Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10173-10135.pdf — page 222]
# DISPATCHChief, WH DivisionChief, LPGLOBEChief of Station, Mexico CityOperational/LPSUITCASE/LIREALM-1Progress Report - 20 October 1967 to 1 May 1968Action Required: FYIReferences:A. HMMA-33516, 17 November 1967B. HMMW-15670, 1 August 1967C. IMMA-34538, 26 April 1968D. HMMA-34398, 3 April 1968E. HMMA-34570, 30 April 19681. As reported in reference A, LIREALM-1 joined the PBRUMEN Section of this Station on 20 October 1967. It was decided that LIREALM-1 should drop further efforts against the Soviet, U.A.R., and Indonesian targets. The decision to discontinue efforts to develop contacts among Mexicans, also made at that timo, was later amended and LIREALM-1 was entrusted with the handling of LIRELIC-1 along the lines of the recommendation made in reference B. Thus, by November 1967 LIREALM-1 had two main responsibilities: a) the French target, against which he already had devoted considorable time and effort, and b) the handling of L'IRELIC-1.Continued...Distribution:Orig & 2 - C/WHD2 - C/LPGLOBE---CS COPYΗΜΜΑ - 3466815 May 1968.201-285412201-773337
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CONTINUATION OFDISPATCHSECRET/DESENSITIZED. HMMA - 34668the above, the Station made an effort to explore the possibilityof using a contact which LIRELIC-1 had with a PBRUMEN citizenin Acapulco to gain another window into LIRING. This PBRUMENcitizen owns a small hotel in the Mexican resort occasionallyvisited by LIRING personnel. Although LIRELIC-1 himself oncedelivered a package sent by his Acapulco friend and managed tohave one or two meetings with representatives of the LIRINGCommercial Section (to discuss the possibility of "trading"with PBRUMEN), it was decided in the end that LIRELIC-1'saccess to LIRING was too superficial to be of any great benefit..This decision was bolstered by the departure for PBRUMEN inApril 1968 of LIRELIC-1's PBRUMEN friend, who left for whatappears to be an extended visit to try to solve complicatedpersonal problems. Thus, with the "shelving" of possibleoporational activities against LIRING, LIOGLE became LIRELIC-1'sonly target in April of this year',5. Unlike his contacts with the French, LIREALM-1's   dealings with LIRELIC-1 have been completely clandestine.   LIREALM-1 meets LIRELIC-1 under alias in out of the way   rostaurants and other public places. A drop constituted by a   P. O, box rented by LIRELIC-1 under alias (to which both he   and LIREALM-1. have keys) was set up for LIREALM-1 to receive   operational messages,6. References D and. E reviewed an incident which occurred   on 16 January and had a direct bearing on LIREALN-1's security.   It is the opinion of this Station that the person who saw   LIREALM-1 talk with Raymond A. FRADYER and Wallace B. ROWTON   did not positively identify either of them. References stated   that this person could not have been Valentin Sergeyevich   LOGINOV, who claimed to have observed the meeting. Reference E   pointed out that before joining the PBRUMEN Section in October   1967 LIREALM-1 had for some time interested himself in the   activities of the Soviets at "Station request. He first made   contact with LOGINOV, for example, in April 1967 and met with   him on the average of once a week until October 1967.   Reference E also pointed out that LIREALM-1 only had four   meetings with the Soviet from October 1967 to January 1968..   The Station wants to emphasize once more that these were all   at LOGINOV's initiative. LIREALM-1 had discontinued his efforts   to maintain contact with the Soviet at Station's directive.   As pointed out above, one of the main targets now handled by   LIREALM-1 is the French. One of the best places to meet   Frenchmen is the French Club. Station would be very reluctant   to have LIREALM-1, a long-time member of that club, terminate   his membership. Neither does the Station want him to be too0.   obvious in giving the cold shoulder to the Soviet. The Station- does not believe, knowing what it knows of LOGINOV, that  serious and permanent damage has been done to LIREALM-1's  security and believes that he can continue to provide valuable  services to this Station.for Willard C. CURTIS
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# DISPATCHTO:Chief, WH DivisionINFO:Chief, LPGLOBEFROM:Chief of Station, Mexico CitySUBJECT:Operational/LPSUITCASE/LIREALM-1ACTION REQUIRED: REFERENCESAction Required: FYIReferences: A. HMMA-34398, 3 April 1968B. HMAW-16361, 25 April 19681. The purpose of this dispatch is to provide Headquarters with additional information requested in reference B in the hope that it will assist the interested components in formulating a clearer picture of the reference A incident. The Station has consulted at length with Wallace B. ROWTON on the details that are provided below as well as, of course, with LIREALM-1 himself.2. First, with regard to paragraph 2b of reference B, a fuller account of the FRADYER/ROWTON/LIREALM-1 meeting at Sanborns will, it is felt, shed more light on the impressions that Headquarters had formed of the probable identification of ROWTON as LIREALM-1's "boss." The following chronological account has been prepared by ROWTON from his reports and memory in consultation with LIREALM-1 (the numbers in the left margin refer to the time at which the events mentioned below took place):1610 (January 16) LIREALM-1 met with ROWTON at the latter's home as planned. ROWTON informed LIREALM-1, much to the latter's disappointment, that unfortunately he had not as yet received the reimbursement for operational expenses ($2,357.35 MN) requested by LIREALM-1 on 10 January 1968, nor had he received from theContinued...Distribution:Orig & 2 - C/WHD2 - C/LPGLOBEDISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBERHMMA - 34570DATE30 April 1968CLASSIFICATIONHQS FILE NUMBERSECRET/IZED201-773337
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# CONTINUATION OF DISPATCHSECRET DESENSITIZED HΜΜΑ - 34570Station any contract or other document that LIREALM-1 might present to LIRELIC-1 as he had proposed. ROWTON explained to LIKEALM-1 that he had hoped to be able to see Raymond A. FRADYER before his meeting with LIREALN-1, but that this had been impossible.1620 ROWTON then telephoned FRADYER's office (in alias, open code, and double talk) and this time managed to reach FRADYER himself. FRADYER told ROWTON that he had the money and could pass it to ROWTON that same afternoon if he felt it necessary. RONTON replied that he preferred to pick it up as soon as convenient for FRADYER and made a date for 1630 in the corridor outside the Koala Restaurant, about three or four minutes by foot from Sanborns. ROWTON then asked LIREALN-1 to wait for him in the downstairs bar of Sanborns, where he would join him, with the money. LIREALM-1 left ROWTON's home alone, and ROWTON followed about five minutes later and proceeded (by taxi) to the Koala Restaurant. ROWTON distinctly recalls waiting for FRADYER for some 15 minutes.1645 ROWTON spoke with FRADYER for about two minutes in the corridor after receiving the envelope containing the money. In reply to FRADYER's queries, ROWTON stated that LIREALM-1 was somewhat disappointed that he could not provide him with some sort of written contract for LIRELIC-1 and also because of the delay in reimbursing him for operational expenses (some of which had been disallowed). ROWTON then revealed to FRADYER that LIREALM-1 was waiting for him at the Sanborns bar so that he could pass him the money without further delay. FRADYER then regretted that he had been unable to see LIREALM-1 personally to explain the disallowance of some of the expenses. ROWTON suggested that FRADYER might take this opportunity to say a few words to LIREALM-1, especially since the latter knew that ROWTON and FRADYER were meeting at that moment somewhere nearby. FRADYER agreed but said that he preferred the gift section of Sanborns to the bar.1655 ROWTON then proceeded alone to the downstairs bar of Sanborns and found LIREALM-1 waiting. ROWTON explained that he was late because of a last-minute arrangement with FRADYER for a brief meeting in the gift shop. LIREALM-1 then paid the bill and accompanied ROWTON up the stairs in the rear to the gift section, where they found FRADYER looking over the silver display in the shop.1700 An apparently casual conversation then took place, with FRADYER and LIREALM-1 doing most of the talking and with ROWTON occasionally examining the silverware on display.CLASSIFICATIONSECRET/DESENSITIZED CONTINUEDPAGE NO2
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CONTINUATION OFDISPATCHSECRETDESENSITIZEDHNMA - 31570his continuing contacts with LOGINOV were at the latter's initiative and that LIREALM-1 would not make any attempt to follow up or show any unusual interest. LIREALM-1 did not report seeing LOGINOV again until 13 January 1968 (two months later) this time, as usual, on the tennis court.7. Headquarters will recall that the LIREALM-1 relation- ship with the Soviets dates back many months prior to the date ROWTON took over his handling. The file reveals that LIREALM-1 first met LOGINOV on 22 April 1967, and that at that timo LOGINOV proposed to LIREALM-1 that they meet regularly, every Wednesday, for tennis and occasionally take in a movie with their wives. This leaves no doubt that the pace was set by LOGINOV himself since he undoubtedly saw in LIREALM-1 a potential target. The situation was further complicated by the character and modus operandi of LOGINOV, as well as the limitations of LIREALM-1's cover situation at the time.8. A principal dilemma facing the Case Officer with regard to LIREALM-1's exposure to the Soviets has been his regular attendance at the French Club. Since the French target has been one of the main ones left to LIREALM-1 after the elimination of the Soviet, Indonesian, and UAR operations, it was considered necessary for LIREALM-1 to continue his normal contacts with the French. He could have dropped his membership in the club to avoid further involvement with the Soviets, but this would have broken a long-established pattern and deprived him of his principal access at that time. It was therefore ruled out as counterproductive.9. Subsequent developments appear to confirm the Station's view that LOGINOV based his provocative remark on a hunch or, at most, on a strong suspicion concerning LIREALM-1. As mentioned in paragraph 1 of reference B, such prolonged social contact between an American and a Soviet "is almost inevitably construed on both sides to have intel- ligence connotations." The Station wishes to emphasize, however, that whatever suspicions were aroused in the mind of LOGINOV concerning LIREALM-1 were already generated months before he joined the PBRUMEN Section in late October 1967.10. In conclusion, the Station feels that nothing has been noted in the subsequent operational activity of FRADYER or ROWTON to indicate that either of them has been identified as an intelligence operative. ROWTON has had no contact of any kind with Soviets in this area, nor has he detected any surveillance, either physical or technical, of his person or home. Both he and FRADYER, however, will continue to maintain maximum security to avoid any further exposure to such persons as LOGINOV. LIREALM-1, on his part, has been able to improve his cover by opening an office and making his overt activity as plausibly commercial as possible.Willard C. CURTIS
[104-10173-10135.pdf — page 229]
# DISPATCHDESENSITIZEDChief of Station, Mexico CityFROMChief, Western Hemisphere DivisionSUBJECT:Operational/LPSUITCASE/LINEUN/1ACTION REQUIRED-REFERENCESREVERENCE: ICNA-34303, 3 April 19631. Reference caused deep concern in Headquarters -- concern which we know you share. To hold any agent meetings in that particular Sanborn Cafeteria is unorthodox enough, but to meet there with someone in the category of LIRE/1, whose cover is of special importance, suggests an unawareness or disdain of basic operational security which merits reprimand.2. We appreciate your candid account of the LIREALI/1-LOCINOV episode, and have several comments to make:a. Why LOGINOV would have said, "I saw you talking with your boss the other day" we do not know, but the fact that he made such a banal remark with a slight grin certainly implies that he did not have ordinary commercial business in mind.b. In the context of the dispatch it sounds rather as though LOONOV was referring to a meeting between LIRE/1 and one other man, not two, in which case it was probably ROWTON and not FRADYER when he identified as the boss. (We assume that ROWTON and LINEAL/1 had been together in the downstairs cafeteria before the brush meeting with FRADYER took place, but this may be incorrect.)3. In order to shed some additional light on the matter, we would like to know even more about this particular Wednesday meeting and the pattern of meetings which have preceded and followed it. Were ROWTON and LIREALI/L meeting together in the bar or cafeteria? What was the appearance of the later three-way, fifteen-minute conversation upstairs in the silver shop (i.e.; casual, serious, intense, sotto-voce, conspiratorial? Was any pretense made of "shopping"?) Our feeling is that ROWTON is as much compromised asDistribution:2 - COS/Mexico City| CROSS REFERENCE TO | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER | DATE          || ------------------ | -------------------------- | ------------- ||                    | EDCIV-16364                | 25 April 1968 || CLASSIFICATION | HQS FILE NUMBER || -------------- | --------------- || DESENSITIZED   | 201-773337      || OFFICE | OFFICER  | ORIGINATING | EXT  || ------ | -------- | ----------- | ---- || WH/1   | NPerkins | TYPIST jmw  | 6954 |(1) - 201-7733371 - WH/1 Chrono1 - CCS| OFFICE SYMBOL | DATE | COORDINATING | OFFICER'S NAME || ------------- | ---- | ------------ | -------------- || C/WH/1        |      |              | W. J. Kaufman  || CCS/Milligan  |      |              |                || OFFICE SYMBOL | DATE | RELEASING      | OFFICER'S SIGNATURE || ------------- | ---- | -------------- | ------------------- || C/WH          |      | William V Broe |                     |
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CONTINUATION OFDISPATCH## DESENSITIZEDLIREALM/1, but in ROWTON's case the less is less because of accepted risks in his style of operating and since we have always assumed that his cover was thin . What is important to know in this case is where and how often ROWTON and LIREALM/1 have had operational meetings in the past. Considering this we had assumed the ROWTON-LIREALM/1 meetings were truly clandestine.4. Another point to be resolved is the frequency of LIREALM/1's meetings with LOGINOV -- from the Reference we infer that the tennis games were a frequent occurrence, although LIREALM/1 had been told almost a year ago to break contact. Even if these meetings could not have been avoided as the Station claims, why were they not reported? The issue takes on even added significance as we understood the Station and Headquarters had been in agreement for some time that LIREALM/1 was to avoid any continuing contact with Soviets. Hindsight in this case certainly proves the correctness of the earlier judgment. (Experience shows that prolonged social contact between an American and a Soviet is almost inevitably construed on both sides, and with reason, to have an intelligence connotation.)5. The fact that LOGINOV did not mention the Sanborn's meeting to FRADYER can hardly be read to mean that LIREALM/1 is clean in LOGINOV's eyes, although FRADYER would naturally have been anxious to see what, if anything, would happen when he next saw LOGINOV face to face. It is true that we have no evidence that LIREALM/1 has been "definitely branded as a VOFIRM operator" but if he is even highly suspect there is still cause for deep concern.6. Various levels and components at Headquarters are trying to evaluate and debate this episode, and we would like to have your recommendations as an aid to our decision. From the few facts that we have we believe we must proceed under the assumption that LIREALM/1 is suspect or possibly compromised in the eyes of the Soviets. Accepting this, do you consider LIREALM/1 has further utility in Mexico? If so, we would like your views as to his proposed targets and handling procedures. After receiving further details as requested in paragraph 3 and your recommendations, Headquarters will advise you its decision.7. We recognize the Station is as disturbed about this breach of basic operational judgment as Headquarters and do not wish to belabor the point. We trust however that this experience will be a lesson well learned and that in the future the Station's clandestine operational procedures will be truly clandestine and professional in style for all of the Station activities, not just LIREALM/1.Ernest A. LUSBY
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# DISPATCHCLASSIFICATIONSECRET DESENSITIZEDTO:Chief, WH DivisionINFO.Chief, LPGLOBEFROM:Chief of Station, Mexico CitySUBJECT:Oporational/LIREALM-1ACTION REQUIRED-REFERENCESPROCESSING ACTIONMARKED FOR INDEXINGNO INDEXING REQUIREDONLY QUALIFIED DESKCAN JUDGE INDEXINGMICROFILMAction Required: FYI1. Since joining the staff of the PBRUMEN Section of this Station in October 1967, LIREALM-1 has been handled by Wallace B. ROWTON under the over-all supervision of the undersigned. His three main activities have been 1) to handle LIRELIC-1, an asset who we hope will turn into a penetration of the Mexican PRI, 2) to continue to develop rapport with and report on the local official French community, and 3) to determine the degree to which LIRELIC-1 can develop access to LIRING and its personnel. LIREALM-1 has continued to see a number of contacts he had developed before joining the PBRUMEN Section, either at Station directive or by social encounter. One of these contacts has long been Valentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV, Second Secretary of the Soviot Embassy and known KGB officer whom LIREALM-1 first ran into while playing tennis at the French Club, where both LIREALM-1 and LOGINOV are members. Station several times asked LIREALM-1 to break contact with LOGINOV, but this has not been possible since LIREALM-1's continued membership at the French Club is desired for operational reasons and LOGINOV, who probably joined the club for similar reasons, has continued to be one of its active members.Continued.Distribution:Orig & 2 - C/WHD2 - C/LPGLOBECROSS REFERENCE TO.DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBERCS COPYHMMA - 34398DATE3 April 1968CLASSIFICATIONExcladed From AutomaticRelegeding and DecleMOS FILE NUMBER201-335412201-773937-SECRET, DESENSITIZED
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# CONTINUATION OF DISPATCHSECRETDESENSITIZEDDISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBERHMMA - 343986. During a recent visit to the Station, a representative of the LPGLOBE staff at Headquarters was given the complete details of the above incident by LIREALM-1. He also reviewed the same incident with the undersigned and the Deputy Chief of Station. The LPGLOBE representative mentioned on this occasion that in his opinion the above incident should have been reported by cable. The undersigned stated then and wants to repeat now that this was not done because 1) it would have served no purpose to alert Headquarters without giving all the facts, which were not known at the time, and 2) the Station wanted to review all elements of this case to report the incident objectively, fairly, and completely. The undersigned told the LPGLOBE representative that he would consider documentation of this case complete after having the opportunity of meeting LOGINOV face to face again. As pointed out above, this did not occur until 28 March. Nothing in the operations conducted by the undersigned, LIREALM-1, or ROWTON has indicated that the Soviets positively identified either the undersigned or ROWTON so as to definitely brand LIREALM-1 as a NOFIRM operator.![Signature of Raymund A. Fadyger for Willard C. CURTIS]for Willard C. CURTIS
[104-10173-10135.pdf — page 235]
# DISPATCHINFO Chief, 89 DivisionFROM Chief, WH DivisionSUBJECT REDTOP LCIMPROVE - Identification of KGB Officers Who Participated In Counter-Surveillance of 201-827966REFERENCE: (A) HMMW-16090, 15 January 1968(B) MEXICO CITY 4777, 9 March 1968(C) EMMA-34264, 11 March 19681.  On 8 March 1968 after 201-827966 failed to show for two scheduled meetings (on the previous evening he had agreed to submit to a debriefing), the area of his hotel was checked by the undersigned. On a main street near the hotel the undersigned almost bumped into Valentin S. LOGINOV (201-138139). A few minutes later Ivan K BARANOV (201-277838) was observed photographing the area (including the undersigned) with an 8mm movie camera. LOG INOV was standing near BARANOV observing the undersigned. LILYRIC reports that LOGINOV and BARANOV were absent together from the Soviet Embassy during the period in question.2.  Another meet with 201-827966 was arranged by telephone for 12:30 on 9 March. From 12:28 to 12:48 the entrance to the hotel where the meeting took place was staked out by BARANOV and Vladimir A. DOLGOV (201-763035). BARANOV was carrying a 35mm camera with a larger telephoto lens. Visual identification of DOLGOV was tenative. However in view of LILYRIC reports that DOLGOV was absent from the Soviet Embassy for the period in question and that all other possible candidates were accounted for, the identification has been confirmed. In addition we have photos of DOLGOV wearing sunglasses identical to the ones he wore during the counter-surveillance.3.  Although we have had previous indications that DOLGOV is probably a KGB officer the Station feels that his participation in this counter-surveillance is sufficient to list him as known KGB.4.  We can also add photographer to BARANOV's technical duties.Distribution:12 - C/SB2 - C/WHCROSS REFERENCE TO201-277838201-763035201-285412B-201-827966D-50-3Frame Coyne for/Willard C. CURTIS
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# DISPATCHCLASSIFICATIONSECRETINFO:FROM: Chief of Station, Mexico CitySUBJECT: REDTOPValentin Sergeyevich LOGINOV (201-285412)ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCES:REFERENCE: HMMA-32872, 24 August 1967PROCESSING ACTIONMARKED FOR INDEXINGNO INDEXING REQUIREDONLY QUALIFIED DESKCAN JUDGE INDEXINGMICROFILMEnclosed is a finished copy of the SFR on Subject forwarded in draft under reference dispatch.Monroe B. DIFFENDALDistribution:3- COS, Mexico City w/atts COPYAttachments: A 1- 15 and 17-18 herewithB 16 and 19 Under Separate Cover 15 FEB 1968DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBERDATEHMMW-16150 8 February 1968CLASSIFICATIONHQS FILE NUMBERSECRET 201-285412| OFFICE    | OFFICE         | ORIGINATING  | TYPIST | EXT. || --------- | -------------- | ------------ | ------ | ---- || SB/O/WH   | Jonathan Hanke | law          |        | 6412 || C/SB/O/WH |                | COORDINATING |        |      || C/SB/CI/K | 08 Feb         |              |        |      || C/WH/1    |                | RELEASING    |        |      ||           |                |              |        |      |OFFICER'S SIGNATUREDISPATCH