Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 225]
was to discuss the possibility of temporarily discontinuing certainEmbassy "points" controlled by the First Section, and permittingPETROV to use these "points" against targets of his section.According to NOSENKO, PETROV brought to the meeting a listof names of certain targets to which he wished to give technical cover-age. During the meeting, KOVSHUK apparently took a piece of paperwhich PETROV had and wrote on it a list of active microphones in theUnited States Embassy and residences. When the meeting ended,NOSENKO had this paper and he took it back to his office.Contained on the reverse side of the paper were the followingnames in Russian: (LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN, and Sipe BURTIN.The name A. A. MIKHAYLOV was listed next to the name of (LUBIN,and the name of Y. E. CHERNETSEV was listed next to the name ofSMITH, NOSENKO has explained that LUBIN, SMITH, Will BURTIN,and Sipe BURTIN were among the targets of PETROV; and MIKHAYLOVand CHERNETSEV were officers of the Second Section.NOSENKO stated he knew nothing more about the four non-Sovietnames except that they were targets of PETROV. NOSENKO stated thathe could not be positive of the date of the meeting other than that itoccurred while KLYPIN was Chief of the First Department. (Accordingto NOSENKO, KLYPIN was succeeded by Sergey M. FEDOSEYEV as
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 226]
Chief of the First Department in circa mid-1961.) Research in regardto the four non-Soviet names leaves no doubt that (LUBIN is George)LUBIN; and that Will BURTIN and Sipe BURTIN) are correct names,with Sipe being the wife of Will BURTIN) All three are Americancitizens who were in the USSR circa June 1961. SMITH, at this time,has still not been identified.In view of the above, it has been possible to deduce the dateof the meeting called by KLYPIN as circa June 1961.According to NOSENKO, the piece of paper described abovewas placed by NOSENKO with other notes he kept between the pagesof a bound volume which NOSENKO calls a "working copy." This,according to NOSENKO, was an accountable, registered notebookissued to all officers in which they were supposed to write all theirnotes, destroying any other notes.According to NOSENKO, he, like many other officers, did notcompletely follow regulations and the tendency was to frequently putloose notes in the notebook so that the notebook often acted as a filerather than being used in the way required by regulations. NOSENKOhas stated that when he left the First Section he took various noteswith him to the Seventh Department; these included notes he had draftedconcerning certain First Section activities for use in briefing FEDOSEYEVG00121050
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 227]
when FEDOSEYEV succeeded KLYPIN, and notes he had prepared forlectures to the Seventh Directorate. According to NOSENKO, he didnot intentionally take the particular paper pertaining to microphones;it was just in the group of notes he took along when he went to the SeventhDepartment.In consideration of the above explanation by NOSENKO, it shouldbe noted that he also brought with him in 1964 his notes for the briefingof FEDOSEYEV and certain notes he obviously had also prepared whilein the First Section; e.g., his notes for a lecture to the SeventhDirectorate in regard to a "mass surveillance" on the AmericanEmbassy.By including a section (pages 236 - 239) on the knowledge ofNOSENKO of the KGB cryptologic attack on United States Embassycommunications, the previous summary implies that there is somereason to question his information on this subject.NOSENKO has asserted that the KGB had never succeeded inreading enciphered communications of the Service Attaches; however,he said that the Eighth Directorate (the unit of the KGB responsible forcommunications intercept and cryptologic analysis) was reading someUnited States Embassy traffic. While it is open to question to whatextent knowledge of successes of the Eighth Directorate would be known
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 228]
to anyone in the First Section of the First Department, within the scope plausibly available to NOSENKO in his claimed position, there is no reason to question his statement.In the previous summary (pages 240 - 248), the failures or successes of NOSENKO in identifying CIA officers are noted. With the exception of ABIDIAN, NOSENKO does not claim to have been the responsible case officer for any of the listed CIA officers. According to his claim, NOSENKO should have been aware that William N. MORELL was CIA, but he has never identified MORELL as CIA. Surely KOVSHUK knew MORELL was CIA but why NOSENKO is not aware MORELL was CIA is not known. It has already been established, however, that NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief, was not aware of all of the activities of KOVSHUK.As regards some of the other listed individuals, a few remarks are appropriate.(a) NOSENKO has never indicated any knowledgePaul GARBLER was CIA, and yet GARBLER was surely known to the FCD as a CIA employee before going to Moscow. It is presumed that the FCD furnished the SCD at least basic information that Paul GARBLER was."American Intelligence." GARBLER, however, did not
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 229]
arrive in Moscow until November 1961, only a month before NOSENKO left the First Section for the Seventh Department.(b) The previous summary stated that according to NOSENKO the KGB did not suspect that Eugene MAHONEY was a CIA officer, yet he was a CIA officer. It was also stated that MAHONEY reported the presence of intensive KGB surveillance while in Moscow from October 1960 to September 1961. The "intensive KGB surveillance" is based on statements of MAHONEY and may possibly be more a reflection of his personal concern over surveillance rather than what was actually happening.(c) Steve WASHENKO was correctly identified by NOSENKO as CIA. William HORBALY was CIA and identified by NOSENKO as suspected of being a CIA officer or cooptee.(d) Lewis BOWDEN, who was not CIA, was, according to NOSENKO, suspected of being a CIA officer.George Payne WINTERS, Jr., has stated that KOVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOWDEN was the "FBI officer" in the Embassy. The Cherepanov Papers indicate53
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 230]
that the KGB had reasons to consider the activities ofBOWDEN with suspicion.It is not believed that the listed failures of NOSENKO to identify CIA officera ars of particular significance in establishing that he was or was not Deputy Chief of the First Section. There are too many un- known factors which would need to be considered. Despite our assumptions as to what the KGB knows, it is possible that (a) the KGB did not know of the CIA affiliation of these people, (b) the information known to the KGB was not available at the First Section, First Department, level, or (c) information available to the Chief of the First Section or !to a specific case officer was of no official concern to NOSENKO and was not made available to him. The last of these possibilitias is suggested in spite of claims by NOSENKO that he had to have known whatever was known in the Section regarding CIA identifications; a propensity on the part of NOSENKO to exaggerate the area of his own knowledgeability has been seen elsewhere in this case.Pages 252-258 of the previous summary contain a report of the 1960 trip of NOSENKO to Cuba and his 1961 trip to Bulgaria. With regard to the Cuba trip, there is collateral evidence of his travel an described by NOSENKO, and there is no substantive reason to doubt his account of his activities on this trip. The statement was made in
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 231]
the previous summary that the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba in 1960damaged his claim that he was supervising operations against Embassycode clerks at the time. To accept the validity of this judgment is tosay that no supervisor in the SCD would be permitted to make a tripabroad unrelated to his supervisory function, a judgment for whichthere is no supporting evidence.As regards the trip of NOSENKO to Bulgaria in 1961, for whichthere is no collateral information, the previous summary concludedthat his account of the trip was untrue and argued that such a trip toBulgaria, if it did take place, at a time when he claimed the operationagainst STORSBERG was reaching a climax and his subordinates were"apparently planning to exploit KEYSERS' newly-discovered vulnerability, "it would indicate that the presence of NOSENKO in Moscow was dis-pensable. There was, however, no evidence that NOSENKO did nottravel to Bulgaria and only highly speculative reasoning as to why hisaccount of the purpose of the trip was untrue.As to the STORSBERG case, while it cannot at present be provedthat the recruitment pitch took place before NOSENKO left for Bulgaria,it can be stated, on the basis of reporting from MORONE, that it had tohave taken place before the time NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria.Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning the presence55
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 232]
of NOSENKO in Moscow at the time this pitch was made, it would appear that NOSENKO was comparatively free to go to Bulgaria because this phase of the STORSBERG operation had been completed.As to the KEYSERS case, there is no apparent problem since it is clear that the approach to KEYSERS took place after NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria, and furthermore that the KGB probably did not become aware that KEYSERS was a homosexual, and therefore potentially vulnerable, until just before the pitch was made.In short, there is no reason to believe that the accounts by NOSENKO of his trips to Cuba and to Bulgaria are not essentially true, or that if they are true they necessarily reflect on his claim to having been supervisor of code clerk operations.
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[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 234]
# SECRETF. NOSENKO'S CLAIMS, THAT IN 1962 HE WAS CHIEFOF THE AMERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION ANDWAS THEREAFTER A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SEVENTH!DEPARTMENT, ARE NOT CREDIBLE![Stamp]SECRET0001217
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 235]
# SECRETF. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of theAmerican-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter aDeputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible. (Previousconclusion)The conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO was Chiefof the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) fromJanuary 1962 to July 1962 and that he was a Deputy Chief of the SeventhDepartment thereafter.NOSENKO has stated that, although he was offered the positionof a Deputy Chief of the First Department, SCD, by Oleg M. GRIBANOV,Chief, SCD, and although an order had been prepared and was in thePersonnel Directorate, he declined the proffered position.According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey MikhaylovichFEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKOas a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promote Vladislav KOVSHUK,then Chief of the First Section, to the position. FEDOSEYEV was
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 236]
SECRETwilling to promote NOSENKO to the position of Chief, First Section. However, GRIBANOV did not wish to promote KOVSHUK and NOSENKO considered that under the circumstances it would be better for him to return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to FEDOSEYEV who wanted KOVSHUK as a Deputy.Vladimir Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOSENKO the position of Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department, pending the reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSENKO would become a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDIN. The above explanation of NOSENKO seems plausible and credible and indicates that GRIBANOV, the Chief of the SCD, for reasons best known to GRIBANOV, was assisting NOSENKO in his career in the KGB.This section actually covers two periods in the claimed career of NOSENKO; namely, January - July 1962 as Chief of the First Section, and July 1962 - January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. Since NOSENKO was in Geneva, Switzerland, from March to June 1962, he actually cannot be seriously faulted for not having detailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January - July 1962. The previous summary (pages 268 - 291) contains remarks in regard to the January - July 1962 period, including the period of March - June 1962 when he was in Geneva. Four specific tourist cases00012192SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 237]
are discussed in the previous summary: the cases of Wallace EverettJOHNSON, William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIENSTOCK, and HorstBRAUNS. Apparent conflicts between information from NOSENKO andinformation derived from subsequent interviews with these individualswere cited as evidence impugning NOSENKO. It is not believed that theprevious comments concerning these cases constitute any substantialevidence that NOSENKO did not hold the claimed position of Chief of theFirst Section, Seventh Department, during January - July 1962. Thatthere were KGB operations against JOHNSON, JONES, BIENSTOCK and)BRAUNS has been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all fourindividuals.A few additional remarks in regard to the above four cases arewarranted, not because it is considered that there are any substantialdiscrepancies between what NOSENKO has said and what each individualstated when interviewed, but because they may provide additional clari-fication.In the Wallace Everett JOHNSON case, it was previously notedthat JOHNSON arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961 and that the KGBoperation against him occurred on 5 January 1962. The summary sug-gested that the short lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tend-encies of (JOHNSON were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contraryto the statements of NOSENKO. NOSENKO during current interviews3SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 238]
has stated that the KGB learned of the homosexual tendencies of JOHNSON"by chance" soon after his arrival. "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY," twohomosexual agents of NOSENKO, were at the time operating out of a roomat the Metropol Hotel where JOHNSON stayed. They met JOHNSON thereand reported his apparent homosexual tendencies."In regard to the William Carroll JONES case, NOSENKO duringcurrent interviews has furnished additional information on the KGB operationagainst JONES, including the woman Ludmila BUGAYEVA who was recruitedas an agent to work against JONES and was used in another case. The otherdetails furnished by NOSENKO concerning the JONES case are compatiblewith his claim to having been Chief of the First Section, Seventh Department.In regard to the Natalie BIENSTOCK case, NOSENKO did not claimto have been the responsible case officer but was able to provide enoughspecific information concerning the case to bring about a confession whenshe was interviewed by the FBI. That he did not know all the details con-cerning the BIENSTOCK case could be explained by his claim to have beenChief of Section and not the case officer directly involved with the case.In regard to the Horst BRAUNS case, in the previous summarythe criticism was levied that NOSENKO did not know why BRAUNS visitedthe USSR and was not able to identify any Soviet citizens whom BRAUNSmet in the USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 239]
the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates. NOSENKO, according to the previous summary, was aware that BRAUNS was a former Soviet citizen and the summary stated that his plan to visit relatives was information available to the KGB through his visa application.In regard to the statement that the Seventh Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates, this is not in agreement with current information from NOSENKO. * Cases of "true" tourists, which were normally the responsibility of the Seventh Department, could become the responsibility of another department or KGB component where Soviet relatives were involved. However, if the case was not taken over or assigned by higher authority to another department or component, it was and remained the responsibility of the Seventh Department. The fact that BRAUNS was a former Soviet citizen could very well have made BRAUNS of interest to the Second Section, First Department, or a direction in the Service of the SCD. However, in the absence of an actual reassignment by higher authority, the case would remain the responsibility of the Seventh Department since BRAUNS) was visiting the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. The previous summary also indicated that BRAUNS listed on his visa application that he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad. BRAUNS had a[^1] By 1962 there had been a large reorganization in the SCD and in the Seventh Department. The situation was not the same as in 1959.[^1]:5SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 240]
relative or relatives in Leningrad. Although BRAUNS, when interviewed by the FBI, mentioned a number of items of which the KGB was aware concerning his background and occupation from his visa application, there is no specific reference in these interviews indicating his statement of purpose in visiting the USSR.Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary reviews remarks by NOSENKO on the Boris BELITSKIY case and states that his claimed role in the case was not plausible. There are several specific points made in the summary which imply that NOSENKO was lying about his knowledge of the case. There is adequate reason to believe that NOSENKO exaggerated his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now states he was to give assistance to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling of BELITSKIY in Geneva in 1962 and not to supervise ARTEMOV.The more important aspect and the primary one is the difference in what NOSENKO specifically reported about the BELITSKIY case and information from the actual CIA record of the case. There are major differences and without going into all the details of the case which is very involved, an effort has been made toward determining whether these apparent differences necessarily indicate that NOSENKO was or is lying or whether there is a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case.NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom American Intelligence recruited in London in 1960 or 1961 and that the00012236SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 241]
KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American Intelligenceinto meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR. The previous summary statedthat NOSENKO did not know when the BELITSKIY operation started(Brussels, Belgium, 1958), did not know the nature of the Britishinvolvement, did not know the operational details and contact arrange-ments BELITSKIY had with CIA, and did not know BELITSKIY's patternof activity in Moscow or Geneva.NOSENKO during current interviews has indicated an awarenessthat the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to useBELITSKIY against the British. However, he still has dated the recruit-ment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in London and still states that theprimary purpose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence incontacts with BELITSKIY within the USSR. The latter was consideredcompletely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY was recruited inBrussels, Belgium, in 1958; that three letters had been mailed toBELITSKIY in the USSR in 1959 and early 1960; and that BELITSKIYhad an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR.There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in theBELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent dis-crepancies between the statements by NOSENKO on the BELITSKIYcase and the actual record are a reflection against NOSENKO.7SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 242]
the other hand, there is some reason to believe NOSENKO has furnished the actual KGB version of the BELITSKIY case and that the KGB, at least as of 1962, did not know the true story of the relationship of BELITSKIY with CIA. There is a distinct possibility the KGB believed the BELITSKIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London and BELITSKIY did not then nor has he since admitted to the KGB his association with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium. As a possible reason why BELITSKIY would have told the KGB in 1961 a partial story of his contact with American Intelligence, some at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused BELITSKIY to believe his security was endangered and as a result he told the KGB of certain events in London in 1961, relating these events as being the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA.The following are certain of the points which suggest the KGB actually considered that BELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in London in 1961 and that BELITSKIY may have never told the KGB of the developments in his case prior to 1961:(a) BELITSKIY was in London in April 1960 at which time he was in contact with a British citizen who was also reporting to MI-5. This individual reported information received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 243]
SECRETGeorge BLAKE. (It seems highly unlikely the KGB would ever have directed BELITSKIY to furnish information which may have been a lead to George BLAKE, or at least could have caused the employees of the unit in which BLAKE was employed from June 1959 to August 1960 to come under suspicion as having passed information to Soviet Intelligence.)(b) NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY, after he went to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CIA rather quickly because he met a girl he had previously known whom he was sure was an American Intelligence agent and that she must have reported his presence in Geneva to American Intelligence. (If the BELITSKIY case had been controlled by the KGB from its inception in 1958, the KGB would have known of the internal mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELITSKIY had a cover address outside the Soviet Union through which to initiate contact. However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and then gave only a partial story of what happened in London in 1961, BELITSKIY would not have told the KGB of the internal mail-ings to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he long had a cover address outside the USSR. BELITSKIY therefore00012269SECRET
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would not have told the KGB how he actually made contact with American Intelligence in Geneva in 1962, but very well could have told the KGB he had seen a particular woman whom he had previously known, he was sure she worked for American Intelligence and it was through this woman American Intelligence became aware BELITSKIY was in Geneva.)(c) BELITSKIY in 1962 in Geneva agreed to meet within the USSR an individual representing CIA. However, his agreement was only under certain stipulated conditions, the most interesting of which was that the individual must be unwitting of the true nature of the relationship of BELITSKIY with CIA. In addition, any message to BELITSKIY or any individual who met BELITSKIY must make no reference to any previous meeting of BELITSKIY with CIA.The above conditions are quite explainable if BELITSKIY had not been under KGB control between 1958 and 1961 and in 1961 gave the KGB only a partial story of the 1961 events in London.