Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 57]
659. monitored and productive "points" in 1960-1961. NOSENKO was not able to explain why he would need this list to know the locations of the microphones when he had been daily receiving, selecting, and distributing the product of all of them for two years. Similarly, it was never clear why NOSENKO did not remember in 1962 that there were eleven points--as the list showed--rather than the four-to-six NOSENKO reported on in 1962.NOSENXO's account of how the product from the microphones was distributed and exploited would inevitably mean that all KGB case officers who had served in the U.S. Embassy Section since the microphones were installed would know of their existence--despite any effort to paraphrase and disguise the product as "agent reports." NOSENKO nonetheless maintained in 1962 that "it is a tremendous secret that we are listening to you," and that the microphones were known to so few that any countermeasures the Americans might take on the basis of NOSENKO's statements could reflect dangerously on him as the source.*Accepting at face value NOSENKO's claimed lack of aptitude and interest in technical matters, and therefore his inability to provide specific technical details concerning electronic operations against the American Embassy, it is still noteworthy that:- NOSENKO did not know the purpose of the so-called "Moscow beam," sometimes saying it was to jam Embassy communications and at other times that it was used to monitor them.- Although he claimed to have personally participated in the planning for the installation of audio devices in the North Wing of the Embassy, he did not know of the existence or the purpose of the coaxial cables and grill found there by American technicians in 1964. (NOSENKO insisted that there were no audio devices installed in the North Wing at the time of its, renovation for occupancy by Americans.)- NOSENKO knew nothing of the general lines of research and development to substitute for or improve the fading microphone coverage of the U.S. Embassy.These three points relate to aspects of the KGE's audio-technical attack on the U.S. Embassy in which the reporting of a source in NOSENKO's claimed position, no matter what his technical aptitude, could have been detrimental to Soviet interests.* Both GOLITSYN and the 1956 source cited on Page 254 were First Chief Directorate officers. That they both knew of the microphones suggests that NOSENKO exaggerated the sensitivity of the microphone operation, which had moreover always been assumed by the Embassy to be active.TOP SECRET
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b. RemarksNOSENKO's sourcing of his information on electronic operations against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was unclear and unlikely. His knowledge of the location and production of these microphones, as well as the existence, nature, and purpose of other electronic operations directed against the Embassy, was not commensurate with his alleged position in the U.S. Embassy Section and his particular responsibility for audio operations. Significantly, the essential element of the information which NOSENKO did report, the existence of the microphone in the Minister Counselor's office, would presumably have been considered by the KGB to have been compromised six months earlier, with the defection of GOLITSYN. Discovery of this microphone, as an outgrowth of action on GOLITSYN's information, would have led to all the others. Thus the Embassy microphones must have been cor.sidered by the KGB to have been compromised before NOSENKO first spoke of them in 1962. Added to this is the fact (supported by NOSENKO himself) that the efficiency of the Embassy microphone installation as a whole had seriously diminished by late 1961 or early 1962 due to, first, normal deterioration of equipment and wiring and, second, the installation of secure rooms and the implementation of more stringent security precautions at the Embassy. For these reasons and in the absence of any information concerning other forms of electronic attack against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, it cannot be considered that the information provided by 105EKO in 1962 and 1964 was harmful to the interests of the KGB nor helpful to American authorities. NOSENKO's denial of any installations in the north wing, in the light of the later discovery there of coaxial cables, the purpose of which appears serious and is as yet unclarified, and in the light of NOSENKO's specific claim to have been responsible for the operational planning for the north wing at the time it was being prepared for American occupancy, would appear to be purposeful deception.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 59]
5.  The BELITSKIY Casea. IntroductionNOSENKO reported to CIA in June 1962 (as one of the two items he wanted to sell) that one of its agents, the Soviet interpreter BELITSKIY, was in fact a KGB double agent who had been planted on CIA (Pages 517-529). NOSENKO said that this was a case run by the Second ("Active Line") Section, but that he personally had a role in the management of the case in May 1962 in Geneva. NOSENKO was able to give certain inside information on this case; for example, he knew the nicknames used by the CIA case officers with the agent.b. DiscussionNOSENKO's information, at least in its general outlines, was correct. CIA had been running BELITSKIY as an agent, and the CIA case officers (alias "Bob" and "Henry," the latter from Washington as NOSENKO said) had just completed a series of meetings with BELITSKIY in Geneva. Important aspects of his information were inaccurate: BELITSKIY had been recruited a year before NOSENKO'S date of 1959, and in Brussels, not London. Also, NOSENKO's claim that this was a Second Chief Directorate operation aimed at enticing CIA into meetings in the USSR was not borne out by the history of the case or by BELITSKIY's conduct, although it cannot be excluded that this was a long-term objective which the KGB still sought without appearing to. NOSENKO's account of the case thus is not as accurate as could be expected if his own role in it had been as claimed.NOSENKO's description of his own involvement is not consistent with observed Soviet practice or with operational logic. NOSENKO said in both 1962 and 1964 that he had had orders to supervise the handling of this case in Geneva in the spring of 1962. The reason was that the case officer for BELITSKIY in Ger.eva (ARTEMEV) was young and inexperienced and had not even worked on the BELITSKIY case before. NOSENKO was saying in effect--with the authority of direct knowledge and official responsibility--that BELITSKIY, a prominent Soviet citizen having personal contacts with well placed members of the Soviet Government, a man who had been under the ostensible control of a hostile intelligence service (CIA) for four years, was sent by the KGB to Geneva for the purpose of recontacting CIA, with prepared information, but that the KGB did not send with him the responsible case officer or any member of the section responsible for the operation. Instead, the KGB turned over the responsibility to a young and inexperienced KGB officer who happened to be in Geneva to protect the security of a delegation and who had had no prior connection with the BELITSKIY case nor even local knowledge of Geneva conditions; then, after BELITSKIY was already in Geneva, the KGB had cabled instructions that NOSENKO, who had no need to know of the case and had learned of it only unofficially from conversations in 1960-1961 with the Section Chief responsible, who had no experience or training in handling double agent operations, and who was similarly in Geneva
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661. by chance with delegation security functions, should guide the other "less experienced" case officer.* As NOSENKO showed under questioning, he did not know the contents of any of the positive intelligence BELITSKIY was to pass to CIA as disinformation; he did not know BELITSKIY's Moscow or Geneva pattern of movement or contacts; he did not know in detail hos or when the operation started; he did not know the nature of degree of British involvement, nor the operational details and contact arrangements. NOSENKO said that BELITSKIY had been placed on a Geneva delegation in the hope that CIA might be able to "find" and recontact him.**c. RemarksThe circumstances above not only cast doubt on NOSENKO'S version of the case and his own access but also suggest that NOSENKO did not have a theoretical appreciation of how double agents are handled. The examples he gave of his "guidance" to ARTEMEV are few in number. NOSENKO also stated in 1964 that he had arranged the actual introduction to BELITSKIY of KISLOV, the TASS man, to provide for BELITSKIY's need of a notional subsource for some of his disinformation; NOSENKO by October 1966 had apparently forgotten this event, for he stated unequivocally that KIS-LOV had had no connection whatever with the BELITSKIY case. NOS-ENKO claimed to have met BELITSKIY, but did not recognize his photo when shown it in 1966.Did NOSENKO's report to CIA on the BELITSKIY case harm the KGB? It was useful to CIA, since despite frequently expressed doubts of BELITSKIY'S bona fides, CIA was handling the operation as if it were genuine (but not intending to go to the extent of exposing to BELITSKIY CIA assets inside the USSR). (The KGB is* NOSENKO has reported that he handled only one American agent (FRIPPEL); he had practically no knowledge of CIA nor even vicarious exposure to the substance of any other double agent operations. ARTEMEV had had extended contact with a CIA tourist agent as early as August 1958, a role in other operations against American tourists in 1959--including clandestine search (see Page 148), and continuous American Department service since then. NOSENKO did not know of the 1953-1959 operational activities of ARTEMEV, although they fell in the operational area NOSENKO claimed to have supervised at the time as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section.** NOSENKO was seemingly unaware that BELITSKIY had contact arrangements which would presumably guarantee recontact.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 61]
662. aware, as Soviet Bloc counterintelligence guidance demonstrates, of the dangers inherent in having disinformation recognized as such.) The meetings in Geneva in May 1962 would have made it clear to the KGB that CIA had no intentions of meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR, and, in KGB eyes, the case may have reached the point of diminishing returns. It is perhaps significant that NOSENKO did not contact CIA and report on the BELITSKIY case until 10 days after BELITSKIY's series of meetings with CIA in Geneva had been completed, which would have given the KGB time for final appraisal of the operation's potential.NOSENKO's account of his own role in this operation appears to have been false, and nothing in the available evidence would preclude Soviet sacrifice of this already tired operation. Since NOSENKO provided some inside details of a sensitive KCB operation which could have been known to only a few, it is difficult to find any other explanation of NOSENKO's access to this information except that the KGB briefed him about it.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 62]
# 6. KGB Investigations*## a. Compromise of POPCV### (1) IntroductionFixing the date and cause of the compromise of POPOV, the CIA penetration source in the CRU (Pages 530-534) could affect the evaluation of NOSEIKO's production. If what HOSENKO has said is basically true, his story of POPCV's compromise (which has also been reported by other sources) is not particularly important and has not harmed the KGB nor measurably assisted CIA: The KGB assumes an awareness by CIA that it conducts surveillance of U.S. Embassy personnel, especially those having known or suspected American Intelligence connections (as with LANGELLE and WINTERS). If NOSENKO on the other hand has been incomplete or inaccurate in his statements about the compromise of FOPOV, then his claims to knowledgeability on this subject must be questioned.### (ii) DiscussionThe information from NOSENKO and other sources on the POPOV compromise may be collated and summarized in tabular form:| Cause                                    | Date Implied              | Source                                                          || ---------------------------------------- | ------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- || KGB surveillance of WINTERS              | 21 January 1959           | NOSENKO**                                                       || KGB surveillance of WINTERS              | 21 January 1959           | CHEPEPANOV document                                             || KGB intercept of WINTERS letter          | 21 January 1959           | POPOV message of 18 September 1959***                           || KGB surveillance of U.S. Embassy officer | none                      | ![sensitive source]                                             || KGB surveillance of LANGELLE             | 4 January 1959            | GOLITSYN, from the KGB orientation paper on the PCPOV case***** || KGB agent                                | prior to 23 November 1957 | GOLITSYN******                                                  |* Under this heading, only the compromises of POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV are considered; there is insufficient collateral material available for an evaluation of NOSENKO's information on Vladimir KAZAN-KOMAREK (pages 569-570) and Alfred SLESINGER (Pages 571-575).** NOSENKO reported that the KGB observed WINTERS mailing a letter which, upon being checked, was found to be addressed to POPOV; he has contradicted himself about whether the KGB applied *metka* to this letter.***POPOV is believed to have been under KGB control in composing this letter.(Footnotes continued on next page.)
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The only other evidence available is analytical. POPOV was transferred to the Illegals handling unit in Berlin on 28 June 1957, an assignment of high sensitivity. Until mid-August he handled five Illegals, thereafter only one, TAIROVA, in October 1957. Following home leave from 12 December 1957 to 19 January 1958, he was again transferred, this time to a position where Illegals and productive GRU sources of intelligence were not exposed to him. Between March and November 1958 there were signs of a KGB investigation of the Illegals handling unit where POPOV formerly served, and he was recalled to Moscow in November of that year. These facts can be interpreted as follows::- POPOV's status as a CIA source was not compromised before his transfer to the Illegals handling unit.- POPOV's status was compromised before his recall to Moscow in November 1958, probably before his reassignment from the Illegals handling unit in January 1958, and possibly some time earlier. The latter possibility is apparent from the Soviets' knowledge that the TAIROVA couple was under surveillance in December 1957 (and until March 1958); it is also noteworthy that, after having met five Illegals in less than one and one-half months prior to 13 August 1957, POPOV subsequently was involved personally with only one other, TAIROVA, in October 1957.- The KGB, realizing that POPOV was a CIA source, chose to keep him in Berlin until November 1958 in order to investigate the possibility of his operating in conjunction with other CIA sources.This line of reasoning, if accepted, would confirm GOLITSYN's information that a KGB agent compromised POPOV prior to the arrival of ZHUKOV in Berlin, an arrival date falling some time before 23 November 1957.(Footnotes from preceeding page.)*****Since such orientation papers are written for general circulation within the KGB, it is doubtful that KGB security practices would permit their contents to reveal sensitive information; other sources have indicated that orientation papers sometimes are sanitized; this particular paper, however, reportedly did state that the KGB learned from an agent in about 1957 (GOLITSYN's estimate) that American Intelligence had a source which had provided GRU information.******This date, which is consistent with that cited in the final sentence of the preceeding footnote, was derived from the time when POPOV reported the presence of the KGB officer ZHUKOV in Berlin; according to GOLITSYN, ZHUKOV was sent to Berlin after POPOV had been identified by a KGB agent as being a source of CIA.TOP SECRET
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665. (111) RemarksThe completeness and accuracy of NOSEIKO's information on the compromise of POPOV, supported as it is by ![blacked out word] and the CHEREPANOV document and POPOV's message but contradicted by GOLITSYN and analytical evidence, cannot be finally evaluated. Only with resolution of the *bona fides* of NOSENKO can a judgment be made on this part of his production.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 65]
666. b. Compromise of PENKOVSKY(1) IntroductionBecause his direct responsibility for coverage of ABIDIAN is an essential element in NOSENKO's story of his 1960-1951 career, because he insists that the KGB had no idea of U.S. involvement in the PENKOVSKIY case until Richard JACOB went to the Fushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962, and because he is adamant on the point that the KGB until almost the end of the PENKOVSKIY case knew of no connection between PENKOVSKIY and the Fuschin Street site which ABIDIN visited, NOSEIKO's story of the compromise of PENKOVSKIY appears to bear directly on the question of COSEIKO's bona fides. Each of the various versions of the compromise c: PENKOVSKIY must be examined and compared with NOSENKO's story and with the established facts.**(ii) DiscussionSources agree on the cause, and two on the timing. NOSENKO, and the "official KGB report" attribute the compromise to the fact that surveillance detected a meeting between Mrs. CHISHOLM and the Soviet whom the KGB later identified as PENKOVSKIY. NOSENKO dated this as around November or December 1961, the official report stated this occurred on 30 December 1961, and did not give a date.gave the cause as surveillance, but of Greville WYNNE and PENKOVSKIY rather than Mrs. CHISHOLM, and stated that the compromise dated from May 1962. gave two different accounts, one that PENKOVSKIY was investigated for reasons unrelated to any suspicions of espionage and was thereby found out as a spy, the other that his excessive spending and sale of foreign merchandise led to an investigation which resulted in detection of his espionage activities. She placed the timing of the first version in 1951, without citing the time of year; in the second, she associated the timing with a warning against association with PENKOVSKIY which she and her husband received in about November 1961.Since* See Pages 535-547 for discussion of this case.**It does not seem unusual for several sources to have reported on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY: Presumably this was the subject of widespread discussion within the two Soviet services, for it was covered in the Soviet press and ir. at least one "official report" disseminated by the KGB. Although their differing situations within the Soviet services could partially explain the differing versions that these sources have given, some of them nevertheless have claimed either direct knowledge of the compromise or specially informed sub-sources. Therefore the discrepancies among the reporting of NOSENKO on the PENKOVSKIY compromise, the accounts by other sources, and the facts on the handling of the case by CIA and MI-6 are pertinent to the question of NOSEIKO'S bona fides.
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DATE 4/12/94LOST/MISSING MATERIALTHE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSINGDURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICALREVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE.DOCUMENT NO. DATED:___________ORPAGE(S) 667FROM:CIA JOB NO. ___________BOX NO. JFK Reel 46FOLDER NO. 2
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668PEIKOVSKIY that he had visited the site after he chose it in 1960, although it is possible, especially as he had not been informed of ABIDIN having been sent to check on a possible signal from him about the dead dron.that the ABIDIAN visit was not the first observed activity at Pushkin Street to stir KGB investigative interest in the site. As the report states, when massive surveillance of U.S. Embassy targets detected an American visiting this address the first time, he was not followed inside by surveillants, but on the second occasion he was followed closely and the surveillant observed that he was kneeling down apparently tying his shoe. went on to say that, although this was not very unusual, it was sufficient to arouse suspicion in view of the fact that this American had been observed visiting the same address on two occasions for no apparent reason. There is no question about the fact that ASIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street drop site on one occasion only, and that was on 30 December 1961. The reference to this as a second visit to this address by an American from the Embassy is a clear indication that the KGB had surveilled the first such visit, which was made by the CIA officer MAHONEY** in January 1961, and not by ABIDIAN. Thus where erred by indicating one American went to Pushkin Street twice, the KGB must have known that MAHONEY went there first, in January 1951, and ABIDIAN went there next, on 30 December 1961. said that the 24-hour fixed surveillance resulted from the second visit, and because of it PSIKOVSKIY was subsequently observed to enter the vestibule of this address but did not visit anyone there. It was determined that no one living at that address kne PEKOVSKIY and he became a target of KGB suspicion and investigation.The rest of the story is completely in disagreement with the facts of the case and does not warrant discussion here. It must be noted, nonetheless, that this is the only instance among all the versions which places the compromise on the American side of the case, and the only one which makes a direct connection between the Pushkin Street dead drop and the KGB detection of PENKOVSKIY. (All others attribute the compromise to surveillance of British Embassy personnel, and NOSENKO claimed that the KGB was unadare of American Intelligence participation until the operation was terminated.) It is also in direct conflict with NOSENKO, who had no knowledge of any U.S. Embassy official visiting the Pushkin Street site prior to ABIDIAN. In this regard, NOSENKO insisted that the date of ABIDIAN'S visit* ABIDIAN reported that a woman entered the vestibule behind him while he was in there, and he knelt down pretending to tie his shoelaces until she proceeded past him and on up the stairs.**NOSENKO was not aware that MAHONEY had been identified to the KGB as a CIA officer well before MAHONEY'S October 1960 arrival in Moscow.