Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 95]
# 696.summary spelled out in detail the complete CIA operational doctrine pertaining to tourist-type operations and stressed Cia's reliance on tourist agents for the spotting, recontacting, assessment, and communications support of internal assets.While NOSENKO has displayed some familiarity with CIA *modus operandi* in the field of tourist operations, he has never mentioned that the KGB was in possession of documentary reporting which described these methods in full detail. NOSENKO does not appear to be aware of who BLAKE was, much less of his importance to the KGE. NOSENKO never volunteered the name of BLAKE in his debriefings, and when specifically asked in 1962 about BLAKE, the KGB agent in British Intelligence, he said that he had read the dossier and that BLAKE had been "an agent of the Second (British) Department (of the Second)" who was not nearly as valuable as the Englishman" (VASSALL). By 1964 he could rot recall any such agent of the British Department. When the name BLAKE was mentioned, he asked: 'Who's BLAKE?"BLAKE had, in addition, passed to the KGB a photocopy of a 21-page summary report of a second, follow-up conference between CIA and MI-6 on "legal travel" operations which was held in Washington from 20 to 25 April 1960. NOSENKO, although not in the Tourist Department at the time the latter report was received by the KGB, said that he reviewed all important materials of the American Tourist Section when he became its Chief in January 1962. Asked whether the Tourist Department had received documentary information from any agent source while NOSENKO was away from the department in the years 1960-1961, he replied that none had and that he knew of no agent who could have provided such documentary information.## (ii) GOLITSYN DocumentNOSENKO in 1964 reported knowing that GOLITSYN at the time of his defection in December 1961 took with him an official top secret KGB document concerning Western Intelligence operational activity in the field of tourism (Pages 147-149). He did not mention this fact in the Jure 1962 meetings. Although NOSENKO also stated that this document had been prepared by the Tourist Department, he has not been able to describe the document in detail and specifically did not mention that this particular document was in large part based, as subsequent analysis has shown, upon the above-mentioned reports submitted to the KGB by George BLAKE.## (iii) Tourist AgentsNOSENKO asserted that the KGB detected no agents among American tourists during the years 1958 or 1959, and that no tourists had been caught in the act of mailing letters, servicing dead drops, or contacting agents, except one in 1959 whose name, NOSENKO said, was MacGUIRE (actually McGOWAN in 1958). NOSENKO signed a statement attesting to these facts.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 97]
# TOP SECRET698. h. NOSENKO'S Operational Activities (1956-1959)(i) GeneralNOSENKO appeared in one operation shortly after being promoted to the position of Deputy Chief, the recruitment of the American woman HARRIS in September 1958 on the basis of her romantic involvement with a Soviet male. HARRIS tentatively identified NOSENKO's photograph as that of one of two Soviets who approached her in Moscow and said that, of the two, he was "definitely the man in charge." She denied having had further contacts with the KGB after leaving the Soviet Union. In 1959, NOSENKO said, he also supervised the sexual entrapment of , but did not become personally involved in the approach, which was made by his superior DUBAS. Some time during this year, NOSENKO said, he recruited the second of his pair of homosexual agents, YEFREMOV. Beginning in the spring of 1959 he used the two in a series of successful recruitment approaches to ,In the case of,as a commercial representative in Moscow, was not the responsibility of NOSENKO's section, NOSENKO was asked to make the approach because he was a "specialist" in this type of operation.) In 1959 NOSENKO also used these agents in operations against two American guides at the Sokolniki Exhibit, BARRETT and WILLERFORD. Finally, NOSENKO said, in 1959 he accomplished the recruitment of the American Express Company representative in Moscow, FRIPPEL, on the basis of sexual compromise.(ii) The Homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOVThere is a preponderance of homosexual recruitment operations in NOSENKO's account of his KGB career. He has referred to several homosexual agents with whom he has worked on specific recruitment-entrapment operations, but said that he himself was never their official case officer. They include "LUCH," "STROYEV," "NIKOLAYEV," "SIBIRYAK" and KOSHKIN. He has remembered only a few of their names and has supplied no personality information about them. He identified only VOLKOV and YEFREMOV as his own agents.NOSENKO claimed to have re-recruited VOLKOV, a former agent (cryptonym "SHMELEV") and recruited YEFREMOV (cryptonym "GRIGORIY") and to have been their sole case officer from the beginning of their KGB careers in 1957-1958 until they were deactivated in 1963 because they became too well known. He met them frequently, directing them in at least a dozen entrapment operations or other homosexual encounters. NOSENKO took them with him when he transferred to the American Department in 1960 (but used them in no operations during 1960 and 1961) and back again in early 1962 to the Tourist Department (where they were used only once, immediately after his return). He gave a relatively clear account of the recruitment (Pages 107-108), but:- He has never been able to remember YEFREMOV's patronym.- He does not know the home address, general area of Moscow residence, family circumstances, job details, or other basic information about either of them.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 98]
€93.- He said that during the five or six years he handled them, he never was at their homes, never met them in a safehouse (only on the street), and never met either of them alone without the other's presence.- He did not know about VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's encounters with and development of one Dutch and five other Americans, independently known to CIA. Of the Americans, three were CIA agents and a fourth was the well-known American diplomat and author Charles W. THAYER.- He told about VOLKOV's and YETIEMOV's compromise of Robert BARFETT in 1959 (Page 126) but did not know that they had met BARRETT again in 1961, shortly before BARRETT was recruited on the basis of the 1959 compromise.- He did not know details of why or how VOLKOV and YEPREMOV first came into contact with their most recent target, W.E. JOHNSON, nor how they set up the compromise which led to lNOSEIKO's entry as a "police official" under the name Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV (Pages 289-293).### Homosexual Entrapment OperationsDuring 1959 NOSENKO said he made recruitment approaches to five U.S. and British citizens on the basis of homosexual entrapment operations involving the agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV. All five approaches were successful, and the four Westerners who have row been identified have, in turn, identified NOSENKO in one way or another as the recruiting officer. With the exception of the FRIPPEL case and the homosexual compromise of BARRETT and WILLERFORD (which did not result in approaches during NOSENKO's tour in the American Tourist Section), these were the only operations in which NOSESKO took part in 1959 and they represented, in fact, the caly recruitments by the section during this year, NOSEIKO said. He claimed repeatedly in 1962, 1964, and 1965 that at the end of 1959 he received a commendation from the KGB Chairman for his recruitment of the five homosexuals and FRIPPEL (discussed separately below). In October 1966, he admitted that this claim was untrue.In discussing the siet case (Pages 123-124) NOSENKO had forgotten details which, from his confirmed participation, he certainly once knew. He said that (as with the case--see below) another case officer (IVAL:OV) had the file materials on the target before he did. NOSENKO stated that his agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV reported to NOSENKO in Moscow on homosexuality and then "IVANOV and I and possibly GUSKCV, the Section Chief, reported this to DUBAS, Chief of the Tourist Department. NOSENKO could not remember the arrangements for taking the pictures, nor in what Moscow hotel the photography took place. When went to Leningrad, NOSENKO was sent there to approach him, flying alone (as in the case). All Leningrad arrangements were made by the local KGB. Asked why he was assigned to the case, NOSENKO replied: "I was told to go." Asked why IVANOV could not handle it, he answered: "He was not considered capable, his English was "not bad but he didn't have enough operational experience." NOSENKO did not remember who wrote the request for permission to make theTOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 100]
# TOP SECRET701. NOSENKO said PRIPPEL was his agent and said, repeatedly: "I recruited him.myself." In 1962 no other KGB officer was mentioned by NOSENKO, who quoted from a number of his conversations with FRIPPEL. In 1964 NOSENKO said he and CHELNOKOV "had carried out the recruitment together," but NOSENKO was the case officer. According to FRIPPEL's account, CHELNCXOV was the senior officer in the recruitment and in the later meetings.NOSENKO never met FRIPPEL alone while FRIPPEL was stationed in Moscow. The only times he ever did so were later, he said, when PRIPPEL returned to the USSR, and these consisted of a brief visit to FRIPPEL's hotel room during FRIPPEL's visit to Moscow in the summer of 1962 and a short meeting in Odessa where FRIPPEL was on a cruise in February 1963. (Both of these meetings took place after NOSENKO, in his 1962 contacts with CIA, had exposed FRIPPEL as a KGB agent.) According to FRIPPEL, in the February 1963 meeting. NOSENKO phoned someone to ask whether he could accept PRIPPEI's invitation to board the ship; the answer was evidently no. NOSENKO denied this, insisting that there was no one in Odessa superior to nim, and as a Deputy Department Chief, he would not have to ask anyone anyway.NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and their wives dined at FRIPPEL'S house in Moscow some time after FRIPPEL's recruitment. NOSENKO acknowledged this to have been a most unusual procedure and could name no parallel in KGB agent handling. Asked why it happened, he said: "Because he invited me," and when asked why CHELNOKOV and his wife went along, NOSENKO said: "Because he was also involved in the recruitment."NOSENKO said he retained operational control of FRIPPEL, then still Moscow representative of a tourist firm, when NOSENKO shifted in June 1960 from the Tourist Department to the American Department; Later NOSENKO also maintained responsibility for contact during FRIPPEL's visits to the USSR after FRIPPEL'S PCS departure from Moscow in January 1961 and after his own return to the Tourist Department. According to FRIPPEL, who saw no sign of change in NOSENKO's reponsibilities during his relationship with him, he recalled meeting CHELNOKOV (who had stayed in the Tourist Department) alone, without NOSENKO, probably in 1960.FRIPPEL said he was queried by NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV only once concerning U.S. Embassy personalities, specifically on BOWDEN and WINTERS. NOSENKO, who claimed case officer responsibility for Embassy Security Officer ABIDIAN in 1960-1961 as well as for FRIPPEL said the two did not know each other; in fact, they met socially several times. NOSENKO could recall nothing which FRIPPEL ever reported to or did for the KGB, dismissing the subject on several occasions with: "He never gave anything of value." The only question NOSENKO posed when he came to FRIPPEL in August 1952, FRIPPEL said, was whether the agent knew what the newspaper editors he was escorting were going to ask KHRUSHCHEV in an interview. According to FRIPPEL, in the February 1963 meeting NOSENKO posed no questions and merely made polite conversation until FRIPPEL excused himself.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 102]
# TOP SECRET703. by the nature of his information about the four individual cases reviewed at length above:- In the BURGI case NOSENKO did not have knowledge of the extensive background information on the recruitment target which the KGE possessed at the time of the approach; or of other significant details in what NOSENKO described as an operation of greatest importance to the American Tourist Section and to himself personally. In addition, NOSENKO has admitted lying about his having received an award for his role in the recruitment of BURGI.- Regarding the DREW case, NOSENKO said he was chosen for the approach (made on the basis of homosexuality) because the regular case officer lacked operational experience. By April 1959, however, the KGB had arranged "hundreds" of homosexual compromises in the USSR, NOSENKO reported in another context. His earlier personal experience with Western targets had been limited to a secondary role in the BURGI case and a principal role in the HARRIS case, the latter not an approach on homosexual grounds. It is difficult to comprehend how NOSENKO would have qualified for the task whereas the case officer IVANOV would not.- There are gaps in NOSENKO's information about a number of significant aspects in the case, including staff planning and management of the operation, operational support arrangements, and on personnel of the outlying KGB units involved. NOSENKO was unable to explain why he was selected to make the approach to.- CHELNOKOV was the senior case officer for FRIPPEL. NOSENKO never met this agent alone while he resided in Moscow as the American Express Company representative, and NOSENKO reportedly acted on a supervisor's instructions at their later meeting in Odessa. Despite his occupation and his entree into the American community in Moscow, FRIPPEL reportedly was not exploited by the KGB against tourists or U.S. Government employees but was targetted to report on matters to which he had no access; hence there seems to have been no logical reason for the FRIPPEL case to have been transferred from the American Tourist Section to the U.S. Embassy Section and back again. Although available information verifies the continuity of NOSENKO as FRIPPEL's handler, it cannot be considered firm evidence of NOSENKO having been an officer in either of these sections and in fact might be interpreted as evidence that he was not.Similarly, while familiar with some but not all of the operational activities of the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV, NOSENKO failed to support his claim to being their American Tourist Section case officer; he has been unable to provide rudimentary background information of these two individuals, who allegedly were prominent in operations of the section. NOSENKO's statement that he retired the files of VOLKOV andTOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 103]
704. **YEFREMOV** because they were too well known is incompatible with his other reporting to the effect that neither took part in an operation between 1959 and early 1962.In further reference to **NOSENKO**'s claims to having been the case officer in these various operations, he has been unable to recount in any detail KGB staff procedures involved in these operations, such as name-tracing, coordinating with other components, obtaining approvals for action, etc. Finally, of his alleged 54 months of service in the American Tourist Section, **NOSENKO**'s described activity against foreigners accounts for only about three months; if the bulk of his time was spent with recruiting or handling Soviet-citizen agents, he might be expected to remember something about some of them. He can barely remember names (and only a few) has given confused accounts of their recruitment, remembers nothing about any of their specific operations or activities for the KGB, and knew no personality background data on any of them.Even if it were assumed that **NOSENKO** was a case officer of the American Tourist Section, his claim to the position of Deputy Chief cannot be substantiated. He himself could not explain his appointment to the job. He did not know about the CIA "legal travel" operations compromised to the KGB in 1958 and 1959 when he was allegedly in a supervisory capacity. **NOSENKO** knew nothing about the documents on such operations which BLAKE gave the KGB and which can be presumed to have been of the utmost interest to the American Tourist Section, among all KGB Headquarters elements. These documents offered material that could have proven valuable to the preparation of **NOSENKO**'s own paper on Western tourist operations; they were used in the genuine KGB paper written by the Tourist Department and passed to CIA by GOLITSYN. As with his status as a case officer in the American Tourist Section, **NOSENKO** the Deputy Chief could not describe how data on tourists was received, general and specific plans laid, events discussed, decisions made, and leads channeled.The foregoing paragraphs suggest the conclusion that **NOSENKO** was not a senior case officer or the Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section. While the methods of the Tourist Department are not independently known in detail, it is conceivable that what **NOSENKO** did on behalf of the KGB (not necessarily the American Tourist Section) could have been accomplished by a principal agent. These conclusions do not cast doubt about the facts presented by **NOSENKO** on the KGB investigation in the OSWALD case but merely rule out the possibility of **NOSENKO**'s having been involved with this case in any way prior to the assassination of President Kennedy.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 104]
6. U.S. Embassy Section (1960-1961)a. IntroductionFrom January 1960 until January 1962 NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the U.S. Erbassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, under KOVSHUK. This period (described in Pages 152-285) is the most significant in NOSENKO's account of his KGB career for a number of reasons:- The section is the specific unit working against the U.S. Embassy, by NOSENKO'S cwn staterents the KGB's most important counterintelligence target in the USSR. Its operations (characterized on Page 152) directly affect American security. The section has the two-fold purpose of knowing of and controlling all access of Embassy personnel to Soviet citizens and of collecting, assimilating, evaluating, and using information from all possible sources to recruit Americans stationed in Moscow.- NOSENKO's position as Deputy Chief of this section provided him his access to most of the major counter- intelligence information he has reported, including recruitments of foreign embassy officials and micro- phone operations against the U.S. Embassy. Most impor- tant, it provided NOSENKO with his authority for stating that there were no successful recruitments of or agents among official Americans in Moscow for this two-year period, or for a time both cefore and after. (This is the same point made by indirection in the CHEREPANOV papers; yet this view is contradicted by information from GOLITSYN. Although the latter did not serve in the U.S. Embassy Section, he knew members of it and gave leads to KGB operational interest in and possible recruitments of official Americans in the Moscow Embassy during this period. Some of these appear to be related to information items NOSEIKO nas provided.)- The apparent importance of NOSENKO's information on this period contrasts sharply with that from other periods. His accounts of recruitments in the tourist field covering the five years prior to this assignment and the two years following have been checked thoroughly and not one of them represents a penetration of any government; none has access to classified information; most were inactive, suspect, or already known to Western counterintelligence organs.- NOSENKO'S work against the U.S. Embassy is con- firmed by ![sensitive source] and less directly by other Soviet sourced reporting to CIA and the FBI. It is denied by GOLITSYN. (GOLITSYN has said that NOSENKO was not in the section during these years.)
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 105]
## b. Entry into the SectionNOSENKO has given a detailed account of how he came to be transferred into the U.S. Embassy Section, but he has never given a precise date, usually saying "January 1960" or "at the beginning of 1960."As described on Pages 153-154, the shift was made at GRIBANOV'S insistence and against NOSENKO's own personal wishes. GRIBANOV told NOSENKO during a personal interview, at which HOSENKO voiced his objections, that the transfer was part of his (GRIBANOV's) plans and was primarily to put new life into operations against American code clerks, the primary target of the Second Chief Directorate. GRIBANOV did not tell him why he, instead of another, had been selected for this job, although NOSENKO had the impression it was because of his achievements in the Tourist Department. (see Part VIII.D.5.). NOSENKO's transfer could not have been a result of his close personal relationship with GRIBANOV or because his father was a friend of GRIBANOV'S: NOSENKO has admitted that he exaggerated the closeness of his relationship with the Chief of the Second Chief Directorate and most recently (February 1965) said that he had few personal contacts with him outside of work; NOSENKO has also said that his father never met GRIBANOV.NOSENKO initially said that he relieved nobody on coming into the section. He eventually recalled, however, that BAKIIVALOV was his predecessor but left the section before he (NOSENKO) arrived. NOSENKO's confusion on this point, his description of how he assumed custody of certain files from BAKHVALOV although the latter had transferred to another department, and the opportunities NOSENKO had to name BAKIHVALOV as his predecessor before he eventually did so are described on Pages 154-156.## c. Functions as Deputy ChiefIn NOSENKO's view the transfer to become Deputy Chief of the section from the same position in another section was definitely an important promotion: He now became second-in-charge of the most important operational section of the entire Second Chief Directorate. AS KOVSHUK'S deputy, NOSENKO had the right and obligation to be aware of all activities in order to exercise his general supervisory functions and so as to be prepared to become the Acting Chief of the section when necessary.NOSENKO said that consequently nothing was hidden from him for the two years 1960 and 1961. He claimed to have had complete knowledge of the U.S. Embassy Section's activities during the relatively recent years of 1960 and 1961 and to know of all significant operational successes achieved in the years before and after this period. He has also_said he has told CIA all he knows of these activities. It was on this basis that he was able to say in 1965: "Tell Mr. McCone that there were no recruitments. I was there."When NOSENKO reported for duty, he and KOVSHUK agreed on a division of supervisory duties within the section. KOVSHUK was, in addition to his over-all responsibility for