Francesco/who-killed-jfk huggingface dataset:
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A. A gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures and personnel of Task Force W.B. Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W within the Clandestine Service, possibly as a major component of the WH Division under different direction.C. The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanism.D. The removal of the past framework which required detailed consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) of even minor operational details and decision by committee on points which it is believed are completely within the purview of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.V. RECOMMENDED ACTION:A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan is recommended.B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.C. It is recommended that you secure from the Special Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Pan American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Miaml and Havana at the appropriate time.D. It is recommended that if any "Track Two" concept is proposed, you endesvor to transfer to the Department of State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled-16-
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subsidy and support of Cuban exile groups.B. It is recommended that the Mongoose operational mechanism be abolished.F. If you concur in this concept, specific recommendation will be made to you concerning the re-positioning of Task Force W within the DD/P.WILLIAM K. HARVEYChief, Task Force W-17-
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MEMORANDUMSUBJECT: Tadeusz (Tad) Witold SZULC (AMCAPE-1) (201-50539)14 February 19771.  SZULC was born on 25 July 1926 in Warsaw, Poland. He arrived in Brazil from Lisbon on 3 August 1940, and came to the U.S. in October 1947 under sponsorship of U.S. Ambassador John C. WILEY, the husband of his mother's sister. He became a correspondent for the *New York Times* (NYT) in 1953, and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1954 by a special Congressional bill.2.  SZULC has been under suspicion as a hostile foreign agent since 1948 when the FBI reported (apparently from a British source) that he was a Communist. He brought himself to the attention of CIA in August 1959 in Santiago, Chile by claiming (falsely) to be "cleared" and requesting contact with an Agency representative. This was the first of many such incidents in Latin America, and resulted in a warning to all Latin American Stations to beware of SZULC and his efforts to interview Agency personnel. It also resulted in continuing watch of his movements and activities because they represented a threat to the cover of Agency personnel. By 1960 his reputation was so widespread that several different CIA officers called for an investigation that would clear up "once and for all" his suspected connections with a hostile intelligence service. He was in frequent contact with Communist Party leaders and functionaries throughout Latin America, constantly sought out and elicited information from U.S. Embassy officers.
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SECRETfrequently mentioning the name of other CIA officers with whom he was acquainted.3. Although the suspicions have increased, and SZULC's anti-Agency activities have become much more serious and blatant in the 1970's, it has not been possible to clear up any of the suspicions about his motives or his possible connections with a foreign intelligence service. There have been numerous reviews of his files and the interest in his activities has extended from the case officer level to the DCI. In fact, it is not possible to come to any clear conclusion about this man, and the notes below are simply illustrative of the kinds of things that keep the suspicions alive. It is important to note that SZULC's activities can be explained by the combination of his personality, ambition, and the demands on an investigative reporter for the NYT. He is an aggressive, insensitive, and persistent journalist with the family connections (Ambassador Wiley) and ability to develop the kinds of contacts appropriate to a successful correspondent for a paper like the NYT.4. Nevertheless, there are elements throughout his entire career that are almost designed to arouse suspicion. For example, a [British] source in Rio de Janeiro (see Attachment A) reported that SZULC was "directed" by the Polish regime in Warsaw to seek employment in U.S. journalistic circles. This report runs like a thread throughout his file and is repeated and garbled in several versions over the years. The report2
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SECREThas never been adequately explained and was apparently never reported in full to [London] by the [British] representative in Rio. This report and other questions that arose early in his career (his contacts with a cousin who was a Press Attache in the Polish Embassy in Rio) were, however, just the earliest elements that aroused suspicion.5. Because he became so well-known to so many Agency officers, his name and reputation have become subject of discussion on many occasions. One senior operations officer stated in 1975 that a Soviet agent could not be more beneficial to the Soviets and the Communist cause than SZULC has been. Although he presented a generally anti-Communist view prior to quitting the NYT in 1972, it is noteworthy that he arranged extensive, favorable TV coverage of the Communist-dominated Ligas Campesinas in Northeast Brazil and that one of the most important anti-Castro operations, AMTRUNK, in which he was involved from the beginning, was disastrous for all participants. More indicative of his true beliefs, however, are the articles he has written since Watergate. They have become increasingly critical of the CIA and of the USG generally and have damaged U.S. image and prestige.6. The notes below are somewhat random examples of elements in SZULC's file that bring him under suspicion. As mentioned above, they in no way point to a firm conclusion. For further information on SZULC during the period 1963 - 1964, see the CI review prepared at Miami Station on Jorge VOLSKY in 1964.
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SECRETa. The 1948 FBI report that SZULC was involved in supplying the Polish Legation in Rio with information from his personal contacts and from Ambassador John C. Wiley has been repeated in various versions throughout SZULC's file. The FBI has found similar allegations made by other sources who knew SZULC at that time. In addition, 'several sources have mentioned SZULC's relations with his cousin, Ignacy SACHS, who was the Press Attache in the Polish Embassy in 1947 and 1948, although there is no indication that SACHS had intelligence connections.b. SZULC's marriage to the daughter of the American manager of the English language newspaper in Rio de Janeiro, the *Herald*, lasted only until SZULC had permanent residence in the U.S. and appears to have been carried through for that purpose.c. By 1949 (SZULC was only 23) he had come to the attention of the [Rio Station] because of his dealings with the Polish Legation and because investigation revealed his father had some (apparently innocent) business dealings with Russians visiting Brazil from Mexico.d. In 1954, about a year after he was hired by the NYT, SZULC obtained a sensational story, by telephone, from a Communist leader in Guatemala. This launched his career with the NYT.e. In 1956 SZULC was investigating Brazilian nuclear policy for the NYT. Although a legitimate topic, it was somewhat unusual for him and the timing seems unusual for NYT interest.SECRET
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SECRETf. In 1959, on a trip to Santiago, Chile, SZULC claimed to be "cleared" and requested an interview with an Agency representative. This was the first of numerous such requests. In addition, it was in about 1959 that he also began making a point of telling Agency personnel the names of other Agency officers he had identified.g. An article SZULC wrote on Cuba for the NYT in December 1959 was hailed as an antidote to the excessively favorable reports of his colleague, Herbert MATTHEWS, but in fact his article was largely favorable to Fidel CASTRO and to CASTRO's plans for Cuba. It is only in comparison that with MATTHEWS blatantly pro-CASTRO articles / SZULC'S piece/can be considered balanced.h. By September 1960, SZULC was in the forefront of those advocating action against CASTRO. (It was he who finally brought the Leonardo Plan to Washington in 1963. See AMTRUNK Operational paper).i. In April 1961, shortly after John F. KENNEDY was innaugurated, SZULC was transferred to Washington by the NYT. Although a reasonable transfer, it is noteworthy that in a very short time SZULC claimed that he had a standing invitation to go directly to the President, the Vice President, the Attorney General, McGeorge BUNDY and Robert HURWITCH on Cuban matters.
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SECRETj. SZULC persistently sought a continuing contact with an Agency representative in Washington shortly after he arrived until it was granted in December 1962. The first contact was with Albert C. DAVIES (Lt. Col. on military detail to CIA - Cuba), and was arranged at the behest of Colonel GROGAN, the Assistant to the Director, on SZULC's request.k. In early 1963, at President KENNEDY's urging, contact with SZULC was made into a formal relationship and was continued until October 1964. The meetings were used by SZULC to cross check his information from other sources, including various Cuban exiles and the Department of State. He became, by virtue of his contacts with the exile community and throughout Washington, one of the most knowledgeable people in the area of Cuban affairs, anti- CASTRO activities, and U.S. Government policy. (See CI study on Jorge VOLSKY for more information on this period.)l. The Agency officer, Alfonso RODRIGUEZ, who maintained official contact with SZULC in 1963 and 1964 said in July 1964:"The special friendship and mutual admiration society that has existed between Tad SZULC, Jorge VOLSKY, and Manuel RAY and the JURE is not something that is transparent or easily explained. This alliance may be something unholy and Machiavellian; I just do not know, but I can find no evidence to prove it."
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SECRETm. Another officer, Seymour Young, wrote in 1965:"After reading and re-reading this man's various files, I began to feel that this man in his position would be an ideal 'agent of influence'. It was noted that he is always in a crisis area and usually in advance of the crisis and writes articles which are more concerned with the Communist successes."n. In about August 1965, SZULC was sent to Madrid as the NYT representative for Spain and Portugal. He stayed overseas until December 1968. He was present in Prague during the Soviet invasion of August 1968 and in December he was expelled, apparently for being too inquisitive. However, the West German Service has remained suspicious of the circumstances of SZULC's expulsion and the details have never been clarified. (It is interesting that SZULC wrote articles reflecting the official CZECH line concerning the defection of General Jan SEJNA who was in the Czech Intelligence service.)o. SZULC was reported by an FBI source to have gone horseback riding with Boris V. YAROCHEVSKIY, a suspect KGB officer, in Washington in June or July 1971. SZULC's file reflects no regular contact with Bloc diplomats.p. In 1972 and 1973 SZULC covered Watergate extensively and demonstrated an *extreme* bias against the CIA. By July 1972, SZULC's inquiries of the Department of State and his articles had taken on a distinctly anti-US Government tone. His coverage of guerrilla and terrorist groups
[104-10102-10227.pdf — page 7]
# SECRETwas less sure than in earlier days and was frequently sensationalist and full of inaccuracies. (See, especially, article in NYT for 14 July 1972 on a terrorist Headquarters in Zurich and other wild statements.)q. Since 1974 SZULC's articles have been highly critical of the Agency and he has used the background information he gathered in the 1960's to attack the Agency and to criticize its operations.r. In May 1975 SZULC accused the Agency of rifling the files of U.S. Senators. This was only one of many irresponsible and false articles he wrote trying to discredit the Agency. One of the more spectacular efforts was a series in *Esquire* magazine, in which, among other things, he charged that the U.S. intelligence community had a hidden budget of $25 billion dollars and a network of 200,000 spies.s. In, *Inside the Company: A CIA Diary*, Philip AGEE credits SZULC's daughter, Nicole, for having "obtained vital research materials in New York and Washington, D.C." There is reason to believe, particularly in view of the extreme views Tad SZULC has manifested in the past two years, that he may have aided his daughter in her "research."**SUMMATION**The case against Tad SZULC as a foreign agent is weak. However, his most recent activities are entirely consonant with the view that he has already served the Soviets well and can8SECRET
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# SECRETend his career as an overt propagandist taking advantage of the current furor over the CIA to do the greatest possible damage. The current paralysis of all anti-Communist action by//?the Agency attests to the effectiveness of AGEE, SZULC, the Soviets, et al.BNOTE: (See attachment/from a highly sensitive source.Any use of the SECRET/SENSITIVE attachment requires C/CI approval.) The source reported that Nicole, while working with the DGI in Cuba to expose the Agency, said that except for her father, her whole family were "fascists." She said that her father quit the NYT because of the restrictive editorial policy and he wished to write according to his beliefs.03LAD/JFK Tas Force 1977/Marty Miller:rp2 Attachments, a/sCopy filed: 201-50539SECRET![image of page number] 1/BR
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14-00000104-10102-10231 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 199214 January 1977MEMORANDUMSUBJECT: Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez (AMLEO-3) (201-249386)1. Born 7 April 1922 in Havana, Cuba, the son of a native-born American citizen, RABEL was brought up in comfortable circumstances. He attended high school in Cuba, completed the last year in New Orleans, Louisiana, and entered Tulane University in September 1938. He enlisted in the U.S. Army in December 1940 and eventually saw combat in France, Belgium, Germany and Austria. After discharge in December 1945, RABEL returned to Cuba to attend the University of Havana and this began a life of job changes, moving back and forth between the U.S. and Cuba, and, in general, rootless living.2. RABEL's background reads like that of a man with no allegiances or loyalties and no particular goals. Viewed in retrospect, his career presents a picture of unreliability. It is probable that RABEL's rootlessness and apparent unreliability applied both to his relations with CASTRO and to those with the Agency. It is quite possible, therefore, that he not only served the Agency in a superficial way but that he did the same for CASTRO at various times when it suited his purposes. Without postulating this sort of dual role (one which fits very well with his previous life) it is almost impossible to explain some of the reasonably good things he did for the Agency and the quite certain allegations that he was a CASTRO agent. This explanation is not fully satisfactory, but it does explain his career better than the chargeRETURN TO CIABackground Use OnlyDo Not Reproduce#12923
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# SECRETthat he was a CASTRO agent from the beginning. The question that must remain unanswered is whether he betrayed the AMTRUNK Operation. He was not arrested until September 1965 (when AMTRUNK had already run its course) but it appears quite certain that he cooperated with the DSE after his arrest and while he was in prison.3. RABEL joined in the clandestine activities against BATISTA in March 1952, first amongst the exiles in the U.S. and then after late 1952 from inside Cuba. He joined the Cuban armed forces to further his plotting and was assigned to the Cuban General Staff. He was the Cuban liaison officer with the U.S. Army mission in Cuba from November 1954 until April 1956. During his entire period in the Cuban army, RABEL was involved with dissident Army elements; when they attempted a coup in April 1956, RABEL was arrested. He was released shortly thereafter, worked in the chicken business for a year and then returned to the U.S. and worked with one of his brothers (Luis RABEL Nunez). In October 1957 he returned to Cuba and became involved with the 26th of July Movement but had to leave a year later when he was brought to the attention of the BATISTA forces because of a bomb explosion. He smuggled weapons to Camilo Cienfuegos for about a year and then in October 1958 he joined the Cienfuegos group. Shortly after the CASTRO victory, CASTRO called upon RABEL to set up a Cuban Marine Corps, a job he held until February 1960, at which time he was appointed Chief of Viviendas Campesinas.2SECRET
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SECRETHe held this job until he defected to the U.S. in December 1962. It is worth noting that he rarely pursued one activity in one place for more than a year at a time from 1945 to 1962.4. RABEL gave Alfonso RODRIGUEZ the following reasons for his defection:a. Communist pressure, hounding, and the basic enmity of the Communist Party toward him. (This appears very reasonable in view of his service in the U.S. Army and training in some aspects of intelligence, such as prisoner interrogation. In addition, his schooling in the U.S. and the reasonable economic circumstances would not have been recommendations from the Communist point of view.)b. Strong backing by Fidel which protected him from more serious attacks from the Party. (This, too, seems entirely reasonable. His family farm was near the farm Fidel's father managed and RABEL and Fidel had known each other as children. In addition, RABEL's long involvement in the anti-BATISTA movement and with Camilo Cienfuegos were probably in his favor in CASTRO's view.)c. An obligation to protect the non-Communists in his department, which prevented his earlier defection, and uncertainty of his reception in the U.S. (In view of the number of defections from RABEL's department, there were, in fact, people to protect. Since RABEL had served in the U.S. Army, and probably felt the U.S. was his secondSECRET
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SECRETcountry, he could well have had questions about his reception after serving in the CASTRO government.)d. His resentment against the confining nature of a Communist State. (Since he never stayed in one place more than a short time in his entire life, to have been restricted to Cuba must have seemed a punishment.)5. RABEL was used to pitch Dr. Marta FRAYDE Barraue in Paris in July 1963, and to check out leads for the AMTRUNK Operation. One of his leads led to the recruitment of AMTRUNK-10. Later, in early 1964, RABEL was leader of the Rebel Army Group supported by the American Legion in Miami and was involved in the Rebel Army Radio program.6. There is no specific evidence (except the accusations below) that RABEL was involved in a suspicious way with the CASTRO regime during this period, but his desire to exfiltrate his wife and children was a constant source of difficulty between him and the Station. This problem led to his eventual termination in July 1964 and to a great deal of resentment on his part. He conspired constantly, from mid-1963 until his capture in Cuba in September 1965, to get into Cuba to exfiltrate his wife and children.7. RABEL was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment but was set free in July or August 1967, which is a strong indication that the charges that he worked for the DSE while in prison were true. Moreover, there is some indication that he may have attempted a provocation at Cuban behest immediately after his capture. There are two firm accusations that RABEL was a
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SECRETCuban agent as early as July 1963 (which would have beenwhen he was screening names for the AMTRUNK Operation), onefrom LITAMIL-9 and the other from Fernando REY reported byVASLOUCH-1. As mentioned above, these charges could wellbe true; yet RABEL could have fulfilled his duties for CASTROsuperficially, for his own purposes, and not necessarilyhave compromised his work with the Agency until he was captured.The difficulties he had in exfiltrating his wife could havebeen, partially, punishment by CASTRO for not fulfilling hisduties as an agent; otherwise, had his work in the U.S. beenvaluable, CASTRO could have facilitated the exfiltration ofRABEL's wife so that RABEL could continue his work as anagent undisturbed.LAD/JFK Task Force 1977 Marty Miller:rpCopy filed: 201-249386Attachments: 4A- 10 Feb 1964 Memo for the RecordB- 6 Mar 1963 dispatch UFGA-7998 with Att.C- 20 Feb 1963 cable WAVE 4730 (IN 71127)D- 30 Sep 1963 dispatch UFGA-11375
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# 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992RETURN TO CIABackground Use OnlyDo Not ReproduceSECRET14 February 1977MEMORANDUMSUBJECT: Nestor Antonio MORENO Lopez (AMICE-27) (201-312091)1. MORENO was born on 25 August 1921 in Havana, Cuba. His father was a Cuban Senator (1940-44) and the Cuban Minister of Public Works (1944). MORENO became a lawyer and continued to live in comfortable circumstances. He became involved in the anti-BATISTA movement, apparently in the late 1950's, and ultimately in the 26th of July Movement. After the revolution, one of his clients was Camilo CIENFUEGOS. In Miami after defection, he was associated with the JURE.2. MORENO's specific activities in the anti-BATISTA movement were not reported and apparently were unexceptional. A point worth noting about his activities before defection is his acquaintance with Tad SZULC, at least by 1959, and with Jorge VOLSKY. MORENO's background as a lawyer did not prepare him for active revolutionary involvement. When he defected in April 1961, therefore, he associated with anti-CASTRO exiles, particularly VOLSKY, but did not become actively involved. He was assessed in 1963 as being unfriendly to CIA.3. About February 1963 MORENO and Enrique CAYADO Ribera reportedly collaborated in the formulation of an operational plan to overthrow the Castro government. They discussed it with Jorge VOLSKY, who then passed it to Tad SZULC. VOLSKY and SZULC apparently conspired to have the plan presented to the "political authorities" (Robert HURWITCH and the KENNEDY Administration) in Washington in order to by-pass the dis-# 00993
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SECRETtrusted "operational authorities" (the CIA). (VOLSKYoriginally took full credit for the plan, called "LeonardoPlan," which eventually became known as the AMTRUNK Operation.)4. The Leonardo Plan was well *thought-out* and caught thefancy of the KENNEDY Administration. HURWITCH bought it tothe CIA with the blessings of the Department of State. Thus,.from the very beginning, SZULC, VOLSKY, and MORENO, each ofwhom had outside interests to some degree in conflict withAMTRUNK, were involved in AMTRUNK policy and planning meetings.Moreover, all three were to some degree antipathetic to theAgency for various reasons and were difficult or impossibleto control.5. MORENO's indiscretions were a serious problem thatlimited his effectiveness as a direct participant in the AMTRUNKOperation by arousing the concern of other participants. Whilethe Station attempted to cut out VOLSKY and SZULC after, theinitial policy discussions in Washington, VOLSKY always remainedinvolved to some degree and kept SZULC fully informed. Underthe circumstances, the censure of MORENO for talking to SZULCwas just an attempt to plug one of many leaks. The fact isthat MORENO, SZULC, and VOLSKY believed they had an insidetrack in Washington because of their contacts there and allthree disliked following Agency instructions that conflictedwith their own diverse interests. However, because JMWAVEStation and AMICE-14 (Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue) objected toMORENO's continued involvement in the AMTRUNK Operation afterlearning of his free talk with SZULC and others, the StationSEGRET