Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10209-10259.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992PilesH. D. StevensTHE LEE HARVEY OSWALD CASE #35116429 January 19641.  According to a newspaper column of "Allen and Scott" in the Chicago American of 6 December 1963, on the OSWALD Case, Abram CHAYES, Legal Officer of the State Department, was one of two persons immediately responsible for OSWALD's being permitted to return to the United States from the Soviet Union in June 1962. The other individual named was Llewellyn THOMPSON, the then Ambassador to Russia. Another said to have been involved in the handling of OSWALD's case was Daniel VINE, Counsel of the American Embassy in Moscow.2.  Abram CHAYES, #352234, who as of 16 February 1961 was described as "the new Counsel in State", was granted security approval for liaison contact with J. Foster COLLINS (in the office of the Chief of the Covert Action Staff) on 6 March 1961. The request for CHAYES' clearance was a "Blanket" request to permit discussion with him of NSC 5412/2 matters on a need-to-know basis.3.  In September 1961 there was a White House namecheck request on CHAYES' wife Antonia (Toni) Leigh CHAYES, nee: HANDLER.4.  In March 1962, CHAYES was granted a renewal of his liaison contact clearance with C/CA on a continuing basis. This time his contact was Archibald ROOSEVELT, Jr.5.  On 10 February 1962, HUMAN EVENTS reported as follows with reference to CHAYES:> "SORT ON COMMITTEE: Representative Francis F. Walter (R.-Pa.), Chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, has scored the new State Department regulations on passports, claiming they would allow Reds denied passports to rifle freely the confidential files of the FBI, the CIA and other investigative agencies." The man behind the new regulations, which Walter claims violate the Internal Security Act of 1950, is reportedly State's chief legal officer, Abram Chayes. Chayes, a Kennedy appointee, is an ex-Harvard professor who was Chester Bowles' top legal advisor when Bowles was Governor of Connecticut. Walter has introduced legislation to remedy the new passport regulations."
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SECRET-2-6.  Farrel VICE, 'Counsel in the American Embassy in Moscow' who is referred to above, may well be Samuel Griffin VICE Jr., 74574, who apparently was once a contract employee on ANTIVE. [The State Department reviewed VICE's file on 2 June 1954; and as of September 1962 a Samuel G. VICE was Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow. At that time MISS advised in a cable to the State Department that it appeared that Bruce Frederick DAVIS, 352067, who defected from the United States Army in Germany on 13 August 1960, had not expatriated himself. DAVIS' case is very similar to that of OSWALD; and he, like OSWALD, lived in the Soviet Union for two years after his defection and prior to making application for return to the United States.7.  VICE was an applicant for CIA employment in early 1953 and was security approved subject to polygraph on 11 August 1953. He did not enter on duty and in September 1953 the office which had been interested in him was "no longer interested". On 13 November 1953, VICE was granted a CIA to permit his use as a contract employee on ARACTIVE in New York City. His CIA was cancelled on 25 March 1953.8. VICE was named as a friend of William Orville HURRELL, 61693-DL. during an investigation of the latter for possible CIA employment in 1952. VICE, according to HURRELL's landlady and social acquaintance in Washington, D.C. during the period of about a year which ended in April 1952, was the only person she knew by name with whom HURRELL was friendly. According to the informant, VICE was a student at Columbia University whose address was 423 Furnald Hall. HURRELL was security disapproved for CIA employment in June 1952 because of his close association on a professional and social basis, while attending Denver University from 1948 to 1951, with persons of questionable loyalty. In November 1954, HURRELL was of interest to project FUAJIVE with reference to assignment to Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; however, the interested office withdrew their request on him, after Security advised of the derogatory information regarding him.9. VICE from 1951 to 1954 attended Scarsdale High School in Scarsdale, New York, which was attacked by a Citizens Group, which alleged Communist influence in the school system. He had several questionable associates in addition to HURRELL.N. D. StevensSECRET![stamp of CSEP-1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 0]
MATERIAL PEVELSED AT CT, HEADQUARTERS BYSELECT COTIUTIUL ON ASSASSIEATIONS STAFF HEARTASPIBER/VOLUTIE: CH STUDY "CONCLUSIONS 4-COMMENTS IN THE CASELF YURIY WANGCH NOSENKO (COPY #9)MTES: 11CT. 68NIT/LOCATION:IF ANY: INFO BEARING IN SECURITY OF ONEDING CIA OPE| DATE RETURNED   | REVIUSED BY (PRINT NAME) | SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL || --------------- | ------------------------ | ------------------------------- || Carell Kon      |                          |                                 || G.ROBERT BINKEY |                          |                                 || JOHANNE SHIT!   |                          |                                 || G.Regent BINKEY |                          |                                 ||                 |                          |                                 || LA & JAKN       |                          |                                 ||                 |                          |                                 || S Sitte         |                          |                                 |ENTS MAY BE COPIED OF REMOVED FROM THIS FILE.
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# 1 October 1963CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTSIN THE CASE OFYURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO
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SECRE.T1 October 1968MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of SecurityFROM : Deputy Chief, Security Research StaffSUBJECT : NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich1. In accordance with the request of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, attached is a summary with conclusions concerning the bona fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. Sub- conclusions are contained in the summary concerning several major areas which were given primary consideration in ise matter of the bona flies of NCSENSO.2. Included in this summary are coinments concerning conclusions in the previous summary and an annex containing re- marke on three separate subjecte related to the NOSENKO Case.3. In brief, the conclusica of this summary is that NOSENKO is the person ho claims to be, that he held bis claimed positions in the KGE during 1953 - January 1964, that NOGENKO was not dis- patched by the KG3, and that his previous lies and exaggerations aro not actually of material significance at this time.Bruce L. SclieAttachment; SummaryBLS:ko0001002SECRET
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TABLE OF CONTENTSI. IntroductionII. Summary of Developments in NOSENKO Case Since30 October 1967II. Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides of YuriyIvanovich NOSENKOA. Is NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claimsto be?B. Is the Claimed GB Career of NOSENKO Piausible?C, Has NOSENKO Given an Acceptable Explanation ofHis Motivation in Contacting CIA in 1962 and ForHis Defection in 1964?D. Is the Information Furnished by NOSENKO to CLAConcerning KGB Operations, Personalities, andOrganization Reasonably Commensurate With HisClaimed KGB Career?E. Can the Information Furnished by NOSENKO beConsidered in Toto as Having Resulted in MaterialDamage to the KGB and/or Has the informationFurnished by NOSENKO Been of Significant Benefitto Western Intelligence?F. Is There Evidence of KGB Deception or "Give-Away"in Information Furnished by NOSENKO Which WouldWarrant a Conclusion that NOSENKO was Dispatchedby the KGB?.
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G. Is There Evidence of a Poltical or Any Other TypeObjective Which Could Justify a Dispatch of NOSENKOby the KGB With Permission to Speak Freely to CLAConcerning His Knowledge of the KGB and WithoutNOSENKO Being Given a Specific Mission or Missions?H. Is There Any Evidence That the Contacts of NOSENKO in1962 or in 1964 With CIA Were Known to the KGB Priorto His Defection or That NOSENKO Was Ever Briefedby the KGB Relative to His Behavior or KGB ObjectivesDuring These Contacts or After His Defection?IV. Comments Concerning Previous Conclusions in Regard to NOSENKOA. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the Naval RU in Any of theCapacities or at the Places and Times He ClaimedB. NOSENKO Did Not Enter the KGB in the Manner or at theTime He ClaimedC. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the American Embassy SectionThroughout the 1953 - 1955 Period as He ClaimedD. During the Period 1955 - 1960, He Was Neither a SeniorCase Officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the SeventhDepartment American-British Commonwealth SectionE. NOSENKO Was Neither Deputy Chief of the American EmbassySection nor a Senior Officer or Supervisor in the SectionDuring the Period 1961- 1962 (sic)F. NOSENKO'S Claims, That in 1962 He was Chief of theAmerican-British Commonwealth Section and WasThereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department,Are Not CredibleG. NOSENKO Has no Valid Claim to Certainty That the KGBRecruited No American Embassy Personnel Between1953 and His Defection in 1964
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V. AnnexAnnex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKOAnnex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in TextAnnex C - The Cherepanov Papers3SECRETG001005
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# SECRETI. INTRODUCTIONSECRET> [Figure] GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.0001006
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# INTRODUCTIONThe following summary and analysis is not intended to be all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organizational, operational, personality and case type information furnished by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. To attempt to do so would be repetitious and confusing to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited areas of primary concern.This summary will not contain a detailed psychological assessment of NOSENKO nor will it contain a recitation of the numerous theories which have been promulgated in the past concerning varying aspects of the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily directed toward the question of whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB, whether his claimed KGB career is relatively plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in a reassessment of the entire case for or against NOSENKO. NOSENKO has admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claims that these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importanceSECRET0001007
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SECRETbut not to mislead this Agency in any material matters of an operational or policy nature.In order to avoid any misunderstanding of the phrase "bona fides" as considered in this summary, NOSENKO will be judged primarily on whether he voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this Agency were known to the KGB. Motivation and certain other pertinent aspects will be considered, but his admitted previous errors, lies and exaggerations will not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a "uuna fide" defector.There is not an accurate standard or scale of measurement against which information concerning NOSENKO can be balanced or correlated to determine if he is or is not a dispatched KGB officer. For purposes of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary list of areas considered pertinent has been compiled. Readers may differ in regard to whether this arbitrary standard is a completely accurate standard, but it is felt that the information from NOSENKO and information from other sources derived through independent investigation will permit the reader to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers appropriate.The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami- nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector, "has been considered inSECRET20001008
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the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary. Remarks concerning certeta errors, inconsistencies, omissions and unsupported conclusions in the previous summary in regard to specific cases or sub-areas will be included in this summary. However, this summary will not include a point-by-point comparison of all areas of agreement or disagreement with information contained in the previous summary.A positivo decision in regard to NOSENKO based on all available information should be made in the immediate future. There are no known sources currently available to provida new positive Information concerning NOSENKO and his bona fides. It is recognized that there is always a possibility in the future a new source or sources will be able to furnish additional information in regard to NOSENKO. However, this possibility is exceedingly tenuous and it is felt there is sufficient information available on which to base a conclusion in the NOSENKO matter.
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SECRET## II. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASESINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967![stamp: Excludes from automatic downgrading and declassification]SECRETC001010
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# SECRET## SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE### SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENKO case since June 1962.Interviews have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and career of NOSENKO without regard to whether a particular aspect had been covered during previous interview or interviews.NOSENKO, although naturally apprehensive during the first few interviews, has been cooperative, has developed a relaxed attitude, and the interviewer has noted no significant reluctance to discuss any aspect of his life, career, or activities. On occasion NOSENKO has indicated a reluctance to make positive statements in certain areas previously considered at a minimum extremely controversial. This reluctance was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that theSECRET![Lal? 1 Exists; tore atomatic Exearrading and declassification]6001011
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## SECRET!interviewer would not dispute or disparage his statements without adequate reason, this reluctance on the part of NOSENKO, in the opinion of the interviewer, totally disappeared.During the interviewing period, particularly in the first six months, NOSENKO materially assisted the interviewer by preparing approximately sixty memoranda on such diverse subjects as his life, motivation for defection, individual cases, notes which he furnished to CIA in 1964, KGB organization, and KGB officer and agent personalities. As an example of the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda included remarks concerning approximately 875 KGB officers, 100KGB agents, 35 GRU officers, and 400 other Soviet nationals. These lists were alphabetically arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO has materially assisted in the organization and evaluation of information furnished by him during current interviews.Copies of transcripts of interviews with NOSENKO and related memoranda have been disseminated to the FBI and the CI Staff. Special Agent Elbert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the Washington Field Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in research and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has interviewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information.2SECRET6001012
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In addition, three professionals from the SB Division have reviewed the current information and assisted in the retrieval of previous information from NOSENKO and collation of current information with previous information. The latter is a tremendous task because of the volume of material; the number of individual cases irvnived; and the extensive information in regard to KGB personalities, procedures, organizational structure and activities.The SB Division also provided the services of an expert translator to translate the tapes of the 1965 interrogation of NOSENKO by Petr DERYABIN and one of the previously mentioned three pro-fessionala completed a new translation of the 1962 interviews with NOSENKO. In addition, transcriptions of certain other particularly pertinent previous interviews of NOSENKO have been completed by the Office of Security.Approximately 7000 pages of transcripts and related material have been compiled and disseminated since late October 1967. Com-iments concerning the value of the information contained in the above material are contained in another section of this summary. As of the present time, a complete analysis is not possible since a considerable portion of the material has not been fully processed. In the preparation of this summary all areas of major significance have been examined. Because of the voluminous information, all analytical and collation work has not been completed; but it is not considered that, based on allSECRET
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SLOALTavailable information, the remaining work will materially affectthe conclusions drawn in this summary.The polygraph interview of NOSENKO was initiated on2 August and concluded on 6 August 1968. Approximately sixtyquestions of a pertinent nature were included in the polygraph inter-view. No problems were encountered during the polygraph interviewand no additional testing of NOSENKO is anticipated. Attached is acopy of the self-explanatory report on the results of the polygraphInterview.Interviews with NOSENKO have continued since the polygraphinterview on a temporarily reduced scale in order to permit a reviewof previous information and preparation of this summary. There isno doubt that future interviews with NOSENKO will reveal informationof intelligence value, but information developed thus far will permita decision in the case of Yurly Ivanovich. NOSENKO.Attachment:12 Aug 68 Polygraph Rpt0001014SECRET
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# 14-00000TO: Chief, Security Research Staff 12 August 1968FROM: Interrogation Research DivisionSUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO IRD # 67491IDENTIFYING DATASubject is a 40 year old former KGB Staffer who defected to the U.S. in 1964 in Geneva.BACKGROUNDMr. Bruce L. Solie of the Security Research Staff has been de-briefing and interrogating Subject since October 1967 in order to resolve the issue whether Subject was a dispatched agent of the KGB. He has conducted a vast amount of research and checking with sources in an effort to establish the veracity of Subject's statements.PURPOSEThe primary purpose of the polygraph test was to determine:1. Whether Subject was a dispatched Agent of the KGB;2. Whether Subject had intentionally given Mr. Solie any false information.PROCEDURESubject was given a polygraph examination on 2 August 1968 at a safesite in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. The examination was conducted in the English language. Subject's comprehension and the ability to express himself in English was completely adequate for purposes of polygraph testing. Subject was completely cooperative in all respects. Subject displayed no evasiveness and appeared to be completely frank wherever he was questioned or gave information on a topic.The following relevant questions were asked during the first test:Is your true name Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO? Yes.Were you born in the year 1927? Yes.Besides the Americans, did you tell anyone else about your intention to defect? No.![SECRET Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]
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SECRE!ID: 1671.Page 2Did you ever tell anyone in the KGB about your contact with American Intelligence? No.Were you given instructions by the KGB to get in contact with American Intelligence? No.Were you told by the KGB to defect in order to carry out an Intelligence mission? No.The following relevant questions were asked during the second test:Did the KGB actually send a communication for your recall to the USSR on the day of your defection? No.Were you acquainted with CHEREPANOV? Yes.Did you actually travel to Gorkiy in November 1963 to hunt for CHEREPANOV? Yes.Are you deliberately withholding from us any information about the KGB recruitment of Americans? No.Does the KGB have METKA and NEPTUNE 607 Yes.Were you the responsible Case Officer for John Abidian in 1960-61? Yes.Do you know the true name of ANDREY or SASHA? No.Did you ever have tuberculosis? Yes.The following relevant questions were asked on test three:Did you serve in Navy Intelligence from 1951 to 1953? Yes.Was SHUBIN in the USSR during the period 1957 to 1959? Yes.To the best of your knowledge, were you in the Seventh Department at this time? Yes.Did you telephone the GRU about SHUBIN at this time? Yes.To the best of your knowledge, was POPOV compromised because of the letter Mr. Winters mailed? Yes.
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Page 3To the best of your knowledge, was NIKITOVSKY exposed to theKGB because of the mass surveillance on the British Embassy?Yes.Was there any misleading information in the notes you broughtout from the Soviet Union? No.Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal association withGRIBANOV? No.Are you hiding any adverse information about your background? No.Subject's polygraph test reflected no significant responses indicativeof deception regarding the relevant questions asked. No further polygraphtests were administered on this date because the examiner did not want torun the risk of fatigue setting in and thus possibly causing adrenalinexhaustion.Polygraph testing was resumed on 6 August 1968. The followingrelevant questions were asked on test four:Did you join the KGB in March 1953? Yes.Were you a KGB officer from 1953 to 1964? Yes.Were you a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department? Yes.Were you only a Captain at this time? Yes.Were you an officer in the U.S. Embassy Section from March1953 to May 1955? Yes.In 1958 and 1959 were you the Deputy Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section in the Seventh Department? Yes.From January 1960 to December 1961 were you the Deputy to theChief of the First Section of the First Department? Yes.From January to July 1962 were you the Chief of the First Sectionof the Seventh Department? Yes.Were you an officer in the First Section, First Department, SCD,at the time of the Stalingrad operation against [Benson, Mule] and[Stroud]? Yes.
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IND # 67-91Page 4The following relevant questions were asked on test five:Since 1953 do you know of any other KGB recruitments in the American Embassy besides *AUDREY* and *HOWARD*? No.Did the KGB know about the notes you brought? No.Have you told us the complete truth about your KGB career? Yes.Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal involvement in cases in 1962 and 1964 in order to mislead us? No.Did you intentionally give us any false operational information? No.Did GRIBANOV offer you the position of Deputy Chief of the First Department? Yes.Was an order actually prepared promoting you to Deputy to the Chief of the First Department? Yes.In early 1960 did GRIBANOV tell you that your primary responsibility was to work against American Code Clerks? Yes.Other than you mentioned, are you hiding any other reasons for your defection? No.Are you deliberately withholding any information on any foreigners recruited by the KGB? No.The following relevant questions were asked on test six:Did you enter the KGB through the influence of General BOGDAN KOBULOV? Yes.Did you succeed BAKHVALOV as Deputy Chief of the First Section? Yes.Did GRYAZNOV succeed you as Deputy Chief of the First Section? Yes.Were the CHEREPANOV papers passed to the Americans with KGB knowledge? No.