Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 132]
# OP220. d. NOSENKO's Responsibility for Coverage of ABIDIAN(1) IntroductionJohn V. ABIDIAN served as the U.S. Embassy Security Officer in Moscow from 2 March 1960 until February 1962, approximately the same period as NOSENKO's claimed service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate. During his Moscow tour, ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perform a number of operational tasks, including clandestine letter mailings to several CIA agents inside the Soviet Union and servicing a dead drop to be used only for receiving two special types of communications* from the source in the GRU, Colonel O.V. PENKOVSKIY.During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO mentioned ABIDIAN on several occasions, Identifying him as the Embassy Security Officer and as a CIA officer. In 1962 he described ABIDIAN'S letter mailing activities, and he said he was himself concerned (zanimat'sya) with ABIDIAN. After recontacting CIA in Geneva in January 1964 NOSENKO divulged that he had been the KGB сазе officer responsible for coverage of ABIDIAN in Moscow; for the first time he described then a visit made by ABIDIAN to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop site.The discussion below is divided into three parts: NOSENKO'S case officer responsibilities and the information he learned about ABIDIAN, NOSENKO's knowledge of clandestine letter mailings by ABIDIAN, and NOSENKO's statements on ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street dead drop.(ii) Duties as Case OfficerOn 17 April 1964 when asked to describe his transfer from the sourist Department to the American Department in January 1960, NOSENKO said that when he reported for duty and was interviewed by V. A. KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, and V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, he was told that as one of his duties he would be the case officer in charge of ABIDIAN, whose arrival in Moscow was expected in the near future. NOSENKO was the only KGB officer responsible for coverage of and activities against ABIDIAN and, NOSENKO said, ABIDIAN was the only American target for whom he, personally, was officially accountable while in the U.S. Embassy Section.NOSENKO was questioned in detail concerning ABIDIAN for six days in January and February 1965. He produced the information in the following paragraphs at that time.When NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy Section, ABIDIAN had not yet arrived in Moscow. The section, however, already had received some information on him, and this was given to NOSENKO by KOVSHUK. Among this material was ABIDIAN's visa* One type was early-warning information, the other notification of his forthcoming absence from Moscow. Othervise, as of this time, PENKOVSKIY submitted information in Moscow via contacts with the British Embassy and the British businessman Greville WYNNE. The PENKOVSKIY cam is discussed at greater length in Part VI.D.7.6.TOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 134]
222. Because ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer, he was made a "special target" of surveillance from the date of his arrival. He was always under 24-hour surveilience by at least two and often three KGB teams, so that at any hour a team was available to cover him if he left the U.S. Embassy. The only time this intensity of coverage might have been reduced, NOSENKO said, was during a period of about one and one-half months in 1961, when surveillance of the Embassy was generally reduced in order to allow increased coverage of British targets.* As the responsible case officer, NUSENKO directed the surveillance of ABIDIAN ard evaluated the operational possibilities offered by pertinent information in the surveillance reports.Prior to ABIDIAN'S arrival in Moscow, the decision was reached not to work aggressively against him with agent contacts or provocateurs unless he first demonstrated some personal vulnerability, NCSENKO stated. It was considered better to concentrate on surveillance coverage ir. the hope that, as LANGELLE's successor, he might lead-to-another-POPOV. Therefore, no-operational- plan was written on ABIDIAN until about October 1960. This plan, which NOSENKO wrote, called for no direct action but did specify that:- ABIDIAN'S maid, Tatyana FEDOROVICH, an operational contact of the U.S. Embassy Section, was to continue to apply metka to ABIDIN's clothing and NEPTUNE-80 to his shoes.*** (She put metka on ABIDIAN's clothing approximately every 14 to 21 days throughout the time she was employed by ARIDIAN.) The only item of operational interest from her during this period was evidence that ABIDIAN was having intimate relations with a female employee at the embassy. FEDOROVIJI was unable to find personal mail or personal papers in ABIDIN's apartment.- KOSOLAPOV's agent, was to try to cultivate APLTAN and report whatever he learned concerning him. never obtained significant information on ABIDIAN'S personal life. ABIDIAN, NOSENKO said, was developing as an informant on American personnel at the Embassy. but NOSENKO did not recall any specific report of his to ABIDIAN that would have been of interest to the U.S. Embassy Section.. NOSENKO tola CIA in 1962* In another context NOSENKO said that KGB surveillance of British targets in 1961 led to the discovery of PENKOVSKIY.** The POPOV case is discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.***Metka and NEPTUNE-80 are surveillance techniques described by NOSENKO. The former. a "thief powder" applied to clothing, leaves a trace on anything with which it comes into contact; its use in detecting clandestine letter mailings is described in greater detail below. NEPTUNE-80, a substance applied to a target's shoes, leaves a trace on the ground wherever he walks and permits the KGB to carry out surveillance long after the target has travelled a particular route. Dogs are used to follow the target's trail.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 135]
223. that ABIDIAN had recruited for an inspecificaintelligence mission in France shortly before leftthe Soviet Union in December 1960 and that the KGB's U.S.Embassy Section thereupon time the case over to the KGBFirst Chisi Directorate.*- Two Embassy chauffeurs were to apply KEPTUNE-80 to  the floorcoaras and foot pedals of A3.DIAN'S car if neces-  sary.- All other agents and operational contacts of the  section were to be instructed to report every detail about  ABIDIAN (see below).- Surveillance teens wore to Le instructed to check all  places where ABIDIAN might be mailing letters.- Coverage of ABIDIAN's mail was to ie continued.Apart from those specified by the operational plan, the onlytwo KGB agerts or operational contacts win met AbIDIAN were Lyud-mila GROMOKOVA and "KANO" (RCB cryptonje, nare not remembered byNOSENKO!. CROMOKOVA, a language instructor for J.S. Embassy per-sonnel, was a KGB agent handled by the U.S. Fabassy Section offi-cer .A. GAVRILENKO ABIDIAN took "only several" Russian languagelessons from GROHOKOVA and NOSENKO did not know whether these wereprivate or class lessons. iHe did not learn anything of operation-al significance from GROMOKOVA's contacts with ABIDIAN, and therewas no regular reporting from her.." "KAMO" was an agent of theMoscow City KGB organization who accidentally met ASIDIAN at theclaimed he concocted this story for the KGB in order toextricate himself when the KGB attempted to recruit him shortlybefore his departure from Moscow.** NOSENKO first identified GROMCKOVA as a KGB agent when viewingEmbassy employee lists on 28 August 1964. The list on whichher name appeared indicated she was a Russian language teacher,and NOSENKO said she was handled by N.A. GAVRILENKO during 1960and 1951. NOSENKO was later shown GROMOKOVA'S photograph andfailed to recognize it; when told her name, however, he againsaid she was GAVRILENKO's agent and that she was valuable be-cause she had a good education and was able to provide per-sonality sketches on her students. He did not associate herwith ABIDIAN until he was told by his interrogators in Febru-ary 1965 that ABIDIAN had been one of her students. NOSENKOthen made the above statement concerning these lessons. ABIDIANreported that he took regular language lessons from GROMOKOVA,normally three one-half hour lessons a week. beginning shortlyafter his arrival in Moscow and continuing until his departure.The first few lessons were with a group of other Embassy per-sonnel, and then ABIDIAN switched to private lessons for theremainder of his tour in the Soviet Union. In reporting hiscontacts with GROMOKOVA, ABIDIAN said he refused to be drawninto talking about his Embassy responsibilities during Russianlanguage conversation but kept the topic limited to his pastpersonal life, travel, education, his fiancee, and his tripson which he saw his fiancee. ABIDIAN also reported that on23 June 1960 GROMOKOVA attempted to persuade him to pass aletter to departing personnel officer Mary GORINHA for for-warding to Jean LIEBERMAN, a former student. When ABIDIANrefused, saying that this is against Soviet law, GROMOKOVAtore up the letter.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 137]
225. about it because the foreign Legal Residencies of the KGB FirstChief Directorate would not accept a request for operationalaction against an American diplomat coming from Moscow.In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked a number of timeswhether he knew of any occasions on which ABIDIAN took trips inthe Soviet Union outside of Moscow. He replied each time that heknew of no such trips and that if ABIDIAN had made such a trip ortrips he would have known of them and would remember them as itwould have been his responsibility as case officer to take cer-tain actions. Among the latter he listed:- Receiving notification of ABIDIN's request to travel  from the UPDK (the Soviet Government organization which pro-  vides services to the diplomatic community in Moscow).- Notifying the UPDK of KGB approval for the trip.- Notifying appropriate local KGB offices on ABIDIAN'S  itinerary and giving them instructions for surveillance and  other operational activity if desired.- Receiving reading, and filing all surveillance  reports and reports of other operational activity carried  out by locak KGB units.NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps. He statedfurther that even if he were absent when such a request for travelwas made, he would have seen all documents upor his return andthat he did not remember seeing such cocuments in ABIDIAN'S file.NOSENKO's interrogators then told NOSENKO that ABIDIANtravelled out of Moscow from 5 to 9 October 1950.* ThereuponNOSENKO stated that he specifically recalled having been on leavein October 1950. He said that he could not recall exactly thedates of this leave (which he had not mentioned before), but hedid remember that he was away exactly 30 days since he stayed ata dacha near Moscow and therefore was not allowed any traveltime. NOSENKO sand further that he also remembered that he had* ABIDIAN made a trip with Paul A. SMITH, the Embassy's Publi-  cations Procurement Officer, to Armenia between 5 and 9 Octo-  ber 1960. (ABIDIAN is of Armenian origin, and speaks the  Armenian language with a high degree of proficiency.) While  there ABIDIAN visited with various churchmen and their  parishioners and an Armenian who had repatriated from Greece  in 1946. They attended a service in Echmiadzin celebrating  the anniversary of the accession of the Katolikos VAZGEN I,  and ABIDIAN also visited some relatives of his in or near  the city of Yerevan. After returning to Moscow, an Armenian  whom ABIDIAN had met on this trip tried to contact ABIDIAN  at the Embassy, but ABIDIAN refused to see him. When NOS-  ENKO was told that on 7 October 1960 ABIDIAN attended a ser-  vice celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Armenian Kato-  likos, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had gone to  Echmiadzin and that an agent had reported a contact with him  there. This agent, NOSENKO recalled, was a priest or a monk,  and the report concerned only his conversation with ABIDIAN;  the agent had no further contact with him. NOSENKO said  that this was his sole recollection concerning ABIDIAN'S  trip, and that he remembered no other details.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 138]
226. left the Soviet Union for Cuba two or three, but not more thanfive, days after his return from leave; he could not recallthe date of his departure for Cuba.Except for the American woman with whom AFIDIAN was thoughtto have been intimate. NOSENKO could not name ASIDIAN's closeAmerican friends in Moscow or his close friends and professionalcontacts with foreigners there.NOSENKO received and read transcripts of all telephone callsthat ABIDIAN made or received at his office and apartment via theMoscow city telephone system. He did not remember the names ornationalities of people whom ASIDIAN called or who called ABIDIAN.because there was nothing of interest in these conversations.NOSENKO did not learn anything from telephone transcripts aboutABIDIAN'S relationship with any foreigner in Moscow.[^5] NOSENKO departed Moscow for Cuba on 15 November 1960 andtherefore, by his own statement, would have been back fromleave by 10 November at the earliest (five days beforedeparture). It was pointed out to NOSENKO that. in thiscase, his 30 days of leave could have begun no earlier than10 October and that he must therefore have been on duty on5 October 1950 when ABIDIAN left Moscow. In October 1966,however, when the subject of his leaves again came up ininterrogation, he volunteered that he had lied in February1965 when he said he had taken this leave. He said hehad no reason for this lie other than he had claimed tobe on leave "in conditions of interrogation when lies andtruths were all a porridge." He told CIA. again for thefirst time. that his 1960 leave was taken in January ofthat year, immediately after joining the U.S. EmbassySection. Additional details on this January leave periodare given below, in discussion of NOSENKO's claimedresponsibility for operations against U.S. militaryattaches in 1960.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 140]
228. didn't uncover any agents on the basis of letters he mailed. There weren't any. I was concerned with *ABIDIAN*; therefore I know. I can't tell you anything about the agent in the Baltic area because he was handied by the Second Section of the American Department, the `Active Line - penetration.`*NOSENKO has described in greater detail how ABIDIAN was detected mailing the letter to Odessa While discussing personnel assigned to the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate, he said on 24 June 1964: "I first saw Aleksey Konstantinovich SUMIN in the Second Section in 1960, although I heard that he was there in 1959.. He is considered a specialist on working against letters containing secret writing... SUMIN sees all the letters mailed by Americans even the American tourists. The letters are caught either by surveillance or by use of metka. There are several types of metka with different colors, and one type will be used on American Embassy personnel, another type on British Embassy personnel and another type for tourists. The same type is not always used against the same group. They are swit.hed around Ar. example is in 1961 when ABIDIAN mailed a letter to an agent in Odessa. This was a 'game /igra double agent operation The agent was 'ARK-HANGELSKIY /KGB cryptonym/ I think. ASIDIAN Used to park his car and walk around, visiting many shops on Gorkiy Street. He went to one commission shop where there was a large mirror in the shop window. and he would check for survelliance, He was even followed to a post office and one of the surveillance men got in there ahead of rim, but he diân't do anything. Then*NOSENKO has explained that the so-called "Active Line" Section of the American Department was concerned with the penetration of U.S. Intelligence, primarily by serving up KGB-controlled agents for recruitment.** CIA has conducted a series of tests designed to determine whether a substance such as metka was being used as a KGB control device For the purpose of these tests, articles of clothing worn by members of the U.S. Embassy and those of other selected Western embassies were sent back to CIA Headquarters. The clothing in each case had been sent to Soviet dry-cleaning establishments or had been permitted to hang unattended in unrestricted areas of the Embassy or in the apartments of Embassy employees Special filter paper was applied to these articles of clothing. The same paper was applied in Moscow to desk tops, safe drawers, and the like.. The paper was then subjected to ultra-violet, chemical, and microscopic analysis as well as to examination for traces of radioactivity. Results have been consistently negative with a single exception. One test, on one item of clothing, produced a sharply positive reaction.. This article of clothing belor.ged to a third national diplomat who was a CIA operational support agent in Moscow; he was also the only person known to CIA to have been a victim of radio-active isotope tagging in correction with an operational task (not letter-mailing) which he had performed for CIA. There were no positive reactions for this agent's clothing in subsequent tests.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 141]
229. He walked by a post box on the street and was checking it. Two or three times he was followed by this post box, but the surveillance never saw him mail a letter. Still the KGB would remove the contents of the letter box and send it in. On the second or third time SUMIN found the letter he mailed with metka. He had also mailed a cover letter to his parents. Of course, SUMIN also knew the address of the agent, since it was a 'game'."Under interrogation in January 1965 NOSENKO described how metka had been applied to ABIDIAN's clothing by his maid and how, in particular this led to the discovery of the letters ABIDIAN mailed to the agent ARKHANGELSKIY in Odessa and to his parents in the United States The following is taken from the protocol of these interrogations which NOSENKO signed as being accurate on 4 March 1965:"ABIDIAN s maid in Moscow was Tatyana FEDOROVICH.She was an operational contact reporting to ARTEMOV. She started to work for ABIDIAN a few months after his arrival, perhaps three months but no longer than six months after his arrival. I met her shortly after she began to work for ABIDIAN in order to get acquainted with her, in order to evaluate her and give her general instructions about her work for ABIDIAN, I do not know the exact date of this meeting but it was before the fall of 1960. I wrote the operational plan on ABIDIAN in circa October 1960. At this time FEDOROVICH was already working for ABIDIAN. This operational plan stated that FEDOROVICH would continue to put metka regularly on ABIDIAN s clothing."FEDOROVICH put metka on ABIDIAN s clothing during the entire period that she worked for him. She did this every two or three weeks except for a few times when she was sick or on leave No one else had access to ABIDIAN'S apartment and therefore no other person had the possibility of putting metka on his clothing."I have said that ABIDIAN mailed an operational letter to the KGB double agent 'ARKHANGELSKIY'. He mailed it at the mailbox on Tverskaya Yamskaya where he had gone several times earlier. Surveillance did not see ABIDIAN mail the letter but the mailbox was controlled and the letter to 'ARKHANGELSKIY' was found, along with a letter to ABIDIAN's parents. Both of these letters had metka on them. as I was told by SUMIN. I cannot remember the date that ABIDIAN mailed this letter except that it was sometime in 1961.'*In a CIA interview on 8 December 1964, ABIDIAN identified a photograph of Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid who worked for Marion ALEAMONTE and Myra KEMMER, Embassy secretaries, until KEMMER departed Moscow in approximately July 1961. Thereafter FEDOROVICH worked part-time for ALBAMONTE and part-time for ABIDIAN. ABIDIAN explained that he had no maid at all for the "first year of so" of his Moscow tour and that FEDOROVICH was the only maid he employed there, when ABIDIAN left Moscow, she began to work for the Embassy
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 142]
230. (continuation of footnote from preceding page)code clerk John GARLAND (Part V.E.3.c.i.). CIA records show that ABIDIAN mailed the first of his clandestine letters on 1 April 1961 and his second, the one to "ARKHANGELSKIY", on 2 July 1961. IF ABIDIAN's recollection is correct (a review of Embassy phone lists shows that KEMMER was in Moscow in June 1961, but was not there in August of that year), it appears that FEDOROVICH could not have been responsible for the *metka* which, NOSENKO said, led to discovery of the first of these letters; also, it is possible that she was not employed by ABIDIAN at the time the letter to "ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed. ABIDIAN's third clandestine letter was mailed on 1 September 1961, apparently after FEDOROVICH came to work for him. When NOSENKO was told in January 1965 that FEDOROVICH could not have been applying *metka* regularly to ABIDIAN'Ss clothing at the time of the "ARKHANGELSKIY" letter-mailing, he repeated that no one but FEDOROVICH had the possibility of doing so and that he was sure she had. When his interrogators suggested that FEDOROVICH may have occasionally cleaned ABIDIAN'S apartment on an informal basis before being formerly hired as his maid, NOSENKO said that this was possibly the case. (CIA does not know whether this was so or not, but ABIDIAN gave his interviewer the impression in December 1964 that he did his own housekeeping until hiring FEDOROVICH.)