Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 69]
c. Compromise of CHEREPANOV(i) IntroductionNOSENKO's stories on the compromises of POPOV and PENKOV-SKIY were examined for their accuracy as to timing and cause. In the case of CHEREPANOV (Pages 548-568), there is no question about when the so-called CHEREPANOV papers were passed, nor how the KGB openly learned of the U.S. Embassy's possession of the papers. The chief question is the authenticity of the documents themselves, with the subsidiary implications, if they are not authentic, that the passage of the papers was instigated by the KGB, and that there could have been neither a compromise of nor a search for CHEREPANOV, as described by NOSENKO and attested to by his travel authorization (see also Part VIII.D.8.).(ii) The Operational Plan in DraftExamination of one draft document--the operational plan against the CIA officer WINTERS--reveals the following points related to form:- Although only a draft, the title of the case officer, the designation of his office, the title of his supervisor as approving authority, and the designation of his office component as well as the title of the confirming authority (the head of the department) are spelled out in full, even including the subordination of the KGB to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. KGB practice, as reported by other sources and as logic would dictate, does not require that this be done, cumbersome as these designations are, and the typist routinely fills them in as the official copy is typed from the draft.- Although only a draft, this document has been signed by KOVSHUK as being approved, which is against common sense and KGB practice. NOSENKO himself noted this discrepancy, asking himself aloud why KOVSHUK had done this.- Although only a draft, the name of the target of the plan appears several times, but earlier KGB defectors have stated and NOSENKO himself has confirmed that the name is left out of drafts so the typist in the typing pool will not know the identity of the subject of the report; a blank line is used wherever the name is to appear to be filled in by hand by the case officer after the document comes back from the typist.- On the basis of references to LANGELLE and POPOV, this plan (which is not dated) would have to have been drafted sometime after October 1959. WINTERS by this time had been in Moscow since August 1958, had been detected in operational letter-mailing, and had been associating with KGB officers, etc. Neither this
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 70]
671. operational plan nor any other of the drafts included in the CHEREPANOV package cited a KG3 cryptonym for him, and he is always referred to in true name, but this is contrary to the usage in the other operational plans in the package. It is also contrary to KGB practice, as described by NOSEN-KO and other sources.- The draft cited several technical aids to be used in the clandestine study of WINTERS. It not only gives the KGB cryptonym of *metka* and "Neptun-80" for two of these techniques, but immediately thereafter explains for what purpose each one of them is used. In the other operational plans from CHEREPANOV, and in conformance with the established KGB practice of inserting cryptonvms for such devices, these preparations are not only not described, but the blank line typed by the typist has been filled in by hand after typing.In addition to the above points of form, this same document contains statements which run counter to rigid KGB practice and which are internally contradictory, especially noteworthy in an approved draft. One of the objectives announced in the plan is to investigate two Soviet citizens who were detected in contact with WINTERS in Moscow; one of the two is identified parenthetically as having gone abroad. This document, if genuine, would be an admission on the part of the case officer, and an approval thereof by his supervisor, that a Soviet citizen who had been observed in contact with an identified officer of American Intelligence had been cleared by the KGB for travel abroad before the nature of that contact had been satisfactorily determined by the KGB. This is in contradiction to all available information concerning KGB travel clearances, which are denied on the basis of unauthorized contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners in the Soviet Union, not to mention Western Intelligence officers. The draft, which consists of only three paragraphs, can be summarized briefly by paragraph to demonstrate the internal contradictions:- To establish the nature of WINTERS' intelligence activities in the USSR, six special tasks will be carried out, including round-the-clock surveillance, *metka*, "Neptun-80,"hidden microphones, other audio-devices. and investigation of already identified Soviet citizens.- Because he already been identified as an intelligence operator, and he has a hostile attitude toward the USSR, there is no basis for recruitment; therefore the actions outlined in the first paragraph will not be carried out because they might alarm him and cause him to leave the USSR prematurely.- Despite the statements of the second paragraph, which indicate that recruitment is out of the question and which precludes putting into effect the measures outlined in the first paragraph, this third paragraph sets forth the expectation that just before WINTERS' scheduled departure and depending on further accumulation of materials on WINTERS, and the prevailing political climate & the time, an opportunity is likely to arise which will permit testing the possibility of recruiting him.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 72]
673. the purposes of casing a drop site and putting down the deaddrop, respectively. The document further stated that the deaddrop had been put down for REPNIKOV, an agent of American Intel-ligence who had recently been arrested by the Moscow KGB. Twoerrors of fact in this passago belie KGB practice as known frommany sources:- There is no reason to doubt that the KGB observed  LANGELLE on the two occasions of his visits to Lenin Hills,  both times to case a proposed dead drop site. Both sites  involved staircases, but they were two different stair-  cases in the same general area of the Lenin Hills park.  Since it is a fact that LANGELLE did not put down a dead  drop on either occasion, KGB surveillance could not have  seen him do so. If the KGB had reason to suspect that he  had done so, but could not locate it (since it was not  there). the KGB would feel the necessity--even more than  in the case of ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street drop--to put  24-hour surveillance on the area for a reasonable length  of time, in order to apprehend the agent for whom it was  intended. The dead drop was not actually put down until  7 June 1958 (during twilight), ten days after the second  casing. Assuming the KGB had not stopped its coverage  of the area after only ten days, the CIA agent who did  put down the dead drop must have been observed doing this.  CHEREPANOV's note thus erred by attributing to LANGELLE  an action which the KGB knew he had not taken and which  the KGB almost certainly knew someone else had taken.- At the time the dead drop was put down, it had not  been designated for any agent, REPNIKOV included. It  was a contingency dead drop, to be activated at some  time in the future as necessary; the agent for whom it  might have been designated could conceivably not even  be recruited until long after the dead drop was loaded.  REPNIKOV, identified in the document as the person in-  tended to unload it, was not a recruited agent of Ameri-  can Intelligence either at the time of the drop-loading  or at any time thereafter; neither was any dead drop  contemplated for him in the event that he might be re-  cruited. Nothing that was in the drop could have sug-  gested REPNIKOV as the intended recipier.t. Again,  CHEREPANOV's note erroneously and groundlessly assigned  the dead drop to REPΝΙΚΟV whereas in fact this dead drop  was unassigned by CIA.If this document were or purported to be the officialversion of the activities of LANGELLE, in typed or printedform, these errors in fact could be interpreted as intentionaland part of the sanitization, or part of an effort to make theKGB investigative work look better than it was. As it is ahandwritten copy, supposedly in the writing of the person whointended to give the document to the U.S. Government and harmthe KGB, and since CHEREPANOV supposedly would have had accessto the true facts, the absence of some comment further indi-cates that the document was intentionally inaccurate and in-complete.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 73]
674. (iv) RemarksThat at least two of the documents were not authentic is evidence that the CHEREPANOV papers were designed by the KGB for American Intelligence consumption.There is no sensitive information contained in any of the documents; that is, they are not worth the risk of stealing either in helping the West or damaging the KGB. It is further questionable how CHEREPANOV was able to steal drafts destined for destruction which are dated August 1958, March 1959, and so on, if he had not acquired his motivation of bitterness against the KGB until 1961, as indicated by NOSENKO and other sources. It is also possible to question numerous other aspects of the CHEREPANOV case, some dating from the earliest known history of the man and others more recent. This seems unnecessary in view of the analysis of the WINTERS document and the LANGELLE summary.It follows that the CHEREPANOV incident was a provocative plan of the KGB. NOSENKO's story about CHEREPANOV, a mutually confirming source on KGB affairs, must be interpreted as an indication that he has deliberately lied in reporting on the CHEREPANOV case and his part in the investigation, now shown to have been spurious. He has also lied in attesting to the validity of the CHEREPANOV documents and thereby to the validity of his own information on the same topics which those documents also covered.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 74]
C. Evaluation of Sourcing1. Introduction.NOSENKO was able to provide logical and plausible sourcing for most of his American leads, through his claimed professional assignments. Among his foreign leads, those to which he had no plausible direct access have been variously sourced to hearsay from case officer friends (as with VASSALL, from his friend CHURANOV) and involvement in peripheral activities (such as his TDY to the city of Viadimir after the [REDACTED] Question-had been spotted as a homosexual during a visit there). able sourcing by NOSENKO has occurred in his statements on his one couble agent case, four American cases and three involving foreigners. They are reviewed below because they include the most important leads NOSENKO has provided.2. DiscussionThere are two KGB Second Chief Directorate operations in-volving ¡mericans which HOSENKO has sourced inconsistently or falsely.He demonstrated uncertainty in his knowledge of the facts of the "ANDKEY" case (Pages 413-426) by making vague allusions to having heard of it in "bits and pieces" from a number of case officers involved in the case at different times; his first know-ledge of it, he said, was due to his own employment in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-1955, "although I worked there quite a bit later. But it was known." (In 1962 he repeatedly dated the recruitment as "1949-50.") Dayle SMITH, identified as "ANDFEY", fixed his recruitment date around December 1953, and he did not leave Moscow until April 1954. Since SMITH was directly sub-ordinate to the office of the Army Attache, which was responsible for the Embassy's code room, NOSENKO as case officer for the Army Attaches had a logical reason for knowing more than he claimed about the case, including the agent's name. MULE, who succeeded VAN LAETHEM as cryptographic security officer and SMITH'S super-visor, was supposed to be one of NOSENKO's more active cases at this time. It is clear from NOSENKO's inability to claim direct knowledge of the case that he was not aware of these, facts.In the case of Edward Ellis SMITH (Pages 468-469), the U.S. Embassy Security Officer from 1954 to 1955, HOSENKO's ignorance of the objective facts of the case led him into statements con-cerning his own knowledge of the case which cannot be true. In 1962 he claimed to have played a significant role in the attempt to recruit SMITH, but he admitted after the defection that these claims were exaggerations designed to make him look better than he was at the time. He said the case officer was KOVSHUK, and GRIBANOV was personally running the operation, but that in a sense he did play a role; he was assigned to a phone watch in support of surveillance during the final phase of the case. Once again it is clear that he did not know the dates of SMITH'S assignment to Moscow (1954 to 1956) ner did he know that the operation he has described tock place between 1 and 5 June 1956, and that SMITH was recailed from Moscow on 8 June 1956. This is a full year after NOSENKO said he transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 77]
## D. Examination of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career### 1. IntroductionWhat follows is an examination of NOSENKO's accounts of his Soviet Intelligence career, beginning with the years 1951 and 1952, in the naval GRU and continuing with his 11 years in the U.S. Embassy Section and the Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO's naval service opens the discussion primarily because, according to his story, it provided a springboard for his entrance into the KGB in 1953 with the rank of lieutenant.The discussion of each period in his career has two central topics: First, NOSENKO's own description of his positions, responsibilities, and access: and second, an assessment of this description from the point of view of internal consistency, accuracy, and the commensurability of his knowledge, operational activities, and performance with his claimed senior and responsible posts with the KGB and his rise to these posts. This assessment is based on a comparison of the information supplied by NOSENKO with collateral information from a variety of overt, official, defector, and clandestine sources.NOSENKO's accounts of the various periods in his career are, of course, cumulative in that his claimed positions and activities during one stage necessarily affect those of succeeding periods. Insofar as possible, each period is evaluated within itself and independently of conclusions earlier reached.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 78]
# TOP VIE679. 2. Naval GRU Servicea. IntroductionNOSENKO's accounts* of his naval GRU service (Pages: 64-77) have been reviewed for their internal consistency and credibility, and examined for accuracy against information from other sources.b. DiscussionBriefly, the outlines of NOSENKO's account of his military service are about as follows:- He studied for the equivalent of 7th, 8th, 9th and part of 10th school years in naval schools in Kuibyshev, Baku and Leningrad. This would normally have nothing to do with military service, except that NOSENKO says he took the military oath at the Baku School in the fall of 1943, at the age of 16. (According to available collateral information, the oath--formal entry into the military forces--was at no time given before the age of 17, and never for purposes of "show" or "morale" as NOSENKO claimed it was here.) He clains to have deserted this school after taking the oath. Also, he shot himself in the hand only about two months after starting anew later the same year in the naval school in Leningrad and never finished school properly.- He was commissioned in the "reserves" in 1947 after completing his second year at the Institute of International Relations in Moscow. However, he cannot remember what branch of the service he was in, except that it was not the navy. He avoided active military duty thereafter by voluntarily doing military translations at the Institute. While at the Institute he contracted venereal disease at least twice and this went on his record.- In the spring of 1950, he was assigned to the Navy by a mandate commission at the Institute. However, he failed one of his examinations ("Marxism-Leninism") upon completion of the Institute of International Relations later in 1950 which delayed his diploma--and hence entry into the service--until successful re-examination later that year. (At about the same time, he was considered and turned down by the KGB [then MG3] because of his school record, drunkenness, and other bad marks in his record.)- He was processed for entry into the naval GRU in 1950. He said he visited the GRU personnel office several times for interviews and to fill out questionnaires and write his personal history in connection with the required security check. He was accepted into naval GRU despite a record which showed desertion, self-inflicted wound inThere is no single account of this period of NOSENKO's life which can be examined because NOSENKO has altered the circumstances and dates importantly from one telling to the next.TOP-SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 79]
680. wartime, drunkenness, venereal disease, still-valid marriageto a State criminal's daughter, rejection for MGB employ-ment, and a bad academic record including failure of acourse in Marxism-Leninism just at this time.He was called to active duty as a senior lieutenanton 12 March 1951, and without any indoctrination or train-ing, he departed four or five days later in civilian clothesfor his first duty station, Sovietskaya Gavan in the SovietFar East. NOSENKO claims to have chosen this post, con-sidered generally to be the least desirable of all navalassignments, on his own initiative, to prove to his fatherthat ne was a man. (The above was his account in 1966, inall earlier accounts he said he went to the Soviet Far Eastin the fall of 1950, and in fact said that he had two months'leave in 1952, one for each of two years there. However,according to the 1956 account, his service there lasted onlyone year.)In Sovetskaya Gavan NOSENKO's job was to extract in-formation from American publications reporting naval de-velopments, Asked in April 1964 for any personal accountof his own work, NOSENKO was able to think of only "four orfive trips" on small ships to the coast of Sakhalin, andthree to Hokkaido, to drop or pick up agents. His own role,he said, was as a trainee; he was taken along only "to learnhow it was done;" he himself never trained or dispatched anyagents, nor did he know the identities or missions of anyothers. Ils also could not describe the ships he had travelledon. Questioned on the location of Sovetskaya Gavan' in 1965,NOSENKO insisted that this city is located in PrimorskiyKray, although it is actually located in Khabarovskiy Kray.**NOSENKO said he returned on routine leave (or, accord-ing to other accounts, because of having contracted tubercu-losis) in April 1952. He then spent two months either inhis parents' Moscow home or, according to other accounts, ina sanitorium near Moscow under treatment for tuberculosis.He said he was coughing up "half a glass of blood at a time."(X-rays and medical examinations from February 1964 havedetected no indications that NOSENKO ever suffered fromtuberculosis.)At this time, the summer of 1952, NOSENKO said he wasoffered in Moscow an opportunity to attend the GRU strategicintelligence school, the Military-Diplomatic Academy, butturned it down because he had already studied most of thecourse matter in the Institute of International Affairs; be-sides, NOSENKO said in October 1966, he failed the physicalexamination when sugar was discovered in his faeces.NOSEIKO was then transferred--without returning tothe Far East--to the Intelligence Staff of the Baltic Fleetat Baltiysk. He invented a story in 1964 about going there* In October 1966 NOSENKO was asked whether he had ever been  to Sakhalin; his answer was no.** This is the equivalent of being stationed for a year in Port-land, Oregon and thinking oneself in California.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 80]
# TOP SECRET681. via Naval Intelligence Points in Berlin, Rostock, and Sass- nitz, but then said this was a lie he told because he felt his interrogators would not believe him if he had said he successfully turned down an assignment to these points, then closing down, and had travelled directly to Baltiysk. (As pointed out to NOSENKO, the assignment to the cold, damp Baltic climate of a recent "B-sufferer appears unthink- able, particularly when that person is a Government Minister's son; he acknowledged this but said, "There were no other positions available.")- He could not remember the name of the place he served near Baltiysk. He had named it as Primorsk in 1962 (which fitted his description of its size and location) but from 1964 on insisted it was Sovetsk. There is no such village in the area, but there is in the region a well-known city by that name (the former Tilsit) far inland and far away. He did not know (as contemporary Soviet maps show) that a rail line went to Baltiysk from Primorsk.- In the Baltiysk area, he claimed in 1962, he had trained agent teams to be sent behind enemy lines in time of war. Under interrogation in 1964 he changed his description of his functions, saying he merely prepared training mater- ials and delivered supplies, never having direct contact with or knowledge of the agent work. His service there was limited to about six months, since he said he left there at the beginning of 1953. He either had had one or two leaves from there, depending on which telling is accepted: In 1964 NOSENKO said that in August or September 1952 he was given a special leave from his duties in Sovetsk to travel to Mos- cow in order to formalize his divorce from his first wife; in April 1956 he wrote that he was divorced during his leave before going to Sovetsk.- NOSENKO said he returned to Moscow on his own initia- tive and against the wishes of his commanding officer at the end of 1952 and began steps to get out of the GRU. He has told conflicting stories of where he stayed and in what leave status. It was during this period, he said, that his conversation with KOBULOV led him to shift to the KGB.In April 1966 NOSENKO wrote that he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Services while stationed in Sovetsk. In earlier accounts he said that he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant while stationed in the Soviet Far East.c. RemarksThe notes above on NOSENKO's career do not treat most of the changes of story, contradictions, corrections, or inaccuracies in NOSENKO's accounts: Variations of dates may be attributable to faulty memory, changes in the story might have resulted from his own elaborations and exaggerations, and inaccuracies might be explained by his inattention or indifference to detail. If all the details were to be considered, the story would become even more confused.Certain general aspects stand out, however:TOP SECRET