Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 48]
# TOP SECRET650. In addition, a number of Americans--e.g., Walter RASK, Adam BROCHES, Henry APISSON, Herbert HOWARD, Vasiliy VOLKOV, William WALLACE, Thomas Whitney, and Stanley ZIRING--denied having been recruited by the KGB, as NOSENKO said they had been.The only noteworthy internal inconsistencies in NOSENKO'S reporting on KGB operations involving Americans appear in the HARMSTONE case, where he has given conflicting information on the KGB's ability to obtain photographic evidence of his homosexuality, and in his advice on how to identify "ANDREY"--that he was the only witness to testify in Roy RHODES' trial and that he did not testify at Roy RHODES' trial but was only interviewed in the pre-trial investigation once. Part VIII.D. covers the extent of his knowledge about American cases in which he took part personally or as a supervisor. Regarding others to which his official positions did not give him access, NOSENKO has indicated that it was his personal contact with KGB colleagues which enabled him to report on nine recruitments (Herbert HOWARD, Sam JAFFE, the KGB agent in France, the YOUNGER couple, "SASHA", and two unnamed agents in Geneva), three development cases (George VAN LAETHEM, Attorney General Robert KENNEDY, and Stephen HOFFMAN); three unsuccessful recruitment approaches (Richard HARMSTONE, Peter BINDER, and Collette SCHWARZENBACH); and three investigations (Thomas BARTHE-LEMY, Lewis BONDEN, and George WINTERS). NOSENKO's alleged associates in the KGB thus gave him the names of four recruited agents and sufficient details for one more to be identified by subsequent investigation, JOHNSON. All of the NOSENKO leads to developmental operations, unsuccessful recruitment approaches, and investigations have been identified.(11) Damage to the SovietsThree criteria can be used in assessing the harm to Soviet interests caused by NOSENKO's operational leads to Americans:First, the originality of his information on recruited agents and unsuccessful recruitment approaches;Second, the agents' access to classified information at the time he reported on them; andThird, the possibility of identifying them on the basis of the details provided or in comiition with details received from other sources.There is no reason to believe that NOSENKO's information on 22 Americans under investigation while in the USSR could have damaged the KGB, especially since all of them had left the Soviet Union before the NOSENKO leads were received (Pages 402-410). In an-other-category, NOSENKO's leads to 35. Americans under development (Pages 379-397), there is no means for evaluating their importance to the KGB because it is impossible to estimate with confidence the likelihood of the KGB recruiting some or any of these targets; vulnerability and assessment data, when coupled with spasmodic or even continuing KGB access to the target, would be no guarantee that he is recruitable. Nevertheless, following the criteria listed above, NOSE..KO's statements on KGB operational interest stemming from their homosexuality did bring about the recall of Robert ARMSTRONG and Stephen HOFFMAN from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 50]
# TOP SECRET652. threesome as difficult handling problems. Given these apparentfactors, the NOSENKO lead may have been considered expendable bythe KGB, without long-lasting adverse effect on the fulfillmentof its overall intelligence requirements.NOSENKO was the first source to identify James STORSBERG, aU.S. military code clerk stationed at the Moscow Embassy, as atarget who had rejected the KGB's recruitment offer (Pages 165-185). The information was received from NOSENKO after STORSBERGwas discharged from the U.S. Army, and when interviewed on thebasis of this information, STORSBERG generally confirmed NCSENKO'Sreporting on the case. GOLITSYN had earlier reported on what mayhave been the same KGB operation, but GOLITSY. believed the mili-tary code clerk had been recruited; from what GOLITSYN had pre-viously told CIA and from later investigations, it seems possiblethat the KGB recruited either STORSBERG or William HURLEY (whoNOSENKO said was not recruited or approached by the KG3). If itis assumed that STORSBERG was not recruited in the approach de-scribed by NOSENKO and in the operation discussed by GOLITSYN,the KGB suffered no loss in the American services learning ofthis case. If it is assumed on the other hand that STORSBERG orHURLEY was recruited, the reporting by NOSENKO assisted the KGB--not the American services--by deflecting security investigationsfrom a recruited agent of the KGB.### (iii) Importance or UsefulnessThe American leads from NOSENKO enabled U.S. security author-ities to:*   Confirm previous information on the recruitments of    13 tourists and three correspondents;*   Verify previous derogatory information on 11 tourists,    two correspondents, and perhaps one military code clerk,    STORSBERG;*   Remove two homosexuals from the U.S. Embassy in    Moscow; and*   Identify 32 KGB agents including Hedwig JOHNSON and    MINTKENBAUGH.*One or possibly two of these 32 agents (SMITH and possibly HOWARD)in the past had been in a position to pass classified informationto the KGB, and a third (JOHNSON) had current access to classifiedinformation and current contact with the KGB; the two homosexualsat the Moscow Embassy (APMSTRONG and HOFFMAN) presumably also hadaccess to classified information. From the standpoint of pro-tecting the security of the U.S. Government, NOSENKO brought toan end the JOHNSON operation and the KGB's potential for recruit-ing ARMSTRONG and HOFFMAN.Against this product of NOSENKO's reporting must be balancedthe amounts of money and manpower that were needed for U.S. secu-rity authorities to exhaust and investigate NOSENKO's informationon 49 recruitments, 35 developmental targets, seven unsuccessfulrecruitment approaches, ard 33 investigations by the KGB--a totalof 113 operational leads. CIA carried the burden of the debriefing :and interrogation of NOSENKO on these cases, but the investigative[^1] Among these 32 agents were many whom the KGB had not recontactedafter their return to the United States from the Soviet Union,others who had brcken contact with the KGB, some who were known
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 51]
# TOP SECRET653. work in the United States was accomplished mostly by other agencies. It would seem, however, that the JOHNSON operation was the only NOSENKO lead to be important or useful.(1) RemarksJudged by his major inaccuracies and by the demonstrable in- completeness in some of his reporting, NOSENKO is not an authori- tative or reliable source of information on operations against Americans by the U.S. Embassy Section and the American Tourist Section. Proven untrustworthy in other categories of operational leads, there is no reason to accept at face value NOSENKO's state- ment that SMITH was the only Moscow Embassy exployee working with the KGB from 1953 through 1963; indeed, evidence to the contrary exists. The same may be true regarding American tourists and correspondents in Moscow, i.e., other recruitments not mentioned by NOSENKO could have occurred. Furthermore, with the question- able exception of the JOHNSON case, the KGB lost nothing of great value in consequence of NOSENKO's leads but gained an advantage by occupying the attention and facilities of American security authorities.It is therefore concluded that NOSENKO has withhold infor- mation on recruitrents of Americans in Moscow, or he is unable to provide a comprehensive review of such activities because he did not_hold the claimed positions in the U.S. Embassy and American Tourist Sections. Either explanation forces strong reservations about the bona fides of NOSENKO as a genuine scurce, and these reservations are reinforced by the relative costs to the KGB and U.S. security authorities of the NOSENKO leads. By itself, this evaluation of his production on American cases suggests the possi- bility that the KGB dispatched NOSENKO to report to CIA, and that the KGB did so for the purpose of misleading the U.S. security services.TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET654. c. Operatiors Involving Other Westerners(i) IntroductionAs already indicated, NOSENKO's principal knowledgeability of KGB operations is related to Americans in the Soviet Union. With the exception of one German and one Norwegian tourist case, his only other personal participation in third-national (i.e., non- American) operations stems from his association with the section of the Tourist Department concerned with United Kingdom and Canad- ian, as well as American, tourists. Where he has commented on sources for the rest of his third-national leads, he indicated his knowledge was acquired either through conversations with other officers or through his position as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department in 1962-1963. Thus he made no claim for com- pleteness of his coverage, nor necessarily for absolute accuracy and full details on any one case. No attempt will be made here, therefore, to compare his information with other sources, except in terms of whether NOSENKO's reporting harmed the Soviets and assisted American security.(ii) DiscussionOf the 90 third-naticaal recruitment leads (Pages 474-502), 22 have not yet been positively identified. These cannot be evaluated at all except to point out that only two of then are potentially significant, the NATO penetration in Belgium in 1962 (which may be the same as a lead from another source) and a code clerk in the West Cercan Embassy in Moscow in 1962. Without knowing the status of these two operations at the time NOSENKO told CIA about them, it is not possible to measure the value to us or the damage to the Soviet Union through the compromise of these cases.Of the remaining 68 known or possible agents who have been identified, 35 were unique leads when NOSENKO provided them. No conclusive investigation results have yet been obtained on 30 of these, but the majority were said by NOSEIKO to be travel agency employees (guides, bus drivers, etc.). Five of the 30 held positions of trust in their respective governments; these five leads are discussed below in terms of potential value to U.S. security and potential damage to the KGB. Of the five who have been interviewed on the basis of the NOSENKO information, four denied being recruited by the KGB, including (the only one or those interviewed holding a government position), discussed below. Reporting on the one remaining lead, a Dutch woman, is unclear and inconclusive--she admitted only to having been ques- tioned while in the USSR.Among the 35 new leads from NOSENKO, a total of five had positions of trust, with known or presumed access to sensitive information, in their respective governments:NOSENKO said in 1962 that theKGB was working on him when he was in Moscow, but he did not know whether was recruited or not.Told Cid of his contacts in Moscow withSoviets whom he suspected of being intelligence officers, and in 1964 he reported a social visit in Vienna by General GORBUNOV (an operational alias of GRIBANOV), whom
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 53]
TOP SECRET65. he had known in Moscow. He has not been interviewed directly on the basis of the NOSENKO lead, nor has he reported a recruitment approach.FrenchNOSENKO reported that is either an agent or a solid contact"IndianNOSENKO has identified him as a KGB agent, with no other information. Stationed at the Indian Embassy in Moscow from 1947 to 1951.There is no derogatory information on him in CIA files.- Indonesianin Moscow: In 1962 NOSENKO reported that prior to 1960 or 1961 the KGB recruited the.Although NOSENKO had spelled out the name in 1962, in 1964 he could recall no such case but thought this must have been a mistake for the case of who had been the at that time. Aside from the fact that conditions in Indonesia precluded CIA's passing this lead to the Indonesian service for investigation, Indonesia's position until 1966 was that of a semi-satellite of the Communist Bloc, and revelation of such a recruitment in the prevailing situation would have been of no value to the United States nor harm to the Soviet Union.Thus of the third-national leads originating with NOSENKO, five might be considered to be important because of their position in government. In two cases he was not able to say whether there was a recruitment, however, while a third (assuming that there was no further confusion on NOSENKO's part) cannot be considered an important lead because of the Communist bias of the Indonesian Government. position as an agent or contact loses significance in view of his previously reported support of a powerful leftist political figure. The possible importance of the lead cannot be assessed without investigation results.The William VASSALL case (Pages 503-507) was the one third-national lead which NOSENKO himself considered most important. He invariably included this lead when talking about the importance of his reporting. The British security services neverthe-
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 54]
# TOP SECRET656. less were well on their way to identifying the source of the Admiralty documents identified by GOLITSYN, having narrowed their list of suspects to 20 (including VASSALL) by 11 June 1962. When they received the fragment of NOSENKO information which focused on the British Embassy in Moscow, the number was reduced to VASSALL and one other. Although the NOSENKO information apparently confirmed the already solid suspicions of VASSALL, there is reason to believe that the identification would have been accomplished without this information. The lead was therefore not new or exclusive information, and NOSENKO himself admitted in 1964 that he knew that GOLITSYN had known of the case from the latter's work in the Information (Reports) Department.Of the identified third-nationals whom NOSENKO said were being targetted or investigated by the KGB, none held positions of significance, with the sole exception of the then member of the British Parliament, whose personal life and career the Soviets subsequently attempted--with considerable success--to destroy through a campaign of scandal.(iii) RemarksOn the basis of the above examination, NOSINKO's information on KGB operations against third-nationals cannot be considered a positive factor in the assessment of his *bona fides*. As a possible negative factor in consideration of his *bona fides*, the insignificance of NOSENKO's reporting on third-national leads must be measured against the criteria of his claimed access and contrary evidence. In the case of foreign tourists his leads show--and he himself has commented--that such recruitments were of no *particular value*; assuming that NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, he should be able to make such a statement without challenge. To date no independent evidence of foreign tourist recruitments has emerged which contradicts him. Operations against other Western embassies in Moscow are a slightly different matter. NOSENKO'S information, or lack thereof, cannot be evaluated on the basis of completeness because he has made no claim to full access to such information or to positions which would have given him better access. Except for those he said he was informed of in connection with possible use against U.S. Embassy targets, he has usually sourced such third-national leads as he did have to particularly close relations with the responsible case officer. It would not be valid to argue that a source of one lead should have told him of others, or that he should have had more close friends in the KGB. Thus on all applicable criteria, the NOSENKO leads to operations against third-nationals must be excluded as a factor weighing for or against his *bona fides*.# TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET657. 4. Technical Operations Against the U.S. Embassya. DiscussionIn reporting on KGB microphones in the U.S. Embassy (Pages 248-269), NOSENKO said in 1962 that there were at that time "four or five points," later adding a sixth, from which conversations were heard. They included the offices of the Minister Counselor, the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, the Air Attache, one (unidentified) "State Department employee," and the Agricultural Attache. He also referred to a non-productive microphone in the code room but did not count this as one of the points. NOSENKO did not supply details of the information which the KGB obtained from any of these microphones except to make general allusions to the importance of the materials from those in the offices of the Minister Counselor and the Military Attache. He also stressed that the existence of these microphones was the KGB's "biggest secret" and that only a very few people knew of them. NOSENKO gave more details and provided a written list of the offices where microphones were actively monitored in 1960 and 1961.NOSENKO's information on the microphones would appear, on the basis of the findings of the sweep team in 1964, to be generally accurate. Where NOSENKO reported there was no production but microphones were found audible, the discrepancy could be explained by KGB technical failure to receive the intercepts after they left the point at which the sweepers tested, where NOSENKO reported materials were obtained (such as from the Air Attache's office) and the sweepers found the microphone inaudible, it could be conjectured that the microphore died between early 1962 and the date of the sweep in 1964. However, NOSENKO's reporting did not harm the Soviets, because GOLITSYN knew and had probably reported on one specific microphone, and another earlier (and probably compromised) source had also reported that the microphones were there. The microphone known to GOLITSYN, when located and traced back to the point where its wires left the building, would lead to the uncovering of all the other microphones, as in fact happened with the find in Room 1008 (Page 256).NOSENKO was unable to expand on his microphone information after his defection. Questioned repeatedly for details of the operation or examples of the product of those microphones, he gave almost no operational details and could supply only the same three generalized examples of their product which he had already given in 1962: the unproductivity of the code room microphone;*   One of the few concrete incidents which NOSENKO recounted connected to the microphone operation (with the exception of the North Wing planning, see below) was the loss of a document reporting the product from one of the microphones. GOLITSYN had already told the same story (Page 255). GOLITSYN said he was present during the search for this document and it was under these circumstances that he learned specifically that there was a microphone in the office of the Minister Counselor. NOSENKO in 1962 stressed that this microphone was the most important in the Embassy.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET658. The Minister Counselor's dictation, including fitness reports which NOSENKO said were of operational interest to the KGB but could not say how many of them there were or whom they concerned; and the Military Attache's planning of trips which permitted the KGB to seize equipment in Stalingrad in 1955. Of these three examples given by an officer who said he culled all the micro- phone materials for two years, one concerned a non-operating and therefore useless microphone, the second concerned a microphone (in the Minister Counselor's office) already reported by a pre- vious defector, and the third concerned a well known incident which took place years earlier (and which NOSEIKO should have planned and helped corduct, according to his claimed position in 1955; NOSENKO said he played no such role).In 1964 NOSENKO trought to CIA a sheet of paper which he said was in KOVSHUK's handwriting and which had been obtained in 1960 or 1961 during a conference (Pages 250-251). This, he said then, was how he knew of the exact locations of all the actively*   A comparison betweer. NOSENKO's third example and a 1956 message from a sensitive source who is believed to have been compromis- ed to the KGB after that message ibut before 1962) reveals sim- ilarities which may not be coincidental.*   NOSENKO (11 June 1962; see Page 260): "We are listening to your Military Attaches there. We know where they intend to travel, what they want to find out. We know what machin- ery and what targets interest them... Some of the things they say are surprising. They discuss, among other things, where to go, what to see, what to take with them - electric equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic equipment and now have permission, if we are absolutely cer- tain that one of your people is taking electronic apparatus with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to take, to steal it. We now have authorization to take any necessary steps to steal it. Because you now have improved your equip- ment. We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955..."*   Sensitive source, 1956 (see Page 254): "... All rooms are being monitored by the KSB... The 'flap' involving the American direction. finding specialists in Stalingrad in the summer of 1955 as organized by the KGB because conver- sations were overheard in the rooms of the American Embassy. As you know, as a result of this flap, the KGB seized valu- able direction-firding equipment from the American Intelli- gence officers..."It is possible that both NOSENKO and the sensitive source were reporting a well-knom event, because GOLITSYN reported in 1962 that the 1955 Stalingrad incident was written up in KGB training materials as an example of Second Chief Directorate work. The training version may have included the role of the microphone information (although GOLITSIN did not report that it did), which may thus have come naturally to the attention of NOSENKO and the sensitive source. However, this would call into question NUSENKO's allegation of direct access to all of the microphone product.TOP SECRET