Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 81]
Q:You have no idea who they are meeting, or when they are meeting them?A:When they are meeting an active development agent, they tell me afterwards. They are telling "this, this, this, this" and I am answering "this, this, this." But usually they are going to meet maids or they don't have to report. There is nothing active and there is.... The file is going on.Q:What about operational vehicles? Automobiles?A:You see, we had one automobile for the whole department. Besides this, we could apply, when necessary, to the officer on duty for the Second Chief Directorate and he would give a car, because he has a number of cars at his disposal.Q:Approximately how much of your time did you spend supervising GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV?.A:I can't say.Q:Was it the most important function?A:Yes, it was important. All work in the First Section was important. This was the most important. But one day I could devote the whole day to code clerks, the next day maybe half the day, maybe two hours in the day. The rest of the day I will be absent. I will be meeting with KLYPIN, or I will be having a meeting with surveillance, or I will be at another place. The third day, again, maybe the whole day, maybe part of it. No, I can't tell you. It depends on the situation.(iii) Additional Duties in KOVSHUK's AbsenceAs Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, one of NOSENKO's responsibilities was to serve as Acting Chief when KOVSHUK was absent from the office. NOSENKO recalled that he fulfilled this function during KOVSHUK's two 30-day leave periods in 1960 and 1961, but he did not remember when this leave occurred in those years. He also served as Acting Chief for about a month in the summer of 1960 when KOVSHUK was in the KGB hospital with heart trouble and for a week or two some time in 1961 when KOVSHUK was ill again. NOSENKO was unable to recall any operational or inspection trips that KOVSHUK made in 1960 or 1961, and the only other specific time that he could remember KOVSHUK being absent was for several days in connection with preparations for President Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union in 1960.NOSENKO's description of his duties in KOVSHUK's absence was summarized in a protocol which he signed on 3 March 1965:"I do not remember any particularly important operational decisions I made as Acting Chief of Section, nor any unusual things that happened duringTOP SECRET
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these times. The only specific responsibility KOVSHUKhad which I handled in his absence was to report tothe Chief of the First Department about all mail goingout of the First Section. I did not meet any of KOV-SHUK's agents during his absences because there was nonecessity to do so. His only Russian agent whom Iremember was Ilya GLAZUNOV (KGB cryptonym "VRUEEL"],whom he transferred to FEDYANIN in 1960, I think. Theonly other agent of KOVSHUK's whom I remember was thecorrespondent Edmund STEVENS.* The only thing that wasdifferent for me as Acting Chief of the Section wasthat I had to go every day to see the Chief of the De-partment.c. Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations(i) IntroductionAmong the numerous KGB activities against American codeclerks in Moscow which NOSENKO has discussed are five opera-tions wherein the KGB intended or effected approaches forrecruitment/defection purposes. According to NOSENKO, nonewas successful. The five major cases are reviewed separatelybelow, one of them in the context of duty trips abroad byNOSENKO's subordinate KOSOLAPOV.**NOSENKO said that, upon assuming responsibility forsupervising operations against American code clerks, hefound a very "difficult situation." Prior to the assignmentof KOSOLAPOV to the U.S. Embassy Section in late 1959, alloperations against code clerks had been handled by A.S. MALYU-GIN, but during MALYUGIN's two years of effort. there hadbeer no operational approaches and no successes. When*The Edmund STEVENS case is discussed in Part V.C.2.**GOLITSYN on 20 March 1962 identified KOSOLAPOV's photographas that of a veteran KCB officer with whom he was personallyacquainted. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV had entered the KGBin about 1952 and had served for two or three years as amember of the First (American) Department of the KGB FirstChief Directorate under United Nations cover in New York City;subsequently he had worked for two or three years in theFirst Chief Directorate at KGB Headquarters. According toGOLITSYN, the bachelor KOSOLAPOV was transferred to the KGBSecond Chief Directorate some time prior to 1960 in line witha KGB policy for only married men to be sent abroad. As of1960, GOLITSYN said, KOSOLAPOV was working against code clerksstationed in the American Embassy in Moscow. He added thatKOSOLAPOV speaks excellent English. Prior to GOLITSYN'Sidentification, CIA had no indication of intelligence acti-vity on KOSOLAPOV's part. Between February 1953 and April1955 he was assigned to the United Nations Secretariat Trans-lation Unit as a translator; in August 1958 he had been aninterpreter at the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Test Detection;in September 1959 he accompanied KHRUSHCHEV on his trip tothe United States (see Part V.E.3.d. which describes therole of NOSENKO's target John ABIDIAN in connection with theKHRUSHCHEV trip). KOSOLAPOV'S English is flawless.
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# 153.NOSENKO took over there were no active developmental opera-tdons against code clerks underway, and the only agents oroperational contante being used against them were poorlyeducated maids and witnesses, none of whom had accomplishedanything of importance. No foreign agents were being usedin operations against coderoom personnel, and at the timeNOSENKO had no agent of his own in America House, or inthe Embassy, who could be used in these operations.In January in February of 1960 GRYAZNOV was assignedto the U.S. Embassy section as a second assistant to NOSENKOin his code clerk activities. From this point on, NOSENKO,KOSOLADOV, and Chuyakov shared the same KGB Headquartersoffice (Room 614). There all KGB files on American codeclerks, as well as files on agents available for workagainst them, were stored in one large safe, accessible toall three officers. NOSENKO supervised all of the section'swork along these lines, and no provocations, compromises,recruitment attempts, or recruitments could have been plannedor carried out without his prior knowledge and agreement*GOLITSYN first named GRYAZNOV as a case officer of theAmerican Department, Second Chief Directorate, on 31 Decem-ber 1961. He said at that time that he had been personallyacquainted with GRYAZNOV since 1945 and that, as of thespring of 1960, GRYAZNOV was "working only against codeclerks of the American Embassy in Moscow." GRYAZNOV hadtravelled to the United States at some time in the past,GOLITSYN added.On 5 June 1962 Golitsyn told CIA that he had been a classmate ofGRYAZNOV during 1945 and 1946 at the "SMERSH" counterintelli-gence school in Moscow; he described GRYAZNOV as a specialistin operations against American code clerks, saying thatGRYAZNOV was "very experienced" and had had "some successes."As an example, he told of having spoken to GRYAZNOV in thespring of 1960 when he, GOLITSYN, was visiting the U.S.Embassy Section of the American Department in connection withhis forthcoming assignment as a First Chief Directoratecounterintelligence officer in Helsinki. GOLITSYN had com-plained to GRYAZNOV that the KGB had no U.S. assets in Helsinkiat the time, and by CIA he quoted GRYAZNOV as replying:"Maybe we will help you." According to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOVwent on to explain that he was handling an agent, a codeclerk in the U.H. Embassy in Moscow, who was about to betransferred, perhaps to Helsinki; he told GOLITSYN that theKGB had received information from this American code clerkand classified him as a "real agent." NOSENKO has notmentioned such an agent (who has yet to be identified) andhas denied that the KGB had any agents in the U.S. Embassyat this time. GOLITSYN identified a photograph of G.I. LAPIN,who travelled with the Moiseyev Dance troup to the UnitedStates and Canada in 1958, as being identical with GRYAZNOV.CIA had no prior indication of intelligence activities byGRYAZNOV, under the alias LAPIN, and had no traces on GRYAZNOVin true name.TOP SECRET
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when he was in Moscow. If NOSENKO went away on a trip, he said, he would have been told about any such activity upon his return.When NOSENKO took over responsibility for operations against code clerks, he read available files on target agents, discussed the situation with KALYUGIN, (phonetic) U.S. Embassy Section case officer responsible for the (phonetic of America House); GRYAZNOV, and XOSOLAPOV, and reported his findings and recommendations to his superiors, KOVSHOG and KLYPIN. Several changes were made as a result. In introducing a new program for the work of the section, NOSENKO suggested the use of third-country nationals (not American and not Soviet) for agent work against code clerks. In line with this suggestion, he personally recruited a military officer, (cryptonym "SARDAR"), and oriented him against the America House. (After his first few weeks he was specifically targetted against military code clerk Matthew ZUJUS.) Another such agent directly handled by NOSENKO was the Finnish businessman Johan PREISFROID, who figured in the case of the military code clerk Jenson (phonetic). BERG. NOSENKO also suggested initiating activity against code clerks prior to their arrival in the USSR and specifically proposed that operational measures be undertaken or that operational possibilities be studied in Helsinki, through which most of the code clerks passed on their way to Moscow.Finally, according to NOSENKO, none of the operations against code clerks was successful during the two years he spent as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, nor did the KGB have any success between January 1962 and January 1964, when NOSENKO left Moscow for Geneva. He stated that GRYAZNOV would have told him if any successful approaches had taken place during this latter period.(11) Approach to STORSBERGFrom the start of his association with CIA, NOSENKO has emphasized that the primary mission of the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 and 1961, during his incumbency as Deputy Chief of Section, was the recruitment of an American military cryptographer. He has explained the special stress placed on this requirement (vis-a-vis the recruitment of State Department code clerks) by saying that, while the KGB had broken certain U.S. State Department cipher systems and could read deciphered messages up to and including those classified "secret", there had been no such success with American military ciphers, which remained secure in this period. NOSENKO also has asserted repeatedly that the KGB had not been able to recruit any American code clerk, either State Department or military, during the years since the recruitment of "ANDREY" in 1953.*See Part VI.D.3.b., which discusses the "ANDREY" case.![Top Secret]
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 86]
January 1960: STORSBERG arrived in Moscow (this date was supplied by the interiogator and was accepted by NOSENKO as accurate, which it is).Early 1960: PREISFREUND was recruited by KOVSHUK. (This was consistent with earlier statements, and NOSENKO had always said he first met PREISFREUND a week or so after his recruitment. On 21 October 1966, however, NOSENKO said that he and PREISFREUND first met in the middle of 1960, in the summer of 1960. He subsequently stayed with the general date mid-1960.')Summer 1960: PREISFREUND first supplied a woman to STORSBERG.Early 1961: Compromising photographs of STORSBERG and a Soviet female were first obtained at the Hotel Peking in Moscow.About May 1961: PREISFREUND was withdrawn from the operation and SKVORTSOV, alias MICHAUD, was introduced. (NOSEIKO dated this by saying it was about three weeks before the approach to STORSBERG.)June 1961: Unsuccessful KGE approach to STORSBERG in the Leningrad Hotel, Moscow. (Earlier on 20 October 1966 NOSENKO had said that the approach was made "a ronth or a month and a half before STORSBERG left Moscow." Told that STORSBERG was reassigned in November 1961, NOSENKO said that the approach was in June 1961, i.e., five months before STORSBERG's departure date. STORSBERG has reported that the approach was in October 1961; see below.)NOSENKO was questioned further on the STORSBERG case later in the October 1966 interrogatiors. He asserted on 21 October that he had first met PREISFREUND in the summer of 1960 and that he continued to meet with him in his case officer capacity after the unsuccessful approach to STORSBERG. He saw PREIS-FREUND most recentiy, he said, in Moscow during 1963. NOSENKO also explained how PREISFREUND first came to know his true name: Initially NOSENKO was introduced to PREISFREUND only by first name and patronymic. Yuriy Ivanovich, on one occasion, however, NOSENKO was visiting PREISFREUND's hotel room in Moscow and "lost his KGB certificate there. Thereafter PREISFREUND knew him as NOSENKO, On 25 October 1966, NOSENKO repeated his earlier statements that the STORSBERG case was the only one in which PREISFREUND participated, although he may have reported casually on other Americans he met during his visits to America House. For the first time he specifically named GRYAZNOV as the case officer holding the operational file on STORSBERG. He continued to maintain that he, NOSENKO, supervised the operation against STORSBERG.
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## INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SOURCESTORBERG did not reply to an interview, so there is no approach until he is interviewed.STORBERG was interviewed by the FBI on 14 and 18 September 1964 in connection with the SULLIVAN case. (He had not been identified on the basis of 5 subject's further information.)Official records, indicate that BORJUN was transferred from Moscow to Lisbon, Portugal, in August 1961. If these records are correct, STORSBERG could not have seen MORONE with MICHAUD on this night in October 1961.
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* This is in reference to NOSENKO's statement that PREISFFEUND involved STORSBERG in speculation which PREISFRUEND also claimed; see also GOLITSYN's second lead, discussed below.TOP SECRET
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"Both NOSENKO and KOVSHUK used to make all sorts of promises to me about helping me out in my business and so on, but they never did a damn thing for me. On the contrary. The only promise they kept was that I would not be asked to do anything except the STORSBERG job. But, as for the rest of it, they didn't help me at all."PREISFREUND was eventually successful, he said, in introducing STORSBERG to Irina as NOSENTO wished and the three of them returned to PREISFREUND's hotel room on a summer evening. PREISFREUND slept in the hotel corridor while STORSBERG and Irina shared his bed. He told his CIA interviewers on 10 July 1965 that at one point during the evening he caught a glimpse of NOSENKO in the corridor wearing a rubber apron and from this deduced that NOSENKO had been taking surreptitious photographs of STORSBERG and Irina together.* On orders from NOSENKO and KOVSHUK, it was the last time he saw STORSBERG.**Toward the end of the 10 July 1965 meeting PREISFREUND said that about six months elapsed between his recruitment and the beginning of his involvement with STORSBERG. "The job," he said, "dragged out a long time." He reaffirmed that this was the only operation in which he participated and that he had told to the best of his ability all he knew of it. He admitted that he was a heavy drinker and said that for this reason he could not be sure about his dates. PREISFREUND added that he would not have forgotten, however, if he had performed other services for the KGB.PREISFREUND was shown GOLITSYN'S photograph and remarked: "Was he here (in Finland)? I don't know him." Shown the photograph during a later meeting, he said that he had once invited a large group of Soviets to go fishing with him in Finland and that this person may have been among them. When given the name KLIMOV, which GOLITSYN used in Finland in 1960 and 1961, and told that it was an alias, PREISFREUND asked whether KLIMOV had signed visas. He was told this was correct and was asked for the true name. PREISFREUND replied: "GOLUB? Yes?"At the close of the 10 July 1965 meeting, PREISFREUND mentioned to his interviewers that he was planning to travel to Leningrad by automobile with his family for about five days, beginning on or about 23 July. He said that he had learned from his business contacts in Moscow and from hotel personnel there that the Soviet authorities suspected him of complicity in NOSENKO's defection and was therefore apprehensive of the forthcoming trip.*** He said that he was particularly concerned about* NOSENKO has not mentioned this.** PREISFREUND could not date this occasion precisely; he said it was probably before the time he accidentally caused a fire in a Moscow hotel, which was in 1961.> [Figure] Image showing a liaison*** An official service has advised CIA that in discussions with V. Ya. CHEKALOV, the Chief of the KGB Ninth (Guards) Directorate, a representative of that service was asked by CHERALOV for whom PREISFREUND was working during his frequent visits to the Soviet Union. CHEKALOV told the representative of the service that PREISFREUND is considered to be an agent of American Intelligence.TOP SECRET
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181what his response should be if the KG3 accused him of confessingto American Intelligence and asked his interviewers to briefhim in this regard. During the final CIA meeting on 13 July1965 PREISFREUND said that he had decided that the situationwas too dangerous; he would not be going to the USSR after all.Reliable information shows, however, that he did go to the Sov-iet Union several days later, returning to Helsinki on 24 July1965.TOP SEGRET
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# 184.## (e) Information from other SourcesInformation available to CIA indicates that the Attaches of the three U.S. military services represented in Moscow shared a single cryptographic center as of 1960 and 1961 and that, except for overlapping assignments during periods of turnover, there was normally only one military code clerk assigned to the Embassy at any particular time. This military code clerk was responsible for enciphering and deciphering the traffic of all three military services. In practice, at least one other member of the Attache staff in Moscow has held a cryptographic clearance and has been trained and has performed the function of back-up for the military code clerk during periods of the latter's absence from the Moscow Embassy or inability to perform his functions for other reasons.STORSBERG was the only military code clerk assigned to the Moscow Embassy from February 1960, when his predecessor, Everett HOBSON, was reassigned, until September 1961, when his successor, Mathew ZUJUS, arrived. STORSBERG himself arrived in Moscow in January 1960 and departed in November 1961.During the period of STORSBERG's tour in Moscow, back-up cryptographic duties were performed by the Military Communications Officer, CWO-2 HURLEY. HURLEY performed these duties on a number of occasions, including the night of the approach to STORSBERG, and he could be loosely termed a code clerk. * Additionally, he performed repair work on the cryptographic machines and directed certain other sensitive activities at the Embassy. HURLEY's tour in Moscow began shortly before STORSBERG's, in December 1959, and he served there until June or July 1962.The only other person performing official functions in the military code room during the 1960-1961 period was James KEYSERS, who arrived in Moscow on 22 December 1960 and was assigned to the office of the Air Force Medical Officer. As a concurrent secondary assignment, KEYSERS worked as a clerk-typist in the office of the Air Attache. From February until mid-April 1961, as a collateral duty, KEYSERS worked in the joint military code room where he was in training to serve as back-up cryptographer. He was relieved of this duty in April 1961 for reasons of lowAlthough NOSENKO has distinguished between STORSBERG's function as "military code clerk" and HURLEY's duties as "military code machine mechanic," he said on one occasion that he considered both to be within the general category of "military code clerks." NOSENKO reported that there was no KGB operation against HURLEY.
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185. aptitude and lack of interest; in June 1961 he was removed from Moscow because of reported homosexual activities.*NOSENKO has described an operation against KEYSERS (see below), but because of the date of KEYSERS' arrival in Moscow, he must be ruled out as a candidate for the first of GOLIT-SYN's two leads discussed above. On the basis of available information, it appears that the subject of this lead must have been either STORSBERG or HURLEY, the only two "military code clerks" in Moscow in the spring of 1960. The subject of GOLITSYN's second lead could have been STOPSBERG, HURLEY, or, in fact, anyone else at the Embassy, although GOLITSYN suggested that he might be a code clerk and might be a military man. By his statement that there was no KGB operation against HURLEY, together with his description of the operation against STORSBERG beginning in the spring of 1960 and his (and PREISFREUND'S) assertion that PREISFREUND took part in only one operation for the KGB--that against STORSBERG--NOSENKO has said in effect that both of GOLITSYN's leads were to the STORSBERG operation, which ended in failure. This conflicts with GOLITSYN's report that PREISFREUND was involved in a successful recruitment operation in late 1960. There are also inconsistencies between the NOSENKO and GOLITSYN leads as regards the progress of the operation. GOLITSYN reported that recruitment of a code clerk was "99 per cent" assured in May-June 1960, whereas NOSENKO and PREISPREUND describe an operation which, at best, was just becoming active at that time. GOLITSYN, in reporting his second lead, said that the operation in which PREISFREUND participated culminated "in late 1960; NOSENKO reported that the only operation in which PREISFREUND took part ended in an unsuccessful approach to STORSBERG in "mid-1961" or, on other occasions, in "autumn 1961."