Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 75]
# Top Secret(KGB ENTRY)NOSENKO states that in March 1953 he was already twenty-five and a half years old, a member of only the Komsomol, and that he had not been recommended for Party membership. He further claimed that on entry to the KGB he became secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organization.Comment: Eligibility for Party membership, if not membership itself, is a requisite for KGB appointment. By Komsomol statutes of that time, twenty-five was at that time the maximum age. Thus, at the time of NOSENKO's claimed KGB appointment, he was within six months of being dropped by the Komsomol as well as still unqualified for Party membership. He could not have been secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organization, as discussed on p. 338.NOSENKO has referred frequently to having contracted tuberculosis for which he was periodically hospitalized.Comment: According to KGB defectors familiar with the standards in force at the time, no candidate was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis.KGB Processing for EntryNOSENKO has stated (in chronological order) that at his initial interview with a KGB personnel, it was not necessary for him to complete any forms or questionnaires since the KGB had his Naval RU file; that he was told that the KGB would request the Naval RU file and meanwhile he was given three copies of a four to six-page biographic form to complete at home; and (at his last interrogation in 1966) that he
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 76]
# Top Secret(KGB ENTRY)never spoke to any KGB personnel officers nor visited the personnel office (and thus completed no forms provided by them)Comment: The most important document filled out by prospective KGB officers was a detailed 16-page personal history questionnaire, Anketa spetsialngo naznacheniya sotrudnika KGB, which was completed in one copy only. Classified even when blank, the form was not permitted to be taken home. KGB defectors have described completion of the form "as an experience not likely to be forgotten". NOSENKO omits in all accounts reference to other documents which are known to have been required in connection with a KGB officer's processing for duty.NOSENKO insisted that he took no physical examination in connection with processing for KGB entry.Comment: A medical examination was a routine and mandatory part of a KGB candidate's processing. Former KGB defectors could think of no instance in which the examination could be waived, particularly for a candidate with a recorded history of tuberculosis.NOSENKO claims in all of his accounts that he entered the KGB building and, with a pass obtained at the Pass Office, was permitted to proceed without escort. NOSENKO specifically asserted that the name of the interviewer did not appear on the pass.690001339TS No. 197124# Top SecretCopy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 77]
Top Secret(KGB ENTRY)Comment: Persons not holding a valid KGB identity document were not permitted entry to or movement in the building without escort. The interviewer's name did appear on the building pass. The interviewer's name was essential to the issuance of the pass: the interviewer had complete responsibility for the visitor's custody while on KGB premises.Initial Service in KGB (1953)NOSENKO stated that in the period of Beriya, in March-June 1953, the two existing directorates were the First Chief Directorate, which was the foreign intelligence directorate, and the Second Chief Directorate, the counter-intelligence directorate. The designations were later reversed for a few months, he said, by Kruglov, Beriya's successor.Comment: Beriya reversed the designations of the First and Second Chief Directorates in March 1953, and they were not changed back until March 1954. NOSENKO does not know how his own directorate was designated either at the time he allegedly entered on duty or during his entire first year of KGB service.NOSENKO described the KGB identity document of the period, but in spite of repeated questioning could not recall anything unusual about it.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 78]
# Top Secret(KGB ENTRY)Comment: Twice, following Stalin's death in March 1953 and again following Beriya's arrest in June 1953, all KGB identity documents were temporarily recalled for revalidation. On both occasions new stamps were placed on the document, lacking which the bearer could no longer enter the KGB installation. KGB defectors state that the events were the topic of numerous anecdotes at the time.NOSENKO claims he received no training in the KGB, but was assigned operations responsibilities immediately upon reporting for duty. He had explained that training was unnecessary because of his Naval RU experience.Comment: NOSENKO's lack of training is unlike that of any other KGB defector. His Naval RU service, by NOSENKO's own account, provided little if any preparation for his subsequent KGB duties.NOSENKO stated that his initial KGB basic pay was 1700 rubles as a case officer, plus secrecy, language and longevity pay, plus 500 rubles "rank pay" as a lieutenant. He recalled that there was one year, 1954, when KGB officers did not receive the pay for rank.Comment: KGB officers! rank pay was abolished in September 1952 and not restored until April 1954, a period which covers NOSENKO's first year of claimed service in the KGB.71# Top Secret0001341TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 79]
# Top Secret(KGB ENTRY)NOSENKO claimed that he was promoted to the rank of senior lieutenant in April 1953, shortly after joining the KGB.Comment: All promotions in the KGB were frozen from the time Beriya became Minister in March 1953 until late 1953. NOSENKO's actual sequence of promotions has never been established. He has also claimed this promotion occurred in 1952 and in 1954. See p. 351.NOSENKO acknowledged that his qualifications for continued KGB service were probably reviewed in connection with the purges following both Stalin's death and Beriya's arrest, during which reviews numerous negative factors in his back- ground would have come to light. He stated, however, that he could only assume that the important and influential position of his own father outweighed the negative factors.Comment: NOSENKO has never mentioned any influence his father had on his KGB service aside from that exercised through KOBULOV, who was himself arrested and executed.Other Aspects Relevant to 1953 KGB ServiceNOSENKO insisted that the KGB was organized from components of the MVD not earlier than late 1954 or early 1955.720001342Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy _______
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 80]
# Top Secret(KGB ENTRY)Comment: The KGB was organized in March 1954, in a final reform of Beriya's organization of Soviet security agencies. Preceded by a series of purges, the inception of the KGB would presumably be memorable to a KGB officer serving in Moscow Headquarters at the time.NOSENKO stated that the MVD Intelligence Directorate (subsequently to become the KGB First Chief Directorate) was located in 1953 in four buildings, including the Agricultural Exhibition and the "KI (Committee of Information) Building".Comment: The Agricultural Exhibition and the "KI Building" were one and the same. From his statement, NOSENKO is unaware that the KI (a combined foreign intelligence agency) ceased to exist in 1951, a matter perhaps unfamiliar to a KGB officer serving at a substantially later time, but one which other KGB officers serving in Moscow in 1953 recalled easily.NOSENKO did not know where the Chief Directorate of the Militia was located in 1953-1954.Comment: According to KGB defectors, a staff officer in the Counterintelligence Directorate at the time would have had frequent occasion to deal with the Chief Directorate of the Militia.730001343TS No. 197124Top SecretCopy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 81]
# Top Secret(KGB ENTRY)## KGB Entry: Summary and ConclusionNOSENKO's assertions regarding the KGB in the 1953-1954 period throw no more light on the actual date of his KGB entry than did his claims of when he transferred from the Naval RU; the contradictions and inconsistencies are interrelated.It is possible that a former KGB officer, relating the truth as he recalls it about events occurring ten years earlier, could be inconsistent; that he could forget his date of entry, not remember what administrative procedures were, fail to recall the circumstances of the organization he joined were, be inaccurate about what his pay was, and be vague on what his KGB identification document looked like. Recognizing that administrative regulations and procedures are on occasion honored in the breach, it is also possible that NOSENKO was accepted by the KGB despite the fact that he was the son of a senior official, that he had tuberculosis, that he was unqualified for Party member- ship, that he had been previously rejected and all at a time when the KGB was not accepting new recruits.The probability of these events being coincident, however, is remote. On examination, NOSENKO's latest admission, that he "actually" entered the KGB in March 1953, is no better substantiated than earlier accounts citing other dates.## ConclusionNOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner nor at the time he claimed.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 82]
# Top Secret## CHAPTER V## AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT(ca. 1953-June 1955)NOSENKO claims to have served in the American Embassy Section of the American Department (Second Chief Directorate) from his entry in the KGB until June 1955. His targets during this period were at first American correspondents residing in Moscow and later Army Attache personnel of the American Embassy in Moscow. His assignment involving American correspondents lasted anywhere from six to eighteen months (depending on the various dates he claimed he entered the KGB). His involvement with the Army Attaches lasted from sometime in 1954 until his transfer to the Seventh Department in June 1955.NOSENKO has sought to avoid discussion of his own or other KGB activities during this entire period which he characterized on occasion as "not relevant" or "of no consequence". He has repeatedly stated that he "found himself" only after this initial KGB service in the American Embassy Section. Until then, he asserted, he was a wastrel and "did not pay attention to the work". (He has variously dated his self-discovery as occurring in 1955 when he transferred to the Seventh Department; in June 1956 in connection with his participation in and award for the BURGI 06 case; and after August 1956 when the death of his father forced him to pull himself together.)## Operations Against American CorrespondentsNOSENKO exempted himself from reporting details of KGB work against any specific American correspondent in Moscow in 1953-1954 by saying that, as a new, very junior employée he had no access to operational files and did not participate personally in the handling of any of the correspondents.75Top Secret0001345TS. No. 197124Copy 10![illegible]
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 83]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)Although able to identify correspondents in Moscow who were then recruited KGB agents, NOSENKO learned this information either in conversations with his superior (V.A.) KOZLOV or at some point and in some undefined way after he no longer was working against these targets. NOSENKO made clear that he was not the case officer responsible for the more important correspondents: "KOZLOV himself was working with them, the chief of the section himself--with SHAPIRO with SHAPIROs 06 wife. I also know that KOZLOV was working with WHITNEY and with (Andrew J.) STEIGER. For each of these persons there was an operational file which I did not see." According to NOSENKO, he was in no way involved with STEIGER and 06 Edmund STEVENS, American correspondents who he alleged were recruited agents of the KGB.Comment: SHAPIRO was identified as a KGB agent by GOLITSYN in 1961, before the lead was received from NOSENKO. SHAPIRO's KGB agent cryptonym, known to NOSENKO and GOLITSYN, appears in the CHEREPANOV papers (see p.309). The KGB defector Nikolay KHOKHLOV in April 1954 06 identified the Polish-born wife of WHITNEY) as a KGB agent, an allegation which she denied.NOSENKO said his early months in the job were spent reading personality (not operational) files on a number of the correspondents in Moscow (none of which indicated the individual's developmental or agent status) and familiarizing himself with KGB methods. Later NOSENKO was assigned the "agent network" or drivers, clerical personnel, and domestics surrounding four of the correspondents, SHAPIRO, GILMORE, 06,06,06 SALISBURY and WHITNEY. He met with his agents periodically to determine whether they had developed any important information. His superior KOZLOV often went along to the meetings with NOSENKO, first to show him how to handle the agents and afterward whenever something interesting would begin to develop. In fact, according to NOSENKO, KOZLOV would accompany him to meetings with these Soviet citizens-agents when there was even a hint that something of interest might
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 84]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)NOSENKO has described some of these agents in general terms, but for all but a few he recalled neither their names nor personalia concerning them.KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY and WHITNEYOn the day of his acceptance into the KGB, NOSENKO stated that he was taken directly to the offices of the American Embassy Section. There he met the section chief, V.A. KOZLOV, who told NOSENKO that he would take over the work of the departing case officer, Captain Anatoliy TORMOZOV, in operations against American correspondents in Moscow.When NOSENKO reported for work the following day, he found a desk in Room 615 and, "There were three other guys sitting there. At first I was running traces, and at the same time I was reading the files on journalists... I think there were seven files in all, and I didn't see any other." NOSENKO listed these files as those on Henry SHAPIRO, Eddy GILMORE (as well as ones on GILMORE's wife (SEREBRYANKOVA) and her sister (CHERNYSHEVA), Harrison SALISBURY and Thomas WHITNEYNOSENKO identified SHAPIRO as an "old agent of ours". He said that (WHITNEY) "worked for us while he was in Moscow and gave us some material, but he refused to work for us when he left the country". GILMORE, NOSENKO said, was an active recruitment target in 1953 and 1954, but NOSENKO did not know whether he was recruited. Likewise, he did not know the status of SALISBURY as of 1953.NOSENKO stressed that the files he was given to read during the early period of his KGB service were developmental files (delo formulyar) rather than the operational files of the agents. The developmental files were less sensitive, and from them "you would never be able to figure out whether he (the subject of the file) is an agent or not". NOSENKO explained that, once a person became an agent, another file is set up, and these agent files were held by the chief of the section, KOZLOV. NOSENKO stated that he read the files on the seven persons "slowly and made some extracts for myself in my personal log--such things as
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 85]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)notations of their dates of arrival, things I could not remember". He was also given the files on the agents surrounding these correspondents, their drivers, maids, and cooks.## Agents Reporting on CorrespondentsNOSENKO said he was responsible for handling the agents who were reporting of SHAPIRO, WHITNEY, SALISBURY and the GILMORES and met them regularly to learn whether"anything was new, whom did SHAPIRO meet, what might be interesting in his behavior, what might be suspicious in his behavior, whom he is contacting, etc". He then reported to KOZLOV and would sometimes prepare a written report of his conversations with the agents. Asked to describe these meetings, NOSENKO replied:"Let us take the same case of SHAPIRO. I would meet drivers about three times a month or even two times. At the meeting I would ask the driver what was new in SHAPIRO’s behavior since our last meeting, whether SHAPIRO had suspicious contacts with foreigners, about his meetings with Russians, were they conducted openly or, perhaps, was SHAPIRO walking behind the person he met. And then the man [agent] would begin his report. Of course, if he spots anything suspicious he calls immediately, and I would see him the next morning. Otherwise, I would tell him at the meeting that I would see him again in about ten days or in two weeks, but if there was something interesting he should call immediately. It was the same with the maid and the cook. Upon returning to the office I would have to report to KOZLOV about my meetings, either orally or in writing. If, for example, [V.M.] KOVSHUK [also of the American Embassy Section] had a meeting with his agents, he too had to report immediately to KOZLOV. If the meetings were taking place late in the day and lasted until midnight or later and there were no written materials submitted at the meeting, I could go home and then report the next morning."
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 86]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)KOZLOV accompanied NOSENKO to meetings with the various agents surrounding the correspondents. "At first he was teaching me. Then he would go in cases when something interesting would begin to develop, even when it hadn't yet begun to develop but when there may have been a hint in a case of some other case officer."NOSENKO's agent network consisted mainly of domestic and clerical personnel in contact with the correspondents and their families. Asked to describe them, he said:"My first agent was a woman agent, a cook, who was working at GILMORE's place. She also worked at the Associated Press later. Her codename was 'AGLODINA', a funny one." (While reviewing a list of Soviets employed by Americans in Moscow, NOSENKO in the fall of 1965 identified one Yelena S. KOSIENKO as his former agent "AGLODINA". At that time he told CIA that he had taken over KOSIENKO from TORMOZOV upon entering the American Embassy Section in 1953, and that she subsequently worked for and reported of GILMORE's successor, Richard KASISCHKE. NOSENKO said that KOSIENKO "never provided any interesting information.) "My second agent was a chauffeur whose cryptonym, I think, was 'SERGEY'. I think he was driving for WHITNEY Then I also had SHAPIRO's chauffeur, a funny little fellow. In other words, charwomen, chauffeurs, this was my agentura [agent network]."Although NOSENKO was able to give a breakdown of this net- work in terms of the number and type of agents targetted against particular individuals, he had forgotten their true names and could not provide personality information on any of them. He explained: "I don't remember now. They all passed by like a river because they were turned over often." NOSENKO did recall that it was he who selected and handled the agent who was placed in SHAPIRO's office as a secretary; this agent had earlier worked in the offices of *Moscow News*, an English-language newspaper published in Moscow.79Top Secret0001349TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 87]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)NOSENKO estimated that he was responsible for handling ten to twelve agents in operations against the correspondents. This, he said, was a normal load, although more experienced case officers might have as many as fifteen. NOSENKO described his agentura as follows:| Target                  | Agents                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      || ----------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- || [Eddy GILMORE] 06       | Two agents, the cook and the driver; one operational contact, a part-time cleaning girl; and a girlfriend of GILMORF's sister-06 in-law and GILMORE'S 06,11 Russian wife.                                                                                                                                   || [Thomas WHITNEY] 06     | One agent, his driver, "SERGEY".                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            || [Henry SHAPIRO] 06      | Three agents; SHAPIRO's secretary and his chauffeur, plus an old woman who was a relative of SHAPIRO's wife and lived with the SHAPIROS in Moscow. (The secretary and chauffeur later worked for [Kenneth BRODNEY] and reported on him to NOSENKO; [BRODNEY] temporarily took [SHAPIRO]'s place in Moscow.) || [Harrison SALISBURY] 06 | Two agents; [SALISBURY]'s driver, and a part-time cleaning girl.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |NOSENKO classified two other of his agents as "neutral", in that they did not have specific targets on whom to report. The first of these was the director of MOSGRAN, a Russian-language training program for foreigners in Moscow. His cryptonym was "RAKETA", but NOSENKO could not recall his true name. The second "VOLODINA", was a female teacher in this same program who instructed some of the correspondents, and Embassy employees in their homes; he could not recall the true name of "VOLODINA". When NOSENKO was relieved of his responsibility for the correspondents in 1954, he turned over all of his agents to other case officers in the American Embassy Section with the exception of "RAKETA" and "VOLODINA", whom he continued to handle in his work with Army Attaches.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 88]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION -. ca. 1953-June 1955)## Operations Against U.S. Army Attache PersonnelNOSENKO claimed specific responsibility for work against American Army Attaches during twenty months of 1954-55, a period in which NOSENKO claimed no supervisory responsibility to divert his attention from personal operational duties. (NOSENKO, explaining why he did not know more details about the Embassy, Section's targets while he was its deputy chief in 1960-1961, said that as a supervisor he was too busy overseeing subordinates. Hence, NOSENKO continued, he could not be expected to remember as many such details as would be possible had he been a case officer working daily on only four or five targets. Elsewhere, he contrasted operations against tourists, who often came and went in a matter of a few days, with the work against the service attaches and diplomats permanently stationed in Moscow, who could be studied systematically and slowly.)NOSENKO has said in different contexts that as the American Department case officer responsible for operations against Army Attaches he received and was responsible for assimilating the product of a wide variety of sources on the individuals who were his targets. He has mentioned infor- mation received from the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelli- gence) Directorate; the Archives of the MGB/MVD/KGB; and the microphones which were emplaced about a year before NOSENKO entered the American Department.Comment: NOSENKO has said variously that the microphones in the Army Attache offices were his most valuable source of information on his targets of 1954-1955; that he knew nothing of these microphones until he re-entered the Embassy Section in 1960; and that he learned of their existence during 1953-1955 but not where any were located.81Top Secret0001351TS No. 197124Copy 10