Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# SECRETWEST GERMANY'S NATIONAL DEMOCRATS AND THE GRAND COALITIONGermany's far-right National Democratic Party (NPD) showed another increase in strength in recent elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg, while the Social Democrats (SPD) lost heavily. This outcome in a traditionally liberal and prosperous state appears to stem in part from the dissatisfaction of many Socialists and trade unionists in the SPD with their party's cabinet cooperation with the Christian Democrats (CDU). Another factor was the discontent of farmers. and refugees with the policies of the Grand Coalition in Bonn. Concern over student dis- orders contributed to the NPD gains, but this was not as decisive as some have supposed. Despite - these gains, the NPD is unlikely to achieve a growth comparable to that of the Nazi Party in the early 1930s.The outcome in Baden-Wuerttemberg confirmed the belief of many Socialists that their coopera- tion with the CDU at both the national and state level is proving to be unprofitable for the party. As a result, they have already decided at the state level not to renew cabinet cocperation with the CDU in Baden-Wuerttemberg, thus making prospects for the Bonn coalition appear less favorable. Nevertheless, SPD leaders in Bonn remain committed to the Grand Coalition and serious instability at the federal level seems unlikely. Over the long run the outcome of this latest election may have certain implications nationally, including the possibility that Bonn leaders may be encouraged to take a more nationalist line.## The NPD's SuccessThe West German state elec- tions in Baden-Wuerttemberg on 28 April brought the far-right National Democratic Party (NPD) 9.8 percent of the vote, the most impressive total it has yet attained in any state. About 71 percent of the voters turned out, approximately three percent more than in the last Baden- Wuerttemberg state election in 1954, but 15 percent less than in the 1965 federal election.Christian Democratic Union (CC) strength fell slightly to 44.1 percent (1964: 46.2 per- cent), while the Social Demo- cratic Party (SPD) achieved a vote of only 29.1 percent (1964:SECRETPage 1 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
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SECRET# PARTIES IN BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG> [Figure: Pie charts illustrating party representation in Baden-Württemberg for 1968 and 1964. In 1968, CDU has 60 seats, SPD has 37, FDP has 18, and NPD has 12, totaling 127 seats. In 1964, CDU has 59 seats, SPD has 47, and FDP has 14, totaling 120 seats.](37.3 percent). The liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), made a slight gain, winning 14.4 percent of the vote (1964: 13.1 percent). Against the background of last October's Bremen elections, in which the National Democratic Party won what was then a record percentage of 8.9, the Baden-Wuerttemberg results brought renewed cries of alarm over the dangers of neo-Nazism in the Federal Republic. More important, the results also raised doubts as to the future of a coalition government by the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, not only in Baden-Wuerttemberg but at the federal government level as well.## Baden-Wuerttemberg: A Test CaseBaden and Wuerttemberg traditionally have been strongholds of liberal, nonsocialist democracy in Germany. In the early 1930s, the Nazi vote in this area was almost always appreciably lower than elsewhere in Germany. The hotbeds of Nazism lay in other regions, for example in Franconia, East Prussia, and Schleswig-Holstein.The economic and social picture in Baden-Wuerttemberg would lead to expectations of stability there. The proportion of the population now employed in industry is higher than in any other state. The economy of the state was virtually untouched by the recent West German recession, during which unemployment never exceeded one percent. Per capita income is above average. Protestants and Catholics are almost evenly balanced in population, while the proportion of protestants in the Federal Republic is slightly higher.A few observers correctly forecast the outcome, but the general expectation was that the vote for the National Democratic Party would be lower than in Bremen. The two major West German polling organizations had predicted in March that the NPD would receive five percent of the vote.Federal-level politicians had campaigned actively in the state. Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger, a popular native son, made a three-day speaking tour, in which he sharply attacked "arrogant, thoughtless, and dangerous nationalism." He stressed this theme in the Hohenlohe area, where the NPD later received its highest vote in the state. Willy Brandt also appeared to speak for the Social Democrats.SECRETPage 2 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
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SECRETNPD Representation in West German States![NPD Representation in Schleswig-Holstein]5.8% (4 seats)23 April '67SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN![NPD Representation in Hamburg]8.8%(seats)1 Oct. '67HAMBURG![NPD Representation in Bremen]3.9% (seats)27 March '66BREMEN![NPD Representation in Lower saxony]7% (10 seats)4 June '67LOWERSAXONYNORTH RHINE-WESTPHALIA![NPD Representation in Hesse]7.9% (8 seats)6 Nov '66HESSE![NPD Representation in Saarland and Rhineland-Palatinate]6.9% (4 seats)23 April '67SAARRHINELAND-PALATINATE![NPD Representation in Baden-Wurttemberg]9.8% (12 seats)28 April '68BADEN-WUERTTEMBERG![NPD Representation in Bavaria]7.4% (15 seats)20 Nov. '66BAVARIASECRETPage 3          SPECIAL REPORT          31 May 68
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SECRETThe participation by na-tional figures reflected a feel-ing in Bonn that this state elec-tion, the last before the 1969federal election, might influencenational politics. The analogyto the federal scene was pointedup by the existence in Baden-.Wuerttemberg of a coalition ofChristian Democrats and SocialDemocrats, similar to that inBonn.## Reaction to Student RiotsIn looking for explanationsof the NPD gains, German observ-ers have emphasized the publicreaction against the Easter stu-dent rioting, and dissatisfactionwith the federal grand coalition.Conservatives lean to the formerexplanation, while students andtrade unionists stress the latter.The NPD did not receive less than6 percent in any electoral dis-trict. This suggests that thesentiment expressed by the voteis widespread, and may extendthroughout the FRG.Reaction to student riotingprobably contributed something,but this aspect seems to havebeen exaggerated as a factor inNPD gains. In Heidelberg, theNPD vote rose to 11.9 percent,but in three other universitytowns, the party's vote fellbelow the state average of 9.8percent. In industrial Esslingen,where there had been two stu-dent riots, the NPD only attained9 percent. Some voters may havebeen influenced by student dem-onstrations to transfer theirvotes from the SPD to the CDU,whose spokesmen have generally ad-vocated a stern treatment ofrioters.At the same time, the "newleft" certainly failed to winpopular support. The DemocraticLeft, supported by radical stu-dents, won only 2.3 percent inthe state as a whole, while mak-ing better showings in certainuniversity and industrial local-ities. While the DemocraticLeft's state-wide average was bet-ter than the far left had at-tained in recent elections underother names, it fell below thelast, low figure gained by theCommunists before they becameillegal: 3.2 percent.## Hostility to the Grand Coalition?There is dissatisfactionwith the coalition within theCDU, and it can be assumed thatsome of the party's right wingvoted for the National Democrats.The Socialists, however, sufferedthe greater loss. Left-of-centerSocialists often complain thatthe party has compromised itsprinciples and lost public favor.There is an undercurrent of feel-ing in these quarters that theparty has endangered German democ-racy by abandoning its long-time position of opposition andentering into collaboration withthe CDU.Although the SPD has pro-vided much of the impetus to thegrand coalition's economic andforeign policies, and althoughthe coalition in Baden-Wuerttem-berg has generally functionedwell, dissatisfaction undoubtedlyexists among idealistic membersof the left and among tradition-ally class-conscious union mem-bers. Middle class voters ofthis persuasion probably turnedSECRETPage 4 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
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SECRETto the Free Democratic Party, which has assumed the role of respectable opposition. The connection between this left-liberal criticism and the NPD gains on 28 April is not immediately apparent.Some commentators including some Socialists, conclude that many SPD voters defected to the NPD. The respected Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung fudged some of the election data to support its argument that workers had gone over to the NPD, but a more careful analysis has shown that the NPD did indeed win above-average support in some working-class neighborhoods.Many old Socialists and trade unionists, such as Willi Bleicher, the powerful boss of the metalworkers in this state, are cool to the coalition and hostile to intellectuals, and some of them are repelled by anarchic student leftism. Even so, most workers are unlikely under conditions of full employment to cast what they would consider a neo-Nazi vote; certainly Bleicher would never favor such action. SFD electoral losses would seem to be due less to defection to the NPD than to the failure of lower-level SPD functionaries, apathetic, or even hostile toward the coalition, to get out the vote, and to the failure of many trade union and normally SPD voters to go to the polls.In traditionally socialist Mannheim, only 58 percent of those entitled to vote turned out. SPD percentages dropped 14 percent in one district and 13 percent in another. The percentage of NPD strength rose to 12.1, 10.9, and 11.2 in the three city districts, but working class votes would not be needed to provide these percentages, especially in the face of a low SPD turnout. These votes probably came mainly from the CDU, the FDP, or from those who had not voted before.NPD Activity Pays OffThe NPD organization worked hard during the campaign, conducting more meetings than all the other parties put together. The party has overcome its former inexperience and disunity, and is developing into a well-oiled political machine. The organization fields speakers and provides canned speeches and propaganda materials to local groups. The NPD's heritage is not purely Nazi. It encompasses more respectable antecedents, such as the Deutschnationaler (German Nationalists) and other conservative elements. In the interests of avoiding a government ban, the National Democratic Party shuns blatantly Nazi appeals and tactics.Adolf von Thadden, the national leader of the NPD, is a smooth personality from a Junker family who denies charges that he was an active Nazi. He seems to model himself more on De Gaulle than on Hitler. The Baden-Wuerttemberg leader of the party, Wilhelm Gutmann, is a former Nazi. During "the good old days," he was Buergermeister of Tiengen on the Swiss border, where he sponsored anti-SemiticSECRETPage 5 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
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SECRETactivities in 1938. He refused to permit the raising of white flags when the Allied forces arrived in 1945. Despite his past, he won 15,000 votes in Karlsruhe. In one commune in the northern end of the state, the NPD gained an absolute majority with 55 percent of the vote; this was the home of an NPD candidate named Valentin Goetz, who had been voted out as Buergermeister two years before.The NPD won its greatest relative successes in three northern districts: Oehringen (14.8 percent), Crailsheim (14.5 percent), and Tauberbischofsheim (14.3 percent). The first two of these districts are largely protestant; the latter is predominantly Catholic. This northern area, and especially its Hohenlohe section, is filled with dissatisfied small farmers, who now face Common Market competition and who have recently suffered the loss of a state subsidy on milk. Rural dissatisfaction provides opportunities for the NPD, but this is not a promising base for a mass movement, particularly since the farm population in the Federal Republic has dropped in the last ten years from 20 percent to 11 percent. Another important voting factor in this northern area is the relatively high proportion of refugees, who were probably aroused by recent statements by Willy Brandt about the Oder-Neisse line and by the failure of the CDU to react more forcefully against Brandt.As was the case in the early 1930s, overwhelmingly Catholic areas, where the Church influences its members politically, had the lowest right extremist vote. One overwhelmingly Protestant district, Freudenstadt, also produced a> [Figure: Photograph of Adolf von Thadden]> ![photo of Adolf von Thadden]> [Figure: Photograph of Wilhelm Gutmann]> ![photo of Wilhelm Gutmann]SECRETPage 6 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
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# SECRETlow NPD vote. A postelectionpoll of 1967 voters in Bromenshowed that, unlike the Hitlermovement, the National Democratsdo not yet attract many womenand youth. More than two thirdsof the voters for the party,were males, and the strongestparticipation was in the 45 to60 age bracket.## FDP Gains and LossesThe FDP profited from itsposition in the opposition. RalfDahrendorf, a sociologist fromthe University of Konstanz withan international reputation, hasrecently entered the party andhas assumed a leading role, in-fluencing the FDP in a loftwarddirection and attracting left-liberal support. In the Stuttgartdistrict where he was a candidate,the party vote rose by 6 percent.On the other hand, the new pat-tern is not acceptable to manyold members of this tradition-ally business-oriented party, wholooking askance at Dahrendorf'sreadiness to debate and discusswith Rudi Dutschke and other rad-ical students. Two of the threedistricts with heaviest NPD gainsalso showed heavy FDP losses, asdid some other former FDP areasof strength.## Perspectives on the VoteThe over-all picture appearsto be that while both the Chris-tian Democrats and the Free Demo-crats lost to the NPD, they gainedat the expense of the Socialists.The Socialists suffered fromapathy and incurred some loss toboth the NPD and Democratic Left.The NPD probably garnered somenew and uncommitted votes. Itis fortunate for the SPD leadersin Bonn that the annual partycongress came before the Baden-Wuerttemberg election. It ishardly likely that the congresswould now defeat a motion with-holding endorsement of the coali-tion, as it did by a four-votemargin in March. Assuming theSPD remains faithful to theBonn coalition now, the prospectsare for further erosion of itsstrength and for greater diffi-culties within its ranks.Meanwhile, the NPD probablywill continue to grow in in-fluence. It now is probablystronger in some other areasthan in Baden-Wuerttemberg. Achange from proportional rep-resentation to single-member..constituencies, which might haveBaden-WuerttembergMannheimHeidelbergHeilbronn.KarlsruhePforzheimFreudenstadeFreiburgTiengenTauber-bischofsheimOchringenCrailsheimSTUTTGARTEsslingenTuebingenUlmConstanzPage 7 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
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SECRETserved to block NPD growth, hasnow become even less acceptablethan before to the SPD, whichwould have lost three-fifths ofits Baden-Wuerttemberg seatsunder this system.A ban of the NPD appearsunlikely unless the party com-mits some flagrant violation ofaccepted rules. A Bonn press of-fice spokesman has stated thatthe government will seek a po-litical debate with the NPD, andnot a ban. On present form, theNPD may get 40 seats in the 1969Bundestag elections. An attemptto set a higher minimum per-centage of votes (present mini-mum: five percent) for Bundestagrepresentation would arouse.violent FPD opposition, and doesnot seem to be under serious con-sideration at the moment. Itwould violate German tradition,and might produce a reaction infavor of the NPD, enabling itto overstep even the new margin.Although the growth ofthe NPD is disturbing, alarm doesnot seem to be warranted. In theearly 1930s, Germany sufferedfrom depression and high unem-ployment, and had bitter memoriesof a recent inflation which wipedout savings. Powerful elementsin the government and society,including President von Hinden-berg, the army, the courts, andheavy industry, were highly re-actionary and either cool or hos-tile to republican democracy--aswere the professors and students.Racism was rampant and more orless respectable, and unwilling-ness to accept defeat in World.War I provided endless opportu-nities for demagoguery. Allthese conditions are now vir-tually absent. The defeat in1945, and subsequent disclosures,work to discredit any real Nazimanifestations. Moreover, thefact that no other state willelect a new assembly before the1969 federal elections may helpto prevent a real bandwagon de-velopment. It must be emphasizedthat the NPD is still a smallparty, if no longer a mere splin-ter group.## The Coalition ProblemGerman observers tend to bemore worried about the effect ofthe NPD showing on foreign opin-ion than about the increase inNPD strength itself, and theirgreatest concern is over the pros-pects for the grand coalition,resulting from the SPD losses.A Baden-Wuerttemberg SPD conven-tion voted on 18 May against con-tinuing the coalition in Stuttgart,and the old state SPD leadersresigned. This would seem tomake the prospects for the Bonncoalition less favorable.At the same time, the FDPappears not to be in a mood toreturn to a coalition in eitherBonn or Stuttgart. Dahrendorfhas suggested that there might bea CDU minority government in thestate. State CDU leaders may,however, prefer to call new elec-tions if a coalition cannot beformed. In this event, theywould appeal for an absolute ma-jority from the voters. If theygot it and if the NPD vote de-clined, this would be encouraging,but new elections might also havea less favorable outcome.SECRETPage 8 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
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# SECRETIf the 1969 federal election follows the pattern of the 28-April election, the same problems will arise in Bonn. With this kind of a breakdown of the vote, the FDP and the SPD together cannot form a majority, and a refusal on the part of both of them to join the CDU means that the latter cannot organize a majority government either--unless the CDU invites NPD collaboration, which it is far from ready to do.A collapse of the grand coalition in Bonn either before or after 1969 and a return by the SPD to opposition positions would signify more than a passing cabinet crisis. In the past, parties tended to harden into intransigence, committed to particular ideological and material interests, and unable to reach pragmatic compromises with each other. In recent years, West German politicians have tried to break with this tradition and to work on the consensus principle. A failure of these efforts would have serious implications. If--as does not seem likely at present--the three major parties were unable to form a majority government, this might lead to severe instability and the discrediting of parliamentary government.Bonn and WeimarMany misleading analogies have been drawn between the Bonn and Weimar republics. One Weimar precedent may help, however, to explain why some observers view the coalition problem seriously. In March 1930, another grand coalition with SPD participation collapsed over the question of cuts in unemployment insurance, leading to the formation of a conservative majority government under Heinrich Bruening. Bruening was later replaced by the reactionary Franz von Papen, who in turn was followed first by a wire-pulling general, Kurt von Schleicher, and then by Adolf Hitler. The worst aspect of the SPD withdrawal was that it made the parliament ineffective and powerless.Once minority government was embarked on, supported by presidential prerogatives, there was no effective test for legitimacy except the will of Hindenburg by then susceptible and old. The Nazis ultimately came to power, not by a majority vote, but through the paralysis and impotence of the constitutional system and through intrigues in the presidential palace on the part of those, especially Papen and Schleicher, who thought they could "use" Nazi mass support.In contrast to the 30s, the presidential powers now are far weaker, and aside from all the other factors inhibiting a recurrence, the Weimar precedent itself must influence SPD leaders in Bonn. They are completely committed personally to the present coalition. A decision to go into opposition is unlikely under Brandt and Wehner.*The absence of executive emergency powers is not of course without dangers. In a bitter parliamentary deadlock, an illegal assumption of power, perhaps by extragovernmental elements, might be the only way out.SECRETPage 9 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
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SECRETAnother possibility might be a left-wing withdrawal from the SPD, although the leadership for a dissident faction has yet to emerge. This might provide a healthy outlet for criticism of the system without a turn to minority rule. Unlike the early 1930s, virtually all West German politicians now would do their best to maintain a functioning constitutional system. Real dangers will probably not arise unless, as in the late Weimar period, the government finds itself confronted with economic or political problems which seem to defy compromise settlement or rational solution:Immediate ProspectsAssuming that the Bonn coalition lasts until the 1969 elections, its leading members may still modify their policies somewhat in the light of the Baden-Wuerttemberg experience. The adverse vote of the refugees in the recent election could act as a brake on the policy of detente with Czechoslovakia and Poland, although there is no sign of this as yet. Chancellor Kiesinger has attributed NPD gains partly to "years of agitation against our own history and against healthy self-confidence," which suggests that he may try to sound a more nationalistic note. To the extent to which the results continue to be attributed to student activities, this will strengthen the demand for firmness. Even before the election, Brandt sent a telegram to SPD state headquarters, advising that speakers should react "completely hard" against student demonstrations.Although the antistudent reaction does not seem to have been as important a factor as some have believed it to be, constant violence and provocation on the part of the students, accompanied by constant press attention, could lead to severe official or unofficial counteraction. This, in turn, could bring more serious student violence, perhaps with the support of other elements.Some matters of student concern have appeal for others. Thus students and many trade unionists oppose emergency laws, and this question is again being agitated. Because of the Nazi experience, there is widespread aversion among left-of-center elements to the use of force in the name of "order," however great the provocation. But also because of the Nazi experience, a really large increase in NPD votes does not seem likely in the 1969 election, or in an earlier new election in Baden-Wuerttemberg, should that come to pass. (CONFIDENTIAL)SECRETPage 10 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68
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SecretSecret