Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 236]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)In 1964, at the second meeting with CIA, NOSENKO produced a handwritten note which he asserted listed all the microphones in the Embassy which were operative in the years 1960-1961. NOSENKO explained that at the end of 1960 or the beginning of 1961, he and KOVSHUK met with Department Chief KLYPIN. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the possibility of releasing monitors from some of the Embassy microphones so they could be assigned to Vladimir PETROV, Chief of the American Department's Second Section for use against non-Embassy targets. (PETROV had earlier requested English-language monitors from the Second Special Section, but had been told that English linguists were engaged on priority targets.) At the meeting, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN reviewed the microphone coverage of the Embassy chancery to decide which rooms offered information of little value, so that the monitors for those microphones could be released to PETROV's Second Section. KOVSHUK used NOSENKO'S notebook in which to list Embassy apartments and offices then being covered on a full-time basis and to note those of lesser importance. KOVSHUK decided to relinquish, temporarily, monitoring of Embassy apartments. He continued the monitoring of the code room, despite the limited value of the information obtained. At the end of the meeting KOVSHUK gave or NOSENKO took the list, and NOSENKO retained it in his office safe until bringing it to CIA in 1964.NOSENKO's list showed that microphones were located in the following offices of the noted occupants:*   "Office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS;*   "Office of the Naval Attache, HOUGHTON;*   "Office of the Army Attache, URBAN;*   "Office of the Air Attache, NEILSEN;*   "Office of the Assistant Air Attache, WINDSOR;*   "Office of the Assistant Air Attaches, SENIO and SACHANEN;*   "Office of the Assistant Army Attaches, MASON, REITZ and WILSON;*   "Office of the Political Officer, GLEYSTEEN;*   "Office of Agricultural Attaches, HORBALY and BROWN;*   "Military Code Room;*   "State Department Code Room and Teletype Office;*   "Apartments of FREERS, HOUGHTON, URBAN and NEILSEN"*   "Eighth Floor Bar (Marines)"06,06,06 06227Top Secret0001499TS No. 197124Copy 102/BR
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 237]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)NOSENKO said that "many" microphones were installed in the chancery building before the Americans occupied it, but he did not know how many were installed in all, how many were in any particular room on KOVSHUK's list, or where they were located in specific rooms. He did recall that most of the microphones were emplaced in the outside wall, the wall nearest Chaykovskiy Street, as most of the offices faced this street and microphones emplaced there were less vulnerable to technical search and discovery.According to NOSENKO, there were no fixed microphones in America House, the Embassy quarters of enlisted military personnel. In 1960-1961 there had been a discussion of using KGB agents employed there to emplace temporary audio devices for one or two days at a time in the rooms of the Americans, as well as in the Embassy garage. These plans were vetoed, however, because of the risk of discovery. For the same reason there was no attempt made in this period to emplace a device temporarily in Spasso House, the Ambassador's residence, or in the apartments of Embassy officers. The KGB was afraid that they would be detected and there would be a scandal.## Performance Characteristics of the MicrophonesAccording to NOSENKO in 1962, the audibility of the microphones in 1960-1961 ranged from very clear to zero, but the microphone system was deteriorating. The KGB could do nothing about it because they could not gain access to the inside of the Embassy. Referring to the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office, NOSENKO said that it was becoming increasingly difficult to work with its product. The microphone was fading, and the recording tape sounded as if "somewhere far away, somewhere in the cellar, someone is speaking in a whisper". KUZMIN, the KGB officer responsible for the monitors, said that soon the KGB could recover nothing. Of the microphones then (in 1962) in place, about twenty no longer were operative.In 1964 NOSENKO referred again to the microphone in the Minister Counsellor's office. NOSENKO learned from DMITRIYEV [Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of OTU Second Special Department] how difficult it was to
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 238]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMDASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)monitor conversations in that office. Only very experiencedlinguists were used, but even they had to listen "ten,fifteen, even twenty times" in order to understand portionsof the recording. After NOSENKO left the Embassy Section,on several occasions in 1962-1963 GRYAZNOV, his former sub-ordinate and his successor, referred to the microphones'decline.. GRYAZNOV said the microphones were picking uponly snatches of conversation, and that in a year or twothey would be completely inoperative. As a result, GRYAZNOVtold NOSENKO, GRIBANOV was insisting on the recruitment ofcode clerks at all costs. Besides the fading quality ofthe microphone's signāl, GRYAZNOV, KOVSHUK and FEDOSEYEVattributed the diminishing value of the audio operation tothe Embassy use of the "room-in-a-room". [NOSENKO saidthat in 1960-1961 the KGB had information that, in prepara-tion for President Eisenhower's visit, a "steel chamber"had been constructed within the Embassy where secure conver-sations could be held.)## Microphones in the North WingAccording to NOSENKO, no microphones or other audiodevices were ever installed in the north wing (as distinctfrom the chancery) prior to the Embassy's occupancy of thebuilding in 1962. In his first meetings with CIA in Genevahe described how he knew. When it was decided to permitthe Embassy to construct the north wing, NOSENKO wrote aproposal that audio equipment be installed. Approval washeld up by KGB Chairman Shelepin, who had reservationsbecause of the political consequences of discovery. Bythe time Shēlēpin approved the proposal two or three monthslater, renovation was far advanced, and Embassy SecurityOfficer ABIDIAN was already inspecting the premises. Theopportunity was lost and the KGB installed no microphones.Consequently, NOSENKO suggested to CIA that the MinisterCounsellor, the service attaches, and others presentlyoccupying rooms in the chancery which had microphones, bemoved gradually to the north wing, where the KGB had neitheraudio equipment nor the capability of installing any.229Top Secret0001501TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 239]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)## Amount, Type, and Value of Audio Surveillance ProductionIn 1962 while citing examples of the kind of information the KGB obtained from monitoring, NOSENKO referred only to the offices of the Minister Counsellor and of the service attaches. According to NOSENKO, Counsellor FREERS dictated Top Secret and Secret cables. If the content justified, GRIBANOV was informed and he notified the KGB Chairman immediately. FREERS also dictated fitness reports on Embassy personnel from which the KGB learned of various American officers' personal weaknesses. With respect to the service attaches, NOSENKO said that the KGB learned from microphones where they intended to travel, and what they wanted to find out.In 1964 NOSENKO provided some additional details. He said that audio reception was good from the military code room, but that the occupants rarely spoke, When one of them was monitored, the monitor report was sent immediately to the Eighth Directorate which was concerned with ciphers. Nothing was obtained from the State Department code room and teletype room because of the interference from the noise of the teletype machines. The microphones in the apartments produced rarely anything of interest. An exception was advance information obtained of a social affair, for which the English-language Section of the OTU Second Special Department would be asked to pay particular attention. There was a microphone with good reception in GLEYSTEEN's (a political officer) office, but no secret information was obtained. Similarly, the conversations were overheard in the Agricultural Attache office, but nothing significant was obtained except "something" which made the KGB suspect HORBALY was connected with American Intelligence.In a protocol signed on 26 October 1965 NOSENKO summarized his knowledge of the value of the information obtained by the KGB via microphones in the Embassy:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 240]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)"I regularly reviewed all of the transcripts from microphones in the American Embassy for a period of approximately two years, from January 1960 to January 1962. The following is the only information which I can remember as being important, interesting or operationally useful to the KGB:"From the microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor, FREERS, I remember that he occasionally dictated cables about the Embassy's evaluation of certain declarations or acts of the Soviet Government and advised the State Department on positions for negotiations with the USSR. This information was of such importance that special reports were written to the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, I cannot remember any specific incidents or events which these cables reported nor any specific evaluations or recommendations made in these cables."Also from the microphones in the Minister Counsellor's office, I remember that he dictated fitness reports (kharakteristiki) on about twelve officers in the Embassy. I cannot remember who any of these officers were or any details from the reports. There was nothing in these reports which was of interest or useful to the KGB."From the microphone in the Army Attache's office I remember that the service attaches regularly discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the targets that they wanted to cover. They also discussed the results of these trips after their return. However, I cannot remember any information about specific trips planned by specific service attache personnel or any specific targets that they planned to cover or any specific operational activity taken by the organs of the KGB against service attaches on trips within the USSR which was based on information obtained from this microphone. There was no interesting, important, or useful information about the personal or professional lives or about the vulnerabilities of anyone in the service attache offices (Army, Navy, and Air) obtained from this microphone."231. Top Secret0001503TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 241]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)"I remember that from the microphones in the State Department code room occasionally a code clerk would read numbers. These numbers were only of interest to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Cryptology) of the KGB. I do not remember any conversations from this microphone. There was no information from this microphone of any of the code clerks which was interesting, important, or useful to the Embassy Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, KGB.""During the approximately two years in which I daily reviewed the production from all the microphones in the American Embassy I do not remember any information on any American in the Embassy which was interesting, important, or useful to me as the Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section except the points noted in the above paragraphs."## Results of Technical and Physical SearchNOSENKO's information [no action had been taken as a result of GOLITSYN's earlier report that there was a microphone in the Embassy office occupied by the Minister Counsellor] was, as far as it went, confirmed by a search of the Embassy chancery in spring 1964. According to the USIB Security Committee damage report which followed, a microphone and associated probe was first discovered in the outside wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the chancery. [In 1960 this room had been the office of the Army Attache, where NOSENKO reported a microphone was emplaced.] The microphone's cable was traced to a major cable which ran horizontally (several inches) under the outside surface of the east face of the chancery, to the roof area of the north annex. A number of vertical cables were found to run to the various microphone installations. Fifty microphones were positively identified [ultimately, fifty-four were found], although the system apparently was devised for a considerably greater number. The microphone system covered all outside rooms on floors six through ten, with certain exceptions. The USIB damage report concluded that the microphones were installed before the Embassy took occupancy of the chancery in 1953.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 242]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)The discoveries in the chancery led to the discovery of other Soviet technical equipment installed in the north wing. Parallel to the audio cable running from the chancery to the north wing roof, there were found three coaxial cables, all terminating in the concrete floor of the north wing attic. The coaxial cables appeared to be of more recent installation, probably prior to the Soviets' evacuation of the north wing in 1962.Comment: While not definitely established, it is assumed that the Soviets, before the Embassy occupied the north wing, used it as a listening post for monitoring microphones in the chancery. In preparation for American occupancy the main cable from the chancery was concealed and run from the north wing roof to the basement, and presumably from there to a listening post elsewhere. The three coaxial cables may have been either installed at that time or earlier. Their purpose is still unknown, but they may have been a feature of a highly sophisticated electronic attack against the code room, the existence or character of which NOSENKO did not know and need not have known. When NOSENKO was informed in 1965 by CIA that there had been a technical discovery in the north wing, he offered his personal assurances that nothing was installed in the north wing and insisted that whatever was found must be something unrelated to an audio system.Damage EstimatesWith reference to the damage caused by the audio penetra- tion, the previously-cited USIB damage report stated that "it must be concluded that due to the extensive period of penetra- tion, the cumulative effect has resulted in serious damage to the United States. The Soviets have gained considerable233Top Secret0001505TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 243]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION January 1960-January 1962)knowledge as to the effectiveness of United States operations within the Soviet Union, particularly the military attache collection program. Soviet knowledge of U.S. emphasis upon certain intelligence collection areas has made it possible for them to identify priority intelligence and probably Soviet targets and thereby permitted them to implement specific counteractions. The Soviets over the years must have amassed considerable information concerning the personal habits, problems, attitudes and weaknesses of personnel assigned to the Embassy which can be used by them for purposes of exploitation at any time of their choosing in the future."Col. Theodore F. HOFFMAN, Army Attache in Moscow from May 1959 to May 1961 (a period coinciding with some eighteen months of NOSENKO's claimed two years' service in the Embassy Section), has been more specific. .c. Interviewed by CIA, Col. HOFFMAN recalled instances which the KGB, by monitoring just the conversations held in his office, could have become aware of the vulnerability of service attache personnel. As examples, he cited the two occasions on which military code clerk STORSBERG was reprimanded for absenteeism (unavailable for cipher duties because he was elsewhere with "girl friends"); HOFFMAN'S conversations with America House manager Peter BINDER (the personality problems, drinking habits and other incidents relating to America House residents and visitors to the America Club), and the detailed circumstances prompting the decision to remove substitute code clerk KEYSERS[^1] from Moscow (homosexuality). Besides his general duties as Chief of the Embassy Section, NOSENKO claims special responsibilities for each of the persons mentioned. He supervised the KGB officers operating against code clerks and residents of America House, and asserts he was personally involved in the KGB attempts to recruit STORSBERG and KEYSERS[^2] The KGB attempted later to recruit [BINDER, as well.)] In summing up his views, Col. HOFFMAN said: "To be perfectly frank, I would assume that ... some of our *modus operandi*, some of our targets, some of the results, and all of our personal weaknesses were compromised."234Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy[^1]: ![scribbled text]
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 244]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)## Audio Operations Against American Embassy:### Summary and ConclusionGiven that NOSENKO's information about microphones in the chancery has been confirmed, that information's significance remains the extent to which it substantiates his claims, e.g., that his knowledge derived from his position as Deputy Chief, and that he for two years reviewed the reports of what the KGB monitored from microphones emplaced in the chancery.NOSENKO's knowledge of the microphones' existence is not proof that he was Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, (or even proof that he served in that unit). KGB sources serving elsewhere than in the Second Chief Directorate earlier reported the microphones' existence; GOLITSYN specifically identified one as being in the Minister Counsellor's officeNOSENKO's acquisition of the list of microphonės in "1960-1961" is singular (the more so since he never hinted of the list's existence while describing the microphones in the chancery to CIA in 1962). He asserts that he had no plan to defect in 1960-1961, when the list was acquired, that for no apparent purpose he risked keeping a highly sensitive document in a safe he shared with two subordinates (GRYAZNOV and KOSOALPOV), and keeping it even after he left the Embassy Section for the Seventh Department. NOSENKO has never plausibly explained the circumstances which prompted his retention of the list until 1964, when he produced it for CIA in Geneva.According to NOSENKO, he reviewed what must have been literally hundreds of monitor reports in the course of two years, important ones of which were forwarded to Second Chief Directorate Chief GRIBANOV, and others of such signi- ficance that they were the subjects of special reports sent to the Central Committee of the CPSU, Yet when challenged he cites not a single example, despite the fact that this period included such critical events affecting Soviet-United235Top Secret0001507TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 245]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)States relations (and hence of priority interest to the KGB), as the U-2 and President Eisenhower's visit. Of the microphones which produced useful information, NOSENKO describes those in the Minister Counsellor's office, the office of the Army Attache, and in the code room; when challenged to cite examples of information obtained, he asserts that none produced any information of interest to the Embassy Section. Lastly, although he stresses the value of the chancery microphones as sources of information on which he relied to direct operations against code clerks and other Embassy personnel, he again can describe no actual instance. In the single case in which he asserted that he relied on information procured from microphones. (KEYSERS failure to 06 report receipt of the defection invitation), he was in error.ConclusionFrom the foregoing it is concluded that, NOSENKO's claims to the contrary, his information on the chancery microphones does not sustain his claim either to have been Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section, or his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB microphone monitoring reports.Cryptologic Attack on Embassy CommunicationsAs former Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section of the American Department NOSENKO claimed to be knowledgeable of the extent of KGB success in its cryptologic attack on Embassy communications. He has consistently asserted that the KGB had never succeeded in reading enciphered communications of the service attaches (for which reason he claimed0001508236Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 246]
# Top SecretAMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)est to the KGBhe recruitment of a military code clerk was his priority. Of the micro-ask in [1960-1961]. He "knew", however, that the Eighth NK0 describesirectorate was reading at least some State Department office of embassy traffic. challenged torts that nonebassy Sectionchancery## NOSENKO's Informationhe relied to At his second meeting with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO expressed r Embassy oncern that the American Embassy in Moscow might be informed tance. In f him, an event which would be fatal since the KGB was relied on reading all the State Department ciphers". He knew this s' failure toubsequent meeting NOSENKO revised his earlier statement to was in errorxplain that while no service attache traffic was being read, certain State Department codes had been broken. He ad only rarely seen the clear-text of deciphered cables, t the most, "ten or twelve times" during 1960 and 1961.The Russian text of those deciphered State Department messages was sent to KGB Chairman Semichastnyy, who some- imes forwarded it to GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief ENKO's claimirectorate. GRIBANOV at times forwarded some of the y microphone aterial to Vladimir Alekseyevich KLYPIN, Chief of the American Deputy Chiefepartment, or KLYPIN's successor, S.M. FEDOSEYEV. NOSENKO personally aw such material on the desk of KLYPIN and later on EDOSEYEV's desk, but was never permitted to read it. ikolay ZEMSKOV, from the Secretariat of the Second Chief irectorate, brought a book containing the broken State epartment messages to KLYPIN or FEDOSEYEV. He would open he book to certain pages which had red paper and permit LYPIN or FEDOSEYEV to see the material. This was Eighth irectorate material, but NOSENKO did not know where or how EMSKOV got it... At times portions of this material were read aloud to NOSENKO by KLYPIN, but they concerned the cions position of the American Ambassador or the U.S. Government n political questions and were of no significance to him. afrequently there was mention of the expected arrival of of the mericans who were not permanently assigned to the Embassy, dgeable of nd NOSENKO remembered that one such item concerned the ack on arrival of a one-or two-man "commission", to check the work erted that the Political Section. The attitude of the Secretary of d communicate tate or the American Ambassador was sometimes expressed on he claimed ertain unremembered topics, but NOSENKO took no interest2370001509TS No. 197TS No. 197124CopyTop SecretCopy 10