Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 189]
Page 194 of the previous summary relates information from NOSENKO that GRYAZNOV went to E… Berlin in early 1960 to obtain two German women who could be used against the residents of American House. During current interviews, this matter has been again covered with NOSENKO. According to NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV arranged for these two women, agents of the Berlin KGB Residentura, to visit Moscow under false documentation, one as a West German and the other as an Austrian. NOSENKO further identified the "West German" agent, "HANNA," as having the cover of a journalist, and stated he believed "HANNA" had met MORONE at American House. In a recent interview, MORONE confirmed that in early 1961 he had met a West German girl at American House who claimed to be a journalist. The statements of MORONE therefore appear to substantiate the report of NOSENKO.Concerning the agent documented as an Austrian, NOSENKO reported that she was queried about her passport at American House and as a result the KGB returned her to East Germany without further attempts to use her at American House. NOSENKO places this incident in the same time period as the "HANNA" case; i.e., 1960 - 1961. He has never suggested any connection with ZUJUS, nor is there reason to assume that he could be referring to the experience of ZUJUS since this took place in the summer of 1962, after NOSENKO had left the American Embassy Section.27
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 190]
It was the conclusion of the previous summary that NOSENKO did not know enough about ZUJUS or his background to have exercised any supervision in the development of ZUJUS. Granted that NOSENKO did not know many details regarding ZUJUS the fact is that NOSENKO left the First Section, First Department, at the end of 1961 at which time any supervisory functions of NOSENKO terminated. ZUJUS, who did not arrive in Moscow until September 1961, remained in Moscow until January 1963. NOSENKO could hardly be held responsible for knowing anything about ZUJUS after 1 January 1962.Pages 165 - 169 of the previous summary contain a synopsis of previous information from NOSENKO in regard to Paul JENNER.Basically, NOSENKO had reported that when the KGB learned that Paul JENNER who was thought to be a code clerk, was coming to Moscow through Helsinki, a plan was made to send Vadim V. KCSOLAPOV to Helsinki to travel on the same train as JENNER to Moscow. A female agent of GRYAZNOV was to be placed on this train at Vyborg after the train entered the USSR. The female agent was to become acquainted with JENNER as a part of a future operation against JENNER in Moscow, and KOSOLAPOV was also to become acquainted with JENNER.NOSENKO has stated that the operation was successful, that both KOSOLAPOV and the female agent made the acquaintance of JENNER.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 191]
and that he, NOSENKO, read the report submitted by KOSOLAPOV on the trip from Helsinki to Moscow.06[JENNER] after arriving in Moscow, reported that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russians, "a boy and a girl, probably university students," who struck up a conversation. According to06[JENNER] they both said that they might see06[JENNER] in Moscow. About three months later06[JENNER] reported being approached again by the same girl, this time at the Moscow airport where he had gone on courier business. There was a short conversation and she gave06[JENNER] a phone number, insisting that he call her. The woman also advised06[JENNER] not to mention the conversation to anyone. NOSENKO has stated that in an effort to follow up the initial train acquaintance, the KGB had arranged for the female agent to encounter06[JENNER] at the Moscow railroad station or airport when he went alone to meet couriers.Insofar as is known,06[JENNER] has never been shown a photograph of KOSOLAPOV. Although KOSOLAPOV was approximately 34 years of age in 1960, his photograph and remarks by NOSENKO indicate that in appearance he was much younger and that he could have passed as a university student.29SECRET00011898/BR
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 192]
During current interviews, NOSENKO has repeated the same general story as regards Paul JENNER he still insists that KOSOLAPOV was on the same train with JENNER from Helsinki. Collateral information raises difficulties here, however: Finnish train manifests indicate that JENNER was the only Moscow-bound passenger on the 31 March 1960 train from Finland to Moscow, and that one Viktor KOLOSSOV (a name NOSENKO has identified as an alias used by KOSOLAPOV) was on the 2 April 1960 train to Moscow.The above obvious discrepancy has not been and cannot be clarified with available information. KOSOLAPOV (KOLOSSOV) was either on the same train as JENNER or he was not. Train manifests indicate that KOSOLAPOV was not. Nevertheless, the "boy and girl, probably university students" who, according to JENNER, struck up a conversation with him on the train would appear clearly to be part of the operational effort described by NOSENKO, particularly in view of the later approach of this same girl to JENNER at the airport. There is no reason to question that this girl was the female agent of GRYAZNOV. In view of the conflict between the train manifest and statements by NOSENKO, however, it is not clear who the "boy student" was: whether this somehow was KOSOLAPOV. or whether it may have been some other person entirely.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 193]
It is not accepted that the train manifests are incontrovertible evidence that KOSOLAPOV could not have been on the same train as JENNER. Neither is it accepted that the train manifests are in error. There is just not a satisfactory answer for the indicated discrepancy between the train manifests and the statement of NOSENKO that KOSOLAPOV and JENNER were on the same train. If indeed KOSOLAPOV did not travel with JENNER this does not establish anything more than that NOSENKO is wrong; it is evidence that he does not know something he, as the supervisor of KOSOLAPOV, should have known according to his own statements.Pages 190 - 192 contain a summary of previous information in regard to the John GARLAND case. GARLAND was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk whom the KGB was studying, but on whom no derogatory information was developed. NOSENKO provided practically no details in regard to GARLAND other than to identify him as a code clerk.GOLITSYN has reported on an incident which it is considered relates to the trip of GARLAND from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960. GOLITSYN reported that in November 1960 the Helsinki KGB Residency received a cable from Moscow advising that an American code clerk would be arriving in Helsinki en route to Moscow and that31SECRET000119171BR.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 194]
the responsible SCD case officer, KOSOLAPOV, would be sent to Helsinki under alias to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which the SCD hoped to continue in Moscow. GOLITSYN talked to KOSOLAPOV in Helsinki at that time, and the Residency procured for KOSOLAPOV a place in the compartment of the American on the train from Helsinki to Moscow.The previous summary also stated GOLITSYN had advised that later in Helsinki he inquired of another SCD officer "from the Embassy Section" (First Section, SCD) about the case on which he had keiped KOSOLAPOV. According to GOLITSYN, the officer refused to discuss the case and he, GOLITSYN, concluded from this reaction that it must have resulted in a successíul recruitment.It has been determined that GOLITSYN, in an interview with the FBI on 20 March 1962, referred to the above "SCD officer from the Embassy Section" as (inu) ZENKIN of the American Department. GOLITSYN also stated that the officer was in Helsinki under the alias of SERGEEV (SERGEYEV), but was unable to furnish a Arst name and patronymic for SERGEYEV, GOLITSYN referred to (inu) ZENKIN as being from the American Department, SCD.It is considered that there is no doubt that the (inu) ZENKIN referred to by GOLITSYN is the individual of the same last name32SECRET0001192
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 195]
concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished information. NOSENKO has identified ZENKN (whose first name he does not recall but possibly is Yuriy) as an officer of the Second Section, First Department, SCD. According to NOSENKO, one group of the Second Section both before and after 1960 - 1961 was engaged in "operative games" against American Intelligence and that ZENKIN was a member of this group. NOSENKO has advised that ZENKIN traveled abroad in connection with activities of the Second Section, but that he had no specific knowledge regarding the activities of ZENKIN on these trips. NOSENKO has furnished some fragmentary information which he learned in regard to ZENKIN and when the full name of SERGEYEV (ZENKIN) together with his photograph is obtained, this fragmentary information from NCSENKO may prove quite useful.As regards the KOSOLAPOV-[GARLAND] matter and the opinion expressed by GOLITSYN based on the refusal of ZENKIN to discuss the case [GARLAND] that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment, there appears to be an inadequate basis for this presumption. According to NOSENKO, and there is no reason to disbelieve NOSENKO on this point, ZENKIN was in the Second Section, not the First Section, in 1960-1961. He was not Chief of the Section, but only a Senior Case
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 196]
Officer. Since KOSOLAPOV was an officer of the First Section and the work against [GARLAND] was the responsibility of the First Section. It does not appear that ZENKIN would necessarily have known of any developments in the KOSOLAPOV [GARLAND] matter.The Finnish train manifest of 16 November 1960 for the Helsinki to Moscow train lists [John GARLAND] and Viktor KOLOSSOV (alias of KOSOLAPOV) as passengers. [GARLAND], when interviewed in 1962 following the lead from COLITSYN, denied having met any Soviet with the physical description of KOSOLAPOV on the Helsinki-to-Moscow trip, and denied ever being approached by Soviet Intelligence. Later interviews by the FBI and a polygraph interview did not indicate that he had ever met KOSOLAPOV or that he had ever knowingly been contacted by any foreign intelligence agent.It is accepted that KOSOLAPOV went from Moscow to Helsinki in November 1960, that he talked with GOLITSYN there, and that he was on the same train as [GARLAND] from Helsinki to Moscow. It is also accepted that NOSENKO is unaware that KOSOLAPOV made a trip to Helsinki in November 1960.Travel for an SCD officer outside the USSR or Bloc countries requires high-level approval, according to NOSENKO. It does not34SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 197]
matter that the individual has previously traveled on a similar mission, each trip must have specific high-level approval. The red tape which thus must inevitably have been involved in preparation for such a trip further supports the assumption that NOSENKO should have known about the KOSOLAPOV-[GARLAND] trip.The position taken by NOSENKO on this point is that he accepts the statement by the interviewer that KOSOLAPOV made such a trip, but he says that he, NOSENKO, simply does not know anything about it. He adds only that had anything significant developed in the study of [GARLAND], he would have been aware of it.NOSENKO, as supervisor of the group working against code clerks, should have known of any trip of KOSOLAPOV to Finland in 1960 or 1961. NOSENKO himself was out of Moscow on a trip to Cuba from 15 November 1960 to circa 17 December 1960. The possibility exists that this could have accounted for his lack of knowledge of the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki and return to Moscow on 16 November 1960. However, NOSENKO has not attempted to use his Cuban trip as a possible explanation for not knowing of the November KOSOLAPOV trip.As with the [JENNER-KOSOLAPOV] case, it is not possible at this time to resolve the discrepancies pertaining to the [GARLAND] KOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSENKO denies any knowledge of
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 198]
*this operational activity of KOSOLAPOV is another apparent instance, as in the [JENNER] case, of his not knowing something he, by his own statements, should have known...Viewed in the context of the total knowledge of NOSENKO of operations against code clerks, however, neither the problems in the [JENNER] case nor those in the [GARLAND] case, singly or combined, in any way represent conclusive evidence that NOSENKO was not supervisor of KOSOLAPOV or that he was not responsible for the code clerk operations described by NOSENKO. This statement, however, was not substantiated in the previous summary.Pages 193-199 of the previous summary contain an account of KGB activity against code clerk [Joseph MORONE] from various sources, including NOSENKO, NOSENKO first mentioned the case in 1962.According to NOSENKO, the responsible case officer for work against [MORONE] was KOSOLAPOV. When it was learned that [MORONE] and an Embassy colleague, a Marine guard by the name of [BEGGS] were planning a vacation trip to Warsaw, arrangements were made with the CUB (the Polish Security Service) for a female Polish agent to come to Moscow and travel from there to Warsaw on the same train as [MORONE] and [BEGGS] The-intent was for the agent, either on the train or subsequently in Warsaw, to meet and compromise [MORONE] sexually. She36SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 199]
successfully accomplished this, but due to certain problems in KGB-UB liaison relations, it was not possible for the KG3 to exploit this directly. The previous summary stated that with respect to the female UB agent, there was persuasive evidence that neither NCSENKO nor KOSOLAPOV played the roles in the MORONE case described by NOSENKO. That summary cited the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba and of KOSOLAPOV to Finland at approximately the same time as the MORONE trip to Warsaw as evidence of the impossibility of NOSENKO and KOSOLAPOV being involved personally in this part of the MORONE case.NOSENKO has stated that KOSOLAPOV met the Polish female agent and made the arrangements to place her on the train to Warsaw. MORONE and DERES departed Moscow on 12 November 1960. It is not known when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow for Helsinki, but he was on the 16 November 1960 train manifest as departing Helsinki for Moscow. NOSENKO departed Moscow on 15 November 1960 for Cuba. The activities described by NOSENKO are therefore possible within the known time frame.It is clear that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal role in the MORONE case, particularly when he stated that he, NOSENKO, placed the female agent on the train. NOSENKO now clearly states that
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 200]
KOSOLAPOV was the only NGB officer in contact with the Polish agent. NOSENKO previously stated that a KG3 technician who was on the train from Moscow to Warsaw reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train arrived in Warsaw. Later NOSENKO said that instead of talking to the technician personally, he may have read the report of the technician after he returned from Cuba.The activities described by NOSENKO with regard to this matter are accordingly possible within the known time frame. It is not considered that the retractions NOS ENKO has made from his original statements on this operation are of sufficient significance to materially discredit him.Page 198 of the previous summary contains the statement that MORONE when interviewed, denied having been intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, a KGB agent employed at the American House, NOSENKO had stated that IVANOVA was instructed to report everything she saw or heard concerning MORONE (page 194). The summary, however, cited a number of reports that MORONE had been intimate with IVANOVA and with Ella UMANETS, also a KGB agent employed at the American House, and commented that NOSENKO therefore was apparently unaware of the sexual involvement of MORONE with "IVANOVA's friends."
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 201]
NOSENKO, during currerviews, has indicated awarenessof at least some involvement of IVANOVA with [CORONE]. He has fur-nished information on a developing operation against Marine guard[GARCIA (Anthony A. GARCIA)] based on the involvement of [GARCIA]with IVANOVA. He has also stated that the possibility was consideredof using IVANOVA against [MORONE] to obtain compromising photographs.This plan was seriously affected when it was learned from themilitiaman/KGB guard at the United States Embassy that IVANOVA,her girl friend, [MORONE] and a Marine guard, possibly [GARCIA] hadbeen "in the city," then returned to the "flat" of one of the Marineswhere the girls spent the night. This apparently placed the reliabilityof IVANOVA in question in the eyes of the First Section.According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that PictroCECCHI, Italian cook at the American Embassy and agent of KOSOLAPOV,reported on Americans at the Embassy, but NOSENKO recalled nothingspecific that CECCHI had reported about [MORONE]. The summary alsostates that [MORONE] was said by other American Embassy employeesto be a close friend of CECCHI and that [MORONE] had admitted blackmarket money exchanges with CECCHI.During current interviews, NOSENKO has stated that CECCHIfurnished "pieces" of information concerning [MORONE] but he, NOSENKO.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 202]
knew of no black market involvement [MORONE] with CECCHI.NOSENKO has also indicated that the KGB sometimes suspected, and on occasion actually became aware that various agents did not fully report everything of interest to the KGB. The KGB of course was aware that CECCHI was involved in the black market. However, whether he reported to the KGB everything he did and with whom is open to question; viz., the Maurice ZWANG case below.The comment was made in the previous summary that NOSENKO was unaware that [MORONE] met some Soviet females in the spring of 1961 at the apartment of Sarwat el SHAZLY, an Egyptian-national KGB agent of the Sixth Department who was also reporting on Americans, and was intimate with one in this apartment.A review of official records indicates that [MORONE] did report having met some Soviet girls at the apartment of Sarwat, but there is no indication that he admitted or that anyone else has reported that he was intimate with any of them. The conclusion of the previous summary in this regard was based on a misinterpretation. Accordingly, since there is no reason to believe that any compromise incident took place in the Sarwat apartment, the story of NOSENKO on this matter is considered completely acceptable.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 203]
A few comments are appropriate concerning remarks in the previous summary on pages 199-204. Comments were made there concerning five code clerks, Maurice ZWANG, John TAYLOR, Frank DAY, Robert DWELLY and Joseph GAFFEY, and although it is not specifically stated, the suggestion is apparent that the reporting of NOSENKO on these cases was considered evidence that NOSENKO was not supervisor of all KGB operations against code clerks. The following observations may assist in placing these cases in their proper perspective:(a) Maurice ZWANG - ZWANG was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk who was actively "worked on" during 1960-1961. The previous summary suggested that the knowledge of NOSENKO regarding KGB activity against ZWANG was inadequate. First, reporting of NOSENKO on ZWANG contained no reference to the relationship of ZWANG with his maid, whom NOSENKO in another case has identified as a KGB agent. Although ZWANG denied sexual relations with his maid, he did admit to some intimacies with her in her apartment.During polygraph examination ZWANG reacted when he
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 204]
responded in the negative to a question regarding sexual relations with his maid. The failure of NOSENKO to report on this relationship can be ascribed to ignorance, but also can be plausibly explained by faulty memory on his part or failure on the part of the maid to report details of this relationship to the KGB.Second, NOSENKO had not reported that ZWANG was involved in the currency operations of Pietro CECCHI.(A fact that previous summary implied he should have known from KGB agent CECCHI.) From the record, however, it appears that the dealings of ZWANG were not directly with CECCHI, but rather through other Embassy employees, making it plausible that CECCHI was either unaware of the involvement of ZWANG or, as NOSENKO himself stated he suspected, CECCHI did not report all details of his currency operations to his KGB handler.(b) John TAYLOR - NOSENKO identified TAYLOR as a State Department code clerk and target of KOSOLAPOV. The KGB was aware of the involvement of TAYLOR with his Soviet maid, but no attempt was made to recruit TAYLOR before his departure in early 1961 since to do so might
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 205]
endanger the plans for a recruitment approach to James STORSBERG who had been under development for almost a year and was considered more valuable.The implication of the previous summary that the explanation given by NOSENKO was subject to question failed to take into account the fact that although STORSBERG was not approached until after the departure of TAYLOR the operation against STORSBERG was underway before TAYLOR became involved with his maid. Further, it is apparent that the KGB did not abandon interest in TAYLOR since he was approached at a later date outside the USSR on the basis of his previous affair with his maid in Moscow.(c) Frank DAY - NOSENKO identified Frank DAY as a State Department code clerk who was the target of either KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. According to NOSENKO, nothing "interesting" was learned about DAY and no operational measures were taken against DAY. The previous summary noted that in July 1961, DAY traveled to the Caucasus with his friend and former overt CIA employee, Agricultural Attache G. Stanley BROWN It was also stated that the two were under surveillance by five persons43SECRET13/BR
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 206]
at all times on the above wip, that they found a "repairman"in their hotel room when they unexpectedly returned, andthat on another occasion an "attractive and available Sovietfemale" was believed to have been plamed in their traincompartment.According to NOSENKO, surveillance and any otherlocal coverage of any employee at the United States Embassywho travels in the USSR is the responsibility of the localKGB organization, not the SCD. It would appear that thelocal organization was trying to do a thorough job on [DAY] 06and [BROWN] 06 but it apparently was nonproductive. It doesnot seem justifiable to expect that NOSENKO should haverecalled a trip which produced no results.(d) [Robert DWELLY] - NOSENKO has related in con-siderable detail the efforts of NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV andKOSOLAPOV to involve [Robert DWELLY, a code cierk] inMoscow from April 1959 - July 1960, in a homosexual com-promise operation. According to NOSENKO, a homosexualagent of GRYAZNOV was of the opinion [DWELLY] was ahomosexuai.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 207]
There is no reason to doubt the statement of NOSENKO concerning KGB efforts to determine when and where [DWELLY] was going "into the city" (Moscow) so that a homosexual compromise situation could be arranged. There were no specific developments from their efforts, according to NOSENKO.[DWELLY] has categorically denied being a homosexual; NOSENKO has not said he was, but only that the homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV assessed [DWELLY] as a homosexual. There does not appear to be any reason to consider the statements of NOSENKO about [DWELLY] as reflecting adversely on NOSENKO.(e) [Joseph GAFFEY] - NOSENKO has identified [Joseph GAFFEY] as a [code clerk]. The previous summary noted that NOSENKO had stated the KGB had tried to lure [GAFFEY] into downtown Moscow, using Svetlana IVANOVA, an agent of DEMKIN in the American House.By way of comment, the previous summary stated that [GAFFEY] arrived in Moscow in September 1961 and that [Fred KADERA] had reported that [GAFFEY] had told him he had been intimate with a Russian girl at the American.