Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10118-10427.pdf — page 46]
handling State communications, etc. In these areas we recommendclose liaison be maintained with State on Congressional matters andthat whenever possible State be given a helping hand with the appro-priate Congressional committees on these matters.We are particularly concerned that the [24designa-tions of CIA personnel [24], particularly [], are sorevealing. We recommend that the Agency arrange with State to[24] designations.The Department of State indicated concern about the level inCIA on which Comint policy matters are handled, and also noted thaton occasions there appears to be lack of coordination within CIA onComint policy matters. This factor is one of the reasons why werecommend raising the level of Sigint policy matters to the Assistantto the DCI for Coordination and Intelligence Community Guidance.State's Counter Communism OfficeWe reviewed with some interest the proposed creation in theoffice of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs of theDepartment of State of a strategy group for combatting communism.While the full scope of its function is as yet unclear, we believe thatCIA should follow the developments in this office closely as itsactivities will have considerable bearing on the work of the Agency.- 34 -
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## State's Operational CenterWe reviewed with some interest the embryonic operational center which the Department of State is developing. We found that this is an interesting development and would obviously have bearing on the intelligence community.## State at White House BriefingsWe recommend that in accordance with the present practice of a representative of the Defense Intelligence Agency attending the briefings of the White House staff by CIA, that a representative of the Department of State also be invited to attend these meetings.## Receipt of Top Classification MessagesWe recommend that the DCI take up directly with the President the problem of receiving all pertinent messages dealing with foreign affairs which might have any bearing on intelligence estimates or reports, or on covert operations. We have particularly in mind such communications as between the President and Khrushchev, etc. We believe that it is important for the DCI to see such messages in order to give proper guidance to the intelligence and operational activities of the Agency.
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THE WHITE HOUSEWASHINGTONApril 3, 1962MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lyman B. KirkpatrickInspector GeneralCentral Intelligence AgencyIn the course of our discussions as members of Mr. McCone's Working Group on Intelligence and in our March 28 meeting with Messrs. McCone and Carter, I indicated that I did not concur in the "Coordination" section of the draft report which we discussed with the DCI and the DDCI.In line with the foregoing, it would be appreciated if you would:1) Amend the second sentence of the section to read: "With the exception of Mr. Coyne, we are fully in accord."2) Add at the end of the section a new paragraph reading as follows:"Mr. Coyne does not concur in this recommendation. He disagrees with (a) the proposed organizational placement and title of the recommended Office, because this would perpetuate the present ineffective arrangement of the Coordination Office now in existence and would not provide the recommended Office with the stature required to assist the DCI in fulfilling his heavy responsibilities throughout the Intelligence Community; (b) the limitations in the functional concepts of the Office, as outlined above. Further, he does not concur in this recommendation because it does not distinguish sufficiently the internal CIA operating functions of the DDCI from the community-wide functions which the recommended Office must perform if the DCI is to execute effectively his principal mission as assigned in the President's Directive of January 16, 1962. Mr. Coyne believes that if the Office is established along the lines recommended above, it will be incapable of effectively assisting the DCI in performing his principal Presidentially-assigned responsibilities of (a) coordinating and effectively guiding the total U. S. foreign intelligence effort; (b) establishing necessary policies and procedures to assure adequate coordination of foreign intelligence activities at all levels; (c) maintaining a continuing review,"
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"with the heads of the Departments and Agencies concerned, of the programs and activities of all U. S. agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities; and (d) assuring efficiency and effectiveness, and avoiding undesirable duplication in the total foreign intelligence effort. Mr. Coyne will submit his recommendations on this subject at a later date."I would appreciate receiving a copy of the revised report of the Working Group at your earliest convenience.![Signature of J. Patrick Coyne]J. Patrick Coyne- 2 -
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# APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM23 October 1962MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceSUBJECT: After Action Report on the Findings of the Working GroupThis is with reference to the memorandum of 6 April 1962 which presented you with the final report of the Working Group which you established in January to consult and advise on the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. This report indicates the action which has been taken on the findings of the Working Group, and if no action has been taken the reasons therefor. The comments here are in the same order as they appeared in the report of the Working Group.(signed) Lyman B. KirkpatrickLyman B. KirkpatrickExecutive DirectorAttachmentCC: DDCILBK:jrc: Retyped gmk (23 Oct. 62)Distribution:Orig - Addressee w/att1 - DDCI w/att1 - Exec. Dir. w/att
[104-10118-10427.pdf — page 51]
# Operational Aids UnitThis recommendation was rendered inapplicable in view of the decision not to transfer TSD to DD/R.## Deputy Chief for British Commonwealth Affairs, Western European DivisionAs recommended, this position has been created and is now occupied by Mr. John Caswell. A review will shortly be made to determine the degree of control that this unit has over liaison.## War PlansAs recommended, the DDCI is giving full support to the War Plans Group, and is assisted in this effort by the Executive Director.## Police ProgramsAs recommended, CIA is giving the police program greater support. An Agency Officer heads the police program in AID, and he has been provided an Executive Officer by the Agency. Project ENDOMORPH will be transferred to the CI Staff..## Liaison with the Department of StateThe DD/P has centralized the control of liaison with the Department of State and careful records are now maintained of all discussions.## Advice to State on Black PropagandaThe Chief, CA Staff, is now charged with advising State, and other departments where appropriate, of any black propaganda activities that might be misinterpreted by the U.S. Government if they were presumed to be legitimately the statement of another government..## CLA Personnel Under State CoverThe DD/P is making a thorough review of State cover directed toward insuring that CIA personnel are not out of line in their various allowances with their State Department colleagues.
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# Assistant to DD/P for Paramilitary and Air Support OperationsWe recommend the creation of an office in the DD/P to be known as Paramilitary and Air Support Operations, under the direction of an Assistant DD/P, to develop the capability for covert paramilitary and air support operations. We suggest that the bulk of this new organization be located at Isolation where it will have facilities for organization and training. Such a move will also relieve the burden on the headquarters building. We recommend that the individual to head this organization be drawn from military service and be a senior Colonel or a Brigadier General with wartime para-military experience. Having in mind the total disestablishment of the DPD in its present form, we recommend that the Air Support Branch of DPD be transferred to the new Paramilitary Office of DD/P.## Domestic DivisionWe endorse the proposal to create a Domestic Division. We strongly urge that the new Domestic Division utilize the Contact Division of 00, which is to be transferred from the DD/I to the DD/P, as the nucleus for field work in the United States. We also believe that this Domestic Division should take over those functions of the Cover and Commercial Staff presently carried out by the Commercial Group, plus all those activities of the Cover Division which involve- 9 -SECRET
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all matters involving liaison with the British or with Canadian, Australian and New Zealand intelligence services except matters concerned with Sigint and Comsec. Further, this officer should have full control authority over liaison exchange of information with the British and the above mentioned Commonwealth services, and all other components of the Agency, including the DD/I, should keep this officer advised on a daily basis of liaison relations with the British services.## War PlansBecause of the vital importance of war plans to the Agency's relations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we recommend that the War Plans Group receive direct support from the DDCI, even though it should remain organizationally as a part of the Central Support Staff of the DD/P.## Police ProgramsWe are convinced that United States Government support to the police in friendly nations can provide great benefits to the United States and that some of these benefits will assist CIA in its work. The President has recently indicated to AID that he wishes this program to receive strong support. We believe that CIA should- 12 -
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give it greater support than it has previously received. We recommend that the police group in the CI Staff receive such augmentation as is necessary, and that Project ENDOMORPH (police training school) be transferred from the NE Division to the CI Staff.## Liaison with Department of StateWe urge that the DD/P centralize liaison with the Department of State and maintain careful records of all discussions between the Agency and State Department officials. We note that nearly every area division chief has a weekly meeting with his counterpart in the Department but that under the present system there is no organized method for keeping the central management of the DD/P informed of what takes place at these meetings.## Advice to State on Black PropagandaWe recommend that the DD/P develop procedures which will insure that other appropriate agencies of the government (Department of State, Defense, White House and USIA) are kept appropriately informed of black propaganda activities which otherwise might be misunderstood and believed to be legitimately the views of a foreign power. We have in mind our discussions with the Department which heard expressed concern that the Department was unaware of certain black propaganda activities relating to Communist China and consequently was led astray.- 13 -SECRET
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# CIA Personnel Under State CoverWe recommend that CIA personnel under the Department of State cover make greater efforts to truly live their cover. We believe in this connection that the DCI should receive assurances from the DD/P, after proper study, that CIA allowances for rents, servants and entertainment are in line with comparable State Department allowances.## "Legitimate" Foreign Service CoverWe recommend that the Agency more and more place people under Foreign Service cover by the "legitimate" method of recruiting individuals, having them take and pass the Foreign Service exams and be commissioned in the Foreign Service and follow through a normal Foreign Service career. CIA should obviously keep the Department advised concerning these individuals, work with the Department on their assignments which will be mutually beneficial, and covertly train them. By this method such individuals will be under true Foreign Service cover and will not only be unknown to other intelligence services, but also to their colleagues in the Foreign Service.- 14 -SECRET
[104-10118-10427.pdf — page 56]
SECRETWatch Committee report, circulate it to all agencies for considera-tion prior to discussion at the Watch Committee meeting when itcould be decided upon in final form and reproduced and disseminated.Related to the Watch Committee -- but also an important aspectof all coordinated intelligence community reports -- we believe thatsubstantive disagreements should be encouraged and even spelledout in Watch Committee reports; that NIEs and SNIEs rather thanbeing suppressed or covered by watered down language as is some-times the case today, in all cases should reflect the consensus ofviews of the intelligence community. If there are differing minorityviews on the part of one or more agencies, including CIA, theseshould be spelled out in appropriate footnotes.CIA Relations with the Department of StateWe examined the relations of CIA with the Department of State.Several matters of concern in this area are mentioned in the sectionon the DD/P. We would note that "covering" for the Agency posescertain problems for the Department in its relations with the Congress.These include such items that attract Congressional interest as:the number of officers in each Embassy, particularly the politicalsection; the designation of CIA officers as FSRs; the CIA role in- 33 -SECRET
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# SECREThandling State communications, etc. In these areas we recommendclose liaison be maintained with State on Congressional matters andthat whenever possible State be given a helping hand with the appro-priate Congressional committees on these matters.We are particularly concerned that the *Foreign Service* designations of CIA personnel *under State cover*, particularly *FSR*, are so revealing. We recommend that the Agency arrange with State to cover CIA personnel equally with FSS and FSO designations.The Department of State indicated concern about the level in CIA on which Comint policy matters are handled, and also noted that on occasions there appears to be lack of coordination within CIA on Comint policy matters. This factor is one of the reasons why we recommend raising the level of Sigint policy matters to the Assistant to the DCI for Coordination and Intelligence Community Guidance.State's Counter Communism OfficeWe reviewed with some interest the proposed creation in the office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs of the Department of State of a strategy group for combatting communism. While the full scope of its function is as yet unclear, we believe that CIA should follow the developments in this office closely as its activities will have considerable bearing on the work of the Agency.- 34 -SECRET
[104-10119-10040.pdf — page 0]
14-00000104-10119-100402025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 199222 November 1968MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of SecuritySUBJECT : Herbert Itkin/Mario Brod et. al.1. Reference is made to your instructions concerning this case and my attached memorandum concerning research on whether or not Itkin was ever, in fact, utilized by this Agency prior to his contacts with Brod.2. All available sources in the Agency reflect no record of Itkin or of Philip Harbin, who was allegedly his case officer. Harbin has been checked both as a true name and as an alias. Although the name is not registered in the Agency, this of course does not mean that some Agency representative did not make this up and use it without telling anyone.3. My visceral reaction is that Itkin is lying about his contacts with Mr. Dulles and Philip Harbin. However, since there appears to be a possibility of an extreme "flap" if Itkin gives the same story to the newspapers that he gave to Mr. Houston, I would recommend that, with the concurrence of Mr. Helms, Mr. Dulles be interviewed and asked if he remembers anything about this case.4. I also spoke with Harry Mason, x5231, in Finance who handles OS budgetary matters and is a personal acquaintance. Without giving him any names I asked him if it would be possible to track down the receipt that Itkin claims he gave Harbin for the $5000.00. Harry says if the case was handled properly and the account is still outstanding it will be fairly easy to find the receipt. I have done nothing further on this, pending your instructions.Ward K. GreeneSA/EPDAttachment> EYES ONLYRETURN TO CIABackground Us
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22 November 1968ITKIN, Herbert.Subject States: When he was first admitted to the bar in 1953 he was employed by the firm of Delson, Levin & Gordon in New York City. (Now Delson and Gordon.) Itkin alleges that one partner, Levin, had close ties with Alger Hiss, Cyrus Eaton and other of similar persuasion. Because of the viewpoint of the law firm, Subject states that he began passing information to Senator Joseph McCarthy. However, in the Spring of 1954, Senator McCarthy told Itkin that he was getting into trouble and allegedly reported that he had passed Itkin's reports to CIA. Itkin then states that a meeting was set up for him either in June/July/or August of 1954 with Mr. Allen Dulles. This meeting was at the Bellevue Stratford in Philadelphia. His contact was reportedly a man known as Philip Harbin.At this time, Itkin says he was able to report on matters affecting U Nu, then the Premier of Burma, the Indonesian Foreign Minister; and the owner or editor of the New Delhi Times. Itkin also claims to have had personal contacts with Luis Gutierrez, Consul General of El Salvador, and with a number of other people who had Guatemalan contacts. Itkin says the only money he received from Harbin was $5,000.00, which was supposed to be repayable and for which he gave a receipt, he believes sometime in 1957. He said the money was not repaid.Itkin states that he met Mario Brod in 1961 and that Brod was represented to him as a former Colonel in the OSS who had intelligence connections. From then on his contact was Brod and apparently Harbin dropped out of the picture.
[104-10119-10040.pdf — page 2]
# Agency Files reflect:No record of Herbert Itkin in Office of Security records, other than newspaper clippings.No record of Herbert Itkin in RI files.No record of Philip Harbin in Office of Security.No record of Philip Harbin as a DCS alias.No record of Philip Harbin in OS pseudo files.No record of Philip Harbin as either a pseudo or a registered alias in RI/CRYPTO.No record of Philip Harbin in RI files.The file of Mario Brod reflects no information concerning his contacts with Herbert Itkin and reflects no information concerning a Philip Harbin.During Itkin's meeting with Mr. Houston he mentioned that the law firm had a negro lawyer named Thomas L. Roberts, #193026, who had very useful contacts with the United Nations. Itkin stated that Roberts was a very presentable and intelligent negro who left the firm and now had a law practice in Dakar.The Office of Security file concerning Roberts reflects that:Mr. Roberts is a current employee of this Agency under deep cover in Dakar In January of 1968 Roberts furnished this Office with an extensive summary of his past association with Herbert Itkin. He also mentioned that he and Itken had associated with Mario Brod at a dinner party in 1965 and had had lunch with Brod in 1967. There is no indication, however, that Roberts is aware of any use of Itken as a CIA informant during the 1950's.
[104-10119-10182.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 199216 February 1970MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of SecuritySUBJECT : Comments on Manuscript Give Us This Day; CIA and the Bay of Pigs Invasion by Edward J. Hamilton1. This manuscript has evidently been kicking around in publishing circles since at least mid-1968, presumably without CIA clearance. William Buckley of the *National Review* seems to have been "shopping" it at one point. One publisher rejected it as too "controversial", and noted its "confidential" nature as well as its potential for libel suits.2. In the foreword to this manuscript, the author (whom I shall refer to under his assumed name of Hamilton), describes the book as a "personal account" of CIA's role in the Bay of Pigs affair in which he was a senior-CIA participant for 19 months. He notes in the foreword his hope that someone would have written this book so that he would not have to do it; now convinced that, if he does not write it, it will never be written, he has taken up his pen "reluctantly and in a mood of nostalgic bitterness." Hamilton states that he has used no official files or documents and has consulted no one in preparing this work. Where true names are used in the manuscript for CIA personnel, he writes that they have been publicly identified before, and in this contention I believe that he is correct, with the possible exception of Jim Noel. The author's claim that this book would provide no information not known to Castro's intelligence service, or that details this late are of no value to the opposition,is, in my view, seriously open to question.3. The book is, in general, favorable to CIA actions in the Bay of Pigs. The villains of the piece are certain liberal figures in the Kennedy Administration (Schlesinger, Goodwin, Stevenson) and to some extent, the President himself. In his concluding chapter, the author's bitterness is undisguised against those in the Administration and the press who took the opportunity of the Bay of Pigs incident to attack and denigrate CIA.4. Messrs. Bissell and Barnes and the author's other CIA co-workers in the Cuban Project, by and large, are given quite favorable treatment. One exception is General Cabell, whom the author excoriates, and it is apparent that Hamilton's opinion of Jerry Droller is far from
[104-10119-10182.pdf — page 1]
EYES ONLY- 2 -favorable, both on political and professional grounds. [Jint Noel] also comes out poorly.5. It is apparent that Hamilton feels very deeply about the Bay of Pigs and its aftermath, to the extent that he is willing to put his career on the line by circulating this manuscript to several publishers without apparent clearance or authorisation. He has utilised as his *nom de plume* the special name assigned to him in the project for dealing with the Caban Fronte, and it would not take anyone who was involved in the Cuban Project more than a few pages of reading to identify the author, as one potential publisher pointed out. The manuscript itself is the most comprehensive story of a CIA operation that has ever been written for publication to my knowledge. Meetings, conversations, and internal and external CIA actions are here reported extensively and with all the authority of an "insider" who was there. It far exceeds in detail anything that has been written on the Bay of Pigs, including Charles Murphy's article in *Fortune* of September 1961 or the "insider" books that were published following the death of President Kennody.6. Attached herewith is a chapter-by-chapter description of the manuscript particularly as it affects CIA security. This analysis states what the author states, whether right or wrong. Where I have occasionally added comments of my own, they are in brackets [].Walter PlorsheimerCuratorHistorical Intelligence CollectionAttachmentAs noted aboveDistribution w/att.Orig& 2 - D/Security2- HICSECRETEYES ONLY