Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 286]
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)NOSENKO described the various ways he had tested suspicions of SHAKHOV in Geneva. He gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared materials emplaced had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's conclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report this finding when he re-turned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament DelegationNOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and as such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the entire delegation. [KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.] To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never reported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants provided him.]NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings at any time.278Top Secret0001549TS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 287]
# Top SecretSEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## Visits to the Geneva KGB Legal ResidencyVirtually every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for more than a day or two, Legal Rezident S.I. GAVRICHEV would invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himself. GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated him with deference, and shortly after his arrival in Geneva in March 1962, NOSENKO gave a lecture on counterintelligence to the assembled members of the Legal Residency. This lecture was given at GAVRICHEV's request, although it was only after some hesitation on the part of the Legal Rezident that all of his subordinates were brought together to hear NOSENKO. In return for helping the Legal Residency to perform countersurveillance on several occasions, NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed by GAVRICHEV to have the use of an operational car and driver to go shopping and carry out other private errands. [NOSENKO was not under CIA surveillance at any time in 1962 in Geneva and his claims as to his activities there, aside from his meetings with CIA, can be neither confirmed nor refuted.]## KGB Officers within the Soviet DelegationNOSENKO claimed that he would know of any others, and he was the sole KGB officer within the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in 1962. Among delegates he identified only Oleg GRINEVSKIY as having any connection with the KGB. GRINEVSKIY was one of NOSENKO's own agents within the delegation: in Moscow he was handled by KGB officers of the Intelligentsia and Correspondents Department of the Second Chief Directorate. Among other delegates NOSENKO described A.K. KISLOV and V.G. FILATOV. According to NOSENKO, KISLOV was head of the American Section of TASS and was "a genuine correspondent"; "definitely not an intelligence officer".Comment: CIA had tentatively identified all three of the delegates as KGB officers. KISLOV was observed in apparent KGB operational activity in both Washington and Moscow. FILATOV served as an alternate contact with the KGB agent in NATO, Georges PAQUES. [British Intelligence] has reported that GRINEVSKIY was a member of the permanent Soviet delegation in Geneva who handled
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 288]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964)Comment: (Continued) a British double agent. NOSENKO was in Geneva at the time.## Association with Other SovietsAccording to NOSENKO, the Soviets he saw most often in Geneva in 1962 were A.K. KISLOV (see above), Yu.I. GUK, and M.S. TSYMBAL. (Both KISLOV and GUK were involved in the "ANDREY" case: see p. 33.)## A.K. KISLOVTASS correspondent KISLOV was one of the three other delegates besides NOSENKO staying at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva. NOSENKO said he arranged for KISLOV's name to be given as a notional source of information on Soviet disarmament policy to KGB double agent BELITSKIY (see below). NOSENKO drank and caroused with KISLOV while in Geneva, and KISLOV was NOSENKO's companion in early June, when NOSENKO either squandered or was robbed of KGB operational funds. [the loss he asked CIA to make good], and on the night of 10 June, when he squandered the 2000 Swiss francs CIA provided on wine and women. With reference to the threat posed his security by KISLOV's knowledge of his profligacy, NOSENKO said that KISLOV was "too drunk to know what was going on", and in any event constituted no threat.In 1964 NOSENKO reported for the first time that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact while stationed in the United States and that NOSENKO had been introduced to KISLOV by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to departing for Geneva in 1962, so that he could use KISLOV at the conference. On the basis of NOSENKO's favorable report afterwards, he said, KISLOV had been recruited as a KGB agent on his return.In 1966 NOSENKO named the Soviets living with him at the Ariane Hotel in 1962, but did not name KISLOV.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 289]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## Yu.I. GUKImplying that their friendship was of long standing, NOSENKO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly every day in Geneva, where they went out to chat and have a few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access to the residency and was able to elicit information about some of GUK's operations in Geneva. He described his "big, big friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the residency.Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to GUK.## M.S. TSYMBALIn 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and identified him as Chief of the Illegals Directorate of the KGB First Chief Directorate. He alluded to having spoken with him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationship.In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some candidates for recruitment and came across some whose back- ground would have made them suitable for the Special [Illegals] Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Head- quarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence, NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was granted access in 1964.281Top Secret0001552TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 290]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)Association with British Female SecretaryNOSENKO has described his association with a British secretary whom he met at a diplomatic reception in Geneva as one of an amorous pursuit: he disclaimed any operational interest in the girl. After several dates, NOSENKO could no longer reach her at her apartment, and he concluded that she had told her superiors that he was a Russian and had probably believed him to be an intelligence officer.Comment: According to an official British report, when NOSENKO became too persistent in his attentions and the secretary reported the contact to her superiors she was withdrawn immediately from Switzerland and she later resigned from the Foreign Office.[^1]This same incident came to the attention of the Swiss service, which later reported it to CIA, without details, as an attempt by NOSENKO to recruit the girl. According to this report, "after a time it became evident that NOSENKO'S interest in her was not only sexual, but also in information to which she had access in the course of her duties". A Swiss official in Geneva told CIA that NOSENKO had definitely tried to recruit the secretary and that he attempted to obtain "disarmament secrets" from her.Supervising Case Officer for KGB-Controlled CIA Agent BELITSKIYNOSENKO'S InformationAmong his other activities in Geneva NOSENKO supervised a younger and less experienced KGB case officer's handling of KGB double agent BELITSKIY. He first heard of the BELITSKIY case under the code name "BELKIN", when he was working in the American Embassy Section of the American Department. He[^1]: 29
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 291]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)learned of the case through his friendship with the chief of the Second ("Active Line") Section of the American Department, V.I. PETROV. BELITSKIY was a KGB agent whom American Intelligence had recruited in London: he had never been met by the Americans in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO did not know the date of recruitment but knew the case was already in progress during his second assignment with the Embassy Section (January 1960-January 1962). BELITSKIY had been a KGB agent for a "long, long" time and was a KGB agent when he first went abroad (prior to his recruitment by American Intelligence).The KGB's purpose in running the BELITSKIY operation was to lure American Intelligence into meeting the agent inside the Soviet Union, to learn the channels and means through which American Intelligence communicated with agents inside the Soviet Union. This was the "most important task" of the Second Chief Directorate. Although BELITSKIY, in meeting with his American case officers, continually pleaded fear of contacts with American Intelligence in Moscow, this was a ruse; the real KGB intent was to use BELITSKIY to lure American Intelligence into contacting him in the Soviet Union. After BELITSKIY was recruited in London, CIA "did not go on with him...didn't hold any meetings with him". Nevertheless, he said, the KGB "cherished the hope...to lead him in somewhat deeper". The KGB First Chief Directorate, with its own responsibilities and objectives, was unaware of Second Chief Directorate objectives in the BELITSKIY case. The First Chief Directorate, through Department D, provided dezinformatsiya [disinformation] at the Second Chief Directorate's request, but in this case, as in other "games", it did not know for what ultimate purpose the disinformation would be used. (In such cases I.I. AGAYANTS, Chief of Department D, did not even know in what country the disinformation was to be used, let alone the identity of the agent.)Comment: According to GOLITSYN, Department D runs its operations alone or in conjunction with (never subordinate to) other KGB departments.283Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 292]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)NOSENKO did not actively participate in the case until he received in Geneva a cable from Moscow directing him to give advice to the young and inexperienced case officer V.L. ARTEMOV. ARTEMOV had not worked on the BELITSKIY case in Moscow either; he also had been sent to Geneva to work on counter-intelligence matters and only to direct BELITSKIY if the Americans should contact the agent. BELITSKIY had been "inserted" in a World Health Organization Delegation in the hope that CIA would "find him".As a result of that KGB instruction, NOSENKO joined with ARTEMOV in directing BELITSKIY's meetings with the latter's American case officers. BELITSKIY was first met in Geneva by the American case officer "Bob", and later by "Henry", who was "called out from the States". BELITSKIY noted that the name on the door of the apartment where he met his American case officers was not the same as that of the person whose apartment it was alleged to be, and that the apartment itself had an "un-lived-in" look.When the American case officers asked BELITSKIY whether he could establish contact with a Russian on the Disarmament Delegation, NOSENKO advised ARTEMOV not to use anyone from the Soviet Foreign Ministry. NOSENKO proposed instead that BELITSKIY claim to get information from the head of the American Department of TASS, A.K. KISLOV. The information, of course, would be (disinformation) furnished by the KGB. In case the Americans would check, NOSENKO and ARTEMOV arranged for BELITSKIY to be introduced to KISLOV.The KGB believed that CIA had accepted BELITSKIY's bona fides. From the KGB viewpoint, however, while BELITSKIY was not a bad agent, he was apt to go too far sometimes, and "add things on his own". For this reason, the KGB limited BELIT-SKIY's time spent with CIA, to lessen the chance that the agent might say something which would cause CIA to sense that he was a plant.0001555284Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 293]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)Comment: NOSENKO's information about the BELITSKIY-CIA relationship is substantially correct, except for some inaccuracies about the origin of the case. BELITSKIY, a commentator for Radio Moscow, as NOSENKO described, in Geneva did meet CIA officers using the aliases "Bob" and "Henry" in a safe apartment.NOSENKO'S version of his role in the case, however, is implausible. He asserts that BELITSKIY, a prominent Russian with acquaintances among influential officials of the Soviet Government, an agent ostensibly under the control of CIA for several years, was sent by the KGB to Geneva to resume contact with CIA. The KGB, according to NOSENKO, sent neither the responsible case officer nor an officer of the KGB section responsible for the operation. NOSENKO states that the KGB instead detailed a "young and inexperienced" KGB officer who happened to be in Geneva at the time, an officer who had no prior connection with the BELITSKIY case nor even knowledge of operating conditions in Geneva.NOSENKO further states that the KGB then instructed. NOSENKO, who had learned of the case unofficially, who had no experience or training in double agent operations, and who was similarly in Geneva for other reasons, to guide the other "inexperienced" KGB officer. NOSENKO can cite no guidance provided by KGB Headquarters, although he claims he exchanged messages with Moscow about the case.ARTEMOV was not inexperienced. He had had continuous service with the Second Chief Directorate at least since 1958, and had been involved with a series of CIA American tourist agents in the Soviet Union. Although allegedly familiar with. ARTEMOV, NOSENKO is unaware of the latter's285Top Secret0001556TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 294]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)Comment:(Continued) involvement with American tourist agents in 1958 and 1959, during a period when NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department's American Section.Under interrogation NOSENKO did not know how, when, or where the BELITSKIY operation started, did not know the nature of British || involvement, did not know the operational details and contact arrangements BELITSKIY had with CIA, did not know BELITSKIY's pattern of activity in Moscow or in Geneva, and did not know the alleged objective of the KGB operation, e.g., the substance of the "disinformation" which BELITSKIY was to provide CIA.From the foregoing it is concluded that NOSENKO did not exercise any supervisory function in the BELITSKIY case.Contact with CIAOn 5 June 1962 U.S. Foreign Service Officer [David MARK] reported to CIA in Geneva that he had been approached by a Soviet citizen whom he believed to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, a member of the Soviet Disarmament Delegation. NOSENKO had merely suggested that they get together for a talk on the following day. In late afternoon on 6 June, NOSENKO told [MARK] privately that he would like to talk to MARK as soon as possible. He was "not going to pump him for information", but "simply wanted to tell him some things". A luncheon meeting was arranged for 9 June, although NOSENO indicated that he preferred an earlier date. [MARK] advised CIA of the appointment and commented that the approach seemed so unusual that it might be an offer of cooperation or defection.At the 9 June luncheon with [MARK] NOSENKO identified himself as a counterintelligence officer sent to Geneva to ensure the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew that MARK had previously served in Moscow and (erroneously) believed him toTop Secret
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 295]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)be an American intelligence officer. NOSENKO said he needed approximately 900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB operational funds which he had squandered on liquor and a prostitute in Geneva, and offered for this amount to sell two items of information to American Intelligence. The first item was the identity of an American, a former employee of the Embassy in Moscow, who was a KGB agent "near ciphers" in the Washington area. The second item was the identity of a Soviet citizen in Moscow who, although ostensibly a CIA agent, had been planted on CIA by the KGB. Although NOSENKO proposed a one-time transaction, he acknowledged to MARK that he might be unable to avoid deeper involvement with American Intelligence.MARK introduced NOSENKO to a CIA officer the evening of 9 June and NOSENKO was taken to the first of five lengthy meetings held in a CIA safehouse. At the initial meeting NOSENKO described himself as a KGB major experienced in operations against the American Embassy in Moscow and against American tourists and other travellers to the Soviet Union. He told of his financial difficulties and repeated his offer to sell the two specified items of information. He said that the need for money was his immediate motive for contacting CIA, although in the ensuing discussion he asserted also that he was dissatisfied with the Communist regime in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO emphasized that he had no intention of becoming an American agent and that after his proposed transaction, he would have no further contact with CIA. Despite this assertion, after describing the cases of "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see p. 33) and the KGB double agent BELITSKIY (see p. 282), NOSENKO supplied considerable biographic information about himself and also discussed in general terms certain additional KGB operations as well as KGB organization and operational methods in Moscow. He understood, as he had told MARK earlier, that CIA would want more information, and he agreed to meet again two days later.NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva. With the second meeting on 11 June, his initially expressed reservations disappeared almost entirely. He answered most questions put to him on KGB organization and operations, most of his information being limited to the Second Chief Directorate. Besides "ANDREY" and BELITSKIY, he provided leads to more than a score of American citizens who had been compromised or recruited by the KGB, and information on the KGB
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 296]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)Audio surveillance operation against the Embassy in Moscow. Among foreign agents of the KGB NOSENKO identified Canadian Ambassador WATKINS (see p. 23) and described a British Admiralty employee (William VASSALL, see p. 30). He talked freely of his activities in Geneva, including his association with KGB officers there, his visits to the KGB residency and his security duties with respect to the Soviet delegation. NOSENKO seemed to CIA to be what he claimed: a KGB officer with personal knowledge of important and sensitive KGB operations. He described his education, his service in the Naval GRU, his entry into the KGB and the general functions and operating techniques of the various components of the Second Chief Directorate in which he had served, along with the approximate dates of his service.Ultimately the only restriction which NOSENKO placed on his cooperation with CIA was his refusal to permit communication with him in the Soviet Union. He was willing to meet with CIA representatives during future trips outside the Soviet Union, which he estimated would occur about once every other year. He said he would not consider defecting except in circumstances in which his personal security was endangered, citing as reasons his devotion to his wife and children (and fear of KGB reprisal against them if he fled), his widowed mother's dependence on him, and his love of Russia and the Russian people.NOSENKO promised to contact CIA and arrangements were made for him to do so, when he came to the West again. Meanwhile, he expressed the intention to do everything within limits imposed by concern for his own security to obtain information which he was informed was of interest to CIA.Attempted Recruitment of Horst BRAUNSImmediately after returning to Moscow from Geneva, NOSENKO claimed he personally was involved in the attempt to recruit American tourist BRAUNS
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 297]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)NOSENKO's Information[BRAUNS was Russian born, and he lived in Leningrad until the Second World War when he fled when the Germans retreated] 06, 08 He eventually settled in the United States where the First Chief Directorate learned he had become a technician working for an "interesting company making computers, adding machines, and other instruments". When [BRAUNS] visited the Soviet 06 Union, NOSENKO assigned his subordinate [K.G.] KRUPNOV to handle the case, and KRUPNOV arranged for Inturist to take 06 [BRAUNS] out of the Inturist hotel and assign him to a room in another hotel where KRUPNOV met him. KRUPNOV "couldn't get Obanywhere" with [BRAUNS], 06 and he called on NOSENKO for help. NOSENKO joined him in [BRAUNS]' room, and eventually secured 06 [BRAUNS]' agreement to cooperate with the KGB, under threat of imprisonment for treason (based on BRAUNS' wartime flight from 08 the Soviet Union) 06 [BRAUNS] left Moscow the next day for Lenin-grad, and because NOSENKO thought the recruitment was "shaky", 06 he sent KRUPNOV to Leningrad to consolidate the recruitment. very [BRAUNS] refused to see KRUPNOV, and NOSENKO went to Leningrad and again talked to [BRAUNS]. 06 [BRAUNS] was so frightened, how-ever, that NOSENKO concluded that he would never work for the KGB; NOSENKO decided to terminate the case and [BRAUNS] was sent von his way.NOSENKO did not know why [BRAUNS] visited the Soviet Union, nor was he able to identify any Soviet citizens whom [BRAUNS] met in the USSR.In 1964 NOSENKO asserted that he had mentioned the [BRAUNS] case to CIA in 1962, but could not at that time recall his name.Comment: NOSENKO did not mention [BRAUNS] in 1962. [BRAUNS] arrived in the Soviet Union on 24 June 1962, after NOSENKO had met with CIA in Geneva. 06 [BRAUNS]' version is consistent with the events as related by NOSENKO, although he could not identify NOSENKO by photograph. In other con-texts NOSENKO has explained that the Seventh0001560TS No. 197124Copy 10Top Secret