Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 64]
The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning cases, KGB operations, and other officers can consistently be related to his claimed department and position assignment during the 1953 to January 1964 period. The scope of his knowledge of his own department when considered in toto is broader after 1957 than before, which is compatible with his claim of increased responsibilities. His knowledge of the work of other departments of the SCD from the late 1950's on is also more extensive, which is also a further indication that NOSENKO actually held the claimed positions during this period of time.5SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 65]
SECRETE. CAN THE INFORMATION FURNISHED EY NOSENKO BECONSIDERED IN TOTO AS HAVING RESULTEDIN MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/OR HASTHE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BEEN OFSIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE?SECRET![BJP 1 Excluded tras astomatic dovigrading and declesfitats stamp]0001065
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 66]
SECRETE. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be considered in toto as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelligence? The conclusion in regard to both of the above questions is affirmative, even though it is realized that ultimate loss to the KGB and ultimate benefit to Western Intelligence are both partly of an intangible nature and not susceptible to accurate measurement.NOSENKO has, as previously indicated, furnished voluminous information during current and previous interviews. An accurate total of specific cases is not possible at this time and would at best be only an interesting figure, the actual significance of which would be marginal. Practically every interview with NOSENKO, even at present, reveals information of counterintelligence interest and it is expected that this production can continue for a considerable period of time. This should not be construed as an indication that NOSENKO is intentionally withholding information, but rather that stimulation of his memory through normal questions and discussions has been and can continue to be productive.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 67]
NOSENKO has furnished information concerning perhaps [2,000] KGB officers and [500] KGB agents or operative contacts (here the terms agents or operative contacts are used to refer to Soviet nationals), mainly in the Second Chief Directorate or internal KGB organizations. However, he has identified approximately [250] former or current First Chief Directorate officers and there is a considerable exchange of officers between the FCD and SCD. In addition, numerous officers of the SCD and other internal KGB organizations travel abroad with delegations, tourist groups, and as visitors to various major exhibitions such as World's Fairs. It is impossible at this time to estimate the number of KGB officers identified by NOSENKO who have been outside the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who will be out sometime in the future.There has been very little attempted exploitation of information furnished by NOSENKO concerning other KGB officers and, therefore, the possible value of this information to United States Intelligence cannot be estimated nor can the potential damage to the KGB be estimated.Disclosure of information concerning certain KGB officers would be a necessary part of any dispatch of a KGB agent or officer to the West either for purposes of contact with Western Intelligence for a
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 68]
limited period of time or for the packing of the individual in a defector status. However, identification of KGB officers or agents to Western Intelligence is necessarily a matter of concern to the KGB and the exposure of the identities of approximately [2,000] KGB officers and [several hundred] KGB agents could not be considered of negligible importance. Obtaining specific information in regard to KGB officers or KGB assets is important to United States Intelligence and a considerable amount of manpower and money is spent on this activity. Even acknowledging that it is much more difficult for CIA to obtain this type of information about the KGB, which operates in a closed society, than it is for the KGB to obtain the identity of CIA employees, it is believed doubtful any reader of this summary would consider that the identification of [2,000] CIA employees and [several hundred] agent assets to the KGB would be any less than a very serious compromise of valuable information. Prior to the defection of NOSENKO, little was known of the organization of the SCD or other internal KGB organizations. The information provided by NOSENKO concerning both has been detailed and extensive. That this information is of value to the United States Intelligence community is hardly subject to dispute, although analysts3SECRET000106841BR
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 69]
can differ as to the weight which should be given to the value of this type of information.NOSENKO has furnished information concerning SCD, KGB, recruitments of United States citizens and foreign nationais covering the period of 1953 through 1963. This should not be interpreted as a statement that NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to all SCD recruitments, even of Americans, during this period. His information based on personal knowledge is in general limited to the First Department and Seventh Department. He has furnished information concerning cases of several other departments in the SCD and some FCD cases, but this information was in generai acquired indirectly from social or business conversations with other KGB officers.NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of cases which were previously known to United States Intelligence. While the value of such information cannot be considered high, the additional details which NOSENKO has provided in a number of cases cannot be dismissed as being of no value to Western Intelligence, even if the information cannot be regarded as damaging to the KGB. Furthermore, inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his having provided such information.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 70]
NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number oirecruitments by the KGB of non-Bioc nationals who were known byWestern Intelligence to be pro-Communist or even connected withCommunist organizations. The identification as a recruited KGBagent of an individual previously known to be pro-Communist is ofconsiderable value to Western Intelligence and may be considered tohave resulted in some damage to the B. Admittedly, the potentialto the KGB of an agent who is known as pro-Communist is less thanthat of a "politically clean" individual. However, "pro-Communist"or even "Communist" are not synonymous with "recruited KGB agent."NOSENKO has furnished additional information on cases inwhich there was some previous but limited information. In a numberof these instances the additional information from NOSENKO has per-mitted identification of the individuals of interest and the closing of an"Unknown Subject" case. In such instances the information fromNOSENKO must be considered valuable to Western Intelligence sincethe incomplete information known previously would in many cases nothave permitted ultimate identification of the individual of interest.This category of cases must be considered as having resulted in damageto the KGB and in benefit to Western Intelligence.5SECRET0001070
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 71]
NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of individuals, both American and non-Bloc foreign, who were recruited by the KGB and concerning whom Western Intelligence had no significant information. It is recognized that certain of these cases mentioned by NOSENKO, particularly in the tourist category, would probably never have actually materialized as productive KGB agents. This could be for various reasons including later refusal to cooperate, later geo- graphical inaccessibility to the KGB, or not being either at the time of SCD recruitment or later in a position to furnish information of interest to the KGB. In this regard, NOSENKO has stated that at least until 1962 there was a definite tendency in the Seventh Department to make a "recruitment" as a statistic for the end-of-year report even though it was apparent the agent at the time had no potential and that it was highly unlikely there would be a potential in the future.NOSENKO has furnished information on or leads to a number of cases, primarily third nationals but some American, in which he has been unable to furnish sufficient details to permit identification at this time. In certain instances it is believed that an identification will be possible after additional research and investigation. Until an identification is made, the value of any particular lead to. Western Intelligence cannot be estimated, but that there may be a potential value6SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 72]
cannot be ignored. As an example of this category, NOSENKO has furnished a lead, still under investigation, to an unidentified agent, probably not an American, who in 1962 was in a position to remove the "NATO Emergency Codes," deliver the codes to the X33 for photographing, and then successfully replace the codes. Because the agent is as yet unidentified, his current access to information affecting the security of the United States cannot be gauged.In all, the information from NOSENKO in the category of cases where Western Intelligence did not previously have significant information must be considered on balance as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and of significant benefit to Western Intelligence.Quantity alone of CI or FI information from a KGB defector is not a standard on which to judge bona fides. The question is whether the amount of his information is reasonably commensurate with his claimed positions in the KGB. This question as regards NOSENKO has been examined, with affirmative findings, in another section of this paper.A few examples from the above cited categories of information Furnished by NOSENKO are listed below. These cases are given as illustrations and are not necessarily listed in order of importance.
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 73]
The case of Robert Lee JOHNSON and the related case ofJames Allen MINTKENBAUGH have been covered in the … notessummary. It can be considered that both were exposed as a resultof a lead from NOSENKO which led to suspicions of JOHNSON.Another American case is that of [Herbert HOWARD, a USIA] 06,08employee who spent considerable time in the USSR in 1962-1963.NOSENKO identified [Herbert HOWARD] having been recruited bythe First Section, First Department, SCD, in .962 and was positivethat [HOWARD] furnished valuable information to the KGB. Wheninterviewed in 1964, [HOWARD] did not admit he had been recruited,but suspicion of [HOWARD] was great enough so that his contact withUSIA was not renewed.If indeed [HOWARD] was recruited by the KGB, it is impossibleto determine how much information would have been compromised by[HOWARD] while in the USSR, he did have certain access to the UnitedStates Embassy. There is good reason to believe that if [HOWARD] wasrecruited, it was he who was responsible for the compromise of apotentially valuable Soviet walk-in with whom CIA was attempting toestablish contact using [HOWARD] as intermediary.NOSENKO in 1964 furnished information in regard to a "ZHART"(apparently a KGB code name, although NOSENKO thought it was a trueSECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 74]
name). He identified "ZHARI" (phonetic) as an American code clerk who defected to the USSR in 1961. An internal assumption was made based on the original lead information from NOSENKO that "ZHARI" was Victor Norris HAMILTON, aka Foul Mitrt HINDALY, a former NSA employee who defected to the USSR In 1962, and the information from NOSENKO was never disseminated or investigated.Prior to the surfacing of John Discoe SMITH by the Soviets in the fril of 1967, information concerning KGB knowledge of American code clerks was being investigated; and John Discoe SMITH was a leading cuspect. After the surfacing of SMITH by the Soviets, it became apparent that SMITH, rather than HAMILTON, was identical to "ZHARI." Investigation disclosed that no definite informa- tien could be established in regard to the actual whereabouts of SMITH after circa mid-1960. It cannot be positively stated that appropriate Lavestigation in 1964 of the "ZHARI" lead would have led to the identi- fication of John Discos SMITH as "ZHARI." However, such identifi- cation would have been of considerable interest to the Department of Stzte and CIA, and could very well have permitted certain action which would have at least lessened the propaganda effect of the surprise ammourcement by the Soviets in the fall of 1967.NOSENKO, In June 1962, furnished information from which William VASSALL could be quickly identified. GOLITSYN, in late 1960-carly 1961, bad furnished information concerning a Soviet pene- tration of the British Government on the basis of which the British9SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 75]
Services had compiled a list of twenty suspects, including VASSALL. Even though it may be presumed that investigation of the twenty suspects would ultimately have resulted in a determination that VASSALL was the agent on whom GOLITSYN had furnished certain information, the information from NOSENKO in June 1962 resulted in the earlier termi- nation by the British Services of a still valuable productive KGB agent.Although not the case of a KGB agent, the matter of the micro- phones in the United States Embassy should also be mentioned. GOLITSYN, following his defection in December 1961, furnished certain information in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy (Chancery). Since in fact the microphones we & connected to central cables, location of one microphone would logically have led to the exposure of the entire set of microphones. However, appro- priate action was not taken on this information and the KGB would have been aware that no action was taken prior to June 1962 when NOSENKO first contacted CIA.If NOSENKO is a dispatched KGB agent, it is not clear why the KGB would attract specific attention to a system of microphones which must have still had some value as of June 1962. A presumption may be made that if NOSENKO was a dispatched agent, the KGB had, as of 1962, an advanced system of monitoring devices which rendered the above microphone system obsolete. However, no concrete evidence of such an advanced system is available and it should be noted that itSECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 76]
was not until circa April 1961 that any effective action was taken to locate and remove the microphone system in which GOLITSYN had given a lead in late December 1961 - January 1962.A few general statements in re the CI information furnished by NOSENKO would be appropriate in this particular section.As regards leads furnished by NOSENKO, American cases, most of these leads have been mentioned in the previous summary. Current interviews with NOSENKO have resulted in approximately seventeen new American leads which are being examined by the FBI. The interviews have also resulted in more specific information in regard to a number of cases previously mentioned by NOSENKO, thus permitting additional development of these cases by the FBI.NOSENKO has provided leads to over 100 third-country KGB agents. Geographically these leads are wide in scope, including nationals of such countries as Indonesia, Austria, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Australia, Japan, Mexico, Italy, and a number of other countries.Included in the more important of these agent or other leads are leads to high levels of government and intelligence to code clerks, to access agents for American targets, to actual or possible illegal11SECRET0001076
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 77]
support assets. Also included are foreign correspondents, representatives of foreign tourist firms, and foreign tourists.A summary of the foreign leads, tentatively defined as of major significance shows nineteen leads highly placed or formerly highly placed in their own government, four code clerks, eight cases involving definite American interest, and four access agents to Americans. It also shows nine instances of clandestine KGB activity against foreign missions in Moscow, including actual KGB clandestine access into certain Western Embassies (but not the British or American Embassies).NOSENKO has also furnished leads to certain FCD foreign national agents, his information on several being derived during his three months in Geneva in 1962.It is impossible to give an exact evaluation of the significance of the foreign leads furnished by NOSENKO. That they are of significant value to Western Intelligence and damaging to the KGB is hardly subject to dispute. This evaluation must be given even though there are numerous foreign leads which have not been adequately exploited at this time.As a final note, the implied conclusion in the previous summary is accepted that the failure of NOSENKO to provide usable positive12SECRET0001076/2
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 78]
SECRETIntelligence information is not a significant factor in a determination of his bona fides. The qualification should, however, be added that it is not felt that NOSENKO has, as of this time, been fully debriefed in many areas of positive intelligence interest.13SECRET0001077
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 79]
# SECRETF. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF ACE DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY"IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICHWOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT NOSENKOWAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB?SECRET![C? 1 Excluded from automatic declassification, exemptions and... ]0001078
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 80]
# SECRETF. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGD. in reaching this conclusion, a full examination of the above tion has been both a necessary and integral part.It is inherent that the volume of information furnished by NOSENKO is only one of the factors which should be given consideration in arriving at a conclusion that NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB. II NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, the KGB would have surely been willing to sacrifice certain information of value to the KGB in order to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. However, if NOSENKO was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB purpose or mission, the nature of which has been and continues to be unknown.An examination of the circumstances under which NOSENKO first contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962 and his behavior during these contacts is particularly pertinent since during this period of time NOSENKO would have surely been under direct KGB control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case.SECRET0001079
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 81]
NOSENKO has stated that his original approach to "sell two pieces of information" was his own idea as to what was most likely to be successful. NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact with the Americans, was not psychologically adapted to defect at the time, and felt that if he merely stated that he was a "KGB counter-intelligence officer who wanted to give information," he very possibly would be rejected. It should be noted that NOSENKO even during his first contact did not limit his remarks to the "two pieces of information" and began to talk quite freely on other matters.If NOSENKO was dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962 contacts, would have been very carefully briefed and that his remarks or statements would have not been of a nature which could cause any suspicion in regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO. Instead, a current review of his statements and remarks during his five contacts in 1962 indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of NOSENKO and may also have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in Geneva.2SECRET0001080
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 82]
SECRETNOSENKO, during his five contacts in Geneva, made many statements which in retrospect were impossible, and the investigation of which could only have raised certain questions concerning NOSENKO. The following is a list of the more obvious areas in which NOSENKO made gross exaggerations or made incorrect or impossible statements.(a) NOSENKO claimed he personally was with Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the SCD, during the recruitment pitch to James STORSBERG (This was a lie and an interview with STORSBERG with display of photograph would have disclosed that NOSENKO did not participate.)(b) NOSENKO was involved in the recruitment approach to Russell LANGELLE. (This was a lie and LANGELLE was available for interview.)(c) NOSENKO said he recruited LUNT (Horace LUNT) in Bulgaria. (Actually NOSENKO never met LUNT)3SECRET
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 83]
SECRET(d) NOSENKO claimed personal contact with Edmund 06 STEVENS who, according to NOSENKO, had been recruited by the KGB. (NOSENKO actually had never personally met 06 STEVENS and only had seen 06 STEVENS once at a distance.)(e) NOSENKO dated the recruitment of "ANDREY" in Moscow as 1949-1950. At the same time he furnished information that "ANDREY" (who is considered identical to Dayle Wallis SMITH) was in Moscow during a part of the time that Roy RHODES, also a recruited agent, was assigned to Moscow, 1951-1953. "ANDREY" (SMITH) was actually in Moscow 1952-1954.(f) NOSENKO said he, GRIBANOV, and another officer met Edward Ellis SMITH. (NOSENKO has since stated he did not meet SMITH and that his only role was obtaining a foreign typewriter and paper for a KGB agent involved in the SMITH operation.)(g) NOSENKO in a number of instances spoke in the first person, saying "We did this," or "We did that, " in reference to a particular KGB activity in which he now admits4SECRET000108231BR
[104-10210-10009.pdf — page 84]
he was not involved but had some knowledge. (IfNOSENKO was under KGB control in 1962, both heand the AGB should have known that these indicatedexaggerations would eventually lead to a questionconcerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.)In 1962-1963 a number of similarities were noted betweeninformation furnished by NOSENKO and information which had beenfurnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962. These similarities werequite striking and gave rise to certain suspicions of NOSENKO becausehe provided information which the KGB would presumably have consideredalready compromised as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN. Certainof the similarities at the time could only be explained in terms ofNOSENKO being a dispatched agent. The following are some examples ofthe similarities noted.(a) Both furnished information in regard to[Johan PREISFREUND] 06(b) Both furnished information in regard to a[military code clerk case (James STORSBERG] 08,06(c) Both furnished information in regard to atrip of Vladislav KOVSHUK, under an assumed name,to the United States. (GOLITSYN was sure it wasconnected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in