Before revision:  It establishes the existence of the solution when controls are of bounded velocity, solves explicitly the game when controls are of finite variation, and presents sensitivity analysis to compare the single-player game with the MFG . Our analysis shows that MFGs, when appropriately formulated, can demonstrate genuine gameeffects even without heterogeneity among players and additional common noise\left({\sqrt N}}\right) .
After revision:  It establishes the existence of the solution when controls are of bounded velocity, solves explicitly the game when controls are of finite variation, and presents sensitivity analysis to compare the solution for the MFG with that for the single-agent control problem. It shows that in the MFG, model parameters not only affect the optimal strategies as in the single-agent case, but also influence the equilibrium price. It then establishes that the solution to the MFG is an \epsilon-Nash Equilibrium to the corresponding N-player game, with \epsilon=O\left({\sqrt N}}\right) .