Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 212]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Comment: DWELLY was assigned to Moscow as a code clerk from April 1959 to July 1960. In a Department of State security interview in March 1966 (prompted by NOSENKO's information), he categorically denied being a homosexual. He described two occasions in Moscow when, while walking alone, two men, who by their general appearance and actions made him think they were "queer", were trying to attract his attention. He recalled that, on one of the two occasions, one asked him the way to the toilet.Joseph GAFFEYNOSENKO originally identified GAFFEY as a military enlisted man in Moscow during the 1960-1961 period, and an operational target of DEMKIN. In February 1965, however, he identified him as a State Department code clerk for whom the responsible case officer was KOSOLAPOV, whom NOSENKO supervised. The KGB attempted to lure GAFFEY into downtown Moscow using Svetlana IVANOVA, the maid in America House who was one of DEMKIN's agents, but GAFFEY rejected her repeated invitations. The KGB was unaware of any vices GAFFEY might have had and had no derogatory information regarding him.Comment: GAFFEY arrived in Moscow in September 1961. A fellow resident of America House, Fred KADERA reported during a State Department security interview that GAFFEY had told him that he had been intimate with a girl at America House. GAFFEY told KADERA that he did not know she was Russian until he was walking her home and met IVANOVA, who identified her as such. America House manager Peter BINDER reported rumors in America House that GAFFEY203Top Secret0001475TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 213]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Comment:(Continued) was having an affair with IVANOVA in America House. He described [GAFFEY] as the heaviest drinker in America House and said that occasion-ally [GAFFEY] could not report to work due to his drinking. In describing the KGB approach made to him in early 1963, [BINDER] (see p.405) quoted his interrogator as saying that [GAFFEY] took IVANOVA to [BINDER's room in America House, implying that he was intimate with her at that time. [GAFFEY] was recalled from Moscow in the summer of 1962, before the expiration of his tour, because of drunkenness. During a State Department security interview, [GAFFEY] admitted being intimate with IVANOVA at America House and at her apartment [GAFFEY] reported that IVANOVA had told him she was pregnant and had asked for money for an abortion.Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations: Summary and ConclusionAccording to NOSENKO, on transfer to the Embassy Section, operations against the American code clerks were the Section's priority task and thus his most important single responsibility as Deputy Chief. He asserts to be complete his awareness of what was known to the KGB on this topic at the time, because of his senior position, his personal review of relevant files and correspondence, his personal direction of KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV, and his personal participation in their operations. Without exception, in every one of the cases NOSENKO describes there are facts substantially at variance with his account, in direct proportion to the amount of collateral information available.ConclusionFrom the foregoing it is concluded that he was neither Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section nor supervisor of all operations against American code clerks. Consequently, he would not necessarily have known of recruitments among other Embassy personnel.2040001476Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 81SR
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 214]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Case Officer for Embassy Security OfficerJohn ABIDIANComment: John V. ABIDIAN served as the Embassy Security Officer in Moscow from 2 March 1960 until February 1962, approximately the same period as NOSENKO's claimed service in the Embassy Section of the American Department. The State Department replacement for CIA officer Russell LANGELLE, ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perform a number of operational tasks, including performing clandestine letter mailings to CIA agents inside the Soviet Union and servicing deaddrop emergency communications from CIA source GRU Colonel O.V. PENKOVSKIY.ABIDIAN studied in Paris in 1949-50 and then secured employment with the Department of State as a clerk/typist. He remained in Paris until 1954. After special training at the CIC school at Fort Holabird and the Secret Service school, ABIDIAN served from 1956 until leaving for Moscow in 1960 as a special agent in the State Department's Office of Security. A large part of his work in this period was accompanying foreign dignitaries visiting the United States, including Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov in November 1956, Mikoyan in the spring of 1959, and Khrushchev at the end of 1959. These0001477205TS No. 197124Top SecretCopy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 215]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Comment: (Continued) duties brought ABIDIAN into contact with KGB officers stationed in New York and Washington as well as among the Soviet delegations. One of the members of the Khrushchev entourage was KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's subordinate in the Embassy Section.During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO mentioned ABIDIAN in several instances, identifying him as the Embassy Security Officer and as "a CIA officer" and describing his letter-mailing activities. His knowledge of ABIDIAN was attributed to his claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section.After recontacting CIA in Geneva in 1964 NOSENKO for the first time explicitly claimed to have been the KGB case officer responsible for ABIDIAN in Moscow and for the first time described ABIDIAN's alleged servicing of a deaddrop in 1960. NOSENKO has described ABIDIAN since 1964 as the sole American for whom NOSENKO was personally accountable during his 1960-1961 Embassy Section service, and one of the most important counterintelligence targets of the Embassy Section and therefore of the entire Second Directorate.## Duties as a Case OfficerWhen he reported for duty in the Embassy Section NOSENKO was told by KLYPIN and KOVSHUK that one of his duties would be case officer for ABIDIAN, whose arrival in Moscow was then expected in the near future. ABIDIAN was to be the only American target for whom NOSENKO personally was officially accountable while he served in this section. KOVSHUK gave NOSENKO such information as the section had on ABIDIAN. Included was ABIDIAN's visa application, the negative results of checks of KGB Headquarters files, and a report prepared by the American Department of the First Chief Directorate. According to that report, which was based on correspondence from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States, ABIDIAN
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 216]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)had served as a Department of State Security Officer concerned with the safety of Premier Khrushchev when he visited the United States in 1959; from ABIDIAN's behavior at that time, the Legal Residencies concluded he was an intelligence officer, probably with CIA. That report and the fact that ABIDIAN was replacing the known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE as Security Officer, made ABIDIAN one of the most important counter-intelligence targets of the Embassy Section and therefore of the entire Second Chief Directorate.NOSENKO personally opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and later adopted for him the cryptonym "ARSEN" used earlier by personnel of the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate of the Second Chief Directorate.NOSENKO was unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more about the life and career of ABIDIAN. He visited the Chief of the American Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate, but that unit had no information not included in its original report. NOSENKO requested that the KGB Legal Residencies in the United States be asked for further details, but none were ever received. NOSENKO thus never learned of ABIDIAN's education and study abroad, date of entry into the Department of State, promotions, personal rank, previous assignments, military service, or foreign service status.Prior to ABIDIAN's arrival in Moscow, the KGB decided not to work aggressively against him with agent contacts or provocateurs unless he first demonstrated some personal vulnerability. It was considered better to concentrate on surveillance coverage in the hope that, as LANGELLE'S successor, he might lead "to another POPOV". [POPOV, a GRU Lieutenant Colonel and CIA agent, according to KGB sources was apprehended in 1959.]Because ABIDIAN was considered to be a CIA officer, he was made a "special target" of surveillance from the date of his arrival. He was always under 24-hour surveillance by at least two and often three KGB teams, so that at any hour a team was available to cover him if he left the Embassy. The only time this intensity of coverage might have been reduced, NOSENKO said, was during a period of about one and one-half months in 1961, when surveillance of the Embassy207Top Secret0001479TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 217]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)was generally reduced in order to allow increased coverage of British targets in connection with the PENKOVSKIY case. As the responsible case officer, NOSENKO directed the surveillance of ABIDIAN and evaluated the operational possibilities offered by information from surveillance reports.In line with the emphasis on surveillance, the operational plan for ABIDIAN written by NOSENKO in October 1960 called for no direct action but specified that:- ABIDIAN's maid Tatyana FEDOROVICH, an "operational contact" of the Embassy Section, was to continue to apply metka to ABIDIAN's clothing and "NEPTUNE-80" to his shoes. (According to NOSENKO, these are surveillance aids. Metka is a "thief powder" applied to clothing pockets, leaving a trace on anything with which it comes into contact. Its primary purpose is to aid in the detection of operational letters mailed by suspected foreign intelligence officers and agents. NEPTUNE-80, applied to a target's shoes, leaves a trace on the ground which the KGB even long afterwards can follow with a dog.) The only item of information received from FEDOROVICH was that ABIDIAN was having an affair with an Embassy female employee. FEDOROVICH was unable to find personal mail or personal papers in ABIDIAN'S apartment.- Pietro CECCHI, Embassy employee and KOSOLAPOV's agent, was to try to cultivate ABIDIAN and report whatever he learned concerning him. CECCHI never obtained any significant information on ABIDIAN's personal life. "ABIDIAN was developing CECCHI as an informant on American personnel at the Embassy", but NOSENKO did not recall any specific report CECCHI gave to ABIDIAN that was of interest to the Embassy Section.- Two Embassy chauffeurs were to apply NEPTUNE-80 to the floorboards and foot pedals of ABIDIAN's car if necessary.208Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 218]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)- All other agents and operational contacts of the section were to be instructed to report every detail about ABIDIAN (see below)- Surveillance teams were to be instructed to check all places where ABIDIAN might be mailing letters.- Coverage of ABIDIAN's mail was to be continued.Apart from those specified by the operational plan, two other KGB agents, Lyudmila GROMAKOVA and "KAMO" (a KGB agent whose identity NOSENKO did not recall) were involved with ABIDIAN. GROMAKOVA, a language instructor for Embassy personnel, was an agent handled by Embassy Section case officer GAVRILENKO. ABIDIAN took "only several" Russian language lessons from GROMAKOVA and NOSENKO did not know whether these were private or class lessons. He learned nothing of operational significance from GROMAKOVA's contacts with ABIDIAN, and there was no regular reporting from her.Comment: Although he had earlier identified GROMAKOVA as a KGB agent, NOSENKO never associated her with ABIDIAN until told that ABIDIAN had been one of her students. In actuality ABIDIAN took regular language lessons from GROMAKOVA, normally three one-half hour lessons per week, from shortly after his arrival until his departure from Moscow.The second KGB agent, "KAMO", was an agent of the Moscow City KGB organization who met ABIDIAN at the Baku Restaurant by accident. When informed that ABIDIAN gave "KAMO" his telephone number, NOSENKO recommended that "KAMO" try to develop a relationship with ABIDIAN. After arguing that this was against the policy of taking no aggressive or provocative action against ABIDIAN, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN finally agreed, and "KAMO" phoned ABIDIAN twice on KGB instructions. ABIDIAN, however, refused to meet him, and209Top Secret0001481TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 219]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)no further action was taken. [See below for ABIDIAN'S account of a similar incident, but one which occurred in Armenia.]NOSENKO did not know the room number of ABIDIAN's office in the Embassy or on what floor it was located, but he could have checked, if necessary, with a copy of the Embassy telephone list published monthly, since it contained the office room number of each American employee. [The Embassy telephone list contained apartment, but not office room numbers.] ABIDIAN's office was in the "Zone of Security" (i.e., secure office areas). NOSENKO said that a report from an agent (identity not recalled) indicated that there was a sign on ABIDIAN's office door which said "Security Office". [There was no such sign.] NOSENKO was unable to determine if ABIDIAN had a secretary. No dictation was monitored in ABIDIAN's office because no KGB microphone was installed there. [In 1964 a microphone, albeit then inoperative, was found in the room occupied in 1960-1961 by ABIDIAN.] NOSENKO recalled no particularly interesting or important information about ABIDIAN obtained from other microphones in the Embassy.NOSENKO did not know the location of ABIDIAN's apartment in the Embassy building, nor how it was furnished, since "data of this nature was not operationally significant unless the target had shown vulnerabilities or was under active development".Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR two or three times while stationed in Moscow, NOSENKO did not know to which countries he went or the time of year when the trips were made. Such information would have been of interest to him as ABIDIAN's case officer since, like LANGELLE's earlier trips abroad, ABIDIAN's trips were presumed to be for operational purposes. However, there was no possibility for the KGB to find out where ABIDIAN had gone; even if the Embassy Section did establish where ABIDIAN would travel, nothing could be done about it because the foreign Legal Residencies of the KGB First Chief Directorate "would not accept a request for operational action against an American diplomat coming from Moscow".0001482210Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 220]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)With reference to whether the KGB could have photographed ABIDIAN'S passport on his return to Moscow, NOSENKO said that the Second Chief Directorate does not photograph passports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet Union. While this procedure would not be impossible, it was not considered so important as to justify the special effort involved.Comment: According to ABIDIAN, he openly discussed his travel plans with Embassy language teacher GROMAKOVA (GAVRILENKO's agent), and on at least some occasions used international telephone calls to arrange for accommodations at his destination in Europe. Also, the Foreign Ministry UPDK (which office provides administrative services to foreign diplomats in Moscow), to which ABIDIAN sent his passport for an exit visa for each departure, could have noted from passport entries the whereabouts of his earlier travel.ABIDIAN took no trips in the Soviet Union outside of Moscow, since if he had, NOSENKO would have known and remembered them, as it was his responsibility as case officer to take certain actions. Among the latter he listed:- Receiving notification of ABIDIAN's request to travel from the UPDK (the Soviet Foreign Ministry unit which provides administrative services to the diplomatic community in Moscow).- Advising the UPDK of KGB approval for the trip.- Advising appropriate local KGB offices of ABIDIAN'S itinerary and giving them instructions for surveillance and any other necessary operational activity.211Top Secret0001483TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 221]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)- Receiving, reading, and filing all reports of surveillance and other operational activity carried out by various KGB units.NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps. Even if he were absent when such a request for travel was made, he would have seen all documents upon his return; he did not recall seeing any such documents in ABIDIAN's file.Comment: ABIDIAN who is of Armenian origin and speaks the Armenian language with a high degree of proficiency, made a trip to Armenia between 5 and 9 October 1960. While in Armenia ABIDIAN visited with various churchmen, their parishioners and an Armenian who had repatriated from Greece in 1946. ABIDIAN attended a service in Echmiadzin celebrating the anniversary of the accession of the Katolikos VAZGEN I, and also visited some relatives of his in or near the city of Yerevan. After returning to Moscow, an Armenian whom ABIDIAN met on that trip tried to contact ABIDIAN at the Embassy, but ABIDIAN refused to see him.After being told ABIDIAN had attended a service celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Armenian Katolikos, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had gone to Echmiadzin and that an agent had reported a contact with him there. This agent, NOSENKO recalled, was a priest or a monk, and the report concerned only his conversation with ABIDIAN; the agent had no further contact with him. NOSENKO said that this was his sole recollection concerning ABIDIAN's trip.With reference to ABIDIAN's travel to Armenia in October 1960, NOSENKO recalled having been on leave at the time. However, NOSENKO's reconstruction of the timing of his alleged leave still placed him in Moscow at the time of ABIDIAN's trip. In 1966, NOSENKO stated that he had lied, that his 1960 leave was taken in January, not October.0001484212Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 222]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Except for the American woman with whom ABIDIAN was thought to have been intimate, NOSENKO knew none of ABIDIAN'S close American friends in Moscow nor his close friends and professional contacts among foreigners there.NOSENKO received and read transcripts of all telephone calls that ABIDIAN made or received at his office and apartment via the Moscow city telephone system, but he recalled none of their names nor nationalities, because there was nothing of interest in the conversations.At the end of the January-February 1965 interrogations concerning ABIDIAN NOSENKO acknowledged that he knew little about this important KGB target. He was "working badly" as ABIDIAN'S case officer, he said, because he had had to concentrate on supervising the work against code clerks.## ABIDIAN'S Letter MailingsDuring the 1962 meetings with NOSENKO in Geneva, he reported KGB knowledge of ABIDIAN's mailing of at least three clandestine letters, in each case to KGB-controlled agents. According to NOSENKO, the KGB detected all the letters mailed by ABIDIAN through the use of *metka*. He cautioned the CIA representatives from further use of Embassy employees for mailing letters to agents in the Soviet Union. He noted that after LANGELLE, no such letters were mailed for a year and a half, until ABIDIAN mailed several. He explained that Embassy employees' servants applied an odorless substance (*metka*) to clothing pockets, and traces of the substance rubbed off on any thing it contacted, such as a letter. All the letters mailed in Moscow were passed through a machine which identified letters bearing tracing of *metka*, he said, and this was how letters ABIDIAN mailed were intercepted. [NOSENKO said the machine was a *fotoapparat*, literally a camera, but presumably he meant some sort of light-sensitive device.] NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN had mailed a letter to someone in Odessa, and two to the Baltic area, probably to Riga, and all were detected by *metka*, not by ABIDIAN's surveillants. According to NOSENKO, no new agents were discovered, however, since all of the agents to whom ABIDIAN mailed letters were already controlled by the KGB.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 223]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Comment: NOSENKO's information is substantially correct, that no letters were mailed for one and a half years after LANGELLE's expulsion, and that ABIDIAN mailed two or three letters, including ones to the Baltic area and to Odessa. No letters were mailed from February 1960 until ABIDIAN mailed one on 1 April 1961, and of the three letters ABIDIAN mailed, one was to Odessa and one each to Latvia and Estonia.CIA has conducted tests to determine whether a substance such as *metka* was being used as a KGB control device. Ultra-violet, chemical and microscopic analyses developed one possible use of a *metka* like substance. Analysis of an article of clothing of a foreign diplomat in Moscow who served as a CIA support agent produced a sharply positive reaction.NOSENKO later described how *metka* was applied to ABIDIAN'S clothing by his maid and how, in particular, this led to the discovery of the letters ABIDIAN mailed to the agent in Odessa and to his parents in the United States."ABIDIAN's maid in Moscow was Tatyana FEDOROVICH. She was an operational contact reporting to ARTEMOV. She started to work for ABIDIAN a few months after his arrival, perhaps three months but no longer than six months after his arrival. I met her shortly after she began to work for ABIDIAN in order to get acquainted with her, in order to evaluate her and give her general instructions about her work for ABIDIAN. I do not know the exact date of this meeting but it was before the fall of 1960. I wrote the operational plan on ABIDIAN in circa October 1960. At this time FEDOROVICH was already working for ABIDIAN. This operational plan stated that FEDOROVICH would continue to put *metka* regularly on ABIDIAN's clothing."0001486214Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 224]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)"FEDOROVICH put *metka* on ABIDIAN's clothing during the entire period that she worked for him. She did this every two or three weeks except for a few times when she was sick or on leave. No one else had access to ABIDIAN'S apartment and therefore no other person had the possibility of putting *metka* on his clothing.""I have said that ABIDIAN mailed an operational letter to the KGB double agent 'ARKHANGELSKIY' (in Odessa). He mailed it at the mailbox on Tverskaya Yamskaya where he had gone several times earlier. Surveillance did not see ABIDIAN mail the letter but the mailbox was controlled and the letter to 'ARKHANGELSKIY' was found, along with a letter to ABIDIAN's parents. Both of these letters had *metka* on them, as I was told by SUMIN (a KGB secret writing specialist). I cannot remember the date that ABIDIAN mailed this letter except that it was sometime in 1961."Comment: ABIDIAN had no maid in Moscow until sixteen months after his arrival; FEDOROVICH worked for him part-time from July 1961 until he left Moscow. Thus FEDOROVICH could not have applied the *metka* which as NOSENKO claimed resulted in the interception of the letter ABIDIAN mailed 1 April 1961, and probably was not yet employed by ABIDIAN even at the time the letter to "ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed on 2 July 1961. ABIDIAN's third letter was mailed on 1 September 1961, while FEDOROVICH was working for him.215Top Secret0001487TS No. 197124Copy 10