Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 362]
# Top Secret## CHAPTER X## PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENTBecause of the incidence of deranged persons CIA has encountered among many would-be defectors, the question of NOSENKO's mental stability was a matter considered early after his defection in Geneva. From the time of his arrival in the United States he has been under psychiatric observation. In addition, he has undergone psychological examination. The CIA psychiatrist and psychologist, besides being highly-qualified professionals, have both had extensive experience with Soviet Bloc defectors. Their findings were reached independently.## Psychological ExaminationIn April 1964 NOSENKO was administered a series of psychological tests by the CIA psychologist. After monitoring numerous interrogation sessions, the psychologist interviewed NOSENKO for fourteen days during 3-21 April 1965, in an attempt to develop sufficient insight into NOSENKO's personality to permit the obtaining of a truthful account of his life.## FindingsNOSENKO is a rationalizer, a distorter, and an evasive person clearly capable of dissembling for personal reasons. He is not a compulsive liar.. He is inclined to relate what he thinks he is expected to say rather than to tell the truth as he knows it. He lies by design as well as for effect, however, and he does not always embroider just to bolster his ego. He is neither "insane" nor psychotic, and he suffers from no "delusions". NOSENKO's rationalizations are not the product of derangement.355# Top Secret0001625TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 363]
# Top Secret(PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT)## Psychiatric ExaminationSince April 1964 NOSENKO has been under the observation of the CIA psychiatrist. Besides monitoring many of the interrogation sessions, the psychiatrist has visited NOSENKO weekly for the first year, monthly until 1967, and at some- what less frequent intervals since.### FindingsNOSENKO is neither psychotic nor neurotic. Of above average intelligence, he is shrewd, perceptive, and highly adaptable. His memory is not defective. Besides suffering from ordinary lapses of memory, however, he sometimes falsely claims lack of recall. NOSENKO's thought processes are unimpaired; he is rational and fully capable of distin- guishing fact from fiction.## PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT: ConclusionThe findings of the psychologist and psychiatrist dispel the notion that NOSENKO's behavior and his statements are other than willful.![document number] 0001626![page number] 356Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy ______
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 364]
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONSCONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDESNOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of authority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB.operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO'S claims.The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO'S biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his.. accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?0001627357Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 365]
# Top Secret(SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)This examination had led to the following findings, arrived at independently:-NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed.-NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time he claimed.-NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period as he claimed.-During the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section.-NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962.-NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.-NOSENKO has no valid. claim to certainty that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel between 1953 and his defection in 1964.These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidence in each instance.The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence of NOSENKO's *bona fides*. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts of his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claims as a whole unacceptable. While truth and fact in this case frequently cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by fact or probability, or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a *bona fide* defector.358Top Secret0001628TS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 366]
# Top Secret(SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a *bona fide* defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine his true motives for contacting American Intelligence and for providing the information he has given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely consisting of NOSENKO'S own assertions, does not permit unequivocal conclusions. Nevertheless, the question cannot be ignored. The character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that some of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials, and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO'S future all require that at least a provisional judgment be made.Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO'S misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he suffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for simply personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB agent.The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. That NOSENKO is not simply a swindler who falsely claims for personal advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident, we believe, from the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations which he has provided and which could only derive from within the KGB itself.Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the product of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind.It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB officer who served in at least some of the components for some or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exaggerated his positions, rank and access to information, and invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to accommodate the fact that several KGB officers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior0001629359Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 367]
# Top Secret(SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS)positions in the KGB. Also, NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be just a product of his own invention, since these were the subject of comment by other sources.Because none' of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies, none of them renders it untenable.In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his information should be assessed accordingly.0001630Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 368]
# Top Secret## Annex BSummaries of Cases Not Examined in TextThere follow NOSENKO's descriptions of KGB operations involving Americans which do not clearly relate to specific KGB positions he held at particular times and which thus could not be usefully employed in examining his claimed KGB service. The cases include, for example, Seventh Department operations of which he said he learned while serving in the American Department, and *vice versa*, as well as operations conducted by KGB elements other than the Second Chief Directorate. Unless otherwise specified, each entry reflects all of the information NOSENKO provided.ACTOR/PROCTORNOSENKO's InformationAn American known as ACTOR or PROCTOR is a valuable First Chief Directorate agent who travelled overtly to Western Europe and there obtained other documents with which to continue clandestinely to the USSR.Comment: The lead may refer to one Vernon W. PROCTOR who visited the Soviet Union in the summer of 1963. The investigation is not complete. NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in notes he brought to Geneva in 1964.0001631399# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 103/BR
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 369]
# Top Secret(Annex B)ALBINGER, DonaldNOSENKO's InformationALBINGER an American citizen born in 1937, visited the USSR in 1963 and there was the target of a KGB investigation in Sochi because he was believed to be an American intelligence agent. In Sochi ALBINGER was in touch with a KGB agent, "TRAPEZUND".By NOSENKO's account, the ALBINGER case was directed by a provincial KGB element while NOŠENKO was assigned to the Seventh Department in Moscow.Comment: According to the FBI, Donald ALBINGER visited the Soviet Union in 1963 and while there, in Sochi, was associated with one Gazarian OHANNES (sic, probably Oganes GAZARYAN), a Lebanese national who repatriated to the USSR in the 1920's. OHANNES allegedly offered ALBINGER intelligence-type photos which ALBINGER said he refused to accept.ALLOYAN, LawrenceNOSENKO's InformationAn American of Armenian background, ALLOYAN visited the USSR in November 1963 and contacted the KGB. He stated to KGB officers that he had been asked by an American Army captain and military intelligence officer, to inform the KGB of American Intelligence use of the Monterey Language School. The Army captain's name is possibly Hugo VAN KRAKOV, and the KGB planned to contact him. NOSENKO noted the case when ALLOYAN, a tourist, first contacted the KGB in Moscow through a Seventh Department case officer.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 370]
# Top Secret(Annex B)Comment: Interviewed by the FBI in January 1965, [ALLOYAN] denied having been in the USSR in 1963. He stated that he was acquainted with a Hugo [VAN KRAKOW who had a son of the same name, but disclaimed knowledge that the latter was an Army captain.[ALLOYAN] said he had not seen the son for twenty years. The younger VAN KRAKOW was interviewed by the FBI and said that he was discharged from the Army in 1953 as a staff sergeant, and that he was not in contact with [ALLOYAN]. NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in notes brought to Geneva in 1964.[APISSON, Henry]NOSENKO's InformationAn American citizen of Armenian origin, [Henry EPISON (sic) was recruited by the KGB of the Armenian SSR in April 1963, on ideological grounds. The recruitment was believed not to have been firm, however, and the KGB planned to renew it if [EPISON] returned to the USSR in 1964. [EPISON] had access to a military installation in the New York suburbs.Comment: [Henry APISSON], a naturalized American and the owner of a hotel and restaurant near [West Point], N.Y., visited the USSR in 1963. In 1964 he acknowledged having had contacts with Soviet officials in 1963 in Armenia, where he may have conveyed an impression of willingness to see them if they should later visit [West Point]. [APISSON] claimed he did not realize the approach was for intelligence purposes.NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in notes brought to Geneva in 1964.401# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 371]
# Top Secret(Annex B)06ARMSTRONG, RobertNOSENKO's Information06,08ARMSTRONG, the American Ambassador's aide, is known by the KGB to be.having a homosexual affair with a code clerk 08,06 of the Danish Embassy, one Johannes BUHLE. ARMSTRONG is a close friend of another homosexual officer of the American Embassy, Stephen HOFFMAN (see below).06Comment: Recalled from Moscow and interviewed on the basis of NOSENKO's allegation, ARMSTRONG 06 acknowledged the truth of the allegations. Before resigning from the Department of State in August 1964, he asserted that he had had no contact with the KGB while serving in Moscow. NOSENKO provided no source for his infor- 06 mation regarding ARMSTRONG, which was a Embassy Section case at a time when NOSENKO claimed to be serving in the Seventh Department.06BARTHELEMY, Thomas Franklin06NOSENKO's Information06BARTHELEMY twice led American tourist groups to the USSR in 1959, during which visits the KGB assessed him to be an American Intelligence agent. He was subsequently in contact with one V.A. LAINE, a Finn who was a KGB agent.06,11NOSENKO only learned of the BARTHELEMY case and of his 06 contact with LAINE while visiting the Leningrad KGB in 1963. BARTHELEMY's Seventh Department file indicated that he had been under surveillance in 1959 because the KGB had information he had graduated from an intelligence school.402# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 12IBR
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 372]
# Top Secret(ANNEX B)Comment: BARTHELEMY was a CIA contact whose intelligence connections were assumed to have been compromised during his visits to the USSR. He reported his contacts with LAINE to CIA. BARTHELEMY's name appeared in the KGB document on Western tourist operations which GOLITSYN provided CIA.(See p.149.)BERMAN, HaroldNOSENKO's InformationWhile on one of his frequent visits to the Soviet Union, American lawyer and prominent professor of law BERMAN was surrounded by KGB agents, but the KGB "could do nothing with him"Comment: BERMAN is a professor at Harvard University who is a specialist in the Soviet legal system. He has visited the USSR on several occasions for study and research, and he had described several incidents which occurred in Moscow which appear to have been KGB provocations. NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information on BERMAN, nor did he provide the date he acquired the information.BINDER, PeterNOSENKO's InformationThe "top sergeant in charge of America House", BINDER, was involved with a Soviet female employee at America House, with whom at various times he had been intimate in his room. He obtained for her items of clothing from the United States. Since the KGB had been unable to obtain compromising photographs of BINDER and the Soviet girl, it had no means to exert pressure on him, and a recruitment attempt thus failed.403. Top Secret
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 373]
# Top Secret(Annex B)06BINDER, Peter (Continued)NOSENKO later identified the Soviet girl as Galya MORELLI, a KGB agent employed at America House as a dishwasher. Vladimir DEMKIN of the Embassy Section was the case officer working against BINDER, and the Chief of the American Department S.M. FEDOSEYEV participated in the recruitment attempt, in 1962, by which time NOSENKO had transferred to the Seventh Department and thus knew no further details.06Comment: [U.S. Army Master Sergeant Peter BINDER] served as manager of the America House from 16 March 08,09 1961 to 22 January 1963. On 15 January 1963 he reported to Embassy officials that he had been abducted off the street by Soviet plainclothesmen, taken to a Militia station, and interrogated on the substance of a letter alleged to have been written by Galya MORELLI, which his interrogators threatened to send to the Ambassador. The letter alleged that BINDER 06 had lived with MORELLI as "man and wife" from 25 November 1961, had warned Soviet employees against Embassy Security Officer John ABIDIAN, that MORELLI had told BINDER she was pregnant 06 and BINDER instructed her to get an abortion, had engaged in blackmarketing, BINDER had 06 told ABIDIAN's replacement Hugh MONTGOMERY about his affair with MORELLI and MONTGOMERY had told him not to worry about it, and that 06 BINDER had told MORELLI that Embassy Officer Richard C. JACOB was a "well-trained spy" and that she and other Soviets should be wary of him. When BINDER denied the allegations and 06 challenged the interrogators to send the letter on to the Ambassador, he was allowed to go free. 06 BINDER acknowledges that he was intimate with MORELLI and that he gave her gifts of money and clothing; and that she said she thought she was pregnant in February or March 1962; she never mentioned an abortion and made no other demands of BINDER. BINDER404Top Secret0606TS No. 197124Copy 13/32
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 374]
# Top Secret(Annex B)Comment: (Continued) states that MORELLI "disappeared" in June or July 1962, while BINDER was on leave.06 Except for dating the recruitment attempt in 1962 instead of 1963, NOSENKO's fragmentary information coincides with BINDER's account. 06 NOSENKO asserts that the notes brought to Geneva in 1964 contained all information he was able to discover. NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section in 1961, supervising BINDER's and MORELLI's case 06 officers, but he relates his knowledge of the case neither to that period nor to the position he then held.BROCHES, Adam 06NOSENKO's InformationBROCHES, born in 1896, visited the Soviet Union with a tourist group in 1960. He has relatives in the USSR, and he was recruited in September 1960 by the KGB on ideological grounds.Comment: BROCHES was born in 1890. His brother, Alexander, was born in 1896. GOLITSYN reported that a Seventh Department officer told him in 1960 that Adam BROCHES had been a Soviet agent in the 1920's and 1930's in Paris and that when he visited the USSR as a tourist guide in 1959 or 1960 the KGB suspected that he might be on an American Intelligence mission to contact V.M. ZARUBIN, his one-time Soviet Intelligence superior in Paris. According to GOLITSYN, the KGB placed BROCHES under surveil-06 lance and the Chief of the Seventh Department was planning to discuss with ZARUBIN what action the KGB should take.405# Top Secret0001637TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 375]
# Top Secret(Annex B)Comment: (Continued)Interviewed by the FBI, [BROCHES] said that he escorted tours to the USSR three times in 1960, and that on his last trip, in September 1960, he was approached by Soviet officials for information on members of his tour group. [BROCHES] claimed he refused to cooperate and denied that he had ever been a Soviet agent. [BROCHES] said, however, that the allegation might refer to another of his brothers, [Ignacy],now dead.NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964. NOSENKO claimed to have been in the American Department when the Seventh Department recruited [BROCHES].[BUNDARIN, Eugene Peter]NOSENKO's Information[BUNDARIN], born in 1917, the son of a Russian emigre, and an employee of the "Four Winds Travel Agency" in New York City, was recruited by the KGB in 1962 on ideological grounds. He left the Four Winds agency and his case is inactive because the KGB is waiting for him to open his own travel bureau. [BUNDARIN] was handled by Seventh Department case officer V.G. DERA.Comment: [BUNDARIN], born 25 April 1917, the son of an emigre and an employee of the Four Winds agency visited the Soviet Union for eighteen days in 1962. He left the Four Winds agency in 1962 to travel abroad, and he now works for Hermes Travel of California. Interviewed by the FBI, [BUNDARIN] denied any connection with Soviet Intelligence. FBI reports indicate
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 376]
Top Secret(Annex B)Comment: (Continued)06[BUNDARIN] and parents associate with CPUSA members and participate in CP front organization activities.NOSENKO's information was limited to that contained in his written notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964.06CHRISTNER, Robert CharlesNOSENKO's InformationWhile reviewing after his defection in 1964 a list of Americans who had visited the Soviet Union, NOSENKO noted 06 that one [CHRISTNER] had been arrested while touring the Soviet Union by automobile. He did not indicate the source or date of his acquisition of the information.Comment: As described in press accounts of the period and stated in a KGB document on American tourists which GOLITSYN provided, [CHRISTNER] 06 was arrested in the Soviet Union on charges of espionage in the summer of 1961. He had a CIA mission at the time, but he reported that he had managed to maintain his tourist cover throughout his intensive interrogations. In the summer of 1961 NOSENKO claims he was in the Embassy Section of the American Department.06FAIN, ThomasNOSENKO's Information06[FAIN] an "American consul" stationed in [Yugoslavia,] 11 visited Moscow in 1959. During that visit he encountered NOSENKO's agent, VOLKOV, who reported his suspicion that407Top Secret0001639TS No. 197124Copy 107/8R
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 377]
Top Secret(Annex B)FAIN, Thomas (Continued)FAIN was a homosexual. There was insufficient time duringFAIN's visit to arrange his entrapment.FAIN was assigned permanently later in Moscow, and theKGB planned at that time to entrap him with a homosexual.Comment: In a Department of State security interviewFAIN has stated that he recalled no Sovietswhom he had met during his five-day visit toMoscow in 1959, except a female Inturistguide and the Hotel Ukraine receptionist. Hereported no noteworthy incidents during hislater permanent assignment in Moscow.FINK, DavidNOSENKO's InformationFINK is an American professor from Philadelphia andfrequent visitor to the USSR whom the Leningrad KGB hopedto recruit on an ideological basis and through the use of afemale agent. Because of his sister's love affair with aSoviet he was refused a visa in 1963, but the KGB hasarranged so that he will be admitted to the USSR if heapplies again. NOSENKO learned of the case when theLeningrad KGB objected to FINK's being denied a visa:NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department at thetime.Comment: Interviewed by the FBI in September 1964,FINK acknowledged that his sister was tryingto marry a Soviet citizen, but that she hadbeen refused a visa to visit the USSR for thepurpose FINK admitted involvement with afemale in Leningrad, during his visit to the