Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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SCANS CORD1.  *Landtag Elections 1965* -- NPO's First Effort 664,157 votes = .5%2.  13 March 1966, communal Elections, Schleswig-Holstein. (NPD Hqs directive not to participate. A few did)    In 11 committees where NPD ran candidates, averaged 10.5% of vote compared with 6% in same towns in 1965.3.  13 March 1966, Bavarian communal Elections NPD minor effort concentrated only in Franconia.    1.6 % of total Bavarian vote date in    Middle Franconia = 5.%    Ansbach - 5.1%    Erlangen - 3.2%    Nurnberg - 7.%    Schwabach - 5.6%    Upper Franconia    Bayreuth - 8.%    Coburg - 5.%    Kulmbach - 5.%4.  27 March 1966 Hamburg Burgerschaft Situation 3 + 3 village mayors    3.9 % (1.5% in 1965)    no candidates elected5.  10 July 1966 Northrhein-Westphalia Landtag Election No NPD candidates elected *novo entered.*6.  16 October 1966 Berlin Election (Communal Council) 8.0% (NSA) 2 seats7.  6 November 1966 Hesse Landtag Elections .5% (28,530 votes = 7.6%+    8 seats in Landtag.    Marburg, Wiesbaden, Darmstadt and Giessen *circa* 10%    VF/M = 9.1%8.  20 November 1966 Bavarian Landtag Elections votes= 7.1%    15 Seats in Landtag9.  23 April 1967 Rheinland-Pfalatine 4 Seats, 6.9 % of vote10. 23 April 1967 Schleswig-Holstein 4 Seats, 5.7 % of vote11. 4 June 1967 Lower Saxony 10 Seats, 7 % of vote12. 11 October 1967 Bremen Burgerschaft 8 Seats, 8.8 % of vote13. 28 April 1968 Baden-Wurttemberg 12 Seats, 9.8 % of vote
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# SecretNe Foreign Dissem![Central Intelligence Agency seal]DIRECTORATE OFINTELLIGENCEThe National Democratic Party in West GermanySpecial Report# WEEKLY REVIEWSecretNΩ 3109 June 1967SC No. 00773/67B
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SECRET# THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN WEST GERMANYThe poor showing of the ultranationalistic National Democratic Party (NPD) in recent elections in several West German states clearly disproves the party's claim of providing an acceptable alternative to the policies and programs of the country's major parties. The NPD's failure to maintain the momentum suggested by the successes scored in two state elections last fall is directly attributable both to its own well-publicized internal dissension and to voter preference for the Christian Democrats and Socialists deriving from the image of vigor and decisiveness imparted by their "grand coalition" under Chancellor Kiesinger. Barring some serious reversal in the fortunes of the Kiesinger government--which is unlikely--it is doubtful that the NPD will be any more successful than other fringe groups have been in seeking to rally latent right-radical sentiment in Germany and revive it as a dynamic political force.## Election SetbacksThe NPD has claimed wide attention both in Germany and abroad and led many observers to conclude that it was a force to be reckoned with. Within two and a half years of its founding in November 1964, the party elected representatives to the legislatures in five of West Germany's ten states (11 counting West Berlin). In elections this April the party was expected to obtain close to 10 percent of the vote in Rhineland-Palatinate and 12 to 15 percent in Schleswig-Holstein but actually won only four seats in each parliament with 6.9 and 5.8 percent of the vote respectively. In the 4 June election in the party's "home base bastion" of Lower Saxony, the NPD's performance was similarly unimpressive--7 sercent of the vote and 10 Landtag seats..Emphasis by party leaders on their success in gaining representation in all the states where the party has competed during the past year has not masked their disappointment that the NPD's momentum of growth has leveled off. The party's failure to make a good showing in Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony--areas considered particularly susceptible to nationalist appeals--is especially damaging, and raises fundamental doubt about the party's future pros-.pects.SECRETPage 1 SPECIAL REPORT 9 Jun 67
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SECRETNPD Representation in West German States![pie chart of NPD representation in Schleswig-Holstein: 5.8% (4 seats)]BREMENHAMBURGLOWERSAXONY![pie chart of NPD representation in Lower Saxony: 7% (10 seats)]NORTH RHINEWESTPHALIA![pie chart of NPD representation in Hesse: 7.9% (8 seats)]HESSE![pie chart of NPD representation in Rhineland-Palatinate: 6.9% (4 seats)]RHINELAND-PALATINATESAARBADEN-WUERTTEMBERG![pie chart of NPD representation in Bavaria: 7.4% (15 seats)]BAVARIASECRET
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SECRET## Origins and Early SuccessesFormed from the remnants of the defunct German Reich Party (DRP)--one of a number of ultra-nationalistic splinter groups which have dotted the political landscape of postwar Germany--the NPD quickly established a political apparatus capable of functioning throughout the country. The new party soon distinguished itself by its relative success in attracting the support of other ultranationalistic elements and a variety of political malcontents. Earlier attempts by other groups to unite disparate nationalists invariably had foundered on personal rivalries and tactical disagreements. Some were no more than platforms for self-expression by leaders advocating a particular set of extremist notions. Even the most successful, the Socialist Reich Party (SRP), which at its high water mark obtained 11 percent of the vote in the Lower Saxony Landtag elections in 1951, was unable to establish effective working relations with rival rightist groups before it was outlawed by the West German supreme court in 1952.During its first year, the NPD encountered many of the problems experienced by its predecessors. The party was unable to put on an effective campaign for the September 1965 national elections and obtained only 2 percent of the votes--short of the 5-percent minimum required for representation in the Bundestag. In local elections in Bavaria and Schleswig-Holstein in March 1966, however, the NPD showed that it could command pockets of strength. In the Bavarian cities of Nuremberg and Bayreuth, it received between 7 and 10 percent of the vote and elected representatives to the local governing councils. These gains were facilitated by concentrating the party's efforts in selected areas such as the Protestant centers of Middle and Upper Franconia in heavily Catholic Bavaria.The first clear demonstration that the NPD could attract more than the ultranationalist vote came two weeks later in Hamburg, where the party nearly doubled its vote as compared with the Bundestag election the year before. Although the NPD failed to elect any deputies, the Christian Democrats and the Socialists were concerned about its ability to secure even 3.9 percent of the vote. The threat to the traditional third party, the conservative Free Democrats (FDP) became apparent. The FDP fell a third below its 1965 vote and lost 4 of its 12 seats in the Hamburg city council. Profiting from a decline in the economy which was already under way and the increasing public disenchantment with the leadership of then Chancellor Erhard in Bonn, the NPD accelerated both its organizational effort and its public relations campaign.The stage was then set for the party's breakthrough in the Hesse and Bavaria state electionsSECRETPage 3 SPECIAL REPORT 9 Jun 67
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# SECRETlast fall in which it won 7.9 and 7.4 percent of the vote and elected 8 and 15 deputies respectively. In Bavaria the NPD emerged as the only small party in the Landtag, causing the FDP to lose its representation in the legislature for the first time in its history. By underlining the weakness of the FCP, the election outcome contributed to the formation of the grand coalition government in Bonn by the Christian Democrats and the Socialists.For the major parties, the NPD's successes had disturbing implications. In contrast to its various predecessors, the NPD appeared capable of mobilizing urban as well as rural support and of altering the general trend long evident in most West German elections toward a two-party system. In Hesse, the combined vote of the Christian Democrats and Socialists was a lower percentage of the total vote than in the previous election four years earlier. Still more significantly, however, Hesse and Bavaria provided further evidence of the NPD's ability to attract "pro- test" votes from various dis- affected lower-middle-class elements including small businessmen and farmers unhappy with their lot in present-day Germany.## Basic Characteristics and Sources of SupportIn spite of its direct lineage from the old German Reich Party, the NPD has tried to dispel the impression among the general public that it is the spiritual heir of Hitler's National Socialists. The party has sought acceptance as a legitimate political party and insists that it intends to function within the established democratic order. Party spokesmen maintain that it differs from the established parties primarily in its allegedly superior devotion to the national interest, which they accuse the governing parties in Bonn of having failed to protect. The NPD says it offers the voter a genuine choice between bankrupt policies of the major parties and a return to national morality.As much as some NPD support- ers might wish to play down the party's Nazi associations, how- ever, it has been clearly estab- lished that the leadership con- sists of a nucleus of former Nazis, who have been active in neo-Nazi parties throughout the postwar years. According to police reports, some 2,000 of the estimated 25,000 members of the NPD belonged to the Nazi party before 1933. This ratio is roughly eight times that for the public as a whole. The party has lost libel suits in which it has chal- lenged charges of neo-Nazism. The German Interior Ministry notes the parallels in political outlook and philosophy between the NPD and the Nazis, and main- tains that the party's activities "approach" unconstitutionality. In the words of one former party member, the NPD is made up of people "who have forgotten nothing and learned nothing" from Germany's past.SECRETPage 4 SPECIAL REPORT 9 Jun 67
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SECRETThe Bonn government is generally reluctant, however, to ban the NPD, believing that it would be imprudent to drive the ultra-rightists underground. If the NPD were to score impressive new successes in future elections, however, the resulting concern in the major parties might prompt a reconsideration of this policy. Interior Minister Luecke favors banning the party as soon as enough evidence can be obtained to assure successful court action. It is also possible that new NPD gains would motivate the established parties to make proposed changes in the electoral law that would make it more difficult for the NPD to obtain Bundestag representation.Although the NPD program is strongly reminiscent of Hitlerian National Socialism, the party's electoral supporters in Hesse and Bavaria also include persons who have no prior Nazi affiliations or any particular susceptibility to Nazism per se. It has managed to attract impulsive youngsters, as well as political malcontents of all ages. Its membership includes individuals from a broad range of occupations. The NPD's special appeal among the lower-middle-class, and particularly among the small business men and farmers is reinforced by the economic squeeze these groups are experiencing as a result of government economy measures. In Hesse and Bavaria, the party did especially well in areas noted for traditional German nationalism and in areas which are predominantly Protestant. Many NPD adherents are expellees from the territories lost at the end of World War II.The makeup of the formal NPD membership is not radically different in age or occupation group from a cross section of the general public. However, there are certain characteristics of NPD supporters which set them apart from supporters of the three major parties. The NPD tends to attract a somewhat larger number of older persons as well as young adults, and the number of lower middle class members, including pensioners, is disproportionately large. Formal membership among students, however, is very small and only 350 of a total of 244,000 university students are on the party rolls..There is no evidence that the NPD receives significant financial support from German industrialists. It is, however, able to operate in the black. The sound state of its finances is in part a result of its practice of charging admission to its rallies. This serves the double function of making the rank and file feel that they have a stake in the party and of making it necessary for its opponents to pay for the right to heckle. The party also derives considerable sums from membership dues, subscriptions to party publications, and donations from members and sympathizers.SECRETPage 5 SPECIAL REPORT 9 Jun 67
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SECRET> [Figure] Party leader Von Thadden at Second NPD Congress at Karlsruhe, June 1966> ![Party leader Von Thadden at Second NPD Congress at Karlsruhe, June 1966]> [Figure] NPD audience: a characteristic cross section> ![NPD audience: a characteristic cross section]> 66827 667 CIASECRET
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Rumors of clandestine fi-nancial support from the Commu-nists or from sympathizers amongNazi emigrants to Latin Americahave not been confirmed.Despite NPD claims of wide-spread sympathy in the West Germanarmed forces, there is no evidenceof this. German security offi-cials estimate that no more than2 percent of armed forces membersare card-carrying NPD members.Since the NPD is a legal politicalorganization, military leadersare constrained from openly in-fluencing members of the armedforces to oppose it.Many Germans are probablyreluctant openly to admit theirsupport for an organization likethe NPD. It is significant, how-ever, that only 6 percent ofrespondents to a national opinionpoll in January 1967 indicated apreference for the NPD.### Leadership ProblemsThe most notable singlehandicap confronting the NPD isthe weakness of its leadership.None of its leaders possesses anygreat talent or stature. Cer-tainly no individual with Hitler'sdemagogic genius has yet ap-peared. The absence of strongleadership in what has been calleda "fuehrer-oriented party" hasleft it divided and weakened byfractionalism. This was clearlydemonstrated in March 1967 wher.then party chairman Fritz Thieienand Deputy Chairman Adolf vonThadden engaged in a public feudwhich further damaged the party'sreputation. An outgrowth of long-standing personal antagonism, thedispute was triggered by Thielen'sresistance to Von Thadden's at-tempted take-over as party chair-man in Lower Saxony. Thielenclaimed that Von Thadden's elec-tion to the state chairmanshiphad been illegal and would hurtthe party's reputation. The par-ty's federal executive, however,turned the tables on Thielen andnot only voted to reinstate VonThadden but also to drop Thielenfrom the national chairmanship andexpel him from the party. Thielenclung to the helm under a temporarycourt order until finally throwingin the sponge in early May withan announcement of his formationof a new, rival part', the Na-tional Peoples Party (NVP).More of an archconservativethan a neo-Nazi, Thielen was nevermore than a figurehead. Real au-thority and leadership--as well asideological guidance--was providedby Von Thadden. Von Thadden is.a 45-year-old native of Pomerania,a member of a prominent and aris-tocratic Prussian family, a numberof whose members were prominentin the anti-Nazi resistance. Al-though Von Thadden applied forNazi party membership he appar-ently was never formally admitted.An ardent nationalist, Von Thaddenaspires to become a German DeGaulle rather than a re-creator ofthe German Reich.Other leaders of some promi-nence include Otto Hess, partypropaganda chief, and WaldemarSchuetz, editor of the NPD's
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SECRETofficial weekly, DeutscheNachrichten. Both were activeNazis.Thielen's departure clearsthe way for Von Thadden formallyto take over leadership of theNPD. It is doubtful that Thielenhas the personal force or follow-.ing to organize a party withsignificant strength. The impactof the new party on the NPD willprobably be small since the bulkof the NPD membership appears toprefer the leadership and ideologyof the Von Thadden group. Onthe other hand, the strengtheningof extremist tendencies within theNPD signaled by the triumph ofVon Thadden may hurt the party'sinterests in the long run. Theresult is also likely to assistthose actively seeking a formalgovernment crackdown on the party.ProgramIn addition to its leadershipdifficulties, another failing ofthe NPD is its inability as yet tooffer a clear, positive programrelevant to existing problems.Xenophobic and opportunistic, theNPD feeds upon nostalgia for anolder German nationalism, discon-tent with the existing social or-der, and Germany's internationalstanding and frustration over thefact that reunification remainsas distant a prospect as ever.Its stated objectives are ill de-fined, when not deliberately am-biguous, and are sometimes incon-sistent. Its electoral approachis generally negative and destruc-tively critical rather than af-firmative. Its principal targetsinclude foreign interests and cul-ture which undermine old valuesand "de-Germanize the fatherland."It attacks the renunciation bythose in power of what the NPDregards as justified Germán ob-jectives. It deplores what itconsiders the miseducation andcorruption of youth, "crime in thestreets," foreign aid, and thecompetition of foreign workers..The NPD demands an end toGerman dependence on the US andcalls for the revival of Germannational consciousness. It at-tempts to draw a parallel betweenWest German - US relations andthose between the East Germanregime and the USSR. In order tofree Germany from foreign domina-tion, NPD spokesmen maintain,American "occupation" forces mustgo, although not before the with-drawal of Russian troops, whichthe NFD would have occur simultane-ously with that of US troops.Germany must again become masterof its own fate, party leaders in-sist, and the "lie" of war guiltand war crimes trials must beended and a new German generalstaff created. A key demand isthat the reunification of Germanycannot be limited to uniting Westand East Germany but must includethe lands beyond the Oder-Neisseborder now held by Poland. Al-though it does not advocate theuse of force to achieve this ob-jective, the party holds out hopethat recovery will be possible bya Machiavellian deal of some scrt.NPD spokesmen at present renouncea national nuclear capability forGermany.SECRETPage 8 SFECIAL REFORT 9 Jun 67
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SECRETThe party puts forth slogans proclaiming "Germany for the Germans" and "Europe for the Europeans." Indeed, the NPD favors a united Europe somewhat along the lines advocated by De Gaulle. Europe, it holds, should be completely independent of the US, and possess its own nuclear deterrent. It should be built on a Franco-German alliance that smaller European countries sooner or later would have to join. The NPD would welcome the decay of NATO as signaling the end of sterile policies which do not serve Germany's real interests.In seeking to gain the broadest popular acceptance, the party avoids affirming the more extreme aspects of Nazi ideology. There is, for example, no obvious anti-Semitism in the party program and Jews technically could become party members. The private attitudes of the leadership, however, are said to resemble traditional Nazi anti-Semitism closely. The NPD makes vague references, moreover, to the importance of "blood ties," rejects evidence relating to the Nazi extermination policy, makes derogatory references to the Jews in the party press, and denounces aid to Israel.In recent campaigning in Lower Saxony, NPD spokesmen shifted tactics somewhat by no longer stressing issues obviously associated with the Nazi period such as war guilt and reparations. Instead, they sought to exploit current grievances including the economic recession, unemployment, lack of progress on reuni-fication, and what they called the unreliability of NATO.## Future ProspectsThe NPD's failure to maintain the momentum of last fall's successes in this year's state elections in Schleswig-Holstein, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Lower Saxony is a serious blow to the party's hopes. The squabble among the leadership apparently reinforced the feeling among uncommitted elements that casting a protest vote for the NPD was not worthwhile under present circumstances. The widespread discontent among farmers over government economy measures did not result in a significant shift of votes to the NPD. Moreover, there has been a strong resurgence of general confidence in the Bonn government. Although the NPD benefited last fall from the popular dissatisfaction with the Erhard government, the grand coalition headed by CDU Chancellor Kiesinger has displayed vigor and decisiveness which has been rewarded at the polls.Even if the NPD were to follow its forerunners into oblivion it would not mark the end of rightist extremism. A portion of the German electorate will remain receptive to this kind of appeal. In the absence of a party such as the NPD, right-wing voters tend to give their support to one of the insignificant splinter parties, or to one of the more conservative established parties, such as the FDP, when they vote at all.SECRETPage 9 SPECIAL REPORT 9 Jun 6.7
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SECRETIt is possible--although in- creasingly unlikely--that the NPD could turn out to resemble other parties of a national-conserva- tive stamp. Despite the radical views of some of their members, such groups have managed to op- erate without subversive mani- festations. The 'German Party (DP), for example, which had been rep- resented in several North German state legislatures and in the Bundestag conducted itself in a responsible fashion.The NPD at present draws a good deal of this traditional right-wing vote from the old Refu- gee Party, the DP, and small con- servative regional parties such as the Bavarian Party. The total extremist vote, however, has in- creased very little since the establishment of the NPD. Es- timates of the extent of hard-core ultranátionalist sentiment in Germany vary between 5 and 15 per- cent of the electorate. Under present conditions this does not constitute a threat to German dem- ocratic institutions and is not greater than the degree of ex- tremist sentiment in other West- ern. European countries.## OutlookAssuming the NPD survives the current period of internal strife, its potential for further growth beyond its present 6- to 8-percent range appears to be limited under conditions now pre- vailing in West Germany. The NPD is still capable of capitalizing on circumstances which might pre- sent themselves as a result of a protracted economic recession or major political blunders which would discredit the present gov- ernment leadership. The outcome of recent state elections, how- ever, tends to confirm that the overwhelming majority of German voters continues to prefer the moderate, albeit increasingly independent and nationalist, pol- icies of the major parties and the government, and rejects the radical alternatives advocated by the NPD. (SECRET)Page 10 SPECIAL REPORT 9 Jun 67
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SecretSecret