[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 76]
677. aspect which NOSENKO failed to see: He said that this man had come to Moscow on a Soviet visa issued on a separate piece of paper, rather than catered in the man's passport, so that there would not be a mermanent record of his travel to the USSR. This implies, and confirmed, that he travelied under his true name to Moscow. furthermore confirmed that he had gone as a tourist, entering the USSR on a Soviet tourist ship. In view of the First Chief Directorate's operational jurisdiction in this otherwise normal tourist, there was an obvious necessity for coor- dination between the First Chief Directorate's American Department and the Second Chief Directorate's Tourist Department, to prevent any slippage (such as NOSENKO described in the SilU3IN case, when the CRU failed to coordinate with the KGP). Yes despite logical professional need-to-know on KOSENXO's part, he first made his own knowledge unofficial, and then his subsource's knowledge unofficial as well.NOSENKO was unable to explain how he had learned of the case of French When pressed for a subsource, he claimed that he had attended a reception at the Indian Embassy in 1953 or 1959 with GRIEANOV, and when GFIBANOV Cold him to take a glass of wine to he understood somehow that was an agent of GRIPANOV's.His sourcing for the case of the French businessman, (Page 484), is not unlike that of He said he had known that there was a French businessman and has an agent. On one occса- sion when NOSENKO was duty officer for the Second Chief Directorate a call for GRIBANOVCA cain and he asked who was calling. When he was told it was then he knew somehow that this was GRIBANOV's agent.3. RemarksNOSENKO's errors concerning "ANDREY" (particularly his early insistence that "ANDREY" had left Moscow years before NOSENKO en- tered the KGB) make it impossible that NOSENKO could have learned of the case in the way he later said he did.NOSENKO's accounts of how he learned of the "Paris agent" are vague and vary with each telling; they also depend heavily on coin- cidence. It is noteworthy too that he claimed to have been told of this one operation by no less than four individuals, whereas the rest of what he learned of First Chief Directorate operations in eleven years of KGB service came from only two other individuals. Furthermore, his knowledge of "SASHA" stemmed from elaborate and apparently contrived sourcing which he himself was unable to recon- struct when pressed for exact details. NOSENKO's inability to give any clear and consistent account of how he heard of either the 'Paris agent" or "SASHA" must be judged in the light of the fact that he first heard of both cases only just after promising to collect such information for CIA. because these were among the cost iapor- tant and the most fortuitous items he ever picked up, it could reasonably be expected that he would remember how he did so, espe- cially since only a little over a year elapsed until his next reeting with CIA.NOSENKO's sourcing for the and leads seems illogical and fabricated. It also appears that SOSENKO has given an inaccurate version of the way in which he would have learned of (not an Illegal as NOSENKO indicated, but an agent).TOP SECRET