Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 251]
SECRETANNEX C - THE CHEREPANOV PAPERS> [Figure: A blurry image of an official stamp.]SECRET0001249
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 252]
SECRETANNEX CTHE CHEREPANOV PAPERSPages 309 - 316 of the previous sun...mary contain a description of the Cherepanov Papers, and how Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV passed a package of documents to an American tourist in Moscow in early November 1963. The conclusion, however, was that the assertions of NOSENKO with respect to the CHEREPANOV case were not material to the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, in late 1963.The definite relationship of the Cherepanov Papers to the bona fides of NOSENKO cannot be ignored and must be given specific consić-eration. If CHEREPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the papers to the American tourist, or if the papers contain "deception information," the bona fides of NOSENKO are subject to very serious question.NOSENKO had personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV who was, according to NOSENKO, an officer in the First Section, First Department,SECRET![Excluded from automatic declassification]0001250
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 253]
during 1960-mid-1961 when he was forced into retirement from the KGB. During the above period of time, NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief, First Section, although he does not claim to have had a direct supervisory responsibility over CHEREPANOV except in the absence of the Chief of Section, Vladislav KOVSHUK, NOSENKO also claims to have participated in the hunt for CHEREPANOV in December 1963.Consideration has previously been given to the theory that the Cherepanov Papers were passed to Americans by the KGB through CHEREPANOV to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. This theory seems to have little credibility since the papers contain no information which would even support the claim of NOSENKO that he was in the First Section, First Department, 1960-1961. The papers also contain no information which would indicate there was even a Deputy Chief of the First Section during 1958,-1960.Statements by NOSENKO are emphatic that CHEREPANOV was not under KGB control, that he passed the papers which it later developed he had taken from the First Section prior to his retirement because he was disgruntled with his treatment by the KGB, and that the action by CHEREPANOV caused consternation in the KGB.There is no collateral evidence which contradicts any of the statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPANOV. Further, there is0001251SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 254]
nothing in either the form or substance of the papers which provides a basis for suspicion as to their authenticity. In addition, the form and substance of the papers are in keeping with the description by NOSENKO of the day-to-day operation of the First Section, First Department.During current interviews, the CHEREPANOV case has been covered in detail with NOSENKO. The Cherepanov Papers, which were originally shown to NOSENKO in 1964 after his defection, have also been covered in detail on a separate item-by-item basis. Although NOSENKO does not claim to have specifically seen any particular item prior to 1964, his statements in regard to the various handwritings, types of notes, and draft memoranda leave no doubt that NOSENKO was very familiar with personnel in the First Section, First Department, and with First Department procedures.Certain additional research has been conducted in regard to the papers and a detailed analysis will be prepared at a later date. It should be noted that a considerable amount of personal judgment has been necessary in making an assessment of the Cherepanov Papers since there are no exemplars with which to compare any of the material.However, based on information developed thus far, and there is no reason to believe additional work will alter the conclusion, there is not an adequate basis for an opinion that CHEREPANOV was under KGB control, that the Cherepanov Papers contain "deceptive information."
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 255]
or that the papers were other than the collection of material by a disgruntled employee which he very carefully selected or accumulated, the removal of which would only have constituted a minimal risk to CHEREPANOV.The entire Cherepanov Papers have been reviewed to determine if there is any information which could be considered "deceptive inmor- mation" either by direct statement or implication. Two possible areas have been noted and given full consideration. These areas are:(a) There is no specific information that there were any recruitments by the KGB of American per- sonnel in the United States Embassy during 1958-1960, nor is there any information suggesting the KGB had an American source or American agent in the Embassy during that period of time.(b) Petr S. POPOV, a GRU officer who had been an extremely valuable Cia source from 1953 on, was, according to the papers, exposed to the KGB in January 1959 as a result of a letter mailing by George Payne WINTERS, Jr. WINTERS was a CLA employee under Department of State cover assigned to the Embassy in Moscow. The letter, which was to POPOV, was obtained by the KGB after mailing by WINTERS and was a direct result of KGB surveillance of WINTERS.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 256]
In regard to (a), the papers are only a rather minute part of the total papers prepared in the First Section during 1958 - 1960.The lack of any information in these papers which directly or indirectly indicates that the KGB made a recruitment of an American in the Embassy or had an American source in the Embassy during the 1958-1960 period is only a matter for consideration. It is not conclusive proof that a recruitment was not made or that an American source did not exist. The papers do not contain a positive statement on either matter.In regard to (b), the quite specific information in the papers that Petr S. POPOV was uncovered by the KGB as a result of KGB surveillance on George Payne WINTERS, Jr., who mailed a letter to POPOV in January 1959, this information should be considered as possibly information of a deceptive nature unless an adequate explanation can be made for its presence in the papers. POPOV was recalled to Moscow from East Germany in November 1958 ostensibly for TDY. The circumstances under which he was recalled and collateral information have given adequate grounds for a belief that by November 1958 POPOV was suspected by the KGB of cooperating with Western Intelligence or that the KGB may even have been sure POPOV had been cooperating with United States Intelligence.It may be presumed that any lead to the KGB in regard to POPOV or the fact that United States Intelligence, more specifically 00012545SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 257]
CIA, had a source in the GRU would have come from an agent or source of the FCD, KGB, not the SCD. It can also be presumed that a source or agent of the FCD in a position to furnish a lead to a penetration of the GRU by Western Intelligence would be carefully protected even within the KGB. The possibility of course exists that a lead from George BLAKE, an FCD agent, resulted in the exposure of POPOV to the KGB, but it is not established that it did nor is there any reason to believe the FCD could not or did not have another agent or agents who furnished information to the XG3 pertinent to development of the case against POPOV.The primary question, however, as regards the Cherepanov Papers is whether, even if it is presumed the KGB obtained information from an FCD source or agent which led to suspicion of POPOV or identification of POPOV, this would be incompatible with information in the papers and could oniy lead to the conclusion that the papers contain "deceptive information."The conclusion in regard to the above is that the fact the papers attribute the exposure of POPOV to the KGB to surveillance on WINTERS when he mailed the letter to POPOV in January 1959 is not incompatible with the distinct possibility that the KGB had previously obtained information from an FCD agent or agents which actually led to suspicion in regard to POPOV or actual identification of POPOV.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 258]
If information was received from an important FCD agent such as George BLAKE or inrough another valuable FCD agent which led to KGB suspicion of POPOV Prior to his return to Moscow in November 1958, it is highly unlikely such information would receive wide distribution within the KG3, either in the FCD or the SCD. It is also possible the limited group within the KG3 who would be aware that the KGB had received information leading to suspicion of POPOV from a valuable agent would be very interested in attributing the exposure of POPOV to the fortuitous mailing of the letter to POPOV by WINTERS. The possibility should be considered that prior to the retrieval by the KGB of the letter to POPOV there was only a deep suspicion of POPOV but that the letter completely solidified the case against POPOV.Consideration has been given to the possibility that CHEREPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the papers to the American tourist and that it was done by the XGB with the hope of involving CA in a KGB-control'ed operation within the USSR. In that event, the papers passed by CHEREPANOV would most likely be genuine since this would have been the initial step in what the KGB hoped would become a successful operation.The above theory has been rejected since there are a number of factors which militate against it. These factors incinde the fact that7SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 259]
The latest formation in the papers was at least three years cic,waici. woula indicate CEREPOV no current access and there.was no indication CHEREPANOVterested in a future contact.80001257SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 260]
SECRETINDEXABIDIAN, John - IV, E, 5, 7-15,19,20,52"ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) - IV, G, J-4ARTAMONOV, Nikolay - III, А, 2ARTEMOV, Vladimir Lvovich - IV, F, 6, 12, 13BAKHVALOV, Mikhail - IV, E, 3, 4BALDIN, Boris Andreyevich - IV, F, 2BARRETT, Robert - III, F, 14, 15BEGGS, Frank- IV, E, 36, 37BEL TSKIY, Boris - IV, F, 6-12BERIYA, Lavrentiy Ivanovich - IV, B, 2,3,5-7BIENSTOCK, Natalie - IV, F, 3,4BIRSE, Arthur - IV, D. 1,2BLAKE, George - IV, D, 9; IV, F, 9; V, C, 6, 7BOBKOV, Filip Denisovich - IV, F, 15, 16; V, B, 3BOHLEN, Ambassador - III, F, 10BOWDEN, Lewis - IV, E, 53,54BRAUNS, Horst- IV, F, 3-6BROWN, G. Stanley - IV, E, 43
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 261]
BUGAYEVA, Ludmila - IV, F, 406 [BURGI, Richard] - IV, D,106 [BURTIN, Sipe] IV, E, 49, 5006 [BURTIN, Will] IV, E, 49, 50CECCHI, Pietro - IV, E, 39, 40, 42CHELNOKOV, Vladimir Dmitriyevich - IV, F, 2, 16CHEREPANOV, Aleksandr N. - III, H, 4; V, C, 1-4, 6-8CHERNETSEV, Y. E. - IV, E, 49CHURANOV, Vladimir A. - III, B, 406 [DAY, Frank] - IV, F, 41, 43DEMKIN, Vladimir - IV, E, 20, 45DERYABIN, Petr Sergeyevich - IV, B,5,6DOUGLAS, William O. - IV, D, 306 [DREW, George] - IV,D,106 [DWELLY, Robert] - IV, E, 41, 44, 45FARMAKOVSKAYA, Olga A. - V,A,1FEDOROVICH, Tatyana - IV, E, 8, 9FEDOSEYEV, Sergey M. - IV, E, 49-51; IV, F,106 [FISK, Norman] - IV, D, 506 [FRIPPEL, Arsene] - IV, D, 206 [GAFFEY, Joseph] - IV, E, 41, 45, 46
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 262]
SECRETGARBLER, Paul - IV, E, 5206 [GARCIA, Anthony A] - IV, E, 3906 [GARLAND, John] III, F, 17; IV, E, 31, 33-3606 [GINSBURG, Michael] IV, D, 5,6GOLITSYN, Anatoliy Mikhaylovich - III, B, 3, 4; III, E, 9-11; III, F, 5-13, 15-19; IV, E, 21, 23, 31-34;IV, B, 5, 6; IV, E, 9, 10;V, A, 1GRIBANOV, Oleg M. - III, F, 3, 4; IV, 6; IV, 6; IV, E, 4, 5, 21; IV, F, 1, 2"GRIGORIY" - III, F, 13; IV, D, 3,6; IV, F, 4GROMAKOVSKIY, Yevgeniy - III, B, 4; IV, E, 20GRYAZNOV, Gennadiy I. - III, B, 4; III, F, 8-13, 15; IV, E, 5, 12, 19-21, 26-28, 30, 43-45; IV.G, 3; V, B, 3, 4GUK, Yuriy I. - III, B, 4HAMILTON, Victor Norris - III, E, 9(aka: HINDAL, Fouzi Mitri)"HANNA" - IV, E, 2706 [HARRIS, Gisella] - IV, D, 1, 7, 8HORBALY, William - IV, E, 5306 [HOWARD, Herbert] III, E, 8; III, F, 20; IV, G, 1, 3, 4IVANOVA, Svetlana - IV, E, 38, 39, 45, 4606 [JENNER, Paul] - IV, E, 28-31, 35-36JOHNSON, Robert Lee - III, E, 8; III, G, 506 [JOHNSON, Wallace Everett] - IV, F, 3, 406 [JONES, William Carroll] - IV, F, 3, 4
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SECRET06[KADERA, Fred] - IV, E, 45KANTOR, Marvin - IV, D, 5, 606 [KARLOV, fnu] - IV, D, 5KASHPEROV, Mikhail - III, H, 4KEMMER, Myra - IV, E, 9: 06 [KEYSERS, James] - IV, E, 22-26, 55, 56KLYPIN, Vladimir Alekseyevich - IV, E, 5, 48-51KOBULOV, Bogdan Zakharovich (General) - IV, B, 1-4,7KOLOSSOV, Viktor - IV, E, 30, 34(Alias used by KOSOLAPOV)KOSOLAPOV, Vadim V. - III, B, 4; III, F, 8, 16, 17; IV, E, 5, 19-21, 28-32, 34-39, 42-44KOSYGINA, Madame - III, A, 1KOVSHUK, Vladislav M. - III, B, 4; III, F, 5, 11, 12; IV, E, 3, 4, 6, 12, 18, 21, 23, 49, 52, 53; IV, F, 1, 2; IV, G, 3; V, C, 2KOZLOV, Veniamin - IV, E, 12KRUGLOV, Sergey Nikiforovich - IV, B, 506 [LANE, Allen] - IV, D, 1, 2LANGELLE, Russell - III, F, 3; IV, E, 8"LILLIAN" - IV, E, 2606 [LUBIN, George] - IV, E, 49, 5006 [LUNT, Horace] - III, F, 306 [MAHONEY, Eugene] - IV, E, 53: [MALIA, Martin] - IV, D, 2SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 264]
SECRET06MARK, David - III, С, 406MATLAW, Ralph - IV, D, 506MERTENS, Gerard - IV, D, 2MIKHAYLOV, A. A. - IV, E, 49MINTKENBAUGH, James Allen - III, E, 8; III, G, 5MORELL, William N. - IV, E, 5206MORONE, Joseph - IV, E, 22, 27, 36, 37, 39, 40, 55MULE, Walter (Capt.) - IV, C, 406MC GOWAN, Edward - IV, F, 1306PECHTER, Bernard - IV, D, 5, 6PENKOVSKIY, Oleg Vasilyevich - IV, E, 13PETROV, Vladimir Ivanovich - III, B, 4; IV, E, 48, 49POPOV, Petr S. - IV, E, 7, 10; V, C/4-706PREISFREUND, Joha - III, F, 5.11, 1206PRESSMAN, Patrick - IV, D, 5, 7"RAKETA" - IV, C, 5RASTVOROV, Yuriy - IV, B, 5, 6RHODES, Roy - III, F, 406RUFE, John - IV, D, 5, 606SCHWARZENBACH, Collette - III, F, 10SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 265]
SERGEYEV (SERGEEV), FNU - IV, E, 32, 33(Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV.)06 [SHAPIRO, Isaac Henry] - II, F, 606 [SHATTAUER, Sofia] - IV, D, 5, 7SHAZLY, Sarwat el - IV, E, 40SHELEPIN, Aleksandr Nikolayevich - III, F, 13"SHMELEV" - III, F, 13; IV, D, 3, 6; IV, F, 406 [SHUBIN, John] - IV, D, 11SHULGINA, Nataliya - IV, F, 11, 12SMITH, Dayle Wallis - III, F, 4, 20; IV, G,1SMITH, Edward Ellis - III, F, 406 [SMITH, John Discoe] - III, E, 9; IV, E, 49, 50STALIN - IV, B, 506 [STEVENS, Edmund] - III, F, 4, 606 [STORSBERG, James] - III, F, 3, 5, 11-13; IV, E, 21-24, 26, 43, 55, 5606 [TARASKA, William] - IV, D, 5, 606 [TAYLOR, David] - IV, D, 206 [TAYLOR, John] - IV, E, 42, 43UMANETS, Ella - IV, E, 38
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 266]
SECRET06 [URBAN, (Colonel)]- IV, E, 24, 25VASSALL, William - Ш, Е, 9; Ш, G, 5; IV, D, 906 [WASHENKO, Steve]- IV, E, 5306 [WILBY, William Stanley] - IV, D, 2WINTERS, George Payne, Jr. - IV, E, 53; V, C, 4-7ZENKIN, FNU - IV, E, 32-34(Very possibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV and very possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV.)06 [ZUJUS, Matthew]- IV, E, 26-2806 [ZWANG, Maurice]- IV, E, 40-427SECRET
[104-10210-10020.pdf — page 0]
TOP SECRET1. Attached are the following pages of the Top Secret study entitled, *The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO*, dated February 1968 (copy 10). Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages containing information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.3. We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A and Attachment when your review has been completed.Attachment: Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 266, 277, 278 281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and 357WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340TOP SECRET
[104-10210-10020.pdf — page 1]
# Top SecretCONTENTSPAGEVIII SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-January 1964) (Cont.)Deputy Chief of Seventh Department(July 1962-January 1964)291KGB Operations 292Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY 292Investigation of SLESINGER 293Arrest and Interrogation of KOTEN 295GRU Agent SHUBIN 296Arrest of BAKGHOORN 298Investigation of OSWALD 303Residence in USSR 303Request to Return to USSR 305Post-Assassination Review of KGB File 307The CHEREPANOV Papers 309Contents 314NOSENKO's Travel Document 315Return to Geneva (January-February 1964) 316Purpose of Trip 317Visits to KGB Legal Residency 318Availability for Meetings with CIA 318NOSENKO's Written Notes 319NOSENKO's Defection 320The Recall Telegram 324Knowledge of Other Seventh Departmen'tOperations 325Operational Activities (July 1962-January 1964) 326KGB Counterintelligence Operations AmongAmerican Tourists 326Information Furnished the KGB byGeorge BLAKE 327KGB Study of American IntelligenceTourist Operations 327NOSENKO's Information 330Summary 331Summary and Conclusion 331(vi)Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10210-10020.pdf — page 2]
# Top SecretCONTENTSIX OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICERelationship with General GRIBANOV 335Communist Party Status 338Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures 342Awards and Decorations 345Sourcing 349Ranks 350X PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT 355XI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NOSENKO'S *BONA FIDES* 357Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO 361Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text 399Index of Personalities 437(vii)Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10210-10020.pdf — page 3]
# Top Secret(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)## Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKOThe portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet officials' statements about him since his defection coincides markedly with NOSENCO's se-description. According to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelligence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively, defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased Minister, he served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings were overcome through the patronage of KG3 General GRIBANOV, and in connection with operations against Americans se occupied positions of progressively greater trust and responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence) Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to assassinate him.These statements are related in chronological order in Annex A.20# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10210-10020.pdf — page 4]
# Top Secret(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943. In a second version (more probable since entry to the Moscow Special Naval School required prior completion of the Seventh Class) NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943 NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (then in Baku).After just six months in Baku, without completing the Ninth Class, COSENKO ran away from school and returned to Moscow.Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.NOSENKO Completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.Comment: NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by a jealous naval officer whom he then protected by stating that the wound was self-inflicted, and that he actually did accidently shoot him-a sensitive source self. quoted to a KGB officer to the effect that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid being sent to the front while attending a naval college in 1942.46# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10210-10020.pdf — page 5]
# Top Secret(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)Comment: (Continued)After NCSENKO's defection was publicized, Soviet Naval defector ARTAMONOV volunteered to CIA that he had known the son of the Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Shipbuilding Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.Birth to 1945: Summary and ConclusionNOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on his early life. However, this portion of his claimed biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's whereabouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the schools he claims to have attended.Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics (fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO'S claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945 are accepted as true.47# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10210-10020.pdf — page 6]
# Top Secret(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute course was of four years' duration and that he entered the Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years' duration and that Lecause he failed a state examination he was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years' duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it was of five years' duration but he failed an examination which delayed his graduation for three months.Comment: See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KG3 upon graduation from the Institute in 1947. The duration of the Institute course and the date of NOSLIKO's completion are material to the plausibility of his claimed Naval PU service, whicis ne said followed almost immediately upon his departure from the Institute.## Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at the Institute of International Relations he entered the Naval RU, serving in the Far Fast and then in a Baltic post, finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV. A sensitive sourceK is the sole source also asserting that NOSENKO served in the RU. According to NOSENKO attended this source the Military-Diplomatic Academy and then served in the RU Information Department for about a year before securing a transfer to the KGB through his father's influence. NOSENKO denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and has never claimed service in the RU Information (Reports) Department, although he had on occasion claimed to have held Reports assignments.49# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10