Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 168]
During current interviews, NOSENKO furnished specific information on certain of the above eleven cases, including William TARASKA, Bernard PECHTER, Michael GINSBURG and John RUFE. It should also be noted that certain of the cases such as Marvin KANTOR and William TARASKA were cases in which the tourist was visiting relatives in the Soviet Union and that NOSENKO has given a satisfactory explanation of how he learned of the KANTOR case. NOSENKO has, in discussing his duties as Deputy Chief of the American-British 'Commonwealth Section, also explained that if a tourist indicated that he intended to visit relatives in the USSR, the case automatically was assigned to a group of officers in the Section who reported directly to the Chief of Section and were not under the supervision of NOSENKO.NOSENKO has stated that he noted the names of three of the individuals when retiring the files of "GRIGORIY" and "SHMELEV," two homosexual agents of NOSENKO previously mentioned. NOSENKO has explained that "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" had the assignment of identifying American travelers with homosexual tendencies, that they had contact with numerous Americans, and that they had homosexual activity with individuals on whom they reported but on whom no overt action was taken by the Seventh Department. In some cases the individual6SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 169]
# SECRETwas not considered a worthwhile target and in others the information was just maintained for possible use at a later date if the individual returned to the USSR.NOSENKO has also explained how he learned of the Patrick PRESSMAN and Gerald SEVERN cases; and, the listing of the (Sofia) SHATTAUER case in connection with the 1955 - 1959 period is in complete error since page 427 of the previous summary contains information from NOSENKO on her recruitment in 1962. During current interviews the notes which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discussed in detail with NOSENKO. He has given a detailed explanation of the material which he brought out and his explanation of all aspects is very convincing.The previous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement of NOSENKO in certain cases being handled by other Sections in the Seventh Department or by the KGB Directorate of Moscow was unusual. An examination of the cited cases does not indicate that his participation was unusual, but rather that his explanation of why he was involved is logical and normal. No consideration was previously given to the English language capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents were used in two of the four cited cases.The summary also noted that there was a question concerning whether Gisella HARRIS) was necessarily a Seventh Department case.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 170]
SECRETThis question seems quite superfluous since HARRIS was in the USSR on a tourist visa and "real" tourists are the responsibility of the Seventh Department. Departmental responsibility within the SCD for an individual traveling in the USSR is decided on the basis of how the individual is traveling; i. e., whether on a tourist visa, as a member of a delegation, as the invitee of an organization in the USSR, as a former diplomat stationed in Moscow, as a diplomat not previously stationed in Moscow, as a member of the Cultural Exchange program, as a student attending a university in the USSR, etc. There are also various other factors which affect the determination of which Department or organizational component of the SCD has the responsibility for a tourist case. These factors include whether the individual is already suspected of foreign intelligence connections and whether the individual is a businessman. In addition, certain actual tourists in the USSR may never become the responsibility of the SCD if the individual is of specific interest to the FCD.On pages 148 - 149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at least some of the substance of the information furnished by George BLAKE in regard to the CIA-MI-6 program of utilizing tourist agents in the USSR. This criticism completely ignored the fact that NOSENKO made several references in 1962 to the KGB having such information00011558SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 171]
SECRETalthough he did then and still suspects that William VASSALL was the source. The references by NOSENKO to the KGB having such information were not developed in 1962 or later interrogations, and it was not until current interviews that it was established that NOSENKO had actually seen excerpts of information passed by George BLAKE.According to NOSENKO, the information which was obviously only partial was furnished to the FCD by the SCD and could only have come from an agent.The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 CIA acquired a lengthy Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the Soviet Union (document was furnished by GOLITSYN following his defection in December 1961). It was noted that the summary contained references to certain 1958 - 1959 tourists whom the KGB counter-intelligence identified as American agents and noted that NOSENKO claimed he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB identified no American Intelligence agents during this period of time. What later is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967.00011569SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 172]
SECRETNOSENKO has never claimed to know all activities against American travelers in the Soviet Union during 1958-1959. Many of these travelers would have been the responsibility of a section in the Seventh Department, other than the American-British Commonwealth Section, or another Department in the SCD. NOSENKO was quite aware that certain of the American tourists in 1958 1959 were acting suspiciously from a KGB point of view.NOSENKO has stated he was aware that a document which the Seventh Department had prepared and furnished to the FCD in an effort to obtain further assistance from the FCD in the work against tourists had been compromised by GOLITSYN. NOSENKO stated he was not in the Seventh Department when the document was prepared and did not review the document until after the defection of GOLITSYN and following advice from the FCD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that the document had been compromised. The document furnished by GOLITSYN has never been reviewed with NOSENKO to determine if it contained additional information not in the document which he was aware had been prepared by the Seventh Department for the FCD.NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by GOLITSYN. In current interviews, however, the description of NOSENKO10SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 173]
concerning the distribution of responsibilities within the SCD forvarious categories of foreign visitors to the USSR provides a logicalexplanation for his unfamiliarity. Previous problems in this regardappear to have stemmed from a misconception of the meaning of theterm "tourist" as used by the KGB. This general term has a specificmeaning in the Second Chief Directorate; namely, a "tourist" is aforeigner travelling to the USSR on a tourist visa. Such a personwas the responsibility of the Tourist Section of the Seventh Depart-ment. A large number of travelers to the USSR, including business-men, persons travelling on invitation of a Soviet organization, studentsattending a university, etc., are not tourists in the KGB concept andwould not be the responsibility of the Tourist Section of the SeventhDepartment.The only unresolved problem considered of any significancein regard to the 1955-1959 period is the account by NOSENKO of thepresence of American citizen John SHUBIN in the USSR as a touristin the late 1950's. The previous summary pointed out that, sinceJohn SHUBIN did not have a valid United States passport between 1940and June 19ól, it was impossible for him to have been a tourist undertrue name in the USSR and, therefore, a target of the Seventh Depart-ment, as NOSENKO claims. Although several avenues of possiblyfruitful investigation have not yet been fully explored, there is no
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 174]
assurance that this anomaly will ever be explained. All thatjustifiably can be said at the present time is that, even if the storyof NOSENKO is inaccurate, there is no evidential reason why suchinaccuracy should be interpreted as indicative of deception or dispatch,or for that matter as indicative that he was not Deputy Chief of theAmerican-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Departmentin 1958-1959; neither would such an inaccuracy reflect on his claimedservice in 1962-1963 in the Seventh Department.120001159
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 175]
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[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 176]
SECRETE. NOSENKO WAS NEITHER DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE AMERICANEMBASSY SECTION NOR A SENIOR OFFICER ORSUPERVISOR IN THE SECTION DURING THEPERIOD 1961 - 1962 (sic)SECRET![GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic declassification]0001160
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 177]
SECRETE. NOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the AmericanEmbassy Section nor a senior officer or supervisor in the Sectionduring the period of 1961 - 1962 (sic). (Previous conclusion)It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO held theposition of Deputy Chief, First Section (American Embassy Section),SCD, from January 1960 - December 1961.The claim of NOSENKO that he held the above position in 1960- 1961 has been the most difficult claimed position of NOSENKO to  satisfactorily resolve and accept. Acceptance or nonacceptance of  his claim to have held this particular position is a critical factor in  a decision as to whether the remainder of his claimed KGB career  is valid. It is believed reasonable to presume that if NOSENKO was  Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh  Department, prior to December 1959 in the absence of any indication  that he was demoted, he should have been at least a Deputy Chief of  Section during 1960 - 1961.Position in the SCD, KGB, and throughout the KGB is importantfrom a monetary point of view as well as a prestige point of view. IfSECRET0001161
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 178]
NOSENKO was only in the First Section as a Senior Case Officer in 1960 - 1961, this would have been a demotion in position with resultant loss of both money and prestige. For this reason alone, his failure to have held the position of Deputy Chief in 1960 - 1961 would raise considerable doubt as to whether he held his claimed position prior to 1960, as well as whether he held his claimed positions in 1962 - 1963.It is apparent that the knowledge of NOSENKO concerning all aspects of activity in the First Section, First Department, during 1960 - 1961 is incomplete when judged by what are considered the normal responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA. During current interviews, an effort was made to determine what the responsibilities of NCS ENKO actually were in 1960-1961 and whether his statements in this area were impossible or could be accepted as not negating his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section.According to NOSENKO, in the early 1960's there were only approximately fifteen Deputy Chiefs of Section in the entire SCD and in certain departments none of the sections had a Deputy Chief of Section. In addition, transfer of a Deputy Chief of Section was not always followed by a replacement in kind, according to NOSENKO who stated that he was not replaced by another Deputy Chief when he transferred to the First Section, First Department.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 179]
According to NOSENKO, there was not a job description for a Deputy Chief of Section and the duties of the particular Deputy Chief were in actuality what the Chief of Department and Chief of Section decided would be his assigned duties.The previous summary drew attention to an apparent conflict between early statements of NOSENKO that he replaced no one when he entered on duty in the First Section, First Department, and his subsequent claim that he replaced Mikhail BAKIVALOV as Deputy Chief in the First Section. Along with this he had first credited KOVSHUK and various other officers in the Section with previous responsibility for certain matters which were assigned to him upon his arrival there, then later stated that BAKHVALOV had been responsible for these matters. The previous summary noted that interrogation had never resolved these contradictions.In the light of the present clearer picture of the nature of a Deputy Chief of Section, the statements of NOSENKO on BAKHVALOV and on the issue of who he, NOSENKO, did or did not replace are not contradictory. There is no reason to question that BAKHVALOV, with whom NOSENKO, incidentally, did not overlap, was a Deputy Chief of Section in the First Section before NOSENKO, and that he was responsible for certain areas which later fell to NOSENKO. On the other
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 180]
hand, according to NOSENKO, the principal reason for his being assigned to the First Section was to concentrate on a new area of emphasis (code clerks). There could of course have been no specific predecessor for a substantively new area. Therefore, in one sense BAKHVALOV was the predecessor of NOSENKO and in another sense he was not. The interpretation of the various statements of NOSENKO on this issue as being in conflict appears to be the result of confusion on this point by all concerned.According to NOSENKO, at the time of his transfer to the First Section, First Department, in early 1960, he had not been told and for a short period thereafter was not told what his actual duties would be. KOVSHUK, Chief of the First Section, wanted to assign NCSENKO to supervise the work against Service Attaches at the United States Embassy. NOSENKO felt that the proposed assignment by KOVSHUK was intended to keep NOSENKO occupied with nonproductive work since KGB policy for work against the Service Attaches was primarily one of control on trips and not active work towards possible recruitment.After a short period of time, NOSENKO was informed by GRIBANOV that he, NOSENKO, had been transferred to supervise the work against code clerks (also code machine mechanics) at the United States Embassy. GRIBANOV defined this work as being of the greatest
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 181]
SECRETimportance, and the recruitment of code clerks as a priority aim of the KGB. KLYPIN, who was Chief of the First Department, later repeated the above and a group consisting of NOSENKO, Gennadiy I.GRYAZNOV and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV was formed with NOSENKO responsible for supervision of the work. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV were not new KGB officers, but instead were experienced officers although both as Senior Case Officers were of lesser rank than NOSENKO.NOSENKO does not claim that he had to train either officer or to minutely scrutinize every action or proposed action of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO does claim he was responsible for supervision over their work.According to NOSENKO, GRIBANOV emphasized that work against code clerks was to be his primary work in the First Section and that it would take precedence over any other activity. Other than work against code clerks, NOSENKO has generally defined his responsibilities as follows:(a) Responsibility for file of (work against) John ABIDIAN, Security Officer at United States Embassy.(b) Responsibility for preliminary review of reports from OTU (KGB technical unit) of "take" from microphones in the United States Embassy.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 182]
(c) Responsibility for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy.(d) Acting in place of Vladislav KOVSHUK, Chief, First Section, when KOVSHUK was absent.As can be seen from the above, the responsibilities of NOSENKO, by his definition, which are borne out by specific information furnished by NOSENKO, would not coincide with the normal responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Branch or Section in CIA. An analyst can either accept or reject the theory that there is necessarily an equation between the responsibilities of a Deputy Chief in CIA and the KGB, but if the analyst accepts the theory, he must offer some supporting evidence on this point.Pages 151 - 261 of the previous summary contained comments and conclusions and sub-conclusions in regard to the claimed service of NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961. The previous primary conclusion was that he was neither Deputy Chief of the First (American Embassy) Section nor a supervisor in that section. The conclusion of this summary is that he was Deputy Chief and had supervisory responsibilities for work against code clerks. The matter of the responsibility of NOSENKO for work against code clerks will be considered later. Comments will first be made on the responsibilities listed in (a) - (d) above.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 183]
Pages 205 - 222 of the previous summary contain a detailed basis for the previous conclusion that NOSENKO was not the KGB case officer for John ABIDIAN. The current conclusion is that he was the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN. Whether or not his work against ABIDIAN compared favorably with what is considered to be the MO of a responsible CIA case officer is immaterial; what is material is whether NOSENKO reasonably fulfilled the requirements of the KGB for work against the particular target, John ABIDIAN. It is felt that the answer to this is that NOSENKO did.According to NOSENKO, the work against ABIDIAN was in the direction of determining if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV," and no consideration was given to active agent work against ABIDIAN for possible recruitment. This explanation by NOSENKO appears reasonable and logical and his knowledge of ABIDIAN and his description of his work against ABIDIAN should be considered only within that framework.Admittedly NOSENKO was unaware of a considerable amount of details regarding the background of ABIDIAN, but on the other hand if the statements of NOSENKO are accepted that the only aim of the KGB was to see if coverage of ABIDIAN would lead to "another POPOV," it follows that such personalia information on ABIDIAN would have had
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 184]
little material value for the SCD. The FCD had advised the SCD priorto the arrival of ABIDIAN in the USSR that ABIDIAN was considered tobe "American Intelligence," and in addition ABIDIAN assumed theSecurity Officer position formerly held by Russell A. LANGELLE,who was known by the KGB to be CIA. No investigation by the SCDwas necessary to determine if ABIDIAN was "American Intelligence"or not.The previous summary, pages 213 - 216, contains some quitespecific statements relative to ABIDIAN and a Soviet maid, a KGBoperational contact according to NOSENKO, which are erroneous.This invalidates one of the bases for the previous conclusion thatNOSENKO was not the responsible case officer for ABIDIAN.NOSENKO had previously stated that in circa October 1960 heprepared an operational plan on ABIDIAN which included continuationof the placing of Metka on the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN by hismaid who is mentioned above, Tatyana FEDOROVICH. The statementis made in the summary that this could not be true because FEDOROVICHdid not work part time for ABIDIAN until at least July 1961. ABIDIANhas recently been reinterviewed concerning the above and the results.invalidate the previous conclusion that FEDOROVICH could not havetreated the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN with Metka prior to July 1961.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 185]
ABIDIAN has now stated that he arrived in Moscow in March1960 with the intention that he would not employ a Soviet maid. Approxi-mately three months later his close association began with MyraKEMMER, a Department of State employee; this association continueduntil she left Moscow in mid-1961. KEMMER had Tatyana FEDOROVICHas a maid and through mutual agreement with KEMMER, FEDOROVICHbecame the part-time maid for ABIDIAN beginning sometime in the fallof 1960. From that time on FEDOROVICH, according to ABIDIAN, haduncontrolled access to his living quarters since she had a key to permitentry for cleaning purposes.ABIDIAN did not mail any operational letters within the SovietUnion until after March 1961 and therefore in view of the above, thereis no reason to contradict the statement of NOSENKO that the three *when mailed?* operational letters intercepted by the KGB and mailed by ABIDIAN allshowed evidence of Metka. It is interesting to note that NOSENKO inJune 1962 warned CIA about the KGB use of Metka for spotting internalletter mailings by United States Embassy personnel.ABIDIAN, according to NOSENKO, was the subject of a 24-hoursurveillance with the Seventh Directorate assigning a specific surveillancebrigade to cover ABIDIAN. The actual surveillance of ABIDIAN was theresponsibility of the Seventh Directorate which submitted reports to the
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 186]
First Section, First Department. NOSENKO, as the responsible caseofficer for ABIDIAN, was expected to review these reports and giveany appropriate guidance or direction to the Seventh Directorate, butunder the KGB organization he would not participate in the surveillanceactivities of the Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO stated that had sur-veillance or agent information disclosed any personal weaknesses ofABIDIAN, the KGB would have attempted to exploit them. No personalweaknesses were disclosed, according to NOSENKO, and the patternof coverage to see if ABIDIAN would lead the KGB to "another POPOV"remained unchanged.Pages 210 - 212 of the previous summary notes that NOSENKOwas unaware of countries visited by ABIDIAN during trips outside theUSSR and that no effort was made by NOSENKO through the FCD to findout such information. According to the previous summary, NOSENKOstated that the FCD "would not accept" such a request for "operationalaction against an American diplomat coming from Moscow." Thesurveillance which would have been required on the part of the FCDto achieve any sort of reasonable coverage of ABIDIAN abroad wouldcertainly have placed a severe burden on the FCD. Further, NOSENKOcontends that the results which might reasonably be expected would beof little or no practical value to the SCD.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 187]
SECRETPages 216 - 221 of the previous summary contain a summary on the matter of the Pushkin Street deaddrop site which John ABIDIAN visited on 30 December 1961. It should be noted that a current review of the 1964-1966 interrogations of NOSENKO on this matter indicates they were unable to clarify the matter and did much to confuse the issue.Current interviews, as indicated above, have not fully resolved the problems, but have assisted in at least minimizing the areas of conflict or confusion. It is apparent that NOSENKO was not in the First Section, First Department, for any material period of time after 30 December 1961. It is also clear that he either read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop site or was fully briefed on the details of the visit. NOSENKO insists that he read the surveillance report at the time or shortly after the event. There is no reason.to question his assertion that he read the report since his accurate knowledge of the route of ABIDIAN and his actions in connection with the visit support this claim. However, his consistent inability on his own to approximate the date of the visit or relateit to his change of assignments raises a question regarding when he actually read the report.NOSENKO claims that the visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street deaddrop area led to the KGB setting up a stationary surveillance post11