Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 14]
# SECRET-EYES ONLYHenry DearbornJohn D. ParfieldCiudad Trujillo - CIALear ReedRobert OwenCharles CooksonIsabel CintronKey Dominican PlottersDr. Jordi BrossaJuan ViciniLuis Eaquerowith the plotters in the Dominican Republic to Ambassador Farland. They describe him as a former FBI employee who considered himself quite a clandestine operator. Esterline, who later served under him in Panama, called him "a wild man who bugged the Agency to support a move to assassinate Trujillo." He had direct dealings with a number of the key plotters.Counsellor of Embassy until 25 August 1960 and Consul General thereafter. He used the code name DELTA in correspondence with the plotters.Second Secretary until 26 August 1960 and a consular officer thereafter. CIA cryptonym: EMDAZE-1Chief of Station until October 1960Chief of Station from 20 January until 4 June 1961. Code name used with the plotters: GALGOOperations OfficerAdministrative AssistantCode names: SWORD and EL CHICOCode Names: Mr. X, ABC, and YAGUATECode name: SOCRATES- 14 -# SECRET-EYES ONLY
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SECRET-EYES ONLYS. Thomas StockerAn American in the Dominican Republic with whom the station had had an earlier unhappy experience. The consulate preferred to have nothing to do with him, but the Dominican plotters brought him in as a cutout to the consulate. He took delivery from Lorenzo Berry of three carbines passed to Perry from the U.S. Consulate for use by the plotters. Ee held them for a few days and then gave them back when Berry insisted they be returned. Berry then passed them to one of the assassins.Dr. Severo CabralJose Francisco TapiaCode names: HECTOR and PLUTARCOAulio BreaAndres FreitasCode name: ANDYLuis Amiama TiqJose Rene RomanJuan Tomas DiazCode name: CRISTOBALDonald Reid CabralCode name: CIBAOLorenzo D. Berry"Wimpy" - Berry is a U.S. citizen who owned Wimpy's Supermarket in Ciudad Trujillo. He was the main communications link between the plotters and the U.S. Consulate. The weapons furnished the plotters were actually passed to Berry.Flerida BerryWimpy's wife - a Dominican citizen of Syrian extraction. She appears to have been even more active in the plot than her husband. It was she who had the contacts with the Dominicans involved.- 15 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
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SECRET-EYES ONLYMost comunications between the Dominican plotters and the U.S. Consulate were by means of written notes. Mrs. Ferry received the notes from or passed then to either the Consul General's secretary or the CIA Station's administrative assistant.Two documents provide a useful point of depature, from an historical point of view. One is a semi-official letter from Ambassador Farland in the Dominican Republic to Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom. The other document is an internal CIA staff paper revealing the relatively passive role that had been played by CIA prior to 1960.16 November 1959Ambassador Farland wrote an "Official-Informal" memorandum to Rubottom reporting that "the underground is more active today than ever in the history of the Trujillo regime." He described the principal opposition group as being about 2,000 strong. He said:" . . . within this group there is growing militant anti- American feeling based on the premise that the United States should actively aid the Dominican revolutionary (sic) for the overthrow of the Trujillo regime. Discussions I have heard on this subject show an appalling lack of understanding of the position of the United States and its adopted doctrine of non- intervention. . . . This group is in possession of clandestine broadcasting equipment which will go into operation when the strike is made. CAS has been informed and joins with me in suggesting that you pass this information to J. C. King."- 16 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
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SECRET-EYES ONLY15 February 1960A CIA staff paper, addressed to Chief, WI Division, discusses a plan for improving intelligence coverage of the Dominican Republic in the event of Trujillo's removal from power. The objectives stated in the paper were to ensure orderly transition in the event Trujillo abdicated or was deposed and to prevent a takeover by Castro-type forces. The following excerpt reveals the level of CIA activity in the Dominican Republic prior to that time:"The COS Ciudad Trujillo conducts no covert operations; however, his official contacts with Generalissimo Trujillo and with the Chief of the Dominican Security Services has enabled him on occasion to assess the attitudes and reactions of the Trujillo government to internal opposition activities and to criticisms of and activities directed against the Dominican government by exiles and other American governments unfriendly to the Dominican regime."10 March 1960This is the date of the first draft that appears in Agency files of a plan to persuade Trujillo to retire. The originator of the draft is not shown, but it was to be forwarded to President Eisenhower from General Edwin Clark, a friend of the President from their years of military service. The plan was for Clark to approach Trujillo, with whom he had been on good terms in the past, and attempt to persuade Trujillo to retire. It was to be pointed out that there was- 17 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
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SECRET-EYES ONLYno one who could succeed him, and that to protect his family and to preserve his image as *El Benefactor*, he should step down and allow asylum to be arranged for him. His family would have the wealth already outside the Dominican Republic, and the fortune by inside would be placed in trust, to be administered/internationally- known personages for the benefit of the Dominican people.This proposition received high-level attention in Washington, including that of President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Herter, and Allen Dulles. In approving Clark's approach to Trujillo, the President specified that Clark should travel as a representative of the State Department, rather than as a personal emissary of the President. General Clark traveled to the Dominican Republic and met with Trujillo on 27 March. By the time of the meeting it appears that it had been decided that the plan would be presented as merely that of private citizen Clark, and that was what was done. The station thought it likely that Trujillo recognized the official U.S. Government hand in the proposal. Of course, nothing came of the meeting.22 March 1960Ambassador Farland, in a TOP SECRET memorandum to Rubottom, forwarded a plan of a Dominican group plotting Trujillo's overthrow- 18 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
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SECRET-EYES ONLYbearing the code naze "Operation Lancet." It was basically a proposal for a course of political actica reinforced by the threat of being cacked by muscle. The operation was to begin ith the arrival of a "special U.S. confidential envoy"/who would tell Trujillo to leave the country. "He tells it plainly and decisively; he will give hin 12 or 18 hours to do it." It would be made clear that if Trujillo refused, a border incident would be contrived, which would be followed by "collective intervention." Assuming Trujillo's acceptance of the ultimatun, the plan then outlined steps for transition to an operating representative government. The army would be reduced in size. A caretaker government would prepare for free elections. Ambassador Farland forwarded the plan with these comments of his om to Rubottom:"... this segment of the dissidents is psychologically conditioned to a point where it will take any step except the ultimate, and for the execution of the latter they expect United States assistance....""Dick, I think the time has come for certain agencies of our Government, without attribution, to establish and implement a definite constructive program to influence the course of events in the Dominican Republic. My conversations with the Secretary and Allen Dulles emphasized the problems and the possibilities of this type of approach."30 March & 7 April 1960The Special Group considered actions that might be taken in the- 19 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
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SECRET-EYES ONLYevent of a flare-up in the Dominican Republic. On 30 March, fearing that Cuba night be involved, there was talk of evacuating U.S. civilians from Guantanamo. There was also discussion of the possibility of sealing off the land entrance to the Dominican Republic from Haiti and of the problem of providing asylum for Trujillo. On 7 April, there was further talk of sealing off the country if Trujillo fell, and an appraisal was made of the chances of his leaving willingly:". . . it is evident that Trujillo will not consider making any arrangements for orderly succession to himself, but that he will either hang on to the bitter end or flee the country on short notice, a la Batista."9 April 1960State sent a cable to Farland through CIA channels, from which the following is an extract:"Could you, if so instructed, make appropriate arrangements within zext few weeks with appropriate civil and military dissident elements to take over the GODR? You would be authorized to indicate to them that as soon as they had seized power they should imediately request United States recognition, and ask for United States military assistance under Article Three of the Rio Treaty in the event of actual or threatened Castro-sponsored invastions or of threatened insurrection incited by pro-Castro or pro-Communist elements within or outside Dominican Republic . . ."Woat, if any, aid would be essential to dissident elements prior to takeover . . ."- 20 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
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SECRET-EYES ONLY"FA wish to emphasize strongly that above is for contingency planning purposes only and in no way initiates higher authority at present contemplates such action. . . . . "11 April 1960Farland cabled his reply through CIA channels, in part as follows:"Under instruction, it would be possible for me to make arrangements with appropriate civilian dissidents whose leaders are known to me including names their selectees for top governmental positions, and with one military dissident, a general, who is expecting an exchange of passwords for purpose secret discussions. . . . . ."Regardless of . . . reething unrest which exists, indications reflect Dominican dissidents, who are admittedly poorly armed, loosely organized and lack working liaison with military dissidents, will find it difficult to effect take- over of GODR without existence one or more or combination of following developments (which we summarize below):(1) Clandestine arms shipments, with sabotage materiel.(2) An invasion to serve as a signal to the populace.(3) Implementation of the dissidents' "Operation Lancet."(4) Advance psychological conditioning by radio.(5) "Incapacitation or assassination of Trujillo."(6) A careful step-by-step plan for the period preceding the coup and for the period following it.Farland stated a need for "minimum but key cooperation" from Dominican military dissidents. He added:"One of the greatest contributions U.S. could make to dissidents would be to let them know we are prepared to assist- 21 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 22]
SECRET-EYES ONLYthes; transmission of armament and sabotage material . . . could fully substantiate this cooperation.9 May 1960and signed by P.E.Oberst, Chief, WH/CA,A memorandum addressed to Chief, WH Division,/reports steps taken or recommended for improving CIA's capabilities in the Dominican Republic. The paper refers to the need for covert action assets, principally to obstruct infiltration of Communists or Fidelistas. Among things recommended were: placement of a junior officer in the embassy; assignment of a full-time officer to the headquarters desk for the covert action program; authorization to use Jose Figueres in third country operations; development of a contingency PM-plan in the event Trujillo fell and hostile forces attempted to seize power, and establishment of a "U.S. Committee for Democracy in the Dominican Republic."A memorandum written of a debriefing of Ambassador Farland reads, in part, as follows:"The dissidents need guns and ammunition from the United States. In particular they need a small number of high-powered rifles with telescopic lenses. The Ambassador said that he saw no problem in the purchase and delivery clandestinely of the arms to the dissidents. But he said, of course, this raises the question of whether the U.S. Government wants to engage in this activity."Col. King said that this of course is a policy decision. He said that CIA could deliver the arms if this is the group we want to support.- 22 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
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SECRET-EYES ONLY(Comment: Farland was in Washington for consultations. Although he is listed as having served as Ambassador until 28 June 1950, it appears that he did not actually return to duty in Ciudad Trujillo. His successor, Vinton Chapin, was nominated 13 June, but he never took the post.)3 June 1960Farland met with Nelson H. Smith, the Dominican desk officer in WH Division. They compared lists of dissidents to see if the names CIA had were those with whom Farland had been dealing. Farland said, "Those are the boys all right." Smith's memorandum of the meeting includes this comment:"Farland then told me that the underground opposition are planning to assassinate Trujillo. He said that it is planned to use a powerful bomb which could be planted along the route of Trujillo's nightly walk and could be detonated by a remote- control firing device. He intimated that this plan is pretty well along and could be executed at any time."Undated Working Paper (filed between papers dated 25 May and 13 June)The author is not identified nor is there any indication that the proposal was approved. Its objective was stated thus: "To precipitate the downfall of the Trujillo regime by 1 August or as soon as possible thereafter." It proposed that the U.S. become a prime motive force against the Trujillo regime. "In the event Trujillo-23-SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 24]
SECRET-EVES ONLYrefused to abiicate, consideration should be given to other covert or over actions designed to effect his removal from the scene." A deadline of 1 July was proposed for completing arrangements.17 June 1960Henry Dearborn, who was in charge in the Ambassador's absence, queried State through CIA channels, asking for ccafirmation on certain points for a meeting he was having with a dissident leader, Dr. Jordi Brosse. He stated his understanding of the U.S. position as follows:a. The U.S. is not prepared to take overt action against the Trujillo government while it is in full coatrol.b. The U.S. is prepared to assist the opposition clandestinely to develop effective forces to accomplish Trujillo's overthros.c. Assistance must continue to be channeled covertly until such time as the dissidents establish a provisionai goverment which controls a substantial section of the Dominican Republic.20 June 1960Dearborn, again through CIA channels, asked Rubottom and Farland if he could make the same statements concerning U.S. policy in a meeting with Juan Vicini, another dissident leader. Farland replied in the affirmative.- 24 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
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SECRET-EYES ONLY28 June 1960Dearborn cabled the results of his first meeting with Juan Vicini. He said that Vicini felt that the time to concentrate on, for planning purposes, was the period extending through the "incapacitation" of Trujillo; too much planning for what would follow risked exposure. Dearborn said that he agreed.Also on 28 June (although the first written record we find is a summary memorandum prepared on 18 October), Rubottom told J.C. King that the Government of the United States was prepared to participate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the following extent: "to provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene. . . . "Rubottom added that the U.S. Government was *not* prepared, at this time, to send arms, equipment, or paramilitary experts to assist the underground to accomplish a revolt.29 June 1960Dearborn cabled the results of his meeting with Dr. Brossa. He said that Brossa had recommended a temporary standdown on "action toward incapacitation of Trujillo" while determining Venezuela's reaction to the Trujillo assassination plot against Betancourt.- 25 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
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SECRET-EYES ONLYDearborn reported that the dissidents had a capability for pickingup arms at sea and for caching/nearby caves. He also described anairdrop site.1 July 1950A memorandum addressed to the Acting DCI recommended approvalfor the delivering of weapons to the Dominican dissidents."It is proposed to procure and deliver to undergroundopposition forces in the Dominican Republic 12 sterile U.S.rifles, Model 1903 (Springfield), with telescopic sights, togetherwith five hundred rounds of ammunition for same.It is planned to deliver these weapons by air through DPDfacilities provided arrangements can be worked out with theopposition for their reception. If they cannot be delivered byair, plans are currently being studied in the CA staff fordelivery by sea.""Approval for delivery of these arms has been given byAssistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, who requests thatthe arms be placed in the hands of the opposition at theearliest possible moment."The memorandum was signed by Rudy Gomez for Chief, WH Division; wasconcurred in by Richard Helms as Acting DD/P; and was approved byC. P. Cabell on 2 July 1960 as Acting DCI.Dearborn was informed by cable of plans to airdrop twelve30.03 Springfields, with ammunition, and with sights "fixed andsighted." The cable asked for the coordinates of a suitable dropsite and for a four-man reception team with flashlights. The cable- 26 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
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SECRET-EYES CTLYadded that, "If air drop delivery not possible, Hqs now studyingmeans of erfecting delivery by sea if deemed more practicable."8 July 1960Headquarters cabled Dearborn, in part:" . . . imperative learn from [Juan Vicini] and/or[Dr. Jordi Brossa] what plans and capabilities are to beemployed simultaneously with action to incapacitate Trujilloand what is needed in way of material support for implementationof plan of action. Of particular importance is info re extentof military participation in preparations. In spite of [Vicini]apparent lack of knowledge of opposition organization, mostlogical that he is actively collaborating with a group thatmust have some plan and capability for action which will assurestable interim government after removal of Trujillo. . . .In your opinion are [Vicini] and [Brossa] members of same groupor if not could the two groups be merged? . . . "8 September 1960The Special Group discussed a letter drafted by the Departmentof State for delivery to Trujillo (copy in CIA files dated 6 September)proposing that he step down. The DCI (Mr. Dulles) doubted the wisdomof putting such a proposal in writing. He preferred a personalapproach. The Group concluded that a personal approach would bebest and discussed William Pawley as a candidate for the job.18 October 1960Chief, WH Division, prepared a memorandum summarizing approvals- 27 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 28]
SECRET-EVES CALYobtained for action in support of the Dominican intermal opposition.The text states that the supary was "provided in response to your verbal request on 13 October 196). . ." This is the memorandum to which reference is made earlier under the entry for 28 June 1960.29 December 1960The minutes of the Special Group meeting of this date read, in part:"Bisrel gave the broad cutlices of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covert activities irected against the Trujillo regime. He emphasized that although support would be given to the Figueres group there is no intention of establishing a paramilitary force as such . . . He also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of them- selves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.. . . . It was noted that Mr. Pawley feels that overt intervention in the Dominican Republic should be mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operations. . . . it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention may be."(Comment: We find nothing in the files identifiable with such a "plan." We found no other reference to any specific plan of about this date.)12 January 1961The following is an excerpt from the minutes of a meeting of the- 28 -SECRET-EVES ONLY
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SECRET-EYES ONLYSpecial Group on this date:"Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department ofState that limited supplies of small arms and other materialshould be made available for dissidents inside the DominicanRepublic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be managedsecurely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final trans-portation into the group being provided by the dissidentsthemselves. The Group approved the project."19 January 1951Cable from headquarters:"For Dearborn: FYI and use as you consider adviseable,authority has been given Hqs for delivery to internal frontof limited supply of small arms and other material on conditionthat introduction of material into DomRep be effected by Doms.. . . Above coordinated with State."24 January 1961Memorandum for the record of a discussion of Project EMDEED bymembers of the CA Staff and of WH Division:"It was confirmed (from Mr. Parrott by phone) that theSpecial Group now has approved that a 'limited supply' ofsmall arms and related equipment may be provided covertly tothe Dominican resistance elements with whom we have beendealing. This was additional to the Special Group's approvalon 29 December 1950 of our Operational Proposal."(Comment: As noted in the entry for 29 December, we knownone of the specifics of this Operational Proposal.)- 29 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
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SECRET-EYES ONLY31 January 1961"Official-Informal" letter from Dearborn to Devine in State Department:"With regard to the delivery of exotic equipment, my friends were of course delighted that such a decision had been made. I hope that it will not be necessary to play down too long the question of actual delivery since they are eager and expectant and too great tardiness on our part would only lead them to question our sincerity."6 February 1961Cable from headquarters:"1. Realize details not now available but Hqs would appreciate /[dissidents'/] reaction to offer of armed assistance to include. /[dissidents'/] current plan . . ."2. Also request /[Robert Owen's/] initial assessment /[dissidents'/] capability carry out plan of action once limited armed assistance provided."10 February 1951The station cabled its reply:"No solid reaction except joy as of 9 Feb."Initial assessment is /[Brossa and Vicini/] could not carry out plan. But with access /[Dr. Severo Cabral/] he now approaching point when will better be able evaluate group potential for action. We some weeks away from being able make solid preliminary assessment."Suggest KUBARK consider sending in each pouch one small- 30 -SECRET-EYES ONLY