Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10174-10071.pdf — page 200]
SECURITY.SECRETPage 3 of losure toELICOG. Frankfurt Despatch 260Nikolaevski is extremely anxious to sain the blessing of the United States Government for hie Faris venture. I told him frankly that while I was in no position to express an official opinion and could not venture a class as to Washington's' reaction, it seemed unlikely to me that the Amerion Government could afford to take sides in the internal political struggle within the Russian emigration, and that until the emiere groups succeeded in reconciling their own differences and were prepared to concentrate their efforts against the Soviet regime rather than against each other, the American Government would hardly be in a position to associate itself in any way with them. Nikolaevaki replied that the anti-Cسعةndst struggle itself was an inadequate program and that something positive must be offered to the Russian people, I agreed, ig this position but suggested that a united pregran on which enigration could agree would probably have much greater innast than a variety of programs offered by competing groups, Nikolaevski, however, stuck to his ideological guns.Hikolaevaki was considerably perturbed by news he received Just before his departure from Frankfers to the effect that Yakovlev had been approached by Colonel Kroaladi, who is nominated in the Kelley memorandum as the leader of the united front organization, to lend the support of SBONR to an emigre congress to be convened in Munich. Yakovlev bad gained the Impression that this project bad American support, although Kromiadi bad apparently made no explicit statement to this effect. He had based his arguments on the broad, concept of united ewigre effort against the Soviet regime and had indicated that it would be a congress of Russian patriots rather than of representatives of emigre organizations. This ameal had obviously made a considerable impression on Yakovlev, ww 18 much less ideologically minded than Nikolaevski and much more inclined to ally himself with any activity which he feels can effectively bring pressure against the Sovieta. Nikolaevski, while expressing high personal regard for Colonel Kromiadi, inmediately attributed this project to the machinations of Meyer and Baranovski and adopted a completely negative attitude toward it. I told him that I had had ne previous knowledge of the project and that I felt reasonably sure that it did not enjoy American support.Nikolaevski plans to proceed to France and attend the first meeting of the executive committee established at the Berlin Congress in an effort to interest then in his project for a congress of Russian emigres.SECRET
[104-10174-10071.pdf — page 201]
# SECURITY: SECRETPage 4 of Enclosure to HICOGFrankfurt Despatch 260## COMMENTIf Nikolaevski in his intransigent position is supported by his organization, which I assume will be the case, it will present a serious obstacle to any plans for uniting the forces of the Russian emigration in the anti-Communist struggle. Nikolaevski's ideological principles are so firmly enrooted that it appears unlikely that anything will shake them or that he can be persuaded to cooperate with groups whose political views differ markedly from his own. Nikolaevski's name and pen carry great influence among Russian emigres and it is most desirable that they be utilized to the utmost. It would be neither realistic nor practical, however, to accept Nikolaevski's position and thereby eliminate other influential groups within the emigration. One solution for this dilemma might be to ignore the extremist groups, right and left, which refuse to participate in the common effort and concentrate primarily on the new emigration who are more flexible in their political ideas and whose under- standing of the Soviet regime is more resent and more profound. The extremists will then be faced with the alternative of carrying on alone or of making peace with their conscience and joining the common cause.![signature of Francis B. Stevens]Francis B. StevensSECRET
[104-10174-10071.pdf — page 202]
CONFIDENTIAL14 August 1950QZ/224The follwing views of LIOUV on the Berlin Congress have been reported as of interest to the sponsors of the Congress.1. The Ferlin Congress is regarded in France as a movement exclusively of the axtreme left, of former Communists and present non-Stalinite Larxists. Utservers regard with disfarer the fact that the Congress was extremely mild in is cotack against the porict regis. They point out that:(a) The Soviet regime as such is not mentioned in a single resolution, which linised themselves to the condemning "totelitarian regives."(b) The issuance of an anti-Franco resolation in the absence of an anti-Stalin resolution is significant,(с) те геfusal to recognize the representatives of the Russian NTS group present at the Congress as listed delegates" confims the extreme leftist nature of the Congress.Fich: PintCONFIDENTIALQZ/224
[104-10174-10071.pdf — page 204]
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONSUBJECT: Congress for Cultural Freedom18 August 19501. On 15 August, I discussed the Berlin Cultural Congress with Kenneth H. Earbley, with particular emphasis on the problem of bringing the continuing Congress organization under control and, at the same time, expanding it into an effective anti-communist weapon.2. I expressed to Hambley our concern over the manner in which Charles A. Skeggs had conducted himself during the Congress, and Hambley replied that he had been equally concerned. He said, however, that while Skeggs activities had caused an unfavorable reaction on the part of a number of the delegates, that reaction had been more directed against Skeggs personally than against him as a representative of the government. Hambley agreed with my suggestion that two bits of silver lining could be found in the Skeggs cloud, namely that he had taken most of the opposition heat himself, thus sparing some of our other people, and that he had conducted himself like anything but the "Polizeispitzel" the communist press of Germany made him out to be. In fact, said Hambley, Skeggs general attitude was such as to cause some of the delegates to disremember that Skeggs was attached to the government in any fashion or presumably subject to any discipline at all.3. Hambley said that most of the delegates with whom he had talked were perfectly willing to accept the explanation that the Congress was smiled upon by the United States Government to the extent that some official funds were supplied for the physical staging of the meeting (as indeed they were) but that the rest of the money came from somewhat vague unofficial sources in the United States. Those who suspected something more, with the exception of the Trevor-Roper group, were generally happy that the United States was doing something of this kind and were in no mood to ask any embarrassing questions or raise any delicate points.4. I asked Hambley what he thought his future role in the Congress should be. He replied that he was perfectly willing to undertake any activities we asked him to undertake but personally felt he should retire into the background as rapidly as possible.
[104-10174-10071.pdf — page 205]
I told him that fooling coincided entirely with our own views and that we would expect him to contist himself in tint fashion. It was agreed that he should continue as a member of the Inter national Committee of Twenty-five but should take no active overt part in organizational or policy matters and would operate behind the scenes only when so directed.5. I discussed with hin the problem raised by the presence of David Rousset and Ignazio Silone on the Executive Committee. Hambley agreed that neither of these individuals could be COD- sidered fully reliable but explained it had been impossible to exclude them from the Committee because of their prominence and the intereste which they represented. Ee said he ideed Rousset as a person who considered himself basically on the American side even though from time to time he had to make noises of a sort to satisfy his leftist constituents.. Es also described Rousset as a bit of a bluffer who could be handled by a combination of fires and tact, particularly so long as to continued to desire to be an American ally. Hambley described Silone as a more complex case- a vain, egocentric person of strong intellect but weak will and an inept politician who insisted on engaging in politics solely to satisfy his ego. Fambley said Silene probably would have been lost to the cause entirely had he not been given a prominent role including a position on the Executivo Committee but that, as it was, he appeared on the surface now to be a convert, albeit a dubious оnе. Hadley expressed belief, however, that Silone could be controlled if haudied expertly and that, if worst came to worst, he could be separated from the Committee without dis- astrous effect. Hambley said that in his opinion Arthur Koestler and Cario Schmid were altogether reliable politically and could be depended upon to counterbalance Silone and Roussot even though it would be unwise to take then fully into confidence as to the nature of the Congress' backing. Irving Brown, of course, is considered completely reliable.6. Inasmuch as the Executive Committee is a creature of the Committee of Twenty-five and draws its membership from that Committee, the latter constitutes the real point of control in the Congress organization. The Committee of Twenty-five, as it stands, is reliable on balance. If necessary, it could be weighted more heavily in our favor by exercise of the privilege of co-opting additional members on whom we could depend, Heabley said. Ee suggested that it might be well to establish a principle either of rotating members of the Executive Committee or of con ducting regular elections of the parent Committee of Twenty-five. probably preferably the latter. This mechanism would provide means whereby obstreperous Executive Committee members might be sidetracked. Eumbley agreed that this might prove a workable scheme.
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SECRETROUTING AND RECORD SHEETINSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "to" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial. Check mark insufficient before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.FROM: ADPC| TO         | ROOM NO. | DATE  | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS                                   || ---------- | -------- | ----- | ------------------ | ------------------------------------------ ||            |          | REC'D | FOD'D              |                                            || Acting CEE |          |       | 8 aug              | Please talk to me about this very promptly || Baker      |          |       |                    |                                            || EE III     |          |       |                    |                                            || WE-UT      |          |       |                    |                                            || 5.         |          |       |                    |                                            || 6.         |          |       |                    |                                            || 7.         |          |       |                    |                                            || 8.         |          |       |                    |                                            || 9.         |          |       |                    |                                            || 10.        |          |       |                    |                                            || 11.        |          |       |                    |                                            || 12.        |          |       |                    |                                            || 13.        |          |       |                    |                                            || 14.        |          |       |                    |                                            || 15.        |          |       |                    |                                            |FORM NO. 51.10APR 1949SECRET
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3 August 1950MEMORANDUM FOR LR. PRECKIMRIDGESUBJECT: Berlin Concress for Cultural Freedom; activities of Kelvin Lasky.REFERENCE: Keno fr EE-3/Glaser to CES dtd 4 Aur 50 w/atts (TSL2928).1. I continue to be very disturbed about the manner in which this entire matter has been conducted, including the non-observance of my orijinal memorandum of 7 April 1950, in which I approved this project, subject to the condition that Lasky would not be permitted to figure publicly in this operation. The memorandum of Er. Glaser and the con- versations mich I have had with Lessrs. Lindsay and Eaker have done very little to relieve my apprehension on the score that no effective action to exclude Lasky from continuing te play a biatantly conspicuous role either has or will be taken by us.2. I submit that paragraph six of the reference memorandum, in both tone and content, is entirely unsatisfactory for the following reasons:a. It fails to reveal any appropriate acknowledgment or comprehension of the damage mich has resulted from Er. Lasky's conduct. This was a major blunder, has been branded as such by our best friends in the State Department, has teen revealed as such by the publicity which is analyzed in the reference петоган- duri itself and must be acknowledged by the responsible members. of our staff both there and in Germany.b. It betrays an unfortunate tendency, apparently more deeprooted than I had suspected, to succumb to the temptation of convenience (doing things the easy way) and irrespective of security and other technical considerations of the utmost importance.3. I have stated to Mr. Lindsay orally and I want to make myself completely clear on this point that unless means can be found to sani- tize this operation by the removal of Lasky, Surnham and other persons of known or traceable official significance from overt roles in the proposed continuing organization, then I am unwilling to have CPC continue
[104-10174-10071.pdf — page 208]
-2-continue its backing. I repeat my request that this be delivered to the field as an instruction and that it be so regarded and acted upon within this headquarters. I do not wish to create the impression that I am in any way opposed to the continuation of the operation, provided it can be sanitized and handled with a greater degree of sophistication and technical expert ease than has characterized our performance up to date. However, I do not wish to be associated with any repetition of what we have seen thus far.760/wF.G.WFGW:lgwP.S. Since dictating the foregoing, I have just learned from General Magruder that he showed our report on this Congress to Secretary Johnson, together with his own very complimentary appraisal of the operation. Secretary Johnson was so favorably impressed with this report and General Magruder's comment that he took the papers over and showed them to the President, who expressed himself as being very well pleased. I can only hope that the very rough edges which have recently appeared are not brought too sharply to the attention of these lofty officials. In any case this development underscores in red everything which I have said about the necessity for tidying up this operation and eliminating all of the "Irish pennants".
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# SECRETROUTING AND RECORD SHEETINSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial. Check mark insufficient! before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.FROM:NO. 23549DATE AUG 14 1950|     | TO      | ROOM NO. | DATE REC'D  | DATE FWD'D | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS                                                                                                               || --- | ------- | -------- | ----------- | ---------- | ------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- || 1.  | m. Bahu |          |             |            |                    | Chad =                                                                                                                 || 2.  | EE      |          | 2           | 11 Aug     | CAB                | Do you think flow would like to see this too?                                                                          || 5.  | ADPC    |          | 11 Aug      | 14 Aug     | 76w/w              | Hand-carry                                                                                                             || 6.  | EE-III  |          | 11 Aug 1950 | 14 1950    | Gy                 | 2 to 5: I think you will be interested in really this - particularly in the light of our recent conversations          || 10. |         |          |             |            |                    | 5 to 2 and 6:                                                                                                          || 11. |         |          |             |            |                    | Please see me more relate and intensify. Stick in what we are doing to strengthen and build on this operation already. || 12. |         |          |             |            |                    |                                                                                                                        || 13. |         |          |             |            |                    |                                                                                                                        || 14. |         |          |             |            |                    |                                                                                                                        || 15. |         |          |             |            |                    |                                                                                                                        |SECRET. Hund Insar? Yes.EE-120
[104-10174-10071.pdf — page 210]
# SECRET9 Agust 1950LOGICRANDE FOR: 18. RAZERSUBJECT : PD.UICK; Conference with Lir. Burnham1. In the first of a series of talks with I'r. Burnham, following his reward from Burope, a broad coverage of the Cultural Congress was splored as well as post-Congres plans and proceedings.2. I went into very little detail with hir. Burnkan as to the eventual setup of the Congress as a permanent institution except to suggest that it had very broad and far-reaching implications and would be carefully studied and pursued within the next few weeks. Fr. Burnham, however, emressed his point of view (which is to be further explored in other reetings this week) as follows:a. The continuation of the Congress as a going concern of intended permanence is now a fact. (We know that there is an executive comittee, an operating committee and that the institution of a Paris Office has been authorized.) Overtly, a permanent Congress for Cultural Freedom can vastly improve the clinate of opinion throughout Eurore, at least, to the extent that it may considerably counter Soviet propaganda and may very well affect large groups of people far beyond the point of reutrality, per-. haps to resistance. Also overtly, the Congress can utilize its participants in various forms of writing, speaking, and political: actica. Covertly, the Coreress can perform a number of useful functions, including maintenance of contect with various resistance ours, forwarding money to such groups, spreading of clandestine propaganda and other purposes. No creat pretentions are necessary in connection with the establishment of the Congress as a permanent institution, though a small office in Paris and another in Berlin are indicated. The sponsorship of a French Intellectual Pericdicel seems to be one of the most pressing and one of the best ideas, and áron is enthusiastic about it and is willing to work for such a magazine as editor. Other members of the Congress, Takevlew, for instance, are willing to work on Congress publications and both Koestler and Duber-Neunan are very anrions to take part in the literary and political activities. Bonav is a very useful man, apparently entirely reliable and a food writer and organizer; he knows languages and knows Dropear politics.# SECRET
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SECRETb. The impact of the Congress on Derin was terrific and Reuter's part magnificent. The whole city was very eager and receptive and paid an extraordinary amount of attention to all of the Congress activities. The book display at the Congress itself was only fairly effective, but was extremely telling in the book stores throughout Western sectors, which made special displays of the books and photographs of the authors. Broadcasting by redio Rias seems to have been more or less nominal, although RIAS cut tapes of all of the Congress speeches, but the Voice of America team did a first-class and absolutely outstanding job. The Congress was given big coverage by VOA in several languages. In addition to the records of European publicity that are on hand, a considerable additional amount was produced. For instance, there was daily broadcasting of a French radio station and sporadic broadcasting coverage by other stitions. There was a large amount of publicity in France and England and a substantial amount in Italy, Sweden and other countries. Special articles are still appearing in the European press and periodicals. The influence of the Congress on a number of important literary and-political leaders appears to be very significant. This was especially true in the case of Frenay and Silone, both of whom under-went an apparent conversion due to the operations of the Congress. On the other hand, the composition of the Congress was unbalanced nationally and also because it was too leftist, too radical.c. The irritation caused by the Trevor-Roper article in the Manchester Guardian was a reflection of the attitude of three members of the British delegation, Trevor-Roper, Ayer, and Peter de Lendelssohn. Actually, Lendelssohn (an old buddy of Lasky's) was the cause of the trouble. He is a second-rate writer, a neurotic, frustrated intellectual, who had a chip on his shoulder and unquestionably inspired Trevor-Roper and Ayer with his spirit of antagonism. Another complication was the fact that Ayer and Koestler have been intellectual rivals and bitterly dislike each other. Ayer was infuriated by Koestler's prominence and communicated this antagonism to Trevor-Roper. The letter is an excessively conceited man (Burnham added at this point that almost all intellectuals are excessively conceited) and was openly annoyed because he did not figure in the proceedings with sufficient prominence. ("Incidentally," says Burnham, "Trevor-Roper's description of Koestler as a 'rootless European' follows Pravda, which uses that term as a general description for Jews.") The annoyance felt by Trevor-Roper and Ayer at their relegation to minor roles in comparison to Koestler found its outlet in articles which both ofSECRET