Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 171]
ABIDIAN has now stated that he arrived in Moscow in March 1960 with the intention that he would not employ a Soviet maid. Approximately three months later his close association began with Myra KEMMER, a Department of State employee; this association continued until she left Moscow in mid-1961. KEMMER had Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid and through mutual agreement with KEMMER, FEDOROVICH became the part-time maid for ABIDIAN beginning sometime in the fall of 1960. From that time on FEDOROVICH, according to ABIDIAN, had uncontrolled access to his living quarters since she had a key to permit entry for cleaning purposes.ABIDIAN did not mail any operational letters within the Soviet Union until after March 1961 and therefore in view of the above, there is no reason to contradict the statement of NOSENKO that the three *when mailed?* operational letters intercepted by the KGB and mailed by ABIDIAN all showed evidence of Metka. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO in June 1962 warned CIA about the KGB use of Metka for spotting internal letter mailings by United States Embassy personnel.ABIDIAN, according to NOSENKO, was the subject of a 24-hour surveillance with the Seventh Directorate assigning a specific surveillance brigade to cover ABIDIAN. The actual surveillance of ABIDIAN was the responsibility of the Seventh Directorate which submitted reports to the![image of numbers]SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 172]
First Section, First Department. NOSENKO, as the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN, was expected to review these reports and give any appropriate guidance or direction to the Seventh Directorate, but. under the KGB organization he would not participate in the surveillance activities of the Seventh. Directorate. NOSENKO stated that had surveillance or aunt information disclosed any personal weaknesses c ABIDIAN, KGB would have attempted to exploit them. No personal weaknesses were disciosed, according to NOSENKO, and the pattern of coverage to see if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV" remained unchanged..Pages 210 - 212 of the previous summary notes that NOSENKO was unaware of countries visited by ABIDIAN during trips outside the USSR and that no effort was made by NOSENKO through the FCD to find out such information. According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that the FCD "would not accept" such a request for "operational action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow." The surveillance which would have been required on the part of the FCD to achieve any sort of reasonable coverage of ABDIAN abroad would certainly have placed a severe burden on the FCD. Further, NOSENKO contends that the results which might reasonably be expected would be of little or no practical value to the SCD.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 173]
Pages 216 - 221 of the previous summary contain a summary on the matter of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site which John ABIDIAN visited on 30 December 1961. It should be noted that a current review of the 1964 - 1966 interrogations of NOSENKO on this matter indicates they were unable to clarify the matter and did much to confuse the issue.Current interviews, as indicated above, have not fully resolved the problems, but have assisted in at least minimizing the areas of conflict or confusion. It is apparent that NOSENKO was not in the First Section, First Department, for any material period of time after 30 December 1961. It is also clear that he either read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop site or was fully briefed on the details of the visit. NOSENKO insists that he read the surveillance report at the time or shortly after the event. There is no reason to question his assertion that he read the report since his accurate knowledge of the route of ABIDIAN and his actions in connection with the visit support this claim. However, his consistent inability on his own to approximate the date of the visit or relateit to his change of assignments raises a question regarding when he actually read the report.NOSENKO claims that the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop area led to the KGB setting up a stationary surveillance post000117111SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 174]
near the site which was maimained for three months and that he was informed on a daily basis of the cons of this stake out (always negative). To take this statement literally would raiwa further problem since, in addition to his transfer from the First Department to the Seventh Department as of early January 1962, NOSENKO went to Geneva in mid-March 1962.It is conceivable that, as he himself now maintains, he was kept advised of developments or nondevelopments following the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street building by Veniamin KOZLOV, a Chief of Department in the Seventh Directorate who had been known to NOSENKO since 1953, or Viadislav KOVSHUK or Gennadiy GRYAZNOV, Chief and Deputy Chief respectively of the First Section, First Department. Even so, however, his failure to call our attention to this matter in June 1962 would seem to require explanation, especially in view of the fact that he did warn us about the danger of operational letter mailings by ABIDIAN -- a warning which would appear clearly to have been derived from KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the spring-summer of 1961.It is to be noted that during the June 1962 meetings NOSENKO was not specifically asked for any additional information regarding any known or suspected intelligence activities of ABIDIAN. Beyond
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 175]
this, NOSENKO himself has stated that it did not occur to him to tellus because the stake out had long since been dropped, it had revealednothing suspicious on the part of ABIDIAN or anyone else, and mereforehe had regarded it as insignificant.This is not implausible. Another possible explanation, however,derived from the already noted inability of NOSENKO to pin down a datefor the visit, is that he learned of the stationary surveillance post if notof the visit itself after his meetings with us in June 1962. It should benoted in this context that with the public exposure of the PENKOVSKIYcase in the fall of 1962, the Pushkin Street deaddrop undoubtedly becamethe subject of widespread interest within the KGB.That NOSENKO is at a minimum still confused about the visitof ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop and its consequences is clearfrom the record. While it is entirely possible that NOSENKO has con-sciously exaggerated his involvement with the visit and its aftermath,it is also possible that the evident distortions of his accounts of theaffair derive from honest confusion.Current interviews and a check of the tapes of previous inter-views leave no doubt that NOSENKO was aware of the visits of ABIDIANto the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March 1961. These visits byABIDIAN were for cover purposes and preceded his start of operational
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 176]
letter mailing. NOSENKO consistently relates, and has furnished drawings which substantiate, that visits of ABIDIAN to a commission shop, a next-door art shop, and a local post office in the area were known to and considered suspicious by the KGB. The entrance to the art shop, according to NOSENKO, was so situated as to be an ideal place for picking up or placing a deaddrop, and a mobile surveillance was placed on the art shop for a period of time following the visit of ABIDIAN. Official records confirm the visits of ABIDIAN at the time and to the buildings described by NOSENKO.Pages 216 - 220 of the previous summary contain no reference to the specific statements of NOSENKO relative to KGB interest in the visits of ABIDIAN to the upper Gorkiy Street area. It is also clear from a review of certain transcripts of previous interrogations that no differentiation was made concerning his statements relative to KGB coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March 1961 and his statements concerning his knowledge of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site after the visit of ABIDIAN to that site (30 December 1961).It is impossible at this time to state that a detailed debriefing of NOSENKO concerning ABIDIAN prior to hostile interrogation would have permitted the clarification of all issues including the above, but
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 177]
There is no doubt that the hostile interrogation has confused matters to the point where complete clarification appears impossible. In any event, one thing is clear -- since he may well have transferred out of the First Section, First Department, by 31 December 1961 and most certainly had transferred by early January 1962, the fact that NOSENKO has supplied confused information regarding the Pushkin Street affair cannot be used to impugn his claim to having been case officer for ABIDIAN from early 1960 until late 1961. Furthermore, the fact that NOSENKO is not able to properly date the visit of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, is in no way indicative of KGB dispatch. If dispatched, NOSENKO presumably would have had the date right.In regard to (b), the responsibility of NOSENKO for preliminary review of reports from OTC (Technical Unit of KGB) of "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy, the previous conclusion was that his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB monitoring reports was not sustained.It is not felt that the previous conclusion made sufficient allowance for the explanation of NOSENKO of what the responsibility actually entailed. Information from microphones in the United States Embassy, according to NOSENKO, was handled very specially. Telephone intercepts were given to a designated officer for distribution to the appropriate case officer, but microphone reports, to prevent wide dissemination even within the First Section, were brought daily to the Deputy Chief or in his absence to the Chief and then were distributed to the individual responsible15
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 178]
case officer. In this way, according to NOSENKO, no one below the rank of Deputy Chie: was aware of the total microphone "take" from the United States Embassy as received by the section.As regards political type information, and according to NOSENKO this was considered the most important by the XGB and CTU, NOSENKO had no responsibility for review or ultimate dissemination of the information to the Chief, SCD, de Cairman, 308, or the Central Committee since this was the responsibility of a unit in the office of the Chief, SCD.NOSENKO has also stated that the output from certain of the working microphones was "dying" and that OTU in addition to having reception difficulties was also having difficulty obtaining a sufficient number of qualified monitor-translators. As a result, according to NOSENKO, OTU was not providing complete verbatim transcripts from most microphones, but actually was reporting only those portions which OTU considered pertinent. Despite the fact that full transcripts of all conversations in areas covered by active microphones would have been of interest to responsible officers of the First Section, OTU, according to NOSENKO, did not provide full transcripts and when asked to provide more gave the routine answer of, "we could do so if we had more personnel." According to NOSENKO, the tapes were maintained at OTU and could not be furnished to the First Section. An officer of the16SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 179]
First Section could listen to a particular tape but he had to go to OTU to do so and as a result this was done very infrequently.It is believed that any presumption that the KGB recovered or transcribed all conversations even in the thirteen areas listed by NOSENKO as having active microphones is not reasonable or even realistic. It is also unrealistic to presume that any conversation conducted within reasonable distance of an active microphone was not compromised to the KGB. The latter is a factor to be considered in any damage assessment; it is not an appropriate basis for a presumption that NOSENKO had to have been aware of this or this just because someone had a conversation in one of the rooms in which there was an active microphone and NOSENKO has claimed he reviewed the "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy.It is apparent that there are a number of imponderable factors to be considered such as whether the conversation could be picked up by the microphone, whether the monitor could recover sufficient portions of the conversation to understand the gist of what was being said, and even if he did, whether he would consider it of sufficient importance or interest to include in his report in verbatim or in summary form.In regard to (c), the claim of NOSENKO that he was responsible for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy,
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 180]
it is not considered that there is in adequate basis for questioning this claim.The previous summary contained a conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was custodian of the Embassy security file was an invention. The basis for this conclusion was not then adequate and current interviews with NOSENKO have further indicated that his claim on this point should be accepted.In regard to (d), the claim of NOSENKO that he acted in piace of KOVSHUK, the Chief of First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent, it is considered that this claim is acceptable providing it is not converted into a presumption that therefore NOSENKO knew everything that KOVSHUK knew.NOSENKO claims that he was not responsible for the direct supervision of approximately two-thirds of the officers in the First Section. These officers normally reported directly to KOVSHUK and would only report to NOSENKO when KOVSHUK was absent. As an example of this, NOSENKO has shown a lack of detailed knowledge of the work against diplomatic personnel in the United States Embassy. He has stated he is sure he would have known of anything "important" such as a recruitment or attempted recruitment, but he does not claim to have reviewed all the reports of the various officers of the First18SECRET0001178
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 181]
Section. His recognition of the més o individuals at the UnitedStates Embassy in 1960 - 1961 and even their assignments seemsadequate.The previous criticism that NOSENKO knew only the namesof most agents or operative contacts who were part of the KGB networkamong the indigenous employees of the American Embassy, did Lorecognize their photographs, and did not give sufficient details con-cerning their specific activities is considered to be an unwarrantedcriticism. NOSENKO indicates that in general the handling of agentsin the First Section was the responsibility of individual case officers.It is also apparent that the philosophy in the KGB was to maintaina single handler-agent relationship as much as possible, and that respon-sibility for an agent would not be transferred merely because the agenthad access to a target who was the responsibility of a case officer otherthan the handler of the agent. This apparent philosophy is of particularinterest in connection with NOSENKO, who even though he was the caseofficer responsible for ABIDIAN and together with KOSOLAPOV andGRYAZNOV worked actively against code clerks, did not have an agentnetwork which he specifically handled. Mere use of an agent for report-ing' on or a specific activity against a particular target was normally19SECRET0001179
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 182]
not an adequate reason to transfer responsibility for the agent and it appears the KGB considers that the continuation of an established handler-agent relationship has considerable merit.NOSENKO, as previously indicated, has stated that he had the responsibility for work against code clerks at the United States Embassy during 1960 - 1961. Except for the period of time that he claims responsibility for supervision of work against the Service Attaches in cariy 1960, he was, according to NOSENKO, responsible for supervision of the work of Vadim A. KOSOLAPOV, Gennadiy . GRYAZNOV, Vladimir DEMKIN and Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY.GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV worked only against code clerks and therefore were supervised solely by NOSENKO, whereas DEMKIN and GROMAKOVSKIY, who handied indigenous agents in American House, came under the supervision of NOSENKO only in those cases where these agents were directed against code clerks.It is quite clear that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning the code clerks, code machine mechanics and pouch clerks who, according to NOSENKO, were included in his targets in 1960-1961, was much greater than his knowledge of any other category of American employees at the United States Embassy during this period except for ABIDIAN.000118020SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 183]
The following comments are concerned with several specificcases in which, according to NOSENKO, there was an approach by theKGB, interesting information was developed, or in which at least aconsiderable amount of specific work was carried out by NOSENKO,KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV.The first case, [James STORSBERG] is covered on pages 166 -177 of the previous summary. Little additional comment is considerednecessary on this case since there does not appear to be any adequatereason to question the general story of NOSENKO in regard to the KGBeffort against [STORSBERG] 06It is recognized and mentioned elsewhere that NOSENKO in 1962exaggerated his personal involvement in the case, particularly in placinghimself as present with GRIBANOV when the recruitment pitch was madeto[STORSBERG] NOSENKO has retracted this particular claim, butthere is no reason to doubt that he was engaged for approximately a yearin the planning and activities which preceded the unsuccessful approachto[STORSBERG].An issue was previously made over the timing of the approachto[STORSBERG] since [STORSBERG] dated this as October 1961, NOSENKOhas indicated about June 1961, and information from GOLITSYN, basedon remarks by KOVSHUK to him, had been interpreted as indicating the
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 184]
approach occurred at the "end of 1960."NOSENKO, during current interviews, has given an acceptable account of the STORSBERG case. He has stated that he cannot precisely date the approach to STORSBERG but that it occurred before the approach at the Moscow airport to James KEYSER (June 16, 1961) because otherwise no action would have been taken against KEYSER.When recently reinterviewed, STORSBERG continued to maintain that the approach occurred in October 1961, but the internal evidence in his description of collateral events makes it clear that the approach had to have taken place considerably earlier.Joseph MORONE another code clerk at the United States Embassy, who will be the subject of further discussion below, has been interviewed on the basis of statements by STORSBERG that MORONE was present in American House the night of the approach. Analysis of the statements of MORONE clearly indicates that the events STORSBERG describes could not have taken place later than the period February to early May 1961.The best estimate possible at this time is that the approach to STORSBERG occurred in March - April 1961, which is quite compatible with the approximate dating of the approach by NOSENKO. In the face of this approximation of the date of the approach to STORSBERG, it is22SECRET12/BR
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 185]
believed reasonable to assume that the remarks of KOVSHUK toGOLITSYN in January 1961, as related by GOLITSYN concerninga successful operation against a [military code clerk] in Moscow at theend of 1960, referred to [STORSBERG] and that KOVSHUK either wasreferring to a compromise phase of the operation rather than the actualapproach, or was prematurely claiming anticipated success.Pages 178 - 181 of the previous summary contain informationin regard to the attempted defection operation against [James KEYSERS]As of this time, it is considered that there are no discrepancies betweenrecord information and information from NOSENKO which in any wayreflect against NOSENKO. [KEYSERS] did not recognize a photographof NOSENKO as the Soviet who made a fast approach to him at the air-port, but this does not provide a valid reason to disbelieve the statementof NOSENKO that it was he who tried to talk to [KEYSERS].There are certain statements relative to the [KEYSERS] case asset forth in the previous summary which require specific comment.(a) The statement is made that no KGB officerdirectly connected with the case could regard [KEYSERS]as the replacement for [STORSBERG]. In fact, [KEYSERS]actually was being trained by [STORSBERG] as a substitute,not a replacement, even though his primary assignment23SECRET000118310/BR
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 186]
was not that of a code clerk. NOSENKO has during current interviews related how he received the impression from the OTU reports of conversations picked up by the microphone in the Military code room at the United States Embassy that KEYSERSeither was not a code clerk or had been away from code work for a considerable period of time. In any event, the impression of NOSENKO was that STORSBERG was having a difficult time explaining the particular work to KEYSERS! The coservations of NOSENKO are of interest since KEYSERS actually had not been a code clerk but, as noted, was being trained by STORSBERG so that he could act as a substitute. Under the circumstances, it is considered quite logical that the KGB would assume at the time that KEYSERS was to be the eventual replacement of STORSBERG.(b) The previous summary stated that, "prior to his departure from Moscow, KEYSERS acknowledged to his supervisors Colonel URBAN his homosexual tendencies and he admitted involvement in three homosexual incidents, all at the American House" (page 179).24SECRET000118491BR
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 187]
Contrary to this assertion, a review of the official memorandum, dated 16 June 1961, of Colonel 06 URBAN reflects that KEYSERS was not informed by Colonel URBAN of the "allegations of homosexuality in order not to aggravate the possibility of a rash act by him while within the Soviet Union."(c) On page 236 of the previous summary, the statement is made that, "In the single case in which he NOSENKO asserted that he relied on information pro-cured from microphones KEYSERS failure to report receipt of the defection invitation) he was in error."While the official record shows that KEYSERS 06 did indeed report receipt of the defection letter to Colonel 06 URBAN in the office of Colonel URBAN, it should be noted that this occurred less than one hour before KEYSERS left the Embassy for the airport. NOSENKO has stated that in the absence of information to the contrary from microphone and telephone taps, the KGB had concluded that KEYSERS had not reported receipt of the defection letter and therefore had decided to approach KEYSERS at the airport. In view of the short time between KEYSERS report of receipt.25SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 188]
of the letter and his departure from Moscow, it would have been remarkable if the XCD earned this information in time to call off the airport approach. The account of NOSENKO in the [KEYS] matter therefore is considered completely credible.Pages 181 - 184 of the previous summary contain information in regard to Matthew [Zujus] who succeeded James STORSBERG having arrived in Moscow in September 1961. GRYAZNOV was the responsible case officer for [ZUJUS] according to NOSENKO.The previous summary states (page 183) that [ZUJUS] during a routine debriefing, confirmed an Embassy report that in the summer of 1962 he had been intimate with an Austrian woman, "LILLIAN," who visited the American House with someone from the United Arab Republic. "LILLIAN" was interviewed by the American House manager and she claimed to be from Vienna but traveling with her employer, a Czech. Further inquiry revealed that no Austrian passport had been issued to "LILLIAN," and she was later asked for her passport. "LILLIAN" replied that she had forgotten it, then left, and did not return.The previous summary stated that the above incident had been described by NOSENKO but in connection with attempts to entrap Joseph [MORONE] in 1960, not [ZUJUS] in 1962.