Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 143]
# TOP SECRET231. A) ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin Street Dead DropIn 1964 NOSENKO told CIA for the first time that KGB sur-veillance had observed a visit by BIDIAN to a probable dead drop on Pushkin Street in Moscow at the end of 1960. This dead drop figured prominently in the PENKOVSKIY case.NOSENKO's first remarks on this subject were made on 20 April 1964: "I left /the U.S. Embassy Section/ in 1962. There was an interesting move. This address where JACOBS was caught in the PENKOVSKIY case - the same address was visited by ABIDIAN in 1960, or at the beginning of 1961. And at that time I went there together with /V. A./ KOZLOV, the Chief of the Surveillance Directorate. /M. G./ MATVEYEV (/Deputy Chief of the American Department/ also went there with us. We went to that address several times, at Pushkin Street. It was very interesting, this radiator and everything, but the only thing we did there was to place an observation post there, and that post was there for about three months after ABIDIAN'S visit... That was in 1960, 1961... They watched for three months. The surveillance teams had to_be occupied there for 24 hours every day. I was there then /in the U.S. Embassy Section/ for the entire time that sur-veillance was watching the Pushkin Street site/... At the be-ginning I came there two or three times. I came there with MATVEYEV once, twice with KOVSHUK; we came there with Venyamin KOZLOV... But no one appeared here and so they were not writing anything /meaning that the Surveillance Directorate was not sub-mitting written reports/. No one appeared. That's why, only orally, KOZLOV was saying 'nothing.' A week passed - 'nothing,' the next week passed - 'nothing' ... I shall tell you why /I didn't mention this to you in June 1962/. Because I had occasions where there were many such places, and they were watched for nothing. And it would just pass away and in a month it would be forgotten... So we waited a month, two, three. Nothing. So they let it go at that and had forgotten. Of course, the surveillance team had it all recorded, but we had forgotten about that in the_First /American/ Department... In 1962, I was in the Seventh /Tourist/ Department. I trans-ferred in January 1962."On the basis of information supplied by NOSENKO during April 1964, he was questioned during January and February 1965 on ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street. The following, which is consistent with and somewhat more detailed than earlier state-ments not recorded here, is taken from these 1965 interroga-tions:- In 1961, while NOSENKO was the responsible case officer, the KGB followed ABIDIAN from the U.S. Embassy to a residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow. A stationary surveillance post at the Embassy saw ABIDIAN leave with the Publications Procurement Officer of the Embassy in a chauffeured automobile, rather than in the car he normally used. The surveillance team assigned specifically to ABIDIAN thereupon followed the car to a bookstore. Both Americans entered the bookstore, butRichard JACOB, a CIA officer, was apprehended while servic-ing the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962。
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 144]
shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone. He walked around the corner and entered a residential building next to a meat market on Pushkin Street. ABIDIAN emerged after a few seconds. The surveillance team saw him go in but did not follow him. This unusual incident was reported by the surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, and the building was inspected that same day by the Chief of the First Department of the Surveillance Directorate, KOZLOV, together with the Deputy Chief of the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, MATVEYEV. Taking into account the character of the building and its inhabitants, the duration and circumstances of ABIDIAN's visit, and the suitability of the hallway particularly the radiator in it - for use as a dead drop site, it was decided by the leadership of the Second Chief Directorate and the Surveillance Directorate that a stationary surveillance post should immediately be set up to cover this location. Because of the short time available, it was not possible to place this post inside the building, so it was set up across the street. In addition, the radiator was checked daily to see if anything, such as a magnetic container, had been concealed behind it. This stationary post was maintained around the clock for 30 days, after which it was maintained from 0800 until midnight for another two months. If a package or magnetic container had been found behind the radiator, which was checked every morning, it was planned to attach to it very thin wires to trigger a signal should someone remove the package. At the same time a member of the surveillance team would be stationed on the landing of the staircase in this building, out of sight from the hallway below. During the three months that the post was maintained, nothing was found concealed behind the radiator, nor were any suspicious persons seen entering or leaving the building. The post was then discontinued, but the address was placed on a list of suspicious places inspected daily by the Surveillance Directorate. The true significance of this location became known to the KGB only later, after the arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962.- NOSENKO first heard of ABIDIAN's visit to the suspected dead drop site on the day it occurred. He was sitting in KOVSHUK's office when he received a telephone call from MATVEYEV telling him of the incident. Although NOSENKO was ABIDIAN's case officer and KOVSKUK was Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, the decision to place the stationary surveillance post on this location was made at a higher level; neither of them was involved in it or in the later decision to discontinue the post. NOSENKO himself visited the building on Pushkin Street the following day or the day after, but he remained only a few minutes and did not recall any details of the hallway, except that there was a radiator there.- As ABIDIAN's case officer, NOSENKO recalled receiving the surveillance report of his visit to the Pushkin Street building and placing this report in ABIDIAN's file. (This is the case file which NOSENKOTOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 146]
234. recent account, NOSENKO had transferred from the U.S. EmbassySection to the Tourist Department about 28 December 1961 andthat his participation in a Tourist Department approach toAmerican citizen W. E. JOHNSON on 5 January 1962 had been con-firmed by JOHNSON himself. Therefore, NOSENKO was told, muchof what he had told CIA about his own role in the PushkinStreet affair became untenable. NOSENKO's response to thisobservation is described in Part V.F.3., which discussesNOSENKO's approach to JOHNSON.Also during the February 1965 interrogations NOSENKO refusedto sign the page of a protocol which read as follows:"I have been told by my interrogators that ABIDIAN's.only visit to the Pushkin Street site took place on 30 Dec-ember 1961. Therefore, I was told that:a. I could not have placed the surveillancereport in ABIDIAN'S case file because I had_alreadyturned over the file to GRYAZNOV.b. I could not have received reports about thestationary surveillance while still ABIDIAN's cазеofficer, since I was already in the Seventh Depart-ment in January 1962.c. The three month period in which the sur-veillance post was watching the Pushkin Street sitedid not expire until 30 March 1962 more than twoweeks after I left for Geneva.Thus I could not have known in June 1962 that the surveil-lance of the dead drop site had failed to produce resultsor that it had been discontinued."Although he acknowledged having reported to CIA on his involve-ment with ABIDIAN as summarized in the protocol, NOSENKO saidthe way in which the protocol was prepared made him "look silly."On no other occasion has NOSENKO refused to sign protocolsdealing with other subjects.NOSENKO was questioned further during October 1966 concern-ing ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street. NOSENKO reaffirmed thatABIDIAN was under special surveillance coverage throughout hisMoscow tour and that this surveillance detected his travel fromthe U.S. Embassy to Pushkin Street and back; he would date thisonly as "sometime in 1961." NOSENKO was asked whether KGB sur-veillance had detected any unusual movements by ARIDIAN duringthe period just preceeding his visit to the PENKOVSKIY dropsite (a reference to his movements on 27 and 28 December 1961as described above). He replied that he knew definitely thatsurveillance had reported nothing unusual and added thatABIDIAN had not succeeded in losing the KGB surveillance atany time during this period.On 20 October 1966 NOSENKO was asked why, in his opinion,ABIDIAN had gone to Pushkin Street at the time he did. In re-sponse, he told CIA for the first time that in about 1960 anTOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 147]
235. American tourist or delegation member had gone to the Pushkin Street address and that it was the "opinion of the Second Chief Directorate" that this American had selected it as a dead drop site, it was thought that ABIDIAN went there merely to check the suitability of the proposed site.When he was asked on 20 October 1966 whether he had visited the Pushkin Street address several days after ABIDIAN had been seen there, as he had earlier said, NOSENKO replied: "I don't remember. I do not want to say that I visited the dead drop. I don't remember now whether I visited it or not. It seems to me that I visited it, but I don't remember. It seems that I visited it with KOZLOV, but I cannot say 'yes,' and I cannot say 'no.'"As previously indicated, NOSENKO said that on the same day ABIDIAN was observed on Pushkin Street (i.e., on 30 December 1961) the Chief of the KGB Surveillance Directorate, KOZLOV, inspected the Pushkin Street building. The FBI had reported, however, that KOZIOV was on TDY in the United States from 15 November 1961 until leaving New York City on 30 December 1961, travelling via France. The timing of ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street, at 0330 hours New York City (Eastern Standard) time, would appear to preclude the possibility of KOZLOV's having gone to the dead drop site on the day NOSENKO said he did.*The Pushkin Street dead drop site was proposed by PENKOVSKIY himself in the August 1960 letter by which he initially contacted CIA. The only known visits by Americans to this address and the only ones connected with its use as a dead drop location occurred on 12 November and 4 December 1960, when CIA officer Eugene MAHONEY checked the address from the outside, and on 21 January 1961, when MAHONEY returned and entered the building to check the precise dead drop location. See Part V.E.3.f. for a discussion of NOSENKO's knowledge of MAHONEY.TOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 148]
# TOP SECRET236. Supervisor of Activities Against American Service AttachesAt the beginning of the interrogation session on 29 January 1965, NOSENKO was asked to list the duties he as- sumed upon reporting to the U.S. Embassy Section in Jan- uary 1960. As he had on a number of earlier occasions, NOSENKO replied that he was given responsibility for the supervision of code clerk operations, was made the KGB case officer for American Security Officer John ABIDIAN who was to arrive in the near future, and was charged with the Second Chief Directorate file on the security of the U.S. Embassy and his section's file on the materials from microphones in various Erbassy offices. Later in this same session NOSENKO recailed--and toid CIA for the first time--that he was also given the duty of supervising activities against officers assigned to the U.S... Army, Navy, and Air Force Attache offices. The pertinent portion of the 29 January 1965 interrogatich was as fol- lows:Question: Who briefed you or gave you instructions on what was expected of you in the Section?NOSENKO: I was speaking with GRIBANOV and KLYPIN.Question: What did KLYPIN say?NOSENKO:That "you are Deputy Chief of Section, but I consider that you must also pay special atten- tion to code clerks. We must study them and make an approach to one of them. It's necessary to work on this." KOVSHUK was in KLYPIN'S office and I remember also that he raised the question: "Ο.Κ. He will supervise this kind of work, but maybe he can also take the military. All three attaches." Well, KLYPIN did not say yes and did not say no. I couldn't say anything because I had not begun; I didn't know how much work this would involve. I couldn't say. And, you see, KLYPIN said: "Let's try it a short period of time." It was that way. It was decided that I will supervise the code clerks and then the three attaches. And KOVSHUK took the diplomats and a whole pile of work. But, of course, in the absence of KOVSHUK I must take everything and in my absence, KOVSHUK must take everything. But later, 1,2,3 -- I don't remember dates -- later I was not super- vising the military attaches but concentrated only on code clerks.Question: Later you were not supervising military attaches, but only code clerks?NOSENKO: Yes.Question: What do you mean you were supervising military attaches?NOSENKO: What does it mean? If the case officers of the three attaches have any questions or any papers to report to the Chief of Section, they go to# TOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 149]
237. me, not to KOVSHUK. They were deciding all questions with me. This is what supervising the work on these three attaches means. They were deciding all questions with me. For example, the case officers who were working against diplomats -- KUSKOV, ARTEMOV, FEDYANIN, CHEREPANOV -- they were reporting any questions, any papers, to KOVSHUK. You see, there was such a division (of labor).Question: Am I correct that by military attaches you mean Army, Navy, and Air Force?NOSENKO: Yes.Question: Attaches and their assistants?NOSENKO: Yes, yes, yes.Question: And enlisted personnel?NOSENKO: DENKIN was handling enlisted personnel, and he was also coming in to me for advice.Question: Roughly how long did you have the responsibilities for the attaches?NOSENKO: (pause) I don't remember. Several months.Question: By several, you mean...?NOSENKO: Five or six.Question: And why was this responsibility removed from you?NOSENKO: I didn't have time. No time. No time. You see, besides this, which is simple to explain, there were too many other questions which...Question: What occupied most of your time?NOSENKO: Day-to-day matters. An order from the Chief of Department to study and develop this question, then this question, then this question. Then something to prepare for GRIBANOV, then something to prepare for KLYPIN, for his report, then something to prepare for myself...Question: To which of the major responsibilities you have mentioned did you devote the most time?NOSENKO: I don't know.Question: What was most important?NOSENKO: They were all important.Question: Can you tell me where you were spending most of your time to cause the removal of your responsibility for military attaches?TOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 150]
238. NOSENKO No. I can't tell you.Question: Who was given the responsibility for military attaches?NOSENKO: Just a moment. I think he was... I don't remember how, or what date, when there appeared in the First (American) Department a Deputy Chief of Department. It was either before I came, or it was in January, or it was a little bit later.Question: Who was this?NOSENKO: ALESHIN. And his job was such -- it was a new one -- supervision of work against military intelligence officers, not only Americans, but of other departments also, the First, the Second, the Third, the Fourth, the Fifth. Coordination of the whole work against all military intelligence officers. And that's why, later, KLYPIN and KOVSHUK said: "Well, why are you supervising this? Let ALESHIN do it. You are the Deputy of the Chief." It was not only because of the lack of time. Also it wasn't convenient to the case officers. They were reporting to me. Then ALESHIN would invite them in and they would have to report the same thing to him.Question: Who were you supervising?NOSENKO: ...GAVRILENKO had the Air Force attaches and assistants; KURILENKO had the Army Attache and assistants; and BELOGLAZOV the Naval Attache, assistants and marines.During interrogations on 20 October 1966, NOSENKO changed his earlier statement that the only operational file he held in the U.S. Embassy Section was that on ABIDIAN, At the same time, he described a leave period that he had not mentioned earlier. NOSENKO said: "When I began to work [in the U.S. Embassy Section!, after a month or so, I took the files on the Naval Attaches. AndNOSENKO had mentioned this earlier. On 18 June 1964 he was asked to list the names and functions of U.S. Embassy Section officers in 1960. He said: "In 1960 the Chief of the First Department was KLYPIN. MATVEYEV was still there as First Deputy. The Second Deputy was, Yevgeniy Nikolayevich ALESHIN. He was given the special assignment of coordinating the activities of the Second Chief Directorate against all foreign military intelligence activity but was assigned to the First Department... In the First Section, KOVSHUK was the Chief and I was the Deputy Chief. In addition to general functions, I had the responsibility for supervising the work against code clerks and the Embassy Security Officer."In June 1964 NOSENKO explained that Nikolay DRANOV was responsible for the Naval Attache's office in January when NOSENKO arrived, but he was transferred and his duties were taken over by BELOGLAZOV who had been working with him against this target.TOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 151]
TOP SECRET239. then after two months I gave then to BELOGLAZOV. I im- mediately went on vacation after I came.* After two weeks I went on leave for a month. I took over the files either before or after the leave.** NOSENKO was asked why he had assumed responsibility only for the Naval Attaches and replied: It was decided by KOVSHUK. I should take only the Navy while I was getting acquainted with the section. At the same time, the case officer DRANOV was retiring and he handled only Naval officers. I didn't take the Army or Air Force."NOSENKO was asked again on 25 October 1966 why he was responsible only for the Naval Attaches during early 1960. He answered: "I took the files only on the Navy, but I was working on all of them."* In other contexts NOSENKO has always equated custody of a file with case officer responsibilities. There- fore, he seems to have indicated here that for the approximately two months when these files were in his name, he was officially the KGB case officer charged with the American Naval Attaches.** During a subsequent interrogation session, NOSENKO was asked to describe the leaves he took during 1960 and 1961. He repeated that he took a month's leave im- mediately upon joining the U.S. Embassy Section, "part of January and part of February" 1960, He had gone, he said, to the Caucasus with his wife and mother. He then added: "You want me to say I was not telling the truth in February (1965) when I said I was on leave before I went to Cuba (in November 1960]. I know this." (See Part V.E.3.d., which describes this November 1960 leave and its relationship to NOSENKO's responsibilities as case officer for John ABIDIAN.)TOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 152]
# Knowledge of the Target(1) IntroductionHis position and duties as Deputy Chief and sometimes Acting Chief gave NOSENKO access to, and required him to know, the extent of the U.S. Embassy Section's knowledge of its target. He has therefore been questioned at length by CIA about the locations and occupants of the Embassy offices as well as about the Embassy personnel whom the KGB had identified as CIA officers. The information from NOSENKO on these two topics is presented below.(ii) Physical PremisesNOSENKO has said that his knowledge of the physical layout of the Embassy derives both from his general supervisory function during 1960 and 1961 and from his responsibilities as the officially registered custodian of the KGB's file on the security of the Embassy. According to NOSEIKO, he received the latter from his chief, KOVSHUK, when he arrived in the section in January 1960; shortly thereafter he arranged by a phone call to the Secretariat of the Second Chief Directorate to have custody transferred officially to his name from that of M.F. BAKHVALOV, his predecessor as Deputy Chief of Section. NOSENKO explained that BAKHVALOV had already left the section by this time but that, under KGB procedures, it was permissible for an officer to remain official custodian of a file belonging to the U.S. Embassy Section, even after leaving the American Department, so long as he remained in the Second Chief Directorate. Until he turned this file over to GRYAZNOV approximately during the period 25 to 28 December 1961, no one else had access to it other than KOVSHUK, Chief of the section, and GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV, who shared the office and safe where this file was kept.NOSENKO stated in February 1965 that he had never studied the contents, nor had he paid any special attention to this file. Since he would necessarily have been in a position to know, NOSENKO also said he is certain that no operational analysis or planning by himself or others was done on the basis of this file during his two years in the section. The file consisted of two volumes, one for the old building on Mokhovaya Street and the second--about one inch thick--concerning the new Embassy building on Chaykovskiy Street, which was occupied in 1953. It was used only for reference purposes, for the KGB had concluded that it was impossible for a Soviet citizen to penetrate the secure areas of the Embassy because of the security precautions in effect. Apart from these file-custodial duties, NCSENKO was generally interested in the floor plans of the Embassy.by virtue of his position as Deputy Chief of the section. NOSENKO's knowledge of the Embassy premises is reflected in the CIA debriefing of February 1965, and these statements are given in the next paragraphs.All KGB employees who went into the secure areas ("Zone of Security") of the Embassy on the seventh through tenth floors*The seventh floor is not one of the secure areas, the eighth, ninth, and tenth are.