Before revision:  One key innovation in our analysis is to reduce the study of optimal information disclosure policies to a constrained price discrimination problem. The information shared by the platform induces a "menu" of equilibrium prices and sellers' expected qualities. Optimization over feasible menus yields a price discrimination problem. The problem is constrained because feasible menus are only those that can arise in the equilibrium of the two sided-market for some information disclosure policy. We analyze this constrained price discrimination problem, and apply our insights to two distinct two-sided market models: one in which the platform chooses prices and  sellers choose quantities (similar to ride-sharing), and one in which  sellers choose prices (similar to e-commerce).
After revision:  One key innovation in our analysis is to reduce the study of optimal information disclosure policies to a constrained price discrimination own revenue. To study this information disclosure problem, we introduce two distinct two-sided market models: one in which the platform chooses prices and sellers choose quantities (similar to ride-sharing), and one in which sellers choose prices (similar to e-commerce).