Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 106]
extremely narrow Soviet compartmentation in such an operation -- a compartmentation which would exclude knowledgeability by any XC3 officer other than very senior pividual of group of action individuals specifically concerned with matters of this nature. The KGB career of NOSENKO would not permit even serious consideration that NOSENKO Comdy beca Atted into me above very limited category.It is accordingly concluded the possibility of a politically motivated free dispatch can in the case of NCSENKO be satisfactorily eliminated.The possibility has also been considered that the KGB might have theorized that by dispatching an agent, in this case an officer, with numerous leads to non-valuable or non-current KGB agents or cases, the facilities of the United States Intelligence community would be practically neutralized for an extended period of time. This could only be based on an assumption that the United States Intelligence community.would involve a major portion of its personnel and efforts in the investigation and resolution of cases which had little or no current or potential value to the KGB. The above possibility cannot be arbitrarily eliminated without full consideration. It is not believed that0001104SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 107]
NOSENKO in the absence of any evivace that he had any KC3 mission or missions to fulfill comes within the above category, particularly since an overall assessment of his information leads to the conclusion that full exploitation of his information would be quite damaging to the KGB. Consideration of the above possibility must also include an evaluation of the deterrent effect on the prospects of future recruiments by the KGB caused by legal action taken against individuals exposed by information from the dispatched agent or officer. The deterrent effect on others of the conviction and sentencing of persons who have committed a crime or crimes has long been a part of the legal theory of why persons who commit a crime should be imprisoned or punished.The deterrent effect on others of the trials and convictions of William VASSALL, Robert Lee JOHNSON and James Allen MMINTKEN-BAUCH should not be underestimated. The KGB aiso could not have known that information furnished by NOSENKO would not result in the trial and conviction of other KGB agents or recruitments concerning whom NOSENKO had some knowledge.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 108]
SECRETH. IS THERE ANY EVELENCE THAT THE CONTACTS CFNOSENKO IN 1962 OR IN 198 WITH CA WERE KNOWN TO ΤΗΣKGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR THAT NOSENKOWAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RELATIVE TO HIS BEHAVIOROR KGB OBJECTIVES DURING THESE CONTACTS ORAFTER HIS DEFECTION?SECRET> [Figure: Stamp with text "STF1P 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification"]0001106
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 109]
SECRETH. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection? The conclusion is that there is no evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection and that NOSENKO was never briefed in any manner by the KGB.The basis for the above conclusion is substantially contained in previous sections. It is being treated here as a separate area of interest since it is a sufficiently important area as to warrant individual consideration.It is recognized that since positive factual confirmation such as the KGB file on NOSENKO is not available, any conclusion concerning whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB can only be based on the full review of available information from NOSENKO, collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the individual analyst concerning the significance or non-significance of each item of available information.The conclusion that the contacts of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962 and 1964 prior to his defection were not known to the KGB isSECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 110]
# Seune.necessarily based in part on a judgment as to whether any of his activities or information logically warrant a substantial suspicion that they were or could be in any part the result of KGB direction or control. One of the particular areas considered was his apparent behavior during his contacts with CIA in June 1962 and the conclusion was that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGB control at that time.Consideration has been given to the possibility that his 1962 contacts with CIA were not known to the KGB, but became known to the KGB later and NOSENKO was doubled by the KGB. It was concluded that there was no basis for or information which would warrant serious consideration of the above possibility aside from the separate conclusion that the KGB would be very unlikely to reward a traiter in KGB eyes by sending him again to Geneva where he would be quite free to defect.Worthy of comment in this section is the fact that NOSENKO, during his 1962 contacts, expressed considerable concern over his personal security, requesting that knowledge concerning his identity be kept to an absolute minimum, that no communications be sent to the
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 111]
United States Embassy in Moscow concerning his contact with CIA and that he did not wish to be contacted and would not recognize any attempted contact within the Soviet Union. NOSENKO also furnished information as to the reason for his concern that no information regarding his contact with CIA become known in the United States Embassy in Moscow and the dangers to NOSENKO in any contact or attempted contact with NOSENKO in the USSR.It is recognized that the above indicated concern of NOSENKO about his personal security is not substantial evidence that NOSENKO was not under KGB control; however, it is evidence that NOSENKO was not in any way encouraging clandestine contact of NOSENKO within the USSR, which very likely would have been an aim of the KGB if NOSENKO was under KGB control.The material which NOSENKO furnished to CIA in 1964 has been carefully reviewed to determine if there is any evidence that the KGB participated in any way in the assembling of this rather unique collection of material. None of the material appears to have been of an accountable type and, on the contrary, it appears that NOSENKO could have furnished all of the material to CIA and returned to the Soviet Union without the KGB ever at a later date becoming aware that the material was actually missing.The latter statement even includes the travel document which authorized the trip of NOSENKO to Gorkiy in December 1963.00011C9SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 112]
The trip in December 1963, according to NOSENKO, was to participate in the search for Aleksandr CHEREPANOV. According to NOSENKO, this particular document was not accountable in that it was only necessary to turn it in when requesting reimbursement for travel expenses. NOSENKO stated that he had not claimed the rather small amount of money to which he was entitled and has also admitted that he really brought the document along because it gave him the indicated rank of Lieutenant Colonel.NOSENKO has completely retracted his claim to having had the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, stating that even as a Deputy Chief of Department he was only a Captain although he was entitled to and expected to receive the rank of Major in early 1964. NOSENKO has stated that giving him the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the above document was the error of KASHPEROV, the officer on duty in the SCD on Sunday, and that practically all Deputy Chiefs of Department in the SCD had at least the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.The above explanation by NOSENKO may well be considered by readers with at least a degree of skepticism. However, if NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, it would seem that he could have been provided with something a little more substantial to document his claim of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In addition, it would seem that the KGB![SECRET stamp]0001110
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 113]
could have provided NOSENKO with some type of document which would support at least one of his claimed positions in the SOD, KGB. Even the Cherepanov Papers do not in any way support the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, SOD, in 1960-1961, nor do they even support the claim of NOSENKO that there was such a position in the First Section in 1960 - 1961 or even in 1958 or 1959.50001111
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 114]
SECRETIV. COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONSIN REGARD TO NOSENKO![Stamp: Excluded from automatic declassification: Security and reclassification cases]SECRET 0001112
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 115]
# SECRET## COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS### IN REGARD TO NOSENKOAttached is a verbatim copy of pages 3.57-360 of the "Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" which contains seven (A - G) primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Navy Intelligence) and KGB career of NOSENKO. These conclusions or findings are independently treated in separate attachments.With the exception of "G," the conclusions in this summary are in direct conflict with the above conclusions and are basically that NOSENKO served in the Naval RU from March 1951 to early 1953, was a KGB officer from March 1953 until his defection in February 1964, and held his claimed positions in the *KGB during the March 1953 - February 1964 period.* For purposes of clarity, the term KGB is used to refer to the Committee for State Security and predecessor organizations unless otherwise indicated.Attachment:Cpy Pgs 357-360 of "Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector"
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 116]
SECRETPREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKOAS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF"THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR"The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been given the designation of A - G for purposes of easier correlation with other sections of this summary.)"SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONSCONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES""NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his *bona fides*. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 117]
SECRETenjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal short-comings, and whose defection, 'the greatest loss ever sufferedby Soviet Intelligence', paralyzed the work of KGBLegal Residency, and justified the formulation of plans to assas-.sinate him.""The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO'sbiography relevant to his claimed KGB service with knownfacts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects thetest to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts areinternally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whetherhe actually gained the information he has from occupying theKGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what hesays he is, according to his own accounts?""This examination had led to the following findings, arrivedat independently:A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RUin any of the capacities or at the places and times heclaimed.B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in themanner or at the time he claimed.C. NOSENKO did not serve in the AmericanEmbassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period ashe claimed.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 118]
D. During the period 1955-1960, he was neithera senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the SeventhDepartment American-British Commonwealth Section.E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of theAmerican Embassy Section nor a senior officer orsupervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962. (sic)F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chiefof the American-British Commonwealth Section and wasthereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, arenot credible.G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certaintythat the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnelbetween 1953 and nis defection in 1964.These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probabilityor certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidencein each instance.""The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidenceof NOSENKO's *bona fides*. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accountsof his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claimsas a whole unacceptabie. While truth and fact in this case frequently![Secret stamp]SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 119]
cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth andfact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtuallyany of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by fact or probability,or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO isnot what he claims to be, and thus he is not a *bona fide* defector.""Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a *bona fide*defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine hi's true motivesfor contacting American Intelligence and for providing the informationhe has given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largelyconsisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocalconclusions. Nevertheless, the question cannot be ignored. Thecharacter of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact thatsome of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials,and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's future allrequire that at least a provisional judgment be made.""Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO'Smisrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posingas a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that hesuffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he hasgreatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, forsimply personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGBagent."0001117SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 120]
The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That NOSENKO is not simply a swindler who falsely claims for personal advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident, we believe, from the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations which he has provided and which could only derive from within the KGB itself,"Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the product of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind."It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB officer who served in at least some of the components for some or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exaggerated his positions, rank and access to information, and invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to accommodate the fact that several KGB officers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior positions in the KGB. Also, NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV'8 patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be just a product of his own invention, since these were the subject of comment by other sources.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 121]
# SECRET"Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies, none of them renders it untenable. ""In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his information should be assessed accordingly."
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 122]
# SECRETA. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE NAVAL RUIN ANY OF THE CAPACITIES OR AT THE PLACES ANDTIMES HE CLAMED![CRO 1 Excluded tram atematle dsweraag aad declassicles stamp]SECRET0001120
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 123]
# SECRETA. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed. (Previous conclusion)The above is conclusion "A" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The current conclusion is that the claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas is adequately substantiated and should be accepted.The interrogations of NOSENKO prior to 1967 were complicated by NOSENKO changing the date of his graduation from the Institute of International Relations from 1950 to 1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949 with the majority of his class. However, previous efforts of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1962 statement that he graduated in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted significance was given to the 1949 - early 1953 period of time.It is considered that NOSENKO has adequately explained his "stupid blunders" as they relate to the above and to certain other personal matters and that his claimed service in Navy Intelligence from March![stamp of SECRET Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]0001121
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 124]
1951 to early 1953 both in the Far East and the Baltic area is fully acceptable. It is not considered necessary to comment concerning all of the remarks in the previous summary regarding the claimed Naval RU service of NOSENKO as reflected on pages 49-59 and remarks will, for purposes of brevity, be limited in scope.The statement is made in the previous summary that "The sole Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the Personnel Chief, Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no ranking officers in either the Baltic or Far East Intelligence Staffs. Some 30 GRU officers he did identify, by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service, but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or through his visits to Geneva."Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum voluntarily prepared by NOSENKO in late 1967 containing the names of a number of GRU personnel of whom he had some knowledge. The attached was not prepared as the result of any inquiry concerning his claimed Naval RU service, but was only a small part of the material prepared by NOSENKO at this time. The entire material included remarks by NOSENKO regarding approximately 875 KGB officers, 100 KGB agents, 35 GRU officers and 400 other Soviet nationals.2SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 125]
It is interesting to note that the attached list contains the names of approximately 20 GRU officers whom NOSENKO relates to the early 1950's period. In addition, NOSENKO has, during current interviews and in other memoranda, furnished the names of additional Navy Intelligence personnel whom he knew in the 1951 - early 1953 period.Page 52 of the above summary and other related pages question whether NOSENKO ever served in the Baltic area with Naval Intelligence and even question his geographical knowledge of the area. Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum with certain diagrams prepared by NOSENKO on 21 February 1968 concerning his assignment with Navy Intelligence in the Far East and the Baltic area. The memorandum was completed by NOSENKO without any reference material and a review of his diagrams indicates they are quite accurate.NOSENKO had previously stated that his service in the Baltic area was at Sovetsk Primorskiy and during current interviews recalled that the former name of the place, an almost deserted fishermen's village, was Fishausen. The previous designation given by NOSENKO for this place as having the mail address of Sovetsk Primorskiy had caused the conclusion that his alleged place of assignment was non-existent. A further check in the matter would have disclosed that the place was not nonexistent, that it is currently known as Primorsk and that the former German name of the fishing village was Fischhausen.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 126]
The previous summary also stated that despite his claimed active cornmissioned service in the Navy, NOSENKO knew nothing of Soviet Navy tradition, doctrines, or organization of procedures. It should be noted that there is a considerable difference between being a member of the Naval RU and being an actual member of the Soviet Navy. The situation could be compared to a career civilian employee of the Office of Naval Intelligence and a line officer in the United States Navy.Attachments:List of GRU Personnel as Prepared by NOSENKODiagrams and comments as Prepared by NOSENKO
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 127]
# skreneo Leonidtill 1952 or 1953 a deputy of chief of navy intelligence, then a chief of navy intelligence, later he was a deputy of chief of GRU (Sezer Ivan and Drashutin). I heard he was a navy attache in the USA.1.  Bespalov - a major, code-clerk of the navy intelligence of 4 fleet in Soviet farbové's region in 1957-1952.2.  Bogdanerskiy - sa deputy of chief- of the wary intelligence of 4 Fleet (on agents) in 1957-1952.3.  Bulakh – an officer of the navy intelligence point of intelligence of the 4 Fleet in Sovietsk Kaliningrad's district in 1952.4.  Chikin - in 1950 a colonel, worked in the department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.5.  Churil'skiy - a colonel, in 1950- worked in the department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.6.  Demchenko an officer of navy intelligence point of intelligence of 4FBet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district.7.  Denisenko - in 1862-1964 a military attache of soviet embassy in Bern,8.  Boli shator Juri - an officer of GRU (colonel), was in the USA, works under cover of press-agency, Necos:9.  bulganin Lev B. in 1950 worked in GRU.10. Irliyer - an officer of GRU in 1950. (or Iyerler).11. Kaloshin - a colonel, in 1950-1953 a chief of personnel department of the navy intelligence.12. Kononyuk - in 1950 finished the institute of international relations a. 1957 taken in the navy intelligence and sent to work in Berlin (knows,
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 128]
14. Kapalkin - a general, in 1950's was a deputy of chief the military diplomatic academy. He has two sons: Kapalkin Sergey - finished this academy in 1950, works in GRU, worked in Italy and in France, his wife is a daughter of Marshal Timoshenko - Olga (finished the institute of foreign trade); Kapalkin Victor - in 1940's studied as a student in the USA, also works in GRU.15. Kabalinov Vladimir – a major, a senior officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.16. Khaberov - in 1950-52 a deputy of chief of navy radio detachment of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.17. Khaykov S.S. - a deputy of chief (on information) of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-52.18. Konkov - a deputy of chief of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1951-52.19. Kozlovskiy - in 1950's - an officer of department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defense.20. Molchanov - an officer of GRU (in 1950)21. Ovchinnikov Gennadi - in 1951-52 an administrative officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.22. Pegedin Boris - a chief of the secretariat of navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1950-1952, knows a Japanese language.23. Rezantsev - a commander of navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district in 1952.24. Shalin - a general, in 1940's was a chief of the military diplomatic academy, later was a chief of GRU.25. Shaposhnikov Lev - a general works in GRU; his father was a marshall class0000146