Before revision:  With diminishing sensitivity over the magnitude of news , one-shot resolution of uncertainty is strictly suboptimal under commonly used functional forms. Information structures that deliver bad news gradually are never optimal. We identify additional conditions that imply the sender optimally releases good news in small pieces but bad newsin one clump. When the sender lacks commitment power, diminishing sensitivity leads to a credibility problem for good-news messages. Without loss aversion, the babbling equilibrium is essentially unique  .
After revision:  With diminishing sensitivity over the magnitude of news . We show the agent's preference between an information structure that delivers news gradually and another that resolves all uncertainty at once depends on his consumption ranking of different states. One-shot resolution is better than gradual bad news, but it is not optimal among all information structures (under common functional forms). In a dynamic cheap-talk framework where a benevolent sender communicates the state over multiple periods, the babbling equilibrium is essentially unique .