Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 180]
## 2. NOSENKO's Background and CareerDate of Information Source Information Reported by10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964) NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGR for approximately 16 years, since about 1947, and was an employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the Ukraine.10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)The photograph which appeared in U.S. newspapers is not that of ROSENKO. ** worked with NOSENKO for several years in FGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his follow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate.10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)"It appeared quite certain that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB."19 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 20 February 1964)... identified by as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at
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![Document Page photo]TOP SECRET775.
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776. (Reported to the FBI on 20 Febru 1964)(Reported to the FBI on 22 Febrbary 1964)(Reported to CIA by the FBi or 8 February 19651was asked whether he felt NOSENKO actually defected or whether he felt the defection might be a "trick" by the KGB. replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO'S defection was not a "trick" by the KGR.NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. It is assumed by the KGB that he is familiar with the number and location of microphones in the U.S. Embassy.Frior to NOSENKO'S defection he was Deputy to the Chief of a department in the Second Chief Directorate. While working in the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow on three separate occasions participated in conferences between "important people" of the Second Chief Directorate and the Seventh Directorate, NOSENKO was present at all of these. Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he hel only the rank of captain in the KGB, attributed this (the disparity between job and rank) to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO.![top secret classification]
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DATE 4/12/94LOST/MISSING MATERIALTHE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSING DURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE.DOCUMENT NO. DATED:ORPAGE(S) 777FROM:CIA JOB NO.BOX NO. Reel 46FOLDER NO. 2A
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778. 10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February 1964)10 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 12 February)19 February 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 25 February)Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO would have a great deal of important information which he could impart to intelligence agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them. He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American and British nationals.The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly familiar with all KGB personalities in Geneva and certainly knew some KGB personalities in other countries.NOSENKO had been in the Second Chief Directorate for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure of the KGB and knows many personnel of the First Chief Directorate.NOSENKO, as Deputy to the Chief of the Tourist Department, had in his possession a telephone directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departments had these phone books.**expressed the opinion that "NOSENKO![photo of Top Secret mark]
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779. is much more valuable to the FBI and CIA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he knows so much about the methods of work of tho First and Second Directorates of the KGB and is familiar with so many individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad. that PENKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and British Intelligence with a lot of informa- tion concerning defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence opera- tions of the KGB."NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and departments at KCB Headquarters in Moscow. In FG3 headquarters there are four separate dining rooms for per- sonnel who work there; one such dining room is reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO has a vast know- ledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.*(Reported to theFBI on March 1964)21 Mar 1964 Re-ported to the FBI on23 March---* NOSENKO volunteered for the first time during the January-March 1965 interrogations that he had eaten occasionally in the "chiefs' dining room." He had not mentioned this dining room earlier.![top secret]
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TOP SECRET14-00000780. (Reported to the FBI on 27 March 1964)20 May 1964 (Reported to FBI on 21 May 1964)Reported to CA by the FRI on 11 June 1964* See above; NOSENKO did not mention these directories.*There seems to be unanimous opinion among the KGB chiefs that NOSENKO... could do the KGB a tremendous amount of harm.* NOSENKO in his position as a deputy chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel directory of approximately 30 pages setting forth the identities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by some KGB "chiefs" that if NOSENKO were merely able to make these two directories available to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged for the present and for several years to come.*The KGB was lucky that the Americans found only 40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually, about 200 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the Embassy. feels quite sure that NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information to the Americans which resulted in the microphones being found. It was his opinion that NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40 microphones which were found and does not have any knowledge of the remaining ones.TOP SECRET
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781. (Reported to the FBIon 22 June 196)(Reported to CIAby the FBI on 8February 1905)The general consensus among KGB employees is that in the future the KGB will te feeling sharply the effects of NOSENKO's escape to American Intelligence. NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on several factors: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness to the U.S. Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be familiar with the number of microphones which had been installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a department, NOSENKO would normally have had access to a telephone directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a formidable one in the minds of other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO travelled in a rather influential circle of friends in Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government.These comments cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an "important catch" for American Intelligence, but no one in the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO had concerning the KGB.The amount of damage caused by NOSENKO's defection is "unpredictable." NOSENKO know few employees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad, but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by virtue of seeing them in the dining room which is reserved for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET4. Reyersuasiona of NOSENKO'S Defection19 Fobary 1964 (Reported to the DCI on 20 Feruar)782. TOP SECRET![photo description]
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783. ![image](image)...I YUROCHKIN, a KGB Sct Officer scheduled for Washington, will not be sent to."well known" to NOSENKO. In the course of his cuties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often visited the department where NOSENKO worked and, as a result, NOSENKO is "more than casually acquainted" with him....TOP SECRET* **[illegible]** provided no information concerning power
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TOP SECRET(Reported to FBI on 28 February 1964)(Reported to the FBI on 1 March 1964)(Reported to the FBI on 28 March 1964)784. ![image]![image]![image]Top Depart24 1964TOP SECRET
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20 March 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 31 March 1964)Reported to 29 June24 March 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 25 March 1964)9 April 1964 (Reported to the FBI on 14 April 1964)785. TOP SECRET
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786. (uported te FB:on 5 May 1964)Two committees have been established by the CPSU for the purposes: (a) to determine why KGB employees such as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN, and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad; and (b) to attempt to eliminate "weak" KGB employees and improve the efficiency of the KGB.An investigating commission of the CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances surrounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate employees. These include GRIPANOV, who was also expelled from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief of the Second Chief Directorate atTOP SECRET
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787. the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB.*It was felt that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to defect.Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK. Of the Il other Second Chief Directorate Employees expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO details of operations in which they were working. S.M. GOLUBEV, a KGb Officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for Moscow because the investigating commission had determined that GUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV told NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal Residency. GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO and GOLUBEV were given different assignments within the KGB and thereafter did not associate with one another in the course of their daily activities.See Pages 327-336 in which NCSENKO's description of his relationship with GRIBANOV is discussed.*** NOSENKO identified GOLUBEV by name and photograph as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer, who had served in New York City under United Nations cover in 1960 and 1961. NOSENKO said that he first met GOLUBEV in 1959 and know nothing of his earlier career. Because GOLUBEV had at one point been assigned to Geneva with the Soviet Disarmament. Delegation, NOSENKO went to him in 1962 for a briefing on Foreign Ministry personnel in the delegation before his own assignment to Geneva. NOSENKO said he last saw GOLUBEV in KGB Headquarters in 1963. At that time GOLUBEV was assigned to the New York Direction of the Counter-intelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO said that GOLUBEV had been in this Department as long as he had known him.
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TOP SECRET(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 29 January 1965)788. It is common knowledge among KGB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1961), a summary statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained considerable "compromising information" concerning NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and added the notation: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father.[^1]GRIBANOV has been dismissed from the KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living on a small pension. His dismissal occurred immediately after NOSENKO's defection.[^2] In addition, not less than 50 other people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment has not yet been approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK.(Reported to CIA by the FBI on 3 February 1965)NOSENKO said that his father and GRIBANOV were not acquainted.GRIBANOV was reportedly in operational contact with a senior Western diplomat in Moscow as recently as late autumn of 1964. At that time he turned his contact over to another KGB officer.TOP SECRET[^1]: [^2]:
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Early June 1965 (Reported to CIA by theFI on 29 June 1905)Major General BANNIKOV is currently temporaryChief of the Second Chief Directorate, havingreplaced GRISANOV who was expelled from the KGBbecause he supported NOSENKO in his career."GRIBANOV is working in a small city outsideMoscow as the chief of security at an import-ant military plant and is now a "nothing."After the detection of NOSENKO the KGB conductedan extensive investigation to determine whichemployees knew him and the nature of their rela-tionship. During this TAPABRIN was questioned;he said he know NOSENKO, but only casually andonly because of limited contacts within the KGB.The investigation determined, however, thatTARABRIN and GRISANOV were friends socially andthat TARABRIN attended several parties at whichNOSENKO was present. Girls invited by NOSENKOwere also there. described one suchparty. Thereafter, TARABRIN was afforded a hear-ing and was accused on willfully concealingvital information. As a result he was expelledfrom the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived ofall pension rights.***NOSENKO said that it was PANNIROV to authorized his 1964 trip to Geneva, during which he defected, andthat to the best of his knowledge, GRIRANOV did not know that he (NOSENKO) was making this trip. Never-theless, NOSENKO said that he thought that GRIBANOV might be fired from the KG3 As a result of his defectionbecause he was responsible for pushing me ahead." NOSENKO said that PANNIKOV would not be punished becausehe had done nothing other than support him as a candidate for the 1964 Geneva assignment (see Pages 333-334).NOSENKO reported that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, at which time he be-came Deputy Chief or "Service No. 2," the reorganized Counterintelligence Department of the First ChiefDirectorate.NOSEIKO said he saw GRIBANOV three times socially during his KGB career; on each occasion TARABRIN was present.NOSENKO reported that he provided girls for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN at parties in 1962 and 1963, but not in 1961.He could not recall any details of the 1962 party (e.g., who the girls were, where they went, what they did,etc.). He was, however, able to describe the 1963 party, which took place in October or November, in con-siderable detail
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TOP SECRET23 April 1956790. ![image of document page]TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET793. According to CIA reports, the sequence of events leading up to NOSENKO's confrontation with the Soviets was as follows:*   On the morning of 11 February 1964 the Soviet Embassy delivered a note to the U.S. State Department requesting an interview with NOSENKO, but no reply was given.*   In the early afternoon of 12 February NOSENKO arrived in the State Department.*   On 12 February NOSENKO's agreement to meet the Soviets was obtained, and initial arrangements as to the timing and place of the confrontation were discussed with him and within the U.S. Government.*   Final arrangements were forced upon during the morning of 13 February; the Soviets were then notified, and the confrontation took place late in the afternoon of the same day.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET797. b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIY(i) Introductionand NOSENKO agree on only one aspect of the PENKOVSKIY compromise (see Part VIII.B.6.b.): They both attribute the initial compromise to KGB surveillance. Although report agrees with NOSENKO that the KGB learned of American participation in the operation only after PENKOVSKIY was arrested, subsequent reports contradict this by tying the compromise directly to surveillance of U.S. Embassy personnel visiting the Pushkin Street dead drop site. story of the events stemming from the compromise of the dead drop site is at odds both with the facts of the case and with all other reporting by Soviet sources of CIA and the FBI.(ii) Discussion)report of 1962--the month after the KGB terminated the operation--indicated that the KGB had been aware of PENKOVSKIY's involvement with Americans, and specifically with the CIA officer JACOB, for about two and one half months prior to the arrests. This statement is inaccurate concerning JACOB, who was a last-minute substitute for the servicing of the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962 and who never before had personally participated in the operation. statements otherwise agree with NOSENKO's subsequent report and the "official report" regarding KGB ignorance of the role of American Intelligence in the PENKOVSKIY case.report on the case, however, is contradictory to his first report and to the other sources: He "said in 1963 that surveillance of U.S. Embassy targets detected a visit to the Pushkin Street site by an American, and that the resulting 24-hour surveillance of the site caught PENKOVSKIY visiting the same location, whereupon he was arrested and confessed. CIA, however, has no evidence besides the statements by that PENKOVSKIY ever went to the Pushkin Street site after it was visited by CIA personnel.In 1963 reported at greater length about the role of Pushkin Street in PENKOVSKIY's compromise. At this time he explained that the American had visited Pushkin Street not once but twice: surveillance had observed him on both occasions when he went inside the entrance, but followed him inside only on the second visit. The surveillant who entered the building reported that the American appeared to be tying his shoe; although this was not unusual in itself, continued, the fact that it was the second visit to the same address for no visible purpose caused suspicion, and as a result the KGB installed a closed circuit TV camera to provide 24-hour coverage of the site. PENKOVSKIY was observed checking it (see preceding paragraph): an American was observed loading a dead drop behind a lobby heating unit (radiator); the KGB tagged the dead drop material with a radioactive substance; PENKOVSKIY was observed unloading the dead drop and proceeding to his office where he secreted theTOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET798. material in a concealment area ir his desk; the AGD also continued in serveillance of the dead doo 10, observed PENEOVSKIY load the drop, arded an Azerican (JACOE) who came to load it. FENECTSETY was then confronted with photographic evidence of the loadings and unloadings and could offer no defense. Tais report as the caly indication from a Soviet source at the EGB had surveilled the 150 visits to the Pestki: Street site made by U.S. Ezbassy officers: while report stated that one American visited the site twice, in fact two different Americars visited the site once cach, ARONEY on 21 January 1961 and ABIDIAN on 30 December 1961.(iii)![image](iv) RemarksThe Pushkin Street dead drop was never used for commun1- cation to PENKOVSKIY. and in fact was loaded only once, when the KGP did so and activated it on 2 November 1962, thereby apprehending JACOB. Loreover, the first visit to Pushkin Street, in January 1961, predated any personal contact between PENKOVSKIY and stern Intelligence, either American or British. Thus, report on Americans visiting there is only partially pocurate, and the use of these "surveilled" visits as an explanation for how the KGB detected PENKOVSKIY is unsupportable. In reporting incorrectly or this matter, The could have erred merely because his sub-sources (one unnamed, the other apparently despite the conflict in reporting about his position) repeated erroneous inform tion in his presence.nevertheless is the only source to reveal that the YGB was aware of the Pankin Street deai drop as early as 21 January 1961, when MONEY went to the site there- fore has detracted from the bona fides of NOSEN by showing KG3 awareress of a C officer naving gone to the dead drop site il reaths Lefore ADIDIAN'S Asit there, and even before PENKOVSKIY finally succeeded in establishing personal contact with Western intelligence services. It was the BIDIAN visit, NOSENKO said, which first aroused KGB interest in the site at Pushkin Street.# TOP SECRET
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