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# 314.activity in Cuba. On 4 September FOBRYIN gave Robert Kennedy "an unusual personal message from KHRUSHCHEV for the President": KHRUSHCHEY pledged that he would not stir up any incidents before the upcoming U.S. elections. On the same day, the President stated publicly that the United States had no proof of a Soviet offensive missile capability in Cuba. Also on the same day, the Soviet Union sent a harsh note to the U.S. Government concerning the (unintentional) violation of Soviet airspace by an American U-2 plane on 30 August, the note threatened "appropriate retaliatory measures" against U-2 bases should such incidents be repeated. The following day (5 September) U-? flights over Cuba were temporarily suspended, and they did not resume until 14 October. On 6 September DOBRYNIN again told SORENSEN that the Soviets had "done nothing new' in Cuba and gave his assurances that all their steps"were defensive in nature and did not represent any threat to...the United States." On 13 October DOBRYNIN irformed Chester BOWLES (a Special Representative and Advisor to the President) that the USSR would never send offensive weapons to Cuba. Sini-lar assurances were given by KHRUSHCHEV to U.S. Ambassador KOHLER in Moscow on 16 October (the same day that the President was shown the U-2 photographs which revealed the presence of offensive missiles) and by Foreign Minister GROMYKO to President Kennedy in person on 18 October.Also on 18 October, the FBI reported,Two days later BOLSHAKOV told washington correspondents Joseph ALSOP and Charles BARTLETT that the Soviets had no offensive weapons in Cuba, and said he had been instructed by KRUSHCEEV and MIKOYAN on 1 הס October (the day before his departure from Moscow) to inform President Kennedy of this fact. CIA has no indication that BOLSHAKOV delivered this message to the President, or ever directly to the Attorney Ceneral, or that, prior to his meeting with BEGLOV in New York City. he made any remarks about Soviet weapons in Cuba.There Is no report of BOLSHAKOV'S having played any role in the Cuban missile crisis beyond making these remarks to ALSOP ard BARTLETT. Discussions at the White House, State Department, and Defense Department about the crisis culminated in the decision-to-impose a blockade on Cuba; this decision was announced by President Kennedy over nationwide television and radio on 22 October 1962. Soviet overtures for a peaceful settlement of the situation were initiated on 26 October by the KGB Legal Resident in Washington, A.S. FEKLISOV,** in contacts with the American journalist John SCALI. FEKLI-SOV's proposals were along the same lines as those received*BEGLOV came to the United States to attend the "Third Un-official US-USSR Conference of Public Figures," held at Andover, Massachusetts, from 21 to 27 October 1962. Also present at this conference was Boris BELITSKIY, identified by NOSENKO four months earlier as a KCB-controlled source of CIA (see Part VI.D.6.). BELITSKIY indicated at that time that BEGLOV might be affiliated with the KGB.**FEKLISOV, who served in Washington under the alias FOLIN, vas the author of one of the documents among the CHEREPANOV papers (see Part VI.D.7.c.).TOP SECRET