Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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TOP SECRET746. ### 3. Schooling### a. IntroductionThere is relatively little reliable collateral information concerning NOSENXO's schooling up until 1950. Other than what he himself has reported, available information consists of overt press releases pertaining to the Minister NOSENKO's career (and. giving his location at various times) and comments by one KGB officer and one defector. NOSENKO's own account, together with references to these other sources, is summarized below.With the exception of minor variations in dates, attributable to memory, NOSENKO's story of his early years until the beginning of World War II, when he had just completed the sixth grade in Moscow, has been generally consistent in its various tellings. Moreover, his accounts of having studied in Lenin- grad and Moscow agree with information concerning the positions and movements of the elder NOSENKO during these years. In contrast, the period immediately following, during which NOSENKO allegedly received his early training in naval matters is characterized with frequent changes of story, contradictions, and admitted falsehood.### b. DiscussionIn 1964 and 1965 NOSENKO recalled that he enrolled in the Moscow special naval school in the summer of 1941, immediately after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, and was evacuated with the entire school from Noscow to Kuybyshev in September to begin studies in the seventh grade. (An article in the Soviet Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) on 14 January 1967 confirmed that seven special naval schools were established in the Soviet Union in April 1940. One of these was in Moscow. However, to be eligible for admission, one had to have completed the seventh grade. The article did not indicate that the Moscow school was evacuated.) In April 1966, NOSENKO remembered that he did not go to Kuybyshev at this time but rather had been evacuated to Chelyabinsk with his mother and entered the seventh grade of a regular school.In keeping with his respective accounts, NOSENKO said in 1964 and 1965 that he returned from Kuybyshev in the summer of 1942 and secured admission to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School, along with which he was evacuated by train to Baku in the fall of that year. In April 1966, after inserting the year spent at Chelyabinsk with his mother, NOSENKO moved all events up a year and wrote in his autobiography that he entered the Kuybyshev school in the fall of 1942 rather than the fall of 1941. NOSENKO also wrote at this time that he transferred to the Leningrad preparatory school and travelled to Baku in the fall of 1943, not 1942.** Describing the reasons for his transfer to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School, NOSENKO explained that the Moscow special naval school was evacuated further to Achinsk in Siberia and that this was farther from home than he wished to go. The Red Star article mentioned above said that the special naval schools were all closed in 1943, however. The special school apparently therefore was not transferred further to Achinsk, but was shut down.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET747. Again to accommodate the added year in Chelyabinsk, NOSENKO said in 1966 that he spent half a year (actually, according to the rest of the story, about three months) in Baku before running away from school back to Moscow in January 1944. In earlier accounts he said he was at the preparatory school there from October 1942 until January 1944. Earlier he had also given expansive and charging accounts of his escape from school to join the Soviet front against the Germans at Tuapse; now he admitted that this was a lie. By cutting the time he was in Baku from 15 months to about three, NOSENKO also admitted implicitly that his accounts of the basic training he received in the preparatory school, of the summer he spent working at the school rather than returning to Moscow on vacation, and of his "certainty" that he celebrated his 15th birthday in Baku were also false.NOSENKO has been relatively consistent in recounting the events of 1944. In 1964, 1965 and again in 1966 he told of studying as an "external" student in Moscow to complete his ninth year of schooling and of rejoining his classmates from Baku when the naval preparatory school returned to Leningrad in the autumn of 1944. On several occasions during 1964 and 1965, NOSENKO described how he and his classmates spent October and November 1944 working in the woods near Leningrad before beginning their tenth grade studies late in the year; he omitted this account from his April 1966 autobiography.NOSENKO's account of the next years is similarly marked with a number of inconsistencies and falsehoods. (In the latter category he has claimed and later admitted as untrue that he attended the Frunze Naval Academy from 1943 to 1944, that he was on active military duty until being demobilized in 1945, and that he was shot in the hand by a jealous young naval officer in 1945.) According to the account given under interrogation in April 1964, NOSENKO was shot in the hand at a party in the end of April 1945, was hospitalized, resigned from the preparatory school, and received a certificate of satisfactory completion of the tenth grade, although he had been in school only since November 1944. In 1965 and 1966 NOSENKO said, respectively, that he was shot by a naval officer in February or March 1945 and that he shot himself in "early" 1945; since the 1964 interrogations he has claimed only that he received a statement of the courses he had attended at the preparatory school and that he completed the tenth grade at the Shipbuilding Tekhnikum in Leningrad.The earliest collateral information specifically concerning NOSENKO's educational background appears to relate to the general period described above.the Soviet Navy defector ARTAMONOV said he attended a naval preparatory school with NOSENKO during the period 1944 to 1946. ARTAMONOV, after NOSENKO's defection was publicized, said he had known a son of the Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in Leningrad from 1944 to 1946. He was then shown a picture of NOSENKO and confirmed this was the man. However, according to NOSENKO's statements, NOSENKO would have been about twoTOP SECRET
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743. classes behind ART/NOV, and would have been at the schoolfor only about two months. It is conceivable that the presenceof the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding would be widely knownin the school and later remembered, but so would that son'sself-inflicted wound and disappearance, which ARTAMO:NOV has notmentioned. It is unlikely, moreover, that ARTAMONOV could (20years later) reliably recognize a photo of a person who had beenthere such a short time and not in ARTAIONOV's class. (NOSEIKOclaims not to have known ARTAMO:IOV nor to recognize the name.)In all accounts, including his 1962 statements, NOSENKOhas said that he entered the Institute of International Rela-tions in Moscow in 1945. His descriptions of courses, eventsand friends are as vague and unsubstantial as his accounts ofhis earlier schooling. He has given various dates for hisgraduation and has explained that he did so to cover up thefact that he failed his final examination in the subject of"Marxism-Leninism, " of which he was ashamed. t:OSENKO inost re-cently claimed that he received his diploma in the end of thesummer of 1950.c. RemarksNOSENKO's own admissions, as well as the small amount ofcollateral information available, make it clear that much of hisaccount of his education has been false. The reasons for thisare not at all clear and perhaps, in fact, there is no logicalexplanation. The CIA psychologist who tested and questionedNOSENKO atout his youth suggested that, under conditions ofinterrogation, he may lie for no other reason other than hisneed to save face. This view is an accurate description ofNOSENKO's behavior when questioned in detail on this and otheraspects of his pre-KGB life; it is not so with regard to ques-tioning on his intelligence career. Nor does the psychologist'sview appear to explain why NOSENKO forgot or was unwilling totell CIA about an entire year of his life, particularly such asignificant one, after consistently and apparently accurately(judging from the Soviet press accounts of the Minister'sactivities) describing the years preceding it. It is notapparent why NOSENKO originally volunteered the story of histravel to Baku in the fall of 1942, when this was untrue, orwhy he said that the Moscow Special Naval School was evacuatedto Achinsk in 1943, when he must be aware that the school wasclosed, if he was there.** The possibility that NOSENKO is not the person he claims  to be (and with a completely false life history, or one  lived by someone else) has been examined carefully, but  no clear conclusion can be drawn on the basis of available  evidence.TOP SECRET
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749. F. Appraisals of NOSENKO, his Motivation, and Other Opera-tional Circumstances1. IntroductionAppraisals of NOSENKO the man and of his motivationsmust be founded, as with any source, on factors which areoften immeasureable, but fewer reservations need be attachedto an appraisal of the other circumstances affecting thecourse of events in Geneva in 1962 and 1964. These opera-tional circumstances can be analyzed and evaluated in muchthe same manner as were NOSENKO's production, sourcing, andbiography for they are tangible pieces of evidence. In thenext portions of this paper are presented these appraisals,which draw chiefly upon Pages 603-641 (for NOSENKO the man),Pages 20-29 (for his motivations), and Pages 11-19 and 30-43 (for the operational circumstances).2. NOSENKOThe CIA specialists who assessed NOSENKO found him tobe of above-average intelligence, one of them saying that"his effective intelligence is more cleverness than intel-lectuality, more shrewdness than efficiency." He is capableof good memory and, as illustrated by *bis repeating certainfacts in the same sequence, capable of what appears to begood memorization of details*. On the other hand, there werenumerous internal contradictions in NOSENKO's recountingsof various events, he himself claimed an odd or poor memory,and he was the oxceptional defector by having been totallydebriefed within a relatively short period.Parts VIII. D. and VIII.E. discuss NOSENKO's truthfulnesswith reference to his Soviet Intelligence and personalbackgrounds. Here may be added other observations by theCIA specialists: NOSENKO can exercise deception cleverly,he improvised and was evasive under interrogation, and hehas a "remarkable" disregard for the truth where it serveshis purposes. The results of the polygraph examination werethat NOSENKO "attempted deliberate deception."The gaps and errors in, NOSENKO's testimony thereforedo not seem attributable to low intelligence or to consis-tently poor memory, but to a conscious attempt to misleadAmerican Intelligence. Independently, then, this conclusionraises the questions of whether NOSENKO was dispatched bythe KGB and if so, why he was chosen. Regarding the latterpoint, it is noted that a CIA psychiatrist observed: "Thisman is capable of playing a role and playing it effectively,"and that a CIA psychologist stated: "From a distance NO-SENKO looks very good (to his KGB superiors) as a possiblepenetration agent, but close up he leaves much to be desired."It was "close up," in the CIA debriefings and interrogations,that NOSENKO displayed an inability to explain the gaps anderrors in his reporting.TOP SECRET
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## 3. MotivationPart of one's motivation for such a drastic act as treason or defection may not be wholly conscious, and there may be underlying causes which any source aight not want or be able to admit even to himself. Thus, what NOSENKO said about motivation need not be taken at face value, and for this reason the whole question of his motivation must remain a minor weight in the overall assessment of *bona fides*.NOSENKO has tried to present a meaningful explacation and has changed or adjusted his story to this end. He initially insisted that he had no ideological motives but simply wanted to "make a deal" in order to get out of trouble; yet this claim is open to question: The amount of operational money which NOSENKO needed to replace was hardly enough to have driven him to treason, especially since there were friends in Geneva like GUK and KISLOV who might have helped him make up his loss. Furthermore, only two days after CIA had rescued him with the funds. NOSENKO spent the CIA moncy in another drunken debauchery (with the same companion) and came back needing more. The discre- pancy between the degree of the need and the scriousness of the act was so evident that the CIA case officer commented to NOSENKO at the outset that there must be some deeper explanation for his act. Thereupon NOSENKO added new reasons: His distaste for certain aspects of the regize, his resentment of KHRUSHCHEV, and his liking for Americans.By his defection ic 1964 NOSENKO changed the course of his life, although he had said in 1962, forcefully and unequivocally, that he would never do so unless in acute danger. In 1964 he could give no coherent explanation for the change of heart and in October 1966 he denied, for the first time, that he had said in 1962 that he would not de- fect. His only motivation was that, having risen to the level of Deputy Department Chief, he would not get to travel abroad any more. (This contradicts NOSENKO's 1962 state- ments: anticipating imminent promotion to Deputy Department Chief, he said that he would leave the USSR at least once a year in the future.) For no visible reason NOSENKO seems to have abandoned a purportedly successful and promising career, an undisturbed family life and children of shom he was fond, cast shame on his father's menory and his re- maining relatives, and departed forever from his our country.His own unease concerning his motivation evidently con- tinued until, in 1965, he wrote one cohesive explacation. No part of this statement was ever borne out by his conduct, attitudes, remarks or reactions. He appeared, wherever his reactions seemed spontaneous, to dislike the United States, to have no interest in it politically, culturally, or scenically, and to preserve a preference for the USSR. A CIA graphologist commented on NOSENKO's "strong emotional ties to his traditional background," while a CIA psycholo- gist reported: "Emotionally he has not defected in spite of his attempt to intellectually rationalize that he has." The psychologist also said that it is "almost impossible to determine his true loyaltics and true beliefs."
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751. 4. Operational Circumstancesa. Presence in Geneva (1962)When he came to Geneva in mid-March 1962 NOSENKOwas a newly appointed Section Chief in the KGB Second ChiefDirectorate, having held this position for two months.He himself acknowledged to CIA that it appeared strangefor the KGB to send a new Section Chief on an extended tripabroad unconnected with his own work. His reasons for beingin Geneva have varied and to some degree contradict oneanother: The Disarmament Conference was not expected tolast more than "a few weeks," but NOSENKO did not begin hiswork against SHAKHOV (one of the main reasons for his beingthere) until six weeks after arrival: GRIBANOV played arole in his TDY, but NOSENKO later denied this; there werein 1962 "new rules" requiring a staff officer to accompanya Soviet delegation, but in 1965 KOSENKO said he did notremember such regulations. He was permitted to go to Genevain 1962 and 1964, as well as to Cuba in 1960 and Englandin 1957 and 1958, under no supervision or restraint despitehis claim to a record so bad that he was not cleared by theKGB for permanent posting to Ethiopia in 1960.b. Presence in Geneva (1964)NOSENKO said on one occasion that GRIBANOV was one ofthose who allowed him to come to Geneva in January 1964,as a personal favor; he later not only denied this but saidin 1965 that GRIBANOV knew nothing about the TDY. He re-ported the 1964 TDY might, because of his new position,be his last trip to the West, hence the "favor" of hissuperiors to permit him this last trip; in 1962 NOSENKOsaid he had the assurance that as Deputy Department Chief(which he knew he was about to become) he would in the futurecome to the West at least once a year. Also, NOSENKO couldnot explain why a First Deputy Department Chief, if allowedout of the USSR as a "treat," would go abroad for a conferencewhich could be expected to last many weeks, probably months.This question is compounded by the fact that NOSENKO wouldbe needed in Moscow: He said that a KGB conference to planthe handling of the tourist season was to be held at aboutthis time, and he stuck to this story even after admittingthat the telegram recalling him for this Moscow conferencewas an invention (see below).c. Access to KGB Residency and Availability to CIANOSENKO in 1962 routinely visited the KGB Legal Resi-dency in Geneva every weekday morning, although he claimedthat he had no reason and that it is normally forbidden (asother sources have confirmed).** When asked how and why hecited GRIBANOV's personal authorization of NOSENKO'Strip in the face of derogatory information as one cause ofGRIBANOV's dismissal.**NOSENKO said he did not visit the KGB Legal Residency inLondon more than once during his visits there in a similarcapacity in 1957 and 1958, nor during his trip to Cuba in1960.TOP SECRET
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752. did so in Geneva, NOSENKO has given different answers at different times. His stories of simply "dropping in and hanging around" for lack of anything better to do are unacceptable in terms of known or likely Soviet practice. His explanation that it was due to TSYMBAL's auspices or or intervention were contradicted by: First, his own confused accounts of his relationship with TSYMBAL; and second, his own statements at other times that it was GUK who was primarily responsible for NOSENKO's visits to the Residency.NOSENKO had a full day free for meetings on 11 June 1962, although thereafter he limited meeting times to shorter and shorter periods until his departure. This seemed natural at the time since he would presumably have his own responsibilities and would need to be seen by his Soviet colleagues in his proper surroundings. However, in 1964 he seemed not to have any official responsibilities or any calls on his time: He was willing to spend all his time in meetings with CIA. Although this could be explained by the fact that he planned to defect anyway, it nevertheless would have involved unnecessary risks to a genuine source about to become a defector. Ho showed no concern at the time, but later (in 1966), he said that he had been in fact afraid; it was for this reason that he invented the Moscow recall telegram, in order to hasten his defection and put an end to his fears of getting caught. It is, of course, impossible to make conclusive judgments on Soviet practice, but one would expect, if NOSENKO were not engaged in security duties, that he would be required to participate for cover reasons in more of the Soviet delegation's official activity. He said that any absence could be explained as "security duties," since everyone on the Soviet Delegation knew or suspected that he was a KGB officer. This unconcern for the suspicions of other Soviets conforms neither with observed Soviet practice nor with reports from other sources that Soviet intelligence and security officers under cover go to some pains to hide their true affiliation.NOSENKO explained the contrast between his freedom and availability in 1964 and his limited free time in 1962 by the fact that in 1964 he had no personal friends in Geneva; in 1962 both GUK and KISLOV expected to see him in his free time. (This story does not explain his ability in 1964 to get away during conference working hours; neither GUK nor KISLOV affected this in 1962.)d. Timing of 1962 ContactNOSENKO had been in Geneva for three months in 1962 when the incident which brought him to CIA occurred; it was only two weeks before his departure. He came to David MARK only 10 days before leaving. This had the effect of limiting CIA's time with him. NOSENKO'S contact came only about 10 days after CIA had completed, in the same city, a series of meetings with BELITSKIY, a Soviet interpreter who had been recruited and handled as an agent by CIA during earlier visits to the West. NOSENKO, as one of the two primary items he wanted to "sell" revealed that BELITSKIY had been under KGB control from the outset (Page 517).TOP SECRET
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# 753.e. Willingness to Meet CIAAlthough in 1962 NOSENKO claimed that he wanted to sell only two specific items for the money he had lost, and then disappear, there were indications from the outset that he expected and planned to come back for further meetings with CIA. At this first meeting he called attention to certain information in his possession about POPOV, hinting that he would tell it later; even as he protested his unwilling- ness to continue meeting with CIA, he was giving ample details about himself which would inevitably have compro- mised him to CIA and forced his future collaboration. Before he finally agreed to return for more meetings, he said: "Maybe I'll meet you again Monday" (two days after the first meeting). NOSENKO refused, despite repeated inducements, to meet on the intervening Sunday. In fact, when he did return on Monday, he said that he had spent Sunday with friends, drinking and "discussing recent USSR foreign policy moves and speeches by KEROSECHEV."f. The Recall TelegramNOSENKO'S confession that he fabricated the story of his having been urgently recalled to Moscow by a telegram leaves only two possible interpretations:- There was a telegram, but NOSENKO's mind has slipped and he is no longer able to distinguish between fact and fancy. This, however, is not borne out by his general conduct nor his performance under interro- gation in 1966.- There was, in fact, no telegram. (This is borne out by Special Intellicence.) Thus, the invention was not NOSENKO's but the KGB's; the KGB briefed NOSENKO to report to CIA that a telegram was sent; and NCSENKO made an error in later admitting that it was not.g. RemarksThe operational circumstances so far reviewed point out the facts that:- NOSENKO was inconsistent if not contradictory in stating his reasons for being in Geneva in 1962 and 1964;- He had unusual access to the KGE Legal Residency and an availability for meeting CIA that seemed to impinge upon his security;- He was willing to return to meetings with CIA al- though having at first said that there were but two items of information for sale;- He was "in place" as a CIA source for the last six of his 100 or so days in Geneva in 1962, thus restricting the amount of time he could provide continu- ing reporting on the local Legal Residency; and- After 12 days in the same status in 1964, he forced the defection by the KGB recall telegram, which appears to have been a fabrication.TOP SECRET