Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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736. info from sensitive sourcedescribed in detail the selection of BARGHOCPN as a hostage forIVANOV (the KGB officer arrested shortly before in New YorkCity as a result of the planningof the provocation, ocel for actrices sarpolding BAIGHOORNwhich were not related to the provocation, BANCHOORN's arrestin Moscow, and the early stages of his interrogation. Exceptfor some variation in dates, NOSENKO's accounts of BARGHOORI'Smovements and of the sequence of events in the provocation-arrest matched that of BARGHOORN. This case is in two wayssimilar to the approach to W.E. JOHNSON: It was an operationin which there was no thought of recruitment, and BARGHOON wasable to identify NOSENKO as a participant.BARGHOORN reported that the day after his arrest he wasquestioned by the same officer who had interrogated him theevening before about the "compromising materials" which hadbeen planted on him. With this officer on this one occasionwas his "chief," whom PARGHOORN subsequently identified by photo-graph as NOSENKO. NOSENKO has said that he was told by theChief of the Tourist Department that GRIBANOV wanted him (HOSENKO)present in the interrogation room at the time when BARGHOOPNadmitted that he had the compromising information in his posses-sion at the time of arrest. NOSENKO did not know why his par-ticular presence was needed or deairca, but he complied despitethe fact that he did not want to reveal his face to BARGHOOPNas he knew BARGHOORN would be released. NOSENKO said that hestayed in the interrogation room only until the interrogatingofficer secured this admission and then he left. BARGHOORIhas reported that NOSERKO attended one of the interrogationsessions, that this session covered only biographic and backgroundmatters, and that the compromising documents and his possessionof them had been discussed the previous evening, right after hisarrest.In describing the planning of this provocation, NOSENKOtold CIA that the suggestion to provide BARGHOORN came fromGRIBANOV, who took the idea of arresting BARGHOORN to KGB Chair-man SEMICHASTNYY, but did not divulge to him that it would be.based on provocation. This was on the day before the arrest.SEMICHASTNYY agreed with the idea of the arrest and securedpermission to carry it out from BREZHNEV, as KiRUSHCHEV wasout of Moscow at the time. Reliable sources show, however,that KHRUSHCHEV was in Moscow on 30 October, the day when SEMI-CHASTNYY allegedly called BREZHNEV, and was also there on 31October, the day of the arrest. BREZHNEV was not seen byWesterners in Moscow from 29 October until 2 November 1963.(iii) The Approach to BRAUNSNOSENKO said he personally approached the American tour-ist BRAUNS (Pages 293-295) shortly after returning to Moscowfrom Geneva in 1962. BRAUNS had lived in Leningrad until WorldWar II, had left with the fleeing Germans, and had eventuallysettled in the United States, where he was a technician workingat an "interesting company making computers, adding machines,or other instruments." NOSENKO had originally instructed hisTOP SECRET
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738. agent refused to leave the United States, and when the CPUSA protested the arrest of one of its members, KOTEN was released.KOTEN was a long-time Communist, and there are no apparent reasons why the KGB should doubt his loyalty. His homosexuality was well-known to his acquaintances within the CPUSA, and at the time of his trip to the Soviet Union he was acting as a tour guide for the New York firm "Afton Tours," which is owned by SVENCHANSKIY. (NOSENKO said that SVENCHANSKIY, also a Communist, was his own agent at the time of KOTEN's arrest.)NOSENKO was able to give a considerable amount of identifying data on the "important agent". This agent had been identified a year before KUTEN'S trip.The fact that KOTEN had been arrested on charges of homosexuality was leaked by Inturist to press services two days after the reported date of the arrest, resulting in wide publicity in Western newspapers. (The U.S. Embassy was not notified officially until two days later.) There was no apparent reason for this extremely unusual step by the KGB, which can be assumed to manipulate Inturist for operational support purposes.After the CPUSA had protested the action, KOTEN was released from prison. He was told that the incident was a mistake which had been corrected, that he was free to go anywhere he wanted in the Soviet Union, and that he could return anytime. the agent, has since repatriated to the Soviet Union.d. Agents Handled by NOSENKOWhen NOSENKO transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department, he took with him the two homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, PREISFREUND, and RYTOVA (Pages 287-289). The homosexuals he used the day after his return, in the operation against W.E. JOHNSON. This was their first operational use since the fall of 1959; they were never used again before being terminated at the end of 1962 or early 1963, NOSENKO said, because they were "too well known." PREISFREUND was considered compromised to American Intelligence following the defection of GOLITSYN, so he also was never used again, although NOSENKO met him socially when PREISFREUND returned to Moscow on business trips as recently as 1963. During the first part of 1962, on instructions from KOVSHUK and the Chief of the American Department, NOSENKO continued to meet with who was still involved in the development of ZUJUS, the American code clerk. NOSENKO last saw before going to Geneva in March 1962; WEISS left the Soviet Union to return to Syria while NOSENKO was away. RYTOVA, NOSENKO said, had been his agent since 1956 or 1957. Some time in 1962 she moved from her position as an instructor of Greek at the Institute.TOP SECRET
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739. of International Relations to a position in the school of the CPSU Central Committee and ceased agent work. Although she was inactive, NOSENKO continued to be registered as her case officer until 1964, when he defected.(1) FRIPPELHaving left his assignment in Moscow in early 1961, FRIPPEL (Pages 129-133 and Part VIII.D.5.) returned several times to the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963. NOSENKO, who remained his case officer although FRIPIEL now lived and worked in New York City, met him each time. FRIPFEL said there were three such occasions, in February 1962 when he met once with NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV in Odessa, and two later times in Moscow and Odessa, when NOSENKO came alone. NOSENKO denied that he met PRIPPEL in Odessa in February 1962 with CHELNOKOV, but said that he met twice with him alone after returning to Moscow from Geneva. The first of these meetings was in the summer of 1962 when FRIP-PEL was accompanying a group of American newspaper editors tour-ing the Soviet Union. FRIPPEL said NOSENKO called briefly at his hotel room to enquire what questions the editors planned to ask KHRUSHCHEV during a planned interview. When FRIPPEL said he did not know, NOSENKO departed and FRIPPEL later re-ported that he did not see NOSENKO again on this trip. (NOSENKO said he called again after the interview to learn the "reactions" of the editors.) The second meeting was in Odessa, when FRIPPEL, visited the Soviet Union as a guide on a tour ship. According to FRIPPEL, it was on this occasion that NOSENKO apparently made a phone call to ask permission to go aboard FRIPPEL's ship, and it might have been at this meeting or the earlier one that NOSENKO told him something of his personal background. (FRIPPEL knew a considerable amount of information about NOSENKO's father and family.) NOSENKO denied the possibility that he would have to request permission to board the vessel and said that if he had told FRIPPEL anything about himself, it was when he was drunk. Both FRIPPEL and NOSENKO agreed that FRIPPEL provided no information of value during any of these meetings..(11) SVENCHANSKIYNOSENKO has cited SVENCHANSKIY, KGB cryptonym "ANOD," as an example of the Second Chief Directorate's use of foreign travel agents to signal the KGB when an interesting tourist is about to visit the Soviet Union (Pages 295-298). SVENCHANSKIY was recruited for this purpose, NOSENKO said, in 1961 and used to send open-code signals to the Tourist Department by marking visa applications whenever he spotted anything significant. Some of SVENCHANSKIY's signals had been, considered, NOSENKO said, "of definite operational interest." In September 1963, NOSENKO took the case over from the previous handling officer, NOSKOV, and his name was listed in SVENCHANSKIY's file as the responsible officer.NOSENKO first said that he had read SVENCHANSKIY's file and then changed this to say that he had only skimmed it. He met twice with his new agent, once in September 1963 and once later in the year. On both occasions, NOSKOV was present.TOP SECRET
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740. NOSENKO said that at the time SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 that, because SVENCHANSKIY was known to have had contacts with AMTORG in New York, there was some suspicion that he might be an FBI agent. NOSENKO was unable to be more precise as to the basis for these suspicions and, when asked how NOSKOV had resolved them, was able to say only that NOSKOV "felt" that SVENCHANSKIY was not an American agent.NOSENKO knew little about SVENCHANSKIY's background from the one-volume file kept on him in the Tourist Department. He did know that SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 on the promise of commercial favors, that he had at one time been detected in blackmarket transactions in the USSR, and that in addition to his travel agency, SVENCHANSKIY ran a Russian-language bookstore in Chicago. PBI and CIA records show that SVENCHANSKIY has been employed by a series of registered Soviet Government organizations in the United States since the early 1930's, that he was released from his position as a United Nations radio officer broadcasting to the Soviet Union in 1952 when he failed to answer questions of the Senate Internal Security Committee concerning alleged subversive activity, and that both his travel agency and his book store are affiliated with registered Soviet agencies, Inturist and Mezhkniga. Allegations on file of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist sympathies and probable Soviet espionage activities date back to the Second World War. In August 1950, Harry GOLD linked SVENCHANSKIY to the Soviet espionage network in the United States during the war. The FBI has reported...was identified as having at one time been the confidential secretary of GOLOS, the "director of Soviet espionage in the United States." (NOSENKO knew that someone called Sonya worked for SVENCHANSKIY in New York, but said that she is not a KGB agent and was not the one who marked the visa applications.)e. The OSWALD InvestigationAs First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said, he was directly involved in the investigation of OSWALD's activities in Minsk which was ordered after the assassination of President KENNEDY (Pages 136-144 and Part VIII.D.5.). It is from his role at this time and his reading of the Minsk KGB file on OSWALD that NCSENKO derived his authority to state that the KGB "washed its hands of OSWALD" after his attempted suicide in the USSR, that there was no attempt to recruit either OSWALD or his wife, and that KGB interest in OSWALD while he lived in Minsk was restricted to passive observation.f. The CHEREPANOV InvestigationPart VIII.B.6.c. contains a discussion of the CHEREPANOV case, in which NOSENKO claims to have been involved in November 1962 while Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.TOP SECRET
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741. g. RemarksLeaving aside NOSENKO's unsubstantiated claims to supervisory jobs in the Tourist Department in 1962-1963, when he indicated he was absent from KGB Headquarters nearly half of the time, his personal role in operations and investigations of the period appears artificial in some instances and implausible in others. NOSENKO's knowledge of the origins of the JOHNSON case is incomplete, the timing conflicts with other activities attributed to himself, the expressed purpose of the compromise in unique, and the outcome seems to have little consequence beyond enabling JOHNSON to confirm that NOSENKO appeared in it. Although BRAUIS may have been in a position to corroborate NOSENKO's appearance in that operation, he has rot done so and his statements contradict NOSENKO on the part the latter played. So too do the statements of BARGHOORN, who recognized NOSENKO as a person who was seen briefly during the interrogation sessions; certain facts from other sources contradict NOSENKO on one important detail (KHRUSHCHEV's presence ir. Moscow) of the BARGHOORN arrest, explaired as a retaliation-hostage action for events in.NOSENKO's information the Soviet arrestof the American Communist KOTEN seems simply to have confirmed earlier information.NOSENKO's information on the background of the SVENCHARSKIY operation is fragmentary, lacking even the most important facts known from several, mainly overt, sources; his attendance at meetings with SVENCHANSKIY was confined to the two times when the original handler was also present. The position of NOSENKO in the FRIPPEL and OSWALD cases is discussed in Part VIII.D.5. In summary, NOSENKO's operational work was not commensurate with that of a Section Chief and Deputy Department Chief, nor with that of a case officer, regardless of rank. Where the participation of NOSENKO in Tourist Department activities has been or might be confirmed by other sources, it is therefore unproven that he was in a supervisory position in the KGB or that he was even a case officer.TOP SECRET
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# Examination of Other Aspects of NOSENKO's Biography## 1. KGB Awards and Ranks### a. AwardsAt various times since contacting CIA in 1962, NOSENKO described a series of awards and decorations which he received over the years for his performance of duties in the Second Chief Directorate (Pages 319-321). He claimed to have received the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Star, and the Order of the Red Banner; he said he received a special commendation from KGB Chairman SEROV for his role in the BURGI recruitment and the same award in 1959 for his recruitment of all of the American or British tourists recruited that year by the KGB (three British and three American homosexuals). NOSENKO told of a number of other commendations which he received--almost one a year--for his "general good work." In October 1966 NOSENKO said that he never received any awards for his KGB operational performance, only a medal for satisfactory completion of 10 years of KGB service and a Red Army anniversary medal.### b. RanksNOSENKO's descriptions of his various rank promotions follow a similar but more complicated pattern (Pages 322-326). He has given two separate sets of circumstances for his first promotion, from junior lieutenant to lieutenant. According to the first of these, the one NOSENKO adhered to during 1964 and 1965, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant while serving in the Far East with the naval GRU at the beginning of 1951. NOSENKO explained that the required time in grade is sometimes cut in half for officers serving at this undesirable post, and that this is why he was promoted after only six months of active duty. In 1966 NOSENKO said for the first time that he did not enter on active duty until March 1951 and that his promotion to lieutenant was in mid-1952, while stationed in Sovetsk, on the Baltic. In all his accounts, NOSENKO has said that he entered the KGB with the rank of lieutenant as this had been his rank in the naval GRU.During his first meetings with CIA in Geneva during 1962 NOSENKO claimed then to be a KGB major and said that he had already completed the necessary time in grade for a lieutenant colonelcy. NOSENKO gave an apparently accurate description of the structure of his salary as a major (so much for rank, so much for longevity, etc.) and pointed out that he was filling a position (Chief of Section) normally held by a lieutenant colonel. On contacting CIA again in 1964, NOSENKO claimed the rank of lieutenant colonel. He supported this claim with the TDY authorization issued for the CHEREPANOV search,[^1] See Part VIII.D.2. for a discussion of the likelihood that NOSENKO served in the naval GRU.[^2] See Part VIII.B.7.c. for an analysis of the CHEREPANOV case.
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743. gave NOGENKO's rank as lieutenant colonel and was signed by GRIBANOV himself and testified to it by his signature on the "official biographical statement" prepared in Frankfurt.The first major change in NOSENKO's story of his promotions came during the interrogations of January 1965 when he volunteered out of context and for no clear reason that he had never held the rank of major but rather, because of a series of administrative slip-ups and GRIBANOV's advice and help, had jumped directly from the rark of captain, which he received in 1956, to the rank of lieutenant colonel in late 1963. NOSENKO was later to claim that he had never said in 1962 tha: he was a major.*In an unsolicited statement given to CIA in April 1966, NOSENKO wrote that he was only a captain and that the TDY authori- zation for the CHEREPANOV search had been filled out in error.c. RemarksNOSENKO'S admissions regarding his awards and promotions directly affect his self-portraiture as a successful and rapidly rising KGB officer. They also have a bearing on one of the alleged reasons for this rise ; it was GRIBANOV'S favoritism. NOSENKO almost invariably linked GRI- BANOV's name to each of the awards he earlier claimed to have received. In most cases it was GRIBANOV who decided that NOSENKO should get a particular award; in the rest, it was The GRIBANOV who physically presented the award to NOSENKO.The same is true of NOSENKO's account of his rank promotions: GRIBANOV, NOSENKO said, had promised him that he would be pro- moted directly from senior lieutenant to major in 1959; when the Personnel Department made a mistake and caly promoted NOSENKO to captain, GRILANOV advised him to accept this rank and promised that when he had completed sufficier: time in grade for promotion to major, GRIBANOV would see to it that he was promoted directly to lieutenant colonel. This is what happened, NOSENKO said in 1965, and after he received his rank of lieu- tenant colonel, GRIBANOV called him in and congratulated him. On the basis of NOSENKO's admissions, there is additional rea- son to question his relationship with GRIBAΝΟΥ.**NOSENKO carried with him to Geneva, against EGR regulation and for no reason he could explain, an official KCB document listing him as a lieutenant colonel and signed by GRIBANOV him- self as well as by two provincial authorities. This suggests strongly that the lie concerning NOSEIKO's rank was not NOSENKO's alone. (If, in fact, as pointed out above, the CHEREPANOV papers were fabricated by the KGB, then there was no genuine search for CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO's document is also fabricated and not a mistake as NOSENKO claims.)* This change of story coincided closely in time with a change in the information reported by . Shortly after NOSENKO'S defection that had said that remarks by his KGB associates made it eppear that NOSENKO was a lieutenant colonel. that ROSENKO was only a captain.** NOSENKO's retractions and changes of story concerning his personal and operational relationship with GRIBANOV are discussed elsewhere (Pages 327-336).TOP SECRET
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## 2. Affiliation with Communist Party Organs### a. IntroductionNOSENKO drifted into the Komsomol, he said, in 1943 or 1944 without giving the step any thought whatsoever. All of his friends at the Baku school were joining, so NOSENKO did too. He remained an indifferent member of this Communist youth organization throughout his school and university years, in the GRU, and during his first year as a KGB officer. On arriving in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in 1953, NOSENKO told CIA, he was appointed Secretary of the small Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Directorate, a group of about 17 members.### b. DiscussionNOSENKO was questioned by DERYABIN on his duties as Komsomol Secretary (Pages 623) and, although able to give a superficial account of these functions, was found to be unaware of certain basic information which DERYABIN felt a person in this position should have. Thus, for example, NOSENKO provided a description of the system of levying dues on Komsomol members which was substantially incorrect and was unaware that a Komsomol Congress (the first in many years and therefore a major event) had been held during his claimed tenure as Secretary.NOSENKO said that he held the position of Komosmol Organization Secretary until the late spring or early summer of 1954, when he got into trouble for having used official KGB alias documentation to conceal the fact that he received treatment for venereal disease contracted from a prostitute. Immediately after this incident, said NOSENKO, he was removed from his position and a "strict reprimand" was placed in his Kom-sorol file. Several months thereafter, on the eve of his 27th birthday, NOSENKO was forced out of the Komsomol because he was too old. For over a year, until January 1956 when NOSENKO was admitted as a candidate member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he was the only officer in the KGB who was neither a Komsomol nor a Party member. ROSENKO'S account of his expulsion from the Komsomol on reaching his 27th birthday is contradicted by the official Statutes of the Komsomol in effect at that time. These regulations stipulate a maximum age of 25 years and NOSENKO should therefore have been forced cut at the end of October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday. This was explained to NOSENKO, who insisted that he remained a member until he became 27 years old and that no special exceptions were made in his case.### c. RemarksThe fact that NOSENKO is incorrect regarding the age limitation makes it doubtful that his account of the venereal disease incident and his removal from the Komsomol Secretary-ship is true. The date which he gives to this incident is after that on which he should have been expelled from the Komsomol. (Additionally, NOSENKO's descriptions of the veneral disease incident, his use of false documents, and his subsequent punishment by the KGB and the Komsomol have been inconsistent; see Pages 80-81).
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745. The evidence that NOSENKO lied about this particular aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further suggests that his entire account for this period of his career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.).