Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 15]
# 98.## a. Agents Reporting on Military AttachesAsked in April 1964 to describe the agent network (agentura) at his disposal in operations against U.S. Military Attaches during this period which began in 1954, NOSENKO replied: "There were two maids, a cook, drivers*... about ten persons, plus the agent 'SERVIZNIY' and the one with the code name 'DMITRIYEV'... These additional two agents, about 12 or 13 agents altogether." With one exception, this network remained constant until NOSENKO transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section in mid-1955. He met each agent about once a week, except for the chauffeurs who were met three times a month in a safehouse or on the street. According to NOSENKO, this network was "just a supporting agentura, which very seldom was worthwhile," the main source of information on the Military Attaches being the microphones in their offices.**Newly added to the network while NOSLNKO held this position was a maid inserted to report on Army Attache Earl L. MICKELSON and his successor, Fillmore K. MEARNS. Her name, NOSENKO thought, was NOVIKOVA. She was an English-speaking university graduate but "hid her knowledge of English in order to overhear conversations or read letters without taking them outside."Besides NOVIKOVA, NOSENKO named one other maid who was his agent, Mariya NEVEROVA, code name "SHVEDOVA," and she was targetted against the Assistant Army Attache, Ira RICHARDS. He described NEVEROVA as a "little, old, thin woman," from whom he never obtained anything of interest. They met in a safehouse on Kuznetskiy Most.Of the KGB agents among the chauffeurs, NOSENKO identified Nikolay SHNYRYEV, who was used by various of the attaches. "He reported where they went, what they said, whether they took notes or photographs, whether they had unusual packages with them, and so on."When viewing photographs in September 1964, NOSELIKO identified Vladislav VOROBYEV as the agent "SERVIZNIY." He had been working in the Embassy since its establishment, starting first as a messenger boy and, in NOSENKO's time, performing clerical tasks. VOROBYEV had no direct connection with the Military Attaches, and NOSENKO said he himself did not know why he had been given VOROBYEV to handle in 1954. The main function of this agent was delivering to NOSENKO copies of the unclassified telephone listings of the Embassy, issued monthly."DMITRIYEV's" true name may have been Dmitriy KUKOLEV: NOSENKO saw this name on a 1962 phone list and thought, but was not sure, that this was his agent. An electrician who worked on the Embassy's electrical wiring systems and elevator, "DMITRIYEV" reported to NOSENKO on antenna wires and* The Military Attaches used a pool of five drivers at random, NOSENKO said. Apart from the permanent driver for the senior attache, none were targetted against individual members of the attache office.** See Part V.E.3.g. on electronic operations against the U.S. Embassy.
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# MICKELSONNOSENKO has identified Earl L. MICKELSON as a colonel and the Military Attache in Moscow during 1954 and 1955. PANKRATOV was the case officer originally handling MICKELSON, and the case was turned over to NOSENKO in 1954. When asked about agents who might have been working against MICKELSON, NOSENKO said that there was one cook, a KGB operational contact whose name he did not recall, and MICKELSON's maid, whose name NOSENKO believed was NOVIKOVA; the cook and NOVIKOVA went to work for MICKELSON after NOSENKO had left the U.S. Embassy Section. In addition to these two, the only other source reporting on MICKELSON was his chauffeur, whose name. NOŠENKO also did not remember. NOSENKO said that the KGB learned nothing interesting about MICKELSON from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance, and that no operational approach or recruitment was attempted. There was, in fact, no interesting or derogatory information on MICKELSON from any source.According to information in CIA files, MICKELSON was involved in at least two incidents inside the Soviet Union which NOSENKO has not reported. In May 1954 he was arrested in Tbilisi on the (false) charge of having photographed a bridge, but he persuaded the Militia not to press charges. In August 1954 NICKELSON was arrested again for illegal photographs south of KHARKOV; on this occasion he was held for two hours before being released.## MEARNSNOSENKO identified Fillmore K. MEARNS as MICKELSON's replacement and said that he was the responsible case officer. There were two agents and one operational contact working against EARNS. Of these, NOSENKO could recall the name only of NOVIKOVA, the same maid who reported earlier on MICKELSON. Besides being told to attempt to overhear MICKELSON's conversations NOVIKOVA was instructed to search his clothing and to copy any notes she might find, but she never overheard or found anything of interest to the KGB. NOSENKO recalled that MEARNS' personal effects were searched by the KGB while they were being shipped to Moscow from the United States, and that all his service records had been discovered and photographed.* NOSENKO described MEARNS as being more "active" in Moscow than MICKELSON had been and said that information from concealed microphones showed him to have a strong character. Nothing of interest concerning him was received from these microphones or from telephone taps.CIA has no derogatory or otherwise significant information on MEARNS, who replaced MICKELSON.## RICHARDSNOSENKO identified Ira B. RICHARDS as a lieutenant colonel who served as the Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. NOSENKO said that he was the case officer working againstNOSENKO has told this same story about MICKELSON.
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# 101.RICHARDS. The one agent reporting on RICHARDS whom NOSENKO could name was the maid Mariya NEVEROVA, KGB cryptonym *"SHVEDOVA,"* but she had never provided any worthwhile information about RICHARDS. In addition, some Soviet drivers reported on RICHARDS, but nothing useful was obtained from them.According to CIA records, RICHARDS served in Moscow from July 1954 to July 1956. There was a microphone in the office which he shared first with MICKELSON and later with MEARNS. RICHARDS confirmed that Mariya NEVEROVA was his maid and described her as a "mousy" woman who had a heart attack during the period she was employed by him. (This incident was not recalled by NOSENKO.) For about four months of his Moscow tour, RICHARDS took Russian-language lessons from Ludmila GROMAKOVA in his apartment. During these lessons, RICHARDS often discussed labor conditions and wages in the United States and, on one occasion, had her record her speech on his tape recorder. GROMAKOVA was pregnant and unmarried at the time. (NOSENKO has named GROMAKOVA as a KGB agent in another context but has not mentioned her contacts with RICHARDS.)* RICHARDS identified one "Volodya" (i.e., first name Vladimir) as his principal driver. About 62 years old in 1954, Volodya was the son of a rich jeweler in Moscow during the Revolution. Volodya himself was well educated and, on one occasion while picnicking outside Moscow, he spoke intelligently with RICHARDS about the Revolution, propaganda, and news media. (NOSENKO did not know of Volodya.) Further details from RICHARDS are given in the following section on FELCHLIN.(iv) FELCHLINNOSENKO identified Howard L. FELCHLIN as a lieutenant colonel who served as Assistant Army Attache in Moscow and stated that he was FELCHLIN's case officer. FELCHLIN was in the Soviet Union during 1954 and part of 1955, until being declared *persona non grata.* NOSENKO did not recall the name of any agents specifically targetted against FELCHLIN, although he thought FELCHLIN must have had a maid and she would have been a KGB agent. Additionally, NOSENKO said, the Assistant Military Attaches shared a pool of cars and drivers, and these were his agents. Unable to recall the precise date of FELCHLIN's expulsion, NOSENKO related it to some event regarding Soviets stationed in the United States for which the Soviet Government decided to reply in kind. NOSENKO was imprecise as to the pretext used to expel FELCHLIN, but said the action was based on information which had been accumulated from a number of sources and incidents. For example, FELCHLIN had been caught taking some photographs and a report had been written; along with other similar indications of FELCHLIN's activities and reports of agents in contact with FELCHLIN, the report was filed away for possible future use. NOSENKO was questioned further on FELCHLIN during the February 1965 interrogations. He said then that FELCHLIN alone had been declared *persona non grata,* and that no other attaches had been involved. NOSENKO[^1] See Part V.E.3.d., which discusses coverage of John ABIDIAN, to whom she also taught Russian.[^1]:
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102. explained his having but few details concerning this action by the fact that it took place after NOSENKO had transferred from the American Department to the Tourist Department in June 1955. NOSENKO knew nothing of FELCHLIN'S background.Other sources have reported that FELCHLIN visited the USSR as a merchant seaman and a diplomatic courier before arriving in July 1953 as Army Attache. He served in the latter capacity for one year, until July 1954, when he was asked to leave the country. (He had previously served in Austria and West Germany and had been in official contact with known GRU officers at both posts, as well as in the United States.) During his entire tour in Moscow he was the subject of intensive KGB interest. Shortly after his arrival, in September 1953, FELCHLIN, with fellow Assistant Army Attache Martin J. MANHOFF, and two Air Force attaches took a train trip to Siberia, the first such trip permitted American attaches in many years. Six months later, on 25 March 1954, the Soviet newspaper *Trud* carried an article saying that FELCHLIN and his companions had lost some of their "spy documents" on the train. FELCHLIN said this charge was false. On another occasion, while travelling with a British Military Attache, FELCHLIN returned to his train compartment to find a scantily clad Soviet female in his bunk. (NOSENKO recalls neither of these incidents.) In June 1954, while in the company of Lieutenant Colonel F.J. YEAGER, an Assistant Army Attache, FELCIHLIN was arrested in Kiev by a Soviet Army officer for photographing a military target. (NOSENKO has never mentioned YEAGER's name; when told the name and asked for an identification, NOSENKO said that he had heard it and that he thought YEAGER was the Air Force Attache.) A large crowd gathered and, after some jostling, FELCHLIN and YEAGER were taken to a Militia station where they were ordered to sign a confession. They were held eleven hours, and their arrest caused the American ambassador to deliver a strong protest note. FELCALIN was told on 3 July 1954 that he had 48 hours to get out of the Soviet Union. No specific charges were mentioned. Major Walter A. MCKINNEY, the U.S. Air Attache and one of FELCHLIN'S travelling companions at the time the "spy notes" were allegedly lost, was declared *persona non grata* at the same time.*Queried concerning SHNYRYEV, RICHARDS and FELCHLIN immediately recognized his photograph and name as one of the general chauffeurs assigned to the Office of the Military Attache at the Moscow Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his first trip outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV. He remarked that the* Ambassador BOHLEN Successfully insisted, against initial Soviet refusal, that his personal plane be allowed into the USSR to fly FELCHLIN and MCKINNEY out. In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked to describe the unusual circumstances under which FELCHLIN left. NOSENKO said he could not, inasmuch as he was no longer in the American Department at the time. Told that the expulsion took place in 1954, NOSENKO said this was not the correct date.
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103. attaches referred to SHNYRYEV as either "Nikolay Perviy" (Nicholas the First) or "Nikolay Vtoroy" (Nicholas the Second) to distinguish him from the other chauffeur with the same name. FELCHLIN said that SHYRYEV drove primarily for the Military Attache himself, but sometimes drove for the Assistant Military Attaches, and he remembered that SHNYRYEV was not well, suffered from war wounds, and had continuing chest or lung trouble. (Asked whether SHNYRYEV had any medical problem, NOSENKO said he was not aware of any.)FELCHLIN said his maid Dora FEDOPOVA (not specifically named by NOSENKO) was in her 50's. When she spoke with FELCHLIN about a job, she asked for about 120 rubles a month, which seemed excessive, so FELCHLIN offered 80. FEDOROVA refused and left. Two days later she returned and accepted. She spoke little English. Other maids came to the back door of FELCHLIN's apartment to "chat" with her, and suspecting that they were reporting to FEDOROVA, FELOILIN teased her about it. FEDOROVA's previous employer at the Embassy gave her full name to columnist Drew PEARSON with a statement that she was one of the chief spies and the 1ccal "boss" of the Embassy network. PEARSON printed the allega- tion. In the summer of 1953 or 1954, according to FELCHLIN, the maid approached FELCHLIN with the article, waved it in his face, and accused him of being PEARSON'S source. (NOSENKO did not recognize FEDOROVA's name and did not recall hearing or reading of this incident.)(v) BENSONNOSENKO identified his target John S. BENSON as a major and Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. He did not recall the names of any agents working against BENSON but said that BENSON was with MULE and STROUD (see below) in Stalingrad in 1955 when all three were caught by the KGE with electronic "spying" devices. They were declared persona non grata. The KGB had no other derogatory information on BENSON from any other source.(vi) STROUDNOSENKO identified William R. STROUD as a captain and an Assistant Army Attache. The only agents working against him were the Military Attaches' drivers. From concealed micro- phones, the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned before STROUD's arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use of electronic spying apparatus. Ile was with BENSON and MULE in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata along with them (see below). Other than this, NOSENKO said, the KGB knew nothing unusual or interesting about STROUD from any source.CIA files show that STROUD was, with BENSON and MULE, the victim of the Soviets' seizure of technical equipment in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata on 7 May 1955. On 31 January 1955 he travelled to Kharkov from Mos- cow with First Secretary Frank SISCOE to interview an Ameri- can defector living there. (According to NOSENKO, SISCOE was suspected by the KGB of being a CIA officer; SISCOE was, in fact, a CIA cooptee.)
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# MULENOSENKO identified Walter MULE as an Assistant Army Attache and said that he was the case officer responsible for him. NOSENKO described an operational approach to MULE, in which he himself participated: In 1953 or 1954 there had been several defection approaches to Soviets in the United States on the basis of money and the promise of a new life. After the KGB Second Chief Directorate decided to try the same measures, MULE was selected because he was only a captain despite his lengthy service in the Army and because material from concealed microphones indicated that he was often disparaged by the other attaches. When MULE received letters from home, he threw them in the trash, and the maids turned these over to the KGB; from this mail it was understood that MULE did not have a house in the United States but lived with his family in a trailer. The father of two children, MULE had sent his wife from Moscow to Germany for an abortion, as a third child would have imposed too great an economic burden. On the basis of all this the KGB appointed N.M. KORODIN, a recruiter of the American Department, to attempt to defect MULE. Together with BORODIN, KOVSHUK, and L.A. LEBEDEV (from the Second Chief Directorate's special technical section) KOSENKO travelled to Leningrad for the operation. LEBEDEV installed a clock containing a concealed camera as well as microphones in MULE's hotel room, and BORODIN entered the room to await MULE's return. When MULE started to enter the room, he caught sight of BORODIN and tried to back out, but NOSENKO and KOVSHUK closed the door from the hall and prevented his escape. BORODIN reviewed for MULE the facts the KGB had accumulated about his lack of success in the Army, the disdain of his fellow attaches, and his shortage of money and then offered him a job as a "consultant." BORODIN had either $5,000 or $10,000 in an envelope to encourage MULE to accept. According to NOSENKO, MULE refused outright, telling BORODIN to get out, that he would not talk to him, and that he was a captain in the American Army.CIA files show that MULE reported this incident. He said that he was locked in his hotel room and subjected to a recruitment attempt by an MVD agent calling himself Jack SIEGAL, who offered him $10,000 for "work" on a long-range basis.. SIEGAL emphasized that MULE would not be required to procure documents from the Embassy, and according to MULE, SIEGAL was aware of facts concerning MULE's personal life that could have been obtained only from listening devices in MULE's apartment or office. SIEGAL left after about 20 minutes, having warned MULE not to report the incident. MULE was unable to identify NOSENKO's photograph.## PNG of BENSON, MULE, and STROUDAfter NOSENKO had been transferred to the Tourist Department in 1955, BENSON, MULE and STROUD were the targets of a KGB operation which resulted in all three men being*Precisely the same role was played by NOSENKO in the recruitment approach to James STORSBERG, according to NOSENKO.(See Part V.E.3.c.ii.)
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# 105.declared persona non grata. NOSENKO gave the followingaccount of this incident: For some time the Second ChiefDirectorate had been trying to acquire a small, convenientpiece of electronic equipment which American Intelligenceofficers were known to be using during their travels insidethe Soviet Union. As early as the beginning of 1954, theAmerican Department had been given authorization from theCentral Committee of the Communist Party to steal thisequipment from the Americans, provided that the success ofsuch an operation was assureds Before his transfer to theTourist Department in 1955, NOSENKO himself had helped todevelop plans for the operation and had even arranged anabortive attempt to steal the equipment from an attache ata railroad station outside Moscow. While BENSON, MULE,and STROUD were on one of their trips (after NOSENKO's trans-fer) it was learned that they had the equipment with them,and the KCB decided to take it from them in Stalingrad.To carry out the operation, Lieutenant General P.V. FEDOTOV,then Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, and A.M.GORBATENKO, Chief of the American Department, flew withother personnel from the American Department to Stalingrad.The hotel rooms of BENSON, STROUD and MULE were watchedconstantly from a visual observation post, and it was notedthat they never ato in the hotel restaurant but always intheir rooms. It was also noted that the apparatus wasplaced under a pillow before they began to eat. While theywere scated at the table having dinner, therefore, the KGBofficers suddenly entered the room and seized the equipment.In order to partially cover the illegality of this act, itwas decided to make a show of expelling BENSON, MULE andSTROUD from the Soviet Union, and this was done via thepersona non grata action.According to information from other sources, the equip-ment was seized from BENSON, MULE, and STROUD on 5 May 1955,and the three were declared persona non grata on 7 May (amonth before NOSENKO claimed to have transferred to theTourist Department). When the 7 May date was given toNOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations, he repliedthat the operation was handled at a higher level, that hedid not directly participate in it, but that he had beeninvolved in the earlier planning to seize the equipment.It was pointed out to him that he had always said he was inthe Tourist Department at the time of this operation, andthat he had consistently said that he transferred from theAmerican to the Tourist Department in June 1955. NOSENKOshrugged, but offered no comment.*The source Kaarlo R. TUOMI, who served in the UnitedStates as a GRU Illegal from 1958 to 1963, reported to CIAin 1964 that while working as a KGB informant in Kirov inthe early 1950's, he was targetted against three U.S. Mili-tary Attaches travelling on a train. TUOMI believed thathe might have contributed information leading to the three* Americans (as he later read in the Soviet press) being de-  clared persona non grata. It would appear that TUOMI's  targets were BENSON, MULE, and STROUD.
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# 107.D. June 1955 to January 1960 (Tourist Department)## 1. IntroductionBy his account™ NOSENKO served in the American-Canadian-British Section of the Tourist Department,* KGB Second Chief Directorate, from June 1955 (shortly after the department was created to operate with and against foreign travellers in the USSR) until his transfer to another department in that directorate in January 1960. He was a case officer until appointed Deputy Chief of the Section about June 1958. In statements made prior to April 1966, NOSENKO claimed to have been twice promoted during this four and one-half year period--to captain in July 1956 and to major in August or September 1959--but in a signed statement of April 1966 he said he remained a captain from 1956 until his defection.NOSENKO has described his personal and direct participation in the section's activities as consisting of:- Recruitment of two Soviet nationals as homosexual agents,** with NOSENKO their handler from the outset until they were dropped in 1962 or 1963.- Recruitment and handling of Soviets as agents targeted against American tourists; their number varied from eight to 14 and many were employed by Inturist.- Operations involving 14 foreigners who visited the USSR for various lengths of time.- Recruitment and handling of the American Express Company representative in Moscow, whom NOSENKO continued to meet following his reassignment in January 1960.- Decision in October 1959 that Lee Harvey OSWALD was of no operational interest to the KGB, and subsequent participation in the KGB investigation of OSWALD's activities in the USSR.Each of these categories is discussed separately below.## 2. Soviet Homosexual AgentsBecause he had been seen meeting a foreigner in a public lavatory in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB concluded that A.I. VOLKOV might be a homosexual and hence of some operational value. The KGB therefore mounted an operation which verified this possibility in 1987: A homosexual agent of the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department provoked VOLKOV into a compromising situation. Then VOLKOV, who had previously been a KGB agent but was at this time deactivated, was called to KGB Headquarters where, after NOSENKO interrogated him, he admitted his homosexuality and agreed to[^1] These components are also known as the First Section and Seventh Department, respectively.[^2] This term refers to agents whose homosexuality is exploited by the KGB against certain male targets.[^1]: These components are also known as the First Section and Seventh Department, respectively.[^2]: This term refers to agents whose homosexuality is exploited by the KGB against certain male targets.