Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 96]
that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 has been noted and commented on in another section of this summary.GOLITSYN has furnished certain information which he received from officers of the First Section, First Department, SCD.In each instance where this information, which was fragmentary, could not be immediately correlated with information from NOSENKO, it was previously considered to be evidential of deception or lying on the part of NOSENKO. This position, however, failed to allow for the possibility that the discrepancies between the two sources were, at least in certain instances, more apparent than real.In certain instances it has now been possible to correlate fragmentary information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO, making it evident that in these instances the differences could not be construed as in any way reflecting against NOSENKO. The four examples cited below represent two probable correlations, (a) and (b); one possible correlation, (c); and one instance where no correlation is possible at this time, (d):(a) GOLITSYN furnished information which he received in April-May 1960 from Gennadiy GRYAZNOV that an attempt had been made by the KGB to recruit an
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 97]
SECRETAmerican female employee of the American Embassy in Moscow through a male Soviet friend, but that the attempt had failed. GOLITSYN also furnished information that the woman had left Moscow by the time he learned of the information but that the Soviets hoped she would return to Moscow so that further work could be undertaken to effect her recruitment. He did not recall the name of the secretary, but did recall that it was a long and "German sounding" name.NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a recruitment attempt against Collette SCHWARZENBACH, who it is considered is identical to the "American secretary" referred to by GOLITSYN. However, SCHWARZENBACH was not a female secretary in the American Embassy, but had been employed as a secretary to the wife of Ambassador BOHLEN during 1955 - 1956 and from 1958 - 1959 was employed as a correspondent by the United Press in Moscow. The recruitment attempt against SCHWARZENBACH, according to NOSENKO, occurred in 1959 and was an operation of the First Section, First Department, SCD.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 98]
SECRET(b) Page 163 of the previous summary contains infor-mation that GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZNOV inthe spring of 1960 that GRYAZNOV had developed an operationagainst an American Embassy military code clerk in which theKGB was "99 per cent sure" that the target would be recruited.This is believed to undoubtedly be a reference to the case ofJames STORSBERG who was actually the subject of a recruit-ment approach in 1961.There is considered to be a good possibility thatGOLITSYN actually learned of the above information fromGRYAZNOV in early January 1961 when he was again in Moscowrather than during the spring of 1960 when GOLITSYN waspreparing for his assignment to Helsinki, Finland. Thistheory is supported by information on page 163 of the previoussummary that GOLITSYN has stated he learned in January1961 from Vladislav M. KOVSHUK (Chief of the First Section)that Johan PREISFREUND had recently been used in thesuccessful recruitment of an American employee of theEmbassy. Johan PREISFREUND was used in the STORSBERGoperation, according to NOSENKO, and NOSENKO was also11SECRET0001089
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 99]
SECRETaware that GOLITSYN had a conversation with KOVSHUK about (PREISFREUND) since GOLITSYN wanted to use (PREISFREUND) in Helsinki. NOSENKO has stated he was not present during the above conversation. It is very possible that KOVSHUK exaggerated a little in his conversation with GOLITSYN in the matter of why GOLITSYN could not use (PREISFREUND) as an agent.NOSENKO has furnished extensive information in regard to the (James STORSBERG) case and with due consideration to the accuracy and recollection of GOLITSYN, there does not appear to be an adequate basis for questioning the bona fides of NOSENKO on the basis of the differences between the report- ing by GOLITSYN of information he received from GRYAZNOV concerning what is considered to have been the (James) STORSBERG case and detailed information furnished by NOSENKO concerning the James STORSBERG case. The exact date of the recruitment attempt against (STORSBERG) has not been positively established, but it is considered to have occurred before early May 1961 and probably in the March-April 1961 period. The statement by James12SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 100]
SECRETSTORSBERG that it occurred in October 1961 is completely unacceptable and is even contradicted by other statements by STORSBERG himself.(c) Page 163 of the previous summary contains information from GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV in April or May 1960 that an American employee of the Embassy in Moscow was either recruited or prepared for recruitment on the basis of a homosexual compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960.The previous summary also states that according to GOLITSYN, the KGB had photographed the American in various homosexual acts, but SHELEPIN, who had just become Chairman of the KGB, was at the time stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments. SHELEPIN did not exclude future use of the photographs which the KGB would hold in reserve.NOSENKO has furnished information concerning the homosexual compromise of Robert BARRETT, who was a guide at the United States Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, and with whom "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY", two homosexual13SECRET0001091
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 101]
SEVRETagents of NOSENKO, became acquainted. Work againstthe United States Exhibition was the responsibility ofthe Ninth Department, SCD, but various Departmentswere participating under the direction of the NinthDepartment.One of the above homosexual agents succeeded ininvolving BARRETT in homosexual activities which werephotographed by the KGB but, according to NOSENKO,although the photographs were of a good quality, the KGBwas unable to use the photographs in 1959 because of ageneral ban by the Central Committee on the recruitmentof the United States Exhibition guides due to the plannedvisit of President EISENHOWER to the Soviet Union.NOSENKO also stated that the compromising materialand information on BARRETT was later given to the FirstDepartment and that BARRETT was recruited by the SecondSection, First Department when he returned with anotherExhibition in 1961, and that he, NOSENKO, was not involved inthe recruitment operation, BARRETT, following his return14SECRET0001092
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 102]
SECRET.to the United States in January 1962, confessed to theFBI that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis ofcompromising photographs which had been takenduring his 1959 trip to Moscow.Although it cannot be established at thistime, it is possible that the information furnishedby GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOVactually refers to the Robert BARRETT case. It shouldbe noted that Robert BARRETT) could not actually becharacterized as an "American employee of the Embassyin Moscow."(d) Page 162 of the previous summary contains infor-mation from GOLITSYN that in the spring of 1960 when hevisited the First Section, First Department, SCD, he learnedfrom GRYAZNOV that GRYAZNOV had as an agent an Embassycode clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki.GRYAZNOV indicated to GOLITSYN that the code clerk hadalready furnished the KGB with some information, that he was15SECRET0001093
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 103]
SECRETconsidered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that ifthe transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYNmight have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki.NOSENKO has furnished no information which can becorrelated in any way with the above information fromGOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYNresulted in an identification despite the considerable investigationwhich has been conducted in the matter. Although this isconsidered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily referto a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy inMoscow during 1960 - 1961. It is also possible that the previousremark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" whomight be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarksin a-c could be clarified or at least additional informationobtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible.The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland inNovember 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of informationfrom NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is16SECRET0001CC4
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 104]
SECRETalso mentioned in another section pertaining to the 1960-1961 careerof NOSENKO. GOLITSYN stated that KOSOLAPOV came to Helsinkito accompany an American Embassy code clerk on the train toMoscow and that KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintancewith the code clerk which could be continued in Moscow.The American Embassy code clerk referred to above wasundoubtedly John GARLAND and the train manifest lists John GARLANDand Viktor KOLOSOV (Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV) as passengers on thesame train from Helsinki to Moscow. NOSENKO is aware of theidentity of John GARLAND but claims no knowledge of the above tripof KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, although being well aware of a previous trip.NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the First Section specificallycharged with work against code clerks, should have been aware of theNovember 1960 trip of KOSOLAPOV to and from Helsinki. His lack ofknowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activitiessuch as his trip to Cuba in November-December 1960 but it_cannot beinterpreted as evidence NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB since, ifhe had been, the KGB should have briefed NOSENKO on the trip ofKOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, as this was an event theKGB knew GOLITSYN was aware of.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 105]
SECRETA theory which has previously been given consideration and warranted full consideration was that if NOSENKO was dispatched, his mission was to confuse leads furnished to American Intelligence and/or to denigrate the value of information furnished by GOLITSYN. In connection with this theory, it should be noted that NOSENKO during current interviews has not made any remarks which could in any way be construed as derogatory to GOLITSYN. In addition, NOSENKO does not claim to have any detailed knowledge of the FCD and frequently, when some topic peculiar to the FCD has been broached with NOSENKO, his immediate reply has been to the effect that "I didn't work in the FCD, " or "You should ask GOLITSYN about that."In connection with any consideration of whether the contact of NOSENKO with CIA in Geneva in June 1962 could have been initiated by the KGB as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN, the timing of certain events should be noted. GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961. NOSENKO departed from Moscow in March 1962 for Geneva, Switzerland, where he remained until 15 June 1962.It is felt that it would have been practically impossible if not impossible for KGB officials to complete an assessment of the actual or potential damage which could result from the defection of GOLITSYN.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 106]
SECRETselect NOSENKO as the individual who would be dispatched to counter-act the possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior tohis departure for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, if NOSENKOwas dispatched by the KGB, it would appear that plans for this wouldhave predated the defection of GOLITSYN and that any GOLITSYNaspect could only be a related aspect and not the basis for the originalplan to dispatch NOSENKO. In addition, if NOSENKO was dispatched,it would hardly seem necessary for the KGB to send NOSENKO toGeneva two and one-half months before his first contact with CIA.The theory has also been considered that NOSENKO could havebeen dispatched to confuse and divert American Intelligence and thusto protect an important KGB penetration or penetrations of the UnitedStates Government, particularly CIA. This is a theory which shouldand has been given full consideration, but it is not possible to factuallysubstantiate or refute this theory in the absence of specific informationthat high-level KGB penetrations do or do not exist.Actually, as regards NOSENKO, the primary area which shouldbe given consideration in the above matter is if all the information fromNOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts19SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 107]
# SECRETof American counter-intelligence to determine the identity of andtake appropriate action against KGB penetrations of the UnitedStates Government. The only answer to this question seems to bethat there would be little consolation or assurance to American intelli-gence even if every statement by NOSENKO was accepted at face value.The only specific area in which NOSENKO could be even con-sidered to claim full knowledge is the United States Embassy in Moscow.In this area his statements could be construed as assurance that therewere no recruitments of American personnel in the United States Embassyin Moscow from 1953-December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY"(Dayle Wallis SMITH) and Herbert HOWARD. The basis for thisexpressed opinion of NOSENKO is considered elsewhere in this summaryand analysts may differ as to whether a recruitment could have occurredof which NOSENKO did not have knowledge, assuming that his statementsare made in good faith. It should be noted, however, that at this timethere is no specific information which is in direct conflict with theexpressed opinion of NOSENKO.NOSENKO, as previously mentioned, has never claimed anyparticular knowledge of FCD activities. In addition, he does not claimto be aware of all recruitments of Americans by the SCD. As an20
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 108]
# SECRETexample, he has made it clear that his knowledge of SCD activitiesagainst members of delegations, foreign businessmen, foreign students,and individuals in the USSR on the invitation of a Soviet organization ora component of the Soviet Government is extremely limited and at bestmainly of a collateral nature.NOSENKO does not even claim any detailed knowledge ofactivities of the Second Section (Active Line) of the First Department, SCD,nor does he claim to know all of the cases of which the Chief of the SeventhDepartment was aware. The latter is specifically supported by certainnotes brought out by NOSENKO which are short references to a numberof Seventh Department cases which are identified only by the KGB codename. These notes, according to NOSENKO, were made when he had anopportunity to review a notebook held by the Chief of the Seventh Departmentand constitute the only knowledge NOSENKO had of these particular cases.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 110]
SECRETG. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF A POLITICAL OR ANYOTHER TYPE OBJECTIVE WHICH COULD JUSTIFY A DISPATCHOF NOSENKO BY THE KGB WITH PERMISSION TO SPEAKFREELY TO CIA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGBAND WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFICMISSION OR MISSIONS?SECRET> [Figure: Stamp with text "GROUP 1 Excludes from automatic downgrading and declassification"]0001100
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 111]
SECRETG. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given a specific mission or missions? The above possibility has been given consideration even though the ultimate ramifications are practically incalculable. The conclusion is that as regards NOSENKO, with the single exception detailed below, there is no evidence of a political or other type objective which could be considered of sufficient importance by the KGB to warrant the dispatch of a KGB officer with the knowledge of NOSENKO to speak freely with CIA without his being given a specific mission or missions by the KGB.It is accepted that the Soviet leadership would be entirely capable of instructing the KGB to dispatch a staff officer for permanent defection to United States authorities with no specific intelligence mission and no limitations on the KGB intelligence information he might reveal providing that such act would, in the estimate of the leadership, result in a net political gain for the USSR. For such a possibility to be seriously entertained by the Soviets, however, it would have to involve an issue of major importance to the Soviet leadership and presumably would have to0001101SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 112]
be considered by them as the only or at least the best means of achieving the desired end and of having a very high probability of success.The only area touched upon in any way by NOSENKO which might meet the above requirements is the assassination of President Kennedy: the involvement of Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination and his association with the Soviet Union. Given (a) speculation obtaining at the time that there was Soviet involvement in the assassination, (b) the premise that in fact there was'no Soviet involvement, and (c) a hypothesis that the Soviet leadership was deeply concerned lest erroneous conclusions be drawn which could lead to irréversable actions, it is conceivable that the Soviet leadership might have been prepared to take extreme steps to convince United States authorities of their non-involvement in the assassination. (The passage to the United States Government of the allegedly complete Soviet consular file on OSWALD was, in itself, an unprecedented act.)The NOSENKO case warrants examination in the above regard in light of the fact that among the information NOSENKO provided was "inside" KGB information on OSWALD: information which purportedly2
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 113]
SECRETrevealed the substance of the content of the KGB files on OSWALD. This information clearly indicated that there was no KGB relationship with OSWALD, that the KGB had no operational interest in OSWALD, and that as a matter of fact OSWALD had presented the KGB with a continuing series of problems.Upon examination, however, NOSENKO does not meet the requirements premised above for serious Soviet consideration of a free KGB defection. The following reasons render this unacceptable:a. The chronology, in itself, presents virtually impossible problems for such a theses, viz. NOSENKO's initial approach to CIA in June 1962, 17 months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy.b. While the information from NOSENKO on OSWALD is interesting and pertinent, it is not, in nature, scope, and content, sufficiently convincing for United States authorities to reasonably be expected to conclude that it represented unequivocal proof of Soviet non-involvement.c. It is implausible not to assume that the Soviets would assume that United States authorities, in any examination of the possibility of a Soviet (KGB) hand in the assassination, would presume30001103
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 114]
extremely narrow Soviet compartmentation in such an operation -- a compartmentation which would exclude knowledgeability by any KGB officer other than very senior persons and an individual or group of action individuals specifically concerned with matters of this nature. The KGB career of NOSENKO would not permit even serious consideration that NOSENKO could have logically been fitted into the above very limited category.It is accordingly concluded that the possibility of a politically motivated free dispatch can in the case of NOSENKO be satisfactorily eliminated.The possibility has also been considered that the KGB might have theorized that by dispatching an agent, in this case an officer, with numerous leads to non-valuable or non-current KGB agents or cases, the facilities of the United States Intelligence community would be practically neutralized for an extended period of time. This could only be based on an assumption that the United States Intelligence community would involve a major portion of its personnel and efforts in the investigation and resolution of cases which had little or no current or potential value to the KGB. The above possibility cannot be arbitrarily eliminated without full consideration. It is not believed that
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 115]
SECRETNOSENKO in the absence of any evidence that he had any KGB mission or missions to fulfill comes within the above category, particularly since an overall assessment of his information leads to the conclusion that full exploitation of his information would be quite damaging to the KGB. Consideration of the above possibility must also include an evaluation of the deterrent effect on the prospects of future recruitments by the KGB caused by legal action taken against individuals exposed by information from the dispatched agent or officer. The deterrent effect on others of the conviction and sentencing of persons who have committed a crime or crimes has long been a part of the legal theory of why persons who commit a crime should be imprisoned or punished.The deterrent effect on others of the trials and convictions of William VASSALL, Robert Lee JOHNSON and James Allen MINTKEN-BAUGH should not be underestimated. The KGB also could not have known that information furnished by NOSENKO would not result in the trial and conviction of other KGB agents or recruitments concerning whom NOSENKO had some knowledge.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 116]
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[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 117]
# SECRETH. IS THERE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTACTS OFNOSENKO IN 1962 OR IN 1964 WITH CIA WERE KNOWN TO THEKGB PRIOR TO HIS DEFECTION OR THAT NOSENKOWAS EVER BRIEFED BY THE KGB RELATIVE TO HIS BEHAVIOROR KGB OBJECTIVES DURING THESE CONTACTS ORAFTER HIS DEFECTION?![GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 118]
SECRETH. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection? The conclusion is that there is no evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection and that NOSENKO was never briefed in any manner by the KGB.The basis for the above conclusion is substantially contained in previous sections. It is being treated here as a separate area of interest since it is a sufficiently important area as to warrant individual consideration.It is recognized that since positive factual confirmation such as the KGB file on NOSENKO is not available, any conclusion concerning whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB can only be based on the full review of available information from NOSENKO, collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the individual analyst concerning the significance or non-significance of each item of available information.The conclusion that the contacts of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962 and 1964 prior to his defection were not known to the KGB is![GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]SECRET