Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 208]
House. It was further noted that CAFFEY was recalled from Moscow in the summer of 1962 because of drunkenness and during interview had admitted being intimate with IVANOVA at the American House and at her apartment and that she had claimed pregnancy.As to whether the above information raises a question concerning NOSENKO, the following factors should be considered:(1) NOSENKO has stated that during the latter part of December 1961 he was part time in the First Department and part time in the Seventh Department, and that he reported full time to the Seventh Department after New Years Day 1962.(2) In addition to the information previously mentioned as furnished by GAFFEY during interview, GAFFEY also stated that he was first intimate with IVANOVA in his room on 27 December 1961 and was also intimate with her later on three occasions at her apartment. According to GAFFEY, IVANOVA told him of her pregnancy about 1 May
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 209]
1962, which is approximately four months afterNOSENKO has stated he transferred to the SeventhDepartment.The matter of review by NCSENKO of OTU reports from micro-phone coverage on the United States Embassy has previously beenmentioned in this summary. Pages 226 - 236 of the previous summarycontained a detailed account of information from NOSENKO on the matterof microphones, countermeasures taken by the Americans in 1964, anddamage estimates prepared by the Americans. The previous conclusionwas that his information did not sustain his claim to have been DeputyChief, First Section, or his claim that he personally reviewed the KGBmicrophone monitoring reports. Comments have been made in thissummary in regard to this previous conclusion.A few remarks, it is believed, will assist in a fuller understarof the microphone matter. In the material brought out by NOSENKO ...1964, there was a single sheet of paper containing on one side hand-written notes which NOSENKO identified as a list of the active micro--phones (those which were being monitored) in the United States Embassy.This list is given on page 227 of the previous summary and need not berepeated here. The acquisition of this list by NOSENKO was character-ized in the previous suramary as singular and it was stated that NOSENKO000120747SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 210]
has zever plausibly explained the circumstances which prompted hisretention of the list until 1964, when he produced it for CIA in Geneva.During current interviews, the matter of the above list has beencovered in considerably greater detail with NOSENKO than had beendone before. His explanation, both of the circumstances which led tohis acquiring the list as well as of his stili having it in his possessionat the time of his defection, is considered plausible, contrary to thejudgment of the previous summary.NOSENKO has stated that..1960 - 1961 Vladimir I. PETROV,Chief of the Second Section, First Department, desired some "points"for use against targets of his section. NOSENKO uses the term "point"not as meaning just a microphone, but as referring to an OTU sub-unitwhich includes microphones as well as the necessary monitors andtranslators to cover the microphone and translate the "take." Thetargets of PETROV were primarily Americans and, therefore, therewas a transcription-translation problem.According to NOSENKO, most of the available "points" wereassigned to the First Section to cover microphones in the United StatesEmbassy. The Chief of the First Department, Vladimir A. KLYPIN,held a meeting attended by KLYPIN, Chief of the First Section ViadislavKOVSHUK, Vladimir I. PETROV, and NOSENKO, the purpose of which48SECRET0001208
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was to discuss the possility of temporarily discontinuing certainEmbassy "points" comrolled by the First Section, and permittingPETROV to use these "points" against targets of his section.According to NOSENKO, PETROV brought to the meeting a listof names of certain targets to which he wished to give technical cover-age. During the meeting, KOVSHUK apparently took a piece of paperwhich PETROV had and wrote on it a list of active microphones in theUnited States Embassy and residences. When the meeting ended,NOSENKO had this paper and he took it back to his office.Contained on the reverse side of the paper were the followingnames in Russian: [LUBIN, SMITH, WILL BURTIN] and [Sipe BURTIN]The name A. A. MIKHAYLOV was listed next to the name of [LUBIN]and the name of Y. E. CHERNETSEV was listed next to the name of[SMITH] NOSENKO has explained that [LUBIN, SMITH, WILL BURTIN]and [Sipe BURTIN] were among the targets of PETROV; and MIKHAYLOVand CHERNETSEV were officers of the Second Section.NOSENKO stated he knew nothing more about the four non-Sovietnames except that they were targets of PETROV. NOSENKO stated Dathe could not be positive of the cate of the meeting other than that itoccurred while KLYPIN was Chief of the First Department. (Accordingto NOSENKO, KLYPIN was succeeded by Sergey M. FEDOSEYEV as49SECRET00012C96IBR
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Chief of the First Departmem in circa mid-1961.) Research in regard to the four nom-Soviet names leaves no doubt that [LUDIN] is George[LUBA] and that Will [BURTIN] and Sipe [BURTIN] are correct names, with [Sipe] being the wife of Will [BURTIN]. All three are American citizens who were in the USSR circa June 1961. [SMITH] at this time, has still not been identified.In view of the above, it has been possible to deduce the date of the meeting called by KLYPIN as circa June 1961.According to NOSENKO, the piece of paper described above was placed by NOSENKO with other notes he kept between the pages of a bound volume which NOSENKO cails a "working copy." This, according to NOSENKO, was an accountable, registered zotebook issued to all officers in which they were supposed to write all their notes, destroying any other notes.According to NOSENKO, he, like many other officers, did not completely follow regulations and the tendency was to frequently put loose notes in the notebook so that the notebook often acted as a file rather than being used in the way required by regulations. NOSENKO has stated that when he left the First Section he took various notes with him to the Seventh Department; these included notes he had drafted concerning certain First Section activities for use in briefing FEDOSEYEV000121050SECRET41RR
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when FEDOSEYEV succeeded KLIMOV, and notes he had prepared for lectures to the Seventh Directorate. According to NOSENKO, he did not intentionally take the particular paper pertaining to microphones; it was just in the group of notes he took along when he went to the Seventh Department.In consideration of the above explanation by NOSENKO, it should be noted that he also brought with him in 1964 his notes for the briefing of FEDOSEYEV and certain notes he likely had also prepared while in the First Section; e.g., his notes re lecture to the Seventh Directorate in regard to a "mass surveillance" on the American Embassy.By including a section (pages 236 - 239) on the knowledge of NOSENKO of the KGB cryptologic attack on United States Embassy communications, the previous summary implies that there is some reason to question his information on this subject.NOSENKO has asserted that the KGB had never succeeded in reading enciphered communications of the Service Attaches; however, he said that the Eighth Directorate (the unit of the KGB responsible for communications intercept and cryptologic analysis) was reading some United States Embassy traffic. While it is open to question to what extent knowledge of successes of the Eighth Directorate would be known
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 214]
to anyone in the First Section of the First Department, within the scope plausibly available to NOSENKO in his claimed position, there is no reason to question his statement.In the previous summary (pages 240 - 246), the failures or successes of NOSENKO in identifying CIA officers are noted. With the exception of ABIDIAN, NOSENKO does not claim to have been the responsible case officer for any of the listed CIA officers. According to his claim, NOSENKO should have been aware that William N. MORELL was CIA, but he has never identified MORELL as CIA. Surely KOVSHUK knew MORELL was CIA but why NOSENKO is not aware MORELL was CIA is not known. It has already been established, however, that NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief, was not aware of all of the activities of KOVSHUK.As regards some of the other listed individuals, a few remarks are appropriate.(a) NOSENKO has never indicated any knowledgePaul GARBLER was CIA, and yet GARBLER was surely known to the FCD as a CIA employee before going to Moscow. It is presumed that the FCD furnished the SCD at least basic information that Paul GARBLER was "American Intelligence." GARBLER, however, did not
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 215]
arrive in Moscow until November 1961, only a month before NOSENKO left the First Section for the Seventh Department.(b) The previous summary stated that according to NOSENKO the KGB did not suspect that Eugene 03 MAHONEY was a CIA officer, yet he was a CIA officer. It was also stated that MAHONEY reported the presence of intensive KGB surveillance while in Moscow from October 1960 to September 1961. The "intensive KGB surveillance" is based on statements of MAHONEY and may possibly be more a reflection of his personal concern over surveillance rather than what was actually happening.(c) Steve WASHENKO was correctly identified by NOSENKO as CIA. William HORBALY was CIA and identified by NOSENKO as suspected of being a CIA officer or cooptee.(d) Lewis BOWDEN, who was not CIA, was, according to NOSENKO, suspected of being a CIA officer.George Payne WINTERS, Jr., has stated that KOVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOWDEN was the "FBI officer" in the Embassy. The Cherepanov Papers indicate53SECRET
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that the KGB had reasons to consider the activities of BOWDEN with suspicion.It is not believed that the listed failures of NOSENKO to identify CIA officers are of particular significance in establishing that he was or was not Deputy Chief of the First Section. There are too many unknown factors which would need to be considered. Despite our assumptions as to what the KGB knows, it is possible that (a) the KGB did not know of the CIA affliation of these people, (b) the information known to the KGB was not available at the First Section, First Department, level, or (c) information available to the Chief of the First Section or to a specific case officer was of no official concern to NOSENKO and was not made available to him. The last of these possibilities is suggested in spite of claims by NOSENKO that he had to have known whatever was known in the Section regarding CIA identifications; a propensity on the part of NOSENKO to exaggerate the area of his own knowledgeability has been seen elsewhere in this case.Pages 252 - 258 of the previous summary contain a report of the 1960 trip of NOSENKO to Cuba and his 1961 trip to Bulgaria. With regard to the Cuba trip, there is collateral evidence of his travel as described by NOSENKO, and there is no substantive reason to doubt his account of his activities on this trip. The statement was made in54SECRET0001214
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 217]
the previous summary that the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba in 1960damaged his claim that he was supervising operations against Embassycode clerks at the time. To accept the validity of this judgment is tosay that no supervisor in the SCD would be permitted to make a tripabroad unrelated to his supervisory function, a judgment for whichthere is no supporting evidence.As regards the trip of NOSΕΝΚΟ το Bulgaria in 1961, for whichthere is no collateral information, the previous summary concludedthat his account of the trip was untrue and argued that such a trip toBulgaria, if it did take place, at a time when he claimed the operationagainst STORSBERG was reaching a climax and his subordinates were"apparently planning to exploit KEYSERS newly-discovered vulnerability,"it would indicate that the presence of NOSENKO in Moscow was dis-pensable. There was, however, no evidence that NOSENKO did nottravel to Bulgaria and only highly speculative reasoning as to why hisaccount of the purpose of the trip was untrue.As to the STORSBERG case, while it cannot at present be provedthat the recruitment pitch took place before NOSENKO left for Bulgaria,it can be stated, on the basis of reporting from MORONE, that it had tohave taken place before the time NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria.Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning the presenceC00121555SECRET4IBR
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of NOSENKO in Moscow at the time this pitch was made, it would appear that NOSENKO was comparatively free to go to Bulgaria because this phase of the STORSBERG operation had been completed.As to the KEYSERS case, there is no apparent problem since it is clear that the approach to KEYSERS took place after NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria, and furthermore that the KGB probably did not become aware that KEYSERS was a homosexual, and therefore potentially vulnerable, until just before the pitch was made.In short, there is no reason to believe that the accounts by NOSENKO of his trips to Cuba and to Bulgaria are not essentially true, or that if they are true they necessarily reflect on his claim to having been supervisor of code clerk operations.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 219]
# SECRETF. NOSENKO'S CLAIMS, THAT IN 1962 HE WAS CHIEFOF THE AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION ANDWAS THEREAFTER A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SEVENTHDEPARTMENT, ARE NOT CREDIBLE![stamp Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]SECRETG001217
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 220]
# SECRETF. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of theAmerican-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter aDeputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible. (Previousconclusion)The conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO was Chiefof the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) fromJanuary 1962 to July 1962 and that he was a Deputy Chief of the SeventhDepartment thereafter.NOSENKO has stated that, although he was offered the positionof a Deputy Chief of the First Department, SCD, by Oleg M. CRIBANOV,Chief, SCD, and although an order had been prepared and was in thePersonnel Directorate, he declined the proffered position.According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey MikhaylovichFEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKOas a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promote Vladislav KOVSHUK,then Chief of the First Section, to the position. FEDOSEYEV wasSECRET C001218
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 221]
willing to promote NOSENKO to the position of Chief, First Section. However, GRIBANOV did not wish to promote KOVSHUK and NOSENKO considered that under the circumstances it would be better for him to return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to FEDOSEYEV who wanted KOVSHUKas a Deputy.Vladimir Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOSENKO the position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, pending the reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSENKO would become a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDIN. The above explanation of NOSENKO seems plausible and credible and indicates that GRIBANOV, the Chief of the SCD, for reasons best known to GRIBANOV, was assisting NOSENKO in his career in the KGB.This section actually covers two periods in the claimed career of NOSENKO; namely, January - July 1962 as Chief of the First Section, and July 1962 January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. Since NOSENKO was in Geneva, Switzerland, from March to June 1962, he actually cannot be seriously faulted for not having detailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January - July 1962. The previous summary (pages 268-291) contains remarks in regard to the January - July 1962 period, including the period of March - June 1962 when he was in Geneva. Four specific tourist cases
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 222]
are discussed in the previous summary: the cases of Wallace Everett JOHNSON, William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIENSTOCK, and Horst BRAUNS. Apparent conflicts between information from NOSENKO and information derived from subsequent interviews with these individuals were cited as evidence impugning NOSENKO. It is not believed that the previous comments concerning these cases constitute any substantial evidence that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, during January - July 1962. That there were KGB operations against JOHNSON, JONES, BIENSTOCK and BRAUNS has been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all four individuals. A few additional remarks in regard to the above four cases are warranted, not because it is considered that there are any substantial discrepancies between what NOSENKO has said and what each individual stated when interviewed, but because they may provide additional clarification.In the Wallace Everett JOHNSON case, it was previously noted that JOHNSON arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961 and that the KGB operation against him occurred on 5 January 1962. The summary suggested that the short lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tendencies of JOHNSON were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contrary to the statements of NOSENKO. NOSENKO during current interviewsSECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 223]
has stated that the KGB learned of the homosexual tendencies of [JOHNSON]^[06] "by chance" soon after his arrival. "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY," two homosexual agents of NOSENKO, were at the time operating out of a room at the Metropol Hotel where [JOHNSON]^[06] stayed. They met [JOHNSON]^[06] there and reported his apparent homosexual tendencies.In regard to the [William Carroll JONES]^[06] case, NOSENKO during current interviews has furnished additional information on the KGB operation against [JONES]^[06], including the woman Ludmila BUGAYEVA who was recruited as an agent to work against [JONES]^[06] and was used in another case. The other details furnished by NOSENKO concerning the [JONES]^[06] case are compatible with his claim to having been Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department.In regard to the [Natalie BIENSTOCK]^[06] case, NOSENKO did not claim to have been the responsible case officer but was able to provide enough specific information concerning the case to bring about a confession when she was interviewed by the FBI. That he did not know all the details concerning the [BIENSTOCK]^[06] case could be explained by his claim to have been Chief of Section and not the case officer directly involved with the case.In regard to the [Horst BRAUNS]^[06] case, in the previous summary the criticism was levied that NOSENKO did not know why [BRAUNS]^[06] visited the USSR and was not able to identify any Soviet citizens whom [BRAUNS]^[06] met in the USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that4SECRET0001221
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 224]
the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visitingrelatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates. NOSENKO, accord-ing to the previous summary, was aware that *BRAUNS* was a formerSoviet citizen and the summary stated that his plan to visit relativeswas information available to the KGB through his visa application.In regard to the statement that the Seventh Department was notconcerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Sovietexpatriates, this is not in agreement with current information fromNOSENKO, Cases of "true" tourists, which were normally the respon-sibility of the Seventh Department, could become the responsibility ofanother department or KGB component where Soviet relatives wereinvolved. However, if the case was not taken over or assigned by higherauthority to another department or component, it was and remained theresponsibility of the Seventh Department. The fact that *BRAUNS* was aformer Soviet citizen could very well have made *BRAUNS* of interest tothe Second Section, First Department, or a direction in the Service ofthe SCD. However, in the absence of an actual reassignment by higherauthority, the case would remain the responsibility of the Seventh Depart-ment since *BRAUNS* was visiting the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. Theprevious summary also indicated that *BRAUNS* listed on his visa appli-cation that he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad. *BRAUNS* had a* By 1962 there had been a large reorganization in the SCD and in the  Seventh Department. The situation was not the same in 1959.
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relative or relatives in Leningrad. Although BRAUNS when interviewed by the FBI, mentioned a number of items of which the KGB was aware concerning his background and occupation irom his visa application, there is no specific reference in these interviews indicating his statement of purpose in visiting the USSR.Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary reviews remarks by NOSENKO on the Boris BELITSKIY case and states that his claimed role in the case was not plausible. There are several specific points made in the summary which imply that NOSENKO was lying about his knowledge of the case. There is adequate reason to believe that NOSENKO exaggerated his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now states he was to give assistance to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling of BELITSKIY in Geneva in 1962 and not to supervise ARTEMOV.The more important aspect and the primary one is the difference in what NOSENKO specifically reported about the BELITSKIY case and information from the actual CIA record of the case. There are major differences and without going into all the details of the case which is very involved, an effort has been made toward determining whether these apparent differences necessarily indicate that NOSENKO was or is lying or whether there is a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case.NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom American Intelligence recruited in London in 1960 or 1961 and that theSECRET
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KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American Intelligence into meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR. The previous summary stated that NOSENKO did not know when the BELITSKI operation started (Brussels, Belgium, 1958), did not know the nature of the British involvement, did not know the operational details and contact arrangements BELITSKIY had with CIA, and did not know BELITSKIY's pattern of activity in Moscow or Geneva.NOSENKO during current interviews has indicated an awareness that the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to use BELITSKIY against the British. However, he still has dated the recruitment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in London and still states that the primary purpose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence in contacts with BELITSKIY within the USSR. The latter was considered completely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY was recruited in Brussels, Belgium, in 1958; that three letters had been mailed to BELITSKIY in the USSR in 1959 and early 1960; and that BELITSKIY had an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR.There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent discrepancies between the statements by NOSENKO on the BELITSKIY case and the actual record are a reflection against NOSENKо,00012247SECRET