Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 48]
# Top Secret(FOUNDATION OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)When SMITH did not come to the next scheduled meeting with GRIBANOV, NOSENKO sought out the maid to find out what had happened. She reported that SMITH was in a state of desperate indecision; he had paced his room all night as if his mood was alternating between despair and defiance. To increase the pressure on him, the KGB sent him threatening letters on each of the succeeding three days. Finally, on the third day, instead of meeting the KGB, SMITH went to Ambassador BOHLEN and reported the blackmail attempt. SMITH was immediately withdrawn from Moscow and (as of 1962) he was "still in intelligence work".In 1964 and afterwards NOSENKO denied that he had played any personal role in the case. He explained that as a junior officer in the American Embassy Section at the time, working on correspondents, he would not have taken part in so important an operation. He said that he had heard about the operation from V. M. KOVSHUK, SMITH's case officer. (On a later occasion NOSENKO said that his only personal role was being assigned to a phone-watch to receive surveillance reports connected with the initial KGB approach to SMITH.)GOLITSYN's InformationIn February 1962 GOLITSYN reported that in 1957 he had read a two-volume KGB study which gave examples of successful operations against the Embassy in Moscow. One case concerned an American, probably single, who was either the Security Officer or the counterintelligence representative in the Embassy. He had a dog, and lived in an apartment in the city or a country house outside Moscow. His Russian maid or cleaning woman was his mistress. The KGB concluded that the American would not succumb to ordinary blackmail and consequently the maid, a KGB agent, was instructed to confess to him that she had been recruited by the KGB against her will and would be arrested if she did not fulfill her KGB tasks. The American agreed to help her, and GOLITSYN believed that he did not report this to his Washington headquarters. GOLITSYN also recalled that the American first supplied only misinformation to the KGB, but when the KGB complained, he provided a mixture of truth and misinformation. GOLITSYN said the case study he read was based on a true incident
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 49]
# Top Secret(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)which took place between 1953 and 1957, but he was not sure that the operation actually resulted in a successful recruitment, as was alleged in the study.Comment: Edward Ellis SMITH (a redhead), Embassy Security Officer (and CIA employee) from July 1954 to June 1956, reported to the Ambassador on 5 June 1956 that he had received four letters from the KGB. The first, received on 2 June 1956, enclosed incriminating photographs of himself and his Russian maid and requested him to come to a personal meeting with KGB representatives outside the Embassy. When he did not do so, SMITH subsequently had received three threatening letters. In reporting the matter to the Ambassador, SMITH admitted having been intimate with his Russian maid. SMITH was recalled from Moscow on 8 June 1956, and he left CIA employment a year later. When interviewed in March 1962 on the basis of the GOLITSYN information, SMITH admitted that he had maintained his affair with the Russian maid during most of the time of his Moscow assignment, 20 July 1954 to 8 June 1956, and confirmed that to help her he had in fact passed unclassified information through her to the KGB for many months.NOSENKO clearly ascribed the SMITH operation to the period when NOSENKO was in the American Embassy Section, in 1953-1955. SMITH's statement that he reported the blackmail attempt to the Ambassador in June 1956 is confirmed. If NOSENKO was, as he says, transferred to the Seventh Department in 1955, he could not have played any role in the KGB approach to SMITH. If he played such a role, he was in the Embassy Section in 1956, not in the Seventh Department as he claims. If he played a role in the SMITH case as well as in the Seventh Department recruitment of BURGI (see p. 115), it remains 06 possible that he was neither an officer in the Embassy Section nor Seventh Department and was acting in some other KGB capacity.39Top Secret0001310TS No. 197124Copy 10UBR
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 50]
# Top Secret## CHAPTER II### EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDESWhat NOSENKO has said about himself, the information about the KGB which he has provided, and the apparently corroborative statements which Soviet officials have made since his defection represent *prima facie* evidence that NOSENKO is a former senior KGB officer. To permit a conclusive judgment that he is a *bona fide* defector, the information NOSENKO provides about his life and related persons and events must be coherent, and his accounts of important events must be consistent. Allowing for personal vagaries such as lapses of memory and so forth, as well as for factors of accident and coincidence, the information he relates must conform within reasonable limits with that which is known from independent and reliable sources to the United States Government about Soviet realities and about the events, topics and individuals NOSENKO describes. Lastly, the information NOSENKO provides must plausibly relate primarily to the KGB positions he held, and his account of how he functioned in these positions must be substantiated by verisimilar detail.The following portions of this paper, organized in chronological fashion insofar as possible, summarize this examination of the significant aspects of NOSENKO's claims.Notes for the ReaderIn order to follow the examination as presented the reader should note the following:The examination tests the validity of the presumptive evidence favoring NOSENKO in terms of coherence, consistency, and compatibility with fact and plausibility.41Top Secret
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 51]
# Top Secret(EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES)## Notes for the Reader (Continued)NOSENKO's claims are judged in the light of his own assertions and in comparison with collateral information. It is not the function of the examination to speculate about possibly credible alternative explanations for the paradoxes reflected in NOSENKO's statements, except when such explanations are advanced by NOSENKO himself.If there is no immediate explanatory note pointing out the relevance or significance of some item in the text, the reader may expect that the item's relevance or significance usually will be developed in the immediately-following text. Otherwise seemingly minor points are included because of their aggregative significance: they will be a matter of comment in the Summary and Conclusions section following each major portion of the examination.Direct questions and NOSENKO's replies about his contradictions, inconsistencies, ambiguities, retractions, omissions and the like, are reflected in the text. Where, during his interrogations, it was not possible to pose direct questions without furnishing NOSENKO information or insight into the interrogators' purposes, the topic was covered exhaustively if indirectly, and NOSENKO was provided every opportunity to comment on the matter in question. When the text indicates that NOSENKO apparently was not asked about a particular matter, or that "he didn't say", or "didn't comment" or "didn't indicate awareness" and so forth, the reader properly may assume that the matter was covered extensively.In instances in which NOSENKO contradicts or retracts earlier assertions, no more weight is necessarily given to his final assertion as opposed to earlier contrary claims.To assist the reader in following what are sometimes lengthy and complex accounts of events, NOSENKO's narrative is broken from time to time by a clearly identified editorial comment which seeks to draw the reader's attention to the relevance or significance of NOSENKO's assertions, or to what conclusion is drawn.42Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 52]
# Top Secret(EXAMINATION OF NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES)Notes for the Reader (Continued)At the end of each episode in NOSENKO's biography there appears a conclusion resulting from the examination of NOSENKO's claims with respect to that period of his life. The judgment of whether NOSENKO is a *bona fide* defector is the sum of these independently drawn conclusions.43Top Secret0001313TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 53]
# Top Secret## CHAPTER III## PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHYNOSENKO's biography from birth to entry into the KGB is relevant to his bona fides insofar as it is material to establishing his true identity, his general veracity, and his eventual eligibility for KGB service. Below are summarized pertinent events in his early life, his study at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, and his RU service, as reconstructed from statements he volunteered as well as from the accounts obtained in repeated interrogations.Birth to 1945 - NOSENKO's AccountNOSENKO was born on 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, in the Ukraine. At the time of his birth, his father, Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, was a shipyard mechanic and an evening student at the Nikolayev Shipbuilding Institute. Shortly after NOSENKO began kindergarten in Nikolayev, in September 1934, his father graduated from the Shipbuilding Institute and the family moved to Leningrad, where NOSENKO started the First Class of school in September 1935. From 1935 to 1937 NOSENKO lived in Leningrad where his father was director of a shipyard. In 1938 the elder NOSENKO became Deputy People's Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry and the family moved to Moscow, where NOSENKO completed the Sixth Class in June 1941 just as the war broke out.NOSENKO has given two versions of his whereabouts for the next two years. In one, he said that on the outbreak of hostilities he was enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School which was evacuated to Kuybyshev where he finished the Seventh Class; thereafter he transferred to the Lenin-grad Naval Preparatory School (which had been evacuated to45# Top Secret0001315TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 54]
# Top Secret(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943. In a second version (more probable since entry to the Moscow Special Naval School required prior completion of the Seventh Class) NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943 NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (then in Baku).After just six months in Baku, without completing the Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to Moscow.Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.46Top SecretC001317TS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 55]
(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Ship- building Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.Birth to 1945: Summary and ConclusionNOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on his early life. However, this portion of his claimed biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's where- abouts as publicized in press accounts at the time of his father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the schools he claims to have attended.Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics (fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO'S claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945 are accepted as true.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 56]
# Top Secret(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)## Attendance at the Moscow Institute of International Relations (1945 - ca. 1950)In all of his accounts, NOSENKO has stated that he entered the Institute's Faculty of International Law and English in September 1945. He completed his first year in spring 1946.In 1947, on completion of his second year at the Institute, NOSENKO claims he received a commission as a junior lieutenant "in the reserves"; he does not recall in what arm he received a commission, other than being sure that it was not in the Navy.Comment: Soviet students completing their second year of higher institutions are commissioned, but in an arm (Army, Navy, Air Force) of Soviet defense forces. At that time they receive their *voyennyy bilet* (military booklet) which reflects their assigned MOS and category (*sostav*). CIA interrogators were unable to resolve why NOSENKO pleaded ignorance on this matter, and concluded it may relate in some manner to his claims to subsequent commissioned service in the Navy.In 1947, also, NOSENKO married the daughter of a Soviet Army Lieutenant General, Augustina K. TELEGINA "just after" her father had been arrested in connection with Stalin's campaign against Marshal Zhukov's associates. NOSENKO recalls neither the date of that marriage, in what season of the year it occurred, nor how long after her father's arrest. (The significance of this first marriage lies in NOSENKO's contradictory statements about when and how he obtained his divorce. See below.]48Top Secret0001319TS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 57]
# Top Secret(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute course was of four years' duration and that he entered the Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years' duration and that because he failed a state examination he was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years' duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it was of five years' duration but he failed an examination which delayed his graduation for three months.Comment: See p.367 for report that NOSENKO joined the KGB upon graduation from the Institute in 1947. The duration of the Institute course and the date of NOSENKO's completion are material to the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service, which he said followed almost immediately upon his departure from the Institute.Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at the Institute of International Relations he entered the Naval RU, serving in the Far East and then in a Baltic post, finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV.49Top Secret0001320TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 58]
Top Secret(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)![redacted]The significance of NOSENKO'S RU service is the fact that he claims it launched his intelligence career and served as the means through which he secured appointment to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a significant period of his adult life for which he should have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to determining the time from which his claims about KGB service can be judged credible.NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his 1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of his initial retractions and his first admission that he had earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU service was consequently prominent in interrogations in 1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations, challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as challenges on those latter topics prompted amended statements with respect to his RU service. The extent of the still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.NOSENKO's Information-1962NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU. [He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad, Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so no one would think he would take advantage of his father's position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' (on the Soviet coast opposite Sakhalin) where he collected Order of Battle information by monitoring the communications of American units operating in50Top Secret0001321TS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 59]
# Top Secret(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)Korea. In spring 1952 NOSENKO suddenly fell ill. Returned to Moscow and given a medical examination, he was diagnosed to have "a small spot on a blood vessel under his collarbone" and he was confined to the Hertzen Sanitorium outside Moscow for two months. In summer 1952, again eligible for duty, NOSENKO was offered an assignment to the Military-Diplomatic Academy, but he rejected the opportunity because the curriculum was almost identical to that of the Institute from which he was graduated.In summer 1952 NOSENKO was ordered to the Baltic city of Primorsk, "the former German city of Pillau". [Baltiysk, a larger city close by Primorsk, is the former German city of Pillau.] There NOSENKO was involved in the formation of "agent-observation posts", in which candidates from among Soviet seamen were formed into three-man teams and trained as stay-behind agents in the event of war. In early 1953, after less than six months in the Baltic assignment, NOSENKO returned on leave to Moscow where he met at his father's dacha KGB General KOBULOV, First Deputy to then-MGB [KGB] Chairman Beria. KOBULOV, on finding that NOSENKO did not care for his RU assignment, invited him to consider joining the KGB.NOSENKO's Information-1964Prior to NOSENKO's graduation he had been tentatively assigned by the Institute's military commission to the RU, and on the instructions of the Institute's "secret unit", he was interviewed by a RU Colonel KALOSHIN at the RU Personnel Department. After passing the state examination on the second try, NOSENKO entered the Navy in September 1950, when he received orders calling him to active duty as a junior lieutenant. He also received orders assigning him to the Intelligence Staff of the Seventh (Far East) Fleet. He left Moscow approximately 1 October 1950, travelling for ten days by train to his unit, which was stationed near Sovetskaya Gavan'. He was there assigned to a Reports Section with duties which included translating American naval publications and making summaries of Order of Battle information of American naval forces in the Far East. A radio signals intercept unit was connected with NOSENKO's unit, but [contrary to what he asserted in 1962 and 1965] he was not personally concerned with that unit's activities.51Top Secret0001322TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 60]
# Top Secret(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)In spring 1951 NOSENKO was promoted to the rank of lieutenant. At the end of 1951 NOSENKO was assigned as an "apprentice" in the Agent-Intelligence Section near Sovetskaya Gavan', an assignment which involved subchaser delivery and pickup of agents from Hokkaido and Sakhalin.In early 1952 NOSENKO filed by mail for divorce from TELEGINA in a Moscow court. In April 1952 he returned to Moscow on leave, where he visited the Naval RU Headquarters personnel officer, Col. KALOSHIN, and requested a transfer from the Far East. During May and June 1952 he was on leave accrued during his two years' service in the Far East. Following his leave, in summer 1952, NOSENKO was ordered to proceed to Rostock but he refused and took unauthorized leave. (He could not learn what his actual assignment was to be in Rostock, and he heard that the Naval Intelligence Points in Germany were being closed down.)He subsequently was assigned to the Baltic city of Baltiysk, where he reported for duty with the Intelligence Staff of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet. He was assigned to a Naval Intelligence Point being set up in Sovetsk (sic, see p. 57), a small town "in Primorskiy Kray" near Baltiysk.Comment: Primorskiy Kray is in the Far East, as NOSENKO'S interrogators pointed out to him at the time. NOSENKO subsequently claimed it was his earlier post, Sovetskaya Gavan', which was in Primorskiy Kray, a fact known to him from the way his letters were addressed. This is also an error. See below.In Sovetsk NOSENKO prepared training materials for agents.Comment: NOSENKO also said that after refusing to go to Rostock he himself had received training in Moscow and then was sent to Rostock and Sassnitz,
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 61]
# Top Secret(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)Comment: (Continued)In East Germany, before going to Baltiysk. In retracting that claim, he explained that he knew his CIA interrogators would not believe that he had successfully refused the assignment in Germany.In August or September 1952 NOSENKO returned to Moscow for 7 to 10 days to complete the divorce proceedings which he had initiated in the Far East. This was not regarded as leave, but official business. He afterwards returned to Sovetsk, but he did not like his work there, and in late 1952 he requested leave to return to Moscow to seek a transfer. When his unit commander refused him leave, NOSENKO appealed to Admiral GOLOVKO in Baltiysk, and because of the elder NOSENKO'S influence, was able to return to Moscow for a month's leave in January 1953. At the end of January NOSENKO visited the RU Personnel Officer, KALOSHIN, and stated his distaste for his work. KALOSHIN told him to "look around", and NOSENKO spent February 1953 "at the disposal of the Personnel Department", not doing anything. Since he wasn't working, he didn't receive his pay, and he lived with his parents.Comment: Just before giving this account of his January 1953 leave, NOSENKO claimed that he spent January and a part of February at the Kubinka Sanitorium. He has never reconciled these two statements.NOSENKO'S Information-1965Prior to his graduation from the Institute, a military commission tentatively assigned NOSENKO to the Navy, after which he visited a special section at the Naval Ministry to file special forms for a security check. Although nothing was said at the time, NOSENKO believed then that he was slated53# Top Secret0001324TS No. 197124Copy 10