Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 262]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)everywhere it went, to different plants, and to meet representatives of the so-called Institute of Agrarian Reform to discuss how to increase production. NOSENKO's cover assignment was deputy chief of the delegation and shortly before departing Moscow he was introduced to the other members as such. He had one agent within the delegation and developed several "confidential contacts" during the trip. NOSENKO would not have accepted the assignment had he known how long and uneventful the trip was to be; he had really wanted to go only to the United States.On his return trip to Moscow, NOSENKO was given a special mission. As he was leaving from Havana Airport, the KGB Legal Rezident in Cuba, A.I. ALEKSEYEV, handed him a package with instructions to deliver it to Moscow. NOSENKO did not know the contents of the package until he arrived in Amsterdam en route home. There the wrappings became loose (it was bound only by thin string) and NOSENKO took the opportunity to determine that it contained copies of "letters between Mikoyan and Khrushchev concerning the prices of sugar" and drafts of agreements between the Soviet Union and East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. On arrival at the airport in Amsterdam, NOSENKO was told that a message had been received from the Central Committee of the Communist Party instructing that the package was to be delivered "urgently" to Che Guevara, who was touring Eastern Europe and was then in Berlin. While the delegation continued on to Moscow, NOSENKO was driven to the Soviet Embassy in The Hague, and in the late evening of his second day in The Netherlands he left by train for East Berlin. When he arrived in Berlin Guevara was found to have left Berlin for Hungary, and NOSENKO delivered the papers to "Guevara's deputy" in Berlin and continued on to Moscow.Comment: Travel records obtained by CIA, which include photographs taken in both Amsterdam and Caracas of NOSENKO's true name service passport and his passport photograph, confirm that NOSENKO, a "minerals engineer", transitted Amsterdam én route to Cuba on 15 November 1960, was in253# Top Secret0001525TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 263]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Comment: (Continued)Caracas on 17 November, and departed Caracas for Havana on 19 November. According to flight manifests, on 13 December NOSENKO arrived in Amsterdam from Havana en route to Moscow and left Amsterdam via air for Moscow on 15 December.NOSENKO was travelling on a service passport; he did not enjoy diplomatic immunity. It is thus highly unlikely that he did serve as a courier, bearing documents of the nature he described as he claimed.NOSENKO's planned trip to the United States and his confirmed travel to Cuba damages his claim that he was supervising operations during this period against Embassy code clerks in Moscow. The trip occurred at the time his alleged target, State Department code clerk MORONE, was to be entrapped on the train en route to Warsaw (15 November) and while his subordinate KOSOLAPOV was in Helsinki (12-16 November) in connection with another code clerk target, John GARLAND.Travel to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case (April-May 1961)In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO reported that he had been sent to Sofia as a KGB response to a Bulgarian Ministry of Interior (MVR) request that the KGB provide a Second Chief Directorate American Department officer to discuss operations with Bulgarian counterparts. While in Sofia NOSENKO asserted he played a key role in the compromise of American professor Horace G. LUNT.NOSENKO's InformationConsultation with the MVRNOSENKO first heard of the Bulgarian assignment from S.I. YEGOROV, Chief of the KGB unit handling liaison with Bloc counterintelligence representatives in Moscow. YEGOROV
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 264]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)said that the Bulgarian Minister of the Interior hadrequested the KGB Chairman to provide an officer from theAmerican Department of the Second Chief Directorate forconsultation with the MVR American Department in Sofia.American Department Chief KLYPIN subsequently instructedNOSENKO to go. NOSENKO was told that he was going for"consultations" and that KGB advisors would discuss hisduties with him. KLYPIN told NOSENKO only that he shouldsee how the MVR worked, and tell them how the KGB managedits operations. NOSENKO had no meetings or discussions withMVR representatives in Moscow before his departure, andknew nothing about the size or responsibilities of the MVRAmerican Department, the names of any MVR officers, or whatthe MVR's particular problems were.NOSENKO flew from Moscow to Sofia in early April 1961and was met at the airport by A.S. KOZLOV, a former SecondChief Directorate officer whom he had known in Moscow.The following morning he was picked up in an officialvehicle and was taken to KOZLOV's office in the BulgarianMVR building. NOSENKO asked KOZLOV what was expected ofhim and was told that "they want to know about how to workagainst the American Legation, everything, right fromletter 'A'". NOSENKO was introduced to the Chief KGBadvisor in Sofia, Mikhail YEGOROV, and to the Chief of theMVR's American Department, after which he was assigned anoffice in the MVR building. During the ensuing weeks hediscussed both general matters and particular cases withindividual Bulgarian officers working against the Americantarget. On one occasion he lectured interested MVR officerson the principles of operations against foreign militarypersonnel in Moscow, and on another he visited an MVRsurveillance post opposite the American Legation. Hediscussed KGB methods of operations against foreign tourists.He also addressed the entire American Department for aboutfive hours to tell them "what is necessary, what to payattention to, how to work". At the end of his visit, sometime in mid-May, NOSENKO conferred with the First DeputyMinister of the MVR about what had been accomplished andhis recommendations for improving operations against Americans.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 265]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Comment: NOSENKO doesn't know why he was selected to consult with the MVR in Bulgaria. As far as is known to CIA, such consultation was a function of the KGB advisors in Sofia whom NOSENKO himself described. The American Legation (after a ten-year absence) reopened in February 1960. By 1961 the MVR had demonstrated that it had lost none of its earlier demonstrated efficiency in controlling the activities of resident foreigners and in establishing the basis for mounting operations against American diplomats. There was no apparent necessity for NOSENKO's Sofia assignment, and therefore his account is jüdged to be untrue.## Compromise of [LUNT]In Geneva in 1962 NOSENKO described the compromise of [LUNT] in graphic terms, including his own personal confrontation of [LUNT]. In his subsequent accounts he had stated that while he never saw [LUNT] personally, he supervised the activities of the MVR officers who dealt with [LUNT]About two weeks after arriving in Bulgaria, around the end of April 1961, NOSENKO was reviewing MVR lists of foreigners scheduled to visit Bulgaria, when he came across the name of Horace G. LUNT. NOSENKO recalled that a Slavic linguist of that name had been reported to him in Moscow by VOLKOV or YEFREMOV as a possible homosexual. When MVR officers confirmed that this [LUNT] was a Slavic specialist, NOSENKO decided to check his recollection against KGB records, for which purpose he telephoned Moscow. An almost immediate reply confirmed that this was the same [LUNT] who had visited Moscow previously, and that he was a homosexual. (The KGB had never exploited its knowledge of [LUNT]'s homo- sexual activities and the MVR had not known that [LUNT] was a homosexual.)
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 266]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)KOZLOV and the Chief of the MVR American Department were very interested in NOSENKO's lead, and KOZLOV appealed to NOSENKO for his help, since "the MVR had never recruited an American". The three discussed the matter with General DUMKOV, the Chief of the MVR Second Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO suggested that a MVR homosexual agent should be employed, an apartment prepared, and preparations made for clandestine photography. They then advised YEGOROV, the senior KGB advisor to the MVR, and KOZLOV called GRIBANOV in Moscow. GRIBANOV prohibited NOSENKO's personal involvement in the entrapment of [LUNT] and NOSENKO's role thereafter was merely advising the MVR officers, "who didn't know what to do".NOSENKO suggested that the MVR officers get two homosexual agents, since "maybe [LUNT] wouldn't like one of 06 them", and he advised them to weigh the time element in deciding whether to entrap [LUNT] with a view to attempting 06 to recruit him at once, or merely to obtain evidence for later blackmail. The MVR American Department Chief and his Tourist Section chief were to attempt the recruitment. NOSENKO remained in a MVR office where he could be reached by telephone in the event the MVR officers needed further assistance.NOSENKO learned from the MVR officers involved that the recruitment had been successful, and that [LUNT] had 06 agreed to meet them again on the following day. NOSENKO later was told that the MVR did not give [LUNT] arrangements 06 for a contact in the United States because he was expected to return to Bulgaria for a Slavic Language conference in 1962 or 1963.[LUNT]'s Information[LUNT] travelled directly from Sofia to Belgrade and there on 9 May 1961 he reported to American Ambassador George Kentian and to CIA that he had been recruited under duress by the MVR in Sofia on 5 May. After being entrapped with a homosexual and accepting recruitment, he was instructed to meet clandestinely with a MVR officer in Paris en route back to the United States. He was given no other tasks.257Top Secret0001529TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 267]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)[LUNT] stated that while on an earlier trip to Sofia in November 1960 he became involved with one Georgi Velev ALEKSIEV, with whom he engaged in homosexual relations on at least five separate occasions. He had given ALEKSIEV American travellers checks which the Bulgarian planned to sell on the blackmarket. Once, while in [LUNT's] company, ALEKSIEV had been recognized and questioned by the Bulgarian civil police. [LUNT] corresponded with ALEKSIEV after departing from Bulgaria in 1960, and he had advised ALEKSIEV of his planned return in April 1961 to Sofia.Comment: [LUNT's] account refutes NOSENKO's claims that the MVR had no evidence of [LUNT's] vulnerability prior to receiving NOSENKO's information in May 1961, and that NOSENKO's personal participation in the MVR operation was such that he knew that [LUNT] was given no MVR contact in the United States.NOSENKO's involvement in the [LUNT] case is unrelated to the assignment he claims at the time. Although NOSENKO cites the [LUNT] case in connection with his Embassy Section duties, it resembles most of all a Seventh Department operation.NOSENKO's presence in Sofia in May 1961 (when he claims his operation against [STORSBERG] was approaching a climax and when his subordinates were apparently planning to exploit [KEYSERS'] newly-discovered vulnerability) indicates that NOSENKO's presence in Moscow was dispensable. The [LUNT] case is thus not evidence supporting NOSENKO's claims regarding Embassy Section service in April-May 1961, nor regarding supervisory responsibility for all American code clerk operations.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 268]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)## Promotion and Transfer to the## Seventh Department (January 1962)NOSENKO stated that his return to the Seventh Department resulted from GRIBANOV's wish to promote him from Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section to Deputy Chief of the whole American Department. However, according to NOSENKO, the new American Department Chief, FEDOSEYEV, wanted as his deputy KOVSHUK, NOSENKO's superior. Under the circumstances, NOSENKO said he preferred to be transferred back to the Seventh Department, in any capacity. NOSENKO reported that he spoke to Seventh Department Chief V.D. CHELNOKOV, and the latter proposed that NOSENKO ask GRIBANOV to be returned to the Seventh Department as chief of the American Section, with the understanding that he would be appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as the incumbent deputy [B.A.) BALDIN retired in July 1962. NOSENKO asserted his proposal was made and approved by GRIBANOV in September or October 1961. GRIBANOV, according to NOSENKO, never indicated his reasons for planning to appoint him Deputy Chief of the American Department or for later promoting him to Section Chief and then Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in 1962.In view of his impending transfer, starting in December 1961 NOSENKO said he spent several hours each day in the Seventh Department. There he stated he talked with Department Chief CHELNOKOV, familiarized himself with certain files of the American Tourist Section, and discussed current operations and operational possibilities with the officers assigned to this section. NOSENKO said the formal order for the transfer was signed by GRIBANOV on 24 or 25 December 1961, and within the next few days NOSENKO officially signed over the ABIDIAN case file and the Embassy security file to his successor as Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, GRYAZNOV. As he had when he transferred into the American Department in 1960, NOSENKO said he took his active agents with him when he returned to the Seventh Department.259Top Secret0001531TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 269]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Comment: NOSENKO dates his transfer as occurring "before GOLITSYN's defection", which he insists occurred in mid-January 1962 even after learning from CIA that the correct date is 15 December 1961. Obliged to take the latter date into account, NOSENKO reconstructed the foregoing chronology of his departure from the Embassy Section and his assumption of duties in the Embassy Section and his assumption of duties in the Seventh Department. Repeated interrogation has never resolved the reason NOSENKO attached so much significance to the date on which he believes GOLITSYN defected.In claiming to have transferred from the Embassy Section just prior to 5 January 1962 (when his participation in the Seventh Department compromise of [W.E. JOHNSON] is confirmed),06 NOSENKO's account makes it impossible for him to have played the role he claimed in the events connected with ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street deaddrop. (See p. 216.)NOSENKO'S assertion that he was GRIBANOV'S candidate over KOVSHUK for Deputy Chief of the American Department is implausible. In contrast to NOSENKO's self-admitted undistinguished performance, KOVSHUK was a former Deputy Chief of the American Department who had been personally involved in such American Department operations of the previous decade as recruitments of Roy RHODES and Dayle SMITH, and the development of CIA officers WINTERS and MORELL and the interro-03 gation of CIA officer LANGELLE, and the more recent attempt to recruit [STORSBERG. 062600001532Top Secret3/BRTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 270]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)## DEPUTY CHIEF of the AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - 1960-1962: Summary and ConclusionAccording to NOSENKO, between January 1960 and January 1962 he was Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section, in which capacity he was occasional Acting Chief, supervisor of all operations against code clerks and for some months service attaches, case officer for priority KGB target ABIDIAN, custodian of the Embassy security file, and reviewer of all information obtained from microphones emplaced in the Embassy. From a comparison of NOSENKO'S assertions, amendments, and retractions with collateral information, he was none of these. Further, while he may have been familiar with the activities of some agents of the Embassy Section, his relationship with them was not in the manner nor circumstances he claimed.From his position as Deputy Chief NOSENKO claims complete knowledge of KGB recruitments and recruitment attempts among Embassy personnel during the period 1960-1961 and thereafter, of CIA personnel identified by the KGB on the Embassy staff, and of the status of the KGB cryptologic attack on Embassy communications. His apparent ignorance of KOVSHUK's relationship with MORELL and KOSOLAPOV's connection with GARLAND refute his contention that he would have known of all KGB recruitment attempts; that he was seemingly unaware of such events while Deputy Chief demolishes his claim that he would necessarily have learned of them later, and while assigned elsewhere. Contrary to his claim, NOSENKO does not know of CIA personnel on the Embassy staff who were identified by the KGB. NOSENKO's information on the KGB cryptologic attack reflects no special knowledge; it is superficial and in error.## ConclusionNOSENKO was neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a supervisor in that section.261Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 271]
# Top SecretCHAPTER VIIISEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962 to January 1964:Comment: By late 1959 or early 1960 the KGB had the complete substance of the CIA and MI-6 tourist agent program in the USSR. The information cb-tained from the KGB agent in MI-6, BLAKE, included accurate details of the objectives and targets of those operations, as well as the practices employed for the selection, recruitment, training and briefing of the agents involved. As a probable consequence of reports received from BLAKE as well as by the independent confirmation of tourist agents identified in the USSR, the KGB by 1961 was mobilizing all of its resources to counter the threat. The KGB's tasks were made no easier by the increase in *bona fide* tourists to the Soviet Union, the numbers of which were increasing by thousands annually. Evidently uncertain of the success of domestic measures it was taking, the KGB extended responsibility for countermeasures to KGB elements outside of the Second Chief Directorate. To that end, selected First Chief Directorate residencies abroad were instructed to exploit all of its facilities in developing tourist agent countermeasures. In describing the magnitude of its tourist agent problem, KGB Headquarters cited the scores of American tourist agents who had been identified in just one year in the Soviet Union.In fact, by the time NOSENKO returned to the Seventh Department in January 1962, the threat against which the KGB was deploying had passed. By early 1961 the tourist agent program was suspended when technical collection programs and other agent operations made the use of tourists unnecessary.The statements of NOSENKO with respect to Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department counterintelligence operations among American263Top Secret0001534TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 272]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)Comment: (Continued)tourists during this period must be examined in light of the foregoing facts. Since NOSENKO claims to have held key KGB positions from which vantage he asserts he was particularly well informed about KGB operations against American tourists, it is appropriate to hold him closely accountable for his statements.NOSENKO's claimed assignment to the Seventh Department, first as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and then as a Deputy and then First Deputy Chief of the entire Department, extended from January 1962 until his defection in Geneva in January 1964. By the time NOSENKO returned to the Seventh Department for this assignment, the KGB reorganization of 1959 had been completed, and according to NOSENKO, the Department was divested of all of its former functions unrelated to tourists. A newly-created Service (sluzhba), NOSENKO explained, assumed responsibility for foreign religious figures, emigres visiting the Soviet Union, and persons travelling to the USSR to visit relatives. The Seventh Department's former responsibilities for operations against foreign seamen, commercial delegations, and so forth were similarly transferred elsewhere.In addition to performing supervisory and administrative duties, NOSENKO asserted that in this period he personally was involved with KGB operations launched against six American tourists and participated in investigations of Lee Harvey OSWALD and of a disaffected KGB colleague from the American Embassy Section, A.N. CHEREPANOV. In this period, also, he travelled on two occasions to Geneva on missions unrelated to his Seventh Department duties.Because of the senior position NOSENKO said he occupied during his period of service in the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed full awareness of all significant KGB operations against American tourists.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 273]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section(January - July 1962)As Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section NOSENKO said he was responsible for planning and coordinating all KGB activities against American (and British and Canadian) tourists in the USSR as well as for supervising the operation- al work of fifteen subordinate case officers. He had no deputy, and he did not indicate who assumed his duties in his absence. He required several months at the beginning of 1962 to "get the feel of things"; "there were no accomplishments" on his part in the initial period on this new job. In mid- February 1962, within a few weeks of his transfer, he began preparations for his assignment to Geneva with the Disarma- ment Delegation. This involved discussions with the Eleventh (Soviet Delegation) Department of the Second Chief Directorate, as well as with case officers responsible for the investiga- tion of one particular Soviet delegate to Geneva, SHAKHOV. NOSENKO claimed that his preparations for his trip were only part-time and in addition to his other regular duties. He spent his early weeks talking to case officers, reviewing reports of the section's activities during the previous two years, and discussing plans for the coming tourist season. He proposed a study of representatives of foreign tourist firms in Moscow with an eye to their recruitment by the KGB, a proposal which was accepted. [NOSENKO elsewhere attributed the proposal to his earlier assignment in the Tourist Depart- ment in 1958-1960, which he alleged resulted in the recruit- ment of FRIPPED.] 1,06## NOSENKO'S AgentsNOSENKO claimed that when he transferred to the Seventh Department he brought with him the agents which he had been handling in the American Department Embassy Section.[Arsene FRIPPEL] 0629,06American Express manager [FRIPPEL] departed from Moscow in early 1961, but NOSENKO claimed he continued to be the Second Chief Directorate case officer since [FRIPPEL] had no 06 contact with the KGB in New York City, and that he met 06 (FRIPPEL) twice in the USSR in 1963. According to NOSENKO,265Top Secret 5/BR0001536TS No. 197124Copy 10