Before revision:  It is shown that this strategic behavior results in a Nash-equilibrium type of agreement among the agents, which implies an inefficient risk sharing. Under quadric utility functionals, we give closed form solutions for this Nash equilibrium and discuss the associated findings. The effect of a similar agents ' strategic behavioris studied in the oligopoly over-the- counter market of finite financial securities, whose equilibrium prices are determined by the equality of demand and supply. The resulting risk sharing inefficiency is even more intense if the agents' participation in the market becomes an endogenous problem.
After revision:  It is shown that each agent should share only a fraction of his true endowment and report that he is exposed to some endowment he does not possess. Furthermore, if all agents follow similar strategic behavior, the market equilibrates at a Nash-type equilibrium which benefits the speculators and results in risk sharing inefficiency is even more intense if the agents' participation in the market becomes an endogenous problem.