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711. his lack of information concerning a sixth (GARLAND) is discussed in detail in Pages 166 through 219. NOSENKO'S information on a number of other cases, less important in his opinion, is described in the tabulation of American case leads given on Pages 364-410. Certain of these cases are further examined below to determine whether NOSENKO'S knowledge equates with details which the deputy and acting chief of the U.S. Embassy Section could reasonably be expected to know and retain.(1) The STORSBERG CaseThe operation against STORSBERG (Pages 166-185) was, NOSENKO said, the most important case he had as supervisor of code clerk operations. The KGB, while able to break certain State Department ciphers, had had no success with military cryptographic systems, and therefore NOSENKO "dropped everything for a year" to involve himself with the development of James STORSBERG, the military code clerk at the U.S. Embassy. The following facts are pertinent to an evaluation of NOSENKO's story of this case.NOSENKO originally raised the STORSBERG case indirectly at his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962. He told how GOLITSYN, during a visit to the American Department in 1960, at a time NOSENKO was on leave, had requested permission to use a U.S. Embassy Section agent, a Finn, in his own opera- tions in Helsinki. During his discussions in the American Department, GOLITSYN learned that this Finnish agent was being used in operations against Embassy employees living in America House. NOSENKO said that the KGB realized that GOLITSYN had passed this information on to the Americans following his defection, for the regulations governing visits to America House by third nationals had been tightened. At this meeting NOSENKO did not name the Finnish agent or specify his involvement in any particular operational acti- vity nor did he date the visit by GOLITSYN.Later in the 1962 meetings NOSENKO gave a detailed summary of the Finnish agent's involvement in the unsuccess- ful recruitment attempt against an American military code clerk. NOSENKO, without naming the Finn or the American, said that he personally conducted the recruitment confron- tation with GRIBANOV present. These early accounts were full of quotes of what NOSENKO said to the American and vice versa. descriptions of the American's reaction to the confron- tation, and statements of NOSENKO'S admiration for the Ameri- can despite his refusal to work. Following his defection, NOSENKO recounted the case in even greater detail, in fact, in more detail than he gave for any other case. He identi- fied the Finn as PREISFREUND ard the American as STORSBERG and described and referred to the case whenever possible (over 50 times). When asked for details of other code clerk cases, for example, he repeatedly diverted to discussion of the STORSBERG case to illustrate how the KGB operated against code clerks in general.After defecting NOSENKO denied that he personally con- fronted STORSBERG. He said that his personal role was limited to directing STORSBERG into the hotel room where the approach vas nade; after first saying that he had never claimed any other role, he admitted that he may have been "painting"