Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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328. fact that I have been talking with you. You can ruin everything.I have a career. I have bright prospects. My boss GRIBANOV, myhighest boss, has a very high degree of respect for me. He some-times bawls me out and I-- Well, I make it look like this is un-pleasant for me. But, in fact, it is a pleasant thing because,inside, I am glad he is bawling me out and not someone else. Iknow that if he bawls me out he has a high regard for me. Hesometimes calls me personally (to his office) and says: 'Youcome with me. I have to meet an ambassador.' I go with him.We arrive and have the conversation. He is there all night. Hecomes out and says: 'Well, where shall we go for a drink?' Iknow beforehand (that he will say this) and everything is readyat the Aragvi Restaurant. We go there. 'Well, what shall wedrink!' [GRIBANOV says]. I answer: 'Well, Oleg Mikhailovich,cognac, of course! He is the highest chief. 'I don't drinkcognac. I'll have vodka,' I say. 'Well, we'll have vodka then,'[GRIBANOV says)..." One of NOSENKO'S CIA handlers suggested atthis point that GRIBANOV seemed to treat NOSENKO as an olderbrother would. NOSENKO replied: "That's his attitude toward me."23 April 1964Question: Did you ever go to GRIBANOV's house?NOSENKO: I never went in the house. I have driven to it.Question: Did he ever come to your house?NOSENKO: No.Question: Were you ever out at night with him, after work?If so, how, under what circumstances?NOSENKO: After work? Yes, once.Question: Who else was there?NOSENKO: TARABRIN.Question: What was the occasion?NOSENKO: No specific reason. GRIBANOV called me at midnight.I could hear that he was already drinking; he askedme how long it would take me to get dressed and comedown to the Praga Restaurant, first private room..Afterwards we wanted to go somewhere else to finishthe evening... GRIBANOV was sloppy drunk, lay downto rest, he needed a couple of hours of sleep. Idrove him and TARABRIN home, got him there at 6:00a.m., gave him some pills to help him.Question: When did you first personally meet GRIBANOV?NOSENKO: I might have seen him in 1953 or 1954, but I did nothave a chance to speak to him then. Once I was in twogroup operational discussions (about 15 people present)about work against Military Attaches in 1954; that wasthe first time I ever spoke to him.
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329. Question: When did you first have any personal conversation with him?NOSENKO: I don't remember. He gathered groups of people. Maybe I was with him with KOZLOV and others in Tourist Department (i.e., between 1955 and 1960).Question: When did you develop a personal relationship with him?NOSENKO: It is difficult to say how it got started. I was still working in the Seventh Department. It was in 1958, or maybe 1957. KOZLOV suddenly called me and said I should immediately report to GRIBANOV. I did, and GRIBANOV said I should quickly be ready to go to a reception with him at the Indian Embassy, with him and Vera (Ivanovna) ANDREYEVA.Question: Why you?NOSENKO: I don't know... (pause) Oh, yes, this is the story. this is it, this is why he started favoring me. Earlier, some time in 1953, I knew some girls, Nina on Pokrovskiy Boulevard and her girlfriend, Rina GUDKOVA, friends of (Yu.I.) GUK and (V.M.) KOVSHUK and (V.A.) CHURANOV. CHURANOV was a friend of TARABRIN, who was a friend of GRIBANOV. Through TARABRIN he got acquainted with these girls, and TARABRIN brought them to GRIBANOV'S dacha one night. The girls were talkative and told me all about it, and said they'd told CHURANOV. I told CHURANOV who warned me not to mention it. I never did, and GRIBANOV learned about this and liked it; he re- marked once: "You are not a gossiper..."Question: How did he find out that you knew and didn't tell any- one?NOSENKO: I don't know, but he did.Question: Who wrote your fitness reports?NOSENKO: My last one was written by (V.D.) CHELNOKOV. The one before that by (V.A.) KLYPIN, in the First Department. Before that in the Seventh Department it was written by [K.N.] DUBAS, before him by (V.A.) KOZLOV, then [S.V.] PERFILYEV and before then, in the First Depart- ment, by [A.M.] GORBATENKO.Question: Did GRIBANOV ever write a fitness report on you?NOSENKO: He may not have actually written them, but he signed them, those reports written in connection with pro- motions to higher jobs or for trips abroad, or general reviews of personnel.15 February 1965 (from a protocol signed 20 February 1965):"Before I joined the KGB in 1953 I had never heard the name of Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV and knew nothing about him. As [F.G.) SHUBNYAKOV, rather than GRIBANOV, was the Deputy Director of the Second Chief Directorate responsible for supervising the acti- vities of the First Department of the Directorate, where I worked,
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333. 23 February 1965: NOSENKO commented further on his social encounters with GRIBANOV and TAPABRIN. The following, which was not included in the protocol quoted above, is taken from case officer notes.Question: Tell me about the occasions when you were with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN.NOSENKO: Three times--drinking in cafes. Twice afterwards there were girls. The most recent time was in September or October 1963. I don't remember the first time. In 1963 I received a call from TARABRI!! at home. Then GRIBANOV got on the phone and told me to take his car and come join them at the Praga Restaurant. I didn't take his car because I didn't want to call the duty- officer. I took a cab and went to the Fraga. They were sitting there and drinking in a private room. joined them. They were drinking champagne, but I took cognac. TARABRIN suggested girls about 1230 and GRIBANOV made me go to the office to get my notebook. I called one girl I knew--her and her sister. When I got back to the restaurant it was closed with only GRIBANOV and TARABRIN still there. We went to the girls' (apartment). They weren't prostitutes exactly. I knew her before.Question: Is this why GRIBANOV called you to the restaurant (i.e., to provide girls)?NOSENKO: I think so. It was the second time I had participated in this. This last time GRIBANOV told the girl his name. The girl works in the Archives of the First Chief Directorate. At that time of night I wasn't able to reach anyone else. Her name is Galina Mikhaylovna. Her mother works in the Central Committee. I don't remember her last name. GRIBANOV was drinking and she told him that she had quarreled with ZAYTSEV, the Chief of the First Chief Directorate Archives. GRIBANOV told her that he would give her a job and told me to arrange for a job in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate for her. Galina's flat is in the building inhabited by Central Committee workers on Kutuzovskiy Prospekt. GRIBANOV's driver drove him home at 0600 and he was in the office by 0830.3 March 1965: Speaking of the damage his disclosures must have caused the KGB, NOSENKO said: "I believe they will punish people in the Second Chief Directorate [SCD]... Even GRIBANOV... He was personally responsible, as head of the SCD, for pushing me ahead."Question: What sort of punishment?......NOSENKO: Even firing.Question: Do you think any others would be punished, or even fired?NOSENKO: Maybe KOVALENKO, BOBKOV, and people in the Eleventh Department. Many others, too.
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334. Later in the same session the interrogator returned to this subject. The following is a transcript of the discussion:Question: You said you think GRIBANOV might be fired. Yet, there is nothing in the protocol you signed [see above] about your relations with GRIBANOV which would seem to make him personally responsible for you. Is there something else, something you haven't told me?NOSENKO: No.Question: Why then do you think GRIBANOV would be fired?NOSENKO: (no answer)Question: (repeats)NOSENKO: Don't know.Question: Well, what is your opinion at least?NOSENKO: Nothing, nothing. Let's not discuss this.Question: Why not?NOSENKO: It's simply my opinion, that's all. I don't know why.Question: Well, what is your opinion?NOSENKO: He was responsible for my becoming Deputy Chief of Department.Question: But you had already gotten ahead before: you said he didn't help you become Deputy Chief of Section in 1958.NOSENKO: Yes.Question: Did you ever hear any gossip about his help to you?NOSENKO: It was said in the SCD that he helped me become Chief of Section and Deputy Chief of Department.Question: Why would BOBKOV be punished?NOSENKO: He was my supervisor, and in '61 he was Secretary of the KGB Party Organization.Question: Would others in the Party Organization be punished?NOSENKO: Yes, also in the Party Organization of the Seventh Department and of the SCD.Question: Would BANNIKOV be punished?NOSENKO: No. He did nothing, just supported my candidature for Geneva.Question: Would KOVSHUK be punished?
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335. NOSENKO: Of course they would speak with KOVSHUK, GUK, GRYAZNOV, who talked to me.Question: How about the First Chief Lirectorate and the Seventh Directorate?NOSENKO: No. I wasn't close to them, except GUK.Question: How about First Chief Directorate residencies abroad?NOSENKO: [S.I.) GAVRICHEV might be recalled from Geneva.Question: You must be withholding something about your relationship with GRIBANOV.NOSENKO: No, I was telling you I visited his office. He told me: 'I found out you're drinking too much.' I said no, not especially. He said: 'Stop this drinking with KOVSHUK. It's not good for you.'Question: But this couldn't harm GRIBANOV's position now.NOSENKO: They would review my file, and find that it contained the report about the woman in '54,* the fact that I was turned down for assignment to Ethiopia, drinking, scandals--GRIBANOV knew about this, but he approved my appointment (to Deputy Chief of Department) anyway.Question: Why did he promote you?NOSENKO: GRIBANOV thought I was a young, active guy. Six recruitments--oh, they weren't much, but it sounds great for the First Department, which was having no success with Americans in the Embassy.Question: But why make you Deputy Chief of Department?NOSENKO: He thought I was a tough guy, good case officer. In '59 I saw him often and was involved in a lot of operations which were reported to him.Question: But it was not then, but in 1961, when he made you Deputy Chief of Department.NOSENKO: (shrugs)Question: Who would officially approve a Deputy Chief of Department?NOSENKO: Must be higher than a Department Chief--bec. :se GRIBANOV signed. They could get him for his, especially those who are against GRIBANOV.Question: Who?NOSENKO: Well, IVANOV, who wanted to get promoted to Deputy Chief of Department in 59-60 but didn't. He was in an inspection group of the Collegium, checking the Seventh Department.* Presumably this is a reference to NOSENKO's contracting venereal disease (see Part IV.C.2.).
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Question: But GRIBANOV must have approved all the other Deputy Department Chiefs, too. Would the sare happen if one of them defecte!?NOSENKO: Well, if it was from the Second Department, for example, no, because GRIBANOV wasn't personally supervising it. It would be someone else's proposal. I my case it was his own initiative.Question: Was anyone in the First Chief Directorate punished as a result of GOLI STN's defaction?NOSENKO: Nc, absolutely not.2. Information fromAs indicated in Part III.I., a number of sources have reported that GRIBANOV and other KGB officers were discharged from the KGB in the wake of NOSE: KO's defecrion.*According to sensitive source:15 KGB orricers had already been dismissed from the KGB because of the defection, and that GRIBANOV and three of his deputies were included in this number. One of the deputies was named "BANIK" (BANNIKOV). GRIBANOV's quilt was said to rest in the facts that, as Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, he had been ultimately responsible for NOSENKO's flight; that NOSENKO was his personal friend and protege; and that, therefore, he should have been aware of NOSENKO's intention to defect.According to sensitive source:when NOSENKO was Leing considered for inclusion in the Soviet dele- gation to go to Geneva, a summary statement of NOSENKO's activities and capabilities was prepared by employees of the Second Chief Directorate and was sent to GRIBANOV... said he understood this summary contained considerable 'compromising' information regarding NOSENKO and, if acted on properly, would have removed NOSENKO from future consideration for the trip to Geneva. B Sensiti stated, however, that he understood from conversations with other source KGB employees, whom he could not recall specifically by name, that GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line through all of it,* In addition, a Western Ambassador with whom GRIBANOV was in operational-contact-in Moscow-has stated that GRIBANOV-disap- peared from the scene sometime in mid-1965 and was replaced by another KGB handler. (He has also indicated that GRIBANOV disappeared about the time of KHRUSHCHEV's downfall in October 1964.)
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337. and put the notation on the summary, 'Send him to Coneva.'the general feeling arong KCB personnel that GRISANOV was willing to overlook a lot of deficiencies about NOSENKO because of GRIBANOV's long-time friendship with NOSENKO'R father."Accora ng to sensitive source,GRlBANOV's dismissal took place immediately after HOSENKO'S defection in February 1964 and no less than 50 other officers, most of them from the Second Chief Directorate and many of them cicse friends of GRIBANOV, had been fired subsequently.prior to NOSENKO's defection, NOSENKO had been the deputy to a Department Chief in the Second Chief Directorate but that he held only the rank of captain in the KCB.attributed NOSENKO's high position to the influence which GRIBANOV exerted on his behalf.rather than being fired, Major General "BANIK" (BANNIKOV) had been appointed Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate in GRIBANOV's stead.*after the defection of NOSENKO, the KGB conducted an extensive investigation of personnel in KGB Headquarters to find out which KGB officers knew him. One of these questioned was TAPABRIN, who said he was acquainted with NOSENKO, but that their relationship was only casual and was limited to occasional official contacts within the KGB. Subsequent investigation determined, however,that TAPABRIN and GRIBANOV were close friends socially and had attended several parties which NOSENKO had arranged and attended. Girls provided by NOSENKO were at these parties.** As a result of his willful concealment of this information, TARABRIN, like GRIBANOV, was discharged from the KGB and dismissed from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.BANNIKOV was the Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO, as noted above, said that BANNIKOV would not be punished as a result of his defection. NOSENKO also said that it was BANNIKOV who sponsored NOSENKO's 1964 trip to Geneva and that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with it or the 1962 trip.** These evidently were the parties described by NOSENKO (see above).at the time of his removal from the NOD, TAB.I was the Chief of the British Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN held this post until 1963, at which time he waз promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the newly established "Service Number Two" (counterintelligence) of the First Chief Directorate.
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# 338.I. Confirmation from Other Sources## 1. IntroductionSince NOSENKO'S defection several Soviet sources and defectors have provided information supporting NOSENKO'S claims of having held certain positions in the KGB at certain times a Soviet scientist with suspected intelligence connections who was approached by CIA, Soviet case officers for an double agent (a NOSENKO lead), and the KGB officer handling Robert Lee JOHNSON (also a NOSENKO lead), a Soviet journalist who contacted the magazine Paris Match with a proposal to write an article on NOSENKO, and two defectors. Some of these sources had supported NOSENKO directly by reporting that he was a Second Chief Directorate officer in the various positions he say he was. Others have offered indirect support by confirming NOSENKO'S knowledge of particular pieces of information or confirming the validity of information which NOSENKO said he learned while in particular KGB jobs. As will be noted, the information from one source sometimes contradicts that learned from another or from NOSENKO himself.has corroborated NOSENKO's story indirectly by his descriptions of the repercussions of the defection within the KG3 (particularly the firing of GRIBANOV) and by his statements concerning the probable effect that the defection would have on KGB operations. reported at various times that NOSENKO is "more valuable than PEN-KOVSKIY," that he is "vastly more important than DERYABIN or GOLITSYN," that the AGB "will not be able to operate normally for two years" that it is the "unanimous opinion" of "NOSENKO could do tremendous harm to the XGB," and that this damage would be severo "for several years to come".has also given indirect support to NOSENKO's statement that he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy... Section. NOSENKO as a "chief" had access to details on Go activities against the U.S.Em-bassy, and the loss suffered by the KGB as a result of USA's knowledge of the microphones installed in the Embassy. (NOSENKO has said that this in-formation was available to him only because he was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section. reported that NOSENKO's position as a "chief" in the Second Chief Directorate gave him access to the names and backgroundhowever, is not known to have stated specifically that NOSENKO was a senior official in the American Embassy Section of the American Department in 1960 and 1961
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# 139.of many KGB officers in the USSR and abroad (see Part III.I.)and to sensitive information on KGB organization, operations,and method. This status made availableto NOSENKO a "30-page personnel and a 200-pagephone list from Moscow Headquarters of the KGB."The agentwas John RUFS, named by NOSENKO as a person recruited inLeningrad in January 1962 on homosexual grounds; thisinformation NOSENKO said he learned as Chief of theAmerican Tourist Section of the Tourist Department.Further examples of supporting NOSENKO in thisway are reviewed elsewhere in this paper and the CHEREPANOVA incidentin Part VI.D.7.c).also offered specific although imperfect con-firmation of NOSENKO's claimed positions in the KGBthat from the very beginning of his employment bythe KGB NOSENKO worked in the Second Directorate.As he once worked against personnel of the U.S. Embassyin Moscow; later he was assigned to work against U.S.journalists in Moscow. During his last years with the KGB,he was assigned to the task of working against American and* NOSENKO has never mentioned these documents.
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# TOP SECRETEuropean tourists in Moscow. His last pwas that of Deputy to the Chief or tArtment, Second Chief Directorate (tourists).NOSENKO secured this relatively positionbecause of help he received from Lt. General GRIBANOV,Chief of the Second Directorate. GRIBANOV through-out NOSENKO's career GREBANOV had always helped him andsaw that he was promoted...With regard to NOSENKO'S KGB rank,"it appeared quite certain that NOSENKO had the rank ofLieutenant Colonel in the KGB," reported having learned from KGB of-ficer that NOSENKO was in fact only a captain.**no feels that NOSENKO has actually defected or whether hefeels that this might be a 'trick' by the KGB. Hereplied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he isconvinced that NOSENKO's defection is not a 'trick' by theKGB."3. sensitive source.said that "he had heard about NOSENKOfrom various persons in Moscow. He said he had never knownNOSENKO personally. He said NOSENKO was an important bossin the KGB. He said he did not know what directorate ordepartment NOSENKO had been in. He con-tinued that when NOSENKO was a young man he was in theGRU Military Academy*** and then [was] sent to the Infor-mation Department of the GRU for a short time; in all,** Until January 1965 NOSENKO maintained that he had pro-gressed through the KGB ranks in normal sequence, fromlieutenant to lieutenant colonel. On 20 January 1965,however, he said that because of administrative confusionand GRIPANOV's advice he had skipped the rank of major andhad moved directly from captain to lieutenant colonel inlate 1963. In April 1966 NOSENKO told CIA that he hadnever held the rank of lieutenant colonel and was reallyonly a captain (see Part V.G.1.).*** The Military-Diplomatic Academy is the strategic intel-ligence school of the GRU. Although NOSENKO said heattended various naval-type schools before joining theGRU, he insisted that he was never enrolled in a formalintelligence course of any training establishment of theSoviet Navy. He claimed to have turned down an offer toattend the Military Diplomatic Academy (which he called theGRU Military Academy) because it offered too many politicalcourses that he had already taken. See Part IV.B.TOP SECRET
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P SECRET311perhaps a year.  NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person while in the GRU and 'not. very good.' He was to have been discharged from the GRU. However, his father, was a very influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was able to get NOSENKO trans-ferred to the KGB.It was the opinion of the persons from whom he heard the information about NOSENKO that NOSENKO had given very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information which included all means of KGB cover-age of people in [logo of microphone systems] the er-bassies, etc. the U.S. Embassy had found many of the micro-information."confided operational informationwhich NOSENKO has reportedSHUBIN was the only GRU agent named by NOSENKO who sourced his knowledge of SHUBIN to an incident which occurred about 1959, while NOSENKO said he was in the Tourist Department...*As indicated in Part V.E.3.g., the final sentence is largely but not entirely correct.**See Part V.F.8.