Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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2. taking the bus at Torreón. LIRING/3 then announced jubilantly that a few days after his return, while he was visiting the safehouse in the hope of Rowton's return or at least a telephone call, he received a telephone call from an anonymous man, obviously a Guatemalan, who asked whether he could make a trip to Tapachula in order to meet with a friend. Then L/3 indicated that he could make the trip, the person instructed him to wait in the lobby of the Figueroa movie house until he was approached by the "friend". LIRING/3 told Rowton that he then proceeded by train to Tapachula (on 19 July) and waited in the lobby as instructed. To his great surprise, he was approached by the same Guatemalan young woman who had met him in Guatemala City in late January, 1967, and told that a certain: "Valentín" would contact him at his home in Mexico City in the near future and that this person was to be his new contact with FAR. LIRING/3 continued thatto Mexico City on 21 July in order to await the arrival of "Valentín". According to LIRING/3 this occurred in a rather strange way. Then he returned home he found a note under the door with a brief text stating that someone had passed by to see him. The note was signed with a five-pointed star rather crudely drawn in the place of a signature. L/3 stated that he was completely puzzled at this, but on reflexion felt that the five-pointed star meant 1700 and he therefore went to the safehouse at 1700 that day to await further contact. According to L/3, a person did telephone him shortly after he arrived and identified himself as "Valentín". He asked L/3 to await another call at 1030 the following day so that a meeting could be arranged. L/3 continued that he finally succeeded in meeting with "Valentín" and brought him to the safehouse on the evening of 25 July. He stated that he talked with this person until 0400 the following morning.5. LIRING/3 reported that "Valentín", who identified himself by true name as Moisés Orozco Leal, Calle Tenis 88, Apt 5, Zona 21, Country Club, Col. Churubusco, Mexico City, D.F. Orozco stated to L/3 that he had been in Mexico some twenty years and had been engaged in propaganda work for the FAR. He added that recently he had received instructions to contact L/3 and talk with him "very frankly" concerning the procurement problem. He explained to L/3 that Far had had very disappointing experiences in the past and was in desperate need of secure and efficient channels for the procurement of arms and ammunition from the U.S. and Mexico. He stated that FAR had the cash necessary to purchase the arms and hoped that LIRING/3's commercial network could handle the procurement and transport. He indicated to L/3 that FAR had checked him out with favorable results both locally and with
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3. the Cubans. In the course of conversation "Valentin" mentioned that Coc-tora Mercedes Fereira, whom 2/3 had met in "avaza, was currently in Hexi-co. "Valentín" states that it was a very critical tize for PAR and thateveryone hoped that something would be rsolved in Havana with regard toconcrete aid from the Cubans. Za indicated that in the past both the Cubansand the Soviets had done more talking that producing in both material andhard cash. In speaking of the most inmediate needs, "Valentic" stated thatFAR needed a dochter argently to train the revolutionaries in first aid,and he asked 1/3 whether he could recommend a doctor that might be sillingto visit FAR headquarters for about ten days for this purpose. 1/3 toldEowton that he rozised to look into the matter sconest, alling that he haćin mind his friend Rail Coreno Conchee, who was a medical student and pro-bably qualified to give first aid instruction.5. LIRING/3 continued that he expressed his w٩٦٦٩٠٠٠   arns procurecent effort, but would prefer to be able to talk irectly with   FAR leaders to get first-hand information as to their needs, and arrange   secure methods of payment. Then 1/3 referred to the delinquent account   (medicine and radio tubes) Walentin" relpied that unfortunately only part   of the medicine had arrived intact, the other part presumedly having been   captured by the Guatemalan aray. He promised that 1/3 would be paid afr   for the material furnished and apologized for not having the money with his   he added that he receives com francial assistence from FAR and has to live   as best he can from his own resources. In reply to 13's query, "Valentín"   stated that he did not personally know "Gardia", since Far insisted on con-   partmentation, and there had been no need for him to meet "Carcia" in the   past. He then lectured 1/3 or security, stating that FAR prinicipal :ro-   blem to date had been within the organization itself result from laxness   on the part of revcluticmarinis and outright betrayal by some members. He   added that LIRING/3 had been assigned the battle-name "Rafael" and that   henceforth he should use that name whenever dealing with FAR members.6. LIRING/3 told Rowten that, in the course of conversation regarding possib-   le supply channels, ta zenticed the possibility of air-drops from scall   privately chartered planes, using the Raúl Moreno as a pilot. According to   1/3, "Valentin" showed immediate interest in this, commenting that he vas   certain FAR would be most interested. He then stated that he felt 1/3 was   an important enough asset to meet directly with César Kontes tiaself and   he promised to look into the possibility of arranging a personal interview.   1/3 replied that he would welcome this opportunity since it would clarify
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4. the entire picture for his and enable him to render the most efficient service to FAR. "Valentin" promised to have some specific word on this at their next meeting which he requested for 28 July, promising to come to L/3's home between 1500 and 1700. "Valentin" explained that although the safehouse appeared to be an excellent meeting place, it was FAR policy not to use the same apartment or place of meeting more than once.7. Rowton met with LIRING/3 again at 1430 on 29 July, 1967, at the safehouse The second meeting had been scheduled for 1900 on 22 July, but on arrival at the safehouse, Rowton found a note from L/3 stating that he would not be able to make the 1900 meeting but would see Rowton at 1430 the following day. The only explanation in the note for the delay was "cosas muy importantes han sucedido". When Rowton met with LIRING/3 that same day at 1430, the latter explained that "Valentín" had left a note at his home saying the meeting would be delayed, and then appeared unannounced when L/3 was not at home and talked briefly with LIRING/4. L/3 stated that he alarmed DIRNG/4 by stating that he ("Valentín") had a wounded man that must be taken care of urgently and asked L/4 to pass on the message to L/3 in the hope that L/3 could look into the possibility of locating a good trusted doctor. "Valentin" promised to come back to the house as soon as he could. According to L/3, "Valentin" reappeared unannounced at about 1000 on 29 July, and showed L/3 a telegram which he had just received from Guatemala City. The telegram contained the text "If you are interested in further details concerning the business, present yourself here", and was addressed to "Valentin" in his true name and address. L/3 stated that he could not recall the sender's name or address but he assumed that it would be an alias in any case.8. According to L/3, "Valentin" explained to him that the telegram meant that a meeting with Cesar Montes could be arranged and that L/3 should accordingly prepare himself for the trip. In reply to L/3's query, "Valentin" stated that this took priority over the operation involving the wounded comrade, who was expected in Mexico City in about 7-8 days. "Valentin" then stated that he and L/3 would have to make a trip to Tapachula as soon as feasible and in order to receive from a FAR contact a sealed envelope containing the name of the first contact in Guatemala City. He added that he himself would not know what was in the envelope and would himself proceed on into Guatemala with the FAR contact who delivered the letter. He added that L/3 would then have to return to Mexico City and fly into Guatemala City under commercial cover, since it would be too dangerous to
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proceed on to Guatemala City from Tapachula by air (the airport being small and all travelers being subject to the curiosity and scrutiny of the local officials). Valentin then stated that L/3 should be able to pass through the Guatemala City airport without difficulty provided he kept his eye out for a certain José Linares, an ex-Chief of Police who worked for the North-American Embassy and had a complete file on all suspect persons who might enter or leave the airport. "Valentin" described Linares as a man of short stature, thin, grey hair combed in a high peak in front, usually dressed in a double-breasted jacket. "Valentin" added that Linares was considered the most dangerous man at the airport, although he is not an official but simply a secret agent of the North Americans.9. "Valentin" then, according to L/3, stated that the latter should procure the following items at once so that he could bring them to Tapachula with him:1.  Khaki shirt and trousers (pantalón y camisa de lona muy gruesos)2.  Leather combat boots (zapatos de campaña)3.  Browning or Walter 9mm automatic weapon with 3 clips and 50 rounds of ammunition.4.  Detonators with wick or electric fuse5.  Gauze for medical treatment6.  Three pills of most potent poison available."Valentin" explained that the Browning automatic was the best since it could be converted easily into a "machinegun" with its clip of 13 cartridges. The Walter was also good since it could be fitted with a silencer. "Valentin" also explained that the poison capsules were desirable to be taken in the event of capture by the army to avoid the possibility of someone confessing under torture. He added that one was for the use of L/3 and the other two for the comrades who would be his escorts.10. "Valentin" further explained that L/3 should open the sealed envelope he had received in Tapachula when he was aboard the plane enroute to Guatemala City, memorize the name and address and then destroy the paper. He added quickly that he realized L/3 could open the envelope any time after he received it in Tapachula, and he was free to do so, but it was hoped for security reasons that he would open it only after he had left Mexico City airport. "Valentin" added that he himself had no idea of that name would appear on the paper, but in any case he was sure that it would be the name of a person not directly involved in revolutionary activities.
[104-10176-10005.pdf — page 16]
6. LIWING/3 was to pay a friendly visit to this person, making no reference to politicians, but simply using a prearranged code word in the conversation. This recognition signal would lead to the first meeting with the comrades (probably two) who would escort LIWING/3 to César Montes.11. LIWING/3 stated that he had another meeting with "Valentín" at 2200 that same evening (29 July) at the Café Literario where he hopes to obtain more detail regarding the timing of the trips. L/3 said that he preferred to make the first trip (to Tapachula) on 1 August since LIWING/4 was greatly upset over the recent developments and had to be calmed down. He added that L/4 was very pessimistic over L/2's chances of returning from such a trip alive and he would have to reassure her that he intended to take all possible precautions.12. Inasmuch as Rowton's careful review of LIWING traffic for the period 22-24 July failed to reveal any telephone call from anyone asking L/3 to make the trip to Tapachula, and in fact revealed traffic indicating that LIWING/3 was in Mexico City during the period 19-21 July, when he claimed to be in Tapachula, Rowton stated that he did not believe L/3's story regarding his initial contact with "Valentín" and his trip to Tapachula. Since Rowton's telephone answering service reported repeated messages from "señor Juarez" and L/3 himself in true name, he felt he could use this rather than intimate in any way that L/3's (safehouse) phone was tapped. LIWING/3 became thoroughly upset, as he had done on the previous occasion when Rowton had impugned his veracity, and assured Rowton with tears in his eyes that he had always been "fundamentally" honest, although he might have exaggerated in the matter of details and exact dates. L/3 was so emotionally disturbed that he felt it unwise to press the matter further at that time and proposed to L/3 that he (Rowton) meet with LIWING/4 that evening at 2200, when he would be meeting with "Valentín" again. Rowton turned down L/3's invitation to be present at the Café Literario so that he could get a look at "Valentín" himself, since Rowton hoped that the meeting would be covered in any case by the Station team (which had L/3 under surveillance since the previous afternoon).13. LIWING/4 came to the safehouse at 2200 and Rowton was able to talk privately with her for about two hours. She arrived in a highly emotional state, alleging that she was not aware of what was happening and was sure that L/3 was heading for disaster. She exclaimed that "risking capital was one thing, but risking one's life was another," and that although she agreed with the principle of the revolution, she could not accept the terrible.
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consequences of revolutionary activities that bad suidenyly pecore a reality for her. She complained that 1/3 kept her in the dark about any things and tout she could not understand his willingness to that his life and the happiness of his fasily "sc precipitously". Then cuton questioned her discreetly as to 13's trip to Tapachula, she stated in uncontrolatle sobs (they appeared to Kwton quite genuine) Ithat he suifenyl left the preceding week, saying he was going to Chiages and dis- appeared for 3-4 days. She said she was so use she could not remember anything but the feeling of abandonment. She trencczplained that although Foxton was the only person she could tura to in a crisis like the one she went through last week, she could not locate in anywhere. She called his telephone (answering service) repeatedly and then in desperation called LIRING/7 in the hose that he would now something on di not know which Farris" she was referring to). CTETS/4 then stated that she realized suddenyl that if 1/3 were to disappear she would be sub- ject to desertation to Cuba, a fate which she apparently genuinely dreaded. Foxton assured her that he would do everything possible to see that she was taken care of in this eventuality, but she protested that 2/3 was thel cnly person she could ope to find happiness with and Forton could zot bring him back if anything happened to him.14. Forten then stated that before 1/3 could take such a trip with serious risks involved, he would have to study the situation thoroughly. Es ex- plained that at the moment he had serious doubts regarding the contacts that have trought 1/3 to this point. 1/4 replied that she hersel had seen the latest contact ("Malentin") caly once when he came to the scuse and gave kar the message regarding the wounded person. hen Foxton queried her again concerring the trip to Tapachula, she stated that 2/3 had told her upon his return that he had asked someone else to make daily calls to low- too's answering service, and upbraided her for calling. (This would ex- plain what appeared to be 1/3's daily calls during the period 19-21 July, but it would not explain 1/3's conversations with Berte Higisser and Ser- gio Valdez of 20/7/57 and his remark to Serta sigisser on 21/7/67 that he did not go out of town after all".)15. Rowten felt that, although his meeting with 1/4 was not particularly productive, it served its purpose in advising 1/3 indirectly that he did. not accept 1/3's story of the trip to Tapachula and his initial contact with Valentin".![signature of Wallace B Rowton]
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# 1 August, 19671.  At meeting with Rowton 1700 34 July LIRING/3 reported that Moises Crozco Leal, who claimed to be L/3's new FAR liaison for procurement of arms, currently staying in his apartment on Calzada Tacubaya. L/3 explained to Rowton that at 2200 29 July meeting with Crozco, latter stated that he had instructions from FAR headquarters to escort L/3 to Tapachula for contact instructions and instructed L/3 procure immediately Browning or Walter SM automatic with 52 three clips and at least 50 cartridges plus detonators with normal or electric fuse and three poison tablets of highest possible potency which he would needs on trip from Guatemala City to Montes headquarters. Crozco, however, insisted that L/3 bring these items with him to Tapachula and added that he would ensure that they were safely delivered to Guatemala City for eventual pick-up by L/3.2.  At end of meeting Crozco asked L/3 to put him up for the night at his home "since it was very late and in any case he wanted to discuss their travel plans further". L/3 did so without the least suspicion Crozco's true motives, and appeared to Rowton to have accepted Crozco's bona fides although he admitted that he had never heard of Crozco before latter's unexpected approach to him 25 July. L/3 stressed to Rowton that Crozco revealed an astounding knowledge Guatemalan revolution, Cuba, as well as L/3's past activities and dates his trips to Guatemala.3.  Rowton stated to L/3 that his preliminary checks revealed that Crozco in all probability a deserter from FAR who actually using L/3's apartment as a hideout. Rowton confessed he could not understand why Crozco would want to return to Guatemala without or without LIRING/3, but urged L/3 to attempt to get the truth from Crozco posing as sympathetic but indicating that he was aware of Crozco's true status in the hope that Crozco could be moved to a safehouse and made available for thorough interrogation. L/3 agreed and arrangements made for Rowton/L/3 meeting at midnight 1 August.4.  Then L/3 appeared at CC30 he reported enthusiastically that he had succeeded in breaking Crozco down but that he had had to call on his friends Sergio-Valdez and Raúl Moreno. Crozco stated that he had been sent to mountains to organize guerrilla bands but found everyone "stupid" and his task impossible. He added that David Casasola who was with him was undisciplined and made mistakes that led to capture of many of his men and probably to his own capture. Crozco continued insisting that he was the
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## 2.only intelliging revolutionary, referring to "the FAR Party" and at one point calling Montes a "cabrón". When he asked 1/3 who had given him the information that he was a deserter and 1/3 refused to divulge his source, Crozco, according to 1/3, exclaimed: "It was Roberto; I know". Crozco then stated that he intended to form his own revolutionary movement which be named "First of May" and had approached 1/3 for support since he at the moment had no financial or material means. 1/3 told Roxton that it was then that he realized that Crozco intended to use the supplies listed para one store for his own use and that once he turned them over to Crozco he would never see them or Crozco again.5. In reply to I/3's query as to how Crozco had gotten to him, Sergio Valdez (who joined 1/3 at the end of the session) explained in the presence of Crozco that Alberto Domingo had referred him to him and that he knew nothing of Crozco's background. At this point Valdez threatened Crozco with physical violence exclaiming to 1/3 that they must dispose of him at once so that he could not reveal vital secrets of the revolution. I/3 claimed to Roxton that he managed to calm Valdez down and get him out of the apartment. I/3 stated that he left both Valdez and Moreno "on guard" outside the apartment house in the event Crozco tried to escape before he could confer with Roxton.6. In view of this highly explosive development Roxton instructed 1/3 to return to the apartment and attempt to persuade Crozco to accompany him to a hotel where Roxton could arrange some sort of protective surveillance until Crozco thoroughly interrogated. I/3 insisted that Crozco be kept incommunicado in view of the information he possesses about I/3, Valdez and Moreno. Roxton promised to do the best he could but insisted that Crozco be removed from the I/3's apartment as soon as possible, I/3 promised to make every effort and asked Roxton meet with him again at 0300 to discuss results his effort.7. At 0400 Roxton met I/3 at the safehouse (where AIMING/4 had moved with their child) and I/3 reported that Crozco could not be persuaded to leave the apartment. Although he feigned calmness, I/3 realized that he was terrorized of what might await him the moment he stepped out of the apartment house. Crozco promised to talk to I/3 again at 1000 that same morning when he had more time to think things over. I/3 stated that he left Valdez and Moreno on guard outside the apartment house (in Moreno's car) on the possible chance that Crozco would make a run for it. I/3 stated that "under no circumstances" would Crozco be allowed to escape.
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3. 8. Rowton, not excluding the possiblity of Crozco's comiting suicide in 1/3's apartment or attracting attention of the neighbors, recommended that 1/3, Horeno and Valdez enter the spartzent soonest and remain inside with Crozco until Bouton could work out some plan to remove him from the apartment carly izexiz that same scrning. 2/3 promised to try but was not at all sure that he could ccavince Crozco to open the door (which he had bolted from the inside). In any case he assured Bowton that he and his two friends would rezain or quard cutside ac that they could Burveil or seize Crozce the moment he left the premises. L/3 stated that he was quite certain that Crozco was unarmed and without funds and could easily be controlled by the thrzzonix Korena and Valdez, thus percitting hin (L/3) to communicate with Rowton.9. Alternatives in this sensitive situation appear to be following:(a) Rowtor instruct 1/3 deliver Orozco to specified place where he can be turned over to "istoleros" Mired by Roxton for pur- pose of getting Crozco off hands of 1/3 and his friends and detaining his long enough for interrogation. 1/3 assured Howton that he able make delivery and agrees desirability thorough interrogation by Rowton or person designated by hin. Delivery could possibly be arranged withot presence Valdez and Moreno,(b) LIRING/3 reveal entire affair to and/or a FR (617 via Ernesto Capoano de Vecchio) and let decision rest with them, interrogating Crozco as best he could in the meantire in his apartment.(c) Let Crozco escape, after giving him enough money to make his way out of town or to another hideout. permit lengthy interrogation but would10. Alernative (a) would/involve enventual disposal of Crozco that would be acceptable Koreno and Valdez (/3 would accept Roxton final decision). 1/3 could allege subsequently that Crozco disposed of by Fowton pistoleros and report this to LIRING and FAR. Alternative (b) would mean loss to ACFACT of valuable debriefing if this deezed desirable. Alternative (c) according to LIRING/3 probably not feasible since Valdez and Moreno fanatic enough to kill Crozco themselves rather than see hin escape.11. L/3 insists that he has not revealed Roator's coaching in this affair to either Valdez or Foreno.Wallace B. Roxton.What about alternative D-line of reply to (Celenpor (induced action of L/3).