Before revision:  This setup leads to an approval-based multi-winner election problem, where each nominator submits a list of trusted candidates, and has a vote strength proportional to their stake. A solution consists of a committee of k validators, together with a fractional distribution of each nominator's vote among them. We consider two objectives, both recently studied in the literature of social choice. The first one is ensuring the property of proportional justified representation (PJR).
After revision:  This setup leads to an approval-based committee elections has appeared in the social choice literature for over a century, and is typically understood as avoiding the underrepresentation of minorities. However, we argue that the security of some distributed systems is directly linked to the opposite goal of avoiding the overrepresentation of any minority, a goal which leads us to an optimization objective known as Maximin Support, closely related to the axiom of Proportional Justified Representation (PJR).