Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 129]
24. Mel'niker Serypy – a chief of very intelligence of 7 Flict in 1950-57.27. Namgaladze - a general, a chief of very intelligence at Black sex, 1950-5228. Sergeyso - an engineer – bonicelined, a senior officer of the wary intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1957-52 (earlier he worked in Turkey).29. Suslovich - in 1850-52 a commander of navy radio detachment of the wary intelligence of 7 Flict.30. Srishshunor - an officer of hill, worked in the USA, best years in India, from where was recalled.31. Tishkin - a rear-admiral, in 1850-52 a deputy chief of the wary intelligence of the ministry of military wary.32. Vasilevskiy Yuri - works in GMI, son of a marshal of USSR.33. Voronker Albert - an officer of the wary intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1952.34. Vorontser Michael - a vice-admiral, a former chief of navy intelligence (1950-52)35. Yershov - an officer of personnel of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52, knows a chinese language.SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 130]
The 16 of March, 1951 was sizued an order about my appointment as a interpreter of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in Soviet harbour, Primorskiy district., where I have gon by a train and arrived in the place of my appointment in the end of March. (I went from Moscow to Khabarovsk, where changed a train to Komsomolsk-on-Amur, then crossed the river and from station Pivan went to Soviet harbour (station Pyatisotka).> [Figure: A hand-drawn map indicating routes and locations. Key locations include 'Bay Vanino', 'Bay Postovaya', 'Settlement Zhilderbat', 'City Soviet Harbour', and 'Island Sakhalin', with arrows indicating travel paths.]The intelligence of 7 Fleet was located in bay Postovaya, here were also Political directory of 7 Fleet, submarine's and destroyer's bases.The headquarters of 7 Fleet was located in settlement Zhilderbat.The commander-in-chief of 7 Fleet was admiral Baykov Ivan I.2 chief of staff - vice-admiral Lisatonov. 6001128The chief of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet was captain of 1 rank Mel'nikov Sergey K., dis deputies - captain of 2 rank Bogdanovskiy
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 131]
(agents department), caption & transits Khajtor Semen S. (information department), captain of Pratik Kenker (navy intelligence), colonok Burchenko (a commissar).I was working in the information department. Officers Kasalince, Efimov were working in this department. Other officers of the intelligence were lieutenant-colonel Sirgiyit, lieutenant Veronker Albert, major Esher, ca stains Orekhov, Kediener, Pegedin, Bespalov and 3-4 more officers. There were also seargents and privates.At the end of April, 1952 I flew in Moserré (stopping for 1-2 days in Khabarovski) for a lease.In June - July 1952 a personnel department of the navy intelligence (a chief - colonel Kaloshin) was deciding a question about my transference because of illness. And I was appointed in the navy intelligence point of navy intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovetsk (located before a peninsula to Baltiysk - former Pillau), where I arrived in August, 1952. (Kaliningrad's district- former Prussia).Soviet is a little city-village, a former german village of fish- ermen, it seems had a name Fishhausen.Sovetsk - a demolished little town, here therechizze à nosy intelligence point and 1-2Others military detachments (buildingbattalion).Baltiysk was a base and headquarters of 4 Fleet.-G001129SECRETBaltiyskSovetskBaltiysk
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 132]
The commander-in-chief of 14 Fleet was admiral Gelovke H. J.The chief of my 1-cy intelligence point was captain of 2 rank Ryngartier.Here were officers: Vinograder, Bulakh, Limchonko and others with sergeants and privates.before my arrival (2 days) this navy intelligence point was transferred from east germany in Soviet. If in Germany the work of the point was connected with agent's work, now there was another test - a preparation of agent-observation post in a case of not war (3-4 persons each post). - an absolutely monkey business.In the end of December I took a leave sensing it will my illness, but having in mind a transference in another place.In mid of March, 1953 I began to work in 2 chief directory of hylh (former MGB).0001130SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 133]
SECRETB. NOSENKO DID NOT ENTER THE KGB IN THEMANNER OR AT THE TIME HE CLAIMEDSECRET![Excluded from declassification] 0001131
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 134]
SECRETB. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed. (Previous conclusion)The above is conclusion "B" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO entered the then Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and that his entry was not only facilitated by but due to the influence of General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.Previous statements by NOSENKO and changes relative to date of entry into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary and will not be repeated here. His statements during current interviews that he entered on duty in mid-March 1953 as a case officer in the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are considered adequately substantiated and should be accepted.The conclusion of the previous summary (pages 61-74) that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed was primarily based on conflicting statements by NOSENKO as to when he entered the KGB (MVD). In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in 1965 NOSENKO again said March 1953, soon after the death of STALIN.SECRET![GROUP 1 Exciated trem automatic downgrading and declassification]0001132
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 135]
# SECRETIn 1964, NOSENKO had given two dates in 1952 as his time of entry into the KGB in an effort not to admit that he had failed to graduate from the Institute of International Relations in 1949.The previous summary gave considerable weight to the statements of NOSENKO indicating that he did not enter the KGB (MVD) under what are considered normal KGB procedures. Proper allowances were not given for position of the father of NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding, and the influence of General KOBULOV. An analyst can either accept or reject the statement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB (MVD) through the influence of General KOBULOV; but, if the statement is accepted, then the failure of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal KGB procedures should also be accepted. A Communist society or a Soviet Intelligence organization is not and could not be immune to influence by a high official. General KOBULOV as of mid-March 1953 was First Deputy to BERIYA, the Minister of the then MVD.The previous summary raises several points concerning the eligibility of NOSENKO for the KGB (MVD). It points out on page 67 that other than his undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU, he was no more eligible for a KGB appointment in 1953 than he was at the time of his previous rejection in 1950. This statement is not contro- vertible and is fully accepted with the qualification that in 1950 NOSENKOSECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 136]
was not sponsored by any person of influence as was the case in 1953with General KOBULOV who in mid-March 1953 was the First Deputyto BERIYA.The previous summary also states that according to KGBdefectors familiar with the standards in force at the time, no candidatewas accepted who had ever had tuberculosis. This is a flat statementwhich it is doubtful any defector or series of defectors could fullysubstantiate; namely, that it never happened. Until and unless it ismedically proven that NOSENKO did not have tuberculosis, it is acceptedthat he did have tuberculosis in 1952 and was at a sanitarium -- rest.place in Kubinka. It is also accepted that he was an officer in the KGBafter mid-March 1953. The influence of KOBULOV could undoubtedlyhave permitted NOSENKO to enter the KGB even though he previouslyhad tuberculosis, but the flat statement that no candidate was accepted whohad ever had tuberculosis is not and cannot be sufficiently substantiated.The previous summary contained a number of additional remarksand conclusions intended to show that NOSENKO was not eligible for andtherefore could not have entered the KGB (MVD). Comments concerningthese will be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis atthis time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB(MVD) as an officer in mid-March 1953. A comment was made thatSECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 137]
NOSENKO did not take a physical examination in connection with his processing for KGB entry, and that such a medical examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing of a KGB candidate. This statement makes no allowance for the influence of General KOBULOV; but, in addition, does not consider the fact that the Naval RU dossier on NOSENKO was available to the KGB (MVD)..The previous summary also failed to note that the MVD would have had independent information in regard to NOSENKO since the MVD would have conducted any necessary inquiry in connection with the entry of NOSENKO into the Naval RU. As of 1953, the MVD undoubtedly also had a dossier on the father of NOSENKO since this was still the STALIN era.The summary also states that NOSENKO did not complete the necessary lengthy Anketa before entry into the KGB (MVD) and did not speak to any personnel officers or visit the personnel office. It would seem that the influence of General KOBULOV could have permitted the elimination of most if not all of the necessity of complying with normal procedures, but NOSENKO has during interviews stated that he completed the Anketa while sitting at his desk after entry into the KGB (MVD).Page 70 of the previous summary states that NOSENKO did not know the designation of his own Directorate either at the time he allegedlySECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 138]
entered on duty or during his first year of KGB service. WhileNOSENKO has claimed that the designation of his Directorate at thetime he entered the KGB (MVD) in mid-March 1953 was the SecondChief Directorate and that it subsequently was redesignated theFirst Chief Directorate, DERYABIN has stated this reversal ofdesignations occurred in March 1953.STALIN died in early March 1953 and that same month theMVD and the MGB were merged under the name MVD with BERIYAas Minister. BERIYA held this position until his arrest in early June1953. BERIYA was succeeded by KRUGLOV, who held office for lessthan a year. Yuriy RASTVOROV was recently queried concerning thedate of the reversal of the designation of the FCD and SCD and placesit as the end of April or early May 1953. GOLITSYN has indicated thatthe change occurred "soon after the advent of BERIYA as head of theMVD in April 1953." In the light of our inability to fix the effective dateof the reversal of the designations of the SCD and the FCD, it isunreasonable to impugn NOSENKO on his statement as to the designationof his Directorate at the time of his entry into the KGB (MVD).There is a disagreement between NOSENKO and others as to whowas responsible for the reversal of designations of the FCD and the SCD.NOSENKO is of the opinion that it occurred under KRUGLOV, which is5SECRET0001136
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 139]
in conflict with the statements of DERYABIN, RASTVOROV andGOLITSYN, all of whom maintain that BERIYA was responsible forthe changes. As for the issue of who was responsible for the reversalof designations, it would appear that NOSENKO is in error. However,the fact that he was a new junior officer and that this was a period ofupheaval in the KGB (MVD) effectively eliminates any significance inthis issue.NOSENKO is criticized in the previous summary for not knowingthe location of the Chief Directorate of the Militia or the history of theKI (Committee of Information). NOSENKO has stated that he had nocontacts with either office during 1953-1955 and there is no adequate reasonto disbelieve this statement. He is not aware of when the KI ceased toexist (1951 given in the summary, but other information indicates the KIcontinued to exist in a nominal capacity until the mid-1950's), but careshould be used in stating what NOSENKO should know if he held a certainposition. Readers of this summary may wish to reflect on their ownmemory concerning the location and their knowledge of Agency facilities atany given period of time or when Agency components or related organizationswere organized or ceased to exist.6SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 140]
The point has also been made that any career of NOSENKO in the KGB should have ended or he should have at least encountered difficulty when his benefactor General KOBULOV, together with the brother of General KOBULOV, was arrested with the BERIYA group in early June 1953. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he encountered no difficulties but is aware that the KOBULOV connection was discussed by an officer from the Personnel Directory with an official of the First Department. Under other circumstances NOSENKO would very possibly have encountered difficulty; but, it should be noted that the father of NOSENKO retained his position, that NOSENKO only met General KOBULOV through his father, and that NOSENKO has stated that although his father knew General KOBULOV, his father could in no way be considered a member of the BERIYA group.SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 141]
SECRETC. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSYSECTION THROUGHOUT THE 1953 - 1955 PERIODAS HE CLAIMED![En amatic Talag and]SECRET0001139
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 142]
SURETC. NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953 - 1955 period as he claimed. (Previous conclusion)The above is conclusion "C" in the previous summary. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section (American Embassy Section), First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 when he was transferred to the Seventh Department, SCD.This period of time has been covered in detail with NOSENKO during current interviews. The conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the First Section but was *not a very effective* officer and that both his work and behavior were decidedly influenced by the fact that he was the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding. NOSENKO is reluctant to admit that he was other than slightly lackadaisical in his work during this period of time, but is not hesitant to admit that his personal behavior was such as to cause him to be removed as Secretary to the Komsomol unit in 1954 and to cause an unsatisfactory "characterization"SECRET0001140![Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 143]
to be prepared in early 1955 which necessitated a decision as to whether he would be fired from the KGB or transferred to some other component.The influence of his family is quite apparent in the above since his father was advised of his difficulties in 1954 by an official of the KGB and his mother interceded on his behalf in 1955 with the Chief of SCD. The result in 1955 was that NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department and not fired from the KGB.The question has been raised as to how NOSENKO could remain in the KGB when after 1954 he was not a member of the Komsomol and was not eligible to become a candidate for the Communist Party. This is a valid question but a plausible explanation is again the fact that he was the son of the then Minister of Shipbuilding.NOSENKO has stated during previous and current interviews that following his entry into the KGB and until circa mid-1954 he was responsible for work against American correspondents in Moscow. He has not claimed that he had any successes and has stated that the work with newspaper correspondents already recruited was being handled by other officers. NOSENKO has explained that during this time he was a "new officer, " indicating he could hardly have been expected to act as an experienced officer. His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during this period of time, together with his knowledge of other KGB officers and his2SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 144]
information concerning his own agents is believed of sufficient weight to accept the statement of NOSENKO that work against American cor- respondents was his assignment from mid-March 1953 to mid-1954.From circa mid-1954 until his transfer to the Seventh Depart- :ment in late May 1955, NOSENKO claims and has claimed he was an officer of the First Section with the responsibility of work against the Military Attaches (Army) at the United States Embassy in Moscow. It is considered, based on his knowledge of the various Military Attache personnel and other collateral information furnished by NOSENKO, that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section during the mid-1954 - late May 1955 period of time, that his primary work was against members of the Office of the Military Attache, but that the quality of his work undoubtedly left much to be desired.In circa mid-1954, NOSENKO was removed as Secretary of the Komsomol unit and by early 1955 his performance was such that at least certain officials in the First Department desired his removal from the First Department, if not the KGB. Under these circumstances, NOSENKO could be criticized as having been a very poor if net undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during this period of time and his knowledge of the members of the Office of36001142SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 145]
SECRETthe Military Attache supports the claim of NOSENKO that he was anofficer of the First Section with the indicated assignment as relatedby him.NOSENKO has stated that the work against the MilitaryAttaches was not primarily directed toward development of recruitmentpossibilities, but was directed toward control of the Military Attacheson trips in order to prevent observation of sensitive areas, sensitivesites or sensitive activities in the USSR. This attitude by the KGBwould appear to be completely plausible and NOSENKO noted asexceptional in this regard the recruitment attempt against Captain WaiterMULE. NOSENKO explained this exception as retaliation for approachesto Soviets in the United States in that period.NOSENKO has been criticized because he did not know all thedetails concerning the Military Attaches which it was considered heshould have known if he had the specific responsibility for work againstthe Military Attaches during the indicated period of time. It is submittedthat this may be evidence of his failure to satisfactorily fulfill his4SECRET0001143
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 146]
...signed functions, it makes no allowance for the uncertain person...status of NOSENKO whose actual future in the KGB was in jeopardy after mid-1954.NOSENKO has previously indicated and still indicates a definite lack of knowledge concerning his assigned targets during approximately March - May 1955. This, according to NOSENKO, was when an unsatisfactory "characterization" was being prepared on NOSENKO, a decision was being made on his case, and a period of time in which he went on a "big drunk" which culminated in his spending about 40 days under hospital care because of the possibility of recurrence of his previous tuberculosis.Pages 84 - 87 of the previous summary suggest that NOSENKO had not furnished sufficient details about his alleged agent network for use against the Military Attaches. It is considered that NOSENKO in current interviews has furnished adequate acceptable results, and as an example furnished specific information concerning "RODINA and RAMZES" (page 85), I would appear that there was no intent by NOSENKO to withhold information concerning these individuals, but rather that he was never asked to amplify his previous casual reference to these individuals.5SECRET0001144
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 147]
The effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was an officer in the First Section during this period of time. It is felt that information furnished by NOSENKO in current interviews and in previous interviews is of sufficient scope and detail that his claimed service as an officer in the First Section during this period of time is completely acceptable.6SECRET0001145
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 148]
![photo of a document page]
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 149]
SECRETD. DURING THE PERIOD 1955-1960, HE WAS NEITHER ASENIOR CASE OFFICER IN, NOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF,THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT AMERICAN-BRITISHCOMMONWEALTH SECTIONSECRET> [Figure: A stamp with text CRCP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]0001147
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 150]
SECRETD. During the period of 1955-1960, NOSENKO was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department, American-British Commonwealth Section. (Previous conclusion)The above is conclusion "D" in the previous summary. The current conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the Seventh Department, SCD, from late May 1955 to December 1959 and was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh Department from 1958 to December 1959.During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished extensive information concerning his own activities in the Seventh Department during the 1955-1959 period. Interviews of persons who were the subject of KGB interest collaterally confirm that NOSENKO was personally involved in certain claimed activities during 1955 to December 1959.These activities include among others the recruitment of Richard BURGI in June 1956, contact with Sir Allen LANE and Arthur BIRSE in the summer of 1957, the recruitment of Gisella HARRIS in 1958, the recruitment of George DREW in the spring of 1959, the recruitment ofSECRET000114851BR
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 151]
SECRET06William Stanley WILBY in June 1959, the recruitment of David TAYLOR in the summer of 1959, the recruitment of Gerard MERTENS in July - August 1959, and the recruitment of Arsene FRIPPED in 1959. The foregoing is not a complete list of all cases in which NOSENKO claims personal involvement, but is representative of cases in which his alleged participation has been confirmed by interviews with the individual who was the KGB target.06,06,06Sir Allen LANE, Arthur BIRSE, William Stanley WILBY, and David TAYLOR were British citizens and the other above-named individuals were United States citizens. This would seem to substantiate the claim of NOSENKO that during 1955 - December 1959 he was an officer engaged in KGB operations against American-British Commonwealth tourists in the USSR.In addition, NOSENKO has furnished specific information about an operation against Martin MALIA, an American tourist who was in the Soviet Union from approximately September 1955 to December 1955. MALIA has not been interviewed and will not be interviewed, so at this time no particular 1955 case in which NOSENKO claims involvement or personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview of the individual involved.2SECRET000114910/8R