Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 167]
768. - Another phase of the preparations would have been MOSENKO's actual and demonstrable participation in operations, seemingly as a KGB officer. Presumably this would be done so that Westerners (e.g., BARGHOORN, TRIPPEL, and W.E. JOHNSON) could certify that they had seen MOSENKO in some such role.- The KGB presumably would have restricted the number of its officers aware of some or all of the operational plans; it would nonetheless be faced with the problem of how public knowledge of NOSENKO's defection might affect others in the service. KGB officers abroad uninformed of the operational plan might be indiscreet with foreigners, in meeting Western double agents, or before microphones in their homes and offices, making such remarks as "I never heard of this man NOSEIKO or speculating close to the mark. Thus the KGB might have tried to support the bona fides of NOSENKO by the spreading of false rumors about his authenticity (this on the part of the limited few aware of the facts of the case), by recalling KGB officers from the posts in the West (ostensibly because they were known to NOSEIKO), by announcing the wholesale dismissal of those responsible including GRIBANOV (although in fact they may have routinely retired or may have been removed from the main stream of KGB Headquarters activities) and by making general announcements within the KGB about the "loss" incurred by the defection.Furthermore, since it is common Soviet practice to make a bad example of defectors, such announcements might be expected to denigrate NOSEIKO as a "bad character" with venereal disease, an odd Party record, self-inflicted wound, etc., in his background. The KGB might also have taken pains to support NOSENKO further by having Western Intelligence sources, notably double agents recognized by the KGB to be such, told of the seriousness of the defection.It is within this possible framework that one might judge whether the reports of concerning NOSENKO were unwitting repetitions of widely disseminated misinformation, or whether their reports constituted purposeful passage of KGB disinformation.Their direct and indirect support of NOSENKO's bona fides, as well as the statements by GOLITSYN, are presented and evaluated in the next sections below, together with presentations and appraisals of their information on topics of reporting in common with NOSENKO's. Certain reports bySource* It is noteworthy that such participation was limited to Tourist Department operations. NOSEIKO did not claim physical participation in any contacts with American Embassy officials during the periods 1953-55 or 1960-61, except for MULE and STORSBERG (where his claimed role was uncheckable since it involved only holding a door) and KEYZERS (which KEYZERS did not confirm and on which NOSEIKO did not insist, admitting that he doubted KEYZERS would remember or recognize him.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 168]
769. Rare also considered because they overlap SOSEJO to some extent, although by saying he was a civilian, contradicted his claim to KG3 staff officer status. A number of general correlations between the NOZENKO case and the operations are then reviewed. The final section of Part IX is a summary of conclusions about the relationship between the NOSENKO case and the reporting about him by GOLITSYN, sensitive sources.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 169]
# TOP SECRET14-00000is.1. ::1.  1:::.:11. c.1.  L::.....::1.  L::.....2001 1550 ן רווה הווייט:1*** ... ...'s was on the list but GOLITSYN gave indictio hardcognize the Base.On 21 June 1962, after CIA's initial meetings with NOSENKO and becaure of the targe overlap of NOSLIKO's information and contacts 2 GOL.13TN'S, me of the CIA case off.cers who hau net NOSUSSO A General with GOLITSEN to otan 11s comments on s GOLASYNCAd receiver of the SSwitcrias an aenyatta letter en reported certain inferma- :: OB.ffer steGO : a, inclura:::::10. :.::::::Corond Chic was stew hit,crsonnel whom the INKO, anc CA recors, one Aleksarr Japan when::::::5,::T 101 106.Curtir ...tified as RGB COLESY said why the fry for an assces- sinformac tormation on tiIn general, could s.. wat ter in what he had seen; ne wo 1.0 S case. It was not ven to him.On 10 February 1964 NOGORO's percction to the Soviet Dis- arament delegation in Geneve Suiterland was publicized, includ- ing hus KGB 001. NOC: GOLEMS hearts news he ima.cda- ately recalled the June 1902 "Matter" froa Santperlanc end linked NOSEIKO to 11; he thereupor stated tilu as recailed COSENKO as a member of the Second Cinef rectorate working against American citizens.On 11 February 1964 GALITSIN raise the 50ty of his Participation in interegions of US, and at this time he was given some backgorur.l or the cum and an uncation of CIA'S reservations about NOSEKO'S on tes. Over the next several moulos GOLITSYN was provided with materiarca tuc 1962 and 1964 meetings with NOSENKO in Switzerland, and at as request was supplied with all the available biographic dati NOSENKO to assist him in analyzing the operation. On 23 Jul 1964, GOLITSYN He confirnea was interviewed in detail on the subject of KSETO. NOSENKO'S identity as the 2 of the former Marister of Ship- building and said that he was a KGb et:icer who had worked in the American Department and the Tourist bitment at the KGB's Second Chief Directorate。 HE NUS own 30 (1:0t buried in a photo spread, but sam and he wentifico it as a photograph of the mat he new. At this tree yave the information abous HOSESKO which is summarized below.# TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 170]
The NOSENKO case has not been discussed with GOLITSYN since the 29 June 1964 interview; thus he has not been questioned further on the circumstances which led to the encounters with NOSENKO described by him, nor have the results of subsequent detailed reinterrogations of NOSENKO - discussed at length in the foregoing sections of this paper - been made available to him for review, analysis, or comment.2. Resume and Discussion of Information*American Department - 1953NOSENKO has said that he entered the KGB in March 1953** and was first assigned to the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department of what is now the Second Chief Directorate, KGB. He stated that his duties from his entry until sometime in 1954, perhaps about June, were to work on files of American correspondents on permanent assignment to Moscow and to meet with the Soviet citizens who were agents or informants reporting on the correspondents to the KGB.GOLITSYN stated that he met NOSENKO in the American Department of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate*** a couple of times in 1953 when he, GULITSYN, was there on other matters. GOLITSYN had earlier identified his own job between December 1952 and April 1953 as Chief of the American Sector, Counter-intelligence (Ninth) Department, Foreign Directorate, under the Chief Intelligence Directorate (formed in December 1952 and re-organized in April 1953). From April 1953 until his departure* The relationship between the reporting by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO on specific operations is shown on Pages 594-595, with comments thereon appearing on Pages 647-659, while in this section are a discussion and an evaluation of what GOLITSYN said about NOSENKO's assignments in the Second Chief Directorate (see Pages 313-344).** Among the various dates given by NOSENKO for this entry, March 1953 has been given more often than others and is more consistent with the rest of NOSENKO's story.*** ... is now designated the KGB Second Chief Directorate.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 171]
for Vienna in October 1953 GOLITSYN was Deputy Chief of theEmigre sector, Counterintelligence Department, Foreign IntelligenceDepartment, Foreign Intelligence Directorate. COLITSYN has notindicated the nature of his responsibilities in either of thesepositions which would have necessitated his visiting the AmericanDepartment of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate, althoughcertain activities of common interest with the latter would appearlogical. NOSENKO's description of his alleged duties with corres-pondents, however, did not encompass his having official contactswith representatives of any component of the CounterintelligenceDepartment of the Foreign Directorate. According to NOSENKO'description of the location of his claimed office in the AmericanDepartment, and his description of the duties of the co-workershe said shared it with him, chance contacts there with such arepresentative would have been precluded. Even by NOSENKO's account,then, an encounter between GOLITSYN and himself could not havebeen in the course of interdepartmental liaison between theirrespective units, nor could it have occurred in NOSENKO's office.GOLITSYN's lack of reporting on KCB operations against Americancorrespondents (other than his conversation with KOVSHUK in 1956or 1957 about Henry SHAPIRO) is further evidence that his businessin the American Department was unrelated to NOSENKO's claimedactivities at that time, and GOLITSYN's own statement on the 1953encounters implied that his meetings with NOSENKO were accidental.Fleeting as their contacts would therefore have been, it couldhave led GOLITSYN to make the unfounded assumption that NOSENKOwas a member of the staff within the American Department.American Department/Tourist Department - 1955-1960NOSENKO stated that he transferred from the American Depart-ment to the Tourist Department in June 1955, and remained in theTourist Department until 1960, becoming a deputy chief of sectionthere in 1958.GOLITSYN, however, insisted that NOSEKKO remained in theAmerican Department until at least 1957, or possibly as late as1958. GOLITSYN added that the KGB would not be aware that he knew.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 172]
# TOP SECRETc.NOSE.KO's true position in the American Department in 1957 or 1958. GOLITSM did not indicate how he acquired his knowledge on this nor why the KGB subsequently would have been unable to determine that he had. If his access to this information was indeed that remote (as GULITS's assignment in 1957 and 1958 would indicate - see below), it is readily apparent that it could likewise be somewhat garbled. COLITSYN was unable to explain the fact that NOSENKO's physical presence in exclusively Tourist Department cases had been positively established through photo identifications made by several of the individuals involved, who met OSENKO as early as 1956.From 1955 to 1959 (the same years when NOSEIKO claimed to have been in the Tourist Department) GOLITSYN was enrolled in the KGB Higher School. He was detached from the school, in the period January-March 1959, in order to gather material for his thesis. At that time GOLITSM spent just under two months in the Tourist Department, but GOLITSYN's work did not involve him in any day-to-day operational activities of this department. He has reported having "occasionally" met NOSEKO in 1959; although he did not specify that it was at precisely this time, it seems probable that it would have been. GOLITSYN said that he asked NOSENKO in 1959 where he was working and NOSENKO told him the Tourist Department. Again it appears from this that his encounters must have been brief, superficial, and not work-related, hence insufficient for GOLITSEN to arrive independently at a well-founded conclusion as to NOSENKO's actual status and function with the Tourist Department.*In describing his own and others' responsibilities in the Tourist Department, NOSEIKO has made no reference to this unit having a formal or regular relationship with the KGB school or to students from the school having been detached to the department.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 173]
# TOP SECRETInformation *not available to GOLITSYN*The detailed interrogations of NOSENKO concerning his claims to KGB positions between 1953 and 1964, did not take place until many months after GOLITSYN made his statements, and they were based upon all collateral information known/relating to each phase. None of the results of these interrogations was made available to GOLITSIN, so he was not aware of the countless points on which NOSENKO contradicted known facts and revealed his ignorance of activities which were carried out by the KGB during his alleged tenure in these departments.3. Comments on GOLITSYNSeveral factors influence the evaluation of GOLITSYN's statements on NOSENKO:- First, as stated in Part VIII.I., it is concluded that NOSENKO did not serve in the KGB positions he claimed. GOLITSYN's testimony verified this conclusion insofar as NOSENKO's claims about service in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960-1961 are concerned. Moreover, in 1962 GOLITSYN concluded that the KGB "letter-writer" (actually NOSENKO) was under KGB control in submitting information to American Intelligence. At issue, therefore, is the evidence from GOLITSYN to the effect that NOSENKO was an officer in the American Department (until 1957 or 1958, whereas NOSENKO said he was reassigned from the department in 1955) and in the Tourist Department subsequently.- Second, GOLITSYN made no comment about or identification of NOSENKO prior to the public announcement of the latter's defection, despite many previous opportunities to do so (e.g., in discussions of GUK, CHURANOV, and KASHCHEYEV) and despite GOLITSYN's proven excellence of memory for names and tasks of KGB personnel. GOLITSYN gave little detail on the circumstances of his encounters with NOSENKO, and he has not been questioned further about them. Nevertheless, as indicated in the foregoing remarks on the circumstances in which the two men could have met, it seems apparent that any contact would have been brief, infrequent, casual, extra-official, andTOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 174]
The following discussion considers GOLITSYN's information about NOSENKO in conjunction with NOSENKO's denial about having been in contact with GOLITSYN.* Possible explanations for GOLITSYN's having referred to their encounters but having misidentified NOSENKO's positions in the KGB are: First, GOLITSYN could have erred; second, GOLITSYN could have lied for personal reasons; and third, GOLITSYN could have lied at the direction of the KGB because he (like NOSENKO) is under KGB control. To examine each of these points separately:- GOLITSYN could have erred. Apart from the denial by NOSENKO, who is an unreliable source, there is no evidence to refute COLITSYN's statement that he and NOSENKO met in the American Department in 1953 and in the Tourist Department in 1958 or 1959. (The conclusions in Report VIII.I. about NOSENKO's bona fides do not rule out the possibility that he was physically present on occasion on the premises of the two departments in these years, although not in the capacities that he has claimed.) The nature of their encounters, however, could have been such that GOLITSYN erred in assuming - because NOSENKO was seen on or near the premises of the two departments, and because NOSENKO told GOLITSYN in 1958 or 1959 that he was in the Tourist Department - that NOSENKO was therefore an officer of these specific elements of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. Thus, if GOLITSYN met NOSENKO as he said, he mistakenly identified NOSENKO as being a member of the staffs of the American and Tourist Departments at these times.- GOLITSYN could have lied for personal reasons. He may have believed that to say he met NOSENKO or to say he knew* There is insufficient information available to reach a conclusion about, or even speculate on, why NOSENKO was so certain GOLITSYN's defection occurred in January 1962, as contrasted with the fact that it took place on 15 December 1961.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 175]
# TOP SECRETNOSENKO's position in the KGB would add authenticity to his earlier evaluation of the NOSENKO information of 1962, to his contradictions of NOSENKO's statements concerning service in the U.S. Embassy Section and the operations of that section, and to his contention that the KGB would try to counteract his (GOLITSYN's) information by spreading purportedly authoritative but purposefully misleading reports on the same subject matter. In summary, GOLITSYN's intention in lying about NOSENKO could simply have been to add greater credibility to his expressed opinion that NOSENKO was a KGB provocateur.- GOLITSYN could have lied at the direction of the KGB, an explanation that is examined here for the sake of completeness and not because CIA has any reason to believe GOLITSYN is under KG3 control. This explanation would mean that GOLITSYN, although offering partial confirmation for NOSENKO's claims, directly attacked the *bona fides* of another KGB-dispatched agent of allegedly comparable rank and knowledgeability. Acting under KG9 instructions, GOLITSYN would have sought to undermine NOSENKO's acceptability, regardless of the fact that NOSENKO said he was providing reliable and comprehensive information about KGB operations against American officials and tourists in the USSR. At the same time, NOSENKO was not giving an account of their relationship that was consistent with GOLITSYN's, by implication NOSENKO was distorting or diluting the earlier reports of GOLITSYN on KGB operations in the Soviet Union, and NOSENKO was seeking to gain acceptance by CIA equal to that experienced by GOLITSYN. According to this hypothesis, two sources under KGB control - each striving for acceptance - deliberately gave conflicting stories of their relationship, and each tried to undermine the *bona fides* of the other. GOLITSYN explicitly and NOSENKO by implication. This explanation is so illogical, as well as so detrimental to the KGB, that it must be rejected from serious consideration.# TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 176]
# TOP SECRETThe choice thus seems to lie between the first two explanations for GULITSIN's misidentification of NOSENKO, one an understandable error of assumption drawn from their few chance encounters, the other a misguided attempt that had no sinister goals. In either case, GOLITSIN's testimony does not contribute to a determination of the status of NOSENKO within the KGB as of the years prior to 1960.There are two explanations for NOSENKO's denial about having met GOLITSYN. One explanation is that they were never in personal contact, the KGB was aware of this fact, and - unprepared for GULITSYN's statements to the contrary - the KGB briefed NOSENKO accordingly. If in this particular instance NOSENKO told the truth and (as discussed above) GOLITSYN did not, no additional or different conclusion can be drawn about the *bona fides* of NOSENKO and his claims of service in the KGB. The second explanation is that, as GOLITSYN said, these encounters did take place in 1953 and again in 1958 or 1959, but because of their casual and fleeting nature, NOSENKO (unlike GOLITSYN) has not remembered them.# TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 177]
## 2. Resume of Information*According to GOLITSYN, he personally met HOSENKO two or three times in 1954 while visiting the U.S. Embassy section of the American Department, a component of the internal security directorate, and again in 1958 and 1959. On the other hand, NOSENKO was unable to identify GOLITSYN's photograph and he denied ever having seen him. GOLITSYN said that GUK, (TUKHANOV, and KASHCHEYEV were friends of NOSENKO as well as of GOLITSYN. (NOSENKO claimed to be on friendly terms with each of the three KGB officers; he acknowledged, however, that his acquaintance with GUK had been merely casual until NOSENKO's three-month TDY to Geneva in 1952, which made them the best of friends.) From 1953 to 1957 or 1958 GOLITSYN said, HOSENKO was a case officer in the U.S. Embassy Section, then transferred to the Tourist Department, where he was a school case officer in 1959. GOLITSYN stated unequivocally that HOSENKO was not a Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section or otherwise serving in that section or in the American Department as of the time he (GOLITSYN) consulted with various officers there in April-June 1960 and January 1961.** COLITSYN spoke there with officers whom HOSENKO claims as close colleagues including KOVSHUK and KRYAZHOV, and would doubtless have known if HOSENKO were supervising or otherwise involved in code clerk operations. In summary, GOLITSYN corroborated some of NOSENKO’s alleged assignment in the KGB Second Chief Directorate but not all of them while NOSENKO contradicted GOLITSYN by saying that the two men had never met.## 3. Comments on GOLITSYNFrom December 1952 until April 1953 GOLITSYN was Chief of the American Desk Counterintelligence Department, Foreign Directorate. KGB (then MGB) and for most of the period from January to March 1959 he was on TDY training assignments to the Second Chief Directorate. In the first job at least GOLITSYN presumably would have had regular dealings with the U.S. Embassy Section, and perhaps also in the second he would have been in contact with the Tourist Department, in which NOSENKO claimed to have been then serving. Despite this and despite his proven excellence of memory for the names and tasks of KGB personnel, GOLITSYN never mentioned NOSENKO in debriefings during the years 1962 and 1963, nor commented on his name on the two occasions when it was shown to him, although he had numerous opportunities to mention him in connection with the names of CHURANOV, KRYAZHEV, and GUK.*The relationship between the reporting by GOLITSYN and HOSENKO on specific operations is shown on Pages 594-595, with comments thereon appearing on Pages 647-659 while in the section which follows below are a discussion and an evaluation of what GOLITSYN said about NOSENKO’s assignments in the Second Chief Directorate…as described on Pages 343-344.**As stated in Part VIII.1., however, it is not credible that NOSENKO served in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-55 or in 1960-1962.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 178]
TOP SECRET![photo of document with many black dots on it]![photo of document with many black dots on it]TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 179]
# TOP SECRET172. There would appear to be no reason why NOSEIKO, if he had ever met , should not have said so to American Intelligence representatives. To have done so would have given NOSEIKO concrete support for his claims of KGB staff service, which he knew to be in question. On the contrary, however, NOSEIKO consistently denied any contact and manufactured a demonstrably false story to explain his own absence during GOLITSIN's admitted visit to the section in which NOSEIKO claims to have served in January 1961. (See Page 183, second footnote.)On the other hand, GOLITSIN's claim must be measured against the background and circumstances of his statements. In the absence of any comments about or identification of NOSENKO by GOLITSIN prior to the public announcement of his defection from the KGB, and in view of the amount of information made available to him from NOSENKO materials prior to his making any statements about his alleged acquaintance with him, GOLITSIN's "identification" of NOSENKO as a KGB staff officer known to him personally cannot be considered as spontaneous or uncontaminated information.The weight of independent evidence against NOSEIKO's alleged service in those positions which GOLITSIN corroborated, combined with the conflict between GOLITSIN's and NOSEIKO's testimony about their personal acquaintanceship, makes it impossible to accept GOLITSIN's verification of NOSENKO's claimed KGB status during any stage of the latter's career.*It is not likely that he would forget it. Direct relationship with or knowledge of a defector would be interesting and important to remaining KGB officers; even if temporarily forgotten, post-defection reminiscences would almost certainly bring back memories of such recent and direct contacts as GOLITSYN relates.TOP SECRET.