Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 163]
251. NOSENKO: Yes. Or maybe it was at a meeting. It is difficult to say. Maybe we went to report to KOVSHUK in his room or maybe KOVSHUK was writing in KLYPIN's study room. I don't remember.NOSENKO then described the purpose of the meeting: To discuss the possibility of releasing monitor positions from some of the chancery microphones and of assigning these released positions to Vladimir [patronymic unknown] PETROV, Chief of the American Department's section for work against American tourists and delegates suspected of being connected with American Intelligence; PETROV had earlier requested English-language monitoring positions from the Chief of the English-Language Section of the OTU's Second Special Department but had been told that all such interpreters were already engaged on priority targets. At the meeting KOVSHUK and KLYPIN reviewed the microphone coverage of the chancery to decide which rooms offered information of little value and which monitoring positions could be released to PETROV. KOVSHUK drew up a list of the Embassy offices and apartments then being covered on a full-time basis and indicated those of lesser importance. At the end of the meeting, KOVSHUK gave the list to NOSENKO, who retained it in his safe until bringing it to CIA in 1964. NOSENKO has added nothing further on the locations of microphones in the chancery building, and much of his information concerning the quality and value of the production by these microphones came from this meeting.Since his defection, NOSENKO has spoken further on his responsibilities in connection with the daily transcripts received from the Second Special Department. He said on 14 May 1964: "All the materials after they were read and signed were returned to the Second [Special] Department of the Operational Technical Directorate. Some of the material from this was put in the individual file, but anyone who read it would never know where it came from. He wouldn't know that it came from mikes....KOVSHUK and I read all of this. From this we gave information to those who needed it, depending on their interest. If there was something interesting, it was given to KLYPIN to read. If KLYPIN saw something interesting he could take it and give it to GRIBANOV. Tatyana GRISHNYAT [from the Second Special Department] came by car with this material. She went to KLYPIN. Sometimes she left them with me."A protocol signed by NOSENKO in 1965 states: "One of my duties as Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, was to receive, review, and give to appropriate case officers the production from microphones in the American Embassy on a daily basis. I also maintained the control book (journal) for these transcripts. These transcripts were prepared by the Operational Technical Directorate of the KGB. Every day a female worker of the OTU brought me the transcripts of conversations in the Embassy from the previous day. I regularly returned all of the original transcripts to this female worker; they were usually in my possession for one day. In my absence this duty was performed by [my superior] KOVSHUK or [my subordinate] GRYAZNOV."
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 164]
252. (b) Number and Locations of MicrophonesThe information from NOSENKO on the number and locations of the KGB microphones in the chancery building in the U.S. Embassy is separated from that furnished by other sources.NOSENKO's Information11 June 1962: [ NOSENKO has just been assured that none of the information he had given CIA would be used without first consulting with him.] "Well, because you are such good guys, I will give you even more. Have the Minister Counsellor stop dictating to himself in his office.... Listen, move the Minister Counsellor from his present office to the north wing of the Embassy (where NOSENKO said there were no listening devices; see below]. We are not listening to the Ambassador. But move the Minister Counsellor.... And we are listening to all your military attaches there. All of them--the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, the Air Force Attache.... We have four or five points [from which we are getting intercepts!. We hear the Minister Counsellor, all three attaches that's four points--and the fifth is where one of the State Department employees sits. And yes, there's another, a sixth point. We are listening to the Agricultural Attache. [C. Stanley BROWN is working there now and someone else, a young man [William HORBALY]. So, we are listening to these six points. This is our biggest secret. Only a few people know this. I was Deputy Chief of the section and received this information. I decided what to give the Chief of Department and what not to give him. Do you understand? This is to say nothing about the other departments and the [U.S.] Embassy Section itself."12 June 1962: "We lost the microphone in the private residence of the Ambassador. This was not THOMPSON, but the one before him. BOHLEN was there then. We once had some-thing there, but you found the [Great] Seal where it was located. But in the Embassy itself, in the Ambassador's office, we have nothing. The one we hear now is [Minister Counsellor] FREERS. Bill FREERS, in particular, walks around his office and dictates. All this is recorded. Well, this is important material."14 June 1962: "When I was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section I received reports on the microphone material daily. If there was something important in it, I reported to the Chief of the department. The rest KOVSHUK and I read and then distributed to the workers the parts that concerned them. Well, the workers who were operating against the three attaches knew about this [microphone] equipment.... Nothing was received from the code room. These machines were working and there were no conversations. He was sitting alone and there was nothing. [ NOSENKO is evidently describing the military code room.]....There is a point there from which we hear the Agricultural Attache. But there in nothing there. They talk about what interests them in the field of agriculture. Nothing interesting."24 January 1964: The late 1960/early 1961 list which NOSENKO brought to CIA (see above) showed that the following offices and apartments in the chancery contained microphones:
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 165]
# TOP SECRET253. "Office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS;"Office of the Naval Attache, HOUGHTON;"Office of the Military Attacke, URBAN;"Office of the Air Attache, NEILSEN:"Office of the Assistant Air Attache, WINDSOR;"Office of the Assistant Air Attaches, SENIO and SACHANEN;"Office of the Assistant Military Attaches MASON, REITZ and WILSON;"Office of the Political Officer, GLEYSTEEN;"Office of Agricultural Attaches, HORBALY and BROWN;"Military Code Roon;"State Department Code Room and Teletype Office;"Apartments of FREERS, HOUGHTON, URBAN and NEILSEN;"Eighth Floor Bar (Marines)"Altogether, sixteen spaces are listed, but of these NOSENKO said that the microphone in one (the Marine bar) had never worked and that nothing of importance was learned from the microphones in the four Embassy apartments. This leaves eleven; when presenting tt. list to CIA, NOSENKO said that while he was in the U.S. Embassy Section, "there were a total of eleven listening posts." (In discussing the late 1960 or early 1961 meeting at which KOVSHUK and KLYPI received the microphone coverage, NOSENKO said on 14 May 1954 that it was decided to release the miophone positions in the GLEYSTEEN office, the LORBAT-BROWN office, the State Department code room and the teletype office. This would leave a total of eight 'listening posts.")14 May 1964: Questioned on the total number of microphones in the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO said that "many" were installed in the chancery building before the Americans moved in, but that he did not know how many were instailed in all, how many were in any one of the rooms included in KOVSHUK's list, or where they were located in specific rooms. He did recall that nost of the microphones were placed in the outside wall, the wall rearest (naykovskiy Street, as most of the offices faced this street and the placement of the microphones near the outer wall would make it more difficult for American technicians to find them if they examined only the inner walls.January 1965: NOSENKO volunteered that there were no fixed microphones in America House, the residence of enlisted men at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He said that there was discussion during 1960 and 1961 of using the KCB agents employed there to place temporary audio devices for one or two days at a time in the rooms of the Americans as well as in the Embassy garage. These plans were vetoed, however, because such devices are too easily found. For the same reason, NOSENKO said, there was no attempt made in this period to place temporary devices in Spasso House (the Ambassador's residence) or in the apartments of suen Embassy officers as John ABIDIAN. The KGB was "afraid that they will be detected and that there will be a scandal."TOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 166]
# TOP SECRET254. ## Information from Other SourcesIn 1956 a sensitive source holding a senior position in the KGB submitted a writter irport to the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow with the cautionary emark: "Do not speak about this information in the rooms of the American Embassy." The report itself contains a portion reading as follows:"Because all rooms in the American Embassy in Moscow are being monitored by the KB, I strongly ask that there be no conversations and discussions concerning this information in the American Embassy. The flap involving the American direction.finding specialists in Stalingrad during the summer of 1955 was organized by the KGE because conversa- tions were overheard in the rooms of the American Embassy. As you know, as a result of this flap, the KGB seized valu- able direction.finding equipment from the American intelli- gence officers. The KGB did not possess this type of valuable equipment, and it would have been necessary for Soviet technicians to sork and experiment for a long time in order to acquire such valuable equipment. The listening devices are so skillfully installed in the walls, floors, and ceilings of the rooms of the American Embassy that it is impossible to find ham, oven with special-purpose instru- ments."GOLITSYN, who defected in late 1961, reported the exis- tence of a microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor and said that many word had been installed in the chancery prior to 1953. OLISYN was debriefed in early 1962 and his information on this subjeet was disseminated within the U.S. Goverrment approximately two weeks before NOSENKO'S initial contact with CIA. GOI LISYN said he had learned of the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office when by chance he happened to see a particular document in an office at KGB Headquarters. According to COLIISYN, during one of his visits to the American Department in 1960 he heard and saw*This is a reference to ine arrest of U.S. Military Attaches BENSON, MULE, and SHROUD and the seizure of sensitive elec- tronic equipment they had with them in Stalingrad in the summer of 1955. NOSENKO reported that the KGB seizure of this equipment was based on information obtained from micro- phones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. See Part V.C.3.b. (viii).**GOLITSYN has reported that he visited the U.S. Embassy Sec- tion of the American Department on a number of occasions in the spring of 1960 as part of his preparation for assignment to Helsinki in July of that year; he has also said that he returned on temporary assignment to Moscow and again con- sulted with U.S. Embassy Section officers in December 1960. With regard to the latter visits, however, COLITSYN's pass- port and CIA travel records indicate that he was in Moscow on temporary duty for two weeks in January 1961 and that he is therefore a month off in his estimate of when these visits took place. On this basis it appears that by his statement that this incident occurred in 1960 The has not been more specific), he could have been referring to either his visits to the American Department in the spring of 1960 or his visits in January 1961.TOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 168]
# TOP SECRET256. can reasonably be presumed to be in apartment 6J based on the symmetry of the known installations. The microphones located were situated so that all microphones and probes were behind radiators. The microphone system discovered covered every outside room on floors six through ten, with the exception of those offices with doors entering onto balconies and when exterior building constructions were adjacent to outside wall sections bearing radiators."The first microphone found was in Room 1008, in what is now the Army Finance office and which in 1960-1961 was the office of the Military Attache, where NOSENKO reported a microphone to be. All other microphones were ultimately traced from this discovery. There were microphones in all rooms identified by NOSENKO, and in others besides. Two of the latter were inoperative when found--ore in te Ambassador's office where NOSENKO said no conversations were being heard in 1960-1961 and the other in the Security Office where NOSENKO said there was none. The damage report concluded that all the microphones were installed before the U.S. Government took possession of the chancery building in 1953.# TOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 169]
# TOP SECRET257. (c) Receptivity and Audibility of MicrophonesNOSENKO made the following evaluations of the quality of intercept received from the chancery microphone installations:11 June 1962: "They are dying, the microphones, and we cannot do anything about it, because we can't get into the Embassy [to make new installations]. In that respect your Embassy and the British Embassy are the only ones we can't get into."14 June 1962: "The most interesting materials, of course, are from the...[Note: one or two words or the tape are unintelligible here; from earlier and subsequent remarks, particularly one on 24 January 1964 (see below), it is clear that NOSENKO is speaking of the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office.] And I tell you honestly that it is becoming increasingly difficult to work with this. The shayba [microphone], as we call them, is fading and only two or three people are able to make out what is being said. That is, the tape sounds as if somewhere far, far away, somewhere in the cellar, someone is speaking in a whisper. It is very difficult to hear, very difficult when it is fading. But, what can you do? They tell us categorically and directly--KUZMIN, the Chief of the section of the Second Special Department responsible for this, tells us that soon we will not have anything there. There are a great number of microphones there, but they don't work. I know that there are about 20 microphones there that don't work. They have all gone deaf."24 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything out of the teletype office because of interference [probably speaking of machine noise]. From this point [pointing at the list, but not stating which microphone he vas speaking about] the reception became progressively weaker until it finally stopped: evidently it wore out. Yes, there was another point in the bar on the 8th floor. This one never worked even though it was installed. Thus, out of the eleven points, nine were working...[NOSENKO then referred to information he learned in 1962 and 1963, after leaving the U.S. Embassy Section.] GRYAZNOV said that the equipment is deteriorating and they are only getting snatches of conversation and that in a year or two they will be completely inoperative. GRIBANOV is insisting on getting to [recruiting] code clerks at all costs."31 January 1964: "Here in HORBALY's and BROWN's room [office of the Agricultural Attaches], there is no acoustical (sic) and nothing comes from here. I'll come back to this, but they complained that they're not getting anything. [These microphones were installed] when this building was being built. It wasn't later after you had moved into the building, but when the building was under construction...[NOSENKO was asked whether more or fewer than nine microphones are now currently active.] It couldn't be more, anyhow."14 May 1964: Very interesting information was heard from Minister Counsellor FREERS' office, NOSENKO said, "but for the last years, even in 1960 and 1961, it was very# TOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 170]
TOP SECRET258. difficult to hear. I was sitting with [S.G.) DMITRIYEV [Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of the Second Special Department) and they told me how difficult it was. The mike was dying. Only very experienced interpreters were sitting on this. They listened 10, 15, even 20 times to the same place [on the tape]....[After 1961] GRYAZNOV was telling me that they were getting almost nothing from this point. [He said this] in 1962, 1963. I was thinking you had given a command [had cautioned FREERS]. We were getting almost nothing. I heard this from GRYAZNOV several times in 1963. The makes were working not bad at all in 1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Navy, Air Force.... I don't know [how reception was in 1962]. I know only that GRYAZNOV was telling me in 1962 and 1963 that they were getting little, little, and almost nothing. He said we are losing everything. We have no materials. We have little, little pieces, but nothing...in general [from all of the micro- phones." NOSENKO then speculated that one reason for this was the fact that the Americans in the Embassy were not saying anything significant, but he said he did not know this to be the case. Speaking of the microphone in GLEYSTEEN'S office, he said: "There was something heard. In 1960 and 1961 it was working I remember. Reception was good but there was no secret information. The mike in HORBALY's room was good in 1960 and 1961...1960 and 1961--good re- ception." According to NOSENKO, reception was good from the State Department code and teletype room "only always the sounds of [teletype] machines. In 1960 and 1961--machines only....Reception was good when conversation came through. I don't know [about reception in 1962 and 1963]....Reception was good [from the military code room] in 1960 and 1961."On-site tests made by American technicians after the 1964 discoveries determined that the following microphones in the chancery (the occupants listed are those as of Decem- ber 1960) were inoperative or unintelligible, but the USIB damage report emphasized that it had not been possible to determine how long these microphones had been inoperative:- one microphone in the apartment of the senior Naval Attache;- three microphones in the apartment of the senior Air Attache;- one microphone in the apartment of the Economic Counsel- lor;- the microphone in the office of the Publications Pro- curement Officer;- The microphone in the Marine bar;- the microphone in the Internal Affairs office- the microphone in the Ambassador's office;- the microphone in the office of the Security Officer;- the microphone in the office of the Chief of Chancery;- the microphone in the office of the Air Attache;- the microphone in the office of the Assistant Air At- tache;- the microphone in the office of the Assistant Naval Attaches;- the microphone in the Navy administrative office;- the microphone in the Air Force administrative office.This list includes the office of the Ambassador (from which HOSENKO said no intercepts were being received in 1960 andTOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 171]
TOP SECT259. 1961) and the office of the Security Officer (where NOSENKO      has said no microphone was installed).      On-site recordings      made from twelve selected microphones in 1964 indicate that      the microphone in the office occupied by the Minister Counsel-      lor in 1960 was capable of producing tapes of "high intelli-      gibility" as of 1964. The 1964 tests of the microphones in      the military and State Department code rooms in the office      of the Naval Attache also produced recordings of high intelli-      gibility. As pointed out below, however, the possible pro-      duction by the code room microphones would have been sharply      reduced by the installation of acoustical reons during 1962.*As noted in Part VI.D.3.e., NOSENKO reported that the U.S.Embassy officer Richard HARMSTONE did not report his havingbeen approached by the KGB for recruitment in May 1959.HARMSTONE did, in fact, report the approach, and the reportwas made in the office of the Security Officer.TOP SECRET
[104-10210-10068.pdf — page 173]
# TOP SECRET261. all recorded, and we turned it over at once to the EighthDirectorate, dealing with coding and decoding."14 May 1964: Discussing the list drawn up by KOVSHUKand the decision to withdraw U.S. Embassy Section require-ments for full-time monitoring of certain microphones, NO-SENKO quoted KOVSHUK: "We are getting information from therooms of the attaches, the Counsellor, and the AgriculturalAttache. The flats [Embassy apartments]--no; the bar--nothing. Of course, I know it is necessary to keep the roomof the code clerks in spite of the fact that there is seldomanything received except several numbers. The code clerk issaying aloud several numbers. But the flats you can take,not permanently, but temporarily." NOSENKO then continued:"KOVSHUK said to give them these flats... But you see,nothing was going on in these flats. They weren't speakingor were talking about steak and eggs. There was nothingof interest from an operating standpoint. Sometimes weheard there would be guests. Okay. There is a possibilityto hear something. In this case we would call DMITRIYEV[English-language Section of Second Special Department] andsay: 'This evening, this day, this flat. Maybe we willget something.' The mikes were working not bad at all in1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Naval, Air Force. Whenthe man was alone we heard nothing. But when two or threemen were sitting in the rooms, the assistants, we heard.For example, when they returned from a trip and discussedwhat they had seen or when they were preparing for a trip....But we heard nothing about agents."Later on this occasion the following diagogue tookplace:NOSENKO:GRYAZNOV was telling me in 1962 and 1963 thatthey were getting little, little, almost nothing.He said we are losing everything. We have nomaterials. We have little, little pieces, butnothing.Question:Was he talking about the Military Attaches?NOSENKO:In general. I think they were speaking verylittle. God knows. Then, you see, we were thinkingthey were taking new measures. GRYAZNOV,FEDOSEYEV, and KQVSHUK considered that there wasa room-in-a-room--a room [acoustic] for themeeting.Question: When did you first hear about the room-inside-the-room?NOSENKO:First it was known when, I think, Eisenhower vasgoing to come.* In 1960 or 1961 we had informa-tion that the Embassy had such a chamber made out[^1] *President Eisenhower's trip to the USSR was scheduled forthe summer of 1960 but was cancelled over the U-2 incidenton 2 May 1960.# TOP SECRET