[104-10211-10001.pdf — page 71]
# 672.If the WINTERS operation plan were a draft like the others in this collection, the above conflicting and confusing paragraphs might be explained as variations jotted down as possible approaches to presenting a plan for the future, as yet undecided in direction. This document, however, is the one which--to NOSENKO's puzzlement--had been approved and signed in draft by KOVSHUK, as Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate. The preparing case officer, KUSKOV, had furthermore indicated to the typing pool that it was to be typed in one copy, which gives the document the appearance of a draft which had been or was about to be made a matter of official KGB record.The foregoing review of errors, contradictions, and disregard for security considerations in preparation constitutes evidence that this is not a genuine KGB draft cocument.## (iii) The Summary on LANGELLEA second document, a handwritten note in what NOSENKO identified as CHEREPLIOV's own handwriting, alse is pertinent to the authenticity of the papers and of NOSENKO's account on CHEREPANOV. This is a short summary of the operational activity of the CIA officer LANGELLE, covering the compromise of POPOV. The document says in part: "In January 1959 a letter with secret writing mailed by a co-worker of the Embassy of the USA in Moscow, WINTERS, was intercepted and was addressed to a Soviet citizen, POPOV, a worker of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. Accord- ing to the contents of the letter, it was clearly established that FOFOV was an American agent..."This coincides precisely with NOSENKO's accourt of POPOV'S compromise (see Pages 532 and 663). Unlike GOLITSYN's recollection of the official report which he read, there is no reference in this document to the report of about 1957 from an agent source that there was a leak of GRU information: nor is there reference to the indication that the KG3 knew that LANGELLE had been posted to Moscow in order to handle a special agent, for this reason placing LANGELLE under heavy surveillance. If both of these items were in the official report which GOLITSYN read, their omission from the summary report in what purports to be CHERE- PANOV's handwriting is noteworthy, particularly since CHEREPANOV was supposed to have been in the same office (room) as the case officer working against LANGELLE during the time the LANGELLE/ POPOV cperation was investigated by the KGB. The latter position should lend authority to CHEREPANOV's version of the compromise and termination of the case; yet GOLITSYN--informed only from the official, and presumably sanitized, account--had more detail, as well as conflicting information, on the same case. While it is reasonable that a sanitized case summary would conceal an agent source of a lead by imputing the discovery to surveillance, it seems less likely, and indeedc unnecessary, to conceal a detection via surveillance by imputing it to an agent source. In thus supporting NOSENKO and others as to the cause of POPOV's compromise, and contradicting GOLITSYN (who is supported by other evidence accumulated in- dependently), this document too appears to be a XGB fabrica- tion.The authenticity of another passage in the same document is likewise open to question. This is the description of LANGELLE'S two visits to Lenin Hills, which the documents stated were forTOP SECRET