Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 206]
During current interviews, NOSENKO has repeated the same general story as regards Paul JENNER. He still insists that KOSOLAPOV was on the same train with JENNER from Helsinki. Collateral information raises difficulties here, however: Finnish train manifests indicate that JENNER was the only Moscow-bound passenger on the 31 March 1960 train from Finland to Moscow, and that one Viktor KOLOSSOV (a name NOSENKO has identified as an alias used by KOSOLAPOV) was on the 2 April 1960 train to Moscow.The above obvious discrepancy has not been and cannot be clarified with available information. KOSOLAPOV (KOLOSSOV) was either on the same train as JENNER or he was not. Train manifests indicate that KOSOLAPOV was not. Nevertheless, the "boy and girl, probably university students" who, according to JENNER, struck up a conversation with him on the train would appear clearly to be part of the operational effort described by NOSENKO, particularly in view of the later approach of this same girl to JENNER at the airport. There is no reason to question that this girl was the female agent of GRYAZNOV. In view of the conflict between the train manifest and statements by NOSENKO, however, it is not clear who the "boy student" was: whether this somehow was KOSOLAPOV, or whether it may have been some other person entirely.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 207]
It is not accepted that the train manifests are incontrovertible evidence that KOSOLAPOV could not have been on the same train as JENNER, Neither is it accepted that the train manifests are in error. There is just not a satisfactory answer for the indicated discrepancy between the train manifests and the statement of NOSENKO that KOSOLAPOV and JENNER were on the same train. If indeed KOSOLAPOV did not travel with JENNER, this does not establish anything more than that NOSENKO is wrong; it is evidence that he does not know something he, as the supervisor of KOSOLAPOV, should have known according to his own statements.Pages 190 - 192 contain a summary of previous information in regard to the John GARLAND case. GARLAND was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk whom the KGB was studying, but on whom no derogatory information was developed. NOSENKO provided practically no details in regard to GARLAND) other than to identify him as a code clerk.GOLITSYN has reported on an incident which it is considered relates to the trip of GARLAND from Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November 1960. GOLITSYN reported that in November 1960 the Helsinki KGB Residency received a cable from Moscow advising that an American code clerk would be arriving in Helsinki en route to Moscow and that31
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 208]
the responsible SCD case officer, KOSCLAPOV, would be sent to Helsinkiunder alias to strike up an acquaintance with the code clerk which theSCD hoped to continue in Moscow. GOLITSYN talked to KOSOLAPOVin Helsinki at that time, and the Residency procured for KOSOLAPOVa place in the compartment of the American on the train from Helsinkito Moscow.The previous summary also stated GOLITSYN had advised thatlater in Helsinki he inquired of another SCD officer "from the EmbassySection" (First Section, SCD) about the case on which he had helpedKOSOLAPOV. According to GOLITSYN, the officer refused to discussthe case and he, GOLITSYN, concluded from this reaction that it musthave resulted in a successful recruitment.It has been determined that GOLITSYN, in an interview with theFBI on 20 March 1962, referred to the above "SCD officer from theEmbassy Section" as (inu) ZENKIN of the American Department.GOLITSYN also stated that the officer was in Helsinki under the aliasof SERGEEV (SERGEYEV), but was unable to furnish a first name andpatronymic for SERGEYEV. GOLITSYN referred to (inu) ZENKIN asbeing from the American Department, SCD.It is considered that there is no doubt that the (inu) ZENKINreferred to by GOLITSYN is the individual of the same last name32
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 209]
concerning whom NOSENKO has furnished information. NOSENKOhas identified ZENKIN (whose first name he does not recall butpossibly is Yuriy) as an officer of the Second Section, First Depart-ment, SCD. According to NOSENKO, one group of the Second Sectionboth before and after 1960 - 1961 was engaged in "operative games"against American Intelligence and that ZENKIN was a member of thisgroup. NOSENKO has advised that ZENKIN traveled abroad in connectionwith activities of the Second Section, but that he had no specific 'knowledgeregarding the activities of ZENKIN on these trips. NOSENKO has fur-nished some fragmentary information which he learned in regard toZENKIN and when the full name of SERGEYEV (ZENKIN) together withhis photograph is obtained, this fragmentary information from NOS ENKOmay prove quite useful.As regards the KOSOLAPOV-GARLAND matter and the opinionexpressed by GOLITSYN based on the refusal of ZENKIN to discuss thecase (GARLAND) that it must have resulted in a successful recruitment,there appears to be an inadequate basis for this presumption. Accordingto NOSENKO, and there is no reason to disbelieve NOSENKO on thispoint, ZENKIN was in the Second Section, not the First Section, in1960 - 1961. He was not Chief of the Section, but only a Senior Case
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 210]
Officer. Since KOSOLAPOV was an officer of the First Section and the work against GARLAND was the responsibility of the First Section, it does not appear that ZENKIN would necessarily have knownof any developments in the KOSOLAPOV-GARLAND) matter.The Finnish train manifest of 16 November 1960 for the Helsinki to Moscow train lists John GARLAND and Viktor KOLOSSOV (alias of KOSOLAPOV) as passengers. GARLAND, when interviewed in 1962 following the lead from GOLITSYN, denied having met any Soviet with the physical description of KOSOLAPOV on the Helsinki-to-Moscow trip, and denied ever being approached by Soviet Intelligence. Later interviews by the FBI and a polygraph interview did not indicate that he had ever met KOSOLAPOV or that he had ever knowingly been contacted by any foreign intelligence agent.It is accepted that KOSOLAPOV went from Moscow to Helsinki in November 1960, that he talked with GOLITSYN there, and that he was on the same train as GARLAND from Helsinki to Moscow. It is also accepted that NOSENKO is unaware that KOSOLAPOV made a trip to Helsinki in November 1960.Travel for an SCD officer outside the USSR or Bloc countries requires high-level approval, according to NOSENKO. It does not
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 211]
matter that the individual has previously traveled on a similar mission, each trip must have specific high-level approval. The red tape which thus must inevitably have been involved in preparation for such a trip further supports the assumption that NOSENKO should have known about the KOSOLAPOV-GARLAND) trip.The position taken by NOSENKO on this point is that he accepts the statement by the interviewer that KOSOLAPOV made such a trip, but he says that he, NOSENKO, simply does not know anything about it. He adds only that had anything significant developed in the study of GARLAND, he would have been aware of it.NOSENKO, as supervisor of the group working against code clerks, should have known of any trip of KOSOLAPOV to Finland in 1960 or 1961. NOSENKO himself was out of Moscow on a trip to Cuba from 15 November 1960 to circa 17 December 1960. The possibility exists that this could have accounted for his lack of knowledge of the trip of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki and return to Moscow on 16 November 1960. However, NOSENKO has not attempted to use his Cuban trip as a possible explanation for not knowing of the November KOSOLAPOV trip.As with the (JENNER)-KOSOLAPOV case, it is not possible at this time to resolve the discrepancies pertaining to the GARLAND-KOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSENKO denies any knowledge of
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 212]
this operational activity of KOSOLAPOV is another apparent instance, as in the JENNER case, of his not knowing something he, by his own statements, should have known.Viewed in the context of the total knowledge of NOSENKO of operations against code clerks, however, neither the problems in the JENNER case nor those in the (GARLAND case, singly or combined, in any way represent conclusive evidence that NOSENKO was not supervisor of KOSOLAPOV or that he was not responsible for the code clerk operations described by NOSENKO. This statement, however, was not substantiated in the previous summary.Pages 193 - 199 of the previous summary contain an account of KGB activity against code clerk Joseph MORONE from various sources, including NOSENKO. NOSENKO first mentioned the case in 1962.According to NOSENKO, the responsible case officer for work against MORONE was KOSOLAPOV. When it was learned that MORONE and an Embassy colleague, a Marine guard by the name of BEGGS, were planning a vacation trip to Warsaw, arrangements were made with the UB (the Polish Security Service) for a female Polish agent to come to Moscow and travel from there to Warsaw on the same train as MORONE and BEGGS. The intent was for the agent, either on the train or subsequently in Warsaw, to meet and compromise MORONE sexually. She36
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 213]
successfully accomplished this, but due to certain problems in KGB-UBliaison relations, it was not possible for the KGB to exploit this directly.The previous summary stated that with respect to the femaleUB agent, there was persuasive evidence that neither NOSENKO norKOSOLAPOV played the roles in the (MORONE) case described byNOSENKO. That summary cited the travel of NOSENKO to Cuba andof KOSOLAPOV to Finland at approximately the same time as the (MORONE)trip to Warsaw as evidence of the impossibility of NOSENKO andKOSOLAPOV being involved personally in this part of the (MORONE)case.NOSENKO has stated that KOSOLAPOV met the Polish femaleagent and made the arrangements to place her on the train to Warsaw.(MORONE and BEGGS) departed Moscow on 12 November 1960. It is notknown when KOSOLAPOV left Moscow for Helsinki, but he was on the16 November 1960 train manifest as departing Helsinki for Moscow.NOSENKO departed Moscow on 15 November 1960 for Cuba. Theactivities described by NOSENKO are therefore possible within theknown time frame.It is clear that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal rolein the (MORONE) case, particularly when he stated that he, NOSENKO,placed the female agent on the train. NOSENKO now clearly states that
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 214]
KOSOLAPOV was the only KGB officer in contact with the Polish agent.NOSENKO previously stated that a KGB technician who was on the train from Moscow to Warsaw reported back to NOSENKO the day after the train arrived in Warsaw. Later NOSENKO said that instead of talking to the technician personally, he may have read the report of the technician after he returned from Cuba.The activities described by NOSENKO with regard to this matter are accordingly possible within the known time frame. It is not considered that the retractions NCS ENKO has made from his original statements on this operation are of sufficient significance to materially discredit him.Page 198 of the previous summary contains the statement that MORONE, when interviewed, denied having been intimate with Svetlana IVANOVA, a KGB agent employed at the American House. NOSENKO had stated that IVANOVA was instructed to report everything she saw or heard concerning MORONE (page 194). The summary, however, cited a number of reports that MORONE had been intimate with IVANOVA and with Ella UMANETS, also a KGB agent employed at the American House, and commented that NOSENKO therefore was apparently unaware of the sexual involvement of MORONE with "IVANOVA's friends."
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 215]
NOSENKO, during current interviews, has indicated awareness:ofat least some involvement of IVANOVA with MORONE. He has fur-nished information on a developing operation against Marine guardGARCIA (Anthony A. GARCIA) based on the involvement of GARCIAwith IVANOVA. He has also stated that the possibility was consideredof using IVANOVA against MORONE to obtain compromising photographs.This plan was seriously affected when it was learned from themilitiaman/KGB guard at the United States Embassy that IVANOVA,her girl friend, MORONE) and a Marine guard, possibly (GARCIA, hadbeen "in the city, " then returned to the "flat" of one of the Marineswhere the girls spent the night. This apparently placed the reliabilityof IVANOVA in question in the eyes of the First Section.:According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that PietroCECCHI, Italian cook at the American Embassy and agent of KOSOLAPOν,reported on Americans at the Embassy, but NOSENKO recalled nothingspecific that CECCHI had reported about MORONE. The summary alsostates that MORONE was said by other American Embassy employeesto be a close friend of CECCHI and that MORONE had admitted blackmarket money exchanges with CECCHI.During current interviews, NOSENKO has stated that CECCHIfurnished "pieces" of information concerning MORONE, but he, NOSENKO,39
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 216]
knew of no black market involvement of *MORONE* with *CECCHI*. NOSENKO has also indicated that the KGB sometimes suspected, and on occasion actually became aware that various agents did not fully report everything of interest to the KGB. The KGB of course was aware that *CECCHI* was involved in the black market. However, whether he reported to the KGB everything he did and with whom is open to question; viz., the Maurice ZWANG) case below.The comment was made in the previous summary that NOSENKO was unaware that *MORONE* met some Soviet females in the spring of 1961 at the apartment of Sarwat el SHAZLY, an Egyptian-national KGB agent of the Sixth Department who was also reporting on Americans, and was intimate with one in this apartment.A review of official records indicates that *MORONE* did report having met some Soviet girls at the apartment of Sarwat, but there is no indication that he admitted or that anyone else has reported that he was intimate with any of them. The conclusion of the previous summary in this regard was based on a misinterpretation. Accordingly, since there is no reason to believe that any compromise incident took place in the Sarwat apartment, the story of NOSENKO on this matter is considered completely acceptable.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 217]
A few comments are appropriate concerning remarks in the previous summary on pages 199 - 204. Comments were made there concerning five code clerks, Maurice ZWANG, John TAYLOR, Frank DAY, Robert DWELLY and Joseph GAFFEY, and although it is not specifically stated, the suggestion is apparent that the reporting of NOSENKO on these cases was considered evidence that NOSENKO was not supervisor of all KGB operations against code clerks. The following observations may assist in placing these cases in their proper perspective:(a) (Maurice ZWANG - ZWANG) was identified by NOSENKO as a code clerk who was actively "worked on" during 1960 - 1961. The previous summary suggested that the knowledge of NOSENKO regarding KGB activity against ZWANG was inadequate. First, reporting of NOSENKO on ZWANG contained no reference to the relationship of ZWANG with his maid, whom NOSENKO in another case has identified as a KGB agent. Although ZWANG) denied sexual relations with his maid, he did admit to some intimacies with her in her apartment. During polygraph examination ZWANG reacted when he
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 218]
responded in the negative to a question regarding sexualrelations with his maid. The failure of NOSENKO to re-port on this relationship can be ascribed to ignorance,but also can be plausibly explained by faulty memory onhis part or failure on the part of the maid to report detailsof this relationship to the KGB.Second, NOSENKO had not reported that (ZWANG)was involved in the currency operations of Pietro CECCHI.(A fact that previous summary implied he should haveknown from KGB agent CECCHI.) From the record, how-ever, it appears that the dealings of ZWANG were notdirectly with CECCHI, but rather through other Embassyemployees, making it plausible that CECCHI was eitherunaware of the involvement of ZWANG or, as NOSENKOhimself stated he suspected, CECCHI did not report alldetails of his currency operations to his KGB handler.(b) (John TAYLOR) - NOSENKO identified (TAYLOR)as (a State Department code clerk) and target of KOSOLAPOV.The KGB was aware of the involvement of (TAYLOR) withhis Soviet maid, but no attempt was made to recruit (TAYLOR)before his departure in early 1961 since to do so might42
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 219]
endanger the plans for a recruitment approach to James STORSBERG, who had been under development for almost a year and was considered more valuable.The implication of the previous summary that the explanation given by NOSENKO was subject to question failed to take into account the fact that although STORSBERG was not approached until after the departure of TAYLOR, the operation against STORSBERG was underway before TAYLOR became involved with his maid. Further, it is apparent that the KGB did not abandon interest in TAYLOR since he was approached at a later date outside the USSR on the basis of his previous affair with his maid in Moscow.(c) Frank DAY - NOSENKO identified Frank DAY as a State Department code clerk who was the target of either KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. According to NOSENKO, nothing "interesting" was learned about DAY and no operational measures were taken against DAY. The previous summary noted that in July 1961, DAY traveled to the Caucasus with his friend and former overt CIA employee, Agricultural Attache G. Stanley BROWN. It was also stated that the two were under surveillance by five persons
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 220]
at all times on the above trip, that they found a "repairman" in their hotel room when they unexpectedly returned, and that on another occasion an "attractive and available Soviet female" was believed to have been planted in their train compartment.According to NOSENKO, surveillance and any other local coverage of any employee at the United States Embassy who travels in the USSR is the responsibility of the local KGB organization, not the SCD. It would appear that the local organization was trying to do a thorough job on DAY and BROWN, but it apparently was nonproductive. It does not seem justifiable to expect that NOSENKO should have recalled a trip which produced no results.(d) Robert DWELLY - NOSENKO has related in considerable detail the efforts of NOSENKO, GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV to involve Robert DWELLY, a code clerk in Moscow from April 1959 - July 1960, in a homosexual compromise operation. According to NOSENKO, a homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV was of the opinion (DWELLY was a homosexual.
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 221]
There is no reason to doubt the statement of NOSENKO concerning KGB efforts to determine when and where DWELLY was going "into the city" (Moscow) so that a homosexual compromise situation could be arranged. There were no specific developments from their efforts, according to NOSEN KO.DWELLY has categorically denied being a homosexual; NOSENKO has not said he was, but only that the homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV assessed DWELLY as a homosexual. There does not appear to be any reason to consider the statements of NOSENKO about DWELLY as reflecting adversely on NOSENKO.(e) Joseph GAFFEY - NOSENKO has identified Joseph GAFFEY as a code clerk. The previous summary noted that NOSENKO had stated the KGB had tried to lure GAFFEY into downtown Moscow, using Svetlana IVANOVA, an agent of DEMKIN in the American House.By way of comment, the previous summary stated that GAFFEY arrived in Moscow in September 1961 and that Fred KADERA had reported that GAFFEY had told him he had been intimate with a Russian girl at the Ame
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 222]
House. It was further noted that GAFFEY was recalled from Moscow in the summer of 1962 because of drunken-ness and during interview had admitted being intimate with IVANOVA at the American House and at her apartment and that she had claimed pregnancy.As to whether the above information raises a question concerning NOSENKO, the following factors should be considered:(1) NOSENKO has stated that during the latter part of December 1961 he was part time in the First Department and part time in the Seventh Department, and that he reported full time to the Seventh Department after New Years Day 1962.(2) In addition to the information previously mentioned as furnished by GAFFEY during interview, GAFFEY also stated that he was first intimate with IVANOVA in his room on 27 December 1961 and was also intimate with her later on three occasions at her apartment. According to GAFFEY, IVANOVA told him of her pregnancy about 1 May
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 223]
1962, which is approximately four months afterNOSENKO has stated he transferred to the SeventhDepartment.The matter of review by NOSENKO of OTU reports from micro- phone coverage on the United States Embassy has previously been mentioned in this summary. Pages 226 - 236 of the previous summary contained a detailed account of information from NOSENKO on the matter of microphones, countermeasures taken by the Americans in 1964, and damage estimates prepared by the Americans. The previous conclusion was that his information did not sustain his claim to have been Deputy Chief, First Section, or his claim that he personally reviewed the KGB microphone monitoring reports. Comments have been made in this summary in regard to this previous conclusion.A few remarks, it is believed, will assist in a fuller understanding of the microphone matter. In the material brought out by NOSENKO in 1964, there was a single sheet of paper containing on one side hand- written notes which NOSENKO identified as a list of the active micro- phones (those which were being monitored) in the United States Embassy. This list is given on page 227 of the previous summary and need not be repeated here. The acquisition of this list by NOSENKO was character- ized in the previous summary as singular and it was stated that NOSENKO47
[104-10150-10004.pdf — page 224]
has never plausibly explained the circumstances which prompted his retention of the list until 1964, when he produced it for CIA in Geneva.During current interviews, the matter of the above list has been covered in considerably greater detail with NOSENKO than had been done before. His explanation, both of the circumstances which led to his acquiring the list as well as of his still having it in his possession at the time of his defection, is considered plausible, contrary to the judgment of the previous summary.NOSENKO has stated that in 1960 - 1961 Vladimir I. PETROV, Chief of the Second Section, First Department, desired some "points" for use against targets of his section. NOSENKO uses the term "point" not as meaning just a microphone, but as referring to an OTU sub-unit which includes microphones as well as the necessary monitors and translators to cover the microphone and translate the "take." The targets of PETROV were primarily Americans and, therefore, there was a transcription-translation problem.According to NOSENKO, most of the available "points" were assigned to the First Section to cover microphones in the United States Embassy. The Chief of the First Department, Vladimir A. KLYPIN, held a meeting attended by KLYPIN, Chief of the First Section Viadislav KOVSHUK, Vladimir I. PETROV, and NOSENKO, the purpose of which