Before revision:  First, a representation needs to correlate with the object in reality that it represents. Second, a representation needs to have some causal impact on behavior. Third, a representation should have its causal roleexclusively -- the absence of the representation should block the behavior it enables. Fourth, a representation should have teleological justification that specifies the cases in which it is a misrepresentation. We argue that not taking all four criteria seriously leads to statements that are neither neuroscientifically nor philosophically satisfying. We discuss how neuroscience can move towards a deeper notion of representation .
After revision:  First, a broad range of discourse in philosophy to distinguish three key aspects of representation: correspondence, functional role, and teleology. We argue that each of these aspects are implied by the explanatory role the term plays in neuroscience. However, evidence related to all three aspects is rarely presented or discussed in the course of individual studies that aim to identify representations. Overlooking the significance of all three aspects hinders communication in neuroscience, as it obscures the limitations of experimental paradigms and conceals gaps in our understanding of the phenomena of primary interest. Working from this three-part view, we discuss how to move toward clearer communication about representations in the brain .