Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# 294."They called him to Inturist. They gave him a room in the Inturist /Hotel/. Then KRUFNCK transferred him from the Inturist to another hotel, put him in a room in the hotel, and started talking to him. Then he left him in his room and calleć us up - said that he reeded help, that he can't do anything with the man. I thought that he would be able to handle him ali by hin- self, so I said to KOVSHUK:* 'I'm sorry. I thought he'd be able to handle it. He tells me that he doesn't seem to get anywhere, so I guess I'd have to go help him.' I got there and I see that the man is scared stiff. He doesn't talk about anything, doesn't want to listen to any of these reasons. He was told that, after ail, he is a traitor to his country, that he went with the Ger- mans... This fellow was a coward, a real coward, so he gave his consent, he agreed to help us.""The next day he went to Leningrad. so felt that this agreement wasn't very firm, rehable. So the next day KRUPNOV and I went to see CIELNOKOV Chief of the Tourist. Departmer.1/. And I told him: 'I feel that this agreement of his is quite sheky. I'm not sure about it. So are we to follow through? If we decide to do so, then we'll have to go to Leningrad. KRUPNOV went and called the mar, and the man rofused to talk to ham. So then I was told to go. Se I went to Leningrad/ and... I went to his hotel room. He locked the door, and he wouldn't let me in. The only thing, fortunately for us, the lock in the door wasn't a very good one, so we called a locksmith, and he found a key that opened the door. So we entered the room, and we started talking to him. The fellow was terribly scared, he was shaking, so it was quite obvious that he would never work for us. So we finally decided: Look, it's okay. We don't want anything from you. Go ahead, leave. Coodbye.. And that was all; that was the end of it. I don't know whether it was BROCKS or BRONX or some name like that which he used in the States, but his true name was IVANOV."In February 1965 NOSENKO said he had forgotten how he came to be involved in the BRAUNS case. He also said that he did not know why BRAUNS had visited the Soviet Union, and that he could not name any Soviet citizens with whom ERAUNS was in con- tact in Moscow.b. Information from BRAUNSInterviewed by the FBI![Interviewed by the FBI]* NOSENKO is apparently in error. At this time, he has re- ported, V.M. KOVSHUK was not in the Tourist Department but in the American Department. He may mean V.D. CHELNOKOV, Chief of the Tourist Department.
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6. The SVEINSKIY Casea. Information from HOSENKO:ROSENKO provided the lead to Alexarder SVENCHANSKIY, KGB cryptonym "CD" on Co January 1964 in the course of discussion of KGB use of foreign travel bureau personnel to spot tourists of possible operational interest. "Well, here's an example! One of cur agents is the director of a smell tourist agency," NOSENKO said, "He takes the tourist's application form which hes a photograph, and if he suspects the tourist of having ties to American Intelligence, he will move the photo slightly, for example. Further, on the fifth Line, where it says 'nation cality, he can make a small piaprick. And at the end, where the stamp of the tourist agency is placed, ne can make a check mark with a pencil. That's all. He indicates an agent to us.. but why he/the tourist/ is suspected we don't know yet, of
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# TOP SECRET308. Following BARGHOORN's admission, another resolution was drawn up by KRUPNOV and signed by KRUPNOV, KOVALENKO, and GRIBANOV. NOSENKO and KRUPNOV then took it to the office of the Chief Prosecutor where the incident report, the first interrogation, and the first and second resolutions were reported to (fnu) MISHUTIN (or MISHUSTIN), the First Deputy to the Chief Prosecutor. GRIBANOV further directed that all materials on BARGHOORN, including information from KGB Archives, be given to the Department of Prosecution of the KGB so that they could begin the legal proceedings against BARGHOORN. After this, all interrogations were conducted by this department; KRUPNOV was dropped from the case, but YEFREMOV continued to act as interpreter.## Information from BARGHOORNBARGHOORN, who had made five earlier trips to the Soviet Union since 1956, arrived there on 2 October 1963. The purpose of his visit, as stated in his visa application, was to gather information for a book on how effectively the Soviet Union was operating as a result of its political ed- ucation and political system. His itinerary took him to Leningrad from 2 to 7 October, to Moscow from 7 to 10 Octo- ber, Tbilisi from 10 to 17 October, and short visits to Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Alma-Ata from 17 to 25 October. He flew from Alma-Ata to Moscow on 25 October and was scheduled to leave for Warsaw on 31 October. On the latter date he was arrested and held by the KGB until 16 November when, at President Kennedy's intervention, he was released and left the Soviet Union. BARGHOORN had no intelligence mission.Upon his return to the United States, BARGHOORN was debriefed by the U.S. Department of State and by CIA. His information indicated a high degree of KGB operational in- terest in him throughout the trip, including encounters with at least five probable KGB agents during his first week there: an attractive waitress who invited him to "do the town," a disenchanted intellectual in Leningrad, an attrac- tive unattached girl who sat next to him on the flight from Moscow to Tbilisi, and two young Armenians whom he met his first day in Tbilisi.* The two Armenians were instrumental in the drugging described by NOSENKO. At dinner in his hotel on the day he arrived in Tbilisi, BARGHOORN met a young man claiming to be a student at the Leningrad Music Conservatory. They left the hotel for a walk and ran into a friend of the student, a second young Armenian, and the three of them went to a cafe for coffee. None was available,*Questioned about this in February 1965, NOSENKO said that BARGHOORN, as a suspected American Intelligence agent, was of operational interest throughout the trip. He vaguely re- called the girl on the plane but either did not know or had forgotten details of any other specific activity. NOSENKO said that none of this activity was directly related to the provocation operation, which was based on a last-minute de- cision.TOP
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# SECRET309. but the young student went to the kitchen "to arrange things," and shortly thereafter "three foul-tasting coffees" appeared. Within an hour, BARGHOORN was in the hospital, acutely-111. He was assigned to a room where there was another patient, and a woman doctor took care of his case. He was in the hospital for four days. During this period his clothes, notes, and other possessions were held by hospital authori- ties.Upon his return to Moscow by air on 25 October, BARG- HOORN checked into the Metropol Hotel. The next six days were occupied by sightseeing and appointments connected with his research. In the late afternoon of 31 October he called on friends at the U.S. Embassy for cocktails, and at 1910, already 10 minutes late, he left in the Ambassador's car for a dinner appointment (prearranged by telephone) at the Metro- pol with Theodore ORCHARD, a British diplomat.BARGHOORN's account of the subsequent events closely parallels NOSENKO's. Ilaving been handed the incriminating materials, he was arrested, handcuffed, and taken to Militia Station No. 58, where he was questioned briefly by a uni- formed Militia officer. The KGB was called. Within 30 minutes a KGB captain (BARGHOORN thought his name night have been GORBUNSKIY) arrived and began to question him, assisted by an interpreter named YEFREMOV.* All question were asked in Russian, and BARGHOORN answered most of them in English. The package of materials was opened and con- tained, according to BARGHOORN, 13 or 14 photographs of rockets. This session lasted until about midnight and centered around BARGHOORN's possession of the photographs and his "intelligence mission." He was then taken to the Lyubyanka prison.Interrogations were conducted the next morning by the original KGB officer together with his "chief," whom BARG- HOORN subsequently identified by photograph as NOSENKO. The questioning concerned BARGHOORN's biography, and nothing was asked about the compromising materials. The following day the case was turned over to a KGB colonel identified as (fnu) PETRENKO, and BARGHOORN did not see NOSENKO or the other KGB officer again. At this and subsequent sessions, BARGHOORN was questioned further concerning the circumstances of his arrest. BARGHOORN described NOSENKO as "clever and quick- witted" and as giving "the impression that he was not a dedicated careerist, but opportunistic and adaptive; he seemed not to care about what he was doing, but doing a good job nevertheless."*Asked why YEFREMOV used his true name during the interro- gations, NOSENKO said this was necessary for legal reasons, that he had to sign documents connected with the interroga- tions. BARGHOORN confirmed that YEFREMOV had participated throughout the entire series of interrogations and had signed interrogation reports attesting to the accuracy of translation.TOP SECRET
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310. John Andres SHUBINJohn Andres SHUBIN and his year of birth are issues which NOSENKO brought to the 1964 Geneva. NOSENKO identified SHUBIN as a man of Russian extraction, a Russian speaker, and a professor in New York City. According to someone personally involved in SHUBIN's fourth trip in 1962 or 1963, SHUBIN had become known to Soviet agent during his third visit to the Soviet Union.Professor of economics at New York University, previously known to the FBIThe following paragraphs contain information from NOSENKO and other sources on SHUBIN.Informationhas been imprecise in dating SHUBIN's third visit to the Soviet Union. He said on 25 January 1964 that SHUBIN visited Moscow some time during the period 1955 to 1961. In 1964 NOSENKO said he was unsure of the contact by SHUBIN but thought it occurred in Moscow at any event, prior to 1950 and while he was on a tour of duty (June 1955 to January 1960) in the Tourist Department. NOSENKO indicated on 26 June 1964 that VELITSKIY was the case officer in the Tourist Department responsible for SHUBIN, and since at another time VELITSKIY transferred from the department, it would appear that he was placing the date of SHUBIN's trip as some time before the transfer.reported that SHUBIN was placed under surveillance during the third trip. He has offered two reasons as to why: On 25 January 1964 NOSENKO explained that SHUBIN had visited the Soviet Union;** on 2 February 1964 he explained the KGB's surveillance as having been founded on the KGB's awareness of SHUBIN.ing for this trip, as variously given by SHUBIN, conflict with the fact that SHUBIN had no passport between 1940 and 12 June 1961, according to one explanation for this discrepancy; however, SHUBIN went to the USSR without valid documents.UBIN's own admission about having gone to the USSR, there is no other evidence of his travel to the Soviet Union prior to 1961.
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4. Information from Other SourcesThe Cell detected in Germany, Lead which assigned inCHUDIN, whose father was a native of Russia, was born in Los Angeles on 20 February 1915.After receiving information of 1954, the FBI interviewed a SHURIN
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# TOP SECRET313. ## 10. BOLSHAKOV, Robert Kennedy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis### a. IntroductionNOSENKO volunteered at his second meeting with CIA in January 1964 that G.N. BOLSHAKOV was his "old friend" and that he was a colonel in the GRU. On 26 January, 1 February, and 19 August 1964 he again raised BOLSHAKOV'S name, emphasizing that he was a GRU officer and a "good friend." In the 1 February interview, after displaying an initial reluctance to discuss with CIA such a "sensitive" subject, he provided a number of details on BOLSHAKOV'S alleged relationship in 1962 with the then Attorney General, Robert Kennedy. His information on this subject, he said, derived from his friendship with BOLSHAKOV in Moscow, where BOLSHAKOV was reassigned (in December 1962 following a tour in Washington as Novosti correspondent and editor of the magazine USSR). NOSENKO claimed a personal role in this affair, in that he personally proposed to the KGB leader- ship that the KGB take over BOLSHAKOV's former (GRU) con- tact with Robert Kennedy.NOSENKO claimed that an information channel of communication between BOLSHAKOV and the Attorney General had developed at Kennedy's initiative. He described in detail the circumstances of their introduction at a social function by a journalist (whom he did not name). He said that he "thought" that the Kennedys knew that BOLSHAKOV was a "military intelligence officer," and he implied that they regarded these private conversations with BOLSHAKOV as a useful instrument of diplomacy. According to NOSENKO, the KGB knew that CIA was not aware of this relationship--it was "obvious" that Robert Kennedy wanted it that way.NOSENKO claimed that after BOLSHAKOV left the United States "during the Cuban missile crisis,"[^1] no one took over his role as a confidential channel to the White House. After the assassination of the President, NOSENKO continued, the Kennedy family tried to reestablish the relationship through their close friend, the artist William WALTON, during the latter's visit to Moscow in December 1963. NOSENKO reported that he had urged that the KGB try to take over the Robert Kennedy operation from the GRU and that he had proposed two plans which would have enabled this to take place, the second involving WALTON. Neither came to fruition, however. Referring to the Cuban missile crisis, NOSENKO said that the GRU had "played dirty" with BOLSHAKOV by forcing him to "tell Robert" that there were no offensive missiles in Cuba whereas there actually were such weapons there.According to other sources, BOLSHAKOV left Washington for Moscow on 3 August 1962 and returned on 2 October 1962. On 23 August, about the time that CIA was reporting urgently to the President that "something new and different" was going on with respect to Soviet aid to Cuba, Ambassador DOBRYNIN assured Theodore SORENSEN (Special Counsel to the President) that the United States had no need to fear Soviet[^1]: The Cuban missile crisis occurred during October 1962, and as indicated above, BOLSHAKOV was not reassigned from Washington until two months afterward.# TOP SECRET
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# 315.at the White House late that night in a secret letter from KIRUSHCHEV. At a farewell party for BOLSHAKOV in December 1962, Presidential Press Secretary Pierre SALINGER asked BOLSHAKOV who would "do his work." POLSHAKOV replied that no one would do precisely the same job, but that if SALINGER had "anything special to say," he might contact A.I. ZINCHUK.[^1]## b. Soviet Sources During the CrisisNOSENKO has rot indicated that BOLSEAKOV had an information-collection role during the Cuban missile crisis. As for Soviet sources at this time, NOSENKO stated on several occasions in 1964, in different contexts, that the KGB "had not had luck in getting intelligence from high places in the U.S. Government" in October 1962. On more than one occasion he said that the KGB agent "SASIIA"[^2] was unable to furnish any information of value in this regard. He said this on 25 February 1964 and again while being questioned about "SASHA" on 4 August 1964. On the latter date NOSENKO said: "During the Cuban missile crisis the [KGB] First Chief Directorate, the Intelligence, couldn't tell what the U.S. will do. KHRUSHCHEV[^3] was rot satisfied with the work of the Intelligence. No agents were producing information on this." NOSENKO continued by saying that "SASHA" reported nothing to the KGB during the Cuban missile crisis. In fact, "he couldn't know anything. I heard that this was very tightly held information. There wore just a few people around President Kennedy who knew the plans, and they were sworu to keep it secret."[^1]: ZINCHUK was identified by DERYABIN by name and photograph in October 1954 as a KGB staff officer. NOSENKO has said that ZINCHUK was a KGB cooptce rather than a staff officer.[^2]: For a discussion of the "SASHA" case, see Part VI.D.3.d.[^3]: Speaking before the Supreme Soviet on 12 December 1962, KHRUSHCHEV said that the decision to negotiate with the United States for a peaceful settlement of the Cuban situation had been influenced by "information from our Cuban comrades and other [unspecified] sources." This information had been received, KHRUSHCHEV stated, on the morning of 27 October 1962 (Moscow time). As previously indicated, however, KHRUSHCHEV's secret and conciliatory letter to the President was received at the White House on the night of 26 October 1952.
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317. departure, NOSENKO said: "Oh, no. There is no contact like there was before. It was broken at the time BOL-SHAKOV left. ZINCHUK was an agent or a coopte....No, there is no such contact since BOLSHAKOV left. He passes no more messages."Referring to the Kennedy-BOLSHAKOV contacts, NOSENKO told CIA on 26 January 1964: "You have shown considerable interest in him |BOLSHAKOV|, even after his return to the Soviet Union...because all this was done by-passing CIA." He said on 1 February 1964: "It was pretty obvious that this relationship between BOLSHAKOV and Robert Kennedy had nothing to do with CIA, and CIA was not witting of it. It was at the personal desire of Bob Kennedy." The KGB determined that CIA was unaware of the exchange between Kennedy and BOLSHAKOV, NOSENKO reported, because when BOL-SHAKOV was subsequently invited to a reception at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, two CIA officers--Kenneth A. KERST and Malcolm A. TOON*-tried to elicit information from him about his relationship with President Kennedy. "The most important thing" they had tried to find out, according to NOSENKO, was whether the President and BOLSHAKOV had met personally. Although BOLSHAKOV did not admit the fact to them, he did have one meeting with President Kennedy--"he was brought in a car...and was taken through a back door into the White House," NOSENKO said.NOSENKO reported that William WALTON visited Moscow in December 1963 and at that time went to BOLSHAKOV, whom he had previously met at the home of Robert Kennedy. Part of their conversations, he continued, related to Robert Kennedy's future political plans: "WALTON said that Bobby...did not expect at present to become a candidate for the vice presidency. He was, perhaps, according to WALTON, thinking of running for Governor of Massachusetts..." NOSENKO said he felt that there were "some feelers sent out on the part of WALTON--not exactly questions, but just a passing of opinion. WALTON was trying to sound them out, but I think that everything was left without an answer....My personal opinion was that these things were told to WALTON so that he could pass them on as, so to speak, Bobby's plans for the future." Another topic covered in the WALTON-BOLSHAKOV discussions, NOSENKO added, was the assassination of President Kennedy.** "As I remember, it was WALTON's opinion--and his opinion reflected the opinion of the Kennedy family--that there was no Russian involvement in the murder of the President. No suspicion at all."NOSENKO proposed two plans whereby the KGB could take over the GRU's channel to President Kennedy. Under the first of these plans, the Soviet Minister of Justice would personally invite the Attorney General to come to the Soviet Union. There the KGB would "set him up in private living quarters, give him everything he wants...so that he would be*Neither KERST, who NOSENKO said was suspected by the KGB of being the CIA Chief of Station in Moscow, nor TOON was affiliated with CIA in any way.**See also Part V.D.6. on NOSENKO's information concerning Lee Harvey OSWALD.
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313. pleased.... Not to make an agent or cooptee out of hia, but just to promote a rapprochement." In addition, on the basis of what BOLSHAKOV had told NOSENKO about Robert Kennedy's interest in a Soviet ballerina, this plan called for the two to be brought together, and the ballerina, who "is quite free in her behavior with the opposite sex, would do "everything necessary for the State." Defore NOSENKO's superiors could make a decision on this plan, the Fresident was assassinated and the matter was dropped. NOSENKO conceived his second plan during WALTON's trip to Moscow in December 1963: "BOLSHAKOV told me that he was going to meet WALTON, and asked me whether we had an interest in it.... I told the chiefs about it and said: 'Let's utilize WALTON ourselves. Why should we let the GRU use hin?'" NOSENKO suggested that the KGB "tell BOLSHAKOV that we are working on KALTON--that this is a Number One target as far as we are concerned. FOLSHAKOV will do anything we ask him." However, "the boss said: 'Well, you know, it will worsen relations between the KGB and the GRU. as long as they are working on it, let then do it.'"NOSENKO indicated that if the KGB had actually assumed authority for the operation in Moscow from the GRU, as he had proposed, the KGB Legal Pesidency in Washington would have then taken over, and "someone new" probably would have been sent from KGB Headquarters to develop the association. This KGB officer would have been "someone with a broader outlook who could carry himself well in social contacts."d. Information fromIn addition to NOSESKO, one other Seriet source had identified BOLSHAKOV as a GRU officer.reported that another member of the GRU Legal Residency had "recently" turned over to BOLSHAKOV an informant who was an Americanorrespondent based in Washington. This journalist, had accompanied Vice President Nixon to the USSR in July 1959 and while there had agreed to cooperate by "furnishing political information." BOLSHAKOV was to "concentrate all of his efforts on this one contact."*![FBI logo]TOP SECRET
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SECRETTOP SECRETКОМИТЕТАГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИПРИ СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССР15- декабря 1965 г.11333Командировочное удостоверение №Выдано под особому,ШейнкоЮрию ИсяновичуКомандированному в УКГБ БрестскойобластиСрок командировки - 15 днейпо 30 декабря 1965 г.Основание: распоряжение Главного УправленияНК-2511Начальник Комитета Государственной Безопасностипри Совете Министров СССРОТМЕТКИ ОКЛЕИВАЕМЫЕ МАРКАМИПрибыл в г. Брест 21/ХІІ-65г из Шайб4/19-63г., в связи с окончанием следствиядело ничем новым не дополнилось, все постарому.Убыл из г. Бреста 11/І-66г. выехал изсвязи с переездом в Управление.ОТМЕТКИ УПРАВЛЕНИЯ КОМИТЕТА ГОС. БЕЗОПАСНОСТИПРИ СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССРО бесплатной квартире не позаботилсяУбыл из МосквыПрибыл в МосквуНач. сек. старшиныФИНОКОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИпри СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССРВыдано:Аванс на расходы по командировке в суммеруб.Перевозочные требования № ДЕ 5867, ДЕ 5870Талон на платную ручную кладь №Ст. бухгалтерTemporary Duty AuthorizationDecember 1963SECRET
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Committee for State SecurityUnder the Council of MinistersUSSR15 December 1963Issued to: Lieutenant ColonelNOSENKO,Yuriy IvanovichFor duty to: UKGB of Gor'kayaOblast'Length of temporary assignment: 15 daysthrough: 30 December 1963Authorization: directive ofChief of a Chief DirectorateEffective on presentation ofidentity document No.: NK-2513Chief s./GRIBANOV of Directorateof DepartmentCommittee for State Securityunder the Council of Ministers, USSRFrontNOTATIONS OF PRESENCE IN PLACESOF TEMPORARY DUTY"Arrived in city of Gor'kiy 16 December 1963""Arrived in city of Shakhun'ye 17 XII 1963Did not use free quarters"s./Chief of Shakhun'ye Chief MilitiaSection, Militia Major (illegible)"Departed Shakhun'ye 17/XII-63Did not use free quarters"s./Chief of Shakhun'ye Chief MilitiaSection, Militia Major (illegible)"Left Gor'kiy 17 December 1963Did not use free quarters"s./ (illegible)Reverse (endorsements only)TDY authorization for Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKOin connection with the search for CHEREPANOV