Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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297. father's papers in 1929. His earliest employers were the "All- Russian Textile Syndicate" from February 1928 to March 1931, by AMTORG in New York City from April 1932 to May 1942, and by the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington from May 1942 until Desember 1942. During the Second World War, SVENCHANSKIY servei in the U.S. Army Air force as "official translator" at the White Horse Air Base in Alaska, where he had frequent contacts with members of Soviet aircraft crews. From October 1946 until December 1952, when he was dismissed for refusing to answer questions by the McCarran Committee concerning alleged subversive activity, SVENCHANSKIY was employed at United Nations Headquarters as a radio officer, broadcasting to the USSR. As of early 1965, SVENCHANSKIY was listed as president of Afton Tours, Inc., New York City, and president of Cross World Books and Periodicals, Chicago. Afton Tours is a branch of the Package Express and Travel Agency, which is a registered agent of Inturist. Cross World Books and Periodicals was registered in 1961 as an agent of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, the Soviet Foreign Trade Administration dealing with the distribution and sale of Russian-language books, periodicals, films, and visual aids. SVENCHANSKIY has made numerous trips to the USSR, including one in August and September 1963.Allegations of SVENCHANSKIY'S Communist sympathies and probable Soviet espionage activities date back to his U.S. Army Air Force service in Alaska,of his strong pro-Soviet bias and suspiciously close contacts with Soviets. In August 1950 Harry GOLD, then in prison as an admitted Soviet agent, linked SVENCHANSKIY to the Soviet espionage network in the United States.* GOLD stated that in March 1942 SVENCHANSKIY, under the name of SWAN, had been instrumental in introducing his "co-conspirator" Abraham BROTHMAN to "another AMTORG man to engage in industrial espionage." A CIA report of 14 November 1950 cites a "tested source" (a Czech national employed at the United Nations) as stating: "I believe that Alexander SVEN CHANSKIY, employed in the Radio Section of the Russian Division of the United Nations, is a Communist and possibly a Communist agent."Identified as a Soviet agent by Eliza- beth BENTLEY, KAZAKEVICH has since emigrated to the Soviet Union; he was identified as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate by COLITSYN and by NOSENKO. Virtually all the individuals with whom SVENCHANSKIY has entered into business arrangements since leaving the United Nations have or had connections with the U.S. Communist Party or with the Soviet Intelligence Services. His business dealings have also brought him into frequent contact with Soviet officials in this country, including a number of identified intelligence officers. (two of them reported on by NOSENKO).* The 21 October 1953 edition of the *New York Times* carried the story of GOLD's 'testimony under the headline "Ex-U.N. Aide linked to Spy Ring by Gold;" the *Times* reported that GOLD had executed an affidavit to this effect the week before.
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An FBI reportSVEN HANSKIY7. KOTIN’s Arrest and the KGB Agenta. Information from NOSENKONOSENKO was asked in Geneva on 26 January 1964 whether he had been involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO recognized this as the case of Bernard KOTIN, a guide for Intourist in New York City (and hence an employee of Alexander SVENCHANSKIY - see below) who had been apprehended on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO explained that, while he had not personally participated in the arrest and had never met KOTIN, he had supervised the case from KGB Headquarters and "the case was reported to me."NOSENKO said that KOTIN had long been a member of the American Communist Party and was a frequent visitor to the Soviet Union after World War II. On these trips he had a large number of contacts with dissident literary figures and with Soviet citizens in general, particularly among Russian Jews.Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and the Second Chief Directorates had come to the conclusion that KOTIN might well be a provocation agent planted in or recruited from the ranks of the Communist Party of the United States. Moreover, on the eve of KOTIN'S 1963 trip, the Tourist Department learned from V.B. BARKOVSKIY of the First Chief Directorate's Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate that KOTIN was carrying with him the address of relatives of an important agent of the KGB's Legal Residency, and that KOTIN intended to visit them while in the USSR. NOSENKO said he did not know the name of this agent.This agent was a naturalized American citizen, about 40 to 45 years old, an engineer born in Russia, who was employed in an "interesting industrial company or technical organization in the New York City area." For some time he had been working.*   CIA told NOSENKO of this information about SOKOLOV in March 1965. He recalled that a woman named Sonya worked for SVENCHANSKIY but said that "we considered that he (SVEN-CHANSKIY) was doing it (spotting the tourists)." NOSENKO did not know of any Soviet Intelligence ties to SOKOLOV.**   NOSENKO has explained in another context that the Second Chief Directorate is wary of foreign contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently sponsored such contacts.TOP SECRET
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# OLUNEIAfter Soviet Trip:" the article stated that "an American tourof the Soviet Union ended today... interview with theapparent arrest of the New York quide identified as Bernard L.Kote: of Afton Tours.". A second article datelined 29 August,Moscow, reported that "an official of the Soviet - Inturist travelorganization said today that Bernard L. Koten... had been arrestedon charges of homosexual activities with a Soviet citizen. Hesaid that Mr. Koren... was arrested in Kiev Tuesday night (27 August) and was being held in Tbilisi (Tbilisi)... where the allegedoffense took place." A third *Times* article, filed in Moscow on28 September 1963, stated that Koren, who had been arrested on26 August, had been released on 28 September and was enroute toVienna; the article also noted that "officials of Inturist re-ported Mr. Koten's release, but declined to comment on the reasonsand circumstances of his arrest."Several of KOTEN's friends have also commented on his arrest:- Isadore Gibby NEEDLEMAN, a New York lawyer, self-  avowed Marxist, and allegedly a Soviet espionage agent in  the past, was reported by an FBI source- Eda GLASER, a "close associate of KOTEN" and the  office manager of the Four Continents Look Store, a Soviet  book outlet in New York, termed the entire incident as  "fantastic" and a "fabrication."- SVENCHANISKIY, who returned to the United States from  Moscow while KOTEN was still being held, stated that the  morals charge against him was true but he (SVENCHANSKIY)  had been assured that the matter would be cleared up and  that KOTEN would be released.FBI sources reported that KOTEN later made the followingremarks concerning his arrest and imprisonment:
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After his release, MOIET told that he wanted to return to the Soviet Union. KOTOMIN told that he could have returned at any time if he wanted to do so. The argument is the report was filled by LILAC. He told LILAC that he did not want to.
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# 8. Arrest of BARGHOORN## a. Information from NOSENKOAt the first of the 1964 meetings in Geneva NOSENKO described the provocation and arrest of Yale University Professor Frederick RARGHOORN in late 1963; he was questioned further on this case on 3 February 1964 and again while waiting in Frankfurt to leave for the United States. NOSENKO's most comprehensive statement, from which the following paragraphs were largely drawn, was made on 9 June 1964. On this last occasion NOSENKO said that the purpose of the KGB operation against BARGHOORN was to retaliate for persona non grata action taken against three Soviets in New York City in the case of John W. BUTENKO and to secure a hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet in the BUTENKO case who was jailed. In Geneva, however, NOSENKO maintained that the operation against BARGHOORN "was to discourage future arrests such as that of IVANOV (the jailed Soviet), not because of any special importance of IVANOV himself."NOSENKO said that in 1963 four KGB First Chief Directorate officers assigned to the New York Legal Residency were caught in operational activity in the United States. Of the four, three had diplomatic immunity, but one was a chauffeur and had only a service passport. The three Soviet diplomats were held three or four hours by the American authorities and then released. IVANOV, the chauffeur, was arrested since he did not have diplomatic immunity.**GRIBANOV, Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, learned of this arrest probably the next day and was directed by KGB Chairman SEMICHASTNYY to take "necessary measures." GRIBANOV thereupon called to his office NOSENKO; A.G. KOVALENKO, Chief of the Tourist Department; and G.I. GRYAZ- NOV and Ye.M. RASHCHEPOV, both Deputy Chiefs from the American Department. After explaining the arrest, GRIBANOV asked what information the Second Chief Directorate had on any American--U.S. Embassy employee or tourist--that could*The detail of NOSENKO's information on the BARGHOORN case reflects both the extent of the CIA debriefings and the depth of his knowledge of this case. He did, in fact, furnish much of this information during his first 1964 meeting with CIA. NOSENKO was also able to describe at length BARGHOORN's professional background, which gave rise to KGB suspicions of intelligence affiliation, and he provided the general outlines of other operational activity centering around BARGHOORN during his 1963 trip to the Soviet Union.**Three Soviets were arrested in Englewood, N.J., on 30 October 1963 during a clandestine meeting with the KGB agent, BUTENKO, an American engineer. Two of the Soviets, G.A. PAVLOV and Yu.A. ROMASHIN, were members of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations; they claimed diplomatic immunity and were released; a few days later they were declared persona non grata along with a third Soviet, V.I. OLENEV, who was named in the charges by the U.S. Government, but was not arrested. Another Soviet citizen, I.A. IVANOV, a driver for AMTORG, did not have diplomatic immunity and was failed. All have been identified as KGB officers
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305. serve as material for an arrest. RASHCHEPOV and GRYAZNOV said that at that very moment there were three or four American military attaches in Rostov and that, in the opinion of the American Department, these officers might be carrying electronic apparatus. It was known that they had cameras, that they had been taking photographs, and that they had been observed taking notes. If permitted, they could be arrested in Rostov before they took the return plane to Moscow. GRIBANOV wanted to know what other possibilities existed and instructed the two representatives of the American Department to write a report on this. He also told them to request permission to arrest and search the military attaches.GRIBANOV then asked what pertinent information was held by the Tourist Department. He was told that there were relatively few American tourists in the Soviet Union at that time; these included BARGHOORN, who was mentioned to GRIBANOV along with one other (name not recalled). NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported, however, that the KGB had no "strong" materials against them. They were ordered to make an immediate study of the situation and to report back to GRIBANOV as soon as possible.Returning to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO gathered the entire American Tourist Section in their office. In a general discussion, it was decided that BARGHOORN was the only American on whom the KGB had anything worth consideration. All the materials on BARGHOORN were gathered together, and NOSENKO and KOVALENKO took them to GRIBANOV, explaining that he was the only possibility. GRIBANOV read all the materials and was pleased with them; he was sure that BARGHOORN was connected with American Intelligence. He then asked what could be done. NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was then in Tbilisi and that, in fact, Ye.N. NOSKOV (case officer, American Tourist Section) was in Tbilisi with a woman doctor from the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for the purpose of working against BAPGHOORN; the doctor had some special item which had been used to make BARGHOORN so violently sick to his stomach that he had to be hospitalized. While he was in the hospital, a careful search had been made of his belongings, but nothing of operational interest had been found. In addition, a KGB agent was placed in BARGHOORN'S room as a patient; he made anti-Soviet statements and offered BARGHOORN "materials," but BARGHOORN did not rise to the bait. At the time of this meeting with GRIBANOV, BARG HOORN was scheduled to fly from Tbilisi to Moscow the following morning, and the KGB knew from a phone tap that he had an appointment with Theodore ORCHARD of the British Embassy at the Hotel Metropol the following evening.It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving "materials" to BARGHOORN in Moscow.. NOSENKO said that this would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that this made no difference to him. He instructed NOSENKO and KOVALENKO*On another occasion, NOSENKO estimated their number at "about 60."*TOP SECRET
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306. to locate an agent who could be used to pass the damagingmaterials to BARGHOORN and told them to write a summary ofBARGHOORN's background with a proposal that the SecondChief Directorate arrest him "when he obtains materialswhich are of interest to American Intelligence." This wasto be sent in letter form to SEMICHASTNYY over GRIBANOV'Ssignature; the letter was not to indicate how BARGHOORNwas to receive the materials (i.e., the fact of provocationwas not to be mentioned).GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOOPN, alongwith a similar letter from GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV con-cerning the military attaches, to SEMICHASTNYY. Whilethe four--NOSENKO, KOVALENKO, GRYAZNOV and KOVALENKD--were waiting in GRIBANOV's office for his return, GRYAZNOVreceived a telephone call from the local KCB organizationin Rostov informing him that the military attaches were inthe air on their way back to Moscow. Shortly thereafter,GRIBANOV returned with the news that the Chairman of the KGBhad approved the arrests of the military attaches as wellas BARGHOORN. (KHRUSHCHEV was absent from Moscow at thetime, but SEMICHASTNYY had called BREZHNEV and secured hisapproval.*)When GRIBANOV learned from GRYAZNOV that the militaryattaches were already on their way back to Moscow, he be-came furious and sent GRYAZNOV out "to do the job or die."Meanwhile, arrangements were made with the "Department D"(the KGB element responsible for disinformation, subordinateto the First Chief Directorate) to provide some materialson rockets which could be passed to BARGHOORN. While thesewere being picked up, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO returned totheir office to plan the provocation.BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance uponhis arrival in Moscow. At 1810 hours a radio message wasreceived from one of the surveillance cars that BARGHOORNhad gone to the U.S. Embassy, and it was decided that theagent (name not recalled, aged 25 to 30 years) would beplaced in contact with him as soon as he came out. TheKGB knew BARGHOORN had an appointment with ORCHARD of theBritish Embassy at 1900 hours, but at 1900 hours a reportwas received that BARGHOORN had left the U.S. Embassy inthe American Ambassador's car. He was alone but for theSoviet driver. Nothing could be done while BARGHOORN was inthe moving car. A check on ORCHARD established that he wasin the downstairs hall of the hotel waiting. It was there-fore decided to approach BARGHOORN when he left the car atthe hotel.*NOSENKO placed these events on the day before BARGHOORN re-turned to Moscow from Tbilisi and on the day before BARGHOORNwas arrested. As indicated below, BARGHOORN returned fromAlma-Ata to Moscow on 25 October 1963 and was arrested on31 October 1963, six days later. CIA records show that on30 October, the day before the arrest, KHRUSHCHEV greetedLaotian Premier SOUVANNA Phouma on his arrival in Moscow andlater in the day attended a luncheon in his honor. On 31October, the day of the arrest, KHRUSHCHEV and SOUVANNA at-tended a performance of Swan Lake in Moscow. BREZHNEV vasnot seen in Moscow from 29 October until 2 November 1963.
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307. No sooner had BARGHOORN stepped out of the car than the agent approached. "You are an American?" the agent asked. "Yes." "Please take it," the agent said. The agent put the packet containing the materials on rocketry in BARGHOORN's inside coat pocket and then ran off.BARGHOORN had taken only one or two steps when he was seized by NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, another case officer of the American Tourist Section, and told he was under arrest. A surveillance car pulled up. BARGHOORN was placed in the car, handcuffed (on GRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets arrested in the United States had received similar treatment) and driven to the 50th Section of the Militia, where a room had been prepared.L.I. YEFREMOV and K.G. KRUPNOV from the American Tourist Section were waiting at the Militia station, KRUPNOV to interrogate BARGHOORN and YEFREMOV to be the interpreter. When BARGHOORN was brought into the station, an "incident report" form was filled out, and a resolution was prepared requesting permission to hold him 48 hours. Between 0200 and 0300 hours BARGIIOORN was taken to the KGB inner prison. At 0400 hours the Tourist Department case officers were released with instructions to report for duty at 0930 hours. NOSENKO and the others went home.KRUPNOV began the questioning in Russian at 1000 hours the next day. Although BARGHOORN speaks good Russian, YEFREMOV remained in case he would be needed to interpret. NOSENKO entered the room several times during these sessions. (Although NOSENKO did not want to reveal his face to BARG- HOORN because he knew BARGHOORN would be released, GRIBANOV had told KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when they reached the point where BARGHOORN was to tell how he obtained the damaging materials.) The first sessions concentrated on general matters, such as BARGHOORN's life history.*After one and one half hours of questioning, BARGHOORN agreed that the materials were on him when he was arrested, but he maintained that they had been placed on his person. He said that he thought they were "newspapers or something," that he did not know what they were. The closed package was then opened and shown to BARGHOORN; it contained about 20 to 25 pages of information on missiles. "BARGHOORN was not, of course, given a close look" at the materials.*In October 1966, NOSENKO stated his certainty that he had been present on the day after the arrest. At this interro- gation NOSENKO said KRUPNOV questioned BARGHOORN "concerning personal background, employment, etc." Then NOSENKO asked BARGHOORN whether he had had the incriminating materials on his person at the time of his arrest. When BARGHOORN admitted this, NOSENKO left. As noted below, BARGHOORN reported that the materials were not discussed at this par- ticular interrogation.TOP SECRET
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# OP-SECRET292. The CIA interviewer then read to him the report which fixed the date of the approach as 5 January 1962, the date contained in NOSENKO's notes, and indicated that NOSEIKO used the name NIKOLAYEV. (see below). Acknowledging that "maybe" he had used the name Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV with JOHNSON, NOSENKO said: "I don't know why I made this mistake with the dates. I think it (the approach) was the first or second day that I was in the Seventh (Tourist) Department. I saw myself that he had (homosexual) intercourse... Your date is absolutely right, but this reminded me that it was soon after I had come in the Seventh (Tourist) Department. Is this important?"Question: How long had you been in the Seventh Department?NOSENKO: Now I remember that it was immediately - one or two days. I know I returned in January 1962. I knew I would be going to the Seventh (Department) already in December. I was visiting the Seventh already then. I had not too many papers to turn over to the First (American Department), and now I remember that I moved to the Seventh immediately (*NOSENKO's* emphasis) after 1 January 1962.b. Information from JOHNSON:JOHNSON reported to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on 5 January 1962 that he experienced an "incident with Soviet plainclothesmen in the Hotel Metropol earlier that day." JOHNSON, who arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961, told the consular officer that "he was dining alone in the Hotel Metropol restaurant the evening of 4 January when he was joined at his table by a Soviet citizen who identified himself as a doctor from Riga. (This was NOSENKO's homosexual agent VOLKOV.) According to JOHNSON, little conversation transpired because the Riga 'doctor' spoke English poorly. Before JOHNSON left, however, the 'doctor' said he would like to chat with him and knew a student who spoke English well. JOHNSON then agreed to come by the 'doctor's' room at the Metropol at 10:00 a.m. the next day. JOHNSON said that he dropped by the 'doctor's' room about 10:00 the morning of January 5. Soon after he entered, the 'doctor' and his 'student' friend (NOSENKO's homosexual agent YEFREMOV) began to make homosexual advances to him. He stated that he protested and was rising to leave when two plainclothesmen suddenly appeared in the room and announced that all were under arrest. JOHNSON was then taken to another room where he was asked to sign a statement in Russian... He signed this statement and was taken to a man in a third room who identified himself as the Chief of Police, Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV.*The police chief first told him that Soviet law had been violated and that he, JOHNSON, could be imprisoned for three, five, or perhaps even eight years. After proceeding in this vein forNOSENKO frequently used the operational pseudonym Yuriv Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV. He has said that he was normally called Georgiy, a variation of Yuriy, by family and friends in Moscow.TOP SECRET