Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 120]
721. 1959. NOSENKO never mentioned that KOSOLAPOV. who de      said was his immediate subordinate and shared NOSENIO'S      office in KGB Headquarters. was a member of this same      delegation.NOSENKO did not know where ABIDIAN's office was locatedin the U.S. Embassy. He said he did not know and wasunable to find out who ABIDIAN's secretary wa5. He reportedthat some agent told the KGR that ABIDIAN had a sign onthe door of his office which said "Security Officer."There was no such sign.KOSENKO did not know where APIDIAN's apartment waslocated. He did not know its contents and said that theKGB was not interested in this. He did not know whetherABIDIAN changed apartments in Moscow, which he did.NOSENKO ide: tified GROMAKOVA, an Embassy languageteacher, as a KGB agent who was valuable because she wasintelligent and was able to provide personality sketches onher students based on classroom discussione. He neverassociated ABIDIAN with GROVAKOVA. en told that ABIDIANhad taken language lessons from her. NOSENKO recalled thatABIDIAN took "several" lessons from GROMAKOVA at the beginningof his tour but discontinued; she reported nothing of sign1-ficance and there was no regular reporting from her onABIDIAN. ABIDIAN, however, reported that he took regular,private Pussian lessons from GROM KOVA throughout his tourin Yoscow and that they discussed in class his past personallife, travel, education, fiancee, and his trips abroad tosee his fiancee.NOSENKO knew that ABIDIAN: ravelled out of the USSRtwo or three times, but had no idea when these trips tookplace or what countries ABIDIAN visited. NOSENKO said that,as ABIDIAN's predecessor LANGELLE was known to have travelledoutside the USSR for operational reasons in connection withthe POPOV case. it would have been of interest to learnwhere ALIDIAN had gone, but the KGB hal no way of findingthis out. (Note in the previous paragraph that CROMAKOVAkncw.) When NOSENKO's interrogator pointed out the possibi-lity of photographing ABIDIAN's passport upon his return tothe USSR, NOSENKO replied that the KGB does not photographthe passports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet Uni0...NOSENKO said that ABIDIAN made no trips outside Moscowwithin the USSK and explained that. as case officer, hewould necessarily have been aware of any such trip as hewould have had to handle all arrangements for surveillanceduring it. When NOSENKO was told that ABIDIAN travelled toSoviet Armenia in October 1960. NOSENKO said for the firsttime that he was on leave in that month. NOSENKO admittedin October 1966 that he krew nothing of ABIDIAN's trip.NOSENKO said that he did not know who were ABIDIAN'Sclose American friends in Moscow or his friends and profes-sional contacts among foreigners there.NOSENKO said at the end of the January-February 1965interrogations concerning ABIDIAN that the reason he knewso little about ABIDIAN was because he was "working badly"as ABIDIAN'S case officer. The reason for his poor work, he
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 123]
724. NOSENKO's date of "late B60 or carly 1961" is incorrect, almost exactly by a year. NOSENKO said he turned ABIDIAN'S file over to GRYAZNOV about 28 December 1961. ABIDIAN checked the Pushkin Street dead drop on 30 December 1961. NOSENKO has described his participation in an approach to the American tourist W.E. JOHNSON as happening "right after returning to the Tourist Department in 1962." Because NOSENKO's participation in this case was confirmed by JOHNSON and because the approach to JOHNSON took place on 5 January 1962 (he reported it to the U.S. Embassy at once), it can be said with certainty that NOSENKO's entire story of his own participation in the surveillance of the Pushkin Street dead drop site is false. NOSENKO: (a) could not have visited the dead drop site with KCZLOV (who in any event was not in Moscow at the time); (b) could not have placed the original surveillance report in ABIDIAN's file, which GRYAZNOV held as of 28 December 1961; (c) could not have received almost daily reports from KOZLOV for about a month and periodic reports thereafter; and (d) could not have neglected to tell CIA of ABIDIAN's visit to the drop in 1952 on grounds that the surveillance of Pushkin Street had been discontinued after three months without anything suspicious being noted. (NOSENKO was in Geneva on 15 March 1962, only two and a half months after ABIDIAN checked the dead drop.)NOSENKO has refused to admit that he lied about his part in this incident. The page containing the contradictions listed in the preceding paragraph was the only page of a "protocol" which NOSENKO refused to sign during the hostile interrogations of early 1965. In October 1966, when he was again asked whether he went to the Pushkin Street dead drop site with KOZLOV, NOSENKO said that he could not remember whether he had gone there at all.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 124]
# Responsibility of Supervising Military Attache OperationsOn 29 January 1965 NOSENKO told his interrogator that for the first five or six months of 1960, immediately after transferring to the U.S. Embassy Section and as part of his responsibilities as its Deputy Chief, he supervised Second Chief Directorate activities against American service attaches in Moscow. By this he meant, NOSENKO said, that when GAVRILENKO (the case officer for Air Force Attaches), KURILENKO (Army Attaches), or BELOGLAZOV (Naval Attaches and Marines) had any questions or reports to submit, they would come to his rather than to KOVSHUK, the Chief of the section, After about six months he was relieved of this duty because his other duties did not allow sufficient time for this function and because it was considered more suitable that ALESHIN, recently assigned to the American Department as Deputy Chief, be given this responsibility.NOSENKO had previously been questioned in detail on his responsibilities in the U.S. Embassy Section, and had never before mentioned this one. NOSENKO told CI:I in June 1964 that when he reported for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section in January 1960, DRANOV was the responsible case officer for the Naval Attaches and Marines. Soon after his own arrival, NOSENKO said, DRANOV was transferred from the section and his responsibilities were taken over by BELOGLAZOV, who had earlier been assisting DRANOV against these targets.NOSENKO said on 20 October 1966 that immediately upon, or at the latest a few weeks after, arriving in the U.S. Embassy Section, he went on leave for a month. Either immediately before or right after this leave KOVSHUK told him that he would be responsible for activities against the Naval Attaches. DRANOV was retiring and gave NOSENKO the files on Naval and Marine personnel. This was NOSENKO's first mention either of the leave period in early 1960 or of having had case officer responsibilities for personnel of the Naval Attache's office in Moscow. (At the same time he said that he had lied about going on leave in November 1960.)NOSENKO was reminded on 25 October 1966 that he had said in 1965 that in 1960 he was supervisor of operations against all U.S. service attache personnel. NOSENKO replied: "I took the files only on the Navy, but I was working on (supervising) all of them."NOSENKO has never volunteered details of specific operational activity he handled as the case officer for U.S. Naval Attaches or supervisor of operations against all attaches in early 1960. He said that Marine Colonel DULACKI's contact with (or attempt to recruit) the Indonesian KGB agent which he has described in detail (see Page 488) took place after he was relieved of these functions.
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# TOP SECRET728. NOSENKO said that the decision to send him to Cuba was made two days before the delegation left Moscow because a security officer was required and he happened to have a passport and authorization to travel. The delegation left Moscow on 15 November 1960, and therefore this decision was reached on 13 November or thereabouts. NOSENKO, who had been transferred to the U.S. Embassy Section in order to supervise and revitalize operations against code clerks, the Section's most important recruitment target, consequently left Moscow on the day that MORONE also departed by train for Warsaw and at a time that his subordinate KOSOLAPOV was in Helsinki (12-16 November 1960), apparently in connection with an operation against John GARLAND.NOSENKO has given widely divergent accounts of the purpose of his assignment to Cuba. In 1962 he related in detail how he had been sent to investigate how the Cuban- intelligence service was operating against Americans stationed in Havana, particularly intelligence officers. and described what he did to fulfill this mission. Since 1964, however, NOSENKO has claimed merely to have been the security officer with the delegation.# TOP SECRET
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# Personal Handling of AgentsWhen NOSENKO transferred from the Tourist Department to the American Department, he took along a number of the agents he had used in tourist operations with him: YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, FRIPPEL, DMITRIYEV, and RYTOVA. During this period he also handled LEVINA, a librarian and language-teacher at the U.S. Embassy who was turned over to him by U.S. Embassy Section case officer MASSYA in 1960; and PREISFREUND and who were used in code clerk operations. These agents and NOSENKO's handling of them are discussed below.## YEFREMOV and VOLKOVNOSENKO continued to meet with these two homosexual agents during his two years as Deputy Chief of the section. He did not use them in any way, however, according to his account. The only contact of the tao known to CIA was a meeting in 1961 with BARRETT. In 1959, while in Yoscow and a CIA agent, BARRETT was compromised by YEFRESOV and VOLKOV in 1961, shortly after an apparently chance Leeting with then, BARRETT was recruited by the KGE on the basis of the Materials obtained in 1959. NOSEO descrited the compromise of BARRETT in 1959 and knew that he had been recruited in 1961. He did not know of BARRETT's contacts with YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in 1961.## FRIPPELNOSENKO said he continued to handle FRIPFEL during the 1960-1961 period, despite the fact that he never provided anything of value, because he and CHELSOKOV (the Chief of the Tourist Department who was always present at these meetings) "kept hoping he would give something." FRIPPEL left the Soviet Union in January 1961, but NOSENKO continued to be registered as his case officer.## DMITRIYEVDMITRIYEV, a specialist on Japan and Thailand who spoke Japanese and English, had been NOSENKO's agent during the 1955-1960 period. DMITRIYEV was then caployed by the Japanese Exhibition in Moscow, and NOSENKO did not indicate how he was used in tourist operations. NOSENKO did not describe any operational use of hin in 1960 or 1961.## RYTOVARYTOVA was NOSENKO's agent in the Tourist Department after 1956 or 1957, at which tize she was exployed at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow. An English speaker, she reported any interesting information concerning visitors to the exhibition. NOSENKO has not referred to any KGB operations in Moscow in which she participated during his service there.## LEVINALEVINA worked as a language teacher and librarian at the American Embassy and NOSENKO handled her because she had a number of code clerks in her language classes. He
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 129]
730. met with LEVINA a number of times, but she never reported anything interesting and was never used directly in operations involving the Americans. She was fired from the Embassy at the end of 1960 or early 1951.(vi) Johan PREISFREUNDAs described in Pages 173-131 and discussed above, PREISFREUND was, NOSENKO said, recruited by KOVSHUK in 1960 and was handled by NOSENKO in the operation against James STORSBERG. Both NOSENKO and PREISFREUND said that this was the only operation in which he took part. NOSENKO suggested to CIA that PREISFREUND would be able to attest to his description of this case, and CIA interviewed PREISFREUND in Helsinki and Stockholm during the summer of 1965. PREIS-FREUND's account generally agreed with NOSENKO's and he was able to supply a considerable amount of personality and background information concerning his former case officer. From PREISFREUND's manner during these interviers, the nature of his responses and statements, and his actions after the interviews were completed, there was no reasonable doubt that he remained under KGB control while meeting the CIA representatives.(vii)(KGB cryptonym "SARDAR") was recruited by NOSENKO in 1961. A Syrian in Moscow,was first targetted against America House in General, but was then used only in the development operation against ZUJUS, the successor to James STORSBERG as military code clerk in Moscow. met and developed ZUJUS, but nothing had come of the operation at the time NOSENKO transferred from the American Department. No other use was made of this agent and there was no approach to ZUJUS. NOSENKO first suggested that CIA attempt a "false flag" recruitment of using his (NOSENKO's) name for this purpose; he provided CIA with in Damascus so that contact could be established, Later NOSENKO said that like PREISFREUND, could verify NOSENKO's position as his handler in the ZUJUS operation (Pages 209-212). CIA interviewed ZUJUS, who vaguely recalled having met , did not recall his name and denied that his relationship with was as close as NOSENKO reported.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 131]
732. the Pushkin Street dead drop, i.e., until late March 1962,and by his insistence that he had returned to the TouristDepartment by the time GOLITSYN defectod; he placed this on15 January 1962 and refused to believe the correct date of15 December 1961.D. RemarksFor no single responsibility has NOSENKO substantiatedhis alleged service as Deputy Chief of the U.S. EmbassySection in the years 1960-1961. His statements about theappointment to and transfer from this position have beeninconsistent; his comparatively narrow experience and hisacknowledged falsehoods about a personal relationship withthe Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, GRIBANOV,dispel the likelihood that these personnel assignments weremade in the way he claims. Repeatedly he has been contra-dictory about his activities during this two-year period,shifting his story to suit the occasion and ignoring howeach succeeding version made all of his claims increasinglyincredible. The limited extent of NOSENKO's informationbetrays a lack of familiarity with details on the duties,targets, and most of the operations which he has ascribedto himself; in a certain few instances, however, such ashis description of ABIDIAN's route to the Pushkin Street deaddrop, he has recounted events just as they are known fromother sources to have occurred. Nevertheless, where col-lateral information has covered the few subjects on whichhe provided details, it has almost invariably contradictedhim and showed him to be ignorant of significant facts.The reporting by NOSENKO thus was so superficial, so in-complete, and so_demonstrably erroneous as to suggest withoutreservation that he never served as an officer in the U.S.Embassy Section, much less as its Deputy Chief.. All avail-able evidence, excluding that from certain Soviets who wereCIA and FBI sources (see Parts VIII.H. and VII.I. below),combines to formulate this conclusion.
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# 7. Tourist Department (1962-1964)## a. IntroductionNOSENKO agreed during the interrogations at the beginning of 1965 that he must have reported for duty as Chief of the American Tourist Section on about 3 January 1962.* In this job he was responsible for planning and supervising KGB activities against all tourists of American, British, and Canadian nationalities arriving in the USSR, and his duties also encompassed preparations for the coming tourist season (Pages 285-287).In July 1962, in conformity with GRILANOV's intentions, NOSENKO was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist Department; it had a table of organization of close to 100 staff officers, was responsible for handling operations against all tourists to the Soviet Union, and maintained the facilities used in these operations. A year later NOSENKO received the title of First Deputy Chief of the Department, a "paper" promotion as there was no other deputy. During this period in the Tourist Department, in addition to his supervisory duties (concerning which he has not been questioned in detail), NOSENKO took personal part in approaches to several tourists, organized and directed the arrest of an American tourist on homosexual charges, and met with a number of agents. It was his senior supervisory position that involved him in two of the most widely publicized cases of this period, the arrest of BARGHOORN and the case of OSWALD.## b. Absences from MoscowDuring his two years in the Tourist Department, NOSENKO was available to perform his assigned duties only part of the time. After arriving in the American Tourist Section and after the approach to JOHNSON on 5 January 1962, NOSENKO spent several weeks "getting the feel" of things by talking to case officers, reviewing reports of the section's activities during the previous two years, and discussing plans for the up-coming tourist season. In mid-February he began preparations for his assignment to Geneva with the Disarmament Delegation. NOSENKO has said that this involved discussions with the Eleventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for arranging for security coverage of Soviet delegations going abroad, as well as with the case officers responsible for the investigation of suspected American agent SHAKHOV. NOSENKO said that he did this on a part-time basis in addition to his regular duties, but has noted in another context that these preparations required sufficient time to make it impossible for him to take a personal part in the recruitment of BIENSTOCK in February 1962. On 15 March 1962, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, remaining there with the delegation until 15 June, when he left Geneva by train to return to Moscow to reassume his duties as Chief of Section. (He said that he had no deputy chief in this position, and it is unclear who performed these functions in his absence.) Thus, according to NOSENKO's account, of the six months he was Chief* This date was settled upon after he acknowledged that his approach to the American tourist W.E. JOHNSON must have occurred on 5 January, as CIA records show.
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734. of the American Tourist Section, he was in Moscow only three months and for much of this time was involved in breaking in on his new job or in preparing for his temporary assignment abroad. NOSEIKO said he had "no accomplishments" in this period.In the fall of 1962, NOSENKO went on leave for a month in Sochi with his wife and mother. NOSENKO has estimated that six months of 1963 were spent on various temporary assignments in the Soviet Union outside of Moscow, plus a one-month's vacation in 1953. From 15 June 1962 to his arrival in Geneva on 19 January 1964, a period of 18 months, HOSENKO was absent from KGB Headquarters for eight months. Thus in the period 1962-63, holding supervisory positions, NOSEIKO was absent or "reading in" for about 13 months, or about 50 percent of the time.c. Personal Participation in OperationsNOSENKO had direct operational contact with three Americans during 1962 and 1963. Two of these (the approach to JOHNSON and the interrogation of BARGHOORS) were unusual in that they were provocations without any attempt to recruit the target; NOSEIKO could name no other examples of such operations. In both cases, the victim of the provocation has verified NOSENKO's presence. The third case, the recruitment approach to BRAUNS, was unsuccessful. Additionally, SOSENKO supervised the homosexual compromise of KOTEN, who was closely tied in with sensitive source and related.(1) The W.E. JOHNSON ProvocationJOHNSON (Pages 289-293), NOSENKO said, was in Moscow as a tourist in early January 1962 and was considered for recruitment, but a decision was made that he was not worth the effort as he had no access to classified materials and lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in Washington and New York City. (JCHNSON's home was in Texas.) Several days after this decision was made, postal intercepts showed that JOHNSON was writing abusive letters concerning the Soviet Union. They were "so bitter" and critical that the KGB decided that something had to be done to stop him. At about the same time the KGB received an indication that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided to entrap him on this basis and force him to promise not to write any more letters or criticize the USSR in articles when he returned to the United States. The compromise was effected by use of NOSENKO's homosexual agents, and NOSENKO was able to describe the confrontation scene, his second meeting with JOHN- SON, and JOHNSON's frightened telephone call to the U.S. Embassy reporting that NOSENKO had recontacted him.NOSENKO told CIA in June 1962 that he had taken part in this operation "in January." When he contacted CIA in Geneva in 1964 he had a scrap of paper on which was noted JOHNSON'S name and the date "5 January 1962." This was the actual date of the approach, but NOSENKO insisted that the date bore no relationship to the name, and that the approach to JOHNSON tookTOP SECRET
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735. place in the summer of 1962, a fact he recalled distinctly be- cause he wore no overcoat. It was only when confronted with official U.S. records that NOSENKO agreed in early 1965 that the apprcach was in January and recalled that it was made immediately after NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department.*NOSENKO said that when JOHNSON first arrived in Moscow there was consideration of recruiting him, but that there was a decision against this as he was of little intelligence value. Then JOHNSON mailed insulting letters which were picked up through postal intecept. About the same time there were indi- cations of homosexuality. Then the operation was mounted against him. This implies a very tight time schedule. JOHNSON arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961; NOSENKO said he reported for duty as Section Chief on 3 January 1962; JOHNSON reported his first contact with NOSENKO's homosexual agent VOLKOV the evening of 4 January; and the approach by NOSENKO was on 5 Janu- ary.Although NOSENKO implied in 1962 that his homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were the ones who originally determined *[JOHNSON'S]* homosexuality, he said in 1954 only that there were *[signs.]* NOSENKO did not know what these indications were or where they came from. JOHNSON reported that he first met the agent VOLKOV on the evening of 4 January when the latter sat down at his restaurant table; on this same occasion VOLKOV in- vited JOHNSON to his hotel room the next day. The fact that VOLKOV joined JOHNSON uninvited and set him up for the approach without leaving the table suggests that there had, in fact, been signs of his homosexuality beforehand and that operational plans had been laid by this time.NOSENKO has described the caution taken in other homosexual entrapment cases and has named several which were called off because of a risk of scandal. It is, therefore, unusual that the KGB would take this risk merely to force JOHNSON, an American and a Baptist minister, to stop writing insulting let- ters and articles.NOSENKO did not know why he became involved in this opera- tion the day after he reported for duty in the senior position of Section Chief. He said only that BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, told him to do it. During his talks with JOHNSON, NOSENKO introduced himself to JOHNSON as "Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV," (rendered by JOHNSON as NIKOLOV) the "Chief of Police."(ii) The BARGHOORN Provocation-ArrestThe arrest of Professor BARGHOORN (Pages 304-309) took. place at the end of October 1963, at the time NOSENKO said he was First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. NOSENKO hasHow NOSENKO's self-stated and confirmed participation in a Tourist Department operation on 5 January 1962 carries implications for his account of ABIDIAN's visit to the PENKOVSKIY dead drop is discussed above.![Top Secret]