Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 153]
754. Taken together, these facts suggest the possibilities that the KGB sent NOSENKO to Geneva on both occasions for the purpose of contacting CIA, that the KGB wanted the opportunity to gauge CIA's reactions to the walk-in in 1962 and to the defection plans in 1964, and that the KGB guid d NOSENKO after contact was established in both years.A further examination of the operational circumstances in Geneva lends credence to these possibilities. During the 1962 meetings, NOSENKO would frequently answer CIA questions by saying: "I will have to think about that tonight," or "I will have some time tonight to jot down and prepare a good answer for you," or "I don't want to give you an answer to that right off--I am afraid to mislead you." He would return to a later meeting with the information, after having visited the Legal Residency. In 1964 there were other examples of what may have been backstage guidance by the KGB:-He called for an urgent special meeting to correct something he had said in an earlier meeting. Initially NOSENKO had named ZUJUS instead of KEYSERS as the U.S. Embassy code clerk whom he had personally approached in 1961. This seemed remarkably urgent and important to him at the time, and in retrospect this case gains special importance: It was the only time he claimed to have had direct contact with a U.S. Embassy staff employee during his alleged tour in the American Department in 1960-1961. If he could not remember this one name, it might call his entire story into question. It is hard to find another explanation; had he simply made a careless mistake, with his customary indifference to names and dates. NOSENKO would be unlikely to mull over what he had said at the meeting nor to bother about correcting a minor misstatement. Much less would he feel compelled to call an emergency meeting to do so.-He came to meetings with "chance" items picked up at the Legal Residency, each of which would require quick action and the commitment of assets on the part of CIA in Geneva. Also, NOSENKO originally said in January 1964 that he wanted to defect right away, but various steps taken or planned by his CIA handlers kept him in place for a time. Each step, however. was quickly negated--usually at the next meeting--by some information NOSENKO had picked up by chance.-He asked, out of context and without any explanation, whether GOLITSYN had told CIA that the President of Finland was a Soviet agent, and later could not coherently explain where he had heard this, why he had not told CIA about it in 1962, and why he had asked.In addition, the Soviet reactions to the defection were unprecedented and contrasted sharply with, for example, the Soviets' avoidance of publicity concerning GOLITSYX's defection in 1961. The post-defection actions by the Soviet Government created publicity which had the superficial effect of underlining NOSENKO's authenticity, establishing him as a public figure, confirming that he had a family, and verifying that his defection was of alarming consequence. TheseTOP SECRET
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755. reactions seem purposeful in light of the approach in Paris in 1966 of a Soviet photographer to Paris Match; the photographer passed photographs of NOSENKO's wife and children as part of a proposed story to dramatize the abandoned family of a "top Soviet intelligence officer" whose defection had caused the "biggest blow ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence." There is no independent press in the USSR, no Soviet journalist Allowed to publish as he pleases, and the Soviet Government in the past has shown no predisposition to dramatize defections from its most secret agency. The photographer can only be presumed to have been acting on KGB instructions.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 155]
TOP SECRET,796. G. Sources Supporting NOSENKO1. IntroductionThe preceding portions of Part VIII. present an analysis of the NOSENKO case without giving detailed consideration to information about him from Soviets reporting to CIA and the FBI. because their evidence generally runs counter to the results of the foregoing analysis, it is reviewed here separately so that the concentrated examination of NOSENKO would not be diverted by asides as to the authenticity and reliability of these Soviets. As indicated below, the CIA and FBI sources who have directly supported NOSENKO's intelligence background areand the defectors and GOLITSYN. More except COLITSYN claimed to know personally or to have worked with him, and NOSENKO contradicted GOLITSYN by saying they had never met. Some of them, as well as CHEREPANOV, supported NOSENKO indirectly through overlapping information on specific KGB operations, but this aspect of their reporting is reviewed in Part IX.2. Corroboration of KOSENKO's Intelligence CareerThe statements of the sources confirm that NOSENKO was a KGB officer with access to sensitive information:said NOSENKO was a KGB lieutenant colonel (later changed to captain), a friend and protege of the head of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, GRIBANOV, who approved NCSENKO'S (1964) TDY to Geneva.was a KGB "chief," with access to details on KGB operations against the U.S. Embassy, and was most recently Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. He also stated that NOSENKO, with his information on U.S. Embassy micro- phones and KGB operations involving correspondents and tourists, was "more valuable (to American intelligence) than PENKOVSKIY and moreover, the KGB "will not be able to operate normally for two years" (i.e., until 1966). He described the repercussions in the KGB caused by NCSENKO's defection: new KGB regulations to increase security, the dismissal of many KGB officers including GRIBANOV and the recall of many others.Asked whether NOSENKO could be a "trick, i.e., a KGB provocateur, expressed the conviction that NOSENKO was not.stated that NOSENKO had attended the GRU's Military-Diplomatic Academy (NOSENKO has indicated he declined the opportunity to enroll in this strategic intelligence school in the early 1950's.) Afterwards, NOSENKO served in the GRU and then entered
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 156]
757. According to source NOSEIKO was in "Intelligence." His defection brought about the recall of a KGB secretary from Geneva, the rumored transfer of some 60 Soviet officials from assignments abroad, and the dismissal of KGB personnel including NOSENKO's friend GUK, who had recommended the TDY to Geneva. In addition, reported, immediately after the defection a representative of the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee went to Geneva to speak to the Soviet Government employees there. said that NOSENKO had been tried *in absentia* in Moscow for treason and sentenced to death (see Pages 46 and 342).- GOLITSYN failed to comment when shown NOSENKO'S name in 1962, and there is no record of his ever having mentioned NOSENKO prior to the Western press announcement of the defection in 1964, even though he had named people known to him in the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. (Shortly after defecting GOLITSYN said that he had visited this Department in 1960 and at the turn of the year 1960-1961.) After NOSENKO defected, GOLITSYN was given a summary of NOSENKO's biography. Thereupon GOLITSYN reported that NOSENKO was a KGB officer whom he first met in 1953 and last saw in 1959. From 1953 to 1957 or 1958, GOLITSYN stated, NOSEIKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department, responsible for coverage of U.S. military personnel and later either for others in the Moscow Embassy or for correspondents. As of 1959, GOLITSYN said, NOSENKO was a senior officer in the Tourist Department; as of 1960, he was definitely not in the American Department. GOLITSYN added that GUK, CHUPANOV, and KASHCHEYEV were friends in the KGB whom he shared with NOSENKO (see Pages 343-344).SourceSoviet source, , indicated she had been told by her KGB friend SVIRIN that NOSENKO was a "civilian"; he had nevertheless provided information on microphones in the U.S. Embassy and had caused "considerable damage." Also have corroborated certain non-Intelligence aspects of NOSENKO'S background.3. RemarksSource,aside, the Soviet sources have certified that NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer, and all asserted or implied that he had access to information valuable to American Intelligence--the microphores in the U.S. Embassy being one item in common.TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET759. Most of them have described the serious repercussions of NOSENKO's defection. The possibilities with regard to the accuracy of these sources' reporting are:First, they are correct. If so, the foregoing analysis is in error, they are valid sources, and NOSENKO is what he claims to be: a genuine defector whose previous positions in the KGB enabled him to divulge all important details on operations against Westerners, mainly Americans.Second, they are misinformed. If so, the foregoing analysis is correct, they may be valid sources, and NOSENKO has always been under KGB control. For this to be true, it would have been necessary for the KGB to dispatch NOSENKO with only a highly restricted number of KGB personnel (including CRIERIOV) aware of the actual circumstances of the operation. The KGB, at the same time, would have propagated within and outside of the Soviet Intelligence Services the fiction that NOSENKO was an actual but disloyal KGB officer and would have supported this fabrication in various ways the rumor spreading about the severity of the loss of NOSENKO, etc.).Third, they have been purposefully misleading American Intelligence for their own or KGB purposes. If so, the foregoing analysis is correct, and some or all of them have participated in a KGS conspiracy to support the bona fides of NOSENKO, a KGS-controlled source.These possibilities are discussed further in Part IX.TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET759. ## H. Alternative Explanations### 1. IntroductionParts VIII.B. through VIII.P. have discussed the inaccuracies, self-admitted contradictions, inconsistencies, and incompleteness of NOSENKO's reporting about himself and the KGB. Collectively, these important flaws in the story of and by NOSENKO make it necessary to choose an explanation for his actions and the nature of his information. There are three alternatives:First, NOSENKO was a KGB officer but (a) has a faulty or selective memory, has embellished or boasted, or his reporting has been influenced by a combination thereof; or (b) he is insane.Second, NOSENKO lied about himself in order to save face.Third, NOSENKO has misrepresented himself, either on his own or at the instigation of the KGB.Each of these mutually exclusive alternatives is discussed below.### 2. First AlternativeAccording to one postulate, NOSENKO was an officer in the KGB but has a faulty memory, has a selective memory, and/or has embellished or boasted:#### a. Faulty MemoryNOSENKO himself has repeatedly appealed for understanding that "different people have different memories" and that his own is "funny," and this is supported by his forgetfulness and errors concerning events he is known independently to have lived through, such as the BURGI and cases. But it cannot be said that he is, in general, "very bad with names," because he has almost total recall of names and positions of hundreds of KGB officers in the American and Tourist Departments. He has a good memory for faces and rarely failed to recognize photographs of people he claimed to know. He remembered consistently details about certain operations (the compromise and investigation of PENKOVSKIY, the surveillance of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, the JENNER case, the arrest of BARGHOORN, and the search for CHEREPANOV, to cite a few examples). NOSENKO was precisely accurate in his recollection of most of his dealings with CIA personnel from June 1962 onward.#### b. Selective MemoryAlthough having a selective memory is probably true of nearly everyone, a CIA psychologist has described NOSENKO as a psychopath who would register each passing event only in relation to its effect on himself at that moment. This would inevitably make him indifferent to the characteristics of other people, for example, and to the sequence in which events transpired; the aspects important to him might not appear so to a more objective observer. Such a person would
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 161]
762. -The validity of the information he has provided. To get such information he would have to be a KGB staff officer, must have worked in both the American and Tourist Departments as he says he did, and must have been a fairly senior officer with broad responsibilities (in view of the number of Tourist Department operations revealed by name in his 1964 notes). To name a few other examples from among hundreds possible:(a) NOSENKO not only knew the identity of a KGB double agent against CIA, BELITSKIY, but gave checkable details from inside the case, including the names by which the CIA case officers identified themselves to the double agent;(b) NOSENKO was able to report, with almost complete accuracy, that CIA ceased clandestine letter-mailings inside the Soviet Union for over a year after the arrest of Russell LANGELLE in late 1959;(c) He identified several Americans recruited or approached by the KGB in operations in which he said he did not directly participate, including "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH), Sergeant Robert JOHNSON, and Henry SHAPIRO;(d) NOSENKO knew inside information on Americans at the Embassy in Moscow, including operational activities of John ABIDIAN, WINTERS mailing of a letter to POPOV, the homosexuality of two diplomatic officers, etc; and(e) He knew certain details of the story of Aleksandr CHEREPANOV which would not have been available outside the KGB staff.Thus there would not be any great need nor much room for embellishment.-The confirmations of others. He appeared before BARGHOORN and other KGB targets as a "chief," and sensitive sources to subsources confirmed NOSENKO's unusual importance: that he was a Deputy Department Chief in the KGB, that his defection was a severe blow to Soviet Intelligence, that he was more important than PENKOVSKIY, and so on. A Soviet journalist told Paris Match that NOSENKO's defection was the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence. A reported the recall to Moscow of many KGB staffers as a result of the defection, and these officers did indeed return to the Soviet Union.Two sourcesThus any embellishment must concern only minor details such as his rank, which he has already admitted.d. Combination of AboveAnother possibility might be that NOSENKO's poor performance was due to a combination of bad memory, psycho-pathologically selective memory, and embellishment. While this theory is intrinsically more logical and might correct and round off some obvious weaknesses in any one of the
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 162]
individual theories, it cannot explain the counterargumentsdiscussed under corponent parts above.e. InsanityIt might be postulated that NOSENKO went insano and thatthis was the cause not only of his seemingly unmotivatedcontact with CIA 15 1962 but of shortcomings in his story.However, NOSENKO thereafter Bandled senior KGB functionswell enough to be promoted and to be permitted abroad in1964; he has beca examined periclically by a CIA psycicolo-gist and a CIA psychiatrist; he has been in contact overconsiderable periods of time and under varying degrees ofstress with experienced CIA and FBI personnel; he has main-tained his equilibrium under difficult circumstances. Noreof the foregoing results in an indication of insanity andthere are countless other arguments which would invalidatethis hypothesis.3. Second AlternativeIt has also been postulated that NOSENKO is a psycho-path, is what he says he is, but that for psychologicalreasons and while under interrogation, he did not want totell what he knew. By this line of reasoning, NOSENKO haslied for no other reason than to save face; by dwelling onthe inconsistencies in NOSENKO's statements, the interro-gator merely caused more inconsistencies or else receivedthe false answers that NOSENKO did not know or did not re-member the facts. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKOrecalled and repeated what he had previously said in theless inhibiting atmosphere of the relaxed debriefings priorto 4 April 1964. This alternative explanationthus does not account for the factual contradictions inNOSENKO's reporting before the interrogations, such as theerrors in dates, in sourcing on the "ANDREY" case, in de-tails about the Pushkin Street dead drop, etc. It alsofails to account for NOSENKO's retractions about his rank aslieutenant colonel, in the face of the KGB TOY travel autho-rization which shows him to be a lieutenant colonel, andabout the telegram recalling him to 8GB Headquarters inJanuary 1951.The suggestion that NOSENKO lied tosave face consequently can be dismissed.4. Third AlternativeThe only other postulate is that NOSENKO is not whathe clains to be, in which case his aisrepresentation wasdone either on his own or as part of a KGB operation.If he is misrepresenting himself on his own, there are(even in theory) only two possibilities: He is merely exag-gerating (discussed above, under the "First Alternative") orhe is a fabricator. He cannot be a fabricator, however, sincethe Soviets have certified him in many ways; including hisdiplomatic status at the Geneva Conference, Soviet officialprotests and Soviet Embassy confrontation in Washington,Soviet officials' remarks in various areas of the world, andreports from other sources on his KGB status andimportance.
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764. There remains the possibility that NOSENKO has misrep- resented himself and is a witting part of a KGB operation. This hypothesis could accormodate the argument that the KGB would not dispatch a KGB staff officer as a double agent against a hostile service because, whether or not the argument is valid, NOSENKO (as indicated in Part VIII.D. above) has not proven his claim to having served as an officer of the KGB. If he has been and is now under KGB control, it would appear that he was being built up for years to look like an officer and was shown to Westerners in certain recruitment operations. This could explain NOSENKO's revelations to FRIPPEL and others about his family and background; the otherwise pointless W.E. JOHNSON case, and NOSENKO's appearance in the BARGHOORN interrogation. It could explain NOSElika's uneven memory and performance under detailed questioning: Much of what he should have known by personal experience could have been merely memorized as part of his KGB briefing. Nothing in NOSENKO's production (see Part VIII.B. above) would preclude his being a KGB-dispatched agent. That he was a KGB-dispatched agent was the conclusion independently arrived at by the CIA specialist who administered a polygraph examination to NCSENKO in April 1964.4. RemarksThe first alternative above has been rejected while the possibility that NOSENKO on his own misrepresented himself is unacceptable. The remaining possibility is that NOSENKO has been manipulated by the KGB in an operation directed against American Intelligence.[^1] His American Department service in 1960-1961 was not supported by any such "show" appearances--he did not insist on the truth of his claim to participation in the KEYSERS case, which, moreover KEYSERS could not confirm; PREISFPEUND is an unreliable witness; and is not accessible to interview.[^1]:TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET766. Furthermore, it is the only acceptable explanation, among the alternatives, for what has transpired since contact with CIA began in 1962.CIA's conclusion about the *bona fides* of NOSENKO is unequivocal: He is a dispatched agent controlled by the KGB.Part IX contains a discussion of the implications of the forezoing conclusion for the Soviet sources who, have corroborated the *bona fides* of ROSENKO.TOP SECRET
[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 166]
# EVIDENCE FOR OR AGAINST NOSENKO## 1. IntroductionThe conclusion that NOSENKO did not serve in the KGB positions he claimed contradicts information reported to CIA and the FBI by (two categories of Soviet Intelligence sources:(1.) the defector COLITSYN [^1] and (2)These sources, all of whom have claimed to be collaborating honestly with American Intelligence, stated or implied that NOSENKO held senior positions in the KGB Second Chief Directorate. If the conclusion of this study of NOSENKO's bona fides is accurate, none of the sources can be correct, and they must therefore be either misinformed about NOSENKO or purposefully misleading.In assessing whether and how sensitive sources could have been innocently misinformed about NOSENKO after he defected, it is necessary to consider the ways in which the KGB might have created and supported a legend for a counterfeit KGB officer-defector like NOSENKO. The KGB might have accomplished this by the following means:- NOSENKO's legend would have required the KGB to brief him in depth on numerous cases and various targets which he would be free to discuss with CIA. The KGB would also have to familiarize him with KGB staff organizational structure and procedures, and KGB officers prominent in his story (e.g., GUK, KOVSHUK, TSYMBAL, GRIANOV) so that he could not only recognize their photographs but also lend reality to his remarks about them. NOSENKO would also have to visit KGB installations and other areas which appeared in his legend.* Sources whose reporting tended to support NOSENKO but who have not been members of the Soviet Intelligence Services are eliminated from detailed consideration here because their connections with NOSENKO are less direct than the sources with service in the KGB and GRU. has never been a Soviet Intelligence officer, and his support for NOSENKO has been relatively limited. However, he reported on repercussions in Geneva caused by NOSENKO's defection and like NOSENKO, he said that the KGB suspected the U.S. State Department official David MARK of belonging to CIA. He has also reported on certain personalities prominent in NOSENKO's reporting, including Yu. I. GUK and V.V. VAKRUSHEV.** Although all of them supported NOSENKO by confirming his KGB status, there is nevertheless a distinct difference between COLITSYN's opinion about him and the statements by the other sources. GOLITSYN believed NOSENKO to be a KGB-dispatched agent, while the rest indicated that he was a genuine defector.*** That these preparations were imperfect, or at least that NOSENKO imperfectly mastered his briefing, was shown in his performance under interrogation.[^1]: sensitive sources