Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10102-10237.pdf — page 8]
# SECRET- 7 -c. A/2 may also attempt to contact the following operational asset if he has an opportunity to make contact.Lester RODRIGUEZ, age late 30s early 40s, married, former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area. Following the Castro takeover he served as head of one of the military zones within Havana province. Eventually he was given lesser assignments and A/2 thinks he is now working in INRA in Oriente Province. He claims RODRIGUEZ assisted his underground group during 1961 by supplying trucks for transporting weapons and materials.E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS1. CoverA/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana. Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc. The two men will also be outfitted with disguises.2. CommunicationsPrimary communications will be established through an SW system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre- arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case of an emergency.F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which has considerable potential but also considerable risk. The area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals. Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before their first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at his father's farm for any length of time and he does not want his father to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on leaving the farm the same day he lands. This presents the problem of what to do with A/3. On approach is to take A/3
[104-10102-10237.pdf — page 9]
# SECRETto Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, however, mayjeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity andpatience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his busi-ness. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to under-take a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his busi-ness competently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication.For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towardsdeveloping assets around his father's farm with maritimereception capabilities.2. A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient numbe   of supporting assets to provide for his safety while in Havana   However, he has not seen VALS and DUARTE for over a year. In   addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army   organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness   in recruiting within the Army. Station reports on DUARTE con-   flict with A/2's evaluation of this man. While there is no   evidence to verify that DUARTE is pro-regime, there has been   a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims DUARTE is an   opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. A/2's   rebuttal to these remarks is that DUARTE has assisted him in   the past and when the chips were down he continued to aid him   in his underground activities. This still leaves a question   mark next to the worth of DUARTE which unfortunately can only   be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2. There are   other security implications which should be discussed in this   evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly se-   curity conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a   contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case   officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking   contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip   was in the offing. A/2 has written several other letters   not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impres-   sion. A/3 on the other hand talked quite freely about his   operation to four friends in New York prior to coming to   Miami and being safehoused. He explained that he was joining   AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them   first to Miami and then to Cuba. Once there they would go   to his father's farm and begin to make contacts. A/3 also   stated that a man named DUARTE would be one of their con-   tacts. This loose talk coupled with A/3's attitude that   KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candi-   date for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated   three days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will   gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he   presents.SECRET
[104-10102-10237.pdf — page 10]
SECRE- 9 -3.  The above evaluation stresses the operational and security weaknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and re-cruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime operations at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential. Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close watching in terms of security and control for these factors will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position if not properly contained.IV. PHASE IIA. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL1.  AMICE/27, senior member of the AMTRUNK group, is a 41 year old PBRUMEN citizen from a wealthy high class family. His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959, A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities. In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under-Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground activities had come to the attention of the government and he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy. He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late 1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly motivated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego, and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to take offense. He is frank to state that he has a low opinion of KUBARK, that he is not a KUBARK agent and he deeply resents any implication that he is working for KUBARK. He states that he is working for the overthrow of the present regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he pre-sents a difficult handling problem.2.  AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a law graduate of the University of Havana. He has been in-volved much of his adult life in clandestine activities. Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME. He is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has a very highly developed security consciousness, developed from his counter-revolutionary experiences. From January to July 1961 he made four black infiltration/exfiltration trips to and from Cuba and PBPRIME, and has an excellent knowledge of the northern Maranzas area. He is easy to work
[104-10102-10237.pdf — page 11]
# SECRET- 10 -with and has evidenced little of the hostilities or anti- KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27.3. AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a year old fisherman from the area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963. He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will be used as a maritime guide.B. TASKS1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil operations.2. Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline into the mainland, including making arrangements for transportation into Havana.3. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana and obtain safehousing and operational support.4. Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfiltration and future infiltrations.5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts among important military figures.6. Establish internal and external communications.7. Exfiltrate from Phase II.C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANSIt is tentatively planned to infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14, and AMTRUNK/4 into the Cinco Leguas Keys area on or about 23 April. Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor into the Keys area and remain in the area for approximately three days, during which time they will remain black, keep the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14 on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747) and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be worked out at this time with these contacts for a second infiltration in the latter part of May, at which time AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to be passed on through these contacts to Havana. Subjects will exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).SECRET
[104-10103-10038.pdf — page 1]
# SECRET27 FEB 1974MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector GeneralSUBJECT : Howard Hunt1.  At the recent request of the Deputy Director for Management and Services, the Office of Finance has searched its records to determine if we could find any payment to Mr. Hunt in an amount of approximately $30,000 that required no accounting.2.  We have searched the following records:a. The expense runs for the period July 1964 to June 1973 for the immediate Office of the DCI, the immediate Office of the DD/P, FI Staff, CI Staff, CA Staff and the Office of Security. We have checked various items that were reflected in these expense records but have identified nothing relating to Mr. Hunt.b. The Madrid Station, JMWAVE and FR/Washington Office accountings to determine if there were funds passed by the Stations to Mr. Hunt during the year he served under non-official cover in Madrid. We could find no payment to Mr. Hunt either in his true name or his two identified pseudonyms.c. Mr. Hunt's travel claims for the period 1960-1972 and have found nothing in these travel claims that were not consistent with normal travel expenses, i.e., transportation, per diem.d. We made a specific analysis of Mr. Hunt's advance account for the period he was under non-official cover (July '65-Sept '66) and haveSECRETE2 IMPDETCL BY: 006567
[104-10103-10038.pdf — page 2]
# SECRETSUBJECT: Howard Huntdetermined that $33,500 was advanced to him for travel and transportation of household goods to and from Madrid with one trip to Paris for he and his family to renew their Spanish visas. All of this advance was fully accounted for. However, in his accounting, one item appeared unusual. It was an expenditure of $1,600 for a sensitive operation which was approved for write-off by Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald on 1 June 1966 without further accounting.3. Also, we confirmed that no other Agency advance accounts were established for Mr. Hunt during this period.4. At the beginning of his non-official cover tour, it was necessary to establish a bank account in his name. The EUR Division accordingly requested we open an account at the Chase Manhattan Bank in Mr. Hunt's name to receive all non- salary payments. (Mr. Hunt had an account at Riggs National Bank to receive his salary and allowance payments). The following deposits were made to the account during 1965 and 1966:Account opened: 13 July 1965|                   |         || ----------------- | ------- || 13 July 1965      | $10,000 || 22 July 1965      | 5,000   || 15 September 1965 | 5,000   || 6 October 1965    | 5,000   || 19 July 1966      | 5,000   ||                   | $30,000 |All of the above have been accounted for by submission of travel and transportation accountings.5. We feel at this time without specific guidelines that further searching would be somewhat fruitless. One strange aspect of the non-official cover assignment in Madrid is that all the costs were charged to the support allotment of the EUR Division which is not normal as non-official cover people are usually assigned to a project. It is unusual to have a case officer abroad for one year on an operational assignment without him incurring operational expenditures.
[104-10103-10038.pdf — page 3]
SECRETSUBJECT: Howard Hunt6. The Office of Finance has not found operational expenditures except for the $1,600 mentioned above. Therefore, it is suggested that Mr. Karamessines be questioned as to a project or projects to which Mr. Hunt's operational expenditures if incurred would have been charged.7. Another possible course of action is to request the Director to approve my asking a cleared contact at Chase Manhattan Bank to provide a transcript of all entries into Mr. Hunt's Chase Manhattan Bank account.8. We are currently reviewing records of all cashier's checks prepared and issued by Monetary to determine if any were payable to Mr. Hunt. Hopefully this effort will be finished by the end of the week.![signature of Thomas B. Yale]Thomas B. YaleDirector of Finance- 3 -SECRET![signature]
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 0]
104-10103-10079 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRET - SENSITIVEDraft Memorandum to the DCI from William HarveyDated 27 November 1962This is not a controlled item
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 1]
R# SECRET - SENSITIVE# 27 November 1962Note: Discussed 27 November 1962 by DD/F with DCI and approved general! in principle by ICI. Fully concurred in by DD/P.MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central IntelligenceTHROUGH: Deputy Director (Plans)SUBJECT: Operational Plan for Continuing Operetions Against Cube1. Action: This memorandua is for your information and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action are contained in Paragraph V below. The purpose of this menu is to delineate an operational plan for the action which we believe should be taken by CIA against Cube for the predictable future. In summary the plan provides for continuing, even intensifying, the intelligence effort against Cuba and for the reorientation of the current effort into a long tera denied area type of operation of the highest priority.I. ASSUMPTIONS:A. The United States Government will give public assurances that, provided no nuclear or offensive weapons Fro present or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cube does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, the United States does not intend to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.# SECRET - SENSITIVETHIS DOCUMEUT ISA SCURCEIN CS HIC CAPAPER NO.-DO NOT DESTROY
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 2]
B. These assurances will preclude any meaningful CIA action on a phased basis to provoke a revolt inside Cube, since unless there are major changes in operational and internal conditions in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at the most, a few days unless supported by a major United States Military commitment. In addition, the non-invasion assurances as a practical matter will preclude invading Cuba on the pretext of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanamo.C. CIA operations involving a high noise level and a distinct element of attributability, particularly paramilitary, guerrilla, and commando type operations will be unacceptable as a matter of policy.D. The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is possible that recent and future developments including the Soviet action in removing the offensive weapons from Cube mey serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over Cuba has been substantially weakened.E. The United States assurances of no invasion and no support of an invasion will, in effect, constitute giving to Castro and his regime a certain degree of sanctuary. This will-2-
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 3]
severely damage the morale and motivation of anti-regime Cubans both inside and outside of Cuba, which will make it increasingly difficult for us to recruit agents, maintain agents already recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communist regime.F. Despite the above factors, Higher Authority probably will continue heavy pressure on the CIA for a maximum effort against Cuba and may even continue to contend that the ultimate objective is the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime. This is an unrealistic objective, however, except on a very long-term basis as the United States Government, we believe, will be unwilling in the immediate future to commit troops to support such an overthrow. The United States Government in its overt dealings with the Cuban exiles probably will not express the above factors to them in the context or with the bluntness stated here.G. In view of these factors, the so-called "Track Two", course of action, 1.e., unlimited support of Cuban exiles and exile groups with no real control or objective purposes in the hope that these groups will be able to shake the Castro regime will, although unrealistic, become increasingly attractive at various levels in the United States Government.H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and economic pressures short of blockade, raids, and aggressive sabotage against Cuba will be continued.-3-
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 4]
I. In view of the above assumptions paramilitary, commandoand sabotage operations, except in rare selective instanceswill serve little purpose; also they will be counter-productivesince, if undertaken, they will make the collection of intolli-gence more difficult and should only be undertaken in those veryfew instances where an unusually high return can be demonstrated.Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA foraction against Cuba, it would appear clear that Higher Authoritywill insist on a continued, even intensified, intelligencecoverage of Cuba.J. In view of the policy factors, an increased use offacilities, real estate and basing outside the United States,particularly in Latin America, will be both necessary anddesirable.K. Adequate aerial reconnaissance of Cuba will continue.II. OBJECTIVES:Based on the above assumptions, the following objectivesappear to be proper for continuing CIA operations againstCuba:A. Take all feasible clandestine action to isolateand assist in isolating the Castro-communist regime in Cubafrom the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of theFree World.B. To the maximum extent possible, discredit the Castro-communist regime in Cuba and in the Western Hemisphere and therest of the world.
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 5]
C. Maintain through clandestine means, short of commando and guerrilla type operations, the maximum economic and political pressures on the Cuban regime and economy not only for the purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on Bloc resources used to support Cuba.D. Maintain maximum possible intelligence and counter- intelligence coverage of Cuba, including particular emphasis on:1.  Capabilities and intentions of the government.2.  Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other security organs.3.  Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba.4.  State of potential resistance, including the morale and temper of the populace.5.  Militia and military order of battle and equip- ment.6.  The loci of power and of possible stresses and strains in the power centers in the Cuban government.7.  Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China, the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World and uncommitted nations.8.  The level of and the weaknesses in the Cuban economy.-5-
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 6]
E. Take maximum action to induce a split in the Cuban regime and maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately through clandestine means to the extent possible on any significant uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regime, or strains and stresses among Cuban leadership or in Cuban/Bloc relationships.III. OPERATIONAL PLAN:A. Espionage and Intelligence Collection - All feasible effort should be undertaken to continue and intensify intelligence collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelligence collection and related operational activity at the present time and its development during the past six months is delineated in detail in Attachment A, which was prepared to serve as the basis for the IG's report on this particular matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence. You will note that this lengthy document breaks down under numerous sub-headings the intelligence coverage which has been developed by the Clandestine Service. Set out below are specifics of operational action it is proposed to take to continue and, as possible, increase intelligence coverage of Cuba.1. Intelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As you know, with the quarantine and the cessation of air travel the heavy flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection-6-
[104-10103-10079.pdf — page 7]
with the contingency planning for supporting any possible military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locka Interrogation Center as such was dismantled, although the personnel of the Center have been retained intact. In order to re-establish the flow of intelligence from refugees, it is proposed that Pan American Airways and KLM be induced to reinstitute their regular flights from Havana to Miami. This should be done as soon as possible after the settlement of the current negotiations and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka refugee interrogation center will be re-established with the same personnel.2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communications with the 131 recruited agents now resident in Cuba. To an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort will of course depend upon the stringency of future Cuban security and control action, which it is impossible as yet to accurately forecast.3. Third Country Operations: The priority on recruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cuba will be reiterated and strengthened and every effort will be made to increase this coverage, both through the development of additional resident agents in Cuba-7-