Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 227]
the other hand, there is some reason to believe NOSENKO has furnished the actual KGB version of the BELITSKIY case and that the KGB, at least as of 1962, did not know the true story of the relationship of BELITSKIY with CIA. There is a distinct possibility the KGB believed the BELITSKIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London and BELITSKIY did not then nor has he since admitted to the KGB his association with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium. As a possible reason why BELITSKIY would have told the KGB in 1961 a partial story of his contact with American Intelligence, some at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused BELITSKIY to believe his security was endangered and as a result he told the KGB of certain events in London in 1961, relating these events as being the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA.The following are certain of the points which suggest the KGB actually considered that BELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in London in 1961 and that BELITSKIY may have never told the KGB of the developments in his case prior to 1961:(a) BELITSKIY was in London in April 1960 at which time he was in contact with a British citizen who was also reporting to MI-5. This individual reported information received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to8SECRET0001225
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 228]
George BLAKE. (It seems highly unlikely the KGB would ever have directed BELITSKIY to furnish information which may have been a lead to George BLAKE, or at least could have caused the employees of the unit in which BLAKE was employed from June 1959 to August 1960 to come under suspicion as having passed information to Soviet Intelligence.)(b) NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY, after he went to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CIA rather quickly because he met a girl he had previously known whom he was sure was an American Intelligence agent and that she must have reported his presence in Geneva to American Intelligence. (If the BELITSKIY case had been controlled by the KGB from its inception in 1958, the KGB would have known of the internal mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELITSKIY had a cover address outside the Soviet Union through which to initiate contact. However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and then gave only a partial story of what happened in London in 1961, BELITSKIY would not have told the KGB of the internal mail- ings to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he long had a cover address outside the USSR. BELITSKIY therefore00012269SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 229]
would not have told the KGB how he actually made contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in 1962, but very well could have told the KGB he had seen a particular woman whom he had previously known, he was sure she worked for American Intelligence and it was through this woman American Intelligence became aware BELITSKY was in Geneva.)(c) BELITSKY in 1962 in Geneva agreed to meet within the USSR an individual representing CIA. However, his agreement was only under certain stipulated conditions, the most interesting of which was that the individual must be unwitting of the true nature of the relationship of BELITSKIY with CIA. In addition, any message to BELITSKIY or any individual who met BELITSKIY must make no reference to any previous meeting of BELITSKIY with CIA.The above conditions are quite explainable if BELITSKIY had not been under KGB control between 1953 and 1961 and in 1961 gave the KGB only a partial story of the 1961 events in London.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 230]
SECRETAs previously indicated, the conclusion is there are a sufficient number of unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case so that discrepancies between information from NOSENKO and the actual record in the BELITSKIY case cannot at present be considered as a reflection against NOSENKO, and there is a distinct possibility the KGB actually did not know the true facts of the BELITSKIY case.The previous summary noted on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGINA was an Intourist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. It also noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKIY "reported to the KGB ...that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA." The previous summary stated BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent and "CIA did not warn BELITSKIY."There appears to be no doubt at this time that the statement by NOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA," is a reasonably accurate description of what actually happened in May 1962 during Agency contacts with BELITSKIY in Geneva. The record reflects that BELITSKIY stated SHULGINA had confidentially told him of her status as a KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence while previously in Paris, France.11SECRETG001228
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 231]
It was determined there was no collateral information which would indicate that the statement by SHULGINA had any factual basis and BELITSKIY was warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behalf of the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY she had been "forcibly recruited by American Intelligence" at a previous date. It was also suggested to BELITSKIY that he should go to the KGB as a loyal Soviet citizen and report the apparent indiscretion of SHULGINA.Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary, in connection with the BELITSKIY case, made reference to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV. It was stated that ARTEMOV had been involved with a series of America.. tourist agents in the Soviet Union and although NOSENKO was allegedly familiar with ARTEMOV, he was unaware of the involvement of ARTEMOV with American tourist agents in 1958 - 1959. The summary noted this was during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department. Although not specifically stated, the above suggested ARTEMOV was actually in the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959 and that NOSENKO was not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO has consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned to the First Section, First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approximately 1957.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 232]
A closer examination of the cases described in the previous summary as "CIA American tourist agents," reveals there is no conflict in the involvement of ARTEMOV in these cases and the statement by NOSENKO that ARTEMOV was with the First Section, First Department. As an example, one of the cases is the case of Edward McGOWAN 06NOSENKO has furnished information concerning this case, stating it was originally a Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a letter by the individual in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the First Department. There is adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV only became involved after the case was transferred to the First Department.Another of the cases involved the contact of ARTEMOV with a CIA officer who was under Department of State cover in Helsinki, Finland, 08,24,14-1 and visited the USSR on a tourist visa. Such an individual would under no circumstances be considered a true tourist or the responsibility of the Seventh Department, particularly since apparently the individual was even traveling under a diplomatic passport. It is assumed the individual was of interest to the First Chief Directorate and if the First Chief Directorate required or desired support from the SCD, it would normally request the First Department for such assistance and it is extremely unlikely that the FCD would request the Seventh Department for assistance in a case involving an American diplomat.13SECRET00012302/BR
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 233]
Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basisfor the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was aDeputy Chief of the Seventh Departument from July 1962 to January1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal isnot necessary since this conclusion was apparently based on inadequateinformation. During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnisheddetails concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed positionwhich substantiate his claim to having been a Deputy Chief of theSeventh Department from July 1962 to January 1964.An example in support of the statement that the previous conclu-sion was based on inadequate information is the matter of the writtennotes which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964.The description of these notes on page 319 of the previous summary isinadequate, inaccurate, and misleading. Prior to current interviews,an effort had not been made to obtain from NOSENKO a detailed explan-ation of his notes or of how he obtained the information in the notes.During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed informa-tion concerning all aspects of his notes. This information supports hisclaimed position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and includescollateral support to his claim of being Deputy Chief of the First Section,First Department, in 1960 - 1961.C00123114SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 234]
Primarily the notes of NOSENKO can be categorized as follows:(a) Short case summaries by the Chiefs of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section, Seventh Department. NOSENKO has stated that he was in 1962 - 1963 responsible for supervision over these Sections and that Filip Denisovich BOBKOV, Deputy Chief, SCD, who supervised the Seventh Department, requested a list of all recruited agents of the Seventh Department. According to NOSENKO, the order from BOBKOV was to only retain the files (cases) of agents in tourist firms and that the files of other recruited agents should be sent to the FCD or Archives. NOSENKO has stated that he in turn levied on the Chiefs of the three Sections the requirement of BOBKOV, but also expanded the request to include all 1960 - 1962 cases, not excluding previous cases or cases which had already been given to the FCD. The notes of NOSENKO included hand-written reports from the Chief or Acting Chief of each Section on recruited agents, with information varying from agent to agent and even including some human errors.Many of the above cases had previously been transferred to the FCD, but the remarks of NOSENKO about them.15SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 235]
inclusion support his statement that he had expanded the original request from BOBKOV so that he would have some "pieces of information to give CIA."(b) Notes by NOSENKO on other cases which he learned of during the 1962-1963 period. Certain of the notes were made from a review of a notebook kept by the Chief, Seventh Department, to which NOSENKO had access on at least two occasions. Most of his notes were not detailed but were sufficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at a later date and yet were somewhat innocuous to maintain before his defection.(c) Notes for lectures to officers of the Seventh Directorate prepared while with the First Department, 1960-1961, and the Seventh Department, 1962-1963.(d) Draft report for the briefing of the new Chief, First Department, in the latter part of 1961.(e) One of three copies of an unregistered report pre- pared by the Chief, Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chiefs, including NOSENKO. This was a briefing paper for use by the Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance before the Collegium of the KGB which was reviewing the activities of the Seventh16SECRET0001233
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 236]
# SECRETDepartment. According to NOSENKO, the prepared report was never typed as a fornal docurnent.The view has been set forth that NOSENKO took undue risk in carrying written notes with him out of the Soviet Union. An examination of this material suggests that NOSENKO was using extrerne care in collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the possession of which might be incriminating or which if he had brought out would have been immediately missed. Instead, he collected a con-siderable amount of valuable information which he could bring out with little or no fear that a search of his effects in the KGB after his departure for Geneva would disclose that certain material was missing. None of the material was registered and all could have previously been des-troyed by NOSENKO.The previous summary stated that NOSENKO brought three KGB documents to Geneva. These were typed papers but none was registered or actually accountable. The reference to three documents was to:(a) The draft report for the briefing of the Collegium which has been mentioned previously.(b) A typed two-page report on several cases. Actually a Chief of Section had typed his notes on cases instead of submitting in handwriting as the others did.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 237]
(c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent.NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file kept by the Chef which he reviewed and that he kept one.Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered document and did not contain the usual information as to number of copies typed.18SECRETG001235
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 238]
SECRETG. NOSENKO HAS NO VALID CLAIM TO CERTAINTY THATTHE KGB RECRUITED NO AMERICAN EMBASSYPERSONNEL BETWEEN 1953 AND HIS DEFECTION IN 1964![GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]SECRET0001236
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 239]
G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGBrecruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and hisdefection in 1964. (Previous conclusion)The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO is of theopinion that there were no KGB recruitments of United States Embassypersonnel in Moscow between 1953 and December 1963 with the exceptionof "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) and Herbert HOWARD who actuallywas a USIA employee but did work part of the time in the Embassy.The question here is whether or not the expressed opinion ofNOSENKO is sufficiently based on actual knowledge so that this opinioncan be accepted as absolute evidence that there were no other KGBrecruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time. Theonly logical conclusion is that the opinion of NOSENKO cannot beaccepted as absolute fact and, therefore, there is a possibility thata recruitment could have occurred and NOSENKO not be aware in anyway of the recruitment. This should in no way be interpreted as asuggestion that NOSENKO could be lying, but rather that an unbiasedobserver without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant toaccept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area.The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO should beexamined and can be cited as follows.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 240]
(a) During March 1953-late May 1955 NOSENKO was a case officer in the First Section, First Department, SCD. NOSENKO does not claim that he would have known the details concerning any recruitments (other than "ANDREY") in this period, but states if there had been he would have heard "something."(b) During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department, not the First Department, but continued to have contact with certain officers in the First Section, First Department. NOSENKO is of the opinion that if there had been a recruitment in the United States Embassy during this period he would have heard "something" even though he would probably have learned few details.(c) During the January 1960-December 1961 period NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, and he has made the categorical statement that there were no recruitments by the KGB of United States Embassy personnel during this period of time. He has also stated that if there had been any recruitments during the 1953-1959 period he is sure he would, during 1960-1961, have heard or learned some details of the 001238 case or cases. There is merit to this contention by2
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 241]
NOSENKO since the Chief of Section was VladislavKOVSHUK who had been an officer of the First Depart-ment since 1953, actually working in the First Section except for the periods of time that he was in the United States to reactivate "ANDREY" in 1957-1958 and a period of time that he was Deputy Chief of the First Department.(d) During 1962-1963 NOSENKO was again in the Seventh Department. However, he continued to maintain contact with certain officers of the First Section, First Department: in particular, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the First Section, then became Chief of Section, and in the latter part of 1963 became a Deputy Chief of the First Department.According to NOSENKO his relationship with GRYAZNOV was sufficiently close during 1962-1963 that he is sure GRYAZNOV would have furnished NOSENKO some information in regard to any successful recruitments of United States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed out that he learned of the existence of the [Herbert HOWARD] case from GRYAZNOV in 1962, although it was not until 1963 that NOSENKO heard the name. NOSENKO actually
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 242]
SECRETlearned of the name when the First Section, FirstDepartment, needed the services of the SeventhDepartment (Third Section) in obtaining a room in acertain hotel for the Soviet girl friend of HOWARDIn general the above constitutes the basis for the stated opinionof NOSENKO that "ANDREY" and Herbert HOWARD were the onlysuccessful KGB recruitments during 1953 - December 1963. It shouldbe noted that there are no other identified KGB recruitments duringthis period of time which would specifically refute the opinion ofNOSENKO. However, in view of the cited actual basis for the opinionof NOSENKO, acceptance of the opinion of NOSENKO as being anhonest opinion should not be converted into a statement that it isabsolute proof that another recruitment could not have occurred.NOSENKO may be completely correct in his opinion, but sinceNOSENKO was only in the First Department 1953 - 1955 and 1960 - 1961his opinion that he would have heard "something" about a recruitmentin 1955-1959 ог 1962 - 1963 Cannot be accepted as infallible.SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 243]
SECRETV. ANNEX![stamp Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]SECRET0001241
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 244]
ANNEXThe previous summary contained an Annex "A" and an Annex"B" covering pages 316-435. Limited comments concerning Annex"A," Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex "B,"Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached. In addition,there is an Annex "C" to this summary which is entitled, "TheCherepanov Papers."Attachments:Annex AAnnex BAnnex C
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 245]
# SECRET## ANNEX B - SUMMARIES OF CASES NOTEXAMINED IN TEXT![Stamp with text Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification] SECRET 0001243
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 246]
# ANNEX 3SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXTPages 399-435 of the previous summary contain summaries on the cases of Americans who, according to information from NOSENKO, were of KGB interest, were approached by the KG3, or were actually recruited by the KGB. It was stated that these cases did not clearly relate to the specific KCB positions held at particular times by NOSENKO and thus could not be usefully employed in examining his claimed KGB service. The sourcing of these cases has been explored in detail during the current interviews with NOSENKO, and it is now possible to establish a certain relationship between these cases and certain claimed positions of NOSENKO in the KGB.It is the conclusion of this summary that any group of cases, as well as all other cases concerning which NCSENKO has furnished information, must be fully considered, not necessarily for the importance or unimportance of the information, but to determine how NOSENKO claimed to have learned of the case and whether his statements concerning each identified case are supported by collateral information.These factors are important in assessing the overall validity of information from NOSENKO as well as being supporting evidence of his claimed positions in the KGB.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 247]
To comment specifically on each of the [49] cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current interviews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO in approximately [40] of the [49] cases. Of even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has logically sourced his information in all except perhaps [four] cases. The indicated inability of NOSENKO to completely source all [49] of the cases is not considered significant, particularly since his having knowledge of all the cases is quite compatible with his claimed positions in the KGB. In addition, criticism of NOSENKO for not being able to source all of his information would be unreasonable since it makes no allowance for normal lapses of memory or failure to recall something which was insignificant at the time it occurred. Without citing in detail any of the [49] cases, the ways in which NOSENKO learned of a number of the cases are considered important since there is a direct relationship to his claimed positions in the KGB during 1960 - January 1964, specifically the position of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961; Chief, First Section, Seventh Department, January - July 1962; and as Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, July 1962 - January 1964. Certain examples of the above are as follows:
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 248]
(a) NOSENKO learned of a number of the Seventh Department cases which had occurred in 1960-1961, as well as several 1958 - 1959 cases from notes prepared by the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section in 1963. These notes were prepared at the request of NOSENKO who as a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, was responsible for supervision of these three sections; and the request was actually an expansion of the original request from BOBKOV, Deputy Chief of the SCD, for information on recruitments of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO brought with him in 1964 the notes prepared by the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section and his knowledge of many of the cases which had occurred prior to 1962, particularly 1960-1961, was limited to information contained in the notes. From these notes, NOSENKO had prepared his report to BOBKOV eliminating those which were not applicable to the request.(b) NOSENKO learned of several 1962-1963 cases of the First Section, First Department, from. Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief,3SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 249]
First Section, First Department. This information was furnished to NOSENKO primarily because of his friendship with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operailcas. However, NOSENKO learned of certain me casus o was furnished additional details as a result of a request from the Sevenia Department to the First Section, First Departmens, for assistance or vice versa.Certain of the [49] cases listed were cases of the Seventh Department prior to 1960 or in 1962-1963 when NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department. Certain of the cases were cases in which the First Section, First Department, was involved prior το 1960 or 1960 - 1961. The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning these two groups of cases does not materially support his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department, but does support his claimed assignment to the Seventh Department prior to 1960 and in 1962-1963, and his claimed assignment to the First Department in 1960-1961.It is difficult to specifically comment concerning these [49] cases since they do not fall into one or two specific categories. Instead, they constitute a rather motley group of cases remaining after completion of the detailed sections of the previous summary. Included are First Department and Seventh Department cases covering a period of approximately five and one-half years. It should be noted, hothat the4
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 250]
explanation of NOSENKO concerning his knowledge of the [49] casesis both plausible and compatible with his claimed positions in theFirst Department and Seventh Department during 1960 - January 1964.