Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 190]
SECRET30 March 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin FerrerDATE : 28 March 1964, 1430 hours1. AMBIDDY-1 commented that the meeting between Carl Jenkins, AMJAVA-4 and AMBIDDY-1 went off very satisfactorily. The first operations were discussed and according to A-1, Carl was very pleased. A-1 did not go into specific details but stated he had shown Carl blueprints of the first operation. At the meeting A-4 presented another plan which calls for the assassination of Castro or some high official at Playa Giron on 17 April, the anniversay of the Bay of Pigs.2. A-1 plans to leave for Nicaragua early part of next week. From Nicaragua A-1 intends to visit Costa Rica. A-1 was asked to check in with us before his departure.3. A-1 was advised the Libernic representative is standing by in case he is needed. Should A-l desire the presence of the representative in Managua he should contact us.4. A-1 was remizled we have not as yet received the budget for last month. A-1 commented he had asked his secretary to mail it a few days ago. A-1 was asked to check again to make sure it bas bien mailed. A-l was advised the money has been deposited and should be in his account by the end of the month.5. A-1 was asked to give us the address of the Tampa barge. A-1 said he would have it for Monday.6. It was suggested to A-1 not to proach the subject of the naval base propaganda with General Somoza but rather to tell General Somoza that if any inquires are mado concerning A-1's operation to use the cover that these materials are for Somona's own meat packing business.SECRET
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 191]
SECRET-2-7. A-1 was told we have two dispensary vans for him, one with an X-ray machine, but we need name of consignee for shipment.8. A-1 was reminded to have AMWORLD-2 close the Swiss bank account.9. A-1 was congratulated on his fine report on Col. Lopez of Honduras.10. The conversation ended by wishing A-1 a Happy Easter.![signature of Raul J. Hernandez]Raul J. HernandezWH/SA/SO/HHFile:AMBIDDY-1 201ConversationsProgramNicaraguaLogisticsAbove conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy codeSECRET
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 192]
27 March 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Martin Ferrer and AMBIDDY-1DATE : 26 March 1100 hours1. AMBIDDY-1 telephoned to say he had received the report from the American engineers. A-1 was informed the cost would be $318,000 without a landing field. A-1 commented it was both his and the engineer's opinion that the job could be done rapidly and well. A-l was requested to forward a copy to us of the engineer's proposal for our perusal. A-1 was advised not to consult with the engineers until we have' completely examined their proposal and suggestions. A-1 agreed.2. A-1 had received an intelligence survey from MOLE and Manuel GOMEZ on the camps. According to A-l there are many sound recommendations which A-1 intends to employ. A-1 again inferred that there will be a general house cleaning of personnel.3. A-1 commented that his representatives (AMYUM-19, GUTIERREZ, NAVARRETE) had gone to New York and could not come to agreement with Mr. Chester and Mr. Zweifach. A-1 would like to purchase supplies in the free port of New Orleans since it would be cheaper than shipping the goods from New York. A-1 also mentioned this was what we had agreed upon at our last meeting.. A-l was informed that as a central point for buying and shipping New York offers many advantages. This does not preclude using other cities in the country or in the world for buying and shipping.. However, New York is the best point of control for this activity. The simplest and most efficient way to buy and ship is to determine exactly what is needed and the frequency with which it is to be delivered. Once the list of requirements is drawn up, it should be given to Chester or Zweifach specifying the exact recurring dates of delivery. There is no need for
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 193]
2A-l's people to waste their time on such things as buying, shipping, getting export licenses, etc. This can all be turned over to professional businessmen, thereby relieving you of all burdens.4. A-1 then commented that in certain cases Mr. King has been able to purchase some items cheaper than Mr. Zweifach. A-1 was informed that in some specific instances this may be the case. However, in large quantities of a recurring nature a professional company will in the long run obtain better rates and render better services than an individual. Also A-1 was reminded that the professional service and efficiency of delivery cannot be duplicated by individuals. A-1 was advised that King could best be used as an adviser and/or consultant to the professional companies doing the work.5. A-1 was requested to make certain that A-19 clarify to GUTIERREZ and NAVARRETE that there may have been some misunderstanding on their part that Chester was receiving instructions from someone else.6. A-1 was requested to return the insurance applications of all personnel he no longer has in his employ.7. The conversation ended with the usual abrazos.![signature]RaulaJd HernandezWH/SA/SO/HHFile:DMJMAMBIDDY-1 - 201ConversationsCommercial![stamp] Above conversation conductedIn prearranged frequentlychanged privacy codeSECRET![stamp]
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 194]
SECRET# DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCESUBJECT OF DOCUMENTDOCUMENT IDENTIFICATIONBI FILE NO.9. SOURCE CRYPTO INFO. B. DATE OF INFO. EVALUATION10. DATE11. DATEDOCUMENT DISPOSITION12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE13. TRANSFERRED TO BI FILE NO.PERTINENT INFORMATIONARTIME BUESA, MANUEL201-267437SEX M DOB ?CIT ?OCC ?SUBJ HAS MADE RECENT STATEMENTS CONCERNINGPLANNED INVASION OF CUBA IN MAY 64019-300-003UFG -0484327 MAR 641926043-PAFRFILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.SECRET1.  926 043
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 195]
# DISPATCHTOChief, Special Affairs StaffINFOFROMChief of Station, JMWAVESUBJECT/TYPIC/AMWORLD/OperationalEvaluation of AMBIDDY-1's Training During Period 6 to 18 January 1964ACTION REQUIRED REFERENCESACTION REQUIRED: None; for your information and files.1. INTRODUCTION: In the period 6 to 18 January 1964, AMBIDDY-1 was given 83 hours of tutorial training, in JMWAVE safe- house facilities, on existing operational doctrine and management techniques applicable to a major clandestine effort against PBRUMEN. A copy of the training schedule which was used in this tutorial training is attached. At the completion of the training course, the various training instructors submitted an evaluation on AMBIDDY-1. These evaluations are outlined in the following paragraph.2. EVALUATIONS: The below-listed evaluations were prepared by the instructors who participated primarily in Phase I of AMBIDDY-1's tutorial training. The Phase I instruction concentrated on imparting to AMBIDDY-1 current operational doctrine relative to unconventional warfare techniques. The evaluations are as follows:a. Small Unit Operations and Training: AMBIDDY-1 responded most enthusiastically to all aspects of the training on small unit techniques. He made detailed notes on the material covered, and these notes included copies of training charts and diagrams. AMBIDDY-1 displayed particularly intensive interest in that portion of the training dealing with the principles of survival and the issuance of individual equipment. In the course of the training, AMBIDDY-1 was given several practical tactical problems to solve. AMBIDDY-1's solutions to these problems were logical and reflected a grasp of the techniques to which he had been exposed during the training sessions. Thomas L. DARGUZIS was the primary instructor in this phase of the training, and he assessed AMBIDDY-1 as being an intelligent, alert, highly-motivated individual who has a realistic appraisal of his own limitations and capabilities.b. Clandestine Activity: AMBIDDY-1 received extensive training in tradecraft subjects, including the nature and elements of clandestine activity, security, cover, compartmentation,Attachment: herewith Training ScheduleDistribution:3 - C/SAS w/attCROSS REFERENCE TO:19-124-27/2DATE TYPED24 March 64DATE DISPATCHEDMAR 27 1964DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBERUFGA-14923HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER201-267437
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 197]
ORIENTATION PROGRAMAMBIDDY-1PROGRAM PERIOD: 6 - 18 January 1964TOTAL HOURS : 83| SRIOD      | SUBJECT                                                                         | INSTRUCTOR         | INTERPRETER || ---------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------ | ----------- || 6 January  | Orientation and Review of Schedule                                              | REUTEMAN and ZAMKA | None        || 1930-2130  |                                                                                 |                    |             || 7 January  | Nature and Elements of Clandestine Activities                                   | MASENGILL          | None        || 1300-1800  |                                                                                 |                    |             || 8 January  | Security (Personal, Physical, Organizational and Operational), Cover            | MASENGILL          | None        || 0900-1400  |                                                                                 |                    |             || 1700-2200  | The Infiltration Team Principles and Concepts, Organization of a Resistance Net | PIRNACK            | DECONBAED   || 9 January  | Compartmentation and Clandestine Communications                                 | MASENGILL          | None        || 0900-1200  |                                                                                 |                    |             || 1300-1500  | Organization of Basic Net for Clandestine Activity                              | MASENGILL          | None        || 10 January | Caching and Sabotage Techniques                                                 | PIRNACK            | DECONBARD   || 0900-1200  |                                                                                 |                    |             |
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 198]
PAGE TWO|            |                                                                            |                    |           || ---------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------ | --------- || 1300-1500  | PM Techniques, Reconnaissance, Raid and Ambush                             | PIRNACK            | DECONBARD || 1700-2200  | Introduction to Clandestine Maritime Operations                            | FAITELSON          | PACHANKIS || 11 January | Maritime Operational Planning Techniques                                   | FAITELSON          | PACHANKIS || 1000-1500  |                                                                            |                    |           || 13 January | Introduction to Clandestine UDT Operations                                 | TATTERSFIELD       | YASUINAS  || 0900-1200  |                                                                            |                    |           || 1300-1500  | UDT Operational Planning Techniques                                        | TATTERSFIELD       | YASUINAS  || 1700-2200  | Small Unit Operations, Training and Application in Clandestine Environment | DARGUZIS           | DECONBARD || 14 January | Weapons Familiarization and Range Firing                                   | PIRNACK            | DECONSARD || 1300-1800  |                                                                            |                    |           || 2000-2200  | Review of Training                                                         | REUTEMAN and ZAMKA | Hone      || 15 January | Management Controls Regarding Agent Selection and Team Composition         | REUTEMAN           | DECONBARD || 1000-1200  |                                                                            |                    |           || 1400-1700  | Management Review of Team Training and Evaluation                          | ZAMKA              | Hone      || 2000-2300  | Operational Planning and Use of Operational Plan as Control Device         | REUTEMAN and ZAMKA | Hone      |
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 199]
PAGE TREB|            |                                                      |                    |            || ---------- | ---------------------------------------------------- | ------------------ | ---------- || 16 January | Mission Briefings - A Management Control             | REUTEMAN           | DECONBARD  || 1000-1200  | Commando Raids                                       |                    |            || 1100-1800. | Analysis of an Infiltration (Operation Case History) | ZANKA              | None       || 1000-2300  |                                                      |                    |            || 17 January | Management of Maritime Assets                        | REUTEMAN           | DECONBARD  || 1000-1200  |                                                      |                    |            || 1400-1700. | Analysis of a Commando Raid (Case History)           | ZAMKA              | None       || 1930-2030  | After. Action Reports - Management Self-Critique     | REUTEMAN           | DECONBARI) || 2030-2230  | Cache Operations˙                                    | REUTEMAN           | DECONBARD  || 18 January | Analysis of a UDT Operation (Case History)           | ZAMKA              | Hone       || 1100-1700  | Photo                                                |                    |            || 4000-1200  | Seminar Discussion and Review                        | REUTEMAN and ZAMKA | Hone       || 1900-2300  |                                                      |                    |            |
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 200]
# SECRET24 March 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 andMartin FerrerDATE : 1300 hours on 24 March 19641.  AMBIDDY-1 telephoned our office to say that the ADELAIDA is leaving today for the free port of Colon to pick' up provisions and to leave three men who are sick. One has a tumor in the neck, the second has a dislocated shoulder, and the third is suffering from stab wounds. A-1 was unable to hospitalize them in Nicaragua because General Somoza felt that this would attract undue attention.2.  A-1 commented that the provisions which they have to buy will be taken from the March budget.3.  A-1 has received a report from AMJAVA-4 indicating that there is a need for a general house cleaning as far as personnel is concerned in many of the camps.4.  A-1 inquired if there was any objection to ADELAIDA leaving for Panama. Martin stated that off hand he could see no objection; however, A-1 should call later in the day for confirmation.File:AMBIDDY-1 - 201ConversationsADELAIDA![signature of Raul J. Hernandez]Raul J. HernandezWH/SA/SO/HHSECRET
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 201]
SECRET24 March 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin FerrerDATE : 24 March 1964 at 1540 hours1. AMBIDDY-1 called as promised to ascertain if there were objections to the ADELAIDA going to the free port of Colon in Panama. A-1 was advised there were no objections. However, the following should be communicated to the ADELAIDA:a. To stay away from the Folk River pier (this pier is heavily watched as a pier used for the smuggling of arms).b. ADELAIDA will be boarded by the U. S. Canal Zone Customs and the ship's papers should be in order.2. The ETA to Colon is 25 March.3. A-1 finally has received the letter from the Philippino.Raul J. HernandezFile: AMBIDDY-1 - 201ConversationsADELAIDAAbove conversation conductad In prearranged frequently changed privacy code
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 202]
SECRET23 March 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Richard Beal and AMBIDDY-1DATE : 23 March at 1100 hours1.  AMBIDDY-1 called to say that AMJAVA-4, who arrived in Miami last night, told him that Alegrett is arriving at 1700 hours today at Miami on *Janicima* Airlines.2.  Alegrett is bringing with him "movies" which he took of the Puerto Cabezas base (Carlay). While at Carlay taking these pictures, Alegrett stated that he was on official business.3.  AMBIDDY-1 was concerned that U. S. Customs may take the pictures away from Alegrett when he entered the country. AMBIDDY-1 was told not to worry about the pictures, for after all Carlay is an official Nicaraguan National Guard base. AMBIDDY-1 said that he would try to get an opportunity to see the pictures.![signature of Richard B. Beal]Richard B. BealWH/SA/SO/HHFile:SecurityAlegrett 301ConversationsAMBIDDY-1 - 201SECRET
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 203]
SECRET23 March 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and G. ThorntonDATE: 23 March 1964 at 1000 hoursAMBIDDY-1 called to say that AMJAVA-4 had arrived in Miami on 22 March. Immigration officials have taken his papers and said they would review them at 0830 today. This office told AMBIDDY-1 to call back if AMJAVA-4 ran into any difficulties in the return of his papers.![signature of gwen thornton]Gwen ThorntonWH/SA/SO/HHFile:AMBIDDY-1 - 201AMJAVA-4- 201ConversationsSECRET
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 204]
# DISPATCHTO: Chief, Special Affairs StaffFROM: Chief of Station, JHWAVESUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC/AMBANG/ANWORLD Interviews with AMBANG-1 and AMBIDDY-1 in Puerto RicoACTION REQUIRED: None; FYIREFERENCE: UFG-4784 Para. 31. The following information, not disseminated, was reported initially to Gordon R. HAWLOTT by AMING-2 on 8 February 1964 following his return from a month's visit to Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico. AMING-2 reported that he had kot separately with AMBIDDY-1 and AMBANG-1 in the apartment of a friend in San Juan, the meetings occurring during the last week of Janary. While HAWLOTT feels that AHING-2 is usually quite reliable and objective on general political reporting, his own participation in exile politics and political ambitions could conceivably influence his objectivity. In an effort to check the accuracy of AMING-2's remarks, the CO again discussed the interviews with AMING-2 on 18 Harch at which time AMING-2 repeated his account of the interview without any change in text, so that the CO is inclined to accept AMING-2's account as generally accurate.2. During the last week of January AMBANG-1 told Source at a private nmeeting in San Juan, Puerto Rico that he would like to enlist Source's assistance as an advisor on medical affairs and as a propaganda worker. Source, per PBRUMEX custon, requested that AUBANG-1 explain to Source what resources he had for the Liberation of PBRUMEN and asked ANBANG-1 to offer proof why he cheuld consider himself a leader. Source clains AMBANG-1 replied that he had boats and weapons sufficient for strong military.... sction into PREUMEN and would be able to place combat forces in FBRUKEN during March 1964, said combat forces having an ability to hold their own for weeks on the island, AHEG-2 observed that ho had driven out to Mayagues where he had seen four coparate(CONTINUED)Distribution:3-Headquarters201-26743723 Mar 64UFGA-1403110-134-37/3
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 205]
# CONTINUATION OF DISPATCHUYGA-14931training installations, one of which was reported to be the property of ANBANG/1. AMBANG,/l replied that be bad training installations on the Florida mainland and had training and logistical bases or a base in Venezuela.3. Source asked ANBANG/1 what backing he had from World Powers for the invasion of PBRUMEN. AMBANG/1 replied that ho still had significant White House contacts despite the death of John F. Kennedy. He added that he was in contact with top personnel of ODACID and held regular meetings with a very high ranking officer of KUBARK. He stated he also had been introduced by the KUBARKER to the Chief of Operations at YOACRE and was in regular comunication with the ODOATH officer. In general, AMBANG/1 stated, his sources of funds were largely ODYOKE. Source then asked if he was to understand that AMBANG/1 had the approval of ODYOKE for operations into PBRUMEN. AMBANG/1 reportedly replied "I have been given the green light".4. Around 1 February Source net in San Juan with ANBIDDY/1 for a private talk. ANBIRDY/1 suggested that Source associate himself with AMBIDDY/l's movement in order to help form a post- liberation government. Source replied that he was rather vague as to AMBIDDY/l's plans and backing. AMBIDDY/1 stated that he had been selected by ODYOKE as that PBRUMENER having the necessary leadership and experience for the overthrow of ANTHUG. Source asked if he understood correctly that AMBIDDY/1 was telling him that he had the approval of ODYOKK. If so, why was AMBIDDY/1 drawing support from Venezuela and from Central American Governments. ANBIDDY/1 reportedly replied that he did not actually rely on Venezuela and other Latin American conors for his assistance, since he was receiving all his logistical and financial support from KUBARK. Source stated that he had heard that AKBIDDY/1 was amassing a formidable invasion force in Bicaragua, Costa Rica and Panaman CZ.AMBIDDY/1 replied that he had been given very large suas of money, which proved the reliance which ODYOKE had in him and made obvious the fact that ODTOKE had selected him to bring about the liberation of PBRUNIKI. Source asked why it was that ODYUKE and KUBARK would select AMBIDDY/1 before all others as the means of liberating PERUMEN. AMBIDDY/1 reportedly replied that ODYOKE had selected him because, in the opinion of ODYOKE, be represented the post sane and centrist political concentration among the PBRUKEN exiles and ODTOKE knew that in AMBIDDY/1 it had a leader resolved to maintain erees and centrist democratic governmost in PBRUKEN following the liberation.3. ASING/3 asked both AMBIDDY/1 and AMBANG/l during his separate interviews with then whether ANBIDDY/1's presence in Puerto Rico signified that the two leaders had met or planned to neot.in an attempt to coordinate their activities. Noither AMBIDDY/1 nor AKBANG/1 denici nor confirmed Source'a questions, but gave evasive answers. Bource therefore assumes that they had not net, but hoped to meet for talka.END OF DIEMPATCH
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 206]
SECRETDOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCESUBJECT OF DOCUMENT2. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION   RI FILE NO.3. DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO. 4. DATE5. ANALYST 6. DATE PROCESSED 7. SOURCE CRYPTONYM 8. DATE OF INFO. 9. EVALUATION10. DISSEMINATED IN 11. DATE12. CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILEDOCUMENT DISPOSITION13. TRANSFERED TO RI FILE NO.PERTINENT INFORMATIONARTIME BUESA, MANUEL201-267437SEX M DOB ?CUBACITACUBAOCC ?019-300-004UFG -0478419 MAR 64P2RE DIRECT CONTACT OF SUBJ, MANUEL RAYRIVERO AND ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO AND LACKOF DECISION ON OPERATIONS, FUND ALLOTMENTSBETWEEN JURE AND SENE. RE DISAFFECTION OFMANUEL QUIZA DOCAL WITH JURE.PAFR1930681FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.SECRET
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 207]
# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY# OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP| TO          | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE           | INITIALS    || ----------- | ---------------- | -------------- | ----------- || 1           | SA/SO/SB         |                | 85          || 2           | SA/SO/AR         |                | AR          || 3           | Raul             |                | (illegible) || 4           |                  |                |             || 5           |                  |                |             || •           | SA/SO/Bobbi      |                |             || ACTION      | DIRECT REPLY     | PREPARE REPLY  |             || APPROVAL    | DISPATCH         | RECOMMENDATION |             || COMMENT     | FILE             | RETURN         |             || CONCURRENCE | INFORMATION      | SIGNATURE      |             |Remarks:File: Ambiddy?- Interesting & quite well done in some areas of his remarks. Especially think that he fielded the n/f to Jones very right- doing credit to himself & organization.FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER| FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | DATE || --------------------------------- | ---- |UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET