Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# TOP SECRET241. were carefully questioned on what they saw, because these areas were of special interest to the KGB. NOSENKO knew no KGB employees who entered the secure areas during 1960 or 1961 and had no personal contact with any of them. He did not remember any information that such KGB employees ever repcrted to the KGB, except that Dmitriy I. KUKOLEV, an electrician whom he personally handled in 1954-1955, had observed antenna wiring in the attic, the details or significance of the wiring were unknown to NOSENKO as of 1965.NOSENKO personally placed some reports by KGB agents in the Embassy security file while he had custody of it. None of the information, he said, was interesting, important, or useful enough for him to remember, and he could not name the agent sources of the KGB. In another context and at another time, however, NOSENKO said he had received a report from some agent (name unknown) that there was a sign "Security Office" on the office door of John V. ABIDIAN, the Embassy Security Officer.[^1]NOSENKO did not study the Enbassy security pro- cedures in detail and did not remember where the classified trash was burned. He said that nothing could be done with this information operationally, because the trash was always burned by a U.S. sergeant or a Marine guard accompanied by an officer.[^2]The Embassy office or floor where any section was located or any individual worked during the years 1960 and 1961 was not remembered by NOSENKO. This reply was also given when he was asked about the rooms and floors for the offices of the ambassador, the political officers, ABIDIAN, and the code clerks.[^3] NOSENKO said that he either knew these locations at the time he was Deputy Chief of the section or could have found them in the in the monthly Embassy phone lists: the KGB received these regularly from agent sources, and the lists gave office numbers and phone numbers.[^4][^1]: There never has been such a sign, NOSENKO's responsibility for the KGB coverage of ABIDIAN is discussed in Part V.E.3.d. All Soviets who enter the top three floors of the Embassy have a marine escort.[^2]: A check with two former Embassy security officers indicates that there has never been such a regulation. The trash is burned by the marine on duty who "invariably does it alone." One of the security officers questioned said: "I can think of no reason why the Soviets would think this to be the case, since whatever collateral information they have on it would point to the truth."[^3]: Part V.E.3.c. reviews NOSENKO's knowledge of and participation in KGB operations against U.S. code clerks.[^4]: The telephone lists give only phone numbers, not office numbers. They do, however, provide apartment numbers.# TOP SECRET
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# SECRET242. In 1960 a "metallic chamber" (acoustical room) arrived at the Embassy for President Eisenhower's use and for secret conversations. NOSENKO was not certain where it was located or whether it was ever used, but he heard from an unknown source that in 1960-19úl meetings were held in a secure room in the "Zone of Security." He did not know any of the technical details of this room.The KGB accomplished only one theft of classified material in any form from the U.S. Embassy during 1960 and 1961. A charwoman (name or cryptonym not recalled), who worked as an agent for the KGB officer Viktor BELOG-LAZOV, stole a bag of papers from the office of the Naval Attaches. Most of the papers were torn or crumpled. They included a draft of a report of the Naval Attaches' sighting of ships and factories while on a trip to Leningrad. Since this report was of only routine interest to the KGB, NOSENKO said, he was unable to recall any other details of the theft, including the date, except that the charwoman was granted a cash award.(iii) CIA Personnel Under Embassy CoverAccording to NOSENKO, the Americans at the U.S. Embassy of greatest counterintelligence interest to the KGB section were the identified CIA officers. When questioned on 2 September 1964 concerning his knowledge of intelligence per-sonnel assigned to the Embassy in 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO stated that the KGB immediately listed any officer associated with the offices of U.S. Armed Forces Attaches as a member of American Military Intelligence and any diplomat as "suspect American Intelligence," the latter nctation always meaning CIA. One of the tasks of the section was to determine which of these diplomats was the CIA "Resident" (KGB nomenclature for Chief of Station), which were CIA case officers, and which were tho CIA agents or cooptees. The KGB knew that code clerks would not be used to fulfill intelligence missions and that the same probably held true for the Ambassador and the Marine guards. NOSENKO on 25 February 1965 signed a pro-tocol which included his statement that, as Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the section, he would "necessarily know whom the KGB knew or suspected to be a CIA officer in the Embassy."NOSENKO has been shown lists of the names of all American personnel assigned to the embassy during 1960 and 1961 and on a number of occasions has been asked to select those known or suspected by the KGB to be CIA officers. The persons he so identified, together with his comments con-cerning them were:-Boris KLOSSON: Considered to be the CIA "Resident" in Moscow during this period. NOSENKO did not know why KLOSSON was considered as such but said: "Every officer in the First (U.S. Embassy) Section thought he was the Resident." KLOSSON may have taken David MARK's job, NOSENKO said, and MARK had been suspected of being the CIA Resident on the basis of his behavior under KGB surveillance and of his letter mailing. NOSENKO didHARK was a CIA cooptee while in Moscow, not a CIA officers seo Part II.B.TOP SECTET
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# TOP SECRET243. not recall the names of KGB agents working specificallyagainst KLOSSON and never read any agent or surveil-lance report indicating that KLOSSON was engaged inclandestine activity. NOSENKO did not know KLOSSON'Sposition in the Embassy, where he had been previouslystationed, what trips he took inside the Soviet Union,where he lived in Moscow, about KLOSSON's wife orwhether he had children with him in Moscow, anythingabout his personal life, the names of close Americanfriends and his Soviet contacts. "I didn't read thefile" on KLOSSON, NOSENKO said on 3 February 1965.The responsible KGB officer, A.M. MIKHAYLOV, "wasreading [the file]. I can't tell you why [we believedKLOSSON was the CIA Resident]. There was opinion--hisprevious position, attitude. Little, little details.I don't remember."- John ABIDIAN: Considered to be a CIA officer  on the basis of his conduct as a U.S. Department of  State security officer in connection with Premier  KHRUSHCHEV'S 1959 visit to the United States and be-  cause he replaced known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE  in Moscow. Surveillance established the fact that he  mailed operational letters and visited a possible dead  drop site in Moscow (see Part V.E.3.d.).- George WINTERS: Known to be a CIA officer and  was given special attention because of his operational  activity in the POPOV case.** WINTERS was in personal  contact with KOVSHUK, who used the Ministry of Foreign  Affairs as cover. The KGB case officer responsible  for covering WINTERS was V.A. KUSKOV.- Steve WASHENKO: Known to be a CIA officer. As  far as NOSENKO was aware, the KGB identified WASHENKO  as a CIA officer on the basis of his mailing one or  two letters to KGB-controlled double agents in the Baltic  area. In addition, from a KGB microphone he was over-  heard dictating an intelligence report shortly after he  returned from a trip in the USSR.Lewis BOWDEN: Suspected of being a CIA officer,but NOSENKO could not recall the reasons why.*** KOVSHUK,under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, was in contactwith BOWDEN.* See below; William MORELL was identified by KLOSSON to the  Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs as a CIA officer be-  fore MORELL arrived in Moscow.** The case of GRU Lieutenant Colonel POPOV is discussed inPart VI.D.7.a.; further KGB information on WINTERS is re-viewed in Part VI.D.7.c.*** The CHEREPANOV document, which sets forth a KGB plan foroperations against BOWDEN, lists several reasons why hewas believed to be an FBI representative in the Embassy.NOSENKO, when reading this document in Geneva in February1964, concurred in this opinion; he referred to BOWDENas FBI on later occasions also. Sea Part VI.D.7.c. onCHEREPANOV.
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# TOP SECRET245. said that, other than this, he did not know anything about MAHONEY--his previcus career, his knowledge of the Russian language, when he arrived in Moscow, when he departed, where he lived, his activities there, or evidence that he was ar intelligence officer. "It wasn't known he was a CIA officer," NOSENKO said on 3 February 1965. "If there was evidence I would have known. But there was none." CSENKO was told that MAHONEY'S CIA status had been revealed to the KGB by a KCB penetration of British intelligence (George BLAKE). He replied that he was certain that the U.S. Embassy Section's file on MAHONEY contained no infor- mation from such a source concerning MAHONEY, and that had there been such information available, he would have been a special target and would have been handled by one of the best officers in the section. NOSENKO added that he could not understand why this infer- mation about MAHONEY was not given to the section by the KGB First Chief Directorate.NOSENKO identifici Paul CARSLER as a naval officer who worked in the office of the Naval Attache and the case officer working against him as BELOGLAZOV. He said that he could provide no other derails on GAPBLER. NOSENKO specifically said that he did not know the names of any agents working against CARBLER, that he knew of no unusual or interesting information concerning GARBLER contained from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance, and that he did not know whether he had read GARBLER'S file or other "materials" concerning him.- NOSENKO did not identify William MORELL as a CIA officer.* Nor did he know that while MORELL was in the Soviet Union, he was under direct cultivation by NOSENKO'S superior, KOVSHUK, and by K.N. SMIRNOV, a case officer of the KGB First Chief Directorate.- NOSENKO did not recognize the name of G. Stanley BROWN. As shown on a list which NOSENKO brought to CIA,  BROWN shared an office with HOFBALY, whom NOSENKO said was a suspected CIA officer; in this office was a KGB microphone with good reception but insignificant pro- duction, according to NOSENKO.** Reportedly 220mm and another member of the Embassy staff were under constant surveillance during a trip within the USSR during 1961, and in the same year he travelled to Leningrad with WINTERS, correctly identified by NOSENKO as a CIA officer.CIA records show that, as a staff officer, MAHONEY served in Frankfurt during 1955 and 1956 and was connected with a joint CIA/MI-6.project which handled the NTS, a Russian emigre organization. His work brought him into liaison in true name with both MI-6 and the French Service; he was known to NTS personnel by his true first name only.See first footnote, Page 243.In discussing the, GSZIKO said that in late 1960 or early 1961 the U.S. Embassy Section had decided to withdraw the requirement for continuousTOP SECRET
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## 247.end of 1961. (BLAKE was arrested the previous April.) He was definitely identified as such in an article carried in the Soviet Government newspaper Izvestiya in October 1963. This article, entitled "A Cruel Lesson," was allegedly written by Arthur HAMAN, an Estonian who defected to the West in 1955 and returned to the Soviet Union in 1963; in it HAMAN attempted to expose how "the U.S. Secret Service, riding roughshod over Swedish sovereignty, recruits agents for subversion and espionage against the Soviet Union and other countries...making active use of the official U.S. missions in Stockholm, newsmen, tourists..." HAMAN named GARBLER as having been involved in this work. This article, which appeared at about the same time as the arrest of WENNERSTROM, described a number of fabricated activities of CIA in Sweden and, in fact, GARBLER had no connection with HAMAN or with anything which HAMAN describes.*GARBLER'S part in ABIDIAN's visit to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop site on Pushkin Street is discussed in Part V.E.3.d.* See Page 394 for other KGB operational use of HAMAN.
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# Electronic Operations Against the U.S. Embassy(i) IntroductionNOSENKO had three basic pieces of information on KGB audio and other electronic operations against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow: The presence of microphones in the chancery building, the absence of audio-technical devices in the north wing of the Embassy, and the existence of a beam which monitors and jams transmissions from the Embassy. These are discussed separately below. Except for knowing that a resonant cavity (wireless) microphone had been found in the American Ambassador's residence in 1953, NOSENKO said he was unaware of audio surveillance devices and techniques (other than the chancery microphones) in use against the Embassy, nor did he know of any material produced by such measures. NOSENKO told CIA on 14 May 1964 that, to the best of his knowledge, there were no wireless microphones (i.e., carrier transmitters and radio transmitters) in the Embassy. His information on KGB electronic operations against this target dated mainly from the period when he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, in 1960-1961 and derives from his special responsibilities in this period; from his 1953-1955 service in the American Department, NOSENKO said, he learned only that audio installations existed.(ii) Microphones in the ChanceryFrequently described by NOSENKO as his most important information, the microphones in the chancery building were first mentioned by him during the 1962 meetings in Geneva. In these and subsequent debriefings NOSENKO reported in detail on the ways in which he acquired this information, on the number and locations of the microphones, the quality of reception, and the value of production. He has not given the date when the microphones became operative, but presumed (in agreement with the KGB defector COLITSYN) that they were installed prior to 1953, when the chancery was occupied by U.S. Government representatives.** Of the 16 microphones listed by NOSENKO, he has stressed the importance of the one in the office of the Minister Counsellor, the existence of which was earlier reported by GOLITSYN and subsequently confirmed by technical investigations. In 1962 NOSENKO said that the audibility of the nine-year-old*NOSENKO stated that the KGB knew the identity of American counter-audio technicians and therefore turned off the microphones whenever any of them arrived at the Embassy. Since a microphone-and-wire system cannot be turned off, this remark suggests either that there was an external power source for the microphones, which NOSENKO has not mentioned, or that NOSENKO himself did not have rudimentary knowledge of such matters.**The investigations by American technicians leave no doubt that the microphone-and-wire system would have had to be in place at the time of occupancy.
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# TOP SECRET249. system varied from very clear to zero; he said in 1964 that the quality was deteriorating and that "in a year or two they [the microphones] will be completely inoperative."* Although the microphones produced a great deal of political intelligence, NOSENKO said, he found nothing worthwhile for use against U.S. code clerks or others of operational interest to him.** All pertinent details from NOSENKO and other sources on the microphone system in the chancery building is presented in the following portions of this paper.(a) NOSENKO's SourcesNearly all of NOSENKO's knowledge about the microphone system in the chancery building was, he said, derived from two circumstances: First, his responsibility as Deputy Chief of the KGB's U.S. Embassy Section, for receiving and disseminating transcripts of conversations there; and second, a special meeting which he attended in his dual capacity as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section and custodian of the microphone information. Additional information was obtained by NOSENKO in 1962 and 1963 from G.I. GRYAZNOV, his former subordinate and his successor as Deputy Chief of the Section. In several discussions with GRYAZNOV during this period NOSENKO learned that some of the microphones were dead while others had become less efficient since NOSENKO's reassignment to the Tourist Department in January 1962. NOSENKO's statements concerning his major sources of infor--mation on the microphones are presented in chronological order below."We are listening to everything the military attaches say in Moscow, the Military, Navy and Air Force Attaches," NOSENKO said on 11 June 1962. "All the reports go through me. I read them....Only a limited group of people read these reports. They are all in the First Department of the Second Chief Directorate. Who are they? The Chief of the Department (we don't give them to his deputies), the Chief of the [U.S. Embassy] Section, and I--altogether three people. Sometimes we report to GRIBANOV things we consider important. We conceal the fact that we are listening to the Americans from our workers in other departments, from the English Department, from the French Department....We are listening to the three attaches and the Minister Counsellor. Don't even send coded cables abbut me (to Moscow). If you do it will be the end of me.... Only three people know that we are listening to you. Even within the Second Chief Directorate it is a tremendous secret that we are listening to you."NOSENKO was asked on 12 June 1962 about the form in which he received the audio intercept reports and whether these reports were delivered to his office. He answered: "No. Here's how it is done. We have a special unit concerned*Tests of the KGB equipment by the American technicians later in 1964 resulted in recordings of high intelligibility in certain instances.**Vulnerability data on Americans in Moscow could be obtained from the microphone system, according to the damage report by the Security Committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) and according to the views of the U.S. Army Attache whose office in the Embassy was the site of a microphone.TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET250. with this function which is called the Second Special Department. It is a part of the Operational Technical Directorate [OTU]. The Special Department has several sections within it. Take, for example, the section under Colonel [N.Ya.] KUZMIN. He has the entire English line, everything. He has young girls and boys there who have an excellent command of English. They all sit in a room with special equipment and listen continuously. Besides this, everything goes on tape and later they transcribe it. They listen to it two or three times so as to get every word.... [They prepare the materials.] The materials from the American Embassy used to come to me...and I decided what to keep and what not to keep. Why? A summary report would come to me with the notation that the information in it was Top Secret or Confidential. This was all nonsense, but I was required to return the report within two days' time... So, I would read through the materials to see what was useful and what was not. It's not all suitable. And I would underline this [the significant items] with a pencil. No, [I was wrong]. The report first went to the Chief of department and then I underlined with a pencil what was necessary and gave it back to them [the Second Special Department, OTU]. They collected it. I signed a receipt that I had received it from them and they gave me a receipt when I returned it. And then they gave me extracts. From these extracts alone one cannot tell where the material came from, but from the report one realizes that the Americans are being listened to. It is necessary to have these extracts to place in the files. We have a file on each person working in the Embassy, the so-called delo-formulyar [developmental file]. We keep one on every Embassy employee."During the second of the 1964 series of meetings in Geneva, on 24 January, NOSENKO took a number of notes from his wallet. Pointing to one of them, he said: "This piece of paper was kept in my operational file and it represents the statistics for the years 1960-1961, listing those microphones which are actively used in monitoring conversations in the U.S. Embassy." This list named eleven offices and apartments in the chancery which contained microphones. When asked whether he had copied the list from records or had drawn it up from memory, NOSENKO explained that it came from an operational review of what "listening points we had in the U.S. Embassy."A detailed explanation of his acquisition of the written list was supplied by NOSENKO on 14 May 1964:Question: How did this list come into your hands? What caused you to write it?NOSENKO: I came to KLYPIN [Chief of the American Department] with my working notebook. KOVSHUK [Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section in the Department] was writing and he put the list on my book. KOVSHUK said this one [microphone] is working well, this one badly, and so on.Question: What was the date of this? What year and month?NOSENKO: Oh, I don't remember, 1960...maybe the beginning of 1961.Question: At the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961 you and KOVSHUK met in KLYPIN's office?# TOP SECRET