Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10103-10108.pdf — page 2]
# SECRETterminated MORENO's involvement in the sensitive aspectsof AMTRUNK in November 1963.6. Since MORENO was one of the original authors of   AMTRUNK and already disliked the Agency, one can imagine his   feelings at that juncture. He sulked, refused at first to   take a position on the Rebel Army Radio Program, and caused   problems in general. By January 1964 MORENO was actually   interferring in the AMTRUNK Operation (by giving demoralizing,   conflicting information to AMTRUNK-9, for example) and   attempting to debrief returnees on behalf of VOLSKY and SZULC.   MORENO was fired, therefore, by RABEL on Station instructions   from the Rebel Army Radio Program in February 1964 and termin-   ated by the Station as of 5 March.7. Shortly after his termination, MORENO, using VOLSKY   as an intermediary, approached Mr. G. Harvey SUMM with a   proposal similar to the Leonardo Plan. The COS met with SUMM   on 1 April 1964 and advised him how to put off MORENO.8. In August or September 1964, MORENO left Miami and   took a position as a Spanish-language professor in South   Carolina.CONCLUSION:MORENO apparently was a sincere anti-CASTRO revolutionary,but his dislike for and distrust of the Agency, which wasundoubtedly stimulated by SZULC and VOLKSY, made his involve-ment in AMTRUNK a liability to the security of the operation.It appears that MORENO, like many Cubans of the upper middle
[104-10103-10108.pdf — page 3]
class, had little sense of security. It is obvious that he trusted SZULC and VOLSKY far beyond what normal prudence would dictate. He probably was not a CASTRO agent, but he did help leak operational details and general plans to people who helped to spread the information more widely and who, themselves, were not trustworthy.LAD/JFK Tas Force 1977/Marty Millet:rpCopy filed: 201-3120914
[104-10103-10112.pdf — page 0]
# DISPATCH2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992TO: Chief, Special Affairs StaffINFO:FROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVESUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC/AMTRUNKProject AMTRUNK Operational ReviewACTION REQUIRED: REFERENCESPRIORITYACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or termination of Project AMTRUNK.1. Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March. Station views on the operation are summarized below.2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weak-nesses:MPRENDA. The AMTRUNKers admit to being anti-KUBARK and to be working "with" KUBARK now only because there was no other alternative if they were to accomplish their mission. In other words, these agents will cooperate with KUBARK only when it is to their advantage. It is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation, since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational successes increase. It is believed that AMICE/27 would have no hesitation "selling out" the operation to any one of the major refugee political groups at any time that he felt it advantageous to do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Escambray, headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his own way with the operation. He believes that he is receiving special attention because of his ZRMETAL connections, and he will not hesitate to go behind KUBARK's back to AMTRUNK/1, AMCAPE/1, and ODACID or higher authority, if the operation or KUBARK handling of the AMTRUNKS does not progress to his liking. Since AMTRUNK/1, according to AMCAPE/1, "masterminded" this operation in the first place, it may be assumed that the AMTRUNKS will withhold nothing from AMTRUNK/1.SZULCDistribution:3 - C/SAS w/attchs.DATE TYPED5 April 1963DATE DISPATCHEDAPRDISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBERUFGA-8381HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBERRETURN TO CIABackground Use OnlyDo Not Reproduce
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31 March 1963# PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEWI. STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2, and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164 on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from headquarters, was already at the training site when the team was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at the safesite until 16 March during which time he conducted training in clandestine methods and techniques. This training included security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communica- tions, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management, and operational planning and reporting. The training included group discussion and participation in a series of appropriate operational situations, several problems, and daily physical training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average of two or three hours with the group in operational discussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March, both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group, debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, workin out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through 30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons familiarization and firing. During the period under discussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were further processed on cover and finance problems. The results of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR 26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time. Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the training report for the week of 25 March.II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVEThe project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow the existing Cuban government by means of a conspiracy among high level military and civilian leaders of the government culminating in a coup d'etat which will oust both Castro and
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# SECRET- 2 -the Communists from power. A secondary and subordinate mission is to determine the climate prevailing among the populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission is exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions, the operation has been split into two initial phases, which will be compartmented from each other. Phase One involves the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3 on the north coast of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then exfiltrate black from the same point at which they infiltrated. Phase Two, involving AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, will consist of black infiltration through the keys area on the north coast of Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise go into Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black. These two phases are discussed in detail in following paragraphs. Phase One and Phase Two are preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes and to make initial contacts among certain select high level military figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as developed.III. PHASE I.A. AMTRUNK Personnel1. AMTRUNK/2 is a (21) year old Cuban who is mature for his years, and in some degree experienced in clandestine operations. He attended Catholic Social University in Havana for two years, majoring in Social Studies. Prior to Fidel's takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials. Following the Playa Giron invasioná great many in the Havana underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He continued in this work through 1961 and finally left Cuba via air in January 1962. Although A/2 does not consider himself an ally of KUBARK he has been cooperative throughout his/training. He is a pensive individual who displays good judgement. His present attitude towards KUBARK appears to be one of "wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is conscientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.SECRET
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# SECREEE## 08 - 3 -2. AMTRUNK/3, a 22 year old Cuban, in contrast to A/2, is volatile, immature and impulsive. On the other hand he is quite loyal to A/2 and his quick wit is appealing to his fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground as an action type, principally engaging in sabotage. His underground work began while he was in secondary school when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista. In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and began full time anti-Castro activities. After the crack down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally when the situation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for Miami in August 1962. While A/3 has performed satisfactorily in his training up to date, his performance falls far short of the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should only function as support for this operation and should not interfere in the actual plans of the operation. Furtunately his role in this operation is comparatively minor and he appears willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless, direct control of A/3 offers problems in the future.B. TASKS1. Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira (AMS 3785 I) and establish contact with the farm manager at A/3's father's farm in the Galera section (AMS 3885 III, Coords 993614)2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2 to Guanaba or Havana.3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his father's farm and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine communications. Having completed this he would then be ex-filtrated at Punta Jijira.4. A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational support through his contacts.5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with high level connections within the Rebel Army.6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandestine communications as well as arrange for transportation for his exfiltration..7. Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido (AMS 3885 II).
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C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS1.  The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltrees will make their way to A/3's father's farm one kilometer from the coast and from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go to Guanabo or Havana.2.  The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his infiltration. This arrangment, as yet, is not definite.3.  The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31 May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 feels that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged telegram signal would indicate his preference.4.  The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for maritime operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedule will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2 considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his contacts..D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA1.  Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the two men will work their way to a farm owned jointly by (A/3's father and Santos SUAREZ) located 1 kilometer from the point of infiltration. They will make contact with the manager of the farm named (Pedro CRUZ). (CRUZ) is (35 to 40) years of age, is married and has an elementary school education. He has no record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon CRUZ to make the following contacts in order to obtain transportation to Guanabo or Havana:a. (Roman HERNANDEZ) who lives a few kilometers away in Sierra del Arzobispo. (HERNANDEZ) owns a small farm and a butcher shop in the area and also owns a truck. He is (37 to 40) years of age, married with six or seven children. He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-revolutionary activities.b. If (CRUZ) is unsuccessful in getting (HERNANDEZ) truck he will contact Augusto MACHIN who operates a farm next to A/3's father's farm. He is (45-50) years old, married, no children, wife's name is (Alicia). He was the mayor of Santa Cruz del Norte in 1954. He owns a jeep.
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# SECRET- 5 -c. Another contact of A/3 is Ramon CALZADILLE age 21, single, 8th grade education. He provided support in the form of food and safehousing to underground workers in the past. His home address is Corojo #1, Cotorro, Havana. He owns a butcher shop in the (Cotorro) section of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 if he needs to be safehoused in Havana.2. The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and vehicles for A/2.a. Elsa Maria NEGRIN, 25 years of age, born in Havana. A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained correspondence with her. She has helped previously in providing safehousing for the underground. She also has a car.b. Pedro IGLESIAS Betancourt, age 55 born in Havana. He is a physician who lives and practices medicine in Havana. IGLESIAS has helped A/2 in underground activities previously. He has a brother, two daughters and a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months ago. Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of medicine at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he resigned. IGLESIAS is also a close friend of Elsa NEGRIN.c. Sergio MENDEZ age about 50 born in Cienfuegos, a former Senator (1954) as well as the former head of the Railroad system in Cuba. Subject was originally a member of the Autentico Party and claimed, to be a KUBARK confidante during Castro's takeover. MENDEZ has an apartment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in underground activities. He has a daughter who works for the government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The husband of this daughter, however, works for Che Guevara. A/2 has maintained correspondence with MENDEZd. Isabel MENOCOL, age about 35, born in Havana, single. Subject is an English teacher who runs a small private tutoring school in English in Havana. She was A/2's English teacher and offered support to the underground. MENOCOL lives by herself, has an automobile and is a close friend of A/2 and his wife.SECRET
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- 6 -e. (Gloria BAMCIALLA) age (23-24) born in Havana, single, mother and father deceased. She attended the University of Havana and Villanova from 1959 to 1960. She became a close friend of A/2 during their student days in Havana. She has no record of underground work. She lives in (Guanabo Beach) during the summer. A/2 felt he might attempt to contact her if she was living at (Guanabo Beach) in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessary3.  The following two operational assets will be contacted by A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.a. (Jorge VALS) age (Late 30s early 40s) married. Subject holds the rank of (Captain) in the Rebel Army but is not presently on active duty. He was a friend of Castro's during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains some contact with Fidel. He also claims (VALS) has been working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo groups. (VALS) primary interest has been trying to organize his friends within the Rebel Army against Fidel. A/2 feels (VALS) is a very discreet individual who has not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer by the G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of (VALS) and trusts him completely. A/2 saw and talked to (VALS) in 1962 prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refugee.b. (Jose DUARTE Oropesa) age early (40s) served in the U.S. Army during World War II. According to A/2, (DUARTE) was made commander of the (5th Military District) by Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos (DUARTE) was removed from the post and presently lives on an Army pension as well as royalties from property confiscated by the government. He said (DUARTE) started working against Castro within the MRP under Manuel RAY. For a time he was the military secretary of the MRP and became quite involved in plotting against Fidel. A/2 also stated that it was rumored at the time that (DUARTE) was working for the MRP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually (DUARTE) was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according to A/2 (DUARTE) was able to evade detection. Subject has good connections within the Rebel Army and revolutionary government. A/2 trusts this individual and has confidence in him as a potential operational lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention (DUARTE) as an opportunist.
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# SECRET- 7 -c. A/2 may also attempt to contact the following operational asset if he has an opportunity to make contact.(Lester RODRIGUEZ) age (late 30s early 40s) married, former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area. Following the Castro takeover he served as head of one of the military zones within Havana province. Eventually he was given desser assignments and A/2 thinks he is now working in INRA in Oriente Province. He claims RODRIGUEZ assisted his underground group during 1961 by supplying trucks for transporting weapons and materials.E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS1. CoverA/2 will be issued documentation claiming he is an employee of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana. Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc. The two men will also be outfitted with disguises.2. CommunicationsPrimary communications will be established through an SW system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre-arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case of an emergency.F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which has considerable potential but also considerable risk. The area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals. Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before their first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at his father's farm for any length of time and he does not want his father to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse. A/2 plans on leaving the farm the same day he lands. This presents the problem of what to do with A/3. On approach is to take A/3
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SECRETto Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. This, however, mayjeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity andpatience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his busi-ness. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to under-take a clandestine assignment on his own. When A/2 and 3step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2has a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his busi-ness compétently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication.For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towardsdeveloping assets around his father's farm with maritimereception capabilities.2. A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient numbe   of supporting assets to provide for his safety while in Havana   However, he has not seen VALS and (DUARTE) for over a year. In   addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army   organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness   in recruiting within the Army. Station reports of (DUARTE) con-   flict with A/2's evaluation of this man. While there is no   evidence to verify that (DUARTE) is pro-regime, there has been   a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims (DUARTE) is an   opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. (A/2's   rebuttal to these remarks is that (DUARTE) has assisted him in   the past and when the chips were down he continued to aid him   in his underground activities. This still leaves a question   mark next to the worth of (DUARTE) which unfortunately can only   be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2. There are   other security implications which should be discussed in this   evaluation. Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly se-   curity conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a   contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case   officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking   contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip   was in the offing. A/2 has written several other letters   not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impres-   sion. A/3 on the other hand talked quite freely about his   operation to four friends in New York prior to coming to   Miami and being safehoused. He explained that he was joining   AMICE/27 and AMTRUNK/2 on an operation that would take them   first to Miami and then to Cuba. Once there they would go   to his father's farm and begin to make contacts. A/3 also   stated that a man named (DUARTE) would be one of their con-   tacts. This loose talk coupled with A/3's attitude that   KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a marginal candi-   date for this operation. However, if A/3 is exfiltrated   three days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will   gain, his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he   presents.SECRET