Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 107]
708. NOSENKO knew that his immediate supervisor KOVSHUK had per- sonal contact, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, with some U.S. Embassy officers and was aware that one of these had been WINTERS. He knew no details of KOVSHUK's contacts with WINTERS., nor that his own friend KISLOV, as well as his friend and few- quent source of operational information LOPUKHOV, were also in touch with WINTERS. He could not remember who else KOVSHUK knew, or what KOVSHUK was doing with them, or why. NOSENKO knew neither that William MORRELL (declared to the Soviet Govern- ment as a CIA officer) belonged to CIA nor that KOVSHUK, who was aware of this fact, was in personal contact with MORELL.Unlike KOVSHUR, ARTEMEV, KOSOLATOV, BORODI!:, BIRYLKOV, KRIVOSKEY and many other Second Chief Directorate officers, NOSENKO never had any direct contact, even for cultivation or assessment, with any American officials, either stationed in the Embassy or visiting the USSR. However, his English had been proven good enough to qualify him particularly for tourist recruitments and his operational flair had been tested. (It was this which caused him to be picked for the DPE, and other approaches and the only reason why he, an inglish speaker would have been specially selected to work on the German who spoke "some English.")DERYABIN and other defectors from the KGB have stated that the deputy chief of a section working against a foreign embassy in Moscow would be responsible for approving and retaining monthly schedules for the planned use of safehouses by the section; that he would discuss agent meeting schedules with individual case officers and approve and retain a list of planned agent meetings for each case officer on an indi- vidual basis; and that he would approve the acquisition of new agents and new safehouses and their transfer from one opera- tion to another. By contrast, NOSEIKO first did not list these functions among his responsibilities and later denied that he had them. NOSE::KO did not understand the question when asked whether he had any responsibility for supervising the use of safehouses in Moscow (Page l62) and said that as the agents and the safehouses belonged to the case officers, they could use them when and how they liked without informing anyone; only when they were meeting an active development agent was it necessary to report to NOSENKO and this only after the meeting. NOSENKO said that, while he was Deputy Chief of the section, three or four subordinate officers had safe apartments, but he did not remember the location of any of them. Neither NOSENKO nor his subordinates GRYAENOV and KOSOLAPOV had such apartments, instead using less secure "meeting apartments" (which are used in the absence of the full-time occupant). NOSENKO was able to locate his own "meeting apartment" (which he said he brought with him when he transferred from the Tourist Department and iater took back with him to the Tourist Department) by street and could do the same for GRYAZNOV's. He was not sure of the location of the apartment used by KOSOLAPOV.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 108]
## Knowledgeability of U.S. Embassy Physical SecurityAccording to NOSENKO, he maintained the file on physical security at the U.S. Embassy, and it contained detailed floor plans and photographs of the installation. NOSENKO was unable to give the location or the floor of the office of any single individual or component of the Embassy, including those of the Ambassador, or his own targets (ABIDIAN, the military code room, and the State Department communications roon). NOSKNKO paid that all important Kutipan (108 were located in the "zone of security," which he has variously reported as the "seventh, eighth, minth, and tenth floors," or "seventh and up," or the "top four floors." NOSENKO did not remember how many floors there are in the Embassy, nor was he even sure how many floors were included in the restric- ted area. (The restricted area in fact consists of the top three floors, the eighth, ninth, and tenth.)## Knowledgeability about American Intelligence PersonnelNOSENKO said that not only the deputy chief but every officer in the section could identify the known and suspected American Intelligence personnel in the Embassy. Nevertheless, he himself did not know about three CIA officers (MAHONEY, MORELL., and GARBLER) whom the KGB had definitely identified as such before their assignments to Moscow in 1960-1961. For example, MORELL, whose overt CIA affiliation was officially announced by the Embassy to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, was under direct and active cultivation by KOVSHUK and the KGB First Chief Directorate officer K.N. SMIRNOV in 1960-1961; NOSENKO knew nothing about this (although asked leading questions and given hints) and did not identify MORELL as a CIA officer. Four of the seven officers whom he said the KGB suspected to be CIA had never had any such affiliation. He could not give any information at all on the person he said the KGB considered to be the CIA chief in Moscow, KLOSSON, either on his Moscow activity and contacts or on the extent and results of KGB coverage, or on his per- sonal situation and background. He could not explain why KLOSSON was considered to be the CIA chief, but said that "every officer thought he was."## Knowledgeability of KGB Code Clerk OperationsAs his main task, the prime reason he was moved into the U.S. Embassy Section, NOSENKO alleged, was to supervise the operational work against American code clerks. In this capacity he closely guided the work of case officers GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO shared an office with his two sub- ordinates, and the three were within sight and hearing of*According to GOLITSYN, who knew both men well. GRYAZNOV was "a very experienced" case officer with some success; he had spent about the last five years of his 16 years in the KGB in the American Department and was a specialist in code clerk operations. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV had about ten years' KGB experience and, like GRYAZNOV, was specializing against code clerks in 1960.> TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 109]
710. one another and used a single safe, which contained fileson the American code clerks and the agents involved with them.NOSENKO said that he carefully directed the work of GRYAZNOVand KOSOLAPOV during these two years, discussing their caseswith them, taking part in operational planning, and approvingor disapproving all operational measures. NOSENKO originallyasserted that he had also read and studied all the fileskept on the American code clerks; under questioning on indivi-dual cases, however, he retracted these statements and saidthat he may have skimmed some of the files, that he did notstudy any of them, but that in any event he read all thecurrent incoming materials on the code clerks from microphones,agents, and the like and then routed them to the case officerconcerned.CIA has two types of information against which the re-ports from NOSENKO can be compared. The first consists ofthe detailed debriefings of code clerks returning fremMoscow, administered routinely by the Department of Stateand the military services; it also includes the special de-briefings and interrogations of the Department of State,the FBI, and CIA as a follow-up to KGB operational activitywhich has become known from various sources. On this basis,CIA has accumulated a considerable amount of collateralinformation on the activities of the U.S. Embassy Sectioninvolving United States code clerks during the period NOSEN-KO said he was its Deputy Chief. The second type of infor-mation is the reporting on KGB operations by GOLITSIN who,from contacts with U.S. Embassy Section officers in Moscowand Helsinki, was able to provide several leads to what hesaid were recruited American code clerks. GOLITSYN's infor-mation thereby directly contradicts NCSENKO's statement thatthe KGB had no successes in its code clerk recruitment opera-tions from the early 1950's to the end of 1963, and none ofthe subjects of GOLITSYN's leads have been positively identi-fied. Some of GOLITSYN's information has been generallysubstantiated by other sources. In one case, this confirma-tion has come from NOSENKO himself, whose information on theSTORSBERG operation, on the agent PREISFREUND's role in it,and on GOLITSYN's knowledge of KGB use of PREISFREUND pre-sents an explanation of one and possibly two of GOLITSYN'Sleads. Another of GOLITSYN's leads, that concerning anoperational trip by KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in order to estab-lish contact with a code clerk, is confirmed by documentaryevidence that KOSOLAPOV did in fact travel on the Helsinki-Hoscow train with an American code clerk at the time andunder the cover GOLITSYN reported. NOSENKO denied that sucha trip was made by KOSOLAPOV.NOSENKO has been questioned in detail about each of thecode clerks serving in Moscow during 1960 and 1961. His in-formation concerning KGB activities involving five of theseAmericans (STORSBERG, JENNER, MORONE, ZUJUS, and KEYSERS) and*As discussed below, there are important differences in theaccounts of GOLITSYN and NOSENKO, particularly regarding theoutcome of this operation.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 111]
712. himself (exaggerating) in his descriptions of 1962. Thisadmission came only after the tape of NOSENKO'S 1962statements had been played to him and he had successivelysaid that (a) it was not his voice, (b) he was drunk in1962, (c) the CIA case officer in Geneva had made himnervous, and (d) CIA probably spliced various pieces oftape together to make this false one. Still, NOSENKOsaid, he directed the entire operation from beginning to end,and it was his most important case. Interrogated furtherconcerning his role in the STORSBERG operation in October1966, NOSENKO said that he had never read the KGB file onSTORSBERG, which was held by GRYAZNOV.GOLITSYN, as NOSENKO reported, didvisit the AmericanDepartment, did request permission to use PREISFREUND opera-tionally in Helsinki, and did report this to CIA in late1961 following his defection. GOLITSYN also reported that,in denying his request, KOVSHUK told him that PREISFREUNDhad recently been used in the successful recruitment of anAmerican Embassy employce, possibly a military man and pos-sibly a code clerk or diplomat; therefore, KOVSHUK said,PREISFREUND could rot be used for six months or so in otheroperations, for otherwise the Americans might become suspi-cious. NOSENKO has not reported these details, but has saidonly that GOLITSIN was instructed to drop interest in PREIS-FREUND because PREISFREUND belonged to the American Departmentof the Second Chief Directorate.NOSENKO volunteered at his first meeting with CIA thathe was on leave outside of Moscow on the occasion of COLITSYN'Svisit to the American Department. Since defecting he hasinsisted with absolute certainty that this visit took placein the late spring or carly summer of 1961 and has describedhis leave, where he went and with whom. GOLITSYN'Ss passportand CIA travel data show that GOLITSYN was on TDY in Moscowin January 1961.* Told this, NOSENKO said that it is untrue,that he recalled being told of GOLITSYN's visit after hisreturn from leave in July 1961, and that he was certain thathe (NOSENKO) was in Moscow in January 1961.NOSENKO has indirectly confirmed that the operation ofwhich GOLITSYN learned during this visit to the AmericanDepartment was the operation against STORSBERG. He did so byhis assertion that PREISFREUND, his own agent, was used inonly one operation, that against STORSBERG. Thus, as to theoutcome of this operation, there is a conflict between NOSEN-KO's information and that earlier provided by GOLITSYN.There is also a conflict between NOSENKO's statements thatthe recruitment approach took place some time after May 1961(NOSENKO's dates have varied from June to October 1961,STORSBERG said it was in October 1961) and GOLITSYN's state-ment that this approach had already been made in January 1961when he learned of it.GOLITSYN provided a second lead which NOSENKO appearsto confirm and which may be related to the STORSBERG case.GOLITSYN said that during a visit to the American Department[^1] *GOLITSYN has based his assertion that NOSENKO was not inthe U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 and 1961 partly on this visit.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 112]
# 713.In the spring of 1960,* he learned from GRYAZNOV that he (GRYAZNOV) had developed an operation against an American military code clerk to the point that the KGB was "99 per cent" certain that a recruitment approach to this code clerk would be successful. GOLITSIN said that CRYAZNOV told him that this would be the first recruitment of a military code clerk (as contrasted to a State Department code clerk) in the history of the American Department. There were only two persons meeting this criterion who were in Moscow at the tine GOLITSYN placed this visit, STORSBERG and HURLEY; the superior of STORSBERG, HURLEY performed back-up cryptographic duties in STORSBERG's absence. If NOSENKO's report that there was no development of or approach to HURLEY can be accepted, this lead from GOLITSIN would apply to STORSBERG rather than HURLEY. There is a conflict between NOSENKO's information on the STORSBERG case and this second GOLITSYN lead in that GOLITSYN described an operation which was in its final stages in the spring of 1960, whereas NOSENKO (as well as STORSBERG) asserted that the STORSBERG operation was just under way at this time and was long and drawn-out.## (11) The JENNER CaseApart from the STORSBERG operation, NOSENKO has been able to supply the greatest amount of detail concerning the operation (also unsuccessful) against the State Department pouch clerk Paul JENNER (Pages 186-196). This case developed as a result of an idea originated by NOSENKO himself shortly after he arrived in the U.S. Embassy Section. Because of the inaccessibility of American code clerks to the KGB in Moscow, it was NOSENKO's plan to send a KGB officer to Helsinki in order to strike up an acquaintance with a code clerk entering the Soviet Union aboard the Helsinki-Moscow train. The first (and last) time this was attempted, NO- SENKO related, was in March 1960, when the KCB learned that JENNER, listed as a "secretary-archivist" and thus assumed by the KGB to be a code clerk, was scheduled to transit Helsinki en route to his assignment at the U.S. Embassy in Xoscow. Under NOSENKO's supervision KOSOLAPOV therefore travelled to Helsinki and boarded the same train as JENNER. Additionally, GRYAZNOV took a KGB female agent to the town, of Tyborg, on the Finno-Soviet border, and placed her on the same train. Both KOSOLAPOV and the female agent met and spoke with JENNER en route to Moscow, and the girl gave him her telephone number, asking him to call her. After JENNER'S arrival in Moscow, both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV submitted written reports to NOSENKO describing the contacts on the train. Although the KGB later found out that JENNER was only a pouch clerk, not a cryptographer, he was considered of interest and when JENNER failed to telephone the female agent, the two were brought together in a "chance meeting" at the Moscow airport. JENNER would have no part of the agent's invitations, however, and the operation therefore went no further.*When NOSENKO was told of the GOLITSYN visit in May or June 1960, he denied that it took place, saying that he necessarily would know if it had.{TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 115]
TOP SEC716. given instructions that no actions were to be taken whichmight embarrass then existing good relations with the UnitedStates. When in February 1965 it was pointed out that MORONEarrived in Warsaw on 14 December 1960 and that NOSENKO leftfor Cuba on 15 November 1960, NOSENKO revised his story ofreceiving the personal report of the technician to say thathe had perhaps read the technician's report after returningfrom Cuba in December 1960.CIA learned of the MORONE train trip and subsequentinvolvement with the UB agent in 1961 from a Polish scurcewho had provided much sensitive and reliable informationpreviously. The Polish source submitted a considerableamount of detail including the date of the operation (whichNOSENKO did not recall) and the fact that the Polish agentwas handled in Moscow by a KGB officer named "Volodya."It was on the basis of this report that MORONE was withdrawnfrom Moscow in May 1961.In accounts given since his defection, NOSENKO has con-sistently named KOSOLAPOV as MORONE's case officer. KCSOLA-POV drafted the plan for the operation on the train, discussedit with NOSENKO and KOVSHUK, met with a U3 official in Moscowto arrange for the agent, met the agent on her arrival, andbriefed her on her assignment. NCSENKO has not been askedand has not volunteered who specifically placed the agenton the train. Records show, however, that MORONE left Moscowon 13 November 1960, arriving in Warsaw on the 14th; from12 to 16 November 1960, KOSOLAFOV is confirmed to have beenin Helsinki, apparently in connection with an operation in-volving the American code clerk GARLAND (see above). It isalso noted that travel records show that NOSENKO, the officersupervising this (as well, presumably, as KOSOLAPOV's tripto Helsinki), left Moscow on 15 November 1960 with a dele-gation going to Cuba.NOSENKO has been questioned concerning the KGB agentsin contact with MORONE and what was learned from them. Hereported that an Egyptian agent visited America House, metMORONE there, but did not report anything of interest con-cerning him. NCSENKO also mentioned IVANOVA, a maid atAmerica House, who knew MORONE and whom the KGB wanted to useto lure MOPONE into a compromising situation (see above).NOSENKO said that he, himself, had met with IVANOVA severaltimes to discuss MORONE, but that he could not recall any-thing specific of interest or use that she reported concerningTOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 116]
717. him. Another agent who may have reported on MORONE, NOSENKOsaid, was an East Geraan girl sent to America House to poseas an Austrian; NOSENKO was not sure what she might havereported or when this was, other than it occurred when hewas working against CORONE and that it was during ABIDIAN'stour in Moscow, for he had come to America House to questionthe girl.Various reports indicate that CORONE was involved inillegal currency speculation with the Egyptiar agent andthat on at least one occasion the Fgyptian introduced MORONEto a Soviet female, with whom MORONE was intimate. NOSENKOdid not know that NORONE was also involved in illegal cur-rency dealings with whom NOSENKO has identified asKOSCLAPOY's agent and who, he said, was involved with andreporting on NOSENKO's target ABIDIAN. NOSENKO did not knowthat IVANOVA once introduced BORONE to a Soviet female, withwhom NORONE was intimate; additionally MORONE was reportedby a number of his co-residents at America House to nave beenintimate with IVANOVA herself (which MORONE denied). Someof those same Americans reported also that HOROSE was inti-mate with UMANETS, another KGB agent identified by NOSENKO;MOROSE hiuself said he knew UMANETS "vell." Finally, theincident involving the East German girl posing as an Austrianinvolved the code clerk ZUJUS, not MORONE, and took placeafter NOSENKO claims to have been transferred from the U.S.Embassy Section; she was interviewed by ABIDEAN's sucessor,MONTGOMERY.(v) The KEYSERS CaseThe approach to KEYSERS is the only time during hisservice in the U.S. Embassy Section that NOSENKO claims tohave had direct contact with an American stationed in Mos-COW. (NOSENKO said on one occasion that this was the onlyface-to-face encounter he could recall; and, on another,that it was possible that STORSEFRG--the only other possibility--may not have seen hia on the night he was approached in theLoscow hotel.) KEYSERS therefore is the only independentAmerican source who could confirm that NOSENKO was involvedin operations against American Embassy personnel in 1960 or1961. NOSENKO himself pointed cut, however, that this con-tact was of very short duration, and that it was possiblethat KEYSERS would not recognize him. This was the case:KEYSERS failed to identify NOSENKO's photograph and describedthe officer who approached him as a man considerably older,shorter, and probably of a much heavier build than NOSENKOwas. Although NOSENKO was able to provide a description ofthis incident, he did not know much about the overall KGBcase against KEYSERS and a number of discrepancies have beennoted.In 1962 NOSENKO first reported the approach to KEYSERS,without naming him, but saying he was the successor to STORS-BERG. Since defecting in 1964, NOSENKO has continued toidentify him as STCRSBERG's replacement. In fact, KEYSERSwas sent to Moscow as an assistant to the Embassy medicalofficer; he also worked in the office of the Air Attache asa collateral duty and for a short while in 1961 was undertraining in the military code room as a "back-up" crypto-grapher for STORSBERG. STORSBERG's replacement in Moscowvas ZUJUS.TOP SECRET,
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719. her: money for an abortion. TAYLOR left Moscow in February 1961, whereas the approach to STORSBERG was reported by NOSENKO and STORSBERG to have occurred four to eight months afterward.Maurice ZWANG: NOSENKO identified ZWANG as a State Department code clerk who was "actively worked on" during the 1960-1961 period. An Egyptian agent, whose name NOSEN-KO did not recall, introduced ZWANG to a ferale KGB agent in an attempt to obtain compromising pictographs, but the agent did not like ZWANG and refused to have intercourse with him. At the time NOSENKO left the U.S. Embassy Section in January 1962, there was no further activity surrounding ZYANG. The KGB had no agents in contact with him, and there was no vulnerability data concerning him. Wien ZWANG was interviewed by the State Department after returning from his Moscow assignment, a polygraph examination indicated that ZWANG had had intercourse with his Russian raid, elsewhere identified by NOSENKO as a KGB agent; 27ANG admitted visiting the maid's apartment several tizes but denied intimacies. In March or April 1961, an Egyptian introduced ZWANG to another Soviet female; ZWANG also admitted visiting her apartment on several occasions, but again denied having had intercourse with her. ZWANG was reported by various other Americans stationed in Moscow to have been active in currency speculation and blackmarketeering with the Egyptian and and agent of KOSOLAPOV according to NOSENKO.NOSENKO cas unaware of this.TOP SECRET