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thinking about exposing the role of Miami attorney Alex E. *CARLSON,residing 145 Curtiss Parkway, Miami Springs, Florida, in theBay of Pigs operation. AMCARBON-1 stated that, if CARLSON wereof any current interest to REUTEMAN, then the Identity 3 wouldsoft peddle the CARLSON angle. REUTEMAN advised AMCAREON-1 thathe had no interest in CARLSON but knew of him and was of theopinion that CARLSON was a sound and honest attorney. The receiptof this operational intelligence enabled JMWAVE to brief CARLSONon the Identity 3's over-all interest in the role that CARLSON hadplayed in the Bay of Pigs invasion. This briefing, in turn,enabled CARLSON to more adequately prepare himself for a meetingwith AMCARBON-1. While AMCARBON-1 did attempt to pursue thisBay of Pigs story, he never did put anything into print as the storywas overtaken by other developments before AMCARBON-1 could finishhis research.c. In WAVE 0904, dated 9 July 1963, AMCARBON-l advisedJMWAVE that Mr. Trevor *ARMBRISTER, an associate editor for theSaturday Evening Post, was in Miami during July 1963 attemptingto research a story regarding the possibility that strategicmissiles were hidden in Cuban caves. This information enabledJMWAVE to keep Headquarters informed on sensational-type articleswhich might be appearing relative to Soviet missiles in Cuba.d. In WAVE 4701, dated 20 September 1963, AMCARBON-1gave JMWAVE his resume of the discussions which he had withAMBIDDY-1 at the Miami Playboy Club on 19 September 1963. Thisinformation was useful in obtaining an insight into what AMBIDDY-1was telling the press.e. In WAVE 5661, dated 10 October 1963, AMCARBON-1reported on a discussion that he had had on 10 October 1963 withAMBIDDY-1's public relations man. This operational intelligencewas useful in terms of keeping KUBARK advised as to what AMBIDDY-1'srepresentatives were telling the outside world about theiroperational activities.f. In WAVE 6910, dated 31 October 1963, AMCARBON-1informed JMWAVE about the flood of telephone calis which werebeing received at the Identity 3 relative to so-called KUBARKvessels which were located in South Florida waters. Thisinformation alerted JMWAVE to the fact that press scrutiny wasgoing to be directed toward the Identity 5. Armed with this warn-ing, JMWAVE was able to take action which minimized the publicityrepercussions from a renewed press interest in the Identity 5.g. In WAVE7671, dated 16 November 1963, AMCARBON-1reported to JMWAVE the fact that he had received a letter fromPeru which contained an interesting operational lead to oneCarlos MONTALVANO in Puno, Peru. This lead was examined by JMWAVE,Headquarters and the Lima Station. This examination revealedthat the letter was written by a crackpot; thus, there was noreal operational potential in this lead. This incident did underscorethe fact that AMCARBON-1 is willing to bring potentially significantoperational leads to JMWAVE's attention.h. In WAVE 1614, dated 6 February 1964, AMCARBON-1advised JMWAVE that he had received numerous telephone callsindicating that Armando Andres GUIROLA Forte, who had defectedfrom a Cuban fishing vessel might be an individual who had previouslybeen seen in Miami during November or December 1963. At the sametime, AMCARDON-1 pointed out that he was suspicious and thoughtthat these telephone calls indicated that GUIROLA was not a bonafide defector, but was either a GOC agent or a KUBARK plant, whowas being used as a means of creating an incident which wouldembarrass the GOC, as a result of their fishing boats penetrating