Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10213-10352.pdf — page 17]
SECRETDOHB 70-1-1CHAPTER III, ANNEX BAttachment 215 November 19745. North VietnamAll diplomats and NFLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad.6. USSRa. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office.b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna.c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned.d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning26.16SECRET
[104-10213-10352.pdf — page 18]
SECRET# Clandestine Services## Handbook No. 43-1-170-1-1CSHB 43-1-1CHAPTER III15 February 1960## ANNEX B## PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS1.  A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number.2.  The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest.3.  It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations/up-to-date listings containing information under the control43SECRET
[104-10213-10352.pdf — page 19]
SECRETCLANDESTINE SERVICESHANDBOOK NO. 43-1-170-1-1CSHB 43-1-1CHAPTER III, ANNEX B15 February 1960of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 per-sonalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying dataof persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be oftangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data otherthan that given in the listing itself.4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system,   identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not   yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers   of the following type but in the same series:IDN-123457These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are car-ried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings,where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" col-umn. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers.5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters,   elther upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch   is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for   it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number   in the dispatch form as follows:Dispatch Symbol and No.ΧΥΖΑ-12345Headquarters File No.201-6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the   request of stations or desks which are developing special identification   programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notifica-   tion of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card   Service.44SECRET
[104-10213-10352.pdf — page 20]
SECRETCLANDESTINE SERVICESHANDBOOK NO. 43-1-170-1-1CSHB 43-14CHAPTER III, ANNEX B15 February 19687. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they _must_ be brought into the 201 system.45SECRET
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 1]
SECRET-FYES ONLYRafael Trujillo, the Dominican dictator, was assassinated at about ten p.m. on the night of 30 May 1961. It was Trujillo's custom to visit one of his mistresses at his ranch at San Cristobal abcut cace a week. On most of his travels he rode in a Carysler with bullet-proof glass and with security guards riding in accompanying cars. He departed from this practice on his periodic trips to San Cristobal and substituted a highly stereotyped pattern of action: after his nightly walk, he dismissed his companions; changed into a khaki undfors; and set out for San Cristocal in an unescorted 1957 Chevrolet, always driven by the same chauffeur.On the night of the slaying, the Chevrolet was intercepted on a four-lane highway on the outskirts of Ciudad Trujillo by elgat armed assassins in three cars. Trujillo was killed by gunfire, and his body was removed from the scene by the assassins. Trujillo's chauffeur was seriously wounded, was left behind by the assassins, and survived. All of the assassins escaped from the scene. Cae was never caught and was eventually granted amnesty. Two were killed while resisting arrest. The others ...were arrested, confessed, and were later executed before coming to trial. About eight or nine others, who were in on or knew of the plot but did not participate in the actual assassiration, were killed while in custody, while resisting arrest, or by suicide to avoid arrest and torture.(Ilote: We use the term "plotters" to refer to all of those involved in this attempt to overthrow Trujillo. "Assassins" refers to the small group that actually did the killing.)SECRET-ETES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 2]
SECRET-EYES ONLYThere were reports in Ciudad Trujillo as the time that theU.S. Consulate had been in some way involved with the plotters.Eventually, after the surviving plotters were granted amnesty,many of the details care cut. Norman Gall, a reporter with theSan Juan Star, wrote an article that appeared in *The New Republic*issue of 13 April 1963. Excerpts follow:The assassination of the Dominican Republic's Rafael L.Trujillo was carried out with assistance from the US CentralIntelligence Agency. Arms for the May 30, 1961 slaying of the69-year-old dictator on a lonely stretch of highway near hiscapital were smuggled by the CIA into the country at therequest of the assassins.The CIA began shipping arms to the Dominican Republic inlate 1960, following a series of talks between US Consul HenryDearborn, Chief Political Officer John Barfield of the USConsulate, and Luis Amiama Tio. Also involved in the plot wasAntonio Imbert, who had been Governor of Porto Plata province.As Trujillo's political and financial problems deepened,talks continued between Dearborn, Barfield and leaders of theanti-Trujillo conspiracy. Toward the end of 1960, contact wasestablished between Amiama and a CIA agent who . . . wasnamed Plato Cox.The key link between the assassins and the CIA in the armsshipments was a long-time American civilian resident of CiudadTrujillo, Lorenzo Berry, otherwise known as "Wimpy," who operateda supermarket in a fashionable neighborhood where Trujillo alsolived. "Wimpy" was put under brief arrest after the killing butwas later allowed to leave the country.The weapons were imported in small parts, to be assembledlater by the plotters, among the routine grocery shipments forthe supermarket arriving regularly in the capital's port. The- 2 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 3]
SECRET-EYES ONLYgun parts entered the Republic in specially-marked food cans, which were later turned over to the conspirators.Plans for the intended assassination were worked out during the same period in which the abortive assault on Cuba was being prepared. However, when the CIA-organized April 17, 1961, invasion at the Bay of Pigs failed and world attention was focused on Washington's complicity in that operation, a postponement of the attempt on Trujillo's life was ordered because of the embarrassment another such failure might cause the United States. But the order to hold up came too late. The needed weapons were already in the hands of the conspirators, who refused appeals by Dearborn and Barfield to delay the assassination. They insisted on moving at the first opportunity. This came on May 30, when Trujillo and his chauffeur drove out into the country in an unescorted 1957 Chevrolet for a rendezvous at a San Cristobal estate, La Fundacion, with Trujillo's 20-year-old mistress, Mona Sanchez.It can be reported on excellent authority that close associates of the slain dictator knew of the US role within a few days following the killing.Dearborn, Barfield and Berry had meanwhile been rushed out of the Dominican Republic by US officials.Since the ouster of the Trujillos, Berry ("Wimpy") has returned to operate his handsomely appointed supermarket, where he greets customers with calm and courtesy, as if Trujillo had never lived.We interviewed Richard Bissell (then DD/P), J. C. King (then Chief, WH Division), and J. D. Esterline (then Chief of Operations, WH Division). King recalls the Agency's role as being limited to monitoring internal plotting against the Trujillo regime "but not pushing or instigating." Esterline, like King, recalls that the Agency was not directly involved in coup plotting. He described the.- 3 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 4]
SECRET-EVES ONLYfurnishing of weapons as a symbol--something that would constitute tangible evidence of U.S. support. Bissell remembers the Agency role as being somewhat more positive than that described by King and Esterline. He viewed the Agency's role as one of giving support to an indigenous group whose intended actions were in the U.S. interest. Ee described the affair as "a fairly nomal operation involving meetings, discussions, and formal approvals." We do not have firm information as to whether or not any of the weapons supplied by CIA were actually used in the assassination of Trujillo.Both Esterline and King believe they were not. Bissell, however, has a vague impression that one of them vas.The Agency officers most immediately involved with the plotters are now widely scattered. Lear Reed, who was chief of station until October 1960, is now retired. Robert Owen, who was chief of station at the time of the assassination, is in Paris. Charles Cookson, the station's operations officer, is in Brazil. Isabel Cintron, the station's administrative assistant who was used as a communications link and in the passing of the arms, resigned in 1964 and is believed to be living in Puerto Rico. Fed Holzan, the headquarters branch chief, is in Guatemala City. We elected not to call back any of these people for interviews. While they might be ableSECRET-EVES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 5]
SECRET-EVES BILYto furnish minor details that are missing from the written records,we think it unlikely that they would be able to add significantlyto the quite complete record that appears in the EMCEED operationalfiles.Agency activities aimed at replacing the Trujillo regime wereassigned the cryptonym EMDEED. One segment of EMDEED was known asEMSLEW, the cryptonym for the operation to remove Trujillo byviolent action. We have reviewed the voluminous EMDEED files. Mostof this account is drawn from them. Many of the more significantdocuments were not put into the EMCEED files but were kept in aprivate file by J. C. King. He made that file available to us.We also have studied another particularly useful document. TheDominican Military Intelligence Service (SIM) officer put in chargeinvestigation of theof the/Trujillo assassination was a navy lieutenant named Ortiz.The Dominican Republic assigned him to its embassy in Ottawa inNovember 1961 when the Trujillo family's attempt to regain powerfailed. The New York field office, of the FBI held extensiveinterviews with him from 6 April through 10 May 1962. The resultwas a massively-detailed, 182-page report on the plot and on theassassination as reconstructed by the SIM from its interrogationsof the persons it apprehended.- 5 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 6]
SECRET-EYES ONLY(the EXCISED operational files)From the records, we can trace the origins and the course of U.S. policy with respect to the overthrow of Trujillo. We also can ascertain from the files the nature and the extent of U.S. support of the plotters, including the passing to them of weapons out of the U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Trujillo. What we cannot discover from the files, despite quite massive documentation, is how the coup group was organized. The best single account we find, and it is not wholly accurate, is in a book by Robert Crassweller.* The main flaw in the story is its failure to identify the individuals with whom the U.S. Government was actually working. Excerpts follow:The plot was organized on the basis of two groups of conspirators linked together by a liaison that later proved too fragile to bear the stresses laid upon it. Each group had its purpose and its separate personnel.The function of the Action Group was to assassinate Trujillo and immediately present proof of its success, in the form of Trujillo's corpse, to the second group, the Political Group. The latter would then launch a coup, taking over the machinery of the government and the Armed Forces.The Action Group consisted of eight men. It appears to have been organized originally by General Antonio Imbert Barreras and Salvador Estrella. . . . They were joined by Lieut. Amado Garcia Guerrero, a member of the military corps attached to Trujillo in the National Palace; Antonio de la Maza, the brother of Octavio de la Maza, who had been killed by the government because of his involvement in the* Robert D. Crassweller, Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator (New York: MacMillan Co., 1965)- 6 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 7]
SECRET-EYES ONLYGalintez case; Evascar Tejeda; Roberto Pastoriza; and PeiroLivio Cedeno. The eighth member, Manuel Caceres Tunti, was inMoca of the sight of the 30th and saw none of the action.The Political Group had a less distinct membership.included Luis Aninza Tis, Modesto Diaz, Ceneral Juan TomasDiaz, and several others. At the very top it had the supportof General Roman Fernandez, Secretary of State for the ArmedForces, and his brother Bibin.The over-all authority appears to have centered principallyin General Diaz, probably the only one who had sufficientprestige to command authority.The Action Group would remain in daily readiness. Wheninformation in the Palace indicated that Trujillo was goingto drive to Estancia Fundacion. Garcia Guerrero in the  Palace would inform the others by personal message.The expected message from Garcia Guerrero in the Palacecame to the patient plotters at seven o'clock on the eveningof Pay 30. They were not fully prepared and coordinated.atthis moment, but the emotional and impetuous de la Mazathreatened to act by himself if the others lagged. In anyevent, the plan went into execution. Each of themhad his revolver or pistol, and de la Maza also had his ownsaved-off shotgun and two M-l semiautomatic rifles.The conspiracy began to come apart within an hour. Neververy professionally contrived, the plot was hastened prematurelyto its culmination by the impatience of de la Maza, and it wasnow afflicted with bad luck and ineptitude. Imediately afterthe assassination, the wen of the Action Group were unable toreach General Roman.The Political Group of the conspiracy never took up itsplanned role. The Action Group scattered, leaving a trail aswide as a boulevard. Trujilio's body was left in the trunk ofde la Naza's car, parked in the garage of Ceneral Tomas Diaz,where the police found it in a few hours. The conspiratorswere all hunted down very quickly, except for Aniama andImbert, who maraged to conceal themselves for months untilthe danger had passed.- 7 -SECRET-EVES CHLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 8]
SECRET-EYES ONLYThe FBI report of its interviews of Ortiz, the SEM investigator, gives an excellent account of why the plot fell apart after the assassination took place. One of the assassins, Pedro Livio Cedeno, was seriously wounded (probably by fire from his own companions). All of the assassins assembled at General Diaz' house after the killing. One of them called a friend, Dr. Pobert Reid Cabral, to treat Livio. Dr. Reid found him so badly injured that surgery would be required. Reid and two of the assassins took Livio to a hospital. While in delirium he mumbled the names "de la Maza" and "Juan Tomas." The police immediately picked up two brothers of Antonio de la Maza. Neither was personally involved in the plot, but both knew the details and the names of most of the assassins. General Diaz, Antonio de la Maza, and Lieut. Garcia Guerrero were killed resisting arrest. Amiama and Imbert went into hiding and survived. The rest were caught and interrogated followingtorture. All confessed.The confessions led to identification of persons who were in or on the fringes of the Political Group: General Roman and his brother, Amiama Tio, General Garcia Urbaez, General Guarionex Estrella, Tomas Baez Diaz, Modesto Diaz, and Miguel Angel Baez Diaz. Lorenzo Berry (Wimpy) was identified as a communications link between the plotters and the U.S. Consulate. However, the SIM did not- 8 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 9]
discover the identities of the political plotters with whom the Consulate was actually working, because neither of the men who might have known the identities were available for interrogatica. Aziami Tio escaped and General Diaz was killed.Although the identities and the intention of the Action Group were fairly widely imom to persons not actually members of it, there appears to have been excellent compartmentation between the Political and the Action Groups--percaps too much compartmentation. The assassination itself war well planned. General Diaz was in over- all charge of the operation, but de la Maza was the one who did all of the work. Ee took three cars to a local garage and had the engines rebuilt so that the cars could reach speeds of 120 mph. He had possession of the weapons from the U.S. Consulate, plus several of his om. Ee and the other participants took the cars to the site selected for the killing and conducted dry runs each night. Everything was ready and the assassins were lying in wait for Trujillo on the night of 23 May. At the last minute he decided not to go to San Cristobal because he wasn't feeling too well. The assassins continued their dry runs each evening. After the assassina- tion was carried out, essentially as it had been planned, the coup that was to follow failed--in part because of bad luck, in part because of poor planning, and in part because of too much compartmentation.
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 10]
SECRET-EYES ONLYGeneral Roman, who was to take over the goverment after Trujillo's death, was not told that the assassination was to be attempted on May 30th. After the slaying, General Diaz tried to telepcore General Roman but could not reach hin. Diaz then took the car with Trujillo's body still in its trak and drove to Roman's house. He saw so many soldiers in the vicinity that he gave up and returned home, leaving the car in the driveway with the body still in the trunk, where it was later found by the police.What had happened was this: Former general and former head of the SIM, Arturo Espaillat, happened to chance upon the scene while the assassination was taking place. He was out for a drive with his wife and was passed by a car that he recognized as Trujillo's. Ee stopped at a drive-in restaurant and almost inmediately heard shooting ahead, which he suspected involved Trujillo. He drove to the scene, saw what was happening, turned around, and sped back into town. He stopped at a military installation and gave the alans and then drove to the home of General Roman to alert him. He and Roman then returned to the scene of the assassination, arriving simultaneously with the police. The police found Trujillo's chauffeur, who was wounded but still alive. Roman and Espaillat then went to the hospital to try to question the chauffeur. Thus, General Diaz could not reach General Roman to inform Rocan that- 10 -SECRET-EYES CLELY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 11]
SECRET-EVES CHAYTrujillo had been killed and that it was time for Roman to make hismove to take over the government. Roman knew only that there had beena shooting involving Trujillo and that Trujillo was missing. He didnot know whether General Diaz' group was involved in it or not. Hevas reluctant to move until he was sure that Trujillo was dead. Bythe tice Roman concluded that Trujillo must be dead, it was too latefor him to act; Hector Trujillo and Joanny Abbes had already takencharge. Roman did make a couple of feeble tries at engineering atake over, but it is apparent that he had no real advance plan norany appreciable chances of succeeding.The assassination itself and the plotting preceding it tookplace against a background of international activity in oppositionto the Trujillo regime, with both the CAS and the U.S. taking clear-cut stands. These are some of the highlights:a. A briefing paper prepared in WE Division for the JointChiefs of Staff in August 1960 states that a revolt was plannedfor December 1959 in the Dominican Republic but was delayedpending receipt of arms from Verezuela. The plot was discoveredand was rolled up in January. Venezuela brought charges in theQAS that the Dominican Republic was "in flagrant violation ofhuman rights, freedom, and democracy" following the mass arrestsin the Dominican Republic in January 1950. A comittee of the- 11 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 12]
# SECRET-EVES ONLYOAS assigned to investigate the charges reported on 8 June 1950 that the Dominican government was guilty as charged.b. A near-miss assassination attempt against President Betancourt on 24 June 1960 killed two in his entourage and injured him and several others. The Venezuelan government announced after capture of most of the assassins that the Dominican government was responsible for the attempt on Betancourt's life and took its case to the OAS. On 20 August, the OAS voted sanctions against the Dominican Republic. Under Secretary of State Dillon, testifying before the House Agriculture Committee on 24 August in support of a request by President Eisenhower for a cut in the Dominican Republic's sugar quota, is reported as having said that it was hoped that economic sanctions would result in the downfall of Trujillo's dictatorship and its replacement by a moderate and free regime. The United States severed diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic on 26 August 1960, although consular relations vere continued.- 12 -# SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 13]
SECRET-EVES ONLYAs a further prelude to a chronological review of operation EOEED/ENSLEW, we think it would be useful to identify the people involved, especially since officers of the Department of State played a very prominent role.Washington - Department of StateRoy R. Ribottom Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American AffairsFrank Devine Special Assistant to RubottomJohn C. Hill Special Assistant to RubottomWashington - CIAJ. C. King Chief, WH DivisionNed Holzan Chief, Branch III, WE DivisionCiudad Trujillo - Department of StateJoseph S. Farland Ambassador until 28 June 1960. It is pertinent to note that King and Ester- line attribute U.S. and CIA involvement- 13 -SECRET-EVES ONLY