Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# SECRETrepresent key factors in the development of the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America. Our major purpose is to determine, some two years after the Frei victory, whether the generally enthusiastic assessment of Christian Democratic prospects engendered by this highly significant election was justified.I- CURRENT BALANCE SHEET OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY2. Parties of Current Significance. Christian Democratic parties are generally agreed to be of current political significance in only four Latin American countries -- Chile, Venezuela, El Salvador and Peru.a. The Chilean PDC is the only party with the responsibility of governing; the solid victory of Frei in the 1964 presidential election was followed by an even more impressive showing in the March 1965 congressional election. However, the Party's reform program is being implemented with less than deliberate speed, no progress has been made in weakening Marxist leadership domination of the urban labor force, and indications are that Frei's moderation will be increasingly challenged by the left wing of the PDC.b. The COPEI Party of Venezuela has strong hopes of duplicating the victory of the Chilean Party in 1968 and appears to have narrowed the gap between itself (22 percent of the electorate in 1963) and the governing Accion Democratica Party (32 percent). COPEI Secretary General Rafael Caldera, one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international stature, is expected to be the Party's standard bearer in his fourth try for the presidency.c. In El Salvador, the PDC garnered 29 percent of the votes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the leading opposition party. It has little chance of capturing the presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by 1972, with Notre Dame-educated Mayor Duarte the likely candidate.d. The Peruvian PDC formed a coalition with the Popular Actica (AP) Party in 1963; it currently holds two cabinet positions. Some would argue that the Peruvian CD (with only 4 percent of the votes in 1963) has no real future in competition with the dominant AP and the long-established APRA, both reformist parties, and thus should not be included in a listing of significant CD parties. Some weight is added to this argument by the very recent split off of a dissident faction of the PDC into a separate party. However, the inclusion of the Peruvian party here is based primarily on the fact that it is the only CD group participating in a coalition government and thus contributes an element of stability to the political scene in Peru.
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to request ODCA approval of the creation of this CoordinatingCommittee and ODCA recognition of CLASC as its chosen hemisphericlabor instrument. The eventual approval of the ODCA leadershipappears likely; indeed, it is doubtful that the Act would haveemerged from the Montevideo Seminar if informal agreement of theOCCA leadership had not been obtained in advance.12. Negative CLASC Influence on Perty Youth Wings. Closer    CLASC identification with the CD political movement will likely    rub off negatively on the CD youth wings which invariably are further    left than their parent parties and identify much more closely with    the revolutionary image and mystique CLASC has sown and propagated.    It is perhaps significant that CLASC has intensified its efforts    since January to establish youth appendages to the Christian labor    movement. This initiativa appears to have made greatest-progress    in Central America.IV - THE ROLE OF ODCA13. ODCA Contributes Little Positive Direction. The Latin    American CD parties formed their regional organization in    Montevideo in 1949 -- the Organizacion Democrata Cristiana de    America (ODCA). The current officers of ODCA are:President : Rafael Caldera, VenezuelaVice President : Hector CORNEJO Chavez, PeruVice President : Rene DE LEON Schlotter, GuatemalaSecretary General: Tomas REYES Vicuna, ChileODCA has consistently assumed an anti-Yankee posture on a broadrange of key issues (most forcefully on the American interventionin the Dominican Republic) out on balance has been less stridentin its criticism than several of its member parties (notably theChilean, Bolivian and Dominican CD's), probably because ofCaldera's restraining hand. The Organization would merit muchcloser attention than we have given it to date if it had substantialinfluence on or authority over member parties, or could applysanctions against national groups. But ODCA amounts to littlemore than a fraternity. Its member parties have little ideologicalhomogeneity and the cement of their union appears to be based moreon revolutionary mysticism (which most parties are careful toqualify with adjectives like peaceful, democratic and Christian)and m negative factors (hostility to the U.S., capitalism and theoligarchics), than on a foundation of CD doctrine or basic agree-ment on just what they want.14. Efforts to Firm Up the ODCA Role. We have asked contacts    in European CD circles to prod ODCA to set criteria for membership    and behavior and that the Europeans weigh petitions for support    from the Latin American parties and organizations against these    criteria. DYVOUR officers have argued that while the Europeans    cannot realistically require nascent and ill-trained CD groups in    Latin America to hold to the same rigid standards of political    morality that have evolved in Europe, neither should the Europeans
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# CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH## SECRETBOOK DISPATCH 596123. Growth Potential Exists, But Much Less Than Originally Anticipated. The CD movement has made only modest progress the past two years. Indications are that the development of the movement will be much slower and less extensive than many anti- cipated in the first flush of enthusiasm following the Frei victory, for it has many problems to resolve. Chief among these, perhaps, is CD failure to reach the lower social classes and to develop a significant worker base. The chances of CLASC contri- buting positively to correct this failure appear remote. Another major problem is the absence of an ideological commonground, despite the lip service paid to the Papal Encyclicals and the Catholic social philosophers, and the failure to enunciate minimum behavioral standards that these philosophical roots would impose. This deficiency is the root cause of two manifestations: First, a propensity to consort with Communist and assorted Marxist groups (e.g., in Colombia, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic and Panama). Second, the progressive radicalization of party youth wings which threatens to push the parent parties further left. The fact remains, nevertheless, that Christian Democracy is the most unified non-Communist movement in Latin America. It cannot be labeled democratic or anti-Communist because of the behavioral aberrations of several national parties.24. Need for Eclectic Operational Approach to CD's. The ranks of those who viewed Christian Democratic prospects with great enthusiasm two years ago -- including the European financial backers of the movement -- have dwindled considerably. But those who have been critics of Christian Democracy from the outset (many of whom might be described as the "visceral denigrators") have displayed no more perception in evaluating CD prospects. The head-in-the-sand generalization that Christian Democracy has no future does not stand the challege of investigation. Neither does the assertion that Christian Democracy is the hemispheric wave of the future. The only valid generalization that might be made on CD prospects is that all generalizations are false. We would submit that the only valid approach to the CD phenomenon is to assess the movement and make operational judgements on a country-by- country basis. There are some countries where the collapse of the party would be no loss. The key question 1s: Can the party develop as a positive element in national political stability? If so, it is incumbent on the Station to develop assets within the party and to examine the need for operational involvement. Station posture toward the CD movement must be based on the raw realities of the local situation, case by case.RUTHERFORD J. LYNER
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CONTINUATION OFDISPATCHSECRETBCCX DISPATCH 5961Field Distribution:(1 copy each)Buenos AiresLa PazRio de JaneiroBelo HorizonteBrasiliaPorto AlegreRecifeSao PauloSantiago, ChileBogotaGeorgetownSan JoséSanto DomingoQuitoGuayaquilSen SalvadorGuatemala CityPort au PrinceTegucigalpaKingstonMexico CityMonterreyPanama CityAsuncionLimaParamariboPort of SpainMontevideoCaracasSantiago de los CaballerosManaguaRes Distribution:(1 copy each)WI/Branch ChiefsWI/Country DesksWI/EXOC/WH/CAC/WH/FIWI/RegistryRI
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# EUROPEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONSGERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (CDU)WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (WCDU)KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATIONEichholz Academy Political Leadership Academy Student InstituteEuropean Christian Democratic Union (ECDU) Christian Democratic Organization of Latin America (ODCA) Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe (UCDEC) International Union of Young Christian Democrats (UUDC)Institute for International Solidarity (IIS)International, Solidarity Foundation (FIS)DIRECTORAdolf Herkenrath PRESIDENT Johannes SchauffSOME BUDGETARY SUPPORTSupport To:Political Training InstitutesTraining Institutes of CLASC(Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists)Youth and Student TrainingOrganizational Support To:Political Parties
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![CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SEAL]DIRECTORATE OFINTELLIGENCESecretNo Foreign DissemFile:CD file# WEEKLY SUMMARY*Special Report*Christian Democracy in Latin AmericaSecret№ 11003 March 1967No. 0279/67A:
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# CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICAThe decisive victory of Eduardo Frei in the September 1964 Chilean presidential election led many to hope that Christian Democracy would develop significantly throughout Latin America, competing with Communism on ideological grounds and offering an alternative, democratic route to social and economic progress.No such treni has yet developed. The Christian Democratic movement's appeal is to students and middle class, a relatively small percentage of the population in most Latin American countries. Its concepts of basic social reform and the dignity of the human person may appeal to the workers, but they still cast their vote on a pragmatic basis for the least objectionable of the established parties that have an immediate chance of governing.The movement's progress is likely to be hampered by its lack of strong leaders and effective labor organizations to compete against the entrenched positions of other political movements.## Current Balance SheetThe Christian Democratic movement is generally agreed to be of current political significance in only four Latin American countries--Chile, Peru, Venezuela, and El Salvador.In only one of these--Chile--is the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) the governing party. Frei's solid victory in the 1964 presidential election was followed by an even more impressive showing in the March 1965 congressional election. However, the party's reform program has run into difficulty in the upper house of Congress, which is still controlled by the opposition; no progress has been made in weakening Marxist domination of the urban labor force; and Frei's moderation has been increasingly challenged by the left wing of his own party, which may capture control in the next two or three years.The only other Christian Democratic party with a claim to a role in government is the one in Perú. It was brought into a pre-election coalition by the dominant Popular Action Party in 1963 and, although it gained only four percent of the votes, it holds two cabinet posts. Its voting strength has been weakened recently by the defection of a dissident faction which formed a separate Popular Christian Party.
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# CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA![Map of Latin America showing Christian Democracy by country]*   Country with active Christian Dermocratic Party*   Country with weak Christian Democratic Party*   Country without Christian Democratic PartyMEXICOQUATEMALACUBADOMINICANREPUBLICHAITIBRITISH HONDURASHONDURASEL SALVADOR NICARAGUACOSTA RICAVENEZUELA GUYANASURINAMFRENCH GUIANACOLOMBIAECUADORPERUBOLIVIABRAZILPARAGUAYCHILEARGENTINAURUGUAY![Portrait of Eduardo Frei]EDUARDO FREIProsident of Chile,Latin America's Christian Democratic leader.![Portrait of Rafael Caldera]RAFAEL CALDERAVenezuelan presidential aspirant andnumber-two Latin American Christian Democrat65860 3-67Classified material on reverse side of page
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SECRETNo Foreign Dissen.Venezuela's Christian Democrats (COPEI) have strong hopes of duplicating the victory of the Chilean party in 1968 and appear to have narrowed the gap between their 22 percent of the electorate in 1963 and the governing Democratic Action's 32 percent. COPEI Secretary Géneral Rafael Caldera, one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international stature, is expected to be the party's standard bearer in his fourth try for the presidency. He has recently come out in favor of a politically expedient move to the right, thus filling the vacuum of the center-right of the Venezuelan political spectrum and opening new sources of support.In El Salvador, the PDC garnered 31.2 percent of the votes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the leading opposition party. It has little chance of capturing the presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by 1972, with Notre Dame educated Mayor Duarte the likely candidate.Applying even the most generous criteria to the judgment of potential, there are not more than four other CD parties--in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Brazil, and Guatemala--that might develop as moderately important forces over the next five years.The Dominican Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC), led by Coanabo Javier, has abandoned, at least for the time being, the irresponsible policies it adopted after the April 1965 revolt and has moved toward the political center. The party has made its opposition to the Balaguer government clear, but has also indicated that it intends to operate within bounds acceptable to the President. The PRSC hopes that this moderate line will increase its following and enable it to improve on the poor showing it made in the 1966 elections. The party has developed a small but talented cadre, primarily from the university ranks.The Panamanian PDC was registered some five years ago and polled only 3.1 percent of the votes in 1964. Although it continues a minuscule party, it has made significant organizational strides and its philosophy of social justice gives it roots lacked by most Panamanian parties, which are largely personalistic or tied to financial interests. The PDC is currently negotiating with the mass-based Panamenista Party of Arnulfo Arias--Panama's largest--in hopes of forming a coalition for the May 1968 elections. The CDs have offered to provide the Panamenistas with much-needed administrative skills in return for a share of the assembly seats in the next election. A long-range goal would be to acquire support within Arias' party and inherit his mass following when he passes from the scene.The Brazilian PDC polled only four percent of the vote inSECRETPage 3 SPECIAL REFORT 3 Mar 67
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SECRETNo Foreign Dissem1962, but the party had significant strength in three important south-central states (Parana, Sao Paulo, and Guanabara). Like all other Brazilian parties, it was abolished during a political reorganization under the Castello Branco administration. Most of its members then affiliated with the progovernment ARENA party and campaigned under its banner in the November 1966 congressional elections. It is unlikely that there will be any significant expansion in the number of political parties--the new Brazilian constitution sets down stringent standards that virtually eliminate the possibility of a repetition of the former proliferation of parties. The former PDC has made no attempt to reconstitute itself, but its former members will probably join with like-minded congressmen to pursue policies consistent with Christian Democratic ideology.The Guatemalan PDC was only recently recognized as a legally constituted party. This group, which is being financed by Catholic sources in Germany and Belgium, has some strength in the youth and student movement and some growth potential among the campesinos who make up more than half the population. Current direction of the party leaves much to be desired; its leader, Rene de Leon, appears honest, but he has little organizational flair or popular appeal. With more vigorous leadership and the development of a middle-echelon cadre, the party might develop significantly--particularly if the incumbent Revolutionary Party (PR) administration fails to resolve basic problems confronting it.The remaining nine Christian Democratic parties--in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay--show scant promise of developing into forces of national importance over the next five years. Leadership of even modest stature exists only in Argentina (Salvador Alende, Horacio Sueldo) and Bolivia (Remo di Natale).Party Youth WingsAs with all political groups in Latin America, the vast majority of CD party militants come from student organizations in the local universities. In most countries of the hemisphere, CD voting strength on the campus is much greater than the political strength of the parent party. A few examples illustrate this point: In Panama, the party polled 3.1 percent of the national vote in 1964 (and probably would poll not more than 5 percent today), but its university youth got 12.8 percent in the January 1966 campus election and 24.4 percent in January 1967. The Dominican PPSC received 5.4 percent of the vote in 1962(and its present strength could well be lower because of internal divisions and leadership conflicts), but its youth wing on the campus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote in May 1966. In Venezuela, COPEI polled 22 percent of the vote in 1963; its student wing on the campus of Central University, however, polled 40.2 percent of the vote in 1966.SECRETPage 4 SPECIAL REPORT 3 Mar 67
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# SECRETNo Foreign DissemSeveral CD leaders, most notably Frei in Chile and Caldera in Venezuela, have expressed considerable concern over the growing radicalization of party youth wings. In several countries the positions assumed by CD youth groups (or important wings) are almost indistinguishable from those of pro-Communist youth elements. In Venezuela, the wing of the COPEI youth headed by Marta Sosa is so "far out" it has earned the sobriquet "the Astronauts." Chilean President Frei reportedly told a German Christian Democrat that his youth wing is moving dangerously far to the left. In Panama, the dominant wing of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian group in the National University, while differentiating itself from the Communist students on certain issues, has frequently taken a parallel line.The great concern of responsible party leaders is that these students, as they progress from campus to parent party, will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the parties further left. Other observers, however, expect the "hotheads" to mellow once they participate directly in party life and cope with hard political reality. Both views can be defended. Some mellowing is inevitable, but in the past ten years the demand for revolutionary (even convulsive) change has mushroomed--and among the youth the cry has assumed much greater proportions.Both German and American observers have commented that massive and intensive political training of youth and political cadres might arrest this drift to the left. Frei and Caldera have specifically asked the West German CD party's Institute for International Solidarity to increase its support in the student training field. However, the Germans, who have long been proponents of organizational programs in Latin America, appear inclined to the position in the youth and student field that party leaders have permitted the situation to deteriorate too long for even a massive training program to produce a moderating trend.## The Labor ArmA major influence in the development of the Christian Democratic movement will be the actions and attitudes of its labor organization, the Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists (CLASC). So far, as an organized force, it has been, a dismal failure except among the campesinos. Its only impact and sole purpose up to this time has been as a political action instrument with primary appeal to the working classes. In this role, it has earned a reputation for independent action and irresponsibility that has reflected negatively on the whole movement despite CLASC's vigorous claims that it is not subservient to the Christian Democratic political leaders.In spite of the apparent differences between CLASC andSECRETPage 5 SPECIAL REPORT 3 Mar 67
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# SECRETNo Foreign Diesemthe CD movement, a closer and more formal relationship appears to be in the offing. Last April, officials of CLASC who are also officers of the Christian Democratic parties met in Montevideo to arrange closer coordination between the two groups. To accomplish this goal, they proposed that both the CD party labor departments and CLASC be granted formal representation in the Christian Democratic Organization of America (ODCA), the regional grouping formed in 1949.The plan has not yet been implemented, but eventual ODCA approval appears likely. Closer CLASC identification with the CD political movement may have an adverse effect on CD youth wings, which--being further left than their parent parties--have identified more closely with CLASC's revolutionary image. Since the first of the year, CLASC has intensified its efforts to create its own youth groups and appears to have made some progress, especially in Central America.## The Role of ODCAIn its 17 years of existence, ODCA has not evolved beyond a sort of fraternity held together more by negative factors such as hostility to the US, to capitalism, and to the oligarchies, than by any basic agreement among its members on doctrine or principles. Moreover, the individual parties have made very clear that they will fight any effort--whether initiated by ODCA or by the European financial backers of the CD movement--to impose standards and controls that will impinge on their freedom of action.In general, ODCA takes a slightly less hostile line on US policies than that of its member parties. This probably results from the influence of its president, Rafael Caldera of Venezuela. The organization's two vice presidents are Hector Cornejo Chavez of Peru and Rene De Leon of Guatemala. Tomas Reyes Vicuna of Chile is its secretary general.Only in Central America has there been any move toward a more cohesive unit geared to area problems. A smaller regional group, the Christian Democratic Union of Central America, was organized last July. It now has five member parties, in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama, and a sixth may be formed in Honduras.## European Role and InfluenceAlthough Latin American Christian Democracy like the European variety, has its roots in the profoundly humanistic and democratic ideas of the French philosopher Jacques Maritain, it does not contain the European fascist concept of the corporate state. The European reaction to the growth of Communism in the 1930s had little effect on the Latin American CDs; consequently the Americans were moving to the political left as the Europeans were moving to the right.Not until 1947 did the newly important and affluent EuropeanSECRETPage 6 SPECIAL REPORT 3 Mar 67