Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10020.pdf — page 19]
# Top Secret(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSEIKO'S KGB CAREER)## Other Sources - 1964 and 1965As indicated in Annex A, reported several items of information he stated the obtained from various KGB colleagues. According to these reports, GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB as a consequence of NOSENKO'S defection, it was rumored that GRIBANOV was to be fired because he had been NOSINKO's friend and patron, that GRIZANOV was held responsible for the defection of his protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSEIKO's assignment to Geneva in 1964 despite knowledge of facts making NOSENKO incligible, that GRIBANOV was a long-time friend of NOSK's father, that ROSENKO had Leen a deputy to a Department Chief despite his junior rank Lecause of GRIBANOV's influence, and that GRIDANOV was dismissed from the KGB and Party Lecause he willfully withheld information about NOSLNKO'S procuring women for parties which he and the General arranged.## NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to refer to this special and personal relationship, which touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO'S KGB service. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain this claim. The extent HOSENKO's statements were retracted or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted. from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on HOSENKO that could be given (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.); recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruit- ment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.); NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in 1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied336Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
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# Top SecretSUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONSCONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDESNOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO'S claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who enjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, "the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence", paralyzed the work of KGB.The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO'S biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts, and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?357Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
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# TOP SECRET1.  Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study entitled, *The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO* dated February 1968 (copy 10).    Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for your review.2.  Certain portions of Annex A of this study are deleted since it contains information which bears on the security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.3.  We request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A when your review has been completed.Attachment: As Stated AboveWARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVEDE2 IMPDET CL BY 011340TOP SECRET
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# Top Secret## Annex AStatements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO4 February 1964NOSENKO defected in Geneva.6 February 1964The Chief of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon that NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February. They speculated privately between themselves that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in an automobile accident.8 February 1964An official spokesman of the Soviet Mission in Geneva reported to the Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert temporarily assigned to Geneva", had been missing for four days.9 February 1964Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared.10 February 1964The Swiss press quoted unidentified Soviet sources as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected.361Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
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# Top Secret(Annex A)10 February 1964 (continued)A U.S. Department of State press release was issued identifying NOSENKU as KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States.According to a sensitive source, Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSINKO would have a great deal of important information which he could impart to intelligence agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them. He also would be intimately acquainted with a large number of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American and British nationals.According to a sensitive source, The bulk of NOSENKO's knowledge concerning KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities working in lleadquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly familiar with all KCB personalities in Geneva and certainly knew some KGB personalities in other countries.Comment: NOSENKO identified a number of KGB officers in Geneva; he asserted that some others,..known by CIA to be connected with the KGB, were not.362Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
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# Top Secret(Annex A)10 February 1964 (continued)According to a sensitive sourceNOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for approximately sixteen years, since about 1947, and was an employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the Ukraine.Comment: NOSENKO claims to have served in the GRU until 1953, when he entered the KGB.According to a sensitive source,It appeared quite certain to several KGS officers that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KGB.Comment: NOSENKO was at the time claiming to have been a KGB lieutenant colonel.According to a sensitive source, from KGB officersThe photograph which appeared in U.S. newspapers is not that of NOSENKO. One worked with NOSENKO for several years in KGB Headquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second Chief Directorate.
[104-10210-10021.pdf — page 4]
# Top Secret(Annex A)10 February 1964 (continued)Comment:The photograph accompanying American and Swiss press accounts of NOSENKO's defection was by error not that of NOSENKO but of a sensitive source Vladimir SHUSTOV, whom and NOSENKO both identified as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.Noting the publicity accompanying the defection of KGB officer NOSENKO in Switzerland, GOLITSYN recalled that NOSENKO had been a Second Chief Directorate officer working against American citizens.Comment:Routinely, GOLITSYN had reviewed in March 1962 (before NOSENKO contacted CIA) a list of Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. NOSENKO's name, which was on the list, did not at that time prompt any comment from GOLITSYN.11 February 1964Ambassador DOBRYNIN informally notified the Department of State that a Soviet note would be delivered later to ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, to request his release, and to demand an immediate interview with him.12 February 1964S.K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.364# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
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# Top Secret(Annex A)12 February 1964 (continued)At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the Swiss refected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappearance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in locating NOSENKO.The Soviet note earlier promised by DOBRYNIN was delivered to the State Department. A noncommittal reply was given to Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in order to obtain assurance that the defection had been voluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as possible.NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours.12-13 February 19614 February 1964In Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO read to Ambassador KOHLER a statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a365# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
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# Top Secret(Annex A)14 February 1964 (continued)"Gross provocation by American Intelligence organs".GROMIKO repeated the demand for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturali- zation Service. The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled by Minister Counselor G.M. KORNIENKO, and Third Secretary V.F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.18 February 1964Feliks KOVALEV, a Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, told a CIA agent that he had attended the Institute of Inter- national Relations with NOSENKO. According to KOVALEV, NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background, was the son of a Minister in the Government, was notorious for his "adventurous" nature, and "famous for his character".> [text removed]366Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
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# Top Secret(Annex A)![Image of heavily redacted text content]367TS No. 19712440
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# Top Secret![image]![image]![image]368Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
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# Top SecretAccording to a sensitive source.NOSENO had been in the second Chief Directorate for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure of the KGB and knows many personnel of the First Chief Directorate.NOSENKO, as Deputy to the Chief of the Seventh Department, had in his possession a telephone directory which iisted the names of some 10,000 KGB employees ia Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Departments had these phone books. expressed the opinion that "NOSENKO is much more valuable to the FBI and CIA than Jas Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he knows so much about the methods of work of the First and Second Directorates of the KGS and is familiar with so many individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad.a KGB officer said that PLNKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence operations of the KGB."Comment: NOSENKO has never commented on the KGB telephone book referred to above.369Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
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Top Secret370Top Secret TS No. 197124Copy
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According to a sensitive source, in response to a question whether NOSENKO actually defected or whether the defection might be a KGB "trick", the source replied that from his own knowledge of this matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's defection was not a "trick" by the KGB.22 February 1964According to a sensitive source from conversations with various unnamed KGB officers: NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow, and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. It is assumed by the KGB that he is familiar with the number and location of microphones in the Embassy.Comment: Although NOSENKO knew that there were microphones in three general locations in the Embassy, his specific information regarding the number and location of microphones was limited to that contained in a written list brought to Geneva in 1964, a list which he claimed no one in the KGB knew he had.24 February 1964Women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO visited the American Embassy in Moscow for the first time, expressing disbelief that he had voluntarily betrayed his family and country and requesting a personal meeting with him.371Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
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Seerzi(Annex A)24 February 196: (continued)Comment: NOSENKO confirmed their identities as his wife and mother on the basis of physical descriptions. On only one previcus occasion have members of a defector's family called on a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in 1963, his wife appeared at the British Frbassy to make inquiries about him.According to a sensitive source, KUROCHKIN (fnu), a KGB S&I officer scheduled for assizament to Washington, will not be sent as he is "well-known" to NOSENKO. In the course of his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often visited the department where NOSENKO worked and, as a result, NOSENKO is "more than casually acquainted with him".Comment: NOSENKO has never identified KUROCHKIN nor referred to the name.372Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
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Top Secret(Annex A)February 1964Nikolay ARTAMONOV, who defected from the Soviet Navy in the late 1950's, noted the publicity accompanying NOSENKO'3 defection. He volunteered to CIA that he attended a naval preparatory school with the son of Minister NOSENKO in 1944-1946.Comment: ARTAMONOV's description of the school and of the dates involved differs from those claimed by NOSENKO.KGB officer Vladimir TULAYEV mentioned NOSENKO to a CIA double agent in Vienna. TULAYEV said that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came from a wonderful family, loved his wife and children, and earned a good salary. (TULAYEV later said on another occasion that he had friends who knew NOSENKO well.)Comment: NOSENKO never identified TULAYEV by name or photograph. When asked, NOSENKO denied knowing him.373Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
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Ton SecretFebruary-March 1964According to a sensitive source:A KG3 commission was in the process of studying "the scale of loss" [caused by NOSENKO's defection] to the USSR. The commission was very large, formed from different departments of the KGB. The study (sic) was made "because it is supposed that NOSENKO had access to many rocket matters, to many nuclear matters, to many strategical objects of the country...many details about life of the leaders of the country, in the government...that he knew very much about Internal relations between the people working in the KGB, that he had many close friends among them and [spent] days and nights together with them. The whole history of his life was studied step by step very carefully."374TS No. 197124
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# Top SecretAccording to a sensitive source, (from conversations with various unnamed KGB officers): NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies of the KGB directorates and departments at KGB Headquarters in Moscow. In KGB Headquarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel who work there; one such dining room is reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.Comment: NOSENKO never referred to the dining rooms until the January-March 1965 interrogations, when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally in the "chiefs' dining room".375Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
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# Top Secret(Annex A)23 March 1964The two women claiming to be the wife and mother of NOSENKO made the last of five visits to the Embassy in Moscow. NOSENKO's wife had explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plan for her own future and that of the NOSENKO children.376Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
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# Top Secret(Annex A)27 March 1964According to a sensitive source (from various unnamed KGB officers certain KGB chiefs): There seems to be unanimous opinion among KGB chiefs that NOSENKO...could do the KGB a tremendous amount of harm. NOSENKO in his position as a deputy chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief Directorate would have been entitled to have one personnel directory of approximately 30 pages setting for the identities of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by some KGB "chiefs" that if NOSENKO were merely able to make these two directories available to American Intelligence, the KGB would be severely damaged for the present and for several years to come.Comment: NOSENKO has never referred to the KGB directories described.31 March 1964KGB officers I.1. PETUKHOV nad P.P.. BORISOV in Canada told their agent George Herman SPRECHER to cease all intelligence activity for a year, to destroy any incriminating materials in his possession as well as to supply the Soviets witin passport photographs so that "escape" documents could be prepared for himself and his family. SPRECHER asked whether the action had any connection with NOSENKO's recently publicized defection, but the KGB officers denied it, asserting NOSENKO "was just a secretary".377# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
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# Top Secret(Annex A)31 March 1964 (continued)Comment: When PETUKHOV recontacted SPRECHER in February 1965, PETUKHOV acknowledged that NOSENKO had in fact been the cause of KGB concern, that he had had some connection with NOSENKO, and NOSENKO may have known something of what the KGB was doing in Canada.NOSENKO described a KGB Illegal, whose name was unknown to his, who apparently is-identical to SPRECHER.March 1964According to a sensitive source who briefed in his office in KGB Headquarters by a Second Chief Directorate officer of the American Department: Personnel of that Department, in which NOSENKO had served until hie defection, were no shocked at the event that they would not mention it at all.Comment: In this and other contexts a sensitive source has stated or implied that NOSENKO served in the American Department in 1963-1964: NOSENKO asserts he left the American Department in January 1962 and served in the Seventh Department until his defection.378# Top SecretTS No.: 197124Copy
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# Top Secret379Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
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# Top Secret(Annex A)April-May 1964KGB officer G.S. VLASOV, case officer of Robert Lee JOHNSON in Paris, began to meet JOHNSON on the street rather than in various restaurants as had been their habit. At one of their final meetings before JOHNSON returned to the United States, VLASOV told JOHNSON that a Soviet Intelligence officer had defected to the Americans in Geneva, and that extreme caution must therefore be exercised in JOHNSON's contacts with the KGB. VLASOV said that the defector could not identify JORNSON but that JoHNSON should dispose of everything he had which might link him to Soviet espionage activities. (See p 24for a summary of the JOHNSON case.)May 1964: According to a sensitive source (from unidentified sources, presumably from KGB officers): Two commissions have been established by the CPS!" for the purposes: (a) to determine why KGB employees such as DERYABIN, GOLITSYN, and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt to eliminate the "weak" employees and improve the efficiency of the KGB.380Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
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# Top Secret(Annex A)20 May 1964According to a sensitive source from a KGB officerThe KGB was lucky that the Americans found only 40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Actually, about 200 microphones were concealed by the Soviets in the Embassy. NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information to the Americans which resulted in the microphones being found. NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40 microphones which were found and does not have any knowledge of the remaining ones.12 June 1964.Professor John M. THOMPSON reported at the American Embassy in Moscow that an unnamed Soviet official with whom he was acquainted told him that NOSENKO was a profligate with two wives and many debts and is considered in Moscow to be someone they are well rid of.22 June 1964According to a sensitive source (from various unnamed KGB officers):The consensus among KGB employees is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the effects of NOSENKO's escape to American Intelligence. NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more important than either GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on several factors: First, NOSENKO worked against personnel stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow and with his help agents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is assumed by KGB personnel that because of his closeness to381Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10