Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 28]
*the Soviet Union.* Exfiltration plans were then implemented and NOSENKO was driven across the border to Germany that same night. Debriefings resumed in a Frankfurt safehouse. The decision was reached on 11 February to bring NOSENKO to the United States, and in the early even..ng of 12 February he and his CIA escorts arrived in Washington via commercial aircraft, thence to a safehouse in the Washington area.At the request of the Swiss and Soviet Governments, NOSENKO met on 14 February with representatives of their respective Washington Embassies in the offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service. He told both that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In answer to the questions of the Soviet representatives, he orally renounced his status and rights as a citizen of the USSR.CIA completed its initial debriefings of NOSENKO on 18 February, and on 24 February he was introduced to representatives of the FBI for questioning. At about the same time, there was a marked decline in NOSENKO's discipline: He became evasive and uncooperative, refusing to answer some of the questions of his debriefers, both CIA and FBI; his nightlife in Washington and nearby cities was punctuated by drinking bouts, crude behavior, and disputes with his security escort. He explained these actions by saying that he was under great tension as a result of his defection, abandonment of his wife and children, and the disgrace that he had brought to his family name. It was against this background that CIA acceded to NOSENKO's demand for a vacation. On 12 March, therefore, NOSENKO left Washington with a CIA case officer and two CIA security guards for a two-week vacation in Hawaii. There his behavior deterioriated still further: He drank heavily and almost constantly; he engaged in sexual acts with a number of prostitutes; he was loud and crude in public places; and he spent money extravagently ($800 on one prostitute) and conspicuously (a $100 bill for a restaurant tip).During NOSENKO's absence, consultations were held with the FBI concerning steps to be taken to restrict his movements and activities. Both agencies feared that his behavior would bring about unwanted attention and publicity, perhaps police arrest, and that doubts about his *bona fides*, which were becoming known to a widening group of people in the U.S. Government, might be inadvertently revealed to NOSENKO himself. The FBI on 1 April said it would "not interpose objection" to the CIA plan to limit NOSENKO's freedom of movement. The Acting Attorney General, the Department of State, and the White House were also notified of the CIA pian at this time.In the morning of 4 April NOSENKO was driven to another safehouse in a Washington suburb, ostensibly only for a polygraph examination. At the safehouse NOSENKO was given a routine polygraph examination, lasting over three hours; he* See Parts III E and III F for further discussions of this cable.
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 29]
6. "reacted significantly" to questions concerning his intentions in defecting to the United States and other related matters.* He was then told that he would remain at this safehouse, which thenceforward was his regular place of residence. Since this time NOSENKO has had contacts with CIA personnel only, has been under full-time guard, and has not been permitted access to news media.Detailed interrogation of NOSENKO was begun on 4 April 1964 in order to obtain information which he had been reluctant to give in debriefings, and to clarify contradictions in what he had already reported. This phase of the interrogations was terminated on 24 April 1964.Despite the searching nature of the questions and the implicit and explicit doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO proved himself willing to answer, or to try to answer, questions put to him. Because much more information pertinent to the question of his *bona fides* had to be obtained, a new phase of interrogation was begun in mid-May 1964. Different interrogators were introduced and questioning was resumed in a neutral, non-hostile manner. The period of neutral questioning continued until mid-November 1964.After further consultations with the FBI, a new round of hostile interrogations began on 26 January 1965. NOSENKO was questioned for a total of about 140 hours by individual interrogators and by interrogation teams consisting of two or three men, and he was directly challenged on many of his previous reports. He admitted that certain of his earlier statements had been incorrect, and that he could not explain contradictions in his testimony. Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained he had been basically truthful, and that he had come to the United States solely for the reasons he had originally given. This interrogation was broken off on 5 March 1965.Questioning of NOSENKO during the summer and autumn of 1964 and the interrogations of January and February 1965 concentrated on the period of his claimed service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from January 1960 to January 1962. Among the reasons for selecting this particular period were the comparatively large amount of collateral information available against which NOSENKO's statements could be checked; the importance of the U.S. Embassy and its personnel as the outstanding KGB Second Chief Directorate targets; their importance from the standpoint of American security; and the extent of NOSENKO's knowledge about the activities of the U.S. Embassy Section, in his capacity as its Deputy Chief.In keeping with Soviet practice, CIA asked NOSENKO in February 1965 to sign a series of interrogation reports, so-called "protocols," most of which concern the period of his claimed service in the American Department. These were written by the CIA interrogators, and they were designed to incorporate* See Part VII.C. for a further discussion of the polygraph tests.
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 30]
# 7.NOSENKO's exact statements and meaning on various specific subjects. The protocols were in no way presented to NOSENKO as documentary portions of a "confession," but rather as distilled and final statements of what he did and did not know concerning particular topics. NOSENKO was asked to read each page of each protocol carefully and to sign his name at the bottom to indicate that he understood and agreed with its contents; he was allowed the use of a dictionary and was permitted to ask any questions and make any changes that he wished. (Amendments were entered by the interrogators and were initialed by NOSENKO.) NOSENKO was asked, after reading each page and after completing the entire protocol, whether he understood what was written there and whether there were any more changes he wished to make. He was then asked to sign and date the statement, "I have read and understood this report and certify it as correct," at the end of the final page. With one exception, which will be noted later, he did so calmly and without objections, although on one or two of them he remarked that his statements were presented in such a manner as to make them look foolish; although invited to do so, he was not able to suggest any changes of fact or presentation which would make them more accurate. Commenting on the use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said on 4 March 1965: "My life story is absolutely correct. Anytning I have signed is absolutely correct. I absolutely understand what I am doing when I am signing any paper. This is an official document, and I fully understand what I'm doing when I sign it as being absolutely correct."In May 1965 a CIA psychologist questioned NOSENKO in detail on his life from birth until 1953, when he said he entered the KGB, in an attempt to gain additional insights into his character and personality.Further questioning was conducted from 26 July until 14 August 1965 with the participation of Peter DERYABIN, a former KGB officer. These interrogations, the first to be held in Russian, were for the purpose of using DERYABIN's first-hand experience in the KGB to obtain a clearer understanding of NOSENKO's personal and professional background.There were no further debriefings or interrogations until 18 October 1966. On this date NOSENKO was polygraphed on the case of Lee Harvey OSWALD.During the period 19-25 October 1966, NOSENKO was questioned for seven days on specific aspects of selected topics ranging from his identity to his involvement in and knowledge of specific KGB operations. Questioning was in both Russian and English.
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 31]
### OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCESA. Earlier Information on NOSENKO in GenevaNOSENKO's name first came to tho attention of CIA in October 1960 when he applied at the American Embassy in Moscow for a visa to enter the United States as a member of an automotive delegation. The following month CIA obtained copies of his passport photograph at two separate points on his TDY route to Cuba. There was no indication of intelligence affiliation, and when NOSENKO arrived under true name with the Soviet delegation in Geneva in March 1962. he was accorded no more than the interest routinely given by Western intelligence services to Soviets travelling abroad.* After arriving in Switzerland, however, but before establishing contact with CIA, NOSENKO was involved in at least two incidents which brought him to the special notice of the British, Swiss, American, and possibly the west German services.The first of these occurred in April 1962. At a cocktail party in Geneva, NOSENKO met a female secretary employed by the British Foreign Office. He saw her several days later in the corridors of the Palais des Nations and asked her to have dinner with him, and a date was made for several evenings later. According to the secretary's later account as reported by her superiors: "They talked about Marxism, the Chinese, Yugoslavia, and love; NOSENKO was obviously smitten with her, became verbally amorous, and told her that he would like to take her off to a desert island." The girl felt that NOSENKO probably was not interested in her for intelligence purposes, but seemed to be genuinely attracted by her. From her conversations with NOSENKO she was able to report that "he had been in submarines during the war and, according to himself, had risen to the rank of Commander. He was a member of the Communist Party. His father was in the Ministry of Shipping. Ile himself had served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1948 and 1949 and had apparently visited England but had not been stationed there." NOSENKO also told her that he was acquainted with of the publishing house in London.** When NOSENKO became too persistent in his attentions, the secretary reported the contact to her superiors, was withdrawn immediately from Switzerland, and later resigned from the Foreign Office.This same incident also brought NOSENKO to the attention of the Swiss service, which later reported it to CIA, without details, as an attempt on NOSENKO's part to recruit the girl.*Although NOSENKO was described in reports (held by CIA) concerning recruitment approaches to Americans in Moscow prior to his first arrival in Geneva, there was no basis in these reports to identify the Soviet described as NOSENKO. The name NOSENKO did not appear in these earlier reports.** was one of NOSENKO's targets during a 1957 trip to the Soviet Union. NOSENKO used the alias NIKOLAYEV in his contacts with and, in CIA debriefings, gave this as the reason he was forced to use the name NIKOLAYEV in the two trips he made to London in 1957 and 1959. The secretary knew NOSENKO by true name. (See Parts V.D.3.d. and V.E.8. for discussion of )
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 33]
she is no longer here. She got into trouble and I feelsorry for her because maybe they have fired her. Becausethey--the Foreign Office--keep only... Speaking honestly,as a human being, I am concerned that they might fireher. Because there was nothing more to it than this onething."The second event bringing NOSENKO to special notice occurredat about the same time that NOSENKO established contact withCIA and may, in fact, have been the incident which he said drovehim to contact David MARK. On 15 June 1962 (ten days afterNOSENKO approached MARK)thepermanent representative in Geneva, told hishost at luncheon, American Ambassador TUBBY, that two girlsfrom the Ba-Ta-Clan Club, a strip-tease bar in Geneva, had cometo the consulate apparently seeking visas. The girlshad told of two Soviets, one about 30 and the other about 40,who had visited the club recently (no date was provided by). According to the girls,said, thetwo Soviets had attempted to pass themselves off as Americansand had spent "hundreds" of francs drinking at the club. Thename which gave Ambassador TUBBY for one of theseSoviets "soundea ike TISENKOV." From their descriptions, thetwo Soviets were almost certainly NOSENKO and his friend A.K. KIS-LOV.* At his first meeting with CIA NOSENKO said that a weekand a half earlier he spent 1500 Swiss francs in a single nightof drinking and women with KISLOV. The necessity of repayingthis money, taken from KGB operational funds, was the immediatecause of his contact with CIA, according to NOSENKO.*See Part III.D. for further information on KISLOV.
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 36]
# 13.this trip because SHAKHOV, who was suspected of possibly being a Western agent, was to be in the delegation. When the Eleventh Department was looking for a case officer to make this trip they wanted to have a chief of section because of the seriousness of the SHAKHOV case. When they asked in the Seventh Department (V.D.) CHELNOKOV agreed that I should take the assignment. There was no background or neighborhood investigation conducted on me in connection with my being approved for this trip.* My assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department, by the Personnel Office of the Second Chief Directorate, by the Central Personnel Office of the KGB and by the Central Committee of the CPSU."NOSENKO was asked why he had been selected to make this trip immediately after assuming the duties of the Chief of the American Tourist Section, on the eve of the tourist season, and at a time when he had no deputy. He explained that it was not thought that the assignment would last so long, and CHELNOKOV, his superior and friend, had decided to let him go as a "treat."During interrogations of October 1966 NOSENKO was questioned further about his 1962 assignment to Geneva as a security officer. He said that in this capacity he would necessarily know the identity of all other KGB officers serving with the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva. There were only, besides himself, the KGB First Chief Directorate officers M.S. TSYMBAL and I.S. MAYOROV. (CIA, however, has tentatively identified three other delegation members as KGB staff officers: A.K. KISLOV, observed in Washington and in Moscow in what appears to have been KGB operational activity; V.G. FILATOV, who served as an alternate handler in the KGB operation with the NATO officer Georges PAQUES; and Oleg GRINEVSKIY, a member of the permanent Soviet Delegation who handled a double agent during this same conference.) NOSENKO included GRINEVSKIY in the list of his own agents in Geneva in 1962 and said that, in Moscow, GRINEVSKIY was handled by an officer of the Intelligentsia and Correspondents Department of the Second Chief Directorate. KISLOV, according to NOSENKO, was an operational contact in Moscow of the Austria-Germany-Scandanavia Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate and was used in operations against the West German Embassy there. NOSENKO also said that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact during his earlier tour in the United States but was neither then nor later a KGB officer. He characterized FILATOV as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs.official and stated that he is "definitely not an intelligence officer."NOSENKO was also requestioned during these interrogations on his investigation of SHAKHOV. After saying on the morning of 19 October 1966 that he had been personally told by the* NOSENKO has said that in 1960 he was turned down for a permanent assignment to Ethiopia because of his excessive drinking. (See Part V.E.4.a)
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 37]
Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate that the SHAKHOV investigation was the main reason for his assignment to Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO later in the day stated: "My main task was to check the security of the delegation, plus SHAKHOV. You can't separate these tasks."In this questioning NOSENKO described the basis for the suspicions of SHAKHOV, the lack of results from earlier investigations, and his own preparation for this assignment. He said that as a representative of the Soviet Delegations Department of the Second Chief Directorate, M.G. SITNIKOV had conducted investigations of SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961, but SITNIKOV was unable to resolve the questions concerning him. Because of the failure of these early efforts, the KGB decided to send "a senior guy" to the Disarmament talks in 1962, and NOSENKO was chosen "to finish things up." Before leaving Moscow in March 1962, NOSENKO therefore discussed the SHAKHOV case with SITNIKOV and with one (ſnu) LYALIN, the Soviet Delegations Department officer in charge of the SHAKHOV case; he also read various materials on the case, including an investigative plan drawn up by LYALIN. NOSENKO's description of these preparations provided the basis for the questioning which followed:Question: Why was SHAKHOV under suspicion in June 1962?NOSENKO: He was working with different delegations at different conferences and, being in Geneva, it was noticed that there was something which can be described as a connection with David MARK, who was considered a CIA officer.* Also, little, little, little things before.Question: When did SHAKHOV and MARK first meet? How did it begin?NOSENKO: In '60 or '61 there was a contact with MARK. I don't remember who reported it. The report was maybe from SITNIKOV in Geneva. MARK was known to the Second Chief Directorate as the Rezident [CIA Chief of Station] in Moscow. After Moscow he went to Geneva, and it was considered he must be the Rezident in Geneva. All the KGB officers going there were told to pay attention to him.Question: What about the report?NOSENKO: Maybe the officers saw the two going to the toilet. Maybe there was a contact. The file said "maybe." I was sent to Geneva to carry*As stated earlier, MARK was not a CIA officer in Moscow, although he did perform certain clandestine tasks for CIA. He had no CIA missions in Geneva in 1962. Within the context of discussion of NOSENKO's security officer duties during October 1966, NOSENKO was asked to name any CIA officers he knew to be present in Geneva during the 1962 disarmament talks. MARK was the only one he cited.
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 38]
2. The 1964 TDYout measures to check... There were many little, little things. MARK maybe turned his head a certain way when SHAKHOV was talking. [S.M.] GOLUBE", formerly of the Fourteenth (Counterintelligence) Department, was in the Soviet Delegation with SHAKHOV.* He noticed little details. When the officers in the United States decided to terminate SHAKHOV [as an agent], they wrote a report on him which said he was liking life in the U.S.--American products, money. He was pictured as not good and, in addition, he was not wanting to work as an agent.NOSENKO'S 1964 trip to Geneva, commencing on 19 January, was also in the capacity of security officer with the Soviet Disarmament Delegation. He said he was the only security officer for the group, which consisted of about 25 persons, and again he was officially listed as an "expert." NOSENKO reported that he had three or four agents within the delegation and an equal number of operational contacts. The only person whom he was instructed to watch in particular was A.A. TKACHEV, an interpreter, who had travelled to Austria in 1960 and 1961 and who, the KGB had noted, was in the habit of going about by himself. Other than this, according to NOSENKO, his responsibilities were general in nature.NOSENKO explained during the February 1965 interrogations how he was selected for this TDY. The protocol he signed on 26 February 1965 states: "GRIBANOV had absolutely nothing to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1964. The fitness report on me for this trip was signed by (F.D.) BOBKOV. For the 1964 trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU was required for me or for any other members of the delegation who had been approved for the 1962 trip. It was my own personal wish to make this trip in 1964 and I had discussed the question with (V.D.) CHELNOKOV even in 1963 and had received his agreement. I had also talked about this with (M.V.] KHLOBUSTOV and (G.) PANCHENKO (both of the Soviet Delegations Department). After it had been decided that I would go, in about the beginning of January 1964, (N.T.) ZIHARIKOV, the Chief of the Department, suggested that a case officer might not be required with this delegation. KHLOBUSTROV, PANCHENKO, and [A.G.] KOVALENKO (Chief of the Tourist Department and NOSENKO's immediate supervisor) supported me for the assignment as a personal favor to me." With regard to GRIBANOV's knowledge of his assignment to Geneva this second time, NOSENKO said that he feared that if GRIBANOV learned about the TDY he would have said, "What, again?" and would not have permitted him to go. It was for this reason that NOSENKO did not discuss the trip with GRIBANOV, he said, and he did not believe that GRIBANOV, in fact, knew anything about it.*GOLUBEV was also identified by sensitive source as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer. According to the was one of several KGB officers forced to leave the United States in 1964 because he was well known to NOSENKO. There is no record in CIA files that GOLUBEV has ever been to Switzerland.