Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 298]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT January 1962-January 1964)Comment: (Continued)Department was not concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates, both of which were the responsibility of other KGB elements. NOSENKO acknowledges that the KGB knew that [BRAUNS] was a former Soviet 06, 08 citizen [BRAUNS]' plan to visit relatives in Leningrad was informationaalso available to the KGB through his visa application. 06 [BRAUNS] had corresponded for a year before his visit with a former girl friend in Leningrad. She spent the first week with him in Moscow (during which the KGB recruitment attempt occurred). The existence of the girl friend was presumably known to the KGB, if not through mail censorship, then from surveillance connected with KRUPNOV's planned approach to [BRAUNS] in the hotel. NOSENKO was unaware of these facts.06Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section:Summary and ConclusionAccording to NOSENKO, he requested transfer to the Seventh Department to avoid being named Deputy Chief of the American Department over his then-superior, the experienced and highly successful KGB officer KOVSHUK. He is adamant that the transfer took place "before (the defection of) GOLITSYN", which he asserts occured in mid-January 1962. Among his other functions in the Seventh Department, he.cites directing five agents whom he brought from the American Department. In his initial capacity as Chief of the American Section, NOSENKO claims involvement only in the [W.E. JOHNSON] case, his time being spent 06 either in "reading in" on his new job or preparing for his initial trip to Geneva. He alleges that he was directed to accompany the Soviet delegation to Geneva for an extended period, in behalf of another Second Directorate Department, over his objections, when he had no deputy to assume his functions in his absence, and on the eve of the tourist season.5/BR2900001561Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 299]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)In Geneva he said he supervised the KGB double-agent BELIT-SKIY's meetings with CIA, before contacting CIA himself to sell information for a relatively small sum. Back in Moscow, immediately after participating in the KGB approach to [BRAUNS], he claims he became Deputy Chief of the entire 100-man Seventh Department.Besides the implausibility of NOSENKO's account of seeking transfer "to avoid becoming Deputy Chief of the American Department", his dating of the transfer impugns his claims. GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961. If NOSENKO transferred, as he said, in mid-January 1962, his earlier participation in the [JOHNSON] compromise (see p. 268) is not evidential of his Seventh Department service. If he transferred just in time for the [JOHNSON] operation, he could not have played the role he claimed in the Embassy Section (re ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street dead drop, see p.216 ). In the period with one exception, none of his claimed agentura participated in a Seventh Department operation. No change marked his claimed increased responsibilities and new functions upon being promoted to Section Chief of the largest department in the Second Chief Directorate. Of the five operations NOSENKO described as occurring during this period, all had aspects for which, by NOSENKO's description of the Seventh Department's mission, they could have been in the jurisdiction of another Second Chief Directorate Department. NOSENKO's various explanations for his assignment to Geneva in 1962 prompt scepticism because of tortuous contradictions. In Geneva he neither directed the investigation of SHAKHOV nor supervised the BELIT-SKIY case, as he claimed.Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department(July 1962 - January 1964)In July 1962, in line with the personal wish of the Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, General GRIBANOV, NOSENKO0001562TS No. 197124Copy 10291Top Secret
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# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)was promoted to the position of a (one of three) Deputy Chief of the entire Seventh Department. A year later, he was made First Deputy Chief, and thus second-in-command to CHELNOKOV and general supervisor of all Second Chief Directorate tourist operations. The Seventh Department, which had a strength of about 100 KGB officers, was responsible for all operations against tourists in the Soviet Union. From this period NOSENKO claimed to have learned, either by virtue of his position as Deputy Chief of otherwise, of a number of KGB operations against Americans, including two arrests, one recruitment, and investigations of a suspected FBI agent and of Lee Harvey OSWALD. NOSENKO as well attributes to his senior KGB position during this period his knowledge of an American GRU agent and of the KGB investigation of a disaffected American Embassy Section officer, the latter occurring just before NOSENKO returned to Geneva for the second time, and defected.## Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY### NOSENKO'S InformationIn September 1963, NOSENKO took over from his subordinate, Seventh Department case officer Ye.N. NOSKOV, the management of KGB agent Alexander SVENCHANSKIY (cryptonym "ANOD"). SVENCHANSKIY was the president of "Afton Tours", a travel agency in New York City, and the owner of a Chicago Russian-language bookstore. There was originally some suspicion that SVENCHANSKIY might be an FBI informant, and the KGB was also concerned over SVENCHANSKIY's contacts with AMTORG personnel in New York City. NOSKOV, the case officer at the time, "felt" that SVENCHANSKIY was not an FBI informant and recruited him in 1960 or 1961 after he was arrested for blackmarketeering while visiting the Soviet Union. (SVENCHANSKIY'S cooperation was secured against KGB promises that Inturist would refer business to the agent's New York travel agency.SVENCHANSKIY's task was to screen visa applications of prospective tourists to the Soviet Union for persons who might be connected with American Intelligence. If he suspected such a person, he would make a signal by moving the photograph on the visa application slightly, or making a small pin-prick or pencilled mark on the application form.Top Secret
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 301]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)When NOSENKO took the case from NOSKOV in September 1963, NOSENKO's name as the handling officer was entered in the single-volume case file, although NOSKOV accompanied NOSENKO to both subsequent meetings with SVENCHANSKIY in Moscow (in September 1963 and at the end of 1963).Comment: SVENCHANSKIY, a Russian-born naturalized American citizen, is president of Afton Tours of New York City and the Cross World Books and Periodicals in Chicago. His partner, and the actual operator of Afton Tours, is Sonya SOKOLOW, reportedly a one-time "confidential secretary" of Jacob GOLOS. Allegations of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist sympathies and probable involvement in Soviet espionage date back to the Second World War. His involvement in espionage has been publicized in the press (notably in a 1953 New York Times account of Harry GOLD'S allegations).Since SOKOLOW manages the Afton Tours office, while SVENCHANSKIY usually is occupied elsewhere with his other firm, he would be unlikely to review and mark suspect visa applications, as NOSENKO alleged. SVENCHANSKIY's background is such as to have prevented his being interviewed on the basis of the information NOSENKO provided.NOSENKO did not refer to his association with SVENCHANSKIY spontaneously, but described it only after referring to the written notes he brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964. (See p.319)Suspected FBI Source Alfred SLESINGEROn 8 July 1964 NOSENKO reported on KGB interest in an American named SLESINGER, a proprietor of a photographic shop in New York City, who was suspected by the KGB of "having connections with the FBI."293Top Secret0001564TS No. 197124Copy 10
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 302]
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)NOSENKO's Information[SLESINGER] came under suspicion by the KGB First Chief Directorate because of his business transactions with a number of Soviets who visited his store and in whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that [SLESINGER] was trying to become closely acquainted with some Soviets, to study them. [SLESINGER] had visited the Soviet Union several times. Learning [SLESINGER] planned another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he might make some contacts or do something interesting" while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to resolve its suspicions that [SLESINGER] was possibly an agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had a file on [SLESINGER] and a senior case officer in the American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M. DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent of the Seventh Department who was director of a photographic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly with [SLESINGER] while the latter was visiting the Soviet Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence.[SLESINGER] went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents who could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted to recruit [SLESINGER], but since no evidence was developed, no approach was made. [SLESINGER] had travelled to the Soviet Union before, several times.Comment:NOSENKO's information was substantially correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER, reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa. In Odessa [SLESINGER] was contacted by a Soviet official who exhibited "intimate knowledge" of his business in New York City and had asked whether [SLESINGER] had "ever been bothered by the FBI."294Top Secret0001565TS No. 197124 CopyIS/BR
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 303]
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)Comment:(Continued)In 1966 [SLESINGER] reported to the FBI that he was in touch with a Moscow photographic shop proprietor, and he described evidence of KGB interest in him during his visit to Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the Soviet Union in 1962, [SLESINGER] had been in contact with a number of Soviet officials from the United Nations.NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned of [SLESINGER], who may represent a First Chief Directorate case.[KOTEN]'s ArrestNOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once, NOSENKO identified the case as that of [Bernard KOTEN] a guide for [Afton Tours] in New York City (and hence an employee of [Alexander SVENCHANSKIY], see above) who had been arrested on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO said that [KOTEN] was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the agent's name.NOSENKO's Information[KOTEN] was a longtime member of the American Communist Party and a frequent visitor after the Second World War to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens, particularly among Russian Jews. ([NOSENKO] explained in another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service has frequently inspired such contacts.) Because of these many suspicious contacts, both the KGB First and Second Directorates had concluded that [KOTEN] might be a "provocation agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks of the Communist Party in the United States.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 304]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)On the eve of [KOTEN]'s arrival in 1963, the Seventh Department learned from V.B. BARKOVSKIY of the First Chief Directorate's S&T Department that [KOTEN] was carrying with him the address of relatives of an important S&T agent of the New York residency, and that [KOTEN] intended to visit the agent's relatives while in the USSR. The S&T agent had asked to be repatriated to the USSR, but when the KGB eventually assented, the agent balked, arousing KGB suspicions. When it was found that [KOTEN] was acquainted with the agent, the KGB concluded that [KOTEN] "evidently received from American Intelligence an assignment to visit [the agent's relatives].": After [KOTEN] visited the relatives in the Crimea, the decision was made to arrest him as a suspect American Intelligence agent. [KOTEN] was entrapped with a KGB homosexual agent and arrested, although he was released when the American Communist Party and other organizations strongly protested.NOSENKO did not personally participate in the arrest nor meet [KOTEN], although he supervised the arrest from KGB Headquarters.Comment: [KOTEN]'s arrest on charges of homosexual activities were publicized at the time in a report datelined Moscow and quoting Inturist which was carried in the *New York Times*. In an interview with representatives of the Department of State, [KOTEN] described how he had been arrested by the KGB in Kiev on 28 August 1963, accused of being an American Intelligence agent and interrogated for three days, and held in jail for a month.GRU Agent [John SHUBIN]The name of [John Andrew SHUBIN] and his year of birth were among the notes which NOSENKO brought to the 1964 meetings with CIA in Geneva.2960001567Top SecretTS No. 197124Copy
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 305]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## NOSENKO's InformationSHUBIN was a native of California of Russian ex- traction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor in New York City. SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958 or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN was the target of Seventh Department case officer A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They very furtively said that they were interested in him," from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent. NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's interest in SHUBIN.Comment:SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited the Soviet Union during that period it was not as an American tourist under his true name. Consequently, he could not then have been the tourist target of the Seventh Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring to SHUBIN'S visit in 1961, there is a further contradiction: NOSENKO could not have noticed his name while reviewing tourist lists in the Seventh Department, because he claims he was in the American Department at the time.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 306]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)## Arrest of BARGHOORNAt the first of the 1964 meetings in Geneva NOSENKO described the provocation and arrest of Yale University Professor Frederick BARGHOORN in late 1963. NOSENKO's most comprehensive statement, from which the following paragraphs were largely drawn, was made on 9 June 1964. NOSENKO said that the purpose of the KGB operation against BARGHOORN was to retaliate for persona non grata action taken against three Soviets in New York City in the case of John W. BUTENKO [in November 1963] and to secure a hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet (Igor IVANOV) in the BUTENKO case who was jailed. (NOSENKO had asserted in Geneva, earlier, that the operation against BARGHOORN "was to discourage future arrests such as that of IVANOV, not because of any special importance of IVANOV himself.")## NOSENKO's InformationIn 1963 four KGB First Chief Directorate officers assigned to the New York Legal Residency were caught in operational activity in the United States. Of the four, three had diplomatic immunity, but one was a chauffeur and had only a service passport. The three Soviet diplomats were held three or four hours by the American authorities and then released. IVANOV, the chauffeur, was arrested since he did not have diplomatic immunity. GRIBANOV, Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, learned of this arrest probably the next day and was directed by KGB Chairman Semichastnyy to take "necessary measures." GRIBANOV thereupon called to his office NOSENKO; A.G. KOVALENKO, Chief of the Seventh Department; and G.I. GRYAZNOV and Ye. M. RASHCHEPOV from the American Department. After describing the arrest, GRIBANOV asked what information the Second Chief Directorate Departments had on any American, Embassy employee or tourist, that could serve as the victim of an [retaliatory] arrest. RASHCHEPOV and GRYAZNOV said that at that very moment there were three or four American Service Attaches in Rostov and that, in the opinion of the American Department, these officers might be carrying electronic apparatus. It was known that they had cameras, that they had been taking photographs, and they had been observed taking notes. They could be arrested in Rostov before they took the return plane to Moscow.
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 307]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)GRIBANOV instructed the two representatives of the American Department to write a report on what other possibilities existed. He also told them to request permission to arrest and search the Service Attaches.GRIBANOV then asked what pertinent information was held by the Seventh Department. He was told that there were relatively few American tourists in the Soviet Union at that time. These included BARGHOORN, who was mentioned to GRIBANOV along with one other (name not recalled). NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported, however, that the KGB had no "strong" materials to use against them. They were ordered to make an immediate study of the situation and to report back to GRIBANOV as soon as possible.Returning to the Seventh Department, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO gathered the entire American Tourist Section in their office. In a general discussion, it was decided that BARGHOORN was the only possible American target. All information on BARGHOORN was gathered, and NOSENKO and KOVALENKO took it to GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV read it and was pleased; he was sure that BARGHOORN was connected with American Intelligence. He then asked what could be done. NOSENKO and KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was then in Tbilisi and that, in fact, Ye. N. NOSKOV (case officer, American Tourist Section) was in Tbilisi with a woman doctor from the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for the purpose of working against BARGHOORN; the doctor had some special substance which had been used to make BARGHOORN so violently ill that he had to be hospitalized. While he was in the hospital, a careful search had been made of his belongings, but nothing of operational interest had been found. In addition, a KGB agent was placed in BARGHOORN's room as a patient; he made anti-Soviet statements and offered BARGHOORN "materials", but BARGHOORN did not rise to the bait. At the time of this meeting with GRIBANOV, BARGHOORN was scheduled to fly from Tbilisi to Moscow the following morning, and the KGB knew from a phone tap that he had an appointment with Theodore ORCHARD of the 06 British Embassy at the Hotel Metropol the following evening.299Top Secret
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 308]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving "materials" to BARGHOORN in Moscow. NOSENKO said that this would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that this made no difference. He instructed NOSENKO and KOVALENKO to locate an agent who could be used to pass the compromising material to BARGHOORN and told them to write a summary of BARGHOORN's background with a proposal that the Second Chief Directorate arrest him "when he obtains materials which are of interest to American Intelligence." This was to be sent in letter form to Semichastnyy over GRIBANOV's signature; the letter was not to indicate how BARGHOORN was to receive the materials. (That the evidence was to be planted was not to be mentioned.)GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOORN, along with a similar letter from GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV concerning the Service Attaches, to Semichastnyy. While the four -- NOSENKO, KOVALENKO, GRYAZNOV and RASHCHEPOV -- were waiting in GRIBANOV's office for his return, GRYAZNOV received a telephone call from the Rostov KGB organization informing him that the Service Attaches were in the air on their way back to Moscow. Shortly thereafter, GRIBANOV returned with the news that the Chairman of the KGB had approved the arrests of the Service Attaches as well as BARGHOORN. Khrushchev was absent from Moscow at the time, but Semichastnyy had called BREZHNEV and secured his approval.When GRIBANOV learned from GRYAZNOV that the Service Attaches were already on their way back to Moscow, he became furious and sent GRYAZNOV out "to do the job or die." Meanwhile, arrangements were made with the "Department D" (the KGB element responsible for dis- information, subordinate to the First Chief Directorate) to provide materials on missiles which could be passed to BARGHOORN. While these were being picked up, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO returned to their office to plan the arrest.BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance upon his arrival in Moscow. At 1810 hours a radio message was received from one of the surveillance cars that BARGHOORN had gone to the American Embassy, and it was decided that the agent (name not recalled, aged 25 to 30 years) would be placed in contact with him as soon as he came out. The KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appointment with [ORCHARD of the British Embassy] at 1900 hours,06,29 but at 1900 hours a report was received that BARGHOORN
[104-10150-10136.pdf — page 309]
# Top Secret(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)had left the American Embassy in the AmericanAmbassador's car. He was alone but for theSoviet driver. Nothing could be done whileBARGHOORN was in the moving car. A check on[ORCHARD] established that he was in the downstairshall of the hotel waiting. It was thereforedecided to approach BARGHOORN when he left the carat the hotel.No sooner had BARGHOORN stepped out of the carthan the agent approached. "You are an American?"the agent asked. "Yes." "Please take it," theagent said. The agent put the packet containing thematerials on missiles in BARGHOORN's inside coatpocket and then ran off.BARGHOORN had taken only one or two steps when hewas seized by NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, another caseofficer of the American Tourist Section, and toldhe was under arrest. A surveillance car pulled up.BARGHOORN was placed in the car, handcuffed (onGRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets arrested inthe United States had received similar treatment)and driven to a Militia station where a room had beenprepared.L.I. YEFREMOV and K.G. KRUPNOV from the AmericanTourist Section were waiting at the Militia station,KRUPNOV to interrogate BARGHOORN and YEFREMOV to bethe interpreter. When BARGHOORN was brought into thestation, an "incident report" form was filled out, anda document was prepared requesting permission to holdhim 48 hours. Between 0200 and 0300 hours BARGHOORNwas taken to the KGB inner prison. At 0400 hours theSeventh Department case officers were released withinstructions to report for duty at 0930 hours.NOSENKO and the others went home.KRUPNOV began the questioning in Russian at 1000hours the next day. Although BARGHOORN speaks goodRussian, YEFREMOV remained in case he would be neededto interpret. NOSENKO entered the room several timesduring these sessions. (Although NOSENKO did notwant to reveal his face to BARGHOORN because he knewBARGHOORN would be released, GRIBANOV had toldKOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when they reachedthe point where BARGHOORN was to tell how he obtainedTop Secret