Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10187-10009.pdf — page 152]
# CLASSIFIED MESSAGEORIG: MELVIN BECKUNIT: SR/10/LAEXT: 2733DATE: 24 January 1962SECRET 1611TO: MEXICOFROM: DIRECTORCONF: SR 6INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/IC 2, CI/OA, FI, FI/INT 2, WH 7, S/C 226 JAN 62 21 08zROUTINE OUT94732TO: MEXI INFO:CITE DIR: 37936REDWOOD REDSKINREF: MEXI 9880 (IN 13260)*1. HQS WILL AUTHORIZE FUNDING SALAZAR PER PARA 2 REF, PROVIDED PROOF CAMPOS TRIP PATON WELDING INSTITUTE PAID FOR BY SOVS AND SALAZAR ACTUALLY INVITED PARTICIPATE, AND FUNDING SALAZAR CAN BE PLAUSIBLY ACCOUNTED FOR EYES OF CAMPOS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATES.2. DUE ATTITUDE CAMPOS, AND CERTAINTY HIS CORRESPONDENCE TO USSR KNOWN TO KGB, BELIEVE ADVISABLE FURTHER ASSESS ITS SECURITY. SAME VEIN, AVOID NECESSITY INDIRECT CONTRIBUTION CAMPOS EXPENSES.3. PLS FORWARD DETAILS SALAZAR RECRUITMENT. REFER HMMW 10395 ADDITIONAL DETAILS HQS GUIDANCE OP, INCLUDING WITHHOLDING REQUIREMENTS WELDING INSTITUTE PENDING CLARIFICATION RECRUITMENT. EXTENDING POA'S SALAZAR AND CAMPOS.END OF MESSAGE.SR COMMENT: * Request has decision whether station proceed with op, assuming necessity to entirely fund SALAZAR expenses.![signature of CWH Milman]![signature of GRACOP]![signature of WH/3/Mexico]![signature of ACSR/10]
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SECRETChief of Station, Mexico CityChief, an via Chief, SIOperational/WZKIMFrancisco CAMPOS Herrera and Guillermo SAINZ de PalazueloAction Required: See Form 5Info: Main Files1. The prospective REDACTED trip of above subjects was discussed with Gerald F. COTHRAN at Headquarters in light of the current AERODYNAMIC policy which is in the process of being formulated. We are still very much interested in subjects' trip and agree with REDACTED that SALAZAR appears to be the principal target, rather than CABRERA. However, we wish to note that the undertaking of the trip for SALAZAR is contingent on the fact that he and REDACTED will spend a period of time at the Institute in a capacity other than that of a sightseeing tourist. If at all possible, it would be useful to determine the exact nature of the invitation made by the Soviets to CABRERA in late 1960 and the manner in which the invitation of SALAZAR was broached to the Soviets. It is noted that the letters forwarded as attachment to SRH-1579 do not indicate that an invitation has been extended.2. There are requirements of intelligence interest on the Electro- welding Institute imeni Paton in Kiev which subjects, because of their qualifications and technical knowledge, may well be able to fulfill. The Institute is the major center for welding research in the USSR. It has been identified as overt Soviet literature as having solved problems of mechanical arc welding with a flux of austenitic steel which is resistant to great heat, acidity, and rust. This was used reportedly in connection with the development of contemporary rocket engineering. The Paton Institute undoubtedly is engaged in solving problems related to welding in guided missile technology.CONTINUEDEXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:3 - Mexico City 1 Jan 1962AMR-1009 25 JAN 1962P01-239372P01-239402SECRETINTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SR/10/LA Arlene Waldron kf 27333 - WI/31 - WI/HR2 - SR/10 ACSR/101 - FI/OPS WI/3CU![illegible annotation]
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# SECRET5.  The following are preliminary specific results of the Antenna Institute which may assist in case SEC/any anecdote deemed essential to fulfill requirements of this matter. Forwarded to Headquarters as reference, both of the documents which are already available to appropriate offices.a.  Obtain documentation concerning new welding and cutting technology; such as applications of, the following welding or cutting:(1) Electron beam-welding or cutting(2) Friction welding(3) Ultrasonic welding for thin wire and thin strips - metals(4) Explosive welding(5) Plasma arc - also for cutting, coating and welding operations(6) Maser beam associated welding.b. Locate types of automatic welding equipment developed and where the equipment is used.c.  In the liaison Institute's discussions, determine by what characteristics, items and by uses Institute is working on the solution of problems related to the welding of special alloys, particularly aluminum, titanium, and stainless steel. Shiva Laboratories of two Butitute are working on the problems: (Two alloys soon to be used in the Soviet atomic program - aluminum alloys and ET-16 -stainless steel).d. In the course elicit any indication from Soviets at the Instituto as to problems related to welding technology at the Centralia and as to programs which were solved by them.e.  Identify other facilities (plants and institutes) which two faton Institute is associated, and in what manner. Identify personnel at the ailing Institute who are on designated duty at other facilities. Locate identify class of their contacts, the facility, purpose, and dates of activity. (Note: For awards to engineers from faton Institute, receive awards in October 1966 for participation in the upgrading of the Centralia stutical Iemilutlon! Pattern Lauis in Mayaland; possible involved in IWM). To estaila ay to determine what was there two personalities personnel to moris receiving two personalities personnel to moris receiving rewards; also any other engineers on dental duty at plants as Laidcatal above.3. In reply to requests of reference, look at the books which sure forwarded to Headquarters calatica are already available to appropriate offices.4.  Requests for evasion of FOA's or Procivico POS (24 January 1967) and Gulliones Gullivan rolling (P.R.) expired 1 January 1968) have been initiated. The con Tejones Sem masclied. Please advise if the lastes tes och expired for Board Carl Stabia1.In accord with a forthcoming more stringent legal travel policy. It is desired that the station as to provide essential information represented #ababee call Petamin,alice is directed loans ce security status a Funciono CAMPS Ferrera, babited an attitude wise for in his dealings with tim Soviets usan to aspicion.mnt adre at his are correspondence butuces ומה ליום inusitate.MLJA 2. THE AREA
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# DISPATCHTO : Chief of Station, Mexico CityFROM : Chief, WHDSUBJECT- LIMESA/LIMUST/LICALLAACTION REQUIRED- NoneREFERENCESE-MA-14477Transmitted herewith are the six best rolls of LICALLA film.OLIVER G. GALBOND9 March 1960Attachments:6 rolls of film1 log (nine pages)Distribution:3 - Mexico City1 - Mexico RYBAT Chrono1 - SubjectWI/3/Mexico/O.R. BYNAM:jmh> [Figure: Stamp with text and lines]RECORDS OFFICER STAMPThe follo.ing action in authorized: de-RibesSigned: Colima talmaF.O. (S23) - Wott WH/1/RNote: If destruction, cite projects and coordinate if appropriate.Removed from Project KDF ACTORCS Classifications 50-6-74/3SCB #73-853/64Box: 35-1-3> [Figure: DESENSITIZED stamp.]USE PREVIOUS EDITIONREPLACES FORMS51 28 51 28A AND 51 29WHICH ARE OBSOLETE
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CONTINUATION OFDISPATCHCLASSIFICATIONSECRET/KDISPATCH SYMBOLHMMA-14793K-17625. In conclusion, the Station would like to point out that the "photo- graphic basehouses" represent an integral and significant part of the Station's counterespionage effort against the LIMERICK installation. These bases do not produce Foreign Intelligence and should not be considered in such a light.![Signature of Willard C. CURTIS]Willard C. CURTIS6 April 1960Distribution:3 - WHD2 - FilesFORM2-67 53aUSE PREVIOUS EDITIONSREPLACES FORMS51-3, WHICH AREOBSOLETECLASSIFICATIONSECRET/KCOORDINATING OFFICESX DELETEDPAGE NO2
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# DISPATCHTO: Chief, WII DivisionFROM: Chief of Station, Mexico CitySUBJECT: LIEMPTY/LIENTRAP/LIEMPTY-10 Security Incident - Liaison with ODENVYACTION REQUIRED: See paragraph ó below.REFERENCES: ΗΜΜΑ-13951 (КАРОК-1705) 16 October 19591. On 13 October 1959 it was learnedfrom source that the local ODENVY chief got a priority cable from his Headquarters asking why data concerning the Mexican apprehension of the (KUBARK) truck and photographer had not been re- ported to the U. S. Ambassador locally. The statement was made that "such matters as this should be immediately reported to the Ambassador."2. This cable resulted from the report the ODENVY office sent in on the incident from the knowledge they had as reported in reference.3. The local ODENVY chief replied to his Headquarters that he did not agree that matters concerning KUBARK operations should be reported by ODENVY to the Ambassador.4. Source stated that the cable was obviously a result of the KUBARK/ ODENVY headquarters "ill feeling" which presently exists and which source believes is primarily (and principally) attributable to the article in TRUE magazine of September 1959.5. Source is LIMEW.6. It is requested that under no circumstances should the information contained herein be disseminated in any form whatsoever outside KUBARK.![signature of Willard C. Curtis]WCCurtis/vps30 October 1959Distribution3 Hqs
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# DISPATCHTO Chief, WII DivisionINFOFROM Chief of Station, Mexico CitySUBJECT LIEMPTY/LIENTRAP/LIEMPTY-10 SecurityIncident.ACTION REQUIRED None, for Headquarters informationaly and coordinateREFERENCE(S)1. At 1110 hrs., 20 September 1959, while on an operational assignment,   LIEMPTY-10 and the LIENTRAP vehicle were temporarily detained by the Servicio   Secreto de Mexico (Mexican Secret Service). LIEMPTY-10 was held under   unofficial custody for approximately 20 hours before his release was obtained. There   follows below an account of the more important details pertaining to this incident.2. LIEMPTY-10 was instructed on 17 September to case the area surrounding   the Theatre Iris, located at Donceles 36, preliminary to undertaking a photographic   surveillance of all persons entering and leaving the theatre between the hours of   0930 and 1200 hrs., 20 September. In this instance, the Station's target was a pro-   Cuban rally sponsored by the Circulo de Estudios Mexicanos (CEM). The Station   had received information that many of the leading Mexican and Central American   Communists would attend this rally and that this was an opportune time to establish   which ones did attend and to collect their photographs. The Station did not know that   the Mexican Secret Service would also be covering this meeting for the purpose of   preventing a Comununist-inspired demonstration.3. The Station was advised at 1730 hrs., 20 September. by Raymond H.   GERENDE (ps), the Principal Agent who handles LIEMPTY-10, that L-10 was being   held by the Secret Service. Immediately following this notification, Allen W. WARE   (ps) was requested to contact Philip K. TESSAROLO (ps) and request him to implement   procedures through a criminal lawyer to effect the release of L-10. TESSAROLO   was contacted and briefed at 2200 hours and immediately began attempts to locate   a reliable criminal lawyer. However, as sometimes happens in an emergency   situation, his two most appropriate contacts were out of tewn. It was not until the   following morning at 0700 hrs. that TESSAROLO located another reliable lawyer   who agreed to handle the case.4. Since GERENDE was known to L-10 and since the Station could not be   sure how much L-10 might be forced to tell the Secret Service, GEPENDE was   given the following instructions:A. To disconnect immediately the LIFEAT/LIVERY lines in the basewhere he and his wife were living and to move all equipment to another safelocation. It was believed appropriate to take this precaution even though L-10did not know the location of the LIVERY base, the telephone number of thebase, or even that GERENDE was living at a place other than his mother'sresidence in another part of the city.B. To collect and deposit with his Case Officer any compromising paperspresently in his possession.C. To make a security inspection of the outside photographic lab at hismother's house.D. To phone L-10's wife and inform her that procedures were underwayto obtain L-10's release and for her not to become upset and talkative.E. To suspend all operational contacts until L-10 was released and theextent of compromise was determined.
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CONTINUATION OFDISPATCHL-10's statement that he did some photographic work for ODACID. There was no newspaper or other publicity pertaining, to L-10 or LIENTRAP.10. During his visit to Secret Service Headquarters WARE discovered that L-10 had not been booked or formally charged with an illegal act and that neither LIMON nor MENDIOLEA could recall L-10's name. L-10 was not placed in jail during the 26 hours he was at Secret Service Headquarters but, rather, was permitted to remain in the Secret Service agents' duty room. No bribes were necessary to obtain his release; however, per LIMEW's request, $500.00 pesos were given to LIMEW to give to his source, LIMEW said that in addition to notifying him about L-10's detention, the source was also responsible for all equipment and film being returned intact to L-10.11. TESSAROLO was advised, as soon as LIMEW became involved in the casq. that the criminal lawyer should not pursue the matter any further. Two bottles of scotch whiskey were given to the lawyer through TESSAROLO for the few tasks he had already performed.12. After his release, L-10 reported that he was not interrogated and that he did not reveal any data about other operations he has worked on nor did he give the names of anybody connected with operational activities. Based on the developments in the case, the Station has no reason to doubt the veracity of L-10's staternent. L-10 was reprimanded for his use of statements to the Secret Service about being employed by ODACID. lie was told that the revelation of such employment was to be made only by the Station and that henceforth he is never to use such a cover story. L-10 was also reprimanded for his lack of judgment in remaining in an area where there was a strong concentration of police; it is believed safe to assume that L-10 will never make this same mistake again.13. In retrospect, it is interesting to note that L-10's use of the ODACID employment story is possibly responsible for his not being interrogated and thus compromising other operations and individuals. This case has pointed out to the Station the desireability of having casual contacts in the Secret Service and other local police-type organizations so that the Station, rather than ODACID and ODENVY, in the first to learn of incidents of this type. Considering the multifarious activities handled by the Station, it must be assumed that the police will occasionally apprehend an agent and that the Station must be geared to handle such emergencies.14. The Station is allowing a one month's cooling off period for the LIEN-TRAP vehicle and LIEMPTY-10. The vehicle wall then be painted another standard color and re-registered in the State of Mexico. After these security precautions are observed, the Station gees no reason why carefully selected photographic surveillance operations should not continue with L-10 as a wiser and more prudent LIENTRAP operator.QNO/vpa15 October 1959Distribution3 HqsWillard C. CURTIS
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# DISPATCHTOINFOFROMSUBJECTACTION REQUIREDREFERENCES)accurate drawing of the type door installed at LIME RICK. This drawing was forwarded to Headquarters via HMMA-11926, 21 January 1959.E. Cas ing Report on West German Embassy - During June, July and August 1958, SCANTLING prepared a detailed casing report on the new West Ger man Embassy. SCANTLING's engineering ability enables him to prepare accurate drawings and sketches from a minimum of data. Also, his personality and gregar ious manner permit him to visit the inside of such establishments, with an appropr iat e cover story, and retain minute details which lat er he commits to paper and emerges with a comprehen sive floor plan and important construction data,F. LIMERICK Construction - SCANTLING's long association with th is target from the casing standpoint provides the Stat ion with an unparall eled sou rce of in formation about LIMERICK construction activities, modifications and reasons for same, All of the LIMERICK cas ing reports on file in Head- qua rters are the product of SCANTLING's unusual a bil ity and knowledge. Consultat ions with Station Officers about LIME RICK construction have been of benefit to the Stationdiring this reporting period and they wili continue to be of worthwhile importance,G. Routine Investigations and Surve illanc es - Although the Stat ion has several assets capable of performing investigations and surveil lances, SCANTLING is still used in situations requiring the utmost in discretion and clandestinity. His activities in this connection are too numerous to list here; suffice it to state that he has contributed materially to the Station's collection of operational information through his investigative efforts. SCANTLING's interview of Paul Frederick Kir schhoff (201-43645) of LCMAY- FOWL interest is an example of SCANTLING's use on-investigations (see ΗΜ ΜΑ-11749, 17 December 1958).H. ESGEM-15 - SCANTLING served as the cutout with ESGEM-15 during the latter's December 1958 trip to Mexico City. In this connection SCANTLING is a support asset which is trustworthy and depen aable. SCANTLING never displays undue curiosity in operations such as the ESGEM-15 one; he accepts the minimum amount of information given and performs his duties in a professional and sincere manner.I. LIEMPTY/3 - SCANTLING handles the administ rative marters connected with L/3. Doris M. KILLGO provides operational direction to L/3. During this reporting period, the Stat ion had hopes of SCANTLING taking over the ope rational supervision of L/3's activities. However, after a four-month trial period with both SCANTLING and KILLCO meeting with L/3, it was decided that it would be desirable for KILIGO to continue handling L/3. L/3's unu sual personality and intellect indicated that he could best be directed by a PBPRIME citizen. Therefore, SCANTLING no longer attends KILLGO'S and L/3's operational meetings, although he does continue to handle L/3's administrative problems,J. Raymond H. GERENDE's Duties - Dur ing GERENDE's absence from
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# DISPATCHTO:INFO:FROM:SUBJECT:ACTION REQUIRED:REFERENCE(S):IMMA-1 2095-1 543G. LIEMPTYS/4 and 5 - LIEMPTY/4 does a truly professional job of dev eloping and printing the base house photographs. No significant developments occurred in relation to L/4 except that OUSLER met directly with him during the December 1958 period that GERENDE was away from Mexico City. LIEMPTY/5, L/4's wife, continued doing routine translations in a very competent manner.11. Administration - Other than the fact that LIJERSEY and the above-mentioned portions of the LIPSTICK projects were combined into this new project, LIEMPTY, there is nothing of significance to report to Headquarters.12. Outlook for Future Development - Although not meaning to be repetitive by di scuss ing again those recommendations made above, a summary of the Station's outlook on the future of the LIEMPTY GERENDE Segment is believed to be appropriate. With the arrival of CLACKETT in April, GERENDE will be free to devote full time to photographic base house operations. GERENDE can do a lot to professionalize these operations by preparing written.communications procedures, by thoroughly klebriefing base house operators on their methods of operation, by preparing detail ed security reviews on each base and by supervising the trial of new photograph ic techniques. GERENDE will. continue to be used on occasional sensitive in vestigations to rent operational hotel rooms and to perform other services for the Station which will not impair the security of his primary responsibilities. It is planned that CLACKETT will put some life Into the LIJERSEY surveillance team and that the Station will soon have another first rate investigative group to support other Station operations.Willard C. CURTISQNO/vp s31 January 1959Distribution3 11qs
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9 December 1958MEMORANDUM FOR: DC/WHSUBJECT: Case Officer Assignments in Nexico1. I Staff has told Rio Station to remove their liaisen case officer from handling their Number One clandestine operation.2. Why should we not do this in the case of Moxico where Estancona is handling LIVESTOCK-2 (Station's most overt and dangerous agent) and LJFEAT (unilateral telephone tap)?3. Incidentally, telephone taps in Mexico are limping along with about half the target coverage of a year ago.![Signature of Charles W. Anderson]CHARLES W. ANDERSONWH/FI
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1 December 1958MEMORANDUM FOR: WH/III/MexicoSUBJECT: LIEMPTYOn this mammoth project, I have only two ideas:a. Should LICALLA be terminated? It is a possible threat to LIMESA.b. Gerende should be taken off all LIFEAT work.CHARLES W. ANDERSONWH/FIWhat's new on Sancho's replacement?
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TO: WH/PersonnelFROM: Chief, WHD29 Oct 1958SUBJECT: Request for Staff Agent to fill PAP-5100 Slot in Mexico City1. It is requested that WH/Personnel locate a staff Agent to fill the PAP-8100 $IO (FI), CS-12 slot in Mexico City which was recently vacated by Wilfred O. CLOFR(Lc:).2. This Agent should be bilingual in Spanish and should have operational experience, especially in physical surveillance techniques.He will be expected to spot, develop, recruit, and direct surveillance assets.and He will be given full responsibility for organizing an effective physical surveillance team.3. It is requested that a suitable candidate be located as soon as possible so that the Contract Agent now performing the functions can be relieved of this responsibility and can devote his time to his other tasks.![signature]
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SECRET23 October 1958MEMORANDUM FOR: CWHSUPJECT : Development of Physical Surveillance Assets in MexicoREFERENCE : WH/FI Memorandum of 14 October 19581. The subject of the recruitment of a physical surveillance team in the United States for use in Mexico as well as other areas within Will has long been a topic of discussion at Headquarters. While it is palpably ridiculous to consider the use of a surveillance team recruited and trained in the United States and based in Mexico, operationally in other areas in Latin America, there is some merit, at least in theory, to the proposal in 2a of reference. Although one of the basic factors in the make-up of any surveillance team is that its member's must be indigenous to the area of operation, it would be possible to recruit such a team as suggested in 2a and use this team in Mexico. However, I believe this would be time-consuming and very expensive for the following reasons:a. Machine runs have already been made to spot candidates within the Agency of the Mexican/American type for the LIMESA/LIMUST project, with negative results.b. In order to make it attractive to young men of the caliber desired, we would have to offer some kind of a career with a starting salary of somewhere between the GS 7 and GS 9 level, plus travel and allowances. Without attempting to even estimate this cost one can see that the figures for a team of fifteen would run into six digits.c. It would take a minimum of three months for a recruiter to move into the southwest aren and spot, contact, develop and recruit a team of fifteen.d. Once a team of suitable candidates was recruited, it would then take a minimum of another three months to train these candidates in basic trade craft and surveillance techniques,e. Upon completion of the training period, the candidates would have to be moved individually into the area of operation to become familiar with this area, the language, people, and atmosphere in general, etc. This would take another three months minimum.f. After completion of the area familiarization period, the team would have to be assembled and put through various surveillance exercises as a unit to check them out prior to actual operationSECRET