[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 43]
# TOP CLUTILI645. must be among persons who are identifiable and accessible, or the information is useless to Western services and is no lose to the Soviets. On this basis, only KGB First Chief Directorate as well as GRU identifications merit inclusion in this valuation, since these are the officers who normally appear abroad and participate in agent operations. Although KGS Second Chief Directorate personnel have in the past transferred to the First Chief Directorate, this is not a predictable event and cannot be considered in discussion of current damage.NOSENKO identified 165 First Chief Directorate personnel, but only 149 could be located in CIA files (i.c., were identifiable by name); the remaining 16 names from NOSENKO were valueless as they were untraceable. Of the 149, there were 37 who were not known or suspected as intelligence officers prior to the receipt of NOSENKO'S information. Of 37, there were 24 who either resided abroad at the time of NOSENKO's defection or were sent abroad since that time.*Assuming that NOSEIKO was correct in his identifications of all 24 members of the KGB who were accessible, it cannot be said that the number is so large that the damage to KGB agent operations was substantial. None of NOSENKO's unique 630 identifications were abroad at the time of his defection or have been since. These personality identifications hence do not serve as evidence of NOSENKO's bona fides. At the same time, his inability to do further measurable harm to the KGB ir. this regard cannot be held against him, either, for he has claired service only in the Second Chief Directorate throughout his career and so cannot be expected to know a high percentage of the First Chief Directorate complement. Therefore, IOSENKO's intelligence personality identifications do not constitute a factor in finding for or against his bona fides.NOSENKO has been the source of many interesting details and examples of KGB modus operandi (Pages 359-360), but while useful for illustrative purposes and valuable because of the fact that the material was easily collatable for study purposes, none of the methods described could be considered new and revealing, and their exposure in any event would not prevent their continued use in the future. NOSENKO's discussion of the only double agent case in which he claimed to have played a role, however, demonstrates his lack of knowledge of the principles and purposes of such an operation. This case, PELITSKIY, is a subjest of separatesensitive sourcesOf these 24, ten were identified by ![redacted] as KGB ![redacted] and thereafter, and two became prominently active in insecure KGB operations shortly after NOSENKO identified them.**Other evidence has contradicted statements by NOSENKO to the effect that certain Soviets were not affiliated with the KGB; in Geneva, for example, where he had daily access to the KGB Legal Residency for months and claimed nearly complete knowledge of KGB personnel, he named 15 of a KGB staff which he said totalled at the most 18; CIA identifications of KGB officers in Geneva on the basis of other sources, investigations and analysis totalled at least double this number and probably triple, as many as 55 of the approximately 120 Soviets stationed there (a proportion which is consistent with other areas and defectors' estimates). NOSENKO was not entirely accurate concerning even KGB officers on his own delegation in Geneva, as noted on Pages 12 and 13. Therefore, the accuracy of NOSEIKO's original identifications, positive or negative, cannot be accepted without question.TOP SECRET