Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 75]
limited period of time or for the placing of the individual in a defector status. However, identification of KGB officers or agents to Western Intelligence is necessarily a matter of concern to the KGB and the exposure of the identities of approximately (2,000) KGB officers and (several hundred KGB agents could not be considered of negligible importance.Obtaining specific information in regard to KGB officers or KGB assets is important to United States Intelligence and a considerable amount of manpower and money is spent on this activity. Even acknowledging that it is much more difficult for CIA to obtain this type of information about the KGB, which operates in a closed society, than it is for the KGB to obtain the identity of CIA employees, it is believed doubtful any reader of this summary would consider that the identification of 2,000) CIA employees and (several hundred agent assets to the KGB would be any less than a very serious compromise of valuable information.Prior to the defection of NOSENKO, little was known of the organization of the SCD or other internal KGB organizations. The information provided by NOSENKO concerning both has been detailed and extensive. That this information is of value to the United States Intelligence community is hardly subject to dispute, although analysts
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 76]
SECRETcan differ as to the weight which should be given to the value of this type of information.NOSENKO has furnished information concerning SCD, KGB, recruitments of United States citizens and foreign nationals covering the period of 1953 through 1963. This should not be interpreted as a statement that NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to all SCD recruitments, even of Americans, during this period. His information based on personal knowledge is in general limited to the First Department and Seventh Department. He has furnished information concerning cases of several other departments in the SCD and some FCD cases, but this information was in general acquired indirectly from social or business conversations with other KGB officers.NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of cases which were previously known to United States Intelligence. While the value of such information cannot be considered high, the additional details which NOSENKO has provided in a number of cases cannot be dismissed as being of no value to Western Intelligence, even if the information cannot be regarded as damaging to the KGB. Furthermore, inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of information already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his having provided such information.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 77]
NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of recruitments by the KGB of non-Bloc nationals who were known by Western Intelligence to be pro-Communist or even connected with Communist organizations. The identification as a recruited KGB agent of an individual previously known to be pro-Communist is of considerable value to Western Intelligence and may be considered to have resulted in some damage to the KGB. Admittedly, the potential to the KGB of an agent who is known as pro-Communist is less than that of a "politically clean" individual. However, "pro-Communist" or even "Communist" are not synonymous with "recruited KGB agent."NOSENKO has furnished additional information on cases in which there was some previous but limited information. In a number of these instances the additional information from NOSENKO has permitted identification of the individuals of interest and the closing of an "Unknown Subject" case. In such instances the information from NOSENKO must be considered valuable to Western Intelligence since the incomplete information known previously would in many cases not have permitted ultimate identification of the individual of interest. This category of cases must be considered as having resulted in damage to the KGB and in benefit to Western Intelligence.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 78]
NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of individuals, both American and non-Bloc foreign, who were recruited by the KGB and concerning whom Western Intelligence had no significant information. It is recognized that certain of these cases mentioned by NOSENKO, particularly in the tourist category, would probably never have actually materialized as productive KGB agents. This could be for various reasons including later refusal to cooperate, later geographical inaccessibility to the KGB, or not being either at the time of SCD recruitment or later in a position to furnish information of interest to the KGB. In this regard, NOSENKO has stated that at least until 1962 there was a definite tendency in the Seventh Department to make a "recruitment" as a statistic for the end-of-year report even though it was apparent the agent at the time had no potential and that it was highly unlikely there would be a potential in the future.NOSENKO has furnished information on or leads to a number of cases, primarily third nationals but some American, in which he has been unable to furnish sufficient details to permit identification at this time. In certain instances it is believed that an identification will be possible after additional research and investigation. Until an identification is made, the value of any particular lead to Western Intelligence cannot be estimated, but that there may be a potential value
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 79]
cannot be ignored. As an example of this category, NOSENKO has furnished a lead, still under investigation, to an unidentified agent, probably not an American, who in 1962 was in a position to remove the "NATO Emergency Codes," deliver the codes to the KGB for photographing, and then successfully replace the codes. Because the agent is as yet unidentified, his current access to information affecting the security of the United States cannot be gauged.In all, the information from NOSENKO in the category of cases where Western Intelligence did not previously have significant information must be considered on balance as having resulted in material damage to the KGB and of significant benefit to Western Intelligence.Quantity alone of CI or FI information from a KGB defector is not a standard on which to judge bona fides. The question is whether the amount of his information is reasonably commensurate with his claimed positions in the KGB. This question as regards NOSENKO has been examined, with affirmative findings, in another section of this paper.A few examples from the above cited categories of information furnished by NOSENKO are listed below. These cases are given as illustrations and are not necessarily listed in order of importance.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 80]
The case of Robert Lee JOHNSON and the related case of James Allen MINTKENBAUGH have been covered in the previous summary. It can be considered that both were exposed as a result of a lead from NOSENKO which led to suspicions of JOHNSON.Another American case is that of Herbert HOWARD, a USIA employee who spent considerable time in the USSR in 1962-1963. NOSENKO identified Herbert HOWARD as having been recruited by the First Section, First Department, SCD, in 1962 and was positive that HOWARD furnished valuable information to the KGB. When interviewed in 1964, HOWARD did not admit he had been recruited, but suspicion of HOWARD was great enough so that his contract with USIA was not renewed.If indeed HOWARD was recruited by the KGB, it is impossible to determine how much information would have been compromised by HOWARD, while in the USSR, he did have certain access to the United States Embassy. There is good reason to believe that if HOWARD was recruited, it was he who was responsible for the compromise of a potentially valuable Soviet walk-in with whom CIA was attempting to establish contact using HOWARD as intermediary.NOSENKO in 1964 furnished information in regard to a "ZHARI" (apparently a KGB code name, although NOSENKO thought it was a true
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 81]
name). He identified "ZHARI" (phonetic) as an American code clerk who defected to the USSR in 1961. An internal assumption was made based on the original lead information from NOSENKO that "ZHARI" was Victor Norris HAMILTON, aka Fouzi Mitri HINDALY, a former NSA employee who defected to the USSR in 1962, and the information from NOSENKO was never disseminated or investigated.Prior to the surfacing of John Discoe SMITH by the Soviets in the fall of 1967, information concerning KGB knowledge of American code clerks was being investigated; and John Discoe SMITH was a leading suspect. After the surfacing of SMITH by the Soviets, it became apparent that SMITH, rather than HAMILTON, was identical to "ZHARI." Investigation disclosed that no definite information could be established in regard to the actual whereabouts of SMITH after circa mid-1960. It cannot be positively stated that appropriate investigation in 1964 of the "ZHARI" lead would have led to the identification of John Discos SMITH as "ZHARI," However, such identification would have been of considerable interest to the Department of State and CIA, and could very well have permitted certain action which would have at least lessened the propaganda effect of the surprise announcement by the Soviets in the fall of 1967.NOSENKO, in June 1962, furnished information from which William VASSALL could be quickly identified. GOLITSYN, in late 1960 - early 1961, had furnished information concerning a Soviet penetration of the British Government on the basis of which the BritishSECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 82]
Services had compiled a list of twenty suspects, including VASSALL. Even though it may be presumed that investigation of the twenty suspects would ultimately have resulted in a determination that VASSALL was the agent on whom GOLITSYN had furnished certain information, the information from NOSENKO in June 1962 resulted in the earlier termi- nation by the British Services of a still valuable productive KGB agent.Although not the case of a KGB agent, the matter of the micro- phones in the United States Embassy should also be mentioned. GOLITSYN, following his defection in December 1961, furnished certain information in regard to microphones in the United States Embassy (Chancery). Since in fact the microphones were connected to central cables, location of one microphone would logically have led to the exposure of the entire set of microphones. However, appropriate action was not taken on this information and the KGB would have been aware that no action was taken prior to June 1962 when NOSENKO first contacted CIA.If NOSENKO is a dispatched KGB agent, it is not clear why the KGB would attract specific attention to a system of microphones which must have still had some value as of June 1962. A presumption may be made that if NOSENKO was a dispatched agent, the KGB had, as of 1962, an advanced system of monitoring devices which rendered the above microphone system obsolete. However, no concrete evidence of such an advanced system is available and it should be noted that it
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 83]
was not until circa April 1964 that any effective action was taken tolocate and remove the microphone system to which GOLITSYN hadgiven a lead in late December 1961 - early January 1962.A few general comments in regard to the CI information fur-nished by NOSENKO would be appropriate in this particular section.As regards leads furnished by NOSENKO to American cases, mostof these leads have been mentioned in the previous summary. Currentinterviews with NOSENKO have resulted in approximately seventeennew American leads which are being examined by the FBI. The inter-views have also resulted in more specific information in regard to anumber of cases previously mentioned by NOSENKO, thus permittingadditional development of these cases by the FBI.NOSENKO has provided leads to over 100 third-country KGBagents. Geographically these leads are wide in scope, includingnationals of such countries as Indonesia, Austria, Uruguay, the UnitedKingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Australia, Japan,Mexico, Italy, and a number of other countries.Included in the more important of these agent or other leadsare leads to high levels of government and intelligence to code clerks,to access agents for American targets, to actual or possible illegal
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 84]
support assets. Also included are foreign correspondents, representatives of foreign tourist firms, and foreign tourists.A summary of the foreign leads arbitrarily defined as of major significance shows nineteen leads highly placed or formerly highly placed in their own government, four code clerks, eight cases involving definite American interest, and four access agents to Americans. It also shows nine instances of clandestine KGB activity against foreign missions in Moscow, including actual KGB clandestine access into certain Western Embassies (but not the British or American Embassies).NOSENKO has also furnished leads to certain FCD foreign national agents, his information on several being derived during his three months in Geneva in 1962.It is impossible to give an exact evaluation of the significance of the foreign leads furnished by NOSENKO. That they are of significant value to Western Intelligence and damaging to the KGB is hardly subject to dispute. This evaluation must be given even though there are numerous foreign leads which have not been adequately exploited at this time.As a final note, the implied conclusion in the previous summary is accepted that the failure of NOSENKO to provide usable positive
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 85]
JEUNE!intelligence information is not a significant factor in a determinationof his bona fides. The qualification should, however, be added thatit is not felt that NOSENKO has, as of this time, been fully debriefedin many areas of positive intelligence interest.13SECRET0001077
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 86]
![image of the page]
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 87]
F. IS THERE EVIDENCE OF KGB DECEPTION OR "GIVE AWAY"IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY NOSENKO WHICHWOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT NOSENKOWAS DISPATCHED BY THE KGB?SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 88]
SECRETF. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in information furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB. In reaching this conclusion, a full examination of the above question has been both a necessary and integral part.It is inherent that the volume of information furnished by NOSENKO is only one of the factors which should be given consideration in arriving at a conclusion that NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB. If NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, the KGB would have surely been willing to sacrifice certain information of value to the KGB in order to support the bona fides of NOSENKO. However, if NOSENKO was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB purpose or mission, the nature of which has been and continues to be unknown.An examination of the circumstances under which NOSENKO first contacted CIA in Geneva in 1962 and his behavior during these contacts is particularly pertinent since during this period of time NOSENKO would have surely been under direct KGB control if there are any implications of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 89]
SECRETNOSENKO has stated that his original approach to "sell two pieces of information" was his own idea as to what was most likely to be successful. NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact with the Americans, was not psychologically adapted to defect at the time, and felt that if he merely stated that he was a "KGB counter- intelligence officer who wanted to give information," he very possibly would be rejected. It should be noted that NOSENKO even during his first contact did not limit his remarks to the "two pieces of information" and began to talk quite freely on other matters.If NOSENKO was dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962 contacts, would have been very carefully briefed and that his remarks or statements would have not been of a nature which could cause any suspicion in regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO. Instead. a current review of his statements and remarks during his five contacts in 1962 indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of NOSENKO and may also have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in Geneva.2SECRET0001080
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 90]
SECRETNOSENKO, during his five contacts in Geneva, made many statements which in retrospect were impossible, and the investigation of which could only have raised certain questions concerning NOSENKO. The following is a list of the more obvious areas in which NOSENKO made gross exaggerations or made incorrect or impossible statements.(a) NOSENKO claimed he personally was with Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the SCD, during the recruitment pitch to James STORSBERG. (This was a lie and an interview with STORSBERG with display of photograph would have disclosed that NOSENKO did not participate.)(b) NOSENKO was involved in the recruitment approach to Russell LANGELLE. (This was a lie and LANGELLE was available for interview.)(c) NOSENKO said he recruited (LUNT (Horace LUNT) in Bulgaria. (Actually NOSENKO never met LUNT.)3SECRET0001081
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 91]
SECRET(d) NOSENKO claimed personal contact with (Edmund)STEVENS who, according to NOSENKO, had been recruitedby the KGB. (NOSENKO actually had never personally metSTEVENS and only had seen (STEVENS) once at a distance.)(e) NOSENKO dated the recruitment of "ANDREY"in Moscow as 1949-1950. At the same time he furnishedinformation that "ANDREY" (who is considered identical toDayle Wallis SMITH) was in Moscow during a part of the timethat Roy RHODES, also a recruited agent, wa's assigned toMoscow, 1951-1953. "ANDREY" (SMITH) was actually inMoscow 1952-1954.(f) NOSENKO said he, GRIBANOV, and another officermet Edward Ellis SMITH. (NOSENKO has since stated he didnot meet SMITH and that his only role was obtaining a foreigntypewriter and paper for a KGB agent involved in the SMITHoperation.)(g) NOSENKO in a number of instances spoke in thefirst person, saying "We did this," or "We did that," inreference to a particular KGB activity in which he now admits
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 92]
he was not involved but had some knowledge. (If NOSENKO was under KGB control in 1962, both he and the KGB should have known that these indicated exaggerations would eventually lead to a question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.)In 1962-1963 a number of similarities were noted between information furnished by NOSENKO and information which had been furnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962. These similarities were quite striking and gave rise to certain suspicions of NOSENKO because he provided information which the KGB would presumably have considered already compromised as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN. Certain of the similarities at the time could only be explained in terms of NOSENKO being a dispatched agent. The following are some examples of the similarities noted.(a) Both furnished information in regard to Johan PREISFREUND(b) Both furnished information in regard to a military code clerk case (James STORSBERG).(c) Both furnished information in regard to a trip of Vladislav KOVSHUK, under an assumed name, to the United States. (GOLITSYN was sure it was connected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in5
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 93]
Moscow, or a recruitment of an American formerlywith the United States Embassy in Moscow; and NOSENKOrelated it directly to the "ANDREY" case, giving theassumed name which KOVSHUK used.)(d) Both furnished information in regard tomicrophones in the United States Embassy in Moscow.(e) Both furnished information in regard toEdmund STEVENS and Isaac Henry SHAPIROThe above list is not complete nor does it indicate the actualdifferences in the amount of information furnished on any particulartopic by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO. To cite the above in detail in thissummary is believed unnecessary since the only point of real interestis whether the fact that NOSENKO was aware of certain events, cases,or situations of which GOLITSYN was also aware raises a legitimatequestion concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.The above area of concern has been thoroughly examined andit is considered that the fact that NOSENKO furnished some informationon certain cases or situations previously mentioned in lesser orgreater detail by GOLITSYN cannot logically be construed as evidence6SECRET0001084
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 94]
SECRETthat NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. NOSENKO has during current interviews satisfactorily sourced his information in almost every instance. In a few instances he has said he did not recall how he learned of a particular piece of information but these apparent lapses of memory were not large in number and are considered to be in no way suspicious.The general area in which there was a similarity between information furnished by GOLITSYN in late 1961 - early.1962 and information furnished by NOSENKO in June 1962 and which would have been the most significant insofar as the security of the United States Government was or is concerned related to certain activities centering around or in the First Department, SCD.It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO was an officer of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1953-1955 and was Deputy Chief of the same section in 1960-1961. Therefore, the fact that NOSENKO furnished information concerning certain cases or situations in the First Department and the fact that GOLITSYN furnished information concerning the same case or situation is not unusual or necessarily suspicious. NOSENKO has stated that GOLITSYN7SECRET
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 95]
SECRETknew and was in contact with other officers of the First Section and GOLITSYN has attributed his knowledge of certain cases or activities of the First Department, SCD, primarily to his association with certain officers in the First Department, SCD.It is recognized that there are certain conflicts in information furnished by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO and at this time it is not possible to satisfactorily correlate certain information from GOLITSYN with information from NOSENKO. Pages 162 - 163 of the previous summary refer to information from GOLITSYN which is characterized as "Information about KGB Operations Against Embassy Code Clerks in 1960 - 1961." The references are to information from GOLITSYN based on remarks by Gennadiy Ivanovich GRYAZNOV and Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV of the First Section, First Department, SCD, and an officer of the Second Section, First Department, SCD.NOSENKO has stated that he was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1960 - 1961, that his primary responsibility was work against code clerks at the United States Embassy in Moscow, and that both KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV were engaged in the same work and under his supervision. The statement by GOLITSYN