MEDIUM severity: The vulnerability is related to the incorrect scaling of the spot price, which can lead to incorrect. The vulnerability is related to the incorrect scaling of the spot price, which can lead to incorrect spot prices being compared with the oracle price. This can result in potential pool manipulation detection failures or false positives, ultimately causing unintended reverts or losses.\n\nThe issue a...

Vulnerable code:
```\nFile: BalancerComposableAuraVault.sol\n\nfunction _checkPriceAndCalculateValue() internal view override returns (uint256) {\n    (uint256[] memory balances, uint256[] memory spotPrices) = \n        SPOT_PRICE.getComposableSpotPrices(\n            BALANCER_POOL_ID,\n            address(BALANCER_POOL_TOKEN),\n            PRIMARY_INDEX()\n        );\n\n    (/* */, uint8[] memory decimals) = TOKENS();\n    for (uint256 i = 0; i < spotPrices.length; i++) {\n        spotPrices[i] = spotPrices[i] * POOL_PRECISION() / 10 ** decimals[i];\n    }\n\n    return _calculateLPTokenValue(balances, spotPrices);\n}\n```\n```\nscaledPrimary = balances[USDC] * scalingFactors[USDC] / BALANCER_PRECISION\n\nscaledPrimary = (100 * 1e6 * 1e30) / 1e18\n\nscaledPrimary = 100 * 1e18\n\nscaledSecondary = balances[DAI] * scalingFactors[DAI] / BALANCER_PRECISION\n\nscaledSecondary = (100 * 1e18 * 1e18) / 1e18\n\nscaledSecondary = 100 * 1e18\n```\n```\nFile: BalancerSpotPrice.sol\n\nfunction _calculateStableMathSpotPrice(\n    uint256 ampParam,\n    uint256[] memory scalingFactors,\n    uint256[] memory balances,\n    uint256 scaledPrimary,\n    uint256 primaryIndex,\n    uint256 index2\n) internal pure returns (uint256 spotPrice) {\n    // Apply scale factors\n    uint256 secondary = balances[index2] * scalingFactors[index2] / BALANCER_PRECISION;\n\n    uint256 invariant = StableMath._calculateInvariant(\n        ampParam, \n        StableMath._balances(scaledPrimary, secondary), \n        true // round up\n    );\n\n    spotPrice = StableMath._calcSpotPrice(\n        ampParam, \n        invariant, \n        scaledPrimary, \n        secondary\n    );\n\n    // Remove scaling factors from spot price\n    spotPrice = spotPrice * scalingFactors[primaryIndex] / scalingFactors[index2];\n}\n```\n```\nspotPrice = spotPrice * scalingFactors[USDC] / scalingFactors[DAI]\n\nspotPrice = (1e18 * 1e30) / 1e18\nspotPrice = 1e30\n\nspotPrice = 1e12 * 1e18\n```\n```\nspotPrice[USDC-Primary] = 0\nspotPrice[DAI-Secondary] = 1e12 * 1e18\n```\n```\nspotPrice[DAI-Secondary] = spotPrice[DAI-Secondary] * POOL_PRECISION / DAI_Decimal\n\nspotPrice[DAI-Secondary] = (1e12 * 1e18 * 1e18) / 1e18\nspotPrice[DAI-Secondary] = 1e12 * 1e18\n```\n```\nFile: BalancerComposableAuraVault.sol\n\nfunction _checkPriceAndCalculateValue() internal view override returns (uint256) {\n    (uint256[] memory balances, uint256[] memory spotPrices) = \n        SPOT_PRICE.getComposableSpotPrices(\n            BALANCER_POOL_ID,\n            address(BALANCER_POOL_TOKEN),\n            PRIMARY_INDEX()\n        );\n\n    (/* */, uint8[] memory decimals) = TOKENS();\n    for (uint256 i = 0; i < spotPrices.length; i++) {\n        spotPrices[i] = spotPrices[i] * POOL_PRECISION() / 10 ** decimals[i];\n    }\n\n    return _calculateLPTokenValue(balances, spotPrices);\n}\n```