Before revision:  There, a small search cost leads to the perfect competition level of information provision--consumers gain when firms are forced to compete on information . Conversely, in the low and medium expected quality cases there are no pure strategy equilibria. Instead, firms mix over a continuum of levels of information : in the low expected quality case they provide full information with probability zero; and in the medium expected quality case they provide full information with positive probability. In both cases there are mixed strategy equilibria in which the firms' realized information structures are Blackwell comparable. Moreover, though recall is permitted, in each case there are equilibria in which the consumer never returns .
After revision:  There, a small search cost leads to the perfect competition level of information provision. If not, this corresponds to information dispersion--firms randomize over signals. If the attraction incentive is absent (due to hidden information or costless search), firms reveal less information and information dispersion does not arise .