Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
[104-10105-10293.pdf — page 1]
SECRET3. We then proceeded to the 29 items which we would like to see modified but which we could not consider classified. We made this clear to Hunt and went through them one by one, discussing our concern with each. Hunt contended that most of these items should not be considered sensitive since they had been publicized extensively; in some cases confirmed in testimony; and, in the case of other items, the principals involved were dead. However, he agreed to changes in the items referred to in paragraphs 1, 3, 17, and 32 of the CI Staff memorandum of 19 September. These involve the deletions of the names of Henry Pleasants and Frank Holcomb, both now retired under cover; a direct reference to joint operations with the British in Hong Kong against China; and the wording of his reference to CIA alias documentation used by the Watergate burglars. The language of this last item will be changed so that it no longer leaves the impression that the documentation was prepared by the Agency for this operation.4. When we had finished, Hunt and his lawyers emphasized as they had mentioned earlier in the meeting that it might be very difficult to get the publisher to agree to changes in the unclassified items. Mr. Snyder offered to present all of the items to the publisher for change without distinguishing between the classified and unclassified items. He said he would do this without implying they were all classified. I felt it necessary to turn down his offer because of the risk of the publisher being unwilling to accept that many changes with the result that we would have to go back to him on the three classified items, thus presenting a situation similar to our retraction of previously demanded deletions in the Marchetti book. I think there would be some danger of the publisher using this in his advertising and through reviewers for publicity purposes.5. As we were leaving, Hunt showed me what was described as a "comfort letter." This was a letter written by him to the publishers on 17 May 1974 at the publisher's request which said that in his opinion nothing in the manuscript violated any agreement between himself and the CIA, nor would subject him to prosecution under the espionage laws. As the meeting was ending, Hunt expressed his hope that no publicity would be given to it and that the Agency would not issue any kind of a press release. In view of the Director's decision that we shall issue a press release, I took pains to persuade Hunt that public acknowledgment of the fact that we had reviewed his
[104-10105-10293.pdf — page 2]
SECRETmanuscript would be in his interest as well as ours. He had referredmore than once during the meeting to the need to avoid the appearanceof "a bear hug"; in other words, collusion or cooperation between himand the Agency, leaving an inference that the book was designed to bea whitewash of CIA. In view of this, it was easy to convince Huntthat an Agency press release would be in his interest. I would notehere, however, that both Mr. Rocca and I felt that Hunt and hislawyers were genuinely cooperative and that a press release whichis too harsh or denigrates the book or Hunt's motives might be unfairand considered by him to be in bad faith. Hunt appears to retainadmiration and respect for the Agency and seems convinced thatnothing in his book will harm our operations or personnel.JOHN D. MORRISON, JR.Acting General CounselAttachmentscc: Acting DDOSAB/DDODC/CI StaffO/SecurityAsst. to DCIMr. Walter PforzheimerC/CCSOGC:JDM:sinOriginal - OGC Subj: PUBLICATIONS1 - Chrono3SECRET
[104-10106-10042.pdf — page 0]
# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992## SECRET20 October 1976RETURN TO CIABackground Use OnlyDo Not ReproduceMr. (Emmett M. Steele) PresidentInternational Art Associates, Ltd.Dear Hr. (Steele,)This document is intended to confirm discussions held between yourself, representing (International Art Associates, Ltd), hereinafter referred to as the "Company", and Mr. John J. Murray, Jr., representing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). If it conforms to your understanding of the agreement reached, kindly so acknowledge by signing below.1. You have agreed on behalf of the Company to assist CIA by placing on retainer Mr. Richard T. Gibson at an annual fee of $9,000 per annum. This fee will be paid to Mr. Gibson by the Company in monthly increments of $750 each. The Company will overtly negotiate a retainer contract with Mr. Gibson, which will make eminently clear that both are negotiating and concluding the contract as independent parties; that the Company will have no obligation to withhold Federal, state or Social Security income taxes.2. In consideration of the support rendered, CIA will pay the Company a fee of $10,000 per annum. Provision is made in this amount to offset any nominal expenses the firm incurs in its overt associations or support of Mr. Gibson.3. CIA will reimburse the Company in quarterly increments via a contrived contractual arrangement between the Company and a notional facility of CIA. Cancelled checks will serve as adequate accounting for monies paid the Company.4. Because of CIA's interest in Mr. Gibson, it is requested that the Company neither offer Mr. Gibson bona fide employment nor accept any proposal of employment from him without prior consent of CIA for a period of two (2) years following termination of this agreement.E2IMPDETCL by: 063837
[104-10106-10042.pdf — page 1]
SECRET5. All information relating to this Agreement is classified secret. Both CIA and the Company agree that the most stringent safeguards will be taken to protect this information, including the existence of the agreement. Any information in any form that must be given to a third party by either CIA or the Company will be done in strict conformance with the laws safeguarding national security information, and only with full consultation between CIA and the Company.6. This agreement is effective 1 October 1976 and shall remain in full effect for an indefinite period, subject to cancellation at any time upon sixty (60) days' notice by either party thereto.The CIA wishes to express its appreciation for the manner in which you have received this request to perform a service related to the national security of the United States and for your personal attention thereto.CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYBYSpecial Contracting Officer(International Art Associates, Ltd.)(Emmett M. Steele, PresidentDate
[104-10106-10143.pdf — page 0]
2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERSFILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: HSCA Request Ltr 8 May 1978 OLC 78-1573INCLUSIVE DATES: Directorate of S & T Memo 22 June 1978CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION:ROOM:DELETIONS, IF ANY:| DATE RECEIVED | DATE RETURNED | REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME) | SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICI    || ------------- | ------------- | ------------------------ | -------------------------------- || 7-7.78        | 7-7.78        | G.ROBERT BLAKEY          | ![Signature of G. Robert Blakey] || 7-10-78       | 7-10-78       | Kenneth Klein            | ![Signature of Kenneth Klein]    || 9-26-78       |               | Johanna Smith            | ![Signature of Johanna Smith]    ||               |               |                          |                                  ||               |               |                          |                                  |NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE
[104-10106-10143.pdf — page 1]
# Top Secret(Security; Classification)CONTROL NO. SC-01836-78Copy 1ROUTING| TO: | NAME AND ADDRESS        | DATE | INITIALS || --- | ----------------------- | ---- | -------- || 1   | Scott Breckenridge, OLC |      |          || 2   | 6D15, Hqs.              |      |          || 3   |                         |      |          || 4   |                         |      |          ||     | ACTION      | DIRECT REPLY | PREPARE REPLY  || --- | ----------- | ------------ | -------------- ||     | APPROVAL    | DISPATCH     | RECOMMENDATION ||     | COMMENT     | FILE         | RETURN         ||     | CONCURRENCE | INFORMATION  | SIGNATURE      |REMARKS:| FROM:                        | NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. | DATE || ---------------------------- | ---------------------------- | ---- || AEO/DDS&T, 6E60, Hqs., x6561 |                              |      |Handle ViaCOMINTChannelsAccess to this document will be restricted tothose approved for the following specific activities:Warning NoticeSensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods InvolvedNATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATIONUnauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions# Top Secret(Security Classification)E2 IMPDET
[104-10106-10143.pdf — page 2]
# TOP SECRET' - EIDER - CHESSSC-01836-78Copy 122 JUN 1978MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Legislative CounselATTENTION : Scott BreckenridgeSUBJECT : HSCA RequestREFERENCE : HSCA Letter Dated 8 May 78, OLC 78-15731. (U) Reference requests access to information in six areas pertaining to the U-2 Project. As you know the U-2 Project files include about 150 boxes and over 650 reels of microfilm, all located at the Records Center. We have reviewed the shelf listing titles to identify pertinent files that might be responsive to the areas of request. The information requested covers an era and an organization which was not a part of this Directorate. As a result much of the corporate memory is no longer available and research of the files by current personnel is time consuming and requires almost a learning process. We have depended a great deal on the written History of the U-2 Project for leads to files and for information contained in this memorandum.2. (U) The primary interest of reference refers to the U-2 Project, Detachment C, while stationed in Atsugi, Japan. Attached are replies keyed to the six areas in the HSCA letter.3. (U) We realize that the information supplied by this memorandum does not fully respond to all the areas requested. Because of the broad and encompassing nature of some of the requests in the HSCA letter and the fact that our files are not organized to readily respond to such broad requests we request that the HSCA staff review the material and determine if their requests could be limited or narrowed in some way.![signature of Thomas G. Ward]Thomas G. WardActing Executive OfficerDirectorate ofScience and TechnologyAttachments:As statedMay be downgraded toUnclassified whenremoved from attachment.CL BY: 469804TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS
[104-10106-10143.pdf — page 3]
# TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESSAttachment To:SC-01836-78SUBJECT: DDS&T Interim Reply to HSCA Request, 8 May 78,OLC 78-1573General Background: Detachment C advance party of security and communication personnel departed the U.S. for Atsugi, Japan, on 20 February 1957, the second echelon of administrative personnel departed 4 March, and the main body of the detachment with two U-2 aircraft and equipment began deployment on 15 March. On 29 March Headquarters was notified that all personnel and equipment were on base. Operational readiness was forecast for the week of 8 April. Operating procedures and liaison had been accomplished with the following major U.S. components:Far East Air ForceFar East Command and Theater CommanderAgency's Tokyo Station and local support unit54th Weather Reconnaissance SquadronAtsugi Naval Air StationDetails or specific operating agreements or procedures with the above components have not been located.By mid-May 1957 the Detachment had flown 30 sorties. All of these operations were preparations for the primary mission of the Detachment. The first primary mission of the Detachment, a flight over part of the USSR, occurred on 20 June 1957, however, this mission did not originate or recover at Atsugi.The first overflight of the USSR from Atsugi occurred on 1 March 1958 and this flight was the only and last flight. This flight, as other previous flights by other Detachments, was tracked by Russian radar, even though the U-2 aircraft had anti-radar applications, and a Soviet protest was made on 5 March 1958 by the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, Mikhail Menshikov. Attached are copies of the Soviet Aide Memoires of 5 March and 21 April 1958 (Tab A).The Detachment continued to perform non-USSR missions in the Far East area until the Powers flight of 1 May 1960. Redeployment of the Detachment began in early July, the last U-2 aircraft departed Japan on 9 July and all personnel and other equipment cleared the base and turned the facilities back to the Navy on 19 August 1960.TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS
[104-10106-10143.pdf — page 4]
TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESSDuring the deployment of Detachment C it performed approximately 86 operational missions, of these only 43 originated and recovered at Atsugi.1. Any and all information pertaining to the take-offs and landings of the U-2 at Atsugi, Japan, limited to the years 1959 through 1962.We have been unable to locate files which would contain logs of all take-offs and landings of the U-2 aircraft assigned to Detachment C. In addition to the mission flights stated above we must assume that there were a large number of take-offs and landings which would include flights for pilot familiarization, training, equipment testing, transitional and flights (purely for cover purposes). 322. Any and all information concerning the radar procedures, facilities, and staff involved with the U-2 flights at Atsugi, Japan, limited to the years 1959 through 1962.As stated in the General Background above we have not located details or specific operating procedures or agreements with the local Navy base at Atsugi.3. Any and all information pertaining to contact between Marine Air Control Squadron #1, Air Group II, 1st Marine Wing, and U-2 personnel at Atsugi, Japan, including but not limited to housing, recreational, and eating facilities - limited to the years 1959 through 1962.We have not identified any relationship between Detachment C and Marine Air Control Squadron #1. On the subject of housing, we have noted that late in 1957 families were permitted at Detachment C and as a result housing was provided in the compound assigned to the Agency Support Unit and ten houses were rented on the local market.4. Any and all information pertaining to defectors with knowledge of the U-2 program.The DDS&T has not located any information pertaining to defectors. We defer this request to the DDO.- 2 -TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS
[104-10106-10143.pdf — page 5]
TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS5.  Any and all information within the U-2 program file pertaining to defectors with knowledge of the U-2 program.See above.6.  Any and all information concerning Soviet knowledge of the U-2 program previous to May 1, 1960.Attached is an extract from a report dated 3 March 1958 concerning Soviet Air Defense which gives a summary of Soviet knowledge of the U-2 overflights between 20 June and 10 July 1956 (Tab B).Also attached is a copy of the Soviet protest note of 10 July 1956 concerning Mission 2013 on 4 July 1956 which was the first penetration of the Soviet borders (Tab C).- 3 -TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS
[104-10106-10143.pdf — page 6]
EMBASSY OF THE UNION OFSOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICSAIDE MEMOIRE5 March 1958According to precisely established data, on March 2, 1958, at 4:05 hours Moscow time, an American military jet aircraft, having appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan, violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the area of the settlement of Velikaya Kema and penetrated into the airspace of the Soviet Union, remaining over its territory for a considerable period of time. Thereafter, the aircraft left in the direction of the Sea of Japan in the area south of the Olga Bay.The information on this violation has been carefully checked and there is no doubt as to its authenticity. The military representatives of the United States, who in this case acted possibly without the knowledge of the Government of the United States, will perhaps deny the said violation, as has happened in the past. However, such a denial cannot eliminate the fact of violation itself. In any case, the Soviet side would have no interest in commenting on this incident if it had not actually taken place.At the present time, when negotiations are being conducted on the holding of a summit meeting which could contribute to an improvement of relations and to strengthening trust between states, the violation of the Soviet border by an American military aircraft may be evaluated as an attempt to undermine the efforts aimed at convening such a meeting and to aggravate the international situation.From the messages of the President of the USA and his conversations with the Soviet Ambassador, as well as from statements by other government officials of the USA, it is known to the Soviet Government that the Government of the USA desires a rapprochement between our governments and improvement in the relations between them. There can hardly be any doubt that such facts of violation of the borders of the USSR can have only one result--that of hindering this cause and upsetting Soviet-American relations.
[104-10106-10143.pdf — page 7]
The attention of the Government of the USA is invited to the fact that in the present situation the violation of the airspace of the USSR by an American military aircraft takes on a particularly dangerous character since, as has been repeatedly reported, American military planes make flights around the clock over many countries of the world carrying thermonuclear bombs. The Government of the USA cannot fail to be aware of what genuinely catastrophic consequences for the cause of peace will ensue when an American plane with such a load will find itself shot down.The attention of the Government of the USA has already been previously directed to cases of violation of the state boundaries of the Soviet Union by American military aircraft. However, as proven by the case cited, the authorities of the USA have not taken the necessary measures to prevent such violations.It is absolutely obvious that it is the duty of the governments of the USSR and the USA to do everything possible to prevent any acts capable of complicating the situation and the relations between the Soviet Union and the USA.The Soviet Government cannot but protest against the violations of Soviet frontiers by an American military aircraft and it expects that the Government of the United States will punish severely those guilty of the violation of the airspace of the USSR which has taken place and that it will take steps to prevent such violations in the future.Taking into account the present situation, where a summit conference is being prepared, and also the spirit and purpose of the negotiations being conducted between our governments, the Soviet Government would not like to make this matter public or subject it to discussion in the UN.The hope is expressed that this matter will be settled satisfactorily between the governments of the USSR and the USA and that there will be no need for the Soviet Government to resort to other means for its settlement.(Initialled by M. Menshikov) Washington, March 5, 1958
[104-10106-10143.pdf — page 8]
# EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICSNote No. 921 April 1958The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and, referring to the Aide-Memoire of the Department of State dated March 31, 1958 and containing a reply of the Government of the United States of America to the Aide-Memoire of the Soviet Government dated March 5 concerning a violation of the Soviet state border in the Far East by an American military jet aircraft, has the honor to communicate the following:In the reply Aide-Memoire of the Department of State an attempt is made to deny the fact of an American military aircraft having violated the Soviet border.As has already been communicated, the Soviet Government has at its disposal carefully verified data on this violation, the reliability of which leaves no room for doubt. According to these data, on March 2, 1958, at 4:05 a.m. Moscow time, an American military reconnaissance aircraft of the Lockheed U-2 type, having appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan, violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the area of the settlement Velikaya Kema, 32 kilometers south of that settlement. Then the violating aircraft deeply penetrated the airspace of the USSR and, after remaining over its territory for a considerable period of time, passed beyond the limits of the Soviet territory 45 kilometers south of the Olga Bay at 8:11 a. m.In the light of the established facts the reply of the Government of the United States of America can in no way be recognized as satisfactory. Naturally, the question arises as to how to explain such a reply of the American Government: whether it was misled deliberately by its military representatives in the Far East or whether it considered it possible to protect such persons subordinate to it, who, without regard to the possible consequences, sanction violation of Soviet borders, thus creating a threat of international complications.
[104-10106-10143.pdf — page 9]
Such a reply of the Government of the United States of America to the communication of the Soviet Government cannot fail to cause serious concern, the more so since the new case of violation of Soviet airspace took place after warnings on the part of the Government of the USSR to the effect that American authorities should take the necessary steps to prevent such violations.In connection with the foregoing the Soviet Government expects that the Government of the United States of America will undertake further investigation of this act of violation of the airspace of the USSR by an American military aircraft and will punish severely those guilty of this violation.The Soviet Government also expects that the Government of the United States of America will take the necessary steps to prevent violations of Soviet airspace by American aircraft in the future and states that in the event of new violations full responsibility for their consequences will rest with the Government of the United States.Washington, D. C.. April 1958
[104-10106-10143.pdf — page 10]
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[104-10106-10143.pdf — page 11]
TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESSSC-02164-58Summary of Initial MissionsIn the period from 20 June to 10 July 1956 the Soviet Bloc air defense system was subjected to eight penetrations of an unprecedented nature, seven occurring within a period of only eight days. It must be remembered that 24 (COMINT) provides the only basis of judging the performance of the Soviet system. This is important because it is clear from REGAL material that 24 considerable air defense business is conducted over landlines and thus not observed by COMINT. However, some tentative conclusions may be drawn from these initial flights and these are indicated as follows:1.  In spite of the fact that these missions come as a surprise, none of them went undetected. This is clear evidence that their radar coverage extends above (72,000) feet.- 23 -TOP SECRET - EIDER - CHESS
[104-10106-10143.pdf — page 13]
SC-02164-587. Confusion and track loss seemed to be related to the presence of large numbers of fighters although the saturation point has not been determined because of insufficient data.8. The question of radars for height finding, the capabilities of TOKEN in this role, the introduction of ROCK CAKES and later developments are discussed in another section. It is believed, however, that these missions were a catalyst in the introduction of ROCK CAKES.- 25 -
[104-10106-10143.pdf — page 14]
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