Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 8]
and through the development of additional legal travellers.4. Liaison Operations: We will continue to press the liaison services who are assisting us in the effort against Cuba for additional coverage, including the recruiting of agents within their own areas for joint dispatch to Cuba. The services most effectively co-operating at this point in this connection are the British, Dutch, French, Spanish, Italian, Greek, Norwegian, Danish, West German, Mexican, Argentinian, Uruguayan, Canadian, Chilean, and Israeli. Direct approaches to several of these services either by you personally or in your name, as you prefer, are being separately recommended. Personal representation by you to the services underlined above would be useful.In addition, we will re-survey all other liaison services with which we are in contact and reiterate to those appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem. In connection with the liaison problem generally, we will endeavor to induce all of the liaison services to make greater use of their national assets, both inside and outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to possible utilization of the Vatican.5. Maritime Operations: In addition to increasing efforts to get at seaman agents and other maritime assets through liaison services, we will continue our unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 9]
particularly Cuban seamen, to increase the twentyofficers and crew members aboard six Cuban vessels we arenow running as controlled agents.6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At   the present time we are running 12 Cuben diplomats   stationed outside Cube as controlled agents and have viable   operations aimed at an additional 20 Cuban diplomats.   We propose to continue and intensify the current program   of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuben official   representative abroad to whom we can gain access and   concerning whom we have any reason to believe a   susceptibility to approach exists. These additional   penetrations will be attempted both through unilateral   operations and where appropriate in conjunction with   liaison services.7. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations   Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or   telephone tap coverage of Cuban officiel installations   in Chile, Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands, England,   Uruguay, Greece, Spain, France, and Canada. No   major expansion of this coverage is presently   contemplated, but we will continue to survey additionsl   targets of opportunity and wherever possible install   coverage in those cases where the additional intelli-   gence from this type of source over and above whet we   are now receiving would appear to make such installation   worthwhile.-8-
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 10]
8. Communications Intelligence: We will continue our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA station in Miami at the same level and will continue to press NSA for additional coverage of Cuban communications. As the current situation "normalizes" it should be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even increase their seaborne intercept coverage of Cuban communications.9. Communist Party Operations: A complete survey has been made world-wide of all Communist Party penetration operations and wherever any such penetration can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the agent to Cuba or by pointing the agent against Cuban targets, this will be done, except in those cases where such action would result in unacceptable/prejudice to the operations in the area where the agent is now based. It is believed that the most lucrative field for the redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will be Latin America where there are 65 penetrations of various communist parties. Of this 65, the survey we have conducted indicates that 23 have some direct pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these 23 will be directed against these targets unless in any case there are overriding reasons to the contrary. The remaining cases in the total of 65 are bein individually examined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban targets.-10-
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 11]
10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two successful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORRID) which have produced substantial intelligence will be continued, resupplied, and reinforced but pointed primarily at continued intelligence collection and at the recruitment for intelligence collection purposes of other Cubans who already are legally resident in Cuba in the areas where the teams are operating (Pinar del Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most carefully selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional agents and teams will be infiltrated black into Cuba in an effort to duplicate the performance of the COBRA and AMTORRID teams and particularly to recruit and, as possible, train additional agents legally resident in Cuba.11. Exfiltration: As feasible, agents and potentirl recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for training, indoctrination, supplying with communications, and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated into Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible, this will be done through legal travel channels, but where this is not possible, it will be done wherever feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration facilities, primarily our maritime assets.-11-
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 12]
B. Much of the above effort as noted vill be primarily directed towards developing all possible evidences of stress or strain within the regime and between the regime and other nations, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program will be continued to take advantage of any possible opportunity to weaken, subvert, or split the regime in any possible fashion. This is basically a long term effort. A great deal of work already has gone into this and the current status of this program and the proposed further expldtation of the numerous leads we have developed is being made, in the interests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of a separate compilation. The effectiveness of assets aimed et actually splitting the regime, i.e., a palace revolt, will of course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United States Government to support them and it is entirely possible that any such effort might fail unless supported with military forces which on the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I above would appear unlikely.C. Sabotage: On the basis of the assumptions set out above, commando type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other acts of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little purpose and should not be undertaken except in the rare instances where an opportunity is presented with acceptable risk to do major damage to the Cuban economy. It is propoвед to continue searching for such limited opportunities, but no active or wide scale program is contemplated.-12-
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 13]
D. Paramilitary, Commando, and Guerrille Type Operations:Given the assumptions in Paragraph I above, no wide scale program of such activity should be undertaken. However, we propose to maintain in being our present facilities and the capability of undertaking such operations in order to fully exploit any substantial change in internal Cuban con--ditions or any substantial revolt or uprising which might occur.E. Economic Warfare: It is proposed to continue and intensify the program already undertaken to deny through clandestine and covert means critical materials to the Cuban economy. This consists primarily of denial operations, possibly some preclusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied firms and governments to prevent the shipments of strategic materials to Cuba.F. Counterintelligence: The current counterintelligence and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and related services will be continued and as possible intensified. This program has developed substantially and it should be possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intellt.gence operations mounted against United States interests from Cuba.G. Political Action, Propaganda, Psychological Warfare:In this field the following tasks will be continued and where appropriate intensified:1. Assist and support State in any feasible action.-13-
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 14]
to develop and exploit current OAS and Latin American attitudes favorable to the containment and/or overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.2. Assist State in the development of post-Castre concepts, leaders, and political groups.3. Stimulate, support and guide covertly the propaganda and political action activities of the CRC and other Cuban political groups and individuals, as appropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside Cuba.4. Develop, maintain and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro-communism, making maximum use of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during the missile crisis.5. Discredit and ridicule Castro and his regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere, with emphasis on the theme the missile crisis demonstrated conclusively that Castro is nothing but a mere pawn of Soviet imperialism.6. Continue "Radio Americas" and other CIA-sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts as appropriate.7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established and policy authority is granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations.8. Continue the infiltration of propaganda material into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers, with special emphasis on selective black operations.-14-
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 15]
# H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will continuethe clandestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligencecollection, psychological warfare and other approved missions.As feasible, we will act to mount as much of this effort espossible from areas outside the continental United States, andparticularly from Latin America. If Higher Authority decideson a "Track Two" concept or on any similar concept whichcontemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generally directedsction operations of Cuban groups against Cubs, it is believedthat efforts should be made to transfer as much as possibleof the responsibility for this non-clandestine, non-intelligencetype operation into the political field, which is the provinceof the Department of State. In this connection, it is believedit would be advisable to press for the creation within theDepartment of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs tohandle the overt government relationships with Cuban exilegroups.# IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:Maximum implementation of the above plan which providesfor the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence,the implementationof related programs as outlined, and themaintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunityas well as take advantage of any future substantial changesin internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permitand make advisable the following:-15-
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 16]
A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures and personnel of Task Force W.B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component of the WH Division under different direction.C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.D. The removal of the past framework which required detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of even minor operational details and decision by committee on points which it is believed are completely within the purview of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.V. RECOMMENDED ACTION:A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan is recommended.B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miami and Havana at the appropriate time.D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept is proposed, you endeavor to transfer to the Department of State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled-16-
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 17]
subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.E. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational mechanism be abolished.F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendations will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force W within the DD/P.WILLIAM K. HARVEYChief, Task Force W-17-
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 18]
# SECRET SENSITIVEDrafting23 Nov, 1962## OPERATIONAL PLAN - CUBAI. **SITUATION:**A. The purpose of this plan is to outline the action to be undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency against the Castro/Communist government of Cuba during FY-63 and for such longer period as may be directed.B. For the purpose of this plan the following assumptions are made:1. National objectives with respect to Cuba are essentially as follows:a. Isolate Castro/Communism from other Western Hemisphere nations.b. Further Discredit the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba and in the Hemisphere.c. Maintain moderate economic and political pressure on the Castro/Communist regime to retard development of the Cuba economy and maintain a drain on Bloc resources.d. Maintain maximum coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements.e. Be prepared to capitalize on any significant uprising, split in Cuban, or split[Figure] This document is a source reference in CS historical paper. Do not destroy.# SECRET SENSITIVE![Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification]
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 19]
## SECRETSENSITIVE-2-on Cuban-Bloc relationships.## II. MISSION:Covertly support the above-cited V. S. nationalobjectives with respect to Cuba.## III. TASKS:### A. Intelligence/Counter-Intelligence1.  Provide the maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba    with particular emphasis on the following:    a.  Capabilities and intentions of the Castro    government.    b.  Activities of Cuban G-2.    c.  Soviet activities in Cuba.    d.  State of resistance including the tone and    temper of the population.    e.  Military and militia order of battle.    f.  Locus of power and/or stress and strain within    the "power centers" in the Cuban government.    g.  Soviet/Cuban and Chinese/Cohen relationships.    h.  Economic### B. Political:1.  Assist and support State in any feasible action to    develop active OAS and Latin-American country support    for the containment, or overthrow of Castro.SECRETSENSITIVEGROUP 1Excluded from automaticdownrading anddeclassification
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 20]
# SECRETSENSITIVE2. Assist State in the development of post-Castro concepts, leaders, and political groups.3. Provide covert support to the CRC and to such other Cuban political groups as appropriate.4. Develop contacts in the "power centers" of the Cuban government as a possible means of splitting the regime.C. Economic:1. Participate in inter-agency economic action planning and execution.2. Prevent essential material and supplies from reaching Cuba.3. Harass Free World Trade with Cuba.D. Psychological:1. Develop, maintain, and exploit the will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communism.2. Discredit the Castro regime in Cuba, in the Hemisphere and elsewhere.3. Develop and exploit tensions between Cuba and Soviet bloc members.E. Resistance:1. Be prepared to covertly provide limited personnel support for any significant internal
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 21]
SECRETSENSITIVE-4-resistance group or uprising.2. Be prepared to support approved U. S. military plans against Cuba.IV. IMPLEMENTATION:To undertake the above-listed tasks, CIA would be required to develop the following programs:A. Intelligence (CI)/ Counter-IntelligenceThe past build-up of intelligence assets must be intensified and expanded. The following types of actions will be maximized.1. Spotting/recruiting/training of legally established Cubans in Cuba.Establishment and maintenance of reliable, secure communications will become more critical as police state controls increase.2. Spotting/recruiting/training Cubans in Government posts, etc.3. Spotting/recruiting/training of third country nationals resident in Cuba.4. Spotting/recruiting/training of legal travelers who have potential access to significant information or who can provide significant operational support.5. Expansion of communications intelligence particularly in the G-2, police, and militia nets. (This is primarily an NSA-problem.)SECRETSENSITIVE
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 22]
# TOP SECRETSENSITIVE4. Maintain refuges debriefing programs.7. Maximize utilization of liaison services for above programs.8. Psychological Warfare (CA):The program must primarily concentrate on and reach the Cuban population. The following psychological warfare activities are considered essential:1. A propaganda balloon launching capability and appropriate policy authority to conduct propaganda balloon launching operations.2. Continue and expand the present propaganda operations infiltrating material into Cuba via the open mails, legal travelers, or couriers.3. Continue propaganda activities utilizing political, professional, cultural, student, and other groups which have a potential for getting their message to their counterparts inside of Cuba.C. ParamilitaryThe program will be basically for developing and maintaining a minimum stand-by capability for use in the event of a significant up-rising or in the event of implementation of U. S. Military plans.The following program is considered essential:1. Maintain the capability to infiltrate/exfiltrate limited numbers of personnel and/or limitedTOP SECRETSENSITIVEGROUP 1Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 23]
SENSITIVEamounts of equipment,2. Maintain sufficient covert assets to meet requilvements levied on CIA in approved U. S. Military contingency plans. Where internal assets are not available, assets may be held externally.V. SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM OTHER AGENCIES:NoneVI. ESTIMATED COST TO CIA:A. PersonnelB. Estimated BudgetFY - 63FY - 64![TOP SECRET SENSITIVE logo]
[104-10103-10097.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992AMTRUNK Operation - Interim Working Draft,Dated 14 February 1977,with Attachments
[104-10103-10097.pdf — page 1]
SECRET, SENSITIVE# AMTRUNK OperationINTERIM WORKING DRAFT 14 February 19771.  It is possible that the AMTRUNK Operation might have been a political action operation run against the U.S.G./CIA. (See the separate memorandum on "Operations to Split the Castro Regime.")2.  In late 1962 or early 1963, pressure was exerted on CIA by Higher Authority (State Department and the White House) to consider a proposal for an on-island operation to split the CASTRO regime. The proposal was presented to Mr. HURWITCH,[^1] the State Department Cuban Coordinator, by Tad SZULC (AMCAPE-1) of the *New York Times*. On 6 February 1963, Albert C. DAVIES, (Lt. Col. on military detail to WH/4 - Cuba) met with SZULC at SZULC's residence, to discuss the plan.[^2] SZULC referred to it as the "Leonardo Plan." While at first hesitant, SZULC finally revealed that Dr. Nestor MORENO (AMICE-27)[^3] was one of its prime originators. SZULC said that he first thought of bringing the plan to the attention of President KENNEDY, as he had had a standing invitation, since November 1961, for direct contact with President KENNEDY, Attorney General KENNEDY, or Mr. McGeorge BUNDY, on matters concerning Cuba. He decided against that approach, however, and instead determined to use the Cuban Coordinating Group. SZULC later said that George VOLSKY (AMTRUNK-1) masterminded the plan, assisted by MORENO. It was agreed that CIA representatives would meet with SZULC and the two Leonardo planners, MORENO and VOLSKY, in Washington.[^4][^1]: [^2]:[^3]: [^4]:SECRET/SENSITIVE
[104-10103-10097.pdf — page 2]
The follow-up meeting on 9 February (in a safehouse) was attended by HURWITCH, Tad SZULC, Jorge VOLSKY, Dr. Nestor MORENO, and David MORALES, Col. A. DAVIES and Alfonso RODRIGUEZ of the CIA.3. A 11 February 1963 memorandum from RODRIGUEZ to the Chief, SAS, expressed definite interest in the operation with certain recommendations which included having JMWAVE Station put its operational mechanism into gear to have the Cuban personnel of the operation (now called AMTRUNK) ready for infiltration by mid-March 1963. Following a review of the AMTRUNK Project, JMWAVE forwarded a lengthy dispatch to Headquarters, dated 8 April 1963, which recommended that the operation be terminated soonest. Since it was a Headquartersoriginated operation, JMWAVE also requested Headquarters decision as to continuance or termination. A Headquarters cable to JMWAVE on 10 April 1963 concurred that the AMTRUNK operation should be terminated for a number of reasons, including the fact that CIA could not at that time be certain that hostile elements were unaware of the plan. A 17 April 1963 cable from Headquarters to JMWAVE Station advised that SZULC had informed HURWITCH that JMWAVE had given VOLSKY responsibility to decide whether or not the operation was to continue. It seems that Headquarters had intended to use VOLSKY, with his concurrence, only as a funding channel for the AMTRUNK operation if the AMTRUNK principals were willing to proceed with the operation independently. In any case, for some reason, CIA continued to2
[104-10103-10097.pdf — page 3]
SECRET/SENSITIVEsupport the operation. The two principals, MORENO (AMICE-27)and Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue (AMICE-14) claimed to have contactwith high-level GOC officials. They completed four infiltrationmissions to Cuba and were terminated in March 1964.4. Early phases of the operation resulted in the on-island   recruitment of Ramon Tomas GUIN Diaz (AMTRUNK-10), Modesto   Orlando OROZCO Basulto (AMTRUNK-9), and Carlos PEDRAZA Aguilar   (AMTRUNK-11). GUIN was arrested in February 1966. (CUBELA   was arrested at the same time, separately.) OROZCO, after   reportedly running scared, was exfiltrated and terminated in   March 1964. He returned to Cuba in December 1964 on an indepen-   dent exfiltration mission and apparently remained in Cuba.   There is some speculation that he might have been G-2. His   knowledge of the identity of internal AMTRUNK agents, caused   a planned infiltration mission to be scrapped. PEDRAZA was   arrested in December 1965, tried for alleged CIA activities   and given a 30 year prison sentence. JMWAVE Station advised   in March 1966 that four former AMTRUNK internal assets were   arrested for counterrevolutionary activities during early 1966,   in addition to CUBELA and GUIN, and that all of the principals   of the AMTRUNK network active during 1963 and 1964 had been   rolled up. The Cuban press reportedly identified DIAZ (AMICE-14)   as the clandestine infiltree who recruited GUIN.COMMENT: It appears that the opposition might havesucceeded in obtaining CIA financial and material support foran operation which was controlled by the planners. Theysucceeded, it seems, in identifying, neutralizing, and exposing3SECRET/SENSITIVE