Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10163-10130.pdf — page 188]
SECRETChief of Station, ManaguaChief of station, JEHAVEChief, Western Hemisphere DivisionTYPIC/AMBIDOT/AMBUDSupport for Dependents of Operational PersonnelFOR YOUR INFORMATIONREFERENCE: HHMA 3798, dated 28 March 19671. When Wallace A. GROWERY met with AMBIDDY/1 on 13 January 1967 to formally terminate the AMWORLD operation. AMBIDDY/1 discussed in detail reference dependents who had been receiving financial assistance from AMWORLD funds and requested that GROWERY explore the possibility of WOFACT financial assistance following termination of their AMWORLD monthly support payments. An investigation was conducted by both JEHAVE and Headquarters to determine if the agents named by AMBIDDY/1 have been employed by WOFACT in order to determine what, if any, obligation might exist to provide financial assistance to the dependents. The results of the combined Headquarters investigation, keyed to reference dependents, are summarised below for Station Managua information.(IDEN A) Subject was a WOFACT agent under prior contract. His MC provided payment of his $350 monthly salary to his dependent parents for two years following possible death while engaged on a WOFACT mission. After Subject's execution in 1962 the parents received his regular monthly salary until 28 June 1963. At that time Headquarters decided to liquidate the remaining balance of $6400 and paid this amount in a lump sum to the parents. Headquarters considers that all legal and moral obligations have been discharged and is not inclined to assume any further financial obligations to the parents. AMBIDDY/1 is apparently unaware that the parents have received approximately $10,000 from WOFACT.MHW 198527 APR 196719-124-25/6201-267437201-281387SECRETWH/COG/CICS N. Gratz ljc 744724 April 1967Distribution:1 - RID DC/WH/COG Mr. Williamson1 - WH/REG/C1 - WH/COG/NO C/WH/COG/MO Mr. Ortman1 - OriginatorC/WH/COG Thomas J. Flores
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# SECRETENUD 1985(IDEN B) Although IDEM C, the husband of IDEN B, vas never directly caployed by SOFACT, IDEN B receives $175 per wenth as a copendont ARROES/BARTYES widow under the ANBUD program and has been paid a total of $10,850 from March 1962 to date through the JUFAYE/ANDUD cover mechanisa. resumably AMBIDDY/1 is unavare that this dependent has been receiving regular ANBUD assistance in addition to the $123 por month received from AMORLD funds.(IDEN D) ANBIDDY/1 provided GROWERY with the complete name and details of the activities of IDEM D's busta prior to his arrest and subsequent 6-30 year pri- son sentence. With this information traces vore run on Subject with negative results. Since neither JIWAVE mor Bendquarters records produced any evidence Subject had ever boen & VORACT employee, no obligation exists to provide financial assistance to IDE в.2. Although reference indicates the discussion between Janes D. RABOTH and Ernest A. LUSBY took place after AMBIDDY/1's conver- sation with GROWERY in January, it is not clear when, or by whon, the subject was originally brought to ZABOTH's attention. If AMBIDDY/1 vas the source of ZABOTH's information it is noteworthy that he apparently neglected to mention his prior detailed dis- cussion with GROWERY.3. Under the circumstances, it is not possible for Bead- quarters to the any action to provide support to these individuals.Eilen F. MARGANYDistribution:Orig and 1 - COB, Managua1- COB, JEWAVE
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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICA TOP AND BOTTOMUNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRETCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYOFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP| TO  | NAME AND ADDRESS     | DATE | INITIALS || --- | -------------------- | ---- | -------- || 1   | WH/2/CR9N            |      |          || 2   | 3B 4402              |      | k        || 3   |                      |      |          || 4   | WH/COG/RR/96 Chircea |      | Ef       || 5   |                      |      |          || 6   | G.V. 201- AMBI.DY-   |      |          || ACTION      | DIRECT REPLY | PREPARE REPLY  || ----------- | ------------ | -------------- || APPROVAL    | DISPATCH     | RECOMMENDATION || COMMENT     | FILE         | RETURN         || CONCURRENCE | INFORMATION  | SIGNATURE      |Remarks:Attached letters returned to you for retention per instructions from AC/WH/COG for Ambild,for 201- per our team &FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER| FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | DATE         |        || --------------------------------- | ------------ | ------ || WH/COG/RR 3E19                    | 22 may 67    |        || UNCLASSIFIED                      | CONFIDENTIAL | SECRET |FORM2-61 237 Use previous editions (40)
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SENDER CHECK CLASSIFICAT ITO AND BOTTOMUNCLASSIFIED CONFENTIAL SECRETCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYOFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP| TO  | NAME AND ADDR'S | DATE   | INITIALS || --- | --------------- | ------ | -------- || 1   | WH/COG/EXO      | 18     | VR       || 2   | 3EO4            |        |          || 3   | AC/WH/COG       | 19 May | GW       || 4   | C/WH/COG/RR     |        | MAK      |ACTION:*   APPROVAL*   COMMENT*   CONCURRENCE*   DIRECT REPLY*   DISPATCH*   FILE*   INFORMATION*   PREPARE REPLY*   RECOMMENDATION*   RETURN*   SIGNATURERemarks:So Drossem interest at this time, however we would like to see all of the future. Artaine letter for Helatinial context. She found these letters very interesting.![signature]FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDERFROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATEWHIZ/CK+N 384402/18 MayUNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRETFORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICAUNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRETCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYOFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP| TO  | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE         | INITIALS       || --- | ---------------- | ------------ | -------------- || 1   | WH/2/CR+N/RO     |              |                || 2   | 3801             |              | E/             || 3   |                  |              |                || 4   |                  |              |                || 5   |                  |              |                || 6   | WH/COG/EKO 3E04  |              |                ||     | ACTION           | DIRECT REPLY | PREPARE REPLY  ||     | APPROVAL         | DISPATCH     | RECOMMENDATION ||     | COMMENT          | FILE         | RETURN         ||     | CONCURRENCE      | INFORMATION  | SIGNATURE      |Remarks:Attached for your review for INFO of possible dissem/interest are copies of letters (with translations) from Cuban exile leader Manuel Artime following his returns from Nicaragua where he attended the funeral of Luis Somoza. Letters were written to a CIA officer.Pls, return to WH/COG/EXO.FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER| FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.        | DATE || ---------------------------------------- | ---- || WH/COG/RR Harding SE 19 X-7144 10 may 67 |      || UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET         |      |FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
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MIAMI, 24 April 1967Dear Jim,Pardon my lateness in writing to you but I have had to face many problems and I wanted to be calm when I wrote to you.I was at Luis Somoza's funeral and I think that I made a good impression. I am at present more worried than I was before, but not for my future, because Tacho is a very good friend of mine and Luis was not. I am worried about Nicaragua's destiny. Let us not forget that Nicaragua is the most solid pillar of Central America.1-Lainos grew closer to Tacho during the funeral. Laines took practically all the load of the funeral arrangements upon himself.2-Many of the good men who gave the Somoza's advice were intimate friends of Luis and they are afraid of coming to Tacho in order to give him advice.3-The Communists are aware of this and they are also aware of the fact that Tacho is even more violent than Luis, therefore, they take advantage of the situation to provoke Tacho, thereby hoping that without Luis's advisors and possibly with the "bad advice" of "an infiltrator" in Tacho's circle of friends/to rule his government with an iron hand, which is just what the Communists want from him.4-I think that Tacho has grown much closer to me and I will try to do everything possible to see that he keeps calm.5-There is no doubt about the fact that the Communists have brought in a great quantity of weapons into Nicaragua. The weapons have not been found, in spite of the investigations by the Security Corps; even General Montiel recognizes this.6-I think that there is discontent in the young officer's ranks because of the low salaries which the officials, sub-officials and enlisted men receive. This is not a problem at the present
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but it could develop into a problem, if the Communists exploit it skillfully.7-I also think that the Security Corps which continues to function under the orders of Montiel, who is also chief of Staff and also a merchant, loses all its efficiency because of the fact that Montiel cannot dedicate sufficient time to the Corps and as a result leaves its direction to Captain Willop, who I think is entirely incompetent for the job.8-I think that the only good thing that panorama has is the loyalty of General Somoza's military troops, for I honestly do not trust some of the high officials.9-Jose Fernandes made the contact with the Nicaraguan girl who received the proposition to study on a scholarship in Russia, at the Patricio Lumumba University, and she is willing to collaborate with us. I gave the contact to Carlos.10-According to reports from Pepe Fernandes the "comrades" are going to try to intensify their "infiltrative job" in the Nicaraguan departmentsEXX of Education and Agrarian reform.The following is expected after 2 May, the day on which Tacho is sworn in: sabotage, terrorism, and kidnappings. Provocations!11-I sincerely think, and excuse me, that the United States should now, due to the psychological state in which Tacho is in, demonstrate that they have confidence in him XXHN and in the success of his Government. He is grateful to the United States for the help which the United States sent to his so that he could save his brother, therefore take advantage of this.12-According to the comments which I heard in Tacho's close circles (Col. Sanchez from Lanica, Gen. Camilo Gonzalez, etc), Sevilla Sacasa is not in very good standing with Tacho. I think that Washington should become friendly with Tacho in a direct manner.
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-3-13-Camilo Gonzalez's son spoke to me and told me that he had to see me later (I do not know when) in order to inform me about a group of Guatemalan Officials who are planning a coup d'etat against Mendez Montenegro and they want my help. When I know something concrete about this I will tell you. I have also heard rumors from Teo Carrasco (a painter, who is the brother XXX of General Peralta's paramour) that Peralta is "in something also." When I find out something concrete about these reports I will send it to XXN you and let you know.14-I am going to Nicaragua for the swearing in ceremonies. I am trying to get free tickets to fly on Lanica. As soon as I see something of interest I will let you know.P.S. Do not forget about Don Manuel Guillot.
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Central South Internacional Inc.P. O. BOX 1453 LITTLE RIVER STATION, MIAMI, FLA, 33138CABLE: CENSOINMiami 24 de Abril 1967Querido Jim:Perdona la demora en la carta, pero he tenido muchos problemas a los cuales hacerles frente, y quería tener tranquilidad para escribirte.Estuve en los funerales de Luis Somoza, y creo que causé buena impresión. Pero ahora est, más preocupado que antes pesar de que mi gran amigo es Tacho y no Luis,pero mi preocupación no es por mi futuro, sino por el destino de Nicaragua. No olvidemos que Nicaragua es el puntal más sólido de Centro-América.1-Lainez logró hacercarse más a Tacho durante este proceso Practicamen- te fué el hombre que llevó todo el peso de los funerales.2-Muchos de los buenos consejeros que tenían los Somoza, estaban intimamente ligados a Luis, y le temen scarcarse al Tacho Para darle consejos.3-Los Comunistas son conscientes de ésto y de que Tacho es un hombre más violento que Luis, por lo tanto se aprestan a provocar al Tacho para que éste, sin los consejeros de Luis y posiblemente con los "malos consejos" de "algún infiltrado" en el circulo de Tacho, unido al caracter violento del Tacho, lleve su gobierno a una mano dura que los comunistas desean en Nicaragua.4-Creo que Tacho se ha acercado mucho más a mi después de éste proceso y yo trataré de hacer todo lo humanamente posible para que vaya por camincs de tranquilidad.5-No hay dudas de que los comunistas han logrado meter en Nicaragua una gran cantidad de armas, que no han aparecido a pesar de las pesquisas de los Cuerpos de Seguridadzésto lo reconoce el mismo Geral Montiel.
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Central South Internacional Inc.Р. О. БОХ 1423 LITTLE RIVER STATION, MIAMI, FLA, 33138CABLE: CENSOIN(2)6-Creo que hay un leve desagrado en las filas de los oficiales jóvenes, por el salario tan bajo que reciben los oficiales, sub-oficiales y clases. Por el momento esto no es problema pero puede ser problema si el comunismo lo explotabilmente.7-Creo además quez el Cuerpo de Seguridad, al seguir bajo el Mando de Montiel, que además es efe de Estado Mayor y además es Comarciante, pierde toda su eficacia, ya que Montiel no puede dedicarle el tiempo necesario y el Cuerpo es dirigido por el Capitán Willop,al cual considero completamente inepto para el cargo.8-Creo que la única cosa buena que tiene el panorama,es la lealtad de la tropa militar al General Somoza, pues, honestamente desconfío hasta de algunos altos oficiales.9-José Fernández logró el contacto con una muchacha nicaragüense que he recibido una proposición de estudio (becada) en Rusia, en la Universidad Patricio Lumumba, y está dispuesta a colaborar con nosotros. Yo le di el contacto a Carlos.10-Según informes de Pepe Fernández, los "camarades" van a tratar de aumentar su intensidad de "trabejo infiltrativo" en los departamentos nicaragüenses de EDUCACIÓN Y REFORMA AGRARIA.También se esperan:sabotage, terrorismo y secuestros después del día 2 do Mayo, toma de posesión de Tacho. Provocacionesl11-Creo sinceramente, y perdónenme, que los Estados Unidos deben shore, dado el estado psicológico del Tacho, demostrarle que tienen confianza en 61 y en los logros de su Gobierno. Aprovechen que él es-tá agradecido por todos los recursos que Estados Unidos mandó para salvar al hermano.
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Central South Internacional Inc.P. O. BOX 1453 LITTLE RIVER STATION, MIAMI, FLA, 33:39CABLE: CENSOIN(3).12-Según comentarios que oí en circulos muy allegados al Tacho(Coronel Sánchez el de Lanica, General Camilo González etc) Sevilla Sacasa no está muy bien parado con el Tacho Creo que Washington debe intimar más directamente con Tacho.13-El. hijo de Camilo González me habló de que tenía que verme luego (no sé cuando) pa. a informarme de un grupo d Oficiales Guatemaltecos, que están preparando un golpe de Estado contra Mendez Monte-negro y quieren mi ayuda. Cuando sepa algo concreto se los mandaré a decir. También he oido rumores de Teo Carrasco (pintor hermano de la querida del General Peralta) de que Peralta está "en algo también". Cuando concrete más los informes se los enviaré.14-Voy a Nicaragua para la toma de posesión, estoy consiguiendo boletos gratis para volar en Lanica. Tan pronto vea algo de interés se los comunicaré.Abrazos:![signature of Ignacio]IgnacioP.S. No se olviden de Don Manuel Guilict.
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# SECRETMIAMI, 3 April 1967Dear Jim,Pardon my lateness in writing, but I have had to run around a lot. The fundamental subjects which I wished to discuss are:1.  I was displeased when our Nicaraguan friend discussed the subject of the implements which we had in Blueffield with General Somoza before I had discussed anything with him (Genral Somoza); above all without even consulting with me before he went ahead and did it, this put me in a difficult position with the Government. This is what I discussed with: Carlos:(a) The company will help me get him out (b) I will tell Somoza that he belongs to me (c) I move them to another place which is less accessible. He agreed with me on consulting with the company, and the answer he gave to (b) was that he planted the "other friend" in with Somoza, and nothing else was said. Thank God that I did well on that job, and I did pass some unpleasant moments.2. During Somozas' stay in the USA I have seen him frequently and I have taken American investors, who wish to put their capital to work in Nicaragua, to see him. We have conversed copiously about his projects. He wants to do the following: Turn over his power when his mandate is terminated. Raise the standard of living for the Nicaraguans. Give the![GROUP Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification stamp]SECRET
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SECRET-2-farmers the chance to take their products to big markets, through the construction of highways, silos to store grains and favorable legislation for the small farmers. The only thing that worries me is the extraordinary influence that "Che Lainez" has on him in economics. There are diverse comentaries about this individual on whether he is a member of the Communist Party or not; but the truth is (I know him personally) that he is a social outcast, bitter, very intelligent and very ambitious. Furthermore, when he tries to please someone he acts like their servant. If he is not a Communist then he is easy material for the Communists.3. Somoza has promised me to continue to move the subject of Cuba in the international spheres, and in his appearance in "Meet the Press" he has already done it.There is a "GARCIA" who is a syndicate leader of the ?wharfs? of New York, who through Adolfo Jimenez told me about a new invasion that was planned for Haiti, directed by me and leaving from Nicaragua. I responded negatively. It seems that they spoke with others about the project and a rumor started which said that I was preparing an invasion of Haiti from Nicaragua; I then went to see the Haitian consul in Miami to make it clear to him and his Government that I was not an adventurer, and that neither I nor the Nicaraguan Government had the slightest intention of interfering with Duvalier.SECRET
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SECRET-3-The consul has now told is that Duvalier wishes to speak with me. I told him that I would be glad to speak with him when he wished and when the interview would be kept secret. I think that this interview could be useful, for I have found that the Haitian Government has a grudge against the U.S. I do not know what we will speak about but I think that I can get some good information for you (plural).5. I think that we can expect violent revolts in Nicaragua, in Panama, in Guatemala, and in Honduras (the opposition is in possession of many arms that have not been found yet). This breakout of guerrilla warfare in Bolivia and Brasil demonstrates Fidel's desperate strategy in trying to start other Vietnams in America whether or not Russia is in agreement.I think that the dismissal of Raul Castro and Vilma Espin from the key posts in Cuban Communism can cause an internal revolt in disagreement between Cuban Communist elements and we have to be on alert in order to take advantage of the event so that it will not surprise as the "bloody rebellion and cultural revolution of China" surprised us.I believe that propaganda for CUBA should be centered on planting distrust in the Armed Forces and on making Fidel Castro appear unstable as a person. If he has not even been faithful to his own "brother," then what can the rest of them expect if they are not even his relatives? I think that we should emphasize the fundamental part that Roul and Vilma had in consolidation of Castroism and its rise to power.SECRET
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SECRET-4-I do not think that Almeida has the control nor the influence over the Army that Raul had, and therefore a conspiracy and revolt of the Armed Forces is easier. There is no doubt that Fidel is assigning key posts to men and women who are his personal friends, without regard to whether they are good or bad Communists. This is going to bring about problems with the old guard of the Communist Party and with the people in the new guard who have been hastily taught Fidel's doctrine but have received Communist indoctrination (many of them sympathize with Raul).It seems that Russia is very displeased with Fidel and it would not surprise me if Russia would try to cause an attack on him; we should insinuate this in the propaganda against Castro for we know that his paranoic mentality and his disgust for Russia would most emphatically make him start to purify and take reprisals against Moscow's unconditional demands; an atmosphere of tension would then be created between Russia and Fidel.The divorce of the Latin American Communist Parties from their obedience to Moscow, seems to be a feeling of disgust for Russia.I have 200 men ready, who upon receiving weapons, can be taken to Cuba in caly 48 hours, in case of a revolt. Their mission would be to overtake a town with a radio station in order to take advantage of the chaos of the revelt and establish a military Government that would be immediately recognized by a number of Latin American Governments andSECRET
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SECRET-5-some European Country.6. Ablanedo tells me in a letter that ROBERTO, the *friend" from Nicaragua, has told him that he cannot go to Blueffield until **everything** is taken out. That will take part of this month which means that apart from the subsidy that I have given him for last month I will have to give him this month's also. Could the company help me with that? The subsidy comes to $275.00 monthly. That is what I give to his family in Miami. This does not include what he is spending in Blueffield.7. Tell me if at last you know anything about the request that I made for Mr. Manuel Guillot, for the Fundora widow and for the poor, deaf lady whose husband is in prison.That's all for now, if there is anything new to tell you I will inform you of it.IgnacioSECRET