Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 200]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)about the case on which he had helped KOSOLAPOV. From the Embassy Section officer's refusal to discuss the case GOLITSYN concluded that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment; otherwise, the Embassy Section officer would have been willing to talk to him about it.Shown GARLAND's photograph by the FBI on 13 March 1962, GOLITSYN failed to identify it "as being that of the unknown individual he had seen in the train compartment in Helsinki with KOSOLAPOV".Information From Other SourcesKOSOLAPOV arrived by train in Helsinki on 12 November 1960. The Finnish railroad manifest of passengers travelling from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960, lists KOSOLAPOV (as KOLOSSOV) among eight Soviets aboard the train, and John W. GARLAND, the only American. [See accompanying exhibit.]As he had with regard to JENNER (see above), SERGEYEV of the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki on 11 November 1960 asked the local police chief (and KGB agent, according to GOLITSYN) for help in locating GARLAND an American who would arrive there on 14 November.Development of GARLAND: Summary and ConclusionWhether or not GARLAND was aware, and contrary to NOSENKO's assertion GARLAND clearly was the target of a KGB operation entailing KOSOLAPOV's travel to Helsinki. NOSENKO denies (with a vehemence which the foregoing summary cannot accurately reflect) that KOSOLAPOV travelled to Helsinki except in connection with JENNER, and his assertion thus cannot be dismissed as the product of faulty recollection in which he confuses the cases of JENNER and GARLAND.NOSENKO's denial of the facts of the GARLAND case is fatal to his claims that he was KOSOLAPOV'S supervisor, and that he supervised all KGB operations against American code clerks. Moreover, the KGB action in the GARLAND case impugns NOSENKO's claim that, as one time Deputy Chief of the Section, he would necessarily know of any operations mounted against Embassy code clerks.192
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 201]
# Top SecretEXHIBIT 2 - Complete Train Manifest, Helsinki-MoscowLuettelo matkustajista, jokaJunallaVainikkalan| Suku- ja etunimet        | Ammatti tai arvo | Syntymäaika | Kansalaisuus               | Määriae               | Osolte Suomessa         || ------------------------ | ---------------- | ----------- | -------------------------- | --------------------- | ----------------------- || Louravieva, Nonna        | sos.min. dipl.   | N:liiton    | N:liitto                   | Lähetystö, Hki.       |                         || Parve, Ralf              | kirjailija       | 1919        | Eosti                      | "                     |                         || Morosov, Alexandre       | dipl.kur. dipl.  | "           | N:liitto/N-S-F,Kouttakulku |                       |                         || Otohaoveki, Alexandre    | "                | "           | "                          |                       |                         || Cavillova, Laria         | rouva            | 1922        | "                          | N:liitto              | "                       || Kolonnor, Viktor         | virkailija       | 19.03.27    | "                          | "                     | "                       || Agadjanov, Camik         | "                | 1922        | "                          | "                     | "                       || Akolzine, Potr           | sirkustait.      | 1913        | "                          | "                     | "                       || Lair, Jean Baptiste      | dipl.kur.        | 17.08.07    | Ranskan                    | "                     | Kouttakulku.            || Garland, John Jr.        | sihteeri         | 22.03.33    | USA:n                      | "                     | "                       || Brwberg, Henry Charles   | tato siht. dipl. | Suomen      | "                          | Ulkoasiainministeriö. |                         || Pantalainen, Aatu Ilmari | kirvesmies       | 14.11.19    | "                          | "                     | Kulmak. 2.H.65, Hki.    || Oksanen, Frans Oskar     | sähk.asent       | 25.05.00    | "                          | "                     | 4.Linja, 20.B.89, Hki.  || Immonen,. Беіккі Juhani  | lainop.kand      | 21.01.20    | "                          | "                     | Kivalterint. 23.G, Hki. |Passintarkastaja:V.t.ylikonst.E. Saukkonen16 November 1960NOTE: GARLAND and KOSOLAPOV @KOLOSSOV travelled on same train.Top Secret0001464TS No. 197124Copy 1
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 202]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)KGB/Polish UB Operations Against MORONEAt his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962 NOSENKO made a passing reference to an operation in which he had placed a female Polisn UB agent in contact with an unnamed American from the Embassy while the latter was visiting Warsaw and later brought the agent to Moscow to further compromise the American. On 11 June 1962 NOSENKO was asked whether he had foreign (non-Russian) agents working against the American Embassy, and he replied that he himself introduced the idea of using such agents to develop Americans afraid of becoming involved with Russian girls. He had several such agents, he said, and he sometimes asked the East German and Polish security services to supply him with such agents. As an example, NOSENKO cited the case of a Marine guard and a code clerk from the Embassy who travelled to Warsaw. The code clerk was intimate with a Polish female agent, whom NOSENKO had planted in their train compartment, on the train to Warsaw, and later in Moscow.In an FBI interview on 24 February 1964 NOSENKO referred to the case again, and when the names of code clerk Joseph MORONE and Embassy Marine guard Frank BEGGS were mentioned, he immediately identified them as the men involved.NOSENKO'S InformationMORONE's case officer was NOSENKO's subordinate and specialist in code clerk operations, KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO read the file on MORONE, and saw his visa photograph, but never saw him in person. NOSENKO discussed the MORONE case with KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV on a number of occasions. Several KGB agents were employed against MORONE, including foreigners as well as Soviet citizens.193Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 203]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Svetlana IVANOVA, a maid or waitress at America House reported to DEMKIN, her case officer, everything she saw or heard concerning [MORONE] KOSOLAPOV visited her several times with DEMKIN to discuss [MORONE] and NOSENKO himself met her once or twice in one of the two safe apartments that DEMKIN had at his disposal. NOSENKO did not recall any specific information from IVANOVA on [MORONE] which was interesting or useful.SARWAT EL SHAZLY, an Egyptian employed at the Egyptian Embassy and an agent of the Sixth (Underdeveloped Countries) Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, visited America House and met [MORONE], but he reported nothing of value that NOSENKO recalled.Pietro CECCHI, an Italian cook at the American Embassy and KOSOLAPOV's agent, reported everything he heard or saw about Americans to KOSOLAPOV, but NOSENKO recalled nothing specific that CECCHI had reported about [MORONE].In early 1960 GRYAZNOV went to East Berlin to obtain two German women who could be used against the residents of America House. One of these, Hanna, a blonde, was documented as a West German. NOSENKO never met her but instructed (PREISFREUND) (see the (STORSBERG) Case) to take her to America House and leave her on her own. Hanna went several times to America House in 1961, but NOSENKO can recall nothing that she may have reported on [MORONE]. The second East German girl was documented as an Austrian, NOSENKO never met her but he recalled that she was asked for her documents at América House on her first or second visit there. She replied that she had left them at her hotel, left America House, and never returned. (NOSENKO did not remember the time when this incident occurred, beyond the fact that he was still in the Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN was the Embassy security officer at the time.)From one of these agents, or possibly in some other manner, the KGB learned that [MORONE] was planning to go on leave in Warsaw. NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV thereupon decided to employ a Polish female agent in an attempt to compromise him. KOSOLAPOV wrote the draft of the operational plan for the attempt, which was approved by GRIBANOV after
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 204]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)some editing by NOSENKO and KOVSHUK. KOSOLAPOV next met with a Polish UB counterintelligence officer in KGB Headquarters to discuss the plan. The Pole was told that the target was an American Embassy employee, but not that he was a code clerk; this fact was deliberately kept from the Poles.As a result of this meeting, a Polish girl was obtained by the Polish UB and sent to Moscow by train. Upon her arrival she was met by KOSOLAPOV, who took her to a Moscow hotel where he gave her instructions concerning her role in the operation. The girl was told to meet *MORONE* on the train, flirt with him, have him fall in love with her, continue the association, and study him. She was to tell him that she had been in Moscow as a guest of her uncle, a member of the Polish Trade Representation in Moscow, and that she could meet him again on her next visit.Arrangements were made with the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for a technician to be placed on the train in the compartment next to that of *MORONE* and his companion, *BEGGS*, for audio and visual (but not photographic) coverage.NOSENKO did not recall when *MORONE* and *BEGGS* left Moscow. The Polish agent did, however, succeed in making *MORONE*'s acquaintance, and the technician from the Operational Directorate reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train reached Warsaw. The technician told NOSENKO the girl had engaged in sexual intercourse with *MORONE* during the trip. The technician also reported that the tape recordings obtained were of poor quality.Comment: At this juncture in NOSENKO's interrogation he was reminded that he was en route to Cuba on 15 November 1960 and did not return to Moscow until mid-December, and that State Department records indicated that *MORONE* and *BEGGS* left Moscow on 13 November and arrived on the following day. NOSENKO responded that instead of having talked to the technician personally, he may have read the technician's195# Top Secret![photo of the bottom of the page with the text "TS No. 197124 Copy 10"]
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 205]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Comment: (Continued)report and had seen "the film strips" after his return from Cuba, NOSENKO, it will be noted, had said earlier that there was no photographic coverage of MORONE's train compartment.Because the KGB still lacked compromising materials, KOSOLAPOV prepared a paper requesting that the girl again be brought to Moscow and permission to acquire compromising photography during her visit. The requests were approved by higher KGB authority. When the girl arrived, KOSOLAPOV met her alone and took her to the Hotel Peking, to a specially equipped room. The girl called MORONE at America House, and MORONE subsequently visited her in the hotel room two or three times, during which photographs were taken. These were placed in the KGB's file on MORONE. He did not fall in love with the girl, as the KGB had hoped, and she had no further contacts with him.Although the KGB had the compromising photography, it was felt that there were insufficiently incriminating to attempt to recruit MORONE. The KGB wanted to trap him in the apartment of a Soviet woman, to catch him in something that was definitely prohibited. For this purpose, Svetlana IVANOVA (see above) was supposed to lure MORONE out of America House to somewhere in Moscow, but before anything further could be done, the Americans ordered MORONE out of Moscow before the end of his tour, possibly because they were concerned about his association with IVANOVA. Therefore, NOSENKO said, the KGB made no attempt to recruit MORONE.NOSENKO has also explained (to the FBI) that no attempt was made to recruit MORONE because Khrushchev instructed the KGB to refrain from any action which might affect the improvement in relations which the Soviets sought with the United States.196Top Secret TS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 206]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)MORONE's InformationFollowing receipt of information about his compromise, received from a sensitive Polish source, MORONE was first interviewed about the allegation in May 1961: On 19 August 1961 he was transferred from Moscow. In an October 1962 security interview, MORONE stated that he had travelled with FRANK BEGGS to Warsaw on 12 November 1960. On the train he saw a Polish girl outside their compartment and asked her what languages she spoke. Later she entered his compartment, and when he tried to engage her in sexual relations, she slapped his face. A day or two after they arrived in Warsaw, the girl contacted him at his hotel, and he went to her room where they had sexual relations. According to MORONE, he had sexual relations with at least two other women while in Warsaw. He and BEGGS returned to Moscow without incident. On 6 February 1961, after MORONE had returned to Moscow, the Polish girl from the train called him at America House, and the following day he visited her in her room at the Peking Hotel, where they were again intimate. On either this or an earlier occasion the girl told him that she had an uncle in Moscow. MORONE has denied being approached or recruited by Soviet Intelligence.Information From Other SourcesA sensitive Polish source reported in 1961 that on 8 November 1960 a Polish female, an experienced English-speaking agent of the Polish UB, arrived in Moscow where she was met by a KGB case officer named "VOLODYA". She stayed at the Hotel Warsaw in Moscow. The KGB case officer, apparently from the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, on 10 November 1960 (sic) pointed MORONE out to this agent at a railroad station in Moscow. Under KGB instructions, the Polish female met MORONE and was intimate with him on the train to Warsaw. In Warsaw on 12 November 1960 (sic) she was quite friendly with MORONE, but pursuant to instructions, she refused all overtures to engage in intimacies. The next day she took MORONE to a suitably-prepared Polish UB safehouse where incriminating photographs were clandestinely taken of MORONE and herself.The female agent again travelled to Moscow on 5 February 1961197Top Secret0001469TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 207]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMDASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)and stayed at the Peking Hotel. Further compromising photographs were taken of her and [MORONE] on this trip.06 The female agent travelled to Moscow a third time and on 12 and 13 February 1961 more photographs were taken of her and [MORONE]. 06.06The Marine guard [BEGGS] has confirmed that the Polish girl and [MORONE] were intimate on the train to Warsaw, and that [MORONE] had been recontacted by the Polish girl in Moscow in February 1961.06[MORONE]'s fellow code clerks and residents of America House described him as a heavy drinker, a heavy gambler, and a ladies' man. Various reports indicate that [MORONE] was 06 involved in a currency-speculation ring operated by SARWAT EL SHAZLY, the KGB agent mentioned by NOSENKO, and [MORONE] 06 confirmed that on at least one occasion SARWAT arranged the Ob introduction of [MORONE] and other code clerks to Soviet females 06 [MORONE] was intimate with one of them in SARWAT'S apartment in the spring of 1961 06 [MORONE] was also said to be a close friend of the Embassy cook, and KGB agent Pietro DCECCHI, and [MORONE] had admitted that along with other Americans, he made it a common practice to purchase rubles illegally from CECCHI. One report states that CECCHI asked a Marine guard to deliver blackmarket rubles to [MORONE] in the 06 State Department code room, (a restricted area to which CECCHI had no access). A number of reports indicated that 60 [MORONE] had been sexually intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, DEMKIN's agent, and with Ella UMANETS, another KGB agent at America House identified by NOSENKO. 06 [MORONE] denied having been intimate with IVANOVA. He said, however, that he had told his friends that he had, that he knew both IVANOVA and UMANETS well and that he had once asked IVANOVA to arrange dates for him and another code clerk with two Russian females. IVANOVA did, and sexual relations ensued,06The Army code clerk [STORSBERG] has reported that [MORONE] 06 was acquainted with the KGB officer SKVORTSOV who, as "MICHAUD", was involved in the KGB attempt to recruit 6[STORSBERG] (See p. 173.) [STORSBERG] recalled meeting MICHAUD at America House; MICHAUD had frequented the bar there. In one version of his recruitment [STORSBERG] said that [MORONE] was06198Top Secret 21/3206TS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 208]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)in SKVORTSOV's company the night SKVORTSOV lured *STORSBERG* to the hotel where the KGB tried to recruit him.## Operation Against *MORONE*: Summary and ConclusionNOSENKO relates but one aspect of the *MORONE* case, the use of the Polish UB female agent. He is apparently unaware of information known to KGB agents (and hence to the KGB), such as *MORONE*'s sexual involvements with IVANOVA's friends and at SARWAT EL SHAZLY's apartment, his illicit currency dealings with CECCHI, and his relationship with UMANETS. He errs in relating to *MORONE* the East German female agent sent to America House: the incident occured, but later, when *MORONE* was no longer in Moscow nor was NOSENKO himself still in the Embassy Section. (See p. 183.) The KGB did not lack a sufficient basis for attempting to recruit *MORONE* if it refrained from the attempt, it was for other reasons. KGB inaction did not relate to Khrushchev's concern for Soviet-United States relations; this was the period between the U-2 incident (May 1960) and the Berlin crisis (August 1961).Even with respect to the Polish UB agent, there is persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO nor KOSOLAPOV played the roles NOSENKO described: NOSENKO was travelling to Cuba and KOSOLAPOV was in Finland in connection with the *GARLAND* case.It is concluded from the foregoing that NOSENKO, in this instance, was not supervisor of all KGB operations against American code clerks nor would he necessarily have known of recruitments among Embassy personnel.## Other KGB Targets Among State Department Code ClerksIn connection with his responsibility for directing KGB operations against American code clerks in 1960-1961, NOSENKO has commented on five other State Department code clerks who served in Moscow during that period. Their brief treatment in this paper reflects not their unimportance but NOSENKO'S limited comments and the lack of collateral199Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 209]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)information. The significance of these cases is the extent to which information provided by NOSENKO accurately reflects the KGB's knowledge of each target.Maurice ZWANG 0606 NOSENKO identified [ZWANG] as a State Department code clerk who was "actively worked on" during the 1960-1961 period. An Egyptian agent, name not recalled, introduced 06 [ZWANG] to a female KGB agent in an attempt to obtain incriminating photographs, but the female did not like [ZWANG] and 06 refused his sexual advances. In January 1962 (when NOSENKO claims he left the Embassy Section) the KGB was engaged in no activity against [ZWANG]. The KGB agents had no agents in contact with him, and had no information indicating [ZWANG] was vulnerable. 06Comment: In connection with a State Department security interview conducted after [ZWANG] returned from 06 Moscow [ZWANG] related that in March or April 1961 an Egyptian introduced him to a Soviet female whom he visited in her apartment on several occasions but with whom he was not intimate. Although [ZWANG] denied it, a poly-06 graph examination indicated that he was intimate with his maid during visits to her apartment. 06 [ZWANG]'s maid has been identified as a KGB agent. Various Americans stationed in Moscow have reported that [ZWANG] was active in currency 06 speculation and blackmarketeering with the Egyptian and KOSOLAPOV's agent, CECCHI.11IBR200Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 210]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)06John TAYLOR06NOSENKO identified (TAYLOR) as a State Department code clerk and the target of KOSOLAPOV. The KGB was interested in (TAYLOR) because of his intimacy with his Russian maid (a KGB agent) and "his sympathy towards the Soviet Union and its people". No attempt was made to recruit (TAYLOR) because of the lack of compromising photographs of (TAYLOR) and the maid, and because the KGB did not want to jeopardize the more important (STORSBERG) case by risking a scandal with (TAYLOR). 0606Comment: (TAYLOR) has acknowledged that he was intimate with his maid from about September 1960 until his departure in early 1961, on one occasion in a "friend's apartment" in Moscow, and that maid had told (TAYLOR) she was pregnant and (TAYLOR) offered her money for an abortion. (TAYLOR) left Moscow in February 1961 and the KGB attempt to recruit (STORSBERG) did not occur 06 until June 1961, according to NOSENKO, or October 1961, according to (STORSBERG). 0606Frank DAY06NOSENKO identified (DAY) as a State Department code clerk at the Embassy who was a target either of KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. The KGB knew nothing interesting about him such as who his friends in Moscow were, or his travel in or outside of the Soviet Union. The KGB had no derogatory information about him and was unaware of any vulnerabilities he may have had. No operational measures were taken against him.201Top Secret15/306001473TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 211]
# Top Secret(AMERICAN EMBASSY SECTION - January 1960-January 1962)Comment: DAY was in Moscow from May 1960 until October 1961. In July 1961 he travelled to the Caucasus with his friend and former covert CIA employee, Agricultural Attache BROWN. The two were under surveillance by five persons at all times on this trip. On one occasion they found "repairmen" in their hotel room upon returning unexpectedly ahead of schedule, and on another an "attractive and available Soviet female" was believed to have been planted in their train compartment.Robert DWELLYReviewing an American Embassy telephone list in September 1964, NOSENKO said that he "believed" DWELLY was a code clerk during the 1960-1961 period. There was no approach to DWELLY and he knew no details of the operational plan against DWELLY nor the identity of any agent who might have been used against him. DWELLY's case officers were KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV.Under interrogation in February 1965, however, NOSENKO said that the KGB was "100 percent sure" that he was a homosexual on the basis of his "behavior when visiting a public men's room". There was a "big hunt" for DWELLY and on a number of evenings when DWELLY was known to be free from work, NOSENKO himself, GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, and NOSENKO's homosexual agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV waited in vain in a KGB surveillance car in the hope that DWELLY would visit downtown Moscow and they could establish contact with him. No photographs of DWELLY were obtained: there was no approach and no recruitment.NOSENKO later added that "perhaps" GRYAZNOV'S homosexual agent "VOLODYA" had spoken with DWELLY in a public toilet in a museum or a park and it was on this basis that he concluded DWELLY was a homosexual.202Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy