Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 22]
# Top Secret22 June 1964 (continued)the American Embassy in the past, NOSENKO would also be familiar with the number of microphones which had been installed in the Embassy by the KGB and the locations of these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a department, NOSENFO would normally have had access to a telephone directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the KGB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a formidable one in the minds of other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO travelled in a rather influential circle of friends in Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. All these comments were cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an "important catch" for American Intelligence, but no one in the KGB really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO had concerning the KGB.29 June 1964GOLITSYN (from personal acquaintance): NOSENKO, the son of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, was a KGB officer who had worked in the American Department and the Seventh Department of the Second Chief Directorate. GOLITSYN, while on his own First Chief Directorate business, met NOSENKO two or three times in the American Embassy Section in 1953, and had seen him occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959. When GOLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO replied that he was assigned to the Seventh Department. NOSENKO served in the American Embassy Section from 1953 until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible for KGB coverage of American military personnel in Moscow during 1953. For the remainder of his service in the Embassy Section until 1957 or 1958, NOSENKO may have had the same responsibilities or may have been working against other Embassy personnel or correspondents, but he was definitely in the American Department during the entire period. In 1957 or 1958 NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department, and was a senior case officer there as of 1959. NOSENKO did not work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate American Department at any time during 1960; GOLITSYN visited the Embassy Section on at least three occasions from early 1960 to early 1961, and would have known if NOSENKO had been in the Section, particularly if NOSENKO had been Deputy Chief. C.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as assistant of the Chief of the Section during this period.
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 23]
# Top Secret(Annex A)29 June 1964 (continued)Comment: NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section in 1955 and was assigned to the Seventh Department until 1960, when he returned to the Embassy Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO did not identify COLITSYN's photograph and had denied since defection that he has ever met or even seen him.June 1964According to a sensitive source "Just after" HOSENKO's defection V.S. MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee travelled to Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of the defection and urged greater vigilance against such acts. The defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEREMEYEVA, a KGB secretary in Geneva. It was rumored that some sixty Soviet officials stationed abroad would be transferred from their assignment as a consequence of the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet Mission in Geneva, speculated that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and would therefore have to return to Moscow. Yu. I. GUK who was known to Source had been discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's travel to Geneva. According to one rumor, the chief of the Department in which NOSENKO had been employed, would also lose his job.by a sensitive sourceComment: MEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerly/stationed in New York City, was said by to be one of those from the CPSU Central Committee who conducted interviews with KGB personnel going abroad. identified MEDVEDEV.Another sensitive source23# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 24]
Top Secret(Annex A)June 1964 (continued)Comment: (Continued) a Counselor of the Soviet Mission at the United Nations, as the Communist Party organizer and possibly a member of the KGB, but said that MEDVEDEV's role is not important and that he worked mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. POCHANKIN, who NOSENKO had identified as a KGB officer, was still in Geneva in December 1966.29 July 1964According to a sensitive source, (from unnamed sources, presumably KCR officers): An investigating commission of the CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances surrounding NOSINKO's defection has thus far been responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate employees. These include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief of the Second Chief Directorate at the time of the defection, GRIBANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB. It was felt that GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans to : defect. Three of CRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General BANNIK [BANNIKOV). Of the 11 other Second Chief Directorate employees expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO details of operations in which they were working. S.M. GOLUBEV, a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for Moscow because the investigating commission had determined that Yu. I. GUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEY told NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal Residency. GOLUBEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB384Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 25]
# Top Secret(Annex A)29 July 1964 (continued)Headquarters sometime in the past, but subsequently NOSENKO and GOLUBLV were given different assignments within the KGB and thereafter did not associate with one another in the course of their daily activites.Corrent: NOSENKO retracted in 1965 his earlier claims that GRIBANOV had been instrumental in his advancement and assignments. NOSENKO identified by name and photograph GOLUBEV, whom he had known personally since 1959, but NOSENKO said he had never worked with him at KGB Headquarters since GOLUBEV had always been in the First Chief Directorate. GOLUBEV left for the USSR on 28 August 1964.July-August 1964According to a sensitive source:information: The first information about NOSENKO was from KGB Headquarters which reported the conclusions of the commission which had been appointed to prepare the damage report on NOSENKO's defection. The letter, which was very brief, said that "the loss was very great and some new forms of work should be created to be efficient in the future". The Legal Residency had not before received any "reports or commentaries on NOSENKO's escape".385Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 26]
# Top Secret(Annex A)November 1964Asked while visiting the United States if the Russian people had been told of the ABEL-POWERS exchange, Soviet mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE replied to an American acquaintance that they had not been told officially but they knew about it since there was "quite a grapevine" in Moscow. It was in this way,, GAMKRELIDZE stated, that he learned of the NOSENKO defection and of its significance.According to the "grapevine", the defection was very damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO was the Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities of all Soviet agents in the United States.386Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 27]
# Top Secret(Annex A)November 1964 (continued)Comment: GAMKRFLIDZE is suspected of having connections with Soviet Intelligence because of his statements, actions, and unusual freedom of solitary movement while on visits to the United States. GAMKRELIDZE rebuffed a CIA recruitment attempt in 1964, but added that he "welcomed the opportunity to meet with an American Intelligence officer...to compare the Soviet Intelligence officers he had met with their American counterparts". During that 1964 meeting GAMKRELIDZE again raised the subject of NOSENKO, describing him as "obviously a traitor to his country".December 1964Nikolay RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's/roommate in Geneva at the time of his defection, told that he had been interrogated by the KGB in connection with NOSENKO's defection, and that he had later attended the Moscow trial in which NOSENKO was sentenced to death in absentia. RESHETNYAK reported to the dismissal of large numbers of KGB officers, including GRIBANOV and GUK. From what RESHETNYAK said, thought the KGB might go so far387Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 28]
# Top Secret(Annex A)December 1964 (continued)as to send someone to the United States to locate and kill NOSENKO. later identified RESHETNYAK as a KGB officer.) SourceComment: NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the staff of the Disarmament Delegation.29 January 1965According to a sensitive source (from conversations with unrecalled KGE officers : It is common knowledge among F.GB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and is now on pension, partial rather than full, as a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being considered for assignment to Geneva (in 1964), a summary statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained considerable. "compromising information", concerning NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it, and added the nots- tion: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO's father.Comment: NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOV was responsible for sending him to Geneva in 1964, but after retracting his claim that GRIBANOV had played any special role in his assignments, he asserted that BANNIKOV approved the 1964 trip. NOSENKO denies that his father and GRIBANOV were acquainted.388Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 29]
# Top Secret(Annex A)8 February 1965According to a sensitive source from a KGB officerPrior to NOSENKO's defection he was Deputy to the Chief of a department in the Second Chief Directorate. While working in the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow, on three separate occasions participated in conferences between "important people" of the Second Chief Directorate and the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these. Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank of captain in the ACB. attributed this (the disparity between job and rank) to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO.Comment: NOSENKO has never identified NOSENKO always claimed that he had been a lieutenant colonel in the KCB until October 1966, when he retracted that claim and asserted that he had been only a captain.According to a sensitive source from a KGB officerGRIBANOV has been dismissed from the KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living on a small persion. His dismissal occurred immediately after NOSENKO's defection. In addition, not less than 50 other people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment has not yet been approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of his deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK.389TS No. 197124
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 30]
# Top Secret(Annex A)8 February 1965 (continued)Corrent: GRIBANOV was reported in operational contact with a senior Western diplomat until late autumn 1964 (almost a year after NOSENKO's defection, when he turned over that contact to another KGB officer.9 February 1965According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer: The amount of damage caused by NOSENKO's defection is "unpredictable". NOSENKO knew few empicyees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad, but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by virtue of seeing them in the dining room which is reserved for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.Early June 1965According to a sensitive source (from conversations with KGS officers: Major General BANNIKOV is currently temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having replaced GRIBANOV who was expelled from the KGB because he supported NOSENKO in his career. GRIBANOV is working in a small city outside Moscow as the chief of security at an unimportant military plant and is now a "nothing".390Top SecretTS No. 197124Cnov
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 31]
# Top Secret(Annex A)15 July 1965According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer who attended the Moscow meeting described): A meeting of all First Chief Directorate personnel at KGB Headquarters was held on 15 July 1965. The meeting was devoted to the circumstances of the expulsion of the Chief of the Second (British) Department of the First Chief Directorate, Ye. A. TARABRIN, about three and a half acaths earlier. I.A. BELOV and other officers also attended the meeting. According to official statements made at the meeting, after the defection of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to determine which employees knew him and the nature of their relationship. During this TARABRIN was questioned; he said he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of limited contacts within the KGB. The investigation determined, however, that PARABRIN attended several parties at which NOSENKO was present. Girls invited by NOSENKO were also there.  Thereafter, TARABRIN was afforded a hearing and was accussed of willfully concealing vital information. As a result he was expelled from the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights.Comment:NOSENKO had most recently asserted that he met GRIBANOV socially only three times during his KGB service, and on each occasion TARABRIN was present. NOSENKO said he twice provided girls for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN, once in October or November 1963 in circumstances similar to those referred to. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of "Service No. 2", the reorganized Counterintelligence Department of the First Chief Directorate.391# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 32]
Top Secret(Annex A)Summer 1965 According to a sensitive sourceAs a result of NOSENKO's defection, many KGB officers were punished, expelled from the Party, and these included KGB Chairman SEROV, and Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV had been expelled from the Party and from the KGB. GRIBANOV had been especially friendly with NOSENKO, had given him many privileges, and they were "buddies and night buddies".Comment: SEMICHASTYY, not SEROV, was KGB Chairman in 1965. SEROV became head of the GRU in 1958.Winter 1965-1966Source, aself-professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agent (from KGB officer V.G. SVIRIN, a colleague of her husband at the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKKNR) in 1960-1962. Source said that SVIRIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations against the American Embassy in Moscow):NOSENKO's father was a Minister or General and his mother was Jewish and "always involved in some blackmarketeering". NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a "civilian" connected somehow with the KGB. When NOSENKO defected, everyone said he was detestable. NOSENKO told the Americans about the microphones and things (sic) in the Embassy.
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 33]
# Top Secret(Annex A)Winter 1965-1966 (continued).Comment:Source's allegation is the single report from any source describing NOSENKO as other than a KGB officer.March: 1966According to a sensitive source,(from unidentified sources in Moscow): NOSENKO, Source who was not personally known to, was an important boss in the KGB. When NOSENKO was a young man, he was in the GRU Military Academy and was then sent to the GRU Information Department for a short time; in all, perhaps for a year. NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person while in the GRU and "not very good". He was to have been discharged from the GRU; however, his father, who was a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KGB. It was the opinion of persons to whom talked that NOSENKO had given very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information which included all means of KGB coverage of people in Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc. Based on NOSENKO's information the American Embassy found many of the microphones.393# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 34]
# Top SecretMarch 1966 (continued)Content: NOSENKO has claimed that he rejected an offer to attend the Military Diplomatic Academ. (which he, like called the GRU Military Academy), by choice accepting assignment to the Far East on entry to the GRU in 1951. At the time, the Military Diplomatic Academy was a four-year course; if NOSENKO did attend the school, he could not have served as the claimed in the GRU. Source is the sole source (besides NOSENKO) who alleged NOSENKO served in the GRU.394# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 35]
Top Secret(Arney A)![illegible text]395Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 36]
# Top Secret(Annex A)Mid-1966Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV, a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine *Paris Match*. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". AS KOROLEV spoke only broken French and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the matter at that time.Comment: KOROLEV is believed identical with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press International Moscow correspondent, Henry SHAPIRO, whom both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. KOROLEV has travelled previously to Brussels as a correspondent for the Soviet publication *Sputnik*, and to Japan and the United States as a correspondent for *Novosti*, the Soviet news Agency. The offer by an official Soviet press representative of information on a "Soviet secret agent", which turned out to refer to NOSENKO, is without precedent.October 1966Soviet journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with an interpreter to renew his offer to *Paris Match* editors to provide a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent". The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their396Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 37]
# Top Secret(Annex A)October 1966 (continued)Life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background statement KOROLEV provided *Paris Match* editors stated: "NOSENKO, about 36-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police organization, defected to the USA without his family about two years ago and asked for political asylum in the U.S.: it was granted to him. This was the most serious defeat of the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espionage and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquainted with the country's leading families and homes. NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident (the defection). Very soon the wife will apply to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is possible that this case will be given such publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA." KOROLEV displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family could be obtained and that interviews with them and with others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a *Paris Match* correspondent.Comment:A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon the wife's request.28 January 1967According to a sensitive source (from personal knowledge): Referring to his own knowledge of KGB organization, said if NOSENKO heard his explanation, he would call ![redacted] a child, since NOSENKO knew these matters better than ![redacted] because he had served at KGB Headquarters longer.Source397Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 38]
# Top Secret(Annex A)February 1967According to a sensitive source (from unidentified GRU sources in Moscow):NOSENKO worked only in KU Information Department of the GRU, and only for about five or six months, after which he went to the KGB.May 1967According to a sensitive source:The KGB assumes that NOSENKO divulged the whole system of surveillance of Americans. He worked on it, knew all about it and exposed the whole system of work. He knew all the posts, the sources (few words unclear) he knew all the surveillance groups and knew surveillants by sight.According to a sensitive source:When NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Department he worked only the Center (Headquarters) in Moscow. He worked badly there, and received bad efficiency reports, as a result of which he had arguments. Then with his father's help he went to the KGB.5 June 1967According to a sensitive source:There had been some KGB suspicions of Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was in Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts which he had not reported, and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva to investigate him. Rezident KULEBYAKIN is still suspicious of SHAKHOV.Comment: NOSENKO claims he was sent to Geneva in 1962 to investigate SHAKHOV.398Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 0]
FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: CASE OF YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO: (835 PAGE STUDY (VOL.1) PAGES 1-84 (PARTS I, II, III + IV)INCLUSIVE DATES:CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: SEROOM:DELETIONS, IF ANY: ONGOING OPERATIONS MATERIAL| DATE RECEIVED | DATE RETURNED | REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME) | SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL || ------------- | ------------- | ------------------------ | ------------------------------- || 11 MAY 1978   |               | KEN KLEIN                |                                 || 16 May        |               | Ken Klein                |                                 || 5 Sept 78     |               | Johanna Smith            | Johanna Smith                   |NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE
[104-10210-10037.pdf — page 1]
TOP SECRETThe Case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKOTOP SECRETFebruary 1967