Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 310]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)the missile documents.) The first sessions concentrated on general matters, such as BARGHOORN's life history.After one and one half hours of questioning BARGHOORN agreed that the materials were on him when he was arrested, but he maintained that they had been placed on his person. He said that he thought they were "newspapers or something," that he did not know what they were. The package was then opened and shown to BARGHOORN; it contained about 20 to 25 pages of information on missiles. "BARGHOORN was not, of course, given a close look" at the materials.Following BARGHOORN's admission, another declaration was drawn up by KRUPNOV and signed by KRUPNOV, KOVALENKO, and GRIBANOV. NOSENKO and KRUPNOV then took it to the office of the Chief Prosecutor where the incident report, the first interrogation, and the first and second declarations were reported to GRIBANOV MISHUTIN, the First Deputy Chief Prosecutor. directed that all materials on BARGHOORN, including information from KGB Archives, be given to the KGB Department of Prosecution so that they could begin legal proceedings against BARGHOORN. After this, all interrogations were conducted by that department; KRUPNOV was dropped from the case, although YEFREMOV continued to act as interpreter.Comment: BARGHOORN's version of his entrapment, arrest, and interrogation coincide fairly precisely with the version provided by NOSENKO. He identified NOSENKO from a photograph as a KGB officer present at one stage of the interrogation on the second day of his arrest and said NOSENKO took some part in the proceedings. He recalled NOSENKO as being "clever and quick-witted" and as "giving the impression that he was not a dedicated careerist, but opportunistic and adaptive: he seemed not to care about what he was doing, but doing a good job nevertheless."
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 311]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## The OSWALD CASENOSENKO's knowledge of the KGB's interest in OSWALD stemmed from his claimed Tourist Department assignments. He asserted that while Deputy Chief of the American Section in 1959 he participated in the KGB determination that OSWALD was of no operational interest. In September 1963, when NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, he was informed of OSWALD's visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to apply to return to the USSR. Immediately following President Kennedy's assassination, NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, reviewed KGB records of OSWALD'S stay in the Soviet Union including the Second Chief Directorate file on OSWALD.For continuity of presentation, both periods of NOSENKO's alleged involvement with the OSWALD case (1959-60 and 1963) are discussed here.The information NOSENKO provided on the OSWALD case is significant if it substantiates NOSENKO'S claimed positions in the KGB and confirms the validity of his claim that he knew the extent of KGB involvement with OSWALD.## NOSENKO's Information### Residence in the USSRPrior to OSWALD's arrival in the USSR, he was completely unknown to the KGB. Moreover, upon receipt of his visa application, the KGB Second Chief Directorate determined that he was not of sufficient importance to justify any special interest by the Seventh Department. Not until about October 1959, when OSWALD expressed a desire to remain in the USSR did he come to the attention of NOSENKO, who was, at that time, Deputy Chief of the American Section of the Seventh Department. All available materials on him were thereupon collected and examined - the visa application, Inturist reports, interpreters' reports, reports from hotel agents, and the results of a check of KGB Archives. NOSENKO'S subordinate, KRUPNOV interviewed the interpreter to whom OSWALD had stated his wish to stay in the USSR.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 312]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT -- January 1962-January 1964)Although the KGB considered it possible that OSWALD might be an American agent, the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility because "this would be done after the person is allowed to stay in the Soviet Union." Surveillance of OSWALD was not increased after his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the KGB in an attempt to establish his intentions. KRUPNOV sent NOSENKO, his chief, a memorandum on information which had been received concerning OSWALD. The memorandum cited reports by KGB informants at the Hotel Berlin, where OSWALD was staying in accordance with an Inturist itinerary and a two-page report by the Inturist interpreter to whom OSWALD made his initial request to remain in the Soviet Union. A file incorporating all information which KRUPNOV had collected was thereupon opened in NOSENKO's section.From this information NOSENKO and KRUPNOV concluded that OSWALD was of no interest to the KGB, and both agreed that OSWALD appeared somewhat "abnormal." For this reason NOSENKO instructed KRUPNOV to advise OSWALD through the Inturist interpreter that he would not be permitted to remain permanently in the USSR and that he must depart on the expiration of his visa, then seek re-entry as a permanent resident through normal channels at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. KRUPNOV followed NOSENKO's orders, and either that day or the next NOSENKO learned that OSWALD failed to appear for a scheduled tour arranged by his Inturist guide. This prompted a search, and after several hours, OSWALD was found in his hotel room, bleeding heavily from self-inflicted wounds. After hearing of this incident from KRUPNOV, NOSENKO then reported it to K.N. DUBAS, Chief of the Seventh Department. NOSENKO believed that DUBAS in turn reported it to GRIBANOV, head of the KGB Second Chief Directorate. GRIBANOV upheld NOSENKO's original decision that the KGB should not become involved with OSWALD and that OSWALD should not be permitted to remain in the USSR.There was no attempt to debrief OSWALD because "he was not an interesting person and wasn't normal." OSWALD was never questioned on his past nor asked to write an auto-biography.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 313]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)NOSENKO did not know who eventually granted OSWALD permission to reside temporarily in the USSR or who approved issuance of his temporary residence permit. The KGB gave instructions that he not be allowed to live in the Moscow area. Either the Soviet Red Cross or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may have made this decision to assign OSWALD to Minsk. The Seventh Department updated his file, and it was sent, along with a cover letter prepared by KRUPNOV, to the local KGB organization in Minsk. KRUPNOV's letter summarized the case and specifically instructed local authorities there to take no action concerning OSWALD except to observe his activities "passively" to make sure that he was not an American Intelligence agent on temporary "sleeper" status. NOSENKO read this letter, and it was signed by DUBAS. On the basis of the instructions contained in the letter, NOSENKO said, no active steps could be taken in Minsk without KGB Headquarters approval. It was NOSENKO's opinion that the only coverage of OSWALD during his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, questioning of his neighbors and associates, and coverage of his mail. After OSWALD'S threatened second suicide attempt, the KGB "washed its hands of him" and that even though there was considered to be some possibility that he was a "sleeper agent," KGB Headquarters interest in him while he was in Minsk was "practically nil."Request to Return to the USSRThe KGB Second Chief Directorate was not concerned with OSWALD's return to the United States in June 1962, by which time NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. No further word on him was received at KGB Headquarters until he appeared at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in September 1963 and requested a visa to return to the Soviet Union. The Mexico Legal Residency reported his visit to KGB Headquarters by cable, requesting information. The KGB First Chief Directorate had no record on OSWALD. M.I. TURALIN, Deputy Chief of the First Chief Directorate's Service Number Two (Counter- intelligence Abroad) called the Seventh Department to see if the latter element had any information on OSWALD. The Chief of the Sixth Section of the Seventh Department, V.K. ALEKSEYEV, received the call and reported the inquiry to Seventh Department Chief CHELNOKOV or to KOVALENKO.305Top Secret0001576 TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 314]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)NOSENKO thought he himself was present at the time. ALEKSEYEV was given OSWALD's background, including his suicide attempt and the fact that he was not considered normal, and was told to advise the First Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not be permitted to return to the Soviet Union. ALEKSEYEV relayed this information to the First Chief Directorate.NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD had spoken at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, and he knew of no contacts between OSWALD and Cubans or representatives of the Cuban Government there or elsewhere.Comment: Independent sources, however, reported on visits by OSWALD to the Cuban as well as Soviet Embassies in Mexico City between 29 September and 3 October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) contact with a KGB officer under Consular cover at the Soviet Embassy there. NOSENKO originally said he knew nothing of any such contact. In October 1966 he revised this to say that OSWALD did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico City. NOSENKO explained that he had been sitting in the office of Seventh Department Chief, K.N. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscow Headquarters from the KGB Legal Residency in Mexico. The cable, which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City requesting permission to return to the USSR and that the cable specified that OSWALD had dealt with Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only.Top Secret
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 315]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964).## Post-Assassination Review of KGB FileNOSENKO next learned of OSWALD's activities as a resultof President Kennedy's assassination. About two hours afterPresident Kennedy was shot, NOSENKO was advised of this factin a telephone call to his home from KGB Headquarters. Ashort while later he was told, again by telephone, that thePresident had died. About two hours later, NOSENKO was toldthat OSWALD had been arrested, and he and the other officersof the American Tourist Section were called in to determinewhether the KGB had any information concerning him. Afterestablishing OSWALD's identity from KGB files and learningthat his file was still in Minsk, NOSENKO phoned the KGBoffice in Minsk on GRIBANOV's orders. The local KGB dictatedover the telephone a summary of its file on OSWALD. Thissummary concluded with the statement that the KGB in Minskhad attempted "to influence OSWALD in the right direction".GRIBANOV had been greatly disturbed about the local KGB'sefforts because it had been given specific instructions tocarry out nothing other than passive measures against OSWALDthere. He ordered that all records in Minsk pertaining toOSWALD's stay there, as well as an explanation of themeaning of the statement about influencing OSWALD, be flownimmediately to Moscow by military aircraft. NOSENKO personallyread the explanation from Minsk concerning the meaning ofthis statement and thoroughly reviewed OSWALD'S file whenit arrived by plane. He then turned the file over to S.M.FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the American Department of the KGBSecond Chief Directorate, who prepared a two-page summarymemorandum for GRIBANOV. This memorandum, which NOSENKOread, was forwarded to KGB Chairman Semichästnyy, andSemichastnyy in turn reported to the CPSU Central Committeeand to Khrushchev concerning it.OSWALD'Sfile from Minsk contained no information toindicate that the KGB in Minsk had taken any action withrespect to OSWALD contrary to instructions from KGB Head-quarters. From the date of OSWALD'S arrival in the USSRuntil his departure, the KGB had no personal contact withhim and had not attempted to utilize him in any manner.3070001578 TS No. 197124Top SecretCopy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 316]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)OSWALD never received any KGB training or KGB assignments. If any other department of the KGB or the GRU had wanted to use OSWALD in any way, it would have had to secure permission from the Seventh Department, which originally opened his case file. In view of OSWALD'S apparent mental instability, no Soviet intelligence organization, particularly not the Thirteenth (Assassination and Sabotage) Department, would have considered using him. KGB Headquarters did not maintain a control file on him following his settlement in Minsk, as it would have done had OSWALD been of any operational interest. The only KGB record on OSWALD maintained in Moscow was an index card giving his name and the fact the Seventh Department had originated a file concerning him.The KGB maintained no separate file on Marina OSWALD; all information about her was kept in OSWALD'S file. There was no indication in OSWALD'S file that the KGB had had any interest in Marina either while she was in the Soviet Union or after she left for the United States.Comment: NOSENKO later told CIA on one occasion that he "only skimmed the file" and on another that he had it in his possession about 20 minutes. In October 1966 he again said that he read the file and that while doing so he saw a picture of OSWALD for the first time. NOSENKO added that he never met OSWALD personally.NOSENKO's assertion that the KGB First Chief Directorate first learned of OSWALD when he applied for a re-entry visa in Mexico City in September 1963 is probably incorrect. The consular file turned over to the U.S. Government by the Soviet Embassy in Washington after the assassination indicated that the KGB First Chief Directorate would have known of OSWALD as early as February 1963 if not earlier. That file contained Marina OSWALD'S letter of February 1963 and a letter of July 1963 from OSWALD, both of which indicated that OSWALD had
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 317]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)Comment: (Continued) earlier requested permission to return to the Soviet Union. In the last dated letter of the file, one of 9 November 1963, OSWALD advised the Soviet Embassy in Washington of his travel under alias to Mexico, his fruitless contact with an official (whom CIA identifies as a KGB officer) of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, his contact there with the Cuban Consulate and his efforts to reach Havana in order to visit the Soviet Embassy there. Without regard to possible earlier correspondence, OSWALD'S request for a Soviet visa addressed to the Embassy in Washington in July 1963 would require the Washington Residency to report the matter to Moscow just as NOSENKO described the Mexico City Residency later did. NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of OSWALD's communications with the Soviet Embassy in Washington discredits his claim to complete knowledge of all aspects of the KGB relationship with OSWALD.## The CHEREPANOV PapersComment: On 4 November 1963 in Moscow, a MEZHKNIGA employee claiming to be one CHEREPANOV, passed to an American book-buyer a package which he requested the American to deliver to a trustworthy person at the American Embassy. Embassy officials found the package to contain a bundle of typed or handwritten documents which appeared to have originated in classified KGB files. Fearing a Soviet provocation which could lead to a denunciation of the Embassy for possessing classified Soviet Government documents, Embassy officials had the documents photographed and on the next day, 5 November, returned the originals to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.0001580309Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 318]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)At his first meeting with CIA in January 1964 NOSENKO related how a disaffected former KGB colleague, A.N. CHEREPANOV, had stolen documents from the American Embassy Section and in November 1963 sent them through an inter- mediary to the American Embassy. CHEREPANOV's treason was discovered, NOSENKO said, when the Embassy returned the documents to Soviet authorities. CHEREPANOV fled Moscow, and NOSENKO claimed to have taken part in the KGB search for him. NOSENKO brought with him to Geneva the official KGB document which authorized his travel in the search for CHEREPANOV.The significance of the CHEREPANOV incident is twofold. The KGB documents which CHEREPANOV allegedly sent to the Embassy appear to have originated in the American Depart- ment's Embassy Section, and the documents relate to KGB *modus operandi*, personnel, targets, and technical devices employed in operations during 1958-1960, during part of which time NOSENKO claimed he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section. The KGB document, the "temporary duty authorization", is an item of physical evidence NOSENKO has offered to substantiate his claim to personal parti- cipation in the CHEREPANOV case and to having held the rank of KGB lieutenant colonel. [The document does not itself refer to CHEREPANOV in any manner.]NOSENKO's InformationThe KGB officer, A.N. CHEREPANOV was born about 1920 or 1921. During World War II he was a KGB officer working with partisan groups behind the lines. Later he was in Yugoslavia for four or five years, and was probably Deputy Chief of the KGB Legal Residency in Belgrade.Comment: CIA records contain references to an Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPANOV, a Soviet diplomat and suspected intelligence officer in Belgrade in 1953. CHEREPANOV left Belgrade in 1956. A Yugoslav intelligence officer who defected in 1957 confirmed that CHEREPANOV had been an intelligence officer.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 319]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)When CHEREPANOV returned to Moscow, he had some (unspecified) problem getting a job, but finally the KGB Second Chief Directorate took him into the American Embassy Section of the American Department, working against State Department personnel in the Administrative Section of the Embassy. He worked in the same room as V.A. KUSKOV, and was case officer for three KGB targets: Richard SNYDER and John McVICKAR, counsular officers, and Marion ALBAMONTF, secretary to the personnel officer. CHEREPANOV's work as a case officer was poor, and as it grew worse, the KGB decided to retire him. Because of his service in World War II, for which he received three years' pension credit for each year of military service, he had enough time to his credit to be eligible for retirement. Also, he was just over the minimum age (40) for retirement from the KGB.Upon retiring in July or August 1961, CHERFPANOV got a job with MEZHKNIGA. Unhappy about his enforced retirement and angry at the KGB, he became even more dissatisfied when MEZHKNIGA turned down his several attempts to go abroad.Prior to leaving the KGB, CHEREPANOV had stolen draft copies of documents he had handled in the Embassy Section. In one case, he copied the contents of a report in his own handwriting, evidently having been unable to steal the document itself. All of the documents he had stolen were intended for destruction.In November 1963 Yu. I. GUK brought NOSENKO news about "a catastrophe" in the KGB. GUK said he had the story from B.D. MAKASHEV, a common friend of GUK and NOSENKO. MAKASHEV had been in Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko's office when the CHEREPANOV papers were brought there, after their delivery by Thomas FAIN of the Embassy. MAKASHEV saw the name of (Second Chief Directorate Chief) GRIBANOV on some of the papers and saw that one of them was a plan for agent opera- tions against an American. He noted that one of the documents was at least an inch thick. Gromyko immediately called KGB Chairman Semichastnyy, who notified GRIBANOV. GRIDANOV'S deputy went to Gromyko's office and picked up the papers. The KGB then began an investigation of all the personnel assigned to the American Department during the time period covered by the papers, 1959 to 1960 or 1961.Top Secret
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 320]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)When the American Embassy saw the CHEREPANOV documents, they were afraid that the documents were part of a KGB provocation, and they wondered what the Russians were trying to do. The Embassy officials photographed the documents and on the next day returned them to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When the Americans gave the documents to the Ministry, the KGB wondered why the Americans gave them back.The whole matter was held very tightly in the KGB during its investigation for 20 or 25 days. When the KGB examined the documents, some were found to be in CHEREPANOV's hand-writing, but no documents were found which pertained to CHEREPANOV's own case work, or that of the American Embassy Section. The KGB found no documents dated later than 1961--none for 1962 or 1963--only 1959, 1960 and 1961. Thus there were a number of indications pointing towards CHEREPANOV, who had left the section in 1961. The KGB did not dare alert him by putting full-time surveillance on him, but instead mounted fixed surveillance posts at his home and office. In order to provoke CHEREPANOV into some precipitous action, a former KGB colleague was sent to visit him who, in the course of conversation, mentioned the great disturbance in the KGB caused by someone passing stolen KGB documents to the Americans. CHEREPANOV manifested no reaction to the news and was quite cool about the matter. The next day the surveillance post observed him leaving his house in the morning at his usual time, apparently on his way to work, but the surveillance post at his office soon reported that he had not arrived at work. He had "simply dropped out of sight".An intensive search "all over the city of Moscow" ensued, then spread throughout the Soviet Union: Border controls were tightened, photographs of CHEREPANOV were sent out to Republic and local KGB and militia offices, and all means of transport were covered. Reports began coming in from various places that someone who seemed to fit CHEREPANOV'S description had been seen acting suspiciously here and there. Reports which came into KGB Headquarters from Gorkiy Oblast strongly indicated the possibility of CHEREPANOV's presence there, so NOSENKO was dispatched to the area to check.