[104-10187-10009.pdf — page 102]
CONTINUATION OFDISPATCHSECRETHMMA-311644. The set-up in the old as well as the nov base is the following:   The equipment - camera, scope and tripol is mounted in one bedroom behind   venetian, blinds with one slat removed. This room is locked to keep servants   or any chance intruder from entering. The operators do not spend all their   time behind the camera, but go to the adjoining bedroom where a table and   typewriter are set up and where the daily logs are transcribed, knitting done,   or some other activity that does not require full concentration is carried out.   The curtains and blinds in this room are kept partially or fully open to allow   good visibility and provide a normal appearance. Most of the daily movement of   the Soviet personnel is followed from this room and when it is necessary to   take pictures of visitors, unknown persons or newly arrived Soviets, the   operators go to the other room and use the pre-set equipment.5. GERENDE's Comment. It seems to me that any careful observation by   the Soviets would have revealed the tell-tale position of the venetian blinds   in both the old and the now bases. I have no doubt that the Soviets realize   they are under photo surveillance. The move by the family from the old to the   new building must surely have been noted by the Soviets. Possibly the Soviets   think the family is working with the local authorities due to LIEMPTY-13's   former association with the Mexican Army.6. Station Comments. The Station agrees with GERENDE that careful   observation by the Soviets would have revealed the missing slat in the venetian   blinds and also the fact that those blirvin are seldom open. The Station also   agrees that the Soviets realize that they are under photo surveillance.   This was pointed out recently when a Soviet shielded an LNERGO walk-in when   they passed the front gate of the Embassy and made a sign to the walk-in   indicating that they could be seen by someone watching with a telescope   trom the buildings across the street. Also, as Headquarters is aware, there   have been numerous comments by residents of Mexico City to the effect that   anyone entering the Soviet Umbassy is photographed; however, seldom has it   been rumored that the "Americans" are doing it, which might indicate most people   believe the Mexican Government is doing any such photographing and thereby   reaffirming GERENDE's statement that the Soviets possibly believe the Mexican   Government runs the base.7. Given the assumption that the LILYRIC base is blown, the Station at   this point does not plan to terminate or revamp the LILYRIC installation.   Any operational change by the operators would be spotted by the Soviets and   if the Base were closed the Soviets would start looking for a new installation.   The LILYRIC Base is performing a useful function and it is believed that it   will continue to do so. The Soviets have had opportunities to complain to   the Mexican Government about being monitored photographically and have not   seen fit to do so and it is believed that they probably will not do so unless   there is a radical change in Soviet and/or Mexican policy. The Station has   instructed GERENDE to take every precaution during his meetings with LIFMPTY-13   to assure that LIEMPTY-13 does not lead the Soviets to him and thereby   jeopardizing other operations, especially LICALLA.LIMITED8. The operator of the LIMITED Base, LIEMPTY-6, is, to my knowledge,   the oldest hand in the photo surveillance of the Soviet target and possibly   the most likely to be "burned". His residence for years at the former Base   (now the site of the new LILYRIC building) and his move to the present base   could not have gone unnoticed by the Soviets. His cover is that of an   insurance salesman, but he actually does not work at the cover and is at   a disadvantage in trying to explain his source of income. At times, in years   past, he had to afford full-time coverage from the base, which allowed him   no time to engage in credible cover activities.9. GERENDE Comments. I do not believe that LIEMPTY-6/LIMITED is a   security risk; however, his present means of working from an open door leading   to his balcony probably can be spotted by the Soviets. LIEMPTY-6 is extremely   cautious about checking himself for surveillance when making meetings.