Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 33]
# TOP SECRET635. Do you have a pre-arranged signal for establishing contact with Soviet Intelligence? No. (No reaction)Do you have a concrete plan to return to the Soviet Union sometime in the future? No. (Reaction)Are you performing a special mission for Soviet Intelligence in connection with your defection? No. (Reaction)Are you deliberately hiding penetrations made by Soviet agents into American Intelligence about which you are aware? No. (Reaction)Are you witting of other recruitments made by Soviet Intel- ligence of American Embassy personnel which occurred after RHODES and 'ANDREY'? No. (No reaction)Are you an agent of the KGB or other Soviet Intelligence organs? No. (No reaction)Was there any pre-arranged signal included in the letters you wrote to your wife (since your defection)? No. (No reaction)## Series 13:Did you defect to the Americans in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)Did you defect to the Americans in Geneva? Yes. (No re- action)Did you defect to the Americans with the assignment of un- covering plans of American Intelligence against USSR? No. (Reaction)Did you defect to the Americans with the assignment to find out more about the structure and methods of operation of American Intelligence? No. (Reaction)Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of penetrating American Intelligence? No. (Reaction)Did you defect to the Americans because you were dissatis- fied with the Soviet system? Yes. (Reaction)Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of discredit- ing Soviet officers of the KGB who defected earlier? No. (No reaction)Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of giving mis- information about Soviet agents' penetration of American Intelligence? No. (No reaction)## Series 14:Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to Geneva in 1962? No. (No reaction)Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to Geneva in 1964? No. (No reaction)
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 34]
# TOP SECRET636. Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to Cuba in 1960? No. (Reaction)Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to London in 1957? No. (No reaction)Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your trip to London in 1958? No. (No reaction)Did you personally participate in the search for CHEREPANOV in December 1953? Yes. (Reaction)Is it true that KOVSHUK visited the United States in 1957? Yes. (Reaction)Did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1962? No. (No reaction)To your knowledge, did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1964? No. (No reaction)Was GUK in Switzerland in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)"Series 15:Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 1962? Yes. (No reaction)Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)Did you tell us the truth about Lee Harvey OSWALD? Yes. (No reaction)Did you tell us the truth about Yuri KROTKOV? Yes. (Reaction)Were the CHEREPANOV papers especially prepared and passed to the Americans by the KGB? No. (Reaction)Is it true that Soviet Intelligence has an agent, whose name is unknown to you, among the American representatives in Paris? Yes. (Reaction)Did you bring with you personal identity documents which were fabricated by KGB? No. (Reaction)Did you give truthful information about the structure of the First and Second Chief Directorates of the KGB? Yes. (No reaction)Are you misinforming American Intelligence according to a specially-developed-KGB-plan? No. (No_reaction)Is it true that AGAYANTS is the Chief of Department D (Dis-information)? Yes. (Reaction)To your knowledge, was PEDOSEYEV the Chief of the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate in 1963 and 1964? Yes. (Reaction)
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 35]
# TOP SECRET637. "Series #6:Did you drink more than you told me? No. (Reaction)(Subject admitted to having only one gin and tonic prior to testing.)Did you know that American Intelligence uses the polygraph? Yes. (No reaction)Did anyone in the Soviet Union explain to you anything about American Intelligence's use of the polygraph. No. (No reaction)Did anyone in the KGB explain anything about the polygraph to you? No. (No reaction)During the last twenty-four hours, did you take any medicine or pills? No. (Reaction.)Did you receive instructions from the KGB on how to attempt to beat the polygraph? No. (Reaction)Were you ever hypnotized by anyone? No. (No reaction)Did you bring any types of medicine or pills with you (from abroad or from the Soviet Union)? No. (Reaction)Do you have any pills or medicine about which you have not told me? No. (Reaction)"Although Subject later admitted that he had two types of pills with him which he brought from Moscow and which [were] in his portfolio, he declined to admit that he had had more liquor than he told [me], that he had received specific instructions about the polygraph from the KGB, or that he had taken any type of pills during the last twenty-four hours."
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 36]
638. 2. Test in October 1965 on Lee Harvey OSWALDa. IntroductionCIA conducted a polygraph examination of NOSENKO on 18 October 1956 on the subject of Lee Harvey OSWALD. *Since the previous polygraph test in April 1964, NOSENKO had been under close security guard, his movements restricted, and in the interim had been interrogated in detail and accused of bad faith in dealing with U.S. Government authorities. NOSENKO had not been interviewed by CIA during the six months prior to October 1966. He had had no access to alcohol or drugs, his food consumption had been normal, and his sleep had been adequate.NOSENKO was given no advance notice of the polygraph examination. Upon entering the room where it was to take place, he immediately recognized the officer present as the person who administered the first CIA polygraph test two and one-half years earlier. NOSENKO correctly said that they had first met on 4 April 1964.In the pre-test interview, questions on the OSWALD case were put to NOSENKO in Russian, his answers (also in Russian) were recorded, the operation of the machine was explained, and clarifications of the questions and his answers were made. The three series of questions pertaining to the OSWALD case are given below in their entirety, and they are followed by the conclusions of the polygraph expert.b. Results"Series No. 11. Was Lee Harvey OSWALD ever in the Soviet Union?Answer: Yes. (No reaction)2. Was OSWALD in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1961?Answer: Yes. (No reaction)3. Did you receive special instructions about what to tell the Americans about the OSWALD case?Answer: No. (Reaction)4. Did you personally meet OSWALD?Answer: No. (No reaction)5. Was OSWALD recruited by KGB as an agent?Answer: No. (No reaction)6. Were you glad that President Kennedy was killed?Answer: No. (Reaction)7. Other than what you told me, did you'actively participate in the OSWALD case prior to 1963?Answer: No. (No reaction)
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 37]
# TOP SECRET639. 8. Did you see a photograph of OSWALD in 1963?Answer: Yes. (Reaction)9. Was Marina PRUSAKOVA an agent of KGB?Answer: No. (No reaction)9a. Before her marriage to OSWALD?Answer: No. (Reaction)9b. After her marriage to OSWALD?Answer: No. (No reaction)10. Did you personally meet Marina PRUSAKOVA?Answer: No. (No reaction)11. Did OSWALD have any kind of contact with the 13th Otdel of the First Chief Directorate?Answer: No. (No reaction)12. Did KGB prepare OSWALD for committing assassinations?Answer: No. (No reaction)13. Was OSWALD prepared (trained) by KGB to kill President Kennedy?Answer: No. (No reaction)24.* Did you hear of OSWALD (case) prior to President Kennedy's assassination?Answer: Yes. (Reaction)"Subject's (NOSENKO's) most significant reactions on this test series were to questions 3 and 24--other reactions of a lesser significance were evident to questions 6, 8, 9a, and 10.""Series No. 220. Is the name OSWALD familiar to you?Answer: Yes. (No reaction)21. Did you ever read the OSWALD case?Answer: Yes. (No reaction)22. Was this the full and official KGB case on OSWALD?Answer: Yes. (Reaction)23. Did you give us any kind of information about OSWALD?Answer: Yes. (No reaction)*Before the beginning of the examination, the polygraph operator
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 38]
# TOP SECRET640. 24. Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) prior to President Kennedy's assassination?Answer: Yes. (Reaction)24a. Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) only after President Kennedy's death?Answer: Instead of the usual yes or no answer,Subject answered: 'Before and after.'When the question was repeated, he againanswered: 'Eefore and after.' Only whenthe question was asked a third time on asubsequent test did he answer 'No.' (Reaction)(Subject reacted when he answered 'Before andafter,' and when he answered 'No."25. Did the KGB consider OSWALD abnormal?Answer: Yes. (No reaction)26. As far as you know, did Marina OSWALD know about her husband's plan to kill President Kennedy?Answer: No. (No reaction)27. To your knowledge did OSWALD talk with a KGB officer in Mexico?Answer: No. (No reaction)28. Did OSWALD return to the United States in 1961?Answer: Yes. (No reaction) Subject's reactionto this question was inconsistent when heanswered 'Yes' hence the (No reaction)notation. However, it is noteworthy thatSubject did not attempt to correct thedate of OSWALD's departure to the U.S.;OSWALD returned to the U.S. in June 1962and not in 1961.29. Is your contact with the OSWALD case part of your legend (cover story)?Answer: No. (Reaction)30. Did you really take part in the OSWALD case in 1959?Answer: Yes. (Reaction)"Subject's most significant reactions were to questions22, 24, 24a, 29 and 30."Series No. 3
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 39]
# TOP SECRET641. 16. Did you personally order RASTRUSIN, in 1959, to collect material re OSWALD?Answer: Yes. (Reaction)13. Did you personally talk on the V. Ch. with Minsk about the OSWALD case in 1963?Answer: Yes. (Reaction)17. Were you instructed on the OSWALD case by one of the KGB operational officers?Answer: No. (Reaction)17a. Did the KGB instruct you to tell us OSWALD was a bad shot?Answer: No. (No reaction)18. Do you know definitely that OSWALD was not of operational interest to KGB?Answer: Yes. (Reaction)18c. Did KGB give the OSWALDs any kind of help in their departure from the Soviet Union?Answer! No. (No reaction)3a. Did you receive special instructions from the KGB about what to tell the Americans about OSWALD?Answer: No. (Reaction)"Subject's reactions to the questions so indicated were about equal in consistency and significance.."On the basis of an analysis of the polygraph charts obtained during Subject's polygraph interrogation and testing during the 18 October 1966 session, it is [my] opinion that:a. Subject was not personally or actually involved in the OSWALD case from 1959 to 1961 while OSWALD was in the Soviet Union.b. Subject heard of OSWALD only after Kennedy's assassination; however, he was not an active participant in 1963 as he indicates, but was probably briefed on the case by a KGB officer.c. Subject received-special instructions (from the KGB) about the OSWALD case and what to tell American authorities about it."TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 41]
# TOP SECRET643. B. Evaluation of Production1. IntroductionWhat a Soviet source reports is one factor in assessing his good faith. Rarely, however, can it be conclusive: Even a genuine and conscientious source may be poorly informed or misinformed; he mey be hampered by forgetfulness, mental shortcomings, or lack of education; his reporting may be incomplete because he is not available long enough to permit amplification and clarification of his information. On the other hand, a Soviet-controlled agent who is planted on the opposition may be supplied with useful, voluminous, and accurate information.There are several standards which may be applied to the assessment of a source's production. Each of them is qualified: none is likely to be conclusive by itself; and all of them together may not permit a definite conclusion, although they do contribute to a broader assessment of *bona fides*. The standards are:First, how does the information equate, in terms of completeness, accuracy, and detail, with the source's claimed or proven position and access to information? (In this, one judges the internal consistency of the source's reporting and also compares it with information from other sources and from investigations.)Second, does the information harm the opposition? (This point is risky to judge, for a genuine source may simply not know anything harmful to his country. Also, information which seems harmful to the USSR may not actually be such in Soviet eyes; for example, the loss of an apparently valuable agent could be mitigated by the KGB's possession of better or comparable assets still unexposed.)Third, is the information important or useful to us? (This point may in some cases be irrelevant, for information useful to us may not harm the opposition, and the apparent usefulness of information may not balance against the time and effort required to process and investigate it.)These standards have been applied in evaluating the production of NOSENKO on the topics discussed below.NOSENKO's production is exclusively in the field of counterintelligence information. As described in Part VI.A., he did not have any useful positive intelligence. This does not necessarily affect the question of his *bona fides*, however, for NCSENKO claims to have been a KGB internal counterintelligence officer. From a comparative standpoint, not one of the previous KGB officers who defected to Western services has produced significant military, economic, or scientific information on the USSR, and only a few have supplied political information (usually concerned with the personalities and relationships in the ruling group of the Communist Party). Therefore, nothing of *positive_intelligence_consequence* is expected of NOSENKO, although some question might be raised about his inability to report on the leadership of the Soviet regime in view of his father's position and NOSENKO'S continuing contacts with the leadership after his father's death. The failure of NOSENKO to respond to questionnnaires along positive intelligence lines is not considered unusual.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 42]
# 644.NOSENKO'S counterintelligence production includes all of his information on the Soviet intelligence and security organs:*   their structure, functions, methods, and procedures;*   their officers and their agents of Soviet citizenship;*   their operational activities inside and outside the USSR.For the most part this portion of the paper (as in Part VIII.C. through Part VIII.P.) follows a format in which the evidence is summarized, the facts interpreted, and conclusions presented.## 2. KGB Organization, Personalities, MethodsAbility to discuss the structure of his service in general and at least some of its components in particular is an absolutely minimal requirement for anyone who claims to have been employed within that service. At the same time, current information on the organization of an intelligence service is of classic interest to opposing intelliger.ce and security services.. Organizational changes are indicators of policy and planning trends in the ser- vice; short of a penetration of the service's leadership, such changes are perhaps the most reliable reflection of changes in operational emphasis and tactics.Had NOSENKO's information on the organization of the KGB been novel in this sense, it would have been of considerable value, while the exposure of this information--although perhaps not a major loss to the Soviets--would nonetheless have been against the KGB's best interests. NOSENKO's reports on the organization of the KGB in 1964 (Pages 352-358) agree with and are a logical extension of that framework of KGB organization newly revealed by the 1961 sources, but this weighs reither for nor against him as the source: In the absence of contradictory information, he cannot be subject to criticism or to suspicion because his reports show no redirection of the thrust of the KGB. Furthermore, NOSENKO's statements indicating that there have been no major changes in the years between the 1959 re- organization and 1964 are acceptable in the light of available information from other sources. The information which NOSENKO provided on the KGB's organization therefore neither supports nor discredits his bona fides.NOSENKO's information of some 1,000 Soviets connected with intelligence and security activities is an impressive achieve- ment of memory. These identifications, however, must be evalu- ated according to the damage inflicted upon the Soviets by his exposure of these personalities. In this respect, the discus- sion must concern new identifications, for intelligence person- alities previously exposed could not be damaged any further by a repetition of their compromise. This discussion must be fur- ther restricted to new identifications of staff personnel, be- cause the entire Soviet population is available to the KGB for occasional use as it sees fit, with the loyalty and discretion of the individual as the only limiting factors; to learn that a Soviet employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is an agent re- porting to the KGB is to learn nothing that has not already been taken for granted, and besides, no action on such infor- mation can be taken. Finally, the new identifications also
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 45]
# TOP SECRET647. refused to collaborate with the KGB. He discussed 14 develop- ment cases which never culminated in recruitment approaches to these U.S. Government employees in Moscow, and he named 11 officials at the Moscow Embassy who were investigated by the KGB. These operations, NOSENKO asserted, comprised the total KGB activity against Embassy personnel with the ex- ception of the technical penetrations (see Part VIII. Β.4.).- Seven American correspondents in Moscow had been re- cruited by the KGB, four of them known to NOSENKO from the years 1953-1954 when he was working against U.S. newspaper- men. Another two were under development by the KGB during that period.- The American Express Company representative in Moscow, Arsene FRIFPEL, had become a KGB agent in 1959; NOSENKO was the case officer.- The number of American visitors recruited by the KG3 in 1962-1963 was 14, and if there had been others, NOSENKO would have known about them in light of his senior position in the Tourist Department curing that period. Moreover, for the years before 1962, NOSENKO provided leads to 19 other American tourists whom the KGB recruited, plus one who was serving the GRU when he came to Moscow. NOSENKO also de- scribed 18 development cases and nine investigations in which the targets were American tourists.As for KGB operations outside the Soviet Union, NOSENKO gave leads to four recruited Americans about whom he learned through conver- sations with KGB associates: a U.S. intelligence officer having the XGB cryptonym "SASHA" (still unidentified), a penetration of Orly Courier Transfer Station (identified as Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON), and two agents in Gereva (names not given and as yet not positively identified). NOSENKO learned of the KOB agent status of Horace G. LUNT an American professor, because he tock part in LUNT's recruitment while on TDY in Sofia, and of the Legal Residency agent because of the connection between and bernard KOTE, an American tourist with whose case NOSENKO was personally involved. In addition, NOSENKO de- scribed two development cases with U.S. citizens. From his know- ledge of the "SASHA" operation, NOSENKO also knew that the KGB had no ager.t sources able to supply information concerning the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.(i) Completeness, Accuracy, Detail and Consistency of ReportingIf he occupied the various KGB positions as claimed, if his access were as broad as he said it was, NOSENKO has provided a.. ccmprehensive review of KGB operations involving Americans in the USSR.Other information, however, contradicts NOSENKO's assurances that he reported on all major cases involving Americans working at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow:- GOLITSYN'S reports indicate that a U.S. military code clerk was recruited in 1960, and other factors point toward this person being James STORSBERG or possibly William HURLEY (Pages 166-182). NOSEIKO, the supervisor of operations against Embassy code clerks in 1960-1961, stated that
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 47]
TOP SECRE649. NOSENKO's reporting on individual cases wherein he was a personal participant or supervisor is not, with few exceptions, contradicted by information available from other sources. Nearly all of his statements have proven accurate when they could be compared with collateral information: In fact, the Americans whom he cited did visit or live in the Soviet Union, and many of them are known to have been of operational interest to the KGB, as NOSENKO said. The exceptions to his general accuracy of reporting, however, are of major importance in themselves and in reference to his claimed positions in the U.S. Embassy Section during 1960-1961:*## NOSENKOU.S. Embassy Security Officer John V. ABIDIAN, for whom NOSENKO was the responsible KGB officer, visited the Pushkin Street dead drop site in 1960 or at the beginning of 1961. Later that same day KOZLOV, Chief of the KGB Surveillance Directoratel went to the scene.KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's direct subordinate, made but one TDY to Helsinki in the 1960-1961 period; NOSENKO would have known about if not approved other TDY's in these years when he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section.Returning from his single TDY to Helsinki, KOSOLAPOV was abroad the same train as his target, the American military code clerk Paul JENNER; as supervisor of all operations against code clerks at the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO was familiar with the details of all such major activities.The KGB knew that the U.S. military code clerk James KEYSERS, whom NOSENKO personally contacted in an effort to persuade him to defect, did not report the earlier recruitment approach by the KGB.## CollateralCIA records on the PENKOVSKIY case, in which the Pushkin Street dead drop was used, show that ABIDIAN visited the site only once, on 30 December 1961 at 1130 hours. KOZLOV left New York City on the same day, travelling via France, at the completion of a TDY in the United States. (Pages 231-235, this subject is discussed at greater length in Part VIII.B.6.)Travel records show that KOSOLAPOV was twice in Helsinki during 1960, in March-April and again in November. (Pages 186-200).Travel records show that JENNER and KOSOLAPOV travelled on separate days. (Pages 186-200)KEYSERS reported the recruitment approach immediately after it occurred, and the report was submitted in an Embassy room later found to have a concealed microphone. (NOSENKO stated that he was a customer for microphone intercepts at the time and that this microphone was monitored on a continuous basis by KGB personnel.) (Pages 213-219)*An example of NOSENKO's inaccuracy on events during his later service in the Tourist Department related to his accounts on the arrest of American Professor Frederick BARGHOORN: According to NOSENKO, the approval for this KGB action in which he had a personal part was obtained from BREZHNEV in KHRUSHCHEV's absence from Moscow, and the arrest was made a few hours later; BARGHOORN was arrested on 31 October 1963, and on that day and the day before KHRUSHCHEV made public appearances in Moscow. (BREZHNEV was not seen in Moscow between 29 October and 2 November