Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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SECRETINSTRUCTION SHEETDATE17 MAY 1963CASE NO.C-101331SET UP FOR F-G-A-EXPEDITE SATEINDICES:SET UP FORC4SP ENQUIRYGOV'T N. CHKEXPEDITE DATEFBIINDICES:LSE:AREA:ISSUE OPERATIONAL APPROVALREQUEST "GREER LIST"ISSUE PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROVALREQUEST RESULTS STAFF/D DOSSIER REVIEWEXTEND PSA FOR DAYS UNTILREVIEW STAFF/S COLLATERAL INFORMATIONREINSTATE PGA FOR DAYS UNTILREQUEST RESULTS TECH. INTERROGATION FROMSECURITY OFFICEDIVISIONFORWARD ATTACHMENT TO DIVISIONREVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE REPORT AT CI/OAFORWARD ATTACHMENT TO SECURITY OFFICEREVIEW OF SECURITY OFFICE CONCURRENT MEMO AT CI/OACANCEL PER DIVISION MEMO... (No notice to division)CANCEL PER CI/OA (Notice to division)(See "Remarks" for reason)REQUEST REVIEW OF ATTACHED REFERENCEREQUEST #1 TRACESFILE attachedREQUEST FOR OPERATIONAL AND DIVISIONAL TRACESTICKLEREQUEST FOR FIELD TRACESNOTICEFIRSTSECONDTHIRD AND FINALREQUESTPRO IPRO IIOTHERREMARKSDestroy ticklesTo ArchivesEdward L. BrownFORM 707 USE PREVIOUS EDITION.SECRET(1211.)
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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIF MON TO AND BOTTOMUNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRETCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYOFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP| TO  | NAME AND ADDRESS   | DATE | INITIALS || --- | ------------------ | ---- | -------- || 1   | CI/DA              |      |          || 2   | 2 B 11             |      |          || 3   | Atta? Mr. Ed Brown |      |          || 4   |                    |      |          || 5   |                    |      |          || 6   |                    |      |          || ACTION      | DIRECT REPLY  | PREPARE REPLY  || ----------- | ------------- | -------------- || COMMENT     | FILE          | RECOMMENDATION || CONSSERENCE | X INFORMATION | SIGNATURE      |Remarks:Ed; Inclosed is Memo re our problem case, LITAMIL 9, prepared by the OTR training officer who recently zet him in Mexi. FYI and retention or destruction. Mike> [Figure: Handwriting containing 'C-10133/', 'File EPB', and '4 mar 63']FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER| FROM- NAME, ADORESS AND PHONE NO. | DATE   || --------------------------------- | ------ || E. E. Mulloy R146                 | 28 Feb |UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRETFORM NO. 2-61 237 Use previous editions
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MEMORANDUM FOR: CI/OASUBJECT : LITAMIL-9C-101331201-32960924 June 1963Attached is the PRQ Part II on LITAMIL-9. An Operational Approval is requested.![signature]John M. WhittenChief, WH/3SECRET![date stamp JUN 26 9 41 AM 63]
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SECRETPERSONAL RECORD QUESTIONNAIREPART 11 - OPERATIONAL INFORMATION|            |              || ---------- | ------------ || PRQ AC-    | DISPATC- NO. || EMMA 21557 |              |INSTRUCTIONS TO CASE OFFICER1.  This form must be filled in by the case officer of appropriate authority on the basis of the best available in-formation. It is *not* to be shown to the subject.2.  Normally, headquarters will be unable to issue an approval unless requester furnishes answers to all directions in PR, parts I and II. However, in an emergency provisional approval may be obtained by complying with the applicable provisions of PR 10-215, paragraphs 6a, 8, 12a and 12d. Thereafter the usual method to document or complete the case must be followed as set forth in FE 10-215.3.  Three (3) completed copies of PR, part I (including copy in subject's handwriting, if possible) and two (2) completed copies of the form must be sent to headquarters as soon as possible.4.  Data acquired later must be sent to headquarters in PR, format in two (2) copies.5.  Fill in all items, if information obtainable. If item not applicable state "NA." If additional space required for item, use reverse side of page keyed to appropriate item number.1. CRYPTONYM2. PSEUDONYMLITAMIL-9SECTION 1. CONTACT AND DEVELOPMENT1- INDICATE HOW, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, AND BY WHOM SUBJECT WAS FIRST CONTACTED OR DEVELOPED.Case Officer (Clyde K SHRYOCK) was introduced to Subject on 18 July 62 by LITAMIL-3, who was recovering from a gall stone operation in the hospital. The Case made contact with Subject to assurepenetration of the PSRCKEX Embassy in Mexico. See MEXI 1467 re initial meeting.2- INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT COULD BE TURNED OVER QUICKLY AND IN A SECURE MANNER TO ANY RESPONSIBLE CASE OFFICER FOR HANDLING. IF SO, INDICATE TO WHOM.Subject could be turned over to any responsible Case Officer, particularly one with a speaking knowledge of Spanish. Subj speaks English and French as well as Spanish.3- LIST OTHER CASE OFFICERS WHO HAVE HANDLED SUBJECT OR WHOM HE KNOWS OR HAS KNOWN. GIVE NAMES BY WHICH THEY HAVE BEEN KNOWN.Subject knows Clyde K SHRYOCK, his Case Officer, by true name. SHRYOCK will introduce Laurence F. BARKER to Subject during the week of 16 June 1963.FORM NO. 1050a REPLACES FORM 51-95F1 NOV 56 WHICH MAY BE USED.SECRET(14-20)
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## SECRETSECTION 11MOTIVATION AN CONTROL1. ESTIMATE SLEJECT'S MOTIVATION. (Be detested, if possible cite evidence. Do not use stará comment such Do T communist."Subject is highly motivated toward PSPRIME and the West, mis anti-Communist.2. INDICATENAT CONTROL, IF ANY, EXISTS GR THE SUBJECT. (If no control, or if there is lack of real contrat explain.)Station Nexico could reveal Subject's activities to the PERGI goverment..SECTION 11COVER1. COVER USED BY SUBJECT AND CASE OFFICER IN THEIR MEETINGS.Subject and Case Officer meet clandestinely in darkened areas of the city at night.2. COVER USED BY SUBJECT IN OST. VING HIS INFORMATION AND IS LUBIALIINGSubject, as an employee of the PERIMEN Kabassy obtains his information from his fellow workers and contacts.3. INDICATE SERVICE FOR TICH SUBJECT THINKS ME (Will work, (Is working).Subject know he is working for PERINE Intelligence.SECTION IⅣINTELLIGENCE CONNECTIONS AND TRAINING1. EXPLAIN SUBJECT'S KNCIN PAST OR PRESENT CONNECTION BITH ANY OTHER INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. INDICATE THE EXTERT SUCH CONNECTION IS RACE OVERTLY.Subject is not knom to have had any contact with any other intelligence service.2. LIST OTHER INDIVIDUALS (Agenis, relatives, friends; no ANGE OF SUBJECT'S PRESENT STOLICENCE ACTIVITIES.Dolores CUEVAS de EICHENESubject's brother, Leonel, resident in MexicoJose CARRAL EscalanteLITAMIL-3 probably suspects Subj is in contact with CO3. EXPLAIN ANY TRAINING SUBJECT HAS HAD IN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.Subject has not had any ormal training in clandestine operations but he is canning and intelligent and has aade great strides on his own since first contact with his Case Officer.SECTION VCOLLABORATION POTENTIAL1. INDICATE OTHER FOREION POWER SUBJECT WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO COLLABORATE #ITH BECAUSE OF HIS IDEOLOGY De Past. ASSOCIATIONS. EXPLAIN.Subject would probably collaborate with an anti-Communist Caban regime. if it should come to power.2SECRET
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SECRETSECTION VI OPERATIONAL USE - CONTACT1. IF SUBJECT HAS BEEN USED OR CONTACTED BEFORE, INDICATE ACTIVITY IN WHICH HE HAS ENGAGED AND THE TYPE OF INFORMATION HE HAS FURNISHED:Subj provided a few intelligence items throughLiTAMIL-3 before direct contact was made with the Case Officer.2. INDICATE HOW AND FROM WHOM SUBJECT OBTAINS INFORMATION.Subject obtains information from members of the PSHMEN Embassy and friends of PSHMEN with whom he deals.3. INDICATE WHAT HAS BEEN TOLD SUBJECT AS TO THE DISPOSITION OF INFORMATION HE FURNISHES.Subject has been told that the information he provides is forwarded to Washington.4. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED FI OR CI TYPE USE OR DUTIES.Subject's FI activities are directed toward the penetration of us PSHMENBahroom of which he is part and the contacts of the Embassy. This is also source of the Station's LAURICIA requirements5. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED PP-PM TYPE USE OR DUTIES.Not applicableSECTION VII PROPOSED LIAISON OR OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY1. DETAIL SUBJECT'S PROPOSED LIAISON TYPE CONTACT OR OPERATIONAL USE:A. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT:Not applicableB. WHERE SUBJECT IS AN OFFICIAL MEMBER OF AN GOVOKE AGENCY:Not applicableSECTION VIII AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT1. EXPLAIN NATURE OF AGENCY RELATIONSHIP WITH SUBJECT: I.E. TRAINEE, OPPOSITE NUMBER. REMUNERATION, IF ANY. AGENCY PERSONNEL KNOWN TO SUBJECT.Subject is going on salary as of 15 June 63 at the rate of 1000 pesos ($320.00 U.S.) monthly. Andrew S. PARKES and Edward D. KNAPMAN are known to Subject under assumed names.SECRET
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# SECRETSECTION IXQUALIFICATIONS FOR OTHER OPERATIONSINDICATE SPECIAL ABILITIES, TALENTS, OR QUALIFICATIONS FOSSESSED BY SUBJECT WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY BE OF VALUE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS.Subject is an artistSECTION XCOMMITMENTS1. IF IT IS PROPOSED TO PAY SUBJECT A REGEAR SALARY, INDICATE THE BEEKLY AMOUAT. IF PAYMENT TO BE MADE IN ERDHANGE COMINGEITHES, SUBSIDY OR OTHER METHOD, SPECIFY AND GIVE DETAILS.As of 15 June 1963, Subject will be paid a monthly salary of 4000 pesos.2. EXPLAIN ANY PROMISES, OTHERWISE NOT COVERED HEREIN, MADE TO SUBJECT. (Example: Commstren's regarding evacuation of subject and family)No commitments or promises but it is assumed that KUBARK will assist Subject to leave the country if this is necessary because of his activities on EJBARK'S behalf.SECTION XILE ARD SECURITY1. INDICATE THE FIELD AGENCIES AND FIELD FILES #ITH WHICH SUBJECT'S NAME HAS BEEN CHECKED AND THE RESULTS.Station files.Close friszds of Subject such as LIMAMI-3, LITAMIL-2, LITAMII-7JOCZE-1 and many other contacts of the Cuban Embassy.2. INDICATE OTHER INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES TAKES TO VERIFY BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION FURNISHED BY SUBJECT.See para 13. INDICATE THETHER OR NOT PROVISIONAL OPERATIONAL APPROXEL OR OPERATIONAL AP- PROVAL FIR SUBJECT'S USE HAS BEEN PRESECUSLY DATAINED.Submitted 27 July 1962 EMMA 194554. DATE APPROVAL OBTAINED5. EVALUATE SUBJECT'S CHARACTER, RELIABILITY MU SECURI CITING BOTUENCE MERE POSSIBLE.Subject is of high moral character, proud of his family background. Sincere, extremely security conscious, reliable, punctaal and highly intelligent. A coemopolitan type, somewhat arty, yet cofniscent of what it tries to get a job done, i.e. KUBARK's job.6. EXPLAIN ANY SITUATION DE DISCRETION IN MICH SUBJECT MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED WHICH MUST BE EVALUATED FROW CE/OPERATIONAL SECURITY VIEWPOINT.Subject's relationship with ODYOKE isknown to Jose CARRAL Escalante and Dolores CUEVAS de EYCHENER рет MIXI 3450. CARRAL and de EYCHEE are not believed to be security risks.SECTION X18SUBJECT'S PERSONAL HABITS1. USE OF LIQUOR, DRUGS: GANELING, PARAMOURS.Subject drinks moderately. Subj is not known to have any flagrant vices.SECRET
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SECRETSECTION XΕΙΙ1. AVOCATIONAL INTERESTS   INDICATE SUBJECT'S HOB8:23 OR INTEREST IN SPORTS, MUSIC. ETC.Subject is interested in music, literature, and art.SECTION XIVGENERAL1- INDICATE WHETHER SUBJECT'S LANGUAGE ABILITIES AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS, ARE SUCH AS HE COULD PASS AS NATIVEOF A COUNTRY OR REGION STHER THAN HIS CON EXPLAIN.Subject is a European type, but becase of his Coban accent wouldprobably recognized as such.2. INDICATE WHETHER INFORMATION IN PRO PARTS AND 11 WAS DETAINED BY RESEARCH, CLANDESTINE ASSESSMENT, FILES,   CORRESPONDENCE OR OTHER MEANS.Information in PRQ Parts 1 and 2 vas obtained through research, file,acents, and direct questioning.3- IF OTHER THAN ROUTINE ACTION IS REQUIRED. IF AND WHEN TERMINATION OF SUBJECT IS EFFECTED, PLEASE EXPLAIN.*(Also see pera. 43b, supra)*No problems are envisaged in terminating agent.SECTION XVEMERGENCY CONDITIONS RECONTACT ARRANGEMENTS1- GIVE FULL DETAILS 1.E BECOGNITION SIGNALS. S/W WHERE COLILO CONTACT BE MADE WHAT BONA FIDES COULD INDIVIDUALMAKING CONTACT USE?Subject is in possession of CO's telephone number (home) and CO's officephone. Co can male contact with Subject at his home ar at the PARIR Embassyif necessary. Sabjectand Co use the name AGUILAR on the telephone.SECTION XVIMISCELLAN ECUS OPERATIONAL DATA AND REMARKSSubject, wo is well deposed toward PSPRIME, is anxious to remain along tera agent for ODIOKE) His intelligence, coupled with his contactsin leftist and Communist circles, makes in an excellent prospect.DATESIGNATURE OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICER17 June 1963Clyde K SERYOCK5SECRET
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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIF TON TOP AND BOTTOMUNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRETCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYOFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP| TO  | NAME AND ADDRESS   | DATE | INITIALS || --- | ------------------ | ---- | -------- || 1   | CI/OA              |      |          || 2   | 2 B 11             |      |          || 3   | Attn: Mr. Ed Brown |      |          || 4   |                    |      |          || 5   |                    |      |          || 6   |                    |      |          || ACTION      | DIRECT REPLY  | PREPARE REPLY  || ----------- | ------------- | -------------- || COMMENT     | VISPALLA      | RECOMMENDATION || CONCURRENCE | X FILE        | RETURN         ||             | X INFORMATION | SIGNATURE      |Remarks:Ed; Inclosed is Memo re our problem case, LITAMIL 9, prepared by the OTR training officer who recently met him in Mexi. FYI and retention or destruction. MikeFileEPB4 mar 63FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER| FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | DATE                || --------------------------------- | ------------------- || H. E. Mulloy R146                 | 28 Feb              || UNCLASSIFIED                      | CONFIDENTIAL SECRET |FORM NO. 2-61 237 Sse previous editiens * U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1961 0--187282 (40)
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28 February 1963MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: LITAMIL-9, Report of TDY, Andrew S. Parmers1. During 21-26 February 1963, Andrew S. PARMERS travelled from Headquarters to Mexico City on TDY to train LITAVIL-9 on various clandestine, operational, techniques, including SW. Upon arrival in Mexico City PARMERS ascertained that LITAMIL-9 allegedly became of moral inbibitions, was unwilling to receive training and also unwilling to accept the SW systues Headquarters had issued for him, and which PARMERS had carried to Mexico City. Nevertheless, PARMERS met LITAMIL-9 three times to determine the agents precise objections and to overcome them if possible. Although the agents general resistance was not overcome. PARUS di review with T.TTAUTE_Q clandestine methods and techniques in a general way.2. The first meeting was held at the Station case officers home, with the Case Officer present. LITAMIL-9 ex- plained his reasons for refusing to be trained and for cot being willing to communicate in Sw with KUBARK while in Cuba. Generally LITAMIL-9 claimed that he is very nervous, and incapable of performing clandestine tasks without having a nervous breakdown and at the sam time getting himself caught in the act because of his general incompetancy. Also, LITAMTL-9 was planning to stay at his brothers home in Cuba, and felt it would be unethical and immoral for him to be communicating clandestinely with KUBARK while accepting the hospitality of his brother and sister-in-law who are staunch supporters of the Castro regime. These agreements obviously had already been presented to the Case Officer who had already concluded that LITAMIL-9 could not be moved from his position. The agent furthermore, felt that there was no need for training or SW since he would be returning to Mexico after only three months in Cuba. He displayed a cable he had just received from his father ansvering LITAMIL-9's query as to what might be his next assignment. The cable stated that LITAMIL-9 would nost likely return to his present post in Mexico. The agent tre- fore felt that upon his return to Mexico City, he could be debriefed by his Case Officer. LITAMIL-9 rejected all attempts to convince him of our need for current info from inside Cuba. He was adament when we pointed out that he might not return to Kexico City as hoped, but might have to remain in Cuba having no means of contact. If this happens he plans to rest his position and return to Mexico as a private citizen, since he already is a registered "resident" of Mexico.
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SZOREI-2-3. On Friday, 24 February, PARKERS spent most of the day visiting alone with LITAMIL-D at the latter's apart- ment. By the end of the day LITAMIL-9 had softened a little and had revealed some of the personality traits mentioned below. LITAKIL-9 also agreed to communicate with his Case Officer through open code in letters to his brother in MexicoRUMEN City. He also was willing to meet inside KUBARK, preferably if the contact was a diplomat but not Cuban. He agreed to take a set of cuff links as bona fides. As a suggestion, he mentioned that his friend, The Swiss Ambassador, nov serving in Madrid, Spain, would be an ideal contact. In revealing how zuch & contact could be performed and in discussing LITAMIL-9 nodus vevendi la Cuba, there was considerable discussions concerning operational Security and clandestine procedures LITAMIL-9 can apply while in Cuba.4. LITAMIL-9 during this meeting also presented, in logical sequence, his reasons for believing that he will return to Mexico City. Rasically he fuele that hatween tha fact that he has many contacts in Mexico City (where he was lived and worked for many years) and the fact that his sister- in-law in Cuba has a responsible position with considerable influence in the Castro Government, he LITAMIL-9 will be re- assigned to his present post in Mexico City after three months of leave, consultations, and training in Cuba.5. The third meeting ocurred in the evening of 25 Februar, in a car pick up situation, with the Case Officer present. This time. LITAMIL-9 was less willing to communicate with KUBARK while in Cuba than he had been during the previous meeting, but with some reluctance, agreed to the use of open code and to be contacted by some diplomat. This meeting. there- fore, was a routine operational meeting, with his Case Officer in charge.6. Based upon their three meetings, PARMERS formed the following opinions of LITAMIL-9: He is a shrewd oppor- tunist, willing to colloborate with KUBARK against the Castro Government, but not to the point where his personal security is endangered. He dislikes the Castro Regime because it has fumbled so bad'y, and because the current Cuban officials are crude and incompetant. He greatly admires the American people, but definitely feels that we are merely concerned about our own national security and well-being. LITAMIL-9 owes his first loyalty to the fine arts, has little Patriotic feelings towards Cuba, since he has lived in Mexico for so many years, and has declared himself to be a resident of Mexico. He is now serving the Cuban Government simply because he had an opportunity (through his sister-in-law) to achieve official status and income and still remain in Mexico where most of his![Exchs:1: 291: 201: to:from:recipients]SECRET
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personal friends reside.7. Although at first appearance, and according to his own opinion statements, LITAMIL-9 appears to be extremely nervous because of his clandestine activities in behalf of KUBARK and against Cuba, after some discussion it was apparent that he actually relishes these clandestine actions that he would have angaged in then long before he did, and that he would have continued a covert relationship with KUBARK even after Castro falls, serving either in Mexico (where he has наду contacts of interest to KUBARK) or in Cuba in some post in Bome future government. He has excellent rapport with his present KUBARK case officer. He states that as long as KUBARK remains willing to accept that he has definite personal limi- tations, (since te can perform only those clandestine tasks related to his cover and cannot be trained or induced to do anything else) he will gladly continue collaborating with KUBARK as long as desired.8. Actually, PARMERS feels that LITAMIL-9 would do most anything we would desire if KUBARK would someday establish some control over him. His present remarks concerning his moral quales are artificial. He has great appreciation for shrewdness and double play, and openly admits having engaged in it all his life. On many occasions he admits that he has accomodated himself to a situation for profit or because he knew that he could turn the tables eventually on his ad- versaries. When he is off-guard he admits to being a cool operater who can scheme and work behind his adversaries' backs. He shows many signs of enjoying doing what he does for and with his present KUBARK case officer.9. In summary, although LITAMII-9 did not accept training or SW in the standard sense, PARMERS believes that the agents reluctance was based on his desire to take few risks. The agent is competent, his moral inhibitions are probably faked. He is convinced that he will return to Mexico soon, and desires to continue serving KUBARK if no greater risk is in- volved. Since ZUBARK at present has no clear control (monetary or ideological) over LITAVIL-9, it was difficult to impose KUBARK's will over him. But he is very willing to perform for KUBARK within the limitations he sets, and if someday we can satisfy, some personal need he might have, he has the pot ential of becoming a good controlled agent for KUBARK. He is intell- igent and by nature ho seems to instinctively conduct his clandestine operations in a securo manner.Andrew S. ParmersOTR Training OfficerSECRET.![photo of a stamp]
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C# 10133118 February 1963MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of TrainingATTENTION: Chief, Covert Training/Operations SchoolChief, TSD TrainingSUBJECT: Request for Covert Training of Luis ALBERU Sonto1. It is requested that full time covert training be provided at Mexico City, Mexico for approximately ten days beginning on or about 19 February 1963 for Luis ALBERU Sonto.2. training is to provide the subject with the basic principles of clandestine tradecraft to better prepare him as an FI agent operating inside a denied area.3. In addition to the basic tradecraft, training should emphasize reporting techniques end include appropriate secret writing instruction, as arranged by the case officer with TSD.4. Subject is a PERUMEN cultural attache in the Embassy in Mexico City. A Provisional Operational Approval vas requested on 26 July 1962 and its status is being checked. (E-101331; MRVB: 1515, Oviedo, Spain)5. Responsible Headquarters case officer for the training is H. E. Mulloy, extension 6172.OSCAR D. MCCOLLUMTraining Officer/RESAPPROVED:Chief, Special Affairs Staff Date![stamp]
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CONCEFKICES:-2-Counter Intelligence &taff...DateIDP Training & QualificationsDateReview Officer
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C # 12/33118 February 1963MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of TrainingATTENTION: Chief, Covert Training/Operations SchoolChief, TSD TrainingSUBJECT: Request for Covert Training of Luis ALBERU Sonto1. It is requested that full time covert training be provided at Mexico City, Mexico for approximately ten days beginning on or about 19 February 1963 for Luis ALBERU Sonto.2. In addition to the basic principles of clandestine tracecraft to better prepare him as an FI agent operating inside a denied area.3. In addition to the basic tradecraft, training should emphasize reporting techniques end include appropriate secret writing instruction, as arranged by the case officer with TSD.4. Subject is a PSRUMEN cultural attache in the Embassy in Mexico City. A Provisional Operational Approval was requested on 26 July 1962 and its status is being checked. (C-101331; DRUM: 1515, Oviedo, Spain)5. Responsible Headquarters case officer for the training is H. K. Mullay, extension 6172.OSCAR D. McCOLLINSTraining Officer/APPROVED:Chief, Special Affairs StaffDateFEB 25 1963
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CONCURRENCES:Counter Intelligence Staff _______________ DateDDP Training & Qualifications _______________ DateReview Officer