Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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3 August, 1957Subject: LIRING/3 Report on Developments in Hoiss Orozco Case.1. During the early morning tours of 1 August, 1957, Rowton remained in constant contact with L/3, either through brief meetings with him or through LIRING/4 who acted as a cut-out at the phone of the safehouse. When Rowton telephoned L/4 at the safehouse at about 0730 on 1 August, she stated that L/3 had called a few minutes before and passed the message that "things were a little better, but he needed help". Rowton knew that L/3 and Sergio Valdez together with Raul Moreno were surveilling the Tacubaya apartment house in order to pick up Orozco if and when he tried to leave the premises. L/3 had told Rowton at an earlier meeting (0400) that morning that when Orozco refused to accompany him peacefully to a hotel, he gave Orozco two alternatives. First he stated (bluffing) that he had a direct channel to FAR and would query FAR about Orozco and bring with him a FAR representative at 1000 that morning and if Orozco had a clear conscience he would have nothing to worry about; secondly, if Orozco did not desire this he could take 300$ pesos which L/3 put in an envelope and leave the apartment for some other place of refuge. L/3 explained to Rowton that he hoped Orozco would take the second alternative so that he and Valdez and Moreno could follow him or seize him as he left the apartment. L/3 asked Rowton to assist in this operation by providing a few pistoleros. Rowton, feeling that he might be able to arrange to take Orozco off L/3's hands once he was out of the apartment (provided the Station could provide a safehouse and several unilateral agents to guard Orozco and eventually interrogate him) promised to hire several pistoleros who would be unwitting of the true situation to help L/3 and his friends. L/3 also asked for a weapon which he said might be necessary if Orozco gave his any trouble. Rowton, of course, refused to comply, saying that since Orozco was unarmed it was unnecessary at that time.2. When Rowton talked again to L/3 on the phone (from the safehouse) the latter reported that things were still quite difficult. He explained that Orozco was still in the apartment and refused to answer the doorbell, obviously terrorized that L/3 had already notified the FAR of his whereabouts L/3 reported in addition that Raul Moreno had taken off in his car, apparently too tired to continue the surveillance; he and Sergio Valdez were consequently left alone without a car to surveil Orozco in the event he left the apartment. L/3 again appealed to Rowton for help. Rowton stalled since
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2. he was unable to confirm whether the Station had any unilateral assets to assist or in fact was interested in taking over Crozco from 1/3 until after 0900 that morning. When Barton talked to 1/3 again on the phone at about 0915, 1/3 reported that Crozco had left the apartment at 0830 and proceeded directly via pesero to his mother's house (Cenis 188/5) in Colźnia Country Club and that 2/3 and ergio Valiez had succeeded in surveilling his there and were at that moment watching the house from near- by. About 20 minutes later 1/3 reported that Crozco had left the house and was at that moment in a nearby barbershop. 13 added that he and Valdez could not carry on the surveillance much longer since they were becoming conscicuous ( as later reported, a police car (unmarked) was spotted by Valdez in the vicinity and night have approachedi them if the house was actually under surveillance by the Kezican police).3. Acwton therefore reported to the Station that he had instructed 1/3 to rezain on surveillance for about 30 minutes more and that unless Station assets could take over the surveillance would have to be abandoned. Howton was informed that a decision bai been made to request the Mexican police to arrest Crozco at the home of his mother and that therefore L/3 could be taken of the case. Rowton zet with 1/3 again at the safehouse at about 1030 and the latter reported that he and Sergio Valdez had been forced to abandon the surveillance effort. Eowton alleged that in the meant ze he kad rounded up three "pistoleros" and sent them to the house but shortly thereafter had received from them a "danger signal", indicating that the house was being watched by the Mexican police and that they could not become involved. As a result they had left the area and could not be of any further use. ( Eowton felt constrained to invent this story since he was aware that Crocco's arrest was icinent and in crder to throw the blame off himself when the report reached 1/3 and Valdez).4. Roston met with 1/3 that afternoon at 1700 at a small coffeeshop on Reforma and denied to L/3 that he had any knowledge of what had happened to Crozco in the meantime. L/3 reported that he ant Valdez were attempting to make plans as to the best course of action. Roxton advised L/3 to contact Jacobo Rodriquez Padilla and through to attempt to contact a FAR representative in Mexico City (possibly the lawyer Ernesto Capoano). L/3 agreed that this was essential since he and Valdez aud come to the conclusion that Crozco must somehow be "clialanted" before he fel; into the hands of the Kexican police since he new too much, especially about 1/3's
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3. commercial cover plans and activities and his past connections with FIR. 1/3 promised to meet with Jacobo the following morning and press him for contact with the FAR. In the meantime Horton continued to feign ignorance of the arrest of Crozco (which took place about 1000 on 1 August, 1967).5. Rowton met again with 1/3 at his Tacubaya apartment at 1200 on 2 August. 1/3 reported that he had talked with Jacobo Rodriguez Padilla at 1200 that xxx day in the Café literario but with disappointing results. Jacobo as usual appeared very fearful of involving himself in any way politically, and when 1/3 informed be that he had to see someone from FAR urgently and it occurred to him that the lawyer Ernesto Capoano might be able to arrange the contact, Jacobo replied that he could not vouch for Capoano at all as far as political matters were concerned. He stated that Capoano was generally helpful for Guatemalans seeking papers and legalizing their status (for which he gave his services gratis) but he was not sure that Capoano would stick out his neck for 1/3. According to 1/3 he then dropped the matter, without disclosing to Jacobo that he was interested in Crozco, feeling that it would be too risky to bring Capoano into the picture (although Jacobo had offerred to arrange a meeting with him for L/3).C. L/3 continued that he felt his only other alternative was to talk the matter over zk with Cepeda in/LIRING office. He therefore went directly there after having talked with Jacobo, and, not finding Cepeda in, went to the office of Curbelo. He managed to see Curbelo privately and related to him the entire affair. He explained that originally he had had a very discreet contact with FAR but that, unexpectedly this contact had disappeared ("Garcia"). Recently however, equally unexpectedly, a new contact in the person of Moisés Crozco Leal had appeared claiming that he was a bona fide FAR representative and had been referred to 1/3 by Alberto Domingo of Siempre. 1/3 purposely stressed this, commenting that he assumed that alberto was in touch with LIRING and therefore a person to be trusted. 1/3 then informed Curbelo that he found several loop-holes in Crozco's story and decided to check on him. He contacted a friend in Guatemala and discovered to his amazement that Orozco had deserted from FAR and was actually in hiding in Mexico. 1/3 revealed to Curbelo that Crozco had locked himself in L/3's apartment the preceding right after he had confessed to 1/3 his true status. L/3 concluded that as far as he knew Crozco was currently in hiding at his mother's home. 1/3 then stated that he needed desperately to communicate these facts to FAR so that appropriate action could be taken to eliminate Crozco before he fell into the hands of the Mexican police
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and revealed very sensitive information about FAR as well as about his own(L/3's) involvement. 1/3 commented to Boston that Curbelo appeared thrcoughly shaken by this and his hand treabled as he made notes. De replied to 1/3 that he would comicate this development infeccely to FAR Cuba inthe hope that he would receive some guidance to pass along to L/3.7. 1/3 then reported that he and Sergio Valdes (apparently both were disgusted with Fail Moreno for having left them holding the bag and did not recontact him again) had decided that it was essential to décover whether Crozco had been arrested so that they could plan some sort of action to "eliminate" him before he couldcounted to Puntemala. 1/3 reported that Valdez had sent his girl-friendAle garmenURBINA TORREthe graTORBE (Plaza Miravalle) to the home of moonle -athoniine auecer urozco was still there or arrested in the reantime. 1/3 later (at; 2200) that evening reported that no one had answered the door at the apartment and hence the woman friend of Valdez had been unable to learn anything about the fate of Orozco. 1/3 added that he and Valdez had struck upon another plan which they hoped would flush out the true facts. In the meantime he asked Rowten to attempt to determine whether Crozco had been arrested. When Rowton telephoned L/3 the following morning at 0900 as he had promised de agains denied any knowledge and suggested that L/3 go ahead with the plan and report to Rowton that evening at 1800. (Reuton did not wish to have prior knowledge of the plan since he felt it better for 1/3 and Valdez to proceed on their own in a spontaneous manner so that 2/3 would have a well backstopped story to give Curbelo when he met with him again.)![Signature of Wallace S. Rowton]Wallace S. Rowton
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3 August, 1967Subject: Monthly Report of Developments in the LIRING/3 Operation.1. During the month of July, 1967, the most important development in the LIRING/3 operation was the approach made to LIRING/3 by Moisés Crozco Leal, who purportedly conveyed instructions to L/3 from the FAR of Guatemala for a personal meeting with César Montes in the mountains of Guatemala. This new contact was reported to Rowton by LIRING/3 at the first meeting follow-ing Rowton's return from CCT in Georgetown, Guyana (26 July, 1967). Wien Station traces revealed that Moisés Crozco had actually deserted the FAR forces some time after May, 1967, and that FAR was actively looking for him; most probably to eliminate him and thus prevent his revealing sensitive in-formation to the mexicans and/or Guatemalans regarding FAR plans and acti-vities, Rowton warned LIRING/3 against taking Crozco's statements and claims seriously and suggested that he question him carefully concerning his past connections with FAR. L/3 did so at his 31 July, 1967, meeting with Crozco, who was then living in L/3's apartment (on Calzada Tacubaya), and informed Rowton later that evening that he had "broken" Crozco, and that the latter had admit-ted that he had deserted the FAR forces and claimed to be in the process of forming his own guerrilla movement to be called "Primer del Mayo".2. In consultation with Rowton through the early morning hours of 1 August, LIRING/3 with the help of his friends Sergio Valdez and Raúl Moreno, attempt-ed to persuade Crozco to leave L/3's apartment and remain in hiding in a near-by hotel (Which Norris K. Umphlett had rented in an alias "Antonio Sanchez" at Rowton's request). Crozco, however, refused to leave L/3's apartment with them by sneaked out at 0830 when he apparently thought that L/3 was not in the vicinity. L/3 and Sergio Valdez, however, were watching the apartment house and manged to surveil Crozco to the home of his mother in Colonia Country Club. L/3, however, on Rowton's instructions, aboandoned the surveillance of the house at about 0930 that morning. L/3 subsequently reported the affair to Curbelo of the LIRING office in the hope of getting word to FAR of the where-abouts of Crozco and of the ruse he attempted to play on L/3. The latter said that he str-ssed to Curbelo that it was Alberto Domingo of Siempre who had ori-ginally sent Crozco to LIRING/3 (through Sergio Valdez).3. LIRING/3 continued to monitor the activities of his friend Sergio Valdez who during the month set up a company (Colrluz) in the workshop of his Mexi-can firend, señorita Alejandra Urbina Torres, at Plaza Miravalle in Mexico- NO RI NO MEXI DDR treir
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2. City. In view of the response of the Tenecuela Station (discuracing Rowton from directing 1/3 into Venzuelan guerrilla cctivites with Corgio Valdez and Raúl Horeno) Scwton instructed 1/3 to main frenvolvement with them in this aspect of the operation. He agreed, an ever, with 1/3 that the res ccm-pany gave hin zuch-recei affitionel financial cover, especially in the eyes of the FERUMENS in the likely event that they would question him more closely fusing a future trip iste their area.*NO FA NO MEXI OSA-*4. Puping the conth, on a tri to Jabiras, Coch., // cucceeded through his half-brother in meeting Judge Francisco Mario Valdez of Huera Rosita who :20-nised to arrange for the issuance to 2/3 in the alias Alberto Cerate Tidal of a (false) passport. LIRIC/3 Feels that the possession of such a false focu-ment will enhance his potential in the eyes of the FERUMENS as well as FAR.5. During his trip to northern Mexico IRC/3 also managed to "purchase" the passports of three (deceased) Cubans who had left the documents together with other papers at the hotel in Nuevo Corečo where they had stayed prior to their supposedly clandestine entry into the C.S. 2/3 prccured these documents with Fortor's prior approval on the asumption that they might prove useful to Rowton at soze future date.6. In connection with the Moisés Crozco affair, Rowton uncovered an important instance of deception ca the part of both LIRING/3 and LIES/4. A review of LIFEAT interecepts revealed that 1/3 was in the safehouse during the perica 19-21 July, when he had claimed to Rowtch that he was on a trip to Tapachule to receive contact instructions for his first meeting with Crozco. LIENG/3 apparently asked 1/4 to backstop his story when Routen queried her separately, since she did so (although claiming ignorance of the purpose of the trip). 1/3 subsequently admitted to howtos that he had not made the trip to Tapachula but had actually net Orozco through Sergi: Valdez (who had been referre, to his by Alberto Domingo of Siempre) and that he had not wanted to reveal this to howton until he could figure out how Valdez fitted into the picture". Since Forter and the Station felt that this was an ther opportunity to Scolar IRING/3, a request was repeated to Ecadquarters for a Spanish-speaking operator. The request could not be complied with at the time and howton has had to continue checking LIRING/3's reports as carefully as he can without benefit of the technical in-terrogation.![signature of wallace rowton]Wallace E. Rowton201-798301
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5 August, 1967Subject: Analysis of LIFEAAT Traffic Relating to LIRING/3 Operation. for the period 29 June to 1 August,1987.1. During this period the most significant operational support provided by LIFEAT intercepts occurred during the period 17 July to I August, the period of LIRING/3's contact with Moisés Crozco Leal. On 27 July, the first meeting Rowton had with L/3 after Rowton's return from JDJ to Gu- jana, L/3 reported that he had been contacted in a mysterious manner by a FAR representative who identified himself by true name as Crozco. He related that he had received a telephone call requesting him to travel to Tapachula, and that he had made the trip 19-21 July, and received contact instructions to meet with a certain "Valentin" in   Intercepts revealed, however, that L/3 was physically in Mexico City during the period 19-21 July. SIM 33(8.2) reveals that L/3 telephoned sra. Berta Wigisser and made a date for 1930 on 21/7/67 at the safehouse apartment. He commented that he did not go out of town after all. Furthermore Rowton's telephone answering service reported to him regular calls from L/3 asking for Rowton daily during the period he was allegedly out of town. This gave Rowton sufficient evidence to challenge L/3's story at his meeting on 29 July. In order to protect the security of LIFEAT Rowton used the evidence of his telephone answering service and his own intuition and logic to dis- count L/3's story of his original contact with Crozco. LIRING/3 finally confessed that he had made up the story because of the involvement of his friend Sergio Valdez (who it now appears met Crozco through Alberto Do- mingo and introduced him to L/3). LIRING/3 felt that reporting the true facts to Rowton would not have been as intriguing in Rowton's eyes and would have made him appear dependent on Valdez for this productive aspect of the operation. On the morning of 31 July, LIRING/3 justified his action by stating that he continued to feel under extreme psychological pressure to "produce" for Rowton since he felt deeply obliged to him for the con- fidence and financial support he had been giving him. He now states that he realizes that he can repay Rowton only by reporting accurately and fully all developments in his dealings with FAR and other revolutionary groups.2. All other LIFEAT intercepts relating to the Crozco affair check out with reports given to Rowton by LIRING/3, including the latter's effort to con- tact Capoano through Jacobo Ledriquez Padilla (SIM-35(42). In SIM-33(10.2) it is apparent that L/3 has discussed "señor Harris" or at least some con- tact he has with Sergio Valdez, since he states that "he has not yet
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2. returned. L/3 kas adritted to Porton that he has revealed to Jerato Valdez and Enrique, Chorales that he has a businessman who finances him in certain commercial ventures, but swears that he has never revealed Howton's alias to anyone ( this can most effectivley by checked in an SQCWIK examination).3. intercepts confirm the reporta f/4 that she has made every effort to reintain social contact with Arti Cagero and Yolanda Dísz as well as Cukrbelo in the hope of keeping the door cento future re-employment in IERTAG. LIVING/4's recrts to Lovton arpaar reliable with the exception of the one relating to the alleged trip to Japachula, when 2/4 backstopped L/3's deception (although vaguely since she insisted that she did not know where he was during the verira 19-21. dicates that 1/4 is basically loyal to 1/3 and cannot be trusted to provide independent information conerning his movements and activities in the future.4. 3A-32 (3.7) and confirms 1/3's conversation with René Cchoar bis Honduran friend inxx Havana on 17/7/67. 2/3 subsequently received the latter from Ochoa mentioned in the intercept and passed the criginal to Rowton (5/8/67). LIFEAT intercerts of conversations between L/3 and his half-brother in Sabinas also confarm 1/3's reports to Boston concerning the false passport and birth-certificate for hisself in the alias Alberto Zárate.5. Additional control information was provided in JAM-29(4.7) concerzirg 1/3's affair (azercus) with Silvia Jurán, as well as with a new women, Yolanda, with whom he attempted to make a date (34-35(9). This wozer, whose husband's first name is Rolando, has telephone 43-25-59, and tas not previcusly appeared in the 1,13 operation. Rowton has not confronted 2/3 with any data provided by of this nature in the hope of using it in an eventual 3032 interview.![signature of Wallace B. Howton]Wallace B Rorton
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# August, 1967Subject: LIRING/3 Report of Contact with Ernesto Capoano.1. Rowton met with LIRING/3 at 1700 at the Tacubaya apartment and remained with him until about 1900. LIRING/3 reported that he had tele- phoned Ernesto Capoano at his office on 4/3/67, after having obtained the phone number from César Tejeda Fonseca, the husband of the daughter of Ortis Rubio (ex-President). L/3 stated that he did not identify him- self to Capoano, but stated simply that he wanted to talk with him re- garding a sensitive matter. According to L/3 Capoano said quickly: "Don't mention any names, but give me some idea of what it's all about". L/3 continued that he replied simply that it concerned "the medicine". At the mention of this, Capoano requested that the caller telephone him again at 1600 on 7/6/67 for an appointment, explaining that he had to leave town over the week-end. L/3 reported Capoano's number as 48-62-09.2. LIRING/3 continued to Rowton that when he called again on 7/8/67 as requested, still not identifying himself, Capoano asked to meet him in front of Gobernación at 1200. Each gave a general description of the other for recognition. Then, however, L/3 appeared in front of Gobernación at the time appointed, he saw no sign of anyone answering the description of Capoano (about 45 years old, wearing dark glasses, with green suit), nor was he approached by anyone. After waiting about 30 minutes in the vicinity L/3 told Rowton that he left. L/3 then stated that he planned to drop in to Capoano's home that same evening since obviously the phone call had not smoked him out. He gave the address of Capoano as Calle Bucareli 128, apt. C-7, which he stated he received from César Tejeda.3. When Rowton met with L/3 again at 1800 on 8 August, the latter reported that finally he had managed to contact Capoano at his home (and office). He reported that at about 1930 he rang the bell and was shown into a spa- cious and nice elegant apartment and asked to take a seat in what served as a waiting room. After about twenty minutes Capoano appeared, introduced himself, and led L/3 into his office.4. The following is a verbatim account of the conversation between Capoano and LIRING/3, as recalled by Rowton from L/3's report:L/3: I have come to see you on a rather delicate matter that is of great concern to me personally. Can we talk safely here?Cap: Yes, I think it is private enough here in my office. (Cap. then closed blinds) We can talk in a low voice, just to be