Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 42]
125. whose name NOSENKO did not recall, at the Hotel Metro-pol in Moscow during the summer of 1959, possibly in August. The approach was based on homosexual compromise involving NOSENKO's agents VOLKOV and YEFIMOV (See Part V.5.2.).Investigation Results:## 1. Recruitment of MERTENS (1959)NOSENKO'S information: When Georg MERTENS visited the Soviet Union in July or August 1959, homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFIMOV, as part of their general assignment to become acquainted with homosexuals accidentally met MERTENS in Moscow and reported their suspicions to NOSENKO. NOSENKO wrote a report of this contact and requested authority to take compromising photographs in preparation for a recruitment approach, and DURAS, his chief, then assigned the case to him. (MERTENS had previously been the responsibility of A.A. VELITSKIY, another case officer). Photographs were taken of homosexual relations between VOLKOV and MERTENS on two separate occasions in Moscow. When MERTENS later travelled to Uzhgorod he was "arrested" by KGB officers (posing as militiamen) while he was engaged in relations with a homosexual agent of operational contact from Odessa. NOSENKO arranged by phone to bring this homosexual to Uzhgorod; he did not recall his name, but supplied CIA with a physical description. (NOSENKO could give no background on the agent and when asked why not, said he "wasn't interested.") MERTENS was then brought before NOSENKO, who recruited him during a session lasting approximately five hours. NOSENKO later travelled with MERTENS when he visited Lvov and Minsk before leaving the USSR. NOSENKO said that he had used the name "George" with MERTENS, but he could not recall what last name he had given him.Investigation Results:NOSENKO explained that the Tourist Department in 1959 had a section dealing with commercial representatives, which was responsible for the man, but had asked NOSENKO'S section for help. "They said they didn't have any agents or anything and didn't know what to do. So somebody said, 'Well look, why don't you ask the chief of the section? He's a specialist on homosexuals and can arrange everything for you.' So I wound up handling the case, and TARABRIN (of the First Chief Directorate) said I should report to him." In this passage NOSENKO seemed to be referring to himself, although he said he was deputy chief of the section; the chief of the section at that time, M.A. LEONOV, is not known to have participated in operations stemming from the homosexuality of the prospective agents.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 43]
m. Compromise of BARRETT (1959)HOSENKO's Information: Robert BARRETT, a guide at the U.S.Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, had become friendly with the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part V.0.2.), whom he met at the fairground. Although BARRETT was not a homosexual, VOLKOV succeeded--after a long period of development--in involving him in homosexual acts, which were photographed by KGB personnel from an adjoining hotel room. As case officer for VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, NOSENKO was responsible for arranging the compromise, was present when the photographs were taken, and has described the occasion in detail. There had been much complaining among the photographic technicians because of the amount of time they were forced to spend waiting for VOLKOV to succeed in his mission, and NOSENKO recalled that he "had to provide them with drinks and treat them well" because "they were a big help" to him in this operation. The photographs were good, but the KGB was unable to use them in 1959 because of a general ban placed by SHELEPIN on the recruitment of U.S. Exhibition guides due to the possible repercussions on KHRUSHCHEV's planned visit to the United States.* (NOSENKO reported, however, that BARRETT was recruited on the basis of the 1959 photography when he returned with another exhibition in 1961. This recruitment was carried out by another component of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO had nothing to do with it.**)Investigation Results:* See the discussion of the WILLERFORD case, below, for additional information on SHELEPIN's prohibition.** In 1961, shortly before his recruitment, BARRETT had ostensibly accidental contact with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV in Moscow. NOSENKO has not mentioned this.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 44]
# 127.n. Compromise of WILLERFORDNOSENKO'S Information: Frederick WILLERFOPD was BARRETT'S roommate during the 1959 exhibition in Moscow. Initially he was a target of the local KGE organization for the city of Moscow, which believed WILLERFORD to be an FBI agent and had been collecting materials on him. At the same time and, without knowing of the interest of the local organization, VOLKOV and YEFREIOV had made WILLERFORD's acquaintance, and NOSENKO had arranged for compromising photograpics of WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV in a Moscow hotel room. ROSENKO watched WILLERFORD and YEFREMOV through a two-way mirror and was able to describe the scene in detail. It was only after this compromising material had been obtained that NOSENKO learned of the local KGB's interest in WILLERFORD. NOSENKO'S department and the local.KG9 unit then made a joint request for operational approval to approach WILLERFORD, but permission was refused because of the general ban on recruitment approaches at this time. The case file was retained by the Moscow KG3 organization, and NOSENKO did not know whether WILLERFORD has been approached subsequently.Investigation Results:Note: There is a similarity between NOSENKO's description of the ban on recruitment approaches in 1959, which prevented the Tourist Department from taking advantage of its compromising photography of BARFETT and WILLER- FORD, and information provided by the earlier defector, GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN reported that an American employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, possibly a code clerk, was prepared for recruitment on the basis of homosexual compromise during 1959 and 1960. According to information he said he learned from U.S. Embassy Section case officer, G.I. GRYAZNOV, the KGB had photographs of the American in various stages of a homosexual act, and there was no question about the recruitment being achieved: "The only question was to where." At the time, however, SHELEPIN had just become Chairman of the KGB and was stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. He was shown these particular photographs but decided that an approach on their basis would be too crude and that another way should be found. Although SHELEPIN did not exclude the use of these photographs some time in the future, according to GOLITSYN, he had reservations against using them at that time for fear of the propaganda repercussions if the attempt should fail and be exposed publicly. GOLITSYN did not know whether the recruitment was subsequently carried out. The essential differences between this account and that of NOSENKO are that GOLITSYN implied the ban was in effect at least into 1960 and that GOLITSYN appeared to be speaking of a general prohibition.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 45]
123. whereas NOSENKO related the ban specifically and only to the U.S. Exhibition at Sokolniki Park which ended on 4 September 1959.** In speaking of the 1959 U.S. Exhibition at Sokolniki Park, Moscow, told that both the KGB and the GRU launched an all-out effort to recruit Americans employed at the Exhibition. All officers at GRU Headquarters were assigned to this task, and some were used by the KGB in an attempt to compromise the Americans; V.A. GRUSHA (identified by NOSENKO as a KGB officer special-izing in American operations of the First Chief Directorate) directed many of these KGB activities in which GRU personnel were involved. As a result of this endeavor, "more than one American" was recruited, and indicated that the technique of compromise--such as "bed pictures"--was employed. When questioned on this subject reported that to handle the Exhibition, the CPSU Central Committee issued a special directive to form a committee headed by the KGB (GRUSHA was in charge of cne section of this committee) and to which the GRU contributed personnel. Its purposes were two-fold: protective, that is, to prevent propaganda, to disrupt presentations, and to conduct counterintelligence; and to recruit.and that the GRU did not recruit any Americans at the Exhibition.TOP SECRET
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## 130.After returning to Geneva in 1964 and during subsequent debriefings and interrogations, NOSENKO made the following additional statements concerning the FRIPPEL case:- Although he had personally recruited FRIPPEL, he did not do so alone; Col. V.D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief (and later Chief) of the Tourist Department, was present; he and NOSENKO "carried out the recruitment together" in early September 1959. NOSENKO was, however, FRIPPEL's case officer.- NOSENKO attributed his involvement in the FRIPPEL recruitment to the following: "In 1958, after 1958, when I became the Deputy Chief of the section, my area of activity was narrowed down. I didn't handle all the tourists at that time. I worked as the Deputy Chief of the section and I had my own little area--for example, the permanent representative of the American Express Company, and besides that I began to collect all the material on all American tourist firms which have anything to do with Inturist and who send tourists to the USSR."- FRIPPEL never provided any information of value to Soviet tourist operations.- When NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960, he took FRIPPEL with him because FRIPPEL was acquainted with some Americans at the Embassy. NOSENKO was asked to question FRIPPEL about the U.S. Embassy and such Embassy officers as George WINTERS and Lewis W. BOWDEN, but FRIPPEL never told NOSENKO anything along this line. [^1]- FRIPPEL provided no interesting information during NOSENKO's two meetings with him in 1962 and 1963, when FRIPPEL returned to the Soviet Union as a tour guide.- NOSENKO met "pretty steadily" with FRIPPEL during the period to January 1961, and once NOSENKO and his wife, in company with CHELNOKOV and his wife, had dinner at FRIPPEL's home, where they met Mrs. FRIPPEL. Odette FRIPPEL was unaware of her husband's status as a KGB agent, and therefore NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV used Inturist cover for their acquaintance with FRIPPEL. Although unusual for KGB Second Chief Directorate case officers to visit agents in their homes with wives present, NOSENKO explained that he went because he "was invited," and CHELNOKOV went "because he was also involved in the recruitment."- First as Deputy Chief of a section of the Tourist Department and later as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, NOSENKO continued to meet with FRIPPEL in Moscow hotels and restaurants. Throughout this period, he was almost invariably accompanied by CHELNOKOV: "Perhaps one time I met with FRIPPEL alone, otherwise it was always withSee Part V.E.3. regarding NOSENKO's duties in the U.S. Embassy Section.[^1]:> See Part V.E.3. regarding NOSENKO's duties in the U.S.Embassy Section.
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131. CHELNOKOV." Usually NOSENKO would arrange these meetingswith FRIPPEL at CHELNOKOV's request and the two continuedto meet with FRIPPEL, despite his lack of production, be-cause they "kept hoping he would give something." In adifferent context, but speaking of CHELNOKOV, NOSENKO ex-plained: "You see, never mind if you are a chief or adeputy chief of a department, you must have one, two, orthree agents. GRIBANOV insists, so that you don't forgethow to work. The Chiefs of the [Second Chief] Director-ate do not demand that they have 12 or 13 agents, but theymust have two or three. They will have important agentsor those in leading positions."- NOSENKO continued to act as FRIFPEL'S case officer  after FRIPPEL had left the Soviet Union and NOSENKO had  been transferred and promoted to the position of Deputy  Chief of the Tourist Department. He met twice with FRIP-  PEL during this latter period when FRIPPEL visited the  Soviet Union as a guide with groups of foreign visitors.  Both of these meetings were handled by NOSENKO alone, with-  out CHELNOKOV.- The first meeting took place in the summer of 1962,  after NOSENKO had returned to Moscow from Geneva. FRIPPEL  had arrived in the Soviet Union as a guide for some Ameri-  can journalists. (NOSENKO was unable to give the compo-  sition of the journalist group or to recall where they  stayed in Moscow and where else they travelled in the Sov-  iet Union.) NOSENKO contacted him in Moscow to learn what  questions the newsmen intended to ask KHRUSHCHEV during  a scheduled interview; subsequently NOSENKO acknowledged  that standard practice required visiting journalists to  submit their intended questions for KHRUSHCHEV in writing  to Soviet authorities prior to interviews. After the  interview, he recontacted FRIPPEL to learn the reaction  of the journalists to their talk with the Soviet leader.  NOSENKO could not recall their specific reaction to the  KHRUSHCHEV interview but did remember that they were  "satisfied." Another reason for contacting FRIPPEL,  NOSENKO added in a later discussion, was to learn whether  any of the journalists might have joined the group at the  last moment in the United States, which might suggest  intelligence connections on their part.*- NOSENKO met FRIPPEL alone for the second and last  time during March 1963. Since FRIPPEL was a guide for  tourists aboard the ship "Olympia," which stopped for a  day in Yalta and Odessa, NOSENKO flew to Odessa from Mos-  cow and accosted FRIPPEL in the lobby of the hotel where  the tourists were having dinner. Finally able to get awayNOSENKO had earlier said on several occasions that one ofthe things KGB sources in foreign tourist companies abroadwere instructed to report to the KGB was any last-minuteadditions to a tour group to the USSR; this might signifyintelligence affiliation.
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132. from his group, FRIPPEL called on NOSENKO in the latter's hotel zoom, and the two drank and talked. NOSENKO had given FRIPPEL a bottle of vodka as a gift, and FRIPPEL said he wanted to give NOSENKO some whiskey in return. They drove in NOSENKO's car to the port, where NOSENKO waited in the car while FRIPPEI, went aboard for the whiskey. (He had invited NOSENKO to visit the ship but could not obtain a pass for him.) When FRIPPEL returned. he brought another American, so NOSENKO had to invent for himself a suitable cover (Inturist) on the spot. The three returned to the hotel and drank some more, everyone getting drunk. During this contact, FRIPPEL reported "nothing of importance," and his most interesting news was that he might again be reassigned to Moscow in December 1963 as the American Express Company representative.*---On 3 February 1964, while reviewing the CHEREPANOV papers** in Geneva, MOSEKO was asked about the following passage which appeared in the KGB operational plan against BOWDEN, dated icbruary 1960 and signed by V.A. KUSKOV Cf the. U.S. Embassy Section: "He (DOWDEN) showed himself to be an indiscreet persor.... Ironically, one day as though by chance, he [BOWDEN) blurred out to our agent SAMEDOVA (the fact of) "ARTUR's" affiliation with American Intelligence."*** NOSENKO Confirmed that the "ARTUR" of the CHEΒΕΡΑΝΟV papers was FRIFPEL, but he said he "could not say" whether FPIPPEL had any affiliation with American Intelligence.---NOSENKO said he later read a report that FRIPPEL had been reassigned, and it was therefore unlikely that his agent would return to Moscow; this report was submitted by V.V. KOSTYRYA (alias VLADIMIROV), a member of the KGB Legal Residency and overtly an Inturist employee in New York City, who was a former Second Chief Directorate colleague of NOSENKO.---The CHEREPANOV Papers are discussed in detail in Part VI.D.7.c.---There is no other report of BOWDEN making such a remark and no basis for it. Although never contacted by or associated with CIA in any way, FRIPPEL during 1960 was under consideration for operational use in Moscow, and in this connection background inquiries about him were submitted to the FBI---While in the Soviet Union in August 1962 and shortly before his recruitment on homosexual grounds (see Part VI.D.2.), the American Spencer ROBERTS was approached on the beach at Sochi by a young Soviet male. ROBERTS and the Soviet, who spoke French, soon became friends, and the Soviet told ROBERTS that he had been used as an agent in several operations against French-speaking foreigners in the USSR. One of these was FRIPPEL, the Soviet said, adding that FRIPPEL was suspected by the KGB of being an American Intelligence agent. NOSENKO, who has provided much detail on the ROBERTS case, did not mention the unidentified Soviet in this context or while discussing FRIPPEL.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 50]
b. FRIPPEL's InformationFRIFFEL, who was the American Express Company representative in Moscow from 7 April 1959 to 3 January 1961, according to ROSIN, had formerly worked for the Soviet Military Intelligence in Riga, referring to the time that ROSIN was an intelligence operative with 52A in the Soviet Union. ROSIN had promised formerly that the first time that "if you and I have to work in Moscow, you can always come to my apartment. It was probable, even with tourists."* See Part III.., which describes NOSENKO's emphatic refusal during the 1962 meetings to have any contacts with CIA inside the Soviet Union. During the October 1966 interrogations, NOSENKO said that in 1962 he had "absolutely no idea" concerning the possibility of CIA using FRIPPEL as an intermediary for contact inside the Soviet Union.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 51]
*TRIPEEL also had sonal contact wo ROSENFO's target John ABIDIAN (see Part V.I.B.3.). ROSENFO said they did not know one another. There is no indication that FRIFPEL was questioned on these contacts by NOSENKO and/or CHELNGKOV.*In February 1965 ROSENFO denied that this meeting took place. Department of State records show that in November 1961 FRIF-FEL applied for a new passport indicating that he intended to depart the United States in February 1962 aboard the "Olympia" for a cruise which would visit the Soviet Union.
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* NOSENKO said it was "impossible" that he should have to request permission to board the vessel.** In February 1965, NOSENKO did not recall having told FRIP-PEL these details of his life and said that, if he had done so, it was while he was drunk.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 53]
# 6. Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-60 and 1963)As in the FRIPPEL case, NOSENKO was involved with Lee Harvey OSWALD during both periods of his assignment to the Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate (1955-1960 and 1962-1964).While Deputy Chief of the American-British-Canadian Tourist Section, NOSENKO had a direct hand in the decision in October 1959 that OSWALD was of no operational interest to the KGB And should be returned immediately to the United States. Before President Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, when NOSENKO was again in the Tourist Department as its Deputy Chief, he was present at the time the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned of OSWALD'S application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to re-enter the USSR. After the assassination, he also played a role in the KGB investigations of OSWALD's activities during residence in the Soviet Union from October 1959 until June 1962.Collateral information relating to OSWALD's stay in the Soviet Union, and particularly concerning any connections he may have had with Soviet intelligence, is meager and indirect. It derives almost entirely from indications of primary interest by the KGB (among all Soviet Government organs) in every defector to the USSR, and from inferences which may be drawn from certain entries in OSWALD'S "Historical Diary" and certain statements made by his wife, Marina, during interviews on behalf of the Warren Commission. After President Kennedy's death, the Soviet Government provided the United States with official documents and letters pertaining to OSWALD's defection to the USSR, his suicide attempt, his marriage, and other events inside the Soviet Union. This information from the Soviet Government generally agrees with the information from NOSENKO. The materials furnished by the Soviet Government make no mention of any Soviet Intelligence interest, or lack thereof, in OSWALD.In this sense NOSENKO's information is unique: It was and remains the only such information available on the 32 months of OSWALD's life in the USSR.** NOSENKO's access to*For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO'S alleged involvement, 1959-1960 and 1963, are discussed in this part of the paper.** Independent sources, however, reported on visits by OSWALD to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City between 29 September and 5 October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) contact with a KGB officer under Consular cover at the Soviet Embassy there. NOSENKO originally said he knew nothing of any such contact. In October 1966 he revised this to say that OSWALD did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico City. NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in the office of Tourist Department Chief, K.N. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Headquarters from the KGB legal Residency in Mexico. The cable, which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City requesting permission to return to the USSR and that he had dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 54]
137. Information on ECB involvement with OSWALD in 1959, at the time of OSWALD's request to remain in the USSR, derives ex-clusively from the claimed fact that he, NOSENKO, was reputy Chief of the KGB Section" dealing with American tourists at that tire. He said he knee of later developments becaus of his position as Donuty Chief of the Tourist Department from mid-1952 until 1964. The central theme of NOSENKO's information, as given to CIA and the FBI, is that the KOD determined as early s 16 October 1959, when OSHALD wala his first declaration of intent to romein in the USSR, Chrt he was "not normal" and thereupon "washed its hands" ofia entirely. According to KOSENKO, the 16" had no operational Interest in CCWALD and made no attempt to recruit es ven to debrief him during the time he spent in Moscow and Mansi or during his trip to Mexico shortly betere killing t President.a. Statements to the FM![Image of the page with some text and markings]
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 55]
*OSWALD attempted to renounce his U.S. citizenship at the American Embassy on 31 October, three days after leaving the hospital. From his diary, the Warren Ccamission concluded he received permission to reside in the Soviet Union on a year-to-year basis about 1 January 1960, approximately the time he moved to Minsk.
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*NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he "only skimmed the file" and on another that he had it in his possession about 20 minutes. In October 1956 he again said that he read the file and that while doing so he saw a picture of OSWALD for the first time. NOSENKO added that he never met OSWALD personally.**In October 1965 NOSENKO said he learned that OSWALD was a poor shot from V.V.KRIVOSHEY, a fellow KGB officer who had been told this while visiting Minsk.