Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 36]
# Top Secret(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)resealed the packages. LEBEDEV said that they also placed some radioactive substance, with the help of the American agent, in the lock of the vault door; when the substance was removed, they could pick the lock. They did the same thing [used some radioactive substance] to the safe in the vault. Before everything was finally ready, the Special Section technicians had to visit Paris several times. The first time was the beginning of 1962. The Paris Residency couldn't have launched the operation before 1962, because they couldn't do it without the help of Special Section technicians and the latter did not travel to Paris in 1960 or 1961.Entry into the vault area was first achieved after the agent used some radioactive substance to determine the combination. The agent also photographed the lock for KGB study. Subsequent entries were always made between two and five o'clock in the morning. The agent removed documents from the vault and delivered them to his KGB case officer, who in turn passed them to Special Section technicians. The envelopes were then opened, photographs were made, the documents were repackaged, and the envelopes were given back to the case officer for return to the vault. Thereafter, the Paris Legal Residency pouched the films to Moscow, and the technicians themselves left Paris until the next opportunity for entry.The KGB officers were able to complete the whole operation during the agent's night duty. During this time, they had to pick up the materials, drive some place ("maybe the Soviet Embassy") open the documents, photograph them, close them again just as they were, and return them to the agent. The KGB could not specify which documents the agent was to bring out; the fact that all the documents had to be opened shows that they were sealed when they were received from the agent.Since he heard that almost all of the material obtained was of interest to the Ministry of Defense, NOSENKO concluded that it came from a military installation. The agent couldn't bring out a great deal of material, only what he could hide on his person. From what the KGB technicians said, NOSENKO thought the agent was not alone on duty. The technicians said that "the agent explained [to co-workers] that he is going out for coffee or a sandwich", and that "he is gone for only 5 or 10 minutes".
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 37]
# Top Secret(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)The last time the vault was entered was in the fall of 1963. At about that time the agent, a military man, received a promotion and was relieved of his night watch duties. (The agent was scheduled for rotation to the United States but, with his promotion, he had obtained an extension until May 1964.) Although the agent was still active in January 1964 and was still assigned to the same military post, he had lost access to the classified documents. The information obtained from the agent's vault was highly sensitive and so valuable to the KGB that the Paris Legal Rezident as well as several case officers there had been rewarded for their part in the operation.Before leaving Moscow for Geneva in January 1964, NOSENKO had been told that the technician FOFANOV had been sent to Paris in the KGB hope that the agent would be able to re-enter the vault again before his transfer to the United States in May. When NOSENKO visited the Soviet Embassy in Paris on 19 January 1964 while en route to Geneva, FOFANOV was on duty at the entrance and NOSENKO chatted with him. FOFANOV said he "was not doing good" and he "would probably be sitting there until May", but he had hopes "that something might happen".The American agent was getting paid by the KGB and he was recruited with the promise of a substantial sum of money. NOSENKO didn't know if he was recruited in Paris or if it was even a formal recruitment, nor what plans the KGB had for him after he left Paris.NOSENKO learned of the case "in little pieces" at separate times from various members of the Second Chief Directorate Special Section who participated in it, principally LEBEDEV or KARETNIKOV in Moscow, and FOFANOV later in Paris. [Under intensive questioning, NOSENKO has also alleged he learned of the case from IONOV, the Chief of the Special Section.] NOSENKO explained that he knew LEBEDEV and KARETNIKOV from their visit to his office to discuss technical installations at new tourist hotels, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 38]
# Top Secret(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)Comment: NOSENKO'S lead was identified as Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSON, who served in the period 1962-1963 at a military courier station at Orly Field, Paris. JOHNSON confessed to KGB recruitment of himself and his wife, his recruitment of James Allen MINTKENBAUGH, and the latter's subsequent collaboration with the KGB. Mrs. JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH have corroborated JOHNSON's statements.NOSENKO is apparently unaware of JOHNSON'S earlier (since 1952) involvement with the KGB in Berlin, the United States, and in Orleans, France. With respect to the 1962-1963 surreptitious entires of the courier station vault, however, JOHNSON's admissions coincide with the information provided by NOSENKO, with no significant differences."SASHA" (KGB cryptonym, identity unknown)When NOSENKO announced in Geneva in 1964 that he was going to defect, he was told that as a consequence additional persons in CIA would be informed of his case and he was asked to search his recollection for any evidence of a KGB penetration of CIA. NOSENKO knew of none in CIA, but he recalled a KGB agent, an American known as "SASHA", who was a member of a U.S. military intelligence organization.NOSENKO's InformationNOSENKO learned of "SASHA" from M.A. SHALYAPIN, the KGB officer who, while assigned to the First Chief Directorate and working in Berlin, recruited the agent in 1955-1957. "SASHA" who had been recruited by financial inducements, had officer status; he wore civilian clothes to his meetings with his KGB handler and he could have been either a civilian or military intelligence officer. "SASHA" returned to the United States "in the 1960's" or "in 1962". "SASHA" was stationed in the United States at the time of the Cuban missile crisis but had been unable to provide the KGB any
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 39]
# Top Secret(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)relevant intelligence of any significance. NOSENKO thought that "SASHA" served as a department chief in intelligence when he was re-assigned to Germany in November 1962 early 1963.NOSENKO met SHALYAPIN for the first time in September or October 1962 [after NOSENKO's first visit to Geneva and initial contact with CIA) through his friend, Yu. I. GUK. GUK had known SHALYAPIN when they had served together in the First Chief Directorate in Moscow. SHALYAPIN had served in the United States, Uruguay, Berlin, and Cuba. In 1962 he had been assigned to the Latin American Department of the First Chief Directorate, as a case officer. He retired from the KGB and through NOSENKO's intervention with Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV, SHALYAPIN obtained a position with Inturist. Presumably out of gratitude to NOSENKO, SHALYAPIN felt free to talk, and over drinks he expressed his bitterness at his treatment by the First Chief Directorate which, without him, would not have had the agent "SASHA" in Germany "at that time" [1963]. NOSENKO heard such details as he knew of "SASHA" in the course of several such talks with SHALYAPIN.Under intensive questioning on the "SASHA" case NOSENKO retracted his statement that he had first heard of the case from SHALYAPIN, though maintaining that he was sure he had discussed the case with SHALYAPIN "at some time". Pressed to identify his first source, NOSENKO then cited several officers--some First Chief Directorate, some Second-who could have told him about it because they were likely to know of it though none of them was actually involved in the operation. Ultimately NOSENKO refused to commit himself. on this point, saying he did not remember from whom he first learned of "SASHA".Comment: "SASHA" has not been identified.29Top Secret0001300TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 40]
# Top Secret(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)William VASSALL ("KGB Agent in the British Admiralty")Asked in the June 1962 meetings with CIA if he was familiar with the case of George BLAKE, the former KGB agent in MI-6, NOSENKO replied that he knew of another, more important, KGB agent who was employed in the British Admiralty.## NOSENKO's InformationThe KGB has now (in 1962) an agent in a high government position in London who provides most valuable information, some from NATO intelligence services' conferences. The agent was recruited in Moscow in 1956 or 1957 on the basis of a homosexual compromise. In Moscow he was "a First Secretary" or "chief of protocol" of the British Embassy. After leaving Moscow he became an assistant to the Minister, or "something like that" in the Admiralty. "He may be an assistant, chief of the secretariat, but he's close to the Minister. All papers for the Minister go through him. He's not an intelligence officer. He is meeting with the KGB now." Several KGB officers received the Order of Lenin for their part in the operation, including the London Rezident RODIN. NOSENKO learned of the agent's existence, but not of his identity, from his friend and colleague in the Second Chief Directorate, V.A. CHURANOV, who had made the recruitment while chief of a section in the British Department.Comment:GOLITSYN had earlier provided a lead to a KGB agent who was the source of Admiralty documents which GOLITSYN had reviewed in KGB Headquarters. On the basis of that lead, British security authorities on 11 June 1962 passed to CIA a list of twenty suspects, including VASSALL. On 17 June CIA gave the British authorities a preliminary report on NOSENKO's information, on the basis of which the twenty-man list was reduced to VASSALL and one other suspect. Full
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 41]
# Top Secret(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)Comment: (Continued)details of NOSENKO's information were passed to British authorities on 20 August, and on 12 September 1962 VASSALL was arrested. He promptly confessed.VASSALL's confession confirmed what NOSENKO had reported. He had been recruited in Moscow in 1955, after a homosexual entrapment, by two KGB officers, one of whom he identified as CHURANOV. He continued to collaborate with the KGB after returning to London, first in his job in the Admiralty Naval Intelligence Division, as clerical officer assistant to the Civil Lord's private secretary, and finally, as an employee in the secretariat of the Naval staff. In London he was met by KGB officer "KOROVIN" who has been identified as London Rezident RODIN. VASSALL's last meeting with the KGB in London was on 17 August 1962. At the time of his arrest in September he had, in preparation for his next meeting on 30 October, fifteen rolls of film containing 140 photographs of classified Admiralty documents.## KGB Audio Attack on the West German EmbassyIn 1962 and 1964 NOSENKO reported on KGB microphones concealed in several Western embassies in Moscow. Aside from the American Embassy (see p. 225), he furnished the greatest detail on the microphones in the West German Embassy.## NOSENKO's InformationThe KGB was able to enter surreptitiously every embassy in Moscow, with the exception of the American and British Embassies. It had been particularly successful with respect to the West German Embassy. KGB microphones monitored the West German Ambassador as he dictated his reports or held discussions with diplomatic colleagues, including American Ambassador Thompson. The microphones were operative during the period 1959 through 1961, and the KGB monitored then-Ambassador Kroll's dictation of cables, dispatches and31# Top Secret0001302TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 42]
# Top Secret(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)conversations as well as passages of a book he was writing on the Soviet Union.NOSENKO learned of the KGB microphones either from O.S. BUBNOV, Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate's Third (Austria and Germany) Department, or Mikhail SKORIK, Chief of that Third Department's First Section. In 1960-1961 Tatyana GRISHNYAT brought from the Operational Technical Directorate to NOSENKO in the American Embassy Section daily monitoring reports from microphones in the American Embassy. On such occasions she had a much larger volume of material addressed to the Third Department, from which NOSENKO concluded that the KGB was even more successful in monitoring the West German Embassy than it was the American Embassy.Comment: NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. Independent of that information, however, West German authorities learned in 1963 that their technical security officer in Moscow had been recruited by the KGB. They surmised that the recruitment may have taken place as early as 1956. In August 1964 the leader of a technical search team was seriously disabled by mustard gas poisoning, presumably at the hands of the KGB. In 1965, finally, another search team completed a "tear down" of the West German Embassy, in the course of which two separate audio systems with 24 microphones were found, as well as 27 microphones in the residence of the Ambassador. In addition, evidence was found indicating that the Embassy had been the target of a sophisticated electronic attack against its cipher machines and its acoustic room.NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB microphones were operative in 1959 and his sourcing of his information to the periodic visits of Tatyana GRISHNYAT to the American Section, are contradictory. NOSENKO claims he was not in the American Section until 1960.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 43]
# Top Secret(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)"ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH)When contacting CIA in 1962 NOSENKO offered to sell information about two KGB operations, one of which he knew only under the KGB cryptonym "ANDREY", a KGB agent recruited in Moscow in 1949 or 1950 who in 1962 was working in Washington "near ciphers".NOSENKO's Information-1962"ANDREY" was a U.S. Army sergeant who was spotted for the KGB by "QUEBEC" (Roy RHODES). [RHODES served in Moscow from April 1951 to July 1953. He dated his own recruitment by the KGB as January 1952.] RHODES was still in Moscow when "ANDREY" was recruited by the Second Chief Directorate, although RHODES was not aware of "ANDREY's" recruitment. The KGB approach to "ANDREY" was based on "women and money"."ANDREY" worked satisfactorily in Moscow for the KGB, providing "materials" and information on ciphers. He promised that he would cooperate with the KGB in future assignments abroad, but would not work with them in the United States as he did not want to "sit in the electric chair". He was paid well for his cooperation in Moscow. The KGB wanted to pay him more but he refused; he said he could not plausibly explain the possession of too much money. When the KGB offered him diamonds and other gems for later sale, he did not take them, telling his case officers that possession could arouse the attention of the American police. In 1950 the agent left Moscow for the United States. The KGB waited for him to reappear in some other country, but he did not. Finally, in 1955, the KGB sent V.M. KOVSHUK, the then-Chief of the American Embassy Section of the Second Chief Directorate, and a participant in "ANDREY's" recruitment in Moscow, to the United States to find the agent. KOVSHUK travelled under the alias "KOMAROV", under the cover of either Second or Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 44]
# Top Secret(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)KOVSHUK, with the help of the KGB Legal Residency in Washington, learned where the agent was living, identified his automobile, and contacted him at the end of 1955 or the beginning of 1956. KOVSHUK had looked for him a long time. He found where "ANDREY" parked his car, but "ANDREY" lived in a place where there were many other people and it was difficult to get close to him. At first "ANDREY" was frightened and refused to work, but when at the third contact he was offered $1,000, the agent accepted the money from KOVSHUK because, due to his gambling, he was again in financial straits. From that point on he worked well with the KGB. He again provided good information, information considered important by the KGB. When KOVSHUK found him, "ANDREY" was working in the Pentagon and he was still working there in 1962.In reference to his *modus operandi* for meetings with "ANDREY", KOVSHUK knew he was under surveillance by the FBI. His meetings always took place in cars. KOVSHUK would lose his surveillance the day before the meeting and travel outside of Washington where he would wait by the highway; "ANDREY" would drive by and stop, KOVSHUK would sit with him in the car, receive "ANDREY's" information, and give him the money. Then KOVSHUK would get out, and the American would drive on.The KGB officer who compromised Rudolf Ivanovich ABEL [Reino HAYHANEN, who defected in Paris in May 1957] also provided the information leading to the arrest of Roy RHODES. When RHODES was under investigation, "ANDREY" was called as a witness because he had worked with RHODES in Moscow. "ANDREY" was the only such witness called, and he was called upon several times to tell how RHODES had behaved in Moscow. "ANDREY" could be identified as the only person who testified at the trial. During this investigation of RHODES, "ANDREY" stopped meeting KGB officers, because he was afraid he too would be exposed and arrested. "ANDREY" may have feared that RHODES was involved in his own recruitment, or he may merely have been panicky because he knew he could be accused of the same thing as
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 45]
# Top Secret(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)RHODES. Little by little, however, "ANDREY" resumed his meetings with the KGB, "having little other choice".KOVSHUK turned "ANDREY" over to a member of the Washington Legal Residency and returned to Moscow. NOSENKO did not know who succeeded KOVSHUK as the handler, but KOVSHUK's successor eventually turned the case over to N.G. BAGRICHEV, who concluded his tour in Washington in 1961. NOSENKO did not know BAGRICHEV's successor, but asserted that there must have been one since. "ANDREY" was still working with the KGB in 1962.NOSENKO's Information-1964While continuing to associate "ANDREY's" recruitment with RHODES' presence in Moscow, NOSENKO in different discussions of the case asserted that "ANDREY" was recruited in "1948-1949", "in 1952 or earlier", or "in 1953"."ANDREY" had been recruited by KOVSHUK and N.M. BORODIN. After returning to the United States, "ANDREY" worked at the Pentagon, "in codes", but by the time KOVSHUK recontacted him in the United States he was nearing the end of his enlistment, and he was working in an Army recruiting office. He was still working in the recruiting office when BAGRICHEV took over the case from KOVSHUK.It was not RHODES' trial at which "ANDREY" appeared, but he was among persons called during the pre-trial investigation. "ANDREY" was called just once, and he was scared to death. "ANDREY" did not testify at the RHODES trial.In Moscow, "ANDREY" had explained to the KGB how the code machines in the Embassy worked and may have given the KGB parts of code machines such as "discs" [sic, meaning rotors]. Aleksandr SELEZNEV, a deputy department chief in the Communications Directorate of the KGB, had been involved in the "ANDREY" case: NOSENKO first saw him in 1953 during the period that "ANDREY" was working for the KGB in Moscow. SELEZNEV came to meetings in the American Department to discuss and plan KGB meetings with "ANDREY". The reason for SELEZNEV's presence was that the case officers were not technical specialists, and SELEZNEV would supply them with350001306TS No. 197124# Top SecretCopy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 46]
# Top Secret(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)questions to be asked of "ANDREY". Since SELEZNEV came to these meetings in civilian clothes, whereas NOSENKO later saw him in uniform in his visits to the American Department, NOSENKO speculated that SELEZNEV may have attended some of the meetings with "ANDREY". Although NOSENKO did not know how the KGB exploited him, he repeatedly emphasized "ANDREY's" great importance to the KGB during the time he worked for them in Moscow. "Thanks to his help they were able to read your State Department codes. To date we have never been able to read your military codes..." "ANDREY" brought no military code material to the KGB, only State Department material. Mainly, he described the operation of code machines and what daily or other periodic settings were made."ANDREY" supplied valuable material from the time that the first recontact was made in the United States until he ceased meeting the KGB because of the RHODES trial. Again, after the trial, he was able to furnish good material. This was true both while KOVSHUK was handling him and while BAGRICHEV was the case officer. Between June 1962 and January 1964, while NOSENKO was in Moscow, he heard that "something is going wrong with this operation".Comment: "ANDREY" was identified as former U.S. Army Sergeant Dayle W. SMITH, who served as a code machine mechanic while assigned to the office of the U.S. Military Attache in the Embassy in Moscow from April 1952 to April 1954. NOSENKO's information has been confirmed as substantially correct by admissions of Roy RHODES and Dayle W. SMITH ("ANDREY"). RHODES informed the FBI in a 1963 interview that among other American enlisted personnel of the Embassy in Moscow, he reported on SMITH to the KGB. After denying involvement with the KGB in interviews with the FBI in 1964 and 1965, SMITH admitted that he had been approached by the KGB in Moscow in late 1953, that he had been offered a large sum of cash and gems in exchange for classified information concerning Embassy cipher systems, and that he had provided
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 47]
# Top Secret(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)Comment: (Continued)the KGB with a mock code machine rotor. He further acknowledged that he had been recontacted by the KGB in the United States in 1957, where he met KGB officers regularly until September 1962. He identified by photograph all of the KGB officers described by NOSENKO as having taken part in the operation. NOSENKO "cannot be certain" that he did not know about "ANDREY" while he served in the Embassy Section in 1953-1955, and when pressed to describe specifically the source of his information, he invariably indicated that he learned of the American agent later, informally from KGB colleagues.Edward Ellis SMITHNOSENKO's InformationIn the context of a 1962 discussion of KGB operations against the American Embassy in Moscow, NOSENKO was asked whether he knew "about SMITH". He answered: "SMITH? The red-head. Listen, he headed the FBI, he was a colonel and headed counterintelligence." NOSENKO went on to describe the mounting of a blackmail operation, of which he was the case officer, against SMITH (whose KGB cryptonym was "RYZHIY", or "REDHEAD").SMITH had been sleeping with his Russian housemaid, who was an agent planted on him by the KGB. When the KGB was unable to obtain actual incriminating photographs, she was instructed to take photographs of herself on SMITH's bed. These were then combined with photographs of SMITH to produce photomontages, copies of which were delivered to SMITH together with a letter inviting him to a meeting with the KGB. SMITH came. The KGB was represented at the meeting by GRIBANOV, NOSENKO and one other officer. At this initial meeting SMITH was not interrogated nor asked for classified information. SMITH agreed to come to further meetings.37Top Secret0001308TS No. 197124Copy 10