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4. officer of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer to sell two items of information. He said that the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting CIA, although in the ensuing discussion he said also that he was dissatisfied with the Communist regime in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO emphasized, nevertheless, that he had no intention of becoming an American agent-- this was to be a one-time transaction, and after that he would have no further contact with CIA.Despite this original reticence, NOSENKO supplied considerable biographic information on himself and also discussed in general terms certain additional KGB operations as well as KGB organization and operational methods in Moscow. He understood, as he had told MARK earlier in the day. that CIA would want more information than the two items which he originally offered, and he agreed to meet again two days later.NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva in June 1962. always in the same safehouse. With the second meeting on 11 June. his initial reservations disappeared almost entirely. He answered most questions put to him on KGB organization and operations. most of his information being concerned with the Second Chief Directorate. responsible for counterintelligence and security within the USSR. NOSENKO seemed to be what he claimed to be: a KGB officer in a sensitive position with knowledge of important KGB operations.NOSENKO returned to Moscow on 15 June, having promised to do everything within the limits imposed by personal security considerations to collect information of interest; the areas of CIA interest had been outlined to him. The only restrictions he placed on his cooperation were his absolute refusal to permit operational contact with him inside the USSR and his request that no mention of his collaboration be made in correspondence to Moscow. He promised to notify CIA. via an address he was given, when he came to the West again.C. Second Geneva Phase (January-February 1964)NOSENKO accompanied the Soviet delegation to a later session of the Disarmament Conference (one having gone by in the interim without his participation), arriving in Geneva on 19 January 1964. The next day he sent a cable to his CIA accommodation address announcing his presence. At the first of the new series of meetings on 23 January he announced that he had decided to defect to the United States citing as reasons his continuing disaffection with the Soviet regime and the fact that he probably would not have further opportunities to travel to the West in the foreseeable future. Although he impiled that he wanted to defect as soon as possible. he agreed to remain in place in Geneva for at least two or three weeks while arrangements for his reception were being made in Washington. NOSENKO had brought a large amount of new information, much of it in scribbled notes, on KGB operational activity collected in the 18 months since his last meeting with CIA. Twelve more meetings were held in a Geneva safehouse over the next twelve days, varying in length from one and a half to six hours.D. Post-Defection Handling (February 1964-Present)On 4 February, four days before the date tentatively selected for NOSENKO's defection, he reported that a cable had been received from KGB Headquarters ordering his immediate return to participate in a KGB conference on foreign tourism to