Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 230]
TOP SECRET825. assignment in Stockholm may have been a KGB-organized prelude to the defection of [REDACTED] is also suggested by the fact that the one operational contact her husband is known to have had there was a Western double agent, and [REDACTED] was able to provide identifying data on this agent.)- Nearly all of [REDACTED]'s identifications of Soviet Intelligence personalities were previously known.- She has given conflicting accounts of her motivation for defecting, of her relationship with her husband, and of her associations with KGB personnel.- Against the background of the claimed difficulties in which she and her husband found themselves, it seems unlikely that [REDACTED] would have been permitted to leave the USSR.- There are oddities in her relationship with the Canadian correspondent who employed her in the USSR and who was her alleged KGB target, as well as in her conduct in the West and in her husband's situation and behavior since the defection.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 231]
TOP SECRETG. General Conclusion1. Evaluation of state of affairsa. IntroductionIn examining the questions, it is necessary to evaluate intelligence source, illegals and to ferret out those leads to Sovietviable and original leads that will assist in ROSENKO’S identification. Identifiable and original leads that will assist in complex--he did that with one exception--the current parameters of the ROSENKO warrant. Considering the conclusion that R.K. could feasible to sacrifice ROSENKO, the assumption can be made that consideration of Johnson operation. The reasons may have lain in the circumstances that the operation was under threat of compromise because of various security losses, and difficult handling problems. Exploited for one time before the ROSENKO Johnson had not leads received. The report of Nuciary Identifiable leads to recruited Americans involved, who had previously compromised, who were unwitting, or who had already lost their access to classified information.![image of redacted portion of document]TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 232]
TOP SECRETsensitive sourcesTOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 233]
TOP SECRET828sensitive sources....
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 234]
629 TOP SECRETsensitive sourcesTOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 235]
# TOP SECRET14-000001: :: : : tis 11.1GTS 15.C:11.ני כויי. קרגזנייו11.7mation or.....::: יו1.733. :to po11. also eS: :12.10:tSS:1:a20.0 coeratiafrTOAL. I אורט בני particularly: OE W.Lar91i- : hua defeг.1601122- video linז.: C: Inte..ذاCOLELYNSKI was# TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 236]
# TOP SECRET821. Other techniques on which various sources have confirmed one another include the following:reported that the surveillance equipment used by the KGB Surveillance Directorate includes special paint invisible to the naked eye but visible through use of a special device. It is used in conmunication with helicopters closed circuit television at bridges, tunnels etc. A similar technique was described by GOLINIEWSKI.- KOSENKO and CHEREPANOV papers have described a special chemical compound sensitive to dogs but not to humans (NINIME KIM) which is used in surveillance.reported that microphones and transmitters are installed in American automobiles in the Soviet Union by personnel of the KGB Surveillance Directorate. GOLINIEWSKI earlier provided many details on this technique.- KGB had developed a transmitter using paper-thin batteries so shaped that they can fit in the shoulder pads of a man's suit. They also can be concealed in the inside covers of Venus. Thus concealed, they are used in Moscow by the KGB to listen to conversations between foreign diplomats, particularly at the Hotel Metropol and the Hotel National. Such miniaturized devices have also, as described by GOLINIEWSKI-COLITSYN KOSENKO inter alia in HEREPIN and CHEREPANOV papers, gave the KGB cryptonym as NARSIPA.- KOSENKO and reported the KGB technique of switching telephone lines intended for the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to a KGB installation where they are intercepted by a Soviet posing as an American.Where the bulk of KOSEIKO's reporting on KGB operations was concerned with those of the Second Chief Directorate, this has been true with only two of the other sources named here however, have also given details on specific KGB criminal counterintelligence activities in addition to their statements on the compromise of CIA assets within the USSR (a topic of reporting by and CHERE- PANOV as well). The information from and is summarized below:has in able to provide details KGB Second Chief Directorate activity. He reported the FGO's discovery of an American employed at the Sokolniki Exhibition in Moscow in*   The existence and feasibility of such a substance has not been verified.# TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 237]
# TOP SECRET232. clandestine contact with an unidentified Soviet female. (This contact is not identified with any CIA operation at the Exhibition in 1959.) He spoke of the KBS's knowledge of an American Intelligence deaddrop under a bench in the area of the Agricultural Exhibition. He said that the KCS controlled all U. S. agent contacts in Moscow, including one with an old man in his 60's (NOS-DIKO reported on an individual who may be identical with this agent).claimed to have fulfilled functions which NOSIMOV and others have described as standard procedure in operations against foreigners and Soviets in the Soviet Union.said she was a Second Chief Directorate agent targeted against the Nepalese Embassy in Moscow and later against the Canadian correspondent who employed.> [Figure: Illegible Content]c. RemarksAs previously indicated it was only after the defections of the genuine sources GOLITSYN and PENKOVSKIY in 1961 that American Intelligence began to receive voluminous and mutually corroborative information from others on the activities of the KGB Second Chief and Surveillance Directorates. The timing of this information therefore appears to be significant in addition to the overlap of specific details. The fact that so many of these sources, even including a Second Chief Directorate information, may reflect a centralized KGB decision to emphasize or sacrifice it.# TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 238]
TOP SECRET833TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 239]
TOP SECRET834sensitive source(s)TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 240]
TOP SECRET835. H. EvaluationThe conclusion that: ROSENKO is on a KGB mission could carry damaging implications to the American intelligence sources who have supported his *bona fides*. Unless their statements on NOSENKO can be convincingly explained as innocent repetition of misinformation spread by the KGB within the Soviet services, these sources might be concluded to have been deliberately misleading either as promotors of their own personal interests or as parties to a KGB conspiracy.Regarding GOLITSYN, the opinion of CIA is that he purposefully gave false support for NOSENKO in an attempt to make his opinions more authoritative. This is not a satisfactory explanation for the remarks on NOSENKO by , however, there seem to be no personal interests which their support of NOSENKO'S bona fides might have served. The choice thus seems to lie between these three officers being genuine sources of American intelligence but unwitting channels of KGB misinformation and, on the other hand, one or more of them being in league with the KGB.The possibility that  are under KGB control was tested further in the context of the NOSENKO operation by reviewing parallels in their reporting and his, and general correlations that appear from one case to another. At the same time, the NOSENKO- connections were shown for comparative purposes. Here  was found that would eliminate  from consideration as possibly being KGB provocation agents.This examination against the conclusion that NOSENKO is under KGB control, has brought the bona fides of  into serious question. If NOSENKO is a dispatched agent of the KGB, these other sources seem also to be.TOP SEC
[104-10211-10146.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992DISPATCHTO Chief, MB DivisionCLASSIFICATION SECRETPROCESSING ACTIONMARKED FORFROM Chief of Station, Mexico CityNO INDEXING REQUIREDONLY QUALIFIED DESKCAR ADGE INDEXINGMICROFILMSUBJECT FRQ Part I - Alfonso Dibildox TorresACTION REQUIRED REFERENCESAttached herewith is FRQ Part I on Subject. ProvisionalOperational Approval is requested, along with 201 number. Subject'scryptozym, assigned 15 October 1963 by the Station, follows underseparate cover.Willard C. CurtisDistribution:3 - WD, w/att. h/w and w/s/c2 - FilesCROSS REFERENCE TODISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER DOIA-22488DATE 13 November 1963HQS FILE NUMBER 201-CLASSIFICATION SECRET
[104-10211-10326.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992# DISPATCHTO: Chief of Station, Mexico CityFROM: Chief, WH DivisionSUBJECT: LIENVOY-81.  As a result of the recent review done of the LIFEAT and LIENVOY Project, it came to Headquarters attention that LIENVOY-8, who was believed to have been terminated, was still covered by the LIEKVOY Project.2.  According to HOMA-14876, LIENVOY-8 was the cause of a security problem for LIENVOY in February 1960 when he requested release from LIENVOY and a transfer to his parent organization, the General Staff of the Presidency. LIENVOY-8 was described as a "scur" nationalist who disapproved of ODTOKE's sharing of the LIENVOY take.3.  Headquarters now notes that LIENVOY-8's clearance has never been cancelled and there is no Agent Service Record or termination report in his file. LIENVOY-8 was included in the LIENVOY Project renewal request for the 1961/62 project year, but not for the 1962/63 year. The field project renewal request for the 1963/64 year included him again.4.  It is requested that the Station inform Headquarters of the present status of LIENVOY-8 (201-118406). If he has been terminated, please forward an Agent Service Record. If he is still being used, please provide a current analysis of his reliability and comments on any security problems present in light of his actions and reputation in 1960.END OF DISPATCHDistribution:0&1 - COS, Mexico City|            || ---------- || HUME-12027 || SECRET     || 31 Oct 63 || 23 October 1963 || 201-118406 |
[104-10213-10002.pdf — page 0]
14-00000104-10213-100022025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)SUBJECT: Related Mission Directive for Mexico1. Attached is the revised Related Mission Directive for Mexico.2. Your approval is requested.J. C. KingChief, 4H DivisionCONCUR:Chief, DD/PDFloyd GeorgeChief, CAChief, CIAPPROVED:Richard HelmsDeputy Director (Plans)3 JUL 1961Date Approved24 January 1961Distribution:Orig & 2 - WHD1 - PG1 - CA1 - OI1 - SR1 - FI/Plans1 - FI/INT1 - RICOPY
[104-10213-10002.pdf — page 1]
# RELATED MISSION DIRECTIVE FOR MEXICO1. GENERAL PROVISIONSA. National Policy. The long-range national policy objectives of the U.S. Government toward Mexico are to reduce to an ineffectual level the influence of international Communism, to encourage democratic government, and to keep the Mexican government friendly and favorably inclined toward U. S. policies. Further guidance is given in the current CCB Regional Operations Plan for Latin America.B. Operational Emphasis. The Station's primary emphasis will continue to be placed on clandestine collection operations and covert action operations against the Sino-Soviet bloc, Cuban, and Communist elements in Mexico.C. Changes in the AMD. This basic policy instruction for activities in Mexico has been revised in light of the Station's last Annual Assessment of Progress Report and to reflect more accurately operational conditions, capabilities and direction. In view of the importance and threat presented by Communist Cuba to U. S. interests in Latin America, coverage of Cuban revolutionary activities in Mexico has been made a specific requirement under Priority A. Priority B objectives and tasks include refinements of desired efforts and also provide for covert action operations against Cuban targets in Mexico. The former task for production of action pictures and their distribution has been deleted, as it is no longer a valid requirement; two former tasks pertaining to the possible use of foreign diplomats have been combined; a task to develop young potential political leaders (ZREAGER) has been added. Two previous Priority C objectives have been eliminated, as there is no established Mexican intelligence service, and the Station regularly reports on activities of the security services. Coverage of Chinese Communists has been raised to Priority B coincident with the elimination of the former Priority C section.D. Contingency Reporting. In addition to the specific objectives set forth in Section II, the Station will from time to time be called on to attempt to satisfy intelligence
[104-10213-10002.pdf — page 2]
Guides and Intelligence Directives, but it is expected that these requirezents be satisfied utilizing existing assets. Of particular interest ca & continuing basis is information on: (a) any indications that Nexico may be used as a base for clandestine activity directed against the U. S. (CI Bock Messages 23 and 115); (b) activities of non-bloc intelligence services, especially those that are potentially harmful to U. 3. interests; (c) the plotting of revolutionary groups according to their current importance in attempts to overthrow the regines of their respective Latin American countries; (d) the current alignment and activities of political forces with the potential for assuming control of the Mexican Government; (e) U. S. Communists residing in Mexico; and (f) the Spanish Communist group.It will be noted that certain previous contingency reporting requirements have been, amended as follows: The former levy for reporting on the stability of the Hexican Government has been changed to a more realistic and meaningful statement as reflected by (d) above. This modification is appropriate, as political changes in Mexico are most likely to occur within the framework of constitutionality. The previcus charge for reporting on secret shipments of strategic materials fria Mexicc to bloc countries is no longer specifically required and has been doleted.## II. OBJECTIVES### PRIORITY A1.  Cbtain information on Sino-Soviet bice plans and activi-    ties in Mexico, including those of bloc intelligence    services.a.  Continue and, where possible, increase physical andtechnical surveillance of bloc installations andresidences.b. Through controlled agent assets, identify and monitorthe activities of bloc personnel, if conditionswarrant, attempt recruitment or defection of blocpersonnel.2
[104-10213-10002.pdf — page 3]
c. Continue CI operations against bico inteligencepersonnel.2. Seek to reduce and, if possible, eliminate Communist   and leftist control or influence in key goverisontal   and non-governmental organizations, political parties,   mass media outlets, and other elements that influence   public or official opinion and policies.a. Develop political action penetration agents in keyfunctional groupe, such as students, teachers andorganized labor, in order to alsrupt and reducetheir capacity for carrying out action harmful toU. S. objectives and interests.b. Expose and discredit illegal cr subversive 3120-Soviet bloc activities and representatives in Mexico,as wel as the activities atul poracanel of inter-national and Iccal Ccamunist front organizations..c. Identify, discredit, and if possible eliminateCormists and pre-Communists from strategic positionsin goverment, educational institutions, state-controlled industrial end agricultural enterprises,laber unions, and student organizations.d. Provide support and give guidance to individuals. and...organizations that can be induced to produce and dis-seminate anti-Communist, pre-Free Horid propagandavia redio, television, newspapers, or other media,and carry cut political action operations againstCommunist or other anti-U. S. elements.e. Identify, develop, and utilize important non-Communistpolitical, business or civic leaders to carry cut pro-paganda, economic or political actions egainst Coram-unist influence and induce them to support viewscoinciding with U. S. Goverment policy intercats.f. Continue to support and guide anti-Coremnist youthand student organizations, publications or agents,and when necessary, develop additional assets in keyschools in Mexico City and selected provinces.
[104-10213-10002.pdf — page 4]
8. Develop and support covert press assets in the staffs of influential newspapers.h. Develop access to individuals and organizations in the labor field and support non-Communist leaders and groups in key unions.3. Obtain information on the organizational structure, key personnel, financing, covert plans and activities of the Communist Party of Mexico (PCM), Communist front organizations and groups, especially the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), and non-Communist and/or anti-J. S. groups that may be susceptible to exploitation by International Communism.a. Exploit and extend existing penetrations in the PCA and the PPS.b. Maintain penetrations of the PCM and seek to penetrate the anti-EMCINA wing of the PCM.c. Develop and, if conditions warrant, recruit a key source in the Workers' University capable of monitoring cultural contacts between the University and bloc diplomatic installations.d. Continue to monitor the activities of selected Communist-influenced labor unions and front groups through the penetration in the PPS, if conditions warrant, make selected recruitments in the unions or groups.4. Continue to obtain information on Cuban Revolutionary activities in Mexico and support U. S. Government efforts against the CASTRO regime.a. Continue to conduct penetration operations of Cuban Embassy and induce defections of Cuban diplomats.b. Recruit agents in Mexico for operational use in Cuba.c. Secure support of high Mexican Government officials for the conduct of operations against Cuba.d. Continue to provide operational support for activities
[104-10213-10002.pdf — page 5]
directed against the CASTRO regine in Cuta. e. Utilize propaganda media, political action assets, and other covert means to combat the influence of Cuban revolutionary ideologies in Mexico,PRIORITY D1. Combat ultra-nationalistic and anti-U. S. activities in Rexico, and propagandize the dangers of Coraminiam.a. Utilise existing media and political action assets to combat anti-U. S. propaganda or activities.b. Utilize existing media and political action assets to prevent or negate collaboration between ultra-nationalisti and Consusunists.c. Utilize media and political action assets to prevent or negate the socio-economic and cultural peretration plans or activities of the Sino-Soviet bloc.d. Spot and develop for future covert collatoration young local figures who show potential for political leader- ship and who may be influenced to beocze generaliy favorable to V. S. interests.2. Obtain information on the secret intenticris and activities of the Mexican Ocveriment in foreign affairs, particular.y toward the U. S., the Sino-Soviet bloc, and Cuta.a. Continue to develop and influence high level contacts in the Hexican Ocvernment, particularly the Office of the President and the Foreign Rinistry.3. Collect information on the Sino-Soviet bloc.a. Continue penetration of airline and steamship offices and official government agencies to obtain advance information on travellers.b. Recruit or obtain the willing collaboration of selected travellers to bloo ocuntries, especially those who will remain in bloc countries for an extended period and who may be on scientific missions.
[104-10213-10002.pdf — page 6]
c. Recruit third naticaals and Latin American diplomats to be assigned or traneferred to blee countries.d. Cbtain communications intelligence on blos diplomatic traffic.4. Obtain information ca the Chinese Coccanists in Mexico.a. Spot, assess and recruit or develop scurces in the Chinese community.b. Exploit the Gobernacion files on Chinese living in Maxico and effoot penetration of the SIMACP.
[104-10213-10202.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRETDOHB 70-1-1CHAPTER 11115 November 1974## ANNEX B## THE 201 SYSTEMRescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966### 1. INTRODUCTIONThe 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lisits of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated.### 2. THE 201 SYSTEMThe principal features of the 201 system are:a. *The 201 Number:* a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individualb. *The 201 Dossier:* the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects.c. *The Master 201 Record:* a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for specia! listings.d. *Main Index Master 201 Reference:* this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated23SECRET
[104-10213-10202.pdf — page 1]
SECRETDOHB 70-1-1CHAPTER III, ANNEX B15 November 19740002 CROIX, WILLIAM PENDLETONSEX M DOB 12 APR 26APOB CERM, BERLIN201-00326071CIT GERMOCC PHARMACISTTYPE NAME T-REF AACD-12345, 20 JUW 53OCC CODE CHEOI CODES AA XX-SUBJECT RECENTLY ATTENDED THE SEVENTEENTH AUSJALRCD DATE 53CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHEMISESAND PHARMACISTS HELO IN MUNICH, GERMANY FROM 22 THROUGH29 ССТОВCЯ.30 NOV 7000833555Information About Subject1. Sequence Number and Name2. Sex and Date of Birth3. Citizenship4. Place of Birth5. Occupation6. Occupation Code7. TextDocument Reference Data Crosp8. 201 Number9. Name Type Indicator10. OI Codes11. Record Date (year only)12. ReferenceISC Control Information13. Date of latest update of the record14. STAR Index Record Number24SECRET