Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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1 May - $ 50,000 Mustering out payments for approx. 100 men and final contractual obligations of project$ 50,000c. Weapons. ARTIME agreed that it would be in nobody's interest for his weapons to fall into the wrong hands. He was asked for ideas on disposition of the arms and came up with the following suggestion which appears to be an excellent one. The mothership, MV SANTA MARIA, is in need of repairs and must go into a shipyard. Tentative arrangements have been made to put her in the yards at Galveston, Texas, some time in March or April. ARTIME can order his security detail to store the arms aboard the ship for "security" reasons before she leaves for the yard. They will simply remain on board when the ship leaves and we can take control of the ship and the weapons from that point on.d. Maritime.(1) MV SANTA MARIA. See above. The ship would be sailed from Monkey Point with a contract crew supplied by Chester, Blackburn, & Roder, Inc. of New York, who are agents for the ship's owner, Libernic Corporation, a CIA proprietary company. One of ARTIME's senior officers would accompany the ship as his representative, with orders to turn over control of it and the arms upon its arrival at Galveston. CIA officers, possibly documented as Customs officials, would accept custody and Office of Logistics could recover the weapons and any other equipment which might be shipped by this method. The ship would then be disposed of according to Headquarters wishes at any time after 17 April when the charter arrangement with General SOMOZA expires and the ship legally reverts to control of the owner.(2) Swifts, V-20's, Boston Whalers, rubber boats and other operational craft are all owned, technically, by ARTIME's group. He has had title to the Swifts legally transferred from a Costa Rican politician to one of his own senior officers. He wants to retain these craft for the time being, hoping against hope that lightning will strike and he may, after all, be able to use them in the next
[104-10163-10173.pdf — page 18]
-5-two months. Case officer recommends we go along with him on this. at least for the time being, as it could be sticky legally and might antagonize him at the time whom we most need his cooperation. In the end, he should be reasonable about disposition of these craft if we shoot square with him in the meantime.(3) Support craft, LCMs, Barges, etc. Disposition arrangements to be worked out together on these craft.e. Aircraft.(1) DC-3. ARTIME is willing to release the aircraft back to its "owners," TASA, a CIA proprietary company in Panama. However, one month's charter payment of $1,250 was due 1 March, and another will be due by the time the aircraft can be returned. ARTIME was reluctant to let the plane go back without payment, but also reluctant to squeeze the $2,500 out of his budget. Case officer voiced his opinion that the owner would probably be glad to get the plane back and would not likely think it worth going to court. However, in view of the fact that it would be a "closed-circuit" transaction and would actually cost the Government nothing, it is recommended that a special authorization of $2,500 be channeled to ARTIME for payment in order to maintain ARTIME's reputation for fiscal probity. He will surely appreciate this gesture.(2) L-20 Beaver and Cessna-180. These aircraft technically belong to ARTIME's group and recovery would be a sticky matter, legally. ARTIME hopes to hold control of these aircraft for the time being, and it is recommended that we go along with him, saving disposition arrangements until later.5. ARTIME again emphasized at the close of the meeting that he must have soonest the March payments for families as an absolute minimum, before he would face his people and maintain control of them in order to insure an orderly phase-out program.cc: C/WMDCWMD/CC/WM/C/CACarl E. JenkinsWM/C/CA/WMSECRET
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19 March 1965MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Chief, WH remarks on Termination of ANWORLD1. At a meeting with DCWHD/C and Mr. Jenkins on 18 March, Chief, WH expressed general satisfaction with the status of termination of AMWORLD and the plans therefor. He stated specifically that he was pleased with the cooperation of AMBIDDY-1 and ANJAVA-4 and would make it a point to inform higher levels in the Agency and the U. S. Government and put a good word for them on the record. He also directed that they be told:a. He personally appreciates their cooperation and the good sense, goodwill and maturity they displayed in accepting and executing the U. S. Government decision to terminate their operations.b. He wants to meet with them personally, at the earliest mutually convenient time, in order to discuss the situation with them.c. After termination of the paramilitary project is completed, he has some other ideas for ventures of mutual interest which he wishes to pursue with them.2. The gist of the above points had been passed to AMBIDDY-1 and AMJAVA-4 previously by Mr. Jenkins, and on the night of 18 March he confirmed by telephone to AMJAVA-4 that Chief, WH had expressed the above sentiments.Carl E. JenkinsWE/C/CA/EAFile:AMBIDDY-1 201AMJAVA-4 201PolicySECRET> [Figure] Stamp indicating automatic declassification.
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# DISPATCHChief, WEDChief of Station, CaracasPRIORITYSUBJECT:FPRUMS/AKWORLD - Future of AMBIDDY 1/ANJAYA 4ACTION REQUIRED/REFERENCE:Action Required: For your informationReference : DIR 981891. Ref cable raises a number of fundamental issues of concern to Caracas Station. In brief, we do not welcome an activation of the movement's center in Caracas, an event which would greatly complicate our operational situation. We have reasons for believing that the host government likewise would probably be embarrassed if AMBIDDY 1 chose Venezuela as a base for whatever program he is planning to undertake. Repeated failures of his attempts at being received by President LEONI are significant in this context.2. Since we must assume that AMBIDDY 1 has alluded to his close ties with KUBARK (and more specifically with BECKHOFF), the Venezuelan security services may well jump to the conclusion that AMWORLD is in fact a KUBARK operation and sooner or later we would be forced to disavow AMBIDDY 1, a circumstance of which he would be bound to learn with consequent embitterment. All these predictable developments, Caracas is most anxious to forestall. Needless to say, both BECKHOFF and OPTRICK are unhappy about this situation of conflict since it involves a man who both admire and who (in their opinion) has served OUTONE interests loyally, at times to the detriment of his abiding cause to liberate FARIDE.3. For the above reasons, we would welcome indeed if formal and institutional ties between AMBIDDY 1 and ANJAVA 4 could be put in abeyance, at least to the extent that AMBIDDY 1 be prevailed upon to pass up Venezuela as a base of operations. This discriminatory approach reflects our awareness thatDistribution:3 - Chief, WED201-5674375 April 1965NYCA-12278DESENSITIZEDSOI - AMBIDDY/1ROA - ANJAVA/4
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C. We would expect, however, and exercizing facility of prediction, within the movement, not reason being that it should be used as far as the local government is concerned to be an admission that NM/M.NE is officially backing AM/AFA.D. We would expect AM/AFA to compartmentalize himself to the extent that he will treat any knowledge acquired in his connection as operational adjunct to the station as privileged in the sense of not imparting it to anyone without a need to know. Specifically, this information would have to be withheld from AMICOT 1 and other members of the movement.E. AM/AFA will have to make a clear choice between serving the cause of FREEDOM liberation by actively associating himself with AMWORLD (a doomed undertaking if our reading of the situation is correct), or by countering FREEDOM's program to subvert Venezuela under Station control.
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3.c It is not clear what this source is trying to coort, but presumably he is trying to indicate that A/'l is hoarding the ARLD money he has been issued for his personal use. Aryone who nows 1/1 knows that the last thing he will ever give up is his magazine and radio broadcasts. The ability to make speeches and have them printed and see his picture reproduced is the top requirenent in his makeup. The next nost izpor- tart recirement is the capability to travel and hob-nob with Heads of State and other intenst which he excels. These two attributes are of considerable to A, as witness the fact that fr. Fitzgerald has insisted on retaining these capabilities for A/1 to use in behalf of the Agency. They are certainly nore important to him than money, as such, concerning which he is incredibly naive and disinterested. He is notorious for having to have somebody else go around with him to be sure he has necessary documents and money, otherwise he would never have a dime in his pocket. I checked further on this point with A4 at our last meeting on 27 June and he said there was no evidence of 1/1 pilfering the till, the problem if any was simply honest mismaragement. We should remember that I has been paid a salary, with Hos agreement and at our suggestion for that matter, of $1,000 a month. ANNORLD/2 zade it a point to deposit the check in A/1's personal account every month, and A/2 maintained de facto control of the account. A/1 told me this incident because he was amazed to find when A/2 left for Spain and turned the records of the account over tol/l, he found that he had 4o 5 thousand dollars in the bank, the most he had ever owned in his life. In addition to this salxary, it should be remembered that A/1 is a co-author of the "Bay of Pigs boold, which was worth several thousand dollars to each of the a co-authors.Note: This line of reporting has been going on for at least the past 2 years in the case of A/1 and is typical of the incessant gossip and character assassination within the Cuban exile community in Miami that has been going on for the last 5 years. While certainly no paragon of virtue or of efficiency, it will take more than this to convince me A/1 is a crook. In the first place, AlidAVA/4 would be the first one to put the finger on him if he started misappropriating MRR funds or otherwise playing games that would hurt the movement. In the second place, 1/1 ie too disorganized to be an effective crook, even if he tried, and it would show up in more concrete form than this report.
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# SECRETFANA JA CITYAC/WH/CBDop,c/WHSECRET 222224ZDIR INFO CARA BOGO SJOS MANA GUAT CITE PACY 6583TYPIC AMWORLD225505121.  AMBIDDY-1 TOLD ZABOTH XE HAD MEETING PRES LEONI IN MARCH, PRES VALENCIA 7 APRIL, AND PLANS SEE PRES ROBLES 22. OR 23 APRIL. PLANS RETURN VIA COSTA RICA FOR TALKS PRES ORLICH AND FONMIN ODUBER AND NICARAGUA..TO SEE PRES SCHICK AND GEN SOMOZA: THEN TO GUATEMALA FOR MEETING PRES PERALTA AND GIVE HIM COMPLETE BRIEFING ROBERTO ALEJOS COUP PLOTTING, WHICH INCLUDES SOME FORMER ARR PEOPLE FOR WHOR A-I VISHESDISCLAIM ANY RESPONSIBILITY. DURING WEEK 3. MAY HE HOPES MEET DAINOLD TO REPORI ON TERMINATION AMWORLD AND DISCUSS ANY OTHER# SECRET
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# OPICS PAINED WISHES.INSO512FACE 22. A-I FUTURE PLANS APPEAR INVOLVE SELLING IDEA OF PROOFA   10 CASTRON CURAIE THREATENCE COCH INCLUDE (1) INTER-   DICTION CUBAN INFIL OPMS, (2) PENETRATE AND ELIMINATE INTERNAL   CASTROITE OPS, (3) POSITIVE CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM BASED ON   "COMANDES RURALES" WHICH WAS BASIS MRR STRENGHT RURAL CUBA AND   CONCEPT A-I DEVELOPED WHICHK CASTRO CONTINUED AFTER A-1   DEFECIION. HE BELIEVES SHALL TEAMS TRAINED AND EXPERIENCED   CUBANS WORKING DIRECTLY WITH LOCAL GOVTS COULD CONTRIBUTE   SIGNIFICANTLY TO LATIN AMERICA COUNTER INSURGENCY PROGRAMS.   FEELS WOULD BE IN ODYOKE INTEREST TO ASSEST BUT WILL LEAVE   SUCH NEGOTIATIONS TO LOCAL GOVT S.3. INDICATIONS ARE A-1 MAY ASK DAINOLD IF IN RETURN   FOR: OPS INTEL AND POL ACTION ON HIS PART, KUBARK CAN CONTINUE   ASSIST HIM IN BROADCASTS TO CUBA, MRR MAGAZINE, DELEGATES IN   CARIBBEAN AREA, AND CONTINUED CONTACT WITH THE AMLASH GROUP   INSIDE CUBA (THEY ARE STILL IN COMMUNICATION). HE INSISTS   HIS BASIC ORGANIZATION CONTINUES AND WILL SURVIVE, WITH DOME   MEMBER'S VIRKING IN FLORIDA, NICARAGUA, AND OTHR PLACES, PLUS   EXPANSION LEGITIMATE BUSINESS. INTERESTS BBY PEOPLE SUCH ASSECRET![signature]
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# Secret14-00000IATO MESA, FIDALGO ARIAS, MADOLIN HERNANDEZ, ETC. A-1/A 2AMJAVE-1 BOTH SAY THEY INTEND MOVE FROM FLORIDA AND ESTABLISHRESIDENCE CENTRAL AMERICA OR VENEZUELA TO ESCAPE FATE OTHEREXILE LEADERS WHO STYRIED IN MIAMI AND ABLE ONLY TO TALK, NOTTO CONTINUE USEFUL WORK.5. A-1 APOLOGIZED FOR ANY PROBLEMS CAUSED BY FRANK   HE PLAYED COLOMBIA. SAID HE MET AND ACCOMPANIED BOTH   BY CUBAN WELL KNOWN KUBARK AGENT AND A-1 CONFESSED SOME   EXAGGERATION AND SHOW JOBS FOR HIS BENEFIT. HOPES REPORTS   WILL BE CONSIDERED THIS CONTEXT AND TAKEN WITH GRAIN OF   SALT. SAID HE ACTUALLY HAS NO COMMITMENT FROM COLOMBAI,   MET WITH PRES VALENCIA FOR TWO HOURS, ONE HOUR TALKING POETRY,   ONE HOUR TALKING OPS. NO DECISION BUT VALENCIA WISHES TALK   AGAIN AFTER TIME TO CONSIDER POSSIBILITIES. ABOUT THE SAME RESULTS   FROM VENEZUELA ALTHOUGH LEONI APPEARED MORE INDECISIVE   BECAUSE NOT SURE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT SUPPORT.   SECRET * DISSEM PER RYBAT TYPIC YOBITE ANWORLD   CFN CABLESECRET
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SECRET27 April 1965MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH DivisionSUBJECT: Present Activities and Possible Future Plans of Manuel Artime Buena## 1. Present Activities:During the past six weeks Manuel Artime has devoted his time to the task of disbanding his paramilitary establishment in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Artime has returned most of the arms and equipment provided him by this Agency. This includes the mother-ship, nearly all of the heavy weapons such as mortars, machine guns and artillery pieces, as well as other miscellaneous items such as communications vans and earth-moving equipment. The small arms not recovered from Artime are sufficient to equip an infantry company.## 2. Future Plans:During the same period Artime has attempted to gain support for a plan by which he, and a small nucleus of his paramilitary force, would conduct counterinsurgency-type operations against Castro-supported rebel bands operating in several Latin American countries. Artime has outlined these proposals to Presidents Leoni Valencia of Colombia and Marcos Robles of Panama, and endeavored to obtain an interview with Raul Leoni of Venezuela, but has been able to conduct conversations on this proposal only on the Venezuelan Cabinet level.To implement such a scheme Artime envisions using a small group of highly-trained individuals plus
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SECRETTwo fast motor launches criginally provided to him by this Agency. Artims would use this force to patrol the coasts of one or the other of the aforementioned countries to prevent the smuggling of arms and/or general contraband. in exchange for this service, Artime would receive the permission of these governments to keep any aras which he might capture in the course of those patrols. Ja addition, he would be allowed to maintain basen of operation from which to launch attacks against Cuba. So far none of these governments has made any commitment to Artise. He clains, however, that both Presidents Valencia and Robles have expressed interest in his pro- poralo.Artine has requested en interview with this Agnacy, presumably to discuss his future, during which it is expected that he will bring up his schene as outlined above.John L. HartDCWED/CTEP/WE/C/CA/EA/ADRohlfing:bh (27 Apr 65)Distribution:Orig & 1- Addressee1-WE/C/CA/BASECRET
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# SECRET28 April 1965MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Western Hemisphere DivisionSUBJECT: Present Activities and Possible Future Plans of Manuel Artine Bussa1. Present ActivitiesFor the past six weeks Artine has devoted his time to disbanding his paramilitary establishment in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. He has;a. returned most of the arms and equipment provided him by us,b. returned the mothership,c. returned nearly all the heavy weapons including mortars, machine guns, and artillery pieces.The small arms not recovered are sufficient to equip an infantry company.2. Future PlansArtine has attempted to peddle a plan to the Venezuelan, Colombian, and Panamanian governments utilising the nucleus of his paramilitary force. Essentially this program is the same for all three countries and involves a![GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic declassification and durclassification]
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quid pro quo arrangemat whereby:a. Artino would use his furue tu patrulthe coast of these countries sad preventsanggling of aree and/or general contraband,b. Artino would receive, in exchange furthis service, permission from these gaveramentato koop any arme which he night capture and beallowed to maintain basus from which tu launchoperations against Cuba,Some of the specifics follow:### ColombiaArtine venta petrolove, toed, and clothingfrom the government for a group to be stationedthere and a beachhead to establish a camp,If there is a landing in Cuba, Artiuo ventaimmediate recognition by the Colombian Governmentan head of a government is exile.Artine would guarantee to wige out smugglingand would patrol from Bluncks to the Fanian border;He would also guarantee to solve the guerrillapeatlas by using two MRR groups. One group toconduct operations against Cuba and the other toant as instructors and field advisers to theColestrian army.SECRET
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-3-Artine would seek private financing from wealthy Cuban exiles and Latin American sympathisers.PanamaArtine would start a "comandos rurales" operation, similar to that which was the base of MRR strength in rural Cuba.Artine would launch a civic action program and also would interdict Cuban infiltration operations.The above plan would be carried out mainly in Chiriqui Province.MiscellaneousWe have no information on what Artime proposed in Venezuela but assume it is much the same as for Colombia and Panama. We also believe Artime may ask CIA to continue to assist him in radio broadcasting to Cuba, financing the MRR magazine, and helping him maintain continued contact with the Cubela group.This would be in return for his counter insurgency program outlined above.JOHN L. HARTDCWHQ/C
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# SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH DivisionSUBJECT: Proposed Meeting Between Chief, WH and AMBIDDY-11. AMBIDDY-1 went to Nicaragua on 11 May 1965 to remove his remaining men and equipment from that country and to complete secure storage arrangements for the small arms which he has retained. He has a meeting scheduled with General Peralta in Guatemala later this week and expects to be back in Miami by 17 May.2. He hopes to meet with Chief, WH at any convenient time thereafter to report on the disbanding of ANWORLD and to discuss any other matters which may be of mutual interest. AMBIDDY-1 has indicated that he is willing to continue cooperating with the Agency by furnishing information and undertaking political action tasks as required. He hoped that the Agency, in turn, will be able to assist him in financing a limited publicity program consisting mainly of radio broadcasts and the MRR magazine. This would help to keep his movement alive and maintain him as a recognized exile leader who would thus be of continued value to the Agency in activities of mutual interest.3. We suggest that his witting deputy, AMJAVA-4, might be invited to visit Washington at the same time to participate in other discussions concerning possible activities in the future. It would be appreciated if Chief, WH were able to get a convenient date for a meeting in order that we may notify AMBIDDY-1 in advance.DDP/WH/C/CA/EA/CEJenkins:bh (13 May 65)Distribution:Orig & 1 - Addressee1 - WH/C/CA/EAJohn L. HartDCS/D/CSECRET
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SECRET17 May 1965MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Proposed Meeting with ANJAVA-41. In addition to the matter of meeting the ANWORLD Swifts on their arrival in New Orleans, ANJAVA-4 indicated he was even more interested in talking with me about AMBIDDY-1's present frame of mind and plans for the future, about some of which he is a little concerned. AMJAVA-4 intends to see AMBIDDY-1 for a few days the first part of this week and will try to get a complete and current reading from ANBIDDY-1 during this time. AMJAVA-4 wants to discuss this in detail with me prior to the meeting of AMBIDDY-1 with Chief, WH, presently planned for the week of 24 May.2. ANJAVA-4 also wishes to discuss the two job offers he has received from the Agency, ie, a job with Caracas Station, or to go into university level training in a holding capacity for future commitment to a post-Castro Cuban regime. He has some topics for discussion concerning last-minute questions in the close-out of AMWORLD and disposition of some of the key personnel of the organization.Carl E. JenkinsWR/C/CA/EA.File:PolicyANJAVA-4 201ANBIDDY-1 201SECRET![stamp of GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]
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# SECRETMeeting with ANJAVA-4 in New Orleans, 21-23 May 1965Subject: AWBIDDY-1 Activities1. ANJAV-4 said he had talked only briefly with AWBIDDY-1 on his return from Guatemala and Nicaragua (21 May, just before A-4 left to meet me in New Orleans). A-1 said he had talked with General Peralta in Guatemala and had disclaimed any connection with Roberto Alejos' coup plotting or the former MRR Cubans who had been involved with it. He had also outlined his proposal for Peralta to consider whereby A-1 and the MRR would undertake, at the invitation of the local government, to assist in countering Castro/Communist infiltration and subversion, and to help develop rural civic action programs as a positive counter-insurgency program. A-1 claimed that Peralta seemed very seriously interested in the proposals and appeared quite appreciative that A-1 had been able to visit him. A-1 expects that Peralta will wish to talk to him further in regard to his counter-insurgency proposals.2. A-1 also talked again with President Schick in Nicaragua about the above proposal. Schick had thought over their previous discussion and approves a pilot program to be run on the east coast, with the rural civic action program near Bluefields. This will allow A-1 to keep a few of his men in the country to work on the program while maintaining security of the weapons he has stored there. A-1 also talked with Luis Somoza, at the latter's invitation, but indicated there was nothing new or interesting from this source.3. A-4 is not sure himself how much A-1 has been able to accomplish in his visits in Central and South America, and how much of his reporting is wishful thinking. He is not ready, however, to call A-1 short and has watched him "rolling ice-boxes to Eskimos" successfully over too long a period of time.![GROUP 1, Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification] SECRET
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SECRET4. A-1 decided to come to New Orleans on the night of 24 May in order to meet the two Swift boats at Morgan City on 25 May (their latest ETA). Having done all the preliminary leg work and made all the arrangements, A-4 decided both of them would not be necessary and he planned to return to Miami the night of the 24th. I promised to contact both of them by phone on Tuesday night (25 May) to make sure the Swifts get in with no problems, and to inform A-1 a firm time for his meeting with C/WH (scheduled for 1800, 27 May).Carl E. JenkinsWH/C/CA/EAFile:GuatemalaNicaraguaSECRET