Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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give it greater support than it has previously received. We recommend that the police group in the CI Staff receive such augmentation as is necessary, and that Project [24] be transferred from the NE Division to the CI Staff.## Liaison with Department of StateWe urge that the DD/P centralize liaison with the Department of State and maintain careful records of all discussions between the Agency and State Department officials. We note that nearly every area division chief has a weekly meeting with his counterpart in the Department but that under the present system there is no organized method for keeping the central management of the DD/P informed of what takes place at these meetings.## Advice to State on Black PropagandaWe recommend that the DD/P develop procedures which will insure that other appropriate agencies of the government (Department of State, Defense, White House and USIA) are kept appropriately informed of black propaganda activities which otherwise might be misunderstood and believed to be legitimately the views of a foreign power. We have in mind our discussions with the Department which heard expressed concern that the Department was unaware of certain black propaganda activities relating to Communist China and consequently was led astray.- 13 -
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# CIA Personnel Under State CoverWe recommend that CIA personnel under the Department of State cover make greater efforts to truly live their cover. We believe in this connection that the DCI should receive assurances from the DD/P, after proper study, that CIA allowances for rents, servants and entertainment are in line with comparable State Department allowances."Legitimate" [08] CoverWe recommend that the Agency more and more place people under [08] cover by the "legitimate" method of recruiting individuals, having them [08] and be [08]; and follow through a normal [08]career. CIA should obviously keep [08] advised concerning these individuals, work with [08] on their assignments which will be mutually beneficial, and covertly train them. By this method such individuals will be under true [08] cover and will not only be unknown to other intelligence services, but also to their colleagues in [08].- 14 -
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# Latin American OperationsWe urge that the Agency give high priority to supporting the expansion of activities of Latin America, and insure that the proper level of competence is assigned to these important posts.## American Friends of the Middle EastWe recommend that the project for support of the organization known as the American Friends of the Middle East, which is currently being run by the NE Division, be transferred to the IO Division inasmuch as it now transcends NE Division area responsibilities and has activities in Africa, or, if it is determined that AFME activities are not worth the Agency's support, that the project be abolished.- 15 -
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# ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THEDEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE)## Office of the DD/IWe have carefully reviewed the organization and activities of the DD/I's immediate office and believe that with the addition of a full time deputy he will be able to assert the degree of influence on the management of the units under him required for sound operations. At present his three office assistants provide good staff work in this review, but we did observe that a considerable amount of the intelligence produced in the DD/I area is reviewed at no higher a level than office chief, if that.We recommend that the DD/I establish in his office a focal point through which all intelligence, processed or unevaluated, going to the White House must flow. If for reasons of urgency a report is sent to the White House prior to evaluation, we recommend that a special notice to the effect that it is unevaluated be attached to the report and that an evaluation follow the report at the earliest possible moment.## Board of National EstimatesThe Office of National Estimates should be strengthened by the addition of one top-level foreign affairs expert to the Board of Estimates, and if obtainable a top-level scientist and a top-level economist. We also believe that the Board would benefit by the
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addition of an individual experienced in business in the international field, provided one of sufficient caliber could be found who would be willing to spend two or three years on the Board of Estimates.## Control of EstimatesWe urge that the DCI utilize the USIB to control the scheduling and to limit the number of National Estimates.## Office of OperationsWe recommend that the Office of Operations be abolished, that the Contact Division be transferred to DD/P to be the nucleus of the Domestic Division.The DD/I has advised us that with the transfer of Contact Division, Office of Operations, to the DD/P, he is considering closer integration of the Foreign Documents Division and the Foreign Broadcast Information Division. These units have a lot in common: both process unclassified information, both have considerable language capability. We believe such an integration should be considered. On the other hand, the Assistant Director for Central Reference believes very strongly that the Foreign Documents Division should be assigned to OCR. He advances as reasons: that the procurement of foreign documents are arranged by OCR; that the dissemination of the FDD product is handled by OCR; that OCR through its relations with the Library of Congress
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OLUILLIand other agencies is in a good position to assist in coordinating the exploitation of foreign documents. We urge that the DD/I integrate FDD and FBID into the most compatible area of the DD/I organization.Support of CenisSupport for the Center for International Studies (CENIS) at MIT is currently being handled by the DD/P. If such support is worth continuing, and we question this, we recommend that it be transferred to the DD/I's office.- 18 -SECRET
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# ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE## DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SUPPORT)### Security OfficeWe recommend that the burden on the Security Office for support of the DD/P be reviewed (see DD/P section). In the meantime, we believe that a careful look at the Security Office is necessary to insure that the volume of work it is carrying is not in any way jeopardizing its primary responsibility of insuring that every possible measure is taken to keep the Agency secure.We recommend that all security clearances be centralized under the Office of Security; e.g., clearances that are issued by DPD, OCI, NPIC, and other Agency components. While we would leave the policy of granting clearances with the appropriate officials, we believe that the Office of Security should maintain a centralized index for special clearances and do all of the processing of these clearances.### Audit StaffWe recommend that the Inspection and Audit Staff check regularly on activities in the Lockheed plant which are of vital concern to the Agency.- 19 -  ![SECRET]
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## DPD SupportWe recommend that the DD/S be given the responsibility for support to all projects under the control of DD/R, providing of course the necessary security safeguards, and that in the future no parallel support mechanism be developed in the Agency.## Automatic Data ProcessingWe believe the Automatic Data Processing Staff can properly remain under the DD/S inasmuch as this is a support mechanism, although we strongly recommend that the DD/S in consultation with other deputies concerned direct this staff to aggressively pursue the objective of automation in the Agency in such a way as to insure the ultimate compatability of automatic data processing systems throughout the intelligence community.- 20 -
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# ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)The Office of the Deputy Director (Research) having already been created, we now make the following recommendations as to those units which should be included under this Deputy.## Development Projects Division - Special Projects BranchWe recommend that the Special Projects Branch of DPD plus the necessary supporting elements, including those projects supporting the Department of Defense in advance reconnaissance programs, be placed under DD/R.## Technical Services DivisionWe recommend that all TSD research and development be placed under DD/R.## Other Research and DevelopmentWe recommend that the extent to which research and development for SIGINT collection equipment, including agents' SIGINT equipment, air-borne collection, etc., should be transferred to DD/R, be left as a matter for negotiation and agreement between DD/I and the Director of Communications.We recommend all research and development in support of NPIC be transferred to DD/R.
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PART IIThis section contains comments and recommendations on areas of the work of the Central Intelligence Agency and activities of the intelligence community in which the working group was either unable to agree, or felt that considerably more study was needed before action is taken. These views are presented herewith so that they may assist and guide those who may be asked to pursue these matters further.
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# CoordinationWe note your intention to abolish the present office of the Assistant for Coordination and to create in its stead an Assistant to DCI for Coordination and Intelligence Community Guidance.With the exception of Mr. Coyne, we are fully in accord. We set forth below our concept of the principal functions of this Assistant.a. He should be the DCI's principal advisor on coordination matters within the community and his personal representative in dealing on such matters with top officials of the community.b. When so directed he should represent the DCI in negotiations and discussions on intelligence matters with appropriate officials of foreign governments.c. He should be responsible for development of Comint and Elint policy insofar as this is an Agency function.d. He should keep continually under review the general extent and direction of the intelligence efforts of the community to insure that such efforts fully and effectively support national policy, submitting reports and recommendations to DCI as appropriate.e. He should correspondingly maintain a continuing review of activities and efforts of the Agency to insure that they remain fully and effectively coordinated with the activities and efforts of other members of the community.- 23 -
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We do not consider it practicable at this time to suggest the number or qualifications of supporting staff officers for this Assistant. We feel, however, that he will need a group of such officers and that they should be of particularly high caliber and broad experience. The functions we visualize for this office are highly important for the community and for CIA. They have not been adequately handled in the past. The Assistant should be given whatever staff the full development of his role may later require.Mr. Coyne does not concur in this recommendation. He disagrees with (a) the proposed organizational placement and title of the recommended office, because this would perpetuate the present ineffective arrangement of the Coordination Office now in existence and would not provide the recommended office with the stature required to assist the DCI in fulfilling his heavy responsibilities throughout the Intelligence Community; (b) the limitations in the functional concepts of the office, as outlined above. Further, he does not concur in this recommendation because it does not distinguish sufficiently the internal CIA operating functions of the DDCI from the community-wide functions which the recommended office must perform if the DCI is to execute effectively his principal mission as assigned in the President's Directive of January 16, 1962. Mr. Coyne believes- 24 -![ZORET]
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that if the office is established along the lines recommended above, it will be incapable of effectively assisting the DCI in performing his principal Presidentially-assigned responsibilities of (a) coordinating and effectively guiding the total U. S. foreign intelligence effort; (b) establishing necessary policies and procedures to assure adequate coordination of foreign intelligence activities at all levels; (c) maintaining a continuing review, with the heads of the Departments and Agencies concerned, of the programs and activities of all U. S. agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities; and (d) assuring efficiency and effectiveness, and avoiding undesirable duplication in the total foreign intelligence effort. Mr. Coyne will submit his recommendations on this subject at a later date.## Princeton Consultants to ONEMr. Coyne recommends that this group be disbanded based on advice from principal concerned officers of the Agency that the group makes no contribution to the intelligence estimating effort. The other members feel that on balance the group should be continued.## National Photographic Interpretation CenterWe are concerned about the capability of NPIC to handle what may be a greatly increased volume of work in coming months. We- 25 -![image of the word SECRET with two lines across it]
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recommend that as a matter of priority the USIB have this matterreviewed and insure that any increased flow of raw material doesnot result in slowing down the prompt and complete processing sourgently required.## Caliber of PersonnelWe believe that the DD/I should devote some considerableeffort to improving the caliber of personnel in his offices. Althoughwe did not make a study in depth, we believe that there is a seriousproblem in this regard in OCI and that steps should be taken underthe new management of OCI to improve the caliber of supervisorypersonnel and thus improve the morale of that office.## Merger of ONE and OCIWe studied at some length the feasibility of merging the Officeof National Estimates with the Office of Current Intelligence. Wefound the Office of Current Intelligence eager for a merger, theOffice of National Estimates strongly opposed. The DD/I was inclinedto favor it, but foresees certain personnel difficulties. We do notbelieve that such a merger would be wise unless it was well esta-blished that the result would be the creation of better national estimatesand current intelligence dailies and weeklies. The DD/I feels that- 26 -  ![SECRET]
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he should be given at least sixty days to explore this proposal and to prepare his recommendations. We concur.Mr. Coyne does not agree with the above paragraph and in lieu thereof recommends that the ONE and OCI be merged now. He believes that such merger will result in improved intelligence products to support the national policy makers.## Preparation and Dissemination of MemorandaWe have noted considerable unhappiness in the Department of State because ONE and OCI have established the practice of distributing throughout the community, and to the White House, uncoordinated memoranda on intelligence matters. These memoranda are prepared as "think pieces", but the Department of State feels that they often seem to influence policy at high levels. We think the Department of State has a point, and we urge'that such memoranda be carefully restricted to circulation within the Agency unless or until they have been coordinated across-the-board.We also urge that the DCI adopt the practice of asking other agencies to prepare such memoranda if the subjects fall within the purview of their responsibilities; e.g., the Department of State on strictly political matters. We believe that, at a minimum, when CIA is asked for a memorandum that inquiries should be made of- 27 -
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other departments to determine whether such a memorandum hasn't already been prepared or might be in the process of preparation.## White House RelationsWe are concerned about Agency relationships with the White House insofar as handling of intelligence matters is concerned. We would like the opportunity to discuss this with you orally before framing recommendations.## Research on International CommunismWe are concerned about the reported inadequacy of research done on International Communism. At the present time some is done in the DD/I area in both OCI and ONE, some is done in the DD/P area in the International Communism Division of the Counter Intelligence Staff, and some is done in the State Department in the Special Studies Group of INR. The DD/1 expressed himself as believing this was sufficiently covered. The Chief, CI Staff believes it is insufficiently covered. Representatives of the Department of State urged that greater expertise be brought to bear on the subject. Inasmuch as it will fall squarely on the shoulders of the DCI if not enough is being done, we urge that the matter be reviewed by the DCI at an early date to satisfy himself that all necessary research in this field is being accomplished.- 28 -SECRET
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## Office of Scientific IntelligenceOn the new chart we have shown OSI as a division under DD/R since we understand this to be your desire. We feel, however, that OSI in its major activities is more closely linked to DD/I than to DD/R and therefore more properly belongs under DD/I. DD/I himself strongly supports this view and urges that he retain OSI. We believe that if this is approved, scientists in OSI should be members of DD/R's career service, subject to transfer between OSI and units of DD/R as might be agreed between the deputy directors concerned.## DD/R's Operational ResponsibilitiesWe have some concern relative to your intention to have DD/R carry into the operational phase his responsibility for certain major projects involving complex and coordinated operations which are highly sensitive and where a misstep could have serious national or international repercussions. DD/R's key people will be mostly scientists, technological experts or leaders in specialized development fields. Such individuals on the average have no professional intelligence operating experience and little background or interest in detailed operational problems requiring thorough inter-agency coordination, painstaking and tedious follow-up actions and careful attention to security details. DD/P, on the other hand, has a number- 29 -![image of the word secret with lines through it]
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of top-flight people who for some years have dealt almost exclusivelywith just such problems.We recognize all the difficulty, in the course of a project of thistype, of shifting responsibility from one deputy to the other; and werealize that development must also lap over into the operationalphase. We suggest having as a general rule (but granting that excep-tions will arise) that when operation begins the responsibility for theoperations should be the DD/P's, but that DD/R should retain hisresponsibility for seeing that the equipment he has developed continuesto function properly. There is here attached a specially classifiedannex.- 30 -![image of the word SECRET which has been crossed out]
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# ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY## National Indications Center - Watch CommitteeWe have examined quite carefully the National Indications Center, its organization, its capacity to support fully the Watch Committee, and its relations with other departments and agencies. We note that opinions within the community concerning NIC and its functions vary widely -- from the feeling that it should be abolished, or combined with DIA indications center -- to the belief that it is entirely satisfactory in its present situation. We do not fully subscribe to either of these views.The functions of the Watch Committee, and NIC, with their terms of reference, were developed prior to the time when DIA was created. Now DIA has developed a strong capability to provide both early warning and indications of approaching crises to the community. Its capacity in this regard will develop even further in the months ahead.We are aware that USIB is now considering the Fitch Committee Report. But we doubt that few if any members of that Committee were intimately aware of the full capacity of DIA and of its future plans. We note that General Carroll was reluctant to be drawn into the Committee's deliberations.
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We recommend, therefore, that except as noted below, NIC operations be allowed to continue as they are for the next three or four months. At that time we recommend a thorough review of the Watch Committee and NIC operations, particularly in the light of DIA's capabilities and activities, with a view to redefining the responsibilities and functions of NIC as may then appear desirable. Mr. Coyne disagrees and recommends that the NIC be abolished now, and that the DIA be assigned the national strategic warning function and that its personnel complement be enlarged to include representation from appropriate members of USIB. Mr. Coyne points to reasons outlined in his memorandum to the DCI dated February 5, 1962.We do believe that the National Indications Center should be properly manned and should receive both the high caliber of personnel at the proper grade and the number of personnel to perform its function promptly and efficiently. In this connection the Department of State has no representatives at NIC at present and the DCI should ask the Secretary to remedy this situation immediately.We would suggest a change in the present method of preparing the Watch Committee report. If NIC is adequately manned, we see no reason why it should not draft, 24 hours in advance, the weekly- 32 -![image of the word secret crossed out]
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Watch Committee report, circulate it to all agencies for considera-tion prior to discussion at the Watch Committee meeting when itcould be decided upon in final form and reproduced and disseminated.Related to the Watch Committee -- but also an important aspectof all coordinated intelligence community reports -- we believe thatsubstantive disagreements should be encouraged and even spelledout in Watch Committee reports; that NIEs and SNIEs rather thanbeing suppressed or covered by watered down language as is some-times the case today, in all cases should reflect the consensus ofviews of the intelligence community. If there are differing minorityviews on the part of one or more agencies, including CIA, theseshould be spelled out in appropriate footnotes.## CIA Relations with the Department of StateWe examined the relations of CIA with the Department of State.Several matters of concern in this area are mentioned in the sectionon the DD/P. We would note that "covering" for the Agency posescertain problems for the Department in its relations with the Congress.These include such items that attract Congressional interest as:the number of officers in each Embassy, particularly the politicalsection; the designation of CIA officers as [24]; the CIA role in- 33 -