Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 257]
342. 5. at the time of the defection, NOSENKO was rooming in Geneva with Nikolay RESHETNYAK, a representative of the Inter-national Organizations Branch of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. RESHETNYAK told that NOSENKO often left his quarters without saying where he was going, but it was assumed that NOSENKO was "Intelligence" and had some mission to accomplish.** RESHETNYAK had been interrogated by the KGB in connection with the NOSENKO defection. RESHETNYAK also told that he had attended the Moscow trial of NOSENKO, held in absentia, at which NOSENKO was found guilty of treason and was sentenced to death. thought the KGB might go so far as to send someone to the United States to locate and kill NOSENKO. Finally, he has reported on the dismissal of large numbers of KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and Yuriy GUK, and other repercussions within the KGB of NOSENKO's defection (see Part III.1.4.)6. GAMKRELIDZENOSENKO's service in the American Department was confirmed in the fall of 1964. by the Soviet mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE.*** At that time an American scientist brought up with GAMKRELIDZE the subject of the ABEL-POWERS exchange****See Part VI.D.7.c.NOSENKO identified RESIHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the staff of the Disarmament Delegation. Asked on 24 January 1964 whether RESHETNYAK might be suspicious of his absences for meetings with CIA, NOŠENKO replied: "lle thinks I'm KGB...so of course there's no problem if I come back late." reported that RESHETNYAK had been dismissed from the KGB 83 a result of the defection of NOSENKO. CIA has no other reports of RESHETNYAK having served in the KGB.GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his statements and actions, as wel as his unusual freedom of movement, often alone, while on visits to the United States. When approached by a CIA representative with a recruitment proposal in 1964, GAM-KRELIDZE declined but added that he "welcomed the opportunity to meet with an American Intelligence officer... since this enabled him to compare the Soviet Intelligance officers he has met with their American counterparts." During this meeting, GAMKRELIDZE raised the subject of NOSENKO again, describing him as "obviously a traitor to his country."**The exchange of the KGB. Illegal Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL for Francis Gary POWERS, the U-2 pilot, took place..in February 1962.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 260]
3443. (Continuation of footnotes from preceding page.)** This chronology differs from that provided by NOSENKO and described previously: According to NOSENKO, he served in the American Department to mid-1955, in the Tourist Department from 1955 until January 1960, in the American Department during 1960 and 1961, and again in the Tourist Department from 1962 until his defection. NOSENKO's confirmed 1956 operation against EURGI and his 1957 operations against and Gisella HARRIS tend to confirm his connection with tourist operations in 1956 and 1957.*** GOLITSYN had spoken as early as December 1961 of these visits to the U.S. Embassy Section.****GOLITSYN had earlier reported that G.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as the assistant of the chief of section at this time. He has never identified the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section nor indicated that such a position was on the table of organization.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 261]
8.  a self-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agent, told U.S. authorities that she did not think NOSENKO was a KGB officer. At the same time, however, said she knew that NOSENKO had told the Americans about the microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The following is from the transcript of her remarks:Question: Do you know anything about NOSENKO, the one who defected in Geneva?I didn't have any real information. I heard some gossip, and the gossip was that he is the son of a general, that his mother is Jewish, and that his mother was always involved in some blackmarketing, that his father had great concern over the family. This is, you know, idle talk. I don't really know--it was just gossip.Question: Would you say that this idle talk was among KGB people or--You know, I didn't know many KGB people. It was only Mr. SVIRIN.*Question: But he told you about this?He didn't tell me, he told husband), ah--you know, they like to think they are all-powerful, that this man of course will be exterminated one day. They always repeat it. Well, somebody committed suicide. The old defector, that GUZENKO, I think. Yes--I read in the paper.Question: But what were you saying about this Geneva NOSENKO? His mother is Jewish, his father was a general. What was his father in?I really don't know.Question: Were there others who suffered as a result of this?I really don't know. I never heard. I never knew that defector. I never knew. He wasn't a KGB person.Question: I beg your pardon?He wasn't a KGB person, NOSENKO.* V.G. SVIRIN was said by to have been a KGB officer under cover of the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKKNR) during the period of her husband's employment (1960-1962) there and later head of a unit conducting-operations against the U.S. Embassy. He maintained a friendly association with and her husband to the date of her defection. According to NOSENKO, SVIRIN was a KGB officer who participated in the PENKOVSKIY investigation (see Part VI.D.7.b.).
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 262]
346. Question:The fellow from Geneva?No. He wasn't a KGB person.Question:No? What was he?He was a civilian, I think.Question:You never heard anything about his family, his friends?No.Question:But you say he was not a KGB person?I say I will tell you one thing: They don't have much gossip on these things. It is never safe. So gossip isn't popular. Besides, each of them have their own grudge, sort of department, and he knows very little except gossip, very little gossip from outside. And so, for instance, maybe Mr. SVIRIN wasn't in a position to know about this person straight, so he repeated the tiny scraps he heard.Question:And that was only that he had a Jewish mother and a general for a father, but nothing about him.*Nothing... I don't know. Everybody was saying that he was detestable, when he ran away. He tipped Americans... He tipped the Americans about the microphones and things in the Embassy.Question:In the Embassy in Moscow?In Moscow, yes.Question:But yet, he was not a KGB person?But you know every Russian who is allowed to see foreigners is connected [in some way with the KGB]. You know, a KGB person is considered to be a person who works at this place, as an officer, and everybody else involved is somehow related to the KGB but not KGB persons themselves.During a later debriefing by CIA, clarified her sourcing of this information. All of it except that concerning the microphones in the U.S. Embassy came from SVIRIN when he visited the . The information that NOSENKO had compromised the NOS microphone system to the Americans was also received from SVIRIN during another social visit On this occasion SVIRIN remarked to that NOSENKO had done considerable damage to the Soviets by revealing the fact of the microphones to U.S. authorities.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 263]
TOP SECRET9. Case Officer for Robert Lee BYINGAMIn an FBI debriefing10. Case Officers for Switzerland (Double agent case)11. Soviet Journalist KOROLEVIn October 1966, Yu.D. KOROLEV, who said he was a Soviet journalist, offered to write a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent" for the French magazine Paris Match.*** The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background statement on NOSENKO which KOROLEV handed Paris Match editors stated in part: "NOSENKO, about 30-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police organization, defected to the USA without his family about two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.; it was* The JOHNSON lead from NOSENKO is discussed in detail in Part VI.D.3.c.** NOSENKO provided information on (see Part VI.D.5.c.).*** See Part III.H. for more details concerning KOROLEV's offer to Paris Match.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 264]
348. granted to him. That was the most serious defeat the SovietSecurity organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espion-age and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquaintedwith the country's leading families and homes."![Top Secret]
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH NESENKO (835 PAGE STUDY)INCLUSIVE DATES: VOL. III PAGES 603-835 PART VII, VIII, IX)CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: SEROOM:DELETIONS, IF ANY: CALLING OPERATIONAL MATERIAL| DATE RECEIVED | DATE RETURNED | REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME) | SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL || ------------- | ------------- | ------------------------ | ------------------------------- || 11 MAY 1978   |               | VEN PLEIN                |                                 ||               |               | L.CM                     |                                 ||               |               | Johnm S                  |                                 |NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILEAPPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994ON HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 1]
# TOP SECRET603. VII. SPECIALISTS' ASSESSMENTS OF NOSENKOA. Opinions on Intelligence and Personality1. Grephoiogical AnalysisThree pages of penciled notes and jottings in Russian made by NOSENKO during an early debriefing session were submitted on 25 March 1964 to CIA handwriting analysts, together with a number of questions posed by the CIA officers handling NOSENKO. The graphologists were told only that the writer was a Russian male aged 36, that he had a university-level education, and that he was an intelligence officer by profession. Their report, which was qualified due to limitations on the amount of NOSENKO's handwriting specimens submitted to them, is quoted below.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 2]
# TOP SECRET604. ![image]
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 3]
# TOP SECRET605. 2. Reports by Psychologista. Psychological Testing ResultsA CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO and administered a series of psychological tests on 9 July 1964. The psychologist's report, including answers to questions raised by the CIA handlers of NOSENKO is quoted in the following paragraphs.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 4]
# TOP-SECRET-606. "Emotional Balance and General Stability: NOSENKO appears to![chart or graph with an unreadable description]"Social Relations and Inter-Personal Effectiveness: NOSENKO![chart or graph with an unreadable description]
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 5]
TOP SECRETC:607."Relations and Loyalty to His Parents: It is apparent
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 6]
608. "Ideological Makeup and Loyalty to His Country: To a
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 7]
# TOP SECRET609. "Psychopathic Personality Structure: Many volumes have been![image]b. Alternative Psychological Explanations![image]
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 8]
# TOP SECRET610. ![image]
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 9]
TOP SECRET611. ![image]c. Psychological Interrogation:For fourteen days between 3 and 21 May 1965, the same CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO on his entire early history, from birth until about 1953, when he said he entered the KGB. The main purposes were to collect additional information on this period, to gain further psychological insights into NOSENKO's personality, and to find possible ways of obtaining a truthful account. Although conducted under the physical conditions of interrogation, the questioning was relaxed and followed no rigid outline. There were relatively few changes of story from previous versions; at the same time, however, NOSENKO described in detail some incidents which he has subsequently admitted to be untrue. An extract from the psychologist's report of these interrogations is given below.*A comparison of information obtained during this series of interrogations with information given earlier and later by NOSENKO can be found in Part IV.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 10]
6::.612. ![image]
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 11]
# TOP SECRET613. 3. Report by PsychiatristDuring the year April 1964-April 1965 NOSENKO was under the medical care of a CIA psychiatrist who visited NOSENKO at regular intervals, usually weekly, to examine him physically ard to listen to any comments NOSENKO might have about himself and his situation. The psychiatrist familiarized himself with available materials on NOSENKO, particularly with reports of his behavior in the months immediately following the defection. A report which he submitted on 20 December 1964 is given below.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 12]
TOP SECRET614. ![the document is mainly dark and blurry]
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 14]
# TOP SECRETDERYABIN joined the Komsomol in 1936 and remained a member until 1940, when he became a candidate member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he became a full Party member in August 1941. During his Party career he held a number of responsible posts. Before the war, when DERYABIN was a teacher in Altay Kray, he was the secretary of a local Komsomol unit and simultaneously served as a member of the Komsomol Plenum in the rayon where he lived. From October 1940 until November 1941 he was Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the 107th Engineer Battalion of the Red Army and from June 1945 until April 1946 held the same position in the Komsomol Committee of the Naval Smersh. This was the unit which had particular responsibility for counterintelligence work within the Naval GRU, which NOSENKO said he joined in 1951. In the MGB DERYABIN was a member of the Party Committee of the Personnel Section of the Guards Directorate and, after his transfer, was elected Secretary of the Party Bureau of the Austro-German Department of the Foreign. Intelligence Directorate. He held this post from January 1953 until his transfer to Austria in September 1953.b. DERYABIN's CommentsThe following statements by DERYABIN are based on his questioning of NOSENKO between 26 July and 13 August 1965. The questions asked and the statements attributed to NOSENKO (referred to as Subject) were during this period. Although the Soviet State Security Service did not become known as the KGB until March 1954, this term is used for convenience sake, except where the specific organization of the MGB or MVD is under discussion. DERYABIN's comments follow:"NOSENKO'S Acceptance into State Security*""Taking NOSENKO's own statements at face value, it is highly improbable that a person such as he has described himself to be would be acceptable for a position as a staff officer in State Security. The following factors are important in this regard:a. It was the policy of State Security to avoid hiring the children of high government officials.b. Until STALIN's death in March 1953, KOBULOV, the man who supposedly helped NOSENKO gain entrance into the service, had no influence inside the MGB apparatus. From about 1948 until 9 or 10 March 1953, KOBULOV had no office inside the MGB or the MVD buildings. I know personally that in these years KOBULOV worked in Germany as Deputy Chief of the GUSIMZ (Chief Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad)** which was once directly under the Council of Ministers and later under the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The office was located on Chkaiova Street, near the Kurskiy Railroad Station (three blocks from my former apartment).* See also Part V.B.** WISMUT A.G. in Germany was subordinate to GUSIMZ; for a further discussion of KOBULOV's role in helping NOSENKO join the KG3, see Part V.B.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 15]
# TOP SECRET617. c. It was physically impossible at the time for NOSENKO to be recommended for and accepted into State Security, as he has told us, all in one month, March 1953. (If one accepts his earlier version that he had his talk with KOBULOV in January or February, his account is similarly impossible because KOBULOV was not then in State Security.) It would normally have taken a much longer time, but in addition to this it was a period of reorganization and the personnel staff was not actively conducting their work at that time, and permanent staff officers were not sure that they would retain their positions.d. In March 1953 NOSENKO was already twenty-five and a half years old and only a member of the Komsomol. He had no recommendation for Party membership and could not become a member for a full year because of his transfer from one service (GRU) to another. It is impossible that State Security would accept him knowing in advance that on his birthday ne would be twenty-six years old and without either Komsomol or Party membership. Even for the son of a Minister, the Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the KGB would have to talk with the Personnel Office and would not give a recommendation for his acceptance, especially for the Internal Counterintelligence (Second Chief) Directorate. In the case of a son of a Minister and one who is recommended by KOBULOV, the secretary would request from NOSENKO a recommendation for Party membership from the members of the Communist Party where NOSENKO used to work, in this case the GRU. In this way the secretary of the Komsomol would be sure himself that NOSENKO would become a candidate member of the Communist Party during the next year."However, even accepting that despite these obstacles and contradictions the KGB would have accepted him, one must also remember (according to NOSENKO's own statements) that NOSENKO'S file contained the following negative points.* They are serious factors and certain of them alone would be enough to cause the rejection; the totality makes it difficult to believe that at a time of crisis in the State Security organs anyone would take the responsibility of accepting him:a. Subject was already married and divorced before entry into State Security.b. He had been married to General TELEGIN's daughter and TELEGIN had been arrested by State Security and was in jail the day that Subject entered State Security.c. NOSENKO said that there was a file on NOSENKO'S father in which compromising material was collected on Subject's family. NOSENKO agreed that one piece of information that would have been in this file was the fact that his maternal grandfather died in a Soviet prison while under sentence as a counter-revolutionary.d. The social status background in the life of Subject's mother was nobility.[^1] See also Part IV.B.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 16]
# TOP SECRET618. e. The shooting incident in Leningrad during World War II and his desertion from the Naval School in Baku would have played a very negative role in any consideration of his acceptance into State Security.f. Subject never completed high school in the normal fashion.g. Subject was a poor student at the Institute of International Relations.h. It should be added that the KGB would definitely know that NOSENKO was involved in an automobile accident in 1947 and was interrogated by the Militia (traffic court), found guilty, and fined. This would definitely play a negative role in NOSENKO's admission to the KGB.i. NOSENKO would never be allowed to enter the KGB having just recovered from tuberculosis. In fact, there was a rule at that time that no person who ever had tuberculosis (even twenty years earlier) would be permitted to work in the KGB."In addition, after acceptance, the fact that KOBULOV was a personal friend of Subject's father, as he has told us, would have been noted in the file and would have played a negative role in permitting Subject to continue to work in State Security after KOBULOV's arrest in June 1953.""I asked Subject how he answered some of the questions in the anketa (entry questionnaire), particularly the questions on his former wife, her relatives, and on his mother's ancestry."I then asked Subject how it was, taking into account his mother's aristocratic ancestry, the fact that her father died in jail, the Trotskyite allegations against Subject's father, the fact that Subject's former father-in-law (TELEGIN) was still in jail, and the fact that Subject was present when TELEGIN's apartment was searched--that he had been accepted into the KGB, particularly in 1953 during the confusion and changes after the death of STALIN. Subject admitted that the question was logical, and said that he could only assume that the influence of KOBULOV and the important and influential position of his own father outweighed these negative factors. He also cited his GRU experience in this connection."I then asked Subject how he had reported his second marriage to the KGB. He replied that before the marriage he had mentioned[^1] NOSENKO first mentioned having had tuberculosis during the June 1962 meetings, when he described it as a minor case but said he was under out-patient treatment until 1958. He next mentioned his illness in 1966, describing how he sometimes coughed up a "glass of blood" at a time. Although DERYABIN's questioning covered this part of NOSENKO's life in detail, there was no mention of tuberculosis in July and August 1965. DERYABIN's comment is based on the 1966 information but is included here for purposes of context.[^2] The anketa and DERYABIN's questioning on this subject are discussed further below.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 18]
# TOP SECRET620. "MVD Leadership, 1953-54: Asked to name the chiefs of the directorates and separate departments of the MVD under BERIYA and KRUGLOV, NOSENKO named nine out of 28. He was unable to name the Chief of the Intelligence Directorate, saying that he remembered only SAKHAROVSKIY (PANYUSHKIN was chief until 1955). Asked to name KRUGLOV's deputies, NOSENKO named only ROMASHKOV ani SEROV, and was ignorant of such prominent deputies as LUNEV and SHATALIN. Told that a Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was one of KRUGLOV's deputies at this time (SHATALIN), NOSENKO flatly denied that this was possible.""Organization of KGB: NOSENKO did not know when the KGB was organized (March 1954). He said that it was in early 1955 or late 1954. Told that he was a year off and asked to think it over, NOSENKO insisted that he was right.""Processing Procedures for Employment with KGB: NOSENKO'S story about how he was processed for employment with the KGB in 1953 is inconsistent with the procedures used at that time. He does not know many of the things that he should know about entrance procedures; he is wrong about many of the things that he claims to remember. The disparities are so great that they cannot be explained (as NOSENKO attempts to do) by the claim that KOBULOV's recommendation resulted in a simplified entrance procedure for NOSENKO.""The most important document filled out by prospective employees of Soviet State Security is a detailed personal history questionnaire, called in Russian *Anketa spetsialnoco naznacheniya sotrudnika KGB*. This exhaustive questionnaire is 16 pages long, and filling it out is an experience that one is not likely to forget. A background investigation is run on the basis of this questionnaire, which itself becomes a permanent and prominent feature of the employee's personnel file. NOSENKO remembers filling out a questionnaire, but does not know its designation. He asserts that it was only 4-6 pages long. He asserts that he filled it out at home, and submitted it in two copies shortly before entering on duty. Actually, this questionnaire was required in ore copy only, and was never permitted to be taken home since it was a classified document (even when not filled in).*""NOSENKO insists that he did not have to take a medical examination prior to entering the KGB. This is not possible. Such an examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing. I cannot think of any instance in which it would be waived.**"*DERYABIN's views are based on NOSENKO's statements in August 1965. In his original biographical statement (1962), NOSENKO said that no *anketa* was required. He implied as much in his most recent statement in April 1966, after being questioned by DERYABIN. This statement is given in Part V.B.**See remarks above concerning NOSENKO's alleged treatment for tuberculosis from 1952 to 1958.