Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# G. Soviet Official ReactionsThe Chief of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon on 6 February 1964 that NOSEIKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February; they speculated that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in a car accident.* Two more days passed without Soviet authorities making any additional public or private statements on the subject. Later events showing Soviet official reactions to NOSENKO's defection are presented below in chronological order:8 February: A Soviet spokesman in Geneva reported to Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert" temporarily assigned to Geneva, had been missing for four days.9 February: Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO had disappeared.10 February: Unidentified Soviet sources were quoted in the press as having said it was presumed that he had defected.A U. S. Department of State press release was issued identifying NOSENKO as a KGB officer and acknowledging his request for political asylum in the United States.11 February: The Department of State was advised informally by Ambassador DOBRYNIN in Washington that a Soviet note to be delivered later would ask how NOSEIKO had left Switzerland, request his release, and demand an immediate interview with him.12 February: S. K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.At simultaneous press conferences in Bern and Geneva, the Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappearance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in locating NOSENKO.The Soviet note predicted by DOBRYNIN was delivered to the State Department, and a noncommittal reply was given to* Apparently no effort was made to notify Moscow immediately. Special intelligence shows that no cable traffic was passed from Geneva to Moscow from 1630 hours on 3 February until 1900 hours on 7 February: at 1915 hours on the 7th, the Geneva Residency transmitted a short top priority cable to Moscow. Likewise, after one routine cable on 4 February, the Bern Residency sent no traffic to Moscow on 5 February. Seven cables, at least four of which were of routine precedence, were sent to Moscow on 6 February; thereafter there was no traffic from Bern to Moscow until the early morning of 10 February.
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# Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in order to obtain assurance that the defection had been voluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as possible.(NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours this same evening.)13 February: NOSENKO said he had no objection to talking to the Swiss, but he would see the Soviets only if necessary.14 February: In Moscow, Ambassador KOHLER was summoned to the office of Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO, who read him a statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a "gross provocation by American Intelligance organs." GROMYKO repeated the demand for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy, Jean-Louis NATURAL, interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service late in the afternoon. The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled by Minister Counselor G. M. KORNIENKO, second to Ambassador DOBRYNIN at the Soviet Embassy, and Third Secretary V. F. ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. (ISAKOV had been a member of the Soviet Delegation to the 1962 Disarmament Conference in Geneva, where NOSENKO said he had first met him.) NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected of his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.
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42. # H. Reactions of NOSENKO's FamilyTwo women who said they were the mother and wife of NOSENKO called at the American Embassy in Moscow on five occasions between 24 February and 23 March 1964,* and NOSENKO, who on the basis of physical descriptions confirmed their identities, said he had no doubt that the KGB had directed them to do this in order to pressure him to return. The women expressed disbelief that NOSENKO had voluntarily betrayed his family and his country. They sought a personal meeting with him in the United States or ar.ywhere else, submitted letters for him, and returned to the Embassy to ask whether he had replied; the younger Mrs. NOSENKO explained that she required some definite statement in writing from her husband so that she could plan her own future and that of the NOSENKO children.NOSENKO proposed to respond to his family's letters by writing two of his own, one which would be intended for KGB consumption and the other for his wife alone. The first of these would state NOSENKO's irrevocable decision to remain in the United States and to sever all ties with his family and homeland. The second letter would be read by Mrs. NOSENKO in the Embassy, left there, and not reported to the KGB; in it he would express hope for a reunion, ask her to wait for him, and tell her to indicate her willingness to join him in the West by writing either "yes" or "no" on the letter itself. Although NOSNEKO prepared both letters, only the first was sent to his wife; it was mailed from Washington to the NOSENKO home in Moscow on 7 April 1964.From March 1964 nothing was heard from NOSENKO's relatives until mid-1966, when Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV,** a Soviet journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine *Paris Match*. KOROLEV indicated that he would---* Only once before had members of a defector's family called at a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in September 1963, his wife appeared at the British Embassy to make inquiries about him. KROTKOV, an admitted agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, is believed by MI-5 and CIA to remain under KGB control.** CIA records show that KOROLEV was employed at the Soviet Pavilion of the Brussels World's Fair in 1958 as a photo-correspondent for the Soviet publication *Sputnik*. He visited Japan in 1963 and the United States in February-March 1965, at the invitation of *Life* magazine, as a photographer for Novosti, a Soviet news agency. On the latter trip he was to be accompanied by Feliks Avramovich ROSENTAL, an interpreter but no record of ROSENTAL's arrival is available. KOROLEV is believed to be identical with Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of 1964, was employed part-time for the United Press International correspondent in Moscow, Henry SHAPIRO. Both NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified SHAPIRO as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Directorate (see Part V.C.).---**TOP SECRET**
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like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret agent." AS KOROLEV spoke only broken French and English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the matter at that time.On 10 October 1966, however, KOROLEV again appeared at the *Paris Match* offices, this time with one Feliks ROSENTAL who acted as his interpreter. He displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and he submitted a one-page document in English which gave a short account of NOSENKO's background. The document said in part: "NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident (the defection). Very soon the wife will apply to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is possible that this case will be given much publicity. His wife has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA." The document, which was in no way represented as coming from a Soviet Government source, also said that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family in Moscow could be obtained and that an interview with the family and with others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a *Paris Match* correspondent.*According to information available to CIA, a divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon the wife's request. There is no known precedent for either Soviet-inspired publicity or divorce difficulties in any previous Soviet defection.TOP SECRET
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Photographs submitted to PARIS MATCH (See Part III.H.)![photo of the subject, circa 1963]Subject (circa 1963)![photo of the subject's wife, elder daughter and younger daughter, circa 1965]Subject's wife, elder daughter and younger daughter (circa 1965)
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SECRET![Photograph of Subject from passport used for temporary assignments to England in 1957 and 1958 (see Part V.D.8)]Photograph of Subject from passport used for temporary assignments to England in 1957 and 1958 (see Part V.D.8)![Photograph of Subject from passport used on assignment to Geneva in 1964 (see Part III.B.2)]Photograph of Subject from passport used on assignment to Geneva in 1964 (see Part III.B.2)![Subject (February 1964)]Subject (February 1964)![Subject's father, the Minister of Shipbuilding (1953)]Subject's father, the Minister of Shipbuilding (1953)SECRETTOP SECRET
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# 1. Repercussions within the KG31. sensitive sourceAccording to, it was the "unanimous opinion" of the KGB leadership and of KGB officers that "NOSENKO could do a tremendous amount of herm to the KGB," and that this damage would be severe for "several years to come." As a direct result, new regulations were promulgated to increase KGB operational security in Moscow and abroad.In addition, the defection brought about the dismissal from the KGB of persons close to NOSENKO and the recall of many officers abroad known to and presumably compromised by NOSENKO.Five months after NOSENKO disappeared from Geneva, in July 1964, said that 15 KCB officers had already been fired. Among them were GRIBANOV** and a number of his deputies** See Part V.H. regarding NOSENKO's relationship with GRIBANOV.
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including cne General BANNIK.* *sensitive source* Since NOSENKO was GRIBANOV'spersonal friend and protege, stated it had been decidedthat GRIBANOV should have been aware of NOSENKO's plans andwas therefore ultimately responsible. reported furtherthat GRIBANOV had been dismissed from the KGBand the Communist Party immediately after the defection, ad-ding that GRIBANOV had personally authorized NOSENKO's 1964trip to Geneva, despite the fact that he had received a sum-mary statement of NOSENKO's capabilities and activities whichcontained enough" compromising material" to prevent such atrip under normal conditions.** reported *sensitivesource*having learned that GRIBANOV was the chief of security ata military plant outside Moscow and is considered a "nothing."***Others dismissed from the KGB included GUK and Ye.A. TARABRIN,Chief of the British Department, First Chief Directorate.******According to NOSENKO in 1965, it was BANNIKOV who sup-ported his candidacy for the 1964 trip to Geneva; asfar as he knew, NOSENKO said, GRIBANOV was not involved.Earlier, however, NOSENKO stated that his 1964 trip hadbeen approved by GRIBANOV.***Reportedly GRIBANOV continued an operational contact witha Western Ambassador in Moscow until as recently as theautumn of 1964. This is a type of activity in whichGRIBANOV was often engaged while serving as Chief of theSecond Chief Directorate.**** In 1962 NOSENKO told CIA: "GRIBANOV and I are very friendlysocially and we have often caroused together unofficially...He is very friendly and we often go out drinking together."Under interrogation in April 1964 NOSENKO was asked speci-fically whether he had ever gone out socially with GRIBANOVafter working hours. He replied that he had done so on oneoccasion and that TARABRIN was present at the time. InFebruary 1965 NOSENKO was asked the same question and thistime answered that he had seen GRIBANOV three times socially,most recently in October or November 1963; TARABRIN, he said,was the only other person present on these three occasions;all three outings began as drinking parties in Moscow res-taurants and the latter two ended at the homes of girlsNOSENKO had been asked to procure. Although indicatedthat TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department at thetime he was fired, NOSENKO said he had held this positiononly until 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of the newlyestablished Service No. 2 (Counterintelligence) of theFirst Chief Directorate.TOP SECRET
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2. sourceAt the time of NOSENKO's defection, told CIA in 1964, he was in training for an illegals assignment in the West, but these plans were cancelled partly because of the NOSEKO case and partly for other reasons not specified to.One of his handlers informed that the NOSENKO matter was very serious, that the XGB was on a "major alert" as a result, and that all missions had been halted to make readjustments.3. sourceIn Geneva at the time of NOSENKO's defection, reported to CIA that just afterwards V.S.MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee travelled to Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of the defection and urged greater vigilance against such acts. also reported that the defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEFREMEYEVA, a KGB secretary in Geneva, and among the Soviets there it was rumored that some 60 Soviet officials then stationed abroad would be transferred from their assignments in consequence of the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet representation in Geneva, speculated to that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and therefore would have to return to Moscow. Y.I. GUK, said, who had known and reported on GUK for years, was discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's travel to Geneva, and according to one rumor, the chief of the department where NOSENKO had been employed would lose his job. (This would be A.G. KOVALENKO who, according to NOSENKO, was Chief of the Tourist Department at the time of the defection.)* MEDVEDEV, a AGB officer formerly stationed in New York City, was said to be one of those from the CPSU Central Committee who conduct interviews with KGB personnel going abroad. identified MEDVEDEV, then a Counselor at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, as the Communist Party organizer and possiuly a member of the KGB, "but his role is not important and he works mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."
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4. KGB Handlers of AgentsA reflection of NOSENKO's defection was seen in KGB's handling of the subject of a lead received from NOSENKO and a double agent.* on 31 March 1964, was questioned by two of the KGB officers about possible surveillance and was asked to provide passport photographs so that "escape" documents could be supplied to him and his family. At this same meeting, the KGB officers announced that was being put on reserve status for an unspecified period and told him that this decision had been made about two months earlier (i.e., about the time of NOSENKO's defection). At the next meeting in November 1964, the Soviet handlers admitted to that they had "some connection" with NOSENKO. Although NOSENKO probably could not identify as a KGB agent, they said, there was a possibility that he knew "what we [the KGB] are doing in Canada."Also, in Paris, Sergeant Robert JOHNSON was told of NOSENKO's defection by his KGB case officer and was instructed to destroy anything which could identify him with Soviet Intelligence. Although the Soviet told JOHNSON that there was nothing to worry about, he was evidently disturbed by the defection, JOHNSON said.*** See Part VI.D.5.c. for full details of the** See Part VI.D.3.c. for a discussion of the JOHNSON case.TOP SECRET
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# IV. NON-KGB ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S LIFE## A. IntroductionThe biography of NOSENKO is built largely upon his own statements to CIA, but certain portions of it have been substantiated (as well as contradicted) by other Soviet sources. Given first below is the NOSENKO autobiography for the period preceeding his entry into the KGB, then follows a summary of his statements about his non-professional life since becoming a KGB officer, and finally there is presented a review of what other sources have said on these subjects. A separate section of this paper, Part V, discusses NOSENKO's career in the KGB.## B. NOSENKO's Pre-KGB AutobiographyAlthough several other sources have since NOSENKO's defection furnished fragmentary information concerning NOSENKO's early personal history, NOSENKO himself has, of course, been the principal source on this topic. He volunteered information during the 1962 meetings, during debriefings in early 1964, and under interrogation in April 1964, in 1965, and in 1966. These various accounts are arranged in separate columns in the following table, and they are organized chronologically from NOSENKO'S birth to his alleged entry into the KGB. The first column in the table contains statements which NOSENKO made during the June 1962 meetings in Geneva; these were taken from the transcripts of the meetings and, for the most part, are in NOSENKO's own words. The column headed "1964," derived from the April 1964 interrogation, reflects a number of changes in his story before and during that interrogation. Most of the information given in the "1965" column was taken from discussions with NOSENKO, mainly on his early years, by a CIA psychologist in May of that year; however, material from the February 1965 interrogation and from DERYABIN's interrogation in July and August has also been included when it was not covered in the psychologist's questioning and when NOSENKO signed protocols certifying his statements to be correct. The "April 1966" column is comprised of remarks by NOSENKO in a signed autobiography submitted to CIA at that time. The final column presents the results of the October 1966 interrogation as they pertain to NOSENKO's early life. From column to column appear inconsistencies and contradictions with regard to dates and locations furnished by NOSENKO, although in 1964, again in 1965, and most recently in October 1966 NOSENKO has said that he was "now" telling the truth. The table shows where he has admitted having previously lied about certain events and where he seems to have forgotten his earlier statements to CIA about the occurrence of other events affecting his life.This tabulation of NOSENKO's autobiography concludes in Part V.A., in which are quoted the various dates and circumstances concerning his entry into the KGB which NOSENKO has given in 1962, 1964, 1965, and 1966.
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June 1962"I was born in Nikolayev, my father worked as a senior mechanic ata plant and took evening courses. Then he graduated from the Nikolayev Ship-building Institute.""lly father was sent to Leningrad, to the Sudomekh plant, a small plant in Leningrad. He was at the plant for half a year and then became director. This was 1936-1937. Then he was sent to the Baltic Shipyard in Leningrad as Chief Engineer. lle was there less than a year."1964Born 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, Ukraine, USSR, where he lived with family until 1934.In 1934, at age six, entered the "zero" (nulevoy) class, equivalent to kindergarten, in Nikolayev.Moved to Leningrad in 1935, where father was first appointed chief engineer and later director of Sudomekh. Lived at several addresses and attended several schools. [Note: Soviet press stated elder SENKO was chief engincer of "several enterprises" in Leningrad during49. 1965Born 1927 in Nikolayev where father was a student at the Shipbuilding Institute. Father from simple peasant background, while mother's parents were nobility.(May)Entered the "zero" class in Nikolayev in September 1934, two months before his seventh birthday. (May)Moved to Leningrad, probably in spring of 1935. Attended three years of school there, completing First Class in 1935-36, Second Class in 1936-37, and Third Class in 1937-38. (May)April 1966"I, NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich, was born 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, an oblast center in the Ukrainian Republic of Soviet Russia.""In September 1934, in Nikolayev, I entered the 'zero' class. My father was already in Ieningrad, where he was working at the Sudomekh Shipyard.""Shortly thereafter he [father] found an apartment and, interrupting my studies, I travelled to Leningrad with my mother. I did not begin studies in the First Class until September 1935 as there were no 'zero' classes in the Leningrad schools. I finished the Third Class in Leningrad in 1938."October 1966Born 1927 in Nikolayev, the son of Ivan Isidorovicn NOSENKO and Tamara Georgievna NOSENKO.Lived in Leningrad from 1935 to 1938.
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# TOP SECRETJune 1962"In 1938 my father was assigned to Moscow as Deputy Peoples' Commissar. I was only a little boy. In 1939 he was appointed Peoples' Commissar, later Minister, of the Shipbuilding Industry and remained such until his death in 1956."19641935-1937; became director of Baltic Shipyard in 1938.]NOSENKO's father was appointed First Deputy to the Peoples' Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry and then became Commissar. Family returned to Moscow, and NOSENKO entered 10-year school located on Ulitsa Bol'shaya Polyanka. [Note: Soviet press reported that I.I. NOSENKO became Deputy Commissar in 1939 and Commissar in 1940.]Completed the Sixth Class at School No. 585. Went to Sochi with parents for vacation and was there when war broke out. Returned to Moscow the next day.50. 1965In 1938 the elder NOSENKO 'was named First Deputy to the Peoples' Commissar of Shipbuilding and the family returned to Moscow. NOSENKO entered a school on Bol'shaya Polyanka. lle completed the Fourth Class in 1938-1939 and the fifth class in 1939-1940. (May)NOSENKO finished the Sixth Class at the 10-year school on Bol'shaya Polyanka during the 1940-1941 academic year. Then he travelled on vacation to Sochi, where the family stayed at a "rest home" of the Council Ministers. Learned of war's outbreak on the radio while thereApril 1966"In 1938 my father was summoned to Moscow and he began to work in the Peoples' Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry. Having finished the Third Class, I moved to Moscow with my mother at the end of the summer."October 1966"In 1941 I completed the Sixth Class at the 585th middle school and went to Sochi for a vacation with my father and mother. On 21 June, during our vacation in the south, the war began and for this reason my parents and I returned to Moscow the next day."