Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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C. Motivations and Intentions of NOSENKO1. IntroductionNOSENKO has not indicated that his professional status in the KGB, his standard of living in the Soviet Union, or his family life prompted him to volunteer to American Intelligence in 1962 and to defect to the United States in 1964. He initially told CIA that he had been unusually successful during his ten-year career as a KGB counterintelligence officer; his closest friends and the people whom he admired most were members of the KGB; he enjoyed his work. The NOSENKO family held a high social position, and their economic situation was "luxurious by Soviet standards." NOSENKO described his family life as close and harmonious. He spoke with fondness and pride about his two daughters, of his wife's tolerance and understanding, of the companionship she gave him. He expressed love and a sense of responsibility for his widowed mother, who heavily depended upon him after the death of his father in 1956. The elder NOSENKO won his son's admiration for having worked his way up from an apprentice pipefitter in a shipyard to the position of Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding. The NOSENKO name is honored in the home town of Nikolayevsk, where the shipyard has been renamed for the former minister and where a statue of him has been erected in the town square. By his own account, NOSENKO thus had had a rewarding home life and a successful and enjoy-able career in the KGB.2. Collaboration in 1962At the outset in 1962, NOSENKO said he wanted to limit his reports to two items of information. Before the first meeting with CIA was over, he went beyond these two items to give details on the KGB Second Chief Directorate and other operations, and he offered to meet again. (Four more meetings ensued in 1962, with NOSENKO providing additional information on the KGB.) He would not defect, NOSENKO said, unless his personal safety was endangered by the KGB. Motivations in coming to American Intelligence, according to NOSENKO, were his financial emergency in Geneva and his disaffection for the Soviet regime.a. Readiness to Report to CIADuring his 9 June meeting with David MARK, NOSENKO said he realized, even before talking to representatives of American Intelligence, that they would not be satisfied with the two items of information alone--he expected them to insist on more. He was introduced by MARK to a CIA case officer later the same day, and at the start of the meeting, the following dialogue took place:NOSENKO: You see, I am not planning to be your agent... and don't think that I am going to work with you in Moscow. No. No...Case Officer: As you have said, I am an intelligence officer as are you. And I think that we will understand one another.NOSENKO: You want to place our relationship on an agent basis.
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Case Officer: Of course.NOSENKO: Never in my life I will go in contact [with CIA] in Moscow or the USSR, never in my life. I also know about Langelle and POPOV; I know this matter. When it was abroad it was fine, but when you decided to meet him in Moscow... You want more than I came with the intention of saying. You want to change this to a long-term relationship. Understand me. I am now the chief of a section. Before my departure [from Moscow] a decision was being reached--and I have just spoken with my wife in Moscow--I am supposed to become the deputy chief of a department. Do you understand what this is?Case Officer: Why are you telling me this?NOSENKO: Because I wanted to come [to CIA] only for a business deal, to give you these two cases, to receive money for this, and that's all. Goodbye. Perhaps, sometime, when I come abroad, we will meet one another and perhaps I will give you something. God knows. But I don't want to do this now. I don't want to and I am not prepared within myself for this... I am giving two interesting cases. The most interesting ones. I say to you honestly, the two most interesting ones. In the first of them ["ANDREY"**], I took no part. In the second [BELITSKIY***] I took part, even here.Case Officer: I want you to understand that these two matters that you spoke to Mr. MARK about are of great importance to us. But I don't have to tell you that. You know that. But we are not going to play like children. You know perfectly well that it is worth every franc... What I want to tell you is this: of course I will ask you more, and of course I want to know as much as you know. If you refuse to answer, that's your business.NOSENKO: I will tell what I am able to tell. What I know, I will tell. Of course, you youself understand that there are things concerning our internal system that I cannot report to you. You yourself understand this.*The compromise of the CIA source in the GRU, P.S. POPOV, is discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.**The case of "ANDREY," the KGB cryptonym for the agent Dayle SMITH, is discussed in Part VI.D.3.b.***BELITSKIY, a KGB-controlled double agent, is discussed in Part VI.D.6
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# When the CIA officer said that he understood NOSENKO hadbeen in the KGB since shortly after the war, NOSENKO, withoutfurther prompting, gave a detailed statement of his own personalpast and his professional career. In tius statement he describedhis education, his service in the GRU, his entry into the KGBand generally the functions and operating techniques of thevarious components of the KGB Second Chief Directorate in whichhe had served, along with the inclusive dates of his servicein each. This account was very similar to that given MARKearlier in the day. Still without prompting, he discussedseveral specific KGB operations against Americans inside theSoviet Union, one involving the recruitment of a Yale Universityprofessor on the basis of homosexual compromise and the otheran unsuccessful attempt to recruit an American code clerk.NOSENKO said he was personally involved in both cases.*The question of his further assistance was then raisedagain: The CIA officer asked NOSENKO to tell more about theYale professor, but NOSENKO demurred, stressing that the agree-ment involved only two pieces of information and ignoring thefact that he had already given considerably more:NOSENKO:I have told you enough for this day, and I willtell you only these two cases which I wanted totell you, and it is enough for this day.CaseOfficer:How do you imagine that this is enough? Youknow that we work much the same way.NOSENKO:Yes.CaseOfficer:You know what interests us, of course.NOSENKO:I know it. Today I gave only two things.Let's meet one another (again).CaseOfficer:Good. But let me say this: What you tell meIs your business. I am not going to try tobring any pressure at all... There is no argu-ment about it. I am not going to say: 'Pleasesee us in Moscow.' I don't want to see youin Moscow because it's too difficult. It iscompletely impossible. That's it. No more onthat subject.NOSENKO:I said to David [MARK] before meeting you thatI don't want to meet anyone anymore, not anyone.CaseOfficer:All right. Agreed.NOSENKO:In another place. I don't know whether I willcome back here in a month or not...I personallydon't want to, either, because my wife will bemoaning at home. But I am afraid they will makeme come, because I know the delegation. I know*Richard BURGI and Joseph MORONE; see Parts V.D.4.b. and V.E.3.c.,respectively. NOSENKO did not supply the names at this time.
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the circumstances. They may make na comeIn that case we can meet.Case You know that I would not bring any pressure.Officer: That's something we understand because we are both in this business. You and I are in the same business, so you can't--NOSENKO: Let me interrupt. Why are we bargaining so now? So that I will say something more to you. I said: 'Let's meet again.' Maybe I will tell [more]. Now I will give you only these two items because we have made a deal. I will tell you about these two cases. Let's meet again, if you insist. I understand that you want more. Well, I will think a bit about what I know.Case That's all right.Officer:NOSENKO: We can meet when I am abroad perhaps... You must understand me. This has not come to me simply. I had time to think for a long time. I thought for a long time. You see, it's very difficult for me, very difficult for me. And after I go it will also be very difficult for me.Case But you knew that when you came. Why did youOfficer: come to us? Why to the American rezidentura [CIA Station) and not to the British?NOSENKO: I came here because you are strong, strong...You don't have to explain to me. I know what makes me go. I told you it is hard for me. I still need to think. That's all. But I can no longer take a step back because the step forward has already been taken. I won't re- fuse if we meet before my departure. If you like, on Monday, on Tuesday, any day. Monday is better for me. Not Sunday, because I have to be there with my own [people].This exchange was followed by a lengthy description of the two leads which NOSENKO had come to sell, the BELITSKIY and the "ANDREY" cases...AS NOSENKO was about to leave this first meeting, his case officer asked when they might meet again. NOSENKO suggested that they meet two days later, on Monday, around noontime as it would be easier for him to get away unnoticed at lunchtime. He then said that the case officer was probably trying to get everything down on tape and asked that this be stopped because of the risk to his security resulting from such a permanent re- cord of their conversations. NOSENKO said: "I will not tell you anything particularly interesting. But I can tell you some- thing. But not today. I can tell how LANGELLE blew POPOV--not LANGELLE, but because of whom and why we found him--for your future use, so that you will know how to operate. But LANGELLE was not guilty. It was not LANGELLE who was guilty. Another person was responsible for the compromise. Next time."
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# 4. The Letter of July 1964The most complete explanation given by NOSENKO of his motives for first contacting CIA and later defecting to the United States is contained in a letter to his CIA case officer in July 1964. He described this letter as "an exposition of all those reasons and root causes which led to the decision to leave the Soviet Union" and further explained that "everything put down here is lacking in a whole series of lesser details which to a greater or lesser degree played their role." Nevertheless, he said, he had tried in this letter "to set down the main things to show how, when, and why the decision was born, grew, and hardened within me to completely alter the course of my life." This letter is presented below in its entirety. Most of the biographical and operational details mentioned in the letter are covered separately in other parts of this paper."1. My life, my childhood and youth passed in very comfortable circumstances since the position of my father gave us the opportunity to live without lacking for anything. And the only difficult periods of my life (before the death of my father) were: study in the naval schools in Kuybyshev, Baku and Leningrad; and the beginning of my working life, the period in the Far East (1950-1952). The opportunity to be always well-dressed, to have a sufficient amount of money, to have my own car, to be able to use the car given me by my family and also my father's car, the opportunity to travel to the South and to vacation in the best sanitariums, dachas, and so forth; all this unquestionably left its mark on me and became something of a habit. After the death of my father, my successful progress in my work gave me a higher salary, and although I did not have all that which I had while my father was alive, still I did not experience any serious difficulties. But already I wanted to live still better."2. Up to 1953, over the course of my entire life--at school, in the Institute, at work, at home in the family--it was always pounded into my head that STALIN was a great genius, that he was good, keen, etc., and the thought never occurred to me to question his words or his deeds because everything that he said, and everything he did, were completely axiomatic. The arrests and trials only involved traitors and it was considered and explained that the people who suffered innocently, especially in 1937 and 1938, suffered only because at the head of the NKVD in 1937, 1938, was the betrayor of the people YEZHOV. Not even the shadow of doubt fell on the name of STALIN. Soon after STALIN's death in 1953 I read a certain document given me by my father. This was a secret letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the 'case of the doctors;' it was not addressed to all communists but only to members and candidate members of the Central Committee. I was deeply shaken by this letter which described in detail how these people,
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important specialists in the field of medicine, werebrought to such a condition that they condemned them-selves; that is, they confessed to things which hadnever happened, to things which they had never done.They were simply forced to give the evidence which wasneeded by the investigators. The secret letters onthe cult of STALIN and much that I heard in the KGBabout the reign of STALIN, all this left its mark andforced me to think deeply about the real truth and tolook at everything more critically. Already I nolonger had faith in all those ideas which for yearshad been pressed into my head."3. The new leaders (KIIRUSHCHEV and Company)used the same methods but already diluted with thewater of democracy, with playing up to the peopleand attempts to convince them that a new era wouldarise, a new and better life, and that now the Partywas always going to concern itself with the welfareof the people. In fact, it was a struggle for powerand the use of all means in this struggle, evenmicrophones (they listened to the conversations ofBERIYA and his friends; later they listened to theconversations of MOLOTOV, MALENKOV, KAGANOVICH, andothers). KHRUSHCHEV's endless blabbing about suc-cesses, when in fact they didn't exist, the figuresabout how the USSR had passed the USA in the produc-tion of butter and milk, when in the stores they wereavailable only infrequently. The endless promisesof a better life when in fact nothing of the sort istaking place. All this similarly forced me to re-evaluate not only the events which were taking placein the country, but already the entire ideology ofthe Party, its external and internal course."4. The events in Novocherkassk where about 20,000to 25,000 people rose up and the way in which thispopular indignation was suppressed by troops with manycasualties. This also made a deep impression on me.When I was resting in the summer of 1961 in Nikolayev,from my relatives--my father's brothers--I understoodwell the real relation of the workers both to theleadership and to the Party as a whole. At the sametime I saw how the workers really lived, how they eat,what they have and what they can buy with their wages."5. I heard a great deal from my father aboutthe domestic policies of KHRUSHCHEV in regard to thedevelopment and the course of construction in industry,about his complete illiteracy in engineering techno-logy and industrial economics, about incorrect deci-sions in regard to many industries, and this was notonly the opinion of my father, but also of other impor-tant leaders in various fields of industry (MALYSHEV,VANNIKOV, AKOPOV, and others). But no one dared toopen his mouth and when in December 1955 my fathertried, as an engineer, to prove that a certain deci-sion would be incorrect, he received such a rebufffrom KHRUSHCHEV that he was profoundly shaken and inthe opinion of my mother this brought him to his ill-ness in 1956 and his death in August 1956.
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# 6. The events in Germany and especially in Hungary showed with absolute clarity the bankruptcy of communist ideology. What was especially important for me was the fact that in these countries it was a protest not of individuals or groups, but of the entire people who could no longer endure a regime imposed on them by force. Here it is necessary to emphasize that the life of the people in these countries was much better than that of the people in the USSR (I saw for myself how people live in Czecho- slovakia, in Germany, and beyond any doubt they live better than the entire people of the Soviet Union)."7. The split of the international communist movement became for me a clear fact and confirmed my opinion that the theory of communism is a theory built on sand and that it is practiced according to the needs of the leadership of the Party at a given stage of life and that in reality full material welfare would never be enjoyed by the people but only by the leadership and the Party and the government."8. Working in the KGB I came to understand much and became conscious of the contradiction between the internal and external course of the USSR. Such questions as disarmament, the ban on atomic weapons, the position of the USSR in the United Nations--all these are used only in the interest of propaganda and as a screen for carrying out of the policies needed by the communist party. (I was myself present at the negotiations in Geneva and saw the 'politics' of the Soviet delegation.)"9. My trips abroad opened my eyes wide to the true reality. With my own eyes, I saw how people live, how much they earn, how they can dress and live on their wages, and I paid special attention to the life of ordinary people and not to that of scientists, engineers, etc. And all the propaganda about the enormous armies of unemployed in the countries of the West, about the 'heavy exploitation', and the 'un- believably difficult life' flew immediately out of my head. And that which I met with in my work, the sending of Soviet citizens abroad--who gets sent where and how, etc.--this finally debunked this propaganda. Many of my acquaintances--GUK, CHURANOV and others-- think back with great pleasure about life abroad."10. I entered the KOMSOMOL completely without thinking about it. The time came, the right age, and I became a Komsomolnik like all the others. It was different in regards to the Party: I joined the Party in 1956 after the death of STALIN and while I was working in the KGB and already at that time there was a lack of faith and indecisiveness in me. My father continually insisted on this, saying that without the Party I would never move ahead and would not have success in life. But I myself understood and saw that I would not be able to work in the KGB unless I was a member of the Party. And if I worked somewhere else, I would truly never move ahead in my career
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unless I entered the Party. But from the very be- ginning of my entry into the Party, I deeply hated all the Party talmudism and dogmatism. All the Party meetings were literally a torture. Especially when I became the deputy chief of the section, the chief of the section, and the deputy chief of the department, because then I had to speak at these meetings. Because this meant to lie, to twist my soul, and to attempt to show myself as deeply dedi- cated to the Party and its course."11. In 1960 my oldest girl's asthmatic attacks became worse. The question of a change of climate was raised. At that time the SCD needed to send an officer to Ethiopia for two to three years to conduct counterintelligence work among the Soviet specialists there. It cost me a great deal of effort to personally talk GRIBANOV into letting me go. The Party and work references had been confirmed, all the questionnaries were already filled out, the photos had been submitted; that is, all the formalities had been accomplished. But at the very last moment the Central Personnel of the KGB began to protest against my going with my family to Ethiopia. The reason for this was that from the house check made at my place of residence they received information that I sometimes came home in a drunken condition and on this ground had quarrels with my wife. A tour abroad with my family was neces- sary because of the health of my daughter (since 1963 the illness has become better) and also it would have been advantageous from the financial point of view. From this time on I understood that Personnel would not let me go abroad with my family."12. Knowing many officers in the FCD, I began to understand that being sent abroad is entirely determined, not by knowledge, experience in work and success, but only by the absolute 'cleanliness' of the person's autobiography and complete assurance as to his limitless dedication to the Party and the government. But not only being sent abroad but the assignment of personnel in the First and Second Chief Directorates and the entire KGB depends on the reasons indicated by me and also on good relations with the eadership and good connections with workers in Central Personnel."13. I lived about 11 years with my wife and our life was not a hell. It is true that there were quarrels and basically they boiled down to the fact that she took an extremely unfavorable attitude to- wards my delays at work and also when I would be de- layed with some of my friends and acquaintances after work and would come home with a few drinks under my belt. Of course, I loved and love my children and only the fact that they are taken care of financially until they grow up and have received an education to some extent consoled me in taking the decision to leave the USSR. What do I have in mind when I speak of financial security? After the death of my father, the family received a large monetary allowance, plus the money