[104-10169-10139.pdf — page 3]
# DISPATCHTO Chief, EE (ATTN: Matthew L. CARSON)Chief, SH (ATTN: Therman O. CUSICK)Chief, EE (ATTN: Leopard P. SACKETT)FROM Chief of Station, GermanySUBJECT ADMINISTRATIVE Handling of a Soviet DefecterACTION REQUIRED See below.1. I suggest that the story of ABLADLE, from the moment he walked into the home of Martia A. HOODINE until he was safely under Alhaka custody in the United States, deserves compiling, analysis, and publication in the form of an Operational Aid. It richly illustrates the sany probless mich ust and can be surmounted, and could be highly instructive to Chiefs of Station in all countries where the next Soviet defcator aight appear.2. Here is the Frankfurt contribution (written at my request) to such a compilations a eliffhanger from start to finion, but also a comentary on the many types of problems which can arise, and the foot tint it takes hard work and skillful improvisation to solve them, it was a cliffhanger both before and after the Frankfurt chapter (I nominate HOUDING for a modal for his part) and ought to sake excellent reading.3. The handling of defectors obviously is not a new responsibility to the German Station. The (CARZONE facility which existe primarily for the receipt, establishcent of bona fides, deoriefing, and resettlesent of defectors bas existed here for the last decade. Hor in the movement by black evacuation-of-operational personnel a unique task for us to perform. We have accomplished this many times by use of our own. Integrated DUNIT facility and also by the furnioning of alعما documentation to the person of interest and accomplishing the transport via scheduled NATS flights. The significant points which made the ARLADLE case unique may never again in their entirety be duplicated but in part they amy well be, and therefore should be enumerated:a. A Soviet diplomat, and noæber of the HIS, stationed in a non-Satellite but politically sensitive country, whion at the time of AELADIE's defection was under considerable Soviet pressure.b. The fact that the actual airowatepees concerning hit ant of defection were such that an immediate decision by the on the scene and to be made to take advantage of the opportunity.c. The fact that little alternative could be given, under the facts as described in (a) above, except to believe the defector's statements and coquiesce in his demands, i.e., he possessed information of a significant and perishable nature and would disclose it completely only upon arrival in the United States.d. The fact that once the commitments in (c) above were made every reasonable effort had to be made to accommodate the defector's demand.e. In order to accomplish all this an untried method of evacuation, 1.e., black ovaouation via commercial aircraft had to be accomplished in order to successfully proceed with the undertaking.4. A retrospective analysis as to how this case commenced, and the unique factors connected with it as muncrated above, lead me to suggest for Headquarters study what I refer to as "rindings" and "areas of study," that I have leteled as Frindings" in effect represent facts which, if not present, quite probably would have deprived us in Germany of participating successfully in the movement of the ARIADIS family. The "areas of study," on the other hand, represent either anseer-able questions or matters in areas wherein operational discussions may well take place to soo if some type of school-book solution can be devised.5. I will elaborate below, where appropriate, on some of these "findings" but will first record thems