[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 46]
# TOP SECRET,648. STORSBERG rejected the recruitment approach, and when inter- viewed on the basis of the NOSENKO lead, STORSBERG confirmed this. Both agree the approach was made in the latter part of 1961.GOLITSYN's reports cover six other operations (Pages 595-598) which NOSENKO has not mentioned: The KGB's recruit- ment of a female employee at the Embassy in 1957, the pre- sence of a code clerk in the Embassy in 1960 who was a KGB agent, an unsuccessful recruitment approach to a female sec- retary at the Embassy prior to July 1960, the KGB plan to complete the recruitment of an American diplomat following his reassignment from Moscow in 1959, the KGB's recruitment of or planned recruitment approach to a U.S. Embassy employee (possibly a code clerk) prior to April/May 1960, and a KGB officer's trip to Helsinki to accompany an Embassy code clerk travelling by train to Moscow. (There is documentary evi- dence to support the accuracy of GOLITSYN's statements about the last of these cases; see below.)On the basis of available information, NOSENKO cannot be faulted on the completeness of his reporting about American tour- ists recruited, approached, and under development by the KGB, but he could cite only one instance of KGB investigations uncovering tourists dispatched to the USSR by American Intelligence (Pages 145-150). He knew nothing concerning two documents of CIA origin which described "legal travel" operations, one discussing forth- coming tasks of American agents in the tourist season of 1959, a year in which NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section. These documents were placed in the hands of the KGB by George BLAKE of MI-6 in July 1959 (before the end of the tourist season) and in 1960; NOSENKO was not familiar with any aspects of the KGB operation with BLAKE. That the Tourist Department was aware of U.S. Intelligence sending agents under tourist cover to the Soviet Union in the years when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section is demonstrable by four cases of 1958 and 1959 cited in a KGB document supplied by GOLITSYN. NOS- ENKO, although having no information on KGB countermeasures against American tourists in 1958 and 1959, knew that the docu- ment had been passed to CIA by GOLITSYN and that it had been written in the Tourist Department. Where NOSENKO's reporting on American tourist cases is checkable, therefore, it has been found to be incomplete.* NOSENKO reported that of nine other tourists investigated by the KGB, eight were suspected of having current connections with American Intelligence. The KGB was correct with regard to Thomas BARTHELEMY and Robert CHRISTNER, who were on CIA missions, and Alfred SLESINGER, an FBI informant who neverthe- less had no American Intelligence mission when he visited the USSR in 1961 and 1962. Frederick BARCHOORN, arrested in the USSR in 1963, had been affiliated with U.S. military intelli- gence many years before, and Ray GARTHOFF had severed his association with CIA as an overt employee before he went to Moscow in 1963. Concerning the rest reportedly suspected by the KGB--Donald ALBINGER, Bernard KOTEN, and Gabriel REINER-- none was associated with American Intelligence in any way.