Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 81]
TOP682. (1) If his story of his personal life is true NOSENKO would, according to all available information, not have been accepted into the naval GRU, one of the particularly sensitive parts of the navy. Either the life history is false, or the GRJ officer service is, or both.(2) The story is vague, unsubstantial, and contradictory; no substance has been added to the base outlines of the story despite frequent questioning. One might expec of an educated or reasonably intelligent person some recollection of military service completed 10 years earlier--the locations where he served, whether he did or did not have TB, how and when he entered or transferred from one place to another, and what he did or what he experienced.(3) NOSENKO's knowledge of military procedures, of the navy, and of the units with which he served is practically non-existent. He has provided no reason whatever to make one believe that he actually was a naval officer.(4) The functions he claims to have fuifilled involved no direct involvement or personal responsibilities: They sound like the bare outlines of a legend, not like real life or personal experience.That this period is fictitious is supported by the findings of the psychologist (Pages 605-611).NOSE KO's description of his naval GPU service cannot be accepted as true. On the basis of his statements, it appears moreover that he was never a naval officer, nor an officer of any other regular military service.Since NOSENKO claims that his GFU status and service provided him the platform for a transfer into the KGB (without such formalities as medical examination, personnel interviews or questionnaires), this conclusion is relevant to his claim of KGB staff status from 1952 or 1953.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 84]
# TOP685. In 1962 NOSENKO described the simple procedure by which he entered the KGB, volunteering that there was no need to fill out a questionnaire (*arketa*) as the KGB already had his files from the GRU. In April 1964 when asked if he had not been required to fill out any questionnaires or other documents, NOSENKO described the *anketa* and other forms he completed (saying he took them home to do so) and his various interviews with KGB personnel officers. He was interrogated in detail on these claims by DERYABIN in 1965, to whom he gave descriptions, albeit inaccurate, of the varicus forms and of his visits to KGB Personnel. In 1966 NCSENKO wrote in his autobiography that there were no talks with KGB Personnel before or after his acceptance and implied that there were no forms to fill out.d. RemarksAccording to all of NOSENKO's stories, his GRU service was the springboard for his acceptance into the KGB. He met KOBULOV while home in Moscow from Primorsk/Sovetsk, he entered the KGB as a lieutenant since this was his naval rank, his admission according to the early version was facilitated by the availability of his GRU personnel file; yet CIA has concluded that NOSENKO was never a GRU officer and it appears highly improbable that he waa ever in Primorsk under any circumstances.On the basis of generally available information concerning Soviet realities at the time of NOSENKO's claimed entry into the YGB, supported by the expert testimony of DERYABIN (who was in the KGB, then MVD, in Moscow at the time and hed been himself a KGB personnel officer until less than a year earlier), a person with the background NOSENKO has given could not be accepted into the KGB in the manner he claims. His health alone would seem to have precluded this, but in addition, NOSENKO descrited a series of incidents in his life equally likely to cause rejection. NOSENKO's mistakes, changes of story, and apparent fabrications add to the unlikelihood of his account.It is concluded that, as in the case of NOSENKO's GRU service, either NOSENKO and those who have supported aspects of his story have seriously distorted his past life, or he did not enter the KGB.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 85]
# TOP S686. 4. Initial Service in the U.S. Embassy Sectiona. IntroductionNOSENKO claims to have served in the U.S. Erabassy Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, during the period from his entry on duty with the KGB until June 1955. His targets during these two years were at first American correspond-ents in Moscow and later American Army Attaches at the Embassy.NOSENKO sought to avoid discussion of his own or other KGB activity during this period and on occasion he has tried to dis-miss the whole period as "not relevant" and "of no consequence." NOSENKO has repeatedly said that he "found himself" only after his initial service in the U.S. Embassy Section. (He variously dated his self-discovery as occurring in 1955, when he transferred to the Tourist Department; in June 1956, in connection with his par-ticipation in and award for the BURGI case; and after August 1956, when the death of his father forced him to pull himself together.) Before this, NOSENKO said, he was a wastrel and "did not pay attention to the work."b. Work Against American CorrespondentsNOSENKO exempted himself from reporting details of KGB work against any specific American correspondent in Moscow in 1953-1954 (Pages 93-96) by saying that, as a new, very junior employee he had no access to operational files and did not participate personally in the handling of any of the correspondents. Although able to identify four correspondents in Moscow who were then re-cruited KGB agents, NOSENKO learned this information either in conversations with his superior KOZLOV or at some point and in some undefined way after he no longer was working against these targets. NOSENKO's early months in the job were spent reading personality (not operational) files on a number of the corres-pondents in Moscow (none of which indicated the individual's de-velopmental or agent status) and familiarizing himself with KGB methods. Later NOSENKO was assigned the "agent network" of drivers, clerical personnel, and domestics surrounding four of the correspondents (two of whom were recruited G5 agents at the time); he met with them periodically to determine whether they had, developed any important information. Even here, however, NOSENKO appears to have been given very little responsibility: His superior KOZLOV often went along to the meetings with NCSENKO, first to show him how to handle the agents and afterward when-ever something interesting would begin to develop. In fact, according to NOSENKO, KOZLOV would accompany him to meetings with these Soviet citizens-agents even when there was a "hint" that something of interest might develop. NOSENKO has been able to identify some of these agents, but for all but a few he re-called neither their names nor personalia concerning them.c. Work Against Army AttachesRegarding NOSENKO's work against American Army Attaches, he claimed a specific area of KGB responsibility, one for which he alone was accountable and one about which something was previously known from U.S. records. Only 20 months at the longest, it isTOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 86]
# 687.the last period in which NOSENKO had no supervisory responsibility to divert his attention from personal operational duties.NOSENKO could not remember when he took over responsibility for the Army Attaches, and he named two other KGB officers before settling upon BUDYLDIN as the person from whom he received the Attaches' files. When belittling his earlier responsibilities for correspondents, he has said several times that he had been in that job "only about six months." Assuming that NOSENKO entered the KGB in the middle of March 1953, this would date his transfer to work against the Attaches in the fall of that year. In discussing this transfer itself, however, NOSENKO has consistently said that it took place in 1954. Asked when in 1954, NOSEΝΚΟ has variously replied "at the beginning of 1954," January 1954, and May 1954. Under interrogation in early 1965, NOSENKO refused to estimate when he took over this responsibility. He has always said that he turned over these duties and transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section in June 1955, when the Tourist Department was established within the Second Chief Directorate.NOSENKO has said in different contexts that as the American Department case officer responsible for operations against the U.S. Army Attaches he received and was responsible for assimilating the product of a wide variety of sources on the individuals who were his targets. He has mentioned information received from the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate; the Archives of the MGB/MVD/KGB; microphones which were emplaced about a year before NOSENKO entered the American Department*; a network of Soviet chauffeurs, cooks, language instructors, and other agents in the Embassy who together provided little useful information; permanent and roving surveillance patrois outside the Embassy; fixed observation posts next to, across from and near the Embassy; advance notification of intent to travel by the Attaches and their itineraries; and reports from outside Moscow, including surveillance, agent networks, the Militia, and the military. The point of collecting and assimilating this information, NOSENKO said, was to be able to know what the Attaches vere doing in Moscow and thereby to control their intelligence collection activities. Far less important was the goal of recruiting Military Attaches; NOSENKO knew of only several instances when this was attempted, and all of these efforts failed.The KGB's principal interest in control rather than recruitment has been NOSENKO's explanation for knowing little about the backgrounds and personal lives of his targets--such information, he stated, simply was not pertinent to the primary mission of[^1] On some occasions NOSENKO has said that the microphones in the Army Attache offices were his most valuable source of information on his targets of 1954-1955; at other times he has said that he knew nothing of these microphones until he reentered the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960; and at still other times he claimed to have known only of their existence during 1953-1955 but not where any were located.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 87]
688. control.. He has also used this explanation to support his claim that there were no recruitments of military attaches during this period.An exception, wherein the KGB did carefully compile a great deal of vulnerability data on an Army Attache, was described by NOSENKO in connection with the approach to Walter MULE (Page 104). On the basis of these expianations, NOSENKO's knowledge of the official and unofficial activities of his alleged targets in this period deserves attention.NOSENKO knew almost nothing about the personal backgrounds and families of the eight members of the Army Attache Office whom he identified as his targets (Pages 99-106). Although he was able to identify each by rank and position in the Embassy--some- times inaccurately--and in a few cases to describe certain of their operational activities, he was unaware of or had forgotten such facts as:- Colonel Earl L. MICKELSON, the Army Attache in 1954 and 1955, was arrested twice by the Militia outside of Mos- cow in 1954.- Assistant Army Attache Ira RICHARDS was a language student of GROMOKOVA (identified by NOSENKO as a KGB agent); by RICHARDS' account she sought to elicit biographic data from him during the lessons.- William STROUD, the Assistant Army Attache, travelled to Kharkov in May 1955 to interivew an American defector. (NOSENKO has identified Frank SISCOE, who accompanied STROUD, as a suspected CIA officer; he was coopted by CIA.)NOSENKO, furthermore, was ignorant of important events, known independently to CIA, which were within the sphere of what he claimed was his direct, personal responsibility:- NOSENKO claimed direct personal responsibility for the file of and operational activity against Lieutenant Colonel Howard FELCHLIN (Pages 101-103). He claimed to be receiving agent information on him but could not recall the names or cryptonyms of any such agents. Ce said, for example: "I think FELCHLIN must have had a maid, and she would have been a KGB agent.") NOSENKO described FELCHLIN as by far the most aggressive of his targets and hence the object of special interest; yet he did not know or rememberNOSENKO himself, when giving the reason why he did not know more details about the U.S. Embassy Section's targets while he was its Deputy Chief in 1960-1961, said that as a supervisor he was too busy overseeing subordinates; hence, NOSENKO con- tinued, he could not be expected to remember as many such de- tails as would be possible had he been a case officer working daily with only four or five files. In another context, NOSENKO explained why he was unable to supply the details of planning and organizing operations against tourists in the period 1955- 1959; he contrasted operations against tourists, who often came and went in a matter of a few days, to the work against the Military Attaches and diplomats stationed in Moscow on permanent assignments, who could be studied systematically and slowly.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 90]
691. few new details of importance on the American correspondents, NOSENKO has proven unreliable regarding his work against Army Attaches: He misidentified two (YEAGER and VAN LAETHEM), he claimed to have almost no information on the backgrounds and activities of the others, and he lacked even the most important details on security affairs involving the majority of his eight alleged targets. In addition, NOSENKO has told CIA almost nothing about the work of his colleagues in the U.S. Embassy Section.The statements by NOSENKO about this period therefore hold so little substance and the manner of his reporting was so unconvincing, that his claim to have been an officer of the U.S. Embassy Section in the years 1953-1955 cannot be true.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 92]
693. personally spoke to him. NOSENKO explained his (unconfirmed) participation in this case, which was not among the responsibilities of his section, by saying there was no KGB officer available who spoke German but was known to speak "a little English," a language in which NOSENKO had fair fluency. In 1957 NOSENKO was also involved in the sexual and blackmarket entrapment of Norwegian journalist (again, not a target of NOSENKO's section, being neither American, British or Canadian): NOSENKO has not explained how he came to be involved in this operation, but he said his role was that of involving with women and blackmarketeers so that another officer, ARKHIPOV, could recruit him. has not identified NOSENKO, but reported on an individual whose role corresponds to the one NOSENKO claimed as his own (Pages 121-122). NOSENKO's third operation in 1957 was really not an operation at all. he was assigned to accompany the British and the latter's interpreter on a tour of Soviet publishing houses (Page 121). NOSENKO said his purpose was only to watch a suspected intelligence agent or officer. His presence was confirmed by who recognized NOSENKO's photograph.This is the sum of NOSENKO's reported, sometimes verified, operational role during the three years preceding his promotion in June 1958 to the position of Deputy Chief of the American-Canadian-British Tourist Section, hereafter referred to as the American Tourist Section.The only case of the June 1955-June 1958 period resulting in agent contacts abroad, and the one to which NOSENKO ascribed the greatest importance, was the recruitment of BURGI. For this reason, the BURGI operation is discussed in detail below, with particular attention being given to those aspects of the case which reflect upon NOSENKO's own personal role.(ii) The BURGI CaseNOSENKO'S statements of this operation generally agreed with that BURGI provided to the FBI in 1957. The part NOSENKO played in the case, both in his brief initial presence with the two homosexuals in the Moscow restaurant on the evening of BURGI'S compromise (20 June 1956) and in the Kiev events (23-28 June 1956) would appear to be one normally taken by a KGB staff officer. The identities of the other two KGb participants in the Kiev recruitment, KOZLOV and PETRENKO, seem clearly established. There were discrepancies between NOSENKO's and BURGI's versions, but most of these could stem from NOSENKO's faulty memory nine years after the events. (Such discrepancies include NOSENKO's failure to remember his first Moscow meetings with BURGI: the identity, role, or even existence of the person "Anatoliy" whom BURGI says introduced him to NOSENKO and participated in the homosexual compromise; whether NOSENKO was at the Kiev airport to meet BURGI; the location of NOSENKO's bedroom in the Kiev Hotel as compared to BURGI's; NOSENKO's reference to BURGI's "interpreter" when in fact BURGI neither had nor needed one; and NOSENKO's failure to remember the unusual circumstances of BURGI's departure from Kiev.) Other contradictions and omissions in NOSENKO's reporting relate to matters of greater operational consequence:TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 93]
# TOP SE694. - NOSENKO was unable to say when or how the KGB first learned that BURGI was a homosexual, nor could he remember who first proposed an operation against him.- NOSENKO gave a confused and evasive account of his dealings with the First Chief Directorate on this case.- NOSENKO insisted that there was no official file on BURGI, and that none was opened as a result of this opera- tion. The initiative for the operation came, he said, from the Second Chief Directorate, and when NOSENKO traced BURGI in the First Chief Directorate, there was no information on him there. The KGB's only information on BURGI at the time of the compromise came from BURGI's visa application (which showed him to be a professor of Russian) and a few agent reports from the preceding days in Moscow: BURGI, on the other hand, reported that during the recruitment KOZLOV, the senior Soviet present, showed knowledge of the names of BURGI's sister, mother and father and knew the sister's occupation; details of BURGI's background, work, and military service, BURGI's relations with the Russicum in Pome, which BURGI said he had never mentioned in the USSR; and BURGI's acquaintance in the U.S. with Alexander KERENSKY.NOSENKO cited "his" recruitment of BURGI in Kiev in 1956 as one of the main reasons for his rapid rise in the KGB. BURGI'S story of the recruitment, as reported to the FBI, definitely establishes NOSENKO's role as having been subordinate to that of KOZLCV--it was KOZLOV, not NOSENKO, who made the recruitment.DERYABIN interrogated NOSENKO on this case. NOSENKO's answers to such detailed questions as how the traces were done, how the travel to Kiev was arranged, details concerning the person- nel involved, the contents of the file, and other mechanics of the case, betrayed an almost total lack of memory.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 94]
# U. ECRET695. c. Promotion to Deputy Chief of SectionNOSENKO said that in June 1958, when the unit that had formerly handled tourists from all countries was reorganized into two sections, he was promoted from the rank of senior case officer to that of Deputy Chief of the newly created American Tourist Section. NOSENKO said that this section was the most important in the Tourist Department, and that he did not know why he, in particular, had been chosen its Deputy Chief but was certain that GRIBANOV had no voice in the decision.d. Knowledge of Section's Staff and Agent PersonnelNOSENKO has named with clarity and consistency the other officers of the American Tourist Section during this period. The Soviet agents of his section whom NOSENKO has identified were mostly his own; he said that the agents were constantly shifted from case officer to case officer and hence it was "difficult to say just who handled which agents." NOSENKO said he had approximately eight Soviet agents in 1958 and about 12 or 14 in 1959, most of them employed by Inturist (Pages 109-112). With the exception of the two homosexuals, YEFREMOV and VOLKOV discussed separately below, NOSENKO cannot supply personal data on his own agents or remember specific jobs they did for the KGB.e. Knowledge of Section's ActivitiesAs of June 1958, according to NCSENKO, the work of the section of which he was deputy chief was "just getting going." Its mission was, first of all, to detect Western Intelligence officers and agents among the increasing flow of tourists visiting the Soviet Union; only secondarily was the section directed toward the recruitment of KGB agents from among these tourists. In his new position NOSENKO was responsible for supervising other officers in the section in efforts along these lines. Because of this and because at GRIBANOV's request he personally reviewed KGB information on the use of tourist cover by Western intelligence services and KGB counteraction through 1958 (Pages 145-146), NOSENKO made a number of statements concerning these subjects during the 1955-1959 period.CIA started its so-called "legal travelle." program in 1955 and by 1958 was deeply committed to such operations. Now there is firm collateral information on what the KGB knew of this operational program. In view of NOSENKO's duties in the American Tourist Section and the section's prime mission, he should have knowledge of agent compromises during 1958 and 1959. Moreover, thanks to collateral holdings, what NOSENKO did and did not know can be compared with information from other sources. These facts are reviewed below.(1) BLAKEA valuable source of information for the KGB in its planning for the operational activity of its Tourist Department in the late 1950's and early 1960's was the Englishman, George BLAKE (Pages 146-147). BLAKE has confessed that in the summer of 1959 he passed the KGB a 19-page summary of the results of a three-day meeting during the first week of June 1959, between representatives of CIA and MI-6; these sessions were on the subject of "legal travel" intelligence operations against the USSR. ThisTOP SECRET