Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 245]
# SECRETAs previously indicated, the conclusion is there are a sufficient number of unresolved questions in the BELITSKIY case so that discrepancies between information from NOSENKO and the actual record in the BELITSKIY case cannot at present be considered as a reflection against NOSENKO, and there is a distinct possibility the KGB actually did not know the true facts of the BELITSKIY case.The previous summary noted on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGINA was an Intourist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. It also noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKIY "reported to the KGB that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA." The previous summary stated BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent and "CIA did not warn BELITSKIY."There appears to be no doubt at this time that the statement by NOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA, " is a reasonably accurate description of what actually happened in May 1962 during Agency contacts with BELITSKIY in Geneva. The record reflects that BELITSKIY stated SHULGINA had confidentially told him of her status as a KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence while previously in Paris, France.11# SECRET0001228
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 246]
It was determined there was no collateral information which would indicate that the statement by SHULGINA had any factual basis and BELITSKIY was warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behalf of the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY she had been "forcibly recruited by American Intelligence" at a previous date. It was also suggested to BELITSKIY that he should go to the KGB as a loyal Soviet citizen and report the apparent indiscretion of SHULGINA.Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary, in connection with the BELITSKIY case, made reference to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV. It was stated that ARTEMOV had been involved with a series of American tourist agents in the Soviet Union and although NOSENKO was allegedly familiar with ARTEMOV, he was unaware of the involvement of ARTEMOV with American tourist agents in 1958 - 1959. The summary noted this was during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department. Although not specifically stated, the above suggested ARTEMOV was actually in the Seventh Department in 1958 - 1959 and that NOSENKO was not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO has consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned to the First Section, First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approximately 1957.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 247]
A closer examination of the cases described in the previous summary as "CIA American tourist agents," reveals there is no conflict in the involvement of ARTEMOV in these cases and the statement by NOSENKO that ARTEMOV was with the First Section, First Department. As an example, one of the cases is the case of Edward McGOWAN. NOSENKO has furnished information concerning this case, stating it was originally a Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a letter by the individual in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the First Department. There is adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV only became involved after the case was transferred to the First Department.Another of the cases involved the contact of ARTEMOV with a CIA officer who was under Department of State cover in Helsinki, Finland) and visited the USSR on a tourist visa. Such an individual would under no circumstances be considered a true tourist or the responsibility of the Seventh Department, particularly since apparently the individual was even traveling under a diplomatic passport. It is assumed the individual was of interest to the First Chief Directorate and if the First Chief Directorate required or desired support from the SCD, it would normally request the First Department for such assistance and it is extremely unlikely that the FCD would request the Seventh Department for assistance in a case involving an American diplomat.13SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 248]
Pages 332 - 333 of the previous summary contain the basisfor the previous conclusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he was aDeputy Chief of the Seventh Department from July 1962 to January1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal isnot necessary since this conclusion was apparently based on inadequateinformation. During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnisheddetails concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed positionwhich substantiate his claim to having been a Deputy Chief of theSeventh Department from July 1962 to January 1964.An example in support of the statement that the previous conclu-sion was based on inadequate information is the matter of the writtennotes which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964.The description of these notes on page 319 of the previous summary isinadequate, inaccurate, and misleading. Prior to current interviews,an cffort had not been made to obtain from NOSENKO a detailed explan-ation of his notes or of how he obtained the information in the notes.During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed informa-tion concerning all aspects of his notes. This information supports hisclaimed position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and includescollateral support to his claim of being Deputy Chief of the First Section,First Department, in 1960 - 1961.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 249]
Primarily the notes of NOSENKO can be categorized as follows:(a) Short case summaries by the Chiefs of the First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section, Seventh Department. NOSENKO has stated that he was in 1962 - 1963 responsible for supervision over these Sections and that Filip Denisovich BOBKOV, Deputy Chief, SCD, who supervised the Seventh Department, requested a list of all recruited agents of the Seventh Department. According to NOSENKO, the order from BOBKOV was to only retain the files (cases) of agents in tourist firms and that the files of other recruited agents should be sent to the FCD or Archives. NOSENKO has stated that he in turn levied on the Chiefs of the three Sections the requirement of BOBKOV, but also expanded the request to include all 1960 - 1962 cases, not excluding previous cases or cases which had already been given to the FCD. The notes of NOSENKO included handwritten reports from the Chief or Acting Chief of each Section on recruited agents, with information varying from agent to agent and even including some human errors.Many of the above cases had previously been transferred to the FCD, but the remarks of NOSENKO about their
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 250]
inclusion support his statement that he had expanded the original request from BOBKOV so that he would have some "pieces of information to give CIA."(b) Notes by NOSENKO on other cases which he learned of during the 1962-1963 period. Certain of the notes were made from a review of a notebook kept by the Chief, Seventh Department, to which NOSENKO had access on at least two occasions. Most of his notes were not detailed but were sufficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at a later date and yet were somewhat innocuous to maintain before his defection.(c) Notes for lectures to officers of the Seventh Directorate prepared while with the First Department, 1960 - 1961, and the Seventh Department, 1962-1963.(d) Draft report for the briefing of the new Chief, First Department, in the latter part of 1961.(e) One of three copies of an unregistered report prepared by the Chief, Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chiefs, including NOSENKO. This was a briefing paper for use by the Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance before the Collegium of the KGB which was reviewing the activities of the Seventh16SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 251]
# SECRETDepartment. According to NOSENKO, the prepared report was never typed as a formal document.The view has been set forth that NOSENKO took undue risk in carrying written notes with him out of the Soviet Union. An examination of this material suggests that NOSENKO was using extreme care in collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the possession of which might be incriminating or which if he had brought out would have been immediately missed. Instead, he collected a considerable amount of valuable information which he could bring out with little or no fear that a search of his effects in the KGB after his departure for Geneva would disclose that certain material was missing. None of the material was registered and all could have previously been destroyed by NOSENKO.The previous summary stated that NOSENKO brought three KGB documents to Geneva. These were typed papers but none was registered or actually accountable. The reference to three documents was to:(a) The draft report for the briefing of the Collegium which has been mentioned previously.(b) A typed two-page report on several cases. Actually a Chief of Section had typed his notes on cases instead of submitting in handwriting as the others did.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 252]
(c) A second copy of a summary on a KGB agent.NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file kept by the Chief which he reviewed and that he kept one. Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered document and did not contain the usual information as to number of copies typed.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 253]
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[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 254]
# SECRETG. NOSENKO HAS NO VALID CLAIM TO CERTAINTY THATTHE KGB RECRUITED NO AMERICAN EMBASSYPERSONNEL BETWEEN 1953 AND HIS DEFECTION IN 1964SECRET> [Figure: A box containing the text 'GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification']0001236
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 255]
SECRETG. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964. (Previous conclusion)The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO is of the opinion that there were no KGB recruitments of United States Embassy personnel in Moscow between 1953 and December 1963 with the exception of "ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) and Herbert HOWARD, who actually was a USIA employee but did work part of the time in the Embassy.The question here is whether or not the expressed opinion of NOSENKO is sufficiently based on actual knowledge so that this opinion can be accepted as absolute evidence that there were no other KGB recruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time. The only logical conclusion is that the opinion of NOSENKO cannot be accepted as absolute fact and, therefore, there is a possibility that a recruitment could have occurred and NOSENKO not be aware in any way of the recruitment. This should in no way be interpreted as a suggestion that NOSENKO could be lying, but rather that an unbiased observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO in this particular area.The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSENKO should be examined and can be cited as follows.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 256]
(a) During March 1953-late May 1955 NOSENKOwas a case officer in the First Section, First Department,SCD. NOSENKO does not claim that he would have knownthe details concerning any recruitments (other than"ANDREY") in this period, but states if there had beenhe would have heard "something."(b) During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKOwas in the Seventh Department, not the First Department,but continued to have contact with certain officers in theFirst Section, First Department. NOSENKO is of theopinion that if there had been a recruitment in the UnitedStates Embassy during this period he would have heard"something" even though he would probably have learnedfew details.(c) During the January 1960-December 1961 periodNOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section, FirstDepartment, and he has made the categorical statementthat there were no recruitments by the KGB of UnitedStates Embassy personnel during this period of time.He has also stated that if there had been any recruitmentsduring the 1953-1959 period he is sure he would, during1960-1961, have heard or learned some details of the001238case or cases. There is merit to this contention by
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 257]
NOSENKO since the Chief of Section was VladislavKOVSHUK who had been an officer of the First Depart-ment since 1953, actually working in the First Section except for the periods of time that he was in the United States to reactivate "ANDREY" in 1957-1958 and a period of time that he was Deputy Chief of the First Department.(d) During 1962-1963 NOSENKO was again in the Seventh Department. However, he continued to maintain contact with certain officers of the First Section, First Department: in particular, Gennadiy I. GRYAZNOV, who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the First Section, then became Chief of Section, and in the latter part of 1963 became a Deputy Chief of the First Department.According to NOSENKO his relationship with GRYAZNOV was sufficiently close during 1962-1963 that he is sure GRYAZNOV would have furnished NOSENKO some information in regard to any successful recruitments of United States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed out that he learned of the existence of the Herbert HOWARD case from GRYAZNOV in 1962, although it was not until 1963 that NOSENKO heard the name. NOSENKO actually3SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 258]
# SECRETlearned of the name when the First Section, FirstDepartment, needed the services of the SeventhDepartment (Third Section) in obtaining a room in acertain hotel for the Soviet girl friend of HOWARD.In general the above constitutes the basis for the stated opinionof NOSENKO that "ANDREY" and Herbert HOWARD were the onlysuccessful KGB recruitments during 1953 - December 1963. It shouldbe noted that there are no other identified KGB recruitments duringthis period of time which would specifically refute the opinion ofNOSENKO. However, in view of the cited actual basis for the opinionof NOSENKO, acceptance of the opinion of NOSENKO as being anhonest opinion should not be converted into a statement that it isabsolute proof that another recruitment could not have occurred.NOSENKO may be completely correct in his opinion, but sinceNOSENKO was only in the First Department 1953 - 1955 and 1960-1961his opinion that he would have heard "something" about a recruitmentin 1955 - 1959 or 1962 - 1963 cannot be accepted as infallible.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 259]
V
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 260]
SECRETV. ANNEXSECRET> [Figure: image of a stamp with text: GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]0001241
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SECRETANNEXThe previous summary contained an Annex "A" and an Annex"B" covering pages 316 - 435. Limited comments concerning Annex"A," Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex "B,"Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached. In addition,there is an Annex "C" to this summary which is entitled, "TheCherepanov Papers."Attachments:Annex AAnnex BAnnex CSECRET0001242
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 262]
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[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 263]
SECRETANNEX B - SUMMARIES OF CASES NOTEXAMINED IN TEXT
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 264]
## ANNEX B## SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EXAMINED IN TEXTPages 399 - 435 of the previous summary contain summaries on the cases of 49 Americans who, according to information from NOSENKO, were of KGB interest, were approached by the KGB, or were actually recruited by the KGB. It was stated that these cases did not clearly relate to the specific KGB positions held at particular times by NOSENKO and thus could not be usefully employed in examining his claimed KGB service. The sourcing of these cases has been explored in detail during the current interviews with NOSENKO, and it is now possible to establish a certain relationship between these cases and certain claimed positions of NOSENKO in the KGB.It is the conclusion of this summary that any group of 49 cases, as well as all other cases concerning which NOSENKO has furnished information, must be fully considered, not necessarily for the importance or unimportance of the information, but to determine how NOSENKO claimed to have learned of the case and whether his statements concerning each identified case are supported by collateral information. These factors are important in assessing the overall validity of information from NOSENKO as well as being supporting evidence of his claimed positions in the KGB.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 265]
To comment specifically on each of the 49 cases would require a very lengthy paper. Current interviews have developed pertinent additional information from NOSENKO in approximately 40 of the 49 cases. Of even more significance is the fact that NOSENKO has logically sourced his information in all except perhaps four cases. The indicated inability of NOSENKO to completely source all 49 of the cases is not considered significant, particularly since his having knowledge of all the cases is quite compatible with his claimed positions in the KGB. In addition, criticism of NOSENKO for not being able to source all of his information would be unreasonable since it makes no allowance for normal lapses of memory or failure to recall something which was insignificant at the time it occurred.Without citing in detail any of the (49) cases, the ways in which NOSENKO learned of a number of the cases are considered important since there is a direct relationship to his claimed positions in the KGB during 1960 - January 1964, specifically the position of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, 1960-1961; Chief, First Section, Seventh Department, January - July 1962; and as Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, July 1962 - January 1964. Certain examples of the above are as follows:
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 266]
(a) NOSENKO learned of a number of the SeventhDepartment cases which had occurred in 1960 - 1961, aswell as several 1958 - 1959 cases from notes prepared bythe Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section, SecondSection and Sixth Section in 1963. These notes were pre-pared at the request of NOSENKO who as a Deputy Chief,Seventh Department, was responsible for supervision ofthese three sections; and the request was actually an ex-pansion of the original request from BOBKOV, Deputy Chiefof the SCD, for information on recruitments of the SeventhDepartment. NOSENKO brought with him in 1964 the notesprepared by the Chief or Acting Chief of the First Section,Second Section and Sixth Section and his knowledge of manyof the cases which had occurred prior to 1962, particularly1960 - 1961, was limited to information contained in thenotes. From these notes, NOSENKO had prepared his re-port to BOBKOV eliminating those which were not applicableto the request.(b) NOSENKO learned of several 1962 - 1963 cases ofthe First Section, First Department, from Gennadiy I.GRYAZNOV who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief,
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 267]
First Section, First Department. This information was furnished to NOSENKO primarily because of his friendship with GRYAZNOV and not as the result of mutual operations. However, NOSENKO learned of certain of the cases or was furnished additional details as a result of a request from the Seventh Department to the First Section, First Department, for assistance or vice versa.Certain of the 49 cases listed were cases of the Seventh Department prior to 1960 or in 1962-1963 when NOSENKO was in the Seventh Department. Certain of the cases were cases in which the First Section, First Department, was involved prior to 1960 or 1960-1961. The knowledge of NOSENKO concerning these two groups of cases does not materially support his claimed positions in the First Department and Seventh Department, but does support his claimed assignment to the Seventh Department prior to 1960 and in 1962-1963, and his claimed assignment to the First Department in 1960 - 1961.It is difficult to specifically comment concerning these (49) cases since they do not fall into one or two specific categories. Instead, they constitute a rather motley group of cases remaining after completion of the detailed sections of the previous summary. Included are First Department and Seventh Department cases covering a period of approximately five and one-half years. It should be noted, however that the
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 268]
explanation of NOSENKO concerning his knowledge of the (49) cases is both plausible and compatible with his claimed positions in the First Departinent and Seventh Department during 1960 - January 1964.5
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 269]
# I
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 270]
# SECRET## ANNEX C - THE CHEREPANOV PAPERS![stamp: Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]SECRET0001249
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 271]
SECRETANNEX CTHE CHEREPANOV PAPERSPages 309 - 316 of the previous summary contain a description of the Cherepanov Papers, and how Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV passed a package of documents to an American tourist in Moscow in early November 1963. The conclusion, however, was that the assertions of NOSENKO with respect to the CHEREPANOV case were not material to the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, in late 1963.The definite relationship of the Cherepanov Papers to the bona fides of NOSENKO cannot be ignored and must be given specific consideration. If CHEREPANOV was under KGB control when he passed the papers to the American tourist, or if the papers contain "deception information," the bona fides of NOSENKO are subject to very serious question.NOSENKO had personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV who was, according to NOSENKO, an officer in the First Section, First Department.SECRET0001250
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 272]
during 1960 - mid-1961 when he was forced into retirement from theKGB. During the above period of time, NOSENKO claims to havebeen Deputy Chief, First Section, although he does not claim to havehad a direct supervisory responsibility over CHEREPANOV exceptin the absence of the Chief of Section, Vladislav KOVSHUK. NOSENKOalso claims to have participated in the hunt for CHEREPANOV inDecember 1963.Consideration has previously been given to the theory that theCherepanov Papers were passed to Americans by the KGB throughCHEREPANOV to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. This theoryseems to have little credibility since the papers contain no informationwhich would even support the claim of NOSENKO that he was in theFirst Section, First Department, 1960-1961. The papers also containno information which would indicate there was even a Deputy Chief ofthe First Section during 1958 - 1960.Statements by NOSENKO are emphatic that CHEREPANOV wasnot under KGB control, that he passed the papers which it later developedhe had taken from the First Section prior to his retirement because hewas disgruntled with his treatment by the KGB, and that the action byCHEREPANOV caused consternation in the KGB.There is no collateral evidence which contradicts any ofthe statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPANOV. Further, there is