Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 160]
The remainder will follow by Dispatch.7. Guertler suggested Curaçao as a suitable place for drydocking Adelaida for needed repairs after the operation. A-l demurred, stating that it would be needed for an infiltration op on 3 May. A-19 was told that it was of the utmost importance that the AKL Dolores be provided with a top quality captain and engineer, regardless of cost or nationality, that the equipment was very sensitive and was irreplacable. A-19 stated that it would be a problem, especially the engineer, but that he would do so. Guertler offered no suggestions where to look, merely commenting that now that AMWORLD had made many commercial contacts he should be able to obtain assistance in locating, a good man for the job.8. The complete crew for the Dolores has not been signed yet. Some of the crew from the Adelaida can fill in while she is in drydock.9. A-19was told that the Consejo was negoriating for Standard Oil of New Jersey to provide AMWORLD will its fuel on a regular basis and that the company war.ted a letter from some prominent Nicaraguan official stating that this was acceptable to the GON.10. The Case Officer asked A-19 if AMWORLD-2 had closed his Swiss account for certain.A-19 replied yes. The writer then told him that that was good because the $25,000 used to open the accound would be refunded to A-2 and that instead of returning it to the Consejo they could keep it and we would deduct the amount from the next month's budget (they have spent most of it already). Shocked looks around the table. They have already spent most of it. It was included in the unexpended assets reported three months ago and was deducted fucceeding month's deposit. Henry said we could spend it. The writer professed surprise since this money was not allocated to the project but was only to be used to keep the account open. This lead to a series of complaints about PBPRIME business methods, the fact that Ramsay Scarlet has recently billed them for $30,000 for something incurred in November, and was that any way to run a business. The writer commented that they just didn't understand anglo-saxon psychology and called it an evening, wishing them the best of luck on their operation.Warren K. GuertlerThis will be discussed with A-1 later, after the operation.
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 161]
# CONTACT REPORT # 57DATE TYPED: 14 Apr. 64OPERATION: AMWORLDCONTACT: AMYUM-19TIME AND PLACE: 1500-1630, 13 Apr. 64, S/HSUMMARY1. 22 PRQ Is turned over for traces.2. As per UFGW-3513 A-19 was reminded that in the future it was absolutely necessary that the AMWORLD monthly accounting be received on time, otherwise our payments may be delayed.3. Payroll changes: Guertler discussed the payroll changes noted in UFGW-3490. The two crewmen mentic..ed were terminated for being AWOL but were carriad for two months befcre being told that they would not be given another chance. Ine two examples cited for pay increases are explained by the fact that while the two man were still in the WAVE area they received no family allotment. They are not at the camps and so are being paid more. A-19 was reminded that the insurance, forms must be submitted in order for an AMWORLDER to be covered and that if a person is terminated all coverage ceases and will not be resumed automatically if the person is re-hired. A-19 says he understands this perfectly and will keep us up up to date on all hirings and firings.4. A-19 was reminded that some of the PRQ Is submitted for traces are unnecessarily vague, citing the case of one submitted from Puerto Rico on Oscar RODRIGUEZ Fernandez. The subjects record of employment lists "Secret Police" without indicating when or for what government.5. The Case Officer told A-19 that the Consejo had learded that Captain Reinaldo BLANCO and Gustavo de los REYES may wish to contact AMBIDDY-1 and that they might prove useful and should be given a hearing. A-19 replied that BLANCO had been trying to see him for two weeks but that he had been stalling because he did not know what he could do with him at this stage of the project. The Case Officer recommended that he should be given a chance since he might prove useful in the future. A-19 said that he would get in touch with him.
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 162]
6. Guertler asked A-19 if he knew the circumstances surrounding the case of Blas COMAS Castro, captain of a JURE boat reported to be in trouble after having received a letter from AMBIDDY-1 thanking him for signing up for AMWORLD. A-19 said that he would check, but as far as he knew the man must have filled out a form, and that it was not a frameup.7. Ramon MONDEJAR Cid and the other members of the M.I.D. recently arrived from Habana have been completely debriefed by the AMYUM intelligence section. Very little was revealed by them during their processing at the Refugee Center, but they have been very cooperative with the AMYUMS. They have been kept isolated from the rest of the PBRUMEN community with the intention of training them and sending them back. A-19 would like to use Aldo VERA Serafin's group to reinfiltrate this group and pick up the Habana coordinator, Barnardo NIEVARES, Now that Nacin is not available, having been kicked out of YOACRE (at KUBARK request, according to A-19) the AMYUMS have no way to contact NIEVARES. A-19 mentioned using his embassy contacts to do this, but the writer strongly urged him to keep this group completely compartimented from any other groups. So far MONDEJAR has made a very favorable impression on his intervi vers but very little is known about the coordinator, Benny NIEVARE:. Guertler suggested that A-19 should have these people questioned about wh: they know of NIEVARES, the circumstances surrounding their recruitment. This group was sent with the specific mission of contacting AMBIDDY-1 and asking for material help. From what is known of this organization it seens quite likely to be a provocation, and ar A-19 admits, these people are either unusually competent or completely controlled. A-19 wants to put then to the test by providing them with sab material and asking them to hit a specific target before discussing the matter of further financial or, material aid.Warren K. Guertler
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 163]
9 April 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1, 9 April 1964,1315 hours1. The following was relayed to AMBIDDY-1: "We are   glad you have second thoughts about Playa Giron. We have   received more information about military, expecially maritime,   build-up in that sector which would make any landing attempt   virtually suicidal." AMBIDDY-1 stated he would confer with   AMJAVA-4 and AMYUM-19 and give us his final decision as to   whether or not this operation would be run. AMBIDDY-1 commented   that one life meant more to him than the entire operation. How-   ever, A-1 again reminded this office of the impact an attack   on Playa Giron on the 17th of April would have on the morale   of the Cuban people. The undersigned replied that there are   two sides to the coin; should their operation fail, this would   play into the hands of Castro, and it was the opinion of this   office that the alternate plan would also do much to raise the   morale of the Cuban people.2. In conclusion it was reaffirmed to A-l that the   final decision is his. He replied that after his meeting   with AMJAVA-4 and AMYUM-19 he will let us know the final   decision.Raul J. HemandeyRaul J. HernandezWH/SA/SO/HHFile:AMBIDDY-1 201ConversationsOp GenesisAbove conversation conductedIn prearranged frequentlycharged privacy ocde
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 164]
SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMKIDDY-1 and MartinDATE : 9 April 1964 at 2000 hours1. AMKIDDY-1 stated he had been unable to obtain the address of the Tampa barge and he was leaving this matter to AMYUM-19.2. Concerning the DC-3, A-1 stated that Marmel Hernandez had talked to Petrosky. Petrosky did send a letter to Talaria instead of Carrillo as A-1 had informed this office before. A-1 will get a complete story from Hernandez upon arrival in Costa Rica. A-1 was advised to move the DC-3 to Panama under some pretext before Talaria notifies Carrillo of the cancellation of the charter. The logic behind this is should Carrillo decide to cause some trouble it would be difficult for the DC-3 to leave Costa Rica.3. In conclusion the undersigned conveyed to A-1 our wishes for a successful operation.![Signature of Raul J. Hernandez]Raul J. HernandezMS/EA/EO/HHFiles: LogisticsG-47Above conversation conducted in prearranged frequently changed privacy codeSECRET![GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 165]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMRIDDY-1 and Martin FerrerDATE : 9 April 19641. A-1 will obtain the address of the Tampa barge today and call our office. A-1 is departing for Nicaragua on 10 April via Lanica at 0730.2. Manuel Hernandes has gone to Panama and should have returned to Costa Rica by now. A-1 will report on Hernandes' findings upon his arrival in Costa Rica.3. A-1 told not to forget the budget before his departure. The quarterly charter payment to Talaria for the C-47 is due this month.4. Petrosky will send a letter to Carrillo stating he would like to charter a C-47. Carrillo will then write back saying that he has a C-47 to sub-let. A-1 hopes that this exchange between Carrillo and Petrosky will culminate in the C-47 being based in Panama.5. The undersigned asked A-1 if he had his Q signals to be used for the operation. A-1 stated he does have them.6. A-1 was requested to send the list of those expelled.7. A-1 should make certain that the Nicaraguan Consulate in New York is alerted to the heavy equipment shipment, and the Consular stamped invoice.8. After signing the Libernis contract General Somosa should mail contrast to the Libernic people.9. A-1 was advised that someone should now be working on the registration of the DOLORES.10. We would appreciate A-1 following up on his visa while in Nicaragua.11. The following was passed to A-1 concerning the village radios: Will arrive in Managua at 1425 hours on 10 April, Pan Am flight no.2501. Air Bill number is Pan Am 026-4-674334. Consists of 27 packages, weighing 2,014. Has been prepaid $603.00. Consignors Consolidated Electrical Equipment Co. It is identified as transceivers and batteries. No.20753 appears on each case along with the address.
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 166]
SECRET12. The batteries shipped by Pan American to Kanagua for use with village radios are dry-charged and "electrolyte" must be added to batteries before they are used. Specifically, "electrolyte" is sulfuric acid and distilled water mixed to a specific gravity of 1.275. "Klectrolyte" is available from any filling station or automobile garage. You vill need 20 gallons of "electrolyte". This liquid could not be shipped on commercial aircraft.13. Radios do not have consular invoic which is normal. A-1 stated he could handled the situation.Raul J. HemanlyRanl. J. HernandesHH/OS/FS/HAAmbiddy-1 201Conversationelogc-47SECRETAbove conversation conductedIn prearranged frequentiychanged privacy col![declassification]
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 167]
# CONFIDENTIALCONTROLLED DISSEMCOUNTRY CubaREPORT NO. CS DB-3/660,494SUBJECT Political Philosophy ofManuel Artime BuesaDATE DISTR. 9 April 1964NO. PAGES 2REFERENCE:DATE OF 18 March 1964INFO.PLACE & United States, MiamiDATE ACQ. (6 April 1964)SOURCE: A Cuban exile observer who was present during the speech.Headquarters Comment. The following is a résumé of the political philosophy of Manuel Artime Buesa, leader of the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria (MRR, Movement for Revolutionary Recovery) as prepared by Source. It is based on statements made by Artime in his speech on 18 March 1964 to the Associación para Recuperación Económica de Cuba (AREC, Association for Economic Recovery of Cuba), on his first publication entitled Comunismo por qué? (Communism cor what?), which was written nine months before Castro came to power, and on Artime's book Traición (Betrayal).1.  Artime does not believe in political extremes - neither the left nor the right. He believes that extremes always end by touching one another. If any extreme gains power in Cuba, and in the case of the extreme right by imposing a dictatorship, he will continue to fight with weapons in hand. Artime does not believe in the classification of men by race, by political ranks in former governments, or by money. He confesses to being an opportunist in the sense that he is taking maximum advantage of each opportunity, but not in the sense of changing his beliefs in accord with opportunities.2.  The main theme of Comunismo por qué? was that more than a change in government a change in the conscience of men is needed. It outlined the duties of the padrón (landowner) toward the workers so that the latter may live in dignity and honor. The padron should feel that the problems of his workers are also his problems. The worker, in turn, has certain obligations to the padron. this *quid pro quo* is not adhered to, a (Christian) government has the right to intervene for the common good. In his letter of resignation to Fidel Castre accusing the latter of being aCOO-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LCONTROLLED DISSEMSTATS DIA ARMY NAVY AIR NBA OCR FBIREPCINCLANT CINCHO# TREASURY USIA I&NS 2SA/EOB SA/BI /PACY IWE/5/R LX-1090SA/Intel SA/WAVE WE/MADR NO PROJECTSA/R 3SA/SO/MIII CI/OPS/WA CSDB-3/660,494SA/CISA/MOBTOTALS IE 2, CI 4, FI J, CA 1, DODS 1, WH (1),WH/BA 12 (1) WELIAISON WH/BA/SO/HHT
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 168]
- 2 -CEDB-3/660,494Communist and traitor, Artime mentioned that he resigned because Castro had not been honest with the businessmen by not telling then their property would be confiscated.3. The following excerpts from Artime's book Traicion clearly outline Artime's ideology:a. "We believe the state should foment and stimulate private economy, both national and foreign. We have to have an effective democracy in Latin America because the word democracy in that area has been prostituted too often. Many countries call themselves democratic but in reality are nothing but militarist and demagogic, and many simply go through the motions of elections. Many are simply totalitarian governments which are living off the blood and toil of the people. The corrupt politicians, the strong men, the totalitarians have been the strongest allies of Communism. Our fight is not against one man, it is not a war of personal hatred--it is a war against the doctrine of hatred, be it called Castro or what have you--it is a war against a doctrine; we are as much opposed to Khrushchev as we are against Tito. We are as much opposed to the totalitarian left as we are opposed to the fascist right"b. "We don't care if they call us extremist. They will continue to call us rightist or leftist, fascist, philocommunist. I recall the words of Don Quixote when he was passing on the outskirts of a small town and Sancho said to Don Quixote, 'Sir, the dogs are barking at us,' Don Quixote replied, Let them, Sancho, if they are barking it is because we are moving. And we will continue to move.'"c. "They say we are very ambitious. Our ambition is that in the coming days when Cuba is liberated people will pronounce our name with respect in our country."d. "Our men in Cuba are not only fighting for the independence of our country but also for the independence of the American hemisphere, for the survival of Christian principles in America, for the Western world." Artime maintains that the situation today is much the way Lenin would have hoped for. Britain and France have recognized Red China; the U.S. is at odds with these two governments--this is exactly what Lenin would have wanted. Artime has supported his statements, by quoting Lenin, "Within 30 years we will embark on a peace ortensive, of coexistence, and we will split the free nations and smash the impotent bourgeois."e. "The battle-ground for Latin America lies 30 miles from our shores. Should the Western world lose this battle, the sleeping giant (Latin America) will wake up on the side of the Communist camp. Then it would be preferable to be dead because the free world will have coased to be."2. "We are all guilty for having turned over Cube, to the hands of men who could not govern her properly. We have knocked on doors and will continue to do so because our cause 18 honorable. We cannot afford to wait for miracles. We must prepare for a long fight and not expect the aid of such organizations as the OAS and the UN. It is up to the Cubans to liberate Cuba. If we are not going to wage a war of principles, I will not join that struggle."C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LCONTROLLED DISSEM
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 169]
SECRET8 April 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin FerrerDATE : 8 April 1964 at 1130 hours1. AMBIDDY-1 informed he had sent man to Tampa to obtain exact location of Tampa barge; he hopes to have the address later today.2. A-1 is leaving for Central America on Friday, 10 April.' Does not expect to return until latter end of April.3. A-1 was asked to make certain his financial request to the Consejo is in our office by 15 April. Two papers should be in our possession by the aforementioned date: the form for last month's expenditures plusrrequest to Consejo for $225,000. If these papers are not in our hands by the specified date it will result in unavoidable delay which will make them unable to meet their bill by the beginning of the following month. A-1 assured the undersigned the deadline would be met.4. A-1 was advised that during the operational phase ANYUM-19 must be available to either Mike or the Consejo at all times. We will not accept any excuse should we wish to con- tact A-19 and are unable to do so. A-1 stated that A-19 will be on call.5. ADELAIDA to depart from Disneyland on its first opera- tion on 11 April at 1500 hours (local time, which according to A-1 is one hour less than Washington time).6. A-1 requested the Consejo supply him with more detailed maps of the city of Playa ütron for Rafael Alvarez, A-1 was told we would check into the matter. Today AMYUM-19 is to giveSECRET![stamp Included from automatic]
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 170]
SECRET2Mike GEIDEL (A) complete schedule for first operation, e.g.ETD, course of ship, ETA, etc..7. The undersigned advised A-1 we would like to talk to   him by telephone tomorrow after we talk to Carl concerning   final aspects of the operation.Raul J. HernandezFile:FinanceSabotageConversationsAMBIDDY-1 - 201SECRET
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 171]
SEGRET8 April 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with AMBIDDY-1DATE : 8 April 1964, 1500 hours1.  AMBIDDY-1 was questioned regarding the present status of the Norwegian engineer, his whereabouts, their plans for his use, etc. A-l said he didn't know the answer, would have to check with AMJAVA-4, and would call us tomorrow with all the details.2.  A-1 vas told that the technicians who are to receive training aboard the Dolores should be ready to leave for New York by 15 April. As the van will be shipped directly, it will only be possible to train the technicians on the Dolores. We will be able to train up to ten tech- nicians, and A-1 should send as many as he wants to. We..... will let AYUM-19 know on Tuesday, 14 April, exactly when and where they should report for training.3.  A-1 was advised that we have the information he requested and he will have it by tomorrow night. A-1 was very pleased to hear this.4.  A-1 said he will call this office tomorrow morning for sureB. HernandezBobbie HernandezWE/SA/SO/HHFile:AMBIDDY-1 201'ConversationsTrainingCommoSECRET
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 172]
# DISPATCHChief of Station, JMWAVEDeputy Chief, WH (Special Affairs)TYPIC/ANWORLD-Training by JMWAVE of AMBIDDY-1 and ANJAVA-41. In the opinion of JAMES D. ZABOTH the training presented to ANWORLD's principal agents was of great value to the project. Project management and operational planning were very effectively highlighted.2. Proof of the pudding was in the plan presented by AMBIDDY-1 and ANJAVA-4 on 28 March in Miami, which envisions a raid on PBRUMEN about mid-April. The good results of the JMWAVE training sessions were readily apparent in the quality of this plan.3. We appreciate the time and effort expended by JMWAVE on these training sessions and wish to record our impression that they were successful and highly professional.KENNETH L. PHILBROOKDistribution:4 - COS, JMWAVEDISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBERUWOW 3517201-267437DATE8 April 1964CLASSIFICATIONSECRET/RYBATDESENSITIZEDMGS FILE NUMBER CS19-124/37/31 - WH/SA/SO/HHOFFICEWH/SA/SO/HHORIGINATINGCarl E. JenkinsEXT.4215WH/SA/SO/HHCOORDINATINGHenry DrechslerOFFICE SYMBOLC/WH/BADISPATCH
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 173]
# SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 and Martin FerrerDATE: 7 April 19641.  It was brought to the attention of AMBIDDY-1 that the MRR is the only Cuban exile organisation that has not properly registered with the United States Government. A-l ill attend to the registration.2.  A-1 requested to check his P.O. box.3.  A-1 reported receiving information this morning that ADELAIDA en route to Disneylasi.4.  Concerning his visa, he stated he had received an FS 510 form. According to A-l these forms have to be filled and submitted to the American Embassy in Managua. A-1 was asked if AMJAVA-4 now has the U. S. re-entry permit. A-4 does presently has the alien-resident ok.n card, but not the re-entry blue book.5.  A-1 was informed that all village radios will be shipped to Blueficids and none would be sent to Miami for him to hand carry. It is hoped that these village radios will arrive in time for the operation. Should this not be the case they have FRC-10s which could serve the same purpose as the village radios.6.  Mr. Mountain is expected to call Sixto Mesa advising the survey has been completed. Hr. Mountain will request Mesa that his three DMJH engineers return to the States. A-l was asked to make sure that ir. Mountain's message reaches the engineers.7.  The soil sample sent from Nicaragua is still in the possession of AMHORLD:8.  A-1 was requested to notify his propaganda personnel not to make sention of Brasil and their radio broadcasts. A-1 agreed.Above conversation conducted In prearranged frequentlyRaul J. HernandyRaul J. HernandesWH/SA/SO/HHcc: AMBIDDY-1 (201)Conversations# SECRET
[104-10163-10041.pdf — page 174]
SECRET7 April 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between AMBIDDY-1and Martin FerrerDATE : 7 April, 1010 hours1. AMBIDDY-1 confirmed what AMJAVA-4 had related to this office earlier, that is, he wanted one large, two medium and two small village radios. This would suffice for one mothership, two Swifts and two rubber boats to rehearse.2. A-1 stated the Libernic representative would not be needed in Nicaragua to confer with General Somoza since all the arrangements have been made. Gen. Somoza has found the charter very acceptable.3. A-1 vas asked fiatly if the Adelaida is ready to begin operations. He replied that it is ready.4. A-1 was advised that we would like to schedule the dry-run for 10 April, if this would be acceptable to him. A-1 agreed with this date.![signature of Raul J Hernandez]File: AMBIDDY-1 201- Conversations DoloresSECRET![stamp of Excluded from automatic declassification]