Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10213-10209.pdf — page 9]
SECRETDOI 50-10DDO INSTRUCTIONNO. 50-10OPERATIONS-GENERAL4 September 1973d. Officials, Representatives, or Employees of Communist Countries in the United States (see DOI 60-11)Prior approval of the Director or the Deputy Director for Operations is required for operational contact in the United States with or operational use of officials, representatives, or employees of the USSR, its satellite countries, Communist China, or any other country under Communist control. If, while in the United States, such individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI will also be required in accordance with paragraph 6.b., above.e. Delegates or Employees of the UnitedIt is DDO policy that the operational use of delegates or employees of the United Nations, including those of its various main organs and of its related intergoverninental agencies, is of such sensitivity as to require special consideration by the Deputy Director for Operations. In especially worthwhile cases wherein operational use of a particular UN individual is deemed essential for the accomplishment of the DDO mission, approval may be obtained. In each case involving a non-U.S. citizen assigned in the U.S. or a U.S. citizen wherever assigned, the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations will be required. (See paragraph 8.b. regarding use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees not assigned in the U.S.) If, while in the United States, the UN individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational pur- poses, the prior concurrence of the FBI may also be required as outlined in paragraph 6.b., above.f. Staff Members or Officials of Red Cross SocietiesThe operational use of staff members or officials of the International Red Cross or its affiliated national Red Cross, Red Crescent, or other equivalent societies requires special consideration and prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. DDO elements should make every effort to avoid the operational use of staff members or officials of Red Cross societies. However, when especially high priority objectives are at stake and alternative agent assets are not available, approval for the use of such individuals may be granted by the Deputy Director for Operations.g. Officials of the Vatican StateOperational contact with officials of the Vatican State will be made only with the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Operational use of Vatican officials will be contingent on prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.h. U.S. Government Funded Professors, Lecturers, Students or GranteesU.S. or foreign professors, lecturers or students and other persons participating in U.S. Government-sponsored academic, cultural, athletic or other10SECRET
[104-10213-10209.pdf — page 10]
# SECRETDOI 50-10DDO INSTRUCTIONOPERATIONS-GENERALNO. 50-104 September 1973exchange programs (except certain Fulbright grantees—see paragraph 5.b., above) are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. Operational use of such individuals while they are actively participating in an exchange program funded by the U.S. Government requires special consideration and approval by the Deputy Director for Operations prior to such use. In certain especially worthwhile cases wherein the operational use of a particular U.S. Government supported exchangee is considered essential to the accomplishment of the DDO mission, the Deputy Director for Operations may grant approval Memoranda requesting such approval will be forwarded through the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. In such cases the Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek the concurrence of the U.S. Government sponsor.l. Members of Educational or Pricate Voluntary Organizations(1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organizations. In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with U.S. educational or private voluntary organizations including trade and professional organizations. The operational use of any employee, staff member or official of such an organization requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency approval for the conduct of such operations.(2) Operational use including covert funding abroad of foreign-based international voluntary organizations and the personnel thereof is permitted even if the organization is also funded by U.S. private voluntary organizations.j. Officials or Employees of the African-Ainerican InstituteOperational use of the officials or employees of the African-American Institute requires prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities will not involve operational matters until the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations has been secured.k. Volunteers to AmericaOperational use of or operational contact with members of Volunteers to America while they are on assignment in the United States will not be made without the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Volunteers to America are participants in programs established by various foreign countries in collaboration with the Department of State as a11SECRET
[104-10213-10209.pdf — page 11]
# SECRETDOI 50-10DDO INSTRUCTIONNO. 50-10OPERATIONS-GENERAL4 September 1973counterpart to the U.S. Peace Corps. Such volunteers are sent to the U.S.for a period of service in schools and community development programs.The name of the organization may vary by country.& OPERATIONAL USE REQUIRES APPROVAL BY CHIEF OF AREA DIVISIONOperational use of any individual in the categories listed in this paragraphis considered of such sensitivity as to require special consideration and ap-proval by the appropriate Area Division Chief. This authority may not bedelegated. The request for approval will be by memorandum in which theindividual's covert approval status will be described, together with a conciseexplanation of the intended operational use.a. Citizens or Alien Residents of the U.S. Used in Denied Areas (see DOI 50-19)The opr.ational use in denied areas of U.S. citizens, or of aliens who havebeen admitted for permanent residence or have resided for a prolongedperiod in the U.S., requires the prior approval of the Chief of the AreaDivision under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place.b. Non-U.S. Citizen Delegates or Employees of the United Nations not Assigned in the U.S.The operational use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of theUnited Nations who are not assigned in the U.S. requires the prior ap-proval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the in-tended use is to take place.c. Members of the Academic Community(1) Within the context of this instruction a member of the academic com-munity is defined as: any student, faculty member, administrativeofficer or staff official of a college, university or similar institution ofhigher learning including their associated research centers. Personsassociated with institutions such as police or military training centers(except the four college-level military service academies) or under-going specialized technical training with business or commercial firmsare not considered to be members of the academic community.(2) Operational use of members of the academic community, especially those cases wherein an individual is to be made witting of Agency interest, will be on a highly selective basis. Each case will be examined to ascertain its essentiality to the DDO mission in terms of the price of possible disclosure, and to ensure that proper security procedures can be observed. When it has been determined that the operational use of a member of the academic community as defined above is19SECRET
[104-10213-10209.pdf — page 12]
SECRETDOI 50-10DDO INSTRUCTIONNO. 50-10OPERATIONS-GENERAL4 September 1973operationally feasible and without suitable alternative, prior approval in the following cases will be obtained as indicated below:(a) Any U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S. or foreign college, university or similar institution of higher learning;(b) Any non-U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated college, university or similar institution of higher learning which is located either in the United States or abroad.If the individual is located in the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. The memorandum will include a statement that the individual is, or is not, a DCD asset or contact, and in the event he is will include the concurrence of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division. If the individual is located outside the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief of the Area Division who has jurisdiction over the area concerned.) Operational use of foreign members of the academic community who are not associated in any way with U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated institutions of higher learning is also considered sensitive. The operational use of such individuals also requires the approval of the Chief of the Area Division In any case involving a well known person or having special security implications, the Division Chief to whom the request is referred under the above provisions will consult with the DDO and obtain the latter's approval.(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) do not apply to Domestic Collection Division contacts with members of the academic community, but such contacts are subject to the following requirements:(a) If a member of the academic community would be asked to perform an operational task or to alter his normal pattern of activity in order to serve Agency purposes, prior approval of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division is required. Additionally, if such an individual will be in a foreign area, the concurrence of the Chief of the Area Division concerned will be obtained.(b) Prior concurrence will be obtained from the appropriate Area Division Chief if an individual is to be utilized in a politically sensitive area where his presence or activities could potentially embarrass the interests of the U.S. Government.(c) The requirements of paragraph 8.a. apply if a citizen or alien resident of the United States would be used in a denied area.(4) At the end of each calendar year, Chiefs of Divisions will submit a report to the Deputy Director for Operations (via Chief, Foreign Resources Division) on the number of individuals recruited from the13SECRET
[104-10213-10209.pdf — page 13]
SECRETDOI 50-10DDO INSTRUCTIONNO. 50-10OPERATIONS-GENERAL4 September 1973academic community during that year. This audit will permit the DDO •to keep abreast of major quantitative changes in the number of po-tentially sensitive operational cases in each Division.(5) It should be noted that the provisions of this paragraph do not applyto DDO employees who wish to study or teach privately. Approval forsuch activity will be obtained in accordance with the provisions ofHR 10-7.9. INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OF STATUS OR CATEGORYWhen an individual undergoes a change of status which places him in one ofthe restricted categories described above, or transfers him from one categoryto another, his operational use or continued operational use is contingent uponapproval or reapproval as prescribed for his new status.10. INTERPRETATION OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONSCertain of the policy restrictions described in this instruction are subject tointerpretation, extension or modification by the Deputy Director for Opera-tions depending on the conditions and the atmosphere for DDO operationsat any particular time. Especially when dealing on the edges of policy rulingsand within the guidelines set forth herein, particular heed should be paid tothe price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities ofthe individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the applicationof these restrictions, guidance should be obtained from the Deputy Directorfor Operations.William E. NelsonDeputy Director for Operations14SECRET
[104-10213-10314.pdf — page 0]
14-00000104-10213-103142025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 19922 August 1978MEMORANDUM FOR: General CounselDirector of SecurityFROM : S.D. BreckinridgeSUBJECT : HSCA Request of 20 July 1978 -OLC-78-27281. Attached is correspondence from the DDO focal point on the IISCA investigation, responding to Question 12 of reference. It states that there are and have been no agreements (at least not as described in the IISCA request) between CIA and the FBI, or other government agencies, that pertain to the Agency's responsibilities to report on U.S. citizens abroad who contact Communist embassies or officials. It also states that current legislation forbids such reporting.2. Attached are copies of papers collected by O/IG during the Rockefeller Commission's inquiry; I recall that there was a 1966 agreement, which is not in these papers. In any event they do not seem to contain a specific provision such as is envisioned in the report. It is possible that interpretations of NSCID and DCID provisions resulted in routine reporting of such con- tacts, although there were no agreements, per se, for such action. Since the promulgation of Executive Orders 11905 and 12036 there have been limitations on reporting on U.S. persons, which may affect past practice. llowever, this office is not in a position to provide an Agency position on this issue.3. It is requested that you coordinate with the DDO in preparing an answer to an Agency response to the HSCA question.S.D. BreckinridgeDistribution:1 - General Counsel1 - D/Security1 - OLC/Subj.1 - OLC/Chron1 - Hr. Gregg w/O/ATT1 - Mr. ShepanekThis document may be downgraded to AIUO when detached from attachment
[104-10213-10314.pdf — page 1]
SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSI ITION TOP AND BOTTOMUNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET## OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP| TO  | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE | INITIALS || --- | ---------------- | ---- | -------- || 1   | Mr. Breckinridge |      |          || 2   | :                |      |          || 3   |                  |      |          || 4   |                  |      |          || 5   |                  |      |          || 6   |                  |      |          || 1 ACTION    | DIRECT REPLY | PREPARE REPLY  || ----------- | ------------ | -------------- || APPROVAL    | DISPATCH     | RECOMMENDATION || COMMENT     | FILE         | RETURN         || CONCURRENCE | INFORMATION  | SIGNATURE      |Remarks:Expansion of DCD-FBI Relationship Book Dispatch 9335 of 18 Feb 1975Two sanitized copies ready for Mr. Knoche.FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER| FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | DATE    || --------------------------------- | ------- || Walter F. Little                  | 3/18/75 || UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET  |         |FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)
[104-10213-10314.pdf — page 2]
SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSI ITION TOP AND BOTTOMUNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECIET## OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP| TO  | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE | INITIALS || --- | ---------------- | ---- | -------- || 1   |                  |      |          || 2   |                  |      |          || 3   |                  |      |          || 4   |                  |      |          || 5   |                  |      |          || 6   |                  |      |          || ACTION      | DIRECT REPLY | PREPARE REPLY  || ----------- | ------------ | -------------- || APPROYAL    | DISPATCH     | RECOMMENDATION || COMMENT     | FILE         | RETURN         || CONCURRENCE | INFORMATION  | SIGNATURE      |Remarks:2 copies each of the attachedpert to Mr. Krocke vir IG3/18/75FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER| FROM: NAME, ADDRESS ANO PHONE NO. | DATE || --------------------------------- | ---- || UNCLASSIFIED                   | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET || ------------------------------ | ------------ | ------ || 1-47 237 Use previous editions | (40)         |        |
[104-10213-10314.pdf — page 3]
# OUTGOING TELEPOUCHSIGNAL CENTER USETEL U 0 0 0 0MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATORTELEPOUCHBOOK DISPATCH 9335E 2 IMPDETCL BY: G2361870TO:FR/ATLANTA, FR/CHICAGO, FR/CLEVELAND, FR/BOSTON, FR/SAN FRANCISCOFR/LOS ANGELES, FR/NEW YORK, FR/WASHINGTON.SECRET TELEPOUCHDISP NO: BD 933522 12 52z Feb74DATE: 18 FEBRUARY 1974ISOLOGTO: CHIEF OF BASE, ATLANTA; CHIEF OF BASE, BOSTON; CHIEF OF BASE, LOSANGELES; CHIEF OF BASE, CHICAGO; CHIEF OF BASE, CLEVELAND; CHIEF OFBASE, SAN FRANCISCO; CHIEF OF BASE, NEW YORK; CHIEF OF BASE, WASHINGTONFROM: CHIEF, FOREIGN RESOURCES DIVISIONSUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH THE FBI1. ATTACHED HEREWITH IS THE SUBSTANCE OF A LETTER FROM FBI HAS   TO ITS EIGHT FIELD OFFICES IN CITIES WHERE FR BNASES ARE LOCATED.   THIS LETTER IS AIMED AT CLARIFYING A NUMBER OF BASIC FACTS REGARDING   THE MISSION OF DDO IN GENERAL AND FR DIVISION ACTIVITIES IN THE USA   IN PARTICULAR, AND IT SPELLS OUT IN SOME DETAIL OUR AGREED INTERPRE-   TATION OF SOME OF THE HISTORICALLY MORE TROUBLESOME ASPECTS OF THE1966 AGREEMENTDATE: 15 FEB 74ORIG:UNIT: FR/COPSEXT: 5885C/FR/91C/FR/B2C/FR/83FR/CO
[104-10213-10314.pdf — page 4]
TEL:TELEPOUCHDISPATCH NUMBER6D 9335E 2 IMPDETCL BY:2. UE. WERE ESPECIALLY GRATIFIED WITH THE OPENING PARAGRAPHS OF THE LETTER WHICH EMPHASIZE THE FACT THAT FR IS CARRYING OUT A U.S. GOVERNMENT REQUIREMENT IN ITS RECRUITMENT OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, AND THAT THIS ACTIVITY IS BEING CONDUCTED IN THE USA WITH FULL BUREAU CONCURRENCE. ANOTHER BASIC POINT WHICH THE LETTER MAKES IS THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE GUIEDELINES (1966 AGREEMENT) IS TO PROTECT THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE U-S.EGOVERNMENT, NOT ENABLE THE BUREAU TO MONITOR OUR OPERATIONS.3. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION INVOLVED IN DRAFTING THIS LETTER, BUT NO REAL STICKY DIFFERENCES AROSE. WE BELIEVE IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO GIVE ADDRESSEES SOME OF THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS AS BACKGROUND FOR ANY TALKS YOU MAY HAVE ON THESE SUBJECTS WITH YOUR FIELD OFFICE CONTACTS. THESE ARE SET OUT BELOW:A. PAGE 2, LAST PARAGRAPH: ON THE QUESTION OF WHAT FOREIGN -OFFICIALS ARE OF "PRESUMED INTEREST" TO THE BUREAU: WE AGREED THAT THIS CATEGORY CHANGED WITH WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AND THAT FR WOULD SIMPLY USE A COMMON SENSE JUDGMENT TO MAKE ITS CASE BY CASE DETERMINATION. UE AGREED THAT TRYING TO BROADEN OR LIMIT THE CATEGORY EYDATE:ORIG:UNIT:EXT:SECRET
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SIGNAL CENTER USE CTEL 0 0 0 0 0SECRETTELEPOUCHBD-9335PAGE 3 OF PAGESE 2 IMPDETCL BY:FURTHER DEFINITION WAS NOT PRACTICAL.B. PAGE 3, TOP PARAGRAPH: PLEASE NOTE THAT THE CRITERIONOF OVERLAP AND/OR CONFLICT IS USED THERE THE SAME AS IN THE 'LL AGRMENT PARAGRAPH TUO CONCERNING BUREAU CONCURRENCE FOR RECRUITMENTAPPROACHES.C. PAGE 3, BOTTOM PARAGRAPH: ALTHOUGH WE ARE REQUIRED ONTO KEEP FBI APPRISED OF INFORMATION RELATING TO ITS COUNTERINTELLIGAND INTERNAL SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES, WE CONCURRED IN THIS REQUESFOR MORE DETAILED AND TIMELY REPORTING ON CERTAIN CASES SINCE WECONSIDERED THE DETAIL ASKED FOR TO BE OF DEMONSTRABLE CI VALUE ANDTIME LIMITS TO BE REASONABLE. THE BUREAU WAS COMPLETELY AMENABLE 1LIMITING SUCH REQUIREMENTS TO CASES WHEREIN THEIR STATUTORY RESPO:SIBILITIES WERE CLEARLY INVOLVED, AND WE WERE PARTICULARLY PLEASEDTHE ADDITIONAL AGREEMENT ALLOWING THE FIELD OFFICES AND THE FR BASITO WORK OUT THE LOCAL HANDLING OF ALL OTHER CASES, INCLUDING 23850SPECIFICALLY THE "PRIOR NOTICE" REQUIREMENT OF PARAGRAPH THREE OF"66 AGREEMENT. ENOTE THAT THIS ENTIRE PORTION OF THE LETTER INVOLTARGETS WHICH ARE HISTORICALLY AS WELL AS PRACTICALLY, IN THE BUREDATE:ORIG:UNIT:EXT:SECRET
[104-10213-10314.pdf — page 6]
SIGNAL CENTER UsdTEL 0 0 0 0TELEPOUCHBD-9335E 2 IMPDET CL BY:"COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ETERRITORY".) IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE BUREAU HAS ALREADY AGREED TO PROVIDE US WITH CERTAIN TYPES OF OPERATIONAL INFORMATION IN EXCESS OF ANY EXISTING AGREEMENT, AND WE HAVE RECEIVED INITIALLY FAVORABLE REACTION TO PROPOSALS FOR ADDITIONAL ITEMS IN THE FUTURE. UE DO NOT BELIEVE THIS REPORTING AGREEMENT WILL CAUSE YOU ANY SERIOUS PROBLEMS, BUT IF IT SHOULD BE BROADENED OR INTERPRETED IN A WAY THAT YOU CONSIDER UNREASONABLE OR BURDENSOME, PLEASE ADVISE AND WE WILL TRY TO HAVE THE CRITERIA DEFINED MORE LEGECO CLEKRUBROSELY.D. PAGE 4, BOTTOM PARAGRAPH: WE HAD CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT. THE CBUREAU FELT THAT IN SOME INSTANCES WE WERE "STRETCHING" THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS INTO THE FIRST STAGES OF RECRUITMENT, AND IN SOME OTHERS UE WERE MOVING INTO RECRUITMENT WITHOUT FORMALLY SEEKING BUREAU CONCURRENCE AND COORDINATION. GOOD FAITH BEING PRESUMED, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT OUR PROBLEM WAS BOTH SEMANTIC FAND ONE OF DEFINITION. THE BUREAU INSISTS, AND WE RECOGNIZE, THAT CONCURRENCE IN OUR PROCEEDING WITH ASSESSMENT CANNOT BE INTERPRETECD AS CONCURRENCE TO MOVE BEYOND ASSESSMENT. THEY EXPLAIN THAT THEYDATE:ORIG:UNIT:EXT:
[104-10213-10314.pdf — page 7]
SIGNAL CENTER USC ONLYTEL 0 0 0 0 0TELEPOUCHBD-93355E 2 IMPDETCL BY:OFTEN CONCUR IN OUR ASSESSMENT OF TARGETS IN WHOM THEY HAVE A VEACTIVE "RECRUITMENT INTEREST" WITH BUREAU SOURCES IN TOUCH, ETC.HENCE, BEFORE THE AGENCY MOVES INTO THE ACTUAL RECRUITMENT OPERATHE BUREAU NEEDS SPECIFIC NOTICE IN ORDER TO ASSESS ITS OUN COUNINTELLIGENCE OR INTERNAL SECURITY EQUITIES AND MAKE A DECISION.THE DEFINITIONS OF "ASSESSMENT" AND "RECRUITMENT" IN THE LESHOULD BE CONSIDERED TOGETHER: THE ONLY POSSIBLE AREA OF CONFUSIWOULD SEEM TO BE IN THE "PROCESS" OF RECRUITMENT. A SIMPLIOFIEDCOMMON SENSE BREAKDOWN WOULD BE THAT ASSESSMENT IS THE OBTAININGAND ANALYZING OF INFORMATION CONCERNING A TARGET INDIVIDUAL TO EUS TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT IT IS DESIRABLE AND/OR FEASIBLE TMOUNT A RECRUITMENT APPROACH: IF OUR ASSESSMENT IS AFFIRMATIVE,THEN MOVE INTO THE RECRUITMENT PHASE PRIOR TO WHICH NOVE UE MUSEEK BUREAU CONCURRENCE AND COORDINATION.UE INTERPRET MANIPULATION OF A TARGET VIA SOCIAL CONTACTS,MANY CASES BY OVERT, LEGAL, OINONCOMPROMISING BUSINESS ARRANGEMETO BE PART OF THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS: THAT IS AN ATTEMPT TO OBT::DINFORMATION REGARDING HIS VULNERABILITY, STRENGTH, IDEOLOGY,
[104-10213-10314.pdf — page 8]
TELSECRETTELEPOUCHBD-9335E 2 IMPDETCL BY:ASPIRATIONS, ETC., ALL OF WHICH ARE PERTINENT TO OUR DECISION TO OR NOT GO" FOR A RECRUITMENT APPROACH. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE INTERPRET A COMMERCIAL ARRANGEMENT WHICH IS IN ANY WAY COVERT OR QUASI LEGAL OR IS A PLANNED STEPPING STONE TO THE PLANNED INTRODUCTION U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST, TO BE PART OF THE RECRUITMENT PROCESS TO REQUIRE PRIOR BUREAU CONCURRENCE.E. PAGE 4, BOTTOM PARAGRAPH: BASES WILL NOTE THAT WE AGREED TO CONSIDER AGENTS RECRUITED IN THE U.S. WHO REMAIN HERE. SAME AS AGENTS RECRUITED ABROAD WHO COME HERE FOR TOURS OR VISITS ALTHOUGH ONLY THE LATTER ARE SPECIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT, WE FELT IMPLICITLY IT INCLUDED THE FORMER. WE FEEL THAT OUR EQUITIES ARE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED BY THE VERY SPECIFIC TERMINOLOGY OF PARAGRAPHFIVE AND SIX OF THE 6966 AGREEMENT. NOTE ALSO THAT ALTHOUGH THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS FOUR, FIVE AND SIX OF THE 01966 AGREEMENT ARE ALL-ENCOMPASSING, WE ARE IN PRACTICE CONCERNED ONLY WITH THOSE AGENTS, OPERATIONS AND SOURCES WHO HAVE REAL OR POTENTIAL CONTACT OR CAPABILITY IN THE FIELDS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND/OR INTERNAL SECURITY; THAT IS, WHO ARE OF KNOWN OR PRESUMED INTEREST TO THEDATE:ORIG:UNIT:EXT:SECRET
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OUTGOING TELEPOUCHSIGNAL CENTER USE ONLYTEL α 0 0 0 0 0SECRETTELEPOUCH0 mder 0 mdess0 Returnto0 binesBD-9335PAGE 7 OF 97E 2 IMPDET CL BY:BUREAU. IT IS INCUMBENT UPON US. HOWEVER, TO BE METICULOUS IN (DETERMINATION OF "PRESUMED" INTEREST AND TO LEAN TOWARDS THAT PRESUMPTION WHEREVER THERE IS ANY DOUBT4. FILE: 100-002-090.ATTACHMENT - FBI LETTER, AS STATED ABOVE - H/UE2 IMPDET-HDIST:1- FR/REG, W/ATT1- FR/COPS W/ATT1- 100-002-090DATE:ORIG:UNIT:EXT:SECRET