[104-10164-10060.pdf — page 96]
# CUBAThe CIA, as defender of those interests, acts without moral scruples to support them. This system is well-known to all but not all are willing to admit it. We can talk extensively about this, but it is not my intention to point out generalities but facts, facts in which the CIA has participated in activities against revolutionary interests within and without the Republic of Cuba by using counterrevolutionary groups.Historically, the CIA has been a principal factor in the coordination, financing, direction and absolute control over these counterrevolutionary groups. Oddly enough, they consider themselves bulwarks of rebellion and heroics as well as possessors of a high level of ideological independence in the struggle for recovery of the liberties removed, according to them, by the Cuban revolution. These are the same groups that have carried out various activities against Cuba, financed and coordinated by the CIA. These are the same groups which have proudly assumed responsibility for the cowardly attack against Cuban fishermen last 8 April, which the world will have to judge and condemn.My relation with these elements began in 1970 and it specifically began with the group ABDALA, of which I was coordinator for the Chicago cell at the very beginning. Later, in 1971, I became ABDALA coordinator for all cells of the midwestern part of the United States. My fundamental mission as CIA agent was to penetrate the ABDALA organization at the highest level in order to concretely evaluate its political orientation, have the necessary information to be able to fully and effectively control the organization and, through it, be able to control other counterrevolutionary organizations associated with ABDALA.I began my activities by attempting to determine the possible affiliation of some members of the organization with the illegal drug traffic in North America. This CIA task was aimed at ascertaining the relations of these elements with the Cuban Revolutionary Government, in other words, to demonstrate that those persons were acting as counterrevolutionary elements to cover up the illegal drug traffic under orders from the Cuban Government.After a year of investigations, that theory was not proved. Despite that, the CIA and other organs continued to look for evidence aimed at involving Cuba and distorting its foreign image. In 1971, the CIA leadership decided to transfer me to New York State where I was given the identification of a high-level official in the drug control commission of the state. These activities did not affect my ties to the ABDALA group but, on the contrary, helped strengthen my ties with the organization's board of directors.I maintained relations with the following CIA officials: Brackenhouse, first CIA agent to contact and recruit me; and Richard (Tomly), staff officer of the McLean, Virginia, Operations office, who conducted my initial training and acted as evaluating supervisor in the ABDALA organization. By then, the main interest of the CIA in ABDALA was in determining the operational capacity of this counterrevolutionary group, the possibility of using it in terrorist activities and predicting its future development. The ABDALA program was known not only to the CIA but also to other governmental organizations and their respective intelligence organs.At the time the ABDALA leadership, which was tied to terrorist activities, was made up of Gustave Marin, Enrique Hnoinosa, Lazaro Alvares, Eduardo Lima, Leo Viota and myself. The CIA Operations office considered ABDALA to be one of the best possibilities as opposed to the rest of the organization, which are believed to be made up of ineffective elements and sharlatans who waste the agency's funds without any results.