Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 1]
SECRET1 October 1968MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of SecurityFROM : Deputy Chief, Security Research StaffSUBJECT : NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich1. In accordance with the request of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, attached is a summary with conclusions concerning the bona fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. Sub- conclusions are contained in the summary concerning several major areas which were given primary consideration in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENKO.2. Included in this summary are comments concerning conclusions in the previous summary and an annex containing re- marks on three separate subjects related to the NOSENKO case.3. In brief, the conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO is the person he claims to be, that he hold his claimed positions in the KGB during 1953 - January 1964, that NOSENKO was not dis- patched by the KGB, and that his previous lies and exaggerations are not actually of material significance at this time.Bruce L. SolieAttachment:SummaryBLS:koSECRET0001002
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# TABLE OF CONTENTSI. IntroductionII. Summary of Developments in NOSENKO Case Since30 October 1967III. Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides of YuriyIvanovich NOSENKOA. Is NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claimsto be?B. Is the Claimed KGB Career of NOSENKO Plausible?C, Has NOSENKO Given an Acceptable Explanation ofHis Motivation in Contacting CIA in 1962 and ForHis Defection in 1964?D. Is the Information Furnished by NOSENKO to CIAConcerning KGB Operations, Personalities, andOrganization Reasonably Commensurate With HisClaimed KGB Career?E. Can the Information Furnished by NOSENKO beConsidered in Toto as Having Resulted in MaterialDamage to the KGB and/or Has the InformationFurnished by NOSENKO Been of Significant Benefitto Western Intelligence?F. Is There Evidence of KGB Deception or "Give-Away"in Information Furnished by NOSENKO Which WouldWarrant a Conclusion that NOSENKO was Dispatchedby the KGB?
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G. Is There Evidence of a Political or Any Other Type Objective Which Could Justify a Dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB With Permission to Speak Freely to CIA Concerning His Knowledge of the KGB and Without NOSENKO Being Given a Specific Mission or Missions?H. Is There Any Evidence That the Contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 With CIA Were Known to the KGB Prior to His Defection or That NOSENKO Was Ever Briefed by the KGB Relative to His Behavior or KGB Objectives During These Contacts or After His Defection?IV. Comments Concerning Previous Conclusions in Regard to NOSENKO:A. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the Naval RU in Any of the Capacities or at the Places and Times He ClaimedB. NOSENKO Did Not Enter the KGB in the Manner or at the Time He ClaimedC. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the American Embassy Section Throughout the 1953 - 1955 Period as He ClaimedD. During the Period 1955 - 1960, He Was Neither a Senior Case Officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department American-British Commonwealth SectionE. NOSENKO Was Neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section nor a Senior Officer or Supervisor in the Section During the Period 1961 - 1962 (sic)F. NOSENKO's Claims, That in 1962 He was Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section and Was Thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, Are Not CredibleG. NOSENKO Has no Valid Claim to Certainty That the KGB Recruited No American Embassy Personnel Between 1953 and His Defection in 1964
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AnnexAnnex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKOAnnex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in TextAnnex C - The Cherepanov Papers
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# SECRETI. INTRODUCTIONSECRET![GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]0001006
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SECRET## INTRODUCTIONThe following summary and analysis is not intended to be all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organizational, operational, personality and case type information furnished by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. To attempt to do so would be repetitious and confusing to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited areas of primary concern.This summary will not contain a detailed psychological assessment of NOSENKO nor will it contain a recitation of the numerous theories which have been promulgated in the past concerning varying aspects of the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily directed toward the question of whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB, whether his claimed KGB career is relatively plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in a reassessment of the entire case for or against NOSENKO. NOSENKO has admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claims that these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importance.
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SECRETbut not to mislead this Agency in any material matters of an operational or policy nature.In order to avoid any misunderstanding of the phrase "bona fides" as considered in this summary, NOSENKO will be judged primarily on whether he voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this Agency were known to the KGB. Motivation and certain other pertinent aspects will be considered, but his admitted previous errors, lies and exaggerations will not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a "bona fide" defector.There is not an accurate standard or scale of measurement against which information concerning NOSENKO can be balanced or correlated to determine if he is or is not a dispatched KGB officer. For purposes of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary list of areas considered pertinent has been compiled. Readers may differ in regard to whether this arbitrary standard is a completely accurate standard, but it is felt that the information from NOSENKO and information from other sources derived through independent investigation will permit the reader to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers appropriate.The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector, "has been considered inSECRET00010082
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SECRETthe preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in partand this summary will include conclusions correlated with the sevenprimary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary.Remarks concerning certain errors, inconsistencies, omissions andunsupported conclusions in the previous summary in regard to specificcases or sub-areas will be included in this summary. However, thissummary will not include a point-by-polat comparison of all areas ofagreement or disagreement with information contained in the previoussummary.A positive decision in regard to NOSENKO based on allavailable information should be made in the immediate future. Thereare no known sources currently available to provide new positiveInformation concerning NOSENKO and his bona fides. It is recognizedthat there is always a possibility in the future a new source or sourceswill be able to furnish additional information in regard to NOSENKO.However, this possibility is exceedingly tenuous and it is felt thereis sufficient information available on which to base a conclusion inthe NOSENKO matter.
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## II![close up of a page]
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SECRETII. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASESINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967SECRET> [Figure: GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]0001010
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# SECRETSUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASESINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENKO case since June 1962.Interviews have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and career of NOSENKO without regard to whether a particular aspect had been covered during previous interview or interviews.NOSENKO, although naturally apprehensive during the first few interviews, has been cooperative, has developed a relaxed attitude, and the interviewer has noted no significant reluctance to discuss any aspect of his life, career, or activities. On occasion NOSENKO has indicated a reluctance to make positive statements in certain areas previously considered at a minimum extremely controversial. This reluctance was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that theSECRET![Stamp LA/RR 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]0001011
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SECRETinterviewer would not dispute or disparage his statements without adequatereason, this reluctance on the part of NOSENKO, in the opinion of theinterviewer, totally disappeared.During the interviewing period, particularly in the first six months,NOSENKO materially assisted the interviewer by preparing approximatelysixty memoranda on such diverse subjects as his life, motivation for de-fection, individual cases, notes which he furnished to CIA in 1964, KGBorganization, and KGB officer and agent personalities. As an exampleof the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda includedremarks concerning approximately (875) KGB officers, (100) KGB agents,35 GRU officers, and 400 other Soviet nationals. These lists were alpha-betically arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO hasmaterially assisted in the organization and evaluation of informationfurnished by him during current interviews.Copies of transcripts of interviews with NOSENKO and relatedmemoranda have been disseminated to the FBI and the CI Staff. SpecialAgent Elbert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the WashingtonField Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in researchand compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter-viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerningwhom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information.
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In addition, three professionals from the SB Division have reviewed the current information and assisted in the retrieval of previous information from NOSENKO and collation of current information with previous information. The latter is a tremendous task because of the volume of material; the number of individual cases involved; and the extensive information in regard to KGB personalities, procedures, organizational structure and activities.The SB Division also provided the services of an expert translator to translate the tapes of the 1965 interrogation of NOSENKO by Petr DERYABIN and one of the previously mentioned three professionals completed a new translation of the 1962 interviews with NOSENKO. In addition, transcriptions of certain other particularly pertinent previous interviews of NOSENKO have been completed by the Office of Security.Approximately 7000 pages of transcripts and related material have been compiled and disseminated since late October 1967. Comments concerning the value of the information contained in the above material are contained in another section of this summary. As of the present time, a complete analysis is not possible since a considerable portion of the material has not been fully processed. In the preparation of this summary all areas of major significance have been examined. Because of the voluminous information, all analytical and collation work has not been completed; but it is not considered that, based on all
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SECRETavailable information, the remaining work will materially affect the conclusions drawn in this summary.The polygraph interview of NOSENKO was initiated on 2 August and concluded on 6 August 1968. Approximately sixty questions of a pertinent nature were included in the polygraph interview. No problems were encountered during the polygraph interview and no additional testing of NOSENKO is anticipated. Attached is a copy of the self-explanatory report on the results of the polygraph interview.Interviews with NOSENKO have continued since the polygraph interview on a temporarily reduced scale in order to permit a review of previous information and preparation of this summary. There is no doubt that future interviews with NOSENKO will reveal information of intelligence value, but information developed thus far will permit a decision in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.Attachment:12 Aug 63 Polygraph Rpt0001014
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# 0 : Chief, Security Research Staff 12 August 1968FROM : Interrogation Research DivisionSUBJECT : Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO IRD #67491## IDENTIFYING DATASubject is a 40 year old former KGB Staffer who defected to the U.S. in 1964 in Geneva.## BACKGROUNDMr. Bruce L. Solie of the Security Research Staff has been de- briefing and interrogating Subject since October 1967 in order to resolve the issue whether Subject was a dispatched agent of the KGB. He has conducted a vast amount of research and checking with sources in an effort to establish the veracity of Subject's statements.## PURPOSEThe primary purpose of the polygraph test was to determine:1.  Whether Subject was a dispatched Agent of the KGB;2.  Whether Subject had intentionally given Mr. Solie any false information.## PROCEDURESubject was given a polygraph examination on 2 August 1968 at a safesite in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. The examination was conducted in the English language. Subject's comprehension and the ability to express himself in English was completely adequate for purposes of polygraph testing. Subject was completely cooperative in all respects. Subject displayed no evasiveness and appeared to be completely frank whenever he was questioned or gave information on a topic.The following relevant questions were asked during the first test:Is your true name Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO? Yes.Were you born in the year 1927? Yes.Besides the Americans, did you tell anyone else about your intention to defect? No.
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IRD # 6749Did you ever tell anyone in the KGB about your contact with American Intelligence? No.Were you given instructions by the KGB to get in contact with American Intelligence? No.Were you told by the KGB to defect in order to carry out an Intelligence mission? No.The following relevant questions were asked during the second test:Did the KGB actually send a communication for your recall to the USSR on the day of your defection? No.Were you acquainted with CHEREPANOV? Yes.Did you actually travel to Gorkiy in November 1963 to hunt for CHEREPANOV? Yes.Are you deliberately withholding from us any information about the KGB recruitment of Americans? No.Does the KGB have METKA and NEPTUNE 80? Yes.Were you the responsible Case Officer for John Abidian in 1960-617 Yes.Do you know the true name of ANDREY or SASHA? No.Did you ever have tuberculosis? Yes.The following relevant questions were asked on test three:Did you serve in Navy Intelligence from 1951 to 1953? Yes.Was SHUBIN in the USSR during the period 1957 to 1959? Yes.To the best of your knowledge, were you in the Seventh Department at this time? Yes.Did you telephone the GRU about SHUBIN at this time? Yes.To the best of your knowledge, was POPOV compromised because of the letter Mr. Winters mailed? Yes.0001016
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IR 67491Page 3To the best of your knowledge, was PENKOVSKIY exposed to the KGB because of the mass surveillance on the British Embassy?Yes.Was there any misleading information in the notes you-brought out from the Soviet Union? No.Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal association with GRIBANOV? No.Are you hiding any adverse information about your background? No.Subject's polygraph test reflected no significant responses indicative eception regarding the relevant questions asked. No further polygraph Es were administered on this date because the examiner did not want to the risk of fatigue setting in and thus possibly causing adrenalin astion.Polygraph testing was resumed on 6 August 1968. The following ant questions were asked on test four:Diou join the KGB in March 1953? Yes.ere you a KGB officer from 1953 to 1964? Yes.iere you a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department? Yes.re you only a Captain at this time? Yes.re you an officer in the U.S. Embassy Section from March 53 to May 1955? Yes..1958 and 1959 were you the Deputy Chief of the American-tish-Canadian Section in the Seventh Department? Yes.January 1960 to December 1961 were you the Deputy to the f of the First Section of the First Department? Yes.January to July 1962 were you the Chief of the First Section he Seventh Department? Yes.you an officer in the First Section, First Department, SCD, e time of the Stalingrad operation against [Benson, Mule] and1? Yes.
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IRD # 67491Page 4The following relevant questions were asked on test five:Since 1953 do you know of any other KGB recruitments in the American Embassy besides ANDREY and HOWARD? No.Did the KGB know about the notes you brought out? No.Have you told us the complete truth about your KGB career? Yes.Did you intentionally exaggerate your personal involvement in cases in 1962 and 1964 in order to mislead us? No.Did you intentionally give us any false operational information? No.Did GRIBANOV offer you the position of Deputy Chief of the First Department? Yes.Was an order actually prepared promoting you to Deputy to the Chief of the First Department? Yes.In early 1960 did GRIBANOV tell you that your primary responsibility was to work against American Code Clerks? Yes.Other than you mentioned, are you hiding any other reasons for your defection? No.Are you deliberately withholding any information on any foreigners recruited by the KGB? No.The following relevant questions were asked on test six:Did you enter the KGB through the influence of General BOGDAN KOBULOV? Yes.Did you succeed BAKHVALOV as Deputy Chief of the First Section? Yes.Did GRYAZNOV succeed you as Deputy Chief of the First Section? Yes.Were the CHEREPANOV papers passed to the Americans with KGB knowledge? No.0001018
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# SECRETIRD #6749Page. 5To your knowledge was there any misleading information in the CHEREPANOV papers? No.Did you ever personally meet GOLITSYN? No.Was there a cable sent to Geneva for you to assist ARTEMEV in the BELITSKIY case? Yes.Did you personally make an approach to *KEYSERS* at the Moscow Airport? Yes.The following relevant questions were asked on test seven:Did you actually review the KGB file on OSWALD? Yes.Did LEE HARVEY OSWALD receive any KGB training or assignments? No.Were there any microphones installed in the North Wing of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow? No.Was the review of microphone reports one of your duties in 1960-61? Yes.Are you withholding any information known to you concerning KGB microphones or electronic activity against the U.S. Embassy? No.Before your official transfer to the Seventh Department did you read the surveillance report on the visit of ABIDIAN to PUSHKIN street? Yes.Did you personally conduct a certain investigation of SHAKOV in 1962 in Geneva? Yes.Was the rank of Lieutenant Colonel on your travel document to GORKIY only a mistake by KASHPEROV? Yes.The following relevant questions were asked on test eight:While in the U.S. Embassy Section did you obtain a typewriter for BORODIN for the preparation of a letter to Edward Ellis SMITH? Yes.
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IRD #67491Page 6Did you read the official report of KOSOLAPOV on his contactwith JENNER on a train from Helsinki to Moscow? Yes.Are you intentionally withholding any information concerningKGB knowledge of CIA personnel in Moscow? No.Is there any possibility that the KGB would dispatch an officerto defect to the Americans? No.Subject's polygraph test of 6 August likewise reflected noindications of deception.CONCLUSIONBased solely on the overall analysis of Subject's polygraphtests, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the Subject hasbeen substantially truthful in answering the relevant questionsasked.
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> [Figure] Photograph of the product
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SECRETIII. ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDESOF YURIY IVANOVICH NCSENKOSECRET![stamp Excluded trom automatic downgrading and declassification]0001021
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# SECRETANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OFYURIY IVANOVICH NOSENΚΟAs indicated in the introduction to this summary, information in regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbitrary but realistic list of areas considered pertinent to the question of whether NOSENKO voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge, and whether his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this Agency were known to the KGB.It was noted that motivation and certain other pertinent aspects would also be considered but that his admitted previous lies and exaggerations would not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a "bona fide defector."The following is a list of the areas considered pertinent and which are being given specific consideration. Attached is a separate section containing remarks in regard to the designated areas of A - H.A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be?B. Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible?![GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]
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C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation ofhis motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for hisdefection in 1964?D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIAconcerning KGB operations, personalities, and organi-zation reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGBcareer?E. Can the information furnished by NOSENKO be con-sidered in toto as having resulted in material damageto the KGB and/or has the information furnished byNOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelli-gence?F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" ininformation furnished by NOSENKO which would warranta conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB?G. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objectivewhich could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGBwith permission to speak freely to CIA concerning hisknowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being givena specific mission or missions?
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# SECRETH. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB prior to his defection or that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior or KGB objectives during these contacts or after his defection?3SECRET0001024
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SECRETA. IS NOSENKO IDENTICAL TO THE PERSONWHOM HE CLAIMS TO BE?![ORDER 1 Excludes from automatic downgrading and declassification]SECRET 0001025