Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 2]
# The Bona Fides of NOSENKO|                                                       | Page || ----------------------------------------------------- | ---- || I. INTRODUCTION                                       | 1    || II. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS               | 3    || A. Introduction                                       | 3    || B. First Geneva Phase (June 1962)                     | 3    || C. Second Geneva Phase (January-February 1964)        | 4    || D. Post-Defection Handling (February 1964 to Present) | 4    || III. OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES                        | 8    || A. Earlier Information on NOSENKO in Geneva           | 8    || B. Reasons for NOSENKO's Presence in Geneva           | 11   || 1. TDY in 1962                                        | 11   || 2. The 1964 TDY                                       | 15   || C. Motivations and Intentions of NOSENKO              | 16   || 1. Introduction                                       | 16   || 2. Collaboration in 1962                              | 16   || a. Readiness to Report to CIA                         | 16   || b. Attitude Toward Defection                          | 20   || c. Motivation                                         | 20   || 3. Decision to Defect (January 1964)                  | 22   || 4. The Letter of July 1964                            | 24   || D. Pattern of Activity in Geneva                      | 30   || 1. Introduction                                       | 30   || 2. Official Duties in Geneva                          | 30   || 3. Visits to the KGB Legal Residency                  | 30   || 4. Association with TSYMBAL                           | 31   || 5. Association with Other Soviets                     | 32   || 6. Availability for Meetings with CIA                 | 33   || E. Timing of Defection.                               | 34   || F. The Recall Telegram                                | 38   |> [Figure: TOP SECRET watermark at the bottom of the page.]
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 3]
G. Soviet Official Reactions 40H.. Reactions of NOSENKO's Family 42I. Repercussions Within the KGB 441. SENSITIVE SOURCE 442. SENSITIVE SOURCE 463. SOURCE 464. KGB Handlers of Agents 47IV. NON-KGB ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S LIFE 48A. Introduction 48B. NOSENKO's Pre-KGB Autobiography 48c. Personal Affairs Since Entering the KGB 791. Family Life 792. Venereal Disease 803. Affiliation with Communist Party Organs 814. Statements to Others by NOSENKO 82D. Soviets' Statements About NOSENKO 83-84V. NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER 85A. Introduction 85B. Entry into the KGB 861. Date of Entry 862. Circumstances and Procedures of Entry 89c. To June 1955 (American Department) 931. Introduction 932. Operations Against Correspondents 93a. KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY, and WHITNEY 93b. Agents Reporting on Correspondents 94c. Information from Other Sources 953. Operations Against Military Attache Personnel 96a. Agents Reporting on Military Attaches 98
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 4]
b. NOSENKO's TargetsPage99(i) MICKELSON100(ii) MEARNS100(iii) RICHARDS100(iv) FELCHLIN101(v) BENSON103(vi) STROUD103(vii) MULE104(viii) FNG of BENSON, STROUD and MULE104(ix) CARDELLA106(x) VAN LAETHEM106D. June 1955 to January 1960 (Tourist Department)1071. Introduction   1072. Soviet Homosexual Agents   1073. Other Soviet Agents   1094. Operations with Foreign Visitors   112a. Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955)112b. Recruitment of BURGI (1956)113c. Approach to ![photo of a person] (1957)120d. Contact with ![photo of a person] and ![photo of a person] (1957)121e. Recruitment of ![photo of a person] (1957)121f. Recruitment of HARRIS (1958)122g. Compromise of KRAFT (1958)123h. Recruitment of DREW (1959)123i. Recruitment of ![photo of a person] (1959)124j. Recruitment of ![photo of a person] (1959)124k. Recruitment of ![photo of a person] (1959)124l. Recruitment of ![photo of a person] (1959)125m. Compromise of BARRETT (1959)126n. Compromise of WILLERFORD (1959)127
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 5]
Page5. The FRIPPEL Case (1959-63) 129a. NOSENKO's Information 129b. FRIPPEL's Information 1336. Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-60 and 1963) 136a. Statements to the FBI 137b. Statements to CIA 141(i) KGB Interest in OSWALD 141(ii) KGB Interest in Marina OSWALD 142(iii) OSWALD'S Marriage and Departure 142from the USSR(iv) OSWALD'S Visit to the Soviet 143Embassy in Mexico(v) NOSENKO's Comments on Possible 144KGB Involvement in the Assassination7. Supervisory Responsibilities and Knowledge 145of Tourist Operationsa. Information from NOSENKO 145b. KGB Knowledge from George BLAKE 146c. GOLITSYN's Tourist Document 1478. TDY's to London (1957 and 1958) 150E. January 1960 to January 1962 (American Department) 1521. Introduction 1522. NOSENKO'S Transfer to the U.S. Embassy 153Section3. Duties and Knowledgeability 157a. Introduction 157b. Functions as Deputy Chief and Acting 158Chief of Section(i) Access 158(ii) Duties 159(iii) Additional Duties in KOVSHUK's 163Absence
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 6]
Pagec. Supervisor of All Code Clerk Operations 164(i) Introduction 164(ii) Approach to STORSBERG 166(a) NOSENKO's Information 168(b) Information from STORSBERG 177(c) Information from PREISFREUND 179(d) Information from GOLITSYN 182(e) Information from Other Sources 184(iii) TDY's by KOSOLAPOV on Code Clerk 186Cases(a) Introduction 186(b) False Identity for Travel 186(c) The Early 1960 TDY (JENNER 187Case)(d) The November 1960 TDY (GARLAND 196Case)(iv) KCB-Polish UB Activities Against 201MORONE(a) Introduction 201(b) NOSENKO's Information 201(c) Information from Other Sources 206(v) Developmental Operation Against 209ZUJUS(a) Introduction 209(b) Information from NOSENKO 209(c) Information from Other Sources 211(vi) Approach to KEYSERS 213(a) Introduction 213(b) Information from NOSENKO 213(c) Information from Other Sources 216d. NOSENKO's Responsibilities for Coverage 220of ABIDIAN(i) Introduction 220
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 7]
(ii) Duties as Case Officer 220(iii) ABIDIAN's Letter Mailings 227(iv) ABIDIAN'S Servicing of the Pushkin 231Street Dead Drope. Supervisor of Activities Against American 236Service Attachesf. Knowledge of the Target 240(1) Introduction 240(ii) Physical Premises 240(iii) CIA Personnel Under Embassy.Cover 242g. Electronic Operations Against the U.S. 248Embassy(i) Introduction 248(ii) Microphones in the Chancery 248(a) NOSENKO's Sources 249(b) Number and Locations of 252Microphones(c) Receptivity and Audibility of 257Microphones(d) Amount, Type, and Value of 260Production(iii) Microphones in the North Wing 267(iv) Monitoring/Jamming Beam 270h. Handler of KGB Agents 2724. Overseas Assignments 274a. Attempt to Obtain Assignment to Ethiopia 274(1960)b. U.S. Visa Application (1960) 274c. The Cuba TDY (1960) 276d. The Bulgaria TDY and the LUNT Case 2795. Transfer to the Tourist Department 284F. January 1962 to January 1964 (Tourist Department) 2851. Date of Transfer 2852. Functions and Activities. 285
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 8]
3. NOSENKO'S Agents 287a. Arsene FRIPPEL 287b. Johan PREISFREUND 288c. VOLKOV and YEFREMOV 288d. 283e. Marina RYTOVA 2894. Approach to W. E. JOHNSON 289a. NOSENKO's Information 289b. Information from JOINSON 2925. Attempt to Recruit PRAUNS 293a. Information from HOSENKO 293b. Information from ERAUNS 2946. The SVENCHNISKIY Case 295a. Information from NOSENKO 295b. Information from Other Sources 2967. KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB Agent 298a. Information from! NOSEΝΚΟ 298b. Information from Other Sources Concerning 300KOTENc. Reporting on 3028. Arrest of BARGHOORN 304a. Information from NOSENKO 304b. Information from BARGHOORN 3089. GRU Agent: John Andrew SHUBIN 310a. Introduction 310b. NOSENKO's Information 310c. Information from Sensitive Source 311d. Information from Other Sources 31210. BOLSHAKOV, Robert Kennedy, and the Cuban 313    Missile Crisisa. Introduction 313
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 9]
Pageb. Soviet Sources During the Crisis 315c. NOSENKO's Statements on BOLSHAKOV 316d. Information from Sensitive Source 318G. NOSENKO's KGB Promotions and Awards 3191. Rank 3192. Awards and Decorations 322H. NOSENKO'S Relationship with GRIBANOV 3271. Information from NOSENKO 327a. Summary 327b. Details 3272. Information from SENSITIVE SOURCE 336I. Confirmation from Other Sources 3381. Introduction 3382. SENSITVE SOURCE 3383. sensitive source 3404. sensitive source 3415. Source 3426. GAMKRELIDZE 3427. COLITSYN 3438. Source 3459. Case Officer for Robert Lee JOHNSON 34710. Case Officer for 34711. Soviet Journalist KOROLEV 347VI. PRODUCTION 349A. Positive Intelligence Information 349B. Soviet Intelligence Personalities 350C. KGB Headquarters 3521. Structure and Functions 3522. Modus Operandi 3593. Staff Procedures 360
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 10]
PageD. KGB Activities. 3611. Operations Against Americans 3612. Tabulation of American Leads 363a. Successful Recruitment Approaches 363b. Development Operations 379c. Unsuccessful Approaches 398d. Investigations 4023. Selected Cases of Recruited Americans 411a. "SASHA" 411(i) NOSENKO's Information on the Agent 411(ii) NOSENKO'S Sourcing 412(iii) GOLITSYN's Lead to "SASHA" 412bb. "ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH) 413(i) Introduction 413(ii) NOSENKO's Information - 1962 413(iii) NOSENKO's Information - 1964 416(iv) NOSENKO'S Sourcing 419(v) Results of Investigations 419c. KGB Agent in Paris (Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON) 427(i) Introduction 427(ii) The Lead from NOSENKO 428(iii) NOSENKO's Sourcing 433(iv) JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH 436(v) Information from Other Sources 437      (a) JOHNSON's Statements 440      (b) MINTKENBAUGH's Statements 450      (c) Hedwig JOHNSON's Statements 457      (d) Mental Condition of Hedwig JOHNSON 459      (e) Soviet Concern about Mrs. JOHNSON's Illness 460
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 11]
(vi) Damage by JOHNSON to U.S.InterestsPage4614. Unsuccessful Approaches to U.S. Citizens   463a. The HARMSTONE Case463(1) Introduction463(ii) Information from NOSENKO464(iii) Information from Other Sources465b. Edward Ellis SMITH468(2) Information from NOSENKO468(ii) Information from GOLITSYN463(iii) Information from SMITH469c. The BINDER Case470(1) Information from NOSENKO470(ii) Information from BINDER4705. Operations Involving Other Westerners   474a. Tabulation474(1) Introduction474(ii) Agent Leads475(a) Afghanistan (1)475(D) Argentina (2)475(c) Australia (1)476(a) Austria (3)476(e) Belgium (6)477(f) Brazil (2)479(g) Canada (5)479(h) Egypt (1)481(1) Finland (9)481...j) France (9)483(k) Germany (9)486(1) Greece (1)487
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 12]
Page(m) India (2) 488(n) Indonesia (1) 488(o) Iran (1) 488(p) Israel (2) 489(q) Italy (6) 490(r) Japan (8) 491(s) Mexico (2) 493(t) The Netherlands (2) 494(u) Norway (1) 494(v) Peru (1) 495(w) Sweden (3) 495(x) Switzerland (2) 496(y) Tunisia (1) 496(z) United Kingdom (7) 496(aa) Uruguay (1) 498(bb) Venezuela (1) 498(iii) Investigations and Development Cases 499b. The VASSALL Case 503(i) Information from NOSENKO 503(ii) Information from GOLITSYN 505(iii) Information from VASSALL 507c. The Illegal 509(i) Introduction 509(ii) Information from NOSENKO 510(iii) Activities in Germany 510(iv) Operation in Canada 5126. The BELITSKIY Operation 517a. Introduction 517b. information from NOSENKO 517(i) Statements in 1962 517
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Page(11) Statements in 1964 520(iii) BELITSKIY Photograph 521c. Information from Other Sources 5227. KGB Investigations 530a. Compromise of POPOV 530(1) Introduction 530(ii) CIA Operation with POPOV 530(iii) Cause and Date of Compromise 532(a) Information from NOSENKO 532(b) Information from SENSITIVE SOURCE 532(c) Infromation from the CHEREPANOV Papers 533(d) Information from GOLITSYN 533b. Compromise of PENKOVSKIY 535(1) Introduction 535(ii) Resume of the PENKOVSKIY Case 535(iii) Statements by NOSENKO 536(a) 536(b) Reports on the Compromise 538(iv) Information from SENSITIVE 544 SOURCE(v) Information from SENSITIVE 544 SOURCE(vi) Information from 545 Source(vii) Information from SOURCE 545(viii) Information from 546(ix) Information from Official KGB Report 546(x) Information from WYNNE 546c. Compromise of CHEREPANOV 548(1) Introduction 548(ii) Earlier Information on CHEREPANOV 548(iii) Reports by Americans 553
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 14]
(iv) Information from NOSENKO 554(v) Information from SOURCE 557(vi) Information from sensitive 559(vii) Information from source 561(viii) Information from sensitive 561(ix) Contents of CHEREPANOV Package 561(x) NOSENKO's Comments on the CHEREPANOV Papers 565d. Reports on KAZAN-KOMAREK 569(i) Introduction 569(ii) Statement by NOSENKO 569(iii) Statement by 569e. Alfred SLESINGER: Suspected Source of the FBI 571(i) Introduction 571(ii) NOSENKO's Information 571(iii) Information 572(iv) SLESINGER's Information 5738. Technical Penetrations of the West German Embassy 574a. Introduction 574b. Information from NOSENKO 576c. The 578d. Evidence of Technical Penetration 5809. Cryptologic Successes Against the U.S. Embassy 583a. Introduction 583b. Information from NOSENKO 585(i) Breaking U.S. Ciphers 585(ii) Handling Deciphered Cables 587(iii) Methods of Cryptologic Attack 588c. U.S. Evaluations 591(i) NSA Report 591
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 16]
Pageb. NOSENKO'S Conduct in Meetings 626c. NOSENKO'S Behavior Under Interrogation 627(i) Introduction 627(ii) Manner of Recounting Events 627(iii) Evasion, Improvisation, and Other 628Defensesd. Additional Observations 630(i) Inquisitiveness about CIA 630(ii) Acceptance of Contrary Information 631from Other Sourcese. Discussions with NOSENKO about his own 631PerformanceC. Polygraph Testing 6321. Test in April 1964 6322. Test in October 1966 on Lee Harvey OSWALD 638a. Introduction 638b. Results 638
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 17]
# VIII. NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 642## A. Introduction 642## B. Evaluation of Production 643### 1. Introduction 643### 2. KGB Organization, Personalities, Methods 644### 3. Operational Leads 645#### a. Introduction 645#### b. Operations Involving Americans 646##### (i) Completeness, Accurary, Detail and Consistency of Reporting 647##### (ii) Damage to the Soviets 650##### (iii) Importance or Usefulness 652#### c. Operations Involving Other Westerners 654##### (i) Introduction 654##### (ii) Discussion 654### 4. Technical Operations Against the U.S. Embassy 657#### a. Introduction 657#### b. Discussion 657#### c. Remarks 659### 5. The BELITSKIY Case 660#### a. Introduction 660#### b. Discussion 660#### c. Remarks 661### 6. KGB Investigations 663#### a. Compromise of POPOV 663##### (i) Introduction 663##### (ii) Discussion 663##### (iii) Remarks 665#### b. Compromise of PENKOVSKIY 666##### (i) Introduction 666##### (ii) Discussion 666##### (iii) Remarks 669#### c. Compromise of CHEREPANOV 670##### (i) Introduction 670##### (ii) The Operational Plan in Draft 670##### (iii) The Summary on LANGELLE 672##### (iv) Remarks 674
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 18]
C. Evaluation of Sourcing 6751. Introduction 6752. Discussion 6753. Remarks 677D. Examination of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career 6781. Introduction 6782. Naval GRU Service 679a. Introduction 679b. Discussion 679c. Remarks 6813. Entry into the KGB 683a. Eligibility 683b. Date of Entry 683c. Circumstances of Entry 684d. Remarks 6854. Initial Service in the U.S. Embassy Section 686a. Introduction 685b. Work Against American Correspondents 686c. Work Against Army Attaches 686d. Additional Reporting 690e. Remarks 6905. Tourist Department (June 1955 to January 1960) 692a. Introduction 692b. The Early Period (1955 to 1958) 692(i) General 692(ii) The BURGI Case 693c. Promotion to Deputy Chief of Section 695d. Knowledge of Section's Staff and Agent Personnel 695e. Knowledge of Section's Activities 695(i) BLAKE 695(ii) GOLITSYN Document 696(iii) Tourist Agents 696f. NOSENKO'S Tourist Paper 697g. The OSWALD Case 697
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 19]
h. KOSENKO's Operational Activities (1958-1959) 698(i) General 698(ii) The Homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOV 698(iii) Homosexual Entrapment Operations 699(iv) The Agent FRIPPEL 700i. Remarks 7026. U.S. Embassy Section (1960-1961) 705a. Introduction 705b. Entry into the Section 705c. Functions as Deputy Chief 706d. Knowledgeability as Deputy and Acting Chief 707e. Knowledgeability of U.S. Embassy Physical 709Securityf. Knowledgeability about American intelligence 709Personnelg. Knowledgeability of KGB Code Clerk Ope .tions 709(i) The STORSBERG Case 711(ii) The JENNER Case 713(iii) The GARLAND Case 714(iv) The MCRONE Case 715(v) The KEYSERS Case 717(vi) Other Code Clerk Cases 718h. Responsibility for and Knowledge of ABIDIAN 720i. Reporting on ABIDIAN'S Visit to the Pushkin 722Street Dead Dropj. Responsibility of Supervising Military Attache 725Operationsk. TDY to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case 726The U.S. Visa and the Cuba TDY 7271. Personal Handling of Agents 729   (i) YEFREMOV and VOLKOV 729   (ii) FRIPPEL 729   (iii) DMITRIYEV 729   (iv) RYTOVA 729   (v) LEVINA 729   (vi) Johan PREISFREUND 730   (vii) 730m. Transfer to the Tourist Department 731
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 20]
# Tourist Department (1962-1964)a. Introduction 733b. Absences from Moscow 733c. Personal Participation in Operations 734(i) The W.E. JOHNSON Provocation 734(ii) The BARGHCORN Provocation-Arrest 735(iii) The Approach to BRAUNS 736(iv) The Arrest of KOTEN 737d. Agents Handled by NOSEIKO 738(i) FRIPPEL 739(ii) SVENCHANSKIY 739e. The OSWALD Investigation 740f. The CHEREPANOV Investigation 740g. Remarks 741## E. Examination of Other Aspects of NOSENKO's Biography 742### 1. KGB Awards and Ranks 742a. Awards 742b. Ranks 742c. Remarks 743### 2. Affiliation with Communist Party Organs 744a. Introduction 744b. Discussion 744c. Remarks 744### 3. Schooling 746a. Introduction 746b. Discussion 746c. Remarks 748## F. Appraisals of NOSENKO, His Motivation, and Other Operational Circumstances 749### 1. Introduction 749### 2. NOSENKO 749### 3. Motivation 750### 4. Operational Circumstances 751a. Presence in Geneva (1962) 751b. Presence in Geneva (1964) 751
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 21]
c. Accs to KGB Residency and Avaliability 752to CIAd. Timing of 1962 Contact 753e. Willingness to Meet CIA 753f. The Recall Telegram 753g. Remarks 753G. Sources Supporting NOSENKO 7561. Introduction 7562. Corrccoration of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career 7563. Remarks 757H. Alternative Explanations 7591. Introduction 7592. First Alternative 759a. Faulty Memory 759b. Selective Memory 759c. Embellishment. 761d. Combination of Above 762e. Insanity 7633. Second Alternative 7634. Third Alternative 7635. Remarks 764I. Summary of Conclusions 765
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 22]
ILLUSTRATIONSPhotograph of NOSENKO and his father, Facing Page 11the Minister of ShipbuildingPhotograph of NOSENKO and NCSENKO's Family Facing Page 43Finnish Travel Manifests: March-April 1960 Facing Page 194Finnish Travel Manifest: November 1960 Facing Page 197TDY Authorization Facing Page 319Translation of TDY Authorization Facing Page 320
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 24]
2. This review is presented in the following format:Part II: A summary of developments in the NOSENKO case from 1962 to the present, including his clandestine meetings with CIA, his defection, and the subsequent debriefings and interrogations.Part III: A discussion of the operational circumstances of NOSENKO's 1962 contact with CIA and his defection two years later. Included is discussion of CIA'S information concerning NOSENKO prior to his first contact in Geneva, NOSENKO's explanation of the reasons for his presence in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, NOSENKO's motivations first for establishing clandestine contact with American Intelligence and later for defecting to the United States, NOSENKO's pattern of activity in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, and the reactions of the Soviets, both official and unofficial, to the defection.Part IV: The non-KGB aspects of NOSENKO's life, both before and after he joined Soviet State Security Service, as he described them and as others have reported them.Part V: The positions and responsibilities of NOSENKO in the KGB, the operations with which he was associated, his travels abroad the awards and promotions which he received and other Soviet sources' statements on these points,Part VI: NOSENKO's production, especially in counterintelligence matters not discussed in the preceding section. Key cases are discussed in detail and other leads are summarized..Part VII: Specialists assessments of NOSENKO: by the CIA graphologist who studied his handwriting; by the CIA psychologist and psychiatrist who examined him; by the former KGB officer Peter DERYABIN; by the CIA case officers who handled him; and by the CIA polygraph operator who tested him.Part VIII: Interpretation of the evidence and conclusions about the *bona fides* of NOSENKO.Part IX: The implications of the conclusions in Part VIII for certain other sources.There are several sources currently or formerly associated with the Soviet Intelligence services who are repeatedly referred to in this review. They include the following:- Anatoliy Mikhailovich GOLITSYN, a KGB officer who defected in Helsinki to U.S. authorities on 15 December 1961.![sensitive source]![sensitive source]TOP SECRET
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 25]
2a.- Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV, a KGB officer whose case is reviewed in Part VI.D.7.c.![source]former agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate.All pertinent material received by CIA prior to 15 January 1967 has been taken into account in this review of NOSEIKO's bona fides.TOP SECRET