Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 247]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)in the information as it did not relate to agents or agent activities. NOSENKO noted, however, that the material concerned messages from the Secretary of State to the American Ambassador, Moscow. All of this material was highly sensitive, and few people were permitted to see it or even to know of its existence. NOSENKO stated that it was treated more carefully than Top Secret information.Unable to describe the techniques of the KGB Eighth Directorate in breaking U.S. Department of State cryptographic systems, NOSENKO nevertheless did indicate methods as known to him. One method, mentioned by NOSENKO on 12 June 1962, stemmed from the habit of certain Embassy officials (notably Ministers Counsellor FREERS and McSWEENEY) dictating the text of outgoing cables aloud. When the texts were picked up on the KGB microphones, the Eighth Directorate compared them against enciphered traffic intercepted by other means.NOSENKO has referred to the Eighth Directorate's interest in equipment sounds and snatches of technical conversations picked up by the microphones in the State Department and military code rooms."Now, we also listened to the code room and the teletype office, but we could never get anything out of the teletype office because of interference [equipment noises which drowned out conversations]. In the military code room--that was where James H. STORSBERG and later (Matthew P.) ZUJUS worked--we didn't get much. We could hear (STORSBERG) swearing on occasion, and then he would mention a group of numbers. This was, of course, all recorded and we turned it over at once to the Eighth Directorate, dealing with coding and decoding. Of course, all other intercepts were turned over to them also."With respect to the use of code clerks by the American Department, NOSENKO recalled that in 1948 or 1949 the KGB was helped a great deal by (James H.) MCMILLAN (a military code clerk of the Embassy staff who defected in 1948), and by "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, see p. 33]. It was thanks to238Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 248]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)"ANDREY's" help that the KGB were able to read State Department and ciphers. [At the time of SMITH's tour in Moscow a single code room was shared by State Department and military code clerks. As the only cryptographic machine technician assigned to the Embassy, SMITH had access to both State and military cryptographic equipment.]NOSENKO also named MARTIN and MICHELL [NSA mathematicians who defected to the USSR in July 1960] and "an American code clerk brought to the USSR from India" [unidentified, but possibly John Discoe SMITH, State Department communications technician who defected to the USSR sometime between 1960-1967, when his presence in the USSR was publicized].NOSENKO said the Eighth Directorate was submitting regular reports to Khrushchev and the Central Committee on their intercepts until "the end of 1961 or the beginning of 1962". He learned this from GRYAZNOV, his successor in the Embassy Section. At about the same time he learned that various Embassy officers were less often overheard from KGB microphones in their offices discussing significant information. This development GRYAZNOV and American Department Chief FEDOSEYEV attributed to a "room-within-a-room" installed in the Embassy and other Embassy security measures. [The acoustical room was installed in December 1962.] After his own departure from the Embassy Section, NOSENKO also learned of the KGB's loss of its code breaking capability from Second Chief Directorate Chief, GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV told him that the Central Committee was exerting considerable pressure on the KGB Chairman for continuation of the information formerly obtained in this manner; consequently, the KGB Chairman was demanding maximum effort from all KGB officers concerned with the recruitment of code clerks.239Top Secret0001511TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 249]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)## Cryptologic Attack on Embassy Communications:Summary and ConclusionFrom USIB and NSA damage assessments following the discovery of the microphones in the chancery, it has been concluded that it was equally feasible for the Soviets to have recovered plain text (by analysis of cipher machine emissions) from enciphered service attache traffic of the period 1952-1962, and from enciphered State Department traffic during 1952-1959. "ANDREY" (see p. 33), the code machine mechanic the KGB allegedly recruited in 1953, serviced the cipher machines in a common State-service attache code room; his access was not limited, as NOSENKO indicates, to State Department traffic. On the basis of these fundamental errors, it is concluded that NOSENKO was not knowledgeable of the extent of KGB cryptologic attack on Embassy communications, and that such information as he provided can not be related to his claim to have been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section.## Knowledge of CIA Personnel within EmbassyAs Deputy Chief and occasional Acting Chief of the American Embassy Section, NOSENKO claimed that he would "necessarily know whom the KGB knew or suspected to be a CIA officer" under diplomatic cover within the Embassy. Within the section, "special emphasis" was placed on the identification and development of American Intelligence personnel, with the objective of an eventual recruitment. The KGB believed that the Ambassador, code clerks, and Marine guards would not be used to perform intelligence missions: any diplomat, however, was noted as "suspect![document page number]240![document page number]# Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 250]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)"American Intelligence", the notation referring to CIA. Reviewing lists of American personnel assigned to the Embassy during 1960-1961 NOSENKO commented on those who were known or suspected by the KGB to be CIA officers, and on some officers who were not.## Embassy Personnel Suspected to be CIA OfficersBoris KLOSSON 06KLOSSON was considered to be CIA "Resident" in Moscow, for reasons unknown to NOSENKO except that he replaced 06 David MARK, who had been regarded as "Resident" because of his behavior under surveillance and of his clandestine letter mailing. KLOSSON's case officer was MIKHAYLOV. NOSENKO recalled the names of none of the KGB agents working specifically against (KLOSSON).06 He never read any agent or surveillance report indicating that KLOSSON was engaged in 0.6 any clandestine activity. NOSENKO was unaware of (KLOSSON's 06 job in the Embassy, whether his family was in Moscow or any other features of his personal life, of his travels inside the Soviet Union, the identities of his close American associates or any of his Soviet contacts. NOSENKO never read KLOSSON's file,06Comment: KLOSSON was not a CIA officer and had no connection with CIA in Moscow.John ABIDIANABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer on the basis of his conduct as a Department of State security officer during Premier Khrushchev's 1959 visit to the United States and because he replaced known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE. Surveillance confirmed that he clandestinely mailed operational letters and visited a deaddrop site in Moscow. (See p.206)
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 251]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Comment: ABIDIAN was a State Department officer coopted by CIA. Although not a CIA staff employee, he was for all intents the CIA "Resident" in Moscow from February 1960 until November 1961.Steve WASHENKOWASHENKO was identified as a CIA officer on the basis of his mailing of one or two letters to KGB-controlled double agents in the Baltic area. Additionally, from a KGB micro- phone he was overheard dictating an intelligence report shortly after he returned from a field trip.Comment: WASHENKO was a CIA employee detached from his Washington overt assignment as an economic analyst to be assigned to Moscow. He was used there for limited operational support activity, including clandestine mailings. He reverted to overt CIA employment after his Moscow assignment.Lewis BOWDENBOWDEN was suspected of being a CIA officer for reasons unknown to NOSENKO. KOVSHUK was in contact with BOWDEN under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover.Comment: BOWDEN had no affiliation with CIA.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 252]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Richard FUNKHAUSERFUNKHAUSER was suspected of being a CIA officer because he was a specialist on the Soviet Union, particularly on economic matters. NOSENKO remembered the names of no KGB agents working against FUNKHAUSER, nor any information about him which was regarded as derogatory by the KGB.Comment: FUNKHAUSER had no affiliation with CIA.William HORBALYHORBALY was suspected of being a CIA case officer or cooptee because the KGB monitored through a microphone in the Embassy his discussion or dictation of observations made on a field trip. NOSENKO knew the names of no KGB agents working against HORBALY, nor whether the agents ever obtained any derogatory information about him. The KGB did not try to recruit HORBALY.Comment: Like WASHENKO, HORBALY was an overt employee and economic analyst of CIA before being appointed to a State Department position in Moscow, where he openly discussed the fact that he had formerly worked for CIA. In January 1962 he accepted an appointment to the Foreign Agricultural Service of the Department of Agriculture. While in Moscow HORBALY had no connection with or knowledge of CIA clandestine activities.243Top Secret0001515TS No. 197124Copy 10VBR
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 253]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)## George WINTERSWINTERS was known to be a CIA officer and was given special attention because of his operational activity in the POPOV case (see p.207 ). KOVSHUK was in personal contact with WINTERS under the cover of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition he was overheard from a KGB microphone dictating an intelligence report shortly after he returned from a field trip.Comment: WINTERS was a CIA officer.## CIA Personnel Not Suspected by the KGB### Stanley BROWNNOSENKO did not recognize BROWN's name, whose name was on a list which NOSENKO brought to CIA in 1964, a list indicating that BROWN shared an office with HORBALY. In that office there was a KGB microphone providing good reception, but insignificant production.Comment: Like HORBALY and WASHENKO, BROWN was an overt employee of CIA who was transferred to the Department of Agriculture prior to being assigned to the Embassy in Moscow. He was engaged in no clandestine activities during his tour. In 1960 he visited Leningrad with WINTERS, whom NOSENKO correctly identified as a CIA officer. BROWN and another member_of_the Embassy staff were under constant surveillance during a trip within the USSR in 1961.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 254]
# Top SecretAMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)William N. MORELLMORELL was not suspected of being a CIA officer.Comment: MORELL was an overt employee of CIA who was identified as such to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs prior to his assignment to the Embassy as a Minister Counsellor. In attempting to recruit Francis STEVENS (see p.430) a KGB officer allegedly commented to STEVENS that MORELL openly acknowledged himself to be a CIA employee. KOVSHUK, under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, was cultivating MORELL.Eugene MAHONEYNOSENKO identified MAHONEY's name as that of an employee of the Administrative Section of the Embassy. Nothing was known of MAHONEY such as his previous career, whether he new Russian, when he arrived or departed Moscow, or where he lived while there. The KGB did not suspect that he was CIA officer.Comment: MAHONE was a CIA officer who served in Moscow from October 1960 until September 1961 as an assistant General Services Officer). His specific CIA mission was to support communications with PENKOVSKIY inside the Soviet Union. From the start of his tour he was active in attempts to familiarize himself with Moscow and he frequently toured various areas of the city on foot. (MAHONEY) went to the vicinity of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site on two occasions during November and December 1960,245Top Secret0001517TS No. 1971CopyTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 255]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Comment:(Continued) and examined the site itself on 21 January 1961. See p. 219.) Throughout his tour [MAHONEY] [^1] was subjected to intense KGB surveillance. On 25 October 1960 ABIDIAN commented that "I find this type of coverage (five surveillants on a recent trip to a barber shop) completely out of character with that which is usually given a new arrival of similar rank. My only inference is that the KGB has at least strong suspicions of [MAHONEY]'s primary role as a CIA officer." (ABIDIAN's own surveillance at the time was occasional and extremely discreet.) [^1] [MAHONEY] lived throughout his tour in Moscow in America House, for which NOSENKO's subordinate DEMKIN was case officer and which NOSENKO had described as thoroughly penetrated by KGB agents among the local employees [^1] [MAHONEY] spoke Russian, and his administrative tasks exposed him more than most Americans to KGB agents and informants among Embassy local employees.Paul GARBLERGARBLER was a naval officer in the office of the Naval Attache and the target of BELOGLAZOV. NOSENKO knew the names of no agents working against GARBLER. The KGB obtained no interesting information concerning GARBLER from microphones, telephone taps, or surveillance. NOSENKO "did not know" whether or not he had read GARBLER's file. (It will be recalled that in other contexts NOSENKO said that all Service Attaches were considered by the KGB to be intelligence officers.)246Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy[^1]: MAHONEY
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 256]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Comment: The CIA Chief of Station while in Moscow, GARBLER had been detailed to CIA by the Navy in 1952, and he served CIA under Naval cover in Berlin from January 1953 until July 1955. He resigned his naval commission in 1955, and in 1956 he was assigned as a CIA officer to the American Embassy in Stockholm, under the cover of Second Secretary and Political Officer.He returned to active duty with the Navy in June 1961 and on 31 August 1961 he was formally proposed as a candidate for the position of Assistant Naval Attache in Moscow. In response to a request from the Soviet Naval Attache office in Washington, in September 1961 GARBLER forwarded to the Soviet Embassy an official biographic summary, followed by an official call on the Soviet Naval Attache. GARBLER arrived in Moscow on 29 November 1961.Prior to his affiliation with CIA, GARBLER had served in Korea where he was acquainted with George BLAKE. GARBLER was a participant in the joint CIA/MI-6 discussions in Washington in April 1960, minutes of which BLAKE had admitted passing to the Soviets. (See p. . )CIA thus assumed GARBLER to have been identified to the KGB as a CIA officer prior to his arrival in Moscow. This assumption was confirmed by an article appearing in Izvestiya in October 1963 in which the author alleged that GARBLER had earlier been involved in subversion and espionage in Sweden.247Top Secret0001519TS No. 197124Copy 103/BR
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 257]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)## Knowledge of CIA Personnel in Embassy: Summary and ConclusionWith the exception of ABIDIAN, there is a paradox connected with each of NOSENKO's identifications, as is most evident in the cases of [MORELL] and GARBLER. It is a fact that both these individuals were known to the KGB as CIA officers, a fact of which NOSENKO apparently is unaware. His claim is thus false, that he would necessarily know whom the KGB believed was a CIA officer, and to the extent he related it to his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, that latter claim is unsubstantiated.## Personal Handler of KGB AgentsNOSENKO has named seven agents which he claimed to have handled while Deputy Chief of the American Section during 1960-1961.## YEFREMOV and VOLKOVNOSENKO continued to manage these two homosexual agents whom he had recruited and managed during his assignment in the Seventh Department, and brought with him when he transferred to the American Department (see p.111). They were used in no operations during the period 1960-1961. [NOSENKO described the compromise of Robert BARRETT in 1959 and knew of his later recruitment in 1961. (See p. 134.) NOSENKO does not know of [BARRETT's] contacts with YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in 1961, when he claims to have been their case officer.]248Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 258]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)291FRIPPELNOSENKO continued to manage the Moscow manager of the American Express Company during the 1960-1961 period, as he had earlier during his assignment to the Seventh Department. (See p. 137.) FRIPPEL was an uncooperative and unproductive source reporting on his acquaintances in the American Embassy.DMITRIYEVNOSENKO's English and Japanese-speaking agent during the 1955-1960 Seventh Department period was employed in the Japanese Exhibition in Moscow. (See p. 107.) He was not used operationally during 1960 or 1961.Marina RYTOVANOSENKO's agent from 1956 or 1957 (see p. 108) at the Russian Permanent Exhibit in Moscow, RYTOVA was not used operationally during 1960-1961.Maya LEVINALEVINA was a language teacher and librarian at the Embassy used as an informant on her American language students, among whom were a number of code clerks. She provided no worthwhile information on any American nor was she ever used in operations. At the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961 she was fired by Paul SMITH and NOSENKO 06 turned her over to another Embassy Section officer. The British Department planned later to use her in either the British or Canadian Embassies. [LEVINA was employed at the Embassy from January 1958 through January 1962. (Cultural, 08, 06 Affairs Officer SMITH] left Moscow in September 1961, and could not have been directly involved in LEVINA's termination. LEVINA thus was employed at the Embassy throughout NOSENKO's tour of duty with the Embassy Section.249Top Secret0001521TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 259]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)06[PREISFREUND]06Recruited by KOVSHUK, [PREISFREUND] was handled by NOSENKO in the operation against [STORSBERG] (see p. 166). He was 06 used in no other operation during 1960-1961.[WEISS] 0606The [Syrian Army captain] studying in Moscow was first targetted against America House occupants, then used in 06 the development of [ZUJUS], [STORSBERG]’s successor. The latter operation had not terminated when NOSENKO left the Embassy Section in January 1962.Personal Handler of KGB Agents: Summary and ConclusionOf the five agents NOSENKO claims to have brought with him to the American Embassy Section from his previous Seventh Department assignment, none was used operationally during 1960-1961. If NOSENKO handled LEVINA as he claimed, he would presumably know that his single agent in the Embassy served throughout his Embassy Section assignment and was not fired earlier, as he asserted. 06 [PREISFREUND] and [WEISS] 06 are discussed in considerable detail in connection with the KGB operations against [STORSBERG] and [ZUJUS] 06 NOSENKO'S claims regarding the agents he handled during the 1960-1961 period do not sustain his assertions that he was Deputy Chief of the American Section, responsible for code clerk operations, or provide conclusive evidence that he did or did not serve in the Embassy Section.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 260]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Temporary Assignments AbroadNOSENKO claims that he was scheduled to travel to the United States in November 1960' (a trip which was cancelled) and that he travelled to Cuba in November-December 1960 and to Bulgaria in April-May 1961, on KGB assignments. The significance of his travel is the extent to which it relates to his claimed position and functions in the Embassy Section, and to operations in Moscow for which he claimed supervisory responsibility.Planned Travel to the United StatesIn one of the initial meetings in 1962 NOSENKO stated that he had been in the United States. He later amended this to explain that he had been scheduled to make a trip to the United States, but that the trip had been cancelled. He was to travel under true name, he said, to avoid being connected to the name NIKOLAYEV, under which he travelled to the United Kingdom in 1957 and 1958. In his early account he claimed that the decision to use his true name was his, personally; later he asserted that the decision was made by "the people in charge of such operations". NOSENKO stated that he was to travel under the cover of an employee of the State Scientific-Technical Committee [GNTK], and was to accompany an automotive delegation. The visit, however, was part of the Soviet-U.S. exchange program, and when the visit was postponed in 1961, NOSENKO'S travel was cancelled,Comment:The name of NOSENKO appeared along with 11 others on a 20 October 1960 request to the Embassy in Moscow for visas for members of a Soviet automotive exchange delegation which was scheduled to visit the United States in November 1960. NOSENKO was listed as an engineer employed by the State Scientific-Technical Committee,251Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 261]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)## Travel to Cuba (November-December 1960)When NOSENKO first mentioned his travel to Cuba (in 1962, in Geneva), he claimed that he travelled under the NIKOLAYEV alias, and he provided colorful details of his activities in Havana in surveying the American Embassy there for operational possibilities. In subsequent versions NOSENKO asserted that he travelled in true name, and that his was a routine assignment to accompany a Soviet delegation as a security officer.## NOSENKO's InformationIn the latter part of 1960, at the same time as he was preparing for his intended trip to the United States, a special delegation of nickel industry experts from Gosplan, the Soviet State Planning Commission, was preparing for departure for Cuba. The delegation was a routine one, consisting mostly of engineers from various sections of the Soviet Union. Since there was no one under any sort of suspicion, the Eleventh (Soviet Travellers Abroad) Department of the Second Chiếf Directorate decided it was unnecessary to include a security officer. Two days prior to the departure of the group, however, the Central Committee of the Communist Party ordered that a Second Chief Directorate officer accompany the group. Because of the short time remaining before the delegation's scheduled departure, the Eleventh Department protested that it would be impossible to find a suitable officer who could get his necessary travel documents ready in time. At this point, A.I. KUZNETSOV of the Eleventh Department suggested NOSENKO, who had been supposed to go to the United States and who had a valid passport (in true name). The Cubans issued NOSENKO a visa immediately as did The Netherlands a transit visa.NOSENKO's functions with the delegation were purely of a security nature. He flew with the delegation to Cuba in October or November and spent about a month and a half there. During this time he accompanied the delegation