Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# Top Secret(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)A sensitive source has quoted two KGB officers respectively, as stating NOSENKO joined the KGB in 1947 or 1949.The significance of NOSENKO'S RU service is the fact that he claims it launched his intelligence career and served as the means through which he secured appointment to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a significant period of his adult life for which he should have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his actual transfer from the Naval EU to the KGB is critical to determining the time from which his claims about KG3 service can be judged credible.NOSEIKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his 1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of his initial retractions and his first admission that he had earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU service was consequently prominent in interrogations in 1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations, challenges of his assertions abcut his RU service prompted adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as challenges on those latter topics prompted amended state- ments with respect to his RU service. The extent of the still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.NOSENKO'S Information-1962NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU. [He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad, Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so no one would think he would take advantage of his father's position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by monitoring the communications of American units operating in50Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1952-January 1964)FRIPPEL was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practically nothing." NOSENKO said that although he had recruited him, "honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent." The KGB nevertheless hoped that FRIFPEL would be reassigned to Moscow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the FRIFPEL case.)Comment: FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962, which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL is known to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union at that time, and there is no apparent reason why he would make a false claim on this matter. According to a sensitive source, FRIPPEL, who is now in New York City, is a current target of the Soviet intelligence service.Johannes PREISFREUNDThe KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection (in December 1961) and thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Embassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh Department. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962, but did not use him in any operations.Comment: PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175) and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent return visits to Moscow, it was only because NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and drinking.266Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)who was [erroneously].considered to be a CIA officer. SHAKHOV *"maybe"* had some contact with MARK in 1960 or 1961, but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A count- intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.X. GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with. SHAKHOV and he had noted "little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United States, earlier, he had been terminated (as an agent) by KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV liked life in the Unites States, American products, and money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not gocd" and 'not wanting to work as an agent".NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad'. "There was no proof, only suspicions, and furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United States since 1942, when he was assigned to the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He at- tended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, and he had at- tended a number of sessions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV Gen- tified him as an MVD (KGB) officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow,a sensitive source identified him as "an employee of the KGB" and KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV'S face "was familiar". An FBI source, however, in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplomat" and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged in no Soviet intelligence activity until that time.277 TS No. 197124Top Secret Copy 10
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he returned to KG3 Headquarters from Geneva.Comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKHOV is still "under suspicion", according to a sensitive source.## Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament DelegationNOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation. [KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.] To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never reported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants provided him.]NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings at any time.278Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## Yu.I. GUKImplying that their friendship was of long standing, NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to the residency and was able to elicit information about sore of GUK's operations in Geneva. lie described his "big, big friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the residency.Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to GUK. According to several sources (see Annex A. because of his friendship with ROSENKO, GUR was dismissed from the KG3.## M.S. TSYMBALIn 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken witin him, but placed no particular. emphasis on their relationship.In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose back- ground would have made them suitable for the Special (Illegalsi Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Head- quarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence, NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was granted access in 1964.281# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)## NOSENKO's InformationSLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB FirstChief Directorate because of his business transactionswith a number of Soviets who visited his store and inwhom he seemed to show more than casual interest. TheFirst Chief Directorate was of the opinion thatSLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted withsome Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited theSoviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER plannedanother trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "hemight make some contacts or do something interesting"while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted toresolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly anagent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB hada file on SLESINGER, and a senior case officer in theAmerican Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M.DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agentof the Seventh Department who was director of a photo-graphic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendlywith SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the SovietUnion, and the two men later exchanged correspondence..SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN.directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents. who.could watch his behavior. If there had been any indicationof intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted..to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed,no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to theSoviet Union before, several times.Comment: A sensitive source had reported to theFBI that the KCB suspected SLESINGER tobe an FBI "plant" and that KGB officer"might be trying to developSLESINGER to act as a courier or in someother agent capacity."NOSENKO's information was substantiallycorrect. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER,reported to the FBI in July 1962 of hisJune 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa.In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by aSoviet official who exhibited "intimateknowledge" of his business in New YorkCity and had asked whether SLESINGER had"ever been bothered by the FBI."294Top SecretTS. No. 197124Copy
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)Comment: (Continued)In 1966 SLESI GFR reported to the FBI that he was in touch with a Moscow photographic shop proprietor, and he described evidence of KGB interest in him during his visit to Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been in contact with a number of Soviet officials from the United Nations.NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Directorate case.## KOTEN'S Arrest and the KGB AgentNOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had been arrested on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that KOTEN was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the agent's name, but from the description he provided he is believed identical with a KGB S&T agent identified earlier on the basis of a May 1962 report from a sensitive source.## NOSENKO's InformationKOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens, particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently inspired such contacts.] Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second Directorates had concluded that KOTEN might be a "provocation agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the Communist Party in the United States.295Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## NOSENKO's InformationSHUBIN was a native of California of Russian ex- traction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor in New York City. SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958 or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN was the target of Seventh Department case officer A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They very furtively said that they were interested in him," from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent. NOSENKO himself telephoned GRJ General SOKOLOV's office and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according to another version, SOKOLOV'S office was advised by others). SOKOLOV'S office eventually apologized for having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU'S interest in SHUBIN".Comment: Earlier, a sensitive source identified an agent apparently identical with SHUBIN and FBI sources reported SilUBIN's travel to the USSR in summer 1961 and in September 1963.SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited the Soviet Union during that period it was not as an American tourist under his true name. Consequently, he could not then have been the tourist target of the Seventh Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further contradiction: NOSENKO could not have noticed his name while reviewing tourist lists in the Seventh Department, because he claims he was in the American Department at the time.297Top SecretTS No.. 197124Copy 10
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHFRE- PANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep woods, "where a person could los: himself for life". On the seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku, where he was on his way to the Iranian border.A special plane was inmediately sent to Baku, carrying S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department off- cers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow, interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some money in return for the documents. He confessed that on 4 November he had passed the documents to an Americar tourist who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he had given the documents to the American in the entrance hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also housed.Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock. surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB that if he had detected his surveillants he would have written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof of his guilt.Comment: Other sources, including sensitive sources, have also reported various aspects of the CHEREPANOV incident. NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time.313. # Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTHENT - January 1962-January 1964)## The Recall Telegram### HOSENKO's InformationOn 3 February 1964, HOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB Legal Residency once during the morning before he ret with CIA and again that evening after 1300; there were at those times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of 4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there were again no such messages for him. Later in the morning of 4 February, however, after attending a session of the Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and found that a telegram from KGB Headquarters had arrived, instructing him to return to Moscow immediately to participate in the KGB conference on tourism. After relating the substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thenceforth in CIA custody.Comment: Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO'S assertion regarding the existence of the recall telegram. According to Special Intelligence, there were er.ciphered communications from Moscow to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and later, lut there was none from 1815 on 3 February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours after HOSEIKO was in custody of CIA.324Top SecretTS No. 197124-Copy
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)NOSEMO'S Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall TelegramNOSENKO maintained throughout ais interrogations in 1964 and 1965 that there was the recall telegram and that it prompted his defection. In October 1966, however, while being questioned again, NOSENKO stated that there had bee:: no telegram recalling him to Moscow from Geneva, and he signed the following statement:"On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in Moscow had been received in the KGE Residency 11 Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said at the time that this telegram said that I was recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent interviews and interrogations by American authorities in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed. No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that the story was a lie. I myself invented this tele- gram in order to hasten my defection. I was rervcus and afraid that my contacts with American Intelli- gence might be noticed."Knowledge of Other Seventh Department OperationsThe notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 (see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB operations conducted, against what NOSENKO described as tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited in the description of these operations in Annex B, these opcrations are not material to NOSEIKO's claim to service in 1962-1963 as cither Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.325Top SecretTS No.. 197124Copy 10
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964: SummaryTo substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSEIKO describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY, the arrests of KOTE!! and BARGHOORN, and the investigations of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGD officer CHEREPANOV, his discovery that SHUBI!: was a GRU agent, and his assignment to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as he described and they were as he described (there are substantial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical with respect to NOSEIKO's own description of Seventh Depart- rent operations. They do not accurately characterize, as NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions which he claimed to have held.KGB Counterintelligence OperationsAmong American Tourists1962-1963Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to326Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy