Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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SECRET-5-Negro-type accent that it is almost impossible to understand him. As a matter of fact, both LOGINOW and CHERNYSH told the undersigned that the latter seemed to understand SALAZAR far better than they did. At every possible moment ho could squeeze in some Communist propaganda SALAZAR threw in a CASTROist tirade, whether it was relevant to the conversation and the moment or not. He tried to embarrass the wife of the Souch Korean representative who was with the group by asking her whether every Korean woman had a wart over her lip as she did. Fortunately, the wife of the Korean representative speaks very little Spanish and hardly any English, and the undersigned just would not translate. He also, in her presence, launched into a tirade about South Korea, which the undersigned cut off by telling rim that he did not know what he was talking about and that North Korea was the bottom of the barrel as far as nations were concerned. SALAZAR said that in Veracruz the Americans avoided him, but that this was all right with him since he had no business with them. He boasted that he was at the battle of the Bay of Pigs, which, he said, was one of the most tremendous battles of modern times. Since the Russians were listening to this the undersigned turned towards them and asked how many men had died in Stalingrad. LOGINOV said about a million and a half. The undersigned then turned to SALAZAR to say that if a thousand men had been hurt at the Bay of Pigs he would be very surprised. Both SALAZAR and CICARD on several occasions blasted Cuban exiles in the United States, saying that they were men without honor and social responsibility who were afraid to work. The undersigned maintained that on the contrary the exiles, who arrived without a dime, had given a very good accounting of themselves in the work department, as most of them had started new and successful comercial enterprises in the United States. SALAZAR and CICARD said this might be so, but that in any case they had no courage, as if they did not agree with the CASTRO regime they should be in Cuba fighting it. SALAZAR has the manners of an arrogant dog, whistles at the table during dinner, uses obscene language in front of ladies, and, as pointed out above, never fails to give out with strong "patria o muerte" music. During the banquet at Chapala on 18 May SALAZAR, who had come with an expensive camera as did CICARD, took pictures of each member of the group so obviously that the undersigned walked up to him and asked him if he did not want his signature as overheard well, to the great amusement of the Soviets.SECRET
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# SECRET-6-this: LIRENO-1, incidentally, has pointed out in his reports that SALAZAR is extremely active in Veracruz and that he has the car of someone important in the city council as well as others. The general commanding the area, who is a source of LIRENO-1, has been looking for a chance to have SALAZAR deported. This Section will see what it can do to oblige him.4. There was no doubt from LOGINOV's statements to the undersigned that the Soviet had made at least some mental notes before he went on the trip about subjects he should raise with the undersigned. Vietnam, of course, was profusely discussed, but LOGINOV also wanted to know about the state of the clection campaigns in the United States and about the March of the Poor on Washington. Ono afternoon that LOGINOV was with CHERNYSH, the undersigned told him that he could not imagine how the Soviets could favor the candidacy of Bobby KENNEDY, an aristocrat and millionnaire who had never worked with his hands and was liberally spending the family fortune to influence people's minds, when ort HUMPHREY, for example, was far more to the left in the American political spectrum and obviously had the support of the labor unions. No matter what the undersigned said, the Soviets found something good to say about KENNEDY, who appears to be the candidate the Soviet Union would most like to see as the next President. The two Soviets laughingly remarked that the undersigned's apparent dislike for KENNEDY might one day cost him his job. The undersigned said that fortunately the American Government was not at the mercy of the prevailing winds as were the governments of "other countries." The manner in which LOGINOV went about collecting his "information" was interesting and amusing. For example, on the way to Guadalajara, when the undersigned and LOGINOV were alone in the corridor of their coach, LOGINOV mentioned the armistice negotiations in Vietnam. The undersigned, as he has done many times in the past, emphasized that this opportunity to find an adequate peace should not be thrown away, as a backdown in negotiations might increase the tempo of the war to the point where a much larger conflict could result. LOGINOV agreed that no one, including his country, wanted such a conflict and indeed a maximum effort should be made to find peace in Vietnam. The undersigned reiterated that much depended on the Soviets, as the latter obviously had some influence over the worth Vietnamese Government. He then said that peace was possible providing thatSECRET
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SECRET-7-two main conditions were met. At that point someone came by and interrupted the conversation for a good two or three minutes. Rather than renew the argument he could see LOGINOV wanted to develop, the undersigned started to talk about the cattle in the fields, Mexican agriculture, et cetera. LOGINOV listened to this for one or two minutes and then reminded the undersigned he had said something about conditions for the armistice. The undersigned said that the primary condition for peace was for North Vietnam to pull out all of its troops from South Vietnam. Before he could mention the second condition, someone again interrupted the conversation, handed the undersigned and LOGINOV drinks, and remained for a good five minutes. After his departure, the undersigned again talked about something else, but again LOGINOV, after one or two minutes, doggedly went back to the original discussion and wanted to know what the second condition was. The under- signed then told him that this condition was that really free elections be held in South Vietnam. About half an hour later, LOGINOV opened up on the March of the Poor, whereupon the undersigned referred him to a recent article in the U.S. News and World Report listing the salaries of various workers in the United States. Electricians, for example, are listed as making $7.50 an hour. In short, the undersigned pointed out, to be really poor in the United States takes a lot of doing, or rather, a lack of doing. He said he wished the United States could do as the Soviets do and send people without a desire to work or the will to assume responsibility to re- education camps in Siberia and elsewhere. LOGINOV confirmed, in fact, that that was what the Soviet government was doing. LOGINOV also touched upon the search for the assassin of Martin Luther KING, whereupon the undersigned told him that the United States lacked the regimentation of the Soviet Union and the heavy state controls over the population so that it was difficult at times to find a man in that nation of more than 200,000,000 people in one or two days. He also told LOGINOV that it remained to be seen who put the assassin up to his act. The undersigned, of course, mentioned that the assassination was an abominable deed, as KING was probably the most reasonable of the black leaders. He said that had the white extremists, as LOGINOV called them, been behind the assassination, it is probable that Stokeley CARMICHAEL or Rap BROWN would have been shot. During the ride on the bus and out of the clear blue, LOGINOV asked the undersignedSECRET
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SECRET-8-whether he had met J. Edgar HOOVER. The undersigned said he had not. LOGINOV then said that he was a bachelor. The undersigned said that if he was it was probably because in his 40 years as head of the FBI he had had an awfully lot to do. The undersigned then pointed out that the FBI was a thoroughly respected organization in the United States which had the support of the people. LOGINOV thon switched to the CIA, but the undersigned told him that unlike the FBI, on which quite a bit was known to the American people, very little filtered out about the CIA. LOGINOV made ono more crack about the periodic changes at the helm of the CIA and dropped the subject. A somewhat similar conversation occurred a little later between the undersigned, LOGINOV, and CHERNYSII when unexpectedly LOGINOV mentioned something about the KGB and its dedication to the protection of the Soviet people and the Constitution. The undersigned asked LOGINOV for a sample of the stamp commemorating the 50th anniversary of the KGB. Neither CHERNYSH nor LOGINOV seemed to know that such a stamp existed but launched into praise of the service which assured the protection of the Soviet people with such a light hand. The undersigned returned that the KGB was an organization with a terrible reputation overseas, where, contrary to what the Soviets had just told him, they appeared to maintain numerous stations. LOGINOV then pointed out that the United States police did not have a light hand and, as he put it, cracked heads any time they had a chance. The undersigned said that, on the contrary, when a firm hand had to be used, the police had a very bad time of it during everyday life, as recent decisions of the Supreme Court made law enforcement a very difficult business because of the emphasis given by the Court to the respect and protection of human rights. Surprisingly enough, neither the Soviets, nor the Czechs, nor the Cubans had much to say about recent race riots in the States other than to confirm for themselves that quite damage had been done. The undersigned had the opportunity to talk to LOGINOV alone about the recent speech of Raul CASTRO and the following nationalization of businesses and restrictions imposed on the Cuban people. LOGINOV, who, incid tally, made no bones about the fact that his country is muc.: opposed to CASTRO's policy of expansion of terrorist activities in Latin America, a the complete nation-alization of private business as an action with which ha "did not agree." He said that the Cuban Communist stateSECRET
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SECRET-9-was a young one and on occasion claimed to know more than those who have been purifying Communism for 50 years and more. The undersigned joked about the fact that the Soviet Union would have to give the Cubans petroleum free if the sugar crop this year was as bad as it appeared to be. LOGINOV had a good chuckle över this but did not comment.5. The undersigned, who has already had the feeling that Jiri SVESTKA apes the Soviets, copies their line, and mimics their comportment, had confirmation of all this during the trip. SVESTKA was one of the first to raise the topic of Vietnam and pour oil over the fire. During dinner in the dining car on the way to Guadalajara, where he sat with the undersigned and the two Soviets, the topic of the Red army came up. The undersigned, who had previously told the Russians that he served for a brief time with that army, said that he had great admiration for the military feats of the Russians. This led SVESTKA to say that the Red army was never beaten. The undersigned then gave SVESTKA a short refresher course in what had happened in Warsaw in 1920 or 1921, when a Franco-Prussian army led by Gen. Maxime WEYGAND and Gen. Jozef PILSI DSKI beat an invading Soviet army, which had, among other things, Joseph STALIN as its commissar. SVESTKA tried to dispute the fact that this took place, whereupon the under-signed offered to buy him a history book. That seemed to pre ent SVESTKA from making any other expeditions into history during the remainder of the trip. Most of the discussions with the Czech, Soviets, and Cubans were on extremely friendly terms, in spite of their pointedness at times. During the night of 18 May, during the train trip back to Mexico City, a particularly heated discussion took place in a compartment Where CHERNYSH, SVESTKA, and CICARD were present. This. discussion will be reviewed in the next paragraph. Suffice it to say that at one point SVESTKA intervened in the defense of CHERNYSH to say something about how indebted Czechoslovakia was to the Soviets. The undersigned then told him that if it had not been the decision of President Franklin D. ROOSEVELT, at the urging, apparently, of STALIN, to stop the advance of the United States army into Czechoslovakia to allow the Russians to liberate Prague, the armistice would not have, found Soviet troops occupying Czechoslovakia, and "things night have been completely different for the Czech nation." When, SVESTKA claimed to bo bewildered by this statement, theSECRET
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SECRET-10-undersigned even more blandly asked him if he meant to say that Czechoslovakia would have become a Communist power had the Soviet armies not occupied the country by the end of the War. SVESTKA said that there was no doubt about this, that the coming of the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia had been inevitable because of the historical and social background of he Czechs. The undersigned expressed horror at a statement like this, which did not take into consideration the fact that such anti-Communists as Jan MASARYK and Eduard BENES were the fathers of the Czech state. SVESTKA then went on to say that indeed neither MASARYK nor BENES had been Communist, but that neither had any deep knowledge of the inborn desires of the Czech people. The undersigned told him that this was enough to make both MASARYK and BENES turn over in their graves. He pointed out that there had been a violent exchange, according to the Mexican press, between the Czech and Soviet papers over MASARYK, with the Russians saying that MASARYK had participated in an attempt to kill Nikolai LENIN. CHERNYSH said that this was a pack of lies, that he had reviewed the Soviet press for that period and found nothing about MASARYK. This was quickly endorsed by. SVESTKA. When the undersigned once more stated his belief that people who had known better would take the first opportunity to overthrow Communism, both CHERNYSH and SVESTKA started speaking at the same time. The undersigned pointed out that the Russian people had never known anything other than a curb on personal freedom and very strong central government, but the Czechs, the Poles, the Hungarians, and others had known differently. Such people were thirsty for personal freedcms and direct control over their destiny. When CHERNYSH said he doubted this, the under- signed reminded him that it was Russian tanks that had crushed the students and workers' revolt in Hungary in 1956. He also pointed to the recent quiet but radical revolution which hạd taken place in Czechoslovakia, saying that, for example, the day after the right to strike had been re-established practi-, cally all workers struck to protest 20 years of mismanagement, poor housing, and lack of freedom. From that point on SVESTKA remained silent, apparently having been shaken up.. The undersigned allowed himself to think that in several years. at least the Czechs, like the Rumanians before them, would be governing themselves without having first to check with Moscow. This discussion ended about 130 in the morning. At 9:00 the undersigned saw LOGINOV, with whom he had a chat about variousSECRET
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SECRET-11-things. He inquired about SVESTKA. LOGINOV said he hadbriely seen him on his way to the dining car, but commentedthat WESTKA looked mighty unhappy about something. It wasobvious to the undersigned that, as mentioned above, theprevious night's discussion had really shaken up the Czech,who was worrying about how things would turn out in Czecho-slovakia and about his future. SVESTKA, as a matter of fact,mentioned to the undersigned when he saw him a few minuteslater that he had felt that part of the previous night'sdiscussion had been conducted in what he phrased as a rathercool atmosphere. This feeling was obviously not shared byCHERNYSH, despite the heat of the discussion, who warmlygreeted the undersigned the next morning, and unless theundersigned is very much mistaken, appeared to have a sort ofliking for him.6. The undersigned finds CHERNYSH a fairly easy man to   talk to. Not that CHERNYSH is not a dedicated Communist, but   he seems to enjoy a good discussion, probably because he   finds this a good opportunity to pass on typical Communist   views. Before the discussion the night of 18 May mentioned   above, during which CHERNYSH was one of the main participants,   the Ukrainian and the undersigned had previously discussed   such things as Western-style elections and the right to strike.   On both topics CHERNYSH obviously was not on the same wave   length as the undersigned. He appeared to believe his state-   ments to the effect that a strike was unnecessary in a society   dedicated to the well-being of the workers. It would only   cripple an economy struggling hard to meet local demands. On   the subject of elections CHERNYSH was even further away from   the Western view. He pointed out that some Americans, and   perhaps the undersigned, did not have any particular liking   for any of the candidates for presidential elections. This   made the element of choice a very marginal benefit, if benefit   it was. The picking of a president and a political leader   inside the government where these men could be thoroughly   tested and screened was a much better prospect. The under-   signed naturally explained at length that, according to the   old cliche, "variety is the spice of life," and that choice   is a born right. The undersigned said that he would never be   able to live in a place where he could pick his close   friends, his family companions, or the people scheduled to   represent him in the republic. That seemed to make no dentSECRET
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SECRET-12-in all of CHERNYSH's arguments. The undersigned scored a little more during the previously mentioned discussion during the night of 18 May. He then had a better chance to compare the American Constitution with the Soviet one, underscoring the elements of centralisa and curès on personal choice. The discussion of the role of the Russians in World War II permitted his question of whether the Russians had fought for their country or for their regime. The undersigned told CHERNYSH that his contact with Soviet soldiers during the War had no doubt in his mind that the latter had fought for their country and families first, and much later to back up their regime. Both SVESTRA and CHERNYSH naturally argued with this view, particularly SVESTKA, who at tires can be more pro-Soviet than the Soviets. As pointed out above, CHERNYSH seems to like the undersigned's company, and the farewell between him and the undersigned at the station in Mexico City appeared to be particularly warn. This, of course, is not viewed by the Cubans or SVESTKA with a particularly good eye.Distribution:Orig - 7 (Consular Corps - Mexico City)1 - P-13042 (CHERNYSH)1 - P-11712 (LOGINOV)1 - P-7111 (SVESTKA)1 - P-10758 (SALAZAR)1 - P-1861 (CICARD)1 - P-10757 (CEPEDA)Raymond A. FRADVERRAF: lmpSECRET
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SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR: The RecordVIA : Chief, SBChief of StationSUBJECT : Celebration of the Czech National Day,9 May17 May 19681.  The celebration of the Czech national day on 9 May    was held at the residence of the Czech Ambassador, Karel HANUS,    in Polanco, where the undersigned estimated that the crowd    numbered at least 150 people. The only other Americans    present were Mr. Wallace W. STUART, head of the Political    Section, and Mr. David N. WIESLEY, Honorary Consul of Iceland.    The undersigned was a little bit surprised to see Rodolphe    BABOUN, the new Haitian Acting Ambassador, in attendance with    a colored Haitian. BABOUN, as a matter of fact, spoke briefly    to the Cuban Ambassador, Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas.2.  The undersigned had several little discussions with    Jiri SVESTKA, Czech Consul and known intelligence officer.    When he casually reminded SVESTKA that Czechoslovakia was an    industrial power before World War I and that Czech products    flooded Western Europe, SVESTKA sharply commented that his    country was still an industrial power. When the undersigned    mentioned that MASARYK was very popular in the United States,    SVESTKA countered that that was no doubt because he had lived    as an exile in the United States. SVESTKA cut short a remark    by the undersigned about the effort currently being made to    throw light on MASARYK's death by saying, "There is no doubt    that he committed suicide." SVESTKA showed himself on this    occasion a rival of LOGINOV as far as provocations are    concerned. After the undersigned answered comments on the    Negro problem and forthcoming urban terrorism and guerrilla    warfare in the United States, SVESTKA mentioned the "overt    letter" to the American Ambassador which appeared in various    local newspapers. He hinted that the incident "described"SECRETP-11712
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SECRET-2-in the open letter was not only a blunder on the part of Ambassador FREEMAN, but also indicative of the superiority complex of the United States. At one point, when Valentin LOGINOV had joined in the discussion, the undersigned retorted that the man who had written the article was a fourth-class writer without a dime who somehow had found the thousands of pesos necessary to place his editorial. When the Czech and the Russian laughed, the undersigned continued that if the Soviet Union wanted to give money to the Mexican Communist Party to engage in such shenanigans to amuse the local members of socialist countries, it was fine with the Americans, as this is just about all it could hope to achieve. SVESTKA and LOGINOV naturally denied that their countries had anything to do with the Mexican Communist Party, not to speak of the overt letter on the Ambassador. The undersigned, tongue in cheek, then pointed out that he was glad to tell them for their information that a Communist Party did exist in Mexico.Perhaps the most interesting reaction of SVESTKA came towards the end of the party just before the undersigned left. During a discussion which included SVESTKA, LOGINOV, one of the Soviet military attaches (a tall colonel with white hair), another Russian, and a youngish, short, and chubby member of the Mexican Foreign Ministry the undersigned expressed a thought that the two systems of government, the capitalist and the soviet, were gradually inching closer together. When SVESTKA allowed himself to doubt it with a nasty little laugh the undersigned naturally could not resist telling him to have a look at what was going on in his country. The reaction of SVESTKA was both immediate and noticeable. He sort of straightened out, jerked his head back, opened his mouth, dropped the ashes of his cigar on the floor, and obviously bit his tongue as he said nothing. From the above and from the fact that SVESTKA plans to drive to the next Consular Association meeting in Guadalajara with his Soviet colleagues, the undersigned feels that SVESTKA is not only a lackey of the ex-NOVOTNY regime, but very probably in the employ of the Soviet KGB. He seems to be inseparable from LOGINOV and has lately mouthed the same provocations in the same techniques, showing himself more and more aggressive, a thing which he was not a year ago.SECRET