Farseen0/scar-pairs huggingface dataset:
MEDIUM severity: The `LibLastReserveBytes::storeLastReserves` function is responsible for packing reserve data into `. The `LibLastReserveBytes::storeLastReserves` function is responsible for packing reserve data into `bytes32` slots in storage. This process involves breaking down the data into various components, including a byte for the reserves array length, five bytes for the timestamp, and 16 bytes for each res...

Vulnerable code:
```\nsrc/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol\nuint8 n = uint8(reserves.length);\nif (n == 1) {\n    assembly {\n        sstore(slot, or(or(shl(208, lastTimestamp), shl(248, n)), shl(104, shr(152, mload(add(reserves, 32)))))\n    }\n    return;\n}\n\nassembly {\n    sstore(slot, or(or(shl(208, lastTimestamp), shl(248, n)), or(shl(104, shr(152, mload(add(reserves, 32)))), shr(152, mload(add(reserves, 64)))))\n    // slot := add(slot, 32)\n}\n```\n```\nrequire(reserves[0] <= type(uint128).max, "ByteStorage: too large");\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `openPositionFarm` function in AuraSpell's smart contract is vulnerable to a reentrancy issue wh. The `openPositionFarm` function in AuraSpell's smart contract is vulnerable to a reentrancy issue when the `lpToken` is present in the `tokens` array. This occurs due to the inconsistent lengths of the `maxAmountsIn` and `amountsIn` arrays, which are used to construct a `JoinPoolRequest` struct in B...

Vulnerable code:
```\nFile: AuraSpell.sol\n\nfunction openPositionFarm(\n    OpenPosParam calldata param,\n    uint256 minimumBPT\n) {\n    // rest of code\n    {\n        // 3. Add liquidity to the Balancer pool and receive BPT in return.\n        if (poolAmountOut!= 0) {\n            vault.joinPool(\n                wAuraPools.getBPTPoolId(lpToken),\n                address(this),\n                address(this),\n                IBalancerVault.JoinPoolRequest({\n                    assets: tokens,\n                    maxAmountsIn: maxAmountsIn,\n                    userData: abi.encode(1, amountsIn, _minimumBPT),\n                    fromInternalBalance: false\n                })\n            );\n        }\n    }\n    // rest of code\n}\n\nfunction _getJoinPoolParamsAndApprove(\n    address vault,\n    address[] memory tokens,\n    uint256[] memory balances,\n    address lpToken\n) internal returns (uint256[] memory, uint256[] memory, uint256) {\n    uint256 length = tokens.length;\n    uint256[] memory maxAmountsIn = new uint256[](length);\n    uint256[] memory amountsIn = new uint256[](length);\n    bool isLPIncluded;\n    for (uint256 i = 0; i < length; i++) {\n        if (tokens[i]!= lpToken) {\n            amountsIn[i] = IERC20(tokens[i]).balanceOf(address(this));\n            if (amountsIn[i] > 0) {\n                _ensureApprove(tokens[i], vault, amountsIn[i]);\n            }\n            maxAmountsIn[i] = IERC20(tokens[i]).balanceOf(address(this));\n        } else {\n            isLPIncluded = true;\n        }\n    }\n    if (isLPIncluded) {\n        assembly {\n            mstore(amountsIn, sub(mload(amountsIn), 1))\n        }\n    }\n    return (maxAmountsIn, amountsIn, poolAmountOut);\n}\n```\n```\nif (isLPIncluded) {\n    assembly {\n        mstore(amountsIn, sub(mload(amountsIn), 1))\n    }\n}\n```\n```\nIBalancerVault.JoinPoolRequest({\n    assets: tokens,\n    maxAmountsIn: maxAmountsIn,\n    userData: abi.encode(1, amountsIn, _minimumBPT),\n    fromInternalBalance: false\n})\n```
MEDIUM severity: The vulnerability allows for a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on the auction process by submitting i. The vulnerability allows for a denial-of-service (DoS) attack on the auction process by submitting invalid AltBn128 points when bidding. The AltBn128 elliptic curve is used in the Encrypted Marginal Price Auction (EMPA) module, which is a type of sealed-auction. The EMPA module uses a simplified ECI...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction _bid(\n    uint96 lotId_,\n    address bidder_,\n    address referrer_,\n    uint96 amount_,\n    bytes calldata auctionData_\n) internal override returns (uint64 bidId) {\n    // Decode auction data\n    (uint256 encryptedAmountOut, Point memory bidPubKey) = \n        abi.decode(auctionData_, (uint256, Point));\n\n    // Check that the bid public key is a valid point for the encryption library\n    if (!ECIES.isValid(bidPubKey)) {\n        revert Auction_InvalidKey();\n    }\n\n    // rest of code\n\n    return bidId;\n}\n```\n```\nfunction isOnBn128(Point memory p) public pure returns (bool) {\n    return _fieldmul(p.y, p.y) == _fieldadd(_fieldmul(p.x, _fieldmul(p.x, p.x)), 3);\n}\n\nfunction isValid(Point memory p) public pure returns (bool) {\n    return isOnBn128(p) &&!(p.x == 1 && p.y == 2) &&!(p.x == 0 && p.y == 0);\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `moveStake` function is designed to handle the transfer of stake between two states, specificall. The `moveStake` function is designed to handle the transfer of stake between two states, specifically between `UNDELEGATED` and `UNDELEGATED`. However, a critical issue arises when attempting to move stake between the same state. Despite the expected no-op operation, the function still executes and...

Vulnerable code:
```\nif (from.status == IStructs.StakeStatus.DELEGATED) {\n    _undelegateStake(\n        from.poolId,\n        staker,\n        amount\n    );\n}\n\nif (to.status == IStructs.StakeStatus.DELEGATED) {\n    _delegateStake(\n        to.poolId,\n        staker,\n        amount\n    );\n}\n```\n```\nif (_arePointersEqual(fromPtr, toPtr)) {\n    return;\n}\n```\n```\nemit MoveStake(\n    staker,\n    amount,\n    uint8(from.status),\n    from.poolId,\n    uint8(to.status),\n    to.poolId\n);\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `BufferRouter#resolveQueuedTrades` and `unlockOptions` functions aim to implement a non-atomic o. The `BufferRouter#resolveQueuedTrades` and `unlockOptions` functions aim to implement a non-atomic operation, where if one part of the transaction fails, the entire transaction should not be rolled back. However, an invalid signature can still cause the transaction to revert, contradicting the inten...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction _validateSigner(\n    uint256 timestamp,\n    address asset,\n    uint256 price,\n    bytes memory signature\n) internal view returns (bool) {\n    bytes32 digest = ECDSA.toEthSignedMessageHash(\n        keccak256(\n            abi.encodePacked(timestamp, asset, price)\n        )\n    );\n    address recoveredSigner = ECDSA.recover(digest, signature);\n    return recoveredSigner == publisher;\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `initiator` modifier is designed to ensure that entities such as planets, comets, or operators a. The `initiator` modifier is designed to ensure that entities such as planets, comets, or operators are initialized only once, after the onboarding proposal is approved. To achieve this, the modifier checks that the `initiated` flag is set to 0 before proceeding with the initialization process. Howev...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction initiatePlanet(\n    DataStoreUtils.DataStore storage DATASTORE,\n    uint256[3] memory uintSpecs,\n    address[5] memory addressSpecs,\n    string[2] calldata interfaceSpecs\n)\n    external\n    initiator(DATASTORE, 5, uintSpecs[0], addressSpecs[1])\n    returns (\n        address miniGovernance,\n        address gInterface,\n        address withdrawalPool\n    )\n```\n```\nfunction initiateComet(\n    DataStoreUtils.DataStore storage DATASTORE,\n    uint256 id,\n    uint256 fee,\n    address maintainer\n) external {\n    initiator(DATASTORE, 6, id, maintainer);\n}\n```\n```\nfunction initiateOperator(\n    DataStoreUtils.DataStore storage DATASTORE,\n    uint256 id,\n    uint256 fee,\n    address maintainer\n) external {\n    initiator(DATASTORE, 4, id, maintainer);\n}\n```\n```\nmodifier initiator(\n    DataStoreUtils.DataStore storage DATASTORE,\n    uint256 _TYPE,\n    uint256 _id,\n    address _maintainer\n) {\n    require(\n        msg.sender == DataStoreUtils.DataStore.readAddressForId(_id, "CONTROLLER"),\n        "MaintainerUtils: sender NOT CONTROLLER"\n    );\n    require(\n        DataStoreUtils.DataStore.readUintForId(_id, "TYPE") == _TYPE,\n        "MaintainerUtils: id NOT correct TYPE"\n    );\n    require(\n        DataStoreUtils.DataStore.readUintForId(_id, "initiated") == 0,\n        "MaintainerUtils: already initiated"\n    );\n\n    DataStoreUtils.DataStore.writeAddressForId(_id, "maintainer", _maintainer);\n\n    DataStoreUtils.DataStore.writeUintForId(_id, "initiated", block.timestamp);\n\n    emit IdInitiated(_id, _TYPE);\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `_maxDeposit` function in the Vault contract is responsible for calculating the maximum amount o. The `_maxDeposit` function in the Vault contract is responsible for calculating the maximum amount of assets allowed to be deposited into the vault. However, the current implementation contains a critical flaw that allows for the bypassing of the deposit cap. The function incorrectly includes vault...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction _maxDeposit(Context memory context) private view returns (UFixed6) {\n    if (context.latestCheckpoint.unhealthy()) {\n        return UFixed6Lib.ZERO;\n    }\n    UFixed6 collateral = UFixed6Lib.from(totalAssets().max(Fixed6Lib.ZERO)).add(context.global.deposit);\n    return context.global.assets.add(context.parameter.cap.sub(collateral.min(context.parameter.cap)));\n}\n\nif (depositAssets.gt(_maxDeposit(context))) {\n    revert VaultDepositLimitExceededError();\n}\n```\n```\nit('bypass vault deposit cap', async () => {\n    console.log("start");\n\n    await vault.connect(owner).updateParameter({\n        cap: parse6decimal('100'),\n    });\n\n    await updateOracle();\n\n    var deposit = parse6decimal('100');\n    console.log("Deposit 100");\n    await vault.connect(user).update(user.address, deposit, 0, 0);\n\n    await updateOracle();\n    await vault.settle(user.address);\n\n    var assets = await vault.totalAssets();\n    console.log("Vault assets: " + assets);\n\n    // additional deposit reverts due to cap\n    var deposit = parse6decimal('10');\n    console.log("Deposit 10 revert");\n    await expect(vault.connect(user).update(user.address, deposit, 0, 0)).to.be.reverted;\n\n    // now redeem 50\n    var redeem = parse6decimal('50');\n    console.log("Redeem 50");\n    await vault.connect(user).update(user.address, 0, redeem, 0);\n\n    await updateOracle();\n    await vault.settle(user.address);\n\n    var assets = await vault.totalAssets();\n    console.log("Vault assets: " + assets);\n\n    // deposit 100 (50+100=150) doesn't revert, because assets = 50\n    var deposit = parse6decimal('100');\n    console.log("Deposit 100");\n    await vault.connect(user).update(user.address, deposit, 0, 0);\n\n    await updateOracle();\n    await vault.settle(user.address);\n\n    var assets = await vault.totalAssets();\n    console.log("Vault assets: " + assets);\n\n    var deposit = parse6decimal('50');\n    console.log("Deposit 50");\n    await vault.connect(user).update(user.address, deposit, 0, 0);\n\n    await updateOracle();\n    await vault.settle(user.address);\n\n    var assets = await vault.totalAssets();\n    console.log("Vault assets: " + assets);\n})\n```\n```\nstart\nDeposit 100\nVault assets: 100000000\nDeposit 10 revert\nRedeem 50\nVault assets: 50000000\nDeposit 100\nVault assets: 150000000\nDeposit 50\nVault assets: 200000000\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `LiquidityMining` contract's `startLiquidityMiningTime` variable is initialized with the current. The `LiquidityMining` contract's `startLiquidityMiningTime` variable is initialized with the current block timestamp when the contract is deployed, and this value remains unchanged throughout the contract's lifetime. Additionally, the `getEndLMTime` function calculates an end time by adding two week...

Vulnerable code:
```\nstartLiquidityMiningTime = block.timestamp;\n```\n```\nfunction getEndLMTime() public view override returns (uint256) {\n    return startLiquidityMiningTime.add(2 weeks);\n}\n```\n```\ncontract A {\n    uint public immutable start;\n    uint public immutable end;\n\n    constructor() {\n        start = block.timestamp;\n        end = block.timestamp + 2 weeks;\n    }\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `Loihi` contract contains several functions that grant the administrator excessive powers, posin. The `Loihi` contract contains several functions that grant the administrator excessive powers, posing a significant risk of exploitation. Specifically, the ability to add assimilators allows the administrator to delegate code execution to various implementations of the same interface. This delegatio...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction safeApprove(address _token, address _spender, uint256 _value) public onlyOwner {\n    (bool success, bytes memory returnData) = _token.call(abi.encodeWithSignature("approve(address,uint256)", _spender, _value));\n\n    require(success, "SafeERC20: low-level call failed");\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `SwEthEthOracle` contract, responsible for providing the price oracle for swETH, contains a vuln. The `SwEthEthOracle` contract, responsible for providing the price oracle for swETH, contains a vulnerability that affects the accuracy of the LST Oracle Calculator's report. The issue arises from the fact that both the `SwEthEthOracle` and `SwethLSTCalculator` contracts rely on the same `swEth.swET...

Vulnerable code:
```\ncontract SwEthEthOracle is SystemComponent, IPriceOracle {\n    /**\n     * @notice Price oracle specifically for swEth (Swell Eth).\n     * @dev getPriceEth is not a view fn to support reentrancy checks. Does not actually change state.\n     */\n```\n```\nFile: RootOracleIntegrationTest.t.sol\n\nswEthOracle = new SwEthEthOracle(systemRegistry, IswETH(SWETH_MAINNET));\n\n//...SNIP...\n\n// Lst special pricing case setup\npriceOracle.registerMapping(WSTETH_MAINNET, IPriceOracle(address(wstEthOracle)));\npriceOracle.registerMapping(SWETH_MAINNET, IPriceOracle(address(swEthOracle)));\n```\n```\n/// @inheritdoc IPriceOracle\nfunction getPriceInEth(address token) external view returns (uint256 price) {\n    // Returns in 1e18 precision.\n    price = swEth.swETHToETHRate();\n}\n```\n```\nfunction calculateEthPerToken() public view override returns (uint256) {\n    return IswETH(lstTokenAddress).swETHToETHRate();\n}\n```\n```\nFile: LSTCalculatorBase.sol\n\nfunction current() external returns (LSTStatsData memory) {\n    IRootPriceOracle pricer = systemRegistry.rootPriceOracle();\n    uint256 price = pricer.getPriceInEth(lstTokenAddress);\n\n    uint256 backing = calculateEthPerToken();\n    // price is always 1e18 and backing is in eth, which is 1e18\n    priceToBacking = price * 1e18 / backing;\n\n    int256 premium = int256(priceToBacking) - 1e18;\n\n    return LSTStatsData({\n        lastSnapshotTimestamp: lastSnapshotTimestamp,\n        baseApr: baseApr,\n        premium: premium,\n        slashingCosts: slashingCosts,\n        slashingTimestamps: slashingTimestamps\n    });\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The vulnerability lies in the `TwoTokenPoolUtils` contract's `_getPoolParams` function, specifically. The vulnerability lies in the `TwoTokenPoolUtils` contract's `_getPoolParams` function, specifically in the handling of the `msgValue` variable. When the secondary token is set to ETH, the function fails to populate the `msgValue` variable, leading to a critical issue.\n\nThe issue arises from the a...

Vulnerable code:
```\nFile: TwoTokenPoolUtils.sol\n\nfunction _getPoolParams(\n    TwoTokenPoolContext memory context,\n    uint256 primaryAmount,\n    uint256 secondaryAmount,\n    bool isJoin\n) internal pure returns (PoolParams memory) {\n    IAsset[] memory assets = new IAsset[](2);\n    assets[context.primaryIndex] = IAsset(context.primaryToken);\n    assets[context.secondaryIndex] = IAsset(context.secondaryToken);\n\n    uint256[] memory amounts = new uint256[](2);\n    amounts[context.primaryIndex] = primaryAmount;\n    amounts[context.secondaryIndex] = secondaryAmount;\n\n    uint256 msgValue;\n    if (isJoin && assets[context.primaryIndex] == IAsset(Deployments.ETH_ADDRESS)) {\n        msgValue = amounts[context.primaryIndex];\n    }\n\n    return PoolParams(assets, amounts, msgValue);\n}\n```\n```\nFile: BalancerUtils.sol\n\n@notice Joins a balancer pool using exact tokens in\nfunction _joinPoolExactTokensIn(\n    PoolContext memory context,\n    PoolParams memory params,\n    uint256 minBPT\n) internal returns (uint256 bptAmount) {\n    bptAmount = IERC20(address(context.pool)).balanceOf(address(this));\n    Deployments.BALANCER_VAULT.joinPool{value: params.msgValue}(\n        context.poolId,\n        address(this),\n        address(this),\n        IBalancerVault.JoinPoolRequest(\n            params.assets,\n            params.amounts,\n            abi.encode(\n                IBalancerVault.JoinKind.EXACT_TOKENS_IN_FOR_BPT_OUT,\n                params.amounts,\n                minBPT,  // Apply minBPT to prevent front running\n            ),\n            false  // Don't use internal balances\n        )\n    );\n    bptAmount = IERC20(address(context.pool)).balanceOf(address(this)) - bptAmount;\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: During the liquidation process, the BigBang protocol fails to update the global `totalBorrow` variab. During the liquidation process, the BigBang protocol fails to update the global `totalBorrow` variable, which is a critical component in calculating user debt repayment and collateral collection. This oversight can lead to incorrect subsequent loan-related calculations, potentially resulting in fina...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction _liquidateUser(\n    address user,\n    uint256 maxBorrowPart,\n    IMarketLiquidatorReceiver _liquidatorReceiver,\n    bytes calldata _liquidatorReceiverData,\n    uint256 _exchangeRate,\n    uint256 minLiquidationBonus\n) private {\n    uint256 callerReward = _getCallerReward(user, _exchangeRate);\n\n    (uint256 borrowAmount,, uint256 collateralShare) = _updateBorrowAndCollateralShare(\n        user,\n        maxBorrowPart,\n        minLiquidationBonus,\n        _exchangeRate\n    );\n\n    totalCollateralShare = totalCollateralShare > collateralShare? totalCollateralShare - collateralShare : 0;\n    uint256 borrowShare = yieldBox.toShare(assetId, borrowAmount, true);\n\n    (uint256 feeShare, uint256 callerShare) = _extractLiquidationFees(borrowShare, borrowShare, callerReward);\n\n    IUsdo(address(asset)).burn(address(this), borrowAmount);\n\n    address[] memory _users = new address[](1);\n    _users[0] = user;\n    emit Liquidated(msg.sender, _users, callerShare, feeShare, borrowAmount, collateralShare);\n}\n\nfunction _updateBorrowAndCollateralShare(\n    address user,\n    uint256 maxBorrowPart,\n    uint256 minLiquidationBonus, // min liquidation bonus to accept (default 0)\n    uint256 _exchangeRate\n) private returns (uint256 borrowAmount, uint256 borrowPart, uint256 collateralShare) {\n    if (_exchangeRate == 0) {\n        revert ExchangeRateNotValid();\n    }\n\n    uint256 collateralPartInAsset = (\n        yieldBox.toAmount(collateralId, userCollateralShare[user], false) * EXCHANGE_RATE_PRECISION\n    ) / _exchangeRate;\n\n    uint256 borrowPartWithBonus = computeClosingFactor(\n        userBorrowPart[user],\n        collateralPartInAsset,\n        FEE_PRECISION_DECIMALS\n    );\n\n    uint256 userTotalBorrowAmount = totalBorrow.toElastic(userBorrowPart[user], true);\n    borrowPartWithBonus = borrowPartWithBonus > userTotalBorrowAmount\n       ? userTotalBorrowAmount\n        : borrowPartWithBonus;\n\n    borrowPartWithBonus = borrowPartWithBonus > maxBorrowPart? maxBorrowPart : borrowPartWithBonus;\n    borrowAmount = borrowPartWithBonus;\n\n    borrowPart = borrowAmount == user\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `swapLiquidity` function in the `LendingPool` contract allows liquidity providers to atomically . The `swapLiquidity` function in the `LendingPool` contract allows liquidity providers to atomically swap their collateral. This function takes a `receiverAddress` argument, which is intended to point to an `ISwapAdapter` implementation trusted by the user. However, an attacker can exploit this funct...

Vulnerable code:
```\nvars.fromReserveAToken.burn(\n    msg.sender,\n    receiverAddress,\n    amountToSwap,\n    fromReserve.liquidityIndex\n);\n\nISwapAdapter(receiverAddress).executeOperation(\n    fromAsset,\n    toAsset,\n    amountToSwap,\n    address(this),\n    params\n);\n\nvars.amountToReceive = IERC20(toAsset).balanceOf(receiverAddress);\nif (vars.amountToReceive!= 0) {\n    IERC20(toAsset).transferFrom(\n        receiverAddress,\n        address(vars.toReserveAToken),\n        vars.amountToReceive\n    );\n\n    if (vars.toReserveAToken.balanceOf(msg.sender) == 0) {\n        _usersConfig[msg.sender].setUsingAsCollateral(toReserve.id, true);\n    }\n\n    vars.toReserveAToken.mint(msg.sender, vars.amountToReceive, toReserve.liquidityIndex);\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `processWithdraw` function in the GMXWithdraw contract is vulnerable to reentrancy attacks due t. The `processWithdraw` function in the GMXWithdraw contract is vulnerable to reentrancy attacks due to its design. Specifically, the function makes an external call to `self.withdrawCache.user.call` before burning the user's shares in the Vault. This allows an attacker to potentially exploit this ree...

Vulnerable code:
```\nif (self.withdrawCache.withdrawParams.token == address(self.WNT)) {\n    self.WNT.withdraw(self.withdrawCache.tokensToUser);\n    (bool success,) = self.withdrawCache.user.call{value: address(this).balance}("");\n    require(success, "Transfer failed.");\n} else {\n    // Transfer requested withdraw asset to user\n    IERC20(self.withdrawCache.withdrawParams.token).safeTransfer(\n        self.withdrawCache.user,\n        self.withdrawCache.tokensToUser\n    );\n}\n\n// Transfer any remaining tokenA/B that was unused (due to slippage) to user as well\nself.tokenA.safeTransfer(self.withdrawCache.user, self.tokenA.balanceOf(address(this)));\nself.tokenB.safeTransfer(self.withdrawCache.user, self.tokenB.balanceOf(address(this)));\n\n// Burn user shares\nself.vault.burn(self.withdrawCache.user, self.withdrawCache.withdrawParams.shareAmt);\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `ValidatorService` contract allows the owner to enable and disable validators. However, a critic. The `ValidatorService` contract allows the owner to enable and disable validators. However, a critical issue arises when a validator is disabled. Although the validator's status is updated to reflect its disabled state, it still retains its delegated funds, which are locked until the end of their de...

Vulnerable code:
```\nfunction enableValidator(uint validatorId) external checkValidatorExists(validatorId) onlyOwner {\n    trustedValidators[validatorId] = true;\n}\n\nfunction disableValidator(uint validatorId) external checkValidatorExists(validatorId) onlyOwner {\n    trustedValidators[validatorId] = false;\n}\n```
MEDIUM severity: The `NiftyswapExchange` smart contract, which implements the ERC 1155 standard, has a vulnerability . The `NiftyswapExchange` smart contract, which implements the ERC 1155 standard, has a vulnerability in its handling of the `onERC1155Received` and `onERC1155BatchReceived` callbacks. Specifically, when the contract receives tokens during liquidity addition, removal, or buying operations, the state o...

Vulnerable code:
```\nif (totalRefundBaseTokens > 0) {\n    baseToken.safeTransferFrom(address(this), _recipient, baseTokenID, totalRefundBaseTokens, "");\n}\n\ntoken.safeBatchTransferFrom(address(this), _recipient, _tokenIds, _tokensBoughtAmounts, "");\n```\n```\nbaseToken.safeTransferFrom(\n    address(this),\n    _provider,\n    baseTokenID,\n    totalBaseTokens,\n    ""\n);\n\ntoken.safeBatchTransferFrom(\n    address(this),\n    _provider,\n    _tokenIds,\n    tokenAmounts,\n    ""\n);\n```\n```\n// Mint liquidity pool tokens\nbatchMint(_provider, _tokenIds, liquiditiesToMint, "");\n\n// Transfer all Base Tokens to this contract\nbaseToken.safeTransferFrom(_provider, address(this), baseTokenID, totalBaseTokens, abi.encode(DEPOSIT_SIG));\n```