Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 50]
SECRETat this time. On the other hand, it is not reasonable that NOSENKOwould lay claim to the title of Deputy Chief of the First Section, FirstDepartment, if this were not true when he clearly knew of the visits ofGOLITSYN to the First Section in 1960-1961 and of his conferenceswith officers closely associated with NOSENKO at that time.NOSENKO has also mentioned a number of officers of the SCDor former officers of the SCD who transferred to the FCD with whomhe was personally acquainted and who were also known to GOLITSYN.A number of these officers were officers from whom GOLITSYN hasstated he obtained certain information or through whom he became awareof certain activities including Vladislav M. KOVSHUK, Gennadiy I.GRYAZNOV, Vladimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy I. GUK, VladimirA. CHURANOV, Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV.The statement of NOSENKO that although he had heard ofGOLITSYN he had never personally met GOLITSYN, stands in conflictwith the statements of GOLITSYN that he, GOLITSYN, had met andtalked with NOSENKO in the SCD in the late 1950's. The descriptionof GOLITSYN of this meeting is that of a casual encounter in the hallsrather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of anyreason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember suchan encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 51]
SEUNETissue, it is eminently reasonable to conclude that the encounter tookplace but that NOSENKO simply has no recollection of it. There isno reason to attach significance to this lapse of memory.The previous opinion that NOSENKO did not hold the claimedposition of Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department, during 1960 -1961 has had the most merit in the controversy over his statementsrelative to his KGB career. This particular aspect will be covered indetail in another section, but of note at this time is the controversyover what duties the position of Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB,entails or does not entail. It is a fruitless exercise to attempt to judgewhether NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 - 1961on the basis of whether his knowledge of the total activities of the FirstSection was commensurate with the knowledge of a Deputy Branch Chiefin CIA in regard to the activities of the entire Branch.Whether NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD,KGB, must be judged on the basis of what were the duties of a DeputyChief of Section in the SCD and in particular what were his duties inthe particular assignment. The organizational structure of the KGBmay or may not have some similarities to the organizational structureof CIA, but any similarities are surely not such as to permit a judgment5SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 52]
SECRETas to whether NOSENKO held a certain claimed position on the basisof a comparison of his activities and responsibilities with that inherentin a somewhat similar position in CIA.One of the most important differences between United Statesagencies or organizations, including CIA, and the bureaucratic structureof agencies or organizations in the USSR, including the KGB, is thesalary structure. Pay of a KGB officer is based on military rank andon actual position held with an additional percentage increase for longevityand language qualification. Actual position held is important from amonetary viewpoint in addition to the prestige. As an example, thedifference in monthly salary between a captain and a major is twentyrubles and the difference in salary between a Senior Case Officer anda Deputy Chief of Section is also twenty rubles. An increase in militaryrank alone has limited pay advantages, as for example a LieutenantColonel who is only a Senior Case Officer receives less pay than a majorwho holds the position of Chief of Section.During current interviews, an effort has been made to obtainfrom NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the variousclaimed positions. The judgment on whether he held or did not holdthe various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual6SECRET0001048
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 53]
supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based to a considerable degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO. Admittedly this is not the most satisfactory way of resolving the questions, but it is the only method possible at this time.00010497SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 54]
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[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 55]
SECRETC. HAS NOSENKO GIVEN AN ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION OFHIS MOTIVATION IN CONTACTING CIA IN 1962AND FOR HIS DEFECTION IN 1964?SECRET![GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]0001050
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 56]
SECRETC. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? Of the eight listed categories which are being given specific consideration in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO, this category is probably the most difficult in which to present a logical position with factual support. There are too many intangible aspects involved and although motivation is an important factor, full resolution of the motivation problem is not a paramount factor in deciding whether NOSENKO is or is not a dispatched agent. NOSENKO could have contacted this Agency in 1962 and defected in 1964 without KGB knowledge and yet even at this late date have failed to disclose some important events of a personal nature which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision. Defectors are humans and have at least the normal reluctance to admit unfavorable information which they consider of a personal nature.On 31 October 1967 NOSENKO, following a request, furnished a handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, a typed copy of which is attached. The memorandum, although not grammatically correct, is quite understandable and is worthy of review. The tenor of the memorandum is one of increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime.SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 57]
# SECRETNOSENKO and others of his generation have lived in a Soviet society throughout their entire lives. The environment is an important factor of influence in the life of an individual and true disillusionment is at best usually a gradual process in which many factors, some recognized and some not recognized by the individual, have played a role in varying degrees.NOSENKO, until 1955 and possibly until the death of his father in August 1956, could be compared to the profligate son of wealthy parents in the United States who finally graduates from college and obtains employment perhaps in the firm of his father without actually earning any of the luxuries he has enjoyed. The father of NOSENKO was not only wealthy by Soviet standards but also held a high government position. The influence of his father and the name of his father undoubtedly was an important if not the most important factor in NOSENKO even being permitted to enter the Naval RU and the KGB even though NOSENKO is particularly reluctant to admit, perhaps even to himself, that this was the primary reason.The above should not be construed as any reflection on the actual intelligence of NOSENKO, but rather as an explanation of how NOSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB. His2SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 58]
# SECRETperformance in both prior to 1956 by his own admission was such that he probably would have been summarily terminated if he had not been the son of the capable, respected Minister of Shipbuilding.If a certain amount of speculation is permitted, the disillusionment of NOSENKO, who lost many personal advantages following the death of his father including a personal automobile, may have actually started soon after the death of his father. That NOSENKO is undisciplined is supported by his admissions relative to his life in the USSR and his behavior both in 1962 in Geneva and for a period of time after his defection in 1964. NOSENKO was addicted to women, liquor, and the material things which can be purchased with money or obtained through influence.A question has been previously raised regarding his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962, particularly his statement that he needed money and would sell "two pieces of information." NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact with the Americans, that he was not emotionally ready to defect, but that he subconsciously believed that if he made a contact he would be making an ultimate commitment from which he could no longer retreat.3SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 59]
# SECRETNOSENKO has stated that he gave considerable thought to the best way to contact the Americans so that he would be believed and not rejected and came to the conclusion that he would offer to sell some information. NOSENKO stated that he thought if he approached the Americans stating he was a "KGB counterintelligence officer who wanted to give information," he would not have been believed and would have been peremptorily rejected. NOSENKO stated he had difficulty deciding how much money to ask for and how to make the approach, but finally decided to do it through David MARK whom the KGB considered was with American Intelligence.The above statements by NOSENKO are not in conflict with the record. NOSENKO did offer to sell "two pieces of information," almost immediately gave more information, made no significant demands for money, and in fact his price for "two pieces of information" was ridiculously low by American standards. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated, as he first stated in 1962, that he had spent excessive amounts of money in one or two riotous evenings. However, NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he could have covered his expenditures by other means without receiving any money from the Americans.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 60]
NOSENKO has stated that the night before his departure from Geneva to the USSR he gave serious thought to defection but was not emotionally adapted to defect at that time. Following his return to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO, during a period of time, made his final decision to defect at the first opportunity, realizing that it meant leaving his wife, children, and other members of his family in the USSR.Some aspects of the motivation of NOSENKO are obscure and will probably so remain. It would be preferable if an exact detailed chronology of all the factors involved could be prepared or if even certain obvious factors could be accurately delineated. These are both impossible at this time and probably at any time in the future. What is important at this time is a decision as to whether the motivation of NOSENKO was based on personal reasons with no implications of KGB dispatch. It is considered that the explanation of NOSENKO concerning his motivation is acceptable and that his statement that no one except the Americans was aware of his contacts with the Americans in 1962 or his intent to defect in 1964 is supported by other information of a collateral nature. (See Section III, H.)Attachment:Typed cpy Memo from NOSENKO
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 61]
Operational Memo # N-4SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri IvanovichThe following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum furnished by Subject on 1 November 1967, following a request on 31 October 1967:What were the motif and the reasons which have led me to the decision to breake with the Soviet Russia? The only definite is an understanding of the situation in the Soviet Russia, the knowledge of the methods of the communist regime, the knowledge of the real foreign and interior policies of the Soviet government and the faith in the rightness of the free world.It was not a decision which was accepted or could be accepted in a month or a year. This decision was slowly growing in me. I think that the beginning was in the studentship.Living with my parents and being in the circles of the parent's and my acquaintances I knew more then there was written in newspapers and periodics and that was propagandized by radio and TV. Working in the Far East and later being in trips in different regions and cities of Russia I found out much better the life and conditions of the life of the people of the Soviet Russia.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 62]
When I worked 11 years in MVD-KGB I understood and found out very many things, details and the real deal of the existing regime, about methods of the work of MGB-MVD-KGB and about their doings, about hundreds of thousands of the people of Russia who were (and still are) considered "politically" dangerous and around whom was (and still is) going an active work of all organs KGB.At the same time when I was several times abroad I have seen personally the so-called "decay" at the West. I have seen in reality how is living people.Several times when I was abroad I was thinking about staying at the West and not returning in Russia, but only one thing was keeping me -- my family.In 1962 in Switzerland I made the acquaintance with the Americans. From my part "the sell of the information" was a real show. I was thinking that they would not believe me otherwise. In that period of the time there was going a big struggle in me to stay abroad or to return home till the last days of living in Geneva and even when I was returning home in Vienna.In 1962-1963 I decided definitely that I did not want and could not live more in the Soviet Russia. In this period of time I have done all my best to go as soon as possible abroad.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 63]
It was not easy to make this decision, it was very difficult to leave the family for ever.And now in spite of everything I do not regret.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 64]
> [Figure] A slightly-angled close-up shot shows a black surface (right side) partially covered with a white sheet of paper (left side), the upper right corner of which is folded forward. A white label marked with the letter 'D' is affixed at the edge of the paper, on the border of the two surfaces.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 65]
SECRETD. IS THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO TO CIACONCERNING KGB OPERATIONS, PERSONALITIES,AND ORGANIZATION REASONABLY COMMENSURATEWITH HIS CLAIMED KGB CAREER?SECRET![Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 66]
# SECRETD. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerningKGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commen-surate with his claimed KGB career? The conclusion is that the infor-mation furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations, personalities,and organization is more than reasonably commensurate with his claimedcareer in the KGB from mid-March 1953 to his defection in early February1964.In reaching the above conclusion, consideration has been givento his claimed departmental assignments and claimed positions in eachdepartment. Certain allowance has been made for faulty memory withconsideration being given to whether there is any indication of deceptionor whether the failure to recall a particular item of interest can logicallybe attributed to the vagaries of the human mind. There is, of course, noaccurate standard of measurement which would permit a positive deter-mination as to whether inability to recall certain details or events isactually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall all past eventsor could be attributed to willful deception.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 67]
An effort has been made to determine if there are any particular patterns or areas where NOSENKO has indicated he did not recall specific matters or certain details, and no pattern or specific areas have been noted. NOSENKO, in fact, has an unusually good memory as evidenced by the extensive information furnished by NOSENKO purely from recollection. In addition, there has been no material reluctance on the part of NOSENKO to discuss his entire life, KGB officers he has known, KGB organization and procedures, or other topics of interest. NOSENKO has furnished considerable detail concerning KGB officers whom he has known at various periods in his entire KGB career. He has been very consistent in information furnished and has frequently added certain details which he recalled at a later date.Certain remarks will be made in another section in regard to the volume and scope of information furnished by NOSENKO. This information is not selective, but is an excellent indicator that NOSENKO was assigned to the First Department and Seventh Department, SCD, during the claimed periods of time and held the claimed positions. Consideration has been given to his various claimed KGB assignments in evaluating the information furnished in an effort to assess whether his indicated knowledge was commensurate with his claimed position during
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 68]
SECRETa particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not occupy the position which he claimed to have held.It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKO supports his claimed positions in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially confirm through collateral sources that NOSENKO served in his claimed positions. Neither has it been possible to obtain from other sources an applicable description of the duties or responsibilities of an individual holding any of the positions NOSENKO claimed to have held after 1958. It is felt there can be no question that NOSENKO served in the capacities of junior case officer, case officer, and senior case officer during 1953 - 1957. As regards the duties and responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Section, Chief of Section, and Deputy Chief of Department, and whether NOSENKO held these various claimed positions, a considerable amount of personal judgment has been necessary. This personal judgment has been made in as judicial a manner as possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in regard to the above is largely dependent upon information from NOSENKO.NOSENKO has compiled detailed diagrams of the actual offices he claims to have occupied and surrounding offices during the four primary periods of time: 1953-1955, 1955-1959, 1960-1961, and 1962-1963. He has prepared specific memoranda concerning his co-officers3SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 69]
and other personnel, and changes of personnel, as well as diagrams of the offices of the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of the SCD during 1956 - 1964. This material is internally consistent. Furthermore NOSENKO could not possibly have known that this detailed information could not immediately be checked for accuracy, at least in part, with a source or another officer who has defected since mid-1964. If these diagrams and memoranda were not relatively correct, NOSENKO, who is quite astute in matters of counterintelligence, would hardly have voluntarily prepared the material in such detail. This type of information is peculiarly adaptable for analysis by a knowledgeable source or by another defector and could, if not relatively correct, permit a rather positive conclusion that NOSENKO was lying or fabricating information.NOSENKO has furnished quite specific information on KGB operations during the 1953 - 1955, 1955-1959, 1960-1961, and 1962 - 1963 periods of time. As might be expected, his specific knowledge is less for the 1953 - 1955 period; but his own personal situation and attitude until 1955 - 1956, which are mentioned elsewhere, should be given consideration. In any event, he has furnished adequate information so that his claimed assignment during 1953 - 1955 is considered sufficiently substantiated even though his actual job performance undoubtedly deserved a low rating.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 70]
SECRETThe knowledge of NOSENKO concerning cases, KGB operations,and other officers can consistently be related to his claimed departmentand position assignment during the 1953 to January 1964 period. Thescope of his knowledge of his own department when considered in totois broader after 1957 than before, which is compatible with his claim ofincreased responsibilities. His knowledge of the work of other departmentsof the SCD from the late 1950's on is also more extensive, which is also afurther indication that NOSENKO actually held the claimed positionsduring this period of time.5SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 71]
![photo description]
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 72]
# SECRETE. CAN THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BECONSIDERED IN TOTO AS HAVING RESULTEDIN MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE KGB AND/OR HASTHE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO BEEN OFSIGNIFICANT BENEFIT TO WESTERN INTELLIGENCE?![GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]SECRET0001065
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 73]
SECRETE. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be considered in toto as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelligence? The conclusion in regard to both of the above questions is affirmative, even though it is realized that ultimate loss to the KGB and ultimate benefit to Western Intelligence are both partly of an intangible nature and not susceptible to accurate measurement.NOSENKO has, as previously indicated, furnished voluminous information during current and previous interviews. An accurate total of specific cases is not possible at this time and would at best be only an interesting figure, the actual significance of which would be marginal. Practically every interview with NCSENKO, even at present, reveals information of counterintelligence interest and it is expected that this production can continue for a considerable period of time. This should not be construed as an indication that NOSENKO is intentionally with-holding information, but rather that stimulation of his memory through normal questions and discussions has been and can continue to be productive.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 74]
NOSENKO has furnished information concerning perhaps (2,000) KGB officers and 300 KGB agents or operative contacts (here the terms agents or operative contacts are used to refer to Soviet nationals), mainly in the Second Chief Directorate or internal KGB organizations. However, he has identified approximately (250) former or current First Chief Directorate officers and there is a considerable exchange of officers between the FCD and SCD. In addition, numerous officers of the SCD and other internal KGB organizations travel abroad with delegations, tourist groups, and as visitors to various major exhibitions such as World's Fairs. It is impossible at this time to estimate the number of KGB officers identified by NOSENKO who have been outside the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who will be out sometime in the future.There has been very little attempted exploitation of information furnished by NOSENKO concerning other KGB officers and, therefore, the possible value of this information to United States Intelligence cannot be estimated nor can the potential damage to the KGB be estimated.Disclosure of information concerning certain KGB officers would be a necessary part of any dispatch of a KGB agent or officer to the West either for purposes of contact with Western Intelligence for a2SECRET