Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 119]
SECRETnecessarily based in part on a judgment as to whether any of hisactivities or information logically warrant a substantial suspicionthat they were or could be in any part the result of KGB directionor control. One of the particular areas considered was his apparentbehavior during his contacts with CIA in June 1962 and the conclusionwas that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGBcontrol at that time.Consideration has been given to the possibility that his 1962contacts with CIA were not known to the KGB, but became known tothe KGB later and NOSENKO was doubled by the KGB. It was con-cluded that there was no basis for or information which would warrantserious consideration of the above possibility aside from the separateconclusion that the KGB would be very unlikely to reward a traitor inKGB eyes by sending him again to Geneva where he would be quite freeto defect.Worthy of comment in this section is the fact that NOSENKO,during his 1962 contacts, expressed considerable concern over hispersonal security, requesting that knowledge concerning his identity bekept to an absolute minimum, that no communications be sent to the2SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 120]
United States Embassy in Moscow concerning his contact with CIA and that he did not wish to be contacted and would not recognize any attempted contact within the Soviet Union. NOSENKO also furnished information as to the reason for his concern that no information regarding his contact with CIA become known in the United States Embassy in Moscow and the dangers to NOSENKO in any contact or attempted contact with NOSENKO in the USSR.It is recognized that the above indicated concern of NOSENKO about his personal security is not substantial evidence that NOSENKO was not under KGB control; however, it is evidence that NOSENKO was not in any way encouraging clandestine contact of NOSENKO within the USSR, which very likely would have been an aim of the KGB if NOSENKO was under KGB control.The material which NOSENKO furnished to CIA in 1964 has been carefully reviewed to determine if there is any evidence that the KGB participated in any way in the assembling of this rather unique collection of material. None of the material appears to have been of an accountable type and, on the contrary, it appears that NOSENKO could have furnished all of the material to CIA and returned to the Soviet Union without the KGB ever at a later date becoming aware that the material was actually missing. The latter statement even includes the travel doqument which authorized the trip of NOSENKO to Gorkiy in December 1963.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 121]
The trip in December 1963, according to NOSENKO, was to participate in the search for Aleksandr CHEREPANOV. According to NOSENKO, this particular document was not accountable in that it was only necessary to turn it in when requesting reimbursement for travel expenses. NOSENKO stated that he had not claimed the rather small amount of money to which he was entitled and has also admitted that he really brought the document along because it gave him the indicated rank of Lieutenant Colonel.NOSENKO has completely retracted his claim to having had the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, stating that even as a Deputy Chief of Depart- ment he was only a Captain although he was entitled to and expected to receive the rank of Major in early 1964. NOSENKO has stated that giving him the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the above document was the error of KASHPEROV, the officer on duty in the SCD on Sunday, and that practically all Deputy Chiefs of Department in the SCD had at least the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.The above explanation by NOSENKO may well be considered by readers with at least a degree of skepticism. However, if NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, it would seem that he could have been pro- vided with something a little more substantial to document his claim of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. In addition, it would seem that the KGB
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 122]
SECRETcould have provided NOSENKO with some type of document whichwould support at least one of his claimed positions in the SCD, KGB.Even the Cherepanov Papers do not in any way support the claim ofNOSENKO that he was Deputy Chief of the First Section, FirstDepartment, SCD, in 1960 - 1961, nor do they even support the claimof NOSENKO that there was such à position in the First Section in1960-1961 or even in 1958 or 1959.50001111
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 123]
IV
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 124]
SECRETIV. COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONSIN REGARD TO NOSENKO![stamp Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]SECRET0001112
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 125]
# SECRET## COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS### IN REGARD TO NOSENKOAttached is a verbatim copy of pages 357-360 of the "Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector" which contains seven (A - G) primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Navy Intelligence) and KGB career of NOSENKO. These conclusions or findings are independently treated in separate attachments.With the exception of "G," the conclusions in this summary are in direct conflict with the above conclusions and are basically that NOSENKO served in the Naval RU from March 1951 to early 1953, was a KGB officer from March 1953 until his defection in February 1964, and held his claimed positions in the *KGB during the March 1953 - February 1964 period.* For purposes of clarity, the term KGB is used to refer to the Committee for State Security and predecessor organizations unless otherwise indicated.Attachment:Cpy Pgs 357-360 of "Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector"SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 126]
SECRETPREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKOAS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF"THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR"The following is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been given the designation of A - G for purposes of easier correlation with other sections of this summary.)"SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONSCONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES""NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in successively senior positions of auhority from which he derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive array of information about KGB personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his *bona fides*. Various Soviet officials, including intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive positions, who0001114
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 127]
SECRETenjoyed considerable authority and trust despite personal short- comings, and whose defection, 'the greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence', paralyzed the work of KGB Legal Residency, and justified the formulation of plans to assassinate him.""The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held. In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own accounts?""This examination had led to the following findings, arrived at independently:A. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed.B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time he claimed.C. NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953-1955 period as he claimed.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 128]
D. During the period 1955-1960, he was neithera senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the SeventhDepartment American-British Commonwealth Section.E. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of theAmerican Embassy Section nor a senior officer orsupervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962. (sic)F. NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chiefof the American-British Commonwealth Section and wasthereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, arenot credible.G. NOSENKO has no valid claim to certaintythat the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnelbetween 1953 and his defection in 1964.These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probabilityor certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidencein each instance.""The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidenceof NOSENKO's *bona fides*. The contradictions in NOSENKO's accountsof his life and KGB service are so extensive as to make his claimsas a whole unacceptable. While truth and fact in this case frequently
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 129]
cannot be established with certainty, it is evident that truth and fact are not what NOSENKO relates. By almost any test, virtually any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by fact or probability, or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a *bona fide* defector.""Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a *bona fide* defector, it is necessary to attempt to determine hi's true motives for contacting American Intelligence and for providing the information he has given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal conclusions. Nevertheless, the question cannot be ignored. The character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that some of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials, and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's future all require that at least a provisional judgment be made.""Of the reasonable explanations advanced for NOSENKO's misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he suffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for simply personal reasons; or, finally, that he is a dispatched KGB agent."
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 130]
# SECRET"The first two possibilities are easily dismissed. ThatNOSENKO is not simply a swindler who falsely claims for personal advantage to have been a KGB officer is evident, we believe, from the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations which he has provided and which could only derive from within the KGB itself.""Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and psychological examination by qualified specialists rule out the possibility that NOSENKO's actions and testimony are the product of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind.""It is somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB officer who served in at least some of the components for some or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exaggerated his positions, rank and access to intormation, and invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to accommodate the fact that several KGB officers have asserted that NOSENKO did in fact hold senior positions in the KGB. Also, NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's patronage, the recall telegram, and the like, cannot be just a product of his own invention, since these were the subject of comment by other sources."SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 131]
SECRET"Because none of the above explanations is consistent with the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies, none of them renders it untenable. ""In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, and believes that prudence requires that he be regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his information should be assessed accordingly."SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 132]
14-00000
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 133]
SECRETA. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE NAVAL RUIN ANY OF THE CAPACITIES OR AT THE PLACES ANDTIMES HE CLAIMEDSECRET> [Figure: CSGUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]0001120
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 134]
SECRETA. NOSENKO did not serve in the Naval RU in any of the capacities or at the places and times he claimed. (Previous conclusion)The above is conclusion "A" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The current conclusion is that the claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas is adequately substantiated and should be accepted.The interrogations of NOSENKO prior to 1967 were complicated by NOSENKO changing the date of his graduation from the Institute of International Relations from 1950 to 1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949 with the majority of his class. However, previous efforts of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1962 statement that he graduated in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted significance was given to the 1949 early 1953 period of time.It is considered that NOSENKO has adequately explained his "stupid blunders" as they relate to the above and to certain other personal matters and that his claimed service in Navy Intelligence from MarchSECRET![GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]0001121
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 135]
SECRET1951 to early 1953 both in the Far East and the Baltic area is fully acceptable. It is not considered necessary to comment concerning all of the remarks in the previous summary regarding the claimed Naval RU service of NOSENKO as reflected on pages 49-59 and remarks will, for purposes of brevity, be limited in scope.The statement is made in the previous summary that "The sole Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the Personnel Chief, Colonel KALOSHIN. He identified no ranking officers in either the Baltic or Far East Intelligence Staffs. Some 30 GRU officers he did identify, by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not from his Naval RU service, but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or through his visits to Geneva.":Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum voluntarily prepared by NOSENKO in late 1967 containing the names of a number of GRU personnel of whom he had some knowledge. The attached was not prepared as the result of any inquiry concerning his claimed Naval RU service, but was only a small part of the material prepared by NOSENKO at this time. The entire material included remarks by NOSENKO regarding approximately 875 KGB officers, (100) KGB agents, 35 GRU officers and 400 other Soviet nationals.2SECRET0001122
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 136]
It is interesting to note that the attached list contains the names of approximately 20 GRU officers whom NOSENKO relates to the early 1950's period. In addition, NOSENKO has, during current interviews and in other memoranda, furnished the names of additional Navy Intelligence personnel whom he knew in the 1951 - early 1953 period.Page 52 of the above summary and other related pages question whether NOSENKO ever served in the Baltic area with Naval Intelligence and even question his geographical knowledge of the area. Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum with certain diagrams prepared by NOSENKO on 21 February 1968 concerning his assignment with Navy Intelligence in the Far East and the Baltic area. The memorandum was completed by NOSENKO without any reference material and a review of his diagrams indicates they are quite accurate.NOSENKO had previously stated that his service in the Baltic area was at Sovetsk Primorskiy and during current interviews recalled that the former name of the place, an almost deserted fishermen's village, was Fishausen. The previous designation given by NOSENK O for this place as having the mail address of Sovetsk Primorskiy had caused the conclusion that his alleged place of assignment was non-existent. A further check in the matter would have disclosed that the place was not nonexistent, that it is currently known as Primorsk and that the former German name of the fishing village was Fischhausen.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 137]
SECRETThe previous summary also stated that despite his claimed active commissioned service in the Navy, NOSENKO knew nothing of Soviet Navy tradition, doctrines, or organization of procedures. It should be noted that there is a considerable difference between being a member of the Naval RU and being an actual member of the Soviet Navy. The situation could be compared to a career civilian employee of the Office of Naval Intelligence and a line officer in the United States Navy.Attachments:List of GRU Personnel as Prepared by NOSENKODiagrams and comments as Prepared by NOSENKO
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 138]
1.  Dekrenev Leonid - till 1952 or 1953 a deputy of chief of navy intelligence, then a chief of navy intelligence, later he was a deputy of chief- of GRU (Serov Ivan and Ivashutin). I heard he was a navy attache in the USA.2.  Bespalov - a major, code - clerk of the navy intelligence of fleet in Soviet Harbour's region in 1957-1962.3.  Bogdanovskiy-sat deputy of chief of the navy intelligence of F Fleet (on agents) in 1957-1962.4.  Bulakh - an officer of the navy intelligence point of intelligence of the 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district in 1952.5.  Chikin - in 1950, a colonel, worked in the departments of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.6.  Churil'skiy - a colonel, in 1950- worked in the department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.7.  Demchenko-an officer of navy intelligence point of intelligence of 4Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district.8.  Denisenko - in 1962-1964 a military attache of soviet embassy in Bern.9.  Bol'shakov Yuri - an officer of GRU (colonel) was is the USA, works under cover of press-agency "Novosti".10. Bulganin Lev N., in 1950 worked in GRU.11. Irliyer - an officer of GRU in 1952. (or dyerler)12. Kaloshin - a colonel, in 1950-1957 a chief of personnel department the navy intelligence000112513. Kononyuk - in 1950 finished the institute of international relations, is in the navy intelligence and went to work in Denmark.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 139]
14. Kapalkin - a general, in 1870s was a deputy of chief the Military-diplomatic academy. He has two sons: Kapalkin Sergey - finished this academy in 1850, works in GRU, worked in Italy and in France, his wife a daughter of Murshal Timoshenko - Olya (finished the institute of foreign trade); Kapalkintic-tor - in 1840s studied as a student in the USA, also works in GRU.15. Kabalinor Vladimir – a major - a senior officer of the navy intelligence of F Fleet in 1950-52.16. Khaberev - in 1950-52 a deputy of chief of navy radio detachment of the navy intelligence of F Fleet.17. Khaytor S. S. - a deputy of chief (on information) of navy intelligence of F Fleet in 1850-52.18. Kon'kov - a deputy of chief of navy intelligence of F Fleet in 1951-5219. Rozlovskiy - in 1950s an officer of department of foreign affairs of the ministry of defence.20. Molchanov - an officer of GRU (in 1850s)21. Orekhov Gennadi - in 1951-52 an administrative officer of the navy intelligence of F Fleet.22. Pogodin Boris - a chief of the secretariate of navy intelligence of F Fleet in 1850-1952, knows a Japanese language.23. Rezantsev - a commander of navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk, Kaliningrad's district in 1952.24. Shalin - a general, in 1840s was a chief of the military diplomatic academy, later was a chief of GRU.25. Shaneshnikov - also a scousal works in GRU. his father was a marshall
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 140]
SECRET000112726. Mel'nikov Sergey - a chief of navy intelligence of I let in 1950-52.27. Namgaladze - a general, a chief of navy intelligence at Black sea., 1950-52.28. Sergeyev - an engineer - bone colonel, a senior officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1507-52 (earlier he worked in Turkey)29. Suslovich - in 1950-52 a commander of racy radio detachment of the. navy intelligence of 7 Fleet.30. Srishchunov - an officer of intel., worked in the USA, last years in In- din, from where was recelist.31. Tishkin - a rear-admiral, in 1950-52 a deputy chief of the navy liste- (02-04) Ali genre of the ministry of military navy.32. Vasilevskiy Yuri - work's in GRU, son of a marshal of USSR.33. Voronkov Allbert - an officer of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet in 1952.34. Vorontsev Michael - a vice, admiral, a former chief of navy intelligence (1950-5235. Yershov - an officer of personnel of the navy intelligence of 7 Fleet- in 1950-52, knows a chinese language.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 141]
SECRETThe 18 of March, 1951 was signed an order about my up-pointment as an interpreter of the navy intelligence of I Fleet in Soviet harbour, Primorskiy district, where I have gone by a train and arrived in the place of my appointment in the end of March. (I went from Moscow to Khabarovsk, where I changed a train to Komsomolsk-on-Amur, then crossed the river and from station Pirun went to Soviet harbour (station Pyatisotka).> [Figure: Map excerpt showing locations mentioned in the text, including Bay Banino, Lay Postoruya, settlement Zhilderbat, city Soviet harbour, and Sakhalin Island.]Bay BaninoLay Postoruyasettlement Zhilderbatcity Soviet harbourIsland SakhalinThe intelligence of I Fleet was located in bay Postovayn, here were also Political directory of I Fleet, submarine's and destroyer's bases.The headquarters of I Fleet was located in settlement Thildarbot.The commander-in-chief of I Fleet was admiral bayker Fraud., chief of staff - vice-admiral täässäätoned.0001128The chief of navy intelligence of I Fleet was captain of Lieut Me l'nikov Sergey K. his deputies - captain of 2 rack bogdanovskij
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 142]
1. Khaytor Somen S. (information department), captain of rank, Khaytor Somen S. (information department), captain of rank Kontor (navy intelligence), colonel Burchenko (a commissar).I was working in the information department. Officers Kabalince, Efimov were working in this department. Other officers of the intelligence, Lieutenant-colonel Sergeyev, lieutenant Voronkov Albert, major Ershov, captains Orekhov, Redionov, Pegadin, Bespalov and 3-4 more officers. There were also sergeants and privates.In the end of April, 1952 I flew in Moscow (stopping for 1-2 days in Khabarovsk) for a leave.In June-July 1952 a personal department of fishery intelligence (a chief - colonel Kaloshin) was deciding a question about my transference because of illness. And I was appointed in the navy intelligence point of navy intelligence of 4 Fleet in Sovietsk (located before a peninsula to Baltiysk - former Pillau), where I arrived in August, 1952 (Kaliningrad's district - former Prussia).Soviet is a little city-village, a former german village of fishermen, it seems had a name Fishhausen.> [Figure: A hand-drawn diagram showing the relative locations of Baltiysk and Sovietsk. Baltiysk is marked as a base and headquarters of H Fleet.]Sovietsk - a demolished little town, here there are a navy intelligence point and 1-2 others military detachments (building battalion).Baltiysk was a base and headquarters of H Fleet.-6001129