Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 334]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## Knowledge of Other Seventh Department OperationsThe notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964 (see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen other KGB operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited in the description of these operations in Annex B, these operations are not material to NOSENKO's claim to service in 1962-1963 as either Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.0001597325Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy - 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 335]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## Operational Activities - July 1962-January 1964: SummaryTo substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO describes KGB involvement in the recruitment of *[SVENCHANSKIY]* 06 the arrests of *[KOTEN]* and BARGHOORN, and the investigations 06 of *[SLESINGER]*, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV, 06 his discovery that *[SHUBIN]* was a GRU agent, and his assignment to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as he described and they were as he described (there are substantial reasons why they might have been conducted by KGB elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Department operations. They do not accurately characterize, as NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department service. NOSENKO's explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was not a lieutenant colonel as the temporary duty authorization indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy Chief of Department and one from which he presumably would have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions which he claimed to have held.## KGB Counterintelligence Operations### Among American Tourists#### 1962-1963Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to326Top Secret0001598TS No. 197124Copy4/6R
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 336]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)tourist operations, and, specifically, awareness of all significant KGB operations against American tourists.## Information Furnished the KGB by George BLAKEThe KGB agent in MI-6, George BLAKE, in 1959 furnished the KGB with a documentary account of the joint CIA-MI-6 meeting in June of that year, (see p.148) and he was to furnish other information by which the KGB could keep current on such hostile operations. Another CIA-MI-6 meeting was held in Washington in April 1960, of which a twenty-one page summary was made. BLAKE also passed this document as soon as it came into his possession to the KGB.## KGB Study of American Intelligence Tourist OperationsThe lengthy 1961 KGB Top Secret study referred to earlier (see p.149) reflects the detailed and accurate information in possession of the KGB during the period of NOSENKO's alleged service in the Seventh Department in 1962-1963. Pertinent portions are quoted as follows:> "It has been established that the Intelligence organs of the USA are displaying special activity in the utilization of legal channels, specifically, in tourism, for the purpose of conducting subversive work against the USSR. Numerous facts indicate that American tourists and members of various US delegations, in the USSR strive to visit areas and installations to which employees of the Embassy and military attaches have no access, establish contact with Soviet citizens, and collect intelligence information. In this regard, the channels of tourism to the USSR are used to dispatch experienced intelligence agents to develop individual Soviet citizens with the objective of their eventual recruitment. In line with the preparation and dispatch of such agents, among the tourists the Americans also make extensive use of persons not directly connected with American Intelligence organs. These latter agents are given one-time assignments such as collecting information leading to the ideological development of Soviet citizens."327# Top Secret0001599TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 337]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)"With the objectives of accomplishing subversive activities, a so-called 'Information Center; has been established in the US with the participation of the Department of State. The 'Center' officially advertises that its purpose is to inform intending American tourists to the Soviet Union about the opportunities and restrictions existing there. Actually, however, the 'Center' is involved in the ideological preparation of American tourists, whom it instructs regarding their conduct in the Soviet Union and the methods to be used there for propag- andizing the American way of life. The 'Center' collects information about the Soviet Union from returning American tourists, including the political attitudes of certain Soviet citizens, their addresses, etc. The direction of the 'Center' is controlled by experienced intelligence officers of CIA."Candidates for missions to the USSR are selected carefully. They ordinarily possess knowledge of the Russian language, know the fundamentals of photo- graphy, have specific technical training and must look upon their mission as a responsible assignment and not as a pleasure trip. American Intelligence organs prefer to use persons who have previously visited the USSR and person having relatives there."Once selected, the American tourist agent is instructed as to his intelligence assignment and his route, and he is acquainted with the security conditions in the USSR, including passport controls, documentation and customs controls, the hazard of both physical and technical surveillance, as well as the possibility of provocations and compromise making the agent vulnerable to blackmail."Among American Intelligence tourist agent tasks there are included visual observation and clandestine photography, the establishment of contact with Soviet citizens, and spotting among such citizens persons who may be developed as sources of information. For American Intelligence, any Soviet citizen, regardless0001600328Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 338]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)of his social status or his personal access to important information, is of interest, because of his ability to travel to regions of the USSR which are of interest to American Intelligence."American Intelligence tourist agents suspect as KGB agents Soviet citizens who too openly express anti- government sentiments, who volunteer information about friends or relatives who work in secret establishments, who accept an invitation for a clandestine meeting but display an awareness of security principles, who quickly request aid or assistance in defecting, or who have a good knowledge of foreign languages."Citing the increase in foreign tourists in the Soviet Union from 35,000 in 1959 to over 50,000 in 1960, the document instructs a KGB First Chief Directorate Legal Residency abroad"to utilize all its resources to expose among American tourists persons suspected of belonging to the enemy intelligence or counterintelligence organs."Promising its assistance, KGB Headquarters instructs the Legal Residency"to inform KGB Headquarters of foreigners temporarily visiting the USSR who are of operational interest in the work against the main enemy [the U.S.]. With this aim, the Legal Residency should intensify its work against local services which are using tourism to conduct intelligence work in the USSR; determine the role played by anti- Soviet emigre organizations with respect to tourism; exploit tourist firms which organize tours in the USSR, with the aim of obtaining information regarding the firms being exploited by hostile intelligence services; and telegraph timely and necessary information to KGB Headquarters regarding tourists believed to be of operational interest, including the individual's surname, name, patronymic, date of birth, profession, date to arrive in the USSR, means of travel, itinerary, description of group with whom tourist travelling, and any other pertinent information available to the Legal Residency about the329Top Secret0001601TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 339]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)tourist. The Legal Residency is further directed to include where possible among tourists groups agents of the Residency, informing KGB Headquarters in advance of their presence and advising how the KGB could contact the agents in the USSR if it should become necessary. Lastly, the Legal Residency is instructed to provide all possible aid, including financial assistance, so that persons favorably disposed to the USSR can visit there, with the objective of their recruitment in the Soviet Union for the purpose of exposing enemy intelligence agents among other tourists."## NOSENKO'S InformationNOSENKO insisted that the operations he described accurately reflected the extent of KGB counterintelligence operations among American tourists during his 1962-1963 service in the Seventh Department. In response to questions during his interrogation, NOSENKO asserted that the Seventh Department, during his absence in 1960-1961, had only noted that "automobile tourism had increased and that American Intelligence had increased its use of multi-national tourist groups." He stated that the Seventh Department received no information during 1960-1961 regarding American Intelligence use of tourism as a cover for espionage. He was aware, he said, from the damage survey conducted in the KGB after GOLITSYN's defection, that American Intelligence had obtained a KGB document on tourist operations, a document which had been written in the Seventh Department.Comment: NOSENKO does not know the content of the document, which he describes as a statistical survey similar to the study he himself drafted in 1959 (see p. 146).# Top Secret
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 340]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## KGB Counterintelligence OperationsAmong American Tourists: SummaryBLAKE's confession and evidence obtained from internal KGB documents establish the KGB concern for the threat of American tourist agent operations and the scope of KGB actions to thwart that threat. The effect of NOSENKO'S statements is that the KGB did not know of the American tourist agent program. He averred that the operations he described accurately depicted the nature of KGB counterintelligence operations during the period.## SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - 1962-1964: Summary and ConclusionAccording to NOSENKO, in January 1962, at the direction of General GRIBANOV, he was appointed Chief of the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth Section in the expectancy that he soon would be named a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. As a Section Chief, he personally handled agents and supervised all Second Chief Directorate operations against American and British Commonwealth tourists, of which he describes four. In this period NOSENKO also was assigned the unrelated duty of serving as a security escort officer with a Soviet delegation travelling to Geneva in which capacity he investigated a delegate of suspected loyalty, SHAKHOV. While in Geneva he drew also the assignment of supervising another KGB case officer's management of the KGB double agent, BELITSKIY. On that visit to Geneva NOSENKO first contacted CIA. In July 1962, NOSENKO claims that as GRIBANOV promised, he became one of three Deputy Chiefs of the entire Seventh Department; in this position he learned of all KGB operations against American tourists. In this connection he described five operations, as well as his accidental discovery of the identity of an American GRU agent, and the investigation and search for a disaffected former KGB colleague. In July '1963 NOSENKO states331# Top Secret0001603TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 341]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)he became First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. Again assigned to escort a delegation to Geneva in January 1964, NOSENKO met CIA representatives again and delivered notes of KGB operations of which he had learned since his last meeting with CIA in 1962. He also presented at this time a KGB travel document to substantiate his claimed rank of lieutenant colonel. Finally, he announced the receipt of a telegram recalling him to Moscow, an event which prompted CIA to accept his immediate defection.NOSENKO's claimed date of transfer into the Seventh Department is in dispute because of contradictory claims he made regarding his Embassy Section activities. He provides no information sustaining his claim to have become Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section; his description of his functions does not differ materially from that given in connection with his earlier claimed service in the same section, as a case officer, and he describes no administrative nor supervisory responsibilities. None of his claimed agents, with one exception, was employed in Seventh Department operations he described. Because of contradictions and the conflicts in his varying accounts, neither of the reasons NOSENKO cites for his assignment to Geneva in 1962 or 1964 is credible. In Geneva, it is implausible that he conducted the investigation of SHAKHOV as he claims, and he clearly did not supervise the management of the double agent, BELIT-SKIY.NOSENKO offers nine "tourist" cases as evidence that he served in the 1962-1964 period in the Seventh Department, part of the time as Deputy Chief. These cases, which included two religious figures, two American Communists, one emigre, one suspected FBI agent, a First Chief Directorate target who intended to marry a Soviet citizen, a hostage, and a permanent resident or former permanent resident of the Soviet Union, all have aspects for which KGB elements other than the Seventh Department may have been responsible. This fact and the anomalies of NOSENKO's accounts of the cases aside, however, the cases are evidence that NOSENKO did serve during the period in the Seventh Department, although they are not persuasive of his claim to have been Deputy Chief. A judgment of that latter claim must rest primarily on an appraisal of other0001604332 TS No. 197124Top Secret Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 342]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964aspects of his statements, including those relating to his supervisory duties and to the nature of Second Chief Directorate operations against American and other foreign tourists.NOSENKO has retracted his assertion that he was a lieutenant colonel, a rank appropriate for a Second Chief Directorate Deputy Chief of Department, and asserts that he was never promoted beyond the rank of captain.Most damaging to NOSENKO's claims that he was a supervisor in the Seventh Department is his assertion that he accurately describes KGB counterintelligence operations against foreign, particularly American, tourists. A senior Seventh Department officer would be aware of the Second Chief Directorate's preoccupation with American tourists: If NOSENKO is unaware of the extent of KGB activities in connection with American tourists, he was not a Section Chief of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.ConclusionNOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and was thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible.333Top Secret0001605TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 343]
# Top SecretCHAPTER IX## OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB SERVICEMost of NOSENKO's assertions can be examined in a chronological fashion, as has been done in the proceding sections. Some can most easily be examined separately, since they relate not to any particular period of his KGB service nor to any specific position he claimed he occupied, but to his entire KGB career. The principal aspects in this category of claims are those he made about his relationship with Second Chief Directorate General GRIBANOV, his Party status, his knowledge of certain KGB forms and procedures, his sourcing of KGB operations, awards he earned for KGB service, and his KGB rank.## Relationship with General GRIBANOVFrom his first meeting with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO maintained that he had a close personal and professional relationship with Major General GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO described recruitment approaches in which he and GRIBANOV took part together, conversations they had on operational matters, the role which GRIBANOV played in his promotions, awards and assignments, and their after hours carrousing. According to NOSENKO, GRIBANOV was wholly responsible, against NOSENKO's wishes, for his appointment to the position of Deputy Chief of the American Department Embassy Section in 1960, and when NOSENKO later rejected GRIBANOV's offer to make him Chief of the entire American Department, it was GRIBANOV who arranged his return to the Seventh Department as Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and who shortly thereafter appointed him a Deputy Chief and thereafter First Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 344]
# Top Secret(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to refer to this special and personal relationship, which touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service. Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.); recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruitment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.); NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in 1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador 06 DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied336# Top Secret0001607TS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 345]
# Top Secret(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)GRIBANOV on only one such occasion and learned from "friends" in 1958-1959 about [DeJean]; GRIBANOV put NOSENKO in Embassy Section in 1960 as Deputy Chief to supervise code clerk operations (Contradicted. NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief and did not supervise code clerk operations); GRIBANOV approved NOSENKO's operational plan for MORONE's recruitment (Retracted.06 The plan was written by another KGB officer.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO to prepare study on foreign intelligence services use of tourism (Contradicted. NOSENKO could recall no details of the study nor whether he ever discussed it with GRIBANOV.); GRIBANOV promised to promote NOSENKO directly to lieutenant colonel from the rank of captain and (subsequently) personally congratulated him on his promotion to lieutenant colonel (Retracted. NOSENKO never was promoted past the rank of captain.); GRIBANOV was instrumental in NOSENKO's receiving personal commendations from the KGB Chairman, the Orders of the Red Banner, the Red Star, and the Order of Lenin (Retracted. NOSENKO received no such awards.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO to Geneva in 1962 (Retracted. NOSENKO went at the request of the Soviet Delegations Abroad Department.); GRIBANOV ordered NOSENKO to assume charge of the BELITSKIY case (Contradicted. NOSENKO did not supervise the BELITSKIY case.); GRIBANOV allowed NOSENKO to go to Geneva in 1964, "as a personal favor" (Retracted. GRIBANOV was not aware that NOSENKO was to return to Geneva a second time.): and finally, GRIBANOV was NOSENKO's patron (Retracted. Their relationship was no closer than their relative rank and position indicated.)ConclusionNOSENKO's contradictions and retractions with respect to his claimed relationship with GRIBANOV discredit his single and most important unretracted claim, that NOSENKO, on GRIBANOV's appointment was Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department.337Top Secret21BR0001608TS No. 197124Copy 10
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# Top Secret(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S. KGB CAREER)## Communist Party StatusIn addition to other stringent requirements, candidates for the KGB must normally be Communist Party or Komsomol members. The significance of NOSENKO's statements about his Party status is the extent to which they are consistent with what is known about Party activity in the KGB, and consistent with NOSENKO's account of his KGB career.NOSENKO said his formal participation in Communist Party activities began in late 1943 or early 1944 when he joined the Komsomol at the Naval Preparatory in Baku. The step was a casual one, he said, and he took it without much thought, mainly because all of his friends were joining. He continued his pro forma membership in the Komsomol while in the Naval RU, and when he "transferred" to the KGB in spring 1953, he transferred routinely to the KGB Komsomol organization from his Naval RU Komsomol unit in the Baltic. He was registered with the KGB Komsomol, he said, without referring the matter to his former Daltic Komsomol unit.Comment: According to knowledgeable KGB defectors, a member's acceptance in another Komsomol unit is contingent upon the endorsement of the individual's former unit; NOSENKO's acceptance by the KGB Komsomol without referring the matter to his Komsomol unit in the Baltic "is impossible".In the fall of 1953 NOSENKO claims he was elected secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organi- zation. He was elected, he said, at a meeting of the Komsomol membership.0001609338Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 347]
# Top Secret(OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)Comment: The Komsomol membership elects only the Komsomol Committee. The latter elects the secretary.NOSENKO cannot describe the duties of a Komsomol secretary in any specific manner. He does not know who was the secretary of the KGB Komsomol organization, nor could he describe his dealings with that official's office.Comment: The secretary of the Second Chief Directorate Komsomol organization is directly subordinate to the KGB Komsomol secretary and would have occasion to deal with the latter frequently.NOSENKO stated that he did not know whether there was a Komsomol Congress while he was Komsomol secretary of the Second Chief Directorate, but that the Congresses were ordinarily held yearly.Comment: The first Komsomol Congress since 1948 was held in March 1954, entailing considerable work by every Komsomol member and especially by the unit secretaries.As Komsomol secretary, NOSENKO collected the dues of the members of his unit: All members paid in the amount of two percent of their monthly salaries.339Top Secret0001610TS No. 197124Copy 10