Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 187]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)In a debriefing in West Germany on 26 June 1961, [KEYSERS]06 related the events leading to his withdrawal from Moscow. On 15 June he had been called to the office of Army Attache [Colonel URBAN], who advised him that he was being transferred from Moscow the following day for excessive drinking, and cautioned him not to reveal the reasons for his transfer.Comment: NOSENKO's information generally coincides with that reported by [KEYSERS] and Embassy officials.06 However, before the events NOSENKO described, 06 [KEYSERS]' behavior and reputation had already been discussed between Security Officer John ABIDIAN and Army Attache, [Colonel HOFFMAN], a 06 conversation which [HOFFMAN] concludes was among those sensitive matters compromised by micro- phones later discovered in the Army Attache offices. Similarly, [Colonel URDAN]'s conversa-06 tion informing [KEYSERS] of his impending transfer was concluded to have been monitored by the same KGB microphones, from which the KGB would have learned, contrary to NOSENKO's assertion, that [KEYSERS] did report the receipt of the defection letter to his superiors.06 [KEYSERS] described the Russian who approached him at the airport as being 40 to 45 years old, about 5 feet 8 inches tall, approximately 225 pounds, and having a dark complexion and light hair. NOSENKO was then 34 years old, and he is several inches taller and not rotund. When [KEYSERS] was shown photographs of NOSENKO, he did not recognize him.According to NOSENKO, the KGB "sensed at once" that [KEYSERS] was a homosexual. He is unaware of certain information relating to 06 [KEYSERS]' homosexual activities, drinking, and difficulties with his superiors, although that information was available through KGB agents in America House and had been widely discussed in Embassy offices in which microphones had been emplaced. No KGB officer directly connected000145018013/BRTS No. 197124CopyTop Secret
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 188]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Comment: (Continued)with the case could regard [KEYSER] as [STORSBERG]'s replacement. [KEYSER] arrived in Moscow almost a year before [STORSBERG]'s departure, and was assigned to the Air Attache office. [ZUJUS], [STORSBERG]'s replacement, arrived in Moscow and worked with [STORSBERG] about three months before [STORSBERG] departed Moscow. [KEYSER] stated NOSENKO was not the person who approached him at the airport. NOSENKO, in asserting that he was, forgot the name of the single American target whom he ever personally confronted.Developmental Operation Against [ZUJUS]In February 1964 NOSENKO reported that he had personally recruited and handled Syrian army officer Samih WEISS, the "main agent" in a KGB developmental operation against U.S. Army Sergeant Matthew Peter [ZUJUS]. [ZUJUS] arrived in Moscow in September 1961 to assume the military code clerk duties of [STORSBERG] and he remained there until January 1963. NOSENKO did not recall the [ZUJUS] case until he was reminded of it by a reference to Samih WEISS which was among his notes which he brought to Geneva.NOSENKO's InformationNOSENKO recruited [WEISS], a Syrian from Damascus, in 1961. WEISS was a captain or major in the Syrian Army who was studying at the Tank Academy. He visited the America Club, and when he identified [ZUJUS] by photograph as one of the persons he had met there, he was told to develop him, not to pay any attention to anyone else. [WEISS] and [ZUJUS] had something in common in that [ZUJUS] had been stationed in Lebanon and the Syrian was from Damascus, only a short distance away. [WEISS] merely studied and developed [ZUJUS] during conversations at the America Club. On one occasion, when [ZUJUS] agreed that it would be nice to have some Lebanese vodka, the KGB arranged for some to be sent from the KGB Legal Residency in Beirut, and [WEISS] presented it to [ZUJUS] as a gift from friends.181Top Secret0001451TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 189]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)[ZUJUS] case officer was GRYAZNOV, and besides handling the "main agent" [WEISS], NOSENKO supervised GRYAZNOV's activities with respect to [ZUJUS]. NOSENKO read the Second Chief Directorate file on the American, as well as all reports as they came into the Embassy Section, and he discussed the case with GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, DEMKIN (the case officer responsible for America House), and his own superiors. GRYAZNOV wrote the operational plan, which called for thorough development by [WEISS] in order to learn everything about him and eventually to introduce an agent to [ZUJUS] through [the Syrian]. Progress was slow because [ZUJUS] was quiet and reserved and often stayed alone, even in America House. Although [WEISS] and [ZUJUS] became acquainted, they did not become good friends. On the days [WEISS] planned to visit America House, NOSENKO met him in hotels or restaurants, never in safehouses. This occurred every week or two, depending on [WEISS]' availability. When they met the day following [WEISS] meetings with [ZUJUS][WEISS] would report such things as which Americans were drinking heavily and who at America House was involved with which girls from foreign embassies. Although [WEISS] visited America House once or twice a month, and drank there with [ZUJUS] he reported little of interest.The KGB learned "something" about [ZUJUS] family in the United States, the details of which NOSENKO did not recall: he was sure, however, that there was nothing unusual or of interest to the KGB about [ZUJUS]' family background. There was no information on [ZUJUS] received from KGB microphones, telephone taps or surveillance, and the KGB was unaware of any vices or vulnerabilities which [ZUJUS] may have had.NOSENKO did not know of any other KGB agents working against [ZUJUS]. The KGB did not attempt to recruit [ZUJUS] while NOSENKO was in the Embassy Section. If there had been a recruitment attempt later, after he left the Section, NOSENKO would certainly learned of it from GRYAZNOV."Because no one else knew him", at the American Department's request NOSENKO continued to manage [WEISS]' contact with [ZUJUS] after NOSENKO transferred to the Seventh Department in January 1962. In March or April 1962 it was planned that [WEISS] would invite [ZUJUS] to a restaurant where he would be introduced to "a friend", but the meeting had not0001452182Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 190]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)materialized before NOSENKO turned WEISS over to GRYAZNOV and left for Geneva. When WEISS returned to Syria in Aprill 1962, he was not turned over to the First Chief Directorate: his file was sent to Second Chief Directorate archives.ZUJUS InformationDuring a routine debriefing by U.S. Army authorities in 1963, ZUJUS confirmed an Embassy Security Office report that in the summer of 1962 ZUJUS had been intimate with an Austrian woman, "Lillian" (last name unknown), who had visited America House with someone from the United Arab Republic and had returned alone a few days later, when she was picked up by ZUJUS. Since ZUJUS was a cryptographer, the America House manager interviewed "Lillian" and learned that she claimed to be from Vienna and to be travelling with her employer, a Czech. When the Embassy Security Officer learned from the Austrian Embassy that no Austrian passport had been issued to "Lillian", he asked her for her passport. She replied that she had forgotten it and then left, saying she was going to her hotel for the passport. She never returned to America House.Comment: NOSENKO described this incident, but in connection with KGB attempts to entrap Joseph MORONE in 1960, not ZUJUS in 1962. (See p. 194.)NOSENKO was not in the Embassy Section in 1962. Interrogation of NOSENKO never resolved how he knew of this incident.Interviewed by a CIA representative in November 1965, ZUJUS said that as manager of the America Club he had frequent dealings with Ella UMANETS. (ZUJUS often used her an interpreter in his dealings with other Soviet employees of America House and was able to provide considerable back- ground information about her.6001453183Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 191]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Comment: NOSENKO has in other contexts identified UMANETS as a long-time KGB agent employed in America House. He never related her to ZUJUS.In that same interview with CIA ZUJUS described having met in Moscow a person from Damascus who had been in Beirut, or a person from Beirut who had been in Damascus, he could not recall which. ZUJUS met him while acting as doorman at America House, but they conversed only for about 15 minutes and ZUJUS could not recall what they had talked about. He may have seen the man on several other occasions, but he did not know his name nor why he was in Moscow, and he could provide no physical description. ZUJUS did not recall that this person gave him Lebanese vodka, but he acknowledged he favored the beverage. ZUJUS confirmed to CIA that his father, Matas, is secretary of the Lithuanian Roman Catholic Alliance of America, an emigre organization concerned with the liberation of Lithuania. ZUJUS indicated that his father often travels abroad in connection with his emigre activities.Comment: Emigre organizations, including the Lithuanian have been traditional KGB targets and most have been penetrated by KGB agents. The fact of the elder ZUJUS emigre activities is almost certainly to have been known to the KGB, making ZUJUS a matter of KGB concern for reasons quite separate from his cryptographic duties.From NOSENKO's unfamilarity with ZUJUS father's activities, ZUJUS intimacy with KGB agent "Lillian" and relationship with KGB agent UMANETS, it is concluded that NOSENKO's role in the case, if any, was limited to his relationship with WEISS and that NOSENKO exercised no supervisory function in the development of ZUJUS.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 192]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962)## Operations Against State Department Code ClerksKGB operations against code clerks, for which NOSENKO claimed supervisory responsibility, included those directed against State Department cryptographic personnel as well as military cryptographers at the Embassy. In several such cases, NOSENKO's claimed subordinate, KOSOLAPOV, figures prominently.## Development of Paul JENNER 06NOSENKO first mentioned the JENNER case in a 1964 interview with the FBI, when he was asked whether he had ever heard of a case within recent years in which KOSOLAPOV had travelled to Helsinki to intercept and establish contact with an American code clerk. NOSENKO "immediately recalled" such an incident which happened in 1960-1961. He explained that because Embassy code clerks were not sufficiently accessible to the KGB after they arrived in Moscow, it was decided to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki as part of an effort to probe for a new way to get in touch with the code clerks. According to NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV made but one trip to Helsinki in this new effort, and it was not tried again by others. NOSENKO identified KOSOLAPOV's target in this operation as Paul JENNER## NOSENKO's InformationA month before JENNER's arrival in Moscow the Embassy Section received a copy of JENNER's anketa (visa application) listing his diplomatic title as Secretary Archivist and indicating when he was to enter the Soviet Union from Finland by train "at the beginning of 1960, in the middle of the month". Believing him to be a code clerk (he was subsequently found to be a pouch clerk) "the group" decided to send KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki with the mission of accompanying JENNER on the train to Moscow to study JENNER's behavior. JENNER and KOSOLAPOV were about the same age. KOSOLAPOV was to be accompanied by a female agent of GRYAZNOV's, "SOLISTKA", a Russian ballerina, who was to board the train after it entered the USSR at Vyborg.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 193]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)A proposal for the operation was prepared for the approval of the KGB Chairman which explained that code clerks were assigned to Moscow usually only for one year (thus limiting their accessibility to the KGB for development) and that it was necessary to attempt to place an agent near them even before they arrived in Moscow. When the Chairman's approval was granted, NOSENKO prepared the _kharakteristika_ (official form) on KOSOLAPOV for the trip and gave it to the Personnel Office. KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable for Helsinki explaining that he was coming for two or three days. NOSENKO didn't sign the cable, but read it, and it was taken to KLYPIN for his signature and thereafter KOSOLAPOV took it to the Second (European) Department of the First Chief Directorate for release. There was no other correspondence with the Helsinki _rezidentura_ concerning the operation before KOSOLAPOV departed Moscow. NOSENKO discussed the plan with GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV and "maybe" they discussed it with KOVSHUK the day before KOSOLAPOV left. KOSOLAPOV had JENNER's photograph and his name, and expected that the Helsinki residency could obtain a ticket for KOSOLAPOV on JENNER's train. NOSENKO did not recall precisely when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow or under what name he travelled. KOSOLAPOV was gone for about a week and he travelled both ways by train.NOSENKO read KOSOLAPOV's _otchet_ (official account) of his trip, and the report of the female agent, "SOLISTKA". According to those reports, KOSOLAPOV became acquainted on the train with JENNER as planned, as did "SOLISTKA", whom GRYAZNOV took to Vyborg and placed in JENNER's car. "SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her Moscow telephone number. While in Helsinki KOSOLAPOV had spoken with the Rezident and Deputy Rezident about obtaining their help in Helsinki with the work against code clerks, and about using Helsinki agents against American code clerks en route to Moscow. Nothing came of the discussion, however; although the Rezident and Deputy Rezident said they would see about it, the Embassy Section later learned the Residency had "more important questions".Top Secret
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 194]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Although the KGB later discovered that [JENNER] was not a code clerk but a pouch clerk, he remained a target for development. Since he did not telephone "SOLISTKA" after one or two months, the KGB arranged for her to encounter him at the railroad station or airport when he went alone to meet the couriers. [JENNER] saw her but did not approach her, turning away. The KGB took no further steps to cultivate [JENNER]. The KGB "had nothing on [JENNER] at all except a suspicion he may have been a homosexual, but there was no proof".On 26 October 1966 NOSENKO confirmed the identification of other CIA sources by identifying a photograph as that of Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV, [born in Perm, 19 February 1928] his former subordinate of the Embassy Section. The photograph shown NOSENKO was that of one Victor Dmitriyevich KOLOSSOV, employee of Vneshtorg, born 19 March 1927, in Perm, who arrived in Finland by train from the USSR on 31 March 1960 [the day [JENNER] left] and departed on 2 April. NOSENKO acknowledged that that data accurately reflected KOSOLAPOV's alias, cover, and itinerary during his trip to Helsinki to accompany [JENNER] back to Moscow in 1960.On 26 October 1966 NOSENKO was confronted with the Finnish train manifest showing that [Paul JENNER] was the single passenger departing Helsinki for Moscow on 31 March 1960 and that KOSOLAPOV/KOLOSOV travelled on 2 April on a train carrying no Americans. Repeating the substance of the KGB operation and citing his recollection from reading KOSOLAPOV'S report of the trip, NOSENKO insisted that KOSOLAPOV travelled on the same train with [JENNER] and that the Finnish manifests must be in error. [See accompanying exhibits.][JENNER's InformationAfter arriving in Moscow on 1 April 1960 [JENNER] reported that he was approached on the train from Helsinki by two young Russians, "a boy and a girl, probably university students". The two Russians struck up a conversation and were soon baiting him on the question of racial discrimination in the United States. They said that they might see [JENNER] in Moscow. About three months later, on 29 June, [JENNER] was performing his normal duty of escorting Embassy couriers
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 195]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)to Sheremetevo Airport when he was again approached by the Russian girl, "Yuliya", who acted surprised to see him and asked him to go outside to talk. "Yuliya" explained that she was waiting to say goodbye to a friend who was leaving on a flight to Irkutsk [JENNER] had seen the Irkutsk flight depart a half hour earlier) and told [JENNER] that her male companion on the train trip to Moscow, Yura, had returned to his studies in Vyborg. Interspersed with "Yuliya's" questions concerning [JENNER]'s impressions and personal activities in Moscow were others about how often he came to the airport and how he liked his job at the Embassy. When [JENNER] said he must leave, she gave him her telephone number in Moscow and insisted that he call her. She advised [JENNER] that "it would be better if you did not mention our conversation to anyone".Comment: As far as CIA is aware, [JENNER] has never been asked to identify KOSOLAPOV's photograph.Besides information about his Soviet companions on the Moscow journey, [JENNER] also told U.S. Department of State security officials about sexual advances made by his first maid in Moscow and about provocative clothing worn by his second maid.Comment: Although NOSENKO has not identified either of these women as KGB agents, he has said in another context that all maids of American code clerks were KGB agents or informants.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 197]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMDASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962)Information From Other SourcesI. Ye. SERGEYEV, a KGB officer and the Soviet Consul in Helsinki, contacted the chief of the Helsinki police on 31 March 1960 to ask his assistance in locating an American named Paul F. JENNER, who was due to arrive in Helsinki the day before.' SERGEYEV explained that he had some "business" with JENNER but he did not specify its nature. Reportedly, this was the first time that SERGEYEV had made such a request of the police chief. GOLITSYN identified the Helsinki police chief as a Soviet intelligence agent from "about 1945 on".Development of JLNNER: Summary and ConclusionNOSENKO's version of the JENNER case in some degree resembles less the facts about JENNER than KGB activities directed against John GARLAND (see below), activities which NOSENKO asserts never occurred. GARLAND, not JENNER, travelled on the same train as KOSOLAPOV, and GARLAND not JENNER, travelled "in the middle of the month". The Helsinki Residency's query to the Helsinki police chief about JENNER indicates that KOSOLAPOV's cable contained information about JENNER not just notice that KOSOLAPOV was coming to Helsinki. It was at the airport in Moscow, not on the train, that "SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her telephone number, an event which would be presumably memorable to NOSENKO (as supervisor of all code clerk operations) if only because of his futile wait for JENNER to call. Finally, NOSENKO is unaware of the actions of KGB agents who were employed as maids by JENNER. From the foregoing it is concluded that NOSENKO was neither KOSOLAPOV's supervisor, nor in this instance, supervisor of all KGB operations against American code clerks.189# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 198]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)## Development of John GARLANDThe GARLAND case is of particular significance to judging the validity of NOSENKO's claim to complete knowledge of all KGB operations against American code clerks. NOSENKO is not merely unaware of KGB action taken with respect to GARLAND, he vehemently asserts no such action was taken.## NOSENKO's InformationNOSENKO on 28 January 1964 identified twenty Americans employed by the American Embassy in Moscow who were of interest for various reasons to the KGB. He gave a short statement concerning each of the twenty, among which was GARLAND, about whom NOSENKO said, "Code clerk, but nothing doing". Later asked to review the list and supply any additional information he might have, NOSENKO stated that the KGB was studying GARLAND like the other code clerks, to gather enough incriminating material to make a recruitment. The case officer was KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO did not recall any agents working against GARLAND, nor could he recall whether he had read the KGB file on GARLAND, but he thought he must have read reports concerning him as they came into the Embassy Section. There was no operational plan drawn up for GARLAND because the KGB developed no derogatory information concerning him; no recruitment thus was ever planned or attempted. NOSENKO could recall no background information concerning GARLAND, such as his travels and acquaintances while stationed in Moscow.Confronted in October 1966 with the evidence [see below] of KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki to accompany GARLAND back to Moscow on 16 November 1960, NOSENKO was insistent that there was no such trip, that KOSOLAPOV travelled but once to Helsinki in connection with JENNER in early 1960, and that the KGB had taken no such action with respect to GARLAND. (NOSENKO had earlier reiterated that he was KOSOLAPOV's direct supervisor from January 1960 until January 1962 and he would have had to know and to approve0001461190Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 199]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)in advance any operational travel performed by his sub- ordinate outside of the USSR.) Reminded that he transitted Amsterdam on a direct flight to Cuba on 15 November 1960 (the day before KOSOLAPOV left Helsinki with GARLAND), NOSENKO stated that he would have learned of KOSOLAPOV'S travel in any case, whether or not he was in Moscow.## GARLAND's InformationGARLAND was first interviewed on 17 July 1962 by the Regional Security Officer in Moscow as a result of the GOLITSYN lead (see below). In this interview GARLAND denied having met any Soviet of KOSOLAPOV's physical description during the Helsinki-to-Moscow train trip and also denied having been approached by Soviet Intelligence. On 30 July 1963 GARLAND was interviewed by the FBI and on 31 July he was given a polygraph examination. The latter, according to the FBI, "disclosed no information indicating that GARLAND was deceptive in his statements to us denying any association with Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV or denying ever knowingly being contacted by any foreign intelligence agent". GARLAND, by his own statement, took the train on 16 November 1960 from Helsinki to Moscow, to assume the duties as supervisor of the State Department code room in the Embassy.## GOLITSYN's InformationGOLITSYN, who was not posted to Helsinki until July 1960, reported that "about the end of 1960, about November or possibly by the beginning of 1961", the KGB Second Chief Directorate sent a telegram to the Helsinki Legal Residence advising that an American code clerk would arrive in Helsinki in transit to Moscow. The telegram stated that the respon sible case officer, KOSOLAPOV, would be sent to Helsinki in alias and under Vneshtorg cover for the purpose of striking up an acquaintance to be continued with the American in Moscow. The Residency procured for KOSOLAPOV a place in the American's compartment. GOLITSYN himself went to the train to see off a Soviet delegation returning to Moscow, and he talked with KOSOLAPOV. Later in the summer or fall of 1961, GOLITSYN met in Helsinki another Second Chief Directorate officer from the Embassy Section, and he inquired191Top Secret