Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10187-10014.pdf — page 109]
SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS - Projects BranchCRYPTONYM: LIEMPTYDIVISION: Western HemisphereSTATION: Mexico CityHEADQUARTERS CASE OFFICER:NAME: J. B. BRADYROOM: 2120 Barton HallEXT.: 2555DATE: 15 December 19581. It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project approval request be amended to include Simon D. CLACKETT (ps) and Wilma J. FIORDALISI (ps) under the LIEMPTY Project effective 1 January 1958. No additional funds are required.2. It is also requested that the LIMESA Project be amended to delete from this Froject these two Contract Agents effective 1 January 1958.![Signature of Robert N. Dahlgren]R. N. Dahlgren, C/WH/IIF![Signature of Charles W. Anderson]Charles W. Anderson, WH/FI![Signature of R. J. King]for R.J. King, Chief, WD16 dec 1958DateAttachments:Memorandum (in quad)Envelope with true namesSECRET
[104-10187-10014.pdf — page 110]
# SECRETRequest for Amendment to LIEM-TY Project1.  It is requested that the LIEMPTY Project approval request be amended to include Simon D. CLACKETT (ps) and wilma J. FIORDALISI (ps), U. S. citizens and contract agents, under this Project in place of the Staff Agent written into the field project outline. At the same time it is requested that the LIMESA Froject be amended to delete these contract agents from the latter project.2.  CLACKETT and FIORDALISI are now approved under the LIMESA Project. They were recruited in the United States to occupy a sensitive LIMESA base-house. Because of the sensitivity of the operation and the equipment to be installed in the basehouse Headquarters decided U. S. citizens should be used. The Station said appropriate documentation and backstopping could be secured for those agents so they could be given false identities under which they could live while they occupied the basehouse.3.  FEXI-2777 (IN 26519), of 14 November 1958, notified Headquarters that security factors and difficulty in obtaining adequate documentation and backstopping precluded the use of U. S. citizens under LIMSA and requested permission to use indigenous agents for this operation. After discussions between John B.D., Chief of the Mexican desk, with the LIMESA/LIEMPTY Case Officer in Mexico City, and discussions between representatives of F1/D, OC, ISS, and WH at Headquarters, Headquarters concurred in the field's operational decision to use indigenous agents in the LIMESA Project. CLACRETT and FIORDALISI received only a very superficial briefing regarding the LIMESA Project. It is not believed Subject's limited knowledge of this sensitive operation will pose a security hazard.4.  Construction on the LIMUST houses is being kept about two weeks from completion until indigenous agents can be cleared and recruited. The delay in completion is normal because all construction money in Mexico has become extremely tight because of the recent presidential inauguration.5.  The Station believes CLACHETT will be an excellent replacement for Wilfred O. CLC.ER (ps), former Staff Agent under Project LIPSTICK, who directed and trained that surveillance team. CiLACHETT has shown a remarkable aptitude for clandestine operational activity and surveillance and investigative work in particular. He also is interested and enthusiastic in undertaking this assignment for KUB.FK. The Station needs a good bilingual agent to recruit, train, direct, and develop a strong dependable physical, surveillance team under LlEMPTY.6.  Clearances and Contacts: CLACKETT was granted a PCSA on 23 July 1958. A POA/CA for use under LIMESA was requested on 19 Aupust 1958. FIORDALISI was granted an OA for use under LIMESA on 14 November 1958. Requests have been submitted to amend their clearances for use under LIEMPTY, CLACKETT and FIORDALISI have signed contracts effective 1 September 1958. The sensitivity of the LIMESA Project required them to leave their young son inSECRET
[104-10187-10014.pdf — page 111]
# SECRET-2-the United States. Because of this a special benefit of periodic trips to their home in Arizona was included in their contracts. Under LINESA their quarters were to be provided. An amendment has been requested to their contracts deleting the special benefit and adding educational and quarters allowances.7. Motivation and Control: CLACKETT and FIORDALISI are extremely patriotic and highly motivated as evidenced in their willingness to undertake the LINESA Project and be separated from their son. They have indicated they are more than willing to do whatever is requested of them, no matter what personal sacrifices and hardships are required. Their complete livlihood is dependent on their KUänkä income.8. Tasks: CLACKETT will recruit, train, and direct the LIEMPTY surveillance team. The Station hopes to develop this team into a major Station support asset. He will receive instructions and direction from the Station Case Officer. FIORDALISI will be used to do all the clerical and administrative work for the LIENTI surveillance team.9. Communication and Contact: CLACKETT will contact the Station Case Officer in a clandestine manner. all necessary security precautions will be / taken. CLACKEIT will also contact his surveillance agents under a cover which will be determined later by the Station and CLACKETT. In view of his Mexican background, CLACHETT can pass as a Mexican. Details of communication and contact arrangements with AGBASK will be arranged by the Station. Under LIEMPTY CLACKETT will be contacted by the same Case Officer he is now contacted by under LIMESA. CLACKETT and FIORDALISI will be in direct contact with relatives and friends in the United States. The cover company has, until now, been serving as a letter drop and contact point for emergency messages.10. Cover: CLACKETT and FIORDALISI entered Mexico on United States documentation and it is planned they will continue to live in Mexico under true name. CLACKETT has a notional cover as a public relations consultant which was established by CCD/NC to use with friends and relatives in the U. S. The same cover story can be adopted to cover their proposed use under EMPTY vis-a-vis their United States friends. The Station is working on local cover for CLACHETT to use in Mexico.11. Anticipated Costs: It is anticipated that the following expenses will be incurred by CLACKETT and FICADALISI:Compensation:|                        |        || ---------------------- | ------ || CLACKETT    ($7750/ут) | 7100   || FIORDALISI  ($400/ут)  | 3700   ||                        | 10,800 |Allowances:|                       |             || --------------------- | ----------- || Educational allowance | 320         || Quarters  ($2500/ST)  | SECRET 2500 ||                       | 2,820       |
[104-10187-10014.pdf — page 112]
SECRETTravel:PCS 300TDY to Headquarters for training (including 30 day per diem at $12 per day). 648 948Total 14,368A total of $14,470 was included under the LIEMETY Project approval request submitted on 24 November 1958 for a Staff Agent; therefore, no additional funds are required.SECRET
[104-10187-10014.pdf — page 113]
SECRET24 November 1958MEMORANDUM FOR: FI/OPS-Projects BranchSUBJECT : Justification for Automobiles under Project LIEMPTY1. It is requested that the Mexico City Station be authorised-to purchase three used sedans for use by the LIEMPTY surveillance team, The Station plans to expand the LIEMPTY surveillance team into a larger, well-trained physical surveillance asset. They will need three automobiles. Private automobiles or commercial transportation will not be satisfactory since the cars must be outfitted with two-way radios.2. Authority is also requested to purchase a panel truck to be used in the LIENTRAP operation under this Project which mounts mobile photo-graphic surveillances.3. It is also requested that a quasi-personal car be authorised for Oliver G. Scantling (ps). Scantling is an indigenous agent under oral contract. A car is a prerequisite for his work for KUBARK which includes casings, surveillances, and investigations. Because of the sensitive nature of his work, and the heavy use made of the car, the Station has decided that Scantling should be furnished a QP car.4. LIEMPTY agents were formerly carried under the LIJERSEY and LIPSTICK Projects. The vehicles used by the LIEMPTY agents under these other Projects will be disposed of and new ones will be purchased after the above TVA has been approved. The vehicles which will be replaced are MV 2148, MV 2147, MV 2138, and MV 20il. One of the surveillance cars will be new and will not replace an old car. It was decided that these vehicles should be replaced rather than transferred to the LIEMPTY Project for security reasons and because of the age of the automobiles. The automobiles are 1951 and 1952 models and have been used for sensitive surveillance work for over two years. The panel truck which was used in the LIENTRAP Operation under the LIPSTICK Project has been operating for two years in all parts of the city and has become a security threat. The fact that the LIPSTICK surveillance team knows that the truck exists, even to the point that one of the team members is the listed owner of the truck, also dictates replacement of this vehicle.![signature of J. C. KING]J. C. KINGChief, WHDSECRET
[104-10187-10014.pdf — page 114]
SECRET(When Filled In)CIA INTERNAL USE ONLYSUPPORT ANNEX - TABLE OF VEHICULAR ALLOWANCE1. PROJECTLIEPTY2. SENIOR STAFF4. AREAA. DIVISIONTN3. TYPE OF ACTION (Check one)B. BRANCHIIIA. NEW TVAC. DESKMexicoB. AMENDMENT OF EXISTING TVA5. | ITEM | TYPE                                              | REQUESTED ACTION |                  |                   || ---- | ------------------------------------------------- | ---------------- | ---------------- | ----------------- ||      |                                                   | TOTALON HAND     | TOTALPRESENT TVA | TOTALPROPOSED TVA || A.   | SEDAN 2 or 4 door, 5 passenger Americanof foreign |                  | 0                | 4                 || B.   | STATION WAGON                                     |                  |                  |                   || C.   | OTHER (List below)                                |                  |                  |                   || (1)  | truck, panel, American. or foreign.mfg.           |                  | 0                | 1                 || (2)  |                                                   |                  |                  |                   || (3)  |                                                   |                  |                  |                   || (4)  |                                                   |                  |                  |                   || (5)  |                                                   |                  |                  |                   || D.   | TOTALS                                            |                  | 0                | 5                 |6. REVIEWED BY7. APPROVAL REQUESTED BY| SIGNATURE LOGISTICS OFFICER | DIVISION | DATE        | SIGNATURE CHIEF, ADMIN. | DIVISION | DATE   || --------------------------- | -------- | ----------- | ----------------------- | -------- | ------ || James S Bunrell/WH          |          | 26 Mar 1858 | Kahnenvar               |          | XMar58 |8. APPROVED9. AUTHORIZED| BY DIRECTION OF DDP                 | DATE       | BY DIRECTION OF DD/S | DATE || ----------------------------------- | ---------- | -------------------- | ---- || Benjamin A. y. Juller/ Jus for CF/1 | 20 fum.'54 |                      |      |FORM 1116 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.9-57SECRETCIA INTERNAL USE ONLY(20-36)
[104-10187-10014.pdf — page 115]
CONFIDENTIALNOTICETHIS FILE HAS BEEN PROCESSED AND RETIRED. **DO NOT**ADD ANY DOCUMENTS TO THIS FOLDER, FORWARD CSDOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS FOLDERTO RID/RPU GE-58.NOTICECONFIDENTIALFORM 2-66 2593 (7-13)
[104-10187-10014.pdf — page 116]
# SECRETM: (Headquarters component)WH/1TO: IP/ANTO: (Station/Base)Mexico CityFROM: (Division)WHINFORMATION FOR REQUESTERSCOMPLETE ITEMS 1 THROUGH 12.ITEM 3-ALL FILE TITLES MUST DE STERILE SINCE THEY WILL APPEAR ON THE FIELD COPIES AND ON MACHINE LISTS.ITEM 6-ALL REMARKS MUST BE STERILE.ITEM 7 AND 8-USE FIRST THREE LETTERS OF DISPATCH SYMBOLS FOR FIELD STATIONS AND LIST HEADQUARTERS ELEMENTS ACCORDING TO ESTABLISHED NUMERIC CODES.ITEM 10-ENTER OLD TITLE WHEN AMENDING A TITLE, CITE ANY FILFS, SUCH AS 201 OR PROJECT FILES THAT ARE RELATED TO THE FILE COVERED BY THIS RLQUIST. IILM 10 MAY ALSO BE USED TO GIVE REASONS FOR THE ACTION BLING REQUESTED, TO IDINTHY THE TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE PLACED IN A FILE OR TO MAKE OTHER EXPLANATORY REMARKS.ITEM 11-A RECORDS OFFICER MUST SIGN ALL FILE ACTION REQUESTS. CONSULT YOUR RMO ON ANY PROBLEMS THAT ARISE.## SUBJECT AND PROJECT FILE REQUEST AND FIELD NOTIFICATION OF ACTIONINFORMATION CONCERNING FILF1. TYPE OF FILE   [ ] SUBJECT   [X] PROJECT2. COUNTRY NUMBLR   050CODE (FILE) NUMBERCATEGORY NUMBEN006ISPECIFIC SUBJECT NUMBER074/13. FILE TITLE (SPECIFIC SUBJECT) (PROJECTS LIMITED TO 15 SPACES)KDFACTOR4. ANALYSIS ACTION   [ ] OPEN FILE   [X] CLOSE FILE (INDICATE DISPOSITION)   [ ] AMEND FILE TITLE   [ ] REOPEN5. ACTION REQUIRED   [ ] RETAIN   [X]DISPOSITION[ ] DESTRUCTION RECOMMENDEDTHRU (DATE)6. REMARKS (FOR FIELD DISTRIBUTION)7. INTERESTED STATIONS (PROJECTS ONLY)HMM8. INTERESTED HEADQUARTERS DESK (LIST ACTION DESK FIRST)050FILES ACTION[ ] HOLD IN CS FILES[ ] RESTRICTED[X] UNRESTRICTED[ ] PREPARE FOLDER AND SEND TO REQUESTER[ ] CHARGE PERMANENTLY TO (OFFICER & DESK)9. COMMENTS (INCLUDE SPECIAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTING INSTRUCTIONS)ENDORSEMENTSIGNATURE OF BRANCH/DESK R. O.COORDINATIONSIGNATURE OF &PANCH/DESK R. O.(WHEN APPLICABLE)RID APPROVALREQUEST APPROVED BYEFFECTIVE DATE23 July 1973CODE (FILE) NUMBER500674/1SECRETFORM 8121-CS COPY
[104-10187-10014.pdf — page 117]
# DISPATCHChief of Station, Mexico CityChief, Western Hemisphere DivisionTermination of KDFACTOR ProjectREFERENCE: HMMA-42,197This is to advise you that the formal termination of the KDFACTOR Project was approved by the Associate WOMACE on 25 May 1973.James B. KARDENETZDISTRIBUTION: 2-COS,Mexico CityE2 IMPDET CL BY: 0552721 JUN 197331 May 1973HMMW-19467WH/1/FI Henry Mulloy1973AC/WH/1 31 May 73 Raymond SwiderDISPATCH
[104-10187-10014.pdf — page 118]
14 May 1973MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, WH DivisionSUBJECT: KOFACTOR Project Amendment and Termination1. The KDFACTOR Project, which provided photographic surveillance from two vantage points of the Soviet compound in Mexico City, was determined to be compromised due to the VWBLANKET case. The five agents were terminated in July 1972, but the base houses could not be terminated until January 1973 because it was necessary to sell one and the termination of the second was tied to the termination of KDABBEY who owned the second base house. It was necessary to pay rent for several extra months until these other terminations could be effected.2. The base houses and agents have now all been terminated and the Station already has rented a replacement safehouse with new agents to provide the same coverage (KDALCOVE).3. Approval of the amendment and termination of Project KDFACTOR is recommended.Herbert W. NatzkeActing Deputy ChiefWestern Hemisphere Division
[104-10187-10014.pdf — page 119]
# DISPATCHTo:Chief of Station, Mexico CityFrom:Chief, Western Hemisphere DivisionSubject:Summary of KDFACTOR Project Security ReviewForwarded under split transmission for your information is a copy of the *KDFACTOR* security review. Also included are two memoranda containing C/WOLENS and C/WOMUSE comments on the security review.Roger W. BICEGOATTACHMENTS:1. Left Side - herewith2. Right Side - U/S/CDISTRIBUTION:Orig. & 1 - COS, Mexico CityCS COPY1-WH/1 Chrono1-IP FilesDISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBERIDDMW-19061CLASSIFICATIONSECRETDATE28 JUN 1972TYPED: 21 June 1972HOS FILE NUMBER50-6-74/1OFFICEWH/1ORIGINATINGJohn DavisTYPISTcfEXT.6954OFFICE SYMBOLDATECOORDINATINGOFFICER'S NAMEOFFICE SYMBOLWH/1DATERELEASINGJohn C. MurrayDISPATCH
[104-10187-10014.pdf — page 120]
# SECRET9 May 1972MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for PlansTHIROUGII : MPS/BG/FISUBJECT : Project KDFACTOR - Security Review1. The CI Staff is satisfied with the fine Security Review of the KDFACTOR Project activity and personnel.2. However, the Staff urges the Station to remain constantly alert to any security repercussions pertaining to all the terminated assets particularly in view of their past knowledge of the project activity and the fact that some of them had family and relatives who also were aware of the project activity. Focus should continue regarding any security problems pertaining to KDFACTOR-7.3. In addition, the Station should continue to monitor any Soviet investigation or probing of owners and tenants involved in the properties used under this project.Frank W. HughesC/CI/OPS/WHDistribution:Orig. & 3 - MPS/BG/FI1 - WII/1/Mexico✓2 - CI/OPS/WH![stamp of secret document]
[104-10187-10014.pdf — page 121]
8- MAY 1972MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for PlansSUBJECT: Security Review of Project KDFACTOR1.  At the time you approved the renewal of Project KDFACTOR in December 1971 you asked that the Station conduct an updated security review of this operation, which provides photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. You asked that particular attention be paid to terminated agents and their families. The Station has made a security review and a detailed report on the findings, from Chief, WH Division, is attached.2.  The report discusses the history of the operation, describes security problems of the past and steps taken to remedy them, and discusses the security and operational situation of the agents presently covered by the project. The report notes that the two operational sites and their associated agents are compartmented from each other and that processing the film is now being done inside the Station. One section of the report discusses in detail the assets who were formerly involved in these operations but have been terminated. The final section of the report describes current security practices and notes that an alternate photographic surveillance site has been procured and is available for use should the present one be compromised.3.  The report demonstrates that the security of the operation is being kept up to high standards and that there are no potential security threats from former agents that the Station is not aware of. The FI Staff believes that the Station's security review and the attached report satisfy the requirements of your request.Attachment![signature of L. A. Campbell]L. A. CampbellChiefForeign Intelligence
[104-10187-10014.pdf — page 122]
SECRET9 May 1972MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for PlansTHROUGH : MPS/BG/FISUBJECT : Project KDFACTOR - Security Review1. The CI Staff is satisfied with the fine Security Review of the KDFACTOR Project activity and personnel.2. However, the Staff urges the Station to remain constantly alert to any security repercussions pertaining to all the terminated assets particularly in view of their past knowledge of the project activity and the fact that some of them had family and relatives who also were aware of the project activity. Focus should continue regarding any security problems pertaining to KDFACTOR-7.3. In addition, the Station should continue to monitor any Soviet investigation or probing of owners and tenants involved in the properties used under this project.Frank W. HughesC/CI/OPS/WHSECRET![stamp]
[104-10187-10014.pdf — page 123]
SECRETDD72-171917 APR 1972MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for PlansSUBJECT : FI Project KDFACTOR, Security ReviewREFERENCE : ADDP Memo (DD/P 1-5899) to C/WHD dated14 December 19711. In response to reference the following is a summary of the KDFACTOR security review:The Station summary of the KDFACTOR Project security is as follows:"There were no known problems of security relating to the Project. In response to the Headquarters request, we have reviewed all phases of the operation and believe that Project security is sound. The Project assets have all been with us for many years and have established themselves as respectable long-time residents of the area. All five assets, four in one family and one in another, are extremely security conscious and have all been SGSWIRLED. The assets derive a substantial portion of their livelihood from their Agency employment and would thus lose a great deal if security factors ever necessitated a termination of their work for us. As an additional safeguard, the KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE operations are compartmented from each other, and there has never been any indication that either segment of KDFACTOR knows of the other's existence".The Headquarters desk has also reviewed the security of the KDFACTOR Project and agrees with the Station that the security is sound. In fact, as presently constituted, the KDFACTOR Project is well compartmented, and each of the two KDFACTOR photo basehouses (KDLITERAL and KDABSINTHE) is run by long-term assets who draw a minimum of suspicion in their operational activities. Terminated assets could possibly expose the existenceSECRET
[104-10187-10014.pdf — page 124]
# SECRET- 2 -of this project, but that seems unlikely from the Headquartersreview of terminated agents witting of present KDFACTORoperational activities. A Soviet investigation of property owner-ship around the Soviet Embassy and their awareness that theSoviet Embassy was under photographic surveillance in the pastcould result in a Soviet investigation of the activities and contactsof KDABBEY-1, the owner of an apartment building and fourhouses close to the Soviet Embassy. It is doubtful that KDABBEY-l'sactivities, which do not inter-relate with the activities of theKDFACTOR agents, would in any way expose the KDFACTORProject operational activities.2. A brief history of the KDFACTOR Project:The KDFACTOR Project had its origins in the LIJERSEYand LIPSTICK Projects, both active in the mid-1950's. In 1958, afterthe arrest of two LIPSTICK surveillance team members, it was decidedto break off the more sensitive, uncompromised LIPSTICK assets manningand supporting two basehouses for photo surveillance of the Soviet Embassy.These assets were consolidated with one photo basehouse against the SovietEmbassy and one surveillance team from the LIJERSEY Project into a newproject (LIEMPTY), which was approved on 16 January 1959. The LIEMPTYProject, renamed the KDFACTOR Project in 1971, consisted of three photobasehouses, two viewing the front of the Soviet Embassy (LIMITED andLILYRIC) and one viewing the rear garden of the Soviet Embassy (LICALLA),plus a mobile surveillance team (LIENTRAP) tied closely with the LIMITEDbasehouse, which was the radio control point for dispatch of the LIENTRAP.In 1959 the LIENTRAP surveillance vehicle and two teammembers were arrested at the scene of a Cuban demonstration in MexicoCity. A Station review of the security implications of this incident statedthat it did not materially affect the security of the project nor expose anyof the LIEMPTY basehouse operations. (Note: As the basehouse operationswere compartmented, the only exposure possible from this incident wouldhave been of the LIMITED basehouse, which is no longer in existence.)The LIEMPTY Project operated substantially as above untilthe Warren Commission report was published in late 1964. In this publica-tion was a picture of a person entering the Soviet Embassy taken from theLIMITED basehouse. The LIMITED photo basehouse was closed in Sept-ember 1964, and all photographic surveillance was suspended as a securityprecaution. In January 1965 the LIMITED basehouse was relocated, andSECRET