Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10102-10232.pdf — page 2]
SECRETterminated MORENO's involvement in the sensitive aspectsof AMTRUNK in November 1963.6. Since MORENO was one of the original authors ofAMTRUNK and already disliked the Agency, one can imagine hisfeelings at that juncture. He sulked, refused at first totake a position on the Rebel Army Radio Program, and causedproblems in general. By January 1964 MORENO was actuallyinterferring in the AMTRUNK Operation (by giving demoralizing,conflicting information to AMTRUNK-9, for example) andattempting to debrief returnees on behalf of VOLSKY and SZULC.MORENO was fired, therefore, by RABEL on Station instructions,from the Rebel Army Radio Program in February 1964 and termin-ated by the Station as of 5 March.7. Shortly after his termination, MORENO, using VOLSKYas an intermediary, approached Mr. G. Harvey SUMM with aproposal similar to the Leonardo Plan. The COS met with SUMMon 1 April 1964 and advised him how to put off MORENO.8. In August or September 1964, MORENO left Miami andtook a position as a Spanish-language professor in SouthCarolina.CONCLUSION:MORENO apparently was a sincere anti-CASTRO revolutionary,but his dislike for and distrust of the Agency, which wasundoubtedly stimulated by SZULC and VOLKSY, made his involve-ment in AMTRUNK a liability to the security of the operation.It appears that MORENO, like many Cubans of the upper middle3
[104-10102-10232.pdf — page 3]
class, had little sense of security. It is obvious that he trusted SZULC and VOLSKY far beyond what normal prudence would dictate. He probably was not a CASTRO agent, but he did help leak operational details and general plans to people who helped to spread the information more widely and who, themselves, were not trustworthy.LAD/JFK Tas Force 1977/Marty Miller:rpCopy filed: 201-3120914
[104-10102-10233.pdf — page 0]
# DISPATCHTO:Chief, WHDChief, EEINFO:FROM:Chief of Station, Rio de JaneiroSUBJECT:BEDOX/OperationalSMEDIFY Information ConcerningTad SZULC (201-050539)ACTION REQUIRED:FYIREFERENCE(S):CLASSIFICATION:SECRET/NOFORNCONTINUED CONTROLDISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO.HBRA 9438HEADQUARTERS FILE NO.201-050539DATE:20 June 1962RE: "43-3" (CHECK "X" ONE)MARKED FOR INDEXINGNO INDEXING REQUIREDINDEXING CAN BE JUDGEDBY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY1. Attached is a SMEDIFY report concerning Tadeusz SZULC   which includes SMEDIFY's traces on SZULC.2. Station has the following information regarding Ignacy   SACHS, who is mentioned in the attachment.ALBICUSPID from ALBICUSPID-5, 4 May 1961 (ultimate source:Henryk HRANKROWSKI, former member of the Polish CommercialMission, in Brazil)Ignacy SACHS, upon his return from India, will notwork in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but willbe reassigned to the Latin American section of the PolishMinistry of Foreign Trade. He recently wrote a report onLatin America based upon material contained in the Southand Central American press. He reportedly had a fallingout with his superiors in the Foreign Ministry, hence thetransfer.ALBICUSPID from ALBICUSPID-5, 30 May 1961 (ultimate source:Czeslaw SLOWAKIEWICZ, Polish diplomat)Ignacy SACHS, after a period of disgrace, has a newjob, economic assistant for underdeveloped countries inDepartment III of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.![signature of frederick l. rouzicky]FREDERICK L. ROUZICYDistribution:1 - WHD w/attachment REC'D RIDIAN 22 Jueb21 - EE w/attachment1 - Sao Paulo2 - Files200/catti WH19 June 1962/boj![handwritten notes on the bottom of the page]CLASSIFICATIONSECRET/NOFORNCONTINUED CONTROLPAGE NO.1
[104-10102-10233.pdf — page 1]
2nd June, 1961.Tadeusz SZULCThe Station copies of the original reports on SZULC have been destroyed. I attach, however, a memorandum consisting of selected entries from his card.2. All the information is from the same source, a Polish emigre who knew SZULC personally and also had informants in the Polish Embassy.3. There is little doubt that SZULC was pro-communist at the time, and that he co-operated with Ignacy SACHS, a cousin who was employed by the Press Section of the Polish Embassy, and provided him with "information". It would, however, be unwise to jump to the conclusion that this collaboration took the form of espionage, since SZULCE does not seem to have made any secret of the relationship.4. I can find no evidence that Ignacy SACHS was an intelligence officer, but he seems to have been an active propagandist. He returned to Poland in 1954. A report from the same source, dated June 1956, stated that he then occupied the Brazilian desk at the Polish Institute for International Affairs.
[104-10102-10233.pdf — page 2]
Tadeusz SZULCBorn: c. 1926.Nationality: Pole. Naturalised U.S. citizen 1955.Occupation: Journalist.June 1947:Used to work for the "Brazil Herald" and now for FRANCE PRESSE. Is, on good terms with the Polish Legation whom he supplies with information on Brazil. One of the party who accompanied Raul FERNANDEZ on his mission to Montevideo. He is the son of Seweryn SZULC.Dec. 1947:sub-source:Re subject's efforts to find employment in American press circles. Mr. HORAN tried to help him, due to a letter ofHarold HORAN of introduction from SZULC's uncle, John WILEY, AmericanNew York:Ambassador in Lisbon, but desisted on finding that SZULC had been connected with the Rio de Janeiro communist paper "Diretrizes".Feb. 1948:Further details of subject's efforts to find a job in the United States. He is to work on the Palestine Commission of the U.N.O. as from middle of February.March 1948:Subject still in New York and writing regular reports on U.S. political affairs and personalities to the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Trying to get a job with U.S. Press through the influence of Mrs. J. WILEY.Sept. 1949:Subject at present in New York, married to an American girl, and working in one of the American News Agencies. Since arrival of new Legation (Warsaw) he was in touch with the Minister, the Secretary and the ex-Press Attache, the late Wikinski. Told by Warsaw Poles in Washington that to be useful he cannot have a job with the Press Dept. of the Washington Polish Embassy or the Polish Press Bureau in New York. Using his "Uncle" introduction letters (the U.S. Ambassador John Wiley married to Polish born, Irene BARUCH, who is the sister of the first Mrs. SZULC), he obtained a job with Americans on orders from the Poles. Subject is helped financially by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro. Thanks to introduction letters from the WILEYS, SZULC penetrated several circles in New York. He is writing reports to Rio de Janeiro and working with people in New York and is considered useful for future tasks.June 1951:Nephew of newly appointed U.S. Ambassador in PANAMA, he is now trying to get a job in Panama as American correspondent. He has a job with U.P. in New York. In Rio de Janeiro in 1947/48, was fellow traveller and informer of communist nucleus on the staff of the communist newspaper "Diretrizes". Also worked for FRANCE PRESSE and reported regularly on the Polish colony in Rio de Janeiro.June 1951:Visited Rio de Janeiro from 11.6.51 to 27.6.51 when he returned to New York. Whilst in Rio, he was in touch with Igancy SACHS to whom he brought information from the USA. The two are relatives and boyhood friends and subject writes personal letters to SACHS containing matters of interest to the Polish Legation. Subject also has useful contacts in New York in political and artistic circles, obtained through his Aunt. Is believed to be trying to obtain American citizenship through having married an American woman.
[104-10102-10233.pdf — page 3]
Sept, 1951:* Personal reports on the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, John WILEY, continue to be forwarded by the Polish Legation in Rio de Janeiro to Warsaw via subject.March 1952:Source met subject in America recently. Subject volunteered that he obtained much information on the differences of policy between the British and American Governments on the Persian problem through his aunt, the wife of John WILEY, and that he kept the Polish Government informed through Ignacy SACHS. He boasted acquaintance with Drew PEARSON and the Shah of Persia.
[104-10102-10237.pdf — page 0]
# DISPATCHTO: Chief, Special Affairs StaffFROM: Chief of Station, JMWAVESUBJECT: Operational/TYPIC/AMTRUNKProject AMTRUNK Operational ReviewACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or termination of Project AMTRUNK.1. Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March. Station views on the operation are summarized below.2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weaknesses:A. The AMTRUNKers admit to being anti-KUBARK and to be working "with" KUBARK now only because there was no other alternative if they were to accomplish their mission. In other words, these agents will cooperate with KUBARK only when it is to their advantage. It is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation, since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational successes increase. It is believed that AMICE/27 would have no hesitation "selling out" the operation to any one of the major refugee political groups at any time that he felt it advantageous to do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Escambray, headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his own way with the operation. He believes that he is receiving special attention because of his ZRMETAL connections, and he will not hesitate to go behind KUBARK's back to AMTRUNK/1, AMCAPE/1, and ODACID or higher authority, if the operation or KUBARK handling of the AMTRUNKS does not progress to his liking. Since AMTRUNK/1, according to AMCAPE/1, "masterminded" this operation in the first place, it may be assumed that the AMTRUNKS will withhold nothing from AMTRUNK/1.Distribution:3 - C/SAS w/attchs
[104-10102-10237.pdf — page 2]
31 March 1963# PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW## I. STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2, and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164 on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from headquarters, was already at the training site when the team was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at the safesite until 16 March during which time he conducted training in clandestine methods and techniques. This training included security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communications, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management, and operational planning and reporting. The training included group discussion and participation in a series of appropriate operational situations, several problems, and daily physical training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average of two or three hours with the group in operational discussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March, both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group, debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, workin out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through 30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons familiarization and firing. During the period under discussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were further processed on cover and finance problems. The results of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR 26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time. Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the training report for the week of 25 March.## II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVEThe project AMTRUNK Mission objective is to overthrow the existing Cuban government by means of a conspiracy among high level military and civilian leaders of the government culminating in a coup d'etat which will oust both Castro and
[104-10102-10237.pdf — page 3]
- 2 -the Communists from power. A secondary and subordinate mission is to determine the climate prevailing among the populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission is exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions, the operation has been split into two initial phases, which will be compartmented from each other. Phase One involves the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3 on the north coast of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then exfiltrate black from the same point at which they infiltrated. Phase Two, involving AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, will consist of black infiltration through the keys area on the north coast of Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise go into Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black. These two phases are discussed in detail in following paragraphs. Phase One and Phase Two are preliminary infiltrations designed to set up infiltration/exfiltration routes and to make initial contacts among_certain select high level military figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as developed.III. PHASE I.A. AMTRUNK Personnel1.  AMTRUNK/2 is a 21 year old Cuban who is mature for his years, and in some degree experienced in clandestine operations. He attended Catholic Social University in Havana for two years, majoring in Social Studies. Prior to Fidel's takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials. Following the Playa Giron invasioná great many in the Havana underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He continued in this work through 1961 and finally left Cuba via air in January 1962. Although A/2 does not consider himself an ally of KUBARK he has been cooperative throughout his training. He is a pensive individual who displays good judgement. His present attitude towards KUBARK appears to be one of "wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is conscientiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.
[104-10102-10237.pdf — page 4]
SECRET- 3 -2. AMTRUNK/3 a 22 year old Cuban, in contrast to A/2, is volatile, immature and impulsive. On the other hand he is quite loyal to A/2 and his quick wit is appealing to his fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground as an action type, principally engaging in sabotage. His underground work began while he was in secondary school when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista. In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and began full time anti-Castro activities. After the crack down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally when the situation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for Miami in August 1962. While A/3 has performed satisfactorily in his training up to date, his performance falls far short of the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should only function as support for this operation and should not interfere in the actual plans of the operation. Fortunately his role in this operation is comparatively minor and he appears willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless, direct control of A/3 offers problems in the future.B. TASKS1. Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira (AMS 3785 I) and establish contact with the farm manager at A/3's father's farm in the Galera section (AMS 3885 I)(Coords 993614)2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2 to Guanaba or Havana.3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his father's farm and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine communications. Having completed this he would then be exfiltrated at Punta Jijira.4. A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational support through his contacts.5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with high level connections within the Rebel Army.6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandestine communications as well as arrange for transportation for his exfiltration..7. Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido (AMS 3885 II).
[104-10102-10237.pdf — page 5]
# C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS1.  The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at Punta La Jijira is 18 May 1963. The infiltrees will make their way to A/3s father's farm one kilometer from the coast and from there A/2 will be provided with transportation to go to Guanabo or Havana.2.  The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after his infiltration. This arrangment, as yet, is not definite.3.  The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31 May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 feels that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged telegram signal would indicate his preference.4.  The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for maritime operations. In addition the infil-exfil schedule will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2 considers the minimum acceptable period of time to make his contacts..# D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA1.  Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the two men will work their way to a farm owned jointly by A/3's father and Santos SUAREZ, located 1 kilometer from the point of infiltration. They will make contact with the manager of the farm named Pedro CRUZ. CRUZ is 35 to 40 years of age, is married and has an elementary school education. He has no record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon CRUZ to make the following contacts in order to obtain transportation to Guanabo or Havana:    a. Roman HERNANDEZ, who lives a few kilometers away in Sierra del Azonicpo. HERNANDEZ owns a small farm and a butcher shop in the area and also owns a truck. He is 37 to 40 years of age, married with six or seven children. He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-revolutionary activities.    b. If CRUZ is unsuccessful in getting HERNANDEZ truck he will contact Augusto MACHIN who operates a farm next to A/3's father's farm. He is 45-50 years old, married, no children, wife's name is Alicia. He was the mayor of Santa Cruz del Norte in 1954. He owns a jeep.
[104-10102-10237.pdf — page 6]
SECRET- 5 -c. Another contact of A/3 is Ramon CALZADILLA, age 21, single, 8th grade education. He provided support in the form of food and safehousing to underground workers in the past. His home address is Corojo #4, Corollos, Havana. He owns a butcher shop in the Cotorro section of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 if he needs to be safehoused in Havana.2. The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and vehicles for A/2.a. Elsa Maria NEGRIN, 25 years of age, born in Havana. A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained correspondence with her. She has helped previously in providing safehousing for the underground. She also has a car.b. Pedro IGLESIAS Betancourt, age 55, born in Havana. He is a physician who lives and practices medicine in Havana. IGLESIAS has helped A/2 in underground activities previously. He has a brother, two daughters and a son now residing in the U.S. His daughters live in' New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months ago. Subject was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano, an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of medicine at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he resigned. IGLESIAS is also a close friend of Elsa NEGRINc. Sergio MENDEZ, age about 50, born in Cienfuegos, a former senator (1954) as well as the former head of the Railroad system in Cuba. Subject was originally a member of the Autentico Party and claimed to be a KUBARK confidante during Castro's takeover. MENDEZ has an apartment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in underground activities. He has a daughter who works for the government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The husband of this daughter, however, works for Che Guevara. A/2 has maintained correspondence with MENDEZd. Isabel MENOCOL, age about 35, born in Havana, single. Subject is an English teacher who runs a small private tutoring school in English in Havana. She was A/2's English teacher and offered support to the underground. MENOCOL lives by herself, has an automobile and is a close friend of A/2 and his wife.SECRET
[104-10102-10237.pdf — page 7]
- 6 -e. GLORIA BAMCIALLA, age 23-24 born in Havana, single,mother and father deceased. She attended the Universityof Havana and Villanova from 1959 to 1960. She becamea close friend of A/2 during their student days inHavana. She has no record of underground work. Shelives in Guanabo Beach during the summer. A/2 felt hemight attempt to contact her if she was living atGuanabo Beach in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessary.3. The following two operational assets will be contacted by   A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be   to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.a. Jorge VALS age late 30s early 40s, married. Subjectholds the rank of Captain in the Rebel Army but is notpresently on active duty. He was a friend of Castro'sduring the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintainssome contact with Fidel. He also claims VALS has beenworking in a limited fashion against Fidel and wasoriginally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristogroups. VALS primary interest has been trying to or-ganize his friends within the Rebel Army against Fidel.A/2 feels VALS is a very discreet individual who hasnot been identified as an anti-Castro organizer bythe G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of VALS andtrusts him completely. A/2 saw and talked to VALS in1962 prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refugee.b. Jose DUARTE Oropesa, age early 40s, served in theU.S.Army during World War II. According to A/2,QUARTE was made commander of the 5th Military Districtsby Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance ofCienfuegos, DUARTE was removed from the post and pre-sently lives on an Army pension as well as royaltiesfrom property confiscated by the government. He saidQUARTE started working against Castro within the MRPunder Manuel RAY. For a timehe was the militarysecretary of the MRP and became quite involved inplotting against Fidel. A/2 also stated that it wasrumored at the time that DUARTE was working for theMRP that he was also a KUBARK agent. EventuallyDUARTE was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but accordingto A/2 DUARTE was able to evade detection. Subjecthas good connections within the Rebel Army and re-volutionary government. A/2 trusts this individualand has confidence in him as a potential operationallead in spite of conflicting reports which mentionDUARTE as an opportunist.