Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10163-10173.pdf — page 170]
and A/1 went with SOMOZA in his car. While they were riding, SOMOZA told A/1 why he was so angry.d. A message had recently come to General SOMOZA from the Nicaraguan Ambassador in Panama saying that he had it from authoritative sources that the U. S. not only would not support his candidacy for the Presidency, but would strongly oppose it. In addition, SOMOZA had word that Sydney ROSS, Director of El Tiempo (Spanish language newspaper in New York), after a recent interview with Asst. Secretary Jack Vaughn of the State Department, had an off-the-record talk with VAUGHN after the interview. VAUGHN had said that, so far as he was concerned, SOMOZA was no different from the other Latin American dictators such as TRUJILLO, PERON, DUVALIER, STROESSNER, Col. LOPEZ, or Gen. CASTELL Branco, and that he could certainly not support installing another military dictator in Nicaragua. The two reports were confirmatory in SOMOZA'S mind and made him feel extremely bad as he said he has always talked favorably about the U.S. and tried to cooperate with them at every chance.e. SOMOZA checked with the U.S. Ambassador in Nicaragua (whether in person or by sending Pres. SCHICK was not made clear) about the matter, and received a typical State Department reply that the U.S. was neutral in Nicaraguan internal affairs and would take no action about the elections. The Ambassador said he could not believe VAUGHN could have made such statements because of the U.S. position of neutrality in Nicaraguan affairs.f. SOMOZA also said he had sent a message to Washington suggesting that if some of the other countries heard about themselves being lumped with TRUJILLO, PERON, etc. they might well call back their troops from Santo Domingo and tell Washington to go to hell.g. He said he was going aherd with his plans regardless of what the U.S. does about it and reminded A/l of Mr. J. C. KING's talk with him (SOMOZA) at the airport in Washington to let him know after the miation attack on the SIERRA ARANZAZU that Washington would understand if SOMOZA decided to kick A/l and his camps out of Nicaragua. He used this as an example of an attempt from Washington to dictate to him which he had ignored, telling A/1 that he was a friend, would continue to be, and would continue to make his own decisions regardless of what Washington might want from him. A/1 made another strong suggestion that SOMOZA take off his uniform and start making public his civic action ideas. In addition, he again advised him to go perschally to Washington
[104-10163-10173.pdf — page 171]
to talk directly with VAUGHN and other U. S. officials to get the picture cleared up. A/1 said, "Let's try to get along with the Norteamericans, it's better to have them with us than against us." SOMOZA agreed, but said he had sent his brother, Luis SOMOZA, ahead.h. The following day, 19 Aug, General SOMOZA called A/1 and said Luis had called him, reporting he had talked to Vaughn in Miami. Said Vaughn had denied talking to Sydney ROSS or of passing such information to the Ambassador in Panama. Luis said he dropped the subject at that point and talked about other things. (A/l believes Luis could be fabricating as usual or could have botched up the interview if it did take place.) A/l again strongly recommended that General SOMOZA make his own visit to Washington and talk to Vaughn and others in person.4. On 19 August, A/1 interviewed President SCHICK for the Tridente (MRR news magazine). He had previously interviewed General SOMOZA. The interview reports will be relatively innocuous coverage of some of the major events of the day. The agenda of points for each interview is attached. A/1 intends to dedicate an issue of Tridente to each country which has helped the MRR, e.g. Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia.Atts.Carl E. JenkinsWH/C/CA/EASECRET
[104-10163-10173.pdf — page 172]
SECRETINTERVIEW WITH HIS EXCELENCY THE CHIEFDIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF THEANASTACIO SOMOZA DERAYLE DIVISION, FORTHE TRIDENTE MAGAZINE1. GENERAL, WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE TECHNICAL   CAPACITY OF THE NICARAGUAN NATIONAL GUARD?2. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE NATIONAL GUARD IS DULY   PREPARED TO FIGHT ANY COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE PLANS IN   YOUR COUNTRY.3. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE   COMMUNIST DANGER IN CENTRAL AMERICA.4. WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE ROLE   THAT THE ARMY SHOULD PLAY IN THE MODERN DEMOCRATIC   STATES IN LATINAMERICA5. ARE YOU SATISFEDWITH THE ROLE THAT YOUR TROOPS HAVE   PLAYED AS INTEGRANT PART OF THE INTERAMERICAN PEACE   FORCE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.6. GENERAL, WE WOULD LIKE FROM YOU A FEW WORDS FOR THE   CUBANS VICTIMS OF THE COMMUNIST TYRANY.SECRET
[104-10163-10173.pdf — page 173]
# INTERVIEW WITH THE EXCELENCY. THE PRESIDENT OF NICARAGUA, DR. RENE SCHICK FOR THE TRIDENTE MAGAZINE.1. MR. PRESIDENT, YOU WHO HAVE BEEN AN EXAMPLE AS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL, EVEN FOR YOUR PARTY'S OPPOSITION, YOU SHOULD HAVE IN YOUR GOVERNMENT WORK SOMETHING ELSE WHICH YOU CONSIDER THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE AND WHICH IS THE MOST LOVED ONE. WHICH IS YOUR MOST IMPORTANT WORK AND YOUR MOST LOVED ONE?2. DO YOU HAVE FAITH IN THE CENTROAMERICAN COMMON MARKET? WHAT FUTURE DO YOU SEE IN IT?3. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE DOMINICAN PROBLEM?4. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE VIET NAM PROBLEM?5. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE DANGER OF COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA IS DANGEROUS ENOUGH, AS FOR THE GOVERNMENTS TO HAVE IT AMONG THEIR PRINCIPAL PREOCCUPATIONS?:6. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ON THE WAYS OF FIGHTING COMMUNISM?7. TO WHAT DO YOU ATTRIBUTE THE PREPONDERANCE SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROSPERITY OF NICARAGUA? IN THESE LAST YEARS?8. WE WOULD LIKE A MESSAGE FROM YOU FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE.SECRET
[104-10163-10173.pdf — page 174]
# SECRET27 August 1965MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDFROM : AMBIDDY/1SUBJECT: Vidal ESPINAL Herrero, possible CI suspect1. Subject is a Spaniard who is believed to be working now at the Ron Carta Vieja factory in Panama City. He previously lived in Maragua and worked for Colonel Miguel RUIZ Herrera (a Costa Rican sometimes employed by General Anastasio SOMOKA) as a specialist in guerrilla warfare.2. About late May or early June, ESPINAL wας drinking in a Managua bar and angaged one of A/l's delegation in conversation, not knowing who be was. He claimed to have been in Guatemala recently where he had worked with some "good people of the lower cleases" in an attempt to overthrow the Guatemalan government. He quoted at Isngth, and accurately, from Che GUEVARA and used examples, also accurately, for some Fidel CASTRO operations on how to overthrow a government. A/1's man played the part of a leftist sympathizer to elicit from subject. Through the Nicaraguan security service, the MRR people found out that Col. RUIZ H. claimed schjact bad some to him and presented himself as a GW expert saying he was willing to vork for him in an attempt to make a coup against the government in Costa Rica. In early July, subject told Col. RUIZ H. that the Costa Rican operation was taking too long and nothing auch vas going on, so he was going to Panana from where he could be called baca immediately when they were ready to go in Costa Rica. Subject had also been overheard to say in Managin that he had a special aission to assassinate a Contral American president.3. /1 said the Nicaraguan service believes that Angelini's Restaurant in Panama City is a source of falee passports for Communisca. 4/1 leaked at the place on his visit in Panama and fouad it to be in a poor section inhabited by Communists not far from the International Hotel.SECRET
[104-10163-10173.pdf — page 175]
SECRET-3-4. A/1 said he reported the above information to Major ARAUE, Chief of the Presidential Guard in Panama City. He was unable to see President ROBLES, who was away in the interior.Carl E. JenkinsWH/C/CA/EASECRET
[104-10163-10173.pdf — page 176]
27 August 1965MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDFROM : AMBIDDY/1SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1 meeting with son of Colonel PERALTA of Guatemala1. On 24 July 1965, A/1 met with the son of Col. PERALTA, at his request, at the Lido Palace Hotel in Nicaragua. The meeting was arranged by General MONTIEL, chief of the Nicaraguan security service.2. Young PERALTA said that his father had no faith in the Agency, and neither did he. They still think the Agency put Luis SIERRA to work with Roberto ALEJOS to overthrow Col. PERALTA. They are not satisfied with their liaison with the Agency or with the Embassy, and not at all clear on what U.S. policy or wishes are in connection with Guatemala. Col. PERALTA is willing to do whatever he is able to do, within reason, to meet U.S. expectations, if he only knows what they are, but he is tired of hearing how bad things are without concrete and constructive suggestions about how to improve them.3. A/1 tried to reassure him, telling him that he (A/1) knew the Agency people in Guatemala very well (not true, of course) and could guarantee it was not true that they had supported ALEJOS or any other coup attempt. A/1 also asked Gen. MONTIEL to try to soothe young PERALTA.4. A/1 said young PERALTA was in Managua to attend a meeting concerning tourism in Central America.Carl. E. JenkinsWE/C/CA/EASECRET
[104-10163-10173.pdf — page 177]
SECRET27 August 1965MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDFROM : AMBIDDY/1SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1 discussion with President ORLICH, Foreign Minister ODUBER and other Costa Rican officials, late July to mid-August 1965.1.  In late July, A/1 went to Costa Rica and met with President ORLICH, telling him the MRR was out of business so far as operations directly against Cuba are concerned, and no longer needs bases, none, or other support for such paramilitary activities. A/1 described the latest MRR program to combat CASTRO/Communist efforts in Latin America by engaging in community development and counter-insurgency activities. He asked only for help in projecting a progressive and constructive image and some basic prestige for the MRR and for himself. To that end, he reminded President ORLICH that both of them knew full well that in the whiskey smuggling scandals and coup attempts for which A/1 had taken the rap, not only was he not guilty, but had been, in fact, the first one to give the warning in both cases. In return for those past favors, he now wants Pres. ORLICH to put him together with Daniel ODUBER (the PLN candidate for president who will almost certainly be elected) in order to counteract the bad-mouth put on A/1 to ODUBER by Manolo RAY, Colonel FIGULS, and Teodore "Yo-yo" QUIROZ. A/1 proposed to meet ODUBER personally, and let him make up his own mind. Pres. ORLICH called ODUBER's office, but he was off politicking on the coast. ORLICH then sent A/1 with Colonel LIPPA (a good friend of A/1) to talk with ODUBER's secretary, who also is a good friend of Col. LIPPA. The secretary (actually a male assistant) said everybody talks about A/1 but nobody really knows him or very much about him. Some good liberal revolutiona- ries say he is a good man, others say he is a S. O. B. A/1 replied that was the reason he had taken the trouble to come to see ODUBER, that he would make his position clear himself and would be glad to confront any accusers if ODUBER so desired. The secretary said they were concerned about the campaign because the opposition was uniting and was getting plenty of money from big businessmen. A/1 offered to help by printing posters, leaflets, and other campaign material if they needed it, free of charge at his "Quality Off-Set Printing Shop" inSECRET -201-867437
[104-10163-10173.pdf — page 178]
# SECRET-3-Miani. He also offered to help Pres. ORLICH's secretary,Roberto NADRIZ, who may run for Deputy if he can beconvinced to ignore his shyness and reluctance to makepolitical speches.2. On 8 and 9 August, A/1 was again in Costa Rica   and met with ODUBER, this meeting was arranged by Roberto   MADRIX. ODURER adaitted that he knew the Cubans vere not   guilty of the smuggling charges that had been levied against   then. He also appreciated A/l's previous refusais to assist   coup plotters and his help in squelching their efforts. A/1   said he told ODUBER, "I Know you have been told I am a 8. О. В.   and I want you to see for yourself what I am and make up your   mind. I know the people who have so described me and would   like to meet you together with them so you can mace your own   godgement." A/1 said these opening remarks brought on   ODUBER's replies about the smuggling and coup reports.A/1 said he gave CDUBER & quick history of the:MRR, what it has done, and what it stands for. He toldODURER he realized they had not been close before, but hefelt ODUBER and the FLN were the best choice for Costa Ricaand therefore the MRR was prepared to support him in any waythey can, including training, mon and equipment. CDUBEXasked for a specialist to do some training of his personalsecurity group, and to furnish some walkie-talkie radios forthen if possible. A/1. assigned Luis ARRIEURIETA Sardinas(201-298890), a member of the MRR delegation to Costa Rica,who is well-known and trusted by ODUBER, to full-time duty asa security adviser and trainer. A/1 also offered to donateene issue of Tridente, the MRR news nagasine, to Costa Ricawith favorable emphasis on ODUBER, and send free copies toCosta Rica. ODUBER also took A/1 up on his previous offer toprint posters, etc. A/l told him that the MRR people had heardof a Communist plot to trap ODUBER by waiting to the strategicmoment and making a widely publicised declaration that theyare supporting him completely. This would split the PLN and mightlose the slection for ODUBER, thus putting in a weak or reactio-nary group what the Communists could control or overthøca.ODUBER said he would expose this scheme and get the jump on thenby saying he doesn't want or need anything from the Communists.4/1 effered to help him with this through Tridente..COURER said he would be aldifferent presidentthat wan. "Chice" ORLICH and will be more independent of theSECRET
[104-10163-10173.pdf — page 179]
# SECRETODUBERU. S., dealing directly with other countries on Costa Rican interests instead of falling in line always with the U.S. and the OAS. A/1 mentioned Pres. ORLICH's offer to recognize a Government of Free Cuba if A/I could manage to seize and hold a piece of Cuba and declare such a government. ODUBER agreed to honor the agreement, without committing troops, but through his good offices in foreign affairs. He agreed to exert moral pressure on the U.S. in behalf of such an under- taking, if necessary, by exploiting the favorable press and public attitude toward him in the U.8.3. In A/l's opinion, ODUBER is not a Communist by any stretch of the imagination, nor will he be a later edition of "Pepe" FIGURRES. If he does take over, there will be many problems for the U.S. in contrast to the easy-going relationship with "Chico" ORLICH. ODUBER's personal circle includes a strong group of violently antt-0.8. people. Cie of then, according to A/l's delegation in San Jose, is (inu) SUNIGA, a government official who is the Costa Rican in charge of Alliance for Progress matters. He has been beard to say that if ODUBER VARS president, no Costa Rican troops vould be sent to Santo Domingo nor would Costa Rica support GAS decisions forced by the U.8.Carl A. JENKINSWE/C/CA/BASECRET
[104-10163-10173.pdf — page 180]
SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFK ON TOP AND BOTTOMUNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL X SECRETCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYOFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP| TO  | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE         | INITIALS       || --- | ---------------- | ------------ | -------------- || 1   | C/WH/C/CA        |              | ✓              || 2   | WH/C/COPS        |              | #              || 3   | DCWH/C           |              |                || 4   |                  |              |                || 5   |                  |              |                || 6   | WH/C/CA/EA       |              |                ||     | ACTION           | DIRECT REPLY | PREPARE REPLY  ||     | APPROVAL         | DISPATCH     | RECOMMENDATION ||     | COMMENT          | FILE         | RETURN         ||     | CONCURRENCE      | INFORMATION  | SIGNATURE      |Remarks:1 - I talked to WH/2 people and got follow-up requirements - CET2 to 6: I believe copies of these memos should go to the appropriate stations for their info. #FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER| FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.  | DATE   || ---------------------------------- | ------ || C. E. Jenkins 1908 - Ph. 6567      | 27 Aug || UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL X SECRET |        |237 Use previous editions
[104-10163-10173.pdf — page 181]
SECRET27 August 1965MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDFROM : AMBIDDY/1SUBJECT: Vidal ESPINAL Herrero, possible CI suspect1. Subject is a Spaniard who is believed to be working now at the Ron Carta Vieja factory in Panama City. He previously lived in Managua and worked for Colonel Miguel RUIZ Herrera (a Costa Rican sometimes employed by General Anastasio SOMOZA) as a specialist in guerrilla warfare.2. About late May or early June, ESPINAL was drinking in a Managua bar and angaged one of A/l's delegation in conversation, not knowing who he was. He claimed to have been in Guatemala recently where he had worked with some "goou people of the lower classes" in an attempt to overthrow the Guatemalan government. He quoted at length, and accurately, from Che GUEVARA and used examples, also accurately, for some Fidel CASTRO operations on how to overthrow a government. A/l's man played the part of a leftist sympathizer to elicit from subject. Through the Nicaraguan security service, the MRR people found out that Col. RUIZ H. claimed subject had come to him and presented himself as a GW expert saying he was willing to work for him in an attempt to make a coup against the government in Costa Rica. In early July, subject told Col. RUIZ H. that the Costa Rican operation was taking too long and nothing much was going on, so he was going to Panama from where he could be called back immediately when they were ready to go in Costa Rica. Subject had also been overheard to say in Managua that he had a special mission to assassinate a Central American president.3. A/1 said the Nicaraguan service believes that Angelini's Restaurant in Panama City is a source of false passports for Communists. A/1 looked at the place on his visit in Panama and found it to be in a poor section inhabited by Communists not far from the International Hotel.SECRET
[104-10163-10173.pdf — page 182]
-2-4. A/l said he reported the above information to Major ARAUZ, Chief of the Presidential Guard in Panama City. He was unable to see President ROBLES, who was away in the interior.Carl E. JenkinsWH/C/CA/EΑSECRET
[104-10163-10173.pdf — page 183]
SECRET27 August 1965MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDFROM : AMBIDDY/1SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1 meeting with son of Colonel PERALTA of Guatemala1. On 24 July 1965, A/1 met with the son of Col. PERALTA, at his request, at the Lido Palace Hotel in Nicaragua. The meeting was arranged by General MONTIEL, chief of the Nicaraguan security service.2. Young PERALTA said that his father had no faith in the Agency, and neither did he. They still think the Agency put Luis SIERRA to work with Roberto ALEJOS to overthrow Col. PERALTA. They are not satisfied with their liaison with the Agency or with the Embassy, and not at all clear on what U.S. policy or wishes are in connection with Guatemala. Col. PERALTA is willing to do whatever he is able to do, within reason, to meet U.S. expectations, if he only knows what they are, but he is tired of hearing how bad things are without concrete and constructive suggestions about how to improve them.3. A/1 tried to reassure him, telling him that he (A/1) knew the Agency people in Guatemala very well (not true, of course) and could guarantee it was not true that they had supported ALEJOS or any other coup attempt. A/l also asked Gen. MONTIEL to try to soothe young PERALTA.4. A/1 said young PERALTA was in Managua to attend a meeting concerning tourism in Central America.Carl. E. JenkinsWE/C/CA/EASECRET
[104-10163-10173.pdf — page 184]
SECRET27 August 1965MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDFROM : AMBIDDY/1SUBJECT: AMBIDDY/1 discussion with President ORLICH, Foreign Minister ODUBER and other Costa Rican officials, late July to mid-August 1965.1. In late July, A/l went to Costa Rica and met with President ORLICH, telling him the MRR was out of business so far as operations directly against Cuba are concerned, and no longer needs bases, money, or other support for such paramilitary activities. A/l described the latest MRR program to combat CASTRO/Communist efforts in Latin America by engaging in community development and counter-insurgency activities. He asked only for help in projecting a progressive and constructive image and some basic prestige for the MRR and for himself. To that end, he reminded President ORLICH that both of them knew full well that in the whiskey smuggling scandals and coup attempts for which A/l had taken the rap, not only was he not guilty, but had been, in fact, the first one to give the warning in both cases. In return for those past favors, he now wants Pres. ORLICH to put him together with Daniel ODUBER (the PLN candidate for president who will almost certainly be elected) in order to counteract the bad-mouth put on A/1 to ODUBER by Manolo RAY, Colonel FIGULS, and. Teodore "Yo-yo" QUIROZ. A/1 proposed to meet ODÜBER personally, and let him make up his own mind. Pres. ORLICH called ODUBER's office, but he was off politicking on the coast. ORLICH then sent A/1 with Colonel LIPPA (a good friend of A/1) to talk with ODUBER's secretary, who also is a good friend of Col. LIPPA. The secretary (actually a male assistant) said everybody talks about A/l but nobody really knows him or very much about him. Some good liberal revolutiona- ries say he is a good man, others say he is a S. O. B. A/1 replied that was the reason he had taken the trouble to come to see ODUBER, that he would make his position clear himself and would be glad to confront any accusers if COUBER so desired. The secretary said they were concerned about the campaign because the oppostion was uniting and was getting plenty of money from big businessmen. A/l offered to help by printing posters, leaflets, and other campaign material if they needed it, free of charge at his "Quality Off-Set Printing Shop" inSECRET