Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 214]
# TOP SECRET809. D.1. IntroductionWhile in general terms corroborating NOSENKO's claims to service in both the GRU and the KGB, has supplied some details which are incompatible with the statements by NOSENKO on his intelligence career. Although not as prolific a reporter on NOSENKO as has had several topics in common with NOSENKO: POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, CHEREPANOV, SHUBIN, SLESINGER, and the contacts between the GRU officer BOLSHAKOV and Attorney General Robert KENNEDY in 1962. When compared with NOSEKO's information, the reports by on the case of POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV are interlocking:and NOSENKO agree that POPOV was compromised after his return to Moscow from East Berlin in November 1958 and in consequence of KGB surveillance.CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO likewise agree about POPOV'S compromise.concurred with NOSENKO by indicating that CIEREPANOV was a genuine source of American Intelligence, and this statement bylearned some of his details on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY, and and NOSENKO have indicated that this compromise resulted from KGB surveillance of PENKOVSKIY's British contacts in Moscow.Presented below are s remarks about NOSENKO, followed by a review of the topics common to these two sources.2. Statements on NOSENKOWhen discussing NOSENKO for the first time, said on that they were not personally acquainted, but that "various persons" in Moscow (whom he did not identify) had spoken to him about NOSENKO. The statements by and NOSENKO on the latter's background are compared in the following tabulation:|                                                                                                                                                                             | NOSENKO                                                                                                                                                 || --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- || As a young man, NOSENKO attended the GRU's Military-Diplomatic Academy (MDA) and then was in the GRU Information Department--in all, perhaps a year of service in the GRU.* |                                                                                                                                                         ||                                                                                                                                                                             | NOSENKO said his entire service in the GRU, in the years 1950-1953, consisted of duty in the Naval GRU, first in the Far East and then in the Baltic.** |* Until the late 1950's, the course at the MDA, the strategic intelligence school of the GRU, lasted for four years; more recently, the course has been of three years' duration.**During the 1950-1953 period and before, the Naval GRU was separate from the rest of the GRU.TOP SEC
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# TOP SECRET810. NOSENKOA "very ur.disciplined person" while in the GRU and "not very good," NOSEIKO was to have been discharged from the GRU.NOSENKO's father, "a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding," was able to get NOSIKO transferred to the KGB.NOSENKO was "an important boss" in the KCB (directorate or department unknom).stated that NOSENKO gave 'very, very good information" to the nited States, having had "great access" to KGB information which included "all means of KGP coverage of people in Moscow, rophone systems in the embassies, etc." The 3.5. Embassy, continued, had found microphones on the basis of information that NOSENKO had provided.3. Parallels with ROSENKO's Reportinga. The CHEREPANOV Case(1) SummaryOne of the two ways in which has corroborated NOSENKO on the authenticity of CHEREPANOV as a cenuine source of American. Intelliger.ce was to cite information he had learned fromCHEREPANCY had formerly served in the KGB; CHEREPANOV cave some papers to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, which returned them to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); the MFA turned the papers over to the KGB, which traced them by analysis to CHEREPANOV; meanwhile, CHEREFANOV had tried to flee the USSR, but he was captured near the Turkish border and executed. In every major respect, therefore agrees with NOSEIKO's version of the case. When asked whether the CHEREPANOV incident might have been "a trick" by the KGB to embarrass the U.S. Embassy, replied that it was definitely not.The second way in which has certified that CHEREPANOV was a genuine source is indirect. Like NOSEIKO and one of the CHEREPANOV documents, had indicated that KGB surveillance of a U.S. Embassy officer trought about the compromise of POFOV.(ii) RemarksAs stated in Part VIII.B.6., the GHEREPANOV incident was a KGB provocation against the U.S. Embassy, but it is conceivable that statements suggesting the contrary could have been madeTOP SEC
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# TOP SECRET811. both CHERPANOV and NOSENKO on the cause of POPOV's compromise, however, appears to be based on direct involvement, and does not appear to be attributable to sub-sources having provided him with erroneous information; this is discussed further below.b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIYdates on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY are at variance with NOSENKO's and they disagree on whether the KGB knew American Intelligence to be involved in this operation before JACOB of CIA was apprehended at the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962. Both sources stated, however, that surveillance led to the detection of PENKOVSKIY, although again they differ on the person with whom PENKOVSKIY was first seen by the KGB: said this individual was the British businessman WYNNE, while NOSENKO said it was the Englishwoman Mrs. CHISHOLM.According to PENKOVSKIY had been working openly with WYNNE, explaining that he was trying to develop WYNNE, and the KGB learned of their meetings through surveillance.*CIA records show that WYNNE met PENKOVSKIY in Moscow during April-May 1961, May-June 1961, August 1961, and June-July 1962.report that PENKOVSKIY came under suspicion in May 1962 therefore is not consistent with his statement about KGB surveillance of the WYNNE-PENKOVSKIY meetings, nor does this report coincide with. the evidence from WYNNE himself that the KGB was sufficiently suspicious of their meetings to record a conversation they had had 1961 (one year earlier than in the version).NOSENKO dated the PENKOVSKIY compromise at a month or two after he was first seen, but at the time not identified, in contact with Mrs. CHISHOLM in November or December 1961.Whereas NOSENKO said the KGB was unaware of the participation of American Intelligence in the PENKOVSKIY operation until JACOB was detained, reported that while PENKOVSKIY was at a reception in Moscow, he was observed making contact with an American in a lavatory. did not date this event, but CIA records show that it was on 27 August 1962. added that the KGB "invented" the incident at Pushkin Street on 2 November 1962, the month after PENKOVSKIY's arrest, in order to catch the American unloading the dead drop.**PENKOVSKIY was not personally known to him, stated. no other sub-sources were named.* The same statement was made by NOSENKO and in the official KGB document on PENKOVSKIY's compromise.**This is obviously true, although the date of PENKOVSKIY's arrest may have been more than a month before.TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET012. c. The Compromise of POPOV(i) IntroductionOf all the sources available to American Intelligence, is the best placed to report on the compromise of POPOV:information agrees with that provided by NOSENKO and CHEREFANOV, as well as that in the 18 September 1959 message from POPOV to CIA (believed to have been dictated by the KGB). These four sources have indicated that the compromise resulted from KG3 surveillance of a U.S. Embassy official following the recall of POPOV in November 1958. however, has not precisely dated the incident (dated by inference by the others at 21 January 1959), has associated it with an American Intelligence dead drop for POPOV (whereas the others have said it was CIA'S mailing of a letter to POPOV), and has not the CIA officer involved ((George WINTERS). The evidence from like that from NOSENKO, CHEREPANOV, and the POPOV message, conflicts with that from COLITSYN whose state-ments on the compromise of FOPOV are supported by analysis of events in 1957 and 1958 on which POPOV reported (sc: Pages 663-665).(ii) Detailsreported on the POPOV com-POPOV's correspondence with his Austrian girlfriend appears to have been the prelude to the POPOV compromise: PCFOV, said had rade a "very serious mistake" by using an accommodation address supplied by American Intelligence to receive mail from a girlfriend in Austria."In score fashion" this came to the attention of the Austrian police, and it was determined that she had been sending mail to a Soviet officer in Berlin. The Austrian police notified the Soviets, and eventually FOFOV was confronted by the chief of his GRU component in Berlin.*** GRU Headquarters was notified, POPOV was recalled* In his fire reference to POPOV's compromise that POPOV made the mistake of providing information traceable to himself. No sub-source for this remark was given and since then has not resolved the discrepancy between this version and the other one treated at length here.** CIA did not supply POPOV with an accommodation address, but he did secretly correspond with KOCHANEK.went to the Austrian police on 25 August 1958 with information that included the identification of POPOV as a Soviet Intelligence officer. POPOV's superior confronted him on 4 November 1958 about KOCHANEK and received from him an admission to having had some correspondence with her concern-ing his search for operational leads: the superior told POPOV that the Soviets believed "she was working for someone" and that "possibly she is the cause" of the Berlin unit's opera-tional difficulties. POPOV was recalled to Moscow on 17 Nov-ember 1958 ostersibly for a week's TDY to discuss the case of an American whom he was developing under CIA aegis. He did not return to Berlin.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET814. (iii) Sub-sourcing bythat he had learned thesedetails about the compromise of POPOV from a conversationwho conducted some of the in-vestigation of POPOV Because at the time he was aThe same sub-source was cited byinformation he supplied CIA in(iv) Remarksreported, inaccurately, that American Intelligencegave to an accommodation address in Berlin, that a dead dropwas used in the Moscow phase of the operation, and that the KGBdoubled POPOV for a year and one-half before terminating the case.Each of those incorrect items came tosince participated in the investigation ofPOPOV, presumably he would have recognized them to be untrue. Oneexplanation for the inaccuracies might be thatprecisely what he had been told, but deliberately mis-informed him. There is, however, no evident reason whywould have done this. Another explanation might be thatmisunderstood his sub-source, or in relaying the information togarbledthe details. This would mean that was less than fullyattentive to details on a personal acquaintance who had gainednotoriety, details which he was told at a time when he was in aposition comparable to POPOV's in contact with Intelligence.None of these explanations seemsentirely satisfactory, and the answer may lie elsewhere.has been inconsistent about the degree of suspicionsurrounding POPOV when he was recalled to Moscow in November 1958in connection with his correspondence withOn one hand,in 1962 indicated that the KGB surveillance of the U.S.Embassy officer was coincidental with the separate investigationof POPOV's relationship with this Austrian woman. On the otherhand, implied that as a result of the suspicionof POPOV in Berlin, there was interest in POPOV's future contactsin Moscow, an interest which would be covered by the KGB's sur-veillance of U.S. Embassy employees.*However, in another version said that as soon as theIllegals reported their compromise in January 1958, POPOVimmediately fell under suspicion. The conflict betweenstatements has not been resolved.TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET815. d. SHUTIN, SLESINGER, and BOLSHAKOVIn three instances 964 NOSEIKO confirmed reports made by the ideification of SHUBIN as a GRU agent, the Soviets' suspicions that SLESINGER was in contact with the FBI, and the status of FOLSHAKOV as a GRU officer.SHUBIN was previously known to have been associated with two GRU Illegals in the United States during the 1940's, but independent of NOSENKO and there is no verification of his having more recently been an agent of the GRU.POLSHAKOV, the only claimed mutual acquaintance of and NOSENKO, has not been named as a GRU officer by any other source, nor has he been observed in meetings with GRU agents. Both and NOSENKO spoke of POLSHAKOV's having met Attorney General Robert KENNEDY in 1962. NOSEIKO added that, in initiating the contact, the Attorney General knew BOLSHAKOV to be a "military intelligence officer," but this report has not been corroborated.**4. Comments onconfirmation that NOSEIKO is a genuine KGB officer-defector is comprised of hearsay evidence. and hence the conclusion that OSENKO was dispatched by the KGB would not necessarily bring bona fides into question: much would depend upon sub-sources, as yet unidentified.and NOSENKO are mutually supporting on the compromise of POPOV, a man and both have authenticated the validity of a CHERE-PANOV document which concerned the POPOV compromise and which was prepared by the KGB for transmittal to American Intelligence. In addition, and NOSENKO support one another about the PENKOV-SKIY compromise, about the contact between BOLSHAKOV and Robert KENNEDY, and about SHUBIN and Their information on BOLSHAKOV and SHUBIN is unique; on SLESINGER it is corroborated by actions taken by the KGB, as reported by SLESINGER; on POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV it is confirmed by KGB controlled sources.With the exception of his details on POPOV's reporting on NOSENKO and on common topics can be explained, individually, by misinformation received and innocently passed along. These items taken together, however, in the light state-ments on the compromise of POPOV (which conflict with GOLITSYN'S reporting and analytical evidence) are indications that is controlled by the KGB.**If Robert KENNEDY indeed knew BOLSHAKOV to be a GRU officer, the question remains as to how NOSENKO was aware of the fact, since was the only source to have made this identification before the time when KENNEDY and BOLSHAKOV met.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET821. F.1. Introductioncounterintelligence production has been extremely limited. For the most part she has provided only superficial reports, generally only in response to questioning and frequently citing her own lack of access to information of value. Her professed personal involvement in, and dramatic accounts of, certain situations on which ROSENKO's reporting is demonstrably false is therefore noteworthy in the context of her total performance. 's reporting on NOSENKO, despite vagueness and contradictions, has the net effect of supporting his bona fides and affirming the importance of the information he has reported. Her accounts of the CHEREPANOV case emphasized the depth of his treason and the retribution of the XGD--themes which dominate the NOSENKO accountHer reports on the compromise of PENKOVSKIY, while differing markedly from ROSENKO's in basis, scope, and detail, confirmed almost to the month NOSENKO'S dating of the compromise. Her confessed participation as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, despite her repeated claims to know nothing of importance concerning its operations, has placed her in NOSEIKO'S milieu, and the KGB officers who figured in her reporting are (with two exceptions) personalities who have previously been identified as KGB officers only by NOSE:KO.2. NOSENKO'S Background and Careerhas claimed no first-hand or authoritative knowledge of NOSENKO, reporting at various times that she had heard gossip, had heard about him from her KGB friend SVIRIN (who she believed only "knew about" NOSEIKO, i.e. did not know him personally), or had heard about him from "someone from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not SVIRIN.". She has reported fragments on NOSENKO's background: his father's position, his mother's ethnic background, and NOSEIKO's non-KGB status. She initially said that NOSENKO's father was a general, later said she was not sure of that, and still later amended her description to "general or minister," adding that he was Ukrainian - thus approaching an accurate statement only after several conversations about him. Her consistent statement that NOSENKO's mother was Jewish and involved in black market activities has not been elsewhere reported, and her statement that NOSENKO was a civilian, rather than a KGB officer, contradicts his own account and that of other sources who have confirmed his KGB status.sourcing of her limited information on NOSEIKO to her KGB friend SVIRIN nevertheless demonstrates at least potential access to some information about NOSENKO. (SVIRIN was identified by NOSENKO as an officer of the Third Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, since 1963, and before that of the Third Department of the Directorate of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, where he participated in and received an award for his part in the investigation of PENKOVSKIY.)TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET823. by NCSEKO); and she described the documents which he turned over to the Americans as having come from the Ministry of Foreign Trade. She stated, therefore, rather than demonstrated, the point that "these were such important documents, important enough that...he was shot."During her second account of the CHEREPANOV affair sourced her information differently and added first-hand details which she had previously disclaimed having. She said that "In two days this man was arrested...In two months he was shot." This is also at variance with NOSEIKO's account of a KGB investiga- tion of up to 20 or 25 days, followed by the KGB officer's visit to CHEREPAOV on 8 December 1963, CHEREPAOV's flight, and a seven- day search for him before his arrest.b. The Compromise of PENKOVSKIYClosely conforming in this respect to NOSENKO's account of PENKOVSKIY'S compromise, placed the date of initial suspicion of PENKOVSKIY at about October or November 1961. Her statements of the basis for this suspicion, however, differ completely from the reasons advanced by NOSEKO (and other sources). Her account is vague, in consonance with her claimed lack of any first-hand contemporary knowledge of the investigation leading to his arrest, and is colored by her expressed personal dislike for PENKOVSKIY the man and by the professional misfortunes of her husband which resulted from PENKOVSKIY's arrest. cited her KGB friend SVIRIN as the source of some of her information, as the source of the indirect warning to her husband to stay away from PENKOVSKIY, and as someone who knew about PENKOVSKIY's trial and had been somehow associated with the investigation - thus confirming NOSEIKO on SVIRIN's participation in the PENKOVSKIY investigation.c. Reports on KGB Personnelhas named relatively few KGB officers who have figured in her career as a KGB agent or about whom she could report any substance. Of her KGB handlers:- CIA has been unable to identify one, Gennadiy Fedor- ovich, whose last name she did not know, her handler while she worked at the Embassy of Nepal in 1964. NOSENKO has not referred to operations against this Embassy.- Two KGB handlers were assigned to in Leningrad - V. I. DEMIDOV and Georgiy PCHELIN. Both of these officers had previously been identified by NOSENKO as officers of the Leningrad KGB and have not been identified by any other source. They were two of the total of four Leningrad KGB officers named by NOSENKO.- Her KGB handler while she was employed by a Canadian correspondent in Moscow was Vladimir Ivanovich KOSTYRYA. Only NOSENKO has identified KOSTYRYA as the KGB officer who had been in the United States under the name Vladimir Viktorovich VLADIMIROV: NOSENKO considered this, as he said in 1965, is most important identification among KGB per- sonnel.KOSTYRYA was in the U.S. under Inturist cover: relationship with him was not related to her earlier Inturist work, however, but her connection with a foreign corres- pondent, which was KOSTYRYA's responsibility after his re- turn to Moscow.
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# TOP SECRET824. Of the four other KGB officers on whom  has reported in any depth, three were previously identified by KOSEKO and only ly NOSERKO:- V.G. SVIRIN, her KGB friend, is nubiquitous figure in much of her reporting on other subjects and in her account of her personal life, as well as her primary candidate for a Western recruitment approach. STIRIN had previously been identified by NOSENKO) es a KGB officer of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, previously involved in the PENKOVSKIY investigation (both of which assignments as confirmed).- In connection with SVIRIN, recounted an incident in which a KGB officer whom she described in deroga-tory terms, Valentin MOZERIK, had narrowly escaped dismissal as a result of a drunken brawl with a militiaman. MUZEYNIK had not only survived, however, but continued to bear a higher KGB rank than his former friend, colleague, and sub-crdinate, SVIRIN. NOSZIKO said MUZEYNIX was an officer of the Directorate of the KGB Second Chief Directorate.- Vadim BIRYUKOV was identified by  as the KGB officer under Novosti cover assigned to report on the interview in August 1966 of .NOSEIKO had previously given information concerning BIRUKOV, a KGB officer of the Tenth Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, targetted against foreign correspondents.5. RemarksThere is confusion in s sub-sourcing for her information on NOSENKO and inconsistency in her statements that on one hard, he was a civilian but on the other, he was aware of microphones in the U.S. Embassy. These facts indicate that if she was briefed by the KCB to report to American Intelligence on 305- as inadequately prepared. Otherwise, however,  has personally supported the bona fides of NOSENKC by offering direct confirmation of the bona fides of CHEREPANOV, by corroborating NOSEIKO's details on the PENKOVSKIY compromise, and by verifying his identification of KGB Second Chief Director-ate personalities.Note: Aside from her support of NOSENKO and CHEREFANOV, there are many aspects of the case which in-dependently led CIA and other Western services to conclude that she is a KGB-dispatched agent. Some of these aspects are as follows:- The circumstances of her claimed relationship with the KGB contradict KGB practice as known from other sources.- description of her husband's recall from Stockholm as his punishment for having previously worked as a GRU colleague of PENKOVSKIY in the GKNNR fit neither the treatment of other GRU officers whom PENKOV-SKIY also identified nor the logic of the situation: Her husband was sent to Stockholm after PENKOVSKIY was un-covered and even after he was arrested. (That the briefTOP SECRET