Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# 209.(v) Developmental Operation Against ZUJUS(a) IntroductionNOSENKO reported that he personally recruited and handled the "cain agent" in the KGB developmental operation against U.S. Army Sergeant Matthew Peter ZUJUS, although GRYAZNOV was the officer responsible for the ZUJUS case. military officer posted to Moscow for training, was used only in this operation, but NOSENKO continued to meet him even after transferring from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist Department. While being interrogated in February 1965, NOSENKO said that could vouch for his bona fides, and he suggested that CIA approach for this purpose.ZUJUS arrived in Moscow in September 1961 to assume the military code clerk duties of STORSBERG (see above), and he remained there until January 1963. After initially confusing ZUJUS with James KEYSERS**, NOSENKO first described the KGB operation against him in February 1964. According to NOSENKO, neither nor any other source supplied significant information to the KGB, and the KGB therefore did not attempt to recruit CUJUS. Claiming not to know the names of KGB agents besides who participated in the operation, NOSENKO nevertheless in other contexts has mentioned two female agents who reportedly associated with ZUJUS. One is Ella UMANETS, the other an East German woman posing as an Austrian. NOSENKO indicated the latter was in contact with MORONE (see above), whereas it is clear that ZUJUS was the American code clerk who met this woman. The date that she and ZUJUS were together, however, falls during the summer of 1962 when, NOSENKO said, he was no longer engaged in operations against the U.S. Embassy.(b) Information from NOSENKOThe first reference by NOSENKO to the ZUJUS case was made on 2 February 1964:NOSENKO: With respect to ZUJUS, I'll tell you exactly what we tried to do with him because I spotted this in some notes. This mistake [confusion of KEYSERS and ZUJUS] made me so mad. I completely forgot about ZUJUS until I saw my little note. In 1961 I recruited a Syrian who was from Damascus.Clus, and не бесаmе aс- quainted with ZUJUS. The reason why they had some- thing in common was that sometime carlier ZUJUS had been stationed in Lebanon and the Syrian himself was from Damascus, which is a relatively short distance away... Here is, his name. He wrote it out himself. It is , and he wrote out his own addressThe KEYSERS case is discussed in the next part of this paper.
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210. here (on one of the notes NOSENKO brought with him to the meeting). We did not work with him, and we retired the case to Archives, and did not turn him over to anyone. Here is his address. The street is __________________. I worked with him myself at the end of 1961 and the beginning of 1962. And when I was leaving Moscow to come here for the Disarmament Conference in 1962 I turned him over for contact to GRYAZNOV, I said goodbye to him and he was scheduled to leave the USSR permanently in April, back to Syria.Question: What did you do against ZUJUS?NOSENKO: Nothing at all. He ______ was merely studying and devloping him. During the conversation [at America House] they even spoke of how nice it would be to have some Lebanese vodka, and we specially had some shipped in from the [KGB Legal] Residency [in Beirut], and the Syrian brought it to ZUJUS saying it had come from his friends. ZUJUS by character is a very quiet, unexcitable, calm person... Nothing disturbs him.Question: Why didn't you turn ____ over to the First Chief Directorate?NOSENKO: There was no reason for this because he was a ______. If we were to turn him over to anyone it would have been to the GRU. But we decided to hell with it and put the case into our Archives.Question: Did _____ know ZUJUS when you recruited him?NOSENKO: No, he didn't hardly know anyone--even by name. So we showed him photographs, and when he said that he had met ZUJUS, then we directed him to develop ZUJUS and not to pay attention to anyone else... If you want to approach him you can use my name, simply Yuriy Ivanovich.NOSENKO then proposed a false flag recruitment of _____ saying whereby a CIA representative would approach _____ saying that he was from the KGB. A year later NOSENKO told CIA that if CIA talked to ____, the latter would be able to vouch for NOSENKO's bona fides.Speaking of his own agents on 20 April 1964, NOSENKO said: ____...I took with me, even though I had transferred to the Seventh [Tourist] Department [in January 1962]. But it had been decided that no one else knew him from the First [American] Department; it would have taken some time before anyone would get used to him. But he was already working in the development of ZUJUS. So they [the First Department] said that they were asking me to continue meeting with him, and they were counting on my cooperation. They also promised to speak to CHELNOKOV [Chief of the Seventh Department] so that I would not have to stop [___] meetings with ZUJUS."TOP SECRET
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# 211.When reviewing lists of employees of the U.S. Embassy between 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO on 19 September 1964 identified ZUJUS as STORSBERG's replacement and said that the case officer working against him was GRYAZNOV. He said that his (NOSENKO's) agent was working against ZUJUS, but that he did not know the names of other agents involved, nor of any unusual or interesting information concerning him, although he had read the Second Chief Directorate file on ZUJUS. There was no information on ZUJUS from KGB microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance. The KGB, NOSENKO stated, did not make an operational approach to ZUJUS and did not recruit him.NOSENKO reported on 2 February 1965 that he himself had supervised GRYAZNOV's handling of the operation and personally handled the main agent,. NOSENKO read all current reports on ZUJUS as they came into the U.S. Embassy Section, and he discussed the case with GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, DEMKIN (the case officer responsible for the America House) and his superiors, GRYAZNOV wrote the operational plan on ZUJUS, which called for thorough development by in order to learn everything possible about him eventually to introduce an agent to ZUJUS through was to invite ZUJUS to a restaurant in March or April 1962, and a "friend" was to be introduced to ZUJUS at that time. This had not been accomplished as of NOSENKO's departure for Geneva in 1962.Progress was slow because ZUJUS was quiet and reserved and often stayed alone, even in America House, plus the fact that although and ZUJUS were acquainted, they did not become good friends. On the days was to visit America House, NOSENKO met him in hotels or restaurants (never in safehouses). This was once every week or two, depending on They would meet again the following day; would report on which Americans were drinking heavily and which were caressing the girls from foreign embassies in Moscow. Although went to America House once or twice a month and drank there with ZUJUS, he reported little of interest. The KGB learned something about ZUJUS's family in the United States, the details of which NOSENKO did not recall; NOSENKO was sure, however, that there was nothing unusual or interesting about ZUJUS'S family background. NOSENKO stated that the KGB was not aware of any vices or vulnerabilities that ZUJUS may have had. There was no recruitment and no approach by the KGB--if there had been, even after NOSENKO left the U.S. Embassy Section, his friend GRYAZNOV would have told him about it.(c) Information from Other SourcesIn connection with a security investigation at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, ZUJUS prepared a statement in January 1963 which acknowledged his having had sexual relations with only one woman in Moscow, an employee of the Finnish Embassy. During a routine debriefing by U.S. Army authorities later in 1963, however, ZUJUS said that he had once had sexual relations with a girl who said she was an Austrian. The U.S. Embassy Security Officer reported in the summer of 1962 that ZUJUS had been intimate with an Austrian woman, Lillian (last name unknown), who had gone to America House with someone![Top Secret]
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212. from the United Arab Republic and had returned alone a few days later, when she was picked up by ZUJUS. Since ZUJUS was a cryptographer, the manager of America House decided to interview the woman. She told him that she was from Vienna and was travelling with her employer, a Czech. The manager then reported to the Security Officer, who learned from the Austrian Embassy that no passport had been issued to this woman. The Security Officer went to America House, and asked Lillian for her passport; she replied that she had forgotten it, and she then left saying she was going to her hotel for the passport. She never returned to America louse.The U.S. Army report of its debriefing of ZUJUS statesZUJUS was interviewed by a CIA representative in November 1955. Asked whether he had met any nationals of Near Eastern countries while in Moscow, ZUJUS named among others a person from Beirut who had been in Damascus or a person from Damascus who had been in Beirut--he could not remember which. ZUJUS said that he had been acting as doorman at America House when this person entered, and that the two "shot the breeze" for about 15 minutes. ZUJUS could not recall what they had talked about, but their conversation apparently did not interest the visitor, because he left after a short while and went to the bar. ZUJUS may have seen the man on several other occasions, but he could supply nc additional information. ZUJUS did not recall that this person gave him Lebanese volka, but did say he favored this beverage. ZUJUS said that he did not know this man's name or why he was in Moscow, and he could provide no physical description.ZUJUS said that, as manager of the America club, he had frequent dealings with Ella UMANETS (a long-time agent named by NOSENKO). ZUJUS often used her as an interpreter in his dealings with other Soviet employees of America House and was able to provide a considerable amount of background information concerning her. He repeated his earlier statements that he had never been approached or recruited by Soviet Intelligence.FBI investigations indicateSee also NOSENKO's account of the AGB using one of two East German women, who represented themselves as Austrians, at America House in an operation against MORONE.TOP SECRE
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# TOP SECRET213. (vi) Approach to KEYSERS(a) IntroductionU.S. Army Specialist Fifth Class James KEYSERS began his tour in Moscow on 20 December 1960 as an assistant to the Embassy Medical Officer, Donald C. MARTIN, an Air Force captain; as an additional duty he was assigned administrative functions in the office of the Air Attache. For a short period in early 1961 KEYSERS was trained to perform back-up cryptographic duties under James STOKSBERG in the military code room, but he was relieved of this in April 1961 because of low aptitude, laziness, and lack of interest. Because of his admitted homosexual tendencies, coupled with his attitude and behavior, KEYSERS was removed from Moscow by his American superiors in June 1961. The decision to transfer him was made on 13 June, and KEYSERS was informed of it the following day; approximately two hours before leaving America House for the airport on 16 June, KEYSERS received a letter from the KGB suggesting that he defect, This was followed by an approach to him at the Moscow airport.NOSENKO has claimed that he was the KGB officer who spoke to KEYSERS on this occasion and has said that this incident was his only face to face contact with an American target during his 1960-1961 period of service in the U.S. Embassy Section (excepting the alleged brief encounter with STORSBERC--See above). NOSENKO has confused the KEYSERS and ZUJUS cases, but correctet this error prior to defecting. In most particulars NOSENKO s account of the case matches the details from KEYSERS and other sources. However, whereas NOSENKO stated (without indicating how the KGB obtained its information) that the KGB knew KEYSERS had not told American authorities of having received the letter, KEYSERS did so before leaving Moscow; this conversation took place in an Embassy room where a KGB microphone was then located.(b) Information from NOSENKONOSENKO first spoke of the case, without naming KEYSERS, on 12 June 1962: "Now I remember. He came to Moscow, to the Embassy. He was to replace the military cipher clerk [STORSBERG]. We sensed at once [that he was a homosexual]. Well, everything was thrown at him. I stayed with this case constantly. I didn't spend time on anything else. We chased him all over Moscow but were late. We were in an operational car. It happened like this. When there was traffic, you couldn't get through. Whether we went up the left side or on the sidewalk where people were walking, in the opposite direction, no matter. Therefore we were late, late [i.e., could not catch him at anything]. But suchAlthough KEYSERS trained in Moscow to assume back-up cryptographic duties, he was not STORSBERG's replace- ment: Mathew ZUJUS, who arrived in September 1961, was. KEYSERS was assigned to Moscow as a replacement for Staff Sergeant J.C. BRADLEY, who had earlier been re turned from Moscow for reasons of homosexuality.# TOP SECRET
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things happen. But we were not mistaken about this fellow. He proved to be a homosexual. He sold himself, so to say. The American ice ballet (Ice Capades tour) arrived. There were many such fellows (homosexuals) with it, and he was extremely drunk, and was embracing and kissing a man. The Americans also saw this. And decided not to... I thought, what to do? Let's write him a letter, in real English, on an English typewriter. We'll send this letter to his room. We knew that he was supposed to leave today, today. And we wrote it: 'Listen, they know about you, You have been caught. It will go very badly for you back there. Come on. Stay here. We are waiting for your answer.' Weli, as is customary, you had someone accompany him. The Assistant Military Attache escorted him. I don't remember who right now. Perhaps it was NIXON, NIELSON. a lieutenant color.el. What was his name? He accompanied him to Finland and then returned by piane. Well, there was no answer from him to this letter. And it was already the last moment, and suddenly--'Listen, they are taking you away, wait, they know who you are, what you are, it's all over. If that's the way it is, stay here.' No answer. What to do? Here's what happened: We got into a car. They (KGB surveillance) has reported that he and the Assistant Military Attache had pulled out from Kropotkin-skaya Naberezhnaya (America House) for the airport to take the plane. So we put on all speed to get there first. We got there first, in order to have got to him. No. It was WILSON." The interview then continued: NOSENKO was asked who had accompanied KEYSERS to the airport. He replied:"Yes, Lt. Col. WILSON, I believe. He didn't leave him for a moment at the airport. I am turning around here, walking there. There is coffee there and cognac. He didn't leave him. I must separate them. O.K. So I said 'What about their documents? Make some pretext to separate them.' They were separated for two minutes. I approached him and said: 'Hello, hello, what about the letter? You think about it?' He said something to the Assistant Military Attache, that they tried to approach me.' So he was in Moscow in all only three or four months. He gave himself away you see. If this ice ballet had not come we would have worked on him. At the start we did not know who he was or what he was. 1.e.. we knew that he came to replace the military code cierk, on whom we had spent much time." NOSENKO then moved on to a description of the STORSBERG operation without naming KEYSERS.After describing the recruitment approach to STORSBERG, NOSENKO reported on 24 January 1964: "Then his replacement came. It was ZUJUS.** We began to study him carefully and it appears that both ourselves and the Americans, primarily in the person of the Security Officer, discovered that heThis officer's name is MASON.** See NOSENKO's statements on 28 January and 2 February 1964 (below). ZUJUS did in fact replace STORSBERG, who completed his Moscow tour in November 1961, five months after KEYSERS was removed from Moscow.
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215. was a homosexual. It appears that there was some visitingballet troupe in which some of the male members were homo-sexuals. He met them in the America House and his behaviortowards them was reported to the American Security Officerand at the same time our agent had reported him to us. Wewanted to mount an operation against him but the Americanshad already decided to give him up. All we could do wasto have a letter delivered to him; the letter warned himthat he was being sent out because he was a homosexualand that he would get into consequent trouble, and an offerwas made to him to stay in the USSR. He did not answerthe letter and it was just prior to his actual departure.He was escorted to the airport by two officers of theMilitary Attache's office. At the airport--I even wentthere with a group of assistants to see if we could get afew words to him to change his mind. He left his groupfor a moment to get a drink of water. When I made thisoffer to him that he would not regret it if he stayed,that he would receive great benefits, he panicked and ranback to his group and shortly thereafter he flew off. Ifhe were not spotted by you possibly we would have been ableto get at him."While reviewing a list of personnel assigned to theAmerican Embassy in Moscow in 1963, NOSENKO said on 28January 1964: "Matthew ZUJUS--how come? That man can'tbe in Moscow. That's the homosexual code clerk I toldyou about, (the) homosexual who was urgently sent back tothe States with military guards. How come he is back in1963? In August 1963? iHe couldn't be there. It isimpossible" He was asked whether he was sure of hisfacts, and NOSENKO answered: "Yes, this must be thesame man, but this must be an error in your document.He just cannot be in Moscow."NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse on 2 February1964 and said that he wanted to come right over as he hadsomething important to say. The meeting with CIA openedas follows: "I was thinking last night and I realizedthat I have made a mistake and it bothered me, so iwanted to be sure to call it to your attention today. Re-member when I told you we were working on Jim STORSBERG,the code clerk, and after that a replacement came for him?And I said that we wanted to get a hold of him because hewas a homosexual? It was not ZUJUS, but it was KEYSERS.In other words, everything I said about ZUJUS applies toKEYSERS.""I don't remember having any face-to-face encounters[with Americans] except when KEYSERS was leaving," NOSENKOstated on 17 April 1964, "When he was being taken to theairport we decided, 'Why not try, in case he's alone; whynot approach him and ask him if he wants to stay?' And sureenough he stood there with these two officers and then hewalked into the restaurant alone... So I immediately ap-proached him right there in the restaurant. "I don't re-member what his name was--I think it was Jim.) So I said"'Jim, did you think about staying perhaps? Because youknow what will happen to you when you return. Say, please.'He looked at me and turned around and without saying a wordhe went into the waiting room and started talking rapidlywith the officers."TOP SECRET
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When questioned on the approach in February 1965, NOSENKO added no new details except that, at the time of the approach, he understood KRYLOV had not reported the KGB letter to his superiors at the American Embassy; be said tact there was no information to this effect from the microphones or telephone taps in the U.S. Embassy.(c) Information from Other SourcesIn Moscow prior to his arrival and in subsequent debriefings, KEYSERS admitted homosexual tendencies and his involvement in three homosexual incidents during his tour in Moscow, all at America House; one of these was an approach to a Marine security guard in March 1964, which was rebuffed, and the two others were homosexual acts with members of the Ice Capades troupe visiting Moscow in May 1964. He denied that he ever said any public display of his homosexuality; but said he could not be sure that someone had not entered his room at America House while he and a homosexual partner have been asleep.During a detailed debriefing in West Germany on 26 June 1964, KEYSERS related the incidents leading up to his approach made at Schonefeld while leaving the Soviet Union.TOP SECRET
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14-00000Ir Colonel TRANMicrophones vere subsequent fice and in the office of the Minister Counsellor. HOSENKO has reported that both were being achitored on a simul-taneous basis in 1961.This is not an accurate description of NOSENKO who was 34 years old at the time, is several inches taller, and
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to Colonel JRAAN, the Deputy Officer, that KEYSALS' behavior had some crotus prior to his removal from his office.In a report to U.S. Army authorities on the date of ELYSERS' removal, Colonel JRAAN said as follows:See Part: V.E.S.G., referring to Colonel HOFFMAN's statement on security losses as a result of KGB microphones in this office.
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219. NOTE: Part VI.D.2., a tabulation of NOSENKO'S leads involving American cases, includes several operations against U.S. code clerks for which he was the supervisor; their names are Frank DAY, Robert DWELLY, Joseph GAFFSY, John TAYLOR, and Maurice ZWANG.