Farseen0/scar-pairs huggingface dataset:
MEDIUM severity: The vulnerability lies in the handling of market ownership transfer in the `BondBaseSDA` smart contr. The vulnerability lies in the handling of market ownership transfer in the `BondBaseSDA` smart contract. Specifically, when the current market owner transfers the market ownership to a new owner, the `callbackAuthorized` mapping is not updated to reflect the new owner's authorization status. This ca...

Vulnerable code:
```\nFile: BondBaseSDA.sol\n\nfunction purchaseBond(\n    uint256 id_,\n    uint256 amount_,\n    uint256 minAmountOut_\n) external override returns (uint256 payout) {\n    if (msg.sender!= address(_teller)) {\n        revert Auctioneer_NotAuthorized();\n    }\n\n    BondMarket storage market = markets[id_];\n    BondTerms memory term = terms[id_];\n\n    if (market.callbackAddr!= address(0) &&!callbackAuthorized[market.owner]) {\n        revert Auctioneer_NotAuthorized();\n    }\n```\n```\nFile: BondBaseSDA.sol\n\nfunction pushOwnership(uint256 id_, address newOwner_) external override {\n    if (msg.sender!= markets[id_].owner) revert Auctioneer_OnlyMarketOwner();\n    newOwners[id_] = newOwner_;\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `updateCommitmentBorrowers` function in the `LenderCommitmentForwarder` contract is designed to . The `updateCommitmentBorrowers` function in the `LenderCommitmentForwarder` contract is designed to update the list of borrowers for a specific commitment ID. The function uses an `EnumerableSetUpgradeable.AddressSet` data structure to store the list of borrowers, which is a complex mapping that con...

Vulnerable code:
```\nmapping(uint256 => EnumerableSetUpgradeable.AddressSet) internal commitmentBorrowersList;\n\nfunction updateCommitmentBorrowers(\n    uint256 _commitmentId,\n    address[] calldata _borrowerAddressList\n) public commitmentLender(_commitmentId) {\n    delete commitmentBorrowersList[_commitmentId];\n    _addBorrowersToCommitmentAllowlist(_commitmentId, _borrowerAddressList);\n}\n```\n```\nusing EnumerableSet for EnumerableSet.AddressSet;\n\nmapping(uint256 => EnumerableSet.AddressSet) internal users;\n\nfunction test_deleteEnumerableSet() public {\n    uint256 id = 1;\n    address[] memory newUsers = new address[](2);\n    newUsers[0] = address(0x1);\n    newUsers[1] = address(0x2);\n\n    for (uint256 i = 0; i < newUsers.length; i++) {\n        users[id].add(newUsers[i]);\n    }\n    delete users[id];\n    newUsers[0] = address(0x3);\n    newUsers[1] = address(0x4);\n    for (uint256 i = 0; i < newUsers.length; i++) {\n        users[id].add(newUsers[i]);\n    }\n    bool exist = users[id].contains(address(0x1));\n    if (exist) {\n        emit log_string("address(0x1) exist");\n    }\n    exist = users[id].contains(address(0x2));\n    if (exist) {\n        emit log_string("address(0x2) exist");\n    }\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The CollateralizationOracle contract's `setDepositExclusion` function is responsible for excluding a. The CollateralizationOracle contract's `setDepositExclusion` function is responsible for excluding and re-including deposits from collateralization calculations. This function is unique in that it does not emit an event to notify about the exclusion or re-inclusion of deposits, which can lead to pot...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction setDepositExclusion(address _deposit, bool _excluded) external onlyGuardianOrGovernor {\n    excludedDeposits[_deposit] = _excluded;\n}\n```\n```\nevent DepositAdd(address from, address indexed deposit, address indexed token)\n{\n    //...\n}\n\nevent DepositRemove(address from, address indexed deposit)\n{\n    //...\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The vulnerability allows a malicious operator to drain the vault funds in a single transaction by ex. The vulnerability allows a malicious operator to drain the vault funds in a single transaction by exploiting the `trade()` function's lack of sufficient safeguards. Specifically, the `receiveAmtMin` parameter, intended to ensure acceptable slippage, can be set to 0, enabling the operator to execute...

Vulnerable code:
```\nstruct tradeInput {\n    address spendToken;\n    address receiveToken;\n    uint256 spendAmt;\n    uint256 receiveAmtMin;\n    address routerAddress;\n    uint256 pathIndex;\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `_accumulateFunding()` function on the maker's side contains a mathematical error in its formula. The `_accumulateFunding()` function on the maker's side contains a mathematical error in its formula for calculating the amount of funding. This flaw leads to an incorrect distribution of funding between the minor and the maker's sides, resulting in an unfair allocation of resources.\n\nThe issue ar...

Vulnerable code:
```\nif (fromPosition.long.gt(fromPosition.short)) {\n    fundingValues.fundingMaker = fundingValues.fundingShort.mul(Fixed6Lib.from(fromPosition.skew().abs()));\n    fundingValues.fundingShort = fundingValues.fundingShort.sub(fundingValues.fundingMaker);\n}\n\nif (fromPosition.short.gt(fromPosition.long)) {\n    fundingValues.fundingMaker = fundingValues.fundingLong.mul(Fixed6Lib.from(fromPosition.skew().abs()));\n    fundingValues.fundingLong = fundingValues.fundingLong.sub(fundingValues.fundingMaker);\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The vulnerability lies in the `closeQuote` function of the `LibQuote` contract, specifically in the . The vulnerability lies in the `closeQuote` function of the `LibQuote` contract, specifically in the scenario where a quote's status is set to `CANCEL_CLOSE_PENDING` and the `quantityToClose` is not zero. In this situation, the function does not enforce the minimum acceptable quote value (minAcceptab...

Vulnerable code:
```\nFile: LibQuote.sol\n\nfunction closeQuote(Quote storage quote, uint256 filledAmount, uint256 closedPrice) internal {\n    if (quote.closedAmount == quote.quantity) {\n        quote.quoteStatus = QuoteStatus.CLOSED;\n        quote.requestedClosePrice = 0;\n        removeFromOpenPositions(quote.id);\n        quoteLayout.partyAPositionsCount[quote.partyA] -= 1;\n        quoteLayout.partyBPositionsCount[quote.partyB][quote.partyA] -= 1;\n    } else if (\n        quote.quoteStatus == QuoteStatus.CANCEL_CLOSE_PENDING\n        || quote.quantityToClose == 0\n    ) {\n        quote.quoteStatus = QuoteStatus.OPENED;\n        quote.requestedClosePrice = 0;\n        quote.quantityToClose = 0; // for CANCEL_CLOSE_PENDING status\n    } else {\n        require(\n            quote.lockedValues.total() >=\n            SymbolStorage.layout().symbols[quote.symbolId].minAcceptableQuoteValue,\n            "LibQuote: Remaining quote value is low"\n        );\n    }\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The vulnerability lies in the `market.update(account,max,max,max,0,false)` function, which is used t. The vulnerability lies in the `market.update(account,max,max,max,0,false)` function, which is used to "settle" an account without changing its position or collateral. This action is assumed to be a reliable way to settle the account, but it can actually revert if the account is below the margin requ...

Vulnerable code:
```\nif (\n   !PositionLib.margined(\n        context.latestPosition.local.magnitude().add(context.pending.local.pos()),\n        context.latestOracleVersion,\n        context.riskParameter,\n        context.local.collateral\n    )\n) {\n    revert IMarket.MarketInsufficientMarginError();\n}\n```\n```\nfunction _settle(IMarket market, address account) private {\n    market.update(\n        account,\n        UFixed6Lib.MAX,\n        UFixed6Lib.MAX,\n        UFixed6Lib.MAX,\n        Fixed6Lib.ZERO,\n        false\n    );\n}\n```\n```\nfunction _updateUnderlying() private {\n    for (uint256 marketId; marketId < totalMarkets; marketId++) {\n        _registrations[marketId].read().market.update(\n            address(this),\n            UFixed6Lib.MAX,\n            UFixed6Lib.ZERO,\n            UFixed6Lib.ZERO,\n            Fixed6Lib.ZERO,\n            false\n        );\n    }\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The vulnerability arises from the absence of slippage protection in the repayment mechanism of a dec. The vulnerability arises from the absence of slippage protection in the repayment mechanism of a decentralized lending protocol. The `slot0()` function, which is used to calculate the `sqrtPriceX96`, can be easily manipulated, allowing an attacker to influence the swap outcome. This manipulation ena...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction _getCurrentSqrtPriceX96(\n    bool zeroForA,\n    address tokenA,\n    address tokenB,\n    uint24 fee\n) private view returns (uint160 sqrtPriceX96) {\n    if (!zeroForA) {\n        (tokenA, tokenB) = (tokenB, tokenA);\n    }\n    address poolAddress = computePoolAddress(tokenA, tokenB, fee);\n    (sqrtPriceX96,,,,,, ) = IUniswapV3Pool(poolAddress).slot0();\n```\n```\n(uint256 holdTokenAmountIn, uint256 amount0, uint256 amount1) = \n    _getHoldTokenAmountIn(\n        params.zeroForSaleToken,\n        cache.tickLower,\n        cache.tickUpper,\n        cache.sqrtPriceX96,\n        loan.liquidity,\n        cache.holdTokenDebt\n    );\n```\n```\nlet amountWBTC = ethers.utils.parseUnits("0.05", 8); // token0\nconst deadline = (await time.latest()) + 60;\nconst minLeverageDesired = 50;\nconst maxCollateralWBTC = amountWBTC.div(minLeverageDesired);\n\nconst loans = [\n  {\n    liquidity: nftpos[3].liquidity,\n    tokenId: nftpos[3].tokenId,\n  },\n];\n\nconst swapParams: ApproveSwapAndPay.SwapParamsStruct = {\n  swapTarget: constants.AddressZero,\n  swapAmountInDataIndex: 0,\n  maxGasForCall: 0,\n  swapData: swapData,\n};\n\nlet params = {\n  internalSwapPoolfee: 500,\n  saleToken: WETH_ADDRESS,\n  holdToken: WBTC_ADDRESS,\n  minHoldTokenOut: amountWBTC,\n  maxCollateral: maxCollateralWBTC,\n  externalSwap: swapParams,\n  loans: loans,\n};\n\nawait borrowingManager.connect(bob).borrow(params, deadline);\n\nconst borrowingKey = await borrowingManager.userBorrowingKeys(bob.address, 0);\n\namountWBTC = ethers.utils.parseUnits("0.06", 8); // token0\n\nlet swapping: ISwapRouter.ExactInputSingleParamsStruct = {\n  tokenIn: WBTC_ADDRESS,\n  tokenOut: WETH_ADDRESS,\n  fee: 500,\n  recipient: alice.address,\n  deadline: deadline,\n  amountIn: ethers.utils.parseUnits("100", 8),\n  amountOutMinimum: 0,\n  sqrtPriceLimitX96: 0,\n};\n\nawait router.connect(alice).exactInputSingle(swapping);\nconsole.log("Swap success");\n\nlet paramsRep: LiquidityBorrowingManager.RepayParamsStruct = {\n  isEmergency: false,\n  internalSwapPoolfee: 500,\n  externalSwap: {\n    swapTarget: constants.AddressZero,\n    swapAmountInDataIndex: 0,\n    maxGasForCall: 0,\n    swapData: swapData,\n  },\n  borrowingKey: borrowingKey,\n  swapSlippageBP1000: 990, // <= slippage simulated\n};\n\nawait borrowingManager.connect(bob).repay(paramsRep, deadline);\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `TribalChief` governor's ability to decrease the allocation point (PoolInfo.allocPoint) for a sp. The `TribalChief` governor's ability to decrease the allocation point (PoolInfo.allocPoint) for a specific pool, either directly or indirectly by increasing the allocation point for other pools, has an unintended consequence. This change reduces the total reward for the affected pool. \n\nWhen the g...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction set(uint256 _pid, uint128 _allocPoint, IRewarder _rewarder, bool overwrite) public onlyGovernor {\n    totalAllocPoint = (totalAllocPoint - poolInfo[_pid].allocPoint) + _allocPoint;\n    poolInfo[_pid].allocPoint = _allocPoint.toUint64();\n\n    if (overwrite) {\n        rewarder[_pid] = _rewarder;\n    }\n\n    emit LogSetPool(_pid, _allocPoint, overwrite? _rewarder : rewarder[_pid], overwrite);\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `harvest` method in the `BadgerSBTCCrvPlus` contract is responsible for harvesting additional yi. The `harvest` method in the `BadgerSBTCCrvPlus` contract is responsible for harvesting additional yield from investments. This method is restricted to being called by the strategist due to the `onlyStrategist` modifier. The method involves a series of steps that transform one asset into another. \n\...

Vulnerable code:
```\n/**\n * @dev Harvest additional yield from the investment.\n * Only governance or strategist can call this function.\n */\nfunction harvest(address[] calldata _tokens, uint256[] calldata _cumulativeAmounts, uint256 _index, uint256 _cycle,\n```\n```\nIBadgerTree(BADGER_TREE).claim(_tokens, _cumulativeAmounts, _index, _cycle, _merkleProof, _amountsToClaim)\n```\n```\nuint256 _badger = IERC20Upgradeable(BADGER).balanceOf(address(this));\n\nif (_badger > 0) {\n    IERC20Upgradeable(BADGER).safeApprove(SUSHISWAP, 0);\n    IERC20Upgradeable(BADGER).safeApprove(SUSHISWAP, _badger);\n\n    address[] memory _path = new address[](2);\n    _path[0] = BADGER;\n    _path[1] = WBTC;\n\n    IUniswapRouter(SUSHISWAP).swapExactTokensForTokens(_badger, uint256(0), _path, address(this), block.timestamp.add(1800));\n}\n```\n```\n@dev\nDeprecated. This function has issues similar to the ones found in IERC20-approve, and its usage is discouraged.\n```\n```\n*@dev Deprecated. This function has issues similar to the ones found in\n* IERC20-approve, and its usage is discouraged.\n```\n```\nIUniswapRouter(SUSHISWAP).swapExactTokensForTokens(\n    _badger,\n    uint256(0),\n    _path,\n    address(this),\n    block.timestamp.add(1800)\n)\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `increaseCollateralAmount` vulnerability in the Lyra vault implementation restricts users from i. The `increaseCollateralAmount` vulnerability in the Lyra vault implementation restricts users from increasing their collateral freely, only allowing it if the overall collateral value exceeds the margin value. This restriction is intended to ensure that the collateral value remains above the margin...

Vulnerable code:
```\nrequire(colInUSD >= borrowMargin, "Liquidation margin not met!")\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `shutdownMarket()` function in the `MarketShutdownFacet` contract is responsible for determining. The `shutdownMarket()` function in the `MarketShutdownFacet` contract is responsible for determining whether the market should be frozen based on the asset collateral ratio. This critical function is vulnerable to being exploited due to its reliance on a cached price, which can be outdated. The cach...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction shutdownMarket(address asset)\n    external\n    onlyValidAsset(asset)\n    isNotFrozen(asset)\n    nonReentrant\n{\n    uint256 cRatio = _getAssetCollateralRatio(asset);\n    if (cRatio > LibAsset.minimumCR(asset)) {\n        revert Errors.SufficientCollateral();\n    } else {\n        STypes.Asset storage Asset = s.asset[asset];\n        uint256 vault = Asset.vault;\n        uint88 assetZethCollateral = Asset.zethCollateral;\n        s.vault[vault].zethCollateral -= assetZethCollateral;\n        Asset.frozen = F.Permanent;\n        if (cRatio > 1 ether) {\n            uint88 excessZeth = assetZethCollateral - assetZethCollateral.divU88(cRatio);\n            s.vaultUser[vault][address(this)].ethEscrowed += excessZeth;\n            // Reduces c-ratio to 1\n            Asset.zethCollateral -= excessZeth;\n        }\n    }\n    emit Events.ShutdownMarket(asset);\n}\n\nfunction _getAssetCollateralRatio(address asset)\n    private\n    view\n    returns (uint256 cRatio)\n{\n    STypes.Asset storage Asset = s.asset[asset];\n    return Asset.zethCollateral.div(LibOracle.getPrice(asset).mul(Asset.ercDebt));\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: This vulnerability allows an adversary to perform a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on the contract b. This vulnerability allows an adversary to perform a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on the contract by exploiting the way it processes deposits and withdrawals. The issue arises from the fact that when a deposit or withdrawal is dequeued, a blank entry is left in the memory, which must be read and sk...

Vulnerable code:
```\nwhile (_quantity > 0) {\n    Receipt memory deposit = deposits[i];\n    if (deposit.amount == 0) {\n        i++;\n        continue;\n    }\n    if (deposit.amount <= _quantity) {\n        _quantity -= deposit.amount;\n        usdBalance[deposit.sender] -= deposit.amount;\n        amountToSend = (deposit.amount * 1e18) / _price;\n        IERC20(crab).transfer(deposit.sender, amountToSend);\n        emit USDCDeposited(deposit.sender, deposit.amount, amountToSend, i, 0);\n        delete deposits[i];\n        i++;\n    } else {\n        deposits[i].amount -= _quantity;\n        usdBalance[deposit.sender] -= _quantity;\n        amountToSend = (_quantity * 1e18) / _price;\n        IERC20(crab).transfer(deposit.sender, amountToSend);\n        emit USDCDeposited(deposit.sender, _quantity, amountToSend, i, 0);\n        _quantity = 0;\n    }\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The vulnerability arises from the lack of a `fid` specification in the removal signature verificatio. The vulnerability arises from the lack of a `fid` specification in the removal signature verification process. The `removeFor()` function utilizes a removal signature to remove a key from the `fidOwner` using the `KeyRegistry.removeFor()` method. The signature is verified in the `_verifyRemoveSig()`...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction _verifyRemoveSig(address fidOwner, bytes memory key, uint256 deadline, bytes memory sig) internal {\n    _verifySig(\n        _hashTypedDataV4(\n            keccak256(abi.encode(REMOVE_TYPEHASH, fidOwner, keccak256(key), _useNonce(fidOwner), deadline))\n        ),\n        fidOwner,\n        deadline,\n        sig\n    );\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `BalancerPairOracle` is vulnerable to manipulation due to its reliance on the `BalancerVault`'s . The `BalancerPairOracle` is vulnerable to manipulation due to its reliance on the `BalancerVault`'s reentrancy guard. Specifically, the `getPrice` function makes an external call to `BalancerVault.getPoolTokens` without verifying the reentrancy protection. This allows an attacker to exploit the orac...

Vulnerable code:
```\nAttackerContract.flashLoan() ->\n    SomeProtocol.flashLoan() ->\n        AttackerContract.exploit()\n\nAttackerContract.exploit() ->\n    BalancerVault.joinPool() ->\n        BalancerVault.returnExcessETH() ->\n            AttackerContract.receive()\n\nAttackerContract.receive() ->\n    BlueBerryBank.liquidate() ->\n        BalancerPairOracle.getPrice() ->\n            BalancerVaul.getPoolTokens(),\n            BalancerPool.getTotalSupply()\n\n        price = f(BalancerVaul.getPoolTokens()) / BalancerPool.getTotalSupply()\n\n    // The position is liquidated under false pretenses.\n```
MEDIUM severity: The vulnerability lies in the incomplete input validation and inconsistent order of validations in v. The vulnerability lies in the incomplete input validation and inconsistent order of validations in various methods and functions within the registries. This lack of robust input validation can lead to potential security issues and exploitation.\n\nIn the `BlockhashRegistry`, methods such as `reCalcu...

Vulnerable code:
```\nassert(_blockNumber > _blockheaders.length);\n```\n```\nfunction removeNode(uint _nodeIndex) internal {\n    emit LogNodeRemoved(nodes[_nodeIndex].url, nodes[_nodeIndex].signer);\n    delete urlIndex[keccak256(bytes(nodes[_nodeIndex].url))];\n    uint length = nodes.length;\n\n    assert(length > 0);\n}\n```\n```\nfunction registerNodeFor(\n    string calldata _url,\n    uint64 _props,\n    uint64 _timeout,\n    address _signer,\n    uint64 _weight,\n    uint8 _v,\n    bytes32 _r,\n    bytes32 _s\n) \n    external\n    payable\n{\n```\n```\nsignerInformation storage si = signerIndex[_signer];\n```\n```\nrequire(si.stage!= Stages.Convicted,\n  "node already convicted");\n```\n```\nrequire (!urlIndex[newURl].used, "url is already in use");\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `removeWhitelistStatus` function in the `LibWhitelistedTokens` module exhibits a critical flaw i. The `removeWhitelistStatus` function in the `LibWhitelistedTokens` module exhibits a critical flaw in its logic, which can have far-reaching consequences. Specifically, when removing the whitelisted status of a token, the function fails to consider the potential impact on related variables, such as...

Vulnerable code:
```\nrequire(s.ss[token].milestoneSeason == 0, "Whitelist: Token already whitelisted");\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `swapDeposit` function, responsible for replacing an existing PCVDeposit with a new one, fails t. The `swapDeposit` function, responsible for replacing an existing PCVDeposit with a new one, fails to utilize its internal functions `_removeDeposit` and `_addDeposit` to manage the deposit swapping process. Instead, it calls the `removeDeposit` and `addDeposit` functions, which may lead to redundan...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction swapDeposit(address _oldDeposit, address _newDeposit) external onlyGovernor {\n    removeDeposit(_oldDeposit);\n    addDeposit(_newDeposit);\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `JUSDBank.withdraw()` function, when used to withdraw funds to another internal account, fails t. The `JUSDBank.withdraw()` function, when used to withdraw funds to another internal account, fails to validate the `ReserveInfo.isDepositAllowed` variable. This vulnerability allows for the potential manipulation of the collateral reserve's deposit allowance, as the `isDepositAllowed` flag can be dy...

Vulnerable code:
```\nFile: JUSDBank.sol\n\nfunction _withdraw(\n    uint256 amount,\n    address collateral,\n    address to,\n    address from,\n    bool isInternal\n) internal {\n    if (isInternal) {\n        DataTypes.UserInfo storage toAccount = userInfo[to];\n        _addCollateralIfNotExists(toAccount, collateral);\n        toAccount.depositBalance[collateral] += amount;\n        require(\n            toAccount.depositBalance[collateral] <=\n                reserve.maxDepositAmountPerAccount,\n            JUSDErrors.EXCEED_THE_MAX_DEPOSIT_AMOUNT_PER_ACCOUNT\n        );\n    }\n```\n```\nfunction _deposit(\n    DataTypes.ReserveInfo storage reserve,\n    DataTypes.UserInfo storage user,\n    uint256 amount,\n    address collateral,\n    address to,\n    address from\n) internal {\n    require(reserve.isDepositAllowed, JUSDErrors.RESERVE_NOT_ALLOW_DEPOSIT);\n}\n```\n```\nFile: JUSDOperation.sol\n\nfunction delistReserve(address collateral) external onlyOwner {\n    DataTypes.ReserveInfo storage reserve = reserveInfo[collateral];\n    reserve.isBorrowAllowed = false;\n    reserve.isDepositAllowed = false;\n    reserve.isFinalLiquidation = true;\n    emit RemoveReserve(collateral);\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The AuraSpell#openPositionFarm function in the JoinPoolRequest uses an incorrect join type for the b. The AuraSpell#openPositionFarm function in the JoinPoolRequest uses an incorrect join type for the balancer, which can lead to unintended consequences. Specifically, the userData field is set to an empty string, which, when decoded, will result in a join type of 0. This is problematic because join r...

Vulnerable code:
```\nenum JoinKind {\n    INIT,\n    EXACT_TOKENS_IN_FOR_BPT_OUT,\n    TOKEN_IN_FOR_EXACT_BPT_OUT\n}\n```\n```\nelse if (kind == JoinKind.TOKEN_IN_FOR_EXACT_BPT_OUT) {\n    return _joinTokenInForExactBPTOut(balances, normalizedWeights, userData);\n} else {\n    _revert(Errors.UNHANDLED_JOIN_KIND);\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The use of an unlocked Solidity compiler version in the `pragma` directive can lead to unintended co. The use of an unlocked Solidity compiler version in the `pragma` directive can lead to unintended consequences when deploying smart contracts. This vulnerability occurs when a contract is deployed with a compiler version that differs from the one used during testing, potentially introducing unknown...

Vulnerable code:
```\npragma solidity ^0.8.19;\n```\n```\npragma solidity ^0.8.19;\n```\n```\npragma solidity ^0.8.19;\n```\n```\npragma solidity ^0.8.19;\n```