Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 151]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)Operational Activities - 1955-1960: SummaryAccording to NOSENKO, after an uneventful assignment in the American Department's Embassy Section, in 1955 he was transferred to the newly-organized Seventh Department Tourist Section as a case officer. Between 1955 and 1957 he assembled a network of agents and was involved in four KGB attempts to recruit foreign tourists. One of these attempts, that against [Richard BURGI], was the first recruit-06 ment of the Tourist Section; it won NOSENKO a commendation, brought him to the attention of General GRIBANOV, and turned NOSENKO into an effective and successful KGB officer. In 1958 NOSENKO was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section. He then recruited the second member of his two-man homosexual team and, in 1958 and 1959, participated in ten KGB attempts to recruit American and British visitors to the USSR and one American resident of Moscow. NOSENKO's success in the Seventh Department prompted GRIBANOV to transfer him back to the American Embassy Section as Deputy Chief with the critical priority task of reviving KGB operations against American Embassy code clerks.It is worthy of note that of the fifteen cases in which he personally participated, by his own admission, NOSENKO became involved in nine not because they were operations of his section, but because the targets were the victims of homosexual or other entrapment. In addition, three of the fifteen operations were not directed by his section, but by senior Seventh Department officers. According to his own statements, four others were specifically the responsibility of other Seventh Department sections of KGB elements, including the Foreign Seamen Section (GEHRCKENS), Delega- 060606tions Section (LANE and (BIRSE), Commercial Representatives0606Section (TAYLOR), and WILLERFORD) (Moscow City KGB). [FRIPPEL]06 does not relate clearly to INOSENKO's claimed Seventh Department service: NOSENKO states he was also used as an agent of the First Department Embassy Section. Even the remaining case, that of HARRIS, was not necessarily a
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 152]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)Seventh Department operation: by NOSENKO's other statements, she was not a "tourist" and she would have been the target of the Moscow Oblast KGB because of her intention to marry a Soviet citizen.While NOSENKO's participation in the attempted recruitment of the targets he describes, even where not confirmed, is not disputed, the evidence suggest that he was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counterintelligence officer responsible for the identification of foreign agents among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation of agents for the KGB.Nothing NOSENKO has said indicates that there was any material change in his duties and responsibilities after he was allegedly promoted to Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section. The evidence is that he was more active, but not that he had any administrative and supervisory responsibilities.## Knowledge of other Seventh Department### American Tourist OperationsNOSENKO said that upon his return to the Seventh Department in 1962 as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, he reviewed the section's activities during his two-year absence, e.g. January 1960 to January 1962. In the course of that review he made written notes of the section's operational targets during that period notes which he brought to Geneva in 1964. (See p. 319.) NOSENKO could not describe the operations other than to say that he recorded the target's names and such details as he could acquire at the time of his review. Eleven of the operations included in his notes were those against Bernard PECHTER, 06,06,06,06,06,06, Patrick PRESSHAN, John RUFE, Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, 06,06 fnu KARLOV, Norman FISK, Ralph MATLAW, Marvin KANTOR, Michael GINSBERG, and William TARASKA: 06 All were from the period 1956-1959 and six of the eleven individuals were identified by the KGB as homosexuals. All of these cases are described in Annex B.145Top Secret0001415TS No. 197124Copy 10SIBR
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 153]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)Comment: NOSENKO has never resolved why these cases, which predated the records he claimed he reviewed, were included in his notes. More important, he never could explain why he was unfamiliar with American tourist cases which occurred at a time when he claimed that he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was knowledgeable of all such cases.## KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among Foreign Tourists, 1955-1960Besides those operations in which NOSENKO claimed personal involvement or about which he learned in his capacity of Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB knew of the use of tourists in the USSR. by foreign intelligence services throughout the 1955-1960 period. Information from other sources serves as'a basis for judging the validity of NOSENKO's claim.## NOSENKO's Information### NOSENKO'S Tourist StudySometime between May and October 1959, during the tourist season, NOSENKO was ordered to gather facts for Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV concerning the use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence services during the period 1955 through 1958. NOSENKO said he assembled this material from the Seventh Department's annual reports of the years 1955-1958, supplemented by information he obtained from discussions with knowledgeable Seventh Department case officers. NOSENKO recalled only that the study incorporated statistical data on the growth of foreign tourism; he did not remember the content of the study, any examples included in it, or what the study concluded about American or British Intelligence tourist
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 154]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)operations. Nevertheless, based on his research for this study as well as on his general and supervisory responsibilities in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO asserted that he could accurately describe KGB counterintelligence operations among tourists during the period 1955-1960.## Extent of KGB KnowledgeAccording to NOSENKO, operations against foreign tourists were developing slowly during this period and very little was known by the KGB about the American Intelligence use of tourism at the time he wrote the study in 1959. No agents were definitely identified among American tourists, and no tourists were "caught in the act" mailing letters, servicing deaddrops or contacting agents, with one exception. 06 [MCGUIRE, sic, see below.) The Seventh Department, NOSENKO said, developed suspicions concerning a number of tourists because of their apparent interest in photography, or because they were disseminating foreign literature. The KGB never established any firm intelligence connection, however, despite various operational measures taken such as *vyemka* (covert baggage search) and maneuvering KGB agents in contact with the suspect tourists. No American tourists were definitely identified as American Intelligence agents, NOSENKO concluded. On related matters, NOSENKO asserted that during his 1955-1960 service in the Seventh Department the KGB acquired no information regarding American Intelligence use of tourism; specifically, the KGB obtained no documentary information on this topic from any agent source.## American Tourist AgentsThe one exception in which an American tourist was observed performing a clandestine task, NOSENKO said, was one whose name he recalled as MCGUIRE, and who mailed a 06 letter in Minsk in 1959. NOSENKO said he never knew what KGB operational activity led to the discovery of McGUIRE'S clandestine letter mailing.147Top Secret
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 155]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)Comment: NOSENKO here is apparently referring to Edward MCGOWAN, a CIA tourist agent who was in fact detected by the KGB while clandestinely mailing an operational letter in Minsk, but in August 1958.There was a Robert Alan MCGUIRE who visited the Soviet Union during NOSENKO's Seventh Department service, but he was not connected with American Intelligence at the time and he mailed no letter. MCGUIRE, however, was a former CIA staff employee. He visited the Soviet Union as a tourist in April-May 1959, during which period he was the target of numerous KGB provocations, including black-market, females, and a Soviet citizens' request for assistance in defecting to the Americans. Also, a customs officer confiscated from MCGUIRE a Radio Liberation Russian-language Script, and MCGUIRE was compelled to sign an acknowledgement of the event, although the reasons were left blank. Interrogation has never resolved how NOSENKO knew the name of MCGUIRE, but not the background of the case, or the background of MCGOWAN's case, but not his name.Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKEIn 1959 the KGB obtained from its agent in MI-6, [George BLAKE, who was arrested by British authorities in April 1961) the complete details of the CIA-MI-6 program for utilizing tourist agents in the Soviet Union. In early June 1959 a three-day conference was held in London between CIA and MI-6 representatives, at the conclusion of which a nineteen-page document was drawn up which described operational doctrine on tourist operations, including agent spotting, agent selection, agent assessment, agent training, and agent tasks planned for the current (1959) tourist season. The document stressed CIA planned use of tourists
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 156]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)for spotting, contacting, and assessing and, eventually, communicating with agents in the Soviet Union. BLAKE confessed to passing the document to the KGB as soon as it came into his possession.Comment: It is not advanced that NOSENKO should necessarily have known of BLAKE, although his statements on the matter have been ambiguous. Asked in 1962 whether he knew of BLAKE (whose earlier arrest had been publicized), NOSENKO affirmed that he did but indicated that BLAKE was a less important source than the Canadian Ambassador (WATKINS) or the agent in the British Admiralty (VASSALL). When BLAKE was mentioned in 1964, NOSENKO asked "Who's BLAKE?"The significance of BLAKE is that his confession established that the KGB was fully aware of the status and character of American and British Intelligence tourist operations while NOSENKO alleges he was in the Seventh Department. It is judged, by any measure as well as by NOSENKO's statements about the KGB, that the substance of the information if not the document itself would be brought to the attention of a key KGB counterintelligence officer concerned, the Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, which NOSENKO claims was himself.KGB Study of American Intelligence Tourist OperationsIn 1961 CIA acquired a lengthy KGB Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union. The KGB study draws recognizably upon the information supplied by BLAKE and, although concerned primarily with American tourist operations in 1960, it also refers to American agents whom KGB counterintelligence elements identified among tourists in the years 1958 and 1959, while NOSENKO claims he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and during which time he claims the KGB identified no American Intelligence agents.149Top SecretG001419TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 157]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - June 1955-January 1960)SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - 1955-1960: Summary and ConclusionNOSENKO's description of the activities of the Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department in this period is almost solely restricted to his account of these fifteen KGB operations. Other than to allege that certain KGB officers he named were his subordinates, he provided no information to substantiate his claim that he had any supervisory or administrative responsibilities. The common feature of the operations do not relate to NOSENKO's own description of the function of the Seventh Department's Tourist Section or later, to the American-British Commonwealth Section. Most were sexual or other entrapment operations, and he acknowledges that several were operations conducted by KGB elements other than his own section. In short, NOSENKO need not have been in the Seventh Department sections, as he claims, to have learned of or participated in the activities he describes. Although NOSENKO gives a graphic account of the Second Chief Directorate's (and his own) counterintelligence mission, his knowledge is not of counterintelligence operations among tourists; in the only three such operations he describes, the counterintelligence aspects were incidental. Contrary to his claims, NOSENKO is aware neither of all important KGB operations conducted against American tourists during the period, nor what was known to the KGB about American Intelligence and British tourist operations.ConclusionWhile NOSENKO was associated with a KGB element conducting operations against American and other foreign tourists during the period 1955-1960, he was neither a senior case officer nor Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section.150Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 158]
# Top SecretCHAPTER VIIAMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION OF AMERICAN DEPARTMENT(January 1960-January 1962)Deputy Chief of the SectionNOSENKO claims to have served as Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from sometime in January 1960 until the first days of January 1962. This section, in his words, was working against "the most important counter- intelligence target in the Soviet Union", the permanent American representation in Moscow. It regarded every American stationed there a possible spy and, simultaneously, as a target for recruitment.The functions of the American Embassy Section were described by NOSENKO as being to monitor all contacts by Embassy personnel with Soviet citizens, to collect all information possible on American Embassy employees, and to use this information as a basis for planning and implementing recruitments. The Americans' personalities, jobs, personal relationships, weaknesses, daily routines, security precautions, contacts with Soviet citizens, and the major and minor scandals in their Moscow lives formed the basis for this work. To gather such information, the section's officers employed large numbers of agents and informants among the indigenous employees of the Embassy, Soviet citizens moving in Embassy social circles, and third-country nationals with American contacts. The officers also benefitted from the reports of numerous surveillance teams at their disposal, as well as information obtained from telephone taps and microphones in Americans' offices and homes. Each officer had a limited number of American targets with whom he attempted to become thoroughly familiar. Annually, they submitted detailed operational plans for1510001421TS No. 197124Copy 10Top Secret
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 159]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)exploiting the knowledge they had gained of their targets. During 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO said, within the section special emphasis was placed on "identifying intelligence officers in the Embassy and actively developing them, acquiring ciphers, and painstakingly studying code clerks, creating the basis on which they can be recruited".As Deputy Chief of this section, NOSENKO said, he had access to all information concerning its activities: "Nothing was hidden" from him. On this basis, he expressed certainty that in 1960 and 1961 the KGB recruited no Americans associated with the Embassy, there were no KGB agents among Americans assigned to the Embassy in this period and, in fact, the KGB had recruited no American Embassy personnel since "ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH, recruited ca. 1953, see p. 33). From continuing friendships with his fellow-officers of 1960-and 1961, who remained in the section when NOSENKO transferred, NOSENKO has also claimed certainty that there were no KGB recruitments from the time he left the section in January 1962 until his January 1964 departure in Geneva.## Transfer to the American Embassy SectionIn December 1959, while serving as Deputy Chief of the American Section of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO learned from the Department Chief DUBAS of plans to transfer him back to the American Department's American Embassy Section, as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO said he was opposed to the move and wanted to remain in the Seventh Department:"I was used to it there and wanted to continue. I wanted to stay in the Seventh Department. This [the transfer] was no promotion. Here I was the Deputy Chief of section and would be the same there. The American Department is, of course, the most important. But here I was working against American tourists. This is also important. Furthermore, I showed [had proven] myself there in '55, '56, '57, '58, and '59 and was considered to be not a bad case officer. And there, in the American Department, I must prove myself with new people."
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 160]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)NOSENKO therefore asked DUBAS to try to retain him. DUBAS later told NOSENKO that he had twice spoken to Second Chief Directorate Chief O. M. GRIBANOV on his behalf, but to no avail. In January 1960 the official orders transferring NOSENKO were issued.On the day NOSENKO reported to V.A. KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, to begin his new job, he was told to report to GRIBANOV's office. NOSENKO expressed his misgivings about the change of assignment to GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV replied that DUBAS had spoken to him but that he, GRIBANOV, "had his own plans and that was all". GRIBANOV told NOSENKO that he thought NOSENKO could bring "fresh air" to the American Embassy Section's operations and that he was to pay particular attention to operations against American code clerks, the "number one target".## Predecessor as Deputy ChiefAsked on 17 April 1964 whom he had relieved upon reporting for duty in the American Embassy Section, NOSENKO replied: "No one." He assumed responsibility for the Embassy security file from KOVSHUK. Various case officers earlier had been responsible for Embassy Security Officer Russell LANGELLE, including MALYUGIN, then KUSKOV, KOVSHUK, and KLYPIN; but LANGELLE had been expelled from the Soviet Union in October 1959 and his successor, John ABIDIAN, was not to arrive until March 1960.On several occasions between January and June 1964 NOSENKO had referred to a KGB officer named Mikhail Fedorovich BAKHVALOV--but never in connection with the American Embassy Section. Thus, in January he first identified him as Colonel Mikhail BAKHVALOV, the Deputy Chief of the Fifth (Eastern Countries) Department. In February he identified a V.A. ALEKSEYEV as the alias of a Mikhail Fedorovich, last name not recalled, who was Deputy Chief of the Fifth Department. In June, in listing KGB officers who had received various awards for their service, NOSENKO included the name of Mikhail BAKHVALOV, Deputy Chief of "an unremem- bered department" of the Second Chief Directorate.153Top Secret0001423TS No. 197124Copy 10
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# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)On 18 June 1964 NOSENKO was asked to list the names of all officers who had either joined or departed the American Embassy Section from the time NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department in 1955 to his return to the American Embassy Section in 1960. NOSENKO listed fourteen officers as having joined the section, and five who had been transferred out. In neither list did NOSENKO mention BAKHVALOV.A week later, however, on 24 June 1964 NOSENKO stated that "in 1959 and possibly in 1958 Mikhail Fedorovich BAKHVALOV was the Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section. I replaced him in his position in 1960 and he went to the Fifth Department as Deputy Chief". In September 1964 NOSENKO asserted that BAKHVALOV, as Deputy Chief, [not the others he had identified earlier] had been LANGELLE'S case officer. In 1965 NOSENKO first mentioned that BAKHVALOV, not KOVSHUK, had been responsible for maintaining the Embassy security file and stated that BAKHVALOV had shared with KOVSHUK responsibility for supervising code clerk operations.Comment: Interrogation has never resolved contradictions between NOSENKO's earlier accounts of what functions he assumed from whom when he entered the Section, and his belated assertions that BAKHVALOV was his predecessor as Deputy Chief.ResponsibilitiesShortly after reporting for duty in the American Embassy Section and following his short discussion with GRIBANOV, NOSENKO said he met with American Department Chief KLYPIN and Embassy Section Chief KOVSHUK to discuss his responsibilities and functions in the section. Repeating what GRIBANOV had said, KLYPIN stressed that NOSENKO's most important single responsibility in the section would be supervision of all KGB operational activity against American military and State Department code clerks stationed in Moscow. As for the other Americans at the Embassy, KLYPIN
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 162]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION- January 1960-January 1962)suggested a division of labor under which KOVSHUK would be responsible for supervising operations against State Department personnel and NOSENKO would supervise work against the Army, Air Force, and Naval Attaches and their assistants. NOSENKO was also to be custodian of certain sensitive files in the section.NOSENKO has signed a protocol which listed his principal responsibilities during 1960 and 1961. It reads in part:"During the entire period in the First [American Embassy] Section, First [American) Department in 1960 and 1961 my position was Deputy Chief of Section. My responsibilities were the following:-General Deputy to the Chief of the First Section, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, and Acting Chief of Section in his absence.-Immediate supervisor for the operational work against American code clerks. In this capacity I closely guided the work of case officers Gennadiy GRYAZNOV and Vadim KOSOLAPOV.-Case officer for American Embassy Security Officer, John ABIDIAN.-For about the first six months of 1960, super- visor of the work against the offices of the Army, Naval, and Air attaches.Comment: Before 1965 NOSENKO never claimed responsibility for supervising operations against service attache targets. In October 1966 NOSENKO for the first time claimed he was personally responsible for (as contrasted to supervising) operational activity against Naval and Marine officers of the office of the Naval Attache.155Top SecretC001425TS No. 197124-Copy 10