Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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# Report DD-837.RYBAISECRETTO:FROM: CESUBJECT: Activities.SOURCES:1.  Information acquired from Solando.    of 2340 NE 5th Ave., Miami.2.  Information acquired during a conversation with Silvia GARCIA Acosta (unwitting source), who is a very close friend of Manuel ARTIME Buesa and undaberran Cruzast-1633.  Information acquired during a conversation with Nazim ELIAS Thumas of 821 SW 23rd Ave., Apt 15. Miami.4.  Information acquired from Acasia VAZQUEZ Gallo of 1836 NW 15th St., Miami, who lived in Cuba at one block from Adelaida PADRON Cruz.SOURCE 1:Source reports that a group of 18 man belonging to the action groups broke with because they were not in agreement with the manner in which uses the money of the organization.According to these men, has assigned very good salaries to all his friends in addition to paying their rent and giving very good gifts to them. A specific example is to whom gave $1,000 when he married.According to source, bought a boat for a certain sum of money but said that he had paid a much higher price. This immorality has created great unrest among members.Source also reports that, at present, there are about 20 prisoners in the Nicaragua bases and that there are problems with . on account of this (source did not give details).Source claims that has already distributed all the political appointments for Cuba, including Councilmen's positions, among his friends and unconditional supporters.SOURCE 2:Source learned in a conversation with Silvia GARCIA Acosta that, at present, is having an affair with Adelaida PADRON Crus and that some days ago gave Adelaida PADRON Crus a house as a gift. That and Adelaida PADRON are now living in this house, which is a "dream." (Phone number PL-4-7912.).Adelaida PADRON Crus was married to prerevolutionary army Major Roger ROJS Lavernia, and paid all the expenses for Adelaida
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SECRET30 April 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1 andMartin FerrerDATE : 29 April 1964 at 1630 hours1. AMBIDDY-1 commenced by saying that he has obtained the charter for Libernic which Somoza had to sign. The original copy has been lost; however, A-1 has a photestatic copy with General Somoza's signature.2. The undersigned requested of A-1 that he make quite clear to President Reid that AMWORLD is not receiving aid from the United States. A-1 was warned about making innuendos or ambiguous statements concerning American aid.3. A-1 stated he would inform this office as soon as arrangements to go to the Dominican Republic were completed. A-1 was advised that we will be in Puerto Rico on Sunday 2 May.File: ambiddy-1 - 201ConversationsSANTA MARIADominican RepublicRaul J. HernandezWH/SA/SOCHHSECRET
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# SECRET30 April 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between Martin Ferrerand AMBIDDY-1DATE : 29 April 1964 at 11001. AMBIDDY-1 was reminded that he should make a quick trip to the Dominican Republic to see President Reid and to arrange for drydocking and refueling facilities. A-1 was advised to use a more subtle approach than used on Colonel Lopez of Honduras. A-l's main objective should be to get "his foot in the door" in the Dominican Republic. A-1 should pursue the soft sell rather than the hard sell. Since he sounded a bit reluctant to forego the next operational phase in order to repair the ADELAIDA, A-1 was reassured that the overhauling of the ADELAIDA would take place after the operation rather than before. A-1 will take AMJ/AYA-4 with him to the Dominican Republic. Should President Reid ask for the name of the shipping company who will act as the agent for Maritima Eam, A-1 should say it is the Boyd Brothers Shipping Company.2. A-1 was asked if he had obtained his U. S. visa. A-1 replied he has all the documents ready and will request it next time he goes to Nicaragua.3. A-1 has no objection to AMYUM-19's attending the next meeting in Puerto Rico. The undersigned informed A-1 that we are preparing the intelligence data on the targets he requested, and they will be presented to him at our meeting.
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SECRET-2-4. A-1 commented if it would be possible for Kelly to arrange fueling facilities at Bluff with Texaco Oil rahter than Esso. The person in charge of the Esso company in Bluff apparently is not in sympathy with MRR movement; therefore, A-l is reluctant to deal with Esso. A-1 inquired if the person in charge of Esso could be replaced. A-1 was informed that although Kelly enjoys a great deal of influence with Esso we doubt that he has that much influence. As it stands now the LCM obtains supplies there and it is then tranferred to the ADELAIDA because A-l is reluctant to take the ADELAIDA near the Esso installation.5. In conclusion A-1 was complimented on the manner his organization behaved during the operation.6. Should A-1 obtain any definite information as to when he will be going to the Dominican Republic he should call our office in order that we may make our own traveling arrangements.Raul J. HernandezWH/SA/SO/HHFile:Dominican RepublicAMBIDDY-1-201ConversationsPOLSECRET
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29 April 1964MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDSUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between AMBIDDY-1and Martin FerrerDATE : 29 April 1964 at 0800-1. The undersigned telephoned AMBIDDY-1 at his home in   an attempt to reach him before his return to Miami became   too well-known and he became engrossed in other matters.2. A-1 was advised that one of the most urgent matters   now pending was his trip to the Dominican Republic to meet   President Reid to resolve the problem of drydock facilities   for the ADELAIDA.3. It was obvious from the sound of A-l's voice that   he was still half asleep and further conversation at this   time would be useless. A-1 was requested to call Martin   at the office later in the day.Raul J. HernandezWH/SA/SO/HHFile:AMBIDDY-1 -201Conversations.
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# DISPATCHTO:Chief, Special Affairs StaffINFO:FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVESUBJECT: RYBAT/TYPIC/ANWORLDRecent Declarations by Manuel ARTINE BuesaACTION REQUIRED REFERENCESACTION REQUIRED: NoneREFERENCE: NoneTransmitted herewith is an AMOT report concerning the referendum and exile reactions to Manuel ARTIME's speech before A.R.E.C., which may be of interest to BECKHOFF.END OF DISPATCHAttachment:ANOT Report DD-778One copy herewithDistribution:3 - C/SAS, w/att/h/w201-267437DATE TYPED: 24 Apr 64DATE DISPATCHED: APR 2 A 1964DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER:19-124-27/3
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SECRET9 May 1964MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/SA/External Operations BranchSUBJECT: ANWORLD-Ottilia Buess1. Subject, who is Manuel Artine's aged mother, has last been reported as hiding out in Iglesia Cristo de Limpias in Havana city.2. Artime has been without news from her for the last two months. His link to her used to be the Spanish Commercial Attache in Havana.3. We have promised Artime to study ways and means of contacting her in order to ascertain her state of health, her husband's whereabouts and any personal needs she may have.4. Can you come up with any ideas?Henry D. HecksherWH/SA/SO/HHHDH/bhDistribution:Orig & 1 - Addressee1 - WH/SA/SO/HH - Artime 201SECRET![text Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]
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# ANWORLD Meeting in San Juan, P. R., 2-3 May 1964SUBJECT: Reality of Autonomy1. On 4 May 1964 HQS representatives raised with ANYUM-19 the question if AMBIDDY-1 in his own mind accepts the premise of independence from KUBARK control in his management of ANWORLD affairs. AMYUM-19 replied that AMBIDDY-1 had not always done so, but had now become convinced that he was in de facto control of ANWORLD. Commenting upon that fact, AMBIDDY-1 had recently remarked that he now thought he could, if he so decided, fire sic7both ANJAVA-4 and ANYUN-18 without KUBARK attempting to gainsay him.2. The arrival of James ZABOTH on the scene had at first re-kindled ANBIDDY-1's suspicions that KUBARK may after all try to clamp tight controls upon his operations. However, ZABOTH'S general approach had disarmed those suspicions and convinced AMBIDDY-1 that he is in fact master of his destiny. ANYUK-19 reminisced that AMBIDDY-1 had in the beginning suspected him and AMJAVA-4 as being KUBARK plants. AMYUM-19 added he wanted to be quite candid in telling us that he would not himself have accepted a position in AMWORLD had he entertained the slightest doubts as to the sincerity of KUBARK's promise of autonomy.3. To re-emphasized our adherence to the principles of autonomy, witness our desire to disengage from extensive involve ment in ANWORLD logistics, our non-interference in personnel matters (except where overriding ODYOKE security interests are involved) and our future handling of bubsidy payments.4. Comment: We found no reason for disbelieving AMYUM-19' acceptance of autonomy as the principle guiding our mole in ANWORLD. As an aside, AHYUM-19 observed that AMBIDDY-1 should not be expected to subordinate himself to PRPRIZE controls of any kind once FORUMS bad been liberated and we allowed that this was likely to be the case.File1ANBIDDY-1 201PolicyHenry D. HecksterWH/SA/SO/HHSECRET
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# CLASSIFIED MESSAGECRIG: H.D.Bechtier/bhUNIT: WH/FA/SO/HHDATE: 7 May 64TO: JHEAVEFROM: DIRECTORCONF: DC/WH/SA-3INFO: DDR VRTO: WAVEPLEASE ARRANGE FOR MEETING BETWEEN "MR. RODEMEYER" AND AMBIDDY-1DURING LATTER'S FORTHCOMING MIAMI STAY, PREFERABLY IN WAVE SAFEHOUSEUSED FOR TNG SESSIONS. IT MOST IMPORTANT MEETING TAKE PLACE AT THISTIME. (FYI: PROPOSE DEBRIEF AMBIDDY-1 ON CONTROVERSIAL EVENTSSURROUNDING COL. FRANK BGAN AS SURFACED IN RECENT BOOK ON BAY OF PIGS.)ADVISE TIME OF MEETING.END OF MESSAGEBRUCE B. CHEEVERDC/WH/BARELEASING OFFICERWH/SA/SO/ARCOORDINATING OFFICERSH. D. HECKSHERWH/SA/CO/HEAUTHENTICATING OFFICER
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ANWORLD Meeting in San Juan, P.R., 2-5 May 1964SUBJECT: Cackling Over Unlaid Eggs1.  AMYUM-19 confided to us that ANBIDDY-1 had, prior to the launching of Operation ZENON, prepared a "three and one half page" news release which laid exaggerated claim to damages inflicted during the raid on Santa Cruz del Sur. Only the last sentence stated, more or less as an afterthought, that this should be considered just a minor MRR operation. ANTUM-19 has told AMBIDDY-1 that in his opinion any future announcements should be held down to one or two brief paragraphs.2.  We pointed out to ANTUM-19 that AMBIDDY-1 was evidently paying no more than lip service to our recommendation that he under-rather than over--play his successes. During the Washington meeting (19-21 March 1964) we had criticized a statement made by AMBIDDY-1 during a Miami press conference to wit: "We do not have enough boats. In one night we can make two trips but not more, but we are doing it. We will fill the country with enough arms to free the country from communism." We took the position that if we were in AMBIDDY-l's shoes we simply wouldn't let on about military matters since this plays into Castro's hands, giving him gratuitous access to military intelligence. AMBIDDY-1 countered by asking us how he could raise the morale of the people without saying anything and without talking about successful ops inside.3.  We mentioned to AMBIDDY-1 that any vital information not publicized makes the task of Castro's espionage service that more difficult. Besides, things had now come to a pass where little credence was placed in claims of success and promises held out by Cuban exile leaders. What really counted was the demonstrable substance of success inside which speaks for itself. ANBIDDT-1 would be much more effective by preserving a posture of inscrutability. We counselled AMBIDOT-1 to resist a natural tendency to![image of the word SECRET with a stamp next to it]
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SECRETinflate the significance of his intial successes and to present them in their proper perspective. Me snould refer to those successes as mere appetizers, with the main dish to follow later. This approach rather than the clain of a big victory vould arvase the kind of interest, and in Castro's case, the kind of premonition which carries psychological inpact.4. We doubt whether AMBIDDT-1 at this stage is prepared to heed our counsel to be conservative in his clains to victory. In the unhealthy climate of competition, engendered by the spectacle of mmerous exile organizations vying to be the first, AKBIDOY-1 may be unable to resist the temptation to broadcast his victories and to exaggerate the damage they have inflicted. Ne vill have to learn the hard way.Henry D. RecksherVH/SA/SO/HHcc: COS, JMWAVEFile:PublicitySECRET![automatic declassification]
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# ANWORLD Meeting in San Juan, P. R., 2-5 May 1964SUBJECT: The Nature of the American Commitment1. Alluding to certain charges levelled against CIA in   a recent publication on the Bay of Pigs affair, whose sub-   stance was that the Cuban military leadership had been served   with erroneous intel estimates by their CIA advisors, I voiced   to ANTUM-19 the hope that the U. S. team servicing ANWORLD   would never be subjected to similar censure (without implying   justification for charges made in the instance of the Bay of   Pigs). I reiterated that it was our strong desire to be   absolutely forthright with our Cuban counterparts, especially in   stressing that our target intelligence had by its very nature to   be of limited usefulness, especially when it came to predicting   the extent and nature of Cuban defense measures. As an example,   certain radar sites had struck us as highly vulnerable to ex   ternal raids, but that this estimate might not necessarily be   borne out if put to the test of an actual operation.2. In the general content of pacts fulfilled, I once   more pointed out to ANYUM-19 that the American commitment to   AMWORLD was a tenuous one and that I would never be able to   give an estimate of U. S. Government intentions vis-a-vis   CUBA other than what can be deduced from the events of the   approaching day. As an example, official American reaction to   the widening repercussions of a limited AMWORLD success in   invaliding Cuba was simply unpredictable. ANYUM-19 hastened to   assure us that AMBIDDY-1 was indeed fully cognizant of the   circumstances I had outlined and that this sense of urgency in   commencing operations was partly a reflection of a sense of   insecurity engendered by the official American posture in   respect to Cuba.Berry D. HeckshorSB/BA/SO/HEcc: COS, JMWAREFile:PolicyOperationsA-1SECRET
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# DISPATCHTO: Chief, Special Affairs StaffFROM: Chief of Station, JHWAVESUBJECT: KAPOK/TIPIC/Operational/AMWORLD AMWORLD Contact ReportsACTION REQUIRED: None, FYIREFERENCE: UFGA-15147 of 8 April 1964Transmitted herewith are the Contact Reports of Warren K. GUERTLER for the period 5 - 14 April 1964.END OF DISPATCHAttachments:Contact Reports (4)One Copy Each HerewithDistribution:2 - C/SIB, w/atts/h/w![image of document processing table]
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# CONTACT REPORT # 54DATE TYPED: 6 Apr. 54OPERATION: AMWORLDCONTACT: AMYUM-19TIME AND PLACE: 0930-1100 Hrs. 4 Apr. 64, S/H 268NEXT MEETING: UnscheduledSUMMARY1. A-19 was asked to provide the Case Officer with a sample of recent AMYUM radio programs. (Comment: P/W requested this. A Station contact is considering producing a "Monitor"-type program, originating in Miami, and broadcast over WRUL. All exile groups would be represented and it would provide a means for special broadcasts such as announcements of any successful AMWORLD ops, etc.2. Reports from Nacin Elias frequently mention an action group known as "M.L.B", one of whose leaders uses the war name “el Diablo”. A report from Nacin dated 16 March included an appeal for help in exfiltrating "el Diablo" and some others who are in danger. A-19 has heard that six men of the M.IUB. have just come out. One of the men is said to be "el Diablo"( Comment: Confirmed by BARR 1853) After they have been processed and debriefed A-19 will have them debriefed by AMFAST-64 and Alonso. A-19 believes that this group is the source of most of the documents furnished by Macin and are either the only worthwhile contacts of Macin or are completely controlled by the GOC. The latter theory is probably the correct one.3. A-18 thinks that the captain of the Adelaide will eventually be replaced by Huane if he does not quit f’ret. He is still not exercising the kind of leadership necessary for military pa. This, of course, will necessitate finding a new captain for the Deleres. Of the three crewmen who recently left the Adelaida, two were having difficulties with the rest of the crew and one, Jose Cabesan, left after his brother had been fired by AMBIDDY-1.4. Quertier asked A-19 if AMWORLD-2 had received a security briefing recently reminding him not to discuss AMWORLD business. A-19 wanted to know if A-2 was still talking too much. The undersigned replied that quite a bit of information pertaining to AMWORLD was coming across his desk and that it appeared to come from AFGWORLD-2. When sufficient details are available it will be called to the attention of the Consejo and AMBIDDY-1, but in the meantime A-19 can remind A-2 to keep quiet about AMWORLD business.5. Infiltration candidate Pablo Roberto FERNANDEZ Perez, PDOR
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Guantanamo, Oriente Province 7 June 1916 may be identicalwith the subject of an AMOT report listing him as candidatefor councilman of Guantanamo City Hall on the PSP slate duringthe Grau regime and stating that his son is private secretaryto Carlos Olivares, Undersecretary of Foreign Relations Ministryof the GOC. A-19 was so informed and was asked to have andinvestigation made, taking into consideretion both the CI andoperational leads aspects of the matter.6. Aida PEREZ Pozo. Guertler asked what her function was with   AMWORLD. A-19 admitted that he was surprised to see her name on   the payroll. She is working with Mole in intelligence. She   has all the lesbian contacts in the city and knows everything   that goes on. Nothing can be done about it because she is another   "woman of confidence of AMBIDDY-1,7. The Case Officer brought up the matter of telephone security,   the possibility that A-19's private line and his hope phone   could be tapped, and suggested the use of pay phones for operational   calls, especially to the Consejo. In order to make use of direct   dialing A-19 could call the Consejo giving his number and await   the return call. (The Consejo might want to bring this up with   A-1) According to A-19 Mole's group is monitoring all calls to   AMYUM headquarters but he does not think his private line (the   one used by GUERTLER) is monitored. In reply to the Case Officer's   question A-19 said that A-l does his business calls from his home,   1.c. the house of his mistress. The Case Officer commented that   this fact was known to another group (unspecified) and let the   Batter drop.0. The reason for the blown AMYUM safe house: While the AMYUNS   were on the roof stringing the antenna one of then drove his   car onto the lawn of the neighbor so that it would be in the   shade of the neighbors tree. Naturally the neighbor came out   to see what was going on. He did see. As A-19 #aid, when he   learned of the incident he had to laugh (albeit somewhat hysterically)   The only alternative would be to kill the idiot. Guertler agreed.   We can only hope that the next safe house will be bery isolated.Warren K. Susrtier
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# CONTACT REPORT # 55OPERATION: AMWORLDCONTACT: AMYUM-19DATE TYPED: 7 Apr 64TIME AND PLACE: 1500-1630 Hre., 6 Apr 64, S/HSUMMARY1. Attached are two recent reports covering the activities   of Jose Elias aka Nacin. The Habana contact, Bernardo Nievares   has informed AMYUM that if he can be picked up he will be able   to come to the WAVE area for about 15 days for debriefing and   training. The Ramon Mondejar Cid, aka "el diablo" mentioned as   having been released by the G-2 and waiting for exfiltration iso   currently in the WAVE area, having escaped with four others.   According to A-19 they have been interviewed by DURGE and were   told to have no contact with any other PBRUMEN groups because   they could receive special training and be sent back to work   against AMTHUG. The AMYUN have been debriefing the five for   several days with the sam idea in mind. GUERTLER will get the   reports when the debriefings are over. A-19 has not gotten the   preliminary reports but says Alonso is impressed with Mondejar.   As for the exfiltration of Nievares AMYUM has no intention of   attempting it but A-19 is considering offering the opportunity   to do so to Aldo Vera (see below).2. Aldo VERA Serafin (201-326634) This subject is a former member   of the DTI, recently considered for use ir an attempt to defect a   COC official in Madrid. The AMYUMS consiuer nim a good action   type and sought him out with the intention of infiltrating him   and his group into Habana province. He is presently receiving   special training for the job. Vera's file generally substantiates   A-19's evaluation of the man. However, local traces do contain   unsubstantiated accusations that he is a G-2 and that he maintains   contacts with alleged G-2 agents and informers. An ODEL VY report   In 1963 said that Vora was engaged in transmitting and receiving   messages by radio with Cuba. The Case Officer informed A-19 that   while he had nothing definite to offer by way of proof he had   some doubts about Vare and cited the above. A-19 says that Vers   does have radio contact with friends in Habana (voice) and that   he offered hic radio facilities to AMYUM. Assuming that Vera himself   is clean, Ar19 was cautioned to have all internal ontacts checked   out and to obtain a complete report on Vera's plans before making   any commitments. The undersigned continues to have some reservatione   but Veravas requested by AMSHAG-1, and A-19 likes him so far.   Guertler will pursue the matter further at a later reeting.3. AMLILAC-2 has been told by ODURGE that as long as AMYUM requeste   peralssion for him to leave the country he will be blackballed.   1000 previous raporte for reason for blackballing). According to   A-10 DURCE suggested that if he was to be used he could be taken   out as a crewman on the Adelaide. A-19 wanted to know if it was   RUBARK that was keeping him on the list. Guertler pleaded ignorance
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and remarked that it could be for any number of reasons completely unrelated to his past relatiors with KUBARK.4. 16 PRQ Is were turned over for traces. The various group leaders are continuing to recruit for their groups. The Case Officer suggested that they might employ their time sore profitably by working with what they already have and leave the recruting to AMYUM-23. A-19 agreed that the system had to be changed in fact. It was changed in theory some time ago. Gertler suggested that it would be a lot easier on all concerned to look for people with the qualifications to fill existing slots instead of the present procedure of looking for jobs to give all the volunteers that present themselves.After having screened at least a thousand volunteers we still keep getting PRQs on potential cooks or people for whom no specific job exists but who are considered "very good boys". A-19 agreed. Probably nothing will change.WARREN K. GUERTEER