Before revision:  My proposed market trades contracts tied to temperature in a double-sided auction  of emissions permits and sequestration contracts . Unlike existing ETSs, the mechanism has a consistent timescale and metric tied to warming, with explicit limits on global temperature in every period into the far future . Every auction finds prices for emissions into the far future. Second, if a jurisdiction does not require firms to manage their emissions, the firms have little incentive to do so. Part 2: A Climate Insidium addresses this. My design incentivizes firms to participate even if their jurisdictions do not join. With sanctions from member jurisdictions and participating firms, the design has bottom-up incentives for joining, and the incentives rise over time under realistic conditions, potentially resulting in a rush to join.
After revision:  My proposed market trades contracts tied to temperature in a double-sided auction of emissions permits and sequestration contracts tied to temperature. This mechanism constrains warming for many (e.g., 150) years into the future and every auction would provide price information for this time range. In addition, this paper proposes a set of market rules and a bottom-up incentives for joining, and the incentives rise over time under realistic conditions, potentially resulting in a rush to join.