Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 41]
SECRETFive times I was sent abroad: In 1957 I was in England with a sport delegation; in 1958 was again in England with a sport delegation; in 1960 I was in Cuba with a delegation of specialists of nickel industry;. in 1961 I was sent in Bulgaria with the aim to help to 1 department 2 directory MVD; in 1962 I was in Switzerland - the conference of disarmament.Working in MVD-KGB every year I had leaves for rest. In 1953 with the wife I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium. In 1954 I was with the family at the cottage. In 1955 I was resting at the cottage. In March 1956 I was resting with the wife in Karlovi Vary, Czechoslovakia. In 1957 I was in Leningrad two weeks with the wife and then rested at the cottage. In 1958 I was resting at the cottage. In 1959 I with the wife rested in Sochi, In January-February 1960 I rested with the wife in Kislovodsk. In 1961 - August - I rested with the wife and daughters in Nicolaev. In October 1962 I rested with the wife in Sochi. In July 1963 I rested with the wife and daughters in Anapa.SECRETC001041
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 42]
SECRETB. IS THE CLAIMED KGB CAREER OF NOSENKO PLAUSIBLE?SECRET![C81 - Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]0001042
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 43]
B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? In thepast the theory has been advanced that NOSENKO was never an officerin the KGB. Information of a detailed nature from NOSENKO concern-ing the KGB, particularly the Second Chief Directorate, has been soextensive as to invalidate any contention that he was not a KGB officer.It is considered that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in the claimed:Departments during the claimed periods of time and served in the claimedpositions in each Department. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO hasnot materially varied in his statements in regard to the above since hisoriginal contact in June 1962 (with the exception of his change to 1952 asdate of his entry into the KGB and then later reverting to the date givenin 1962). There have been some variations in dates of a minor nature,as indicated elsewhere in this summary, but these are of month or dayof transfer from one Department to another and not considered criticalor evidence of deception. NOSENKO has admitted previously giving falseinformation in regard to rank and medals, but his basic story concerning
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 44]
his KGB career today is not significantly different from the fragmentary version he gave in June 1962.Basically the following is now considered to have been the KGB career of NOSENKO:Mid-March 1953 - late May 1955, First Section,First Department, SCDLate May 1955 - December 1959 (1958 - December 1959 - Deputy Chief of Section) Seventh Department, SCDJanuary 1960 - December 1961, Deputy Chief of Section, First Section, First Department, SCDJanuary 1962 - July 1962, Chief of First Section,Seventh Department, SCDJuly 1962 - January 1964, Deputy Chief of Seventh Department, SCD(NOTE: The term Deputy Chief is being used throughout this summary, but the better terminology probably is "Deputy to Chief."The position of "Deputy Chief" in United States Government parlance, including CIA, is not synonymous with the term "Deputy Chief" as used
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 45]
in Soviet organizations and more specifically in the KGB. As an example, a Chief of Department in the KGB or the Chief of a Residentura abroad may have 2, 3 or even 4 deputies, one of whom is given the title of First Deputy. This particular deputy acts in the absence of the Chief of Department and in general has supervisory functions over all the Department sections. The exception to the latter is when the Chief of Department retains direct supervision over what he may consider the most important section. Other deputies have supervisory functions only over designated sections or organizational components.)During current interviews and in prepared memoranda, NOSENKO has furnished detailed information which it is considered substantiates his claimed positions in the KGB. Detailed remarks on these topics are contained in separate sections of this summary.It is realized that GOLITSYN, although confirming that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in both the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, has stated that NOSENKO remained in the First Department until circa 1958 and that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960. It is impossible to correlate this information with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the First Department in late May 1955 and was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, in 1960, nor is an adequate explanation of these variances available0001045SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 46]
SECRETat this time. On the other hand, it is not reasonable that NOSENKO would lay claim to the title of Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, if this were not true when he clearly knew of the visits of GOLITSYN to the First Section in 1960 - 1961 and of his conferences with officers closely associated with NOSENKO at that time.NOSENKO has also mentioned a number of officers of the SCD or former officers of the SCD who transferred to the FCD with whom he was personally acquainted and who were also known to GOLITSYN. A number of these officers were officers from whom GOLITSYN has stated he obtained certain information or through whom he became aware of certain activities including Vladislav M. KOVSHUK, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, Vladimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy I. GUK, Vladimir A. CHURANOV, Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV.The statement of NOSENKO that although he had heard of GOLITSYN he had never personally met GOLITSYN, stands in conflict with the statements of GOLITSYN that he, GOLITSYN, had met and talked with NOSENKO in the SCD in the late 1950's. The description of GOLITSYN of this meeting is that of a casual encounter in the halls rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this0001046SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 47]
issue, it is eminently reasonable to conclude that the encounter took place but that NOSENKO simply has no recollection of it. There is no reason to attach signicance to this lapse of memory.The previous opinion that NOSENKO did not hoid the claimed position of Deputy Chieí, First Section, First Department, during 1960 - 1961 has had the most merit in the controversy over his statements relative to his KGB career. This particular aspect will be covered in detail in another section, but of note at this time is the controversy over what duties the position of Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB, entails or does not entail. It is a fruitless exercise to attempt to judge whether NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960-1961 on the basis of whether his knowledge of the total activities of the First Section was commensurate with the knowledge of a Deputy Branch Chief in CIA in regard to the activities of the entire Branch.Whether NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB, must be judged on the basis of what were the duties of a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD and in particular what were his duties in the particular assignment. The organizational structure of the KGB may or may not have some similarities to the organizational structure of CIA, but any similarities are surely not such as to permit a judgment5SECRET0001047
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 48]
as to whether NOSENKO held a certain claimed position on the basis of a comparison of his activities and responsibilities with that inherent in a somewhat similar position in CIA.One of the most important differences between United States agencies or organizations, including CIA, and the bureaucratic structure of agencies or organizations in the USSR, including the KGB, is the salary structure. Pay of a KGB officer is based on military rank and on actual position held with an additional percentage increase for longevity and language qualification. Actual position held is important from a monetary viewpoint in addition to the prestige. As an example, the difference in monthly salary between a captain and a major is twenty rubles and the difference in salary between a Senior Case Officer and a Deputy Chief of Section is also twenty rubles. An increase in military rank alone has limited pay advantages, as for example a Lieutenant Colonel who is only a Senior Case Officer receives less pay than a major who holds the position of Chief of Section.During current interviews, an effort has been made to obtain from NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various claimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not hold the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual6SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 49]
supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the questions, but it is the only method possible at this time.7SECRET0001049
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 50]
# SECRETC. HAS NOSENKO GIVEN AN ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION OFHIS MOTIVATION IN CONTACTING CIA IN 1962AND FOR HIS DEFECTION IN 1964?![GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]SECRET0001050
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 51]
SECRETC. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CLA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? Of the eight listed categories which are being given specific consideration in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO, this category is probably the most difficult in which to present a logical position with factual support. There are too many intangible aspects involved and although motivation is an important factor, full resolution of the motivation problem is not a paramount factor in deciding whether NOSENKO is or is not a dispatched agent. NOSENKO could have contacted this Agency in 1962 and defected in 1964 without KGB knowledge and yet even at this late date have failed to disclose some important events of a personal nature which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision. Defectors are humans and have at least the normal reluctance to admit unfavorable information which they consider of a personal nature.On 31 October 1967 NOSENKO, following a request, furnished a handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, a typed copy of which is attached. The memorandum, although not grammatically correct, is quite understandable and is worthy of review. The tenor of the memorandum is one of increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime.SECRET![black ink stamp]
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 52]
# SECRETNOSENKO and others of his generation have lived in a Soviet society throughout their entire lives. The environment is an important factor of influence in the life of an individual and true disillusionment is at best usually a gradual process in which many factors, some recognized and some not recognized by the individual, have played a role in varying degrees.NOSENKO, until 1955 and possibly until the death of his father in August 1956, could be compared to the profligate son of wealthy parents in the United States who finally graduates from college and obtains employment perhaps in the firm of his father without actually earning any of the luxuries he has enjoyed. The father of NOSENKO was not only wealthy by Soviet standards but also held a high government position. The influence of his father and the name of his father undoubtedly was an important if not the most important factor in NOSENKO éven being permitted to enter the Naval RU and the KGB even though NOSENKO is particularly reluctant to admit, perhaps even to himself, that this was the primary reason.The above should not be construed as any reflection on the actual intelligence of NOSENKO, but rather as an explanation of how NOSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB. His2SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 53]
# SECRETperformance in both prior to 1956 by his own admission was such that he probably would have been summarily terminated if he had not been the son of the capable, respected Minister of Shipbuilding.If a certain amount of speculation is permitted, the disillusionment of NOSENKO, who lost many personal advantages following the death of his father including a personal automobile, may have actually started soon after the death of his father. That NOSENKO is undisciplined is supported by his admissions relative to his life in the USSR and his behavior both in 1962 in Geneva and for a period of time after his defection in 1964. NOSENKO was addicted to women, liquor, and the material things which can be purchased with money or obtained through influence.A question has been previously raised regarding his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962, particularly his statement that he needed money and would sell "two pieces of information." NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact with the Americans, that he was not emotionally ready to defect, but that he subconsciously believed that if he made a contact he would be making an ultimate commitment from which he could no longer retreat.3# SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 54]
SECRETNOSENKO has stated that he gave considerable thought to the best way to contact the Americans so that he would be believed and not rejected and came to the conclusion that he would offer to sell some information. NOSENKO stated that he thought if he approached the Americans stating he was a "KGB counterintelligence officer who wanted to give information," he would not have been believed and would have been peremptorily rejected. NOSENKO stated he had difficulty deciding how much money to ask for and how to make the approach, but finally decided to do it through David MARK whom the KGB considered was with American Intelligence.The above statements by NOSENKO are not in conflict with the record. NOSENKO did offer to sell "two pieces of information," almost immediately gave more information, made no significant demands for money, and in fact his price for "two pieces of information" was ridiculously low by American standards. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated, as he first stated in 1962, that he had spent excessive amounts of money in one or two riotous evenings. However, NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he could have covered his expenditures by other means without receiving any money from the Americans.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 55]
SECRETNOSENKO has stated that the night before his departure from Geneva to the USSR he gave serious thought to defection but was not emotionally adapted to defect at that time. Following his return to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO, during a period of time, made his final decision to defect at the first opportunity, realising that it meant leaving his wife, children, and other members of his farr.lly in the USSR.Some aspects of the motivation of NOSENKO are obscure and will probably so remain. It would be preferable if an exact detailed chronology of all the factors involved could be prepared or if even certsin obvious factors could be accurately delineated. These are both impossible at this time and probably at any time in the future. What is important at this time is a decision as to whether the motivation of NOSENKO was based on personal ressons with no implications of KGB dispatch. It is considered that the explanation of NOSENKO concerning his motivation is acceptable and that his statement that no one except the Americans was aware of his contacts with the Americans in 1962 or his intent to defect in 1964 is supported by other information of a collateral nature. (See Section III, H.)Attachment:Typed cpy Memo from NOSENKO5SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 56]
Operational Memo # N-4SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri IvanovichThe following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum furnished by Subject on 1 November 1967, following a request on 31 October 1967:What were the motif and the reasons which have led me to the decision to breake with the Soviet Russia? The only definite is an understanding of the situation in the Soviet Russia, the knowledge of the methods of the communist regime, the knowledge of the real foreign and interior policies of the Soviet government and the faith in the rightness of the free world.It was not a decision which was accepted or could be accepted in a month or a year. This decision was slowly growing in me. I think that the beginning was in the studentship.Living with my parents and being in the circles of the parent's and my acquaintances I knew more then there was written in newspapers and periodics and that was propagandized by radio and TV. Working in the Far East and later being in trips in different regions and cities of Russia I found out much better the life and conditions of the life of the people of the Soviet Russia.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 57]
When I worked 11 years in MVD-KGB I understood and found out very many things, details and the real deal of the existing regime, about methods of the work of MGB-MVD-KGB and about their doings, about hundreds of thousands of the people of Russia who were (and still are) considered "politically" dangerous and around whom was (and still is) going an active work of all organs KGB.At the same time when I was several times abroad I have seen personally the so-called "decay" at the West. I have seen in reality how is living people.Several times when I was abroad I was thinking about staying at the West and not returning in Russia, but only one thing was keeping me -- my family.In 1962 in Switzerland I made the acquaintance with the Americans. From my part "the sell of the information" was a real show. I was thinking that they would not believe me otherwise. In that period of the time there was going a big struggle in me to stay abroad or to return home till the last days of living in Geneva and even when I was returning home in Vienna.In 1962-1963 I decided definitely that I did not want and could not live more in the Soviet Russia. In this period of time I have done all my best to go as soon as possible abroad.2SECRET0001057
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 58]
It was not easy to make this decision, it was very difficult to leave the family for ever.And now in spite of everything I do not regret.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 59]
SECRETD. IS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO TO CIACONCERNING KGB OPERATIONS, PERSONALITIES,AND ORGANIZATION REASONABLY COMMENSURATEWITH HIS CLAIMED KGB CAREER?![stamp Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]SECRET 0001059
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 60]
# SECRETD. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerningKGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commen-surate with his claimed KGB career? The conclusion is that the infor-mation furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations, personalities,and organization is more than reasonably commensurate with his claimedcareer in the KGB from mid-March 1953 to his defection in early February1964.In reaching the above conclusion, consideration has been givento his claimed departmental assignments and claimed positions in eachdepartment. Certain allowance has been made for faulty memory withconsideration being given to whether there is any indication of deceptionor whether the failure to recall a particular item of interest can logicallybe attributed to the vagaries of the human mind. There is, of course, noaccurate standard of measurement which would permit a positive deter-mination as to whether inability to recall certain details or events isactually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall all past eventsor could be attributed to willful deception.SECRET![Stamp Excluded from automatic declassification]0001060
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 61]
An effort has been made to determine if there are any particular patterns or areas where NOSENKO has indicated he did not recall specific matters or certain details, and no pattern or specific areas have been noted. NOSENKO, in fact, has an unusually good memory as evidenced by the extensive information furnished by NOSENKO purely from recollection. In addition, there has been no material reluctance on the part of NOSENKO to discuss his entire life, KGB officers he has known, KGB organization and procedures, or other topics of interest. NOSENKO has furnished considerable detail concerning KGB officers whom he has known at various periods in his entire KGB career. He has been very consistent in information furnished and has frequently added certain details which he recalled at a later date.Certain remarks will be made in another section in regard to the volume and scope of information furnished by NOSENKO. This information is not selective, but is an excellent indicator that NOSENKO was assigned to the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, during the claimed periods of time and held the claimed positions. Consideration has been given to his various claimed KGB assignments in evaluating the information furnished in an effort to assess whether his indicated knowledge was commensurate with his claimed position during2SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 62]
a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have held.It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports his claimed positions in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially confirm through collateral sources that NOSENKO served in his claimed positions. Neither has it been possible to obtain from other sources an applicable description of the duties or responsibilities of an individual holding any of the positions NOSENKO claimed to have held after 1958. It is felt there can be no question that NOSENKO served in the capacities of junior case officer, case officer, and senior case officer during 1953 - 1957. As regards the duties and responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Section, Chief of Section, and Deputy Chief of Department, and whether NOSENKO held these various claimed positions, a considerable amount of personal judgment has been necessary. This personal judgment has been made in as judicial a manner as possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in regard to the above is largely dependent upon information from NOSENKO.NOSENKO has compiled detailed diagrams of the actual offices he claims to have occupied and surrounding offices during the four primary periods of time: 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 - 1963. He has prepared specific memoranda concerning his co-officers3SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 63]
and other personnel, and changes of personnel, as well as diagramsof the offices of the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of the SCD during 1956 -1964. This material is internally consistent. Furthermore NOSENKOcould not possibly have known that this detailed information could notimmediately be checked for accuracy, at least in part, with a sourceor another officer who has defected since mid-1964. If these diagramsand memoranda were not relatively correct, NOSENKO, who is quiteastute in matters of counterintelligence, would hardly have voluntarilyprepared the material in such detail. This type of information ispeculiarly adaptable for analysis by a knowledgeable source or by anotherdefector and could, if not relatively correct, permit a rather positive con-clusion that NOSENKO was lying or fabricating information.NOSENKO has furnished quite specific information on KGBoperations during the 1953-1955, 1955-1959, 1960-1961, and 1962 -1963 periods of time. As might be expected, his specific knowledge isless for the 1953 1955 period; but his own personal situation and attitudeuntil 1955-1956, which are mentioned elsewhere, should be givenconsideration. In any event, he has furnished adequate information sothat his claimed assignment during 1953 - 1955 is considered sufficientlysubstantiated even though his actual job períormance undoubtedlydeserved a low rating.SECRET