Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 174]
262. of steel.... In 1960 and 1961 the mike in GLEY-STEEN's office was working, I remember. Reception was good, but there was no secret information. I don't know [about reception from this mike in 1962].Question: What about GRYAZNOV's statement [concerning diminishing production of the Embassy microphones]?NOSENKO: This was only one common phrase. He didn't tell which room. I think he was speaking about the group...Question: How was production from the mikes in HORBALY's office?NOSENKO: Not good, but we did get something which made us suspect he was connected with intelligence. HORBALY.Question: What about the code room and teletype office?NOSENKO: At State, yes. Only always the sounds of machines in 1960 and 1961. Machines only. Three times during these two years maybe somebody said one phrase or one of the guys said several numbers.Question: What about the military [code] area?NOSENKO: The reception was good. He [STORSBERG] seldom spoke. Sometimes he repeated numbers to himself. And sometimes a mechanic of code machines came to him, a military guy, a sergeant [William HURLEY, an Army Warrant Officer]. They said two or three phrases. "Did you check this?" "Yes." "This side good." Et cetera.Question: In all this time that you read all this material, there must have been something that impressed you as extremely valuable.NOSENKO: Extremely valuable--nothing. A little was interesting from FREERS' room. It was given to the special group of GRIBANOV. They were writing special information to the [KGB] Chairman to the [CPSU] Central Committee. There were political questions, for example.26 January 1965: The following is taken from an interrogation protocol signed by NOSENKO: "I regularly reviewed all of the transcripts from microphones in the American Embassy for a period of approximately two years, from January 1960 to January 1962. The following is the only information which I can remember as being important, interesting or operationally useful to the KGB:a. From the microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS, I remember that he occasionally dictated cables about the Embassy's evaluation of certain declarations or acts of the Soviet Government and advised the State Department on positions for negotiations with the USSR. This information
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 175]
263. was of such importance that special reports were written to the Central Committee of the CPSU. How- ever, I cannot remember ary specific incidents or events which these cables reported nor any specific evaluations or recommendations made in these cables.b. Also from the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office, I remember that he dictated fitness reports (kharakteristiki) on about twelve officers in the Embassy. I cannot remember who any of these officers were or any details from the reports. There was nothing in these reports which was interesting or useful to the KGB.c. From the microphone in the Military Attache's office I remember that the Military Attaches regularly discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the targets that they wanted to cover. They also discussed the results of these trips after their return. However, I cannot remember any information about specific trips planned by specific Vilitary Attache personnel or any specific targets that they planned to cover or any specific results from any trip. I do not remember any specific operational activity taken by the organs of the KGB against Military Attaches on trips within the USSR which was based on information obtained from this microphone. There was no interesting, important, or useful information about the personal or professional lives or about the vulnerabilities of anyone in the Military Attache's office (Army, Navy, and Air) obtained from this microphone.d. I remember that from the microphones in the State Department code room occasionally a code clerk would read numbers. These numbers were only of interest to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Cryptology) of the KGB. I do not remember any conversations from this microphone. There was no information from this microphone on any of the code clerks which was interesting, important, or useful to the U.S. Embassy "Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, KGB.During the approximately two years in which I daily reviewed the production from all the microphones in the American Embassy I do not remember any information on any American in the Embassy which was interesting, important, or useful to me as the Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section except the points noted in the above paragraphs.28 January 1965: "In 1960 and 1961 I don't remember any report from the mikes about agents. Never. Nothing about work with agents or work with contacts. But FREERS or WALMSLEY (Minister Counsellor 1954-1956) were dictating interesting opinions of the Embassy concerning the political situation and this material was looked at by the information group and then they were preparing special reports for KHRUSHCHEV."
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 176]
# TOP SEC264. ## Evaluation by OthersTheodore F. HOFFMAN, Army Attache in Moscow from May 1959 to May 1961, has been interviewed concerning the micro- phone discoveries. (In the spring of 1961, Colonel HOFFMAN was succeeded by Colonel URBAN as Army Attache.) While in Moscow, Colonel HOFFMAN occupied room 1008, where the first microphone was found and his statements below relate to matters presumed to be of general and specific interest to the U.S. Embassy Section during the period when NOSENKO claims to have been its Deputy Chief.*"James H. STORSBERG [military code clerk] was dating a foreign national, I believe a secretary in the British Embassy, name not recalled. On one or two occasions, he was needed either to decode or to encode for dispatching a message and was not avail- able. He would be off with his girl friends, and we couldn't find him. He was verbally reprimanded in my office in regard to the two incidents of absenteeism."M/Sgt. Peter BINDER [manager of America House] and I discussed frequently the administrative problems encountered in his operation of the America House. We also discussed the importance of his keeping me informed of the conditions, personality problems, drinking habits, and any other incident of importance that might occur in the America House or the America House club. All discussions were conducted in my office."In May or June 1961, James C. KEYSERS [military code clerk] was found to have allowed one or more male members of...a U.S. ice review entertainment group touring the Bloc countries to spend the night in his room at America House. He was suspected of homosexual activities, and he admitted to me being a participant in homosexual activities. I believe these admissions and my entire discussion with KEYSERS took place in room 9, identified now as the shielded code room, lo- cated on the ninth floor of the Embassy. I gave SAVAGE [his enlisted administrative assistant] verbal instructions in my office to immediately prepare the necessary paper work for removing KEYSERS from the station and instructed him to inform ACSI by cable as to the details of the incident."I remember...a discussion I held with the U.S. Air Attache in his office [where a KGB microphone was located] concerning homosexual activities on the part of two of the Air Force enlisted personnel on station... The discussion in his office concerned the administra- tive procedures necessary in removing the individuals from Station.*Apart from his general duties as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, NOSENKO bore special responsibilities for each of the persons mentioned by Colonel HOFFMAN: He super- vised the KGB officers operating against code clerks and the residents of Aserica House, and he personally participated in approaches to the two code clerke named, STORSBERG and KEYSERS. The STORSBERG and KEYBERS casos are discussed in Part V.8.3.0.TOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 177]
# SECRET265. (Summing up) "To be perfectly frank, I would assume that...some of our modus operandi, some of our targets, some of the results, and all of our personal weaknesses were compromised. This is not a very definite answer; however, it is the best estimate I can make."In its general introduction, the USIB damage report states: "Although there has been no observable indication that the Soviets have acted in any manner to the detriment of the United States based upon information considered possibly compromised, it must be concluded that due to the extensive period of penetration, the cumulative effect has resulted in serious damage to the United States. The Soviets have gained considerable knowledge as to the effectiveness of United States operations within the Soviet Union, particularly the military attache collection program. Soviet knowledge of U.S. emphasis upon certain intelligence collection areas has made it possible for them to identify priority intelligence and probable Soviet targets and thereby permitted them to implement specific counteractions. The Soviets over the years must have amassed considerable information concerning the personal habits, problems, attitudes and weaknesses of personnel assigned to the Embassy which can be used by them for purposes of exploitation at any time of their choosing in the future."The following extract from the USIB damage report concerns the declining value of the production from the microphones in 1962 and 1963.*"The security practices and procedures appear to have followed a pattern from April 1953 to May 1960, at which time the first plastic room was installed. A change occurred in the work habits in that the more senior State Department officers utilized the plastic room for sensitive discussions and dictation. The room could accommodate only a limited portion of the Embassy classified discussions and accordingly, a number of classified discussions were held outside this secure area. In the April 1953-May 1960 period it was an accepted practice for the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission to discuss openly in their offices routine classified operations of the Embassy and to dictate classified documents and telegrams....In September 1962, the second acoustic room was erected for the typing section for the handling of sensitive classified material. From December 1963 to date it was indicated that no classified telegrams have been dictated*As previously indicated, NOSENKO said that in 1962 and 1963 he learned there was almost no production from the Embassy microphones. One reason was the natural decline in efficiency of equipment installed ten years previously; the KGB believed that other reasons were the installation of acoustic rooms in the Embassy and tightened security procedures.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 178]
266. outside of the acoustic rooms.... The military attaches reported that most cables were drafted in longhand or typed by the originator and then turned over to the code clerks for transmission. In certain instances cables were dictated in the offices. There were many discussions in the offices relating to official duties, office routine, proposed travel, personal observations and normal office talk not specifically in themselves considered classified. From 1953 to 1959, sensitive classified matters were discussed in whispers or to the accompaniment of external noises, such as radios and-- street noises.... In 1959 a secure inner room was constructed in the attache section and has since been utilized for classified discussions and debriefings...."
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 180]
# TOP SECRET268. After being told by CIA on 31 January 1965. that a lead cable had been found in the north wing, NOSENKO said: "I personally can assure you that nothing was done in that right wing. Nothing, absolutely nothing. There was nothing done there, so it must have been something else."No extensive counter-audio checks have yet been carried out in the north wing of the U.S. Embassy, and no wired microphones have been found there. Investigation of the microphones in the main section of the Embassy led, however, to the discovery of other Soviet technical equipment installed in the north wing. The USIB damage report stated: "Three-coaxial cables were discovered running parallel to the one-hundred-and-one pair audio cable from the North Annex roof area to the basement of the North Annex... [All three cables were severed by American technicians in 1964.] The cable runs were as follows:"1. The first coaxial cable...terminated under six inches of reinforced concrete in the North Annex attic. The certer conductor was connected to the lead sheath of the 20-pair and of the 30 pair cable which in turn come from the east face of the chancery. The shield of the coaxial cable was unconnected."2. The second coaxial cable...followed the same path as the first coaxial cable. The shield was unterminated. The center conductor was terminated in an insulated metal grill. The grill is located in the upper crust of the North Annex attic floor with the long dimension in juxtaposition to the old common wall between the Chancery and the North Annex. The long dimension is normal to the street in front of the Embassy. The grill is made of one centimeter steel reinforcing rods spot welded into a mesh of 15 cm. (5.9 inches). The overall dimensions of the grill are 14'4" by 4'7". The coaxial cable was connected to one corner of the grill.... The grill is located as close as possible to the old common wall and is about thirty feet below the State Department code room. The grill 'points' in the general direction of the code room as the plane of the grill is parallel to the plane of the ground."3. The third coaxial cable ran along the approximate path of the other coaxial cables to the block of reinforced concrete that contains the grill mentioned above. This coaxial cable terminated in a four-inch piece of fine Lits wire. The shield of the coaxial cable was unterminated..."The damage report added: "The coaxial cables appear to be of recent installation probably prior to Russian evacuation of the North Annex. The outer shields of all the coaxial cables were carefully insulated."The coaxial cables and their terminations were evaluated as follows in the damage report: "All tests that have been performed indicate that the grill work and the lead sheaths [of] the cables 20 and 30 pairs were used as antennas.... No function has been determined for the third coaxial cable which terminated in a short piece of Lits wire.... The location# TOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 181]
# TOP SECRET269. of the grill in such close proximity to the State Department Code Room indicated that an operation was directed against that area.... The lead sheath may have had other uses. The possible uses that have been suggested are listed below. The most likely use is as an antenna although the other possibilities have not been completely discarded."a. Antenna for collection effort directed against code room."b. Antenna for use in connection with some other surveillance device or technique."c. An alarm system to 'protect' the microphone system."d. Part of a hum removal system connected with the microphone installation."e. Not in use."# TOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 182]
270. (iv) Monitoring/Jamming BeamNOSENKO was questioned on 31 January 1964 about the so-called "Moscow Signal." (This is an "S" band signal that has been directed against the top floors--the "secure area"--of the U.S. Embassy since the early 1950's from an apartment building located about 200 feet away. Detailed investigation of the signal has been underway since October 1962, but its exact nature and purpose have not yet been established. Although there is some speculation that the signal is meant for harassment purposes only, the view now generally accepted by U.S. technicians is that it has some intelligence-collection function. No change in the signal has been noted since the discovery and the cutting of the cables referred to in the preceding section.) The interview went as follows:NOSENKO: There is a beam, there is a ray which works against the Embassy. I know.Question: Do you know what it is?NOSENKO: No, I don't. But I know that they work and they put things in, and they listen and they do something, and they...Question: (Interrupting.) Is it successful, is it working?NOSENKO: Yes, they keep working all the time. Perhaps periodically, but it's working. Yes, there is something in the back of the Embassy on this Chaykovskiy Street, and there is something in front of the Embassy, too.Question: And it is for listening in?NOSENKO: No, it's in order to deprive you of working with stationary equipment.Question: What do you mean--so that our receivers wouldn't operate properly?NOSENKO: Look, I'm not a specialist. I don't know the details. I know only that the work is being done in this particular area, in this particular direction. But what they do, I don't really know.Question: But this is not for the purpose of obtaining information?NOSENKO: Let's say you go on the air. So we find out whether you're listening in on some of our communications or something like this.Question: To what extent would you in your [American] Department, in your [U.S. Embassy] Section, know about these technical aspects? Would you have to know it? Would you know the details of these things?
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 183]
# TOP SECRET271. NOSENKO: No. No. This is something that the members of the [KGB] Eighth Directorate [responsible for communications and ciphers] should concern themselves with, the ones who work in OTU. This doesn't concern us in the American Department, in the U.S. Embassy Section.Questioned again later, NOSENKO said that the signal was used to jam U.S. equipment working in the Embassy building. It was this system, he said, which had determined that the Americans had intercepted some GRU agent radio communications. The beam was designed "both to monitor and to jam" transmissions from the Embassy... NOSENKO repeated that "not being a specialist" he was ignorant of the technical nature of the job, or any further details.# TOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 184]
# TOP SECRET276. Because NOSENKO's true name and photographs had been submitted to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in connection with this visa request, NOSENKO added, it was henceforth necessary for him to use his true name for all travel abroad.c. The Cuba TDY (1960)In November 1960, after and as a result of the cancellation of his planned trip to the United States, NOSENKO travelled with a delegation of nickel industry experts to Cuba. He first mentioned this trip on 11 June 1962, during his second meeting with CIA. His account of his activities was given in answer to the question of whether he had ever visited Germany: "I have been in Germany. Yes, yes. I was in Cuba in '61. Well, as NIKOLAYEV. I was there a month and a half. This was when your Embassy was there and we wanted to prepare... Well, I looked it over to see what kind of people you had working there. They asked me to prepare, so to speak, an accounting on how things were going. I arrived there and asked how they were working against you, just on you. Everyone there is working for you. One, two, three, five days went by... I had unlimited funds, any amount. I could go to any restaurant, any show. So that's how it was with me. The fellows reported: 'He [an American] is there.' My mission was to get a general picture. Not for one, two, or three days, but for a month or two, to provide an opinion... I worked pretty cleverly on them. He [the American] would go to a restaurant. They would say to me: 'He is at such-and-such a restaurant and can be observed there.' I would go and observe him in the mirror or somehow. I am sitting in the restaurant, drinking, and that's all. But I would watch him to see how he behaves, etc., etc. That is, I would begin to feel if he has the mark of an intelligence officer. ...But this was not enough for me. I would go again and again. I would see that, yes, he is an intelligence officer... We were asked to share our experiences with them [the Cubans]. They didn't know a thing... They had turned ali intelligence work over to the Communist Party. The Communist Party complicates it."In the final minutes of NOSENKO's last meeting with CIA in 1962 the subject of his trip to Cuba came up again; NOSENKO recalled that he had used the name NOSENKO for his trip to Cuba and that his function there was that of security officer.Question: When did you travel to Cuba?NOSENKO: 1960, November and December 1960.Question: Under the name NIKOLAYEV?NOSENKO: No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO. I will explain how this happened. I was supposed to go to America, sometime in November, with a group from Gosplan, automotive specialists, etc. Data had already been submitted for coordination and, in particular, my name had been given to the American Embassy there [Moscow]. But the American Embassy announced that this delegation could be accepted, but a little later. And my passport had already been issued. My passport had already been signed authorizing travel abroad, but it was a service passport, not a diplomatic one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed toThe U.S. Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January 1961.
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 185]
273. Her job was simply to inform us in case something interesting happens and somebody interesting comes to the library, but practically nobody ever went to the library. Then, what could she tell us about these sergeants that were taking Russian lessons, that she was supposed to be reporting on? In the first place, they were lazy bums. They would go to a lesson once and then miss the next two and then perhaps go again, and again miss one or two." In September 1964 NOSENKO added that LEVINA had never been targetted ayainst any particular individual and had never provided any interesting reports on her American contacts. At the end of 1960 or in the beginning of 1961, NOSENKO said, she was released from the Embassy by Paul SMITH, possibly because she was a little deaf and one had to speak loudly to her to be understood. NOSENKO turned LEVINA over to another officer before he returned to the Tourist Department, and later the British Department was planning to use her in either the British or Canadian Embassies.CIA records show that LEVINA was employed at the Embassy as a librarian from January 1958 through January 1962, when she was released. Paul SMITH was Second Secretary of the Embassy in charge of the Cultural Affairs Section and Publications Procurement Officer from May 1959 until approximately September 1961, when he left Moscow