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-2-SEC100-1-1002all of the points which were hoped to be obtained by the formation of Identity 1, and since this would constitute an obviously undesirable duplication of effort, approximately ten of the "strike leaders" indicated that they would give their support to CADROIT or other existing organizations rather than to the new group. (The German language report of the CADROIT meeting is forwarded under separate cover as Attachment "A")5. On 21 July 1953, a special meeting of various west Berlin government and resistance group representatives was called to discuss the feasibility and desirability of encouraging the formation of Identity 1. With few exceptions, all of the major organisations expressed the view outlined in paragraph 3 above. The suggestion was officially voiced that the members of Identity 1 should lend their support to existing organisations. (A German language report of this meeting prepared by the CADROIT representative is forwarded under separate cover as Attachment "B")6. On 12 August 1953, a meeting was called by HICOG-EAD of representatives of U.S. intelligence organisations in Berlin. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the possibility that the formation of Identity 1 might constitute a threat to the security of american forces in Berlin. HICOG had also received an erroneous report that DILINEN and CADROIT were rendering Identity 1 financial support. The latter impression was corrected during the meeting, and it was determined that Identity 1 would probably not constitute a threat if it did not receive or develop financial backing. At the time of these discussions, it did not appear likely that Identity 1 would receive such support, and its assets would probably be absorbed in other West. Berlin or West German organizations. There were indications that several of the "strike leaders," with the aid of ZRCODIFY, were gaining employment in the Federal Republic.7. The only direct contact established by BOB with any of the "strike leaders" was with Identity 2, who was considered for employment with DTLINEN. The nature of this contact is essentially covered in the following correspondence: SELLY CUCA, DIR 18181 and ICP-A 6120. Identity 2 was not hired by DILINEN.8. On 17 October 1953, the Chairman of Identity 1, Identity 3, informed Nelson O. Leonard that he (Identity 3) intended to resign from Identity 1 since he was receiving insufficient support to make a living. He stated that although he was receiving some support from Identity 4, it was not enough to maintain his organization upon a working basis. Identity 3 said that he had made several radio appearances, and that as a result of these, Identity 1 had been receiving up to one hundred visitors a day. He reported that he had attempted to gain financial support from the West German Ministry for All German Affairs and other organizations, but had been unsuccessful. He then suggested to Leonard that Identity 1 and CADROIT could establish a covert working agreement with the latter organization furnishing the funds. The offer had one attractive aspect, namely, that CADROIT could, through the contacts of Identity 1, broaden its present mission and expand into other fields of psychological warfare. However, for the reasons outlined in paragraph 3 above, He was instructed to cover all contact with Identity 3. After he was informed that CADROIT would not endorse the suggested working arrangement, Identity 3 admitted to Leonard that there were undesirable elements within Identity 1 who would have to be removed before the organization could function effectively.