Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10103-10112.pdf — page 10]
3. The above evaluation stresses the operational and security weeknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and recruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime operations at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results which these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential. Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close watching in terms of security and control for these factors will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position if not properly contained.IV. PHASE IIA. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL1.  AMICE/27, senior member of the AMTRUNK group, is a 41 year old PBRUMEN citizen from a wealthy high class family. His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos. Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959, A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities. In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under-Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground activities had come to the attention of the government and he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy. He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late 1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly motivated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego, and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to take offense, He is frank to state that he has a low opinion of KUBARK, that he is not a KUBARK agent and he deeply resents any implication that he is working for KUBARK. He states that he is working for the overthrow of the present regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he presents a difficult handling problem.2.  AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a law graduate of the University of Havana. He has been involved much of his adult life in clandestine activities. Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME. He is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has a very highly developed security consciousness, developed from his counter-revolutionary experiences. From January to July 1961 he made four, black filtration/exfiltration trips to and from Cubaland PBPRIME, and has an excellent knowledge of the northern Matanzas area. He is easy to work
[104-10103-10112.pdf — page 11]
SECRET- 10 -with and has evidenced little of the hostilities or anti-KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27.3. AMTRUNK/4. Subject is a 49 year old fisherman from the Cárdenas area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963. He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will be used as a maritime guide.B. TASKS1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil operations.2. Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline into the mainland, including making arrangements for transportation into Havana.3. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana and obtain safehousing and operational support.4. Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfiltration and future infiltrations.5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts among important military figures.6. Establish internal and external communications.7. Exfiltrate from Phase II.C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANSIt is tentatively planned to infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14, and AMTRUNK/4 into the Cinco Leguas Keys area on or about 23 April. Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor into the Keys area and remain in the area for approximately three days, during which time they will remain black, keep the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14 on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747) and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be worked out at this time with these contacts for a second infiltration in the latter part of May, at which time AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to be passed on through these contacts to Havana. Subjects will exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).SECRET
[104-10103-10112.pdf — page 12]
# SECRET-- 11 --D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA1.  Cayo Cinco Leguas. This key is used for production of charcoal and salt. Residents are reported solidly anti-Communist. A/14 has two contacts here that he used previously for infils and exfils. One is "Tango" (Garcia Lezcano) whom A/14 wanted to use as a guide in this operation, but who was already being utilized elsewhere The other contact is the owner of the Salina (salt drying beds) A/14 has not yet been able to recall this individual's name.2.  Finca Casualidad. This area is directly south of Cinco Leguas, on the mainland. Key contacts here are (Antonio Garcia) (not related to Tango, above) and (Pablo Lopez) both of whom have small farms in the area.3.  Town of Marti. Contact here is"Perico" LNU. Subject is about 50 years old, is employed by INRA and has a jeep which was used previously by A/14 for operational purposes.4.  City of Cardenas. Contact is (Pedro Barbi owner of the Bate Marino restaurant Subject is a close friend of A/14 who assisted him previously with transportation for maritime receptions. (Barbi) would be used to take A/14 and A/27 to Havana. Owns a car.5.  City of Matanzas. A-14 has a friend here named (Carlos) Pedraza who also assisted A/14 in underground activities in 1961. Subject is 60 years old, married, and is a forman of public works in the city. Subject has a son Carlos how in New York City Pedraza will be contacted for transpor-tation to Havana. Owns a car.6.  Varadero. "Fifo" (Pineiro) owns a car and was formerly a close friend of A/14. Subject was formerly active in the underground and might be used by A/14 in the event he could not use (Barbi) or (Pedraza) for obtaining transportation. (Pineiro) is the brother of the communist Manolo Pineiro, aka "Barba Roja", but is reported to be anti-communist himself.7. Havanaa. (Adolfina (Suarez) More) Subject is single and lives with her mother. Is friend of AMICE/27 (possibly mistress) and can be used as safehouse keeper. Subject is sister of (Rafael (Suarez) More) (a Commandante inthe Navy) who, according to A/27, was at one time (chief of naval operations. His present assignment or location is unknown.# SECRET
[104-10103-10112.pdf — page 13]
SECRET## 12b. (Manuel (Garcia) Sanchez) Is a close friend of A/14 and is uncle of (A/14's) wife Can be used for operational support, a car, and safehousekeeping. Was formerly a Lt. in Oriente under (Calixto Garcia) but no longer in army. A/14 believes he is now an administrator of some type of industry in Havana.c. (Maria Josefa (Isalgue)) Subject is aunt of A/14 and can be used as safehouse keeper. She is single, lives alone except for ten cats. Does not have a car. Was formerly a teacher but now has a pension and does not work.d. (Gonzalo (Lopez) de la Torre) Subject is a relative of A/27 and can be called on for ops support or safehousing. Subject has a car, is married, no children, is in his sixties.e. (Bebo (Orozco)) To be recruited by A/14 as his principal agent in Havana. Subject and A/14 previously worked together in the underground. (Orozco) was in the Sierra with Castro and also fought in Camaguey. He resigned from the army in February 1959, although he has maintained many contacts within the army. Was one time active in the Movimiento Democratico Martiano and was a friend of (Capt. Bernardo Corrales) who was shot by Castro in Pinar del Rio. Subject came to PBPRIME in April 1961 with A/14 to obtain arms and remained there 10 days, infiltrating back into Cuba without his absence having been known to the authorities. Was responsible for safehousekeeping (Vargas Gomez) for nearly one month when authorities were searching for him. Will be used for intel collection and spotting on defectable army officers. He is also known to A/27, but not well. A/14 was last in touch with (Orozco) by letter about two months ago.f. Ramon (Guin) Diaz. Subject to be recruited by A/27 as principal agent. Would be used for operational intelligence and spotting among disaffected army officers. Would be kept entirely compartmented from (Orozco) Guin is an army Comandante, now managing a large INRA farm complex outside of Havana. He is known to A/27 and A/14, both of whom believe he can be contacted safely. He is anti-Communist and is one of the group of Camilo Cienfuegos officers contacted by A/27 in early 1961 to join in an overthrow of the government.co-defendant in CUBELA trial - IN prisonSECRET
[104-10103-10112.pdf — page 14]
# SECRET- 13 -g. Target personalities who are suspected of being disaffected and on whom A/27 and A/14 will attempt to gather information in Havana are as follows:1. Comandante "Macho" Parra2. Cdte. Oscar Guerra3. " Jose Pinares4. Capt. FNU Lawton5. " Manuel Avila6. Cmdte. Rene de los Santos7. " Pedro Miret8. Capt. Juan Nuiry9. Cmdte. Rafael Suarez More10. Capt. Fernando Fernandez Superville11. Capt. FNU Guerra Matos12. Capt. Sandy Olivares13. " Jose Fernandez AlvarezThese names have all been checked through JMWAVE RI and in most cases also with AMLEO/3. In a majority of cases there appears to be some evidence to indicate the subjects may be disaffected. In the case of Jose Pinares however, it would appear that he is completely loyal to the regime. This information was passed on to A/27 and A/14. RI files were negative on Avila and Lawton.E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONSAMICE/27 and AMICE/14 will live black during their entire stay in Cuba. They will be equipped with alias documentation and with disguises. Both of them have previously lived in the Havana area and know the city well. They will be trained in Secret Writing (SW) and will plan to train at least two and possible three agents in Havana in SW, prior to their own exfiltration. In addition, it is planned to train A/27 and A/14 in OWVL. At the time of infiltration, exfiltration plans will have been laid on with the agents. In the event that a change in time or location of exfiltration becomes necessary, an OWVL message could be sent to the agents. Any urgent and immediate message which might have to be sent by the agents during their short stay in Havana would be on a prearranged open code system by commercial telegram. Such a system will be worked out to cover several possible contingencies. Internal communications of whatever net is organized by A/27 and A/14 will be arranged by courier, cut-out, live and dead drops.F. OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION1. The LCFLUTTER examinations on both AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 were inconclusive. Although it is the opinion of both the case officers and the training personnel who have been in close contact with these individuals that both agents are
[104-10103-10112.pdf — page 15]
# SECRET- 14 -highly motivated and strongly anti-communist, this point will remain basically unresolved since it is almost certain that A/27 would refuse a second LCFLUTTER examination if asked. It is believed that A/27 was withholding information during the LCFLUTTER and subsequently. The nature, seriousness, and possible consequences of this are as yet not clear.2. A/27 has told at least two people something about this operation. Although he says that he did not give any details of the operation, he does admit to having discussed it in very general terms with two individuals whom he named at the time of the LCFLUTTER test. One of these is a friend of Gutierrez/Menovo and one a friend of Vargas Gomez.THERE SAME USUSPICISOhe was 6-2 agent.3. AMICE/27 has not seen his contacts in the army for the past two years. Although it is difficult to assess how well he knows various persons in the military about whom he speaks, it is the case officer's opinion that few of these contacts might be considered really close. AMICE/14 has been out of direct touch with his operational contacts since July 1961.4. The infiltration into Cayo Cinco Leguas is dependent upon having a good guide in the boat. At this time, Phase II is awaiting the recruitment of AMTRUNK/4 as guide.5. Control over AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 is basically lacking. Some control can be exerted through the implied threat of withholding support to the operation. Control however will remain tenuous at best and A/27 will continue to be a difficult handling problem.6. On the positive side of the ledger is the calibre of the agents, both of whom are well educated, astute, and highly motivated. Both agents have experience in clandestine operations, particularly A/14 who has made a number of previous clandestine entries and exits and has many operational contacts. To date both have performed in a superior manner in training.## V. FUTURE PLANSDuring the week of 1 through 6 April, the team will receive maritime instruction. During the week 8 through 13 April, they will receive SW training, possibly OWVL training, disguise training, and further operational planning sessions.## VI. COMMITMENTS1. According to AMICE/27, the following principle, which he feels is a commitment from ODYOKE, was enunciated during his initial trip to ZRMETAL: "ODYOKE will recognize a new CubanSECRET
[104-10103-10112.pdf — page 16]
# SECRET- 15 -government which is anti-Communist and which operates on democratic principles; ODYOKE does not desire to impose a government of its own choice upon Cuba". A/27 has made a big point of discussing this "commitment". It is apparent that he intensely dislikes (or fears?) Batista and his followers. It is also apparent that in his mind he links Batista and KUBARK, and fears that KUBARK would back Batistianos in a post-Castro government.2.  All AMTRUNK group members think that they received a commitment while in ZRMETAL that that ODYOKE would support their operational plan, with funds, training, logistical support. and technical assistance, but would leave control of the operation entirely in their hands. In other words they are not working for ODYOKE or KUBARK in any sense. On this point they are very sensitive.3. Another commitment which AMICE/27 claims to have discussed in ZRMETAL is that ODYOKE should give "official recognition" to members of a conspiracy which culminates in a successful coup d'etat, following the coup, in order that these individuals will not be treated as political criminals by a future regime. This means recognition of an individual's participation in the conspiracy, not a promise of recognition of a specific government formed by the conspirators themselves.4. Discussion of the above "commitments" has been pressed several times by A/27. PEGGINS has not agreed to any of these commitments with A/27. However, A/27 feels that the commitments have already been made by ODYOKE in ZRMETAL. PEGGINS has told A/27 that he will report these "commitments" back to ODYOKE to determine if, in fact, ODYOKE considers them as commitments.5. The only commitment made by JMWAVE through PEGGINS has been that if any of the AMTRUNK group were killed or captured while on the mission, their families in PBPRIME would be assisted for a "reasonable amount of time" financially. PEGGINS declined to state what that time would be or how much financial assistance would be involved.6. One further negative commitment has been discussed between PEGGINS and A/27. PEGGINS has stated to A/27 that no commitment will be made at this time to support any internal group organized by the AMTRUNKS with weapons or explosives and that this extends specifically to no promise to support active sabotage with demolitions.N.BSECRET19-6-81/1.
[104-10103-10244.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992SECRET20 April 1977SUBJECT: Identification of Sensitive SourceThe sensitive source cited in paragraph 4, page 29, of Book V - Final Report of SSC to Study Governmental Operations - was an audio operation against the Cuban Embassy in Paris, France encrypted UNSUERRA. It is defunct and the files are retained in Archives in Warrenton. The French Desk will order for us if needed.A copy of the referenced communication, PARI 1664 (IN 69266) dated 27 November 1963, is attached. It was located in Volume 4 of Rolando CUBELA's official file, 201-252234. UNSNAFU-12, cited in paragraph 3 of that cable, is Marta FRAYDE, a Cuban alternate delegate to UNESCO and an unwitting FI source at that time.Please note that a copy of this cable was provided to Mr. Breckinridge to carry to a meeting on 11 June 1976 with Senators Hart and Schweiker.![signature of Chris Hopkins]Chris HopkinsLAD/Task Force (JFK)Attachment: a/s
[104-10103-10350.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992# SECRET14 January 1977.MEMORANDUMSUBJECT: Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez/(AMLEO-3)(201-249386)1. Born 7 April 1922 in Havana, Cuba, the son of a native-born American citizen, RABEL was brought up in comfortable circumstances. He attended high school in Cuba, completed the last year in New Orleans, Louisiana, and entered Tulane University in September 1938. He enlisted in the U.S. Army in December 1940 and eventually saw combat in France, Belgium, Germany and Austria. After discharge in December 1945, RABEL returned to Cuba to attend the University of Havana and this began a life of job changes, moving back and forth between the U.S. and Cuba, and, in general, rootless living.2. RABEL's background reads like that of a man with no allegiances or loyalties and no particular goals. Viewed in retrospect, his career presents a picture of unreliability. It is probable that RABEL's rootlessness and apparent unreliability applied both to his relations with CASTRO and to those with the Agency. It is quite possible, therefore, that he not only served the Agency in a superficial way but that he did the same for CASTRO at various times when it suited his purposes. Without postulating this sort of dual role (one which fits very well with his previous life) it is almost impossible to explain some of the reasonably good things he did for the Agency and the quite certain allegations that he was a CASTRO agent. This explanation is not fully satisfactory, but it does explain his career better than the charge# SECRET
[104-10103-10350.pdf — page 1]
# SECRETthat he was a CASTRO agent from the beginning. The question that must remain unanswered is whether he betrayed the AMTRUNK Operation. He was not arrested until September 1965 (when AMTRUNK had already run its course) but it appears quite certain that he cooperated with the DSE after his arrest and while he was in prison.3. RABEL joined in the clandestine activities against BATISTA in March 1952, first amongst the exiles in the U.S. and then after late 1952 from inside Cuba. He joined the Cuban armed forces to further his plotting and was assigned to the Cuban General Staff. He was the Cuban liaison officer with the U.S. Army mission in Cuba from November 1954 until April 1956. During his entire period in the Cuban army, RABEL was involved with dissident Army elements; when they attempted a coup in April 1956, RABEL was arrested. He was released shortly thereafter, worked in the chicken business for a year and then returned to the U.S. and worked with one of his brothers (Luis RABEL Nunez). In October 1957 he returned to Cuba and became involved with the 26th of July Movement but had to leave a year later when he was brought to the attention of the BA TISTA forces because of a bomb explosion. He smuggled weapons to Camilo Cienfuegos for about a year and then in October 1958 he joined the Cienfuegos group. Shortly after the CASTRO victory, CASTRO called upon RABEL to set up a Cuban Marine Corps, a job he held until February 1960, at which time he was appointed Chief of Viviendas Campesinas.# SECRET
[104-10103-10350.pdf — page 2]
# SECRETHe held this job until he defected to the U.S. in December 1962. It is worth noting that he rarely pursued one activity in one place for more than a year at a time from 1945 to 1962.4. RABEL gave Alfonso RODRIGUEZ the following reasons for his defection:a. Communist pressure, hounding, and the basic enmity of the Communist Party toward him. (This appears very reasonable in view of his service in the U.S. Army and training in some aspects of intelligence, such as prisoner interrogation. In addition, his schooling in the U.S. and the reasonable economic circumstances would not have been recommendations from the Communist point of view.)b. Strong backing by Fidel which protected him from more serious attacks from the Party. (This, too, seems entirely reasonable. His family farm was near the farm Fidel's father managed and RABEL and Fidel had known each other as children. In addition, RABEL's long involvement in the anti-BATISTA movement and with Camilo Cienfuegos were probably in his favor in CASTRO's view.)c. An obligation to protect the non-Communists in his department, which prevented his earlier defection, and uncertainty of his reception in the U.S. (In view of the number of defections from RABEL's department, there were, in fact, people to protect. Since RABEL had served in the U.S. Army, and probably felt the U.S. was his secondSECRET
[104-10103-10350.pdf — page 3]
# SECRETcountry, he could well have had questions about his reception after serving in the CASTRO government.)d. His resentment against the confining nature of a Communist State. (Since he never stayed in one place more than a short time in his entire life, to have been restricted to Cuba must have seemed a punishment.)5. RABEL was used to pitch Dr. Marta FRAYDE Barraue in Paris in July 1963, and to check out leads for the AMTRUNK Operation. One of his leads led to the recruitment of AMTRUNK-10. Later, in early 1964, RABEL was leader of the Rebel Army Group supported by the American Legion in Miami and was involved in the Rebel Army Radio program.6. There is no specific evidence (except the accusations below) that RABEL was involved in a suspicious way with the CASTRO regime during this period, but his desire to exfiltrate his wife and children was a constant source of difficulty between him and the Station. This problem led to his eventual termination in July 1964 and to a great deal of resentment on his part. He conspired constantly, from mid-1963 until his capture in Cuba in September 1965, to get into Cuba to exfiltrate his wife and children.7. RABEL was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment but was set free in July or August 1967, which is a strong indication that the charges that he worked for the DSE while in prison were true. Moreover, there is some indication that he may have attempted a provocation at Cuban behest immediately after his capture. There are two firm accusations that RABEL was a