 fired in row with UNSNAFU/9. Requested guidance.C/WH/C/FIWE/5/CWE/3WH/C/CH/PATHOMAS F. THIELEC/WE/INTDESMOND FITZGERALDC/WHSECRET/RYBATREPRODUCED BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.![message form]
[104-10216-10397.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992UG. R. H. WEBSTER/01DC/WH/C/FI6153ATE. 25/JUNE/1965MESSAGE FORMSECRET/RYBATROUTING05 26 Jun 65 13090• ROMETOM DIRECTORDONG. DC/WH/C-5INFO UR FILE ACOR C/WE J. C/CI-C/FI2ROMEDESENSITIZEDART TYPIC AMLASH23142REFS: A. DIR 22113B. ROME 6642 (IN 98023)C. ROME 6652 (IN 98588)1. BACKGROUND THIS CASE TOO EXTENSIVE TO RELAY. HOWEVER, PLAN HAVE/JOSEPH LANGOSCH, WHO BEING ASSIGNED PRAN AS PBRUMEN REGIONAL SER,   VISIT ROME TO BRIEF PRESLAND, PROBABLY IN AUGUST.2. NO DEFINITE EVIDENCE AMLASH COMPLEX PART OF DOUBLED OP BUT CERTAINLY AN INSECURE ONE. REF A WAS DESIGNED TO PRESENT CURRENT HQS   THOUGHTS AND INTENTIONS ON OPERATION.3. INVOLVEMENT AMWHIP/2 RELATIVELY MARGINAL AS HE APPEARS BE ONLY   ON FRINGES OF MAIN GROUP ARDO PRIVY TO PLANS. HOWEVER, UNLESS ROME   HAS SPECIFIC OPS PLANS INVOLVING HIM WHICH MUST BE IMPLEMENTED NEAR FUTURE, SUGGEST CONTACT WITH HIM BE MINIMIZED UNTIL LANGOSCH CAN PROVIDE BACKGROUND.END OF MESSAGEC/WH/C/FIWE/4 S. Munger (by phone)THOMAS F./THIELEC/WE/INT/Amlash-1 DESMOND FITZGERALDC/NHSECRET/RYBAT
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 199214-00000104-10216-1039815 February 1965MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Meeting with AMLASH-1 in Paris, 31 January to 3 February 19651. AMLASH-1 returned from Rome to Paris on 31 Jan 1965 and was met for a very brief meeting the same night by ONTRICH in order to arrange a meeting for the following day. The following subjects were discussed at the two meetings on 1 and 2 February 1965:a. The primary reason for again meeting AMLASH-1 before his planned return to Cuba was to brief him on the security implications involved in the infiltration and possible capture of Modesto Orlando Orozco Basulto AKA Bebo Orozco, who infiltrated into Cuba on 21 Dec 1964. Orozco, according to his wife, went to Cuba to rescue Jose Vasquez Korey and three others who were hiding in the home of a woman named Gloria Cabrera, who lived at No. 72 27th Street, between N & O, Apartment 3, Vedado, Havana. Orozco's capture, if he has been captured, presents an indirect threat to the security of AMLASH-1 and a more direct threat to the security of AMTRUNK-10 since Orozco in Jan 1964 exfiltrated through the rat line established by AMICE-14 (Miguelito). Upon his return to Cuba, AMLASH-1 will check the above with AMTRUNK-10; and, if Orozco is under the control of the security service, will decide and communicate with Miami whether AMLASH-1 and AMTRUNK-10 believe it necessary to exfiltrate ANTRUNK-10. AMLASH-1 was briefed to send a letter to UNSNAFU-9 to indicate whether Orozco has been arrested or whether he is still in hiding. If the letter to UNSNAFU-9 mentions a good and pleasant return trip, this will mean that Orozco is not under the control of the security service. If the letter talks abouta long, tiring trip, this will indicate that Orozco has been arrested. AMLASH-1 was also requested to send a report on the above and any complications which have developed or may develop from Orozco's infiltration.b. AMLASH-1 suggested that his nom de guerre "Charles," which we have been using for the past three years, be changed to "Gerardo."SECRET
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c. AMLASH-1 was given a resupply of S/W developer pills and carbon. He planned to take the S/W material back with him to Havana. AMLASH-1 again reviewed with UNSNAFU-9 and reminded UNSNAFU-9 to turn over to his Paris case officer all letters regardless of how received from AMLASH-1 to either UNENAFU-9 or letters that may be addressed to his parents-in-law. AMLASH-1 also agreed to send S/W out in letters addressed to Juan Ventura (AMWHIP-I's business partner) in Geneva or Rome. AMWHIP-1 was briefed to inform Ventura that any letters he received from AMLASH-1 should be immediately air mailed to AMWHIP-1 in New York. Since AMLASH-1 will probably find it necessary some time not to sign the letters to Ventura in his true name, AMWHIP-1 was also briefed to inform Ventura to forward to New York any letter received from Cuba addressed to him and signed by a person unknown to him. S/W letters to AMLASH-1 should continue to be addressed to Ernestina Acosta, Edf. No. 526, Apt. 8, Esquina Calles 25 y H. In an emergency a letter can also be sent to AMLASH-1's mother.d. AMLASH-1 was again debriefed on the cache that had been put down for him in Matanzas. He repeated what he had previously reported and attempted to answer most of the questions in the WAVE cable. A cable on this subject was sent from Paris to Headquarters, info WAVE, on 2 Feb. AMLASH-1 was requested to send a message either through his channel or through ANTRUNK-10's S/W channel reporting how much of the radio equipment and other material had been recovered from the cache.e. AMLASH-1 was asked if he knew of any individual in Cuba whom he could recruit and who could be inserted into the Cuban Intelligence Service with the idea of attempting to get the DGI to assign this man to Caracas, Venezuela. AMLASH-1 could think of only one possibility, an individual known as Gustavo Gonzalez. AMLASH-1 has full confidence in Gustavo and Gustavo has previously been approached on several occasions by Pinero to work for him. Upon his return to Cuba AMLASH-1 will check to find out if Gustavo can still get himself recruited by Pinero and then be sent on a mission abroad, hopefully to Caracas. (AMWHIP-1, who also knows Gustavo, will provide the background infor-mation upon his return to New York.)f. ANLASH-1 reported on the upcoming FEU elections on 10 February 1965. AMLASH-1 stated that Crombet, the president of the Communist Youth, will become the new
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-3-president and that his man, Lazaro Mora, would be one of the vice-presidents. (A cable on this subject was sent to Headquarters from Paris.)g. AMLASH-1 was requested to check with Fizzolo regarding the precautions being taken to prevent sabotage of the locomotives being shipped from France to Cuba; specifically, how carefully do they check the placement of the seals, are they special seals or regular lead seals, are there going to be any additional checks once the locomotives reach Cuba, will they drain the oil and lubricants from the factory to the port, and do they run the locomotives under their own power or are they towed.AMLASH-1 agreed to attempt to develop answers to the above requirements and pass the information to his contact in the Paris Station. AMLASH-1 also agreed to attempt to find out and pass to the Paris Station through UNSNAFU-9 the names of the Cuban techs training at La Rochelle.h. In a general discussion regarding the persons with whom AMLASH-1 had been in contact either personally or through letters, AMLASH-1 mentioned Alfredo Portela. AMLASH-1 stated he had received a letter from Portela and had in turn written to Portela. He considers Portela a friend which was the only reason for writing to him.i. AMLASH-1 was debriefed on Cuban Intelligence Service personnel. A cable on this subject was sent from Paris to Headquarters.j. A cable was sent from Paris to Headquarters suggesting WAVE send a S/W letter to ANTRUNK-10 stating: "Este tranquilo. Carlos regresa pronto."k. AMLASH-1 was asked for information on the fol- lowing persons:(1) Samuel Gonzalez Rodriguez-Planes. AMLASH-1 reports he is a member of the Ameijeiras group and is a good and brave man.(2) Antonio Lusson y Batlle, Chief of Operations of the General Staff of the Occidental Army. AMLASH-1 reports Lusson is an independent and rare type individual who keeps to himself and doesn't involve himself in political matters. AMLASH-1 has heard nothing bad about Lusson.
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(3) Cndte. Raul Diaz Arguelles, Chief ofArtillery of the Occidental Army.(4) Elpidio Baez Bigo. According to AMLASH-1,Baez is a trusted Fidelman,(5) Luis Manuel Cantillo Toirac. Assigned tothe Cuban Embassy in Madrid and one of the securitypeople. He was formerly assigned to Brazil, is youngand has for several years been with Pinero and theCuban IS,(6) Enrique Oltuski Osacki. Oltuski is a closefriend of Faustino Perez and his stock with the regimerises or falls as does that of Faustino..(7) Sergio Tollon. Code clerk in the Embassy inParis. Tolyon is staying in Paris at the request ofAmbassador Carrillo.1. Gastro enteritis, water pollution and unsanitary   conditions. AMLASH-1 states there are no real problems,   although the scarcity and lack of a balanced diet do   cause some problems. The purification of water has been   a problem which probably has been the cause of some of the   sickness in the country.n. AMLASH-1 did not believe that Aragones had invitedhin to fly back to Havana with him in order to get himback because of any serious security matter. AMLASH-1did state that Aragones was concerned that AMLASH-1 may notreturn to Cuba. Since Aragones cleared AMLASH-1 for histrip abroad, he is in a way responsible that AMLASH-1 doesnot defect and returns to Cuba. AMLASH-1 feels Aragonesdoes not want any problems with Fidel in case AMLASH-1decides to stay out.n. AMLASH-1 was unable to provide any information onthe political developments in Cuba in mid-November andDecember since he had been out of the country since earlyNovember. AMLASH-1 was asked to check on the problemsbetween the opposing factions in the Cuban leadership andexplained the issues, the background and personalitiesinvolved.o. Soviet advice or influence in political and economicmatters creates resentment among the middle and higher levelCuban officials. Basically, the Soviets are not respected.
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-5-p. Rank of Cuban officials under Fidel in terms of their influence in making national policy. Roul is still the heir apparent to Fidel. Next to Raul is Che Guevara. After that, no other official, according to AMLASH-1, has any great influence in the making of Cuban national policy. President Dorticos' relationship with Fidel is good since he is a hard and serious worker, has good administrative ability and is able to work within the general outline laid down by Fidel. Raul Castro has some political influence and control in Oriente where he has placed his men in positions of influence, but only Fidel personally has any political influence in the rest of Cuba. Even within the military Fidel selects and appoints high army officers. Che Guevara is still strong in the economic field and has not suffered a decline in his influence and authority because of his earlier policy of industrialization. Guevara restricts himself to the economic field and plays a very small role in the political field. He is serious and very hard worker, one of the few, according to AMLASH-1, who has worked seven days a week without leave since the revolution. Emilio Aragones holds an important position as the organizational secretary of the PURS. He is the official who was always at the office of the National Directorate of the Party and has contact with all the officials in the regime. He plays an important coordinating role. Faure Chomon has been accused of organizing former 13th of March Revolutionary Directorate people, but, according to AMLASH-1, this probably based on the fact that Chomon always gives jobs in the ministry he heads to DR people. Because of this Chomon today controls to a large degree the Ministry of Transportation. Of all the ministries, the DR's stronghold is in the Ministry of Transportation. Other DR people who continue to hold important positions in the regime are Alberto Mora, Ambassador Carrillo and Jose Naranjo.q. AMLASH-1 and AMWHIP-1 were unable to develop any specifics, but from their conversations with Ambassador Carrillo got the impression that Carrillo would prefer and welcome a transfer from the Embassy in Paris to the Embassy. in Madrid.r. According to Emilio Aragones, Anibal Escalante is being considered for a job outside Cuba. The job will probably be in the commercial/economic field, but a decision had not been made as of November 1964 as to location.
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SECRET-6-8. AMLASH-1 again reported that he feels Orlando Blanco, Consul of the Cuban Embassy in Bern, is approachable since he is unhappy with the Cuban regime. AMLASH-1 also feels that Enrique Rodriguez Loeches, Cuban Ambassador in Pabat, is approachable if approached and developed by the right person. Marina Garcia Gonzalez assigned to the commercial section of the Cuban Embassy in Rabat, AMLASH-1 feels is also approachable and feels money can be used as an inducement. Ambassador Carrillo, AMLASH-1 feels, if the proper person developed him, could probably be compromised with Fidel. He is a character and could easily be entangled according to AMLASH-1 in a compromising situation, Ambassador Carrillo is a close friend of Lucy Echevarria.2. AMLASH-1 was also asked information on a long list of other requirements on Cuba. On many he was unable to provide information and cables were sent to Headquarters on the requirements on which he did provide information.cc: WH/EA/EOBWH/SA/MOBFile: AMLASH-1 201Internal OpNestor D. SanchezWH/SA/AMWORLDSECRET
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 199210 May 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLES1. On 29 April 1963 Dorothe Matlack, Domestic Exploitation Section, ACSI, telephoned to the affect that a banker named Clemard Joseph Charles had left Haiti six days earlier and had just arrived in New York. A friend of Charles, named Joseph Dryer, 109 Lakewood Avenue, West Palm Beach, Florida, had written to General Delmar, former CG Antilles Command, recommending Charles as a man of great interest to the US Government in view of the events in Haiti. Charles was described as President of the Banc Commerciale, Port en Prince, Haiti, who is in President Devalier's favor. Mrs. Matlack mentioned that she had alerted Col. Fan Kail in Miami to contact Dryer in order to obtain more background information and an assessment on Charles.2. On 1 May 63 Mrs. Matlack advised that Charles was staying at the Park Sheraton Hotel, New York, and that he had telephoned her since her name had been supplied to him by Dryer. Charles considered her to be his point of contact in Washington. According to Mrs. Matlack, Charles had appointments to see Vice President Johnson, Senator Keating, and Congressman Rogers (Florida). However, Charles was willing to talk to representatives of Mrs. Matlack's office. Mrs. Matlack stated that the Haitian Desk man in ACSI was ready to go to New York to talk to Charles and invited CIA to accompany him. Charles speaks very little English and a fluency in French was therefore required for the interview. Mrs. Matlack stated that she might be able to obtain a French linguist from First Army, Governor's Island, but he would not be as an intelligence officer. It was decided that James Balog, New York Office, who has a knowledge of the French Language would accompany the ACSI representative under Army cover. It was also arranged that Balog would meet the ACSI representative (Captain Rogers) at the Park Sheraton Hotel where Charles was staying.3. On 2 May 63 Mrs. Matlack reported that Col. Kail had interviewed Mr. Dryer in West Palm Beach. Dryer had appointed Charles as Director of his bank in Haiti. Charles, according to Dryer, formerly had no political ambitions but in view of the current political situation in Haiti, Charles now thinks that he may some day be president. Dryer described Charles as well-connected, politically and financially, on both sides of the fence in Haiti. He is also a good friend of President Duvalier. Dryer had given Charles letters of introduction to Senator Keating and to other officials in Washington. Charles wanted to see President Kennedy and indeed had gone to the White House to arrange for an appointment. He was well received by the President's appointment secretary and invited to dinner that evening with the appointment
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# SUBJECT: Clemard Joseph CHARLESsecretary. Through a misunderstanding, however, Charles did not attend the dinner but went to New York instead.4. Charles is travelling, according to Dryer, with a German geologist named de Mohrenschildt. de Mohrenschildt is associated with Charles in a business venture in Haiti and is trying to arrange a meeting for Charles with Vice President Johnson.5. On 3 May 63 Jim Balog telephoned to advise that he had had a five-hour session the previous day with Charles and that he had obtained both personality data and views by Charles on what the United States should do in the current Haitian situation. Balog advised that he was transmitting the information to Washington. Upon arrival, copies of the teletypes were transmitted to ACSI (Mrs. Matlack), WI Division, and the Latin America Branch.6. On 6 May 63 Marge Stuntz, Support Branch, advised that WI Division wished to speak to Charles and Balog was asked to arrange an appointment. Mrs. Matlack telephoned at approximately 1715 to advise that she had just received a telephone call from Mrs. de Mohrenschildt asking assistance in obtaining hotel reservations in Washington. Upon being told that we had no special means of obtaining reservations, Mrs. Matlack stated that she would check with the State Department Protocol Office to determine which hotels would admit negro guests. Mrs. Matlock finally made reservations at the Alban Towers. A check with Jim Balog revealed that he had arranged for Charles to meet the WI representative in the lobby of the Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C., at 12:00 noon on 7 May. Attempts to reach Mrs. Matlack that afternoon were unsuccessful. At 0850, 7 May, a call was made to Mrs. Matlack to confirm that Charles would be in Washington on that day and that arrangements had been made for a meeting with an Agency representative for 12:00 noon. Mrs. Matlock retorted that both Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and Charles had called her that previous evening to confirm a 12:00 luncheon appointment with her. Mrs. Matlack was concerned that CIA and Army could not be working at cross purposes. She had received authorization from ACSI to meet Charles at lunch and felt that it would not be politic for her to withdraw from her appointment since Army considered her the point of contact with Charles. Marge Stuntz informed WI Division of the conflict and pressed on the suggestion that the WI Division representative might meet Charles and Mrs. Matlack at noon and that Mrs. Matlack offered to withdraw shortly thereafter. The WI representative declined the offer and requested that a meeting later in the afternoon be arranged. Mrs. Matlock believed that due to conflicting instructions, she had been placed in the middle in the situation from which she could not graciously withdraw and requested that someone accompany her.[]
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## CONFIDENTIAL-3-SUBJECT: Clamard Joseph CHARLES7. I met Mrs. Matlack in the lobby of the Hotel Willard shortly before noon, and a few minutes later, Mr. Charles arrived, accompanied by Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt. He lunched in the restaurant in the hotel. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he had been born in Bota, Russia, but during the Bolshevik Revolution had been taken to Poland as a small child. He had spent approximately 20 years in Poland prior to World War II and had served in the Polish Army. He also mentioned that he had been a member of an ICA team to Yugo-slavia in 1957 and while in Belgrade had met Cumalka who was visiting Belgrade at the time. He had spoken to Cumalka and was invited to visit Poland, which invitation he had accepted. His home is in Dallas, Texas. He has a PhD. in geology and has had some teaching experience. Mrs. de Mohrenschildt was born in Peking, China. Her father was Russian and her mother French, and she is now or has been a fashion designer. Mr. de Mohrenschildt mentioned that he has known Charles for sometime and that he is a partner with him in a sisal business in Haiti.8. Both Charles and de Mohrenschildt were anxious to arrange meetings with government officials in Washington. I mentioned to Charles that a meeting had been arranged for him at 2:15 and that a Mr. Green would meet him in the lobby. At 1410 Mrs. Matlock, Mr. and Mrs. de Mohrenschildt and I departed and Charles remained in the lobby waiting for contact.9. In the course of the luncheon conversation, Charles had mentioned to Mrs. Matlack that he desired to see a Mr. Wise, AID, to discuss US aid to Haiti. Later that afternoon Mrs. Matlack called to state that she had called the State Department to pass along Charles' request. Mr. Zagourski (State) had called her back to pass on the Haitian Desk man's extreme displeasure that anyone in the United States Government should be in official contact with Charles. The desk man considered Charles to be close to the Duvalier Government, to have been involved in several shady financial dealings, and in general, to be an undesirable character. Mrs. Matlack asked whether the Agency had any interest in Charles which would dictate further contact with Charles.10. Mayo Stuntz checked with WH Division and determined that as a result of the meeting with Charles, the ID/P Haitian Desk had no further plans to contact him. I told Mrs. Matlack that our interest seemed to have been satisfied and that I believed we should disengage ourselves as gracefully as possible.