Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 31]
size high fire power weapon co at least gesture in right directic:: can be made if we all throm out. Ammo could come later."14 February 1961At the Special Group meeting of this date, Mr. Bundy:"... asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government to Trujillo."(Comment: We did not find a copy of such a memorandum in CIA files.)15 February 1961Ned Holman, the headquarters branch chief, met with Juan Vicini and Donald Reid Cabral in New York City. Excerpts from his memorandum record of the meeting follow:"... Vicini played down somewhat the necessity for delivery of ams, although he did say that it is desireable and should be a part of the planning. He said that members of the opposition could, if they wanted to, obtain small quanitities of arms fron Army contacts ... but that any arms so obtained would have to be used very quickly before their loss is discovered. For this reason, he said it would be desireable to have aras delivered by us that could be stored for use at any moment desired."Vicini said that the object of cbtaining this kind of help anyway is the elimination of Trujillo and instead of using arms or grenades he began to speak of more exotic materiels and rethods ... a powerful bomb that could be planted along the route of Trujillo's evening walk and could be detonated from a nearby- 31 -
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 32]
SECRET-EYES ONLYelectronic device . . . (or) . . . the possibility of poisoning the dictator's food or of putting poison capsules in bottles of certain medicines that the dictator is known to take regularly. . . ."A less exotic and more practical plan that they put forward was one that they said had already been planned at one time before. They said that when the dictator leaves his office for his home there are three automobiles in his procession with the dictator himself in the first automobile and the bodyguards in the following two. The idea that has been discussed internally is for several trucks to block the progress of these cars at a given intersection at which time young men who belong to the action groups would leap out of the trucks with fire arms and grenades to finish off the dictator."4 March 1961Headquarters pouched to the station a copy of Holman's memorandum of his meeting, with Vicini and Reid. On 4 March, the chief of station cabled his assessment of the plan to intercept Trujillo's entourage and kill him with guns and grenades:"Vicini idea . . . almost certain fail if applied. That type attack is precisely what bodyguards appear best qualified cope with. Their defense pattern and displacement vehicles plus police practice detour traffic blocks away from entourage make Vicini idea fatally childish in Owen's view."(Comment: The assassination was actually carried out through a variation of this scheme. The assassins detected and took advantage of a stereotyped pattern in Trujillo's movements in which he rode at night, unescorted, on little traveled highways.)- 32 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 33]
The station cabled headquarters on 4 March:" . . . if opportunity support pro-US group not to be lost, believe . . . imperative make sure arms with ammo ready for immediate entry DomRep . . . if necessary at air drop sites . . . "5 March 1961As a follow-up to that cable, the station cabled a communication from Dr. Severo Cabral: "We have in our hands chance to speedup events. Everything is being planned perfectly. Results may be assured as much as human fallibility permits. . . . . "7 March 1961Headquarters cabled the field, in part:"Existing authorization precludes introduction arms into Dom Rep by U.S. personnel. Order prepare contingency plans for possible alternate delivery method, request station determine additional drop zones and confirm those mentioned . . . . Request type and quantity arms desired. . . . "8 March 1961Cable from the station:"Brossa told Dearborn on 7 March that Dr. Severo Cabral and group plan try kill Trujillo by (intercepting his car) at point near (Wimpy's Supermarket). Date not set and obviously depends on Trujillo travel . . . Severo Cabral not aware Brossa has told us but interesting that Charge' Papal Nunciatura also aware plot exists but possibly not of personnel involved."- 33 -
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 34]
SECRET-EYES ONLY8 March 1961Headquarters cabled the station:"Hqs deeply interested plan . . . and request urgently additional details in order make plans timely assistance. Uncertainty of plans, timing and chances of success precludes Hqs seeking commitment for such specific assistance as that requested . . . . "13 March 1961Headquarters cabled the station:"Following elicited from EMOTH-8 (Andres Freitas):Freitas speaks for Amiama Tio group which includes military members . . . in six brigade Hqs and which have capability, at appropriate time, of taking over military garrisons with arms already at hand, and appointing military/civilian junta in control provisional govt. . . . . Request following station action with respect Amiama Tio group: A. Identify military membership; B. Assess capabilities as claimed; C. Indicate if assets can be coordinated with overall effort. Hqs places special emphasis on identifying military membership Amiama Tio group. This important for vetting as well as enable assess realistically chances successful takeover."15 March 1961Cable from the station:"Lorenzo (Wimpy) Berry asked [a consulate employee] for small supply fragmentation grenades 'for use in next week or so.' By note, the chief of station checked back with Wimpy and learned the dissident group must do EMISLEW /kill Trujillo/ this month or drop it as number of fringe persons with loose mouths are apparently aware renewal plan . . . . Wimpy asked for five 45 mm (sic) rapid fire weapons or similar, 1,500 rounds ammo for- 34 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 35]
SECRET-EYES ONLYsaze, . . 50 fragmentation grenades, . . ten 64mm tankrockets. . . . . . . "16 March 1961Headquarters cabled its reply:"Hqs exploring possibilities for arms delivery and willadvise ASAP. Meanwhile, request you clarify soonest: IsBerry making request on own initiative or is he speaking forDr. Severo Cabral? . . . . "17 March 1951Cable from the station:."For issue to several /of the dissident group/ ConsulGeneral Dearborn requests three 38 caliber Smith and WessonSpecial pistols or similar and three small boxes cartridges.If sending ammo complicates problem, advise and we will tryget from Marines."Chief of Station reiterates suggestion /to send in eachpouch one small size high fire power weapon/ as Dearbornincreasingly concerned lest momentum which group has now for[assassination/] decline result lack tangible or too slow actionon arms by the U.S. Government. Also security these peopleincreasingly of direct interest US Government which each daymore involved in /the operation/. Loss of one of key peoplethru capture could lead revelation details ODYOKE/EMLEEDactivity. Thus preferable we give them some chance defendthemselves against SDM."18 March 1961Chief of Station Robert Owen met for the first time with Dr.Severo Cabral. He cabled the results:- 35 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 36]
SECRET-EYES ONLY"His group [assassination] plan now this: Group knows identity Trujillo's mistress in capital. He visits her once week or once in two weeks. Goes her apartment incognito and lightly guarded. Group apparently has someone in building who can alert them to visit. Dressed as army officers, small group will go to entrance, distract guard with pretext, dispatch him or them in silence, enter apartment and try do [assassination], possibly including mistress, in silence."To do they need five M-3 or comparable machine guns and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in event firefight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job. Severo Cabral's final position was U.S. Government get items here soonest via pouch or similar means. Evident he actually worried that delivery by other means would compromise entire project. Obvious he can count on only one group both receive arms and do [assassination]."Dr. Severo Cabral expects and willing risk chaos for period of undetermined length after [assassination] mainly because for security reasons his group cannot approach military and hope to get decisive agreement support before [assassination].20 March 1951Headquarters cabled the station:"Regret no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against shipment of arms ... Will deliver to the group's representatives outside the Dominican Republic if this feasible. Coordinated with State Department."22 March 1961The station replied, in part:"... we realize permission does not now exist but Chief of Station knows that he at least two posts received pistols via pouch for worthy purposes, so it can be done. Judging from ref, WI not prepared take this step. If this unalterably so then- 36 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 37]
SECRET-EYES ONLYplease continue try get authorization for air drop of . . . arms or import arms by *[other]* means. Completely negative plea for arms, whatever delivery method, will end cooperation Severo Cabral and probably by *[Himpy and Mrs. Berry]*. *.25 March 1961The above excerpt is the most significant point in the cable, but the excerpt does not fully reveal the contentious tone of the cable. On 25 March, Headquarters, in a cable released by the DD/P (Bissell) undertook to set Owen straight. The cable gives a fairly complete statement of U.S. policy and objectives and of Oven's responsibilities. It is summarized here. We support a program to replace the Trujillo regime; we wish to avoid precipitate action if planning is not well organized, as appears to be the case; machine guns and ammunition will be supplied to demonstrate good will to the dissidents; the requested revolvers are being pouched. Headquarters is planning with State against the eventuality of sudden action by the dissidents that might result in the forming of a new government."If above clarifies. Hqs position, Owen should proceed accordingly. In event major points remain unclear, State Department preparing orders permit return for consultations."(Comment: We do not know whether Oen replied to this cable or not. We do not find a reply in the files. Owen did go to headquarters for consultations about 5 April, but we cannot- 37 -* It is apparent from the EMDEED operational files that no arms were ever air-dropped or delivered by sea.SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 38]
SECRET-EYES ONLYestablish that the trip was a direct result of this cable. There is some evidence that suggests that the trip may have been in connection with a request from the dissidents for submachine guns.)26 March 1961Cable from the station:"For Dr. Severo Cabral request permission pass three semi-automatic M-1 carbines 30 caliber and supply ammo which avaliable consulate from departed naval personnel. Would need from Hqs nine 30 cartridge magazines for weapons. Request prompted by Severo Cabral note 25 March which says he cannot hold group together beyond April 15 without arms delivery. . . . ."(Comment: It may be helpful to interrupt the chronology at this point. As we vill later explain, these carbines were actually passed to the dissidents. They were in the hands of Antonio de la Maza, who worked out the details of the assassination and was the lead figure in carrying it out. They almost certainly were taken to the scene of the slaying by the assassins. We have no evidence that any of them were actually fired during the shooting. The little evidence we have suggests that they were not actually used. These three carbines are the weapons referred to by various sources as having been passed to the plotters by CIA. We find no evidence of any other weapons having been passed.)-38-SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 39]
SECRET-EYES ONLY27 March 1951Headquarters cabled the station:"FYI, ref hardware (the three pistols the station asked be pouched) makes fairly sizeable package if lumped single shipment. Request soonest COS estimate of risk involved sending one package; or whether split shipment preferable."(Comment: We find no indication in the files that these revolvers were ever actually pouched. We suspect they were not, because the request for them was overtaken by subsequent events.)29 March 1961Headquarters cabled the station:"... Hqs inclined to favor passing Severo Cabral ref carbines and ammo. Are carbines carried on local installation inventory, thus requiring paper work which may blow CIA's ultimate use? How does station propose to pass weapons in secure manner order avoid other ODACID installation employees becoming witting they being made available to Dominicans? Require Consul General Dearborn's concurrence... Advise...Pouching ... nine magazines ..."31 March 1961The station replied:"No inventory problem. No paper work to show CIA in act in anyway. Plan file off serial numbers. Will handle packaging after hours. Only consulate person who knows disposition is Dearborn. Delivery to Wimpy Perry by the station's female administrative assistant or other CIA officer depending on what steps seems best here. Dearborn concurred in request and in this message. We cannot emphasize enough that we must make gesture of- 39 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 40]
SECPET-EYES ONLYgood will to Severo Cabral now. These items are not what heasked for but they are an investment in operational continuity.The security risk in his having these items is no greater thanhis having similar items delivery which done by more complicatedand less.secure cache or drop."Headquarters cable to the station:"Passing the three carbines approved. Advise Hqs whenpassing..of this equipment completed."(Comment: This cable was released by the DD/P (Bissell).)7 April 1961Cable from the station:"The pouch forwarding magazines for the three carbinescontained 15-bullet magazines rather than 30-bullet magazinesas requested. Pls expedite pouching 9 latter type M-1 carbinemagazines."9 April 1961Cable from the station:"The station's female administrative assistant passedthe three carbines to Wimpy Berry April 7. No complications."(Comment:. The files do not contain an account of how thecarbines were actually passed. As we will later see, headquarterssubsequently pouched submachine guns for passing to the dissidents.Headquarters asked for the station's plan for securely passing thesubmachine guns to the dissidents. The station replied: "Proposeuse essentially same technique as that for the three carbines."- 40 -SECRET-EVES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 41]
SECRET-EYES ONLYThe station's female administrative assistant driving own carwill go to local supermarket Wimpy Perry's for usual Saturdaymorning purchases. Then to consulate to get mail. Will get assistfrom Chief of Station in loading package or packages into cartrunk with groceries. Station operations officer will thenaccompany to administrative assistant's apartment, help takegroceries in. If no danger signal given by operations officer,Wimpy Berry will arrive in personal car, pick up items fromoperations officer at partially concealed entrance to admini-strative assistant's apartment and promptly leave. Cover forhis visit will be commercial delivery."7 April 1961Chief, WH Division, submitted to Chief, RI, a memorandum requestingwaiver of pouch restriction on pouching weapons. "The above requestis submitted for the following reason: Station Ciudad Trujillo hasrequested that Headquarters provide four M3 machine guns and 240rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance to a small actiongroup to be used for self protection."(Comment: The entry for 18 March 1961 refers to a requestfor submachine guns, but there was no follow-up on it from the station.This pouch waiver request was submitted while the chief of station was- 41 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 42]
SECRET-EVES ONLYat headquarters for consultations. It is probable that he made theplea in person. As will be seen later, the submachine guns (the so-called "grease guns" of World War II) were pouched but approval wasnever given the station to pass them to the plotters.)12 April 1961Zeadquarters cabled the station:"Equipment for Severo Cabral [submachine guns] which subjectof Chief of Station conversations Hqs being pouched . . . 14April. Prior to passing equipment, advise Hqs what scheme ofdelivery proposed."(Comment: The delivery scheme is explained in comment onthe 9 April entry.)13 April 1961An extract from a note sent to Consul General Dearborn fromJuan Vicini:"The three Leica cameras, model M-1 [the three carbines],with their accessories, should be in the proper hands in a dayor two. . . . With the small amount of equipment which theyare receiving they can only take action at a few specific placesand therefore the probabilities are considerably reduced andthe time factor, considerably extended accordingly. With therest of the equipment (four Leicas, model M-3) [the submachineguns] the possible places of action are multiplied and the losttime greatly reduced."14 April 1961Extract from a note from SOCRATES [Luis Baquero] to DELTA- 42 -SECRET-EVES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 43]
Consul General Dearoom:"The three Leica cameras and accessories are in the hands of the ones that will take the pictures. They need more cameras in order to do a better and faster job. We hope that the mедо we sent two days ago might help in Wash. in this regard."17 April 1961Note from YAGUATE [Juan Vicini] and SOCRATES [Luis Baquero] to DELTA [Dearborn]:"The last word, up to the minute in the matter of cameras: CRISTOBAL [General Juan Tomes Diaz] says that with the 3 Leica cameras already delivered it is impossible to do the jotographic job. He needs to have the rest of the equipment (the 4 M-3 Leicas) before he undertakes the job. The ones already delivered he sees them as good complementary equipment (defensive) but he needs the others for the aggressive part of the job. It is my belief that the ones already delivered have served a psychological purpose also: the men involved have always been in doubt the good faith of your people in Wash. Their feeling was that in several months all they have obtained were promises. Now they see that you actually mean cusiness. So, now, all they are doing is waiting for the heavу самегаз."17 April 1961Headquarters cabled the station:" . . . most important [the submachine guns] repeat not not/be passed to Severo Cabral without additional Hqs approval. Please advise when equipment received and proposed scheme and timing of delivery."- 43 -
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 44]
SECRET-EVES ONLY20 April 1961Headquarters cabled the station:"[Submachine guns] should be held in station custody till further notice and not repeat not be passed to [Impy Berry]. This Hqs decision based on judgment that filling vacuum created by [assassination] now bigger question than ever view unsettled conditions in Caribbean area.""Request station provide foll info soonest: (a) Have [the three carbines] been delivered to Severo Cabral? (b) Details on an alternate plan to deliver [submachine guns] which would involve ground caching."(Comment: It might be noted that this cable was sentJust three days after the failure of the Landing at the Bay of Pigs.)20 April 1961Note to DELTA [Dearborn] from YAGUATE and SOCRATES:"The officers that were to do the photographic job are not only disappointed but really angry at the refusal of the delivery of the other Leicas. They have decided to give up the plan and disperse, because they cannot take any more risks for nothing."20 April 1961Cable from the station:"[Submachine guns] here 19 April with no entry problems whatsoever. Excellent basic wrapping means station's plan can be simplified even more. The administrative assistant, the operations officer, and the chief of station can share delivery direct to drop. Request Hqs advise when we may begin."- 44 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 45]
SECRET-EYES ONLY(Comment: The precise nature of this "excellent basic wrapping" is not further clarified in the file. Norman Gall, writing in *The New Republic*, said that the weapons were shipped to Wimpy Berry in food cans. This sounds to us as if the submachine guns were packed in food containers for pouching. If so, we wonder how Gall learned of this. We can state with fair confidence that these submachine guns were never passed out of the consulate. As late as the very day of the assassination, Bob Owen sent a cable protesting the policy that forbade his passing them. This sounds as if there must have been a leak from the consulate--from one of the very few who knew of the submachine guns. We cannot confirm that the submachine guns were actually packaged in food containers for pouching. TSD has no record of having done so. Jake Esterline has a faint recollection of food containers, but not in connection with pouching.)21 April 1961Cable from headquarters to the station:"[Submachine guns] should be held in station custody till further notice and not repeat not be passed to [Wimpy Berry]."22 April 1961The station replied to headquarters' query of 20 April regarding disposition of the three carbines:" . . . [Wimpy Berry] has given [the three carbines] to intermediary who holding until Severo Cabral picks up . . . "- 45 -SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 46]
SECRET-EYES ONLY(Comment: This "intermediary" appears to have been Thomas Stocker. The significance of this and the security problem it posed will become apparent from one of the later entries for 31 May.)25 April 1961Cable from the station:"Foll from Dearborn: I believe political consequence of not delivering submachine guns so serius I plan go Washington within next few days for discussion with Department and CAS Hqs!"26 April 1961Cable from, the station:"Wimpy Berry told Chief of Station . . . Antonio de la Maza plans try assassination between 29 April and 2 May. Severo Cabral possibly not yet aware plan. No solid info other members assassination effort but General Juan Tomas Diaz probably will aid. Will use the three carbines plus whatever else can get. De la Maza asks Berry add the submachine guns if possible30 April 1961Cable from the station:"Following from Dearborm: April 28 Lorenzo Berry as emissary Juan Vicini and Severo Cabral called on me with foll info: . . . main mission Berry was plead with me release submachine guns they believe in Dom Rep and under my control. Action group has 3 carbines, 4 to 6 12-gége shotguns with 120 rounds and some small arms. . . . Action entails roadside ambush near San Cristobal-46-SECRET-EYES ONLY
[104-10214-10034.pdf — page 47]
SECRET-EYES ONL!and few additional weapons could ce important. I replied I had no submachine guns under my control and that any U.S. controlled itens which might be in Dom Rep could only be released on specific authorization from Washington. I pointed out that since the three carcines were made available Cuban incident had occurred and hoped group could understand this is period of study and assessment...2 May 1951Cable from the station:" . . . suggest Hqs review: decision not pass submachine guns. Determination of group to go ahead with possibly inadequate means could spell end best pro-US force now working toward the overthrow of the Trujillo regime."2 May 1961Draft cable prepared at headquarters:" . . . Since it appears that E10M group has committed itself to action with or without additional support, coupled with fact that the carbines already made available to them for personal defense; station authorized pass submachine guns to Berry for their additional protection on their proposed endeavor. . . . "(Coment: This cable was never sent. It was authenticated by Ray Eerbert for J. C. King, and Richard Bissell coordinated on it. It was forwarded to the DCCI for release. General Cabell attached a handwritten buck-slip: "Return to: Chief, W.H. Div., unacted upon.")- 47 -SECRET-EVES ONLY