Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 21]
# TOP SECRET"NOSENKO'S Claim to Have Been a Komsomol Secretary in the Second Chief Directorate, KGB"NOSENKO claimed to have become a member of the Komsomol Organization (K/O) of the KGB when he entered on duty in March 1953, to have been elected as Secretary of Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Directorate in the fall of 1953, and to have served in that capacity until the fall of 1954, when he was re- moved because he used operational-alias documents in obtaining treatment for a venereal disease he had incurred. He claims to have been excluded from the Komsomol, without prejudice, when he attained his 27th birthday in October 1954."Asked to describe how he transferred from the Komsomol Crgan- ization of the Naval Intelligence Post in the Baltic to the Kom- somol Organization of the KGB, NOSENKO gave an entirely incorrect description of this procedure, both as regards deregistration from the K/O in the Baltic, and registration with the K/O in the KGB. He stated that he was issued a new Komsomol registration card by the KGB K/O, without reference to the previous K/O in the Baltic; this is impossible."NOSENKO gave an incorrect account of how a K/O secretary is elected, stating that he was elected at a meeting of the K/O. In fact, the K/O meeting can only select the K/O committee, which will convene separately to elect the Secretary."NOSENKO could not describe the duties of a K/O secretary in a specific manrer."NOSENKO did not know who was the secretary of the overall KGB K/O. The secretary of the SCD K/O would be directly subordinate to him and would deal with him frequently."NOSENKO was unable to describe his dealings with the KGB K/O or the identities or responsibilities of the people with whom he dealt there."NOSENKO insisted that in 1953-54, the maximum age for a Kom- somol member was 27. In actual fact, the maximum age was 26 (it was raised later). This point is important, both because NOSENΚΟ should know exactly if he had served as a K/O secretary, and also because it refutes his story that he was excluded from the Kom- somol for over-age in 1954."NOSENKO maintained that all the members of his K/O paid dues in the amount of 2 percent of their monthly salaries. This is incorrect, as monthly Komsomol dues were calculated on a sliding scale determined by wage group: at that time, Komsomol members earning up to 500 rubles monthly paid 0.5 percent: those earning 500 to 1500 rubles paid 1 percent, and those earning over 1500 rubles paid 1.5 percent. The K/O secretary collects the dues, and must know the right amount."NOSENKO did not know whether or not a Komsomol Congress took place while he was K/O secretary, saying that they took place every year. In actual fact, the 12th Komsomol Congress which convened in March 1954 was the first since 1948; at this 12th Congress a number of changes were made in the Komsomol Rules (Ustav). As secretary of a K/O NOSENKO would have been involved
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 22]
# TOP SECRET624. in a good deal of preparatory work for this Congress, which was a big event in the life of every Komsomol worker at the time, and could not be forgotten."Although DERYABIN's direct knowledge of the KGB ended in 1954, his detailed information of KGB procedures has been updated by his more recent examination of reports from other sources. With regard to what NOSENKO has said about KGB procedures, DERYABIN stated: "Asked to describe how he conducted name checks on a Soviet citizen and on a new arrival to the American Embassy in 1953-54, NOSENKO gave a superficial description of how such checks were done. However, he resisted every attempt to get him to describe this process in detail, and he made several blunders which show that he never actually ran such a check himself. For example, he did not know where the records of all Soviet citizens who have been tried are kept, and he attempted to improvise an answer (completely wrong) that they would check with the Militia about this. NOSENKO correctly said that Archives were located on Kirov Street, but he was completely unable to stretch his limited knowledge to provide a description of how these various repositories were actually checked. NOSENKO was also asked to describe in detail how he ran such a check on a Soviet citizen in the 1956-59 period. Here again he was in difficulty and refused even to try. He did not even know the everyday term Spets-proverka, which means a check for clearance."It was particularly interesting that he did not feel able to dispute my challenges of his information, even though he undoubtedly knows that I do not have first-hand knowledge of procedures in this period. I even tested this on one occasion by asking NOSENKO the difference between the 1st Spets Otdel (Special Department - KGB cards and files) and the Operativno-Uchetniy Otdel (Operational Reports Department - the functional name for the 1st Special Department). He answered that the 1st Special Department holds the files on Soviet criminal cases while the Operational Reports Department is for political and espionage cases. It seems he invented this answer on the spot. In addition, it is wrong that political and security cards are separate from criminal cres in the 1st Special Department. They were in my time and must still be combined in one card file."NOSENKO states that he knows nothing about the files of the First Chief Directorate. It is unbelievable that in ten years of service in the Second Chief Directorate NOSENKO never saw a First Chief Directorate file; how else would he be able to check information on foreigners, especially on American Embassy personnel? The first stage in such a check is an inquiry to the First Chief Directorate and a check of any files they may have on the subject. According to his own account, NOSENKO should have been doing this type of thing the whole of his ten years of service, without regard to whether he was assigned to the American Department or the Tourist Department."
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 23]
# TOP SECRET625. 2. Remarks by CIA Handlersa. IntroductionFive CIA case officers who worked directly with NOSENKO have recorded their personal observations on his behavior and actions. The principal case officer, the first CIA representative to meet NOSENKO in 1962, participated in all of the meetings and inter- rogations (either personally or monitoring from off-stage) since then; he is a senior officer with 17 years of operational experi- ence, including extensive agent handling and dealings with more than 10 officers of Soviet and Satellite Intelligence and Security Services who were defectors or agents in place; he has also had desk or supervisory responsibilities connected with at least 20 other such sources. A second case officer, who participated in the meetings in Geneva in 1964 and in all subsequent phases of the operation, has spent the 16 years of his career solely in Soviet operations and has handled several Soviet sources in place, as well as defectors. Three other officers, who began to work with NOSENKO after his arrival in the United States and conducted the bulk of both the debriefing and the hostile interrogations, have spent most of their careers in Soviet counterintelligence operations; among them, they command an extensive knowledge of the Soviet Intelligence Services, and they have had a variety of agent- and defector-handling experience.NOSENKO was talked to and questioned in several types of circumstances:- In five tightly organized meetings in 1962 in Geneva with limited time available for each of a wide range of topics, none of which could be ignored but none of which could be covered in detail.- In concentrated but somewhat longer meetings in place in Geneva in January-February 1964, with the know- ledge by all participants that items not adequately covered then could be dealt with after the defection.- In routine debriefing sessions after his defection, first in a Frankfurt safehouse, then in a safehouse in the Washington area, where a special effort was made not to put pressure on NOSENKO or express doubts about his statements.- Under detailed hostile interrogation (especially April 1964 and January-March 1965).- In extended, detailed debriefing sessions which NOSENKO could not evade (May-November 1964, May 1965, July-August 1965, and October 1966).Thus there were opportunities to note his performance and reac- tions under varied degrees of stress and control.The features of NOSENKQ's conduct, manner, and techniques discussed below are confined to those which were clearly and con- sistently observed by all of the officers involved.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 25]
# TOP SECRET627. These limitations of knowledge and quirks of memory were evident not only during meetings when NOSENKO was being debriefed. They were also apparent in the interrogations which supplanted the debriefings.c. NOSENKO'S Behavior Under Interrogatior(i) IntroductionIn the many and long interrogation sessions there emerged habits of behavior noticeable to each of the CIA officers present. Trese characteristics of NOSENKO were his manner of recounting events and his evasiveness, improvisations, and other defensive techniques. They are reviewed below.(ii) Manner of Recounting EventsTypical of NOSENKO's performance in the interrogations were the following points.- Talking about operations he supervised and about his personal role in the KGB Headquarters aspects of other operations, NOSENKO habitually used the passive voice ("it was decided") or indicated that he was not alore in these activities ("there was no accounting on who was working on any code clerk case--it was GRYAZNOV, KOSCLAPOV, NOSENKO, and also working was KLYPIN, GRIBANOV," or "We made the decision--I and KOVSHUK and GRYAZNOV," or "I and GRYAZNOV discussed this with him. ") when asked where a particular conversation took place, he rarely located it in his own office ("I was in KOVSHUK's office when KCSLCV called him about the trip" or "I was in KLYPIN's office and he was talking to KOVSHUK").- At the other extreme from being impersonal, NOSENKO sometimes quoted conversations in which he took part ("I then said," "he said to me," etc.), but it was in just such matters that NOSENKO most often contradicted himself (e.g.. his relationship with GRIBANOV and his part in the recruitment approach to the American code clerk James STORSBERGİ.- In repeating certain 'stories (the CHEREPANOV case and the provocation against Professor Frederick BARGHOORN are examples) NOSENKO gave them in precisely the same order, without addition or omission. In relating the PENKOVSKIY story, which he stressed he learned "little by little from several different sources, he presented the facts each time in nearly identical order. Asked for more details on these cases, he invariably insisted--often with irritation--that he knew nothing more and if he did, he would have reported it. Other factors contributed to the impression that in such instances NOSENKO had delivered his information by rote: Statements like "I don't remember what I told you before" when queried agair on a particular case: detachment and a lack of emotion when describing the compromise of Soviets who, like himself, had cooperated with American Intelligence: POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV: an irability to correlate dates and events in different operations which he said he was handling (such as conflicts in the timing of his approach to W.E. JOHNSON and in the date he gave for John V. ARIDIAN'S visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, and conflict between the dates of his participation in the MORONE case and his travel to Cuba).
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 27]
# TOP SECRET629. data on ABIDIAN from the State Department Biographic Register, he said "only the First Chief Directorate" uses it: when the interrogator pursued the point, NOSENKO said he remembered that KOVSHUK did have a copy in his office, "but an old one, 1956, which didn't list ABIDIAN." Under pressure about ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street, NOSENKO said the KGB thought that ABIDIAN may not have entered the building on Pushkin Street; yet he had earlier given extensive details about how the KG3 had analyzed the precise number of seconds ABIDIAN had been inside, to determine where the drop, if any, might be. As another example, when he was initially asked about George BLAKE, tle KGB agent in MI-6, the context of the question was a discussion of Second Chief Directorate operations. NOSENKO labeled it as such and said it "was not as important as VASSALL." Later, when the name was mentioned again, he asked: "Who's BLAKE?"On other occasions, when his self-contradictions were pointed out or when he admitted ignorance of matters he acknowledge he should have known, NOSENKO would fall back upon one of the following lines of defense:- "What I know I tell you; what I remember I tell you," or "I don't know," "I can't explain," -- or a shrug.- The details, even if confused or contradictory, are not important. What is important is the "whole" or entirety of the facts, their importance and their "reality." It is this that American Intelligence should evaluate, not details.- He must be genuine because otherwise "how could I have been working with 'SARDAR' and 'PROKHOR'?" (Johan PREISFREUND whose KGB cryptony was "PROKHOR," did confirm NOSENKO's role.) "How else could I tell you about STORSBERG?" "The KGB would not use a staffer as a provocateur," nor would the KGB supply information on "live cases" such as the Paris case (JOHNSON) and VASSALL, and reveal the names of its officers abroad.- If American Intelligence checked his story "fully," it would learn that despite all this confusion, he was genuine. He repeatedly urged that his interrogators check via an independent penetration of the KGB--there it would verify that his name is registered as the case officer who opened, held and turned over the ABIDIAN file and thus that he was a KGB officer.*NOSENKO referred to this method of corrcborating him at least 20 times during the interrogations of January-March 1965. He said on 1 February 1965 that "maybe the day will come when you have a source to check and you will find out" (that he was ABIDIAN'S case officer). Later in the same interrogation session, he added: "I see how poor and miserable I'm looking with regard to ABIDIAN'S file, but anyone who can check in (KGB) Archives will see." On February he said, "I greatly wish that you will have as soon as possible an agent in the KGB. It is simple to look at the![drawing] was the only such source at the time.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 28]
# TOP SECRET630. file on ABIDIAN. On the first page is written that 'I, NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich, opened this file'." On 16 February he said: "Time will show I am what I say." On 3 March he referred nine times within one hour to a check via such a source. He repeatedly stated that "time will show" that he is not a provocateur. At one point he engaged in the following dialogue with his interrogators:NOSENKO: I'm telling you that, if you check, you'll find that I'm right.INTERROGATOR: We're not disputing that you worked for the KGB. We're disputing that you held the positions you say you held in the KGB.NOSENKO: That's what I'm saying. If you could check you would find that I was only in these two departments and only in these positions...(later in the session)NOSENKO: I can't tell you anything more. I can't prove anything. Maybe the future will show.INTERROGATOR: What can the future show?NOSENKO: I don't know. But from what I understand the checking has not gone very far. Maybe you can check further... I mean, if you have any possibility now, I mean by chance, have anyone in the KGB or out of the KGB, with any of my acquaintances, friends.INTERROGATOR: You mean our acquaintances, don't you?NOSENKO: Yes, but maybe your acquaintances can check with someone, because anyone in the KGB should know that, yes, there was a NOSENKO.INTERROGATOR: Should we ask someone like VAKHRUSHEV or SUSLOV?NOSENKO: No, of course not, because I gave you their names. Check someone else, not known to me, so you can be sure.d. Additional Observations(1) Inquisitiveness About CIANOSENKO's questions about CIA and its activities seemed to his interrogators to be beyond the interest or curiosity expected of Soviet Intelligence defectors. Frequently he asked, even while discussing his own KGB responsibilities: "You tell me about a case, and I will remember details." Other examples of NOSENKO's inquisitiveness include the following:- When shown the CIA publication "Checklist of Soviet Officials Abroad" during the 1964 meetings in Geneva, NOSENKO made inquiries about what organization prepared it and to what part of the U.S. Government that organization is subordinate.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 29]
# TOP SECRET631. - In January 1964, entirely out of context, he asked whether GOLITSYN had reported to CIA that Finnish President KEKKONEN was a KGB agent. (He was not able to explain in later questioning why he had not informed CIA about the case before he made the foregoing inquiry.)- NOSENKO asked precisely how American Intelligence collection in the USSR is directed and coordinated. The CIA case officer responded: "What was that question?" NOSENKO thereupon said: "It was not a question--just general interest." When the case officer urged him to repeat the question, he refused to talk about it and diverted the conversation to other matters.- He asked where CIA secretaries resided in the Washington area.- NOSENKO tried to find out the grades of the CIA officers in contact with him.- NOSENKO inquired in early 1964 whether the CIA officer who met him in Geneva two years earlier had received a medal for that phase of the operation.## (ii) Acceptance of Contrary Information from Other SourcesUnder interrogation, even when accused of lying, NOSENKO rarely challenged the validity of CIA's information nor claimed superior knowledge. The only facts he challenged strongly were incontestably true, such as the date of GOLITSYN's defection, the date of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, KOSOLAPOV's travel separate from JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV'S November 1960 trip to Helsinki. It seemed at all times that he accepted that CIA knew more than he did on topics including conditions in the USSR and cases and people for whom he claimed direct responsibility. He never challenged DERYABIN's statements about KGB procedures, although aware that his own information was more recent.## (e) Discussions with NOSENKO on His Own PerformanceAfter admitting his inability to respond to questions about operations in which he said he participated, NOSENKO sometimes gave a general appraisal of his own performance. He would admit that it was "impossible to have such memory breaks" and agree that his response was neither reasonable nor acceptable ("In your place I wouldn't believe it either," or on another occasion, "It will look bad to your boss"). Admitting that the questions were fair, logical, and clearly put, he acknowledged at least a dozen times during the January-March 1965 interrogation that his performance under questioning was bad and unacceptable.He also admitted that most of the leads he had passed were largely useless. Out of the 150-or-so-he-said_he_had_provided, he stated that the great majority were "no good," unimportant, or people with whom the KGB had not worked ("Maybe 'ANDREY' became not interesting to KGB, changed jobs, and was not so important any more"; "some of the agents recruited by the Seventh Department weren't meeting the KGB"; etc.) He consistently estimated, however, that there were about 20 to 25 "good" leads.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 31]
633. "Although the Subject had used both alcohol and some unknown drug prior to testing, there is rc question, based both on analysis of Subject's polygraph charts as well as personal observation during the interview, that Subject has attempted deliberate deception in the specific pertinent areas which are mentioned below in this report.""It is {my} conclusion that Subject is not a bona fide defector, but is a dispatched agent sent by Soviet Intelligence for a specific mission or missions.""According to the plan, the different phases involving various pertinent areas were covered with Subject polygraphically. Challenge of Subject's reactions was indirect and 'soft.' On no occasion dia Subject even attempt to volunteer any explanation of the possible causes for his polygraph reactions. He continually denied and refused to admit that there was anything to any of the questions which were asked of him. when the final test questions were completed and a record was cbtained of all of Subject's polygraphic responses, the nature of the challenge and probing was changed.""Subject was told that he was lying to numerous pertinent questions and was accused of being a dispatched agent. Subject's only explanation to (my) direct accusation was that he could not be a dispatched agent because of the amount of information he had volunteered to American Intelligence.""Subject, who before and throughout testing reflected complete self-control and composure, now exhibited a completely different picture. His composure was non-existent, his eyes watered, and his hands trembled. Prior to being confronted with (my) opinion that Subject was a dispatched agent, when Subject was asked on one of the last test runs (a) if he were sent to penetrate American Intelligence and (b) if Subject received instructions from KGB on how to attempt to beat the polygraph, his answers were given in a voice that actually trembled...""Listed below are all of the questions asked of Subject.""Series #1:Were you born in the Soviet Union? Yes. (No reaction)Were you born in the city of Nikolayev? Yes. (No reaction)Were you born on 30 October 1927? Yes. (No reaction)Did you deliberately give any kind of misinformation when you told us your autobiography? No. (Reaction)Is NOSENKO the surname which you had at time of birth?Yes. (Reaction)Are you concerned about the fact that the polygraph test may discover that you are hiding the truth from me? No. (No reaction)Was your father the Minister of Shipbuidling? Yes. (No reaction)
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 32]
# TOP SECRET634. Were you a member of the Communist Party before 1956? No. (No reaction) (Subject stated that he applied for candidacy to the Commu- nist Party in 1956, and in mid-1957 was accepted as a member.)Did you deliberately give any misinformation about your work and service in the KGB? No. (No reaction)Besides your children, is there anything in your life on the basis of which someone may blackmail you? No. (No re- action) (Subject stated that his love for his children was the only thing that is of any consequence which the Soviets might use for blackmail purposes. However, Subject said he was not worried, because regardless of threats against the welfare of his children, he would not allow himself to be black- mailed or controlled.)Have you ever engaged in any homosexual activity? No. (Reaction)Did you give deliberate misinformation about your education? No. (No reaction)Did you ever commit a major crime? No. (No reaction)Did you give deliberate misinformation about your military service? No. (No reaction)"Series #2:Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in 1962? Yes. (No reaction)Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in January 1964? Yes. (No reaction)Did you voluntarily defect to the Americans? Yes. (No reaction)Did you ask for the right of political asylum from the Americans? Yes. (No reaction)Were you sent to the Americans by the organs of Soviet Intelligence (with a special mission)? No. (Reaction)Do you have a sincere desire to fight against the KGB and all other punitive organs of the Soviet Union? Yes. (No reaction)Did you establish contact with American Intelligence on orders of the KGB? No. (Reaction)Did anyone know of your intention to defect to the Americans? No. (No reaction)Does the KGB have a pre-arranged signal for establishing contact with you in America? No. (Reaction)