Before revision:  In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem in a two-sided market: which sellers should the platform allow to participate  and how much of its available information about participant sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers to maximize its own revenue. To study this information disclosure problem , we introduce two distinct two-sided market models: one in which the platform chooses prices and the sellers choose quantities (similar to ride-sharing), and one in which the sellers choose prices (similar to e-commerce).
After revision:  In this paper we study the following information disclosure problem in a two-sided market: which sellers should the platform allow to participate and how much of its available information about participant sellers' quality should the platform share with buyers ? We study this information disclosure problem , we introduce two distinct two-sided market models: one in which the platform chooses prices and the sellers choose quantities (similar to ride-sharing), and one in which the sellers choose prices (similar to e-commerce).