Farseen0/scar-pairs huggingface dataset:
MEDIUM severity: The `TokenVesting` contract's `revoke` function allows the owner to cancel the vesting of tokens for. The `TokenVesting` contract's `revoke` function allows the owner to cancel the vesting of tokens for a beneficiary, but only if the beneficiary has already claimed the tokens using the `MerkleTokenVesting.claimAward` function. This design decision creates an incentive for the beneficiary to delay cl...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction revoke(address beneficiary) public onlyOwner {\n    TokenAward storage award = getTokenAwardStorage(beneficiary);\n\n    require(award.revocable, "Cannot be revoked");\n    require(!award.revoked, "Already revoked");\n\n    // Figure out how many tokens were owed up until revocation\n    uint256 unreleased = getReleasableAmount(beneficiary);\n    award.released += unreleased;\n\n    uint256 refund = award.amount - award.released;\n\n    // Mark award as revoked\n    award.revoked = true;\n    award.amount = award.released;\n\n    // Transfer owed vested tokens to beneficiary\n    targetToken.safeTransfer(beneficiary, unreleased);\n\n    // Transfer unvested tokens to owner (revoked amount)\n    targetToken.safeTransfer(owner(), refund);\n\n    emit Released(beneficiary, unreleased);\n    emit Revoked(beneficiary, refund);\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The vulnerability arises from the use of `MAX_UINT256` when setting approval for the manager or trad. The vulnerability arises from the use of `MAX_UINT256` when setting approval for the manager or trade router to withdraw tokens from the vault. This approach is problematic because it assumes that all ERC20 tokens support allowances up to the maximum value of `uint256`, which is not the case for sev...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfor (uint i = 0; i < tokens.length; i++) {\n    IERC20(tokens[i]).safeIncreaseAllowance(ownerIn, type(uint256).max);\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The protocol's valuation of USDC in the event of a depeg can lead to a loss of funds for users. The . The protocol's valuation of USDC in the event of a depeg can lead to a loss of funds for users. The protocol relies on a Chainlink feed to obtain the price of USDC, a stablecoin pegged to the US dollar. However, in the event of a depeg, where the price of USDC deviates from its peg, the protocol's v...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction consult(address token) public view whenNotPaused returns (int256, uint8) {\n    address _feed = feeds[token];\n\n    if (_feed == address(0)) {\n        revert Errors.NoTokenPriceFeedAvailable();\n    }\n\n    ChainlinkResponse memory chainlinkResponse = _getChainlinkResponse(_feed);\n    ChainlinkResponse memory prevChainlinkResponse = _getPrevChainlinkResponse(_feed, chainlinkResponse.roundId);\n\n    if (_chainlinkIsFrozen(chainlinkResponse, token)) {\n        revert Errors.FrozenTokenPriceFeed();\n    }\n    if (_chainlinkIsBroken(chainlinkResponse, prevChainlinkResponse, token)) {\n        revert Errors.BrokenTokenPriceFeed();\n    }\n\n    return (chainlinkResponse.answer, chainlinkResponse.decimals);\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `onlyActiveState` modifier in the `NodeRegistry` contract contains a variable `In3Node memory n`. The `onlyActiveState` modifier in the `NodeRegistry` contract contains a variable `In3Node memory n` that is declared but never utilized within the modifier's scope. This unused variable, `n`, is assigned the value of `nodes[si.index]`, which is an `In3Node` struct, but its value is not used or refe...

Vulnerable code:
```\nmodifier onlyActiveState(address _signer) {\n    SignerInformation memory si = signerIndex[_signer];\n    require(si.stage == Stages.Active, "address is not an in3-signer");\n\n    In3Node memory n = nodes[si.index];\n    assert(nodes[si.index].signer == _signer);\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: This vulnerability allows an attacker to exploit a precision loss in the `LibTokenSilo::removeDeposi. This vulnerability allows an attacker to exploit a precision loss in the `LibTokenSilo::removeDepositFromAccount` function, specifically in the calculation of `removedBDV`. The issue arises when a whitelisted token's `bdvCalc(amountDeposited)` value is less than the `amountDeposited`. In such cases,...

Vulnerable code:
```\nuint256 removedBDV = amount.mul(crateBDV).div(crateAmount);\n```
MEDIUM severity: The D3Oracle vulnerability occurs when the Chainlink aggregator returns a price that falls outside t. The D3Oracle vulnerability occurs when the Chainlink aggregator returns a price that falls outside the designated minimum and maximum price range. This can happen when the actual market price drops below the minimum or exceeds the maximum allowed value. In such cases, the oracle will not return the...

Vulnerable code:
```\n(uint80 roundID, int256 price, uint256 updatedAt, uint80 answeredInRound) = priceFeed.latestRoundData();\n\nrequire(price > 0, "Chainlink: Incorrect Price");\nrequire(block.timestamp - updatedAt < priceSources[token].heartBeat, "Chainlink: Stale Price");\nrequire(answeredInRound >= roundID, "Chainlink: Stale Price");\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `TreasuryVester` contract, when deployed, initializes several storage variables with fixed value. The `TreasuryVester` contract, when deployed, initializes several storage variables with fixed values. These variables, including `gtc`, `vestingAmount`, `vestingBegin`, `vestingCliff`, and `vestingEnd`, are defined as public and are not reassigned or updated within the contract. This suggests that...

Vulnerable code:
```\ngtc = gtc_;\n```\n```\nvestingAmount = vestingAmount_;\nvestingBegin = vestingBegin_;\nvestingCliff = vestingCliff_;\nvestingEnd = vestingEnd_;\n```\n```\npublic class Address {\n    public String gtc;\n}\n```\n```\nuint public vestingAmount;\nuint public vestingBegin;\nuint public vestingCliff;\nuint public vestingEnd;\n```
MEDIUM severity: The JUSDBank system imposes individual collateral borrow limits for each collateral type, aiming to . The JUSDBank system imposes individual collateral borrow limits for each collateral type, aiming to prevent users from borrowing more than the maximum allowed amount. However, a vulnerability exists in the implementation, allowing users to bypass these limits. The issue arises from the fact that the...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction borrow(\n    uint256 amount,\n    address to,\n    bool isDepositToJOJO\n) external override nonReentrant nonFlashLoanReentrant {\n    DataTypes.UserInfo storage user = userInfo[msg.sender];\n    _borrow(user, isDepositToJOJO, to, amount, msg.sender);\n    require(\n        _isAccountSafeAfterBorrow(user, getTRate()),\n        JUSDErrors.AFTER_BORROW_ACCOUNT_IS_NOT_SAFE\n    );\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `LibBytes` library contains several functions that are vulnerable to integer overflows, specific. The `LibBytes` library contains several functions that are vulnerable to integer overflows, specifically `readBytesWithLength`, `readAddress`, `writeAddress`, `readBytes32`, and `writeBytes32`, as well as `readBytes4`. These functions manipulate arrays of bytes, and their implementation involves ari...

Vulnerable code:
```\nif (b.length < index + nestedBytesLength):\n    LibRichErrors.rrevert(\n        LibBytesRichErrors.InvalidByteOperationError(\n            LibBytesRichErrors.InvalidByteOperationErrorCodes.LengthGreaterThanOrEqualsNestedBytesLengthRequired,\n            b.length,\n            index + nestedBytesLength\n        )\n    )\n```
MEDIUM severity: The vulnerability arises from a critical oversight in the protocol's fee management mechanism. Speci. The vulnerability arises from a critical oversight in the protocol's fee management mechanism. Specifically, the `updateFeePerSecond` function, which allows the owner to modify the `feePerSecond` variable, fails to account for accrued fees prior to the update. This oversight can lead to inaccurate f...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction updateFeePerSecond(uint256 feePerSecond) external onlyOwner {\n    _store.feePerSecond = feePerSecond;\n    emit FeePerSecondUpdated(feePerSecond);\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `cancelVesting` function is intended to cancel a vesting grant and potentially distribute unclai. The `cancelVesting` function is intended to cancel a vesting grant and potentially distribute unclaimed, vested funds to the user if `giveUnclaimed` is set to `true`. However, due to a bug, this functionality is compromised when the user has staked or locked funds. Specifically, the `userVesting` va...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction cancelVesting(uint256 categoryId, uint256 vestingId, address user, bool giveUnclaimed)\n    external\n    onlyOwner\n{\n    UserVesting memory userVesting = userVestings[categoryId][vestingId][user];\n\n    if (userVesting.amount == 0) {\n        revert UserVestingDoesNotExists(categoryId, vestingId, user);\n    }\n\n    if (userVesting.startTime + vestingInfos[categoryId][vestingId].period <= block.timestamp) {\n        revert AlreadyVested(categoryId, vestingId, user);\n    }\n\n    uint256 lockupId = lockupIds[categoryId][vestingId][user];\n\n    if (lockupId!= 0) {\n        veTRUF.unstakeVesting(user, lockupId - 1, true);\n        delete lockupIds[categoryId][vestingId][user];\n        userVesting.locked = 0;\n    }\n\n    VestingCategory storage category = categories[categoryId];\n\n    uint256 claimableAmount = claimable(categoryId, vestingId, user);\n    if (giveUnclaimed && claimableAmount!= 0) {\n        trufToken.safeTransfer(user, claimableAmount);\n\n        userVesting.claimed += claimableAmount;\n        category.totalClaimed += claimableAmount;\n        emit Claimed(categoryId, vestingId, user, claimableAmount);\n    }\n\n    uint256 unvested = userVesting.amount - userVesting.claimed;\n\n    delete userVestings[categoryId][vestingId][user];\n\n    category.allocated -= unvested;\n\n    emit CancelVesting(categoryId, vestingId, user, giveUnclaimed);\n}\n```\n```\nuint256 lockupId = lockupIds[categoryId][vestingId][user];\n\nif (lockupId!= 0) {\n    veTRUF.unstakeVesting(user, lockupId - 1, true);\n    delete lockupIds[categoryId][vestingId][user];\n    userVesting.locked = 0;\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `isValidRefinance` function in the `AstariaRouter.sol` contract contains a critical flaw in its . The `isValidRefinance` function in the `AstariaRouter.sol` contract contains a critical flaw in its mathematical logic, leading to incorrect validation of refinance requests. Specifically, the function checks whether the loan interest rate has increased, rather than decreased, by more than 0.5%. Thi...

Vulnerable code:
```\nif (!ASTARIA_ROUTER.isValidRefinance(lienData[lienId], ld)) {\n    revert InvalidRefinance();\n}\n```\n```\nuint256 minNewRate = uint256(lien.rate) - minInterestBPS;\nreturn (newLien.rate >= minNewRate \n       && newLien.rate <= lien.rate);\n```
MEDIUM severity: The vulnerability occurs when the `transferFrom` call is used to burn swap tokens, and the return va. The vulnerability occurs when the `transferFrom` call is used to burn swap tokens, and the return value of this call is intentionally ignored. This oversight can potentially allow an attacker to mint an arbitrary amount of Amp tokens, depending on the implementation of the token being used. \n\nIn t...

Vulnerable code:
```\nswapToken.transferFrom(\n    _from,\n    swapTokenGraveyard,\n    amount\n)\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `getLiquidationBonus` function in the provided code exhibits an exponential scaling issue in its. The `getLiquidationBonus` function in the provided code exhibits an exponential scaling issue in its calculation of liquidation bonuses. Specifically, the bonus is calculated as a proportion of the borrowed amount, multiplied by the bonus percentage for the given token, and then scaled by the number...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction getLiquidationBonus(\n    address token,\n    uint256 borrowedAmount,\n    uint256 times\n) public view returns (uint256 liquidationBonus) {\n    Liquidation memory liq = liquidationBonusForToken[token];\n\n    unchecked {\n        if (liq.bonusBP == 0) {\n            liq.minBonusAmount = Constants.MINIMUM_AMOUNT;\n            liq.bonusBP = defaultLiquidationBonusBP;\n        }\n        liquidationBonus = (borrowedAmount * liq.bonusBP) / Constants.BP;\n\n        if (liquidationBonus < liq.minBonusAmount) {\n            liquidationBonus = liq.minBonusAmount;\n        }\n        liquidationBonus *= (times > 0? times : 1);\n    }\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `_payment()` function in the LienToken.sol contract is vulnerable to overpayment issues when pro. The `_payment()` function in the LienToken.sol contract is vulnerable to overpayment issues when processing payments. Specifically, it transfers the full `paymentAmount` to the lien owner, which can lead to unintended consequences.\n\nIn the first scenario, when a user intends to pay off a single li...

Vulnerable code:
```\nTRANSFER_PROXY.tokenTransferFrom(\n    WETH,\n    payer,\n    payee,\n    paymentAmount\n)\n```\n```\nuint256 paymentAmount = totalCapitalAvailable;\n\nfor (uint256 i = 0; i < openLiens.length; ++i) {\n    uint256 capitalSpent = _payment(\n        collateralId,\n        uint8(i),\n        paymentAmount,\n        address(msg.sender)\n    );\n    paymentAmount -= capitalSpent;\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The vulnerability allows sophisticated vault accounts to avoid being settled by transferring excess . The vulnerability allows sophisticated vault accounts to avoid being settled by transferring excess cash out of the account during the settlement process. This can occur when an account's collateral ratio is unhealthy, and the excess cash is transferred out, making the account appear healthy. Howeve...

Vulnerable code:
```\nFile: VaultAccountAction.sol\n\nfunction settleVaultAccount(address account, address vault) external override nonReentrant {\n    requireValidAccount(account);\n    require(account!= vault);\n\n    VaultConfig memory vaultConfig = VaultConfiguration.getVaultConfigStateful(vault);\n    VaultAccount memory vaultAccount = VaultAccountLib.getVaultAccount(account, vaultConfig);\n\n    (bool didSettle, bool didTransfer) = vaultAccount.settleVaultAccount(vaultConfig);\n    require(didSettle, "No Settle");\n\n    vaultAccount.accruePrimeCashFeesToDebt(vaultConfig);\n\n    vaultAccount.setVaultAccount({vaultConfig: vaultConfig, checkMinBorrow: false});\n\n    if (didTransfer) {\n        IVaultAccountHealth(address(this)).checkVaultAccountCollateralRatio(vault, account);\n    }\n}\n```\n```\nFile: VaultLiquidationAction.sol\n\nfunction _authenticateDeleverage(\n    address account,\n    address vault,\n    address liquidator\n) private returns (\n    VaultConfig memory vaultConfig,\n    VaultAccount memory vaultAccount,\n    VaultState memory vaultState\n) {\n    requireValidAccount(liquidator);\n    require(liquidator!= vault);\n\n    require(account!= msg.sender);\n    require(account!= liquidator);\n\n    vaultConfig = VaultConfiguration.getVaultConfigStateful(vault);\n    require(vaultConfig.getFlag(VaultConfiguration.DISABLE_DELEVERAGE) == false);\n\n    if (vaultConfig.getFlag(VaultConfiguration.ONLY_VAULT_DELEVERAGE)) {\n        require(msg.sender == vault);\n    } else {\n        require(msg.sender == liquidator);\n    }\n\n    vaultAccount = VaultAccountLib.getVaultAccount(account, vaultConfig);\n\n    require(block.timestamp < vaultAccount.maturity, "Must Settle");\n\n    if (vaultAccount.maturity == Constants.PRIME_CASH_VAULT_MATURITY) {\n        vaultState = vaultAccount.accruePrimeCashFeesToDebtInLiquidation(vaultConfig);\n    } else {\n        vaultState = VaultStateLib.getVaultState(vaultConfig, vaultAccount.maturity);\n    }\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The vulnerability arises from the use of the `address` type in various contract variables and functi. The vulnerability arises from the use of the `address` type in various contract variables and function parameters, which can lead to type-related issues and potential errors. Specifically, the `TBTCSystem.priceFeed` variable is declared as an `address`, but it could be more accurately represented as...

Vulnerable code:
```\nstruct Deposit {\n    address TBTCSystem;\n    address TBTCToken;\n    address TBTCDepositToken;\n    address FeeRebateToken;\n    address VendingMachine;\n    uint256 lotSizeSatoshis;\n    uint8 currentState;\n    uint256 signerFeeDivisor;\n    uint128 undercollateralizedThresholdPercent;\n    uint128 severelyUndercollateralizedThresholdPercent;\n}\n```\n```\ncontract DepositFactory is CloneFactory, TBTCSystemAuthority {\n\n    address public masterDepositAddress;\n    address public tbtcSystem;\n    address public tbtcToken;\n    address public tbtcDepositToken;\n    address public feeRebateToken;\n    address public vendingMachine;\n    uint256 public keepThreshold;\n    uint256 public keepSize;\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `emergencyPause` function in the GMX smart contract lacks a crucial control mechanism to prevent. The `emergencyPause` function in the GMX smart contract lacks a crucial control mechanism to prevent its execution before callbacks have completed. This oversight can lead to unforeseen consequences, including financial loss for users. The function's unrestricted execution can disrupt ongoing transa...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction afterDepositExecution(\n    bytes32 depositKey,\n    IDeposit.Props memory depositProps,\n    IEvent.Props memory eventData\n) external onlyController {\n    GMXTypes.Store memory _store = vault.store();\n\n    if (\n        _store.status == GMXTypes.Status.Deposit &&\n        _store.depositCache.depositKey == depositKey\n    ) {\n        vault.processDeposit();\n    } else if (\n        _store.status == GMXTypes.Status.Rebalance_Add &&\n        _store.rebalanceCache.depositKey == depositKey\n    ) {\n        vault.processRebalanceAdd();\n    } else if (\n        _store.status == GMXTypes.Status.Compound &&\n        _store.compoundCache.depositKey == depositKey\n    ) {\n        vault.processCompound();\n    } else if (\n        _store.status == GMXTypes.Status.Withdraw_Failed &&\n        _store.withdrawCache.depositKey == depositKey\n    ) {\n        vault.processWithdrawFailureLiquidityAdded();\n    } else if (_store.status == GMXTypes.Status.Resume) {\n        vault.processEmergencyResume();\n    }\n}\n```\n```\nfunction beforeProcessDepositChecks(\n    GMXTypes.Store storage self\n) external view {\n    if (self.status!= GMXTypes.Status.Deposit)\n        revert Errors.NotAllowedInCurrentVaultStatus();\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The vulnerability allows a malicious Keeper to manipulate the execution of deposits, orders, or with. The vulnerability allows a malicious Keeper to manipulate the execution of deposits, orders, or withdrawals by intentionally providing insufficient gas to the execution process. This can cause the execution to fail, resulting in the Keeper receiving the execution fee and incentive rewards. The malic...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction executeDeposit(\n    bytes32 key,\n    OracleUtils.SetPricesParams calldata oracleParams\n) external\n    globalNonReentrant\n    onlyOrderKeeper\n    withOraclePrices(oracle, dataStore, eventEmitter, oracleParams)\n{\n    uint256 startingGas = gasleft();\n\n    try this._executeDeposit(\n        key,\n        oracleParams,\n        msg.sender,\n        startingGas\n    ) {\n    } catch (bytes memory reasonBytes) {\n        _handleDepositError(\n            key,\n            startingGas,\n            reasonBytes\n        );\n    }\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `executeOperation` function in the provided smart contract allows for the execution of arbitrary. The `executeOperation` function in the provided smart contract allows for the execution of arbitrary tasks on behalf of the user's DSProxy. This is achieved by granting the flash loan wrapper contract (FLAaveV2, FLDyDx) permission to execute functions on the user's DSProxy, which is only revoked aft...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction executeOperation(\n    address[] memory _assets,\n    uint256[] memory _amounts,\n    uint256[] memory _fees,\n    address _initiator,\n    bytes memory _params\n) public returns (bool) {\n    require(msg.sender == AAVE_LENDING_POOL, ERR_ONLY_AAVE_CALLER);\n    require(_initiator == address(this), ERR_SAME_CALLER);\n\n    (Task memory currTask, address proxy) = abi.decode(_params, (Task, address));\n\n    // Send FL amounts to user proxy\n    for (uint256 i = 0; i < _assets.length; i++) {\n        _assets[i].withdrawTokens(proxy, _amounts[i]);\n    }\n\n    address payable taskExecutor = payable(registry.getAddr(TASK_EXECUTOR_ID));\n\n    // Call Action execution\n    IDSProxy(proxy).execute{value: address(this).balance}(\n        taskExecutor,\n        abi.encodeWithSelector(CALLBACK_SELECTOR, currTask, bytes32(_amounts[0] + _fees[0]))\n    );\n\n    // Return FL\n    for (uint256 i = 0; i < _assets.length; i++) {\n        _assets[i].approveToken(address(AAVE_LENDING_POOL), _amounts[i] + _fees[i]);\n    }\n\n    return true;\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The vulnerability allows a malicious actor to lock the option token minter's fund by exploiting the . The vulnerability allows a malicious actor to lock the option token minter's fund by exploiting the blocklisting mechanism in certain token contracts. Specifically, when a token is deployed via the Teller contract, the contract checks that the receiver address is not the address `0`. However, a mali...

Vulnerable code:
```\n# This is a code block\n# It needs to be formatted properly\n# The task is to fix the formatting and remove comments which do not describe the code\n\n# 1. Ensure that the code is properly indented.\n# 2. Ensure that there are no leading tabs - the outer most block should start with no whitespace infront.\n# 3. Ensure that a line is too long break it in multiple lines.\n# 4. Keep all the code the same even if it seems unnecessary in the context.\n# 5. Remove comments which contain no information about the code.\n# 6. Remove any comments which contain URLs.\n# 7. Do not add any backticks as this will be done automatically. If you do it will break the formatting. DO NOT ADD BACKTICKS.\n\nif True:\n    print("Hello, World!")\n```