Before revision:  We model this interaction using multi-stage and multi-attribute auctions where a retiree--auctioneer--maximizes herexpected present discounted utility . We estimate the model parameters using rich administrative data from Chile and find that retirees with low savings value firms' risk-ratings the most. The estimates also suggest that almost half the retirees who choose an annuity do not value bequest, and firms are more likely to have low annuitization cost for retirees in the top two savings deciles.
After revision:  We model this interaction using multi-stage and multi-attribute auctions where a retiree--auctioneer--maximizes herexpected present discounted utility annuitization costs compete for savings of risk-averse retirees by offering them personalized pensions. We find that (1) retirees' preferences for firms' risk ratings decrease with their savings, (2) almost half of the retirees who choose an annuity do not value bequest, and firms are more likely to have low annuitization cost for retirees in the top two savings deciles.