[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 172]
# TOP SECRET260. (d) Amount, Type, and Value of ProductionEvaluations of the quality of production have been given by NOSENKO as well as U.S. authorities concerned with the microphones in the chancery building.## NOSENKO's Statements11 June 1962: "Well, perhaps, there would be some kind of fitness report (kharakteristika). Sometimes there the Counsellor, FREERS, who was there before EcSWEENEY, dictated something; he said that so-and-so has such-and-such weak-nesses. We had not known that. We are listening to your military attaches there. We know where they intend to travel, what they want to find out. We know what machinery and what targets interest then--always.... They chatter sometimes. Some of the things they say are surprising [from the point of view of security]. They discuss, among other things, where to go, what to see, what to take with them--electronic equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic equipment and now have permission, if we are absolutely cer-tain that one of your people is taking electronic apparatus with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to take it, to steal it. We now have authorization to take any necessary steps to steal it. Because you now have improved your equipment. We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955, but now you have better apparatus....What do we do [when we know the attaches are taking special equipment]? Well, they are getting ready to go and we hear that such-and-such data interests them. We give them disinformation; we make them think, for example, that there are rockets there. And there's absolutely nothing there, understand? Absolutely nothing. We make it appear on the radio [by spurious transmissions] that there are rockets there; we even have patrols standing there and everything.... They talk about interesting things, but never in my life have I heard a conversation about agent operations, not once."12 June 1962: (Speaking again about coverage of the U.S. Service Attaches) "They say: 'Today, let's go to such-and-such a place.' They go to the military attache, the two assistants, and say: 'This region is interesting. They have something there.' We know it at once. I personally tele-phone surveillance at once and tell the Chief of the depart-ment to come at once. He arrives and I say: 'Throw in three, four, five brigades (surveillance teams).' We work al-most openly against the attaches....FREERS, Bill FREERS, in particular, walks around in his office and dictates. A11 this is recorded. Well, this is very important material. We do not know the cipher, but he dictates Top Secret and Con-fidential cables (in the clear). We receive the clear text and decide at once whether there is anything serious there or not. If we decide that this must be reported to the [KGB] Chairman immediately, GRIBANOV may call him right away."24 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything because of interference (teletype machine noise).... We didn't get much out of the [military] code room; we could hear [the code clerk James] STORSBERG swearing on occasion, and then he would mention a group of numbers. This was, of course,*See Part V.E.3.c. on the STORSBERG case.