[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 75]
676. NOSENKO claimed to have had a direct role as the supervising case officer in the BELITSKIY case in its 1962 Geneva phase. As a first-hand source, however, he was wrong about the origins of the operation and ignorant of the content and the operational planning of the 1962 meetings he was supposedly supervising. In this instance, as in the Edward SMITH case, NOSENKO's information is inadequate for his sourcing.NOSENKO provided leads to nine KGB operations which had originated with the First Chief Directorate. Six of these he claimed to have learned about through his friend in that Directorate, GUK. who was personally involved in most of these operations. Of the other three, two--the Paris agent (JOHNSON) and the Brussels/NATO case--he said he picked up in bits and pieces from technicians of the Second Chie: Directorate's Special Section who had assisted in thes. For both of the latter operations, numerous coincidences were alleged by NOSENKO to have enabled him to obtain the fragmentary information from his sub-sources, and he was never able to clarify what parts he learned from which of the four technicians he named as sub-sources.In describing his acquisition of information on the ninth case, "SASHA," NOSENKO has contradicted himself: He first said he had learned about "SASHA" from SHALYAPIN, providing lengthy and involved explanations of how he became acquainted with SHALYAPIN at the time of the latter's retirement from the KGB in 1962. Later, under interrogation, NOSENKO did not recall his statements that SHALYAPIN was the original source of the "SASHA" story, first attributing it to others and later saying that he could not remember when and from whos he first heard it, but SHALYAPIN and others had talked about it. This was despite the fact that by the time he heard of "SASHA" he had already met and agreed to cooperate with CIA; furthermore, when asked if "SASHA" was an important lead, he agreed that it was a serious matter. Except for this one occasion he had consistently failed to appreciate the significance of such a lead, indicating that it was not considered important in the KGB.Also casting doubt on his sourcing of "SASHA" is the fact that, in his first reference to "SASHA" and the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, NOSENKO said he had learned of this item from SHALYAPIN, whereas later he said it was not from SHALYAPIN (but he could not identify another source from whom he had heard this detail).Regarding NOSENKO's leads to westerners. the case of the "illegal" in Canada--the RCMP's is paramount as to sourcing. NOSENKO first said his friend GUK had told him of the case unofficially, GUK having been involved in the operation in Moscow. When asked why GUK should be involved in a Canadian case in 1963 when he was supposedly working in the First Chief Directorate's American Department against American targets, NOSENKO retracted his initial statement and said that GUK somehow got in contact with his, not as a KGB officer but simply as an acquaintance. Despite the non-official nature of GUK's relationship as thus implied by NOSENKO, GUK was able to tell him all the operational details concerning except his name. This case has an odd*   Although he had met GUK many years before, NOSENKO indicated that they did not become friends until his visit to Geneva in 1962. and only then did GUK begin to reveal operational details to him.TOP SECRET