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4-00000Station and will not help but interroge with the liaison services. We can further predict that the situation towhich movement (which is belligerently anti-AMBIOD; may view as active AMBIDO 1sponsored programs will disfavor and would a strong pressure to bear onthe Government to curtail or surpress the movement.4. We realise that the Station's position, as set forth above, saddles   Headquarters with an exceedingly delicate task. While as a last resort we   could of course drop discreet hints to our Venezuelan liaison contacts   suggesting the inadvisability of affording AMBIDDY 1 and his associates   sanctuary in Venezuela, we would only entertain that distasteful prospect as   a last resort and with the full approval of Headquarters.5. Another approach, only slightly less unsatisfactory, would be to   restrict AMBIDDY 1's radius of activity to an extent tantamount to denying   him all freedom of political action while in Venezuela. But all in all, it   would probably be best for KUBARK if AMBIDDY 1 could be dissuaded from going   through with his proposed move in a manner which does not hurt his pride and   which does not alienate him from KUBARK. Headquarters may be able to suggest   palatable alternatives to Venezuela.6. As regards ANJAVA 4, we share some of Headquarters misgivings about   surfacing him to Liaison. What prompted us to suggest this approach was a   desire to overcome the difficulties which would be facing ANJAVA 4 in any   case should he decide to make his home here. We are inclined to doubt that   he could obtain permission to enter Venezuela in immigrant status without   powerful intercession. He would be used by the Station on projects which   we (and presumably the host government) view as compatible with Venezuela's   national security interests.7. Some of the doubts raised by Headquarters are altogether valid and   were considered before we made our proposal. We are least concerned, however, about   the issues of dual loyalty and dual control etc, because it happens to be one of   our objectives in building a more durable relationship with Liaison, esp DIGEPOL,   to entice them into joint ventures where dual control does exist. We find ANJAVA 4   temperamentally suited (esp since his basic loyalty belongs to KUBARK) to serve   as an operational link between Station and liaison, without acting to the   detriment of either. Although the tenor of our relationship with DIGEPOL has   undergone a notable improvement, there are still deep-rooted reservations and   suspicious which a man of ANJAVA, 4's personality traits might heir to dispel.8. With regards to the substance of our operations against PERUNIN,   especially those which are CB-oriented, there is a natural congruity of interests   between ODYOKE and Venezuela which renders joint pursuits in fact most desirable.   More likely than not, DIGEPOL will do Station the favor of fecilitating the   admission of ANJAVA 4 and of providing him with viable cover, maybe including   official (DIGEPOL) documentation, and let it go at that. We rather doubt that   unless prodded by Station DIGEPOL would avail itself of ANJAVA 4's services, let   alone use him to penetrate Station's operational program. This leaves in the   balance the pros and cons of surfacing a valuable KUBARK asset to liaison.9. The general concepts guiding Caracas Station in desiring to secure the   services of ANJAVA 4 were spelled out in OUGA-12052.10. In presenting Station's proposal to ANJAVA 4, the following points    could be made:A. We do not propose that he sever his longstanding personal andpolitical links with ANBIDDY 1.B. We do not expect that he disconnect his links with the movement,let alone cease supporting its program.![form 55a logo]USE PREVIOUS EDITION.![classification]DESENSITIZEDCONTINUED