Before revision:  However, if there is heterogeneity within the population, the evolution of cooperation is dependent on both the interaction structure and the decision making rules implemented by the entities. Here, we perform a detailed analysis on the role of the interaction structures in the evolutionary stability of cooperation in heterogeneous multiplicative environments. We utilize this analysis to examine the applicability of a simple state-based decision making rule in a variety of settings.
After revision:  However, if there is heterogeneity within the population, the evolution of cooperation in fluctuating environments typically assumes a homogeneous, well mixed population, whose constituents choose between two behavioral strategies. In this paper, we generalize these results by developing a systematic study of the cooperation dynamics in fluctuating environments under the consideration of structured, heterogeneous populations with individual entities subjected to general behavioral rules. We find that, in the presence of environmental fluctuations, the cooperation dynamics yields the creation of network components with distinct evolutionary properties. We utilize this result to examine the applicability of a simple state-based decision making rule in a variety of settings.