Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 143]
The commander-in-chief of 4 Firet was admiral Jelovko H. J.The chief of my navy intelligense print was captain of 2 zouk Ryazantico.Here were officers: Finogradov, bulakh, Desuchouko and others wilt sexzganti and privates.before my arrival (2 deys) this macy intelligence point was transfe-zed from east gerniany in Sorest. If in Germany the work of the point was sonnested with agent's work, now there was another task - a preparation of agent-obteriäition post in a case of new war (3-4 persons each post). – an absolutly monkey bussnessIn the end of Desember I took a leave reasoning it with my illness, bout having in mind a transferonse in another place.In mid of March, 1953 I began to work in 2 chief directory of keyb (forure Mod)
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 144]
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[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 145]
SECRETB. NOSENKO DID NOT ENTER THE KGB IN THEMANNER OR AT THE TIME HE CLAIMEDSECRET![Excluded from downgrading and declassification]6001131
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 146]
SECRETB. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed. (Previous conclusion)The above is conclusion "B" in the previous summary in regard to NOSENKO. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO entered the then Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and that his entry was not only facilitated by but due to the influence of General Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULOV.Previous statements by NOSENKO and changes relative to date of entry into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary and will not be repeated here. His statements during current interviews that he entered on duty in mid-March 1953 as a case officer in the First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are considered adequately substantiated and should be accepted.The conclusion of the previous summary (pages 61-74) that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed was primarily based on conflicting statements by NOSENKO as to when he entered the KGB (MVD). In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in 1965 NOSENKO again said March 1953, soon after the death of STALIN.SECRET![GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]0001132
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 147]
SECRETIn 1964, NOSENKO had given two dates in 1952 as his time of entry into the KGB in an effort not to admit that he had failed to graduate from the Institute of International Relations in 1949.The previous summary gave considerable weight to the statements of NOSENKO indicating that he did not enter the KGB (MVD) under what are considered normal KGB procedures. Proper allowances were not given for position of the father of NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding, and the influence of General KOBULOV. An analyst can either accept or reject the statement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB (MVD) through the influence of General KOBULOV; but, if the statement is accepted, then the failure of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal KGB procedures should also be accepted. A Communist society or a Soviet Intelligence organization is not and could not be immune to influence by a high official. General KOBULOV as of mid-March 1953 was First Deputy to BERIYA, the Minister of the then MVD.The previous summary raises several points concerning the eligibility of NOSENKO for the KGB (MVD). It points out on page 67 that other than his undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU, he was no more eligible for a KGB appointment in 1953 than he was at the time of his previous rejection in 1950. This statement is not controvertible and is fully accepted with the qualification that in 1950 NOSENKO
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 148]
was not sponsored by any person of influence as was the case in 1953with General KOBULOV who in mid-March 1953 was the First Deputyto BERIYA.The previous summary also states that according to KGBdefectors familiar with the standards in force at the time, no candidatewas accepted who had ever had tuberculosis. This is a flat statementwhich it is doubtful any defector or series of defectors could fullysubstantiate; namely, that it never happened. Until and unless it ismedically proven that NOSENKO did not have tuberculosis, it is acceptedthat he did have tuberculosis in 1952 and was at a sanitarium -- restplace in Kubinka. It is also accepted that he was an officer in the KGBafter mid-March 1953. The influence of KOBULOV could undoubtedlyhave permitted NOSENKO to enter the KGB even though he previouslyhad tuberculosis, but the flat statement that no candidate was accepted whohad ever had tuberculosis is not and cannot be sufficiently substantiated.The previous summary contained a number of additional remarksand conclusions intended to show that NOSENKO was not eligible for andtherefore could not have entered the KGB (MVD). Comments concerningthese will be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis atthis time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB(MVD) as an officer in mid-March 1953. A comment was made that
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 149]
NOSENKO did not take a physical examination in connection with his processing for KGB entry, and that such a medical examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing of a KGB candidate. This statement makes no allowance for the influence of General KOBULOV; but, in addition, does not consider the fact that the Naval RU dossier on NOSENKO was available to the KGB (MVD).The previous summary also failed to note that the MVD would have had independent information in regard to NOSENKO since the MVD would have conducted any necessary inquiry in connection with the entry of NOSENKO into the Naval RU. As of 1953, the MVD undoubtedly also had a dossier on the father of NOSENKO since this was still the STALIN era.The summary also states that NOSENKO did not complete the necessary lengthy Anketa before entry into the KGB (MVD) and did not speak to any personnel officers or visit the personnel office. It would seem that the influence of General KOBULOV could have permitted the elimination of most if not all of the necessity of complying with normal procedures, but NOSENKO has during interviews stated that he completed the Anketa while sitting at his desk after entry into the KGB (MVD).Page 70 of the previous summary states that NOSENKO did not know the designation of his own Directorate either at the time he allegedly4SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 150]
SECRETentered on duty or during his first year of KGB service. WhileNOSENKO has claimed that the designation of his Directorate at thetime he entered the KGB (MVD) in mid-March 1953 was the SecondChief Directorate and that it subsequently was redesignated theFirst Chief Directorate, DERYABIN has stated this reversal ofdesignations occurred in March 1953.STALIN died in early March 1953 and that same month theMVD and the MGB were merged under the name MVD with BERIYAas Minister. BERIYA held this position until his arrest in early June1953. BERIYA was succeeded by KRUGLOV, who held office for lessthan a year. Yuriy RASTVOROV was recently queried concerning thedate of the reversal of the designation of the FCD and SCD and placesit as the end of April or early May 1953. GOLITSYN has indicated thatthe change occurred "soon after the advent of BERIYA as head of theMVD in April 1953." In the light of our inability to fix the effective dateof the reversal of the designations of the SCD and the FCD, it isunreasonable to impugn NOSENKO on his statement as to the designationof his Directorate at the time of his entry into the KGB (MVD).There is a disagreement between NOSENKO and others as to whowas responsible for the reversal of designations of the FCD and the SCD.NOSENKO is of the opinion that it occurred under KRUGLOV, which is5SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 151]
in conflict with the statements of DERYABIN, RASTVOROV andGOLITSYN, all of whom maintain that BERIYA was responsible forthe changes. As for the issue of who was responsible for the reversalof designations, it would appear that NOSENKO is in error. However,the fact that he was a new junior officer and that this was a period ofupheaval in the KGB (MVD) effectively eliminates any significance inthis issue.NOSENKO is criticized in the previous summary for not knowingthe location of the Chief Directorate of the Militia or the history of theKI (Committee of Information). NOSENKO has stated that he had nocontacts with either office during 1953-1955 and there is no adequate reasonto disbelieve this statement. He is not aware of when the KI ceased toexist (1951 given in the summary, but other information indicates the KIcontinued to exist in a nominal capacity until the mid-1950's), but careshould be used in stating what NOSENKO should know if he held a certainposition. Readers of this summary may wish to reflect on their ownmemory concerning the location and their knowledge of Agency facilities atany given period of time or when Agency components or related organizationswere organized or ceased to exist.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 152]
The point has also been made that any career of NOSENKO in the KGB should have ended or he should have at least encountered difficulty when his benefactor General KOBULOV, together with the brother of General KOBULOV, was arrested with the BERIYA group in early June 1953. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he encountered no difficulties but is aware that the KOBULOV connection was discussed by an officer from the Personnel Directory with an official of the First Department. Under other circumstances NOSENKO would very possibly have encountered difficulty; but, it should be noted that the father of NOSENKO retained his position, that NOSENKO only met General KOBULOV through his father, and that NOSENKO has stated that although his father knew General KOBULOV, his father could in no way be considered a member of the BERIYA group.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 153]
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[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 154]
SECRETC. NOSENKO DID NOT SERVE IN THE AMERICAN EMBASSYSECTION THROUGHOUT THE 1953 - 1955 PERIODAS HE CLAIMEDSECRET![stamp]0001139
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 155]
SECRETC. NOSENKO did not serve in the American Embassy Section throughout the 1953 - 1955 period as he claimed. (Previous conclusion)The above is conclusion "C" in the previous summary. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section (American Embassy Section), First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 when he was transferred to the Seventh Department, SCD.This period of time has been covered in detail with NOSENKO during current interviews. The conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the First Section but was not a very effective officer and that both his work and behavior were decidedly influenced by the fact that he was the son of the Minister of Shipbuilding. NOSENKO is reluctant to admit that he was other than *slightly lackadaisical* in his work during this period of time, but is not hesitant to admit that his personal behavior was such as to cause him to be removed as Secretary to the Komsomol unit in 1954 and to cause an unsatisfactory "characterization"SECRET0001140> [Figure: Text within a box reads 'Group 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification']
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 156]
to be prepared in early 1955 which necessitated a decision as to whether he would be fired from the KGB or transferred to some other component.The influence of his family is quite apparent in the above since his father was advised of his difficulties in 1954 by an official of the KGB and his mother interceded on his behalf in 1955 with the Chief of SCD. The result in 1955 was that NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department and not fired from the KGB.The question has been raised as to how NOSENKO could remain in the KGB when after 1954 he was not a member of the Komsomol and was not eligible to become a candidate for the Communist Party. This is a valid question but a plausible explanation is again the fact that he was the son of the then Minister of Shipbuilding.NOSENKO has stated during previous and current interviews that following his entry into the KGB and until circa mid-1954 he was responsible for work against American correspondents in Moscow. He has not claimed that he had any successes and has stated that the work with newspaper correspondents already recruited was being handled by other officers. NOSENKO has explained that during this time he was a "new officer," indicating he could hardly have been expected to act as an experienced officer. His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during this period of time, together with his knowledge of other KGB officers and his
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 157]
information concerning his own agents is believed of sufficient weight to accept the statement of NOSENKO that work against American cor- respondents was his assignment from mid-March 1953 to mid-1954.From circa mid-1954 until his transfer to the Seventh Department in late May 1955, NOSENKO claims and has claimed he was an officer of the First Section with the responsibility of work against the Military Attaches (Army) at the United States Embassy in Moscow. It is considered, based on his knowledge of the various Military Attache personnel and other collateral information furnished by NOSENKO, that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section during the mid-1954 - late May 1955 period of time, that his primary work was against members of the Office of the Military Attache, but that the quality of his work undoubtedly left much to be desired.In circa mid-1954, NOSENKO was removed as Secretary of the Komsomol unit and by early 1955 his performance was such that at least certain officials in the First Department desired his removal from the First Department, if not the KGB. Under these circumstances, NOSENKO could be criticized as having been a very poor if not undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during this period of time and his knowledge of the members of the Office of3SECRET0001142
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 158]
SECRETthe Military Attache supports the claim of NOSENKO that he was anofficer of the First Section with the indicated assignment as relatedby him.NOSENKO has stated that the work against the MilitaryAttaches was not primarily directed toward development of recruitmentpossibilities, but was directed toward control of the Military Attacheson trips in order to prevent observation of sensitive areas, sensitivesites or sensitive activities in the USSR. This attitude by the KGBwould appear to be completely plausible and NOSENKO noted asexceptional in this regard the recruitment attempt against Captain WalterMULE. NOSENKO explained this exception as retaliation for approachesto Soviets in the United States in that period.NOSENKO has been criticized because he did not know all thedetails concerning the Military Attaches which it was considered heshould have known if he had the specific responsibility for work againstthe Military Attaches during the indicated period of time. It is submittedthat this may be evidence of his failure to satisfactorily fulfill his4SECRET0001143
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 159]
assigned functions, but makes to allowance for the uncertain personal status of NOSENKO whose actual future in the KGB was in jeopardy after mid-1954.NOJENKO has previously indicated and still indicates a definite lack of knowledge concerning his assigned targets during approximately March - May 1955. This, according to NOSENKO, was when an un- satisfactory "characterization" was being prepared on NOSENKO, a decision was being made on his case, and a period of time in which he went on a "big drunk" which culminated in his spending about 40 days under hospital care because of the possibility of recurrence of his previous tuberculosis.Pages 84 - 87 of the previous summary suggest that NOSENKO had not furnished suficient details about his alleged agent network for use against the Military Attaches. It is considered that NCSENKO in current interviews has furnished adequate acceptable details, and as an example furnished specific information concerning "VOLODINA and "RAKET" (page 85). It would appear that there was no intent by NOSENKO to withhold information concerning these individuals, but rather than he was never asked to amplify his previous casual reference to those individuals.50001144
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 160]
# SECRETThe effectiveness or non-effectiveness of NOSENKO during his assignment to the First Section, First Department, from mid-March 1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the question of the bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was an officer in the First Section during this period of time. It is felt that information furnished by NOSENKO in current interviews and in previous interviews is of sufficient scope and detail that his claimed service as an officer in the First Section during this period of time is completely acceptable.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 161]
0001146
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SECRETD. DURING THE PERIOD 1955 - 1960, HE WAS NEITHER ASENIOR CASE OFFICER IN, NOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF,THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT AMERICAN-BRITISHCOMMONWEALTH SECTIONSECRET![GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]0001147
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 163]
SECRETD. During the period of 1955 - 1960, NOSENKO was neither a senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department, American-British Commonwealth Section. (Previous conclusion)The above is conclusion "D" in the previous summary. The current conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the Seventh Department, SCD, from late May 1955 to December 1959 and was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh Department from 1958 to December 1959.During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished extensive information concerning his own activities in the Seventh Department during the 1955-1959 period. Interviews of persons who were the subject of KGB interest collaterally confirm that NOSENKO was personally involved in certain claimed activities during 1955 to December 1959. These activities include among others the recruitment of Richard BURGI in June 1956, contact with Sir Allen LANE and Arthur BIRSE in the summer of 1957, the recruitment of Gisella HARRIS in 1958, the recruitment of George DREW in the spring of 1959, the recruitment ofSECRET![Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]6001148
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 164]
# SECRETWilliam Stanley WILBY in June 1959, the recruitment of David TAYLOR in the summer of 1959, the recruitment of Gerard MERTENS in July - August 1959, and the recruitment of Arsene FRIPPEL in 1959. The foregoing is not a complete list of all cases in which NOSENKO claims personal involvement, but is representative of cases in which his alleged participation has been confirmed by interviews with the individual who was the KGB target.Sir Allen LANE, Arthur BIRSE, William Stanley WILBY, and David TAYLOR were British citizens and the other above-named individuals were United States citizens. This would seem to substantiate the claim of NOSENKO that during 1955 - December 1959 he was an officer engaged in KGB operations against American-British Commonwealth tourists in the USSR.In addition, NOSENKO has furnished specific information about an operation against Martin MALIA, an American tourist who was in the Soviet Union from approximately September 1955 to December 1955. MALIA has not been interviewed and will not be interviewed, so at this time no particular 1955 case in which NOSENKO claims involvement or personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview of the individual involved.2SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 165]
SECRETNOSENKO has furnished information on the travel of certainUnited States Government officials, including Congressional represent-atives to the USSR in 1955 - 1956; and the trip of Supreme Court JusticeWilliam O. DOUGLAS in 1955 which, when considered with the previouslymentioned specifics, adequately substantiate his claimed service in theSeventh Department and work against American-British Commonwealthtourists during the late May 1955 - December 1959 period.NOSENKO has stressed that when he transferred to the SeventhDepartment, the Tourist Section had just been established and an agentnetwork was not available for operations against American and Britishtourists. This seems quite logical since the influx of tourists into theUSSR was just in a formative stage.NOSENKO has spoken in detail about an agent network he de-veloped after 1955 which primarily consisted of Intourist personneland two homosexual agents, "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" (KGB codenames), whose extensive use in KGB operations has been confirmed byinterviews with individuals who were the subject of homosexual com-promise operations.The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150in regard to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service ofNOSENKO. To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty3
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 166]
SECRETpages would be repetitious and in many instances superfluous. It is considered that even if the statements were accepted in toto, there would still not be an adequate basis for a conclusion that NOSENKO was not an officer in the claimed positions in the Seventh Department during the period of late May 1955 - December 1959. Nor is it conceded that, if all the sub-conclusions and the interpretations of various areas of information were accepted without qualification, there is any evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. However, there are certain assumptions and interpretations which appeared in the previous summary which are particularly worthy of comment and which are considered erroneous or require additional clarification.On page 145 it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENKO was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counter-intelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign agents among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate, KGB, and the MVD have used homosexual and heterosexual compromise in numerous known (and presumably unknown) successful recruitments and recruitment attempts. This activity has not been limited to the Seventh Department, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO was "only an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not a KGB officer.4SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 167]
SECRETconsidered with the detailed information NOSENKO has provided onSeventh Department personnel, activities, procedures, and topics ofa similar nature is not considered to have any foundation in fact.Page 145 of the above summary lists eleven operations whichwere Seventh Department cases prior to 1960 and which were includedin the notes furnished to CIA in 1964 by NOSENKO. The named operationswere those against Bernard PECHTER, Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE,Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, (fnu) KARLOV, Norman FISK,Ralph MATLAW, Marvin KANTOR, Michael GINSBURG, and WilliamTARASKA. The criticism made in regard to the above eleven caseswas that NOSENKO could not describe the individual operations otherthan to say that he had recorded the name of the target and such detailsas he could acquire when he reviewed the activities of the Seventh Depart-ment in 1962 following his return from the First Department.The notes brought out by NOSENKO are considered in anothersection of this summary, but it should be noted here that a full reviewof all of the notes of NOSENKO currently available indicates that hisstatements as to how and why he obtained the information in the notesare completely plausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnishedby NOSENKO would almost necessitate a separate listing of the approxi-mately 150 cases or names mentioned in the notes.SECRET