Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 274]
Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)`FRIPPEL` was a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practically nothing." NOSENKO said that although he had recruited him, "honestly speaking, `FRIPPEL` was not an agent." The KGB nevertheless hoped that `FRIPPEL` would be reassigned to Moscow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the `FRIPPEL` case.)Comment: `FRIPPEL` agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice in the USSR in 1963. However, `FRIPPEL` asserts he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962, which NOSENKO flatly denies. `FRIPPEL` is known to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union at that time, and there is no apparent reason why he would make a false claim on this matter.Johannes `PREISFREUND`The KGB considered `PREISFREUND` compromised to American Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection (in December 1961) and thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Embassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take `PREISFREUND` with him when he transferred to the Seventh Department. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however, he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO met with `PREISFREUND` on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962, but did not use him in any operations.Comment: `PREISFREUND` asserts that he was no longer a KGB agent after the `STORSBERG` operation (see p.175) and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent return visits to Moscow, it was only because NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and drinking.Top Secret
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 275]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## VOLKOV and YEFREMOVAccording to NOSENKO, he used the two homosexual agents in the entrapment of [W. E. JOHNSON] several days after 06 returning to the Seventh Department. This was their first operational activity since 1959, because they were employed in no operations during the entire period he was their case officer while assigned to the Embassy Section. After the 06 [JOHNSON] entrapment, these agents were not used again. NOSENKO claimed that in 1962 or 1963 they were retired, and he personally dispatched their files to KGB Archives. (For details of VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's activities see p.110)Comment: There is evidence that VOLKOV was involved in a KGB entrapment operation directed against American tourist (William J. ZUBON)in July 06 1962 (while NOSENKO claims he was still his case officer), an event of which NOSENKO ap- parently is uninformed.06 [Samih WEISS]After his transfer to the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed he was instructed also to continue directing Syrian 11,06 military officer WEISS, who was targetted against military 06 code clerk [ZUJUS] (see p. 161 ). NOSENKO continued to meet 06 [WEISS] during the first months of 1962, and in February or March he attempted to have [WEISS] arrange a social affair 06 with [ZUJUS] so that another KGB agent could be introduced to the code clerk. Just before leaving for Geneva for the first time, NOSENKO turned [WEISS] over to GRYAZNOV, NOSENKO's successor as Deputy Chief of the American Department Embassy Section.06 [WEISS] was scheduled to finish his studies in Moscow in May 1962, after which NOSENKO believed he returned to [Syria]. 11Comment: Because of the political climate in [Syria], there has been no opportunity to query [WEISS] regarding NOSENKO's allegations.06267Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 100001538
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)Marina RYTOVAUntil 1960 or 1961 a Greek language instructor at the Institute for International Relations, RYTOVA obtained a job at a CPSU Central Committee school and thereafter ceased all agent work. Nevertheless, NOSENKO asserted that he was officially registered as her case officer until his defection in 1964.NOSENKO's Agents: Summary and ConclusionNOSENKO's claims with respect to these agents do not sustain his claims to service in the Seventh Department in this period, since none were utilized in Seventh Department operations.Operational Activities (January - June 1962)As Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Department during the period January-July 1962, NOSENKO claimed he directed the compromise of [W.E. JOHNSON] 06 in January, briefed himself on the Section's activities, and prepared himself for his assignment as a security officer with a delegation travelling to Geneva. During March and June he visited Geneva and contacted CIA and, by his assertion, supervised the case officer handling of KGB double agent Boris BELITSKIY. Shortly after his return to Moscow in June he claimed he recruited [Horst BRAUNS]. 06Entrapment of [W.E. JOHNSON] 06NOSENKO's Information 06NOSENKO first referred to [JOHNSON] in Geneva in 1962, when he described how YEFREMOV and VOLKOV in January 1962 had been used in the homosexual entrapment of a tourist, [JOHNSON], a 06 08 [Young Baptist from California] The KGB was angered that the American was writing letters critical of the Soviet Union. Although the American agreed to NOSENKO's demand that he work with the KGB in the United States, the American immediately reported the recruitment attempt to the Embassy.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 277]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)In February 1964 NOSENKO produced among other notes which he had brought with him to a meeting with CIA (see p.319) one bearing the name of Everett Wallace[sic] JOHNSON and the date "5 January 1962". Questioned about the note, NOSENKO recalled the significance of neither the name nor the date, and stated that the case was not a recruitment but "some sort of developmental operation".NOSENKO next mentioned JOHNSON on 17 April 1964. Although not immediately recalling JOHNSON's name, he eventually remembered that it was something like JOHNSON or JOHNSTON), and that he was a Baptist from the California coast & NOSENKO placed the operation sometime in the summer of 1962, after his return to Moscow from Geneva, because he also remembered he wore no overcoat at the time. JOHNSON, who had come to the Soviet Union as a tourist, was discovered to be a homosexual, and on this basis the KGB Second Chief Directorate considered him as a recruitment target. The Second Chief Directorate was not interested in JOHNSON as an agent because he had no access to important information and he lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States for convenient contact.Several days later KGB surveillance observed JOHNSON mailing some letters in Moscow. When read by the KGB they were found to be "so bitter toward the Soviet Union, angry, critical, that the KGB decided something had to be done" to prevent his writing letters and making anti-Soviet statements on his return to the United States."At about the same time" there was some sign that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided to entrap him on this basis. The sole reason was to halt JOHNSON's criticism of the USSR. No recruitment was to be attempted because neither the First nor the Second Chief Directorate had any use for him as an agent and because the KGB had concluded that he was unlikely to accept recruitment NOSENKO did not know why he was selected to make the approach to JOHNSON, except that "BOBKOV said I should go." (NOSENKO said he had reported on duty in the Seventh Department only the day before. F.D. BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, supervised the activities of the Seventh Department.) NOSENKO's homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were selected to compromise JOHNSON269Top Secret0001540TS No. 197124Copy 10![illegible]
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)JOHNSON became acquainted with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the Metropol Hotel. They told JOHNSON that they had recently arrived in Moscow and invited JOHNSON to visit their hotel room. JOHNSON agreed because "they understood each other right away. They knew they were the same (i.e., homosexuals)." Under the guise of the hotel administrator and a militiaman, KGB officers burst in on the trio. Photographs of the incident had been taken (but had yet not been developed). A report describing the circumstances (an akt) was prepared and JOHNSON was then transferred to another room. By this time NOSENKO had arrived at the hotel from his office and he went into the room where JOHNSON was being held.The "militiaman" described what had happened to NOSENKO, in JOHNSON's presence. Addressing JOHNSON NOSENKO said: "How come? How could you do such a thing? What are we going to do now? After all, this is punishable by court and...people are given from five to eight years for such relations. It used to be three to five, now it's from five to eight." Frightened JOHNSON wrote out and signed a promise not to criticize the Soviet Union in the future.The following day, after the incriminating photographs had been developed, NOSENKO approached JOHNSON in the cafe of the Metropol Hotel and asked him whether he intended to keep his promise. When JOHNSON said that he planned to do so, NOSENKO presented him with an envelope containing copies of the photographs and said that they would be released to the foreign press if JOHNSON were to break his promise. The KGB later learned that JOHNSON had visited (or phoned, according to a later version) the American Embassy and the KGB thus assumed that he had reported the approach. NOSENKO did not recall what name, if any, he had used during this operation.In 1965 NOSENKO dated the entrapment operation as having occurred in summer in either 1962 or 1963. Reminded that his notes paired JOHNSON's name with the date of 5 January 1962, NOSENKO insisted that the date had nothing to do with the name, that he recalled the operation as having taken place in summertime. [NOSENKO ultimately accepted 5 January 1962 as the date of JOHNSON's entrapment, since it occurred "immediat ly after his transfer back to the Seventh Department.]
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 279]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)06JOHNSON's InformationAccording to a statement given to the FBI, prior to his visit to the USSR JOHNSON had written a church authority in Moscow requesting permission to preach there. He was in- formed that some official permission was needed. JOHNSON 06 subsequently travelled to Moscow as a tourist, and he did preach on one occasion but he suspended further such activi- ty on the advice of Russian Baptist colleagues.29 During his ten-day stay in Moscow JOHNSON wrote and posted letters to some twenty persons outside the USSR.06JOHNSON reported to the Embassy in Moscow on 5 January 1962 that he had experienced an incident with Soviet plain- clothesmen at the Hotel Metropol earlier that day: JOHNSON, 06 who had arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961, explained that he was dining alone at the Metropol restaurant on the evening of 4 January when he was joined by a Soviet citizen who identified himself as "a doctor from Riga". The "doctor" spoke English poorly, and JOHNSON agreed to visit the doctor's06 room at the hotel on the following day, when the doctor would have with him a student friend who spoke English well. Soon after JOHNSON arrived in the doctor's room on 5 January, the "student" made homosexual advances. 06 JOHNSON protested and started to leave when two plainclothesmen suddenly appeared in the room and announced that all were under arrest. After signing a statement in Russian, JOHNSON was taken to another 06 room where he was confronted with a man who identified him- self as Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV, "the Chief of Police". 06 After threatening JOHNSON with imprisonment, "NIKOLOV" of- fered to dismiss the matter, provided JOHNSON would sign a 06 commitment not to criticize the Soviet Union when he returned to the United States.06On 8 January JOHNSON telephoned the Embassy to report that he had been recontacted by the "Police Chief" who reminded him of his pledge and showed him incriminating photographs alleged- ly taken of JOHNSON and the "student" in the hotel room pre- viously.0606Shown photographs of VOLKOV and NOSENKO, JOHNSON thought VOLKOV to be "familiar", but he could not identify NOSENKO as the "Police Chief".271Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)Comment: From their modus operandi the "doctor from Riga" is undoubtedly VOLKOV and the "student" YEFREMOV. NOSENKO frequently used the operational pseudonym Yuriy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV and was called Georgiy.06Although JOHNSON apparently confirmed NOSENKO's role, NOSENKO's version of the case is incompatible with what must have been the actual time frame. According to NOSENKO'S version, within five days of JOHNSON's arrival 06 in Moscow the KGB had discovered that he was a homosexual, concluded from "two or three" censored letters that he was a threat, and arranged his entrapment. The rapid pace of events suggests that JOHNSON' s homosexuality 06 was already known to the KGB (if not to NOSENKO; 06 before JOHNSON's arrival in Moscow. NOSENKO's 06 ignorance of JOHNSON'S preaching (probably the actual cause of KGB concern) is further evidence that NOSENKO did not know the complete background of the KGB operation, and that his role was merely that of playing the "Police Chief".NOSENKO's participation in this case contradicts his assertions about the timing of his transfer from the American Department. (See p. 260.)06William Carroll JONES06NOSENKO's Information08JONES, a wealthy Baptist layman, visited the USSR on six 29 or seven occasions, each time meeting with Russian Baptists. He is personally acquainted with President Johnson and knew President Kennedy. He was the target of Seventh Department case officer Vitaliy DERA. While visiting the Soviet Union 06 in 1962 JONES became involved with a Soviet female. Although she was not a KGB agent, the KGB took control of her relationship with JONES and, on JONES 06 subsequent trips to the Soviet Union, unsuccessfully sought to obtain incriminating photographs.272Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy121BR
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)Comment: Interviewed by the FBI in June 1964, JONES(the sponsor of the annual Presidential"prayer breakfast" in Washington) confirmedthe substance of NOSENKO's information butdenied sexual intimacies with any Soviet fe-male. JONES claimed to have made 24 tripsto the Soviet Union and to have successfullysmuggled Bibles into the USSR on numerousoccasions. According to JONES, in 1963Pravda publicized an incident in which a num-ber of Bibles were confiscated from his lug-gage.A 1961 KGB document furnished CIA byGOLITSYN cited JONES by name in connectionwith a description of his Bible smugglingactivities.NOSENKO reported the JONES case in 1962in Geneva and stated that the Seventh De-.partment case officer, DERA, was NOSENKO'Ssubordinate in the Section. However, NO-SENKO's ignorance of (JONES' Bible) smuggling(the activity which most likely prompted KGBaction) and of the fact that JONES' activitieshad been publicized in the Soviet press, in-dicate that NOSENKO had no intimate connectionwith the caseRecruitment of Natalie BIENSTOCKNOSENKO's InformationThe KGB recruited BIENSTOCK during her 1962 visit to theUSSR. The Seventh Department case officers were K.G.KRUPNOV and A.G. KOVALENKO, who were acting in behalf ofthe Leningrad KGB. The latter had become interested in theAmerican tourist while she was staying with a Soviet boyfriend in Leningrad. (NOSENKO himself would have attemptedthe recruitment, but he was busy preparing to leave forGeneva in April 1962.) During the recruitment, the KGBofficers did not disclose their knowledge that she was anAmerican Intelligence agent and that she had been involved
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 282]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)In the American Intelligence attempt to deliver a written message to a Soviet ballerina in the United States. The ballerina received the message, but passed it to the KGB, which concluded that [BIENSTOCK] was an agent either of CIA 06 or of the FBI. After recruitment, [BIENSTOCK] was turned 06 over to First Chief Directorate officers of Department D (Disinformation). If she returned to the USSR the KGB planned to secure her confession of her relationship with American Intelligence.Comment: [BIENSTOCK] was employed as an interpreter with a Bolshoi troupe touring the United States when she was asked by CIA to pass a letter to the ballerina, a letter destined for the ballerina's brother in the USSR. [BIENSTOCK] re-06 fused, and the letter was delivered by other means. Interviewed by the FBI on the basis of NOSENKO's information, [BIENSTOCK] acknowledged in July 1964 that she had been recruited by the KGB while visiting Moscow as a tourist in 1962, and that she had been intimidated by the KGB accusation of her involvement with the ballerina. (Note that NOSENKO stated the KGB withheld its knowledge of that involvement.) 06 [BIENSTOCK] also admitted having contact in the United States through secret writing with KGB officers, until the letters ceased at KGB in-itiative in late 1962 or early 1963.
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964)## Travel to Geneva (March-June 1962)NOSENKO visited Geneva between 10 March and 15 June 1962 as a security officer accompanying the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. In addition to performing that function, NOSENKO claimed he supervised the activities of another KGB case officer's meetings with a KGB-controlled CIA agent, visited the KGB rezidentura in Geneva and associated with KGB officers in Switzerland during the period. Six days before his return to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO contacted CIA.## Purpose of Trip to GenevaNOSENKO arrived in Geneva on 10 March 1962 listed officially as an "expert" of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs attached to the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference. NOSENKO explained that after GOLITSYN's defection in Finland [in December 1961] an order was issued that no delegation was to be permitted to depart the Soviet Union without an accompanying KGB security officer. [NOSENKO has since stated that he can recall no such order.]Explaining in 1962 how he came to be designated, as the security escort, NOSENKO said he argued that he was needed to direct the fifteen case officers in his section, but GRIBANOV stated that Foreign Minister Gromyko was leading the delegation and that someone of an appropriate senior rank should accompany the delegation, not just a senior case officer, but a section chief or a deputy chief or a chief of a department. NOSENKO was the most junior section chief. His immediate superior in the Seventh Department approved the trip on the basis that it would last only a month.0001546275TS No. 197124Copy 10Top Secret
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)In addition to his general security duties with the delegation, NOSENKO said in 1962 that he was given a special assignment to check on a senior delegation advisor, Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV (see below).During the 1965 interrogations, NOSENKO provided somewhat varying accounts of the background of his 1962 trip to Geneva. He said that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with his assignment, but that (S.G.) BANNIKOV, the Deputy Chief of the Second Directorate who supervised the Soviet Delegations Abroad Department, made the selection. The latter department was investigating SHAKHOV, and BANNIKOV was concerned with the selection of a security officer because SHAKHOV, who was suspected of being a Western agent, was to be in the delega- tion. Because of the seriousness attached to the case, the Delegations Department wanted a chief of section as case officer, and when a request was made to the Seventh Depart- ment Chief, CHELNOKOV, the latter agreed to NOSENKO's as- signment. NOSENKO stated that CHELNOKOV, his superior and friend, let him go to Geneva as "a treat", even though he had just assumed his duties as Chief of the American- British Commonwealth Section, he had no deputy, and the trip was occurring on the eve of the tourist season.## Investigation of SHAKHOVAccording to NOSENKO, M.G. SITNIKOV, representing the Soviet Delegations Department, conducted investigations of SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961, but had been unable to resolve the KGB suspicions about him. Because of the failure of these early efforts, the KGB decided to send a "senior guy" to the Disarmament talks in 1962, and NOSENKO was chosen "to finish things up". Before leaving Moscow in March 1962, NOSENKO discussed the SHAKHOV case with SITNIKOV and with LYALIN, the Soviet Delegations Department case officer in charge of the SHAKHOV case. He also read various materials on the case, including an investigative plan drawn up by LYALIN.NOSENKO has said that SHAKHOV was under suspicion in 1962 because he was working with different delegations at different conferences, and there was some evidence that in Geneva ear- lier he was somehow connected with American diplomat [David MARK].
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)who was (erroneously) considered to be a CIA officer. SHAKHOV "maybe" had some contact with [MARK] in 1960 or 1961,06 but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counter- intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.M. GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and he had noted "little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United States, earlier, he had been terminated (as an agent) by KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHAKHOV liked life in the Unites States, American products, and money. In that KGB report he was depicted as "not good" and not wanting to work as an agent".NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected of being an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his trips abroad". "There was no proof, only suspicions, and furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer.Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United States since 1942, when he was assigned to the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, and he had attended a number of sessions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROV identified him as an MVD (KGB) officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow,KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV'S face "was familiar". An FBI source, however, in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a "pure diplomat" and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged in no Soviet intelligence activity until that time.277Top Secret0001548TS No. 197124Copy 10UBR