Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 89]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)Information was also received according to NOSENKO from the network of Soviet chauffeurs, cooks, language instructors, and other agents in the Embassy; permanent and roving surveillance patrols outside the Embassy; fixed observation posts next to, across from and near the Embassy; advance notification of intent to travel by the attaches and their itineraries; and reports from outside Moscow, including surveillance, agent networks, the Militia, and the military. The point of collecting and assimilating this information, NOSENKO said, was to be able to know what the military attaches were doing in Moscow and thereby to control their intelligence collection activities. Far less important was the goal of recruiting military attaches; NOSENKO knew of only a few instances when this was attempted, and all of these efforts allegedly failed.The KGB's principal interest in control rather than recruitment has been NOSENKO's explanation for knowing little about the backgrounds and personal lives of his targets--such information, he stated, simply was not pertinent to the primary mission of control. He has also used this explanation to support his assertion that there were no recruitments of American military personnel during this period.Comment: NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB's mission was to control rather than to recruit American military attaches is contradicted by the emphasis KGB tradition and doctrine place on conducting operations against the United States, the "main enemy", in the KGB parlance, in this case American officials with access to classified information, who were residing in the Soviet Union.In the USSR, especially in the early 1950's prior to the U-2 reconnaissance, the Service Attache travel program was the primary means by which the U.S. Armed Forces acquired intelligence information on the Soviet Union's military-industrial complex. The prevention or inhibition of this collection activity fell consequently to KGB components concerned with the security of military-industrial installations,
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 90]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)Comment: (Continued)with transportation facilities, and with the geographic regions to which the Service Attaches travelled. Approval of Service Attache travel itineraries was not within the competence of a case officer within the Embassy Section; the determination would have to have been made by officials concerned with the USSR's military and industrial security and aware of reciprocal privileges being extended to Soviet Service Attaches in the United States, matters involving the GRU as well as the KGB. An Embassy Section case officer would have as a matter of course monitored reports of Service Attaches' travel, searching for personal vulnerabilities among his targets, and assisted local KGB elements in setting up provocations outside of Moscow. NOSENKO, however, has included neither of these latter functions as having been among his responsibilities.## Custody of Case Files on Army Attache Personnel"Sometime in the first half of 1954" NOSENKO said, he was relieved of his responsibilities for the correspondent cases, and from then until his transfer from the American Department he handled KGB Second Chief Directorate operations against the officer personnel of the Army Attache's office. NOSENKO's account of the turnover of the correspondent files to his successor and of the acceptance of the attache files is presented below.-8 April 1964: "I took over the Army Attache cases from Nikolay KHRENOV... When I was leaving in 1955, I turned the attache files over to Valeriy BUDYLDIN."83# Top Secret0001353TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 91]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)-10 April 1964: "I made a mistake [when] I said I accepted the cases from KHRENOV.... I accepted the cases from Pavel Fedorovich PANKRATOV. This was in the beginning of 1954."-15 April 1964: NOSENKO said that he thought he turned over the correspondent files to F.V. KISLITSYN (who returned to the USSR from Australia in May 1954). NOSENKO asked when the PETROVS defected in Australia; he explained that he was not sure about KISLITSYN and could have given them to another officer. "If KISLITSYN came [back from Australia] in 1953, then it was to KISLITSYN. Otherwise, it was someone else."-18 June 1964: "KISLITSYN came into the Embassy Section in 1954 and I gave him the files on American correspondents. BUDYLDIN also joined the section this year and took the files on the Army Attache and his assistants from PANKRATOV. BUDYLDIN left later that year and turned those files over to me.... Yuriy LEONTIYEV joined the section in 1955, and I gave him the files on the Army Attache and his assistants."NOSENKO has also been indefinite as to the date he assumed responsibilities for the Attaches. As noted above, he said on 10 April 1964 that he received the files in the beginning of 1954. IIe had earlier said that he worked on the correspondents "only about six months". If the date of March 1953, which he most often gave for his entry into the KGB, is correct, this would place the turnover in the fall of 1953. On other occasions he has said specifically that he turned over the correspondent cases and began work against the Attaches in January 1954, on still others that this occurred in May 1954. In February 1965, NOSENKO said that he could not remember when he changed assignments.## Agents Reporting on Army AttachesAsked in April 1964 to describe the agent network (agentura) at his disposal in operations against Army Attaches during this period which began in 1954, NOSENKO replied: "There were two maids, a cook, drivers...about ten persons, plus the agent 'SERVIZNIY' and the one with the cryptonym 'DMITRIYEV'.... These additional two agents, about 12 or 13 agents altogether." With one exception, this
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 92]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)network remained constant until NOSENKO transferred from the American Embassy Section in mid-1955. He met each agent about once a week, except for the chauffeurs who were met three times a month in a safehouse or on the street. The Assistant Army Attaches used a pool of five drivers at random, all of whom were his agents, NOSENKO said. Apart from the permanent driver for the senior Attache, none was targetted against specific members of the attache office.Comment: As noted earlier, NOSENKO named "VOLODINA" and "RAKETA" as agents he used against correspondents and against Army Attache targets, but he never again referred to them and, in describing his own activities, he never indicated how or in what cases they were used.According to NOSENKO, this network was "just a supporting agentura, which very seldom was worthwhile," the main source of information on the Army Attaches being the microphones in their offices.Newly added to the network while NOSENKO held this position was a maid inserted to report on Army Attache [^06] Earl L. MICKELSON and his successor, [^06] Fillmore K. MEARNS. Her name, NOSENKO thought, was NOVIKOVA. She was an English-speaking university graduate but "hid her knowledge of English in order to overhear conversations or read letters without taking them outside".Besides NOVIKOVA, NOSENKO named one other maid who was his agent, Mariya NEVEROVA, cryptonym "SHVEDOVA," and she was targetted against the Assistant Army Attache, [^06] Ira RICHARDS. He described NEVEROVA as a "little, old, thin woman," from whom he never obtained anything of interest. They met in a safehouse on Kuznetskiy Most.85Top Secret0001355TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 93]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)Of the KGB agents among the chauffeurs, NOSENKO named Nikolay SHNYRYEV, who was used by various attaches. "He reported where they went, what they said, whether they took notes or photographs, whether they had unusual packages with them, and so on."When viewing photographs (see below) in September 1964, NOSENKO identified Vladislav VOROBYEV as his former agent "SERVIZNIY". He had been working in the Embassy since its establishment, starting first as a messenger boy and, in NOSENKO's time, performing clerical tasks. VOROBYEV had no direct connection with the Army Attaches, and NOSENKO said he himself did not know why he had been given VOROBYEV to handle in 1954. The main function of this agent was delivering to NOSENKO copies of the unclassified telephone listings of the Embassy, issued monthly."DMITRIYEV's" true name may have been Dmitriy KUKOLEV; NOSENKO saw this name on a 1962 phone list and thought, but was not sure, that this was his agent. An electrician who worked on the Embassy's electrical wiring systems and elevator, "DMITRIYEV" reported to NOSENKO on antenna wires and other wires he had observed on the top floors. Like VOROBYEV, "DMITRIYEV" had no direct connection with the Army Attaches.Comment: Elsewhere NOSENKO described an electrician who provided some technical information on the Embassy, but he related him to his second tour in the American Embassy Section in 1960-1962 and did not then claim that the electrician was his agent.In September 1964 NOSENKO was shown a series of 260 biographic cards on Soviet citizens employed by the American Embassy in Moscow. Each card contained a photograph of the person involved and short biographic notes, including his name and job in the Embassy. The first time he went through these cards, NOSENKO was permitted to see only the photographs; NOSENKO did not identify the photographs of SHNYRYEV.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 94]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)and KUKOLEV but said that the face of VOROBYFV was familiar, adding that he thought his name was VOROBYEV. When shown the Embassy biographic cards on SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV, he identified each of them as his agents during the 1954-1955 period in the American Department and equated them to the cryptonyms given previously. In the case of SHNYRYEV, when shown the biographic information, which listed SHNYRYEV as "chauffeur for the military attache," NOSENKO exclaimed: "Oh my God, this is my own agent." He later said it was a good photograph of SHNYRYEV.NOSENKO'S TargetsAsked in February 1965 to list the Army Attache personnel for whom he was directly responsible during 1954 and 1955, NOSENKO orally listed the following names: "MICKELSON, MEARNS, RICHARDS, FELCHLIN, BENSON, MULE, STROUD, and CARDELLA."Comment: In the order as given by NOSENKO, the list comprises two generations of Army Attaches in Moscow. It is neither in alphabetical order nor chronological according to date or service in Moscow. It is, however, in descending order of rank from Colonel MICKELSON through Captains MULE and STROUD to Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA.NOSENKO correctly identified Earl L. MICKELSON as a colonel and the Army Attache in Moscow during 1954 and 1955. PANKRATOV was the case officer originally handling MICKELSON, and the case was turned over to NOSENKO in 1954. When asked about agents who might have been working against MICKELSON, NOSENKO said that there was one cook, a KGB operational contact whose name he did not recall, and MICKELSON's maid, whose name NOSENKO believed was NOVIKOVA. In addition to these two, the only other source reporting on MICKELSON was his chauffeur, whose name NOSENKO also did not remember.87Top SecretC001357TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 95]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)NOSENKO said that the KGB learned nothing interesting about 06 [MICKELSON] from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance, and that no operational approach or recruitment was attempted. There was, in fact, no interesting or derogatory information on [MICKELSON] from any source.06Comment: [MICKELSON] was involved in at least two incidents inside the Soviet Union which NOSENKO has not reported. In May 1954 he was arrested in Tbilisi on the (false) charge of having photographed a bridge. In August 1954 06 [MICKELSON] was arrested again for illegal photography south of Kharkov; on this occasion he was held for two hours before being released. It is judged that such events, particularly those staged by the KGB, would be known to the KGB case officer responsible for the attache officer concerned.06 [MEARNS]NOSENKO accurately identified [Fillmore K. MEARNS] as [MICKELSON]'s replacement and said that he was the responsible case officer. There were two agents and one operational contact working against [MEARNS]. Of these, NOSENKO could recall the name only of NOVIKOVA, the same maid who reported earlier on [MICKELSON]. Besides being told to attempt to overhear [MEARNS]' conversations, NOVIKOVA was instructed to search his clothing and to copy any notes she might find, but she never overheard or found anything of interest to the KGB. NOSENKO recalled that [MEARNS]' personal effects were searched by the KGB while they were being shipped to Moscow from the United States, and that all his service records had been discovered and photographed. (NOSENKO has told this same story about [MICKELSON].) NOSENKO described [MEARNS] as being more "active" in Moscow than [MICKELSON] had been and said that information from concealed microphones showed him to have a strong character. Nothing of interest concerning him was received from these microphones or from telephone taps.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 96]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)06RICHARDS06NOSENKO correctly identified Ira B. RICHARDS as a08 lieutenant colonel who served as an Assistant Army Attache 08in Moscow. The one agent reporting on RICHARDS whom NOSENKO 06could name was the maid Mariya NEVEROVA, KGB cryptonym"SHVEDOVA", but she had never provided any worthwhileinformation about RICHARDS. In addition, some Soviet driversreported on RICHARDS, but nothing useful was obtained fromthem.0606Comment: RICHARDS served in Moscow from July 1954 toJuly 1956. There was a microphone in the officewhich he shared first with MICKELSON and laterwith MEARNS.0606woman06 RICHARDS confirmed that Mariya NEVEROVA washis maid and described her as a "mousy"who had a heart attack during the period shewas employed by him, an incident which wasnot recalled by NOSENKO.For about four months of his Moscow tour,06 RICHARDS took Russian-language lessons fromLudmila GROMAKOVA in his apartment. During06 these lessons, RICHARDS often discussed laborconditions and wages in the United States and,on one occasion, had her record her speech onhis tape recorder. GROMAKOVA was pregnant andunmarried at the time. In another context,NOSENKO named GROMAKOVA as a KGB agent during1960-1962 but did not relate her to RICHARDS 06or to the 1953-1955 period.06 RICHARDS identified one "Volodya" (thediminutive of Vladimir) as his principaldriver. About 62 years old in 1954, Volodya'sfather was a rich jeweler in Moscow at the timeof the Revolution. Volodya himself was welleducated and, on one occasion while picnickingoutside Moscow, he spoke intelligently with89Top Secret0001359TS No. 197124Copy 1015/RR
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 97]
Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)Comment: (Continued)[RICHARDS] about the Revolution, propaganda, and news media. NOSENKO did not know of Volodya who, as [RICHARDS] driver, was NOSENKO's agent by NOSENKO's own account.[FELCHLIN]NOSENKO correctly identified Howard L. FELCHLIN as a lieutenant colonel who served as Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. By far the most aggressive of his targets and hence the object of special interest, NOSENKO said [FELCHLIN] served in the Soviet Union during 1954 and part of 1955, until being declared persona non grata. NOSENKO did not recall the names of any agents specifically targetted against [FELCHLIN], although he thought [FELCHLIN] must have had a maid who would have been a KGB agent. Additionally, NOSENKO said, the Assistant Army Attaches shared a pool of cars and drivers, and these were his agents. Unable to recall the precise date of [FELCHLIN]'s expulsion, NOSENKO related it to some event regarding Soviets stationed in the United States for which the Soviet Government decided to reply in kind. NOSENKO was imprecise as to the pretext used to expel [FELCHLIN], but said the action was based on information which had been accumulated from a number of sources and incidents. For example, [FELCHLIN] had been caught taking some photographs and a report had been written; along with other similar indications of [FELCHLIN]'s activities and reports of agents in contact with [FELCHLIN], the report was filed away for possible future use. NOSENKO was questioned further on [FELCHLIN] during the February 1965 interrogations. He said then that [FELCHLIN] alone had been declared persona non grata, and that no other attaches had been involved. NOSENKO explained his having but few details concerning this action by the fact that it took place after NOSENKO had transferred from the American Department to the Seventh Department in June 1955. NOSENKO knew nothing of [FELCHLIN]'s background.Top Secret
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 98]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)Comment: FELCHLIN visited the USSR as a merchant seaman and a diplomatic courier before arriving in July 1953 as an Assistant Army Attache. He served in the latter capacity for one year, until July 1954, when he was expelled. He had previously served in Austria and West Germany and had been in official contact with known GRU officers at both posts, as well as in the United States. During his entire tour in Moscow he was the object of intense KGB surveillance.Shortly after his arrival in September 1953 FELCHLIN with fellow Assistant Army Attache Martin J. MANHOFF and two Air Force Attaches, took a train trip to Siberia, the first trip permitted such Americans in many years. Six months later, on 25 March 1954, the Soviet newspaper *Trud* carried an article falsely alleging that FELCHLIN and his companions had lost some "spy documents" on the train. On another occasion, while travelling with a British Military Attache, FELCHLIN returned to his train compartment to find a scantily clad Soviet female in his berth. NOSENKO recalled neither of these incidents.In June 1954, while in the company of Lieutenant Colonel F.J. YEAGER, an Assistant Army Attache, FELCHLIN was arrested in Kiev by a Soviet Army officer for photographing a military target. (NOSENKO has never mentioned YEAGER's name; when told the name and asked for an identification, NOSENKO said that he had heard it and that he thought YEAGER was the Air Attache.) A large crowd gathered and, after some jostling, FELCHLIN and YEAGER were taken to a Militia station where they were ordered to sign a confession. They were held eleven hours, and their arrest caused the American Ambassador to deliver a strong protest note. FELCHLIN was told on 3 July 1954 to depart the Soviet Union within 48 hours.Major Walter A. MCKINNEY, the American Air91Top Secret0001361TS. No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 99]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - ca. 1953-June 1955)Comment: (Continued)Attache and one of FELCHLIN's travelling companions at the time the "spy notes" were allegedly lost, was declared persona non grata at the same time. Ambassador Bohlen successfully insisted, against initial Soviet refusal, that his personal plane be allowed into the USSR to fly FELCHLIN and MCKINNEY out. In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked to describe the unusual circumstances under which FELCHLIN left. NOSENKO said he could not, inasmuch, as he was no longer in the American Department at the time. Told that the expulsion took place in 1954, NOSENKO said this was not the correct date.Queried concerning SHNYRYEV, RICHARDS and FELCHLIN immediately recognized his photograph and name as one of the chauffeurs assigned to the office of the Army Attache at the Moscow Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his first trip outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV. He remarked that the Attaches referred to SHNYRYEV as either "Nikolay Perviy" (Nicholas the First) or "Nikolay Vtoroy" (Nicholas the Second) to distinguish him from another chauffeur with the same name. FELCHLIN said that SHNYRYEV drove primarily for the Army Attache himself, but sometimes drove for the Assistant Army Attaches, and he remembered that SHNYRYEV was not well, suffered from war wounds, and had continuing chest or lung trouble. Asked whether SHNYRYEV had any medical problem, NOSENKO said he was not aware of any.FELCHLIN said his maid Dora FEDOROVA was in her 50's. When she spoke with FELCHLIN about a job, she asked for about 120 rubles a month, which seemed excessive, so FELCHLIN offered 80. FEDOROVA refused and left. Two days later she returned and accepted. She spoke little English. Other maids came to the back door of FELCHLIN's apartment to "chat" with her, and suspecting that they were reporting to FEDOROVA, FELCHLIN teased her about it.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 100]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION ca. 1953-June 1955)Comment: (Continued)FEDOROVA's previous employer at the Embassy gave her full name to columnist Drew Pearson with a statement that she was one of the chief spies and the local "boss" of the Embassy net- work. Pearson printed the allegation. In the summer of 1953 or 1954, according to FELCHLIN, the maid approached FELCIILIN with the article, waved it in his face, and accused him of being Pearson's source. NOSENKO did not recognize FEDOROVA's name and did not recall hearing or reading of this incident.BENSONNOSENKO correctly identified his target John S. BENSON as a major and Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. He did not recall the names of any agents working against BENSON but said that BENSON was with MULE and STROUD (see below) in Stalingrad in 1955 when all three were caught by the KGB with electronic "spying" devices. They were declared persona non grata. The KGB had no other derogatory infor- mation on BENSON from any other source.STROUDNOSENKO correctly identified William R. STROUD as a captain and an Assistant Army Attache. The only agents working against him were the Army Attache drivers. From concealed microphones, the KGB learned before STROUD'S arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use of electronic spying apparatus. He was with BENSON and MULE in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata along with them (see below). Other than this, NOSENKO said, the KGB knew nothing unusual or interesting about STROUD from any source.93Top Secret0001363TS No. 197124Copy 10