Fawazzx/semantic huggingface dataset:
It is clear from the charge that some of the amounts were misappropriated between April, 1947 and March, 1950, some between April, 1947 and March, 1949, some between April, 1947 and March, 1951 and quite a large number between September, 1947 and March, 1950 and a still large number between April, 1951 and March, 1952
Semantic role: Ratio of the decision
The decision of the Allahabad High Court in T. R. Mukherji's case (IL), is directly in point and is clearly to the effect that the different clauses of s. 239 are mutually exclusive in the sense that it is not possible to combine the provisions of two or more clauses in any one case and to try jointly several persons partly by applying the provisions of one clause and partly by applying those of another or other clauses
Semantic role: Ratio of the decision
On the other band there is the decision of this Court in The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kandinmlla Subbaiah , which is to the effect that where several persons had committed offences in the course of the same transactions, they could jointly be tried in respect of all those offences under s. 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the limitation placed by s. 234 of the Code could not come into operation
Semantic role: Ratio of the decision
Mr. Bhimasankaram then relying upon the decision in R. v. Dawson ( [1960] 2 W.L.R. 435, contended that in any event it was not desirable to try the respondents at the same trial for as many as 83 offences and pointed out that these observations had received the approval of this Court in The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kandimalla Subbaiah ([1962] 2 B. C.R. 194
Semantic role: Argument
7, that is, transportation for life (now imprisonment for life) and imprisonment not exceeding 10 years appears to be that the offence is not exclusively triable by a court of session and could also be tried by a Magistrate, who, except when empowered under s. 30 would be incompetent to try offences punishable with transportation for life (now imprisonment for life) and the further reason that it should be open to the court of Session, instead of awarding the sentence of transportation for life to a convicted person to award him imprisonment in a jail in India itself for a period not execeeding 10 years
Semantic role: Ratio of the decision
Coming to the next ground of attack on the validity of pardon, the argument of Mr. Bhimasankaram is that whereas s. 337 (1) speaks of pardon being granted by a District Magistrate, or Presidency Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate or any Magistrate of First Class, except in cases where an enquiry or trial was pending before another Magis- tratc, the pardon here was granted by the Additional District Magistrate in a case where an enquiry was pending before the District Magistrate and is, therefore, illegal and of no avail
Semantic role: Argument
Bengal requisitioned large extent of fisheries including the disputed Nalban Fishery on 5.11.1969 in exercise of power under Section 3(1) of the West Bengal Land Requisition and Acquisition Act of 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Requisition Act').Pursuant to the aforesaid requisition order the State of West Bengal took possession of the Nalban Fishery on 8.11.1969.Members of the Sarkar family challenged the order of requisition by filing a writ petition in Calcutta High Court in November,1969 which was registered as Civil Rule No.7317 (W) of 1969.The aforesaid writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge
Semantic role: Facts
The appeal arising out of the petition suit bearing Suit No.2539 of 1955 which had been registered as appeal No.200 of 1960 was finally disposed of by the Division Bench and the said order was assailed in this Court in SLP (C) Nos.5370 & 5371 of 1978.The said two appeals arising out of the said two special leave petitions were disposed of by order dated 18.4.1979 on the basis of a compromise arrived at between the parties on intervention of Shri Ashok Sen who appearing for one of the parties but it was indicated in the order that the State's right in relation to the fisheries will not be affected by the decree in question
Semantic role: Facts
It may be noted that Nalban Fishery had been requisitioned by the State of West Bengal under the provisions of Requisition Act since 5.11.1969 and possession thereof had been taken on 8.11.1969 and the Sarkar family had challenged the said order unsuccessfully which final by the dismissal of the special leave petition by this Court on 17.11.1972.On 25.5.1979 the Collector 24 Parganas who had been appointed as Receiver realised that he could not have taken possession of Nalban Fishery as Receiver since the said fishery had already been in possession of the State of West Bengal pursuant to requisition order dated 5.11.1969.Obviously,the earlier compliance report dated 20.11.1978 that the Receiver has taken possession of the Nalban Fishery was a symbolic one inasmuch as the State of West
Semantic role: Facts
The Receiver,therefore,intimated to the Registrar of this Court the mistake committed by him in his earlier report and after taking advice from the Senior Counsel expressed apology to this Court for the mistake committed in the earlier report While the matter stood thus in relation to the aforesaid Nalban Fishery,the Government of West Bengal handed over the possession of the said Nalban Fishery to the Director of Inland Fisheries,State Fisheries Development Corporation for undertaking fisheries development scheme
Semantic role: Facts
The Sarkar family thereupon filed an application before the Calcutta High Court contending inter alia that under the decree passed in the partition suit by the Supreme Court the property belongs to the Sarkar family and could not have been handed-over to the State of West Bengal,That application was disposed of by the learned Single called upon the Collector 24 Parganas who was the Receiver pursuance to the orders of the Supreme Court to take over the possession of Nalban Fishery from the State of West Bengal and give vacant possession of the same to the Sarkar family
Semantic role: Facts
G.Ramaswamy,the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State Fishery Development Corporation Ltd.contended that a compromise decree between the parties in a suit for partition will not in army way affect the rights of the State in respect of the fisheries whether such rights the State acquires by virtue of an order of requisition under the Requisition Act or by virtue of any other statutory provisions under which the fisheries right vest in the State
Semantic role: Argument
It was further contended that this Court while giving affect to the compromise arrived at between the Sarkar family made it explicitely clear that the said compromise will not in any way affect the rights of the State over the fisheries even if those fisheries agreed to be divided between the parties and in that view of the matter and the State of West Bengal having already requisitioned the Nalban Fishery and having taken possession of the same the Receiver could not have taken possession of the said Nalban Fishery pursuant to the order of this Court appointing the Collector 24 Parganas as Receiver and
Semantic role: Argument
Bengal contended that the State being the owner of Nalban Fishery and having vested the management and control thereof with the State Fishery Development Corporation and the said Corporation having decided to use the tank fishery for a Boating Complex and the Bansilal Farms being the highest bidder and having been granted the right to have a Boating Complex therein and he having invested a huge sum of money,his rights cannot be taken away in the dispute between the State and the Sarkar family
Semantic role: Argument
He further contended that Nalban Fishery having been vested in the State of West Bengal under the provisions of West Bengal under the provisions of West Bengal Acquisition Act,1955,the State cannot get rid of the direction given by the Supreme Court to the Receiver to handover possession of the various fisheries covered by the final decree to the parties to whom they have been allotted under the decree and the Nalban Fishery being one such fishery,the possession thereof was required to be given to the person in whose favour the said fishery has been allotted and therefore the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench in appeal have rightly issued the directions
Semantic role: Argument
The subsequent incumbent to the post of District Magistrate 24 Parganas,who became the Receiver by virtue of his official position had no further jurisdiction to re-deliver possession of the Nalban Fishery to the State of West Bengal and the comments already made by the High Court on the report of the subsequent Receiver sufficiently indicate how he had acted with the bias mind and consequently the Nalban Fishery having not vested in the State of West Bengal under the Acquisition Act,the decree passed by the Supreme Court on 18.4.1979 remains operative
Semantic role: Ratio of the decision
It would be appropriate at this stage to extract this part of the decree passed by this Court: "In view of the foregoing,we again wish to re-emphasize that the terms the decree shall not affect the rights of the State of West Bengal,in any manner whatsoever to the fisheries in question,if they have vested in the state under the provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act,1953 (Act X of 1954
Semantic role: Ruling by Lower Court
Further while directing the Receiver to handover possession of the various fisheries covered by the final decree to the parties to whom they have been allotted under the decree,this Court also protected the interest of the State by observing: "We made it quite clear that this will not in any manner prejudice or affect the right of the State to its claim over the fisheries under the West Bengal Acquisition Act 1955 (West Bengal Act 1 of 1954) or under any other statute
Semantic role: Ratio of the decision
The Nalban Fishery had been requisitioned by the State of West Bengal in exercise of power under Section 3(1) of the West Bengal Land Requisition and Acquisition Act is not disputed and cannot be disputed and since the validity of the said order of requisition had been challenged by the Sarkar family in the Calcutta High Court and being unsuccessful there,they had also filed special leave petition in this Court in SLP (C
Semantic role: Statute
The said Receiver was not aware of the fact that Nalban Fishery had in fact requisitioned by the State of West Bengal and the State is in possession of the same since November,1369.The possession -thus taken by the Receiver of the vast extent tank fishery is obviously a symbolical possession but in view of the order of this Court dated 18.4.1979 as well as 22.4.1979 while passing a decree in terms of compromise arrived at between the parties and on the admitted position that State had already come into possession of the fishery by virtue of the order under the Requisition Act,the said fishery remained out of the purview of the allotment made by the Sarkar family in the compromise and,therefore,the Receiver could not have taken possession of the same
Semantic role: Ratio of the decision
As has been stated earlier the possession which was taken by the earlier Receiver was a symbolical one and factually the State had not been divested of its possession which it took on 8.11.1969.In our considered opinion the succeeding Receiver rightly took into account the directions of this Court passed on 18.4.1979 and 24.4.1979 and rightly took the view that the rights and interest of the State in relation to Nalban Fishery is not affected in any manner by the so-called allotment of the fishery in the partition decree amongst the members of the Sarkar family
Semantic role: Ratio of the decision
In view of our earlier conclusion that the rights and interest of the State of West Bengal was not in any way be affected by the so-called partition and allotment of the Nalban Fishery inter se amongst the members of the Sarkar family,the said order dated 63.10.1980 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court will not stand on the way of the State in claiming and putting forth its interest and right over the Nalban Fishery
Semantic role: Ratio of the decision
They faced the trial and the learned Sessions Judge vide its judgment dated 4th October,2004 found them guilty of the said offences and punished them as follows: "Hence A.1 to A.3 are sentenced to undergo R.I.for THREE YEARS and further sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/each (total fine amount Rs.3,000/-) offence punishable u/s.498-A IPC.I.D.of the fine amount of Rs.1000/to undergo SI for 9 months
Semantic role: Facts
11.Alongside insertion of Section 304-B in IPC,the legislature also introduced Section 113-B of the Evidence Act,which lays down when the question as to whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for,or in connection with,any demand for dowry,the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death
Semantic role: Precedent
Section 304-B IPC is read together with Section 113-B of the Evidence Act,a comprehensive picture emerges that if a married woman dies in unnatural circumstances at her matrimonial home within 7 years from her marriage and there are allegations of cruelty or harassment upon such married woman for or in connection with demand of dowry by the husband or relatives of the husband,the case would squarely come under "dowry death" and there shall be a presumption against the husband and the relatives
Semantic role: Precedent
In this Act,'dowry' means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly- (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person,to either party to the marriage or to any other person,at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties,but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies
Semantic role: Precedent
The appellant also paid ex gratia to the workmen bonus at the rate of annas 2 per rupee of their basic earnings making it clear by their notification dated the 7th April, 1950, that the directors had sanctioned the payment at that rate in spite of the appellant having suffered a trading loss for the year, that it was being paid entirely at the discretion of the appellant and was not related to or connected with any contract of employment of any worker
Semantic role: Facts
On the 4th May, 1950, the Secretary of the respondent Union petitioned to the Provincial Conciliation Officer (Textile) that there was more production in 1949 than in 1948, that there was no reason to hold that the profit in 1949 was less than in the previous year and that the rate of bonus was wrongly reduced and asked that bonus for 1949 should also be paid at the rate of annas 4 per rupee
Semantic role: Facts
The respondent thereupon appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal which substantially agreed with the Industrial Court on questions of fact as well as the general position in law but imported considerations of social justice and treating this as a special case " where social justice would demand that labour should have bonus for the year where for that very year capital had not only a reasonable return but much in excess of that ", allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to pay to the workmen bonus at the rate of annas 4 per rupee within six weeks of their decision
Semantic role: Facts
Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume XI, at page 515 ascribes the following meanings to the word bonus: " An allowance in addition to what is usual current or stipulated ; a sum given or paid beyond what is legally required to be paid to the recipient; something given in addition to what is ordinarily received by or strictly due to the recipient" and adds: It has been said to carry the idea of something uncertain and indefinite, something which may or may not be paid depending on varying circumstances and under particular conditions has been said to imply a benefit accruing to him who offers it and an inducement to the offeree
Semantic role: Ratio of the decision
It is also significant to note that even while importing considerations of social justice the Labour Appellate Tribunal was oblivious of the fact that it was by their own acts of indiscipline and strike that the workers of the appellant company themselves contributed, to the trading losses incurred by the appellant and it hardly lay in their mouth then to contend that they were none the less entitled to a payment of bonus commensurate with the dividend paid to the shareholders out of the undistributed profits of the previous years
Semantic role: Ratio of the decision
This contention can be shortly answered by referring to our decision in Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi, (1950] S.C.R. 459 1950 Indlaw SC 48; where we held that the Industrial Tribunals were tribunals within the meaning of article 136 and further that article 136 has vested in this, Court exceptional and overriding power to interfere where it reaches the conclusion that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a Court or tribunal within the territory of India has not given a fair deal to a litigant
Semantic role: Ratio of the decision
The biscuits were sold under the brand name "Meghraj".Under show cause notices it was alleged that the appellants herein (assessee) have sold the biscuits under the brand name "Meghraj",which was a registered trade mark of Kay Aar Biscuits (P) Ltd.who was using the said trade mark on manufacture of biscuits themselves,and,therefore,the appellants were not eligible to the benefit of SSI Notification No.1/93-CE dated 28.2.1993 as amended by Notification No.59/94-CE dated 1.3.1994
Semantic role: Facts
He came to the conclusion vide his orders that the trade name "Meghraj" was in the form of a logo printed on the wrapper of the biscuits and,therefore,the appellants were not entitled to the benefit of Notification No.1/93-CE dated 28.2.93 as amended by Notification No.59/94 dated 1.3.94.Consequently,the Adjudicating Authority called upon the appellants to pay differential duty for the period April 1994 to June 1994 amounting to Rs.3,74,948 plus short paid duty for the period April 1995 to May 1995 amounting to Rs.92,992
Semantic role: Facts
To complete the chronology of events,it may be pointed out that after the impugned decision of the Tribunal dated 11.4.2000,the appellants herein moved an Application for Rectification on 12.5.2000 (ROM No.72/2000).In that application it was urged on behalf of the appellants herein that the said brand name "Meghraj" did not belong to M/s
Semantic role: Facts
it was further pointed out that in fact the appellants had applied for ownership of the brand name "Meghraj" vide application dated 30.9.91 to the Registrar,Trade Marks under the Trade Marks Act and that the said application for registration was pending before the competent authority and since the above arguments were not recorded in the impugned Order of the CEGAT dated 11.4.2000 the same warranted rectification
Semantic role: Facts
One more fact needs to be mentioned that on 30.6.2000 the Registrar of Trade Marks appears to have issued Registration Certificate on 30.6.2000 registering the trade mark "Meghraj" in favour of the appellants with effect form 30.9.91.It appears that issuance of this certificate was mentioned before the CEGAT which rejected the Rectification Application on 8.12.2000
Semantic role: Ratio of the decision
Explanation IX "Brand name" or "trade name" shall mean a brand name or trade name,whether registered or not,that is to say a name or a mark,such as symbol,monogram,label,signature or invented word or writing which is used in relation to such specified goods for the purpose of indicating,or so as to indicate a connection in the course of trade between such specified goods and some person using such name or mark with or without any indication of the identity of that person
Semantic role: Statute
Notification No.1/93-CE dated 28.2.1993 was subsequently amended by Notification No.59/94 dated 1.3.94.Para '7' of Notification No.1/93-CE as amended read as under: "Para-7 The exemption contained in this Notification shall not apply to the specified goods where a manufacturer affixes the specified goods with a brand name or trade name (registered or not) of another person,who is not eligible for the grant of exemption under this Notification
Semantic role: Statute
Kay Aar Biscuits (P) Ltd.had stopped its production in 1993; that the company had become defunct; that the appellants herein had applied to the Registrar of Trade Marks for registration of the mark "Meghraj" and vide registration certificate dated 30.6.2000 the Registrar has recognized the appellants as owner of the trade mark with effect from 30.9.91.In the circumstances,the appellants submitted that the demand for differential duty was unwarranted
Semantic role: Argument
The case put up by the petitioner corporation that it was the first to use the mark "Monarch" in this country on its food products and that,in as much as the mark "Monarch" was admittedly a distinctive mark,it had acquired the right to get the mark registered in its name and also the right to oppose the application of any other trader in this country seeking to get that mark registered in his name in respect of the food products manufactured or sold by him
Semantic role: Precedent
Applying the principle of deemed equivalence we may clarify that if the SSI unit wrongly affixes a trade mark of another person,be it registered or not,or if it uses the trade mark of an ineligible person then such default would not be eliminated by the above principle of deemed equivalence embodied in S.28 of the Trade Marks Act,1999 as that principle is based on a deeming fiction which fiction is confined only to the provisions of the Trade Marks Act
Semantic role: Statute
Therein the court ruled that the principle stated in High Trees's case (supra), is that, where one party has, by his words or conduct, made to the other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it, the party who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to the previous legal relationship as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him, but he must accept their legal relations subject to the qualification which he himself has so introduced, even though it is not supported in point of law by any consideration, but only by his word
Semantic role: Precedent
So far as this Court is concerned, it invoked the doctrine in Indo Afghan Agencies's case 1967 Indlaw SC 411 (supra) in which is was, inter alia, laid down that even though the case would not fall within the terms of Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act') which enacts the rule of estoppel, it would still be open to a party who had acted on a representation made by the Government to claim that the Government should be bound to carry out the promise made by it even though the promise was not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution
Semantic role: Precedent
SC 1496 1977 Indlaw SC 282, Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., [1979] 2 SCC 409 1978 Indlaw SC 56, Union of India v. Godfrey Philips Indian Ltd., [1985] 4 SCC 369 1985 Indlaw SC 275 and Dr. Ashok Kumar Maheshwari v. State of U.P. & Another, (1998) 2 Supreme 100 1998 Indlaw SC 1376
Semantic role: Precedent
Its object is to interpose equity shorn of its form to mitigate the rigour of strict law, as noted in Anglo Afghan Aencies's case1967 Indlaw SC 411 (supra) and Sharma Transport Represented by D.P. Sharma v. Government of A.P. and Others, [2002] 2 SCC 188 2001 Indlaw SC 19917
Semantic role: Precedent