Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 152]
NOSENKO has furnished information on the travel of certain United States Government officials, including Congressional representatives to the USSR in 1955 - 1956; and the trip of Supreme Court Justice William O. DOUGLAS in 1955 which, when considered with the previously mentioned specifics, adequately substantiate his *claimed* service in the Seventh Department and work against American-British Commonwealth tourists during the late May 1955 - December 1959 period.NOSENKO has stressed that when he transferred to the Seventh Department, the Tourist Section had just been established and an agent network was not *vailable* for operations against American and British tourists. This seems quite logical since the influx of tourists into the USSR was just in a formative stage.NOSENKO has spoken in detail about an agent network he developed after 1955 which primarily consisted of Intourist personnel and two homosexual agents, "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" (KGB code names), whose extensive use in KGB operations has been confirmed by interviews with individuals who were the subject of homosexual compromise operations.The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 in regard' to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of NOSENKO. To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 153]
SECRETpages would be repetitious and in many instances superfluous. It is considered that even if the statements were accepted in toto, there would stili not be an adequate basis for a conclusion that NOSENKO was not an officer in the claimed positions in the Seventh Department during the period of late May 1955 December 1959. Nor is it conceded that, if all the sub-conclusions and the interpretations of various areas of information were accepted without qualification, there is any evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. However, there are certain assumptions and interpretations which appeared in the previous summary which are particularly worthy of comment and which are considered erroneous or require additional clarification.On page 145 it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENKO was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counter-intelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign agents among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate, KGB, and the MVD have used homosexual and heterosexual compromise in numerous known (and presumably unknown) successful recruitments and recruit-ment attempts. This activity has not been limited to the Seventh Depart-ment, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO was "only an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not a KGB en4SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 154]
considered with the detailed information NOSENKO has provided on Seventh Department personnel, activities, procedures, and topics of a similar nature is not considered to have any foundation in fact.Page 145 of the above summary lists eleven operations which were Seventh Department cases prior to 1960 and which were included in the notes furnished to CIA in 1964 by NOSENKO. The named operations were those against Bernard PECHTER, Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE, 06,06,06,06,06,06,06,06 Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, (inu) KARLOV, Norman FISK, Ralph MATLAW Marvin KANTOR, Michael GINSBURG, and William 06,06 TARASKA The criticism made in regard to the above eleven cases was that NOSENKO could not describe the individual operations other than to say that he had recorded the name of the target and such details as he could acquire when he reviewed the activities of the Seventh Department in 1962 following his return from the First Department.The notes brought out by NOSENKO are considered in another section of this summary, but it should be noted here that a full review of all of the notes of NOSENKO currently available indicates that his statements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notes are completely plausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished by NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approximately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 155]
During current interviews, NOSENKO furnished specificinformation on certain of the above eleven cases, including WilliamTARASKA, Bernard PECHTER, Michael GINSBURG and John RUF.It should also be noted that certain of the cases such as Marvin KANTORand William TARASKA were cases in which the tourist was visitingrelatives in the Soviet Union and that NOSENKO has given a satisfactoryexplanation of how he learned of the KANTOR case. NOSENKO has, indiscussing his duties as Deputy Chief of the American-British Common-wealth Section, also explained that if a tourist indicated that he intendedto visit relatives in the USS, the case automatically was assigned to agroup of officers in the Section who reported directly to the Chief ofSection and were not under the supervision of NOSENKO.NOSENKO has stated that he noted the names of three of theindividuals when retiring the files of "GRIGORIY" and "SHMELEV," two homosexual agents of NOSENKO previously mentioned. NOSENKOhas explained that "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" had the assignment ofidentifying American travelers with homosexual tendencies, that theyhad contact with numerous Americans, and that they had homosexualactivity with individuals on whom they reported but on whom no overtaction was taken by the Seventh Department. In some cases the individualSECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 156]
SECRETwas not considered a worthwhile target and in others the information was just maintained for possible use at a later date if the individual returned to the USSR.NOSENKO has also explained how he learned of the Patrick PRESSMAN and Gerald SEVERN cases; and, the listing of the Sofia SHATTAUER case in connection with the 1955 - 1959 period is in complete error since page 427 of the previous summary contains information from NOSENKO on her recruitment in 1962. During current interviews the notes which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discussed in detail with NOSENKO. He has given a detailed explanation of the material which he brought out and his explanation of all aspects is very convincing.The previous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement of NOSENKO in certain cases being handled by other Sections in the Seventh Department or by the KGB Directorate of Moscow was unusual. An examination of the cited cases does not indicate that his participation was unusual, but rather that his explanation of why he was involved is logical and normal. No consideration was previously given to the English language capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents were used in two of the four cited cases.The summary also noted that there was a question concerning whether Gisella HARRIS was necessarily a Seventh Department case.7SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 157]
SECRETThis question seems quite superfluous since HA. was in the USSR on a tourist visa and "real" tourists are the responsioility of the Seventh Department. Departmental responsibility within the SCD for an individual traveling in the USSR is decided on the basis of how the individual is traveling; i.e., whether on a tourist visa, as a member of a delegation, as the invitee of an organization in the USSR, as a former diplomat stationed in Moscow, as a diplomat not previously stationed in Moscow, as a member of the Cultural Exchange program, as a student attending a university in the USSR, etc. There are also various other factors which affect the determination of which Department or organizational component of the SCD has the responsibility for a tourist case. These factors include whether the individual is already suspected of foreign intelligence connections and whether the individual is a businessman. In addition, certain actual tourists in the USSR may never become the responsibility of the SCD if the individual is of specific interest to the FCD.On pages 148 - 149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at least some of the substance of the information furnished by George BLAKE in regard to the CIA-MI-6 program of utilizing tourist agents in the USSR. This criticism completely ignored the fact that NOSENKO made several references in 1962 to the KGB having such informationSECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 158]
SECRETalthough he did then and still suspects that William VASSALL was the source. The references by NOSENKO to the KGB having such information were not developed in 1962 or later interrogations, and it was not until current interviews that it was established that NOSENKO had actually seen excerpts of information passe by George BLAKE.According to NOSENKO, the information which was obviously only partial was furnished to the FCD by the SCD and could only have come from an agent.The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 CIA acquired a lengthy Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union (document was furnished by GOLITSYN following his defection in December 1961). It was noted that the summary contained references to certain 1958 - 1959 tourists whom the KGB counter-intelligence identified as American agents and noted that NOSENKO claimed he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB identified no American Intelligence agents during this period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 159]
NOSENKO has never claimed to know all activities againstAmerican travelers in the Soviet Union during 1958-1959. Manyof these travelers would have been the responsibility of a section inthe Seventh Department, other than the American-British Commen-wealth Section, or another Department in the SCD. NOSENKO wasquite aware that certain of the American tourists in 1958 1959 wereactir.g suspiciously from a KGB point of view.NOSENKO has stated he was aware that a document which theSeventh Department had prepared and furnished to the FCD in an effortto obtain further assistance from the FCD in the work against touristshad been compromised by GOLITSYN. NOSENKO stated he was not inthe Seventh Department when the document was prepared and did notreview the document until after the defection of GOLITSYN and foliow-ing advice from the FCD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that thedocument had been compromised. The document furnished by GOLITSYNhas never been reviewed with NOSENKO to determine if it containedadditional information not in the document which he was aware hadbeen prepared by the Seventh Department for the FCD.NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity witha number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished byGOLITSYN. In current interviews, however, the description MOOSENKO10SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 160]
concerning the distribution of responsibilities within the SOD for various categories of foreign visitors to the USSR provides a logical explanation for his unfamiliarity. Previous problems in this regard appear to have stemmed from a misconception of the meaning of the term "*tourist*" as used by the KGB. This special term has a specific meaning in the Second Chief Directorate; namely, a "*tourist*" is a foreigner travelling to the USSR on a tourist visa. Such a person was the responsibility of the Tourist Section of the Seventh Department. A large number of travelers to the USSR, including business-men, persons travelling on invitation of a Soviet organization, students attending a university, etc., are not tourists in the KGB concept and would not be the responsibility of the Tourist Section of the Seventh Department.The only unresolved problem considered of any significance in regard to the 1955-1959 period is the account by NOSENKO of the presence of American citizen [John SHUBIN] in the USSR as a tourist in the late 1950's. The previous summary pointed out that, since [John SHUBIN] did not have a valid United States passport between 1940 and June 1961, it was impossible for him to have been a tourist under true name in the USSR and, therefore, a target of the Seventh Department, as NOSENKO claims. Although several avenues of possibly fruitful investigation have not yet been fully explored, there is no
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 161]
assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All thatjustifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the storyof NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why suchinaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch,or for that matter as indicative that he was not Deputy Chief of theAmerican-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Departmentin 1958-1959; neither would such an inaccuracy reflect on his claimedservice in 1962 - 1963 in the Seventh Department.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 162]
SECRETE. NOSENKO WAS NEITHER DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AMERICANEMBASSY SECTION NOR A SENIOR OFFICER ORSUPERVISOR IN THE SECTION DURING THEPERIOD 1961 - 1962 (sic)![GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification image]SECRET0001160
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 163]
SECRETE. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period of 1961 - 1962 (sic). (Previous conclusion)It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO held the position of Deputy Chief, First Section (American Embassy Section), SCD, from January 1960 - December 1961.The claim of NOSENKO that he held the above position in 1960 - 1961 has been the most *difficult* claimed position of NOSENKO to satisfactorily resolve and accept. Acceptance or nonacceptance of his claim to have held this particular position is a critical factor in a decision as to whether the remainder of his claimed KGB career is valid. It is believed reasonable to presume that if NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh Department, prior to December 1959 in the absence of any indication that he was demoted, he should have been at least a Deputy Chief of Section during 1960 - 1961.Position in the SCD, KGB, and throughout the KGB is important from a monetary point of view as well as a prestige point of view. IfSECRET0001161
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 164]
NOSENKO was only in the First Section as a Senior Case Officer in 1960-1961, this would have been a demotion in position with resultant loss of both money and prestige. For this reason alone, his failure to have held the position of Deputy Chief in 1960- 1961 would raise considerable doubt as to whether he held his claimed position prior to 1960, as well as whether he held his claimed positions in 1962 - 1953.It is apparent that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning all aspects of activity in the First Section, First Department, during 1960 - 1961 is incomplete when judged by what are considered the normal responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA. During current interviews, an effort was made to determine what the responsibilities of NOSENKO actually were in 1960-1961 and whether his statements in this area were impossible or could be accepted as not negating his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section.According to NOSENKO, in the early 1960's there were only approximately fifteen Deputy Chiefs of Section in the entire SCD and in certain departments none of the sections had a Deputy Chief of Section. In addition, transfer of a Deputy Chief of Section was not always followed by a replacement in kind, according to NOSENKO who stated that he was not replaced by another Deputy Chief when he transferred to the First Section, First Department.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 165]
According to NOSENKO, there was not a job description for a Deputy Chief of Section and the duties of the particular Deputy Chief were in actuality what the Chief of Department and Chief of Section decided would be his assigned duties.The previous summary drew attention to an apparent conflict between early statements of NOSENKO that he replaced no one when he entered on duty in the First Section, First Department, and his subsequent claim that he replaced Mikhail BAKHVALOV as Deputy Chief in the First Section. Along with this he had first credited KOVSHUK and various other officers in the Section with previous responsibility for certain matters which were assigned to him upon his arrival there, then later stated that BAKHVALOV had been responsible for these matters. The previous summary noted that interrogation had never resolved these contradictions.In the light of the present clearer picture of the nature of a Deputy Chief of Section, the statements of NOSENKO on BAKHVALOV and on the issue of who he, NOSENKO, did or did not replace are not contradictory. There is no reason to question that BAKHVALOV, with whom NOSENKO, incidentally, did not overlap, was a Deputy Chief of Section in the First Section before NOSENKO, and that he was responsible for certain areas which later fell to NOSENKO. On the other> [Figure: A "SECRET" stamp is seen]
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 166]
hand, according to NOSENKO, the principal reason for his being assigned to the First Section was to concentrate on a new area of emphasis (code clerks). There could of course have been no specific predecessor for a substantively new area. Therefore, in one sense DAKHIVALOV was the predecessor of NOSENKO and in another sense he was not. The interpretation of the various statements of NOSENKO on this issue as being in conflict appears to be the result of confusion on this point by all concerned.According to NOSENKO, at the time of his transfer to the First Section, First Department, in early 1960, he had not been told and for a short period thereafter was not told what his actual duties would be. KOVSHUK, Chief of the First Section, wanted to assign NOSENKO to supervise the work against Service Attaches at the United States Embassy. NOSENKO felt that the proposed assignment by KOVSHUK was intended to keep NOSENKO occupied with nonproductive work since KGB policy for work against the Service Attaches was primarily one of control on trips and not active work towards possible recruitment.After a short period of time, NOSENKO was informed by GRIBANOV that he, NOSENKO, had been transferred to supervise the work against code clerks (also code machine mechanics) at the United States Embassy. GRIBANOV defined this work as being of the greatest
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 167]
importance, and the recruitment of code clurks as a priority aira of the KGB. KLYPIN, who was Chier of the Firs: Department, later re- peated the above and a group consisting of NOSENKO, Gernadiy 1. GRYAZNOV and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV was formed with NCSENKO responsible for supervision of the work. GRYAZNOV and KCSOLAPOV were not new KGB officers, but instead were experienced officers although both as Senior Case Officers were of lesser rank than NOSENKO. NOSENKO does not claim that he had to train either officer or to minutely scrutinize every action or proposed action of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO does claim he was responsible for supervision over their work.According to NOSENKO, GRBANOV omphasized that work against code clerks was to be his primary work in the First Section and that it would take precedence over any other activity. Other than work against code clerks, NOSENKO has generally defined his respon- sibilities as follows:(a) Responsibility for file of (work against) John ABIDIAN, Security Officer at United States Embassy.(b) Responsibility for preliminary review of re- ports from OTV (KGB technical unit) of "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 168]
(c) Responsibility for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy.(d) Acting in place of Vladislav KOVSHUK, Chief, First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent.As can be seen from the above, the responsibilities of NOSENKO, by his definition, which are borne out by specific information furnished by NOSENKO, would not coincide with the normal responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Branch or Section in CIA. An analyst can either accept or reject the theory that there is necessarily an equation between the responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA and the KGB, but if the analyst accepts the theory, he must offer some supporting evidence on this point.Pages 151 - 261 of the previous summary contained comments and conclusions and sub-conclusions in regard to the claimed service of NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961. The previous primary conclusion was that he was neither Deputy Chief of the First (American Embassy) Section nor a supervisor in that section. The conclusion of this summary is that he was Deputy Chief and had supervisory responsibilities for work against code clerks. The matter of the responsibility of NOSENKO for work against code clerks will be considered later. Comments will first be made on the responsibilities listed in (a) - (d) above.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 169]
Pages 205 - 222 of the previous summary contain a detailed basis for the previous conclusion that NOSENKO was not the KGB case officer for John ABIDIAN. The current conclusion is that he was the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN. Whether or not his work against ABIDIAN compared favorably with what is considered to be the MO of a responsible CIA case officer is immaterial; what is material is whether NOSENKO reasonably fulfilled the requirements of the XG3 for work against the particular target, John ABIDIAN. It is felt that the answer to this is that NOSENKO did.According to NOSENKO, the work against ABIDIAN was in the direction of determining if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV," and no consideration was given to active agent work against ABIDIAN for possible recruitment. This explanation by NOSENKO appears reasonable and logical and his knowledge of ABIDIAN and his description of his work against ABIDIAN should be considered only within that framework.Admittedly NOSENKO was unaware of a considerable amount of details regarding the background of ABIDIAN, but on the other hand if the statements of NOSENKO are accepted that the only aim of the KGB was to see if coverage of ABIDIAN would lead to "another POPOV," it follows that such personalia information on ABIDIAN would have had0001167SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 170]
little material value for the SCD. The SCD had advised the SCD prior to the arrival of ABIDIAN in the USSR that ABIDIAN was considered to be "American Intelligence," and in addition ABIDIAN assumed the Security Officer position formerly held by Russell A. LANGELLE, who was known by the KGB to be CIA. No investigation by the SCD was necessary to determine if ABIDIAN was "American Intelligence" or not.The previous summary, pages 213 - 216, contains some quite specific statements relative to ABIDIAN and a Soviet maid, a KGB operational contact according to NOSENKO, which are erroneous. This invalidates one of the bases for the previous conclusion that NOSENKO was not the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN.NOSENKO had previously stated that in circa October 1960 he prepared an operational plan on ABIDIAN which included continuation of the placing of Metka on the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN by his maid who is mentioned above, Tatyana FEDOROVICH. The statement is made in the summary that this could not be true because FEDOROVICH did not work part time for ABIDIAN until at least July 1961. ABIDIAN has recently been reinterviewed concerning the above and the results invalidate the previous conclusion that FEDOROVICH could not have treated the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN with Metka prior to July 1961.