Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 51]
that my mother had saved and valuable property, etc. My mother many times offered to divide all this in three parts: for me, my brother, and for her, but I suggested that we not do this before her death. And, of course, my mother will not leave my children without attention, and my share of the property and the money will be given to my children."14. If the defections of PETROV, RASTVOROV and DERYABIN passed without evoking any particular thoughts, the defection to the United States of GOLIT-SYN, whom I had heard of as an intelligent person and a capable officer, undoubtedly caused me to think very deeply. Because to act thus, it is necessary to have not only boldness and decisiveness, but also great strength of will. And already I put to myself the question, will I be able to act thus in view of the dissatisfactions and disillusionments which had accumulated inside of me?"15. Being in Geneva in 1962, not long before my departure I myself of my own desire entered into contact with you. The reason for this was the loss of money received by me for operational expenses. I would have been unable to accumulate such a sum of money before my departure and there was nobody to borrow from (at this time GUK was himself in finan- cial difficulty and at the same time he was already preparing for his return home). To tell the truth about the loss of the money would have meant that it would be necessary to explain whore and in what cir- cumstances it had been lost. This would have risked expulsion from the KGB and a serious reprimand from the Party. Not to tell the truth, to think up some sort of a story--they wouldn't believe, and worst of all, they might think that I had appropriated the money, that is, stolen it. And this would be for me the worst of all and I would, of course, in such event have told the truth."16. To tell the truth, it was only after my return home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not immediately, began fully to realize all the seriousness of my contact with you and its full meaning. And although I did not give you any promises or assurances about our continued contact in the future, I under- stood that you sooner or later would set yourself the task of continuing our contact. And here it was that weighing up all the reasons and causes which I have indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself the decision to leave the USSR at the first opportunity and that I started to work towards being sent on a trip abroad."17. Of course, I wanted to come abroad with some sort of 'baggage', that is, with materials which could be useful and necessary for you. In this entire period up to January 1964 I tried to collect information which would be of the maximum value for you. My assignment to the position of deputy chief of the Seventh Depart- ment in July 1962 gave me a greater opportunity than before. But at the same time this assignment almost
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excluded the possibility of a trip abroad and "it was only with great difficulty that I was able to get away for the trip in January 1964. It was necessary to convince CHELNOKOV and then to ask CHELNOKOV to convince BOBKOV and in 1963 to convince KOVALENKO. In this I advanced many reasons: that I had not spent all the money (in foreign currency); that the medicine which I bought for my daughter had proven very successful and that I needed to buy some more medicine to carry out one more series of treatments; that this trip would not be a long one and that since I was already the deputy chief of the Department I would not be able to travel abroad any more and so, therefore, this trip would probably be my last. Of course, all this was said at convenient moments and outside of work. Things were easier with the Eleventh Department (which deals with trips abroad) because I was on good terms with PENCHENKO who covered Switzerland, besides which when I came back from Geneva in 1962 I had brought him a number of presents."18. The publication in 1963 by the foreign press of the VASSALL case put me on my guard since in the newspaper Times it said outright that the English learned about him thanks to the Americans who learned about VASSALL in the spring of 1962. Fortunately, the leadership of the FCD, as I learned from GUK, CHURANOV, and TARABRIN, came to the conclusion that here the Americans had been helped by GOLITSYN. But at the same time the FCD was not completely sure of this. But the publication in the American press of Alsop's articles on the CIA alarmed me extremely. This article in one spot said plainly that as far as is known the KGB does not have any sources in the CIA while at the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB. From this moment, I do not conceal this fact, I began to feel afraid that the KGB would somehow learn of my contact with you. This article deeply 'interested' the KGB."19. During the closed trial of PENKOVSKIY I got a pass in the Second Department and went in order to look at him myself. For sometimes it is enough to simply look at a man, to see how he holds himself and to hear how he speaks in order to form some sort of an initial opinion of him. Personally, I liked how PENKOVSKIY held himself at the trial; I liked his appearance and I understood that everything which had been said in the KGB about him and the sort of person they were trying to make him out to be (that he was morally degraded, that he had descended and sunk into a swamp) that all this was nonsense, bluff, and chatter. And PENKOVSKIY, the same as GOLITSYN, gave me a feeling of greater confidence in the correctness of the decision taken by me to leave the Soviet Union.26 July 1964Signed: Yú. NOSENKO"
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# NOSENKO'S Activities in Geneva## 1. IntroductionThe extent to which NOSENKO made himself available for meetings with CIA in Geneva in 1962 and 1964 is reviewed here in connection with his statements about the KGB duties assigned to him for these trips, his visits to the KGB Legal Residency, and his personal association with other Soviets. Although NOSENKO was not precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, he did indicate that he was his own boss, disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. At the first meeting with CIA in 1962 he accounted for his freedom of movement by saying: "I can come and go as I please at any time. (Ambassador) ZORIN knows who I am, almost the entire delegation knows who I am, because I don't need to pretend. Nobody pays any attention to me. They know that I am not a Ministry of Foreign Affairs man (at the conference sessions). I sit, listen, leaf through some papers. For this reason I can leave the conference at any time, or I do not come at all, and no one will say a word to me." CIA made no attempt to place NOSENKO under surveillance in 1962 and 1964, and thore is no evidence from other sources confirming or disproving NOSENKO'S statements about his activities while away from the CIA safehouse.## 2. Official Duties in GenevaIn 1962 NOSENKO said he was the sole KGB officer in the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation. To assist him in carrying out these security officer functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. In addition, NOSENKO had the specific mission of checking on suspicions attached to one of the delegation members, P. F. SHAKHOV[^1] but by the time he established contact with CIA, he said, this assignment had already been completed.In 1964, NOSENKO said his only operational task then was to handle the general security responsibilities for the Soviet delegation, as he had done in 1952. There was no specific mission such as the one concerning SHAKHOV in 1962.NOSENKO has described his investigations of SHAKHOV, but he has never indicated either that he conducted security checks of other delegation members in 1962 and 1964, or that he received any security-type information (except on SHAKHOV) from the KGB cooptees who were supposed to be reporting to him. Likewise, NOSENKO has not said that he prepared communications for KGB Headquarters regarding his clandestine assignments in Geneva.## 3. Visits to the KG3 Legal ResidencyVirtually every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for more than a day or two, the Legal Resident, S. I. GAVRICHEV, would invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himself.I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL also arrived with the delegation in March 1962 but had left Geneva by the time NOSENKO contacted CIA.[^1]: SHAKHOV is discussed further in Part II.3.1.
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In 1964 NOSENKO confirmed that he had spent much time with KISLOV in Geneva two years before and that they had become very friendly. For the first time, NCSENKO reported that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact while in the United States, that he had been introduced to KISLOV by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to his departure for Geneva in 1962 in order to be able to exploit him during the Geneva Conference, and that after returning from Geneva KISLOV had been recruited as a KGB agent on the basis of a favorable report NOSENKO had prepared.Often during the 1962 meetings NOSENKO spoke of his "big, big friend" GUK, whom he described as the Deputy Legal Resident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the KGB Legal Residency. He implied that his friendship with GUK, a former member of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, was of longstanding. NOSENKO related that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva. They often went out together to chat and have a few drinks, and as a consequence, NOSENKO was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations there. In 1964 NOSENKO told CIA he found it difficult to obtain information on the activities of the Geneva Legal Residency because he no longer had a good friend there like GUK, who had been reassigned to KGB Headquarters. When questioned later in 1964 about his relationship with GUK, NOSENKO said he had come to know GUK well only during his 1962 TDY in Geneva.6. Availability for Meetings with CIAIn speaking to David MARK on 6 June 1962, NOSENKO expressed displeasure over MARK's insistence on deferring their luncheon (at which NOSENKO sought contact with American Intelligence) until three days later. When the first meeting with CIA did take place on 9 June 1962, NOSENKO stayed for three hours, and it was at his suggestion that another meeting was scheduled for 11 June. This second meeting in 1962 lasted seven hours. NOSENKO remained in Geneva until 15 June, and in the interim he met CIA officers three more times for over seven hours altogether. He offered to meet again on the day of his departure, but this proposal was rejected as needlessly endangering his security.From the first 1964 meeting on 23 January to his defection on 4 February, NOSENKO was met a total of 13 times, the sessions lasting for five or six hours. He was able to come to the CIA safehouse every day but one, and this opportunity was skipped at the request of the CIA handlers. By mutual consent, most of the meetings started in the afternoon, but on two occasions NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours; several meetings went on until past midnight. NOSENKO appeared to be totally at the disposal of CIA, to be the master of his time, and to have no other demands for his attention except for the visits to the KGB Legal Residency, "looking in" on an occasional session of the Disarmament Conference, and attendance at a reception.
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# E. Timing of DefectionAfter telling CIA on 24 January 1964 of his decision to defect, NOSENKO at the same meeting concurred when CIA gave operational and administrative reasons for him to stay in place until the middle of February. During the week that followed, the date of the defection was moved up to 8 February in accordance with NOSENKO's wishes and with his reports indicating that less information of value would be forthcoming than CIA had at first thought. On 4 February, however, NOSENKO reported that he was being recalled to Moscow for a conference on foreign tourism in the USSR, and he therefore placed himself in CIA custody on that date.* Details on the timing of NOSENKO's defection are given in the following paragraphs.At the 24 January meeting the CIA case officers agreed in principle with NOSENKO's decision to defect. NOSENKO felt that it would be best for him to disappear from Geneva without a trace, leaving all his personal possessions behind; he assumed that CIA could exfiltrate him from Switzerland to the United States. He wanted to carry out this plan as soon as possible, but the CIA officers encouraged him--and NOSENKO agreed--to remain in place for at least three weeks more. The reasons given NOSENKO for this request were:*   The desire to get information on the local KGB Legal Residency and the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference while he still had access to this information;*   The value of having NOSENKO present when O.Μ. GRIBANOV made a visit to Geneva about 7 February a visit known to CIA only through NOSENKO;***   The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO'S in place spotting of CIA recruitment targets among the Soviet representation in Geneva;*   The necessity of making arrangements, acceptable to NOSENKO, for his defection and resettlement.The events which followed NOSENKO's agreement to remain in place for a short time longer are chronicled below:[^1] The report of NOSENKO's recall to Moscow for the conference on tourism is discussed further in Part III.F.[^2] GRIBANOV was in 1964 the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate and, according to NOSENKO and other sources, the sponsor of NOSENKO's rapid rise in State Security. Several sources, have reported that GRIBANOV was fired from the KGB as a result of NOSENKO's defection (Part III.I.). NOSENKO's relationship with GRIBANOV is discussed in Part V.H.
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# 26 January 1964:In a three-and-a-half hour meeting, NOSENKO emphasized that although he agreed that it was necessary and useful for him to remain in place until the GRIBANOV visit to Geneva, he wanted to defect as soon as possible thereafter.# 28 January 1964:NOSENKO reported that GRIBANOV might not be coming to Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman SEMICHASTNYY was apparently reluctant to permit him to travel beyond Vienna. NOSENKO said that he would probably have definite information on GRIBANOV's trip by the end of the week.# 30 January 1964:At the seventh meeting of the series, NOSENKO said that there now appeared to be little likelihood that GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris. Therefore, he wanted to defect right away. As reasons he cited the emotional strain of any further delay and the fact that he and his case officers were wasting their time working against the local KGB Legal Residency, which had no worthwhile or promising targets. lle also felt that nothing of value could be obtained from the Soviet delegation because "TSARAPKIN himself doesn't know what he will say until he is told by Moscow the day before." The CIA handlers, however, delayed the defection for one week by cbtaining NOSENKO'S agreement to assist in an audio operation: CIA proposed to install listening devices in the offices of the KGB Legal Residency, and NOSENKO said he would check certain physical aspects of the delegation buildings. As the best time for the defection, he suggested Saturday morning, 8 February, because he probably would not be missed until the following Monday. This date was tentatively scheduled, and NOSENKO again repeated his desire simply to "disappear without a trace." He also asked about exfiltration plans.# 31 January 1964:NOSENKO reported the results of his reconnaissance of the KGB Legal Residency in connection with the proposed audio operation, which would invoive microphone transmitters operating on a carrier current. He told CIA he had accidentally overheard in the Residency that the building used its own batteries and generator, and therefore the scheme would not work. He repeated his willingness to remain in place until the arrival of the CHEREPANOV Papers, which he was told were enroute from Washington. He explained that he had felt pressure at the previous meeting because of an imminent move by the delegation from its hotel to the Soviet villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappearance would be noticed more quickly. This move, he had now learned, had been postponed pending the arrival of a housekeeping officer from Moscow.*   From 7 to 10 February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris, where he was seen on the street with a Soviet identified by NOSENKO as a KGB counterintelligence officer. There is no evidence that he visited Switzerland.** See Part VI.D.7.c for further details on CHEREPANOV.
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# 1 February 1964:At NOSENKO's request, it was firmly agreed that the Jeicction would take place in the morning of 8 February, NOSENKO said that he assumed that exfiltration would be by automobile to West Germany and thence by plane to the United States. llis case officers.confirmed that this was correct.# 3 February 1964:NOSENKO reviewed the CHEREPANOV materials. The defection was stili scheduled for Saturday, S February.# 4 February 1964:NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safe-house from his hotel room in the early afternoon and said: "I want to come now and not go back." After arriving he explained that when he dropped by the KGB Legal Residency following the morning session of the Disarmament Conference, he read a cable ordering him to return to Moscow immediately to prepare for a KGB conference on foreign tourism in the Soviet Union. The residency was arranging for a ticket for NOSENKO to fly to Moscow via Paris the following day, and a replacement was being readied to assume NOSENKO's duties as security officer for the Soviet Delegation in Geneva; he was not told who the replacement would be. Before he had left for Geneva in January, NOSENKO then related, the Soviet Government had been deliberating the question of expanding foreign tourism in the USSR and had agreed to open a number of new cities and tourist itineraries in this connection. SEMICHASTNYY had now decided that it was time to call a conference to discuss new "tactics and strategies" for handling the increased number of tourists expected. Since NOSENKO had been placed in charge of the entire conference, he was directed to leave at once to prepare a basic report on the KGB handling of tourists; the report would be read to the conference either by himself or by someone from the leadership of the KGB or the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO explained that he was the only one who could do this job as Lt. Col. A.G. KOVALENKO, the KGB Headquarters Department senior officer, was a relatively new man in this line of operations, having been there only four or five years, perhaps less. NOSENKO also told CIA that "by great coincidence" he had learned, just before the cable arrived, he was being moved to the Soviet villa on the morning of 5 February. Ile had arranged for a Soviet chauffeur to bring a car around at 0930 hours the next morning for the move. llis absence would be noted at that time, and therefore "the main thing is to cross the Swiss border before morning." NOSENKO felt, however, that there would be considerable confusion among the Soviets in Geneva for a time following his disappearance, and that there would be no real concern until the evening. To foster Soviet uncertainty he had left his clothing lying around his hotel room and had brought no personal effects to the CIA safe-house. NOSENKO estimated the first Soviet queries to Swiss* See Part III.F.TOP SECRET
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37. authorities would probably be made late on 5 February or early on the 6th.NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February and remained in a safehouse there until 11 February, when press publicity about the defection and Soviet demands for an immediate interview with NOSENKO prompted the Director of Central Intelligence to order that he be brought to Washington as soon as possible. He arrived in the evening of 12 February.TOP SECRET
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F. The Recall TelegramOn arriving at the safehouse at 1515 on 4 February 1964 NOSENKO related that on the preceding day, 3 February, he had been to the KGB Legal Pesidency during the day and again in the evenir.g. ('e had met with CIA from 1200 to 1800 hours on 3 February.) lic related tast as of that time "everything was quiet and peaceful," an: he received four personal letters from Moscow. NOSEIKO said that on the morning of 4 February he had again stoppe in at the Residency, but "nothing was going on." Later in the morning, however, after attending a session of the Disarrament Conference, NOSENKO learned that the coded telegram described alove had arrived from Moscow crdering him to return invernately to Moscow to participate in the KGE conference on tourism.> [Figure: Image of a telegram or communication, heavily redacted]Special intelligence imiccates, however, that no cable traffic at all was sent from Moscow to Geneva from the late afternoon of 3 February 1964 until the morning of 5 February, the day after the defection. (Two priority cables of unusual length, 247 and 207 groups, were transmitted to Geneva at 1901 and 1915 hours Greenwich time on 3 February; there was no traffic on 4 February, and the next message passed was a routine cable originated by Moscow at 0755 hours on 5 February.)On 26 October 1966, while being questioned about the circumstances of his defection, NOSENKO was asked about this telegram which reculled him to Moscow. NOSENKO said that there was no such telegram, and that he had invented it in order to defect as soon as possible because he was nervous and afraid his contacts with American Intelligence in Geneva might be noticed by Soviet authorities. After detailed questioning on this point, NOSENKO voluntarily signed a statement with the following wording.."On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in Geneva that a telegram from KGB Headquarters in Moscow
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TOP SECREThad been received in the KGB Residency in Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said at the time that this telegram said that I was recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent interviews and interrogations by American authorities in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that the story was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous and afraid that ay contacts with American Intelligence might be noticed."