Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 321]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHERE- PANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep woods, "where a person could lose himself for life". On the seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku, where he was on his way to the Iranian border.A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department offi- cers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow, interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked why, he said he was "angry at the KGB, very angry", and besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some money in return for the documents. He confessed that on 4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he had given the documents to the American in the entrance hallway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also housed.Because CHEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KGB that if he had detected his surveillants he would have written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof of his guilt.Comment:NOSENKO'S assertions with respect to the CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at the time0001584313Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 322]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## Contents of the CHEREPANOV PackageThe KGB documents in the CHEREPANOV package totalled 103 pages in the original Russian version, divided almost equally between typewritten reports in final form and hand- written draft reports or notes, plus two copies of letters written by Soviet citizens to the American Embassy. The longest single document was a 33-page Top Secret report, dated 18 April 1959, entitled "Operational Conditions in the U.S.A. and the Activities of American Counterintelligence Organs against Soviet Installations and Soviet Citizens in the U.S.A. in 1957-1958". The report was signed by Colonel A. FEKLISOV, [alias FOMIN, the former KGB rezident in Washington] whose title is given as "Chief, First [American] Department, First Chief Directorate". The rest of the documents refer to KGB coverage of various American Embassy and American diplomats in Moscow during the period August 1958 to 15 October 1960. Most of the documents were prepared by or for one senior case officer of the Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, Major V. KUSKOV. (NOSENKO has identified V.A. KUSKOV as an officer of the Second Chief Directorate who shared an office with CHEREPANOV from about 1958 to 1961.) Two reports were on Americans who had left the Soviet Union, Edward L. KILLHAM, Second Secretary from July 1957 to July 1959, and Wallace L. LITTELL, Attache from June 1956 to July 1958. There were operational plans for agent work against four American diplomats once stationed in Moscow, Richard HARMSTONE, Lewis W. BOWDEN, James A. RAMSEY, and George WINTERS. Other documents included were an agent's report of her relationship with WINTERS, a summary of LANGELLE's activities while in the USSR, a list of Soviet citizens whose letters to the Embassy had been intercepted by the KGB, a handwritten summary (signed by CHEREPANOV) of derogatory information on a Soviet youth who had been in touch with American Consul Richard SNYDER, and various hand- written drafts and notes on the foregoing Americans.Top Secret
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)The operational plan on WINTERS, as an example, indicated that WINTERS had already been identified as an intelligence officer, and to ascertain the nature of his intelligence activities, the KGB was to employ round-the-clock surveillance, technical aids metka and "NEPTUNE-80", audio surveillance, and investigation of his contacts among Soviet citizens. The plan reflected that while the KGB judgment was that WINTERS "had a hostile attitude toward the USSR" and that there "was no basis for recruitment", care should be taken not to alarm him and cause him to leave the country prematurely, since there still might arise an opportunity to attempt to recruit him.NOSENKO said that he had never seen the documents CHEREPANOV passed to the Embassy, although he was familiar with their substance.Comment: The information in the CHEREPANOV Papers was substantially consistent with what NOSENKO had said earlier in 1962 regarding WINTERS, LANGELLE, HARMSTONE and Embassy Section operational techniques such as the use of metka.## NOSENKO's Travel DocumentWhen NOSENKO first related to CIA in Geneva in 1964 his knowledge of the CHEREPANOV case, he produced a document (see accompanying exhibit) which he said was his official KGB "temporary duty authorization" to go to Gorkiy Oblast to search for CHEREPANOV. The document, signed by General GRIBANOV, authorized Lieutenant Colonel NOSENKO to travel to Gorkiy during the period immediately before NOSENKO's trip to Geneva, 15-30 December 1963. NOSENKO acknowledged that it was "illegal" to have kept the document and to have brought it with him from the Soviet Union. He did it, he said, to show CIA.315Top Secret0001586TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 324]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT- January 1962-January 1964)Comment:NOSENKO has never provided a satisfactory explanation for his retention of the document nor for bringing it to Geneva. According to an earlier KGB defector, the bearer of a temporary duty authorization is held strictly accountable for the document which has to be turned in with the financial voucher. What-ever NOSENKO's purpose, the effect of presenting the document to CIA was to corroborate his statements about CHEREPANOV and substantiate his claim that he was a KGB lieutenant colonel. NOSENKO was not a lieutenant colonel (see p.350). When he eventually said in 1966 that he was only a captain, NOSENKO was challenged to explain how he came to possess an official KGB document signed by General GRIBANOV and identifying him as a lieutenant colonel. NOSENKO asserted that it came about "by mistake".## Return to Geneva (January-February 1964)NOSENKO was detailed a second time to perform security escort duties with the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference, and he returned to Geneva in January 1964 where he resumed contact with CIA and announced his intention to defect. He brought with him a considerable number of hand-written notes to which he referred when describing to CIA officers KGB operations of which he claimed he learned at KGB Headquarters during 1962 and 1963. His delegation security duties were not onerous. He visited the Geneva Legal Residency daily and met with CIA almost as frequently while awaiting approval of his defection and exfiltration from Switzerland, tentatively scheduled for some three weeks later. A little more than a week after his arrival, however, NOSENKO declared that he had to defect at once, because he had received cabled instructions to return to the USSR immediately. On 4 February 1964 NOSENKO was taken from Switzerland to Germany, and on 12 February he was brought to the United States.316Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
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Top SecretExhibit 3 - Temporary Duty Authorization for Lt. ColonelYuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, 15-30 December 1963FRONT![Seal of the Committee for State Security]Committee for State Security Underthe Council of Ministers, USSR15. December 1963![Document Number] 11933Issued to: Lieutenant ColonelNOSENKOYuriy IvanovichFor duty to: UKGB of Gor'kayaOblast’Length oftemporaryassignment: 15 daysthrough: 30 December 1963Authorization: directive of Chiefof a Chief DirectorateEffective on presentation ofidentity document No.: NK-2513Chief s./GRIBANOV of Directorateof DepartmentCommittee for State Security Underthe Council of Ministers, USSR![Signature of the Head of the Committee]Top Secret0001588TS No. 197124Copy 1
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## Purpose of Geneva TripNOSENKO explained that it was his personal wish that had brought him to Geneva, that he was allowed to travel as "a treat" when it appeared to be the last occasion he might have to travel to the West. [NOSENKO said in 1962 that when he became Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, as he expected to become, he would travel to the West every two or three years.] He had discussed the possibility of the trip in 1963 with then-Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV, and secured his agreement. He also talked with officers of the Soviet Delegations Department, but after it had been decided that he should go, the Chief of that Department, [N.T.) ZHARIKOV, suggested that it might be unnecessary for a security officer to accompany this particular delegation. [A.G.] KOVALENKO, the new Chief of the Seventh Department, supported NOSENKO's assignment as a personal favor. Although at one time NOSENKO said that GRIBANOV approved the trip, he has later asserted that GRIBANOV was not involved and that if GRIBANOV had learned of NOSENKO's plans, he would not have permitted NOSENKO to go.NOSENKO's only mission was to concern himself with the general security of the delegation, as he had done in 1962. He had no specific tasks such as on his earlier assignment (e.g., investigating SHAKIDV or supervising the BELITSKIY operation).Comment: NOSENKO has never satisfactorily explained why a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department would draw an unrelated assignment abroad which would last many weeks if not months. In another context, NOSENKO had described a KGB conference to take place about this time where plans were to be drawn up for KGB operations during the coming tourist season: he acknowledged that he was expected to attend, but nevertheless went to Geneva.317Top Secret0001590TS. No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 327]
# Top SecretEXHIBIT 3 - Temporary Duty Authorization for Lt. Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, 15-30 December 1963REVERSE1.  Командированный не позднее Э-дневного срока по возвращении из командировки обязав представить авансовый отчет об нарасходованных в связи с командировкой суммах.2.  При получении проездного билета предъявить в дел.-дор, кассу командировочное удостоверение для наложения компостера.ОТМЕТКИ О ЛЕБЫВАНИЯ В ПУНКТАХ КОМАНДИРОВКИ(указываются даты прибытияси убыля, заверенные![seal] ArretuПрибыл в. Шам4/7/11-1965Бесплатной квартиройНе пользовался!Har. Maziyerno гомУбыл из г. Шахуньи 17/1-3бесплатной квартирый неAar. Шакунсткого гомОТМЕТКИ УПРАВЛЕНИКАНДЕЛАТКОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ GỐM CHỐC THБесплаОссплатныt kupowПри СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ ССОРУбыл из Москвы "Прибыл в Москву![seal]Нач. секретариатаПечатьФИНОКОМИТЕТА ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИпри СОВЕТЕ МИНИСТРОВ СССРВыдано:Руб.Аванс на расходы по командировке в суммеПеревозочные требования №№005867,005870Талоны на плацкарту №№.Ст. бухгалтерNOTATIONS OF PRESENCE IN PLACES OF TEMPORARY DUTY"Arrived in city of Gor'kiy 16 December 1963""Arrived in city of Shakhun'ye 17 XII 1963 Did not use free quarters"s./Chief of Shakhun'ye Chief Militia Section, Militia Major(İllegible)"Departed Shakhun'ye 17/XII-63 Did not use free quarters"s./Chief of Shakhun'ye. Chief Militia Section, Militia Major(Illegible)"Left Gor'kiy 17 December 1963 Did not use free quarters"s./ ______ (Illegible)0001589# Top SecretTS. No. 197124Copy ______
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## Visits to Legal ResidencyAs in 1962, NOSENKO said he visited the Legal Residency daily. According to strict rules, he explained, an officer in his status (temporary duty assignment which was independent of Residency) should not do so, but his case was exceptional because he was a Deputy Chief of Department and because of the relationship he established in 1962 through the intervention of M.S. TSYMBAL. Illegals Directorate Chief TSYMBAL, NOSENKO related in 1964, was an old friend; they had become acquainted in Moscow before meeting again in Geneva in 1962, when they dined together frequently. TSYMBAL's wife once had taught NOSENKO in school, and TSYMBAL had once offered NOSENKO a job in the Illegals Directorate. NOSENKO asserted that TSYMBAL's introduction of NOSENKO to Rezident GAVRICHEV in 1962 permitted NOSENKO to frequent the Legal Residency in 1964.Comment: In 1962 NOSENKO attributed his access to the Residency to his "old friend Yuriy GUK", not TSYMBAL, He mentioned TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva but claimed no close acquaintance.## Availability for Meetings with CIAIn 1964 NOSENKO behaved as if he had no official responsibilities or any demands on his time, and he was willing to spend all of his time in meetings with CIA. He said that his absence from the Disarmament Delegation could be explained as "security duties" since everyone on the Delegation knew or suspected that he was a KGB officer. From the first meeting on 24 January until 4 February, NSOENKO met CIA officers thirteen times for meetings usually lasting for five or six hours. By mutual agreement, most of the meetings started in the afternoon. On two occasions NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours and several meetings continued until past midnight.Top Secret
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 329]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## NOSENKO's Written NotesAfter returning to KGB Headquarters from Geneva in 1962, NOSENKO said, he had availed himself of various opportunities to record what he learned of KGB operations in order to inform CIA, and to pilfer appropriate KGB documents to which he had access, when he could safely do so. He brought to Geneva in 1964 three KGB documents and a large number of handwritten notes. The latter reflected items which he had. excerpted from various documents to which he had access, principally the Seventh Department Chief's special file containing periodic summaries of all Seventh Department operations. He last had access to this special file, he stated, in connection with his review of it in December 1963 to confirm that it was intact after the CHEREPANOV affair. While the file contained no true names, he claimed he learned such true identities as were contained in his notes by asking KGB colleagues. For safekeeping, NOSENKO said he kept the notes and documents in a wall safe of the office which he occupied alone, as Deputy Chief of the Department.Questioned repeatedly about the KGB operations referred to in his notes, NOSENKO in many instances could not expand on what he had written: He insisted he had written everything he could discover, and knew no more.Comment: NOSENKO's sourcing for the notes does not explain how he learned of the cases described in the notes dating from 1957-1959, a period not covered by the documents NOSENKO claimed he reviewed. Neither can NOSENKO explain why he was not knowledgeable, without the notes, of operations which occurred while he was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department's American-British Commonwealth Section. NOSENKO acknowledges that his access to a personal safe in319Top Secret0001592TS No. 197124Copy 10
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)Comment: (Continued)which to keep the notes was just fortuitous, since neither all offices had such safes, nor even all offices of Deputy Chiefs.## NOSENKO's DefectionOn arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the second Geneva phase, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that after long and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting series, he had decided to defect. He explained that he had recently been promoted to the position of First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, and that because of the stature and responsibilities of his new job, there would be few if any opportunities for him to visit the West in the future. Therefore, he had decided to seize the opportunity at hand and to flee to the United States at once, leaving his family behind. He foresaw no possibility of his wife and children being permitted to leave the USSR for the "next twenty years". NOSENKO told CIA that "the hardest thing is to part with my family". He had, however, carefully considered their fate as the close relatives of a defector, and he felt that, because of his mother's position in Soviet society, no harm would come to them.NOSENKO was told that CIA accepted in principle his decision to defect. NOSENKO felt that it would be best for him to disappear from Geneva without a trace, leaving all his personal possessions behind; he assumed that CIA would exfiltrate him from Switzerland to the United States. He wanted to carry out this plan as soon as possible, but the CIA officers encouraged him--and NOSENKO agreed--to remain in place for at least three weeks more. The reasons given NOSENKO for this request were:- The desire to obtain further information on the local KGB Legal Residency and the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference while he still had access;
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 331]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)- The value of having NOSENKO present when GRIBANOV made a visit to Geneva about 7 February, a visit known to CIA only through NOSENKO;- The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO's in-place spotting of CIA recruitment targets among the Soviet representation in Geneva;- The necessity of making arrangements, acceptable to NOSENKO, for his defection and resettlement.In a three-and-a-half hour meeting on 26 January NOSENKO emphasized that although he agreed that it was necessary and useful for him to remain in place until GRIBANOV visited Geneva, he wanted to defect as soon as possible thereafter.On 28 January NOSENKO reported that GRIBANOV might not be coming to Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman Semichastnyy was apparently reluctant to permit him to travel beyond Vienna. NOSENKO said that he would probably have definite information on GRIBANOV's trip by the end of the week.On 30 January NOSENKO said that there appeared to be little likelihood that GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris. [From 7 to 10 February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris, where he was seen on the street with a Soviet identified by NOSENKO as a KGB counterintelligence officer.] Therefore, he wanted to defect right away. He cited as reasons the emotional strain of any further delay and the fact that he and his case officers were wasting their time working against the local KGB Legal Residency, which had no worthwhile or promising targets. He also felt that nothing of value could be obtained from the Soviet delegation because "Tsarapkin himself doesn't know what he will say until he is told by Moscow the day before". CIA handlers, however, delayed the defection for one week by obtaining NOSENKO's agreement to assist in an audio operation: CIA proposed to install listening devices in the offices of the KGB Legal Residency, and NOSENKO said he would check certain physical aspects of the delegation buildings. As the best time for the defection, he suggested Saturday morning, 8 February, because he probably would not be missed until the following0001594321Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)Monday. This date was tentatively scheduled, and NOSFINKO again repeated his desire simply to "disappear without a trace". He also asked about exfiltration plans.On 31 January NOSENKO reported the results of his reconnaissance of the KGD Legal Residency in connection with the proposed audio operation, which would involve microphone transmitters operating on a carrier current. He told CIA he had accidentally overheard in the Residency that the building used its own batteries and generator, and therefore the scheme would not work. He repeated his willingness to remain in place until the arrival of the CHERFPANOV Papers, (see p.309) which he was told were en route from Washington. He explained that he had been alarmed at the previous meeting because the delegation was supposed to move from its hotel to a Soviet villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappearance would be noticed more quickly. This move, as he had now learned has been postponed pending the arrival of a housekeeping officer from Moscow.At NOSENKO's request on 1 February, it was firmly agreed that the defection would take place on the morning of 8 February. NOSENKO assumed that exfiltration would be by automobile to West Germany and thence by plane to the United States, and his case officers confirmed his assumption.On 3 February NOSENKO reviewed the CHERFPANOV materials. The defection was still scheduled for Saturday, 8 February.NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse from his hotel room in the early afternoon of 4 February and said: "I want to come now and not go back." After arriving at the CIA safehouse he explained that when he dropped by the KGB Legal Residency following the morning session of the Disarmament Conference, he read a cable ordering him to return to Moscow immediately to prepare for a KGB conference on foreign tourism in the Soviet Union. The residency was arranging for a ticket for NOSENKO to fly to Moscow via Paris the following day and a replacement was being readied to assume NOSENKO'S duties as security officer for the Soviet delegation in Geneva. Before he had left for Geneva in January, NOSENKO then related, the Soviet Government had been deliberating the question of expanding foreign tourism in the USSR and had0001595322Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 333]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)agreed to open a number of new cities and tourist itineraries in this connection. Semichastnyy had decided that it was time to call a conference to discuss new "tactics and strategies" for handling the increased number of tourists expected. Since NOSENKO had been placed in charge of the entire conference, he was directed to leave at once to prepare a basic report on the KGB handling of tourists; the report would be read to the conference either by himself or by someone from the leadership of the KGB or the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO explained that he was the only one who could do this job as Lt. Col. A.G. KOVALENKO, the KGB Headquarters Department senior officer, was a relatively new man in this line of operations, having been there only four or five years, perhaps less. NOSENKO also told CIA that "by great coincidence" he had learned, just before the cable arrived, he was being moved to the Soviet villa on the morning of 5 February. He had arranged for a Soviet chauffeur to bring a car around at 0930 hours the next morning for the move. His absence would be noted at that time, and therefore "the main thing is to cross the Swiss border before morning". NOSENKO felt, however, that there would be considerable confusion among the Soviets in Geneva for a time following his disappearance, and that there would be no real concern until the evening. To foster Soviet uncertainty, he had left his clothing lying around his hotel room and had brought no personal effects to the CIA safehouse. NOSENKO estimated the first Soviet queries to Swiss authorities would probably be made late on 5 February or early on the 6th.NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February and remained in a safehouse there until 11 February, when press publicity about the defection and Soviet demands for an immediate interview with NOSENKO dictated that he be brought to Washington as soon as possible. He arrived in the United States on the evening of 12 February 1964.323Top Secret0001596TS No. 197124Copy 10